1NC Framework

1. The affirmative must propose and advocate a course of action to be taken by the federal government in Washington, D.C.

1. To be ‘resolved’ is to express an opinion regarding some action following the colon.

Words and Phrases 1964 [Permanent Edition //STRONG]

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

2. The United States is the government in Washington, D.C.

DPG 1998 [Dictionary of Government and Politics Ed. P.H. Collin, p. 292//STRONG]

United States of America (USA) [ju:’naitid ‘steits av e’merike] noun independent country, a federation of states (originally thirteen, now fifty in North America; the United States Code = book containing all the permanent laws of the USA, arranged in sections according to subject and revised from time to time COMMENT: the federal government (based in Washington D.C.) is formed of a legislature (the Congress) with two chambers (the Senate and House of Representatives), an executive (the President) and a judiciary (the Supreme Court). Each of the fifty states making up the USA has its own legislature and executive (the Governor) as well as its own legal system and constitution.

3. “Should” expresses the desirability of the action of the verb phrase following it. In this case, you must substantially decrease military or police presence.

### **Cambridge Dictionary, 2000** [Cambridge University Press p.792//STRONG]

Should – v. aux. Used to express that it is necessary, desirable, admirable, or imperative to perform the action of the following verb

1. Violation – they don’t defend the implementation of a policy by the USFG, instead they [whatever]
2. **Vote negative**
3. **Predictability – it is impossible for the negative to prepare for any of the thousands possible performances or starting points that the aff could select. There are an infinite number of discussions that are related to the resolution. Restricting the topic to government policies creates predictable ground for both sides. It is impossible for the negative to respond in a meaningful way to a string of political pronouncements by the aff.**

Unbridled affirmation makes research impossible and destroys dialogue in debate
Hanghoj 08
http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf
Thorkild Hanghøj, Copenhagen, 2008
Since this PhD project began in 2004, the present author has been affiliated with DREAM (Danish Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials), which is located at the Institute of Literature, Media and Cultural Studies at the University of Southern Denmark. Research visits have taken place at the Centre for Learning, Knowledge, and Interactive Technologies (L-KIT), the Institute of Education at the University of Bristol and the institute formerly known as Learning Lab Denmark at the School of Education, University of Aarhus, where I currently work as an assistant professor.

Debate games are often based on pre-designed scenarios that include descriptions of issues to be debated, educational goals, game goals, roles, rules, time frames etc. In this way, debate games differ from textbooks and everyday classroom instruction as debate scenarios allow teachers and students to actively imagine, interact and communicate within a domain-specific game space. However, instead of mystifying debate games as a “magic circle” (Huizinga, 1950), I will try to overcome the epistemological dichotomy between “gaming” and “teaching” that tends to dominate discussions of educational games. In short, educational gaming is a form of teaching. As mentioned, education and games represent two different semiotic domains that both embody the three faces of knowledge: assertions, modes of representation and social forms of organisation (Gee, 2003; Barth, 2002; cf. chapter 2). In order to understand the interplay between these different domains and their interrelated knowledge forms, I will draw attention to a central assumption in Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy. According to Bakhtin, all forms of communication and culture are subject tocentripetal and centrifugal forces (Bakhtin, 1981). A centripetal force is the drive to impose one version of the truth, while a centrifugal force involves a range of possible truths and interpretations. This means that any form of expression involves a duality of centripetal and centrifugal forces: “Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear” (Bakhtin, 1981: 272). If we take teaching as an example, it is always affected by centripetal and centrifugal forces in the on-going negotiation of “truths” between teachers and students. In the words of Bakhtin: “Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction” (Bakhtin, 1984a: 110). Similarly, the dialogical space of debate games also embodiescentrifugal and centripetal forces. Thus, the election scenario of The Power Game involves centripetal elements that are mainly determined by the rules and outcomes of the game, i.e. the election is based on a limited time frame and a fixed voting procedure. Similarly, the open-endedgoals, roles and resources represent centrifugal elements and create virtually endless possibilitiesfor researching, preparing, presenting, debating and evaluating a variety of key political issues. Consequently, the actual process of enacting a game scenario involves a complex negotiation between these centrifugal/centripetal forces that are inextricably linked with the teachers and students’ game activities. In this way, the enactment of The Power Game is a form of teaching that combines different pedagogical practices (i.e. group work, web quests, student presentations) and learning resources (i.e. websites, handouts, spoken language) within the interpretive frame of the election scenario. Obviously, tensions may arise if there is too much divergence between educational goals and game goals. This means that game facilitation requires a balance between focusing too narrowly on the rules or “facts” of a game (centripetal orientation) and a focusing too broadly on the contingent possibilities and interpretations of the game scenario (centrifugal orientation). For Bakhtin, the duality of centripetal/centrifugal forces often manifests itself as a dynamic between “monological” and “dialogical” forms of discourse. Bakhtin illustrates this point with the monological discourse of the Socrates/Plato dialogues in which the teacher never learns anything new from the students, despite Socrates’ ideological claims to the contrary (Bakhtin, 1984a). Thus, discourse becomes monologised when “someone who knows and possesses the truth instructs someone who is ignorantof it and in error”, where “a thought is either affirmed or repudiated” by the authority of the teacher (Bakhtin, 1984a: 81). In contrast to this, dialogical pedagogy fosters inclusive learning environments that are able to expand upon students’ existing knowledge and collaborative construction of “truths” (Dysthe, 1996). At this point, I should clarify that Bakhtin’s term “dialogic” is both a descriptive term (all utterances are per definition dialogic as they address other utterances as parts of a chain of communication) and a normativeterm as dialogue is an ideal to be worked for against the forces of “monologism” (Lillis, 2003: 197-8). In this project, I am mainly interested in describing the dialogical space of debate games. At the same time, I agree with Wegerif that “one of the goals of education, perhaps the most important goal, should be dialogue as an end in itself” (Wegerif, 2006: 61).

1. **Topic-specific education – requiring the aff to defend implementation of a policy is essential to understand the specific resolution. Vague discussion of philosophical issues don’t enable us to truly understand policies.**
2. **Switch-side debate. Forcing teams to defend a topical affirmative ensures students must research and be able to argue for multiple sides of an argument. Presenting the arguments for a position you don’t agree with as forcefully as possible is essential for ethical politics.**

Day 66, Dennis Day, University of Wisconsin-Madison Professor of Speech, 1966, The Central States Speech Journal, February 1966, p. 7

All must recognize and accept personal responsibility to present, when necessary, as forcefully as possible, opinions and arguments with which they may personally disagree. To present persuasively the arguments for a position with which one disagrees is, perhaps, the greatest need and the highest ethical act in democratic debate. It is the greatest need because most minority views, if expressed at all, are not expressed forcefully and persuasively. Bryce, in his perceptive analysis of America and Americans, saw two dangers to democratic government: the danger of not ascertaining accurately the will of the majority and the danger that minorities might not effectively express themselves. In regard to the second danger, which he considered the greater of the two, he suggested: The duty, therefore, of a patriotic statesman in a country where public opinion rules, would seem to be rather to resist and correct than to encourage the dominant sentiment. He will not be content with trying to form and mould and lead it, but he will confront it, lecture it, remind it that it is fallible, rouse it -'out of its self-complacency To present persuasively arguments for a position with which one disagrees is [it is] the highest ethical act in debate because it sets aside personal interests for the benefit of the common good. Essentially, for the person who accepts decision by debate, the ethics of the decision-making process are superior to the ethics of personal conviction on particular subjects for debate. Democracy is a commitment to means, not ends. Democratic society accepts certain ends, i.e., decisions, because they have been arrived at by democratic means. We recognize the moral priority of decision by debate when we agree to be bound by that decision regardless of personal conviction. Such an agreement is morally acceptable because the decision-making process guarantees our moral integrity by guaranteeing the opportunity to debate for a reversal of the decision. Thus, personal conviction can have moral significance in social decision-making only so long as the integrity of debate is maintained. And the integrity of debate is maintained only when there is a full and forceful confrontation of arguments and evidence relevant to decision. When an argument is not presented or is not presented as persuasively as possible, then debate fails. As debate fails decisions become less "wise." As decisions become less wise the process of decision-making is questioned. And finally, if and when debate is set aside for the alternative method of decision-making by authority, the personal convictions of individuals within societv lose their moral significance as determinants of social choice.

1. **The aff’s rebellion against traditional debate creates a sense of righteous authority that devolves into the worst tyranny**

Morson 04, Northwestern Professor, Prof. Morson's work ranges over a variety of areas: literary theory (especially narrative); the history of ideas, both Russian and European; a variety of literary genres (especially satire, utopia, and the novel); and his favorite writers -- Chekhov, Gogol, and, above all, Dostoevsky and Tolstoy. He is especially interested in the relation of literature to philosophy. http://www.flt.uae.ac.ma/elhirech/baktine/0521831059.pdf#page=331

Bakhtin viewed the whole process of “ideological” (in the sense of ideas and values, however unsystematic) development as an endless dialogue. As teachers, we find it difficult to avoid a voice of authority, however much we may think of ours as the rebel’s voice, because our rebelliousness against society at large speaks in the authoritative voice of our subculture.We speak the language and thoughts of academic educators, even when we imagine we are speaking in no jargon at all, and that jargon, inaudible to us, sounds with all the overtones of authority to our students. Weare so prone to think of ourselves as fighting oppression that it takes some work to realize that we ourselves may be felt as oppressive and overbearing, and that our own voice may provoke the same reactions that we feel when we hear an authoritative voice with which we disagree. So it is often helpful to think back on the great authoritative oppressors and reconstruct their self-image: helpful, but often painful. I remember, many years ago, when, as a recent student rebel and activist, I taught a course on “The Theme of the Rebel” and discovered, to my considerable chagrin, that many of the great rebels of history were the very same people as the great oppressors. There is a famous exchange between Erasmus and Luther, who hoped to bring the great Dutch humanist over to the Reformation, but Erasmus kept asking Luther how he could be so certain of so many doctrinal points. We must accept a few things to be Christians at all, Erasmus wrote, but surely beyond that there must be room for us highly fallible beings to disagree. Luther would have none of such tentativeness. He knew, he was sure. The Protestant rebels were, for a while, far more intolerant than their orthodox opponents. **Often enough, the oppressors are the ones who present themselves and really think of themselves as liberators. Certainty that one knows the root cause of evil: isn’t that itself often the root cause?** We know from Tsar Ivan the Terrible’s letters denouncing Prince Kurbsky, a general who escaped to Poland, that Ivan saw himself as someone who had been oppressed by noblemen as a child and pictured himself as the great rebel against traditional authority when he killed masses of people or destroyed whole towns. There is something in the nature of maximal rebellion against authority that produces ever greater intolerance, unless one is very careful. **For the skills of fighting or refuting an oppressive power are not those of openness, self-skepticism, or real dialogue.** In preparing for my course, I remember my dismay at reading Hitler’s Mein Kampf and discovering that his self-consciousness was precisely that of the rebel speaking in the name of oppressed Germans, and that much of his amazing appeal – otherwise so inexplicable – was to the German sense that they were rebelling victims. In our time, the Serbian Communist and nationalist leader Slobodan Milosevic exploited much the same appeal. Bakhtin surely knew that Communist totalitarianism, the Gulag, and the unprecedented censorship were constructed by rebels who had come to power. His favorite writer, Dostoevsky, used to emphasize that the worst oppression comes from those who, with the rebellious psychology of “the insulted and humiliated,” have seized power – unless they have somehow cultivated the value of dialogue, as Lenin surely had not, but which Eva, in the essay by Knoeller about teaching The Autobiography of Malcolm X, surely had. Rebels often make the worst tyrants because their word, the voice they hear in their consciousness, has borrowed something crucial from the authoritative word it opposed, and perhaps exaggerated it: the aura of righteous authority. **If one’s ideological becoming is understood as a struggle in which one has at last achieved the truth, one is likely to want to impose that truth with maximal authority**; and rebels of the next generation mayproceed in much the same way, in an ongoing spiral of intolerance.

1. No offense to their interpretation – they can still read a topical plan text that addresses social justice