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IRAN ADVANTAGE

No countries invade Fettweis

Withdrawal increase cooperation, all countries want stability, No countries will invade a perceived weak Iraq

Fettweis 07 Christopher Fettweis, Ph.D., assistant professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Naval War College, December 2007. [Survival 49.4, On the Consequences of Failure in Iraq, p. 83—98]

The biggest risk of an American withdrawal is intensified civil war in Iraq rather than regional conflagration. Iraq's neighbours will likely not prove eager to fight each other to determine who gets to be the next country to spend itself into penury propping up an unpopular puppet regime next door. As much as the Saudis and Iranians may threaten to intervene on behalf of their co religionists, they have shown no eagerness to replace the counter-insurgency role that American troops play today. If the United States, with its remarkable military and unlimited resources, could not bring about its desired solutions in Iraq, why would any other country think it could do so?17 Common interest, not the presence of the US military, provides the ultimate foundation for stability. All ruling regimes in the Middle East share a common (and understandable) fear of instability. It is the interest of every actor - the Iraqis, their neighbours and the rest of the world - to see a stable, functioning government emerge in Iraq. If the United States were to withdraw, increased regional cooperation to address that common interest is far more likely than outright warfare

Iran prolif and heg due to presence Wehrey 10

Iranian drive for hegemony and proliferation are directly due to US presence

Wehrey Dassa Jessica et al 10 Frederic Wehrey Dalia Dassa Kaye Jessica Watkins Jeffrey Martini Robert A. Guffey Prepared for the United States Air Force The research described in this report was sponsored by the United States Air Force under Contract “THE IRAQ EFFECT The Middle East After the Iraq War” http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND\_MG892.pdf

Indeed, what many view as an Iranian drive for hegemony may in fact be intended as a form of deterrence or a bid for increased stature and “indispensability.” The “new assertiveness” in Iranian external behavior can be characterized as an attempt to consolidate and preserve the strategic gains that were in some sense handed to the Islamic Republic by the U.S. invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. Analysts of Iran suggest largely defensive Iranian ambitions with respect to such key issues as Iraq, where “The overarching priority for Tehran is to prevent Iraq from once more emerging as a military and ideological threat” and where Iran is more interested in stabilizing Iraq to facilitate an American withdrawal than in seeking a preeminent position in the Gulf (Takeyh, 2008, pp. 23, 28). Tehran’s motives for pursuing a nuclear capability for both security (deterrent) and status (reinforcing its regional leadership) reasons are also not new, explaining why Iranian interest in such a capability dates back to the Shah.19 Although there are tactical differences among Iranian domestic factions with respect to the acceptable costs for pursuing a nuclear option, there is broad support for the strategic decision and perceived right of Iran to acquire an indigenous enrichment capability. The Iraq War and the momentous 2009 Iranian presidential election have not fundamentally altered such calculations. This trend likely reflects Iran’s interest in consolidating its regional stature, as well as its interest in bolstering its deterrent capabilities to avoid a military attack from the United States. If Iran’s recent regional activity in part reflects such deterrent and defensive interests, this may open up the possibility of cooperation or rapprochement with Iran for U.S. policymakers, a point the final chapter of this monograph explores further

Iran squo power Freeman 08

Iran is a status quo power, seen after US invasion of kuwait

Amb. Freeman 08 Ambassador Freeman was Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs The following is an edited transcript of the fifty-first in a series of Capitol Hill conferences convened by the Middle East Policy Council. The meeting was held on Friday, January 18, 2008, in the Gold Room of the Rayburn House Office Building with Chas. W. Freeman, Jr., presiding. Symposium: Iran’s Strategic Concerns and U.S. Interests “Iran’s Strategic Concerns and U.S. Interests” http://www.umsl.edu/~naumannj/professional%20geography%20articles/Iran%27s%20Strategic%20Concerns%20and%20U.S.%20Interests.pdf

I'm particularly struck by the observation that Iran has accepted the domestic character of the regimes in its neighbors and is focusing on their external behavior. Normally, that is the mark of evolution towards a status quo power. It has been an unspoken truth that, at various points, the United States has looked to Iran — under the shah, for example — as the regional gendarme and our main partner in maintaining security and order. Also, as I recall very vividly from the Gulf War, when the United States intervened to liberate Kuwait and reduce Iraq to proportions that could be balanced by Iran, Iran showed an even temper and a reasoned approach and did not take advantage of the many opportunities that presented themselves for mischief making at American expense. And so, the current pattern is not necessarily the pattern of the future

W/D ups Arab cooperation to balance Iran

US drawdown in Iraq increases Arab-state cooperation to balance Iran

Wehrey Dassa Jessica et al 10 Frederic Wehrey Dalia Dassa Kaye Jessica Watkins Jeffrey Martini Robert A. Guffey Prepared for the United States Air Force The research described in this report was sponsored by the United States Air Force under Contract “THE IRAQ EFFECT The Middle East After the Iraq War” http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND\_MG892.pdf

Some Israelis also see potential opportunities emerging from a U.S. drawdown from Iraq. For example, an Israeli official suggested that the Saudis could play a more-constructive role in regional security in the context of a U.S. drawdown, including supporting stabilizing steps for Iraq. Because Israel increasingly views itself as tacitly aligned with “moderate” Arab states, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, in a common concern about growing Iranian influence, Israelis view an expanded regional role for U.S. allies in the wake of a U.S. drawdown as potentially beneficial.75 Israelis also view a U.S. drawdown as providing opportunities to enhance dialogue with Syria. For example, some Israeli officials believe that a U.S. withdrawal may help lead Syria away from Iran, at least in the context of a different U.S.–Syrian relationship, because Syria’s concerns over Iranian dominance in Iraq could increase once the Americans leave.76

w/d ups nationalism

US pullout of Iraq would spark nationalism allowing them to unite against Iran to check

Yaphe 08 Judith S. Yaphe Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University Dr. Judith S. Yaphe is a Distinguished Research Fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University “After the Surge: Next Steps in Iraq?” February 2008 http://blog.lrei.org/tmurphy/files/2009/11/after-the-surge.pdf

A young Iraqi who serves as an advisor to the prime minister’s office spoke last fall in Washington, arguing that the United States and Iran were trying to kill Iraqis’ national identity. He blamed the United States for creating a political vacuum in Iraq and faulted Iran for institutionalizing instability as part of its strategy to establish hegemony and spread Shi’ite theocracy throughout the region. The only solution, he said, is the revival of Iraqi nationalism, even if it means temporarily shelving the development of democracy. He described Iraqi nationalism—once seen as the special ideological province of the Ba’th Party—as increasingly popular, especially the Islamic brand of Iraqi nationalism preached by Muqtada al-Sadr. He called on the United States to draw on a broad spectrum of Iraqi political parties—including ex-Ba’thists and Communists—to create a new national resistance movement that could counter Iranian efforts to destabilize Iraq and a national compact to frame government reforms and national reconciliation. He also encouraged the United States to apply the surge strategy that has been successful in Sunni areas of Iraq to predominantly Shi’a southern Iraq

Long Term presence key issue Barzegar 8

US Long Term Presence in Iraq is the *Critical Impediment* to US-Iran Relations

Kayhan Barzegar, Prof. of International Relations @ Islamic Azad University, ‘8 [*Middle East Policy*, Winter, Iran’s Foreign Policy in Post Invasion Iraq, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Barzegar\_Middle\_East\_Policy\_Winter\_2008.pdf]

What are the roots and aims of Iran’s foreign policy in post-invasion Iraq? Many scholars attribute Iran’s policies to a desire to achieve national and regional interests, perceiving this policy to be mainly offensive and ideological.1 I argue instead that the roots and aims of Iran’s foreign **policy are defensiv**e, mainly pragmatic, and based on state-oriented and strategic issues. As to Iran-U.S. relations in the new Iraq, the main controversy involves different perceptions of the security challenges; actions that Washington considers to be necessary for protecting the U.S. interests in post-invasion Iraq **are regarded by** Tehran as undermining Iran’s security and national interests. The new political-security developments in post-invasion Iraq have led Iran to seek a friendly, stable, secure and prosperous neighbor. However, the Bush administration’s regional policy — largely focused on defining Iraq **as a counterweight** to Iran, building regional alliances against Iran, and **establishing long-**term military bases next to Iran’s borders — **has compelled Iran to oppose it.** I argue that historical views and stateoriented and strategic issues all have significant effects on Iran’s foreign policy in post-invasion Iraq. I then explain that the nature of cultural and political-security characteristics of Iran’s sources of power as well as the demands of the factors and principles involved in Iran-Iraq relations will inevitably force Iran to be pragmatic in its policy toward the new Iraq; ideology is only one source of Iran’s power. Lastly, I argue that Iran’s foreign policy is based on achieving strategic aims. It is the result of a combination of considerations aimed at producing both security and opportunities. The birth of a new Iraq demands a revision of the current regional political-security architecture, mainly based on “balance of power.” By shifting Iraq to a friendly state, Iran desires to discard the traditional designation of Iraq as Iran’s counterbalance in the Persian Gulf and to turn the new relations into a “balance of interests.” **The main conflict in Iranian-U.S. relations** in post-invasion Iraq is based on redefining Iraq’s political-security structure. Understanding the roots of Iran’s foreign policy has important implications for the United States and regional countries that are currently concerned about Iran’s role and aims in Iraq.

2AC Iran Overview

1. Iran will talk only if there is a US withdrawal—our military presence causes them to feel insecure and threatens their zone of influence, that’s Kugelman 06

2. Iranian cooperation hinges on the plan, respecting the security agreement is the only way to have US-Iranian dialogue that’s Serwer and Parker 08

3. Engaging Iran allows a cooperative effort ensuring Iraq stability, that’s Bahgat 07

4. Only the plan secures Iranian cooperation, by honoring the SOFA we both demonstrate that we are not a permanent presence in the ME and that we will honor our agreements with Iran Serwer and Parker 08

5. US Long Term Presence in Iraq is the *Critical Impediment* to US-Iran Relations

Kayhan Barzegar, Prof. of International Relations @ Islamic Azad University, ‘8 [*Middle East Policy*, Winter, Iran’s Foreign Policy in Post Invasion Iraq, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Barzegar\_Middle\_East\_Policy\_Winter\_2008.pdf]

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AT Iran ready to talk

1. Iran will talk only if there is a US withdrawal—our military presence causes them to feel insecure and threatens their zone of influence, that’s Kugelman 06

2. Iranian cooperation hinges on the plan, respecting the security agreement is the only way to have US-Iranian dialogue that’s Serwer and Parker 08

Their evidence is awful,

“Iran is ready to talk, 2010”

[ ] They say Iran is ready to talk, but there is no link to the case---it is not specific to US-Iranian dialogue, rather broad talks on nuclear weapons

[ ] This evidence talks about how Iran is postponing talks

[ ] It concedes tensions with western culture, Ahmadinejad both “avoided direct responses” and went into a “flurry of anti-western rhetoric”

[ ] Prefer our specific evidence—the key issue is the fact that WE HAVE TROOPS ON THEIR BORDER

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

[ ] Even if they win Iran is ready to talk, this is only because they perceive the US withdrawal, a failure to do the plan would result in a reversal in Iranian policy

Moubayed 09 Sami Moubayed staff writer for Asia Times Feb 3, 2009 “Ahmadinejad rides the American tide” http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle\_East/KB03Ak04.html

They include American support for a 1953 coup that toppled a democratically elected Iranian government, during the years of president Dwight Eisenhower. They also include American backing for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq wars, under Ronald Reagan, and support for the creation of Israel in 1948, under Harry Truman. He accused the US of preventing Iran from achieving any kind of scientific progress, and injecting the country with “poverty, ignorance, and illiteracy”. For a new page, he noted, American must withdraw from Iraq (which Obama has promised to do) and apologize for all wrongs committed against Tehran since 1979. After all the fire, Ahmadinejad said one useful thing: that he was willing to look forward, no longer back, if there was a “fundamental change” in US foreign policy.

AT we post date—Iran policy

This doesn’t matter, Iran policy hasn’t changed, the ayatollah still hates US presence, and religious objections don’t change year by year

Reuters 07 Thomson Reuters is the world's largest international multimedia news agency, providing investing news, world news, business news, technology news, headline news, small business news, news alerts, personal finance, stock market, and mutual funds information available on Reuters.com, video, mobile, and interactive television platforms. Thomson Reuters journalists are subject to an Editorial Handbook which requires fair presentation and disclosure of relevant interests. “U.S. withdrawal needed for security, Iran tells Iraq” Aug 9, 2007 http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKDAH94046820070809

"Iran fully backs Iraq's popular government... Iraq's biggest problem is the presence of American forces there," Iran's most powerful figure, Supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was quoted as telling Maliki in the holy city of Mashhad by the official IRNA news agency. Khamenei said the Washington wanted to maintain a "puppet government" in Baghdad and called on U.S. forces to withdraw. "The occupying forces should leave Iraq and let the Iraqis decide about their own faith," he said. Baghdad has urged both Iran and the United States to negotiate and not fight out their differences on Iraqi soil.

Iran will take Iraq after withdrawal 2007

1. Empirics flow aff, Iran is a status quo power, after US invasion of Kuwait, opening a door for Iran to assume regional hegemony, it chose not to expand, that’s freeman 08

2. Plan sovles Irans perceived expansion is a direct blowback to our presence, Engaging Iran in dialogue allows a cooperative effort ensuring Iraq stability, that’s Bahgat 07

[ ] This evidence was power tagged—Talks about global middle east effort, Iran is one of the countries included in the “regional friends” to “help the Iraqi nation”

[ ] This evidence quotes “Ahmadinejad warned the west that dialogue and friendship - not threats - were the right way to deal with Iran” Just more reason why our advantage is true

[ ] Evidence doesn’t take into account twitter revolution or nuclear program, these both check a desire to expand, Iran cant control its own populous and it doesn’t need to secure more land now that is has nuclear missiles

[ ] US pullout of Iraq would spark nationalism allowing them to unite against Iran to check

Yaphe 08 Judith S. Yaphe Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University Dr. Judith S. Yaphe is a Distinguished Research Fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University “After the Surge: Next Steps in Iraq?” February 2008 http://blog.lrei.org/tmurphy/files/2009/11/after-the-surge.pdf

A young Iraqi who serves as an advisor to the prime minister’s office spoke last fall in Washington, arguing that the United States and Iran were trying to kill Iraqis’ national identity. He blamed the United States for creating a political vacuum in Iraq and faulted Iran for institutionalizing instability as part of its strategy to establish hegemony and spread Shi’ite theocracy throughout the region. The only solution, he said, is the revival of Iraqi nationalism, even if it means temporarily shelving the development of democracy. He described Iraqi nationalism—once seen as the special ideological province of the Ba’th Party—as increasingly popular, especially the Islamic brand of Iraqi nationalism preached by Muqtada al-Sadr. He called on the United States to draw on a broad spectrum of Iraqi political parties—including ex-Ba’thists and Communists—to create a new national resistance movement that could counter Iranian efforts to destabilize Iraq and a national compact to frame government reforms and national reconciliation. He also encouraged the United States to apply the surge strategy that has been successful in Sunni areas of Iraq to predominantly Shi’a southern Iraq

[ ] US drawdown in Iraq increases Arab-state cooperation to balance Iran

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Some Israelis also see potential opportunities emerging from a U.S. drawdown from Iraq. For example, an Israeli official suggested that the Saudis could play a more-constructive role in regional security in the context of a U.S. drawdown, including supporting stabilizing steps for Iraq. Because Israel increasingly views itself as tacitly aligned with “moderate” Arab states, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, in a common concern about growing Iranian influence, Israelis view an expanded regional role for U.S. allies in the wake of a U.S. drawdown as potentially beneficial.75 Israelis also view a U.S. drawdown as providing opportunities to enhance dialogue with Syria. For example, some Israeli officials believe that a U.S. withdrawal may help lead Syria away from Iran, at least in the context of a different U.S.–Syrian relationship, because Syria’s concerns over Iranian dominance in Iraq could increase once the Americans leave.76

AT “US withdrawal leads to Iran filling void Taheri 09”

1. Iran is a squo power, they wont fill any power vaccum, proven after US invasion of Kuwait, that’s Freeman 08

Their evidence is awful,

[ ] Iran wants Iraq stability and the US out of the Middle East, that’s Serwer and Parker 08, they know empirically that they cant get away with invading Iraq, with the US in Afghanistan, it will go against rationality

[ ] non-unique--This evidence talks about the perception of withdrawal, should have been triggered by 2011 security agreement

[ ] c/a other countries will fill the power vaccum—they want to balance against Iran

[ ] Sanctions check—Iran cannot sustain expansion, it will be tied down economically

[ ] This evidence is specific to soft balancing---because they are not militarily increasing their presence, means this evidence is only observing bandwagoning Iran’s economic power

AT Iran will take over--freeman

Iran is a status quo power, seen after US invasion of kuwait

Amb. Freeman 08 Ambassador Freeman was Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs The following is an edited transcript of the fifty-first in a series of Capitol Hill conferences convened by the Middle East Policy Council. The meeting was held on Friday, January 18, 2008, in the Gold Room of the Rayburn House Office Building with Chas. W. Freeman, Jr., presiding. Symposium: Iran’s Strategic Concerns and U.S. Interests “Iran’s Strategic Concerns and U.S. Interests” http://www.umsl.edu/~naumannj/professional%20geography%20articles/Iran%27s%20Strategic%20Concerns%20and%20U.S.%20Interests.pdf

I'm particularly struck by the observation that Iran has accepted the domestic character of the regimes in its neighbors and is focusing on their external behavior. Normally, that is the mark of evolution towards a status quo power. It has been an unspoken truth that, at various points, the United States has looked to Iran — under the shah, for example — as the regional gendarme and our main partner in maintaining security and order. Also, as I recall very vividly from the Gulf War, when the United States intervened to liberate Kuwait and reduce Iraq to proportions that could be balanced by Iran, Iran showed an even temper and a reasoned approach and did not take advantage of the many opportunities that presented themselves for mischief making at American expense. And so, the current pattern is not necessarily the pattern of the future

AT Freeman indict

“This would mean that Iran would never attack”

[ ] No link--None of our impacts are based off of Iranian aggression, they are based off of other ME eastern countries response to Iranian actions like developing nuclear missiles

AT “Allowing Iran to take over as regional hegemon LT prolif and war Cook 09”

1. Empirics flow aff—Kuwait invasion disproves any expansionist Iranian action, that’s freeman 08

[ ] Plan solves, diplomacy solves for nuclear proliferation, that’s Lugar 06

Even if that is true, the plan is the only way to solve Iran’s quest for regional hegemony and nuclear missiles are all a reaction to US presence in Iraq

Wehrey Dassa Jessica et al 10 Frederic Wehrey Dalia Dassa Kaye Jessica Watkins Jeffrey Martini Robert A. Guffey Prepared for the United States Air Force The research described in this report was sponsored by the United States Air Force under Contract “THE IRAQ EFFECT The Middle East After the Iraq War” http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND\_MG892.pdf

Indeed, what many view as an Iranian drive for hegemony may in fact be intended as a form of deterrence or a bid for increased stature and “indispensability.” The “new assertiveness” in Iranian external behavior can be characterized as an attempt to consolidate and preserve the strategic gains that were in some sense handed to the Islamic Republic by the U.S. invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. Analysts of Iran suggest largely defensive Iranian ambitions with respect to such key issues as Iraq, where “The overarching priority for Tehran is to prevent Iraq from once more emerging as a military and ideological threat” and where Iran is more interested in stabilizing Iraq to facilitate an American withdrawal than in seeking a preeminent position in the Gulf (Takeyh, 2008, pp. 23, 28). Tehran’s motives for pursuing a nuclear capability for both security (deterrent) and status (reinforcing its regional leadership) reasons are also not new, explaining why Iranian interest in such a capability dates back to the Shah.19 Although there are tactical differences among Iranian domestic factions with respect to the acceptable costs for pursuing a nuclear option, there is broad support for the strategic decision and perceived right of Iran to acquire an indigenous enrichment capability. The Iraq War and the momentous 2009 Iranian presidential election have not fundamentally altered such calculations. This trend likely reflects Iran’s interest in consolidating its regional stature, as well as its interest in bolstering its deterrent capabilities to avoid a military attack from the United States. If Iran’s recent regional activity in part reflects such deterrent and defensive interests, this may open up the possibility of cooperation or rapprochement with Iran for U.S. policymakers, a point the final chapter of this monograph explores further

AT “US withdrawal will lead to dire consequences for Iraq Ayhan, Jun 11, 2010”

1. Disregard this evidence, Dinar Daddy, the blogger of the website has a disclaimer

Daddy No date (No quals http://www.theiraqidinar.com/)

Disclaimer None of the information I share on this site is my own unless I create a post where I share my own opinion or personal experience. I simply try to collect the best rumors and information I feel applies to a given day’s news and information that I hear or read on the internet about the “New Iraqi Dinar”. Those I do speak with, I trust. So, any personal phone calls that I share on the blog, I have reason to believe they are sincere in their intent, and I believe they are in some way connected to those who do know what is going on. As for myself, I am connected to no “source”, just to those who tell me they are. I will never reveal a “contact” of mine, or their “source” for the purpose of giving more grounds or proof of their claims. Just take everything as a rumor and allow it to reveal itself over time. I have no hidden agenda for posting what I deem to be worthy reading. I’m just trying to make this difficult ride easier to follow for my family, friends, acquaintances, and anyone they deem to share this site with. I wish you all the very best! I hope this ride will end soon. It has definitely taken its toll… Dinar Daddy

[ ] Their evidence concludes that the UN could check any instability

[ ] Their evidence concludes Iran would never take over because countries like Turkey would flip out at another Shiite state in the region

[ ] Their evidence concedes that US presence caused instability, means the impact is non-u

[ ] c/a Yaphe 08 and Wehrey Dassa Jessica et al 10 No impact to a US withdrawal

Withdrawal increase cooperation, all countries want stability, No countries will invade a perceived weak Iraq

Fettweis 07 Christopher Fettweis, Ph.D., assistant professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Naval War College, December 2007. [Survival 49.4, On the Consequences of Failure in Iraq, p. 83—98]

The biggest risk of an American withdrawal is intensified civil war in Iraq rather than regional conflagration. Iraq's neighbours will likely not prove eager to fight each other to determine who gets to be the next country to spend itself into penury propping up an unpopular puppet regime next door. As much as the Saudis and Iranians may threaten to intervene on behalf of their co religionists, they have shown no eagerness to replace the counter-insurgency role that American troops play today. If the United States, with its remarkable military and unlimited resources, could not bring about its desired solutions in Iraq, why would any other country think it could do so?17 Common interest, not the presence of the US military, provides the ultimate foundation for stability. All ruling regimes in the Middle East share a common (and understandable) fear of instability. It is the interest of every actor - the Iraqis, their neighbours and the rest of the world - to see a stable, functioning government emerge in Iraq. If the United States were to withdraw, increased regional cooperation to address that common interest is far more likely than outright warfare

AT US will negotiate with Iran

Don’t really need to answer this because we are advocating that the problem with dialogue is Iran, and that is because of US presence in Iraq

AT Iran insists its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes

Lets think about the logic behind this claim, there are 3 countries in the “axis of evil” Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. Iraq got razed by the US in a week on Iran’s border. North Korea was going to get toppled by the US, but then they got nuclear missiles, and then the US started meeting North Korea’s demands. Hmmmm I wonder what Iran thought would be a good idea, and it wasn’t to invest in nuclear energy, especially when you have freaking oil under you country

But I guess it could be for peaceful purposes, the UN report… oh that’s right, Iran refused to let UN officials inspect their nuclear program

AT War wont escalate

[ ] They clearly misunderstand our advantage, our impacts are based off of a US miscalculation with Iran, this is so they don’t misinterpret actions as hostile and retaliate, that lugar 06

Prefer it, this is from a US senator and takes out their defense because even if Iran is scared of a US strikeback, if they feel we are invading them, and they have a nuclear missile, they would rationally launch it

Iran is trying to get influence in Iraq by killing opponents

Don’t take this evidence into consideration, it is from The National Council of Resistance of Iran, claiming, but with no evidence, that the killing of this lawmaker was orchestrated by Tehran

Even if you buy this, there is no real argument here

IRAQ STABILITY ADVANTAGE

Iraq Stability Overview

1. Violence in Iraq is because of lack of understanding their culture, our lack of planning, and the way our forces acted by their own excess that Dodge 09

2. If we pull out, this creates the key space that will allow the competent non-sectarian Iraqi’s to rebuild Iraq that’s Ad Ali 07

3. Engaging Iran is critical to ensure Iraq stability, it allows a cooperative effort, that’s Bahgat 07

4. Recent election coupled due to US perceived control caused violence between two major factions that’s Pitt 10

5. We have to leave now, failing to would empower al Qaeda to the point where they would be able to bleed the US dry in Iraq, that’s Jarrar and Leaver 10

AT “Premature withdrawal destroys Iraq stability”

1. We have to leave now, failing to would empower al Qaeda to the point where they would be able to bleed the US dry in Iraq, that’s Jarrar and Leaver 10

2. If we pull out, this creates the key space that will allow the competent non-sectarian Iraqi’s to rebuild Iraq that’s Ad Ali 07

3. Violence in Iraq is because of lack of understanding their culture, our lack of planning, and the way our forces acted by their own excess that Dodge 09

4. Withdrawal ensures a peaceful political process because natives will take responsibility to protect Iraq

(Lawrence J. Korb, Senior Fellow at Center for American Progress, 2/27/09, Center For American Progress, “The Promised Withdrawal From Iraq”, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/02/promised\_withdrawal.html)

President Obama today made a critical change in our nation’s foreign policy in Iraq, reaffirming his full commitment to the Status of Forces Agreement negotiated by the Bush administration late last year. Obama’s announced he will remove all U.S. combat troops from Iraq by August 31, 2010 and honor the 2011 SOFA deadline for a complete withdrawal of all U.S. forces. This shows he remains committed to the promise he made to the American people during his campaign—that he would finally act to end this needless, mindless, senseless war. During his campaign, Obama promised to remove U.S. combat troops within 16 months, leaving behind a residual force with limited responsibilities. His announcement today largely fulfills these pledges. While the 19-month deadline is an extension of his earlier estimate, it still offers a strong commitment to remove U.S. forces from the country. His plan will benefit both the United States and Iraq, moving both nations toward a new era of responsible engagement in the Middle East. By setting a deadline for withdrawing combat forces, Obama has sent an unmistakable message that the United States fully supports a sovereign Iraq and is serious about upholding the principles set out in the SOFA. That agreement promised that U.S. troops would leave Iraqi cities by June 30, 2009, and vacate the country by the end of 2011. Obama’s plan would see all combat troops out of Iraq well before this deadline, leaving only a residual transition force in place until the agreement runs out. By strengthening our commitment to leave, and setting an earlier deadline for the end of combat operations, Obama has also taken an essential step in building trust with the Iraqi government and people. Even after the signing of the SOFA, some Iraqis publicly doubted whether the United States would leave the country. Obama’s announcement today is a definitive sign that he does not intend to keep forces in Iraq indefinitely, and will work toward fully turning over our responsibilities to the Iraqi government and security forces. This plan will also create momentum for Iraqi political progress. The set deadline will put Iraqi leaders and sectarian actors on notice that they must pursue meaningful reconciliation. Last month’s provincial elections were carried out without major incident, yet signals from members of the Sunni Awakening—the tribal groups whose support and manpower were a key cause of the drop in violence over the last few years—that they might resort to violence if they determined that election fraud had taken place, indicate that Iraqis still have work to do in this area. Obama’s announcement means that the Iraqis must take on the burden of ensuring the continuation of a peaceful political process. Obama’s announcement is the start of a meaningful shift in the American role in Iraq. The president was careful to note that a U.S. military withdrawal will enable a more comprehensive U.S. engagement in the region. As combat troops leave, we will increasingly transfer to a tripartite support mission: pursuing the remnants of Al Qaeda in Iraq, train the Iraqi security forces to carry out missions, and protecting American personnel who remain in the country. This modified mission, along with the redeployment of combat troops, will reduce the stress on our already overburdened servicemen and women, paving the way for a full withdrawal at the end of 2011. The clock is already ticking—the end of August 2010 is just 18 months away. The majority of Americans (69 percent in a recent CNN/Opinion Research Corporation poll) support removing most American forces from Iraq. Fortunately, this country, and our service men and women overseas, finally have a president who is committed to the same ends.

AT, our ev postdates your Iraq withdrawal stabilizes claim

1. Here is some evidence that post dates yours Current Withdrawal table stabilizing Iraq, we post date on this

General Ray Odierno 6/4 (Commander of American forces in Iraq, Department of Defense press briefing, http://www.usf-iraq.com/news/press-briefings/pentagon-dod-news-briefing-with-gen-ray-odierno-june-4)

In terms of security, actually security continues to move forward at a very good pace. I judge security on a couple of things: the feel that I get as I go around, but also on the statistics that we look at. I look at number of incidents; casualties -- civilian, Iraqi security forces, U.S. I look at high-profile attacks. All of those statistics for the first five months of 2010 are the lowest we've had on record. Although there has been some violence, there have been some bad days in Iraq, every statistic continues to go in the right direction. That's especially important to us now as the Iraqi security forces have continued to take more and more responsibility and are in fact in the lead now across the country, in Iraq, for security. And they have been now for the last couple months. In addition to that, over the last 90 days or so, we've either picked up or killed 34 out of the top 42 al Qaeda in Iraq leaders. They're clearly now attempting to reorganize themselves. They're struggling a little bit. They've broken -- they've lost connection with AQSL [al Qaeda Senior Leadership] in Pakistan and Afghanistan. They will attempt to regenerate themselves. They're finding it more difficult. And these operations -- going after the top al Qaeda in Iraq leaders has been a truly partnered effort between the Iraqi security forces and U.S. forces as we move forward. They've continued to develop their ability to collect intelligence and then action that intelligence. And they're getting better at that every day. The most -- the other important point I'd like to talk about, that I've been very impressed with, has been the Iraqi military leaders. During this time of vulnerability, as we are getting ready to seat the government, the Iraqi security forces have performed extremely well. The leaders have stayed neutral. They have shown their professionalism in enforcing the constitution, not showing favoritism toward certain parties. They’ve continued to execute their operations across the country, from Mosul to Basra, from Diyala province out to the Syrian border. And I think it has proven a lot to us that they are getting more and more ready to take over full control of security. Today, in Iraq, we're at 88,000 boots on the ground. We are on track to be at 50,000 by the first of September. We are on our plan

AT Ad Ali indict

1. Our Ad Ali evidence is amazing, the march elections don’t matter with Iraq stability, if anything this flows aff, they are an example of a huge voter turn out, a controversial election, just like the 2000 US election, and then a Supreme court ruling on a decision, this if anything is more a reason why Iraq can govern itself

AT constitutional article 140

1. Non-Unique, this is a DA to the squo, withdrawal has no effect, the violence that is being talked about has no solution, since 2007

2. No link, no reason why the US would adopt article 140 anyway, doesn’t say “US” or “withdrawal” this card is irrelevant

3. Ev concedes that the UN is finding a solution, external to US

4. There is no impact to this argument, it says there will be conflict over this small city, there are hundreds of these scenarios all over Iraq because of US presence, we need to pull out, that’s Gard in 05

AT Corsi indict

1. Corsi has a PHD in political science from Harvard, the terminal evidence is warranted, talks about the spillover effect of a war in Iraq, and the implications on Israel and China. Their indict has no cards and attacks Corsi’s ability to challenge mainstream thought as if it were bad

AT Iraq is stable now

1. Recent election coupled due to US perceived control caused violence between two major factions that’s Pitt 10

2. Status quo violence is up because of US presence

**Gard and Johns 05** Lieutenant General Robert G. Gard, Jr., former President of the National Defense University, and Brigadier General John Johns, former assistant secretary for defense, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation Nov ‘5, “There are risks if the U.S. withdraws its troops from Iraq. Are there greater risks in keeping them there?” http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2005/11/00\_gard-johns\_there-are-risks-if-the-us-withdraws.htm

Charge #1: There could be a civil war. Only the presence of U.S. forces is keeping some stability in Iraq and precluding a religious war and increased civilian casualties. Response: There already is a civil war, even if the Administration doesn't use that term. It is beside the point that one side doesn't wear uniforms, a common occurrence in today’s warfare. With conservative estimates of 12,000 - 25,000 civilian deaths and many more thousands wounded since the fall of Baghdad, the high level of civil violence is indisputable. While U.S. troops do provide security in certain locations like the Green Zone, the reality is that daily life in Baghdad is still miserable, journalists can’t leave their hotels, congressional visitors can’t drive from the airport into Baghdad, and suicide bombers continue to kill on a daily basis. The presence of U.S. forces, the collateral damage they cause and the casualties they inflict on Iraqi civilians are major incentives for the recruitment of insurgents. The visible presence of our troops may actually be more of a cause of civil conflict than a solution to it.

AT “need an external power”

1. We are the problem--Violence in Iraq is because of lack of understanding their culture, our lack of planning, and the way our forces acted by their own excess that Dodge 09

2. Iran could the external power--Engaging Iran is critical to ensure Iraq stability, it allows a cooperative effort, that’s Bahgat 07

3. Recent election coupled due to US perceived control caused violence between two major factions that’s Pitt 10

4. US troops are the cause of instability, don’t buy their hacks who have been saying Iraq needs the US before 2003 so we could protect our oil reserves, our evidence is from people on the ground, and from Iraq who say US troops and their cultural insensitivity fuels anti-Americanism and instability

5. US pullout of Iraq would spark nationalism uniting the region, our evidence is predictive

Yaphe 08 Judith S. Yaphe Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University Dr. Judith S. Yaphe is a Distinguished Research Fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University “After the Surge: Next Steps in Iraq?” February 2008 http://blog.lrei.org/tmurphy/files/2009/11/after-the-surge.pdf

A young Iraqi who serves as an advisor to the prime minister’s office spoke last fall in Washington, arguing that the United States and Iran were trying to kill Iraqis’ national identity. He blamed the United States for creating a political vacuum in Iraq and faulted Iran for institutionalizing instability as part of its strategy to establish hegemony and spread Shi’ite theocracy throughout the region. The only solution, he said, is the revival of Iraqi nationalism, even if it means temporarily shelving the development of democracy. He described Iraqi nationalism—once seen as the special ideological province of the Ba’th Party—as increasingly popular, especially the Islamic brand of Iraqi nationalism preached by Muqtada al-Sadr. He called on the United States to draw on a broad spectrum of Iraqi political parties—including ex-Ba’thists and Communists—to create a new national resistance movement that could counter Iranian efforts to destabilize Iraq and a national compact to frame government reforms and national reconciliation. He also encouraged the United States to apply the surge strategy that has been successful in Sunni areas of Iraq to predominantly Shi’a southern Iraq

6. Prefer it, empirics flow aff, their have always been ethnic divides in the middle east which cause perpetual violence, but as seen in Russia’s invasion, the Northern alliance comprised of Tajiks, Hazara, Uzbeks, and Turkmen, which are both Shia and Shiite united against a common enemy

AT Iraq will be destabilized, weak gov’t religious oil dependence

1. Iraq will stabilize if we depart, weak government and oil dependence don’t matter, there will be political realignment that’s Ad Ali 07

2. Ev concludes the majority of Iraqi’s want the US out, this means even if our withdrawal destabilizes Iraq, our presence will cause destabilization because of them trying to get us to leave

3. This oil dependence argument does not make sense, Iraq has the most valuable resource on the planet, it will be able to have a steady economy built around oil.

AT CMR withdrawal shit

1. Plan solves, this evidence is talking about military distrust with government, that is because it is a puppet government of the US, that Ad Ali 07, Everyone distrusts the government

2. No coup, Iraq is as democratic as we are, in their greatest test for the March election, a controversial decision, was reviewed by the supreme court, uphold, and then everything was fine

OVERSTRETCH ADVANTAGE

AT We have huge deficit now/not key

1. Iraq is overstretching the army, General Riggs said that in 39 years, it has never been this bad, Iraq is causing our officers to resign causing the quality of our troops to drop as well, that Gard and John 05

2. Plan is most key, Iraq spending is unsustainable, costing 6 billion per week hurting our power that’s Feingold 06

AT We aren’t key to global econ

1. US is key to global economy, we are linked throughout the world, Open Door economics established after WW2 caused the US to economically monopolize the globe, we control waterways, facilitate international trade, and it was our recession that caused the global recession

2. No link-their evidence is talking about the global economy of 2050

3. US key to the economy

Mandelbaum 5 (Michael Mandelbaum, Professor and Director of the American Foreign Policy Program at Johns Hopkins, The Case for Goliath: How America Acts As the World’s Government in the Twenty-First Century, p. 192-195)

Although the spread of nuclear weapons, with the corresponding increase in the likelihood that a nuclear shot would be fired in anger somewhere in the world, counted as the most serious potential consequence of the abandonment by the United States of its role as the world's government, it was not the only one. In the previous period of American international reticence, the 1920s and 1930s, the global economy suffered serious damage that a more active American role might have mitigated. A twenty-first-century American retreat could have similarly adverse international economic consequences. The economic collapse of the 1930s caused extensive hardship throughout the world and led indirectly to World War II by paving the way for the people who started it to gain power in Germany and Japan. In retrospect, the Great Depression is widely believed to have been caused by a series of errors in public policy that made an economic downturn far worse than it would have been had governments responded to it in appropriate fashion. Since the 1930s, acting on the lessons drawn from that experience by professional economists, governments have taken steps that have helped to prevent a recurrence of the disasters of that decade.' In the face of reduced demand, for example, governments have increased rather than cut spending. Fiscal and monetary crises have evoked rescue efforts rather than a studied indifference based on the assumption that market forces will readily reestablish a desirable economic equilibrium. In contrast to the widespread practice of the 1930s, political authorities now understand that putting up barriers to imports in an attempt to revive domestic production will in fact worsen economic conditions everywhere. Still, a serious, prolonged failure of the international economy, inflicting the kind of hardship the world experienced in the 1930s (which some Asian countries also suffered as a result of their fiscal crises in the 1990s) does not lie beyond the realm of possibility. Market economies remain subject to cyclical downturns, which public policy can limit but has not found a way to eliminate entirely. Markets also have an inherent tendency to form bubbles, excessive values for particular assets, whether seventeenth century Dutch tulips or twentieth century Japanese real estate and Thai currency, that cause economic harm when the bubble bursts and prices plunge. In responding to these events, governments can make errors. They can act too slowly, or fail to implement the proper policies, or implement improper ones. Moreover, the global economy and the national economies that comprise it, like a living organism, change constantly and sometimes rapidly: Capital flows across sovereign borders, for instance, far more rapidly and in much greater volume in the early twenty-first century than ever before. This means that measures that successfully address economic malfunctions at one time may have less effect at another, just as medical science must cope with the appearance of new strains of influenza against which existing vaccines are not effective. Most importantly, since the Great Depression, an active American international economic role has been crucial both in fortifying the conditions for global economic well-being and in coping with the problems that have occurred, especially periodic recessions and currency crises, by applying the lessons of the past. The absence of such a role could weaken those conditions and aggravate those problems. The overall American role in the world since World War II therefore has something in common with the theme of the Frank Capra film It's a Wonderful Life, in which the angel Clarence, played by Henry Travers, shows James Stewart, playing the bank clerk George Bailey, who believes his existence to have been worthless, how life in his small town of Bedford Falls would have unfolded had he never been born. George Bailey learns that people he knows and loves turn out to be far worse off without him. So it is with the United States and its role as the world's government. Without that role, the world very likely would have been in the past, and would become in the future, a less secure and less prosperous place. The abdication by the United States of some or all of the responsibilities for international security that it had come to bear in the first decade of the twenty-first century would deprive the international system of one of its principal safety features, which keeps countries from smashing into each other, as they are historically prone to do. In this sense, a world without America would be the equivalent of a freeway full of cars without brakes. Similarly, should the American government abandon some or all of the ways in which it had, at the dawn of the new century, come to support global economic activity, the world economy would function less effectivel y and might even suffer a severe and costly breakdown. A world without the United States would in this way resemble a fleet of cars without gasoline.

AT No timeframe for econ collapse

1. Their indict of Fakiolas is wrong, he says that when overstretch is coupled with overcommitments, that INEVITABLY results in economic collapse, therefore EVERY SECOND we remain tied down in Iraq, we get weaker to the point where we cant stabilize the world

Overstretch key to hard power for Middle East

1. Our evidence post dates, their authors soon changed their mind when they saw the drain Iraq had on our global economy, after the economic crisis

2. Overstretch kills hard power, prefer General Riggs to their hack, we cant meet our recruiting goals because of how many troops are tied down in Iraq, this is causing a negative feedback loop as we institute programs like stoploss, destroying retention, killing hard power, that’s Gard and Johns 5

3.Turn-overstretch breeds anti-Americanism and terrorism, our evidence assumes all barriers

Pape 2009 [Robert A., Prof. Poli. Sci. @ UChicago, "Empire Falls," in National Interest, January 22, http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=20484 | VP]

Today, the cold-war framework of significant troop deployments to Europe, Asia and the Persian Gulf is coming unglued. We cannot afford to keep our previous promises. With American forces bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan and mounting troubles in Iran and Pakistan, the United States has all but gutted its military commitments to Europe, reducing our troop levels far below the one hundred thousand of the 1990s. Nearly half have been shifted to Iraq and elsewhere. Little wonder that Russia found an opportunity to demonstrate the hollowness of the Bush administration’s plan for expanding NATO to Russia’s borders by scoring a quick and decisive military victory over Georgia that America was helpless to prevent. If a large-scale conventional war between China and Taiwan broke out in the near future, one must wonder whether America would significantly shift air and naval power away from its ongoing wars in the Middle East in order to live up to its global commitments. If the United States could not readily manage wars in Iraq and Afghanistan at the same time, could it really wage a protracted struggle in Asia as well? And as the gap between America’s productive resources and global commitments grows, why will others pass up opportunities to take advantage of America’s overstretched grand strategy?

Since the end of the cold war, American leaders have consistently claimed the ability to maintain a significant forward-leaning military presence in the three major regions of the globe and, if necessary, to wage two major regional wars at the same time. The harsh reality is that the United States no longer has the economic capacity for such an ambitious grand strategy. With 30 percent of the world’s product, the United States could imagine maintaining this hope. Nearing 20 percent, it cannot.

Overstretch key to global community

1. Soft power is a better internal, unilateral occupation has proven to maybe get our presence out in the world, but it hurts our image. A passive US involved in multilateral coalitions is a superior internal

2. [cross apply] Turn-overstretch breeds anti-Americanism and terrorism, our evidence assumes all barriers

Pape 2009 [Robert A., Prof. Poli. Sci. @ UChicago, "Empire Falls," in National Interest, January 22, http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=20484 | VP]

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AT overstretch is key to protect the weaker states

1. Turn, overstretch means we cant protect anyone, when are military is overstretch it kills our hard power because of programs like stoploss that causes a recruitment and retention crisis that’s gards and johns 5

2. Soft power solves, means other states and global coalitions will be able to protect weaker states

AT Solvency Take-outs

1. No redeployment, 2 bills have been rejected in senate

The Associated Press 06 Senate rejects Iraq redeployment motions 6/22/2006 7:25:52 PM ET <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/13477664/>

"Redeploying United States troops is necessary," said Kerry, D-Mass. Most senators didn't agree, and the proposal fell on a 86-13 vote. Minutes later, the Senate defeated by 60-39 a resolution to urge the administration to begin "a phased redeployment of U.S. forces" sometime this year. The resolution would not have set a deadline for the end of the U.S. presence in Iraq.

2. Iraq is a first step, it is better for overstretch, only a risk they are redeployed

3. Obama will want to appease his party and follow his campaign promise to withdraw all troops from Iraq and bring them home

4. This card is awful, the word “redeploy” isn’t even in it. It talks about how there are a lot of troops in Afghanistan and that number will increase and number in Iraq will decrease. NO CAUSAL LINK BETWEEN TROOPS TAKEN OUT OF IRAQ AND THOSE EXACT TROOPS GO TO AFGHANISTAN

SOFT POWER ADVANTAGE

Soft power overview

1. Iraq tanked our credibility, we need to get out now, to send a signal that we aren’t a evil adventurous hegemon that’s Hinnebusch 07

2. Polls prove in Iraq Turkey Pakistan and Jordan that 80% of the people hate us and want us out of Iraq, it is the stepping stone to regaining international legitimacy that’s Gard and Johns 5

3. All their authors are wrong, they are the same analyists that predicted instability and war with a withdrawal from Vietnam, they couldn’t have been more wrong, that’s Fetweis 07

“Withdrawal in an insecure Iraq will down cred”

1. Plan stabilizes Iraq, sparks nationalism causing local citizens to more actively engage in democracy, that’s Yaphe 08

2. Plan politically re-alligns the government, and takes out the cause of instability, US troops that’s Ad Ali 07

3. Turn-failing to honor the SOFA will hurt credibility far more because it demonstrates how the US feels it is exempt from agreements that Serwer and Parker 08

4. They misunderstand our advantage, soft power isn’t dropping because the US is seen as not being able to stabilize Iraq, its dropping because we are perpetuating this image of America as this evil imperial colonialist, that is what is hurting America’s soft power, that’s Hinnebusch 07

5. Withdrawal key to increase US global credibility—Pew poll proves

Lieutenant General Robert G. Gard, Jr., former President of the National Defense University, and Brigadier General John Johns, former assistant secretary for defense, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation Nov ‘5, “There are risks if the U.S. withdraws its troops from Iraq. Are there greater risks in keeping them there?” http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2005/11/00\_gard-johns\_there-are-risks-if-the-us-withdraws.htm

International cooperation will be undermined: The number of countries assisting the U.S. in Iraq, most of which provide few troops, has already fallen by a quarter, from 34 last year to 25 today; and five more are due to leave by year's end. Recently South Korea announced the reduction of its commitment. Furthermore, the international cooperation necessary to confront terrorism may deteriorate further by the continued suspicion of, and hostility toward, the United States in most other countries.

A recent Pew Center international poll shows that the United States is held in low esteem across the globe, particularly in the Muslim world, largely as a result of the U.S. Administration’s foreign policies; and the war in Iraq continues to be deeply unpopular internationally, including with the populaces of our allies. Most countries believe that the invasion and occupation of Iraq has made the world a less safe place. Many are also suspicious that the United States intends to establish permanent bases in Iraq to secure the flow of oil from the region, a charge the Administration has not denied.

Withdrawal makes us look inconsistent and downs cred

1. This is EXACTLY what Fettweis indicts, this domino effect is completely incorrect, as shown with the US withdrawal of Vietnam, that’s Fettweis 07

2. Non-unique, Obama already announced withdrawal, their ev doesn’t take this into account

3. Turn- not doing the plan makes us look inconsistent as we already agreed to the SOFA, makes Iran hate us, and downs our credibility, that’s Jarrar and Leaver 10

And Serwer and Parker 08

Withdrawal means Terrorists win

1. No, it means terrorists lose, Osama Bin Laden has said his strategy is to bleed to US dry, withdrawal makes his effort unwinnable that’s Jarrar and Leaver 10

2. Recruiting for al Qaeda is based off of hatred of the US, plan solves this thus crippling the terrorists’ base

3. Plan solves, US Iranian dialogue will be able to solve for terrorism as they can leverage the public against the terrorists

4. Evidence not specific to Iraq, terrorist havens are in Afghanistan, and the US will still be there to engage terror groups

5. ISF will check, withdrawal will allow them to step up to doing our job

6. Withdrawal sparks nationalism, means people will have allegiance to government, rather than the town thugs thats Yaphe 08

7. Non-u Should have already been triggered by obama’s announcement of withdrawal

8. Terrorist groups are completely dependent on community support

Noorani 07 (A.G. Noorani, staff writer, Frontline, Volume 24 - Issue 07 :: Apr. 07-20, 2007INDIA'S NATIONAL MAGAZINE from the publishers of THE HINDU “Roots of suicide terrorism” a review of Robert Pape’s work on terrorism http://www.hindu.com/fline/fl2407/stories/20070420000507800.htm)

For over 30 years, from 1945 to 1980, suicide attacks had disappeared. Their perpetrators of today have been to college. They are educated ones. Poverty is a poor explanation for their conduct. It is a three-stage process, which Pape analyses by posing three principal questions: what is the strategic logic of suicide terrorism; its political aim; its social logic. "Why does suicide attack receive mass support in some societies and not others? Without social support from the terrorists' national community, suicide terrorist campaigns could not be sustained." Sri Lanka and Kashmir supports this finding. "Community support enables a suicide terrorist group to replenish its membership. Other kinds of terrorists can try to husband their human resources by hiding from society, but suicide terrorist organisations cannot operate without losses. Most suicide attackers are walk-in volunteers. Second, community support is essential to enable a suicide terrorist group to avoid detection, surveillance, and elimination by the security forces of the target society. Given that recruitment needs oblige them to keep a relatively high profile, suicide terrorist groups cannot prevent many members of the local community from gaining basic information that would be useful to the enemy (for instance, the identity of recruiters, common locations for recruitment, and even locations of frequently used safehouses, means of communication, and other logistics). As a result, without broad sympathy among the local population, suicide terrorist groups would be especially vulnerable to penetration, defection, and informants. They must therefore be popular enough that society as a whole would be willing to silence potential informants. Everyone may know who the terrorists are. No one must tell." Why do Kashmiri women wail at the windows as funeral processions of slain militants pass by? The individual logic is important. What drives the individual action?

KRITIKS

AT Security K (1/7)

1. Removing troops solves the K. Valbajorn proves no link and Turn

2. Empirical Evidence that there is instability in the middle east. Iraq Iran wars prove actual material violence. Troop presence has lead to real violence in places like Israel and Vietnam.

3. Turn: The Critique is a Stereotype of The Aff – We Productively use Representations to End Foreign Interference – This is Substantially More productive Than the Narcissistic Criticism

MortenValbjørn, PhD in the Department of Political Science @ Aarhus, ‘4 [*Middle East and Palestine: Global Politics and Regional Conflict,* “Culture Blind and Culture Blinded: Images of Middle Eastern Conflicts in International Relations,” p. 65-6]

The reason why the problems concerning Blindness to the Self is also relevant in this connection is not due to any lack of awareness of the representer's place in representations of Otherness. Rather, the problem is to be found in the manner in which this issue is addressed. The thorough self-consciousness associated with the relational conception of culture is thus brought about by means of a radical constructivism, which, at least in its most outspoken versions, seems to replace a possibly naïve subject/object separation by an almost solipsistic subjectivism equivalent to Wight's "subject = fi" formula in the above. This radical constructivism is quite evident among IR's "dissident thoughts" and can also be recognized in statements by Said such as: "Orientalism responded more to the culture that produced it than to its putative object, which was also produced by the West" (1995: 22).However, first does it make sense to perceive representation as part of either a construction of identities or of some kind of subtle performance of power, and, second, is it really possible to represent the Other at one's own discretion? With regard to the first question, the almost unambiguously **negative and rather monolithic** depiction of "Western" representations of the Middle East that can to be found among proponents of the relational conception of culture seems to some extent to be based on a rather **problematic stereotyping**, far from the more balanced accounts by, for instance, Rodinson (1974, 1987). By presenting the orientalist scholarship in a very stereotyped and caricatured way, Said, for instance, almost ends up doing to the orientalists what he accuses orientalist scholarship of having done to Middle Eastern societies (Brimnes, 2000). Furthermore, it **is anything but obvious** that representations produced as part of the performance of power **must necessarily** be regarded as unreliable and without value as such. Halliday, among others, criticized this understanding and argued that the relationship between the origin and the validity of a discovery **is more ambiguous** than one might think: "the very fact of trying to subjugate a country would to some degree involve producing an accurate picture of it" (1995: 213).

Regarding the second question, advocates of the relational conception of culture easily leave the impression that the way the Other is represented almost exclusively depends on the representer while the represented appears more or less as **an empty and passive object** onto which all kinds of conceivable fantasies and ideas can be projected. However, Bhabha, for instance, suggested that instead of regarding the representation of Otherness as a "hegemonic monologue" where the Other is a passive object on which all thinkable fantasies and conceptions can be projected-such as it sometimes seems to he the case in the works of, for example, Said and Campbell-we might rather think of it as a hybrid dialogue, though seldom equal nor without power plays (Bhabha, 1997; Keyman, 1997; Brimnes, 2000). Furthermore, the representation of Otherness has often had far more ambiguous effects than what this approach's advocates usually would acknowledge. Sadiq al-Azm, for example, coined therefore the notion of "Orientalism in reverse." Here, the classic essentialist and problematic Orient/Occident discourse allegedly used to legitimize imperialism is reversed and applied to the struggle **for an end of foreign interference**. In the Middle Eastern context, this is visible in Arab Nationalism, as well as among radical Islamist movements, in which the criticism of foreign (in)direct influence is often based on the argument of an allegedly unique Islamic or Arab culture (Azm, 2000).

When advocates of the relational conception of culture seek to counter the prevailing lack of selfconsciousness within the universalist IR mainstream, as well as among proponents of the essentialist conception, it thus seems that they unintentionally have turned into what most of all appears **as a narcissist self-centeredness**. Apparently they lack enough concern for how the representation of Otherness is not only about the representer's projections, desires, fantasies, and so on. This kind of (over)reaction also seems to influence their ability to relate to Otherness **in a more substantial way.**

AT Security K (2/7)

4. The Aff outweighs the K. Thousands of Iraqis have died and will continue to die with troop presence. Prefer emancipation of the Iraqis before representations of security.

5. Also, we read specific ev that only a pullout will solve our harms. Even if……… the root cause is based in security rhetoric, the harms will be indefinitely replicated if we allow our troops to stay

6. And, this justifies perm: do both. Doing both allows for solving the harms outlined while recognizing and rejecting the security discourse. The kritik isn’t intrinsic to the aff, there will inevitably be security rhetoric, one additional instance won’t preclude the possibility of the alt

Critique Alone is not adequate to alter the current security environment – Political Action is Necessary to Promote Emancipation Over Security

Pinar Bilgin, Prof. of IR @ Bilkent Univ, ‘5 [*Regional Security in The Middle East*, p. 60-1]

Admittedly, providing a critique of existing approaches to security, revealing those hidden assumptions and normative projects embedded in Cold War Security Studies, is only a first step. In other words, from a critical security perspective, **self-reflection, thinking and writing are not enough in themselve**s. They should be compounded by other forms of **practice** (that is, action taken on the ground). It is indeed crucial for students of critical approaches to re-think security in both theory and practice by pointing to possibilities for **change immanent in world politics** and suggesting emancipatory practices if it is going to fulfil the promise of becoming a 'force of change' in world politics. Cognisant of the need to find and suggest alternative practices to meet a broadened security agenda without adopting militarised or zero-sum thinking and practices, students of critical approaches to security have suggested the imagining, creation and **nurturing of security** communities **as emancipatory practices** (Booth 1994a; Booth and Vale 1997). Although Devetak's approach to the theory/practice relationship echoes critical approaches' conception of theory as a form of practice, the latter seeks to go further in shaping global practices. The distinction Booth makes between 'thinking about thinking' and 'thinking about doing' grasps the difference between the two. Booth (1997: 114) writes: Thinking about thinking is important, but, more urgently, so is **thinking about doing** .... Abstract ideas about emancipation **will not suffice:** it is important for Critical Security Studies to engage with the real by **suggesting policies**, agents, and sites of change, **to help humankind,** in whole and in part, to move away from its structural wrongs. In this sense, providing a critique of existing approaches to security, revealing those hidden assumptions and normative projects embedded in Cold War Security Studies**, is only a first** (albeit crucial) step. It is vital for the students of critical approaches to re-think security in both theory and **practice**.

AT Security K (3/7)

7. The Plan is Vital to Critical Security - The Alternative Frees Policy From Difficult Question for the Sake of ending securitization.

Jeroen Gunning, Lecturer in International Politics @ Univ. of Wales, ‘7 [*Government and Opposition* 42.3, “A Case for Critical Terrorism Studies?” p. Blackwell-synergy]

The notion of emancipation also crystallizes the need for policy engagement. For, unless a ‘critical’ field seeks to be policy relevant, which, as Cox rightly observes, means **combining** ‘critical’ and ‘problem-solving’ approaches, it does not fulfil its ‘emancipatory’ potential.94 One of the temptations of ‘critical’ approaches is to **remain** mired in critique and deconstruction without moving beyond this to reconstruction and **policy** relevance.Vital as such critiques are, the challenge of a critically constituted field is also to engage with policy makers – and ‘terrorists’ – and work towards the realization of new paradigms, new practices, and a transformation, however modestly, of **political structures**. That, after all, is the original meaning of the notion of ‘immanent critique’ that has historically underpinned the ‘critical’ project and which, in Booth's words, involves ‘the discovery of the latent potentials in situations on which to build political and social progress’, as opposed to putting forward utopian arguments that are not realizable. Or, as Booth wryly observes, ‘this means building with one's feet **firmly on the ground**, not **constructing castles** in the air’ and asking ‘what it means for real people in real places’.96 Rather than simply critiquing the status quo, or noting the problems that come from an un-problematized acceptance of the state, a ‘critical’ approach must, in my view, also concern itself with offering concrete a**lternative**s. Even while historicizing the state and oppositional violence, and challenging the state's role in reproducing oppositional violence, it must wrestle with the fact that ‘the concept of the modern state and sovereignty embodies a **coherent response** to many of the **central problems** of political life’, and in particular to ‘the place of violence in political life’. Even while ‘de-essentializing and deconstructing claims about security’, it must concern itself with ‘hows ecurity is to be redefined’, and in particular on what theoretical basis.97 Whether because those critical of the status quo are wary of becoming co-opted by the structures of power (and their emphasis on instrumental rationality),98 or because policy makers have, for obvious reasons (including the failure of many ‘critical’ scholars to offer policy relevant advice), a greater affinity with ‘traditional’ scholars, the role of ‘expert adviser’ is more often than not filled by ‘traditional’ scholars.99 The result is that policy makers **are insufficiently challenged to question** the basis of their policies and develop new policies based on immanent critiques. A notable exception is the readiness of European Union officials to enlist the services of both ‘traditional’ and ‘critical’ scholars to advise the EU on how better to understand processes of radicalization.100 But this would have been impossible if more critically oriented scholars such as Horgan and Silke had not been ready to cooperate with the EU. Striving to be policy relevant does not mean that one has to accept the validity of the term ‘terrorism’ or stop investigating the political interests behind it. Nor does it mean that each piece of research must have policy relevance or that one has to limit one's research to what is relevant for the state, since the ‘critical turn’ implies a move beyond state-centric perspectives. End-users could, and should, thus include both state and non-state actors such as the Foreign Office and the Muslim Council of Britain and Hizb ut-Tahrir; the Northern Ireland Office and the IRA and the Ulster Unionists; the Israeli government and Hamas and Fatah (as long as the overarching principle is to reduce the political use of terror, whoever the perpetrator). It does mean, though, that a critically constituted field must work hard to bring together all the fragmented voices from beyond the ‘terrorism field’, to maximize both the field's rigour and its policy relevance. Whether a critically constituted ‘terrorism studies’ will attract the fragmented voices from outside the field depends largely on how broadly the term ‘critical’ is defined. Those who assume ‘critical’ to mean ‘Critical Theory’ or ‘poststructuralist’ may not feel comfortable identifying with it if they do not themselves subscribe to such a narrowly defined ‘critical’ approach. Rather, to maximize its inclusiveness, I would follow Williams and Krause's approach to ‘critical security studies’, which they define simply as bringing together ‘many perspectives that have been considered outside of the mainstream of the discipline’.101 This means refraining from establishing new criteria of inclusion/exclusion beyond the (normative) expectation that scholars self-reflexively question their conceptual framework, the origins of this framework, their methodologies and dichotomies; and that they historicize both the state and ‘terrorism’, and consider the security and context of all, which implies among other things an attempt at

empathy and cross-cultural understanding.102 Anything more normative would limit the ability of such a field to create a genuinely interdisciplinary, non-partisan and innovative framework, and exclude valuable insights borne of a broadly ‘critical’ approach, such as those from conflict resolution studies who, despite working within a ‘traditional’ framework, offer important insights by moving beyond a narrow military understanding of security to a broader understanding of human security and placing violence in its wider social context.103 Thus, a poststructuralist **has no greater claim** to be part of this ‘critical’ field than a realist who looks beyond the state at the interaction between the violent group and their wider social constituency.104

AT Security K (4/7)

8. Our Scenario Evaluations are Crucial For Ethically Responsible Politics - Purely Theoretical Kritik is Insufficient - We Need “As If” Stories to Offset the Worst International Violence

Michael Williams, Professor of International Politics at the University of Wales—Aberystwyth, ‘5 [The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations, p. 165-7]

Moreover, the links between skeptical realism and prevalent postmodern themes go more deeply than this, particularly as they apply to attempts by post-structural thinking to reopen questions of responsibility and ethics.8° In part, the goals of post-structural approaches can be usefully characterized, to borrow Stephen White's illuminating contrast, as expressions of 'responsibility to otherness' which question and challenge modernist equations of responsibility with a 'responsibility to act'. A responsibility to otherness seeks to reveal and open the constitutive processes and claims of subjects and subjectivities that a foundational modernism has effaced in its narrow identification of responsibility with a 'responsibility to act'.81 Deconstruction can from this perspective be seen as a principled stance unwilling to succumb to modernist essentialism which in the name of responsibility assumes and reifies subjects and structures, obscures forms of power and violence which are constitutive of them, and at the same time forecloses a consideration of alternative possibilities and practices. Yet it is my claim that the wilful Realist tradition does not lack an understanding of the contingency of practice or a vision of responsibility to otherness. On the contrary, its strategy of objectification is precisely an attempt to bring **together a responsibility to otherness** and a responsibility to act within a willfully liberal vision. The construction of a realm of objectivity and calculations is not just a consequence of a need to act - the framing of an epistemic context for successful calculation. It is a **form of responsibility** to otherness, an attempt to allow for diversity and irreconcilability precisely by - at least initially - reducing the self and the other to a structure of material calculation in order to allow a structure of **mutual intelligibility,** mediation, and stability. It is, in short, a strategy of limitation: a willful attempt to construct a subject and a social world limited - both epistemically and politically - **in the name of a politics of toleration**: a liberal strategy that John Gray has recently characterized as one of *mondus vivendi*. If this is the case, then the deconstructive move that gains some of its weight by contrasting itself to a non- or apolitical objectivism must engage with the more complex contrast to skeptical Realist tradition that is itself a constructed, ethical practice. The issue becomes even more acute if one considers Iver Neumann’s incisive questions concerning postmodern construction of identity, action and responsibility. As Neumann points out, the insight that identities are inescapably contingent and relationally constructed, and even the claim that identities are indebted to otherness**, do not** in themselves **provide a foundation** for practice, particularly in situations where identities are ‘sediment’ and conflictually defined. In these cases, deconstruction alone will not suffice unless it can demonstrate a capacity to counter in practice (and not just philosophical practice) the essential dynamics it confronts. Here, a responsibility to act must go beyond deconstruction to **consider viable alternatives and counter-practices**. To take this critique seriously is not necessarily to be subject yet again to the straightforward ‘blackmail of the Enlightenment and a narrow ‘modernist’ vision of responsibility. While an unwillingness to move beyond a deconstructive ethic of responsibility to otherness for fear that an essential stance is the only (or most likely) alternative expresses legitimate concern, it should not license a retreat from such questions or their practical demands. Rather, such situations demand also an evaluation of the structures (of identity and institutions) that might viably be mobilised in order to **offset the worst implications of violently exclusionary** identities**. It requires,** as Neumann nicely puts it, the generation of **compelling 'as if' stories** around which counter-subjectivities and political practices can coalesce. Willful Realism, 1 submit, arises out of an appreciation of these issues, and comprises an attempt to craft precisely such 'stories' within a broader intellectual and sociological analysis of their conditions of production, possibilities of success, and likely consequences. The question is, to what extent are these limits capable of success, and to what extent might they he limits upon their own aspirations toward responsibility? These are crucial questions, but they will not be addressed by retreating yet again into further reversals of the same old dichotomies.

AT Security K (5/7)

9. Security Means Human Emancipation not Mere Survival - Providing Safety Create Opportunities For Flourishing

Ken Booth, Prof. of IR @ Wales, ‘5 [*Critical Security Studies and World Politics*, p. 22]

The best starting point for conceptualizing security lies in the real conditions of insecurity suffered by people and collectivities. Look around. What is immediately striking is that some degree of insecurity, as a life determining condition, is universal. To the extent an individual or group is insecure, to that extent their life choices and chances **are taken away**; this is because of the resources and energy they need to invest in seeking safety from domineering threats - whether these are the lack of food for one’s children or organizing to resist a foreign aggressor. The corollary of the relationship between insecurity and a determined life is **that a degree of security creates life possibilities**. Security might therefore be conceived as synonymous with **opening up space in people’s lives.** This allows for individual and collective **human becoming** - the capacity to have some choice about living differently - consistent with the same but different search by others. Two interrelated conclusions follow from this. First, security can be understood as an instrumental value; it frees its possessors to a greater or lesser extent from life-determining constraints and so allows different life possibilities to be explored. Second, security is synonymous simply with survival. One can survive without being secure (the experience of refugees in long-term camps in war-torn parts of the world, for example). Security is therefore **more than mere** animal survival (basic animal existence). It is survival-plus, the plus being the **possibility to explore human becoming**, As an instrumental value, security is sought because it frees people(s) to some degree to do other than deal with threats to their human being. The achievement of a level of security - and security is always relative - gives to individuals and groups some time, energy, and scope to chose **to be or become**, **other than merely survival as human biological organisms**. Security is an important dimension of the process by which the human species can reinvent itself beyond the merely biological.

10. Their impacts are constructed. There is empirical evidence of the US being imperialist throughout the war on Iraq and the impacts never happened.

11. If the neg can sever discourse, then the aff can also, reason to prefer the perm

AT Security K (6/7)

12. The Critique’s Obsession with Representations Blocks ANY Productive Change to International Relations - It Creates an Unavoidable epistemological crisis

MortenValbjørn, PhD in the Department of Political Science @ Aarhus, ‘4 [*Middle East and Palestine: Global Politics and Regional Conflict,* “Culture Blind and Culture Blinded: Images of Middle Eastern Conflicts in International Relations,” p. 67-8]]

As mentioned before, the relational perspective is a critique of both the neglect of the issue of Otherness by the IR mainstream and the way in which proponents of an essentialist approach relate to the Other. For this reason, it would be natural to assume that proponents of this second attempt to "culturalize" the study of international relations would be particularly keen to address the question of how to acknowledge cultural diversity without committing the sins of orientalism. Indeed, this is also what Said is stressing in the introduction to Orientalism: The most important task of all would be to undertake studies in contemporary alternatives to Orientalism, to ask how one can study other cultures and peoples from a libertarian, or nonrepressive and non-manipulative perspective. (1995: 24) However, he then goes on to add that "these are all tasks **left embarrassingly incomplete** in this study" (Said, 1995: 24). Looking at other analyses based on a relational conception of culture, it becomes apparent that the latter remark is very telling for this kind of understanding of culture as a whole **(e.g. Doty**, 1993: 315). Despite a blank rejection of the universalism of IR mainstream and, at least in principle, a recognition of the existence of different Others who are not only projections of own fantasies and desires, in practice, proponents of this alternative approach nonetheless usually leave the question of how to address and approach the actual cultural Other **unanswered**. This might very well be an unintended outcome of the previously mentioned radical constructivism associated with this approach. Thus, by stressing how the representation of the Other is intimately related to the construction of identities or a subtle way of performing power, one risks being caught in a kind of epistemological and moral crisis, characterized by a nagging doubt about whether it really is possible to gain any knowledge of Others or if we are just projecting our own fantasies, and by a pronounced fear that our representations are silencing voices so that we unwittingly are taking part in a subtle performance of power (Hastrup, 1992: 54). In merely dealing with the relationship between the representcr and his representations, these dilemmas can **be "avoided**." However, at the same time **one writes off the opportunity to** relate to cultural diversity as anything but discursive products of one's own fantasies and projections. This is precisely the critique that supporters of the relational understanding of culture have been facing. From this perspective, it appears less surprising that Said has had so much more to offer on the dynamics of Western representations of the Middle East **than on real alternatives to the orientalist depiction** of the region. Unfortunately, this second bid for a culturalistic approach to the study of international relations is not only aligned with a number of very welcome critical qualities that may enrich the study of international relations. It is also related to a problematic **tendency to overreac**t when it comes to addressing the prevalent Blindness to the Self within IR mainstream and among subscribers to the essentialist conception of culture. Thus, aspirations of promoting a larger self consciousness in the study of international relation end **up becoming self-centeredness**, just as the attempt to promote a larger sensitivity toward the Other in reality becomes oversensitivity **to saying anything substantial** when it comes to actual Other. This is problematic, partly because we **are left without any real idea** as to how to approach **actual** Middle Eastern **international relations rather** than Western representations of these; and partly because there is the risk of losing sight of **the material and very** **concrete consequences** that specific representations may engender (Krishna, 1993). Also, the proponents of this second "culturalistic" alternative seem to be better at asking important and critical questions than at offering attractive answers.

AT Security K (7/7)

13. The Aff’s Immanent Critique of Current International policy is More Effective Than Their blind optimism.

Richard Wyn Jones, Prof. of International Politics @ Aberystywyth, ’99 [*Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory*, p. 77]

The work of the first generation of critical theorists does not offer much specific guidance in the task of outlining what emancipation might mean in practice. but the preceding discussion of their work suggests three points that those attempting to overcome this failing should bear in mind. First, and most obviously, visions of concrete utopias must be consistent with whatever deeper notions of the grounding of emancipatory potential are deployed. Thus, for example, if the possibility of emancipation is grounded in the economic realm, then, logically, depictions of a more emancipated order cannot simply concentrate on (narrowly defined) political institutions. Second, descriptions-indeed, prescriptions-of a more emancipated order must focus on realizable utopias. Critical theorists must not lose sight of the fact that the coherence of their project is dependent on their utilization of **the critical potential of immanence**. If they succumb to the temptation of suggesting a blueprint for an emancipated order that is unrelated to the possibilities inherent in the present-a tendency that Marx and Engels argued was characteristic of "utopian socialists" such as Robert Owen (Marx and Engels 1948: 44-46)-then critical theorists **have no way** of justifying their arguments epistemologically. After all, to justify a utopia that is not already present in some fonn within the prevailing order requires the existence of an Archimedean point according to whose standards this utopia might be envisioned-a possibility rejected by critical theorists. Thus immanent critique (understood in broad terms) remains a vital part of the melatheoretical armory of critical theory. Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that a vision of an emancipated order that is not based on immanent potential will be **politically efficacious.** Unless anchored in a realistic assessment of actually existing possibilities, emancipatory ideas are hardly likely to convince their target audience (whoever they might be) that progressive change is not only desirable but also plausible and achievable, and therefore worth the effort or risk of trying to secure. Thus, for both epistemological and purely instrumental reasons, concrete utopias must be based on practices that have some basis in preexisting behavior.

14. Frame work:

A. Interpretation: The aff is allowed a topical plan and the neg is allowed a competitive policy option.

B. Voting Issue for education and ground.

C. Utopian Fiat—this is not real world at all and means that there is no real solvency for the kritiks harms.

D. Ground—there are thousands of Kritiks on every manner of subject. Allowing them would create an impossible research burden and explodes neg ground.

E. Policy options are better because they promote argumentation on the mechanisms of the resolutional actor and the repercussions that are unique to the plan or counter-plan.

F. Also, the neg’s discourse must be consistent with their criticism.

COUNTERPLANS

AT Conditions CP (1/2)

1. Article 140 cannot be used as a bargaining chip in negotiations

Alrafidayn 06/69 [no author, Iraq, 2010, “Kurds: Article 140 is not negotiable and non-recognition of the political scene held” http://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8&langpair=ar|en&u=http://www.alrafidayn.com/2009-05-26-22-07-53/17873----140---------.html&prev=/language\_tools&rurl=translate.google.com]

Bayazid Hassan MP for the Kurdistan list of change: "Article 140 cannot be a bargaining chip in negotiations and discussions the political blocs." He said: "that any government formed in the future, to respect this constitutional provision, implementation and that all parties not to engage in bidding policy on them." He continued that: "There will be flexibility over the Kurdish demands with regard to article 140 on the disputed areas in the negotiations between political blocs, as it demands guaranteed by the Constitution. "and called on concerned parties to:" to make concessions on a candidate as prime minister and speed up the formation of the government because it is the interest of all Iraqis. "He said:" All political scenarios before possible in the distribution of positions of presidential and sovereign. " For his part, leader of the Kurdistan Alliance MP Mohsen al-Sadoun said the voices we hear from some politicians in the masses of winning the elections on the non-recognition rule of constitutional 140 further complicate the political scene in Iraq. Sadoun said that which does not recognize the Article 140 does not recognize the Constitution voted by the people Iraqi and a guarantee of their rights. He added: that some politicians, instead of heading to find a quick solution to form a government at this difficult time talking about the substance had been resolved by the Constitution. called Sadoun politicians to stay away from political pressure and the tendency to solve the problem of forming a government which is now serious concerns on the Iraqi arena. Meanwhile, MP for the Iraqi National Coalition Qasim al-Araji, said on Monday that the meeting will bring together the leader of Iraq, Iyad Allawi, leader of coalition rule of law, Nuri al-Maliki and a pressure directed against the coalition. "They said," It should not be a coalition of law held side events away from the National Alliance must be the existence of joint meetings, "noting that" It is my view that the meeting between al-Maliki, Allawi is a pressure point on the National Coalition to accept Maliki's candidates for the National Alliance for prime minister. "The spokesman for a coalition of law Hassani revealed talks official will be conducted by the National Alliance with the Iraqi List soon to discuss the issue of forming a government. Araji said that the National Coalition to "Antkhov of the meeting, which will not yield any result because Maliki, Allawi insist on the post of prime minister, but I think it's leverage against the national coalition."

2. The only solvency evidence that the neg reads is the Boot evidence which only says that Maliki wants for US troops to leave and does not describe if the Iraq government would or would not prescribe to article 140 of the constitution – this means that even if the CP is a good idea it is impossible to implement the plan because there is no evidence Maliki would say YES to implementing article 140

3. Perm Do Both

4. Perm Do the CP

AT Conditions CP (2/2)

3. Maliki said he would not compromise on article 140, its not going to pass

AKnews 10 MP: Diverse views regarding article 140 within Maliki's bloc "shaky agreement" Sunday, June 27th 2010 6:25 PM <http://aknews.com/en/aknews/4/158946/>

Haji said the article 140 and Kirkuk were pivotal points for Kurds in any negotiation with other Iraqi blocs. According to a Kurdish MP of the Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU) **Osama Jamil**, the merger alliance formed of the State of Law and the Iraqi National Alliance (INA) led by Ammar al-Hakim **was "shaky**" Some figures in **Maliki's** State of Law coalition **said earlier that they would not compromise on Kirkuk after the bloc had reportedly agreed earlier to implement the constitution of which the article 140 is a part**.

4. Conditioning Counter-Plans Are Illegitimate and a Voting Issue:

1. Explodes the research burden- There are an infinite number of conditions the negative can put on the affirmative plan.
2. Not competitive- The counter-plan is plan plus by adding the condition of something to the implementation of plan justifies permutation: perm: do the plan and condition on another issue of equal importance
3. Destroys plan focus- Focuses the debate on the condition on which plan is passed instead of the actual plan
4. PICs that do the entirety of the plan are illegitimate – we cannot garner any of the 1ac as offense which uniquely skews the debate because it is THE only offense the affirmative has in the round—justifies the permutation: perm: do the counterplan
5. Can’t generate offense- We can straight turn ALL the disadvantages and they can still solve them through the counterplan- they have infinite prep-time to research and find the evidence that the condition will be met meaning that we are FORCED to go for theory every time
6. No right to this ground- they can run the conditions as disads to the plan and agent counterplans which solves back all of their offense and avoids the abusiveness of this counterplan
7. This is a voter for fairness and education

AT DOD CP (1/3)

**1. Perm – do the counterplan – its not severance – we never specified the branch**

**2. Agent counterplans are a voter—**

**A. Unpredictable – There’s an infinite number of agents—no solvency advocate means we can’t research answers—kills policy-making because the counterplan doesn’t actually exist**

**B. Kills education-distracts focus from the resolution and creates arbitrary debates about the agent**

**3. Congress will check Obama-preventing plan passage**

**Crenson and Ginsberg 07** Matthew Crenson and Benjamin Ginsberg.  Crenson is a political science professor at Johns Hopkins University.  Benjamin Ginsberg Ph.D. was a political science professor at Johns Hopkins University.  He is now the Director of the Center for the Study of American Government and Chair of the Government Program of Advanced Academic Program at Johns Hopkins University, 2007. [Presidential Power: Unchecked and Unbalanced p. 218] [Cory Stern]

Through its general legislative powers, moreover, Congress can exercise broad influence over foreign policy.  Congress may, for example, refuse to appropriate funds for presidential actions it deems to be unwise or inappropriate.  Thus, in 1796, the House of Representatives was asked to appropriate funds to implement the Jay Treaty.  Opponents of the treaty demanded that the House be given all papers and records pertaining to the negotiating process—a demand rejected by President Washington.  The House narrowly approved funding but accompanied its acquiescence with a resolution affirming its right to refuse appropriations for the implementation of any treaty to which a majority of its members objected.  On several occasions over the years, the House has indeed refused to appropriate funds needed to implement treaties negotiated by the president and ratified by the Senate. This power of the purse also extends to military action.  Not only does Congress have the constitutional power to declare war, but under its general legislative powers it must appropriate the funds needed to support military activities.  In Federalist 69, Hamilton argues that Congress’s power of the purse provides it with an ultimate check on the president’s power as commander in chief.  This principle was illustrated during the Reagan administration when Congress enacted the so-called Boland Amendment, which prohibited the president from using any funds to provide military support for right-wing “Contra” guerilla forces in the civil war then raging in the nation of Nicaragua.  The administration’s response was to seek funds from Saudi Arabia, the Sultan of Brunei, and even from private individuals.  This attempt to circumvent Congress’s authority sparked the 1986 congressional Iran-Contra investigations, which led to criminal convictions for several high-ranking administration officials.  In 2007, congressional Democrats threatened to use their power of the purse to gain some leverage over the bush administration’s Iraq policies.

**4. Global security evidence indicates that CENTCOM has control over coordinating operations-even if they organize the entire operation this does NOT mean they are exempt from executive approval for troop withdrawal**

**5.  Perm – do both – it’s not intrinsic because it limits the action of both the USFG and the DOD to the plan mandate**

2AC DOD CP (2/3)

6. Cant solve case – US Iraq security agreement requires congressional approval. It cannot be done by the DOD alone.

08 (

The new U.S.-Iraq security agreement would be by far the most wide ranging security commitment ever concluded between the U.S. and a foreign country without approval from Congress. While status of forces agreements (SOFAs) are meant, according to the State Department's definition, to "determine the legal status of U.S. armed forces stationed abroad," generally they are accompanied by a corresponding treaty which defines the overall U.S. security commitment for that country. Treaties, requiring Senate ratification, authorize the scope of the U.S. military presence in Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia, and NATO members. Since this SOFA includes a security commitment to Iraq, it must be submitted to Congress for approval.

**7. Plan not key-Department of Defense will do everything necessary to stay in power.**

**Serwiech, 08** (Tom, State Department, December “DOD controls U.S. government” [http://www.dark](http://www.dark/) [government.com/news/dod-controls-us-government](http://government.com/news/dod-controls-us-government))

As military officers sought to take over the role played by civilian development experts abroad, Pentagon bureaucrats quietly populated the National Security Council and the State Department with their own personnel (some civilians, some consultants, some retired officers, some officers on "detail" from the Pentagon) to ensure that the Defense Department could keep an eye on its rival agencies. Vice President Cheney, himself a former secretary of defense, and his good friend Rumsfeld ensured the success of this seeding effort by some fairly forceful means. At least twice, I saw Cheney staffers show up unannounced at State Department meetings, and I heard other State Department officials grumble about this habit. The Rumsfeld officials could play hardball, sometimes even leaking to the press the results of classified meetings that did not go their way in order to get the decisions reversed. After I got wind of the Pentagon's dislike for the approved interagency anti-drug strategy for Afghanistan, details of the plan quickly wound up in the hands of foreign countries sympathetic to the Pentagon view. I've heard other, similarly troubling stories about leaks of classified information to the press.

2AC DOD CP (3/3)

**8. DOD links to politics- spending trades off with other agenda items specific to Iraq**

**Center for American Progress 2-26** [Korb, Lawrence. “Obama’s Defense Budget Is on Target.” Center for American Progress. 2-26-10. <http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/02/defense_budget.html>]

President Barack Obama’s topline budget projections for fiscal year 2010 allocate $534 billion to the Department of Defense, the largest allocation of any department. The amount represents roughly a 4-percent increase over the $513 billion allocated to the Pentagon in FY2009 under the Bush administration, and $6.7 billion more than the outgoing administration’s projections for FY 2010. Supporters of a vastly increased defense budget, including many who support the Pentagon’s internal request for $584 billion for FY2010, have argued that Obama’s baseline represents a budget cut in a time of war. They contend that this so-called reduction will unnerve our allies, embolden our enemies and, by ending programs like the F-22 Raptor and slowing down programs like the F-35 and Future Combat Systems, will not only weaken defense but hurt our economy. Objective analysis reveals that these arguments are without merit. The defense budget has nearly doubled in real terms in the last decade, and this year’s $534 billion baseline provides adequate funding to maintain the quality of our troops and military infrastructure, and modernize the force. This amount does not in any way undermine the war effort, as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are financed in separate supplementals, which to date total nearly $1 trillion. Obama has promised $130 billion more for these efforts in FY2010. Nor will this level of funding unnerve our allies or embolden our enemies. Adding the supplementals for the war to the regular budget will bring total defense spending to about $700 billion for FY2010, more in real terms than at anytime since World War II, and more than what the rest of the world combined spends on defense. The FY2010 budget offers two necessary changes from past Bush administration budgets. First, Obama will reportedly hold the defense budget flat at FY2010 levels over the next 10 years, adjusting only for inflation. The Center for American Progress made a similar recommendation in “[Building a Military for the 21st Century: New Realities, New Priorities](http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/12/pdf/military_priorities.pdf),” which in December 2008 argued that the current sum of $534 billion: “If used wisely, is more than enough to ensure American military predominance while recapitalizing equipment lost in Iraq and Afghanistan, and growing and modernizing the force. The next administration should therefore keep the defense budget flat over the next four years, adjusting for inflation and fluctuations in the U.S. dollar.” Second, after over seven years of war in Afghanistan and nearly six years in Iraq, the Obama administration’s budget will include the cost of the two wars for the first time. Under the Bush administration, the cost of the wars—[currently](http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf) totaling $657 billion for Iraq and $173 billion for Afghanistan[1]—was appropriated through emergency supplementals, a process that allowed the services to take advantage of war-funding bills to request money for significant non-war-related projects, such as additional F-22 Raptors, that should have been included in the DOD’s baseline budget. CAP advocated reforming the process: “DOD should in the future submit appropriations for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan with the baseline request in one consolidated budget. This procedure will allow lawmakers to scrutinize the items from the supplemental and force Congress and DOD leaders to make trade-offs and hard choices when considering the FY2010-13 defense budget priorities.”

AT Consult NATO

1. Impacts should have already happened. We have already begun pulling out of Iraq, the plan just makes sure we stick to schedule.
2. Permutation do the Plan and consult NATO.
3. Counterplan doesn’t compete – in addition to the fiating of the plan, the counterplan sets up consultation framework and consults. Means that it’s functionally plan plus. Doing the plan and consulting solves all net benefits.
4. Counterplan is textually plan plus – textual competition is best. Prevents marginal counterplans that retreat troops EXCEPT for one person – which kill limits. Functional competition forces mixes burdens, which is arbitrary.
5. Permutation do the counterplan. Counterplan does the plan plus consultation- means its plan plus.
6. Can’t solve relations - NATO doesn’t give value to consultation thinks consulting is irrelevant and dangerous

Moore 06 - Ph.D. Concordia College Department of Political Science (3/22/06 Rebecca, International Studies Association, Town & Country Resort and Convention Center, "NATO: A Bridge to Europe and the Greater Middle East?", <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p99240_index.html>, MEF)

Transforming NATO into an organization whose mission is to rebuild both democracy and a nation’s economy corresponds neither to its legitimate mandate nor to its means.” 38 The French were

1. **Turn—Consultation destroys heg**

Charles **Krauthammer**,The National Interest, Winter, **2003**

America must be guided by its independent judgment, both about its own interest and about the global interest. Especially on matters of national security, war-making and the deployment of power, America should neither defer nor contract out decision-making, particularly when the concessions involve permanent structural constrictions such as those imposed by an International Criminal Court. Prudence, yes. No need to act the superpower in East Timor or Bosnia. But there is a need to do so in Afghanistan and in Iraq. No need to act the superpower on steel tariffs. But there is a need to do so on missile defense. The prudent exercise of power allows, indeed calls for, occasional concessions on non-vital issues if only to maintain psychological good will. Arrogance and gratuitous high-handedness are counterproductive. But we should not delude ourselves as to what psychological good will buys. Countries will cooperate with us, first, out of their own self-interest and, second, out of the need and desire to cultivate good relations with the world's superpower. Warm and fuzzy feelings are a distant third. Take counterterrorism. After the attack on the u.s.s. Cole, Yemen did everything it could to stymie the American investigation. It lifted not a finger to suppress terrorism. This was under an American administration that was obsessively accommodating and multilateralist. Today, under the most unilateralist of administrations, Yemen has decided to assist in the war on terrorism. This was not a result of a sudden attack of good will toward America. It was a result of the war in Afghanistan, which concentrated the mind of heretofore recalcitrant states like Yemen on the costs of non-cooperation with the United States.14 Coalitions are not made by superpowers going begging hat in hand. They are made by asserting a position and inviting others to join. What "pragmatic" realists often fail to realize is that unilateralism is the high road to multilateralism. When George Bush senior said of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, "this will not stand", and made it clear that he was prepared to act alone if necessary, that declaration-and the credibility of American determination to act unilaterally-in and of itself created a coalition. Hafez al-Asad did not join out of feelings of good will. He joined because no one wants to be left at the dock when the hegemon is sailing. Unilateralism does not mean seeking to act alone. One acts in concert with others if possible. Unilateralism simply means that one does not allow oneself to be hostage to others. No unilateralist would, say, reject Security Council support for an attack on Iraq. The nontrivial question that separates unilateralism from multilateralism-and that tests the "pragmatic realists"-is this: What do you do if, at the end of the day, the Security Council refuses to back you? Do you allow yourself to be dictated to on issues of vital national-and international-security? The new unilateralism argues explicitly and unashamedly for maintaining unipolarity, for sustaining America's unrivaled dominance for the foreseeable future. It could be a long future, assuming we successfully manage the single greatest threat, namely, weapons of mass destruction in the hands of rogue states. This in itself will require the aggressive and confident application

of unipolar power rather than falling back, as we did in the 1990s, on paralyzing multilateralism. The future of the unipolar era hinges on whether America is governed by those who wish to retain, augment and use unipolarity to advance not just American but global ends, or whether America is governed by those who wish to give it up-either by allowing unipolarity to decay as they retreat to Fortress America, or by passing on the burden by gradually transferring power to multilateral institutions as heirs to American hegemony. The challenge to unipolarity is not from the outside but from the inside. The choice is ours. To impiously paraphrase Benjamin Franklin: History has given you an empire, if you will keep it.

1. **Heg solves nuclear war**

Zalmay **Khalilzad**, Former Assist Prof of Poli Sci at Columbia, Spring 19**95**, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 2; P. 84

Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.

1. U.S. will maintain beneficial relations with key allies even if NATO collapses

**Gallagher 03**–Assistant Secretary of Commerce (Winter 2003, Michael, Houston Journal of International Law)

NATO’s supporters argue that ending NATO will destabilize Europe. Ending NATO, they claim, will destroy the transatlantic link between the United States and Europe, and isolate the United States from Europe. The ties of history, however, prevent this outcome. The United States has long enjoyed a “special relationship” with the United Kingdom. The United States also has strong relations with such nations as Italy, Turkey, Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway. Some claim that NATO is the foremost expression of U.S. commitment to Europe. The United States, however, aided Europe in two world wars, and stood firmly by Europe’s side during the Cold War – this commitment surpasses diplomatic formalities. The United States will not isolate itself from Europe merely because NATO disbands. Additionally, European nations do not need a formal security link to the United States. Even with NATO gone, “there is still plenty of life in, and need for, [the United States-Europe security] partnership.”

1. Consultation counterplans are a voter.
2. Infinitely regressive – they could consult any number of countries or groups
3. Topic education – shifts discussion from military presence to consultation – we lose all relevant education
4. Reading relations net benefits as a disad solves.
5. Relations non-unique – Their Wittes and Rosenberg evidence says Obama is acting unilaterally now – that’s angering NATO – should have caused the disadvantage.

DISADS

AT Politics – Jobs Bill (1/4)

1. Non – unique – their Digital News evidence says Congress is working on the bill – but no where conclusively says it will pass or that it is even likely to pass.

2. Wont Pass - Democrats not on board.

Jake Sherman, staff writer, 7-3-2010. [Politico, Dems in a jam as economy slows, http://fredericksburg.com/News/Web/politico?p\_id=2342]

President Barack Obama and the Democrats head into the summer campaign season with the economy slowing, unemployment flirting with double-digits — and few options for a quick fix.

Obama’s economic stimulus plan is winding down, right when Democrats need it most. And a big new jobs bill?

Forget it. House Democrats had to battle this week just to pass a bill to prevent teachers from being laid off, over the objections of 15 mostly conservative House Democrats and even Obama, who threatened a veto over how the House planned to pay for it.

3. Non Unique. Fallout from the US Iraqi security agreement already happened. We are just honoring the commitment. More fallout would happen if we didn’t honor our agreement.

4. Non unique: No jobs bill—Democrats not on board.

Jake Sherman, staff writer, 7-3-2010. [Politico, Dems in a jam as economy slows, http://fredericksburg.com/News/Web/politico?p\_id=2342]

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AT Politics – Jobs Bill (2/4)

5. Plan increases Political Capital. Withdrawal popular – key congressmen think the war was a mistake

(Paul Joseph Watson, staff writer, 6/25/10, Prison Planet, “Congressman Rohrabacher: Almost All House Republicans Think Iraq War Illegal, Immoral”, http://www.prisonplanet.com/congressman-rohrabacher-almost-all-house-republicans-think-iraq-war-illegal-immoral.html)

Judge Andrew Napolitano’s new Saturday show on the Fox Business Network is set to send shock waves through the political establishment this weekend when his guest – Republican Congressman Dana Rohrabacher – reveals that almost all House Republicans now believe that the invasion of Iraq was not only a mistake, but also illegal and immoral. “This morning when we taped our show for this weekend, Congressman Dana Rohrabacher, a right down the middle conservative Republican from southern California, former speech writer for Ronald Reagan, looked at me and said ‘almost all Republicans in the House of Representatives now believe that the war in Iraq was a mistake, that it was unlawful, that it was immoral, that it wasn’t worth the lives lost or the trillions that will be spent’,” Napolitano told The Alex Jones Show. “That is newsworthy that he would say it, it is newsworthy that so many Republicans would change their mind,” added Napolitano, a former New Jersey Superior Court Judge. As far back as three years ago, GOP support for the war in Iraq was beginning to waver, with a CNN poll finding that 38 percent of Republicans opposed the war. The recent primary success of anti-incumbent candidates like Rand Paul, a vocal critic of the invasion and occupation of Iraq, shows that the tide has rapidly turned. Napolitano pointed out that when he attacked the Bush administration for abusing the constitution, Republicans were upset, but that they are now starting to realize how government is supposed to operate as it was intended by the founding fathers. Napolitano’s show, which was broadcast solely on the Internet until last week, achieved top ratings for its premiere on the Fox Business Network, with viewers hungry to hear true libertarian viewpoints outside of the controlled statist neo-lib/neo-con paradigm. “There is a thirst out there for a focus on the government that has a bias in favor of human liberty and believes that the individual is greater than the state, that the individual has natural rights and an immortal soul and the government is just an artificial creation based on fear and force,” summarized Napolitano. Napolitano’s popularity has even made him a target with his own colleagues. Fellow Fox News host, neo-con and habitual government apologist Shep Smith attacked Napolitano yesterday for “standing up for BP,” when in reality the Judge was merely pointing out that the government has no business under the constitution in regulating the affairs of private companies. The revelation that almost all House Republicans now consider the invasion of Iraq to have been illegal, immoral and a giant mistake illustrates how far we have come in destroying the phony left-right paradigm. Now that Obama has continued and indeed expanded the Bush doctrine of military imperialism and occupation, many establishment neo-libs are defending the wars that they once opposed. Obama campaigned as the “peace candidate,” yet has broken every promise he made and is now a bigger warmonger than George W. Bush. With troops still yet to leave Afghanistan or Iraq, Obama has made it clear that a military attack on Iran is not “off the table”. Obama now has more American troops deployed than at any time under Bush. The date for withdrawing troops from Iraq is continually pushed back, and even then it is admitted that a “residual force” of tens of thousands of troops will remain to occupy the country. Now that the vast majority of Republican Congress members oppose the occupation of Iraq, resolutions need be introduced to bring the troops home from not only Iraq but Afghanistan too, with U.S. forces still engaged in two unwinnable wars which are bankrupting the already shattered U.S. economy while returning nothing but the flag-draped coffins of dead American soldiers.

AT Politics – Jobs Bill (3/4)

**6. Non unique: Standalone bill unlikely, GOP has blocked it in the past**

Lori Montgomery (staff writer for the Washington Post, 6/26/10, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/25/AR2010062504933.html)

One day after voting to block Democratic legislation that would have extended emergency jobless benefits, a Republican senator urged Democrats to try again, saying she would support a stripped-down bill aimed solely at guaranteeing unemployment checks to millions of people who have been out of work more than six months. Sen. Olympia J. Snowe (R-Maine), a key moderate whose vote had been ardently sought by Democratic leaders, sent a letter Friday to Senate Majority Leader Harry M. Reid (D-Nev.), arguing that the plight of the long-term unemployed must be swiftly addressed. "The hundreds of thousands of unemployed Americans who are losing jobless benefits every week deserve our immediate attention," Snowe wrote, calling for "a free-standing extension of unemployment insurance benefits" to be brought to the Senate floor for a vote early next week. "Separating the unemployment insurance provisions [from numerous other provisions in the bill] and passing it as emergency legislation acknowledges the urgency of helping those who continue to look for work." Reid spokesman Jim Manley derided the request, noting that Republicans have in recent weeks blocked efforts to push through the same stand-alone extension of jobless benefits that Snowe is now requesting. If Snowe wants to help jobless workers, Manley said, she should line up support among her GOP colleagues to break a stalemate that has dragged on for more than two months. "We appreciate Senator Snowe's concerns, but the fact is that she is sending the letter to the wrong person and to the wrong party," Manley wrote in an e-mail. "We know that the thousands of unemployed workers in Maine want an explanation as to why she joined with all Republicans several times to vote against legislation to help the unemployed . . . but Senator Snowe provides no evidence that any other Republicans support her proposal."

7. Obama won’t spend political capital on jobs bill – Dems want to reduce the deficit

Cynthia Tucker (Writer for Atlanta Journal-Constitution, Pulitzer prize winner, 6/16/10, “Priority needs to be on jobs” Lexis Nexis)

With unemployment still hovering around 10 percent and economic anxieties fueling the "wrong track" sentiment in opinion polls, you'd think President Barack Obama would be burning through his remaining political capital to get a major jobs bill through Congress. Instead, Democrats have been captured by the newest conventional wisdom: Voters are anxious about the deficit. So, instead of a strong push to save teachers, firefighters and police officers who are losing their jobs to state and local budget cuts, the White House seems to be settling for a minor jobs bill that won't amount to a bucket of water in a for-bidding desert of joblessness.

AT Politics – Jobs Bill (4/4)

8. Turn: Winners win – political leadership in tough fights builds capital

**Singer 9**

(Jonathan, My Direct Democracy, “By Expending Capital, Obama Grows His Capital”, 3-3-9, http://www.mydd.com/story/2009/3/3/191825/0428)

From the latest NBC News-Wall Street Journal survey: Despite the country's struggling economy and vocal opposition to some of his policies, President Obama's favorability rating is at an all-time high. Two-thirds feel hopeful about his leadership and six in 10 approve of the job he's doing in the White House. "What is amazing here is how much political capital Obama has spent in the first six weeks," said Democratic pollster Peter D. Hart, who conducted this survey with Republican pollster Bill McInturff. "And against that, he stands at the end of this six weeks with as much or more capital in the bank." Peter Hart gets at a key point. Some believe that political capital is finite, that it can be used up. To an extent that's true. But it's important to note, too, that political capital can be regenerated -- and, specifically, that when a President expends a great deal of capital on a measure that was difficult to enact and then succeeds, he can build up more capital. Indeed, that appears to be what is happening with Barack Obama, who went to the mat to pass the stimulus package out of the gate, got it passed despite near-unanimous opposition of the Republicans on Capitol Hill, and is being rewarded by the American public as a result. Take a look at the numbers. President Obama now has a 68 percent favorable rating in the NBC-WSJ poll, his highest ever showing in the survey. Nearly half of those surveyed (47 percent) view him very positively. Obama's Democratic Party earns a respectable 49 percent favorable rating. The Republican Party, however, is in the toilet, with its worst ever showing in the history of the NBC-WSJ poll, 26 percent favorable.

9. No Spillover. Congress votes on ideology not politics.

10. Double dip recession won’t happen

**BusinessWeek 7/2** (Rebecca Christie, Carol Massar, 7/2/10, " White House's Romer Sees No Sign of a Double-Dip Recession ", http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-07-02/white-house-s-romer-sees-no-sign-of-a-double-dip-

recession.html)

July 2 (Bloomberg) -- The U.S. economy doesn't show signs that it will relapse into another recession, said Christina Romer, President Barack Obama's chief economist. “We certainly do not see any sign of that in the data,” said Romer, who chairs the White House's Council of Economic Advisers, in an interview on Bloomberg Television today. “We're anticipating moderate growth.” The U.S. economy lost 125,000 workers in June while adding 83,000 private-sector jobs, according to Labor Department data released earlier today. Private employers hired fewer workers than forecast, and overall payrolls fell because of a drop in federal census workers. “It's not good enough but it is very much in the direction of slow steady expansion,” Romer said. She said Obama would keep “plugging away” to encourage Congress to approve extended unemployment benefits and aid for small business and local governments.

11. Non intrinsic: a rational policymaker could do both the plan and pass financial reform. Disad isn’t germane – only intrinsic disads should be evaluated – encourage topic education.

12. Recession wont cause depression. Mead assumes repeat of the great depression, which took 10 years to happen.

13. Case Outweighs and turns the DA. We have 7 nuclear war scenarios. Withdrawing causes political stability which ends sectarian violence culminating in nuclear war, that’s Corsi. Diplomacy with Iran is the key internal link to preemptive strikes in the middle east that culminate in extinction within the week, that’s DEBKAfile Talks also solve terrorism that’s Ebrahimi-far. Iraq is also key to overstretch which collapses the economy ending in nuclear war. We solve their impact. Withdraw is key to soft power, democracy, heg which ends in nuclear war.

AT CMR DA (1/3)

1. Non-unique - Afghanistan is already destroying CMR.

Haddick 9/4 [Robert, managing editor of Small Wars Journal, This Week at War: McChrystal Plays Defense, SEPTEMBER 4, 2009, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/09/04/this\_week\_at\_war\_mcchrystal\_plays\_defense]

Gen. Stanley McChrystal's report on the situation in Afghanistan is likely to strain relations between the Obama administration and the uniformed military. The arrival of McChrystal's report in Washington is likely to spark its own low-level war of finger-pointing and blame-shifting between civilian policymakers in the White House and McChrystal's staff and defenders in the Pentagon. This strain in civil-military relations could last through the duration of the U.S. military's involvement in Afghanistan and beyond.

McChrystal's report is supposedly secret, but anonymous staffers have already revealed its themes to the Washington Post. The goal of these staffers is to protect McChrystal and the uniformed military against White House officials they likely don't trust. These staffers have evidently concluded that they need to leak first in order to establish their position and put White House staffers on the defensive.

The first task for McChrystal's report (and its leaking defenders) was to show how President Barack Obama's supposedly limited war aims actually result in broad, expensive, and open-ended goals for Afghanistan:

Although the assessment, which runs more than 20 pages, has not been released, officials familiar with the report have said it represents a hard look at the challenges involved in implementing Obama's strategy for Afghanistan. The administration has narrowly defined its goal as defeating al-Qaeda and other extremist groups and denying them sanctuary, but that in turn requires a sweeping counterinsurgency campaign aimed at protecting the Afghan population, establishing good governance and rebuilding the economy.

McChrystal's report has thus shifted responsibility over to the White House to either the rally the country and the Congress around a big nation-building campaign or to explicitly scale back the desired war aims.

Next, according to the Washington Post, McChrystal's report lists numerous obstacles that could prevent success, barriers that are outside of the U.S. military's control:

For instance, McChrystal thinks a greater push by civilian officials is vital to shore up local Afghan governments and to combat corruption, officials said. He is emphatic that the results of the recent Afghan presidential election be viewed as legitimate, but is also realistic in acknowledging that the goals of the government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai and the coalition are not always as closely aligned as they could be, they said.

Separately, officials said, McChrystal's assessment finds that U.S. and other NATO forces must adopt a less risk-averse culture, leaving bases and armored vehicles to pursue insurgents on foot in a way that minimizes Afghan civilian deaths.

In others words, McChrystal is saying, don't hold me responsible for success if Karzai's election is a fraud, civilian officials don't show up, or European soldiers are not allowed to patrol.

The report illustrates the basic struggle between civilian policymakers and military commanders. Each side looks to the other to solve its problems. The White House staff is hoping that McChrystal will deliver a clear, high-probability war-winning strategy, a strategy that would reduce Afghanistan as an issue of concern. McChrystal, like all field commanders, wants his political masters to give him a realistic and measurable objective, with the resources needed to accomplish it.

McChrystal's report implies a pessimistic outlook for U.S. success in Afghanistan. If he and his staff had an optimistic view about the Afghan challenge, there would have been no need to be so diligent about clarifying responsibility for what comes next. In the case of success, all would share the glory. McChrystal's report is a preemptive defense against blame and recrimination. That does not bode well for either the U.S. mission in Afghanistan or for civil-military relations.

AT CMR DA (2/3)

2. CMR is Resilient – Gates and high ranking Generals will respect any Obama decision and shield it from opposition.

Schake, fellow at the Hoover Institution and holds the Distinguished Chair in International Security Studies at the United States Military Academy, 9-4-‘9 (Kori, “So far so good for civil military relations under Obama,” Foreign Policy, http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/09/04/so\_far\_so\_good\_for\_civil\_military\_relations\_under\_obama)

Crucial to Feingold's argument is that the Afghan people resent our military involvement. Both McChrystal, and now Gates, are persuaded that is not true. They argue that how we operate in Afghanistan will determine Afghan support to a much greater degree than the size of the force. Gates for the first time yesterday signaled his support for further force increases on that basis, indicating he will not be a political firewall for the White House if McChrystal and Mullen advocate politically uncomfortable increases.

Afghanistan was always going to be a central national security issue, because President Obama had campaigned and carried over into governance his argument that it was the "right" war and negligently under-resourced during the Bush administration. Even with domestic anti-war sentiment on the rise and a potential rebellion by Congressional Democrats against funding the Afghan mission, Obama is seemingly trapped into supporting the military commander's troop requests. Hard to imagine the Houdini contortion that lets him sustain his claim that his predecessor neglected the most important war and then refuse troops to a commander who you put into position and who is supported by a well-respected Defense Secretary.

Yet the President may -- and perhaps should -- do exactly that, and for reasons that are laudable in our system of civil-military relations. The American way of organizing for warfare has distinct responsibilities for the leading military and civilian participants. To work up the ladder, it's the military commander's job to survey the requirements for success and make recommendations. It's the job of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to evaluate the military judgment of that strategy and resourcing, advising the Secretary and the President on its soundness and other possible courses of military action. It's the Secretary of Defense's job to figure out how to provide those resources from a limited pool of people and equipment, to identify and manage the risk it creates for other operations and objectives (e.g., Iraq, managing China's rise, deterring North Korea, etc). It is the Commander in Chief's job to establish the war's objectives and determine whether they merit the resources it would require to be successful. He may determine the objectives are too costly in themselves, or that achieving them would distract too much effort from other national priorities, or that we do not have the necessary partners in the Karzai government to achieve our objectives.

It should go without saying that it is not the National Security Advisor's job to intimidate military commanders into dialing down their requests to politically comfortable levels, although that is what Jim Jones is reported to have done when visiting Afghanistan during the McChrystal review. Such politicization of military advice ought to be especially noxious to someone who'd been both the Commandant of the Marine Corps and a Combatant Commander. When the Bob Woodward article recounting Jones' attempted manipulation as published, Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen commendably defended McChrystal's independence. It is also curious that the one person invisible in this debate, as in the debate about relieving General McKiernan, is the CENTCOM commander, General Petraeus.

But beneficially and importantly for our country, policy debates over the war in Afghanistan indicate that the system of civil-military relations is clearly working as designed. We owe much to Gates, Mullen, and McChrystal for shielding the process from politicization and providing military advice the President needs to make decisions only he can make.

AT CMR DA (3/3)

3. No backlash - the military will follow orders even if they disagree with them

Ackerman 8 [Spencer, The Washington Independent, 11/13, “Productive Obama-Military Relationship Possible,” <http://washingtonindependent.com/18335/productive-obama-military-relationship-possible>]

Some members of the military community are more sanguine. Several say that if they disagree with the decision, they respect Obama’s authority to make it.

“In the end, we are not self-employed. And after the military leadership provides its best military advice, it is up to the policy-makers to make the decision and for the military to execute those decisions,” said a senior Army officer recently back from Iraq, who requested anonymity because he is still on active duty. “Now, if those in the military do not like the decision, they have two choices. One, salute smartly and execute the missions given them to the best of their ability. Or, the other, leave the military if they do not feel they can faithfully execute their missions. That is one way the military does get to vote in an all-volunteer force.”

Moss agreed. “The military will just follow the order,” he said. “The great majority of Americans want U.S. forces out of Iraq. This is part of the reason Obama was sent to the White House.”

4. Heg has plummeted - troop overstretch in Iraq and Afghanistan

Aerospace Daily & Defense Report (world's leading weekly magazine for aviation and aerospace professionals) April 15, 20**08** [Lexis]

Growing concerns with the U.S. having enough Army and Marine Corps land forces to react to potential unforeseen crises overseas are drawing attention on Capitol Hill. The concerns come as lawmakers craft fiscal 2009 defense bills and eye post-Bush administration budgetmaking, keeping in mind the looming potential for a significant number of troops operating in Iraq for years to come and the strain that deployments so far have placed on the volunteer U.S. military. ?We have had 12 military contingencies in the last 31 years, some of them major and most of them unexpected,? House Armed Services Committee (HASC) Chairman [Ike Skelton](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/us/lnacademic/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T4099783609&returnToId=20_T4099784752&csi=8151&A=0.4218644934481497&sourceCSI=9369&indexTerm=%23PE0009XOQ%23&searchTerm=Ike%20Skelton%20&indexType=P) (D-Mo.) said at a recent hearing. ?We must have a trained and properly equipped force ready to handle whatever comes. But my strong concern is that our readiness shortfalls and the limitations on our ability to deploy trained and ready ground forces have reached a point where these services would have a very steep uphill climb with increased casualties to respond effectively to an emerging contingency,? Skelton said. Skelton made the remarks at an April 9 hearing with the four-star vice chiefs of the Army and Marines, both of whom admitted that they were not satisfied with their respective service?s so-called strategic depth to respond to crisis scenarios like the post-9/11 invasion of Afghanistan. Army Gen. Richard Cody testified that the Army remains ?out of balance,? repeating what has become a common official Army phrase referring to the need to recruit, station, train and equip soldiers for more than just counterinsurgency operations (Aerospace DAILY, Jan. 17). ?The current demand for our forces in Iraq and Afghanistan exceeds the sustainable supply and limits our ability to provide ready forces for other contingencies,? Cody said. ?Overall, our readiness is being consumed as fast as we build it. If unaddressed, this lack of balance poses a significant risk to the all-volunteer force and degrades the Army?s ability to make a timely response to other contingencies,? the Army vice chief said.

AT Laser DA (1/2)

1. Contractors would have already been worried when Obama announced the withdrawal from Iraq, no reason the aff makes this problem worse – this means the disad is non-unique.

2. Defense spending low now

Rich Smith (business writer, 6/23/10, http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2010/06/23/pentagon-suffers-death-by-a-trillion-cuts.aspx)

First, we're no longer talking about a "$100 billion scenario." When Gates suggested cutting spending by $100 billion over five years, the logical assumption was that presidential-congressional horse trading would ensue, resulting ultimately in Pentagon spending cuts somewhere above $0, but below $100 billion. That scenario is now out the window. Now we're more likely talking cuts of somewhere between $100 billion and $1 trillion over the next decade. This is not good news for investors in defense companies. Revenues will drop, valuations will fall, and industry consolidation is likely as the defense majors scramble to shore up their revenue streams. (On the plus side, they'll probably do this by buying up smaller players like UAV-specialist AeroVironment (Nasdaq: AVAV), so keep your eyes peeled for M&A activity. Acquisition premiums are in the offing.)

3. Prefer this evidence, it is more recent by several months. This is important because only a few months ago, people assumed that horse trading would occur, but it is becoming clear now that cuts are more drastic than their evidence assumes.

4. No link - Their New York Times evidence says nowhere that Obama will compensate contractors for cuts in the defense budget – it only states that cuts will be made and contractors will lose contracts.

5. No internal link – the FCS program has already been cut, meaning Obama will compensate in other areas

Rich Smith (business writer, 6/23/10, http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2010/06/23/pentagon-suffers-death-by-a-trillion-cuts.aspx)

"Fire in the hole!" He didn't come right out and shout it, but Defense Secretary Robert Gates probably should have given investors a warning of this sort earlier this month, when he announced plans to slash the defense budget by $100 billion. Across the length and breadth of the military-industrial complex, defense contractors are hunkering down, and preparing for the worst. It's not exactly as if Gates has been shy about acting on past threats, after all. Last year we described a whole series of cuts implemented at his behest; one after another, multi-billion dollar efforts to develop Future Combat Systems, build F-22 Raptor fighter jets, and test an Airborne Laser fell to the budgetary axe.

AT Laser DA (2/2)

6. No internal link – contractors will ask for missile defense programs

Seattle Times 6/17/10 (Dan Joling, Associated press writer, “Lockheed Martin to seek missile defense contract” http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/businesstechnology/2012145390\_apusmissiledefense.html?syndication)

ANCHORAGE, Alaska — Defense contractor Lockheed Martin will team with Alaska's state-owned aerospace corporation to pursue a U.S. Missile Defense Agency contract to maintain and improve the country's ground-based missile defense system, the companies announced Thursday. The system is designed to defend against intermediate- and long-range ballistic missiles, and is a main component of the nation's overall missile defense system. Interceptor missiles are stationed at Fort Greely, Alaska, about 100 miles south of Fairbanks, and Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. Boeing was picked over Lockheed Martin as the original prime contractor for the system. But the Missile Defense Agency on May 14 issued an amended draft request for proposals for a "re-compete." A final request for proposals is expected this summer, with a five-year contract awarded early next year. The military has valued the contract at about $600 million per year. Mathew J. Joyce, GMD vice president and program manager for Lockheed Martin Space Systems Co., said his company offers more than 30 years of experience in missile defense development, production and operations and more than 50 years' experience in strategic weapon system operations. Teaming with Alaska Aerospace Corp., he said, gives Lockheed Martin a lay of the land in Alaska, a conduit to local suppliers and employees, and a partner that has proved it can launch rockets successfully in a harsh northern environment. "Each one of their launches must work," Joyce said. "That's what their customers depend on them for. That's what the customer depends on us for. I see a whole lot of synergy." The state Legislature created Alaska Aerospace in 1991 to develop a high-technology aerospace industry. From its complex in Kodiak, the corporation has successfully launched 14 rockets, including eight in support of missile defense. Its last launch was in December 2008. Alaska Aerospace has two launches - Air Force satellites - scheduled this year. The partnership with Lockheed Martin is a key part of the corporation's business plan and will allow it to expand, said Thomas R. Case, president and chief operating officer. Former President George W. Bush directed the Department of Defense to field an initial set of missile defense capabilities, including GMD, by 2004-05. Boeing in late 2004 installed the first ground-based interceptors at Fort Greely and Vandenberg. Initial components also included high-powered radar based on land and at sea, and a command-and-control system. As of November, there were more than 20 interceptor missiles in the field, according to Boeing's website. Dale Nash, Alaska Aerospace chief executive officer, said the corporation has wanted to expand in interior Alaska for some time and the partnership will take a different approach to maintaining the ground missile defense system, offering a resident work force. That has not been the case at Fort Greely, he said. “They're not building houses. They're not spending money. Their family isn't here," Nash said. "That's completely opposite of what's been going on with us in Kodiak."

To wrest the contract from Boeing, Lockheed Martin will try to demonstrate best value to the Defense Department, including a resolution to reliability issues, Joyce said. Headquartered in Bethesda, Md., Lockheed Martin employs about 136,000 people worldwide. It reported 2009 sales of $45.2 billion.

AT Iran Redeployment DA

1. Non-unique - Their Eley evidence which was written three years ago does not take into account the current withdrawal date that Obama has declared – this should have at least triggered the announcement of such a plan to increase troop presence in Iran

2. The Iraq war has destroyed our credibility and hegemony worldwide – that’s Hinnebusch – this means that Obama would never re-enter into another possibly long and unpopular war in the Middle East which would further destroy his and the US’ position in the world

3. The US would never attack Iran knowing that there would be escalation from the conflict which would engulf the entire Middle East destroying all of his previous work in the region

4. US invasion of Iran not viable, over-stretch of troops in Iraq and Afghanistan make war impossible

Damian Lataan, Historian and former Aeronautical Engineer, 6-24-2010, http://lataan.blogspot.com/2010/06/coming-iran-war.html

Invasion of Iran by the US is out of the question, (though the insertion of some special forces is highly likely in order to co-ordinate air strikes). Iran is a vast country that is some three times larger than Iraq. The US, considering its current ground troop commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan would not be able to effectively invade Iran. It would have to rely on an overwhelming aerial bombing campaign in order to prevail.

5. The plan solves – our Iran advantage post-dates their evidence and specifically describes Obama’s current strategy and would be the best strategy with Iran which is to cooperate and engage in relations with Iran meaning that he would not redeploy troops to Iran

6. The plan solves – extend our Kupchan and Takeyh evidence which says that US talks with Iran are key to stop their nuclearization which is the reason that the threat exists and that the US would possibly invade Iran

AT Afghanistan Redeployment DA

1. Their Martinez evidence concedes that the withdrawal date set for 2011 in Afghanistan would lead to a more strategic placement of troops but there would still be a net decrease of troops meaning no redeployment

2. Non-Unique - the surge into Afghanistan was a redeployment of many troops from Iraq to Afghanistan but the link and impact were not triggered

3. Afghanistan progress is evident across the board

Doug Bandow, Think Tank Contributor, May 7 2010, Cato Institute

Herat, Afghanistan—Malou Innocent and I have escaped Kabul for the much more pleasant city of Herat, in northwest Afghanistan near Iran and Turkmenistan.  We haven’t left all of Afghanistan’s many problems behind, but the atmosphere here is far different than in Kabul. Set in a wide plain, Herat played an important historic role as part of the “Silk Road,” the famed Asian trading route.  Although captured by the victorious Taliban, Herat showed little sympathy for its new overlords.  After its liberation the city suffered from the domination of “warlord” Ismail Khan, but sprouts of liberalism increasingly can be seen in Herat.  For instance, though women are expected to cover their hair, women’s organizations have proliferated and gained public acceptance. Violence is minimal, though an RPG attack six months ago effectively shut down what had been the city’s only five-star hotel, transformed into offices for Westerners.  Set on a hill dramatically overlooking the city, the building offered too tempting a target. Tight security is evident at the airport, hotels, government buildings, and NGO offices.  But there are far fewer armed police on the streets, machine gun-topped Humvees at intersections, and fortress-like buildings.  Most concrete goes to construction rather than barriers.  Barbed wire is used sparingly, not by the mile, as in Kabul. The international presence is strong, but not as overwhelming as in the capital.  We generated a lot of attention when we were on the street.  Most reactions were positive.  Children wanted their pictures taken with us; students wanted to practice their English; adults wanted to introduce themselves.  We exercised caution and were closely guarded, but never felt the sense of persistent menace as in Kabul. Most humbling was meeting with human rights activists.  Our cultures differ dramatically in some regards, but what most Afghans desire is not much different than what Americans want:  peace and prosperity, freedom and opportunity.  Evident on the street are the strong family and friendship ties that underlie Afghan society.  A number of people have stepped out heroically in an attempt to build a better society.  The consistent frustration of these activists is the Afghan government.  Corruption is pervasive; the police cannot be trusted.  While people disagree over America’s future role, virtually everyone desires a more effective, representative, and honest Afghan government.  And many of them believe that requires less, rather than more, international “aid.” Malou and I have a few more days in Afghanistan, and another city to visit.  So far it has been a fascinating and challenging visit.  Many hard decisions must be made to reorient U.S. policy.  Among the hardest of those decisions must be made regarding Afghanistan.

4. The Iraq war has destroyed our credibility and hegemony worldwide – that’s Hinnebusch – this means that Obama would never re-enter into another possibly long and unpopular war in the Middle East which would further destroy his and the US’ position in the world

5. Obama’s withdrawal date is evidence that Afghanistan is at least relatively stable which means that there would be no point to increasing troop presence and resentment

6. The only reason to redeploy troops would be to increase stability but withdrawing forces from Iraq would lead to increased stability which would then spill over to create a much more stable Middle East meaning there would be no reason to redeploy – that’s Ad Ali

AT Allied Prolif

1. Non-unique – we have pulled out more than 100,000 troops over the past few years but other countries have not started their nuclearization or prolif

2. Non-unique – Obama’s announcement of a withdrawal date should have led to a loss in credibility and the perception from our allies that we are weak in Iraq and would not be able to deter conflicts

3. Extend the Gard and Johns 05 evidence from the 1AC that the Iraq war destroyed US credibility and international image five years ago – this non-uniques the impact because if credibility was already down it should have triggered the impact

4. By withdrawing the US will regain its national influence and soft power – that’s **Hinnebusch**

5. Soft Power key to international credibility and influence – this turns the DA because the plan is key to extended deterrence

**Nye 2004** (Joseph, former Assistant Secretary of Defense and Dean of Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, “Soft Power, The Means to Success in World Politics,”)

In the global information age, the attractiveness of the United States will be crucial to our ability to achieve the outcomes we want. Rather than having to put together pickup coalitions of the willing for each new game, we will benefit if we are able to attract others into institutional alliances and eschew weakening those we have already created.NATO, for example, not only aggregates the capabilities of advanced nations, but its interminable committees, procedures, and exercises also allow them to train together and quickly become interoperable when a crisis occurs. As for alliances, if the United States is an attractive source of security and reassurance, other countries will set their expectations in directions that are conducive to our interests. For example, initially the U.S.-Japan security treaty, signed in was not very popular in Japan, but over the decades, polls show that it became more attractive to the Japanese public. Once that happened, Japanese politicians began to build it into their approaches to foreign policy. The United States benefits when it is regarded as a constant and trusted source of attraction, so that other countries are not obliged continually to reexamine their options in an atmosphere of uncertain coalitions. In the Japan case, broad acceptance of the U.S. by the Japanese public “contributed to the maintenance of US hegemony” and “served as political constraints compelling the ruling elites to continue cooperation with the United States.”17 Popularity can contribute to stability. Finally, as the RAND Corporation’s John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt argue, power in the global information age will come not just from strong defenses, but from strong sharing. A traditional realpolitik mind-set makes it difficult to share with others. But in the information age, such sharing not only enhances the ability of others to cooperate with us but also increases their inclination to do so.18 As we share intelligence and capabilities with others, we develop common outlooks and approaches that improve our ability to deal with the new challenges. Power flows from that attraction. Dismissing the importance of attraction as merely ephemeral popularity ignores key insights from new theories of leadership as well as the new realities of the information age. We cannot afford that.

AT Appeasement DA

1. The Record 08 card read in the 1NC only shows that if aggression in the world is left unchecked it will lead to war – it doesn’t address the tag and doesn’t provide a claim, warrant, or even information inside the card for US commitments signal opposition to aggression or why revoking these would lead to conflict

2. Troop presence not key to credibility in the Middle East. Building relations with Arab states more important

Kathleen J. McInnis, coordinator of the Project on Nuclear Issues and a research associate at CSIS, 2005,

Extended Deterrence: The U.S. Credibility Gap in the Middle East

U.S. relationships in the Middle East, however, have a strikingly different character, more akin to hesitant engagement than to Washington’s well-established partnerships in Asia. A rising tide of Islamic fundamentalism, coupled with growing anti-U.S. sentiment, has strained these tenuous relations. As then–Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton recently stated, “Iranian nuclear capabilities would change the perceptions of the military balance in the region and could pose serious challenges to the [United States] in terms of deterrence and de- fense.”3 One such challenge is the prospect of multiple nuclear powers emerging in an already volatile Middle East. The outcome of this scenario depends in part on the capacity and credibility of U.S. strategic capabilities, including the nuclear deterrent. Ultimately, if key “nuclear dominos” in the region, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, decide that U.S. security guarantees are insufficient, they may be tempted to acquire their own nuclear weapons. A U.S. extended deterrent policy in the Middle East would lack credibility, not due to a lack of physical capability or presence in the region, but rather as a result of the fragility of U.S. relations with its allies in the region, creat- ing a uniquely dangerous situation.

3. Turn - Our troops in the Middle East and specifically Iraq breed resentment which fuels terrorism in the region

4. Conflict is driven by lack of communication, not perceptions of weakness. Improved soft power prevents their impact

Lieutenant Colonel Wayne M. **Shanks**, **U**nited **S**tates **Army,** Strategy to Increase US Credibility, 3/9/**06** http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA449854&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf

Information, as an element of national power, must be effectively integrated with the other elements of national power to accomplish key provisions within the United States Government’s (USG) *National Security Strategy* (NSS). The public’s mistrust of the United States is born out of a widespread misunderstanding and mistrust of its policies and a lack of USG credibility, especially in the Greater Middle East. A coordinated strategy of policy adjustments and an integrated communication plan grounded in sound communication practices, using cultural expertise and all available communication means, should increase the USG’s credibility. Credibility will improve USG ability to successfully inform domestic and international audiences and may dispel a portion of the mistrust and hate for its actions and policies. The purpose of this paper is to explore the informational element of national power, examine current public relations processes for developing communication strategy, discuss potential national security policy implications which affect the USG’s credibility, and offer recommendations for a long-term strategy to increase USG credibility. A main premise used in this paper is that the root of most of the USG’s credibility issues is inexorability linked to the mistrust of the USG’s policies or actions and that an effective communication strategy will decrease that mistrust by increasing a relative understanding of those policies and actions. Information, as an element of national power, must be effectively integrated with the other elements of national power to accomplish key provisions within the United States Government’s (USG) *National Security Strategy* (NSS). The public’s mistrust of the United States, currently leveraged by extremist groups to foster violence and hatred, is born out of a widespread misunderstanding and mistrust of the its policies and a lack of USG credibility, especially in the Greater Middle East.1 Several national security policy areas and their associated actions appear counter to ideals outlined in the NSS and risk serious damage to USG credibility worldwide when those perceptions polarize various publics and increase negative perceptions of the US government. A coordinated strategy of selected policy adjustments and an integrated communication plan grounded in sound communication practices, using cultural expertise and all available communication means, should increase the USG’s credibility. **Credibility will** **improve USG ability to successfully inform domestic and international audiences and may dispel a portion of the mistrust and hate for its actions and policies.**

AT Israel Compensation DA (1/2)

1. The only warrant in their Susser 04 card for why Israel would demand compensation is that they would be afraid of Iranian proliferation. This is solved by the plan – withdrawing troops is necessary to open talks with Iran, and the subsequent negotiations are key to ending Iranian proliferation, that’s our Kugelman 06 and Kupchan and Takeyh 06 evidence. This takes out their disad because Israel will no longer have any reason to want compensation.

2. Israel is already receiving military aid from the U.S.

Associated Press 10 (3/20/10“Despite anger, US unlikely to cut military aid to Israel; it benefits both sides” <http://rdmag.com/News/FeedsAP/2010/03/manufacturing-despite-anger-us-unlikely-to-cut-military-aid-to-/>

The U.S. stepped up funding to Israel after the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973, at a time when the Soviet Union was arming the Arabs. Following the 1979 Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, Washington guaranteed Israel would continue receiving annual military and civilian aid in a 3:2 ratio with aid given to Egypt. Since then, Israel's share has ranged between $2.1 billion and $3.7 billion a year. Over the last decade, as Israel's economy has grown, the U.S. has converted the whole package to military funding, under an agreement to have it at $3.15 billion a year by fiscal 2013 and keep it at that level until 2018. The package amounts to only about 2 per cent of Israel's annual gross domestic product, compared with 14 per cent in 1985. But for a country with hostile neighbours, and where military spending ranks sixth in the world proportional to size of economy, that aid is vital. It represents about 20 per cent of the country's annual defence budget. Equally important, it gives Israel ready access to advanced and unique hardware. "Israel has developed its own military industry, but there are things you can only get from the United States," said Eytan Gilboa, an expert on Israeli-American relations at Israel's Bar-Ilan University. According to Israeli defence sources and U.S. congressional reports, Israel spends the bulk of its aid on warplanes such as F-15s and F-16s, jet fuel, high-end munitions and missile defence systems — weaponry the Israeli military would find difficult to replace or do without. "If aid were to stop, it would directly affect Israel's security and have an indirect effect on its economy," said Arie Arnon, an economics professor at Ben Gurion University near Beersheba. With that potential influence in mind, advocacy groups such as Amnesty International called on the U.S. to withhold aid dollars from Israel after its offensive in Gaza last year, arguing that the money was paying for weapons that were killing Palestinian civilians.

3. There is no internal link chain in the disad – they claim that Israel would demand JDAM systems, but the impact is based off of bunker buster bombs – the two are completely different weapons systems

4. U.S. has already committed to giving Israel bunker busters

World Tribune 06 (World Tribune, U.S. rushing bunker-bustersto Israel, 7/24/06) <http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/06/front2453941.072222222.html>

WASHINGTON — The United States has approved an Israeli request for "accelerated deliveries" of precision-guided air munitions to Israel. Officials said the Bush administration approved an Israeli request for bunker-buster weapons days after the outbreak of the Hizbullah war on July 12. They said the Israel Air Force concluded that its heavy air strikes on Hizbullah strongholds around Lebanon have been ineffective. Officials said the Israel Air Force failed to destroy Hizbullah headquarters in southern Beirut. On July 19, Israeli F-15I and F-16I fighters dropped 23 tons of munitions on Hizbullah's command and control bunker, but failed to destroy the hardened facility, Middle East Newsline reported. "The administration and Congress already approved the PGM sale," an official said. "We're talking about accelerated deliveries." On Monday, the London-based A-Sharq Al Awsat said the U.S. Air Force would transfer the GBU-28 bunker-busters to Israel. The newspaper said the air force would take bombs stored in Central Command headquarters in Qatar.

AT Israel Compensation DA (2/2)

5. Even if they win Israel will get bunker busters, they won’t strike Iran

Zakaria B.A., Yale University, Ph.D., Harvard University, Newsweek journalist 5/19(5/19/2010 “Bibi’s Bluster http://www.newsweek.com/2010/03/18/bibi-s-bluster.html)

But after watching Netanyahu's government over the past year, I have concluded that he is actually not serious about the Iranian threat. If tackling the rise of Iran were his paramount concern, would he have allowed a collapse in relations with the United States, the country whose military, political, and economic help is indispensable in confronting this challenge? If taking on Iran were his central preoccupation, wouldn't he have subordinated petty domestic considerations and done everything to bolster ties with the United States? Bibi likes to think of himself as Winston Churchill, warning the world of a gathering storm. But he should bear in mind that Churchill's single obsession during the late 1930s was to strengthen his alliance with the United States, whatever the costs, concessions, and compromises he had to make.

6. Israel has already perceived us as withdrawing from Iraq due to Obama’s pledge, even though we aren’t withdrawing in the status quo Israel thinks we are, thus the link to the disad should have been triggered already.

TOPICALITY

2AC T – Combat Troops

1. We Meet: we withdraw support troops, not combat troops.

Plan only effects support troops. Combat troops will be gone by August.

CNN 09 (2/27/09 CNN. “Obama to pull combat troops from Iraq by August 2010 http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/02/26/obama.troops/)

President Obama told congressional leaders Thursday he's planning to pull all combat troops out of Iraq by August 2010, according to three congressional officials. President Obama says he plans to keep up to 50,000 support troops in Iraq after combat troops leave in 2010. Under this scenario, all combat troops will be withdrawn within 19 months of Obama's January inauguration, three months longer than his promise on the campaign trail. In a meeting at the White House Thursday evening, Obama also told lawmakers that he plans to keep a range of 35,000 to 50,000 support troops on the ground in Iraq after combat troops are out, the officials said.

2. Counter Interpretation: Military Presence includes bases where intelligence gathering, training, and military-led development aid can be found.

Transnational Institute, 09

(July, “Foreign Military Bases and the Global Campaign to close them” http://www.tni.org/primer/foreign-military-bases-and-global-campaign-close-them)

Over the past decades, there has been a slow decline in the total number of foreign military bases, largely as a result of the end of the Cold War. But at the same time, there has been a rapid growth in the number of countries ‘hosting’ a foreign military presence. In other words, the new strategy seems to be to have smaller detachments in ever increasing number of countries.

Together with the shift towards smaller bases in more countries, there has also been a shift away from massive troop deployments to smaller spread-out facilities, where intelligence gathering, training, and military-led development aid can be combined.

The recent spread of bases is a clear indication of what are considered the new international battle grounds: Central Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.

3. Prefer our counter interpretation. We limit to three case areas of intelligence gathering, training, and military development. Their interpretation is specific to Afghanistan, not Iraq.

4. Reasonability—competing interpretations creates too strong of an incentive to go for T—kills policy education and over-penalizes the aff.