Cap

1. Framework – we think that the neg should defend wither the status quo or a competitive policy option. The k moots the entire 1AC killing clash and education

2. Perm do the plan and reject in all other instances; either the alt can’t overcome this one link in which case it’s not strong enough to overcome the squo or it does solve, meaning the plan isn’t a crucial link

3. Capitalism isn’t the root cause of anything

DANDEKER 2 (CHRISTOPHER, Department of War Studies, King's College, http://books.google.com/books?id=TNhFH5g3sCsC&dq=Effects+of+War+on+Society+Christopher+Dandeker&source=gbs\_navlinks\_s, DA 7/11/11)

Despite the fact that industrial capitalism has produced two world wars, as Aron (1954) and more recently Michael Mann (1984) have argued, there is no 'special relationship1 between capitalism and militarism—or the tendency to war—only one of historical indifference. All the pre-dispositions of 'capitalist states' to use warfare calculatively as a means of resolving their disputes with other states predate the formation of capitalism as an economic system. Of course, it could be argued that capitalism merely changes the form of militarism. That is to say, pre-capitalist patterns of militarism were still expressions of class relations and modern capitalism has just increased the destructive power of the industrialised means of war available to the state. But this argument will not do. Socialist societies in their use of industrialised power show that the technological potential for war is transferable and can be reproduced under non-capitalist conditions. Furthermore, the military activities of socialist states cannot be explained in terms of a defensive war against capitalism or even an aggressive one. as national and geopolitical power motives are arguably just as significant in the determination of state behaviour. Furthermore, imperial expansion not only predates capitalism but it is also difficult to reduce the causes of wars then and now to the interests of dominant economic classes (Mann 1984:25-46).

**4. Perm do both: we can work within the system to break down capitalism**

**Monthly Review**, March 90, Vol. 41, No. 10, p. 38

No institution is or ever has been a seamless monolith. Although the inherent mechanism of American capitalism is as you describe it, oriented solely to profit without regard to social consequences, this does not preclude significant portions of that very system from joining forces with the worldwide effort for the salvation of civilization, perhaps even to the extent of furnishing the margin of success for that very effort.

**5. Cap inevitable and sustainable, solutions can be offered pollution, financial instability, health problems and inequality**

Rogoff 11

Kenneth Rogoff, Professor of Economics at Harvard, 12/2/2011, “Is Modern Capitalism Sustainable?,” <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/is-modern-capitalism-sustainable->, KB

In principle, none of capitalism’s problems is insurmountable, and economists have offered a variety of market-based solutions. A high global price for carbon would induce firms and individuals to internalize the cost of their polluting activities. Tax systems can be designed to provide a greater measure of redistribution of income without necessarily involving crippling distortions, by minimizing non-transparent tax expenditures and keeping marginal rates low. Effective pricing of health care, including the pricing of waiting times, could encourage a better balance between equality and efficiency. Financial systems could be better regulated, with stricter attention to excessive accumulations of debt.

CommentsWill capitalism be a victim of its own success in producing massive wealth? For now, as fashionable as the topic of capitalism’s demise might be, the possibility seems remote. Nevertheless, as pollution, financial instability, health problems, and inequality continue to grow, and as political systems remain paralyzed, capitalism’s future might not seem so secure in a few decades as it seems now.

6. Alt fails – capitalism is too ingrained in society for the alt to cause everyone to reject it

7. Transition wars resulting from the collapse of capitalism cause extinction .

Harris 2 (Lee, Atlanta writer, policy review, the intellectual origins of America-bashing, <http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3458371.html>)

This is the immiserization thesis of Marx. And it is central to revolutionary Marxism, since if capitalism produces no widespread misery, then it also produces no fatal internal contradiction: If everyone is getting better off through capitalism, who will dream of struggling to overthrow it? Only genuine misery on the part of the workers would be sufficient to overturn the whole apparatus of the capitalist state, simply because, as Marx insisted, the capitalist class could not be realistically expected to relinquish control of the state apparatus and, with it, the monopoly of force. In this, Marx was absolutely correct. No capitalist society has ever willingly liquidated itself, and it is utopian to think that any ever will. Therefore, in order to achieve the goal of socialism, nothing short of a complete revolution would do; and this means, in point of fact, a full-fledged civil war not just within one society, but across the globe. Without this catastrophic upheaval, capitalism would remain completely in control of the social order and all socialist schemes would be reduced to pipe dreams.

8. The alternative to capitalism leads to extinction

Ebeling 93

Richard M. Ebeling, March 93, vice president of academic affairs for The Future of Freedom Foundation, THE FAILURE OF SOCIALISM, www.fff.org/freedom/0393b.asp

Socialism's failure in the former Soviet Union and in the other socialist countries stands as a clear and unquestionable warning as to which path any rational and sane people should never follow again. Government planning brought poverty and ruin. The idea of collectivist class and ethnic group-rights produced tens of millions of deaths and a legacy of civil war and conflict. And nationalized social services generated social decay and political privilege and corruption.

#### 9. The K cedes the political

#### 10. Capitalism solves war – interdependency, democracy and constructive competition

Griswold, 05 (Daniel, director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies at Cato, “Peace on earth? Try free trade among men”, http://www.freetrade.org/node/282)

As one little-noticed headline on an Associated Press story recently reported, "War declining worldwide, studies say." According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the number of armed conflicts around the world has been in decline for the past half century. In just the past 15 years, ongoing conflicts have dropped from 33 to 18, with all of them now civil conflicts within countries. As 2005 draws to an end, no two nations in the world are at war with each other. The death toll from war has also been falling. According to the AP story, "The number killed in battle has fallen to its lowest point in the post-World War II period, dipping below 20,000 a year by one measure. Peacemaking missions, meanwhile, are growing in number." Those estimates are down sharply from annual tolls ranging from 40,000 to 100,000 in the 1990s, and from a peak of 700,000 in 1951 during the Korean War. Many causes lie behind the good news -- the end of the Cold War and the spread of democracy, among them -- but expanding trade and globalization appear to be playing a major role. Far from stoking a "World on Fire," as one misguided American author has argued, growing commercial ties between nations have had a dampening effect on armed conflict and war, for three main reasons. First, trade and globalization have reinforced the trend toward democracy, and democracies don't pick fights with each other. Freedom to trade nurtures democracy by expanding the middle class in globalizing countries and equipping people with tools of communication such as cell phones, satellite TV, and the Internet. With trade comes more travel, more contact with people in other countries, and more exposure to new ideas. Thanks in part to globalization, almost two thirds of the world's countries today are democracies -- a record high. Second, as national economies become more integrated with each other, those nations have more to lose should war break out. War in a globalized world not only means human casualties and bigger government, but also ruptured trade and investment ties that impose lasting damage on the economy. In short, globalization has dramatically raised the economic cost of war. Third, globalization allows nations to acquire wealth through production and trade rather than conquest of territory and resources. Increasingly, wealth is measured in terms of intellectual property, financial assets, and human capital.

Anthro

1. The impact is inevitable and only the aff solves – \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

2. Alt can’t solve – won’t be adopted

De-Shalit, 2000. Professor of Political Theory at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Associate Fellow at the Oxford Centre for Environment, Ethics, and Society, Mansfield College, Oxford University. “The Environment: Between Theory and Practice,” p. 49-50, Avner, Questia.

One may ask: so what? Does it matter that Deep Ecology uses the term 'environment' differently from science? My answer is: it may not matter, as long as we recognize that this is indeed the case, that Deep Ecology is a political (or psychological) theory whose goals do not always seek to reform our attitudes about the environment, but rather seek to replace politics by a non-political system. If, however, Deep Ecology claims to respect the environment and treat it 'as it is', then this claim may be deceptive because environmental attitudes become a means of changing the 'system'. Their theory, then, is not about the moral grounds for respecting the environment, but about non-environmental goals. 19 If we understand this, it is clear at least why Deep Ecology has rarely, if at all, served as a rationale for environmental policies. The general public, including activists, may have sensed that, when they want to justify recycling or the treatment of sewage, talks about the new psyche will not do. The deeper problem, I fear, is that, since Deep Ecology is rather dominant in environmental philosophy, many people in the general public conclude that 'this is environmental philosophy' and therefore that 'arguments taken from environmental philosophy in general will not suffice in real cases'.

3. Perm: do both. We must be human-centered to be probably biocentric—ignoring human needs is still a mismanagement of ecology – turns the K.

David Schmidtz, Philosophy, University of Arizona, Environmental Ethics, 2000, p. 379-408

Like economic reasoning, ecological reasoning is reasoning about equilibria and perturbations that keep systems from converging on equilibria. Like economic reasoning, ecological reasoning is reasoning about competition and unintended consequences, and the internal logic of systems, a logic that dictates how a system responds to attempts to manipulate it. Environmental activism and regulation do not automatically improve the environment. It is a truism in ecology, as in economics, that well-intentioned interventions do not necessarily translate into good results. Ecology (human and nonhuman) is complicated, our knowledge is limited, and environmentalists are themselves only human. Intervention that works with the system’s logic rather than against it can have good consequences. Even in a centrally planned economy, the shape taken by the economy mainly is a function not of the central plan but of how people respond to it, and people respond to central plans in ways that best serve their purposes, not the central planner’s. Therefore, even a dictator is in no position simply to decide how things are going to go. Ecologists understand that this same point applies in their own discipline. They understand that an ecology’s internal logic limits the directions in which it can be taken by would-be ecological engineers. Within environmental philosophy, most of us have come around to something like Aldo Leopold’s view of humans as plain citizens of the biotic community.[[21]](http://www.theihs.org/libertyguide/hsr/hsr.php?id=41&print=1" \l "_ftn22) As Bryan Norton notes, the contrast between anthropocentrism and biocentrism obscures the fact that we increasingly need to be nature-centered to be properly human-centered; we need to focus on "saving the ecological systems that are the context of human cultural and economic activities." [[22]](http://www.theihs.org/libertyguide/hsr/hsr.php?id=41&print=1" \l "_ftn23) If we do not tend to what is good for nature, we will not be tending to what is good for people either. As Gary Varner recently put it, on purely anthropocentric grounds we have reason to think biocentrically.[[23]](http://www.theihs.org/libertyguide/hsr/hsr.php?id=41&print=1" \l "_ftn24)

I completely agree. What I wish to add is that the converse is also true: on purely biocentric grounds, we have reason to think anthropocentrically. We need to be human-centered to be properly nature-centered, for if we do not tend to what is good for people, we will not be tending to what is good for nature either. From a biocentric perspective, preservationists sometimes are not anthropocentric enough. They sometimes advocate policies and regulations with no concern for values and priorities that differ from their own. Even from a purely biocentric perspective, such slights are illegitimate. Policy makers who ignore human values and human priorities that differ from their own will, in effect, be committed to mismanaging the ecology of which those ignored values and priorities are an integral part.

4. Perm: Do the plan and the alternative. Solves the link to the K because we can do the plan while also challenging the humanist assumption of sovereignty over nature.

Zimmerman 91 (Michael E., Heideggerean Scholar Tulane Univ. “Deep Ecology, Ecoactivism, and Human Evolution” published in ReVision Winter 1991 13.3. PDF accessed July 6, 2008 p. 123-127).

Deep ecologists such as Arne Naess affirm the uniqueness of humankind and its potential for contributing to the Self-realization of all beings. Naess (1984) discusses humanity's potentialities for evolving into a species whose unique capacity involves appreciating the won­der of creation: It may sound paradoxical, but with a more lofty image of maturity in humans, the appeal to serve deep, specifically human interests is in full harmony with the norms of deep ecology**.** But this is evident only if we are careful to make our termi­nology clear. This terminology is today far from common, but it may have an illu­minating impact. It proclaims that essen­tially there is at present a sorry underesti­mation of the potentialities of the human species. Our species is not destined to be the scourge [or cancer—M.E.Z.] of the earth. If it is bound to be anything, per­haps it is to be the conscious joyful appre­ciator of this planet as an even greater whole of its immense richness. This may be its "evolutionary potential**"** or an ineradicable part of it. (p. 8) Insofar as Naess speaks of the "evo­lutionary potential" of humanity to become appreciators of the planet, he has something in common with the evo­lutionary views of Murray Bookchin. Bookchin (1990) argues even more emphatically (than Naess) that humani­ty's evolutionary potential includes the capacity for intervening in natural processes, even to the point of shaping aspects of evolution on Earth. Clearly, there is room for negotiation and com­promise in the hitherto somewhat unsa­vory debate between deep ecologists and social ecologists in that both hold to some version of a "progressive" and "evolutionary" view of humankind**.** Deep ecologists cannot reasonably hope for a move toward nondualistic**,** nonan­thropocentric attitudes without simulta­neously affirmingthe notionthat humankind has the capacity for evolu­tion to a more mature stage of con­sciousness. Social ecologists are quite right in pointing out the dangers involved in rejecting out of hand the whole of modernity, especially its emancipatory political dimensions.

Security

1. Perm do the plan and the alt—either the perm should be able to overcome any residual link to the plan and solve the entirety of the kritik or the alternative is too weak to overcome the status quo

2. Security means the potential for emancipation, not mere survival. Safety is the only foundation for human flourishing

Ken Booth, Prof. of IR @ Wales, ‘5 [*Critical Security Studies and World Politics*, p. 22]

The best starting point for conceptualizing security lies in the real conditions of insecurity suffered by people and collectivities. Look around. What is immediately striking is that some degree of insecurity, as a life determining condition, is universal. To the extent an individual or group is insecure, to that extent their life choices and chances **are taken away**; this is because of the resources and energy they need to invest in seeking safety from domineering threats - whether these are the lack of food for one’s children or organizing to resist a foreign aggressor. The corollary of the relationship between insecurity and a determined life is that **a degree of security creates life possibilities**. Security might therefore be conceived as synonymous with **opening up space in people’s lives.** This allows for individual and collective **human becoming** - the capacity to have some choice about living differently - consistent with the same but different search by others. Two interrelated conclusions follow from this. First, security can be understood as an instrumental value; it frees its possessors to a greater or lesser extent from life-determining constraints and so allows different life possibilities to be explored. Second, security is synonymous simply with survival. One can survive without being secure (the experience of refugees in long-term camps in war-torn parts of the world, for example). Security is therefore **more than mere** animal survival (basic animal existence). It is survival-plus, the plus being the **possibility to explore human becoming**, As an instrumental value, security is sought because it frees people(s) to some degree to do other than deal with threats to their human being. The achievement of a level of security - and security is always relative - gives to individuals and groups some time, energy, and scope to chose **to be or become**, **other than merely survival as human biological organisms**. Security is an important dimension of the process by which the human species can reinvent itself beyond the merely biological.

3. Perm do the plan and reject the epistemology of security as we set up property rights for companies to go to the moon—the logic of security is not intrinsic to the aff’s policy action

4. Desecuritization Cedes Security to the right - Political engagement is Necessary

Olav. F. Knudsen, Prof @ Södertörn Univ College, ‘1 [*Security Dialogue* 32.3, “Post-Copenhagen Security Studies: Desecuritizing Securitization,” p. 366]

A final danger in focusing on the state is that of building the illusion that states have impenetrable walls, that they have an inside and an outside, and that nothing ever passes through. Wolfers’s billiard balls have contributed to this misconception. But the state concepts we should use **are in no need of** such an illusion. Whoever criticizes the field for such sins in the past needs to **go back to the literature**. Of course, we must continue to be open to a frank and unbiased assessment of the transnational politics which significantly influence almost every issue on the domestic political agenda. The first decade of my own research was spent studying these phenomena – and I disavow none of my conclusions about the state’s limitations. Yet I am not ashamed to talk of a domestic political agenda. Anyone with a little knowledge of Euro- pean politics knows that Danish politics is not Swedish politics is not German politics is not British politics. Nor would I hesitate for a moment to talk of the role of the state in transnational politics, where it is an important actor, though only one among many other competing ones. In the world of transnational relations, the exploitation of states by interest groups – by their assumption of roles as representatives of states or by convincing state representatives to argue their case and defend their narrow interests – is a significant class of phenomena, today as much as yesterday. Towards a Renewal of the Empirical Foundation for Security Studies Fundamentally, the sum of the foregoing list of sins blamed on the Copen- hagen school amounts to a lack of attention paid to just that ‘reality’ of security which Ole Wæver consciously chose to leave aside a decade ago in order to pursue the politics of securitization instead. I cannot claim that he is void of interest in the empirical aspects of security because much of the 1997 book is devoted to empirical concerns. However, the attention to agenda-setting – confirmed in his most recent work – draws attention away from the important issues we need to work on more closely if we want to contribute to a better understanding of European **security as it is** currently developing**.** That inevitably requires a more **consistent** interest in security policy in the making – not just in the development of alternative security policies. The dan- ger here is that, as alternative policies are likely to fail grandly on the political arena, crucial decisions may be made in the ‘**traditional’ sector of security** p**olicymaking**, **unheeded by any but the most uncritical minds.**

5. They haven’t challenged our specific truth claims—unless they can prove why our authors warrants are scenarios are constructed or wrong, then we get to weigh the proximate, warranted impacts of the aff versus the nebulous claims of the kritik

6. The alt only rejects one instance of securitization—make them prove how this lets them claim solvency for the impacts of the k when the rest of the world is entrenched in security logic

7. The plan critiques violent forms of hegemonic authority. The alternative abandons hope for political action in the name of critique

**Gunning 2007** [Jeroen, Lecturer in Int’l Politics @ U of Wales, Government and Opposition 42.3, “A Case for Critical Terrorism Studies?”]

The notion of emancipation also crystallizes the need for policy engagement. For, unless a ‘critical’ field seeks to be policy relevant, which, as Cox rightly observes, means combining ‘critical’ and ‘problem-solving’ approaches, it does not fulfil its ‘emancipatory’ potential.94 One of the temptations of ‘critical’ approaches is to remain mired in critique and deconstruction without moving beyond this to reconstruction and policy relevance.Vital as such critiques are, the challenge of a critically constituted field is also to engage with policy makers – and ‘terrorists’ – and work towards the realization of new paradigms, new practices, and a transformation, however modestly, of political structures. That, after all, is the original meaning of the notion of ‘immanent critique’ that has historically underpinned the ‘critical’ project and which, in Booth's words, involves ‘the discovery of the latent potentials in situations on which to build political and social progress’, as opposed to putting forward utopian arguments that are not realizable. Or, as Booth wryly observes, ‘this means building with one's feet firmly on the ground, not constructing castles in the air’ and asking ‘what it means for real people in real places’.96 Rather than simply critiquing the status quo, or noting the problems that come from an un-problematized acceptance of the state, a ‘critical’ approach must, in my view, also concern itself with offering concrete alternatives. Even while historicizing the state and oppositional violence, and challenging the state's role in reproducing oppositional violence, it must wrestle with the fact that ‘the concept of the modern state and sovereignty embodies a coherent response to many of the central problems of political life’, and in particular to ‘the place of violence in political life’. Even while ‘de-essentializing and deconstructing claims about security’, it must concern itself with ‘how security is to be redefined’, and in particular on what theoretical basis.97 Whether because those critical of the status quo are wary of becoming co-opted by the structures of power (and their emphasis on instrumental rationality),98 or because policy makers have, for obvious reasons (including the failure of many ‘critical’ scholars to offer policy relevant advice), a greater affinity with ‘traditional’ scholars, the role of ‘expert adviser’ is more often than not filled by ‘traditional’ scholars.99 The result is that policy makers are insufficiently challenged to question the basis of their policies and develop new policies based on immanent critiques. A notable exception is the readiness of European Union officials to enlist the services of both ‘traditional’ and ‘critical’ scholars to advise the EU on how better to understand processes of radicalization.100 But this would have been impossible if more critically oriented scholars such as Horgan and Silke had not been ready to cooperate with the EU. Striving to be policy relevant does not mean that one has to accept the validity of the term ‘terrorism’ or stop investigating the political interests behind it. Nor does it mean that each piece of research must have policy relevance or that one has to limit one's research to what is relevant for the state, since the ‘critical turn’ implies a move beyond state-centric perspectives. End-users could, and should, thus include both state and non-state actors such as the Foreign Office and the Muslim Council of Britain and Hizb ut-Tahrir; the Northern Ireland Office and the IRA and the Ulster Unionists; the Israeli government and Hamas and Fatah (as long as the overarching principle is to reduce the political use of terror, whoever the perpetrator). It does mean, though, that a critically constituted field must work hard to bring together all the fragmented voices from beyond the ‘terrorism field’, to maximize both the field's rigour and its policy relevance. Whether a critically constituted ‘terrorism studies’ will attract the fragmented voices from outside the field depends largely on how broadly the term ‘critical’ is defined. Those who assume ‘critical’ to mean ‘Critical Theory’ or ‘poststructuralist’ may not feel comfortable identifying with it if they do not themselves subscribe to such a narrowly defined ‘critical’ approach. Rather, to maximize its inclusiveness, I would follow Williams and Krause's approach to ‘critical security studies’, which they define simply as bringing together ‘many perspectives that have been considered outside of the mainstream of the discipline’.101 This means refraining from establishing new criteria of inclusion/exclusion beyond the (normative) expectation that scholars self-reflexively question their conceptual framework, the origins of this framework, their methodologies and dichotomies; and that they historicize both the state and ‘terrorism’, and consider the security and context of all, which implies among other things an attempt at empathy and cross-cultural understanding.102 Anything more normative would limit the ability of such a field to create a genuinely interdisciplinary, non-partisan and innovative framework, and exclude valuable insights borne of a broadly ‘critical’ approach, such as those from conflict resolution studies who, despite working within a ‘traditional’ framework, offer important insights by moving beyond a narrow military understanding of security to a broader understanding of human security and placing violence in its wider social context.103 Thus, a poststructuralist has no greater claim to be part of this ‘critical’ field than a realist who looks beyond the state at the interaction between the violent group and their wider social constituency.104

8. Threats aren’t arbitrary. Can’t throw out security or wish away threatening postures—we have to develop strategies for coping with threat perceptions.

Olav. F. Knudsen, Prof @ Södertörn Univ College, ‘1 [*Security Dialogue* 32.3, “Post-Copenhagen Security Studies: Desecuritizing  Securitization,” p. 360]

In the post-Cold War period,  agenda-setting has been much easier to influence than the securitization approach assumes. That change cannot be credited to the concept; the change in  security politics was already taking place in defense ministries and parlia-  ments before the concept was first launched. Indeed, securitization in my view  is more appropriate to the security politics of the Cold War years than to the  post-Cold War period.  Moreover, I have a problem with the underlying implication that it is unim-  portant whether states ‘really’ face dangers from other states or groups. In the  Copenhagen school, threats are seen as coming mainly from the actors’ own  fears, or from what happens when the fears of individuals turn into paranoid  political action. In my view, this emphasis on the subjective is a misleading  conception of threat, in that it discounts an independent existence for what-  ever is perceived as a threat. Granted, political life is often marked by misper-  ceptions, mistakes, pure imaginations, ghosts, or mirages, but such phenom-  ena do not occur simultaneously to large numbers of politicians, and hardly most of the time. During the Cold War, threats – in the sense of plausible  possibilities of danger – referred to ‘real’ phenomena, and they refer to ‘real’  phenomena now. The objects referred to are often not the same, but that is a  different matter. Threats have to be dealt with both in terms of perceptions and in  terms of the phenomena which are perceived to be threatening.  The point of Wæver’s concept of security is not the potential existence of  danger somewhere but the use of the word itself by political elites. In his 1997  PhD dissertation, he writes, ‘One can view “security” as that which is in  language theory called a speech act: it is not interesting as a sign referring to  something more real – it is the utterance itself that is the act.’   The deliberate  disregard of objective factors is even more explicitly stated in Buzan & Wæver’s joint article of the same year.   As a consequence, the phenomenon of  threat is reduced to a matter of pure domestic politics.   It seems to me that the  security dilemma, as a central notion in security studies, then loses its founda-  tion. Yet I see that Wæver himself has no compunction about referring to the  security dilemma in a recent article.  This discounting of the objective aspect of threats shifts security studies to  insignificant concerns. What has long made ‘threats’ and ‘threat perceptions’  important phenomena in the study of IR is the implication that urgent action  may be required. Urgency, of course, is where Wæver first began his argu-  ment in favor of an alternative security conception, because a convincing sense  of urgency has been the chief culprit behind the abuse of ‘security’ and the  consequent ‘politics of panic’, as Wæver aptly calls it.   Now, here – in the case  of urgency – another baby is thrown out with the Wæverian bathwater. When  real situations of urgency arise, those situations are challenges to democracy;  they are actually at the core of the problematic arising with the process of  making security policy in parliamentary democracy. But in Wæver’s world,  threats are merely more or less persuasive, and the claim of urgency is just an-  other argument. I hold that instead of ‘abolishing’ threatening phenomena  ‘out there’ by reconceptualizing them, as Wæver does, we should continue  paying attention to them, because situations with a credible claim to urgency  will keep coming back and then we need to know more about how they work  in the interrelations of groups and states (such as civil wars, for instance), not  least to find **adequate democratic procedures** for dealing with them.

9. PIKS are bad

**a.) steals the entirety of the aff—means we can’t get our best offense against a kritik, kills clash which is the key in**

**b.) detracts from questions of policymaking—we lose education about the political in favor of semantics**

**c.) justifies perm do the alternative—if the alternative can include the plan, it’s not a competitive advocacy that the neg should be able to win on**

Nietzsche

1. The K links to itself – to claim that we can’t take any positive action because that might be securitizing is to adopt passivity and fear, which is exactly what Nietzsche criticizes. We should be willing to take a leap of faith and indulge a creative act like the plan no matter what the risks.

2. Go to the alt – turn – naturalism

**(A) Inverting morality leads to naturalistic values**

**Comte-Sponville**, professor of Philosophy at the Sorbonne and author of numerous books, **‘91**

[Andre, *The Brute, the Sophist, and the Aesthete: Art in the Service of Illusion*, Why We Are Not Nietzscheans, edited by Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut, p. 33-36]

This is what Nietzsche calls his "Fundamental Innovations: In place of 'moral values,' purely naturalistic values. Naturalization of morality" *(WP,* 462.).These "naturalistic values" are, of course, of vi­talist inspiration: Every naturalism in morality—that is, every healthy morality—is dominated by an instinct of life . . . *Anti-natural* morality—that is, almost every morality which has so far been taught, revered, and preached—turns, conversely, *against* the instincts of life. *(TI,* "Morality as Anti-Nature," 4) We can see here that Nietzsche was right to feel himself singular: all phi­losophers, more or less, have affirmed that morality should conquer the instincts or, at the very least, dominate them; Nietzsche teaches that the instincts should conquer morality. Spinoza would have said: *Ultimi bar­barorum!*

**(B) Turns and outweighs their impact – naturalism leads to the worst forms of moral calculation and oppression**

MacSaorsa, ‘7

[Iain, “The Myth of Natural Law,” [www.spunk.com](http://www.spunk.com), <http://www.spunk.org/texts/otherpol/critique/sp001283.txt>]

Rights, far from being fixed, are the product of social evolution and human action, thought and emotions. What is acceptable now may become unacceptable in the future. Slavery, for example, was long considered "natural". In fact, John Locke, the "father" of "Natural Rights" was heavily involved in the slave trade. He made a fortune in violating a "natural law". Many claimed slavery was a "Natural Law". Few would say so now. The "Natural Law" cult desires to stop this evolutionary process and fix social life into what \*they\* think is good and right and use a form of argument which tries to raise their ideology above critique or thought. This denies the fundamental nature of liberty, the ability to think for yourself. Michael Bakunin writes "the liberty of man consists solely in this: that he obeys natural laws because he has \*himself\* recognised them as such, and not because they have been externally imposed upon him by any extrinsic will whatever, divine or human, collective or individual" [Bakunin on Anarchism, page 227]. The case for liberty and a free society is that every individual is unique, that all can contribute something which no other individual has noticed or thought about. It is this interaction of individuals which allows individuals, society, social customs and rights to evolve, change and develop. "Natural Law", like the state, tries to arrest this evolution. It replaces individuality with cold dogma, **placing the individual under yet another God,** destroying critical thought with a new rule book. In addition, as these "Natural Laws" are the product of human as humans, they \*must\* be applicable to \*all\* humanity. Hence the "Natural Law" cult desires to see \*one\* moral code dominate society, all other codes \*must be\* (by definition) "against nature". That the Dogma of Natural Law was only invented a few hundred years ago, in one part of the planet, does not seem to bother them. Nor the fact that for the vast majority of human existence people have lived in societies which violated almost \*all\* aspects of their "Natural Law". If "Natural Law" did exist, then all people would have discovered this "true" law years ago. As it is, the debate is still going on, with (for example) fascists and "Libertarians" each claiming "the laws of nature" (and sociobiology) as their own.

3. Perm – do the plan and then the alt. The perm is uniquely net-beneficial – it resolves the alternative’s moral relativism towards inclusion and respect for the Other

**Hatab,** Professor and Chair of Philosophy and Religious Studies Old Dominion, **‘2**

[Lawrence, Prospects for a Democratic Agon: Why We can still be Nietzscheans, Journal of Nietzsche Studies, issue 24, p. Project Muse]

Democratic respect forbids exclusion, it demands inclusion; but respect for the Other as other can avoid a vapid sense of " tolerance," a sloppy "relativism," or a misplaced spirit of "neutrality." Agonistic respect allows us to simultaneously affirm our beliefs and affirm our opponents as worthy competitors [End Page 142] in public discourse. Here we can speak of respect without ignoring the fact that politics involves perpetual disagreement, and we have an adequate answer to the question "Why should I respect a view that I do not agree with?" In this way beliefs about what is best (aristos) can be coordinated with an openness to other beliefs and a willingness to accept the outcome of an open competition among the full citizenry (demos). Democratic respect, therefore, is a dialogical mixture of affirmation and negation, a political bearing that entails giving all beliefs a hearing, refusing any belief an ultimate warrant, and perceiving one's own viewpoint as agonistically implicated with opposing viewpoints. In sum, we can combine 1) the historical tendency of democratic movements to promote free expression, pluralism, and liberation from traditional constraints, and 2) a Nietzschean perspectivism and agonistic respect, to arrive at a postmodern model of democracy that provides both a nonfoundational openness and an atmosphere of civil political discourse. [26](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_nietzsche_studies/v024/24.1hatab.html" \l "FOOT26#FOOT26) An agonistic politics construed as competitive fairness can sustain a robust conception of political rights, not as something "natural" possessed by an original self, but as an epiphenomenal, procedural notion conferred upon citizens in order to sustain viable political practice. Constraints on speech, association, access, and so on, simply insure lopsided political contests. We can avoid metaphysical models of rights and construe them as simply social and political phenomena: social in the sense of entailing reciprocal recognition and obligation; political in the sense of being guaranteed and enforced by the state. We can even defend so-called positive rights, such as a right to an adequate education, as requisite for fair competition in political discourse. Rights themselves can be understood as agonistic in that a right-holder has a claim against some treatment by others or for some provision that might be denied by others. In this way rights can be construed as balancing power relations in social milieus, as a partial recession of one's own power on behalf of the power of others—which in fact is precisely how Nietzsche in an early work described fairness and rights (D 112). And, as is well known, the array of rights often issues conflicts of different and differing rights, and political life must engage in the ongoing balancing act of negotiating these tensions, a negotiation facilitated by precisely not defining rights as discrete entities inviolably possessed by an originating self.

4. Alternative can’t overcome the link – society is founded on universal systems of morality that the alternative ignores or can’t overcome

5. Nietzsche justifies treating human beings as disposable, which is exactly what our 1AC criticizes. The will to power simply becomes the will to control and removes all meaning to life – turns the K.

Hicks 03 Prof and Chair of Philosophy @ Queens College of the CUNY

(Steven V., “Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Foucault: Nihilism and Beyond,” *Foucault and Heidegger: Critical Encounters*, Ed. Alan Milchman and Alan Rosenberg, P. 109, Questia)

Here again, one might raise objections to Heidegger's equating of Nietzsche's doctrine of will to power with the metaphysics of subjectivity. After all, Nietzsche often attacked Descartes's “ego cogito” as a logical or linguistic fiction (cf. BGE, §§ 16, 54). Yet according to Heidegger, Nietzsche still follows Descartes's lead in making human beings the subject or foundation of things. Unlike Descartes, however, Nietzsche's subject is not a fixed mental substance, but the body interpreted as a center of instincts, drives, affects, and sublimations, i.e., as will to power. Heidegger claims that this “body as given” idea still involves Nietzsche in a “fixity” that brings him into the philosophy of presence: “Nietzsche argues that being is as fixated, as permanent” (N, 2:200). And this forced sense of presence, Heidegger thinks, leads to the dangers of “radical objectifiability” and to the “disposability of beings, ” i.e., treating beings as nothing but objects of use, control, and management. 32 Moreover, like its Cartesian counterpart, the Nietzschean subject reins supreme over the whole of beings and posits “the measure for the beingness of every … being” (N, 4:121). 33 In claiming that “truths are illusions” and that “Being is an empty fiction, ” Nietzsche “fashions for the subject an absolute power to enjoin what is true and what is false” and hence to define what it means “to be” or “not to be” a being (N, 4:145). According to Nietzsche, what is true—what has being—is that which serves the interest of the subject whose essence is will to power (in the mode of existence of eternal recurrence; cf. N, 2:203). Being is thus reduced to the status of a value or a “condition of the preservation and enhancement of the will to power” (N, 4:176). This is why Heidegger considers Nietzsche the “consummation, ” and not the overcoming, of Western metaphysics: by reducing Being to a value, the doctrine of will to power makes the nihilism of the metaphysical tradition (the assumption that Being itself is nothing and the human will everything) a matter of philosophical principle. 34 Thus Nietzsche's “counter-ideals” of will to power and eternal recurrence, far from overcoming nihilism, actually express or exemplify the loss of any sense of Being, or the withdrawal of Being itself, in favor of beings (i.e., products of human will). As Heidegger reads him, Nietzsche understands Being in terms of value (or what is useful for enhancing the human will) because Being itself has totally withdrawn in default. And this brings to completion traditional metaphysics, which, according to Heidegger, is the history of Being in its withdrawal. As Heidegger sees it, Nietzsche's metaphysics of will to power is “the most extreme withdrawal of Being” and thus “the fulfillment of nihilism proper” (N, 4:204, 232). So Nietzsche brings to completion, in his **denial of Being**, the very nihilism he wanted to overcome. Far from twisting free of the ascetic ideal, Heidegger claims, Nietzsche 's doctrine of will to power actually provides the basis for its most complete expression in the modern “secularized” ascetic “will-tocontrol” everything. In other words, instead of seeking salvation in a transcendent world by means of ascetic self-denial—the aspect of metaphysics that Nietzsche most obviously rejects—salvation is now, Heidegger claims, sought “exclusively in the free self-development of all the creative powers of man” (N, 4:89). This unlimited expanding of power for power's sake parallels in many ways what Nietzsche characterized as the most terrifying aspect of the ascetic ideal: the pursuit of “truth for truth's sake.” It is, according to Heidegger, the “hidden thorn” in the side of modern humanity (cf. N, 4:99). This “hidden thorn” expresses itself variously in the Protestant “work ethic” and in the “iron cage” of bureaucratic-technological rationality (discussed in the works of Max Weber); it also expresses itself in the various power aims of modern scientific/technological culture as well as in the frenzied impulse to produce and consume things at ever faster rates. Heidegger even suggests that Nietzsche's own figure of the Overman (Ubermensch) foreshadows the calculating, technological attitude of modern secularized asceticism: “His Overman [stands] for the technological worker-soldier who would disclose all entities as standingreserve necessary for **enhancing the ultimately aimless quest for power** for its own sake.”35 This emerging technological human, grounded in a control-oriented anthropocentrism, compels entities to reveal only those one-dimensional aspects of themselves that are consistent with the power aims of a technological/productionist culture. Instead of dwelling and thinking in a world unified by what Heidegger metaphorically terms the “fourfold of earth and sky, gods and mortals, ” impoverished modern technocrats occupy a world “bereft of gods” in which thinking becomes calculating, and dwelling becomes tantamount to the “technological domination of nature” and what Nietzsche calls “the common economic management of the earth” in which “mankind will be able to find its best meaning as a machine in the service of this economy” (WP, § 866). Thus citizens come to be viewed primarily as consumers, wilderness is looked upon in terms of “wildlife management areas, ” and genuine human freedom is “replaced by the organized global conquest of the earth, and the thrust into outer space” (N, 4:248). As Heidegger sees it, “our era entertains the illusion that man, having become free for his humanity, has freely taken the universe into his power and disposition” (N, 4:248). In summary, Nietzsche tried to combat the nihilism of the ascetic ideal (e.g., the collapse of the Christian table of values) by bringing forth new nonascetic values that would enhance rather than devalue humanity's will to power. According to Heidegger, however, instead of overcoming nihilism, Nietzsche simply **reinforced it.** By characterizing Being as an “empty fiction” and “the last smoke of a vaporized reality ” (TI, 2:2, 481), and by degrading it to the status of a value for enhancing the subject's will to power, Nietzsche **loses any sense of Being as such**. For him it is a mere nothing, a “nihil.” And this brings to completion the “fundamental movement” of history in the West, which is nihilism: the withdrawal of Being itself and the consequent focus on beings as objects for “consolidating the power of Will and for expanding it out beyond itself” in an ever-increasing spiral. 36 As Heidegger sees it, this “eternally recurring” will to power, or “will to will, ” is a will-to-control that only **reinforces the nihilism** Nietzsche feared: the **loss of meaning or direction, the devaluation of the highest values, the “constructs of domination, ” and the devotion to frenzied consumption and production**.

Heidegger

1. Perm do both – calculative thought is necessary in the short term – the alt overcomes any residual links

2. Case outweighs – Extinction kills everyone – voting aff allows us to live and fight another day

3. Death precedes all other impacts – it ontologically destroys the subject and prevents any alternative way of knowing the world

**Paterson 3** [Department of Philosophy, Providence College, Rhode Island Craig, “A Life Not Worth Living?”, Studies in Christian Ethics, <http://sce.sagepub.com>]

Contrary to those accounts, I would argue that it is death per se that is really the objective evil for us, not because it deprives us of a prospective future of overall good judged better than the alter- native of non-being. It cannot be about harm to a former person who has ceased to exist, for no person actually suffers from the sub-sequent non-participation. Rather, death in itself is an evil to us because it ontologically destroys the current existent subject — it is the ultimate in metaphysical lightening strikes.80 The evil of death is truly an ontological evil borne by the person who already exists, independently of calculations about better or worse possible lives. Such an evil need not be consciously experienced in order to be an evil for the kind of being a human person is. Death is an evil because of the change in kind it brings about, a change that is destructive of the type of entity that we essentially are. Anything, whether caused naturally or caused by human intervention (intentional or unin- tentional) that drastically interferes in the process of maintaining the person in existence is an objective evil for the person. What is crucially at stake here, and is dialectically supportive of the self-evidency of the basic good of human life, is that death is a radical interference with the current life process of the kind of being that we are. In consequence, death itself can be credibly thought of as a ‘primitive evil’ for all persons, regardless of the extent to which they are currently or prospectively capable of participating in a full array of the goods of life.81 In conclusion, concerning willed human actions, it is justifiable to state that any intentional rejection of human life itself cannot therefore be warranted since **it is an expression of an ultimate disvalue for the subject,** namely, the destruction of the present person; a radical ontological good that we cannot begin to weigh objectively against the travails of life in a rational manner. To deal with the sources of disvalue (pain, suffering, etc.) we should not seek to irrationally destroy the person, the very source and condition of all human possibility.82

4. Doesn’t solve the Case - Ontology has no connection to empirical reality

David **McClean** (philosopher, writer and business consultant, conducted graduate work in philosophy at NYU) **2001** “The cultural left and the limits of social hope” http://www.american-philosophy.org/archives/past\_conference\_programs/pc2001/Discussion%20papers/david\_mcclean.htm

There is a lot of philosophical prose on the general subject of social justice. Some of this is quite good, and some of it is quite bad. What distinguishes the good from the bad is not merely the level of erudition. Displays of high erudition are gratuitously reflected in much of the writing by those, for example, still clinging to Marxian ontology and is often just a useful smokescreen which shrouds a near total disconnect from empirical reality. This kind of political writing likes to make a lot of references to other obscure, jargon-laden essays and tedious books written by other true believers - the crowd that takes the fusion of Marxian and Freudian private fantasies seriously. Nor is it the lack of scholarship that makes this prose bad. Much of it is well "supported" by footnotes referencing a lode of other works, some of which are actually quite good. Rather, what makes this prose bad is its utter lack of relevance to extant and critical policy debates, the passage of actual laws, and the amendment of existing regulations that might actually do some good for someone else. The writers of this bad prose are too interested in our arrival at some social place wherein we will finally emerge from our "inauthentic" state into something called "reality." Most of this stuff, of course, comes from those steeped in the Continental tradition (particularly post-Kant). While that tradition has much to offer and has helped shape my own philosophical sensibilities, it is anything but useful when it comes to truly relevant philosophical analysis, and no self-respecting Pragmatist can really take seriously the strong poetry of formations like "authenticity looming on the ever remote horizons of fetishization." What Pragmatists see instead is the hope that we can fix some of the social ills that face us if we treat policy and reform as more important than Spirit and Utopia.

5. The alternative can’t yield positive change – ontological examination results in political apathy or authoritarianism

**Thiele, ‘3** [Leslie, Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida. “The Ethics and Politics of Narrative” Foucault and Heidegger: Critical Encounters**]**

The pursuit of knowledge continues unabated for the skeptic. Yet it proceeds with a suspicious eye. There are inherent limitations toand a price to pay for-the pursuit of knowledge. Charles Scott describes Foucault's efforts in this regard: "Far from the skepticism that argues that nothing is really knowable ... genealogies embody a sense of the historical limits that define our capacities for knowing and believing. Things are known. But they are known in ways that have considerable social and cultural costs."" Both Heidegger and Foucault maintain[s] that there is no legitimate basis for the radical skeptic's conviction that knowledge is impossible or unworthy of pursuit. This sort of skepticism, Heidegger states, consists merely in an "addiction to doubt."? The skeptical nature of political philosophical thought, in contrast, is grounded in the imperative of endless inquiry. The point for Heidegger and Foucault is to inquire not in order to sustain doubt, but to doubt that one might better sustain inquiry. At the same time, inquiry is tempered with a sensibility of the ethico-political costs of any "knowledge" that is gained. Doing political philosophy of this sort might be likened to walking on a tightrope. If vertigo is experienced, a precarious balance may be lost. Falling to one side leaves one mired in apathy, cynicism, and apoliticism. This results when skeptical inquiry degenerates into a radical skepticism, an addictive doubt that denies the value of (the search for) knowledge and undermines the engagements of collective life, which invariably demand commitment (based on tentatively embraced knowledge). Falling to the other side of the tightrope leaves one mired in dogmatic belief or blind activism. Authoritarian ideologies come to serve as stable foundations, or a reactive iconoclasm leads to irresponsible defiance. Apathy, cynicism, and apoliticism, on the one side, and dogmatic authoritarianism or reactive iconoclasm, on the other, are the dangerous consequences of losing one's balance. These states of mind and their corresponding patterns of behavior relieve the vertigo of political philosophical inquiry, but at a prohibitive cost. It has been argued that Foucault did not so much walk the tightrope of political philosophy as straddle it, at times leaving his readers hopeless and cynical, at times egging them on to an irresponsible monkeywrenching. For some, the Foucauldian flight from the ubiquitous powers of normalization undermines any defensible normative position. Hopelessness accompanies lost innocence. Cynicism or nihilism become the only alternatives for those who spurn all ethical and political foundations. By refusing to paint a picture of a better future, Foucault is said to undercut the impetus to struggle. Others focus on Foucault's development of a "tool kit" whose contents are to be employed to deconstruct the apparatuses of modern power. Yet the danger remains that Foucault's "hyperactive" tool-kit users will be unprincipled activists, Luddites at best, terrorists at worst. In either case, Foucault provides no overarching theoretical vision. Indeed, Foucault is upfront about his rejection of ethical and political theories and ideals. "I think that to imagine another system is to extend our participation in the present system," Foucault stipulates. "Reject theory and all forms of general discourse. This need for theory is still part of the system we reject."!" One might worry whether action is meant to take the place of thought. If Foucault occasionally straddles the tightrope of political philosophy, Heidegger obviously stumbled off it. In the 1930S, Heidegger enclosed himself within an authoritarian system of thought grounded in ontological reifications of a "folk" and its history. Heidegger's historicization of metaphysics led him to believe that a new philosophic epoch was about to be inaugurated. It implicitly called for a philosophical Fuehrer who could put an end to two millennia of ontological forgetting. The temptation for Heidegger to identify himself as this intellectual messiah and to attach himself to an authoritarian social and political movement capable of sustaining cultural renewal proved irresistible. Whether Heidegger ever fully recovered his balance has been the topic of much discussion. Some argue that Heidegger's prerogative for political philosophizing was wholly undermined by his infatuation with folk destiny, salvational gods, and political authority. 12

6. Perm solves best - change can only come from within the system

**Feenberg, ’99** [Andrew, Professor of Philosophy at San Diego State Univ. Questioning Technology. Routledge. Pages 104-105]

The student movements and the counterculture of the 196os demanded self-management and participatory democracy as antidotes to what they saw as technocracy triumphant. Modern society was thought to suffer not from economic exploitation but from technical domination. This background explains the popularity of Marcuse's One-Dimensional Man and other similarly pessimistic social critiques. But these gloomy accounts of modern life left little or no room for change. The conceptual line between the left dystopian critique and the positivist celebration of technocracy was surprisingly thin. Theoretically, the critique was very nearly self-cancelling. In practice dystopianism was so influential in stimulating opposi­tion to the closed system it described that thirty years later its exaggera­tions are obvious. While the technocratic tendency of modern societies is no illusion, it is nowhere near as total as its adversaries once feared. Political action is still possible and indeed has on occasion been effective despite the obstacles. These issues were prominent in the political debates of the 196os, when for the first time the left called technical progress into question. In that period the idea of resistance was shaped by such large-scale movements as the May Events of 1968, the antiwar movement, and the urban riots in American cities. Technology appeared to be an enemy compara­ble to the state; hence anti-technocratic struggle was sometimes con­ceived on the model of political revolution. Actions such as burying a car in celebration of Earth Day and the destruction of a mainframe com­puter at a Canadian University carried this position to its logical conclu­sion. When revolution failed, some of the rebels actually returned to the land to escape the mechanical embrace of the "System." Times have changed. There is a certain continuity in the themes of contemporary political movements, which still focus on race, gender, and the environment, but activism today is far more modest in its ambitions. We have come to recognize politics in smaller interventions in social life, sometimes called "micropolitics," a situational politics based on local knowledge and action. Micropolitics has no general strategy and offers no global challenge to the society. It involves many diverse but converging activities with long-term subversive impacts. This approach is particularly relevant in the technical sphere where it is difficult to con­ceive totalizing strategies of change**.** Certainly communist societies failed in this project. Soviet Communism was unable to move from its original modernizing strategy to a transition to socialism. Mao's Cultural Revolution is now generally regarded as a technical disaster. Nor were radical critics in the West more successful in defining a total response. Marcuse's absolute refusal is a tragic moral posture, not an effective political stance. Heidegger's out­right rejection of agency is not a true alternative to instrumental control but merely its abstract negation. Political events have long since over­taken these negative postures. What we have learned is that even if no totalizing approach makes sense, the tensions in the industrial system can be grasped on a local basis from "within," by individuals immediately engaged in technically mediated activities and able to actualize ambiva­lent potentialities suppressed by the prevailing technological rationality. I call this "democratic rationalization." It starts out from the conse­quences of technology itself, from the ways in which it mobilizes the population around technical mediations. In the new technical politics, the social groups so constituted turn back reflexively on the framework that defines and organizes them: "we," as patients, users of a domestic computer system, participants in a division of labor, neighbors of a pol­luting plant, are the actors. It is this sort of agency that holds the promise of a democratization of technology. Technical politics foreshad­ows a world in which technology, as a kind of social "legislation" affect­ing every aspect of our lives, will emerge from these new types of public consultation.

7. The alternative dooms us to extinction – acting to avoid nuclear war outweighs heideggarian insights, heres comparative evidence

Ronald E. **Santoni** (Phil. Prof @ Denison) **1985**, Nuclear War, ed. Fox and Groarke, p. 156-7

To be sure, Fox sees the need for our undergoing “certain fundamental changes” in our “thinking, beliefs, attitudes, values” and Zimmerman calls for a “paradigm shift” in our thinking about ourselves, other, and the Earth. But it is not clear that what either offers as suggestions for what we can, must, or should do in the face of a runaway arms race are sufficient to “wind down” the arms race before it leads to omnicide. In spite of the importance of Fox’s analysis and reminders it is not clear that “admitting our (nuclear) fear and anxiety” to ourselves and “identifying the mechanisms that dull or mask our emotional and other responses” represent much more than examples of basic, often. stated principles of psychotherapy. Being aware of the psychological maneuvers that keep us numb to nuclear reality may well be the road to transcending them but it must only be a “first step” (as Fox acknowledges), during which we Simultaneously act to eliminate nuclear threats, break our complicity with the ams race, get rid of arsenals of genocidal weaponry, and create conditions for international goodwill, mutual trust, and creative interdependence. Similarly, in respect to Zimmerman: in spite of the challenging Heideggerian insights he brings out regarding what motivates the arms race, many questions may be raised about his prescribed “solutions.” Given our need for a paradigm shift in our (distorted) understanding of ourselves and the rest of being, are we merely left “to prepare for a possible shift in our self-understanding? (italics mine)? Is this all we can do? Is it necessarily the case that such a shift “cannot come as a result of our own will?” – and work – but only from “a destiny outside our control?” Does this mean we leave to God the matter of bringing about a paradigm shift? Granted our fears and the importance of not being controlled by fears, as well as our “anthropocentric leanings,” should we be as cautious as Zimmerman suggests about out disposition “to want to do something” or “to act decisively in the face of the current threat?” In spite of the importance of our taking on the anxiety of our finitude and our present limitation, does it follow that “we should be willing for the worst (i.e. an all-out nuclear war) to occur”? Zimmerman wrongly, I contend, equates “resistance” with “denial” when he says that “as long as we resist and deny the possibility of nuclear war, that possibility will persist and grow stronger.” He also wrongly perceives “resistance” as presupposing a clinging to the “order of things that now prevails.” Resistance connotes opposing, and striving to defeat a prevailing state of affairs that would allow or encourage the “worst to occur.” I submit, against Zimmerman, that we should not, in any sense, be willing for nuclear war or omnicide to occur. (This is not to suggest that we should be numb to the possibility of its occurrence.) Despite Zimmerman’s elaborations and refinements his Heideggerian notion of “letting beings be” continues to be too permissive in this regard. In my judgment, an individual’s decision not to act against and resist his or her government’s preparations for nuclear holocaust is, as I have argued elsewhere, to be an early accomplice to the most horrendous crime against life imaginable – its annihilation. The Nuremburg tradition calls not only for a new way of thinking, a “new internationalism” in which we all become co-nurturers of the whole planet, but for resolute actions that will sever our complicity with nuclear criminality and the genocidal arms race, and work to achieve a future which we can no longer assume. We must not only “come face to face with the unthinkable in image and thought” (Fox) but must act now - with a “new consciousness” and conscience - to prevent the unthinkable, by cleansing the earth of nuclear weaponry. Only when that is achieved wll ultimate violence be removed as the final arbiter of our planet’s fate.

8. Turn – Authoritarianism

The alternative necessitates blindness which guarantees totalitariansim

Slavoj **Zizek 1999** “The Ticklish Subject” p. 13-5

As Heidegger himself put it, those who came closest to the ontological Truth are condemned to err at the ontic level…err about what? Precisely about the line of separation between ontic and ontological. The paradox not to be underestimated is that the very philosopher who focused his interest on the enigma of ontological difference- who warned again and again against the metaphysical mistake of conferring ontological dignity on some ontic content (God as the highest Entity, for example) – fell into the trap of conferring on Nazism the ontological dignity of suiting the essence of modern man. The standard defence of Heidegger against the reproach of his Nazi past consists of two points: not only was his Nazi engagement a simple error (a ‘stupidity [dummheit]’, as Heidegger himself put it) in no way inherently related to his philosophical project: the main counter-argument is that it is Heidegger’s own philosophy that enables us to discern the true epochal roots of modern totalitarianism. However, what remains unthought here is the hidden complicity between the ontological indifference towards concrete social systems (capitalism, Facism, Communism), in so far as they all belong to the same horizon of modern technology, and the secred privelgin of a concret sociopolitical model (Nazism with Heidegger, Communism with some ‘Heideggerian Marxists’) as closer to the ontological truth of our epoch. Here one should avoid the trap that caught Heidegger’s defenders, who dismissed Heidegger’s Nazi engagement as a simple anomaly, a fall into the ontic level, in blatant contradiction to his thought, which teaches us not to confuse ontological horizon with ontic choices (as we have already seen, Heidegger is at his strongest when he demonstrates how, on a deeper structural level, ecolocial, conservative, and so on, oppositions to the modern universe of technology are already embedded in the horizon of what they purport to reject: the ecological critique of the technological exploitation of nature ultimately leads to a more ‘environmentally sound’ technology, etc.). Heidegger did not engage in the Nazi political project ‘in spite of’ his ontological philosophical approach, but because of it: this engagement was not ‘beneath’ his philosophical level – on the contrary, if one is to understand Heidegger, the key point is to grasp the complicity (In Hegelese: ‘speculative identity’) between the elevation above ontic concerns and the passionity ‘ontic’ Nazi political engagement. One can now see the ideological trap that caught Heidegger: when he criticizes Nazi racism on behalf of the true ‘inner greatness’ of the Nazi movement, he repeats the elementary ideological gesture of maintaining an inner distance towards the ideological text – of claiming that there is something more beneath it, a non-ideological kernel ideology exerts its hold over us by means of this ver insistence that the cause we adhere to is not ‘merely’ ideological. So where is the trap? When the disappointed Heidegger turns away from active engagemtn in the Nazi movement, he does so because the Nazi movement did not maintain the level of it ‘inner greatness’, but legitimized itself with inadequate (racial) ideology. In other words, what he expected from it was that it should legitimize itself through direct awareness of its ‘inner greatness’. And the problem lies in this very expectation that a political movement that will directly refer to its historico-ontological foundation is possible. This expectation, however, is in itself profoundly metaphysical, in so far as it fails to recognize that the gap separating the direct ideological legitimization of a movement form its ‘inner greatness’ (its historico-ontological essence) is constitutive, a positive condition of its ‘functioning’. To use the terms of the later Heidegger, ontological insight necessary entails ontic blindness and error, and vice versa – that is to say, in order to be ‘effective’ at the ontic level, one must disregard the ontological horizon of one’s activity. (In this sense, Heidegger emphasizes that ‘sicence doesn’t thing’ and that, far from being its limitation, this inability is the very motor of scientific progress.) In other words, what Heidegger seems unable to endorse is a concrete political engagement that would accept its necessary, constitutive blindness – as if the moment we acknowledge th gap separating the awareness of the ontological horizon from ontic engagement, any ontic engagement is depreciated, loses authentic dignity.

This precludes engagement with the other – makes violence inevitable

**Levinas, ’96** [Emmanuel, Professor of Philosophy at the Sorbonne, Levinas Basic Philosophical Writings, p. 9-10]

In relation to beings in the opening of being, comprehension finds a signification for them on the basis of being. In this sense, it does not invoke these beings but only names them, thus accomplishing a violence and a negation. A partial negation which is violence. This partiality is indicated by the fact that, without disappearing, those beings are in my power. Partial negation, which is violence, denies the independence of a being: it belongs to me. Possession is the mode whereby a being, while existing, is partially denied. It is not only a question of the fact that the being is an instrument, a tool, that is to say, a means. It is an end also. As consumable, it is nourishment, and in enjoyment, it offers itself, gives itself, belongs to me. To be sure, vision measures my power over the object, but it is already enjoyment. The encounter with the other (autrui) consists in the fact that despite the extent of my domination and his slavery, I do not possess him. He does not enter entirely into the opening of being where I already stand, as in the field of my freedom. It is not starting from being in general that he comes to meet me. Everything which comes to me from the other (autrui) starting from being in general certainly offers itself to my comprehension and possession. I understand him in the framework of his history, his surroundings and habits. That which escapes comprehension in the other (autrui) is him, a being. I cannot negate him partially, in violence, in grasping him within the horizon of being in general and possessing him. The Other (Autrui) is the sole being whose negation can only announce itself as total: as murder. The Other (Autrui) is the sole being I can wish to kill. I can wish. " And yet this power is quite the contrary of power. The triumph of this power is its defeat as power. At the very moment when my power to kill realizes itself, the other (autrui) has escaped me. I can, for sure, in killing attain a goal; I can kill as I hunt or slaughter animals, or as I fell trees. But when I have grasped the other (autrui) in the opening of being in general, as an element of the world where I stand, where I have seen him on the horizon, I have not looked at him in the face, I have not encountered his face. The temptation of total negation, measuring the infinity of this attempt and its impossibility - this is the presence of the face. To be in relation with the other (autrui) face to face is to be unable to kill. It is also the situation of discourse. If things are only things, this is because the relation with them is established as comprehension. As beings, they let themselves be overtaken from the perspective of being and of a totality that lends them a signification. The immediate is not an object of comprehension. An immediate given of con- sciousness is a contradiction in terms. To be given is to be exposed to the ruse of the understanding, to be seized by the mediation of a concept, by the light of being in general, by way of a detour, "in a roundabout way." To be given is to signify on the basis of what one is not. The relation with the face, speech, an event of collectivity, is a relation with beings as such, as pure beings. That the relation with a being is the invocation of a face and already speech, a relation with a certain depth rather than with a horizon - a breach in the horizon - that my neighbor is the being par excellence, can indeed appear somewhat surprising when one is accustomed to the conception of a being that is by itself insignificant, a profile against a luminous horizon and only acquiring signification in virtue of its presence within this horizon. The face signifies otherwise. In it the infinite resistance of a being to our power affirms itself precisely against the murderous will that it defies; because, completely naked (and the nakedness of the face is not a figure of style), the face signifies itself. We cannot even say that the face is an opening, for this would be to make it relative to an environing plenitude. Can things take on a face? Is not art an activity that lends faces to things? Does not the facade of a house regard us? The analysis thus far does not suffice for an answer. We ask ourselves all the same if the impersonal but fascinating and magical march of rhythm does not, in art, substitute itself for sociality, for the face, for speech. To comprehension and signification grasped within a horizon, we oppose the signifyingness of the face. Will the brief indications by which we have introduced this notion allow us to catch sight of its role in comprehension itself and of all the conditions which delineate a sphere of relations barely suspected? In any case, that which we catch sight of seems suggested by the practical philosophy of Kant, to which we feel particularly close. In what way the vision of the face is no longer vision but audition and speech; how the encounter with the face - that is, moral consciousness - can be described as the condition of consciousness tout court and of disclosure; how consciousness is affirmed as the impossibility of killing; what are the conditions of the appearance of the face as the temptation and the impossibility of murder; how I can appear to myself as a face; in what manner, finally, the relation with the other (autrui) or the collectivity is our relation, irreducible to comprehension, with the infinite - these are the themes that proceed from this first contestation of the primacy of ontology. Philosophical research, in any case, cannot be content with a mere reflection on the self or on existence. Reflection offers only the tale of a personal adventure, of a private soul, which returns incessantly to itself, even when it seems to flee itself. The human only lends itself to a relation that is not a power.

9. The only way to access being is through ethics – the alt precludes ontology

**Merleau, ‘4** [Chloë Taylor, doctoral candidate in philosophy @ University of Toronto, Canada, “Levinasian Ethics and Feminist Ethics of Care.”, www.sspp.us/Protected-Essays/2004-SPEP-Merleau.doc]

Levinas argues against the Western philosophic tradition, and against Heidegger in particular, that ontology is not fundamental. Rather, for Levinas, ethics, a relation to and for an other, is prior to being, grounding human existence. Before we “are,” we are already in a relation to others, whatever the order of the verb in this sentence. It is therefore a mistake to begin by theorizing what the being of the self is, independent of its relations of vulnerability and responsiveness to others, because the self never is independent of or prior to these ethical terms. Ethics is the fundamental human experience, and is grounded in relations to others. Mainstream ethical philosophy, however, has inherited the notion of the self assumed by traditional metaphysics, and thus has been concerned with a subject it presumes to be autonomous and free, independent of others and faced with abstract questions about its own rights, duties, and freedoms.[[1]](#footnote-1) Even the duties towards others that such ethical theories imagine have typically been duties towards other abstractly-conceived autonomous agents who are the same as ourselves, and first and foremost is the duty to not interfere in their rights and freedoms. Philosophy has thus not conceived of ethics as it occurs in our most fundamental experiences, as a responsiveness to others who are vulnerable to us and to whom we are vulnerable, and with whom we are in encounters and relations which involve difference and inequalities in power. Philosophy has not, therefore, approached ethics in terms of the situations in which it is perhaps most frequently and most desperately required, in relation to those who are exposed to us in need, requiring our interference and response.

1. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)