# 2NC Security

## Links

### A2: No Link - Generic

#### The aff’s one minded goal of preventing claims of extinction and claims of terrorism is just a product of security logic. They’re incorporating security as normal, daily discourse, marginalizing all else for the sake of security. The way they characterize their impacts, the way they claim solvency to existential threats is just a guise to justify the annihilation of entire communities. They are constructing threats and making them seem real to create a sense of security when 1) the threat never existed and 2) they’re not actually secure – that’s Lundborg and Vaughan-Williams

### A2: NIB – Economy Link

#### There are five different internal links to their economy advantage and none have a credible scenario.

#### 1st is congestion – there IS NEITHER CORRELATION NOR CAUSATION between congestion and economy. So what if there is congestion, it’s not like it’s going to collapse employment, uncertainty, and the economy… status quo proves -- and if it does, the plan can’t solve because in that case congestion is inevitable – that’s on case

#### 2nd is state budgets – THERE REALLY IS NO INTERNAL LINK – their cards, let alone their TAGS describe how the plan exactly solves state deficit spending. Deficits in the status quo have led to the currently terrible economic climate. The plan only perpetuates this situation because all it does is increase the national debt.

#### 3rd is investor uncertainty – if this argument is true, the case turns itself – because when the federal government pumps money into the economy, private investors know the economy is low and investor confidence decreases. AND the Ricardian effect means fiscal austerity is the best solution to investor uncertainty

**Farrell and Quiggin, ‘12**

[Henry Farrell: associate professor of political science and international affairs @ GWU, John Quiggin: Austrailian economist, Professor and an Australian Research Council Federation Fellow and a Laureate Fellow at the University of Queensland and a Climate Change Authority of Australian Government Board Member, 3/9/2012, Consensus, Dissensus and Economic Ideas: The Rise and Fall of Keynesianism During the Economic Crisis (George Washington University) <http://www.cedes.uerj.br/documentos/artigos/Consensus%20Dissensus%20and%20Economic%20Ideas%20The%20Rise%20and%20Fall%20of%20Keynesianism%20during%20the%20economic%20crisis.pdf>]

Over late 2009 and early 2010, the European Central Bank had became ever more insistent¶ on the need for European countries to return to normal patterns of spending, and¶ in particular for members of Economic and Monetary Union to make a speedy transition¶ back to compliance with the requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact. Bank officials¶ were increasingly comfortable in arguing against Keynesian scal stimulus, and in favor of¶ an alternative approach based on shoring up market and consumer con dence.¶ we started to change tune and say \well, Keynesian multipliers are not¶ the only thing to look at, there are also so-called confidence effects. . . . the¶ Ricardian effect . . . will restrain consumption rates today which will mean that¶ you negate the whole effect you had in mind. And vice-versa, if you can prove¶ today that you are fiscally responsible, consumers will know that there will be¶ no further tax increases coming, and might refrain from cautionary savings,¶ which will help you further on the real side." . . . There has been a great paper¶ by John Taylor at the time that looks at discretionary fiscal expansion programs¶ in the US over 50-60 years, and found their effects to be at best ambiguous and¶ at worst actually harmful. . . .We've been doing the econometrics of this for¶ decades now - we have come to some sort of consensus which basically went out¶ of the window within weeks. I don't think it ever really went out of the window¶ in the ECB.¶ Such claims were supported by o cials of the European Commission, which began to¶ argue against further scal stimulus, and in favor of initiatives (which would not uncoincidentally¶ expand the Commission's competences) to support scal rectitude in the member¶ states.

#### 4th is stimulus – cross-apply the disad here – further explanation will be on case and the DA

#### 5th is jobs – jobs might be key to improve the economy, but it isn’t the single most important component to prevent economic collapse. In the 2008 recession, there were a lot of job lay-offs and a spike in unemployment rates and yet there wasn’t economic collapse, let alone a global nuclear war. There aren’t any warrants to this claim in the 1AC or 2AC so no new 1AR arguments.

<insert generic here>

### A2: Ayson

#### Their Ayson evidence is story-book retelling of Iraq all over again when Bush claimed the Saddam Huessein and Al-Qaeda possessed nuclear weapons and launched a “preventative attack” that killed hundreds of Americans and even more innocent Iraqi civilians. A bunch of “would’s” and “could’s” but never any real threat.

#### How many more times will we have to embrace this marginalization of human life in the name of national security before we realize that it doesn’t works? We invaded Vietnam under the semblance of fighting communism, we invaded Iraq to supposedly preve

## Impacts

### A2: Extinction

#### And the affirmative is missing the fundamental point. The biggest impact in the round is not extinction but is the systemic violence that occur in the name of national and personal security. The fact that the aff keeps reverting to big magnitude impacts is precisely what we are critiquing. Securitization against the “other” and the “threat of destruction” authorizes any form of force on the illusionary premise of “preserving the existence of everyone.” Under their interpretation, any threat, whether big or small, whether realistic or improbable, justifies preemptory action, no matter how potentially annihilating – only a step back from this type of security logic allows genuine political thinking – that’s Neocleous

#### AND they artificially inflate the magnitude of the impact, and to that degree can’t actually solve it. For example:

#### <explain their internal link scenario here>

### \*\*Cards\*\*

Their reliance on security suffers from serial policy failure – and the attendant endless production of new threats to be countered creates an endless politics of war

Dillon and Reed 09 (IR professor @ Lancaster University; Lecturer @ King’s College London, “The Liberal Way of Killing: Killing to Make Live”)

There is, third, the additional critical attribute of contingency. It is this feature which does not merely add governing through contingency to the political rationalities and governmental technologies of contemporary liberal rule. It lends its own distinctive infection to them; one which has had a profound impact on the nature of liberal rule and war in relation, especially, to its current hyperbolicization of security and its newly problematized and proliferating accounts of dangers, threats and enemies. For if the biopolitical imperative is that of making life live, the martial expression of that imperative, the drive to liberal war, is preparedness to make war on the enemies of life. The biopoltiical imperative to make life live finds its expression today, however in making life live the emergency of its emergence; for that is what species life is now said to be. The liberal way of rule and war has thus become the preparedness to make war on whatever threatens life’s capacity to live the emergency of its emergence. For allied to the radical contingency of species existence is an account of species existence as a life of continuous complex adaptation and emergence. From the perspective of security and war, in particular, such a pluripotent life, characterized by its continuously unfolding potential, is a life that is continuously becoming-dangerous to itself, and to other life forms. Such danger is not merely actual; because life itself, here has become not merely actual. The emphasis in the problematization of danger which accompanies such a politics of life itself therefore also shifts dramatically from the actual to the virtual. Only this explains the astonishing degree to which the historically secure lives of the Atlantic basin have come to construe themselves, politically, as radically endangered by as many unknown as there are unknowable dangers; a point regularly and frankly admitted, officially, from terror to health mandarins, nationally and internationally. Many have observed that the societies of the Atlantic basin are now increasingly ruled by fear; that there is a politics of fear. But they interpret this politics of fear in political naïve ways, as the outcome of deliberate machination by political and economic elites. They may well be correct to some degree. But what is perfectly evident, also, is that the elites themselves are governed by the very grid of intelligibility furnished by the account of life as an emergency of emergence. It is not simply a matter, therefore, of leaders playing on fears. The leadership itself is in the grip of a conjugation of government and rule whose very generative principle of formation is permanent emergency. In other words, fear is no longer simply an affect open to regular manipulation by leadership cadres. It is, but it is not only that, and not even most importantly that. More importantly (because this is not a condition that can be resolved simply by ‘throwing the rascals out’) in the permanent emergency of emergence, fear becomes a generative principle of formation for rule. The emergency of emergence therefore poses a found crisis in western understandings of the political, and in the hopes and expectations invested in political as opposed to other forms of life. Given the wealth and given the vast military preponderance in weapons of mass destruction and other forms of global deployed military capabilities of the societies of the Atlantic basin, notably, of course, the United States, this poses a world crisis as well. In short, then, this complex adaptive emergent life exists in the permanent state of emergence. Its politics of security and war, which is to say its very foundational politics of rule as well, now revolve around this state of emergency. Here, that in virtue of which a ‘we’ comes to belong together, its very generative principle of formation (our shorthand definition of politics), has become this emergency. What happens, we also therefore ask of the biopoliticization of rule, when emergency becomes the generative principle of formation of community and rule? Our answer has already been given. Politics becomes subject to the urgent and compelling political economy, the logistical and technical dynamics, of war. No longer a ‘we’ in virtue of abiding by commonly agreed rules of government, it becomes a ‘we’ formed by abiding by commonly agreed rules of government, it becomes a ‘we’ formed by the rule of the emergency itself; and that is where the political crisis, the crisis of the political itself is that a ‘we’ can belong together not only in terms of agreeing to abide by the rule of its generative principles of formation but also by the willingness to keep the nature of operation of those generative principles of formation under common deliberative scrutiny. **You cannot, however, debate emergency. You can only interrogate the futile demand it makes on you**, and all the episteme challenges it poses, acceding to those demands according both to how well you can come to know them, and how well you have also adapted you affects to suffering them, or perish. The very exigencies of emergency thus militate profoundly against the promise of ‘politics’ as it has been commonly understood in the western tradition; not simply as a matter of rule, but as a matter of self-rule in which it was possible to debate the nature of the self in terms of the good for and of the self. Note, also, how much the very idea of the self has disappeared from view in this conflation of life with species life. The only intelligence, the only self-knowledge, the only culture which qualifies in the permanence of this emergency is the utilitarian and instrumental technologies said to be necessary to endure it. We have been here before in the western tradition and we have experienced the challenges of this condition as tyranny (Arendt 1968). The emergency of emergence, the generative principle of formation, the referential matrix of contemporary biopolitics globally, is a newly formed, pervasive and insidiously complex, soft totalitarian regime of power relations made all the more difficult to contest precisely because, governing through the contingent emergency of emergence, it is a governing through the transactional freedoms of contingency.

#### The affirmatives predictions are based in misplaced certainty – they have compiled indeterminate evidence and generated a singular, likely inaccurate reading

Mitzen and Schweller, 11 (Jennifer Mitzen and Randall Schweller, Mitzen and Schweller are professors of Political Science at Ohio State University, “ Knowing the Unknown Unknowns: Misplaced Certainty and the Onset of War”, 3/15/2011, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09636412.2011.549023, RM)

Taking the definitional question first, we define misplaced certainty as a situation where a decision maker has eliminated uncertainty prematurely. Thus understood, misplaced certainty is comprised of two equally important dimensions. First, the decision-maker's subjective probability estimate of one does not line up with the way the world really is, that is, with the objective probability, which is less than one. The decision maker has made a mistake. In some sense, mistakes are inevitable—decision makers can never know all of the relevant information and are, to some extent, always placing bets. Seen in this light, international politics is like the stock market: longs bet that a stock will go up, while shorts bet that it will go down; both sides cannot be correct. 63 Both have some degree of confidence in their assessment, but one of the traders must be misestimating the future price of the stock. Most everyday decisions are low-risk, low-cost bets under uncertainty, and mistakes are common. Misplaced certainty, however, is not merely a mistake. With misplaced certainty a decision maker places a bet without really acknowledging it is only a bet. The evidence is indeterminate, but the decision maker imposes a singular reading of the situation on which the bet is based. This suggests the second dimension of misplaced certainty—persistence. The decision maker holds tight to those estimates, acting as if they are accurate readings of a situation. As Arie Kruglanski and Donna Webster describe it, the mind “seizes and freezes.” 64 A mistake is a case where the decision maker decides, perhaps even is certain about a course of action, but then realizes that the initial judgment was mistaken and changes course. With misplaced certainty, in contrast, if the decision maker encounters new information that objectively undermines the initial judgment he or she does not, as a result, become less certain about it. Rather, as time passes, certainty about the initial judgment or decision hardens, and incoming information, even when contradictory, is assimilated to it. 65

#### \*\*Nuclear security’s risk calculus relies on faulty universalizations that cannot account for any value to life

Bryan Hubbard, MA in Political Science @ ASU, ’97 [*Rhetorical Analysisis of Two Contemporary Atomic Campaigns*, http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA327948]

The escalation of risk to life-threatening risk makes a particular value statement that suggests all people prioritize risks to life over risks to quality of life. This practice repeats universalizing discourse of modernity despite other appeals toward difference. The automatic escalation of risk discussion to life-threatening risk ignores a plethora of values short of life and death and universalizes criteria for decision making**.** Experience shows social practices often occur for reasons outside the evaluation of life-threatening risk based on individualized cultural perceptions, tastes and values. People disagree over what they consider a risky activity because of differences in value systems and multiple decision-making heuristics not considered by traditional risk communication which envisions one uniform rational-world paradigm. This difference involves very specific value judgments. Different activities will receive different risk characterization despite their statistical similarity. Ravetz (1980) suggests, "the variety in the public perceptions of acceptable risk partly reflects the variety of life itself in its many dimensions of experience" (p. 47). This does not necessarily point to the failure of risk communication to inform individuals of risk but indicates other criteria also inform decisions that traditional risk communication ignores. To date, the bulk of academic literature on risk communication seems to have an invested interest in the future of the nuclear industry and modernity. Largely based on social science, the literature has tried to quantify public perception and acceptance of technological risk (Bassett, Jenkins-Smith, & Silva, 1996; Cohen 1995; Farr, 1992; Fischoff, 1995; Garrick & Gekler, 1989; McBeth & Oakes, 1996; McCormick, 1981; McDaniels, Axelrod, & Slovic, 1995; Sokolowska & Tyszka, 1995; Weinberg, 1991). The results are mixed. Waterstone (1992) reviews this line of study and notes, it "has taken a mechanistic, deterministic view of events and behavior; has been scientific and technocratic; has largely downplayed, if not ignored, the role of social and economic factors in affecting risk; and has represented an ideology of the status quo**"** (p. 2). Risk communicators, who share a rational-world vision with these social scientists, employ this line of research and disregard public failure to conform as examples of an ignorant irrational publics. This perception decreases policy-makers faith in democratic decision making while creating resentment toward technocrats from the general public who can read the insensitivity toward their concerns. The institutionalization of risk communication as previously conceptualized sanctions nuclear communication as an **exclusive technocratic discourse** which results in **polarizing one-way communication.**

## A2: Stuff

### A2: Cede the Political

#### This argument actually flows neg: the fact that in response to crucial questions about securitization the first action of the so-called “policy makers” is to abandon the political sphere, is a signal that there is something innately wrong with the political system

### A2: Alt Fails/No solvo

#### The alternative is to challenge the intuitive impulse to favor the prevention of large magnitude impacts. “War” captures attention immediately while the systemic, daily violence that occurs in the lives of the marginalized and oppressed is devalued simply, because the debate community and society as a whole are innately wired for large impacts. They try to rationalize their decisions through seemingly logical reasons but in reality there are massive gaps between the internal link chains and we fill in the gaps backwards. For example:

#### <insert snippet of internal link here>

#### AND the alternative is not the obliteration of government action. It is an alternative way of thinking. We advocate that policy makers and government officials should approach their respective duties with a critical perspective. Instead of objective, factual analysis, the alt argues for critical inquiry, to challenge the way in which we pursue goals and implement actions which encourages better decision making skills.

# 2NC Case Ext.

### Squo Solves

#### 1NC #1: Status quo solves credit programs – USDOT’s TIFIA and RFFI provide more loans and grants than NIB would. There is plenty of attractive credit – and if the status quo can’t solve, means the plan can’t either because investors just aren’t interested in transportation infrastructure – that’s Utt

#### SQUO TIGER solves TI

**Cohn, ‘11**

[Jonathan Cohn, senior editor, winner of Sidney Hillman and harry chapin merit awards and finalist for RFK and Helen Bernstein book awards, senior fellow at Demos, 8/11/2011, the new republic <http://www.tnr.com/blog/jonathan-cohn/93496/infrastructure-bank-roads-airports-funding-obama-kerry-hutchison>]

The bank, by contrast, would make its decisions based on cost-benefit analysis, without all the congressional meddling. It might sound like a pipe dream, but the Recovery Act launched a working model for that sort of program in 2009. It’s called the Transportation Investment Generating Economic Recovery program, or TIGER. And it counts among its fans journalist Michael Grunwald, who knows a thing or two about government waste. (Yes, that's twice today I'm quoting him.) As Grunwald writes:¶ The so-called TIGER program doesn't just hand out cash to every project with the proper paperwork; it rewards the applicants with the most impressive economic and environmental benefits, and it's attracted $40 worth of applications for every dollar in grants. The winners have included several freight-rail projects that will take thousands of trucks off the road, a green-themed revitalization of a Kansas City neighborhood, and a multi-modal transportation center at the intersection of three interstates, a major rail corridor and a popular 26-mile bicycle and pedestrian pathway in Normal, Ill.¶ Whether the bank could replicate TIGER's success – and, more fundamentally, whether it could significantly bolster the country’s decaying infrastructure – will obviously depend on the specifics, as Pollack's paper points out. How independent should the bank be? (Obama’s proposal would put it inside the Transportation Department; others, like a bill from Senators John Kerry and Kay Bailey Hutchison, would make it a stand-alone entity.) How much start-up money should the federal government give it? (Kerry’s bill calls for just $10 billion while Obama’s calls for $30 billion. An earlier proposal, from Senators Chris Dodd and Chuck Hagel, would have allocated $75 billion.) How wide a range of proposals would it consider? (Obama's bank would limits itself to transportation. Under a proposal from Rep. Rosa DeLauro, the bank would take on energy and telecommunications projects, as well.)

### 1NC #2 XTN

#### 1NC #2: Stimulus kills the economy – our creditors are concerned with our lack of fiscal restraint. Experts predict a return to the 1970s double-digit inflation. We need a budget surplus, not deficits, to stimulate the economy – flailing economies of Bush and Obama prove that Clinton’s anti-Keynesian policies are far more successful. Reducing government spending is key to free up assets for more productive use which in turn leads to more growth – that’s Taylor and Vedder

#### American Recovery and Reinvestment Act proves stimulus doesn’t work – it killed 1,226,000 productive private sector jobs while only creating 443 thousand government jobs

Conley and Dupor ’11

( Timothy Conley and Bill Dupor, Timothy Conley is an associate professor at the Department of Economics, University of Western Ontario, Canada, Bill Dupor is an associate professor of economics at Ohio State Unvierstiy, May 17, 2011, “The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act: Public Sector Jobs Saved, Private Sector Jobs Forestalled”, <http://web.econ.ohio-state.edu/dupor/arra10_may11.pdf>)

\*\*HELP services = health, (private) education, professional and business services

 Table 4 reports the jobs effect of ARRA aid for the four employment categories, both with and without the fungibility restriction imposed. Each estimate uses the outlaid amount, includes the same forty-six states, twelve control variables and all five instruments. The table reports estimates of the thousands of jobs that existed in September of 2010 that would have not existed (i.e. jobs saved or created) had the Act not been implemented. A negative enumber implies that the ARRA destroyed or prevented employment growth in that sector over the period. The bracketed pair of numbers beneath each estimate correspond to its 90% confidence interval. First, our point estimate states that government employment (non-Federal) was 443 thousand persons greater than it would have been in absence of the Act, as seen in Table 4. This is the only sector where we see a strong positive employment effect of ARRA aid. The estimate is consistent with the raw data represented visually in Figure 4. This figure shows that states with weak budget positions, after including ARRA aid, saw falling government employment. Intuitively, state and local governments with declining tax revenue (that was not replaced with ARRA aid) either cut or else did not increase government hiring. In our counterfactual world without the Act, all states would have been forced to take the same action of firing and not filling job openings—resulting in significant government jobs lost. On the other hand, employment in HELP services is 772 thousand persons lower because of the Act. This is consistent with the raw data represented visually in Figure 5. States with weak budget positions, after including ARRA aid, tended to have greater employment growth in the HELP service sector. The employment effects for the other two sectors are smaller. Non-HELP services employment was 92,000 persons greater because of the Act; however, the lower bound of the confidence interval is -347 thousand. Next, goods-producing employment was reduced by 362 thousand workers. The upper bound of its confidence interval was positive 218 thousand. A second way to report the jobs effect is directly as the elasticity of employment growth with respect to ARRA aid (specifically, OFFSET). This coefficient, for each of the sectors, appears in Table 5 in two cases: fungibility is imposed, a from equation (3.1) and fungibility is not imposed, b from equation (3.2). This elasticity equals 0.139 for the government employment sector when fungibility is imposed. In words, this means that a one-percent increase in ARRA outlays relative to the state’s pre-recession revenue results in employment that is 13.9% greater in September 2010. The corresponding elasticity for the HELP service sector is negative -0.096. Table 5 also tells us that the data does not reject the fungibility restriction. Under the heading “fungibility restriction not imposed,” we see the elasticity estimates when b is not required to equal d. Examining the government column, the elasticity for the ARRA outlay-based offset equals 0.149 and the elasticity for −LOSS equals 0.206. Taking into account the standard errors of the estimates, these two values are very close. Formally, the Chi-squared statistic for the test is sufficiently low that we fail to reject fungibility at all conventional significance levels. This failure to reject fungibility also holds for the other sectors. Moreover, our finding of jobs forestalled for the three private sectors is maintained even when the fungibility restriction is not imposed (although the precision of the estimates fall). What can explain our two findings that (a) the ARRA has created/saved government jobs, [Tables omitted] (b) the ARRA has may have forestalled at least some private sector jobs (in particular those in the HELP service sector)? Finding (a) has a straightforward explanation. First, a significant part of the ARRA is aimed directly at saving government jobs and services, e.g. the $53.6 billion State Fiscal Stabilization Fund. Second, states have found ways to use ARRA dollars (not directly intended for government salaries) to free up state funds for other uses. Several examples based on U.S. Dept. of Transportation programs are presented in Section 2. Freed-up state monies can in turn be used for government hiring and retention. Finding (b) might be partially explained by a ‘crowding out’ effect. In the absence of the ARRA, many government employees would have found jobs in the private sector. Governement workers tend to be well educated. In 2006, the most recent available data, 49% of state and 47% percent of local government workers had at least a bachelor’s degree,35 for private sector workers this proportion is only 25%. The labor market for well-educated individuals was relatively strong during and after the recession. In September of 2010, the unemployment rate among persons with at least a bachelor’s degree was only 4.5%; on the other hand, versus 10% for high school graduates with no college. The spread in unemployment rates across different educational attainment categories was fairly constant during and after the recession. The HELP services sector employs much more educated workers than our other two private sectors36, is thus relatively strong as seen in Figure 2, and could plausibly have absorbed large numbers of these counter-factually unemployed workers.

### 1NC #3 + #6 XTN

#### Group 1NC 3 and 6: bank will have little impact before the double dip – bureaucratic structure means responsibility ceding and infighting over where to invest. Bank organizers will fuss over job descriptions and requirements for the executive team and the first loan will take about a year or two to grant – that’s Utt.

#### AND the fiscal stimulus will fail – infrastructure spending takes years before it’s actually spent and is not targeted towards areas of high unemployment. The jobs are temporary and the goods aren’t in great enough demand to perpetuate the stimulus. The only thing that stimulus succeeds in doing is adding to the national debt – proving the link to the spending disad – that’s Rugy

#### Investment is risky and doesn’t always solve – Japan proves

**Lane, ‘11**

[Charles Lane, Editorial Staff, 11/1/2011, Washington Post <http://search.proquest.com/docview/901157657>]

¶ But it's not just a matter of turning on the money tap and letting it flow. Though roads, rails and levees represent huge, upfront capital expenditures, the long-term benefits are often difficult to calculate objectively. The whole business is fraught with uncertainty, trade-offs and pork-barrel politics.¶ ¶ Nor are the economics of public works simple. After its economic bubble burst, Japan tried to restart growth with more than $6 trillion in infrastructure spending between 1991 and 2008. It ended up with little to show for it but a swollen national debt and lots of bridges to nowhere

### Congestion

#### 1NC #4: congestion is inevitable – people commute to work and back at similar times during the day – even if NIB were to build more roads, people would just congest the best, most efficient routes – that’s Downs

#### Case turns case: Construction will cause congestion – long-delayed repair and replacement processes lead to bottlenecks and road closures – that’s Little

#### Road building exacerbates congestion

TTI 98

(Texas Transportation Institute, part of the Texas A&M system that conducts studies to solve transportation problems, “An Analysis of Relationship Between Highway Expansion and Congestion in Metropolitan Areas”, November 1998, <http://www.daclarke.org/AltTrans/analysis.html>)

What does this mean for the average person in these metro areas? Clearly, congestion levels are continuing to rise. But these results also show that metro areas that invested heavily in road construction did not end up any better off than those that didn’t. There is substantial evidence that demonstrates that building new roads often increases congestion. A well-established body of research shows that new lanes tend to get filled up with new traffic within a few years, particularly if surrounding routes are also congested. This phenomenon—often called "induced traffic"—occurs when road capacity is expanded near congested routes and drivers flock to the new facility hoping to save time, even if they have to travel a great deal farther to achieve it. Also, the new roadways tend to draw people who would otherwise avoid congested conditions or take alternative modes to their destinations. The result is an overall increase in the total amount of driving and the total number of automobile trips in the region—not just the redistribution of traffic from surrounding areas. This theory has been strongly supported by empirical evidence. Since the 1940s, dozens of traffic studies have found that traffic inducement does indeed occur. New studies continue to support this hypothesis. The most notable of these covers 30 urban counties in California from 1973 to 1990. The authors, UC Berkeley researchers Mark Hansen and Yuanlin Huang, found that at the metropolitan level, every 1% increase in new lane-miles generated a 0.9% increase in traffic in less than five years, which led them to conclude that "With so much induced demand, adding road capacity does little to reduce congestion." In spite of these findings, many transportation agencies still insist that highway construction and road widenings are a viable means of relieving congestion. One such road, a segment of I-287 in northern New Jersey, filled up with traffic (especially trucks) just two years after construction, prompting Princeton University Professor David Bernstein to complain that "It’s as if we hadn’t learned anything in the last 50 years."

#### \*Congestion inevitable- population growth and accumulating wealth

Downs 04

(Anthony Downs, Senior Fellow at Brookings Institution, Fall 2004, Keynote address to UCTC’s Annual Student Research Conference at the University of California, Davis, <http://www.uctc.net/access/25/Access%2025%20-%2004%20-%20Traffic%20Congestion%20is%20Here%20to%20Stay.pdf>)

Peak-hour trafﬁc congestion in almost all large and growing metropolitan regions around the world is here to stay. Indeed, it is almost certain to get worse during at least the next few decades, mainly because of rising populations and wealth. This will be true no matter what public and private policies are adopted to combat congestion. This outcome should not be regarded as a mark of social failure or wrong policies. In fact, trafﬁc congestion reﬂects economic prosperity. People congregate in large numbers in those places where they most want to be. The conclusion that traffic congestion is inevitable does not mean it must grow unchecked. Several policies described here—especially if used in concert—could effectively slow congestion’s growth. But, aside from disastrous wars or other catastrophes, nothing can eliminate traffic congestion from large metropolitan regions here and around the world. Only serious recessions—which are hardly desirable—can even forestall its increasing. So my advice to trafﬁc-plagued commuters is: relax and get used it. Get a comfortable air-conditioned vehicle with a stereo system, a tape deck and CD player, a hands-free telephone, perhaps even a microwave oven, and commute daily with someone you really like. Learn to make congestion part of your everyday leisure time, because it is going to be your commuting companion for the foreseeable future.

### Alt Causes

#### 1NC #5: European debt crisis will spill over, crippling the economy regardless of the double dip. US banks hold more than $900 billion of the European debt. Financial markets will start to freeze up and paralyze the US money market causing a deeper recession, depressing job opportunities, and killing consumer confidence – that’s Geewax

#### Natural resources AND agriculture AND manufacturing AND trade AND transportation account for one fourth of the GDP – means AT MOST transportation infrastructure account for ONLY a sixteenth of the total GDP -- proves there are alt causes to economic decline – that’s THEIR Little card

#### \*Squo proves Europe spillover

Kling 12 (CNNMoney: Europe's Woes Spill Over to US Companies Tuesday, 24 Apr 2012 08:15 AM By Michael Kling, http://www.moneynews.com/StreetTalk/Europe-Woes-US-Companies/2012/04/24/id/436887,)

More American companies are reporting lower sales and lowering expectations as Europe's problems reach the United States. Kellogg, shoe-seller Wolverine World Wide, and cleaning-equipment maker Tennant all cited the dour situation in Europe as they reported lower earnings and sales forecasts, CNNMoney reported. "The European debt crisis made it more difficult for Tennant customers to obtain credit," stated Tennant, which missed its forecasts. Kellogg CEO John Bryant said his company has "significant challenges" in Europe. Wolverine announced that its sales outlook is "tempered by macroeconomic and financial uncertainty in Europe." Stocks of all three companies fell Monday. Investors will probably be hearing about more companies missing forecasts and lowering expectations as they reveal their quarterly results. "It's almost impossible for Europe to not be a problem for earnings going forward," said Bill Stone, chief strategist with PNC Asset Management Group, according to CNNMoney. Although Eaton, a manufacturer of auto parts, reported that its earnings beat forecasts, Eaton CEO Sandy Cutler said that its sales in Europe fell. "The recession in Europe is going to be longer than anticipated," Cutler told CNNMoney. Many experts see Europe in a downward spiral and austerity measures increase unemployment and decrease government revenue in the short term. Read more: CNNMoney: Europe's Woes Spill Over to US Companies

### No Impact to Econ

#### 1NC #7: economic collapse doesn’t cause war – empirics prove. World War II only started after Nazi Germany’s economy recovered significantly. Most wars come after periods of growth and the ones that don’t are causes of economic catastrophe, not the consequence – it’s not like a country with ZERO economy is going to be able to wage war – that’s Ferguson

#### Royal isn’t a credible card in the context of this debate: it only talks about increased LIKELIHOODS not certainties and doesn’t take into account the recent offensive attacks that have severely debilitated external terrorist organizations. In fact, we caught Bin Laden in a time of economic downturn

#### AND No impact to economic decline – ’08 recession proves recovery is quick

Reddy (their card – the read argument) 7/16 – (Sudeep, Wall Street Journal Economics Reporter, Wall Street Journal, “IMF’s Blanchard: Global Economy Gripped by Meta-Uncertainty,” 7/16/12 http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2012/07/16/imfs-blanchard-global-economy-gripped-by-meta-uncertainty/)

–On the pervasive global slowdown: People feel the world has darkened a lot. The trend is a bit worse than the forecast suggests. The bigger story is that we still have a weak world recovery. There is clearly increased uncertainty. The fact that this downside risk is not the tail risk anymore … is increasing uncertainty. I was talking to somebody who is on the board of a number of large companies. They’re all sitting on the cash and not spending. I asked him and he said, ‘Well, it’s uncertainty.’ But what exactly is it? It’s nearly meta-uncertainty. It’s a world they cannot quite think about. These were decisions in the U.S., where so far the direct effects from Europe haven’t been very substantial. So I think the world’s higher uncertainty is clearly a factor. –On the significant declines in trade: In 2008-09, there was a collapse of global trade. We were all very surprised. Output was not doing well, but the collapse in global trade was enormous. We realized at the time that the elasticity of trade with respect to global output was not 1, as you might think, but more like 3 to 4. So this explained it. And then it recovered like crazy. This is still true. If global output goes down by 1%, global trade goes down by 3% to 4%. If a part of the world does poorly, then it imports much less, and therefore the other guys export much less. It’s striking. We focus on financial links because they make the news everyday. But these trade links are quite relevant.

### No Impact to Heg

#### 1NC #8: heg isn’t key to internationally stability – empirics show that even when the US cuts back on defense and military spending, there aren’t security dilemmas. In fact, the 1990s prove that “the stabilizing power of US heg” is only a nationalsitic myth – that’s Fettweis

#### Growth is not zero sum – wont impact US leadership

Bernd-Joachim **Schuller and** Marie **Lidbom,** University of Skövde, Sweden, 20**09**

“COMPETITIVENESS OF NATIONS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY. IS EUROPE INTERNATIONALLY COMPETITIVE?” (<http://www.ktu.lt/lt/mokslas/zurnalai/ekovad/14/1822-6515-2009-934.pdf>)

In many countries, most of what is produced is generally also consumed there, which has been shown in the EU (Boschini & Eriksson, 2005). This makes the economy less susceptible to things happening in other countries. However, **discussions on competitiveness often come with** expressed **concerns that positive economic developments in one part of the world are to a disadvantage for another part. This is not** necessarily **true.** **Suppose that the firms of an internationally trading country find ways which make them more competitive on the world market. This enables their products to be sold in larger amounts both on domestic and foreign markets, i.e. both domestic supply and exports grow**. **The increasing supply and demand** of domestically produced goods and services **boost the circular flow of income in the economy as productivity is rising**. C**onsequently, both public and private incomes increase. Saving, investment, consumption, export, but even import will rise. Thus, positive economic developments in one part of the world are not automatically a disadvantage for other part**s 5 . It should be clear from the discussion that national competitiveness is not a zero-sum game, but rather a plus-sum game – success breeds success. As mentioned before, countries engaging in international trade have the possibility to grow beyond their production potential, and raise average productivity. This gives an opportunity to all participants in international trade to gain. A country should not be seen as a gigantic firm. Running an economy differs obviously a lot from managing a firm. As discussed above, a firm not being able to make profits will soon be forced out of the market, unless it improves its performance. But since trade between countries is not profit driven, nations do not have a distinct bottom line. In a democracy with bad economic outlook, the individuals have the choice to vote and to express their disappointment by not re-electing the ruling government. A nation going bancrupt is virtually unheard of 6.

#### \*Economic power is not key to hegemony

Kapila 10 (Dr. Subhash Kapila is an International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst and the Consultant for Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group and a graduate of the Royal British Army Staff College with a Masters in Defence Science and a PhD in Strategic Studies., “21st Century: Strategically A Second American Century With Caveats,” June 26, <http://www.eurasiareview.com/201006263919/21st-century-strategically-a-second-american-century-with-caveats.html>)

Strategically, the 20th Century was decidedly an American Century. United States strategic, military, political and economic predominance was global and undisputed. In the bi-polar global power structure comprising the United States and the Former Soviet Union it was the United States which globally prevailed. The 20th Century's dawn was marked by the First World War which marked the decline of the old European colonial powers, noticeably Great Britain. The Second World War marked the total eclipse of Great Britain and other colonial powers. The United States replaced Great Britain as the new global superpower. The 20th Century's end witnessed the end of the Cold War, with the disintegration of the Former Soviet Union as the United States strategic challenger and counter-vailing power. On the verge of the new millennium the United States strode the globe like a colossus as the sole global super power. With a decade of the 21st Century having gone past, many strategic and political analysts the world over have toyed with projections that United States global predominance is on the decline, and that the 21st Century will not be a second American Century. Having toyed, with such projections, these analysts however shy away from predicting whose century the 21st Century will strategically be? The trouble with such projections is that they are based predominantly on analyses of economic trends and financial strengths and less on detailed analyses of strategic and military strengths, and more significantly strategic cultures. Presumably, it is easier for such analysts to base trends on much quoted statistical data. Strategic analysis of global predominance trends is a more complex task in the opinion of the Author, as it cannot be based on statistical data analysis. Global predominance trends need unravelling of strategic cultures of contending powers, the reading of national intentions and resolve and the inherent national strengths and willpower demonstrated over a considerable time span of half-centuries and centuries. Crisply put, one needs to remember that in the 1980's, Japan and Germany as "economic superpowers" could not emerge as global superpowers. Hence global predominance calls for more than economic strengths. The United States getting strategically bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan in the first decade of the 21st Century has not led to any noticeable decline in American global predominance. Despite Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States reigns supreme globally even in East Asia where China could have logically challenged it. More significantly, and normally forgotten, is the fact that the off-quoted shift of global and economic power from the West to East was facilitated by United States massive financial direct investments in China, Japan, South Korea and India. China quoted as the next superpower to rival the United States would be economically prostate, should the United States surgically disconnect China's economic and financial linkages to the United States. More significantly, while examining the prospects of the 21st Century as a "Second American Century" it must be remembered that besides other factors, that out of the six multipolar contenders for global power, none except China have shown any indications to whittle down US global predominance. Even China seems to be comfortable with US power as long as it keeps Japan in check. This Paper makes bold to assert that the 21st Century would be a Second American Century despite China's challenge and the strategic distractions arising from the global Islamic flash-points.

# 2NC/1NR States Ext.

### A2: Can’t Solve >> Fed Key

#### The counterplan stimulates the economy in the same manner as the plan, through deficit spending – means all 1AC stimulus solvency flows neg as well – that’s their McNichol evidence. AND extend their Stiglitz and their Zakaria evidence here: PUBLIC investment is key to spur job growth – means states solve economic growth

#### States solve best—more effectively focus on transportation needs

Christman and Riordan, Anastasia Christman Senior Policy Analyst at NELP, And Christine Riordan, Dean, Daniels College of Business, Dec. 2011, “State Infrastructure Banks: ¶ Old Idea Yields New Opportunities for Job Creation,” National Employment Law Project, <http://www.nelp.org/page/-/Job_Creation/State_Infrastructure_Banks.pdf?nocdn=1> linja

Many lawmakers and economists in Washington, D.C. have¶ advocated the creation of a national infrastructure bank (NIB) to ¶ kick-start investments in the country’s aging roads, bridges, water ¶ systems, transit systems, airports and other infrastructure. This ¶ NIB, as proposed in the Senate and by the White House, would ¶ provide financial assistance to infrastructure projects that ¶ contributed to regional or national economic growth, demonstrated ¶ a clear public benefit, led to job creation, offered value to ¶ taxpayers, and mitigated environmental concerns.¶ 1¶ The federal ¶ assistance would be used to leverage private investment, and ¶ would be paid back through user fees or other dedicated revenue ¶ sources. Supported by parties as diverse as the Chamber of ¶ Commerce and the AFL-CIO, the idea has nevertheless become ¶ politically charged in Washington.¶ 2¶ Getting stalled-out in D.C. doesn’t mean advocates for better ¶ financing for infrastructure have to sit on their hands. Indeed, in ¶ state houses across the country, lawmakers are having robust ¶ debates about infrastructure projects, and several cities have taken ¶ bold moves to identify innovative infrastructure funding ¶ mechanisms.¶ 3¶ The fact is that infrastructure is a profoundly local issue and is a key ¶ determinant of a community’s standard of living.¶ 4¶ As former ¶ Pennsylvania Governor Ed Rendell noted in a U.S. Congressional ¶ hearing on infrastructure, “Visible or not, properly functioning ¶ infrastructure provides us with the reliability and predictability that ¶ we as Americans have come to expect from modern daily life.”¶ 5¶ Everyday Americans feel the effects of deteriorating physical assets ¶ close to home in the form of traffic delays, unsafe drinking water, ¶ inadequate public transportation and unpredictable electrical ¶ power. Local lawmakers recognize this: in a 2011 survey, more 2¶ than three-quarters of U.S. mayors identified the need to ¶ prioritize maintenance of current roads and streets over ¶ building new highways, and almost half indicated a need to ¶ grow public transit capacity.¶ 6¶ State and local governments and their constituents already ¶ carry much of the burden of funding these critical ¶ resources. Nationally, “transportation” is typically the ¶ third-largest state expenditure after “education” and ¶ “public welfare.”¶ 7¶ Since the Cold War era, local ¶ governments have invested more than $1.25 trillion in ¶ water and sewer investments.¶ 8¶ As the National Conference ¶ of State Legislatures has pointed out, “Local ¶ governments—including counties, townships and ¶ municipalities—provide approximately 30 percent of total ¶ surface transportation funding and own 77 percent of the ¶ nation’s roadway miles.”¶ 9¶ ¶ Yet, federal funding streams through the National Surface Transportation Act or the Federal Highway ¶ Trust Fund send money to the states without requirements to consider the infrastructure needs of ¶ cities and metropolitan areas. As a 2008 policy brief from the National Conference of Mayors noted, ¶ “[O]f the more than $42 billion annually flowing to states for surface transportation investment, only ¶ six percent of available funds are directed to decision-makers in the nation’s metropolitan areas.”¶ 10¶ Unfortunately, traditional sources of state funding aren’t doing the job. Through 2010, nineteen U.S.¶ states cut transportation funding,¶ 11¶ and in 2011 another six states followed suit.¶ 12¶ To truly address ¶ the infrastructure shortcomings that affect our communities most acutely, we need state-level ¶ solutions that include input from local lawmakers and local constituents. ¶ Even in the absence of an NIB, two-thirds of state legislatures have already embraced the concept of ¶ the infrastructure bank. Since the 1990s, various federal bills have authorized states to create their ¶ own state infrastructure banks (SIBs) to finance priority projects. In this brief, we will elaborate on ¶ the different types of SIBs that exist today, share some interesting projects that have been funded ¶ with SIBs, and posit some best practices that advocates in any state could be urging lawmakers to ¶ adopt. An SIB, if designed with enough flexibility in applicable projects and with opportunities for ¶ local advocates and lawmakers to weigh in on priorities, can be an effective tool for repairing the ill ¶ effects of decades of neglect to our communities’ transportation networks, water systems and power ¶ grids.

### A2: Tyson >> Fed Key

#### This evidence is not that NIB is key to future federal investment, but rather that such a consolidated infrastructure bank is helpful in spurring private investment – means states solve