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# 1NC Shell

**Text: The United States federal government should propose that it** \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ **to the Russian Federation for binding consultation. The United States should support the proposal during consultation and abide by the result of consultation. We’ll clarify**

**Observation one is competition –**

**A) “should” and “will” are “used to express obligation” and “a requirement,” meaning it implies such permanence—Dictionary.com,** **03**

**B) Thus, the fiat of the plan is unconditional, with immediate action and enforcement. Otherwise, they can spike out of offense by claiming the plan is delayed or unenforced. Consultation is mutually exclusive because it conditions the plan on Russia’s acceptance.**

**Observation two is the net benefit –**

**Consultation is key to successful revamp of NATO-Russia Council**

**Butcher 09**- Martin, independent international security analyst; June 28, 2009; NATO Monitor http://natomonitor.blogspot.com/2009/06/nato-russia-council-back-in-action.html)

The NATO-Russia Council ( NRC) met informally at Ministerial level Saturday in Corfu, bringing an end to the body suspension, in place since the Russian military intervention in Georgia last Summer. The NRC had been due to hold this meeting in late May, but Russia cancelled that meeting angry at NATO holding joint exercises with Georgia. Before the meeting, James Appathurai the NATO spokesman told reporters that: It means we are back to business. It was not the business that was totally frozen. But at the political level and at the military-to-military level, I expect we will leave Corfu back to business. In fact, the Council had only ever been suspended at the insistence of former President George Bush. Many European nations had wanted to use the NRC to talk with Russia about Georgia, but the US insisted on gesture politics instead. President Obama has sought better relations with Russia to move his arms control and disarmament agenda along. Restoration of the NATO-Russia Council was part of this policy. The NRC has been meeting regularly at Ambassadorial level for some time. At a meeting a week ago, Russian Ambassador to NATO Dmitry Rogozin told Itar-Tass that the NRC ministerial meeting “will make it possible to re-launch the full format political dialogue that was interrupted on the NATO initiative after the Russian response to Georgia’s aggression against South Ossetia.” The restoration of the political dialogue will also “open the way for the resumption of military cooperation, including interaction on Afghanistan, resumption of Russia’s participation in the NATO antiterrorist operation in the Mediterranean “Active Endeavour,” as well as cooperation in the fight against pirates near the Somalia coast.” Re-engaging with Russia on Afghanistan is another key Obama objective. With Russian support the possibility grows of more robust northern supply lines into Afghanistan to provide logisitics for the ever growing US and NATO mission. Given the uncertain nature of southern supply routes through Pakistan, this is likely to be essential to any NATO success in Afghanistan. After the meeting, outgoing NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said to journalists that: Despite the fact that there are differences ... the spirit (of the meeting) was one of wanting to cooperate.. The NATO-Russia Council, which has been in the neutral stand for almost a year, is now back in gear. The 29 ambassadors in Brussels will very quickly get back to work to agree on new procedures to make the NATO-Russia Council function more effectively. The Russian view of the meeting was a little less positive. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov told reporters that the meeting was ".. a positive development", but that there was a "frank exchange of views" at the table. As de Hoop Scheffer said, the disagreements focused on Georgia, where NATO nations refuse to accept Russian recognition of breakaway regions South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which they now support militarily. Scheffer said that: No one tried to paper over our differences, on Georgia for example. But we agreed not to let those disagreements bring the whole NRC train to a halt. Lavrov, on the other hand, insisted that Russia's recognition of the separatists could not be reversed: All have to accept the new realities and the decisions taken by Russia after the conflict are irreversible. This is a first step, but the most positive factor is that both sides have agreed that talking about problems is better than a new East-West face-off. The Bush administration wa sprepared to push NATO into a new Cold War to make a point to Russia about Georgia. Cooler heads have prevailed, and a range of issues from missile defence and arms control to Afghanistan are now on the table for future cooperation.

# 1NC Shell

**A strong NRC is key to key to preventing arctic territorial disputes**

**Lisken**, Alexander, Staff Writer for Ria Novosti, A Leading Russian News Source, **09**

(“ U.S. analyst says NATO-Russia Council ideal for Arctic talks”, http://en.rian.ru/world/20090527/155103313.html)

MOSCOW, May 27 (RIA Novosti) - A leading U.S. analyst has said the NATO-Russia Council is the perfect forum for talks on Arctic security. "There seems to be a growing interest and importance in the Arctic region. Certainly, Russia has a fundamental interest in the Arctic and its future development in terms of economics and resources, and also maritime trade," Dr. Charles M. Perry, vice president and director of studies at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, told RIA Novosti. "There are some contentions about who owns what. The NATO-Russia forum would be an excellent place to talk about things like Arctic security. Not necessarily solving it all bilaterally...this concerns everybody in the region and right now we are not talking about it very well," Dr. Perry, who is also vice-president of National Security Planning Associates, said. Arctic territories, seen as the key to huge untapped natural resources, have increasingly been at the center of mounting disputes between the United States, Russia, Canada, Norway, and Denmark in recent years as rising temperatures lead to a reduction in sea ice. President Dmitry Medvedev said in September at a Russian Security Council session that the extent of the Russian continental shelf in the Arctic should be defined as soon as possible. Russia has undertaken two Arctic expeditions - to the Mendeleyev underwater chain in 2005 and to the Lomonosov ridge in the summer of 2007 - to support its territorial claims in the region. Moscow has pledged to submit documentary evidence to the UN on the external boundaries of Russia's territorial shelf by 2010. The Russia-NATO Council meets on Wednesday in Brussels for the second time since the end of last August's war between Russia and Georgia over Abkhazia. The work of the Council was suspended by the alliance unilaterally in September 2008, Relations had looked to be recovering, but took another hit earlier this month with the expulsion of two Russian NATO diplomats from Brussels. Russia responded by expelling two NATO officials from Moscow and pulling out of a NATO-Russia Council session. "It is really important to keep some kind of useful form and vehicle, at the very least, for Russia and NATO member states to gather around the same table, lay out their concerns about emerging problems," Dr. Perry said. The meeting is expected to focus in particular on security in the Euro-Atlantic region and NATO-Russia relations, as well as see a discussion of Monday's announcement of a nuclear test by North Korea.

# 1NC Shell

**Left unchecked, these disputes lead to a US-Russia war**

**Zellen, 07**- Barry, Security Innovator, “The Polar Show Down: As the Arctic's ice begins to melt, a new race for its undersea resources begins” August 23, 2007 http://securityinnovator.com/index.php?articleID=12387&sectionID=43

In response to Russia’s aggressive assertion of its claims to the Arctic, Cohen believes that “legal and diplomatic actions are necessary,” and pointed out that the U.S. State Department has “already expressed its skepticism of planting of the Russian Flag,” and believes the act was “not in legal effect.” Cohen added that “Canada joined in this opposition,” noting its Prime Minister, Stephen Harper, quickly embarked upon a “three-day Arctic trip” during which he made major announcements that “increased Canada’s naval presence in the Arctic.” In order to “block Russia's grab,” Cohen believes that the United States “should encourage its friends and allies—especially Canada, Denmark, and Norway—to pursue their own claims with the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf.” And while America “has not ratified LOST,” the Law of the Sea Treaty, Cohen noted the other Arctic states “have filed claims with the Commission in opposition to Russia's claims,” and believes “the U.S. should also encourage Canada to coordinate a possible claim through the International Justice Court in The Hague against the Russian grab, which the U.S. may join.” Cohen believes Moscow’s “decision to take an aggressive stand has left the U.S., Canada, and the Nordic countries little choice but to forge a cooperative high-north strategy and invite other friendly countries, such as Great Britain, to help build a Western presence in the Arctic: This will probably have to include a fleet of modern icebreakers, submersibles, geophysics/seismic vessels, and polar aircraft.” As Cohen explained, there’s “too much at stake to leave the Arctic to the Russian bear.” But in an optimistic “parting thought,” Cohen added, “I don’t think Russia has financial resources and technology to explore Artic for its riches alone,” and that it “would be much better if U.S., Canada, and—as well as Denmark and Norway will have a multilateral regime negotiated that will specify the economic zones, and will open each other’s resources for joint ventures that will boost economic development in the Arctic.” To understand Russia’s intentions, we interviewed Dr. Vladimir Frolov, the director of the National Laboratory for Foreign Policy, a Moscow-based think tank.[18] Frolov, a former Foreign Service officer, writes about Russia’s foreign policy for Russia Profile magazine and penned a prescient column in the July 17th edition titled “The Coming Conflict in the Arctic: Russia and U.S. to Square Off Over Arctic Energy Reserves.”[19] Frolov explained that “there are two principal lines of thinking on global warming in Russia. One is that global warming is a myth, the other is that global warming exists and it is good for Russia.” He added that “Russia might benefit from global warming if it leads to more mild temperatures in the Arctic, provided the problem of flooding could be solved,” because a milder climate “would make it less prohibitively costly to develop the considerable energy resources that Russia has there.” He noted that “Russia views the Arctic reserves as its ‘last barrel of oil’ to be safeguarded and then used to Russia’s strategic advantage,” much like the U.S. view of “oil exploration in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR).” So bountiful are Russia’s reserves of Arctic petroleum resources that Frolov thinks that they will precipitate an inevitable clash between Russia and the United States reminiscent of its Cold War clash across the Arctic. As Frolov explained in his July 17, 2007 column in Russia Profile, “the stage has been quietly set for a much more serious confrontation in the non-too-distant future between Russia and the United States—along with Canada, Norway and Denmark,” as Russia “recently laid claim to a vast 1,191,000 square km chunk of the ice-covered Arctic seabed.” Its claim is “not really about territory, but rather about the huge hydrocarbon reserves that are hidden on the seabed under the Arctic ice cap: these newly discovered energy reserves will play a crucial role in the global energy balance as the existing reserves of oil and gas are depleted over the next 20 years.”

**EXTINCTION**

**Bostrom 02** (Professor of Philosophy, Yale University Nick, “Existential Risks,” http://www.transhumanist.com/volume9/risks.html)

A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization. Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankind’s potential permanently. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century.

\*\*Consultation Solves

# Consultation Solves NRC

**CONSULTATION OVER MILITARY IS KEY TO THE NATO-RUSSIA COUNCIL AND U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS**

**VERSHBOW AND BURNS 04** (Alexander, US ambassador to Russia, R. Nicholas, US ambassador to NATO, Izvestia, http://www.usembassy.ru/embassy/oped.php?record\_id=11)

Finally, the NATO-Russia Council provides tremendous political value. It is a serious forum for conceptual work on peacekeeping and discussion of defense reform. We have also engaged in strategic political and security discussions on topical issues such as Afghanistan, the Balkans and Georgia.

The most remarkable aspect of the current NATO-Russia relationship is the breadth of our cooperation and the number of our common projects. However, there is more that we can do together, especially militarily. Despite the progress made, Russian and NATO forces are not yet sufficiently interoperable. Our militaries should exercise together more often. For those exercises to occur on Russian soil, Russia needs to conclude an agreement that provides legal protections for our troops – the Partnership for Peace Status of Forces Agreement. We are confident of completing this agreement by the end of the year. We could also hold more joint NATO-Russia field exercises, especially counter-terrorism field training. In addition, we need to make joint NATO-Russia peacekeeping a reality. We hope that Moscow will take another look at creating a NATO-interoperable peacekeeping brigade, which would be a major step forward in this regard.

For the past two years, we have discussed the need to build mutual confidence among our respective naval forces. In February of 2003, we signed a Framework Document on cooperation in Search and Rescue at Sea. However, NATO also has a vigorous maritime interdiction operation – known as Active Endeavor – underway in the Mediterranean to protect shipping lanes from possible acts of terrorism. We expect that, at the Istanbul Summit, NATO will invite Russia to join with the Alliance in Operation Active Endeavor.

At Istanbul, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, Secretary of State Powell, and the other 25 NATO Foreign Ministers will meet together in the NATO-Russia Council. Despite Russia's concerns about NATO enlargement, we see that Russian attitudes toward the Alliance have grown more positive as a result of engagement in the NRC. Russia has said that it does not intend to join NATO, but its participation in the NRC and its partnership with the Alliance extends security across virtually two continents. This constructive new relationship between former enemies eases decades of suspicion and mistrust between NATO and Russia, and leaves our countries more secure today than at any time in the last half-century.

# Consultation Solves NRC

**Consultation is key to successful revamp of NATO-Russia Council**

**Butcher 09**- Martin, independent international security analyst; June 28, 2009; NATO Monitor http://natomonitor.blogspot.com/2009/06/nato-russia-council-back-in-action.html)

The NATO-Russia Council ( NRC) met informally at Ministerial level Saturday in Corfu, bringing an end to the body suspension, in place since the Russian military intervention in Georgia last Summer. The NRC had been due to hold this meeting in late May, but Russia cancelled that meeting angry at NATO holding joint exercises with Georgia. Before the meeting, James Appathurai the NATO spokesman told reporters that: It means we are back to business. It was not the business that was totally frozen. But at the political level and at the military-to-military level, I expect we will leave Corfu back to business. In fact, the Council had only ever been suspended at the insistence of former President George Bush. Many European nations had wanted to use the NRC to talk with Russia about Georgia, but the US insisted on gesture politics instead. President Obama has sought better relations with Russia to move his arms control and disarmament agenda along. Restoration of the NATO-Russia Council was part of this policy. The NRC has been meeting regularly at Ambassadorial level for some time. At a meeting a week ago, Russian Ambassador to NATO Dmitry Rogozin told Itar-Tass that the NRC ministerial meeting “will make it possible to re-launch the full format political dialogue that was interrupted on the NATO initiative after the Russian response to Georgia’s aggression against South Ossetia.” The restoration of the political dialogue will also “open the way for the resumption of military cooperation, including interaction on Afghanistan, resumption of Russia’s participation in the NATO antiterrorist operation in the Mediterranean “Active Endeavour,” as well as cooperation in the fight against pirates near the Somalia coast.” Re-engaging with Russia on Afghanistan is another key Obama objective. With Russian support the possibility grows of more robust northern supply lines into Afghanistan to provide logisitics for the ever growing US and NATO mission. Given the uncertain nature of southern supply routes through Pakistan, this is likely to be essential to any NATO success in Afghanistan. After the meeting, outgoing NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said to journalists that: Despite the fact that there are differences ... the spirit (of the meeting) was one of wanting to cooperate.. The NATO-Russia Council, which has been in the neutral stand for almost a year, is now back in gear. The 29 ambassadors in Brussels will very quickly get back to work to agree on new procedures to make the NATO-Russia Council function more effectively. The Russian view of the meeting was a little less positive. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov told reporters that the meeting was ".. a positive development", but that there was a "frank exchange of views" at the table. As de Hoop Scheffer said, the disagreements focused on Georgia, where NATO nations refuse to accept Russian recognition of breakaway regions South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which they now support militarily. Scheffer said that: No one tried to paper over our differences, on Georgia for example. But we agreed not to let those disagreements bring the whole NRC train to a halt. Lavrov, on the other hand, insisted that Russia's recognition of the separatists could not be reversed: All have to accept the new realities and the decisions taken by Russia after the conflict are irreversible. This is a first step, but the most positive factor is that both sides have agreed that talking about problems is better than a new East-West face-off. The Bush administration wa sprepared to push NATO into a new Cold War to make a point to Russia about Georgia. Cooler heads have prevailed, and a range of issues from missile defence and arms control to Afghanistan are now on the table for future cooperation.

**Consultation Key to Preventing Obama from Going it Alone with Russia collapsing the NRC**

Daniel **Korski,** Senior Policy Fellow at European Council on Foreign Relations, 20**09**

(World Defence Systems, Issue 18, http://ecfr.3cdn.net/5c0b3ea63b9482bfa9\_6xm6y7k7s.pdf)

As NATO sets out to draft a new Strategic Concept to replace the version that has guided the alliance since 1999, one important question trumps almost all others: what kind of relationship does the alliance want to have with Russia? Over the past half-dozen years, while it has centralised authority at home, Russia has embarked on a strategic Alleingang. Its resolve to use energy as a foreign policy instrument, strong-arm tactics and even use of military force in disputes with others have reawakened concerns, especially among its neighbours.1 Patrols by Russian long-range bombers, manoeuvres in the Caucasus, the unilateral suspension of the CFE Treaty and anti Western and anti-NATO references in Kremlin’s revised National Security Strategy have only served to compound these concerns in the West.2 Whatever the Alliance’s view of its Russia policy, in the eyes of many ordinary Russians and almost all of the country’s foreign policy elite, NATO has become the principal symbol of the West’s post Cold War hubris. Vladimir Putin’s rewriting of the late 1990s as a period of wilful Western subjugation of Russia may be crass and incorrect, but it has also been popular. Despite this, relations between the West and Russia have improved since last summer’s war in Georgia. NATO and Russian leaders recently held their highest-level talks since relations soured. There are also signs that Russia’s leaders may be transferring at least part of their anti-Western animus onto other international organisations like the European Union, whose Eastern Neighbourhood Partnership many Russians leaders despise, as well as the WTO, OSCE and the Council of Europe. When President Obama visited Moscow in late July he agreed a number of concrete measures with his Russian counterparts. These included a Transit Agreement for lethal US supplies bound for NATO’s Afghan mission and the establishment of a commission like the Gore/Chernomyrdin Joint Commission of the 1990s. Kyrgyzstan’s Manas Air Base, closed to US supplied at Russian behest only a few months ago, will now be reopened. There was also progress on strategic arms reduction and a joint statement on missile defence that went beyond what the US delegation had hoped for. Yet problems still remain for the NATO Russia relationship. The restart of a US Russia dialogue has not yet translated into sustainable improvements in the NATO-Russia relationship. Indeed, some analysts even fear that the Obama administration prefers to work bilaterally with Russia rather than bring NATO into the discussions: President Obama’s letter to Russia’s President Medvedev, in which missile defence was used as a bargaining chip to bring Moscow closer to the idea of nuclear arms-control, was sent without consulting any European governments.3 On their way back to Washington, senior US officials stopped over in Brussels to brief the North Atlantic Council, but there had been no discussion of US-Russia policy beforehand.

# NRC Key to Consulting Russia

**Consultation between Russia and NATO states goes through the NRC**

**NATO 10**- North Atlantic Treaty Organization; “NATO’s relations with Russia” June 10, 2010

 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\_50090.htm

Cooperation between Russia and NATO member states is directed by the NRC and developed through various subordinate working groups and committees. Every year, NRC member countries agree on an annual work programme. Key areas of cooperation include the fight against terrorism, defence reform, military-to-military cooperation, counter-narcotics training of Afghan and Central Asian personnel, theatre missile defence, crisis management, non-proliferation, airspace management, civil emergency planning, scientific cooperation and environmental security. The Allies and Russia also regularly exchange views on current security issues in the Euro-Atlantic area, creating thereby a standing mechanism for consultation on larger political issues. To facilitate cooperation, Russia has established a diplomatic mission to NATO and Russian Military Branch Offices have been set up at NATO’s two top military command headquarters. In Moscow, a NATO Information Office seeks to explain NATO and promote the benefits of the NATO-Russia partnership, and a Military Liaison Mission is helping improve transparency and coordination on the military side. Key areas of cooperation. Current security issues The NRC has provided a forum for the development of a continuous political dialogue on current security issues, which has expanded steadily to include frank and constructive exchanges on topical and sometimes controversial issues. Discussions have been held on subjects such as the situation in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Georgia, Ukraine, Belarus, Central Asia, the Middle East and Iraq, as well as exchanges on issues such as NATO’s transformation, energy security, missile defence and the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. In some instances, political dialogue has resulted in joint positions – on border control in the Balkans (February 2003), on defence reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina (July 2003) and on the presidential elections in Ukraine (December 2004). Dialogue has also generated some ideas for practical cooperation, such as the decision to launch in December 2005 of an NRC pilot project for counter-narcotics training of Afghan and Central Asian personnel (see below).

# Consultation On Military Key to the NRC

Consultation on Military Cooperation is Critical to a lasting NATO-Russian Relationship

Meier et al, 1997 [Oliver Meier is Senior Analyst at the Berlin Information-center for Transatlantic Security, Otfried Nassauer is the Director of the Berlin Information-center for Transatlantic Security, Dr. Dmitri Trenin is the Deputy Director of the Carnegie Center Moscow, “The NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council - Dialogue or Discord?” http://www.bits.de/public/policynote/pn97-2.htm]

The political will to turn the PJC into a centerpiece of a cooperative European security structure is essential. Both, NATO member states and Russia should therefore view the PJC as an opportunity and show their commitment by investing considerable resources. If Russia chose to "constructively engage" NATO on many subjects by devoting time and money to the successful implementation of the Founding Act, NATO could hardly continue its approach of offering compromises on language but not on substance. NATO should therefore take any Russian offer for real cooperation seriously and make such offers itself. Furthermore, NATO could come a long way towards some Russian demands without endangering its own mission. For the PJC to succeed, it is essential that an intelligent strategy is designed to enable the PJC to achieve policy results on concrete issues while not neglecting bigger issues that lie at the heart of NATO-Russia conflicts. Achieving early results is crucial, because this could initiate a process in which the institution is strengthened through its own successes. Dealing with the big issues, many of which were left unresolved by the Founding Act, is important because eventually these have to be resolved. Working out an agenda that covers the core areas of dispute and setting up a working group structure that can work efficiently is essential. The approach chosen should be a mix of two, ideal-type strategies which both have their strengths and weaknesses. Theoretically, the PJC could be used to either work based on a "bottom up"-approach or on the basis of a "top down"-approach. The challenge for NATO and Russia Foreign Ministers is to devise a political program for the PJC that takes advantage of the strengths of each approach, while at the same time avoiding their respective shortcomings. Following the "bottom up"-approach logic, the PJC would attempt to find solutions to small, specific problems first and then develop an outline for a "grand strategy" for European security on the basis of these small successes. Such an approach has several advantages. It prevents the PJC from becoming deadlocked over discussions on European security concepts. The credibility of the PJC as a place for cooperation can be established by producing quick results for identifiable problems. Furthermore, specific measures can be agreed upon in a relatively short time-frame. There are however dangers associated with such a "bottom up"-approach. By focusing on small problems, important decisions about the final goals of the 16+1 process could be postponed. Hard choices about the future relationship between Russia and NATO, however, cannot be avoided in the long run. Early compromises found within the PJC framework could become meaningless once major conflicts about "big" issues surface. If a "bottom up"-approach were chosen for the PJC, participants would have to take special care that results of talks about certain issues would fit into the evolving European Security Architecture over which there is no agreement yet. Finally, if NATO and Russia were to make concrete progress mainly in military cooperation this could easily result in the militarization of cooperation. Especially the smaller European non-NATO states could perceive this as a new European "big power concert", which works out political compromises over their heads. The other approach toward the PJC could be to work out "grand strategies" for the future of European security first, and then find solutions for the most pressing security problems on the basis of these models. The advantage of such a "top down"-approach is that some of the bigger, unresolved conflicts about the future NATO-Russia relationship would be dealt with right away. E.g. both sides would have to deal with CFE, the future relationship between different European security institutions, and the question of nuclear weapon deployments in new member states. The danger with such an approach is that general discussions about these topics could effectively block substantive progress on specific issues. A "top down"-approach would require that the hard choices are made first when confidence in each other does not yet exist. This is especially true for discussions about the second (and possibly third) round of NATO enlargement. Russia is unlikely to give up its opposition to further enlargement rounds, whilst NATO has not developed good arguments to exclude Baltic states and other former Soviet republics from future NATO membership. One way to deal with this problem would be for NATO to state at the outset of consultations with Russia what the limit of its "open door" policy with regard to enlargement is going to be, and whether Russia will eventually be considered to become a full member of NATO. Such a statement would decrease the intensity of debates about future rounds of NATO enlargement. By constructively engaging each other, NATO and Russia could take advantage of the strengths of the "bottom up"- and "top down"-approach. NATO-Russia consultations should also be conducted in a transparent manner. Transparency will at least require that the results of PJC-consultations will be fully available to third parties and the public.

# Specific solvency: Iraq

Action on Iraq before consultation kills the relationship

Hunter and Rogov, 2004 (Robert E. Ph.D. in international relations, Fulbright Scholar, London School of Economics; B.A., Wesleyan University, Sergey former Representative of the Institute of USA and Canada in the Soviet Embassy in the United States

The period following the transition from the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority to a sovereign Iraqi government might present an opportunity for NATO-Russian cooperation, depending on the desires of the Iraqi interim government.  NATO and Russia should consider participating in a joint civil-military operation in Iraq in 2005. This could take the form of special units in which NATO and Russia work together. Joint operational objectives could include the following: •assisting in the monitoring of Iraq’s borders  •improving the effectiveness of the National Police, army, and other security forces •assisting the United Nations (UN), if present, with force protection and intelligence •taking part in reconstruction efforts. NATO and Russia would need to do the following: •develop special command-and-control arrangement for Russian forces (perhaps using the Deputy to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, for Russian Forces) •agree on guiding principles for NATO and Russian peacekeeping operations •identify the Russian sectors of responsibility (or joint responsibility) •outline the fundamental military tasks for Russian forces •establish a legal framework acceptable to all parties. Russia will never put its forces under NATO’s military command, at least as long as it is not a full participant in allied political decisionmaking. Thus, Russia’s military engagement in Iraq is unlikely, unless command arrangements were worked out through the NRC. Still, Iraq should be a central topic for consideration within the NATO-Russia Council, including political discussion, strategic assessments, coordination of policy, and appropriate activities regarding possible cooperation in Iraq.

\*\*\*GENUINE CONSULTATION KEY

# Genuine Consulation Key to The NRC

**Genuine consultation is key to Russian involvement**

**Vinocur 02**, Senior correspondent at the International Herald Tribune, Former NYT correspondent

(John, May 29, “ Russia, oldest NATO foe, becomes limited partner”, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/05/29/news/29iht-rome\_ed3\_\_1.html?pagewanted=1)

 ROME:— NATO brought Russia into a partnership arrangement inside the military alliance Tuesday, a move that both former adversaries hailed as an immense step for international security but one that they said would require political will and patience to succeed. For all the hopeful rhetoric that accompanied the creation of a NATO-Russia Council within the Atlantic alliance, it was clear that, while Russia had won a voice in NATO discussions, it had obtained a partnership with an asterisk. In consultations within NATO, Russia will have an equal voice on a predetermined number of issues that range from counterterrorism to the spread of nuclear weapons. But Russia will have no possibility of blocking or vetoing decisions taken by the North Atlantic Council, the organization's highest authority.

 **GENUINE CONSULTATION IS KEY—THE NATO-RUSSIA COUNCIL WILL COLLAPSE WITHOUT JOINT DECISION MAKING**

**Vinocur,** Staff writer for International Herald Tribune**, 2002 (**Russia, Oldest NATO foe, becomes Partner. http://www.nytimes.com/2002/05/29/news/29iht-rome\_ed3\_\_1.html?scp=1&sq=Putin%20himself%20referred%20to%20Russia's%20integration%20hanging%20on%20political%20will%20and%20patience.%20Blair%20said,%20%22There's%20a%20lot%20to%20do%20to%20give%20substance%20to%20the%20mission.%22%20Robertson&st=cse)

Putin himself referred to Russia's integration hanging on political will and patience. Blair said, "There's a lot to do to give substance to the mission." Robertson, in an interview with European newspapers earlier in the week, openly spoke of the possibility of the new council's failure. If that happened, he said, NATO would survive. Failure, according to Robertson, would be visible if the council could not make joint decisions and turned into a debating club. That had been more or less the fate of the NATO-Russia consultative group set up five years ago. It was essentially a talk shop, and Russia abandoned it as a means of expressing its anger over the alliance's bombing campaign against Yugoslavia in 1999.

**GENUINE CONSULTATION IS KEY TO THE NRC—FALSE CONSULTATION REDIVIDES EUROPE**

**Rumer and Simon,** Contributors to the St. Petersburg Times, **2001,** [12-25-2001, As Strange as it May Seem, NATO needs Russia, http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action\_id=2&story\_id=6193&highlight=nintendo%20DS)

RUSSIA does not belong in NATO. The Russian people and their leaders are ambivalent about membership in the alliance, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is not ready to fully embrace its former enemy and commit to its defense, which could include, for example, a pledge to defend Russia against China.

But unless NATO gives Russia a more meaningful seat at the table and a real vote on select issues of mutual interest, the alliance cannot retain its claim as the mainstay of European security.

The current arrangement of 19+1, whereby the alliance's 19 members consult Russia, but make decisions without it, maintains Cold War-like divisions in Europe and constrains NATO's already-limited capabilities to address the two biggest threats to the continent - terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. By denying Russia a vote on these issues, NATO runs the risk of consigning itself to irrelevance. Next year will be crucial for NATO. At the Prague summit in November, the alliance is all but certain to admit new members - including, over Russian objections - the three Baltic countries of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.

# Genuine Consulation Key to The NRC

**Genuine Consultation Key to Solvency**

 **Ambassador Brooks, 2009**

(Linton, US Ambassador and former Under Secretary of Energy for Nuclear Security and Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration,

 Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference www.carnegieendowment.org/files/npc\_build\_or\_break4.pdf)

Amb. Brooks: We Always Talk About Deterrence Being a Function of Capability and Will. Nothing We’re Going to Do in the Next Several Years, as Just a Practical Matter, is Going to Take Away the Capability to Offer Extended Deterrence, Even If the Start Follow-on Goes Quickly, and We Immediately Move to a Much More Dramatic Level. So the Question is How Do We Convince Our Allies That We Still Have the Will? Things Like Weapons in Europe are Symbols, but They’re Not the Only Way. I Agree Completely with the Point About Consultation, and I’d Go Further. We in the ’80s, When I Was Doing Arms Control, We Would Wind up Paul Nitze and Ed Rowney, and We Would Put Them on Planes, and They Would Go to Every Capital You’ve Ever Heard of. and They Would Say, We’re Here to Consult; Tomorrow We’re Making an Announcement, and Here’s What It is. and So What Our Allies Got Was They Weren’t Surprised. They Didn’t Do What Mort Said. They Didn’t Read Our Position in the Paper, but They Also Didn’t Influence Our Position. I Think Those Days Have to Be Over. That’s Going to Be Hard, Because the New Administration, Like All New Administrations, Wants to Do Things Quickly. and Consultation with Allies, as Many in this Room Know, Whatever Else It is, is Not a “Quickly” Kind of Thing, but I Think We are Going to Have to Do More of It So That We Do Not Have Our Allies Misinterpret Where the President is Going. I Don’t Think There’s Anything That Risks the Security of Our Allies at Least in What the President Has Outlined So Far, but I Think It is Entirely Possible to Do this Wrong and Leave That Impression. and So I Think We’re in the Need to Build in Time for Genuine Consultation with Allies, or We’re Not Going to Like the Way this Works out. We Are Going To Trade One Set Of Problems For Another.

# Non-Genuine Consultation Collapses The NRC

**Non-genuine consultation collapses Russian NRC involvement**

**Rumer and Simon 01 -** Senior Fellows at the National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies(Eugene, 12 25, “Strange as it May Seem, NATO Needs Russia”, ).

Petersburg’s Times)

But unless NATO gives Russia a more meaningful seat at the table and a real vote on select issues of mutual interest, the alliance cannot retain its claim as the mainstay of European security. The current arrangement of 19+1, whereby the alliance's 19 members consult Russia, but make decisions without it, maintains Cold War-like divisions in Europe and constrains NATO's already-limited capabilities to address the two biggest threats to the continent - terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. By denying Russia a vote on these issues, NATO runs the risk of consigning itself to irrelevance. Next year will be crucial for NATO. At the Prague summit in November, the alliance is all but certain to admit new members - including, over Russian objections - the three Baltic countries of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.

 **RUSSIA’S LACK OF VETO WILL UNDERMINE THE NRC**

Kemper, Staff Writer for the Chicago Tribune, 2002 [May 29, “NATO embraces Russia as ally”, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2002-05-29/news/0205290416\_1\_nato-russia-council-military-alliance-pratica-di)

As a member of the NATO-Russia Council, Russia now can join debates over anti-terrorism initiatives, crisis management, peacekeeping, search-and-rescue missions and joint military exercises at a time when NATO is facing fundamental questions about its role and its global relevance. Yet Russia, which formed the heart of the Soviet Union before it splintered into 15 separate nations more than a decade ago, was denied a full place at the NATO table. Russia will have no veto over NATO actions with which it disagrees, including the planned expansion of the alliance. Nor will Moscow have any role in NATO's core military alliance, in which all members pledge to protect the others from attack. The disagreements and Russia's inequality in status may trouble the new council one day, as they did previous efforts by NATO and Russia to forge ties. Officials acknowledged that some details of the relationship remain to be worked out.

**THE UNITED STATES MUST SEEK ACTION OUT OF THE NATO-RUSSIA COUNCIL—TALK IS NOT ENOUGH**

**VERSHBOW 4** (ALEXANDER, US AMBASSADOR TO RUSSIA, UPI)

Certainly, it is a psychologically difficult thing for many Russians to accept that countries that were not only former Warsaw Pact members, but were actually part of the Soviet Union, are now joining NATO. We make the case that Russia's security is enhanced by having the countries to its west linked to a collective security structure, as these same countries are less likely to create problems in their relations with Russia. Russian-Polish relations are much better now than they were five or 10 years ago. We need to establish more concrete facts on the ground to demonstrate that NATO-Russia cooperation is actually dealing with real security problems. Those problems include terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and regional conflicts. The sooner we can move from talk to action in the NATO-Russia Council, we are apt to get more support from Russia for NATO's operations in Afghanistan, and perhaps a contribution to Iraq, at least indirectly, after the transition to an Iraqi government on June 30. The prospects for cooperative missile defense would be sensational -- the most contentious issue in U.S.-Russia relations in the 1980s and '90s turning into an area of tangible strategic, and even industrial, cooperation, as part of the new agenda in the first decade of the 21st century.

# Generic Genuine Consultation Key

The Perm Fails- Prior and Genuine Consultation is key to Relations Abroad

Cleveland 86, Former U.S Ambassador to NATO and Assistant Secretary of State, (The President as Manager of American Foreign Policy, Public Administration Review, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Mar. - Apr., 1986), pp. 103-104)

The art of international consultation is thus central to the American presidency. If there is a general rule about consultation, it is the Golden Rule. When about to take an action affecting others, the President or other officials need to ask: how would we react if one of our friends or one of our adversaries behaved as we are about to behave without consulting us about it? Something like this is, or has mostly been in recent history, the declaratory policy of the United States. It was expressed, for example, by Vice President Hubert Humphrey when he spoke to the North Atlantic Council on April 7, 1967: To put it bluntly, how do you make sure that our negotiations with the Soviets-as on disarmament, on nonproliferation, or anti-ballistic missiles-do not do violence to your vital interests? And conversely, how do we make sure that the initiatives and negotiations of our allies do not adversely affect our own vital inter- ests and responsibilities? We have a way of safeguarding and harmonizing our interests as traffic quickens through the "open door." It is by consultation through this Council .... And if we follow the Golden Rule-that each of us consult as soon, as often, and as frankly as he would wish the others to consult-the Alliance will prove to be the midwife of more hopeful times. The purpose of international consultation is not just to buy support for what we have already decided to do. The history so far of managed multilateralism suggests a more heretical notion: that by consulting with others before we have finished thinking ourselves, we force ourselves to think harder about what we are doing and why. It is comparatively easy for a President of the United States to be deluded, especially if he consults mostly with staff members and political friends most likely to agree with his (often unstated) basic premises. It is always much harder to delude friends and allies abroad: they have their own interests to look after and are not so reluctant as a President's advisers to ask the fundamental questions. The notion that consulting with foreigners improves the quality of our own decisions is not easy to sell to Americans whose feel for foreign policy is limited to bureaucratic bargains and legislative tactics in the District of Columbia. I know because I have tried. But by finding out what others are likely to say and do, before the "domestic" bargains have been struck and our own policy has been frozen, the President secures a valuable input into his own thinking. Simply imagining what various kinds of foreigners are likely to say and do (for example by having the State Department's desk officers for the affected countries in the room) is too pale a substitute for the real thing. In the interdependent world economy it is especially evident that everything is related to everything else. Once NATO at U.S. initiative had created in the Nuclear Planning Group a forum which required that the use of tactical nuclear weapons be professionally discussed among responsible and increasingly knowl- edgeable Defense Ministers of allied governments, we had to think much harder ourselves about the rationale for the presence and potentials for use of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. The original top-secret justification, in the late '50s, for placing the equivalent of 7,000 Hiroshima bombs in Europe had been almost unbelievably thin. The result of having to explain it to skeptical peers in the '60s was dramatic: some brilliant analytical work was done in Washington, better than anything produced on the subject prior to the self- created requirement for international consultation. "Consultation" covers a wide spectrum of activity. It includes the exchange of information, briefings, analysis, and expertise. Briefing is about all we did with our allies on the Vietnam war, and our allies in conse- quence felt no responsibility for the quagmire into which we had wandered. It can mean advance notification as a matter of general interest (where U.S. naval units will be visiting next), consent-building notifica- tion just before a public announcement (President Ken- nedy telling key European leaders about the missiles in Cuba and what we had decided to do about them), or advance discussion on national intentions (talks with friends and allies around the world before a Presidential meeting with Soviet leaders). Toward the "harder" end of the spectrum, there is "before and during" consultation with a view to developing parallel national actions and attitudes-as was done extensively in promoting the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty, and is regularly (if not always skillfully) done on peace-and-security crises and fiscal and monetary policy. And in the most serious cases, "before and during" consultation can take place with a view to genuinely collective action-the appointment of a United Nations or NATO Secretary General, the mobilization of an international peacekeeping force, the rescue of a debt-ridden developing country. Whether to consult early or late is not subject to rule- making; the answer depends so much on what the topic is. In general, if the consultation is "real"-in the sense that the nation starting the conversation is prepared to modify its views on the basis of the discussion it starts- the conversation should be opened as early as possible. Where something more like notification is intended, but consent is needed for a decision taken, the best practice seems to be to tell those affected about the decision before they read about it in the newspapers, but not so long before as to create the opportunity to object. (President Charles de Gaulle of France was clear about this distinction. When Dean Acheson flew to Paris in October 1962 to tell him what President Kennedy had decided to do about the Soviet missiles in Cuba, de Gaulle's first question was, "Are you informing me or consulting me?") Most international arguments about consultation stem from a sense of surprise; and timely consultation can at least obviate the use of procedural complaints as a surrogate for substantive objections. Surprise can nor- mally be avoided by continuously informing and con-sulting

# Generic Genuine Consultation Key

Prior Consultation in the International Sphere is key to Effectiveness and Relations

Bergsten 76, director of the Peterson Institute for International Economics (C. Fred, *Interdependence and the Reform of International Institutions*, International Organization, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Spring, 1976), pp. 368-369)

Both the existing and proposed new international institutions need to be mobilized much more effectively than has been the case in recent years. This of course requires a greater willingness by national governments to use the institutions. But there are many things which the institutions can do largely on their own to foster progress. The institutions, through their top management and staffs, should seek actively to promote their constitutional objectives.1" These efforts should seek to engage actively officials in national govemments concerned with the relevant functional issue, at both the political and senior bureaucratic levels. They should also involve the private sector in countries where it can be influential. Indeed, unofficial groups can often be mobilized fonnally to help catalyze international action; the Rey Committee of the OECD helped lay the basis for the current Multilateral Trade Negotiations, and the UN Group of Eminent Persons paved the way for its new Commission on Transnational Enterprises. The institutions should also seek to galvanize, and provide a forum for, earlier external input to national policy decisions. The goal should be formal consultation prior to such decisions, as is in fact required by the Articles of Agreement of the IMF regarding exchange-rate changes. But even without such formality, which is extremely difficult in terms of domestic politics in most countries, a major function of international institutions should be substantive discussions early in the decision- making process. The deepening of transnational networks suggested above would of course contribute greatly to this process. Expansion of the consultative process would help create such transnational networks. So the relationship between international consultation and institutional evolution could become a self-reinforcing process. Both steps require strong, active, and effective management of the inter- national institutions themselves, at both the director-general and staff levels. Again there is a self-reinforcing process: if the institutions take a more active and initiatory approach to problems, they will attract better management and staff. Finally, effective mobilization of international institutions requires stronger support for them within national governments. Few governments are in fact organized effectively to backstop the international organizations of which they are members; most often there is a wide gap between the people responsible for relations with the institutions and those responsible for the substance of the issues. The same government officials who are responsible for national decisions must participate directly in the international institutional process if that process is to succeed.

Genuine consultation can change attitudes – countries will say yes eventually even if they don’t initially support the plan

Chernoff 95, Associate Professor of Political Science at Colgate University, [Fred, After Bipolarity, pg. 219]

If the aim is to look at how communication indicates the use of information in the cybernetic and neo-liberal theories, then the breadth of communication might be inadequate. When one examines alliance members’ resentment or satisfaction in decisions, it is important to look at how, not just how many, states are involved in the decisions. One must consider whether all the states involved had equal roles, whether some had access to more information, and whether some were consulted in a more significant way, e.g. by being offered a genuine chance to shape the final decision. Communication between the sponsor of a proposal and others helps to provide information from one party to others. But two-way communication gives states a chance to have their concerns heard and addressed and thus gives them at least the opportunity to think that their participation played a role in shaping the outcome of the case. Coding for the depth measure is based on the number of meetings of officials who were consulted, on the level of those officials within their governments, and on whether they were being asked for their views on the proposal or whether they were simply being informed of a decision already taken. A large number of mere information sessions that were widely attended would constitute high breadth but low depth. So the frequency, the intensity, and the nature of consultations might lead states to feel that their interests are taken into account in the formulation of proposals or policies and thus, in theory, to be more willing to support them. There might be cases in which communications have substantial depth but little breadth. That is a certain group of states particularly important for a specific issue might consult intensely without attempting to bring all or most NATO members into the consultations.

# Generic Genuine Consultation Key

Only genuine consultation spills over to create a framework for future consultation – the permutation can’t access the net benefit

Haass 04 (Richard N. President of the Council on Foreign Relations "The United States and Europe: Adjusting to the Global Era"

Genuine consultation is a must . Consultation cannot consist of simply informing others of what has already been decided or going through the motions and not adapting policies yet still expecting support. Nor can consultations wait until a crisis is upon us; talks should be held in advance on how to deal with the central challenges of this era. This promises to be the best and most likely only way of forging a policy framework relevant to the challenges central to this era of international relations .

**Allies don’t necessarily oppose changes in US military – they just want to hear about them in advance; political relations are critical to credibility of US nuclear umbrella**

Reif 09, Director of Nuclear Non-Proliferation at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Kingston, Deputy, 8/7/2009, “How to think about "extended deterrence",” http://www.nukesofhazardblog.com/story/2009/8/7/154022/6070

1. So long as U.S. allies could fall victim to nuclear attack, the U.S. should retain nuclear weapons to deter such an attack. However, allied concerns about the state of the U.S. nuclear umbrella should not be taken to mean that they oppose any or **even significant changes to U.S. nuclear posture**. Rather, key allies such as Japan, South Korea, and Turkey **don’t want to be surprised** by changes to U.S. strategic posture. **They want to be consulted** well ahead of time. 2. There is much more to assuring allies than the nuclear component of extended deterrence. For example, a critical factor in an ally’s confidence in the credibility of extended deterrence is its confidence in **the strength of its political relationship** with the United States. If political relations fray then the credibility of the U.S. extended deterrent will be perceived to be weak, no matter what type of or how many nuclear weapons the United States possesses. Nuclear weapons are often relied on as a crutch to avoid the hard choices and difficult negotiations with allies that changes in U.S. nuclear posture would require.

**Genuine consultation before fiat of the plan in critical to maintain relations**

**Haass 99** Richard N. Haass, Dir. of foreign policy studies at Brookings, 1999, *Transatlantic tensions,* p. 234

Still, consultations are critical. Surely the U.S. administration of the day needs to avoid consulting only after is has determined its own policy, be it by executive decision or congressional fiat. U.S. diplomatic efforts to build European support for a common approach to India and Pakistan in the aftermath of their May 1998 nuclear tests and after the Clinton administration had put into effect comprehensive sanctions mandated by U.S. legislation are an instructive example. Such consultation does little more than disguise unilateralism.

**And, restructured relations require prior consultation.**

**Chollet 02** Derek Chollet, fellow at American Academy in Berlin, 4/19/02 [The Times Union]

Listening to the voices from both sides of the Atlantic, it is easy to think that the United States and Europe are headed for an irreparable break. whether it's about Ariel Sharon, Saddam Hussein or steel. the United States and Europe just can't agree Many in Europe believe that President Bush and his administration are unbending unilateralists who don't care about the views of their long standing allies. Meanwhile in Washington, many believe that Europe is so self absorbed and so weak militarily that it neither understands the nature ofthe threats emanating from places such as the Middle East nor could it do anything about them. Both sides are right. But at the same time, both are wrong The Bush administration has shown that it is capable ofdeft multilateral diplomacy when it wants to be. and in the recent military campaign in eastern Afghanistan¬Europe has proved it is ready to join in the fight. Rather than finger pointing, Washington and Europe must change bow they approach each other. For the Bush administration, this reguires a more serious attempt to get its European partners on board. So far, Bush has offered only rhetoric and meetings with British Prime Minister Tony Blair neither of which goes very far on the continent The lack of real effort to consult Europe has been astonishin . Secretary of State Colin Powell's visit to Madrid last week is his first to Europe this year. On Vice President Dick Cheney's I 0 day tour to build support for confronting Iraq, his only European stop was London. Bush will finally visit Europe in May. European officials say that there are virtually no working level consultations. They complain that Washington calls only when it has made a decision. It will be impossible for Washington to get Europe's support if it does not even try.

\*\*\*PRIOR CONSULTATION IS KEY

# Prior Consultation is Key

**CONSULTING RUSSIA AFTER THE FACT IS NOT ENOUGH—CONSULTING NATO FIRST WILL CAUSE RUSSIAN OPPOSITION**

**SIMES 3**

(Dmitri, President of the Nixon Center, FDCH Political Testimony, 9-30)

The United States should also think more strategically about official communications with Russia. Aside from a few specific cases directly involving key issues in bilateral relations--such as the Bush Administration's decision to withdraw from the Anti- Ballistic Missile Treaty--the U.S. has rarely engaged in advance consultation with Moscow on important policy initiatives. In fact, Russian officials complain that they hear about new policies after not only NATO allies are briefed, but also after they appear in the media. The administration's Proliferation Security Initiative, announced by President Bush in Krakow (on the way to seeing President Putin in St. Petersburg) in June 2003, has been cited as a particular example with the added complaint that Moscow was not invited to send a delegation to a Madrid gathering on counter-proliferation strategy held after Mr. Bush's speech.

**PRIOR CONSULTATION IS KEY TO U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS**

**HAASS 2**

(Richard, US State Department, Federal Information and News Dispatch, State Department, June 3)

Finally, both the United States and Europe need to improve the quality of consultations with Russia. When either Americans or Europeans are about to make decisions that have an impact on Russia or the relationship, they owe it to Russia to consult in advance, not simply announce a decision after the fact. That does not mean Russia will have a veto, but it does mean decisions will be made with full knowledge of the impact on the relationship. And, we expect our Russian partner to do likewise.

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**SIMES 3**

(Dmitri, President of the Nixon Center, FDCH Political Testimony, 9-30)

The United States should also think more strategically about official communications with Russia. Aside from a few specific cases directly involving key issues in bilateral relations--such as the Bush Administration's decision to withdraw from the Anti- Ballistic Missile Treaty--the U.S. has rarely engaged in advance consultation with Moscow on important policy initiatives. In fact, Russian officials complain that they hear about new policies after not only NATO allies are briefed, but also after they appear in the media. The administration's Proliferation Security Initiative, announced by President Bush in Krakow (on the way to seeing President Putin in St. Petersburg) in June 2003, has been cited as a particular example with the added complaint that Moscow was not invited to send a delegation to a Madrid gathering on counter-proliferation strategy held after Mr. Bush's speech.

**PRIOR CONSULTATION IS KEY TO U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS**

**HAASS 2**

(Richard, US State Department, Federal Information and News Dispatch, State Department, June 3)

Finally, both the United States and Europe need to improve the quality of consultations with Russia. When either Americans or Europeans are about to make decisions that have an impact on Russia or the relationship, they owe it to Russia to consult in advance, not simply announce a decision after the fact. That does not mean Russia will have a veto, but it does mean decisions will be made with full knowledge of the impact on the relationship. And, we expect our Russian partner to do likewise.

\*\*\*NRC GOOD

# NRC Good – Laundry list

**THE COUNTERPLAN SOLVES BETTER—COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA IS KEY TO SOLVE REGIONAL INSTABILITY, TERRORISM, PROLIF, AND FAILED STATES.**

**VERSHBOW 02** (Alexander, US Ambassador to Russia, Feb 22, http://www.usembassy.it/file2002\_02/alia/a2022210.htm)

Russia's relations with NATO should also reflect our shared security interests. As we begin the 21st century, it is clear that the members of NATO and Russia face similar challenges to their security. These include transnational threats such as global terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as continued dangers flowing from regional instability, militant nationalism, and "failed states." NATO itself must continue to adapt to meet these threats -- both by redefining its mission and equipping itself with the capabilities needed to fulfill that mission. But all the Allies recognize that NATO's efforts to deal effectively with 21st century threats will be far more successful if they are accompanied by closer cooperation with Russia.

**NATO-RUSSIA COUNCIL IS KEY TO U.S.-RUSSIAN COOPERATION—THIS SOLVES TERRORISM, PROLIF, AND REGIONAL WAR**

**LEVGOLD 3,** PhD, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, is a member of Executive Committee of The Harriman Institute, prof. @ Columbia Univ (ROBERT, NATIONAL INTEREST, WINTER 02/03)

In this sense, the new arrangement between Russia and nato is but a prototype of the relationship Putin and his allies have in mind. The promise of this venture owes as much to the new agenda being addressed as to the new mechanism by which Russia is to be included. In the struggle against global terrorism, the effort to control weapons of mass destruction and the management of regional conflicts-the heart of this new agenda-nato, as both sides understand, needs Russia. The mechanism of the nato-Russia Council, therefore, has an intrinsic value that its predecessor, the Permanent Joint Council, lacked, designed as it was to deal primarily with Russian discontents. Not surprisingly, therefore, "nato at 20" in the half year of its existence is already off to a far more constructive start than the pjc. It is seriously at work on assessing terrorist threats, planning airspace management and joint training exercises, discussing problems of crisis management, considering theater missile defense, and coordinating efforts to secure fissile material wherever possible (as was demonstrated by U.S.-Russian cooperation in removing more than 100 pounds of enriched uranium from Serbia's Vinca nuclear reactor last August).

# NRC Good – Russian Integration

**Russian NATO integration cannot move forward absent Russia’s continued membership in the NRC**

**Bandler AND Kulhanek 6/2,** Bandler served as Special Assistant to President Clinton, Senior Director for Europe in the National Security Council, Counselor for the 1999 NATO Summit, Kulhanek is a research fellow at the Association for International Affairs, a premier Prague based NGO.

(Donald Bandler and Jakub Kulhanek, “ Russia: A NATO Member?”, <http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/russia-nato-member-0>, KW)

The fact that Moscow invited NATO troops to parade alongside Russian soldiers raises a host of intriguing questions about the future direction of the NATO-Russia relationship. Brussels and Moscow have recently embarked on a rather tedious process of repairing their ties in the wake of the war in Georgia. Are Brussels and Moscow in for a more durable rapprochement? At the moment, NATO and Russian officials continue to sound quite upbeat about the prospects for deepening their cooperation. Clearly, the US, EU and Russia have considerable stakes and common interests to consider. But let us speculate even more; can this ongoing thaw eventually result in NATO membership for Russia? In December 2009, the first session of the NATO-Russia Council was held after its suspension in response to the war in Georgia. That meeting opened a new and less tense chapter in NATO-Russia relations – one of the most visible manifestations of the current thaw. In the meantime, the NATO countries have become increasingly engaged in political, military and relief activities in Afghanistan. Despite all its grudges against the Alliance, Russia can ill afford the failure of NATO, since it would then have to face the spread of violence and extremism on its own in Central Asia. Under the umbrella of the NATO-Russia Council, a myriad of programs and activities have been progressing. NATO and Russia agreed on a road map of military activities for this year. Dmitri Trenin, a prominent Russian foreign policy expert, suggested that NATO and Russia should explore the development of joint missile defenses, for example. His idea was recently echoed by Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov at a press conference last month, where he spoke in favor of just such a joint endeavor with the Alliance. There is ample room for both sides to share expertise and technology in addressing common challenges and a panoply of current global threats. Does this dawn of a more cooperative relationship herald a more far-reaching reconciliation between these former rivals? If so, is Russia’s admission into NATO feasible in the long-run? However hypothetical it might seem, the subject has been broached periodically by foreign policy makers and experts on both sides. As early as December 1991, Russian President Boris Yeltsin wrote to NATO leaders saying that his country would join the Alliance some time in the future. Yeltsin’s successor Vladimir Putin, hinted during his first presidential term that Russia could become a full fledged member of the Atlantic Alliance. In early February this year the Institute of Contemporary Development -- an influential liberal think-tank with close links to current Russian President Dmitry Medvedev who sits on the Institute’s board of trustees -- published a report on the future of Russia. It foresees Russia’s accession into NATO over time. Although the Institute represents a fairly isolated liberal point of view, the fact remains that by resuscitating the notion of Russia’s NATO membership the report shows that this daring proposition has not been banished from Russia’s foreign policy debate.

 **RUSSIAN INTEGRATION INTO NATO SOLVES TERRORISM, REGIONAL CONFLICT, AND U.S.-CHINA GLOBAL WAR**

**RIVERA 3** (DAVID W. RIVERA is visiting assistant professor of government at Hamilton College, Political Science Quarterly March 22, 2003 )

On the other hand, Russian membership in NATO might serve to reinforce and consolidate positive tendencies in Russian foreign policy, such as the absence of a military response to NATO's 1999 expansion and the Yeltsin administration's important cooperation in the implementation of NATO's peace plan in Kosovo. (123) In addition, NATO membership would serve to slow, if not reverse, Moscow's almost decade-long movement in the direction of an alliance with the People's Republic of China, a state likely to equal if not surpass the United States in economic and military power in this century and thus the world's most likely candidate to ignite a global "hegemonic war." (124) The same can be said regarding Moscow's highly profitable military and nuclear cooperation with Iran. Most basically, Russian membership "would integrate a potentially threatening state into NATO and increase the overall power base of the alliance." (125) It would also promote the continuation of Russian cooperation and assistance in future American actions against terrorist networks and rogue states. Such cooperation and assistance will be even more beneficial should pessimistic predictions of enduring conflict between the West and the Islamic world as a whole come true. (126) In this regard, Russia is, behind Saudi Arabia, the world's second largest exporter of oil. (127) Finally, whatever the relative merits of these arguments, this study has shown that the record of post-Soviet Russia's behavior toward its newly independent neighbors cannot be legitimately construed as providing grounds for Russia's exclusion from NATO.

# EXT – Russian Integration Solves Nato Effectiveness

 **INTEGRATING RUSSIA SOVLES NATO EFFECTIVENESS AND CHECKS GLOBAL CONFLICTS**

**ORENSTEIN 2** (Mitchell, Editor of Russia Watch Special Edition, Russia Watch, April)

Events since September 11 show clearly the promise of closer NATO-Russia relations. Russia offers important strategic assets to NATO, including intelligence sharing, overfly rights, and assistance in attaining access to bases in the former Soviet Union. While Russia has numerous entanglements that make some NATO analysts wary it also has significant military and political assets, whose value were demonstrated in the days after September 11. Having Russia in NATO enhances the alliances ability to take the lead globally on a variety of important security issues, such as anti-proliferation measures, missile defense, and fighting terrorism. It strengthens the political clout of any joint NATO-Russia decision, particularly in the developing world. In short, it makes NATO less of a regional security organization and more of a global alliance, spanning the Northern Hemisphere from Vancouver to Vladivostok. By increasing the interoperability of forces and military culture across the Northern Hemisphere, the NATO of the future can manage conflict not only within Europe, but also play a role in out-of-area conflicts, as a community of countries with established patterns of military cooperation that may be called upon to act in a variety of formats and situations. The promise of this NATO of the future is great—and greater than many have imagined.

**CONCRETE NRC ACTION IS KEY TO INTEGRATE RUSSIA WITH NATO**

**VERSHBOW 2002**

(Alexander, U.S. Ambassador to Russia, The United States Mission to the European Union, December 6, <http://www.useu.be/Categories/Defense/Dec0602VershbowRussiaNATO.html>)

I am greatly encouraged to see that the new NATO-Russia Council is proceeding with a new spirit of flexibility and compromise. The Council, like NATO itself, must rely on the same principles of consensus, consultation and cooperation that have evolved among the NATO Allies over the past five decades. Russia's voice is being heard in deliberations as an equal member as the Council examines and debates critical issues. But the Council is not a debate club - its success will be determined by its activities and actions. In September, for instance, Russia hosted a joint civil emergency exercise in Noginsk, where 30 countries co-operated to respond to a mock terrorist attack using chemical weapons - unfortunately, an all-too-real threat in today's world. This exercise yielded valuable lessons on how we can help save innocent lives through unprecedented cooperation by first responders from all over Europe. What else have NATO and Russia been doing together? Military authorities have completed joint assessments of the threat posed by Al Qaeda to our troops in the Balkans and to civil aviation. In the hope of avoiding future submarine disasters, such as the Kursk tragedy, NATO and Russia have successfully put together a framework agreement on cooperation in search-and-rescue at sea. We expect the agreement to be signed next month. We have developed an outline for a thorough assessment of the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This assessment will become the basis for cooperation to stem the spread of these dangerous weapons. These are a few of the productive results of our collaboration in the few short months since May. NATO and Russia are now investigating how we can work together on peacekeeping and integrated training of our military forces. All of this is an impressive agenda of joint action that will bring us closer together and increase our common security: that of Europe, of the United States, and of Russia. It is clear that we are now entering new territory. The signing of the Treaty of Moscow last May, Moscow's extraordinary co-operation with us in the war against global terror, and formation of the NATO-Russia Council are all tangible evidence of this fundamental fact. Our purpose is to build common security with Russia, and we must think creatively as we explore new questions that need to be raised. Should NATO and Russia, for instance, develop military capabilities to work together against terrorist threats? As NATO works on missile defense, should it develop a common missile defense system with Russia? Is there a role for Russia in conjunction with the new NATO Response Force, which in turn would provide a stimulus for reform of the Russian defense forces? In some cases we will no doubt have to overcome old ways of thinking that have divided us in the past but that now must give way to the new realities that unite us. It is an opportunity we must not let slip through our hands. The Allies at the Prague Summit specifically cited the NATO-Russia Council's achievements as significant and pledged to intensify and broaden cooperation with Russia in order to achieve our shared goal of a secure, stable and peaceful Europe. Enlargement of NATO is aimed at this same goal. As National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice said after the Prague Summit, NATO membership for Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia will help strengthen and solidify democracy in those countries and "to have stable democracies at the door of Russia . . . can only be for the good." Stable countries on Russia's borders will better enable Russia to meet the real threats to its security that emanate from other directions. And when President Bush traveled to St. Petersburg immediately from Prague, he made clear that Russia is NATO's partner and friend, and that the new members of the Alliance are pledged to peace and freedom. Dramatic proof of the new cooperation possible today between Russia and NATO was provided by the statements concerning Iraq issued by NATO, on the one hand, and by the United States and Russia jointly, on the other. We have spoken in unison with a message to Saddam Hussein that the will of the United Nations must be respected and that we will stand together until we ensure that Iraq has no weapons of mass destruction in its possession. Six months ago when I spoke to the Institute, I said that we were witnessing a period of transition when economic and other non-strategic issues would assume a greater importance in U.S.-Russian relations. The importance of these relations has been evident during recent months as I've traveled to conferences in Anchorage, Alaska; Houston, Texas; and my home city of Boston, Massachusetts. In Alaska economic ties between the U.S. West Coast and the Russian Far East were discussed; in Texas, the importance of cooperation in the field of energy; and in Boston, the new opportunities for increased U.S. investment in Russia. Our economic co-operation has the potential to take on a strategic dimension that will serve both our interests. These kinds of broad-based relations that serve our mutual interests, I believe, help Russia accept our assurances that NATO can be its partner. Not just against the terrible scourge of terrorism that has caused so much loss of life in Russia, the United States and elsewhere over the past months and years, but also to advance the common principles that we share.

# NRC Good – Russia Fears Of Nato Expansion

**NRC Cooperation solves Russian fears of NATO expansion**

**BOUCHER 4** (Richard, State Department Spokesman, March 29, Federal Information and News Dispatch, State Department)

Yeah. Are you concerned with the statement that was made by the Russian Defense Minister threatening to expand their military, even their nuclear arsenal, as a result of expanding NATO, or do you think this is just blowing off steam? MR. BOUCHER: I'm not going to try to comment on why people make statements around the world. I would just make clear what we've said before, that NATO's expansion is not a threat to anyone. NATO's expansion involves the expansion of values of peace and democracy and open societies that, in the past 10, 15 years, have led to a more stable Europe, a better Europe, a more secure situation for all the countries in Europe -- whether it's those joining NATO or those who are not in NATO. The NATO-Russia Council remains an important area of cooperation for all of us, and that continues to be, you know, we think, fruitful in bringing stability to the continent. QUESTION: You are doing anything to reassure them that this is not really something that can threaten Russia? MR. BOUCHER: I think they've heard from us again and again. The best thing we can do is the kind of real cooperation that we have in the NATO-Russia Council, which we recognize and they have recognized brings us together in very practical ways that contribute to the security of NATO members, of the United States, as well as of Russia.

**Absent cooperation and trust, NATO eastern expansion sparks a nuclear conflict**

**Umland 09**- Andreas; Assistant Professor of Contemporary Russian History at The Catholic University of Eichstaett-Ingolstadt in Upper Bavaria.; “NATO-Russia War: a Scenario” Atlantic Council; February 19, 2009; http://www.acus.org/new\_atlanticist/nato-russia-war-scenario

As there is little prospect that the West will develop the strength or even willingness to correct these and similar inconsistencies in its international behaviour, Moscow’s falcons will find it easy to further demonize the Western elites. The latter, in turn, will face an acrimonious choice to make when it comes to follow up on their promise, to Georgia and Ukraine, that these countries shall become members of NATO – an organization seen as fundamentally anti-Russian by both Moscow’s intellectuals and the Russian common man. Unless something fundamentally changes in Russian-Western relations, we will – as the Russian-Georgian war illustrated – continue to live on the brink of an armed confrontation between two nuclear super-powers.

# EXT – NATO Expansion = War

**Russia strongly opposes NATO expansion- risks conflict**

**New Europe 09**- “Obama wants NATO expansion and closer Russian ties” March 30, 2009 http://www.neurope.eu/articles/93756.php

US President Barack Obama said he backs the expansion of NATO to European countries aspiring to join the alliance but pledged to work towards reinvigorating US-Russian relations, a difficult combination since **Russia opposes NATO bringing in those countries and has sounded ominous warnings if any attempt is made**. Obama, meeting with NATO Secretary General Jaap De Hoop Scheffer ahead of the alliance summit in Germany and France this week, also said he will present his administration’s strategic review of the mission in Afghanistan to other members. “We expect to share that with our NATO counterparts,” Obama said. Moscow has strongly opposed NATO expansion closer to its borders, particularly NATO’s agreement last year to eventually offer membership to Georgia and Ukraine, two former Soviet states. Obama did not mention the two countries. “My administration is seeking a re-set of the relationship with Russia, but in a way that’s consistent with NATO membership and consistent with the need to send a clear signal throughout Europe that we are going to continue to abide by the central belief that countries who seek and aspire to join NATO are able to join NATO,” Obama said.

# NRC Good – Russian Economy 1/2

**NATO-RUSSIA COUNCIL ALLOWS PUTIN TO FOCUS ON DOMESTIC PROBLEMS—SOLVES CIVIL WAR AND ECONOMIC COLLAPSE**

**SAN FRANSISCO CHRONICLE 2**

Last week's twin announcements -- of a treaty making two-thirds cuts in the American and Russian nuclear arsenals and the creation of a NATO-Russia council to address counterterrorism efforts and other issues -- fit right into Putin's policy goals. Both events are likely to ease Moscow's concerns over the closer relationships with the West being established by its former satellites and the Baltic republics. "The main thrust of Russian foreign policy right now under President Putin is to ensure international stability," said Fiona Hill, a Russia analyst at the Brookings Institution in Washington. "And a critical component of this is a predictable, stable relationship with the United States, in which Russia is consulted on all of the issues that directly affect its national interests." Putin needs such stability to tackle huge domestic problems in his nation of 146 million -- an economy characterized by a vast manufacturing Rust Bowl, a Third World life expectancy for men of just 60 years, low levels of foreign investment, vast corruption, and civil wars in Chechnya and elsewhere in the Caucasus.

 **RUSSIAN ECONOMIC COLLASPE WOULD DESTROY THE WORLD ECONOMY**

**AUSTRALIAN FINANCIAL REVIEW 2k**

As a big debtor nation, Russia’s ability to meet its financial obligations also matters to world markets – as the Russian rouble’s collapse and accompanying loan default in August 1998 starkly revealed. The crisis raised fears of a domino effect across emerging markets that could ultimately push the global economy into recession. That, in the end, didn’t occur. But an economist specialising in Russia at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Ivan Szegvari, says the confidence of international investors in emerging markets, and in transitional economies as a whole, is affected by what happens in Russia. In addition, Russia remains one of the most important clients of international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund. “These organisations are the major players in the whole institutional set-up of the world economy – and they are strongly preoccupied with what happens in Russia,” says Szegvari. “What happens in Russia has, and will have, a large impact on the credibility of these institutions… “So I see many, not directly economic, issues which makes me say that Russia’s importance for the rest of the world is incomparably more than the current size of its GDP should suggest.”

# NRC Good – Russian Economy 2/2

**Global nuclear wars**

**Mead 09** - Senior Fellow in US Foreign Policy Studies @ Council on Foreign Relations

Walter Russell, Only Makes You Stronger, The New Republic, 2-4-09, http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?id=571cbbb9-2887-4d81-8542-92e83915f5f8&p=1

The greatest danger both to U.S.-China relations and to American power itself is probably not that China will rise too far, too fast; it is that the current crisis might end China's growth miracle. In the worst-case scenario, the turmoil in the international economy will plunge China into a major economic downturn. The Chinese financial system will implode as loans to both state and private enterprises go bad. Millions or even tens of millions of Chinese will be unemployed in a India's future is also a question. Support for global integration is a fairly recent development in India, and many serious Indians remain skeptical of it. While India's 60-year-old democratic system has resisted many shocks, a deep economic recession in a country where mass poverty and even hunger are still major concerns could undermine political order, long-term growth, and India's attitude toward the United States and global economic integration. The violent Naxalite insurrection plaguing a significant swath of the country could get worse; religious extremism among both Hindus and Muslims could further polarize Indian politics; and India's economic miracle could be nipped in the bud. If current market turmoil seriously damaged the performance and prospects of India and China, the current crisis could join the Great Depression in the list of economic events that changed history, even if the recessions in the West are relatively short and mild. The United States should stand ready to assist Chinese and Indian financial authorities on an emergency basis--and work very hard to help both countries escape or at least weather any economic downturn. It may test the political will of the Obama administration, but the United States must avoid a protectionist response to the economic slowdown. U.S. moves to limit market access for Chinese and Indian producers could poison relations for years. For billions of people in nuclear-armed countries to emerge from this crisis believing either that the United States was indifferent to their well-being or that it had profited from their distress could damage U.S. foreign policy far more severely than any mistake made by George W. Bush. All this has weakened Ahmadinejad at home and Iran abroad. Iranian officials must balance the relative merits of support for allies like Hamas, Hezbollah, and Syria against imposed by foreign forces and shaped to fit foreign rather than domestic interests and preferences, many countries are only half-heartedly capitalist. When crisis strikes, they are quick to decide that capitalism is a failure and look for alternatives. As a result, developing countries and countries where capitalism has relatively recent and shallow roots tend to suffer greater economic and political damage when crisis strikes--as, inevitably, it does. And, consequently, financial crises often reinforce rather than challenge the global distribution of power and wealth. This may be happening yet again. None of which means that we can just sit back and enjoy the recession. History may suggest that financial crises actually help capitalist great powers maintain their leads--but it has other, less reassuring messages as well. If financial crises have been a normal part of life during the 300-year rise of the liberal capitalist system under the Anglophone powers, so has war. The wars of the League of Augsburg and the Spanish Succession; the Seven Years War; the American Revolution; the Napoleonic Wars; the two World Wars; the cold war: The list of wars is almost as long as the list of financial crises. Bad economic times can breed wars. Europe was a pretty peaceful place in 1928, but the Depression poisoned German public opinion and helped bring Adolf Hitler to power. If the current crisis turns into a depression, what rough beasts might start slouching toward Moscow, Karachi, Beijing, or New Delhi to be born? The United States may not, yet, decline, but, if we can't get the world economy back on track, we may still have to fight.

# EXT – NRC Key To Russian Economy

**NRC is key to political stability and thus Russian economic growth**

**Fischer 02**, investment professional with over ten years of experience

(Michael, “ Russia revives”, Lexis, KW)

Why is Russia looking so good these days? "We regard Russia as one of the few emerging markets that currently have positive fundamentals and where we still expect positive change in the future," says Ender Oztas, head of research at Emerging Value Asset Management SA. "Positive change is for us the single most important investment factor, both on the micro and on the macro level." Emerging Value's three global emerging funds have produced high double-digit returns this year. Oztas attributes that performance to their overweight position in Russia. For Sawikin, "political stability is key to everything else. You have a president [Vladimir Putin] who is in control, sober and surrounded by the best and the brightest. And there hasn't been a revolving door of faces as there was under [former president] Yeltsin." The feeling of stability in the country, he says, is having many salutary effects, such as a reduction in the export of capital and, indeed, signs of the return of capital from offshore. In addition, says Sawikin, Russia is enjoying economic stability and currency stability and continuous improvement of the macroeconomic indicators, which flow in large part from the political stability as well as the strong oil prices that have helped to create these surpluses. Oztas points out that geopolitically, the integration of Russia into the newly formed NATO Russia Council marks a historic change in its relationship with the US. "Russia is ideally placed to fill in and take over the role of a major oil and gas supplier in this case. Its position outside OPEC gives it the flexibility to pursue its own policies, and we expect Russia to strengthen its position as a leading natural resources supplier."

# Russian Econ Collapse --> Accidental Launch

**Russian economic decline leads to an accidental nuclear launch**

**FORDEN 2001** (Geoffrey, senior research fellow at the Security Studies Program at MIT, Policy Analysis,)

Because of that need. Russia's continuing economic difficulties pose a clear and increasing danger to itself, the world at large, and the United States in particular. Russia no longer has the working fleet of early-warning satellites that reassured its leaders that they were not under attack during the most recent false alert—in 1995 when a scientific research rocket launched from Norway was. for a short time, mistaken for a U.S. nuclear launch. With decaying satellites, the possibility exists that if a false alert occurs again, Russia might launch its nuclear-tipped missiles.

 **Extinction**

**Ira Helfand and John Pastore 2009**

 (both past presidents of Physicians for Social Responsibility) “U.S.-Russia nuclear war still a threat”, http://www.projo.com/opinion/contributors/content/CT\_pastoreline\_03-31-09\_EODSCAO\_v15.bbdf23.html

President Obama and Russian President Dimitri Medvedev are scheduled to Wednesday in London during the G-20 summit. They must not let the current economic crisis keep them from focusing on one of the greatest threats confronting humanity: the danger of nuclear war. Since the end of the Cold War, many have acted as though the danger of nuclear war has ended. It has not. There remain in the world more than 20,000 nuclear weapons. Alarmingly, more than 2,000 of these weapons in the U.S. and Russian arsenals remain on ready-alert status, commonly known as hair-trigger alert. They can be fired within five minutes and reach targets in the other country 30 minutes later. Just one of these weapons can destroy a city. A war involving a substantial number would cause devastation on a scale unprecedented in human history. A study conducted by Physicians for Social Responsibility in 2002 showed that if only 500 of the Russian weapons on high alert exploded over our cities, 100 million Americans would die in the first 30 minutes. An attack of this magnitude also would destroy the entire economic, communications and transportation infrastructure on which we all depend. Those who survived the initial attack would inhabit a nightmare landscape with huge swaths of the country blanketed with radioactive fallout and epidemic diseases rampant. They would have no food, no fuel, no electricity, no medicine, and certainly no organized health care. In the following months it is likely the vast majority of the U.S. population would die. Recent studies by the eminent climatologists Toon and Robock have shown that such a war would have a huge and immediate impact on climate world wide. If all of the warheads in the U.S. and Russian strategic arsenals were drawn into the conflict, the firestorms they caused would loft 180 million tons of soot and debris into the upper atmosphere — blotting out the sun. Temperatures across the globe would fall an average of 18 degrees Fahrenheit to levels not seen on earth since the depth of the last ice age, 18,000 years ago. Agriculture would stop, eco-systems would collapse, and many species, including perhaps our own, would become extinct. It is common to discuss nuclear war as a low-probabillity event. But is this true? We know of five occcasions during the last 30 years when either the U.S. or Russia believed it was under attack and prepared a counter-attack. The most recent of these near misses occurred after the end of the Cold War on Jan. 25, 1995, when the Russians mistook a U.S. weather rocket launched from Norway for a possible attack. Jan. 25, 1995, was an ordinary day with no major crisis involving the U.S. and Russia. But, unknown to almost every inhabitant on the planet, a misunderstanding led to the potential for a nuclear war. The ready alert status of nuclear weapons that existed in 1995 remains in place today.

# Russian Econ Collase --> Laundry List

**RUSSIAN ECONOMIC COLLAPSE CAUSES NUCLEAR WAR, TERRORISM, ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS, AND CIVIL WAR**

**OLIKER AND CHARLICK-PALEY 2** (Olga and Tanya, RAND Corporation Project Air Force, “Assessing Russia’s Decline,” www.rand.org/pubs/monograph\_reports/MR1442/)

What challenges does today’s Russia pose for the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. military as a whole? Certainly Russia cannot present even a fraction of the threat the Soviet monolith posed and for which the United States prepared for decades. Yet, if certain negative trends continue, they may create a new set of dangers that can in some ways prove even more real, and therefore more frightening, than the far-off specter of Russian attack ever was. As a weak state, Russia shares some attributes with “failed” or “failing” states, which the academic literature agrees increase the likelihood of internal and interstate conflict and upheaval. Tracing through the specifics of these processes in Russia reveals a great many additional dangers, both humanitarian and strategic. Moscow’s efforts to reassert central control show that much control is already lost, perhaps irretrievably. This is manifested both in center-periphery relations and in the increasing failure of law and order throughout the country, most clearly seen in the increasing institutionalization of corruption and crime. Although Russia’s weakened armed forces are unlikely, by temperament and history, to carry out a coup, real concerns exist that the forces may grow less inclined to go along with aspects of government policy, particularly if they are increasingly used as instruments of internal control as in Chechnya. Moreover, the fact that the Russian military is unlikely to attempt to take power does not mean that it will not seek to increase its influence over policymaking and policy-makers. The uncertainties of military command and control threaten the possibility of accidental (or intentional) nuclear weapon use, while deterioration in the civilian nuclear sector increases the risk of a tragic accident. Russia’s demographic trajectory of ill health and male mortality bodes ill for the nation’s ability to resolve its economic troubles (given an increasingly graying population) and creates concerns about its continued capacity to maintain a fighting force even at current levels of effectiveness. Finally, the fact that economic, political, and demographic declines affect parts of Russia very differently, combined with increased regional political autonomy over the course of Russian independence and continuing concerns about interethnic and interregional tension, creates a danger that locality and/or ethnicity could become rallying cries for internal conflict. While some might argue that Russia’s weakness, or even the potential for its eventual collapse, has little to do with the United States, the truth is that a range of U.S. interests is directly affected by Russia’s deterioration and the threats that it embodies. The dangers of proliferation or use of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), heightened by Russian weakness, quite directly threaten the United States and its vital interests. Organized crime in Russia is linked to a large and growing multinational network of criminal groups that threatens the United States and its economy both directly and through links with (and support of) global and local terrorist organizations. Russia is also a major energy producer and a transit state for oil and gas from the Caspian at a time when the U.S. government has identified that region, and energy interests in general, as key to its national security. Washington’s allies, closer to Russia physically, are not only the customers for much of this energy but are also the likely victims of any refugee flows, environmental crises, or potential flare-ups of violence that Russian decline may spur. Finally, recent history suggests a strong possibility that the Untied States would play a role in seeking to alleviate a humanitarian crisis on or near Russian soil, whether it was caused by epidemic, war, or a nuclear/industrial catastrophe

# NRC Good – EU Economy 1/2

**The NRC is key to EU economic prosperity**

**Mcrae 02**, associate editor of The Independent

(Hamish, “COULD RUSSIA BE EUROPE'S ROUTE TO FUTURE GROWTH?”, 2002, Lexis, KW)

Where does the Nato-Russia council fit in to this economic picture? There are two crucial points. The first is that institutions lag behind. Just as it has taken a decade for the institutional structure of this security agreement to adapt to the new military reality, so it will take years for institutions to adjust to the new economic reality. But that does not alter the fact that the balance of military power shifted seismically when the Warsaw Pact disbanded in 1991. The balance of economic power is shifting now. That is not to say that the Russian economy will soon be larger than any Western European one. At the moment its nominal GDP is not much larger than Switzerland's and at purchasing power parity, GDP is only the size of Spain. But the fact remains that if you are looking at where growth in Europe is generated, look east. Over the next few years, Eastern Europe in general and Russia in particular will become a much more important element in the European economy. The second point is that the EU sees Eastern European nations almost as supplicants. Potential members have to go through various hoops to make sure they have adapted enough to fit the rules of the club. In return, they are offered, to start with, a form of associate membership. Yes, they can join but there won't be free trade in agricultural goods, nor initially at least will there be free movement of workers. Given the choice, most countries say yes. But it won't be like that for Russia. That is partly because the country has too strong a sense of its history, its size, its culture and its merit to behave as a supplicant. But it is also because of the balance of power. Its natural resources alone give it enormous authority in a world where the principal alternative source of oil and gas is the Middle East. World oil production will probably peak in the next five to 10 years. So not only is the country growing faster than Western Europe. The EU's economic prosperity depends on a friendly Russia. Welcome to the Nato council.

**EU economic growth key globally**

**Woodcock 04,** Political Correspondent @ Press Association

(Andrew, “ EU NEEDS RADICAL ECONOMIC REFORM - BROWN “, Lexis)

Europe needs radical reform of its labour markets and regulatory systems if it is to rein in unemployment and boost growth, Chancellor Gordon Brown told his fellow EU finance ministers today. As finance ministers gathered in the Netherlands to discuss the EU's budget and progress on the 10-year economic reform agenda agreed at Lisbon in 2000, Mr Brown warned that weak growth in Europe was endangering the global economy. He called for annual "Lisbon scorecards" ranking EU states' performance in reforming their economies. He also warned his 24 EU colleagues: "Europe must create 21 million new jobs to meet the target for 2010, and yet unemployment is still rising. "So I tell colleagues today that there is no security without change and that greater flexibility is an essential route to greater employment." Figures for 2003 released in today's Labour Force Survey show national unemployment rates in the EU ranging as high as 19.2%, in Poland. While the worst joblessness was in new member-states in eastern Europe, high levels were also recorded in long-standing and influential EU nations like France (9.4%), Germany (9.6%) and Spain (11.3%). The UK's rate was recorded as 5% - sixth-best in the Union. In an article in the Financial Times today, Mr Brown warned that "it is the weakness of European Union growth that lies at the root of imbalances" in the global economy. The danger to the recovery demanded a new "sense of urgency" among policymakers, said the Chancellor. Europe had a "special responsibility" to take the steps needed to keep growth on track.

# NRC Good – EU Economy 2/2

**Global nuclear wars**

**Mead 09** - Senior Fellow in US Foreign Policy Studies @ Council on Foreign Relations

Walter Russell, Only Makes You Stronger, The New Republic, 2-4-09, http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?id=571cbbb9-2887-4d81-8542-92e83915f5f8&p=1

The greatest danger both to U.S.-China relations and to American power itself is probably not that China will rise too far, too fast; it is that the current crisis might end China's growth miracle. In the worst-case scenario, the turmoil in the international economy will plunge China into a major economic downturn. The Chinese financial system will implode as loans to both state and private enterprises go bad. Millions or even tens of millions of Chinese will be unemployed in a India's future is also a question. Support for global integration is a fairly recent development in India, and many serious Indians remain skeptical of it. While India's 60-year-old democratic system has resisted many shocks, a deep economic recession in a country where mass poverty and even hunger are still major concerns could undermine political order, long-term growth, and India's attitude toward the United States and global economic integration. The violent Naxalite insurrection plaguing a significant swath of the country could get worse; religious extremism among both Hindus and Muslims could further polarize Indian politics; and India's economic miracle could be nipped in the bud. If current market turmoil seriously damaged the performance and prospects of India and China, the current crisis could join the Great Depression in the list of economic events that changed history, even if the recessions in the West are relatively short and mild. The United States should stand ready to assist Chinese and Indian financial authorities on an emergency basis--and work very hard to help both countries escape or at least weather any economic downturn. It may test the political will of the Obama administration, but the United States must avoid a protectionist response to the economic slowdown. U.S. moves to limit market access for Chinese and Indian producers could poison relations for years. For billions of people in nuclear-armed countries to emerge from this crisis believing either that the United States was indifferent to their well-being or that it had profited from their distress could damage U.S. foreign policy far more severely than any mistake made by George W. Bush. All this has weakened Ahmadinejad at home and Iran abroad. Iranian officials must balance the relative merits of support for allies like Hamas, Hezbollah, and Syria against imposed by foreign forces and shaped to fit foreign rather than domestic interests and preferences, many countries are only half-heartedly capitalist. When crisis strikes, they are quick to decide that capitalism is a failure and look for alternatives. As a result, developing countries and countries where capitalism has relatively recent and shallow roots tend to suffer greater economic and political damage when crisis strikes--as, inevitably, it does. And, consequently, financial crises often reinforce rather than challenge the global distribution of power and wealth. This may be happening yet again. None of which means that we can just sit back and enjoy the recession. History may suggest that financial crises actually help capitalist great powers maintain their leads--but it has other, less reassuring messages as well. If financial crises have been a normal part of life during the 300-year rise of the liberal capitalist system under the Anglophone powers, so has war. The wars of the League of Augsburg and the Spanish Succession; the Seven Years War; the American Revolution; the Napoleonic Wars; the two World Wars; the cold war: The list of wars is almost as long as the list of financial crises. Bad economic times can breed wars. Europe was a pretty peaceful place in 1928, but the Depression poisoned German public opinion and helped bring Adolf Hitler to power. If the current crisis turns into a depression, what rough beasts might start slouching toward Moscow, Karachi, Beijing, or New Delhi to be born? The United States may not, yet, decline, but, if we can't get the world economy back on track, we may still have to fight.

# NRC Good – Prolif/terror

Reaffirming the Strained Russia-NATO alliance is key to Non-Prolif, and the war on terror

Marakov 10, Nikolai Staff Writer for the Voice of Russia (an English Speaking Russian Newspaper), 2010 [Russia, NATO Approve Cooperation Plan, http://english.ruvr.ru/2010/05/06/7419980.html)

Russia and NATO have approved a cooperation plan for 2010. An agreement has been reached in Brussels, at the session of the Council at the level of the General Chiefs of Staff. The current session is the second, following the Russian-Georgian conflict of the year 2008. Its programme provides for a large variety of events, Russia’s ambassador to NATO Dmitry Rogozin said. Russia’s delegation in Brussels was headed by General Nikolai Makarov, Chief of the General Staff of Russia’s Armed Forces. Quite a number of topical issues, including such as the fight against terrorism and piracy, were discussed in the course of a one-hour talk Nikolai Makarov had with his Western colleagues. And still some NATO member-states are making efforts to bring down to the minimum trust between Russia and the North Atlantic Alliance, as Dmitry Rogozin said in an interview for the Voice of Russia. The reason is that there’s a stable group of countries in NATO, which would welcome no reset in relationships with Russia. Neither do they want to react in any way to Moscow’s proposals, aimed at creating more stable rules of behaviour for the European states. Meaning the Baltic countries first of all. And they demonstrated yesterday that they are unwilling to conduct a dialogue. They even made an attempt to sharply narrow the range of issues on military cooperation between Russia and NATO. On the other hand, Dmitry Rogozin stressed that the weight of all these countries, due to the minimal strength of their armed forces, is insignificant. Of course, they can use their veto right, thus, blocking decisions, which are of great importance for the European countries. However, the European giants – such as France, and Germany, and also the USA, which are interested in good relations with Russia, will influence the new NATO member-states. And as regards the coordinated plans for a military cooperation, which were agreed in Brussels, they provide for contacts within the operational compatibility framework, as well as for the possible holding of joint military exercises and military research in the fields, which may be of interest for the two sides, Dmitry Rogozin said. Meaning first of all the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and, of course, peace-keeping operations. And as regards joint military exercises, this is an issue of political will, but the military must be ready to implement them. At the same time, paramount attention is paid to the issue of building a missile defence system in Europe with NATO’s help. The NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen says that a positive decision on the beginning of the implementation of this project will appear before the end of this year. This system will cover 28 countries. It is a good chance to bolster cooperation with Russia, Rasmussen stressed, adding that this issue should be discussed in detail. As you might remember, Russia was invited to get involved in the European missile defence shield project at the unofficial NATO summit in Tallinn last month. And though Russia refused to participate in the Tallinn forum, shortly after it was over President Medvedev confirmed that Russia was interested in the development of a single missile defence shield in Europe. But of importance here is one thing: all responsible sides, not individual states, trying to deploy national missile defence system elements in the East European countries, should get involved in the efforts to build a single missile defence shield in Europe.

**And, Extinction**

**Utgoff 02**, “survival” v. 44 no 2 summer 2002, p. 90

Widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear 'six-shooters' on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations. as the Scud-C (range 500 km) and the Scud-B (range 280 km) and also chemical arsenals for them like the powerful nerve agent VX. 16 These missiles armed with chemical warheads could strike airfields and mobilisation points, incapacitating these areas. With Israel denied air superiority, Syria could retake the Golan Heights. A simultaneous Palestinian uprising in the West Bank and the Gaza strip alongwith other Arab states attacking would make the situation particularly grave. Such a scenario would be ripe for a nuclear Armageddon.

# EXT – Solves Terrorism

**NATO-Russian relations key to deterring terrorism**

**Commission on U.S. Policy toward Russia 09**- a joint project of The Nixon Center and the Belfer Center for Science and

International Affairs at Harvard University; “The Right Direction for U.S. Policy toward Russia” March, 2009; http://www.nixoncenter.org/RussiaReport09.pdf

The September 11 attacks starkly demonstrated the common threat of terrorism to America and Russia. Moscow has since provided important assistance to the United States and its NATO allies in Afghanistan; however, this help may be at risk if U.S.-Russia and NATO-Russia relations weaken further. After initially acquiescing to a U.S. military presence in the region, Russia has complicated U.S. efforts to maintain air bases in central Asia to support operations against the Taliban and al-Qaeda, including Kyrgyzstan’s recent decision that the United States should close its Manas base. This in part reflects U.S.-Russian differences over both Afghanistan and the wider central Asian region. It also starkly illustrates the potential costs of treating the former Soviet Union as a competitive battleground rather than a zone of cooperation. Though the Russian government has an interest in preventing the return of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan, Moscow might revoke its permission for transit of NATO cargoes to Afghanistan via Russia if NATO-Russia relations deteriorate further. Greater cooperation in Afghanistan is far more desirable and could build on past collaboration to develop deeper intelligence sharing and improved coordination with Russia’s long-standing allies in the country. However, it will require greater willingness to consider Russian perspectives.

**Terrorists will use WMDs and cyber weapons – risking extinction**

**Alexander 2003**, (Professor and Director of the Inter-University for Terrorism Studies, Washington Times, 8-28-Lexis)

Unlike their historical counterparts, contemporary terrorists have introduced a new scale of violence in terms of conventional and unconventional threats and impact. The internationalization and brutalization of current and future terrorism make it clear we have entered an Age of Super Terrorism [e.g. biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear and cyber] with its serious implications concerning national, regional and global security concerns. Two myths in particular must be debunked immediately if an effective counterterrorism "best practices" strategy can be developed [e.g., strengthening international cooperation]. The first illusion is that terrorism can be greatly reduced, if not eliminated completely, provided the root causes of conflicts - political, social and economic - are addressed. The conventional illusion is that terrorism must be justified by oppressed people seeking to achieve their goals and consequently the argument advanced by "freedom fighters" anywhere, "give me liberty and I will give you death," should be tolerated if not glorified. This traditional rationalization of "sacred" violence often conceals that the real purpose of terrorist groups is to gain political power through the barrel of the gun, in violation of fundamental human rights of the noncombatant segment of societies. For instance, Palestinians religious movements [e.g., Hamas, Islamic Jihad] and secular entities [such as Fatah's Tanzim and Aqsa Martyr Brigades]] wish not only to resolve national grievances [such as Jewish settlements, right of return, Jerusalem] but primarily to destroy the Jewish state. Similarly, Osama bin Laden's international network not only opposes the presence of American military in the Arabian Peninsula and Iraq, but its stated objective is to "unite all Muslims and establish a government that follows the rule of the Caliphs." The second myth is that strong action against terrorist infrastructure [leaders, recruitment, funding, propaganda, training, weapons, operational command and control] will only increase terrorism. The argument here is that law-enforcement efforts and military retaliation inevitably will fuel more brutal acts of violent revenge. Clearly, if this perception continues to prevail, particularly in democratic societies, there is the danger it will paralyze governments and thereby encourage further terrorist attacks. In sum, past experience provides useful lessons for a realistic future strategy. The prudent application of force has been demonstrated to be an effective tool for short- and long-term deterrence of terrorism. For example, Israel's targeted killing of Mohammed Sider, the Hebron commander of the Islamic Jihad, defused a "ticking bomb." The assassination of Ismail Abu Shanab - a top Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip who was directly responsible for several suicide bombings including the latest bus attack in Jerusalem - disrupted potential terrorist operations. Similarly, the U.S. military operation in Iraq eliminated Saddam Hussein's regime as a state sponsor of terror. Thus, it behooves those countries victimized by terrorism to understand a cardinal message communicated by Winston Churchill to the House of Commons on May 13, 1940: "Victory at all costs, victory in spite of terror, victory however long and hard the road may be: For without victory, there is no survival."

# NRC Good – European Stability

**Collapse of the NRC threatens European stability**

**Commission on U.S. Policy toward Russia 09**- a joint project of The Nixon Center and the Belfer Center for Science and

International Affairs at Harvard University; “The Right Direction for U.S. Policy toward Russia” March, 2009; http://www.nixoncenter.org/RussiaReport09.pdf

The potential collapse of the post-cold war security architecture in Europe—established by the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, and the NATO-Russia Council, among other agreements and institutions—is also a serious threat to European security. Here, the fundamental problem is Russian dissatisfaction with a security system established at the time of Moscow’s greatest weakness, during the 1990s. Russia does have legitimate interests in Europe, though it sometimes pursues them through unacceptable means. Ultimately, no security architecture can be sustainable without participation by all affected parties, including Russia. Stable security architecture that builds on existing institutions and agreements could contribute significantly to Europe’s security and prosperity. Russia’s President Dmitry Medvedev has called for dialogue on new security architecture and this provides an important opportunity for the United States, NATO, and the European Union to make specific proposals.

**European instability causes nuclear war**

**Khalilzad 95**; Zalmay RAND, The Washington Quarterly, Spring 1995, p. Lexis

With the shifting balance of power among Japan, China, Russia, and potential new regional powers such as India, Indonesia, and a united Korea could come significant risks of preventive or proeruptive war, Similarly, European competition for regional dominance could lead to major wars in Europe or East Asia. If the United States stayed out of such a war -- an unlikely prospect -- Europe or East Asia could become dominated by a hostile power. Such a development would threaten U.S. interests. A power that achieved such dominance would seek to exclude the United States from the area and threaten its interests-economic and political -- in the region. Besides. with the domination of Europe or East Asia, such a power might seek global hegemony and the United States would face another global Cold War and the risk of a world war even more catastrophic than the last.

# AT: Nationalist Backlash against NRC

**NATIONALISTS WON’T BACKLASH AGAINST THE NRC—THE RUSSIAN MILITARY LOVES IT**

**KAHKAMADA 2** (IRINA, STATE DUMA VICE SPEAKER, MOSCOW NEWS, MAY 29)

What do you think of the NATO-Russia Council? Is it a handout given to Moscow in exchange for its acceptance of the Alliance's eastward expansion? NATO is a no-nonsense organization that has tremendous weight in international politics. The Cold War is over, and our political and economic resources are limited. Therefore it is not in Russia's strategic interests to go against NATO. It is not our intention to wage war against the Alliance, or against the Baltic countries that are getting ready to join it. We should by no means enter into a confrontation with the bloc. On the other hand, entry into NATO involves a lot of complications. So it would be to our advantage to have effective institutions in which we would have equal voting rights in matters relating to the prevention of proliferation of mass destruction weapons, the fight against terrorism, and the creation of common armament systems. By opting for closer relations with the West, doesn't President Putin risk setting the generals against himself? Surely the generals have always viewed NATO as Russia's chief potential enemy? Not all Russian generals have a negative opinion of the Alliance. Some believe that NATO's eastward expansion and Russia's accession to the Alliance will help enhance our cooperation, enabling us to participate in the development of sophisticated weaponry to battle terrorism.

# AT: NRC Didn’t Solve Georgia/Russia War

**The NRC would have been effective but NATO withdrew**

**MÜTZENICH** **10,** Member of German Parliament, PHD in polsci at University of Cologne

(ROLF, “ Security with or against Russia? On the Russian Proposal for a »European Security Treaty«”, <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/ipg/ipg-2010-2/06_a_muetzenich_us.pdf>)

During the Georgia crisis, nato did not acquit itself particularly well. It became clear that there is a profound split in the alliance between the new member states, who define their security against Russia, and the old member states, who are set on compromise and partnership with Russia. The five-day war in Georgia also reflected a manifest crisis in the system of cooperative security in Europe. Furthermore, by suspending the nato-Russia Council, nato deprived itself unnecessarily of the very body in which the Georgia crisis could have been dealt with best. Only seven months after the Georgia crisis, on March 4, 2009, the natoRussia Council formally resumed its activities. This annoyed many Central and Eastern Europeans, but it was a long overdue step. The nato-Russia Council should not be a »fair-weather« organization. In particular in difficult periods and crises – such as during the war in the Caucasus – instead of putting it on ice, it should be used as a strategic instrument of crisis management.

# AT: Russia-NATO Politically incompatible

 **RUSSIA IS COMPATIBLE WITH NATO**

**Rumer and Simon,** Contributors to the St. Petersburg Times, **2001,** [12-25-2001, As Strange as it May Seem, NATO needs Russia, http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action\_id=2&story\_id=6193&highlight=nintendo%20DS)

Arguments that Russia is politically incompatible with NATO do not stand up to scrutiny, either. True, its democracy is young and highly imperfect, its treatment of ethnic minorities often appalling and its relations with neighbors frequently contentious. But when Russia sits down with NATO, it will be sitting at the same table with Turkey, whose ill treatment of Kurds is well-known; with France, whose hands and nose were bloodied in a violent colonial war in Algeria and whose top government officials are routinely implicated in corruption scandals; and with Germany, whose post-Cold War founding father ended his political career in disgrace after an embarrassing investigation into his party's slush fund. None of this excuses Russia's failings, but they are hardly reason enough to disenfranchise Russia in all matters of European security.

# AT: Consultation Collapses NATO

**RUSSIA WON’T DAMAGE COHESION—AFF ARGUMENTS ARE WRONG**

**Rumer and Simon,** Contributors to the St. Petersburg Times, **2001,** [12-25-2001, As Strange as it May Seem, NATO needs Russia, http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action\_id=2&story\_id=6193&highlight=nintendo%20DS)

Nor is there a credible argument that NATO's political cohesion will be at risk if Russia is given a real voice and a vote on key European security issues. Does anyone really believe that Moscow will have more clout in a gathering of 20 or more European nations, most of which have a long-time relationship with and commitment to the United States, than Washington? If so, the United States ought to rethink its commitment to the alliance. Anyone who fears that Russia will exert disproportionate influence in alliance deliberations has no faith in NATO cohesion. There are likely to be crises - in the Caucasus, for example - during which Russia could obstruct alliance moves and decisions. But there are likely to be times when Russian involvement - also in the Caucasus - could prevent a crisis. In the end, greater Russian involvement in NATO is likely to have more influence on Russia than vice versa. The likely result of Russia receiving a vote on select NATO decisions is that it will face, in some instances, the choice between isolation or union with the rest of Europe. It is a safe bet that Moscow will not want to be the odd man out.

 **RUSSIAN INVOLVEMENT IS KEY TO NATO EFFECTIVENESS—ALL OF THE OTHER ALLIES ARE LAME**

**Rumer and Simon,** Contributors to the St. Petersburg Times, **2001,** [12-25-2001, As Strange as it May Seem, NATO needs Russia, http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action\_id=2&story\_id=6193&highlight=nintendo%20DS)

As a military and political alliance, NATO has two fears when contemplating Russian involvement in its affairs: that the alliance's ability to act militarily might suffer and that its status as an alliance of democratic nations with shared values would be compromised. Neither fear is justified. In fact, the war on terrorism necessitates closer cooperation between NATO countries and Russia. It would not be an exaggeration to say that Russia, with its political and military support for the war on terrorism and its willingness to stay out of the way of U.S. deployments in Central Asia, has made a greater contribution to the war effort than most of the United States' NATO allies combined (with the notable exceptions of Britain and Turkey, both of which enjoy special relationships with Washington). The alliance's invocation of its mutual-defense clause on behalf of the United States after Sept. 11 underscored the fact that NATO's strength is no longer primarily military: It's political. Beyond such support, the allies have few means to help the United States defend itself. NATO's ability to act militarily is increasingly dependent on the dwindling group of members with more than token military capabilities and the political will to use them. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, the first batch of new NATO members after the Cold War, have struggled to meet the military commitments inherent in their membership. Judged in terms of military capabilities alone, alliance strength has, so far, been diluted by expansion. The candidates for the second round of enlargement - Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Macedonia and the Balkan states - are unlikely to reverse this trend. But new and prospective NATO members do not deserve to be singled out for criticism. Most older NATO members, eager to reap the post-Cold War peace dividend, have not kept up with their defense commitments, either. If NATO has turned a blind eye to the military failings of its current members, why would it consider Russia a threat to NATO defense?

\*\*\*RUSSIAN RELATIONS NET BENEFIT

# NRC Good – US-Russian Relations

**History Proves Abandoning the NRC Collapses Relations**

**Smith 2006** Senior Lecturer in Defence and International Affairs at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, UK

(Martin A., Russia and NATO since 1991 From Cold War through cold peace to partnership?, 2006, Routledge, p104)

During 2004 and 2005, senior figures on both sides continued to laud the evolution of practical and operationally focused collaboration within the framework of the NRC. In April 2004, for example, NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer asserted that ‘the expansion of our military-to-military cooperation has been truly spectacular – from 7 joint exercises and events in 2002, to a planned 57 this year’.74 Three months later, speaking in London, Sergei Ivanov gave a detailed exposition of NRC-based co-operation in a number of military-operational areas, including naval issues, joint peacekeeping operations and military aviation.75 Yet, despite the generally positive track record of the NRC to date, it would be unwise to suggest that the ‘bumpy road’76 that had hitherto characterised progress in the Russia–NATO relationship has necessarily been replaced by smooth and increasingly effortless forward movement. There have been important instances where consultation within the NRC seems not to have taken place. For example, the deployment of allied fighter aircraft to the Baltic States in spring 2004, shortly after their formal accession to NATO. This caused a discernible – if, ultimately, temporary – chill in relations.77 Several months later, President Putin returned to the subject in a question-and-answer session with western journalists and academics. He suggested that much of the chilliness could be put down to the fact that the Russian government was not consulted, or even forewarned, about this deployment. It felt as if NATO was behaving ‘as if it was in the context of 1985 when the Soviet Union was an enemy’.78

**ACCIDENTS ARE INEVITABLE—LOW RELATIONS INCREASE THE RISK OF ESCALATION—THE IMPACT IS FULL-SCALE NUCLEAR WAR**

**FORDEN 2001** (Geoffrey, senior research fellow at the Security Studies Program at MIT, Policy Analysis)

The danger posed by those incidents was not the unauthorized or accidental launch of a handful of nuclear-tipped missiles but the possibility that either country might misinterpret a benign event—a computer training tape mistakenly inserted into an operational computer or sunlight glinting off clouds during a rare lineup of the sun. earth, and satellite—and decide to launch a full-scale nuclear attack. Almost inevitably, some future benign event will be misinterpreted by Russian military leaders as a possible nuclear attacked especially if the incident happens during a period of increased political tension with the United States. When that happens, early warning systems can play a vital role in preventing escalation into a nuclear holocaust. Therefore, Russia's deteriorating early-warning system poses a real threat to U.S. security. The United States has a vital interest in helping Russia maintain an early-warning system that covers the entire globe. Such a system could provide Russia with the confidence that no attacks have been launched. U.S. assistance, however, should be narrowly focused on solving real problems.

**Extinction**

**Ira Helfand and John Pastore 2009**

 (both past presidents of Physicians for Social Responsibility) “U.S.-Russia nuclear war still a threat”, http://www.projo.com/opinion/contributors/content/CT\_pastoreline\_03-31-09\_EODSCAO\_v15.bbdf23.html

President Obama and Russian President Dimitri Medvedev are scheduled to Wednesday in London during the G-20 summit. They must not let the current economic crisis keep them from focusing on one of the greatest threats confronting humanity: the danger of nuclear war. Since the end of the Cold War, many have acted as though the danger of nuclear war has ended. It has not. There remain in the world more than 20,000 nuclear weapons. Alarmingly, more than 2,000 of these weapons in the U.S. and Russian arsenals remain on ready-alert status, commonly known as hair-trigger alert. They can be fired within five minutes and reach targets in the other country 30 minutes later. Just one of these weapons can destroy a city. A war involving a substantial number would cause devastation on a scale unprecedented in human history. A study conducted by Physicians for Social Responsibility in 2002 showed that if only 500 of the Russian weapons on high alert exploded over our cities, 100 million Americans would die in the first 30 minutes. An attack of this magnitude also would destroy the entire economic, communications and transportation infrastructure on which we all depend. Those who survived the initial attack would inhabit a nightmare landscape with huge swaths of the country blanketed with radioactive fallout and epidemic diseases rampant. They would have no food, no fuel, no electricity, no medicine, and certainly no organized health care. In the following months it is likely the vast majority of the U.S. population would die. Recent studies by the eminent climatologists Toon and Robock have shown that such a war would have a huge and immediate impact on climate world wide. If all of the warheads in the U.S. and Russian strategic arsenals were drawn into the conflict, the firestorms they caused would loft 180 million tons of soot and debris into the upper atmosphere — blotting out the sun. Temperatures across the globe would fall an average of 18 degrees Fahrenheit to levels not seen on earth since the depth of the last ice age, 18,000 years ago. Agriculture would stop, eco-systems would collapse, and many species, including perhaps our own, would become extinct. It is common to discuss nuclear war as a low-probabillity event. But is this true? We know of five occcasions during the last 30 years when either the U.S. or Russia believed it was under attack and prepared a counter-attack. The most recent of these near misses occurred after the end of the Cold War on Jan. 25, 1995, when the Russians mistook a U.S. weather rocket launched from Norway for a possible attack. Jan. 25, 1995, was an ordinary day with no major crisis involving the U.S. and Russia. But, unknown to almost every inhabitant on the planet, a misunderstanding led to the potential for a nuclear war. The ready alert status of nuclear weapons that existed in 1995 remains in place today.

# NRC K2 Relations

**Consultation key to US-Russian relations and the success of US foreign policy and military operations**

**Commission on U.S. Policy toward Russia 09**- a joint project of The Nixon Center and the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University; “The Right Direction for U.S. Policy toward Russia” March, 2009; http://www.nixoncenter.org/RussiaReport09.pdf

Protecting and advancing America’s national interests in the decades ahead requires a strategic reassessment of the United States’ relationship with Russia with an emphasis on exploring common interests. A constructive relationship with Russia will directly influence the United States’ ability to advance effectively vital national-security interests in nonproliferation, counterterrorism, and energy security, and to deal with many specific challenges such as Iran or European security. If left unchecked, the ongoing deterioration of U.S.-Russian relations will begin to seriously damage our ability to achieve objectives across these interests. The Obama administration must establish an effective, comprehensive bilateral structure to facilitate consultation, dialogue, and negotiation. U.S. priorities must be defined more clearly. And we must more realistically assess Russia’s views of its interests.

**Genuine consultation on military issues solvers US-Russian relations**

**RAND 9**

(RAND Corporation, May 1, 2009, “UNITED STATES SHOULD TAILOR ITS RUSSIA POLICY TO BUILD ON SHARED VIEWS AND INTERESTS”, Lexis, KW)

Russia's relations with the United States have grown rockier in recent years, in large part because its leaders feel that U.S. policies have undercut Russia's interests. The United States' criticism of Russia's domestic policies, U.S. plans for missile defense and U.S. efforts to spread democracy to countries on Russia's borders have led Russian leaders to conclude that the United States is seeking to counter Russia, according to RAND researchers. The growing mutual suspicion that has emerged has the potential to dangerously escalate, damaging the interests of both states. Among the key recommendations, the report urges U.S. policymakers to: vigorously pursue new arms control agreements with Moscow allay Russian fears about proposed U.S. missile defenses in Europe reevaluate promotion of energy pipeline routes, focusing less on policy goals and more on market sustainability rebuild institutionalized, high-level consultations and maintain existing dialogues, including military-to-military contacts Although relations with Russia will be difficult for the foreseeable future, these policy changes could lay the groundwork for progress, Oliker said. At the same time, the United States must be prepared to deal with a recalcitrant Russian and work to prevent the relationship turning adversarial.

# NRC K2 Relations

**Consultation on large military actions is key to relations**

**Shuster 10,** Reporter for TIME magazine who is based in Moscow (Simon, April 23, “Russia Reclaims Influence, U.S. Doesn't Object”, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1983785,00.html, KW),

Five years ago in the former Soviet Union, governments loyal to Moscow were falling roughly every six months. Those were the glory days of the "color revolutions" that brought new leaders to Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan in quick succession between 2003 and 2005, all with the backing of the U.S. The region's political center of gravity was tilting sharply toward the West. But now that trend has reversed. In the past three months, two of those governments have been ousted. Leaders far friendlier to Russia have taken power in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, displacing the Orange and Tulip revolutions, respectively. (Indeed, Kiev just agreed to extend Moscow's naval lease on the Black Sea port of Sevastopol in exchange for cheaper gas; the previous Ukrainian regime had opposed the move.) The region's last standing leader of a color revolution (the Rose), Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, is feeling lonelier than ever, and he has a warning for the Obama Administration: Don't give Russia a free hand in the former Soviet bloc. In an interview with TIME at his glass-domed presidential palace, Saakashvili laid out how he sees the situation: U.S. President Barack Obama has been put in an awkward spot by his drive to invigorate ties with the Kremlin, having to deal with the legacy of George W. Bush, who had infuriated Moscow by supporting the color revolutions and building close ties with the governments they brought to power. Now Obama is being urged by the Russians to back away from those relationships. "It's not just about abandoning your ally Georgia. No, Russia is asking the U.S. to give back the Soviet sphere of influence," Saakashvili says. In practical terms, this seems to require three things of the U.S. and its European allies: do not push for any more ex-Soviet countries to join NATO, do not openly support any opposition movements that seek to oust pro-Russian governments, and, more generally, make sure to consult Moscow before going ahead with any big initiatives in Russia's backyard, especially military ones. Under the Bush Administration, all three of those were ignored, and relations with Russia became nastier than they had been since the Cold War. Obama, on the other hand, has been far more obliging, and his Administration believes Moscow is reciprocating — much to Saakashvili's chagrin. Nowhere has this been clearer than in NATO's changing attitudes. In a statement on April 14, NATO secretary-general Anders Fogh Rasmussen urged NATO countries to integrate Russia into their security strategy instead of seeing Russia as a potential threat. "The United States and Russia now clearly see eye to eye on a range of security issues. And we should use this new momentum to take further steps to enhance our common security," Rasmussen said. Plans to put Ukraine and Georgia on a fast track to NATO membership have been put aside, and as a result, Russia is helping NATO get its supplies into Afghanistan. The American approach to missile defense in Eastern Europe has also changed. Whereas Bush plowed ahead with his plan despite Moscow's fierce objections, Obama has invited the Kremlin to take part in a dialogue over the issue. The Russians are taking notice. "It's been very encouraging that the U.S. has refused to interfere in Ukraine's domestic policy in the way it was doing during the Orange Revolution [in 2004]. Americans have also sharply cut their support to Georgia. At least they are not giving one dollar of military assistance, as far as I know, to Saakashvili," says Sergei Markov, a longtime Kremlin spin doctor and a parliamentary deputy for the United Russia party led by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. Officially, of course, the Obama team insists it has not turned away from U.S. allies for the sake of better ties with Moscow, and Saakashvili says he has "no reason to complain about day-to-day relations." The U.S. has continued to criticize Russia for occupying about a fifth of Georgia's territory after the two countries fought a war in 2008. That war marked a turning point for America's broader strategy: it showed that Russia was willing to use force to defend its interests in the region, while the U.S. could be dragged into a war if it continued to oppose those interests to the end. Even the Bush Administration was not prepared to take that risk. "[Bush's Secretary of State] Condoleezza Rice told me that you must avoid an open military conflict with Russia," says Nino Burjanadze, former speaker of the Georgian Parliament and now a leading opposition figure. "She told me, 'We respect Georgia, but we will not go to war with Russia over Georgia.' " That approach probably saved the U.S. from a military catastrophe, and now, under Obama, the U.S. has become even less willing to cheer Russia's adversaries on. It has instead embraced Russia as a partner for global security, and the tactic is paying off. Concrete agreements have already been signed, most notably this month's treaty to reduce the world's two biggest nuclear arsenals by a third. But it remains to be seen how countries like Georgia will fit into this budding relationship. Right now, it doesn't appear congenial to the government in Tbilisi. As Russia continues to clamor to have Saakashvili removed from office, the U.S. seems to be keeping him at arm's length. At this month's nuclear nonproliferation conference in Washington, Obama snubbed Saakashvili's request for their first one-on-one meeting, instead sitting down with the new Kremlin-friendly President of Ukraine, who had agreed at the summit to get rid of his country's highly enriched uranium.

# NRC K2 Relations

**The foundation for a US-Russia partnership exists now but US failure to use the NRC to genuinely consult Russia on key issues risks breaking down US-Russian relations.**

 **Smith 06**, Senior Lecture in Defense and International Affairs at the Royal Military Institute, (Martin A. Smith is. Russia and NATO Since 1991: From Cold War through cold peace partnership? p. 99-114-120/)

 Optimists could point to two important differences compared to the situation in 1997. First, there was some evidence that both sides had learned from the failure of the PJC. NATO leaders in 2001-2 explicitly stated their willingness, from the start of the negotiations, to bring Russian representatives more substantially into their core consensus-building process than ever before. The Russians, for their part, formally accepted the implied obligation that this placed upon them to participate constructively and positively in the often frustrating and laborious task of international consensus building. There was also the prospect of the NRC being institutionalized to a greater degree than the PJC. Russia was to maintain a permanent mission at the NATO Headquarters, as opposed to just sending representatives to meetings, as had been the case with the PJC. The 2002 agreement also pledged that a ‘Preparatory Committee’ was to be established to undertake the necessary staff-wrok in advance of NRC meetings. This apparently innocuous administrative announcement belied a more profound potential change. The Preparatory Committee would include ‘Russian representation at the appropriate level’. This would, if implemented in good faith, allow the Russians to be involved in the crucial agenda-setting and preparation stages of the consultative process. Crucially, it would make it more difficult, in practice, for NATO members to present them with pre-cooked ‘alliance positions’. Underlying all of this was a perception, in some quarters, that western- especially US- policy towards Russia might be in the process of undergoing genuine and significant changes, as a result of the events of Septermber, 11, 2001. According to this view, the West was now ready to go further than ever before in bringing Russia into one of its core institutional consuls. In Rome, Lord Robertson spoke of the: Expectation that this will not be just another glitzy protocol event, but a real breakthrough. Expectations that the new NATO- Russia council will not just talk but will act, not just analyze but prescribe, not just deliberate but take decisive action… and if we need a reminder of why, then there is a simple answer. There is a common enemy out there. The man and the women in the street, be it Petrovka Street or 66th Street, knows it, feels it, and they expect us to address it September 11 2001 brought death to thousands of people in one act of terrible, criminal violence. But it also brought a message to the leaders of the democratic world. Find solutions and find them together. Elsewhere, the opinion was more mixed. Some commentators continued to argue that Russia-NATO relations still lacked underlying co-operative substance and that the new NRC was unlikely to change this. In the UK, The Guardian, adopting a markedly cooler editorial tone than had its reporter in Reykjavik, wrote of a ‘phoney piazza of platitudes’ in Rome. The response from sections of the Russian media was similarly negative and skeptical. In the final analysis, uncertainty remained about the future of Russia-NATO relations, as did a certain unease over the likely durability of any institutionalized arrangements between the two, especially if a major new crisis were to erupt. In the spring and early summer of 2002, no-one was really sure whether or how the new NRC would move beyond the limitations of the old PJC. Russian analyst Alexander Goltz set out a potentially useful litmus test of future success when he argued that: The problem is that we can come to mutual understanding and mutual decisions even without this body [the NRC]… what Russia needs is the opportunity to participate in the decision making process when [there’s] some problem, some controversial issues, something like the war in Yugoslavia. [It’s] not a problem to reach an agreement when you have the same points of view. The problem is to reach an agreement and to come to a consensus when you have different views on the same problems. That is the task.

# NRC K2 Relations

**Consultation solves disagreements**

**Kozyrev 95,** Foreign minister of Russia under President Boris Yeltsin from October 1990 to ‘96

(Andrey, “ Partnership or Cold Peace? “, Foreign Policy, Summer, 1995, P. 9-10, JSTOR, KW)

I remain confident that there is nothing in our countries' interests that dooms us to rivalry and confrontation. However sensitive a current international issue—be it efforts to make Iraq comply with decisions of the United Nations Security Council, to settle the conflict in Bosnia, to conduct peacemaking in the former ussr, or to determine Russia's relationship with nato—if that issue gives rise to disagreement between Moscow and Washington, it is usually not a matter of principle but of tactics aimed at reaching common goals. We are brought together by a need to meet jointly the challenges of the post-Cold War world, ranging from regional conflicts, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the upsurge of aggressive nationalism to organized crime and demographic, environmental, and other global problems. Things get tougher when, for the sake of partnership with Russia, the United States and other Western countries have to abandon certain Cold War policies and must instead grant Russia access to the world commodity and technology markets, take into consideration Russia's interests as an exporter of arms, and so forth. Sometimes it is worth sacrificing immediate gains for long-term strategic interests. Moreover, it is not psychologically easy to accept the need to consult Moscow on issues that have always been deemed within the prerogative of the West, since the Soviet Union was barred from any participation. I often witness how, after protracted and sometimes tedious negotiations to reconcile positions within Western structures such as nato and the European Union, my counterparts from the United States and Western Europe come to the horrible awareness that they have yet to arrange it with a Russia that may (and in most cases does) have an opinion of its own. In those circumstances, the temptation is great to offer Russia a fait accompli, a final position of the "take it or leave it" type. Difficult issues are easier to tackle when Russia is involved in joint decision-making. Russia's participation in the political Group of Eight may serve as an example. It is already yielding tangible results. In particular, in 1994 the Big Eight conference in Winnipeg addressed the issue of aid to Ukraine. The conference resulted in important decisions aimed at promoting prompt improvement of the economy in Ukraine and implementation of market reforms there. This settlement serves equally the interests of the West and Russia, whose aid to Ukraine, mainly in the form of energy supplies, exceeds the aggregate assistance provided by all the Western countries. It is much harder to arrive at meaningful arrangements when Russia does not participate in decision-making within the framework of Western structures.

**THE NATO-RUSSIA COUNCIL PREVENTS DOWNTURNS IN U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS FROM DAMAGING OVERALL COOPERATION**

**ROBERTSON 2003**

(NATO Secretary General and Lord, Official Kremlin International Broadcast, May 13)

I think that the existence of **NATO-Russia Council** has prevented differences over Iraq from becoming a crisis like the Russia-NATO relationship suffered during Kosovo in 1999. It has brought about a new maturity, it has created a new equality and a new respect for each other so that we are now capable of disagreeing without falling out, of having different opinion without walking out of the room, and I think that that is a very good sign for the future of the international community that the NATO nations and Russia can now have established a working relationship of such durability that it can survive and move on from even passionately held differences of opinion like the one that recently took place on Iraq.

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# NRC K2 Relations

**Prior consultation on large strategic issues solves long term relations and conflict**

**Dobbs 96**, Foreign policy correspondent for the Washington Post, esteemed non-fiction writer

(Michael, 2/10, “Christopher Says He's 'Off to a Good Start' With New Russian Foreign Minister”, Lexis, KW)

Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov extracted a promise from the United States today to hold regular consultations on regional crises in exchange for reassurance that there can be no return to the days of the Cold War. Making his debut on the international stage in a get-acquainted session with Secretary of State Warren Christopher here in the Finnish capital, Primakov made clear that he intends to defend Russian interests more assertively than did his pro-Western predecessor, Andrei Kozyrev, particularly in relation to the former Soviet republics. At the same time, however, he insisted that Russia and the United States should find a way of managing their differences to head off a global confrontation. U.S. officials initially were taken aback by Russian President Boris Yeltsin's decision to replace Kozyrev with Primakov, who aroused suspicions in Washington because of his impeccable Communist credentials, his background as Russia's spy master and his close relations with such Third World dictators as Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. But after 6 1/2 hours of meetings, Christopher pronounced himself pleasantly surprised by the firmness with which Primakov ruled out any return to the days of the Cold War. "We are off to a good start," said Christopher, speaking at the end of an eight-day tour of the Balkans and the Middle East. U.S. officials said the two men quickly agreed to address each other by their first names. Primakov echoed Christopher's words about the "productive" and "businesslike" nature of their first encounter and played down Russian opposition to U.S. plans to expand the NATO security alliance to the borders of the Soviet Union. He confirmed that Russia wanted to strengthen its ties with Ukraine and other former Soviet republics, but insisted that Kremlin leaders had no intention of resuscitating the old Soviet Union. "Obviously there are disagreements between us, and there will continue to be disagreements," said Primakov, who served as head of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service prior to his appointment as foreign minister last month. "But we must not resolve these disagreements through confrontation, because that would be very dangerous." Primakov has succeeded in grabbing Washington's attention by making it plain that he intends to reorient Russian foreign policy around the former Soviet republics and other nearby states such as China and Iran. By staking out a tougher position than his predecessor, he has endowed the U.S.-Russian relationship with at least a shadow of its former drama. Although Primakov has described the economic reintegration of the former Soviet republics as "inevitable," he went to some trouble today to reassure Washington about Russian intentions. He said Russia fully respected the sovereignty of its neighbors and nobody was talking about "the restoration of the Soviet Union." The most concrete result of the meeting, which included a 3 1/2-hour working dinner Friday night, was an offer by Christopher to hold "constant consultations" with the Russians on regional problems, such as those in the Middle East, China, Latin America and Africa. U.S. officials announced that the State Department's chief Middle East negotiator, Dennis Ross, will travel to Moscow next week to brief the Russians on progress toward a peace agreement between Syria and Israel. Such bilateral meetings on regional issues took place regularly when Mikhail Gorbachev was leader of the Soviet Union, but have occurred less frequently over the last few years. Today's decision is likely to bolster the self-esteem of Russian diplomats and foreign policy thinkers, who complained that Kozyrev paid too much attention to the United States, at the expense of Russian interests elsewhere in the world. In charting a course for future relations, Primakov and Christopher also agreed to adhere to a policy of "no surprises," meaning the countries will avoid forming initiatives that affect each other's interests without prior consultation. They committed to implementing existing agreements, including the START arms reduction treaty, which has yet to be approved by the Russian parliament. Both Christopher and Primakov said the two sides would attempt to work through their differences in private rather than in public. The most obvious differences involve U.S. plans for NATO expansion and Russian attempts to maintain profitable commercial relationships with Iran and Iraq, which Washington considers to be "rogue states." When he returns to Moscow, Primakov will be playing host to Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati.

# NRC K2 Relations

**U.S.-RUSSIAN COOPERATION ON SECURITY ISSUES IS KEY TO A LASTING AND SOLID RELATIONSHIP**

**STENT 2** (Angela, Moscow Times, 11-27, director of Georgetown University's Center for Eurasian, Russian and East European Studies, served in the U.S. State Department's office of policy planning from 1999 to 2001)

This partnership, however, needs fresh impetus. Without a more forward-looking agenda, it could stagnate or deteriorate, if the United States and Russia continue to disagree over issues involving Russia's ties to Iraq, Iran and North Korea. U.S.-Russian ties must have a stronger foundation than a common enemy. There are several areas where Russia and the United States have compelling reasons to cooperate, areas that could provide a firmer basis for a partnership based on mutual interest. WMD Proliferation: Russia and the United States share an interest in limiting proliferation not only of nuclear, but also of biological and chemical materials. Questions about Soviet-era stockpiles of these materials remain, and there is much that both sides can do together to prevent them from falling into the wrong hands. European Security: The NATO-Russia Council offers a new start for NATO-Russia relations and is working better than many had initially expected on issues such as counter-terrorism, theater missile defense, and search-and-rescue operations. The council should focus more on Russian military reform, encouraging Russia's military to interact more intensively with NATO counterparts and pursue new thinking on security cooperation in Europe. Security in the Post-Soviet Space: If the anti-terrorist campaign is to achieve any lasting results, the powers in the region will have to cooperate with the United States to jointly pursue peace in Eurasia. The United States and Russia should work with China, the Central Asian states and as many other regional powers as are willing and able to establish a new framework for security in the post-Soviet space. Russia should work toward being a guarantor of stability in this area, together with its other partners. There is no more zero-sum game in Central Asia. The coming risks of succession crises and potential instability in Central Asia cry out for partnership, not rivalry. Energy Cooperation: The October Houston Energy summit and its aftermath have reinforced the importance that the Bush administration attaches to promoting greater U.S.-Russian energy cooperation. While Russia cannot replace Saudi Arabia as a supplier, its impressive increases in oil production and its potential to supply more oil to the world market and gas to Europe have reinforced its significance in an uncertain energy world. The Middle East: Russia's interests in the Middle East have changed dramatically in the past decade. Moscow's credibility as a more even-handed player in the Arab-Israeli conflict has risen over the past few years and today Russia exercises its influence in the new "quad" format, with the United States, EU and UN. While America remains the key broker in this area, Russia could play a more active role under the right conditions. New Security Issues: Despite the current preoccupation with traditional security issues, Western relations with Russia will become increasingly focused on non-traditional questions beyond terrorism, such as infectious diseases, trafficking in humans and drugs, and organized crime, that threaten our security and aid and abet terrorism. The United States and Russia must intensify their cooperation in resolving long-term problems whose impact reaches well beyond Eurasia. Working together in these areas will take time and effort. But it will form the basis of a longer-term and broader-based U.S.-Russian partnership. It will create structures that will ensure a denser network of ties between the two countries and their populations. In the new, uncertain world, Russia and America face the threat of global terrorism and unconventional warfare together. They will need each other as partners for much of this new century.

**Permanent consultation mechanisms are key to relations**

**Kobrinskaya 96**, writer for the Moscow Times

(Irina, 1996, “Dangers of Isolationism”, Lexis, KW)

The period before presidential elections will hardly be marked by sharp turns in Russian foreign policy, but it can be crucial in the formation of a civilized Russian foreign policy. The signing of the treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe could be of great significance. The collaboration of Russia with NATO in Bosnia could help to form a new partnership between NATO and Russia and solve some of the conflicts that have arisen over NATO expansion. The establishment of permanent consultation mechanism between Russia and the United States, as former supreme allied commander of Europe, General Andrew Goodpaster, has suggested, will help to establish and maintain co-operation and good relations.

# Prior Consultation Key to Relations

**PRIOR CONSULTATION IS KEY TO U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS**

**SIMES 3** (DMITRI, PRESIDENT OF THE NIXON CENTER, FDCH POLITICAL TESTIMONY, 9-30)

The United States should also think more strategically about official communications with Russia. Aside from a few specific cases directly involving key issues in bilateral relations--such as the Bush Administration's decision to withdraw from the Anti- Ballistic Missile Treaty--the U.S. has rarely engaged in advance consultation with Moscow on important policy initiatives. In fact, Russian officials complain that they hear about new policies after not only NATO allies are briefed, but also after they appear in the media. The administration's Proliferation Security Initiative, announced by President Bush in Krakow (on the way to seeing President Putin in St. Petersburg) in June 2003, has been cited as a particular example with the added complaint that Moscow was not invited to send a delegation to a Madrid gathering on counter-proliferation strategy held after Mr. Bush's speech.

**PRIOR CONSULTATION IS KEY TO U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS**

**HAASS 2** (Richard, US State Department, Federal Information and News Dispatch, State Department, June 3)

Finally, both the United States and Europe need to improve the quality of consultations with Russia. When either Americans or Europeans are about to make decisions that have an impact on Russia or the relationship, they owe it to Russia to consult in advance, not simply announce a decision after the fact. That does not mean Russia will have a veto, but it does mean decisions will be made with full knowledge of the impact on the relationship. And, we expect our Russian partner to do likewise.

# Military Cooperation Key to Solve Relations

**Military cooperation is key to relations**

**VERSHBOW 04 (**Alexander, U.S. Ambassador to Russia, U.S. Embassy in Japan, Jan 8, http://japan.usembassy.gov/e/p/tp-20040113-01.html)

From the U.S. viewpoint, there are several priority areas where we believe we should seek to deepen cooperation and overcome lingering Cold War thinking. Broader military-to-military relations, joint industrial projects on missile defense, moving from information exchange to operational cooperation against terrorism, and shoring up the increasingly leaky nonproliferation regimes -- progress on all of these fronts will contribute to both nations' security. Both countries need to see more tangible benefits from the relationship before we can speak of a long-term and enduring strategic partnership. Expanding trade and investment will help generate such benefits and give average Russians and Americans a direct stake in the success of our relationship, thereby creating more domestic political support for the relationship.

# Consultation Over Regional Conflicts Key to Relations

**GENUINE CONSULTATION OVER REGIONAL CONFLICTS IS KEY TO SOLIDIFY U.S.-RUSSIAN COOPERATION AND MAINTAIN STRONG TIES WITH RUSSIA**

**VERSHBOW 02 (**Alexander, US Ambassador to Russia, Feb 22, http://www.usembassy.it/file2002\_02/alia/a2022210.htm)

NATO and Russia have had some success in their first efforts at cooperation over the past decade, especially through our joint peacekeeping efforts in the Balkans. But I think that both sides would agree that our cooperation has not fully lived up to the promise embodied in the NATO-Russia Founding Act signed in 1997. Our common task is to get the relationship right this time: to devise new mechanisms for cooperation, coordinated action and joint decisions that can integrate Russia more closely in NATO's work, while respecting NATO's and Russia's prerogatives to act alone if necessary. The idea discussed between Presidents Bush and Putin last November, and endorsed by NATO and Russian Foreign Ministers a month later, is quite simple: to create a new forum in which NATO's 19 members and Russia work together as a group of 20 equal partners on issues where our shared interests make it sensible to do so. Areas for joint action "at 20" might include counter-terrorism, non-proliferation, or responding to future regional conflicts. They might also include concrete projects that build a climate of cooperation and transparency between NATO and Russia -- politically and militarily. We hope that the proposed new mechanism will be operational by the spring -- before the May meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in Reykjavik and before President Bush's visit to Moscow and St. Petersburg. It will be a qualitative step beyond today's 19-plus-one format, in which NATO formulates its position before engaging with its Russian partners. The concept now will be to formulate positions on specific issues and projects through early engagement of the 20 nations meeting together. This NATO-Russia Council "at 20" will be a fundamental and historic change in NATO's dealings with Russia -- a move toward a more substantial partnership and genuine collaboration that might be called an "alliance with the Alliance." Through concrete joint projects, joint discussions, and eventually even joint decisions, NATO and Russia will be able to take responsibility together for dealing with some of the new challenges to security that threaten peace and stability in Europe. For it to work, changes in attitude will be required on both sides, and not just changes in procedures. In particular, Russia will need to develop a new "culture of cooperation" -- the spirit of flexibility, understanding, and compromise that is essential to an organization that works on the basis of consensus among nations with differing security perspectives and priorities. This is the way NATO works, and it is the way that NATO-Russia relations also will need to work. Unfortunately, this culture of cooperation has not always been a hallmark of Russia's approach to NATO up till now. Put simply, Russia still needs to overcome a legacy of mistrust and competition in its dealings with NATO. For its part, NATO needs to be more open and more flexible in taking Russia's views into account. What is crucial is that we get beyond the zero-sum relationship of the past and develop what we Americans like to call a win-win relationship.

# Russian Relations High

**The cooperation on a new start agreement set the stage for continued mutually beneficial relations**

**Burns 4/14** - Under Secretary for Political Affairs Center for American Progress

(William J. Burns, April 14, 2010, “The United States and Russia in a New Era: One Year After "Reset"”, http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2010/140179.htm, KW)

At the beginning of 2010, we are in a significantly better place with Russia than we were at the beginning of 2009. Many challenges and difficulties remain, and we have a great deal of work to do together to widen and strengthen the base of cooperation, but we’ve made a promising start. President Obama and Secretary Clinton have both invested substantially in relations with Russia, and made it a high priority. The President’s meeting with President Medvedev in Prague last week was their seventh face to face discussion in a little more than a year; they’ve had some sixteen substantive phone conversations over the same period, and have developed a very effective pattern of communication. The same is true of Secretary Clinton and Foreign Minister Lavrov, and of U.S.-Russian contacts at many other levels. All this diplomatic effort has produced practical results. Let me describe briefly a few of them. The first is renewed nuclear leadership by Russia and the United States. The new START agreement signed by President Obama and President Medvedev in Prague on April 8 enhances American security, reduces the threat of nuclear war, and sets a powerful example of responsible U.S.-Russian leadership in managing and reducing our remaining nuclear arsenals on the eve of the NPT Review Conference in May. New START reduces the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads on each side by roughly 30%, from the upper limit of 2200 in the Moscow Treaty of 2002 to 1550. The allowable number of nuclear delivery vehicles will be reduced from the existing START level of 1600 to 800, with no more than 700 deployed at any one time. The new treaty contains modernized and streamlined verification and transparency measures that will build confidence and predictability on both sides. It does not constrain our own capacity to pursue missile defense programs. New START continues the vital work of arms reductions pursued by Administrations of both parties since the end of the Cold War, a moment when Russia and America together deployed some 20,000 strategic nuclear warheads.

**US russian relations are at an all time high**

**LeVine, 6/23**

(Steve, contributing editor at Foreign Policy, former chief foreign affairs writer for BusinessWeek, and Central Asia and Caucasus correspondent for the Wall Street Journal, 6/23/10, “The beginning of a beautiful friendship (maybe)”, Foreign Policy, http://oilandglory.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/06/23/the\_beginning\_of\_a\_beautiful\_friendship\_maybe)

When the Obama administration's foreign policy team talks about Russia, they do it exuberantly. After almost two decades of on-and-off tension, the U.S. and Russia are on the way to a "normalization" of relations, says Ben Rhodes, deputy National Security Adviser for strategic communications. Michael McFaul, President Barack Obama's special advisor on Russia, says that what's going on is historic in scope. The relationship has gotten the West and Russia away from "the 19th Century Great Game, and the 20th Century Cold War," said McFaul, who along with Rhodes briefed reporters last night by telephone. The high-fiving was prompted most recently by an impending state visit from Russian President Dmitry Medvedev to Washington tomorrow. At a time when foreign policy successes are hard to come by, the administration appears intent on parading Medvedev as an unqualified triumph of signal importance, involving advances in areas of "core U.S. strategic interests," McFaul said. There is some justification for the administration's crowing: The U.S. relationship with Russia has indisputably improved, a development that may be responsible -- along with relatively low oil prices and the financial crisis -- for Moscow's generally nicer tones. Yesterday Russian diplomats endorsed a Council of Europe resolution denouncing Moscow's countenancing of an atmosphere of torture, murder and other violence in Chechnya and elsewhere in the north Caucasus; such a Russian vote would have been unthinkable just months ago. Today, Medvedev is touring Silicon Valley, a sign of both his stated hope of diversifying Russia's economic dependence on oil, gas, and metal exports, and the Obama Administration's desire to solidify a business-to-business relationship between the U.S. and Russia. McFaul described the "surreal experience" of Russian youths shooting hoops with Obama in May, and the next day Medvedev hosting 22 American venture capitalists at his residence outside Moscow. "This simply didn't happen before," said McFaul. The administration wants such business ties to be part of reset, he said.

# Russian Relations High

**Russian relations high now- recent passage of Arms treaty paves the way to future cooperation**

**Office of the Press Secretary 6/24**- “Joint Statement by U.S., Russia on Strategic Stability” June 24, 2010; http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2010/June/20100624192451ihecuor0.1087719.html?CP.rss=true

The United States of America and the Russian Federation are committed to continuing the development of a new strategic relationship based on mutual trust, openness, predictability, and cooperation by following up on the successful negotiation of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, which is focused on the reduction of strategic offensive arms and provides a basis for consideration of further mutually beneficial measures.

**Relations high- Russia is embracing US foreign policy goals and is allowing US troops through its borders**

**USA Today 6/23-** “War in Senate brewing over U.S.-Russia arms deal” June 23, 2010 http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2010-06-23-nuke-treaty\_N.htm

The new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, known as START, was signed by the presidents in April and now needs to win 67 votes in the Senate for ratification. Other signs of the improved relations cited by the White House: securing Russian support for United Nations sanctions against North Korea and Iran, gaining approval from Russia to allow troops and supplies to cross its borders on the way to Afghanistan, and Russia's participation in Obama's 50-nation Nuclear Security Summit in April.

**US-Russian relations are completely restored to pre-cold war status- the two will cooperate in a number of policy issues**

**Blade News Service 6/25**- “Russian relations restored, U.S. says” June 25, 2010; http://toledoblade.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20100625/NEWS14/6250365

WASHINGTON - President Obama declared Thursday that he and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev have "succeeded in resetting" the relationship between the former Cold War adversaries that had dipped to a dangerous low in recent years. Mr. Obama acknowledged differences in some areas, such as Moscow's tensions with neighboring Georgia, but said "we addressed those differences candidly." He said the United States and Russia had agreed to expand cooperation on intelligence and the counterterror fight and worked on strengthening economic ties between the nations. "Twenty years after the end of the Cold War, the U.S.-Russian relationship has to be about more than just security and arms control," Mr. Obama said at a joint news conference. "It has to be about our shared prosperity, and what we can build together."

# Relations Good – Prolif

**Continued US-Russian cooperation and consultation is key to maintain non-proliferation**

**Burns 4/14** - Under Secretary for Political Affairs Center for American Progress

(William J. Burns, April 14, 2010, “The United States and Russia in a New Era: One Year After "Reset"”, http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2010/140179.htm, KW)

 Russia and the United States have also led the way in the crucial work of safeguarding nuclear materials. Building on the vision and determination of Senator Richard Lugar and former Senator Sam Nunn, we have helped Russia improve security at its facilities. The U.S. and Russia lead the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, whose critical task was strongly supported at this week’s Nuclear Security Summit in Washington. Yesterday, Foreign Minister Lavrov and Secretary Clinton signed a new bilateral agreement that will dispose of 34 metric tons each of weapons-grade plutonium, enough to make some 17,000 nuclear weapons. Even as we have worked to reduce our nuclear arsenals and safeguard nuclear materials around the world, Russia and America have increased our cooperation to ensure that other countries do not acquire nuclear weapons. We are both key partners in the Six Party talks, and resolute in our determination to achieve the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. And we are equally committed to holding Iran to its international responsibilities and preventing it from developing nuclear weapons, which would have catastrophic consequences for stability in a part of the world that matters enormously to both of us, and to the global economy. We have worked painstakingly from the beginning of the new Administration to build **a habit of close consultation** with Russia, along with our other partners in the P5+1 group which leads international diplomacy on the Iranian nuclear issue. We collaborated carefully with Russia on a creative confidence-building proposal regarding the Tehran Research Reactor, which the IAEA offered to Iran last autumn. We constructed this proposal with Russia in the sincere hope that it would be something to which Iran could say “yes.” It would have met an Iranian humanitarian need; enabled the Iranian leadership to offer tangible proof of the exclusively peaceful nature of its intentions, by using much of its stockpile of low-enriched uranium for a clear civilian purpose; and in the process it would have provided time and space for serious negotiation. The TRR proposal was meant both to test Iran’s intentions, and to invest in partnership with Russia. After an initial positive reaction to our joint proposal in early October in Geneva, Iran’s actions have been uniformly negative. We and the Russians, along with the Chinese and our European partners, have begun serious work on a new UNSC sanctions resolution, aimed at taking intelligent, targeted measures to try to change the calculus of the Iranian leadership and produce the negotiated resolution to which we remain committed. That level of cooperation was unimaginable in the depths of U.S.-Russian acrimony at the end of 2008; while we will no doubt continue to have our share of tactical differences, we have come a long way in a relatively short time in our efforts together on Iran.

**And, Extinction**

**Utgoff 02**, “survival” v. 44 no 2 summer 2002, p. 90

Widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear 'six-shooters' on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations. as the Scud-C (range 500 km) and the Scud-B (range 280 km) and also chemical arsenals for them like the powerful nerve agent VX. 16 These missiles armed with chemical warheads could strike airfields and mobilisation points, incapacitating these areas. With Israel denied air superiority, Syria could retake the Golan Heights. A simultaneous Palestinian uprising in the West Bank and the Gaza strip alongwith other Arab states attacking would make the situation particularly grave. Such a scenario would be ripe for a nuclear Armageddon.

# EXT - Prolif

**Strong U.S.-Russia cooperation key to check proliferation**

**Berman 08** Howard Berman (Member of the House of Representatives, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs) “Russia, Iran, and Nuclear Weapons”, Committee on Foreign Affairs, http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/press\_display.asp?id=519

We’re here this morning to begin to assess the proposed agreement between the United States and Russian governments to expand civil nuclear cooperation. One key factor we’ll take into account during this process is the extent to which Russia is cooperating with the United States, the European Union and others to discourage Iran’s development of a nuclear weapons capability.One of the greatest potential threats to the security of the United States and its allies is an Iranian Bomb. We’ve all heard the crude threats that President Ahmadinejad makes against Israel, which he repeated as recently as last week. But Israel’s not the only state feeling the heat from Tehran’s radioactive rhetoric. Other states in the Middle East are now, suddenly, interested in developing their own nuclear energy programs, emulating Iran. I don’t believe this is a pure coincidence. As we know all too well, allegedly peaceful nuclear power programs can be used as a cover for the clandestine development of nuclear weapons.Not only would a nuclear-armed Tehran have the ability to intimidate other states in ways that could cripple U.S. national interests in the region and beyond – it would also effectively end the global nonproliferation regime. Unfortunately, we currently face a situation in which Iran is enriching uranium faster than sanctions are being applied to stop it. To date, the multilateral sanctions imposed on Iran by the United Nations are woefully inadequate. They have failed to change Tehran’s calculation that the benefits of a nuclear weapons capability outweigh the costs. In other words, our current policy at this particular point -- and I hope it changes, but at this particular point -- is not working. Russia’s role in persuading and pressuring Iran to cease its dangerous nuclear activities is absolutely crucial. Yet in the past, Moscow has often been the main stumbling block to tougher sanctions. While Russia recently has been more supportive, its commitment to effective international action remains in question. Just two weeks ago, Russian Prime Minister Putin publicly declared that there is no evidence that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons capability; he said this the very same week that the International Atomic Energy Agency seemed to be moving toward the opposite conclusion. It is in this context that the Bush Administration has signed a new agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation with Moscow, something that has long been promised and upon which Russia places a high value. The Foreign Affairs Committee formally received the proposed nuclear cooperation agreement on May 13th. For the record, we are now on Day 19 of the statutory Congressional review period of 90 continuous days of session. The agreement will enter into force if, during this 90-day period, Congress does not enact a joint resolution of disapproval or approves a resolution of approval with conditions over the President’s veto. This Committee has statutory responsibility to review the proposed agreement and report to the House on whether it should be approved or disapproved. This hearing is an initial step in that process. There has already been a significant amount of commentary on the benefits and drawbacks of this agreement. Its proponents argue that it may encourage Russia to be more forthcoming on tougher sanctions on Iran; critics counter that Russia will do so only if we hold the agreement back as a point of leverage. Proponents claim this agreement will allow the U.S. and Russia to work together to create a nuclear fuel bank and multilateral fuel assurances to reduce incentives for countries, like Iran, to develop their own uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing plants, that can make fuel for reactors or bombs. Critics respond that these things can be done now without this agreement. Advocates claim that this agreement will allow greater cooperation with Russia to develop proliferation-resistant reprocessing methods to extract useful uranium and plutonium from spent reactor fuel with minimal risk of diversion to military ends. Opponents charge that any reprocessing is dangerous, and efforts to expand reprocessing globally will inevitably encourage other states to start their own reprocessing efforts. To the extent that the Russia cooperation agreement assists this effort, opponents charge, it actually works against nonproliferation efforts to reduce the amount of plutonium available for nuclear weapons.

# Relations Good – Heg

**U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS ARE KEY TO U.S. HEGEMONY**

**SIMES 3** (DMITRI, PRESIDENT OF THE NIXON CENTER, FDCH POLITICAL TESTIMONY, 9-30)

At the same time, U.S. leaders increasingly recognized the emerging, inter-related threats of terrorism and proliferation. Though policy makers and experts had devoted some attention to these issues earlier, the tragic events of September 11 rapidly crystallized American thinking about these threats and transformed the struggle to contain them into the principal aim of American foreign policy. Notwithstanding its diminished status and curtailed ambition, Russia has considerable influence in its neighborhood and a significant voice elsewhere as well. Moscow can contribute importantly to U.S. interests if it chooses to do so. Accordingly Russia can markedly decrease, or increase, the costs of exercising American leadership both directly (by assisting the United States, or not) and indirectly (by abetting those determined to resist, or not).

**Global nuclear war**

Khalilzad – 95 (Zalmay, RAND Corporation, The Washington Quarterly, Spring 1995)

On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.

# Relations Good – Nuclear WAR

 **U.S.-RUSSIA RELATIONS CHECK FOUR SCENARIOS OF NUCLEAR WAR**

**COHEN 1** (Stephen, Prof of Russian Studies at NYU, June 7, http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20010625&c=1&s=cohen)

In these and other ways, Russia has been plunging back into the nineteenth century. And, as a result, it has entered the twenty-first century with its twentieth-century systems of nuclear maintenance and control also in a state of disintegration. What does this mean? No one knows fully because nothing like this has ever happened before in a nuclear country. But one thing is certain: Because of it, we now live in a nuclear era much less secure than was the case even during the long cold war. Indeed, there are at least four grave nuclear threats in Russia today: § There is, of course, the threat of proliferation, the only one generally acknowledged by our politicians and media--the danger that Russia's vast stores of nuclear material and know-how will fall into reckless hands. § But, second, scores of ill-maintained Russian reactors on land and on decommissioned submarines--with the destructive capacity of nuclear weapons--are explosions waiting to happen. § Third, also for the first time in history, there is a civil war in a nuclear land--in the Russian territory of Chechnya, where fanatics on both sides have threatened to resort to nuclear warfare. § And most immediate and potentially catastrophic, there is Russia's decrepit early-warning system. It is supposed to alert Moscow if US nuclear missiles have been launched at Russia, enabling the Kremlin to retaliate immediately with its own warheads, which like ours remain even today on hairtrigger alert. The leadership has perhaps ten to twenty minutes to evaluate the information and make a decision. That doomsday warning system has nearly collapsed--in May, a fire rendered inoperable four more of its already depleted satellite components--and become a form of Russian nuclear roulette, a constant danger of false alarms and accidental launches against the United States. How serious are these threats? In the lifetime of this graduating class, the bell has already tolled at least four times. In 1983 a Soviet Russian satellite mistook the sun's reflection on a cloud for an incoming US missile. A massive retaliatory launch was only barely averted. In 1986 the worst nuclear reactor explosion in history occurred at the Soviet power station at Chernobyl. In 1995 Russia's early-warning system mistook a Norwegian research rocket for an American missile, and again a nuclear attack on the United States was narrowly averted. And just last summer, Russia's most modern nuclear submarine, the Kursk, exploded at sea. Think of these tollings as chimes on a clock of nuclear catastrophe ticking inside Russia. We do not know what time it is. It may be only dawn or noon. But it may already be dusk or almost midnight. The only way to stop that clock is for Washington and Moscow to acknowledge their overriding mutual security priority and cooperate fully in restoring Russia's economic and nuclear infrastructures, most urgently its early-warning system. Meanwhile, all warheads on both sides have to be taken off high-alert, providing days instead of minutes to verify false alarms. And absolutely nothing must be done to cause Moscow to rely more heavily than it already does on its fragile nuclear controls. These solutions seem very far from today's political possibilities. US-Russian relations are worse than they have been since the mid-1980s. The Bush Administration is threatening to expand NATO to Russia's borders and to abrogate existing strategic arms agreements by creating a forbidden missile defense system. Moscow threatens to build more nuclear weapons in response. Hope lies in recognizing that there are always alternatives in history and politics--roads taken and not taken. Little more than a decade ago, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, along with President Ronald Reagan and the first President George Bush, took a historic road toward ending the forty-year cold war and reducing the nuclear dangers it left behind. But their successors, in Washington and Moscow, have taken different roads, ones now littered with missed opportunities. If the current generation of leaders turns out to lack the wisdom or courage, and if there is still time, it may fall to your generation to choose the right road. Such leaders, or people to inform their vision and rally public support, may even be in this graduating class. Whatever the case, when the bell warning of impending nuclear catastrophe tolls again in Russia, as it will, know that it is tolling for you, too. And ask yourselves in the determined words attributed to Gorbachev, which remarkably echoed the Jewish philosopher Hillel, "If not now, when? If not us, who?"

# Relations Good – Nuclear Terrorism

 **U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS ARE KEY TO PREVENT NUCLEAR TERRORISM**

**COHEN 2001** (Stephen, Prof of Russian Studies at NYU, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE 11-11-2001)

President Bush's meetings with Russian President Vladimir Putin next week, in Washington and Texas, give the United States a second historic chance, after the squandered opportunity of the 1990s, to establish a truly cooperative relationship with post-communist Russia. Such a relationship is essential for coping with today's real security dangers, which exceed those of the Cold War and make the United States so vulnerable that even it can no longer meaningfully be considered a "superpower." Indeed, both the decay of Moscow's systems of nuclear control and maintenance since 1992 and the "low-tech, high-concept" attacks on America on Sept. 11 may be omens of an unprecedented dark age of international security. None of its dangers can be dealt with effectively without Russia, the world's only other fully nuclearized country and its largest crossroad of civilizations.

**Terrorism will get worse and lead nuclear terrorism and extinction.**

**Jerusalem Post, 4**

(David Rudge, “Terror expert: Worst is yet to come; [Daily Edition],” 5-12-2004, p.06, Proquest) // JMP

Global terrorism is on the rise and is likely to continue unabated for the next 100 years, according to Prof. Yonah Alexander, one of the world's leading analysts on the subject. Alexander, director of the Inter-Universities Center for Terrorism Studies, also believes it is only a matter of time before groups like al-Qaida use non-coventional weapons as part of attempts to promulgate their ideology and undermine western society. In this respect, he anticipates that al-Qaida's next theater of operations will be Europe, where the organization has established a widespread base and network. "If you ask me whether the worst is yet to come, the answer is definitely yes," Alexander told The Jerusalem Post prior to giving a lecture as guest speaker at the University of Haifa's National Security Studies Center."We can expect to see an escalation in terrorism on a global scale with a continuation of conventional acts of terror, such as suicide bombings and shooting, as well as mega-terror like September 11 in the US and March 11 in Spain."There will also be a move towards the use of non- conventional weapons: biological, chemical, nuclear as in dirty bombs, and cyber- terrorism, whereby perpetrators will try to disrupt power supplies and air traffic, for example, at the touch of a button." Alexander, who is based in the US and Israel, has studied the subject of terrorism in the Middle East and the global arena for over 40 years and has published over 100 books on the issue. The center he heads is a consortium of universities and think-tanks in some 30 countries. He said there had already been indications of future trends by terrorist organizations such as the anthrax attacks in the US after September 11, 2001, reports that al-Qaida was trying to produce ricin and, in Israel, the abortive attempt to blow up the Pi Glilot fuel and gas storage depot. "According to the studies we have conducted, we can expect a continuation of bus bombings like the ones that have occurred in Israel, as well as attempts to strike at chemical plants and infrastructure targets and super- terrorism with non-conventional weapons," said Alexander. The supposition that international terrorism will expand and escalate is based, according to Alexander, on factors such as the spread of radical theological ideology, racial intolerance, ethnic and religious differences and, especially in Africa, tribal rivalries, as well as extremist nationalism and separatism. Furthermore, he cited the numerous disputes and conflicts throughout the world, such as those in Chechnya, Kashmir, Afghanistan, the Middle East, and South America, as well as the gap between developed nations and poorer countries. "Other important factors include the intensification of the link between terrorism and organized crime, and the education of hatred, including anti-Semitism, that we see all the time on various Internet sites," said Alexander. "The problem here is that children are being brought up to hate and they will pass this on to their children and so forth, which is why we don't see an end to terrorism in the next 100 years. "Should we be concerned about the future? Yes, we should, because of the motivation of terrorists, their ideologies, the availability of funds, the proliferation of conventional and non- conventional weapons, the intrinsic vulnerability of democratic societies and the high cost of trying to counter terror. "What concerns many is the expansion of international networks as seen after the Madrid bombings, when links were discovered between Spanish citizens and people in North Africa, Asia, and with various other groups like Hamas. "It would be a grave mistake, however, to say that Islam is generating this terror. In fact, Islam has been hijacked and taken hostage by extremists who are using it to serve their own interests." Alexander, in his lecture, posed the questions of whether nations should submit to terrorism and whether civilization would survive in the event of the use of non- conventional weapons. In the first case, he maintained that submission only serves to encourage terrorists and their leaders and boost their motivation, while survival would depend on nations taking all necessary steps to reduce the risks, including international intelligence cooperation. "Dealing with terrorism requires a broad range of responses, starting with clear and coherent policies. It is necessary to have quality intelligence, as well as law enforcement, the military, and the means to counter technological and cyber-terrorism," said Alexander. “We also need an educational response because the children of today will be the terrorists of tomorrow. Unless we can defuse the extremist ideological and theological elements and their propaganda, the measures won't work. "We have to deal with the root causes and try to improve economic and social conditions - a sort of global Marshall plan - but first it is necessary to deal with the terror leadership. "To this end some innocent civilians might be harmed but, make no mistake, this is war and to fight it nations have to pool their resources. No nation can deal with the problem unilaterally. "In the past, terrorism was regarded as a tactical rather than a strategic threat but it has become a permanent fixture and a challenge to the strategic interests of nations. "In fact," said Alexander, "it represents the most threatening challenge to civilization in the 21st century. The question of survival will depend to a great extent on how civilized society tackles this threat."

# EXT—Nuke Terrorism

**U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS ARE KEY TO PREVENT NUCLEAR WAR AND NUCLEAR TERRORISM**

**ALLISON 99** (Graham T. "Russia's Domestic Political Future and U.S. National Interests." Discussion Paper 99-15, Cambridge, MA: Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, August 1999 http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/publication.cfm?ctype=paper&item\_id=52)

Why is Russia not like Indonesia, or Brazil, or Nigeria? In former Prime Minister Stepashin''s quip: why is it not a banana republic--without bananas? Just the day before his dismissal as Prime Minister, on August 9, Sergei Stepashin noted that the government should obey the Constitution or face the prospect that Russia become "the world''s largest banana republic, only without bananas." In a sentence: because history has left a superpower arsenal of nuclear weapons, biological weapons, chemical weapons, missiles, and know-how in the midst of a revolution that is deconstructing every sinew of the totalitarian Soviet state. Why does Russia matter? Start with 7,000 active nuclear warheads: armed, mounted on missiles, capable of arriving at targets in the United States less than an hour after the decision to launch. Were a dozen or hundred of these weapons to be triggered--accidentally in a Y2K failure, by some unauthorized agent, as a consequence of misperception, or whatever--the United States would disappear from the map. Incredible, unimaginable, and a Cold War anachronism, yes--but a brute fact, hard to ignore. As surely as during the Cold War, this superpower arsenal creates for the U.S. a highest-priority, enduring interest in Russia: namely, that these weapons are not used against America or our allies. Add 5,000 tactical nuclear weapons, many lacking any locking device to prevent their unauthorized use, some stored at bases where a colonel with the cooperation of two lieutenants could "privatize" a dozen warheads and take them to world markets to monetize their value. Finally, remember an additional 12,000 nuclear weapons in various storage facilities in Russia, many with no mechanical protection beyond that of guards whose salaries are frequently delayed for months. One backpack nuclear weapon at Oklahoma City would have caused not just the Federal Office Building, but Oklahoma City itself, to disappear. One such nuclear device in the minivan that was used by terrorists to attack the World Trade Center would have caused lower Manhattan to disappear, including all of Wall Street up to Gramercy Park. Beyond assembled weapons, there are approximately 70,000 nuclear weapons-equivalents in stockpiles of highly enriched uranium and plutonium, a softball-sized chunk of which, if it found its way to Iran or to one of bin Laden''s terrorist groups, would provide the critical ingredient from which a crude nuclear device could be assembled. Beyond all this, there are biological weapons, chemical weapons, thousands of ICBM''s, and, beyond physical items, know-how for producing additional missiles and other weapons without limit. In sum: the overriding reason Russia must matter for Americans appears vividly as one considers the clear and present danger of "loose nukes": the theft of one or a dozen weapons, sale to a rogue state or terrorist group, and use of these weapons to attack American soldiers abroad or civilians at home. Nothing in the international arena poses so sure a threat to Americans'' survival and well-being for the next generation as the threat of theft of nuclear, biological, and other weapons from a collapsing Russia.

# Relations Good - Economy

**U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS CHECK RUSSIAN EXPANSIONISM AND SOLVE WORLD ECONOMIC RECOVERY**

**HAMILTON 3** (Lee, Director of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and Former Chairman of the House Committee on International Relations, The International Economy, June 22)

While it has proven premature to speak of a positive transformation in U.S.-Russian relations, the breadth of our common interests suggests that partnership is preferable to confrontation. The United States and Russia each have an interest in strengthening Russia's economy. The United States should forgive some Soviet-era Russian debt, repeal the outdated Jackson-Vanik amendment, and support Russian accession into the World Trade Organization, in return for greater transparency and market reform within Russia. A Russian economy tied more to the West would strengthen the global economic recovery, reduce Russia's interest in dealing in nuclear technology with countries like Iran, and enable the full development of Russia's oil and gas reserves. The United States and Russia also have overlapping security concerns. While we should speak out vigorously against Russian human rights violations in Chechnya, the United States must continue working with Russia in the war on terror and the stabilization of Central Asia. We should also bring Russia closer to NATO, as cooperation reduces the likelihood of a return to Russian expansionism.

**Global nuclear wars**

**Mead 09** - Senior Fellow in US Foreign Policy Studies @ Council on Foreign Relations

Walter Russell, Only Makes You Stronger, The New Republic, 2-4-09, http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?id=571cbbb9-2887-4d81-8542-92e83915f5f8&p=1

The greatest danger both to U.S.-China relations and to American power itself is probably not that China will rise too far, too fast; it is that the current crisis might end China's growth miracle. In the worst-case scenario, the turmoil in the international economy will plunge China into a major economic downturn. The Chinese financial system will implode as loans to both state and private enterprises go bad. Millions or even tens of millions of Chinese will be unemployed in a India's future is also a question. Support for global integration is a fairly recent development in India, and many serious Indians remain skeptical of it. While India's 60-year-old democratic system has resisted many shocks, a deep economic recession in a country where mass poverty and even hunger are still major concerns could undermine political order, long-term growth, and India's attitude toward the United States and global economic integration. The violent Naxalite insurrection plaguing a significant swath of the country could get worse; religious extremism among both Hindus and Muslims could further polarize Indian politics; and India's economic miracle could be nipped in the bud. If current market turmoil seriously damaged the performance and prospects of India and China, the current crisis could join the Great Depression in the list of economic events that changed history, even if the recessions in the West are relatively short and mild. The United States should stand ready to assist Chinese and Indian financial authorities on an emergency basis--and work very hard to help both countries escape or at least weather any economic downturn. It may test the political will of the Obama administration, but the United States must avoid a protectionist response to the economic slowdown. U.S. moves to limit market access for Chinese and Indian producers could poison relations for years. For billions of people in nuclear-armed countries to emerge from this crisis believing either that the United States was indifferent to their well-being or that it had profited from their distress could damage U.S. foreign policy far more severely than any mistake made by George W. Bush. All this has weakened Ahmadinejad at home and Iran abroad. Iranian officials must balance the relative merits of support for allies like Hamas, Hezbollah, and Syria against imposed by foreign forces and shaped to fit foreign rather than domestic interests and preferences, many countries are only half-heartedly capitalist. When crisis strikes, they are quick to decide that capitalism is a failure and look for alternatives. As a result, developing countries and countries where capitalism has relatively recent and shallow roots tend to suffer greater economic and political damage when crisis strikes--as, inevitably, it does. And, consequently, financial crises often reinforce rather than challenge the global distribution of power and wealth. This may be happening yet again. None of which means that we can just sit back and enjoy the recession. History may suggest that financial crises actually help capitalist great powers maintain their leads--but it has other, less reassuring messages as well. If financial crises have been a normal part of life during the 300-year rise of the liberal capitalist system under the Anglophone powers, so has war. The wars of the League of Augsburg and the Spanish Succession; the Seven Years War; the American Revolution; the Napoleonic Wars; the two World Wars; the cold war: The list of wars is almost as long as the list of financial crises. Bad economic times can breed wars. Europe was a pretty peaceful place in 1928, but the Depression poisoned German public opinion and helped bring Adolf Hitler to power. If the current crisis turns into a depression, what rough beasts might start slouching toward Moscow, Karachi, Beijing, or New Delhi to be born? The United States may not, yet, decline, but, if we can't get the world economy back on track, we may still have to fight.

# Relations Good – Aids

**Relations solves the AIDS epidemic and saves millions of lives**

**VERSHBOW 2004** (ALEXANDER, US AMBASSADOR TO RUSSIA, STATE DEPARTMENT APRIL 22)

Without intervention, researchers predict that over 75 million people will be infected worldwide by 2010, with a loss of human life to AIDS totaling 100 million by 2020. Scientists predict that more than two million Russians could be infected by 2005 - next year - and millions more by 2010; in fact, the HIV virus is spreading more rapidly here than in almost any other country on the planet. Unless decisive action is taken - and soon - Russia faces a humanitarian catastrophe rivaling that of World War II. Fortunately, this represents an area tailor-made for bilateral cooperation. As the AIDS epidemic began in the United States years before it struck Russia, we have considerable experience in treating the disease and controlling its spread. Russia has an educated population and an expanding sector of dedicated NGOs that provide hope that concerted efforts at prevention can succeed. What these organizations lack is resources and, most crucially, high-level political support. In addition, Russia is blessed with a large and talented medical and scientific community that can play an important role in international efforts to find a cure and develop a vaccine. Given our complementary resources and our mutual interest in staving off disaster, the AIDS crisis provides an ideal opportunity to demonstrate the potential of our partnership for the betterment of Russia's own people, and all of humanity.

**AIDS is the biggest threat to humanity and if we don’t do anything about it, AIDS will end humanity.**

**Kerns 1999** (Tom professor of philosophy, AIDS and Apocalyptics for Questioning Millennium Madness, http://bioethicscourse.info/aidsite/lec-millemad.html)

The worst threat to humankind AIDS is "the number one health problem on this planet." (C. Everett Koop, former US Surgeon General) "AIDS is the single greatest threat to well-being facing the world's population today." (Marc Lappé) AIDS is "a messenger of apocalyptic change," as it is spread through "one of the most biologically urgent of human behaviors." - Dr June Osborn (former member of the US Presidential Commission on HIV/AIDS, & professor in U Mich SPH) Economic costs are high "Although it is less than a decade since the virus that causes AIDS was discovered, it has become increasingly evident that this pandemic will have profound economic and social implications for both developed and developing countries. The importance of health as an input to the economic development and growth of a country is well established - a healthier population is more productive and has an increased capacity for learning. The adverse impacts of the HIV/AIDS pandemic will undermine improvements in health status and, in turn, reduce the potential for economic growth. AIDS is distinct from other diseases, and its impact can be expected to be quite severe.... Its most critical feature, distinguishing AIDS from other life-threatening and fatal illnesses, such as diarrhea (among children in developing countries) or cancer (among the elderly in developed countries), is that it selectively affects adults in their sexually most active ages, which coincide with their prime productive and reproductive years." - in AIDS in the World, 1992, p 195 (Jill Armstrong is an economist in the Eastern Africa Dept of the World Bank, Washington, DC. Eduard Bos is a demographer in the Population, Health, and Nutrition Division of the World Bank's Population and Human Resources Department.) E. "Whatever else AIDS is, it's not just another disease." (Dr June Osborne, former member of the US Presidential Commission on HIV/AIDS) Features that make AIDS unique: High morbidity & mortality Lifelong infectiousness lengthy asymptomatic stage highly mutable virus Joshua Lederberg considers the possibility of HIV "learning the tricks of airborne transmission:" "We know that HIV is still evolving. Its global spread has meant there is far more HIV on earth today than ever before in history. What are the odds of its learning the tricks of airborne transmission? The short answer is "No one can be sure." ... [A]s time passes, and HIV seems settled in a certain groove, that is momentary reassurance in itself. However, given its other ugly attributes, it is hard to imagine a worse threat to humanity than an airborne variant of AIDS. No rule of nature contradicts such a possibility; the proliferation of AIDS cases with secondary pneumonia [and TB] multiplies the odds of such a mutant, as an analog to the emergence of pneumonic plague." effective modes of transmission destroys the immune system viral reservoir expanding

# Relations Good – Indo-Pak War

**U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS ARE KEY TO PREVENT INDIA-PAKISTAN WAR**

**LEVGOLD 3,** PhD, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, is a member of Executive Committee of The Harriman Institute, prof. @ Columbia Univ (ROBERT, NATIONAL INTEREST, WINTER 02/03)

Additionally, without a great deal of imagination one can conjure renewed trouble over strategic military developments. This is and will remain a nuclear world. While U.S. attention is rightly focused these days on preventing outlaw states and groups from arming themselves with nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, ultimately the nuclear superstructure will be determined by the major nuclear powers. Currently, U.S. preponderance has permitted the United States to dictate the shape of the U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship, and Putin has prudently bowed to an outcome he cannot prevent. In the process, he and parts of the Russian security establishment are coming to accept the possibility of working with the United States and its nato allies on the future role of missile defense. But these are opening gambits in an ongoing process, leading in unknown directions-probably into space and the uncertainties that competition there will bring, and to a set of Chinese responses that will further complicate the Indo-Pakistani nuclear nexus and perhaps draw Japan across the nuclear threshold. The United States may for some time enjoy technological leads, permitting it by means of its own choosing to cope with the threats that lie ahead. In the modern era, however, history has been hard on states that assumed they could unilaterally impose a security order of their own devising and make it last. If, on the other hand, Russia is America's ally and not merely a reluctantly compliant foil, the United States would have much more leverage in designing a nuclear regime drained of competitive pressures among established nuclear powers, and thus more capable of circumscribing the behavior of new and would-be nuclear states.

**Indo Pac War leads to Extinction.**

**Fai 2001** (Ghulam Nabi, 7/8/2001. Kashmiri American Council. Washington Times, Lexis.)

The foreign policy of the United States in South Asia should move from the lackadaisical and distant (with India crowned with a unilateral veto power) to aggressive involvement at the vortex. The most dangerous place on the planet is Kashmir, a disputed territory convulsed and illegally occupied for more than 53 years and sandwiched between nuclear-capable India and Pakistan. It has ignited two wars between the estranged South Asian rivals in 1948 and 1965, and a third could trigger nuclear volleys and a nuclear winter threatening the entire globe. The United States would enjoy no sanctuary. This apocalyptic vision is no idiosyncratic view. The director of central intelligence, the Defense Department, and world experts generally place Kashmir at the peak of their nuclear worries. Both India and Pakistan are racing like thoroughbreds to bolster their nuclear arsenals and advanced delivery vehicles. Their defense budgets are climbing despite widespread misery amongst their populations. Neither country has initialed the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, or indicated an inclination to ratify an impending Fissile Material/Cut-off Convention.

# Relations good – Sino-Russia War

 **U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS ARE KEY TO REORIENT RUSSIAN MILITARY POWER AND CHECK RUSSIA-CHINA NUCLEAR WAR**

**NEWSWEEK 95** - MAY 15 1995

"Russia," says Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, "is a big country." That it is; lop off the newly independent states born within the old Soviet husk and you've still got a lot left -- a highly educated work force sitting on top of some of the globe's most valuable resources. True, much of that vast territory has an awful climate (climate matters-for different reasons than Russia's, it explains why Australia will never be a great power). But unlike India and China, two other "giant" states, Russia will be able to husband its vast resources without the additional strain of feeding -- and employing-more than a billion souls. It also, of course, is the only country that can launch a devastating nuclear attack on the United States. That kind of power demands respect. And sensitive handling. Stephen Sestanovich, head Russia watcher at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, argues that present U.S. policy is geared too much to "dismantling Russian military might" -- a policy that, since it breeds Russian resentment of Western meddling, is self-defeating. "We have to reorient Russian power," says Sestanovich, "not eliminate it. Because we can't eliminate it." Indeed, Washington should prefer a strong Russia. A Russia so weak, for example, that it could not resist a Chinese land grab of its Far East without resorting to nuclear weapons is a 21st-century nightmare. All this implies a close U.S. -- Russian relationship stretching into the future. American officials say it will be a "pragmatic" one, recognizing that Russian and U.S. national interests will sometimes collide. The danger, for the United States, is that a pragmatic relationship could be dominated by security issues. In Western Europe, some futurists say that in the coming decades Russia will talk to the United States about nuclear weapons but to the European Union about everything else-trade, economic development and the rest

 **RUSSIA-CHINA WAR KILLS HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS AND ENDS IN EXTINCTION**

**SHARAVIN 1** (Alexander, Director of the Institute for Military and Political Analysis, What the Papers Say, Oct 3)

Chinese propaganda has constantly been showing us skyscrapers in free trade zones in southeastern China. It should not be forgotten, however, that some 250 to 300 million people live there, i.e. at most a quarter of China's population. A billion Chinese people are still living in misery. For them, even the living standards of a backwater Russian town remain inaccessibly high. They have absolutely nothing to lose. There is every prerequisite for "the final throw to the north." The strength of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (CPLA) has been growing quicker than the Chinese economy. A decade ago the CPLA was equipped with inferior copies of Russian arms from late 1950s to the early 1960s. However, through its own efforts Russia has nearly managed to liquidate its most significant technological advantage. Thanks to our zeal, from antique MiG-21 fighters of the earliest modifications and S-75 air defense missile systems the Chinese antiaircraft defense forces have adopted Su-27 fighters and S-300 air defense missile systems. China's air defense forces have received Tor systems instead of anti-aircraft guns which could have been used during World War II. The shock air force of our "eastern brethren" will in the near future replace antique Tu-16 and Il-28 airplanes with Su-30 fighters, which are not yet available to the Russian Armed Forces! Russia may face the "wonderful" prospect of combating the Chinese army, which, if full mobilization is called, is comparable in size with Russia's entire population, which also has nuclear weapons (even tactical weapons become strategic if states have common borders) and would be absolutely insensitive to losses (even a loss of a few million of the servicemen would be acceptable for China). Such a war would be more horrible than the World War II. It would require from our state maximal tension, universal mobilization and complete accumulation of the army military hardware, up to the last tank or a plane, in a single direction (we would have to forget such "trifles" like Talebs and Basaev, but this does not guarantee success either). Massive nuclear strikes on basic military forces and cities of China would finally be the only way out, what would exhaust Russia's armament completely. We have not got another set of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-based missiles, whereas the general forces would be extremely exhausted in the border combats. In the long run, even if the aggression would be stopped after the majority of the Chinese are killed, our country would be absolutely unprotected against the "Chechen" and the "Balkan" variants both, and even against the first frost of a possible nuclear winter.

# Ext – Relations Solve Sino-Russian War

**U.S.-RUSSIAN COOPERATION IS KEY TO PREVENT RUSSIA-CHINA CONFLICT**

**LEVGOLD 3,** PhD, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, is a member of Executive Committee of The Harriman Institute, prof. @ Columbia Univ (ROBERT, NATIONAL INTEREST, WINTER 02/03)

Finally, Russians apply the word "partnership", albeit somewhat more gingerly in this case, to evoke the two countries' common stake in seeing China safely integrated into the international community. Some stress the importance of promoting China's continued domestic evolution into a responsible and predictable actor on the international stage. Others focus on guaranteeing a strong Russian presence in its own Far East, lest Chinese power too easily flow across the border. But either way, addressing the challenge of China forms another key area of potential U.S.-Russian cooperation.

# Relations Good – Middle East

 **U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS ARE KEY TO MIDDLE EAST PEACE**

**VERSHBOW 4** (ALEXANDER, US AMBASSADOR TO RUSSIA, STATE DEPARTMENT APRIL 22, 2004)

Russia has thus far reacted cautiously to the Greater Middle East initiative, but we believe Russia can and should be a vital partner in this endeavor. Russia, with a Muslim population larger than that of the entire European Union, presents a model of how Muslim communities can flourish in harmony with their non-Muslim neighbors and contribute to social and economic progress - without succumbing to polarizing fundamentalism. Russia also has longstanding ties with many Middle Eastern countries, enabling it to serve as a force for positive change in places where America has less influence. So, in the coming years, one of the challenges is to find a way for Russia, the United States and other democracies to work together to help the peoples of the Greater Middle East to move down the path of reform and deal with terrorism at its source.

**Middle East Instability Causes Nuclear Escalation.**

**Evron 1994** (Yair is a Professor of International Relations at Tel Aviv University, ISRAEL’S NUCLEAR DILLEMA, 1994, p. 123-4 )

The potential risks involved in the functioning of the superpowers’ C3 may recur in the Middle East and, in some cases, with apparently greater intensity. The probability of erroneous decisions is therefore higher. These factors center on technical failures of warning systems, or the combination of technical failure and human error, deriving from misperception of the enemy’s behavior. There also exist processes of escalation that are totally distinct from technical failure, and which derive exclusively from human error. The latter case is most often the function of the erroneous interpretation of various enemy actions. These factors are liable to yield disastrous outcomes. The outcomes can be divided into two major categories of events: misperception of an enemy action that is mistakenly understood as a conventional or nuclear attack on the state’s nuclear bases or on the state in its entirety. Such a misperception could cause a rapid escalation. The second category comprises the escalation from a conventional war to the use of nuclear weapons. The persistence of intense conflicts in the Middle East will of course contribute to the potential danger of misperceptions. Hence, for example, if the Arab-Israeli peace process fails to advance and in particular were the situation to return to the level of conflict that preceded the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement, the intensity of the conflict could reinforce the potential for errors of perception among decision-makers. A high level of conflict tends to promote the tendency of decision-makers to view the other side’s actions with great concern.

# Relations Good – Syria

**Sour US-Russian relations embolden Syria**

**Ghattas 2008**- Sam F. Ghattas. “Syria takes advantage of Russia-U.S. tensions; Iran may be next” Associated Press. Aug 26, 2008. http://www.startribune.com/templates/Print\_This\_Story?sid=27439334

Syria's President Bashar Assad has publicly stepped up his outreach to old ally Russia in recent days, seeking aid to build up Syrian military forces and offering Moscow help in return — in an apparent effort to exploit a new Russian-American rift. U.S. officials have noticed: Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice warned Mideast leaders this week that they should worry about Syria's efforts to gain more sophisticated weapons. Syria's long-term aim, however, remains unclear, in part because Assad also continues to pursue peace efforts with Israel — a key U.S. and European goal — even as he makes overtures to Russia that are sure to antagonize the West. Syria has a long history of apparently contradictory diplomatic moves as it maneuvers to find options and balance its interests Yet the latest Syrian moves feed directly into larger Western fears that the Russian-American standoff — prompted by Russia's invasion of Georgia — could lead Russia to provide more military and diplomatic aid to a host of countries and militant groups the United States sees as troublesome. "The Russian move into Georgia has begun a tectonic shift in the (Mideast) region," said Joshua Landis, a Syria expert in the United States. "It has emboldened Syria, Hezbollah and Iran to push harder against Israel and the U.S."

**This opportunity translates into Syrian Iskander Missiles, evoking aggression and making war inevitable with Israel**

 **Kass 05**- Lee; Analyst in the research and analysis division of Science Applications International Corporation; “Syria after Lebanon: The Growing Syrian Missile Threat” Middle East Quarterly. Fall 2005. http://www.meforum.org/article/755

The Syrian regime's efforts to upgrade its missile capability threaten U.S., Israeli, and Turkish interests. With a stronger Syrian missile capability, the Assad regime could launch either a preemptive strike or, more likely, feel itself secure enough in its deterrent capability to encourage terrorism without fear of consequence. Syrian officials have sought to obtain the advanced SS-X-26 surface-to-surface missiles, also known as Iskander-Es, from Russia, but Russian president Vladimir Putin cancelled the deal after learning from his experts that Israel would not have a capability to intercept the missiles.[3] With a range of 174 miles (280 kilometers), the Iskander-E could have hit cities such as Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and Haifa. While a significant threat due to the proximity of Israeli population centers, the missiles fall under the 186 mile (300 kilometer) range subject to the Missile Technology Control Regime to which Russia, the United States, and thirty-two other countries are subject. It is unclear from unclassified sources whether countries that obtain Iskander-Es can extend the missiles' range, but if so, they would pose an enhanced threat to Turkey, Jordan, and Iraq as well.[4] Regardless, the chance that the Syrian government might provide the missile to terrorists or other rogue states undermines both the spirit and the effectiveness of the Missile Technology Control Regime and other nonproliferation agreements.The Iskander-E would be a particularly dangerous upgrade. Unlike Scuds, Iskander-Es have solid fuel propellants. Solid propellants are less complicated because the fuel and oxidizer do not need to travel through a labyrinth of pumps, pipes, valves, and turbo-pumps to ignite the engines. Instead, when a solid propellant is lit, it burns from the center outward, significantly reducing launch preparation time. Immediately after launch, Iskander-Es perform maneuvers that prevent opponents from tracking and destroying the launchers. Once in flight, the Iskander-Es can deploy decoys and execute unpredictable flight paths to confuse missile defense systems.[5] Moreover, they are fast. According to Uzi Rubin, former head of Israel's Arrow-Homa missile defense program, the Iskander can fly at 1,500 meters per second, equivalent to 3,355 miles (5,370 kilometers) per hour.[6] Launched from Damascus, the Iskander-E could reach Tel Aviv in less than three minutes, sooner if the Iskanders' mobile launchers were moved closer to the border. This capability might prevent Israel's multi-tiered missile defense shield from adequately protecting the country.Even though Iskander-Es lack the range to hit many strategic targets, their accuracy and varied warhead types make them an adaptable military system. The missile was intended to obliterate both stationary and mobile targets, particularly short-range missile launchers, ports, command and control facilities, factories, and hardened structures. Such flexibility would allow Syria to destroy an enemy's existing military capabilities and its ability to wage a future war

**Syrian missile strike snowballs to nuclear Armageddon**

**Strategic Analysis 2K** [Sharad Joshi. “Israel’s Nuclear Policy: A Cost-Benefit Analysis” Strategic Analysis: A Monthly Journal of the IDSA March 2000 (Vol. XXIII No. 12) http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/sa/sa\_00jos01.html

The Syrian chemical arsenal should be considered, to a certain extent, as being a direct response to Israeli nuclear power, though it has other WMD arsenals to fear, such as Iraq’s. In Syrian strategic thinking, chemical weapons are designed to offset Israel’s conventional superiority in the event of war. A major Israeli concern is—a massive Syrian surprise attack with conventional forces on the Golan Heights. Syria possesses missiles such as the Scud-C (range 500 km) and the Scud-B (range 280 km) and also chemical arsenals for them like the powerful nerve agent VX. 16 These missiles armed with chemical warheads could strike airfields and mobilisation points, incapacitating these areas. With Israel denied air superiority, Syria could retake the Golan Heights. A simultaneous Palestinian uprising in the West Bank and the Gaza strip alongwith other Arab states attacking would make the situation particularly grave. Such a scenario would be ripe for a nuclear Armageddon.

# Relations Good – Laundry List

 **U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS ARE KEY TO SOLVE DISEASE, TERRORISM, AIDS, PROLIF, AND ENVIRONMENTAL COLLAPSE**

**HAASS 2** (Richard, US State Department, Federal Information and News Dispatch, State Department)

Given today's international landscape, it is clearly in the interest of both the United States and Russia that Russia be fully integrated into this post-post-Cold War world. Russia can be a critical partner in building security and stability in the regions it borders -- Europe, Central Asia, and the Far East. After half a century in which we viewed the Soviet Union as the primary threat to stability in these regions, we can now work with a democratizing Russia to help integrate these areas more fully into the global system. Russia is also a necessary partner in addressing today's many transnational and global challenges. As a permanent member of the Security Council and a nation with broad international reach, Russia must be part of the solution to such threats as terrorism, proliferation, HIV/AIDS, and environmental degradation. Finally, there is a high opportunity cost -- in two ways -- if the United States, Russia, and Europe fail to seize the moment to integrate Russia into Western and international norms and institutions. On one hand is the risk of forfeiting the contribution a prosperous, democratic, self-confident Russia could make to global prosperity, particularly in energy, aeronautics, and other high-tech fields. On the other, a failed or isolated Russia would represent yet another source of transnational threats -- from loose nukes and other weapons of mass destruction, to large migration flows into Central and Western Europe, to drugs and disease.

 **U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS SOLVE WORLD STABILITY, NUCLEAR WAR, NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL TERRORISM**

**SIMES 3** (DMITRI, PRESIDENT OF THE NIXON CENTER, FDCH POLITICAL TESTIMONY, 9-30)

The proper starting point in thinking about American national interests and Russia--or any other country--is the candid question: why does Russia matter? How can Russia affect vital American interests and how much should the United States care about Russia? Where does it rank in the hierarchy of American national interests? As the Report of the Commission on American National Interests (2000) concluded, Russia ranks among the few countries whose actions powerfully affect American vital interests. Why? First, Russia is a very large country linking several strategically important regions. By virtue of its size and location, Russia is a key player in Europe as well as the Middle East and Central, South and East Asia. Accordingly, Moscow can substantially contribute to, or detract from, U.S. efforts to deal with such urgent challenges as North Korea and Iran, as well as important longer term problems like Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition, Russia shares the world's longest land border with China, an emerging great power that can have a major impact on both U.S. and Russian interests. The bottom line is that notwithstanding its significant loss of power after the end of the Cold War, Moscow's geopolitical weight still exceeds that of London or Paris. Second, as a result of its Soviet legacy, Russia has relationships with and information about countries that remain comparatively inaccessible to the American government, in the Middle East, Central Asia and elsewhere. Russian intelligence and/or leverage in these areas could significantly aid the United States in its efforts to deal with current, emerging and still unforeseen strategic challenges, including in the war on terrorism. Third, today and for the foreseeable future Russia's nuclear arsenal will be capable of inflicting vast damage on the United States. Fortunately, the likelihood of such scenarios has declined dramatically since the Cold War. But today and as far as any eye can see the U.S. will have an enduring vital interest in these weapons not being used against America or our allies. Fourth, reliable Russian stewardship and control of the largest arsenal of nuclear warheads and stockpile of nuclear materials from which nuclear weapons could be made is essential in combating the threat of "loose nukes." The United States has a vital interest in effective Russian programs to prevent weapons being stolen by criminals, sold to terrorists and used to kill Americans. Fifth, Russian stockpiles, technologies and knowledge for creating biological and chemical weapons make cooperation with Moscow very important to U.S. efforts to prevent proliferation of these weapons. Working with Russia may similarly help to prevent states hostile to the United States from obtaining sophisticated conventional weapons systems, such as missiles and submarines. Sixth, as the world's largest producer and exporter of hydrocarbons (oil and gas), Russia offers America an opportunity to diversify and increase supplies of non-OPEC, non-Mid-Eastern energy.

# AT: Alt Causes to Relations

Consultation through NATO-Russia key to overcoming alt causes to low relations

Kharlamov 10, Ilyana, Staff Writer for the Voice of Russia, An English Translated Russian Newspaper, [Russia and NATO “sworn” Partners, http://english.ruvr.ru/2010/05/20/8175970.html]

As he spoke at an Atlantic Council seminar in Washington, Admiral Stavridis pointed out that some NATO countries view Russia as a potential threat. However, NATO’s number one member, the United States, is set on cementing partnership with Russia in all areas, including the joint struggle against international terrorism and Afghan drug trafficking. Naval crews in the Gulf of Aden have demonstrated that Russian-US cooperation can be a success. Even though the Gulf of Aden countries have still to come to agreement on the joint command of this piracy-infested area, cooperation between Russian and NATO naval ships have produced good effect. As for countries hostile towards Russia in the NATO, these must be the Baltic countries, which are new to NATO and made no secret of their hostility at the last session of the Russia-NATO Council, where they attempted to set restrictions on defense cooperation. Though these countries’ weight in the alliance is negligibly small in view of the potential of their armed forces, they can block important decisions. For this reason, Russia and NATO have to supply them with extra guarantees that Moscow nurtures no evil intentions towards them. As NATO is busy working out a strategic concept, intensive consultations are underway on all issues of the political agenda. Commenting on that is the head of the European security department at the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences Dmitry Danilov. Relations with Russia are top on the agenda, he says, and were central on the agendas of all NATO meetings of late, including the summits in Strasbourg and Tallinn. NATO countries do differ on relations with Russia. In all likelihood, NATO countries will stick to the policy of maintaining a strong defense, including on their eastern borders, but will keep the so-called pragmatic partnership with Russia in areas of mutual concern.  Russia and NATO may cooperate in building a common European missile defense shield. President Medvedev has signaled Russia’s readiness to set up a continental anti-missile shield but has received no concrete proposals to that effect from NATO yet. That means Moscow will not be invited to join a new European defense system, a decision on which is to be passed by a NATO summit in November. This is the most likely scenario, given the US attempts to deploy its own missile defense system in Eastern Europe under the pretext of a nuclear threat from Iran. About joint measures against drug trafficking from Afghanistan, no one doubts the importance of them. Despite NATO’s presence, drug production has increased manifold in Afghanistan. What is worrying is the hidden campaign by western partners in favor of a Russian military presence in Afghanistan. But present-day Russia wants no repetition of the past and is strongly against being dragged in a second Afghan campaign.

# AT: No Impact – Russia is weak

 **RUSSIAN WEAKNESS DOESN’T MATTER—COOPERATION IS STILL USEFUL IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS - THIS IS ESPECIALLY TRUE FOR MILITARY PRESENCE**

**WALLANDER AND RUMER 3** (Eugene B. Rumer and Celeste A. Wallander- Eugene B. Rumer is a senior fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University (NDU). Celeste A. Wallander is director of the Russia and Eurasia Program and the Trustee Fellow at CSIS, Washington Quarterly, Winter)

Russia retains a great deal of influence in the international arena by virtue of its institutional memberships. As the United States continues to wage the war on terrorism in many theaters and fora, a constructive Russian stance on issues ranging from the U.S. military presence in Central Asia to Security Council deliberations about Iraq is far more preferable to obstructionism. To that end, Russia can prove a useful diplomatic partner even if Russian consent is no longer necessary for a country, particularly the United States, to achieve its objectives, whatever they may be, and even if Russia's status as a global power continues to decline.

 **RUSSIA IS INFLUENTIAL THROUGHOUT EURASIA—RUSSIAN COOPERATION SOLVES THE CASE AND RUSSIAN OPPOSITION TURNS IT**

**WALLANDER AND RUMER 3 (**Eugene B. Rumer and Celeste A. Wallander- Eugene B. Rumer is a senior fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University (NDU). Celeste A. Wallander is director of the Russia and Eurasia Program and the Trustee Fellow at CSIS, Washington Quarterly, Winter)

Russia's geopolitical presence gives it influence throughout Eurasia and importance in U.S. policy in the region. Russia can be influential by working with the United States on policy initiatives, such as herding North Korea into six-party talks or eliminating the Taliban in Afghanistan. At the same time, Russia can be influential insofar as its support for countries can undercut U.S. policies, such as Russian sales of nuclear technology and conventional military arms to Iran. The "Russia card" can give some leaders in Eurasia political and diplomatic options that make them less susceptible to U.S. influence, as is the case with Ukraine's Leonid Kuchma, Belarus's Aleksandr Lukashenka, and Turkmenistan's Saparmurat Niyazov. n5 In sum, even if Russia does not have usable military power to bring to bear as a source of influence, geopolitics has provided Russia a diplomatic presence in Eurasia that others, including the United States, need to take into account.

Finally, Russia's institutional memberships enhance its government's weight in international affairs. Russia remains the only country that negotiates and signs nuclear strategic arms control treaties with the United States. Similarly, Russia's views on European security are advanced by virtue of its importance for maintaining and possibly adapting the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, which establishes strict limits on its signatories' conventional arsenals and their deployment. Russia is present at the table of the world's major powers whenever G-8 ministers and heads of state gather. Russian participation in the G-8 informal club of leading industrialized nations -- a modern-day version of the nineteenth-century European concert of great powers -- gives it further political clout and prestige in the international community at large, as well as in the post-Soviet space where it alone has achieved full G-8 membership. Most importantly, Russia remains one of five permanent members of the UN Security Council, the handful of UN members capable of single-handedly preventing Security Council decisions and whose support and approval must be secured to pass resolutions.

**Additionally, Russian opposition tanks heg**

**SIMES 3** (DMITRI, PRESIDENT OF THE NIXON CENTER, FDCH POLITICAL TESTIMONY, 9-30)

Seventh, as a veto-wielding permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, Russia can substantially ease, or complicate, American attempts to work through the UN and other international institutions to advance other vital and extremely important U.S. interests. In a world in which many are already concerned about the use of U.S. power, this can have a real impact on America's success at providing global leadership. More broadly, a close U.S.-Russian relationship can limit other states' behavior by effectively eliminating Moscow as a potential source of political support.

# AT: Any Cooperation Bad Turn

 **THE IMPACT TURNS ARE NO LONGER TRUE—RUSSIAN POLICY HAS SHIFTED TOWARD GENUINE COOPERATION**

**U.S.-RUSSIA BUSINESS COUNCIL**, 20**02**

(January, <http://www.usrbc.org/Members-Only/Transcripts%20and%20Summaries/2002/vershbow%20jan.htm>)

On the political side, the most dramatic news is that nothing dramatic happened last year. President Putin’s team, though mostly comprised of his colleagues from St. Petersburg or the KGB, is competent and non-ideological. A robust civil society is taking root. For this the United States can take some credit — over the past 10 years the U.S. has helped to foster the establishment of NGOs and the training of entrepreneurs and civil activists under the auspices of the Freedom Support Act and other programs.

Although nothing dramatic happened politically in Russia in the past year, there has been a serious change in foreign policy. Since September 11th, Russia has firmly aligned with the West. President Putin had probably made the decision by the beginning of last year that this was best for Russia’s future. Collaborating with rogue states, and trying to play Europe off against the U.S. would not secure Russia’s place on the global political and economic stage. To further this collaboration with the West, President Putin has supported the coalition in the war against terrorism by facilitating the use of military bases and sharing intelligence. He also avoided precipitating a crisis over the ABM Treaty disagreement, and he has shifted Russia’s goals regarding NATO from blocking its expansion to cooperating with it.

# AT: START/High Relations Solves

**Continued cooperation is key**

**Burns** -2010 Under Secretary for Political Affairs Center for American Progress **4/14**

(William J. Burns, April 14, 2010, “The United States and Russia in a New Era: One Year After "Reset"”, http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2010/140179.htm, KW)

 Alongside the concrete accomplishments of the past year, the atmospherics of bilateral relations are improving. Pollsters report that over 50% of Russians now have a positive view of the United States, compared to around 30% at the end of 2008. But we will not sustain that progress unless we build on the foundation which has been laid, and widen the arc of cooperation. We need a relationship that is about more than New START and nuclear security, important as those issues are. We need a relationship that connects us more actively and intimately on the other great challenges before us in the 21st century, from economic modernization to climate change and energy security. And we need a relationship that connects our societies, and especially our young people, in ways that can help shape a more hopeful future for both of us.

# AT: Cohen Is A Hack

**Cohen is among the leading experts on Russia**

**BARANOV 2** (Andrei, Komsomolskaya Pravda, Feb 28, http://www.wps.ru/chitalka/terror/en/archives.php3?d=28&m=2&y=2002)

Professor of the New York University Stephen Cohen is among the leading experts on Russia in the United States. His recent book Failed Crusade: America and the Tragedy of Post-Communist Russia, relating about the chances to establish stable partnership with Moscow Washington missed in the 1990's, aroused heated debate among the political consultants.

\*\*\*HEG NET BENEFIT

# Consulting Russia Solves Heg

**Consulting Russia preserves American hegemony**

**HOPF 01** (Ted, Department of Political Science, Ohio State University—March, http://www.cdi.org/russia/152.html##10)

While American unipolarity has made the world a less attractive place for many states, Russia included, we should not exaggerate: the United States does not even imagine directly infringing on Russian territorial integrity or sovereignty, as it is conventionally understood. But that does not imply that Russia should welcome the continuation of US hegemony. The good news is that US unipolarity is a declining asset. Because of its fetish for unilateral and absolute security, America (seemingly congenitally) rejects any broadening of its hegemonic management to include true multilateral co-determination--whether with Europe, Japan, China, or Russia--of the international security environment. But this kind of unilateralism, while temporarily perhaps meeting Americans' cultural need for absolutism in foreign affairs, conceals the fact that US authority is slowly and surely being eroded by these actions. In fact, it could be argued that we are witnessing a race between the gradual disappearance of America's unipolar moment through: 1) its growing loss of authority among other states in the world, including its NATO allies and Japan, not to mention Russia, India, China, Iran, et. al.; and 2) America's provocation of another power, say China or Russia, to confront it. In other words, US actions may create a self-fulfilling prophesy (a world that looks a lot like the Cold War it seems to have never ended prosecuting). Or, the US might wake up to the fact that it dominates the globe, and realize that sharing hegemonic management of the globe with others, including Russia, will preserve that position of dominance far longer than will its unilateral assertion. Moreover, the promised gains of such a long-term arrangement are vastly greater than the meager rewards from getting a pipeline to pass through Turkey rather than Russia.

**Global nuclear war**

Khalilzad – 95 (Zalmay, RAND Corporation, The Washington Quarterly, Spring 1995)

On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.

\*\*\*CONSULTATION UNIQUENESS

# No Consultation Now

**No consultation now**

**Marukushin,** Vadim, Consultant with BBC Monitoring of Former Soviet Union, **2009**

(BBC, Jan. 30, 2009, “Defence Ministry paper optimistic about Russia-US relations”, Lexis, KW)

 John Beyrle, U. S. Ambassador to the Russian Federation, emphasized this theme, in the spirit of "diplomatic caution", in a direct nighttime television broadcast. Talking with Vladimir Pozner [REFERENCE here is to the president of the Russian Television Academy, who interviewed Beyrle on ABC's Nightline], this high-ranking diplomat called attention, in particular, to the fact the past tradition of consultations on important issues has practically been lost. The ambassador emphasized: "I can say with confidence that we will look for an opportunity to resume the mechanisms of consultations, which we have given up in recent times." He included the sphere of arms control in the list of priority themes for American-Russian dialogue. And here, according to Beyrle, it will be necessary to work out a new treaty for strategic arms control [that is, the U. S. and Russia will have to work out a new treaty to replace the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty-1 [START-1], which expires at the end of 2009].

\*\*\*SAY YEAAAHHH

# NRC Says Yes

**Consultation through the NRC means Russia says yes**

**Smith**, Senior Lecturer in Defence and International Affairs at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, UK, 20**06**

(Martin A., Russia and NATO since 1991 From Cold War through cold peace to partnership?, 2006, Routledge, p102-103)

Senior Russian political leaders were careful, in late 2002 and early 2003, not to be seen to be closing off any options completely and, thus, definitively antagonising the United States. In February 2003, President Putin indicated publicly that Russia might ultimately support military action against the Saddam regime, if it did not improve the nature and extent of its compliance with Resolution 1441.61 Foreign Minister Ivanov, meanwhile, declared that his government would use ‘all available political and diplomatic means to avoid a situation in which it would be necessary to exercise our veto power’ in the UN Security Council.62 This stood in stark contrast to Ivanov’s bullish stance during the corresponding phase of the Kosovo crisis in 1998–9. Then, as noted in Chapter 4, he had consistently and unswervingly threatened to use Russia’s veto to kill any attempt to secure UN authorisation of military action against the Serbs. Would the Putin government, in the event, have actually been prepared to veto military action over Iraq? The issue was not, of course, put to a vote at the UN. What is clear is that, whether by accident or design, the Russian government avoided taking most of the blame for the failure of American and British attempts to obtain a follow-up UN resolution, explicitly authorising the use of force. Condoleezza Rice, then the US National Security Adviser, allegedly encapsulated post-war US policy as being to ‘punish France, ignore Germany and forgive Russia’. Whether this particular phrase was apocryphal or not, it was chiefly the Chirac government in France that was demonised as the main obstruction by the Bush administration and its supporters. The official Russian stance during the actual conflict in Iraq in March and April 2003 was essentially one of passive neutrality. It has been argued that this was the approach which, being realistic, the US would have wished the Russians to take.63 In its efforts to ‘forgive Russia’, the Bush administration made a point of demonstrating continued diplomatic friendship and co-operation in the immediate aftermath of the conflict, in stark contrast to its short-term attitude towards the French.64 At a press conference following a ministerial meeting of the NATO– Russia Council in May 2003, Lord Robertson argued that the council could take some of the credit for ensuring that a rupture in relations had been avoided: I think that the existence of the NATO–Russia Council has prevented differences over Iraq from becoming a crisis, like the NATO–Russia relationship suffered during Kosovo in 1999. It has brought about a new maturity. It has created a new equality and a new respect for each other, so that we are now capable of disagreeing without falling out, of having different opinions without walking out of the room . . . the NATO nations and Russia . . . have established a working relationship of such durability that it can survive and move on from even passionately held differences of opinion.65 A sense of perspective should be retained here. The NRC had *not* provided a forum within which NATO members and the Russian government had tried to resolve differences over Iraq. It could not have done so, for the simple reason that NATO members themselves were fundamentally divided, with France and the FRG in the vanguard of those opposed to military action. Nevertheless, the NATO Secretary-General was justified in his upbeat assessment. The Russians were far more constructive and engaged in 2002 and 2003 than they had been in 1998 and 1999. Why was this? One possible answer was suggested by Alexander Vershbow, the US Ambassador to Russia, in January 2003. Vershbow argued that Russian co-operation in the NRC was being ‘facilitated by their perception that NATO is evolving in its orientation to deal with the very same threats that Russia is worried about – terrorism, WMD proliferation, and that’s making it easier for them to see NATO in a more positive light’.66 Just as it could be argued that western attitudes to Russia had become more genuinely open and amenable to its participation in NATO’s counsels after September 11, so it was being suggested here that the Russian government, for its part, was demonstrating a new flexibility and willingness to co-operate. The two were closely related. The Putin government seemed satisfied that NATO’s declared intention to make the NRC more practically focused and more genuinely inclusive of Russia was being followed through. In the autumn of 2002, Igor Ivanov was quoted as saying that activities in the NRC ‘have shown that this is not simply yet another mechanism, but something that works constructively for everyone. We don’t hold empty discussions, but talk about what can be most effective’.67 Alexander Grushko, Deputy Director of the European Co-operation Department at the Russian Foreign Ministry, echoed his boss. In summarising the ongoing programmes that had been developing in the council by late 2002, Grushko concluded that ‘in a word, the Twenty is really working’.68 Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov, widely regarded as being particularly close to Putin, told the press after the May 2003 NRC ministerial meeting that ‘as regard to my assessment of this year of work at 20, I can say that we have already reached the practical, tangible result and there is less and less theory and more and more practice’.69

# Russia Says Yes

**Rising economic prosperity has given Russia the courage to resist America in the international arena – they say yes**

**Mufson 07,** Washington Post Staff Writer, 07

(Steven Mufson, “Oil Price Rise Causes Global Shift in Wealth; Iran, Russia and Venezuela Feel the Benefits”, 11/10/07, The Washington Post, pg. A01, Lexis)

Russia, the world's No. 2 oil exporter, shows oil's transformational impact in the political as well as the economic realm. When Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000, less than two years after the collapse of the ruble and Russia's default on its international debt, the country's policymakers worried that 2003 could bring another financial crisis. The country's foreign-debt repayments were scheduled to peak at $17 billion that year. Inside the Kremlin, with Putin nearing the end of his second and final term as president, that sum now looks like peanuts. Russia's gold and foreign-currency reserves have risen by more than that amount just since July. The soaring price of oil has helped Russia increase the federal budget tenfold since 1999 while paying off its foreign debt and building the third-largest gold and hard-currency reserves in the world, about $425 billion. "The government is much stronger, much more self-assured and self-confident," said Vladimir Milov, head of the Institute of Energy Policy in Moscow and a former deputy minister of energy. "It believes it can cope with any economic crisis at home." With good reason. Using energy revenue, the government has built up a $150 billion rainy-day account called the Stabilization Fund. "This financial independence has contributed to more assertive actions by Russia in the international arena," Milov said. "There is a strong drive within part of the elite to show that we are off our knees." The result: Russia is trying to reclaim former Soviet republics as part of its sphere of influence. Freed of the need to curry favor with foreign oil companies and Western bankers, **Russia can resist what it views as American expansionism**, particularly regarding NATO enlargement and U.S. missile defense in Eastern Europe, and forge an independent approach to contentious issues like Iran's nuclear program. The abundance of petrodollars has also led to a consumer boom evident in the sprawling malls, 24-hour hyper-markets, new apartment and office buildings, and foreign cars that have become commonplace not just in Moscow and St. Petersburg but in provincial cities. Average income has doubled under Putin, and the number of people living below the poverty line has been cut in half.

**Russia says yes- it is accommodating us foreign policy out of self-interest**

**Yuan, 02**

(Jing-dong Yuan, Director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program, as well as a senior consultant to the CNS Education Program and an Associate Professor of International Policy Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, 11/30/02, “A promising partnership is tested; Russia and China”, International Herald Tribune, Lexis)

Since Putin came to office almost three years ago, Russia has changed its foreign policy, in particular its relationship with the United States, to reflect a realistic assessment of Russia's national interests, among them the need to reform and modernize its economy while limiting defense spending. As a result, Moscow has appeared to accommodate the often unilateralist foreign policy of the Bush administration, most recently its threat to use force unless Iraq disarms. Putin's government has accepted U.S. abrogation of the ABM Treaty, its development of missile defenses, the expansion of NATO and the emerging American military doctrine of preemption -- developments that Russia not long ago opposed. A centerpiece of the Chinese-Russian entente -- the regional arrangement linking China, Russia and a group of Central Asian states known as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization -- is under strain. Russia's decision to move closer to the United States after the Sept. 11 attacks was critical in prompting some Central Asian members of the organization to allow American forces to be stationed on their territory. Such developments worry China. But neither Moscow nor Beijing is willing to risk confronting Washington and sacrificing their core interests. Russia's new strategic relationship with America gives it continued geostrategic relevance while protecting Russia's economic revival and internal stability. China has equally high stakes in maintaining a stable bilateral relationship with the United States so that it can focus on economic growth and deal with the Taiwan issue.

# Russia Says Yes

**Russia agrees to almost anything the US says**

**Hillman 01,** reports on the White House and national politics for The Dallas Morning News, 01

(G. Robert, 11/13/01, “Bush, Putin hopeful about wide-ranging discussions White House talks to focus on post-Cold War relations, nuclear arms, terrorism”, Dallas Morning News, Lexis)

The new U.S.-Russian relationship that has been coalescing rapidly since the two leaders first met in Slovenia five months ago has taken on new urgency since the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. The United States has sought intelligence and logistical support - and just plain advice - from Russia for the war in Afghanistan. And the Russians have readily cooperated, even acquiescing as the United States negotiated air rights and military basing with former Soviet republics in Central Asia. "Putin regards [this] as an historic opportunity," said Clifford Gaddy, a senior fellow in foreign policy and economic studies at the Brookings Institution in Washington. "It's actually a sense of mission for Russia as a nation and for Putin personally. He believes that he is capable of playing the role of putting the world on a new track."

**Russia says yes – Cooperation with NATO**

**Forsberg 05,** director of the Finnish Institute of International Affairs in Helsinki

(Tuomas, “Russia's relationship with NATO: A qualitative change or old wine in new bottles?”, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Volume 21, Issue 3 September 2005, pg. 332-353, informaworld)

Nevertheless, the overlapping interests of leading NATO countries and Russia seem to be longstanding and real. NATO members may criticize Russia over its lack of democracy, violation of human rights norms or behaviour in specific international questions, but they will not regard Russia as a threat to them. Despite its persistent uneasiness with NATO's basic character as a military alliance, its continuing existence and enlargement, **Russia clearly prefers co-operation to confrontation.** The strong animosity of the past era has been buried and partnership prevails, but we may still experience a series of aftershocks of a slowly dying ghost of the Cold War. Sergei Ivanov's opinion piece written for the New York Times in April 2004 is a good example of these contradictory elements. He rhetorically asks 'why an organization that was designed to oppose the Soviet Union and its allies in Eastern Europe is still necessary in today's world', remains sceptical about NATO's ability to stabilize international conflicts, but ends up praising the current level of co-operation.77

# Russia Says Yes – Middle East

**Russia will say yes regardless of the plan - hates US military presence in the middle east**

**Cohen 97,** Senior Research Fellow, The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, Ph.D., 97

(Ariel Cohen, 3/16/1997, “A New Paradigm for U.S.-Russia Relations: Facing the Post-Cold War Reality”, The Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/1997/03/BG1105nbsp-A-New-Paradigm-for-US-Russia-Relations)

Russia is attempting to regain its influence in the Middle East, and apparently is more willing to denigrate the U.S. as a way to do this. In 1996 alone, Moscow sold Iran two nuclear reactors capable of generating enriched uranium and plutonium. Tehran also received a large number of Russian state-of-the art military systems, including battle tanks and three Kilo-class submarines capable of paralyzing oil shipments in the Gulf area. Foreign Minister Primakov and his Iranian counterpart, Ali Akbar Velayati, denounced U.S. troop deployments in the Persian Gulf as "undermining regional stability" and called for cooperation against the American presence in that vital area.20 Moscow has emerged as the leading defender of Iraq's Saddam Hussein, despite participating in the anti-Saddam coalition during the Gulf War. In addition to leading the charge at the United Nations to allow a food-for-oil deal for Baghdad, Russia is spearheading efforts to lift sanctions against Saddam Hussein's regime altogether.21 Iraq owes Russia over $7 billion for past weapons shipments and economic assistance, and Moscow hopes to recover this debt by enabling Iraq's oil to flow once again to the world market.

# Russia Says Yes – Nuclear Weapons Reductions

**Russia ALWAYS agrees to US nuclear weapon reductions, leading to further cooperation**

**Pifer 09**, Visiting Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 2/25/

(Stephen, “An Agenda for U.S.-Russian Relations in 2009”, Brookings, http://www.brookings.edu/testimony/2009/0225\_russia\_pifer.aspx)

President Obama should revive the bilateral nuclear arms reductions process. Doing so will have a positive impact on the broader relationship. Moscow values an ongoing nuclear arms dialogue with Washington, if for no other reason than it acknowledges Russia’s place as a nuclear superpower. The president should take advantage of this. President Reagan and Secretary of State Shultz made arms control a central element of a broader U.S.-Soviet agenda in the 1980s, recognizing that Moscow’s interest in arms control created diplomatic space to pursue other issues, including human rights. Their strategy worked. As President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev signed the treaty banning U.S. and Russian medium-range missiles and narrowed differences over strategic weapons, parallel discussions made progress on human rights issues, including winning exit permission for Soviet dissidents, and secured more helpful Soviet approaches to problems such as Angola and the Middle East peace process. Presidents George H. W. Bush and Clinton likewise gave arms control special attention. Arms control progress contributed to a positive relationship, with significant pay-offs for other U.S. foreign policy goals: Russia went along with German reunification; lent diplomatic support during the 1990-91 Gulf crisis; cooperated with the United States and NATO in ending the Bosnia conflict; and acquiesced in NATO enlargement. By contrast, the Bush administration saw little value to arms control after it withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and signed the SORT Treaty in 2002, preferring flexibility with regard to U.S. force structure to limitation and predictability. That came at a price: a weaker relationship and decreased leverage on other issues with Russia. Beyond giving a positive impulse to the bilateral relationship, arms control is in the U.S. interest. SORT allows each side to deploy 2200 strategic warheads. Such levels make no sense today. U.S. security would be enhanced by reducing the number of nuclear weapons capable of reaching America. Moreover, given its imposing conventional force capabilities, the United States has every incentive to deemphasize nuclear weapons.

# Russia Says Yes – Military Reductions

**Russia says yes- growing isolationism and hatred for US military anywhere near it**

**The Plain Dealer 08**, 6/7/08

(“The new Russian deepfreeze”, The Plain Dealer, Opinion, pg. B8, Lexis)

The president hopes to use the one-week trip, tied to a summit of the G-8 industrialized nations that starts June 6 in Germany, to shore up alliances with a Europe that's tilting America's way. By including the Czech Republic, Poland, Albania and Bulgaria in his itinerary, Bush signals intentions to press ahead with new military agreements close to Russia's borders despite Moscow's objections. The plans include basing missile interceptors in Poland and the Czech Republic. Russia's growing isolation was underscored at last month's European Union summit when other nations made clear their joint displeasure over Russia's repressions and more nationalistic approach to oilfield contracts. British-Russian relations already were in the deepfreeze over last fall's Cold War-style murder of dissident Alexander Litvinenko in London. Russian leader Vladimir Putin will meet privately with Bush during the G-8 summit, but their still-cordial personal feelings may be the extent of it. Putin signaled what's at stake in blunt interviews with Western reporters ahead of the summit, when he warned that Russian missiles would target Polish and Czech air bases if they host the U.S. interceptors. This, despite a trip to Russia by Defense Secretary Robert Gates last month, seeking to reassure Russian leaders about technical limitations of the still-under-development system, and offering to share radar sites. Instead, Russian reactions point to a new arms race in Europe. Russia already has frozen compliance with a 1990 treaty on conventional forces in Europe and recently tested a new generation of missiles in response to the U.S. interceptor program. It has also threatened to abrogate a landmark 1988 U.S.-Soviet treaty on medium-range missiles.

**Russia says yes to the plan- it sees reduction of US presence as a chance to reassert itself as a great power on the world stage**

**Trovato 07,** staff writer, 2/20/07

(Joe Trovato, “Russia revisits Cold War policy”, Badger Herald, University Wire, Lexis)

Putin defended these Russian arms sales to Iran, which is under pressure from the West to terminate its nuclear program, saying "We don't want Iran to feel cornered." This is mysterious, for Putin had long been committed to stopping the spread of nuclear weapons. This appears to be another power projection to show that Russia is once again a major power that the West - which has largely disregarded Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union - can no longer overlook when shaping its foreign policy. Russia and the United States are increasingly finding themselves on the opposite sides of policy all around the world. Whether it be in Iran, Iraq, Georgia, Lebanon or Kosovo, it almost seems that the two nations are back to playing a Cold War-like game of global chess. The New York Times reported that both countries were now "openly competing for influence in Europe, the Caucasus and in Central Asia." Russian concerns over NATO's courting of nations such as Ukraine and Georgia, historically part of the Russian spheres of influence, and the Bush administration's hope to build missile defense systems in Poland and the Czech Republic were also central to Putin's criticisms. The United States is of course concerned with the sale of arms to Iran and Syria and Russia's threat to withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, once such a symbol of the partnership between the two nations. According to The Washington Post, President Bush has continually tried to "prod (Putin) to recommit to democracy and better relations with his neighbors". It is clear that Putin's criticisms of the United States in the post-Cold War world are part of a Russian attempt to reassert itself as a global player that the West must deal with. While the United States is certainly not free of blame in the rocky relationship that has thus developed, Putin's attack is both unwarranted and unnerving. Sen. Joe Lieberman even said that Putin's address was mostly "Cold War rhetoric" and that his position on Iran was both "outrageous" and "provocative." Russia and the United States are obviously historical opposites, but this renewed tension is most likely the result of Russia's newfound power stemming from its energy resources, and its hope for retribution after a decade and a half of sole American supremacy in the post-Cold-War world.

# AT: Say No - NRC

**THE COUNTERPLAN SOLVES RELATIONS EVEN IF RUSSIA SAYS NO—AMERICAN COMPLIANCE WITH RUSSIA’S VETO IS THE BEST VALIDATION OF THE NRC**

**SAUNDERS** **02**, MAY 26 2002 (Paul, Director of The Nixon Center, San Diego Union-Tribune)

The new NATO-Russia Council was designed to give Russia a greater role in some alliance deliberations by using the "NATO at Twenty" formula, which involves Moscow in NATO discussions of terrorism, non-proliferation, and other issues before NATO members have reached a common position. Russia is therefore, in theory, an equal participant in the meetings. In practice, there will be two important tests that apply to both NATO-Russian and U.S.-Russian relations. One was explained well by a senior Kremlin official who met with a Nixon Center delegation in Moscow last month: he said, "will the United States not do something because we object?" Of course, the only American answer can be, "it depends." But this Russian question, the eventual U.S. answer in deeds, and the Russian response to that answer, could define much of the meaning of the NATO-Russia Council and the U.S.-Russian relationship.

**Even if Russia says no, the act of consultation through the NRC is enough to ensure good relations**

**Smith**, Senior Lecturer in Defence and International Affairs at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, UK, 20**06**

(Martin A., Russia and NATO since 1991 From Cold War through cold peace to partnership?, 2006, Routledge, p102-103)

At a press conference following a ministerial meeting of the NATO– Russia Council in May 2003, Lord Robertson argued that the council could take some of the credit for ensuring that a rupture in relations had been avoided: I think that the existence of the NATO–Russia Council has prevented differences over Iraq from becoming a crisis, like the NATO–Russia relationship suffered during Kosovo in 1999. It has brought about a new maturity. It has created a new equality and a new respect for each other, so that we are now capable of disagreeing without falling out, of having different opinions without walking out of the room . . . the NATO nations and Russia . . . have established a working relationship of such durability that it can survive and move on from even passionately held differences of opinion.65 A sense of perspective should be retained here. The NRC had *not* provided a forum within which NATO members and the Russian government had tried to resolve differences over Iraq. It could not have done so, for the simple reason that NATO members themselves were fundamentally divided, with France and the FRG in the vanguard of those opposed to military action. Nevertheless, the NATO Secretary-General was justified in his upbeat assessment. The Russians were far more constructive and engaged in 2002 and 2003 than they had been in 1998 and 1999. Why was this? One possible answer was suggested by Alexander Vershbow, the US Ambassador to Russia, in January 2003. Vershbow argued that Russian co-operation in the NRC was being ‘facilitated by their perception that NATO is evolving in its orientation to deal with the very same threats that Russia is worried about – terrorism, WMD proliferation, and that’s making it easier for them to see NATO in a more positive light’.66 Just as it could be argued that western attitudes to Russia had become more genuinely open and amenable to its participation in NATO’s counsels after September 11, so it was being suggested here that the Russian government, for its part, was demonstrating a new flexibility and willingness to co-operate. The two were closely related. The Putin government seemed satisfied that NATO’s declared intention to make the NRC more practically focused and more genuinely inclusive of Russia was being followed through. In the autumn of 2002, Igor Ivanov was quoted as saying that activities in the NRC ‘have shown that this is not simply yet another mechanism, but something that works constructively for everyone. We don’t hold empty discussions, but talk about what can be most effective’.67 Alexander Grushko, Deputy Director of the European Co-operation Department at the Russian Foreign Ministry, echoed his boss. In summarising the ongoing programmes that had been developing in the council by late 2002, Grushko concluded that ‘in a word, the Twenty is really working’.68 Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov, widely regarded as being particularly close to Putin, told the press after the May 2003 NRC ministerial meeting that ‘as regard to my assessment of this year of work at 20, I can say that we have already reached the practical, tangible result and there is less and less theory and more and more practice’.69

\*\*\*DEFERENCE

# No Deference

Consultation won’t trap the U.S into Deference

Jentleson 03 Director, Terry Stanford Institute of Public Policy and Professor of Public Policy 2003, Bruce W., Political Science Proffesor at Duke University, "Tough Love Multilateralism," WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, v. 27 n. 1, Winter 2003, p. 7+.)

Following this course means avoiding any reversion to the overly deferential approach that the Clinton administration initially took, such as with Secretary of State Warren Christopher's first trip to Europe in 1993 to consult with NATO allies on behalf of the new administration but which came across as a "what do you think we should do?" style of leadership. Nor does this approach mean buying into the penchant of France and others to seek to check U.S. power at every turn -- often knee-jerk reactions in their own right. U.S. leadership can be assertive without being arrogant and open to genuine consultation and give-and-take collaboration without shrinking into deference. The United States has plenty of power; the challenge is converting this power into influence.

\*\*\*LEAKS

# Leaks Frontline

1. The lie will come out—US can’t keep a secret.

Wilson and Dilulio 98, Professors of Political Science and UCLA and Princeton, James Q. Wilson and John J. [American Government: Institutions and Policies, p. 291]

American government is the leakiest in the world . The bureaucracy, members of Congress, and the White House staff regularly leak stories favorable to their interests. Of late the leaks have become geysers, gushing forth torrents of insider stories . Many people in and out of government find it depressing that our government seems unable to keep anything secret for long . Others think that the public has a right to know even more and that there are still too many secrets. However you view leaks, you should understand why we have so many. The answer is found in the Constitution. Because we have separate institutions that must share power, each branch of government competes with the others to get power. One way to compete is to try to use the press to advance your pet projects and to make the other side look bad . There are far fewer leaks in other democratic nations in party because power is centralized in the hands of a prime minister, who does not need to leak in order to get the upper hand over the legislature, and because the legislature has too little information to be a good source of leaks. In addition, we have no Official Secrets Act of the kind that exists in England; except for a few matters, it is not against the law for the press to receive and print government secrets.

1. This is particularly true of Obama—he’s been plagued by leaks from day one.

Thompson 08, Michael, staff writer for Associated Content, 11-5-. [Associated Content, The Obama Administation’s First Leak, http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/1182373/rahm\_emanuel\_the\_obama\_administrations\_pg2\_pg2.html?cat=9]

So how does candidate Obama's camp spring virtually no leaks during a 20-month campaign, but then unleash a gusher of a leak within hours of his acceptance speech? Does this portend to more things to come? Past presidents such as Clinton and Ronald Reagan went so far as to limit participation in their most crucial White House discussions, so distressed were they by endless leaks to the press. Biden infamously has said that a hostile foreign power likely will test Obama within six months. It seems that on the domestic front, Barack Obama already is being tested by leaks within 24 hours.

1. Leaks Imminent- it’s the Structure of the Government

Poreba 10, staff writer for Strategic Defense.net (*Intelligence, The American Way, http://www.strategicdefense.net/american-intel.html)*

Nothing has done more to shape the American intelligence system than the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution. These founding documents explain why America even practices intelligence (i.e., to protect the God-given rights of its people).(1) The checks and balances mandated by the U.S. Constitution, in particular, protect Americans from tyrannical government but also create unique challenges to the function of intelligence.(2) Below are several values and ideas derived from American political culture and their effects on the evolution of the American style of intelligence. Representation and Government Accountability: U.S. citizens are entitled by their constitution the right to elect representatives who serve the will of the people for a specified term. This political structure has at least two effects on American foreign and intelligence policy. Term limits, especially for the U.S. presidential administrations, make it exceedingly difficult for the American government to pursue long-term foreign and intelligence policies. However, term limits also allow U.S. citizens to reverse and remove, through their right to vote, failed policies and inadequate officials, respectfully. The opposite is true of monarchy, where long-term success of a nation weighs heavily on the competence and character of the royal family. Second, the United States intelligence community must compromise, through oversight, some of its secrets in order to maintain the public trust. Within the evolutionary timeline of the American intelligence system, this reality was manifested in the creation of the House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in the mid-1970s. (Other democracies, like Canada through its Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC), have put in place similar oversight practices). The intelligence community would argue that to maintain its existence, it must sacrifice some control of its budget, its tactics (e.g., covert action), and its operational priorities. Perhaps its greatest sacrifice, however, is the risk it takes by sharing its information with policymakers who may intentionally or mistakenly leak that information to the media. Information leaks can be devastating in terms of the loss of money, lives, and political advantage.(3)

# Leaks Frontline

1. **RUSSIA HAS A HUGE AND EFFECTIVE SPY NETWORK—THEY WILL DISCOVER LIES**

**Knickerbocker,** Brad, Staff Writer for the Christian Science Monitor, **2001** (The Spying Game, http://www.deseretnews.com/article/829030/The-spying-game.html)

With regard to Russia in particular, industrial espionage is likely to increase. So is the possibility that Russian spies could inadvertently (or on purpose) reveal U.S. counterterrorism methods to those who would do this country harm. At the same time, intelligence officials expect more efforts to acquire data on the U.S. arsenal so that Russia can improve its weaponry -- to bolster its own defenses, have better arms and equipment to export for the income it badly needs to improve its faltering economy, and improve its global influence. "Russian intelligence is not only spying against the U.S. and America's friends and allies now but is much more active and aggressive than it ever was during the hottest days of the Cold War," says Stanislav Lunev, a former colonel in Russia's military intelligence unit who defected to the United States in 1992. "Hundreds of these spies, who are pretending to be diplomats, experts, journalists and other 'legal' Russian representatives, are operating from Washington, New York, San Francisco, Seattle and other stations," Lunev wrote recently in his regular online column for NewsMax.com. Meanwhile, Tenet told the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence last month, the United States "must constantly push the envelope on 'intelligence data' collection beyond the traditional, to exploit new systems and operational opportunities to gain the intelligence needed by our senior policymakers." And, since the Russians know this, they no doubt will increase their own intelligence efforts and seek more moles like Robert Hanssen, the FBI agent alleged to have spied for Russia for 15 years.

# Leaks—General

Information that should be secret will be inadvertently revealed – classification problems

Banisar 07 ,Policy Fellow at the Open Society Institute and Visiting Research, 2007 (David Banisar,. Fellow at the Faculty of Law, University of Leeds, July 2007, “Government Secrecy: Decisions Without Democracy,” p. 16)

The lack of standards results in overuse of the designations and greater restrictions on information both for internal use and for public availability. A 2006 Government Accountability Office review found over fifty different categories of information designated as sensitive, ranging from Sensitive Homeland Security Information, Sensitive but Unclassified, Law Enforcement Sensitive, to For Official Use Only.41 The GAO found that, in different agencies, similar information was often being designated for control using different labels and procedures. It also found that few agencies provided adequate guidance, training or internal controls. The GAO concluded that “the lack of such recommended internal controls increases the risk that the designations will be misapplied. This could result in either unnecessarily restricting materials that could be shared or inadvertently releasing materials that should be restricted.” Within departments such as Justice, the GAO found numerous procedural problems due to lack of formal policies, inadequate training, and poor oversight. In the FBI, any employee or contractor could designate information as sensitive even though the FBI had no guide and did not provide adequate training.42 A 2006 review by the National Security Archive of 37 major agencies and components found little consistency across government agencies.43 Only eight of the agencies had legal authority to designate information as sensitive, while 24 were only following their own internal guidelines. Eleven had no policy at all. Nearly one-third of the policies allowed any employee to designate information as sensitive, but they did not set policies on how the markings could be removed, and only seven total set restrictions on how they can be designated. The review also found that policies set after 9/11 were “vague, open-ended or broadly applicable” compared with those before.

New Laws Mean Leaks Inevitable- Transparency

Banisar 07, Policy Fellow at the Open Society Institute and Visiting Research, (David Banisar,. Fellow at the Faculty of Law, University of Leeds, July 2007, “Government Secrecy: Decisions Without Democracy,” p. 12)

A campaign led by media organizations resulted finally in the 1966 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). For the past 40 years, this Act, subsequently amended several times to enhance openness and supplemented with other laws, has stood as the pinnacle of openness for the public. It has been supplemented by laws such as: the Government in the Sunshine Act to ensure that meetings of federal agencies headed by a collegial body, such as the Federal Communications Commission, are open to the public and minutes or transcripts are kept of the meetings; the Federal Advisory Committee Act which ensures that committees that advise the federal government are composed fairly and hold open meetings; and the Privacy Act, which allows individuals to obtain and correct their personal information in records held by federal bodies. As new technologies have made the provision more easily available and increased demand by citizens to know more, the trend toward more openness has continued. In 1993, Congress enacted a law to require that the Federal Register be published in electronic form. In 1996, the Congress adopted the Electronic Freedom of Information Act to extend the FOIA to electronic records and to provide for more use of electronic resources. More recently, efforts to improve electronic government have increased both access to information and increased participation.

**There are leaks, particularly when documentation is submitted to Congress**

**Broad 2009,** William J Broad, journalist, NYT, 6/2/2009, “U.S. Accidentally Releases List of Nuclear Sites,” http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/03/us/03nuke.html?\_r=1

The federal government mistakenly made public a 266-page report, its pages marked “highly confidential,” that gives detailed information about hundreds of the nation’s civilian nuclear sites and programs, including maps showing the precise locations of stockpiles of fuel for nuclear weapons. The publication of the document was revealed Monday in an online newsletter devoted to issues of federal secrecy. That set off a debate among nuclear experts about what dangers, if any, the disclosures posed. It also prompted a flurry of investigations in Washington into why the document had been made public. On Tuesday evening, after inquiries from The New York Times, the document was withdrawn from a Government Printing Office Web site. Several nuclear experts argued that any dangers from the disclosure were minimal, given that the general outlines of the most sensitive information were already known publicly. “**These screw-ups happen**,” said John M. Deutch, a former director of central intelligence and deputy secretary of defense who is now a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. “It’s going further than I would have gone but doesn’t look like a serious breach.” But David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security, a private group in Washington that tracks nuclear proliferation, said information that shows where nuclear fuels are stored “can provide thieves or terrorists inside information that can help them seize the material, which is why that kind of data is not given out.” The information, considered confidential but not classified, was assembled for transmission later this year to the International Atomic Energy Agency as part of a process by which the United States is opening itself up to stricter inspections in hopes that foreign countries, especially Iran and others believed to be clandestinely developing nuclear arms, will do likewise. President Obama sent the document to Congress on May 5 for Congressional review and possible revision, and the Government Printing Office subsequently posted the draft declaration on its Web site.

# Leaks—Nuclear Issues

New governmental openness makes leaks of nuclear policy likely

Vijayan 09Senior Editor covering information security and data privacy issues for Computerworld Jaikumar Vijayan is a S, 6/15/2009, “Open Government Could Lead to Data Leaks,” Lexis

Without new data classification and other governmentwide standards, the Obama administration's push to make information more accessible could lead to the **inadvertent exposure of sensitive data,** according to security experts. The warning comes in the wake of last month's accidental posting of a document on the U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO) Web site that listed all U.S. civilian nuclear sites along with descriptions of their assets and activities. The 267-page document was part of a federal government report being prepared for the United Nations ' International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The document had been categorized as "sensitive but unclassified" -- or SBU -- a government designation that usually includes at least some controls over disclosure. A large number of government documents fall under the SBU category. Meanwhile, President Barack Obama is looking to fulfill a campaign pledge by pushing federal agencies to make government data more easily accessible to the public. Earlier this month, federal CIO Vivek Kundra announced plans to quickly make more than 100,000 data sources available to the public on the government's Data.gov Web site. "The federal government is trying to push out more data, but they need to make sure . . . that [sensitive] data isn't pushed out to places where it shouldn't be," said John Pescatore, an analyst at Gartner Inc. "There still is such a thing as 'need to know.' " "Openness is a wonderful thing, so long as you have checks and balances to see that it doesn't become too open," said Ken Silva, chief technology officer at VeriSign Inc. and a former executive technical director at the U.S. National Security Agency . When data previously available from a few hundred government sources suddenly starts becoming available via thousands of Web sites -- including widely used social networks like Facebook and MySpace -- there need to be controls in place to protect against **inadvertent leaks,** Silva added. Karen Evans, formerly de facto CIO of the federal government as administrator of the Office of Electronic Government and Information Technology at the Office of Management and Budget , suggested that the sensitive data on U.S. nuclear sites was probably posted because the GPO had a different process for handling SBU documents than the IAEA. Evans noted that there is little consistency in the way the various federal agencies handle SBU data. Each has its own process for defining, labeling and protecting such information, she said. In fact, there are some 107 unique markings and more than 130 different handling processes and procedures for SBU information among U.S. government agencies, Evans added. Such differences are likely to cause **more unexpected problems** as agencies move to share more information among themselves and with the public.

# Leaks—NRC

The permutation is dead in the water – consultation guarantees leaks that cause an alliance backlash to the permutation even if they support the plan

Stanley Sloan 97, Senior Specialist in Security Policy with the Congressional Research Service, 7-25- [CSM])

In spite of tough times, European Union (EU) leaders would like to move ahead with deepening the Union through the formation of a European Monetary Union. They claim to support enlarging the EU to bring in new democracies from Eastern and Central Europe. But doing both in the next several years will be difficult at a time when economic margins are so slim and domestic political support notably fragile. The summit of EU leaders in Amsterdam last month clearly put European weaknesses on display. It's not easy being No. 1 Self-confident US behavior has rubbed many Europeans the wrong way. When the Clinton administration revealed its choice of three candidates - Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary - to participate in the first wave of NATO enlargement, many allies privately applauded. Even France, which is a strong proponent of including Romania and Slovenia, was not surprised that the United States and several other allies would only support a smaller group. But the fact that the United States appeared to have abandoned the process of NATO consultations in making its choice clear, and then said its decision was non-negotiable, troubled even our closest allies. It strengthened the hand of those in Europe who claim that the United States is acting like a "hegemonic" power, using its impressive position of strength to have its way with weaker European allies. One official of a pro-American northern European country that supports the package of three told me, "We liked the present but were troubled by the way it was wrapped." US officials say that they wanted to keep the issue within alliance consultations but that their position was being leaked to the press by other allies. They decided to put an end to "lobbying" for other outcomes. Their choice to go strong and to go public may be understandable and even defensible. However, the acknowledged leader of a coalition of democratic states probably needs to set the very best example in the consultative process if it wants other sovereign states to follow. Perhaps it is just hard being No. 1. US officials have noted that the United States is "damned if it does, and damned if it does not" provide strong leadership. Perhaps the style of the NATO decision simply reflects a Washington culture in which the bright and brash more often than not move ahead in the circles of power. But the style does not work well in an alliance of democracies. Whatever the explanation, US-European relations would have been better served by a US approach that allowed the outcome to emerge more naturally from the consultative, behind-the-scenes consensus-forming process. The final result would have been the same, and the appearance of a United States diktat to the allies would have been avoided.

# Leaks—Spies

**RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE IS EXTREMELY EFFECTIVE—SPIES WILL UNCOVER ANY AMERICAN SECRET**

**LUNEV 01** - COLONEL STANISLAV LUNEV, FORMER RUSSIAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, 2001 (http://newsmax.com/archives/articles/2001/2/20/154206.shtml, 2/20)

This morning the FBI announced the arrest of a veteran bureau agent on charges he has been spying for Russia. According to an FBI spokesman, 56-year-old Robert Philip Hanssen was assigned to FBI headquarters in Washington and had been a bureau agent for about 27 years. He was arrested shortly after FBI agents caught him depositing a package of classified information at a "dead drop" in a Northern Virginia park. According to FBI officials, Hanssen spent most of his career in counterintelligence, but for at least 15 years actually worked for Russian intelligence. They said Hanssen has done extreme damage to the security of the United States. While it’s a terrible thing to have a spy inside the very U.S. government agency charged with fighting against espionage in this country, it would be extremely difficult to say that it is unexpected. Russian intelligence is not only spying against the U.S. and America’s friends and allies now, but is much more active and aggressive than it ever was during the hottest days of the Cold War. We know how dangerous Chinese intelligence activity against the U.S. was under the Clinton-Gore administration. During the last eight years America has had a very strange relationship with Russia, based primarily on a massive money flow from the U.S., as well as on secret sweetheart deals between Washington and Moscow. But the mainstream press did not bother to inform Americans about the level of Russian intelligence penetration of U.S. governmental and private institutions. Very brief reports about this type of really dangerous hostile activity were not, until today, noticed by the American public, but its influence is many times greater than the alleged Chinese intelligence penetration. Red China’s intelligence machine has not been operating against the U.S. for as long a time as Russian intelligence has. In addition, up until now the Chinese have not had so much of the up-to-date technical and technological capabilities as Russian military and political intelligence agencies (the GRU and the SVR) have at their disposal. It is important to understand that around the clock, every day, about 100 Russian spy satellites are collecting all possible secret and classified information about the U.S., its troops and facilities worldwide. Russian intelligence experts are decoding and very carefully analyzing information from those space satellites and reporting the most important data to the government for its practical use. Space intelligence is working in close cooperation with air, naval and electronic intelligence and reconnaissance, whose mobile and ground-based stations are located around the perimeter of Russian territory and worldwide. This includes such well-known giant electronic spy stations as those in Cuba, Vietnam and other countries, and the so-called "scientific" and "merchant" ships, which are operating all around U.S. territory and monitoring American submarines and other warships at sea.

 **RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE AGENTS ARE WATCHING YOU—EVERY AMERICAN SECRET WILL BE DISCOVERED**

**Lunev 01** - COLONEL STANISLAV LUNEV, FORMER RUSSIAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, 2001 (http://newsmax.com/archives/articles/2001/2/20/154206.shtml, 2/20)

Hundreds of these spies, who are pretending to be diplomats, experts, journalists and other "legal" Russian representatives, are operating from Washington, New York, San Francisco, Seattle and other stations. In addition, the GRU and SVR are using thousands of people who come to the U.S. as members of numerous governmental, parliamentary, scientific, cultural and other delegations, businessmen, students, immigrants and others for intelligence purposes. They are well trained and prepared to carry out the main task of penetrating the very heart of U.S. secrecy. The curtains over this extremely sensitive area, and over the level of Russian intelligence penetration of the U.S. were recently slightly parted by former Russian President Boris Yeltsin. In his "Midnight Diaries" Yeltsin revealed that he was informed by Russian intelligence about the relations between Bill Clinton and Monika Lewinsky far in advance of when it became known to the U.S. Congress, national security authorities and – finally – to the public.

\*\*\*THEORY

# Consult CPs Good

1. **Consultation is key to education:**
	1. **Consultation CPs uniquely check the desirability of the process by which the plan is passed. No other CP provides the educational benefit of testing unilateral troop withdrawal versus other alternatives**
	2. **consultation forces them to defend the immediate enactment of the plan, which is key to core neg generics, allowing them to sever immediacy destroys politix, trade-off, and other main DA’s.**
2. **Literature checks abuse:**
	1. **There isn’t net benefit or consultation literature on every country, which sets a key limit on who can be consulted.**
	2. **We have specific literature saying that we should consult Russia about the plan, which proves it’s predictable.**
	3. **They have plenty of ground—unilateralism versus multilateralism is one of the most researched areas under every resolution.**
3. **Consultation increases education—you learn more about international political systems and relations between countries.**
4. **Probabilistic solvency increases aff ground – the counterplan guarantees a delay and potential non-adoption. All they have to do is win one argument and the entire CP goes away.**
5. **Consult Counterplans are key to fairness**
	1. **They maintain negative flexibility by hedging against unpredictable 2ac add-ons**

* 1. **They’re key to beat small affirmatives that don’t link to anything – especially problematic on this topic because of the diversity of small roles or missions affs**
1. **Net benefits check abuse:**
	1. **The aff always has the option of straight turning the NB and not even dealing with the solvency of the CP. Proves we don’t link to any of their “steals aff” offense**
	2. **The research burden is inevitable- reading the counterplan as a disad still would’ve forced the research burden without gaining the additional topic based education based on unilateral withdraw vs multilateral**
2. **Best policy option—the search for perfection promotes real world education by comparing congressional unilateral withdrawal versus first withdrawing with prior consultation. The CP is key**

# Consult CPs Good

1. **Don’t vote on potential for abuse. It’s like voting on arguments they didn’t make, in round abuse is the only objective standard.**
2. **Their interpretation is arbitrary:**
	1. **It’s the same as rejecting all politics disads because there’s too much stuff on the docket or they’re too complex. Don’t punish us because we’re strategic.**
3. **Counter-interpretation— the affirmative must provide the negative with a means to test the desirability of unilateral troop removal and decisive action, which is key to topic based education**

# at: Conditional Fiat

1. **No abuse:**
	1. **They control the outcome. They can read cards saying whether or not Russia would like the plan.**
	2. **We only defend one outcome of consultation, which makes the counterplan predictable.**
2. **Policy complexity increases education because it forces them to make strategic concessions and think in multiple worlds, which increases critical thinking.**
3. **It’s reciprocal—they can kick advantages or solvency, which is the same as arguing that Russia says no.**
4. **Net benefits check—they can straight turn them and entirely avoid the issue of the counterplan’s outcome.**
5. **Ere negative on theory—they have infinite prep, speak first and last, and win more rounds. Conditional fiat is critical to competitive equity.**
6. **CP isn’t conditional – it’s a single act of consultation with a debate about outcome – just like every other debate**
7. **There’s no greater abuse because the counterplan itself is conditional – the 1AC is nine minutes of offense against the world of the status quo and the world of a veto**
8. **Conditional advocacies are good**
	1. **Negative flexibility its key to test the desirability and immediacy of the plan, and also preserves core neg ground based on the immediate enaction of the plan like politix and trade-off**
	2. **Time pressuring the 2ac increases quality of debate because it forces them to make strategic choices in time-allocation and offense, which is best for crticial thinking**

# at: Textual Competition

**Evaluating whether two policies can practically co-exist is best:**

**The Counterplan still competes textually because the plan text uses words like will or should that imply unconditional and guaranteed enforcement.**

1. **Counterplan Ground—textual competition destroys our ability to counterplan in uniqueness by making “ban the plan” non-competitive, which is critical to ground. The aff can always rearrange words or letter to make all counterplans not competitive.**
2. **Hurts Education and Clash—debating about various interpretations of texts better simulates critical thought and allows more clash because you can read disads and turns off of the effects of the policy instead of only evaluating the words in a vacuum.**
3. **Its bad for the Aff too—it allows counterplans to exclude a word from the plan or replace acronyms or hyphens and win on dumb net benefits like E-prime and Marcouse.**

**(\_) If they win this argument, their perms become meaningless because “do both” is intrinsic. The words “do” and “both” are in neither the plan nor the counterplan.**

# at: Timeframe Counterplans Bad

1. **Its reciprocal with the plan because getting a law passed in Congress takes time.**
2. **Not a timeframe counterplan—consultation is one simultaneous action that begins immediately. Their offense doesn’t apply because it assume the classic delay counterplan where there isn’t any immediate action.**
3. **The delay is critical- the counterplan tests the desirability of immediate action in the plan, which is critical to test the “resolved” portion of the resolution, which is critical to ongoing topical based education.**
4. **Their interpretation destroys core negative generics like politics DA and trade-off DA’s because the changes in troops and capital aren’t immediate. Preserving our interpretation is key to fairness.**

1. **Thinking about the future is good for education. It’s more real world and promotes critical thought similarly to how disads and plans force us to evaluate different possibilities for the future.**

# at: perm: consult on other stuff

**1. Doesn’t solve – our link arguments are specific to consultation over troop withdrawal**

**2. This is intrinsic – they fiat consultation on an issue that is not in the plan or the counterplan. Consultation is a process that is issue-specific, which means the process they advocate in the perm is intrinsic. Intrinsic perms are a voting issue because they give the aff unlimited ground and destroy negative strategy.**

**3. The permutation is vague and should be rejected – we could make arguments about Russian rejection of the perm or arguments about how the issue involved in the perm is not big enough to solve the net benefit but we can’t because they don’t specify another policy about which to consult. This is unfair and a voting issue.**

# at: perm: consult on enforcement

**The perm is illegitimate:**

1. **It’s Intrinsic—the plan doesn’t outline a specific enforcement mechanism and the counterplan doesn’t consult on enforcement, meaning they create a new type of consultation about a new issue. Intrinsicness is a moving target and should be rejected.**
2. **It Severs—the plan unconditionally guaranteed enforcement but the permutation conditions it on Russia’s acceptance, which severs the certainty of the plan. Reject the perm because it makes the plan conditional.**
3. **Doesn’t Solve the NB: the permutation doesn’t let Russia have a say in crucial policy regarding US troop withdrawal, which is key to their continued alliance.**

# at: perm: plan then consult

1. **Double Bind – Either this permutation consults on the plan and links to the net-benefit because they do the plan regardless of the outcome of consultation**

OR

**It consults on another issue that is not the plan and is intrinsic and is a voting issue because it allows the affirmative to add anything to escape the links to negative arguments.**

1. **Vague – Reject the permutation because they have not specified what it consults on. This makes it impossible to answer on the negative.**
2. **No solvency—**

**A. Prior consultation is key to the survival of NRC, that’s Butcher. Absent the consultation the impact is arctic sparked Russia-US nuclear war.**

**B. PRIOR CONSULTATION IS KEY- RUSSIA’S LACK OF VETO WILL UNDERMINE THE NRC**

Kemper, Staff Writer for the Chicago Tribune, 2002 [May 29, “NATO embraces Russia as ally”, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2002-05-29/news/0205290416\_1\_nato-russia-council-military-alliance-pratica-di)

As a member of the NATO-Russia Council, Russia now can join debates over anti-terrorism initiatives, crisis management, peacekeeping, search-and-rescue missions and joint military exercises at a time when NATO is facing fundamental questions about its role and its global relevance. Yet Russia, which formed the heart of the Soviet Union before it splintered into 15 separate nations more than a decade ago, was denied a full place at the NATO table. Russia will have no veto over NATO actions with which it disagrees, including the planned expansion of the alliance. Nor will Moscow have any role in NATO's core military alliance, in which all members pledge to protect the others from attack. The disagreements and Russia's inequality in status may trouble the new council one day, as they did previous efforts by NATO and Russia to forge ties. Officials acknowledged that some details of the relationship remain to be worked out.

1. **The perm is illegitimate:**
	1. **They sever the unconditional and guaranteed enforcement of the plan by conditioning it on Russian acceptance without modification. Sever perms are moving targets and make stable plan texts impossible.**
	2. **Sequential adoption perms should be rejected. They make all counterplans non-competitive and can co-opt offense by changing the time of the plans implementation.**
	3. **It’s not topical because “resolved” means “fixity of purpose” [websters dictionary, ‘01]. Perms can be extra-topical but not completely non-topical. This forces them to justify the resolution, which is the basis of our offense.**

# at: perm: consult then plan [lie]

1. No Solvency

A. The perm would be seen as bluffing

Sartori 05, (Anne, Assistant Professor of Politics at Princeton) [Deterrence by Diplomacy, Princeton University Press, p. 125-6.]

Similar Issues arise in the context of negotiations. Negotiators often have incentives to misrepresent information. For example, if a negotiating team falsely claims that its country is willing to make a few concessions, then it may get a more favorable bargain. The negotiating partner might prefer to make major concessions than to arrive at no agreement. However, if the negotiating partner is itself prepared to concede little, then the bluffing state my back down and accept a less-favorable deal. My theory suggests that the state whose negotiators are caught bluffing will find its negotiations more difficult in the near future, since others will be less likely to believe their claims. However, it also suggests that negotiations will bluff only rarely; this explains why states are often able to make agreements based upon purely verbal and written negotiations. On a more macro level, this theory might help to explain the functioning of alliances. The details of the formal model apply less directly to alliances, which involve promises, rather than threats. Nevertheless, the idea is similar. States have incentives to form alliances that they do not intend to fulfill. Forming an alliance can make a state better off by persuading opponents not to threaten the state or its ally. My work suggests that states might acquire reputations for bluffing, of a sort, when they renege on their alliances commitments, thereby reducing the credibility of their future commitments. To avoid these, states should fulfill most of their commitments, a pattern that we see in practice (Leeds 2004).

B. That kills heg.

Sartori 02, Anne is an associate professor of political science at Northwestern University, Winter 2002, International Organization 56, 1, Winter 2002, pp. 122, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international\_organization/toc/ino56.1.html)

I demonstrate formally that diplomacy works in the absence of domestic audiences. It works precisely because it is so valuable. When states are irresolute, they are tempted to bluff, but the possibility of acquiring a reputation for blufﬁng often deters a state from blufﬁng. A state that has a reputation for blufﬁng is less able to communicate and less likely to attain its goals. State leaders often speak honestly in order to maintain their ability to use diplomacy in future disputes.6 They are more likely to concede less important issues and to have the issues they consider most important decided in their favor. The model thus suggests that in the (more complicated) real world, states use diplomacy to attain a mutually beneﬁcial “trade” of issues over time. States sometimes do bluff, of course. It is impossible to measure how often they do so because opponents and researchers may not discover that a successful deterrent threat was actually a successful bluff. Nevertheless, the model I present here has a theoretical implication about when bluffs will succeed: Diplomacy, whether it be honest or a bluff, is most likely to succeed when a state is most likely to be honest. A state is most likely to be honest when it has an honest reputation to lose, a reputation gained either by its having used diplomacy consistently in recent disputes or having successfully bluffed without others realizing its dishonesty. Since a state that uses diplomacy honestly cannot be caught in a bluff, concessions to an adversary can be a wise policy. When a state considers an issue relatively unimportant and the truth is it is not prepared to ﬁght, blufﬁng carries with it the possibility of success as well as the risk of decreased credibility in future disputes. The term appeasement has acquired a bad name, but not all states in all situations are deterrable. Many scholars believe that Hitler would have continued his onslaught regardless of Britain’s actions in response to Hitler’s activities in Czechoslovakia.7 If Britain had tried to bluff over Czechoslovakia, its attempts to deter Germany’s attack on Poland would have been even less credible. Similarly, the United States’ acquiescence to the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia was not a high point of moral policymaking; however, given that any threats regarding Czechoslovakia would have been bluffs, honest acquiescence was the best way to preserve credi- bility. In the latter case, U.S. leaders seemed to realize the beneﬁts of honesty; when Russian ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin told U.S. president Johnson that U.S. interests were not affected by the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia, “in response he was told that U.S. interests are involved in Berlin where we are committed to prevent the city being overrun by the Russians.”8 Johnson’s words reveal that he saw a difference between Czechoslovakia, where he was honestly admitting that there was no strong U.S. interest, and Berlin, where he was threatening and prepared to go to war.

# at: perm: consult then plan [lie]

 C. **Global nuclear war**

Khalilzad – 95 (Zalmay, RAND Corporation, The Washington Quarterly, Spring 1995)

On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.

**D.** The Lie will get out- especially with Obama

Thompson 08, Michael, staff writer for Associated Content, 11-5-. [Associated Content, The Obama Administation’s First Leak, http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/1182373/rahm\_emanuel\_the\_obama\_administrations\_pg2\_pg2.html?cat=9]

So how does candidate Obama's camp spring virtually no leaks during a 20-month campaign, but then unleash a gusher of a leak within hours of his acceptance speech? Does this portend to more things to come? Past presidents such as Clinton and Ronald Reagan went so far as to limit participation in their most crucial White House discussions, so distressed were they by endless leaks to the press. Biden infamously has said that a hostile foreign power likely will test Obama within six months. It seems that on the domestic front, Barack Obama already is being tested by leaks within 24 hours.

E. The lie will come out—US can’t keep a secret.

Wilson and Dilulio 98, Professors of Political Science and UCLA and Princeton, James Q. Wilson and John J. [American Government: Institutions and Policies, p. 291]

American government is the leakiest in the world . The bureaucracy, members of Congress, and the White House staff regularly leak stories favorable to their interests. Of late the leaks have become geysers, gushing forth torrents of insider stories . Many people in and out of government find it depressing that our government seems unable to keep anything secret for long . Others think that the public has a right to know even more and that there are still too many secrets. However you view leaks, you should understand why we have so many. The answer is found in the Constitution. Because we have separate institutions that must share power, each branch of government competes with the others to get power. One way to compete is to try to use the press to advance your pet projects and to make the other side look bad . There are far fewer leaks in other democratic nations in party because power is centralized in the hands of a prime minister, who does not need to leak in order to get the upper hand over the legislature, and because the legislature has too little information to be a good source of leaks. In addition, we have no Official Secrets Act of the kind that exists in England; except for a few matters, it is not against the law for the press to receive and print government secrets.

# at: perm: consult then plan [lie]

1. **It’s a double-bind. Either:**

**Plan and counterplan are enacted simultaneously and it doesn’t solve the net benefit because consultation isn’t prior to plan passage.**

 **or…**

**They consult and then pass the plan which severs the immediacy of the plan and should be rejected because it’s a moving target and allows them to co-opt our offense.**

1. **Promising genuine consultation but doing the plan regardless is intentional deception, which is immoral and should be rejected.**

 Mark C. **Murphy**, 19**96** [41 Am. J. Juris. 81]

 Bok's remarks capture the insight that what disturbs people about lying is not fundamentally that lies are contrary to the good of knowledge, though lies certainly are contrary to that good. What is most troubling about being lied to is that lies infect the decisionmaking process, undermining the good of practical reasonableness. Thus, the account of the moral absolute against lying defended here does justice to what bothers reflective people about being the victim of lies. [39](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=06a87a29b6952f9bfd647f95fda3771b&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkAk&_md5=fb417e0cf720ff1549cfe598dbc5ee69" \l "n39#n39" \t "_self)
I have argued that although Finnis is right to think that the lie is an act directed against the intrinsic good of knowledge, the wrongfulness of lying is most adequately explained by reference to the good of practical reasonableness. Lying is absolutely morally forbidden, in last analysis, because refraining from lying is necessary to show adequate respect for the status of other agents as practical reasoners. On this matter, at the very least, natural law theory should affirm its agreement with Kant. [40](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=06a87a29b6952f9bfd647f95fda3771b&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkAk&_md5=fb417e0cf720ff1549cfe598dbc5ee69" \l "n40#n40" \t "_self)

1. **It’s intrinsic because neither the plan nor the counterplan use non-binding consultation. Reject it because intrinsic perms can co-opt our offense by adding planks to the plan and make plan texts unstable.**

# Ext- Lying Bad

**Lying restricts the freedom of the deceived**

**Kupfer, 82**. (Joseph Kupfer, professor of philosophy and religious

studies at Iowa State, he Moral Presumption Against Lying , Review of

Metaphysics, 36:1 (1982:Sept.) p.104-107)

**Immediate restriction of the deceived’s freedom is inherent in all (successful) lies because they limit the practical exercise of his reason: reasoning about possible courses of action**. Believing true what is false or vice versa, **the deceived’s perspective on the world and his possible futures in it are distorted. As a result, his choices of action concerning that future in it are circumscribed**. By limiting the horizon or content of his practical reasoning, **the lie restricts the choosing and subsequent acting of the deceived.** He reasons within a more or less false view of the world; misinformed, his practical conclusions and the actions they motivate are misdirected. The lie misdirects the deceived’s reasoning about future conduct in two complementary ways: it may suggest choices that are not available or eliminate from consideration live options. **Both the illusion and elimination of choice limit the deceived’s freedom. The first makes this reasoning practically fruitless, thereby retarding or postponing the deliberations necessary to the exercise of freedom.** The latter excludes options from the scope of his volition’ the are “shielded from his view. In this respect, **lying establishes “conditions of unfreedom…(which) restrict choice by making alternatives unavailable or ineligible of the illusion and elimination of choice have the net effect of deflecting the deceived’s reasoning.** Unwarranted inferences are drawn; barren plans of action laid’ irrelevant courses of inquiry opened. **The lie not only determines what the deceived thinks about, but it skews how he thinks of things, e.g. whether he sees something as a threat or a boon. Misinformed and misdirected, the deceived’s practical reasoning and thereby his freedom are restricted.** In lying, the deceived’s thinking is channeled through a distorted view of the world as lying always aims to misrepresent the way things really are. But the more we see things the way they really are the more free our choices and subsequent actions. In offering a criterion for freedom as autonomy, Benn and Weinstein speak to the issue of one individual controlling and thinking of another. Though not specifically about lying, what they say is clearly germane to it: “it [criticism, choice, and eventually freedom] …requires that B’s sources of information shall not be controlled by A, for then B’s view of reality is what A chooses to make it. **Lying is clearly a way of choosing another’s view of reality for him. It is important to underscore the significance of the deceived’s rational competency together with the liar’s posefulness explain the sense in which restricting reason (and freedom) is “inherent” in or “necessary to” lies**. Lies being what they are, the restriction is “practically” necessary---necessarily part of the practice. **Lies being purposeful endeavors at getting someone capable of reasoning to hold a false belief, restricting that person’s reasoning is simply how lies “work.” And since restricting reasoning necessarily restricts freedom, restriction of freedom is inherent in lying.** In all cases of lying, the liar is trying to channel the thinking and subsequent choosing of the other by his utterance, though this is rarely the only thing he is trying to accomplish. The restriction is usually thought to serve some further purpose. As Isenberg points out, “it is impossible to understand why, without ulterior purpose, anyone would wish another to believe a proposition, P. when he himself thinks P is false. It is a rare liar who seeks simply to deceive. But **regardless of ulterior or ultimate purpose, the lie is always immediately limits the particular deliberations and choosing of the deceived.** “Immediately “ is important here, since it is possible to enhance the other’s freedom in the long run by lying. Similarly, lying may benefit the deceived in other ways as well, such as prompting him to think and choose intelligently for himself. These and considerations like them are what enable us to excuse or justify some lies.

# at: perm: Multiple Worlds

**1. It’s Intrinsic – The CP is one world, it consults and that is it – the outcome of consultation is an effect of the CP, not a part of fiat. It’s a voting issue because it allows the affirmative to add anything to escape the links to negative arguments.**

**2. It’s Severance – Consulting before do the plan severs the immediate nature of fiat which is a voting issue because it destroys uniqueness for all negative positions**

**3. Even if the outcome of consultation is guaranteed to be “yes”, there is also a theoretical risk of a minor modification or a “no”. The permutation risks hurting relations which links to the net benefit**

# Multiple perms bad

**Making more than one permutation is a voting issue because it’s the same as reading multiple conditional counterplans only a worse timeskew because perms take two seconds to read. This isn’t reciprocal because we only get one dispositional counterplan. And, they’re a worse moving target than counterplans because the aff can decide whether or not to advocate them based on 2nr strategy.**

**at: perm: do counterplan**

1. **The Perm Shifts Advocacy:**

**This is a severance permutation which skews 1NC strategy and is a voting issue**

1. **Functionally – the perm allows the plan to be amended or vetoed – since the plan is the focus of the debate a stable plan is key to ground for both sides**
2. **Textually – the plan text says [should/will] which imply definite adoption**
3. **Topical action – the perm means the whole plan is conditional which means the aff could advocate any non-topical minor modification or even the status quo**

**Reject the perm because severance is a moving target that allows them to spike out of our offense by removing parts of the plan and makes all counterplans not competitive—it’s the same as affirmative conditionality.**

**Even if perms can be extra-topical, they can’t be completely non-topical.**

1. **“Resolved” means “fixity of purpose”—webster’s dictionary ’01. They’re not resolved implementation because Russia can say no.**
2. **Reject the perm because it allows completely non-topical action. Our interpretation is best because it forces them to justify the resolution and it’s more predictable because the resolution is the only sacrosanct thing in debate.**

\*\*\*AFF ANSWERS

# AFF – No Genuine Consultation

**US won’t give Russia a veto on important security issues**

**Millikin 7**, reporter for AFP

(David, “Rice and Putin seek to ease tensions”, Lexis, KW)

US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Russia's President Vladimir Putin agreed Tuesday to ease their diplomatic rhetoric, but made no progress on resolving security disputes poisoning relations between the two powers. Rice said the United States could not allow Russia to "veto" the defence missile shield that it wants to build in eastern Europe. Russia remains opposed to a UN plan for the Serbian province of Kosovo to attain virtual independence. "The president backed the American side on the need to rein in rhetoric in public discussions and to concentrate on concrete business, which there is a lot of," Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov told Russian news agencies after the Rice-Putin talks just outside Moscow. "I do not think that Moscow's position towards Washington can be qualified as hostile but rather as an invitation to a more frank dialogue on questions on which we have differences," Lavrov said after a dinner with Rice later Tuesday. Rice -- who made a blistering attack just before her visit on what she described as Putin's rolling back of democracy -- also urged calming of increasingly stormy East-West ties. "I've said while I'm here that the rhetoric is not helpful. It is disturbing to Americans who are trying to do our best to maintain an even relationship," she told journalists. "The real outcome of today's discussions was that we agreed that we need to intensify our consultations, our dialogue, to minimise misunderstandings," Rice said after meeting with Lavrov. However, Washington and Moscow remained far apart on the key disputes that Rice had been hoping to help resolve during her three-day visit. There was no softening of Russian opposition to US plans for an anti-missile shield in Poland and the Czech Republic, former Soviet satellite states that are now part of NATO. "Russia confirmed its position on the anti-missile shield," Lavrov told news agencies. Rice warned that Washington could not "permit somehow a veto on American security interests." "The United States needs to be able to move forward, to use technology to defend itself, and we're going to do that," she said.

# EXT – No Genuine Consultation

NATO-Russia is a sham- Russian input isn’t followed

Kramer 2002, Mark, Cold War Studies program and a senior fellow of the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, *Russian Foreign Policy and the West*, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 114, No. 4 (Winter, 1999-2000), pp. 568 )

Seventh, the largely symbolic nature of the newly formed NATO-Russia Council points to the need for other steps to reach out to Russia. Russian envoys in the new council will be meeting with NATO representatives to discuss important issues-terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, arms control, theatre missile defense, civil emergencies and the like-but NATO will not seek or permit Russian input regarding the alliance's membership, functions and defence preparations.73 The NATO-Russia Council will be a useful interim body, but the United States and its allies should seek to move beyond it, beginning at the Prague summit. The way to do this is not by treating Russia as a special case deserving of a privileged role in the alliance before it has even applied to join. Instead, the NATO governments should announce at the Prague summit that they hope Russia will some day become a member of the alliance, and they should strongly encourage it to apply. They should then work with Russia so that it can gradually bring itself into compliance with the MAP. This effort may take a decade or longer, but the sooner it begins, the better.

**Genuine Consultation Cannot Happen Through NATO because it is Also a Military Institution Only Abandoning NATO Will Allow the Creation of A New Political Forum**

Dr. **Kastrup 04**, Former Foreign Policy and Security Adviser to Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, 2004

(Dieter, www.ncafp.org/.../04%20Rndtbl%20on%20Repairing%20US-European%20Relations%2011-04.pdf)

For Ambassador Kastrup, NATO continues to be an indispensable forum. The Prague Declaration at the NATO summit in 2002 contains provisions that address post-9/11 developments. NATO has never been a purely military institution; it has always been a forum for political dialogue. But we need a genuine political dialogue that cannot be conducted within existing fora. We should look for something new. Perhaps we could make use of elements from all the proposals mentioned in the framework questions. But it would be a mistake to turn this task over to a private group of eminent persons, no matter how eminent they might be. Political leaders should be in the driver’s seat. This is a political decision, and it must be made by politicians. Why should not the newly elected American president take the initiative? President Bush should invite Europeans and Americans to come together to try to define the tasks ahead of us. They could then appoint personal representatives with the aim of drafting a document; whether it is called Transatlantic Charter or not is unimportant. The speaker believes that Henry Kissinger is right; some kind of permanent body has to be established. Good people from Europe and the United States must sit together and help produce ideas, sort out differences, and define the common task. Is this politically naïve, he asked? But what is the alternative? To sit and wait? It is time to act, declared Ambassador Kastrup, and boldly!

# AFF - Econ Growth Solves Relations

**Economic cooperation key to US-Russian relations**

**Lavrov 6/11**- Sergey; Russian Foreign Minister when asked about the keys to improved US-Russian relations “We can't say that NATO presents a threat to us” Kommersant, June 11th 2010; Lexis

But I will emphasize that we are bound not only by disarmament problems. I have already mentioned the need to substantially increase the economic component. This is the main foundation of our relations, and the plans here are great. At the end of May a large group of representatives of US innovative companies came to Russia. And they left inspired. They are preparing concrete ideas towards the visit of President Medvedev to the US. Our companies are also preparing serious proposals that could become the subject of joint projects. I hope this work will proceed apace and the theme of innovation will be one of the determinants of our relationship. I will mention one of the projects the creation of a new large cargo aircraft. Only Russia and the US produce these aircraft, and now the Americans' planes are at the end of their useful life time and we have the need to modernize the same AN-124.

# AFF – Non-Unique

**We virtually never consult Russia on things like the plan, nothing happens**

Andrea **Gabbitas 02**. Ph.D. candidate in the Security Studies Program at MIT

 (“Prospects for U.S.-Russian Nonproliferation Cooperation Under Bush and Putin.” BCSIA Discussion Paper 2002-16, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, December 2002. )

President Bush has expended significant energy on the creation of a cooperative personal relationship with President Putin. Although Bush has focused on the need to work cooperatively with Russia, the United States has still pressed forward with several unilateral moves at Russia’s expense and without Russian consultation, belying his rhetoric about the importance of bilateral cooperation. However, Bush has realized that Russian cooperation is necessary to combat both state proliferation and the diversion of nuclear materials, two areas in which Bush has pressed for U.S.-Russian cooperation. Bush’s commitment to nonproliferation regimes has been less conscientious, and he has used them selectively to back U.S. policy where the regimes accord with U.S. interests while looking the other way when U.S. policy might violate them.

# EXT – Non-Unique

**Consultation fails- stable relations impossible with US suprises**

**RT 10**- RT is the first Russian 24/7 English-language news channel which brings the Russian view on global news. “Reset button in US-Russian relations doesn’t work – Russia’s NATO envoy” February 16, 2010; http://www.allvoices.com/s/event-5238254/aHR0cDovL3J0LmNvbS9Qb2xpdGljcy8yMDEwLTAyLTE2L3RyYW5zZG5pZXN0ZXItaXNrYW5kZXItbWlzc2lsZS1hYm0uaHRtbA==

Commenting on the Transdniester offer, Dmitry Rogozin also added that there could be no talk yet of bilateral efforts to “reset” Russian-US relations if Moscow continues to find out about the United States’ plans to locate missiles in Eastern Europe from mass media: “How can we talk of a true partnership with Washington if we read unpleasant news in the newspapers?” Earlier in February, NATO member Romania approved a US plan to deploy American SM-3 interceptor missiles on its territory. The US State Department said that such systems will be in operational readiness in Romania by 2015. Besides this, plans to host American ABMs in Bulgaria are also being discussed. The Russian Foreign Ministry has asked Bulgaria for clarification of its plans by asking a rather rhetorical question: “Why is it that, after the Romanian surprise, a Bulgarian one follows?”

# AFF – NRC Doesn’t Solve Arctic

**The NRC is ineffective and fails to create a real US-Russian partnership**

**Xinhau 10**

(2/7/10, “ News Analysis: Europe, Moscow need mutual trust to break "cold peace"”, lexis, KW)

In the words of Thorsten Benner, associate director of Berlin-based Global Public Policy Institute, "the post-cold war has produced a cold peace at best." As 20 years have passed, the post-Soviet Russia, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the United States and its Western NATO allies have not reached a consensus on organizing security. Sergei Karaganov, chairman of the Russian Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, had this to say: "The unfinished nature of the Cold War constantly bring about open or hidden suspicious, as well as a confrontational mentality in Russia and many other European countries. " He cited quarrels over natural gas between Western and Eastern Europe, scrambles for Arctic resources and disputes over missile defense system as "classic examples." Low political mutual trust has rendered NATO-Russia Council (NRC), another main security framework, ineffectual to help form a real partnership between Moscow and other European countries.

# AFF – No Arctic Conflicts

**Arctic conflicts are unlikely – Countries with Arctic interests stand to benefit more from diplomacy and war**

**Lackenbauer 10,** Assistant Professor of Modern Canadian History at St. Jerome's University, Ontario. He holds a PhD and an MA in history from the University of Calgary, and a BA from the University of Waterloo.

(Whitney, “ An Arctic conflict is unlikely”, Lexis, KW)

Climate change, the receding ice cap, potentially feasible transportation routes, and newly accessible resources have prompted unprecedented interest in the Arctic. Some commentators perpetuate the idea that a "showdown" is looming between Canada and Russia over Arctic resources, playing on the political rhetoric of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev promising to protect Russia's Arctic resources. I agree that Medvedev's comments are not helpful, and his vague references to other countries' attempts to deny Russians access to their mineral resources are peculiar. They are also unsurprising, and do not forecast an inevitable "clash" over the Arctic. Russian foreign policy is notoriously difficult to interpret. Winston Churchill once called it "a puzzle inside a riddle wrapped in an enigma, and the key is Russian nationalism." As much as Canada proclaims itself to be an "Arctic superpower," the Russians really are. They derive roughly 20 per cent of their GDP and 22 per cent of their exports north of the Arctic circle. Up to 90 per cent of Russian hydrocarbon reserves on the continental shelf are in the Arctic, as well as strategic reserves of metals and minerals such as copper, cobalt, nickel, gold, and diamonds. The stakes are high for the Russians, and they have a proven track record of actually exploiting these resources, and their economy is deplorably dependent on energy extraction. It is understandable that they are concerned about the process of defining the limits of their continental shelf. Canada, of course, also talks of its Arctic resource frontier. In contrast to the Russians, however, we have a poor record of actually investing in resource development in the region. We cannot claim to derive even one per cent of our GDP from the region. But as quick as we and our Western allies are to point accusatory fingers at Russian politicians who resolve to protect what is theirs, we are just as guilty of hyperbolic rhetoric and political chest-pounding. Prime Minister Stephen Harper's messages of "use it or lose it," "stand up for Canada," and talk of Canada as an "Arctic superpower" might be designed for domestic audience, but they also register outside of Canada. The irony, of course, is that Canada's behaviour mirrors that of Russia. We have broadcast to the world our intentions to beef up our military presence as if this will somehow bolster our sovereignty position. As my new book with Peter Kikkert suggests, this logic is problematic. Our legal sovereignty over the territory, waters, and continental shelf in our Arctic is well-established. Our rights are protected by international law, and will not be strengthened by a stronger military presence. There is no risk of the Russians stealing away Ellesmere Island, or the Danes using Hans Island as a stepping stone to claim other parts of our archipelago. We have not even submitted our claim to the extended continental shelf, which will be based upon ongoing scientific research. When we do, our rights are clearly established. There is no "scramble" for territory, and "use it or lose it" is a misnomer. We already have the sovereignty that we need. The Russians stand to benefit most of all if Arctic boundaries are sorted out according to international law. Indeed, beside every provocative Russian statement about its resolve to defend its claims is another that reiterates Russia's commitment to legal processes.

**CONFLICT IN THE ARCTIC IS IMPOSSIBLE—WEATHER CONDITIONS PREVENT IT**

**NEW SCIENTIST 02** -3-2-2002 (http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn1978-arctic-melting-will-open-new-sea-passages.html)

Entitled Naval Operations in an Ice-Free Arctic, the report reveals that standard naval operations could be close to impossible in Arctic waters. The biggest problem is that communications satellites do not cover the area well, says Conlon. Modern ships and weapons rely on various kinds of sensors but none work well in Arctic conditions, he adds. Ice complicates the way sound travels through water, making sonar and acoustic monitoring difficult. Icy decks and high winds make it extremely difficult for aircraft to operate. Unbroken summer daylight makes covert operations harder.

# AFF – NRC BAD – No Modifications

**DOUBLE BIND—IF THE NATO ALLIES SUPPORT THE PLAN, IT WILL CRIPPLE THE NRC—IF THEY SAY NO THE COUNTERPLAN DOESN’T SOLVE THE CASE**

**SPARAGNO 2003**

(Anthony, Naval Post Graduate School, The NATO-Russia Council: Origins and Prospects, June)

If the Allies came to the NATO-Russia Council with a pre-determined position at some point, that could also disrupt the relationship. According to the House of Commons Defence Committee report, The Future of NATO, “The developments in NATO-Russia relations, particularly since 11 September, have been exciting and promise a great deal…Despite the disappointment of the PJC, NATO is right to take this opportunity to test Russia’s willingness to engage constructively in important common security issues. And, correspondingly, NATO should be wary of giving the impression of any ‘pre-cooking’ of decisions.”243 According to an expert observer, “[T]here are some issues that Allies have determined will be pre-coordinated before approaching Russia. These issues are not written in stone, but all Allies know that they are there.”244 This observer opines that proliferation issues and peacekeeping operations are two topic areas in which the Allies may want to “manage things” by approaching Russia with a “pre-coordinated” position.245 These examples are, it should be noted, not particularly persuasive in that both topic areas are explicitly listed in the May 2002 “New Quality” declaration, and NATO and Russia have been cooperating in peacekeeping in the Balkans since December 1995.A

# AFF - NRC BAD – Allies will pull issues

 **ALLIES WILL PULL ISSUES FROM THE NRC TO EXCLUDE RUSSIA**

**SPARAGNO 2003**

(Anthony, Naval Post Graduate School, The NATO-Russia Council: Origins and Prospects, June)

Each of the NATO members and Russia can make a proposal for consideration within the NRC. However, the 19 members of the Alliance then meet in the Political Committee, of which Russia is not a member, to decide if this is an issue that they want to discuss with Russia in the NRC.195 Moreover, each NATO member retains the ability to withdraw any item from discussion with Russia in the NRC.196 According to Susan Glasser of the Washington Post, “some NATO members…expressed concern that Russia would be given too prominent a role…Eventually, NATO decided on a ‘safeguard’ provision, allowing any member to withdraw an item from the council’s agenda and refer it to the NATO governing council, to which Russia does not belong.”197 According to an expert on NATO-Russia relations, if an Ally begins to see the discussions “heading in an undesirable direction,” it can remove the issue from the NRC for discussion among only the Allies.198 Although the safeguard exists, “it has yet to be exercised.”

# AFF – AT: NRC Solves Relations

**COOPERATION IN THE NRC IS NOT ENOUGH TO SOLVE RUSSIAN ANIMOSITY**

VERSHBOW 2004

(Alexander, U.S. Ambassador to Russia, U.S. Embassy in Japan, Jan 8, http://japan.usembassy.gov/e/p/tp-20040113-01.html)

Moreover, we recently have seen Russia adopt a more assertive stance toward its neighbors. This new policy is reflected in Russia's unilateral diplomacy in Moldova, where a cooperative framework to help resolve the Transnistrian dispute already exists, in Russia's highly visible meetings with the leaders of Georgia's three separatist regions, and in Russia's dispute with Ukraine over Tuzla island. Many in Russia clearly remain unhappy with NATO's expansion eastwards, even as Moscow voices satisfaction with its cooperation with NATO through the NATO-Russia Council. And a more strident tone in foreign policy debates in the new Duma could cast doubt on Russia's openness to integration with the West and chill Russia's relations with its neighbors. So our efforts to cooperate on the resolution of long-simmering conflicts around Russia's periphery may provide an early test of the likelihood of deeper bilateral ties.

# AFF - NRC BAD – Kills NATO

 **NATO-RUSSIA COUNCIL WILL DESTROY NATO EFFECTIVENESS AND CAUSE PROLIF AND TERRORISM**

**LUNEV 2002** (Stanislav, Highest Ranking Soviet Defector to the U.S., Newsmax.com, March 8, http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2002/3/7/154934.shtml)

However, participation in the new council will actually allow Russia to pit members of the alliance against each other, thus allowing Moscow to undermine the effectiveness of NATO and the security of its members. In other words, it will give Putin an unofficial veto power. As NewsMax reported on Dec. 10, for half a century NATO has worked as an effective military alliance because its members share common interests and values such as democratic and open societies, free-market economies, the rule of law, and peaceful transition of power through democratic means. Russia, however, has failed to meet those standards and has shown that at the present time it is not a part of Western civilized society. We know that there is no democracy in Russia, which under Putin is reverting to its totalitarian past. There is, as well, no real free-market economy there, but rather one that American and other Western experts call a "virtual economy," heavily dependent on foreign credits and loans and the export of Russia's natural resources. In the new NATO council Russia will discuss with Western leaders anti-terrorist and non-proliferation activities at the very time when Moscow continues to sell weapons to the sponsors of international terrorism. It's very difficult to believe that Russia's leaders, who are personally involved in the proliferation process, do not know that significant numbers of these weapons are going to end up in the hands of international terrorists. Russia also will be discussing political and military projects at a time when its leadership continues Russia's military buildup and war preparations, which were originally designed for a future war against America and NATO. Moscow supports practically all the so-called rogue nations and supplies them with technologies and materials used to create weapons of mass destruction, weapons that in the future could be directed against America and our friends and allies. There is no doubt that Russia is currently not ready for participation in such a Russian-North Atlantic council, and its expanded role could undermine NATO's existence as a consensus builder within the Northern Atlantic nations.

# AFF - NRC BAD - Kills NATO AND RED SPREAD

 **RUSSIAN PARTICIPATION THROUGH THE NRC KILLS NATO AND CAUSES RED SPREAD**

**PYNE 2** (David, Columnist and Legal Advisor, june 3, http://www.american-partisan.com/cols/2002/pyne/qtr2/0603.htm)

De-facto Russian membership in NATO grants Russia added power and prestige in furtherance of Mr. Putin's overall objective of enhancing its claim to being the preeminent power on the Eurasian subcontinent and increasing its ability to influence and have a greater say in determining the course of world affairs. Rather than require Russia to become an actual member of NATO to obtain the privilege of exercising a veto on most of the alliance's key decisions, Russia is granted a special relationship with NATO signified by the creation of the NATO-Russia Joint Council under this agreement, not given to any other country. This new arrangement grants Russia many of the rights, but none of the responsibilities of NATO membership. NATO's other member states will likely continue to be held to a higher standard of conduct than Russia, which continues to provide Iran with nuclear technology, has formed a union state with an unrepentant Communist dictator in Belarus, has signed an alliance with the world's most populous and still-Communist country aimed against the United States and is in the process of extinguishing its last free press outlets to prevent criticism of Russia's President. While President Putin's repression at home and abroad has worsened, President Bush and other Western leaders have chosen to turn a blind eye to Russian genocide in Chechnya and mute their past criticisms in the interest of forming an alliance with Russia against terrorism. In anticipation of the implementation of this agreement, Russia set up a new office at NATO headquarters a couple of weeks ago, expanding upon its previous liaison office which has been dominated by hard-line and suspicious Russian Army and military intelligence officers since its inception. In fact, it was Russia's senior liaison officer, a lieutenant general, who was selected to command the Russian lightning advance to capture the Pristina airport before NATO in June 1999. The stationing of such hard-line Russian army officers and spies at NATO HQ is unlikely to change with this agreement and will continue to pose a serious security risk to the alliance. NATO is in the midst of a profound transformation from a once anti-Communist military alliance oriented to defend Western Europe from Russian attack to an increasingly pan-European "common house" collective security arrangement long advocated by both the Soviets and the Russians. Russian President Putin alluded to this development with his telling first remark at the founding meeting that perhaps the new NATO-Russia Joint Council should be renamed "the House of Soviets." The Soviet Union and now Russia have sought the neutralization of NATO for half a century and with this new agreement allowing a de-facto Russian veto in virtually all NATO decisions, Russia finally seems poised to succeed where the USSR failed. While Russia cannot exercise a veto over the admission of additional members to the alliance, now that it is on the inside and has finally succeeded in transforming NATO from a military alliance into a mere political grouping similar to the United Nations whose only military role consists of staffing peacekeeping operations, it no longer has any real incentive to oppose new members. This new arrangement is not without its critics within NATO. Janusz Onyszkiewicz, a former Polish defense minister, told the Warsaw Voice newspaper that Russia might use its new influence to paralyze NATO decision-making, cause internal conflicts, and stifle cooperation between the alliance and former Soviet countries. Russia's new place at NATO will potentially allow it to have access to NATO's most closely guarded secrets as well as its military plans and operational deployments. Even NATO's plans for counter-terrorist operations could be compromised by Russia to our adversaries. Russian and NATO interests are at least as likely to clash in the future as they are to agree. NATO decisions continue to require unanimity, which will be increasingly difficult to achieve with the diverse interests represented by Russia and its former Eastern European allies. Russia's new role as a de-facto NATO member will allow it to pit members of the alliance against each other and thus undermine the effectiveness of NATO in furtherance of Russia's national interest.

# AFF - Consultation Bad – Collapses NATO

 **CONSULTING RUSSIA RUINS NATO EVEN IF RUSSIA HAS NO VETO**

**HARVARD CRIMSON** **01** - DECEMBER 19, 2001 http://www.thecrimson.com/article.aspx?ref=161182

While the staff is correct to note that Russia is not an enemy, it is also not so strong an ally that it should be given an influential role in the United States’ most powerful military alliance. Even if Russia does not receive any veto power over NATO, the need to consult Russia and smooth over any active opposition will necessarily constrain the alliance’s actions. In the past few years, Russia has frequently perceived its security interests as counter to our own. Russia voiced strong opposition to the NATO-led campaign in Kosovo and it has repeatedly used its veto power in the U.N. Security Council to block enforcement of the sanctions against Iraq. Russia has also shown little interest in stopping nuclear proliferation, as its cash-strapped government has sought to sell reactors and other materials to Iran. At the start of the war in Afghanistan, the need to consult and coordinate with so many allies led the U.S. to conduct many operations on its own. Including Russia in a “NATO at 20” will only make the alliance more unwieldy and less effective in assuring its members’ security.

# AFF – Consultation Bad – Relations

**The link is wrong- Consultation with the NRC won’t improve relations, only a risk that it damages**

**Golts 09**- Aleksandr; independent military analyst and deputy editor of Yezhednevny Zhurnal; “Restarting U.S.-Russia Relations Will Take More Than Pushing A Button” February 28, 2009 http://www.rferl.org/Content/Restarting\_US\_Russia\_Relations\_More\_Than\_Pushing\_Button/1500909.html

The problem is that Putin doesn't really need this. We are in the midst of a crisis. Good relations with the United States and with the West as a whole won't help -- there is no money in it. And you can't put hungry people to work with fairy tales about getting up off your knees and about how "Washington has been forced to acknowledge Russia's international authority." No, for this you need stronger measures. For instance, a national mobilization against an insidious enemy who is preparing an imminent attack. And we aren't talking about China. So what good are Washington's intentions to delay the missile-defense shield or to postpone practically indefinitely NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine? Moscow will immediately throw up some new conditions and complaints. For example, the Kremlin might call for overall limits on the military forces of all NATO countries so that they do not exceed the forces of the Russian Federation. Or the Kremlin might insist that any future NATO expansion be done only with Moscow's consent. An unwillingness to comply with any of these demands will be interpreted as proof that NATO is preparing aggression against Russia. The survival of the Putin regime does not depend on cooperation with the West but with a "managed" chronic conflict. Everyone who is reciting the "hit-the-restart-button" line should give some thought to how compatible the two machines that are set to be restarted actually are.

# AFF – Consultation Bad – Kills HEg

**Consulting Russia hinders US foreign policy goals**

**Golts 09**- Aleksandr; independent military analyst and deputy editor of Yezhednevny Zhurnal; “Restarting U.S.-Russia Relations Will Take More Than Pushing A Button” February 28, 2009 http://www.rferl.org/Content/Restarting\_US\_Russia\_Relations\_More\_Than\_Pushing\_Button/1500909.html

Under these circumstances, Washington obviously doesn't need much from Putin and Co. -- just that they stay out of the way and don't interfere. U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates noted, with clear irritation, that Moscow is sending conflicting signals. On the one hand, it is demonstrating its total willingness to help out regarding Afghanistan, including allowing the ground transit of nonmilitary cargoes across Russia. On the other, it is doing everything possible to hinder the U.S. effort, including, for instance, forcing Kyrgyzstan to close down the U.S. air base outside of Bishkek.

# AFF - Russian Integration Bad – Kills NATO/WAr

**RUSSIAN INCLUSION IN NATO IS BAD—DESTROYS ALLIANCE COHESION AND DRAGS NATO INTO WAR**

**RIVERA 3 (**DAVID W. RIVERA is visiting assistant professor of government at Hamilton College, Political Science Quarterly March 22, 2003 )

The conclusions reached in this article bear upon the future of North Atlantic security arrangements as well. On the one hand, arguments against the inclusion of the Russian Federation in an expanded NATO are numerous and serious. First and foremost among them concerns the increased risk of war that would come from the very commitment to defend the Russian Federation's extensive southern and eastern borders from all potential attackers. Equally worrisome is the cost of converting a successful military alliance into something that might more closely resemble an ineffective collective security system. (120) Not least among such arguments, deep-seated anti-Americanism persists among the Russian elite and clearly presents an obstacle to genuine and enduring trust and cooperation between Moscow and Washington. (121) This is especially true of Russia's military establishment whose head of the International Defense Cooperation Department publicly describes NATO's Partnership for Peace program as a mere backdrop to t he rehearsing of military actions against Russia." (122)

# AFF - AT: Relations – Alt Causes

**Alt cause to stable relations- trade**

**Carnegie Endowment No date**- Nine former ambassadors to the US and Russia collaborate on the main issues facing the two nations; “U.S.-Russian Relations: A Statement” http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/ambassador\_statement.pdf

Expanding our economic ties can also promote a more stable and predictable relationship. We must move beyond the WTO issue and remove politically motivated barriers that have held up U.S.-Russian commercial exchange so that Russia takes its place as a full member of the global trading community.

# AFF – Cohen is a Hack

**Cohen yearns for Stalinist Russia and bases his literature on that fact**

**The Iconic Midwest 05**, Blog on Politics, philosophy, history, pop culture, and general mayhem.

 (“Stephen F. Cohen's Yearning for Stalin”, <http://iconicmidwest.blogspot.com/2005/01/stephen-f-cohens-yearning-for-stalin.html>)

For your daily dose of insanity, head on over to The Nation to read Stephen F. Cohen latest descent into madness: The Media's New Cold War In this piece Cohen castigates nearly every western news outlet for preferring the pro-western faction in the recent political troubles in Ukraine. Russia, so says Cohen, has lots of geopolitical reasons for interfering with the internal workings of Ukraine. The west doesn't. So there. The notion that Ukraine, as a sovereign nation, should be free to sort her own politics out is out of the question for Cohen. Seemingly, Ukraine can only exist by Russia's indulgence. As a result Cohen has no problem with the possibility of Russia being involved in the assassination attempt on Viktor Yushchenko. Hell, the dioxin poisoning is not even mentioned in the lengthy article. At its heart **Cohen's article seems to express a deep and unreserved longing for the Soviet Union**. Cohen even claims that half of Ukrainians long for just such a return of communist hegemony over their lives. Cohen thinks that would be just swell. Obviously, the more slave-like Ukrainians need to be told what to do by the more masterly Russians. Maybe if we had a repeat of the Soviets forced "migration" and starvation campaigns against Ukrainians we could reach near unanimity in support for Russia in Ukraine. Why not? What's a genocide between neighbors? What amazes me is that Cohen so readily buys into the "isolation" fantasy. Russia today sounds a little like Germany pre-WWI, so paranoid that an all out coalitional war was inevitable. But there is one big difference today; no one is competing with Russia as they were with Germany. Russia, if it ever can break free from its phobic paranoia, can just as readily join with the western nations as Ukraine is attempting to, or as places like Poland and the Czech Republic already have. No one is competing with Russia because it represents nothing, unless you think their strange oligarchic anarchy is something anyone would want to emulate. What does Russia have that the EU or the US could possibly want enough to isolate and destroy them for? The answer is of course nothing. The west does not want an isolated Russia, they want a Russia fully integrated and engaged with the west. Yes, the goal is a future where Russia is in NATO, and a part of the economic vitality of Europe. Russian isolation can only happen through Russian actions. It is just strange to see people like Cohen wanting to help Russia in this self-defeating, self-fulfilling prophecy. **Memo to Stephen F. Cohen: Uncle Joe is dead** **and** likely to remain so. In case you didn't know, **that's a very good thing**.