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# \*\*\*Futenma Hurts Alliance\*\*\*

# Futenma Hurts Alliance - Infighting

Okinawa is the largest threat to the US-Japan alliance – the US refuses to relocate troops unless a new base is built on Okinawa

Eric **Talmadge**, writer for the Associated Press, 06-22-2010, “US-Japan security pact turns 50, faces new strains” Businessweek http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9GG68080.htm

But while **the alliance** is one of the strongest Washington has anywhere in the world, it **has come under intense pressure** lately **over a plan to** make sweeping reforms that would **pull** back roughly 8,600 **Marines from Okinawa to the U.S. Pacific territory of Guam. The move was conceived in response to opposition on Okinawa to the large U.S. military presence there** -- more than half of the U.S. troops in Japan are on Okinawa, which was one of the bloodiest battlefields of World War II. Though welcomed by many at first, **the** relocation **plan has led to renewed Okinawan protests over the U.S. insistence it cannot be carried out unless a new base is built on Okinawa** to replace one that has been set for closing for more than a decade. **A widening rift between Washington and Tokyo over the future of the Futenma Marine Corps Air Station was a major factor in the resignation of Prime Minister** Yukio **Hatoyama** earlier this month. It could well plague Kan as well.

# Futenma Hurts Alliance – Spillover

The Futenma dispute must be solved – failure to resolve it creates a domino effect that would cripple the alliance in the long term

John **Feffer**, co-director of Foreign Policy in Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies, 03-06-2010, “Okinawa and the new domino effect” Asia Times http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/LC06Dh01.html

You’d think that, with so many Japanese bases, the United States wouldn’t make a big fuss about closing one of them. Think again.  **The** current **battle over** the Marine Corps air base at **Futenma** on Okinawa -- an island prefecture almost 1,000 miles south of Tokyo that hosts about three dozen U.S. bases and 75% of American forces in Japan -- **is just revving up**.  In fact, **Washington seems ready to stake its** reputation and its **relationship with a new Japanese government on the fate of that base** alone, which reveals much about U.S. anxieties in the age of Obama. **What makes this so strange**, on the surface, **is that Futenma is** an **obsolete** base. Under an agreement the Bush administration reached with the previous Japanese government, the U.S. was already planning to move most of the Marines now at Futenma to the island of Guam. Nonetheless, the Obama administration is insisting, over the protests of Okinawans and the objections of Tokyo, on completing that agreement by building a new partial replacement base in a less heavily populated part of Okinawa. **The current row between Tokyo and Washington is no mere** “Pacific **squall**,” as *Newsweek* dismissively [described it](http://www.newsweek.com/id/232055). **After six decades of saying yes to** everything **the U**nited **S**tates has demanded, **Japan finally seems on the verge of saying no** to something that matters greatly **to Washington, and the relationship that** Dwight D. **Eisenhower once called** an “**indestructible** alliance” **is** **displaying** ever **more hairline fractures. Worse yet**, from the Pentagon’s perspective, **Japan’s resistance might prove infectious -- one major reason why the United States is putting its alliance on the line over the closing of a single antiquated military base and the building of another of dubious strategic value. During the Cold War, the Pentagon worried that countries would fall like dominoes before a relentless Communist advance. Today, the Pentagon worries about a different kind of domino effect**. In Europe, NATO countries are refusing to throw their full support behind the U.S. war in Afghanistan. In Africa, no country has stepped forward to host the headquarters of the Pentagon’s new Africa Command. In Latin America, little Ecuador has kicked the U.S. out of its air base in Manta.

# Futenma Hurts Alliance – Japanese Backlash

**Failure to resolve the Futenma dispute causes Japanese backlash, hurting the alliance**

John **Feffer**, co-director of Foreign Policy in Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies, 03-06-2010, “Okinawa and the new domino effect” Asia Times http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/LC06Dh01.html

"**The dispute could undermine** security in East Asia on the 50th anniversary of **an alliance that has served the region well**," intoned The Economist more bluntly. "Tough as it is for Japan's new government, it needs to do most, though not all, of the caving in." **The** Hatoyama **government is by no means radical, nor is it anti-American**. It isn't preparing to demand that all, or even many, US bases close. It isn't even preparing to close any of the other three dozen (or so) bases on Okinawa**. Its modest pushback is confined to Futenma,** where it finds itself between the rock of Japanese public opinion and the hard place of Pentagon pressure. Those who prefer to achieve Washington's objectives with Japan in a more roundabout fashion counsel patience. "**If America undercuts the new Japanese government and creates resentment among the Japanese public, then a victory on Futenma could prove Pyrrhic** ," writes Joseph Nye, the architect of US Asia policy during the Clinton years.

# Futenma Hurts Alliance – Spillover

**Okinawa protests spillover to undermine the alliance**

Michael **Auslin**, director of Japan Studies at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 06-16-2010, “The Real Futenma Fallout” Wall Street Journal http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704324304575307471399789704.html

Japanese military officials worry that this year's **protests in Okinawa could have spillover effects, inspiring protesters** around Atsugi **to demand a reduced American presence**, and possibly even agitating against the government plan to move Japanese planes there. Moreover, **Iwakuni's mayor might reject the** new **burden of** potentially **hosting the George Washington's** **air wing. That, in turn, would embolden antinuclear protesters in Yokosuka, the U.S. Navy's main base, to step up their ongoing pressure to move the nuclear-powered George Washington, the Navy's only permanently forward deployed aircraft carrier, out of Japanese waters. This worst-case scenario would be a series of simultaneous, grassroots movements against the U.S. military presence in Japan** that **could** potentially **put fatal stress on the bilateral security alliance** and effectively isolate Japan militarily in the western Pacific. Given Mr. Hatoyama's fate when he botched this issue, politicians now are more likely to respond to public demands or they will be replaced by those who do. The resulting political clash would either reaffirm tight ties with Washington or lead to endemic paralysis in Japan's national security establishment.

# Futenma Hurts Alliance – Rape and Protests

**Okinawa dispute hurts alliance – rape cases, complaints, and protests prove Japan is massively opposed to the US’s stance**

**Xinhua News Agency**, 07-09-2010, “News Analysis: U.S. military presence to remain thorn in relations with Japan” published on newsystocks.com http://newsystocks.com/news/3587183

WASHINGTON, Jul. 9, 2010 (Xinhua News Agency) -- **The U.S. military presence in Japan will remain a long term source of consternation between the two allies**, in spite of a recent easing of tensions, some experts said. "**All you need is another rape case and it comes up as a high profile issue,**" said Rodger Baker, director of East Asia analysis at global intelligence company Stratfor. **Residents of Okinawa**, a Japanese island that hosts about two-thirds of Japan's 40,000 U.S. troops, **still recall the 1995 case in which three U.S. servicemen kidnapped and raped a 12-year-old Japanese girl. They continue to complain about noise from overhead U.S. aircraft and the island has seen mass demonstrations calling for U.S. forces to leave**. Last year, then Prime Minister Yukio **Hatoyama sparked a row when he called for a "partnership of equals"** in a relationship dominated by Washington since the end of World War II. **When the dust cleared, Hatoyama resigned because of a broken campaign promise to shutter Futenma**, a U.S. air base located in Okinawa.

# Futenma Hurts Alliance - Infighting

**Okinawa is a key obstacle to maintaining the US-Japan alliance**

**Emma Chanlett-Avery**,Specialist in Asian Affairs at the Congressional Research Service, **and Weston S. Konishi**, Analyst in Asian Affairs at the Congressional Research Service 07-23**-2009**, “The Changing US-Japan Alliance: Implications for U.S. Interests” published on fas.org http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33740.pdf

**The** DPRI **review identified friction between the U.S. forces stationed in Okinawa and the local population as a key obstacle to a durable alliance. In addition to the 1995 rape conviction, complaints about noise pollution** from the air bases **and concern about safety** **issues after the crash of a helicopter** in August 2004 **convinced alliance managers that the burden on Okinawa’s urban areas needed to be reduced in order to make the alliance more politically sustainable**. As part of the realignment of U.S. bases, U.S. officials agreed to move most aircraft and crews constituting the Marine Air Station at Futenma (a highly populated area) to expanded facilities at Camp Schwab, located in a less-congested area of Okinawa. **The challenge of replacing Futenma had dogged alliance managers for years**: since 1996, both sides had worked to implement the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Report, which called for the return of 12,000 acres of land to the Japanese, provided that appropriate replacement facilities were arranged. In addition to the Futenma agreement, the United States agreed to relocate the Okinawa-based III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF), which includes 8,000 U.S. personnel and their dependents, to new facilities in Guam. In return, Tokyo promised to pay $6.09 billion of the $10.27 billion estimated costs associated with the move. With the DPRI review and the revitalized alliance, new momentum led to a tentative agreement in 2006.

# Futenma Hurts Alliance – Japanese Backlash

**Futenma hurts US-Japan relations – US desire to hold out on Futenma and maintain control over military decisions will ultimately destroy the alliance**

Hamish **McDonald**, writer for the Sydney Morning Herald 06-05-2010, “Obama policy sees a PM resign, but Japan’s resentment will stay” accessed on LexisNexis

"Hatoyama did not survive this rebuke by the US and this policy reversal that made him appear dithering and weak before Japan's voters. But this isn't over. **Obama's handling of the Futenma fiasco will have ongoing consequences - reminding Japan's citizens that they are not really in control** of their own circumstances, **that they are** to some degree **still occupied by the US military and unable to tell America 'no'** in the matters that the US doesn't want to accept." To be kind to Obama, he may not be the one running Washington's policy on Japan. The tone was set on a visit to Tokyo last October by Robert Gates, the Defence Secretary carried over from the George Bush administration. He bluntly declared the agreement was fixed, all alternatives considered, and it was "time to move on". Yet during the 15 years of negotiation that led to the 2006 agreement on Futenma, the **Americans never clearly explained why it was essential for the marines to stay in Okinawa.** If they were an essential part of defending Japan or South Korea, why were they always being sent off somewhere else, to Vietnam, Iraq or Afghanistan? Why can't their helicopters and tilt-rotor Ospreys be based at one of the other US air force and marine bases in the main islands? The recent TV series The Pacific gave viewers an idea of the impact of the closing great amphibious battle of World War II on the Okinawans, whose kingdom and culture came late under Japanese direct rule, and explains the intense feeling there about having to host 70 per cent of the US military presence in Japan. **Hatoyama's ascendancy last year was the assertion of a new kind of Japanese identity. He wanted a "more equal" alliance with Washington. Gates clearly doesn't want to entertain this thought.** – Sydney Morning Herald

# Futenma Hurts Alliance - Spillover

**US-Japan tensions over Futenma spillover to destroy the alliance**

**The Nikkei Weekly** 05-24-2010, “Futenma tying down government” accessed on LexisNexis

**A U.S. official recently remarked that Japan's attitude might change if North Korea fired a missile at it. The comment shows that Japan-U.S. tensions are rising to the point where they threaten the bilateral alliance**. Diplomatic quicksand - **Equally worrying, the Futenma mess is hampering Japan's economic diplomacy**. **Last summer's DPJ election** manifesto **said a** **DPJ government would push for free-trade agreements with** other Asia-Pacific nations, including **the U.S**. Although FTA talks with South Korea have begun, they are making little progress. **As for the launch of talks** with the U.S., **a senior official with the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry said flatly: "This is not the time for that." He cited the Futenma impasse.**

# Futenma Hurts Alliance – Spillover

 ( ) That will collapse the alliance

Bruce Klingner, Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation, 4-21-2010, “Futenma Cast Shadow Over US Japan Alliance,” The Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Commentary/2010/04/Futenma-Cast-Shadow-Over-US-Japan-Alliance

Impact on the Alliance. Futenma has had a corrosive effect on the alliance and paralyzed Washington’s ability to engage with Japan. This corrosive environment has fueled suspicion. U.S. officials comment that Washington should be able to understand, predict, and rely on the views of an ally. But this is not the case with the DPJ. While the Hatoyama administration issues platitudes about the importance of the alliance, its actions call its commitment into question. In January, Prime Minister Hatoyama characterized solving the Futenma issue is a litmus test for developing the U.S.－Japan security arrangement. If Hatoyama fails to accept the Guam Agreement or provide a viable alternative by the end of May, it will be hard to keep the alliance from taking on serious water. While it is unclear what dynamics are set into motion, it is easy to see things unfolding.

( ) Futenma key to alliance confidence – it’s the vital internal link to cooperation on climate and energy

Yuki Tatsumi, Senior Associate with the East Asia Program at the Stimson Center, 2-12-2010, “US-Japan alliance at 50: heading into uncharted waters,” Stimson, http://www.stimson.org/pub.cfm?id=%20932

One may argue that the Futenma relocation issue is an alliance management issue, and that Tokyo and Washington should not lose sight of the strategic importance of the US-Japan alliance for both Tokyo and Washington by focusing only on Futenma relocation. Indeed, the US-Japan relationship is about more than the US forces in Japan. There are a number of areas in which the two countries can and should cooperate, ranging from climate change, alternative energy, and nuclear nonproliferation. In fact, some of these issues are being discussed between both countries as a part of their efforts to identify ways to deepen the US-Japan alliance. However, the strategic importance of the alliance can only be buttressed by genuine confidence between the United States and Japan—and effectively managing the alliance is an important component of building such confidence. Failing to address the Futenma relocation issue, therefore, can adversely impact this intangible dimension of the alliance.

# Futenma Hurts Alliance - Spillover

Failure to resolve **Futenma will break the alliance – it signals the end of Japanese compliance with the American military**

Howard **LaFranchi**, writer for the Christian Science Monitor 05-11-2010, “Signs of a growing US-Japan split in Okinawa base dispute” accessed on LexisNexis

"**This [base issue] has already had a corrosive effect on the US-Japan alliance,**" says Bruce Klingner, a senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation's Asian Studies Center in Washington. **The dispute stems from rejection** by Hatoyama - prime minister since last September - **of** a 2006 **US**-Japan **troop-realignment** agreement that moves 8,000 marines from Okinawa to Guam. **The agreement also calls for replacing** Okinawa's **Futenma** Marine air base, located near a crowded city, to a more remote site. Hatoyama came into office promising to move Futenma, unpopular with local residents, off Okinawa and perhaps even to a location outside Japan. Last week, he appeared to concede that Futenma would remain on Okinawa. According to reports from Tokyo this week, he has settled on a compromise, to be presented to Washington, to move the base to a distant site. At least one runway would be built on pilings in a bay to reduce environmental impact. Noting that Hatoyama has waffled repeatedly on deadlines and altered pronouncements based on his audience, Mr. Klingner says a joke circulating in Tokyo paints a devastating picture of the prime minister's leadership on the issue. "Who's the most influential on Mr. Hatoyama?" asks the joke, according to Klingner, who just returned to Washington from Japan. "Whoever last talked to him." **An air base of 2,000 marines may seem like an unlikely straw to break the back of a six-decade-old alliance. But**, Klingner says, **US officials worry that the Futenma row is a sign of more indecisiveness and political upheaval to come from Japan over defense and security issues**. "They [**US officials] see Futenma not as a one-off, but as a potential harbinger of things to come**," he says.

# \*\*\*Solvency\*\*\*

# Solvency – Ending Futenma Dispute Boosts Alliance

Withdrawing from Futenma solves the alliance without harming US deterrence capabilities

Mike **Mochizuki,** Associate Dean of the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University , **and** Michael **O’Hanlon**, Director of Research and a Senior Fellow on Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution 03-06-2010, “The unnecessary crisis: A proposed compromise on Futenma” http://www.gwu.edu/~power/publications/publicationdocs/MochizukiOHanlon%20\_Futenma\_Jan2010.pdf

But the desirability of such an air station needs to be weighed against the political risks to the alliance. We two authors have long argued that **the Kadena Air Force Base on Okinawa is militarily more significant than Futenma Marine base, given Kadena's likely role in possible conflicts in Korea, the Taiwan Strait or elsewhere**, as well as its role as a hub in the American global network. **Preserving** local political **support for Kadena is**, therefore, **much more important than holding onto** **Futenma or building a successor**. So, if further **accommodating Okinawan interests** on the Futenma issue is necessary, it **is a modest price to pay for shoring up the broader political health of the U.S. military presence on Okinawa** in general and at Kadena in particular. Just as **the US makes pragmatic decisions in other parts of the world about force relocation for the greater good of an alliance**, it can factor local sensitivities into this issue. **Provided the US could improve its contingency access** to other airfields on Okinawa and elsewhere **in Japan** for use in a possible crisis or war, our view is that **the US could make do without Futenma or a substitute**. Losing the airfield altogether (with modest numbers of flights for the residual Marine presence occurring from alternative facilities in Okinawa and other prefectures, perhaps) is not a preferred option but a tolerable one—especially with the Marines in Guam.

# Solvency – Better Strategic Partnership

**Reducing marines in Japan solves the alliance without harming regional security**

Emma **Chanlett-Avery**,Specialist in Asian Affairs at the Congressional Research Service, **and** Weston S. **Konishi**, Analyst in Asian Affairs at the Congressional Research Service 07-23**-2009**, “The Changing US-Japan Alliance: Implications for U.S. Interests” published on fas.org http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33740.pdf

Some **analysts argue that** the Cold War formula for the U.S.-Japan alliance is outdated and that **the forward presence of** 53,000 **U.S. troops is an unnecessary burden to the U.S. military**. They assert that **Japan has the resources to develop** into **a more autonomous defense force and could cooperate with the U.S. military** in areas of mutual concern **on a** **more limited**, “normal” country-to-country **basis**. Further, advocates argue that the **eventual withdrawal of U.S. forces from Japanese soil could cement a more durable strategic partnership than the current configuration**.31 Opponents of this strategy argue that the large-scale U.S. military presence is necessary in a region with simmering tension and the rise of China, a power that may challenge U.S. hegemony in Asia. Some military experts argue that **reducing the number of Marines stationed in Japan**, while maintaining air and sea assets, **could reduce** some of **the burden on local communities and still maintain** a strong U.S. **deterrence in the region.**

# Solvency – Restructures the Alliance

The US should withdraw from Japan – boosts the alliance

Doug **Bandow**, senior fellow at the Cato Institue, 09-02**-2009**, “Dealing with the New Japan: Washington won’t take ‘no’ for an answer” Huffington Post http://www.huffingtonpost.com/doug-bandow/dealing-with-the-new-japa\_b\_275914.html

Actually, **Americans should be as interested as Japanese in transforming the U.S.-Japan alliance. The current relationship remains trapped in a world that no longer exists**. The imperial Japanese navy has been rusting away on the bottom of the Pacific for more than six decades; Douglas MacArthur departed as American regent in Tokyo nearly a half century ago; China buried Maoism with Mao Zedong more than three decades ago; the Cold War ended two decades ago; **Japan retains the world's second** (or third, based on purchasing power parity) **largest economy** despite "the lost decade." **Yet Japan remains dependent on America for its security**, a minor military player despite having global economic and political interests. There are historic reasons for Tokyo's stunted international role, but it is time for East Asian countries to work together to dispel the remaining ghosts of Japanese imperialism past rather than to expect America to continue acting as the defender of last resort. **Since Japan and Asia have changed, so should America's defense strategy. There should be no more troops based on Japanese soil**. No more **military units tasked for Japan's defense**. No more security guarantee for Japan. The U.S. should adopt a strategy of off-shore balancer, expecting friendly states to defend themselves, while being ready to act if an overwhelming, hegemonic threat eventually arises. China is the most, but still not very, plausible candidate for such a role--and even then not for many years. Washington's job is not to tell Japan, which devotes about one percent of its GDP, one-fourth the U.S level, to the military, to do more. **Washington's job is to do less. Tokyo should spend whatever it believes to be necessary on its so-called "Self-Defense Force**." Better relations with China would lower that number. So would reform in North Korea. Of course, the former isn't certain while the latter isn't likely: let Japan assess the risks and act accordingly. In any case, **the U.S. should indicate its respect for Japanese democracy and willingness to accommodate itself to Tokyo's changing priorities.**

# Solvency – Increases Alliance Sustainibility

The Futenma issue must be resolved to maintain the alliance

Hitoshi **Tanaka**, senior fellow at the Japan Center for International Exchange, May **2010**, “Futenma: Diplomatic Mess or Strategic Opportunity” JCIE http://www.jcie.org/researchpdfs/EAI/5-2.pdf

The United States and Japan should abide by four basic principles for their approach to the Futenma issue. First, **there needs to be a firm determination from both ends that the Futenma dispute should not undermine the alliance**. Rather than hastily rushing to an unsatisfactory resolution, **what is important** at this juncture **is that both parties focus on the establishment of a process that will contribute to recovering confidence in the alliance**. Second, it is important to recognize that, ultimately, the Japanese central government is responsible for fixing the final relocation site. There is no legal procedure for obtaining agreement from any given local community. Therefore, while due consideration must be given to gaining broad understanding from the local community surrounding the relocation site, the central government must ultimately make the final decision. Third, **since reducing the burden on the local community serves the common objective of sustainable alliance relations, the process of managing the relocation must be considered joint work, rather than a confrontational negotiation** between the two governments. Fourth, **the relocation plan for Futenma must recognize the long-term perspective of the alliance.** As the United States considered the relocation of the base in the context of the transformation of US forward deployment, Japan must contemplate the issue in the context of the changing security environment in East Asia and under the new foreign policy orientation of the Democratic Party of Japan government.

# Solvency – Increases Alliance Confidence

Futenma is key – destroys confidence in the alliance

Yuki **Tatsumi**, senior associate of the East Asia Program at the Stimson Center, 02-12-2010, “US-Japan alliance at 50: heading into uncharted waters” Stimson Center http://www.stimson.org/pub.cfm?id=%20932

One may argue that **the Futenma relocation issue is an alliance management issue**, and that Tokyo and **Washington should not lose sight of the strategic importance of the US-Japan alliance** for both Tokyo and Washington by focusing only on Futenma relocation.  Indeed, **the US-Japan relationship is about more than the US forces in Japan**.  There are a number of areas in which the two countries can and should cooperate, ranging from climate change, alternative energy, and nuclear nonproliferation.  In fact, some of these issues are being discussed between both countries as a part of their efforts to identify ways to deepen the US-Japan alliance.  **However, the strategic importance of the alliance can only be buttressed by genuine confidence between the United States and Japan—and effectively managing the alliance is an important component of building such confidence.  Failing to address the Futenma relocation issue, therefore, can adversely impact this intangible dimension of the alliance.**

# Solvency – Restructures the Alliance

The US should withdraw from Futenma – this is the only way to boost the alliance – moving troops within Okinawa fails

Doug **Bandow**, senior fellow at the Cato Institue, 05-12-2010, “Japan can defend itself” published on cato.org http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=11804

Making fewer promises to intervene would allow the United States to reduce the number of military personnel and overseas bases. **A good place to start in cutting international installations would be Okinawa**. America's post-Cold War dominance is coming to an end. Michael Schuman argued in *Time*: "Anyone who thinks the balance of power in Asia is not changing — and with it, the strength of the U.S., even among its old allies — hasn't been there lately." Many analysts nevertheless want the United States to attempt to maintain its unnatural dominance. Rather than accommodate a more powerful China, they want America to contain a wealthier and more influential Beijing. Rather than expect its allies to defend themselves and promote regional stability, they want Washington to keep its friends dependent. To coin a phrase, **it's time for a change**. U.S. intransigence over **Okinawa has badly roiled the bilateral relationship.** **But even a more flexible basing policy would not be enough.** Washington is risking the lives and wasting the money of the American people to defend other populous and prosperous states. **Washington should close Futenma — as a start to refashioning the alliance with Japan**. **Rather than a unilateral promise by the United States to defend Japan, the relationship should become one of equals working together on issues of mutual interest.** Responsibility for protecting Japan should become that of Japan. Both **Okinawans** and Americans **deserve justice. It's time for Washington to deliver.**

# Solvency – Restructures the Alliance

Withdrawal from Okinawa would only restructure the alliance, not kill it

Doug **Bandow**, senior fellow at the Cato Institue, 03-25-2010, “Okinawa and the Problem of Empire” Huffington Post http://www.huffingtonpost.com/doug-bandow/okinawa-and-the-problems\_b\_512610.html

**The two countries would still have much to cooperate about, including security. Leaving responsibility for Japan's defense with Tokyo would simply eliminate the unrealistic expectations engendered by the alliance** on both sides. **The governments could focus on issues of mutual interest**, sharing intelligence, preparing emergency base access, **and** otherwise **cooperating to meet international challenges**. **The best way for Americans to help residents of Okinawa is to press Washington to reshape U.S. foreign policy**, making it more appropriate for a republic than a pseudo-empire. With the rise of numerous prosperous allied and friendly states -- most notably Japan, but also South Korea, Australia, India, and others -- **the U.S. should step back**, prepared to deal with an aggressive hegemon should one arise but determined to avoid being dragged into routine geopolitical squabbles. **Then Tokyo could chart its own destiny, including deciding what forces to raise and where to base them. The Japanese government could no longer use American pressure as an excuse for inaction in Okinawa. Then Okinawans finally might gain justice -- after 65 long years.**

# Solvency – Sustainable Alliance

( ) Alliance collapse is inevitable without reducing U.S. military presence – the plan is key to create a politically sustainable alliance

J.E. Dyer, writer for commentary, 3-11-2010, “Past Time to Rethink Our Approach to Japan,” The Greenroom, http://hotair.com/greenroom/archives/2010/03/11/past-time-to-rethink-our-approach-to-japan/

But the current situation is troubling, because what it amounts to is the Obama administration being dismissively recalcitrant about something that does, in fact, involve Japanese sovereignty and Japan’s mastery of her own destiny. The situation is that we want to move a Marine Corps air base to Futenma on Okinawa – from its previous location on Okinawa – and Okinawans don’t want the base at Futenma. (They want it gone altogether.) There’s been resistance to it for some time, but a previous Japanese government concluded an agreement with the Bush administration in 2006 to go ahead with the Futenma move. Since the new prime minister, Yukio Hatoyama, formed his government in September 2009, however, Japan has been rethinking the 2006 agreement. There were different ways to handle this, but what the Obama administration has done is insist, with what is perceived as summary rudeness, that the 2006 agreement be honored. Hatoyama signaled in December that his government would not simply agree to that right away, and announced that a final decision would be given no earlier than May. Hillary Clinton called in the Japanese ambassador and gave him a talking to. Obama himself declined requests for a personal sidebar with Prime Minister Hatoyama at the Copenhagen summit (although since he also declined such requests from Gordon Brown, Hatoyama might not need to feel super-especially slighted. “Diss our best allies” seems to be one of the principles of Obamian Smart Power). Now senior American officials are visiting Japan and being interviewed every other week uttering veiled threats about the consequences, if Japan doesn’t stop with the domestic politics already, and just move forward with the Futenma base. Have we lost our minds? For one thing, what happened to all that Obama business about shedding arrogance and being solicitous of the rest of the world? If we went by his administration’s rhetoric and supposed aspirations, we’d think that if the Okinawans don’t want a Marine air base, Obama would be the first one to listen and take their concerns to heart. Indeed, if Republican senators under a GOP administration were over in Japan telling the Japanese that Futenma is the place we need to put the base, Obama would probably lead the charge against such “imperialism.” But there’s a more fundamental issue here, and it makes the Obama administration’s weird inflexibility particularly ill-timed. The issue’s origin is very simple: time has passed. The world has changed in some important ways since 1945. We haven’t given our alliance with Japan a really fresh, critical look since Nixon handed Okinawa back in 1971, and it’s high time we did. The UK Guardian article linked above comes, like most such treatments, from the perspective that the only alternative to a divisive tiff between the US and Japan is the restoration (or at least reaffirmation) of the post-1971 status quo in our relationship. But that status quo is losing support in Japan, and it’s not because the Japanese “don’t like us,” or because they want to reemerge as an imperial power and start talking about Co-Prosperity Spheres again. It’s because the justification for the features of Japan’s role in the alliance is starting to crumble. Most Americans aren’t aware that Japan pays the cost of maintaining the military bases we use there. It costs the Japanese a lot of money to host our forces. That feature of our relationship might not be called into question if there were no dispute over how many bases there should be, and where they should go – but there is. If there were still a Soviet Union rattling a big saber short miles across the La Perouse Strait from Hokkaido, such disputes might loom smaller in Japan’s domestic politics. But there isn’t. It’s shortsighted to dismiss an emerging sense among Japanese voters that they’d be perfectly safe with fewer bases hosting fewer US forces on their islands, and it’s downright obnoxious to demand that the national government behave as if that sense didn’t exist, or wasn’t a real and serious factor in its internal obligations to its people. Japan has every right to her own evolving perceptions about her security requirements. This is a voluntary alliance, not the Warsaw Pact. We may not like all of those evolving perceptions, and they may present inconvenient decision points for us, but throwing diplomatic tantrums is exactly, and I mean precisely, the wrong way to handle such developments. The truth is, our relationship with Japan has to evolve. We can grunt angrily and resist, or we can get out ahead of the problem and do some rethinking ourselves. That’s what we have State and Defense Departments for: to think ahead of current conditions to what will position us for future ones. What we should want is to manage our way to a new, more sustainable relationship with Japan. The day is going to come when we assume more of the cost of basing forces there, and probably have to keep fewer on the Japanese islands anyway. This

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Advantage 1 – Alliance – Solvency

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need only happen in alarming, confrontational jolts if we sit around twiddling our thumbs and assuming nothing has to change. It’s not a bad thing to contemplate our alliance with Japan evolving to a different basis. It’s a necessity, but it’s also a positive opportunity. I think we will always want to count Japan as an ally – an official military ally, by treaty agreement – but our alliance in 2010 and beyond doesn’t have to have exactly the same features as our alliance up to now. Getting on a new footing with Japan isn’t something to be feared, it’s something to be planned, negotiated, and managed. The signals our moves send to China and Russia (as well as everyone from India to Australia) will also matter tremendously. It’s not to our advantage at all for the US-Japan alliance to appear grudging, and maintained mainly out of fear of China. (It’s not to Japan’s either; Japan is and will always be too big for China to intimidate militarily anyway, without China rattling sabers that would bring retribution down on her from elsewhere.)

**\*\*\*Japan-U.S. Alliance Good \*\*\***

**Japan-U.S. Alliance Good – Nuclear War**

 ( ) U.S.-Japan alliance key to prevent nuclear war

INSS Institute for National Strategic Studies, commission of a bipartisan study group including Armitage, Campbell, Kelly, Nye, Wolfowitz, and more, 10-11-2000, “The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership,” <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SR_01/SR_Japan.htm>

Major war in Europe is inconceivable for at least a generation, but the prospects for conflict in Asia are-far from remote. The region features some of the world’s largest and most modern armies, nuclear-armed major powers, and several nuclear-capable states. Hostilities that could directly involve the United States in a major conflict could occur at a moment’s notice on the Korean peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait. The Indian-subcontinent is a major flashpoint. In each area, war has the potential of nuclear escalation. In addition, lingering turmoil in Indonesia, the world’ fourth-largest nation, threatens stability in Southeast Asia. The United States is tied to the region by a series of bilateral security alliances that remain the region’s de facto security architecture. In this promising but also potentially dangerous setting, the U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship is more important than ever with the world’s second-largest economy and a well-equipped and competent military , an as our democratic ally, Japan remains the keystone of the U.S. involvement in Asia. The U.S.-Japan alliance is central to America’s global security strategy.

( ) Escalates to great power wars

Morton Halperin, former Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, Ph.D. in International Relations, 7-9-1999, “The Nuclear Dimension of the U.S.-Japan Alliance”, The Nautilus Institute, http://www.nautilus.org/archives/library/security/papers/Halperin-US-Japan.pdf

If conflict is to occur among the major nuclear weapons powers, it is most likely to take place in Northeast Asia. The United States, Russia, and China all have substantial military forces in the region as well as major stakes in the area; in addition, there are many sources of potential conflict among the three and their allies within the region, including the future of both the Korean peninsula and Taiwan, and control of both natural resources and territory in local seas. Not only do these three most active nuclear weapons states confront each other in this area, but it is also the home to four other states — Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and North Korea — that have contemplated the development of nuclear weapons and have the capacity to develop a serious nuclear weapons capability.5 Thus, there is no doubt that the future of nuclear weapons in the international system will be determined in substantial part by what happens in Northeast Asia, and the future of international politics in this area will have a major impact on efforts to control nuclear proliferation.

**Japan-U.S. Alliance Good – Regional Stability and Environment**

Alliance with Japan solves East Asian instability and the environment

Xinhua General News Service November 14**, 20**09 Saturday 5:10 AM EST Roundup: Obama 2 accessed on Lexis Nexis

 Prior to his public address, the U.S. president, on his first visit to Japan since taking office, held talks on Friday evening with Japanese Premier Yukio Hatoyama, during which the revitalizing and deepening of the alliance between the U.S. and Japan was discussed, as well as issues concerning the combating of global climate change. A joint statement made by the two leaders following the meeting declared they had agreed on plans to cut their countries' greenhouse gas emissions by 80 percent by 2050 and to support efforts by "the poor and most vulnerable" nations to combat climate change. Both leaders were in agreement that the two countries need to seek a speedy resolution on the issue through a new ministerial- level framework, although a timeframe for the resolution, which, for the DPJ and the Japanese people, is a highly emotive and consequential issue, was not mentioned. On a lesser yet related issue, Obama did, however, assert his desire to see Tokyo abide by a 2006 deal stipulating that the heliport functions of the U.S. Marine Corps' Futemma Air Station be transferred by 2014 to a new facility to be built in another city in Okinawa, a Japanese Foreign Ministry official said. Although Hatoyama in previous statements has more than alluded to Japan becoming less reliant on the U.S. economically and seeking more autonomy and bilateral equality from Washington in its pursuance of a more unified (East) Asia, Hatoyama told Obama that his "East Asian community" concept is built on Japan-U.S. relations and expressed hope for the United States' increased presence in the region. The two leaders also agreed that their countries should seek a "multilayered" alliance in which they work closely not just on military security but also on other issues, such as anti-disaster efforts, medicine and health, education and the environment. "INDESTRUCTABLE PARTNERSHIP" WITH JAPAN ENDURES Following Obama's meeting with Hatoyama on Friday, his keynote speech on Saturday told of a renewed American leadership dedicated to the pursuit of a new era of engagement with the world which will see the U.S. administration forging relationships that are based on mutual interests and mutual respect. In the Asia Pacific region specifically, he spoke passionately about the history of the Japan-U.S. alliance and how U.S. efforts in the area will be rooted in a long, robust and renewed alliance between the United States and Japan. "In two months, our alliance will mark its 50th anniversary -- a day when President Dwight Eisenhower stood next to Japan's Prime Minister and said that our two nations were creating 'an indestructible partnership' based on equality and mutual understanding," said Obama. "In the half century since, that alliance has endured as a foundation of our security and prosperity. It has helped us become the world's two largest economies, with Japan emerging as America' s second-largest trading partner outside of North America. It has evolved as Japan has played a larger role on the world stage, and made important contributions to stability around the world from reconstruction in Iraq, to combating piracy off the Horn of Africa, to assistance for the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan most recently through its remarkable leadership in providing additional commitments to international development efforts there," he continued. "Above all, our alliance has endured because it reflects our common values -- a belief in the democratic right of free people to choose their own leaders and realize their own dreams; a belief that made possible the election of both Prime Minister Hatoyama and myself on the promise of change. And together, we are committed to providing a new generation of leadership for our people, and our alliance." Obama also highlighted the significance of U.S. relations with other countries in the region and how these alliances directly influenced the prosperity and impacted the security of the everyday American. "I want every American to know that we have a stake in the future of this region," said Obama. "Because what happens here has a direct affect on our lives at home. This is where we engage in much of our commerce and buy many of our goods. And this is where we can export more of our own products and create jobs back home in the process." "This is a place where the risk of a nuclear arms race threatens the security of the wider world, and where extremists who defile a great religion plan attacks on both our continents. And there can be no solution to our energy security and our climate challenge without the rising powers and developing nations of the Asia Pacific," he said. "These alliances continue to provide the bedrock of security and stability that has allowed the nations and peoples of this region to pursue opportunity and prosperity that was unimaginable at the time of my first visit to Japan," the President said.

**Japan-U.S. Alliance Good – Regional Stability**

U.S. JAPAN ALLIANCE IS ESSENTIAL IN MAINTAINING PEACE AND PROSPERITY

**States News Service** **01-19**-2010 Tuesday THE U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE MARKING 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF SIGNING OF U.S.-JAPAN TREATY OF MUTUAL COOPERATION AND SECURITY accessed on Lexis Nexis

In the last half century, the global security environment has changed dramatically as exemplified by the end of the Cold War and the rise of transnational threats. Unpredictability and uncertainty in the Asia-Pacific region continue, with new threats emerging in the international community as a whole, such as terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as well as their delivery systems. Given such a security environment, the U.S.-Japan security arrangements will continue to play an essential role in maintaining both the security of Japan and the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. The Ministers place particular importance on sustaining the high degree of public support for the Alliance. They endorse ongoing efforts to maintain our deterrent capabilities in a changing strategic landscape, including appropriate stationing of U.S. forces, while reducing the impact of bases on local communities, including Okinawa, thereby strengthening security and ensuring the alliance remains the anchor of regional stability. The Alliance provides a context of peace and stability for East Asia that has enabled all nations of the region to develop and prosper. The Alliance will remain alert, flexible and responsive in the face of the full range of emerging twenty-first century threats and persistent regional and global challenges. The most important common strategic objectives within the region are to ensure the security of Japan and to maintain peace and stability in the region. The United States and Japan will continue to strengthen their ability to respond to contingencies that could threaten those objectives. The United States and Japan are working closely together and cooperating with their partners through various international fora including the Six-Party Talks to deal with the threat from North Koreas nuclear and missile programs as well as to address humanitarian issues. The Ministers stress that the United States and Japan will work to advance cooperative relations with China, welcoming it to play a constructive and responsible role in the international arena. The United States and Japan also will enhance regional cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region. The United States and Japan will work together to respond to natural disasters and to provide humanitarian relief in the region and beyond. The United States and Japan will continue to deepen their cooperation, including that between U.S. forces and Japans Self Defense Forces, in wide-ranging areas of common interest in the changing security environment.

**Japan-U.S. Alliance Good – Regional Stability**

Japan-U.S. alliance key to East Asian Stability

Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye February 2007 Richard L. Armitage, President, Armitage International Joseph S. Nye, Sultan of Oman Professor of International Relations at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/070216\_asia2020.pdf

The ability of the Japanese economy to sustain such high levels of financial support for the international system will likely decrease in relative terms by 2020, but after 50 years of passivity, Japan’s new leaders are arguing for a more proactive security and diplomatic role that will keep Japan’s weight in the international system high. The United States needs a Japan that is confident and engaged in that way. Turning away from the U.S.-Japan alliance or lowering our expectations of Japan would likely have a negative impact on regional stability and its role in the region. Instead of a Japan that underpins the international system in 2020, it may become comfortable as a “middle power” at best, and recalcitrant, prickly, and nationalistic at worst. Not to encourage Japan to play a more active role in support of international stability and security is to deny the international community Japan’s full potential. But if U.S. strategy continues to have high expectations for Japan that meld with Japanese national sentiment, Japan will stand as a powerful model for the region of what leadership based on democratic values means. In this regard, we focus on two key elements of the U.S.-Japan relationship economy and security and put forth a bipartisan action agenda aimed at achieving the high expectations we hold for the alliance and its ability to influence the future of Asia.

**Japan-U.S. Alliance Good – Asian Economy**

Japan-U.S. relations key to Asian Economy

Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye 2007 Richard L. Armitage, President, Armitage International Joseph S. Nye, Sultan of Oman Professor of International Relations at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/070216\_asia2020.pdf

Well into the future, the United States and Japan will hold the keys to economic prosperity and stability in Asia. Our two nations have a primary responsibility to exercise leadership and wise stewardship over the international economic system of which Asia is a major driver. Likewise, we need to consider ways to help each other successfully overcome our respective economic, structural, and strategic challenges. With the Doha Round of international trade talks in disarray, it is all the more important that we consider ways to expand the density and depth of our economic partnership, keeping a clear eye not simply on economics but also national strategy. The United States and Japan need to move quickly toward promoting and ensuring the forces of free trade and economic integration by launching negotiations toward a bilateral free-trade agreement. This would become the hub for an emerging network of FTAs in Asia and provide energy to the whole world economy.

**Japan-U.S. Alliance Good – Regional Stability and Prolif**

Japan-U.S. alliance key to regional stability and nonprolif

Richard L. Armitage **and** Joseph S. Nye 2007 Richard L. Armitage, President, Armitage International Joseph S. Nye, Sultan of Oman Professor of International Relations at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/070216\_asia2020.pdf

There is no denying the advances made in our security relationship. During most of its existence, the U.S.-Japan security relationship operated under two fundamental principles: that the United States will defend Japan and areas under its administration, and that Japan would provide bases and facilities for U.S. forces in country for the security of the Far East. This, coupled with Japan’s selfimposed constraints on defense, formed a security framework that compelled an inevitable junior-senior partnership until recent years. Japan’s Self-Defense Forces deployments to the Indian Ocean in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and to areas in and around Iraq to assist in the reconstruction effort demonstrated Japan’s initiative to make contributions well beyond the geographic scope of East Asia. Japan’s active participation abroad better mirrored its global interests and helped to diminish the security hierarchy that typified the U.S.-Japan relationship in the past**.** The United States and Japan also worked together in 2005 to make urgently needed military and financial contributions for humanitarian relief after the December 2004 tsunami disaster in Southeast Asia. Further, the United States and Japan, with India and Australia, established the “Core Group” to coordinate and manage the international relief effort until the United Nations was prepared to assume that role. Working with others, our alliance responded to this disaster of enormous scale with speed and with the required substance and magnitude. To address the growingthreat of missile proliferation in the region, the United States and Japan have cooperated to develop missile defense technologies and concepts. The United States and Japan are now in the process of producing and employing a missile defense system, sharing the technological capabilities of the world’s two largest economies. By cooperating on this important venture, Japan will benefit from the synergies resulting from a missile defense command and control system, improving its joint operational systems and our bilateral ability to quickly share critical information.

**Japan-U.S. Alliance Good – Japanese Stability**

Japan-U.S. alliance key to Japanese stability

Richard L. Armitage **and** Joseph S. Nye 2007 Richard L. Armitage, President, Armitage International Joseph S. Nye, Sultan of Oman Professor of International Relations at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/070216\_asia2020.pdf

Japan’s peacekeeping, disaster, and humanitarian relief deployments have made significant contributions to the region and areas around the globe. Likewise, over the past several years, Japan’s security environment has become increasingly challenging and complicated. The alliance is a key component of Japan’s security. However, it is important that Japan shoulder responsibilities in providing for the mainstay of its own defense. This includes missile defense capabilities to protect adequately its people, its critical infrastructure, and areas of U.S. Forces Japan. Adequate defense on the part of Japan also includes effective joint operational command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C3ISR) capabilities and capabilities to respond to a variety of contingencies. The United States will continue to be a key aspect of Japan’s security; however, Japan must make the alliance more equal by adequately providing for more of the areas required for its own defense.

**Japan-U.S. Alliance Good – Regional Stability**

Japan-U.S. alliance key to regional security

P.T. Singam The West Australian (Perth) **3-4**-2010 Thursday First Edition accessed on Lexis Nexis

 The US-Japan security alliance is the cornerstone of Japan's defence and security and the Japanese know it. There is no other alternative security umbrella, not only for Japan but also for the region. The Japanese may want to forge an independent position but they are unlikely to abandon the alliance. Greater Japanese co-operation with China, especially through a China-South Korea-Japan trilateral grouping, should be welcomed. Any co-operation between countries in the region will only help to build confidence, prevent conflict and ensure economic prosperity.

**Japan-U.S. Alliance Good – Regional Stability**

Japan-U.S. alliance key to Asian security

**Daily Yomiuri** **6-20**-2010 Sunday EDITORIAL; Talks needed to boost Japan-U.S. alliance The Daily Yomiuri(Tokyo) accessed on Lexis Nexis

Saturday marked the 50th anniversary of the automatic ratification of the revised Japan-U.S. Security Treaty--without the approval of the House of Councillors--amid demonstrators surrounding the Diet building. There is no question that the Japan-U.S. alliance has played an important role in ensuring peace, stability and economic prosperity in Japan and the rest of Asia during the past half century. Setting aside the way the revised treaty was approved by the Diet, the political decision of the Cabinet of then Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi to revise the treaty and maintain the bilateral alliance was correct. The conflicts surrounding the 1960 security treaty mirrored the Cold War between the East and West abroad and a showdown between conservatives and reformists at home. At that time, this country was completing its postwar reconstruction and entering a period of high economic growth. Public opinion was split over the revised security treaty, with memories of tragic war experiences still fresh in many people's minds. Govt appeals to. A group opposing revision, including the Japan Socialist Party, insisted the pact be abolished, saying it would make it easier for Japan to become embroiled in a war. Lawmakers of the ruling and opposition parties, as well as the general public, spent a huge amount of political energy on the issue. The Yomiuri Shimbun and six other Tokyo-based newspaper companies issued a joint appeal to the demonstrators that said, "Abandon violence and protect parliamentarism." Kishi announced his resignation right after the security treaty went into effect on June 23, 1960. The Japan-U.S. alliance, which was born after many difficulties were overcome, effectively staved off the military threat posed by the former Soviet Union during the Cold War. In the post-Cold War period, the bilateral alliance functioned as a deterrent to new threats from regional conflicts, including that on the Korean Peninsula, weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. By redefining the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, Japan and the United States came to regard their alliance as a kind of public asset to bolster the stability of Asia-Pacific region. The Japanese and U.S. governments later reviewed the Guideline for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, increasing the effectiveness of the bilateral alliance. Reconsidering relationship South Korea and Southeast Asian nations were now seriously concerned about the deterioration in the Japan-U.S. relationship caused by former Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama's poor diplomacy--evidence that other Asian nations also perceive the Japan-U.S. alliance as a public asset. Ironically, Hatoyama's words and deeds, which could have been interpreted as distancing Japan from the United States gave many people a good opportunity to reconsider the Japan-U.S. relationship. It is vital for us to think about how to deepen and develop the Japan-U.S. alliance based on history and past developments in the relationship between the two countries. The issue of relocating functions of the U.S. Marine Corp's Futenma Air Station is the first thing that needs to be worked on. First of all, the government should properly implement the Japan-U.S. agreement reached late last month, which says the location of the alternative facilities and the method for building runways will be decided by the end of August. It also is important to patch up strained relationships with Okinawa Prefecture and the Nago city government, and make tenacious efforts to seek acceptance of the plan. How should Japan and the United States cooperate with each other and other nations to tackle such issues as global warming, the war on terrorism and disarmament? By deepening discussions on such issues and by Japan playing more active roles in the international community, the nation could build an even stronger alliance with the United States. Security is the core of the bilateral alliance. North Korea has been developing nuclear missiles and sank a South Korean patrol vessel in March. China has rapidly been building up and modernizing its military. The Chinese Navy is expanding its operations to wider areas, causing friction with neighboring nations. Japan cannot be so optimistic about its security environment. Fully preparing for emergencies through close cooperation between the Self-Defense Forces and U.S. forces in peacetime will ultimately serve as a deterrence against such emergencies. The alliance sometimes is compared to riding a bicycle: The inertia of a bicycle will carry it forward, but unless we pedal, the bike will eventually slow down and fall. To maintain the alliance, it is vital for the two nations to set common goals and work hard together to achieve them. It is also indispensable to make ceaseless efforts to settle pending issues one by one. It is not enough to merely chant, "The Japan-U.S. alliance is the foundation of Japan's diplomacy."

**Japan-U.S. Alliance Good – Regional Stability**

Japan-U.S. alliance is the cornerstone of regional stability

Barack **Obama** United States Of America - President **and** Naoto **Kan** Japan - Prime Minister FD (Fair Disclosure) Wire **6-26-**2010 Saturday accessed on Lexis Nexis

Well, Prime Minister Kan and I just had an excellent conversation and bilateral meeting after three days where we've had an opportunity to share ideas on not only the most pressing issues that are facing our economies but also a range of security issues. I congratulated Prime Minister Kan on his leadership, and we both noted the significance of 50 years of a U.S.-Japan alliance that has been a cornerstone not only of our two nations' security but also peace and prosperity throughout Asia. We discussed some very pressing security issues, in particular North Korea, the sinking of the Cheonan, and the importance of both our countries standing in solidarity with South Korea and the entire international community standing with South Korea in condemning the incident and making sure that North Korea gets a clear signal that such provocations are unacceptable. I also expressed appreciation to Japan for its support for the Iran sanctions that we passed through the United Nations Security Council, and we discussed issues of implementation. But, of course, in addition to significant dangers, we also talked about great opportunities. We see the possibilities of strengthening our economic ties across a whole range of issues. That's been, obviously, the subject of this summit. We're both determined to pursue opportunities in clean energy and job growth and promoting the kind of sustainable recovery that will create opportunities for our people and increase opportunities not just for this generation but for future generations. And I'm very much looking forward to visiting Japan and enjoying the hospitality of Prime Minister Kan as he helps to shape the agenda for the next APEC meeting. And I thanked him for the very generous offer of boom and skimmers coming from Japan that can help in what is going to be a very lengthy process of cleaning up the Gulf in the wake of the oil spill. But it's an example of a friendship and an alliance in which Japan and the United States have consistently been there for each other. And although that friendship and alliance has to continually be renewed and reshaped in light of new circumstances, the core values and the shared vision at the heart of our alliance remains strong, and I am very confident that working with Prime Minister Kan, we are going to be able to continue to build on that tremendous history over the last 50 years. NAOTO KAN, PRIME MINISTER, JAPAN: I am very happy to have such a -- have candid discussions with President Obama today. And at the outset of our meeting, I talked about my experience from 30 years ago when I visited the United States on the invitation of the Department of State, and about the experience of seeing the various NGOs are making activities depend solely on nations, and I saw the grassroots democracy there. And I shared my recognition that President was elected on such a background of the democracy in the United States. And I said to the President I have an experience of political life based on such grassroots activities, and I will also continue to pursue such a style of politics with my allies. And I am also happy to have such a meeting in a year which is a milestone of 50 years -- 50th anniversary of the Japan-U.S. alliance. And this alliance between Japan and the United States not only has brought peace and prosperity not only to Japan, but also it has been a foundation and cornerstone of civility of the whole Asia-Pacific region. And President Obama has such a recognition and he completely shares the same understanding about our alliance. And for the stability of Asia, Japan is proud of having been working together with the United States. And I told the President that it is very important to further enhance the partnership and our alliance, and at the same time, in order to pursue that goal, it is important for the Japanese public themselves to think really about the significance of our alliance, and for them to think about the decisions for the future of our alliance. And I talked about my recognition with President Obama today. And in other words -- in other words, it is often the case that people see the way -- people see the situation as politicians make their decisions and the public makes complaints about it, that it is important for us to avoid such a situation by creating real discussions about our future ways. And we talked also about the incident in which North Korea attacked the -- attacked and sunk the North Korean naval -- South Korean naval vessel, and we talked also about the issue of Iran and Afghanistan. Always we have to work together to respond, and we share a common understanding of those issues. And I also reaffirmed our recognition that it is important for us to cooperate in such issues as climate change or nuclear disarmament in North Korea's regime. And during the past three days, we talked about economic issues at the G-8 and G-20 meetings, and we discussed these issues together. And President Obama expressed the support for the economic course that Japan will pursue, and I was strongly encouraged by his comments. .

**Japan-U.S. Alliance Good – Regional Stability and Prolif**

Japan-U.S. alliance responsible for Asian stability and controlling prolif

Capt. Will Powell, 5th Air Force Public Affairs Defense Department Documents and Publications **1-22**-2010 U.S., Japan forces celebrate as alliance reaches half-century mark accessed on LexisNexis

1/22/2010 - TOKYO (AFNS) -- Fifty years ago U.S. and Japanese officials signed a security treaty that has outlasted 10 U.S. presidents and 22 Japan prime ministers, and things show no sign of slowing down yet. To celebrate the 50th anniversary of the alliance, approximately 200 Japanese and American servicemembers and government officials gathered together Jan. 19 at the U.S. Embassy. Most in attendance were infants or not even alive in 1960 when the two countries signed the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, but today they are dignitaries and generals charged with upholding and enhancing what the two countries have called "one of their most important alliances." "I don't think we can say it enough about how much the relationship between the U.S. and Japan means to our two countries," said Lt. Gen. Herbert J. "Hawk" Carlisle, 13th Air Force commander, who represented U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Pacific Air Forces at the event as the senior-ranking U.S. military member. "In the past 50 years the growth of the relationship between the U.S. and Japan, and the incredible ascending of Japan to its place as a world leader, has been nothing short of extraordinary. President Eisenhower called this an 'indestructible partnership.' I would add it's an indestructible and indispensible partnership for both countries." Members from each branch of the Japan Self-Defense Forces and U.S. military attended the event, which underscores the nature of the joint environment and the importance of each service component in maintaining peace and security in the region. Although Japan's constitution restricts their military force to self-defense only, since the signing of the treaty the Japan Self-Defense Forces have played an increasingly global role in providing security, stability and humanitarian assistance. Japan forces supported operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom for years with maritime refueling and reconstruction assistance. Maritime forces are helping anti-piracy efforts in the Horn of Africa. And now, Japanese Airmen are delivering supplies and medical experts to Haiti to help with disaster relief efforts following the devastating earthquake there. "I think all of those events are a direct result of the cooperative planning and training that is a result of our very strong alliance," said Navy Capt. Jim White, U.S. Embassy defense and naval attacho'. The treaty, signed during the height of the Cold War, gives the U.S. access to bases, infrastructure and other support in Japan in exchange for the U.S.' commitment to aid in the cooperative defense of Japan should an armed attack occur here. The Cold War ended two decades ago, but both countries pledge to continue the long-standing partnership. "We face new challenges now with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and regional nuclear threats," said Rear Adm. Tsutomu Anzai, Maritime Self-Defense Force director general of administration. "To overcome these new challenges, we'll need a very good relationship and strong alliance between Japan and the United States." The admiral believes the two nations can strengthen the alliance with more top-level military and political dialogue, by integrating operations and communication between all ranks in counterpart and joint services, and through bilateral exercises. The two defense departments will get the chance to demonstrate and enhance the alliance's strength during a major bilateral, joint exercise known as Keen Edge, which runs Jan. 22 to 28. All U.S. and Japanese services are involved in the command post exercise, and this year even the PACOM commander and his staff are participating. The security treaty makes bilateral exercises like Keen Edge possible and successful because the treaty is what authorizes U.S. forces to be based in Japan. Building mutually beneficial relationships here requires frequent personal and professional, face-to-face engagements, which is one of the key reasons for U.S. forward presence in Japan. Those relationships are built on a "shared vision of peace, prosperity, democracy and regional stability," said Lt. Gen. Edward A. Rice Jr., commander of U.S. Forces Japan and 5th AF, which combined with 13th AF Detachment 1, serve as the U.S. Air Force's "face" in Japan. That shared vision is likely to last well into the future, which puts no expiration date on the security treaty. "This is another beginning for the alliance with the United States," said Air Self-Defense Force Col. Yutaka Takahashi, lead liaison officer for 5th AF. "We'll have to work hard together, enhance each other's capabilities and help each other out, but this vital alliance should last another 50 years."

**Japan-U.S. Alliance Good – Japanese Stability**

Japan-U.S. alliance key to Japanese security

Jiji Press Ticker **Service 1-19**-2010 Tuesday 11:11 AM JST Hatoyama Stresses Significance of Japan-U.S. Security Alliance accessed on LexisNexis

Japan's Prime Minister Yukio said Tuesday that the security alliance between his country and the United States continues to be indispensable for the peace and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region as well as the defense of Japan. In a statement to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the signing of the revised Japan-U.S. security treaty on Jan. 19, 1960, Hatoyama said that the alliance has made significant contributions to the region's stability, stressing that Japan owes its postwar peace and economic expansion to its security ties with the United States. Hatoyama said that his government will discuss with the United States how to deepen the bilateral security alliance centering on the treaty and make it fit for the 21st century, adding that he hopes the results of the discussions will be announced within this year. Japan and the United States are slated to hold a meeting of the Security Consultative Committee, known as a "two-plus-two" forum among the two countries' foreign and defense ministers, during the first half of this year for the discussions on ways to strengthen the security alliance. The Japanese side hopes to draw a conclusion by the time U.S. President Barack Obama visits Japan in November to attend a summit of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum to be held in Yokohama, southwest of Tokyo. Political watchers say that the key to success in working out measures to deepen the security alliance is whether Tokyo and Washington can resolve the controversial issue of relocating the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station in the southernmost Japan prefecture of Okinawa. The two countries in 2006 agreed to relocate the base in the city of Ginowan to the Marine Corps' Camp Schwab in Nago in the same prefecture. But the Hatoyama government, launched in September last year, is reviewing the accord and looking for an alternative relocation site. In the statement, Hatoyama said that the security situation surrounding Japan is tough, pointing, for example, to North Korea's missile and nuclear tests. U.S. deterrence based on the bilateral security alliance will continue to play a significant role to ensure the peace and security of Japan, which has vowed not to possess nuclear weapons or become a military superpower, Hatoyama said. Hatoyama stressed the significance of the U.S. military presence in Japan, saying he believes that U.S. forces stationed in the country will continue serving as something like public property by providing a great sense of security to nearby nations at a time when the regional security situation remains unstable.

**Japan-U.S. Alliance Good – Regional Stability**

Japan-U.S. alliance key to regional stability

Staff Sgt. Thomas Doscher States News Service 7-21-2010 Wednesday NORAD, USNORTHCOM HOSTS U.S.-JAPANESE JOINT STAFF TALKS accessed on LexisNexis

7/21/2010 - PETERSON AIR FORCE BASE, Colo. -- The North American Aerospace Defense Command and U.S. Northern Command headquarters was the site of a U.S.-Japanese Joint Staff Conference July 11 to 16, designed to bring together members of both nations' joint staffs to discuss issues of mutual importance and further strengthen the historic alliance. The conference, held annually since 1992, comes on the heels of the 50th anniversary of the signing of the United States-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. The Japanese officers received briefings from various U.S. organizations, including USNORTHCOM, a tour of Cheyenne Mountain Air Force Station and a visit with the 100th Missile Brigade at Schriever Air Force Base. Japan Ground Self Defense Force Maj. Gen. Koichi Isobe, Japan Joint Staff Director for Defense Plans and Policy, said the conference is an excellent opportunity to discuss important issues for the Japan-U.S. alliance with the Joint Staff and other key players on the U.S. side, including USNORTHCOM. "The fact that we are holding the discussions here at NORAD and USNORTHCOM headquarters will also enable us to learn about NORTHCOM's mission and responsibilities in regard to homeland security and disaster relief," he said. "The JSDF has similar responsibilities so we're very much looking forward to hearing the NORTHCOM briefing." Air Force Lt. Col. Leslie Maher, Joint Staff J5, Northeast Asia Division, said the conference gives both nations' militaries a better understanding of their capabilities and expectations for ensuring regional security and stability. "The idea was that as we did more bilateral coordination with the Japanese and developed bilateral plans, we needed to see how each other's decision-making matrix worked," she said. "So what the conference was designed to do was to go through notional scenarios that escalate from peacetime to various levels of crisis intensity in order to discuss and determine how we should cooperate and react bilaterally in order to de-escalate the situation. This gives us the opportunity to discuss issues at zero ground speed so we can understand how we must respond and cooperate in a crisis." These annual conferences are important because the alliance between the United States and Japan is a key factor in the stability of Asia, Colonel Maher explained. With that much riding on the alliance, it's important to keep those relationships strong. "After 50 years of mutual cooperation to ensure peace in Northeast Asia, the security alliance has never been stronger," said Air Force Brig. Gen. Jeff Newell, Joint Staff Deputy Director for Politico-Military Affairs for Asia. "The military-to-military relationship has never been healthier," he said. "And it is important that we continue to align our visions for the future, because the U.S.-Japan security alliance is a foundation of peace and stability in Northeast Asia." Isobe said the alliance's strength not only benefits Japan, but the entire East Asia region. "The defense of Japan consists of two elements," he explained. "It's the capability provided by the Self Defense Force and the capability provided by the U.S.-Japan security relationship and alliance. Because of that, we have a very strong relationship that provides peace and stability, not just for Japan, but for the entire region as well." Colonel Maher agreed, noting the strong partnership between the U.S. Navy and the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force as an example. "The navy-to-navy relationship between us and Japan, for instance, is probably one of our strongest bilateral relationships," Colonel Maher added. "This relationship has facilitated frank, military-to-military discussions and sharing of information, which has contributed greatly to maritime peace and security in Northeast Asia." With the alliance's 50th anniversary, Colonel Maher said the emphasis of this conference is on themes that will prepare the alliance for the future, such as space, cyberspace and missile defense. "That's why this seminar is more important than those in the past," she said. "We're trying to set us up for the next 50 years." "Not only do we want to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the mutual security treaty, but we also want to talk about the next 50 years and what the alliance relationship should look like," General Isobe agreed.

**Japan-U.S. Alliance Good – Regional Stability**

Collapse of the Japan-U.S. alliance collapses Japanese security

The Daily Yomiuri(Tokyo**)** 1-1-2010 Friday EDITORIAL; Leaders must chart new political course accessed on LexisNexis

The Hatoyama Cabinet is under pressure to take the deciding vote away from its junior coalition partners. When it comes to important policies and bills that could determine the fate of the nation and have a major impact on people's lives, the administration should not hesitate to form a temporary alliance and cooperate with opposition parties or even to form a national-unity administration through a bold political reorganization. The Japan-U.S. alliance is the cornerstone of national security. While continuing its development of nuclear arms, North Korea is demanding a security guarantee and economic assistance. Meanwhile, China is attempting to expand its economic interests, backed by its military buildup. For Japan, which is separated by a narrow strip of water from these two countries of different political systems, maintaining amicable Japan-U.S. relations on the basis of the security alliance should be a fundamental part of the national strategy. In spite of this, Hatoyama's words and deeds touting his vision of an East Asian community and aimed at distancing Japan from the United States could potentially endanger the alliance. It is self-evident that, as a sovereign state, Japan has an equal relationship with the United States. Yet, the Japan-U.S. security alliance is based on mutual benefit whereby Japan is protected by the United States in time of emergency in exchange for allowing the United States to establish military bases in Japan. The Japan-U.S. security alliance made it possible for Japan to pursue butter instead of guns in the postwar years. If Japan ends its previous dependence on the United States and pursues relations as an equal, it will become vital to drastically reinforce the nation's ability to defend itself and deal with external threats, including that posed by North Korea. Doing so would require a substantial increase in defense spending, a move that would lead to cuts in budgetary resources that should otherwise be used to improve the economy and carry out social welfare programs. This would be exacerbated by greater concerns among neighboring nations about Japan's military buildup. For this country, weakening its alliance with the United States and seeking a fifty-fifty bilateral relationship is not a realistic option. Meanwhile, Japan has every reason to step up its strategic reciprocal relationship with China, a nation with which this country has close economic ties. Cooperation with China is also indispensable to keep North Korea in check

**Japan-U.S. Alliance Good – Regional Stability and Asian Economy**

Japan-U.S. alliance key to regional stability and Asia’s economy

Testimony-by: Joseph Donovan, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary **3-17**-2010 Wednesday Affiliation: Department of State Statement of Joseph Donovan Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs Department of State Committee on House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global Environment u.s.-japan relations; committee: house foreign affairs; subcommittee: asia, the pacific, and the global environment accessed on LexisNexis

U.S.-Japan Security Alliance As President Obama said in his Tokyo speech last November, the U.S.-Japan alliance is not a historic relic from a bygone era, but an abiding commitment to each other that is fundamental to our shared security. The U.S.-Japan Alliance plays an indispensable role in ensuring the security and prosperity of both the United States and Japan, as well as regional peace and stability. The Alliance is rooted in our shared values, democratic ideals, respect for human rights, rule of law and common interests. The Alliance has served as the foundation of our security and prosperity for the past half century, and we are committed to ensuring that it continues to be effective in meeting the challenges of the 21st century. The U.S.-Japan security arrangements underpin cooperation on a wide range of global and regional issues as well as foster stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. The Alliance is the cornerstone of our engagement in East Asia. That is a phrase oft-repeated by U.S. officials, but I think it is important and perhaps timely to step back and consider what that means. This cornerstone role began and grew out of the farsighted vision of American leaders at the end of World War II, a vision that recognized the importance of building strong partnerships with democratic market economies to meet the challenges of the second half of the 20th century, not just with our wartime allies, but equally with those who had been our adversaries. This vision was predicated on an idea, validated by the passage of time, that U.S. interests are best served by the emergence of strong, prosperous and independent democracies across the Pacific, as well as the Atlantic. Those leaders built an alliance with Japan based both on common interests and shared values, an alliance formally consecrated 50 years ago. That alliance not only helped secure peace and prosperity for the people of Japan and the United States, but it also helped create the conditions that have led to the remarkable emergence of Asia as the cockpit of the global economy that has helped lift millions out of poverty and gradually spread the blessings of democratic governance to more and more countries of that region. The Alliance had its roots in the Cold War. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the movement towards a more market-oriented government in China, some began to question the relevance of what President Eisenhower had called our indestructible partnership. Yet under the leadership of President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto, the United States and Japan set out to demonstrate that our partnership should and could adapt to the evolving dynamics of the post-Cold War Asia. In the 14 years since the Clinton-Hashimoto Joint Security declaration, the relationship has grown stronger even as it has evolved. The United States and Japan have worked together to update our alliance, through efforts ranging from the force posture realignment to the review of roles, missions, and capabilities. The alliance has grown in scope, with cooperation on everything from missile defense to information security. Additionally, Japan provides approximately $3 billion annually in host nation support to the U.S. military, more than any other U.S. ally. There are more than 48,000 American military personnel deployed in Japan, including our only forward deployed carrier strike group, the 5th Air Force, and the III Marine Expeditionary Force. Through the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI), the United States and Japan made a landmark alliance commitment under the 2006 U.S.-Japan Realignment Roadmap, which was reaffirmed by the 2009 Guam International Agreement, to implement a coherent package of force posture realignments that will have far-reaching benefits for the Alliance. These changes will help strengthen the flexibility and deterrent capability of U.S. forces while creating the conditions for a more sustainable U.S. military presence in the region. The transformation includes the relocation of approximately 8,000 Marines from Okinawa to Guam, force posture relocations and land returns on Okinawa, and other realignments and combined capability changes on mainland Japan (e.g., increased interoperability, as well as collaboration on ballistic missile defense). This realignment will strengthen both countries ability to meet current responsibilities and create an Alliance that is more flexible, capable, and better able to work together to address common security concerns, whether in the region or globally.

**Japan-U.S. Alliance Good – Regional Stability**

Japan-U.S. alliance key to Asian peace

Joseph I. Lieberman, Conneticut Senator, **6-30**-2010 Wednesday SENATE RESOLUTION RECOGNIZES 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF TREATY OF MUTUAL SECURITY AND COOPERATION WITH JAPAN accessed on LexisNexis

The Senate last night approved a resolution introduced by Senator Jim Webb chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asia and Pacific Affairs, which recognized the 50th anniversary of the ratification of the Treaty of Mutual Security and Cooperation with Japan and affirmed support for the United States-Japan security alliance and relationship (S.RES.564). "The U.S.-Japan alliance has preserved for generations a largely stable environment in Asia which has directly and crucially contributed to the region's robust economic growth and political development," said Webb. "Recent troubles in the region-for example, the sinking of the Republic of Korea's ship, the Cheonan, by North Korea-have underscored the need to maintain this strategic relationship and regional balance." The bipartisan resolution was cosponsored by Senators Kit Bond Benjamin Cardin, Christopher Dodd, James Inhofe, John Kerry, Joseph Lieberman, and Richard Lugar. "The U.S.-Japan alliance is critical to the continued security and economic prosperity of the Asia Pacific region. It is critical we continue to strengthen this strategic partnership between our two nations in order to deal with new and emerging challenges in the 21st century," said Senator Kit Bond "For more than half a century, our alliance with Japan has been the foundation for unprecedented security, freedom, and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. Like all Americans, I am proud of that our alliance has grown into a force for good all over the world. In a dynamic and uncertain future, I am convinced that our alliance and friendship with Japan will only grow more important," said Senator Joe Lieberman.

**Japan-U.S. Alliance Good – Regional Stability**

Japan-U.S. alliance key to asian stability

Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State, Robert M. Gates, Secretary of Defense, Katsuya Okada, Minister for Foreign Affairs **and** Toshimi Kitazawa, Minister of Defense issued on May 28, 2010 in Tokyo, Japan. Joint Statement of U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee accessed on LexisNexis

On May 28, 2010, the members of the United States-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) reconfirmed that, in this 50th anniversary year of the signing of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, the U.S.-Japan Alliance remains indispensable not only to the defense of Japan, but also to the peace, security, and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region. Recent developments in the security environment of Northeast Asia reaffirmed the significance of the Alliance. In this regard, the United States reiterated its unwavering commitment to Japan's security. Japan reconfirmed its commitment to playing a positive role in contributing to the peace and stability of the region.

**Japan-U.S. Alliance Good – Regional Stability**

Japan-U.S. alliance key to Asian stability

The U.S. Department of State 1-19- 2010 TuesdayTHE U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE MARKING 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF SIGNING OF U.S.-JAPAN TREATY OF MUTUAL COOPERATION AND SECURITY accessed on LexisNexis

On this the Fiftieth Anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, the Members of the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) affirm that the U.S.-Japan Alliance plays an indispensable role in ensuring the security and prosperity of both the United States and Japan, as well as regional peace and stability. The Alliance is rooted in our shared values, democratic ideals, respect for human rights, rule of law and common interests. The Alliance has served as the foundation of our security and prosperity for the past half century and the Ministers are committed to ensuring that it continues to be effective in meeting the challenges of the twenty-first century. The U.S.-Japan security arrangements underpin cooperation on a wide range of global and regional issues as well as foster prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. The Ministers are committed to building on these arrangements and expanding into new areas of cooperation.

**Japan-U.S. Alliance Good – Spratly Islands**

US-Japan alliance is key to prevent war over the Spratly Islands.

Okimoto 2, President of Okamoto Associates and Special Adviser to the Cabinet and Chairman of the Japanese prime minister's Task Force on Foreign Relations 2002 “Japan and the United States: The Essential Alliance,” spring 2002, Vol. 25, No. 2, http://www.twq.com/02spring/okamoto.pdf]

**The Japan-U.S. alliance** also probably **serves as a deterrent against any one nation seizing control of the Spratly Islands and**, by extension, the sea lanes and resources of **the South China Sea**. Formally, the area is outside the Far East region that the United States and Japan agree is covered by Article 6 of the security treaty. **For the countries vying for control of the sea**, however, **the proximity of two of the world’s great maritime forces must at least urge them to use caution as they pursue their competition**.

Spratly Conflict goes nuclear

Nikkei 95 [The Nikkei weekly, Developing Asian nations should be allowed a grace period to allow their economies to grow before being subjected to trade liberalization demands, says Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, July 3, 1995, lexis]

Developing Asian nations should be allowed a grace period to allow their economies to grow before being subjected to trade liberalization demands, says **Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir** Mohamad. He dismisses an argument put forward by some industrialized countries that fair trade can be realized when trading conditions are the same for all countries. It is not fair when small developing countries are obliged to compete with Japan and the U.S. under the same conditions, the outspoken champion of Asian interests insists. The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum originated as a loose discussion platform. But it has become an institution, and agendas are prepared ahead of meetings. However, Mahathir is dissatisfied with its management, because, he says, group policy is decided by a handful of leading nations. **He is also resentful of some countries' opposition to the Malaysian-proposed East-Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC), aimed at promoting economic cooperation in the region. The EAEC, which the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) defines as a part of APEC, doesn't stand in opposition to APEC, he says. "The EAEC and APEC can coexist," he says.** The EAEC is just a conference, not a trade bloc like the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAF-TA), he adds. Mahathir has gone to some lengths to bring Japan on board. Without the world's No. 2 economy, the EAEC will not be taken seriously by the international community, he says. Some have suggested also sending out invitations to Australia and New Zealand. **But in order to join the EAEC, those two nations should not only just call themselves Asian countries, he says. They should also share values and culture with their Asian partners, he stresses, because the caucus is a group of Asian countries. Mahathir strongly opposes the use of weapons to settle international dispute**s. The prime minister hails the ASEAN Regional Forum as a means for civilized nations of achieving negotiated settlement of disputes. Many members of the forum, including Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines and Thailand, have problems with their neighbors, but they are trying to solve them through continued dialogue, he adds. **Three scenarios Mahathir sees Asia developing in three possible ways in future. In his worst-case scenario, Asian countries would go to war against each other, possibly over disputes such as their conflicting claims on the** **Spratly Islands. China might then declare war on the U.S., leading to full-scale, even nuclear, war.**

**Japan-U.S. Alliance Good – Taiwan (1/2)**

US-Japan alliance is key to preventing China Taiwan war

**Okimoto 2** [Yukio Okimoto President of Okamoto Associates and Special Adviser to the Cabinet and Chairman of the Japanese prime minister's Task Force on Foreign Relations 2002 “Japan and the United States: The Essential Alliance,” spring 2002, Vol. 25, No. 2, http://www.twq.com/02spring/okamoto.pdf]

**Regardless of whether China’s development takes the bright path or the fearful one, however, reason for concern exists on one issue: the resolution of the status of Taiwan. Chinese citizens from all walks of life have an attachment to the reunification of Taiwan and the mainland that transcends reason. The U.S.-Japan alliance represents a significant hope for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan problem. Both Japan and the United States have clearly stated that they oppose reunification by force**. When China conducted provocative missile tests in the waters around Taiwan in 1996, the United States sent two aircraft carrier groups into nearby waters as a sign of its disapproval of China’s belligerent act. Japan seconded the U.S. action, raising in Chinese minds the possibility that Japan might offer logistical and other support to its ally in the event of hostilities**. Even though intervention is only a possibility, a strong and close tie between Japanese and U.S. security interests guarantees that the Chinese leadership cannot afford to miscalculate the consequences of an unprovoked attack on Taiwan. The alliance backs up Japan’s basic stance that the two sides need to come to a negotiated solution.**

**Japan-U.S. Alliance Good – Taiwan (1/2)**

China Taiwan War would draw in the US and lead to extinction

Straits Times 2000 [The Straits Times, “No One Gains in War over Taiwan,” 6/25/00, Lexis]

THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -horror of horrors -raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation. There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else.

**Japan-U.S. Alliance Good – North Korea**

US-Japan alliance is key to preventing North Korean War

**Okimoto 2** [Yukio Okimoto President of Okamoto Associates and Special Adviser to the Cabinet and Chairman of the Japanese prime minister's Task Force on Foreign Relations 2002 “Japan and the United States: The Essential Alliance,” spring 2002, Vol. 25, No. 2, http://www.twq.com/02spring/okamoto.pdf]

Despite its years of famine; its evaporating industrial and energy infrastructure; and its choking, inhumane society, **the DPRK government still refuses to retreat** to its place on the ash heap of history. Despite the poverty of the people, the North Korean military maintains an arsenal of thousands of rocket launchers and pieces of artillery—some of which are possibly loaded with chemical and biological warheads—awaiting the signal to wipe Seoul off the map. The DPRK’s immense stock of weapons includes large numbers of Nodong missiles capable of striking Japan’s western coastal regions and probably longer-range missiles capable of hitting every major Japanese city. The United States has two combat aircraft wings in the ROK, in Osan and Kunsan. In addition, some 30,000 U.S. Army troops are stationed near Seoul. **Most military experts admit that the army troops serve a largely symbolic function; if an actual war were to erupt, a massive North Korean artillery bombardment could pin down both the U.S. Eighth Army** and the ROK armed forces at the incipient stage. **The firepower the USFJ can bring to bear upon the Korean Peninsula within a matter of hours makes the U.S.-Japan alliance the Damoclean sword hanging over the DPRK. The DPRK leaders are masters of deception and manipulation, but they know that launching a military strike against the ROK will expose them to a strong and final counterstrike from U.S. forces in Japan.**

That’s the most likely scenario for nuclear war

Moore 9 [Malcolm Moore, Telegraph's Shanghai Correspondent., 6-14-2009, North Korea claims US could provoke nuclear war, Telegraph, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/5532319/North-Korea-claims-US-could-provoke-nuclear-war.html]

Meanwhile, the Tongbil Sinbo newspaper said that North Korea is "completely within the range of US nuclear attack and the Korean peninsula is becoming an area where **the chances of nuclear war are the highest in the world**." Over the weekend, North Korea angrily responded to fresh United Nations sanctions by threatening to build as many nuclear weapons as possible. Until now, it said, it had only reprocessed one-third of its spent fuel rods into weapons-grade plutonium. Analysts believe the rogue state could end up with enough plutonium to make eight to nine bombs. The rogue state also claimed to have a uranium-enrichment programme, the first time it has admitted to one. The claim is alarming, said Professor Yang Moo-Jin, of Seoul's University of North Korean Studies. "The North has abundant natural uranium of good quality, which, if combined with technology and facilities, would result in a great nuclear arsenal," he said.

**Japan-U.S. Alliance Good – Sino-Russia Alliance (1/2)**

Strengthening the US-Japan alliance is critical to loosen Sino-Russian ties and checking agression

Brookes 5 [Peter Brooks, Senior Fellow at the heritage foundation, 8/15/05 “An Alarming Alliance: Sino Russian ties tightening” The Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed081505a.cfm]

The first- ever joint Chinese-Russian military exercises kick off Thursday in Northeast Asia. The exercises are small in scale — but huge in implication. They indicate a further warming of the "strategic partnership" that Moscow and Beijing struck back in 1996. More importantly, they signal the first real post-Cold War steps, beyond inflammatory rhetoric, by Russia and China to balance — and, ultimately, diminish — U.S. power across Asia. If America doesn't take strategic steps to counter these efforts, it will lose influence to Russia and China in an increasingly important part of the world. Unimaginable just a few years ago, the weeklong military exercises — dubbed "Peace Mission 2005" — will involve 10,000 troops on China and Russia's eastern coasts and in adjacent seas. This unmistakable example of Sino-Russian military muscle-flexing will also include Russia's advanced SU-27 fighters, strategic TU-95 and TU-22 bombers, submarines, amphibious and anti-submarine ships. The exercise's putative purpose is to "strengthen the capability of the two armed forces in jointly striking international terrorism, extremism and separatism," says China's Defense Ministry. But the Chinese defense minister was more frank in comments earlier this year. Gen. Cao Gangchuan said: "The exercise will exert both immediate and far-reaching impacts." This raised lots of eyebrows — especially in the United States, Taiwan and Japan. For instance, although Russia nixed the idea, the Chinese demanded the exercises be held 500 miles to the south — a move plainly aimed at intimidating Taiwan. Beijing clearly wanted to send a warning to Washington (and, perhaps, Tokyo) about its support for Taipei, and hint at the possibility that if there were a Taiwan Strait dust-up, Russia might stand with China. The exercise also gives Russia an opportunity to strut its military wares before its best customers — Chinese generals. Moscow is Beijing's largest arms supplier, to the tune of more than $2 billion a year for purchases that include subs, ships, missiles and fighters. Rumors abound that Moscow may finally be ready to sell strategic, cruise-missile-capable bombers such as the long-range TU-95 and supersonic TU-22 to Beijing — strengthening China's military hand against America and U.S. friends and allies in Asia. Russia and China are working together to oppose American influence all around their periphery. Both are upset by U.S. support for freedom in the region — notably in the recent Orange (Ukraine), Rose (Georgia) and Tulip (Kyrgyzstan) revolutions — all of which fell in what Moscow or Beijing deems its sphere of influence. In fact, at a recent meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (i.e., Russia, China and the four 'Stans'), Moscow and Beijing conspired to get Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan to close U.S. airbases. As a result, Uzbekistan gave America 180 days to get out, despite the base's continued use in Afghanistan operations. (Quick diplomacy by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld saved the Kyrgyz base, but it remains on the ropes.) Moreover, it shouldn't be overlooked that the "Shanghai Six" have invited Iran, India and Pakistan to join the group as observers, expanding China and Russia's influence into South Asia and parts of the Middle East. What to do? First, the Pentagon must make sure the forthcoming Quadrennial Defense Review balances U.S. forces to address both the unconventional terrorist threat and the big-power challenge represented by a Russia-China strategic partnership. Second, the United States must continue to strengthen its relationship with its ally Japan to ensure a balance of power in Northeast Asia — and also encourage Tokyo to improve relations with Moscow in an effort to loosen Sino-Russian ties. Third, Washington must persevere in advancing its new relationship with (New) Delhi in order to balance Beijing's growing power in Asia and take advantage of India's longstanding, positive relationship with Russia. And be ready to deal. Russia has historically been wary of China. America must not ignore the possibilities of developing a long-term, favorable relationship with Russia — despite the challenges posed by Russian President Vladimir Putin's heavy-handed rule. These unprecedented military exercises don't make a formal Beijing-Moscow alliance inevitable. But they represent a new, more intimate phase in the Sino-Russian relationship. And China's growing political/economic clout mated with Russia's military would make for a potentially potent anti-American bloc. For the moment, Beijing and Moscow are committed to building a political order in Asia that doesn't include America atop the power pyramid. With issues from Islamic terrorism to North Korean nukes to a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, the stakes in Asia are huge. Washington and its friends must not waste any time in addressing the burgeoning Sino-Russian entente.

**Japan-U.S. Alliance Good – Sino-Russia Alliance (2/2)**

Sino Russian War leads to Extinction

Sharavin 1 [Alexander Sharavin, head of the institute for political and military analysis, 10/1/2001 The Third Threat http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/5470.html

Russia may face the "wonderful" prospect of combating the Chinese army, which, if full mobilization is called, is comparable in size with Russia's entire population, which also has nuclear weapons (even tactical weapons become strategic if states have common borders) and would be absolutely insensitive to losses (even a loss of a few million of the servicemen would be acceptable for China). Such a war would be more horrible than the World War II. It would require from our state maximal tension, universal mobilization and complete accumulation of the army military hardware, up to the last tank or a plane, in a single direction (we would have to forget such "trifles" like Talebs and Basaev, but this does not guarantee success either). Massive nuclear strikes on basic military forces and cities of China would finally be the only way out, what would exhaust Russia's armament completely. We have not got another set of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-based missiles, whereas the general forces would be extremely exhausted in the border combats. In the long run, even if the aggression would be stopped after the majority of the Chinese are killed, our country would be absolutely unprotected against the "Chechen" and the "Balkan" variants both, and even against the first frost of a possible nuclear winter.

\*\*\* AT: Okinawa Key To Heg \*\*\*

AT: Okinawa Key To Heg – Okinawa Kills Heg

Okinawa kills heg

AFP, **7-2-**2010 Okinawa city to sue Japan over US base issue, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jPLYb0MSl5WhGoTaofS1sES5ULXw

A Japanese city hosting an unpopular and controversial US military airbase plans to file a lawsuit against the country's government for failing to address the needs of locals, its mayor said Friday. The issue of where to relocate the US Marine Corps Air Station Futenma from its current position in a densely populated area in Okinawa strained ties with Washington and helped trigger former prime minister Yukio Hatoyama's downfall. Anti-base protests have flared in recent months after Hatoyama first pledged to move the contentious Futenma airbase off Okinawa, than reneged on the promise following protests from the United States, enraging locals. Hatoyama's successor Prime Minister Naoto Kan has pledged to follow an accord reached in May under which the base would be relocated within Okinawa -- as first agreed in 2006 -- to the island's coastal Henoko region. Okinawans have been the reluctant hosts of Japan's largest concentration of US forces for decades and have long complained about noise pollution and potential safety problems from low-flying US military jets near the airbase. "We were forced to accept an excess burden of hosting the US base and denied even the basic human rights in our everyday lives. Therefore, I decided to question at court the government's policy in providing the Futenma airbase (to the United States)," Ginowan mayor Yoichi Iha said in a news conference. The mayor plans to file the lawsuit before March 2011, local reports said. The city will argue that the airbase threatens the safety of residents and therefore violates Japan's constitution, reports said. Futenma and other US bases were established as American forces took the island in one of the bloodiest battles of World War II. After the war, Okinawa stayed under US occupation until 1972 and has since then remained the strategic US military cornerstone in the Pacific, with the world's two largest economies forming a key security partnership. U.S. military bases on Okinawa, home to some 27,000 service personnel and nearly as many family members, occupy one-fifth of the island. Although being stationed in an attractive western Pacific locale may be pleasant for U.S. soldiers, the pervasive American military presence harms most Okinawans. Barbed-wire-topped fences line major roads and cut across towns; prime commercial sites and beaches are unavailable for civilian use; accidents, crowding, and crime are constant annoyances; live-fire military exercises and aircraft flights disrupt what would otherwise be a peaceful environment. Okinawan demands for a reduction in the number and size of U.S. bases have been growing, especially since the election of Masahide Ota as governor in 1990.

\*\*\* AT: Japan Rearm Bad \*\*\*

**AT: Japan Rearm – Japan has Military Force Now**

**Impacts are non-unique – Japan increasing its military now**

Christopher A. Preble, independent defense analyst who has written for a variety of publications, 3-4-2010, U.S.-Japanese Security Relations: Adjusting to Change, Cato Institute, http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb-007.html

**It is evident that Japan has the resources to once again become an active military player in the world scene. Indeed, the Japanese GNP ranks second only to that of the United States. In addition to its great economic strength, Japan has created the Japanese Self-Defense Forces, including a modern navy of over 200 ships**. Although the use of the JSDF is ostensibly constrained by the constitution, **it is a formidable force.** **There is a growing inclination in Japan to play an active role in world affairs, in spite of the supposed constitutional restrictions on the use of military force.** One manifestation of activism has been Japan's aggressive foreign aid budget. In 1989 Japan contributed over $6.77 billion in bilateral foreign aid and another $1.7 billion through multilateral aid programs--more than any other nation in the world. It is also pertinent to note that **Tokyo's military spending and the size of the JSDF have increased markedly since the mid-1970s despite the supposed strictures of the peace constitution**. Unfortunately, uneasiness about growing Japanese influence as the result of such activity is used by some Americans to justify the continuation of the U.S. military presence in Japan and Washington's dominant role in the overall U.S.-Japanese security relationship. In some cases, it has even reinforced fears of the resurgence of Japan as a military threat to the United States.(9) Consequently, arbitrary U.S. obstacles to a larger Japanese military role have remained entrenched. Some U.S. officials seem to believe that the Japanese nation is, by nature, inordinately oriented toward world domination.

AT: Japan Rearm – Militaries are Normal

Japan should become a “normal” state – no reason why they shouldn’t get a military

Richard J. Samuels, Ford International Professor of Political Science, 2-23-2005, Ford International Professor of Political Science, Project Muse, http://web.mit.edu/polisci/research/samuels/Samuels%20JJS%20article.pdf

For more than half a century, invariably evoking questions of how to understand modern history. After the war, Japanese strategy shifted from the view that forcewas an instrument of great powers to one that rejected it altogether. Since that time, those who preferred the literal interpretation ofArticle 9 and those who have endeavored to loosen its constraints have contended for power within the LDP. Support for revision of Article 9, for Japan to assume a more proactive and global defense posture, for the integration of forces with the U.S. military, and for the dispatch of Self Defense Forces (SDF) abroad are all measures of where one stands on this second axis. Because the difference between a great power and a small power is the willingness to use force, moreover, they also define competing Japanese national identities. Some who support the U.S. alliance are willing to deploy the SDF to “share alliance burdens.” They wish Japan to become a great power again and are associated with the idea that Japan should become “normal.” In the view of these “normal nation-alists,” the statute of limitations for Japan’s mid-twentieth-century aggression expired long ago; it is time for Japan to step onto the international stage as an equal of the United States. They believe that military strength is the way to prestige, their prime value. Opposing them are “middle-power internationalists,” who believe that Japan must remain a small power with self-imposed limits on its right to belligerency. Japan’s contributions to world affairs should remain nonmilitary. They believe that prosperity is the way to prestige. Among those who prefer Japan to keep a greater distance from the United States are “neoautonomists” who would build an independent, fullspectrum Japanese military that could use force, and “pacifists” who eschew the military institution altogether. The former believe that military strength is the way to autonomy, their prime value, whereas the latter, who share that prime value, believe that prosperity is the best way to achieve it. All four groups seek security for Japan, but each closely associates security with a different value: neoautonomists seek security with sovereignty, pacifists security with peace. “Normal nation-alists” want security with equality, middle power internationalists seek security through prosperity. After briefly examining two issues central to any substantive discourse on contemporary Japanese security policy, I explore these views and the relationships among those who hold them. As we shall see, while their discourse is often incongruent, it is more animated than when the Yoshida consensus was most robust, and possibilities for a new grand strategic consensus are improving.

AT: Japan Rearm Bad – Japan has Military Force Now

Japan is gaining a strong military now

Christopher A. Preble, independent defense analyst who has written for a variety of publications, 3-4-2010, U.S.-Japanese Security Relations: Adjusting to Change, Cato Institute, http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb-007.html

With the decline of the Soviet threat, Japanese military forces should be capable of defending Japan's security and playing a wider security role with only modest expansion. The size and composition of the military must be decided by the Japanese government and people. But the United States should not oppose the development of Japanese forces capable of military actions in support of their interests abroad. The economics of the current U.S.-Japanese defense arrangement cannot be overstated. Although Japan's contribution to its defense appears sufficient in absolute terms, roughly $26 billion, it is inadequate in relative terms. Tokyo's allocation of slightly over 1 percent of GNP to defense contrasts sharply with the 6 percent spent by the South Koreans, for example, and the 5.3 percent spent by the United States, Japan's protector. An appreciation of how the U.S. defense of Japan affects competition between the number-one and number-two economic powers in the world is paramount. Edward A. Olsen writes: The United States cannot mandate Japan's future strategy any more than Japan can shirk its responsibilities indefinitely. Neither should the United States subsidize a prosperous ally's economy, providing funds for Japan's defense so that Tokyo does not need to spend from its own resources on Japan's defense and can allocate them to economic purposes. Much is still made of Japanese domestic fears of the resurgence of military power. At times the Japanese seem even more concerned about militarism than are the nations formerly occupied by the armies of the Rising Sun. And, given the resentment and mistrust of the military that still persist in Japan more than 45 years after the end of World War II, it could be argued that the Japanese will never willingly assume a greater military role. Today domestic opinion in Japan sends mixed signals. The Japanese people as a whole remain wary of military action; in a recent poll, 67 percent opposed sending Japanese forces to the Persian Gulf, even in noncombat roles.(12) At the same time, younger Japanese voters, those born after World War II, press for greater Japanese autonomy. Japan's reluctance to assume a military role in the gulf must also be placed in a larger context. After all, the United States has obligingly assumed the costs and risks of defending Japanese interests there, thus sparing the Japanese government and people difficult decisions about how to defend their interests. Moreover, even if there is still substantial Japanese reluctance to assume a larger military role in general, U.S. needs must also be addressed. The United States simply cannot continue to subsidize Japan's defense as it did throughout the cold war. Given America's pressing domestic problems, Washington cannot retain its vast global security commitments. Indeed, with the Soviet threat diminishing, the emphasis in the United States will be on "bringing the boys home." Both Tokyo and Washington must appreciate those realities and begin now to plan for the substitution of Japanese for U.S. military power where appropriate.

\*\*\* Power Projection- Strong Military\*\*\*

Power Projection- Strong Military

Japan is gaining a strong military - solves power projection

Christopher A. Preble, independent defense analyst who has written for a variety of publications, **3-4-**2010, U.S.-Japanese Security Relations: Adjusting to Change, Cato Institute, http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb-007.html

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\*\*\*AT: Deterrence Good\*\*\*

AT: Deterrence Good – Chinese Missiles

U.S. is deterring China’s missiles

REBECCA GRANT, President, IRIS Independent Research AFA National Symposium, 3-25-2009, U.S. needs to deter China's mobile missile launchers, UPI.com, http://www.upi.com/Business\_News/Security-Industry/2009/03/25/US-needs-to-deter-Chinas-mobile-missile-launchers/UPI-75531237999938/

As threats shift, the ability of the Lockheed Martin/Boeing F-22 Raptor to cover a volume of airspace against air and surface-to-air threats could become a significant edge. There are no plans to base F-22 Raptors in Europe. Still, the time may come when they deploy there often. It's not hard to picture a situation where Russian fighters overwhelm a four-air­craft detachment of the U.S.-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Being able to bring highly capable forces to bear would be the essence of deterrence over the Baltic region. Pair border probes with future capabilities and potential intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance degradation, and the case for F-22 availability in a NATO scenario becomes clear. China is a world power, a major trading partner and, without question, a potential military competitor for the United States. With China, the United States may face a decades-long balance between confrontation and cooperation. Conventional deterrence will be a big part of calibrating the balance. For the United States, relying on airpower's conventional deterrent will be a prime tool. China has already demarcated the realms of air, space and cyberspace as arenas for competition and de-emphasized its land forces. In 2004, China's defense white paper stated bluntly: "The army is streamlined by reducing the ordinary troops that are technologically backward while the navy, air force and Second Artillery Force (China's nuclear-weapons unit) are strengthened." Instead, current Chinese military doctrine focuses on local, or regional, war under high-technology conditions, which they define as "a limited war, fought in a restricted geographic area for limited objectives with limited means and a conscious effort to curtail destruction." Rapid defeat of the enemy is the main objective, and the preferred tool is to inflict strategic and operational paralysis or even defeat the enemy with one strike. The Chinese do not much worry about global power projection, stability operations or major land campaigns. Deterring China will be all about providing persistence to make clear that the armed forces of the United States and its allies will not back off until goals are met. Credible deterrence will include the ability to target mobile launches like the one China used to shoot a missile into orbit to destroy its defunct weather satellite. That launch brought home how difficult it could be to track, target and kill mobile launchers. Those mobile launchers could threaten everything from anti-satellite attack to use of nuclear weapons. Mobile launchers are notoriously difficult to pin down.

AT: Deterrence Good – North Korea

**New sanctions deter North Korean prolif**

Rebecca Grant, President, IRIS Independent Research AFA National Symposium, 7-21-2010, U.S. imposes sanctions on N. Korea, UPI.com, http://www.upi.com/Top\_News/US/2010/07/21/US-imposes-sanctions-on-N-Korea/UPI-64271279712739/

New sanctions against North Korea were imposed Wednesday in reaction to the sinking of a South Korean warship, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said. The action came after Clinton, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates and their South Korean counterparts conducted high-level security talks in Seoul as a show of unity in the wake of North Korea's deadly sinking of the warship Cheonan in March, South Korean news agency Yonhap reported. Pyongyang has denied involvement in the sinking that killed 46 sailors. "Today, I'm announcing a series of measures to increase our ability to prevent North Korea's proliferation, to halt their illicit activities that helped fund their weapons programs and to discourage further provocative actions," Clinton said during a news conference. She said the "new country-specific sanctions" imposed by the United States target North Korea's "sale and procurement of arms and related material and the procurement of luxury goods and other illicit activities." Clinton emphasized the sanctions weren't directed at the North Korean people, but at "the destabilizing illicit and provocative policies pursued by that government." In a statement, U.S. and South Korean officials urged North Korea to take responsibility for the attack and called on Pyongyang "to refrain from further attacks or hostilities against (South Korea) and underscored that there would be serious consequences for any such irresponsible behavior." The United States and South Korea announced Tuesday they would respond to the attack by conducting "large-scale" military exercises. About 8,000 U.S. and South Korean forces will participate in the war games, starting Sunday in the Sea of Japan. Clinton and Gates toured the Demilitarized Zone, a heavily guarded 2.5-mile-wide buffer between the Koreas. It was believed to be the first time that two high-ranking Cabinet secretaries have done so simultaneously.

AT: Deterrence Good - China

United States deterring China now

Nicholas R. Lardy and Richard N. Haass, Anthony M. Solomon Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, 6-2010, The United States and China: A New Framework, the Brookings institute, http://www.brookings.edu/papers/1997/10china\_haass.aspx

Shaping and managing the U.S. relationship with Chinais one of the principal foreign policy challenges facing the United States for the foreseeable future. It is at least as important as efforts to build an open world trading order and clearly more important than any attempt to expand NATO's membership. Indeed, if the U.S.-Soviet relationship was critical to the history of the second half of the twentieth century, it is quite possible the relationship between the United States and China will, more than any other foreign tie, define international affairs in the first half of the next century. It is difficult to exaggerate what is at stake for the United States. U.S. interests include deterring any use of military force by China against Taiwan or other countries in the region, discouraging Chinese export of technology associated with weapons of mass destruction or rogue state military capabilities, eliciting diplomatic cooperation vis-à-vis North Korea and within the UN Security Council, fostering political and economic reform on the mainland, expanding the opportunity to trade with and invest in what could one day be the world's largest market, preserving Hong Kong's market system and its special status, and encouraging a responsible environmental policy on the part of the country that is home to one out of every six people on the planet. More generally, the United States has a clear interest in seeing the emergence of a China that is prepared to act with restraint, both beyond its borders and toward its own citizens. The emergence of such a China should not be assumed. It is possible the United States might one day find itself in the position of having to contain an expansionist, hostile China. If this happens, U.S. foreign policy will have to adjust accordingly. But containing China would surely be costly and dangerous, and vastly inferior to a situation in which the country was more responsible and its relationship with the United States more cooperative. This should be our goal. The upcoming October summit between President Jiang of China and President Clinton provides a historic opportunity for the two countries to realize some progress toward creating a framework for managing the many issues that divide them. The number and complexity of these issues should not be underestimated. The leaders are not likely to find solutions to most of them in the course of brief discussions. What they can and should do, however, is create a basis for moving relations forward. This said, the term summit is misleading and even counterproductive. For many, it will conjure up images of U.S.-Soviet summits, reinforcing a view that the United States and China are adversaries engaged in a new cold war. Similarly, summitry often implies an emphasis on the negotiation of arms control and other accords. But the United States and China are not and need not become adversaries. Nor should the measure of success of the Jiang-Clinton meeting be the number of pacts signed. On many matters the countries remain far apart, and there has simply not been adequate dialogue to bridge the differences. Also, many of the most important issues do not lend themselves to negotiation and resolution in some formal text. Frank discussion and honest consultation are required. The most important outcome of President Jiang's visit thus might be a mutual commitment to hold regular meetings between not only presidents but mid- and high-level officials. After Tiananmen Square, such meetings became rare. This is not in the American interest. Meetings with Chinese officials are as much in the U.S. interest as China's and should not be seen as some benefit to be withdrawn as a sanction. Where there is disagreement with some aspect of Beijing's behavior, U.S. officials should use meetings to press their case. At one level, the meeting in Washington will automatically go part way toward establishing a more normal pattern of relations between the two countries. Although U.S. presidents have met bilaterally with Chinese leaders at the United Nations and at meetings of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, President Jiang's visit in late October will be the first official visit by the Chinese head of state to the White House in more than a decade and the single most important visit by a Chinese leader since Deng Xiaoping's historic trip in 1979. And Mr. Clinton's proposed return visit to China next spring would be the first visit there by an American president in nine years. By contrast, since 1989 both President Jiang and Premier Li Peng have had numerous state visits to all other major industrial countries and the heads of these states each have made one or more official visits to China. But it will take more than an exchange of visits to transform the relationship into a partnership, a phrase used by both Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen to describe their goals. There is a long agenda of issues on which the two countries appear to have different interests and priorities.