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# Negative Shell – Long

A. Interpretation: the aff can only defend advantages based on the consequences of hypothetical enactment of their plan by the USFG. They should win if the topical plan is the best policy option presented. The neg should win if the plan is worse than the status quo or an alternative competitive with the plan.

B. Violation – the aff claims advantages independent of the enactment of a plan by the USFG

C. Standards

1) Plan focus – The plan is the starting-point for debate. If they claim advantages in the 1AC which do not stem from the plan, there is no way for us to predict what the content of those advantages will be. Consequently, there is no way for us to generate stable and predictable offense. Without plan focus, they would always leverage an artificial ground advantage—even if there are impact turns to the critiques, we should not have to be prepared to run them against their aff; and, in any case, they will always be better prepared to debate their own unpredictable drivel than we will.

Ruth Lessl Shively, Associate Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, 2000, Political Theory and Partisan Politics, p. 182-3

The point may seem trite, as surely the ambiguists would agree that basic terms must be shared before they can be resisted and problematized. In fact, they are often very candid about this seeming paradox in their approach: the paradoxical or "parasitic" need of the subversive for an order to subvert. But admitting the paradox is not helpful if, as usually happens here, its implications are ignored; or if the only implication drawn is that order or harmony is an unhappy fixture of human life. For what the paradox should tell us is that some kinds of harmonies or orders are, in fact, good for resistance; and some ought to be fully supported. As such, it should counsel against the kind of careless rhetoric that lumps all orders or harmonies together as arbitrary and inhumane. Clearly some basic accord about the terms of contest is a necessary ground for all further contest**.** It may be that if the ambiguists wish to remain full-fledged ambiguists, they cannot admit to these implica­tions, for to open the door to some agreements or reasons as good and some orders as helpful or necessary, is to open the door to some sort of rationalism. Perhaps they might just continue to insist that this initial condition is ironic, but that the irony should not stand in the way of the real business of subversion.Yet difficulties remain. **For** agreement is not simply the initial condition, but the continuing ground, for contest. If we are to success­fully communicate our disagreements, we cannot simply agree on basic terms and then proceed to debate without attention to further agree­ments. For debate and contest are forms of dialogue: that is, they are activities premised on the building of progressive agreements. Imagine, for instance, that two people are having an argument about the issue of gun control. As noted earlier, in any argument, certain initial agreements will be needed just to begin the discussion. At the very least, the two discussants must agree on basic terms: for example, they must have some shared sense of what gun control is about; what is at issue in arguing about it; what facts are being contested, and so on. They must also agree—and they do so simply by entering into debate—that they will not use violence or threats in making their cases and that they are willing to listen to, and to be persuaded by, good arguments. Such agreements are simply implicit in the act of argumentation.

2) Judge evaluation – their framework provides no coherent criteria for how the judge should assess competing claims or weigh impacts. We give criteria by which one can make decisions, whereas their arguments amount to empty speculation at best.

Michael Ignatieff, Carr Professor of Human Rights Practice, Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at the JFK School of Government, Harvard University, 2004, The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror, p. 20-1

There are two problems with a perfectionist stance, leaving aside the question of whether it is realistic. The first is that artic­ulating nonrevocable, nonderogable moral standards is rela­tively easy. The problem is deciding how to apply them in spe­cific cases. What is the line between interrogation and torture, between targeted killing and unlawful assassination, between preemption and aggression? Even when legal and moral distinc­tions between these are clear in the abstract, abstractions are less than helpful when political leaders have to choose between them in practice. Furthermore, the problem with perfectionist standards is that they contradict each other. The same person who shudders, rightly, at the prospect of torturing a suspect might be prepared to kill the same suspect in a preemptive at­tack on a terrorist base. Equally, the perfectionist commitment to the right to life might preclude such attacks altogether and restrict our response to judicial pursuit of offenders through pro­cess of law. Judicial responses to the problem of terror have their place, but they are no substitute for military operations when terrorists possess bases, training camps, and heavy weapons. To stick to a perfectionist commitment to the right to life when under terrorist attack might achieve moral consistency at the price of leaving us defenseless in the face of evildoers. Security, moreover, is a human right, and thus respect for one right might lead us to betray another. A lesser evil morality is antiperfectionist in its assumptions. It accepts as inevitable that it is not always possible to save human beings from harm without killing other human beings; not al­ways possible to preserve full democratic disclosure and trans­parency in counterterrorist operations; not always desirable for democratic leaders to avoid deception and perfidy; not always possible to preserve the liberty of the majority without sus­pending the liberties of a minority; not always possible to antici­pate terrible consequences of well-meant acts, and so on. Far from making ethical reflection irrelevant, these dilemmas make ethical realism all the more essential to democratic reflection and good public policy. The fact that liberal democratic leaders may order the surreptitious killing of terrorists, may withhold infor­mation from their voters, may order the suspension of civil liber­ties need not mean that “anything goes.” Even if liberties must be suspended, their suspension can be made temporary; if exec­utives must withhold information from a legislature in public, they can be obliged to disclose it in private session or at a later date. Public disinformation whose sole purpose is to deceive the enemy might be justified, but deliberately misleading a demo­cratic electorate with a view to exaggerating risk or minimizing hazard can never be. The same balancing act needs to be ob­served in other cases. If the targeted killing of terrorists proves necessary, it can be constrained by strict rules of engagement and subjected to legislative oversight and review. The interroga­tion of terrorist suspects can be kept free of torture. Drawing these lines means keeping in clear sight the question of whether these means reinforce or betray the democratic identity they are supposed to defend.

3) Topic education – their framework is designed to dodge education about the core questions of alternative energy policy, which makes debate devolve into repetitive discussions of [insert critique vocabulary here] that aren’t about the topic. Lack of predictability means the aff is never tested in-depth and every debate is shallow. Education about policymaking is key to politics as a whole: we have a responsibility to forge an allegiance between politics and democratic deliberation.

l. Gundersen, Associate Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, 2000, Political Theory and Partisan Politics, p. 108-9

Will deliberation work the same way among ordinary citizens? Yes and no. Yes, deliberation will tend to heighten citizens apprecia­tion of their interdependence. At the same time, the results are likely to be analogous rather than identical to those in formal governmental bodies, since citizen deliberation must of course function in the ab­sence of the institutional interdependence established by the US con­stitution, with its clear specification of joint responsibilities. The theoretical mutuality of interests assumed by the Constitution exists among ordinary citizens, too. The difference is that they have only their interests, not the impetus of divided power, to encourage them to discover and articulate them. Granted. But once they begin to do so, they are every bit as likely to succeed as the average representative. Citizen deliberation, in other words, will intensify citizens' apprecia­tion of interdependence. Although I cannot prove the point, there are compelling reasons to think that citizen deliberation yields an awareness of overlapping interests. I have already alluded to the first, and perhaps most telling of these: if governors in a system of divided government such as our own succeed in deliberating their way to the public interest (however imperfectly or irregularly), surely ordinary citizens can be counted upon to do the same thing. Indeed, if my initial argument that deci­sion-making spells the end of deliberation is on the mark, then we have good reason to expect citizens to deliberate better than their rep­resentatives. One can add to these theoretical considerations a length­ening list of empirical findings which suggest not only that citizens are willing and able to engage in political deliberation, but also that they are quite able to do so—able, that is, precisely in the sense of coming to a deeper appreciation of the collective nature of the prob­lems they face (Dale et al. 1995; Gundersen 1995; Dryzek 1990; see also Gundersen n.d., chapter 4). In the end, the claim that deliberation enhances interdependence is hardly a radical one. After all, if deliberation will of itself diminish partisanship, as I started out by saying, it must at the same time en­hance interdependence. To aim between Athens and Philadelphia requires, perhaps more than anything else, a changed way of thinking about partisanship. Institutions and ways of thinking tend to change together; hence if the institutional reorientation suggested here is to take root, it must be accompanied by a new way of thinking about partisanship. Shifting our appraisal of partisanship will amount to a nothing less than a new attitude toward politics. It will require that we aspire to something new, something that is at once less lofty (and less threatening) than the unity to which direct democracy is supposed to lead, but more demo­cratic (and more deliberative) than encouraging political deliberation among a selected group of representatives. As I argued above, it will require that we seek to stimulate deliberation among all citizens. With Madison, we need to view partisanship as inevitable. Collec­tive choice, indeed choice itself, is a partisan affair. But we also need to resist the equation of politics and partisanship. If politics is seen as nothing more than a clash of partisan interests, it is likely to stay at that level. Conversely, for deliberation to work, it must be seen as reason­able, if not all-illuminating—as efficacious, if not all-powerful. At the same time, of course, citizens must borrow a page from the participa­tory democrat's book by coming to view deliberation as their responsi­bility rather than something that is done only by others in city hall, the state capitol, or Congress—others who are, after all, under direct and constant pressure to act rather than deliberate. Politics, in other words, must be resuscitated as an allegiance to democratic deliberation.

D. Voter for fairness and education. Framework is a prerequisite to debate.

Ruth Lessl Shively, Associate Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, 2000, Political Theory and Partisan Politics, p. 181-182

The requirements given thus far are primarily negative. The ambiguists must say "no" to—they must reject and limit—some ideas and actions. In what follows, we will also find that they must say "yes" to some things. In particular, they must say "yes" to the idea of rational per­suasion. This means, first, that they must recognize the role of agreement in political contest, or the basic accord that is necessary to discord. The mistake that the ambiguists make here is a common one. The mistake is in thinking that agreement marks the end of contest—that consen­sus kills debate. But this is true only if the agreement is perfect—if there is nothing at all left to question or contest. In most cases, however, our agreements are highly imperfect. We agree on some matters but not on others, on generalities but not on specifics, on principles but not on their applications, and so on. And this kind of limited agreement is the starting condition of contest and debate. As John Courtney Murray writes: We hold certain truths; therefore we can argue about them. It seems to have been one of the corruptions of intelligence by positivism to assume that argument ends when agreement is reached. In a basic sense, the reverse is true. There can be no argument except on the premise, and within a context, of agreement. (Murray 1960, 10) In other words, we cannot argue about something if we are not com­municating: if we cannot agree on the topic and terms of argument or if we have utterly different ideas about what counts as evidence or good argument. At the very least, we must agree about what it is that is being debated before we can debate it. For instance, one cannot have an argument about euthanasia with someone who thinks euthanasia is a musical group. One cannot successfully stage a sit-in if one's target audience simply thinks everyone is resting or if those doing the sitting have no complaints. Nor can one demonstrate resistance to a policy if no one knows that it is a policy. In other words, contest is meaningless if there is a lack of agreement or communication about what is being contested. Resisters, demonstrators, and debaters must have some shared ideas about the subject and/or the terms of their disagree­ments. The participants and the target of a sit-in must share an under­standing of the complaint at hand. And a demonstrator's audience must know what is being resisted. In short, the contesting of an idea presumes some agreement about what that idea is and how one might go about intelligibly contesting it. In other words, contestation rests on some basic agreement or harmony.

# Negative Shell – Short

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C. Standards

1) Plan focus – The plan is the starting-point for debate. If they claim advantages in the 1AC which do not stem from the plan, there is no way for us to predict what the content of those advantages will be. Consequently, there is no way for us to generate stable and predictable offense. Without plan focus, they would always leverage an artificial ground advantage—even if there are impact turns to the critiques, we should not have to be prepared to run them against their aff; and, in any case, they will always be better prepared to debate their own unpredictable drivel than we will.

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D. Voter for fairness and education. Framework is a prerequisite to debate.

\*\*\*DEFINITIONS

# Definition – USFG is the Agent of the Resolution

( ) The topic is defined by the phrase following the colon – the USFG is the agent of the resolution, not the individual debaters

Webster’s Guide to Grammar and Writing, 2000, online: http://ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/marks/colon.htm

Use of a colon before a list or an explanation that is preceded by a clause that can stand by itself. Think of the colon as a gate, inviting one to go on… If the introductory phrase preceding the colon is very brief and the clause following the colon represents the real business of the sentence, begin the clause after the colon with a capital letter.

# Definition – USFG is in D.C. (Not ‘the People’)

( ) “The USFG” is the government in Washington D.C. – not individuals

Microsoft Encarta Online Encyclopedia 2000 [http://encarta.msn.com]

“The federal government of the United States is centered in Washington DC.”

( ) Our definition excludes action by smaller political groups or individuals.

Black’s Law Dictionary Seventh Edition Ed. Bryan A. Garner (chief) 1999

Federal government 1. A national government that exercises some degree of control over smaller political units that have surrendered some degree of power in exchange for the right to participate in national political matters.

# Definition – Resolved Relates to the Resolution, Not Debaters

( ) “Resolved” expresses intent to solve the question posed by the resolution – this is distinct from individual debaters being ‘resolved’

American Heritage Dictionary 2000, online: www.dictionary.com/cgi-bin/dict.pl?term=resolved

To find a solution to; solve …

To bring to a usually successful conclusion

Definition – Should Implies Expectation

( ) “Should” denotes an expectation – this means the resolution shows expectation that its agent will enact the plan

American Heritage Dictionary – 2000 [www.dictionary.com]

3 Used to express probability or expectation

\*\*Rules Good

# Rules key to Ethics

Rules are key to checking evil; the only way to oppose something is to align yourself with its opposite. This means that a minimum of shared agreement is the necessary condition for preventing atrocity.

Ruth Lessl Shively, Associate Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, 2000, Political Theory and Partisan Politics, p. 180

Thus far, I have argued that if the ambiguists mean to be subver­sive about anything, they need to be conservative about some things. They need to be steadfast supporters of the structures of openness and democracy: willing to say "no" to certain forms of contest; willing to set up certain clear limitations about acceptable behavior. To this, fi­nally, I would add that if the ambiguists mean to stretch the bound­aries of behavior—if they want to be revolutionary and disruptive in their skepticism and iconoclasm—they need first to be firm believers in something. Which is to say, again, they need to set clear limits about what they will and will not support, what they do and do not believe to be best. As G. K. Chesterton observed, the true revolutionary has always willed something "definite and limited." For example, "The Jacobin could tell you not only the system he would rebel against, but (what was more important) the system he would not rebel against..." He "desired the freedoms of democracy." He "wished to have votes and not to have titles . . ." But "because the new rebel is a skeptic"—be­cause he cannot bring himself to will something definite and limited— "he cannot be a revolutionary." For "the fact that he wants to doubt everything really gets in his way when he wants to denounce any­thing" (Chesterton 1959,41). Thus, the most radical skepticism ends in the most radical conservatism. In other words, a refusal to judge among ideas and activities is, in the end, an endorsement of the status quo. To embrace everything is to be unable to embrace a particular plan of action, for to embrace a particular plan of action is to reject all others, at least for that moment. Moreover, as observed in our discussion of openness, to embrace ev­erything is to embrace self-contradiction: to hold to both one's pur­poses and to that which defeats one's purposes—to tolerance and intolerance, open-mindedness and close-mindedness, democracy and tyranny. In the same manner, then, the ambiguists' refusals to will some­thing "definite and limited" undermines their revolutionary impulses. In their refusal to say what they will not celebrate and what they will not rebel against, they deny themselves (and everyone else in their political world) a particular plan or ground to work from. By refusing to deny incivility, they deny themselves a civil public space from which to speak. They cannot say "no" to the terrorist who would silence dissent. They cannot turn their backs on the bullying of the white supremacist. And, as such, in refusing to bar the tactics of the anti-democrat, they refuse to support the tactics of the democrat. In short, then, to be a true ambiguist, there must be some limit to what is ambiguous. To fully support political contest, one must fully support some uncontested rules and reasons. To generally reject the silencing or exclusion of others, one must sometimes silence or ex­clude those who reject civility and democracy.

# Rules key to Policymaking

Every political action takes place within a context of rules, shared assumptions, and conventions.

Thomas A. Spragens, Professor of Political Science at Duke, 2000 Political Theory and Partisan Politics p. 82-3

The first of these modalities of political association will be essen­tially contractual. This is a mode of association that governs the economy and a significant part of political interaction. This is the realm in which bargaining, horse trading, wheeling and dealing, brokering, compromising, and vote-swapping occupy center stage. This realm encompasses much of everyday political life, and it is a perfectly le­gitimate component of a democratic society. This is the realm in which instrumental rationality reigns supreme, the arena in which straightforward "rational choice" explanations are proper and effective. It is a thoroughly partisan realm because it is grounded in the pursuit of self-interest, and interests in a free society always are in conflict. Interests, of course, may also coincide in impor­tant ways, as, for example, when Ben Franklin admonished his col­leagues that they would either all hang together or hang separately. This phenomenon is what sustains the logic of collective action and what makes it important for a society to develop ways to facilitate cooperative behavior when that is clearly in everyone's interest to have that happen. This cooperation could be deemed an expression of what Aristotle deemed to be the lowest form of friendship, friendship based upon mutual usefulness one to another (Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics, 8.3). Even this self-interested, instrumental rationality mode of political association, it should be noted, has its own ethic. This ethic is essen­tially what is sometimes depicted as that of good business practice. It encompasses honesty, fair dealing, the avoidance of fraud or misrep­resentation, and living up to one's promises. What is important to observe here, moreover, is that this fair dealing business ethos is made possible in part because the contractual realm is situated in the context of the other layers and modalities of democratic association. Those we bargain with are also people who share with us a commitment to justice and people with whom we seek the good life. Without that shaping and constraining context, the bargaining mode of social inter­action tends to slide almost ineluctably toward mutual predation."

# Rules key to Competition

Debate is a form of forensics, which means legal speaking. Thus we apply the same standards we use for law to debate.

Decker and Morello, professors of communication and debate coaches, 90

The American Debate Association: Rule-Based Policy Debate., By: Decker, Warren D., Morello, John T., Argumentation and Advocacy, 19900101, Vol. 27, Issue 2

Perhaps the function and utility of set rules can be clarified through a comparison to the American legal system's use of rules. Academic debate has always drawn heavily on the analogy to law for both its theory and context. Forensics, of course, was defined by Aristotle as legal speaking. Furthermore, comparisons to law are appropriate since many debaters engage in the activity as preparation for law school and the legal profession.The American legal system is a system of rules. "The plethora of rules prescribe, in essence, who can present the evidence, what evidence can be admitted, and how the evidence can be introduced" (Loh 14). The rules ensure fairness and promote the willingness of disputants to accept the outcomes of trials (Loh). Rules of procedure predate particular trials. Lawyers do not argue, for instance, whether or not there ought to be a hearsay rule and, if so, what the elements of such a rule should be. Testimony judged in violation of the hearsay rule is excluded, and there is no recourse to the "hearsay is not a voting issue" brief.To promote equity and to prevent abusive practices from demeaning the conduct of the proceedings, the legal system--and many governmental and business decision-making bodies--establish governing rules. Organizations sponsoring competitive activities have both the right and the duty to develop procedures designed to safeguard the integrity of the event in question. Debate should be no different.

# Rules key to Education

Fairness key to education

Patrick Speice and Jim Lyle 2003 “traditional policy debate: now more than ever” Oceans Policy Adrift http://www.wfu.edu/Student-organizations/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/SpeiceLyle2003htm.htm

Having dispensed with the “impact assessment” portion of this section, it is time to move to a fuller consideration of the educational “impacts” that the TPD formula brings to the table. Not only is the TPD format best for reasons of competition, it is also best for providing debaters an educational benefit to the activity. These benefits are of use to students in the academic, professional, and social realms. In addition to teaching general communication and argumentation skills, TPD helps develop at least three different skills: research skills, logic skills (aimed at both the development of general argument structure and sustained political advocacy), and critical thinking skills (Solt, 1993; Parcher, 1996; Mitchell, 1998; Freeley, 1996). Furthermore, requiring the critique team (presuming they are negative) to at least defend the status quo also is beneficial educationally by serving as a “valuable exercise to build power of critical theory” (Truett, 2001, p. online).

Without concrete terms for discussion, disputes become meaningless and valueless, only once a consensus has been arrived at can there be any engagement.

Kemerling, 97 professor of philosophy at Newberry College, (Garth, “Definition and Meaning”, http://www.philosophypages.com/lg/e05.htm)

We've seen that sloppy or misleading use of ordinary language can seriously limit our ability to create and communicate correct reasoning. As philosopher [John Locke](http://www.philosophypages.com/ph/lock.htm) pointed out three centuries ago, the achievement of human knowledge is often hampered by the use of words without fixed signification. Needless controversy is sometimes produced and perpetuated by an unacknowledged ambiguity in the application of key terms. We can distinguish disputes of three sorts: Genuine disputes involve disagreement about whether or not some specific proposition is true. Since the people engaged in a genuine dispute agree on the meaning of the words by means of which they convey their respective positions, each of them can propose and assess logical arguments that might eventually lead to a resolution of their differences. Merely [verbal disputes](http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/v.htm#verbal), on the other hand, arise entirely from ambiguities in the language used to express the positions of the disputants. A verbal dispute disappears entirely once the people involved arrive at an agreement on the meaning of their terms, since doing so reveals their underlying agreement in belief. Apparently verbal but really genuine disputes can also occur, of course. In cases of this sort, the resolution of every ambiguity only reveals an underlying genuine dispute. Once that's been discovered, it can be addressed fruitfully by appropriate methods of reasoning. We can save a lot of time, sharpen our reasoning abilities, and communicate with each other more effectively if we watch for disagreements about the meaning of words and try to resolve them whenever we can.

Debate leads to education about the real world

Christopher C. Joyner (prof. of International law at Georgetown) Spring 1999 “teaching international law: views from an international relations political scientist” ILSA journal of international & comparative law 5 ILSA J Int’l & Comp L 377

The debate exercises carry several specific educational objectives. First, students on each team must work together to refine a cogent argument that compellingly asserts their legal position on a foreign policy issue confronting the United States. In this way, they gain greater insight into the real-world legal dilemmas faced by policy makers. Second, as they work with other members of their team, they realize the complexities of applying and implementing international law, and the difficulty of bridging the gaps between United States policy and international legal principles, either by reworking the former or creatively reinterpreting the latter. Finally, research for the debates forces students to become familiarized with contemporary issues on the United States foreign policy agenda and the role that international law plays in formulating and executing these policies. [n8](http://www.lexisnexis.com:80/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.198312.75798603953&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1214883404208&returnToKey=20_T4068094503&parent=docview" \l "n8#n8) The debate thus becomes an excellent vehicle for pushing students beyond stale arguments over principles into the real world of policy analysis, political critique, and legal defense.

# Rules key to Deliberation

Critique is not a matter of rejecting categories categorically but rather of choosing the right categories; this is especially true when critique is held to the standard of competitive judgment which must defer to shared sets of basic assumptions.

Ruth Lessl Shively, Assoc Prof Polisci at Texas A&M, 2000 *Political Theory and Partisan Politics* p. 188-9

This is why the ambiguists need to do more than call for a whole­sale resistance to categories. Because resistance to some categorizations always involves acceptance of others, they need to own up to, and justify, their own choices.6 If they propose that we choose their version of reality and their favored categorizations, they must give us reasons. If they think we ought to be skeptical ambiguists rather than truth- or harmony-seekers, they must make a case for this prescription. Simply being against established categories is disingenuous when the argu­ment is designed to establish new categories in replace of the old. We are brought back, then, to the issues of rational judgment and persuasion. Earlier I argued that political contest rests on certain un-contested foundations or rational conditions. Here I have added that the policy of anti-categorization rests on certain stable categories of its own. Thus, the subversives are not free from the responsibility of choosing and justifying the subversive categories that define and guide them. For once we recognize the inescapability of choosing categories, we see that subversion or any other political project is a matter of choosing the right categories, not of escaping them. Thus, to be truly subversive requires taking a stand: judging what is good and bad, legitimate and illegitimate, allowed and disallowed, in the best sub­versive society. The desire to avoid this sort of judgment is understandable, for it tends to be associated with intolerant and oppressive attitudes and behaviors. And the situations within which we must judge are often dauntingly complex and uncertain. Rarely can we be certain that our judgments are right. Nonetheless, judgments must be made—not only in the develop­ment of political theory, but also in confronting the decisions of every­day political life. Thus, even in the face of great uncertainty and ambiguity, we are compelled to act and, in so doing, to judge what is good and bad, reasonable and unreasonable, and so on. The ambiguity of our situation does nothing, as such, to alter the need for judgment. As John Courtney Murray writes, to say that uncertainty and complexity must keep us from judging or acting is as senseless as a surgeon in the midst of a gastroenterostomy [saying] that the highly complex situation in front of him is so full of paradox ("The patient is at once receiving blood and losing it"), and irony ("Half a stomach will be better than a whole one") and dilemma ("Not too much, nor too little, anesthesia") that all surgical solutions are necessarily am­biguous. (Murray 1960, 283) Political Theory and the Postmodern Politics of Ambiguity The point, of course, is that there is no avoiding judgment and action here, and that in political theory and politics, as in surgery, we are often compelled to deal with the complexities we meet as best we can. Thus, if we must judge, there is no point in trying to avoid the task through a policy of indiscriminate subversion. Our choice is not whether to judge, but whether to judge through open, reasoned argu­ment or not. And the point of this essay has been to say that the former option is best.

Communicative persuasion is at the heart of politics; the difference between intimidation and political speech is precisely the attempt to persuade through reason.

Ruth Lessl Shively, Assoc Prof Polisci at Texas A&M, 2000 Political Theory and Partisan Politics p. 183

Earlier we asked how the ambiguists distinguish legitimate politi­cal behaviors, like contest or resistance, from illegitimate behaviors, like cruelty and subjugation. We find a more complete answer here. The former are legitimate because they have civil or rational persua­sion as their end. That is, legitimate forms of contest and resistance seek to inform or convince others by appeal to reasons rather than by force or manipulation. The idea is implicit in democracy because de­mocracy implies a basic respect for self-determination: a respect for people's rights to direct their own lives as much as possible by their own choices, to work and carry on relationships as they see fit, to participate in community and politics according to decisions freely made by them rather than decisions forced on them, and so on. Thus, to say that rational persuasion is the end of political action is simply to acknowledge that, in democratic politics, this is the way we show respect for others' capacities for self-direction. In public debate, our goal is to persuade others with ideas that they recognize as true rather than by trying to manipulate them or move them without their con­scious, rational assent. Of course, to say that this is the implicit end of political action is not to say that we always recognize or act in accord with it. Like most ideals, it is, strictly speaking, unattainable. Yet, like most ideals, it nonetheless defines our judgments on the subject. It is the gauge against which we judge progress or decline. Nor is this recognition of rational persuasion a rejection of the role of interest or power in politics. Clearly, the reasons we may give in persuading others may be based on issues of interest or power. We may try to convince others, for example, that a certain policy position is in their self-interest or that a certain action will increase their bar­gaining power. Though I should quickly add that, in a democracy, there must be other reasons recognized beside power and interest. For if power trumps everything, then those with the most power will always win and those with less will always lose (unless, by happy chance, their interests coincide), and there is no point in talking about democratic concepts like rights or equality or freedom. Democracy necessarily assumes that certain ideas trump power: for example, that ideas like the right to assemble, the right to free speech and represen­tation, the rights of the accused, and so on, are to be rendered to people regardless of their positions in society. I should also say that by calling these activities "rational" I do not mean to conjure up universal, rational principles or Rawlsian original positions, but only to say that democratic political activities have as their end persuasion by appeal to shared reasons. The "rational" tag simply serves to distinguish voluntary from less-than-voluntary kinds of persuasions. Thus, for example, I may "persuade" a man to do something by hypnotizing him or by holding a gun to his head, but I would not be using rational persuasion; I would not be giving him reasons upon which he might make his own judgment. Instead, I would be deciding for him. Again, the point is that in order to respect the self-determination of others, we must give them reasons they can rec­ognize, or grounds that allow them to weigh their own thoughts and choose. Nor, finally, should the "rational" or "civil" tag suggest that demo­cratic actions are always inoffensive or acceptable to the majority. There are many actions that can be considered persuasive and political in the broad sense used here, while yet being offensive to majorities: we might list among these gay rights groups' disruptions of church ser­vices, animal rights groups' splashing of blood on fur owners, or anti-abortion groups' attempts to block clinic entrances. Leaving aside legal or moral questions about these tactics, we can say that they are political in a way that burning crosses is not. That is, they are political to the extent that they are aimed at rational persuasion of some kind: at communicating or heightening aware­ness of an idea, at enhancing others' understandings of an issue, and thus at enhancing others' freedom and ability to make political de­cisions—rather, that is, than being aimed at merely intimidating them. We can further grasp the intuition here by noting the different re­sponse we would have upon learning that an animal rights activist was splashing blood on people with the intent merely of bullying them or frightening them out of the habit of wearing furs. In such a case, most of us sense that the action is no longer legitimately politi­cal because (or to the extent that) it is aimed at intimidation rather than rational persuasion.»

Empty abstractions are like cyanide to democracy – only through robust dialogue and meaningful conversation can we learn and improve as beings and democratic participants

Christopher A. Bracey, Associate Professor of Law, Associate Professor of African & African American Studies, Washington University in St. Louis, September 2006, Southern California Law Review, 79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1231, p. 1311-1314, LexisNexis

Robust dialogue on public policy matters also promotes the individual growth of the dialogue participants. Conversation helps people become more knowledgeable and hold better developed opinions because "opinions can be tested and enlarged only where there is a genuine encounter with differing opinions." n267 Moreover, meaningful conversation serves to broaden people's moral perspectives to include matters of public good, because appeals to the public good are often the most persuasive arguments available in public deliberation. n268 Indeed, even if people are thinking self-interested thoughts while making public good arguments, cognitive dissonance will create an incentive for such individuals to reconcile their self interest with the public good. n269 At the same time, because political dialogue is a material manifestation of democracy in action, it promotes a feeling of democratic community and instills in the people a will for political action to advance reasoned public policy in the spirit of promoting the public good. n270 For these reasons, the collective aspiration of those interested in pursing serious, sustained, and policy-legitimating dialogue on race matters must be to cultivate a reasoned discourse that is relatively free of retrograde ideological baggage that feeds skepticism, engenders distrust, and effectively forecloses constructive conversation on the most corrosive and divisive issue in American history and contemporary life. As the forgoing sections suggest, the continued reliance upon pedigreed rhetorical themes has and continues to poison racial legal discourse. Given the various normative and ideological commitments that might be ascribed to [\*1314] opponents of race preferences, the question thus becomes, how are we to approach the task of breaking through the conversational impasse and creating intellectual space for meaningful discourse on this issue?

# Deliberation Impact – Partisanship

The alternative to a politics of deliberation is rampant partisanship

Adolf G. Gundersen, Associate Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, 2000, Political Theory and Partisan Politics p. 97-8

In contrast to "deliberation," which means "the thoughtful consider­ation of alternative courses of action,"1 we might think of "partisan­ship" as "struggle to enact a fixed course of action." So defined, the differences between deliberation and partisanship are as obvious as they are profound: deliberation requires openness and the cooperative exercise of the intellect; partisanship presumes closure and involves the factional exercise of rhetorical manipulation or raw power. As a general rule, it also follows that deliberative democracy will flourish in inverse proportion to partisanship. For this reason deliberative democrats need a strategy for eliminating (or at least containing) par­tisanship. This paper advances such a strategy, a strategy which I recommend based on a critique of the two alternatives that have for some time dominated thinking in this area. The first of these alterna­tives is advanced by a wide-range of participatory democrats. On their view, partisanship can not only be contained, but also perhaps elimi­nated altogether, by having would-be partisans confront one another in public decision-making bodies. The participatory strategy ultimately rests on the belief that all partisan conflict is susceptible to transforma­tion as long as partisanship is confronted directly. Indeed, the partici­patory strategy for dealing with partisanship enjoins two sorts of confrontation: confrontation among citizens and confrontation with an actual decision. The second alternative strategy for dealing with parti­sanship that I examine here, no less well known, is Madisonian. Its strategy for limiting partisanship is in many ways the mirror image ofthat proposed by participatory democrats. Where the participatory strategy puts its faith in confrontation, the Madisonian strategy puts its faith in separation—again of two sorts. For the Madisonian, the worst effects of partisanship can be contained by first separating citi­zens from the actual task of decision-making and then by institution­alizing separate sources of decision-making power. Although I believe there is something to be learned from both the participatory and the Madisonian strategies for dealing with par­tisanship, I end up rejecting both of them in favor of an alternative which weds Madisonian institutional insights to participatory demo­crats' concern with the individual citizen. I argue that the best way to limit the unavoidable influence of partisanship is to confine par­tisan maneuvering to the latter stages of decision making and policy formation. I conclude that both distance and proximity can be made to serve the ends of deliberative democracy, that, indeed, distance and proximity must be combined in any effective strategy for limit­ing partisanship. That deliberation and partisanship are mutually exclusive does not seem particularly controversial. Deliberation is a process of weighing alternative courses of action. Partisanship is the exercise of power on behalf of a chosen course of action. Especially when viewed in the context of democratic politics, deliberation and partisanship thus seem irreconcilable. First, and most obviously, deliberation involves weigh­ing alternatives; partisanship involves coercion, negotiation, or, in its most discursive form, rhetorical manipulation. Second, deliberation requires balancing or adjudicating between a plurality of views; par­tisanship presupposes that one view has been judged superior (or advantageous). Third, deliberation requires only an opposing view­point; partisanship requires an opponent.

# Deliberation Impact – Agency

Political deliberation radically empowers personal agency

Adolf G. Gundersen, Assoc Prof Polisci at Texas A&M, 2000, Political Theory and Partisan Politics p. 105

Fortunately, we now have innovative recommendations aplenty for stimulating deliberation,5 covering virtually every institution in American society, including, of course, government itself. The prob­lem at the moment is choosing from among them in such a way as to achieve the widest and longest lasting impact. Although prioritizing deliberative reforms is a far more complex task than it might appear to be at first glance,6 each element of the via media I am recommending here establishes a separate criterion that reform proposals ought to meet. These four criteria helps us sort through the plethora of propos­als now being discussed by academics and policymakers. This is as true of this first element as it is of the other three, for it calls not for expanding deliberation tout court but, rather, for expanding delibera­tion outside the context of public decision-making bodies. Hence, it calls on us to resist plans for stimulating deliberation through the radical de­centralization of society. It likewise recommends that we demand more of deliberative reform than that it shore up existing deliberative insti­tutions, however valuable that might be. Instead, the premium this strategy places on indirect political engagement asks us to look for deliberative opportunities precisely in those places we are least accus­tomed to looking for them: families, churches, civic organizations, professions, public spaces, and the like. To encourage indirect political engagement by encouraging politi­cal deliberation is, in one sense, quite radical, for although it is not at all the same thing as adopting the view that "everything is political," it is tantamount to claiming that "everything can be a site for political deliberation." Conversely, from another perspective this view hardly represents much of a challenge at all, for it simply asks us to recognize the obvious fact that, ever since Athenian citizens carried the business of the assembly and courts into the agora, politics has always seeped out through the cracks of formal institutions. And it is to recognize that, at least within certain limits, this is not only proper, but desir­able—desirable because decisions that are discussed are likely to be wiser than those that are not, wherever they happen to be discussed. In general terms, then, aiming somewhere between Athens and Philadelphia means spurring deliberation. But we can locate our tar­get more precisely than that. We saw earlier that the second element of this strategy is to counter partisanship not only at the institutional treetops, but at the grass roots as well. This second criteria narrows our search to reforms that might stimulate deliberation there—where it is insulated from the inherently partisan pressure to adjudicate disputes and issue policy. But just what does stimulating grass-roots delibera­tion mean? It means encouraging citizens to actively deliberate out­side of formal decision-making institutions at what is normally thought of as the "pre-political" level. It means stimulating political discourse in places that are not normally thought of as "political." It means working to promote thoughtful exchanges among those who are po­litical, but not yet partisan. It means cultivating a public both willing and able to engage one another in political discussion. Finally, and most centrally, it means finding creative ways to support the civic fabric of society, of strengthening those institutions which, while not charged with the responsibility for making political decisions, are potential sites for political deliberation.

# Role of the Ballot

We must conceive of the ballot communicatively in order to produce effective political action; our framework provides the preconditions necessary to establishing a discursive community.

Mary Dietz, Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota, 2000, Political Theory and Partisan Politics p. 121-3

Jürgen Habermas has recently been developing a strong link between a philosophical conception of language (as communicative rationality) geared toward the redemption of validity claims; and the concrete dynamics of politics as speech-action. He unites the two in a discourse theory of politics as deliberative democracy, where the public use of reason is distinguished by the enactment of procedures (validity rela­tions) through which participants (as free and equal citizens) achieve agreement through critical discussion, or at least engage in "action oriented toward reaching understanding" (Habermas 1993b, 133). Habermasian citizens are truth-seekers insofar as, in Habermas's words, "the sphere of validity relations is ... internally differentiated in terms of the viewpoints proper to truth, normative Tightness, and subjective truthfulness or authenticity" (Habermas 1990, 115).8 In short, Habermas's defense of rationality and reasonableness, and his equally compelling conception of politics as democratic deliberation, are both directed toward identifying and rooting out of politics "distorted com­municative" conditions. In clarifying the relation between speech and politics, Habermas notes that "discourse theory has the success of deliberative politics depend not on a collectively acting citizenry but on the institutionalization of the corresponding procedures and conditions of communication" (n.d. 12, italics mine). The "procedures and conditions" to which Habermas refers emerge out of a theory that (a) thematizes a "terrain of argumentation" in which validity claims are made; (b) assumes that all speech presupposes a "background consensus" among participants; and (c) anticipates that the validity claims inherent in the performing of a speech action can be "vindicated" or "redeemed" (Einlosen) when the background consensus among interlocutors breaks down or is challenged.9 Habermas links linguistic intersubjectivity as practical discourse to the vindication of validity-claims that all citizens make (either implic­itly or explicitly) as speakers. Therefore, discourse theory reconstructs four claims that are potentially redeemable in every statement a speaker makes, and grounded in the very character (or the "universal prag­matics") of our linguistic intersubjectivity: (1) intelligibility (or com-prehensibility); (2) truth (regarding the propositional content); (3) justifiability (or appropriateness, in terms of the norms invoked); and (4) truthfulness (or sincerity, in the sense that the speaker does not intend to deceive the listener). Undistorted communication (and hence the success of deliberative politics) is thus secured in procedures and conditions in which interlocutors can, if necessary, redeem the four validity-claims to intelligibility, truth, justifiability, and truthfulness that are themselves embedded in every speech-act. The premise behind the highly specialized discussion that Habermas calls "practical discourse" is the desire to reach agreement on the basis of "rationally motivated approval of the substance of an utterance" (Habermas 1993b, 134). Thus, discourse ethics establishes what Habermas calls a "fundamental idea": interactions are communi­cative "when the participants coordinate their plans of action consensually, with the agreement reached at any point being evaluated in terms of the intersubjective recognition of validity claims" (Habermas 1993b, 58).10 To clarify this point, Habermas draws his now well-known distinction between two types of social interaction—communicative and strategic: Whereas in strategic action one actor seeks to influence the behavior of another by means of the threat of sanctions or the prospect of gratification in order to cause the interaction to continue as the first actor desires, in communicative action one actor seeks rationally to motivate another by relying on the illocutionary binding/bonding ef­fect (Bindungseffekt) of the offer contained in his speech act. (Habermas 1993b, 58)" The normative and procedural implications of Habermas's analytic distinction are instructively sketched by Simone Chambers: As opposed to strategic action, where participants are primarily inter­ested in bringing about a desired behavioral response, in communica­tive action, participants are interested in bringing about a "change of heart." For example, in strategic action participants often attempt to sway each other by introducing influences unrelated to the merits of an argument, for example, threats, bribes, or coercion. . . . Communi­cative actors are primarily interested in mutual understanding as op­posed to external behavior.... Only the "force of the better argument" should have the power to sway participants. (Chambers, 1996, 99) 9

# Fairness outweighs Education

Fairness outweighs education

Patrick Speice and Jim Lyle 2003 “traditional policy debate: now more than ever” Oceans Policy Adrift http://www.wfu.edu/Student-organizations/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/SpeiceLyle2003htm.htm

If it were decided that the promotion of education is of greater importance than preserving debate as a game, then the activity would begin to fall apart. Imagine that if instead of having two teams argue over competing viewpoints about a particular resolution/plan that debate instead asked debaters to simply inform the other participants of a different viewpoint regarding the plan. What would the activity look like then? Instead of hearing why the plan was good and bad, or why one policy alternative was better than another, we instead would hear why the plan is good, and why the plan reminded us of a story about one’s childhood. How would the judge evaluate such claims? If the desirability of the plan loses its importance and debate ceases to answer a yes/no question, what criteria should be used to resolve the “debate” (Smith, 2002)? While promoting intellectual development and enterprise are important components of the activity, the promotion of these values at the expense of the value of clash can only lead to the transformation of debate into discussion. In fact, it is not only that such a development spurs the loss of competitiveness, such a turn for the activity risks the loss of debate itself. Teams can begin to argue however they wish, and the “2 + 2 = 4” strategy becomes viable. What comes to matter then is word choice or performance. The result is a loss of depth of the education provided by the activity. Learning loses direction and begins to wander into the realm of acquiring random trivia. The entire purpose of having a policy resolution is rendered moot. Certainly one of the things most debaters enjoy about debate is that it really has no rules, however, if we decide to completely throw away “rules,” even as guiding principles, then the activity becomes something other than debate as an activity premised on fairness and competitive equity.

# A/T: Deliberation = Elitist

Deliberation is not elitist

Adolf G. Gundersen, Associate Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, 2000, Political Theory and Partisan Politics p. 106

The argument for countering partisanship at the grass roots by supporting political deliberation there is pretty simple: If deliberation is a good thing in "deliberative bodies" like congress, isn't a good thing among average citizens, too? To suppose otherwise is to hold either that the average citizen is incapable of deliberation or that the average citizen is less capable of deliberation than the average representative. Both positions collapse upon even the most glancing scrutiny. To hold that the average citizen is incapable of deliberation is both patently antidemocratic and empirically questionable, to say the very least. To hold that the average citizen is less capable of deliberation than the average representatives is perhaps slightly less antidemocratic and empirically dubious, but achieves this very modest gain in credibility only at the cost of landing in the out-and-out contradiction of valorizing deliberation in one place while denigrating it in another. If deliberation contains moments of both confrontation and engagement, democratizing deliberation by making it the province of the citizenry rather than leaving it in the hands of representatives has the potential of greatly expanding the degree to which confrontation and engagement become society-wide traits, traits which work on an ongoing basis to blunt the worst effects of partisanship. At least as important, such a democratization of deliberation is likely to enhance the deliberativeness of the polity since it will encourage deliberation at one removed from the locus of decision making—precisely the place it is most likely to succeed.

# A/T: Rules = Biopower

Biopower inevitable

William Connolly, Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins, 2005, Pluralism, p. 138-9

There is often ambivalence in people’s orientation to the sacred, an ambivalence concealed through fear of retribution by God or their compatriots. Those demanding punishment of others who defile what they take to be sacred, familiarly enough, often intensify the demand because of the very ambivalence that they themselves feel. Spinoza, Nietzsche, and Freud, among others, read the punishment of blasphemy in this way. And each himself was accuse of blasphemy because of that very analysis. None, however, says that homo sacer is part of the sacred. The issue is pertinent because in a political culture of deep pluralism – a culture in which people honor different existential faiths and final sources of morality – different images of the sacred unavoidably and repeatedly bump into each other. What is needed today is a caution relaxation of discourse about the sacred, one that allows us to come to terms affirmatively with the irreducible plurality of sacred objects in late modern life. With respect to sovereignty it is important to underline the significance of acts by which deep conflicts are settled, but it is equally important not to elevate them to the level of the sacred. Agamben also contends that biopolitics has intensified today. That intensification translates the paradox of sovereignty into a potential disaster. It is well to recall, however, that every way of life involves the infusion of norms, judgments, and standards into the affective life of participants. Every way of life is biocultural and biopolitical. Lucretius, Augustine, Spinoza, Rousseau, and Merleau-Ponty, writing at different periods, all appreciate the layering of culture into biological life. They treat the biological not merely as the genetic or the fixed but also as the introjections of culture into intertwined layers of corporeality.

# A/T: Rules = Violence

Conventions of communication are not a matter of violent exclusion but rather the preconditions for consensus.

Mary Dietz, Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota, 2000, Political Theory and Partisan Politics p. 123-4

Habermas's distinction between "pure" communicative action and strategic action raises many difficulties, not the least of which is its adherence to an idealized model of communication that, as Habermas himself acknowledges, does not fit a great deal of everyday social interaction (McCarthy 1991,132). Machiavelli's famous riposte to those thinkers who "have imagined republics and principalities which have never been seen or known to exist in reality" (Machiavelli 1950, 56) seems pertinent here, for the idealized model that Habermas imagines and the distinction that supports it appear boldly to deny the Machia­vellian insight that "how we live is so far removed from how we ought to live, that he who abandons what is done for what ought to be done, will rather learn to bring about his own ruin than his pres­ervation" (56). I will return to this point as it relates to politics later. For now, it is important to underscore that Habermas relies upon the communicative-strategic distinction to do at least two things: first, to show that on the level of linguistics, communicative action enjoys an "originary" priority over strategic and all other modes of linguistic usage, which are themselves "parasitic" (Rasmussen 1990, 38) or "de­rivative" (McCarthy 1991, 133) upon the former.12 Second, on the level of political theory, Habermas introduces the distinction in order to limit the exercise of threats and coercion (or strategic action) by enu­merating a formal-pragmatic system of discursive accountability (or communicative action) that is geared toward human agreement and mutuality. Despite its thoroughly modern accouterments, communica­tive action aims at something like the twentieth-century discourse-equivalent of the chivalric codes of the late Middle Ages; as a normative system it articulates the conventions of fair and honorable engage­ment between interlocutors. To be sure, Habermas's concept of com­municative action is neither as refined nor as situationally embedded as were the protocols that governed honorable combat across Euro­pean cultural and territorial boundaries and between Christian knights; but it is nonetheless a (cross-cultural) protocol for all that. The entire framework that Habermas establishes is an attempt to limit human violence by elaborating a code of communicative conduct that is de­signed to hold power in check by channeling it into persuasion, or the "unforced" force of the better argument (Habermas 1993b, 160).^

# A/T: Rules = Exclusion

Political ethics is committed to pluralizing the body politic

William Connolly, Prof of Polisci at Johns Hopkins, 2000, Political Theory and Partisan Politics p. 168-9

When such a line is pursued,7 a positive ethical case can be built for a bi-valent, robust ethos of politics. This would be one in which an enlarged number of constituencies acknowledge more vigorously com­parative elements of partisanship and contestability in their own iden­tities and fold this shift in self-recognition into pursuit of greater forbearance and generosity in social relations. It would also be a plu­ralism in which new drives to pluralization, say, in the domains of gender, sexuality, household organization, ethnicity, metaphysical faith, and orientations to death, were met with greater responsiveness than some traditions of secular pluralism now authorize. For, if the possi­bilities of life are as protean and diverse as some of us project them to be while historically contingent dictates of social organization regu­larly narrow their range, we can expect existing formations to be chal­lenged periodically by new movements that seek to transfigure injuries, grievances, energies, and uncertain hopes, circulating through them into new possibilities of being. Appreciation of such a pluralist/pluralizing ethos need not draw upon Nietzschean sources alone, though they do provide an excellent source for it, and they do deserve agonistic respect from those not moved by them. It can draw selective support from a variety of cur­rents flowing through theistic doctrines, particularly those which emphasize the mystery of God or the place of love in a faith receptive to the surprise of alterity. It can also draw sustenance from a modest rewriting of the Rawlsian problematic. In this refigured Rawlsianism, we pursue restrained terms of contestation and collaboration between multiple, overlapping traditions, each of which recognizes a certain reciprocity between the element of contestability in its own faith and in the alternative faiths with which it contends and collaborates. Such a rewriting touches the Rawlsian idea that the modern age is incom­patible with a fixed conception of the good. But it no longer calls upon each constituency to leave its metaphysical/religious doctrine in the private sphere before it enters public, secular life. Rather, it calls upon it to acknowledge the contestability of its own presumptions and to allow that acknowledgment to infuse restraint, agonistic respect, and responsiveness into its relations with other constituencies. That is, it calls upon each to revise its self-understanding in the light of these considerations. Such an ethos of pluralism neither rises above partisan­ship nor reduces politics to unfettered partisanship. It fosters restrained partisanship within and between multiple constituencies, each of which may be able to identify lines of connection and collaboration with a series of others. This is, then, a political ethic, an ethic in which politics plays a constitutive role and a politics in which ethics plays a constitutive role. It does not, of course, provide an accurate description of the contemporary condition in America, with its steep inequalities and large classes of people closed out of effective participation in political life. It is a critical ideal. As such, it is perhaps more appropriate to the times in which we live than the Rawlsian model it rewrites. It is pre­sented not as the standard to which every ethic must appeal but as an ethical sensibility able to enter into critical dialogue and selective col­laboration with a variety of other perspectives. The very indispensability and contestability of contending onto-theo and onto-non-theistic stances in the late-modern world supports the case for cultivating relations of agonistic respect and selective collaboration between multiple, overlapping constituencies, each of which draws pertinent as­pects of its fundamental doctrine into public life when, as so very often happens, the occasion demands it. And several of which also invoke the essential contestability of the ethical sources they honor the most. Out of these diverse lines of connection across multiple lines of differ­ence, a politics of creative coalitions might even be forged to enable action in concert through the state to support the economic and cul­tural preconditions of justice and pluralism.8 Sr

# A2: “rules bad”

Even radical criticism assumes the minimum requirements of argument; debate requires a positive defense of application NOT because debate is ideological but rather because of the necessary structures of argument.

Ruth Lessl Shively, Associate Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, 2000, Political Theory and Partisan Politics, p. 186-7

In response to these arguments, the ambiguists might counter that they do not mean to contest the basic structures of democracy—that they mean simply to resist the cruel and subjugating tendencies that prevail within these structures. Thus, assuming that we live in an open, democratic society, they may simply set out to challenge our catego­rizations of people and behaviors as good or evil, licit or illicit, normal or abnormal, and so on. And within our given system, they may sim­ply seek to remind us that these categories are our creations—that we need the irrational and the deviant to have our own sense of rational and communal identity. Thus, perhaps it is possible to pursue a gen­eral policy of contest and subversion—a policy designed to resist so­cial pressure to categorize and judge others—without contesting or subverting the basic structures of openness and democracy. I would like to finish this discussion by briefly suggesting why such a policy of general subversion is not the best answer to the important issues the ambiguists raise, or why a policy of rational judgment is a preferable approach to these issues. The first problem with the ambiguists' position here is one that they typically ac­knowledge. The problem is that it is impossible to subvert all cat­egorizations, for in subverting one categorization, one necessarily embraces another. Thus, in subverting traditional categories—like good versus bad, normal versus abnormal, right versus wrong— the ambiguists necessarily embrace the alternative categories of the ambiguist: categories like those of open-mindedness versus close-mindedness, flexibility versus rigidity, creativity versus conformity, skepticism versus trust, tolerance versus intolerance, and the like. Which is to say that in denouncing anything, theorists cannot help but suggest what it is that they are not denouncing—or what they are accepting as preferable. While, as I said, the ambiguists acknowledge the impossibility of subverting all categorizations, they do not think that this undermines their general policy of subversion. Rather, they maintain that the ac­knowledgment of this fact should make us approach our own (and others') ideas with skepticism and flexibility, prompting us to see our ideas not as justified truths but as useful positions from which to unmask truth claims and not as enduring grounds for political theory but as temporary resting points from which to unsettle others—points that can themselves be expected to be challenged and changed down the road. The problem with this position is that even temporary and un­stable positions need justification. That is, even if we acknowledge that our categorizations are apt to be undermined and overthrown, they must be given reasons at the moment we are using them. If we are denouncing others' choices, we are necessarily commending our own and, as such, we need to say why we think our own commend­able. Likewise then, in denouncing traditional categories, the ambiguists cannot avoid suggesting that their own categories are superior; and, as such, they cannot avoid making positive moral claims or presenting a general, alternative theory about humanity and society. Thus, they are obligated to present their reasons for this alternative vision.

\*\*Standards Defenses

# Predictable Ground key to Education

It is necessary to arrive at an agreement about what the resolution means before any active discussion can take place- the most predictable way to interpret the debate-space is first to take common usage and then to propose more specific and narrow stipulations.

Kemerling, 97 professor of philosophy at Newberry College, (Garth, “Definition and Meaning”, http://www.philosophypages.com/lg/e05.htm)

The most common way of preventing or eliminating differences in the use of languages is by agreeing on the [definition](http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/d2.htm#def) of our terms. Since these explicit accounts of the meaning of a word or phrase can be offered in distinct contexts and employed in the service of different goals, it's useful to distinguish definitions of several kinds: A [lexical definition](http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/l5.htm#lexi) simply reports the way in which a term is already used within a language community. The goal here is to inform someone else of the accepted meaning of the term, so the definition is more or less correct depending upon the accuracy with which it captures that usage. In these pages, my definitions of technical terms of logic are lexical because they are intended to inform you about the way in which these terms are actually employed within the discipline of logic. At the other extreme, a [stipulative definition](http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/s9.htm#stip) freely assigns meaning to a completely new term, creating a usage that had never previously existed. Since the goal in this case is to propose the adoption of shared use of a novel term, there are no existing standards against which to compare it, and the definition is always correct (though it might fail to win acceptance if it turns out to be inapt or useless). If I now decree that we will henceforth refer to Presidential speeches delivered in French as "glorsherfs," I have made a (probably pointless) stipulative definition. Combining these two techniques is often an effective way to reduce the [vagueness](http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/v.htm#vag) of a word or phrase. These [precising definitions](http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/p7.htm#prec) begin with the lexical definition of a term but then propose to sharpen it by stipulating more narrow limits on its use. Here, the lexical part must be correct and the stipulative portion should appropriately reduce the troublesome vagueness. If the USPS announces that "proper notification of a change of address" means that an official form containing the relevant information must be received by the local post office no later than four days prior to the effective date of the change, it has offered a (possibly useful) precising definition.

Think of debates like chairs- unless there is some commonality in the general idea of what a debate (or a chair) is, pretty soon we could all be sitting on tables.

Kemerling, 97 professor of philosophy at Newberry College, (Garth, “Definition and Meaning”, http://www.philosophypages.com/lg/e05.htm)

The [extension](http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/e9.htm#exte) of a general term is just the collection of individual things to which it is correctly applied. Thus, the extension of the word "chair" includes every chair that is (or ever has been or ever will be) in the world. The [intension](http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/e9.htm#exte) of a general term, on the other hand, is the set of features which are shared by everything to which it applies. Thus, the intension of the word "chair" is (something like) "a piece of furniture designed to be sat upon by one person at a time."

Predictability key to Plan Focus

Predictability and plan-focus are inextricably linked; the only way to generate discussion we can prepare about is to focus on the plan as the foundation of argument.

Patrick Speice and Jim Lyle 2003 “traditional policy debate: now more than ever” Oceans Policy Adrift http://www.wfu.edu/Student-organizations/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/SpeiceLyle2003htm.htm

This notion of **predictability is one that is important for debate as a game. If one team cannot predict what the other will say, then it becomes futile to attempt to research and prepare for tournament competition. This problem is even more apparent in the case of critical affirmatives. If an affirmative team is able to argue that the performative effects of the 1AC are a justification to vote affirmative, or if the affirmative team can argue that their 1AC should be endorsed as a tool of cultural change, they are essentially asking the judge to vote for portions of the 1AC that are not necessarily linked to the plan.**

Limits key to Politics

Limits key: political philosophy is a question concerning whether or not an ideal is desirable, not the mere formulation of infinite ideals.

Donald S. Lutz, Professor of Political Science at Houston, 2000, Political Theory and Partisan Politics, p. 39-40

Aristotle notes in the Politics that political theory simultaneously proceeds at three levels—discourse about the ideal, about the best possible in the real world, and about existing political systems.4 Put another way, comprehensive political theory must ask several differ­ent kinds of questions that are linked, yet distinguishable. In order to understand the interlocking set of questions that political theory can ask, imagine a continuum stretching from left to right. At the end, to the right, is an ideal form of government, a perfectly wrought con­struct produced by the imagination. At the other end is the perfect dystopia, the most perfectly wretched system that the human imagi­nation can produce. Stretching between these two extremes is an infi­nite set of possibilities, merging into one another, that describe the logical possibilities created by the characteristics defining the end points. For example, a political system defined primarily by equality would have a perfectly inegalitarian system described at the other end, and the possible states of being between them would vary prima­rily in the extent to which they embodied equality. An ideal defined primarily by liberty would create a different set of possibilities be­tween the extremes. Of course, visions of the ideal often are inevitably more complex than these single-value examples indicate, but it is also true that in order to imagine an ideal state of affairs a kind of simpli­fication is almost always required since normal states of affairs invari­ably present themselves to human consciousness as complicated, opaque, and to a significant extent indeterminate. t A non-ironic reading of Plato's Republic leads one to conclude that the creation of these visions of the ideal characterizes political philoso­phy. This is not the case. Any person can generate a vision of the ideal. One job of political philosophy is to ask the question "Is this ideal worth pursuing?" Before the question can be pursued, however, the ideal state of affairs must be clarified, especially with respect to con­ceptual precision and the logical relationship between the proposi­tions that describe the ideal. This pre-theoretical analysis raises the vision of the ideal from the mundane to a level where true philosophi­cal analysis, and the careful comparison with existing systems can proceed fruitfully. The process of pre-theoretical analysis, probably because it works on clarifying ideas that most capture the human imagination, too often looks to some like the entire enterprise of political philosophy.5 However, the value of Jean-Jacques Rousseau's concept of the General Will, for example, lies not in its formal logical implications, nor in its compelling hold on the imagination, but on the power and clarity it lends to an analysis and comparison of ac­tual political systems. Among other things it allows him to show that anyone who wishes to pursue a state of affairs closer to that summed up in the concept of the General Will must successfully develop a civil religion. To the extent politicians believe theorists who tell them that pre-theoretical clarification of language describing an ideal is the essence and sum total of political philosophy, to that extent they will properly conclude that political philosophers have little to tell them, since politics is the realm of the possible not the realm of logical clarity. However, once the ideal is clarified, the political philosopher will begin to articulate and assess the reasons why we might want to pursue such an ideal. At this point, analysis leaves the realm of pure logic and enters the realm of the logic of human longing, aspiration, and anxi­ety. The analysis is now limited by the interior parameters of the human heart (more properly the human psyche) to which the theorist must appeal. Unlike the clarification stage where anything that is logical is possible, there are now definite limits on where logic can take us. Appeals to self-destruction, less happiness rather than more, psychic isolation, enslavement, loss of identity, a preference for the lives of mollusks over that of humans, to name just a few possibilities, are doomed to failure. The theorist cannot appeal to such values if she or he is to attract an audience of politicians. Much political theory in­volves the careful, competitive analysis of what a given ideal state of affairs entails, and as Plato shows in his dialogues the discussion between the philosopher and the politician will quickly terminate if he or she cannot convincingly demonstrate the connection between the political ideal being developed and natural human passions. In this way, the politician can be educated by the possibilities that the politi­cal theorist can articulate, just as the political theorist can be educated by the relative success the normative analysis has in "setting the hook" of interest among nonpolitical theorists. This realm of discourse, domi­nated by the logic of humanly worthwhile goals, requires that the theorist carefully observe the responses of others in order not to be seduced by what is merely logical as opposed to what is humanly rational. Moral discourse conditioned by the ideal, if it is to be suc­cessful, requires the political theorist to be fearless in pursuing norma­tive logic, but it also requires the theorist to have enough humility to remember that, if a non-theorist cannot be led toward an ideal, the fault may well lie in the theory, not in the moral vision of the non-theorist.

Limits key to Inclusion

Limits are key to make openness meaningful: the context in which speech occurs it speech’s only source of meaning

Mary Dietz, Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota, 2000, Political Theory and Partisan Politics, p. 131-2

If another of the imperatives of the political world is to avoid becoming contemptible, then speaking the truth is a good, but not an unalloyed good. The paradoxes of politics tend to wreak havoc with the principles of communication because, as Merleau-Ponty observes, "politics is a relationship to [people]men rather than principles" (Merleau-Ponty 1964, 219).32 Thus in politics an openness toward the opinions of others is sometimes not a condition of mutual respect, but antithetical to it. It may be a peculiarity of the political domain that "when everyone can tell you the truth, you lose their respect," but it is a peculiarity that discourse ethicists ignore to their peril (Machiavelli 1950, 87). One might say, then, that speaking the truth is an indispensable element in politics, but not the point of it. To make communicative action, or the enactment of principles of discourse ethics, or moral conversation, the end or goal of politics is to mistake the nature of working in half-truth and thereby misconstrue "the milieu that is proper to politics" itself. The supervenience of strategic (speech) action on communicative (speech) action in politics that I have been alluding to here is what I also think Timothy Garton Ash meant to convey when, in the aftermath of the PEN Congress, he referred to the "qualitatively different responsibility" that the intellectual has for "the validity, intellectual coherence, and truth of what he says and writes," as opposed to the politician, who invariably works in half-truth. The point is not that the intellectual lives in a communicative world of validity, coherence, and truth while the politician does not. (Although Habermas's ideal communication situation might stand a better chance of realization in a scholarly conference or a graduate seminar, as opposed to a press conference, an election campaign, or even a neighborhood caucus.) The politician also inhabits a world of validity, coherence, and truth. Yet validity, coherence, and truth take on different colorations working in the context peculiar to politics—where strategic imperatives and the exercise of power, conflicts of interest and drives of ambition, are ineliminable aspects of collective action. Hence, it is one thing to encourage (or even insist upon) the intellectual's responsibility to keep providing us with various practical (or even imaginary) means for judging the health or sickness of the body politic, and quite another to expect the politician—or the citizen—to "live" them.

Limits and Education key to Politics

Rules good: even openness requires limits, rules and closure. Shared conventions form the basis for the possibility of political discussion and participation.

Ruth Lessl Shively, Associate Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, 2000, Political Theory and Partisan Politics, p. 179

To put this point another way, it turns out that to be open to all things is, in effect, to be open to nothing. While the ambiguists have commendable reasons for wanting to avoid closure—to avoid specify­ing what is not allowed or celebrated in their political vision—they need to say "no" to some things in order to be open to things in general. They need to say "no" to certain forms of contest, if only to protect contest in general. For if one is to be open to the principles of democracy, for example, one must be dogmatically closed to the prin­ciples of fascism. If one would embrace tolerance, one must rigidly reject intolerance. If one would support openness in political speech and action, one must ban the acts of political intimidation, violence or recrimination that squelch that openness. If one would expand delib­eration and disruption, one must set up strict legal protections around such activities. And if one would ensure that citizens have reason to engage in political contest—that it has practical meaning and import for them—one must establish and maintain the rules and regulations and laws that protect democracy. In short, openness requires certain clear limits, rules, closure. And to make matters more complex, these structures of openness cannot simply be put into place and forgotten. They need to be taught to new generations of citizens, to be retaught and reenforced among the old, and as the political world changes, to be shored up, rethought, adapted, and applied to new problems and new situations. It will not do, then, to simply assume that these structures are permanently viable and secure without significant work or justification on our part; nor will it do to talk about resisting or subverting them. Indeed, they are such valuable and yet vulnerable goods that they require the most unflag­ging and firm support that we can give them.

\*\*Education Good

# Roleplaying key to Education

Instrumental affirmation of a policy through role-playing is a prerequisite to liberal democratic participation

John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 1999, p. 56-57

To answer this question, we say that, ideally, citizens are to think of themselves as if they were legislators and ask themselves what statutes, supported by what reasons satisfying the criterion of reciprocity, they would think it most reasonable to enact. When firm and widespread, the disposition of citizens to view themselves as ideal legislators, and to repudiate government officials and candidates for public office who violate public reason, forms part of the political and social basis of liberal democracy and is vital for its enduring strength and vigor. Thus in domestic society citizens fulfill their duty of civility and support the idea of public reason, while doing what they can to hold government officials to it. This duty, like other political rights and duties, is an intrinsically moral duty. I emphasize that it is not a legal duty, for in that case it would be incompatible with freedom of speech. Similarly, the ideal of the public reason of free and equal peoples is realized, or satisfied, whenever chief executives and legislators, and other government officials, as well as candidates for public office, act from and follow the principles of the Law of Peoples and explain to other peoples their reasons for pursuing or revising a people’s foreign policy and affairs of state that involve other societies. As for private citizens, we say, as before, that ideally citizens are to think of themselves as if they were executives and legislators and ask themselves what foreign policy supported by what considerations they would think it most reasonable to advance. Once again, when firm and widespread, the disposition of citizens to view themselves as ideal executives and legislators, and to repudiate government officials and candidates for public office who violate the public reason of free and equal peoples, is part of the political and social basis of peace and understanding among peoples.

# Education key to Deliberation

Politics is the realm of power; education is the only way to check manipulation.

Donald S. Lutz, Professor of Polisci at Houston, 2000, Political Theory and Partisan Politics, p. 36-7

The position argued here is that to the extent such a discussion between political theorists and politicians does not take place we damage the prospects for marrying justice with power. Since the hope of uniting justice with power was the reason for creating politi­cal philosophy in the first place, political theorists need to pursue the dialogue as part of what justifies their intellectual project. Poli­tics is the realm of power. More specifically it is the realm where force and violence are replaced by debates and discussion about how to implement power. Without the meaningful injection of consider­ations of justice, politics tends to become discourse by the most powerful about how to implement their preferred regime. Although constitutionalism tends to be disparaged by contemporary political science, a constitution is the very place where justice and power are married. Aristotle first taught us that a constitution must be matched to the realities of the political system—the character, hopes, fears, needs and environment of the people—which requires that constitutional­ism be addressed by men and women practiced in the art of the possible.2 Aristotle also taught us that a constitution (the politeia, or plan for a way of life) should address the improvement of people toward the best life possible, which requires that constitutionalism be addressed by political theorists who can hold out a vision of justice and the means for advancing toward it. The conversation between politician and political theorist stands at the center of their respective callings, and a constitution, even though it reflects only a part of the reality of a political system, has a special status in this central conversation. Although the focus of this chapter is on a direct conversation be­tween theorist and politician, there is an important, indirect aspect of the conversation that should not be overlooked—classroom teaching. Too often the conversation between politician and political theorist is described in terms of a direct one between philosophers and those holding power. Overlooked is the central need to educate as many young people as possible. Since it is difficult to predict who will, in fact, hold power, and because the various peoples who take seriously the marriage of justice with power are overwhelmingly committed to a non-elitist, broad involvement of the population, we should not overlook or minimize our importance as teachers of the many. Politi­cal leaders drawn from a people who do not understand what is at stake are neither inclined nor equipped to join the conversation. As we teach, we converse with future leaders. Perhaps not everyone who teaches political theory has had the same experience, but of the more than eight thousand students I have taught, I know of at least forty-nine who later held a major elective office, and at least eighty more who have become important political activists. This comes down to about five students per teaching year, and I could not have predicted which five it would be. The indeterminate future of any given student is one argument against directing our efforts at civic education toward the few, best students. A constitutional perspective suggests not only that those in power rely upon support and direction from a broad segment of the public, but also that reliance upon the successful civic education of the elite is not very effective, by itself for marrying justice with power in the long run.

# Education key to Deliberation

Education is key to deliberation and checking partisanship. We can’t wish partisanship away—debate is a key space with which to foster the kind of education which checks partisanship.

Adolf G. Gundersen, Assoc Prof Polisci at Texas A&M, 2000 Political Theory and Partisan Politics p. 112-3

A new via media will also encourage a new attitude toward par­tisanship, one that recognizes its necessity, but believes in the possi­bility of confining it within clear limits. Citizens, like their representatives in Washington or the state capitol, will deliberate only if they see some value in doing so**.** Deliberation does not work very well in a world in which everyone behaves like the Athenian ambassadors in the Melian dialogue or in which everyone believes that, when all is said and done, Thomas Hobbes really was right. Here too, every single item on the above list can probably play some role. Deliberation begets deliberation, partly because it works—and people see that it works. At the same time, I would argue that here we must take a long view. Reorienting how society thinks about politics (in this case, how it thinks about a thinking politics), is no small matter. It requires a solution with reach, from an institution that enjoys widespread pub­lic support, and in a way that is capable of dealing with the impor­tant cognitive component involved in all deliberation. Here I do not think there is an alternative to public schools—which, for starters, means strengthening them, not weakening them, as now seems fash­ionable. It also means changing curriculum to emphasize the inevi­tability of partisanship, struggle and manipulation, on the one hand, and the desirability and possibility of public deliberation, on the other. Schools should, of course, also teach deliberative skills. But my view is that the big change must come here: in the broad orien­tation to political life that they convey. Schools should be places where kids learn the lessons of Pericles and James Madison—and then learn to move beyond them. Most of what I have had to say here stems from the view that par­tisanship is both the bane of deliberation and its natural outcome. Partisanship puts an end to deliberation—and in one sense that is all well and good, since deliberation is not an end in itself but is, rather, "thought-directed-at-action." Between thought and action, there will always be a place for partisanship in any democratic society worthy of the name. At the same time, partisanship that inordinately en­croaches on the thoughtful activity of deliberation itself ought to be limited wherever possible. Here there is broad agreement among democratic theorists. But this agreement quickly breaks down over the issue of how to limit partisanship. The participatory strategy is to turn partisans against each other and to thus extinguish the flames of partisan rivalry. Less optimistic, the Madisonian strategy is to separate decision makers from the heat of partisan conflict, while forcing representatives to cooperate with each other. Having rejected both of these strategies, I argued for a via media between Athens and Philadelphia, one which borrows liberally from both of the older strategies. Its centerpiece is citizen deliberation, which I argued is capable of blunting partisanship. We cannot wish partisanship away. Nor can we force citizens to stop taking sides. All we can do is encourage its opposite. Fortunately, because deliberation begets de­liberation, it is entirely reasonable to think that we can do so success­fully. That place "between Athens and Philadelphia" is not so far off as we might think. &

# Education solves Totalitarianism

The relativist cynicism of radical critique paves the way to fascism; framework is necessary to educate ourselves about positively changing the world for the better such that we don’t fall prey to the right-wing totalitarianism at the heart of postmodern critique.

Martin Lewis, Assistant Professor at George Washington, 1992, Green Delusions p. 258

A majority of those born between 1960 and 1980 seem to tend toward cynicism, and we can thus hardly expect them to be converted en masse to radical doctrines of social and environmental salvation by a few committed thinkers. It is actually possible that a radical education may make them even more cynical than they already are. While their professors may find the extreme relativism of subversive postmodernism bracingly liberating, many of today's students may embrace only the new creed's rejection of the past. Stripped of leftist social concerns, radical postmodernism's contempt for established social and political philosophy—indeed, its contempt for liberalism—may well lead to right-wing totalitarianism. When cynical, right-leaning students are taught that democracy is a sham and that all meaning derives from power, they are being schooled in fascism, regardless of their instructors' intentions. According to sociologist Jeffrey Goldfarb (1991), cynicism is the hallmark—and main defect—of the current age. He persuasively argues that cynicism's roots lie in failed left- and right-wing ideologies—systems of thought that deductively connect "a simple rationalized absolute truth ... to a totalized set of political actions and policies" (1991:82). Although most eco-radicals are anything but cynical when they imagine a "green future," they do take a cynical turn when contemplating the present political order. The dual cynical-ideological mode represents nothing less than the death of liberalism and of reform. Its dangers are eloquently spelled out by Goldfarb (1991:9): "When one thinks ideologically and acts ideologically, opponents become enemies to be vanquished, political compromise becomes a kind of immorality, and constitutional refinements become inconvenient niceties.

\*\*Plan Focus Good

# Fiat Good

Even if fiat is illusory, it contextualizes the plan and status quo such that arguments can be had about the desirability of policy implementations.

Patrick Speice and Jim Lyle 2003 “traditional policy debate: now more than ever” Oceans Policy Adrift http://www.wfu.edu/Student-organizations/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/SpeiceLyle2003htm.htm

There are several ways those who utilize language and performance critiques have sought to use education to subvert competitive values. First, instead of viewing fiat as a tool that allows for the evaluations and comparisons that necessary for playing the game, fiat is argued to be an educational illusion that has allowed for debate to serve as a weak form of individual/collective expression and activism (Shanahan, 1993). The non-policy focused debaters ignore the fact that fiat serves important competitive purposes for the activity, and focus on fiat’s imaginary existence. The arguments that justify the lack of an alternative to the plan, the focus on phrase X, or the absolutist “vote neg” stance common with these arguments are grounded on the belief that fiat doesn’t exist: “why vote for the plan, it will never be enacted as a result of the judge’s decision?” Unfortunately, this overlooks the fact that fiat works to contextualize the plan/resolution to the status quo so that each side of the debate can advance arguments about the workability of the competing options vis-à-vis one another.

Plan Focus key to Deliberation

Deliberation assumes certain institutional structures and shared values.

Adolf G. Gundersen, Associate Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, 2000, Political Theory and Partisan Politics, p. 104-5

Indirect political engagement is perhaps the single most important element of the strategy I am recommending here. It is also the most emblematic, as it results from a fusion of confrontation and separa­tion. But what kind of political engagement might conceivably qualify as being both confrontational and separated from actual political deci­sion-making? There is only one type, so far as I can see, and that is deliberation. Political deliberation is by definition a form of engage­ment with the collectivity of which one is a member. This is all the more true when two or more citizens deliberate together. Yet delibera­tion is also a form of political action that precedes the actual taking and implementation of decisions. It is thus simultaneously connected and disconnected, confrontational and separate. It is, in other words, a form of indirect political engagement. This conclusion, namely, that we ought to call upon deliberation to counter partisanship and thus clear the way for deliberation, looks rather circular at first glance. And, semantically at least, it certainly is. Yet this ought not to concern us very much. Politics, after all, is not a matter of avoiding semantic inconveniences, but of doing the right thing and getting desirable results. In political theory, therefore, the real concern is always whether a circular argument translates into a self-defeating prescription. And here that is plainly not the case, for what I am suggesting is that deliberation can diminish partisanship, which will in turn contribute to conditions amenable to continued or extended deliberation. That "deliberation promotes deliberation" is surely a circular claim, but it is just as surely an accurate description of the real world of lived politics, as observers as far back as Thucydides have documented. It may well be that deliberation rests on certain preconditions. I am not arguing that there is no such thing as a deliberative "first cause." Indeed, it seems obvious to me both that deliberators require something to deliberate about and that deliberation presumes certain institutional structures and shared values. Clearly something must get the deliberative ball rolling and, to keep it rolling, the cultural terrain must be free of deep chasms and sinkholes. Nevertheless, however extensive and demanding deliberation's preconditions might be, we ought not to lose sight of the fact that, once begun, deliberation tends to be self-sustaining. Just as partisanship begets partisanship, deliberation begets deliberation. If that is so, the question of limiting par­tisanship and stimulating deliberation are to an important extent the same question.