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Position Explanation

This is the South Korea Aff. Currently, the U.S. deploys somewhere around 27,000 ground forces in the Republic of Korea. Our aff argues that the presence of these forces risks a war on the Peninsula and impedes international efforts to halt North Korea's proliferation of nuclear weapons. The general thesis of the first two advantages is the same: a withdrawal of U.S. ground forces would be a confidence building measure and would de-escalate the perception of a U.S. threat towards North Korea, reducing the risk of conflict and eliminating the main motivation for North Korea's nuclear weapons program.

The third advantage argues that the U.S. troops stationed in Korea would be better suited elsewhere. A withdraw from the peninsula would enable the U.S. to redesign these particular ground forces and train them to respond rapidly to a wider-array of future threats. This type of overhaul in our force structure is important for the ability of the U.S. to project power into conflicts around the globe, and maintain the stabilizing influence of U.S. leadership and hegemony.

This aff is strategic because it’s got a million impacts. Their disadvantages will struggle to outweigh our case.

Inherency 1ac

Obama is committed to maintaining U.S. military presence in Korea for the foreseeable future

Reuters, 5-24-2010, “Obama Tells Military: Prepare for North Korea Aggression,” http://www.commondreams.org/headline/2010/05/24-6

President Barack Obama has directed the U.S. military to coordinate with South Korea to "ensure readiness" and deter future aggression from North Korea, the White House said on Monday. The United States gave strong backing to plans by South Korean President Lee Myung-bak to punish North Korea for sinking one of its naval ships, White House spokesman Robert Gibbs said in a statement. The White House urged North Korea to apologize and change its behavior, he said. "We endorse President Lee's demand that North Korea immediately apologize and punish those responsible for the attack, and, most importantly, stop its belligerent and threatening behavior," Gibbs said. "U.S. support for South Korea's defense is unequivocal, and the president has directed his military commanders to coordinate closely with their Republic of Korea counterparts to ensure readiness and to deter future aggression," he said. Obama and Lee have agreed to meet at the G20 summit in Canada next month, he said. Late last week, a team of international investigators accused North Korea of torpedoing the Cheonan corvette in March, killing 46 sailors in one of the deadliest clashes between the two since the 1950-53 Korean War. Lee said on Monday South Korea would bring the issue before the U.N., whose past sanctions have damaged the already ruined North Korean economy. The United States still has about 28,000 troops in South Korea to provide military support. The two Koreas, still technically at war, have more than 1 million troops near their border. "We will build on an already strong foundation of excellent cooperation between our militaries and explore further enhancements to our joint posture on the Peninsula as part of our ongoing dialogue," Gibbs said.

Our Korea policy is a disaster already happening – an aggressive and punitive poster on the peninsula is fueling North Korean belligerence and proliferation

David Lai, Prof of Asian Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, 2009, “Obama's Policy Option on North Korea,” http://www.chinasecurity.us/index.php?option=com\_content&view=article&id=286

We may never figure out what North Korea’s true intents were, but regardless, the serious implications of these provocative acts should be seen in light of their great importance. First, after years of playing hide-and-seek with the United States and other powers in Northeast Asia, North Korea has shown that it has maintained a functioning nuclear weapons program and delivery capability. Second, North Korea’s defiant acts have also exposed the problems with the 6-PT. Since the initiation of the 6-PT in 2003, the United States, China, South Korea, Japan and Russia have worked hard to get North Korea to agree to terms that would lead towards the disablement of its nuclear weapons program. Those agreements have turned out to be quite fragile, and the nations involved in the negotiation have not been able to hold North Korea accountable for its provocative behavior. With the putative success of its second nuclear test, North Korea has stepped up its demand for recognition as a nuclear power, and future talks on its nuclear weapons, if they take place, may be on nuclear arms control rather than on denuclearization. The stark reality is that US policy toward North Korea and its quest to become a nuclear power is largely a failure. For too long, the United States has treated North Korea as a juvenile delinquent and responded to its provocative acts in a haphazard manner with a combination of threats and concessions. Time and again, the United States has dealt with North Korea, but with no vision for how to make progress. North Korea has been able to take advantage of these shortcomings while making steady advances on its nuclear weapons program and delivery capability. Mandate for Change Frustrated with these setbacks, the United States is now back to asking the same old question: what should be done about this defiant nation? President Obama came to office with a mandate to construct a foreign policy very different from the one pursued by his predecessor. He has taken the initiative with Cuba, reached out to Iran and extended olive branches to Muslim nations. Obama intended to do the same with North Korea and was willing to deal with Pyongyang directly. However, enraged at North Korea’s provocative acts, President Obama has decided to once again “take a hard look” at US policy on North Korea. Unlike the guessing game as to what North Korea will do, we know how this “hard look” will turn out. Living up to the old adage that “when all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail,” in dealing with North Korea’s provocations, the United States reaches for the same tool every time, no matter if it repeatedly failed to do the job in the past. Every time Pyongyang does something outrageous, all the United States can think of are measures for “getting tough”, such as applying pressure, meting out punishment or putting North Korea back on the list of terrorist states. Indeed, President Obama is already talking in those terms and making it clear that there will be no rewards for North Korea’s bad behavior. Obviously, getting tough is not a new answer to this old question. It would just be another haphazard US reaction to North Korea’s actions. We already know that sanctions, embargos and military posturing have a limited effect on the regime. Warning Obama not to go down this path, Mike Chinoy, a long-time Asia specialist for CNN, has noted the maxim that, “Insanity is doing the same thing over and over and expecting a different result.”1 This reminder has come a bit late. The United States has already gone to the UN Security Council and obtained a new resolution to toughen sanctions on North Korea. The defiant delinquent responded as expected. North Korea declared that it had been enriching uranium and would weaponize all of its reprocessed, weapons grade plutonium. In response, at a joint press conference with South Korean President Lee Myung-bak, President Obama vowed that, “We are going to break that pattern.” Obama meant that he would stand firm this time and never yield again. The president’s resolve will find its test when the United States takes measures to implement the sanctions and when it responds to future North Korean acts, such as missile launches and more nuclear tests. Unfortunately, sanctions and tough measures will intensify confrontations, but will not change North Korea’s behavior. President Obama would be better served by directing his attention to developing a truly workable agenda for the North Korean issue. And a good place to start would be to straighten out some of the United States’ own views. First, what is our problem with North Korea? Is it a problem with North Korea’s efforts to develop nuclear weapons? Or is it a problem with the North Korea regime itself? The United States obviously has a problem with both, and there is no denying that many Americans believe that a change of the rogue regime in our favor would automatically resolve the nuclear issue (with the assumption that if North Korea turns democratic, it will not feel the need to develop nukes).

Plan: the United States federal government should substantially reduce its ground force military deployments in the Republic of Korea.

Korean War 1ac – Harms

Contention \_\_\_\_ – Korean War

The Yellow Sea incident has put all sides on high alert—risk of short-term conflict on the Korean Peninsula is at an all time high

Scott A. Snyder, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Korea Studies at the CFR, June 2010, “The Cheonan Reckoning,” http://www.cfr.org/publication/22363/cheonan\_reckoning.html

The verdict by an international team of investigators that it was a North Korean torpedo that sank South Korea's corvette, the Cheonan, on March 26 in waters near South Korea's Northern Limit Line (NLL) has become the catalyst for a worrisome near-term escalation of inter-Korean tensions, and has stimulated closer international scrutiny regarding North Korea's internal stability. It has also become a litmus test of Chinese policy that will require a judgment at the UN Security Council. The initial announcement of the investigation result triggered a rhetorical spiral that rolled back almost every reconciliatory measure that had taken place during ten years of inter-Korean rapprochement, with the notable exception of the Kaesong Industrial Zone, a zone in North Korea that hosts South Korean manufacturing plants and employees. A spokesman for North Korea's National Defense Commission (NDC) immediately and strongly denied any culpability, offering to send its own investigation team to review the evidence, and threatening “all out war” in response to unspecified retaliatory measures by South Korea.

Multiple Scenarios exist for armed conflict –

First is North Korean belligerence -- The Cheonan sinking was just the first in a wave of efforts by the north to raise tensions – more provocations are coming

Bruce Klingner, Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation, 5-20-2010, “It Was A North Korean Torpedo”, http://blog.heritage.org/2010/05/20/it-was-a-north-korean-torpedo/

As if the Cheonan attack was not bad enough, Seoul will be nervously waiting for the other shoe to drop. It can be expected that North Korea will react strongly to any international efforts to punish it for the Cheonan attack. It is also likely that the Cheonan sinking is not a singular event but rather the beginning of a North Korean campaign to raise tensions. Pyongyang could even be looking for a strong international response to the Cheonan sinking in order to justify additional belligerent behavior. If that is the case, then North Korea will engage in additional provocative behavior, particularly in the run-up to Seoul’s hosting of the G-20 summit in November.

These multiple flashpoints could trigger hostility and conflict escalation – status quo military deployments ensure the US quickly gets drawn in

Simon Tisdale, assistant editor of the Guardian, 5-24-2010, “China faces tough choices over Korea,” http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/may/24/china-faces-tough-choices-korea

The risk of renewed, all-out warfare on the Korean peninsula is rated low by most western and Chinese analysts. But the chances of escalating armed clashes, planned or otherwise, have risen significantly following South Korea's decision to punish the North for the March sinking of its naval corvette, the Cheonan. And once shooting starts, it can be hard to stop. Today's South Korean announcement that it is planning joint anti-submarine exercises with the US provides one obvious possible flashpoint. Seoul says a North Korean torpedo destroyed the Cheonan, killing 46 sailors. If its vengeful navy were to encounter another of Kim Jong-il's submarines, mayhem may ensue. President Lee Myung-bak's move to resume psy-ops (psychological warfare operations) along the demilitarised zone, including broadcast propaganda messages targeted at North Korean troops, has already led Pyongyang to threaten to shoot up the border. And if the South makes good its vow to intercept North Korean commercial shipping, more trouble is likely. Both sides have much to lose if violence ratchets up. "This latest violence is as unlikely as previous incidents to lead to renewal of general fighting," said author Arthur Cyr in the China Post. "The Korean war was extraordinarily costly, and neither side has ever tried to renew such hostilities. North Korea now has at least a primitive nuclear weapon, but any use would result in instant devastating retaliation." The US, with 29,000 troops based in the South, may quickly be drawn into any new skirmishing. Barack Obama has directed the US military to be ready "to deter future aggression" and is demanding the North admit responsibility and apologise. But cash-strapped Washington has no appetite, and scant capacity, for more war, with the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq unfinished. Much the same goes for Japan, which is backing South Korea at the UN security council.

Korean War 1ac – Harms

Second – Hardliners

The sub incident proves that hardliners are in the driver’s seat of North Korea’s power transition – this crisis uniquely risks nuclear conflict – hardliners cannot be deterred

Chung Chong Wook, Prof at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 6-1-2010, “The Korean Crisis: Going Beyond the Cheonan Incident,” http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/RSIS0582010.pdf

Sharply rising military tensions following the sinking of a South Korean naval corvette are creating a crisis in the Korean peninsula. It is not the first time that the Korean peninsula is engulfed in a crisis, but this one is different. There are good reasons to view the current crisis with grave concern. One is the nature of the crisis. The current imbroglio is not an unintended consequence of an accident. Nor was it an act of terrorism. It was what could be a carefully planned and well-executed act of war where a 1,200-tonne naval ship, the *Cheonan*, was blown into half, killing 46 soldiers – at least that is the conclusion in South Korea. The Nuclear Factor After a month-long investigation, the Seoul government announced that the ship was hit by a torpedo launched from a North Korean submarine. The evidence it produced included the tail part of the torpedo recovered from the bottom of the sea where the ship sank. President Lee Myung-bak, demand the North’s apology, announced a series of measures suspending all inter-Korea cooperation except in the humanitarian area. North Korea, which earlier denied its involvement, immediately cut off almost all land, air and sea lines of communications with the South. It warned that any violation was to be dealt with by the wartime laws. It also placed its armed forces on special alert. The two Koreas appear to be heading for a serious military confrontation. Another factor that adds to the severity of the current crisis is the nuclear capability of the North. Pyongyang is believed to have fissionable materials enough for up to ten plutonium bombs. Its two nuclear tests so far reinforced the possibility of all-out military flare-up involving nuclear weapons. The nuclear logic could certainly apply for deterring a war, but North Korea has proven that the rational logic of deterrence may not necessarily hold. Such is the risk of dealing with a desperate country whose brinksmanship tactics often defy the strategic calculus of its neighbors. The drastic decline in the South Korean stock market is indicative of how the situation is perceived. Despite all these ominous developments, however, premature pessimism is not advisable. The China Factor The key in assessing the security dynamics in the Korean peninsula is China whose policy has consistently been to avoid any serious military conflict there. What China fears is the prospect of serious social and political upheavals, even short of an open war between the two Koreas which could trigger a massive inflow of refugees, mostly poor and potentially violent, into China’s northeastern territory. Such a contingency might not only disrupt China’s economic growth but could result in the emergence of a unified Korea under the auspices of the South and the expansion of the military presence of its ally, the United States, right on its border. This strategic value of North Korea as a buffer as well as the political and economic consequences of the loss of this buffer has been at the heart of the Chinese strategic thinking toward the Korean peninsula. Recently the Chinese government has accorded an even higher priority to this strategy as the political and economic situation in North Korea seemed to be headed toward a critical point. Kim Jong-Il’s bout with a stroke last August and his poor health since then led to the abrupt efforts in Pyongyang to arrange power succession by his third son, Kim Jong-un, who at 27 years old, has little experience in running the country. The timing could not have been worse. A series of economic mismanagement including the failure of the currency reform last November made the government lose control over the market. This rising inflation led to incidences of open revolts. Power Struggle? Experts in Seoul now pay close attention to signs of power struggle in Pyongyang that is usual during a power transition and extreme economic deprivation. They are very sensitive to the report that the military, particularly the hardliners in it, have gained a predominant position and are pushing for a confrontational policy toward the South. Many of them speculate that these hardliners were behind the Cheonan incident as they had been behind the nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009. They point out to the recent reshuffle in the North’s military leadership which removed the moderates like Kim Il-Chul and promoted the hawkish generals. One of them was in charge of the naval fleet that the South believed was responsible for the torpedo attack on the Cheonan.

Korean War 1ac – Harms

This risks full-scale conflict escalation

Doug Bandow, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, 4-6-2010, “An Unstable Rogue,” http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=23144

The Yellow Sea incident reemphasizes the fact that North Korean irresponsibility could lead to war. Tensions on the Korean peninsula have risen after President Lee ended the ROK’s “Sunshine Policy”—which essentially provided bountiful subsidies irrespective of Pyongyang’s behavior. Nevertheless, the threat of war seemingly remained low. Thankfully, the prospect of conflict had dramatically diminished over the last couple of decades. After intermittently engaging in bloody terrorist and military provocations, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea seemed to have largely abandoned direct attacks on South Korea and the United States. Now we are no longer sure. Even if the DPRK was not involved in the sinking, only prudence, not principle, prevents the North from engaging in armed instances of brinkmanship. And with Pyongyang in the midst of a leadership transition of undetermined length, where the factions are unclear, different family members could reach for power, and the military might become the final arbiter, the possibility of violence occurring in the North and spilling outward seems real. Such an outcome would be in no one’s interest, including that of China. So far the People’s Republic of China has taken a largely hands-off attitude towards the North. Beijing has pushed the DPRK to negotiate and backed limited United Nations sanctions. But the PRC has refused to support a potentially economy-wrecking embargo or end its own food and energy subsidies to North Korea. There are several reasons for China’s stance. At base, Beijing is happier with the status quo than with risking North Korea’s economic stability or the two nations’ political relationship. Washington doesn’t like that judgment. However, changing the PRC’s policy requires convincing Beijing to assess its interest differently. The Yellow Sea incident could help. Apparently North Korean leader Kim Jong-il is planning to visit China. Speculation is rife about the reason: to request more food aid, promote investment in the North, respond to Beijing’s insistence that the DPRK rejoin the Six-Party Talks or something else? South Korea should propose its own high level visit to the PRC. The foreign ministers of both nations met in Beijing in mid-March and issued a standard call for resumption of the Six-Party Talks. But the ROK should press further, backed by the United States. Despite China’s preference for avoiding controversy, the status quo is inherently unstable. Doing nothing is worse than attempting to force a change in the North’s nuclear policies or ruling elites. Even under the best of circumstances there is no certainty about what is likely to occur in North Korea. Politics in Pyongyang resembles succession in the Ottoman court, involving not only varying factions but different family members. A weaker Kim Jong-il is less able to impose his will on the military or hand over power to his youngest son, as he apparently desires. Although the DPRK’s governing structures so far have proven surprisingly resilient, it’s impossible to ignore the possibility of an implosion, military coup or messy succession fight. If North Korea continues to develop nuclear weapons, its actions could trigger two equally explosive responses: a military attack by the United States or decisions by South Korea and Japan to build nuclear weapons in response. And the Yellow Sea incident highlights other dangers: it may have been an act of brinkmanship too violent by half or an act of military disobedience designed to sink any prospect of negotiations. Either of these could lead the worst of all outcomes on the peninsula—full-scale war. Then the PRC would face the worst case in virtually every dimension: the end of North Korea, a united ROK allied with Washington on China’s border, mass refugee flows over the Yalu, and conflict, including possibly radiation, spilling over Chinese territory. None of these is necessarily likely. But all are possible and must be compared by Beijing to the price of confronting the Kim regime. Doing something starts to look like a much better option than standing behind the DPRK, hoping that everything works out. Admittedly, now might not seem to be the best time to engage China, given the strains in the U.S.-PRC relationship. However, Beijing is unlikely to reconsider its policy unless it believes doing so is in its interest. Irrespective of the state of bilateral U.S.-China relations, the PRC will have to be persuaded to change course. The South also has a critical role to play in engaging China. The two nations’ economic ties continue to expand. But Beijing also desires to expand its political role while diminishing U.S. influence: that is unlikely to happen so long as South Korea feels threatened by the North and uncertain about China’s willingness to develop a more equal relationship between the two Koreas. Pressing Pyongyang more strongly would provide evidence of the PRC’s commitment to play a more constructive regional role. Japan, too, should challenge China over the issue. The new government in Tokyo is committed to improving Japan’s relationship with Beijing. As part of that dialogue, Tokyo should point to the dangers posed by North Korean misbehavior to surrounding nations. Moreover, the potential of military conflict on the peninsula and attacks on Japan have caused greater interest in Japan for adopting a more aggressive foreign policy backed by a larger military. The PRC opposes this new course; resolving the multiple problems of North Korea would be the most effective way to quiet Japanese geopolitical fears. We must hope that the Yellow Sea sinking was a tragedy rather than a provocation. But even if the former, the incident should remind everyone that the Korean peninsula remains a military tinderbox. It would only take one accident or mistake to trigger full-scale war.

Korean War 1ac – Harms

U.S. troop presence is a trip-wire that ensures any conflict will escalate globally—troop withdrawal avoids this nightmare

Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow @ CATO, 1996, Tripwire: Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World, p. 8-10

Military Dangers More important is the military risk of U.S. security ties. Although the American commitment probably helps deter North Korean aggression, it ensures that the United States will be involved if hostilities should recur. Indeed, the 37,000 U.S. soldiers are a tripwire that makes intervention automatic. Although the risk of war seems slight at the moment—in late 1995 famine in the North and political scandal in the South did raise tensions—the consequences would be horrific. And the possible acquisition by North Korea of atomic weapons increases the potential costs exponentially. If a conflict erupted, perhaps over the nuclear issue should the current agreement with Pyongyang break down, the American troops would become nuclear hostages. There are obviously times when the nation must risk war. But this is not one. There are no vital American interests at stake that warrant such a risk. The mere fact that the United States fought in Korea nearly 50 years ago does not mean it should prepare to do so again; the best way of honoring the sacrifice of so many soldiers in that war is to ensure that no Americans will be forced to fight and die in a similar future conflict. That is not to say that Washington has no interests at stake on the peninsula—the U.S.-South Korean cultural and economic ties are real, though modest—but they do not warrant a security guarantee and troop presence. In any case, America no longer needs to provide a military commitment to secure its interests. South Korea is now fully capable of defending itself. So, why is Washington risking the lives of U.S. soldiers in Korea? Put bluntly, would it dramatically affect American interests if war broke out on the peninsula and produced the worst-case scenario— a North Korean conquest of the ROK? Since the Korean War killed an estimated 1 million Koreans and Kim Jong Il's regime is the last best replica of Stalinist totalitarianism, such a conflict and outcome would obviously be tragic.21 But tragedy alone is not sufficient to warrant U.S. intervention, otherwise America would have invaded the USSR and, later, China to stop mass murder greater than that which occurred in Nazi Germany. America would also have occupied Angola, Bosnia, Burundi, Liberia, Sudan, and a host of other smaller hellholes around the globe. While moral concerns tug at our hearts, they are not enough to warrant committing 260 million Americans to war, risking unknown amounts of treasure and numbers of lives. In the case of Korea, we should ask, would U.S. security be seriously affected by a war (assuming no American tripwire was present to automatically trigger U.S. involvement)? No Threat to America The answer is no. Kim Jong Il's forces would pose no credible military threat to the United States. And, unlike the situation in 1950, a successful North Korean attack, highly unlikely given the South's capabilities, would be unconnected to a larger, hegemonic international threat to America. A united communist Korea would lack the wherewithal even to threaten its closest neighbors, China and Russia. Given the low quality of the North's military, and Pyongyang's economic travails, as well as the intensified international isolation that would greet the DPRK as a result of renewed aggression, even the unlikely worst-case scenario would be a tragedy confined to the Korean peninsula. A victorious North Korea would face insurmountable difficulty developing the military capability to intervene overseas, against, say, Japan. Pyongyang's possible possession of nuclear weapons would rightly frighten Tokyo, but the latter's development of a countervailing weapon, while unsettling to its neighbors, would deter any adventurism.

U.S. involvement means its guaranteed to go nuclear

Peter Hayes, Nautilus Institute Executive Director, 10-4-2006, “The Stalker State: North Korean Proliferation and the End of American Nuclear Hegemony,” http://www.nautilus.org/publications/essays/napsnet/policy-forums-online/security/0682Hayes.html/

Does it matter that a small hermitic state with almost no awareness of or commitment to international norms of political and interstate behaviour has nuclear weapons? Leaving aside the global cost of establishing that states not in compliance can get away with pulling out of the NPT, and ignoring the cost of on-going division and instability in Korea to Koreans and non-Koreans alike – a nuclear North Korea increases the risks of nuclear next-use in the coming decades. If as I have suggested, the DPRK has become a nuclear ‘stalker state’ that seeks to redress past wrongs and use nuclear leverage to force the United States to treat it in a less hostile and more respectful manner, then the United States will have to ask itself whether continued isolation and pressure on the regime is more likely, or less so, to ameliorate stalking behaviours in time of crisis, when the risk of nuclear next-use becomes urgent. Like a repeat offender, the DPRK is likely to continue to use nuclear threat to stalk the United States until it achieves what it perceives to be a genuine shift in Washington’s attitude. Unlike an individual who stalks, there is no simple way to lock up a state that stalks another with nuclear threat. Currently, the United States has no common language for discussing nuclear weapons with the North Korean military in the context of the insecurities that bind the two sides together at the Demilitarized Zone. Continued rebuffing of Pyongyang’s overtures may lead to more ‘nuclear stalking’ – that is, the development of creative and unanticipated ways of using nuclear threats, deployments, and actual use in times of crisis or war. There are no grounds to believe that the DPRK will employ a US or Western conceptual framework of nuclear deterrence and crisis management in developing its own nuclear doctrine and use options. Indeed, US efforts to use ‘clear and classical’ deterrent threats to communicate to North Koreans that ‘if they do acquire WMD, their weapons will be unusable because any attempt to use them will bring national obliteration’ – as Condoleezza Rice put it in her Foreign Affairs essay in 2000 – serve to incite the DPRK to exploit this very threat as a way to engage the United States, with terrible risks of miscalculation and first-use on both sides.

Korean War 1ac – Harms

It’s the most likely scenario for nuclear war anywhere on Earth

Malcolm Moore, Telegraph's Shanghai Correspondent., 6-14-2009, North Korea claims US could provoke nuclear war, Telegraph, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/5532319/North-Korea-claims-US-could-provoke-nuclear-war.html

Meanwhile, the Tongbil Sinbo newspaper said that North Korea is "completely within the range of US nuclear attack and the Korean peninsula is becoming an area where the chances of nuclear war are the highest in the world." Over the weekend, North Korea angrily responded to fresh United Nations sanctions by threatening to build as many nuclear weapons as possible. Until now, it said, it had only reprocessed one-third of its spent fuel rods into weapons-grade plutonium. Analysts believe the rogue state could end up with enough plutonium to make eight to nine bombs. The rogue state also claimed to have a uranium-enrichment programme, the first time it has admitted to one. The claim is alarming, said Professor Yang Moo-Jin, of Seoul's University of North Korean Studies. "The North has abundant natural uranium of good quality, which, if combined with technology and facilities, would result in a great nuclear arsenal," he said.

Even limited nuclear war with North Korea has massive consequences – causes massive climate change, starvation, refugee flows, ozone depletion and wrecks the global economy

Michael Hamel-Green, Victoria University, and Peter Hayes, Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute, 1-5-2010, “The Path Not Taken, the Way Still Open: Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia”, http://www.nautilus.org/publications/essays/napsnet/sr/10001HayesHamalGreen.pdf/at\_download/file

The consequences of failing to address the proliferation threat posed by the North Korea developments, and related political and economic issues, are serious, not only for the Northeast Asian region but for the whole international community. At worst, there is the possibility of nuclear attack, whether by intention, miscalculation, or merely accident, leading to the resumption of Korean War hostilities. On the Korean Peninsula itself, key population centres are well within short or medium range missiles. The whole of Japan is likely to come within North Korean missile range. Pyongyang has a population of over 2 million, Seoul (close to the North Korean border) 11 million, and Tokyo over 20 million. Even a limited nuclear exchange would result in a holocaust of unprecedented proportions. But the catastrophe within the region would not be the only outcome. New research indicates that even a limited nuclear war in the region would rearrange our global climate far more quickly than global warming. Westberg draws attention to new studies modelling the effects of even a limited nuclear exchange involving approximately 100 Hiroshima-sized 15 kt bombs2 (by comparison it should be noted that the United States currently deploys warheads in the range 100 to 477 kt, that is, individual warheads equivalent in yield to a range of 6 to 32 Hiroshimas).The studies indicate that the soot from the fires produced would lead to a decrease in global temperature by 1.25 degrees Celsius for a period of 6-8 years.3 In Westberg’s view: That is not global winter, but the nuclear darkness will cause a deeper drop in temperature than at any time during the last 1000 years. The temperature over the continents would decrease substantially more than the global average. A decrease in rainfall over the continents would also follow…The period of nuclear darkness will cause much greater decrease in grain production than 5% and it will continue for many years...hundreds of millions of people will die from hunger…To make matters even worse, such amounts of smoke injected into the stratosphere would cause a huge reduction in the Earth’s protective ozone.4 These, of course, are not the only consequences. Reactors might also be targeted, causing further mayhem and downwind radiation effects, superimposed on a smoking, radiating ruin left by nuclear next-use. Millions of refugees would flee the affected regions. The direct impacts, and the follow-on impacts on the global economy via ecological and food insecurity, could make the present global financial crisis pale by comparison. How the great powers, especially the nuclear weapons states respond to such a crisis, and in particular, whether nuclear weapons are used in response to nuclear first-use, could make or break the global non proliferation and disarmament regimes. There could be many unanticipated impacts on regional and global security relationships5, with subsequent nuclear breakout and geopolitical turbulence, including possible loss-of-control over fissile material or warheads in the chaos of nuclear war, and aftermath chain-reaction affects involving other potential proliferant states. The Korean nuclear proliferation issue is not just a regional threat but a global one that warrants priority consideration from the international community.

Korean War 1ac – Harms

Ozone depletion causes complete extinction

Greenpeace, 1995, Full of Holes: Montreal Protocol and the Continuing Destruction of the Ozone Layer, http://archive.greenpeace.org/ozone/holes/holebg.html

When chemists Sherwood Rowland and Mario Molina first postulated a link between chlorofluorocarbons and ozone layer depletion in 1974, the news was greeted with scepticism, but taken seriously nonetheless. The vast majority of credible scientists have since confirmed this hypothesis. The ozone layer around the Earth shields us all from harmful ultraviolet radiation from the sun. Without the ozone layer, life on earth would not exist. Exposure to increased levels of ultraviolet radiation can cause cataracts, skin cancer, and immune system suppression in humans as well as innumerable effects on other living systems. This is why Rowland's and Molina's theory was taken so seriously, so quickly - the stakes are literally the continuation of life on earth.

Econ decline causes extinction

Phil Kerpen, National Review Online, October 29, 2008, Don't Turn Panic Into Depression, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/10/29/opinion/main4555821.shtml

It’s important that we avoid all these policy errors - not just for the sake of our prosperity, but for our survival. The Great Depression, after all, didn’t end until the advent of World War II, the most destructive war in the history of the planet. In a world of nuclear and biological weapons and non-state terrorist organizations that breed on poverty and despair, another global economic breakdown of such extended duration would risk armed conflicts on an even greater scale.

Korean War 1ac – Solvency

U.S. withdrawal is a game-changer – the non-aggression signal would deescalate current tensions and jumpstart denuclearization

David Lai, Prof of Asian Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, 2009, “Obama's Policy Option on North Korea,” http://www.chinasecurity.us/index.php?option=com\_content&view=article&id=286

President Obama should see that the shortest route to the solution of the North Korean nuclear issue is the direct one between Washington and Pyongyang. Yet given the unending confrontations with North Korea, the United States also has to make a stop in Beijing. In addition, Obama should see that the reasons for the 6-PT still hold, and it is necessary to get the 6-PT back to work. Finally, the president needs a realistic, workable approach to North Korea. China and Russia have long maintained that the North Korea problem is a remnant of the Cold War. They claim that it is a result of North Korea and the United States failing to make timely adjustments in their relations at the end of the Cold War (Russia and China normalized their relations with their Cold War opponent South Korea in 1991 and 1992 respectively). Thus, it follows that North Korea’s quest for nuclear weapons is an answer to its perceived security threat from the United States. Washington holds the key to the North Korean issue, and it is time the United States stops letting emotions dictate its foreign policy and should deal with North Korea pragmatically. That being said, it is unrealistic to propose change to the US approach toward North Korea at the height of the current confrontation. But the time will come when the United States has to sit down with North Korea to find a way out.4 In the next round of negotiations, President Obama should offer North Korea a pragmatic approach to get the two nations out of this senseless agony. Here are the key elements of this new potential approach: First, we know that North Korea wants to settle its problems with the United States directly. However, North Korea’s problems are ultimately Northeast Asian regional problems. Thus, the United States should deal with North Korea directly in the context of the 6-PT. That is, much like what former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Christopher Hill did during the previous 6-PT, the United States can reach tentative agreements directly with North Korea in separate meetings and then bring in the other four parties to endorse these agreements and commit to their respective responsibilities. The United States should also take a new action-for-action approach with North Korea. Unlike the previous approach, which required North Korea to freeze its nuclear facilities first, the United States should take the initiative and ease North Korea’s security concerns in return for North Korea freezing its nuclear weapons program. The US initiatives should include a peace treaty to conclude the Korean War, which would entail the withdrawal of US combat troops from South Korea and diplomatic recognition as part of normalizing relations with North Korea. Along with the normalization of relations, the United States should promote full-fledged exchanges with North Korea, most notably, economic trade and development, education and cultural exchanges. These are not revolutionary ideas. The United States has reassured North Korea many times, verbally and in written form, in the Agreed Framework of 1994 and the 6-PT statements, that the United States respects North Korea’s sovereignty, the United States has no intention of invading North Korea and the United States will normalize relations with North Korea when the time is right. All of these promises were made on the condition that North Korea abandoned its nuclear program first. The key this time is for the United States to be willing to make the first move. The United States should make no secret about this pragmatic approach and what to expect from it. This would be an adjustment based on the reality that the United States has refused to face for a long time and not another concession. This new approach would fundamentally change the nature of the game and US-North Korea relations. By extricating itself from direct conflict in Northeast Asia, the United States would expect the nations in this region to take full responsibility in pursuing the goal of a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. The United States would be declaring its commitment to this goal and working with the involved parties to bring the nuclear weapon issue to a satisfactory conclusion. The United States came to the Korean Peninsula 60 years ago with the good intention of helping the Koreans; however, the situation has changed over time. The US military presence is now increasingly perceived as an obstacle to the Korean unification process. The withdrawal of US combat troops from South Korea is meant to remove this obstacle. Although the United States surely wishes the Koreans all the best in their unification efforts, at the same time, it wants to see this unification take place through peaceful means, not through war.

Korean War 1ac – Solvency

The plan empowers North Korean reformers sidelines hardliner influence – its key to peace on the Peninsula

Yasuhiro Izumikawa, PhD and candidate for the Keidanren Chair in Japanese Research, Miyazaki International College, Miyazaki, Japan, Fall 2004, “The Korean Endgame,” Pacific Affairs: Volume 77, No. 3

Among the few Westerners who have visited North Korea, Selig Harrison stands out for his intensive contacts with North Korean leaders, and he is one of the Western intellectuals most informed of the inner workings of North Korean politics. Based on his rich experiences, the author puts forward a provocative argument about how the United States can promote stability and peace in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia. This book provides an insightful alternative strategy for US policy toward the region, although his opponents will remain unconvinced. The author’s core argument is straightforward and controversial: the United States should gradually disengage itself from the Korean Peninsula. According to the author, the current US policy that is designed to maintain a permanent US military presence in the Korean Peninsula is counter- productive to the stability of the region. Instead, he argues, the US military in South Korea should gradually withdraw from the peninsula in order to promote the reconciliation of the two Koreas and to solicit cooperation from the regional powers for the creation of a nuclear-free neutral Korea. The assumption that underlies the author’s argument, although it remains implicit, is that domestic politics in North Korea play an equal or more important role in determining its external behaviour than international environments. In particular, he emphasizes the importance of nationalism in both Koreas. He points out that nationalism in North Korea remains strong despite economic hardships, and that perceived US military threats help North Korean hardliners exploit this nationalism to defend their preferred policies. In South Korea, on the other hand, the continuing US military presence is the source of rising anti-US nationalism, he argues. It follows that US disengagement would enable North Korean reformers to pursue more cooperative relations with the West, while alleviating anti-US sentiment in the South.

U.S. troop presence isn’t key to deterrence or South Korean defense

Doug Bandow, senior fellow @ CATO, Fall 2005, “Seoul Searching,” National Interest, ln

Why should the United States maintain troops in the Republic of Korea (ROK)? What American interests are being served by the alliance? Officials in both capitals maintain that the alliance remains as relevant as ever. The two governments insist that the "fundamental goal is to enhance deterrence and security on the Korean Peninsula." But Washington's Cold War security concern for the ROK has disappeared. Even if the security of South Korea remained vital to the United States--and it does not--America's treaty and troops aren't necessary to achieve that end. The South has dramatically outstripped North Korea on virtually every measure of national power and can stand on its own.

Ext – Yes Korean War

The risk of another Korean war is at an all time high

Donald Kirk, Asia Times Online, 6-26-2010, “Pyongyang's $65 trillion bill for US enmity,” http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/LF26Dg01.html

Who would have imagined, when North Korean troops stormed across the 38th parallel between North and South on June 25, 1950, that we would still be hearing disturbing talk of a "second Korean War" 60 years later. Incredibly, however, the differences between North and South Korea are as bitterly pronounced now as they were all those years ago.

More belligerence and accidents are inevitable

Korea Policy Institute, May 2009, “The Case for a Peace Treaty to End the Korean War,” http://www.kpolicy.org/documents/policy/090529kpicaseforapeacetreaty.html

No one knows when the next showdown will occur. But there is no doubt that it will come, and that the "consequences" will be more severe. It could be another missile test or detonation of a nuclear device by North Korea, an escalation of joint U.S.-South Korea military exercises, an incident at the DMZ, a skirmish at sea, or worse. The clock is ticking and there is no clear path back to dialogue at present.

High alert postures make escalation of these accidents likely

Daily Mail, 5-25-2010, “U.S. troops in South Korea put on alert as tensions rise over sinking ship,” http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/worldnews/article-1280806/US-troops-South-Korea-alert-tensions-rise-Cheonan-ship-sinking.html#ixzz0tMOceD84

Barack Obama yesterday ordered that the 28,000 U.S. troops in South Korea be put on alert as tensions with North Korea escalated. The U.S. President demanded that Pyongyang apologise for sinking a South Korean warship in March and punish those responsible. International investigators blame North Korea for sinking the Cheonan ship, killing 46 sailors. The Pentagon said it will start joint anti-submarine and military drills with South Korea ‘in the near future’ as a result of the findings. U.S. support for South Korea was ‘unequivocal’, White House spokesman Robert Gibbs added. ‘We endorse [President Lee Myung-bak’s] demand that North Korea... stop its belligerent and threatening behaviour,’ he said. The U.S. is reportedly bringing forward deployment of a hightech F-22 Raptor ground-attack aircraft to Japan this month. Should conflict erupt, it could reach North Korea within minutes. North Korea threatened to fire at equipment from which South Korea planned anti-Pyongyang broadcasts. President Lee said he would not hesitate to retaliate. The U.S. backs the Lee plan to bring the issue to the UN Security Council and would work with allies to ‘reduce the threat’. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who is in talks in China, said the situation was ‘highly precarious’. The row centres on the sinking of the South's Cheonan corvette in March, killing 46 sailors in one of the deadliest clashes between the two countries since the 1950-53 Korean War. In a sombre televised address to the nation, President Lee said if his country's waters, airspace or territory were violated he would 'immediately exercise our right of self-defence.' He added: 'I solemnly urge the authorities of North Korea ... to apologise immediately to the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and the international community.' The two Koreas are still technically at war and have more than 1million troops near their border. In the past the South has tolerated the North's outrages such as the downing of a South Korean airliner in 1987, which killed 115 people. But this time the mood is far tougher and it has banned all trade, investment and visits with North Korea. 'North Korea will pay a price corresponding to its provocative acts,' said President Lee, adding that he would be operating a principle of 'proactive defence'. 'North Korea's goal is to instigate division and conflict. It is now time for the North Korean regime to change'.

Ext – Korea War Escalates

Our troop presence ensures the U.S. gets drawn in

Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow @ CATO, 5-25-2010, “Engaging China to Maintain Peace in East Asia,” http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=11845

While the U.S. remains involved in wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, East Asia contains the seeds of potentially bigger conflicts. China holds the key to maintaining regional peace. For instance, the Republic of Korea is imposing economic sanctions on North Korea after the latter sank a South Korean naval vessel. A military response could set off a retaliatory spiral leading to war. With 27,000 troops stationed on the Korean peninsula, Washington could not easily stay out of any conflict.

War in North Korea would spread to global nuclear conflict

**Kim** Myong Chol, November 24, 1998, www.nautilus.org/for a/security/23C\_Kim.html

The long-sealed Pandora's box would be unlocked, loosing genies onto the world. The North Koreans would follow up through with their threat by announcing that they have succeeded in fabricating not only atomic bombs but hydrogen bombs small enough to be delivered by their small fleet of ICBMS. The Japanese and the Germans would decide to join the nuclear club. The East Asian tensions would be ratcheted up. The European front is quiet except for the Balkan situation, which has little possibility of flaring up into a nuclear exchange. The Mideast situation will remain still tense, but a nuclear shoot-out is a remote possibility. However, the Northeast Asian situation is quite alarming, because two million-strong armies, both armed with nuclear weapons, confront each other along the 38th Parallel in Korea in a near-war tension in the absence of a peace treaty. The first casualties in a nuclear conflagration in Korea would be South Korea and Japan, which have the world's heaviest concentration of operating nuclear power stations to serve the most booming economies on earth. The second would include the USA, Russia, and China. ICBMs fired from the USA and North Korea would cross their paths over Japan and the Pacific, joined by those launched from Russia and China.

Any US-North Korean nuclear use escalates – even if the US ultimately wins

Alan Romberg, senior associate at Stimon and Michael Swaine, senior associate at Carnegie, May 2003, “The North Korea Nuclear Crisis,” Arms Control Today, http://armscontrol.org/act/2003\_05/rombergswaine\_may03

Even if it forbore the catastrophic and suicidal choice of launching a “sea of fire” attack on South Korea, Pyongyang could well decide—either pre-emptively or as a first response to a U.S. strike—to launch its own strike against U.S. forces or facilities in South Korea, hoping to split the U.S.-South Korean alliance and mobilize world opinion against any further escalation by the United States. Supposing only part of this came to pass—splitting the U.S.-South Korean alliance, for example—the consequences for U.S. regional security interests would still be immeasurable. Moreover, whatever restraints were applied at first, a pre-emptive strike by either side could produce an escalatory spiral leading to a full-blown conflagration on the peninsula. Although the United States and South Korea would ultimately prevail in such a conflict, the cost in lives, property, and political relations with all the other countries concerned would almost certainly be enormous.

Ext – Withdrawal Solves/Stable

Withdrawal is key to prevent east Asian arms racing and instability

Christine Ahn, Fellow at the Korean Policy Institute, 1-31-2009, “An Expensive Division: Looking at the High Cost of Maintaining Two Koreas,” http://www.kpolicy.org/documents/policy/090131christineahnexpensivedivision.html

For one, division means the continued militarization of the Korean peninsula, which has tremendous costs—not just in terms of billions of won and dollars spent on the military—but in the way that fear continues to grip the Korean people and cloud their ability to envision a more just and peaceful society. Militarization of Korea When former President Bill Clinton visited the DMZ in 2003, he described it as the "scariest place on earth." Along the 151-mile barbed-wire border dividing the North and South are 1.2 million landmines. For more than 60 years, the United States has spent over $2 billion annually to subsidize South Korea's military, and South Korea has incurred tremendous cost to keep U.S. troops. The United States has committed to spending $10 billion on base construction in South Korea, and South Korea has begun to increase its military budget annually by 10 percent under its $665 billion Defense Reform 2020 Initiative. John Feffer, editor of Foreign Policy In Focus, estimates that spending will go towards purchasing "expensive, high-tech systems, such as new F-15k fighters from Boeing, SM-6 ship to air missiles, and rapid response teams with 2,000 advanced armored vehicles to handle a possible North Korean collapse." South Korea is also preparing for 2012, when it will assume control of the U.S. Forces in Korea and bear the primary responsibility of the defense against North Korea. Although the 27,000 American troops now in South Korea will be reduced, thousands of American troops and a couple of U.S. military bases, in Pyongtaek and Osan, will remain to secure U.S. interests in the region. The two huge bases in Pyongtaek and Osan are now major listening posts for the U.S. military. Investigative journalist and longtime contributor to The Nation Tim Shorrock, while conducting exhaustive research for his book Spies for Hire on the privatization of U.S. intelligence, uncovered unsavory evidence that the U.S. military bases are eavesdropping on Korean civilian activities. According to Shorrock, Pyongtaek has become a key overseas intelligence outpost for the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA). Although the primary target is the DPRK, U.S. intelligence activities at Pyongtaek and Osan also monitor China, Vietnam, and other countries in Asia. "Scariest of all is their potential power to monitor South Korean communications," states Shorrock. Shorrock asserts that while the NSA must follow certain legal procedures to spy on Americans inside the United States, there are no restrictions on the NSA's monitoring of overseas communications. Since 9/11, what is considered a threat has widened to include almost any activity that questions or challenges U.S. dominance. According to Shorrock, "That means that political activity aimed at curbing the buildup at Pyongtaek is very closely monitored. There may be certain restrictions on ROK authorities spying on Korean citizens; but the gloves would be off for U.S. authorities doing that." In the course of his investigation, Shorrock discovered an article by a U.S. Forces in Korea official on U.S. cooperation with ROK police in monitoring U.S. bases: "It's an amazingly frank assessment that tells me that the anti-bases movement is being as closely monitored, and probably more so, than Al Qaeda - and basically puts the movement in the same camp as global terrorists." According to Jae-Jung Suh, professor at Johns Hopkins University, the U.S. military aims to transform into a 21st century global fighting machine, which includes realigning bases and further enmeshing South Korea and Japan into the U.S. military alliance. Not only does increasing the militarization of South Korea intensify military pressure against North Korea, Suh predicts that in the long run, it will exert pressure on Asian allies to fortify their militaries. This new arms race will further punctuate a deepening fault line between the U.S.-Asia alliance. But there are more than economic costs associated with increasing the militarization of Korea. According to Selig Harrison of the Center for International Policy, "The subsidy provided by the U.S. presence enables South Koreans to postpone hard choices concerning how fast and how far to move toward reunification." In other words, the U.S. military presence enables South Korea to provide a high level of defense against North Korea at a reduced cost. "The withdrawal of U.S. forces would force Seoul to decide whether it should seek the same level of security now provided by the U.S. presence by upgrading defense expenditures," writes Harrison, "Or whether instead, the goal of accommodation and reunification with the north would be better served by negotiating a mutual reduction of forces with the north."

Ext – Withdrawal Solves/Stable

U.S. withdrawal would be smooth – S Korea and regional power balances ensure a peaceful transition

Doug Bandow, senior fellow @ CATO, 11-11-2008, “Seoul Searching,” http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=20218

Today, however, the misnamed mutual defense treaty—in practice, the defense guarantee runs only from Washington to Seoul—is an expensive anachronism. It should be terminated, not reinforced. The ROK and the United States should remain friends and cooperate in pursuing common goals, including promoting Asian security, but the American people no longer should be responsible for South Korea’s defense. Washington’s promise to defend the South goes back to 1953 and the unsatisfying end of the Korean War. Rather than gain the victory Americans had grown to expect, the Eisenhower administration accepted a stalemate near the pre-invasion border. The fighting concluded with an armistice, but no peace treaty. China, whose large-scale intervention had saved North Korea from defeat, maintained a large troop presence in the DPRK. Without wartime U.S. support, the ROK government would have been swept from the peninsula. Without post-war U.S. support, Seoul would have been overwhelmed in any resumption of hostilities. The aged, irascible and authoritarian Syngman Rhee was an embarrassment to the United States, but Washington felt it had little choice but to support him as well as the military dictators who followed. At least Park Chung-hee was an economic liberalizer, and the ROK economy took off before the South finally transitioned to democracy, some two decades ago. South Korea is a helpless international dependent no longer. The South ranks among the world’s top-dozen economies and is the third most important geopolitical player in East Asia. Also, the ROK long ago raced past the North in every measure of national power. South Korea has twice the population, upwards of forty times the GDP, a vast technological edge, and far more allies and friends. Seoul’s military budget approaches the DPRK’s entire GDP. Moreover, the North’s one-time military allies, Russia and China, both recognized Seoul as the cold war concluded. The ROK now does more business with Beijing than with America. The likelihood of either Moscow or Beijing backing North Korea in any new war is somewhere between infinitesimal and zero. The rest of East Asia would unreservedly stand behind South Korea. And yet, Seoul has spent the last decade subsidizing the North. Providing aid to and investing in one’s enemy is a curious strategy for dealing with a supposed security threat. If the ROK actually fears the North, it should have redirected some of the aid money to its military budget. In sum, the South doesn’t need America to defend it. South Korea has been capable of protecting itself for decades. It makes no sense for the United States to maintain a defense guarantee for—or troop deployments in—the ROK. The North’s nuclear program, whatever the prognosis for the ongoing denuclearization talks, offers no justification for the alliance. First, U.S. forces based in the peninsula do not constrain Pyongyang. To the contrary, they offer a justification for the DPRK to build a nuclear arsenal. They will be nuclear hostages if the North creates a deliverable weapon. Nowhere else on earth would Washington have so many military personnel at such risk. Second, absent America’s defense commitment, a North Korean nuclear weapon would be a problem for the South and the rest of the region, not the United States. Washington retains an overwhelming deterrent capability, Pyongyang as yet has no means of reaching the American homeland, and even if it were capable of doing so, there is no evidence that Kim Jong-il, or his likely successors, are suicidal. Other advocates of the alliance make the “dual use” argument, that American forces stationed on the Korean peninsula are useful for purposes other than defending South Korea. But an army division and assorted other forces have little useful role in promoting regional stability, whatever that means in practice (invading Burma or preventing the dissolution of Indonesia?). And minimal ROK support for other U.S. objectives, such as providing a small troop contingent to a safe sector of Iraq (which Seoul plans on withdrawing by year’s end), is not worth today’s one-sided alliance. Most American analysts, at least, also view the ROK as a member of an incipient anti-China coalition to contain Beijing. The only problem with this strategy is that virtually no one in South Korea will sign up. Forget the historic ties and present economic relationship between the PRC and ROK. The most obvious casus belli between the United States and China is Taiwan. Who in South Korea wants to make his country a permanent enemy of the incipient superpower next door, let alone do so to save Taipei? Especially since U.S. bases in the South would be an equally obvious and easy target should Washington and Beijing start shooting at one another. In short, while Seoul wants a continuing U.S. presence as a residual insurance policy against North Korea and perhaps China (and even Japan), it will not risk its security by backing U.S. geopolitical objectives. The alliance was one-way when it was created. It remains one-way today. Washington has good reason to support the survival of a democratic, capitalist ROK. But long ago the South gained the ability to assure that result. The world will be better-off when today’s totalitarian North Korea disappears, whether replaced by a reformist regime or absorbed by South Korea. But the United States has no incentive to try to force such a result. The job of transforming the Hermit Kingdom should be left to the North’s neighbors, who have far more at stake, both good and bad.

Ext – Withdrawal Solves/Stable

Withdrawal prevents the U.S. from being drawn into future crisis

Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow @ CATO, 5-24-2001, “Needless Engagements,” http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=1260]

While continuing Pax Americana would probably be safer (at least in the short term) for Washington’s legion of client states and dependents, it would not be safer for America. Distancing the United States from entanglement in local and regional squabbles would leave this country more secure. More robust democratic powers in the region could deter would-be aggressors, and U.S. military withdrawal would reduce the like li-hood that America would be drawn into future crises. Washington’s forced departure from the Philippines led the United States to adopt a program of “places not bases,” focus-ing on ready access to military facilities rather than on permanent deployments. 163 A similar approach could replace security guar-antees elsewhere in Southeast Asia.

That minimizes the impact of any conflict

Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow @ CATO, 5-27-2000, “Leave Korea to the Koreans,” http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=4694

Korea has for 50 years been one of America's most dangerous military commitments. Today the United States maintains 37,000 soldiers as a tripwire to ensure involvement should war again break out between the two Koreas. Indeed, there is no place else in the world where Americans are more likely to be involved in a conflict. The United States would win any war, but it would not be a bloodless victory, like that over Serbia.Yet, the Korean Peninsula is not nearly as important as American policy suggests. Neither the Pentagon nor Gen. Douglas MacArthur believed South Korea to be intrinsically significant in 1950. President Harry S. Truman intervened to stop North Korea's invasion because he believed it was inspired by the Soviet Union. We now know that the Soviets were reluctant supporters of Pyongyang's offensive. In any case, the Soviet Union is gone, along with any threat of global conquest.Thus, by any definition, Korea today is a peripheral rather than a vital U.S. interest. War there would be tragic, but would not threaten America. Moreover, the Republic of Korea need no longer play the role of helpless victim. The South has won the competition between the two Koreas. It has 30 times the GDP, twice the population, and a vast technological lead. South Korea, in contrast to the North, is a major international player. Indeed, Russia is shipping weapons to South Korea to pay off its debts. China, too, is unlikely to back Pyongyang in any war. Obviously, North Korea remains a dangerous actor. But its threats are largely empty - desperate attempts to gain international attention. Bankrupt, starving, and friendless, the North is struggling to survive, not to dominate South Korea, let alone the region. Even its most worrisome activities, such as missile and nuclear weapons research, look more like strategies to defend itself in an increasingly hostile world than to prepare itself for an aggressive war. When your neighboring enemy spends as much on defense as your entire GDP, and is allied with the world's greatest military power, you don't have many defense options. The summit announcement is one of the most dramatic developments on a peninsula long noted for surprises. Six years ago, Kim Jong-il's father, Kim Il-sung, was set to meet Kim Dae-jung's predecessor, Kim Young-sam. Kim Il-sung dropped dead shortly before the meeting, however, and relations between the two nations quickly deteriorated. Since that time, North Korea has suffered famine, near economic collapse and, if reports are accurate, political infighting. The only card Pyongyang has had to play to gain international attention and assistance is the threat to misbehave. Kim Jong-il's apparent willingness to meet with Kim Dae-jung is another sign of desperation. Even if the meeting falls through, Pyongyang has conceded the legitimacy of its southern counterpart. Of course, a successful summit is not sufficient to end a half-century of hostilities. The North has initiated war, regularly employed terrorism, launched frequent military probes, and constantly rattled its saber. Seoul has returned the hostile feelings, if not actions. But a meeting of the two Kims would provide an opportunity for their two nations to start anew. Moreover, it would offer Washington a chance to step into the background. The United States should leave the direction of Korean policy to Seoul. The country most threatened by North Korea is South Korea. The country with the most to gain from detente between the two is South Korea. America should normalize its relationship with both countries. For the North, that means dropping economic sanctions and initiating diplomatic relations. Of course, such a policy would "reward" Pyongyang, but that is precisely what the United States should do when North Korea acts responsibly. Such an opening may not be enough to defang what remains a militarized yet unpredictable regime, but it is more likely to have positive results than is the current policy. As for the South, Washington should phase out its troop presence and security guarantees. South Korea is well able to defend itself. The justification for an American tripwire disappeared long ago. The Korean Peninsula is entering an exciting new era. The two Koreas may be finally willing to put their 50-year old struggle behind them. In any case, it is time for Washington to disengage. Then South Korea and its neighbors, rather than America, are the ones that have to deal with future bumps in the Korean road to peace and reunification.

Strikes Bad Add-On

Pressure for preemptive military strikes involving U.S. troops will grow without the plan

Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow @ CATO, 2-26-2009, “Starting the Second Korean War?,” http://reason.com/archives/2009/02/26/starting-the-second-korean-war

What to do about North Korea was a major topic during Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's recent trip to South Korea and China. The North remains predictably unpredictable. If the Korean peninsula has gone a few weeks without a crisis, expect Pyongyang to create one. So it has been with the advent of the Obama administration. Angry over the Bush administration's failure to offer sufficient inducements, the North announced that it was halting plans to dismantle its nuclear program. Irritated with Seoul's new hard-line towards North Korea, Pyongyang declared all agreements with the Republic of Korea to be inoperative. Now the North apparently is preparing to stage a missile test. Secretary Clinton called the latter "unhelpful," as if Dear Leader Kim Jong Il was a valued negotiating partner. The government in Seoul responded with a yawn and Secretary Clinton indicated her desire for continued negotiations. But the latest emanations from Pyongyang have caused some policymakers to advocate confrontation. Philip Zelikow, late of the Bush State Department, suggests war. This isn't the first time that U.S. officials have proposed sending in the bombers. The Clinton administration apparently came close to ordering military strikes before former President Jimmy Carter's dramatic flight to Pyongyang. And Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) has spent years pondering the possibility of preventive war against the so-called Democratic People's Republic of Korea. It was never a good idea, but the pressure for military action may grow. Selig Harrison of the Center for International Policy recently traveled to the DPRK, where he was told that existing supplies of plutonium had been "weaponized." He argues that the U.S. "can tolerate a nuclear-armed North Korea that may or may not actually have the weapons arsenal it claims," but others would put the military option back on the table. Zelikow goes even further. He says: "whatever the merits of Harrison's suggestion when it comes to North Korea's nuclear weapons, the United States should not accept Pyongyang's development of long-range missiles systems, which can be paired with an admitted nuclear weapons arsenal, as still another fait accompli." In his view, Washington should warn the North to stand down; if the DPRK failed to comply, the U.S. should take out the missile on its launch pad. Why? Zelikow contends that "the North Korean perfection of a long-range missile capability against the United States, Japan, or the Republic of Korea would pose an imminent threat to the vital interests of our country." To rely on deterrence, he adds, would be a "gamble." Obviously no one wants the North to possess nuclear weapons or missiles of any kind. However, North Korean threats against the ROK and Japan are not threats against America's vital interests. Japan is the world's second ranking economic power and the South has roughly 40 times the GDP and twice the population of the North. Sooner rather than later they should be expected to defend themselves. Washington is busy enough dealing with its own geopolitical problems in the midst of an economic crisis. Moreover, nothing in the North Korean regime's behavior suggests that Dear Leader Kim Jong Il is any less amenable to deterrence than were Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong. Kim may be many things, but there is no indication that he is suicidal. Rather, he likes his virgins in the here and now. Of course, it would be better not to have to rely on deterrence. But a preventive strike would be no cakewalk. If there is insanity at work on the Korean peninsula, it is the assumption that Kim would do nothing if his nation was attacked by the U.S. He might choose inaction, but more likely would see such a strike as the prelude to regime change. In that case the results of the Iraq war would impel him to act first rather than await invasion. America and South Korea would win any war, but the costs would be horrendous. Moreover, the DPRK could easily initiate a more limited tit-for-tat retaliation. The South's capital of Seoul lies within easy range of Scud missiles and massed artillery. Even the "optimists" who believe that Seoul could be protected by massive military strikes along the Demilitarized Zone talk about holding casualties to under 100,000. Imagine Pyongyang announcing a limited bombardment in response to the U.S. action, combined with the promise of a ceasefire if the ROK blocked any further American response. Washington's Asian policy would be wrecked along with Seoul. Despite the vagaries of dealing with the North, it is not the first bizarrely brutal and secretive regime with which the U.S. has dealt. Forty-some years ago there was China. The unstable Mao regime, atop a country convulsed by the bloody Cultural Revolution, was developing nuclear weapons. National Review editor William F. Buckley and New York Sen. James Buckley both pressed for a preventive attack on Beijing's nascent nuclear program. The Johnson administration considered proposals for such an assault. The arguments were similar as those made today regarding North Korea: An unpredictable regime, the uncertainty of deterrence, and the relative ease of attack. It's impossible to know what the world would have looked like had Washington struck, but China likely would have moved closer to the Soviet Union and become more resolutely hostile to the U.S. Restraint almost certainly was the better part of valor. So, too, with North Korea today. Of course, Washington still should work with the DPRK's neighbors in an attempt to persuade Pyongyang to abandon both its missile and nuclear ambitions. Even more important, though, would be to turn the problem of North Korea over to the surrounding states. To the extent that the North threatens anyone, it is South Korea and Japan. China and Russia are unlikely direct targets, but still have good reason to prefer a stable and peaceful Korean peninsula. Thus, the U.S. should withdraw its 29,000 troops from the ROK, where they are vulnerable to military action by Pyongyang. Then North Korea would be primarily a problem for the ROK, China, Japan, and Russia. And the U.S. need not worry about the latest North Korean gambit.

Strike on North Korea causes a regional war that escalates

Kim Myong Choi, Exec. Dir. of Center for Korean-American Peace, 10-24-2002, “Agreed framework is brain dead,” http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0212A\_Chol.html#sect2

Three facts may suggest the extent of the North Korean readiness for nuclear exchange. A North Korean official said, "One top-class nuclear scientist and one missile expert are on the Central Committee of the ruling Workers Party of Korea. They are always among the suite accompanying Kim Jong Il on his criss-crossing on-the-spot guidance tour. Most of the population of the nation can be evacuated into deep hardened underground shelters in less than twenty minutes with little panic or confusion. The whole nation can live safely in underground facilities for many months. Fortress North Korea has been designed to withstand a nuclear saturation strike and retaliate in kind. However, it is not the case either with South Korea or Japan or the U.S. The three countries are most vulnerable to North Korean missile attacks. Any military strike initiated against North Korea will promptly explode into a thermonuclear exchange between a tiny nuclear-armed North Korea and the world's superpower, America. The most densely populated Metropolitan U.S.A., Japan and South Korea will certainly evaporate in The Day After scenario-type nightmare. The New York Times warned in its August 27, 2002 comment: "North Korea runs a more advanced biological, chemical and nuclear weapons program, targets American military bases and is developing missiles that could reach the lower 48 states. Yet there's good reason President Bush is not talking about taking out Dear Leader Kim Jong Il. If we tried, the Dear Leader would bombard South Korea and Japan with never gas or even nuclear warheads, and (according to one Pentagon study) kill up to a million people."

Strikes Fail

Strike won’t disarm North Korea—mobile delivery systems

LTC Edward A. Corcoran, USA-retired, Ph.D. in comparative government, and serves as a Senior Fellow on national security issues at GlobalSecurity.org, 29 November 2005 “STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND DETERRENCE” http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/2005/sndeterrence.htm

Delivery Systems. These would be the highest priority targets, and eliminating them would be essential to neutralizing North Korea's WMD threat.[18] Some 420 fighters, bombers, transport planes, and helicopters were redeployed in October 1995, with more than 100 aircraft moved to three air bases near the DMZ. As part of this redeployment, more than 20 Il-28 bombers were moved to Taetan which shortened their arrival time to Seoul from 30 minutes to 10 minutes. North Korea is also assessed as having some 500 mobile SCUD and perhaps 100 more modern missiles with ranges over 1000 km. The mobile launchers can move between various deployment positions and are expected to be in reinforced shelters. In addition, biological or chemical agents could be dispersed by hundreds of helicopters, light aircraft, or artillery shells. Just using precision conventional weapons to strike well over 500 hardened shelters for aircraft and missile launchers would be a sizable task and would probably leave a significant percentage of targets still operational. Using low-yield nuclear weapons could increase the kill rate and would allow several positions to be struck with one weapon. But even figuring ten targets per weapon, 50 nuclear strikes, many close to the DMZ, would result in widespread contamination and still leave untouched hundreds of smaller delivery vehicles, as well as surviving attack aircraft and longer range missiles.

Strike would require large numbers of nuclear weapons and encourage North Korean retaliation

LTC Edward A. Corcoran, USA-retired, Ph.D. in comparative government, and serves as a Senior Fellow on national security issues at GlobalSecurity.org, 29 November 2005 “STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND DETERRENCE” http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/2005/sndeterrence.htm

Table 1 summarizes potential nuclear targeting. Conventional weapons would be generally ineffective against the most critical targets (command and control centers and WMD delivery vehicles). Engaging these targets with nuclear weapons would not only require large numbers (well over 100), but even then effectiveness is questionable because of target hardening and uncertainties on locations. Neutralization to a high degree of confidence of North Korean command and WMD capabilities seems well out of reach, even with a US use of nuclear weapons, so potential North Korean retaliation (particularly against Seoul) cannot be reliably eliminated. Using nuclear weapons would necessarily result in widespread nuclear contamination and large numbers of causalities. Nor would it be possible to limit this to the Korean peninsula alone. High air bursts would minimize fallout, but also insure that it carried a maximum distance (i.e., across neighboring countries). Higher yield ground bursts (required for many of the hardened facilities) would release much more fallout. Even limiting their use to the most critical probable command centers, perhaps a dozen, would still produce unacceptable levels of fallout. Anything less would certainly be ineffective. Lower-yield, deep penetrating warheads, even if available would be inadequate because of the difficulty of specifying an exact underground location to engage. It is clear that rapid neutralization of the North Korean WMD capabilities or incapacitation of the leadership cannot be achieved with conventional weapons. But the use of nuclear weapons would require relatively large numbers, would produce significant fallout, and would still provide only a low assurance of success. And even in these extreme circumstances, the only clear requirement for high-yield strategic nuclear weapons would be on some selected command and control facilities; their use would have to be restricted to a small number of targets because of fallout considerations. In the event of large-scale hostilities, the number of potential targets climbs into the hundreds. Such a widespread use of nuclear weapons on the small Korean peninsula not only seems most unattractive, it would almost certainly provoke North Korean retaliation with their own remaining WMD. Use of a relatively few nuclear weapons against carefully selected targets would minimize contamination, but would also minimize results and still raise the specter of North Korean retaliation. Overall, it seems difficult to construct scenarios where any nuclear strikes would be appropriate; even a battlefield use of nuclear weapons seems unappealing. Furthermore, current counterproliferation planning emphasizes the use of lower-yield weapons, including specially designed earth-penetrating weapons.[28] So even if a high-yield requirement somehow developed, a handful of strategic weapons would certainly suffice.

Strikes Fail

Strikes escalate to full-scale Korean war and NBC conflict

Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow @ CATO, 4-22-2003, “N. Korea Is No Place to Apply Iraq 'Lessons',” http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=6020

When Undersecretary of State John R. Bolton said North Korea should "draw the appropriate lesson from Iraq," the meaning was clear: The United States might send in the Marines. The administration apparently believes that its hard-line stance led to the three-way talks among North Korea, China and the U.S. planned for later this week. And if the talks bog down or blow up, Bolton's statement implies that war again will be an option. But we should know clearly what we may provoke, and it isn't a limited, quick, low-casualty Iraqi-style conflict. Where North Korea is concerned, even a limited military strike almost certainly means full-scale war on the Korean peninsula, with massive casualties and widespread devastation. The North is thought to possess one or two nuclear weapons or at least has reprocessed enough plutonium to make them. More important, it has cheated on the 1994 Agreed Framework, which froze its nuclear program, and it also has taken a series of increasingly provocative steps. North Korea probably chose the current path for a mixture of reasons. Its putative nuclear capability is the only reason other nations pay any attention to an otherwise bankrupt, irrelevant state. So far the nuclear option also has been useful in eliciting bribes, such as fuel oil shipments and financial aid. Moreover, developing a nuclear arsenal may be the surest route to ensuring that the U.S. does not attack. A decade ago, many American policymakers and pundits blithely talked about military options for destroying the Yongbyon reactor and other North Korean nuclear facilities. Many people, apparently including President Bush, seem to be making the same calculations again. It is not surprising that policymakers in Seoul, within easy reach of North Korean artillery and Scud missiles, have a different perspective. Officials in Beijing, Moscow and Tokyo also worry about radioactive fallout, missile attacks, refugee flows, economic turmoil and regional chaos. Even among the countries in the region most vulnerable to a North Korea with nuclear weapons, there is no constituency for war. South Korea is particularly adamant. As President Roh Moo Hyun said, "For Washington, their prime interest lies in getting rid of weapons of mass destruction to restore the world order, but for us it's a matter of survival." Some advocates of military action predict that Pyongyang would not retaliate against a blow to its nuclear facilities. Others propose coupling such a military strike with the use or threat of tactical nuclear weapons against the North's conventional forces. But to attack and assume the North would not respond would be a wild gamble. A military strike might not get all of Pyongyang's nuclear assets, and hitting the reprocessing facility and spent fuel rods could create radioactive fallout over China, Japan, Russia or South Korea. Moreover, given the official U.S. policy of preemption, designation of the North as a member of the "axis of evil" and the Iraq war, Pyongyang might decide that even a limited military strike was the opening of a war for regime change. In that case, it would make sense to roll the tanks. An account by a high-ranking defector, Cho Myung Chul, is particularly sobering. In analyzing Iraq's defeat in the 1991 Gulf War, North Korean military officials concluded that Baghdad was too defensive. Cho related the North Korean view as: "If we're in a war, we'll use everything. And if there's a war, we should attack first, to take the initiative." He estimates the chances of general war at 80% in response to even a limited strike on Yongbyon. Unfortunately, "everything" is a daunting force: In addition to a large army, the North possesses long-range artillery and rocket launchers, up to 600 Scud missiles and additional longer-range No Dong missiles. And it has developed a significant number and range of chemical and perhaps biological weapons. Estimates as to the number of casualties run to more than 1 million. Also possible would be a limited retaliatory strike against the United States' Yongsan base in the center of Seoul. The Seoul-Inchon metropolis includes roughly half of South Korea's population, about 24 million people, and is the nation's industrial heartland. Pyongyang is thought to be able to fire up to 500,000 shells an hour into Seoul. Washington could hardly afford not to respond to an attack on Yongsan, yet retaliation would probably lead to general war. Such a scenario might threaten civilian control of the military in Seoul; the perception that South Koreans died because the U.S. acted against the wishes of the Roh administration might create a decisive split between Seoul and Washington. Dealing with North Korea could prove to be one of the most vexing challenges for this administration. Military action does not offer a simple solution but rather portends a real war of horrific destructiveness.

Escalation is guaranteed

Doug Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, 5-3-2010, “Taming Pyongyang,” http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=11739

The result not only would mean a serious and prolonged worsening of bilateral relations and increase in bilateral tensions, but could end any chance — admittedly today very slim — of reversing North Korean nuclear development. Moreover, a military strike would entail a chance of war. Tit-for-tat retaliation might spiral out of control. The potential consequences are horrifying.

A2: Squo Deters Invasion

American airpower preserves deterrence – ground troops not key

Thomas H. Henriksen, Senior Fellow @ the Hoover Institute, 2003, “Time to Leave South Korea,” http://www.hoover.org/publications/hoover-digest/article/7977

Despite escalating tensions on the Korean peninsula in recent months, it is time to start the pullback of the 14,000 American troops stationed along the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and the GIs garrisoned in the nearby capital rather than waiting a year. Implementing Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s plans for repositioning U.S. forces from the DMZ and their central Seoul base will better align Washington’s decades-old obligations with newfound perils on the peninsula and beyond. The United States can honor its commitment to defend South Korea from another northern invasion by our formidable land and carrier-based airpower. This military reconfiguration in South Korea should be part of an overhaul of American post–Cold War strategy.

The plan won’t be interpreted by North Koreas as a lack of resolve

Thomas H. Henriksen, Senior Fellow @ the Hoover Institute, 2003, “Time to Leave South Korea,” http://www.hoover.org/publications/hoover-digest/article/7977

Obviously, there are risks. A sudden transformation could cause instability in Asia. North Korea could interpret American withdrawal as a lack of resolve. But this seems unlikely given that an attack across the DMZ, with or without our small Maginot-line force, would be seen as an act of war by Washington, triggering a counterattack and imperiling the Pyongyang regime itself. In one sense, the absence of a U.S. force on the DMZ would make a massive U.S. retaliation easier; otherwise American troops would no doubt be overrun by the world’s fifth-largest army and face the danger of errant friendly fire.

North Korea won’t invade – they know its suicidal

Joshua Snyder, Prof of English in Korea, 10-17-2007, “America’s Entangling East Asian Alliances”, http://www.lewrockwell.com/orig8/snyder-joshua3.html)

It could be argued that Kim Jong-il might launch an invasion of the South in order to cement his place in power, after which ruling over a reunified Korea with all the South's resources in his control. But he is no moron, and realizes that there is no Soviet Bloc to support him or even trade with him after such an invasion. An invasion would simply make him the leader of a larger, war-devastated, and even more isolated pariah state. Kim Jong-il has witnessed first-hand the market successes of China and his children have been educated abroad, in Switzerland. While he has a genius for brinkmanship, he realizes that further isolation will only weaken his hold on power, which is why he has been scurrying to further economic cooperation with the South. And even if this North-South cooperation were but a ruse, South Korea has the means to protect itself; its high-tech juggernaut economy is the world's twelfth largest and is forty times larger than that of the North.

North Korean ground forces are falling apart—they won’t risk invasion

John P. Cummings, Colonel in the United States Army, 5-3-2004, “Should the U.S. Continue to Maintain Forces in South Korea?,” http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA423298&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)

Due to the degradation of North Korean conventional forces and in light of the recent North Korean policy of developing nuclear weapons, it is unlikely that North Korea would launch a conventional attack on South Korea. However, in the unlikely event of such an attack, South Korea with assistance from the U.S. Navy and Air Force, could defeat the attack. North Korea’s policy to develop nuclear weapons is similar to the massive retaliation strategy of the 1950s Eisenhower administrations. Both governments want to portray credible military strength to attain national interests at the lowest possible cost. The Eisenhower Administration’s policy wanted to decrease taxes and military spending in order to build a stronger U.S. economy. Reliance on a strategy of massive retaliation with nuclear weapons was much cheaper than maintaining large conventional forces. Unfortunately, as later events were to prove, this strategy resulted in the U.S. forces being unable to influence any struggle, short of a thermo-nuclear exchange, concerning a national interest. North Korea’s policy is to gain concessions from U.S. and other regional powers to meet the objective of regime survival. Like the Eisenhower Administration, North Korea is pursuing a policy of relying on nuclear weapons to meet the nation’s policy objectives because it is cheaper than maintaining a large standing army. This policy is probably contributing to the degradation of their conventional forces capability.

A2: Squo Deters Invasion

S Korean ground forces + U.S. air power solve without U.S. ground presence

John P. Cummings, Colonel in the United States Army, 5-3-2004, “Should the U.S. Continue to Maintain Forces in South Korea?,” http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA423298&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)

When considering North Korean conventional threat versus ROK military capabilities that include a large ground force, one must ask, what is the military purpose of American ground forces forward deployed to South Korea? What more could the 37,000 United States forces contribute to a ground campaign conducted by 650,000-strong ROK force? Pundits reiterate that the United States’ major military contribution to South Korea in the event of hostilities will be in the form of naval and air forces, not ground forces. Andrew Krepenevich, noted scholar and expert in foreign relations, approaches the issue in a more strategic context. In an article he wrote concerning America as a global power, he makes several predictions. He states that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile technology will likely demand an increasing share of United States defense resources for homeland defense. He maintains that this will leave less military capability available for forward presence. He argues that our policy should encourage allies to assume a larger role in providing ground forces for peacekeeping, urban control operations and regional conflicts. In the case of South Korea, this would not entail an increase of resources on the part of U.S. allies. “South Korea should be capable of effectively defending itself without major United States ground reinforcements.”13

U.S. ground forces numbers are paltry and useless compared to the ROK forces

John P. Cummings, Colonel in the United States Army, 5-3-2004, “Should the U.S. Continue to Maintain Forces in South Korea?,” http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA423298&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)

South Korea relies upon its very formidable ground force to defend against a North Korean attack. The Republic of Korea (ROK) army consists of three armies that share defense responsibilities on the peninsula. The First ROK Army (FROKA) defends the eastern section of the DMZ. The Second ROK Army (SROKA) is responsible for the defense of the rear from the rear of the front area to the southern, eastern, and western coast lines. The Third ROK Army (TROKA) defends the western section of the DMZ and guards the three most likely attack routes from North Korea to Seoul-the Munsan, Chorwon, and Tongduchon avenues of approach. Due to its paramount defense responsibilities, TROKA is the largest and most capable of the three armies. The ROK army units consist of 11 corps, 50-plus divisions, and 20 brigades. Its 560,000 active duty troops man 2,200 main battle tanks, 4,850 artillery pieces, and 2,200 armored infantry vehicles. FROKA and TROKA’s shared defense of the border is bolstered by their occupation of well-fortified battle positions stretching from the DMZ to positions fifty kilometers south. In addition, ROK can call up an additional 3.5 million reservists’ to augment the active force. The United States contribution to ROK ground forces is comparatively small. The total U.S. ground force forward based in South Korea consists of 37,500 troops comprising of elements of the U.S. Army 2nd Infantry Division. The division maintains two ground maneuver brigades (two armored battalions, two mechanized infantry battalions, and two light infantry battalions), an aviation brigade (cavalry squadron, attack battalion, and lift battalion), and division artillery consisting of four artillery battalions (two cannon battalions and two rocket battalions).4 The division units do not occupy battle positions and are spread out across 17 installations throughout TROKA area of operations.

Prolif 1ac – Harms

North Korean prolif continues unabated – they’re on track to an intercontinental first strike capability

Scott A. Snyder, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Korea Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, June 2010, “U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula,” http://www.cfr.org/publication/22205/us\_policy\_toward\_the\_korean\_peninsula.html

Meanwhile, North Korea’s efforts to develop its missile programs continue unchecked.15 The Pentagon’s February 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review report concluded that if North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs continue to progress along the current trajectory, North Korea will eventually have both a nuclear capability and the capacity to deliver a nuclear weapon to its neighbors and to the United States.16 The task of addressing North Korea’s nuclear status is much harder now that North Korea has conducted two nuclear tests. The challenges posed will likewise be even more difficult once the country develops an effective nuclear weapons delivery capability.

U.S. troop presence creates a justification for North Korean prolif

Doug Bandow, senior fellow @ CATO, 11-11-2008, “Seoul Searching,” http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=20218

The North’s nuclear program, whatever the prognosis for the ongoing denuclearization talks, offers no justification for the alliance. First, U.S. forces based in the peninsula do not constrain Pyongyang. To the contrary, they offer a justification for the DPRK to build a nuclear arsenal. They will be nuclear hostages if the North creates a deliverable weapon. Nowhere else on earth would Washington have so many military personnel at such risk.

A nuclear north korea cannot be contained – failure to reverse Pyongyang’s proliferation risks global prolif and nuclear terrorism

Scott A. Snyder, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Korea Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, June 2010, “U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula,” http://www.cfr.org/publication/22205/us\_policy\_toward\_the\_korean\_peninsula.html

As tensions on the Korean peninsula rise after an international investigation found that North Korea was responsible for the sinking of a South Korean warship, a Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Independent Task Force warns that North Korea's continued provocations pose a serious threat to its neighbors and that its nuclear weapons program must be stopped. “The United States must seek to resolve rather than simply manage the challenge posed by a nuclear North Korea,” asserts the Task Force. In its report, U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula, the Task Force emphasizes that “despite the difficulty of the challenge, the danger posed by North Korea is sufficiently severe, and the costs of inaction and acquiescence so high, that the United States and its partners must continue to press for denuclearization.” The United States cannot risk “the potential spread of nuclear weapons to rogue states, terrorist groups or others—especially in the Middle East.”

Proliferation leads to nuclear war

Robert Pfaltzgraff, Professor of International Security Studies at The Fletcher School @ Tufts, and James Schoff, the Associate Director of Asia-Pacific Studies at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA), Feburary 2009, “Updating U.S. Deterrence Concepts and Operational Planning,” IFPA White Paper, online

Moreover, as suggested above, as more nations seek or attain nuclear status, we may very well be entering an era in which nuclear “non-use” is ending. This means that the risk of deterrence failures is growing, and with it questions about the ability of the United States to control the escalation chain in a crisis situation. During the Cold War, escalation dominance was presumed to lie with the United States, or at least that it could be managed in the U.S.-Soviet context because the stakes of escalation were such that both states were putatively deterred from nuclear weapons use (against the other). Today, however, the same may not be true with respect to North Korea and Iran, let alone in the context of a Taiwan contingency, or with respect to India and Pakistan in a crisis over Kashmir. Deterrence failures in the regional context may result from an accident, a deliberate calculation, or the intervention of a third party (e.g., Israel or Taiwan) in a crisis contingency. However, regardless of their origins, the consequences might very well be an escalatory exchange that ultimately draws the United States into a regional nuclear conflict.

Prolif 1ac – Harms

Nuclear terrorism causes extinction

Mohamed Sid-Ahmed, internationally renowned reporter and columnist in Al Ahram, "Extinction!" Al-Ahram Weekly, September 1, 2004<http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm>

What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This could lead to a third world war, from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers.

North Korean prolif is a litmus test for global nonproliferation – failure to mount an effective intentional response risks further horizontal prolif, including the Middle East

Scott A. Snyder, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Korea Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, June 2010, “U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula,” http://www.cfr.org/publication/22205/us\_policy\_toward\_the\_korean\_peninsula.html

North Korea conducted its first nuclear test in 2006. This and its subsequent test constitute a direct challenge to peace and stability in Northeast Asia. The risk of proliferation of fissile materials to other regions has ramifications for stability in the Middle East, as well as for the global nonproliferation regime. North Korea’s nuclear tests sharpen the dilemma for the international community over whether it is willing to use coercive tools—such as pressing for tougher sanctions under new UN resolutions targeting North Korean trade and financial transactions, implementing a more intrusive export control regime, or additional military measures—in combination with negotiations in an effort to roll back North Korea’s nuclear program.

Prolif in the Middle East will cause accidental and authorized launches

Stephen Peter Rosen, Foreign Affairs, September-October 2005, After Proliferation: What to Do If More States Go Nuclear

Nuclear-armed countries in the Middle East would be unlikely to display such restraint. Iran and Iraq would be much too suspicious of each other, as would Saudi Arabia and Iran, Turkey and Iraq, and so forth. And then there is Israel. Wariness would create the classic conditions for a multipolar arms race, with Israel arming against all possible enemies and the Islamic states arming against Israel and one another. Historical evidence suggests that arms races sometimes precipitate wars because governments come to see conflict as preferable to financial exhaustion or believe they can gain a temporary military advantage through war. Arguably, a nuclear war would be so destructive that its prospect might well dissuade states from escalating conflicts. But energetic arms races would still produce larger arsenals, making it harder to prevent the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons.

That escalates

Sharad Joshi, Student, International Relations, March 2000, Strategic Analysis, http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/sa/sa\_00jos01.html

The introduction of nuclear weapons in an already hostile region could increase the possibility of actual use of nuclear weapons in a tense situation. The continuous hostility of varying levels over the past five decades, might lead to the inclusion of nuclear and other WMD in existing “war-fighting” doctrines. [18](http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/sa/#note18) If the states in the region see WMD simply as weapons to be used in a conflict, the probability of these weapons being used increases drastically. The Arabs have tried to counter Israel’s nuclear superiority, by developing a sizeable chemical and biological weapons arsenal. The greater the number of powers in a region possessing WMD, the greater the risk of escalation. Wars in history have more often than not been limited; but the main reason for this has been constraints due to resources and technological know-how. Instances are very rare of a war being limited due to considerations of the consequences of existing capabilities. [19](http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/sa/#note19) The indiscriminate effect of Weapons of Mass Destruction makes it very difficult to keep a war involving such weapons, limited.

Prolif 1ac – Harms

North Korean proliferation guarantees East Asian instability

Michael Hamel-Green, Victoria University, and Peter Hayes, Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute, 1-5-2010, “The Path Not Taken, the Way Still Open: Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia”, http://www.nautilus.org/publications/essays/napsnet/sr/10001HayesHamalGreen.pdf/at\_download/file

Given the high stakes involved, North Korean proliferation, if unaddressed and unreversed, has the potential to destabilize the whole East Asian region and beyond. Even if a nuclear exchange does not occur in the short term, the acute sense of nuclear threat that has been experienced for over five decades by North Koreans as a result of US strategic deterrence is now likely to be keenly felt by fellow Koreans south of the 38th Parallel and Japanese across the waters of the Sea of Japan. China, too, must surely feel itself to be at risk from North Korean nuclear weapons, or from escalation that might ensue from next-use in the Korean Peninsula resulting not only in the environmental consequences noted above, but in regime collapse and massive refugee flows. South Korea and Japan appear willing to rely on their respective bilateral security pacts with the United States to deter North Korean nuclear attack for the time being. However, should South Korea and/or Japan acquire nuclear weapons, the outcome would be destabilizing, especially if this resulted from rupture of their alliance relationships with the United States. Both have the technical capability to do so very rapidly. South Korea has previously engaged in nuclear weapons research but desisted after US pressure. Japan still proclaims its adherence to the three Non-Nuclear Principles although recent confirmation that the United States routinely transited nuclear weapons through Japan and retains the right of emergency reintroduction of nuclear weapons has tarnished Japan’s non-nuclear image. Moreover, it has large stockpiles of plutonium that could rapidly be used to produce nuclear warheads. Such responses, already advocated by conservative and nationalist groups within South Korea and Japan, could trigger a regional nuclear arms race involving the Koreas, Japan, Taiwan, and China, with incalculable wider consequences for Southeast Asia, South Asia and the whole Pacific and beyond. These developments would spell the demise of the current global non- proliferation regime as underpinned by the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Failure to reverse the DPRK’s nuclear breakout is also an important factor driving a general malaise in the exercise of American power which one of the authors has characterized elsewhere as “the end of American nuclear hegemony.”8

This risks wars throughout Asia

Stephen Cimbala, Professor of Political Science @ Penn State, 2010, “Nuclear Weapons and Cooperative Security in the 21st Century,” P.117-8

Failure to contain proliferation in Pyongyang could spread nuclear fever throughout Asia. Japan and South Korea might seek nuclear weapons and missile defenses. A pentagonal configuration of nuclear powers in the Pacific basis (Russia, China, Japan, and the two Koreas – not including the United States, with its own Pacific interests) could put deterrence at risk and create enormous temptation toward nuclear preemption. Apart from actual use or threat of use, North Korea could exploit the mere existence of an assumed nuclear capability in order to support its coercive diplomacy. As George H. Quester has noted: If the Pyongyang regime plays its cards sensibly and well, therefore, the world will not see its nuclear weapons being used against Japan or South Korea or anyone else, but will rather see this new nuclear arsenal held in reserve (just as the putative Israeli nuclear arsenal has been held in reserve), as a deterrent against the outside world’s applying maximal pressure on Pyongyang and as a bargaining chip to extract the economic and political concessions that the DPRK needs if it wishes to avoid giving up its peculiar approach to social engineering. A five-sided nuclear competition in the Pacific would be linked, in geopolitical deterrence and proliferation space, to the existing nuclear deterrents in India and Pakistan, and to the emerging nuclear weapons status of Iran. An arc of nuclear instability from Tehran to Tokyo could place U.S. proliferation strategies into the ash heap of history and call for more drastic military options, not excluding preemptive war, defenses, and counter-deterrent special operations. In addition, an eight-sided nuclear arms race in Asia would increase the likelihood of accidental or inadvertent nuclear war. It would do so because: (1) some of these states already have histories of protracted conflict; (2) states may have politically unreliable or immature command and control systems, especially during a crisis involving a decision for nuclear first strike or retaliation; unreliable or immature systems might permit a technical malfunction that caused an unintended launch, or a deliberate but unauthorized launch by rogue commanders; (3) faulty intelligence and warning systems might cause one side to misinterpret the other’s defensive moves to forestall attack as offensive preparations for attack, thus triggering a mistaken preemption.

Prolif 1ac – Harms

Asian wars go nuclear

Hugh White, Strat. Studies Prof @ Australian, 6-4-2008, “Why War in Asia Remains Thinkable,” IISS, http://www.iiss.org/conferences/global-strategic-challenges-as-played-out-in-asia/asias-strategic-challenges-in-search-of-a-common-agenda/conference-papers/fifth-session-conflict-in-asia/why-war-in-asia-remains-thinkable-prof-hugh-white/

But while I agree that war in Asia is unlikely, it does seem to me to be ‘thinkable’. Moreover I will suggest that there is a real risk that war will become more thinkable in Asia over coming years and decades. And by ‘war’ I mean not just the kinds of small wars that have sadly always remained quite common in global and regional affairs. I mean big wars: wars between major powers that can kill millions, disrupt the lives of billions and wreck the international system. I mean the kind of wars that the founders of the IISS worried about fifty years ago when this great institution was founded, and which they and their successors have done so much to study, understand and prevent. I should explain that am going to focus my remarks here on East and especially Northeast Asia. By doing that I do not by any means intend to suggest that India’s rise is not central to the long-term development of Asia’s strategic future. On the contrary I think it most certainly is central. Nor do I think there are not grave problems for peace in South Asia; there clearly are, including a strong risk of major [and even nuclear] war. But nonetheless I believe that challenges to the future peace of the wider Asia-Pacific are much more likely to come from Northeast Asia than from South Asia, and that is where I will focus. Of course the risk of big wars in Northeast Asia has never completely disappeared. The Taiwan and North Korean situations have clearly posed a threat of major conflict in Asia. But many have tended to see these flashpoints as residual risks from an earlier age – throwbacks to the Cold War. The question I want to raise is whether they are not better seen as premonitions of a darker future in which Asia becomes more systemically dangerous, and if so what we can do about it. The question arises because of the tension between two contradictory but co-existing realities which we could see here in our conference yesterday as the sessions developed. On the one hand, we saw the reality of a region characterised by cooperation, integration and growth, in which shared interests predominate, and in which there is real hope of close regional cooperation to address a range of newer security threats such as those we were discussing for most of yesterday – energy security, environmental challenges and the proliferation of WMD to ‘rogue states’. In this reality, major war is indeed unthinkable. On the other hand we saw in the last session yesterday a quite different reality - the reality of active and intensifying military and strategic competition fuelled by suspicion, distrust and even hostility, in which major war is clearly not unthinkable, for the simple reason that some of the major powers in Asia are clearly building their forces with exactly that possibility in mind..

That causes extinction

Michael May, Engineering-Economic Systems at Stanford, Washington Quarterly, Summer 1997.

The unpalatable facts, to Europeans and North Americans, are that Asia has about half of the world's people, that it is growing faster than other parts of the world, and that, by mid-century, it will probably have more than half the population of the developed world and more than half of its money. Energy consumption, economic influence, and military power will be distributed in proportion. That is the rosy scenario. The dark scenario is that of a war that would, in all likelihood -- because nuclear weapons can be procured and deployed by any of these countries at a fraction of the cost of peaceful development --leave most of the civilized world devastated.

Prolif 1ac – Solvency

The plan removes the primary motivation for North Korean proliferation

Scott A. Snyder, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Korea Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, 12-30-2009, “Can the North Korean "Peace Offensive" Drive a Wedge in the U.S.-ROK Alliance?,” http://sitrep.globalsecurity.org/articles/091230529-can-the-north-korean-peace-off.htm

Following Ambassador Stephen Bosworth's December 8-10 visit to Pyongyang, he declared that the two sides had reached a "common understanding with the DPRK on the need to implement the six party joint statement and to resume the six party process." The North Korean foreign ministry spokesman affirmed Bosworth's statement, but mentioned the negotiation of a peace agreement, normalization of relations, and economic and energy assistance as the main items of the talks. During private meetings in November, the North Koreans described the need for a change in the U.S. "hostile policy" through the negotiation of a permanent peace treaty to replace the armistice as a higher priority than denuclearization. Chosun Ilbo worries in a December 11th editorial following the Bosworth visit that North Korea's intent is to break the U.S.-ROK alliance and insist on the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea. If this is the North's motive, can such a strategy work? Since the early 1990s and the establishment of separate but parallel dialogues between the United States and North Korea (over nuclear issues) and inter-Korean relations (over potential peninsular reconciliation), there have been worries that North Korea might attempt to exploit these channels by creating a wedge in U.S.-ROK alliance cooperation. But the alliance is the main factor in the emergence of U.S.-ROK-DPRK triangular relations that has limited North Korea's capacity to improve one relationship while neglecting the other. Effective U.S.-ROK alliance cooperation makes the two countries' relationships with North Korea parallel and interactive: progress in one is likely to require progress in the other while a failure to improve one relationship will act as a limiting factor constraining the development of the other. This dynamic has proven to be true during the past two decades. The negotiation of the U.S.-DPRK Geneva Agreed Framework in the mid-1990s was greeted with skepticism by the Kim Young Sam administration, especially as the North Koreans responded negatively to South Korean policy following the death of Kim Il Sung. But the implementation of the Agreed Framework and South Korea's central role in the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization ultimately created a new channel for inter-Korean relations, contributing to an easing of inter-Korean tensions in the late 1990s. In turn, the establishment of the inter-Korean summit in 2000 proved to be a catalyst for North Korea to reach out to the United States by sending Cho Myung-rok, Vice Chairman of the National Defense Commission, to Washington and to enable Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to visit Pyongyang at the end of the Clinton administration. However, a negative turn in U.S.-DPRK relations with the inauguration of the Bush administration created constraints on Kim Dae Jung in his pursuit of a second inter-Korean summit. Ultimately, inter-Korean relations were constrained by a chill in the U.S.-DPRK relationship. Although Roh Moo-hyun was able to have a second inter-Korean summit at the end of 2007, South Korea was ultimately constrained in its attempts to promote inter-Korean economic cooperation at Kaesong by the necessity of coordination on nuclear issues with the United States through the six party talks. With the inauguration of the Lee Myung-Bak administration, there was speculation that North Korea might again follow a policy of focusing on the United States while marginalizing South Korea (tongmi bongnam); however, the pattern described above reveals that U.S.-ROK alliance coordination imposes real limits on the capacity of North Korea to pursue progress in one relationship while trying to marginalize the other. Developments in 2009 appear to confirm the limits of the ability of North Korea to pursue progress in one relationship while marginalizing the other. The early part of 2009 was marked by the simultaneous deterioration in inter-Korean relations and rising tensions in U.S.-DPRK relations resulting from North Korea's missile and nuclear tests. Likewise, North Korea's "charm offensive" of the second half of 2009 has been dual-pronged: former President Clinton's mission to Pyongyang to secure the release of American journalists re-opened DPRK efforts to engage with the United States, while North Korea released a South Korean held for months at Kaesong during Hyundai Asan Chairperson Hyun Jung-eun's visit to Pyongyang in mid-August. Such a convergence in the momentum of North Korea's respective relationships with the United States and South Korea suggests that any North Korean effort to exploit differences between the United States and South Korea is being minimized. However, North Korea still resists Lee Myung-bak's efforts to place denuclearization on the agenda of the inter-Korean relationship while focusing on U.S. 'hostile policy' as an opening to place peace on the U.S.-DPRK diplomatic agenda prior to denuclearization. Some observers see Pyongyang's focus on peace as a direct challenge to the U.S.-ROK alliance, since the establishment of a permanent peace regime on the Korean peninsula would arguably obviate the need for the alliance or for U.S. troops on the peninsula. However, precisely because these issues are at the core of the alliance, it is unimaginable that such issues could be taken up absent the closest of consultation between the United States and South Korea, further tying together prospects of improvements in both U.S.-DPRK and inter-Korean relations. From the perspective of the United States, progress on denuclearization, peace, and normalization of relations is increasingly connected, as Ambassador Bosworth implied in Seoul immediately following his visit to Pyongyang. Ambassador Bosworth's dialogue with North Korea--and his deepened regional consultations with allies and friends--underscores the necessity of regional cohesion as a core element of the Obama administration's current approach to North Korea. Arguably, any progress in the U.S.-DPRK relationship and in inter-Korean relations is likely to be mutually reinforcing.

Prolif 1ac – Solvency

US military draw downs in Korea would reverse North Korea’s path to nuclearization

David Scofield, former lecturer at the Graduate Institute of Peace Studies,Kyung Hee University, is currently conducting post-graduate research at the School of East Asian Studies, University of Sheffield, 4-8-2005, “Christian ties may bind US troops to South Korea,” http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/GD08Dg01.html

Many would argue that to withdraw any troops while North Korea's nuclear program remains unresolved would be tantamount to rewarding Pyongyang for bad behavior. The North Koreans have after all demanded US withdrawal since the armistice ending the Korean War in 1953. But withdrawal may actually increase the pressure on Pyongyang as it puts the ball, even for those who believe it their mission to support the North, squarely back in Pyongyang leader Kim Jong-il's court. The purported threat of US invasion from the South is regularly expressed by the North as justification for the nuclear-weapons program and the positioning of more than 70% of its forces near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Removing the US "threat" would seem to nullify that argument.

The plan results in Chinese pressure on North Korea

Doug Bandow, senior fellow @ CATO, 5-25-2010, “Engaging China to Maintain Peace in East Asia,” http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=11845

How to maintain the peace in East Asia? Washington must engage the PRC on both issues. America's relationship with Beijing will have a critical impact on the development of the 21st century. Disagreements are inevitable; conflict is not. China is determined to take an increasingly important international role. It is entitled to do so. However, it should equally commit to acting responsibly. As the PRC grows economically, expands its military, and gains diplomatic influence, it will be able to greatly influence international events, especially in East Asia. If it does so for good rather than ill, its neighbors will be less likely to fear the emerging superpower. Most important, responsible Chinese policy will diminish the potential for military confrontation between Beijing and Asian states as well as the U.S. In return, Washington should welcome China into the global leadership circle if its rise remains peaceful and responsible. American analysts have expressed concern about a Chinese military build-up intended to prevent U.S. intervention along the PRC's border. But the U.S. cannot expect other states to accept American dominance forever. Any American attempt to contain Beijing is likely to spark — predictably — a hostile response from China. Instead, Washington policymakers should prepare for a world in which reciprocity replaces diktat. The U.S. could encourage Chinese responsibility by adopting policies that highlight the importance of the PRC's role in promoting regional peace and stability. Such an approach is most needed to deal with the Korean peninsula and Taiwan. For instance, Beijing could play a critical role in restraining and ultimately transforming the North. So far the PRC has declined to apply significant pressure on its long-time ally. In fact, North Korea's Kim Jong-il recently visited China, presumably in pursuit of additional economic aid and investment. His quid pro quo might have been a professed willingness to return to the Six-Party nuclear talks. But few analysts believe there is much chance of a nuclear deal whether or not these negotiations proceed — and almost certainly no chance unless the PRC is prepared to get tough with the North, including threatening to cut off generous food and energy shipments. To encourage Beijing, Washington should suggest that China would share the nightmare if an unstable North Korea expands its nuclear arsenal. The North's nuclear program would yield concern even in the best of cases. But the so-called Democratic People's Republic of Korea is no best case. The regime started a war in 1950 and engaged in terrorism into the 1980s. Pyongyang has cheerfully sold weapons to all comers. Worse, today it appears to be in the midst of an uncertain leadership transition. If North Korean forces sank the South Korean vessel, then either Kim Jong-il is ready to risk war or has lost control of the military, which is ready to risk war. The Obama administration should indicate to the PRC that Washington will face sustained pressure to take military action against the North — which obviously would not be in Beijing's interest. Should the DPRK amass a nuclear arsenal, the U.S. would have no more desire than China to be in the middle of a messy geopolitical confrontation, especially one that could go nuclear. Thus, Washington would not be inclined to block decisions by the ROK and Japan to create countervailing nuclear arsenals. Just as the prospect of a North Korean bomb worries the U.S., the possibility of a Japanese nuclear capacity would unsettle the PRC. Should China take the tough, even risky (from its standpoint) steps necessary to moderate or transform Pyongyang, Washington should promise to reciprocate. The DPRK poses the greatest threat to regional peace and security. Eliminate it, and eliminate the principal justification for a U.S. military presence in East Asia. Most obvious would be a promise not to maintain American bases or troops in the Korean peninsula, whether united or divided. Pulling back units from Japan would also be warranted.

Chinese pressure is key to denuclearization efforts

Richard N. Haass, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, June 2010, “U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula,” http://www.cfr.org/publication/22205/us\_policy\_toward\_the\_korean\_peninsula.html

This Task Force report comprehensively reviews the situation on the peninsula as well as the options for U.S. policy. It provides a valu-able ranking of U.S. interests, and calls for a firm commitment from the Obama administration to seek denuclearization of the Korean penin-sula, backed by a combination of sanctions, incentives, and sustained political pressure, in addition to increased efforts to contain prolifera- tion. It notes that China’s participation in this effort is vital. Indeed, the report makes clear that any hope of North Korea’s dismantling its nuclear program rests on China’s willingness to take a strong stance. For denuclearization to proceed, China must acknowledge that the long-term hazard of a nuclear Korea is more perilous to it and the region than the short-term risk of instability. The report also recognizes that robust relations between Washington and its allies in the region, Japan and South Korea, must underpin any efforts to deal with the North Korean problem.

Prolif 1ac – Solvency

Only Complete U.S. withdrawal can garner active Chinese support for reunification and denuclearizatrion efforts

Peter Van Nguyen, writer for Asia Times Online 10-13-2009, “U.S. bases are obstacle to Korean reunification,” UPI Asia, http://www.upiasia.com/Security/2009/10/13/us\_bases\_are\_obstacle\_to\_korean\_reunification/1193/

The United States believes that if the North collapsed, China would have to back reunification to demonstrate that it is a responsible player in regional cooperation. But in order to get the Chinese to endorse the plan, the United States would have to give up its strategic military bases in South Korea and order a complete withdrawal of U.S. troops from the region. Both Koreas have been constantly eyed by foreigners due to their geostrategic value in Northeast Asia. For China, Japan and the United States, the Koreas have provided a buffer zone for more than half a century since the end of the Korean War. The Korean peninsula is also seen as a predetermined battlefield if war breaks out between China, the United States and Japan. This would leave the warring states relatively untouched, as the three nations could avoid hitting each other’s territories, which would escalate the conflict and make it difficult for all parties to disengage for fear of losing face. But both Koreas would have to face the brunt of a full-scale war. For China, protecting North Korea means keeping the United States and its allies from encroaching on its border. China would rather maintain the status quo than accept a reunified Korea under South Korean administration. Therefore, China will do its best to stabilize North Korea and rebuild its political structure in line with Chinese interests. China might be forced to accept a reunified Korea if it wants to maintain an international image as a peace-promoting country. However, unless it gets some kind of security guarantee without losing the strategic balance in the region, there is little incentive for it to allow reunification to take place unchallenged. Since the end of the Korean War the United States has maintained a large military contingent in South Korea to deter an invasion attempt by the North. The U.S. military presence keeps China’s ambitions in check and in the bargain offers Japan some security, as the Japanese fear reprisals from the Chinese for atrocities committed during World War II. Besides, China’s growing economic and military clout has increased the necessity for a military presence in South Korea. However, U.S. military bases in South Korea could pose the greatest obstacle to a peaceful reunification of the Koreas. Even a unified Korea might not want the U.S. military, as reunification would make the objective of providing deterrence against the North redundant. A U.S. military base in a united Korea would only strain ties with China, as it would be difficult to explain why it was required if the North Korean threat no longer exists. Also, millions of North Koreans have a deeply embedded resentment against the United States and are highly suspicious of its geopolitical moves in the region. Many believe that the South Korean government is a puppet of the United States. Stationing troops in Korea after reunification would only reinforce this belief. This would create a deep rift within the Koreas and threaten to derail the reunification process. The complete withdrawal of all U.S. military bases and personnel from the Korean peninsula should follow after a timetable has been set, allowing the new Korea to handle its own security.

US-SINO cooperation on North Korea is key to broader security cooperation—that’s key to stability in Northeast Asia

Scott A. Snyder, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Korea Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, June 2010, “U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula,” http://www.cfr.org/publication/22205/us\_policy\_toward\_the\_korean\_peninsula.html

Productive Sino-U.S. consultations on North Korea have been lauded in recent years as evidence that the United States and China can work together to address common security challenges. Conversely, the failure to collaborate to achieve North Korea’s denuclearization will represent a setback and an obstacle to other areas of U.S.-China security cooperation. For this reason, it is essential for the United States and China to develop a clear understanding regarding how to deal with North Korea, thereby establishing a framework for lasting stability on a nonnuclear Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia.

Ext – Withdrawal 🡪 Chinese Support

The plan reassures China about U.S. intentions, sparking cooperation on North Korean prolif

Scott A. Snyder, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Korea Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, June 2010, “U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula,” http://www.cfr.org/publication/22205/us\_policy\_toward\_the\_korean\_peninsula.html

China worries about the emergence of an unfriendly regime in a future unified Korea. If the Obama administration’s efforts to build regional cohesion and closer Sino-U.S. cooperation are to bear fruit, the United States will need to clarify its objectives toward the Korean peninsula and provide reassurance about its intentions. The Task Force calls for a dialogue with China about the future of the Korean peninsula and “principles” of a united Korea. Such a dialogue could include dis- cussion about the process of potential unification and what a unified Korea might look like, including the number, location, and even presence of U.S. troops in Korea and a pledge to keep the peninsula nuclear- free. Any discussion with China regarding desired outcomes or future developments on the Korean peninsula would have to be based on full, prior U.S. coordination with allies in Seoul and Tokyo.

Ext – China Key to 6-Party Talks

Chinese involvement in the 6-party talks is key

Scott A. Snyder, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Korea Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, June 2010, “U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula,” http://www.cfr.org/publication/22205/us\_policy\_toward\_the\_korean\_peninsula.html

While each member of the Six Party talks—China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the United States—has its own concerns, “any hope of resolving the North Korean standoff will depend on all parties cooperating with one another and being firm with North Korea.” The report emphasizes that “Chinese cooperation is essential to the success of denuclearization on the Korean peninsula and to ensuring regional stability.”

China has the most influence

Doug Bandow, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, 4-6-2010, “An Unstable Rogue,” http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=23144

The country that could do the most to reduce the chance of conflict is China. Beijing increasingly expects political influence commensurate with its growing economic strength. Dealing with North Korea provides the PRC with an opportunity to demonstrate the strength of its commitment to peace and stability.

US action alone cannot solve denuclearization

Scott A. Snyder, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Korea Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, June 2010, “U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula,” http://www.cfr.org/publication/22205/us\_policy\_toward\_the\_korean\_peninsula.html

Given the high level of mistrust between the United States and North Korea, the United States will not be able to change the situation by itself. It will need cooperation from counterparts in Asia who have already affirmed their support—through the Six Party Joint Statement of Sep- tember 19, 2005—for the objectives of denuclearization, improved bilateral relations in the region, regional economic development, and the establishment of peace on the Korean peninsula.1 The United States, China, Russia, South Korea, Japan, and North Korea have all signed on to this statement. The goal of the Obama administration should be to work with its partners to pursue its full implementation.

Ext – 6-Party Talks Solve Prolif

Strengthened multilateral negotiations can solve nuclearization

Insook Kim, Research Associate, East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the Monterey Institute for International Studies, February 2009, “The Six-Party Talks and President Obama's North Korea Policy,” http://www.nti.org/e\_research/e3\_six\_party\_obama\_north\_korea.html

Progress at the Six-Party Talks has been painstakingly slow and uneven over the years. Despite this, the multilateral negotiations have led North Korea to take incremental and concrete steps toward the ultimate goal of denuclearization. With sustained political will and close coordination amongst the parties involved, this multilateral framework can be strengthened to yield concrete and powerful results. President Barack Obama's proposed comprehensive diplomacy that combines the strengths of multilateral negotiations with the unique benefits of direct bilateral engagement presents a sensible and practical approach to the North Korean nuclear issue. The change in administration in the United States provides a rare opportunity to provide a fresh impetus to the denuclearization process. It is up to Washington and Pyongyang, in close cooperation with the other capitals, to seize upon this opportunity to proactively engage in negotiations that can successfully overcome not only the immediate obstacles but also the longer-term challenges posed by the North Korean nuclear weapons program.

6 party talks are key to progress

Japan Times, 7-17-2009, “New IAEA head Amano hopes to revive six-party process,” http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20090717a6.html

Reviving the six-party talks remains a vital component of the effort to denuclearize North Korea, Yukiya Amano, the next director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, said Thursday in Tokyo. But Amano, who earlier this month became the first Asian voted in as head of the nuclear watchdog, noted that the IAEA can only play its role once Pyongyang agrees to allow inspectors to enter its nuclear facilities. "There needs to be steps forward within the six-party talks on a process for denuclearization," he said in a news conference at the Foreign Ministry, adding that the IAEA is ready to do its job when called upon.

A2: Korea/Japan Prolif

North Korean prolif makes their disad inevitable—U.S. troops don’t prevent regional prolif

Thomas H. Henriksen, Senior Fellow @ the Hoover Institute, 2003, “Time to Leave South Korea,” http://www.hoover.org/publications/hoover-digest/article/7977

Our DMZ contingent has neither halted Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons ambitions nor inhibited its missile sales to Iraq, Pakistan, Libya, or Syria. It cannot be expected to stop nuclear material transfers to other rogue states or possibly terrorist networks. More important, American ground units in Korea have not assuaged fears in Japan, Taiwan, or military circles in South Korea about Pyongyang’s nuclear arming. These states will increasingly look to their own defense. Japan, the most pacifistic state, has now openly abandoned its long-held prohibition of U.S. nuclear-powered warships in its harbors. Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba stated that his country is prepared to wage a preemptive strike against a possible missile launch by North Korea. Pyongyang’s likely production of 10 or more new atomic bombs will deepen anxiety among its neighbors. They will consider defensive measures, perhaps a nuclear option, even with U.S. ground forces in South Korea.

Nuclear security guarantees solve

Doug Bandow, senior fellow @ CATO, Fall 2005, “Seoul Searching,” National Interest, ln

The Bush Administration also seems to think that South Korea is better prepared to stand on its own. Moving U.S. forces south--essentially dismantling the fabled tripwire of fifty years--and cutting the American garrison by one-third suggest that Washington no longer believes its military presence to be central to the ROK's security. As Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld explained after meeting with South Korean Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-ung, "the South Koreans are appropriately increasingly taking the lead in their own defense" and will be "assuming some missions and some responsibilities as we adjust our relationship going forward." Dealing with a nuclear North Korea would be more complicated but would not be aided by conventional troop deployments. To the contrary, America's force presence exacerbates the problem by creating thousands of American nuclear hostages within range of Pyongyang's weapons. Whether Washington ended up holding a nuclear umbrella over the ROK or encouraging South Korea to create its own nuclear deterrent, the United States would gain nothing by maintaining an Army division and other units in the South.

No ROK breakout – it would take years

Jonathan Pollack, professor of Asian and Pacific studies and chairman of the Strategic Research Department at Naval War College, and Mitchell Reiss, former Director of the Reves Center for International Studies, 2004, “The Nuclear Tipping Point”

Despite this impressive engineering base and technological infrastructure, it would he no easy matter for South Korea to develop nuclear weapons. Previous estimates of the time needed to complete a weapons program severely underestimated the technical barriers.9 The extreme secrecy required for a covert program would also he far harder to maintain in the current democratic environment than what prevailed during the era of military dictatorship. The greatest obstacle would he obtaining the required fissile materials, either weapons-grade plutonium or highly enriched uranium. South Korea does not possess the indigenous capability to produce either type of bomb-grade material, although research breakthroughs (notably, in pilot production of high-speed centrifuges for isotope separation) have been reported in South Korean publications. Although South Korea could attempt larger-scale manufacture of the sophisticated equipment required for fissile material production, the ultimate success of such a home-grown effort would be far from assured and would entail a sustained, massive commitment of financial and manpower resources. A more likely route, therefore, would be for Seoul to import reprocessing or uranium enrichment technology from abroad. The political and institutional barriers to such transfers, howevei are quite daunting. In recent decades, the leading nuclear industrial countries have informally banded together in a Nuclear Suppliers Group to control international trade in this area. The transfer of sensitive technologies is monitored closely, and any request by a South Korean firm or end user for reprocessing or uranium enrichment technology would trigger alarm bells abroad, especially in Washington. If South Korea sought to repeat an earlier attempt at a nuclear option, it is far more likely that Seoul would explore a clandestine route to) avoid detection, trying to exploit the network of black market suppliers. Ihe ROK would still need to invest years of effort, at great risk of exposure by foreign suppliers or by its increasingly rambunctious mass media, before it could acquire the infrastructure needed to produce the material for a bomb. Even then, it would require additional time before it could develop workable, deliverable nuclear weapons.

A2: Korea/Japan Prolif

Any Korean buildup would be conventional

Jonathan D. Pollack Professor of Asian and Pacific Studies @ the Naval War College, and Mitchell B. Reiss, Director of the Reves Center for International Studies, 2004, *The Nuclear Tipping Point*, p. 272-73

The traditional conservative nationalist position is now a much weakened force in South Korean domestic politics, corresponding closely to the steady decline in the role of the uniformed military as a political force and the ROK's demographic transition. But the political right remains a potent actor in electoral politics and in some major media. It has yielded significant ground to Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun on policies toward the North, though it severely criticizes both presidents for an ide- alized, naive view of the DPRK threat that Pyongyang continues to exploit. The principal voices defending the alliance with the United States are also found in conservative circles. Even though some observers raise major objections to U.S. heavy-handedness, they see few alternatives to continued close ties with the United States, both at present and fol- lowing unification. Thus the nationalist right believes that the ROK must accommodate the impending shifts in U.S. defense strategy on the peninsula. At the same time, the political right wants to ensure that Seoul's defense needs are clearly addressed in any such changes and that perceived political imbalances in the alliance are rectified in return for the ROK's consent to looming policy changes. The political right also supports U.S. efforts to achieve North Korean denuclearization. Notably absent from the political right's views is any consideration of a renewed nuclear weapons option.37 The clear assumption is that the ROK must avail itself of the opportunity to modernize its conventional forces in line with the U.S. plans for military transformation. Over time this would enable the ROK to reduce the major manpower burdens imposed by its very large conventional forces—especially the ground forces—and begin to shift attention to modernization goals for a post- unification environment. Such steps would be deemed appropriate to ensure that the ROK remains an essential partner in U.S. regional security strategy over the longer term. If there are advocates of a "Gaullist" position in the ROK, their voices are not heard, at least not at present. Indeed, against whom would such a hypothesized nuclear force be directed? Would it be an attempt to achieve notional strategic equivalence with the North, on the assumption that the DPRK's nuclear capabilities will persist and that the United States might ultimately expect the ROK to be fully responsible for its own defense? Some Korean officials, for example, have long envisioned the need for an upgraded ROK missile capability able to reach major targets in the North, even if restricted to conventional warheads. In the late 1990s, the ROK pressured the United States to permit an increase in the range of the Hyonmu, the South's indigenous short-range ballistic missile, from 180 to 300 kilometers. Such an enhanced range would approach but not exceed the guidelines under the Missile Technology Control Regime, although the ROK is not a signatory to it. At the time, U.S. officials voiced concern that the Hyonmu might possess an inherent capability to extend its range beyond 300 kilometers, creating the prospect of a future offensive missile capability." Despite such concerns, the United States ultimately consented to ROK acquisition of the U.S. version of a 300- kilometer missile, with the ROK currently planning to deploy 110 of these missiles against targets in the North.39

U.S. withdrawal won’t lead to japan rearm

Maria Rost Rublee, Assistant Professor Government and World Affairs @ UT, April 2009, “The Future of Japanese Nuclear Policy,” Center for Contemporary Conflict, http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2009/Apr/rubleeApr09.asp

U.S. Withdrawal. Should the United States withdraw from the U.S-Japan Security Treaty or otherwise retract the nuclear umbrella, Japan will take the nuclear option much more seriously. One Japanese defense expert noted that the most important thing the United States can do to keep Japan from going nuclear is to maintain and strengthen the U.S.-Japan security relationship.[[42](http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2009/Apr/rubleeApr09.asp#references)] A U.S. withdrawal does not, however, guarantee that Japan would take the nuclear option. A number of Japanese defense analysts noted that a very strong conventional defense could take the place of a military nuclear capability. Others mentioned that because developing a second-strike capability would take years to develop, a nuclear force was less attractive—especially considering how vulnerable the small island country is to any nuclear strike. Thus, the Japanese response to U.S. disengagement would not necessarily be a nuclear one, but the potential for a nuclear Japan certainly increases.

The risk of Japan rearm is near zero

Llewelyn Hughes, PhD candidate in political science at MIT, Spring 2007, “Why Japan Will Not Go Nuclear (Yet),” International Security, Vol. 31, No. 4

Nevertheless, a hollowing out of the U.S. deterrent is unlikely to automatically translate into the inclusion of a nuclear deterrent within Japan’s force structure. Nuclear hedging has not been implemented as a coherent national strategy, and sustained political will and organizational cooperation would be required to independently develop a robust nuclear deterrent. The evidence suggests that support for such a policy among domestic organizations cannot be assumed. Japan’s energy bureaucrats, for example, are unlikely to support the transfer of nuclear materials for military purposes, given the repercussions for the civilian nuclear energy program. Evidence also suggests that Japanese military planners believe that the costs of independent nuclearization outweigh any security beneªts. Finally, polling shows that public preferences against nuclearization are stable, suggesting that Japanese public opinion is likely to remain a signiªcant constraint on policy change even in the absence of Japan’s bilateral alliance with the United States.

A2: Korea/Japan Prolif

Japan lacks the capability

Matake Kamiya, Winter 2002, W.Q., “Nuclear Japan, p ln

Those who emphasize the potential for Japan to go nuclear in the foreseeable future argue that, of all the elements required to be a nuclear power, the only one that Japan lacks is the will. The proponents of this view are mistaken, however, because Japan currently has only latent, not immediate, nuclear capability. In other words, **even if Japan decided to build its own nuclear arsenal tomorrow, it could not** achieve that goal overnight. First, **Japan has intentionally avoided acquiring the necessary weapons-grade plutonium** to make bombs; Japan's plutonium stockpile consists only of reactor-grade plutonium. Although some kind of small-scale nuclear bomb production with reactor-grade plutonium may be possible, experts generally agree that bomb production with this kind of plutonium involves an extremely dangerous technological process and that such bombs are likely to be too unstable and too militarily unreliable to be deployed as actual warheads. In fact, no country has ever tried to produce nuclear weapons with reactor-grade plutonium. If Japan decided to develop its own nuclear weapons, it would surely choose to do so with weapons-grade plutonium because the process would be much easier, safer, and cheaper. The amount of weapons-grade plutonium, however, that Japan could obtain from existing nuclear power plants would be limited. For a major power such as Japan, having a small number of nuclear warheads is militarily meaningless. A militarily **meaningful nuclear arsenal would require production of hundreds of warheads, which would** first **necessitate** that **Japan spend at least a decade constructing new facilities** to extract the grand amount of weapons-grade plutonium required. n23 These facts clearly demonstrate that Japan's plutonium program and its plutonium stockpile are unrelated to the possibility of nuclearization. Japan's acceptance of comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency **(IAEA) safeguards** further **assures that Japan operates its plutonium** program **strictly for peaceful purposes**. Moreover, since 1994, Japan has disclosed specific figures on its plutonium stock as part of its effort to promote the transparency of the country's nuclear-fuel recycling program, to help assuage any inevitable suspicion of Japanese intentions. The second technological hurdle that Japan must clear before claiming to possess a militarily meaningful nuclear arsenal entails ballistic missile development. For Japan, tactical nuclear weapons would be useless in practical terms; as an island nation, it would find few meaningful targets for such weapons. But **Japan would have to devote many years to developing a ballistic missile program** before achieving deployment capability. Among other difficulties, converting Japan's H-2 rocket into a form for military use is not realistic. Liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen, the fuels used to power Japan's H-2, must be maintained at extremely low temperatures. Because maintaining the huge H-2 at these temperatures for extended periods of time is practically impossible, technicians must first cool the H-2's fuel tanks before they are filled, shortly before launch, a process that requires at least a few hours. Finally, **Japan lacks the technology** necessary to build an accurate inertial guidance system and the reentry mechanisms that are essential for ballistic missiles. Even if Japan technologically mastered ballistic-missile development, its small physical size (in territorial square miles) would still make it vulnerable to a first strike. Land-based missiles on such a small territory would not ensure a retaliatory capability, and air-launched missile systems would not necessarily receive adequate warning time to allow the deploying aircraft to scramble to secure locations. Japan would have to deploy submarines to possess a credible second-strike capability. For that purpose, Japan would be faced with building nuclear engines as well as an extensive terrestrial or satellite communications grid to support their activities. **The time needed** for Japan to make this extensive list of technological strides can **more realistically** be measured in **decades than years**. In conclusion, for all its latent nuclear potential, **Japan is not capable now, nor** will it be **anytime soon, of going nuclear** quickly. The likelihood that Japan would secretly pursue nuclear weapons development without the world knowing about it, even if Japan had the desire, is minimal. Japan is an open society; all of its nuclear power activity is subject to IAEA regulation; and it is practically incapable of surmounting all the technological hurdles without international assistance.

Prolif by Japan and Korea would solve NK nuclearization and doesn’t cause instability or conflict

Ted Galen Carpenter, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at CATO, 11-11-2006, “Nuclear Neighbors Might Thwart N. Korea,” http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=6772

The prospect of additional nuclear weapons proliferation in northeast Asia obviously is not an ideal outcome. But offsetting the North's looming illicit advantage may be the best of a bad set of options. Moreover, the real danger arising from proliferation is when repulsive rogue states such as North Korea get such weapons, not when stable, democratic countries such as Japan and South Korea do so in self-defense. If the North had to deal with nuclear neighbors, whom it could not so easily intimidate, it might have to abandon its current provocative course. Indeed, Pyongyang might face the prospect of confronting more prosperous adversaries that could easily build larger and more sophisticated nuclear arsenals than it could hope to do. Kim's regime might then conclude that keeping the region non-nuclear would be more productive. Even if it does not do so, a nuclear balance of power in the region would likely emerge instead of a North Korean nuclear monopoly. The prospect of a nuclear-armed Japan is also the one factor that might galvanize the Chinese to put serious diplomatic and economic pressure on Pyongyang to give up its nuclear ambitions. Washington Post columnist Charles Krauthammer expresses that thesis starkly: "We should go to the Chinese and tell them plainly that if they do not join us in squeezing North Korea and thus stopping its march to go nuclear, we will endorse any Japanese attempt to create a nuclear deterrent of its own. . . . If our nightmare is a nuclear North Korea, China's is a nuclear Japan. It's time to share the nightmares." Even if one does not embrace Krauthammer's approach, the reality is that if the United States blocks the possible emergence of a northeast Asian nuclear balance, it will be stuck with the responsibility of shielding non-nuclear allies from a volatile, nuclear-armed North Korea. More proliferation may be a troubling outcome, but it beats that scenario.

A2: NK Prolif Inevitable

The Aff’s signal of nonaggression makes denuclearization palatable for the North Koreans

Korea Policy Institute, May 2009, “The Case for a Peace Treaty to End the Korean War,” http://www.kpolicy.org/documents/policy/090529kpicaseforapeacetreaty.html

Is peace with North Korea possible? “Above all, [North Korea] wants, and has pursued steadily since 1991, a long-term, strategic relationship with the United States. This has nothing to do with ideology or political philosophy. It is a cold, hard calculation based on history and the realities of geopolitics as perceived in Pyongyang. The North Koreans believe in their gut that they must buffer the heavy influence their neighbors already have, or could soon gain, over their small, weak country,” write Stanford scholars John Lewis and Robert Carlin (Washington Post, 1/27/2007). Seasoned negotiators with North Korea during the Clinton years, Lewis and Carlin published an account of lessons learned in “Negotiating with North Korea: 1992 — 2007,” published in January 2008, much if it based on first-hand knowledge. North Korea’s interest in engaging the U.S., according to the account, was based on a “strategic decision by Kim Il Sung in the early 1990s to press for engagement with the United States and even accept a continuing U.S. military presence on the Peninsula as a hedge against expanded, potentially hostile, Chinese or Russian influence.” At the height of tensions with the U.S., a North Korea official provided an elaboration of this theme to Lewis and Carlin in 2003. It presents an outlook of the North Korean leadership that is largely unacknowledged, or simply unknown, in the west and is worth quoting in full: The basic strategic fact for us is rooted in history. We have been victimized by all our neighbors from Qing times on. This is why we want closer relations with the U.S. Do you know the Chinese saying, ‘Keep those far away close, and those close to you keep at a distance’? This is our strategic reality, and this is why we want closer relations with the U.S. It is time for us to become friends. We have learned a lot about each other in the last fifteen years, and we have come to know each other. For over a century the countries around us have competed to control us for their own strategic security and economic reasons, and we became their battlefield. You must look at the strategic picture – the big picture – as we have in order to survive. (Lewis and Carlin, 2008) Most of the lessons we have learned about what North Korea wants resulted from negotiations during the time period reviewed by Lewis and Carlin. Prior to that, there was no diplomatic contact between the two countries. U.S. State Department officials were routinely instructed not even to acknowledge the presence of North Korea diplomats at social functions. However, the historical record reveals that North Korea’s interest in peace with the U.S. dates back nearly four decades. New York Times editor Harrison Salisbury and Selig Harrison were the first U.S. journalists to interview Kim Il Sung, in 1972. At an October 2008 conference sponsored by the Korea Policy Institute (KPI) at the University of California at Berkeley, Harrison related Kim’s message: [Kim Il Sung] said, “We are being smothered by military expenditures,” and he made an appeal to the U.S. to take a new approach toward North Korea. And he said, “Look, we see you” — this was 1972 — “we see you talking about détente with the Russians and the Chinese. Where is that going to leave us? And so we need to reduce our defense expenditures or we won’t be able to survive, and we need your help, in order to do that through arms control.” He mentioned it again in 1994. (Selig Harrison, KPI conference presentation, 2008) By the mid 1970s, small numbers of Korean Americans began trickling into North Korea to reunite with long-lost relatives. They brought back the same message. By now, thousands of Korean Americans have visited North Korea, and have heard this same message from practically everyone they’ve met, as if echoing down through the years. In brief, the message is that North Korea wants and needs peace with the U.S. The need for peace now The desirability of a long-term U.S. strategic relationship with North Korea based upon pragmatic considerations should be considered by the new administration in the years ahead. But the immediate objective of achieving complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear program requires a new approach that replaces enmity with peaceful co-existence as the basis for negotiations. A peace treaty with North Korea was on the agenda for serious consideration at the end of the Clinton administration. In a recent statement made in Seoul, former U.S. Ambassador to South Korea James Laney updated the case for a peace treaty this way: One of the things that have bedeviled all talks until now is the unresolved status of the Korean War. A peace treaty would provide a baseline for relationships, eliminating the question of the other’s legitimacy and its right to exist. Absent such a peace treaty, every dispute presents afresh the question of the other side’s legitimacy. Only with a treaty in place will both sides be relieved of the political demand to see each move as conferring approval or not. After more than a half century, it is time for us to come to terms with existence [of North Korea] simply as a fact, and not see it as a concession. Further, a treaty would reduce the uncertainties about future policy which inevitably accompany changes in administration, in either South Korea or the US, since it is based upon ratification by the respective legislatures. (James T. Laney, “The New U.S. Administration and Peace on the Korean Peninsula,” December 2008) After eight years of futile efforts to pressure North Korea into agreeing to CVID as a precondition for normalization of relations, it is time to put peace first. The Korea Policy Institute therefore offers the following recommendations to the administration of President Obama upon which to base a new U.S. policy toward Korea and the six-party talks: Sign a peace treaty with North Korea formally ending the Korean War. Normalize relations as a basis for seeking practical ways to resolve differences pertaining to arms control, for engaging in dialog for the improvement of human rights in North Korea, and to facilitate the provision of humanitarian and development assistance needed to help ensure the economic security of the North Korean people, many of whom regularly cross the border into China in search of food as refugees with no legal protection. Encourage North and South Korea to pursue reconciliation and disarmament in accordance with their Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, Exchanges and Cooperation and Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula of 1992, and agreements reached in the North-South summit meetings of 2000 and 2007. Provide leadership in orienting the six-party talks towards the goal of creating a nuclear-free zone in Northeast Asia and of ensuring mutually beneficial economic relations among all countries in the region. Treat the complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs as an ongoing process linked to progress made in denuclearizing the entire Korean peninsula as agreed in the September 19, 2005 six-party agreement, and in progress made in North-South and regional nuclear disarmament as described in recommendations 3 and 4, above. Pursue “direct and aggressive diplomacy with North Korea that can yield results” as pledged by President Obama in his campaign for the presidency. Convene a summit meeting between President Obama and General Secretary Kim Jong Il in which the two leaders may engage in a candid exchange of ideas leading to the realization of mutual goals

A2: NK Prolif Inevitable

Gestures of assurance against U.S. military threats are key to jumpstart the 6-party talks

David S. Cloud, Politico, 5-25-2009, “North Korea nuclear test a test for President Obama,” http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0509/22928.html#ixzz0tMTquARb

But convincing North Korea to cease work and dismantle its nuclear facilities confounded the Bush administration and, so far, the Obama administration. Until now, Obama has followed a course adopted in the later years of the Bush administration, which dealt with North Korea through so-called six-party talks, the long-running negotiations on eliminating North Korea’s nuclear program that also involves China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea. Though the talks produced an agreement in principle that North Korea would denuclearize in return for energy assistance and other aid, Pyongyang walked away from the deal before finalizing details. It announced in April after test-firing a ballistic missile that it was pulling out of the talks and resuming its nuclear program. Victor Cha, a former National Security Council aide during the Bush administration, argued that the North is still angling for diplomatic recognition, including security assurances from the United States, before it will open up to the outside world.

Even limited progress towards denuclearization solves most of the advantage

John W. Lewis, professor emeritus at Stanford University, where he directs the Center for International Security and Cooperation's Project on Peace and Cooperation in the Asian-Pacific Region, and Robert Carlin, visiting scholar at the Center for International Security and Cooperation, 2-10-2010, “Activating a North Korea policy,” http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/activating-north-korea-policy

The fundamental U.S. goal is exactly right: We want North Korea to denuclearize and to return to the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. But stating the goal isn't the same as moving closer to it. To do so, we must accomplish things that can help stabilize the situation, make it less likely that the strategic threat from the North will get worse, and begin exploring with Pyongyang a range of ideas for reducing tensions on the Korean Peninsula and in the region. A couple of mid-term steps could include a halt in nuclear testing and long-range ballistic missile launches, along with a complete freeze of the Yongbyon nuclear center, which would involve further decommissioning and a return of international inspectors. These interim steps won't "solve" the nuclear problem, but they aren't beyond what we can accomplish. They will do considerably more to protect our interests and those of our allies than the current all-or-nothing policy, which is going nowhere fast.

A2: Regime Change Solves

Regime change causes full-scale Korean war and instant instability throughout Asia – and it doesn’t solve prolif

Scott A. Snyder, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Korea Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, June 2010, “U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula,” http://www.cfr.org/publication/22205/us\_policy\_toward\_the\_korean\_peninsula.html

A fourth option for achieving denuclearization would be to pursue regime change in North Korea. This might include support for subver- sive activities intended to undermine the current leadership, expansion of economic sanctions, strengthened measures to inspect and interdict all cargo to and from North Korea, and a rhetorical policy designed to publicly support regime change. Given the widespread pessimism regarding the likelihood of the current regime voluntarily giving up its nuclear weapons, its lack of credibility in implementing past diplomatic agreements, and its will- ingness to sell conventional weapons and missile technologies to the highest bidder, this approach prioritizes denuclearization over stability. It assumes that any negotiations will be a pretext for delay rather than a vehicle for successfully managing or resolving the dangers posed by North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. It also implicitly assumes that a new North Korean regime would be more amenable to negotiations and willing to give up the weapons, though this may not be the case. Given current North Korean leader Kim Jong-il’s advanced age and reported ill health, leadership may pass to a designated successor, who may or may not continue the policies of the current regime. There are many uncertainties and dangers in a regime change scenario (detailed in a later section on contingency plan- ning), but the option accepts North Korea’s destabilization as a means to ensure denuclearization. This option entails a willingness to bear the immediate costs of instability for the establishment of a new order in North Korea, either through Korean reunification or the installation of a reform-oriented North Korean leadership. An obstacle to the regime change option is that it contradicts the high priority North Korea’s neighbors place on a stable transition to a new leadership in North Korea. As a result, U.S.-driven regime change would come at a high cost to U.S. interests and relationships in the region. China prioritizes regional peace and stability over denuclear- ization as a policy objective. The South Korean government has also traditionally been cautious about pursuing externally imposed regime change on the North for fear that the near-term costs of a sudden transition in the North would be more than the South is willing or able to bear. The fears of violence, flows of refugees, spillover, and costs are not unreasonable or unfounded, and the United States should take those concerns into consideration.

A2: Prolif Good

Proliferation would be rapid – nuclear hedging

Mitchell Reiss, fmr director of the Reves Center for International Studies, 2004, “The Nuclear Tipping Point”

Or it may be that countries would not sprint to cross the nuclear finish line but rather hedge their bets by working quietly and methodically to acquire the technology and materials necessary to build nuclear bombs on short notice once a political decision was made. Today, many of the building blocks for a nuclear arsenal—the scientific and engineering expertise, precision machine tools, computer software, and nuclear design information—are more readily available than ever before. And what is unavailable on the open market can be purchased on the black market due to the flourishing illicit trade in nuclear technology and materials between and among rogue (or what used to be termed pariah) states. A hedging strategy would allow a state to gradually increase its nuclear competence and shrink the period of its greatest strategic vulnerability: the time between a decision to acquire nuclear weapons and the actual possession of a usable nuclear arsenal. States that adopt this approach could remain poised on this non-nuclear precipice for months or even years, awaiting a political decision to tip them over the edge.

Proliferation will lead to nuclear use, terrorist acquisition of nuclear weapons, miscalculation and accidental launch

George Shultz, secretary of state from 1982 to 1989, William Perry, secretary of defense from 1994 to 1997,Henry Kissinger, secretary of state from 1973 to 1977, and Sam Nunn, former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, 1-4-2007, “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” Wall Street Journal, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116787515251566636.html

Nuclear weapons today present tremendous dangers, but also an historic opportunity. U.S. leadership will be required to take the world to the next stage -- to a solid consensus for reversing reliance on nuclear weapons globally as a vital contribution to preventing their proliferation into potentially dangerous hands, and ultimately ending them as a threat to the world. Nuclear weapons were essential to maintaining international security during the Cold War because they were a means of deterrence. The end of the Cold War made the doctrine of mutual Soviet-American deterrence obsolete. Deterrence continues to be a relevant consideration for many states with regard to threats from other states. But reliance on nuclear weapons for this purpose is becoming increasingly hazardous and decreasingly effective. North Korea's recent nuclear test and Iran's refusal to stop its program to enrich uranium -- potentially to weapons grade -- highlight the fact that the world is now on the precipice of a new and dangerous nuclear era. Most alarmingly, the likelihood that non-state terrorists will get their hands on nuclear weaponry is increasing. In today's war waged on world order by terrorists, nuclear weapons are the ultimate means of mass devastation. And non-state terrorist groups with nuclear weapons are conceptually outside the bounds of a deterrent strategy and present difficult new security challenges. Apart from the terrorist threat, unless urgent new actions are taken, the U.S. soon will be compelled to enter a new nuclear era that will be more precarious, psychologically disorienting, and economically even more costly than was Cold War deterrence. It is far from certain that we can successfully replicate the old Soviet-American "mutually assured destruction" with an increasing number of potential nuclear enemies world-wide without dramatically increasing the risk that nuclear weapons will be used. New nuclear states do not have the benefit of years of step-by-step safeguards put in effect during the Cold War to prevent nuclear accidents, misjudgments or unauthorized launches. The United States and the Soviet Union learned from mistakes that were less than fatal. Both countries were diligent to ensure that no nuclear weapon was used during the Cold War by design or by accident. Will new nuclear nations and the world be as fortunate in the next 50 years as we were during the Cold War?

A2: Prolif Good

New nuclear states lead to instability

Michael Horowtiz, Dept of Political Science @ UPenn, 2-10-2009, “The Spread of nuclear Weapons and International Conflict: Does Experience Matter?” Journal of Conflict Resolution, SAGE

The hypotheses above are compared to a null hypothesis predicting no effect between time and behavior. Given the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable, the most appropriate statistical model is logistic regression.18 These tests include Huber-White robust standard errors and control for the possibility of fixed time effects with peace-year splines (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998).19 Table 1 presents initial statistical representations of the relationship between MID reciprocation and the possession of nuclear weapons, building from a simple model without any control variables to larger models including relevant controls. The results show a clear and consistent statistically significant impact to learning over time with nuclear weapons. The control variables behave in the predicted directions. As Schultz finds, reciprocation is less likely when a challenger is democratic. Interestingly, as the relative power of Side A in a dispute increases, reciprocation appears more likely. This suggests that the general relationship between power and dispute reciprocation is not necessarily linear. Neither the dyadic-satisfaction variable nor the joint-nuclearpossession variable, measuring whether both sides have nuclear weapons, is significant. 20 In general, the significance of the Side B nuclear-weapons variable suggests there is something inherent about nuclear capabilities that influences militarized behavior, although the nuclear variable for Side A is not significant. However, the results show that nuclear experience matters as well. The Side A nuclear-experience variable is –0.024 and significant at the .05 level. Given the caveats above about the indirect nature of these tests, the nuclear-learning argument seems clearest in explaining the results for challengers. The negative and significant coefficient for Side A shows that the challenges of older nuclear states are reciprocated significantly less than the challenges of younger nuclear and nonnuclear states.

\*\*\*reciprocation means acceding to demands

Nuclear weapons encourage conventional war

Robert Rauchhaus, Assistant Professor of Political Science @ University of California Santa Barbra, 2009, “Evaluating the Nuclear Peace Hypothesis: A Quantitative Approach,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Sage

The results of the general estimating equation are presented in Table 1. Let us first turn our attention to the effects of nuclear weapons. As the results clearly indicate, nuclear weapons have statistically significant effects on the chance of conflict. This is true for both symmetric nuclear dyads in which both states possess nuclear weapons as well as for asymmetric dyads in which only one of the states possesses nuclear weapons. The results are also substantively significant. For a more detailed substantive interpretation of the data, all of the coefficients can be converted into odds ratios. For our purposes here, it is worth noting the sign of coefficients and the relative impact of the variables. Substantively, all of the coefficients for asymmetric nukes and symmetric nukes are positive except for one. When two states have nuclear weapons, the negative coefficient indicates that they are less likely to go to war with one another. This coefficient has the strongest substantive effect of all the measures of nuclear deterrence, and the statistical significance is at the p < .001 level. In all other instances but this one, the coefficients are positive, which indicates that states with nuclear weapons are more likely to engage in militarized disputes (crises), to use force, and to be involved in uses of force that result in fatalities. This is true for situations of nuclear symmetry as well as asymmetry, although the effect is more pronounced when both states possess nuclear weapons.

Flexible Forces 1ac – Power Projection Scenario

Ground forces are overstretched – naval and airpower alone solve for East Asian stability without tying up U.S. forces for other important missions

Mike Mount, CNN Senior Pentagon Producer, 5-21-2010, http://www.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/05/20/korea.sunken.ship.us/index.html

The U.S. Army is stretched thin in two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, but Gates said there are other options in the case of armed conflict on the Korean peninsula. "We have said for a long time that if there were a problem in Korea our main arms would be the Navy and the Air Force, and those are not stretched in the same way that the ground forces are," he said.

Keeping U.S. ground forces in Korea prevents quick redeployment readiness

Jonathan Pollack, professor of Asian and Pacific studies and chairman of the Strategic Research Department at Naval War College, and Mitchell Reiss, former Director of the Reves Center for International Studies, 2004, “The Nuclear Tipping Point,” P. 268

Third, and most important, U.S. planners believe that American forces may be needed much more elsewhere, especially given the expectation of open-ended demands on U.S. forces deployed to Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere in the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia. In this view, American forces must become much more flexible and agile, able to redeploy on very short notice to distant theaters. Under prevailing circumstances, the Second Infantry Division remains a fixed asset, committed exclusively to deterrence and defense on the peninsula. The redeployment and reconfiguration of U.S. forces would enable their transformation into far more mobile combat units geared to a much wider array of prospective contingencies, not simply to peninsular missions. The United States therefore envisions a much less singular U.S. security role in Korea and (very likely) appreciable reductions in the American military presence on the peninsula over the coming decade. Although a reduced U.S. footprint will also reduce public resentment in the ROK of a highly visible U.S. security presence, ROK security planners express growing unease, since they fear that they will be left exposed and ill prepared to deal with future military threats. They also fear that a major withdrawal of U.S. forces will leave South Korea surrounded by more powerful neighboring states.

Withdraw allows global deployment flexibility

Hwang Doo-hyong, Yonhap News, 12-14-2009, “U.S. troops to redeploy abroad in future to meet security challenges: command,” http://nobasestorieskorea.blogspot.com/2009/12/text-fwd-us-troops-to-redeploy-abroad.html

The United States said Monday it will deploy some of its troops in Korea to other conflict regions in the future to meet growing security challenges both regionally and globally. "We also need to have our forces in Korea in the future to be able to more regionally engaged and globally deployed," Gen. Walter Sharp, commander of U.S. forces in Korea, told a forum at the Center for Strategic and International Studies here. "Regionally engaged and globally deployed, but never forgetting that our No. 1 responsibility in Korea is to defend the Republic of Korea if we did go to war." Sharp's remarks are in line with those of Adm. Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who said earlier this month that the Obama administration will follow up on the strategic flexibility posture drawn up by the Bush administration for rapid deployment of U.S. troops abroad to conflict regions. "The idea of strategic flexibility is one we are addressing with the South Korean leadership," Mullen said. "We think it is very important, part of a strategic concept for security both for the region and globally."

Flexible Forces 1ac – Power Projection Scenario

This flexibility is key to U.S. global power projection and deters the most likely sources of conflict in 21st century

Jeremy Shapiro, Research Director @ the Brookings Institution, 2002, “United States Air and Space Power in the 21st Century”, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph\_reports/MR1314/MR131 4.pdf)

Buchan presents many conceivable solutions to this dilemma, from eliminating nuclear weapons altogether to incorporating them fully into U.S. warfighting doctrine. Each solution has its individual advantages and disadvantages, but all require the U.S. national military strategy to have the courage of its convictions: If the U.S. military wishes to retain such weapons over the long term, it must make a plausible case that these weapons serve a purpose that justifies the moral indignation they arouse and must ensure that the weapons are well maintained and deployed consistently with their purpose. The clearest role for U.S. nuclear forces is to continue to provide a deterrent force but against a wider variety of threats than during the Cold War. This implies maintaining survivable forces and command and control, a force of almost any reasonable size, and an adequate mix of forces to hedge against technical or operational failures. It also implies de-emphasizing rigid targeting plans aimed at specific adversaries and building flexibility into the force. The second area of stability is access to bases. As David Shlapak’s short history of access issues in Chapter Nine demonstrates, the ability to base assets abroad and to secure overflight rights has always been a critical element of U.S. power projection. Even in the Cold War, with a known adversary and reliable allies on its periphery, basing issues became a critical enabler of USAF actions. This reality reflected the fact that the Cold War was ultimately a global struggle that required the United States to exert influence in a variety of far flung regions. In that struggle, the capacity to project and sustain military power over great distances formed the glue that bound the U.S. alliance structure and therefore became a critical element of U.S. influence in the world. One lesson of that conflict was that a single adversary could capitalize on an increasingly small world to convert an argument over Europe into a global struggle with many fronts. In the future, as information and communication technologies render that world even smaller, a variety of adversaries will effectively perform the same task but in even less-predictable ways. Thus, the capacity to project and sustain military power, and therefore the issue of access, will become still more central to U.S. military power. Indeed, as Shlapak demonstrates, the types of contingencies that are likely to crop up in the next decade or two will most likely occur in areas where the United States faces significant basing uncertainties, particularly the Middle East and East Asia. At the same time, the proliferation of missile and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) technologies has rendered many existing close-in USAF bases less secure. Despite the achievement of staging bombing raids on Yugoslavia from the continental United States during Operation Allied Force in 1999, current technology will not allow the United States to respond to this problem by relying exclusively, or even mainly, on extended range operations from U.S. territory. Rather, the United States needs a diversified portfolio of strategies and relationships that mirrors and expands on its Cold War experience in worldwide struggle. This portfolio would include not only maintaining the current main operating bases overseas but also planning for uncertainty in access by means of flexible deployment and employment plans.

Flexible Forces 1ac – Power Projection Scenario

Collapse of U.S. power projection causes great power transition wars, destroys democratic peace, and causes economic collapse - multipolarity can’t provide for stability or solve a plethora of global problems.

Bradley Thayer, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota, December, 2006, "In Defense of Primacy,” The National Interest, Lexis.

Retrenchment proponents seem to think that the current system can be maintained without the current amount of U.S. power behind it. In that they are dead wrong and need to be reminded of one of history's most significant lessons: Appalling things happen when international orders collapse. The Dark Ages followed Rome's collapse. Hitler succeeded the order established at Versailles. Without U.S. power, the liberal order created by the United States will end just as assuredly. As country and western great Ral Donner sang: "You don't know what you've got (until you lose it)." Consequently, it is important to note what those good things are. In addition to ensuring the security of the United States and its allies, American primacy within the international system causes many positive outcomes for Washington and the world. The first has been a more peaceful world. During the Cold War, U.S. leadership reduced friction among many states that were historical antagonists , most notably France and West Germany. Today, American primacy helps keep a number of complicated relationships aligned --between Greece and Turkey, Israel and Egypt, South Korea and Japan, India and Pakistan, Indonesia and Australia. This is not to say it fulfills Woodrow Wilson's vision of ending all war. Wars still occur where Washington's interests are not seriously threatened, such as in Darfur, but a Pax Americana does reduce war's likelihood, particularly war's worst form: great power wars. Second, American power gives the United States the ability to spread democracy and other elements of its ideology of liberalism. Doing so is a source of much good for the countries concerned as well as the United States because, as John Owen noted on these pages in the Spring 2006 issue, liberal democracies are more likely to align with the United States and be sympathetic to the American worldview.3 So, spreading democracy helps maintain U.S. primacy. In addition, once states are governed democratically, the likelihood of any type of conflict is significantly reduced. This is not because democracies do not have clashing interests. Indeed they do. Rather, it is because they are more open, more transparent and more likely to want to resolve things amicably in concurrence with U.S. leadership. And so, in general, democratic states are good for their citizens as well as for advancing the interests of the United States. Critics have faulted the Bush Administration for attempting to spread democracy in the Middle East, labeling such an effort a modern form of tilting at windmills. It is the obligation of Bush's critics to explain why democracy is good enough for Western states but not for the rest, and, one gathers from the argument, should not even be attempted. Of course, whether democracy in the Middle East will have a peaceful or stabilizing influence on America's interests in the short run is open to question. Perhaps democratic Arab states would be more opposed to Israel, but nonetheless, their people would be better off. The United States has brought democracy to Afghanistan, where 8.5 million Afghans, 40 percent of them women, voted in a critical October 2004 election, even though remnant Taliban forces threatened them. The first free elections were held in Iraq in January 2005. It was the military power of the United States that put Iraq on the path to democracy. Washington fostered democratic governments in Europe, Latin America, Asia and the Caucasus. Now even the Middle East is increasingly democratic. They may not yet look like Western-style democracies, but democratic progress has been made in Algeria, Morocco, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, the Palestinian Authority and Egypt. By all accounts, the march of democracy has been impressive. Third, along with the growth in the number of democratic states around the world has been the growth of the global economy. With its allies, the United States has labored to create an economically liberal worldwide network characterized by free trade and commerce, respect for international property rights, and mobility of capital and labor markets. The economic stability and prosperity that stems from this economic order is a global public good from which all states benefit, particularly the poorest states in the Third World. The United States created this network not out of altruism but for the benefit and the economic well-being of America. This economic order forces American industries to be competitive, maximizes efficiencies and growth, and benefits defense as well because the size of the economy makes the defense burden manageable. Economic spin-offs foster the development of military technology, helping to ensure military prowess. Perhaps the greatest testament to the benefits of the economic network comes from Deepak Lal, a former Indian foreign service diplomat and researcher at the World Bank, who started his career confident in the socialist ideology of post-independence India. Abandoning the positions of his youth, Lal now recognizes that the only way to bring relief to desperately poor countries of the Third World is through the adoption of free market economic policies and globalization, which are facilitated through American primacy.4 As a witness to the failed alternative economic systems, Lal is one of the strongest academic proponents of American primacy due to the economic prosperity it provides. Fourth and finally, the United States, in seeking primacy, has been willing to use its power not only to advance its interests but to promote the welfare of people all over the globe. The United States is the earth's leading source of positive externalities for the world. The U.S. military has participated in over fifty operations since the end of the Cold War--and most of those missions have been humanitarian in nature. Indeed, the U.S. military is the earth's "911 force"--it serves, de facto, as the world's police, the global paramedic and the planet's fire department. Whenever there is a natural disaster, earthquake, flood, drought, volcanic eruption, typhoon or tsunami, the United States assists the countries in need. On the day after Christmas in 2004, a tremendous earthquake and tsunami occurred in the Indian Ocean near Sumatra, killing some 300,000 people. The United States was the first to respond with aid. Washington followed up with a large contribution of aid and deployed the U.S. military to South and Southeast Asia for many months to help with the aftermath of the disaster. About 20,000 U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines responded by providing water, food, medical aid, disease treatment and prevention as well as forensic assistance to help identify the bodies of those killed. Only the U.S. military could have accomplished this Herculean effort. No other force possesses the communications capabilities or global logistical reach of the U.S. military. In fact, UN peacekeeping operations depend on the United States to supply UN forces. American generosity has done more to help the United States fight the War on Terror than almost any other measure. Before the tsunami, 80 percent of Indonesian public opinion was opposed to the United States; after it, 80 percent had a favorable opinion of America. Two years after the disaster, and in poll after poll, Indonesians still have overwhelmingly positive views of the United States. In October 2005, an enormous earthquake struck Kashmir, killing about 74,000 people and leaving three million homeless. The U.S. military responded immediately, diverting helicopters fighting the War on Terror in nearby Afghanistan to bring relief as soon as possible. To help those in need, the United States also provided financial aid to Pakistan; and, as one might expect from those witnessing the munificence of the United States, it left a lasting impression about America. For the first time since 9/11, polls of Pakistani opinion have found that more people are favorable toward the United States than unfavorable, while support for Al-Qaeda dropped to its lowest level. Whether in Indonesia or Kashmir, the money was well-spent because it helped people in the wake of disasters, but it also had a real impact on the War on Terror. When people in the Muslim world witness the U.S. military conducting a humanitarian mission, there is a clearly positive impact on Muslim opinion of the United States. As the War on Terror is a war of ideas and opinion as much as military action, for the United States humanitarian missions are the equivalent of a blitzkrieg. THERE IS no other state, group of states or international organization that can provide these global benefits. None even comes close. The United Nations cannot because it is riven with conflicts and major cleavages that divide the international body time and again on matters great and trivial. Thus it lacks the ability to speak with one voice on salient issues and to act as a unified force once a decision is reached. The EU has similar problems. Does anyone expect Russia or China to take up these responsibilities? They may have the desire, but they do not have the capabilities. Let's face it: for the time being, American primacy remains humanity's only practical hope of solving the world's ills.

Flexible Forces 1ac – Leadership Scenario

U.S. containment strategy creates the perception of U.S. acquiescence to North Korean prolif

Scott A. Snyder, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Korea Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, June 2010, “U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula,” http://www.cfr.org/publication/22205/us\_policy\_toward\_the\_korean\_peninsula.html

The Task Force finds that though containment is essential to U.S. counterproliferation objectives, such a strategy by itself is insufficient. It risks the likelihood that, over time, the overall security situation will deteriorate as North Korea continues to secretly make progress in its missile development and nascent nuclear capability. The manage and contain approach may also lead to the perception that the United States is interested only in counterproliferation, leading eventually to acquiescence rather than denuclearization, regardless of administration assertions to the contrary. The Task Force considers that manage and contain, as evidenced by the current approach, may be a useful interim strategy, but does not resolve the larger problem and must ultimately be coupled with continued efforts to denuclearize. Implementation of this option is necessary, but not enough to achieve denuclearization, which remains an important U.S. objective.

That makes collapse of regional security alliances inevitable and erodes US global leadership

Scott A. Snyder, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Korea Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, June 2010, “U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula,” http://www.cfr.org/publication/22205/us\_policy\_toward\_the\_korean\_peninsula.html

Despite the strong words, the Obama administration’s actions to date suggest that the objective of rollback of North Korea’s nuclear program is halfhearted. The time frame for achieving denuclearization is so vague that there is a significant risk that “strategic patience” will result in acquiescence to North Korea’s nuclear status as a fait accompli. Responsibility within the administration for implementation of policy toward North Korea has been divided under several envoys into different baskets—negotiations, sanctions implementation, and human rights— with no clear evidence that these discrete missions are backed by a sense of urgency or priority at senior levels in the administration. The Task Force finds that the Obama administration’s current approach does not go far enough in developing a strategy to counter North Korea’s con- tinuing nuclear development or potential for proliferation. U.S. Policy Options Although the facts of North Korea’s progress in pursuing nuclear weapons are undeniable, how neighboring states and the United States respond to North Korea’s nuclear ambitions will have significant regional and global political and security consequences. By testing two nuclear devices, the DPRK has challenged the United States and the region to accept its nuclear status. Ironically, although intended as a declaration of strength, North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests also show its weakness, vulnerability, and desperation, underscoring its political isolation, failing economy, lagging conventional military capa- bilities, and keen desire for international acceptance and recognition. It is this reality that may allow a coordinated response to succeed. The Task Force debated four policy options for the United States and its partners: (1) explicit acquiescence, (2) containment and management, (3) rollback, and (4) regime change. The Task Force concedes that U.S. policy is constrained and that the United States has limited ability to effect change on its own. Given the reality of a bad situation with few good choices, the Task Force considered the pros and cons of each option and its likelihood of adoption and success. The Task Force ultimately rejects options 1 and 4, acknowledges the interim benefits of option 2, and endorses option 3—denuclearization. oPtion 1—ACquieSCenCe The first option is that the Obama administration could conclude that there are no viable options for achieving North Korea’s denucleariza- tion, thus conceding failure and acquiescing to its nuclear status. In this case, the administration might accept the idea put forward by the North Korean leadership that an improved diplomatic relationship should be delinked from the denuclearization decision by focusing on reducing tensions and improving relations with North Korea regardless of its nuclear status. Such an approach would immediately ease the crisis in relations with North Korea and open a much broader array of diplo- matic and political options for bilateral engagement. Explicit acquiescence, however, would threaten the sustainability of existing U.S. alliances in Asia. Japan and South Korea would consider U.S. acquiescence as undermining Washington’s ability to provide for their security, regardless of U.S. security commitments of extended deterrence and provision of a nuclear umbrella as protection. Explicit acceptance of a nuclear North Korea might also catalyze consideration of a wider range of military options in South Korea and Japan, including the acquisition of preemptive strike capabilities and nuclear weapons in an attempt to restore a regional balance in capabilities, thus setting off a regional arms race. Moreover, the people of Japan and South Korea would not accept a nuclear North Korea, and U.S. political opposition would likely make political hay out of the issue, accusing the Obama administration of appeasement. Acquiescence would be an embarrassing admission of defeat and would weaken perceptions of U.S. power around the world. Such capitulation would make negotiations with Iran and other nuclear hopefuls more difficult, if not impossible.

Flexible Forces 1ac – Leadership Scenario

U.S. leadership solves nuclear war

Zalmay Khalilzad, Former Assist Prof of Poli Sci at Columbia, Spring, 1995, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 2; P. 84.

Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.

Flexible Forces 1ac – Terrorism Scenario

The plan frees up U.S. troops for quick deployment abroad

Thomas H. Henriksen, Senior Fellow @ the Hoover Institute, 2003, “Time to Leave South Korea,” http://www.hoover.org/publications/hoover-digest/article/7977

South Korea’s 600,000 troops ought to assume the primary role in defending their own country, relieving U.S. troops for security operations in liberated Iraq or for swift-response roles in the campaign against terror, for example. American forces are stretched thin around the globe in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Japan, Germany, and now the Philippines and Kyrgyzstan. A rebalancing of American power should have taken place after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when the world enjoyed a brief respite from major threats. The current volatile international environment is no excuse not to undertake such a review now—for it is actually during times of war, hot or cold, that conditions compel change. Halcyon eras, like the 1990s, breed complacency. The U.S. military and geopolitical framework underwent profound changes in World War II and again with the onset of the Cold War. The war on terror necessitates carefully executed adjustments but so, too, does a world vastly altered by the end of the Soviet confrontation. North Korea is no longer Moscow’s proxy.

That’s key to success in the War on Terror

John P. Cummings, Colonel in the United States Army, 5-3-2004, “Should the U.S. Continue to Maintain Forces in South Korea?,” http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA423298&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)

In the foreseeable future the United States will continue to view the stability and security of the Korean Peninsula as a vital national security interest and integral to sustaining global commerce. Withdrawal of United States ground forces from South Korea will not degrade the military readiness of the alliance defense. On the contrary, it will eliminate one of the major sources of growing anti-Americanism among the South Korean population. Moreover, United States can utilize ground forces that are re-deployed from the peninsula in the Global War on terrorism, and save the associated costs of forward based troops. For South Korea, with strong United States support, to take the lead in the defense of their nation is an idea whose time has come. In conclusion, withdrawal of U.S. ground forces from South Korea would be a win-win alternative. We gain economic and military resources while maintaining our objectives in northeast Asia and garnering positive public opinion, and South Koreans step out of our shadow and join the first rank of nations as a fully functioning democratic nation in charge of its own national defense.

Unchecked terrorism will result in extinction

Yonah Alexander, professor and director of the Inter-University for Terrorism Studies in Israel and the United States. “Terrorism myths and realities,” The Washington Times, August 28, 2003

Unlike their historical counterparts, contemporary terrorists have introduced a new scale of violence in terms of conventional and unconventional threats and impact. The internationalization and brutalization of current and future terrorism make it clear we have entered an Age of Super Terrorism [e.g. biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear and cyber] with its serious implications concerning national, regional and global security concerns. Two myths in particular must be debunked immediately if an effective counterterrorism "best practices" strategy can be developed [e.g., strengthening international cooperation]. The first illusion is that terrorism can be greatly reduced, if not eliminated completely, provided the root causes of conflicts - political, social and economic - are addressed. The conventional illusion is that terrorism must be justified by oppressed people seeking to achieve their goals and consequently the argument advanced by "freedom fighters" anywhere, "give me liberty and I will give you death," should be tolerated if not glorified. This traditional rationalization of "sacred" violence often conceals that the real purpose of terrorist groups is to gain political power through the barrel of the gun, in violation of fundamental human rights of the noncombatant segment of societies. For instance, Palestinians religious movements [e.g., Hamas, Islamic Jihad] and secular entities [such as Fatah's Tanzim and Aqsa Martyr Brigades]] wish not only to resolve national grievances [such as Jewish settlements, right of return, Jerusalem] but primarily to destroy the Jewish state. Similarly, Osama bin Laden's international network not only opposes the presence of American military in the Arabian Peninsula and Iraq, but its stated objective is to "unite all Muslims and establish a government that follows the rule of the Caliphs." The second myth is that strong action against terrorist infrastructure [leaders, recruitment, funding, propaganda, training, weapons, operational command and control] will only increase terrorism. The argument here is that law-enforcement efforts and military retaliation inevitably will fuel more brutal acts of violent revenge. Clearly, if this perception continues to prevail, particularly in democratic societies, there is the danger it will paralyze governments and thereby encourage further terrorist attacks. In sum, past experience provides useful lessons for a realistic future strategy. The prudent application of force has been demonstrated to be an effective tool for short- and long-term deterrence of terrorism. For example, Israel's targeted killing of Mohammed Sider, the Hebron commander of the Islamic Jihad, defused a "ticking bomb." The assassination of Ismail Abu Shanab - a top Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip who was directly responsible for several suicide bombings including the latest bus attack in Jerusalem - disrupted potential terrorist operations. Similarly, the U.S. military operation in Iraq eliminated Saddam Hussein's regime as a state sponsor of terror. Thus, it behooves those countries victimized by terrorism to understand a cardinal message communicated by Winston Churchill to the House of Commons on May 13, 1940: "Victory at all costs, victory in spite of terror, victory however long and hard the road may be: For without victory, there is no survival."

Flexible Forces 1ac – Terrorism Scenario

The plan frees up troops to prevent nuclear terrorism against the U.S.

Martin Sieff, UPI, 9-15-2003, “Analysis: U.S. confronts Army overstretch,” ln

Other force deployment conundrums abound in Northeast Asia. Some 31,500 U.S. troops remain deployed at the moment in South Korea. That is a larger number than are deployed across the entire United States for domestic security at a time when concerns about possible future mega-terrorist attacks, including with weapons of mass destruction, are greater than ever. The total number of regular Army troops deployed at home for domestic security is 28,600, almost 3,000 less than those still tied up in South Korea.

That prevents global nuclear war

Patrick **Speice**, Jr. J.D. Candidate 2006, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary, February 20**06**, William & Mary Law Review

The potential consequences of the unchecked spread of nuclear knowledge and material to terrorist groups that seek to cause mass destruction in the United States are truly horrifying. A terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon would be devastating in terms of immediate human and economic losses. [49](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=0a3109dbc60902f6e2cf6f2a66ae4c5d&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVlz-zSkAA&_md5=b7478009938b75f75e8896ccf2d3f78c#n49) Moreover, there would be immense political pressure in the United States to discover the perpetrators and retaliate with nuclear weapons, massively increasing the number of casualties and potentially triggering a full-scale nuclear conflict. In addition to the threat posed by terrorists, leakage of nuclear knowledge and material from Russia will reduce the barriers that states with nuclear ambitions face and may trigger widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons. [51](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=0a3109dbc60902f6e2cf6f2a66ae4c5d&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVlz-zSkAA&_md5=b7478009938b75f75e8896ccf2d3f78c#n51) This proliferation will increase the risk of nuclear attacks against the United States [\*1440] or its allies by hostile states, [52](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=0a3109dbc60902f6e2cf6f2a66ae4c5d&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVlz-zSkAA&_md5=b7478009938b75f75e8896ccf2d3f78c#n52) as well as increase the likelihood that regional conflicts will draw in the United States and escalate to the use of nuclear weapons.

Ext – Withdrawal Solves Terrorism

Withdrawal frees up troops for the war on terrorism

John P. Cummings, Colonel in the United States Army, 5-3-2004, “Should the U.S. Continue to Maintain Forces in South Korea?,” http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA423298&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)

Neither Richard Halloran’s diplomatic options nor the blatantly militant pre-emption options should be entertained. There is a more viable option: a unilateral withdraw of United States ground forces from South Korea. The current administration’s commitment to the global war on terrorism, with subsequent military deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq, has caused considerable strain on the United States Military’s finite resources. Service components, scrambling to meet the increased operational tempo of the current environment, have yet to realize the implications on retention and sustaining a quality force. Withdrawal of forces from South Korea would enable the United States to realize an infrastructure cost savings while continuing to meet the guidance in the National Security Strategy and regional policy objectives that are inherent in forward basing of troops. It will also make available more forces for the administration’s global war on terrorism. Additionally, the removal of American forces from South Korea would alleviate political unrest associated with the increasing anti-American sentiment among South Koreans.

More evidence

John P. Cummings, Colonel in the United States Army, 5-3-2004, “Should the U.S. Continue to Maintain Forces in South Korea?,” http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA423298&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)

Considering the capability of the ROK Military and the recent disparate demands on the United States military, the time is ripe to withdraw ground forces from South Korea. This course of action will enable the military to apply more resources toward the global war on terrorism. Furthermore, there will be inherent cost savings by withdrawing ground forces from South Korea. The American force structure currently in Korea could be deployed elsewhere (Afghanistan, Iraq, or Bosnia). Withdrawal of forces would eliminate the infrastructure cost of maintaining hundreds of individual camps required to forward base U.S. ground forces. Furthermore, the removal of U.S. ground forces would halt the progress of anti-American sentiment among the South Korean population.

A2: Heg Causes Terrorism

Terrorism inevitable under multipolarity – only heg has a chance of preventing attacks.

Stephen Brooks, Assistant Professor, AND William Wohlforth, Associate Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth. Foreign Affairs, July / August 2002. “American Primacy in Perspective.”

Some might question the worth of being at the top of a unipolar system if that means serving as a lightning rod for the world's malcontents. When there was a Soviet Union, after all, it bore the brunt of Osama bin Laden's anger, and only after its collapse did he shift his focus to the United States (an indicator of the demise of bipolarity that was ignored at the time but looms larger in retrospect). But terrorism has been a perennial problem in history, and multipolarity did not save the leaders of several great powers from assassination by anarchists around the turn of the twentieth century. In fact, a slide back toward multipolarity would actually be the worst of all worlds for the United States. In such a scenario it would continue to lead the pack and serve as a focal point for resentment and hatred by both state and nonstate actors, but it would have fewer carrots and sticks to use in dealing with the situation. The threats would remain, but the possibility of effective and coordinated action against them would be reduced.

Resentment inevitable – heg is the only effective preventative against terrorism.

Andrew Sullivan, Sunday Times, February 10, 2002. “A lesson for America-haters.”

So the resentment of American power - even among close allies such as Britain - is not only likely, it's inevitable. And because there isn't even a close rival emerging to challenge this dominance, the resentment will only increase. We've seen what this amounts to in the form of the failed satrapies of the Islamic Middle East: a mixture of begging bowls for American aid and murderous terrorism in resentment of it. In China it is greeted with deep suspicion and a ferocious new nationalism - but there is still no sign of an actual, substantive Chinese military able to compete for global dominance with America. In Europe there is the cult of the EU among the elites, and the euro for the masses. But every European country understands that world power is something in the history books, not feasible, if even desirable, today. The more interesting question is: what should the United States do about resentment of its hegemony? Sure, it can and should consult its allies more widely. But when those allies (with the exception of Britain) have very little substantive to contribute in, say, waging the war in Afghanistan, those consultations can end up being exercises in condescension or phoniness. Sure, America can and should take a more active role in many international institutions. But it cannot be expected to provide the bulk of the funding for bodies (like the UN) whose main task seems at times to be attacking the United States and its allies. Nor should a great power be expected consistently to subordinate its own interests to those of other states, especially when its actions actually protect those other states from harm. If Europeans resent America's power, they need to ask themselves: would they like to confront global terrorism without it? Imagine Al-Qaeda intact today, entering into close contact with Iraq or Iran to get nuclear, biological or chemical weapons to detonate in the middle of London. Feel better about American hegemony now? Then of course when it appears that the United States might actually take its allies' advice and retreat into ambivalence, there is a chorus of disapproval and widespread fears of a new "isolationism". America, when you look at it, is damned if she does, and damned if she doesn't. Which is why Americans, at some point, just get on with it and ignore the chorus of whining from around the world. That's the underlying reality and we might as well acknowledge it. That's why the IOC gave in to American demands that its WTC flag be a part of the opening ceremony in Salt Lake City. That's why, in the end, the United States will eventually ignore allies who refuse to co-operate in the war against terrorism and terrorist states. Real power always finds a way. And the only corrective to American dominance is not an attempt to weaken America or poison the world by fomenting hatred of her. At the moment, when America is the firmest bulwark against a terrorist network that aims to destroy every free country, that would be a particularly foolish venture.

A2: Multipolarity Solves

Multipolarity causes great power conflict, regional arms races, economic collapse, resource conflict, and global warming.

Christopher Layne, prof at Texas A&M, Summer, 2009, “The Waning of U.S. Hegemony,” International Security, Lexis.

What will multipolarity mean? The NIC's answer is equivocal. Although it predicts that, along with Europe, new great powers will oppose a continuation of a U.S.-dominated unipolar system, Global Trends 2025 does not anticipate that the emerging great powers will seek to radically alter the international system as Germany and Japan did in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (p. 84). 20 Still, there are factors that could lead to a more fraught international environment, including: the declining credibility of U.S. extended deterrence security guarantees, which could fuel new regional arms races (p. 97); competition for control of natural resources--especially energy--which could drive great power competitions (pp. 63-66) 21; and fallout from the financial and economic crisis, which could cause the international economic system to become more mercantilist (pp. 93-94). Finally, in a multipolar world, established international institutions may not be able to deal with the challenges posed by economic and financial turmoil, energy scarcity, and global climate change. In such a world, a nonhegemonic United States will lack the capability to revitalize them (p. 81). Although no one can be certain how events will unfold in coming decades, Global Trends 2025 makes a strong argument that a multipolar world will be fundamentally different than the post-Cold War era of U.S. preeminence.

Warming causes extinction. [Gender Paraphrased]

Bill Henderson, Environmental Scientist. 8-16-2006. Counter Currents, “Runaway Global Warming Denial.” http://www.countercurrents.org/cc-henderson190806.htm

The scientific debate about human induced global warming is over but policy makers - let alone the happily shopping general public - still seem to not understand the scope of the impending tragedy. Global warming isn't just warmer temperatures, heat waves, melting ice and threatened polar bears. Scientific understanding increasingly points to runaway global warming leading to human extinction. If impossibly Draconian security measures are not immediately put in place to keep further emissions of greenhouse gases out of the atmosphere we are looking at the death of billions, the end of civilization as we know it and in all probability the end of [hu]man's several million year old existence, along with the extinction of most flora and fauna beloved to man in the world we share.

Economic collapse causes extinction

Phil Kerpen, National Review Online, October 29, 2008, Don't Turn Panic Into Depression, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/10/29/opinion/main4555821.shtml

It’s important that we avoid all these policy errors - not just for the sake of our prosperity, but for our survival. The Great Depression, after all, didn’t end until the advent of World War II, the most destructive war in the history of the planet. In a world of nuclear and biological weapons and non-state terrorist organizations that breed on poverty and despair, another global economic breakdown of such extended duration would risk armed conflicts on an even greater scale.