# \*\*\*\*HEG FRONTLINE\*\*\*\*

**Weaponization and arms race not inevitable—**

**a. Inherent checks**

**Mueller, 6** (Karl, PhD and Political Scientist @ RAND, “Toward a U.S. Grand Strategy in Space,” March 10th, Washington Roundtable on Science and Public Policy, http://www.marshall.org/article.php?id=408, EMM) Note: These paragraphs are from a section addressing common misconceptions about space. Thus, the opening sentence “Space is already so militarized that weaponizing it won’t be a big deal” is a statement the author is attempting to refute.

2. Space is already so militarized that weaponizing it won’t be a big deal. This is a political matter: it’s consequently true only if people believe it • Like it or not, the norm of space sanctuary is real. The second misconception is that the transition from space not being weaponized to being weaponized may be a gray, indistinct thing. It is not true that it is not going to be a big political deal when it happens, even if we don’t know exactly what form it will take. People with engineering backgrounds in the space weapons community have a tendency, I think, to say, “Space is already so weaponized and so militarized because we use GPS for the guidance of many of our weapons, or because in the 1980s there were anti-satellite systems, or because ICBMs cross space on their way to targets, that we have al-ready crossed the weaponization frontier. Stop talking to me about it.” I would liken them to the people who on December 31, 1999 were running around saying, “We shouldn’t have these big parties tonight! The millennium doesn’t start for another year; it starts in 2001, not 2000.” That may be technically correct, but it is totally irrelevant because this is about what the public believes. The party is tonight and you can go or not, it’s up to you. There is a norm of space sanctuary that exists and that is largely because of the behavior of the United States over the last forty or fifty years. The United States could take steps to convince people that the millennium was actually in 2001 instead of 2000 or convince people that it already had weaponized space or convince people that GPS is a weapons system. However, there are a number of reasons why we haven’t done that to this point and why we might not want to do that in the future. I don’t want to suggest that because everybody thinks it is so means that it is immutably the case, but for the time being, space weaponization would be a big deal. So it is something that needs to be ad-dressed in political terms as well as technological terms.

**b. Terrestrial military analogies are wrong – space is unique and not necessarily destined to be weaponized**

**Mueller, 6** (Karl, PhD and Political Scientist @ RAND, “Toward a U.S. Grand Strategy in Space,” March 10th, Washington Roundtable on Science and Public Policy, http://www.marshall.org/article.php?id=408, EMM)

Another big argument: military use of space is evolving just the way air power and sea power did. The flag-follows-trade argument fits into this. Navies were developed to protect merchants and commerce from predation by pirates. Air power evolved observation platforms in World War I, then fighters and bombers. Therefore we know the same thing is going to happen to space. It ties into the “weaponization is inevitable” argument. The problem is that air power and sea power evolved in very different ways and space power doesn’t match either one of them. There are interesting illustrative parallels; his-tory rhymes even though it doesn’t repeat itself. These historical precedents provide us with some interesting notions about what might happen next, but they definitely don’t tell us what will happen next. Space is different in so many ways from the other places where we have operated before that we are basically starting from a blank sheet of paper.

No impact to space attack - the US only needs 4 to have full GPS capabilities and redundancy means an attack would leave some standing

**Forden, 7** – writer for Arms Control Today (Geoffrey, “After China's Test: Time For a Limited Ban on Anti-Satellite Weapons. Arms Control Today, April 2007, <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_04/Forden>**)**

On the other hand, an attacker would have to destroy a considerable number of satellites in order to have an immediate effect on military operations. There are on average about 10 GPS satellites visible at any given time and point on the Earth's surface even though a high positional accuracy requires only six. An attacker would have to destroy at least six satellites to affect precision-guided munitions even momentarily because other GPS satellites would soon appear as their orbits took them into view. A country would need to disable nearly one-half of the United States' 24 NAVSTAR/GPS satellites currently in orbit to eliminate the ability to employ precision-guided munitions for more than a few hours each day.[[**9**](http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_04/Forden.asp#Note9)] Likewise, the United States has a number of alternatives for communications satellites in the short term. Other space assets, such as weather and mapping satellites, although important in the long term, are not as time critical.

**Even if weaponization is inevitable, there is a substantial advantage to US inaction – letting other countries go first gives us international political cover**

**Coffelt, 5** – Lt. Colonal; thesis to the school of advanced air and space studies (Christopher A, “THE BEST DEFENSE: CHARTING THE FUTURE OFUS SPACE STRATEGY AND POLICY.” A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies For Completion of the Graduation Requirements SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIR AND SPACE STUDIES AIR UNIVERSITY, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. June 2005.)

Sputnik’s launch bestowed the honor and prestige of being first in orbit upon the Soviet Union, but was fortuitous for United States policy makers, as well. Whether or not the soviets beat the United States outright or the United States allowed the soviets to go first is irrelevant. The critical point is the soviets *did* go first. In one stroke, Sputnik solved the complicated, politically charged overflight issue that us policy makers grappled with and could not resolve. This enabled the United States to pursue its space reconnaissance program free from the legal and policy quagmire that accompanied launching first, and avoided appearing as an aggressor. Responding to the soviet capability fueled and legitimized the United States’ spending on its space program, 291 and garnered unprecedented public support. Robust funding complemented by international legitimacy and public support provided the united states space program a significant advantage. If, as some argue, weaponization of space is truly inevitable, **the United States should manage risk, research and develop in secret, allow an adversary to cross the weapons in space threshold first, and reap the sputnik-like rewards of being a close second**. In spite of the apparent advantages this strategy offers, it is likely much easier said than done. Advocating or supporting any second-follower strategy would be an extremely difficult position for an elected official or military officer, considering the US’ clear, longstanding preference for positive action and offensive solutions.

**No motivation or ability for adversaries to challenge us in space - only a risk US weaponization would lead to conflict**

**Hitchens, 3** (Theresa, Director of the Center for Defense Information, “ Monsters and Shadows: Left Unchecked, American Fears Regarding Threats to Space Assets Will Drive Weaponization,” Disarmament Forum No1, Accessed on Spacedebate.com, <http://ctbtdebate.org/evidence/1222/>)

It is obvious that American space systems do have inherent vulnerabilities. It is also obvious that technologies for exploiting those vulnerabilities exist, or are likely to become available over the next several decades. However, neither vulnerabilities in American systems nor the potential capabilities of others necessarily translate into threats. In order to threaten American space assets, a potential adversary must have not only the technological ability to develop weapons and the means to develop and use them, but also the political will and intent to use them in a hostile manner. There is little evidence to date that any other country or hostile non-state actor possesses both the mature technology and the intention to seriously threaten American military or commercial operations in space and even less evidence of serious pursuit of actual space-based weapons by potentially hostile actors. There are severe technical barriers and high costs to overcome for all but the most rudimentary ASAT capabilities, especially for development of on-orbit weapons. It further remains unclear what political drivers outside of American development of space-based weaponry would force American competitors, in the near- to medium-term to seriously pursue such technology. Neither vulnerabilities in American systems nor the potential capabilities of others necessarily translate into threats.

**Heg inevitable – their ev is perennial scaremongering**

**Nye, 10** -- December University Distinguished Service Professor at [Harvard University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harvard_University) and former dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard (December 2010, “THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN POWER: DOMINANCE AND DECLINE IN PERSPECTIVE.” Published by Foreign affairs, <http://1431731ontario.net/Current/Articles/TheFutureOfAmericanPower_DominanceAndDeclineInPerspective.pdf>)

Despite such differences, Americans are prone to cycles of belief in their own decline. The Founding Fathers worried about comparisons to the Roman republic. Charles Dickens observed a century and a half ago, “If its individual citizens, to a man, are to be believed, [the United States] always is depressed, and always is stagnated, and always is at an alarming crisis, and never was otherwise.” In the last half century, belief in American decline rose after the Soviet Union launched Sputnik in 1957, after President Richard Nixon’s economic adjustments and the oil shocks in the 1970s, and after the closing of rust-belt industries and the budget deficits in the Reagan era. Ten years later, Americans believed that the United States was the sole superpower, and now polls show that many believe in decline again.

Pundits lament the inability of Washington to control states such as Afghanistan or Iran, but they allow the golden glow of the past to color their appraisals. The United States’ power is not what it used to be, but it also never really was as great as assumed. After World War II, the United States had nuclear weapons and an overwhelming preponderance of economic power but nonetheless was unable to prevent the “loss” of China, to roll back communism in Eastern Europe, to overcome stalemate in the Korean War, to stop the “loss” of North Vietnam, or to dislodge the Castro regime in Cuba. Power measured in resources rarely equals power measured in preferred outcomes, and cycles of belief in decline reveal more about psychology than they do about real shifts in power resources. Unfortunately, mistaken beliefs in decline — at home and abroad — can lead to dangerous mistakes in policy.

**Turn - developing ASATs undermines primacy – inherent vulnerabilities hamstring US power**

**Hitchens, 02** – vice president of the Center for Defense Information (Theresa, “Future Security in Space: Commercial, Military, and Arms Control Trade-Offs,” Occasional Paper No. 10, ed: Moltz, <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/opapers/op10/op10.pdf>)

One problem is that space weapons, just like satellites, would have inherent vulnerabilities (for example, fixed orbital paths), raising the specter of an ever-spiraling need for better weapons and force protection. Just as it is difficult to protect satellites, it is difficult to protect space weapons. For example, satellites or space weapons traveling in fixed paths in low-Earth orbit (LEO) are virtual sitting ducks for ground-based ASATs or even fighter aircraft equipped with rockets, not to mention space-based ASATs.

The other related negative side effect of the inherent vulnerability of orbiting weapons is the pressure to use them first. The strategic dynamic of space-based weapons could perhaps be compared to that of nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles— offense-dominant weapons with inherent vulnerabilities (fixed sites). This is a recipe for instability, as the United States and Soviet Union soon found in their nuclear competition.

Spurring other nations to acquire space- based weapons, either ASATs or weapons aimed at terrestrial targets, would undercut the ability of U.S. forces to operate freely on the ground on a global basis and thus negate what today is a unique advantage of being the world’s only military superpower.3 Along with military assets in space, U.S. commercial satellites would also become targets (especially because the U.S. military is heavily reliant on commercial providers, particularly in communications). In other words, the United States could be in the position of creating strategic and military problems for itself, rather than solving them.

**Weaponization won’t solve heg or deterrence – our conventional superiority means that the calculus is already set**

**Krepon, 3** – president of the Stimson Center (Michael, with Christopher Clary, “Space Assurance or Space Dominance?.” The Henry L. Stimson Center, http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/spacebook.pdf)

These presumed benefits have already been demonstrated by U.S. power projection capabilities featuring conventional munitions of increasing range and lethality. Further advances can be expected, so advocates of U.S. space warfare capabilities have the added burden of explaining why these terrestrial advances are insufficient to support a dominant U.S. military capability, and what added value would accrue from even greater increases in lethality, promptness, and reach from space. Moreover, further improvements in the range, promptness, and lethality of terrestrial weapons are likely to come far sooner, and at a fraction of the diplomatic, political, and financial cost, than the advent of “space strike” capabilities.

Are space weapons needed to destroy hardened, underground bunkers? Existing or improved conventional weapons can serve to deny access to such facilities, thereby rendering the weapons inside unusable. The nullification of such threats could thereby be accomplished at a small fraction of the multiple costs associated with flight-testing and deploying space warfare capabilities. For the same reasons, the rationale for “improved” nuclear weapons designed for this purpose is deeply suspect.

The presumed additional deterrent value of U.S. space weapons is also questionable. **If existing U.S.** conventional military and nuclear **superiority prove insufficient to deter, it is doubtful that the addition of space warfare capabilities would make an appreciable difference in an adversary’s calculus of decision**. The search to strengthen or supplant nuclear deterrence by means of space warfare capabilities will therefore appear to many as a quest to escape from, rather than “enhance,” deterrence. When viewed though this lens, the pursuit of space weapons appears designed less for strengthening deterrence and more for negating the deterrents of potential adversaries.

To the extent that this perception holds, the flight-testing and deployment of space weapons is unlikely to raise the nuclear threshold, as proponents claim. To the contrary, the use of conventionally armed "space-strike" weapons could prompt **unwanted escalation by threatening the nuclear forces of a weaker foe**. In this event, the United States will receive little or no applause of the choice of weaponry used in preemptive strikes.

**Weaponization won’t deter global conflict—their argument that the US would be seen as benign is nonsense**

**Coffelt, 5** – Lt. Colonal; thesis to the school of advanced air and space studies (Christopher A, “THE BEST DEFENSE: CHARTING THE FUTURE OFUS SPACE STRATEGY AND POLICY.” A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies For Completion of the Graduation Requirements SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIR AND SPACE STUDIES AIR UNIVERSITY, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. June 2005.)

Second, the argument goes further, asserting that being in such a position enables the US to provide protection from ballistic missile launches, air raids, and even land invasions by aggressor nations against their neighbors. It envisions that this may even allow the US to put an end, once and for all, to interstate conflict.287 ABM discussions in the MIRV and SDI case studies reveal the weaknesses in this argument. Assuming one could deploy a perfect, impenetrable defensive shield that also had the capability to affect other targets in space, in the air, on land, or at sea, **there is no evidence that such a capability would have any ability to prevent cross border incursions or conflicts**. The monopoly on nuclear weapons did not prevent such acts, therefore, why would the US assume that orbiting space weaponry would? Analyses of these cases indicate that deployment of an impenetrable defense is also highly unlikely. Even if the US could de deploy a system that was 99.9999% reliable, these machines still will have some associated, finite mean time between failures. Essentially, the question becomes “when” not “if.” The US would certainly not find itself in a tenable position if it had publicly stated it would shoot down all ballistic missile launches only to experience a system failure or simply miss when country a fired a missile on country b. World opinion would be more apt to believe the US allowed the impact of country a’s missile on country b’s sovereign territory vice the truth that the system simply malfunctioned. The US would immediately be viewed as having taken a side in the conflict and would be subject to the accompanying strategic implications of that perceived support or non-support. Therefore, there is no evidence to support a conclusion or belief that an offensive space strategy enabled by orbital weapons would be welcomed by the rest of the international community who would accept the US as the benevolent trustee of space.

# 2NC Weaponization Not Inevitable Ext.

US weaponization not inevitable – too expensive

Wilkerson, 8 – Lt. Col., published by US Army War College, (Don, “Space Power Theory: Controlling the Medium Without Weapons in Space.” U.S. Army War College, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA482300>)

It is difficult to support Oberg’s prognostication that weapons in space are inevitable for the U.S. in the 21st Century. The extensive cost of current space programs like Global Positioning System (GPS), Space-Based Infrared System (SIBIRS), the Rapid Attack Identification Detection Reporting System (RAIDRS) and Space Based Radar (SBR) along with numerous service military programs competing within a limited defense budget, it is highly unlikely that the U.S. government will make more funding available for space weapons when the currently perceived threat can be mitigated using existing cost effective capabilities.

The August 2006 U.S. National Space Policy states that its primary objective is to ensure that the U.S. maintains and enables free access to and the use of space for peaceful purposes. The policy mandates that the U.S. will pursue programs and capabilities to ensure space assets are protected since they are vital to our national security and economic interests.

However, the policy does not direct the development or deployment of space weapons. The official U.S. policy in space continues to support the existing Outer Space Treaty of 1967 focusing on free access to space for peaceful purposes while deterring the misuse of space by other nation states. Nevertheless, the U.S. will not disclose any technical developments or options that may be essential in defending space assets “in order to forestall a hypothetical future arms race in space. Such an approach would not be in the national security interest of the U.S.” One may infer that the U.S. government will not hamper or discourage technological programs and developments that may eventually produce techniques, weapon systems and operating procedures that place weapons in orbit to defend space assets.

# 2NC Kills Primacy Ext.

**Weaponization makes heg unsustainable – leads to preemptive strikes that would disrupt existing space technology that is critical to conventional warfighting.**

**Krepon, 3** – president of the Stimson Center (Michael, with Christopher Clary, “Space Assurance or Space Dominance?.” The Henry L. Stimson Center, http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/spacebook.pdf)

Advocacy of a hedging strategy rests on the conclusion that the risks associated with the weaponization of space far exceed the benefits to the United States. Weaker adversaries may not wish to compete with Washington in the flight-testing and deployment of space weaponry, but neither are they likely to concede this high ground entirely. The technical challenges associated with developing space mines and other crude forms of space weaponry are not severe. Weaker states would therefore have the means to counter U.S. initiatives to weaponize space at low cost.

In space, as with terrestrial missile defenses, it is far more challenging to mount a successful defense than to penetrate a soft target. Because of their threatening nature and their vulnerability, weapons designed for space warfare, whether on the ground or in orbit, would become extremely high-value targets. To prevent a precarious and dangerous mix of satellites interspersed with ASATs, the United States would seek to prevent space mines and other attacking devices either from being launched or from being parked in orbit. Alternatively, if the United States does not prevent the deployment of foreign ASATs in space, it must be prepared to wage war by shooting first and asking questions later. **Military operations in space would thus be placed on continual hair-trigger alert** because successful dominance in space would not be possible without the capacity for preemptive strikes or preventive measures. Having first crossed key thresholds relating to the flight-testing and deployment of space weaponry, would the United States arrogate to itself the right during peace time to carry out preemptive strikes to prevent others from following suit? And having rejected arms control arrangements prohibiting the flight-testing and deployment of space weaponry, would the United States seek to impose or dictate these constraints solely on others, and by force of arms?

It is inconceivable that a quest by the United States to enforce dominion or appropriation of space in this manner could be politically sustainable or successful against varied means of retaliation. And even if a future government of the United States attempted to destroy threats to unimpeded U.S. satellite operations, how would U.S. satellites and the space shuttle cope with the debris resulting from space warfare? The technical challenges of launching successful preemptive or preventive attacks against deployed space mines would be daunting. Attacks against some space mines would doubtless trigger hostile responses, so preemptive or preventive attacks would need to be launched against as many targets as can be identified. Would warfare of this kind be confined to space? Would the United States also attack the space launch facilities and key communication nodes of the state or states that have orbited space mines? If not, would the United States shoot down space launch vehicles

or aircraft that might be carrying space mines?

These questions, and others that flow logically from them, clarify the adverse military and diplomatic ramifications that would accompany U.S. initiatives to weaponize space. Considerable skepticism is warranted that preemption or preventive war strategies can be confined to space, since satellite warfare is so intimately related to military operations on Earth.

Attacks on satellites could severely damage prospects for escalation control and, in the worst case, could trigger the use of weapons of mass destruction against U.S. expeditionary forces, allies, or the U.S. homeland. Since space warfare would not be perceived as a trivial pursuit, those nations that could be gravely disadvantaged by the flight-testing and deployment of space weaponry are likely to consider equally grave countermeasures.

At a minimum, an attempt by the United States to seek space dominance through deployed war-fighting capabilities is likely to generate the launch of relatively cheap, low-tech, but lethal ASATs by weaker adversaries. An unequal competition to weaponize space could still place at risk satellites **that are essential for U.S. military communications** and early warning in deep crisis. The weaponization of space could thus result in increased U.S. casualties on the conventional battlefield.

**Unilateral space weaponization destroys hegemonic legitimacy, turning the impact**

**Coffelt, 5** – Lt. Colonal; thesis to the school of advanced air and space studies (Christopher A, “THE BEST DEFENSE: CHARTING THE FUTURE OFUS SPACE STRATEGY AND POLICY.” A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies For Completion of the Graduation Requirements SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIR AND SPACE STUDIES AIR UNIVERSITY, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. June 2005.)

Advocates of this line of thinking argue that the US should capitalize on its great technological advantage and assert itself in space on behalf of free peoples everywhere, acting as the benevolent, hegemonic trustee of the medium. The argument contends that the US should immediately deploy sufficient weapons in low earth orbit to secure all of space and assure access to it for peaceful peoples, and deny similar attempts by those with hostile intentions.

While compelling and well-argued, the weaknesses are profound. First, trustee advocates assume away the consequences back here on earth. Even if the US was capable of successfully executing a hegemonic grab of low earth orbit, thereby advancing its ability to single-handedly control an important medium, life continues on or in the other three mediums. It is highly unlikely that the rest of the world would perceive that the US action was in everyone’s best interests. Truman believed the US would be the benevolent trustee of atomic power, which did little to soothe the soviet’s anxieties over how the US would behave. This is not to suggest that the us should allow itself to be held hostage to the will of the international community. The US must reserve the option to act in self defense or to secure its vital interests, but unilateral acts to secure interests oftentimes incur negative costs in other areas. Specifically, while other nations may be powerless to stop a hegemonic space grab, they can still exert power and influence over the US through diplomatic and economic means. There would be a subsequent loss of legitimacy for this and other US actions and an accompanying decrease in soft power which enables the US to influence other nations short of resorting to violence or the threat of violence. Analysis of the case studies does not give any indication that other state’s ever put faith in benevolent hegemonic control of something that all could benefit from. Therefore, the US should expect a similar response to any offensive actions in space.

# 2NC Doesn’t Solve Heg Ext.

**Even total space domination would not deter—political calculations are more important than technological ones**

**Coffelt, 5** – Lt. Colonal; thesis to the school of advanced air and space studies (Christopher A, “THE BEST DEFENSE: CHARTING THE FUTURE OFUS SPACE STRATEGY AND POLICY.” A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies For Completion of the Graduation Requirements SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIR AND SPACE STUDIES AIR UNIVERSITY, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. June 2005.)

Just as US advantages in nuclear weapons throughout history could not deter all conflict, so it will be with orbital weapon systems. The sophisticated technological solution definitely showcases American power and may dissuade some potential adversaries, but it cannot completely deter all of them from aggression. The soviets blockaded berlin in 1948 despite the fact the US had a monopoly on nuclear weapons and had shown their willingness to employ them. Despite the fact the US had a clear superiority in numbers and quality of nuclear weapons in the 1950s, the soviets and chinese supported the north korean’s invasion of south korea and participated in the conflict themselves. The US nuclear superiority of the 1960s did not prevent north vietnam from invading south vietnam and the soviets support of that direct conflict with the united states. Over the past several decades, there are numerous other examples which illustrate how possession of greatly superior nuclear and conventional weapons and capability did not completely deter, further reinforcing the conclusion that there is no basis for a modern-day assumption that highly responsive, non-nuclear strike capability from space would provide any greater deterrent effect. It is unrealistic for us strategists to assume deployment of “rods from god” (kinetic, tungsten rods) or any other orbital weapons platform will drive potential adversaries to behave or bend to us will any more than present weapon systems do.

# \*\*\*\*CHINA FRONTLINE\*\*\*\*

**No China threat - domestic issues will keep them out of military confrontation with the US**

**MacDonald, 5/11** – US Institute of Peace (11, Bruee W., Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission on The Implications of China’s Military and Civil Space Programs, pdf)

In the face of this growing Chinese military space challenge, it is easy to assume the worst about Chinese intentions. China seeks to be able to prevail militarily at some point in the future should conflict come, but they see the United States as militarily superior to them and thus would be unlikely to consciously provoke any military conflict. While we should guard against a worst case, we should not treat it as a given. I do not believe China or the PLA is spoiling for a fight with the United States – China has come too far to want to place their substantial economic achievements at risk unless they faced an extraordinary threat to their national security. In addition, China faces serious demographic realities over the next couple of decades, where their ratio of workers to retirees will shrink substantially (the result of their one- child policy), which further underscores China’s need for stability and continued economic growth for years to come. China also has additional needs, and vulnerabilities:

• Growing environmental problems and water shortages with no obvious solutions that are growing

irritants to the public;

• A relentless search for new sources of manufacturing inputs;

• An increasingly restive working class that is making new demands for higher wages and political

freedoms;

• A non-democratic one-party system that leaves its senior leadership constantly looking over its

shoulder at possible challenges to its authority, especially in the aftermath of the “Arab Spring”;

• Growing citizen anger against corruption and cronyism that seems impossible for the CCP to root

out; and many more.

These factors are reasons why China is probably not looking for war with the United States, though they

also could inadvertently become factors in China’s stumbling into a conflict they would ordinarily not want, through miscalculation or distraction.

**No risk of rise - China cannot become the hegemon because of structural barriers**

**Nye 6/23** – University Distinguished Service Professor at [Harvard University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harvard_University) and former dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard (Joseph, transcript of a discussion involving Mahbubani, Nye, and Moyo, published in NYT opinion, NYT, “The Seesaw of Power.” Discussion moderated by Serge Schmemann. <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/24/opinion/global/24iht-june24-ihtmag-nye-36.html?_r=2&pagewanted=1>)

Nye : I actually agree with Kishore that, over time, China will change, and I think he’s also correct that it’ll take quite some time. J. Stapleton Roy, former American ambassador to China, once said, “There are more Chinese free today than any time in Chinese history, but China’s not free.” The country that locks up Liu Xiaobo and Ai Weiwei is not free. The question is how will China change over time. As China changes it’ll be better able to use its civil society and better able to develop its soft power. So let’s hope it happens.

Let me add, I applaud what China has done economically. To raise 400 million people out of poverty is an enormous accomplishment. But let’s remember that China faces some problems. One is going to be demographic. The one-child-per family policy is leading to an inverted demographic pyramid starting in 2015, in terms of new entrants to the labor force. As the Chinese say, they may grow old before they grow rich. They’re also going to have to face that as countries reach higher per capita G.D.P., growth rates tend to slow down. They’re no longer picking the low-hanging fruit. And China hasn’t solved the political participation problem yet, so there may be bumps in the road.

Let me go back to China’s external behavior for a minute and pick up something Dambisa said, which I think is important. We should welcome China’s purchase of commodities in Africa. If that raises incomes in Africa, that’s all to the good. It’s a different type of Chinese behavior that we worry about in Africa: It’s when a World Bank official or an E.U. official goes in and says, “No, I won’t build you a sports stadium, because it’s more important that you do something using this money related to poverty reduction,” and the African country says, “No, thank you. The Chinese have offered me both a sports stadium and a Swiss bank account for the president.” That has a terrible effect of undercutting the development of effective institutions, which is what Africa really needs. I worry about China’s behavior regarding corruption — not that it’s gobbling up commodities.

**China won’t challenge us – the gulf is too large**

**Nye, 10** -- University Distinguished Service Professor at [Harvard University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harvard_University) and former dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard (December 2010, “THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN POWER: DOMINANCE AND DECLINE IN PERSPECTIVE.” Published by Foreign affairs, <http://1431731ontario.net/Current/Articles/TheFutureOfAmericanPower_DominanceAndDeclineInPerspective.pdf>)

Yet China has a long way to go to equal the power resources of the United States, and it still faces many obstacles to its development. Even if overall Chinese GDP passed that of the United States around 2030, the two economies, although roughly equivalent in size, would not be equivalent in composition. China would still have a vast underdeveloped countryside, and it would have begun to face demographic problems from the delayed effects of its one-child policy. Per capita income provides a measure of the sophistication of an economy. Assuming a six percent Chinese GDP growth rate and only two percent American GDP growth rate after 2030, China would probably not equal the United States in per capita income until sometime around the middle of the century. In other words, China’s impressive economic growth rate and increasing population will likely lead the Chinese economy to pass the U.S. economy in total size in a few decades, but that is not the same as equality.

Moreover, linear projections can be misleading, and growth rates generally slow as economies reach higher levels of development. China’s authoritarian political system has shown an impressive capability to harness the country’s power, but whether the government can maintain that capability over the longer term is a mystery both to outsiders and to Chinese leaders. Unlike India, which was born with a democratic constitution, China has not yet found a way to solve the problem of demands for political participation (if not democracy) that tend to accompany rising per capita income. Whether China can develop a formula that manages an expanding urban middle class, regional inequality, rural poverty, and resentment among ethnic minorities remains to be seen.

Some have argued that China aims to challenge the United States’ position in East Asia and, eventually, the world. Even if this were an accurate assessment of China’s current intentions (and even the Chinese themselves cannot know the views of future generations), it is doubtful that China will have the military capability to make this possible anytime soon. Moreover, Chinese leaders will have to contend with the reactions of other countries and the constraints created by China’s need for external markets and resources. Too aggressive a Chinese military posture could produce a countervailing coalition among China’s neighbors that would weaken both its hard and its soft power.

The rise of Chinese power in Asia is contested by both India and Japan (as well as other states), and that provides a major power advantage to the United States. The U.S.-Japanese alliance and the improvement in U.S.-Indian relations mean that China cannot easily expel the Americans from Asia. From that position of strength, the United States, Japan, India, Australia, and others can engage China and provide incentives for it to play a responsible role, while hedging against the possibility of aggressive behavior as China’s power grows.

**Diplomacy checks China threat**

**Hagt, 7** -- director of the China Program at the World Security Institute (Eric, “China’s ASAT Test: Strategic Response.” <http://www.wsichina.org/cs5_3.pdf>)

Even if we are facing the worst case scenario and China is bent on space weaponization (entirely inconsistent with its past behavior), **the** **reality remains that China can be brought to the negotiating table with appropriate measures and international pressure**. After all, China clearly remains the far weaker space power vis-à-vis the United States and a space race would be proportionately far more costly to China than the United States. But in order for progress to be made, the United States also needs to come to terms with a new reality. China’s ASAT test was a voice of opposition both to the structure of security in space and the U.S. pursuit of military dominance in space at the exclusion of others.

And thus, it is actually America’s response to the ASAT test that may be even more important in how the future of space security plays out. China probably has both the technological and financial means to compete with the United States in space over the long term. If the United States concludes it must meet a threat with more threat, it may invite a military race in outer space and China may just give it to them. If the United States can muster the political will and leadership to restrain its reaction, there is still hope. But flexibility and sacrifice will be essential.

**Impossible to deter China – existing weapons system, military-commercial bonds, and allied response**

**Meteyer, 5**—Major, U.S. Air Force (“David O., “The Art of Peace: Dissuading China from Developing Counter Space Weapons,” page 41-42, June 2005, http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA435590)

Several factors will complicate a U.S. defense policy of dissuasion that aims to reduce the threat of space systems. First, China’s space program already has operational systems providing a wide range of military and commercial capabilities. 74 China’s space capabilities give it more than just a foot-in-the-door. In fact, China is already reaping the numerous benefits afforded by the highest frontier. In addition, even though China’s space programs are relatively immature when compared to the U.S., the learning curve for improving upon these technologies is steep. Finally, it is one thing to dissuade someone from doing something they cannot already do and hence cannot appreciate its advantages; it is an entirely different thing to dissuade someone from doing something they already do, especially when it has clear benefits. Second, there is an extremely close relationship between military and commercial entities in the space industry. Some systems are dual use such as navigational or weather satellites. Therefore, targeting programs that provide many services enjoyed by the public is challenging to carry out. For example, it would be difficult to justify the denial of satellite produced weather information used to aid civilian populations. A properly networked space-based weather information structure may have reduced the devastation caused by the recent Indian Ocean tsunamis as well as other types of catastrophic events. Third, states frequently buy space capabilities from other states or commercial businesses. For example, France and Russia both operate military space systems and it is widely believed that both of these states offer their military space systems for use by other countries. 75 In addition, several commercial companies sell space services to include imaging and satellite communications.76 This limits the prospect of a dissuasion policy because even if China abandons certain space programs, they may still acquire similar information through these third party connections. In light of these reasons, it seems unlikely that dissuasion will succeed in stopping China from pursuing many types of military space systems. In addition, many of these space systems (e.g., commercial communications satellites) simply do not pose a significant enough threat to U.S. security interests to justify a dissuasion campaign However, space weapon systems that can destroy other satellites (e.g., space mines) o from space can destroy things on earth (e.g., space-based laser) do in fact present a significant threat to not only U.S. space supremacy, but to U.S. security as well. It is for these reasons that a dissuasion campaign should only target counter space systems.

# AT: Space Pearl Harbor

**The Rumsfeld commission report on space Pearl Harbors was biased and isn’t credible**

**Hartung, 05** (William, senior research fellow at the World Policy Institute at the New School, “Weapons in space put the world at risk”, 7/13, Seattle Post Intelligencer, <http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/opinion/232239_spaceweapons13.html>)

Within the next few weeks, President Bush is expected to release his administration's new national space policy. The most crucial aspect of the plan will be whether it endorses placing weapons in space. There have been a series of reports since 2001 that essentially advocate deploying space weapons. The Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization, initially chaired by Donald Rumsfeld, argued that the United States must take steps to avoid a "space Pearl Harbor." The Rumsfeld report said there is no current bar to "placing or using weapons in space, applying force from space to Earth, or conducting military operations in and through space." Not so coincidentally, seven of the 13 members of the Rumsfeld space commission had ties to aerospace companies that could stand to gain from the launching of a major space weapons program.

**The threat is exaggerated – the impact would be minimal**

**Perera, 08** (David, “'Space Pearl Harbor' overstated,” Government Computer News, 2/22,

[http://www.gcn.com/online/vol1\_no1/45866-1.html?topic=geospatial#](http://www.gcn.com/online/vol1_no1/45866-1.html?topic=geospatial))

The Navy’s use of an anti-ballistic missile to shoot down a falling U.S. satellite Feb. 20 did not inaugurate a new era of vulnerability for high-bandwidth military communications, said David Mosher, a Rand Corp. senior policy analyst specializing in issues related to the militarization of space and ballistic missile defense.

Any concern “about a space Pearl Harbor is way overstated,” Mosher told Defense Systems in an interview Feb. 21.

As the military edges closer to achieving its network-centric vision of warfare, it is becoming more dependent on high-bandwidth communications routed through satellites. That makes satellites an increasingly attractive target despite a near-universal condemnation of the militarization of space.

Defense Department officials said this week’s satellite operation was not a show of force or a response to China’s destruction of one of its own weather satellites in January 2007.

However, even if the United States should find itself fighting an enemy with the will and capacity to destroy U.S. satellites, high-bandwidth communications would continue to operate, Mosher said.

“The key here is not to protect satellites. The key is to protect the function,” he added. That could be accomplished many ways, including ensuring that satellite systems are robust enough to survive the loss of some of their units.

A prime example is the Global Positioning System, which consists of at least 24 satellites in medium Earth orbit. “It would take a whole lot to significantly degrade GPS,” Mosher said. “You’d have to shoot a lot of satellites.”

Increased use of transoceanic fiber-optic cables could also make the military less dependent on satellites. Such cabling has already proven to be reliable and has done a great deal to reduce satellite use in the private sector, Mosher said.

In any event, if a satellite-shooting war occurs, air vehicles with sensors and routers located lower in the atmosphere than satellites would already be active. “That just makes sense in regional warfare anyway,” he said.

A shot-down satellite would be a loss because alternatives would not perfectly compensate for the missing capacity, “but it’s not the end of the world,” Mosher said.

# 2NC No Space Pearl Harbor Ext.

**The space Pearl Harbor threat is hyped nonsense**

**Moore, 6** - contributing editor of The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Mike, SAIS Review, “A New Cold War?”, Winter Spring, projectmuse)

But even if a military and economic rivalry develops, would that necessarily lead to one of the many Pearl Harbor scenarios spun out by space warriors?[12](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/sais_review/v026/26.1moore.html#FOOT12) The answer is almost surely no. Any substantive antisatellite threat to U.S. space assets would have to be preceded by extensive testing, including tests in space. The United States would quickly detect any such tests.

The kindest thing that can be said about space Pearl Harbor scenarios is that they are classic scare tactics, the latest installment in a string of scenarios trotted out by hardliners throughout the Cold War.[13](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/sais_review/v026/26.1moore.html#FOOT13) Pearl Harbor allusions trigger potent images for Americans, visions of a sleepy Sunday morning that turn into a nightmare of roaring aircraft and staccato gunfire, of exploding bombs and torpedoes, of roiling smoke and foundering ships, of death in a fire-flooded bay. They also bring to mind a nation that was woefully unprepared for global war despite the Roosevelt administration's desperate attempts to get the country into some sort of fighting trim. Yet on closer inspection Pearl Harbor analogies seem to be little more than dramatic devices chosen for their emotional impact rather than for their correspondence to actual probability.

**Conventional deterrence solves – their argument is a weak scare tactic**

**Moore, 6** -- contributing editor of The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, a peace-and-security magazine (Mike, not to be confused with Michael, “A New Cold War?.” SAIS Review 26.1 (2006) 175-188. Project MUSE) \*\*we do not endorse gendered language

The kindest thing that can be said about space Pearl Harbor scenarios is that they are classic **scare tactics**, the latest installment in a string of scenarios trotted out by hardliners throughout the Cold War.13 Pearl Harbor allusions trigger potent images for Americans, visions of a sleepy Sunday morning that turn into a nightmare of roaring aircraft and staccato gunfire, of exploding bombs and torpedoes, of roiling smoke and foundering ships, of death in a fire-flooded bay. They also bring to mind a nation that was woefully unprepared for global war despite the Roosevelt administration's desperate attempts to get the country into some sort of fighting trim. **Yet on closer inspection Pearl Harbor analogies seem to be little more than dramatic devices** chosen for their **emotional impact** rather than for their correspondence to actual probability.

The Pearl Harbor attack was a wager by an arrogant and highly militarized government. Japan assumed the United States, once its Pacific fleet was crippled, would work out a negotiated settlement that would fall far short of all-out war with a powerful seafaring nation 5,000 miles distant. Tokyo bet that the United States, which had no close Asian ties and had for two years refrained from fighting on behalf of its close British allies, would not expend blood and treasure to shield Asians from Japanese control.

Japan's leaders were ignorant of American history and the American character. They lost their bet, bringing destruction upon their homeland. Would any national leader make that kind of irrational bet today—or tomorrow? The United States was militarily weak in 1941, although its latent power was enormous. Today, the United States is universally recognized as the world's hyperpower; even the Defense Department acknowledges that the United States has no "peer competitor." The United States has the means and the will to fight effectively with new generations of conventional weapons, as well as with an assortment of nuclear weapons, should it come to that.

What 21st-century leader would risk his nation's survival on a risky surprise attack? Any nation that wanted to launch a Pearl Harbor-style attack on U.S. space assets would first have to conduct many tests in space. U.S. observation satellites and ground stations would detect those tests. Does anyone really believe that United States, even if an Adlai Stevenson-style president were in the White House, would fail to respond vigorously to such a provocation?

The United States does not lack for enemies. But just as tigers do not attack a healthy bull elephant, it is difficult to imagine that any nation would directly challenge the United States in space. Could a hostile country secretly mount a covert program capable of taking out a few U.S. military and surveillance satellites? Possibly. Could such an enemy secretly develop the capability to eliminate enough U.S. satellites to tip the balance of power radically in a surprise attack? Not likely. The question proposes a suicidal scenario as unreal as anything the bolt-from-the-blue crowd dreamed up during the Cold War.

"Purposeful interference with U.S. space systems," says a 1999 Department of Defense directive, "will be viewed as an infringement on our sovereign rights. The US may take all appropriate self-defense measures, including, if directed by the National Command Authorities, the use of force, to respond to such an infringement on our rights."14 Clearly, this directive is ambiguous. The nature and extent of the "appropriate self-defense measures" are not clear. But again, what national leader is likely to bet his life and the life of his state against the world's "hyperpower"? Who would want to challenge a country whose precision conventional weapons can reliably strike targets as small as a house from 20,000 feet and 12 miles downrange, and which has thousands of nuclear weapons ready for use?

# \*\*\*\*AT: STRIKES ADVANTAGE\*\*\*\*

# No Korea Nuke War

No risk of Korean provocations or nuclear use - deterrence checks

National Post, 9 [“A ticking bomb on Korean peninsula”, 5-28, Lexis]

Q What are the chances of war? A Very low. North Korea is highly unlikely to repeat its invasion of the South because this would entail a war with the United States that Mr. Kim would certainly lose. Staying in power is Mr. Kim's one overriding aim. If he begins a general war, this would undoubtedly cause the downfall of his regime. Q What are the other possibilities? A Small-scale clashes are likely. The maritime boundary in the Yellow Sea has never been agreed. This could be the setting for naval skirmishes, especially if the United States and South Korea stop and search ships using Northern ports. Q What about North Korea's nuclear weapons? A North Korea is believed to have built a small arsenal of nuclear bombs -- perhaps fewer than 10 -- using plutonium taken from its reactor at Yongbyon. But these are not as threatening as you might think. North Korea has probably failed to convert them into nuclear warheads for delivery by a missile. So dropping the bombs from a plane would be the only way of conducting a nuclear attack. Any military aircraft taking off in North Korean airspace during a war would probably be shot down very quickly. Q So what is the worst that North Korea can do? A The biggest danger for South Korea is that its capital, Seoul, is only 50 kilometres from the border with the North. This means that 20 million South Koreans live within range of Mr. Kim's heavy artillery. North Korea's army deploys 17,900 artillery pieces, many of them aimed at Seoul. In the event of war, these guns could fire between 300,000 and 500,000 high explosive shells at Seoul every hour.

Tensions on the peninsula are dissipating

Swenson-Wright, 11 - Associate Fellow with the Asia Programme at Chatham House. (John, “Korea: A Glimmer of Hope,” The World Today, February, http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/twt/archive/view/-/id/2120/)

The exchange of artillery fire between the two Koreas marked a sharp escalation of tensions. This rare instance of the North striking at the land-based territory of the South was a departure from past engagements confined to maritime skirmishes inthe contested area of theWest (orYellow) Sea. It was also a stand-off that threatened to escalate very rapidly into a potentially catastrophic full-blown military exchange between the two sides. Despite these tensions, in January 2011 the mood appears to have changed sharply. Both Korean governments seem to be signalling a much more accommodating, constructive approach to one another in each side's respective New Year's statements, and are expressing a willingness to engage in direct talks as a means of avoiding further conflict. This more ameliorative rhetoric, while welcome, raises important questions about the prospects in 2011 for a genuine improvement in relations between the two Koreas. Worrying as the events of last year have been, one notable benefit has been the beginning of what appears to be a new spirit of resolve and cooperation between the United States and its core Asian allies. Washington has long enjoyed close and effective relations with Seoul and Tokyo. The difference now is that this partnership appears to be evolving from two separate but important bilateral partnerships into a more substantive and somewhat novel trilateral arrangement. Political trilateralism has existed in the past, but the common challenge posed by the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) appears to be pushing this relationship in a more substantive direction, with scope for new, unprecedented security and intelligence minilateral cooperation between Washington, Tokyo and Seoul.

Survival matters more to the north

Pollom 10 (Drew, The Gonzaga Bulletin, “War in Korea unlikely,” 2010, <http://www.gonzagabulletin.com/war-in-korea-unlikely-1.1815018>, 12/1 EMM)

Suddenly we are transported back to the 1950s. The recent aggressive activity by North Korea, the last real remnant of the Cold War, has once again put the U.S. and Asia on the brink of war. While the North has always taken grandiose actions in an attempt to gain attention, the last six months have truly been deadly. First, there was the sinking of the South Korean warship by a North Korean torpedo. Now there is the shelling on Yeonpyeong by North Korea resulting in the death of two civilians. Seoul demands vengeance. The U.S. conducts war games. Americans prepare themselves for war in Korea. Before you make that tin foil hat to protect you from the nuclear radiation, you have to first see if war with North Korea will actually happen. Beyond the black and white situation of responding to North Korean aggression is a complex world of Asian politics, particularly involving the U.S. and China. At the end of the day, while I still believe we are not going to war with North Korea, we are getting close. North Korea has always been an enigma. Described as a Stalinist regime, given its cult-like reverence for its leaders, this isolated country is known for having a huge bark. Since the 1990s, North Korea has leveraged its nuclear weapons against the world in exchange for an erratic list of demands. People often view the North as dangerous and unstable, both of which are very true if you look at its behavior at face value. However, beneath everything North Korea has ever done, there has been one all-consuming goal: survival. The regime will do and say anything that will ensure its continued hold on power. North Korea would pretty much lose that hold if it went to war. Despite its numbers in the military, it cannot keep up with the well-fed and technologically superior South. Even its nuclear arsenal can be neutralized by the tactical strikes of the U.S. Air Force. Even in its grandest delusion, North Korea knows that a war with the U.S. will end in disaster for it. Based on that, I believe that the latest aggression is another act of desperation to be important on the global stage. At the same time, the U.S. isn't exactly rushing to go to war. The war games conducted last week are an important act to show the world that the U.S. and South Korea won't be bullied by the North. The reality is any war effort will most likely be hamstrung from the start. There is, of course, the obvious fact that most of the troops are still dedicated in Iraq and Afghanistan. With the current economic recession and large budget deficits, we may not want to plug another huge chunk of money in another invasion. Instead, we are more likely to seek a diplomatic solution to the situation before it gets out of hand. In the end, whatever we end up doing, South Korea will most likely follow.

# No Bioterror

No risk of a bioterror attack, and there won’t be retaliation - your evidence is hype

Matishak 10 (Martin, Global Security Newswire, “U.S. Unlikely to Respond to Biological Threat With Nuclear Strike, Experts Say,” 4-29, http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw\_20100429\_7133.php)

WASHINGTON -- The United States is not likely to use nuclear force to respond to a biological weapons threat, even though the Obama administration left open that option in its recent update to the nation's nuclear weapons policy, experts say (See GSN, April 22). "The notion that we are in imminent danger of confronting a scenario in which hundreds of thousands of people are dying in the streets of New York as a consequence of a biological weapons attack is fanciful," said Michael Moodie, a consultant who served as assistant director for multilateral affairs in the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency during the George H.W. Bush administration. Scenarios in which the United States suffers mass casualties as a result of such an event seem "to be taking the discussion out of the realm of reality and into one that is hypothetical and that has no meaning in the real world where this kind of exchange is just not going to happen," Moodie said this week in a telephone interview. "There are a lot of threat mongers who talk about devastating biological attacks that could kill tens of thousands, if not millions of Americans," according to Jonathan Tucker, a senior fellow with the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. "But in fact, no country out there today has anything close to what the Soviet Union had in terms of mass-casualty biological warfare capability. Advances in biotechnology are unlikely to change that situation, at least for the foreseeable future." No terrorist group would be capable of pulling off a massive biological attack, nor would it be deterred by the threat of nuclear retaliation, he added. The biological threat provision was addressed in the Defense Department-led Nuclear Posture Review, a restructuring of U.S. nuclear strategy, forces and readiness. The Obama administration pledged in the review that the United States would not conduct nuclear strikes on non-nuclear states that are in compliance with global nonproliferation regimes. However, the 72-page document contains a caveat that would allow Washington to set aside that policy, dubbed "negative security assurance," if it appeared that biological weapons had been made dangerous enough to cause major harm to the United States. "Given the catastrophic potential of biological weapons and the rapid pace of biotechnology development, the United States reserves the right to make any adjustment in the assurance that may be warranted by the evolution and proliferation of the biological weapons threat and U.S. capacities to counter that threat," the posture review report says. The caveat was included in the document because "in theory, biological weapons could kill millions of people," Gary Samore, senior White House coordinator for WMD counterterrorism and arms control, said last week after an event at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Asked if the White House had identified a particular technological threshold that could provoke a nuclear strike, Samore replied: "No, and if we did we obviously would not be willing to put it out because countries would say, 'Oh, we can go right up to this level and it won't change policy.'" "It's deliberately ambiguous," he told Global Security Newswire. The document's key qualifications have become a lightning rod for criticism by Republican lawmakers who argue they eliminate the country's previous policy of "calculated ambiguity," in which U.S. leaders left open the possibility of executing a nuclear strike in response to virtually any hostile action against the United States or its allies (see GSN, April 15). Yet experts say there are a number of reasons why the United States is not likely to use a nuclear weapon to eliminate a non-nuclear threat. It could prove difficult for U.S. leaders to come up with a list of appropriate targets to strike with a nuclear warhead following a biological or chemical event, former Defense Undersecretary for Policy Walter Slocombe said during a recent panel discussion at the Hudson Institute. "I don't think nuclear weapons are necessary to deter these kinds of attacks given U.S. dominance in conventional military force," according to Gregory Koblentz, deputy director of the Biodefense Graduate Program at George Mason University in Northern Virginia. "There's a bigger downside to the nuclear nonproliferation side of the ledger for threatening to use nuclear weapons in those circumstances than there is the benefit of actually deterring a chemical or biological attack," Koblentz said during a recent panel discussion at the James Martin Center. The nonproliferation benefits for restricting the role of strategic weapons to deterring nuclear attacks outweigh the "marginal" reduction in the country's ability to stem the use of biological weapons, he said. In addition, the United States has efforts in place to defend against chemical and biological attacks such as vaccines and other medical countermeasures, he argued. "We have ways to mitigate the consequences of these attacks," Koblentz told the audience. "There's no way to mitigate the effects of a nuclear weapon." Regardless of the declaratory policy, the U.S. nuclear arsenal will always provide a "residual deterrent" against mass-casualty biological or chemical attacks, according to Tucker. "If a biological or chemical attack against the United States was of such a magnitude as to potentially warrant a nuclear response, no attacker could be confident that the U.S. -- in the heat of the moment -- would not retaliate with nuclear weapons, even if its declaratory policy is not to do so," he told GSN this week during a telephone interview. Political Benefits Experts are unsure what, if any, political benefit the country or President Barack Obama's sweeping nuclear nonproliferation agenda will gain from the posture review's biological weapons caveat. The report's reservation "was an unnecessary dilution of the strengthened negative security and a counterproductive elevation of biological weapons to the same strategic domain as nuclear weapons," Koblentz told GSN by e-mail this week. "The United States has nothing to gain by promoting the concept of the biological weapons as 'the poor man's atomic bomb,'" he added.

Your evidence is massively exaggerated

Leitenberg 5 (Milton, Senior Research Scholar @ University of Maryland, “ASSESSING THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AND BIOTERRORISM THREAT,” December, EMM)

Framing “the threat” and setting the agenda of public perceptions and policy prescriptions. For the past decade the risk and immanence of the use of biological agents by nonstate actors/terrorist organizations—“bioterrorism”—has been systematically and deliberately exaggerated. It became more so after the combination of the 9/11 events and the October- November 2001 anthrax distribution in the United States that followed immediately afterwards. U.S. Government officials worked hard to spread their view to other countries. An edifice of institutes, programs, conferences, and publicists has grown up which continue the exaggeration and scare-mongering. In the last year or two, the drumbeat had picked up. It may however become moderated by the more realistic assessment of the likelihood of the onset of a natural flu pandemic, and the accompanying realization that the U.S. Government has been using the overwhelming proportion of its relevant resources to prepare for the wrong contingency.

# No Indo/Pak War

No India/Pakistan war –

A) Deterrence

Tellis 2 (Ashley, Foreign Policy Research Institute, Orbis, Winter, p. 24-5)

In the final analysis, this situation is made objectively "meta-stable" by the fact that neither India,[nor] Pakistan**, nor China has** the **strategic capabilities to execute** those successful damage-limiting **first strikes** that might justify initiating nuclear attacks either "out of the blue" or during a crisis. **Even China**, which of the three comes closest to possessing such capabilities (against India under truly hypothetical scenarios), **would find it difficult to** **conclude** that the **capacity for** "splendid **first strikes" lay within reach.** Moreover, even if it could arrive at such a determination**, the political justification** for these actions **would be substantially lacking** given the nature of its current political disputes with India. Onbalance, therefore, **it is reasonable to conclude that a** high degree of deterrence stability, at least with respect to wars of unlimited aims, **exists within** the greater **South Asian region**.

B) Economics

Tellis 2 (Ashley, Foreign Policy Research Institute, Orbis, Winter, p. 19)

In any event, **the** saving grace **that** mutes **the potential for** exacerbated competition **between both countries remains their relatively** strong economic constraints. **At the Pakistani end, these constraints are structural**: **Islamabad** simply has no discretionary resources to fritter away on an open-ended arms race, and it **could not acquire resources** for this purpose without fundamentally transforming the nature of the Pakistani state itself—which transformation, if it occurs successfully, would actually mitigate many of the corrosive forces that currently drive Islamabad’s security competition with India. [21](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6W5V-44R2RMN-3&_user=1111158&_handle=V-WA-A-W-AV-MsSAYVA-UUA-U-AAWWZYDZDV-AAWUWZYVDV-WUAYUYVAZ-AV-U&_fmt=full&_coverDate=10%2F01%2F2002&_rdoc=3&_orig=browse&_srch=%23toc%236580%232002%23999539998%23279210!&_cdi=6580&view=c&_acct=C000051676&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=1111158&md5=a57af48126ec154c39015e0e91157808" \l "fn22#fn22) **At the Indian end, these constraints may be more self-imposed**. New Delhi commands a large pool of national resources that could be siphoned off and reallocated to security instruments, but the current weaknesses of the central government’s public finances and its reform program, coupled with its desire to complete the technological modernization programs that have been underway for many decades, prevents it from enlarging the budgetary allocations for strategic acquisitions at will. [22](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6W5V-44R2RMN-3&_user=1111158&_handle=V-WA-A-W-AV-MsSAYVA-UUA-U-AAWWZYDZDV-AAWUWZYVDV-WUAYUYVAZ-AV-U&_fmt=full&_coverDate=10%2F01%2F2002&_rdoc=3&_orig=browse&_srch=%23toc%236580%232002%23999539998%23279210!&_cdi=6580&view=c&_acct=C000051676&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=1111158&md5=a57af48126ec154c39015e0e91157808" \l "fn23#fn23) **With these constraints on both sides, future nuclearization in India and Pakistan is more likely to resemble an "arms crawl" than a genuine Richardson-type "arms race."** The **strategic capabilities** on both sides **will increase** incrementally but **slowly**—and in India will have further to go because of its inferior capabilities compared to China’s. This slowness may be the best outcome from the viewpoint both of the two South Asian competitors and the United States.

C) No first use

Enders 2 (David, Daily News Editor for the Michigan Daily, Citing Ashutosh Varshney, PhD, Professor of Political Science at UMich, “Experts say nuclear war still unlikely,”

http://media.www.michigandaily.com/media/storage/paper851/news/2002/01/30/News/Experts.Say.Nuclear.Wa

r.Still.Unlikely-1404620.shtml)

University political science Prof. Ashutosh Varshney becomes animated when asked about the likelihood of nuclear war between India and Pakistan."Odds are close to zero," Varshney said forcefully, standing up to pace a little bit in his office. "The assumption that India and Pakistan cannot manage their nuclear arsenals as well as the U.S.S.R. and U.S. or Russia and China concedes less to the intellect of leaders in both India and Pakistan than would be warranted."The world"s two youngest nuclear powers first tested weapons in 1998, sparking fear of subcontinental nuclear war a fear Varshney finds ridiculous. "The decision makers are aware of what nuclear weapons are, even if the masses are not," he said. "Watching the evening news, CNN, I think they have vastly overstated the threat of nuclear war," political science Prof. Paul Huth said. Varshney added that there are numerous factors working against the possibility of nuclear war. "India is committed to a no-first-strike policy," Varshney said. "It is virtually impossible for Pakistan to go for a first strike, because the retaliation would be gravely dangerous."

# No Israel/Iran War

No risk of Iran using its weapons - deterrence checks - they only want it for defense

Easterbrook 10(Gregg, Reuters Columnist, “ What will Iran do with nuclear weapons? Probably nothing,” Apr 22, <http://blogs.reuters.com/gregg-easterbrook/2010/04/22/what-will-iran-do-with-nuclear-weapons-probably-nothing/>, EMM)

Of course is it alarming to think of an atomic bomb in the hands of a nation at least nominally ruled by the dull-witted anti-Semite Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. But experience suggests that an Iranian atomic bomb would be employed in the same way as all other atomic munitions since 1945 – to deter attack. That is to say, Iran will use an atomic bomb by not using it: the observed pattern followed by other nuclear-armed states. Since Nagasaki, no nation possessing atomic or nuclear weapons has employed this power, because the logic of nuclear deterrence is overwhelming, If Iran acquires an atomic bomb and fires one against Israel, Tehran will be leveled 30 minutes later. The current rulers of Iran may be repugnant, but they are not madmen.

Iran won’t strike Israel and it won’t escalate

Luttwak 6 (Edward N. Luttwak, Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “A Conflict That Will Stay Close to Home”, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/18/opinion/18luttwak.html, July 18, 2006, LEQ)

Which brings us back to Iran. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has been threatening Israel with destruction daily and keeps denying the Holocaust in a manner that reveals his own genocidal fantasies. But as of now, Iran has no military capacity against Israel other than a few unreliable ballistic missiles imported from North Korea whose warheads could fall just about anywhere. Even if by some miracle they were to hit a city or town in Israel, their conventional explosives would not inflict much damage anyway. On the other hand**,** an Iranian missile attack would give Israel the opportunity to strike Iran's nuclear installations without provoking global outrage. It would be a very serious act of war, but it would not stir the Arab states to aid Iran's mullahs: they, too, fear a nuclear Iran**.** Much is at stake in the current crisis: Israel's security; Lebanon's viability as a nation; the future roles of Hamas and Hezbollah; America's ability to function as an effective power in the Middle East; and more still. There are dangers on every side. But, fortunately, the outbreak of a regional war is not one of them.

Israel wont strike --- all eyes are on it and logistical hurdles

Keiler, 10 [7/25/10, Jonathan F , former captain in the Army's Judge-Advocate General Corps, The American Thinker, “Surprise! Why An Israeli Strike on Iran is Unlikely”, http://www.americanthinker.com/2010/07/surprise\_why\_an\_israeli\_strike.html

If Israel does launch a military strike against Iran's nuclear facilities it will be the most widely anticipated military operation in modern history, even more so than D-Day or the 2003 campaign against Iraq. The buildup to those operations lasted a few years. Speculation about an Israeli strike on Iran has persisted for more than a decade. And this leads one to the most obvious of conclusions -- that if Israel has not struck yet, it won't. I don't pretend to know one way or the other, but the fact that conditions for an Israeli strike against Iran were more favorable a few years ago than they are today is a relatively persuasive argument that the window of opportunity, if it ever existed, may have passed. In a recent piece, The Weekly Standard's Reuel Marc Gerecht makes this point, among many others. But the gist of Gerecht's piece is that if the leadership of the Israeli Air Force (IAF) believes that military success is probable, then the widely bruited, supposedly disastrous consequences of such a strike, (e.g. Iranian counter moves in the Persian Gulf and against American and Israeli interests, strengthening of the Iranian regime, weakening of opposition movements, etc.) are much overrated. Gerecht makes a compelling case for an Israeli strike, if the IAF leadership thinks it is feasible. Where I think he may err -- and many other pundits as well -- is in guessing that if the IAF proposes a plan, that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu would be particularly inclined accept an optimistic IAF evaluation and launch a strike. Of course, nobody knows the exact conditions for a successful IAF strike, although if you want a hypothetical plane-by-plane and target-by-target operational plan the Center for Strategic and International Studies produced one for general consumption. The real question is at what point Israel's political leadership pushes past the uncertainty. Here the threshold is likely much higher than Gerecht and other like-minded pundits imagine. It's true historically that Israel's leadership has put great faith in the IAF, and that this confidence has generally been well rewarded. The IAF is the world's only air force to have taken out enemy nuclear installations, and it is a perfect two-for-two in that regard (against Iraq and Syria.) Likewise, the IAF had spectacular successes in the 1967 War and the 1982 Lebanon War. On the other hand, over-reliance in the ability of Israel's airman to solve its military problems led to setbacks in the 1973 Yom Kippur War and the 2006 Lebanon War. Gerecht not only places great store on what the IAF might tell Netanyahu but on the fact that Netanyahu is an ardent Zionist and Israeli patriot. And for that matter, there is little reason to doubt the bona fides of Defense Minister Ehud Barak, or any other element of Israel's mainstream leadership when it comes to a genuine desire to protect the nation. The radical anti-Zionist Israeli left has yet to come to power, and hopefully never will. Gerecht also particularly cites the Netanyahu's family background, noting that his father was a famous scholar of oppressed Spanish Jewry, and his brother, the only commando to die at Entebbe. Here is an implication that Netanyahu might be willing gamble on the IAF if he truly believes Iran is near to producing a nuclear weapon. But the brother who is likely to have the most influence on Netanyahu is not his fallen older brother Jonathan, but rather his younger brother Iddo, who has over the past decades devoted much time and effort to detailing the circumstances of Jonathan Netanyahu's death at Entebbe, the results of which are sobering. For the truth is, the military situation vis a vis Iran is in many ways more similar to Entebbe, than it is to the surgical anti-nuclear strikes carried out by the IAF against Iraq and Syria. And the reasons for this are the issues of complexity and surprise. An Israeli attack on Iran would be an enormously complex undertaking, so much so, that the actual point the attack, dropping bombs on Iran's nuclear facilities, is but one facet of a gigantic political, diplomatic, logistic, technical, and operational problem. It is similar to the situation faced at Entebbe, when the problem of getting a rescue force from Israel into the heart of Africa to a large extent subsumed the actual goal of the raid -- rescuing the hostages. The truth about Entebbe, divorced from superficial accounts of daring, heroism and Hollywood fantasy, is that the raid, which can legitimately be considered the boldest and most successful hostage rescue in history, came very close to becoming a tragic failure. There is insufficient space here for a full detailed account of the matter, but the actual rescue of the hostages was arguably the weakest part of the plan, and the portion of the operation that came closest to failure. In summary, Entebbe occurred in 1976, when Western armies were still adjusting to the problem of suicidal hostage takers, and sophisticated hostage rescue techniques were in their infancy. Many devices rescue forces take for granted today, such as flash bang grenades or night vision devices, were unavailable. Success, even for the best troops, was a hit and miss affair. Two years before Entebbe, at a high school in the northern Israeli town of Ma'alot, a botched IDF rescue attempt resulted in scores of deaths and injuries. The Entebbe rescue plan sought to avoid another Ma'alot through the element of surprise. It called for a thirty man sayeret matkal team (led by Lieutenant Colonel Netanyahu) to immediately drive off the first aircraft to land at Entebbe in a black Mercedes and a pair of Land Rovers meant to imitate Ugandan President Idi Amin's motorcade. The commandos themselves were crudely disguised in Ugandan style uniforms and blackface, and carried AK-47s like the Ugandan army. The vehicles were to drive up to the doors of the terminal where the hostages were held, whereupon the commandos were to leap out, rush the building and rescue the hostages before the terrorists knew what was happening. But this was just one element of a much more complex plan, that also required three other transport aircraft to reach Entebbe via a long dangerous flight route, land unobserved and unmolested, seize the airport, destroy Ugandan fighter planes, ambush Ugandan reinforcements, guard the rescue aircraft, treat and evacuate casualties and rescued hostages, refuel the aircraft and withdraw, all of which required 120 or so additional troops plus vehicles. There were of course, also multiple additional political, diplomatic, command/control and logistic considerations. In the event, Colonel Netanyahu's rescue convoy was intercepted by a pair of Ugandan soldiers several hundred meters from the terminal. The Israelis tried to kill both with small caliber silenced pistols, but one soldier survived the assault and fled. Commandos gunned him down with un-silenced machine guns. Ugandan soldiers then opened fire on the convoy as it moved out again. Netanyahu, fearing that the rescue team would be annihilated in its thin skinned vehicles, ordered the commandos to abandon them and run to the terminal, still at least fifty meters away. Some commandos fired back as they ran, emptying their ammo magazines. They arrived at the terminal disordered and sheltered in the lee of the building, the plan a shambles. To add to the confusion, the terminal building did not match the mock-up upon which they'd trained. The assault came to a stop. Netanyahu then stepped out into the open to urge on the attack and was mortally wounded. At this point the rescue at Entebbe would seem to have failed. What saved it was the still overwhelming effect of surprise, and a bit of individual courage and initiative. Inside the terminal the German and Palestinian terrorists had been alarmed by the shooting and shouting outside, but were so certain that they were safe from an Israeli rescue attempt that they attributed the commotion to in-fighting among the Ugandans, whom they held in low regard anyway. This over-confidence had been deliberately fostered by the Israeli government, which prior to the raid had essentially admitted surrender, and agreed (at that time contrary to Israeli practice) to negotiate with the terrorists. As the terrorists stood by, a few individual commandos acted on their own initiative and stormed the building. They killed the terrorists and rescued the hostages. Netanyahu and Barak are former commandos themselves, and when briefed by IAF commanders they will know the story of Entebbe, and countless other operations, many from personal involvement. They will understand that anything in a complex plan that can go wrong likely will. And they will also know that the one thing that saved the day at Entebbe, the element of strategic surprise, will be absent in an assault on Iran. The only surprise the Israelis can hope for in a strike against Iran is the precise date and time, and considering the complexities of getting scores of aircraft through hostile airspace before even reaching Iranian skies, they might not even have that. If the Israelis were serious about attacking Iran, the best thing they could do now is stop talking about it. Indeed, ideally, the Israelis would appear accept the position that seems to be that of the United States under President Obama -- that a nuclear Iran is inevitable and manageable. Then maybe they could lull the Iranian leadership and military into complacency and hope to regain a bit of strategic surprise. But right now, with every eye trained on Israeli skies and the world expectantly awaiting an Israeli assault, the chances of Israeli success must be dramatically reduced, a fact not lost on Netanyahu and Barak. I don't pretend to know what Israel will do, and nobody would be happier to see a successful Israeli strike on Iran than me, but logic suggests that if the Israelis haven't done it yet, they probably never will. And Benjamin Netanyahu is no more likely to launch an attack than his predecessors, for the same set of complex reasons that they were restrained.

Israel won’t first strike - second strike capabilities and perception of Iran as rational check

Parsi ‘6 (Trita Parsi, Ph.D. in International Relations from Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, “What's to fear? A challenge to Israel's strategic primacy”, www.iranian.com/Parsi/2006/January/Nuclear/index.html, January 5, 2006, LEQ)

What lies at the heart of Israel's campaign to halt Iran's nuclear advances, however, is not necessarily the fear of a nuclear clash, but the regional and strategic consequences nuclear technology parity in the Middle East will have for Israel. In spite of its rhetoric, Israel views the regime in Tehran as rational(but extremist), calculating and risk-averse. EventhoseIsraeli officials who believe thatIran is hell-bent on destroying the Jewish state recognize that Tehran is unlikely to attack Israel with nuclear weapons due to the destruction Israel would inflict on Iran through its second-strike capability. With its nuclear-equipped submarines, Israel has a guaranteed second-strike capability. "Whatever measure [the Iranians] have, they can't destroy Israel's capability to respond," Ranaan Gissin, spokesperson for Israel's prime minister, told me.

# \*\*\*\*SOLVENCY FRONTLINE\*\*\*\*

**Squo solves—**

**a. Soft weapons such as satellite jammers solve power projection – avoids debris and spending DAs**

**Day, 5** -- associate editor of Raumfahrt Concret (german aerospace magazine) and on Space Studies Board of the National Research Council/National Academy of Sciences (Dwayne, the space review, June 6, “Blunt arrows: the limited utility of ASATs.” <http://www.thespacereview.com/article/388/1>) CMR

There are also numerous downsides to traditional kinetic ASAT weapons. They generate debris, for starters, making orbits that the United States needs to use unhealthy for our own satellites. The United States might also find itself in a situation where it is more desirable to temporarily shut down an adversary’s satellite than to permanently do so. For these and other reasons the United States increasingly favors “softer” methods of denying an enemy’s space assets than blowing their satellites out of the sky. Jamming or incapacitating them is the ideal option. If the United States can destroy a ground station with an existing cruise missile, that would prove far more cost effective than **spending billions to develop an ASAT capability**. Why develop a new weapon when existing ones can already do the job?

**b. ABLs are comparatively more effective**

**Day, 5** -- associate editor of Raumfahrt Concret (german aerospace magazine) and on Space Studies Board of the National Research Council/National Academy of Sciences (Dwayne, the space review, June 6, “Blunt arrows: the limited utility of ASATs.” <http://www.thespacereview.com/article/388/1>) CMR

The US Air Force also recently began studying the possibility of utilizing the YAL-1A Airborne Laser for missions other than missile defense. The Airborne Laser (or ABL) is mounted in a modified 747-400F aircraft and uses a powerful laser to intercept ballistic missiles hundreds of miles away. It could theoretically be pointed up instead of sideways, and destroy a satellite, probably simply by overheating it so that its electronics fail. There are several operational advantages of this. One is that **it does not create debris in orbit**, just a dead satellite—although unlike the CCS, this is not reversible. Another advantage is that the weapon is paid for and operating for another mission,so any ASAT capability would be a bonus. However, ABL has run into numerous development problems of its own and has risked cancellation in recent years. If its missile defense mission is canceled, its ASAT mission would probably not justify the cost of operating the aircraft.

The advantage of both of these approaches to ASAT is that they are relatively inexpensive, either by utilizing commercial equipment or piggybacking on another mission. An additional advantage is that they are low visibility, **not creating the kind of provocative threat that leads to international complaints**, foreign or domestic calls for arms control, or a potential ASAT arms race.

**ASATs are unnecessary – US satellites are not in jeopardy and weaponization only accelerates arms races**

**O’Hanlon, 7** – senior fellow at Foreign Policy (Michael, Brookings, “A Space Weapons Race is Not the Answer for America.” <http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2007/0122defense_ohanlon.aspx>)

Worrying though this is, the US must not overreact. Rushing into a space weapons competition would not serve American strategic interests. But neither are sweeping controls on the military uses of space plausible or desirable. To develop an effective space policy, the US and its allies must bear several principles and realities in mind.  First, the US increasingly uses space for military purposes, particularly for tactical war-fighting. Real-time data links and GPS-guided bombs are only the latest manifestations of this trend. The dependence on reconnaissance, targeting and communications satellites will surely grow.  Second, although the US in particular has militarised space in such ways, space has yet to be weaponised. That is, hardly any weapons have been put into orbit or deployed to attack satellites. The Chinese test works against this generalisation, of course, but does not yet repudiate it.  Third, those countries that rely on space systems cannot expect them to remain almost invulnerable. The nuclear powers already have ballistic missiles that have latent anti-satellite capabilities. The US, in particular, is also pursuing several ballistic missile defence programmes that also could be modified for anti-satellite weapon purposes; other countries may soon have similar, if less technically advanced, capabilities. For US armed forces, inherent vulnerabilities in low-altitude imaging satellites are of particular concern. They could be attacked by the type of weapon China has just tested, or microsatellites or lasers.  While regrettable, the Chinese anti-satellite test is a partially understandable step by a rising military power. China's test was more blatant than America's ongoing efforts in space but, if one can forgive the pun, it has not occurred in a vacuum.  Fourth, other countries will gradually become more able to use space for offensive military purposes. In particular, they are likely to gain the capacity to find and target large mobile assets such as ships and big formations of ground forces.  Basic technological and strategic realities support the argument for a moderate and flexible US military space policy. These realities also refute the extreme positions that have been espoused by prominent US policymakers in recent years. The late 1990s report of the Commission on Outer Space, for instance, warned of a possible space "Pearl Harbor". It implied that the US needed rapidly to take many steps - including offensive ones - to address such a purportedly imminent threat.  Most **US satellites are not vulnerable to attack today nor are they likely to be in the years ahead**. Thereafter, threats may often be handled through relatively passive measures and through redundant systems rather than an all-out space weapons competition. The Chinese anti-satellite test does put lower-altitude reconnaissance systems in greater jeopardy, but not higher-altitude communications and targeting satellites.  By racing to develop its own space weapons, the US would cause two unfortunate consequences. Militarily, **it would legitimate a faster space arms race than is otherwise likely** - something that can only hurt a country that nearly monopolises military space activities today.  Second, it would reinforce the current prevalent image of a unilateralist US, impervious to the stated will of other countries (as reflected in the huge majority votes at the United Nations in favour of negotiating bans on space weaponry).  For all its popularity, a wide-ranging ban on space weaponry is unjustified. Such an accord would be generally unverifiable and unable to reverse the simple fact that many ballistic missile defence systems can be transformed into anti-satellite weapons with relatively modest adjustments.  So the right policy for the US in space remains hedging and going slow. Extreme solutions can be more rhetorically appealing. But they fail to address the technical and strategic realities of the day and should not be adopted. That said, a few more such Chinese tests and we may have little choice.

**ASATs fail – space assets depend on more vulnerable ground-based tech**

**Hitchens, 7** - Director of World Security Institute’s Center for Defense Information and the author of “Future Security In Space: Charting a Cooperative Course,” She also leads CDI’s Space Security Project. She serves on the editorial board of The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, and is a member of Women in Security and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (Winter, Theresa, “U.S.-Sino Relations in Space: From ‘War of Words’ to Cold War in Space?” China Security, World Security Institute, pdf)

At the same time, it is unclear that the up-tick in U.S.-Sino tensions spurred by the test will result in an all-out U.S. drive for an arsenal of offensive counter-space weapons – including similarly destructive ASATs. As most space experts recognize, ASATs cannot protect U.S. space assets because there are myriad terrestrially-based ways to threaten space systems including satellites. It is also highly unclear that ASATs would serve to deter potential adversaries from seeking to target U.S. space assets, as most other nations (including China) are not as dependent on space. Certainly, the China test has raised questions about whether U.S. policy to keep its options open regarding space weapons, and to “dissuade or deter others from either impeding [U.S.] rights or developing capabilities intended to do so,” has already failed. On the other hand, U.S. National Space Policy also states that the United States will take action to “deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to U.S. national interests”\_7 – and the Chinese ASAT test seems to be a sign that Beijing intends to do just that, raising the issue of how the United States might opt to implement, and possibly use, counter-space capabilities. The problem for the U.S. Air Force, which is the “keeper of the keys” on this “space control” policy, is that a build up of counter-space weapons will require major investment (not to mention time to develop technology) at a time when the Pentagon budget is under severe pressure from the ongoing costs of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. And as noted above, the first priorities for space are programs to improve space situational awareness and to protect U.S. satellites, commercial and military, from attack. These two factors suggest that funding for development of a counter-space arsenal may be difficult to garner, at least in the short-term.

**Weaponization is destabilizing – undermines national security interests and hurts every aspect of US global stature, including commercial access**

**Coffelt, 5** – Lt. Colonal; thesis to the school of advanced air and space studies (Christopher A, “THE BEST DEFENSE: CHARTING THE FUTURE OFUS SPACE STRATEGY AND POLICY.” A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies For Completion of the Graduation Requirements SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIR AND SPACE STUDIES AIR UNIVERSITY, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. June 2005.)

In the current context, **weaponizing space is detrimental to United States national security** due to its destabilizing effects. It shortens the period of military and political advantage the United States currently enjoys and makes it more expensive as the investment in space weapons starts sooner rather than later. United States strategists must resist the seductive, immediately visible military advantages of orbital weapons, and seek understanding of the larger strategic implications. Further, terrestrial-based weapons to deny an adversary’s access to space start the US down the slippery slope of offensive space strategy when the US clearly has the most to lose, and have some potential to destabilize, as well.

Strategy needs to drive weapons development and resource allocation, not the other way around. Hence, a clear understanding of the military utility of a potential weapon and its fit within the larger strategy must exist as a prerequisite to weapons development. The reason this is so critical is because it is entirely possible for the military establishment to develop weapons that fit within and fulfill the military strategy, but push the US into a course of action that works counter to and undermines the larger, grand strategy of the nation. The adoption of offensive strategies (most especially during peacetime) fueled by particularly offensive weapon systems can have unintended, negative strategic consequences that cancel out expected gains in security. Former secretary of defense Mcnamara notes that a new weapon cannot be viewed in isolation. Anyone who has been exposed to so-called brochuremanship knows that even the most outlandish notions can be dressed up to look superficially attractive. Instead, each new weapon must be considered against a wide range of issues: its place in the complex of missions to be performed; its effects on the stability of the military situation in the world; other alternatives available.296 he goes on to accurately note that “adding a weapon to our inventory is not necessarily synonymous with adding to our national security.”297 as the case studies reveal, the US has acquired weapons that did not add to its national security when the military utility of the weapon was not well understood, when there was no strategic requirement for the weapon which called for its development, and especially when the weapon systems had a characteristic offensive omnipresence.

The offensive omnipresence of orbital weapons systems is likely to elicit the same destabilizing effects that were evident in the adoption of several offensive nuclear strategies and weapon systems. In spite of the fact that a weapon may be deployed to orbit with purely defensive intentions, the dual use potential of any weapon deployed in orbit renders it inherently offensive. Further, the effects generated by two distinct employment modes of terrestrial-based weapons are likely to have similar characteristics. The fact that orbital weapons are nearly constantly susceptible to terrestrial-based asats and ballistic missile defenses with asat capability gives them a sort of offensive omnipresence with respect to the targets (in orbit) they hold at risk. In these cases, the omnipresence is generated by the deployment configuration of the target, vice the weapon, which literally comes to the weapon or easily falls within its line of site. The US must seek a clearer understanding of more than just the first order effects that these weapons deliver and how they fit into the larger us strategy for space.

Satellites as they are employed today are very stabilizing. On-orbit assets provide transparency for the US and other nations through the intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, communications, early warning, and other functions. While denying an adversary’s use of these systems in wartime is desirable and useful, the proliferation of these less expensive weapons is destabilizing due to spacecraft vulnerability and, in large part, due to the inability to properly assess, characterize, and attribute attacks against satellites in peacetime. It makes little strategic sense for the US to lead efforts in advancing this technology before taking equal or greater measures to ensure its military and commercial space assets are as well protected as possible from these effects.

The US is clearly the most dependent upon and militarily integrated with space, but is also the most vulnerable. This integration creates synergies between forces that yields unmatched combat power and an incredible asymmetric advantage over any potential adversary. **Pushing technology and weapons development to deny an adversary’s access to space systems does little to nothing towards ensuring us access to space**. Considering most countries’ low dependence upon and integration with space systems makes such a move even more strategically questionable. There may, indeed, come a day when the US needs to deny the entire environment of space as aircraft do for air, providing defense of us systems through the prosecution of offense, but that day has not yet arrived. Therefore, the US has a better chance to retain the current security stability and prolong/extend its position of advantage in space by pursuing a strategy that combines fewer offensive elements and more defensive aspects.

# 2NC Squo Solves Ext.

Ground based space weapons solve – are technologically feasible, cheap, and provide maneuverability

Wilkerson, 8 – Lt. Col., published by US Army War College, (Don, “Space Power Theory: Controlling the Medium Without Weapons in Space.” U.S. Army War College, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA482300>)

Ground-based space weapons as an Offensive Counter Space (OCS) capability of space control can be quite effective against enemy strategic space assets. They provide maneuverability and are technologically feasible and less costly than placing offensive weapon platforms or space vehicles in orbit (See Tables 1 and 2). More importantly, the technology to produce and employ ground based space weapons already exists. This is evident by the Air Force’s fielding of the Counter Communications System (CCS) as a mobile SATCOM jamming capability. 41

One mission for OCS ground-based weapons is to deny, disrupt or degrade enemy satellites by jamming their communication links between the satellites and their ground stations. Ground-based weapons or RF systems would prevent satellites from receiving commands from ground stations by jamming antenna frequencies at the satellite which is much more vulnerable than antennas at the ground stations. Jamming enemy strategic space assets could result in degradation of orbits, disruption of satellite communications or limit the ability to task reconnaissance satellites to collect imagery or downlink their data. 42

Another potential method for ground-based weapons would be to take command of an adversary satellite by breaking the codes or “spoofing” the commands, preventing the satellite from performing its intended mission. Again, the advantage of using these techniques in support of space control is that their affects can be temporary and reversible which is an alternative to actually destroying an enemy’s space-based system. 43

Lasers as a ground-based weapon system are equally as promising as groundbased RF systems. Low power lasers have shown promise to temporarily blind reconnaissance and surveillance satellites sensors by denying or disrupting their ability to perform collection missions. Again, one advantage of ground-based chemical gas lasers over space weapons as a means to assist in controlling space would be their resident storage of large amounts fuel and the convenience of continuous resupply unlike space laser weapons in orbit. 44

# 2NC ASATs Fail Ext.

Plan’s useless – they don’t defend the ground nodes which are critical

Wilkerson, 8 – Lt. Col., published by US Army War College, (Don, “Space Power Theory: Controlling the Medium Without Weapons in Space.” U.S. Army War College, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA482300>)

The most vulnerable segment of any space system is the ground node or ground stations that control the on-orbit assets or receive the data downlinks from the satellites. Since ground stations are typically considered “soft” targets and many locations can be easily identified through good intelligence, they are probably the most susceptible to attack from conventional weapons. Equally vulnerable would be the launch facilities used to place satellites into orbit. Therefore, substantial investments to place weapons in space would be counter-intuitive if ground stations are more susceptible to attack and can be easily neutralized. Perhaps discretionary funding should be allocated to hardening critical space nodes, ground nodes and communication links making them less susceptible to intentional electronic jamming, blinding, spoofing and conventional strikes. The author contends that these passive and active defense measures help make on-orbit and ground space systems more resistant to attack and are more economically feasible than placing weapons in space.

# \*\*\*\*AT: SPACE TERRORISM\*\*\*\*

**No satellite terrorism – they do not have the tech or motive to attack in space.**

**Mueller, 3** – associate political scientist at RAND (Karl P., “Totem and Taboo: Depolarizing the Space Weaponization Debate.” in “Space Weapons: are they needed?” ed Logsdon and Adams <http://www.gwu.edu/~spi/assets/docs/Security_Space_Volume.Final.pdf>)

The third inevitability argument is that as space systems become more and more economically important to the United States, these assets will naturally become attractive targets of attack for rival states, terrorists, and other enemies, and therefore it will be necessary to place weapons in space in order to protect them. 38 American industry, commerce, and civil society do indeed depend heavily and increasingly on space systems for communications, navigation, weather prediction, and many other functions. 39 However, it is far from clear that attacking U.S. commercial space assets would automatically appear worthwhile to an enemy seeking ways to hurt the United States, or that protecting them would necessarily require weapons in space. In the abstract, it is apparent that an enemy seeking to harm or to intimidate the United Sates might want to attack important satellites, potentially causing disruption of the services they provide, destroying expensive pieces of American infrastructure, and possibly even causing significant damage to the U.S. economy. However, an enemy that wanted to achieve such a result against the United States could do so far more easily by attacking something other than satellites in orbit, and unlike satellites, most of these targets can be attacked without first developing or acquiring specialized weapons for one exotic target set. 40 Attacking satellites is certainly possible, but crippling or destroying a small object hundreds of miles overhead moving at 17,000 miles per hour (to say nothing of satellites at higher altitudes) is considerably more challenging than doing comparable damage to targets such as ships, airliners, bridges, dams, pipelines, computer networks, office buildings—the list could go on almost indefinitely. 41 That such targets are not attacked on a regular basis is due mainly to the relatively small numbers and limited capabilities of serious terrorist enemies, not to any great degree of protection for these assets. Increased defensive measures since 11 September 2001 have done little to alter the relative difficulty of attacking space and terrestrial targets. Moreover, if an enemy did want to disrupt the use of American satellites, attacking their ground communications stations and launch facilities might well be more effective than striking satellites in orbit, as well as much easier.

**Ground forces solve – space assets are ineffective at quelling the threat**

**Moore, 6** -- contributing editor of The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, a peace-and-security magazine (Mike, not to be confused with Michael, “A New Cold War?.” SAIS Review 26.1 (2006) 175-188. Project MUSE)

The most credible threat America is likely to face in the first half of this century is not a state-sponsored attack on its space assets, but rather intermittent terrorism generated by states or sub-state actors. Fighting terrorism requires imagination, well-coordinated governmental agencies, extraordinarily good intelligence resources, unflagging military tenacity, a willingness by the American people to accept a degree of discomfort, inconvenience, and uncertainty, and a high degree of cooperation among national leaders everywhere, including China.

Fighting terrorism also requires having sophisticated national-security assets in space, including surveillance, communications, and geo-positioning satellites.16 But it does not require that the United States develop and deploy a space-control capability or place weapons in space—unless one believes that the bin Ladens of the world have advanced anti-satellite programs hidden in their caves and spider holes.

# \*\*\*\*1NC ARMS RACE DA\*\*\*\*

**Weaponization causes global insecurity and arms races, increasing space debris and risking rapid nuclear war**

**Hoey, 6** - Research Associate at the Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies, writer for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, [Mathew, Space Review, “Military Space Systems: The Road Ahead” February 26, <http://www.thespacereview.com/article/563/1>]

Many people believe that a deployed anti-satellite capability and an ability to attack targets on or near the Earth’s surface from space would create a global climate of insecurity both by enhancing current risks and by creating new problems. These new and increased risks would be the byproducts not only of systems to be deployed by the United States but also of the subsequent arms race in space which could be expected to result thanks to responses by China, Russia, the European Union, and perhaps Japan. Perhaps the most consequential impact would be increasing the probability of accidental nuclear war. Space-based weapons could shorten the road to armed conflict, whether nuclear or conventional. In the event that a space asset of one nation was attacked by another (on purpose or by accident), an immediate military response would be triggered, shortening the diplomatic process while escalating the armed conflict. Once employed regularly, anti-satellite systems and space weapons would litter LEO with debris, which in turn would permanently compromise our collective ability to explore the heavens and use space for constructive commercial purposes. The weaponization of space and the deployment of ASAT systems would undermine existing international arms control treaties that are already under stress. In addition, they would fly in the face of the collective will of the international community, which has demanded a ban on weapons in space for two decades and repeatedly been blocked by the United States. For those who share these concerns, one thing is certain: the time for international negotiations on a treaty to ban weapons in space is long overdue. Within a very few years, this potential development could become a reality.

**And, weaponization results in preemptive strikes, first use, and encourages backlash against US assets**

**Mitchell et al, 1** -Associate Professor of Communication and Director of Debate at the University of Pittsburgh

(Dr. Gordon, ISIS Briefing on Ballistic Missile Defence, “Missile Defence: Trans-Atlantic Diplomacy at a Crossroads”, No. 6 July, <http://www.isisuk.demon.co.uk/0811/isis/uk/bmd/no6.html>)

A buildup of space weapons might begin with noble intentions of 'peace through strength' deterrence, but this rationale glosses over the tendency that '… the presence of space weapons…will result in the increased likelihood of their use'.33 This drift toward usage is strengthened by a strategic fact elucidated by Frank Barnaby: when it comes to arming the heavens, 'anti-ballistic missiles and anti-satellite warfare technologies go hand-in-hand'.34 The interlocking nature of offense and defense in military space technology stems from the inherent 'dual capability' of spaceborne weapon components. As Marc Vidricaire, Delegation of Canada to the UN Conference on Disarmament, explains: 'If you want to intercept something in space, you could use the same capability to target something on land'. 35 To the extent that ballistic missile interceptors based in space can knock out enemy missiles in mid-flight, such interceptors can also be used as orbiting 'Death Stars', capable of sending munitions hurtling through the Earth's atmosphere. The dizzying speed of space warfare would introduce intense 'use or lose' pressure into strategic calculations, with the spectre of split-second attacks creating incentives to rig orbiting Death Stars with automated 'hair trigger' devices. In theory, this automation would enhance survivability of vulnerable space weapon platforms. However, by taking the decision to commit violence out of human hands and endowing computers with authority to make war, military planners could sow insidious seeds of accidental conflict. Yale sociologist Charles Perrow has analyzed 'complexly interactive, tightly coupled' industrial systems such as space weapons, which have many sophisticated components that all depend on each other's flawless performance. According to Perrow, this interlocking complexity makes it impossible to foresee all the different ways such systems could fail. As Perrow explains, '[t]he odd term "normal accident" is meant to signal that, given the system characteristics, multiple and unexpected interactions of failures are inevitable'.36 Deployment of space weapons with pre-delegated authority to fire death rays or unleash killer projectiles would likely make war itself inevitable, given the susceptibility of such systems to 'normal accidents'. It is chilling to contemplate the possible effects of a space war. According to retired Lt. Col. Robert M. Bowman, 'even a tiny projectile reentering from space strikes the earth with such high velocity that it can do enormous damage — even more than would be done by a nuclear weapon of the same size!'. 37 In the same Star Wars technology touted as a quintessential tool of peace, defence analyst David Langford sees one of the most destabilizing offensive weapons ever conceived: 'One imagines dead cities of microwave-grilled people'.38 Given this unique potential for destruction, it is not hard to imagine that any nation subjected to space weapon attack would retaliate with maximum force, including use of nuclear, biological, and/or chemical weapons. An accidental war sparked by a computer glitch in space could plunge the world into the most destructive military conflict ever seen.

**It escalates and draws in every major power, including China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Iran, and Israel**

 **Hitchens, 7** -- director of the World Security Institute’s Center for Defense Information (Theresa, Disarmament Times, “[An ASAT Arms Race: The Slippery Slope to Space Weaponization?](http://disarm.igc.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=51:dt2007summerHitchens&catid=60:dt2007summer&Itemid=2).” <http://disarm.igc.org/index.php?view=article&catid=60%3Adt2007summer&id=51%3Adt2007summerHitchens&option=com_content&Itemid=2\>)

Russia. Like the US, the former Soviet Union dabbled in a number of ASAT technologies during the Cold War. Russia remains a strong space power, and although its space programs suffered from chronic lack of funds during the 1990s, that situation is now being remedied thanks to Moscow’s influx of petro-dollars. Russia remains committed to its self-imposed ASAT moratorium and has declared that it will not be the first to use space weapons. Nonetheless, Russia would be hard pressed politically not to enter any developing ASAT arms race that included the US and China, and would fully have the capacity to compete.

India. India has a robust space program, and Indian Air Force leadership for years has been agitating for a military counterpart. Trade journal Defense News on April 9, 2007, reported that India has already begun developing ASAT weapons and has reinstated plans to establish an Aerospace Command to manage a cohesive military space program. It is clear that if India actually pursues such a path, Pakistan will certainly follow, **likely engendering a wider Asian space arms race.**

Israel. Israel is the only other nation where government and military officials have openly discussed consideration of ASATs and other techniques, such as sophisticated jamming, for disrupting satellites. Israel also has a fairly sophisticated satellite program, launching its own satellites since 1998 and maintaining its own military imaging and communications satellites. Thus, Israel too could be a player in any ASAT arms race; certainly Israeli officials have been eyeing Iran’s efforts to become a space power with alarm.

**That would kill heg and destroy US space leadership, outweighing any short-term boost from the plan**

**Hitchens, 2** -CDI Vice President, (Theresa, April 18 “Weapons in Space: Silver Bullet or Russian Roulette? The Policy Implications of U.S. Pursuit of Space-Based Weapons”, http://www.cdi.org/missile-defense/spaceweapons.cfm)

China and Russia long have been worried about possible U.S. breakout on space-based weaponry. Officials from both countries have expressed concern that the U.S. missile defense program is aimed not at what Moscow and Beijing see as a non-credible threat from rogue-nation ballistic missiles, but rather at launching a long-term U.S. effort to dominate space. Both Russia and China also are key proponents of negotiations at the UN Conference on Disarmament to expand the 1967 Outer Space Treaty to ban all types of weapons. The effort to start talks known as PAROS, for "prevention of an arms race in outer space," has been stalled due in large part to the objection of the United States. For example, in November 2000, the United States was one of three countries (the others were Israel and Micronesia) to refuse to vote for a UN resolution citing the need for steps to prevent the arming of space. It is inconceivable that either Russia or China would allow the United States to become the sole nation with space-based weapons. "Once a nation embarks down the road to gain a huge asymmetric advantage, the natural tendency of others is to close that gap. An arms race tends to develop an inertia of its own," writes Air Force Lt. Col. Bruce M. DeBlois, in a 1998 article in Airpower Journal. Chinese moves to put weapons in space would trigger regional rival India to consider the same, in turn, spurring Pakistan to strive for parity with India. Even U.S. allies in Europe might feel pressure to "keep up with the Joneses." It is quite easy to imagine the course of a new arms race in space that would be nearly as destabilizing as the atomic weapons race proved to be. Such a strategic-level space race could have negative consequences for U.S. security in the long run that would outweigh the obvious (and tremendous) short-term advantage of being the first with space-based weapons. There would be direct economic costs to sustaining orbital weapon systems and keeping ahead of opponents intent on matching U.S. space-weapon capabilities — raising the proverbial question of whether we would be starting a game we might not be able to win. (It should be remembered that the attacker will always have an advantage in space warfare, in that space assets are inherently static, moving in predictable orbits. Space weapons, just like satellites, have inherent vulnerabilities.) Again, the price tag of space weapons systems would not be trivial — with maintenance costs a key issue. For example, it now costs commercial firms between $300 million and $350 million to replace a single satellite that has a lifespan of about 15 years, according to Ed Cornet, vice president of Booz Allen and Hamilton consulting firm. Many experts also argue there would be costs, both economic and strategic, stemming from the need to counter other asymmetric challenges from those who could not afford to be participants in the race itself. Threatened nations or non-state actors might well look to terrorism using chemical or biological agents as one alternative. Karl Mueller, now at RAND, in an analysis for the School of Advanced Airpower Studies at Maxwell Air Force Base, wrote, "The United States would not be able to maintain unchallenged hegemony in the weaponization of space, and while a space-weapons race would threaten international stability, it would be even more dangerous to U.S. security and relative power projection capability, due to other states' significant ability and probably inclination to balance symmetrically and asymmetrically against ascendant U.S. power." Spurring other nations to acquire space-based weapons of their own, especially weapons aimed at terrestrial targets, would certainly undercut the ability of U.S. forces to operate freely on the ground on a worldwide basis — negating what today is a unique advantage of being a military superpower.

# Link Ext.

**Weaponization sparks an asymmetrical response, destroying sustainable US leadership and turning heg**

**Zhang, 8** - Senior Research Associate at the Project on Managing the Atom in the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government (March, Hui, “Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space,” Belfer Center, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/18178/russian\_and\_chinese\_responses\_to\_us\_military\_plans\_in\_space.html)

As many experts point out, space-based weapons cannot protect satellites, as these weapons are vulnerable to the same types of attack as the objects they aim to protect.37Chinese officials believe the real purpose of U.S. space plans is not to protect U.S. assets but rather to further enhance U.S. military dominance. As one official pointed out, “Space domination is a hegemonic concept. Its essence is monopoly of space and denial of others’ access to it. It is also aiming at using outer space for achieving strategic objectives on the ground.”38Ambassador Hu Xiaodi warned, “It is rather the attempt towards the domination of outer space, which is expected to serve in turn the absolute security and perpetual superiority (many people call this hegemony) of one country on earth. The unilateralism and exceptionalism that are on the rise in recent months also mutually reinforce this.”39 Washington’s missile defense plans and ambitions to dominate the use of space would very likely spark competitive military dynamics in space. As China’s proposal on PAROS at the CD states, “Outer space is the common heritage of mankind and plays an ever-increasing role in its future development.” China fears that the U.S. space weaponization plans will have disastrous effects on the peaceful use of outer space.40U.S. plans will also have harmful consequences for China’s political, military-strategic, commercial, and inter- national security interests. Of particular concern is the effect of U.S. actions on China’s modest deterrent capabilities, its capacity to pursue unification with Taiwan, its commercial stake in space development, and its broader interest in a stable security environment. Arms competition in space. Because space-based weapons are at once threatening to other countries and vulnerable to attack, it is reasonable to assume that countries capable of blocking their use would do so. One possible response would be the development of ASATs to target space-based weapon systems. It is widely believed that space-weapons platforms and sensor satellites would become prime high-value targets and the most vulnerable to defense suppression attacks. Destroying a satellite is far simpler than destroying a warhead carried on a reentry vehicle. As a result, for systems that rely on strike weapons or crucial sensors based in space (e.g., BMD),as Ashton Carter stated, “ASATa ttack on these components is probably the cheapest and most effective offensive countermeasure.”41It is reasonable to believe that other countries could resort to asymmetric methods to counter critical and vulnerable space-based components in LEO, such as weapon carrier vehicle satellites and space-based tracking satellites. China fears that U.S.space weaponization plans, if acted on, will inevitably lead to an arms race in outer space and risk turning space into a battlefield. Richard Garwin, among others, speculates that “if there are weapons in space, then be extensive development and deployment of ASAT, in order to negate those weapons.”42Chinese Ambassador Hu Xiaodi ex- pressed China’s concerns about an arms competition in space: The country that takes the lead in deploying weapons in space will enjoy an advantage for a period, but it will not be able to monopolize space weapons. Other states, when they find it affordable economically, scientifically and technically, will follow suit at a different pace and scale. This many not generate as pace arms race in its strict sense (be- cause other states are not really competing with the leading power), but the space weapon arsenal will inevitably develop and increase both qualitatively and quantitatively. As soon as the weapons are deployed in outer space, the international community will have to change its efforts from preventive ones to the aim of space disarmament. Soon after- wards, as a few other countries (major powers) also have put their weapons in the arena of outer space, there will be an attempt towards space weapon non-proliferation—that is, let the haves continue their privileged position, while prohibiting other have-nots from accessing space weaponry. In other words, an old story will unfold in a new form.43

**Weaponization risks miscalc and nuclear war – studies prove**

**Johnson, 7** – PhD and director of The Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy (Rebecca, the Acronym Institute [an Independent, not-for-profit research and advocacy organization working on disarmament, arms control, and security issues], “Space without Weapons.” October, http://www.acronym.org.uk/space/congo.htm)

The pursuit of missile defences could increase nuclear threats by creating an **escalating offence-defence spiral**, not only in production of weaponry, but also in operational situations, which could be particularly destabilising and dangerous in times of crisis. The use of space for targeting conventional forces may already provoke asymmetric threats, particularly through hacking, jamming or attacks to disable ground stations.

A number of adverse security consequences are foreseeable if space were to be weaponised. It could exacerbate the threats from space debris and EMP and provoke other space-faring nations to deploy weapons for use in, to or from space.

**In computer wargame trials** conducted by the Pentagon a few years ago, the use of weapons in space (including anti-satellite weapons) led inexorably **to the use of nuclear weapons and therefore to nuclear war on the ground**. Losing one's space-based 'eyes and ears' appeared to cause **miscalculations that led to rushed, panicky 'use them or lose them' decisions** being made, with devastating consequences.

Even if weaponising space did not lead directly to nuclear war - **with the inevitable catastrophic consequences for humankind** - it would create a situation of widespread distrust. It could also impede international cooperation in areas related to space technology and developments, including commercial enterprises and space exploration.

**Weaponization guarantees backlash – no one will just roll over and accept unilateral US dominance**

**Peña and Hudgins, 2** -- \*senior defense policy analyst at cato, AND \*\*former director of regulatory studies at cato (Carlos, Edward, “Should the United States “Weaponize” Space? Military and Commercial Implications.” Cato, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa427.pdf)

More to Lose Than to Gain As important and potentially vulnerable as current U.S. space-based assets might be, deploying actual weapons (whether defensive or offensive) would likely be perceived as very threatening to the status quo. Because of this, any move to weaponize space would likely precipitate a response to counter such capability. And weapons in space would indeed be tempting targets for a preemptive attack by an adversary. To be sure, not deploying weapons in space is no guarantee that potentially hostile nations (such as China) will not develop and deploy ASATs. However, it **is virtually certain that deploying U.S. weapons in space will lead to the development and deployment of ASATs to counter such weapons**. The United States should therefore not be the first to weaponize space—either with defensive weapons or with offensive ASATs. But deploying defensive decoys—rather than weapons—would not inevitably lead to such an arms race.

In the final analysis, any near-term moves toward weaponizing space are premature. If the U.S. government is concerned that some nations may find its military and commercial satellites tempting targets, then the United States ought to look first to its foreign policy and military posture as a factor in motivating those nations to take hostile actions toward the United States. According to Richard Betts at the Council on Foreign Relations, “American activism to guarantee international stability is, paradoxically, the prime source of American vulnerability.” 54

# Perception 1st

**Their benign hegemon theory is naïve – the plan irreparably changes how other countries perceive US power, which outweighs**

**Moore, 6** -- contributing editor of The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, a peace-and-security magazine (Mike, not to be confused with Michael, “A New Cold War?.” SAIS Review 26.1 (2006) 175-188. Project MUSE)

U.S. space-power partisans define space control as having the capability to grant access to space to the good guys and deny access to the bad guys. That power is framed in the language of deterrence; it would be used only when necessary.

However, this goal ignores the predictable political impact of possessing such power. A nation able to deny access to space to hostile states in a time of conflict would have the latent capability to deny access to *anyone* at *any* time. Why would any nation-state that values its own sovereignty be content with that?

The people of many nations already hate, fear or mistrust the United States, in part because of its staggering lead in high-tech warfare, which has been repeatedly demonstrated not only in war games, but in actual battle.

One suspects most countries already have come to terms with the fact that the United States will continue indefinitely to be the most powerful state the world has ever known, militarily, economically, and culturally. But is there a tipping point? A line beyond which even a nation as relatively benign as the United States cannot go without provoking reactions that ultimately would compromise the security of its own citizens? **[End Page 178]**

U.S. control of space, says Everett C. Dolman of the Air Force's highly influential School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, would place "as guardian of space the most benign state that has ever attempted hegemony over the greater part of the world." It would be a bold and decisive step, and "at least from the hegemon's point of view, morally just."4

Morally just? That phrase lies at the heart of the debate over space control and weapons in space. This debate is not just about whether such courses of action would be prudent or imprudent. It is also about America's message to the world. The United States is a free and open society, with a commitment to liberty and the rule of law. We have a generosity of spirit that is uncommon in history, which we advertise widely. On balance, this sounds like a nation concerned with morality and justice.

But modern America has at times demonstrated an unseemly imperial arrogance in its foreign policy. Americans sometimes ask, "Why*do* they hate us?" One answer comes easily: We are the world's richest and most powerful nation, a nation that—on the whole—lives well. This fact incites envy. Another easy answer: Many tens of millions of people hate America because they live in an intellectual dark age and are culturally incapable of understanding the extraordinary values that make the United States great. One would not describe jihadists as children of the Enlightenment.

Yet there is another, harsher answer. Perhaps some men and women hate us because they know America well. They resent the common belief among Americans that the United States—alone among nations—is nearly always right. Indeed, *righteous*. For more than a century, dozens of U.S. interventions—hundreds, really—in the internal affairs of other states have been driven, at least in part, by that sense of righteousness.5

National righteousness is not uncommon. It characterizes the elites of any number of states beginning with France, a nation whose chief exports seem to be wine, cheese, and moral smugness. But Britain and Germany are powerfully righteous states, too, as are Norway and Sweden, Russia and India, Saudi Arabia and Israel, China and Japan.

None of these states, however, aspires to develop and maintain the capability to exercise "full spectrum dominance"—a favored Defense Department phrase6 —anywhere in the world at any time; none of these states contemplates developing and deploying a space-control capability; none of these states is attempting to design space-based weapons.

A definitive U.S. decision to develop and deploy a comprehensive space-control capability and to place weapons in space would be a bridge too far.

# Accidents Module

**Poor Russian intelligence warning would result in miscalculation on space debris and nuclear war with the US**

**Lewis, 04** - Post doctorate Fellow in the Advanced Methods of Cooperative Security Program, (Jeffery, July “What if Space Were Weaponized? Possible Consequences for Conflict Scenarios” Center for Defense Information, <http://www.cdi.org/PDFs/scenarios.pdf>

This is the second of two scenarios that consider how U.S. space weapons might create incentives for America’s opponents to behave in dangerous ways. The previous scenario looked at the systemic risk of accidents that could arise from keeping nuclear weapons on high alert to guard against a space weapons attack. This section focuses on the risk that a single accident in space, such as a piece of space debris striking a Russian early-warning satellite, might be the catalyst for an accidental nuclear war. As we have noted in an earlier section, the United States canceled its own ASAT program in the 1980s over concerns that the deployment of these weapons might be deeply destabilizing. For all the talk about a “new relationship” between the United States and Russia, both sides retain thousands of nuclear forces on alert and configured to fight a nuclear war. When briefed about the size and status of U.S. nuclear forces, President George W. Bush reportedly asked “What do we need all these weapons for?”43 The answer, as it was during the Cold War, is that the forces remain on alert to conduct a number of possible contingencies, including a nuclear strike against Russia. This fact, of course, is not lost on the Russian leadership, which has been increasing its reliance on nuclear weapons to compensate for the country’s declining military might. In the mid-1990s, Russia dropped its pledge to refrain from the “first use” of nuclear weapons and conducted a series of exercises in which Russian nuclear forces prepared to use nuclear weapons to repel a NATO invasion. In October 2003, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov reiterated that Moscow might use nuclear weapons “preemptively” in any number of contingencies, including a NATO attack.44 So, it remains business as usual with U.S. and Russian nuclear forces. And business as usual includes the occasional false alarm of a nuclear attack. There have been several of these incidents over the years. In September 1983, as a relatively new Soviet early-warning satellite moved into position to monitor U.S. missile fields in North Dakota, the sun lined up in just such a way as to fool the Russian satellite into reporting that half a dozen U.S. missiles had been launched at the Soviet Union. Perhaps mindful that a brand new satellite might malfunction, the officer in charge of the command center that monitored data from the early-warning satellites refused to pass the alert to his superiors. He reportedly explained his caution by saying: “When people start a war, they don’t start it with only five missiles. You can do little damage with just five missiles.”45 In January 1995, Norwegian scientists launched a sounding rocket on a trajectory similar to one that a U.S. Trident missile might take if it were launched to blind Russian radars with a high altitude nuclear detonation. The incident was apparently serious enough that, the next day, Russian President Boris Yeltsin stated that he had activated his “nuclear football” – a device that allows the Russian president to communicate with his military advisors and review his options for launching his arsenal. In this case, the Russian early-warning satellites could clearly see that no attack was under way and the crisis passed without incident.46 In both cases, Russian observers were confident that what appeared to be a “small” attack was not a fragmentary picture of a much larger one. In the case of the Norwegian sounding rocket, space-based sensors played a crucial role in assuring the Russian leadership that it was not under attack. The Russian command system, however, is no longer able to provide such reliable, early warning. The dissolution of the Soviet Union cost Moscow several radar stations in newly independent states, creating “attack corridors” through which Moscow could not see an attack launched by U.S. nuclear submarines.47 Further, Russia’s constellation of early-warning satellites has been allowed to decline – only one or two of the six satellites remain operational, leaving Russia with early warning for only six hours a day. Russia is attempting to reconstitute its constellation of early-warning satellites, with several launches planned in the next few years. But Russia will still have limited warning and will depend heavily on its space-based systems to provide warning of an American attack.48 As the previous section explained, the Pentagon is contemplating military missions in space that will improve U.S. ability to cripple Russian nuclear forces in a crisis before they can execute an attack on the United States. Anti-satellite weapons, in this scenario, would blind Russian reconnaissance and warning satellites and knock out communications satellites. Such strikes might be the prelude to a full-scale attack, or a limited effort, as attempted in a war game at Schriever Air Force Base, to conduct “early deterrence strikes” to signal U.S. resolve and control escalation.49 By 2010, the United States may, in fact, have an arsenal of ASATs (perhaps even on orbit 24/7) ready to conduct these kinds of missions – to coerce opponents and, if necessary, support preemptive attacks. Moscow would certainly have to worry that these ASATs could be used in conjunction with other space-enabled systems – for example, long-range strike systems that could attack targets in less than 90 minutes – to disable Russia’s nuclear deterrent before the Russian leadership understood what was going on. What would happen if a piece of space debris were to disable a Russian early-warning satellite under these conditions? Could the Russian military distinguish between an accident in space and the first phase of a U.S. attack? Most Russian early-warning satellites are in elliptical Molniya orbits (a few are in GEO) and thus difficult to attack from the ground or air. At a minimum, Moscow would probably have some tactical warning of such a suspicious launch, but given the sorry state of Russia’s warning, optical imaging and signals intelligence satellites there is reason to ask the question. Further, the advent of U.S. on-orbit ASATs, as now envisioned50 could make both the more difficult orbital plane and any warning systems moot. The unpleasant truth is that the Russians likely would have to make a judgment call. No state has the ability to definitively determine the cause of the satellite’s failure. Even the United States does not maintain (nor is it likely to have in place by 2010) a sophisticated space surveillance system that would allow it to distinguish between a satellite malfunction, a debris strike or a deliberate attack – and Russian space surveillance capabilities are much more limited by comparison. Even the risk assessments for collision with debris are speculative, particularly for the unique orbits in which Russian early-warning satellites operate. During peacetime, it is easy to imagine that the Russians would conclude that the loss of a satellite was either a malfunction or a debris strike. But how confident could U.S. planners be that the Russians would be so calm if the accident in space occurred in tandem with a second false alarm, or occurred during the middle of a crisis? What might happen if the debris strike occurred shortly after a false alarm showing a missile launch? False alarms are appallingly common – according to information obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, the U.S.-Canadian North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) experienced 1,172 “moderately serious” false alarms between 1977 and 1983 – an average of almost three false alarms per week. Comparable information is not available about the Russian system, but there is no reason to believe that it is any more reliable.51 Assessing the likelihood of these sorts of coincidences is difficult because Russia has never provided data about the frequency or duration of false alarms; nor indicated how seriously early-warning data is taken by Russian leaders. Moreover, there is no reliable estimate of the debris risk for Russian satellites in highly elliptical orbits.52 The important point, however, is that such a coincidence would only appear suspicious if the United States were in the business of disabling satellites – in other words, there is much less risk if Washington does not develop ASATs. The loss of an early-warning satellite could look rather ominous if it occurred during a period of major tension in the relationship. While NATO no longer sees Russia as much of a threat, the same cannot be said of the converse. Despite the warm talk, Russian leaders remain wary of NATO expansion, particularly the effect expansion may have on the Baltic port of Kaliningrad. Although part of Russia, Kaliningrad is separated from the rest of Russia by Lithuania and Poland. Russia has already complained about its decreasing lack of access to the port, particularly the uncooperative attitude of the Lithuanian govern-ment.53 News reports suggest that an edgy Russia may have moved tactical nuclear weapons into the enclave.54 If the Lithuanian government were to close access to Kaliningrad in a fit of pique, this would trigger a major crisis between NATO and Russia. Under these circumstances, the loss of an early-warning satellite would be extremely suspicious. It is any military’s nature during a crisis to interpret events in their worst-case light. For example, consider the coincidences that occurred in early September 1956, during the extraordinarily tense period in international relations marked by the Suez Crisis and Hungarian uprising.55 On one evening the White House received messages indicating: 1. the Turkish Air Force had gone on alert in response to unidentified aircraft penetrating its airspace; 2. one hundred Soviet MiG-15s were flying over Syria; 3. a British Canberra bomber had been shot down over Syria, most likely by a MiG; and 4. The Russian fleet was moving through the Dardanelles. Gen. Andrew Goodpaster was reported to have worried that the confluence of events “might trigger off … the NATO operations plan” that called for a nuclear strike on the Soviet Union. Yet, all of these reports were false. The “jets” over Turkey were a flock of swans; the Soviet MiGs over Syria were a smaller, routine escort returning the president from a state visit to Moscow; the bomber crashed due to mechanical difficulties; and the Soviet fleet was beginning long-scheduled exercises. In an important sense, these were not “coincidences” but rather different manifestations of a common failure – human error resulting from extreme tension of an international crisis. As one author noted, “The detection and misinterpretation of these events, against the context of world tensions from Hungary and Suez, was the first major example of how the size and complexity of worldwide electronic warning systems could, at certain critical times, create momentum of its own.” Perhaps most worrisome, the United States might be blithely unaware of the degree to which the Russians were concerned about its actions and inadvertently escalate a crisis. During the early 1980s, the Soviet Union suffered a major “war scare” during which time its leadership concluded that bilateral relations were rapidly declining. This war scare was driven in part by the rhetoric of the Reagan administration, fortified by the selective reading of intelligence. During this period, NATO conducted a major command post exercise, Able Archer, that caused some elements of the Soviet military to raise their alert status. American officials were stunned to learn, after the fact, that the Kremlin had been acutely nervous about an American first strike during this period.56

**The presence of ASAT weapons mean that false alarms are misinterpreted and risk crisis escalation**

**Lewis, 04** - Post doctorate Fellow in the Advanced Methods of Cooperative Security Program, (Jeffery, July “What if Space Were Weaponized? Possible Consequences for Conflict Scenarios” Center for Defense Information, <http://www.cdi.org/PDFs/scenarios.pdf>

All of these incidents have a common theme – that confidence is often the difference between war and peace. In times of crisis, false alarms can have a momentum of their own. As in the second scenario in this monograph, the lesson is that commanders rely on the steady flow of reliable information. When that information flow is disrupted – whether by a deliberate attack or an accident – confidence collapses and the result is panic and escalation. Introducing ASAT weapons into this mix is all the more dangerous, because such weapons target the elements of the command system that keep leaders aware, informed and in control. As a result, the mere presence of such weapons is corrosive to the confidence that allows national nuclear forces to operate safely.

# Prolif Module

**The plan sparks prolif and destroys the potential for international disarm agreements, specifically the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty**

**Zhang, 8 -** Senior Research Associate at the Project on Managing the Atom in the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government (March, Hui, “Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space,” Belfer Center, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/18178/russian\_and\_chinese\_responses\_to\_us\_military\_plans\_in\_space.html)

Damage to arms control and nuclear proliferation regimes. The inherent offensive and first-strike capabilities offered by space weapons would likely provoke destabilizing military and political responses from other countries. As Ambassador Hu points out, “With lethal weapons flying overhead in orbit and disrupting global strategic stability, why should people eliminate WMD [weapons of mass destruction] or missiles on the ground? This cannot but do harm to global peace, security and stability, hence be detrimental to the fundamental interests of all States.”56Nuclear experts have warned that deploying even limited missile defenses would increase the difficulty of reducing the numbers of warheads.57Russia has threatened to respond to any country’s deployment of space weapons.58 The Chinese government holds that a secure international environment and strategic stability are the foundations for advancing the international nu- clear disarmament process.59However, U.S. missile defense and space weaponization plans will destroy these foundations. Ambassador Hu made this point clearly in remarks to the CD: It should be stressed that efforts to prevent an arms race in outer space and those on nuclear disarmament go hand in hand. In this perspective, it is of crucial importance for nuclear disarmament that a missile defense system undermining strategic stability should not be developed, and that no weapons should be deployed in outer space. It is hard to imagine that once a full-fledged missile defense system is put in place or weapons have been introduced into outer space there can be business as usual in nuclear disarmament. At best, such moves would never be conducive to nuclear disarmament.60 If China, or any other nation, felt a need to build new warheads to enhance deterrent capabilities in response to perceived provocation in space, this would increase demand for plutonium and highly enriched uranium to fuel those weapons. The process could harm the chances of negotiating a successful Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty(FMCT),which has long been seen as a key building block for controlling nuclear weapons proliferation and for eventual disarmament. Failure to proceed with the nuclear disarmament process, to which the nuclear weapon states are committed under the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, would undermine the already fragile nuclear non-proliferation regime. In short, China, as evidenced in Chinese statements at the CD,is concerned that the deployment of space weapons “will disrupt strategic balance and stability, undermine international and national security and do harm to the existing arms control instruments, in particular those related to nuclear weapons and missiles, thus triggering new arms races.”

**The FMCT solves prolif, terrorism, and international disarm**

**UNIDIR, 10** – United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (April, “A Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty: Understanding the Critical Issues,” pdf)

It is worth bearing in mind the following considerations on the objectives of a ﬁssile material treaty. The weight given to these factors by delegations or groups of delegations will determine the outcome of eventual negotiations: Banning the production of ﬁssile materials for nuclear weapons will serve several ends. It will limit the pool of materials available for manufacturing such weapons, thereby beneﬁting the causes of horizontal and vertical non-proliferation, and lowering the risk of diversion to terrorists.18 There exists a widespread expectation that an outcome of the • negotiations will be the formalization of the longstanding moratoria on ﬁssile material production declared unilaterally by France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States, extended to cover the other FM producers that possess, or are thought to possess or to be in the process of acquiring, nuclear weapons. A ﬁssile materials treaty will also aid the cause of nuclear disarmament • by making reductions in nuclear arsenals irreversible. This will be achieved through the manner in which the treaty ensures that ﬁssile materials declared excess to weapons needs is prevented from any future use in nuclear weapons. Such an outcome will serve two purposes. It will improve the climate of trust among the nuclear- weapon-possessing states, and at the same time it will help build conﬁdence among non-nuclear-weapon states that real steps toward nuclear disarmament are being taken, provided that this excess ﬁssile materials are placed under international safeguards. From the emphasis in the Shannon Mandate on the need for a “ • non- discriminatory” regime, it is clear that the ﬁnal outcome will need to satisfy non-nuclear weapon states that a ﬁssile material treaty would have no discrimination in favour of the nuclear-weapon states. This factor reﬂects the view among non-nuclear-weapon states that the bargain underpinning their agreement to the NPT is not being honoured by the nuclear weapon states. It would greatly boost the causes of nuclear disarmament and non- • proliferation if a treaty covered existing stocks of ﬁssile materials as well as future production. Even if agreement on existing stocks eludes negotiators, parallel measures outside of a treaty could enhance transparency and facilitate irreversibility.

Prolif dramatically increases the risk of accidental, intentional, or terror-based nuclear war

Utgoff 2 - Deputy Director of Strategy, Forces, and Resources @ the Institute for Defense Analyses (Victor, Survival, “Proliferation, Missile Defense and American Ambitions”, 44:2, Summer, p. 87-90)

Many readers are probably willing to accept that nuclear proliferation is such a grave threat to world peace that every effort should be made to avoid it. However, every effort has not been made in the past, and we are talking about much more substantial efforts now. For new and substantially more burdensome efforts to be made to slow or stop nuclear proliferation, it needs to be established that the highly proliferated nuclear world that would sooner or later evolve without such efforts is not going to be acceptable. And, for many reasons, it is not. First, the dynamics of getting to a highly proliferated world could be very dangerous. Proliferating states will feel great pressures to obtain nuclear weapons and delivery systems before any potential opponent does. Those who succeed in outracing an opponent may consider preemptive nuclear war before the opponent becomes capable of nuclear retaliation. Those who lag behind might try to preempt their opponent’s nuclear programme or defeat the opponent using conventional forces. And those who feel threatened but are incapable of building nuclear weapons may still be able to join in this arms race by building other types of weapons of mass destruction, such as biological weapons. Second, as the world approaches complete proliferation, the hazards posed by nuclear weapons today will be magnified many times over. Fifty or more nations capable of launching nuclear weapons means that the risk of nuclear accidents that could cause serious damage not only to their own populations and environments, but those of others, is hugely increased. The chances of such weapons falling into the hands of renegade military units or terrorists is far greater, as is the number of nations carrying out hazardous manufacturing and storage activities. Increased prospects for the occasional nuclear shootout Worse still, in a highly proliferated world there would be more frequent opportunities for the use of nuclear weapons. And more frequent opportunities means shorter expected times between conflicts in which nuclear weapons get used, unless the probability of use at any opportunity is actually zero. To be sure, some theorists on nuclear deterrence appear to think that in any confrontation between two states known to have reliable nuclear capabilities, the probability of nuclear weapons being used is zero.3 These theorists think that such states will be so fearful of escalation to nuclear war that they would always avoid or terminate confrontations between them, short of even conventional war. They believe this to be true even if the two states have different cultures or leaders with very eccentric personalities. History and human nature, however, suggest that they are almost surely wrong. History includes instances in which states known to possess nuclear weapons did engage in direct conventional conflict. China and Russia fought battles along their common border even after both had nuclear weapons. Moreover, logic suggests that if states with nuclear weapons always avoided conflict with one another, surely states without nuclear weapons would avoid conflict with states that had them. Again, history provides counter-examples. Egypt attacked Israel in 1973 even though it saw Israel as a nuclear power at the time. Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands and fought Britain’s efforts to take them back, even though Britain had nuclear weapons. Those who claim that two states with reliable nuclear capabilities to devastate each other will not engage in conventional conflict risking nuclear war also assume that any leader from any culture would not choose suicide for his nation. But history provides unhappy examples of states whose leaders were ready to choose suicide for themselves and their fellow citizens. Hitler tried to impose a ‘victory or destruction’ policy on his people as Nazi Germany was going down to defeat.4 And Japan’s war minister, during debates on how to respond to the American atomic bombing, suggested ‘Would it not be wondrous for the whole nation to be destroyed like a beautiful flower?’5 If leaders are willing to engage in conflict with nuclear-armed nations, use of nuclear weapons in any particular instance may not be likely, but its probability would still be dangerously significant. In particular, human nature suggests that the threat of retaliation with nuclear weapons is not a reliable guarantee against a disastrous first use of these weapons. While national leaders and their advisors everywhere are usually talented and experienced people, even their most important decisions cannot be counted on to be the product of well-informed and thorough assessments of all options from all relevant points of view. This is especially so when the stakes are so large as to defy assessment and there are substantial pressures to act quickly, as could be expected in intense and fast-moving crises between nuclear-armed states.6 Instead, like other human beings, national leaders can be seduced by wishful thinking. They can misinterpret the words or actions of opposing leaders. Their advisors may produce answers that they think the leader wants to hear, or coalesce around what they know is an inferior decision because the group urgently needs the confidence or the sharing of responsibility that results from settling on something. Moreover, leaders may not recognise clearly where their personal or party interests diverge from those of their citizens. Under great stress, human beings can lose their ability to think carefully. They can refuse to believe that the worst could really happen, oversimplify the problem at hand, think in terms of simplistic analogies and play hunches. The intuitive rules for how individuals should respond to insults or signs of weakness in an opponent may too readily suggest a rash course of action. Anger, fear, greed, ambition and pride can all lead to bad decisions. The desire for a decisive solution to the problem at hand may lead to an unnecessarily extreme course of action. We can almost hear the kinds of words that could flow from discussions in nuclear crises or war. ‘These people are not willing to die for this interest’. ‘No sane person would actually use such weapons’. ‘Perhaps the opponent will back down if we show him we mean business by demonstrating a willingness to use nuclear weapons’. ‘If I don’t hit them back really hard, I am going to be driven from office, if not killed’. Whether right or wrong, in the stressful atmosphere of a nuclear crisis or war, such words from others, or silently from within, might resonate too readily with a harried leader. Thus, both history and human nature suggest that nuclear deterrence can be expected to fail from time to time, and we are fortunate it has not happened yet. But the threat of nuclear war is not just a matter of a few weapons being used. It could get much worse. Once a conflict reaches the point where nuclear weapons are employed, the stresses felt by the leaderships would rise enormously. These stresses can be expected to further degrade their decision-making. The pressures to force the enemy to stop fighting or to surrender could argue for more forceful and decisive military action, which might be the right thing to do in the circumstances, but maybe not. And the horrors of the carnage already suffered may be seen as justification for visiting the most devastating punishment possible on the enemy.7 Again, history demonstrates how intense conflict can lead the combatants to escalate violence to the maximum possible levels. In the Second World War, early promises not to bomb cities soon gave way to essentially indiscriminate bombing of civilians. The war between Iran and Iraq during the 1980s led to the use of chemical weapons on both sides and exchanges of missiles against each other’s cities. And more recently, violence in the Middle East escalated in a few months from rocks and small arms to heavy weapons on one side, and from police actions to air strikes and armoured attacks on the other. Escalation of violence is also basic human nature. Once the violence starts, retaliatory exchanges of violent acts can escalate to levels unimagined by the participants beforehand.8 Intense and blinding anger is a common response to fear or humiliation or abuse. And such anger can lead us to impose on our opponents whatever levels of violence are readily accessible.In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear ‘six-shooters’ on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.

# AT: Response is Peaceful

**Any deployment of space weapons would trigger a massive arms race, make space unusable for civilians, and lead to nuclear war.**

**Cox, 7** (Stan, Alternet.com, “Real-Life Star Wars: The Militarization of Space”, 11-15-07, http://www.alternet.org/audits/67699/?page=2&ses=bc840069826945d72d02af984b214a450

Why should we citizens even care what goes on outside the planet and its atmosphere? The prospect of space war seems a lot less ominous than did, say, the threat of a US-Soviet nuclear holocaust. Nobody lives in space; no civilians will be maimed or killed by a robotic shoot-em-up in orbit. Helen Caldicott and Craig Eisendrath answered such arguments in their book War in Heaven: The Arms Race in Outer Space, published earlier this year. In the wake of the Soviet launch of Sputnik in 1957, they wrote, humans across the globe began asking, "Would [outer space] be the venue for wars and synchronized killings, or the common space for a complex of cooperative peaceful efforts benefiting our species? The two uses of space could not exist side by side." They stress that the first deployment of weapons will set off a multi-trillion-dollar arms race, risk littering orbital space with enough debris to make it unusable for any civilian purpose, and possibly trigger a nuclear war.

# AT: Other Countries Can’t/Won’t Respond with Weapons

**The ease of ground-based ASATs means other countries can easily respond**

**Marshall, 6** - fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government and jointly at the Space Policy Institute of George Washington University (William, Boston Globe, “Weapons in outer space”, 7/5, <http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2006/07/05/weapons_in_outer_space/>)

The problem is that satellites are also vulnerable to elimination by enemies. A Space Commission report chaired by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld considers the threat so real it warned of a ``Space Pearl Harbor."

Naturally, Americans want to protect these assets, so why not pursue space weapons? The most compelling reason is that they would actually make the situation worse.

This is due to the technical ease of ground-based anti-satellite systems. Adversaries wouldn't need to go to the trouble of building space-based weapons systems. Simple and inexpensive, ground-based systems could shoot these satellites out of the sky. More than 25 nations already have the missile capability to reach the altitude at which the satellites orbit. More significantly, powerful lasers able to kill a satellite in low orbit through heating are available commercially in more than 50 nations. If the United States deploys ground-based anti-satellite technology, or ASATs (which it can do technically now), then others will follow suit. America has the most assets in orbit to lose in such a game.

If the United States deploys space-based weapons -- like interceptors for missile defense (which it is on course to deploy within about 6 years) -- an adversary could simply take them out from the ground. If any security advantage afforded by such a weapon is easily negated, then one is left with the prospect of other nations moving toward developing ground-based ASAT capabilities. This would severely jeopardize America's precious satellites, all of them. Also, the capabilities provided by each proposed space-based weapon can be achieved with ground-based alternatives that are generally 100 to 1,000 times cheaper.

In addition, the United States is planning to release a new National Space Policy within weeks, tweaks to the language of which could give the green light for US deployment of space-based weapons. Instead, the United States should send a sign to other nations by taking space-based weapons off the books once and for all. America can still protect its satellite systems -- in less-threatening ways.

Plan necessitates a response

Wilkerson, 8 – Lt. Col., published by US Army War College, (Don, “Space Power Theory: Controlling the Medium Without Weapons in Space.” U.S. Army War College, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA482300>)

The international political implications of placing weapons in space would generate opposition internationally and domestically. It is intuitive that once a nation state deploys weapons into space, other space-faring countries will attempt to do the same undoubtedly creating the next arms race in space. David Zeigler, a former mission specialist with NASA, (the author of the article “Safe Havens: Military Strategy and Space Sanctuary”) argues that placing weapons in space actually detracts from the security of states that pursue protection of space based assets. He also asserts that the weaponization of space may be more consistent with Cold War strategies but not necessarily appropriate for a post Cold War environment. Zeigler contends that the need for space sanctuary is greater now than ever with space weapons being economically unfeasible based on limited military funding and the fact that their operational need and capability concepts are grossly overrated.

# AT: Perceived as Defensive

**There is zero chance that weaponization will be seen as defensive**

**Coffelt, 5** – Lt. Colonal; thesis to the school of advanced air and space studies (Christopher A, “THE BEST DEFENSE: CHARTING THE FUTURE OFUS SPACE STRATEGY AND POLICY.” A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies For Completion of the Graduation Requirements SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIR AND SPACE STUDIES AIR UNIVERSITY, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. June 2005.)

As there are currently no weapons in space, the United States cannot credibly claim it is deploying them as a necessary measure for defensive purposes; rather, it will appear entirely offensive. Further, the omnipresence of orbital weapon systems and their dual use potential renders any weapon deployed into orbit as inherently offensive. Terrestrial-based weapon systems that target orbital systems also present an offensive, destabilizing threat in peacetime as they are continually postured and primed to inflict damage meant to deny and destroy enemy capability vice protect one’s own. Due to the orbital deployment of their intended target, these weapons exhibit some of the offensive, omnipresent characteristics seen in orbital weapon systems. Unable to secure the perception that these weapons are intended for defensive purposes, the United States must deal with the distinct disadvantage that offensive weapons bring, namely: security dilemmas.

Security dilemmas

Additional weapons and forces can increase a state’s security until the build-up reaches a turning point where neighboring states fear the offensive potential of the new forces. This spurs a natural reaction to the potential threat, and threatened states add weapons and forces to increase their security, thereby diminishing the security benefit sought by the original state. If the perception of danger is severe, it might even serve as the catalyst for an arms race that greatly increases costs (without added security) as competitors attempt to match the new capability. Even more dangerous than an expensive arms race or marginalization of the original security benefit is the possibility of provoking a preemptive attack. Faced with what appears to be an untenable situation or imminent attack, there are clear advantages for a threatened state to strike preemptively, and neutralize the new threat before it achieves a state of full deployment or operational capability. Decisions to increase weapons during periods of relative peace draw the greatest amount of suspicion, especially when undertaken by a dominant military power.

The United States cannot expect that the entire world will sit idly by as it deploys weapons in space which, effectively, border every state on the planet. If the United States had unlimited armies, navies, and air forces, would it surround every border and coastline with them, ready to put down potential aggression or implement united states policy objectives at a moments notice? Adversaries and allies alike would certainly find such action offensive, possibly spurring them to respond. Putting weapons in space will elicit a similar reaction and/or countermeasures which decrease or negate the intended security benefits. Even without the intense bipolar competitive environment of the cold war, weapons in space could spark an arms race where others (alone or cooperatively) attempt to match the new capability to ensure their interests are similarly secured in space. While the likelihood of spurring a preemptive attack appears low, it remains a possibility that a strategist must consider.

Putting weapons in space may elicit a preemptive attack from a threatened state or states. Striking in the early phases of a space weapon deployment is advantageous because the new weapon system may not have its full capability. Additionally, striking before the United States could potentially prepare and mass for a first-strike gives the threatened state its best chance for success. Aside from the militarily negative consequences of deploying weapons into space, there are also distinct non-military disadvantages.

# AT: Plan = Minimal

**Just one ASAT attack causes nuclear war, mass debris, and economic collapse**

**Krepon and Black, 9**-\*co-founder and senior research associate @ The Stimson Center, director of the South Asia and Space Security programs @ The Stimson Center, M.A. from the School of Advanced International Studies @ Johns Hopkins University, B.A. from Franklin and Marshal College, \*\*Research Associate @ The Stimson Center, BA and MPP (Master of Public Policy) @ University of Maryland [Michael, Samuel, Space Security Project, “Space Security or Anti-Satellite Weapons?,” May 2009, Stimson]

Every US President since Dwight D. Eisenhower has recognized the value of satellites and has championed the peaceful uses of space. Consequently, ASAT tests have been rare. Another reason for restraint is that satellites serve as the eyes and ears of nations that have nuclear weapons. An attack on satellites could therefore trigger a nuclear war. Third, major powers that start a war in space would have great difficulty protecting their own satellites. Fourth, space warfare could cause massive amounts of debris, which would indiscriminately endanger essential satellite operations and manned spaceflight. Fifth, major space powers have interlinked economies. A war in space could do great harm to their financial transactions and international commerce. Sixth, space is widely viewed as a global commons that should remain a sanctuary blessedly free from the disputes that plague us on Earth. Because all major powers could be seriously disadvantaged by a war in space, none have wished to open this Pandora’s Box.

# \*\*\*\*CHINA DA\*\*\*\*

# China DA Links

**Weaponization undermines Chinese nuclear deterrence, setting them on an even more hardline path**

**American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 7** - Independent policy research center (5/16, “China’s Nuclear Arms Posture Examined in New Book from the American Academy of Arts and Sciences,” <http://www.amacad.org/news/nuclear_china.aspx>)

Yet United States military policy to develop and deploy space-based missile defense systems threatens China’s confidence in its ability to deter a nuclear attack, argues arms control expert Jeffrey Lewis in a new book from the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. The Minimum Means of Reprisal: China’s Search for Security in the Nuclear Age documents the history, development and principles behind China’s nuclear policy, and discusses China’s concerns about U.S. defense policy. Although internal factors continue to drive China’s decisions about its nuclear forces, Lewis suggests that the United States is passing up an opportunity to reassure Chinese leaders in favor of preparations for the preemptive use of nuclear weapons that Chinese leaders will find increasingly difficult to ignore. Lewis reasons that while a major buildup of strategic forces in China is possible, China is more likely to acquire asymmetric means of hampering U.S. preemptive capabilities. These means may include countermeasures to defeat U.S. missile defenses, such as anti-satellite weapons, which China successfully tested earlier this year. Lewis argues that China’s longstanding policy of maintaining the minimum nuclear force necessary to deter attack is “fundamentally in the interest of the United States,” and that U.S. policymakers should, among other measures, commit to a bilateral no-first-use pledge rather than to space-based weapons and defense systems that undermine China’s security.

**Weaponization would result in a massive arms race with China, threatening all out nuclear war.**

**Carroll, 3** - former Shorenstein Fellow at the Kennedy School of Government @ Harvard, Scholar-in-Residence at Suffolk (10/28, James, "Bush's battle to dominate in space," Boston Globe, [http://www.mail-archive.com/ctrl@listserv.aol.com/msg108822.html](http://www.mail-archive.com/ctrl%40listserv.aol.com/msg108822.html))

Two weeks ago China put a man in space, a signal of China's arrival -and of the arrival of this grave question. Beijing has invested heavily in commercial development of space and will become a significant economic competitor in that sphere. But such peaceful competition presumes a framework of stability, and it is inconceivable that China can pursue a mainly nonmilitary space program while feeling vulnerable to American military dominance. China has constructed a minimal deterrent force with a few dozen nuclear-armed ICBMs, but US "global engagement" based on a missile defense, will quickly undercut the deterrence value of such a force. The Chinese nuclear arsenal will have to be hugely expanded. Meanwhile, America's "high frontier" weapons capacity will put Chinese commercial space investments at risk. No nation with the ability to alter it would tolerate such imbalance, and over the coming decades there is no doubt that China will have that capacity. Washington's refusal to negotiate rules while seeking permanent dominance and asserting the right of preemption is forcing China into an arms race it does not want. Here, potentially, is the beginning of a next cold war, with a nightmare repeat of open-ended nuclear escalation.

**Weaponization leads to Chinese perception of asymmetry – results in Chinese invasion of Taiwan and US retaliation**

**Krepon, 3** – president of the Stimson Center (Michael, with Christopher Clary, “Space Assurance or Space Dominance?.” The Henry L. Stimson Center, http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/spacebook.pdf)

More definition can be provided to these abstractions by analyzing the scenario of a possible crisis between the United States and China over the future of Taiwan. 4 2 If China possessed imaging satellites capable of locating forward- deployed U.S. aircraft carriers, this targeting information could then be relayed to platforms carrying long-range, anti-ship missiles. As a consequence, U.S. aircraft carriers could be placed at acute risk. Heavy U.S. casualties could result, and depending on the status of forces in the theater, China might initially secure some military gains against Taiwan. Based on this scenario, a U.S. ASAT capability might be viewed as necessary to protect carrier operations in high-threat environments along China’s periphery. By extension, just as surface combatants and submarines provide a defensive screen for carriers on the high seas, ASAT capabilities might provide a defensive screen in space. In this view, the United States might be willing to tolerate an ASAT arms competition in which its own satellites were placed at greater risk in order to ensure incapacitation of the potential enemy’s ability to strike high-value American targets at sea.

To be sure, China might not need satellite capabilities in order to identify the location of U.S. carriers during a crisis over Taiwan. Indeed, satellite capabilities would provide only the most infrequent location information regarding the whereabouts of U.S. aircraft carriers, and only then, if the satellites were cued where to look by other means. In addition, the stipulated assumption of carrier vulnerability in high-threat regions is not new, since it was a staple of the Cold War. What is new in this regard is the assumption that U.S. carriers would be vulnerable to attack by China.

In this scenario, preemption, like asymmetric warfare, is a two-way street. While China could seek to carry out preemptive strikes against U.S. carriers, thereby seeking to facilitate war objectives regarding Taiwan, the United States could seek to carry out preemptive strikes against Chinese satellite capabilities and trailing ships, thereby foiling China’s war plans and limiting U.S. casualties. If China were to strike preemptively against U.S. carriers, it would incur **devastating retaliation** by U.S. military forces, swiftly by U.S. air power, and subsequently by U.S. sea power. If China were able to secure beachheads on Taiwan, these would be pummeled unmercifully. There can be no doubt but that, in the event of a Chinese attack against U.S. naval forces in the Pacific, **Washington would undertake a fearsome military response**, and China would need to contemplate the prospect of Taiwan becoming independent.

In this scenario, the potential benefits of space warfare are far greater when initiated by the stronger adversary than by the weaker foe. A preemptive U.S. strike against Chinese satellites could increase the prospect of a decisive military victory with minimum casualties. A preemptive U.S. strike limited to Chinese space assets would, however, leave much to chance. If the United States were serious about limiting casualties and pursuing damage limitation in the event of a war with China across the Taiwan Strait, preemptive strikes would need to extend to other Chinese targets that could do harm to American military forces and the U.S. homeland. These strikes could also be executed from space, as well as by terrestrial means.

SATELLITE WARFARE AND ESCALATION CONTROL

The inherent escalatory potential of satellite warfare between the United States and a major power such as China is exposed by such anodyne calculations. Any analysis of this scenario for preemptive attacks on space assets—whether initiated by the United States or by China—cannot assume that strikes would be confined to satellites. Moreover, **escalation control in this scenario must be considered a highly dubious proposition**. After all, the purpose of attacking objects in space, or attacking terrestrial targets from space, is to affect the conduct of military operations on Earth. It is therefore exceedingly hard to envision warfare in space that does not spread elsewhere, whether by asymmetric, conventional, or unconventional means. The resulting combat is likely to be less discriminating and proportional, and far more lethal, either because the stronger party has lost satellites used for targeting and precision guidance, or because the weaker party is unlikely to be concerned about collateral damage.

# China DA Link Magnifier

**Inherent uncertainty of security politics in space make weaponization automatically appear aggressive, sparking backlash**

**Zhang, 11** – Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Asia Pacific Studies at Lingnan University (March/April, “The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China Military Space Relationship,” Asian Survey, Vol. 51, No. 2, JSTOR)

The first factor that caused the security dilemma in the Sino-U.S. military space relationship is the professed American quest for space dominance. This quest is a reflection of the U.S. obsession with primacy that predates the Obama administration. The primacy strategy demands undisputed military dominance in different areas, including space, to ensure the best possible protection of U.S. national security. The U.S. is the only country in the world that has articulated a coherent national strategy for space dominance. As emphasized by Michael W. Wynne, former Air Force secretary, “America’s domination of the space domain provides an unrivaled advantage for our nation and remains critical to creating the strategic and tactical conditions for victory.”12 The U.S. is the leader in the militarization of space. It was the first country that established a dedicated command, the U.S. Space Command, to unify military operations in space. In fact, as its Vision for 2020 proclaims, the Space Command seeks to achieve “full spectrum dominance” in space.13 Furthermore, it envisions permanent dominance in the military dimension of space operations: “Today, the U.S. is the preeminent military space power. Our vision is one of maintaining that preeminence—providing a solid foundation for our national security.”14 General Lance W. Lord, former commander, Air Force Space Command, points out the importance of space dominance: “Space superiority is the future of warfare. We cannot win a war without controlling the high ground, and the high ground is space.”15 In December 2007, the U.S. Air Force re- leased a White Paper called The Nation’s Guardians: America’s 21st Century Air Force, in which General T. Michael Moseley made a similar statement: “No future war will be won without air, space and cyberspace superiority”; thus, “the Air Force must attain cross-domain dominance. Cross-domain dominance is the freedom to attack and the freedom from attack in and through the atmosphere, space and electromagnetic spectrum.”16 This strategy of space dominance, however, generates the classic security dilemma between the U.S. and other countries. Although the U.S. may be motivated by defensive purposes, such as shielding the American population from nuclear weapons and other threats, other countries have to assume the worst in an anarchic world. As observed by Joan Johnson-Freese, “I would argue that the rest of the world accepts U.S. space supremacy. What the Bush Administration claims is space dominance, and that’s what the rest of the world won’t accept.”17 Chinese strategists certainly perceive the U.S. quest for space dominance as damaging to China’s national security; whoever controls space will have the edge in winning the next war. Indeed, Chinese military and civilian strategists argue that the U.S. search for “absolute security” jeopardizes other countries’ security. It is widely reported in Chinese military literature that the U.S. has already developed and is in fact implementing a master plan for military dominance in space. The challenge for China is to prevent the U.S. from jumping too far ahead. As observed by a major study organized by the General Staff of the PLA, “In recent decades the U.S. has been consistently pursuing dominance in space in order to become its overlord.”18 The study also points out that the U.S. is the first country to develop a full set of doc- trines for space militarization and dominance: In April 1998, the U.S. Space Command published its long-term strategic development plan, Vision for 2020, which specifically proposed the concept of space dominance and revealed the goals of allowing the American military to use space weapons to attack the enemy’s land, sea, air, and space targets. World opinion believes this represented the formal debut of U.S. space war theory and indicated an important first step by the U.S. military toward space war.19 Li Daguang, one of the most influential PLA experts on space war, also alleges that the U.S. has initiated “a new space war” to maintain its status as “the overlord of space.” He claims that the ultimate goal of the U.S. space program is to “build a powerful military empire in outer space that attempts to include any space between earth and moon under American jurisdiction.” Under this empire, “without U.S. permission, any country, including even its allies, will not be able to use outer space for military or other purposes.”

# China DA Brink

**Chinese perception of US space power on the brink now**

**Zhang, 11** – Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Asia Pacific Studies at Lingnan University (March/April, “The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China Military Space Relationship,” Asian Survey, Vol. 51, No. 2, JSTOR)

One particular concern for the Chinese military is that the U.S. may no longer be content with merely militarizing space, which involves extensive use of satellites for military operations. Instead, weaponization of space is on the agenda. The PLA now believes that the U.S. is on the verge of important breakthroughs in the development of weapons for space war. As one study claims: “Currently, the U.S. military already possesses or will soon possess ASAT technologies with real combat capabilities, such as aircraft-launched ASAT missiles, land-based laser ASAT weapons, and space-based energy ASAT weapons.”21 Moreover, the PLA suggests that the U.S. is trying to acquire space-based weapons to attack targets on earth: The U.S. military is developing orbital bombers, which fly on low altitude orbits, and when given combat orders, will re-enter the atmosphere and attack ground targets. This kind of weapon has high accuracy and stealth capability, and is able to launch sudden strikes. These capabilities make it impossible for enemies to defend against. Orbital bombers thus can strike at any target any- where on the planet. It is the major means for the U.S. military to perform global combat in the 21st century.22 This perception of the American lead in space militarization and attempts for its weaponization is a major motive for the Chinese military to develop similar projects and thus avoid U.S. domination in future wars. The PLA believes that control of the commanding heights will decide the outcome of future wars, and China cannot afford to cede that control to the U.S. As a result, space war is a key component of the PLA Air Force’s (PLAAF) new doc- trines. In 2006 the PLAAF released a comprehensive study called Military Doctrines for Air Force, which makes the following statement: In future wars, merely possessing air superiority will no longer be sufficient for seizing the initiative of battles. In significant ways, only obtaining space superiority could ensure controlling the initiative of war. The contest in outer space has become the contest for the new commanding heights. Seizing control of space will mean control of the global commanding heights, which will in turn enable dominance in air, land, and sea battles. Thus, it is impossible to achieve national security without obtaining space security.23

# AT: China Inherently Aggressive

**China is solely reactionary – US action would spark dangerous counterbalancing**

**Zhang, 11** – Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Asia Pacific Studies at Lingnan University (March/April, “The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China Military Space Relationship,” Asian Survey, Vol. 51, No. 2, JSTOR)

Although many U.S. experts are correct in emphasizing the importance of space war in China’s asymmetric strategy to counter U.S. conventional advantages, this article suggests that China’s military space agenda is also driven by the security dilemma between the two countries. China is pursuing military capabilities in space to counter perceived national security threats posed by the U.S. quest for space dominance and missile defense that could neutralize China’s nuclear deterrence. In both cases, Chinese security experts believe that the U.S. seeks “absolute security” in order to maximize protection for the American population from external threats.9 This means that China at least recognizes the defensive motivations behind the U.S. quest for space dominance and missile defense. However, with the chaotic nature of international relations, one country’s efforts to maximize its security could degrade the security of others by changing the balance of power. Inevitably, the U.S. quest for “absolute security” evokes countermeasures from other countries. As Kenneth Waltz observes, when a great power seeks superiority, others will respond in kind, since “maintaining status quo is the minimum goal of any great power.”

**China’s actions in space are not aggressive—they are simply a rational reaction to bellicose US space policy**

**Milowicki and Johnson-Freese, 8**- \* Director of Aviation Programs @ the US Naval War College, M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies @ the US Naval War College B.S. in Aerospace Engineering @ the US Naval Academy, \*\*Professor of National Security Affairs @ the US Naval War College, teaches a course on Space & Security @ Harvard, Adjunct Professor @ The Watson Institute, Brown University, former Director of the Center for Space Policy & Law @ the University of Central Florida, Ph.D. [Gene, Joan, Astropolitics, “Strategic Choices: Examining the United States Military Response to the Chinese Anti-Satellite Test” January, Volume 6, Issue 1, informaworld]

The U.S. defense establishment's reaction to the ASAT test is guided and constrained by the National Space Policy of 2006 and the military doctrine that proceeds from it. Specifically, under paragraph 2 of the National Space Policy, one of the principles (cited below) clearly gives the military a mandate to react as it currently has to bolster both its defensive and offensive counterspace capabilities. Two underlying principles of the policy that are typically cited as unilateral and jingoistic by critics read as follows:[32](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/smpp/section?content=a791222676&fulltext=713240928#EN0032) The United States considers space capabilities—including the ground and space segments and supporting links—vital to its national interests. Consistent with this policy, the United States will: preserve its rights, capabilities and freedom of action in space; dissuade or deter others from either impeding those rights or developing capabilities intended to do so; take those actions necessary to protect its space capabilities; respond to interference; and deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to U.S. national interests. The United States will oppose the development of new legal regimes or other restrictions that seek to prohibit or limit U.S. access to or use of space. Proposed arms control agreements or restrictions must not impair the rights of the United States to conduct research, development, testing, and operations or other activities in space for U.S. national interests.[33](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/smpp/section?content=a791222676&fulltext=713240928#EN0033) While the principle of preserving its rights, capabilities and freedom of action in space is absolutely reasonable for the U.S. to claim, the language of the principle makes it unclear if other countries are expected to be able to claim similar rights or if they accrue only to the U.S. If the latter, it is not reasonable to expect that other countries will forego the same rights claimed by the U.S. Regarding the second principle, rejecting arms control, this language makes public what has been U.S. government policy since the Space Commission Report first questioned whether space arms control was in the interest of the U.S. Given that the rest of the world regularly votes in support of resolutions toward preventing an arms race in space through the United Nations (UN), with the U.S. standing alone against those resolutions, this principle becomes perceived as another example of the U.S. ignoring the perspectives of other countries in favor of a unilateralist approach—not necessarily an effective approach if the U.S. is trying to get the rest of the world to accept it as a benevolent hegemon in space. Intentionally or not, this bellicose and overtly unilateral section of the document has effectively tied the hands of the U.S. military establishment in diplomatically or politically responding to actions too negatively. Perhaps, in order to provide more options, the policy should be revisited in light of geopolitical realities. With only a few changes, the U.S. could alter its course and establish the U.S. as a constructive player in the international community rather than as a perceived “bad actor” bent on preemptive and hegemonic use of space for its own purposes;[34](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/smpp/section?content=a791222676&fulltext=713240928#EN0034) a perception that possibly prompts or, at a minimum, provides an excuse for bad actions on the part of other countries. Theresa Hitchens' observation in her Congressional Testimony of 23 May 2007 captures the situation. She states, “if nothing else, U.S. declaratory policy gives Beijing an excuse to pursue a similar course. China's actions—despite its public dedication to the non-weaponization of space—make it abundantly clear that U.S. space dominance strategy will not go unchallenged.”[35](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/smpp/section?content=a791222676&fulltext=713240928#EN0035)

# AT: No Requisite Tech for Response

**China has the will and the tech to respond with ASATs**

**Zhang, 5** - Senior Research Associate at the Project on Managing the Atom in the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government (December, Hui, “Action/Reaction: U.S. Space Weaponization and China,” Arms Control Today, <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_12/DEC-CVR>)

Moreover, it is reasonable to believe that China could resort to asymmetric methods, such as anti-satellite weapons, to counter critical and vulnerable space-based components in LEO such as space-based interceptors, a space-based laser, or space-based tracking satellites.

China’s best anti-satellite pick might be small, ground-launched kinetic-kill vehicles, which can be used to destroy their target by colliding with it at extremely high velocity. Such weapons are relatively cheap and technically easy and should be well within China’s grasp. These vehicles could reach a satellite in LEO; if mated with a larger booster, they might be capable of reaching higher orbits. Another possible anti-satellite weapon would be a space mine armed with conventional charges. China could also resort to using missiles to deliver a cloud of shrapnel to a particular spot in LEO at a precise time and destroy a space-based interceptor or space-launch satellite as it arrives there.

Countries such as China that have the ability to place objects in orbit or lift them to geosynchronous altitude can also track objects closely in space. Beijing should thus have the ability to develop weapons that could attack satellites either in low-Earth or geosynchronous orbit.

# \*\*\*\*RUSSIA DA\*\*\*\*

# Russia DA Links

**Plan angers Russia – threatens conflict**

**Jakhu et al, 8** – Institute of Air and Space Law, McGill University (Dr. Ram, member of Secure World Foundation, “Space Security 2008.” On Governance board of the publication. http://swfound.org/media/29045/ssi2008.pdf)

Russia’s second priority is upgrading its nuclear missile attack warning system. Together, these recent developments are seen as having a critical role in guaranteeing Russia’s secure access to space.134 Russia has expressed concern about the potential weaponization of space and the extension of the arms race to outer space, especially in light of the development of US missile defense systems.135 Thus Russia has actively argued for a treaty prohibiting the deployment of weapons in space. In the interim Russia has pledged not to be the first to deploy any weapons in outer space and has encouraged other spacefaring nations to do the same. However, **various Russian officials have also threatened retaliatory measures against any country that attempts to deploy weapons in space**.136

# \*\*\*\*SOFT POWER DA\*\*\*\*

**Weaponization wrecks soft power**

**Coffelt, 5** – Lt. Colonal; thesis to the school of advanced air and space studies (Christopher A, “THE BEST DEFENSE: CHARTING THE FUTURE OFUS SPACE STRATEGY AND POLICY.” A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies For Completion of the Graduation Requirements SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIR AND SPACE STUDIES AIR UNIVERSITY, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. June 2005.)

Weaponizing space also decreases the United States’ ability to influence adversaries and achieve policy objectives short of military action (soft power). It undermines the legitimacy of the United States’ actions and its role as the leader of the free world. How can the United States assume the mantle of world leadership if it continues to act unilaterally at the expense of the international cooperation, peace, and interests it claims to value? Putting weapons in space is the ultimate unilateral act and affords no opportunity to form “coalitions of the willing.”289 The United States currently enjoys a significant superiority in air/land/sea combat power, robustly enhanced and enabled by space capabilities. In this position of advantage, it makes little strategic sense to disrupt the status quo with the deployment of destabilizing, offensive weapons in space. Putting weapons in space or pursuing an offensive space strategy upsets an advantageous status quo and overplays the United States’ hand, shortening the period of advantage. Moreover, if, as some believe, the world is on a path to the inevitable weaponization of space, there are clear advantages in assuming the follower role.

**Soft power solves democracy**

**Kroenig et al, 10** -- Department of Government Georgetown University Washington, DC, USA (Matthew, December 13, 2010, “Taking Soft Power Seriously” Comparative Strategy, 29: 5, 412 — 431<http://www.matthewkroenig.com/Kroenig_Taking%20Soft%20Power%20Seriously.pdf>)

The United States has also attempted to use soft power to promote the spread of democracy around the globe. Unlike in the other two issue areas, the U.S. democracy promotion campaigns met with some success as evidenced by a spate of electoral revolutions in the postcommunist region. We argue that the successful inﬂuence of these U.S. democracy promotion efforts is due to the presence of the necessary conditions for an effective soft power campaign. In the countries that experienced electoral revolutions, there was a functioning marketplace of ideas, the United States identiﬁed and supported credible messengers to transmit ideas about democratization, and ideas about the best practices for bringing down authoritarian regimes could signiﬁcantly impact the outcome.

In recent years, the United States has devoted a disproportionate amount of its democracy promotion attention to the postcommunist region. The proportion of countries receiving USAID democracy assistance, and the duration of time over which the countries receive assistance, are higher in the postcommunist region than in other world regions. A survey of USAID funding from 1990–2003 “reveals that the postcommunist region stands out as a clear priority for USAID with respect to democracy assistance.” 73 Other U.S. government-funded democracy promotion organizations such as the National Endowment for Democracy have similarly concentrated their resources on the postcommunist region.

The U.S.’s soft power strategies aimed at promoting democracy in the postcommunist world since the end of the Cold War have met with notable success. The rate of electoral revolutions in this region has been staggering. According to a recent study, “pivotal elections that have either enhanced or introduced democracy have taken place in eight countries, or 40 percent of the twenty postcommunist countries that remained eligible for such revolutions.” 74 The well-publicized “color revolutions” swept through Georgia (The Rose Revolution, 2003), Ukraine (The Orange Revolution, 2004), and Kyrgyzstan (The Tulip Revolution, 2005).

The available studies on the wave of electoral revolutions in the postcommunist region all identify American democracy promotion efforts as an important contributing cause of these revolutions, and some scholars go so far as to argue that the revolutions were signiﬁcantly engineered by the United States. 75 For example, in a recent study on Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, Michael McFaul writes that the ideas and resources provided by the United States and other external actors “did play a direct, causal role in constraining some dimensions of autocratic power and enhancing some dimensions of the opposition’s power.” 76 The United States invested in opposition, media, and civil society groups, signaled their displeasure with incumbent authoritarian regimes, and intervened to prevent incumbent regimes from stealing elections. 77

**Democracy is key to solve multiple scenarios for extinction**

**Diamond, 95**– Director @ The Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law @ Stanford and Senior Fellow @ The Hoover Institution (Larry, “Promoting Democracy in the 1990s,” [http://carnegie.org/fileadmin/Media/Publications/PDF/Promoting%20Democracy%20in%20the%201990s%20Actors%20and%20Instruments,%20Issues%20and%20Imperatives.pdf](http://carnegie.org/fileadmin/Media/Publications/PDF/Promoting%20Democracy%20in%20the%201990s%20Actors%20and%20Instruments%2C%20Issues%20and%20Imperatives.pdf%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank))

 This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic one.  Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate.  The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threatsto security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, andopenness.  Lessons of the Twentieth Century  The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse"their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democraciesdo not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.

**It also turns heg**

**Nye 5/30** -- University Distinguished Service Professor at [Harvard University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harvard_University) and former dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard (“Power and foreign policy.” Journal of Political Power 4:1, 5/30 2011, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/2158379X.2011.555960>)

Some analysts regard all these distinctions as useless abstractions that can all be collapsed into the first face of power (Baldwin 2002, p. 179). If we succumb to this temptation, however, we are likely to limit what we see in terms of behavior and that tends to limit the strategies that policy-makers design to achieve their goals. Command power (the first face) is very visible and readily grasped. It is the basis for hard power – the ability to get the outcomes one wants through coercion and payment. The co-optive power of faces 2 and 3 is more subtle, and less visible. It contributes to soft power, the ability to get preferred outcomes through the co-optive means of agenda setting, persuasion, and attraction. All too often policy-makers have focused solely on hard command power to compel others to act against their preferences, and ignored the soft power that comes from preference formation. But when co-opting is possible, one can save on carrots and sticks.

In global politics, some goals that states seek are more susceptible to the second and third than to the first face of power. Arnold Wolfers once distinguished between what he called possession goals – specific and often tangible objectives – and milieu goals which are often structural and intangible (1962, p. 73). For example, access to resources or basing rights or a trade agreement are possession goals, while promoting an open trade system, free markets, democracy, or human rights are milieu goals. In the terminology used above, we can think of states having specific goals and general or structural goals. Focusing solely on command power and the first dimension of power may mislead us about how to promote such goals. For example, military means alone are less successful than when combined with soft power approaches in promoting democracy – as the United States discovered in Iraq. And the soft power of attraction and persuasion can have both agentic and structural dimensions. For example, a government can try to attract others through its actions like public diplomacy, but it may also attract others through the structural effects of its example or what can be called the ‘shining city on the hill’ effect.

# Solves Democracy Ext.

**Soft power solves democracies better than hard power**

**Kroenig et al, 10** -- Department of Government Georgetown University Washington, DC, USA (Matthew, December 13, 2010, “Taking Soft Power Seriously” Comparative Strategy, 29: 5, 412 — 431<http://www.matthewkroenig.com/Kroenig_Taking%20Soft%20Power%20Seriously.pdf>)

One may question whether successful U.S. efforts were more the result of hard power, rather than soft power, as we claim. While the United States clearly provided material support to pro-democracy groups, the democratic transitions in these cases are better characterized as resulting from soft power, as we deﬁne it. By facilitating interaction between the graduates of previous democratic openings and antiregime forces, the United States helped to disseminate a set of ideas about how to pry a democratic opening out of a fraudulent election. The electoral model of regime change diffused by U.S. democracy promotion efforts bolstered the effectiveness of antiregime forces and loosened authoritarian governments’ grip on power without directly altering the material costs and beneﬁts of either set of actors.

Finally, one could question whether these electoral revolutions should really be considered cases of success, given the extent of democratic backsliding in some of these countries subsequent to the democratic openings. Certainly, U.S. democracy promoters would have preferred further democratic consolidation in these cases, but we employ a more modest measure of success—visible progress toward the stated goal of the soft power campaign. There is no doubt that the color revolutions exceed this more modest threshold. McFaul assesses that “Even if Ukrainian democracy does slide back toward autocracy over the long run, the Orange Revolution will still remain a dramatic case of democratic breakthrough, and may be the most important instance of democratic breakthrough in this decade.” 87

In sum, the U.S. effort to use soft power to spread democracy achieved some success in the postcommunist region. It is no coincidence that this environment was also conducive to the exercise of soft power. In the postcommunist region, a robust civil society sustained a free marketplace of ideas, the graduates of previous electoral revolutions were persuasive democratic messengers, and the idea of the electoral model of regime change was indispensable to the democratic transitions. Had any of these three conditions been absent, it is much less likely that the U.S. would have succeeded in using soft power to spread democracy in the postcommunist region.

# Solves Prolif

**Diplomatic leadership solves prolif**

**Poe, 11** -- Lieutenant, United States Navy B.S., Savannah State University, 2005. Masters thesis for fufilment of MASTER OF SCIENCE IN INFORMATION SYSTEMS OPERATIONS (Carl P., “AN INFLUENCE ANALYSIS OF DISSUADING NATION STATES FROM PRODUCING AND PROLIFERATING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD).” Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE IN INFORMATION SYSTEMS OPERATIONS from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL March 2011, approved by Steven J. Iatrou Thesis Co-Advisor Dr. Anthony Pratkanis Thesis Co-Advisor Dr. Dan C. Boger Chair, Department of Information Sciences. March 2011 http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2011/March/11Mar\_Poe.pdf)

Total elimination of a nation-state’s nuclear facilities out of fear that the nationstate may one day decide to create a divergent path within the program to produce nuclear weapons would not be a practical approach due to the complexities presented by globalization. Instead, a more practical means to prevent the production and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction among emerging nation-states would through early engagement. **Working with other adjacent nation-states through diplomatic exchange** to reduce the threat perceived by the emerging nation-state would be just one approach to lowering the security threshold. This could be through the creation of a nuclear free zone within a given region and increasing the level of transparency of military and governmental programs among regional nation-states. Also, persuading the emerging nation-state to sign documentation such as the NPT and the CTBT would also be a key step in deterring and dissuading the nation-state not to produce and proliferate WMD. Couple these strategic approaches with the social influence tactics discussed in Chapter V and more formidable measures such as sanctions, resolutions, and fear tactics may not have to be invoked.

Prolif dramatically increases the risk of accidental, intentional, or terror-based nuclear war

Utgoff 2 - Deputy Director of Strategy, Forces, and Resources @ the Institute for Defense Analyses (Victor, Survival, “Proliferation, Missile Defense and American Ambitions”, 44:2, Summer, p. 87-90)

Many readers are probably willing to accept that nuclear proliferation is such a grave threat to world peace that every effort should be made to avoid it. However, every effort has not been made in the past, and we are talking about much more substantial efforts now. For new and substantially more burdensome efforts to be made to slow or stop nuclear proliferation, it needs to be established that the highly proliferated nuclear world that would sooner or later evolve without such efforts is not going to be acceptable. And, for many reasons, it is not. First, the dynamics of getting to a highly proliferated world could be very dangerous. Proliferating states will feel great pressures to obtain nuclear weapons and delivery systems before any potential opponent does. Those who succeed in outracing an opponent may consider preemptive nuclear war before the opponent becomes capable of nuclear retaliation. Those who lag behind might try to preempt their opponent’s nuclear programme or defeat the opponent using conventional forces. And those who feel threatened but are incapable of building nuclear weapons may still be able to join in this arms race by building other types of weapons of mass destruction, such as biological weapons. Second, as the world approaches complete proliferation, the hazards posed by nuclear weapons today will be magnified many times over. Fifty or more nations capable of launching nuclear weapons means that the risk of nuclear accidents that could cause serious damage not only to their own populations and environments, but those of others, is hugely increased. The chances of such weapons falling into the hands of renegade military units or terrorists is far greater, as is the number of nations carrying out hazardous manufacturing and storage activities. Increased prospects for the occasional nuclear shootout Worse still, in a highly proliferated world there would be more frequent opportunities for the use of nuclear weapons. And more frequent opportunities means shorter expected times between conflicts in which nuclear weapons get used, unless the probability of use at any opportunity is actually zero. To be sure, some theorists on nuclear deterrence appear to think that in any confrontation between two states known to have reliable nuclear capabilities, the probability of nuclear weapons being used is zero.3 These theorists think that such states will be so fearful of escalation to nuclear war that they would always avoid or terminate confrontations between them, short of even conventional war. They believe this to be true even if the two states have different cultures or leaders with very eccentric personalities. History and human nature, however, suggest that they are almost surely wrong. History includes instances in which states known to possess nuclear weapons did engage in direct conventional conflict. China and Russia fought battles along their common border even after both had nuclear weapons. Moreover, logic suggests that if states with nuclear weapons always avoided conflict with one another, surely states without nuclear weapons would avoid conflict with states that had them. Again, history provides counter-examples. Egypt attacked Israel in 1973 even though it saw Israel as a nuclear power at the time. Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands and fought Britain’s efforts to take them back, even though Britain had nuclear weapons. Those who claim that two states with reliable nuclear capabilities to devastate each other will not engage in conventional conflict risking nuclear war also assume that any leader from any culture would not choose suicide for his nation. But history provides unhappy examples of states whose leaders were ready to choose suicide for themselves and their fellow citizens. Hitler tried to impose a ‘victory or destruction’ policy on his people as Nazi Germany was going down to defeat.4 And Japan’s war minister, during debates on how to respond to the American atomic bombing, suggested ‘Would it not be wondrous for the whole nation to be destroyed like a beautiful flower?’5 If leaders are willing to engage in conflict with nuclear-armed nations, use of nuclear weapons in any particular instance may not be likely, but its probability would still be dangerously significant. In particular, human nature suggests that the threat of retaliation with nuclear weapons is not a reliable guarantee against a disastrous first use of these weapons. While national leaders and their advisors everywhere are usually talented and experienced people, even their most important decisions cannot be counted on to be the product of well-informed and thorough assessments of all options from all relevant points of view. This is especially so when the stakes are so large as to defy assessment and there are substantial pressures to act quickly, as could be expected in intense and fast-moving crises between nuclear-armed states.6 Instead, like other human beings, national leaders can be seduced by wishful thinking. They can misinterpret the words or actions of opposing leaders. Their advisors may produce answers that they think the leader wants to hear, or coalesce around what they know is an inferior decision because the group urgently needs the confidence or the sharing of responsibility that results from settling on something. Moreover, leaders may not recognise clearly where their personal or party interests diverge from those of their citizens. Under great stress, human beings can lose their ability to think carefully. They can refuse to believe that the worst could really happen, oversimplify the problem at hand, think in terms of simplistic analogies and play hunches. The intuitive rules for how individuals should respond to insults or signs of weakness in an opponent may too readily suggest a rash course of action. Anger, fear, greed, ambition and pride can all lead to bad decisions. The desire for a decisive solution to the problem at hand may lead to an unnecessarily extreme course of action. We can almost hear the kinds of words that could flow from discussions in nuclear crises or war. ‘These people are not willing to die for this interest’. ‘No sane person would actually use such weapons’. ‘Perhaps the opponent will back down if we show him we mean business by demonstrating a willingness to use nuclear weapons’. ‘If I don’t hit them back really hard, I am going to be driven from office, if not killed’. Whether right or wrong, in the stressful atmosphere of a nuclear crisis or war, such words from others, or silently from within, might resonate too readily with a harried leader. Thus, both history and human nature suggest that nuclear deterrence can be expected to fail from time to time, and we are fortunate it has not happened yet. But the threat of nuclear war is not just a matter of a few weapons being used. It could get much worse. Once a conflict reaches the point where nuclear weapons are employed, the stresses felt by the leaderships would rise enormously. These stresses can be expected to further degrade their decision-making. The pressures to force the enemy to stop fighting or to surrender could argue for more forceful and decisive military action, which might be the right thing to do in the circumstances, but maybe not. And the horrors of the carnage already suffered may be seen as justification for visiting the most devastating punishment possible on the enemy.7 Again, history demonstrates how intense conflict can lead the combatants to escalate violence to the maximum possible levels. In the Second World War, early promises not to bomb cities soon gave way to essentially indiscriminate bombing of civilians. The war between Iran and Iraq during the 1980s led to the use of chemical weapons on both sides and exchanges of missiles against each other’s cities. And more recently, violence in the Middle East escalated in a few months from rocks and small arms to heavy weapons on one side, and from police actions to air strikes and armoured attacks on the other. Escalation of violence is also basic human nature. Once the violence starts, retaliatory exchanges of violent acts can escalate to levels unimagined by the participants beforehand.8 Intense and blinding anger is a common response to fear or humiliation or abuse. And such anger can lead us to impose on our opponents whatever levels of violence are readily accessible.In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear ‘six-shooters’ on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.

# Solves/Turns Heg Ext.

**Soft power solves heg – their exclusive realist focus blinds them to the complex interactions between states not explained by realism**

**Nye 5/30** -- University Distinguished Service Professor at [Harvard University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harvard_University) and former dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard (“Power and foreign policy.” Journal of Political Power 4:1, 5/30 2011, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/2158379X.2011.555960>)

Realism represents a good first cut at portraying some aspects of international relations. But as we have seen, states are no longer the only important actors in global affairs; security is not the only major outcome that they seek, and force is not the only or always the best instrument available to achieve those outcomes. Indeed, these conditions of complex interdependence are typical of relations among advanced postindustrial countries such as the United States, Canada, Europe, Australia, and Japan. Mutual democracy, liberal culture, and a deep network of transnational ties mean that anarchy has very different effects than realism predicts. In such conditions, a smart power strategy has a much higher mixture of the second and third faces of power.

It is not solely in relations among advanced countries, however, that soft power plays an important role. In an information age, communication strategies become more important, and outcomes are shaped not merely by whose army wins, but also by whose story wins. In combating terrorism, for example, it is essential to have a narrative that appeals to the mainstream and prevents their recruitment by the radicals. In battling insurgencies, kinetic military force must be accompanied by soft power instruments that help to win over the hearts and minds (shape the preferences) of the majority of the population.

Smart strategies must have an information and communication component. States struggle over the power to define norms, and framing of issues grows in importance. For instance, while CNN and the BBC framed the issues of the first Gulf War in 1991, by 2003, Al Jazeera played a large role in shaping the narrative in the Iraq War. Such framing is more than mere propaganda. In describing events in March 2003, one could say that American troops ‘entered Iraq,’ or that American troops ‘invaded Iraq.’ Both statements are true, but they have very different effects in terms of power to shape preferences. Similarly, if one thinks of international institutions, it makes a difference if agendas are set in a Group of 8 with a few invited guests or a Group of 20 equal invitees. These are just some examples of how the dimensions of the second and third faces of power are becoming more important in the global politics of an information age.

**Hard power focus unsustainable – overstretch**

**Gallarotti, 11** -- Professor of Government Wesleyan University (1/1, “The Power Curse: The Paradox of Power in World Politic.” Division II Faculty Publications, Wesleyan University. <http://wesscholar.wesleyan.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1057&context=div2facpubs>)

Over and above the effects of complexity, the augmentation of power generates another deleterious consequence in the form of overstretch. Kennedy (1987), Gilpin (1981), and Snyder’s (1991) work on great powers has perhaps best highlighted the problem of overstretch. They underscore the effects of different levels of analysis in promoting this tendency toward overstretch. Snyder (1991) analyzes expansion as a process driven by the domestic political interests that benefit from such expansion. Kennedy (1987, p. xxiii) sees overstretch as a structural pathology of economic growth leading to expansion, but this greater global presence becomes increasingly difficult to support in a world of greater competition when nations are faced with inherent economic decline. Gilpin (1981) underscores the interplay of internal and external factors leading to overexpansion. He posits that great powers will be overextended in maintaining their international position as a result of a tendency to over-invest in the provision of public goods and a concomitant tendency for the costs of maintaining an international presence to rise. This greater burden will continually outpace the capacity of the internal militaryeconomic system, which itself is in decline, to support it. And since growth in power correlates with expansion, there emerges a natural tendency toward overstretch. For all three scholars, the possibilities of overstretch are an occupational hazard of the quest for power. This is the case because expansion or the quest for power are self-feeding processes: the more that is bitten off the greater the appetite must become to accommodate an increasing nourishment. This occurs for three reasons.

First, the expanding quest for influence breeds missions creep. A growing presence in the international system is self-reinforcing because the maintenance costs of involvement in foreign affairs grow along with the size of the stake in the system (Kennedy 1987 and Jervis 2003). 11 Empires are the best example of such a process (Snyder 1991). The growth in empires has been traditionally shaped by the need to protect trade routes in the colonial network, which has called for more bases and more soldiers (Bartlett 1969 and Galbraith 1960). Galbraith (1960) underscores the compelling nature of this process in the expansion of British empire in the 19 th century: expansion was reinforced by what he refers to as “turbulent frontiers.” Jervis (2003) avers that dominant nations are especially prone to develop pockets of negative feedback that adversely affect their standing in the international system because of mission creep: i.e., a growing global presence leads to many points of involvement that generate international hostility towards the dominant nation. Second, nations can experience a process of growing dependence on their expanded domains. Much of this is a normal function of being increasingly endowed with external sources of influence like tribute, colonies, bases, markets, resources, and allies (Kennedy 1987, p. xxiii). 12 But above and beyond this normal dependence, nations may become overly dependent on these external sources of power because of moral hazard: nations can be lax about developing internal resources to achieve self-sufficiency when they have an expanded domain that provides many benefits with minimal internal adjustment costs. Both dependence and over-dependence, for example, plagued both the ancient Roman and Athenian empires. In both cases the domestic economies grew increasingly unable to evolve in ways that were able to meet the costs of supporting a large empire (French 1964).

Finally, both mission creep and growing dependence are driven by domestic political effects that reinforce this expansion. Expansion often creates new interest groups and energizes old interest groups in the domestic political game that benefit from such expansion, and hence use their political influence to promote expansionist policies. Snyder (1991) has argued that such domestic interests become politically dominant in influencing state policies when they can form greater coalitions among themselves and others (through logrolling). 13 Snyder goes on to show the impact of this process in numerous case studies of empire on the part of industrialized states over the past two centuries. Block (1977) demonstrates how the growing internationalism of U.S. foreign policy after World War II was strongly driven by American business interests that benefited from foreign investment and trade. But while Block and Snyder chronicle domestic reinforcement of expansion in pluralistic-democratic systems, domestic factors are nonetheless important in more autocratic systems where the actions and interests of smaller elite groups and autocrats themselves provide the domestic political stimulus for expansionist policies.

One of the most salient manifestations of this process in the context of soft and hard power occurs as a result of popular domestic reactions to such expansion, both in the expansionist nation and in the target nation. Very often the domestic economic and social burdens of such overstretch (through the use of hard power) undermines the domestic popular support (soft power) which is necessary to maintain it. 14 This could have manifold consequences for the policy of expansion. One of the most pernicious is the fact that it could create political shockwaves at home that severely undermine the position of the ruling regime or administration, thus leaving it in turmoil. This may enervate the international influence of that nation for a variety of reasons owing to the fact that the nation is politically incapable of effectively managing its foreign relations in a state of political weakness. In this case, erstwhile enemies may take more liberties against it geo-strategically, nations (whether hostile or friendly) may be less influenced by its demands and requests, and it will be incapable of pursuing compelling opportunities in the international system. But also enervating in this context is a diminishing influence over target populations and other nations. Even when not overtly imperialistic, a growing international presence causes disturbances among the people of target nations. They may be x-inefficient in attending to the interest of the expansionist nation, and they may be xefficient in undermining the foreign presence. Either way, such a posture generates substantial weakening effects for the expansionist nation because it increases the burden of expansion. In terms of third-party nations (not targets of expansion), the expansion itself may compromise their good will and potential support, such that the expansionist nation is left with fewer venues of assistance in maintaining their international presence (i.e., more potential adversaries and fewer allies).

**Soft power key to overall leadership**

**Gallarotti, 11** – Prof of Government, Wesleyan University (Guilio M., “Soft Power: what it is, why it’s important, and the conditions for its effective use.” Division II Faculty Publications, Wesleyan University. <http://wesscholar.wesleyan.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1056&context=div2facpubs&sei-redir=1#search=%22Soft%20power%3A%20what%20is%2C%20why%20its%20important%2C%20conditions%20its%20effective%20use%22>)

Greater attention to soft power itself reflects the changing landscape of international relations. It is no coincidence that such sources of power have been embraced by Neoliberalism and Constructivism, paradigms that have underscored the changing nature of world politics. In this case, theory has been influenced by events. While history has shown soft power always to have been an important source of national influence (certainly the case studies in hard and soft power do), changes in modern world politics have raised its utility all the more (Gallarotti 2010a and 2010b). 3 Indeed the world has become and is continuing to evolve into a “softer world.” World politics in the modern age has been undergoing changes that have elevated the importance of soft power relative to hard power. In this transformed international system, soft power will be a crucial element in enhancing influence over international outcomes because it has become more difficult to compel nations and non-state actors through the principal levers of hard power (i.e., threats and force). The world stage has become less amenable to Hobbesian bruts, and more amenable to actors that are sensitized to the soft opportunities and constraints imposed by this new global environment.

**Soft power solves heg – creates allied bandwagoning**

**Gallarotti, 11** – Prof of Government, Wesleyan University (Guilio M., “Soft Power: what it is, why it’s important, and the conditions for its effective use.” Division II Faculty Publications, Wesleyan University. <http://wesscholar.wesleyan.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1056&context=div2facpubs&sei-redir=1#search=%22Soft%20power%3A%20what%20is%2C%20why%20its%20important%2C%20conditions%20its%20effective%20use%22>)

While Realists have traditionally looked at a nation’s influence in the world as a function of these tangible and coercive sources of power (threat and force), Nye has highlighted the influence that derives from a more intangible and enlightened source: a positive image in world affairs that endears nations to other nations in the world polity. This positive image derives from a number of sources: the domestic and foreign policies that nations follow, the actions they undertake, and/or national qualities that are independent of specific policies or actions (e.g., such as culture). 9 This positive image generates respect and admiration, which in turn render nations that have soft power more endearing in the eyes of other nations. The endearment can be so strong that other nations may even attempt to emulate the policies and/or actions of soft power nations, domestic and/or foreign. 10 Endearment serves to **enhance the influence** of soft power nations as other nations will more readily defer to their wishes on international issues, and conversely avoid confrontations. Hence, decisions about issues affecting the soft power nations will be bounded within a somewhat favorable range of options for the soft power nations. 11 In a similar vein, emulation creates a system of nations that are comporting themselves (actions, policies, goals) in a manner consistent with the interests of the role-model nations. In these ways, soft power ultimately configures the context within which other nations make decisions in ways that favor the interests soft power nations (i.e., meta-power, discussed below). 12

The principal difference between hard and soft power can be understood in the following way: hard power extracts compliance principally through reliance on tangible power resources—more direct and often coercive methods (either their symbolic use through threat or actual use), soft power cultivates it through a variety of policies, qualities, and actions that endear nations to other nations—more indirect and non-coercive methods. In this respect, hard power exhibits a greater conflict of interests relative to soft power. Hard power contemplates nations compelling other nations to do what the latter would ordinarily not otherwise do (Dahl’s [1957] classic definition of power). Soft power, on the other hand, conditions the target nations to voluntarily do what soft power nations would like them to do, hence there is far less conflict of interests in the process of soft power.

Soft power represents a form of meta-power. Meta-power describes situations in which power relations themselves are embedded within some greater constellation of social relations that influence those relations and thereby influence final outcomes that derive from the interactions among actors. The structures of the bargaining boundaries are determined by the processes going on in the greater social relations within which they are embedded (i.e., endogenous rather than exogenous). To quote Hall (1997, p. 405) “Meta-power refers to the shaping of social relationships, social structures, and situations by altering the matrix of possibilities and orientations within which social action occurs (i.e., to remove certain actions from actors' repertoires and to create or facilitate others).” (Italics in original)

Under conditions of meta-power, little can be inferred about the balance of power in a bargaining process merely by simply looking at the equilibria within the existing bargaining space. One actor may seem to be moving the other actor closer to his/her preferred position within the a bargaining space without in fact enjoying much influence over the seemingly compliant actor. Since the preferences or objectives are endogenous, and therefore the result of some greater constellation of social relations, the bargaining space itself can be the outcome of some greater configuration of power that has set possible equilibria in a range highly consistent with the interests or preferences of the seemingly compliant actor. Hence, even losing a struggle for immediate power within the prevailing bargaining space may in fact still be winning the bargaining game if some greater set of social relations can skew the bargaining space in favor of the compliant actor. This would be a case of losing a battle but winning the war.

Meta-power is often equated with agenda control. Nye (2004b, p. 9) himself refers to soft power as a control over the “political agenda” and attributes the origin of the concept to the work of Bachrach and Baratz (1962 and 1963). Agenda control, in its more precise context, would indeed represent a subset of meta-power. Within some collective bargaining process that is guided by a formal agenda, outcomes are circumscribed by the range of issues and strategic possibilities configured by the agenda setter him/herself. The agenda defines what issues will be raised, and in doing so therefore sets the bargaining boundaries. 13

**Soft power solves heg better than hard power**

**a. Globalization**

**Gallarotti, 11** – Prof of Government, Wesleyan University (Guilio M., “Soft Power: what it is, why it’s important, and the conditions for its effective use.” Division II Faculty Publications, Wesleyan University. <http://wesscholar.wesleyan.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1056&context=div2facpubs&sei-redir=1#search=%22Soft%20power%3A%20what%20is%2C%20why%20its%20important%2C%20conditions%20its%20effective%20use%22>)

Other paradigms (Neoliberalism and Constructivism) have arisen to challenge the scholarly primacy of Realism, and concomitantly introduced alternative vision of power oriented more around soft than hard power. It is no surprise that such alternative visions have been nurtured in an historical breeding ground that has seen a transformation of international politics, a transformation that has augmented the utility of soft power. A number of changes in world politics stand out as especially transformative forces elevating the utility of soft power relative to hard power.

First, there is the impact of interdependence and the pervasive process that compounds its effects on power: globalization. The diminishing utility of hard power is partly the result of a specific political, social and economic context created by modernization: that context is interdependence (Herz 1957, Osgood and Tucker 1967, Keohane and Nye 1989, and Nye 2004a). Using sticks, or whatever kinds of coercive methods, generate considerable costs in an interdependent world. Indeed in such an interpenetrated world, punishing or threatening other nations is tantamount to self-punishment. In such an environment strategies for optimizing national wealth and influence have shifted from force and coercion to cooperation. But even more elusive than the quest to limit the fallout from coercion and force in such an environment, is the quest to impose some specific outcomes onto targeted actors. In an interpenetrated world, targeted actors have many more avenues of escape. Transnational actors and national leaders could avoid being compelled by carrots or sticks because of their free reign and access to the international political economy. They can merely escape coercion or buy-offs by taking refuge in numerous possible international havens. In one important respect, this modern day “economic feudalism” created by interdependence is shifting the nexus of power from the territorial state to transnational networks (Nye 2002, p. 75).

Globalization has strongly compounded the effects of interdependence by enhancing the process of social and economic interpenetration in the international system. The global age has given civil societies the capacity to receive and transmit information, as well as move across nations with ever greater speed and magnitude. These greater links compound the interdependence among networks containing both transnational actors and national governments. As the international stakes of these transnational actors grow, so do their incentives to expend political capital within their own domestic political systems to reinforce the economic ties between their nations (Milner 1988). This enhanced access to foreign governments and citizens created by globalization also compounds the effects of democratization in creating political impediments to the use of hard power (Haskel 1980). These forces have both diminished possibilities of political conflict and have thus shifted the epicenter of competition away from force, threat, and bribery (Rosecrance 1999 and Nye 2004b. p. 31).

**b. Military costs have increased relative to soft power costs**

**Gallarotti, 11** – Prof of Government, Wesleyan University (Guilio M., “Soft Power: what it is, why it’s important, and the conditions for its effective use.” Division II Faculty Publications, Wesleyan University. <http://wesscholar.wesleyan.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1056&context=div2facpubs&sei-redir=1#search=%22Soft%20power%3A%20what%20is%2C%20why%20its%20important%2C%20conditions%20its%20effective%20use%22>)

Third, the costs of using or even threatening force among nuclear powers have skyrocketed. Indeed, current leading scholarship in the field of security has proclaimed that the nuclear revolution has been instrumental in creating a new age of a “security community,” in which war between major powers is almost unthinkable because the costs of war have become too great (Jervis 1988, 1993, 2002). Mueller (1988) reinforces and modifies the nuclear deterrent argument by introducing the independent deterrent of conventional war in an age of advanced technology. In short, the utility of respect, admiration and cooperation (i.e., soft power) has increased relative to the utility of coercion with respect to the usefulness of the instruments of statecraft. Moreover, the exorbitant dangers that the hard resources of military technology have produced require far greater use of the instruments of soft power in order for nations to achieve sustainable security in the long run.

**c. Democracy**

**Gallarotti, 11** – Prof of Government, Wesleyan University (Guilio M., “Soft Power: what it is, why it’s important, and the conditions for its effective use.” Division II Faculty Publications, Wesleyan University. <http://wesscholar.wesleyan.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1056&context=div2facpubs&sei-redir=1#search=%22Soft%20power%3A%20what%20is%2C%20why%20its%20important%2C%20conditions%20its%20effective%20use%22>)

Fourth, the growth of democracy in the world system has served to compound the disutility of coercion and force as the actors bearing the greatest burden of such coercion and force (the people) have political power over decisionmakers. In this respect, the process of democratic peace has altered power relations among nations (Doyle 1997, Russett and Oneal 2001, and Ray 1995). As individuals become politically empowered, they can generate strong impediments to the use of force and coercion. But even beyond the enfranchisement effect, democratic cultural naturally drives national leaders towards the liberal principles manifest in the cannons of soft power. Hence, national leaders are much more constrained to work within softer foreign policy boundaries, boundaries that limit the use of force, threat and bribery. Rather, outcomes are engineered through policies more consistent with liberal democratic legitimacy.

**d. General prosperity**

**Gallarotti, 11** – Prof of Government, Wesleyan University (Guilio M., “Soft Power: what it is, why it’s important, and the conditions for its effective use.” Division II Faculty Publications, Wesleyan University. <http://wesscholar.wesleyan.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1056&context=div2facpubs&sei-redir=1#search=%22Soft%20power%3A%20what%20is%2C%20why%20its%20important%2C%20conditions%20its%20effective%20use%22>)

Fifth, social and political changes have made modern populations more sensitive to their economic fates, and consequently far less enamored of a “warrior ethic” (Jervis 2002 and Nye 2004b, p. 19). This “prosperous society” has compounded the influence of economics and made economic interdependence that much more compelling as a constraint to the utility of hard power. With the rise of this welfare/economic orientation and the spread of democracy, national leaders have been driven more by the economic imperative and less by foreign adventurism as a source of political survival (Gallarotti 2000 and Ruggie 1983). This prosperous society, through the political vehicle of democracy, has shifted not only domestic but also foreign policy orientations. The economic welfare concern has put a premium on cooperation that can deliver economic growth and employment, and worked against hard power policies that might undercut such goals.

**e. International organizations**

**Gallarotti, 11** – Prof of Government, Wesleyan University (Guilio M., “Soft Power: what it is, why it’s important, and the conditions for its effective use.” Division II Faculty Publications, Wesleyan University. <http://wesscholar.wesleyan.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1056&context=div2facpubs&sei-redir=1#search=%22Soft%20power%3A%20what%20is%2C%20why%20its%20important%2C%20conditions%20its%20effective%20use%22>)

Finally, the growth of international organization and regimes in the post-war period has embedded nations more firmly in networks of cooperation: themselves being fundamental components of soft power. As these networks have evolved, so too has the soft power of norms and laws they represent increased (Krasner 1983 and Keohane and Nye 1989). In such a world, unilateral actions that disregard these institutions become far more costly. Such institutions have effectively raised the minimum level of civil behavior in international politics, and consequently raised the importance of soft power significantly. Expectations have gravitated more toward the sanctity of such institutions, and hence hard power policies and actions that are inconsistent with these expectations generate greater fallout relative to an environment where no such institutional superstructure existed. Consequently, the networks of cooperation have made nations far less likely to extract compliance in what are considered illegitimate ways (i.e., through force, coercion, or bribery).

# DA Solves China Threat

**Soft power checks China war**

**Nye 2/10** – University Distinguished Service Professor at [Harvard University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harvard_University) and former dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard (2/10/2011, “The Future of Power .” Carnegie Council Transcript, [https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/resources/transcripts/0355.html/:pf\_printable](https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/resources/transcripts/0355.html/%3Apf_printable))

Some people say, "What difference does it make if China gets more powerful or if it passes the United States?" The answer is, it can make a difference because it can lead to very bad policy decisions. If the Chinese, as they now believe, think the United States is in decline, they may suffer a certain hubris which makes them overly assertive, which makes it difficult for us to compromise with the Chinese because, when we compromise, they say "Ah, it proves it. They're in decline."
We have seen some of that in the last year and a half with the U.S.-China relations. That is difficult and dangerous, because it leads to a situation where we are going to have to cooperate with China on climate change, financial stability, pandemics, and so forth, but if every time we try to meet them halfway, they say, "Ah, it proves they're in decline," then you get bad policy outcomes. That's why this prevalent belief in China that the United States is in decline is particularly dangerous.
It could also be dangerous on the American side as well. If we become too fearful about our decline, we are likely to overreact—either to close ourselves off or to create a fear of China which becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Remember the classic statement of [Thucydides](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thucydides%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank) that the Peloponnesian War was caused by the rise in power of Athens and the fear that created in Sparta. Others have said the cause of World War I, which tore the European system apart in the last century, was the rise in power of Germany and the fear that created in Britain. There are some who say that's going to be the story of the 21st century: The rise in power of China and the fear that creates in the United States will lead to great conflicts.
That's wrong. But if you believe it, it can become true as a self-fulfilling prophecy.
China, in terms of economic power—and I have a whole chapter in the book on economic power as such—China is probably going to be equal to the United States in overall size of its GDP sometime in the 2020s. But equality in size is not equality in composition of an economy.
China still has vast areas of poverty and huge inequality, which is growing very rapidly, among different regions. They are not out of the woods either demographically or in terms of political stability. When one looks at per-capita income, which is a better measure of the sophistication of an economy, they are not going to equal the United States, if they do, until well into the century—2040 or something of that sort.
Why is that interesting? Because if you look at this analogy people make with Germany, Germany had already passed Britain economically by 1900. If my numbers are correct, China is not going to pass us for at least a couple of decades or more. That gives us time. We don't have to have the fear. We can essentially manage this policy, because we have the time and space to do it.
What's more, a lot of the current views about the rise of China and the so-called threat that it poses focus very much on one dimension of power, economic power. They neglect two other dimensions of power—each has a chapter in my book—military power, where the United States is not only ahead, but likely to stay ahead for another couple of decades, and soft power, that ability to get what you want through attraction and persuasion.
China understands the importance of soft power. [Hu Jintao](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hu_Jintao%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank) told the 17th Party Congress in 2007 that China needed to invest in soft power. That's smart. If your hard power is rising, you are going to scare your neighbors into coalitions against you, but if you can develop soft power along with your hard power, that's a smart-power strategy. You are less likely to provoke those countervailing balances.
China has invested billions of dollars in this—the Beijing Olympics, the Shanghai Expo, the various Confucius Institutes around the world, new broadcasting by Chinese television internationally, and so forth. But they have a very hard time in projecting soft power because of their domestic political system. After all that investment, they go and lock up somebody like [Liu Xiaobo](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liu_Xiaobo%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank), throwing him in jail and preventing him going to the Nobel Prize ceremony. You just undercut that massive investment. I remember giving a speech at Beijing University and students asked me, "How do we increase China's soft power?" I said, "I'll tell you the answer, but you're not going to like it. Lighten up." The reason they don't like it is because they can't do it. China is not going to equal the United States in soft power until you see real changes in China's domestic political system.

# DA Solves Terrorism

**Soft power comparatively better than hard power for solving terrorism**

**Gallarotti, 11** -- Professor of Government Wesleyan University (1/1, “The Power Curse: The Paradox of Power in World Politic.” Division II Faculty Publications, Wesleyan University. <http://wesscholar.wesleyan.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1057&context=div2facpubs>)

Also, in an interdependent world, actions on the part of foreign populations and states have significant impacts on the interests of nations. Each nation faces a plethora of actors (states, transnational actors, individuals) in the world polity that can perpetrate actions either for or against their interests. So in some sense a condition of reciprocity exists in which there are actions and reactions in world politics among these actors. Favorable actions or policies on the part of nations toward other nations or actors may elicit reactions which are equally favorable with respect to their particularistic goals. One may think of the reaction from a hostage population which has been liberated in war. Conversely, unfavorable actions may elicit reactions in kind. One thinks of partisan groups fighting off an occupying force. To some extent this functions somewhat as an interactive network with very loosely specified expectations governing exchange (Gallarotti 1989). Economists have studied such arrangements in the context of loosely specified labor contracts. One of the issues studied has been the effects of such contracts on efficiency. Leibenstein (1966) coined the term x-efficiencies and x-inefficiencies to describe differing levels of productivity that result from factors other than the structure and application of inputs (i.e., allocative efficiency). Even with similar input allocations, efficiency among firms may still vary greatly because of factors unrelated to the application of inputs (e.g., motivation, incentive schemes, differing managerial styles). As in the firm, these interactional networks may take a variety of forms that impact directly on the influence which nations may realize from their relations with other actors or nations. The use of coercive (i.e., hard) power, for instance, may generate substantial x-inefficiencies (i.e., actions that cut against the interests of the perpetrating nations). When the activation of hard power takes a menacing form, naturally the perpetrating nations can expect deleterious reaction from target nations and populations. There is no clearer manifestation of this than some of the self-defeating elements in George W. Bush’s policy to eradicate the threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. Taking an aggressive and unilateralist approach to increasing the security of Americans by wiping out such threats has generated reactions from target nations that have enhanced those threats all the more (Gallarotti 2010a and 2010b). In this respect, a number of scholars have proposed soft power as a preferable means of fighting terrorism (Lennon 2003).

# UQ – Soft Power High

**Soft power high**

**Nye 6/23** – University Distinguished Service Professor at [Harvard University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harvard_University) and former dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard (Joseph, transcript of a discussion involving Mahbubani, Nye, and Moyo, published in NYT opinion, NYT, “The Seesaw of Power.” Discussion moderated by Serge Schmemann. <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/24/opinion/global/24iht-june24-ihtmag-nye-36.html?_r=2&pagewanted=1>)

While Kishore and I are good friends, I happen to disagree with him. We agree on some trends, but I think he greatly exaggerates about American soft power being in decline. The facts show quite the opposite. Look at the recent BBC poll on the attractiveness of different countries, and you will find that the United States is ranked well ahead of China. Hu Jintao told the 17th Party Congress in China in 2007 that China needed to invest more in its soft power, and they’ve invested billions in Confucius Institutes and in creating a “Chinese Al Jazeera” and so forth. But the problem for China is that much of a country’s soft power comes from its civil society, not from its government, and China can’t unleash its civil society.

Why is it that India’s Bollywood sells so many films overseas and China doesn’t? It’s not because Indian actors and directors are better; it’s because China has censors. China has a magnificent Expo at Shanghai, which I went to and loved, and then it goes and locks up Liu Xiaobo, and it undercuts its own soft power. If you look at the polls done by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs or the BBC poll I mentioned, Chinese soft power has not increased and U.S. soft power has. So I just think the facts are not consistent with Kishore’s grand sort of sweeping generalizations.

**US soft power high – solves terror, econ, climate, diseases**

**Nye 2/10** – University Distinguished Service Professor at [Harvard University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harvard_University) and former dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard (2/10/2011, “The Future of Power .” Carnegie Council Transcript, [https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/resources/transcripts/0355.html/:pf\_printable](https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/resources/transcripts/0355.html/%3Apf_printable))

If you go to the bottom board of transnational relations, things that cross borders outside the control of governments—everything from terrorism, to financial flows, to climate change, to pandemics, you name it—it makes no sense to call that unipolar or multipolar. Power is chaotically distributed. This is the area where these new non-state actors roam freely, if you like. The only way you can deal with this area, on the bottom board of this three-dimensional chess game, is through cooperation. It is basically through getting governments to work together, which makes us realize that it's not always just power over others; it's power with others that is important.
Here the United States has some unique advantages. Our openness and our values allow us to create networks and institutions, and maintain alliances in much better ways than others do. That's going to be where we have to exercise this smart strategy of combining hard and soft power, if we are going to have a sensible foreign policy for this new diffusion of power in the 21st century.
The "rise of the rest," and particularly of Asia, and the diffusion of power from governments to non-state actors are going to require us to become much more sophisticated in the way we think of what power is and to put a bigger mix of soft power, along with hard power, into the smart-power mix if we are going to have a successful foreign policy.

**Soft power high – solves global stability**

**Senghal 2011** – well known defense analyst at Pakistan herald (Ikram, 3/10, “Expanse of soft power.” <http://www.pkarticleshub.com/2011/03/10/expanse-of-soft-power/>)

“Soft power” is the ability to make others do what you want, what they would otherwise not have done. Based on intangibles: i.e., less on what you own, and more on what you represent; others do what you want because of how they see you. What one wants can be done not just by states, but by all actors in international politics, such as NGOs or international institutions, through co-option and attraction.

The currencies are values, culture, policies and institutions and to what extent these are able to attract others. Soft power has become increasingly important after 9/11. The US cannot fight terrorism on its own. **Global stability can only be created with the cooperation of other states and international institutions.**

Soft power is generated in international affairs partly by what the government does through its policies and public diplomacy. This affects both the general public and governing elites in other countries by a host of non-state actors within and outside the country, both in positive (and negative) ways. This creates an enabling or disabling environment for government policies. **Soft power can enhance the probability of other elites adopting policies that allow one to achieve preferred outcomes**, alternatively where being seen as friendly to another country is seen as a local political kiss of death, its decline or absence will prevent a government from obtaining particular goals. The interactions of civil societies and non-state actors may help to further goals such as democracy, liberty, and development.

The actor’s reputation and credibility within the international community as well as the flow of information between actors is the touchstone of success for soft power. Often associated with the rise of globalisation and neo-liberal international relations theory, popular culture, media and the spread of a national language are regularly identified as the sources. A nation with a large amount of soft power resources, and the goodwill that engenders it, inspires others to adopt the culture, avoiding the need for expensive hard-power outlays.

Exchange programmes, broadcasting, or teaching a country’s language and promoting the study of a country’s culture and society do not produce Soft Power directly but are seen as its tools to promote understanding. They nurture positive images and propagate myths in favour of the source country. They provide a first but important step in the translation of “benignity,” “beauty,” and “brilliance” into soft power. The major elements include (1) its culture, when it is pleasing to others and inspires admiration and respect – e.g., McDonald’s and Hollywood movies promotes US culture worldwide; (2) its values, when attractive and consistently practiced; (3) its policies, when seen as inclusive and legitimate. The US and China today lead the world in exercising soft power with great success. India has also been partly successful in perfecting and projecting it, led by the private sector this success is accentuated by the fact that its hard power initiatives in South Asia have failed badly.

# \*\*\*\*SPACE DEBRIS LINKS\*\*\*\*

**Weaponization kills commerce – massive debris problem**

**Krepon, 3** – president of the Stimson Center (Michael, with Christopher Clary, “Space Assurance or Space Dominance?.” The Henry L. Stimson Center, http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/spacebook.pdf)

Others think differently. Proponents of space weaponization argue in the narrowest of terms, focusing on possible threats without evaluating their probability and keying on potential military benefits without weighing these benefits against the probable consequences of their favored pursuit. 3 1

The necessity to weaponize space in order to extend U.S. military superiority on the ground, sea, and air is well worth questioning. If terrestrial military superiority can continue to be extended without taking the lead in weaponizing space, is the latter warranted? And might it be possible that U.S. terrestrial military dominance could be greatly and unnecessarily complicated by weaponizing space? Put another way, how much dominance is enough? Basic questions also need to be asked regarding the interconnections of space weaponization and space-dependent commerce. The process of globalization and its positive distributed effects have been far more evident in space than on earth. The commercial utilization of space has been central to communications, navigation, remote sensing, timekeeping, and direct broadcasting. U.S. Space Command projects that by 2003, the Global Positioning System alone will generate $16 billion per year in revenues. In 2001, during the downturn in the telecommunications sector, the worldwide satellite industry still earned $85 billion in revenues. Before the downturn, some observers, such as space policy expert James Oberg, expected that by 2010, the cumulative U.S. investment in space could reach $500 billion to $600 billion— equaling the value of all current U.S. investments in Europe. 3 2

Is the flight-testing and deployment of space warfare capabilities the best way to protect and expand these investments? Would we think the same way about protecting the banking system, telephone landlines, fiber-optic cables, electrical grids, or stock markets? Common sense suggests that the flight-testing and deployment of space warfare capabilities would not be conducive to commerce that depends on the unhindered utilization of space. Instead, insurance rates for satellite launches would likely rise, and investors in space commerce would likely become more leery.

The drive toward space weaponization would have percussive effects on space commerce. Since the vulnerabilities of commercial satellites are very great and the costs of protective measures are open-ended, cost-benefit calculations of commercial investments in space would become more problematic. Space commerce requires the minimization of space debris. The growth of commerce in space therefore requires a peaceful environment. This environment has been nurtured over the past decade by the absence of space weapons’ flight-testing and deployment. Is the nurturing and expansion of space commerce now to proceed on an entirely different premise? How would proponents of the flight-testing and deployment of U.S. space warfare capabilities propose to assure commercial markets?

**ASATs cause enough space debris to render satellites useless—just one explosion could make as many as 50 unusable**

**Mackey, 9** - Colonal, USAF, analyst @ the Air & Space Power Journal [James, Air & Space Power Journal, “Recent US and China Antisatellite Activities,” Fall 2009 edition, ProQuest]

On 11 January 2007, China became the third known country with a proven ASAT capability when it conducted an unannounced launch of a Deng Fong-21 / Kai Tuo Zhe-1 (DF-21 /KT-I) against its own defunct Feng Yun-lC meteorology satellite.11 This event confirmed intelligence estimates of Chinese ASAT developments. Given the secretive nature of the Chinese government, most of the details remain hidden from the public, with most of what is known based upon observation and established Chinese capabilities. (This article draws upon publicly available sources for its references to technical data and capabilities.) The Chinese launched the Feng Yun-1C ("Feng Yun" is Chinese for "wind and cloud"), a polar-orbiting meteorological satellite, on 10 May 1999 from the Taiyuan Launch Complex, located in Shanxi prov- ince. Since 1985 that complex has served as a launch point for polar-orbiting satel- lites, primarily of the Earth monitoring, science, and meteorological type.12 Feng Yun-lC was in sun-synchronous orbit ranging between 845 and 865 kilometers above Earth, with an inclination of ap- proximately 99 degrees.13 Comparable American satellites include the defense meteorological satellites and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's polar-orbiting satellites. A kinetic-kill vehicle launched by a modified DF-21 intermediate-range ballistic missile known as the KT-I spacelaunch vehicle, in essence a modified DF-21, destroyed Feng Yun-lC.14 The exact technical characteristics and specific capabilities of the missile are not publicly known and are probably unique. Expert review of available information and testimony from civilian monitors and modelers indicate that the missile carried a kinetic-kill vehicle of approximately 600 kilograms. A simplistic evaluation of the kinetic energy provides some insight into the level of effectiveness of the kill. Given the mass of the Feng Yun-lC at 880 kilograms, an estimated kin etic-kill- vehicle mass of 600 kilograms and closure speed of 32,400 kilometers per hour yield a maximum kinetic energy of approximately 40.9 gigajoules. To put this into perspective, one ton of standard TNT explosives yields approximately 4.184 gigajoules of kinetic energy. Thus, the combined kinetic energy of the satellite and interceptor amounts to approximately nine times the explosive yield of one ton of TNT The world will continue to feel the consequences of this action for decades. Specifically, the intercept produced a massive debris field estimated at 20,000 to 40,000 fragments, each of them one centimeter or greater in size.15 This single event resulted in a 20 percent increase in the number of trackable objects in low Earth orbit (LEO). Because the interception was coplanar, much of the debris field resides in close proximity to the original altitude of the Feng Yun-lC at the time of the interception; however, some fragments maybe as high as 3,500 kilometers in orbit.16 These fragments pose a significant threat to satellites from many nations. A review of the database maintained by the Union of Concerned Scientists indicates [there are] well over 50 satellites in LEO near the altitude of the debris field from Feng Yun-lC. A further review reveals 16 satellites with an apogee/perigee within 825 to 900 kilometers and an inclination angle of 98 to 99 degrees (table 1). The threat from the debris is not limited to any single satellite. With velocities in the range of eight kilometers per second, debris colliding with any of these 16 satellites could have a dramatic cascading effect, leading to uncontrollable and/ or inoperable satellites threatening other satellites in nearby orbits and dramatically increasing the amount of hazardous debris in LEO, as recently occurred with the collision between Iridium and Russian military satellites. Additionally, the Union of Concerned Scientists' satellite database lists a number of satellites that pass through the debris field's altitude during their Molnyia (highly elliptical) orbits. Given the nature of such orbits and the associated increase in speed while at perigee, these satellites would hit the debris at a higher speed, with catastrophic results. Under the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, China may be accountable if such an incident were to occur.17

**A nuclear ASAT attack would disable every satellite within it altitude in a few weeks—causes global economic collapse and military readiness**

**Mueller and Harris, 3** -\*adjunct professor of security studies @ Georgetown University, senior political scientist @ the RAND corporation, former professor of comparative military studies @ the U.S. Air Force’s School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Ph.D. in politics @ Princeton University, B.A. in Political Science @ University of Chicago \*\* Senior Policy Researcher @ the RAND corporation [John, Elwyn, The Atlantic, “Headlines Over the Horizon” July/August Issue, <http://www.rand.org/commentary/atlantic/summaries.html>] Note: this was a RAND study first published in The Atlantic )

An anti-satellite attack could be mounted in a variety of ways, but a high-altitude nuclear detonation would create by far the most extensive effects. It would destroy satellites near the detonation point, of course; but, more significant, it [and] would also expand and intensify the power of the Van Allen radiation belts, clouds of high-energy particles that encircle Earth. Satellites passing through the region after a nuclear attack—among them hundreds of low-orbiting communications, weather, imaging, and scientific satellites, including the International Space Station and the Hubble space telescope—would be subjected to greatly increased levels of radiation, against which civil and commercial systems are not protected. (The satellites of the Global Positioning System are not nuclear-hardened either—but they operate in higher, less vulnerable orbits.) Such radiation would progressively degrade the satellites' solar panels and onboard electronic systems, and within months, or even weeks, after a nuclear explosion every satellite orbiting at the affected altitudes—aside from a few military systems that are protected against nuclear attack—could be disabled. It would take many months for the excess radiation trapped in the Van Allen belts to dissipate. A nuclear anti-satellite [an] attack would do the most harm to the United States, which owns most of the more than 250 satellites that might be affected, and which depends more than any other country on space systems. Such an attack would substantially damage the U.S. and world economies (replacing the ruined satellites could cost tens of billions of dollars, in addition to the costs of losing their services) and would seriously inconvenience the U.S. military, which relies heavily on civil and commercial satellites for functions such as communications and weather forecasting. Although no nation is likely to attack satellites as a short-term military strategy (the full effects would take too long to accumulate), someone might well consider using the tactic as a deterrent, as a coercive threat, or to strike a painful blow against the United States and its allies without the difficulties or obvious risks of attacking a target on American soil.

**ASAT attacks cause huge amounts of debris that lasts for hundreds of years and could damage space assets in similar altitude orbits**

**Milowicki and Johnson-Freese, 8**- \* Director of Aviation Programs @ the US Naval War College, M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies @ the US Naval War College B.S. in Aerospace Engineering @ the US Naval Academy, \*\*Professor of National Security Affairs @ the US Naval War College, teaches a course on Space & Security @ Harvard, Adjunct Professor @ The Watson Institute, Brown University, former Director of the Center for Space Policy & Law @ the University of Central Florida, Ph.D. [Gene, Joan, Astropolitics, “Strategic Choices: Examining the United States Military Response to the Chinese Anti-Satellite Test” January, Volume 6, Issue 1, informaworld]

In a test designed to evaluate their anti-satellite (ASAT) missile capability, at 1728 EST on 11 January 2007, the PLA of the PRC successfully destroyed one of their defunct weather satellites, the Feng Yun 1C. This 750-kilogram (kg) satellite was in a polar, sun-synchronous, low-Earth orbit (LEO) at an altitude of approximately 860 km. The method used to destroy the satellite was with a direct-ascent, kinetic kill vehicle. The vehicle was boosted into orbit by a four-stage, solid-fuel launch vehicle based on China's KT-2, launched from a transporter erector launcher (TEL) at the Songlin test facility near Xichang in Sichuan province.[4](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/smpp/section?content=a791222676&fulltext=713240928#EN0004) The vehicle slammed into the Feng Yun 1C satellite instantly obliterating it and disintegrating it into an estimated 35,000 individual orbital debris particles of one centimeter (cm) or larger in size.[5](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/smpp/section?content=a791222676&fulltext=713240928#EN0005) The debris field quickly dispersed along the satellite's original orbital path, with all of these individual particles traveling in a path perpendicular to the paths of many other spacecraft, both manned and unmanned in equatorial LEO. Most notably, Space Shuttle missions and the International Space Station (ISS) are potentially put at risk, especially in the long-term, from the debris created by this test. According to the U.S. Air Force Space Command, over 700 spacecraft in LEO are now at increased risk of collision with debris from the resulting debris cloud.[6](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/smpp/section?content=a791222676&fulltext=713240928#EN0006) The debris cloud will continue to spread and stratify in altitude over time, increasing the probability of collisions at all LEO altitudes. According to Dr. T. S. Kelso of the Center for Space Standards and Innovation, “85% of that debris cloud will be in orbit in 100 years. It shows how badly they messed things up with one event.”[7](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/smpp/section?content=a791222676&fulltext=713240928#EN0007) The U.S. has already had to maneuver at least one satellite in order to avoid a potential collision with debris from Feng Yun 1C. In late June, flight controllers at NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center boosted the Terra environmental spacecraft 1.3 kilometers (km) in altitude after a week of tracking and analysis of a 40 cm piece of debris from Feng Yun 1C showed a 7% chance of collision with Terra. The maneuver of Terra reportedly reduced the chance of collision with that one piece of known debris to zero.[8](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/smpp/section?content=a791222676&fulltext=713240928#EN0008) The current state of U.S. space surveillance capability makes a bad situation even worse. While the U.S. has the most robust space surveillance system, its capabilities are, nevertheless, limited. Objects in space are routinely tracked from Earth, for example, only if they are 10 cm or larger. To put that in perspective, the U.S. Air Force is currently tracking about 1,500 10 cm or larger particles from Feng-Yun 1C. That leaves an estimated number of over 35,000 1 to 10 cm particles that, while potentially capable of being detected, are not being tracked. These debris particles have the potential to cause catastrophic damage to orbiting spacecraft. Theresa Hitchens, Director of the Center for Defense Information, warns that “this incident highlights the irresponsible nature of the Chinese test, as well as more generally the threat from any future testing or use of debris-creating ASATs. And, it makes it all the more urgent that responsible spacefaring nations get together to ban such testing and use.”[9](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/smpp/section?content=a791222676&fulltext=713240928#EN0009)

**Even 2 or 3 ASAT tests create enough space debris to make low earth orbits unusable**

**Thisdell, 11** - staff writer @ Flight International runs the website Space, Time and Money [Dan, Flight International, “Space junk raises alarm” LexisNexis]

In January 2007, China successfully tested an anti-satellite missile, destroying one of its redundant spacecraft orbiting about 800km (1,290 miles) above the Earth. In April 2011, one of the 3,000 pieces of debris that test created passed close enough to the International Space Station, orbiting at around 400km, to raise concerns of a collision. Those 3,000 pieces are matched by about the same number left over from the February 2009 collision between an active Iridium communications satellite and a Russian satellite whose orbit was degrading. In all, the US military's Joint Space Operations Center (JSOC) tracks some 22,000 orbiting items larger than about 10cm (3.9in) across - and, as the chart shows, that number has roughly doubled since 2000. The vast majority of those items are debris, rather than payloads or rocket bodies, and there are another 700,000 or so pieces at around the 1cm size. Through the US State Department, the JSOC issued about 1,000 warnings in 2010 to foreign governments that a space asset was at risk of collision. Many of those resulted in avoidance manoeuvres, which consume propellant a satellite would normally use to maintain orientation. While some debris is an unavoidable consequence of launching a rocket, one senior US official says that "if we don't make some changes, we won't be able to use space". The USA, this official says, "learned our lesson" after a 1985 anti-satellite test left debris near the ISS. Stressing the need for all space-faring nations to take debris seriously, this official adds that China has behaved "very irresponsibly but we are hopeful"; a January 2011 "missile defence" test by the Chinese was followed within an hour by a statement assuring the world the incident was a test that left no debris. However, the US position is that another two or three ASAT tests would threaten the use of low-Earth orbits.

**Weaponization of space makes it unusable for any purpose because of massive debris**

**Zhang, 6** (Hui Zhang is a Senior Research Associate at the Project on Managing the Atom in the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. “Space Weaponization and Space Security” in Bringing Chinese Perspectives to Washington, a publication of the World Security Institute China Program, 2006 Issue No 2. <http://www.wsichina.org/attach/china_security2.pdf>)

Weaponizing space would further exacerbate current problems with space debris.17 Even worse, some scientists warn that if a number of satellites are destroyed in the course of a war, the Earth would be encased in a cloud of debris that would prevent future satellite stationing and space access.18 Given concerns over the space debris issue, senior scientists in China have emphasized that preventing environmental pollution should not only apply on Earth, but should also apply in outer space. As Xiangwan recently noted, “prevention of pollution in space should be put on an agenda and as time goes by, this problem will become increasingly obvious.” He further states: “In preventing space pollution, the following two issues are worth noticing: space garbage and weaponization of space.” “[W]eaponization of space is more dangerous than ordinary space garbage,” since “it will seriously pollute space” and “it will threaten peace and stability on the Earth.”

**Weaponization generates so much debris that space would become inaccessible**

**Zhang, 5 -** Senior Research Associate at the Project on Managing the Atom in the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government (December, Hui, “Action/Reaction: U.S. Space Weaponization and China,” Arms Control Today, <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_12/DEC-CVR>)

China also fears the increasing population of space debris. Such debris, resulting from 50 years of space activity, already poses a considerable hazard to spacecraft. Under U.S. space weaponization plans, this crowding problem could worsen as a large number of space weapons could be deployed in LEO. The launching and testing of weapons would also increase space debris. Moreover, deploying space-based weapons in the increasingly crowded realm of LEO would leave less room for civilian systems. Those problems would also occur during periods of peace. If a number of satellites were to be destroyed during the course of a war, some scientists warn, they would create so much debris that it would prevent future satellites from being stationed in space and generally limit space access. Indeed, pointing to the debris problem, Chinese scientists and officials have said that space weaponization should be considered an environmental threat as well as a security problem.

**ASAT tests and subsequent arms race causes rampant space debris**

**Hansel, 10** - Ph.D. candidate and teaching assistant at the Chair for International Politics and Foreign Policy Analysis at the University of Cologne, member of the editorial staff of the "Zeitschrift furAussen- und Sicherheitspolitik" [Journal of Foreign Policy and Security Policy] (3/28, Mischa, “The USA and Arms Control in Space: An IR Analysis,” Space Policy, ScienceDirect)

Why is the simple physical destruction of objects so particularly harmful in space?40 The reason for this lies in the uniqueness of orbital movement. Objects do not have to provide their own energy source to circle the Earth. They can travel with extraordinarily high velocities almost indeﬁnitely. This applies to even the smallest objects, of which there are thousands in different Earth orbits. Because of their speed even these small particles can inﬂict serious damage if they collide with a spacecraft. Unfortunately such instances are becoming more and more likely as for various reasons the population of space debris has been ever increasing since the beginning of the Space Age. One of the reasons for this has been the long-term practice of throwing away rocket stages or leaving no longer useful satellites in orbit. The consequences are unintended collisions between spacecraft. Until the Chinese ASAT test the least signiﬁcant source of space debris was the testing of kinetic energy weapons. But, as the Chinese ASAT test showed, the intentional destruction of objects in space could easily become the most troubling source of space debris. This would almost certainly be the case if an arms race were underway.

# AT: There’s a lot of other debris

**This would be a particularly heinous form of debris – it’s unique**

**Wright, 7** - codirects the Union of Concerned Scientists' (UCS) Global Security Program (10/1, David, “Space debris from antisatellite weapons,” BAS, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/space-debris-antisatellite-weapons)

Moreover, this debris wouldn't be spread uniformly throughout low Earth orbit, but instead it would be concentrated near the altitude at which the original satellite was orbiting, significantly increasing the debris density in that region. Because of the low atmospheric drag at high altitudes, the debris resulting from the destruction of satellites orbiting at altitudes greater than about 800 kilometers could remain in orbit for decades or centuries. Because of asymmetries in Earth's gravitational field, for a satellite in a near polar orbit (such as a spy satellite), the resulting debris would spread out into a shell around Earth over time. This debris could therefore threaten all satellites whose orbit carried them through that altitude.

# AT: Too Late to Mitigate Debris

**Every effort key – it’s a linear impact**

**David, 5/10** - Research Associate for Secure World Foundation, SPACE.com’s Space Insider Columnist, a correspondent for Space News newspaper, a contributing writer for the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA) Aerospace America magazine and also serves as a consultant to the Coalition for Space Exploration (11, Leonard, “Ugly Truth of Space Junk: No Feasible Solutions,” msnbc, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/42975224/ns/technology\_and\_science-space/t/ugly-truth-space-junk-no-feasible-solutions/)

When asked if the U.S. Air Force plans on funding space debris mitigation capability, Shelton responded: "We haven’t found a way yet that is affordable and gives us any hope for mitigating space debris. The best we can do, we believe, is to minimize debris as we go forward with our operations. As we think about how we launch things, as we deploy satellites, minimizing debris is absolutely essential and we’re trying to convince other nations of that imperative as well."

# \*\*\*\*COMMERCIAL SPACE INDUSTRY TURN\*\*\*\*

**Plan kills the commercial space industry**

**Johnson, 7** – PhD and director of The Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy (Rebecca, the Acronym Institute [an Independent, not-for-profit research and advocacy organization working on disarmament, arms control, and security issues], “Space without Weapons.” October, http://www.acronym.org.uk/space/congo.htm)

If there are significant military and national security advantages to be gained via commercial space, then it is important to recognize that there is the potential for great harm by placing military requirements at the forefront of how we think about space. While the January 2001 Space Commission report (and others) focus on the vulnerability of U.S. space assets and the potential for a “space Pearl Harbor,” there is a “flip side” that must also be considered. John Newhouse, senior fellow at the Center for Defense Information, states:

The [Space Commission] report does not call for but implies a U.S. need to accelerate development of antisatellite weapons, some of them space-based. But deploying such weapons will press other countries to develop and deploy countermeasures. And in any such tit for tat, the United States has the most to lose, since it is far more dependent on satellites for commercial communications and data-gathering operations than any other country. **Among the effects could be a sharp rise in the cost of insuring commercial satellites and an outcry from industry**.4

And, as John Logsdon, director of the Space Policy Institute at the George Washington University points out: “There appears to be no demand from the operators of commercial communication satellites for defense of their multibillion-dollar assets. If there were to be active military operations in space, it could be difficult not to interfere with the functioning of civilian space systems.”5

In other words, weaponizing space could be costly to an American industry that has great promise to grow and increase its contribution to the U.S. (and world) economy. Ultimately, a vibrant commercial space industry will support and enhance U.S. military capabilities far better than letting military requirements dominate space policy. Therefore, the government should avoid overregulating commercial space activities and imposing costly military requirements.

Commercial space development prevents resource wars

Collins and Autino, 10 - \* Life & Environmental Science, Azabu University AND \*\* Andromeda Inc., Italy (Patrick and Adriano, “What the growth of a space tourism industry could contribute to employment, economic growth, environmental protection, education, culture and world peace,” Acta Astronautica 66 (2010) 1553–1562, science direct)

The major source of social friction, including international friction, has surely always been unequal access to resources. People ﬁght to control the valuable resources on and under the land, and in and under the sea. The natural resources of Earth are limited in quantity, and economically accessible resources even more so. As the population grows, and demand grows for a higher material standard of living, industrial activity grows exponentially. The threat of resources becoming scarce has led to the concept of ‘‘Resource Wars’’. Having begun long ago with wars to control the gold and diamonds of Africa and South America, and oil in the Middle East, the current phase is at centre stage of world events today [37]. A particular danger of ‘‘resource wars’’ is that, if the general public can be persuaded to support them, they may become impossible to stop as resources become increasingly scarce. Many commentators have noted the similarity of the language of US and UK government advocates of ‘‘war on terror’’ to the language of the novel ‘‘1984’’ which describes a dystopian future of endless, fraudulent war in which citizens are reduced to slaves.

7.1. Expansion into near-Earth space is the only alternative to endless ‘‘resource wars’’

As an alternative to the ‘‘resource wars’’ already devastating many countries today, opening access to the unlimited resources of near-Earth space could clearly facilitate world peace and security. The US National Security Space Ofﬁce, at the start of its report on the potential of space-based solar power (SSP) published in early 2007, stated: ‘‘Expanding human populations and declining natural resources are potential sources of local and strategic conﬂict in the 21st Century, and many see energy as the foremost threat to national security’’ [38]. The report ended by encouraging urgent research on the feasibility of SSP: ‘‘Considering the timescales that are involved, and the exponential growth of population and resource pressures within that same strategic period, it is imperative that this work for ‘‘drilling up’’ vs. drilling down for energy security begins immediately’’ [38].

Although the use of extra-terrestrial resources on a substantial scale may still be some decades away, it is important to recognise that simply acknowledging its feasibility using known technology is the surest way of ending the threat of resource wars. That is, if it is assumed that the resources available for human use are limited to those on Earth, then it can be argued that resource wars are inescapable [22,37]. If, by contrast, it is assumed that the resources of space are economically accessible, this not only eliminates the need for resource wars, it can also preserve the beneﬁts of civilisation which are being eroded today by ‘‘resource war-mongers’’, most notably the governments of the ‘‘Anglo-Saxon’’ countries and their ‘‘neo-con’’ advisers. It is also worth noting that the $1 trillion that these have already committed to wars in the Middle-East in the 21st century is orders of magnitude more than the public investment needed to aid companies sufﬁciently to start the commercial use of space resources.

Industrial and ﬁnancial groups which proﬁt from monopolistic control of terrestrial supplies of various natural resources, like those which proﬁt from wars, have an economic interest in protecting their proﬁtable situation. However, these groups’ continuing proﬁts are justiﬁed neither by capitalism nor by democracy: they could be preserved only by maintaining the pretence that use of space resources is not feasible, and by preventing the development of low-cost space travel. Once the feasibility of low-cost space travel is understood, ‘‘resource wars’’ are clearly foolish as well as tragic. A visiting extra-terrestrial would be pityingly amused at the foolish antics of homo sapiens using longrange rockets to ﬁght each other over dwindling terrestrial resources—rather than using the same rockets to travel in space and have the use of all the resources they need!

7.2. High return in safety from extra-terrestrial settlement

Investment in low-cost orbital access and other space infrastructure will facilitate the establishment of settlements on the Moon, Mars, asteroids and in man-made space structures. In the ﬁrst phase, development of new regulatory infrastructure in various Earth orbits, including property/usufruct rights, real estate, mortgage ﬁnancing and insurance, trafﬁc management, pilotage, policing and other services will enable the population living in Earth orbits to grow very large. Such activities aimed at making near-Earth space habitable are the logical extension of humans’ historical spread over the surface of the Earth. As trade spreads through near-Earth space, settlements are likely to follow, of which the inhabitants will add to the wealth of different cultures which humans have created in the many different environments in which they live.

Success of such extra-terrestrial settlements will have the additional beneﬁt of reducing the danger of human extinction due to planet-wide or cosmic accidents [27]. These horrors include both man-made disasters such as nuclear war, plagues or growing pollution, and natural disasters such as super-volcanoes or asteroid impact. It is hard to think of any objective that is more important than preserving peace. Weapons developed in recent decades are so destructive, and have such horriﬁc, long-term side-effects that their use should be discouraged as strongly as possible by the international community. Hence, reducing the incentive to use these weapons by rapidly developing the ability to use space-based resources on a large scale is surely equally important [11,16]. The achievement of this depends on low space travel costs which, at the present time, appear to be achievable only through the development of a vigorous space tourism industry.

8. Summary

As discussed above, if space travel services had started during the 1950s, the space industry would be enormously more developed than it is today. Hence the failure to develop passenger space travel has seriously distorted the path taken by humans’ technological and economic development since WW2, away from the path which would have been followed if capitalism and democracy operated as intended. Technological know-how which could have been used to supply services which are known to be very popular with a large proportion of the population has not been used for that purpose, while waste and suffering due to the unemployment and environmental damage caused by the resulting lack of new industrial opportunities have increased.

In response, policies should be implemented urgently to correct this error, and to catch up with the possibilities for industrial and economic growth that have been ignored for so long. This policy renewal is urgent because of the growing dangers of unemployment, economic stagnation, environmental pollution, educational and cultural decline, resource wars and loss of civil liberties which face civilisation today. In order to achieve the necessary progress there is a particular need for collaboration between those working in the two ﬁelds of civil aviation and civil space. Although the word ‘‘aerospace’’ is widely used, it is largely a misnomer since these two ﬁelds are in practice quite separate. True ‘‘aerospace’’ collaboration to realise passenger space travel will develop the wonderful profusion of possibilities outlined above.

8.1. Heaven or hell on Earth?

As discussed above, the claim that the Earth’s resources are running out is used to justify wars which may never end: present-day rhetoric about ‘‘the long war’’ or ‘‘100 years war’’ in Iraq and Afghanistan are current examples. If political leaders do not change their viewpoint, the recent aggression by the rich ‘‘Anglo-Saxon’’ countries, and their cutting back of traditional civil liberties, are ominous for the future. However, this ‘‘hellish’’ vision of endless war is based on an assumption about a single number—the future cost of travel to orbit—about which a different assumption leads to a ‘‘heavenly’’ vision of peace and ever-rising living standards for everyone. If this cost stays above 10,000 Euros/kg, where it has been unchanged for nearly 50 years, the prospects for humanity are bleak. But if humans make the necessary effort, and use the tiny amount of resources needed to develop vehicles for passenger space travel, then this cost will fall to 100 Euros/kg, the use of extra-terrestrial resources will become economic, and arguments for resource wars will evaporate entirely. The main reason why this has not yet happened seems to be lack of understanding of the myriad opportunities by investors and policy-makers. Now that the potential to catch up half a century of delay in the growth of space travel is becoming understood, continuing to spend 20 billion Euro-equivalents/year on government space activities, while continuing to invest nothing in developing passenger space travel, would be a gross failure of economic policy, and strongly contrary to the economic and social interests of the public. Correcting this error, even after such a costly delay, will ameliorate many problems in the world today.

As this policy error is corrected, and investment in proﬁtable space projects grows rapidly in coming years, we can look forward to a growing world-wide boom. Viewed as a whole, humans’ industrial activities have been seriously underperforming for decades, due to the failure to exploit these immensely promising ﬁelds of activity. The tens of thousands of unemployed space engineers in Russia, America and Europe alone are a huge waste. The potential manpower in rapidly developing India and China is clearly vast. The hundreds of millions of disappointed young people who have been taught that they cannot travel in space are another enormous wasted resource.

We do not know for certain when the above scenario will be realised. However, it could have such enormous value that considerable expenditure is justiﬁed in order to study its feasibility in detail [5]. At the very least, vigorous investment by both private and public sectors in a range of different sub-orbital passenger vehicle projects and related businesses is highly desirable. Fortunately, the ambitious and rapid investment by the Indian and Chinese governments in growing space capabilities may ﬁnally jolt the space industries of Russia, America, Europe and Japan out of their long economic stagnation, and induce them to apply their accumulated know-how to economically valuable activities—notably supplying widely popular travel services to the general public.

**Those escalate to nuclear war**

**Weiner, 90** - Prof. At Princeton (Jonathan, The Next 100 Years p. 270)

If we do not destroy ourselves with the A-bomb and the H-bomb, then we may destroy ourselves with the C-bomb, the Change Bomb. And in a world as interlinked as ours, one explosion may lead to the other. Already in the Middle East, from North Africa to the Persian Gulf and from the Nile to the Euphrates, tensions over dwindling water supplies and rising populations are reaching what many experts describe as a flashpoint. A climate shift in that single battle-scarred nexus might trigger international tensions that will unleash some of the 60,000 nuclear warheads the world has stockpiled since Trinity.

# Space Industry Link Ext.

**Weaponization destroys the commercial space industry – crowd out and spending**

**Peña and Hudgins,2** -- \*senior defense policy analyst at cato, AND \*\*former director of regulatory studies at cato (Carlos, Edward, “Should the United States “Weaponize” Space? Military and Commercial Implications.” Cato, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa427.pdf)

It is also important to consider the chain of events that is likely to occur if the United States tries to dominate space militarily and the effects that weaponizing space could have on the commercial space sector. John Newhouse, senior fellow at the Center for Defense Information, states: The [Space Commission] report does not call for but implies a U.S. need to accelerate development of antisatellite weapons, some of them space-based. But deploying such weapons will press other countries to develop and deploy countermeasures. And in any such tit for tat, the United States has the most to lose, since it is far more dependent on satellites for commercial communications and data-gathering operations than any other country. Among the effects could be a sharp rise in the cost of insuring commercial satellites and an outcry from industry. 68 In other words, weaponizing space could be costly to an American industry that has great promise to grow and increase its contribution to the U.S. (and world) economy. Ultimately, a vibrant commercial space industry will support and enhance U.S. mili- tary capabilities far better than letting military requirements dominate space policy.

Therefore, the government should avoid overregulating commercial space activities and imposing costly military requirements. For example, the Heritage Foundation has recommended designating the Global Positioning System as critical national infrastructure, making the Department of Defense the lead agency responsible for GPS, and deploying a more secure GPS satellite network. 69 Although GPS was originally designed for and is operated by the U.S. military, 70 it is now interconnected with commercial satellites, and civilian and commercial use now dwarfs military use. More stringent military requirements imposed on the GPS system could have adverse effects on the commercial sector, such as increased complexity and higher cost of equipment.

The past decade has seen expanded commercial use of sophisticated communications satellites for the Internet, television, and other broadband applications, but commercial suppliers still struggle under tight launch and export restrictions. Currently there are major efforts afoot in Congress to ease federal regulations imposed on private commercial space ventures, to deal with structural problems caused by activities of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and to promote private space ventures. 71 Space-related defense systems and strategies, if not wisely structured, could seriously hinder the development of future commercial activities in space and, in the long run, could harm America’s defense capabilities. Conversely, the Pentagon’s ability to defend the nation could benefit from a flourishing of commercial activities.

The weaponization of space could ultimately lead to the federal government regulating commercial satellites for military purposes. As a result, **the growth of private-industry ventures in space could be hindered by poorly conceived specifications and regulations in the name of national defense**. There are unintended consequences of military requirements on certain kinds of dual-use technology. Consider NASA’s experience with designing the Space Shuttle. 72 In order to garner political support for the shuttle, NASA asked the Pentagon what capabilities it would want in such a vehicle. The Pentagon replied that it wanted the shuttle to be able to maneuver in the atmosphere so that it might land at any number of bases in the United States. Thus, the shuttle, which had to be designed with large wings, heated up more on reentry than would a nonmaneuverable craft with far smaller wings. This design required 34,000 heat resistant tiles, which of course added cost to the shuttle. A nonmaneuverable vehicle might have been able to use a different heatresisting system. Further, in the early years of the shuttle project, these custom-made tiles tended to fall off, requiring more time and cost to maintain the vehicles. In addition, the tiles altogether weighed some 25,000 pounds, cutting the shuttle cargo capacity in half. 73

Thus, it is no mystery why the shuttle cost so much and never became a commercially viable system. In this case, the Pentagon did not mandate the design of the craft, but instead NASA chose the design for political reasons. This example shows how the unintended consequences of technology mandates can hinder the development of the very technology that is the target of the mandates.

Another current example of a government intervention that is hindering space commercialization is export licensing. The Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act, passed in 1998, transferred export licensing from the Commerce Department to the State Department. The State Department has been much stricter on exports than Commerce, producing serious delays for businesses.

Sometimes the consequences of the export control process are truly destructive to private space efforts. Take the case of the company MirCorp, owned 40 percent by private Western investors and 60 percent by the mostly private Russian rocket company Energia. MirCorp wanted to export from the United States to Russia a tether that would be launched from Russia up to the Mir space station, which MirCorp was in the process of commercializing. That tether would have been deployed outside of Mir to provide the station with power. But the State Department delayed approval, only granting export permission the day after the Russian government decided to de-orbit Mir.

Certainly there are security concerns about space-related exports. But the current system does not focus narrowly on keeping dangerous technology out of the hands of America’s enemies. Rather, its overbroad and often arbitrary rules cause considerable collateral damage to American entrepreneurs.

To further illustrate how Defense Department requirements imposed on the commercial sector could stunt innovation and growth, consider an analogy with the computer and information sector. Lower launch costs could revolutionize satellites in the same way that personal computers (PCs), software, and the Internet—developed together, free from regulations—created syngeries that revolutionized the PC itself. PCs in the early 1980s, like their large mainframe brothers, were used principally for storing data and crunching numbers. Now PCs are tools for entertainment, communications, and undreamed of potential applications.

The development of the PC also has been characterized by unprecedented increases in processing capacity, hard drive space, and reductions in price. For example, Moore’s Law, (named after Gordon Moore, one of the founders of Intel) states that processor speed doubles, while prices drop by half, every 18 months. Although it is conceivable that some of the technologies incorporated into PCs— for example, the mouse—could have been devised in government defense labs, making PCs at prices that anyone can afford was the achievement of private entrepreneurs.

Farsighted defense planners have long recognized the importance of commercial sector innovation to defense. For example, a December 1999 report issued by the Defense Science Board Task Force on Globalization and Security discussed how the Department of Defense depends on the private sector in the United States to move faster than its overseas competitors in developing new products and new applications of technology. 74 The Pentagon builds on such commercial progress.

The benefits of the free-market growth in PCs and software to national defense can be seen in flight simulator software. For example, Mike Coligny, the CEO of Flyit Simulators of San Diego, observed that “we developed a [helicopter] simulator that the government typically would pay millions of dollars for, and ours cost $65,000. It’s been on the market since late July [2000].” 75 And Ensign Herb Lacy at the Pensacola Naval Air Station purchased a $50 Microsoft Flight Simulator game that he modified to recreate the controls of a T-34C Turbo Mentor, for a total cost of only $250. Using the same software as Lacy, the Navy created six makeshift simulators at a cost of $6,000 each, compared to millions of dollars for conventional simulators. 76

But the Pentagon’s interest in space activities could short-circuit this process. For example, defense specialists foresee greater defense use of the commercial communications network currently in orbit and are concerned that the network should not be compromised or blinded by an adversary. This concern could prompt the Pentagon to seek authority to mandate certain specifications for commercial satellites that would make them less vulnerable to potential enemies. But **such mandates could have adverse unintended consequences similar to those that might have occurred had the Pentagon decided to set specifications on PCs to protect them from disabling electromagnetic pulses caused by atomic blasts**. Twenty years ago, the Pentagon might have reasoned that such a requirement would make PCs more appropriate for defense uses. Yet we know after the fact that such a requirement would have added significantly to the cost of PCs and forced manufacturers to take such requirements into account in every new phase of PC development. In the end, the PC revolution as we now know it might have been stillborn.

The bottom line is that if the Pentagon needs satellites that are more resistant to attack, it would be better to commission hardened satellites specifically for its needs. Buying such specialized satellites would be a legitimate defense expenditure. The Pentagon would likely have to spend more money than it would if the government forced manufacturers to accept certain costly standards, but the latter approach would simply shift costs to the private sector. Such private, societal costs would likely be higher than the government’s budget expenditures dedicated to military satellites. The Pentagon would need to plan its strategies on the assumption that a private space network would be more vulnerable than it might find ideal. But the alternative, in the long term, would be a weakened overall private satellite network that would be less useful for defense purposes.

In any case, commercialization of space, which could lead to lower launch costs and more versatile satellites, would make for a more extensive, redundant, and secure satellite system. This redundancy would be good for the Pentagon as a hedge against technical failure, as well as making it more difficult and costly for a potential adversary to destroy.

# \*\*\*\*SPENING LINKS\*\*\*\*

**Plan costs trillions even assuming future launch efficiencies**

Kekauoha, 3 – Major Stanford K. Kekauoha graduated from Brigham Young University—Hawaii, Laie, Hawaii, with Bachelors of Science degrees in Business Management and Computer Information Systems in 1988. In July 2003, Major Kekauoha was assigned as Commander, Air Operations Strategy Flight, 502nd Air Operations Squadron, Pacific Air Forces, Hickam AFB, Hawaii. Cards taken from his masters thesis. Kekauoha was advised by Everett Dolman and (Stanford, “SPACE WEAPONS AND SPACEPOWER.” Thesis Presented to the Faculty of The School of Advanced Air and Space Studies For Completion of Graduate Requirements Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. PDF, google scholar)

 Certainly the cost of space weaponization is staggering when adding the fixed costs of space access, and the development costs associated with highly technical and complex space applications. Estimates for fielding space weapons run the gamut from $40 billion for a 20-satellite space based laser constellation, to $165 billion for a ground based laser architecture, with the high estimate exceeding $1 trillion for fielding space weapon capability.37 A major expense of any space program is generated by launch costs, and space weapons would share this limitation. Although the space industry expects to reach its goal of cutting space lift costs in the near future to a reasonable $1,000 per pound, and eventually achieving launch costs of only $100 per pound by 2025, launch costs are a limiting factor in any future space deployment.38 Even with the projected savings in space lift expenditures, the space weapon price tag is still astounding and dwarfs all other military procurement programs including the B-2 bomber, which had a per unit production cost of $2.2 billion per plane.39

# \*\*\*\*PLAN VIOLATES OST\*\*\*\*

US space-based weaponization wrecks the OST and spurs global weaponization

Wilkerson,8 – Lt. Col., published by US Army War College, (Don, “Space Power Theory: Controlling the Medium Without Weapons in Space.” U.S. Army War College, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA482300>)

Conversely, the other side of the argument to not deploy weapons in space is probably more compelling. The proliferation of space-based weapons will allow potential adversaries to place U.S. space assets at risk without the long-term equivalent investment in technology and hardware, and potentially without placing similar space systems in orbit. If the U.S. withdraws from the Outer Space Treaty and begins pursuing weapons in space to justify the defense of vital national space systems, other countries will undoubtedly pursue these weapons as well. Once other space-faring nations deploy weapons in space, not only will on-orbit assets be in danger, but also terrestrial targets within the U.S., such as cities, conceivably may be held at risk from attack from space.

The proliferation of space weapons could become tomorrow’s “nuclear arms control” issue that would be a costly venture for all involved. Countries would begin to channel resources to develop the technology and systems to place weapons in space in order to demonstrate their power, modernity and their desire to compete with the world’s most powerful countries. However, current U.S. ground-based space weapon systems and conventional warfighting systems already provide the necessary offensive capabilities and deterrence to support a space power theory without deploying weapons into space.

\*

# \*\*\*\*WEAPON SPEC KEY\*\*\*\*

**The aff must define what a “space weapon” is – key to detailed policy discussions**

**Oberg, 7** -- 22-year veteran of NASA mission control (James, the space review, “Phony space weaponization: the case of Radarsat-2.” <http://www.thespacereview.com/article/886/1_>)

Diplomats know it is hard enough defining what is and is not a “space weapon”, and that this difficulty has stymied productive discussions of treaty controls over their proliferation (see[“Space weapons: hardware, paperware, beware?”](http://www.thespacereview.com/article/744/1), The Space Review, November 13, 2006). Something as innocuous as a screwdriver, thrust through a pressure hose, becomes a means of destruction—a “weapon”. But something as dangerous as a handgun, packed into a Soyuz survival kit, gets treated (by Russian demand) as a “survival tool” exempt from any weapons treaty.

Now, to add to the murkiness, there’s the phenomenon of falsely accusing a space vehicle of being a “weapon”. For domestic or international political propaganda profits, innuendo or outright accusations against a project can be issued, perhaps significantly degrading the project’s international partnerships and agreements. It’s even possible that the accusations are sincere, based on delusions and misconceptions about space flight on the part of the accusers. However, more likely the propagandists are relying on exploiting the biases and misconceptions they know exist in their target audiences.

# \*\*\*\*POLITICS\*\*\*\*

# Links – General

**Both the public and policymakers despise the plan - there’s overwhelming bipartisan opposition to space weaponization - even Obama spin can’t overcome this**

**CISSM, 8** (Center for International and Security Studies @ Maryland, “ Large Majorities of Americans and Russians Oppose All Space Weapons,” Jan 23, <http://drum.lib.umd.edu/bitstream/1903/10631/3/CISSM_Space_Jan08_art.pdf>)

Most Americans and Russians agree that their governments should work together to prevent an arms race in space. Large majorities in both countries favor unilateral restraint and a treaty that would keep space free of weapons. A United States Air Force Defense Support System satellite used for infrared detection (Photo: USAF) Americans and Russians also support treaties that would prohibit countries from attacking or interfering with each others' satellites and from testing or deploying weapons designed to attack satellites. These are among the key findings of a WorldPublicOpinion.org poll of 1,247 Americans and 1,601 Russians developed in conjunction with the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland (CISSM). Knowledge Networks in the United States and the Levada Center in Russia conducted the interviews. Russia (67%) say that as long as no other country puts weapons into space, their own governments should also refrain from doing so. Most Russians (72%) and Americans (80%) also favor a new treaty banning all weapons in space. Support for such a ban was strong among Americans even when they were presented counter arguments about the potential military advantages of deploying such systems. The US poll revealed strong bipartisan consensus on the issue. Majorities in both the Republican and Democratic parties believe the US government should refrain unilaterally from deploying space weapons. There is also bipartisan backing for a treaty to ban these weapons, though support is higher among Democrats. Steven Kull, director of WorldPublicOpinion.org, noted that there was remarkable agreement within and between the two countries on the issue of space weapons. "What is striking is the robust consensus among Russians as well as Americans, and among Republicans as well as Democrats that space should not be an arena for the major powers to compete for military advantage," Kull said.

**Empirically proven**

**Lambakis, 1** (Steven, Writer @ the Hoover Institution, “Space Weapons: Refuting the Critics,” Policy Review No 105, Feb 1, <http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6612>, EMM)

Clashes over the military use of space, usually a result of proposals to fund politically controversial weapons programs, have agitated and unsettled the country at various times throughout the space age. But though the world has changed, the intellectual and doctrinal foundations underlying the debate have not.

# Links – Political Capital

**Plan saps tons of PC - Congress isn’t ready to support space weaponization**

**Lambeth, 3** (Benjamin, PhD Political Science and Writer @ RAND, “Mastering the Ultimate High Ground: Next Steps in the Military Uses of Space,” Accessed on Spacedebate.org, <http://www.spacedebate.org/evidence/1415>)

For the time being, the idea of placing offensive weapons in space for use against terrestrial targets remains contrary to declared national policy, and there is no indication that the nation is anywhere near the threshold of deciding to weaponize space. Any truly serious steps toward acquiring a space force application capability will involve a momentous political decision that the nation's leadership has not yet shown itself ready to make. As the Air Force's former deputy chief of staff for air and space operations, then Lieutenant General Robert Foglesong, noted, "if the policy decision is made to take our guns into space, that will be decided by our civilian leadership." Until that threshold is reached, any talk of space weaponization will remain not only politically moot but needlessly provocative, and military space activity will remain limited to enhancing terrestrial operations and controlling the ultimate high ground.

# Links – Flip-Flop

**Plan’s an enormous flipflop - Obama promised to eliminate all space weapons**

**Gilbert, 10** (Jo-Anne, Griffith Asia Institute @ Griffith University, “ A SPOON FULL OF SUGAR MAKES THE MEDICINE GO DOWN? AN ANALYSIS OF THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S ‘NEW’ NATIONAL SPACE POLICY,” 8/9, <http://sustainablesecurity.org/article/spoon-full-sugar-makes-medicine-go-down-analysis-obama-administration%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%98new%E2%80%99-national-space>)

On 28 June 2010, US President Barack Obama released a new, and much anticipated National Space Policy (NSP) document. In contrast to the bellicose and unilateral tone of George W. Bush’s 2006 policy, the 2010 document is replete with references to ‘international cooperation’ and ‘responsibility.’ When taken with Obama’s campaign promise to pursue a “world-wide ban” on space weapons(1) and overtures to the Conference on Disarmament that the US is prepared to negotiate international arms control agreements regarding space, those opposed to the weaponisation of space might have some cause for optimism that the US has stepped back from setting a dangerous precedent.

**Flip-flops destroy the agenda**

**Goddard, 9** (Taegan, Creator – Political Wire, (One of the Most Widely-Read and Influential Political Web Sites on the Internet), "Does Obama Practice a Different Kind of Politics?", CQ Politics, 3-19, http://innovation.cq.com/ liveonline/51/landing)
#  Dan from Philadelphia: How quickly is Obama burning through his political capital? Will he have anything left to actually keep some of his promises? With potential shifts from his campaign stances on the question of Gitmo, Iraq troop withdrawals and taxing employer healthcare benefits, it seems he is in for tough fights on all fronts.
# Taegan Goddard: That's a great question. I think Obama spends some of his political capital every time he makes an exception to his principles -- such as hiring a lobbyist to a key position or overlooking an appointee not paying their taxes. Policy reversals such as the ones you note burn through even more of this precious capital.

# 2NC Flip-Flops Kill the Agenda Ext.

**Flip-flops are politically devastating**

 **The Dallas Morning News, 1** (4/16/2001 (lexis))

A high number of flip-flops can bleed a president dry, they added, especially one who campaigned for a "responsibility era" in contrast to the scandal-ridden Clinton era. "His stock-in-trade more than anything else is, 'This is a guy who keeps his commitments, even when it's painful ,' " said Norman Ornstein, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. Democrats said the coal companies applied pressure to Bush, forcing a decision they say ignores the threat of global warming. In mocking Bush's prior campaign pledge, many cited the chemical formula for carbon dioxide, CO2. "The president and his team have really made a 180-degree turn on their position here, suggesting now that CO2 is somehow A-OK," said Sen. Joe Lieberman, D-Conn., who ran against Bush as the Democratic candidate for vice president. Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton, D-N.Y., wife of Bush's predecessor, called it "a promise made and a promise broken." "In less than eight weeks in office, President Bush has gone from CO2 to 'see you later,' " Hillary Clinton said. During a campaign speech in Saginaw, Mich., on Sept. 29, Bush outlined a clean air strategy targeting four pollutants. "With the help of Congress, environmental groups and industry, we will require all power plants to meet clean air standards in order to reduce emissions of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, mercury, and carbon dioxide within a reasonable period of time," Bush said. And since his inauguration, Bush's Environmental Protection Agency chief, Christie Whitman, has publicly backed the carbon dioxide restrictions. But late Tuesday, he sent a letter to Republican senators saying he was still committed to new emission standards on the first three items. "I do not believe, however, that the government should impose on power plants mandatory emissions reductions for carbon dioxide, which is not a 'pollutant' under the Clean Air Act," Bush wrote. Critics said broken promises are especially troublesome for Bush, who promised a more straightforward approach than his predecessor. During an Oct. 26 speech titled "Responsible Leadership," Bush told supporters in Pittsburgh that "in a responsibility era, government should trust the people." "And in a responsibility era, people should also be able to trust their government," Bush said. Ornstein said it may be hard for Bush to make those kind of comments in the future. "Now his opponents are going to jump up and say, 'Oh yeah?' " Ornstein said. "This is going to be used against him." White House aides said they believe most voters will understand the circumstances behind the decision. They cited a recent Energy Department study saying that capping carbon dioxide emissions would escalate the shift from coal to natural gas for electricity generation, thus boosting prices. "It's better to protect the consumer and avoid worsening the energy crisis," White House spokesman Ari Fleischer said. If Bush has any doubt how much damage a broken promise can do, he needs only to ask his father , President George Bush, who hurt himself by reversing his nationally televised "read my lips, no new taxes" pledge. The younger Bush's carbon dioxide pledge came in an energy policy speech, and most of the attention at the time was devoted to his proposal to drill for oil in an Alaska wildlife refuge. Thomas E. Patterson, a professor of government and the press at the Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, said the damage done to Bush depends on what happens in the future. He likened broken campaign promises to "razor cuts." "If you only have a few of them, they really can get lost in everything else that's going on," Patterson said. " It's the accumulation of these razor cuts that starts the real bleeding."

**Flip-flops kill the agenda - it’s the most destructive political label in America**

**Rainey, 8** (6/25/08 (James, Staff @ LA Times, "ON THE MEDIA: Candidates Show Lack of Leadership on Iraq," Daily Herald, [http://www.heraldextra.com/component/option,com\_contentwire/task,view/id,61544/Itemid,53/](http://www.heraldextra.com/component/option%2Ccom_contentwire/task%2Cview/id%2C61544/Itemid%2C53/))

The Iraq experts I interviewed agreed that one of the most problematic barriers to a real debate is -- as author and journalist George Packer said -- a culture that has "made flip-flopper the most feared label in American politics." They could point to another politician, fact averse but stalwart, who took too long to adapt once it became clear Iraq was going sideways. "It seems in America you are stuck with the position you adopted, even when events change, in order to claim absolute consistency," Packer said. "That can't be good."

# Links – Congress

**Congress hates the plan – viewed as unnecessary and expensive**

**Johnson, 7** – PhD and director of The Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy (Rebecca, the Acronym Institute [an Independent, not-for-profit research and advocacy organization working on disarmament, arms control, and security issues], “Space without Weapons.” October, http://www.acronym.org.uk/space/congo.htm)

To answer my first question: It appears quite clear from the documents and statements put out by the Bush administration during its first six years that an influential cadre has been pushing for the United States to design and deploy weapons for use in and from space. But despite the desire, the weaponisation of space is far from being a *fait accompli*. First, Congress has proved less than persuaded of the need, particularly in view of high costs and technological hurdles. (Add to this, their concerns about the overstretch of the US budget with the war on Iraq, and in that context weaponising space is not a priority.) Moreover, some sceptics have voiced the conclusion that the weaponisation of space is only inevitable if the US itself drives a race to do so.

# Politics – AT: Link Turns

**No risk of political support – massive backlash as a result of the plan**

**Mueller, 6** (Karl, PhD and Political Scientist @ RAND, “Toward a U.S. Grand Strategy in Space,” March 10th, Washington Roundtable on Science and Public Policy, http://www.marshall.org/article.php?id=408, EMM)

The United States probably has – conceivably at least – the capability of doing that if we want. We are in a position where we could actually say, “Alright, space is so important to national security and global stability that it needs to be handled by someone responsible. Guess what – we’re it!” So the United States develops space weapons first and says, “Alright, nobody goes into space and does anything there without our permis-sion.” This would obviously be quite a sensational political thing to do. It would be expensive monetarily and politically. The political investment would be very large and before you embark on a path that involves that as your desired end-state, you need to be sure you actually want to go there. Another analogy here: it is like trying to corner the gold market. Buying so much gold that you corner the market would be very, very profitable. Buying a whole lot of gold and not cornering the market is just putting a lot of money into an investment with a very poor return. So you want to be pretty clear about whether you are going to be able to achieve the end-state you envision before you embark on a path that leads in that direction.

**The plan is political unfeasible - your author agrees**

**Dolman and Cooper, 11** (Everett, PhD and Professor of Comparative Military Studies @ US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies and Recipient of Central Intelligence’s Outstanding Intelligence Analyst Award, and Henry, Former Deputy for the Strategic and Space Systems, “Chapter 19: Increasing the Military Uses of Space,” Part of “Toward a Theory of Spacepower,” Edited by Charles Lutes and Peter Hays, National Defense University Press, <http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/spacepower/spacepower.pdf>)

Within about 15 years of Arnold's comments, Soviet ICBMs armed with nuclear warheads did indeed have the ability to threaten Washington, but over 40 years later, America's ability to reliably defend itself from ICBMs remains minimal—due not to technology limitations but to long-standing policy and political constraints. To understand the passion of the current opposition to space weapons, one must look into the fundamental issue of the Cold War: nuclear weapons deployed at a scale to threaten the existence of all life on the planet. The specter of potential nuclear devastation was so horrendous that a neo-ideal of a world without war became a political imperative. Longstanding realist preference for peace through strength was stymied by the invulnerability of ballistic missiles traveling at suborbital velocities. Thus, America accepted a policy of assured and mutual destruction to deter its opponents in a horrible (if effective) balance of terror. This meant it became politically infeasible even to contemplate shooting down missiles aimed at America or its allies— especially from machines in space that might prove so efficient as to force an opponent to strike while it could, before such a system became operational.

# AT: Space Dominance Popular

**Even amid fears of space inferiority, weaponization is still politically explosive**

**Moltz, 7** (James, PhD and Associate Professor for Security Studies @ Naval Postgraduate School, “ Protecting Safe Access to Space: Lessons from the First 50 Years of Space Security,” Space Policy Vol 23, November, Accessed on Spacedebate.org, <http://www.spacedebate.org/evidence/3150>)

But the combined impact of sharply elevated defense spending for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, a series of now-familiar technical problems in developing space-based missile defenses, and the unwillingness of most Democratic and many Republican members of Congress to move hastily into the weaponization of space before understanding its likely costs and geopolitical implications, led to the scaling back of many of these programs by mid-2006. In November 2006, the Democrats' seizure of both houses of Congress in the mid-term elections seemed to end any realistic prospects for near-term deployment of space weapons. Or did it? China's successful test of an ASAT weapon in January 2007 shocked the US political establishment. Proponents of space defenses, like Republican Senator Jon Kyl, argued for near-term deployment of orbital ASAT weapons, seeing China's action as the start of a space arms race that the USA could not afford to lose. But his calls fell upon deaf ears even among most of his fellow Republican members of Congress, as other defense priorities dominated their attention and the new Democratic majority all but eliminated prospects of significant new funding. Previous, rosy predictions of an era of unchallenged US "space dominance" now seemed hopelessly unattainable after just one Chinese test.

# AT: Winners Win

**Its either not unique or empirically false – multiple wins now**

**Financial Executive, 5/1/09** (Lexis)

President Barack Obama's "first 100 days" ended April 30, having been fast, furious, eventful and full of change. Cont..As president, early efforts have indicated he's serious about these priorities and wants to act quickly while he still has the necessary political momentum to move his agenda. It's anyone's guess as to when his ample supply of political capital will squander. So far, the Democratic majority in Congress has worked hard to implement the president's agenda and Democratic legislative proposals have been abundant. History shows that a president's momentum doesn't last forever. Obama's political capital, too, will diminish over time and some of hispolicy initiatives will be hard to get through Congress. Cont….Obama immediately tackled health care by signing legislation--just15 days into his term--expanding the State Children's Health Insurance Program. This law is significant because Democrats had failed twice during the Bush Administration to push it through Congress. Concurrently, the Obama administration is working closely with congressionalleadership on the second major economic stimulus package. On Feb. 17, the president signed the $787 billion "American Recovery and Reinvestment Act." Based primarily on Obama's proposals, it's the largest spending bill in the history of the United States. This unprecedented effort to jumpstart the economy contains a multitude of unemployment and social-welfare provisions, as well as domestic spending for healthcare, education and infrastructure (targeted at the energy sector). Unfortunately, it does not contain the tax relief that many business leaders deemed necessary for a quick economic recovery.

**Political capital is finite- Obama has to pick and choose initiatives**

**Washington Post, 8** (Michael A. Fletcher, “Think Tank Urges a Trust in Government Initiative Along with Obama Agenda”, 11-18-08, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2008/11/18/think\_tank\_urges\_a\_trust\_in\_go.html)

To ensure that Obama does not squander his political capital, the authors said he should pursue an explicit trust strategy, which means being careful about how quickly he rolls out his initiatives. As a starting point, Obama has promised a major economic stimulus package after taking office. More long-term, he has promised to push for changes in health care that would make coverage almost universal, while promising to implement a cap-and-trade system to address climate change. Although many supporters of Obama want him to move rapidly to capitalize on his victory and implement his agenda, the report's authors cautioned that Obama would do better to carefully sequence his initiatives. Complicated issues such as heath care and parts of his energy and climate change agenda might have to wait, they suggested. "The issue is not being bold versus being cautious," Galston said. "The issue is where to be bold and, in particular, where to be bold first."

# \*\*\*\*CODE OF CONDUCT CP SOLVENCY\*\*\*\*

**Every recent development regarding space points to the possibility for cooperation – it solves the case**

**Zhang, 11** – Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Asia Pacific Studies at Lingnan University (March/April, “The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China Military Space Relationship,” Asian Survey, Vol. 51, No. 2, JSTOR)

Despite the pessimism about the U.S.-China military space relationship, this article suggests that the security dilemma is susceptible to changes in the strategic environments of the different parties. Perceptions that threats from other countries are rising or declining could intensify—or mollify—the security dilemma. Indeed, recent and important developments in the strategic environments of both countries have created conditions to ease tensions. These developments include the current strategic adjustment of the U.S. under the Obama administration, which has endorsed the banning of weapons in space; the recent U.S. willingness to curb missile defense; and the altered situation in the Taiwan Strait. These developments have significantly changed the strategic landscape between China and the U.S. and moderated the major factors contributing to the space security dilemma. This new strategic landscape may offer a window of opportunity for arms control in outer space.

**Empirically, negotiations are successful**

**Zhang, 11** – Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Asia Pacific Studies at Lingnan University (March/April, “The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China Military Space Relationship,” Asian Survey, Vol. 51, No. 2, JSTOR)

In addition, China and the U.S. need more dialogue to reduce their mutual suspicion. According to Joan Johnson-Freese, for China and the U.S. to limit the impact of the space security dilemma, “Better strategic communication is required to prevent history from repeating itself. . . . Misunderstandings are better avoided through direct communications than inferences and speculations based on sometimes less than credible sources.”54 She also points out that the U.S. “must decide what message it wants to send to China and other countries about space, and do so clearly and consistently. The effort would be very useful in alleviating the security dilemma.”

The Obama administration’s National Space Policy, released in June 2010, attempts to send out such a message by stating that the U.S. “calls on all nations to work together to adopt approaches for responsible activity in space.”56 As the previous section indicates, the Chinese security community has taken notice of the important changes in Obama’s space policy. As a result, the PLA has relaxed its traditional concern over the perceived U.S. quest for space dominance.

**The counterplan effectively deters China from weaponization and preserves peace in space – specifically solves risk of space pearl harbor, while the plan destroys sustainable hegemony**

**Zhang, 6** - Research Associate at the Project on Managing the Atom in the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, Project on Managing the Atom (Hui, "Space Weaponization and Space Security: A Chinese Perspective", [China Security](http://www.wsichina.org/), Vol 2, Issue 1)

At this stage, it would be difficult to persuade the United States to alter its ballistic missile defense plans, as the GMD system is already being deployed. The United States would, no doubt, refuse such a broad ban. In fact, it is unrealistic to expect that the United States will accept any negotiations on space weapons in the near future. The United States is unlikely to return to anything like the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty – instead, it will seek to retain the right to build and operate at least a ground-based missile defense system. If China wants to move beyond mere complaints towards an actual agreement, then it will have to consider proposals that might conceivably be acceptable to the United States. To overcome the deadlock at CD and to reduce the concerns of both the United States and China, a minimum-scope space weapons ban (the “focused approach”) with some bilateral confidence-building measures could be a practical first step. This approach could include the following two core elements: Banning the testing and deployment of any weapons in outer space, including space-based kinetic energy weapons, space-based directed energy weapons, and any other space-based weapons for attacking space-, ground-, sea-, or air-based targets. This would rule out space-based missile defense and ASAT systems. Banning the testing and deployment of any “dedicated” ASAT weapons. This would include any strike system – whether ground-based, sea-based, air-based or space-based – against orbiting satellites. Subsequently, what is the likelihood of both the United States and China considering a “focused approach” to space weapons? The U.S. Side The United States would likely find a focused approach more acceptable than a broad approach. While it bans space-based weapons and ASATs, the former would allow deployment of the GMD system that composes the central part of the Missile Defense Agency’s current budget and development efforts. In practice, as a number of studies show, there is no rationale for the U.S. to deploy space weapons and ASATs.28 For example, an enormously expensive space-based interceptor system for missile defense would be intrinsically vulnerable to a number of cost-effective ASAT attacks and be overwhelmed by the simultaneous launch of several missiles from a compact area.29 Moreover, the negative impacts of using space weapons for other military missions – protecting satellites, denying the hostile use of space to adversaries and projecting force – would far outweigh the benefits, since the utility of space weapons is limited by three main factors: high cost, considerable susceptibility to countermeasures, and the availability of cheaper, more effective alternatives.30 Furthermore, a space-based BMD system would inevitably encourage other countries to pursue ASATs as countermeasures. Thus, a space weapon ban would reduce the proliferation of ASATs. It would reduce the risk of a “space Pearl Harbor” for other military and civilian satellites. As many experts in the U.S. point out, given the heavy dependence of the United States on its space assets, “the United States has more to lose than to gain by opening the way to the testing and deployment of ASATs and space weapons.”31 The United States is now more dependent on satellites to perform important military functions than any other state. By placing weapons in space, the United States could stimulate others to balance symmetrically and asymmetrically against U.S. space assets. It would be very difficult for the United States to maintain unchallenged hegemony once space is weaponized. The current U.S. military advantage in space instead would be lost, or at a minimum degraded, by weaponization. Further, space weaponization would threaten U.S. civilian and commercial assets by making them far more vulnerable than they are today. The U.S. economy and society are highly dependent on the applications of commercial satellites. In short, as Richard Garwin and his co-authors point out: “A regime that effectively prohibits the deployment of space weapons and the use of destructive ASATs before they can destroy U.S. or other satellites would be a smart, hardnosed investment in U.S. national security, but would require U.S. leadership.”32 It is clear that the United States still has time for serious re-consideration of its space activities. While current funding requests from the Bush administration show continued interest in space-based weapons systems, the actual level of funding is small and these weapons remain in the conceptual and research stages. At the current speed of development, for example, the planned space-based BMD system would not reach fruition until around 2020. China’s Point Of View From the Chinese perspective, a non-space-based BMD system would be less threatening to national security than a space-based one. Countermeasures for mid-course missile defense systems would be less expensive and easier for China to develop. These include decoys, anti-simulation measures33 and an increase in warheads capable of penetrating such a defense system. However, as many scientists point out, a robust, global-coverage BMD system would have to include boost-phase missile defense.34 From the Chinese perspective, a U.S. space-based, boost-phase missile defense system would pose the greatest threat of all. This is due to the fact that at boost phase, the missile defense system would have fewer targets; the target ICBM would be much larger than the normal re-entry vehicle; the target would be much more fragile than a re-entry vehicle; and the target would be easily detectable due to the bright plumes of the burning booster. A non-space-based, boost-phase missile defense system would not be able to cover China’s ICBMs. In fact, an ICBM at an altitude of 200km can be detected within a range of 1,600km by a sensor on the ground, and within 2,000km by a sensor at an altitude of 15km. Because of China’s vast area, the United States would have to destroy a Chinese missile in boost-phase from space.35 As such, even a limited ban on space weapons would significantly reduce the threat for China from U.S. missile defense systems, assuming that Chinese military planners have confidence in countermeasures for midcourse missile defense systems. Other bilateral confidence-building measures between the United States and China would facilitate China’s consideration of a “focused approach” to space weapons negotiations. These measures might include: (1) A U.S. acknowledgment of the seriousness of China’s concerns, including an assurance that a U.S. missile defense system will not target China; (2) A U.S. pledge to adopt a bilateral no-first-use policy toward China, following the example of similar Chinese and Russian policies; such a policy would ease China’s major concern about the possibility of a U.S. preemptive strike; (3) The clear exclusion of Taiwan in the U.S.-Japan joint theater missile defense plan, and a U.S. move to block the sale of such systems to Taiwan; (4) A limitation on the scale and scope of the envisioned U.S. non-space-based BMD architecture, including placing a limit on the number of missile defense interceptors and restricting the scope of the overall system to the minimum required for dealing with rogue threats. This latter measure would ensure that China’s current stock of fissile materials would be sufficient to fill the number of new warheads needed to balance U.S. missile defense interceptors. In the absence of any limitations on U.S. missile defense systems, China harbors concerns about whether its current fissile material stocks are extensive enough to supply the warheads needed to counter the U.S. threat to its nuclear deterrent. This directly affects China’s willingness to participate in the Fissile Material Cut- Off Treaty. Restrictions on the U.S. BMD system would also ensure that China builds its nuclear arsenal in a predictable way – until it has the capacity to balance the U.S. defensive capabilities – which the United States would acknowledge and understand.

Only the CP accounts for China’s interests and needs, ensuring compliance

**Zhang, 6** - Research Associate at the Project on Managing the Atom in the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, Project on Managing the Atom (Hui, "Space Weaponization and Space Security: A Chinese Perspective", [China Security](http://www.wsichina.org/), Vol 2, Issue 1)

*China’s position* In China’s view, the most effective way to secure space assets would be to agree on a space weaponization ban. Ambassador Hu stated, “If any country is really worried about possible menace to its space interests, this could certainly be alleviated through the negotiation and conclusion of a treaty on the prevention of space weaponization, as suggested by China… Such a legally binding international treaty will be the best tool to safeguard the interests of all sides.”23 China’s stance on banning weapons in outer space has been consistent since 1985, when it first introduced a working paper to the U.N. Conference on Disarmament (CD). China’s most recent working paper on the issue, introduced in June 2002, emphasizes three basic obligations: (1) Not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying any kind of weapons, not to install such weapons on celestial bodies, and not to station such weapons in outer space in any other manner; (2) Not to resort to the threat or use of force against outer space objects; and (3) Not to assist or encourage other States, groups of States, international organizations to participate in activities prohibited by this Treaty.24 In recent years, the U.N. General Assembly has adopted resolutions calling for the CD to begin negotiations on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) with an overwhelming majority of support. However, John Bolton, then U.S. undersecretary of state for arms control and non-proliferation, told the CD: “the current international regime regulating the use of space meets all our purposes. We see no need for new agreements.”25 Many Chinese leaders believe Bolton is wrong. There are no existing treaties that effectively prevent the testing, deployment and use of weapons, other than those of mass destruction, in outer space. In addition, none of these instruments covers the threat or use of force from Earth (land, sea and air) against objects in outer space. The history of proliferation has taught us that banning the testing and deployment of weapons from the outset is much more effective than attempting disarmament and nonproliferation after the fact. *Scope of “space weapon” and U.S. missile defenses*

# AT: Coop Impossible

**New developments make cooperation the best option – any evidence from before 2008 should be discounted because it doesn’t assume drastic changes under Obama**

**Zhang, 11** – Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Asia Pacific Studies at Lingnan University (March/April, “The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China Military Space Relationship,” Asian Survey, Vol. 51, No. 2, JSTOR)

As Kevin Narizny points out in his study of grand strategy, political turnover in the executive office often leads to dramatic shifts in state behavior. In particular, changes in control of government from one party to another can lead states to redefine their strategic goals and the means of promoting them.40 The profound and ongoing strategic adjustment by the Obama administration has indeed borne out this argument. The much-maligned grand strategy of primacy and unilateralism has given way to a new stance that emphasizes strategic restraint and multilateral diplomacy. Smart power, rather than military preponderance, is now seen by many as the best way to pursue U.S. interests in the world. he current strategic adjustment by the U.S. has significantly lowered China’s traditional concern about the threat posed by a hegemonic America. China’s foreign policy analysts have reached a consensus that the U.S. has suffered a significant relative decline and is in the process of strategic retreat.41 As a result, the old hegemonic system is believed to have disintegrated. This new perception of the U.S. position in the world has also led the PLA to reassess the likelihood of war between the two countries. Some Chinese military strategists now believe that the relative decline of the U.S. has critically affected the ability and will of the American military to engage in major foreign wars. Lei Sihai, a strategist with a PLA background, claims that “the military capability of the U.S. has declined significantly and it is no longer capable of launching major wars.”42 Major General Jin Yinan, a strategist at the PLA National Defense University, has suggested that the rise of China and the relative decline of the U.S. have made a war scenario between them very unlikely.43 Thus, the strategic landscape between China and the U.S., as seen by Chinese experts from both civilian and military backgrounds, has shifted because of changes in American grand strategy and military strategy. This change in perception has relaxed Chinese concerns about national security. It marks a significant turnaround from China’s view of the American threat from the mid-1990s to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, when the American pursuit of hegemony was seen as the greatest threat in China’s strategic environment. After U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced major changes in the Pentagon’s 2010 budget, including cancelling the procurement of F-22 fighters and key missile defense programs, one PLA strategist characterized these adjustments as “a comprehensive rethinking about U.S. geopolitical strategies.” As the analysis emphasizes, “Gates’s and Obama’s thinking no longer shows aggressiveness. Instead, they seek a new security framework through accommodation. These significant adjustments in U.S. military strategies, especially the decisions to cut missile defense and stop procurement of F-22 fighters, which are directed mainly against China and Russia, should be welcomed. They are conducive for relaxing relations among great powers and reducing their strategic misunderstanding.”44 Moreover, Chinese experts have taken keen notice of the new space policy of the Obama administration, which opposes deployment of weapons in space and is willing to explore international agreements on the issue. As observed by a recent PLA analysis, “Obama’s willingness to reach an international treaty banning space-based weapons and to establish a global cooperative mechanism will have positive impacts on the world’s efforts for space arms control and prevention of an arms race.”

**Now is different – Obama’s policy changes make Chinese cooperation possible – our ev is official statements from Chinese leaders**

**Zhang, 11** – Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Asia Pacific Studies at Lingnan University (March/April, Baohui, “The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China Military Space Relationship,” Asian Survey, Vol. 51, No. 2, JSTOR)

Once the above measures begin to relax the security dilemma, China, the U.S., and other major powers can work toward a multilateral agreement governing the military use of space. Although China’s military space programs, especially its January 2007 ASAT test, contradict its official policy of seeking to ban weapons in space, they can be interpreted as a hedging strategy in response to the security dilemma. When the U.S. opposed efforts to ban the weaponization of space, the PLA felt compelled to initiate its own military space programs. Now that the Obama administration is willing to ban weapons in space, this could bring both China and Russia to the negotiating table for a multilateral agreement.

Indeed, in February 2008 China and Russia jointly proposed such a treaty at the U.N. Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Chinese experts have repeatedly emphasized that arms control for outer space remains China’s top priority, though it is prepared for an arms race if necessary. President Hu’s statement on the issue in November 2009 effectively reaffirmed this position. Therefore, the current strategic adjustment by the U.S. and President Obama’s new space policy could make a multilateral approach feasible. According to a PLA strategist assessing the new directions in U.S. space policy: If Obama, who champions the theme of change, forsakes the longtime U.S. strategy for space hegemony and is willing to pursue arms control in outer space through an international treaty, then, with effective mechanisms for monitoring and verification, the world community will be able to walk on the right track toward peaceful use of space, eradication of [the] arms race, and realization of permanent peace.

**Not too late for crisis mitigation - Obama’s new stance against weaponization had led to more cooperation with China**

**Zhang, 11** – Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Asia Pacific Studies at Lingnan University (March/April, “The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China Military Space Relationship,” Asian Survey, Vol. 51, No. 2, JSTOR)

Because of the security dilemma, many experts in both China and the U.S. have expressed growing pessimism about the future of arms control. However, this article suggests that precisely because the current U.S.-China military space relationship is governed by the security dilemma, it is amenable to changes in the strategic environment that could extricate both from their mutual mistrust and the ongoing cycle of actions and counteractions. The current strategic adjustment by the U.S., efforts by the Obama administration to curb missile defense, and the fundamentally altered situation in the Taiwan Strait offer a window of opportunity for the two countries to relax the tensions in their space relationship. With the right strategies, China and the U.S. could slow the momentum toward a space arms race.

Perhaps reflecting this new context of space security, when meeting with the heads of foreign air force delegations in November 2009, President Hu Jintao promised that China would “unswervingly uphold the principle of peaceful use of space and actively participate in international cooperation on space security.”7 Li Daguang, a leading PLA space war expert known for his pessimistic views on international space cooperation, recently argued that “ensuring the peaceful use of outer space and preventing its weaponization represent a consensus of the international community.”8 These messages show that China has perhaps modified its previous assessment of the feasibility of arms control in outer space. This shift, together with President Obama’s new space policies, could dilute the security dilemma between China and the U.S. and pave the way for arms control.

# CP solves Russia

**CP effectively pacifies Russia – removes the incentive for space militarization**

**Rushkin, 9**-staff writer @ Kraznaya Zvedza, the official Russian Defense Ministry Newspaper [Viktor, Kraznaya Zvedza, “For Space without Weapons,” March 19, 2009, LexisNexis]

Development in Russia of one or another variant of anti-satellite weaponry is completely justified from the point of view of providing for the interests of national security, considers State Duma deputy, ex-Secretary of the RF [Russian Federation] Security Council and RAN [Russian Academy of Science] Academician Andrey Kokoshin. "Russia undoubtedly has every justification for working on such kinds of assets and, if necessary, demonstrating its capability to secure its national security interests in space in such a manner," he said in a visit with a "Krasnaya Zvezda" correspondent. The deputy drew attention to the fact that in recent years the United States has actively advanced the idea of deploying various kinds of strike weapons in space. "The study and implementation of such kinds of scientific research and experimental design projects have been especially accelerated after the USA unilaterally withdrew from the 1972 Soviet-American ABM Treaty," he noted. This treaty treated the limiting of missile defence systems, and it simultaneously served as an extremely important obstacle for the development of anti-satellite weaponry. "The fact of the matter is that anti-missile weapons based, say, in space or even based on the ground, sea or in the air, may also be used as anti-satellite weapons," indicated Academician Kokoshin. Moreover, it is much easier to hit a satellite moving along a well-known orbit in a pre-determined direction, than to hit a ballistic missile warhead or to hit a missile in its boost phase." In his words, the ABM Treaty imposed extremely serious limitations on missile defence space systems. Limiting the number of fixed missile defence regions also was an important obstacle to the development of anti-satellite systems by the treaty parties. Andrey Kokoshin recalled that Russia and China had developed a draft convention on preventing future militarization of space and deploying strike assets in space. Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov recently spoke about this specifically with the US Secretary of State. "This is a very important project," explained the deputy, "since in principle many states are able to create anti-satellite weapons. Today at least a half-dozen countries, and possibly even more, have these technological capabilities. But developments in this direction are extremely undesirable for global strategic stability. It is also dangerous for the United States itself, despite its great efforts to develop various space assets. The USA depends to a very great extent on various space assets both for military purposes, as well as in the civilian economy sector." The deputy noted that today the range of possibilities for developing anti-satellite weapons is very wide, even wider that it was in the 1980's when this issue was being very actively considered and both sides were in the main displaying restraint. "Although at that time there was a lot of movement in the direction of deploying weapons in space and the development of anti-satellite weapons of the "ground-to-space" and the "air-to-space" types, such developments nevertheless did not occur," said Kokoshin. In his opinion, today it is also possible to reach agreement on the prevention of an arms race in space. But as long as such agreements have not been achieved, Russia, undoubtedly, has every justification to conduct developments of anti-satellite weapons.

# AT: Russia Says No / Cheats

**Russia supports bans**

**BBC, 10** [BBC Monitoring former Soviet Union, “Russian experts call for agreements to ban tests of anti-satellite weapons,” October 14, 2010, LexisNexis]

Moscow, 14 October: Russian scientists believe that it is necessary to conclude an agreement between the leading space powers on banning tests of anti-satellite weapons. "It is being proposed to agree on banning tests of anti-satellite weapons of any type of basing with hitting real targets in space," the head of the international security centre of the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) of the RAN [Russian Academy of Sciences], Aleksey Arbatov, has said at a presentation of the "Non-nuclear factors of nuclear disarmament" publication. Arbatov added that this primarily concerned Russia, the USA and China, which recently carried out a successful test of an anti-satellite system based on the ground. According to Arbatov, for such an agreement to become possible, the sides should make "equal mutual concessions". "For example, the Americans would give up testing a space-based interceptor, while Russia and China would, in return, agree not to test anti-satellite systems," Arbatov said. According to him, an end to tests of weapons in space would, apart from anything else, lead to a reduction in [the amount of] space debris in the orbit. "There is an ecological benefit in this. This would prevent an increase in the amount of space debris," Arbatov said. The chief scientist of the IMEMO of the RAN, Vladimir Dvorkin, for his part, said that the policies pursued by the new US Administration made it possible to hope to conclude such an agreement. "There is some reason to hope that under President Obama the US position will change in a constructive direction and non-arming of space will become a task for negotiations," Dvorkin said.

# CP Solves India

**India could be constrained by arms control - the US just has to show commitment**

**Samson, 11** (Victoria, Writer @ The Space Review, “India and space security,” May 9, <http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1838/1>)

As for the United States, there was curiosity expressed by conference participants about how sincere the United States is about the international cooperation pushed for in its National Space Policy. They are looking for concrete examples that the United States is serious about reaching out to other space powers. Several participants, Indian and otherwise, said that they felt that the United States was in a decline and that would affect India’s security calculus. At the January conference, several participants said that they had found it was easier to get information from the Chinese about their space program than from the Indians about theirs. The draft Code of Conduct (CoC) for Space Activities being circulated by the European Union was only discussed in passing. Yet, several times it was mentioned by Indian participants that the Indians believe that the CoC is being promoted by the West at the expense of countries like India. They are not convinced of how it can help them, but they left the impression that they would be open to discussions about it. From participants coming outside of India and the United States, it seemed that as long as India remains a democracy and an ally, there is little concern about India developing an ASAT.

# \*\*\*\*GRAB BAG CP\*\*\*\*

**ASATs are useless – multiple tactics mean adversaries can nullify their potential benefit. Instead, the US should**

1. **declare that any attack on space assets will henceforth be considered an attack on US soil and will be responded to with conventional attack, and**
2. **back up satellites with defensive measures such as fiber-optic backup and redundant non-space systems**

**Butt, 8** - physicist in the High-Energy Astrophysics Division at the [Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics](http://www.cfa.harvard.edu/) (7/22, Yousaf, “Can space weapons protect U.S. satellites?,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/can-space-weapons-protect-us-satellites)

Throughout this debate, it's almost taken as an article of faith that space weapons can be defensively useful. Yet, there's little technical basis to support this belief: While certainly offensively potent, space weapons are defensively ineffective.

First, let me be clear about what I mean by the term "space weapons." In my definition, I include any weapons based in space that can attack targets either in space or on the ground or any land-, sea-, or air-based weapons that can attack satellites.1

Fragile, blind, unmanned satellites are different from armored and actively piloted tanks, ships, and airplanes because they move in predictable orbits without situational awareness of their surroundings, providing an easy target for an enemy bent on interfering or destroying them. To save on launch costs, they're typically built as light as possible with minimal shielding. And the few evasive actions they can take greatly sap the limited onboard fuel.

The most optimistic incarnation of a defensive space weapon is the so-called "bodyguard satellite," which is designed to protect satellites from ground-based antisatellite (ASAT) weapons. The bodyguard would shadow the high-value satellite it's protecting by being in an identical orbit, typically trailing its "boss" by a few hundred kilometers. Once cued to a threat, it could launch an interceptor to impact and destroy the incoming ASAT kill vehicle. A single bodyguard satellite system that could intercept an incoming ASAT would have a mass of about 500 to 1,500 kilograms, including the necessary housing, solar panels, batteries, station-keeping fuel, and communication and sensor subsystems.

The problem is that a single bodyguard satellite would be insufficient to guard its "boss." Even if the bodyguard successfully intercepted an incoming ASAT, the adversary could simply try again on a successive orbit--the so-called "limited magazine" problem. Of course, a satellite could possess multiple bodyguard satellites, but the launch costs alone (about $15,000 per kilogram of payload) quickly become prohibitive for multiple bodyguards weighing about 1,000 kilograms each in orbit. At some point, the cost of having many bodyguard satellites exceeds that of the satellite being protected. It then makes more sense to simply have a backup redundant satellite ready to launch rather than multiple defensive space weapons.

More problematic still is the fact that the attacker can use simple countermeasures such as decoys and flares to fool the bodyguard's interceptor. This is the same reason why ballistic missile defense also doesn't make sense.

Directed-energy weapons such as lasers may be available in the future, but they run on chemicals as the source of the laser energy, which also are subject to the limited magazine problem if the laser is in orbit. And if the laser is ground-based, its range of lethality is limited to a small fraction of the globe in the ground-station's vicinity. Furthermore, ground-based systems must use complicated and expensive adaptive optics to compensate for the natural broadening and dimming of the laser light as it traverses the atmosphere, something that has not yet been publicly demonstrated over hundreds of kilometers for a high-power laser. Of course, the laser ground stations are hostage to conventional ground attack, and, more prosaically, cloud cover.

Thus, the much feared "Space Pearl Harbor" can happen with or without space weapons, as they provide little, if any, effective defense. In fact, introducing weapons into space that are offensively potent yet defensively ineffective may actually make a "Space Pearl Harbor" more imminent. In the eyes of potential adversaries, the only distinction between defensive and offensive space weapons would be the unknowable intention behind their use. A bodyguard satellite, for instance, could easily be reconfigured to attack other satellites instead of defending against incoming ASATs.

Fielding offensive space weapons for the sake of deterrence also doesn't make sense because the United States relies much more heavily on its satellites than any of its adversaries. A better way to deter attacks on U.S. satellites would be for Washington to make clear that any attack on its space assets would be considered an attack on U.S. soil and result in a heavy conventional retaliatory attack.

Ultimately, the protection of the capabilities facilitated by space assets is needed. For instance, having a fiber-optic backup system for certain high-value communication satellites is much smarter than maintaining many expensive, ineffective bodyguard satellites. Alternate redundant non-space systems, whenever possible, are the smartest defense. The United States could also have redundant satellites ready to replace any losses in those satellites for which no land-based backups exist. Temporary and reversible electronic countermeasures that could throw off the guidance systems of incoming ASATs are another sensible defense. Better "Space Situational Awareness" is also badly needed, if for nothing else, than to properly tell apart a satellite attack from a satellite malfunction or natural interference such as a strong solar flare or debris impact.

Most importantly, the United States should be leading the charge to have an overarching international policy that restricts the weaponization of space. The United States possesses the greatest military and civil space investment; thus, it has the most to lose in an offensive space war. And since Washington is the most reliant on its space assets, an arms race in space would be disproportionately detrimental to U.S. interests.

Instead of relying upon expensive, provocative, and defensively useless space weapons, the incoming administration would do well to invest in any of the other approaches listed above to improve our space security.

# 2NC Solvency Ext.

**This solves the risk of enemy lashout**

**Rand Review, 11** – Rand Corporation (Winter 2010-2011, “Ability to Deter Attacks on U.S. Space Systems “May Be Eroding,” http://www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/winter2010/news4.html)

The study concludes that the United States should implement a coordinated national space deterrence strategy designed to operate on both sides of a potential adversary’s cost-benefit calculus by simultaneously raising the costs and reducing the benefits of acting. The table shows selected elements of that strategy, along with some potential means to fulfill it.

U.S. Space Deterrence Strategy Should Raise Costs and Reduce Benefits of Attack

Elements of Strategy Potential Means to Fulfill Strategy

Raise Costs of Attack: Condemn the use of force in space, and declare that the United States will severely punish attacks on its space systems and those of its allies in ways, times, and places of its own choosing. Bolster emerging international taboos on space warfare through diplomatic engagement, treaty negotiations, and other means.

Enhance the credibility of U.S. threats to punish space aggressors through diplomatic, economic, and, if necessary, military actions.

Reduce Benefits of Attack: Persuade potential adversaries that the probability of deriving sufficient benefits from attacking space assets would be too low to risk the inevitable costs of U.S. retribution. Conceal vulnerabilities of space systems, and demonstrate the ability to operate effectively without space support.

Pursue ways to make vulnerable U.S. space systems more resilient and defendable, and demonstrate the capability to deny potential adversaries the benefits of attack.

**This form of deterrence logic is tried and true**

**Morgan, 10** - senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation, served on the strategy and policy staff at Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, Pentagon, and as professor of comparative military studies at the Air University School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS) (Forest E., “Deterrence and First-Strike Stability in Space,” RAND, pdf)

Efforts to apply this logical framework to the task of reestablishing first-strike stability in space reveal the challenges involved. Deterring an adversary from attacking U.S. space systems (satellites, ground infrastructure, and communication links) would require the United States to issue potent and credible threats of punishment, denial, or some combination of both. Employing the first approach would entail threatening sufficient punishment to persuade the opponent that the costs that would be suffered in response to attacks on U.S. space systems would likely outweigh any benefits achieved and that it would not pay those high costs if it withheld such attacks. The second approach would entail persuading the opponent that it cannot expect sufficient benefit from prospective attacks to make them worth the probable cost. Both approaches are logically viable, but making them sufficiently potent and credible to be effective will be difficult.

# \*\*\*\*BMD CP\*\*\*\*

**BMD is the main motivation for Chinese space weaponization—getting rid of BMD would reassure them regarding our offensive capabilities.**

**Zhang, 11** – Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Asia Pacific Studies at Lingnan University (March/April, “The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China Military Space Relationship,” Asian Survey, Vol. 51, No. 2, JSTOR)

In October 2008, the U.S. Congress approved $5 million for an independent study of possible space-based missile defense. This move gravely alarmed the Chinese military, which believed that the deployment of space-based missile defense could become inevitable. In fact, some PLA experts have claimed that “Star Wars has come back.”28 Li Daguang even charged that this decision by the U.S. Congress amounted to “declaring a new Cold War against China.”29 Chinese military strategists believe U.S. missile defense poses a real threat to China’s nuclear deterrent. Until recently, the Chinese military tended to believe that U.S. missile defense could not effectively deter a major nuclear power like China or Russia. It was thought that a range of countermeasures, such as deploying decoys and multiple warheads, could be employed to deceive and overwhelm U.S. missile defense. Now, however, with the maturing of a multilayered missile defense system by the U.S. and its allies, Chinese nuclear experts are losing confidence in China’s offensive capabilities. This pessimism was illustrated in a 2008 interview of Wang Wenchao in a Chinese military magazine. Wang, credited with being the chief designer of China’s sea-based strategic missiles, expressed grave pessimism about China’s offensive nuclear capability against U.S. missile defense. He said, “I have done research: Facing a multi-tiered missile defense system, if any single layer can achieve a success rate of 70%, then 100 single warhead missiles could all be intercepted even if they are mounting a simultaneous attack.”30 This is why Wu Tianfu—arguably the most important deterrence strategist of the Second Artillery of the PLA, which runs China’s strategic nuclear forces—charges that the U.S. has “forced China to engage in a space arms race.”31 More specifically, U.S. missile defense has forced China to integrate space war with its strategic nuclear deterrence. China must possess the ability to weaken American space-based assets such as early-warning satellites, to ensure the credibility of its own offensive nuclear forces. Thus, space war and nuclear war are now intertwined in Chinese strategic thinking. Indeed, China’s official media have credited Wu with establishing the PLA’s first space war research institute.32 Shen Dingli, a prominent Chinese nuclear expert, also states that the January 2007 ASAT test was crucial for China’s nuclear deterrence: “When an America with both superior nuclear and conventional arsenals aspires to build missile defense, China’s response is first to oppose it verbally, then counter it with action if the U.S. refuses to stop. China cannot afford to lose the effectiveness of its still-limited nuclear deterrent.”33 The result is China pursuing an emerging integrated space-nuclear strategy. As argued by Hou Xiaohe and Zhang Hui, strategists at the PLA National Defense University, space warfare will aim at the eyes and ears of missile defense, which are early-warning satellites and other sensors deployed in space. China’s ability to cripple these U.S. space assets will significantly weaken the effectiveness of American missile defense, allowing less time and providing less accurate information to guide ground-based interceptors toward the incoming missiles. The strategists also point out that this strategy is more cost-effective than merely expanding China’s nuclear missiles: “Using limited resources to develop anti-satellite weapons to attack enemy space assets that are costly and easily damaged will become an important choice for weaker countries.”34

# \*\*\*\*SENSORS CP\*\*\*\*

**Space-based sensors solve satellite vulnerability and allow us to deter attacks**

**Krepon, 3** – president of the Stimson Center (Michael, with Christopher Clary, “Space Assurance or Space Dominance?.” The Henry L. Stimson Center, http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/spacebook.pdf)

 There are a number of ways in which the United States could improve situational awareness in space. Improved capabilities in X-band radars currently being developed for missile tracking as part of a national missile defense system could also be tasked for space and debris monitoring. Additional X-band systems could be brought online to supplement the current, less accurate, Cband systems. The optical cameras that track objects in space, known as the Ground-Based Electro-Optical Deep Space Surveillance System, have undergone upgrades in recent years that, when complete, will allow the system to do an adequate job at monitoring those orbits. Information collected by these sensors has to be processed, filtered, organized, and stored. These data points are then used to build models of orbits using complicated algorithms. The algorithms being used, created when computer processors were significantly slower than today, could be updated to create a more accurate picture of the environment. Automation and filtering software needs to be used to “mine” the data and minimize the time required of human operators, a significant potential bottleneck in the cataloguing process. The United States currently has no space surveillance sensors in the southern hemisphere. Agreements with friendly countries to exchange information, or simply leasing land for space surveillance facilities, could help close some of these coverage gaps. Space-based sensors would also provide expanded understanding of the threat environment. There has been some discussion of using the Space-Based Infrared Sensors–High for space threat detection.

Additionally, few, if any, current satellites appear to carry the kind of long- and short-range detection systems needed to tell if the satellite is under attack, or even being closely approached by another object. Adding an on-board system for attack reporting would likely increase total system cost by between one and five percent and would probably require some kind of low-power 360-degree radar or proximity fuse system to detect the approach of another object. 33

Vulnerability assessments need to become more of a factor in the design of future satellites and systems. One type of insurance policy against space warfare would be to opt for more systems with less, but adequate, capability instead of far fewer satellites with significantly greater capability. In some instances, advanced technology might permit the distribution of a single satellite’s function so that no single kill would be disabling. In other instances, back-up systems should be available in the event of the loss of satellites crucial for U.S. military operations. The U.S. military could move towards larger constellations of satellites, with greater overlap in coverage, that could withstand or compensate for gaps in coverage caused by the loss of a satellite. On-orbit spares or replacements on the ground could be used for rapid reconstitution. Replacements on the ground, however, would require U.S. investment in a rapid launch capability.34

Even if back-ups prove less capable or efficient than the satellites lost, they would address the risks attendant to single-point failures resulting in significant degradation of U.S. military capabilities. Of particular note in this regard are advances in unmanned aerial vehicles. 35 Looking toward the future, airborne assets, particularly for imaging and signals intelligence, but also for targeting, guidance, and communications, could be available to supplement, or, if need be, help compensate for satellites that are destroyed. Significant advances in remotely piloted vehicles could reinforce the conclusion by potential adversaries that the initiation of space warfare would produce ephemeral gains and punishing retaliation. Additional backup capabilities such as fiber optic land lines and undersea lines could prove helpful in some regions of the world to permit high-volume communications even if satellites are lost. Fiber optic capability could be leased at pre-set prices for use during crisis, analogous to the way that the Civil Reserve Air Fleet functions today. 36 U.S. naval combatants can be expected to retain the ability to communicate through line-of-sight and airborne techniques, so that battle groups have the ability to function as integrated entities even if their access to satellites is disrupted. Netted tactical data link systems provide relative navigation among net members. While not as accurate as GPS, netted systems, such as the Joint Tactical Information and Distribution System, mitigate the harm caused by jamming or more pernicious damage to the GPS system. 37

# \*\*\*\*HARDEN ASSETS CP\*\*\*\*

**Hardening satellites is a better alternative to space weaponization - solves the threat of ASAT attacks**

**Hui, 6** (Zhang, Research Associate @ the Project on Managing the Atom of the Belfer Center @ Harvard, “ Space Weaponization And Space Security: A Chinese Perspective ,” Spring, <http://www.wsichina.org/attach/CS2_3.pdf>)

Some Measures for Space Security As discussed above, the cumulative effect of space weaponization by the United States would undermine global security and the peaceful use of outer space by all nations. If Washington wants to reduce the potential vulnerability of its space assets, there are a number of ways to improve space security. Weaponizing space can only erode this security. As Ambassador Hu recently emphasized, “for ensuring security in outer space, political and legal approaches are more be effective, while resorting to force and the development of space weapons will only be counter-productive.”20 There are technical approaches, which, if implemented unilaterally, could improve the survivability of space systems. The United States and others could, for example, harden or shield the most vulnerable parts of their satellites (such as the solar cells and the focal planes) against nuclear, laser, or other conventional attacks. In some cases (e.g. nuclear explosion), hardening satellites would be difficult but technically feasible. To avoid paralysis of a whole system, redundant capabilities could be made available for rapid replacement of satellites in orbit. Increased maneuverability, enhanced situational awareness, and improved stealth capability, would also make it easier to evade a hostile attack.21