## 1AC Hegemony

#### Upgrading strategic transportation systems boosts rapid response time and air mobility – that’s critical to crisis de-escalation

CBO, September 2005, Congressional Budget Office, “Options for Strategic Military Transportation Systems,” http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/66xx/doc6661/09-27-strategicmobility.pdf

Since the end of World War II, the United States has maintained the ability to project combat power rapidly around the globe. That ability has been achieved through a dual approach: “forward basing” units overseas in regions of particular importance and fielding longrange (strategic) transportation systems that can move forces around the world quickly, either to reinforce the forward-based units or to respond to needs that arise elsewhere. Following the Cold War, emphasis has shifted away from forward basing and toward increasing the mobility of forces based in the United States. In the past 15 years, the U.S. military has cut the number of forward-based troops by about half and has improved its strategic transportation capability by fielding such systems as C-17 airlift aircraft and large, medium-speed roll-on/roll-off ships (LMSRs) for sealift. In addition, the Army is largely focusing its current “transformation” efforts on changing equipment and organization to create units that can be deployed more quickly and easily. Nevertheless, officials in the Department of Defense (DoD) seek to increase the speed of military deployments to an even greater degree, because the ability to deliver forces to a distant theater in the first few days or weeks of a crisis is seen as critical to ensuring a favorable outcome. Several general approaches exist for speeding up the U.S. military’s response to crises, such as: B Better matching the locations of forward bases to locations where conflicts are likely to arise, B Redesigning ground combat and support units and their equipment to make them easier to transport, and B Improving strategic transportation forces.

#### Air mobility is the vital internal link to overall air power

Richard J. Hazdra, Major, USAF, Fairchild Paper, Air University Press August 2001 http://www.au.af.mil/au/aul/aupress/fairchild\_papers/Hazdra/Hazdra.pdf

Since airlift was first used as a tool of national security during the Berlin airlift, it has grown to deliver passengers, cargo, and fuel to operations worldwide in support of national security. However, Air Mobility Command (AMC) is the single organization that performs for air mobility for the United States (US). Currently, the US Air Force (USAF) has structured AMC for war; yet this command performs operations during times when the United States is at peace. AMC performs missions to support US military operations in hostile environments as well as humanitarian operations in nonhostile environments. The number of operations requiring mobility air forces has been on the rise since the Cold War ended. These steady-state operations seem to overtask mobility air forces. This study centers on the question: Can AMC’s force structure, organized for two major theater wars, fulfill that requirement and perform the steady-state operations in today’s strategic environment? This study finds that AMC’s force structure cannot meet its requirements for two major theater wars and that the current force structure is inefficient in meeting the requirements for steady-state operations. First, this study presents a primer to acclimate the reader to the complex environment and multifaceted requirements of mobility air forces. Second, it examines AMC’s current force structure as determined by Department of Defense (DOD) requirements for war. Third, this study describes the various types of missions that AMC performs on a steady-state basis and evaluates the importance of these operations in fulfilling US national security strategy. Fourth, this study recommends action that the USAF and the DOD should investigate in order to improve their air mobility capabilities in support of the national security strategy. Chapter 1 Introduction If we do not build a transportation system that can meet the needs of tomorrow, then it doesn’t matter much what kind of force we have because it won’t be able to get there. —Gen John M. Shalikashvili, US Army Air mobility is the key to unlocking the strength of United States (US) airpower because it performs rapid global mobility. US military forces have relied on this capability since World War II, and it has always been there. Combatant commanders increasingly rely on air mobility to transport forces quickly into their theaters to head off potential crises, and Air Mobility Command (AMC) always responds enthusiastically with the necessary assets. When the National Command Authorities (NCA) task the Department of Defense (DOD) to achieve any objective, it relies on AMC to achieve rapid global mobility requirements. Consequently, mobility air forces have a remarkable reputation for getting the job done for DOD and combatant commanders. Since AMC has always achieved its objectives, neither the US Air Force (USAF) nor DOD has conducted a thorough examination to determine if air mobility capabilities will suffice in the future. However, the time has come to review the force structure of AMC to determine if it can realistically continue to meet national security requirements.

#### Air power is vital to maintain U.S. hegemony

Major William K. Lewis, senior pilot in the T-37, T-38, AT-38 and F-15 Eagle, Distinguished Graduate of the Squadron Officer School and the Air Command and Staff College, and graduate of the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, June 2002, “UCAV – THE NEXT GENERATION AIR-SUPERIORITY FIGHTER?”, school of advanced airpower studies @ Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.

Air superiority has been an enduring prerequisite to military victory during conflicts in the twenty-first century. The first aerial engagements in World War I were crude attempts by surface commanders to deny their adversary aerial artillery spotting and reconnaissance operations, while allowing and enhancing their own. These early missions mark the beginning of an unending quest by air forces to control and exploit the aerospace medium. Control of this environment became an important first step in military operations; it provided freedom to attack as well as freedom from attack.28 As General Momyer and Colonel Warden put it, air superiority is the prelude to military victory—without it no conventional operations can be sustained. This is not an attempt to say that air superiority alone wins wars; on the contrary, it is rarely an end in itself. Control of the skies protects forces and permits decisive subsequent and follow-on operations by all air and surface arms. Attaining air superiority alone cannot promise victory, but it can enable the full complement of military might to become engaged. Air Superiority will continue to be a vital prerequisite for military operations in the next century. Technology will advance and the nature of the enemy will inevitably change. But, as one recent study emphasized: The ability to use the skies with impunity, while denying the same capability to an enemy, is a perquisite for every other warfighting element of any future campaign. Without it we lose the advantages gained by the inherent speed, range, and flexibility of airpower. We also risk putting ourselves on the defensive while ceding the same advantages to our adversaries. As the precision and lethality of our weapons increases, air superiority must be gained to allow us to observe the enemy, track his activity, and react in a prompt and decisive manner, whether or not he uses (or can use) airpower in support of his own objectives, or even whether or not we choose to use (or can use) airpower in support of our objectives.29 As long as aircraft are more flexible and versatile than ground forces and have the speed, range and persistence to permit concentration on any point on the surface, they will continue to have a profound impact on the nature and outcome of war. Air superiority will continue to be an essential military mission for the foreseeable future.

#### Loss of U.S. military dominance causes multiple nuclear wars

Robert Kagan, senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 7-19-2007, “End of Dreams, Return of History,” http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/07/end\_of\_dreams\_return\_of\_histor.html

The jostling for status and influence among these ambitious nations and would-be nations is a second defining feature of the new post-Cold War international system. Nationalism in all its forms is back, if it ever went away, and so is international competition for power, influence, honor, and status. American predominance prevents these rivalries from intensifying -- its regional as well as its global predominance. Were the United States to diminish its influence in the regions where it is currently the strongest power, the other nations would settle disputes as great and lesser powers have done in the past: sometimes through diplomacy and accommodation but often through confrontation and wars of varying scope, intensity, and destructiveness. One novel aspect of such a multipolar world is that most of these powers would possess nuclear weapons. That could make wars between them less likely, or it could simply make them more catastrophic. It is easy but also dangerous to underestimate the role the United States plays in providing a measure of stability in the world even as it also disrupts stability. For instance, the United States is the dominant naval power everywhere, such that other nations cannot compete with it even in their home waters. They either happily or grudgingly allow the United States Navy to be the guarantor of international waterways and trade routes, of international access to markets and raw materials such as oil. Even when the United States engages in a war, it is able to play its role as guardian of the waterways. In a more genuinely multipolar world, however, it would not. Nations would compete for naval dominance at least in their own regions and possibly beyond. Conflict between nations would involve struggles on the oceans as well as on land. Armed embargos, of the kind used in World War I and other major conflicts, would disrupt trade flows in a way that is now impossible. Such order as exists in the world rests not merely on the goodwill of peoples but on a foundation provided by American power. Even the European Union, that great geopolitical miracle, owes its founding to American power, for without it the European nations after World War ii would never have felt secure enough to reintegrate Germany. Most Europeans recoil at the thought, but even today Europe 's stability depends on the guarantee, however distant and one hopes unnecessary, that the United States could step in to check any dangerous development on the continent. In a genuinely multipolar world, that would not be possible without renewing the danger of world war. People who believe greater equality among nations would be preferable to the present American predominance often succumb to a basic logical fallacy. They believe the order the world enjoys today exists independently of American power. They imagine that in a world where American power was diminished, the aspects of international order that they like would remain in place. But that 's not the way it works. International order does not rest on ideas and institutions. It is shaped by configurations of power. The international order we know today reflects the distribution of power in the world since World War ii, and especially since the end of the Cold War. A different configuration of power, a multipolar world in which the poles were Russia, China, the United States, India, and Europe, would produce its own kind of order, with different rules and norms reflecting the interests of the powerful states that would have a hand in shaping it. Would that international order be an improvement? Perhaps for Beijing and Moscow it would. But it is doubtful that it would suit the tastes of enlightenment liberals in the United States and Europe.

#### Transition causes escalating regional conflicts and global WMD use

Robert J. Lieber, Professor of Government and International Affairs @ Georgetown University. The American Era: Power and Strategy for the 21st Century. 2005. Pg. 53-54.

Withdrawal from foreign commitments might seem to be a means of evading hostility toward the United States, but the consequences would almost certainly be harmful both to regional stability and to U.S. national interests. Although Europe would almost certainly not see the return to competitive balancing among regional powers (i.e., competition and even military rivalry between France and Germany) of the kind that some realist scholars of international relations have predicted,2’ elsewhere the dangers could increase. In Asia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan would have strong motivation to acquire nuclear weapons — which they have the technological capacity to do quite quickly. Instability and regional competition could also escalate, not only between India and Pakistan, but also in Southeast Asia involv­ing Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, and possibly the Philippines. Risks in the Middle East would be likely to increase, with regional competi­tion among the major countries of the Gulf region (Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq) as well as Egypt, Syria, and Israel. Major regional wars, even­tually involving the use of weapons of mass destruction plus human suffering on a vast scale, floods of refugees, economic disruption, and risks to oil supplies are all readily conceivable. Based on past experience, the United States would almost certainly be drawn back into these areas, whether to defend friendly states, to cope with a humanitarian catastrophe, or to prevent a hostile power from dominating an entire region. Steven Peter Rosen has thus fit­tingly observed, “If the logic of American empire is unappealing, it is not at all clear that the alternatives are that much more attractive.”22 Similarly, Niall Ferguson has added that those who dislike American predominance ought to bear in mind that the alternative may not be a world of competing great powers, but one with no hegemon at all. Ferguson’s warning may be hyperbolic, but it hints at the perils that the absence of a dominant power, “apolarity,” could bring “an anarchic new Dark Age of waning empires and religious fanaticism; of endemic plunder and pillage in the world’s forgotten regions; of economic stagnation and civilization’s retreat into a few fortified enclaves.”23

#### Heg is key to preserve security and halt prolif.

Bradley A. Thayer, Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies of Missouri State University. 2007. American Empire: A Debate. Pg. 16

Second, American interests abroad are protected. U.S. military power allows Washington to defeat its enemies overseas. For example, the United States has made the decision to attack terrorists far from America’s shores, and not to wait while they use bases in other countries to plan and train for attacks against the United States itself. Its military power also gives Washington the power to protect its interests abroad by deterring attacks against America’s interests or coercing potential or actual opponents. In international politics, coercion means dissuading an opponent from actions America does not want it to do or to do something that it wants done. For example, the United States wanted Libya to give up the weapons of mass destruction capabilities it pos¬sessed or was developing. As Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz said, “I think the reason Mu’ammar Qadhafi agreed to give up his weapons of mass destruction was because he saw what happened to Saddam Hussein.”2’ Third, our allies like Australia, Great Britain, Japan, Kuwait, Israel, and Thailand are protected by American military might and so we are able to deter attacks against them. They are aligned with the United States, and thus under its “security umbrella”—any attack on those states would be met by the mili¬tary power of the United States. Other states know this and, usually, that is sufficient to deter aggression against the allies of the United States.

#### Proliferation leads to nuclear war

Robert Pfaltzgraff, Professor of International Security Studies at The Fletcher School @ Tufts, and James Schoff, the Associate Director of Asia-Pacific Studies at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA), Feburary 2009, “Updating U.S. Deterrence Concepts and Operational Planning,” IFPA White Paper, online

Moreover, as suggested above, as more nations seek or attain nuclear status, we may very well be entering an era in which nuclear “non-use” is ending. This means that the risk of deterrence failures is growing, and with it questions about the ability of the United States to control the escalation chain in a crisis situation. During the Cold War, escalation dominance was presumed to lie with the United States, or at least that it could be managed in the U.S.-Soviet context because the stakes of escalation were such that both states were putatively deterred from nuclear weapons use (against the other). Today, however, the same may not be true with respect to North Korea and Iran, let alone in the context of a Taiwan contingency, or with respect to India and Pakistan in a crisis over Kashmir. Deterrence failures in the regional context may result from an accident, a deliberate calculation, or the intervention of a third party (e.g., Israel or Taiwan) in a crisis contingency. However, regardless of their origins, the consequences might very well be an escalatory exchange that ultimately draws the United States into a regional nuclear conflict.

#### Loss of hegemony ensures terrorism

Stephen Brooks, Assistant Professor, AND William Wohlforth, Associate Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth. Foreign Affairs, July / August 2002. “American Primacy in Perspective.”

Some might question the worth of being at the top of a unipolar system if that means serving as a lightning rod for the world's malcontents. When there was a Soviet Union, after all, it bore the brunt of Osama bin Laden's anger, and only after its collapse did he shift his focus to the United States (an indicator of the demise of bipolarity that was ignored at the time but looms larger in retrospect). But terrorism has been a perennial problem in history, and multipolarity did not save the leaders of several great powers from assassination by anarchists around the turn of the twentieth century. In fact, a slide back toward multipolarity would actually be the worst of all worlds for the United States. In such a scenario it would continue to lead the pack and serve as a focal point for resentment and hatred by both state and nonstate actors, but it would have fewer carrots and sticks to use in dealing with the situation. The threats would remain, but the possibility of effective and coordinated action against them would be reduced.

#### Terrorist attack would cause extinction

Mohamed Sid-Ahmed, Al-Ahram, 9-1-2004, “Extinction!” http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm

What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This could lead to a third world war, from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers.

#### US surveillance in Iran is currently failing – Drones thwarted

Haaretz, 12-15-2011, “Iran official: We tricked the U.S. surveillance drone to land intact,” <http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/iran-official-we-tricked-the-u-s-surveillance-drone-to-land-intact-1.401641>

Iranian electronic warfare specialists were able to "trick" the recently downed U.S. surveillance drone to land on Iran soil intact, Iranian engineers said in an exclusive interview with the Christian Science Monitor on Thursday. On Monday, U.S. President Barack Obama indicated that the United States had officially requested that Iran return the secret RQ-170 Sentinel drone, after Iranian TV displayed the craft in what they considered to be a great victory. Speaking with the Christian Science Monitor on Thursday, Iranian military officials said that they were able to cut off communication between the U.S. drone and its operators, and reconfigured the drone's GPS to make it land where it thought was its home base in Afghanistan. "The GPS navigation is the weakest point," the Iranian military official told the Monitor, calling the downing an "electronic ambush" of secret drone. "By putting noise [jamming] on the communications, you force the bird into autopilot. This is where the bird loses its brain," he added.

#### AACs would lock in U.S. surveillance and intelligence capacity

Col George D. Kramlinger, Summer 2005. USAFA; MAAS, School of Advanced Airpower Studies; MA, Naval War College, is the commander, 612th Air Operations Group, Headquarters Twelfth Air Force, Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona. “Narrowing the Global-Strike Gap with an Airborne Aircraft Carrier,” Air & Space Power Journal, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj05/sum05/kramlinger.html#kramlinger.

Finding mobile targets in an access-denial environment requires persistent, close-in, and stealthy intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). During the Persian Gulf War of 1991, Iraq used camouflage, concealment, and deception along with mobility to effectively hide Scud-missile launchers in its western deserts despite a huge commitment of strike aircraft and standoff ISR platforms.31 During Allied Force, the Serbs constantly moved their mobile SAM systems, preventing ISR platforms from providing actionable targeting information. As a result, large sections of Serbian airspace remained unsafe for nonstealthy aircraft.32 During Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, the RQ-1A Predator and high-flying RQ-4A Global Hawk UAVs demonstrated the enormous value of persistent, close-in ISR at finding, fixing, and tracking emerging and fleeting targets. However, neither of these UAVs is stealthy, and we have lost many of the low-flying Predators over hostile territory.33 Double-digit SAM threats will push large, conventional ISR platforms such as the RC-135 Rivet Joint (signals intelligence) and the E-8 Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System to less effective ranges. Medium and low Earth orbit satellites lack the dwell time over a particular area for persistent ISR. Furthermore, space-based radars may not have sufficient fidelity to track mobile targets.34 One of the X-45C program objectives calls for producing two hours of loiter time with a 4,500-pound payload 1,000 miles from the launch base.35 Fuel saved by launching from an AAC near enemy territory will increase endurance and enable the stealthy X-45C UCAV to conduct persistent ISR in a high-threat environment. However, we currently have no practical method of employing fighter-sized UCAVs over global range.

#### ISR Is key to preventing proliferation of WMD’s and Bioweapons

Togzhan Kassenova, an associate in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment and a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow. She specializes in weapons of mass destruction nonproliferation issues, with a regional focus on Central Asia and Southeast Asia; nuclear security; strategic trade management; and civilian nuclear energy programs.¶ Kassenova serves on the UN Secretary General’s Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters. She is a member of the Steering Committee of the Fissile Material Working Group and the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific.,January 25, 2012, “ Preventing WMD Proliferation” <http://www.scribd.com/doc/90025449/Preventing-WMD-Proliferation-Myths-and-Realities-of-Strategic-Trade-Controls> For example, some of the equipment, detection techniques, and personnel training related to WMD proliferation are also key to preventing the smuggling of drugs and small arms. Intelligence and law enforcement capacity critical to confronting terrorist groups is indispensable to preventing the operation and enhancing of proliferation networks. Similarly, capacity for disease surveillance, detection, and source identification—vital during outbreaks of highly infectious diseases such as the avian flu—is central to preventing the proliferation of sensitive biomaterials for malicious purposes.

## Surveillance

### 2ac Add On

#### US surveillance in Iran is currently failing – Drones thwarted

Haaretz, 12-15-2011, “Iran official: We tricked the U.S. surveillance drone to land intact,” <http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/iran-official-we-tricked-the-u-s-surveillance-drone-to-land-intact-1.401641>

Iranian electronic warfare specialists were able to "trick" the recently downed U.S. surveillance drone to land on Iran soil intact, Iranian engineers said in an exclusive interview with the Christian Science Monitor on Thursday. On Monday, U.S. President Barack Obama indicated that the United States had officially requested that Iran return the secret RQ-170 Sentinel drone, after Iranian TV displayed the craft in what they considered to be a great victory. Speaking with the Christian Science Monitor on Thursday, Iranian military officials said that they were able to cut off communication between the U.S. drone and its operators, and reconfigured the drone's GPS to make it land where it thought was its home base in Afghanistan. "The GPS navigation is the weakest point," the Iranian military official told the Monitor, calling the downing an "electronic ambush" of secret drone. "By putting noise [jamming] on the communications, you force the bird into autopilot. This is where the bird loses its brain," he added.

#### AACs would lock in U.S. surveillance and intelligence capacity

Col George D. Kramlinger, Summer 2005. USAFA; MAAS, School of Advanced Airpower Studies; MA, Naval War College, is the commander, 612th Air Operations Group, Headquarters Twelfth Air Force, Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona. “Narrowing the Global-Strike Gap with an Airborne Aircraft Carrier,” Air & Space Power Journal, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj05/sum05/kramlinger.html#kramlinger.

Finding mobile targets in an access-denial environment requires persistent, close-in, and stealthy intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). During the Persian Gulf War of 1991, Iraq used camouflage, concealment, and deception along with mobility to effectively hide Scud-missile launchers in its western deserts despite a huge commitment of strike aircraft and standoff ISR platforms.31 During Allied Force, the Serbs constantly moved their mobile SAM systems, preventing ISR platforms from providing actionable targeting information. As a result, large sections of Serbian airspace remained unsafe for nonstealthy aircraft.32 During Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, the RQ-1A Predator and high-flying RQ-4A Global Hawk UAVs demonstrated the enormous value of persistent, close-in ISR at finding, fixing, and tracking emerging and fleeting targets. However, neither of these UAVs is stealthy, and we have lost many of the low-flying Predators over hostile territory.33 Double-digit SAM threats will push large, conventional ISR platforms such as the RC-135 Rivet Joint (signals intelligence) and the E-8 Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System to less effective ranges. Medium and low Earth orbit satellites lack the dwell time over a particular area for persistent ISR. Furthermore, space-based radars may not have sufficient fidelity to track mobile targets.34 One of the X-45C program objectives calls for producing two hours of loiter time with a 4,500-pound payload 1,000 miles from the launch base.35 Fuel saved by launching from an AAC near enemy territory will increase endurance and enable the stealthy X-45C UCAV to conduct persistent ISR in a high-threat environment. However, we currently have no practical method of employing fighter-sized UCAVs over global range.

#### ISR Is key to preventing proliferation of WMD’s and Bioweapons

Togzhan Kassenova, an associate in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment and a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow. She specializes in weapons of mass destruction nonproliferation issues, with a regional focus on Central Asia and Southeast Asia; nuclear security; strategic trade management; and civilian nuclear energy programs.¶ Kassenova serves on the UN Secretary General’s Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters. She is a member of the Steering Committee of the Fissile Material Working Group and the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific.,January 25, 2012, “ Preventing WMD Proliferation” http://www.scribd.com/doc/90025449/Preventing-WMD-Proliferation-Myths-and-Realities-of-Strategic-Trade-Controls

For example, some of the equipment, detection techniques, and personnel training related to WMD proliferation are also key to preventing the smuggling of drugs and small arms. Intelligence and law enforcement capacity critical to confronting terrorist groups is indispensable to preventing the operation and enhancing of proliferation networks. Similarly, capacity for disease surveillance, detection, and source identification—vital during outbreaks of highly infectious diseases such as the avian flu—is central to preventing the proliferation of sensitive biomaterials for malicious purposes.

#### Proliferation leads to nuclear war

Robert Pfaltzgraff, Professor of International Security Studies at The Fletcher School @ Tufts, and James Schoff, the Associate Director of Asia-Pacific Studies at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA), Feburary 2009, “Updating U.S. Deterrence Concepts and Operational Planning,” IFPA White Paper, online

Moreover, as suggested above, as more nations seek or attain nuclear status, we may very well be entering an era in which nuclear “non-use” is ending. This means that the risk of deterrence failures is growing, and with it questions about the ability of the United States to control the escalation chain in a crisis situation. During the Cold War, escalation dominance was presumed to lie with the United States, or at least that it could be managed in the U.S.-Soviet context because the stakes of escalation were such that both states were putatively deterred from nuclear weapons use (against the other). Today, however, the same may not be true with respect to North Korea and Iran, let alone in the context of a Taiwan contingency, or with respect to India and Pakistan in a crisis over Kashmir. Deterrence failures in the regional context may result from an accident, a deliberate calculation, or the intervention of a third party (e.g., Israel or Taiwan) in a crisis contingency. However, regardless of their origins, the consequences might very well be an escalatory exchange that ultimately draws the United States into a regional nuclear conflict.

### 1AR Walls

### Uniqueness Walls

#### Extend our Haaretz evidence from the 2AC saying that our current surveillance and intelligence capabilities are failing, as Iran has pulled down our drones. Here’s some more evidence:

#### US intelligence capability is mitigated by Iran – They have access to US capability

Thomas Erdbrink, staff writer, 12-12-2011, “Iran claims to extract data from U.S. drone,” The Washington Post, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/iran-claims-to-extract-data-from-us-drone/2011/12/12/gIQAMVZvpO_story.html>

Iranian military experts are in the final stages of extracting data from a sophisticated U.S. drone that crashed in Iran under mysterious circumstances this month, a lawmaker said Monday.¶ In Washington, President Obama said Monday that the United States has asked Iran to return the drone. Parviz Sorouri, a key member of the Iranian parliament’s national security and foreign policy committee, told state television that the extracted information will be used to sue the United States over the “invasion” by the unmanned aircraft.¶ He said Iran will “soon” start to reproduce the drone after a process of reverse engineering, which is nearly finished. “In the near future, we will be able to mass-produce it. . . . Iranian engineers will soon build an aircraft superior to the American [drone] using reverse engineering,” Sorouri was quoted as saying.

#### Drones are crashing – Short-range bases solve

Jim Miklaszewski, chief pentagon correspondence for NBC News, and Courtney Kube, national security producer for NBC News, 6-11-2012, “Navy drone crashes off Maryland; no injuries,” NBC News, <http://usnews.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2012/06/11/12169157-navy-drone-crashes-off-maryland-no-injuries?lite>

A U.S. Navy drone flying out of Patuxent River Naval Air Station crashed Monday after operators lost contact with the aircraft, NBC News reported. The BAMS-D (Broad Area Maritime Surveillance), an unmanned demonstrator aircraft that’s still in development, went down in a swampy area of nearby Bloodworth Island on Maryland’s Eastern Shore. The 44-foot aircraft was on a training flight when it went down. There were no reported injuries on the ground and no damage to property. The cause of the crash is still under investigation. The Coast Guard set up a safety zone around the marshy area along the Nanticoke River where the crash occurred, The Associated Press reported. The BAMS-D is basically the Navy's version of the Global Hawk surveillance drone, made by Northrop Grumman.

### Internal Link Wall

#### Intelligence is key to preventing prolif

Togzhan Kassenova, an associate in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment and a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow. She specializes in weapons of mass destruction nonproliferation issues, with a regional focus on Central Asia and Southeast Asia; nuclear security; strategic trade management; and civilian nuclear energy programs.¶ Kassenova serves on the UN Secretary General’s Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters. She is a member of the Steering Committee of the Fissile Material Working Group and the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific.,January 25, 2012, “ Preventing WMD Proliferation” http://www.scribd.com/doc/90025449/Preventing-WMD-Proliferation-Myths-and-Realities-of-Strategic-Trade-Controls

In addition to a comprehensive licensing system designed to prevent inadvertent proliferation, governments should have the legal authority and institutional capacity to enforce any controls they have in place to prevent intentional illegal activity. Strong enforcement depends on the capacity of intelligence, law enforcement, border, and customs agencies to detect and respond to smuggling in a timely and effective manner and on the education of producers and traders regarding the rationales and requirements of strategic trade controls. This in turn depends on the provision of appropriate training and equipment. Civilian and criminal penalties for violations are also an indispensable part of an effective enforcement mechanism.

#### Surveillance is the best way to solve proliferation

Bob Graham, Chairman of the CPWMDPT, 2010, “Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism Report Card,” http://www.pharmathene.com/WMD\_Report\_Card.pdf

Congress should reform its oversight both structurally and substantively to better ¶ address intelligence, homeland security, and crosscutting 21st-century national security missions, such as the ¶ prevention of weapons of mass destruction proliferation and terrorism.

### **Impact Wall**

#### **The Korean peninsula is unstable; thoughts of nuclear war are arising**

Hobart Mercury, 2010, “N Korea talks up nukes war”, http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/?rand=0.8019133907375702

NORTH Korea is prepared to launch what it calls ``a sacred war'' based on nuclear deterrent, it's leaders said last night amid heightened tensions on the Korean peninsula. A Korean Central News Agency statement said: ``The revolutionary armed forces are getting fully prepared to launch a sacred war of justice based on the nuclear deterrent at any time necessary to cope with the enemies' actions deliberately pushing the situation to the brink of a war.'' Armed Forces Minister Kim Young-Chun made the warning during a meeting in Pyongyang marking the 19th anniversary of leader Kim Jong-Il gaining supreme command of the Korean People's Army. The country's leaders also repeated their concerns that live-fire military exercises by South Korea were in preparation for a new Korean war. Peace talks negotiator and New Mexico Enhanced Coverage Linking Governor Bill Richardson, who recently returned from the Korean peninsula, has warned that violence between the North and South may erupt if the South continues its military drills and the North abandons its refrain from retaliation. A former US ambassador to the United Nations, Richardson spent the past week as an envoy, aiming to bring stability to a region that has been reeling since last month's deadly Northern artillery attack on a South Korean island. Richardson said yesterday the large mobilisation of South Korean troops, tanks, helicopters and fighter jets was another test for the North, which has shown restraint in recent days. ``The situation is a tinderbox,'' he said. ``There's still enormous tension, enormous mistrust and I believe diplomacy is what is needed to get us out of this.'' He said he was tired but hopeful after meetings with North Korean officials. Richardson, who has been to North Korea several times, said the situation was ``the worst I have ever seen''.

#### Nuke war results from prolif

Samuel Totten, Associate Professor in the College of Education at the University of Arkansas, The Widening Circle of Genocide, 1994, p. 289

There are numerous dangers inherent in the spread of nuclear weapons, including but not limited to the following: the possibility that a nation threatened by destruction in a conventional war may resort to the use of its nuclear weapons; the miscalculation of a threat of an attack and the subsequent use of nuclear weapons in order to stave off the suspected attack; a nuclear weapons accident due to carelessness or flawed technology (e.g., the accidental launching of a nuclear weapon); the use of such weapons by an unstable leader; the use of such weapons by renegade military personnel during a period of instability (personal, national or international); and, the theft (and/or development) and use of such weapons by terrorists. While it is unlikely (though not impossible) that terrorists would be able to design their own weapons, it is possible that they could do so with the assistance of a renegade government.

#### **UAVs key to Afghanistan—****Better surveillance, fire support, and enhanced capability to our soldiers and Marines**

Duncan Hunter, former Lieutenant in the US Marines, Congressman representing the 52nd district of California, 2009 “UAVs critical for Afghanistan” <http://hunter.house.gov/index.php?option=com_> content&task=view&id=131&Itemid=61

In the skies above Iraq and Afghanistan, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are providing America's military forces with a significant advantage over our terrorist enemies. UAVs are flying more than 30 missions a day in both of these regions, providing video surveillance, fire support and enhanced combat capability to our soldiers and Marines. Most importantly, these assets are saving American lives on the battlefield. By 2005, the greatest threat to coalition forces in Iraq, as well as the primary source of combat casualties, was Improvised Explosive Devices ---- remotely detonated munitions that allow insurgents to engage targets from a distance. In direct response to this threat, the U.S. Army launched Task Force Odin in 2006 at the insistence of Congress to provide persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance of Iraq's roadways through use of UAVs and several other resources. Since then, more than 3,000 insurgents have been captured or killed, and coalition deaths attributable to roadside bomb attacks decreased by 85 percent. Task Force Odin was a success by all measures and further demonstrates the effectiveness of UAVs in today's fight against terrorism. Now that greater attention is shifting to Afghanistan, particularly with the addition of another 20,000 U.S. combat troops, we must learn from our experiences and fully implement a surveillance strategy that effectively mitigates roadside bomb attacks and quickly covers rugged terrain along the Afghan-Pakistan border.

#### **Losing Afghanistan guts leadership and causes multiple scenarios for nuclear war**

James Carafano, senior research fellow for national security at The Heritage Foundation and directs its Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, 1-2-2010 “Con: Obama must win fast in Afghanistan or risk new wars across the globe” <http://gazettextra.com/news/2010/jan/02/con-obama-must-win-fast-afghanistan-or-risk-new-wa/>

Not much chance Obama will go that route. If the violence skyrockets next year and it looks as though the president’s ambitious objectives can’t be met, Afghanistan could look a lot more like Vietnam in 1973. U.S. forces withdrew. Our abandoned ally was soon overrun. South Vietnam became a gulag; Cambodia sprouted the killing fields; life in Laos was just plain lousy. By 1979, the Sino-Vietnamese war erupted. We can expect similar results if Obama’s Afghan strategy fails and he opts to cut and run. Most forget that throwing South Vietnam to the wolves made the world a far more dangerous place. The Soviets saw it as an unmistakable sign that America was in decline. They abetted military incursions in Africa, the Middle East, southern Asia and Latin America. They went on a conventional- and nuclear-arms spending spree. They stockpiled enough smallpox and anthrax to kill the world several times over. State-sponsorship of terrorism came into fashion. Osama bin Laden called America a “paper tiger.” If we live down to that moniker in Afghanistan, odds are the world will get a lot less safe. Al-Qaida would be back in the game. Regional terrorists would go after both Pakistan and India—potentially triggering a nuclear war between the two countries. Sensing a Washington in retreat, Iran and North Korea could shift their nuclear programs into overdrive, hoping to save their failing economies by selling their nuclear weapons and technologies to all comers. Their nervous neighbors would want nuclear arms of their own. The resulting nuclear arms race could be far more dangerous than the Cold War’s two-bloc standoff. With multiple, independent, nuclear powers cautiously eyeing one another, the world would look a lot more like Europe in 1914, when precarious shifting alliances snowballed into a very big, tragic war. The list goes on. There is no question that countries such as Russia, China and Venezuela would rethink their strategic calculus as well. That could produce all kinds of serious regional challenges for the United States. Our allies might rethink things as well. Australia has already hiked its defense spending because it can’t be sure the United States will remain a responsible security partner. NATO might well fall apart. Europe could be left with only a puny EU military force incapable of defending the interests of its nations. None of this is to suggest that staying in Afghanistan is an easy option. Wars never are. They require good men and women to put their lives on the line every day for our security. We should put them at risk only for an issue of vital national interest. Afghanistan is one such issue. And that—not cost—is the real bottom line. The war won’t bankrupt America. Multitrillion dollar proposals like “cap and trade” environmental schemes or government-managed health systems might well kill our economy. But the $30 billion required for the Afghanistan surge represents about 0.20 percent of our GDP. In terms of D.C. budget debates, that’s a rounding error. But in terms of national security, the cost of failure in Afghanistan would be incalculably high.

### **A2: Afghanistan Troops Pulling Out**

#### Troops remain in Afghanistan

Ronald E. Neumann, US ambassador to Afghanistan, 2-19-2012, “U.S. troops will remain in Afghanistan beyond 2014,” The Washington Post, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/us-troops-will-remain-in-afghanistan-beyond-2014/2012/02/13/gIQA3lxFOR_story.html>

Defense Secretary Leon Panetta provoked a widespread misunderstanding this month when he spoke of the U.S. military’s changing mission in Afghanistan, to that of an advisory role. Media reports of Panetta’s comments indicated that this meant U.S. forces would speed up their withdrawal from that country, when the White House has yet to make any such decision and the basic strategy of transition is unchanged. Compounding the confusion is the public’s misunderstanding of the current policy in Afghanistan — of transferring the “security lead” to the Afghans at the end of 2014 — the basic strategy of which remains unchanged. This transfer is not a timetable for the withdrawal of all foreign troops. Rather, the policy is that, after 2014, the Afghans will do the bulk of the fighting but will still have advisers from abroad in combat with them. U.S. forces are still expected to supply air support, artillery, medical evacuation and combat logistics after 2014 because the Afghan army will have none of these support services ready before 2016 at the earliest. The U.S. role will shift, but it is critically important to understand that, in the shift to a mission mainly devoted to advising and supporting — whatever the terms used — our forces will still be fighting on the ground, before, during and after 2014.