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## 1acs and Advs

### Key Terms/FYI

Some Important Terms Defined

CBO, September 2005, Congressional Budget Office, “Options for Strategic Military Transportation Systems,” http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/66xx/doc6661/09-27-strategicmobility.pdf

The Delivery Rate of Today’s Strategic Mobility Forces The transportation capability offered by a strategic mobility system is a function of three main factors: B The system’s throughput capacity—the total rate at which it can move military units; B The system’s promptness—the amount of time it takes to move cargo a given distance after the decision to do so has been made; and B The system’s independence from external constraints, such as limited airfield or seaport facilities, that can increase the time needed to make deliveries. Those three factors combine to determine how rapidly military forces can be transported where needed. Although the first two factors are similar, a distinction exists between the average rate at which a transportation system can move military units (throughput capacity) and the time needed to deliver a particular unit or load (promptness). For example, a system capable of delivering one brigade on the fifth day of an operation and a second brigade on the tenth day has the same throughput capacity as a system that can deliver two brigades on the tenth day. But the former is more prompt because it can deliver the first brigade five days earlier.

### Plans

### 1ac Adv Starter

#### Status quo reliance on land-and-sea based airpower transportation infrastructure make U.S. air superiority vulnerable – enables force denial by China, Iran, and North Korea

Col George D. Kramlinger, Summer 2005. USAFA; MAAS, School of Advanced Airpower Studies; MA, Naval War College, is the commander, 612th Air Operations Group, Headquarters Twelfth Air Force, Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona. “Narrowing the Global-Strike Gap with an Airborne Aircraft Carrier,” Air & Space Power Journal, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj05/sum05/kramlinger.html#kramlinger.

US Air Force bombers played key roles in Operations Allied Force, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom. Throughout Allied Force, B-2s flying 30-hour round-trip missions from the continental United States (CONUS) struck high-value Yugoslav targets at night through airspace considered too hostile for nonstealthy aircraft. Fortunately, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) airfields in nearby Italy enabled the proven tactic of packaging short-range defense suppression, fighter, and jamming aircraft to improve bomber survivability.1 Two B-2 sorties originating from the CONUS during each of the first two nights of Enduring Freedom quickly created a permissive environment above Afghanistan by eliminating the Taliban’s meager strategic air defenses.2 As a result, B-1 and B-52 bombers conveniently based at the British-owned atoll of Diego Garcia cycled freely over all of Afghanistan, pounding al-Qaeda positions around-the-clock.3 During the 10 months preceding Iraqi Freedom, multirole fighters patrolling the southern and northern no-fly zones systematically dismantled much of the Iraqi Integrated Air Defense System (IADS).4 Consequently, the operation began with B-1s and B-52s based in Diego Garcia enjoying the freedom of action to loiter over most of Iraq with large payloads to rapidly engage emerging battlefield targets.5 However, a permissive environment for nonstealthy bombers or -favorable basing options for bombers and short-range support assets may not exist in the next conflict. Nations that prohibit overflight or that deny basing rights, as well as adversaries who hold key airfields at risk or coerce allies with missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD), can prohibit access to regionally deployed land-based airpower. Naval attack fighters operating from the sea and conventional long-range bombers cannot survive penetration of a sophisticated IADS that denies access to all but the stealthiest platforms. Standoff air- and sea-launched cruise missiles are becoming increasingly vulnerable to advanced air defenses and have only limited capability against mobile, hardened, and deeply buried targets (HDBT) that create access denial. Long range, survivability, and penetrating weapons make the B-2 stealth bomber a highly capable global-strike platform.6 Unfortunately, the 16 combat-coded B-2s in our inventory are insufficient to conduct an unescorted enabling operation in places where access denial precludes the use of regionally based airpower.7 F/A-22 and F-117 stealth fighters should protect and augment the limited B-2 fleet by engaging mobile and hardened high-value targets, but they lack global range because of the single pilot’s limited endurance. In the very near future, Iran, North Korea, and China will likely possess the combination of weapons, missiles, and air defenses to negate access to theater-based airpower. Consequently, the Air Force may have to use CONUS-to-CONUS missions to gain access to denied airspace. Hampered by a limited B-2 inventory and an inability to operate stealth fighters over global range, the United States will face a global-strike gap if it confronts a vast and well-defended adversary in an access-challenged theater halfway around the world.

#### Lack of infrastructure investment for airfields is the critical flaw in current U.S. policy

John E. Flynn, Captain – Naval Reserve, “Joint and Allied Logistics Opportunities and Tools Supporting

21st Century War Fighter Rapid Decisive Operations,” 2002, http://www.dodccrp.org/events/7th\_ICCRTS/Tracks/pdf/106.pdf

Logistics needs to focus on those key items that enable U.S. forces to establish and sustain presence. Presence may depend upon the timely and intact seizure of key facilities and equipment. This occurred during the Marine assault on Guadalcanal. Using captured weapons and ammunition, the Marines “strengthened their defenses with the enemy’s undamaged engineering equipment and rushed to complete the airfield (Henderson field) as quickly as possible.” [MacDonald, 1986, p. 74] Although U.S. Forces may occasionally operate in areas where infrastructure is superb, such as that offered by Saudi facilities during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, U.S. forces must be able to operate and be supported for sustained periods in complex environments that will often possess little indigenous infrastructure. Operation Enduring Freedom is an excellent example of this. Logistics will also need to focus on key consumables that sustain U.S. forces. Among these consumables, as validated during Desert Shield and Desert Storm, are water, fuel, food, and ammunition. Water and fuel are likely to be the largest commodities required as measured by bulk and consequently, impact on the U.S. military transportation infrastructure. In the context of those RDO that may require the use of expeditionary Army ground forces, with a strong requirement for airlift, the necessary additional logistics burden of sustainment or ‘tail’ comes at the expense of rapidly deploying ‘teeth.’ The United States Marine Corps has over two hundred years of experience of participating in naval operations. The Marine Corps treats the oceans as highways that allow them to engage the enemy when and where they choose. The oceans are the Marines floating airfields and afloat logistics bases. The oceans are the source of air and naval artillery fire power and are the key enabler and sustainer that are central to concepts such as Ship to Objective Maneuver, Operational Maneuver from the Sea, and Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare. Although the Army has emulated the Marine Corps and embraced the value of Afloat Pre-positioning Ships, the Army has not fully exploited the capabilities resident in FDNF.

#### Finally, note that the U.S. is not investing in airborne aircraft carriers in the squo

Col George D. Kramlinger, Summer 2005. USAFA; MAAS, School of Advanced Airpower Studies; MA, Naval War College, is the commander, 612th Air Operations Group, Headquarters Twelfth Air Force, Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona. “Narrowing the Global-Strike Gap with an Airborne Aircraft Carrier,” Air & Space Power Journal, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj05/sum05/kramlinger.html#kramlinger.

To bridge the global-strike gap until the next-generation long-range strike platform becomes available, the Air Force is focusing on proven technology to develop an interim capability that is responsive, persistent, survivable in a nonpermissive environment, and capable of delivering a variety of weapons, including those designed to counter HDBTs.8 The service hopes to field this interim capability by 2015, when a number of potential adversaries will possess the means to deny -access. Industry has responded with a variety of proposals, including an upgraded B-1, an FB-22, an arsenal aircraft that carries cruise missiles, a variety of UCAV options, and an increased B-2 weapons load. The AAC option, however, is noticeably absent.

### 1ac Solvency (AACs)

#### AACs solves global strike capacity—

#### a) Allows B-2 and UCAV rapid access in a crisis

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The Airborne Aircraft Carrier Solution To close such a gap, the Air Force should develop a fleet of airborne aircraft carriers (AAC) to allow stealthy fighters and unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAV) to protect, augment, and support the B-2 fleet. The AAC concept uses a Boeing 747-400 mother ship to transport and employ both a single stealth fighter in the piggyback configuration and a single UCAV carried under the fuselage. Air-to-air refueling will provide global range, enabling each AAC to remain airborne for days at a time. A retractable, protective shroud will cover the nose and cockpit of the stealth aircraft so its pilot can move freely between the AAC and fighter. Mechanisms to launch and recover the airborne stealth fighter and UCAV will facilitate multiple sorties by the parasite aircraft. Between missions both the fighter and UCAV will refuel and rearm while docked with the mother ship. After two or three coordinated strikes over the course of 12–24 hours, the mother ships will return the fighters and UCAVs to the CONUS for maintenance and regeneration as another group of AACs replaces them. The AAC concept will neither serve as a substitute for nor attempt to generate the sorties of a naval aircraft carrier. Instead, a fleet of AACs will enable the marshalling of high-payoff “silver-bullet” strike packages at the strategic and operational levels of war early in a campaign as a means of overcoming access denial and setting conditions for the deployment and employment of theater-based conventional forces.

#### b) Also ensures bomber survivability --- fighter support, SAM suppression, and radar jamming

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To enhance effectiveness and survivability in a high-threat environment, B-2 bombers must become part of a coordinated strike package that includes fighter support, SAM suppression, and escort jamming. Daylight bombing by B-17s over Germany became effective only after P-51 fighters equipped with external drop tanks accompanied the bombers to the deepest targets and back. The Air Force lost 15 of 729 B-52 sorties to SAMs over North Vietnam in December 1972 during Linebacker II—and would have lost many more if not for jamming support and fighters flying SAM-suppression missions.36 During Allied Force, F-15Cs cleared the skies of Serbian MiGs, F-16CJs suppressed deadly SAMs, and EA-6Bs provided standoff jamming as part of a coordinated package to improve effectiveness and survivability of the stealthy B-2 and F-117.37 With only 16 combat-coded B-2s, the Air Force can ill afford to lose even a single stealth bomber to an enemy fighter or SAM. The AAC concept provides fighter sweep, SAM suppression, and escort jamming from global range when access denial prevents the execution of these missions from regional bases. The AAC concept will be successful only if the UCAV employed from the mother ship is optimized to perform both the ISR and electronic-attack missions. UCAV developmental energy should not be wasted attempting to replicate the high-fidelity weapon--delivery capability of the F/A-22 or F-117. Instead, design of the X-45C production variant should focus on persistent ISR and close-in escort jamming in a high-threat environment—missions no platform can currently perform. UCAV design must enable rearming, refueling, and maintenance functions from the top of the vehicle since the upper surface will dock with the lower side of the AAC. The AAC UCAV should carry only a small weapons load—two SDBs to engage time-critical or mobile targets—and should dedicate the majority of payload capacity for ISR systems, jamming equipment, and additional fuel for increased persistence. Stealthy UCAVs jamming S-300/400 radars and finding mobile SAM launchers will become as big an enabler for the B-2 as the P-51 was for the B-17 in World War II.

#### ACCs would multiply the effectiveness of existing bomber capacity through enhanced transportation capability --- the plan restores U.S. air dominance and prevent a host of global WMD conflicts

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In view of ever-expanding global interests, the growing importance of the geographically vast Asia-Pacific region, diminished reaction time, and the proliferation of antiaccess capabilities, the United States faces a global-strike gap. Defense of US vital interests cannot wait for procurement of the next long-range strike platform or development of a hypersonic, suborbital global-strike vehicle. Consequently, the United States must narrow the global-strike gap as a hedge against uncertainty and turmoil in the near- and midterm security environment. The AAC concept enables F/A-22s, F-117s, and fighter-sized UCAVs to destroy critical mobile and hardened targets while protecting the limited B-2 fleet with fighter sweep, SAM suppression, and escort jamming over global range in an access-denial environment. A fleet of 60 AACs will reduce the near-term global-strike gap with a balance among cost, capability, flexibility, and strategic risk. Eventually, global-strike missions using AACs and B-2s will gain air superiority, neutralize WMDs, and paralyze an adversary as a means to facilitate the introduction of less stealthy combat aircraft into the theater. Airborne aircraft carriers offer a cost-effective and practical method to close the global-strike gap in an access-denial environment.

### 1ac Solvency (Airships/Mobility)

#### Independently, Investment in airships would greatly enhance U.S. air mobility

CBO, September 2005, Congressional Budget Office, “Options for Strategic Military Transportation Systems,” http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/66xx/doc6661/09-27-strategicmobility.pdf

Airships would be virtually independent of air bases and would be well suited to deliver combat-ready troops, along with their vehicles and other equipment, directly to their destination. (With current mobility forces, by contrast, troops and equipment usually travel separately.) Delivering fully equipped units straight to their destination would reduce the time that units typically spend between arriving in a theater and beginning operations. High-speed ships could be designed to be less dependent on seaports and to transport cargo and passengers together, but such capabilities would probably result in higher costs for a given amount of throughput capacity.

### 1ac Solvency (General)

#### The aff is key to overall 21st century military effectiveness

Major John V. McCoy, Florida Institute of Technology, 2003, “Unmanned Aerial Logistics Vehicles: A Concept Worth Pursuing?,” http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA416527

The US military recognizes the need to prepare now for an uncertain future. The Department of Defense’s Joint Vision 2020 provides vision for US military force development as the military prepares for the future over the next twenty years. In Joint Vision 2020, future military forces retain the primary purpose of fighting and winning the nation’s wars. However, Joint Vision 2020 asserts that today’s forces must transform into future forces to properly adapt to the changing and increasingly complex twenty-first century strategic environment. The overall goal of Joint Vision 2020 transformation is the creation of a force dominant across the full spectrum of military operations. By design, the Joint Vision is an outline fleshed out over time as concepts develop until its actualization in the year 2020. The Joint Vision 2020 strategy will develop a new level of joint interoperability, including a force that accepts, expects, and encourages cross-service interdependence and operational integration. Joint Vision 2020 also expects new dimensions in robotics to dramatically increase the capability of the 2020 joint task force over what is available today. Focused Logistics is an operational concept of Joint Vision 2020 to be expanded. This research paper explores the focused logistics tenet of joint deployment/rapid distribution, with emphasis on the potential for logistic application of unmanned aerial vehicles. Unmanned aircraft may answer expected logistic needs on future battlefields possibly yielding benefits of simplicity, reliability, flexibility, lift capability, interoperability, asset visibility, reduced risk, and reduced cost. Future military logisticians are to use focused logistics to deliver just the right amount at just the right time to just the right place on contiguous or noncontiguous battlefields. Even though the US is risk adverse concerning loss of life, situations may dictate that logistic lines of communication traverse unsecured areas. The benefits of unmanned resupply aircraft may exceed the benefits of current air resupply systems involving manned C-130, C-17, C-5, C-40A, UH-60, and CH-47 aircraft. Unmanned resupply aircraft may even yield benefits exceeding those of existing manned ground resupply system.

### 1ac – China Scenario

#### Taiwan independence coming

David A. Shlapak, Senior International Policy Analyst @ RAND, et al, 2009, “A Question of Balance,” RAND, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND\_MG888.pdf

The factors described in this chapter present something of a mixed bag, and their collective impact, in terms of the future stability of the crossstrait relationship, is somewhat unpredictable. But we believe that, in general, the “tense stability” that characterized the cross-strait confrontation prior to the mid-1990s is suffering from gradual erosion. The debate concerning sovereignty over Taiwan has evolved dramatically. Today, this dispute pits a Beijing government that insists there is only one China of which Taiwan is a part against a Taiwan that still retains many formal trappings of being a Chinese state but increas- ingly develops an independent national identity. Notwithstanding the collapse of voter support for the DPP, nearly all significant political parties in Taiwan now accept the notion that any future arrangement with China must receive the separate approval of Taiwan’s 23 million voters. For Beijing, the emerging Taiwanese national identity raises the profoundly worrisome prospect that if unification is delayed for too long, the Taiwanese people will be unwilling to accept any arrangement that subsumes them within a “Chinese” state or confederation. Gradual changes along these lines seem unlikely to provide the spark for conflict, but they could provide a backdrop for crisis if Beijing concludes that long-term trends are turning powerfully against them. The rapidly growing cross-strait economic relationship means that Beijing can now inflict significant pain on Taiwan if it so chooses. But, to date, Beijing has had difficulty translating this economic leverage into meaningful political results, other than as a device for signaling its irritation with Taipei. If Beijing loses hope that economic and social maneuvers can slow or reverse forces on Taiwan that run athwart of at least eventual reunificaton, the attractiveness, in a crisis, of military options is likely to increase. In Taiwan, meanwhile, advocates of greater independence fear that growing economic ties will mean “time is not on their side,” and they may feel the need to push more provocative measures when political circumstances give them the chance. Beijing’s anger at what it saw as Chen Shui-bian’s provocative behavior encouraged a dangerous shift in the PRC’s “red lines” for threatening force against Taiwan. Beijing sees Chen and his allies as pathological “envelope-pushers” constantly looking for ways to promote the island’s independence, and the perceived need to keep Chen boxed in caused China to shift away from the four clear, relatively easyto- follow “red lines” that it warned Taiwan not to cross in the past. Instead, China has gravitated toward more vague, ambiguous “red areas” and it is more likely to define (or redefine) these situationally and reactively during periods of crisis. This ambiguity and improvisation could become dangerous sources of misperception during a crisis. The combination of more than a decade of PRC military modernization and flat Taiwanese defense spending have transformed the balance across the strait away from one that had long favored Taiwan. In the heat of any future cross-strait crisis, this shift in the perceived balance of forces seems to remove an important impediment to Chinese use of force.

#### Draws in the U.S.

Michael Hanlon, Senior Fellow foreign Policy, 5-1-2005, ‘The Risk of War Over Taiwan is Real,” Brookings, http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2005/0501asia\_ohanlon.aspx

And as bizarre as it may seem, the US really would fight to prevent faraway Taiwan from being conquered. This is true not only because President George W. Bush publicly said so in 2001, but also for deeper reasons. First, US credibility as a dependable security partner would be on the line in any conflict over Taiwan. After a half-century of coming to Taiwan's aid in crises, to back down when the going got tough would cause every other US ally around the world to doubt the strength of America's commitment. Among other implications, more countries might then pursue their own nuclear deterrents. Second, and more positively, Taiwan's vibrant democracy elicits strong support in the US. This goes for Democrats as well as Republicans; it was the Clinton administration, after all, that sent two aircraft carriers toward the Taiwan Strait in 1996 in reaction to China's firing of missiles near the island.

#### China would use nuclear weapons – Taiwan is an existential issue, leads to extinction

Straits Times (Singapore), June 25, 2000, No one gains in war over Taiwan

The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation. There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else. Gen Ridgeway recalled that the biggest mistake the US made during the Korean War was to assess Chinese actions according to the American way of thinking.

#### Rapid and endurable bombers capacity is essential to prevent escalating Chinese nuclear use – loitering ability, sensors, intelligence capabilities prove the B-2 is significantly better than other assets

Stephen Cambone, CSIS, and Colin Gray, The University of Hull (UK), 1996, “The Role of Nuclear Forces in U.S. National Security Strategy: Implications of the B-2 bomber,” Comparative Strategy, 15: 207-231

Relocatable or imprecisely located targets: This target category includes mobile ICBMs (e.g.. the Russian 55-25 and anticipated Chinese DF-31 and DF-41 missiles). ground forces out of garrison, and targets “whose gencral location is known or at least highly suspected, and . . other area targets where the effectiveness of the attack can be significantly improved with aim point adjustn’ient based on a radar or visual check or cueing from J-STARS or some other sensor platform” [70]. Mobile missiles, in particular, will assume greater importance in the strategic ibrucs of Russia as well as in the missile arsenals of rogue regional powers. According to some estimates, 75% of Russian ICBMs will he mobile by the turn of the century 1711. The B- 2’s loiter ability (for extended search time), high-altitude survivability (for good field of view), low observability (for tactical surprise), advanced sensor suite (for acquiring targets), and large payload (for multiple strikes) would be especially useful in eventually developing a capability against mobile missiles. No other existing or prospective weapons system comes close to combining all of these characteristics. Ballistic missile barrage attacks against suspected operating areas for mobile missiles are highly inefficient, and in any case they would be impossible under the strict limits of START II. ICBM- or SLBM-delivered maneuvering reentry vehicles conceivably could be used to attack mobile missiles, but the United Stales has no plans to acquire such weapons. Autonomous terminally guided cruise missiles also might serve as mobile missile hunters, hut again they are not included in future defense plans. Thus long-range manned bombers, which can exploit ongoing improvements in surveillance and rapid data transmission and processing capabilities, offer the best-—if less than ideal—offensive means for dealing with mobile missiles.

#### That’s key to prevent or reduce the impact of a US-China nuclear war

Keir Lieber, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame, and Daryl Press, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, July/August 2007, “Superiority Complex,” The Atlantic, http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200707/china-nukes

In the past, a nuclear attack on China’s arsenal would have had horrific humanitarian consequences. The weapons were less accurate, so an effective strike would have required multiple high-yield warheads, detonating on the ground, against each target. The Federation of American Scientists and the Natural Resources Defense Council modeled the consequences of such an attack—similar to the submarine attack described above—and published their findings in 2006. The results were sobering. Although China’s long-range missiles are deployed in a lightly populated region, lethal fallout from an attack would travel hundreds of miles and kill more than 3 million Chinese civilians. American leaders might have contemplated such a strike, but only in the most dire circumstances. But things are changing radically. Improved accuracy now allows war planners to target hardened sites with low-yield warheads and even airbursts. And the United States is pushing its breakthroughs in accuracy even further. For example, for many years America has used global-positioning systems in conjunction with onboard inertial-guidance systems to improve the accuracy of its conventionally armed (that is, nonnuclear) cruise missiles. Although an adversary may jam the GPS signal near likely targets, the cruise missiles use GPS along their flight route and then—if they lose the signal—use their backup inertial-guidance system for the final few kilometers. This approach has dramatically improved a cruise missile’s accuracy and could be applied to nuclear-armed cruise missiles as well. The United States is deploying jam- resistant GPS receivers on other weapons, experimenting with GPS on its nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, and planning to deploy a new generation of GPS satellites—with higher-powered signals to complicate jamming. The payoff for equipping cruise missiles (or **nuclear bombs)** with GPS is clear when one estimates the civilian casualties from a lower-yield, airburst attack. We asked Matthew McKinzie, a scientific consultant to the Natural Resources Defense Council and coauthor of the 2006 study, to rerun the analysis using low-yield detonations compatible with nuclear weapons currently in the U.S. arsenal. Using three warheads per target to increase the odds of destroying every silo, the model predicts fewer than 1,000 Chinese casualties from fallout. In some low-yield scenarios, fewer than 100 Chinese would be killed or injured from fallout. The model is better suited to predicting fallout casualties than to forecasting deaths from the blast and fire, but given the low population in the rural region where the silos are, Chinese fatalities would be fewer than 6,000 in even the most destructive scenario we modeled. And in the future, there may be reliable nonnuclear options for destroying Chinese silos. Freed from the burden of killing millions, a U.S. president staring at the threat of a Chinese nuclear attack on U.S. forces, allies, or territory might be more inclined to choose preemptive action. Strategic Implications of the Nuclear Imbalance The most plausible flash point for a serious U.S.-China conflict is Taiwan. Suppose Taiwan declared independence. China has repeatedly warned that such a move would provoke an attack, probably a major air and naval campaign to shatter Taiwan’s defenses and leave the island vulnerable to conquest. If the United States decided to defend Taiwan, American forces would likely thwart China’s offensive, since aerial and naval warfare are strengths of the U.S. military. But looming defeat would place great pressure on China’s leaders. Losing the war might mean permanently losing Taiwan. This would undermine the domestic legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party, which increasingly relies on the appeal of nationalism to justify its rule. A crippling defeat would also strain relations between political leaders in Beijing and the Chinese military. To stave off a regime-threatening disaster, the political leaders might decide to raise the stakes by placing part of the Chinese nuclear force on alert in hopes of coercing the United States into accepting a negotiated solution (for example, a return to Taiwan’s pre-declaration status). By putting its nuclear forces on alert, however, China’s leaders would compel a U.S. president to make a very difficult decision: to accede to blackmail (by agreeing to a cease-fire and pressuring the Taiwanese to renounce independence), to assume that the threat is a bluff (a dangerous proposition, given that each Chinese ICBM carries a city-busting 4,000-kiloton warhead), or to strike the Chinese missiles before they could be launched. How do America’s growing counterforce capabilities affect this scenario? First, American nuclear primacy may prevent such a war in the first place. China’s leaders understand that their military now has little hope of defeating U.S. air and naval forces. If they also recognize that their nuclear arsenal is vulnerable—and that placing it on alert might trigger a preemptive strike—the leaders may conclude that war is a no-win proposition. Second, if a war over Taiwan started anyway, U.S. nuclear primacy might help contain the fighting at the conventional level. Early in the crisis, Washington could quietly convey to Beijing that the United States would act decisively if China put its vulnerable nuclear arsenal on alert. Finally, if China threatened to launch nuclear attacks against America’s allies, its territory, or its forces in Asia, nuclear primacy would make a preemptive first strike more palatable to U.S. leaders. Any decision to attack China’s ICBM force, though, would be fraught with danger. A missile silo might have escaped detection. Furthermore, a strike on China’s 18 ICBMs would leave Beijing with roughly 60 shorter-range nuclear missiles with which to retaliate against U.S. forces and allies in the region. However, in the aftermath of a “clean” disarming strike—one that killed relatively few Chinese—American leaders could credibly warn that a Chinese nuclear response would trigger truly devastating consequences, meaning nuclear attacks against a broader target set, including military, government, and possibly even urban centers. In light of warnings from Chinese defense analysts and from within China’s military that it might use nuclear weapons to avoid losing Taiwan, an American president might feel compelled to strike first. In this terrible circumstance, he or she would reap the benefits of the past decade’s counterforce upgrades.

### 1ac – Air Mobility Scenarios

#### Loss of rapid air mobility crushes deterrence and overall U.S. leadership

Richard J. Hazdra, Major, USAF, Fairchild Paper, Air University Press August 2001 http://www.au.af.mil/au/aul/aupress/fairchild\_papers/Hazdra/Hazdra.pdf

Both Congress and the USAF itself have delayed desperately needed technological advances for AMC. Congress is forcing AMC’s pursuit of technological advance to remain at a snail’s pace due to the congressional agreements limiting the DOD budget. However, Congress will have to provide funding to obtain new air mobility designs if the armed forces are to have the rapid global mobility capability that the NSS requires. Despite the requirement to improve air transport capability, the Air Force seems narrowly focused on development and procurement of the F-22 at the expense of other critically important air mobility technological requirements. The Air Force has repeatedly emphasized the F-22 program in public and before Congress.38 In contrast, the CINCTRANSCOM seems to go it alone with little congressional or service support, when requesting technological advancements for AMC. Pursue New Air Mobility Aircraft Designs Peacetime military innovation occurs when respected senior military officers formulate a strategy for innovation.39 Albeit the concept of air mobility is not new, Gen Ronald R. Fogleman became an advocate in 1992 while assigned as the CINCTRANSCOM and then subsequently Air Force chief of staff. A change in the strategic security environment resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union may have been the catalyst for his advocacy.40 With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the security environment became more uncertain because the United States is no longer in a bipolar world. Uncertainty in the security environment arose from questions about the national interests that the United States would face in a multipolar world or in a world where the United States would face asymmetric threats from weaker enemies. The concept of rapid global mobility provides the United States with the means to project its military capabilities around the world to either punish an act of aggression, preempt an act of aggression, or deter an act of aggression. It is important to develop air mobility into a rapid global mobility force that has the flexibility to transition from the steady-state operations to a major theater war. Now is the time to pursue innovations in air transport design, rather than waiting for a major theater war. Once built and employed during peacetime, analysis on the new designs can accrue and errors can be recognized and corrected before their use in war.41 This environment encompasses a vast array of potential crisis spots on the globe, which requires a greater reliance on rapid global mobility, whose reduced force structure and worldwide infrastructure currently limit our capabilities. According to Stephen Peter Rosen, the United States can best face the issues associated with choosing new technologies by managing uncertainty.42 Looking through his lens, air mobility becomes a priority for force structure modernization because if the proper configurations of equipment cannot arrive in-theater when required, the ability of the United States to intervene in a crisis greatly diminishes. The United States needs to emphasize mobility forces now because the most opportune time for technological advancements occurs during peacetime.43 Update the Force Structure The NSS defines national interests that extend beyond the US borders; and in doing so, it establishes a requirement for military intervention to secure those interests. In citing the requirement for intervention, the secretary of defense––through the QDR––identifies several different types of interventions that the United States must prepare for. This policy of intervention, which the United States has employed numerous times since the end of the Cold War, affects several force structure issues to include an increased operations tempo and an increased personnel tempo. In addition, the concept of rapid global mobility has become the means to achieve effective military intervention and, as such, has become the backbone of both military and peacetime operations. The resulting increase in the need for air mobility operations has occurred alongside the decline of both the air mobility force structure and the worldwide air mobility infrastructure. In order to meet the challenges created in the new strategic environment, AMC must continue its pursuit of technological innovations to include new aircraft designs. New airlift designs should include intercontinental range without aerial refueling, and new tanker designs should provide for greater cargo capacity combined with greater offload capability. AMC can modernize most of its aging fleet of aircraft in order to address some issues. However, only a fleet of larger and longer-range air transports will reduce the personnel tempo while maintaining a high operations tempo. If the United States fails to meet this challenge, it limits its ability to intervene in crises and, consequently, degrades its leadership position in the world.

### AACs Good – Intel/Surveillance

#### AACs would lock in U.S. surveillance and intelligence capacity

Col George D. Kramlinger, Summer 2005. USAFA; MAAS, School of Advanced Airpower Studies; MA, Naval War College, is the commander, 612th Air Operations Group, Headquarters Twelfth Air Force, Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona. “Narrowing the Global-Strike Gap with an Airborne Aircraft Carrier,” Air & Space Power Journal, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj05/sum05/kramlinger.html#kramlinger.

Finding mobile targets in an access-denial environment requires persistent, close-in, and stealthy intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). During the Persian Gulf War of 1991, Iraq used camouflage, concealment, and deception along with mobility to effectively hide Scud-missile launchers in its western deserts despite a huge commitment of strike aircraft and standoff ISR platforms.31 During Allied Force, the Serbs constantly moved their mobile SAM systems, preventing ISR platforms from providing actionable targeting information. As a result, large sections of Serbian airspace remained unsafe for nonstealthy aircraft.32 During Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, the RQ-1A Predator and high-flying RQ-4A Global Hawk UAVs demonstrated the enormous value of persistent, close-in ISR at finding, fixing, and tracking emerging and fleeting targets. However, neither of these UAVs is stealthy, and we have lost many of the low-flying Predators over hostile territory.33 Double-digit SAM threats will push large, conventional ISR platforms such as the RC-135 Rivet Joint (signals intelligence) and the E-8 Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System to less effective ranges. Medium and low Earth orbit satellites lack the dwell time over a particular area for persistent ISR. Furthermore, space-based radars may not have sufficient fidelity to track mobile targets.34 One of the X-45C program objectives calls for producing two hours of loiter time with a 4,500-pound payload 1,000 miles from the launch base.35 Fuel saved by launching from an AAC near enemy territory will increase endurance and enable the stealthy X-45C UCAV to conduct persistent ISR in a high-threat environment. However, we currently have no practical method of employing fighter-sized UCAVs over global range.

### Transportation Key to Air Power

#### Upgrading strategic transportation systems boosts rapid response time and air mobility – that’s critical to crisis de-escalation

CBO, September 2005, Congressional Budget Office, “Options for Strategic Military Transportation Systems,” http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/66xx/doc6661/09-27-strategicmobility.pdf

Since the end of World War II, the United States has maintained the ability to project combat power rapidly around the globe. That ability has been achieved through a dual approach: “forward basing” units overseas in regions of particular importance and fielding longrange (strategic) transportation systems that can move forces around the world quickly, either to reinforce the forward-based units or to respond to needs that arise elsewhere. Following the Cold War, emphasis has shifted away from forward basing and toward increasing the mobility of forces based in the United States. In the past 15 years, the U.S. military has cut the number of forward-based troops by about half and has improved its strategic transportation capability by fielding such systems as C-17 airlift aircraft and large, medium-speed roll-on/roll-off ships (LMSRs) for sealift. In addition, the Army is largely focusing its current “transformation” efforts on changing equipment and organization to create units that can be deployed more quickly and easily. Nevertheless, officials in the Department of Defense (DoD) seek to increase the speed of military deployments to an even greater degree, because the ability to deliver forces to a distant theater in the first few days or weeks of a crisis is seen as critical to ensuring a favorable outcome. Several general approaches exist for speeding up the U.S. military’s response to crises, such as: B Better matching the locations of forward bases to locations where conflicts are likely to arise, B Redesigning ground combat and support units and their equipment to make them easier to transport, and B Improving strategic transportation forces.

#### Air mobility is the vital internal link to overall air power

Richard J. Hazdra, Major, USAF, Fairchild Paper, Air University Press August 2001 http://www.au.af.mil/au/aul/aupress/fairchild\_papers/Hazdra/Hazdra.pdf

Since airlift was first used as a tool of national security during the Berlin airlift, it has grown to deliver passengers, cargo, and fuel to operations worldwide in support of national security. However, Air Mobility Command (AMC) is the single organization that performs for air mobility for the United States (US). Currently, the US Air Force (USAF) has structured AMC for war; yet this command performs operations during times when the United States is at peace. AMC performs missions to support US military operations in hostile environments as well as humanitarian operations in nonhostile environments. The number of operations requiring mobility air forces has been on the rise since the Cold War ended. These steady-state operations seem to overtask mobility air forces. This study centers on the question: Can AMC’s force structure, organized for two major theater wars, fulfill that requirement and perform the steady-state operations in today’s strategic environment? This study finds that AMC’s force structure cannot meet its requirements for two major theater wars and that the current force structure is inefficient in meeting the requirements for steady-state operations. First, this study presents a primer to acclimate the reader to the complex environment and multifaceted requirements of mobility air forces. Second, it examines AMC’s current force structure as determined by Department of Defense (DOD) requirements for war. Third, this study describes the various types of missions that AMC performs on a steady-state basis and evaluates the importance of these operations in fulfilling US national security strategy. Fourth, this study recommends action that the USAF and the DOD should investigate in order to improve their air mobility capabilities in support of the national security strategy. Chapter 1 Introduction If we do not build a transportation system that can meet the needs of tomorrow, then it doesn’t matter much what kind of force we have because it won’t be able to get there. —Gen John M. Shalikashvili, US Army Air mobility is the key to unlocking the strength of United States (US) airpower because it performs rapid global mobility. US military forces have relied on this capability since World War II, and it has always been there. Combatant commanders increasingly rely on air mobility to transport forces quickly into their theaters to head off potential crises, and Air Mobility Command (AMC) always responds enthusiastically with the necessary assets. When the National Command Authorities (NCA) task the Department of Defense (DOD) to achieve any objective, it relies on AMC to achieve rapid global mobility requirements. Consequently, mobility air forces have a remarkable reputation for getting the job done for DOD and combatant commanders. Since AMC has always achieved its objectives, neither the US Air Force (USAF) nor DOD has conducted a thorough examination to determine if air mobility capabilities will suffice in the future. However, the time has come to review the force structure of AMC to determine if it can realistically continue to meet national security requirements.

### Airpower Good – Heg

#### Air power is vital to maintain U.S. hegemony

Major William K. Lewis, senior pilot in the T-37, T-38, AT-38 and F-15 Eagle, Distinguished Graduate of the Squadron Officer School and the Air Command and Staff College, and graduate of the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, June 2002, “UCAV – THE NEXT GENERATION AIR-SUPERIORITY FIGHTER?”, school of advanced airpower studies @ Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.

Air superiority has been an enduring prerequisite to military victory during conflicts in the twenty-first century. The first aerial engagements in World War I were crude attempts by surface commanders to deny their adversary aerial artillery spotting and reconnaissance operations, while allowing and enhancing their own. These early missions mark the beginning of an unending quest by air forces to control and exploit the aerospace medium. Control of this environment became an important first step in military operations; it provided freedom to attack as well as freedom from attack.28 As General Momyer and Colonel Warden put it, air superiority is the prelude to military victory—without it no conventional operations can be sustained. This is not an attempt to say that air superiority alone wins wars; on the contrary, it is rarely an end in itself. Control of the skies protects forces and permits decisive subsequent and follow-on operations by all air and surface arms. Attaining air superiority alone cannot promise victory, but it can enable the full complement of military might to become engaged. Air Superiority will continue to be a vital prerequisite for military operations in the next century. Technology will advance and the nature of the enemy will inevitably change. But, as one recent study emphasized: The ability to use the skies with impunity, while denying the same capability to an enemy, is a perquisite for every other warfighting element of any future campaign. Without it we lose the advantages gained by the inherent speed, range, and flexibility of airpower. We also risk putting ourselves on the defensive while ceding the same advantages to our adversaries. As the precision and lethality of our weapons increases, air superiority must be gained to allow us to observe the enemy, track his activity, and react in a prompt and decisive manner, whether or not he uses (or can use) airpower in support of his own objectives, or even whether or not we choose to use (or can use) airpower in support of our objectives.29 As long as aircraft are more flexible and versatile than ground forces and have the speed, range and persistence to permit concentration on any point on the surface, they will continue to have a profound impact on the nature and outcome of war. Air superiority will continue to be an essential military mission for the foreseeable future.

#### It prevents the rise of emerging challengers to U.S. power

Robert S. Dudney, Editor in Chief. “Airpower and Optical Illusions: Many still find it easy to discount the value of airpower” Air Force Magazine March 2005, Vol. 88, No. 3

Airpower, in each case, proved valuable in unexpected ways. We will be glad to have such a flexible, hard-hitting weapon the next time we run into a nasty surprise, as we inevitably will. Future air wars might be more demanding than many now expect. Note that, when USAF pilots in F-15Cs recently engaged in mock combat with Indian Air Force pilots, the Indians often won. China is modernizing its military forces faster than anyone expected. In today’s dynamic world, it would be unwise to prepare only for threats that are visible now. US power must be flexible and adaptable. In every conflict for the past 15 years, airpower has provided that kind of capability. Retired Gen. Richard E. Hawley, former head of Air Combat Command, says Pentagon officials should “have a little humility about their ability to predict what kind of a fight we may be in 15 years hence.” Hawley added: “Those who would bet the future security of the nation on their ability to predict the future are on the wrong track. None of us can know what the future holds, and only a balanced mix of forces and capabilities will allow us to face that future with full confidence that our military will not fail us when we need it most.”

Airpower is the lynchpin of US military strategy

Air and Space Power Journal March 10, 2003

The reason for this emphasis on air and space power among our soldiers, sailors, and marines is their realization that military operations have little likelihood of success without it. It has become the American way of war. Indeed, the major disagreements that occur among the services today generally concern the control and purpose of air and space assets. All of them covet those assets, but their differing views on the nature of war shape how they should be employed. Thus, we have debates regarding the authority of the joint force air component commander, the role of the corps commander in the deep battle, the question of which service should command space, and the question of whether the air or ground commander should control attack helicopters. All the services trumpet the importance of joint operations, and air and space power increasingly has become our primary joint weapon. Air and space dominance also provides our civilian leadership with flexibility. Although intelligence is never perfect, our leaders now have unprecedented information regarding what military actions can or cannot accomplish and how much risk is involved in a given action. For example, our leaders understood far better than ever before how many aircraft and weapons would be needed over Serbia and Afghanistan to produce a specified military effect, weapon accuracy, collateral damage that might occur, and risk to our aircrews. This allowed our leaders to fine-tune the air campaign, providing more rapid and effective control than previously. Other factors affect the way we'll fight. One hears much talk today of "transforming the military" to meet new threats. The Persian Gulf War, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan- and, for that matter, Somalia and Haiti- indicate that traditional methods, weapons, forces, and strategy will often be inadvisable. Warfare has changed. Stealth, precision weapons, and space-based communication and intelligence-gathering systems are examples of this new form of war. Certainly, the human element in war can never be ignored. People make war, and all their strengths and weaknesses must be considered. Yet, it would be foolish not to exploit new technologies that remove part of the risk and human burden in war. It is not always necessary for people to suffer. Air and space power permits new types of strategies that make war on things rather than on people and that employ things rather than people. It capitalizes on the explosion in computer, electronic, and materials technologies that so characterize the modern era. This is America's strength- one that we must ensure.

### Heg Impact – Kzad

#### Heg solves nuke war

Zalmay Khalilzad, Former Assist Prof of Poli Sci at Columbia, Spring, 1995, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 2; P. 84.

Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.

### Heg Impact – Thayer

#### Collapse of heg causes great power transition wars, destroys democratic peace, and causes economic collapse - multipolarity can’t provide for stability or solve a plethora of global problems.

Bradley Thayer, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota, December, 2006, "In Defense of Primacy,” The National Interest, Lexis.

Retrenchment proponents seem to think that the current system can be maintained without the current amount of U.S. power behind it. In that they are dead wrong and need to be reminded of one of history's most significant lessons: Appalling things happen when international orders collapse. The Dark Ages followed Rome's collapse. Hitler succeeded the order established at Versailles. Without U.S. power, the liberal order created by the United States will end just as assuredly. As country and western great Ral Donner sang: "You don't know what you've got (until you lose it)." Consequently, it is important to note what those good things are. In addition to ensuring the security of the United States and its allies, American primacy within the international system causes many positive outcomes for Washington and the world. The first has been a more peaceful world. During the Cold War, U.S. leadership reduced friction among many states that were historical antagonists , most notably France and West Germany. Today, American primacy helps keep a number of complicated relationships aligned --between Greece and Turkey, Israel and Egypt, South Korea and Japan, India and Pakistan, Indonesia and Australia. This is not to say it fulfills Woodrow Wilson's vision of ending all war. Wars still occur where Washington's interests are not seriously threatened, such as in Darfur, but a Pax Americana does reduce war's likelihood, particularly war's worst form: great power wars. Second, American power gives the United States the ability to spread democracy and other elements of its ideology of liberalism. Doing so is a source of much good for the countries concerned as well as the United States because, as John Owen noted on these pages in the Spring 2006 issue, liberal democracies are more likely to align with the United States and be sympathetic to the American worldview.3 So, spreading democracy helps maintain U.S. primacy. In addition, once states are governed democratically, the likelihood of any type of conflict is significantly reduced. This is not because democracies do not have clashing interests. Indeed they do. Rather, it is because they are more open, more transparent and more likely to want to resolve things amicably in concurrence with U.S. leadership. And so, in general, democratic states are good for their citizens as well as for advancing the interests of the United States. Critics have faulted the Bush Administration for attempting to spread democracy in the Middle East, labeling such an effort a modern form of tilting at windmills. It is the obligation of Bush's critics to explain why democracy is good enough for Western states but not for the rest, and, one gathers from the argument, should not even be attempted. Of course, whether democracy in the Middle East will have a peaceful or stabilizing influence on America's interests in the short run is open to question. Perhaps democratic Arab states would be more opposed to Israel, but nonetheless, their people would be better off. The United States has brought democracy to Afghanistan, where 8.5 million Afghans, 40 percent of them women, voted in a critical October 2004 election, even though remnant Taliban forces threatened them. The first free elections were held in Iraq in January 2005. It was the military power of the United States that put Iraq on the path to democracy. Washington fostered democratic governments in Europe, Latin America, Asia and the Caucasus. Now even the Middle East is increasingly democratic. They may not yet look like Western-style democracies, but democratic progress has been made in Algeria, Morocco, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, the Palestinian Authority and Egypt. By all accounts, the march of democracy has been impressive. Third, along with the growth in the number of democratic states around the world has been the growth of the global economy. With its allies, the United States has labored to create an economically liberal worldwide network characterized by free trade and commerce, respect for international property rights, and mobility of capital and labor markets. The economic stability and prosperity that stems from this economic order is a global public good from which all states benefit, particularly the poorest states in the Third World. The United States created this network not out of altruism but for the benefit and the economic well-being of America. This economic order forces American industries to be competitive, maximizes efficiencies and growth, and benefits defense as well because the size of the economy makes the defense burden manageable. Economic spin-offs foster the development of military technology, helping to ensure military prowess. Perhaps the greatest testament to the benefits of the economic network comes from Deepak Lal, a former Indian foreign service diplomat and researcher at the World Bank, who started his career confident in the socialist ideology of post-independence India. Abandoning the positions of his youth, Lal now recognizes that the only way to bring relief to desperately poor countries of the Third World is through the adoption of free market economic policies and globalization, which are facilitated through American primacy.4 As a witness to the failed alternative economic systems, Lal is one of the strongest academic proponents of American primacy due to the economic prosperity it provides. Fourth and finally, the United States, in seeking primacy, has been willing to use its power not only to advance its interests but to promote the welfare of people all over the globe. The United States is the earth's leading source of positive externalities for the world. The U.S. military has participated in over fifty operations since the end of the Cold War--and most of those missions have been humanitarian in nature. Indeed, the U.S. military is the earth's "911 force"--it serves, de facto, as the world's police, the global paramedic and the planet's fire department. Whenever there is a natural disaster, earthquake, flood, drought, volcanic eruption, typhoon or tsunami, the United States assists the countries in need. On the day after Christmas in 2004, a tremendous earthquake and tsunami occurred in the Indian Ocean near Sumatra, killing some 300,000 people. The United States was the first to respond with aid. Washington followed up with a large contribution of aid and deployed the U.S. military to South and Southeast Asia for many months to help with the aftermath of the disaster. About 20,000 U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines responded by providing water, food, medical aid, disease treatment and prevention as well as forensic assistance to help identify the bodies of those killed. Only the U.S. military could have accomplished this Herculean effort. No other force possesses the communications capabilities or global logistical reach of the U.S. military. In fact, UN peacekeeping operations depend on the United States to supply UN forces. American generosity has done more to help the United States fight the War on Terror than almost any other measure. Before the tsunami, 80 percent of Indonesian public opinion was opposed to the United States; after it, 80 percent had a favorable opinion of America. Two years after the disaster, and in poll after poll, Indonesians still have overwhelmingly positive views of the United States. In October 2005, an enormous earthquake struck Kashmir, killing about 74,000 people and leaving three million homeless. The U.S. military responded immediately, diverting helicopters fighting the War on Terror in nearby Afghanistan to bring relief as soon as possible. To help those in need, the United States also provided financial aid to Pakistan; and, as one might expect from those witnessing the munificence of the United States, it left a lasting impression about America. For the first time since 9/11, polls of Pakistani opinion have found that more people are favorable toward the United States than unfavorable, while support for Al-Qaeda dropped to its lowest level. Whether in Indonesia or Kashmir, the money was well-spent because it helped people in the wake of disasters, but it also had a real impact on the War on Terror. When people in the Muslim world witness the U.S. military conducting a humanitarian mission, there is a clearly positive impact on Muslim opinion of the United States. As the War on Terror is a war of ideas and opinion as much as military action, for the United States humanitarian missions are the equivalent of a blitzkrieg. THERE IS no other state, group of states or international organization that can provide these global benefits. None even comes close. The United Nations cannot because it is riven with conflicts and major cleavages that divide the international body time and again on matters great and trivial. Thus it lacks the ability to speak with one voice on salient issues and to act as a unified force once a decision is reached. The EU has similar problems. Does anyone expect Russia or China to take up these responsibilities? They may have the desire, but they do not have the capabilities. Let's face it: for the time being, American primacy remains humanity's only practical hope of solving the world's ills.

### Heg Impact – Kagan

#### Loss of U.S. military dominance causes multiple nuclear wars

Robert Kagan, senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 7-19-2007, “End of Dreams, Return of History,” http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/07/end\_of\_dreams\_return\_of\_histor.html

The jostling for status and influence among these ambitious nations and would-be nations is a second defining feature of the new post-Cold War international system. Nationalism in all its forms is back, if it ever went away, and so is international competition for power, influence, honor, and status. American predominance prevents these rivalries from intensifying -- its regional as well as its global predominance. Were the United States to diminish its influence in the regions where it is currently the strongest power, the other nations would settle disputes as great and lesser powers have done in the past: sometimes through diplomacy and accommodation but often through confrontation and wars of varying scope, intensity, and destructiveness. One novel aspect of such a multipolar world is that most of these powers would possess nuclear weapons. That could make wars between them less likely, or it could simply make them more catastrophic. It is easy but also dangerous to underestimate the role the United States plays in providing a measure of stability in the world even as it also disrupts stability. For instance, the United States is the dominant naval power everywhere, such that other nations cannot compete with it even in their home waters. They either happily or grudgingly allow the United States Navy to be the guarantor of international waterways and trade routes, of international access to markets and raw materials such as oil. Even when the United States engages in a war, it is able to play its role as guardian of the waterways. In a more genuinely multipolar world, however, it would not. Nations would compete for naval dominance at least in their own regions and possibly beyond. Conflict between nations would involve struggles on the oceans as well as on land. Armed embargos, of the kind used in World War I and other major conflicts, would disrupt trade flows in a way that is now impossible. Such order as exists in the world rests not merely on the goodwill of peoples but on a foundation provided by American power. Even the European Union, that great geopolitical miracle, owes its founding to American power, for without it the European nations after World War ii would never have felt secure enough to reintegrate Germany. Most Europeans recoil at the thought, but even today Europe 's stability depends on the guarantee, however distant and one hopes unnecessary, that the United States could step in to check any dangerous development on the continent. In a genuinely multipolar world, that would not be possible without renewing the danger of world war. People who believe greater equality among nations would be preferable to the present American predominance often succumb to a basic logical fallacy. They believe the order the world enjoys today exists independently of American power. They imagine that in a world where American power was diminished, the aspects of international order that they like would remain in place. But that 's not the way it works. International order does not rest on ideas and institutions. It is shaped by configurations of power. The international order we know today reflects the distribution of power in the world since World War ii, and especially since the end of the Cold War. A different configuration of power, a multipolar world in which the poles were Russia, China, the United States, India, and Europe, would produce its own kind of order, with different rules and norms reflecting the interests of the powerful states that would have a hand in shaping it. Would that international order be an improvement? Perhaps for Beijing and Moscow it would. But it is doubtful that it would suit the tastes of enlightenment liberals in the United States and Europe.

### Heg Impact – Lieber

#### Transition causes escalating regional conflicts and global WMD use

Robert J. Lieber, Professor of Government and International Affairs @ Georgetown University. The American Era: Power and Strategy for the 21st Century. 2005. Pg. 53-54.

Withdrawal from foreign commitments might seem to be a means of evading hostility toward the United States, but the consequences would almost certainly be harmful both to regional stability and to U.S. national interests. Although Europe would almost certainly not see the return to competitive balancing among regional powers (i.e., competition and even military rivalry between France and Germany) of the kind that some realist scholars of international relations have predicted,2’ elsewhere the dangers could increase. In Asia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan would have strong motivation to acquire nuclear weapons — which they have the technological capacity to do quite quickly. Instability and regional competition could also escalate, not only between India and Pakistan, but also in Southeast Asia involv­ing Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, and possibly the Philippines. Risks in the Middle East would be likely to increase, with regional competi­tion among the major countries of the Gulf region (Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq) as well as Egypt, Syria, and Israel. Major regional wars, even­tually involving the use of weapons of mass destruction plus human suffering on a vast scale, floods of refugees, economic disruption, and risks to oil supplies are all readily conceivable. Based on past experience, the United States would almost certainly be drawn back into these areas, whether to defend friendly states, to cope with a humanitarian catastrophe, or to prevent a hostile power from dominating an entire region. Steven Peter Rosen has thus fit­tingly observed, “If the logic of American empire is unappealing, it is not at all clear that the alternatives are that much more attractive.”22 Similarly, Niall Ferguson has added that those who dislike American predominance ought to bear in mind that the alternative may not be a world of competing great powers, but one with no hegemon at all. Ferguson’s warning may be hyperbolic, but it hints at the perils that the absence of a dominant power, “apolarity,” could bring “an anarchic new Dark Age of waning empires and religious fanaticism; of endemic plunder and pillage in the world’s forgotten regions; of economic stagnation and civilization’s retreat into a few fortified enclaves.”23

### Heg Impact – Great Power Wars

#### Heg decline leads to nuclear war

Dennis Florig, Professor at the Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, 2-6-2010, “Hegemonic Overreach vs. Imperial Overstretch” http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=1548783

Classical theory of hegemonic cycle is useful if not articulated in too rigid a form. Hegemonic systems do not last forever; they do have a life span. The hegemonic state cannot maintain itself as the fastest growing major economy forever and thus eventually will face relative decline against some major power or powers. The hegemon faces recurrent challenges both on the periphery and from other major powers who feel constrained by the hegemon’s power or are ambitious to usurp its place. Techniques of the application of military force and ideological control may become more sophisticated over time, but so too do techniques of guerilla warfare and ideological forms of resistance such as religious fundamentalism, nationalism, and politicization of ethnic identity. World war may not be imminent, but wars on the periphery have become quite deadly, and the threat of the use of nuclear weapons or other WMD by the rising number of powers who possess them looms.

#### Heg solves power wars – bandwagoning checks conflict

Yuhan Zhang, researcher at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Lin Shi, consultant for the Eurasia Group, 1-22-2011, “America’s decline: A harbinger of conflict and rivalry” http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/01/22/americas-decline-a-harbinger-of-conflict-and-rivalry/

Over the past two decades, no other state has had the ability to seriously challenge the US military. Under these circumstances, motivated by both opportunity and fear, many actors have bandwagoned with US hegemony and accepted a subordinate role. Canada, most of Western Europe, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Singapore and the Philippines have all joined the US, creating a status quo that has tended to mute great power conflicts. However, as the hegemony that drew these powers together withers, so will the pulling power behind the US alliance. The result will be an international order where power is more diffuse, American interests and influence can be more readily challenged, and conflicts or wars may be harder to avoid.

### Heg Impact – Human Rights

#### Heg solves human rights

Michael Ignatieff, director of the Carr Center at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, Hamilton Spectator, January 18, 2003. “American Empire.”

Regime change also raises the difficult question for Americans of whether their own freedom entails a duty to defend the freedom of others beyond their borders. Yet it remains a fact -- as disagreeable to those left wingers who regard American imperialism as the root of all evil as it is to the right-wing isolationists, who believe that the world beyond our shores is none of our business -- that there are many peoples who owe their freedom to an exercise of American military power. It's not just the Japanese and the Germans who became democrats under the watchful eye of Generals MacArthur and Clay. There are the Bosnians whose nation survived because American air power and diplomacy forced an end to a war the Europeans couldn't stop. There are the Kosovars who would still be imprisoned in Serbia, if not for Gen. Wesley Clark and the Air Force. The list of people whose freedom depends on American air and ground power also includes the Afghans and, most inconveniently of all, the Iraqis. The moral evaluation of empire gets complicated when one of its benefits might be freedom for the oppressed. Iraqi exiles are adamant: even if the Iraqi people might be the immediate victims of an American attack, they would also be its ultimate beneficiaries. Whenever it has exerted power overseas, America has never been sure whether it values stability -- which means not only political stability but also the steady, profitable flow of goods and raw materials -- more than it values its own rhetoric about democracy. When the two values have collided, American power has come down heavily on the side of stability, for example, toppling democratically elected leaders from Mossadegh in Iran to Allende in Chile. Next door in Iran, America had backed stability over democracy, propping up the autocratic rule of the shah, only to reap the whirlwind of an Islamic fundamentalist revolution in 1979 that delivered neither stability nor real democracy. Does the same fate await an American operation in Iraq? International human rights groups such as Amnesty International are dismayed at the way both the British government of Tony Blair and the Bush administration are citing the human rights abuses of Hussein to defend the idea of regime change. Certainly British and U.S. governments maintained a dishonourable silence when Hussein gassed the Kurds in 1988. Yet human rights groups seem more outraged by the prospect of action than by the abuses they once denounced. The fact that states are late and hypocritical in adopting human rights does not deprive them of the right to use force to defend them. The disagreeable reality for those who believe in human rights is that there are some occasions -- and Iraq may be one of them -- when war is the only real remedy for regimes that live by terror. The choice is one between two evils, between containing and leaving a tyrant in place and the targeted use of force, which will kill people but free a nation from the tyrant's grip.

#### Human rights outweigh everything.

John Shattuck, former Assistant Secretary of State, 9-12-1994**,** Federal News Service

On the disintegration side, we are witnessing ugly and violent racial, ethnic and religious class conflict in Haiti, in Bosnia, in Central Asia, in Africa, most horribly in Rwanda -- all places where I have traveled in recent months and witnessed unspeakable suffering and abuses of the most fundamental rights. The new global community has yet to develop an adequate response to these horrors. We must intensify our search for new ways of holding individuals and governments accountable for gross human rights violations, for new ways of anticipating and preventing conflicts before they spiral into uncontrollable violence and reprisal, for new ways of mobilizing the international community to address an avalanche of humanitarian crises. These are daunting tasks. Why then has the Clinton administration made protecting human rights and promoting democracy such a major theme in our foreign policy? The answer I think lies not only in our values, which could be reason enough, but in the strategic benefits to the United States of a policy that emphasizes our values. We know from historical experience that democracies are more likely than other forms of government to respect human rights, to settle conflicts peacefully, to observe international and honor agreements, to go to war with each other with great reluctance, to respect rights of ethnical, racial and religious minorities living within their borders, and to provide the social and political basis for free market economics. In South Africa, in the Middle East, and now remarkably perhaps even in Northern Ireland, the resolution of conflict and the broadening of political participation is releasing great economic and social energies that can provide better lives for all the people of these long-suffering regions. By contrast, the costs to the world of repressive governments are painfully clear. In the 20th century, the number of people killed by their own governments under authoritarian regimes is four times the number killed in all of this century's wars combined. Repression pushes refugees across the borders and triggers wars. Unaccountable governments are heedless of environmental destruction, as witnessed by Chernobyl and the ecological nightmares of Eastern Europe.

### A2: Heg Bad – Entanglement

#### Engagement prevents entanglement and solves great power wars and regional conflicts.

Stephen Walt, Professor of International Affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government. “American Primacy: Its Prospects and Pitfalls.” Naval War College Review, Spring 2002.

A second consequence of U.S. primacy is a decreased danger of great-power rivalry and a higher level of overall international tranquility. Ironically, those who argue that primacy is no longer important, because the danger of war is slight, overlook the fact that the extent of American primacy is one of the main reasons why the risk of great-power war is as low as it is. For most of the past four centuries, relations among the major powers have been intensely competitive, often punctuated by major wars and occasionally by all-out struggles for hegemony. In the first half of the twentieth century, for example, great-power wars killed over eighty million people. Today, however, the dominant position of the United States places significant limits on the possibility of great-power competition, for at least two reasons. One reason is that because the United States is currently so far ahead, other major powers are not inclined to challenge its dominant position. Not only is there no possibility of a "hegemonic war" (because there is no potential hegemon to mount a challenge), but the risk of war via miscalculation is reduced by the overwhelming gap between the United States and the other major powers. Miscalculation is more likely to lead to war when the balance of power is fairly even, because in this situation both sides can convince themselves that they might be able to win. When the balance of power is heavily skewed, however, the leading state does not need to go to war and weaker states dare not try.8 The second reason is that the continued deployment of roughly two hundred thousand troops in Europe and in Asia provides a further barrier to conflict in each region. So long as U.S. troops are committed abroad, regional powers know that launching a war is likely to lead to a confrontation with the United States. Thus, states within these regions do not worry as much about each other, because the U.S. presence effectively prevents regional conflicts from breaking out. What Joseph Joffe has termed the "American pacifier" is not the only barrier to conflict in Europe and Asia, but it is an important one. This tranquilizing effect is not lost on America's allies in Europe and Asia. They resent U.S. dominance and dislike playing host to American troops, but they also do not want "Uncle Sam" to leave.9 Thus, U.S. primacy is of benefit to the United States, and to other countries as well, because it dampens the overall level of international insecurity. World politics might be more interesting if the United States were weaker and if other states were forced to compete with each other more actively, but a more exciting world is not necessarily a better one. A comparatively boring era may provide few opportunities for genuine heroism, but it is probably a good deal more pleasant to live in than "interesting" decades like the 1930s or 1940s.

### A2: Heg Bad – Prolif

#### Only heg prevents prolif – other attempts fail.

Bradley A. Thayer, Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University. The National Interest. November 2006 - December 2006. “In Defense of Primacy.”

U.S. primacy--and the bandwagoning effect--has also given us extensive influence in international politics, allowing the United States to shape the behavior of states and international institutions. Such influence comes in many forms, one of which is America's ability to create coalitions of like-minded states to free Kosovo, stabilize Afghanistan, invade Iraq or to stop proliferation through the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Doing so allows the United States to operate with allies outside of the UN, where it can be stymied by opponents. American-led wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq stand in contrast to the UN's inability to save the people of Darfur or even to conduct any military campaign to realize the goals of its charter. The quiet effectiveness of the PSI in dismantling Libya's WMD programs and unraveling the A. Q. Khan proliferation network are in sharp relief to the typically toothless attempts by the UN to halt proliferation.

#### Heg is key to preserve security and halt prolif.

Bradley A. Thayer, Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies of Missouri State University. 2007. American Empire: A Debate. Pg. 16

Second, American interests abroad are protected. U.S. military power allows Washington to defeat its enemies overseas. For example, the United States has made the decision to attack terrorists far from America’s shores, and not to wait while they use bases in other countries to plan and train for attacks against the United States itself. Its military power also gives Washington the power to protect its interests abroad by deterring attacks against America’s interests or coercing potential or actual opponents. In international politics, coercion means dissuading an opponent from actions America does not want it to do or to do something that it wants done. For example, the United States wanted Libya to give up the weapons of mass destruction capabilities it pos¬sessed or was developing. As Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz said, “I think the reason Mu’ammar Qadhafi agreed to give up his weapons of mass destruction was because he saw what happened to Saddam Hussein.”2’ Third, our allies like Australia, Great Britain, Japan, Kuwait, Israel, and Thailand are protected by American military might and so we are able to deter attacks against them. They are aligned with the United States, and thus under its “security umbrella”—any attack on those states would be met by the mili¬tary power of the United States. Other states know this and, usually, that is sufficient to deter aggression against the allies of the United States.

#### Heg prevents allied rearm.

Robert Art, Prof of IR at Brandeis, 2009, “America’s Grand Strategy,” p. 205.

These arc difficult questions to answer. What is clear is that America’s extended deterrence efforts and hence its ability to stop nuclear spread— have been most successful with those nations where American troops, or their close surrogates, have been stationed: Japan, South Korea, and the nonnuclear nations of Western Europe, especially Germany Among its close allies, the one nation where extended deterrence has been least successful in stopping unclear spread is the one in which there have been no American troops: Israel. \With no American troops to bolster extended deterrence, Israel has developed nuclear weapons. Thus, sufficient conventional forces symbolize Americas commitment appear to be useful for extending deterrence and for reducing the pressures for national nuclear ownership. American actions, including the stationing of troops overseas, have played a critical role in retarding nuclear weapons spread among key states. Why remove American troops completely from those states, when the consequences could be severe and when the cost of keeping the troops overseas can be relatively cheap?

### A2: Heg Bad – Terrorism

#### Terrorism inevitable under multipolarity – only heg has a chance of preventing attacks.

Stephen Brooks, Assistant Professor, AND William Wohlforth, Associate Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth. Foreign Affairs, July / August 2002. “American Primacy in Perspective.”

Some might question the worth of being at the top of a unipolar system if that means serving as a lightning rod for the world's malcontents. When there was a Soviet Union, after all, it bore the brunt of Osama bin Laden's anger, and only after its collapse did he shift his focus to the United States (an indicator of the demise of bipolarity that was ignored at the time but looms larger in retrospect). But terrorism has been a perennial problem in history, and multipolarity did not save the leaders of several great powers from assassination by anarchists around the turn of the twentieth century. In fact, a slide back toward multipolarity would actually be the worst of all worlds for the United States. In such a scenario it would continue to lead the pack and serve as a focal point for resentment and hatred by both state and nonstate actors, but it would have fewer carrots and sticks to use in dealing with the situation. The threats would remain, but the possibility of effective and coordinated action against them would be reduced.

#### Resentment inevitable – heg is the only effective preventative against terrorism.

Andrew Sullivan, Sunday Times, February 10, 2002. “A lesson for America-haters.”

So the resentment of American power - even among close allies such as Britain - is not only likely, it's inevitable. And because there isn't even a close rival emerging to challenge this dominance, the resentment will only increase. We've seen what this amounts to in the form of the failed satrapies of the Islamic Middle East: a mixture of begging bowls for American aid and murderous terrorism in resentment of it. In China it is greeted with deep suspicion and a ferocious new nationalism - but there is still no sign of an actual, substantive Chinese military able to compete for global dominance with America. In Europe there is the cult of the EU among the elites, and the euro for the masses. But every European country understands that world power is something in the history books, not feasible, if even desirable, today. The more interesting question is: what should the United States do about resentment of its hegemony? Sure, it can and should consult its allies more widely. But when those allies (with the exception of Britain) have very little substantive to contribute in, say, waging the war in Afghanistan, those consultations can end up being exercises in condescension or phoniness. Sure, America can and should take a more active role in many international institutions. But it cannot be expected to provide the bulk of the funding for bodies (like the UN) whose main task seems at times to be attacking the United States and its allies. Nor should a great power be expected consistently to subordinate its own interests to those of other states, especially when its actions actually protect those other states from harm. If Europeans resent America's power, they need to ask themselves: would they like to confront global terrorism without it? Imagine Al-Qaeda intact today, entering into close contact with Iraq or Iran to get nuclear, biological or chemical weapons to detonate in the middle of London. Feel better about American hegemony now? Then of course when it appears that the United States might actually take its allies' advice and retreat into ambivalence, there is a chorus of disapproval and widespread fears of a new "isolationism". America, when you look at it, is damned if she does, and damned if she doesn't. Which is why Americans, at some point, just get on with it and ignore the chorus of whining from around the world. That's the underlying reality and we might as well acknowledge it. That's why the IOC gave in to American demands that its WTC flag be a part of the opening ceremony in Salt Lake City. That's why, in the end, the United States will eventually ignore allies who refuse to co-operate in the war against terrorism and terrorist states. Real power always finds a way. And the only corrective to American dominance is not an attempt to weaken America or poison the world by fomenting hatred of her. At the moment, when America is the firmest bulwark against a terrorist network that aims to destroy every free country, that would be a particularly foolish venture.

### A2: Multipolarity Good

#### Multipolarity makes inconsistency inevitable causing great power wars.

William Wohlforth, Prof at Dartmouth, 1-1-2009, “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War,” World Politics, Volume 61, Number 1.

It is often seen in a scholarly context that contrasts power-based and identity-based explanations.[31](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html" \l "f31) It is thus put forward as a psychological explanation for competitive behavior that is completely divorced from distributions of material resources. But there is no theoretical justification for this separation. On the contrary, a long-standing research tradition in sociology, economics, and political science finds that actors seek to translate material resources into status. Sociologists from Weber and Veblen onward have postulated a link between material conditions and the stability of status hierarchies. When social actors acquire resources, they try to convert them into something that can have more value to them than the mere possession of material things: social status. As Weber put it: “Property as such is not always recognized as a status qualification, but in the long run it is, and with extraordinary regularity.” [32](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html" \l "f32) This link continues to find support in the contemporary economics literature on income distribution and status competition.[33](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html" \l "f33)Status is a social, psychological, and cultural phenomenon. Its expression appears endlessly varied; it is thus little wonder that the few international relations scholars who have focused on it are more struck by its variability and diversity than by its susceptibility to generalization. [34](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html" \l "f34) Yet if sit captures important dynamics of human behavior, and if people seek to translate resources into status, then the distribution of capabilities will affect the likelihood of status competition in predictable ways. Recall that theory, research, and experimental results suggest that relative status concerns will come to the fore when status hierarchy is ambiguous and that people will tend to compare the states with which they identify to similar but higher-ranked states.[35](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html" \l "f35) Dissatisfaction arises not from dominance itself but from a dominance that [End Page 38] appears to rest on ambiguous foundations. Thus, status competition is unlikely in cases of clear hierarchies in which the relevant comparison out-groups for each actor are unambiguously dominant materially. Applied to international politics, this begins to suggest the conditions conducive to status competition. For conflict to occur, one state must select another state as a relevant comparison that leaves it dissatisfied with its status; it must then choose an identity-maintenance strategy in response that brings it into conflict with another state that is also willing to fight for its position. This set of beliefs and strategies is most likely to be found when states are relatively evenly matched in capabilities. The more closely matched actors are materially, the more likely they are to experience uncertainty about relative rank. When actors start receiving mixed signals—some indicating that they belong in a higher rank while others reaffirm their present rank—they experience status inconsistency and face incentives to resolve the uncertainty. When lower-ranked actors experience such inconsistency, they will use higher-ranked actors as referents. Since both high- and low-status actors are biased toward higher status, uncertainty fosters conflict as the same evidence feeds contradictory expectations and claims. When the relevant out-group is unambiguously dominant materially, however, status inconsistency is less likely. More certain of their relative rank, subordinate actors are less likely to face the ambiguity that drives status competition. And even if they do, their relative weakness makes strategies of social competition an unlikely response. Given limited material wherewithal, either acquiescence or strategies of social creativity are more plausible responses, neither of which leads to military conflict. The theory suggests that it is not just the aggregate distribution of capabilities that matters for status competition but also the evenness with which key dimensions— such as naval, military, economic, and technological—are distributed. Uneven capability portfolios—when states excel in different relevant material dimensions—make status inconsistency more likely. When an actor possesses some attributes of high status but not others, uncertainty and status inconsistency are likely.[36](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html" \l "f36) The more a lower-ranked actor matches the higher-ranked group in some but not all key material dimensions of status, the more likely it is to conceive an interest in contesting its rank and the more [End Page 39] likely the higher-ranked state is to resist. Thus, status competition is more likely to plague relations between leading states whose portfolios of capabilities are not only close but also mismatched.

#### Multipolarity makes wars inevitable – competition for status can’t be regulated.

William Wohlforth, Prof at Dartmouth, 1-1-2009, “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War,” World Politics, Volume 61, Number 1.

The evidence suggests that narrow and asymmetrical capabilities gaps foster status competition even among states relatively confident of their basic territorial security for the reasons identified in social identity theory and theories of status competition. Broad patterns of evidence are consistent with this expectation, suggesting that unipolarity shapes strategies of identity maintenance in ways that dampen status conflict. The implication is that unipolarity helps explain low levels of military competition and conflict among major powers after 1991 and that a return to bipolarity or multipolarity would increase the likelihood of such conflict. This has been a preliminary exercise. The evidence for the hypotheses explored here is hardly conclusive, but it is sufficiently suggestive to warrant further refinement and testing, all the more so given [End Page 56] the importance of the question at stake. If status matters in the way the theory discussed here suggests, then the widespread view that the rise of a peer competitor and the shift back to a bipolar or multipolar structure present readily surmountable policy challenges is suspect. Most scholars agree with Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke’s argument: “[S]hould a satisfied state undergo a power transition and catch up with dominant power, there is little or no expectation of war.” [81](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html" \l "f81) Given that today’s rising powers have every material reason to like the status quo, many observers are optimistic that the rise of peer competitors can be readily managed by fashioning an order that accommodates their material interests. Yet it is far harder to manage competition for status than for most material things. While diplomatic efforts to manage status competition seem easy under unipolarity, theory and evidence suggest that it could present much greater challenges as the system moves back to bipolarity or multipolarity. When status is seen as a positional good, efforts to craft negotiated bargains about status contests face long odds. And this positionality problem is particularly acute concerning the very issue unipolarity solves: primacy. The route back to bipolarity or multipolarity is thus fraught with danger. With two or more plausible claimants to primacy, positional competition and the potential for major power war could once again form the backdrop of world politics.

#### Offshore balancing causes appeasement and oppositional great power – primacy allows regional balancing.

Michael Lind, Senior Research Fellow and Policy Director, Economic Growth Program, New America Foundation, 2006, “American way of strategy.”

The first is that according to most versions of offshore balancing the United States would intervene in a region only after the local balance of power had broken down. The problem is that the very absence of American participation in regional power politics might hasten the breakdown of local balances. This was the case in Europe between the world wars. When the United States refused to guarantee the security of France in the 1920s, Britain also refused, for fear of having to confront Germany on its own in the future. In the 1930s, as German power grew, instead of balancing against Hitler many European countries appeased him or even joined him, including the Soviet Union at the time of the Hitler-Stalin pact. If these countries had been certain of American support, they might have balanced against Hitler instead. Balance of power coalitions tend to require an “anchor” power strong enough to convince other states that by joining the coalition they are joining the winning side. The United States could not act as such an anchor power, rallying local states against a local threat, if it stayed out of regional power politics until the moment of maximum danger.

### A2: Offshore Balancing

#### Offshore balancing impossible – public opposition.

Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Professor of Political Science at Tufts University. The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, vol.31:2 summer 2007. “Hegemonic Delusions: Power, Liberal Imperialism, and the Bush Doctrine.” http://fletcher.tufts.edu/forum/archives/pdfs/31-2pdfs/Taliaferro.pdf

Second, many of Layne’s arguments about the feasibility of an offshore balancing strategy today seem disconnected from political reality. He devotes only five pages in a 290-page book to a discussion of how the United States ought to go about implementing his preferred strategy. He never grapples with the tremendous sunk costs of U.S. forward deployment in Europe and East Asia, nor does he consider the lack of support for such a radically different grand strategy among officials in Washington or the American people. It is also difficult to imagine Washington’s allies in the Persian Gulf, East Asia, and even Western Europe openly advocating the withdrawal of all U.S. forces in the near future, if for no other reason than that the American military presence dampens the security dilemma in those three regions.

### Airpower Good – Deterrence (General)

#### US air mobility is key to deterrence

Richard J. Hazdra, Major, USAF, Fairchild Paper, Air University Press August 2001 http://www.au.af.mil/au/aul/aupress/fairchild\_papers/Hazdra/Hazdra.pdf

The United States often seeks to deter other states from taking action against US interests. The threat of increasing a government’s civilian costs will deter that government from exerting its political will through military aggression.10 With increasing civilian costs in mind, if the United States wants to prevent a country from exerting its political will through military means, the United States could build up military forces in a neighboring country. The potentially aggressive country would interpret the buildup as a threat to its people if it acted militarily to exert its political will. Thus, this perceived threat raises the cost to that country if it decides to exert its political will through military force. This argument requires a tremendous amount of airlift to deploy the coercive airpower assets into theater rapidly. Airlift is the prime mode of transportation because coercive airpower assets can only move into theater by employing air mobility assets. Fighter aircraft deploy by employing tankers for coronet support, and their maintenance support must deploy by air because those fighters will require maintenance for reconstitution after the initial deployment flight. Reconstitution is also required if the fighter aircraft are going to fly combat patrol sorties once they arrive in-theater as espoused in Air Force doctrine.11

#### That prevents multiple scenarios for nuclear war

Zalmay Khalilzad and Ian O. Lesser. “Sources of Conflict in the 21st Century: Regional Futures and U.S. Strategy,” 1998 http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph\_reports/MR897/

The first key implication derived from the analysis of trends in Asia suggests that American air and space power will continue to remain critical for conventional and unconventional deterrence in Asia. This argument is justified by the fact that several sub-regions of the continent still harbor the potential for full-scale conventional war. This potential is most conspicuously on the Korean peninsula and to a lesser degree, in South Asia, the Persian Gulf, and the South China Sea. In some of these areas such as Korea and the Persian Gulf, the United States has clear treaty obligations and therefore has pre-planned the use of air power should contingencies arise. U.S. Air Force assets could also be called upon for operations in some of these other areas. In almost all these cases, US airpower would be at the forefront of an American politico-military response because (a) of the vast distances on the Asian continent; (b) the diverse range of operational platforms available to the U.S. Air Force, a capability unmatched by any other country or service, (c) the possible unavailability of naval assets in close proximity, particularly in the context of surprise contingencies; and (d) the heavy payload that can be carried by U.S. Air Force platforms. These platforms can exploit speed, reach, and high operating tempos to sustain continual operations until the political objectives are secured. The entire range of warfighting capability—fighters, bombers, electronic warfare (EW), suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD), combat support platforms such as AWACS and J-STARS and tankers—are relevant in the Asia-Pacific region, because many of the regional contingencies will involve large, fairly modern, conventional forces, most of which are built around large land armies, as is the case in Korea, China-Taiwan, India-Pakistan and the Persian Gulf. In addition to conventional combat, the demands of unconventional deterrence will increasingly confront the U.S. Air Force in Asia. The Korean peninsula, China, and the Indian subcontinent are already arenas of WMD proliferation. While emergent nuclear capabilities continue to receive the most public attention, chemical and biological warfare threats will progressively become future problems. The delivery systems in the region are increasing in range and diversity. China already targets the continental United States with ballistic missiles. North Korea can threaten northeast Asia with existing Scud-class theater ballistic missiles. India will acquire the capability to produce ICBM-class delivery vehicles, and both China and India will acquire long-range cruise missiles during the time frames examined in this report. The second key implication derived from the analysis of trends in Asia suggests that airand spacepower will function as a vital rapid reaction force in a breaking crisis. Current guidance tasks the Air Force to prepare for two major regional conflicts that could break out in the Persian Gulf and on the Korean peninsula. In other areas of Asia, however, such as the Indian subcontinent, the South China Sea, Southeast Asia, and Myanmar, the United States has no treaty obligations requiring it to commit the use of its military forces. But as past experience has shown, American policymakers have regularly displayed the disconcerting habit of discovering strategic interests in parts of the world previously neglected after conflicts have already broken out. Mindful of this trend, it would behoove U.S. Air Force planners to prudently plan for regional contingencies in nontraditional areas of interest, because naval and air power will of necessity be the primary instruments constituting the American response. Such responses would be necessitated by three general classes of contingencies. The first involves the politico-military collapse of a key regional actor, as might occur in the case of North Korea, Myanmar, Indonesia, or Pakistan. The second involves acute politicalmilitary crises that have a potential for rapid escalation, as may occur in the Taiwan Strait, the Spratlys, the Indian subcontinent, or on the Korean peninsula. The third involves cases of prolonged domestic instability that may have either spillover or contagion effects, as in China, Indonesia, Myanmar, or North Korea.

### Airpower Good – Deterrence (China)

#### Dominant air power deters Chinese aggression over Taiwan

Maj. Gen. Charles J. Dunlap, deputy judge advocate general of the Air Force, 9-2006, “America’s asymmetric advantage,” Armed Forces Journal, http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/09/2009013

While it will be seldom feasible for America to effectively employ any sort of boots-on-the-ground strategy in current or future counterinsurgency situations, the need may arise to destroy an adversary’s capability to inflict harm on U.S. interests. Although there is no perfect solution to such challenges, especially in low-intensity conflicts, the air weapon is the best option. Ricks’ report in “Fiasco,” for example, that Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction program never recovered from 1998’s Operation Desert Fox and its four days of air attacks is interesting. It would appear that Iraq’s scientific minds readily conceded the pointlessness of attempting to build the necessary infrastructure in an environment totally exposed to U.S. air attack. This illustrates another salient feature of air power: its ability to temper the malevolent tendencies of societies accustomed to the rewards of modernity. Given air power’s ability to strike war-supporting infrastructure, the powerful impulse of economic self-interest complicates the ability of despots to pursue malicious agendas. American air power can rapidly educate cultured and sophisticated societies about the costs of war and the futility of pursuing it. This is much the reason why air power alone delivered victory in Operation Allied Force in Kosovo in 1999, without the need to put a single U.S. soldier at risk on the ground. At the same time, America’s pre-eminence in air power is also the best hope we have to dissuade China — or any other future peer competitor — from aggression. There is zero possibility that the U.S. can build land forces of the size that would be of real concern to a China. No number of troops or up-armored Humvees, new radios or advanced sniper rifles worries the Chinese. What dominating air power precludes is the ability to concentrate and project forces, necessary elements to applying combat power in hostile areas. As but one illustration, think China and Taiwan. Saddam might have underestimated air power, but don’t count on the Chinese to make the same mistake. China is a powerful, vast country with an exploding, many-faceted economy with strong scientific capabilities. It will take focused and determined efforts for the U.S. to maintain the air dominance that it currently enjoys over China and that, for the moment, deters them. Miscalculating here will be disastrous because, unlike with any counterinsurgency situation (Iraq included), the very existence of the U.S. is at risk.

### Airpower Good – Counter-Insurgency

#### Effective airpower is key to counter-insurgency success

Maj. Gen. Charles J. Dunlap, deputy judge advocate general of the Air Force, 9-2006, “America’s asymmetric advantage,” Armed Forces Journal, http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/09/2009013

Today it is more than just bombing with impunity that imposes demoralization; it is reconnoitering with impunity. This is more than just the pervasiveness of Air Force-generated satellites. It also includes hundreds of unmanned aerial vehicles that are probing the landscape in Iraq and Afghanistan. They provide the kind of reliable intelligence that permits the careful application of force so advantageous in insurgency and counterterrorism situations. The insurgents are incapable of determining where or when the U.S. employs surveillance assets and, therefore, are forced to assume they are watched everywhere and always. The mere existence of the ever-present eyes in the sky no doubt inflicts its own kind of stress and friction on enemy forces. In short, what real asymmetrical advantage the U.S. enjoys in countering insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan relates to a dimension of air power. Strike, reconnaissance, strategic or tactical lift have all performed phenomenally well. It is no exaggeration to observe that almost every improvement in the military situation in Iraq and Afghanistan is attributable to air power in some form; virtually every setback, and especially the strategically catastrophic allegations of war crimes, is traceable to the land forces.

## Solvency Extensions

### 2ac Trick – Procurement Cascade

#### The aff’s investment in ACCs has a spillover effect that reprioritizes innovation and procurement across the aircraft sector --- locks in U.S. superiority for the long-term

Col George D. Kramlinger, Summer 2005. USAFA; MAAS, School of Advanced Airpower Studies; MA, Naval War College, is the commander, 612th Air Operations Group, Headquarters Twelfth Air Force, Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona. “Narrowing the Global-Strike Gap with an Airborne Aircraft Carrier,” Air & Space Power Journal, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj05/sum05/kramlinger.html#kramlinger.

A parasite-aircraft/mother-ship combination offers a less expensive and more effective method of looking at future bomber development. The future manned bomber could use the AAC and piggyback concept whereby the smaller bomber is optimized for threat penetration, survivability, and weapons delivery (especially against mobile and hardened targets), thus driving down development cost and aircraft price, while the mother ship is built for long range and payload capacity. The US aircraft industry could then optimize itself to take advantage of new technology such that it builds a small number (50–60) of relatively low-cost, up-to-date stealthy parasite bombers and UCAVs with a fairly short development cycle.47 A stealthy, blended-wing C-5B replacement could be designed with AAC duty in mind, thus increasing the synergy between the airlift and global-strike forces. Consequently, the AAC concept offers a promising capability to reduce medium-term strategic risk, facilitate long-term transformation, and potentially revolutionize the way the Air Force procures bomber systems.

### A2: Squo Solves (General)

#### Future conflicts will place a premium on rapid response – transportation investments are critical

CBO, September 2005, Congressional Budget Office, “Options for Strategic Military Transportation Systems,” http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/66xx/doc6661/09-27-strategicmobility.pdf

The United States maintains considerable capabilities to transport its military forces to distant locations. Even so, the Department of Defense (DoD) seeks to improve those strategic transportation capabilities, particularly the promptness with which units can be moved to their destinations. 1 The experience of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in 1990 and 1991 led many planners to conclude that the ability to deploy units more rapidly would be needed because a future adversary would be unlikely to permit a lengthy buildup of U.S. forces, as Iraq did then. Today’s focus on military “transformation” has further emphasized the desire for rapid deployments, because the proposed shift to smaller, lighter networked units places a premium on getting them to their destinations as early as possible so their firepower or other capabilities can be applied quickly and decisively.

#### Rapid mobility shortfalls exist and make the U.S. vulnerable – transportation investments are essential to national security

CBO, September 2005, Congressional Budget Office, “Options for Strategic Military Transportation Systems,” http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/66xx/doc6661/09-27-strategicmobility.pdf

Mobility studies by DoD over the past decade have emphasized shortfalls in the ability to deliver forces in the early days of a conflict. Ideally, a commander wants all forces in place immediately, because the time needed to amass forces represents a period of vulnerability that an adversary might be able to exploit. In addition, the Army’s transformation efforts have focused largely on getting more forces to a conflict in less time, placing an even greater premium on promptness than in the past. Except in cases in which forces are forward deployed at the right place and time, however, requirements for mobility must be tempered by the feasibility of transportation. A mobility system with adequate throughput capacity over a longer time scale can fall short at earlier times if initial units cannot be moved promptly.

### Feasibility - AACs

#### AACs are feasible with modifications on current tech --- Boeing study proves

Evan Ackerman, Analyst for DVice Magazine, 5-8-2012, “The Air Force's secret 1970s plan to use 747s as aircraft carriers,” http://dvice.com/archives/2012/05/the-air-forces-2.php

Flying aircraft carriers are staples science fiction and steampunk. It's an idea that sounds like it would be completely crazy in reality, but it's not crazy enough to keep the Air Force commissioning a report on the idea from Boeing back in 1973. This wasn't a new idea, even in the 1970s. The Air Force had tried to make it work several different ways, starting with F9C Sparrowhawks that could be launched and retrieved from airships like the Macon and Akron, which was sort of a success. Better luck was had with launching small fighter aircraft from bombers (as with the XF-85 Gremlin), but the idea was still deemed too risky, since docking with the bomber in-flight was almost impossible, even during the day in good weather. Eventually, the Air Force just gave up on the idea entirely and made due with mid-air refueling, which restricts aircraft to single missions with single payloads but removes range constrains due to fuel capacity. By the 1970s, though, the Air Force was in need of "a versatile system with global range and supersonic performance" that could provide for a 24 hour strike capability anywhere on Earth. One option would have been to build air bases in Europe, Africa, and Asia, but the Air Force thought that it might make more sense to build mobile air bases instead, so it asked Boeing to take a look and see if turning 747s into aerial aircraft carriers was a possibility. The difference between an aerial aircraft carrier (AAC) and an aerial fuel tanker is that an AAC can rearm aircraft as well as refuel them, crews can switch out with each other, and it's even possible to perform repairs and maintenance on fighters. So obviously, an AAC would be pretty useful, but is it realistic? According to Boeing, definitely yes. Boeing took their 747-400 and hollowed out the inside, leaving two decks worth of open space. It didn't make any significant structural modifications to the 747 airframe, meaning that fighter aircraft would have to fit within just over 17 feet of width. This, of course, necessitated designing an entirely new "microfighter," and Boeing drew up five concepts: These microfighters would have been tiny. A loaded F-16 weighs about 40,000 pounds, while a loaded microfighter was just over a quarter of that. They weren't designed with landing gear, and since they didn't have to climb up to altitude, they didn't need to carry nearly as much fuel. As for armament, the plan was to give them a pair of 20mm cannons, along with pylons for smart bombs and air to air missiles. The interior of the 747 would have been split into an upper hangar deck and a lower flight deck. Full complement was ten microfighters (!) plus a crew of 42. The flight deck had launch and recovery bays both fore and aft of the 747's wings. Two microfighters could be prepped and launched at once, and all ten could be launched in intervals of just 80 seconds a piece. Ten minutes was sufficient time to rearm a microfighter from scratch, and enough supplies were carried onboard the AAC to allow each fighter to fly three separate missions. Meanwhile, a crew rest area and lounge let pilots rest and recuperate. The AAC was not intended to work alone. In fact, Boeing envisioned a "Multi-Purpose Strike System" utilizing a fleet of ten 747-AACs all overseen by an AWACS. This would enable 100 fighter aircraft to be deployed to anywhere Europe on eight hours notice, which sure sounds good on paper. Boeing made sure to point out that "no unique technology evelopment has been identified for Airborne Aircraft Carrier. Demonstration of capability is possible within the current state-of-the-art." In other words, Boeing thought that it was certainly possible to build an AAC with the technology that existed at the time (or at least, that would exist by 1980), and it recommended detailed design studies along with preliminary modifications to a 747 that would have allowed for testing of a docking system. So what's the problem? Why don't we have 747 Airborne Aircraft Carriers? Well, "technical feasibility" and "the potential of great national benefit" (Boeing's words) is one thing, but practicality is something else entirely. The AAC would have been a very big, very expensive risk that didn't offer enough unique benefits (relative to naval aircraft carriers and land bases) to justify development, and the microfighters were too specialized to be able to fulfill the AAC's promise of near-instant versatility. That said, it's entirely possible that there might be a new niche where an airborne aircraft carrier could thrive, and that's with UAVs. UAVs already know how to land on other UAVs, and if we can make the whole shebang autonomous (with, say, a solar-powered high-endurance UAV as a mothership), we'd have something almost (but not quite) as cool as the 747-AAC.

#### Research and development investment overcomes technical barriers

Col George D. Kramlinger, Summer 2005. USAFA; MAAS, School of Advanced Airpower Studies; MA, Naval War College, is the commander, 612th Air Operations Group, Headquarters Twelfth Air Force, Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona. “Narrowing the Global-Strike Gap with an Airborne Aircraft Carrier,” Air & Space Power Journal, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj05/sum05/kramlinger.html#kramlinger.

The idea of an aircraft carrier in the sky with parasite aircraft is not new. In the early 1930s, the Navy airships Akron and Macon were designed with an internal 60- by 75-foot hangar deck that included an overhead trolley system to store four Sparrowhawk scout planes, launching and recovering them with a retractable trapeze and winch assembly (fig. 2). Also in the 1930s, Russia experimented with parasite fighters carried by a Tupolev TB-3 bomber to provide defensive escort, offensive air-to-air sweep, and long-range offensive strikes. The most ambitious experiment used a large bomber with fighters carried above and below each wing and one under the fuselage on a trapeze.38 In the late 1940s, the desire to incorporate the World War II lessons of fighter escort with the intercontinental bomber led to the development of the XF-85 Goblin parasite aircraft, designed to fit into the bomb bay of a B-36 using a trapeze assembly for launch and recovery. However, the XF-85 proved unstable in flight-testing with a B-29 mother ship (fig. 3). Subsequently, the Air Force experimented with B-36s carrying F-84s on a trapeze assembly and with towing the fighters using a wingtip-attachment mechanism. Needing more intelligence during the early part of the Cold War, the service shifted its emphasis on the parasite from fighter escort to reconnaissance; for a very short period of time, the Air Force operated a GRB-36 squadron that carried RF-84 fighters using the bomb-bay trapeze assembly (fig. 4). Technical limitations and advancements in air-to-air refueling ended the service’s experimentation with parasite-fighter projects. However, these B-36 experiments demonstrated the feasibility of using a trapeze assembly as a launch-and-recovery mechanism for the AAC UCAV, projected to be tailless and only four feet thick. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has used mother ships and parasites for over 40 years. In-flight release of rocket planes and lifting bodies from under the wing of a B-52 furthered space exploration and development of the space shuttle. Two Boeing 747-100 shuttle carrier aircraft (SCA) now routinely ferry the DC-9–sized space-shuttle orbiter from Edwards AFB, California, to the Kennedy Space Center, Florida, in the piggyback configuration. Modifications to the 747 include three shuttle-attachment struts with associated interior structural strengthening and two additional vertical stabilizers to enhance directional control (fig. 5). In 1977 space shuttle Enterprise made five free-flight tests from the first SCA with separation occurring at altitudes from 19,000 to 26,000 feet (fig. 6). The orbiter is 122 feet long and 57 feet high, with a wingspan of 78 feet; it weighs approximately 175,000 pounds when carried by the SCA.39 In comparison, a combat-loaded stealth fighter is one-third the weight and less than half the size of the shuttle.40 The size of current stealth fighters precludes carriage under the wing or fuselage of a mother ship, but these aircraft are certainly small enough for a comfortable fit in the piggyback configuration. The commercially available 747-400ER (extended-range) freighter seems the best candidate for the AAC mother ship. This 231-foot-long aircraft carries 250,000 pounds for 5,000 miles, unrefueled; cruises at .85 Mach; and costs approximately $200 million.41 By comparison, the 174-foot-long Boeing C-17 carries 160,000 pounds for 2,400 miles, unrefueled; cruises at .77 Mach; and costs $237 million.42 The 747-400ER has a significant range advantage, given the weight of a 55,000-pound stealth fighter; 36,000-pound X-45C; and associated support equipment. Air-to-air refueling capability will give the 747-400 AAC the range and endurance necessary to conduct global-strike operations in an access-denial environment. The increased length and standard vertical-stabilizer configuration of the 747-400ER, compared to those of the C-17, will better facilitate a docking station for a 65-foot-long stealth fighter in the piggyback configuration. The sturdy cargo deck and cavernous space of the 747-400 freighter will provide for munitions storage, crew space, and structural modifications necessary to accommodate the recovery mechanisms. The AAC concept entails many technological challenges, especially the development of a mechanism to recover the stealth fighter to the backbone of the mother ship in flight. A scissors-lift platform anchored to the cargo deck, extending through the upper fuselage, and then rising from the backbone above the vertical tail may provide a viable recovery scheme. With this system, the stealth fighter flies an instrument-aided approach to touchdown on the raised platform with landing gear extended. At touchdown, the platform securely captures the landing gear and then lowers the fighter to the mother ship’s backbone. Like the shuttle orbiter, the stealth fighter will launch from the backbone position. Consequently, the scissors lift will not have to raise a fully loaded aircraft, thus minimizing the weight and complexity of the lift mechanism. The 747 mother ship may require a redesigned split vertical tail similar to that of the SCA. If practical, the distance between vertical tails may allow the fighter to fly an -instrument-aided approach directly to the backbone and negate the need for a scissors-lift mechanism. The AAC will include a retractable shroud that covers the nose and cockpit area of the fighter and a trapdoor leading from the backbone to the interior of the shroud to facilitate cockpit access. A series of trapdoors on the AAC backbone will enable access to the fighter’s underside for refueling, rearming, and minor maintenance. A lift system will move munitions from the interior cargo deck of the mother ship through a trapdoor to the weapons bays of the docked fighter. Refueling between missions will generally occur in the docked position. However, the addition of a standard Air Force air-to-air refueling boom and probe-and-drogue system will offer tremendous mission flexibility. To increase battlespace awareness, the AAC will include an ISR sensor suite netted with the other AACs, supporting ISR platforms and the combined air and space operations center.43 These are just some of the AAC design considerations, and this article in no way intends to offer a complete blueprint. However, past experience suggests that the AAC concept is feasible and that innovation can overcome the technological challenges.

#### Boeing disproves that we are building an Avengers ship, we are LOGICAL!

Combat Reform, 5-15-2012, http://www.combatreform.org/airborneaircraftcarriers.htm

In the early 1970s, the arrival of heavy transports revived the dream of aerial aircraft carriers. In 1973, Boeing announced that its engineers were investigating the possibility of using a 747 to carry a dozen or so ‘advanced micro fighters’. The studies, which went on until 1975, involved a variety of different configurations. It was envisaged that not only would the tiny aircraft be launched from the mother plane, but that they would also return to it, be refueled and rearmed and launched once again. These tasks were expected to last no more than about ten minutes per plane. The micro fighters themselves were to be tailless, supersonic aircraft (Boeing model 908-625) 8.84 metres long with a wing span of 5.33 metres and weighing 3,760kg fully loaded and would be armed with a rotating 25mm cannon and air-to-air or air-to-ground missiles. Lockheed was simultaneously working on a comparable adaptation of its C-5 Galaxy.

### Ext – B-2s Key

#### B-2 key to loitering capacity – other aircraft don’t have the stealth or endurance

Christopher Bowie, Senior Analyst at the Northrop Grumman Analysis Center and D.Phil from Oxford, December 2001, “Destroying Mobile Ground Targets,” Northrop Gruman Analysis Center Papers, online pdf

In terms of airframe, an upgraded B-2A or a new start B-2C (C for ‘conventional’)29 appears to offer the most utility when looking for the optimal mix of capabilities. The older bombers fare poorly in the vital area of survivability, as do the non-stealthy fighters.30 The most advanced new fighters, the F-22 and JSF, do not possess the range, loiter/ endurance, or weapons mix to effectively prosecute deeper mobile ground targets or operate from rear area bases outside the range of enemy anti-access threats or political constraints imposed by local governments. This reduces the utility of these aircraft when conducting operations in the future anti-access environment anticipated by the Department of Defense. The proposed UCAV under development is related closer to modern fighters than long-range bombers. It features high survivability through stealth, but has limited payload and range. The Predator, an armed version of which has been recently used in combat in Afghanistan, offers excellent loiter, but is limited by slow speed, survivability concerns, and a small payload.

#### That’s key to attack mobile platforms

Christopher Bowie, Senior Analyst at the Northrop Grumman Analysis Center and D.Phil from Oxford, December 2001, “Destroying Mobile Ground Targets,” Northrop Gruman Analysis Center Papers, online pdf

Loiter/Endurance: Long range also equates to loiter and endurance. Mobile targets may only present themselves at fleeting opportunities and may only be vulnerable for short periods. Accordingly, strike platforms must be capable of orbiting for lengthy periods of time to be airborne and available to strike when the target is located and tracked. During the Vietnam conflict, Operation Desert Storm, and Operation Allied Force, US fighters using multiple refuelings from tankers would often orbit for hours waiting for a suitable target to appear. Bombers armed with JDAMs did the same in Operation Enduring Freedom to strike fleeting targets in Afghanistan.24 In Allied Force, during the decision time required to identify and get approval to attack a fleeting target, NATO fighters often ran low on fuel and had to leave the area to search for a tanker.25 Survivability: Effective strike platforms must be capable of surviving both while loitering and when penetrating to deliver weapons. Stealth appears as a prerequisite against any capable opponent, particularly if facing an air defense equipped with advanced SAMs. Nonstealthy platforms might be capable of surviving in orbits if armed with standoff weapons of sufficient range to keep the platform outside the range of enemy defenses. • Short Reaction Time: Once a target is located, the strike platform must be capable of rapidly reacting to reach the fleeting target (or reaching a location to fire a high speed weapon at the target).

#### The magnitude grows over time – the B-2 is most adaptable

Stephen Cambone, CSIS, and Colin Gray, The University of Hull (UK), 1996, “The Role of Nuclear Forces in U.S. National Security Strategy: Implications of the B-2 bomber,” Comparative Strategy, 15: 207-231

To the extent that additional mobile SS-25s were to become part of a Russian buildup, an expanded 8-2 fleet would be a useful counter in two ways. First, more B-2s would offer more warheads and delivery vehicles. Second, B-2s have great adaptability to new targeting technologies. The B-2’s targeting capability will improve along with expected progress in surveillance, data transmission, and computer processing, capabilities that all would greatly expand the ability of the attacking bomber In engage elusive targets, including dispersed mobile SS-25s. Minuteman ICBMs, Trident SLBMs, and air- and sea-launched cruise missiles as now programmed are inherently less adaptable than the B-2 to such future targeting demands.

#### B-2’s key to a disarming strike against the Chinese nuclear arsenal

Michael Vickers, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 4-15-2001, “Bolster the B-2 Fleet Now: Future challenges Demand Penetrating Bomber,” http://www.checkpoint-online.ch/CheckPoint/J5/J5-0002-USABolsterB2Fleet.html

This heavy reliance on fighters and aging, non-stealthy bombers ignores emerging strategic realities. Ballistic and cruise missiles are placing the theater bases from which the Air Force's short-range fighter aircraft must operate at increasing risk. Additionally, air defenses pose an increasing threat to non-stealthy aircraft. Even against the antiquated air defenses of Yugoslavia, only stealthy aircraft – the B-2 and F-117 – were allowed to fly over Belgrade for the first 58 days of last year's war in Kosovo. Every secretary of defense from Melvin Laird to Dick Cheney has endorsed the purchase of additional B-2s. The current force of 16 operational (21 total) B-2s, as retired General Chuck Horner, commander of allied air operations during the Persian Gulf War, has noted, is far too small to underwrite a large-scale air campaign. As he retired from the service, Horner, a fighter pilot, observed: B-2 «The Gulf War gave me a glimpse of the future of warfare. I saw adversaries who attacked without warning. I saw adversaries armed with weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. I saw an American public that expected our wars to be swiftly won and relatively casualty free. In 1996 I see the same things but my confidence that we can overcome these things has faded. In 1991, I returned from the Gulf convinced that tomorrow's air commanders required – and would indeed have – a fleet of sixty or more stealth bombers. Inexplicably, the B-2 fleet was slashed from 75 to 20, undermining our ability to employ a newly relevant strategy.» «... in the event of a Chinese attack on Taiwan between now and 2020, the B-2 will likely be the only weapon system capable of targeting mobile missiles deep in China's interior.» «... in the event of a Chinese attack on Taiwan between now and 2020, the B-2 will likely be the only weapon system capable of targeting mobile missiles deep in China's interior.» The B-2 is, without doubt, a very expensive aircraft. Its strategic cost-effectiveness depends on its ability to penetrate any projected air defense and to deliver long-range precision strikes—particularly against critical mobile targets such as missile launchers—more efficiently than can, for example, an expendable cruise missile or reusable unmanned combat air vehicle. These potential alternatives to a penetrating bomber, however, face considerable technological and operational risk, and are not likely to be fielded in meaningful quantities for the better part of two decades. Similarly, the bomber technologies that might enable a "quantum leap" beyond the B-2 – advanced propulsion, hypersonics, unmanned capabilities and significantly reduced signature – are not likely to be sufficiently mature for at least another decade. Hence, such a bomber is unlikely to enter the force until 2025 or thereabouts, even if the Air Force substantially accelerates its current plans. B-2 To be sure, penetrating bombers are but one element of an effective long-range precision strike system. Equally important is the ability to find critical mobile targets, a capability that U.S. forces lack at present, and whose realization was not helped by Congress's recent cancellation of the Discoverer II, space based, moving target indicator radar project. But in the event of a Chinese attack on Taiwan between now and 2020, the B-2 will likely be the only weapon system in the U.S. arsenal that is capable of targeting mobile missiles deep in China's interior. If the Japanese were to get squeamish about allowing U.S. forces use of their bases in the defense of Taiwan, the bomber, which flew 30-plus hour missions from its base in Missouri during last year's war, could prove even more vital. The need for additional B-2s, moreover, far transcends a potential Chinese threat to Taiwan. An Iraq or Iran armed with nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles could also stymie U.S. forces' ability to counter another oil grab.

### UCAVs Good - Heg

#### UCAVs solve force protection, tactical deterrence, and fleeting-target strikes

John Pike, former director of the Space Policy, Cyberstrategy, Military Analysis, Nuclear Resource and Intelligence Resource projects at the Federation of American Scientists, 1-31-06, “Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV)”, GlobalSecurity.org. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/ucav.htm

The objective of the joint DARPA/Air Force Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV) Advanced Technology Demonstration (ATD) program is to demonstrate the technical feasibility for a UCAV system to effectively and affordably prosecute 21st century lethal strike missions within the emerging global command and control architecture. The operational UCAV system is envisioned as a force enabler that will conduct Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) and strike missions in support of post-2010 manned strike packages. This SEAD/Strike mission will be the first instantiation of an UCAV vision that will evolve into a broader range of combat missions as the concept and technologies mature, and the UCAV affordability potential is realized. UCAV could be fielded as soon as 2007 in small numbers, but the technical risk of the program casts doubt on whether such an acceleration could be realized. The Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle vision is an affordable weapon system that expands tactical mission options for revolutionary new air power as an integrated part of a system of systems solution. The UCAV weapon system will exploit the design and operational freedoms of relocating the pilot outside of the vehicle to enable a new paradigm in aircraft affordability while maintaining the rationale, judgment, and moral qualities of the human operator. This weapon system will require minimal maintenance, can be stored for extended periods of time, and is capable of dynamic mission control while engaging multiple targets in a single mission under minimal human supervision. The UCAV will conduct missions from ordinary airfields as part of an integrated force package complementary to manned tactical and support assets. UCAV controllers will observe rules of engagement and make the critical decisions to use or refrain from using force. The initial operational role for the UCAV is a "first day of the war" force enabler which complements a strike package by performing the SEAD mission. In this role, UCAVs accomplish preemptive destruction of sophisticated enemy integrated air defenses (IADs) in advance of the strike package, and enable the attacking forces by providing reactive suppression against the remaining IADs. Throughout the remainder of the campaign, UCAVs provide continuous vigilance with an immediate lethal strike capability to prosecute high value and time critical targets. By effectively and affordably performing those missions the UCAV system provides "no win" tactical deterrence against which an enemy's defenses would be ineffective, thereby ensuring air superiority.

#### Key to air dominance and overall heg

Major William K. Lewis, senior pilot in the T-37, T-38, AT-38 and F-15 Eagle, Distinguished Graduate of the Squadron Officer School and the Air Command and Staff College, and graduate of the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, June 2002, “UCAV – THE NEXT GENERATION AIR-SUPERIORITY FIGHTER?”, school of advanced airpower studies @ Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.

Air superiority is an essential military mission, and will continue to be so for the foreseeable future. Control of the air is not an end of its own, but rather it provides the flexibility and freedom of action central to a full range of military capabilities. In the coming century the United States will confront a number of disparate and ambiguous challenges to its hegemony. The resources available to meet those challenges will undoubtedly be constrained. Extremely long lead times in the acquisition and procurement of new technologies mean that now, as the F-22 Raptor begins to replace the venerable F-15 Eagle, the next- generation air-superiority fighter is entering development. Unmanned aircraft must be considered as an alternative to manned aircraft for this critical mission. While cost has been the driving factor for advances in UCAV, technology has been the major limitation. This thesis concludes that an air-superiority UCAV should be feasible by the year 2025 and that it should provide an effective and affordable alternative to manned air-superiority fighters.

### A2: Plan Doesn’t Build UCAVs

#### UCAV development is occurring absent the plan – we just provide the transportation infrastructure that makes it effective

Col George D. Kramlinger, Summer 2005. USAFA; MAAS, School of Advanced Airpower Studies; MA, Naval War College, is the commander, 612th Air Operations Group, Headquarters Twelfth Air Force, Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona. “Narrowing the Global-Strike Gap with an Airborne Aircraft Carrier,” Air & Space Power Journal, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj05/sum05/kramlinger.html#kramlinger.

Given the success of the Predator unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) armed with the Hellfire missile, the Air Force is accelerating efforts to develop a UCAV that can perform a penetrating-strike sortie in a high-threat environment. The Boeing X-45A technology-demonstrator UCAV, which began flight-testing in 2002, has successfully released a prototype SDB and has flown tactical profiles with a second X-45A UCAV (fig. 1).20 We expect the fighter-sized X-45C to fly in 2007 with a radius of 1,200 miles, a cruise speed of .80 Mach, a 40,000-foot operating altitude, and a 4,500-pound payload.21 Boeing is now proposing an X-45D with the range, payload, and size of a bomber.22 Without a cockpit and associated pilot, the UCAV is stealthier than its manned counterpart and better suited to loiter in hostile airspace, waiting to attack elusive, mobile targets. However, the bomber-sized vehicle will require fighter sweep, threat suppression, and jamming support to protect this very expensive investment. The fighter-sized UCAV will need a prohibitive commitment of tankers to operate over global range.

#### Ongoing development proves additional breakthroughs are coming

Bill Sweetman, editor for Aviation Week, 1-1-04, “UCAV for Global Strike”. http://www.eisc.com.cn/webdata/Data.asp?nRecno=54760&Recno=8354&kw=[Radar]

The US Air Force (USAF) has adopted the title ’Global Strike Enabler’ (GSE) for its version of the joint-service unmanned air combat vehicle (UCAV) that is being developed by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). The GSE title signifies that the USAF is determined to find a unique mission for the UCAV, rather than one that duplicates manned aircraft. The USAF sees the UCAV’s principal advantage as its ability to "go deep and persist", flying into heavily defended airspace and remaining there long enough for manned strike aircraft to fly in, complete their missions and leave. This is made possible by the UCAV’s range and endurance - the service is still looking for two hours’ endurance combined with a 1,850km unrefuelled radius - and its stealth, provided by a combination of materials and an inherently low-observable shape. Persistence also means that the UCAV needs to carry a large number of weapons. Although the UCAV is designed to carry two 900kg Joint Direct Attack Munitions, the USAF is more enthused about the fact that it can carry eight Boeing GBU-39/B Small Diameter Bombs (SDBs). Since the USAF expects that the UCAV will operate in co-operative groups, this could place dozens of weapons over a target set during a UCAV mission. For the same reason, the USAF is very interested in "payloads that will regenerate", according to Colonel Michael Leggett, chief of advanced programs in Air Combat Command’s requirements branch. Such payloads include jamming and information warfare (IW) systems. The UCAV, the USAF believes, will be able to approach closer to an emitter than a manned aircraft and jam it effectively with less power. Within a group of UCAVs, the jamming signal will actively switch from one aircraft to another to frustrate home-on-jam techniques used by defenders.

### Feasibility – Air Ships

#### New technological breakthroughs make development of advanced airship transportation capacity imminently feasible

Orbital Vector, 11-2-2010, “Advanced Airships,” http://orbitalvector.com/Aircraft/Airships/ADVANCED%20AIRSHIPS.htm

A number of societal trends and emerging technologies seem to be converging toward the eventual revival of true airships as a widely available means of transport. The future of hybrids still seems dubious, and further development of true airships to take advantage of their characteristic strengths may follow instead. New materials, technologies, and approaches may create a number of radically new designs. The potential fuel economy and endurance of airships make them an increasingly attractive mode of transportation. Though slower than many modern heavier-than-air craft, they could ultimately move cargo and passengers cheaper, especially over very long distances. Some important innovations being actively researched for advanced airships are listed below. -- Optimized Aerodynamic Shape: The traditional cigar shape of older airships worked very well for the slow speeds they were designed to fly at. Newer airships, however, will be designed for higher speeds, and to use some of their forward motion to help generate lift. Their cross section may more closely resemble an airplane’s wing, with a flattened bottom and a rounded, tapering top. Seen from above or below, they will also have a more pronounced teardrop shape. -- Vectored Thrust: Aside from the usual stabilizing rear rudders, future airships may also have one or more pairs of outrigger wings. These would help not only with stability, but may be used to mount gimbaled propeller engines for far greater maneuverability and lift capacity. The motors would be able to rotate with a large amount of freedom, perhaps even being able to fully spin at 360 degree or angle themselves outward, depending on the sophistication of the exact design. -- Advanced Materials: Considerably stronger, more lightweight materials will be used in the construction of future zeppelins, such as advanced composite laminates, carbon nanotubes, and graphene. These will allow the airships to be able to handle greater aerodynamic forces and loads, while at the same time allowing much lighter vehicle weights. -- Solar Cells: Many dirigibles have a lot of upper surface area exposed to the sun. The topside of the airship may be covered with lightweight, high-efficiency solar cells, with the power generated being fed into batteries. This extra power will not only provide for the electrical systems aboard, but will also help to run the craft’s engines, lending the craft a great deal more fuel efficiency. Some airships may also use the solar cells to heat the lifting gas, affording them greater buoyancy. -- Vertical Configurations: Though the traditional vision for airships is to have them laid out horizontally like most other aircraft, some designs have been proposed for a more vertical-oriented configuration. These tend to be slower than their longitudinal cousins, but are more stable and able to handle inclement weather better. Some proposed vertical-configuration designs envision them as heavy lifters, basically airborne cranes for military and construction use. Other see them as used for luxury travel, such as the proponents of the Aircruise design, who see them as mobile, floating hotels and penthouses. -- Dynamic Buoyancy System: Of all the possible future innovations, it is this one which may allow airships to eventually become the useful workhorses of the air many of its boosters envision. These systems will allow airships the same type of versatility heavier-than-air vessels enjoy, while giving up none of an airship’s advantages.

#### Hybrid airships are feasible and would be effective

CBO, September 2005, Congressional Budget Office, “Options for Strategic Military Transportation Systems,” http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/66xx/doc6661/09-27-strategicmobility.pdf

The hybrid airships in Option 1B would have the advantage of being virtually independent of airfield constraints. When departing its loading site with a full load, a hybrid airship would need a long runway or other open space to gain enough speed, and hence dynamic lift, for takeoff. That would probably not be a serious operational constraint, however, because loading locations would usually be in the United States, where they could be planned for in advance. Upon arriving in a theater, a hybrid airship should be able to land in a much shorter distance than on takeoff because it would have burned much of its fuel and thus would need less speed-generated dynamic lift for a gentle landing. After unloading, the now neutrally (or perhaps slightly positively) buoyant airship should be able to take off almost vertically.

### Airships Mech Solve Mobility

#### Investment in hybrid airships solves – flexibility

CBO, September 2005, Congressional Budget Office, “Options for Strategic Military Transportation Systems,” http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/66xx/doc6661/09-27-strategicmobility.pdf

Instead of buying more aircraft with the payload size of current airlifters, this option would develop and field an aircraft with a significantly larger payload. Two very different approaches have been proposed for such a heavylift aircraft: one would develop new fixed-wing aircraft with larger payloads and longer ranges than current airlifters, and the other would develop heavy-lift airships (which would have propulsion and steering systems and be lighter than air or nearly so). An example of the first approach is a blended-wing body concept, an airframe that would combine efficient high-lift wings and a wide airfoil-shaped body to generate lift and minimize drag, thus increasing fuel economy. Such a design has been proposed for a wide variety of missions, including strategic transportation, aerial refueling, and aerial launch of long-range air-to-surface missiles. In addition to its larger payload, the longer range of such an aircraft could improve cycle times (the total time from loading one cargo to returning for the next) by reducing the number of en route stops needed to reach a distant theater. The disadvantage of a larger fixed-wing aircraft is that it would probably be more constrained to operate from large airfields than current aircraft are. Consequently, that approach would add to the current force’s already substantial capability to deliver cargo to large air bases but would run counter to the trend of seeking greater flexibility to operate airlifters from the more numerous smaller airfields available around the world. Because of those drawbacks, CBO chose the second approach for Option 1B—a conceptual heavy-lift hybrid airship (see Figure 3-2 for an artist’s conception of such an aircraft). A hybrid airship differs from a conventional airship, such as a blimp, in that it derives its lift from more than just the buoyancy of the helium inside the hull. The airfoil shape of the hull provides additional lift essentially acting as a wing when the airship is moving forward. Specific design concepts for such an airship vary, but roughly speaking, the static lift provided by the helium-filled gas bags in the hull supports the weight of the airship and its fuel, and the dynamic lift provided by the hull’s shape offers the extra lift to allow the ship and its payload to make the transition to flight. Some concepts also include actual wings to provide dynamic lift. Forward speed comes from propellers, much as with current airships. The balancing of static and dynamic lift means that total lift is much easier to control—both on the ground and in the air—than with conventional airships. (Old newsreel footage of a crowd of ground handlers being lifted into the air when a gust of wind hit a Zeppelin during docking graphically illustrates the problem of controlling a large conventional airship.) In principle, a hybrid airship would not need to be held down with strong tethers upon landing or to have ballast added during unloading because the ship, minus its payload, would be about neutrally buoyant. High winds could still be a problem, however, because the size of the hull would present a large sail area for winds to act on. Option 1B would develop and field a hybrid airship similar in performance to the goals of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s (DARPA’s) Walrus program: an aircraft with a payload of at least 500 tons that could operate from unimproved locations and transport its load anywhere in the world in a few days. 5 Specific designs could vary significantly, but concept designs envision an airship roughly 1,000 feet long and 300 feet wide. Its structure would probably consist of a nonrigid hull to hold the helium and an underslung gondola to carry cargo and troops. Estimates of achievable speeds for hybrid airships range from about 80 knots to 120 knots. For this analysis, CBO assumed an average speed of 100 knots. This option would have a total cost of $11.3 billion, CBO estimates—about $3.0 billion to $4.0 billion to develop the airship and the rest to purchase 14 to 16 airships and operate them for 30 years. 6 Those estimates are based on a DoD study of advanced mobility concepts and on contractor data for proposed heavy-lift airships (see the appendix for more details). CBO assumed that all of the airships would be available for operations in the event of a crisis. (The calculations of the additional capability provided by this option assume a fleet of 15 airships.) Although not as prompt as conventional aircraft, hybrid airships could still begin arriving in the Persian Gulf region from the United States in about five days (see Figure 3-3), assuming that the units they transported were ready for loading immediately. The 15 airships would deliver about 1,000 tons of cargo per day—about three times as much as the 21 C-17s in Option 1A. Despite delivering more cargo than Option 1A, this option shows a similar percentage increase in cargo delivered early in the scenario, a peak of about 7 percent, because the first prepositioning ships would be arriving at about the same time as the airships under the assumptions of CBO’s deployment scenario. If the prepositioned ships were located farther from the theater and hence arrived later, the initial percentage increase in deliveries attributable to this option would be higher. The throughput capacity of Option 1B would decline if the cost of the airships grew relative to CBO’s estimates and reduced the number of airships that could be bought within the spending target for these options. Among other possibilities, unforeseen technical hurdles during development could increase development costs. Alternatively, lower development costs could allow the purchase of a slightly larger airship fleet, with a corresponding increase in throughput capacity. (For example, a development cost half that of CBO’s low estimate would allow the purchase of three additional airships within the total cost target.) Aside from very large payloads, the biggest advantage of hybrid airships would be their potential ability to operate essentially independently of large air bases in a theater. Such airships could also offer shorter time lines for reception, staging, onward movement, and integration than would the other alternatives, both because cargo could be delivered closer to its final destination and because airships have the potential to efficiently carry troops with their equipment, eliminating the need for personnel to marry up with equipment that has been transported on a different platform. (Those factors are discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.)

### Airships Good – Rapid Response

#### Airships are key to rapid response times

CBO, September 2005, Congressional Budget Office, “Options for Strategic Military Transportation Systems,” http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/66xx/doc6661/09-27-strategicmobility.pdf

Despite the greater flexibility of aircraft, they, too, can seldom take a direct route to their destination. Countries along the shortest path may deny overflight rights, and the need to make en route stops for fuel will usually result in a longer one-way flight distance and transit time. For instance, a C-17 flying from Charleston to Kuwait would travel about 7,000 nm with a typical set of en route stops (two or three stops, each with a planned ground time of 2.25 hours). The need for such stops could be reduced with aerial refueling, if it was available and deemed necessary. Of course, even when they must stop along the way, aircraft have much shorter transit times than ships do— hours rather than weeks—because of their much higher speeds. A typical airlift mission from the United States to Kuwait, for instance, could have a transit time of less than 24 hours, compared with about three weeks for a 20-knot Ship.

### A2: Survivability Problems

#### NBD

CBO, September 2005, Congressional Budget Office, “Options for Strategic Military Transportation Systems,” http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/66xx/doc6661/09-27-strategicmobility.pdf

Survivability Although strategic transportation forces are usually responsible for delivering cargo and troops to secure locations, situations can arise in which airlifters and sealift ships are sent into harm’s way. For example, during Operation Iraqi Freedom, several airlift aircraft have been hit by ground fire while flying into Baghdad. In addition, the Iraqi naval mines that damaged the guided missile cruiser U.S.S. Princeton and the amphibious assault ship U.S.S. Tripoli during Operation Desert Storm could have damaged sealift ships delivering forces to Saudi Arabia, and the terrorist attack against the destroyer U.S.S. Cole in Yemen could just as easily have been directed against a sealift ship. In such situations, the ability of a transportation system to avoid being hit—or to survive if hit—can be important, especially since the cargo it carries may be critical to the success of operations on the ground. To protect against attack, airlifters are often equipped with countermeasures, including missile warning systems to help them avoid threats and flares to try to fool infrared missiles (such as those launched by shoulder-fired surface-to-air missile systems). Additionally, in a threatening environment, airlifters might operate only at night, to make visual tracking more difficult for an enemy, and might fly much steeper approaches and departures, to stay out of the range of ground fire as long as possible. Sealift ships, for their part, are protected by security forces when in port and by naval forces when at sea (if the threat warrants an escort). The options in this analysis that would rely on C-17s (Option 1A) or LMSRs (Options 2A, 3A, and 3B) would have much the same survivability as current strategic transportation forces. The high-speed sealift ships in Option 2B might be more survivable than slower ships because they could, for example, outrun any threatening submarines they encountered. However, most of the threats facing sealift ships would probably occur near the ship’s destination, where even HSS ships would have slowed down prior to entering port. As was the case with RSOI, the hybrid airships in Option 1B could have unique advantages in terms of survivability. On one hand, their large size, low altitude, and slow speed would make airships very easy to detect, track, and shoot at. On the other hand, proponents argue that although an airship might be easy to hit, it could operate successfully in a threatening environment for several reasons: B A large airship could easily carry an extensive set of defensive systems, such as missile countermeasures and even air-to-air missiles to defend against hostile aircraft. B The cargo compartments could be armored with materials that are too heavy or bulky for use on conventional aircraft. B The low speed of an airship means that if it was hit, it would not be susceptible to the large dynamic stresses that can cause conventional aircraft to break up in flight when damaged. B The helium in the compartments of the hull would be at only a slightly higher pressure than the ambient atmosphere, so it would leak very slowly out of any holes shot in the hull. Consequently, if an airship was hit by ground fire, it would not pop like a rubber balloon but rather lose buoyancy slowly like a mylar balloon.

## Topicality

### TI – ACs = Airports

#### Aircraft Carrier = airport

Kenny Golden, Decorated Retired Naval Commander, 6-24-2010, “An Interview with Congressional Candidate Kenny Golden,” http://www.altdaily.com/features/news/news-profiles/an-interview-with-congressional-candidate-kenny-golden.html

First of all, it does not have to 2020. Whatever is a reasonable timeline to get there is what we should aim for. 80% of the earth is blue, and 70% of that is deep enough for an aircraft carrier. An aircraft carrier is a mobile airport with a bunch of tough guys on it that can influence policy and diplomacy throughout the entire planet at a moment’s notice. It’s expensive but that 13 billion is a 50 year commitment to an airport you can put anywhere on the planet. We are expanding drone technology as well, and so aircraft carriers will only increase in importance.

#### More ev

PDO, 8-1-2011, “China one step closer to developing aircraft carrier,” People’s Daily Online, http://english.people.com.cn/90780/7456726.html

China needs aircraft carriers to adapt to new forms of naval warfare in the future. An aircraft carrier is like a mobile airport moved from the rear area to the front line, which makes it possible to launch sustained saturation attacks on enemy positions. Furthermore, carrier-based reconnaissance aircraft can provide information support for precision strikes carried out by fighter aircraft. If a country loses air supremacy, it will be difficult to move its ground forces and dangerous to concentrate its ground forces. At present, nine countries have aircraft carriers as they have realized the importance aircraft carriers to present and future naval warfare. Japan and South Korea, which enjoy the protection of U.S. aircraft carriers, are making active efforts to build their own. Both countries have built aircraft carrier-like amphibious assault ships

### TI – Airports Topical

#### Airports are transportation infrastructure

AOPA, 2010, “Obama calls for transportation infrastructure investment,” Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, http://www.aopa.org/advocacy/articles/2010/100906obama.html

President Barack Obama announced Sept. 6 that his administration will press for a major investment in the nation’s transportation infrastructure, including at airports and in the Next Generation air transportation system (NextGen). The president made the announcement during a Labor Day speech in Milwaukee, Wis.

#### More ev – airports = transportation infrastructure

ITPI, 2012, “Transportation Infrastructure,” In the Public Interest is a Research Center on Privatization and Responsible Contracting, http://www.inthepublicinterest.org/sector/transportation-infrastructure

Roads, airports, parking garages, and other transportation infrastructure are critical to the movement of people and goods, and to national security. Public entities give up control of important aspects of the transportation system when they privatize, allowing future decisions to be made for private gain rather than the public interest. In many instances, these deals may provide an influx of short-term cash, but public assets that are sold at bargain prices and under bad terms can affect communities for years to come.

#### Transportation infrastructure includes highways, bridges, ports, airports, railroads, and pipelines.

Michael Goodchild et. al, director of University of California, Santa Barbara’s Center for Spatial Studies, Richard L. Church, and Val Noronha, 2002, “Spatial Information Technologies in Critical Infrastructure Protection, National Consortium on Remote Sensing in Transportation,” p. 2

Examples of Critical Transportation Infrastructure (CTI)

1. Major arterial highways and bridges comprising the National Highway System (NHS), including the Strategic Highway Network (STRAHNET) and National Intermodal Connectors.

2. International marine harbors, ports and airports.

3. Major railroads, including depots, terminals and stations.

4. Oil and natural gas pipelines.

5. Transportation Control Systems (e.g., air traffic control centers, national rail control centers) [Everett].

#### Transportation infrastructure consists of roads, bridges, airports, ports and rail lines

Mustafa Alshawi, chairman of the Iraq Institute for Economic Reforms, and Associate Dean of Research at the University of Salford, 11-20-2009, Concept and Background to Public Private Partnership (PPP)/Private Finance Initiative (PFI): UK Experience, p. 1

1 Infrastructure is defined as transportation infrastructure (roads, bridges, airports, ports, rail lines); communications infrastructure; housing; and electricity generation and distribution. Infrastructure projects can be “mega projects” (dams, coast-to‐coast highways, mega‐ports, large power plants) or much smaller projects that can include communication franchises or limited highway spurs.

### Ext – Airfields = Infrastructure

#### DOD does now define “infrastructure” --- it includes airfields

DOD Dictionary ’10 (The DOD Dictionary is managed by the Joint Education and Doctrine Division, J-7, Joint Staff. All approved joint definitions, acronyms, and abbreviations are contained in Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 08 November 2010, as amended through 15 April 2012. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod\_dictionary/

infrastructure

(DOD) All building and permanent installations necessary for the support, redeployment, and military forces operations (e.g. barracks, headquarters, airfields, communications, facilities, stores, port installations, and maintenance stations).

Source: JP 3-35

#### Yes, we’re an airfield complex – plan’s not a sub-set

D.O.D. ’12 (The Today’s Military – Military Glossary Section – last updated 2012 – The Today’s Military website is produced by the United States Department of Defense. This site is not intended as a recruiting tool for any branch of the U.S. Military. Rather, it was developed as a resource for parents, educators and young adults curious about military service, http://www.todaysmilitary.com/inside/view/sailors-aboard-the-uss-nimitz)

Aircraft carriers are essentially airports at sea, and they provide military aircraft with enough space to take off and land in international waters. Some of these aircraft carriers are bigger than others. For example, the USS Nimitz is a supercarrier and has room for 6,000 people, not to mention up to 85 aircraft. It takes a lot of Sailors to keep aircraft carriers as large as the USS Nimitz running smoothly.

#### ACs are infrastructural capacity

STE, 2012, “When Disaster Strikes, Send the Enterprise,” http://www.sendtheenterprise.org/

Aircraft carriers have their own fleet of helicopters. Because disasters frequently compromise the affected region’s transportation infrastructure, heavy-lift helicopters are extremely useful for the response effort. An aircraft carrier can deliver, launch, fuel and and service dozens of helicopters to any shore in the world’s oceans

### Misc T Cards

### A2: Plan = Vehicles

#### WM – An AAC is a floating airfield complex, not a vehicle

Major Gregory L. Gardner, School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1996, “INFRASTRUCTURE, THE FOURTH ELEMENT OF STRATEGIC MOBILITY” – approved: April 19th – http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA314299

Air Transportation Infrastructure

Air transportation is the quickest means available for the US military to project combat power into a theater. By air, the Army can deploy an airborne brigade from Fort Bragg to Southwest Asia in under 82 hours.40 This same brigade would take over a week to close the same distance if it traveled by sea. Along with the transport of units, air transportation also performs the equally important task of delivering critical sustainment supplies into a theater. The delivery of Patriot missiles from the manufacturer to using units during Operation DESERT STORM was only possible because of air transportation. While the aircraft and crews receive most of the much-deserved credit for these operations, the infrastructure that supports them is an integral component for success. The infrastructure supporting air transportation is complex. It varies from the personnel that make the system work, the electronic devices that are required for today's modern aircraft, to the runways and structures used by both people and machines. For simplicity, this paper defines infrastructure in terms of systems that support a primary function, with the understanding that there are numerous sub-systems within the primary system. For air transportation there are two (2) primary systems -- the airfield complexes and the commercial airline companies. These systems exist both in the US and overseas, to include the US commercial airline industry which is becoming increasingly multinational. Airfields Airfield capability and capacity are factors consisting of many sub-elements. Runway length, ramp space, and approach radars are prime considerations. However, many other factors effect the ability of an airfield to handle air traffic. Other areas which must be considered are fuel handling capacity and availability, available maintenance services, cargo handling capability, de-icing capability, hours of operation, and the conditions under which access will be allowed. The United States Air Force has the capability to make up for shortfalls in many of these areas. However, these resources are limited and cannot quickly improve things such as runway length and ramp space problems.

#### And, WM – airships are distinct from individual cars – they’re a crucial part of the infrastructure

Major Gregory L. Gardner, School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1996, “INFRASTRUCTURE, THE FOURTH ELEMENT OF STRATEGIC MOBILITY” – approved: April 19th – http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA314299

Strategic mobility infrastructure is an integral part of strategic mobility. The military must take a holistic approach to strategic mobility. That approach will include the aircraft and ships that physically move personnel and materiel. It must also include the elements of infrastructure that move personnel and materiels, and support those ships and aircraft. The airfields that serve as air ports of debarkation (APOD) and air ports of embarkation (APOE), along with those enroute airfields that support the flights, can determine the airflow into a theater of operations. The health of the commercial airline industry is directly related to the numbers of aircraft available for use in civil reserve air fleet (CRAF) missions.

### A2: Ev Assumes SMI Not TI

#### “Strategic mobility infrastructure” is a sub-category of transportation infrastructure

Major Gregory L. Gardner, School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1996, “INFRASTRUCTURE, THE FOURTH ELEMENT OF STRATEGIC MOBILITY” – approved: April 19th – http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA314299

Strategic mobility infrastructure is a vital component of the strategic mobility of the US armed forces. Each piece that supports the land, sea, or air portion of strategic mobility performs unique functions, which if allowed to degenerate, is capable of causing delays or failure in a deployment operation. DOD plays a critical role, along with private industry and other government agencies, in improving and ensuring the continued viability of strategic transportation infrastructure.

### A2: TI Excludes Vehicles

#### CI - “Transportation infrastructure” includes vehicles

Oswald 11 (Michelle, Professor – Bucknell University, et al., “Measuring Infrastructure Performance: Development of a National Infrastructure Index”, Public Works Management & Policy, 16(4), p. 378)

Defining the Infrastructure Sector A more technical definition of the transportation sector is The fixed facilities (roadway segment, railway track, transit terminals, harbors, and airports), flow entities (people, vehicles, container units, railroad cars), and control systems that permit people and goods to transverse geographical space efficiently and in a timely manner in some desired activity. Transportation is provided by modes—highway, rail, air, waterway, and pipeline. (U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 2010a)

#### Transportation infrastructure includes vehicles

Begin and Eten, 10 – Shane Eten is Founder at Feed Resource Recovery Inc., a renewable energy firm

Ryan Begin is an engineer who works at Feed Resource Recovery Inc. (Ryan and Shane, “WASTE RECOVERY, CONVERSION, AND UTILIZATION” 10/21/10 http://www.faqs.org/patents/app/20100264079)//dm

In one embodiment, in operation, food products 130 are transported, for example, by rail or truck, from a producer 140 to the distribution and/or manufacturing facility 120 for packaging, processing, and/or distribution to one or more retailers 150. Once the food products have been delivered to a retailer, waste 160 stored by the retailer (including, for example, spoiled and/or unsold produce, packaging material, FOG, non-saleables, and other associated waste), is transported to the waste-processing facility 110. In some embodiments, biodegradable waste is stored by the retailer in a refrigerated or frozen form to limit or prevent decomposition prior to being sent to the waste processing facility 110. In some embodiments, the same transportation infrastructure may be utilized for the delivery of food products from the distribution facility 120 and the return of waste to the waste processing facility 110. As used herein the term "transportation infrastructure" includes vehicles such as rail cars, trucks, or ships, which may be utilized to transport food or waste; the routes, roads, rails, waterways, and the like upon which these vehicles may travel; as well as any containers which may be used to transport the food products or heterogeneous waste. As a result of using the same transportation infrastructure for the delivery of food products from the distribution facility 120 and the return of waste to the waste processing facility 110, in some embodiments, the waste 160 is transported to the waste-processing facility 110 with substantially no additional environmental impact, and little or no additional cost, as this occurs on the return of an existing delivery. In other embodiments, different transportation infrastructures, for example, different sub-sets of a truck fleet are utilized for the delivery of food products 130 and the transportation of waste 160. In some embodiments the same containers are used for both the delivery of food products and the return of heterogeneous waste. For example, if cardboard boxes are used to deliver food products to a retailer, the retailer may use these same cardboard boxes to package biodegradable and/or non-biodegradable waste to be sent to the waste processing facility.

### A2: Primary Purpose

#### We reasonably meet “primary purpose” – D.O.D. glossary proves:

D.O.D. ’12 (The Today’s Military – Military Glossary Section – last updated 2012 – The Today’s Military website is produced by the United States Department of Defense. This site is not intended as a recruiting tool for any branch of the U.S. Military. Rather, it was developed as a resource for parents, educators and young adults curious about military service, http://www.todaysmilitary.com/inside/military-glossary/)

Aircraft Carrier – A Navy warship designed to support aircraft, complete with runway and maintenance facilities. Each carrier has its own ZIP code.

### A2: T – No Military

#### “Transportation” includes the military

Kim 9 (Brian, Wyle Laboratories, Inc., et al., “Guidebook on Preparing Airport Greenhouse Gas Emissions Inventories”, Airport Cooperative Research Program – Report 11, http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/acrp/acrp\_rpt\_011.pdf)

Transportation Sector: Consists of private and public passenger and freight transportation, as well as government transportation, including military operations.

#### Infrastructure includes military assets

GAO, “Defense Critical Infrastructure,” August 2008, http://www.gao.gov/assets/280/279685.html

The Department of Defense (DOD) established the Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP) to assure the availability of mission critical infrastructure, including surface, sea, and air transportation assets to carry out its missions. GAO was asked to evaluate (1) the extent to which the U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) has identified, prioritized, and assessed critical transportation assets; (2) the extent to which DOD installation personnel have taken actions to help assure the availability of critical transportation assets, both within and independent of DCIP; and (3) how DOD is funding critical transportation asset assurance. GAO examined a nonprojectable sample of 22 critical transportation assets, reviewed relevant DOD guidance and documents, and interviewed cognizant officials.

#### The plan effects transportation infrastructure

Nick Turse, associate editor of TomDispatch.com and the winner of a 2009 Ridenhour Prize for Reportorial Distinction as well as a James Aronson Award for Social Justice Journalism, 7-12-2012, “Obama’s Scramble for Africa,” http://www.opposingviews.com/i/politics/2012-election/under-obama-us-military-moves-africa

Instead, it’s a superpower’s superhighway, on which trucks and ships shuttle fuel, food, and military equipment through a growing maritime and ground transportation infrastructure to a network of supply depots, tiny camps, and airfields meant to service a fast-growing U.S. military presence in Africa.”

### Can Be Military – Contextual Ev

#### TI includes civilian and military infrastructure – contextual evidence proves

Alessabdro Marzani, NASA, 2004, “Mobile acoustic system for the detection of surface-breaking cracks in pavement,” Smart Structures and Materials 2004: Smart Sensor Technology and Measurement Systems. Edited by Udd, Eric; Inaudi, Daniele. Proceedings of the SPIE, Volume 5384, pp. 98-107, http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2004SPIE.5384...98M

Monitoring the structural condition of road and airport pavement is an extremely critical task to ensure the safety and efficiency of teh transportation. The topic is relevant to both civil and military transportation infrastructure. The presence of damage in pavement, including surface cracking, depressions, swells, and wear, is inevitable due to the sever environmental and service loads that these structures must be subject to. Existing NDE techniques aimed at assessing the structural condition of pavement include Falling Weight Deflectometer, Ground Penetrating Radar, and acoustic methods based on surface waves. This paper presents improvements to the traditional surface-wave method for the detection of surface-breaking cracks in pavement. The advances include 1) the modeling of the problem as dipsersive waves propagating in a multilayer system, 2) the inclusion of post-processing algorithms based on the Wavelet Transform to improve the sensitivity and accuracy of the inspection, and 3) the use of non-contact, air-coupled acoustic detectors to enhance the mobility of the inspection unit. The crack detection procedure consists of first generating a dispersive wave with an impulse hammer, and then measuring the changes in velocity, amplitude and/or frequency content as the wave travels across the flaw with the aid of the Continuous Wavelet Transform. Multilayer wave propagation modeling provides a better understanding of the experimental results by predicting how the various frequencies interact with cracks of different depths. The results of field tests will be presented for both rigid (concrete-based) and flexible (bitumen-based) pavement with surface cracks.

DSPJ, April/June 2011, The Defense Standardization Program Journal, http://www.dsp.dla.mil/app\_uil/content/newsletters/journal/DSPJ-04-11.pdf

Background Each military service—Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force—provides for its own logistics support. The services, as well as the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), manage supplies and track assets. The U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) provides the transportation (airlift and sealift) resources and tracks supplies while in transit. The combatant commanders are responsible for logistics and for directing distribution in the operational and tactical components to meet military objectives. In the early 2000s, the services, DLA, and USTRANSCOM recognized the potential for significant gains in logistics efficiency and effectiveness by moving to standardized modular shipping containers across the services to improve the intermodal compatibility of transportation platforms in all three transportation modes (air, land, and sea). Problem/Opportunity The timely arrival of commodities and supplies to warfighters is critical to mission success. This is a constant challenge, however. The military transportation infrastructure is a collection of independent, specialized platforms, containers, and material handling equipment. Cargo flow is typically hampered by packing, loading, unloading, repacking, and reloading at various transshipment points. This contributes to major shipment delays and the delayed arrival of goods to the warfighter. Furthermore, the location, contents, and condition of each package’s items are not typically monitored or tracked accurately, if at all. In many cases, containers loaded with critical items arrive at forward logistics nodes, only to await distribution. In addition, each service uses disparate types and sizesof ISO containers and non-ISO containers and packaging. These differences require multiple means of material handling across the services and the commercial sector.

#### Military airports and air bases are transportation infrastructure

GAO, “Defense Critical Infrastructure,” August 2008, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08851.pdf

The Department of Defense (DOD) relies on a global network of critical surface, sea, and air transportation infrastructure—such as roads, railways, seaports, military air bases, and commercial airports—to carry out its missions. The incapacitation or destruction of one or more of the assets constituting this network of critical infrastructure could have a debilitating effect on DOD’s ability to project, support, and sustain its forces and operations worldwide. DOD’s critical transportation infrastructure is owned by both DOD and non-DOD entities, including private companies, state and local governments, and foreign governments. Because of its importance to DOD operations, this critical infrastructure represents an attractive target to adversaries, and may also be vulnerable to a host of natural disasters and accidents. DOD has recognized and emphasized the importance of assuring the availability of mission-critical infrastructure in the most recent versions of the National Military Strategy 1 and the Quadrennial Defense Review. 2 Critical assets in the Transportation Defense Sector depend on public works infrastructure that provides the utilities needed for many transportation critical assets to remain operational. 3 To identify and help assure the availability of mission-critical infrastructure, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs (ASD[HD&ASA]) was assigned responsibility for the risk-based Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP) in September 2003. ASD(HD&ASA) subsequently issued guidance in August 2005 articulating the roles and responsibilities for DOD organizations involved in the program. 4 Under DCIP, DOD created 10 functionally based defense sectors and designated a Defense Infrastructure Sector Lead Agent (sector lead agent) for each sector. 5 The U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) is the sector lead agent for the Transportation Defense Sector. DOD Directive 3020.40 assigns the sector lea d agent responsibility for, in collaboration with other DCIP stakeholders, identifying the interdependencies among infrastructure that crosses DOD sector boundaries, and for maintaining a characterization of sector support functions, systems, assets, and dependencies as they relate to identified operational capabilities and assets. Because TRANSCOM also is a combatant command, it is responsible for preventing and mitigating the loss of DOD-owned critical assets, within its assigned area of responsibility, and for coordinating with the military services and other sector lead agents in identifying and assessing critical assets. In addition to DCIP, DOD has established several other complementary programs, such as the Antiterrorism Program, that predate DCIP but contribute indirectly to the protection and assurance of critical assets.

DTR, 7-5-2012, Defense Transportation Regulation Part V: Department of Defense Customs and Border Clearance Policies and Procedures, http://www.transcom.mil/dtr/part-v/dtr\_part\_v\_toc.pdf

Defense Transportation System. The Defense Transportation System is that portion of the worldwide transportation infrastructure that supports Department of Defense transportation needs in peace and war. The Defense Transportation System consists of two major elements: military (unique) and commercial resources. These resources include aircraft, assets, services, and systems unique to, contracted for, or controlled by the Department of Defense. The Defense Transportation System infrastructure, including ports, airlift, sealift, railway, highway, in-transit visibility, information management systems, customs, and traffic management that the Department of Defense maintains and exercises in peacetime, is a vital element of the Department of Defense capability to project power worldwide. It provides for responsive force projection and a seamless transition between peacetime and wartime operations.

TranSystems, 2012, http://www.transystems.com/Home/Markets/Federal-Government/Transportation-Infrastructure-and-Utilities.aspx

Transportation Infrastructure and Utilities TranSystems has held several Indefinite Delivery Contracts for civil or infrastructure design projects for military installations in the US, Europe, and the Caribbean. Our infrastructure experience spans from comprehensive utility to pavement projects, including both vehicular and airfield pavement projects.

#### Contextual ev – includes military

Tony Chrestman, President, Ruan Transport, 10-16-2001, Congressional Testimony, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-107shrg81246/html/CHRG-107shrg81246.htm

In addition, Congress should reassess the continuing trend toward a federal transportation program that fails to prioritize spending on the National Highway System (NHS). The NHS, which includes the Interstate Highway System and other principal highways, carries 75 percent of the nation's truck traffic. It serves 53 land borders and 242 military installations. Despite the obvious commercial and military importance of the NHS, one-third of the system is in poor or mediocre condition, and one-quarter of NHS bridges are deficient. Furthermore, the lack of system capacity expansion over the past three decades has led to severe congestion on a large part of this system. The NHS is the backbone of the commercial and military transportation infrastructure, and its many deficiencies will compound any system interruptions that occur as the result of a terrorist attack. The trucking industry recommends that Congress should direct additional funds to the NHS and other highways of national significance.

#### Includes military

Stephen Goodman, Military Traffic Management Command @ the DoD, and Jens Pohl, CAD Research Center @ Cal-Poly San Luis Obispo, 6-16-1999, “ISMIS: A Military Transportation Decision-Support Framework,” http://www.cadrc.calpoly.edu/pdf/ismis.DOC.pdf

The information that is shared in a distributed communication environment is not limited to the

data stored in databases. Individual software applications will be generators of information that

may be stored in databases or, more often, will be shared directly with other applications. In this

respect the military transportation infrastructure (Fig.1) that is gradually evolving in direct response

to the global transportation management needs of the US Department of Defense can be viewed as

consisting of a large number of sharable resources. Some of these resources are databases that

serve as depositories of dynamically changing data. Others are software applications that analyze,

evaluate and generate views of combinations of data that are of interest to users.

### A2: T – In The U.S.

#### Aircraft carriers fall within U.S. sovereign territory

Lt. Commander Steve Rowe, U.S. Naval Reserve, September 2000, “Saving Naval Aviation,” http://www.combatreform.org/airborneaircraftcarriers.htm

The Navy has unbalanced the carrier air group's support and force-protection capabilities in favor of decks jammed with strike aircraft, essentially duplicating the Air Force's role. If naval aviation is to survive, it must be able to perform unique missions with forces based entirely at sea. Ask any naval aviator or naval flight officer (NFO) why the Navy bases its tactical aviation at sea, and he will tell you that Navy air is a vital and unique national capability. He will say that only carrier-based aviation can provide powerful combat power without the need for overseas airfields, basing rights, and overflight permissions, and regardless of the sensibilities of other nations. Navy aircrew will say that every aircraft carrier is little piece of sovereign U.S. territory from which the United States can defend its vital interests--with allies if desired; alone if required. Until very recently, the Navy pilot or NFO would have been right.

## A2: Disads

### A2: Airships Drains Political Capital

#### The plan has powerful Congressional allies and the backing of well-financed lobbies

William Matthews, Defense News Reporter, 5-1-2012, “Deflated: America’s Airship Revolution is Threatened by Mishaps, Delays, Funding Cuts,” http://www.defensenews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=2012305010009

Capt. Phillip Ventura, an Air Force spokesman, said in March that rising development costs, substantially higher sustainment costs and technical challenges prompted the Air Force to pull the plug on Blue Devil 2. “The Air Force determined that these cost overruns, in the current fiscal environment, outweighed the potential benefits of a long-duration ISR capability. Consequently, the airship contract was definitized Jan. 31, and descoped to deliver only the airship by June 30,” Ventura said. The Air Force has not yet decided on what to do with the airship after it is delivered, he said. Deptula and Mav6 have been pushing back hard, and the company now has at least two allies in Congress. Sens. Daniel Inouye, D-Hawaii, and Thad Cochran, R-Miss., reminded the Pentagon in a Feb. 14 letter that as recently as November 2010, the Air Force considered Blue Devil 2 as “urgently needed,” and that “the U.S. Central Command continues to maintain a requirement for this capability.” They added that “it would be a significant failure to stop work and not deploy this much needed platform to Afghanistan.”

#### Bipartisan support for airship funding

Ben Iannotta, Reporter for Defense News, 6-5-2012, “Will Congress Overrule the White House on Key ISR Programs?,” http://www.defensenews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=2012306050006

For those who watch ISR spending, a large portion of the drama this budget season centers on whether Congress will step in to overturn cuts proposed for three programs that, until a few months ago, were labeled as crucial for the war in Afghanistan and intelligence gathering elsewhere. In a change of heart, the Obama administration now wants to save some $6 billion over a decade by canceling, or in one case scaling back, three programs: The Block 30 versions of the Global Hawk unmanned planes that were to replace eavesdropping, photo-taking U-2s in 2015; the 370-foot long multi-intelligence Blue Devil 2 airship that was going to be delivered to Afghanistan as a harbinger of more airships to come; and the Enhanced View commercial satellite imagery purchasing program, whose broad area images the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency converts into foundational maps for other kinds of intelligence. As Congress mulls the administration’s 2013 budget proposal, lobbyists and corporate executives are working furiously behind the scenes, and in some cases through the media, to rescue their programs. While Northrop Grumman appears to be winning support on Capitol Hill, Enhanced View contractor GeoEye and Blue Devil 2’s Mav6 are bracing for the cuts. For Mav6, which depends on the airship for nearly 90 percent of revenue, finding a new sponsor could be crucial to survival for the 85-person company. Block 30 Global Hawk Northrop’s camera- and SIGINT-equipped Block 30 Global Hawks have been gaining the most traction in Congress, although the restoration of all 31 aircraft is seen as a long shot. “It’s likely that the cancellation will stick, but there will be a compromise,” said Phil Finnegan, an analyst with the Teal Group of Fairfax, Va. “Any administration always has trouble with cancellations because Congress likes to keep production lines open.” Finnegan noted moves in the House of Representatives to retain the 18 Block 30s that are either flying or in production, and the possibility that three additional aircraft could be put on contract. Lawmakers on both sides of the aisle had chafed at the service’s proposal to box up the aircraft and send them to the “boneyard,” a Tucson, Ariz., facility known formally as the Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Center.

#### Low risk of a link – critics of the program are politically ignored

William Matthews, Defense News Reporter, 5-1-2012, “Deflated: America’s Airship Revolution is Threatened by Mishaps, Delays, Funding Cuts,” http://www.defensenews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=2012305010009

But the hybrid airship has its skeptics. Among them is Brandon Buerge, a Kansas-based aerospace engineer and former lead scientist for airship maker Guardian Flight Systems. A hybrid airship the size of the LEMV, which must keep moving to stay airborne, will run out for fuel long before 21 days, Buerge said. He estimates that it can fly for about seven days. Others say four or five. In a paper prepared for the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Buerge contends that conventional lighter-than-air ships, not hybrids, which depend on aerodynamic lift, are better suited for long-endurance flights. “The lifting body hybrid airship model was capable of carrying more than twice the fuel load of the similarly sized conventional ship,” he said. But hybrids burn through fuel fairly fast. “The much lower average fuel burn predicted for the conventional ship resulted in generally superior loitering performance,” Buerge wrote. Peter Van Staagen also questions LEMV’s ability to stay aloft for three weeks. Vice president and chief technology officer of Information Systems Laboratories, a San Diego firm that focuses on ISR technologies among others, Van Staagen said, “Carrying that amount of payload and flying that duration at those altitudes — all of those are singularly difficult. Doing one is hard, doing two is very difficult, doing all three is impossible” with current technology. Van Staagen estimates that LEMV can stay aloft for about five days. The Army’s 21-day mission? “That’s a real stretch,” he said. But the skeptics’ evaluations “have fallen on deaf ears,” and a half-billion dollars has been spent on the LEMV, he said. When asked about flight duration doubts, Army officials responded with a prepared statement: “Flight durations will depend on each specific mission set and payloads, and cannot be discussed.” But LEMV’s endurance is being examined outside the Army. Complaints filed through the Government Accountability Office’s FraudNET charge the Army with “waste, fraud, abuse and mismanagement of federal funds” for proceeding with LEMV and ignoring claims that the LEMV could not meet the 21-day flight goal. GAO has begun examining the program, but a GAO official declined to provide details while the evaluation is underway.

### A2: Spending/Econ Disads

#### Cutting defense spending incites depression

James Cypher, Professor of Economics at CSU-Fresno, Dollars & Sense, July-August, 2002, p19(4)

Military spending is once again propping up an economy burdened by excess capacity and withering private-sector investment. (See James M. Cypher, "Return of the Iron Triangle: The New Military Buildup," D&S, January/February 2002.) But military spending also crowds out social programs supported by public-sector funds, such as healthcare, public transportation, education, and environmental protection. James M. Cypher Since World War II, military spending has been used by the U.S. government as an imperfect form of domestic planning. It has functioned as a vital economic prop for a system that is prone to stagnation and depression. It has created an artificial demand for the "metal eating" industries (autos, steel, aluminum, coal, iron ore, machine tools, shipbuilding, etc.) whenever these industries faced a declining domestic market. In short, military spending has helped the U.S. economy grow.

#### \*Military spending causes more investment, preventing recession from turning into depression

James Cypher, Professor of Economics at CSU-Fresno, Dollars & Sense, July-August, 2002, p19(4)

The CEP attempts to show that the U.S. economy's low level of growth in recent years is due to a high level of military spending which leads to a low level of investment. (Military spending "crowds out" investment.) In fact, the opposite is true. In the United States, when military spending declines, investment declines. Thus, in 1970, military spending declined 1.6% and investment went down 2.0% (see table). In 1974 military spending fell 3.5% while investment decreased 1.7%. In both cases in the following year, military spending was increased to counteract the fall in investment. In expansionary periods we find that both military spending and investment increase. Thus, given the need for the stimulus that military spending provides for the U.S. economy, we find that military spending directly and via its ripple effect leads U.S. corporations to expand their capital base. In periods of slump and recession, the stimulus provided by military spending stops investment from declining as much as it otherwise would without the military buildup. This helps to put a "floor" underneath the economy, helping to stabilize its otherwise erratic movement.

#### Defense spending boosts the economy

Christopher Layne, Visiting Assistant Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing,” International Security, Summer, 1997, p. 110

It is not inappropriate to infer that the attempt to sustain expanding commitments on a shrinking relative power base is harmful to America’s economic performance. Is the strategy of preponderance directly responsible for America’s relative economic decline (or for making it worse than it otherwise might have been)? This is a complex question. Defense spending does not invariably lead to economic decline; indeed, under certain conditions it can stimulate economic growth.It could be argued in fact that America’s sustained postwar economic growth would have been impossible without “military Keynesianism.”

#### Defense spending helps the economy. All government spending is useful

Robert Higgs, Senior Fellow in Political Economy at The Independent Institute, “World War II and the Triumph of Keynesianism,” 2001, http://www.independent.org/tii/news/011008Higgs.html, accessed 1/19/03

Keynesian economics rests on the presumption that government spending, whether for munitions or other goods, creates an addition to the economy’s aggregate demand, which brings into employment labor and other resources that otherwise would remain idle. The economy gets not only the additional production occasioned by the use of those resources but still more output via a “multiplier effect.” Hence the Keynesian claim that even government spending to hire people to dig holes in the ground and fill them up again has beneficial effects; even though the diggers create nothing of value, the multiplier effect is set in motion as they spend their newly acquired income for consumption goods newly produced by others.

## A2: Militarism K

### Impact Turns

#### Shut Up Hippies!

Alex Epstein, fellow at ayn rand institute, 2003, “Peacenik Warmongers,” http://www.aynrand.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=7458

There is an increasingly vocal movement that seeks to engage America in ever longer, wider, and more costly wars--leading to thousands and perhaps millions of unnecessary deaths. This movement calls itself the "anti-war" movement. Across America and throughout the world, "anti-war" groups are staging "peace rallies" that attract tens and sometimes hundreds of thousands of participants, who gather to voice their opposition to an invasion of Iraq and to any other U.S. military action in the War on Terrorism. The goal of these rallies, the protesters proclaim, is to promote peace. "You can bomb the world to pieces," they chant, "but you can't bomb it into peace." If dropping bombs won't work, what should the United States do to obtain a peaceful relationship with the numerous hostile regimes, including Iraq, that seek to harm us with terrorism and weapons of mass destruction? The "peace advocates" offer no answer. The most one can coax out of them are vague platitudes (we should "make common cause with the people of the world," says the prominent "anti-war" group Not in Our Name) and agonized soul-searching ("Why do they hate us?"). The absence of a peacenik peace plan is no accident. Pacifism is inherently a negative doctrine--it merely says that military action is always bad. As one San Francisco protestor put the point: "I don't think it's right for our government to kill people." In practice, this leaves the government only two means of dealing with our enemies: to ignore their acts of aggression, or to appease them by capitulating to the aggressor's demands. We do not need to predict or deduce the consequences of pacifism with regard to terrorism and the nations that sponsor it, because we experienced those consequences on September 11. Pacifism practically dictated the American response to terrorism for more than 23 years, beginning with our government's response to the first major act of Islamic terrorism against this country: when Iranian mobs held 52 Americans hostage for 444 days at the American embassy in Tehran. In response to that and later terrorist atrocities, American Presidents sought to avoid military action at all costs--by treating terrorists as isolated criminals and thereby ignoring the role of the governments that support them, or by offering diplomatic handouts to terrorist states in hopes that they would want to be our friends. With each pacifist response it became clearer that the most powerful nation on Earth was a paper tiger--and our enemies made the most of it. After years of American politicians acting like peaceniks, Islamic terrorism had proliferated from a few gangs of thugs to a worldwide scourge--making possible the attacks of September 11. It is an obvious evasion of history and logic for the advocates of pacifism to label themselves "anti-war," since the policies they advocate necessarily invite escalating acts of war against anyone who practices them. Military inaction sends the message to an aggressor--and to other, potential aggressors--that it will benefit by attacking the United States. To whatever extent "anti-war" protesters influence policy, they are not helping to prevent war; they are acting to make war more frequent and deadly, by making our enemies more aggressive, more plentiful, and more powerful. The only way to deal with militant enemies is to show them unequivocally that aggression against the United States will lead to their destruction. The only means of imparting this lesson is overwhelming military force--enough to defeat and incapacitate the enemy. Had we annihilated the Iranian regime 23 years ago, we could have thwarted Islamic terrorism at the beginning, with far less cost than will be required to defeat terrorism today. And if we fail to use our military against state sponsors of terrorism today, imagine the challenge we will face five years from now when Iraq and Iran possess nuclear weapons and are ready to disseminate them to their terrorist minions. Yet such a world is the goal of the "anti-war" movement. The suicidal stance of peaceniks is no innocent error or mere overflow of youthful idealism. It is the product of a fundamentally immoral commitment: the commitment to ignore reality--from the historical evidence of the consequences of pacifism to the very existence of the violent threats that confront us today--in favor of the wish that laying down our arms will achieve peace somehow.

#### Demilitarization causes economic collapse

Fadhel Kaboub, UMKC, A Rising Tide Cannot Lift All Boats, February, 2001, http://f.students.umkc.edu/fkfc8/RisingTide.html, accessed 1/19/03

Employment policies in the U.S. have changed over time. Increasing aggregate demand used to be accomplished by increasing military expenditure. Military Keynesianism also promoted technological advancement in both public and private sectors, which resulted in increasing employment even for low-skilled workers. After the Cold War, the U.S. government reduced its military expenditure, therefore a large portion of the labor force became unemployed. In 1971, Paul M. Sweezy and Harry Magdoff estimated that if the U.S. were to completely eliminate its the military spending, the net effect in terms of unemployment would be worse than that observed during the Great Depression.

### Peace Mvmt/Pacifism Fails

#### Alt fails – militarism is too entrenched

Encyclopedia of the New American Nation, no date given ( “Militarism - The cold war and after”, <http://www.americanforeignrelations.com/E-N/Militarism-The-cold-war-and-after.html>)

Many conditions acceptable for achieving victory during World War II have been denounced as militarism in the postwar era. Believing that the war was essential for the achievement of legitimate national goals, most Americans accepted industrial mobilization, strong and sometimes secretive executive leadership, large armed forces, large military budgets, and the use of whatever weapons were available. From the beginning of the Cold War, however, there have been many dissenters who doubt any international danger and question the military and foreign policies designed to counter communist aggression.

Probably the most cited example of militarism in American life is the military-industrial complex—an alliance between the military establishment and the companies supplying weapons and matériel used by the armed forces. The relationship was not new during World War II, but huge postwar defense budgets and the great dependence of some companies on government orders brought lobbying activities to new heights and saw substantial increases in the number of former military men on corporation payrolls. Add to this intellectual, political, labor, and geographic interests in various research projects or companies whose operations represented thousands of jobs, and there emerges a vast constituency to influence defense decisions. Defense spending for research and development also has had great impact on the nation's universities. The historian Stuart W. Leslie has described how large contracts from the military have influenced academic scientific research and maintained or established new laboratories under university management. The science and engineering departments did the research, consulted, and trained the graduates for work that was in demand by the defense establishment with the result, as Leslie says, that the military was establishing the scientific priorities.

#### Attempts at pacifism fall short and only encourage aggressors

J. A. H. Futterman, Ph.D. from UT-Austin and Physicist at the University of California's Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, “Obscenity and Peace: Meditations on the Bomb,” 1990-

94, <http://www.dogchurch.com/scriptorium/nuke.html>

Still, there is the notion that because I did research related to nuclear weapons, I deserve a greater portion of guilt for what happens if they are used. Let me point out that even the anti-nuclear activists contribute to thenuclear weapons business, because they make war on nuclear weapons instead of making peace. They areshooting the bearer of the bad news that we can't make global war safely anymore . It's as if they want war to be safer, so that humanity can continue as before, making wars that only kill some of us. I hand them back the guilt[20] some of them wish to hand me. In particular, I sometimes consider those who engage in anti-war or anti-nuclear actions (including some scientists who eschew defense research for moral reasons)without ever doing any actual peace-making to be in the same category that Dante seems to have placed PopeCelestine V. Celestine apparently abdicated the papacy out of fear that the worldliness that one must take onas Pope would jeopardize his salvation. Of him and his kind Dante says, [21] "...These are the nearlysoulless, whose lives concluded neither blame nor praise. They are mixed here with that despicablecorps of angels who were neither for God nor Satan, but only for themselves. The High Creator scourged them from Heaven for its perfect beauty, and Hell will not receive them since the wickedmight feel some glory over them." In other words, I think that those who engage in peace protests withoutengaging in the enfranchisement of the disenfranchised, the empowerment of the powerless, and thedeterrence of the willfully destructive may be serving their own desire to be morally pure , more than thecause of peace. Instead of acknowledging the difference between forcefully confronting a bully and being one, they advocate passivity, which just encourages the bully.

### Violence/War Inevitable – Human Nature

#### Humans have a will to survive – they will do whatever necessary to ensure that survival

Victor Davis Hanson, Ph. D. in Classics, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, aProfessor Emeritus at California University, Fresno, “Postmodern War,” City Journal, February 8, 2005, http://www.victorhanson.com/articles/hanson020805.html   
Yet lost in all this confusion is the recognition that the essence of war remains unchanged—the use of force to eliminate an adversary, coerce an opponent to alter his behavior, or prevent annihilation. Technology ,modern social theory, the ease and luxury of the West—these are simply the delivery systems that change with the ages, but do not alter or affect the substance of conflict. In our present context, all our concern aboutAmerican combat casualties would vanish should there be another mass murder similar to 9/11. Like ancientman, postmodern man is hardwired to survive , and thus really will use his full arsenal when faced with the alternative of extinction . Should we lose the stock exchange or the White House, there would be almost no calls for restraint against states that harbored or aided the perpetrators, on the logic that every terrorist must sleep, eat, and use an ATM card somewhere. But what about the far more likely scenario of guerrilla wars and counterinsurgency? In such lesser conflicts, the human desire for victory still trumps most other considerations. The hysteria over the Iraqi war in the 2004 election did not really result from a failure to find weapons of mass destruction or to publicize a clear link between al-Qaida and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. These were issues raised after the fact for political purposes during a campaign that happened to coincide with a change in American perceptions as the war’s rocky aftermath unfolded. After all, on the eve of the invasion over 65 percent of Americans supported the war, and three weeks later, when Saddam’s statue fell, supportwas nearing 70 percent. The current depressing debate about preemption, allies, WMD, and al-Qaida ties originated in the subsequent inability of the United States to project a sense of absolute victory in the postbellum occupation, as looting led to terrorist reprisals, an insurgency, and televised beheadings.

### Pacifism = Moral Evil

#### Pacifism enables greater evils

Robert Tracinski, Received his undergraduate degree in Philosophy from the University of Chicago andstudied with the Objectivist Graduate Center and Editorial Director of the Ayn Rand Institute, “What a Real War Looks Like,” Ayn Rand Institute, September 14, 2001, http://www.aynrand.org/site/News2? page=NewsArticle&id=7386&news\_iv\_ctrl=1509

But, it has been asked, if we are to attack all of the nations that have harbored terrorists, are we really capableof such a massive task? The answer is that we must threaten our enemies with a level of force so awesome that no nation in the Middle East can resist us. We must be prepared to use nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons were first employed to secure the surrender of Japan, sparing the lives of hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops. If any terrorist nation chooses to resist our demands, we must be prepared to use these horrificweapons once again, with the same justification. Sparing our civilians and soldiers from mass death is precisely the purpose for which we maintain our nuclear arsenal. If we are not willing to use it now, then our nuclear deterrent becomes a hollow threat. Here the liberals will make their most dishonest objection: that theuse of such massive force will merely escalate a "cycle of violence." This evades the fact that Tuesday's attacks are the result of decades of turning the other cheek to evil, a policy that merely emboldened theterrorists. This is the real "cycle of violence." Even worse, liberals will balk at the prospect of civilian casualties in enemy countries. By this standard, however, the allies could not have fought Hitler, for fear of killing German civilians. It is obvious that such a pacifist philosophy would require a total surrender to evil. Yes, a full-scale war will be horrific. But war is supposed to be horrific--so horrific that our enemies cannot endure it and will not dare to repeat it.