# AAC Neg Addendum

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## Airpower doesn’t solve

### Doesn’t solve – Limited

#### AFF can’t solve- Airpower is not a ‘silver bullet’

Scott A. Cooper, captain in the U.S. Marine Corps, 2001, “Air Power and the Coercive,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 1, Project Muse

Although Corley's views rightfully praise the consistent and dependable performance of the U.S. military, one should not blindly accept the conclusions of his report and the general utility of air power. The belief that air power used alone can vanquish an enemy is dangerous for any strategic thinker or policymaker. Operation Allied Force was a successful test of the [End Page 81] North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) will and cohesion. Its lessons, however, are not found in its victory, but in its problems and paradoxes.¶ Although Operation Allied Force enjoyed a successful conclusion, it taught the military about the limits of air power as a coercive tool: morally and practically, its use does not come without risks or costs. These lessons caution the U.S. military and senior policymakers not to become overconfident in its ability to coerce but to explore more deeply the concept of coercion in order to define explicitly the role and capabilities of the U.S. military in international conflicts.¶ From the outset of Operation Allied Force, the expectation that air power would have an influence on the flow of refugees confuses the capabilities of air power. As a practical matter, no military alternative that would have prevented the expulsion of 800,000 Kosovar Albanians at an acceptable cost to the allied coalition was plausible. Decisionmakers chose air power because it was an act that could be done, and done quickly, even though it hardly related to the situation on the ground.¶ Many in the defense community, including those who flew in Operation Allied Force, were acutely aware of the limits of air power. After the first days of bombing, pilots' reactions mirrored those of many editorial writers, who asked, "What is air power doing to stem the flow of refugees?" The air campaign coincided with--but did little to deter--the intensification of Operation Horseshoe, the Serb military effort to expel ethnic Albanians from Kosovo. Airmen understood that their mission was not to curb this tide but to destabilize Yugoslav president Milosevic's regime, even though his seemingly successful effort to cleanse Kosovo ethnically appeared to undermine their efforts. Milosevic's eventual capitulation surprised those who flew in the war as much as it did the general public, and many airmen did not believe that the 11 weeks of bombing had directly caused Serb forces to retreat from Kosovo. Operation Allied Force was an aberration because coercion of the regime worked without occupying Kosovo, and NATO was lucky it did. The operation also was an aberration because of the minimal collateral damage to all parties.¶ The defense community faces a challenge because its last major victory, Operation Desert Storm, was also an aberration, for two primary reasons. First, Iraq chose to fight the coalition symmetrically; for example, Saddam Hussein did not use chemical weapons against Israeli cities. The Iraqi army, however, hadless firepower and was not nearly as well trained as the U.S. forces were. Second, the battlefield was well definedand had a contained theater [End Page 82] of operations. Policymakers are in danger of using these past victories as examples of U.S. capabilities without considering the fortunes we enjoyed.

### Doesn’t solve – AAA Guns

#### AFF gets shot down – literally

Barry R. Posen, Professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a member of its Security Studies Program, 2003, “Command of the Commons: The military foundation of U.S. Hegemony,” International Security, Vol. 28, No. 1, Project Muse

Inexpensive weaponry drives U.S. fighters to high altitudes, where their effectiveness against ground forces is reduced. Below 15,000 feet, expensive tactical fighter aircraft are vulnerable to inexpensive weaponry—light-to-medium automatic cannon (antiaircraft artillery, or AAA) and relatively small and inexpensive short-range SAMS (mainly portable infrared-guided systems similar to the U.S. Stinger). Although some kinds of decoys work against some of the low-altitude SAMs, the effectiveness of AAA is essentially a function of how many weapons the adversary possesses, their location relative to important targets, and how much ammunition they are able and willing to expend. AAA is best thought of as a kind of aerial minefield. Vast numbers of AAA weapons [End Page 24] were built during the Cold War, especially by the Warsaw Pact, but also in the West. They seem not to wear out. 56 The majority of U.S. aircraft and helicopters lost in the Vietnam War were brought down by AAA. 57 Though coalition aircraft losses in the 1991 Persian Gulf War were very low, AAA and short-range infrared SAMs caused 71 percent of the attrition. 58 Currently, the U.S. military reports only 7 aircraft lost to enemy fire in the 2003 war—6 attack helicopters and an A-10. It is likely that all were victims of short-range air defense weapons. 59 In the only major success for Iraqi air defenses, 27 of 35 U.S. Army attack helicopters were damaged and one was lost in a single raid—all to AAA. 60 Even in South Vietnam, where North Vietnamese and Vietcong units had no radars for early warning, these weapons brought down 1,700 helicopters and aircraft between 1961 and 1968. 61 Generally, it is now the strategy of U.S. and [End Page 25] Western air forces to fly above 15,000 feet to avoid AAA. This reduces losses, but it also significantly reduces a pilot's ability to locate enemy forces on the ground, to distinguish targets from decoys, to distinguish undamaged targets from damaged ones, and more generally to develop a feel for the ground situation. A mobile adversary, with some knowledge of camouflage and deception, operating in favorable terrain, can exploit these problems. Thus inexpensive and simple air defense weapons help to protect ground forces even when they do not down many aircraft.

## A2: China-Taiwan Conflict

#### China would really rather not go to war with Taiwan – economic partners check back

Thomas Christensen, Professor of political

science MIT, 1-7-2010, “The Contemporary Security Dilemma: Deterring a Taiwan Conflict,” The Washington Quarterly

 <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1162/016366002760252509>, CP

That being said, economic growth and job creation are also critical to the¶ stability of the regime in China. The goals of economic growth and nationalism¶ sometimes pull Beijing in opposite directions. Good economic policy¶ requires further foreign penetration of the Chinese economy and positive¶ relations with the United States, Taiwan, and Japan—China's three biggest¶ economic partners—whereas nationalist posturing in military and economic¶ policy could easily injure relations with those major trading and investment¶ partners. An attack against Taiwan would risk not only military disaster but¶ also prolonged alienation of China's economic partners. Beijing may be willing¶ to fight over Taiwan even against militarily superior foes, but it is hardly¶ eager to do so. Thus, deterrence is possible, but not simple.¶ Traditional theorizing about the security dilemma in the Taiwan Strait¶ has three related deficiencies. First, security dilemma theorists have assumed¶ that international security politics concerns merely defending sovereign territory from invasion and foreign acquisition. Second, from that assumption¶ these theorists have argued that defensive weapons systems and¶ doctrines therefore pose little threat to stability because they require no response¶ from other defenders of the status quo. Finally, these theorists therefore¶ believe that arms control efforts, particularly those focusing on limitations¶ on offensive weaponry capable of seizing territory, are the best corrective¶ measures to prevent security dilemmas and spiraling tensions.11