## Util Good 2AC

Utilitarianism is moral – this crushes their warrants

Kymlicka, 90 (Will, Professor of Philosophy and Canada Research Chair in Political Philosophy, Queen's University at Kingston, Recurrent Visiting Professor, Central European University, “Contemporary Political Philosophy,” Clarendon Press, pg. 10-11, Tashma)

There are two features of utilitarianism that make it an attractive theory of political morality. Firstly, the goal which utilitarians seek to promote does not depend on the existence of God, or a soul, or any other dubious metaphysical entity. Some moral theories say that what matters is the condition of one`s soul, or that one should live according to God`s Divine Will, or that one’s life goes best by having everlasting life in another realm of being. Many people have thought that morality is incoherent without these religious notions. Without God, all we are left with is a set of rules——‘do this’, ‘don`t do that`—which lack any point or purpose. It is not clear why anyone would think this of utilitarianism. The good it seeks to promote—happiness, or welfare, or well-being—is something that we all pursue in our own lives, and in the lives of those we love, Utilitarians just demand that the pursuit of human welfare or utility (I will be using these terms interchangeably) be done impartially, for everyone in society. Whether or not we are God’s children, or have a soul, or free will, we can suffer or be happy, we can all be better or worse off. No matter how secular we are, we cannot deny that happiness is valuable, since it is something we value in our own lives. A distinct but related attraction is utilitarianism’s ‘consequentialism`. I will discuss what exactly that means later on, but for the moment its importance is that it requires that we check to see whether the act or policy in question actually does some identifiable good or not. We have all had to deal with people who say that something——homosexuality, for example (or gambling, dancing, drinking, swearing, etc.)-—is morally wrong, and yet are incapable of pointing to any bad consequences that arise from it. Consequentialism prohibits such apparently arbitrary moral prohibitions. It demands of anyone who condemns something as morally wrong that they show who is wronged, i.e. they must show how s0meone`s life is made worse off. Likewise, consequentialism says that something is morally good only if it makes someone’s life better off. Many other moral theories, even those motivated by a concern for human welfare, seem to consist in a set of rules to be followed, whatever the consequences. But utilitarianism is 110t just another set of rules, another set of ‘do’s’ and ‘don’ts’. Utilitarianism provides a test to ensure that such rules serve some useful function. Consequentialism is also attractive because it conforms to our intuitions about the difference between morality and other spheres. If someone calls certain kinds of consensual sexual activity morally wrong because they are `improper’, and yet cannot point to anyone who suffers from them, then we might respond that the idea of ‘proper` behaviour being employed is not a moral one. Such claims about proper behaviour are more like aesthetic claims, or an appeal to etiquette or convention. Someone might say that punk rock is ‘improper’, not legitimate music at all. But that would be an aesthetic criticism, not a moral one. To say that homosexual sex is ‘improper’, without being able to point to any bad consequences, is like saying that Bob Dylan sings inproperly—it may be true, but it is not a moral criticism. There are standards of propriety that are not consequentialist, but we think that morality is more important than mere etiquette, and consequentialism helps account for that difference. Consequentialism also seems to provide a straightforward method for resolving moral questions. Finding the morally right answer becomes a matter of measuring changes in human welfare, not of consulting spiritual leaders, or relying on obscure traditions. Utilitarianism, historically, was therefore quite progressive. It demanded that customs and authorities which had oppressed people for centuries be tested against the standard of human improvement (‘man is the measure of all things`). At its best, utilitarianism is a strong weapon against prejudice and superstition, providing a standard and a procedure that challenge those who claim authority over us in the name of morality.

And it causes motivation – solves their morality claims

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If we are t0 treat utilitarianism as a plausible political morality, then we must interpret it as a theory of equal consideration. That may seem strange, given the inegalitarian acts utilitarianism might justify—e.g. depriving disliked people of their liberty. But we need t0 distinguish different levels at which equality can be a value. While utilitarianism may have unequal effects 0n people, it can none the less claim t0 be motivated by a concern for treating people as equals.

## Perm 2AC

**Perm do both – pragmatic solutions are key**

**Shaviro, 90** (Steven, PhD from Yale, professor at Wayne State University, former professor at University of Washington, “Passion and Excess,” The Florida State University Press, pg. 39-40, Tashma)

Clearly a new approach was needed to the task of forging "la destinée humainc libre, Parrnchant a Fasservissement rationnel de la production comme :3 Vasservissement irrationnel au passe [a tree human destiny, tearing it away from the rational enslavement of production, as well as from the irrational enslavement to the past]” (OC, 1:465; VE, 194). In the rituals 0l`Acéphale, the “secrct s0ciety" or “conspiracy\*’ which absorbed most of his efforts between 1936 and 1939, Bataille sought to articulate a sufficiently violent libertarian response to fascism’s sinister sublimation of violence and binding of social energies. From a position of willed marginality, the Acéphale group attempted at once to make a decisive political intervention, and to transgress the limits which circumscribe any definition of the “‘political.“ “Il est néccssaire dc pro· duire et de manger: beaucoup de choses sont néccssaircs qui ne sont encore rien et il en est également ainsi de l’agitation politiquc [It is necessary to produce and to cat: many things are necessary that are still nothing, and so it is with political agitation]" (OC, 1:442, VE, 179). Political necessity is a matter of survival and may not be belittled or denied, But **it must be fused with** "interior experience” in the **sacrificial violence** of "nonproductive expenditure.”

**Perm do both – Excessive consumption will cause extinction – it’s already at an unsustainable level.**

**Trainer, 07** (Ted Trainer, Senior Lecturer in the School of Social Work at the University of New South Wales. “Renewable Energy Cannot Sustain a Consumer Society” p. 128-29)

It is of the utmost importance to recognize that whether or not renewable energy can sustain consumer-capitalist society is not a matter of whether it can meet present energy demand. The essential question is whether it can enable constant increase int he volume of goods and services being consumed and the associated increase in energy demand. Energy demand is rising significantly, although estimates of future demand vary. ABARE’s *Energy Outlook 2000*shows that the average annual rate of growth in energy use in Australia over the decade of the 1990s was around 2.5% p. a. The *Australian Yearbook* shows that between 1982 and 1998 Australian energy use increased 50%, an arithmetical average growth rate of 3.13% p.a., and the rate has been faster in more recent years. (Graph 5.12.) However ABARE estimates that Australian energy demand will slow, reaching about 1.9% p.a. by 2040, meaning more than a doubling in annual use by then. In July 2003 Australian electricity authorities warned that blackouts are likely in coming years due to the rapid rate of increase in demand, estimated at almost 3% pa for the next five years. (ABC News, 31 July.) Robbins (2003) reports NEMMCO predicting electricity growth over the next 10 years in NSW, Queensland and Victoria as 3.1%, 3.5% and 2.6% p.a. respectively. Poldy (2005) shows that over the past 100 years Australian energy consumption has followed GDP growth closely, and he estimates that in recent years it has approximated a growth rate of 3.6% p.a. In 2004 world energy use jumped, growing at 4.3% p.a. (Catan, 2005.) Thus the commitment to growth greatly exacerbates the problem, and in turn all of the other resource supply problems, because all involve an energy component. For instance if the cost of fuel increases significantly, then so will the cost of food and minerals, and even university courses, because fuel is needed to produce them. It has been argued above that renewables are not likely to be capable of meeting present electricity and liquid fuel demand, but given the inertia built into growth trends, the demand to be met will probably be three or four times as big as it is now by mid century...and doubling every approximately 35 years thereafter. To summarise regarding Fault 1, consumer-capitalist society is obviously grossly unsustainable. We have far overshot levels of production, consumption, resource use and affluence that are sustainable for ourselves over a long period of time, let alone extended to all the world’s people. Yet our top priority is to increase them continuously, without limit. This is the basic cause of the many alarming sustainability problems now threatening our survival.

## Falsifiability

### theory non-faisabiable

**Bataille’s theories of sacrifice are based on non-falsifiable means**

Olson, 94 – professor of philosophy at Allegheny College, masters in theological studies from the University of Dallas, (Carl, “Eroticism, violence, and sacrifice: A postmodern theory of religion and ritual,” Method & Theory in the Study of Religion, ProQuest)//JKahn

4. Eroticism and death Without giving any historical proof for his position, Bataille asserts that the origin of eroticism can be traced prior to the division of humanity into those who were free and those who were slaves. It's origins can be found m pre- historic signs of erotic life embodied by figures with large breasts and erect penises, but its foundation is the sexual act itself (Bataille 1989a: 66). The knowledge of death plays an important role m the origin of eroticism. Al-though his claim cannot be refuted or proven, Bataille asserts that prehistoric beings were aware of death, an awareness that gave nse to an awareness of eroticism. The knowledge of death is essential because it gives rise to a sensibility that m turn stimulates eroticism, an extreme emotion that sepa- rates the sexuality of humans from that of animals (Bataille 1989a: 31-32, 23).5 The difference between humans and animals is more precisely defined when he states that "eroticism differs from the animal sexual impulse m that it is, m principle, just as work is, the conscious searching for an end, for sensual pleasure." (Bataille 1989a: 44) There is also an anticipation by the participants m erotic play that it will culminate with sensual pleasure. In the pleasure of erotic play one does not gain anything or become enriched, unlike [continues…] 6. Bataille's theory and the Sun Dance Bataille failed to test his theory of sacrifice by applying it to actual examples of sacrifice m the religions of the world. Having defined the nature of sacnfice for Bataille, it is therefore necessary to compare it to an actual sacnfice. In order to demonstrate the shortcomings of Bataille's theory of sacrifice I have chosen to apply it to the Sun Dance of the Sioux. Following this example, I suggest that, contrary to Bataille's theory, a more reasonable interpretation of the Sun Dance can be attained by concentratmg on its symbolism. This approach is suggested by the theoretical work of Clifford Geertz (1971) and Victor Turner (1967; 1968; 1975), the latter of whom refers to a symbol as the smallest umt of ntual or as storage umts of dynamic entities. My account of the Sun Dance relies on the work James R. Walker (1980) because his information was gathered from several different sources, and it represents the most authoritative account available to us of the rite in one period of its history My approach presupposes that the nte and its meaning have continued to change m response to new circumstances for the Sioux. By selectmg this nte, I am bemg eminently fair to Bataille, from one perspective, because the erotic and violent features of the Sun Dance could be used to prove the validity of his theory The complexity of the Sun Dance makes it difficult to interpret. Although he does not consider the Sun Dance of the Sioux, Jorgensen (1972: 206, 236) interprets, for mstance, the Ute and Shoshone nte as an acquisition of power that transforms the person and allows him to gain power, status, and autonomy From another perspective, Melody (1976) interprets the Sun Dance of the Sioux as a commemoration of tribal virtues expressed m the dance, a celebration of the people, an acknowledgment of the generative power of the sun, and a celebration of renewal. The rejoicing over renewal of the world is close to Hultkrantz's mterpretation (1981. 238) of the nte as a recreation of the cosmos. According to Hassnck (1967' 238, 248), the Sun Dance represents a socially umfymg activityactivity and a chance to resolve a conflict between an individual ego and the adjustment to the physical and social forces. And Lewis (1972: 47) mterprets the Sun Dance in terms of its various functions: umfymg force; maintaining tribal traditions; insuring tribal well-bemg in huntmg and warfare; offering to the dancer perpetual prestige. I propose offenng a different mterpretive approach for the Sun Dance that cntically reflects on Bataille's theory According to this interpretation, the Sun Dance of the Sioux exhibits a threefold significance: existential, social, and cosmic. In other words, if one examines the many symbols associated with the nte, one will see that this sacnfice enables one to attain three levels of being. While the sacred pole was bemg pamted, mstructors and students sat m a circle around the black painted figures of a buffalo and man, each de- picted with exaggerated gemtals, m order to impart to the man the potency of Iya, patron-god of libertmism, and to the buffalo the potency of Gnaski, the crazy buffalo and patron-god of licentiousness (Walker 1980: 107-108). According to Black Elk's non-nsqué interpretation of the images, the buffalo represented all the four-legged animals on the earth, and the figure of the man signified all people (Brown 1979' 79). In contrast, Bataille would be quick to seize on the erotic connections of the patron gods of libertinism and licentiousness. However, if the erotic is a quest for sensual pleasure, repre- sents a realm of play, and reveals a foretaste of continuity, it cannot be used to interpret the meaning of Iya and Gnaski because within the context of the Sun Dance they more powerfully suggest the renewal and recreation motifs of the rite. Bataille's concept of eroticism also would not fit into an insightful interpretation of the Sun Dance as a dominant theme of the rite because of its anti-social character as a solitary activity accomplished m secret. The heterological method of Bataille is intended to alleviate the contra- dictions of life and free the individual from the homogeneity of the world. In contrast to Bataille's insistence on a search for radical difference, the world- view of the Sioux, embodied m the symbolic aspects of the Sun Dance con-ceived as an offering of body and soul to Wakan-Tanka (the Great Spmt), suggests a homogeneous view of the cosmos. The umverse, for mstance, is represented by the round form of the ceremomal drum, whose steady beat is the throbbmg at the centre of the cosmos (Brown 1979' 69). Within the context of the Sun Dance, the cosmic pillar of the umverse is represented by the cottonwood tree, which further represents the enemy who is symbolically killed and transported back to the centre of the campcamp by means of sticks because human hands are not allowed to touch the body The ntual partic- ipants consecrate the tree with the stem of the sacred pipe, another symbol of the earth, the buffalo, and everything that lives and grows on the earth. Once the tree is trimmed of its branches and its sides and branch tips are painted red, the rawhide effigies of a man and a buffalo are suspended from the crosspiece of the sacred tree, which is then placed into a hole at the centre of the camp. The sacred tree not only suggests a umversal pillar, but it also represents the wayway of the people (Brown 1979 69, 75-76). Other cosmic symbols are the sun and earth signified by a red circle, symbolic of all that is sacred. In the centre of the circle representing the sun is a blue circle which suggests Wakan-Tanka, the centre of the cosmos and all existence (Brown 1979' 71-72). Moreover, the lodge of the Sun Dance is composed of twenty- eight poles, each signifying an object of creation, and staked m a circle that represents the entire created world (Brown 1979' 80). It is difficult to find anything excessive or transgressme in these cosmic symbols of the Sioux that would support Bataille's position. Rather than achieving the differentiation that Bataille's theory advocates, the sun dancer symbolically acquires the cosmos. According to the ethno- logical report of Walker (1980: 114), the candidate who dances the most excruciatingly painful form of the dance with the intention of becoming a shaman is given a small hoop by his mentor. This hoop is symbolic of the sky, the four winds, time, all things that grow, and all circular thmgs made by the tribe. After his successful completion of the dance, the sun dancer is allowed to place this symbol on his tipi. This privilege suggests that he attams all that the hoop symbolizes. Contrary to Bataille's theory, the highest aspiring sun dancer does not find that the cosmos becomes other for him, and he does not stand as an individual sovereign within the cosmos. He rather becomes part of the whole, and he acquires the cosmos. Instead of perceiving the cosmic symbolism associated with the most painful performance of the rite, Bataille's writings suggest that he would stress its sadistic and masochistic aspects. Sadism, an excessive violation of modesty and a violent excretion, is not onlyonly an eruption of excremental forces, but it also forms a limitation by subjugating whatever is opposed to such an eruption (Bataille 1970-1988: II, 56). If masochism is an enjoyment of pain, the violence exercised on the flesh of the sun dancers would be viewed by Bataille as a transgression and violation of the participant's flesh, which also calls attention to the flesh itself and connects it to the erotic. Bataille also mamtams (1984: 91) that violence agamst the flesh is an external manifestation of the internal violence of the sacnficial participant, which is perceived as a loss of blood and vanous forms of ejaculations. Moreover, for Bataille the cuttingcutting of the flesh would be suggestive of the discontinuity of the self. Unlike the solitary activity of eroticism for Bataille, the sun dancer of the Sioux rite does not distinguish or divorce himself from his society because he represents the people and suffers on their behalf during the rite. After punfymg themselves, their clothing, and the equipment to be used m the nte, the participants crycry at the centre of the campcamp and assume the suffering of the people, which enables other tribal members to gain understanding and strength (Brown 1979' 72, 78). If there is present the discontinuity charac-tenstic of Bataille's profane human society among the Sioux, the Sun Dance bridges any social divisions by uniting the social bonds of a particular tribe and umtmg them with different Indian tribes. By means of an invitation from the tribe initiating the nte prior to its begmnng, other Indian tribes are invited to participate m the nte, even though some of the visitors may be hereditary enemies (Dorsey 1894: 452). This scenano enhances the social solidarity of the Indian nation and builds a closer relationship with the things of the um- verse ; the sacred centre created by the dancers is alleged always to be with them throughout the remainder of their existence. There is no evidence of transgressme or excessive social behaviour by the sun dancers m Bataille's sense. Moreover, the dancers have acquired a sacred power dunng the nte that they may later share with other members of their societysociety According to Powers (1977' 100), the acquired power of the sun dancers may be mvested m those who are sick by the placement of the dancers' hands on the less fortunate. Thereby the sacred power is shared to cure the sick, and enter into communion with others. In comparison to Bataille's theory, the sun dancers do not differentiate themselves from their society They share a sacred power that can benefit every member of the tribe. Bataille's heterological method and its stress on finding radical difference prevents him from seeing the socially unifying possibilities of a rite such as the Sun Dance. According to Bataille, violence is inevitable because human beings can- not totally reject it. In contrast to Bataille's theory, the Sun Dance represents a threefold sacrifice of which the initial two sacrificial actions are symbolic: cutting down the cottonwood tree which is symbolic of the enemy; shooting at the effigies of a man and buffalo suspended from the crosspiece of the sacred tree, and the final action of the actual sacrifice of human flesh on the fourth day of the rite. The second symbolic killing of the effigies of a man and buffalo, amid much rejoicing by the participants, represents the hope for future success m hunting and victory in war (Powers 1977' 98). These sym-bolic killings by the Sioux violates Bataille's assertion that violence cannot be controlled. Rather, the symbolic nature of the Sioux killings suggests a limiting and eventual termination of violence and not a promoting of any cycle of violence. Although Bataille is right to emphasize the importance of violence m sacrifice, there does not appear to be any danger that the con- tagious violence of the sacred will overflow and overwhelm the Sioux and other tribes. There are certainly martial features to the Sun Dance, but their symbolic nature suggests a containment of violence rather than any overflow- ing of it. Bataille's theory does make clear, however, that the Sioux accept violence, even though they try to reject or control it. Within the drama of the Sun Dance, there is a hint of an inherent prestige associated with victims who choose to perform the sacrifice in the most painful and violent manner. The actual sacnficial victims, for instance, can choose to dance m any of four ways-ways: gazing at the sun from dawn to dusk; having wooden skewers, tied to rawhide ropes secured about half wayway up the sacred pole, mserted into their breasts; having wooden skewers mserted mto the breasts and then being suspended about one foot off the ground; or having wooden skewers inserted which then are attached with thongs to one or more buffalo skull(s) that must be dragged along the dance area (Powers 1977' 98-99). The Sun Dance is not completed until the flesh of the victim has been torn through, representing the death and rebirth of the victim. It is permissible for others to assist by pulling on the ropes to end the victim,' agony As well, the multiple number of sun dancers contradicts Bataille's assertion (1988a: 59) that a victim represents a surplus of communal wealth and substitutes for other members of the commumty Neither is the victim an accursed share destmed for violent destruction. Bataille is nght, however, to emphasize the importance of death m sacnfice, which possesses the power to return one to continuity by means of eroticism. What he fails to see is the connection between death and spintual rebirth. And due to his notion of eroticism, which represents a disequilibrmm that stimulates a person consciously to call one's being into question, Bataille is not able to recogmze that the sun dancer is actually actually able to find his identity Although Bataille's theory of sacrifice does not account for the Sun Dance in its entirety, the rite does adhere to his theory to some extent because it calls attention to the flesh and reveals external violence and the internal violence of the subject. The violation and breaking of the sun dancer's flesh does suggest the usefulness of Bataille's observation about the intimate connection between human flesh and violence. However, by giving pieces of their flesh, the sun dancers impugn Bataille's claim that the violation of the victim's flesh connotes a connection to a sexual act. At this point, Bataille's theory is problematic because it lacks consistent sense m the context of the Sun Dance. Bataille's need to reintroduce eroticism blinds him to the facts or drama of an actual sacrifice. The flesh of the sacrificial victim m the Sun Dance represents ignorance (Brown 1979' 85) and not the dispossession of the self, an anti-social aspect of eroticism for Bataille. From an existential perspective, to be freed from the ropes tied to the skewers symbolizes freedom from the bonds of the flesh and not some erotic urge. The lack of an erotic emotion is evident m the symbolism of donning rabbit skins on the dancer's arms and legs. The rabbit is a symbol of humility, a virtue with which one must approach Wakan-Tanka. The victim is also equated symbolically with the sacred pipe that stretches from heaven to earth (Brown 1979. 74). In this context, the sacred pipe mdicates the transcending of earthlyearthly flesh. The dancer becomes the centre of the world m which the four directions meet when he is tied at the centre of the four poles, so that the four directions converge m his body (Brown 1979' 95). Within the drama of the Sun Dance, elements of eroticism, violence, and death are evident. This does not mean, however, that these features of sacrifice necessarily involve stressing separation, difference, transgression, and excess. Although it is possible to find these features in the Sun Dance to some degree, the Sioux nte stresses finding one's identity within a religious and social tradition. By successfully completmg the nte, a sun dancer does not separate himself from the group or become distinct from other things; rather, he often assumes a position of leadership within the tribe. And, as already noted, the sun dancer is intimately related to his mentor, ntual assistant or second, and other members of the tribe who play various roles m the nte. All this suggests the socially unifying nature of the nte. Moreover, within a tribal society such as the Sioux, the individual's identity is sociallysocially defined, even though one's visions and dreams help one to define oneself and one's place within a wider social context. Besides being a form of human sacnfice, the Sun Dance also functions as an initiation rite. The dancer, having died to his former ignorant condition, attains a totally new existential status of enlightenment and responsibility The ordeal that one endures is often accompanied by visions of the divine; the successful completion of the nte is a prereqmsite if one aspires to become a shaman. Walker (1980: 182) notes that after the successful completion of the Sun Dance the victim is eligible for leadership of a war party or for chieftamship. The candidate receives new meamng and status which is symbolized by the red design, drawn on his chest by the shaman as a symbol of all that is sacred. Furthermore, the victim is equated throughout the nte with the moon, which waxes and wanes, lives and dies, like all things (Brown 1979- 71). 7 Concluding remarks The significance of the Sun Dance enables us to see that there is an alternative interpretation to Bataille's theory that is more faithful to the actual evidence and is not simply imposed on the ritual activities by the creative imagination of a theorist. This interpretive analysis of the Sun Dance is suggested by the patterns exhibited by the nte itself and reflects more accurately the actual nte and its religious and symbolic context. Bataille, however, includes a personal agenda because he wants to re-introduce the erotic into religion. In other words, Bataille's theoretical speculation about eroticism shapes his theory of religion and sacnfice. Thus, his theoretical world-view takes precedence over the religious phenomena that he examines. With his involvement in the Surrealist movement, his emphasis on em- bracing bodily waste, his anal and erotic obsessions, the role of the ambiguous pineal eye in his works, and composition of excessively obscene novels, all suggest an explicit advocacy of decadence by Bataille. In his work entitled My Mother, the socially excessive theme is mcest. His novel The Blue of Noon, for mstance, focuses on the nauseous and squalid aspects of human life where its characters are engaged m endless orgies, vomiting, and unnat- mg. The erotic and death are contmually united in his Story of the Eye when, for example, the two leading libertmes of the novel have sexual mtercourse next to the cadaver of a young girl they have driven to death. Two further dramatic examples are the rape of a priest by the female protagomst and his death by strangulation and simultaneous sexual orgasm, and the death of the distracted matador gorged through his eye by the hom of a bull as he is distracted and blinded by the obscene antics of the female protagomst. Bataille's hermeneutical method of heterology is designed to lead to ex- cess and decadence. Trymg to explain his mithode de meditataon used m his book on religious expenence, Bataille wntes (1954: 216), "I think like a girl takes off her dress. At its most extreme pomt, thought is immodesty, obscen- ity itself." This kind of statement seems to suggest de Sade or Mephistopheles becommg Faust. In his work on heterology, Pefams summarily states (1991. 41) that the works of Bataille are "a theater of the excremental m whose scenes one may glimpse golden threads." Frednc Jameson (1991. 382), a self-admitted Amencan adherent of postmodern literary cnticism, affirms that decadence is a charactenstic of postmodermsm: "'Decadence' is thus in some way the very premonition of the postmodern itself, but under condi- tions that make it impossible to predict that aftermath with any sociological or cultural accuracy, thereby divertmg the vague sense of a future into more fantastic forms, all borrowed from the misfits and eccentrics, the perverts and the Others, or aliens, of the present (modem) system." And if, as sug- gested by Rosen (1987' 142), this decadence originates in political despair, Bataille's hermeneutical program is a political manifesto and not an apt tool for interpretmg religious phenomena. From a more positive perspective, Bataille's theory of religion does call attention to neglected elements in the study of religion in the form of bodily waste: excrement, saliva, tears, unne, mucus, dirt, skin, and so forth. Al- though his distinction between the sacred and the profane cannot be applied consistently as a useful hermeneutical device with the religious phenomena or world-view of Native Amencan Indians, his emphasis on the difference within the sacred itself is suggestive. He is also nght to stress the violent aspects of sacrifice and their sexual implications. Although violence is certainly present m the Sun Dance, the Sioux rite appears to move in the direction of nonviolence - by symbolically killing an enemy represented by a tree, for instance - that undermines Bataille's opinion that violence cannot be contained. By offering his body and soul, the Sioux sun dancer points to a renewal and continuance of cosmic generative forces. The Sun Dance also joins Indian societies together and provides for social continuity by allowing others to share m the sacred power engendered by the rituals. Moreover, the rite enables the sun dancer to become ontologically transformed by being reborn and being set free of his mortal flesh. Although there is a sense in which the sun dancer is distinctive, the emphasis of the nte is unity with society and social well-being rather than stressing the differences between the sacrificial victim and society .

### falsifiability good

**The alternative’s lack of confirmation generates an infinitely fallible position of flawed logic**

Garcia, 06 – professor of philosophy, at the University of Florida, former professor at the University of Bogota, citing and extrapolating on the studies of Karl Popper, winner of the Kyoto Prize in Arts and Philosophy, philosopher and professor at the London School of Economics, (Carlos, “Popper’s Theory of Science: An Apologia (Continuum Studies in Philosophy)”, 2006, Print)//JKahn

‘Dogmatic falsificationism’ admits that all scientific theories are fallible, without qualification, but attributes infallibility to the empirical tests. It recognizes the conjectural character of all scientific theories and the impossibility of proving any theory. Lakatos thinks that such a view is justificationist, given its strict empiricism. By settling for falsifiability, dogmatic falsificationists have a modest standard of scientific honesty. They also hold that the repeated overthrow of theories with the help of hard facts produces the growth of science. According to Lakatos, two false assumptions, conjoined with an insufficient criterion of demarcation7 support this position. The assumptions are: (21) the existence of a natural, psychological, borderline between theoretical and observational propositions; and (b) that any proposition that satisfies the (psychological) criterion for being observational (factual) is true. Lakatos appeals to Galileo’s observations of the moon and the sun to show that psychology renders false the first assumption while logic speaks against the second. His argument runs as follows: Galileo considered the old theory that celestial bodies were faultless crystal spheres refuted because he observed mountains in the moon and spots in the sun. But his observations were not observational in the sense of having being made with the pure, unaided senses. They were obtained with an instrument whose reliability was in question. Since Galileo did not have an articulated optical theory to validate his telescope observations, nor did he have any means to confer legitimacy to the phenomena observed and to assure the reliability of his optical data, he was not in possession of an infallible test-statement. Hence, we do not have a case of refutation. Rather, we have a confrontation of Aristotelian observations (made in the light of a well-articulated theory of the heavens) against Galilean observations (made in the light of his precarious optical theory). We have two inconsistent theories. The upshot is that ‘there are and can be no sensations unimpregnated by expectations and therefore there is no natural (i.ei,psyeh0logieal) demarcation between observational and theoretical propositions’ .51 The second assumption of dogmatic falsificationism is false because there is no way to prove any factual proposition from an experiment. ‘Observational’ propositions are not inclubitably decidable. Thus, all factual propositions are fallible. On the other hand, since propositions cannot be derived from facts but only from other propositions (a point of elementary logic that Lakatos thinks few people understand), it turns out that a clash between a theory and a factual proposition is more inconsistency rather than falsification.

**The alternative relies on synthetic priori confirmation – these destroys the signal of effective sacrifice**

Garcia, 06 – professor of philosophy, at the University of Florida, former professor at the University of Bogota, citing and extrapolating on the studies of Karl Popper, winner of the Kyoto Prize in Arts and Philosophy, philosopher and professor at the London School of Economics, (Carlos, “Popper’s Theory of Science: An Apologia (Continuum Studies in Philosophy)”, 2006, Print)//JKahn

Popper agrees, in general, with the core of Hume’s objections, but he dislikes Hurne’s psychologistic explanation of induction and causality. What Popper finds right in Hume’s account pertains to noncontroversial matters. For example, let us consider a purported principle of induction: that is, ‘a statement with the help of which we could put inductive inferences into a logically acceptable form’.13 Such a principle, Popper says, cannot be analytic (if it were so, inductive inferences would be just logical transformations exactly like their deductive counterparts); hence, it must be synthetic. But a principle like this requires a justification of its own, and putting aside the unlikely scenario in which one accepts an a priori justification (an avenue difficult to reconcile with the basic premises of empiricism) the justifying principle would have to be inductively justified at its turn. Soon, we would be trapped in a regress: For the principle of induction must be a universal statement in its turn. Thus, if we try to regard its truth as known from experience, then the very same problems which occasioned its introduction will arise over and over again. To justify it, we should have to employ inductive inferences; and to justify these we should have to assume an inductive principle of a higher order; and so on.14 Popper concludes that the various difficulties of inductive logic area insurmountable and cannot be alleviated by claiming that inductive inferences ‘even attain a varying degree of “reliability” or of “[2r0babz'lity” since taking the principle of induction as probable rather than true generates similar problems. As mentioned above, the examination of the problem of induction in terms of logical justification reveals two undesirable outcomes: the impossibility of justifying law-like statements which transcend experience (something we would need to do, if we accept induction); and the untenability of a verificationist principle of empiricism, according to which only experience enables us to establish the truth of universal statements. Popper’s solution of the problem of induction goes in two steps: the first consists in eliminating psychologism by withdrawing attention from the process ‘of inventing or conceiving a theory’, because it is not amenable to logical analysis; the second consists in formulating an alternative method to test empirical theories. Let us see briefly how the first strategy can be implemented.

**Falsifiability is a prerequisite to recognizing success**

Garcia, 06 – professor of philosophy, at the University of Florida, former professor at the University of Bogota, citing and extrapolating on the studies of Karl Popper, winner of the Kyoto Prize in Arts and Philosophy, philosopher and professor at the London School of Economics, (Carlos, “Popper’s Theory of Science: An Apologia (Continuum Studies in Philosophy)”, 2006, Print)//JKahn

To sum up, Hume has shown that a skeptical conclusion is inevitable. On the one hand we cannot escape from the burden of causal expectation and on the other we cannot see that such a habit provides any reason whatsoever to justify the belief in causal connection. If Hume is right about the origin of the idea of necessity, and we accept his remark according to which ‘all probable reasoning is nothing but a species of sensation’,11 it looks as if we are committed to a totally sceptical answer to the general problem of justifying induction. Let me emphasize that Hume did not deny that there are regularities in the world; he simply showed that there were no logical links between different events occurring at different times. He also questioned the attribution of causal relationships to successive events, since the fact that x happens before does not necessarily means that x causes )1. Hume’s sceptical conclusions do, in fact, challenge every kind of nondemonstrative argument, whether or not grounded in causal imputation. Since any attempt at justifying logically the inference from particulars to universals is deemed to fail, we are left in a bad position to give a good account about our knowledge of general facts. 12 2.2 Popper’s solution As I have just illustrated, under the classical treatment of induction one finds a handful of distinct although related philosophical problems. One of these can be recast as ‘Why, if at all, is it reasonable to accept the conclusions of certain inductive arguments as true — or at least as probably true? Why, if at all, is it reasonable to employ certain rules of inductive inference?’ Popper is concerned mainly with this problem, and thinks that the question: ‘are inductive inference justified?’ encapsulates its important epistemological aspects. Since there is nothing like ‘the’ problem of induction, but many problems grouped under this heading though Popper offers a response to all of them — there is no single approach and, presumably, no single solution. In what follows the reader can see that what Popper does, in effect, is to give an account of science which can coexist with a position that denies there can be evidential support or justification for law-like claims, that also denies there can be projection of properties, and finally that denies we can judge scientific theories by their ‘track record’ or by appeal to empirical evidence directly — as in direct acquaintance or sense-data accounts.

## Alt Fails

### General – 2AC

**The alt goes too far – turns solvency**

**Shaviro, 90** (Steven, PhD from Yale, professor at Wayne State University, former professor at University of Washington, “Passion and Excess,” The Florida State University Press, pg. 40-41, Tashma)

The **extremism of** Benjamin's and **Bataille’s formulations makes it difficult to** see how they can be **appli**ed **to** concrete **situations** of social struggle. It is easy to point out the absurdity of Acéphale‘s projects of voluntary self-sacrifice and communal ecstasy. But this is an "absurdity” on which Bataille himself was the Hrst to insist. Absurdity, for Bataille, is not the negative condition it is regarded as by telcological thinkers and existentialists. It is an affirmation that opposes the capitalist logic ofputring all productive forces to work. “[L’homme] est libre de ressembler E1 tout ce qui n’est pas lui dans l`univers. ll peut écarter la pensée que c’est lui ou Dieu qui empéche le reste des choses d’étre absurde [(Man) is free to resemble everything that is not himself in the universe. He can set aside the thought that it is he or God who keeps the rest of things from being absurd]" (OC, 1:445; VE, 180). The problem, then, is not how to give meaning and force to otherwise absurd and inefficacious acts. It is rather how to prevent sacrifice and expenditure from becoming (as is the case in fascism) new grounds of power or signification.

### Outdated – 2AC

**Bataille's theories are outdated and no longer apply**

**Piel, 95** (Jean, French philosopher and critic, editor of Critique, a French Journal, “On Bataille: Critical Essays,” State University of New York Press, pg. 105-106, Tashma)

Up to this point, **Bataille's reflexions**, **applied to** the **contemporary era**, and to the experiences of the use of riches that take shape there, **no longer delight in** the **passionate reactions and rages** that animate certain passages of "The Notion of Expenditure." Rather, Bataille's reflexions are those of a man whose maturity has brought him a taste for more serene judgments; at times they have even brought him the ambition—perhaps "crazy"?—of envisaging solutions that are certainly not positive in any lasting way, but at the very least, entailed moments of equilibrium capable of bringing men some respite. How different is the tone of the chapter in The Accursed Share devoted to luxury and poverty, from the pages where, in the article from La Critique sociale, the conditions governing the class struggle were described! The opinion formulated upon the Soviet—that is to say Stalinist—experience in the 1949 book contrasts with the apparently disapproving silence, with which it was surrounded in the 1933 article: not only is the judgment made that "there was no choice left," which, in sum, justifies the adopted rhythm of accumulation, corresponding to a stage in history that has simply opened a new space for growth through other ways, just as capitalism had once done, but still "communist dissidence itself" (that which contested the paths chosen by Soviet power) is accused of sharing "the general sterility of the democracies" and the "collusion between the opposition and the bourgeois" is denounced. As for the most powerful capitalist society, if the fact is strongly stressed that all of its earlier behavior engaged it in an impasse, Bataille admits that it is perhaps itself on the way to glimpsing a solution by getting rid of the excess in the form of a gift, pure and simple. Thus, in The Accursed Share, Georges Bataille, a precursor of the theory of gift in modern economic life and of "generalized economy," was also—more than ten years before his time—the prophet of "peaceful coexistence" and of unexpected developments of the competition for expansion between the two blocs. This is a great accomplishment for a single book, and it is a legacy unexpected at the very least from a man who had for a long time forbidden himself any claim to provide a lesson. But it is nothing when compared to the development that could be implied—for the interpretation of phenomena that, in our contemporary experience, still require an explanation—by the exploitation of ideas that abound, or that begin to arise in this book, so rich and yet still so unknown, which economists and sociologists should use as a point of departure in their thinking at this midpoint of the twentieth century.

### Economic Systems – 2AC

**Alternative has no potential – can't overcome economic systems**

**Plontisky, 95** (Arkady, Professor of English and Theory and Cultural Studies, Purdue University, “On Bataille: Critical Essays,” State University of New York Press, pg. 111, Tashma)

Indeed, as Bataille's discourse shows with extraordinary power, it is the economic insistence on consumption at the multiple and often interacting levels of theoretical economies—economic, political, conceptual—that is most problematic. The theoretical problem is a metaphoric loss of the economy of loss and thus of the general economy. It is not that consumption and the pleasure of consumption are not important or theoretically and otherwise pleasurable. **To reverse the configuration** absolutely and to privilege expenditure unconditionally **would be** just as **untenable**. As I indicated earlier, Bataille's heavy insistence on waste and expenditure must be seen as problematic in this respect, and is "saved" only by the enormous labyrinthine complexity of Bataille's inscription of these concepts.

## Cede the Political

**And Bataille cedes the political**

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Bataille believes that an affirmation of transience is politically liberating, that transience is a vital force that renders absurd the coercive, long-term projects of the bourgeoisie. Yet pro-transience takes away any real consciousness of political stakes when it annihilates a sense of life’s rich duration. Indeed, a sense of **transience cannot authentically liberate people from coercive projects**, since such projects are themselves generated by a sense of transience. People want to gain lingering pleasure and freedom, and to avoid long periods of pain and slavery. Bataille’s pro-transience view, on the other hand, evades any sense of these irreducible durations; it therefore evades a sense of the world of time as a world of stakes, as involving elements to be either avoided at all costs or seized! Through this evasion of real time, Bataille’s thought is politically neutered. Against Bataille, I insist that only an affirmation of real time can be politically progressive. For Bataille, the full engagement with the truth of transience generates a form of wild abandon (which unfetters forces that would otherwise be invested in conservative projects), but if we see pro-transience as an end game, as a pointless act of looking through the wrong end of a telescope, this view of time is shown to be about as exuberant as nostalgia TV. Pro-transience is in fact less audacious than a priest’s remorse, a slave’s regret.

### 1AR

**( ) Bataille definitely links to anti-politics – his scholarship breeds political impotence.**

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Life proceeds at its own pace, and therefore does not slip towards death in a transient manner. Time’s duration makes up the very substance of life, and duration’s pains or pleasures cannot be avoided or speeded up towards their ends except artificially (in this sense pro-transience, which anticipates the end of all experience in death, is existentially an escapist view of time). People want to avoid spending long periods in slavery or in pain, and wish instead to enjoy extended periods of free time or pleasure. Pro-transience thought, however, evades this sense of time as a material stake. Pro-transience thought therefore maintains a **politically impotent view** of time. I shall assume that time cannot be separated from space, and that time is essentially a view of what happens to space. If we see time as encompassing all of space, it is difficult to see time as rushing headlong towards an end, since we must imagine time as having to move through the tangled matter of space to get to any end: a tortuous procedure. Time does not cut through space instantly like a magic knife towards an end, so why should we view all time from its end? Moreover, time is ‘everything that happens’, involving the irreducible durations of pleasure or pain, slavery or sovereignty. Again, with such a rich view of time, it is hard to see how time can be authentically described as slipping easily towards its extinction. Since time is made up of everything that occurs, the philosophical act of analysing time from the point of view of the annihilation of all occurrence is narrow to the most extreme degree. How can this backward glance, this posthumous look at time from the illusory vantage point of nothingness, not be an emaciated view, a ‘little’ view? How can such a narrow, such a restricted view of time not be a slave perspective in the Nietzschean sense? Pro-Transience, Accumulation and Projects Transience is ironically the motor of accumulation. Projects can only take place through systems that defer time’s lived spontaneity and flow. Grandiose projects can only take place on the ruins of time. Christian and romantic pessimism depresses and humbles the worker, leading him or her to become detached from the experience of rich duration and to invest the resulting alienated energies in any project of salvation whatsoever. An over-stimulated sense of individual temporal finitude induces the worker to invest his or her energies in absurd long-term projects, the completion of which may transcend his or her own lifetime. A pronounced emphasis on the consciousness that everyone’s life is finite without exception, and in essentially the same way, fosters the belief that no one is especially favoured by that economy which is itself built out of a culture of transience, and so any social and political tensions generated by jealousy are neutralized. At the same time, everyone is assigned their proper place within any given hierarchy under the sign of universal transience. The workers’ disinvestment of energies from rich duration and re-investment of these energies in industrial projects is furthered by the time-consuming rigours of the industrial work process itself. In a society increasingly dominated by advanced technology and science, time appears to fly because it seems to be programmed to the bitter end. The violent aesthetics of postmodern culture provide the final touch in bowing the head of the worker, making him or her derive solace from the vain promises of the future. Although pro-transience is the motor of accumulation and project, contempo- rary postmodernists and post-structuralists feel that it is a sense of transience which will happily free us from accumulation and project. They assume that a sense of our essential mortality will free us to withdraw our vital energies from systems that would invest these energies in projects that falsely claim to give us immortal life; we are then free to squander these energies in a sovereign manner. For postmodernists and post-structuralists, the fleeting nature of time and the inevitability of death show linear time to be unreal. We would do well therefore to drop those unreal projects that are built on linear time. But captains of industry also affirm the fleeting nature of time and the inevitability of death. They encourage us to capitalize on the unreal nature of time in order to bring unreal projects into being. Postmodernists and post-structuralists simply offer the teleology of final death in place of the teleology of project. It is not possible to free that rich duration which is coercively funnelled into projects via a sense of transience that is just as violent towards rich duration. My critique focuses on the contemporary philosophical affirmation of transience rather than on any wider cultural affirmation of transience. Continental philosophy has been dominated by pro-transience thinking throughout the 20th century and up to the present day, led by pro-transience thinkers such as Heidegger and Bataille, who have influenced the work of postmodernist/poststructuralist thinkers including Barthes, Deleuze, Foucault, Derrida, Lyotard and Baudrillard. I concentrate on the work of Bataille, since his work represents the most extreme example of pro-transience thought.

**( ) Bataille’s worldview necessarily dismisses the systems that check the dominance of the Far-Right**

**Wolin ‘6** (Richard, Distinguished Professor of History at the [City University of New York](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/City_University_of_New_York) Graduate Center, “Left Fascism: Georges Bataille and the German Ideology”Constellations vol. 2 issue 3, pp. 397-428)

Here, the analysis must begin with an examination of Bataille’s essay, “The Psychological Structure of Fascism,” often rightly hailed as a theoretical breakthrough in our understanding of the mass psychological appeal of modern authoritarian rule. Yet, the essay also contains a barely veiled admiration for the vitality and energy of the existing fascist states, especially when contrasted with the decadence and inertia of the contemporary European democracies. Bataille purveys a critique of parliamentarianism that is as zealous as anything one finds in the work of Carl Schmitt. Parliamentary decision-making, he claims, partakes wholly of the order of the homogenous. It aims solely at co-optation, the elimination of difference. As such, it is purely instrumental and serves primarily to suppress the breakthrough of heterogeneous elements that threaten to explode the normative bases of the given economic and political order. As Bataille observes, in a striking anticipation of Jean-Francois Lyotard’s association of “consensus” and “terror”: “The reduction of differences in parliamentary practice indicates all the possible complexity of the internal activity of adaptation required by *homogeneity.*60 Bataille can perceive no fundamental differences between the conduct of political and economic life in modern democratic societies, insofar as both are examples *par excellence* of homogeneity – this despite the fact that discussion aims at mutual understanding, whereas economic activity is goal-oriented and utilitarian. Given this curt dismissal of the institutional bases of democracy, it comes as little surprise that Bataille glorifies the role played by fascism in modern political life as a type of breakthrough of the heterogeneous. For Bataille, “the fascist leaders are incontestably part of heterogeneous existence. Opposed to democratic politicians, who represent in different countries the platitude inherent to *homogeneous* society, Mussolini and Hitler immediately stand out as something *other*.”62 What he admires about these men and the movement they represent is that they embody “a force that situates them above other men,” which accounts for their “sovereignty.” Yet, he also esteems greatly their thoroughgoing antagonism to law: “the fact that laws are broken is only the most obvious sign of the transcendent, *heterogeneous* nature of fascist action.”63 Here, the parallels with Schmitt’s critique of bourgeois legal positivism are of course profound. Both Schmitt and Bataille view the institution of law as the consummate embodiment of the spirit of bourgeois rationalism. It symbolizes everything they detest about the reigning social order: its prosaic longing for security, its unrevolutionary nature, its abhorrence of “transcendence,” its anathematization of the vitality and intensity one finds in the “exception” (Schmitt) or “transgression” (Bataille). Moreover, for Bataille the system of law merits especially harsh treatment insofar as it signifies a type consecration of the profane order of things, as such, it stands as an impediment to contact with the heterogeneous or the sacred. Bataille concludes his endorsement of fascist politics with the following encomium: “*Heterogeneous* fascist action belongs to the entire set of higher forms. It makes an appeal to sentiments traditionally defined as *exalted* and *noble* and tends to constitute authority as an unconditional principle situated above any utilitarian judgment.” As opposed to the bourgeois order of life, which, with its utilitarianism and its legalism, merely sanctifies “the prose of the world,” fascism offers a new political aesthetic, the return, as it were, of an *aesthetic politics*: a type of politics that reintroduces the long lost elements of charismatic leadership (in Bataille’s terms, “sovereignty”), violence, and martial glory. It is, moreover, a politics that facilitates a great emotional cathexis between leaders and masses, a point which Bataille emphasizes repeatedly. For one of fascism’s great attributes is that it “clearly demonstrates what can be expected from a timely recourse to reawakened affective forces” – forces capable of guaranteeing a measure of *collective solidarity*, which have been banished from a society in which the division of labor and rationalization reign supreme. In sum, fascism serves to reintroduce a type of *ecstatic politics* into the forlorn and disenchanted landscape of political modernity, a politics that aims at the creation of a quasi-Nietzschean *ecstatic community*.

## Disads

### Eternal Suffering DA – 2AC

**The alternative eternally dooms humanity – makes endless catastrophe inevitable**

**Shaviro, 90** (Steven, PhD from Yale, professor at Wayne State University, former professor at University of Washington, “Passion and Excess,” The Florida State University Press, pg. 37-39, Tashma)

Yet if the intensity of Bataille’s involvement is clear, the details of its expression are not. Does the passage which I have just quoted function as description or as exhortation? On what sort of threshold are we standing, and what is the nature of the "void” which lies beyond it? At such a point, what kind of "alternative” is at stake? What further disaster could be entailed by a “retreat”? And is it even possible to retreat? Since the foundations have already crumbled, is not a fall inevitable? But what sort of courage is available in such a situation? What kind of "conquest" is it which is no longer played out according to the dialectic of master and slave, with the risk of heroic death as ultimate stake? What experience of time is realized by this leap into die void? The only way to answer such questions may be to alter the way in which they are posed. For the peculiar effect of **Bataille’s work** is that it **offers no satisfying conclusions**, no points of repose. Not even the satisfaction of absolute destruction. His obsessive meditations concern—a.nd participate in—a catastrophe all the more obscure and unsettling in that it refuses apocalyptic closure. "Ce qui seul demeure est l’agitation circulaire—qui ne s’épuise pas dans l`extase et recommence ai partir d’elle [What alone remains is circular agitation—which does not exhaust itself in ecstasy and begins again from it]" (OC, 5:130; IE, lll). The "yertiginous fall’” takes place in a “bottomless void,” and consequently never hits bottom. The privileged act of sacrifice serves no end, leads to no appeasement. And despite Bataille’s frequent sexual stereotyping and invocations of virility, his "interior experience" does not culminate in any display of phallic mastery. Pure loss, **expenditure without recompense**, it **issues** only in **an absurd compulsion to** repeat, to **approach the threshold of disaster again and again**. The “summit" of ecstasy cannot be extricated from a concomitant "decline": "De méme que le S0mKIlCt n’est a la fin que l’inacecssible, le déclin des l’abord est Pinévitable [Iust as the summit is finally only the inaccessible, so the decline, from the very first, is inevitable]” (OC, 6:57). The exuberant violence of Bataille’s texts is matched only by the pointless dissipation of the energies they invoke.

**Their whole try-or-die trick is backwards. We aren’t all hopeless now, and Bataille’s vision of ecstasy solely thrill-seeks us to death.**

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Bataille affirms the living moment, but as a moment that creates transience (the moment is ruinous) and which is itself transient (it cannot prevail in a dualist universe). The ecstatic moment, which should be a celebration of a kind of irrepressible flow of duration, **is over in a flash**, and either tends towards death or leads directly to death. Often, Bataille states that the wild expenditure of life’s forces can be described as life affirmed up to the point of death and not beyond, in order perhaps to avoid the accusation of morbidity. It is even possible that Bataille sense that his view of time was too teleological as it stood. He writes: ‘I believe eroticism to be the approval of life, up until death’ (Bataille, 1957b/1990b: 16). What Bataille is perhaps saying here is that beings caught up in the midst of the most extreme pleasure do not care whether they survive or not, thereby illustrating his equation of pleasure and ruin. However, the extreme indifference of beings in the midst of ecstasy to the whole question of survival suggests that death is of little importance to them compared to the experience of pleasurable duration enjoyed in the time up to death. On close inspection we can see that for Bataille ‘the approval of life up until death’ represents a very specific kind of behaviour that is almost totally death orientated, a foolhardy spirit of ruination that will end in death more or less directly. It can be seen that the exuberant devil-may-care spirit of affirming life up to the point of death can be accessed by individuals only if they open themselves up to death first. The vision of life affirmed up to the point of death **is still a vision of life dominated by death.** Although Bataille’s work shows him savouring, as it were, the taste of death in a sensual, poetic fashion, he concedes that an individual cannot physically experience the event of his or her own death in a concrete, knowing fashion, since in death the knower and known are wiped out at a single stroke. Only a living being can affirm death, through the ecstatic abandonment of toilsome life-conservation and care which a sense of mortality allows. Such a view could be seen to link up with Bataille’s partial admission that life affirmed up to the point of death is more important than a mere leap from life into death.

**Bataille’s alt justifies atrocities and death.**

**Boldt-Irons, 2000** (Leslie Anne, Associate Professor of French at Brock University, “Military discipline and revolutionary exaltation: the dismantling of “l’illusion lyrique” in Malraux’s L’Espoir and Bataille’s Le Bleu du Ciel,” Romantic Review, vol. 91 issue 4, p. 481)

In 1933, Bataille contributed a review of André Malraux’s novel *La Condition humaine* to the ultra left-wing journal *La Critique sociale.*1 In this article, Bataille questions the place that revolution occupies in the larger and more general context of “human agitation.” He asks, for example, whether the convulsive movements of revolt, social upheaval, and revolution should be situated outside of, or above, what is normally experienced as life in its quotidian expressions of tenderness, enthusiasm or even hate. In the name of what authority, for example, might one be justified in placing the fascination with pleasure, torture and possible death *outside* the limits of acceptable social practice – extreme states often linked to revolutionary upheaval *outside* the limits of acceptable social practice? Another way of situating the convulsion of revolutionary movements – an approach clearly endorsed by Bataille – is to place it squarely within the framework of *any* activity marked by agitation. From this perspective, the acts of torture and murder would arise from an excitability or arousal similar in nature to that intensifying the fury of the revolutionary impulse. This impulse, writes Bataille, is a means by which the proletariat – who had for a long time been deprived of the possibility of attributing any value to suffering and to life – is able to gain access to *value* itself, a value linked to states of excitation unsubordinated to any simple political means or end. This value, and the state of agitation to which it is linked, gives the proletariat both life and hope, for which even death in all its atrocity might be the payment required.

### Fascism DA – 2AC

**The alt dissolves into facism – turns their impacts**

**Geroulanos, 6** (Stefanos, doctoral candidate in intellectual history, Johns Hopkins Humanities Center, “The Anthropology of Exit: Bataille on Heidegger and Fascism,” October, Number 117, Summer 2006, pg. 3-24, MIT Press Journals, pdf, Tashma)

This is not the place to retrace or replay that debate; still, the problem is signiﬁcant, because Bataille’s political equivocation sets up his analysis and colors his identiﬁcation of Heidegger with fascism. To quote Zeev Sternhell, “fascism had a fascination for men . . . for whom any attempt to transcend bourgeois mediocrity and democratic ﬂaccidity was highly praiseworthy.”3 That Bataille shared this fascination has given much ammunition to Bataille’s detractors, who argue that his nonconformism played an active role in the delegitimation of the Third Republic.4 Some contemporary cultural historians have echoed Jean-Paul Sartre and other critics in arguing that Bataille’s philosophical anthropology relied on a strategy of (a) articulating human experience on the basis of vitalist or mystical postulates, and (b) providing a consequent critique of bourgeois secularism (a critique ex deﬁnitione hostile to liberal democracy and socialist utopia) that rivaled fascism in its reactionary aims and substance. Some further argue that **Bataille’s claims** on heterogeneity **evince** a hidden **pro-Nazism** that is supposedly part and parcel of postwar critiques of liberal humanism.

### Fascism DA – 1AR

**Alt = facism**

**Shaviro, 90** (Steven, PhD from Yale, professor at Wayne State University, former professor at University of Washington, “Passion and Excess,” The Florida State University Press, pg. 40, Tashma)

**Bataille** was not alone at this time in being driven to what might seem to be "metaphysical" extremes. Walter Benjamin—whose relation with Bataille and with Bataille’s colleagues in the College de Sociologie has still not been adequately explored—**was** also **obsessed with** the role of **catastrophe** (in Benjamin’s terms, "shock") **as** a **crucial** experience of modern capitalist culture. Shock, for Benjamin, is an overdetermined, intensely ambiguous, and inescapable moment of violent condensation. Abolishing traditional structures of subjectivity, it is a dominating instance of both actual oppression and possible liberation. Both the psychological devastation caused by the worker’s enslavement to the assembly line and the unleashing of subversive energies as a result of unchecked processes of mechanical reproduction may be seen (like the experience of the urban crowd) as repercussions of "the disintegration of the anra in the experience of shock” (lllumiizatmm, I94). And the traumatic, double-bind structure of "shock," the simultaneous necessity and impossibility of mastering it or finding some adequate response to it, leads to an extreme polarization of political alternatives, **The most obvious and frightening reaction is** the **fascist aestheticization of politics**, its apotheosis of violence in the shape of spectacle.

## Util Core

### util good – self discovery

**Only utilitarianism allows for self-discovery – the alternative’s presentation of choice destroys the final product**

Kymlicka, 90 – Professor of Philosophy and Canada Research Chair in Political Philosophy at Queen's University at Kingston, Recurrent Visiting Professor in the Nationalism Studies program at the Central European University, B.A. (Honours) in philosophy and political studies from Queen's University, Ph.D. from Oxford University, (Will, “Contemporary Political Philosophy”, Clarendon and Oxford, 1990, Print)//JKahn

Sandel says that liberalism ignores the way we are embedded in our social roles. He emphasizes that as ‘self-interpreting beings’, we can interpret the meaning of these constitutive attachments (Sandel 1984a: 91). But the question is whether we can reject them entirely should we come to view them as trivial or degrading. On one interpretation of communitarianism, we cannot, or at any rate, we should not. On this view, we neither choose nor reject these attachments, rather we find ourselves in them. Our goals come not by choice, but by self-discovery. A Christian housewife in a monogamous heterosexual marriage can interpret what it means to be a Christian or a housewife—she can interpret the meaning of these shared religious, economic, and sexual practices. But she cannot stand back and decide that she does not want to be a Christian at all, or a housewife. I can interpret the meaning of the roles I find myself in, but I cannot reject the roles themselves, or the goals internal to them, as worthless. Since these goals are constitutive of me as a person, they have to be taken as given in deciding what to do with my life; the question of the good in my life can only be a question of how best to interpret their meaning. It makes no sense to say that they have no value for me, since there is no ‘me’ standing behind them, no self prior to these constitutive attachments. It is unclear which if any communitarians hold this view consistently. It is not a plausible position, since we can and do make sense of questions not just about the meaning of the roles we find ourselves in, but also about their value. Perhaps communitarians do not mean to deny that; perhaps their idea of our embeddedness is not incompatible with our rejecting the attachments we find ourselves in. But then the advertised contrast with the liberal view is a deception, for the sense in which communitarians view us as embedded in communal roles incorporates the sense in which liberals view us as independent of them, and the sense in which communitarians view practical reasoning as a process of ‘self discovery’ incorporates the sense in which liberals view it as a process of judgement and choice. The differences would be merely semantic. And once we agree that individuals, are capable of questioning and rejecting the value of the community’s way of life, then the attempt to discourage such questioning through a ‘politics of the common good’ seems an unjustified restriction on people’s seif-determination.

### util good – doesn’t preclude alt

**Self-discovery and political utilitarianism aren’t mutually exclusive**

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The idea that deliberation is completed by this process of self-discovery (rather than by judgements of the value of the attachments we discover) seems pretty facile. In places, Sandel admits that practical reasoning is not just a question of self-discovery. He says that the boundaries of the self, although constituted by its ends, are none the less flexible and can be redrawn, incorporating new ends and excluding others. In his words, ‘the subject is empowered to participate in the constitution of its identity’; on his account ‘the bounds of the self [are] open and the identity of the subject [is] the product rather than the premise of its agency’ (Sandel 1982: 152). The subject can, after all, make choices about which of the ‘possible purposes and ends, all impinging indiscriminately on its identity’ it will pursue, and which it will not (Sandel 1982: 152). The self, constituted by its ends, can be ‘reconstituted’ as it were, so self-discovery is not enough. But at this point it is not clear whether the distinction between the two views does not collapse. There are apparent differences here. Sandel claims that the self is constituted by its ends, and that the boundaries of the self are fluid, whereas Rawls says that the self is prior to its ends, and its boundaries are fixed antecedently. But these two differences hide a more fundamental identity; both accept that the person is prior to her ends. They disagree over where, within the person, to draw the boundaries of the ‘self’; but this question, if it is indeed a meaningful question, is one for the philosophy of mind, not political philosophy. For so long as Sandel admits that the person can re-examine her ends—even the ends constitutive of her then he has failed to justify communitarian politics. He has failed to show why individuals should not be given the conditions appropriate to that re—examining, as an indispensable part of leading the best possible life. And amongst these conditions should be the liberal guarantees of personal independence necessary to make the judgement freely. Sandel trades on an ambiguity in the view of the person that he uses in defending communitarian politics. The strong claim (that self-discovery replaces judgement) is implausible, and the weak claim (which allows that a self constituted by its ends can none the less be reconstituted), while attractive, fails to distinguish him from the liberal view.6

**Utilitarian motives are towards freedom and reasonlessness – no mutual exclusivity**

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But this is false. Firstly, as Taylor notes, telling people to act freely does not tell them what particular actions are worth doing. But even if it provided determinate guidance, it still presents a false view of our motivations. If I am writing a book, for example, my motivation is not to be free, but to say something that is worth saying. Indeed, if I did not really want to say anything, except in so far as it is a way of being free, then my writing would not be fulfilling. What and how I write would become the result of arbitrary and ultimately unsatisfying choices. If writing is to be intrinsically valuable, I have to care about what I am saying, I have to believe that writing is worth doing for its own sake. If we are to understand the value people see in their projects, we have to look to the ends which are internal to them. I do not pursue my writing for the sake of my freedom. On the contrary, I pursue my writing for its own sake, because there are things which are worth saying. Freedom is valuable because it allows me to say them. The best defence of individual freedoms is not necessarily the most direct one, but the one which best accords with the way that people on reflection understand the value of their lives. And if we look at the value of freedom in this way, then it seems that freedom of choice, while central to a valuable life, is not the value which is centrally pursued in such a life. No one disagrees that projects have to be our primary concern-— thatdoes not distinguish the liberal and the communitarian. The real debate is not over whether we need such tasks, but over how we acquire them and judge their worth. Taylor seems to believe that we can acquire these tasks only by treating communal values as ‘authoritative horizons’ which ‘set goals for us’ (Taylor 1979: 1579). Liberals, on the other hand, insist that we have an ability to detach ourselves from any particular social practice. No particular task is set for us by society, no particular practice has authority that is beyond individual judgement and possible rejection.

### util good – deepest self

**The alternative only reaches the uneficumbered self – this has no end – failure to reach the deepest self guarantees a loss of identity**

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The first argument goes like this: Rawls’s view of the ‘uneficumbered self’ does not correspond with our ‘deepest self—understanding’ in the sense of our deepest self-perception. According to Sandel, if the self is prior to its ends, then we should, when introspecting, be able to see through our particular ends to an unencumbered self. But, Sandel notes, we do not perceive our selves as being unencumbered: Rawls’s view of the self as ‘given prior to its ends, a pure subject of agency and possession, ultimately thin’, is ‘radically at odds with our more familiar notion of ourselves as beings “thick with particular traits” (Sandel 1982: 94, 100). On Rawls’s view, ‘to identify any characteristics as my aims, ambitions, desires, and so on, is always to imply some subject “me” standing behind them, at a certain distance’ (Sandel 1984a: 86). There would have to‘be this thing, a self, which has some shape, albeit an ultimately thin shape, standing at some distance behind our ends. To accept Rawls, I would have to see myself as this propertyless thing, a disembodied rather ghostly object in space, or as Rorty puts it, as a kind of ‘substrate’ lying ‘behind’ my ends (Rorty 1985: 217). In contrast, Sandel says that our deepest self-perceptions always include some motivations, which shows that some ends are constitutive of the self. But the question of perception here is misleading. What is central to the liberal view is not that we can perceive a self prior to its ends, but that we understand ourselves to be prior to our ends in the sense that no end or goal is exempt from possible re-examination. For re-examination to be meaningfully conducted, I must be able to see my self encumbered with different motivations from those I now have, in order that I have some reason to choose one over another as more valuable for me. My self is, in this sense, perceived prior to its ends, i.e. I can always envisage my self without its present ends. But this does not require that I can ever perceive a self unencumbered by any ends—the process of practical reasoning is always one of comparing one ‘encumbered’ potential self with another ‘encumbered’ potential self. There must always be some ends given with the self when we engage in such reasoning, but it does not follow that any particular ends must always be taken as given with the self. As I said before, it seems that what is given with the self can change over the course of a lifetime.

### util good – liberalism solves

**Liberal visions of utilitarian communitarianism solve self-expression and reasonlessness**

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This third argument contrasts the communitarian view of practical reasoning as self-discovery with the liberal view of practical reasoning as judgement. For liberals, the question about the good life requires us to make a judgement about what sort of a person we wish to be or become. For communitarians, however, the question requires us to discover who we already are. For communitarians, the relevant question is not ‘What should I be, what sort of life should I lead?’ but ‘Who am The self ‘comes by’ its ends not ‘by choice’ but ‘by discovery’, not ‘by choosing that which is already given (this would be unintelligible) but by reflecting on itself and inquiring into its constituent nature, discerning its laws and imperatives, and acknowledging its purposes as its own’ (Sandel 1982: 5 8). For example, Sandel criticizes Rawls’s account of community, because ‘while Rawls allows that the good of community can be internal to the extent of engaging the aims and values of the self, it cannot be so thoroughgoing as to reach beyond the motivations to the subject of motivations’ (Sandel 1982: 149). On a more adequate account, Sandel claims, communal values are not just affirmed by the members of the community, but define their identity. The shared pursuit of a communal goal is ‘not a relationship they choose (as in a voluntary association) but an attachment they discover, not merely an attribute but a constituent of their identity’ (Sandel 1982: 150). The good for such members is found by a process of self—discovery—by achieving awareness of, and acknowledging the claims of, the various attachments they ‘find’. But surely it is Sandel here who is violating our deepest selfunderstandings. For we do not think that this self-discovery replaces or forecloses judgements about how to lead our life. We do not consider ourselves trapped by our present attachments, incapable of judging the worth of the goals we inherited or ourselves chose earlier. We do indeed find ourselves in various relationships, but we do not always like what we find. No matter how deeply implicated we find ourselves in a social practice, we feel capable of questioning whether the practice is a valuable one—a questioning which is not meaningful on Sandel’s account.

### util good – key to alt

**The alternative’s freedom is useless without utilitarianism – creates arbitrary communal rejection**

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Hence what is good for me has to be the good for one who inhabits these roles’ (Maclntyre 1981: 204-5). Self-determination, therefore, is exercised within these social roles, rather than by standing outside of them. And so the state respects our selfdetermination not by enabling us to stand back from our social roles, but by encouraging a deeper immersion in and understanding of them, as the politics of the common good seeks to accomplish. Communitarians have a number of different arguments against the liberal account of the self and its ends. I will consider three, which can be summarized this way: the liberal view of the self (1) is empty; (2) violates our self-perceptions; and (3) ignores our embeddedness in communal practices.5 Firstly, the emptiness argument. Being free to question all our social roles is self—defeating, Charles Taylor says, because ‘complete freedom would be a void in which nothing would be worth doing, nothing would deserve to count for anything. The self which has arrived at freedom by setting aside all external obstacles and impingements is characterless, and hence without defined purpose’ (Taylor 1979: 157). True freedom must be ‘situated’, Taylor argues. The desire to subject all aspects of our social situation to our rational self-determination is empty, because the demand to be self-determining is indeterminate. It ‘cannot specify any content to our action outside of a situation which sets goals for us, which thus imparts a shape to rationality and provides an inspiration for creativity’ (Taylor 1979: 157). We must accept the goal that our situation ‘sets for we do not, then the quest for selfdetermination leads to Nietzschean nihilism, the rejection of all communal values as ultimately arbitrary: ‘One after the other,.the authoritative horizons of life, Christian and humanist, are cast off as shackles on the will. Only the will to power remains’ (Taylor 1979: 159). If we deny that communal values are ‘authoritative horizons’, then they will appear as arbitrary limits on our will, and hence our freedom will require rejecting them all (Maclntyre 1981: ch. 9).

### util good – tradeoffs

**Moral tradeoffs are inevitable and reprehensible only until the utilitarian system**

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On one interpretation, utilitarianism is a standard for aggregating individual interests and desires. Individuals have distinct and potentially conflicting preferences, and we need a standard that specifies which trade-offs amongst those preferences are morally acceptable, which trade-offs are fair to the people whose welfare is at stake. That is the question which this first interpretation of utilitarianism attempts to answer. One popular answer, found in many different theories, is that each person’s interests should be given equal consideration. Each person’s life matters equally, from the moral point of view, and hence their interests should be given equal consideration. " V Utilitarianism, on this first view of it, accepts this general egalitarian principle. However, the idea of treating people with equal consideration is imprecise, and it needs to be spelled out in more detail if it is to provide a determinate standard of rightness. One obvious, and perhaps initially appealing, way to spell out that idea is to give equal weight to each person’s preferences, regardless of the content of the preferences or the material situation of the person. As Bentham put it, we count everyone for one, no one for more than one. On the first account of utilitarianism, then, the reason that we should give equal weight to each person’s preferences is that that treats people as equals, with equal concern and respect. ) . If we accept this as our standard of rightness, then we will conclude that morally right actions are those that maximize utility. But it is important to note that maximization is not the direct goal of the standard. Maximization arises as a by-product of a standard that is intended to aggregate people’s preferences fairly. The requirement that we maximize utility is entirely derived from the prior requirement to treat people with equal consideration. So the first argument for utilitarianism is this: 1. people matter, and matter equally; therefore 2. each person’s interests should be given equal weight; there fore 3. morally right acts will maximize utility.

### util good – alternative worse

**Utilitarianism is best – alternatives collapse the system of moral maximization and preference fulfillment**

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Unfair preferences (if rational and informed) are as legitimate as any other preference according to the utiliarian standard of rightness, but we do better in terms of that standard by treating them as illegitimate in our decision-making. So we have two conflicting explanations for treating certain preferences as illegitimate. To defend utilitarianism, therefore, it is not enough to show that the utilitarian standard of rightness can justify using non-utilitarian decision-procedures. One must also show that this is the right justification. The utilitarian says that the reason why we use non-utilitarian procedures is that they happen to maximize utility. But is it not more plausible to say that the reason why we use non-utilitarian procedures is simply that we accept a non-utilitarian standard of tightness? Why think there has to be some indirect utilitarian explanation for our non-utilitarian commitments? Some utilitarians seem to think that if a utilitarian explanation is available for our moral convictions then there is no need to consider any non-utilitarian explanations. But this begs the question. We need some argument for endorsing the utilitarian standard of rightness over alternative standards. Is there any such argument in utilitarian writings? There are in fact two distinct arguments, but I will argue that neither works on its own, and that the plausibility of utilitarianism depends on conflating the two. Once we have examined these arguments, we will see that the ' problems discussed above stem directly from the utilitarian standard of rightness, and are not substantially affected by how that standard is applied. 4. TWO ARGUMENTS FOR UTILITY-MAXIMIZATION In this section, I will consider the two main arguments for viewing utility-maximization as the standard of moral rightness (whether or not this standard is employed as a decision-procedure). As we will see, they generate two entirely different intepretations of what utilitarianism is.

### util good – perm

**There is zero preclusion of the utilitarian mindset even if our morals aren’t utilitarian – means the perm’s the best option**

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We should not be U—agents who decide how to act by making utilitarian calculations, and who view promises as devices for maximizing utility. Instead we should view promises, and other people’s rights, as of such towering importance that they are basically invulnerable to the calculus of social interests. In short, we should be nonutilitarians in our moral reasoning. But, they argue, this does not mean that utilitarianism is wrong. On the contrary, the reason why we should be non-utilitarians in our decision-making is precisely that we are more likely to maximize utility that way. A society of non-utilitarians who believe in the intrinsic importance of promises and rights will do better, in terms of maximizing utility, than a society of act- or rule—utilitarians who view promises and rights as devices for maximizing utility. This may sound paradoxical. But it raises a true and important point. Utilitarianism is essentially a ‘standard of tightness’, not a ‘decision-procedure’ (Brink 1986: 421-7; Railton 1984: 140-6).7 What defines utilitarianism is the claim that the right act is the one that maximizes utility, not the claim that we should deliberately seek to maximize utility. It is an open question whether we should employ a utilitarian decision-procedure——indeed, this question is itself to be answered by examining the consequences on overall utility of different decision-procedures. And it is quite possible that we would do better in terms of the utilitarian standard of rightness by employing a non-utilitarian decision-procedure. This certainly seems true in regard to our personal attachments—everyone’s life is less valuable if we are unable to make commitments in the sort of whole-hearted and unconditional way precluded by direct utilitarianism. Hence we should be ‘indirect utilitarians’. While this is an important point, it does not yet answer the objections raised above. Consider our everyday view that certain kinds of preferences are unfair, and so should not be given any weight in our moral decision-procedures. It is possible that the utilitarian standard of tightness can justify our adopting such a non-utilitarian decision-procedure. If so, then both sides agree that certain preferences should not be counted. But on our everyday view, the reason why unfair preferences should not be given any weight in our decision-procedure is that they are morally illegitimate—they do not deserve to be counted.

### util good – social util

**Your framing arguments ignore external utilitarian social spheres**

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(a) Special relationships U-agents who base their actions on utilitarian calculations assume that each person stands in the same moral relationship to them. But this does not allow for the possibility that I could have special moral relationships to my friends, family, lenders, etc., that I could be under a greater obligation to them than to other possible beneficiaries of my actions. Our intuitions tell us that there are such special obligations, and that they should be fulfilled even if those to whom I am not especially obligated would benefit more. Consider a loan. It is part of our everyday morality that people come to have differential entitlements in virtue of having loaned money in the past. If someone lends me $10, then she is entitled to receive $10 back from me, even if someone else could make better use of the money. Utilitarian reasoning disregards such backward looking entitlements, for it says that only forward-looking consequences matter. For the U-agent, the moral value of an act lies solely in its causal properties of producing desirable states of affairs. Hence what I ought to do is pull on the causal lever which will produce the maximal amount of utility for the system as a whole. In deciding how to spend my $10, I must look at all the potential preference satisfactions of people (including myself) and determine which action will maximize them. It is of no interest to the U-agent,in and of itself, that one of those people loaned me the $10, or that someone else performed some service for me on the understanding that she would receive the money. It may be that if the utilities work out in a certain way, I ought to repay the loan, or fulfil my contract. But the process of deciding what to do will go on in exactly the same way as if I had not borrowed or promised the money. This is counter-intuitive, for most of us would say that the ‘past circumstances or actions of people can create differential entitlements or differential deserts to things’ (Nozick 1974: 155).

### util good – moral decisionmaking

**Morality under your framework is also maximizing utility**

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There are also two different accounts of what it means to ‘act according to utilitarian principles’. On one view, this means that the agent should decide how to act by consciously making utilitarian calculations, by trying to assess how different actions would affect the satisfaction of informed preferences (direct utilitarianism); on the other view, the idea of maximizing utility enters only indirectly (if at all) into the agent’s decision—making. Morally right actions are those that maximize utility, but agents are more likely to maximize utility by following non-utilitarian rules or habits, than by following utilitarian reasoning (indirect utilitarianism).

### util good – numbers

**We please the most people**

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Unfortunately, that is impossible. There are limited resources available to satisfy people’s preferences. Moreover, people’s preferences may conflict. So whose preferences should we satisfy? Consequentialism tells us to be concerned with consequences for human welfare, but what if the promotion of one person’s welfare conflicts with that of another? Consequentialism needs to be spelled out if we are to answer that question. How does utilitarianism spell out the idea that we should promote people’s utility? Utilitarians say that the right action is the one that maximizes utility———e.g. that satisfies as many informed preferences as possible. Some people’s preferences will go unsatisfied their preferences conflict with what maximizes utility overall. That is unfortunate. But since the winners necessarily outnumber the losers, there is no reason why the preferences of the losers should take precedence over the more numerous (or more intense) preferences of the winners. For’ the utilitarian, equal amounts of utility matter equally, regardless of whose utility it is. No one stands in a privileged position in the calculations; no one has a greater claim to benefit from an act than any other. Hence we should bring about consequences which satisfy the greatest number of (informed) preferences amongst people in the society. (This, of course, is the barest sketch of the utilitarian account of consequentialism—I discuss two ways to flesh it out in the next section.) This commitment to examining the consequences for human well-being is one of the attractions of utilitarianism, as compared to theories which say that we should follow tradition or divine law regardless of the human consequences. But the particular kind of consequentialism in utilitarianism is, I think, unattractive. Where it is impossible to satisfy all preferences, our intuitions do not tell us that equal amounts of utility should always have the same weight.

### at – utilitarians want the alt

**False – utilitarians are prepared for lack of relationships**

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This may be true, but it does not solve the problem. It still implies, for example, that ‘if you have employed a boy to mow your lawn and he has finished the job and asks for his pay, you should pay him what you promised only if you cannot find a better use for your money’ (Sart0rius 1969: 79). The U-agent’s reasoning, while more complex than one might initially think, still fails to recognize any special relationship between employer and employee, or lender and borrower. Some utilitarians are prepared to accept this result. Rolf Sartorius, for example, says that if the usual factors do not ensure that payment maximizes utility, i.e. if the boy ‘is not likely to publicize my breaking my promise to him too loudly, appears to have a reservoir of trust in mankind generally, and any sum I could give him really would do more good if contributed to UNICEF, then the conclusion on act-utilitarian grounds must be that I should give the money to UNICEF. But is this really absurd?’ (Sart0rius 1969: 80). Yes, this is absurd. What is absurd here is not necessarily the conclusion but the fact that the boy’s having actually performed the job, or that I had actually promised him the money, never enters into the decision as such. Notice that the consequences Sartorius mentions would be exactly the same even if the boy had not actually mowed the lawn, but simply (falsely) believed that he had done so, or falsely believed that I had promised him the money. The fact that the boy actually mowed the lawn, or that I had promised him the money, does not matter to the U—agent because nothing we could do or say could ever put us in a special moral relationship such that my obligation to him is greater than my obligation to others. No matter what the boy has done or I have said, he can never have a greater claim on my actions than anyone else. In our everyday view, the existence of a promise creates a special obligation between two people. The U-agent, however, treats promises and contracts, not as creating special moral ties to one person, but as simply adding new factors into the calculation of overall utility. The everyday view says that I should repay loans regardless of whether it maximizes utility. The U-agent says that I should repay the loan because it maximizes utility. The boy has no greater claim on me than others, he just is likely to benefit more than they are, and so repayment is the best way to fulfil my utilitarian obligation.

### at – util = immoral

**There is zero moral distinction between a utilitarian and a beautiful society**

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But if that duty is, as seems most plausible, the duty to treat people with equal consideration, then we are back to the first interpretation of utilitarianism as a way of treating people as equals. Maximizing utility is now just a by-product, not the ultimate ground of the theory. And then we need not double the population, since we have no obligation to conceive those who would constitute the increased population. If we none the less accept that maximizing utility is itself the goal, then it is best seen as a non-moral ideal, akin in some ways to an aesthetic ideal. The appropriateness of this characterization can be seen by looking at the other example Rawls gives of a teleologist, namely Nietzsche (Rawls 1971: 25). The good which Nietzsche’s theory seeks to maximize (e.g. creativity) is available only to the special few. Others are useful only in so far as they promote the good of the special few. In utilitarianism, the value being maximized is more mundane, something that every individual is capable of partaking of or contributing to (although the maximizing policy may result in the sacrifice of many). This means that in utilitarian teleology, unlike Nietzsche’s, every person’s preferences must be given some weight. But in neither case is the fundamental principle to treat people as equals. Rather it is to maximize the good. And in both cases, it is difficult to see how this can be viewed as a moral principle. The goal is not to respect people, for whom certain things are needed or wanted, but rather to respect the good, to which certain people may or may not be useful contributors. If people have become the means for the maximization of the good, morality has dropped out of the picture, and a non-moral ideal is at work. I A Nietzschean society may be aesthetically better, more beautiful, but it is not morally better (Nietzsche himself would not have rejected this description—his theory was ‘beyond good and evil’). If utilitarianism is interpreted in this teleological way, then it too has ceased to be a moral theory. Z I said earlier that one of utilitarianism’s attractions was its secular nature—f0r utilitarians, morality matters because human beings matter.]But that attractive idea is absent from this second interpretation, whose moral point is quite obscure. Humans are viewed as potential producers or consumers of a good, and our duties are to that good, not to other people. Utilitatianism simply ceases to have any attraction if it is cut off from that core intuition. If utilitarianism is best seen as an egalitarian doctrine, then there is no independent commitment to the idea of maximizing welfare. The utilitarian has to admit that we should use the maximizing standard only if that is the best account of treating people as equals. This is important, because much of the attraction of utilitarianism depends on a tacit mixing of the two justificati0ns.8 Utilitarianism’s intuitive unfairness would quickly disqualify it as an adequate account of equal consideration, were it not that many people take its maximizing feature as an additional, independent reason to endorse it. Utilitarians tacitly appeal to the good-maximization standard to deflect intuitive objections to their account of equal consideration. Indeed, it may seem to be a unique strength of utilitarianism that it can mix these two justifications. Unfortunately, it is incoherent to employ both standards in the same theory. One cannot say that morality is fundamentally about maximizing the good, while also saying that it is fundamentally about respecting the claim of individuals to equal consideration. If utilitarians were held to one or other of the standards, then their theory would lose much of its attractiveness. Viewed as a maximizing-teleological theory, it ceases to meet our core intuitions about the point of morality; viewed as an egalitarian theory, it leads to a number of results which conflict with our sense of what it is to treat people as equals, as I now hope to show in a more systematic way. 5. INADEQUATE CONCEPTION OF EQUALITY If we are to treat utilitarianism as a plausible political morality, then we must interpret it as a theory of equal consideration. That may seem strange, given the inegalitarian acts utilitarianism might justify—e.g. depriving disliked people of their liberty. But we need to distinguish different levels at which equality can be a value.

**Utilitarianism has the same moral and self-inflicted goals as the alt**

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The distinctness of this second interpretation is also apparent in Thomas Nagel’s discussion. He demands that we add a ‘deontological’ constraint of equal treatment on to utilitarianism, which he thinks is concerned with selecting the ‘impersonally best outcome’ (Nagel 1986: 176). Nagel says we must qualify our obligation to maximize the good with the obligation to treat people as equals. Obviously his demand only makes sense with reference to the second interpretation of utilitarianism, according to which the fundamental duty is not to aggregate individual preferences fairly, iv 1 but to bring about the most value in the world. For on the first interpretation, utilitarianism is already a principle of moral equality; if it fails as a principle of equal consideration, then the whole theory fails, for there is no independent commitment to the idea of maximizing utility. This second interpretation stands the first interpretation on its head. The first defines the right in terms of treating people as equals, which leads to the utilitarian aggregation standard, which happens to maximize the good. The second defines the right in terms of maximizing the good, which leads to the utilitarian aggregation standard, which as a mere consequence treats people’s interests equally. As we have seen, this inversion has important theoretical and practical consequences. So we have two independent, and indeed conflicting, paths to the claim that utility ought to be maximized. Which is the fundamental argument for utilitarianism? Up to this point, I have implicitly relied on the first view—that is, utilitarianism is best viewed as a theory of how to respect the moral claim of each individual to be treated as an equal. Rawls, however, says that utilitarianism is fundamentally a theory of the second sort—i.e. one which defines the right in terms of maximizing the good (Rawls 1971: 27). But there is something bizarre about that second interpretation. For it is entirely unclear why maximizing utility, as our direct goal, should be considered a moral duty. To whom is it a duty? Morality, in our everyday view, is a matter of interpersonal obligations—the obligations we owe to each other. But to whom do we owe the duty of maximizing utility? It cannot be to the maximally valuable state of affairs itself, for states of affairs do not have moral claims.

### at – util crushes morals

**Utilitarianism allows morals to thrive – liberal politics doesn’t preclude mindless action**

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2. COMMUNITARIANISM AND THE COMMON GOOD Communitarians object to the neutral state. They believe it should be abandoned for a ‘politics of the common good’ (Sanclel 198412: 16-17; Taylor 1986). This contrast between the ‘politics of neutrality’ and communitarianism’s ‘politics of the common good’ can be misleading. There is a ‘common good’ present in liberal politics as well, since the policies of a liberal state aim at promoting the interests of the members of the community. The political and economic processes by which individual preferences are combined into a social choice function are liberal modes of determining the common good. To affirm state neutrality, therefore, is not to reject the idea of a common good, but rather to provide an interpretation of it (Holmes 1989: 239-40). In a liberal society, the common good is the result of a process of combining preferences, all of which are counted equally (if consistent with the principles of justice). All preferences have equal weight ‘not in the sense that there is an agreed public measure of intrinsic value or satisfaction with respect to which all these conceptions come out equal, but in the sense that they are not evaluated at all from a [public] standpoint’ (Rawls 1982b: 172). As we have seen, this anti-perfectionist insistence on state neutrality reflects the belief that people’s interest in leading a good life is not advanced when society discriminates against the projects that they believe are most valuable for them. Hence the common good in a liberal society is adjusted to fit the pattern of preferences and conceptions of the good held by individuals. In a communitarian society, however, the common good is conceived of as a substantive conception of the good life which defines the community’s ‘way of life’. This common good, rather than adjusting itself to the pattern of people’s preferences, provides a standard by which those preferences are evaluated. The community’s way of life forms the basis for a public ranking of conceptions of the good, and the weight given to an individual’s preferences depends on how much she conforms or contributes to this common good. The public pursuit of the shared ends which define the community’s way of life is not, therefore, constrained by the requirement of neutrality. It takes precedence over the claim of individuals to the resources and liberties needed to pursue their own conceptions of the good.

### at – util = thought control

**Wrong – all utilitarians are free to question roles**

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3. THE UNENCUMBERED SELF On the liberal view of the self, individuals are considered free to question their participation in existing social practices, and opt out of them, should those practices seem no longer worth pursuing. As a result, individuals are not defined by their membership in any particular economic, religious, sexual, or recreational relationship, since they are free to question and reject any particular relationship. Rawls summarizes this liberal view by saying that ‘the self is prior to the ends which are affirmed by it’ (Rawls 1971: 5 60), by which he means that we can always step back from any particular project and question whether we want to continue pursuing it. No end is exempt from possible revision by the self. This is often called the ‘Kantian’ view of the self, for Kant was one of the strongest defenders of the view that the self is prior to its socially given roles and relationships, and is free only if it is capable of holding these features of ‘its social situation at a distance and judging them according to the dictates of reason (Taylor 1979: 75-8, 132-

### at – we’re morally better

**Only utilitarianism provides a framework form which we can evaluate which is right**

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Some people have concluded from this that utilitarianism must be rejected. If we accept the fourth view of welfare, and if welfare cannot be aggregated on that view, then there is no way to know which act maximizes welfare, and we need some other account of the morally right act. But that is a non sequitur. From the fact that we cannot know which act maximizes utility, it does not follow that the morally right act is not the one which maximizes utility. It may just mean that we cannot know which act is morally right. There is no reason to exclude the possibility that humans may not always be able to determine the morally right act. Even if there is an inherent incomrnensurability of different kinds of value, such that we cannot say that one of a range of value-increasing acts maximizes value, we can still make some less fine-grained rankings, and so make judgements about better or worse acts 1986: 75-92). So utilitarianism, despite its traditional ties to welfare hedonism, is compatible with any of the four accounts of utility. Of course, utilitarianism loses one of its attractions when it leaves hedonism behind.

### at – alt doesn’t preclude util

**Embracing excess without having the desire to embrace excess excludes Bataille from utilitarian methodology**

Kymlicka, 90 – Professor of Philosophy and Canada Research Chair in Political Philosophy at Queen's University at Kingston, Recurrent Visiting Professor in the Nationalism Studies program at the Central European University, B.A. (Honours) in philosophy and political studies from Queen's University, Ph.D. from Oxford University, (Will, “Contemporary Political Philosophy”, Clarendon and Oxford, 1990, Print)//JKahn

If the way to satisfy the most preferences is to order pizza, then this sort of utilitarianism tells us to order it. But what if, unbeknownst to us, the pizza we ordered is poisoned, or just rancid? Ordering it now would not promote our welfare. What is good for us can be different from the preferences we currently have. Marxists emphasize this in their theory of false consciousness—e.g. workers have been socialized in such a way as to be unable to see their real interest in socialism. But the same problem arises in less dramatic or controversial ways. We can just lack adequate information, as in the pizza example, or have made mistakes in calculating the costs and benefits of a particular action. Preferences, therefore, do not define our good. It is more accurate to say that our preferences are predictions about our good. We want to have those things which are worth having, and our current preferences reflect our current beliefs about what those worthwhile things are. But it is not always easy to tell what is worth having, and we could be wrong in our beliefs. We might act on a preference about what to buy or do, and then come to realize that it was not worth it. We often make these sort of mistakes, both in specific decisions, like what food to order, and in ‘global preferences’ about what sort of life to lead. Someone who has planned for years to be a lawyer may get to law school and realize that they have made a mistake. Perhaps they had a romantic view of the profession, ignoring the competitiveness and drudgery involved. Someone who had planned to remain in their home town may come to realize that it is a parochial way to live, narrow and unchallenging. Such people may regret the years they spent preparing for a certain way of life, or leading that life. They regret what they have done, because people want to have or do the things which are worth having or doing, and this may be different from what they currently prefer to have or do. The first is what matters to us, not the second (Dworkin 1983: 24-30). Utilitarianism of the preference-satisfaction variety says that something is made valuable by the fact that lots of people desire it. But that is wrong, and indeed backwards. Having the preference does not make it valuable-—on the contrary, its being valuable is a good reason for preferring it. And if it is not valuable, then satisfying my mistaken preference for it will not contribute to my well-being.

## Metaphors bad (generic)

**The ‘severance of the head’ is a violent metaphor that destroys self-determination and turns the alt**

**Sinister, 10** – staff writer for the Scavenger, Ipinicus Rampant, and No New Year, (Gauche, “Why the use of metaphors is oppressive”, The Scavenger, October 10, 2010, http://www.thescavenger.net/people/why-the-use-of-metaphors-is-oppressive-78235-481.html)//JKahn

NB: This post is full of language that may be offensive, derogatory or triggering. I agree with the premise that language reflects and reinforces certain ideas, and that it’s worthwhile to be more aware of the assumptions behind our usage and understanding (assumptions that make sense of words and give them meaning beyond their denotative referent; the word’s face value - what might be the first entry in a small dictionary). It’s a project initially motivated by solidarity with self-determination – by wanting to respect how people prefer to be addressed, described or discussed; to respond to their political needs; and to show support for cultural change through linguistic change. And it inevitably extends to questioning the assumptions on which all language relies. But I’ve found common knowledge and practice around inclusive language in social justice circles to be both too simple, and too complicated. Inclusive language 101 The basics of oppressive language are simple to grasp. When you use language that can refer to or that is associated with a group of people or their characteristics and circumstances to mean something else (generally derogatory, but it may not be), you thicken the link between the two: saying “gay” when you mean “uncool” implies that gay people are uncool. It's simple to understand with the most overt examples, and simple to change: no matter how accustomed you are to using words like "nigger," "faggot" or "retard," it's not hard to set up an alarm in your mind and find a better replacement. Often there's no perfect substitute, no word that's quite as powerful - but that's because oppression is powerful and there's little that can call up so much power, so quickly, as a slur that stands in for a whole history of violence. There’s plenty of existing discussion about words and phrases that can be hurtful or exclusionary and why you shouldn’t use them.[Meloukhia](http://meloukhia.net/2009/09/why_inclusionary_language_matters.html:%20) gives a few examples:¶ Bitch. Cripple. Grow a pair. Lame. Cunt. White trash. “He/his/him” as a generic when the gender of a subject is not known. Ballsy. Harpy. Whore. Female impersonator. Jewed. Real woman. Retarded. Slut. Dumb. Natural woman. Harridan. Witch. Idiot. Man up. Biological sex. Crazy. Tranny. Invalid. Psycho. Step up. Asexual (not in reference to someone who identifies as asexual). Breeder. Shrew. She-male. Gay (not in reference to sexual orientation). Moron. You guys as a generic greeting to a mixed gender group. Skank. Mankind. “Man” as a generic for “people.” Gyp. Halfwit. Insane. Schizo/schizophrenic. “Disabled” as in “the disabled.” Women born women. Ungendering by using “he” as a pronoun for a trans woman or “she” as a pronoun for a trans man. Fat/fatty (as an insult, not an adjective). Some of these offend because they are commonly used as an insult but also refer to, or are associated with, a group of people (“cunt,” “moron,” “insane”). Some perpetuate stereotype by associating a group of people with certain characteristics or actions (“ballsy,” “jewed”). Some directly exclude (“biological sex,” using male pronouns as generic). Some embody double standards (“whore,” “shrew”). Some depersonalise (“the disabled”). I don’t want to argue for either rejecting certain words or reclaiming others, and I certainly don’t want to make a judgement about who can say which words, and when. I do want to acknowledge that there’s more to language than vocabulary; more to inclusionary language than banning words and phrases. I want to talk about when language perpetuates unintended associations and assumptions in ways that are problematic but not necessarily hurtful. I want to consider this without calling for a ban, without even asking people to avoid certain phrases or judging them on how they use language. I want to do this because I love language and I find it fascinating, and while deliberate language is political, it may not be inclusionary, and it isn’t activism. Beyond denotation: Against metaphor Extending [my last piece on analogy](http://thescavenger.net/people/why-analogies-of-oppression-dont-work-32685.html), I want to argue against metaphor: against substituting one thing for another, against reaching into the baggage of one thing to enrich or complicate our understanding of another. To start with an obvious example, blackness and darkness is routinely used to stand in for mystery, fear, or general negativity. Though these associations may exist in many cultures, in mine it also draws on racism. We use poor to signify lack, but it indicates both the state of having less (“poor people”) and being less (“poor form”). Disability metaphors abound: a publication which would never refer to people as “retards” or “spastics” is likely to use “blind” and “deaf” regularly as a metaphor for ignorance or ineptitude (“the Government is blind to growing dissatisfaction ...” etc). Debt is “crippling” and design is “schizophrenic.” In [Illness as Metaphor,](http://books.google.com.au/books?id=paBlQgAACAAJ&dq=illness+as+metaphor&hl=en&ei=KoCuTOb4H4ygvQO88LW6Bg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CDAQ6AEwAA) Susan Sontag considers late 20th century discourse on cancer to reveal our time’s anxiety about uncontrolled economic growth and technological progress. Rape is used as a metaphor for almost any offence or injustice, from colonisation to privacy violations to logging of old-growth forests. Consent is relevant in almost every political conversation - autonomy is essentially consent collectivised - but alluding to sexual assault is not. It’s impossible to escape metaphor’s intersections with oppression; most adjectives can be applied to bodies and people, so the words that describe us (short, young, light) inevitably draw on some other meanings (curt, fresh, unimportant). I want richly layered associative meaning. I want poetry.

### at – key to expression

**False – there are always other ways to communicate things without metaphors – especially the alternative**

**Hartman, 02** – professor of linguistics and anthropology at the University of Florida, Ph.D. from Stanford University, (Dr. M.J., “The Language of Peace: Constructing Non-Violent Metaphors”, Community Coalition Against War & Terrorism, the University of Florida, February 16, 2002, http://grove.ufl.edu/~hardman/peace.html)//JKahn

Background Information Violence in the English Language¶ Much work has been done delineating the violence in the English language; the evidence is now overwhelming of the continual thread of violence through English, whether violence is relevant to the topic at hand or not. We are all also well aware of the damage that verbal violence does, to health and to general well being.¶ This workshop gives some attention to constructing ways of talking that lead to understanding, that are vivid, interesting, that can focu Background Information¶ Violence in the English Language¶ Much work has been done delineating the violence in the English language; the evidence is now overwhelming of the continual thread of violence through English, whether violence is relevant to the topic at hand or not. We are all also well aware of the damage that verbal violence does, to health and to general well being.¶ This workshop gives some attention to constructing ways of talking that lead to understanding, that are vivid, interesting, that can focus attention, and all the other things that are used as justification for violence in language but without the violence. We focus on the thread of generative violence metaphors, in the guise of war, sex and sports, that pervade our language, developing alternate generative metaphors that would also have cohesion. If we did not speak of most of our daily work as some sort of fight or battle, or hear others speak in a constant stream of their fights and battles, our overall health might be better, for example:¶ "Johnny don't fight at school. Your mother is helping the war on cancer. Your father has his battles everyday at work. Your sister has to attack her studies. We just can't have you fighting at school."¶ How might the above be redone? The workshop will draw on the creativeness of the audience to weave the threads that could lead us to non-violent, non-hypocritical language for those of us who would wish a non-violent or at least a less-violent society.¶ For example, to beat a dead horse involves not only futility but the notion that, if the horse were alive, violence would lead to success or compliance.

## AT: VTL

**( ) Bataille wildly inflates the value of ecstasy and tempting death – in doing so, he ignores the value of *living***

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Life is a serious business of highly charged temporal stakes, involving a being’s struggle to secure for itself the experience of pleasure time/free time rather than pain time/slave time. Since lived time is a living stake, death is not the profound phenomenon that Bataille thinks it is. For one who is racked by drawn-out pain, the pain of death situated at the end of time is an irrelevance. And for one who is caught up in the throes of extended pleasure, the dubious pleasure of death is likewise irrelevant. Death, far from being profound, may simply provide a pragmatic escape from a life of pain and toil, or a simple halt to a life of pleasure and freedom. We can see death as important to time in that it is the end of the great game of time, the great flow. But death is relative in importance to time for the same reason; it is simply the end of the great game of time, a game without which it would be pure abstraction. However, we are not suggesting that death has absolutely no importance for living beings. On the contrary. By countering Bataille’s view of death, which tries to domesticate death through attempting to engage it in ‘intimate’ dialogue, and which tries to make political gain out of death, we can see death as a real, non-negotiable phenomenon. Death can no longer be thought of as an ambiguous but essentially accessible deity, but must instead be seen as that which wipes out real substantial time with no hope of appeal. Death can now be viewed as a certain element in the game of time, as something to be dreaded or desired as the end of time, but which has no fixed moral or political meaning in itself. By affirming the reality of time we are in fact affirming the reality of death, and so we are proposing a more tragic philosophy than the one Bataille proposes – which is ironic, given that Bataille is considered by most postmodernist/ post-structuralist philosophers to be perhaps the cruellest thinker.

**( ) Bataille’s starting point is so-obsessed with finding meaning through death that he becomes death-obsessed. Bataille’s not “no value to life”, he’s “no value to living”**

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For Bataille, the full engagement with the truth of transience generates a form of wild abandon (which unfetters forces that would otherwise be invested in conservative projects), but if we see pro-transience as an end game, as a pointless act of looking through the wrong end of a telescope, this view of time is shown to be about as exuberant as nostalgia TV. Pro-transience is in fact less audacious than a priest’s remorse, a slave’s regret. Conclusion Time must no longer be treated merely as a form of fiction, to be used in a fast and loose manner by storytellers in order to mould moral and political beliefs. Instead, time must be treated as a raw phenomenon, being itself the stake over which moral and political forces fight. Time must no longer be seen as a pristine phenomenon that could receive its essence from a single instance (in Bataille’s view, this instance is death). Rather, time must be seen as a vulgar plenitude that encompasses everything that happens. Time must no longer be seen as an existential option that can be authentically transcended in an instant to its end, but rather as something that is experienced by living beings as unavoidable and irreducible in its flow. **To see all life from life’s end is to see all life with the eyes of the dead.** To think all time from time’s end is to think with the mind of the dead. It is time to quietly drop this pro-transience philosophy of time, which is hardly a philosophy at all. Instead we must begin to observe what time looks like from the only real vantage point that there is: **the vantage point of the living.** There is no way to experience the world except through time. Time may be transient, but it is all there is. By dropping the perspective that sees all time from time’s end, one has time. And the pleasures and pains of time are revealed to be excessive stakes.

**( ) Bataille overestimates the value of death to the living being – it’s better to max-out lived time and experiences**

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This work sets out to attack Bataille’s assumption that life is essentially transient. Using Bergson’s anti-teleological thought experiments, I hope to reveal the ludicrous paradoxes involved in seeing the essence of time in time’s end. With Bergson, I demand that we consider time to be the whole of its flow. I insist that Bataille overestimates the importance that death has for living beings, and I affirm instead the intensity of lived time and ongoing experiences.

## AT: Extinction

**( ) Bataille’s premise of inevitable extinction is simply wrong:**

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I shall assume that time cannot be separated from space, and that time is essentially a view of what happens to space. If we see time as encompassing all of space, it is difficult to see time as rushing headlong towards an end, since we must imagine time as having to move through the tangled matter of space to get to any end: a tortuous procedure. Time does not cut through space instantly like a magic knife towards an end, so why should we view all time from its end? Moreover, time is ‘everything that happens’, involving the irreducible durations of pleasure or pain, slavery or sovereignty. Again, with such a rich view of time, it is hard to see how time can be authentically described as slipping easily towards its extinction. Since time is made up of everything that occurs, the philosophical act of analysing time from the point of view of the annihilation of all occurrence is narrow to the most extreme degree. How can this backward glance, this posthumous look at time from the illusory vantage point of nothingness, not be an emaciated view, a ‘little’ view? How can such a narrow, such a restricted view of time not be a slave perspective in the Nietzschean sense?

# To format

## Josh

**Sasso, 95** (Robert, professor at University of Nice Sophia Antipolis, “On Bataille: Critical Essays,” State University of New York Press, pg. 42-43, Tashma)

Yet one must not confuse the question of thought with the psychological, in a descriptive approach, or with logic, aimed at the normative. What is in question is the total thought of everything, meta­psychic and onto­logical, which ventures to defy all finitude—that of things, that of practices, that of knowledge. To raise oneself up in this way to the lofty and vertiginous perspectives of the site of thought seems to require heroes and madmen. And if the history of philosophy is that "succession of noble minds," that "gallery of reason's heroes who think," whose object is the ''everything" or the "absolute"—according to Hegelian definitions how could Bataille break free from philosophy and its "acrobatics," all the while pretending to embrace the "totality of possibilities," short of being "mad"? However, what is more reasonable, what is wiser, from the viewpoint of philosophical tradition, than the questioning from which Bataille sets out? "My answer to anyone," he confides, "is first of all a question. I hope to ask, from one man to another, whether he has ever suspected some hoax. On the surface, everything is in order, foreseen and defined, but none of this is certain." Now already this suspicion, without causing a stir, can cause one to be suspicious about the person who evokes it. If it only takes one "philosopher" to wonder about what ultimately founds this apparently ordered world in which Hippias is more useful than Socrates, then it only takes one philosopher to believe, or to pretend to believe, that this astonishment shouldn't astonish: "Personally, what I speak of is simple and we all experience it at every moment: I am speaking of life that consumes itself, independently of any use to which this self­consuming life can be put. Therefore what I say should never surprise. It is always in front of us all. But always a little secretly." Up to this point, nothing particularly outrageous, although the incitement to ask oneself what is really happening, despite the "evidence" of the "well known," might have appeared as a sufficient motive for accusing and condemning Socrates. Without running the same deadly risk, Bataille jeopardizes his case to no less of an extent when he refuses to be satisfied with the very solutions of philosophy. To the philosophic questioning of "common sense" is added, then, a questioning of what one could call the ''sense constructed" by the philosophers. A double challenge, consequently, which will be translated by the extreme attempts to escape from "doxa" as well as from the abusive jurisdiction of "reason," that is, from any "police/regulation/policy [police] of thought." As a result of such a position, an intellectual practice without restraint is developed. If one understands by intellectual practice the indissociable exercise of the couple thought/writing, it is not surprising, from Bataille's perspective, that to the phrase "I think like a girl takes off her dress," there hangs this resolution: "How to write? if not as a woman accustomed to honesty but undressing at an orgy." The acceptance of the impudence, of the obscenity of thought, at the extremity of its movement, orders a work dedicated to the thematics of excess and of violence, according to a triple register (novelistic text, theoretical essays, and "meditations"), in which each type of "discourse" can coexist with its "other" or be transposed there: this erotic tale will provide the opportunity to quote Hegel while that work on "economy" will end with a note on the "madness" of its author, and on the importance he attributes to mysticism. From then on, this "work" can appear quite unseemly, a source of unending equivocations (without purpose) hardly qualified to measure up to its inordinate pretentions. It is however an undertaking that—even were it to be declared "impossible"—makes rigorously explicit its own conditions for possibility.

**Sasso, 95** (Robert, professor at University of Nice Sophia Antipolis, “On Bataille: Critical Essays,” State University of New York Press, pg. 45, Tashma)

However, one can and one must take up the "question" again because, in the preceding hypotheses, the primordial question, providing the "dimensions" of all interrogations about what is called thinking, hasn't been asked. Heidegger formulates it in these terms: What calls us, what commands us, as it were, to think? What calls us to thought? From this angle, the challenge to think in Bataille's writing takes on its true dimension as an opening to the pro­vocation of thought, that is to what solicits it, to which it corresponds and of which it is the intimate understanding. Bataille's theoretical attempts to broach this question are generally placed within the framework of genealogies of humanity: history of art, of religion, of societies, of eroticism. At the "origin" is always "thought," a real phenomenon whose transformations will constitute History. But the very structure of this manifestation, its reflexivity, is the indication of an event literally without foundation: thought only originates in a collapse. More precisely, it only really takes place to the extent that man is no longer in continuity with nature and animality. Man's truly prehistoric immanence to natural life, still witnessed by the Lascaux paintings, is made progressively impossible by the splitting of the given and by the "ontological" scission resulting from objectifying activity. The entire drama of History that necessarily ensues, stems from this paradox: by his transforming action, man can experience and prove his essence only by negating all present states of things, without being able to recognize and assert himself entirely within the result of this negation, for this would risk equating his being with the ''object." Arising from a violence, exerting its violence with regard to every dasein, whether "given" or "produced," thought is able neither to rest upon an "unshakeable foundation," ground or base, nor find rest in an "absolute knowledge," which would mean the completion of its "realization," without deceptively betraying its nature and its destiny. On the contrary, according to Bataille, thought can never really escape from the violence from which it proceeds, and which always finishes by unleashing it by wrenching it from the ordered concatenations to which it temporarily submits in order to respond to the (necessarily) pragmatic requirements of praxis. The lost intimacy of supposed immanence engages man in transcendence, that is in the process of a contradictory quest: to attain oneself in the end by suppressing one's transcendence, although the latter is the condition for ipseity. To attain oneself thus would amount to destroying oneself as self, in other words as non­object.

**Sasso, 95** (Robert, professor at University of Nice Sophia Antipolis, “On Bataille: Critical Essays,” State University of New York Press, pg. 46-48, Tashma)

Must one content oneself with saying, sardonically, that **Bataille's reflexion and work serve no purpose**? In that case, it wouldn't matter if the judgment came laughingly, from some young Thracian servant girl, but if it were pronounced by a modern Thales, then it would not be lacking in irony. Rather, let us see once again, by simplifying, in what sense it is possible to speak of a "challenge to think" in Bataille's work. In this work, the so­called challenge is essentially presented: 1) as the "provocation" (shocking, for most readers) of the content and form of his "work"; 2) as an ambiguous attempt to exercise and express the thought­limit, at the limit of "philosophy'' as of "poetry"—at their breaking point. As for the first point, the justification of the provocation would be dependent less on biographical anecdotes than on the "objective" demands of all thought responding to the violence that founds and that summons it. With regard to the second point, one must insist on the fact that Bataille envisages the arrival of thought at the gates of non­knowledge only to the extent that thought would have exhausted its "resources"; in other words, on the condition that it have first yielded to the ascesis of philosophy proceeding to "absolute knowledge." Certainly "[t]he greatest effort of thought is necessarily that which condemns effort in general"; and "only in excess does thought (reflexion) complete itself in us." This is no idle argument, for thought "demands a meticulous relentlessness and it only yields to violence—its opposite—in the end." Such a "completion" of thought puts an end to knowledge. What is manifested, then, has strictly speaking no status, is "ecstatic," in the flash of an instant, with no possibility of being grasped intuitively or enunciated discursively, unless it is subject to a comic illusion. Extreme tension can only be followed by an emotional or linguistic release (more generally in symbols); hence the inevitable disappointment of the experience that follows thought, in as much as it is doomed to absolute contradiction: "As I sink into night, poetry, sobbing, tears together rob me of the impossible. Philosophy disguises it, and love or laughter finish deluding me." Such is non­knowledge, which is never "super­knowledge" in Bataille's work. It is true that shortly after the sentences just quoted, Bataille follows in the same text with this: "However we might grasp, finally, the trap into which, in various ways, man in his entirety has fallen. We have searched for it on all sides." However, this is in order to immediately add: "But there where the impossible prevails (where convulsive emotion—but at the limit of reason—follows upon clarity) all explanation eludes us." No doubt one will be willing to grant that Bataille was not "mad." Must one, in return, award him the quality of a hero, for having alone taken up the challenge to think? One declaration, among others, suffices to bring things back to more fitting proportions: "I personally don't presume to think that in a small number of years I have managed to solve, by myself, a problem that has up to this point disarmed humanity in its entirety." The fact remains that it appears difficult to lessen the provocation of an undertaking so zealous in the most general questioning of "what is," and so stubborn regarding the compromises of all forms of rest in thought, that is to say of all forms of its death, in the illusory reign of coherence. The sovereign exercise of a thought without reserve, because it is accomplished teleologically in "incoherence," can be exhausting and frustrating, unless it provides one with the opportunity to joyously give one's assent to a shattered and unguided world, to measure up to its excessiveness: "sovereign ek­sistence." The trap, for Man, is to "reflect," to lead a "tedious" interrogation. But to think, in this sense, is a challenge that cannot be challenged, like the invitation to a certain stone guest: "The hope never abandoned me," admitted Bataille in The Impossible, "of clasping in my hand the stone hand of the Commandeur."