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## AT: Aesthetics

### Focus on aesthetics legitimizes the status quo—beauty can be found within even the most horrible circumstances

White 87 – Professor of Comparative Literature

Hayden, Professor of Comparative Literature at Stanford University, The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse & Historical Representation, p. 71

This aestheticism underwrites the conviction (periodically reaffirmed when history fails to provide a knowledge that can legitimately claim the title “scientific”) that historical studies are, after all, a branch of belles-lettres, a calling suitable for a kind of gentleman-scholar for whom “taste” serves as aguide to comprehension, and “style” as an index of achievement. When the notions of taste and style are given a specifically moral connotation, as they inevitably are when they serve as the basis of a professional ethics, they authorize the attitudes that the socially responsible historian properly assumes before his designated objects of study. These attitudes include respect for the “individuality,” “uniqueness,” and “ineffability” of historical entities, sensitivity to the “richness” and “variety” of the historical field, and a faith in the “unity” that makes of finite sets of historical particulars comprehensible wholes. All this permits the historian to see some beauty, if not good, in everything human and to assume an **Olympian calm in the face of any current social situation**, however terrifying it may appear to anyone who lacks historical perspective. It renders [one] him receptive to a genial pluralism in matters epistemological, suspicious of anything smacking of reductionism, irritated with theory, disdainful of technical terminology or jargon, and contemptuous of any to discern the direction that the future development of [one’s] his own society might take.

### \*edited for gendered language

## AT: Anthro – Permutation Solves

### Permutation solves – absolute rejection is unnecessary

Barry 99 –Lecturer in Politics

John Barry, Lecturer in Politics @ Keele, 1999, Rethinking Green politics, pg. 35

We may think of environmental virtue as having to do with the refinement of moral discernment in regard to the place of nature as a constitutive aspect of the human good. The cultivation of environmental virtues can then be regarded as a matter of discerning the place nature has within some particular human good or interest. A more positive statement would be to say that those who destroy nature are motivated by an unnecessarily narrow view of the human good, and that 'what they count as important is too narrowly confined' (Hill, 1983: 219). In so doing the inherent plurality of the 'human good' is occluded. That is, forms of anthropocentrism which narrow the human good and human interests can be criticized as vices, or potential vices. At the same time, those who destroy nature also often have a mistaken appreciation of the 'seriousness' (Taylor, 1989) of the human interest or good in the service of which nature is destroyed. However, **to reject anthropocentrism** **is not the solution,** but is rather itself a vice of which we need to be aware. A virtue approach is thus anthropocentric in that its reference point is some human good or interest, but as argued in the next chapter, this ethical (as opposed to metaphysical) anthropocentrism is compatible with including considerations of non-human interests and welfare.

### The affirmative espouses ecological stewardship – this is compatible with and more ethical than

Barry 99 –Lecturer in Politics

John Barry, Lecturer in Politics @ Keele, 1999, Rethinking Green politics, pg. 7-8

Ecological stewardship, unlike ecocentrism, seeks to emphasize that a self-reflexive, long-term anthropocentrism, as opposed to an 'arrogant' or 'strong' anthropocentrism, can secure many of the policy objectives of ecocentrism, in terms of environmental preservation and conservation. As argued in Chapter 3, a reformed, reflexive anthropocentrism is premised on critically evaluating human uses of the non-human world, and distinguishing 'permissible' from 'impermissible' uses. That is, an 'ethics of use', **though anthropocentric and rooted in human interests**, seeks to regulate human interaction with the environment by distinguishing legitimate 'use' from unjustified 'abuse'. The premise for this defence of anthropocentric moral reasoning is that an immanent critique of 'arrogant humanism' is a **much more defensible and effective way** to express green moral concerns than rejecting anthropocentrism and developing a 'new ecocentric ethic'. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, ecocentric demands are premised on an over-hasty dismissal of anthropocentrism which precludes a recognition of the **positive resources within anthropocentrism** for developing an appropriate and practicable moral idiom to cover social-environmental interaction.

### ONLY the perm solves – absolute non-anthro disables ALL green politics by erasing the human ability to correct problems we created

Dobson, 2k– Professor of Politics at the University of Keele

Andrew, “Green Political Thought,” 3rd ed., pg. 55-56

The reason for dwelling on this is that the green movement may be doing itself a disservice by what has been seen as its insistent distancing from the human. In the first place it is self-contradictory. Charlene Spretnak, for example writes that “Green politics rejects the anthropocentric orientation of humanism a philosophy which posits that humans have the ability to confront and solve the many problems we face by applying human reason and by rearranging the natural world and the interactions of men and women so that human life will prosper. (Spretnak and Capra, 1985, pg. 234). There is evidently a reasonable green rejection of human-instrumentalism here, but also a disturbing hint that human beings should abandon their pretensions to solving problems they have brought upon themselves. This suspicion is reinforced by comments of the following kind: “In the long run, Nature is in control” (Spretnak and Capra, 1985, p. 234). If Spretnak really believes this, one wonders why she bothers to write books persuading us of the merits of green politics. The fact of her involvement implies a ebleif that she has some control, however minimal, over the destiny of the planet. Overall, of course, it is the generalized belief in the possibility of change that makes the green movement a properly political movement. Without such a belief, the movement’s reason for being would be undermined. From this perspective, the recognition that weak anthropocentrism is unavoidable may act as a useful political corrective to the idea that ‘Nature is in control’: at least it reintroduces the human on to the agenda—a necessary condition for there to be such a thing as politics.

## AT: Anthro – Humans First Good

### Preventing human extinction is necessary in an eco-centric framework

Baum 9 – PhD @ Penn State University

Sean Baum, PhD @ Penn State University, 2009, “Costebenefit analysis of space exploration: Some ethical considerations,” Space Policy, Vol. 25, Science Direct

It is of note that the priority of reducing the risk of human extinction persists in forms of CBA which value nature in an ecocentric fashion, i.e. independently of any consideration of human interests. The basic reason is that without humanity leading long-term survival efforts (which would most likely include space colonization), the rest of Earth life would perish as a result of the astronomical processes described above. This point is elaborated by futurist Bruce Tonn, who argues on ecocentric grounds for reorienting society to focus on avoiding human extinction through both immediate avoidance of catastrophe and long-term space colonization [40]. Tonn dubs this process of surviving beyond Earth’s eventual demise ‘‘transcending oblivion’’ [41]. There is thus some convergence in the recommendations of the common anthropocentric, money-based CBA and the ecocentric CBA described here. This convergence results from the fact that (in all likelihood) only humans are capable of colonizing space, and thus human survival is necessary for Earth life to transcend oblivion.

### \*CBA = Cost-Benefit Analysis

### Concerns over humans create an a priori environmental consciousness – solves the impact

-only focusing on anthropocentrism allows egocentrism and ethnocentrism to greatly damage the environment

Johnson 96

Pamela C. Johnson, Development of an Ecological Conscience: Is Ecocentrism a Prerequisite? The Academy of Management Review – peer reviewed journal, July, JSTOR

3. Anthropocentrism, especially when motivated by concerns about intergenerational equity and justice, can be a **strong foundation** for the development of an ecological conscience. If one elevates the well-being of the entire human species, now and in the future, to the center of moral consideration, it becomes impossible to escape the conclusion that the well-being of humans and the well-being of the ecosystems on which we depend are **inextricably linked**. We have one small planet, and as a species we are interconnected with other species in a complex set of ecological relationships about which we have only limited understanding. It seems to me that egocentrism and ethnocentrism are **more ecologically problematic than anthropocentrism**. If we can get over the anthropocentric/ecocentric divide, we can begin to address some more pressing issues hinted at by Hanna (1995: 797) when he asked, for example, "What level of environmental disturbance would make it appropriate to close a plant or shut down a business (thereby significantly stressing and placing at risk a human community)?" Specific questions about the ethical principles and reasoning processes we use to mediate interspecies conflicts (particularly between "vital interests" of humans and other species) are the tough ones. Paradigm definition is necessary but insufficient to address such issues. Questions such as these are where the hard work of operationalizing an ethic or a paradigm really begins.

### Human-centeredness is a pre-requisite to care for the environment

Light 2 – Professor of environmental philosophy

Andrew Light, professor of environmental philosophy and director of the Environmental Conservation Education Program, 2002, Applied Philosophy Group at New York University, METAPHILOSOPHY, v33, n4, July, p. 561

It should be clear by now that endorsing a method­ological environmental pragmatism requires an ac­ceptance of some form of anthropocentrism in envi­ronmental ethics, if only because we have sound empirical evidence that humans think about the value of nature in human terms and pragmatists insist that we must pay attention to how humans think about the value of nature. Indeed, as I said above, it is a common presupposition among committed nonan­thropocentrists that the proposition that humans are anthropocentrist is true, though regrettable. There are many problems involved in the wholesale rejec­tion of anthropocentrism by most environmental philosophers. While I cannot adequately explain my reservations to this rejection, for now I hope the reader will accept the premise that not expressing reasons for environmental priorities in human terms **seriously hinders** our ability to communicate a moral basis for better environmental policies to the public. Both anthropocentric and nonanthropocentric claims should be open to us.

### This influence on the environmental movement should be the most relevant concern

Light 2 – Professor of environmental philosophy

Andrew Light, professor of environmental philosophy and director of the Environmental Conservation Education Program, 2002, Environmental Ethics: What Really Matters What Really Works David Schmidtz and Elizabeth Willott, p. 556-57

In recent years a critique of this predominant trend in environmental ethics has emerged from within the pragmatist tradition in American philosophy.' The force of this critique is driven by the intuition that environmental philosophy cannot afford to be qui­escent about the public reception of ethical argu­ments over the value of nature. The original moti­vations of environmental philosophers for turning their philosophical insights to the environment sup­port such a position., Environmental philosophy evolved out of a concern about the state of the grow­ing environmental crisis, and a conviction that a philosophical contribution could be made to the res­olution of this crisis. But if environmental philoso­phers spend all of their time debating non­-human centered forms of value theory they will ar­guably never get very far in making such a contri­bution. For example, to continue to ignore human motivations for the act of valuing nature causes many in the field to overlook the fact that most people find it very difficult to extend moral consideration to plants and animals on the grounds that these entities possess some form of intrinsic, inherent, or other­wise conceived nonanthropocentric value. It is even more difficult for people to recognize that non­humans could have rights. Claims about the value of nature as such do not appear to resonate with the or­dinary moral intuitions of most people who, after all, spend most of their lives thinking of value, moral obligations, and rights in exclusively human terms. Indeed, while most environmental philosophers be­gin their work with the assumption that most people think of value in human-centered terms (a problem that has been decried since the very early days of the field), few have considered the problem of how a non-human-centered approach to valuing nature can ever appeal to such human intuitions. The particular version of the pragmatist critique of environmental ethics that I have endorsed recognizes that we need to rethink the utility of anthropocentric arguments in environmental moral and political theory, not nec­essarily because the traditional nonanthropocentric arguments in the field are false, but because they hamper attempts to contribute to the public discus­sion of environmental problems, in terms familiar to the public.

### Reverence for human life is first priority

Schmahmann and Polachek 95

Partner and Associate in Legal Firm, 22 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 747

To some extent, it is a challenge to the value of civilization to dismiss the Judeo-Christian ethic as anthropocentric or speciesist [n27](http://www.lexisnexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.466339.82986242574&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1220851870623&returnToKey=20_T4504297941&parent=docview#n27) and thus deficient, and to minimize the significance of the capacity to express reason, to recognize moral principles, and to plan for ordered coexistence in a complex technological society. "The core of this book," Singer writes in Animal Liberation, "is the claim that to discriminate against beings solely on account of their species is a form of prejudice, immoral and indefensible in the same way that discrimination on the basis of race is immoral and indefensible." [n28](http://www.lexisnexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.466339.82986242574&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1220851870623&returnToKey=20_T4504297941&parent=docview#n28) Such an equation, however, allows Ingrid Newkirk, founder of People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), to state that "[s]ix million Jews died in concentration camps, but six billion broiler chickens will die this year in slaughter houses." [n29](http://www.lexisnexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.466339.82986242574&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1220851870623&returnToKey=20_T4504297941&parent=docview#n29) The only "pure" human being, Newkirk has theorized, is a dead one. "[O]nly dead people are true purists, feeding the earth and living beings rather than taking from them. . . . We know it is impossible to breathe without hurting or exploiting." [n30](http://www.lexisnexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.466339.82986242574&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1220851870623&returnToKey=20_T4504297941&parent=docview#n30) These forms of doctrinaire "animal rightism" ignore the value that society has placed on human life which enables society to function in an orderly fashion. In effect, the extreme positions of animal rights activists **devalue human life and detract from human rights**. [n31](http://www.lexisnexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.466339.82986242574&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1220851870623&returnToKey=20_T4504297941&parent=docview#n31) "The belief that human life, and only human life, is sacrosanct is a form of  [\*754]  speciesism," Singer writes. [n32](http://www.lexisnexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.466339.82986242574&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1220851870623&returnToKey=20_T4504297941&parent=docview#n32) But if the sacredness of all life is equivalent, what is one to make of animals that kill each other and the often arbitrary nature of life and death and survival of the fittest in the wild? What is one to make of the conflict between the seeming arbitrariness of the killing that takes place in nature and the ethical content of human existence that starts with the certainty that the life of every individual person is uniquely sacred? Sometimes the statements of contemporary radical environmentalists and animal rights activists display a profound misanthropy. "If radical environmentalists were to invent a disease to bring human population back to ecological sanity, it would probably be something like AIDS," writes one author using the pseudonym Miss Ann Thropy. [n33](http://www.lexisnexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.466339.82986242574&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1220851870623&returnToKey=20_T4504297941&parent=docview#n33) "Seeing no other possibility for the preservation of biological diversity on earth than a drastic decline in the number of humans, Miss Ann Thropy contends that AIDS is ideal for the task primarily because 'the disease only affects humans' and shows promise for wiping out large numbers of humans." [n34](http://www.lexisnexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.466339.82986242574&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1220851870623&returnToKey=20_T4504297941&parent=docview#n34) Ingrid Newkirk has commented that even if animal research resulted in a cure for AIDS, PETA would "be against it." [n35](http://www.lexisnexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.466339.82986242574&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1220851870623&returnToKey=20_T4504297941&parent=docview#n35) The point is that reverence for human life must be both the starting point and the reference point for any ethical philosophy and system of law that does not immediately become unhitched from its moorings in civilization. With respect to animals and their similarities to humans, Singer's dismissal of "fine phrases" notwithstanding, the fact that debate exists about the ethical consequences of such differences is almost distinction enough. It is we -- humans -- who are having the debate, not animals; and it is a unique feature of humankind to recognize ethical subtleties. This ability to recognize gradations and competing interests is what defines the rules that we live by and the system of rights and responsibilities that comprise our legal system. Animals cannot possess rights because animals are in no way a part  [\*755]  of any of these processes. On the other hand, any duties we may have respecting our treatment of animals derive from the fact that we are part of these processes. [n36](http://www.lexisnexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.466339.82986242574&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1220851870623&returnToKey=20_T4504297941&parent=docview#n36)

### Human rights should be preferred – animals lack the capacity for free moral judgment

Cohen 86 – Professor @ U of M

Carl, Professor @ UMich, [http://spot.colorado.edu/~heathwoo/phil1200,Spr07/cohen.pdf](http://spot.colorado.edu/~heathwoo/phil1200%2CSpr07/cohen.pdf)

The attributes of human beings from which this moral capability arises have been described variously by philosophers, both ancient and modem: the inner consciousness of a free will (Saint Augustine); the grasp, by human reason, of the binding character of moral law (Saint Thomas); the self-conscious participation of human beings in an objective ethical order (Hegel); human membership in an organic moral community (Bradley); the development of the human self through the consciousness of other moral selves (Mead); and the underivative, intuitive cognition of the rightness of an action (Prichard). Most influential has been Immanuel Kant's emphasis on the universal human possession of a uniquely moral will and the autonomy its use entails. Humans confront choices that are purely moral; humans--but certainly not dogs or mice-- lay down moral laws, for others and for themselves. Human beings are self-legislative, morally autonomous Animals (that is, nonhuman animals, the ordinary sense of that word) lack this capacity for free moral judgment. They are not beings of a kind capable of exercising or responding to moral claims. Animals therefore have no rights, and they **can have none.** This is the core of the argument about the alleged rights of animals. The holders of rights must have the capacity to comprehend rules of duty, governing all including themselves. In applying such rules, the holders of rights must recognize possible conflicts between what is in their own interest and what is just. Only in a community of beings capable of self-restricting moral judgments can the concept of a right be correctly invoked. Humans have such moral capacities. They are in this sense self-legislative, are members of communities governed by moral rules, and do possess rights. Animals do not have such moral capacities. They are not morally self-legislative, cannot possibly be members of a truly moral community, and therefore cannot possess rights. In conducting research on animal subjects, therefore, we do not violate their rights, because they have none to violate.

### Use of nature is moral and solves extinction

Younkins 4 – Professor @ Wheeling

Edward, Professor @ Wheeling, THE FLAWED DOCTRINE OF NATURE'S INTRINSIC VALUE, http://www.quebecoislibre.org/04/041015-17.htm

Many environmentalists contend that nature has an intrinsic value, in and of itself, apart from its contributions to human well-being. They maintain that all created things are equal and should be respected as ends in themselves having rights to their own actualization without human interference. Ecological egalitarians defend biodiversity for its own sake and assign the rest of nature ethical status at least equal to that of human beings. Some even say that the collective needs of nonhuman species and inanimate objects must take precedence over man’s needs and desires. Animals, plants, rocks, land, water, and so forth, are all said to possess intrinsic value by their mere existence without regard to their relationship to individual human beings. Environmentalists **erroneously assign human values and concern to an amoral material sphere**. When environmentalists talk about the nonhuman natural world, they commonly attribute human values to it, which, of course, are completely irrelevant to the nonhuman realm. For example, “nature” is incapable of being concerned with the possible extinction of any particular ephemeral species. Over 99 percent of all species of life that have ever existed on earth have been estimated to be extinct with the great majority of these perishing because of nonhuman factors. Nature cannot care about “biodiversity.” Humans happen to value biodiversity because it reflects the state of the natural world in which they currently live. Without humans, the beauty and spectacle of nature would not exist – such ideas can only exist in the **mind of a rational valuer**. These environmentalists fail to realize that value means having value to some valuer. To be a value some aspect of nature must be a value to some human being. People have the capacity to assign and to create value with respect to nonhuman existents. Nature, in the form of natural resources, does not exist independently of man. Men, choosing to act on their ideas, transform nature for human purposes. All resources are man-made. It is the application of human valuation to natural substances that makes them resources. Resources thus can be viewed as a function of human knowledge and action. By using their rationality and ingenuity, men affect nature, thereby enabling them to achieve progress. Man’s **survival** and flourishing depend upon the study of nature that includes all things, even man himself. Human beings are the highest level of nature in the known universe. Men are a distinct natural phenomenon as are fish, birds, rocks, etc. Their proper place in the hierarchical order of nature **needs to be recognized**. Unlike plants and animals, human beings have a conceptual faculty, free will, and a moral nature. Because morality involves the ability to choose, it follows that moral worth is related to human choice and action and that the agents of moral worth can also be said to have moral value. By rationally using his conceptual faculty, man can create values as judged by the standard of enhancing human life. The highest priority must be assigned to actions that enhance the lives of individual human beings. It is **therefore morally fitting to make use of nature**.

## AT: Anthro – Humans First – Key to Environment

### Human-centeredness is key to environmental sustainability

Schmidtz 2k – Professor of Philosophy @ Arizona

David Schmidtz, 2k. Philosophy, University of Arizona, Environmental Ethics, p. 379-408

Like economic reasoning, ecological reasoning is reasoning about equilibria and perturbations that keep systems from converging on equilibria. Like economic reasoning, ecological reasoning is reasoning about competition and unintended consequences, and the internal logic of systems, a logic that dictates how a system responds to attempts to manipulate it. Environmental activism and regulation do not automatically improve the environment. It is a truism in ecology, as in economics, that well-intentioned interventions do not necessarily translate into good results. Ecology (human and nonhuman) is complicated, our knowledge is limited, and environmentalists are themselves only human. Intervention that works with the system’s logic rather than against it can have good consequences. Even in a centrally planned economy, the shape taken by the economy mainly is a function not of the central plan but of how people respond to it, and people respond to central plans in ways that best serve their purposes, not the central planner’s. Therefore, even a dictator is in no position simply to decide how things are going to go. Ecologists understand that this same point applies in their own discipline. They understand that an ecology’s internal logic limits the directions in which it can be taken by would-be ecological engineers. Within environmental philosophy, most of us have come around to something like Aldo Leopold’s view of humans as plain citizens of the biotic community.[[21]](http://www.theihs.org/libertyguide/hsr/hsr.php?id=41&print=1" \l "_ftn22) As Bryan Norton notes, the contrast between anthropocentrism and biocentrism obscures the fact that we increasingly need to be nature-centered to be properly human-centered; we need to focus on "saving the ecological systems that are the context of human cultural and economic activities." [[22]](http://www.theihs.org/libertyguide/hsr/hsr.php?id=41&print=1" \l "_ftn23) If we do not tend to what is good for nature, we will not be tending to what is good for people either. As Gary Varner recently put it, on purely anthropocentric grounds we have reason to think biocentrically.[[23]](http://www.theihs.org/libertyguide/hsr/hsr.php?id=41&print=1" \l "_ftn24) I completely agree. What I wish to add is that the converse is also true: on purely biocentric grounds, we have reason to think anthropocentrically. We need to be human-centered to be properly nature-centered, for if we do not tend to what is good for people, we will not be tending to what is good for nature either. From a biocentric perspective, preservationists sometimes are not anthropocentric enough. They sometimes advocate policies and regulations with no concern for values and priorities that differ from their own. Even from a purely biocentric perspective, such slights are illegitimate. Policy makers who ignore human values and human priorities that differ from their own will, in effect, be committed to mismanaging the ecology of which those ignored values and priorities are an integral part.

## AT: Anthro – Inevitable and Good

### Embracing animal suffering as inevitable is net-better for animal welfare

Duckler 8 – PhD in Biology

Geordie, ARTICLE: TWO MAJOR FLAWS OF THE ANIMAL RIGHTS MOVEMENT, PhD in Biology, JD from Northwestern, 14 Animal L. 179

The animal rights movement's laudable goals include, patently enough, protecting the welfare of a few familiar animals. The movement's methods to reach those goals include the promulgation of legislation that penalizes the neglectful, the abusive, and the downright malicious. The movement contributes unevenly to the ongoing public debate over what to do with and about animals. [n102](http://www.lexisnexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.997959.0518058672&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1220848443484&returnToKey=20_T4504110919&parent=docview#n102) The moment the movement flounders into rights territory, it misapprehends the police power of the state and the protection of the citizenry and exponentially compounds problems by offending the biological understanding of what is an animal. At that moment, the movement's methods immediately outstrip and disserve its goals. The problem is not that the movement's analysis in this area is somehow faulty; the problem is that there is no analysis at all. Tort, property, contract, and ownership laws, respecting the objective value of a smallish amount of animal life at the expense and allowance of the destruction of many other animals, serve law, science, logic, and "animal welfare" far better by embracing the realities and necessities of complex animal-environmental interactions and attending to the welfare of humans through the vehicle of law.

## AT: Anthro – Regulation of Abuse is Sufficient

### Absolute rejection of use of nature is ludicrous –regulation of abuse is sufficient

Barry 99 –Lecturer in Politics

John Barry, Lecturer in Politics @ Keele, 1999, Rethinking Green politics, pg. 57-58

For example, by claiming part of nature as property people are obliged to treat it differently than if it were unowned. Individuals now stand in a different relation to that part of nature, because they now stand in a different relation to other humans. Thus, the treatment of nature viewed purely as a human resource can be guided, at least in part, by ethical considerations. In discussing the question of how we ought to treat the non-human world the focus should be on the evaluation of the reasons given for particular types of usage. Much of environmental ethics concerns itself with establishing that treatment be premised on the independent moral status of non-humans, rather than focusing on the primacy of the relational character of human/nonhuman affairs. One possible reason for this proprietarian view suggested earlier is the non-anthropocentric conviction that a human-centred environmental ethic, resting on human interests in and valuations of nature, cannot guarantee the a priori preservation of nature from human use that many deep ecologists and environmental ethicists see as the mark of any 'true' environmental ethic. Anthropocentric moral reasoning is held to be a precarious and insufficient ethical basis for the protection of nature. If, however, we reject the notion that an environmental ethic must be judged by whether or not it secures this a priori protection for the natural world, and instead see the job of any environmental ethic as **regulating actual human uses of nature** and **identifying abuses**, then anthropocentrism per se (as opposed to particular conceptions of it) need not stand accused of being part of the problem rather than part of the solution. It is the conviction of those who believe that non-anthropocentrism is necessary for an environmental ethic that leads to an emphasis on the non-anthropocentric powers, values or capacities, and which marks much of what I have called the proprietarian strand of environmental ethics. This nonanthropocentric ethic presents us with a picture of the world in which humans are disinterested valuers. The naturalistic anthropocentrism of an ethic of use sees humans as 'interested and partial valuers', and active transformers of that world. Because a relational view ultimately turns on human interests and concerns, it is viewed as capable only of an 'ethic for the use of the environment' as opposed to a genuine 'environmental ethic' (Regan, 1982), defined as an ethic which gives non-anthropocentric reasons for the protection of nature. What I wish to do in this section is to argue that an 'ethics of use' which **regulates** social-environmental **interaction** is a **sensible ethical platform** upon which actual, concrete human-nature conflicts and decisions can be resolved, and **upon which green politics can base itself**.

## AT: Anthro – Not Politically Viable

### The alternative is not politically viable – prefer the affirmative’s material protection of the environment

Light 2 – Professor of environmental philosophy

Andrew Light, professor of environmental philosophy and director of the Environmental Conservation Education Program, 2002, Applied Philosophy Group at New York University, METAPHILOSOPHY, v33, n4, July, p. 441

Even if Katz and Oechsli's arguments are technically correct as a possible statement of the implications of anthropocentrism in environmental policy and environmental activism, the facts of the case do not bear out their worries. And we can imagine this to be so in many other cases. Even if sound nonanthropocentric motivations can be described for other policies or acts of environmental heroism, at best we would expect that any moti­vation for any action would be mixed, especially when it is a human performing that action. An environmental ethic that ignored this lesson would be one that would be ill fitted to participate in policy decisions where the context always involves an appeal to a variety of intuitions and not only to a discrete set. We must ask ourselves eventually: What is more important, settling debates in value theory correct or **actually motivating people to act**, with the commitment of someone like Mendes, to preserve nature? The pressing timeframe of environmental problems should at least warrant a **consideration of the latter**.

## AT: Anthro – Alt Fails

### Dubbing people “anthropocentric” because they didn’t talk about animals makes the creation of an effective environmental movement impossible, and isn’t accurate

Lewsi 92 – Professor of Environment

Martin Lewis professor in the School of the Environment and the Center for International Studies at Duke University. Green Delusions, 1992 p17-18

Nature for Nature’s Sake—And Humanity for Humanity’s It is widely accepted that environmental thinkers can be divided into two camps: those who favor the preservation of nature for nature’s sake, and those who wish only to maintain the environment as the necessary habitat of humankind (see Pepper 1989; O’Riordan 1989; W Fox 1990). In the first group stand the green radicals, while the second supposedly consists of environmental reformers, also labeled “shallow ecologists.” Radicals often pull no punches in assailing the members of the latter camp for their anthropocentrism, managerialism, and gutless accommo­dationism—to some, “shallow ecology” is “just a more efficient form of exploitation and oppression” (quoted in Nash 1989:202). While this dichotomy may accurately depict some of the major approaches of the past, it is remarkably **unhelpful for devising the kind of framework required for a truly effective environmental movement**. It incorrectly assumes that those who adopt an anti-anthropocentric view (that is, one that accords intrinsic worth to nonhuman beings) will also embrace the larger political programs of radical environmentalism. Sim­ilarly, it portrays those who favor reforms within the political and economic structures of representative democracies as thereby excluding all nonhumans from the realm of moral consideration. Yet no convincing reasons are ever provided to show why these beliefs should necessarily be aligned in such a manner. (For an instructive discussion of the pitfalls of the anthropocentric versus nonanthropocentric dichotomy, see Nor­ton 1987, chapter ir.)

### Their ethic is biologically impossible

Duckler 8 – PhD in Biology

Geordie, ARTICLE: TWO MAJOR FLAWS OF THE ANIMAL RIGHTS MOVEMENT, PhD in Biology, JD from Northwestern, 14 Animal L. 179

Those of us at the heart of the animal law movement envision a world in which the lives and interests of all sentient beings are respected within the legal system, where companion animals have good, loving homes for a lifetime, where wild animals can live out their natural lives according to their instincts in an environment that supports their needs - a world in which animals are not exploited, terrorized, tortured or controlled to serve frivolous or greedy human purposes. This vision guides in working toward a far more just and truly humane society. [n83](http://www.lexisnexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.997959.0518058672&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1220848443484&returnToKey=20_T4504110919&parent=docview#n83)   A workable definition of "sentience" or "sentient beings" notwithstanding, one would have to ignore the last hundred and fifty years of accumulated rigorous scientific study of how evolution by natural selection actually works in the natural world to sincerely make such a  [\*197]  plea. [n84](http://www.lexisnexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.997959.0518058672&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1220848443484&returnToKey=20_T4504110919&parent=docview#n84) A world "in which animals are not exploited, terrorized, tortured or controlled to serve frivolous or greedy human purposes" [n85](http://www.lexisnexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.997959.0518058672&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1220848443484&returnToKey=20_T4504110919&parent=docview#n85) is an **unobtainable, inherently biologically impossible world**. Moreover, the world of nature to which Tischler fervently hopes to return animals already is a world in which animals are "exploited, terrorized, tortured or controlled" [n86](http://www.lexisnexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.997959.0518058672&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1220848443484&returnToKey=20_T4504110919&parent=docview#n86) to serve the frivolous or greedy purposes of other animals, including conspecifics and kin.

Morality fails to apply across animalia – other animals won’t respect morality

Duckler 8 – PhD in Biology

Geordie, ARTICLE: TWO MAJOR FLAWS OF THE ANIMAL RIGHTS MOVEMENT, PhD in Biology, JD from Northwestern, 14 Animal L. 179

Another example of ethical conflict created by the animal rights position is that the entire animal world must be seen to be inherently immoral because the new "rights" will never be respected between and among animals other than humans. [n89](http://www.lexisnexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.997959.0518058672&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1220848443484&returnToKey=20_T4504110919&parent=docview#n89) God help the activist who tries valiantly to hold long onto the argument that it is morality that demands legal rights for animals: A basic biology text would stop them absolutely cold at the early chapter describing the major division of all  [\*198]  life into prokaryotes and eukaryotes. [n90](http://www.lexisnexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.997959.0518058672&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1220848443484&returnToKey=20_T4504110919&parent=docview#n90) If activists gleaned their information from a college science lesson instead of from a religious tome, they would find that prokaryotes engage in immoral acts: Throughout earth history, prokaryotes have created immense global "crises of starvation, pollution, and extinction" [n91](http://www.lexisnexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.997959.0518058672&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1220848443484&returnToKey=20_T4504110919&parent=docview#n91) that make human parallels appear trivial in comparison. Prokaryotes destroy other organisms by the great multitude, routinely transfer genetic material freely from individual to individual, fool around with genetic engineering, create "chimeras" at a level that our most ill-advised laboratory technicians could only dream about, and fundamentally alter the biotic and abiotic world in doing so. [n92](http://www.lexisnexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.997959.0518058672&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1220848443484&returnToKey=20_T4504110919&parent=docview#n92)

## AT: Anthro – Captivity Good

### Attempts to free animalia does not produce a true freedom – enclosure is simply a benign replacement for the harsh natural world

Duckler 8 – PhD in Biology

Geordie, ARTICLE: TWO MAJOR FLAWS OF THE ANIMAL RIGHTS MOVEMENT, PhD in Biology, JD from Northwestern, 14 Animal L. 179

It is crucial to animal rights advocates' general theme that they deliberately overlook that evolution shaped the wild with abusive, cruel, predatory, and destructive activities through natural selection. While observations of the natural world can certainly be ignored over the short term, the truths they convey cannot ultimately be eluded over the long term. It cannot be denied that animals, whether in the wild or in enclosed environments, must live through a constant bevy of unavoidably vicious experiences: microscopic predators erode them; parasites weaken them; vegetation restricts them; substrates degrade them; other animals pirate their resources; toxins invade them; hunger shadows them; their abiotic physical environment strains them; their biotic organic environment burdens them; and conspecifics, kin, and potential mates exploit them. [n79](http://www.lexisnexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.997959.0518058672&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1220848443484&returnToKey=20_T4504110919&parent=docview#n79) Through evolutionary processes, the natural world is an environment in which competition for resources makes life unrelentingly harsh and terminate early. It brooks no permanent relief from pain and decay. The careless and intentional acts of other living things, in trying to keep their own bodies alive, are regularly the cause of each trouble encountered. [n80](http://www.lexisnexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.997959.0518058672&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1220848443484&returnToKey=20_T4504110919&parent=docview#n80) An artificial enclosure such as a home, zoo, laboratory,  [\*196]  or kennel, may indeed reduce those impacts or, at worst, perhaps simply replace those impacts with different ones. Whatever the enclosure, opening its door and allowing the animal "to go free" does not send the animal into any more free or favorable environment in any respect worth describing.

### Removal from captivity leads to increased pain and suffering

Duckler 8 – PhD in Biology

Geordie, ARTICLE: TWO MAJOR FLAWS OF THE ANIMAL RIGHTS MOVEMENT, PhD in Biology, JD from Northwestern, 14 Animal L. 179

The animal rights movement would rather "bowdlerize" evolution by natural selection or nature (often unrealistically defined as animal life outside of human influences) through what science writer Matt Ridley has called "condescending sentimentalism" by "desperately playing up the slimmest of clues to animal virtue ... and clutching at straws suggesting that humankind somehow caused aberrant cruelty." [n81](http://www.lexisnexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.997959.0518058672&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1220848443484&returnToKey=20_T4504110919&parent=docview#n81) Animal rights advocates work hard to discount the reduction of the natural horrors that captivity, farming, and ranching has effected on animals. They prefer instead to trumpet the benefits that freedom has brought to humans and then apply the false syllogism that those benefits are readily translatable to animals. In doing so, they mistake what life is like for an animal who is "truly free." This in turn, threatens to expose animals to higher levels of pain and suffering than they currently experience in captivity, on farms, on ranches, and in our homes. [n82](http://www.lexisnexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.997959.0518058672&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1220848443484&returnToKey=20_T4504110919&parent=docview#n82)

## AT: Anthro – Labs Turn

### Turn – laboratory use

Cohen 86 – Professor @ U of M

Carl, Professor @ UMich, [http://spot.colorado.edu/~heathwoo/phil1200,Spr07/cohen.pdf](http://spot.colorado.edu/~heathwoo/phil1200%2CSpr07/cohen.pdf)

Humans owe to other humans a degree of moral regard that cannot be owed to animals. Some humans take on the obligation to support and heal others, both humans and animals, as a principal duty in their lives; the fulfillment of that duty may require the sacrifice of many animals. If biomedical investigators abandon the effective pursuit of their professional objectives because they are convinced that they may not do to animals what the service of humans requires, they will fail, objectively, to do their duty. Refusing to recognize the moral differences among species is a sure path to calamity. (The largest animal rights group in the country is People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals; its co- director, Ingrid Newkirk, calls research using animal subjects "fascism" and "supremacism." "Animal liberationists do not separate out the human animal," she says, "so there is no rational basis for saying that a human being has special rights. A rat is a pig is a dog is a boy. They're all mammals.") Those who claim to base their objection to the use of animals in biomedical research on their reckoning of the net pleasures and pains produced make a second error, equally grave. Even if it were true--as it is surely not--that the pains of all animate beings must be counted equally, a cogent utilitarian calculation requires that we **weigh all the consequences** of the use, and of the nonuse, of animals in laboratory research. Critics relying (however mistakenly) on animal rights may claim to ignore the beneficial results of such research, rights being trump cards to which interest and advantage must give way. But an argument that is explicitly framed in terms of interest and benefit for all over the long run must attend also to the disadvantageous consequences of not using animals in research, and to all the achievements attained and attainable only through their use.

Turns their morality claim

Cohen 86 – Professor @ U of M

Carl, Professor @ UMich, [http://spot.colorado.edu/~heathwoo/phil1200,Spr07/cohen.pdf](http://spot.colorado.edu/~heathwoo/phil1200%2CSpr07/cohen.pdf)

The sum of the benefits of their use is utterly beyond quantification. The elimination of horrible disease, the increase of longevity, the avoidance of great pain, the saving of lives, and the improvement of the quality of lives (for humans and for animals) achieved through research using animals is so incalculably geat that the argument of these critics, systematically pursued, esablishes not their condusion but its reverse: to refrain from using animals in biomedical research is, on utilitarian grounds, **morally wrong.**

## AT: Anthro – No Value to Life DA

### Animal equality leads to no value to human life

Schmahmann and Polachek 95

Partner and Associate in Legal Firm, 22 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 747

Singer is right, of course, that once one dismisses Hebrew thought; [n22](http://www.lexisnexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.466339.82986242574&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1220851870623&returnToKey=20_T4504297941&parent=docview#n22) the teachings of Jesus; [n23](http://www.lexisnexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.466339.82986242574&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1220851870623&returnToKey=20_T4504297941&parent=docview#n23) the views of St. Aquinas, St. Francis, Renaissance writers, and Darwin; [n24](http://www.lexisnexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.466339.82986242574&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1220851870623&returnToKey=20_T4504297941&parent=docview#n24) and an entire "ideology whose history we have traced back to the Bible and the ancient Greeks" [n25](http://www.lexisnexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.466339.82986242574&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1220851870623&returnToKey=20_T4504297941&parent=docview#n25) -- in short, once one dismisses innate human characteristics, the ability to express reason, to recognize moral principles, to make subtle distinctions, and to intellectualize -- there is no way to support the view that humans possess rights but animals do not. In the end, however, it is the aggregate of these characteristics that does render humans fundamentally, importantly, and unbridgeably different from animals, even though it is also beyond question that in individual instances -- for example, in the case of vegetative individuals -- some animals may indeed have higher cognitive skills than some humans. To argue on that basis alone, however, that human institutions are morally flawed because they rest on assumptions regarding the aggregate of human abilities, needs, and actions is to deny such institutions the capacity to draw any distinctions at all. Consider the consequences of a theory which does not distinguish between animal life and human life for purposes of identifying and enforcing legal rights. Every individual member of every species would have recognized claims against human beings and the state, and perhaps other animals as well. As the concept of rights expanded to include the "claims" of all living creatures, the concept would lose much of its force, and human rights would suffer as a consequence. Long before Singer wrote Animal Liberation, one philosopher wrote: If it is once observed that there is no difference in principle between the case of dogs, cats, or horses, or stags, foxes, and hares, and that of tsetse-flies or tapeworms or the bacteria in our own blood-stream, the conclusion likely to be drawn is that there is so much wrong that we cannot help doing to the brute creation that it is best not to trouble ourselves about it any more at all. The ultimate sufferers are likely to be our fellow men, because the final conclusion is likely to be, not that we ought to treat the  [\*753]  brutes like human beings, but that there is no good reason why we should not treat human beings like brutes. Extension of this principle leads straight to Belsen and Buchenwald, Dachau and Auschwitz, where the German and the Jew or Pole only took the place of the human being and the Colorado beetle. [n26](http://www.lexisnexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.466339.82986242574&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1220851870623&returnToKey=20_T4504297941&parent=docview#n26)

## AT: Anthro – Vegetarianism Turn

### TURN – the alternative leads to more animal death – eating animals is the most ethical thing to do

Pollan 6 – Professor @ Berkeley

“An Animal’s Place,” 11-10, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9500efd7153ef933a25752c1a9649c8b63&pagewanted=6>.

The farmer would point out that even vegans have a ''serious clash of interests'' with other animals. The grain that the vegan eats is harvested with a combine that shreds field mice, while the farmer's tractor crushes woodchucks in their burrows, and his pesticides drop songbirds from the sky. Steve Davis, an animal scientist at Oregon State University, has estimated that if America were to adopt a strictly vegetarian diet, the total number of animals killed every year would actually increase, as animal pasture gave way to row crops. Davis contends that if our goal is to kill as few animals as possible, then people should eat the largest possible animal that can live on the least intensively cultivated land: grass-fed beef for everybody. It would appear that killing animals is unavoidable no matter what we choose to eat.  When I talked to Joel Salatin about the vegetarian utopia, he pointed out that it would also condemn him and his neighbors to importing their food from distant places, since the Shenandoah Valley receives too little rainfall to grow many row crops. Much the same would hold true where I live, in New England. We get plenty of rain, but the hilliness of the land has dictated an agriculture based on animals since the time of the Pilgrims. The world is full of places where the best, if not the only, way to obtain food from the land is by grazing animals on it -- especially ruminants, which alone can transform grass into protein and whose presence can actually improve the health of the land.  The vegetarian utopia would make us even more dependent than we already are on an industrialized national food chain. That food chain would in turn be even more dependent than it already is on fossil fuels and chemical fertilizer, since food would need to travel farther and manure would be in short supply. Indeed, it is doubtful that you can build a more sustainable agriculture without animals to cycle nutrients and support local food production. If our concern is for the health of nature -- rather than, say, the internal consistency of our moral code or the condition of our souls -- then eating animals may sometimes be the **most ethical thing to do.**  There is, too, the fact that we humans have been eating animals as long as we have lived on this earth. Humans may not need to eat meat in order to survive, yet doing so is part of our evolutionary heritage, reflected in the design of our teeth and the structure of our digestion. Eating meat helped make us what we are, in a social and biological sense. Under the pressure of the hunt, the human brain grew in size and complexity, and around the fire where the meat was cooked, human culture first flourished. Granting rights to animals may lift us up from the brutal world of predation, but it will entail the sacrifice of part of our identity -- our own animality.  Surely this is one of the odder paradoxes of animal rights doctrine. It asks us to recognize all that we share with animals and then demands that we act toward them in a most unanimalistic way. Whether or not this is a good idea, we should at least acknowledge that our desire to eat meat is not a trivial matter, no mere ''gastronomic preference.'' We might as well call sex -- also now technically unnecessary -- a mere ''recreational preference.'' Whatever else it is, our meat eating is something very deep indeed.

## AT: Anthro – Separation from Nature Good

### Human separation from nature is inevitable and good- the transition to small ag leads to poverty and environmental destruction

Bailey 6 – Economic Philosopher

Ronald, Economic Philosopher and Science Editor for Reason Magazine, The Lingering Stench of Malthus, <http://www.reason.com/news/show/117481.html>

The further good news is that the movement of humanity's burgeoning population into the thousand of megacities foreseen that Rifkin is part of a process that ultimately will leave more land for nature. Today cities occupy just 2 percent of the earth's surface, but that will likely double to 4 percent over the next half century. In order to avoid this ostensibly terrible fate Rifkin proclaims, "In the next phase of human history, we will need to find a way to reintegrate ourselves into the rest of the living Earth if we are to preserve our own species and conserve the planet for our fellow creatures." Actually, he's got it completely backwards. Humanity must not reintegrate into nature-that way lays disaster for humanity and nature. Instead we must make ourselves even more autonomous than we already are from her. Since nothing is more destructive of nature than poverty stricken subsistence farmers, boosting agricultural productivity is the key to the human retreat from wild nature. As Jesse Ausubel, the director for the Program for the Human Environment at Rockefeller University, points out: "If the world farmer reaches the average yield of today's US corn grower during the next 70 years, ten billion people eating as people now on average do will need only half of today's cropland. The land spared exceeds Amazonia." Similarly all of the world's industrial wood could be produced on an area that is less than 10 percent of the world's forested area today leaving 90 percent of the world's forests for Nature.

## AT: Economic Environmentalism

### Just because economics was part of the problem of environmental destruction does not mean economic rationality should be disavowed – holds the keys to all environmental solutions

Scorse 8 – Professor of International Studies

Jason, Assistant Professor @ Monterey Institute of International Studies @ Middlebury College, What Environmentalists Need to Know About Economics, Online Book

Environmental problems exist at varying scales-local, regional, national, and international-yet they almost always share similar features, be it air pollution in Mexico City or Los Angeles, habitat loss in Kenya or Brazil, or fisheries collapse in the Indian, Pacific, or Atlantic oceans. Environmentalists trying to make sense of these issues are posed with difficult questions: - Why do relatively rational actors buying and selling goods and services very often not take into account the toxic pollution that results from their choices? - Why do fishermen routinely over-exploit the fisheries that they depend on? - Why are the ecological services provided by forests and wetlands, which produce tangible and wide-ranging values for society, usually not taken into account when decisions are made? - How can there be such massive pollution and resource use involved in industrial agriculture, and yet food is so cheap? Economists have been studying questioning like these for many decades and have devised a fairly comprehensive framework for understanding the root causes of environmental problems, which is where we begin. Those who believe that economists have an unalterable faith in the power of markets, may be surprised to learn that **economists long ago understood** that there are conditions under which markets will not lead to socially optimum outcomes, especially in the environmental realm.' In fact, in the environmental arena market imperfections are ubiquitous. Readers may also be pleasantly surprised to discover that the economic theories that explain why markets fail **also hold the keys to solving** the myriad environmental problems we face. Virtually all of the policies being discussed in the political realm, NGO board meetings, and on environmental websites can be **traced to economic theories** that were derived dating back as early as the 1940s, and are still vigorously debated in academic settings around the world to the present day. The three most important sources of environmental problems are 1) market failure, 2] the tragedy of the commons, and 3] the under-provision of public goods, which I will discuss independently, even though some of their features overlap.

### Applying economic value to the environment is the only way to internalize and combat environmental destruction

Scorse 8 – Professor of International Studies

Jason, Assistant Professor @ Monterey Institute of International Studies @ Middlebury College, What Environmentalists Need to Know About Economics, Online Book

The atmosphere is a much different type of resource, one that is not actively harvested, but the essential logic holds. Because virtually anyone can dump as much greenhouse gases into the atmosphere as they want, there is little incentive for any individual company or nation to restrict their emissions. If they do so it will have only marginal benefits that are unlikely to reduce global warming and which are spread out over all of the world's people. Poorer nations, particularly island nations or those at or below sea level, who stand to suffer the most from global warming, have no recourse with which to demand that emissions be restricted, because there is no international body that has jurisdiction over the atmosphere.8 While there are ways to address the issue of global warming short of creating property rights to the atmosphere [to be discussed later), the key point is that it is the **open access nature** of the atmosphere that has created the problem in the first place. This brings up another essential point. Many critics of economics claim that it is the commoditization of the environment and living things that are the root causes of environmental problems; that it is a world that assigns property rights to the world's environmental heritage and assigns them price tags, which is the greatest threat to a more livable future. A careful examination, however, of the areas where we see some of the greatest environmental threats **leads to the exact opposite** conclusion. It is the fact that much of the world's oceans and the atmosphere are freely open to exploitation that drives the unsustainable levels of both fish harvesting and greenhouse gas emissions. The same is true for many areas of the Amazon rain forest, where property rights are non-existent, non-transparent, or not enforced; as a result we observe massive deforestation.9

## AT: Deep Ecology – Value Identification Contradiction

### Deep ecology’s attempt to define value systems in natural objects is directly contradictory with their criticism – it creates the worst form of anthropocentrism

Bobertz 97 – Professor of Law

Bobertz Ass’t Prof of Law, Nebraska College of Law, 1997, Bradley Columbia Journal of Environmental Law, Lexis

Apart from the political dangers Ferry associates with deep ecology, he believes the philosophy suffers from a fundamental self-contradiction. The argument that natural objects can possess their own interests strikes Ferry as "one of the most absurd forms of anthropomorphism." n100 We cannot "think like a mountain," to use Aldo Leopold's famous phrase, n101 because, quite obviously, we are not mountains. Recalling Sierra Club v. Morton, n102 the famous standing case involving a proposal to construct a ski resort in California's Mineral King valley, Ferry claims that environmentalists "always suppose that the interests of objects (mountains, lakes and other natural things) are opposed to development. But how do we know? After all, isn't it possible that Mineral King would be inclined to welcome a ski slope after having remained idle for millions of years?" n103 Yet few people, including the writers Ferry labels as deep ecologists, would disagree with the fact that recognizing value in natural objects is an act of human cognition. Perhaps a person suffering from profound psychosis might claim the ability to understand how a mountain "thinks," but the writers Ferry criticizes do not advance such bizarre claims. n104 For deep ecologists and environmental ethicists, phrases such as "think like a mountain" are metaphorical and heuristic, not literal and agenda-setting.

## AT: Deep Ecology – Alt Fails

### Deep ecology offers no avenue for actual reform – the idea that we can wish away the need for government intervention is unfunded and dangerous

Bobertz 97 – Professor of Law

Bobertz Ass’t Prof of Law, Nebraska College of Law, 1997, Bradley Columbia Journal of Environmental Law, Lexis

Yet even if deep ecologists seek merely to expand our moral field of vision, we are still left with the question of what people should do about their insights. For the most part, deep ecologists are coy on this matter. They hope, along with Naess, that by changing the way people think about nature, the need for government intervention will lessen. But this seems like **wishful thinking**. We cannot expect the teachings of deep ecology to affect so many people that the ideal of sustainable development will be realized without the need for law. At times, deep ecologists seem to want it both ways, to have a fundamental change in culture without **engaging in the dirty work of politics**. It is as if culture and law occupy clean, non-overlapping subsets of human experience, and that changes in culture can occur without either promptings by or reflections in the law. On this point, deep ecologists appear naive.

## AT: Ecofeminism – 2ac

### Tons of DAs to the ecofeminist movement

-disempowerment because fail to challenge institutions

-not intersectional

-causes Hobbesian anarchism that reentrenches patriarchy

-causes population growth that furthers domination

Lewis 94 – Professor of Environmental Studies

Martin, Assistant Professor in the School of Environment and the Center for International Studies @ Duke, Green Delusions, pg. 35-36

In more pragmatic ways as well, radical eco-feminism and, to a lesser extent, marxist eco-feminism have profoundly antifeminist implications in practice. The former movement advises women to turn away from existing means of wielding public power. Since large-scale institutions are, by definition, irredeemably patriarchal and exploitative, women are called away from existing positions of public power (Plant 1989:187). Instead, all feminists (men as well as women) are enjoined to retreat into separatist, autonomous communities. Marxist eco-feminists do not de­mand such hermetic exclusion, but their philosophy too calls ultimately for struggle against rather than participation within capitalist society. Since institutional science, corporations, and large public institutions are, despite radicals’ fondest hopes, well entrenched, such withdrawal risks disempowering women still further. A refusal to seek positions in such imperfect institutions as presently exist would relegate women to the role of sideline critics, undermining their opportunity to be partici­pants—and indeed leaders—in the ongoing restructuring of society. In its effort to avoid the appearance of cultural imperialism, radical eco-feminism also flirts with an ethical relativism that could conceivably undermine the feminist agenda **at the global scale**. To posit that "[wjhat counts as sexism, racism, or classism may vary cross-culturally" (K. Warren r990:139) is to ignore a huge array of deeply sexist practices existing in numerous non-Western cultures. Finally, the successful realization of the radical eco-feminist dream would threaten women in a very immediate sense. In the anarchic world they envision, men—who are certainly more physically powerful than women and appear to be more inclined toward violence as well—could easily arrogate power at the local level and **devise neo-patriarchies**. Anarchists argue that humankind's inherent good would prevent this—a view accessible only to those wearing the deepest of psychological blinders. As will be shown in chapter three, many primal societies, contrary to eco-romantic fantasies, were unabashedly patriarchal.

## AT: Ecofem – Alt Fails

### Ecofeminism won’t solve- it devalues women and will not be accepted by a larger public

Bretherton 1 - MA in Latin American Studies

Charlotte Bretherton “ECOCENTRIC IDENTITY AND TRANSFORMATORY POLITICS,” The International Journal of Peace Studies, Volume 6, Number 2, Autumn/Winter 2001

The implications of ecofeminist ideas for human identity are numerous. For women, particularly those (primarily Western) women who have become alienated from the natural world, there is a need to rediscover their "natural" ecocentric/ecofeminine identification. Ecofeminism thus posits, for women, an essentialist ecocentric identity. This would involve not a loss or negation of the self but an opportunity to experience the fulfilment of recovering one's true maternal nature and to embrace the responsibilities associated with identification as a saviour of the planet. To some extent women have appeared to take up these responsibilities. In many parts of the world they have undoubtedly contributed significantly to environmental activism. Moreover, a number of women's environmental organisations have espoused overtly ecofeminist principles (Bretherton 1996). Indeed, Mies and Shiva (1993, p.3) claim, from their conversations with women's groups in many parts of the world, "women, worldwide, felt the same anger and anxiety, and the same sense of responsibility to preserve the bases of life, and to end its destruction." However, this raises the danger that women, who are everywhere the least powerful members of society, might be expected to assume disproportionate responsibility for cleaning up men's messes. Rather, an ecocentric identification demands that the "feminine" qualities of cooperation and nurturance be valued and embraced by all members of societies. It demands, too, that the "masculine" qualities of competition and dominance be devalued and rejected. Consequently, it must be concluded that, in many societies, the adoption of an ecocentric identity would involve, for men, a change of consciousness very much more fundamental than that required of women. While the major focus of an ecofeminine identity is positive identification with the natural world, there are implicitly elements of an identity defined negatively against the alien other of unreconstructed "masculine" man. Because of its implied exclusivity, which reflects a tendency towards maternalist essentialism, ecofeminism is **unlikely to provide the basis for a universal ecocentric identity**. Ecofeminism is important, nevertheless. It provides a trenchant critique of those cultural norms and values which support the power structures of contemporary societies and which have facilitated the development of a dangerously dysfunctional relationship between human collectivities and the ecosystems of which they are a part. In focusing very specifically upon this latter issue, bioregionalists would be well advised to incorporate feminist insights concerning the origin, and persistence, of gendered structures of power (Plumwood 1994; Bretherton 1998).

### Acceptance of ecofeminism reinscribes unequal division of labor and devalued women’s work—even if well-intentioned, it will be interpreted as less important work

MacGregor 4 – Postdoc Fellow

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What I make of this is that ecofeminist discussions of women's activism ought not only to recognize tensions between mothering and politics but also to engage in a critical political economic analysis of women's unpaid labor. Viewed in light of feminist critiques of the feminization of caring in capitalist societies and of the current hegemony of new right ideology, it is dangerous for ecofeminists to uncritically celebrate women's roles as earth carers. It is dangerous if it affirms rather than challenges the [End Page 67] feminization and privatization of **caring work.** Feminist political economists, on the other hand, have tracked the changes in unpaid work over time and have analyzed the gender implications of a capitalist system that depends on the externalization of reproductive labor (cf. Folbre 1993). This tracking is done not to celebrate the fact that women do this work but to show how women's caring work is deeply implicated in the dominant political and economic agendas. Scholars have argued that care and care-related practices are **devalued in liberal-capitalist societies** precisely because they are associated with femininity—that is, they are seen as women's work (cf. McDowell 1992). Moreover, their theoretical interpretations of empirical data (such as those gathered in time budget studies) suggest that caring is a deeply gendered, that is, feminized activity in Western (and probably many other) cultures and that the unequal division of unpaid care work between men and women has not changed dramatically in the past thirty years (cf. Eichler 1997; Armstrong and Armstrong 1994).

## AT: Ecofem – Racism DA

### Ecofeminism is racist, classist and essentializing

Sturgeon 97

Noel, Cultural Critic and Activist, “Ecofeminist Natures”, p 120

One perception among Native American women is that the emphasis on the masculinism of the social and ideological systems involved in environmental destruction implies an essentialist division between women and men, which his problematic for those resisting racism as well as sexism. When I asked Winona LaDuke, Anishinaabeg feminist and environmental activist, if she called herself an ecofeminist, if she called herself an ecofeminist, she said that while she was glad there was an ecofeminist movement developing, she thought of her activism as stemming from her acculturation as a member of her people. Marie Wilson, a Gitskan woman who is interviewed in *Healing*, expressed a similar distance from ecofeminism; “When I read about ecofeminism I find that the attitudes towards women and the feelings inside myself are quite different. It’s difficult to explain, but it’s as if women are separate. Though I agree with the analysis, the differences must be because of where I come from. In my mind, when is speak about women, I speak about humanity because there is equality in the Gitksan belief: the human is one species broken into two necessary parts, and they are equal.” Such articulations point to different radicalized histories of sexism and of feminism. White ecofeminism’s legacy of a racist and classist feminism--which could unproblematically argue for the “maleness” of oppressive structures without analyzing the negative consequences for poor men or men of color--bears strange fruit in the unwillingness of some Native American women (or for that matter, some working-class white women) to identify as a “feminist” of any kind. To the extent that ecofeminist theory identifies the intersection of sexism and environmental degradation as a result of “male” thinking rather than a particularity of white, Western, patriarchal capitalist social structures, ecofeminists participate in a kind of separatist feminism that has, sine the late 1960s, been identified as a form of racism. Though this kind of gender essentialism is not often apparent in the two anthologies under consideration, it has been on strand within ecofeminism.

## AT: Ecofem – Essentialism Turn

### Coalescing politics around the identity of “women” occludes difference and erases the other

Sandlands 97 – Professor of Environmental Studies

Catriona Sandilands, Professor of Environmental Studies @ York, Mother Earth, The Cyborg, and The Queer: Ecofeminism and (More) Questions of Identity, NWSA Journal, 1997

These questions are neither flippant nor academic For feminism, the **reliance on the category "women"** signals a problematic support for a gendered solidity that is the product of power-laden discursive "Othering" and often smacks of a blindness to the process of social construction." The solidity of the identity "women"—even, or perhaps especially, if pluralized— functions politically by concealing the mode of its construction. Given that in patriarchal discourse the construction is the site of the problem, then that **solidity must be rejected**.

### Eco-feminism risks essentializing women as noble savages, perpetuating patriarchy

Roszak, 95 – on the editorial board of the Ecopsychology Newsletter

Betty, Ecopsychology

Do we turn away from men, do we define ourselves by sex, revel in “the feminine”? The danger is that once more we may become self-separated, ghettoized, our culture relegated to “women’s subjects” or “women’s studies” so easily dismissed by the male hierarchies, so easily ignored. Moreover, there is danger in thinking that women as legislators in male-dominated politics can save the world. Even if all the politicians were woman, as long as the institutions and thinking remain patriarchal, there can be no essential change. Experience has taught us that there is unfortunately nothing magical about women in power. I suggest we cannot accept identity as symbolic: “we are not “woman”: we are—every one of us—a human being with personal characteristics that may or may not approximate some statistical norm or some mystical notion what “woman” is. As feminists we need to guard as much against a new sentimentalized interpretation of women as against the romanticization of nature. We must learn to mistrust a sentimentalized view of women, motherhood, the home. In many cultures and religions throughout the world, where the mother is venerated, women are suppressed. When gender difference in personality and development are considered “inherent,” even though such differences may seem to be advantageous to women, the patriarchal perspective is being perpetuated. Any biological or “natural” differences among groups can eventually be skewed to favor the group in power. Thus the new field of ecopsychology needs from the start to avoid such assumptions that women are in some sense “closer” to nature than men and therefore more intuitive, caring, and specially called to “save the Earth.” Until every man accepts and expresses what has been called “the feminine” in his nature, and every woman is allowed to express what has been called “the masculine” in hers, we must be wary of setting ourselves apart as women in some new version of the noble savage, who bears all wisdom and will redress the wrongs and injustices of the world.

### Ecofeminist identity politics leads to error replication and exclusion

Sandilands 99 – Professor of Environmental Studies

Catriona, Assistant professor of Environmental Studies @ NYU, “The Good-Natured Feminist” p. 5

In ecofeminism, the fact of being a women is understood to lie at the base of one’s experience of ecological degradation of one’s interests in ecological protection, and reconstruction, an of one’s “special” ecological consciousness. Whether the important elements of that “being” are seen to reside in biological, social, ascribed, or imposed factors is immaterial to my argument, the crucial thing is that identity, similarity, and belonging to a specific group are the primary foci of political speech and the basis of political legitimacy, and that the achievement of the freedom to express identity without oppression is a key political goal (as opposed to, say, a focus on individuality and a desire to put specific identity aside to achieve a common good, an equally problematic but nonetheless different political logic). While an obvious result of identity politics is an exclusionary logic—“you can’t speak about this because you do not belong to the group”—there are other deeper problems with the model. For example, Identities are inevitably partial, and the relevant social categories on which identity politics are based can go only so far to describe a person, the reduction of any self to a list of categories replicates many of the problems that identity politics set out to address, including the socially experienced limits of the identity categories themselves. I will outline what I consider the logic and limits of identity politics later, what said at the outset is that ecofeminists in basing their political specificity on an identitarian women’s experience of nature or environmental degradation or on a specifically women’s set of issues or principles or metaphors, assume a correspondence among ontology, epistemology , and politics—an identity politics—that reduces the relations between feminism and ecology to a highly problematic group experience for women and nature.

## AT: Ecofem – Essentialism – AT: Strategic Essentialism

### Strategic essentialism enforces normalizing categories – doesn’t avoid the link

Sandlands 97 – Professor of Environmental Studies

Catriona Sandilands, Professor of Environmental Studies @ York, Mother Earth, The Cyborg, and The Queer: Ecofeminism and (More) Questions of Identity, NWSA Journal, 1997

Given the potential constructionism apparent in some purportedly essentialist positions and the underlying essentialism of some purportedly social constructivist positions—in other words, the slippage across them despite original intentions—Carlassare asserts that the category "women'' **cannot be asserted without essentialism in some form**. Her conclusion is that the category "women" must be understood as a politically strategic invocation that is used variably within different ecofeminist productions of its source and meaning. Useful as this argument is for its transcendence of social/cultural ecofeminist arguments over essence, what Carlassare fails to address is the fact that strategic essentialism is never simply strategic but contains within it the potential to create a perception of essence despite the supposedly ironic nature of the stance. The question of performative subversion remains unaddressed in her work, her "unity in diversity" argument for strategic essentialism rests on the assumption of a political need to be seen as representing a common identity even if none of the participants actually believes in its existence. Thus, while she rejects the need for coherence and heralds ecofeminisms potentially subversive multiplicity, her validation of essentialist claims under the rubric of strategy misses the key point of performative parody.25

### Strategic essentialism is a cop-out for homogenization of women – upholds biological determinism and culture-nature dualism

Sandlands 97 – Professor of Environmental Studies

Catriona Sandilands, Professor of Environmental Studies @ York, Mother Earth, The Cyborg, and The Queer: Ecofeminism and (More) Questions of Identity, NWSA Journal, 1997

Clearly, what I am suggesting involves a radical displacement of contemporary wisdom. For ecofeminism to move beyond the reified identity categories of "women" and "nature" that have plagued it, it is insufficient to claim social construction and proceed anyway. As Carlassare argues, there is no inevitable relationship between social constructivism and antiessentialism. What Alaimo's work adds to the political equation is that it is possible to create affinities between humans and nature that do not involve statements of biological determination so long as nature is carefully re-inscribed as an active agent in its and our artifactuality. That this is a difficult task is quite clear: discourses of biological determinism are alive and well. But it is not sufficient to claim that everything is social any more than it is to suggest that this claim produces infinite flexibility. A more appropriate response is to engage with the culture/nature dualism itself, to argue that continuity with nature docs not consign humans to necessitarian repetition, and to use this blurring as a way of shaking up the apparent solidity of the social categories produced through their apparent connection to nature.

## AT: Ecofem – Caring Turn

### TURN--Associating women with care dangerously limits the ethico-political possibilities for women

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One of the themes in contemporary ecofeminist literature is that women's care-related perspectives on human-nature relations should be adopted as a generalized normative stance, a form of ecological civic virtue or "a universal public caring" (Salleh 1997). This argument is supported by those ecofeminist theorists who portray caring relationships as models for sustainable living and as important sources of political empowerment for women in the larger social sphere. The women who appear in the narratives that inform ecofeminist alternative visions are variously referred to as grassroots women, housewife activists and "re/sisters" (Salleh 1997)) who work voluntarily to sustain life and to fight against the powers that put that life in jeopardy. The vision that their experiences inspire consists of an integration of diverse political struggles into one overarching movement for survival that is grounded in everyday material practices at the local level. So grounded, it is a vision that is fundamentally different from right-wing ideologies that embrace global capitalism as well as from the philosophies of postmodernism that are said to privilege discourse and discourage activism. While there are important aspects to ecofeminist valuations of women's caring—particularly in light of the way non-feminist ecopolitical discourse ignores the work of care—I argue that there are also **political risks** in celebrating women's association with caring (**both as an ethic and a practice**) and in reducing women's ethico-political life to care. In view of these risks, to be discussed herein, I think a degree of skepticism is in order. I question whether care is a wise choice of metaphor around which to create a feminist political project for social and ecological change. How can societal expectations that women be caring or the exploitation of women's unpaid caring labor under capitalism be challenged at the same time that the specificity of women's caring stance towards the environment is held up as an answer to the ecological crisis? What does it mean, moreover, for women to enter the realm of the political through a window of care and maternal virtue? How is this feminist? And how, if at all, is it political? It is my position that ecofeminists should see caring through less-than-rosy-glasses, as a paradoxical set of practices, feelings, and moral orientations that are embedded in particular relations and contexts and socially constructed as both feminine and private. Revaluing care in the way many ecofeminists seem to do results in an affirmation of gender roles that are [End Page 57] **rooted in the patriarchal dualisms** that all feminisms, on my definition at least, must aim persistently to resist and disrupt. I support my position by drawing on the work of some of the feminist philosophers, political economists, and political theorists who have argued that the positive identification of women with caring ought to be treated cautiously for it **obscures** some of **the** **negative implications** of feminized care and **narrows our understanding** of women as political actors. In the first part of the discussion, I cast doubt on ecofeminist ideas about the "feminine principle" by highlighting some of the critiques of care ethics made by feminist moral philosophers. I then subject ecofeminist celebrations of caring labor to questions raised by feminist political economists about its exploitation in globalizing capitalist societies. I also question whether claims that women are empowered through their care-inspired eco-activism have been accompanied by a sufficient consideration of feminist political transformation. That discussion leads into the final part of the paper where I look to feminist theorists of citizenship to develop the argument that ecofeminists would be better served by using the language of citizenship instead of the language of care to understand and theorize women's engagement in ecopolitics.

### Equating women with care is morally unacceptable—this notion ensures exploitation women and is fundamentally oppressive

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However, there are important questions to be raised about the implications of care metaphors and, specifically, care ethics for ecofeminist politics. The first is whether invoking an inevitably and/or intentionally feminized ethic of care is an advisable strategy for problematizing eco-political and social relationships. Can it lead to a destabilization of gender codes? What are the risks in an approach that celebrates women's caring as a public virtue? In response to these questions, it is instructive to take note of a current in feminist philosophy that has combined arguments for valuing the capacity to care with arguments that problematize and politicize women's caring, to show that caring is not an unqualified good. Some feminist philosophers maintain that care ethics is a double-edged sword for feminism. While some believe that an ethics of care can offer a way to assert a positive face of feminism (perhaps one more inspirational than a feminism which dwells upon women's exploitation under patriarchy), an uncritical emphasis on women's care-related morality can also affirm harmful assumptions about gender and reify exclusionary notions about the nature of care and, indeed, of carers. Peta Bowden explains the tension nicely: "Condemnation of caring runs the danger of silencing all those who recognize its ethical possibilities, and risks capitulating to dominant modes of ethics that characteristically exclude consideration of women's ethical lives. On the other hand, romantic idealization is also a danger" (1997, 18-19) [End Page 61] Since the 1980s, when care ethics was in its heyday, questions have been asked about the validity and implications of care perspectives for feminism. There is resistance in feminist philosophy to the "strategy of reversal" that has been deployed by cultural feminists who choose to see "women's ways of knowing," "maternal thinking" or "feminine ethics" as superior to men's ways of knowing and masculine ethics and as an ethic that can transform the world. Lorraine Code points out, for example, that "it is by no means clear that a new monolith, drawn from hitherto devalued practices, can or should be erected in the place of one that is crumbling" (1995, 111). An important lesson for ecofeminists here is that listening to and validating women's voices and those of other marginalized subjects is important but does not inevitably lead to epistemic privilege (Davion 1994). Not only is the idea that women may have greater access to "the truth" questionable on empirical grounds, it is also too risky a position to put forth in the context of a masculinist and misogynist culture that both **creates and exploits women's capacity to care**. Thinking about this point in the context of ecofeminist rhetoric Code writes: Women may indeed have the capacity to save the world, in consequence, perhaps, of their cultural-historical relegation to a domain 'closer to nature' than men, whatever that means. Yet claims that such a capacity is uniquely, essentially theirs have consistently served as premises of arguments to show that women should be the moral guardians both of 'humanity' and of nature. Such injunctions assign women responsibilities that are fundamentally oppressive, while excluding them from recognition as cognitive agents and creators of social meaning, precisely because of their alleged closeness to nature. An ecofeminism developed in this direction would be morally-politically unacceptable.

### Embracing care exploits women and creates anxiety, pain and suffering for the carer

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Peta Bowden contends that it is necessary for feminists to acknowledge negative aspects to caring as well as positive ones. She calls them dark sides and light sides of caring: the tendency to see the perspectives and concerns arising from maternal and other practices of caring simply in a positive light glosses the dark side of these practices: the frustrating, demeaning, and isolating dimensions of their routines. 'Care' has a lengthy history in the (English-speaking) west as a burden, a bed of trouble, anxiety, suffering and pain; care ethicists ignore this history, and the dismal actuality of many contemporary practices of caring, at great risk. (1997, 9) Highlighting the relevance of this insight for ecofeminism, Chris Cuomo (1998, 129) writes: "put simply, caring can be damaging to the carer if she neglects other responsibilities, including those she has to herself, by caring for another."5 Certainly self-sacrifice, exploitation, and loss of autonomy and leisure time are among the more negative aspects of women's caring. So is the inability to withhold care or to say "no" that comes with an internalized duty to maintain relationships. It is important to look at why women tend to have little choice but to be caring.6 Feminist critiques of [End Page 63] violence against women often include the claim that women need to develop a greater sense of autonomy and separation. (Intimacy and abuse sometimes go hand in hand.) Such negative aspects provide reasons to treat with greater scepticism any desire to focus solely on the lighter side of women's caring and life-affirming values. In recognition of this point, perhaps it is necessary to consider striking a balance between an ethic of care and an ethic of justice.7

## AT: Ecofem – Caring Turn – AT: Intentions Good

### Good intentions are irrelevant—invocation of a rhetoric of care constrains women’s agency and leads to dangerous politics

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So Tronto and Curtin wish to extend care beyond the private sphere [End Page 75] as long as it can be a politicized and de-gendered notion of care. To be sure, one can think of examples where caring practices are public and political, and some that are not strictly feminized even though they are still gendered.16 Nevertheless, I tend to agree with those who see the care-politics connection as too closely and unavoidably associated with maternalism to be a good strategy for feminist politics. They see maternalist justifications of women's citizenship through arguments about care as fundamentally constraining of women's political agency and contrary to politics. Dietz (1985) argues, for example, that the ethics of care are inappropriate as bases for political practice because they are inextricably linked to personal relationships rather than more abstract relations of citizenship.17 Other critics warn that politics rooted in caring can very easily become exclusionary and parochial, where care-giving is extended only to particular, well-known others who are deemed worthy of care. Kathleen B. Jones (1993) finds maternalism a "dangerous rhetoric" and so asks, "how far can we extend these moral categories, derived from intimate relations, into the arena of political discourse and public action?" (quoted in Squires 1999, 156). It may also be that the need to protect and care for a particular other (say a child) can lead to actions that are harmful to generalized others. This possibility is **extremely relevant to questions of ecological politics**. For example, women "earth-carers" in one community could oppose a toxic waste incinerator out of fear for the health of their children, and at the same time fail to "care" that their opposition might lead to its displacement onto another community (as tends to happen in NIMBY-type struggles).

## AT: Ecofem – AT: Standpoints Good

### Standpoint narrative is simply a tool used to re-affirm traditional social roles—it serves to keep women in their place

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A second significant limitation of ecofeminist "empowerment" stories is that they rarely consider, from a feminist perspective, the process through which women might move beyond the politics of survival to political resistance and transformation. Popular examples of grassroots women's narratives tend to give a very simplistic portrayal of women's empowerment as a process that rarely involves consciousness-raising or self-reflective political resistance to gender norms. It is entirely possible that the women who star in ecofeminist dramas are engaged in processes of political and personal transformation, but if they are, this has so far not been an important point in ecofeminist texts. It may be that in order to build a theory of "embodied materialism" (Mellor 1997), the story needs to be that "women's political awareness is not merely reactive, but expresses qualities of personal synthesis, initiative, intuition and flexibility, learned in caring labours" (Salleh 1997, 175, my emphasis). This does not sound like a process of political transformation to me, but rather like an affirmation of social expectations of what it means to be feminine or female—and a claim that political life is not a site for self-knowledge.

## AT: Ecofem – Alt Fails – Government Focus Key

### The alternative misidentifies consumption problems – lets government and MNCs off the hook

Scott 7 – Professor @ Florida

Austin Scott, Professor @ Florida, Austin E. Scott, University of Florida, Concerning Consumption: The Ecofeminist Reply to Citizens as Consumers, 2007 WPSA Annual Meeting, Las Vegas NV, http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p\_mla\_apa\_research\_citation/1/7/6/1/1/pages176113/p176113-1.php

The above discussion is not meant to dismiss all citizen responsibility when it comes to environmental issues. If individuals believed nothing was their fault, it could lead to a nihilistic view of ameliorating the environment. My intent is to draw attention to the overwhelming tendency to cast responsibility for the environment through individualized consumer acts. What is problematic from an ecofeminist account is when women are unfairly made out to be the saviors of the environment through consumption. Placing the principle and value of environmentalism onto the backs of women simultaneously **alleviates the influences that government, corporations, and patriarchy** has in our environmental struggle. More generally, any attempt to couch “earthcare” in consumption terms is usually done so at the **expense of structural and systemic political change**. Nurturing citizen responsibility is acceptable as long as it does not neglect the importance of addressing the dominant patriarchal culture that benefits from keeping political transformation out. 45 John Barry argues that the sphere of consumption could be a place where one can practice ecological virtue; the goal is to cultivate mindful, not mindless, consumption. 46 After all, he maintains, “one of the most powerful and radical political acts an individual or group can do in modern, consumption-oriented societies is to refuse to consume.” 47 I think this is an important point to consider from an ecofeminist viewpoint. Women, as the principal domestic consumers, **cannot simply refuse to consume** since they are responsible for much of their family’s needs. They must consider the needs, even wants, of other individuals and consume accordingly. A flat-out refusal to consume is a radical act, absolutely, **but lacks viability**. Furthermore, if we consider Kasser’s contention that some consuming activity is akin to addiction, quitting consumption is **much more complicated** than Barry acknowledges.

## AT: Ecofem – AT: Plumwood

### Plumwood mistheorizes the nature of power and human relations—her focus on rationalism functions to entrench dominant modes of thought, precluding its liberatory potential

Birkeland 95 – Professor @ Canberra

Janis Birkeland U. of Canberra “DISENGENDERING ECOFEMINISM” Trumpeter, 1995, http://trumpeter.athabascau.ca/index.php/trumpet/article/viewFile/302/451

Most ecofeminists identify the concept of ‘gender’ (the social construction of sex)as the conceptual glue between the above interlocking sets of dualisms, and the term ‘patriarchy’ to refer to their systemic expression in social and institutional structures. Such terms have been received by many as highly provocative or even confrontational, because these subjects are still taboo (taboos being things that generally support power relations). Plumwood instead chooses to substitute the term ‘mastery’ for patriarchal consciousness, and the ‘master-slave’ dualism for dominance relationships as overarching concepts in her deconstruction of Western thought. Rather than use gender as a metaphorical icon of value, therefore, she reduces it to the male/female dichotomy, relegating the concept to just another means by which people are categorised, much in the way that race and class have been used to marginalize people. Ecofeminist theory, when framed this way, loses its shock effect - which is ar-guably a good thing. The disengendered terminology makes the paradigm more palatable and academically kosher. While this de-politicised version may broad-en its appeal, however, it may simultaneously narrow its true transformative potential. Further, this disengendered typology may **reinvent the mind/body dualism** upon which Plumwood focuses and which is notably absent from most ecofeminist literature. In this work, therefore, the biological dimension of hu-man psychology and behaviour (and which we share with other animals) is split off from the cerebral and disgarded. Plumwood challenges the limitations of Western rationalism with a rationalism of the same order, which presents no difficulty, but risks losing a key ecofeminist insight in the process. After all, the pervasiveness of mastery or dominance and the use by the master of dualistic thinking in manipulating the populace is not a new idea to those involved in social justice movements; and certainly institutionalised forms of slavery are at least publicly disapproved of, even when practiced enthusiastically. The virtues of equality and freedom from tyranny have long been taught in such ubiquitous sites as the pulpit - yet these exhortations have done little to reduce hierarchical social relations. Why would they work now? It is the - until recently invisible- omnipresence of gender within these hierarchical dualisms that creates the potential for new insights and the basis for a new human identity and social transformation. In the desire to displace gender as a pivotal element in her theory, Plumwood appears to overlook the central role of both sex and gender in the motivations behind the seeking and abusing power. For example, in Plumwood’s extensive deconstruction of the master-slave relationship, the power drive on the part of the master is presumed but not theorised. Power and dominance are not really defined; they just present themselves as something that pervades human relationships. Perhaps this is because power cannot be adequately deconstructed in a gender-blind and a-sexual analysis? Surely humans have many biological and instinctual behaviour patterns related to sex and reproduction that they share with a mix of other animals, though we are not as yet able to disentangle these phenomena. In Plumwood’s theory, however, the human appears connected to nature on the cerebral plane only, either by experiencing nature existentially or by understanding nature intellec-tually. In her disengendered theory, the human is a creature without sex drivesor personal insecurities, moved only by cerebral constructs and sensory experi-ence. But is this not a denial of the nature within? I for one find it hard to believe that the power drive we witness daily does not predate the introduction of rational logic in ancient Greece, as is implied. It seems unlikely that power relations originated in modes of reason or that they can be extirpated by new conceptualisations alone. This begs the question as to the strategic impact of a disengendered ecofem-inism. Can people be motivated to abandon relations of personal power, and the value systems that legitimise them, because new cerebral constructs are p-resented which should be preferred by rational people? Ironically, Plumwood’s model of the human is, in this respect, not that unlike the rational information processor of traditional management and decision theory who makes optimal choices based on objective analyses. Have not many malestream green theorists already articulated the view that the remedy to dominance relations or mastery is a new way of perceiving reality? It may indeed be a necessary condition, but it is not sufficient. Rational arguments and intellectual frameworks are important, but if we want to motivate people to take on board these new insights, we need to recognize the human as a complex blending of emotional needs as well as ideologies. In a power-based society, or ‘patriarchy’, many people feel they can only ensure the provision of personal needs (such as sex, love and belonging) through material accumulation and the display of wealth. Until we face the problem of hyper-masculine identification in the self and the culture, I suspect that **there will be no fundamental social change**.

## AT: Ecofem – AT: Root Cause

### Eco-feminism fails—Impossible to identify root cause of oppression

Slicer 94 - Professor of Philosophy

Deborah, Assistant Professor of Philosophy @ U of Montana*, Ecological Feminism*, pg. 29

The first is the claim that there is some “root” cause of our multiple social oppressions, including naturism. While this particular claim does not appear in all ecofeminist literature, some version of a quest for historical or conceptual first causes appears often enough and very often either androcentrism or anthropocentrism are identified as the culprits. I try to clarify what various writers seem to mean when they make this claim, and I argue that our multiple oppressions are too inextricably link to identify a root cause and that little of practical or conceptual important actually hangs on doing so.

### Gender is not the “root cause” of environmental degradation—such claims are simplistic and wrong

Fox 98 – Center for Environmental Studies

Fellow @ Cent. Env Studies, “The Deep-Ecology-Ecofem debate,” in “Environmental Philosophy” ed. Zimmerman, p 232-3

To begin with, deep ecologists completely agree with ecofeminists that men have been far more implicated in the history of ecological destruction than women. However, deep ecologists also agree with similar charges derived from other social perspectives: for example, that capitalists, whites, and Westerners have been far more implicated in the history of ecological destruction than pre-capitalist peoples, blacks, and non-Westerners .21 If ecofeminists also agree with these points, then the question arises as to why they do not also criticize deep ecology for being neutral with respect to issues concerning such significant social variables as socioeconomic class, race, and Westernization. There appears to be two reasons for this. First, to do so would detract from the priority that econfeminists wish to give to their own concern with androcentrism. Second, and more significantly, these charges could also be applied with equal force to the ecofeminist focus on androcentrism itself.14 How does one defend the ecofeminist charge against deep ecology (i.e., that androcentrism is "the real root" of ecological destruction) in the face of these charges?" For deep ecologists, it is simplistic on both empirical and logical grounds to think that one particular perspective on human society identifies the real root of ecological destruction. Empirically, such thinking is simplistic (and thus descriptively poor) because it fails to give due consideration to the multitude of interacting factors at work in any given situation. (While on a practical level it can be perfectly reasonable to devote most of one's energy to one particular 'cause-if only for straightforward reasons to do with time and energy-that, of course, is no excuse for simplistic social theorizing.) Such thinking falls, in other words, to adopt an ecological perspective with respect to the workings of human society itself. Logically, such thinking is simplistic (and thus facile) because it implies that the solution to our ecological problems is close at hand-all we have to do is remove "the real root" of the problem-when it is actually perfectly possible to conceive of a society that is nonandrocentric, socioeconomically egalitarian, nonracist, and nonimperialistic with respect to other human societies, but whose members nevertheless remain aggressively anthropocentric in collectively agreeing to exploit their environment for their collective benefit in ways that nonanthropocentrists would find thoroughly objectionable. Indeed, the "green" critique of socialism proceeds from precisely this recognition that a socially egalitarian society does not necessarily imply an ecologically benign society.

## AT: Environmental Securitization – It’s Accurate

### Environmental securitization is necessary to *accurately* represent the link between climate and conflict

Mazo 10 – PhD in Paleoclimatology from UCLA

Jeffrey Mazo, Managing Editor, Survival and Research Fellow for Environmental Security and Science Policy at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, 3-2010, “Climate Conflict: How global warming threatens security and what to do about it,” pg. 12-13

The expected consequences of climate change include rising sea levels and population displacement, increasing severity of typhoons and hurricanes, droughts, floods, disruption of water resources, extinctions and other ecological disruptions, wild- fires, severe disease outbreaks, and declining crop yields and food stocks. Combining the historical precedents with current thinking on state stability, internal conflict and state failure suggests that adaptive capacity is the most important factor in avoiding climate-related instability. Specific global and regional climate projections for the next three decades, in light of other drivers of instability and state failure, help identify regions and countries which will see an increased risk from climate change. They are not necessarily the most fragile states, nor those which face the greatest physical effects of climate change. The global security threat posed by fragile and failing states is **well known**. It is in the interest of the world’s more afflu- ent countries to take measures both to reduce the degree of global warming and climate change and to cushion the impact in those parts of the world where climate change will increase that threat. Neither course of action will be cheap, but inaction will be costlier. Efficient targeting of the right kind of assistance where it is most needed is one way of reducing the cost, and understanding **how and why different societies respond** to climate change is one way of making that possible.

### Climate and security are linked – Darfur proves environmental concerns were central

Mazo 10 – PhD in Paleoclimatology from UCLA

Jeffrey Mazo, Managing Editor, Survival and Research Fellow for Environmental Security and Science Policy at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, 3-2010, “Climate Conflict: How global warming threatens security and what to do about it,” pg. 84-85

A contrasting illustration is provided by UNEP’s analysis of conflict and the environment in the Sudan. In this case, the authors are primarily interested in the specific environmental aspects of recovery, reconstruction and development, and they explicitly exclude other factors to focus on the environmental dimensions of conflict. 43 Like de Waal, they note that environmental problems affecting pasture and farmland occur throughout Sudan and are ‘clearly and strongly linked to conflict in a minority of cases and regions only’, but that nevertheless ‘there is substantial evidence of a strong link between the recent occurrence of local conflict and environmental degradation ... in the drier parts of Sudan’. 44 Like de Waal, they discuss the breakdown of traditional systems of mediation and dispute resolution after 1970 and the influx of small arms into the region, ‘with the unfortunate result that local conflicts today are both much more violent and more difficult to contain and mediate’. 45 Although they also recognise that land degradation ‘does not appear to be the dominant causative factor in local conflicts’, they conclude that: There is a very strong link between land degradation, desertification and conflict in Darfur. Northern Darfur – where exponential population growth and related environmental stress have created the conditions for conflicts to be triggered and sustained by political, tribal or ethnic differences – can be considered a tragic example of the social breakdown that can result from ecological collapse. Long-term peace in the region **will not be possible** unless these underlying and closely linked environmental and livelihood issues are resolved.

## AT: Foucault/Green Aesthetics—Alt Slayers

### Foucauldian self-reintervention cannot yield *social* change – their strategy is doomed

Fotopoulos 2

Takis, Editor, former senior lecturer in Economics at the University of North London, DEMOCRACY AND NATURE, v8, n1, March, http://www.democracynature.org/dn/vol8/takis\_transitional.htm

 As I mentioned above, we may characterise as ‘Lifestyle anarchism’ strategies all those, spontaneous or not, activities in the economic or broader social realm, which are not an integral part of a political project for systemic change. Such activities may involve the building of communes or ecovillages as well as Community Supported Agriculture, farmers markets, land trusts, LETS, local economic development and alternative technologies. I will therefore classify as ‘lifestyle’ activists all those who are involved in such activities for their own sake, (even if they use antisystemic slogans to justify them), rather than with the explicit aim to build a new political antisystemic movement with a clear vision about a future society and a strategy to reach it. Although Bookchin, who coined the term ‘lifestyle anarchism’, did not specifically describe which activities may be included here I think that the above activities often present many of the characteristics attributed by Bookchin to it: assailing organization, programmatic commitment and se­rious social analysis, as well as rejecting the need for building a political movement (unlike the anarcho-syndicalist movement which in its heyday tried to en­gage in creating an organized movement as we have seen above) and relying instead on bringing social change ‘by example’ and the corresponding change in values. The motive behind such activities, as Bookchin described it, in fact ‘articulates Foucault’s approach of ‘personal insurrection’ rather than social revolution’.[53] Such activities are rampant in countries like Britain since the 1970s, when the ideas of Colin Ward (and others around him) concerning what they called ‘Anarchy in Action’ ―in fields as diverse as town planning, housing, education and allotments― became influential. Similar trends are expressed today by various anarchist currents that extol the virtues of co-ops, which they consider as ‘anarchism in its latest practical manifestation’, since ‘they allow the practice of anarchism to be conducted within the larger capitalist economy’,[54] or adopt a ‘pragmatic’ anarchism, which rejects the traditional antisystemic demands of anarchists to abolish the market economy and money![55] However, it is utterly a-historical to suggest, as some ‘pragmatic’ (lifestyle) anarchists[56] do, that in the same way as capitalism evolved out of feudalism, a new liberatory society could emerge in the future out of the alternative institutions being established today by activities involved in ‘anarchy in action’. The fundamental flaw in such analysis is that the capitalist society was indeed an evolutionary development, but not so much as regards its economic and political institutions, in the establishment of which (as I attempted to show elsewhere[57]) the state played a crucial role. In fact, the capitalist society was an evolutionary development mainly as regards its heteronomous character, i.e. the fact that a new capitalist elite had simply replaced the old feudal one. However, a liberatory society is an autonomous society, a completely different ‘species’ of society, that involves the abolition of the institutional concentration of power at the hands of various elites. This is a revolutionary change which can never be achieved through some kind of evolution, even if such evolution could be speeded up by the activities of ‘anarchists in action’, lifestyle anarchists etc, who are involved in establishing alternative institutions here and there, outside of a political programmatic movement, with its own goals, means and strategy. As Bookchin stressed, the important differences between life-style and LM strategies center around the role of the individual with respect to social change. In life-style strategies, social change is seen to start from the lifestyle of the individual, and to proceed through bypassing the state and the market economy, rather than through contesting and attempting to replace them with new social institutions. On the other hand, the LM strategy emphasises the role of the social individual, that is, of the individual who takes part in political struggles at the local level and social struggles in general, with the aim to effect social change, not `through setting an example', but through creating a confederation of municipalities which will be in tension with the nation-state, until the former replaces the latter.[58] The ID project, although of course also stresses the role of social individual in social change, still, it uses a concept of freedom in terms of individual and social autonomy which aims to transcend the duality of individualism versus collectivism[59] and, in this sense, is differentiated from the LM project which adopts collectivism. The emphasis assigned to the individual (rather than to the social individual) by lifestyle strategies and the similar ‘anarchy in action’ strategies has inevitably led to **social marginalization**, as the almost insignificant social impact of movements inspired by such strategies has shown in the last 25 years. Furthermore, this trend, inevitably, has not escaped the trap of being “so skewed towards the idea of the reforms of the individual's values and lifestyle, as the primary political route to radical social change, that it ends up seeming positively antipathetic to the notion of the collective”[60] ―the New Age movement being a clear indication of this trap. Furthermore, the activities of the people involved in this sort of ‘anarchy in action’/lifestyle anarchism in no way constitute a movement, let alone a political movement. First, there is no common organisation, something that implies that we should more accurately call the groups involved in such activities as spontaneous gatherings of people with similar ideas and values rather than ‘organised movements’ worthy of this name. Second, the activists involved do not share a common worldview. Furthermore, as the activists involved in such diverse activities have never put forward any kind of common program with shared goals, ideology and strategy we cannot talk about a common set of values characterising the participants in these ‘movements’. Finally, the activities of many of the participants involved are in no way related to antisystemic politics (in the sense of promoting an alternative society), if indeed they are related to politics at all! In fact, all too often some of the activities involved are so politically harmless that the political elites frequently use them for their own ends. As I pointed out elsewhere,[61] this sort of activity is utterly ineffective in bringing about a systemic change. Although helpful in creating an alternative culture among small sections of the population and, at the same time, morale boosting for activists who wish to see an immediate change in their lives, this strategy **does not have any chance of success** ―in the context of today’s huge concentration of power— to create the democratic majority needed for systemic social change. This is because the projects suggested by this strategy may be too easily marginalized, or absorbed into the existing power structure (as has happened many times in the past) while their effect on the socialisation process is minimal ―if not nil. Particularly so, when such strategies usually concentrate on single issues, which are not part of a comprehensive political program for social transformation and, therefore,, do not help in creating the ‘anti-systemic’ consciousness required for systemic change.

## AT: Foucault/Green Aesthetics—Alt Slayers

### Individualized ethics cannot create collective change-their alternative results in quietism

Luke 97 – Professor of Political Science

Timothy, professor of political science at Virginia polytechnic, ECOCRITIQUE: CONTESTING THE POLITICS OF NATURE, ECONOMY, AND CULTURE, p-24-25

ultimately, deep ecology is “utopian ecologism.” As a utopia, it presents come alluring moral visions of what might be; at the same time, It fails to outline practicable means for realizing these moral visions. Deep ecologists are caught in the trap of endorsing new visions for new ecotopias but they do not even have a practical program for future primitive reinhabitiation or bioregional community buildings. Political action is displaced into the realm of ethical ideals, making it ever individuals moral duty to change himself or herself in advancing cultural change. Without the opportunity to change collective activity- in the economy, ideology, technology, or policy-this personal moral regeneration might become only a quietistic postmodern Taoism of finding the right path in an evil society. Naess, for example, suggests that hig vision of deep ecology is virtually idiosyncratic; others are strongly enjoined to concoct their own own ecological omelettes. Devall and Sessions conclude that deep ecology stands for these ultimate values; inward and outward direction, two aspects of the same process. We are not alone. We are part and parcel of the larger community, the land community. Each life in its own sense is heroic and connected. In the words of Bodhisativa, “No one is saved until we are all saved.” This perspective encompasses all notions of saving anything whether it be an endangered species, the community, or your own self. Each life is a heroic quest. It is a journey of the sport during which we discover our purpose. We have only to embark to set out in our own hearts, on this journey we began so long ago, to start on the “real work” of becoming real and of doing what is real. Nothing is labored, northing forced. The process of developing maturity is simpler than many think. Like water flowing through the canyons, always yielding, always finding its way back, simple in means, rich in ends. The deep ecologists may claim these values as their final goals. However, such principles have little practical utility for staging an ecological revolution.

## AT: Foucault/Green Aesthetics – Ext: Too Indiv.

### Individualized aesthetic changes won`t alter societal behaviors – legal mandates are necessary to overcome collective action problems

Doremus 3

Holly, Professor of Law and Chancellor`s Fellow at UC-Davis, Environs Environmental Law & Policy Journal, v27, Fall, p. 239-40

I am not comparing most environmental violations to murder; obviously environmental transgressions are not subject to the same harsh and near-universal societal condemnation. I am simply suggesting that environmental protection, like other social goals, may require more than a societal consensus. Inevitably, some people will be “environmental deviants.” They may disagree with a society consensus in favor of environmental protection, they may have strong contrary motivations, or they may simply lack an effective self-sanctioning mechanism. At least some actions those “environmental deviants” would commit could cause grievous environmental harm and therefore merit deterrence or punishment by legal sanctions. But in the environmental context there is a stronger and more generally applicable reason why law must persist even if we develop a very firm consensus on societal values. Environmental problems are typically collective action problems that cannot be solved without the concerted action of a large number of persons. **Individual action is futile**; it costs the actor some effort or forgone opportunity without bringing the desired environmental gain. Under those circumstances, persons who hold environmentally protective values are like not to act on those values without assurances that others will follow suit. In theory, informal, non-legal, social sanctions could ensure sufficient compliance to prevent futility. But in our increasingly anonymous world, social sanctions such as shaming or ostracization may not operate very effectively. Legal mandates can provide confidence that environmentally protective action will not be futile and that others will bear their fair share of the burden

### Darier`s alternative doesn’t spillover to societal change

Murdoch 2k

Jonathan, Dept of City and Regional Planning, Cardiff University, Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning, v2, p.91

The unfolding of discourse simultaneously becomes the play of power: as ways of talking emerge, so they open and close options, construct and deconstruct structures and objects, make and unmake people and things. And yet, there is little attention here to the complex interplay of discourses. While many contributors to Discourses of the Environment are happy to criticize “greenspeak”, little attention is given to this discourse in its larger discursive context. Perhaps this explains why the `politics` that follow from these Foucauldian analyses seem so `unpolitical`. A number of the contributors to what Sandilands calls the `space for … a genuinely ethical self-transformative practice` (p.93). Bowerbank examines self-transformation as `ecological identity work`, while Darier sees an environmental ethics (in the wake of Foucault) as comprising a constant `self-reflection`, selfknowledge, self-examination of the existing limits of what constitutes the `environment` and the individual`s conduct vis-à-vis the environment and vis-à-vis oneself` (p.227). Yet, there is little explanation of how this emphasis on “self” might translate into a viable environmental discourse.

## AT: Free Market Environmentalism – Doesn’t Solve

### Doesn’t solve the case

Mingyuan 5 – Professor of Law

Mingyuan Associate Professor of Law at Tsinghua University School of Law 2005, Wang Temple Journal of Science, Technology & Environmental Law, lexis

Compared to conventional energy resources such as coal and oil, renewable energy resources are generally more environmentally-friendly and, therefore, benefit both the economy and the environment. Unfortunately, while the market mechanism [\*358] generally may not prove renewable energy economically beneficial, sometimes the market fails to operate in terms of a specific energy market. That is, the market fails to operate in the context of energy and renewably energy. Environmental benefits resulting from the development and use of renewable energy sources, a form of positive externality or market failure, cannot be measured by price signals and, therefore, cannot be incorporated into the market system. Furthermore, because of the differences of project scale and the maturity of technology, the costs of developing and using renewable energy are usually more expensive and less competitive than costs of fossil fuel energy, especially electricity derived from coal-burning power plants.

## AT: Free Market Environmentalism – No Impact

### Free markets don’t create progress – they are inefficient and exclude questions of natural capital

Mayer 7 – Professor of Management
Mayer Prof of Management Oakland University 2007 Don American Business Law Journal, Lexis

Conventional wisdom tells us that free markets and private enterprise bring about the greatest good through optimally efficient use of resources. The reality is that corporations can be as bureaucratic as any government agency with new efficiencies and innovations being strangled within the organization. n98 Corporate initiatives to conserve energy and materials and to invest in cost-effective and eco-friendly products and efficiencies are not a given for many organizations; while there are some emerging corporate exemplars that will be discussed in Part III, they are exceptional. On a **[\*266]** more basic level, claims that the free market creates greater wealth and well-being globally will invariably rely on Gross Domestic Product (GDP) numbers that systematically exclude the accelerating draw-down of natural capital. What is natural capital? Natural capital is breathable air, drinkable water, fertile soil, wetlands and coastal dunes that mediate storm surges, aquifers that provide a source for irrigating otherwise unproductive land, rivers and lakes that provide recreation and fishing, and oceans that have provided sustenance and a way of life for people over the centuries. In our economic calculations of how we are doing in terms of wealth creation, the now-accelerating diminution of natural capital has been left out of the equation. Because the market paradigm recognizes only priced exchanges, it cannot compute other conditions about life, health, or happiness. Thus, while we are--by standard economic measures--getting richer, the natural environment that we bequeath to successive generations is getting poorer. n99

## AT: Free-Market Environmentalism – Market Failure

### Purely market economics fails – public goods, externalities and tragedy of the commons

Speth 8 – Dean of Yale School of Forestry

James, dean of the Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies at Yale University, and Professor in the Practice of Environmental Policy, The Bridge @ the Edge of the World, pg. 84

In Markets and the Environment, environmental economists Nathaniel Keohane and Sheila Olmstead call attention to three distinct types of market failure where the environment is concerned. First, there are the negative externalities noted above, for example, all the indirect costs of the environmental damage imposed on those downstream of polluters and on the public at large, costs that the unaided market does not require the polluter to pay. The other two categories of market failure are public goods and the tragedy of the commons: "Some environmental amenities, such as biodiversity, are enjoyed by lots of people, whether or not those people help pay for them. Economists call such goods public goods. A market failure arises because some individuals will end up being free riders: Rather than helping to provide the public good themselves, they merely enjoy what others provide for them. "A third class of environmental problems is known as the tragedy of the commons. When a natural resource—such as a fishery or an underground aquifer—is made available to all, individuals will tend to exploit the resource **far beyond the optimal level.** This problem arises because the incentives of individuals diverge from the common good. We call it a tragedy because everyone would be better off if they could all commit themselves to act less selfishly. Thus individually rational actions add up to a socially undesirable outcome.

## AT: Free-Market Environmentalism – No D-Rule

### Not a D-rule

Richards 9 – PhD in Philosophy @ Princeton

Jay Richards, PhD with honors in Philosophy and Theology from Princeton, “Money, Greed, and God: Why Capitalism Is the Solution and Not the Problem,” pg. 53

The problem isn’t simply that taxes are too high. After all, not all forms of taxation are unjust. Every government has to collect taxes to fund services beneficial to all—to maintain courts, pro- tect citizens from domestic and foreign predators, enforce traffic law and contracts, and so forth. These government functions stem from our inalienable rights. We have a right to protect ourselves from aggressors, for instance, so we can delegate that right to government. We don’t have the right to take the property of one person and give it to another. Therefore, we can’t rightfully delegate that function to the state. Delegated theft is still theft.

## AT: Global-Local – Global Focus Solves Violence

### Global thinking promotes local action and checks violence

Sachs 92 – Professor of Science @ Penn State

Wolfgang Sachs, Green Movement Activist and co-ed. Development guest Prof Science @ Penn State, 1992, Development Dictionary, p. 109-113

But recognizing the pitfalls of global eco-managernent does not solve the dilemma which will stay with us in the decades to come. Both alternatives— to think in categories of one world as well as not to think in such categories—are equally self-destructive. On the one hand, it is a sacrilege in our age of cultural evaporation to apprehend the globe as a united, highly integrated world. On the other hand, a vision of the globe as a multitude of different and only loosely connected worlds cannot dispense with the idea of ecumenism in the face of lurking violence and the devastation of nature. Not surprisingly, calls for global consciousness abound. Given that local events can affect the conditions of life in remote places, these calls aim at bringing into congruence the range of our responsibility with the range of our effects.

### \*\*\*Continues\*\*\*

People are seldom residents of only one mental space. They have the ability to change their point of view and to look with the other’s eyes at themselves. in fact, people often hold multiple loyalties at one and the same time. In many instances they combine rootedness in a place with affiliation to a larger community. An inhabitant of medieval Cologne knew how to be a member of the Christian Church; a villager in Rajasthan was aware of Bharat, Mother india; and Croatian peasants as well as the citizens of Cracow were part of the Habsburg empire. In a similar vein, the one world may be thought of in terms of a meta-nation instead of a super-nation. It constitutes the horizon within which places live out their density and depth. In this perspective. ‘one world’ is not a design for more global planning, but an ever present regulative idea for local action. Cosmopolitan localism seeks to amplify the richness of a place while keeping in mind the rights of a multi-faceted world. It cherishes a particular place, yet at the same time knows about the relativity of all places.

Even if there are risks, global thinking is necessary to check violence and complacency

Nayar 99 – Professor @ Warwick

Jayan Nayar, Law Prof @ Warwick, Fall 1999, 9 Transnat’l L. & Contemp. Probs. 599, p ln

Located within a site of privilege, and charged to reflect upon the grand questions of world-order and the human condition as the third Christian Millennium dawns, we are tempted to turn the mind to the task of abstract imaginings of "what could be" of our "world," and "how should we organize" our "humanity." Perhaps such contemplations are a necessary antidote to cynicism and skepticism regarding any possibility of human betterment, a necessary revitalization of critical and creative energies to check the complacencies of the state of things as they are. n1 However, imagining [\*601] possibilities of abstractions--"world-order," "international society," "the global village," "the family of humankind," etc.--does carry with it a risk. The "total" view that is the take-off point for discourses on preferred "world-order" futures risks deflection as the abstracted projections it provokes might entail little consequence for the faces and the names of the humanity on whose behalf we might speak. So, what do we do? I choose, in this contribution to the collective endeavor towards "reframing world-order," not to explore possibilities of reform or transformation of the current "order." My projections do not involve the (re)formulation of "world-order" ideas for the reorganization of the "world polity." They do not seek to advance (re)articulations of normative standards appropriate for the "family of humankind" as it confronts the perceived challenges of the coming years (let alone, the next millennium). They do not (re)conceptualize the configurations of power and responsibilities worthy of an aspired-for collective civilizational project. My reason for this is simple. The projections of "good ideas" for the reconstitution of "global" imaginings within the mainstream of political-legal discourse are many. No doubt such endeavors will continue in search of better futures. Reference to these articulations and attention to their proposals are indeed necessary as we seek to destabilize current hegemonies of violence. However, a representation of these proposals is not, I believe, what I could usefully do here. Instead, I would like to pursue an alternative track of "imaging" human futures, "re-viewing" rather than "reframing" world-order.

## AT: Heidegger – Permutation Solvency

### Absolutist rejection fails

Pasquale 5 – PhD in Anthrolology

Frank L., Ph.D., a cultural anthropologist Secular Humanist Bulletin, Feb. 10 Volume 20, Number 3. Absolute Thinking in an Inabsolute World http://secularhumanism.org/index.php?section=library&page=pasquale\_20\_3&back=http://secularhumanism.org/lib/list.php%3Fpublication%3Dshb

For my own part, I have grown weary of extremist thinking, whether purely right/wrong, black/white, good/evil, either/or, us/them, absolute, or absolutely relative. Western history and philosophy sometimes seem to me a succession of presumptuous pretensions to certainty. Such thinking has led to great achievements, but also untold destruction. It provided an impetus for great adventure and oppressive imperialism. It envisioned shining cities on a hill, and a purified “race” of superior humans (minus those deemed “unfit”). To view ourselves as absolutely, unchangeably prejudiced, judgmental, selfish, oppressive, or evil is as dangerous and as empirically indefensible as to think ourselves perfect or capable of perfection. By doing so, we lapse back into an age-old habit of framing the world in dueling absolutes. (Remember Manichaeanism? How about Bushism?) But we are not absolutely good, nor absolutely evil; we are capable of both and generally interested in improving. We make small advances here and lapse back there. Our ethics and values are neither fixed and eternal nor absolutely relative but an approximate reflection of our nature (such as we dimly perceive it at this point in species evolution), our needs, and our shared aspiration to live lives worth living. While it is essential that we remain skeptically aware of our many failings and foibles, we should not deny our incremental advancements, our ethical aspirations, or our potential for goodness and nobility, imperfect as these may be. At the very least, to deny such advancements is to negate the contributions of those whose lives were devoted to promoting a precious self-fulfilling prophecy of human decency and justice, regardless of power, class, culture, skin color, or metaphysical stance. At the worst, it is to frame a dismal world and a self-fulfilling prophecy where power alone is the greatest “good,” where we are forever consigned to an original sin of destructive judgmentalism without hope of improvement, and where all “religious” people and phenomena constitute a uniform evil that must be obliterated without a trace. I had thought that humanism represented a repudiation of such thinking, but perhaps I was mistaken.

## AT: Heidegger – Authoritarianism DA

### The alternative results in authoritarian dogmatism

Thiele 3 – Professor of Political Science

Leslie Paul, Professor of Political Science @ Florida, “The Ethics and Politics of Narrative,” Foucalt and Heidegger: Critical Encounters,

The pursuit of knowledge continues unabated for the skeptic. Yet it proceeds with a suspicious eye. There are inherent limitations to— and a price to pay for—the pursuit of knowledge. Charles Scott describes Foucault's efforts in this regard: “Far from the skepticism that argues that nothing is really knowable…genealogies embody a sense of the historical limits that define our capacities for knowing and believing. Things are known. But they are known in ways that have considerable social and cultural costs.” 8 Both Heidegger and Foucault maintain that there is no legitimate basis for the radical skeptic's conviction that knowledge is impossible or unworthy of pursuit. This sort of skepticism, Heidegger states, consists merely in an “addiction to doubt.” 9 The skeptical nature of political philosophical thought, in contrast, is grounded in the **imperative of endless inquiry**. The point for Heidegger and Foucault is to inquire not in order to sustain doubt, but to doubt that one might better sustain inquiry. At the same time, inquiry is tempered with a sensibility of the ethico-political costs of any “knowledge” that is gained. Doing political philosophy of this sort might be likened to walking on a tightrope. If vertigo is experienced, a precarious balance may be lost. Falling to one side leaves one mired in apathy, cynicism, and apoliticism. This results when skeptical inquiry degenerates into a radical skepticism, an addictive doubt that denies the value of (the search for) knowledge and undermines the engagements of collective life, which invariably demand commitment (based on tentatively embraced knowledge). Falling to the other side of the tightrope leaves one mired in dogmatic belief or blind activism. Authoritarian ideologies come to serve as stable foundations, or a reactive iconoclasm leads to irresponsible defiance. Apathy, cynicism, and apoliticism, on the one side, and dogmatic authoritarianism or reactive iconoclasm, on the other, are the dangerous consequences of losing one's balance. These states of mind and their corresponding patterns of behavior relieve the vertigo of political philosophical inquiry, but at a prohibitive cost. It has been argued that Foucault did not so much walk the tightrope of political philosophy as straddle it, at times leaving his readers hopeless and cynical, at times egging them on to an irresponsible monkeywrenching. For some, the Foucauldian flight from the ubiquitous powers of normalization undermines any defensible normative position. Hopelessness accompanies lost innocence. Cynicism or nihilism become the only alternatives for those who spurn all ethical and political foundations. By refusing to paint a picture of a better future, Foucault is said to undercut the impetus to struggle. Others focus on Foucault's development of a “tool kit” whose contents are to be employed to deconstruct the apparatuses of modern power. Yet the danger remains that Foucault's “hyperactive” tool-kit users will be unprincipled activists, Luddites at best, terrorists at worst. In either case, Foucault provides no overarching theoretical vision. Indeed, Foucault is upfront about his rejection of ethical and political theories and ideals. “I think that to imagine another system is to extend our participation in the present system, ” Foucault stipulates. “Reject theory and all forms of general discourse. This need for theory is still part of the system we reject.” 10 One might worry whether action is meant to take the place of thought. If Foucault occasionally straddles the tightrope of political philosophy, Heidegger obviously stumbled off it. In the 19305, Heidegger enclosed himself **within an authoritarian system** of thought grounded in ontological reifications of a “**folk” and its history**. Heidegger's historicization of metaphysics led him to believe that a new philosophic epoch was about to be inaugurated. It implicitly called for a philosophical Fuehrer who could put an end to two millennia of ontological forgetting. 11 The temptation for Heidegger to identify himself as this intellectual messiah and to attach himself to an authoritarian social and political movement capable of sustaining cultural renewal proved irresistible. Whether Heidegger ever fully recovered his balance has been the topic of much discussion. Some argue that Heidegger's prerogative for political philosophizing was wholly undermined by his infatuation with folk destiny, salvational gods, and political authority. 12

### Heidegger’s philosophy has moral consequences and leads to paralysis – It justifies sitting back and allowing for the Holocaust while criticizing the technology used to kill the Jews

Bookchin 95 – Professor @ Ramapo College

Murray Bookchin, Founder of the Institute for Social Ecology and Former Professor at Ramapo College, 1995, Re-enchanting Humanity, p. 168-170

"Insofar as Heidegger can be said to have had a project to shape human lifeways, it was as an endeavor to resist, or should I say, demur from, what he conceived to he an all-encroaching technocratic mentality and civilization that rendered human beings 'inauthentic' in their relationship to a presumably self-generative reality, 'isness', or more esoterically, 'Being' *(Sein).* Not unlike many German reactionaries, Heidegger viewed ‘modernity' with its democratic spirit, rationalism, respect for the individual, and technological advances as a 'falling' (Gefallen) from a primal and naive innocence in which humanity once 'dwelled,’ remnants of which he believed existed in the rustic world into which he was born a century ago. 'Authenticity', it can be said without any philosophical frills, lay in the pristine Teutonic world of the tribal Germans who retained their ties with ‘the Gods’, and with later peoples who still tried to nourish their past amidst the blighted traits of the modern world. Since some authors try to muddy Heidegger's prelapsarian message by focusing on his assumed belief in individual freedom and ignoring his hatred of the French Revolution and its egalitarian, 'herd'-like democracy of the 'They', it is worth emphasizing that such a view withers m the light of his denial of individuality. The individual by himself counts for noth­ing', he declared after becoming a member of the National Socialist party in 1933. 'The fate of our Volk m its state counts for everything.'22 As a member of the Nazi party, which he remained up to the defeat of Germany twelve years later, his antihumanism reached strident, often blatantly reactionary proportions. Newly appointed as the rector of the University of Freiburg upon Hitler's ascent to power, he readily adopted the Fuehrer-principle of German fascism and preferred the title Rektor-Fuhrer, hailing the spirit of National Socialism as an antidote to 'the darkening of the world, the flight of the gods, the destruction of the earth [by technology], the transformation of men into a mass, the hatred and suspicion of everything free and creative.’28 His most unsavory remarks were directed in the lectures, from which these lines are taken, 'from a metaphysical point of view', against 'the pincers' created by America and Russia that threaten to squeeze 'the farthermost corner of the globe ... by technology and ... economic exploitation.'29 Technology, as Heidegger construes it, is 'no mere means. Technology is a way of revealing. If we give heed to this, then another whole realm for the essence of technology will open itself up to us. It is the realm of revealing, i.e., of truth.’30 After which Heidegger rolls out technology's transformations, indeed mutations, which give rise to a mood of anxiety and finally hubris, anthropocentricity, and the mechanical coercion of things into mere objects for human use and exploitation. Heidegger's views on technology are part of a larger weltanschauung which is too multicolored to discuss here, and demands a degree of inter­pretive effort we must forgo for the present in the context of a criticism of technophobia. Suffice it to say that there is a good deal of primitivistic animism in Heidegger's treatment of the 'revealing' that occurs when techne is a 'clearing' for the 'expression' of a crafted material - not unlike the Eskimo sculptor who believes (quite wrongly, I may add) that he is 'bringing out' a hidden form that lies in the walrus ivory he is carving. But this issue must be seen more as a matter of metaphysics than of a spir­itually charged technique. Thus, when Heidegger praises a windmill, in contrast to the 'challenge' to a tract of land from which the ‘hauling out of coal and ore' is subjected, he is not being 'ecological'. Heidegger is concerned with a windmill, not as an ecological technology, but more metaphysically with the notion that 'its sails do indeed turn in the wind; they are left entirely to the wind's blowing'. The windmill 'does not unlock energy from the air currents, in order to store it'.31 Like man in relation to Being, it is a medium for the 'realization' of wind, not an artifact for acquiring power. Basically, this interpretation of a technological interrelationship reflects a regression - socially and psychologically as well as metaphysically – into quietism. Heidegger advances a message of passivity or passivity conceived as a human activity, an endeavor to let things be and 'disclose' themselves. 'Letting things be' would be little more than a trite Maoist and Buddhist precept were it not that Heidegger as a National Socialist became all too ideologically engaged, rather than 'letting things be', when he was busily undoing 'intellectualism,' democracy, and techno­logical intervention into the 'world'. Considering the time, the place, and the abstract way in which Heidegger treated humanity's 'Fall' into technological ‘inauthenticity’ – a ‘Fall’ that he, like Ellul, regarded as inevitable, albeit a metaphysical, nightmare - it is not hard to see why he could trivialize the Holocaust, when he deigned to notice it at all, as part of a techno-industrial ‘condition’. 'Agriculture is now a motorized (motorsierte) food industry, in essence the same as the manufacturing of corpses in the gas chambers and extermination camps,' he coldly observed, 'the same as the blockade and starvation of the countryside, the same as the production of the hydrogen bombs.’32 In placing the industrial means by which many Jews were killed before the ideological ends that guided their Nazi exterminators, Heidegger essentially **displaces the barbarism of a specific state apparatus,** of which he was a part, by the technical proficiency he can attribute to the world at large! These immensely revealing offhanded remarks, drawn from a speech he gave in Bremen m 1949, are beneath contempt. But they point to a way of thinking that gave an autonomy to technique that has fearful moral consequences which we are living with these days in the name of the sacred, a phraseology that Heidegger would find very congenial were he alive today. Indeed, technophobia, followed to its logical and crudely primitivistic conclusions, finally devolves into a **dark reactionism** – and a **paralyzing quietism**. For if our confrontation with civilization turns on passivity before a ‘disclosing of Being’, a mere ‘dwelling’ on the earth, and a ‘letting things be’, to use Heidegger’s verbiage – much of which has slipped into deep ecology’s vocabulary as well – the choice between supporting barbarism and enlightened humanism has no ethical foundations to sustain it. Freed of values grounded in objectivity, we are lost in a quasi-religious antihumanism, a spirituality that can with the same equanimity hear the cry of a bird and ignore the anguish of six million once-living people who were put to death by the National Socialist state.

## AT: Heidegger – Ontological Focus Bad

### Pure ontological focus precludes politics – leads to endless questioning and inaction

Wolin 90 – Professor of European History

Richard Wolin, Professor of Modern European Intellectual History at Rice, 1990, The Politics of Being, pg. 117-118

Moreover, as Harries indicates, Heidegger's theory of the state as a "work" is modeled upon his theory of the work of art. Thus, as we have seen, in Heidegger's view, both works of art and the state are examples of the "setting-to-work of truth." In essence, the state becomes a *giant work of art:* like the work of art, it partici­pates in the revelation of truth, yet on a much more grandiose and fundamental scale, since it is the *Gesamtkunstwerk* within which all the other sub-works enact their preassigned roles. However, the idea of basing political judgments on analogy with aesthetic judg­ments is an extremely tenuous proposition. Though we may readily accept and even welcome Heidegger's claim that works of art re­veal the truth or essence of beings ("The work [of art] ... is not the reproduction of some particular entity that happens to be pres­ent at any given time," observes Heidegger; "it is, on the contrary, the reproduction of the thing's *general essence*"),66we must ques­tion the attempt to transpose aesthetico-metaphysical criteria to the realm of political life proper. Is it in point of fact meaningful to speak of the "unveiling of truth" as the raison d'etre of politics in the same way one can say this of a work of art or a philosophical work? Is not politics rather a nonmetaphysical sphere of human interaction, in which the content of collective human projects, in­stitutions, and laws is articulated, discussed, and agreed upon? Is it not, moreover, in some sense **dangerous**to expect "metaphysical results" from politics? For is not politics instead a sphere of hu­man plurality, difference, and multiplicity; hence, a realm in which the more exacting criteria of philosophical truth must play a sub­ordinate role? And thus, would it not in fact be to place a type of **totalitarian constraint** on politics to expect it to deliver over truth in such pristine and unambiguous fashion? And even if Heidegger's own conception of truth (which we shall turn to shortly) is suffi­ciently tolerant and pluralistic to allay such fears, shouldn't the main category of political life be justice instead of truth? Undoubt­edly, Heidegger's long-standing prejudices against "value-philosophy” prevented him from seriously entertaining this proposition; and thus, as a category of political judgment, justice would not stand in sufficiently close proximity to Being. In all of the aforementioned instances, we see that Heidegger’s political philosophy is **overburdened with ontological considerations** that end up stifling the inner logic of politics as an independent sphere of human action.

## AT: Heidegger – Alt 🡺 Extinction

### Heidegger’s philosophy is reminiscent of Nietzhe’s nihilism – rejecting all technology makes life meaningless, culminating in extinction

Hicks 3 – Professor of Philosophy @ Queens

Steven V., Professor of Philosophy @ Queens, “Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Foucault: Nihilism and Beyond,” Foucault and Heidegger: Critical Encounters, Ed. Alan Milchman and Alan Rosenberg, p. 109, Questia

Why a “philosphical shock”? The answer, in part, may be that from Foucault's perspective, Heidegger's insightful reading of Nietzsche and the problem of nihilism is itself too ascetic. Heidegger's emphasis on “silence” as proper to Dasein's being, his frequent use of quasireligious (even Schopenhauerean) terms of “grace” and “call of conscience, ” his many references to the destiny of the German Volk, his avoidance of politics and the serious “quietistic” tone of Heideggerian Gelassenheit are all reminiscent of the **life-denying ascetic** ideal Nietzsche **sought to** **avoid**. 65 Moreover, Foucault seems to join with Derrida and other “neo-Nietzscheans” in regarding Heidegger's idea of “letting Being be”—his vision of those who have left traditional metaphysics behind and with it the obsession with mastery and technology that drives contemporary civilization—as too passive or apathetic a response to the legitimate problems of post-Nietzschean nihilism that Heidegger's own analysis uncovers. 66 Here we have arrived at a key difference between Heidegger and Foucault: for Foucault, Heidegger takes insufficient account of the playful and even irreverent elements in Nietzsche and of Nietzsche's critique of the dangers of the ascetic ideal. Foucault joins with other new Nietzscheans in promoting, as an alternative to Heideggerian Gelassenheit, the more Nietzschean vision of “playing with the text”—which in Foucault's case means promulgating active and willful images of resistance and struggle against particular practices of domination, rebellion against “micro-powers, ” and blatant disregard for tradition (cf. DP, 27). 67 This context-specific, unambiguously confrontational nature of Foucault's critique of the forms of domination and technologies of power lodged in modern institutions offers a more Nietzsche-like response than the one Heidegger offers to the nihilistic problems of Western civilization. As Foucault sees it, the lessons Heidegger would have us draw from Nietzsche throw us back to the passive “nihilism of emptiness” that Nietzsche feared. While not predicting the emergence of better times, Foucault tries to offer a better (less passive, less ascetic) model for reforming our “background practices” and for cultivating an affirmative attitude toward life that he and other neo-Nietzscheans think may be “our only chance to keep from **extinguishing life on earth altogether**.”

## AT: Heidegger – Alt 🡺 Genocide

### Simply uncovering Being provides no method for combatting violence – leads to genocide

Rockmore 91 – Prof of Philosophy

Tom, On Heidegger’s Nazism and Philosophy Dusquesne University Prof of Phil http://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft6q2nb3wh;brand=ucpress

Heidegger's failure to denounce, or even to acknowledge, Nazi practice can be interpreted as an oblique resistance to the practical consequences of his theoretical commitment. He was obviously unwilling to acknowledge the failure of his turn to Nazism, not for mere psychological reasons, but on good philosophical grounds; for his turn to Nazism was grounded in his own theory of Being, which he never abandoned. For the same reason, he was also unwilling to abandon National Socialism, or at least an ideal form of it, because of his continued interest in certain points where his thought converged with Nazism, including the coming to be of the Germans as German and the confrontation with technology. Heidegger's insensitivity to the effects of Nazism in practice is coupled, then, with a residual theoretical enthusiasm for a form of Nazism in theory. In Heidegger's writings on technology, at least two passages indicate a striking insensitivity to human suffering. Heidegger, who understood technology as a form of disclosure, was careful to conceal and not to reveal some of his most deeply held views about the technological process. There is a passage in the original version of Heidegger's essay, "The Question concerning Technology," which originated as a lecture in 1949 under the title "Enframing" but which was altered in the version published in 1954.[126] In the version published during Heidegger's lifetime, the text, which was clearly changed to conceal an earlier formulation, retains only seven words in the translation, five in the revised text: "Agriculture is now the mechanized food industry."[127] This banal point hardly reveals the startling claim embedded in the original manuscript, which only became available some seven years after Heidegger's death. The original passage reads as follows: "Agriculture is now a mechanised food industry, in essence the same as the manufacturing of corpses in gas chambers and extermination camps, the same as the blockade and starvation of nations, the same as the production of hydrogen bombs."[128] From a strictly Heideggerian point of view, this passage is literally correct, since he maintains that all of modernity suffers from the turn away from Being which leads to the hegemony of technology. Yet this passage is disturbing, in part because of Heidegger's manifest insensitivity, in a period when he emphasizes the Ereignis , to the most catastrophic moral Ereignis of our time: the Holocaust. Heidegger, who is sensitive to Being, is startlingly insensitive to human being. There is further a manifest conceptual mistake in simply considering all forms of technology as indistinguishably alike. For Heidegger has failed to consider, and certainly failed to comprehend, the relation of technology to the event of the Holocaust: the unparalleled way in which all available technological resources were harnessed, and new ones were invented, specifically to commit genocide . No amount of liberal handwringing at this late date should be allowed to obscure Heidegger's incapacity, not only to respond to, but even to comprehend, the Holocaust through his theory of technology.[129] His theory, hence, fails the test of experience.

## AT: Heidegger – Humanism Good

### Liberal humanism liberates more than it destroys and stops the worst oppression in history – the West’s fight against communism proves

Kors 1 – Professor of History

Alan Kors, Professor of History at University of Pennsylvania and Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2001, “Triumph without Self-Belief,” Orbis, Summer, EBSCO

For generations, and to this day, the great defenders of the humane consequences of the allocation of capital by free markets--Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich Hayek, and Milton Friedman, for example--have remained unexplored, marginalized, or dismissed as absurd by most American intellectuals. The lionized intellectuals were and are, in sentimental memory, those who dreamed about and debated how one would make the transition from unproductive and unjust capitalism to the cornucopia of central planning. For a full generation, academic intellectual culture above all generally viewed the West's anticommunist military strength, let alone its willingness to project that strength, as the great obstacle to international justice and peace, and derided the doctrine of peace through strength as the slogan of the demented. For at least a generation, Western intellectual contempt for the West as a civilization, a set of ideals, and the object of hope for the potentials of humanity has been the curriculum of the humanities and "soft" social sciences. Given these ineffably sad phenomena, the seeming triumph of the West (both the collapse of neo-Marxist theory at universities outside the West, and especially the downfall of the Soviet empire) will be understood by Western intellectuals as showing, in the latter case, how absurd Western fears were from the start, and, in both cases, not so much a victory for the West as merely the economic collapse of communists who in various ways betrayed their ideals or failed to temper them with adequate pragmatism or relativism. One must recall, however, the years 1975-76 in the world of the intellectual Left: the joy at American defeat in Indochina; the excitement over Eurocommunism; the anticipation of one, ten, a hundred Vietnams; the contempt for Jean-Francois Revel's The Totalitarian Temptation; the ubiquitous theories of moral equivalence; the thrill Of hammers and sickles in Portugal; the justifications of the movement of Cuban troops into those great hopes for mankind, Angola and Mozambique; the loathing of all efforts to preserve Western strategic superiority or even parity. One must recall, indeed, the early 1980s: the romanticization of the kleptomaniacal and antidemocratic Castroite Sandinistas and the homicidal megalomaniac Mengistu of Ethiopia; the demonization of Reagan's foreign policy; the outrage when Susan Sontag declared the audience of Reader's Digest better informed than readers of The Nation about the history of the USSR; the mockery of the president's description of the Soviet Union as the "evil empire" and of communism as a vision that would end on "the dustbin of history"; and the academic associations that approved politically correct resolutions for a nuclear freeze. The latter included the American Historical Association, which voted in overwhelming numbers to inform the American government and public that, as professional historians, they knew that Reagan's rearmament program and deployment of missiles in Europe would lead to a severe worsening of U.S.-Soviet relations, end the possibilities of peace, and culminate in an exchange of weapons in an ineluctable conflict. All of that will be rewritten, forgotten, indirectly justified, and incorporated into a world view that still portrays the West as empire and the rest of the world as victim. The initial appeal of communism and romanticized Third World leaders--Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Mao Zedong, Ho Chi Minh, Fidel Castro, Sekou Toure, and Daniel Ortega--who would redefine human well-being and productivity (well, they certainly redefined something) reflected the Western pathology whereby intellectuals delude themselves systematically about the non-West, about that "Other" standing against and apart from the society that does not appreciate those intellectuals' moral and practical authority and status. However, when an enemy arose that truly hated Western intellectuals--namely, fascism--and whose defeat depended upon the West's self-belief, Western intellectuals quickly became masters of judgments of absolute superiority and had no difficulty in defining a contest between good and evil. Cognitive dissonance is an astonishing phenomenon, and in academic circles, it prevents three essential historical truths from being told. First, the most murderous regime in all of human history, the Bolsheviks in power, has fallen: its agents were guilty of irredeemable crimes against humanity, and its apologists should do penance for the remainder of their lives. Anticommunists within the law were warriors for human freedom; communists and anti-anticommunists, whatever their intentions, were warriors for human misery and slavery. The most that can be said in communism's favor is that it was capable of building, by means of. slave labor and terror, a simulacrum of Gary, Indiana, once only, without ongoing maintenance, and minus the good stuff. Secondly, voluntary exchange among individuals held morally responsible under the rule of law has demonstrably created the means of both prosperity and diverse social options. Such a model has been a precondition of individuation and freedom, whereas regimes of central planning have created poverty, and (as Hayek foresaw) ineluctable developments toward totalitarianism and the worst abuses of power. Dynamic free-market societies, grounded in rights-based individualism, have altered the entire human conception of freedom and dignity for formerly marginalized groups. The entire "socialist experiment," by contrast, ended in stasis, ethnic hatreds, the absence of even the minimal preconditions of economic, social, and political renewal, and categorical contempt for both individuation and minority rights., Thirdly, the willingness to contain communism, to fight its expansion overtly and covertly, to sacrifice wealth and often lives against its heinous efforts at extension--in Europe, Vietnam, Central Asia, Central America, Korea, Laos, Cambodia, and, indeed, Grenada--was, with the struggle against Nazism over a much briefer period, the great gift of American taxpayers and the American people to planet earth. As Britain under Churchill was "the West" in 1940, so was the United States from 1945 to 1989, drawing from its values to stand against what was simultaneously its mutant offspring and its antithesis. In the twentieth century, the West met and survived its greatest trial. On the whole, howeverWestern intellectuals do not revel in these triumphs, to say the least. Where is the celebration? Just as important, where is the accounting? On the Left, to have either would be to implicate one's own thought and will in the largest crime and folly in the history of mankind. We have seen myriad documentaries on the collective and individual suffering of the victims of Nazism, but where is the Shoah, or the Night and Fog, let alone the Nuremberg trails of the postcommunist present? As Solzhenitsyn predicted repeatedly in The Gulag Archipelago, the countless victims who froze to death or were maimed in the Arctic death camps would go unremembered; the officers and guards who broke their bodies and often their souls would live out their lives on pensions, unmolested; and those who gave the orders would die peacefully and unpunished. Our documentary makers and moral intellectuals do not let us forget any victim of the Holocaust. We hunt down ninety-year-old guards so that the bones of the dead might have justice, and properly so. The bones of Lenin's and Stalin's and Brezhnev's camps cry out for justice, as do the bones of North Vietnam's exterminations, and those of Poi Pot's millions, and Mao's tens of millions. In those cases, however, the same intellectuals cry out against--what is their phrase?--"witch-hunts," and ask us to let the past be the past. We celebrated the millennium with jubilation; we have not yet celebrated the triumph of the West. Ask American high school or even college students to number Hitler's victims and Columbus's victims, and they will answer, for both, in the tens of millions. Ask them to number Stalin's victims and, if my experience is typical, they will answer in the thousands. Such is their education, even now. The absence of celebration, of teaching the lessons learned, and of demands for accountability is perhaps easily understood on the Left. Convinced that the West above all has been the source of artificial relationships of dominance and subservience, the commodification of human life, and ecocide, leftist intellectuals have little interest in objectively analyzing the manifest data about societies of voluntary exchange, or in coming to terms with the slowly and newly released data about the conditions of life and death under the Bolsheviks and their heirs, or in confirming or refuting various theories on the outcome of the Cold War (let alone, given their contemporary concerns, in analyzing ecological or gender politics under communist or Third World regimes). Less obvious, but equally striking in some ways, has been the absence of celebration on so much of the intellectual Right, because it is not at all certain something worth calling Western civilization did in fact survive the twentieth century.

## AT: Heidegger – Ontological Focus Bad

### Focusing on ontology obfuscates recognition of the truth about the world—It encourages relativist accounts of identity, which serve the interests of the market—This leads to environmental destruction, mass poverty and violent oppression

Graham 99 – Professor of Management

Phil Graham, Graduate School of Management , University of Queensland, Heidegger’s Hippies: A dissenting voice on the “problem of the subject” in cyberspace, Identities in Action! 1999, http://www.philgraham.net/HH\_conf.pdf

Half the world’s people have never made a phone call. In reality, the Asian “miracle” wasn’t. In reality, the world is worse off now than it was thirty years ago. These are facts of life. Which brings me to another sticky point: fact. Ethics, morality, and social justice are (separate) notions that have buckled under the weight of a consciousness-free, totalitarian work ethic. They have disappeared from the public agenda, except for those who wish to point out that we really can’t afford to have any, economically speaking. That’s a fact. Symbol worship has replaced questions of reality, ethics, and beauty. The “problem of the subject” is a dumb issue of ontology that has been settled innumerable times throughout history, both in the East and the West, if I may make the crass distinction. Of course, if we do not look back at history, which gives the clearest view of humanity’s progress, then we may not realise this. The various relativisms that plague notions of reality have placed the burden of proof on existence itself - a task that Heidegger kick-started in a (seemingly successful) effort to wipe out public thought in 1933. In reality, 0.1 percent of the world’s people own a computer. If this is the constituency of the global information society, it is a very small society indeed. But computers, of course, are just a small part of the informationalism story. Multinational companies, especially multinational media companies, are generally much more powerful than nation-states these days –except, perhaps, in the United States where the one is almost indistinguishable from the other. Regardless, business tells government what it should and should not do, and it gets paid good money for its flawed and self-interested advice. In reality, by 1997, the 358 richest people in the world owned more than the poorest 2.3 billion (Bauman, 1998). The inequality is increasing. These are not controversial statements, which makes them all the more alarming. “The market” continues to go about its socially and environmentally destructive work, largely unhindered by any coherent opposition, the remnants of which are either being financially assuaged, intellectually confused, or violently silenced. “Harmony and understanding” are the public order of the day in the information age. Community consciousness in the West is a function of propaganda. Identity is a mere commodity –a “thing”. The media fix is the public consciousness in action. It is the symbol worship, the ritual, myth, and ceremony of everyday life at the end of the second Christian millenium.

### Focus on ontology forces an inward subjectivist turn—this prevents emancipation and limits the role of the social

Graham, ‘99

Phil Graham, Graduate School of Management , University of Queensland, Heidegger’s Hippies: A dissenting voice on the “problem of the subject” in cyberspace, Identities in Action! 1999, http://www.philgraham.net/HH\_conf.pdf

Of course, “the problem of the subject” is not specific to the information age. Indeed, it found its roots, like most recurring philosophical problems, in ancient Greece: The power of abstraction reached new levels when Heraclitus concentrated attention on the knowing of things rather than the thing known. As thought constitutes the thinker it controls phenomena. Since thought controls all things the universe was intelligible. The whole was a perpetual flux of change. The cosmos was the dynamics of existence. Being was a perpetual becoming. In attempting to meet the problem of correlating being and becoming or space and time Parmenides declared the two mutually exclusive and that only being was real. His philosophical absolute was “the unshaken heart of wellrounded truth”. (Innis 1951: 111) To state their positions more succinctly: ‘Heraclitus maintained that everything changes: Parmenides retorted that nothing changes’ (Russell 1946: 66). Between them, they delineated the dialectical extremes within which the “problem of the subject” has become manifest: in the extremes of questions about ontology, the nature of “Being”, or existence, or ‘Existenz’ (Adorno 1973: 110-25). Historically, such arguments tend towards internalist hocus pocus: The popular success of ontology feeds on an illusion: that the state of the intentio recta might simply be chosen by a consciousness full of nominalist and subjective sediments, a consciousness which self-reflection alone has made what it is. But Heidegger, of course, saw through this illusion … beyond subject and object, beyond concept and entity. Being is the supreme concept –for on the lips of him who says “Being” is the word, not Being itself –and yet it is said to be privileged above all conceptuality, by virtue of moments which the thinker thinks along with the word “Being” and which the abstractly obtained significative unity of the concept does not exhaust. (Adorno 1973: 69) Adorno’s (1973) thoroughgoing critique of Heidegger’s ontological metaphysics plays itself out back and forth through the Heideggerian concept of a universalised identity –an essentialist, universalised being and becoming of consciousness, elided from the constraints of the social world. Adorno’s argument can be summed up thus: there can be no universal theory of “being” in and of itself because what such a theory posits is, precisely, non-identity. It obscures the role of the social and promotes a specific kind of politics –identity politics (cf. also Kennedy 1998): Devoid of its otherness, of what it renders extraneous, an existence which thus proclaims itself the criterion of thought will validate its decrees in authoritarian style, as in political practice a dictator validates the ideology of the day. The reduction of thought to the thinkers halts the progress of thought; it brings to a standstill would thought would need to be thought, and what subjectivity would need to live in. As the solid ground of truth, subjectivity is reified … Thinking becomes what the thinker has been from the start. It becomes tautology, a regressive form of consciousness. (Adorno 1973: 128). Identity politics - the ontological imperative - is inherently authoritarian precisely because it promotes regression, internalism, subjectivism, and, most importantly, because it negates the role of society. It is simplistic because it focuses on the thingliness of people: race, gender, ethnicity. It tries to resolve the tension of the social-individual by smashing the problem into two irreconcilable parts. Identity politics’ current popularity in sociological thought, most wellevidenced by its use and popularity in “Third Way” politics, can be traced back to a cohort I have called Heidegger’s Hippies –the failed, half-hearted, would-be “revolutionaries” of the 60s, an incoherent collection of middle-class, neo-liberal malcontents who got caught up in their own hyperbole, and who are now the administrators of a ‘totally administered’ society in which hyperbole has become both lingua franca and world currency (Adorno 1964/19731973).

Heidegger declared the end of dogmatic thought and ideology free politics – While this sounds benign, this void allowed for the ascension of Hitler

Graham 99

Phil Graham, Graduate School of Management , University of Queensland, Heidegger’s Hippies: A dissenting voice on the “problem of the subject” in cyberspace, Identities in Action! 1999, http://www.philgraham.net/HH\_conf.pdf

Societies should get worried when Wagner’s music becomes popular because it usually means that distorted interpretations of Nietzsche’s philosophy are not far away. Existentialists create problems about what is, especially identity (Heidegger 1947). Existentialism inevitably leads to an authoritarian worldview: this, my Dionysian world of the eternally self-creating, the eternally self-destroying, this mystery world of twofold voluptuous delight, my “beyond good and evil,” without a goal, unless the joy of the circle itself is a goal; without will, unless a ring feels good will towards itself – do you want a name for this world? A solution to all its riddles? A light for you, too, you best-concealed, strongest, most intrepid, most midnightly men? – This world is the will to power – and nothing besides! And you yourselves are also this will to power – and nothing besides! (Nietzsche 1967/1997). Armed with a volume of Nietzsche, some considerable oratory skills, several Wagner records, and an existentialist University Rector in the form of Martin Heidegger, Hitler managed some truly astounding feats of strategic identity engineering (cf. Bullock, 1991). Upon being appointed to the Freiberg University, Heidegger pronounced the end of thought, history, ideology, and civilisation: ‘No dogmas and ideas will any longer be the laws of your being. The Fuhrer himself, and he alone, is the present and future reality for Germany’ (in Bullock 1991: 345). Heidegger signed up to an ideology-free politics: Hitler’s ‘Third Way’ (Eatwell 1997). The idealised identity, the new symbol of mythological worship, Nietzsche’s European Superman, was to rule from that day hence. Hitler took control of the means of propaganda: the media; the means of mental production: the education system; the means of violence: the police, army, and prison system; and pandered to the means of material production: industry and agriculture; and proclaimed a New beginning and a New world order. He ordered Germany to look forward into the next thousand years and forget the past. Heidegger and existentialism remain influential to this day, and history remains bunk (e.g. Giddens4, 1991, Chapt. 2). Giddens’s claims that ‘humans live in circumstances of … existential contradiction’, and that ‘subjective death’ and ‘biological death’ are somehow unrelated, is a an ultimately repressive abstraction: from that perspective, life is merely a series of subjective deaths, as if death were the ultimate motor of life itself (cf. Adorno 1964/1973). History is, in fact, the simple and straightforward answer to the “problem of the subject”. “The problem” is also a handy device for confusing, entertaining, and selling trash to the masses. By emphasising the problem of the ‘ontological self’ (Giddens 1991: 49), informationalism and ‘consumerism’ confines the navel-gazing, ‘narcissistic’ masses to a permanent present which they self-consciously sacrifice for a Utopian future (cf. Adorno 1973: 303; Hitchens 1999; Lasch 1984: 25-59). Meanwhile transnational businesses go about their work, ~~raping~~ the environment; swindling each other and whole nations; and inflicting populations with declining wages, declining working conditions, and declining social security. Slavery is once again on the increase (Castells, 1998; Graham, 1999; ILO, 1998). There is no “problem of the subject”, just as there is no “global society”; there is only the mass amnesia of utopian propaganda, the strains of which have historically accompanied revolutions in communication technologies. Each person’s identity is, quite simply, their subjective account of a unique and objective history of interactions within the objective social and material environments they inhabit, create, and inherit. The identity of each person is their most intimate historical information, and they are its material expression: each person is a record of their own history at any given time. Thus, each person is a recognisably material, identifiable entity: an identity. This is their condition. People are not theoretical entities; they are people. As such, they have an intrinsic identity with an intrinsic value. No amount of theory or propaganda will make it go away. The widespread multilateral attempts to prop up consumer society and hypercapitalism as a valid and useful means of sustainable growth, indeed, as the path to an inevitable, international democratic Utopia, are already showing their disatrous cracks. The “problem” of subjective death threatens to give way, once again, to unprecedented mass slaughter. The numbed condition of a narcissistic society, rooted in a permanent “now”, a blissful state of Heideggerian Dasein, threatens to wake up to a world in which “subjective death” and ontology are the least of all worries.

## AT: Calculations Bad

### Calculative thought is necessary in order to secure justice in the face of specific forms of oppression that deny “being” or “alterity”

Campbell 99 – Professor of International Politics

David, Prof of Int’l Politics @ Univ. of Newcastle, Moral Spaces, p. 50-51

In pursuing Derrida on the question of the decision, a pursuit that ends up in the supplementing of Derridean deconstruction with Levinasian ethics, Critchley was concerned to ground political decisions in something other than the "madness" of a decision, and worried that there could be a "refusal of politics in Derrida's work" because the emphasis upon undecidability as the condition of responsibility contained an implicit rejection of politics as "the field of antagonism, decision, dissension, and struggle," the "domain of questioning s Yet from the above discussion, I would argue that Derrida's account of the procedure of the decision also contains within it an account of the duty, obligation, and responsibility of the decision within deconstruction. Moreover, the undecidable and infinite character of justice that fosters that duty is precisely what guarantees that the domain of politics bears the characteristics of contestation rightly prized by Critchley. Were everything to be within the purview of the decidable, and devoid of the undecidable, then (as Derrida constantly reminds us) there would be no ethics, politics, or responsibility, only a program, technology, and its irresponsible application. Of course, for many (though Critchley is clearly not among them), the certainties of the program are synonymous with the desires of politics. But if we seek to encourage recognition of the radical interdependence of being that flows from our responsibility to the other, then the provocations give rise to a different figuration of politics, one in which its purpose is the struggle for-or on behalf of-alterity, and not a struggle to efface, erase, or eradicate alterity. Such a principle -one that is ethically transcendent if not classically universal-is a powerful starting point for rethinking, for example, the question of responsibility vis-avis "ethnic" and "nationalist" conflicts.'°6 But the concern about politics in Derrida articulated by Critchley is not about politics per se, nor about the possibilities of political analysis, but about the prospects for a progressive, radical politics, one that will demand-and thus do more than simply permit-the decision to resist domination, exploitation, oppression, and all other conditions that seek to contain or eliminate alterity. Yet, again, I would argue that the above discussion demonstrates that not only does Derridean deconstruction address the question of politics, especially when Levinasian ethics draws out its political qualities, it does so in an affirmative antitotalitarian manner that gives its politics a particular quality, which is what Critchley and others like him most want (and rightly so, in my view). We may still be dissatisfied with the prospect that Derrida's account cannot rule out forever perverse calculations and unjust laws. But to aspire to such a guarantee would be to wish for the demise of politics, for it would install a new technology, even if it was a technology that began life with the markings of progressivism and radicalism. Such dissatisfaction, then, is not with a Derridean politics, but with the necessities of politics per se, necessities that can be contested and negotiated, but not escaped or transcended.

## AT: Postmodern Ks

### Failure to protect the natural world is the ultimate act of silencing others

Wapner 2k – School of the International Service at American University

Paul, International Studies Quarterly, v46, p. 179

The response to eco-criticism I am suggesting calls on postmodern critics to see the manner in which they themselves silence nature and to take their own advice and respect the radical “otherness” of nonhuman world. Postmodernism prides itself on criticizing the urge toward mastery running through the core of modernity—an urge animated by a desire to gain greater degrees of control over ourselves and the world, including (and especially) the natural world (Spretnak, 1999; Thiele, 1997). But isn’t mastery exactly what postmodernism is exerting as it captures the nonhuman world within its own conceptual domain? Doesn’t postmodern criticism do tis own violence as it silences the world of forests, oceans, mountain ranges, and savannas? Might not postmodernism be simply deepening the modernist urge toward mastery eliminating the ontological weight of the nonhuman world through the assertion that there is no “nature” because everything is a social construction? The postmodernist may respond that, well, yes, recognizing the social construction of “nature” does ignore the self-expression of the nonhuman, but how would we know what such *self* expression means? Indeed, nature doesn’t seem to speak; rather, some person always speaks on nature’s behalf and as we all know, whatever that person says is a social construction. Indeed, isn’t any attempt to listen to the nonhuman world a form of social construction? All attempts to listen to nature are, indeed, social constructions, *except one.* Even the most radical postmodernist acknowledges the distinction between physical existence and nonexistence. As mentioned, postmodernists assume that there is a physical substratum to the phenomenal world, even if they argue about its different meanings. This substratum is essential for allowing entities to speak or express themselves. That which doesn’t exist, doesn’t speak. That which doesn’t exist, manifests no character. Put differently, yes, the postmodernist should rightly worry about interpreting nature’s expressions. And everyone should be wary about those who claim to speak on nature’s behalf (including when environmentalists and student of global environmental politics do so). But we should not doubt the simple-minded notion that a prerequisite of expression is existence. That which doesn’t exist can never express itself. And this in turn suggests that preserving the nonhuman world—in all its diverse embodiments—must be seen by eco-critics as a fundamental good. Eco-critics must be supporters, in some fashion, of environmental preservation.

## AT: Primitivism K

### Hunger-gathering dooms the earth to environmental destruction – Pleistocene die-off proves

Lewis 94 – Professor of Environmental Studies

Martin, Assistant Professor in the School of Environment and the Center for International Studies @ Duke, Green Delusions, pg. 59-60

Primitivists, the most extreme eco-radicals, argue that as soon as plants and animals were domesticated true primal harmony began to vanish. Yet **even hunter-gatherers** have been guilty of environmental despoliation. In fact, much indirect evidence suggests that roughly 11,000 years ago paleolithic hunters perpetrated the earth's most horrific human-induced ecological tragedy: the extermination of most large mammals in North and South America. Let us begin, therefore, in the Pleistocene epoch. Some 11,000 years ago, a brief interlude in geological terms, the Pleistocene Ice Age came to an end. With it vanished approximately 85 percent of all large mammals in North America. These extinctions were part of a global wave of species death that struck with greatest severity on the peripheral continents of North America, South America, and Australia. Eurasia was less seriously affected, Africa least of all. African extinctions occurred at the earliest date, American extinctions significantly later, and extinctions on remote islands most recently (Martin and Klein 1984). The earth has witnessed many other episodes of mass extinction, but the Pleistocene die-off was unique in several respects. Its geographical patterns were curiously discontinuous, but more unusual was its general restriction to large mammals and, to a lesser extent, large birds. Mammalian megafauna on the hard-hit continents was, however, devastated. Major evolutionary lines, such as that of the ground sloths, perished entirely. As appalling as the extinctions of plants and arthropods currently occurring in tropical rainforests is, it **has not yet matched** the ecological destruction that occurred when several continents' largest and most widespread animal species perished. Since the end of the Pleistocene, North America has been a **faunal wasteland**. Our mammalian diversity should equal that of Africa—as it recently did. A host of large mammals had easily survived the ebb and flow of glacial and interglacial climates over the Pleistocene's many hundred thousand years. Were is not for this ecological holocaust, mammoths and mastodons, giant ground sloths and gargantuan armadillos, saber-toothed tigers and dire wolves, American camels and American horses, giant beavers and short-faced bears, and many other species as well, would have greeted the first Europeans to land on this continent.

## AT: Primitivism K – Hunter-Gather 🡺 Extinction

### Hunter-gathering will cause the next great extinction – the world will not transition to some harmonious balance, but a more Hobbesian state

Lewis 94 – Professor of Environmental Studies

Martin, Assistant Professor in the School of Environment and the Center for International Studies @ Duke, Green Delusions, pg. 62-63

Strong evidence for the overkill scenario also comes from the few areas that humans did not reach in the Pleistocene. In Europe, for example, many species survived for a period on Mediterranean islands that remained inaccessible to Homo sapiens. "Ironically the last European elephants appear to have been dwarfs occupying oceanic islands, an environment inevitably viewed by biogeographers as especially prone to the hazards of natural extinctions" (P. Martin 1984:390!. The evidence is even more clear for Madagascar and New Zealand. On those islands, large animals persisted until human beings arrived some 1,000 to 2,000 years ago, at which point massive extinctions ensued. Moreover, waves of species death followed Polynesian seafarers not just to New Zealand but to other Pacific island groups as well, most notably Hawaii. Finally, the last of the Pleistocene extinctions, that of the giant Steller's sea cow, did not occur until the eighteenth century, when its remote, unpeopled refuge in the Bering Sea was finally discovered by Russian sailors. In the Pleistocene epoch, this gentle, easily killed marine herbivore had been widespread in coastal waters as far south as California (on island extinctions in general, see the various essays in Martin and Klein 1984). Nonspecialists often dismiss the human-agency thesis out of hand. They do so, I believe, not because they can refute its arguments, but rather because it **contradicts their cherished** **myths** about primitive peoples. Few radical environmentalist have begun to realize the extent to their error in continuing to imagine that until the advent of Europeans the North American landscape had existed in a harmonious and static balance.

### The attempted move towards the agricultural countryside will only results in increased environmental destruction

-public transportation loses effectiveness

-more detached dwellings

-increased long-distance trade patters

Lewis 94 – Professor of Environmental Studies

Martin, Assistant Professor in the School of Environment and the Center for International Studies @ Duke, Green Delusions, pg. 49

While the dream of an anarchic rural utopia may be simply naïve, opposition to urbanism per se is directly threatening to nature. As Paehlke (1989) carefully shows, urban living is in a great many respects far less stressful on nature than is rural existence. Given our current political economic structure (which despite eco-radical hopes, is in no immediate danger of collapse), any movement of the American population away from cities toward the countryside will result only in a hastening of environmental destruction. Urbanism’s environmental benefits are most easily visible in the realm of transportation. Public transport, which is almost always less polluting than travel by private automobile, is feasible only in and between cities. The denser a city’s population becomes, the more efficiently its public transport system can operate. Moreover, in urban core areas, walking is often the most convenient mode of travel. In America’s countryside, in contrast, the automobile is generally the sole feasible means of transport. At present, rural Americans seem willing to drive ever greater distances to seek modern conveniences, small towns everywhere are decaying as their erstwhile shoppers cruise to the regional centers large enough to support shopping malls or, at least, discount stores. The intrinsic energy efficiency of cities is evident in other aspects of life as well. Detached dwellings require far more energy to heat than do rowhouses, let alone apartments. Congeneration, a process by which industries use what would otherwise be waste heat, is most feasible in areas of high density. More significant is the reduced energy costs of trucking goods from business and from business to consumer in the urban environment. Simply by virtue of its energy efficiency, the city pollutes far less on a per capita basis than does the countryside, given the same living standards. Noxious by-products may be more quickly diluted in rural environs, but the total output per person is generally much greater.

## AT: Primitivism K – Recultivation Inevitable

### Primitivism not possible – recultivation is inevitable

Lewis 94 – Professor of Environmental Studies

Martin, Assistant Professor in the School of Environment and the Center for International Studies @ Duke, Green Delusions, pg. 69

Except in a few blessed environments, hunting and gathering is possible only so long as the human presence remains **extremely sparse**, usually less than one person per square mile. Since many hunter-gatherer populations do increase over time, albeit very slowly, such density thresholds seem to have been reached many millennia ago in several parts of the world. As this occurred, hunting and gathering modes of life became untenable, and local populations either crashed or perforce adopted some form of cultivation or pastoralism.

## AT: Primitivism K – Prefer Our Evidence

### Prefer our evidence – primitivism has no scientific or academic basis

Lewis 94 – Professor of Environmental Studies

Martin, Assistant Professor in the School of Environment and the Center for International Studies @ Duke, Green Delusions, pg. 81

Conclusion

A large proportion of eco-radicals fervently believe that human social and ecological problems could be solved if only we would return to a primal way of life. Ultimately, this proves to be an article of faith that receives **little support** from the historical and anthropological records. Although many radical environmentalists are anxious to find empirical groundings for their primal visions, their marshaling of evidence is far too selective to satisfy the demands of scholarship. Meanwhile, in academia the tide has finally turned. The contemporary view of careful scholars Is well summarized by Timothy Silver, who concludes that American Indians on the whole were neither despoilers nor preservers of nature, and that "since his arrival in North America, mankind has remained apart from, and altered, the natural world" (1990:66, 197).

## AT: Primitivism K – Gender Equality DA

### Primitivism collapses women’s rights – leads to war and starvation

Lewis 94 – Professor of Environmental Studies

Martin, Assistant Professor in the School of Environment and the Center for International Studies @ Duke, Green Delusions, pg. 66-67

The assertion that hunter-gatherers are invariably peaceful and sexually egalitarian is also unsupportable. Some of the most egalitarian of small-scale societies have also been cursed with some of humanity's highest rates of murder (Knauft 1987). Among the !Kung San—often upheld as the paradigm of primal virtue—men often dominate women ({Conner and Shostak 1986:71], while murder rates are similar to those of most modern industrial societies (Cohen 1989:92). In one central Australian hunter-gatherer society, conditions have been considerably worse. As Mary Douglas (1966:141) explains, "for the least complaint or neglect of duty, Walbiri **women are beaten or speared**." Among the Eskimo even war was not unknown, and if battles were small-scale affairs they could still be quite bloody (Chance 1990:25). More striking is the incontrovertibly dominant status of Eskimo men. Birket-Smith (1971:157) claims that among the Netsilik tribes, "the killing of female children is so common that a girl who is not betrothed at birth is usually doomed." The same scholar's report on Netsilik adultery' is equally telling: "when a man punishes his wife for being unfaithful it is because she has trespassed upon his rights; the next evening he will probably lend her himself" (1971:158). Many historical hunter-gatherers also habitually raided their sedentary neighbors. In pre-Columbian Meso-America, for example, the agrarian cavitations of the Basin of Mexico suffered repeated devastations at the hands of the northern "chichimecs," a congeries of foraging peoples described as fierce barbarians by anthropologist Richard Adams (1977: 269). In the American Southwest too, huntcr-gatherers commonly plundered their sedentary neighbors, although the enmity between Pueblos and Apaches was probably exaggerated by an earlier generation of scholars (Goodwin r969). While hunter-gatherers are often peaceful among themselves, this does not necessarily preclude them from exploiting their less-mobile neighbors. Nor were all hunter-gatherers affluent in the sense of enjoying abundant leisure and good health. This thesis rests largely on evidence from the IKung San of the Kalahari, a seasonally dry savannah that has been erroneously called a desert. Hunters living in less-productive environments, such as the arctic tundra, present a grimmer picture. In fact, among virtually all documented hunting and foraging groups, as Mark Cohen (1989:130! demonstrates, "hunger has clearly been at least a seasonal problem .. . and starvation is not unknown" (see also Johnson and Earle 1987:33).

## AT: Primitivism K – Elitist Backlash

### The affirmative’s nostalgia for a return to rural and local agriculture leads to an elitist backlash that undergirds continued environmental destruction and pollution havens that turn the aff

Lewis 94**-** assistant prof @ Duke School of the Environment and Center for International Studies

Martin, Green Delusions, pg. 82

Radical environmentalists have argued since the late nineteenth century that large-scale economic and political structures are both inherently dehumanizing and deadly to nature (Bramwell 1989). In the 1970s the idea that all organizations should be small of scale was eloquently restated by the economist E.F. Schumacher, whose *Small is Beautiful* (1973) remains an environmental classic. Schumacher and his followers believe that expansive social entities are invariably governed by stifling bureaucracies whose rule-bound behaviors lead to environmental degradation and social waste. True human values, they aver, can only be realized in intimate groups. Schumacherians have also argued that the wisdom of small-scale organization is mirrored in ecological systems, themselves structures around local transfers of energy and matter. The radical environmentalists’ extraordinary faith in decentralized political power runs counter to the philosophies of both traditional liberalism and socialism. In the United States, movements espousing the devolution of political power, such as the various states rights campaigns, have often been strategic ploys by the radical right to counteract reforming tendencies at the national level. On environmental as much as on social issues, America’s federal government has historically been more forward looking than most local political entities. As Koppes (1988: 240) writes in regard to the history of the American conservation movement: conservationists often found decentralization frustrating for it tended to reflect the immediate economic interests of powerful regional elites rather than national priorities. Arguing that natural resources belonged to the whole country, conservationists thus usually tried to have environmental policy made at the national level.” Indeed, the main environmental agenda of the Reagan administration was precisely to shift responsibility for environmental problems from the federal to the state and local levels (Henning and Mangun 1989:75). While the rhetoric associated with this move may have stressed the desirability of local autonomy and freedom from meddling Washington bureaucrats, its overriding goal was nothing less than the gutting of environmental regulation. This is not to imply, however, that decentralization is always anti-environmental. In certain circumstances a selective shift of authority from the higher to the lower levels of a spatial hierarchy can in fact be highly beneficial. In recent years, political-environmental theorists have carefully examined the ecological consequences of decentralization from the federal to the state level. Several scholars advocating a federalist approach have indeed discovered that certain American states often act as environmental pacesetters (Lowry 1992). Indeed, the national government has at times attempted to weaken state-level pollution standards. But the federalist approach, stressing a carefully constructed balance of federal and local (especially state) authority, must not be confused with the radical decentralization advocated by green extremists. It is necessary to recognize, as Lowry (1992) demonstrates, that the ability of progressive states to enact strong environmental measures is severely hampered whenever interstate competition intrudes. In other words, in the absence of centralized coordination, pollution-generating firms can often thwart state policy by departing, or threatening to depart, for less environmentally sensitive jurisdictions. Even in economic sectors in which offenders cannot relocate, such as agriculture, the lack of centralized authority will severely limit the diffusion of innovative control programs from the more progressive to the less progressive states. And finally, it must be recognized that some states will simply opt to abdicate environmental responsibility altogether” (Davis and Lester 1987: 563).

## AT: Primitivism K – Epistemology DA

### Primitivism is based on a flawed epistemology--to oppose civilization justifies its position of hegemony

Vandiver 1

Pendleton Vandiver, ANARCHIST EPISTEMOLOGY, 7/22/01, http://theanarchistlibrary.org/HTML/Pendleton\_Vandiver\_\_Anarchist\_Epistemology.html

The primitivist critique is very important, and cannot be ignored by anyone with a green anarchist orientation. Yet there are vexing contradictions in much primitivist theory, which seem to result from a lack of consideration of epistemology. The proponents of this philosophy purport to call into question civilization in total. A Primitivist Primer by John Moore calls anarcho-primitivism a shorthand term for a radical current that critiques the totality of civilization from an anarchist perspective, yet they mostly place themselves firmly within Western scientific discourse with their reliance on anthropological data. If anarcho-primitivism were primarily an immanent critique, exploring the aims and methods of civilization in order to show that they are inconsistent with one another, perhaps it could afford to rely upon a perspective that is supplied to it by Western science. But anarcho-primitivism is purporting to tell us how to go outside of civilization, and the outside that is being posited is totally, qualitatively other. The fact that this other is being defined, from top to bottom, by the very institutions that are being called into question scarcely seems to perturb anarcho-primitivist theorists. The juxtaposition of uncompromising purism and naiveté that is revealed in much primitivist writing is often jarring, even shocking. A quote from Zerzan’s Elements of Refusal is emblematic of the unacknowledged irony that pervades much of the anarcho-primitivist critique:” In fact, [primitive] life was lived in a continuous present, (12) underlying the point that historical time is not inherent in reality, but an imposition on it.” It does not matter what source that little number 12 is asking us to consider. After informing the reader that this indemonstrable assertion is a “fact”, Zerzan duly provides a footnote to prove it! That the assertion may in some sense be true, I do not wish to contest. The point is that an entirely unscientific, indeed anti-scientific, stance is being dressed up in academic attire in order to give the entire proceeding an air of rigor and methodological legitimacy that can only seem congruous to the superficial reader. The thesis itself, that time is the primal cause of alienation, is worth considering, and indeed Zerzan is a wonderful writer who often says important things. Yet epistemologically, we are getting into hot water when we simultaneously challenge the very existence of civilization while accepting its methodology and its conclusions. Indeed, the entire primitivist project is saddled with the unfortunate onus of a purist theory that is riddled with impurities it does not even seek to address. The primitivist tendency to valorize nature over culture is naive because it forgets that culture necessarily defines nature. The definition of nature as anything that is not culture is always going to be useful to power, because it equates nature with everything that is already subjugated and offers its opponents the opportunity to identify themselves with the defeated. This is a suckers game, and provides the necessary conditions within which an unwittingly loyal opposition can form around the most ostensibly radical critique. To completely oppose civilization as it defines itself is to grant it hegemony over everything it claims as its own. If we wish to destroy civilization, we should also seek to define it on our terms — which an anarchist epistemology would seek to provide. Primitivists have hitched their wagon to a star, and it would behoove them to look at the trajectory of that star if they want to see where they are headed. Thirty years ago, anthropologists painted a very different picture of what primitive life was like; thirty years from now, the picture is also likely to look different. In that case, the entire social philosophy of anarcho-primitivism will likewise change. How can a critique which purports to be so radical allow itself to be compromised by direct intimacy with the very institutions it claims to oppose? Unless primitivist theory confronts the question of epistemology, it will not remain a vital force in anarchism.

## AT: Social Ecology K – Env Protection Consistent

### Environmental protection is consistent with social ecology

Bookchin 90

Murray, American anarchist & environmentalist, Institute for Social Ecology, The Philosophy of Social Ecology: Essays on Dialectical Naturalism, p. 16

Admittedly, I have simplified the alternatives. But I have done so only to reveal their logic and implications. For one thing, I do not wish to deny that even liberal environmentalism and the value of instinctive sensibility have their roles in resisting a powerful technology that has been placed in the service of mindless growth, accumulation, and consumption. A stand against the construction of a nuclear reactor, a new highway, an effort to clear-cut mountains, or a new condo development that threatens to deface an urban landscape—all represent impact acts, however limited, to prevent further environmental deterioration. Land, wildlife, scenic natural beauty, and ecological variety that is preserved from the bull dozer and profit-oriented predators, are important enclaves of nature and aesthetics that must be preserved where we can do so. It requires no great theoretical or ideological wisdom to recognize that almost everything of wonder and beauty, from a statuesque tree to a burrowing mammal, has its place in the world and function in the biosphere.

### Even Bookchin says we should do what we can to stop more environmental harms – don`t reject the plan

Bookchin 91

Murray, Institute for Social Ecology, Defending the Earth: a Dialogue Between Murray Bookchin and Dave Foreman p.78

Let me make it clear, however, that by counterposing reform environmentalism to the possibility of a truly radical ecology movement, I am not saying that we should desist from opposing the construction of nuclear power plants or highways today and sit back passively to await the coming of an ecological millennium. To the contrary, the existing ground must be held on to tenaciously, everywhere along the way. We must try to rescue what we still have so that we can at least reconstitute society with the least polluted and least damaged environment possible. To be effective, however, we must break away from conventional reformism and energetically adopt much more powerful nonviolent direct-action resistance strategies. Furthermore, we need to go well beyond tinkering with existing institutions, social relations, technologies, and values and begin to fundamentally transform them. This doesn’t mean that we don’t organize around a minimum program with clear immediate objectives or even that we never participate in local elections. I have argued for such measures in my books and articles on libertarian municipalism. It does mean, however, that the immediate goals we seek and the means we use to achieve them should orient us toward the radical fundamental changes that are needed instead of towards co-optation and containment within the existing, hopelessly destructive system.

## AT: Social Ecology

### Turn – their project creates a political void that would be filled with racist forms of local power

Kovel 98

(Joel, Professor of Social Studies at Bard College, “Negating Bookchin,” in SOCIAL ECOLOGY AFTER BOOKCHIN, Ed: Andrew Light, p.46)

The issue is no longer hierarchy as such, but hierarchy as it becomes domination – and domination as it is undone to become emancipation. Here a criterion is at hand in the notion of dialectic as the emergence of being through negation. Is this occluded or thwarted? Then we have an instance of domination. Is the occlusion undone so that negations emerge, proliferate, expand, and more toward universality? Then domination is to that degree overcome, while emancipation supervenes. Such an approach fosters concrete engagement with points of resistance and transformation as they spontaneously emerge. The abstract denunciation of hierarchy as such favors an equivalently abstract kind of politics, with the abstraction filling up with the localization of **whoever enunciates it**. Thus social ecology`s municipalism, rigidly advanced by Bookchin, is a doctrine unable to be shared with or to learn from that 90% and more of the world population who do not share in the blessings of the Vermont town, German philosophy, or the emancipatory heritage of the white West. There is, in short, a kind of **cryptofacism inherent** in social ecology as Bookchin develops the notion, no matter how antiracist its individual practitioners may be.

## Apoc Discourse Good

### Debate about apocalyptic impacts is crucial to activism and effective policy education

Blain – professor of Sociology – 91

Michael Blain, RHETORICAL PRACTICE IN AN ANTI-NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAMPAIGN, Peace & Change

Peace activism can be understood as a sociopolitical performance. It enacts a pattern of discourse that can be rhetorically analyzed in terms of its strategy of incitement. As peace activists mobilized their forces in the 1980s, they built up a discourse -- a repertoire of possible political statements for use against nuclear weapons policies. Such statements as **nuclear annihilation**, radiation pollution, and strategic madness have been the **primary incitements to peace activism**. Activists use language pragmatically. As political actors addressing a public audience, they know they must speak a language **familiar to that audience**. Nineteenth-century activists were educated, middle-class women, clergymen, educators, and businessmen with a reform Christian conscience. Twentieth-century activists have included political leftists and cultural dissidents as well as traditional pacifists and religious liberals.(n1) Middle-class professionals have played prominent roles in the peace movement. For example, medical activists like Helen Caldicott and Robert Lifton have elaborated a discourse on the madness of "nuclearism"(n2) In fact, some analysts interpret the peace movement as a power struggle of middle-class radicals and countercultural rebels against the power elite.(n3) This article presents the results of a rhetorical analysis of activists' discursive practices in a victorious campaign to defeat a U.S. government plan to construct the first new nuclear weapons plant in twenty years in the state of Idaho, the Special Isotope Separator (SIS). It shows how activists in the Snake River Alliance (SRA), a Boise, Idaho, antinuclear organization, mobilized hundreds of "Idahoans" to act as "concerned citizens" and "Life Guards," to lobby, testify, demonstrate, and finally, to kill this plan. The article introduces a perspective on how discourse functions in political movements. An effective movement discourse must accomplish two things: (1) knowledge, or the constitution of the subjects and objects of struggle, and (2) ethics, or the moral incitement of people to political action. I will show how this perspective can illuminate how anti-SIS activists developed an effective discourse to kill this crucial nuclear weapons program. A critical evaluation of this campaign can contribute to peace in at least three ways: it can celebrate the artful practices these activists engaged in to achieve their political objectives; it can add a case study of a victorious campaign to the emerging literature on the tactics of nonviolent action; and finally, it can contribute to the current debate about the future of the peace movement in a post-cold war world. The anti-SIS campaign involved an alliance of environmental and peace groups, which suggests one possible political strategy for future peace actions. POLITICAL MOVEMENTS AS VICTIMAGE RITUALS Political activists must **engage in discourse to fight and win** power struggles with their adversaries. In political battles, such as the anti-SIS campaign, words are weapons with tactical functions. Michel Foucault clearly articulates this perspective: Indeed, it is in discourse that power and knowledge are joined together. And for this reason, we must conceive discourse as a series of discontinuous segments whose tactical function is neither uniform nor stable ... as a multiplicity of discursive elements that can come into play in various strategies. It is this distribution that we must reconstruct ... according to who is speaking, his position of power, the institutional context in which he happens to be situated ... with the shifts and reutilizations of identical formulas for contrary objectives.(n4) A power strategy refers to all means, including discursive practices, put into play by an actor in a particular power relationship to influence the actions of others. The language of political movements, including peace activism, is militaristic; activists talk strategy, tactics, and objectives. And it is important to see that discourse is itself a part of any power strategy. Kenneth Burke's concepts of victimage rhetoric and rituals can be used to illuminate this process.(n5) Political activists use victimage rhetoric to mobilize people to fight and defeat their adversaries. Victimage rhetoric is melodramatic in form. It functions to incite those who identify with it to engage in political acts of ritual scapegoating. Activists mobilize people to engage in activism by getting them to identify with an actual or impending violation of some communal "ideal"--a problem, concern, or danger. Activists mount "education" campaigns to get the public to **identify with the imminent danger**. A critical knowledge of the nature of this danger is constructed, taking the form of villainous powers inflicting or threatening to inflict some terrible wrong on the world. This rhetorical practice is tactical in the sense that it is designed to generate intense anger and moral outrage at what has, is, or could be happening to the values of those who identify with it. These people can then be mobilized in a campaign to fight the villain. This effect is intensified by emphasizing the negative features of the actions of the agents and agencies responsible for the violation. Once implanted, this knowledge exerts an ethical incitement to activism. Activists, this model suggests, must develop a discourse that does two things: vilify and activate. These two functions correspond to two moments in a melodramatic victimage ritual. These two moments of identification are (1) acts of violation or vilification and (2) acts of redemptive or heroic action. Movement leaders must construct images of both villains and activists fighting villains. They must convince us that acts of **violation have occurred or will happen**, and then they must **goad us** into doing something about it. This analysis suggests that a movement discourse is a rhetorical system composed of two elements working in tandem. One of the main features of motive in victimage ritual is the aim to destroy the destroyer. In the anti- SIS campaign, as we shall see, the objective was to kill a Department of Energy (DOE) program to build a nuclear weapons plant. One means of accomplishing that objective was to vilify its proponents. The second element in a movement discourse is redemptive or ethical. Once leaders succeed in convincing their followers that there is a real threat, they must then incite those convinced to act. To accomplish these objectives, peace activists have assembled a discourse charged with peril and power--a knowledge of the scene they confront and an ethic of political activism. They have constituted a "knowledge" of the dangers posed by the nuclear arms race and nuclear war that is infused with a redemptive ethic of political activism. Activists use this knowledge and ethic to goad people into campaigns to achieve antinuclear objectives. For example, activists have invoked the term power in two distinct ethical senses. There is the "bad" power of the agents of the nuclear arms race (politicians such as Ronald Reagan or Margaret Thatcher; agencies such as the U.S. government, NATO, or the Department of Energy). And there is the "good" power that activists produce by their concerted political actions, including a subjective effect called "empowerment." Activists empower themselves by "taking personal responsibility for the fate of the earth," sacrificing time, energy, and money to the cause. By engaging in political activism, peace activists say they **transcend psychological despair** and obtain a sense of personal power.(n6)

## Apoc Discourse Good – Extinction Reps Key

### Portraying eco-damage as ‘extinction-level’ is a crucial communication act that forestalls complete extinction – it solves their turn because it sparks a new social ethic

Epstein and Zhao 9 – Lab of Medicine @ Hong Kong

Richard J. Epstein and Y. Zhao ‘9 – Laboratory of Computational Oncology, Department of Medicine, University of Hong Kong, The Threat That Dare Not Speak Its Name; Human Extinction, Perspectives in Biology and Medicine Volume 52, Number 1, Winter 2009, Muse

Final ends for all species are the same, but the journeys will be different. If we cannot influence the end of our species, can we influence the journey? To do so—even in a small way—would be a crowning achievement for human evolution and give new meaning to the term civilization. Only by **elevating the topic** [End Page 121] **of human extinction** to the level of serious professional discourse can we begin to prepare ourselves for the challenges that lie ahead. Table 3.   Human Thinking Modes Relevant to Extinction: from Ego-Think to Eco-Think  The difficulty of the required transition should not be underestimated. This is depicted in Table 3 as a painful multistep progression from the 20th-century philosophical norm of Ego-Think—defined therein as a short-term state of mind valuing individual material self-interest above all other considerations—to Eco-Think, in which humans come to adopt a broader Gaia-like outlook on themselves as but one part of an infinitely larger reality. Making this change must involve communicating the non-sensationalist message to all global citizens that “things are serious” and “we are in this together”—or, in blunter language, that the road to extinction and its related agonies does indeed lie ahead. Consistent with this prospect, the risks of human extinction—and the cost-benefit of attempting to reduce these risks—have been quantified in a recent sobering analysis (Matheny 2007).  Once complacency has been shaken off and a sense of collective purpose created, the battle against self-seeking anthropocentric human instincts will have only just begun. It is often said that human beings suffer from the ability to appreciate their own mortality—an existential agony that has given rise to the great religions— but in the present age of religious decline, we must begin to bear the added burden of anticipating the demise of our species. Indeed, as argued here, there are compelling reasons for encouraging this collective mind-shift. For in the best of all possible worlds, the realization that our species has long-term survival criteria distinct from our short-term tribal priorities could **spark a new social ethic** to upgrade what we now all too often dismiss as “human nature” (Tudge 1989). [End Page 122]

### Human extinction is the greatest act of suffering imaginable – using scientific methods to forestall extinction is crucial

Epstein and Zhao 9 – Lab of Medicine @ Hong Kong

Richard J. Epstein and Y. Zhao ‘9 – Laboratory of Computational Oncology, Department of Medicine, University of Hong Kong, The Threat That Dare Not Speak Its Name; Human Extinction, Perspectives in Biology and Medicine Volume 52, Number 1, Winter 2009, Muse

Human extinction is 100% certain—the only uncertainties are when and how. Like the men and women of Shakespeare’s As You Like It, our species is but one of many players making entrances and exits on the evolutionary stage. That we generally deny that such exits for our own species are possible is to be expected, given the brutish selection pressures on our biology. Death, which is merely a biological description of evolutionary selection, is fundamental to life as we know it. Similarly, death occurring at the level of a species—extinction—is as basic to biology as is the death of individual organisms or cells. Hence, to regard extinction as catastrophic—which implies that it may somehow never occur, provided that we are all well behaved—is not only specious, but self-defeating.  Man is both blessed and cursed by the highest level of self-awareness of any life-form on Earth. This suggests that the process of human extinction is likely to be accompanied by more suffering than that associated with any previous species extinction event. Such suffering may only be eased by the getting of wisdom: the same kind of wisdom that could, if applied sufficiently early, **postpone extinction**. But the tragedy of our species is that evolution does not select for such foresight. Man’s dreams of being an immortal species in an eternal paradise are unachievable not because of original sin—the doomsday scenario for which we choose to blame our “free will,” thereby perpetuating our creationist illusion of being at the center of the universe—but rather, in reductionist terms, because paradise is incompatible with evolution. More **scientific effort** in propounding this **central truth of our species’ mortality**, rather than seeking spiritual comfort in **escapist fantasies**, could pay dividends in minimizing the eventual **cumulative burden of human suffering.**

### The 1AC is necessary discourse – combating complacency is crucial to halting certain and inevitable extinction

Epstein and Zhao 9 – Lab of Medicine @ Hong Kong

Richard J. Epstein and Y. Zhao ‘9 – Laboratory of Computational Oncology, Department of Medicine, University of Hong Kong, The Threat That Dare Not Speak Its Name; Human Extinction, Perspectives in Biology and Medicine Volume 52, Number 1, Winter 2009, Muse

We shall not speculate here as to the “how and when” of human extinction; rather, we ask why there remains **so little discussion of this important topic**. We hypothesise that a lethal mix of **ignorance and denial** is blinding humans from the realization that our own species could soon (a relative concept, admittedly) be as **endangered** as many other large mammals (Cardillo et al. 2004). For notwithstanding the “overgrown Petri dish” model of human decline now confronting us, the most sinister menace that we face may not be extrinsic selection pressures but complacency. Entrenched in our culture is a knee-jerk “boy who cried wolf ” skepticism aimed at any person who voices concerns about the future—a skepticism fed by a traditionally bullish, growth-addicted economy that eschews caution (Table 1). But the facts of extinction are less exciting and newsworthy than the roller-coaster booms and busts of stock markets.

## Government Action Good\*\*\*

### \*\*\*This card is probably the best in the file answering hippie environmentalism alts\*\*\*

### Government action is necessary. Alternatives like anarchy, localism, spirituality, and eco-centrism will get squashed and worsen current destruction

Taylor 2k – Professor of Social Ethics

Bron, Professor of Religion & Social Ethics, Director of Environmental Studies, University of Wisconsin-Oshkosh, BENENEATH THE SURFACE: CRITICAL ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF DEEP ECOLOGY, P. 282-284

A more trenchant problem is how bioregionalists (and the anarchists who influenced their most influential theorists) often assume that people are naturally predisposed (unless corrupted by life in unnatural, hierarchical, centralized, industrial societies) to cooperative behavior. This debatable assumption appears to depend more on radical environmental faith, a kind of Paul Shepard-style mythologizing, than on ecology or anthropology. Unfortunately for bioregional theory, evolutionary biology shows that not only cooperation promotes species survival; so also, at times, does aggressive competitiveness. Based on its unduly rosy view of the potential for human altruism, it is doubtful that bioregionalism can offer sufficient structural constraints on the exercise of power by selfish and well-entrenched elites. It should be obvious, for example, that nation-state governments will not voluntarily cede authority. Any political reorganization along bioregional lines would likely require “widespread violence and dislocation.” Few bioregionalists seem to recognize this likelihood, or how devastating to nature such a transitional struggle would probably be. Moreover, making an important but often overlooked point about political power, political theorist Daniel Deudney warns: The sizes of the bioregionality based states would vary greatly because bioregions vary greatly. This would mean that some states would be much more powerful than other [and] it is not inevitable that balances of power would emerge to constrain the possible imperial pretensions of the larger and stronger states. Andrew Bard Schmookler, in his critique of utopian bioregional progeny). For ignoring a specific problem of power. He asked: How can good people prevent being dominated by a ruthless few, and what will prevent hierarchies from emerging if decentralized political self-rule is ever achieved? One does not have to believe all people are bad to recognize that not all people will be good, he argued; and unless bad people all become good, there is no solution to violence other than some kind of government to restrain the evil few. Schmookler elsewhere noted that those who exploit nature gather more power to themselves. How, then, can we restrain such power? There must be a government able to control the free exercise of power, Schmookler concluded. Once when debating Green anarchists and bioregionalists in a radical environmental journal, Schmookler agreed that political decentralization is a good idea. But if we move in this direction, he warned, “there should be at the same time a world order sufficient [to thwart] would-be conquerors.” Moreover, “Since the biosphere is a globally interdependent web, that world order should be able to constrain any of the actors from fouling the earth. This requires laws and means of enforcement.” Schmookler concluded, “Government is a paradox, but there is no escaping it. This is because power is a paradox: our emergence out of the natural order makes power and inevitable problem for human affairs, and only power can control power. Bioregionalism generally fails to grapple adequately with the problem of power. Consequently, it has little “answer to specifically global environmental problems,” such as atmospheric depletion and the disruption of ocean ecosystems by pollution and overfishing. Political scientist Paul Wapner argues that this is because bioregionalism assumes “that all global threats stem from local instances of environmental abuse and that by confronting them at the local level they will disappear.” Nor does bioregionalism have much of a response to the “globalization” of corporate capitalism and consumerist market society, apart from advocating local resistance or long-odds campaigns to revoke the corporate charters of the worst environmental offenders. These efforts do little to hinder the inertia of this process. And little is ever said about *how* to restrain the voracious appetite of a global-corporate-consumer culture for the resources in every corner of the planet. Even for the devout, promoting deep ecological spirituality and ecocentric values seems pitifully inadequate in the face of such forces. Perhaps it is because they have little if any theory of social change, and thus cannot really envision a path toward a sustainable society, that many bioregional deep ecologists revert to apocalyptic scenarios. Many of them see the collapse of ecosystems and industrial civilization as the only possible means toward the envisioned changes. Others decide that political activism is hopeless, and prioritize instead spiritual strategies for evoking deep ecological spirituality, hoping, self-consciously, for a miracle. Certainly the resistance of civil society to globalization and its destructive inertia is honorable and important, even a part a part of a wider sustainability strategy. But there will be no victories over globalization and corporate capitalism, and no significant progress toward sustainability, **without** new forms of international, enforceable, global environmental **governance**. Indeed, without new restraints on power both within nations and internationally, the most beautiful bioregional experiments and models will be overwhelmed and futile.

## Incrementalism Good – 2ac\*

### Piecemeal reform is the only way to achieve broader social reform

Bradley 9 – PhD in Political Economy, M.A. in Economics

Robert Bradley, PhD in Political Economy, M.A. in Economics, “Capitalism at Work: Business, Government and Energy,” pg. 103

There are good revolutions and bad ones. There must be continual improvement, or incrementalism, between sea changes. Often, if not quite always, revolution comes by steps, not bounds. Business thinker Jim Collins enriched the Schumpeter-Drucker-Hamel view by noting how good-to-great companies were disciplined change makers whose entrepreneurship was less about revolutionary moments than revolutionary process. In his words: Good-to-great transformations never happened in one fell swoop. There was no single defining action, no grand program, no one killer innovation, no solitary lucky break, no wrenching revolution. Good to great comes about by a cumulative process—**step by step**, **action by action**, **decision by decision**, turn by turn of the flywheel—that adds up to sustained and spectacular results. Success was “an organic evolutionary process . . . a pattern of buildup leading to breakthrough.” The “doom loop,” noted Collins from his case studies, was “big programs, radical change efforts, dramatic revolutions, chronic restructuring— always looking for a miracle moment or new savior.” Collins saw greatness in disciplined thought and action; failure, in “fads and . . . management hoopla.” There was no silver bullet, no magic, that could substitute for **sustained, well- directed effort**.

## Incrementalism Good – Pragmatism

### Incrementalist solutions add up – no environmental solutions will occur without practical and governmental change

Hirokawa 2 – JD and LLM

Keith Hirokawa, JD @ UConn, L.L.M. in Environmental and Natural Resources Law, Lewis & Clark Law School, Northwestern School of Law of Lewis & Clark College, J.D., University of Connecticut, June 2002, Stanford Environmental Law Journal, 21 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 225

Under this reinterpretation of the public trust doctrine and its evolution, pragmatism's perspective of legal progress modifies the notion of revolutionary paradigm shifts. Delgado's pessimism can be avoided by acknowledging that, without contesting the possibility of paradigm dispute, we can question the unavoidability of incommensurability between paradigms. Under the pragmatic view of legal progress, the law shifts in incremental steps. Consequently, the pragmatist is free to recognize incremental changes as achievements [\*277] and innovations, rather than having to take a position between "wrong - or at least seriously flawed" 228 - paradigm shifts, or alternatively, no change in the law at all. Furthermore, the pragmatist can recognize appropriate arguments through which the interpretive community can modify an interpretation or practice. As Holmes stated: A very common phenomenon and one very familiar to the student of history, is this. The customs, beliefs, or needs of primitive time establish a rule or a formula. In the course of centuries the custom, belief, or necessity disappears, but the rule remains. The reason which gave rise to the rule has been forgotten, and ingenuous minds set themselves to inquire how it is to be accounted for. Some ground or policy is thought of, which seems to explain it and to reconcile it with the present state of things; and then the rule adapts itself to the new reasons which have been found for it, and enters on a new career. The old form receives new content, and in time even the form modifies itself to fit the meaning which it has received. 229 Changes in each instance create entirely new contexts in which more (or less) progressive arguments find a hold. Every time a change occurs, even if it is incremental or ostensibly seems benign, the change creates a new context within which an entirely new set of possibilities will arise. 230 The pragmatist therefore evaluates progress by the distance a new idea causes practices to move away from past practices and paradigms. The difference between the pragmatic version of progress and the Kuhnian version is one only of degree. In the end, the results of both versions of progress are the same - we look back at the change and realize that earlier ideas do not make sense anymore. The effectiveness of the pragmatic approach lies in the simple realization that, in adopting an innovative approach to a legal question, courts will find comfort in adopting what appears to be an incremental change, rather than a radical paradigmatic shift. In [\*278] contrast to radical theorists that deny the existence of progress because of a failure to immediately reach the radical goals of alternative paradigms, the pragmatist recognizes that a **series of incremental changes eventually add up**. Environmental pragmatism enables environmentalists to seek achievable gains by **focusing on minor improvements** in the law that **incrementally close the gap** between the values that pre-existed current environmental law and the alternative paradigms of environmental protection.

### Even if we seek utopia, gradual reforms are the best mechanism to get there

Delicath, 96 **–** assistant professor in the Dept. of Communication @ the University of Cincinnati

John W., Earthtalk, Communication Empowerment for Environmental Action, Eds. Muir & Veenendall, pg. 162

First, “radical environmentalists” **can no longer simply avoid politics**. A viable ecology movement requires action within existing structures, something that “radical environmentalists” have so far rejected in their refusal to compromise. The movement needs to direct its attention to when and where to compromise. Even utopian politics recognizes the need to engage existing political processes. The very fact that one must move individuals to want utopia necessitates working out some instrumental means of getting to ecotopia. Any such instrumentality involves using politics that remain this side of utopia. An excellent example of this is the need for a radical environmental voice on global issues that must inevitably require action on the part of the nation-state. Dealing with crises like global warming and the depletion of the ozone layer requires international action and the responses of governments in the form of effective energy, defense, trade, and foreign policies.

### Reform versus revolution is a false choice – incremental changes can transform the social

de Geus 96

Marius, Teaches political theory and legal theory at the University of Leiden. Democracy and Green Political Thought, p. 200

What do we understand by ecological restructuring? Restructuring is akin to transforming as opposed to abolishing the state and the status quo. It is not a dogmatic attempt to create a completely new world that knows no pollution at all and that is clean and beautiful in all respects. Ecological restructuring does not imply that the attaining of a `Nowhere a la William Morris`. The whole society does not have to be altered, no every stone has to be moved. It encompasses further-reaching changes and reforms on a middle to long term, that can be readjusted, that are aimed at the prevention and solution of the most aggravating forms of pollution and at acute forms of degradation of the environment. It deals with policy plans in the areas of production and consumption that can be tried out first under Poppers motto: If they go wrong, the damage is not very great and readjustment is not very difficult (Popper 1974: 159). This kind of restructuring will bear the character of compromise and will have to be accomplished in democratic ways. They must be the result of open discussion, of imaginative power, and of the preparedness to accept disagreeable measures. They will require courage and determination and will entail taking certain risks, but less considerable risks than are implied by acting only marginally or not at all (as is happening at present), or by aspiring to do it all at once (as the utopians envisage). The comparison that suggests itself is that of the (re)building of a house (Van Gunsteren 1978: 148). The utopian engineer takes up the position of an architect who is designing a completely new and complex building. Starting from a specific set of ideals the engineer tries to build an architecturally sound and appealing edifice. In this respect Popper speaks of `aestheticism`, the desire to build a world which is not only a little better and more rational than ours, but which is free from all its ugliness: not a crazy quilt, an old garment badly patched, but an entirely new gown, a really beautiful new world (Popper 1974: 165). In the case of piecemeal engineering the house in a principle is kept intact: heavy leakages are repaired; broken windows are replaced, generally the maintenance that is really necessary is carried out step by step. There is no need for an architect, there is no need for rebuilding, reconstruction or more drastic alterations. Reservedness, carefulness, doing no more than is strictly necessary, are the basic principles. Somewhere in between lies the wide (and actually neglected) area of restructuring, the rebuilding of a house. It is not that a completely new house is erected – in order to prevent the annihilation of capital, the usually high costs, the unpredictable problems, disadvantages, and setbacks – but the existing house is more or less thoroughly altered, rebuilt, reconstructed, to comply with the newly formulated demands. An architect is needed only for certain stages, during the rebuilding one has a roof above one`s head, when surprises arise (the sewer turns out to be in a worse condition than assumed, some beams need to be repaired, etc.) the plans can be readjusted, and one can still learn from earlier mistakes. The rebuilding does not primarily tackle the consequences of the obsolescence of the houses, the leaking roof, the porous pipes, the woodrot in the window-frames, but alters, the structure of the house itself. With great caution some of the walls are broken through modern provisions are installed, new rooms are added, a dormer is constructed. In large part the house stays the same, yet simultaneously undergoes a structural change. In the case of environmental policy these are the kinds of choices that have to be made. The house is kept as it is, one tries only to prevent unacceptable deterioration and takes no measures to restrict water and energy consumption. One can also decide to demolish the house and replace it with a perfectly insulated, energy-saving and environmentally friendly built house, fitted with sun collectors and a compost lavatory. One can also – with far less cost and with reasonable results – insulate an existing house, install a highly efficient heating system, and take a range of water-saving measures (replacing the bath with a shower, replacing the outdated cistern with one of a small water volume, installing water-saving taps.) I do not want to spin out of this example endlessly. The vital point is that there is a whole world between piecemeal engineering and utopian engineering and that the introduction of middle-range reforms can eventually lead to structural changes in our modern unecological society. If applied with patience and perseverance, a combination of detached and surveyable alterations in itself can produce the highly needed ecological reconstruction of society.

## Management Good

### Domination of the physical universe is key to solve poverty, promote nanotech and space control

Zey 1 – Professor of Business

Michael, professor at Montclair State University School of Business and executive director of the Expansionary Institute, a research and consulting organization focusing on future trends in technology, society, the economy, politics, “MAN'S EVOLUTIONARY PATH INTO THE UNIVERSE” The Futurist, Vol. 35, May 2001

We must examine the many ways such developments impact the individual, society, and the economy. And we must explore the underlying reasons why our species is feverishly working to advance the planet and ourselves and transform all we encounter. When we truly understand the depth and strength of man's overwhelming imperative to grow and progress, we can more clearly anticipate the future. At first blush, it would seem that there is little mystery about the impulses driving the human species in this quest: We engage in such productive activities merely to enhance our material condition. We invent technologies that will improve our standard of living and make our lives more pleasant and comfortable. Our species from the earliest periods of prehistory seems compelled not just to survive, but to grow, progress, and enhance itself and its environment. At each new level of our development, we endeavor to master our environment as well as the physical dynamics governing our universe. Humanity's activities, including the entire scientific and technological enterprise, represent a unified attempt by the species to spread "humanness" to everything we encounter. Over the centuries, we have labored to improve planet Earth, and we are now preparing to transform the universe into a dynamic entity filled with life. We will accomplish this by extending our consciousness, skills, intellect, and our very selves to other spheres. I label the sum total of our species' endeavors to improve and change our planetary environment--and ultimately the universe itself-vitalization. Vitalization is a force that is conditioning human behavior. The drive to vitalize--to imbue our planet and eventually the cosmos with a consciousness and intelligence--is a primary motivation behind all human productive activity. Vitalization is the primary force shaping human behavior. However, in order to pursue vitalization successfully, the human species must master four other forces, what I label the "building blocks of vitalization." These four processes encompass the extraordinary advances in areas such as space, medicine, biogenetics, engineering, cybernetics, and energy. The four supporting forces are: \* Dominionization: control over physical forces, such as energy. \* Species coalescence: unity through built systems, such as transportation and communications. \* Biogenesis: improvement of the physical shell, such as through bioengineering. \* Cybergenesis: interconnection with machines to advance human evolution. Each of these forces plays a critical catalytic role in the achievement of vitalization. Dominionization: Controlling Nature The term dominionization refers to the process whereby humankind establishes control over several key aspects of its physical universe. With each passing decade, we enhance our ability to manipulate matter, reshape the planet, develop innovative energy sources, and control fundamental aspects of the physical universe, such as the atom and electromagnetism. Someday, we will learn to influence weather patterns and climate. In a host of ways, dominionization helps humanity vitalize the planet and eventually the universe. As we master the basic dynamics of nature, we are more able to shepherd the evolution of our planet as well as others. As we develop novel and powerful forms of energy, we can rocket from one sphere to another. Moreover, by improving our already formidable skills in moving mountains and creating lakes, we will be better able to change both the topography and the geography of other planets. Examples of dominionization abound. Major macroengineering projects attest to man's ability to transform the very surface of the earth. By constructing man-made lakes, we will be able to live in previously uninhabitable areas such as intenor Australia. Shimizu Corporation envisions a subterranean development called Urban Geo Grid--a series of cities linked by tunnels--accommodating half a million people. In the emerging Macro-industrial Era, whose framework was established in the 1970s and 1980s, we will redefine the concept of "bigness" as we dot Earth's landscape with immense architectural structures. Takenaka, a Japanese construction firm, has proposed "Sky City 1000," a 3,000-foot tower, to be built in Tokyo. Another firm, Ohbayashi, plans to erect a 500-story high-rise building featuring apartments, offices, shopping centers, and service facilities. We will establish dominion over the very heart of physical matter itself. Through nanotechnology, our species will attain control over the atom and its tiniest components. Such control will enable us to effortlessly "macromanufacture" from the bottom up, one atom at a time, any material object. This will enable us to permanently eradicate age-old problems such as scarcity and poverty.

## Management Good – MNCs DA

### Preventing resource destruction by MNC’s is key to averting every major impact and runaway globalization

-MNCs will damage the environment beyond repair

-Checks runaway globalization and neoliberal order

WEJ 6

World Economic Justice, http://www.worldeconomicjustice.blogspot.com/

Below is a preview of a Documentary Film titled "NIRMO". NIRMO is about the link between natural resource plunder and poverty, diseases, environmental collapse, wars NIRMO exposes the links between natural resource plunder by multinational corporations, and resultant mass poverty, pandemics, environmental degradation, social collapse, and wars in the world today. This documentary follows a WEJ movement that starts with a walk to Toronto from Montreal. The documentary follows the two friends as the struggle to educate the world that there is an alternative to the abject poverty in the world. A major cause of poverty is that these nations which are rich in resources are being robbed by multinational companies. Although a threat to Multinational Corporations, NIRMO is the start to the beginning of ending poverty. NIRMO will bring the countries resource revenue to the hands of it's people and not corporations. [Expected Release Date: September 2007] NIRMO will highlight the world's economic history and the role of the multinational corporation in natural resource extraction from the 16th century, through colonialism, to the present day of multilateral institutions such as the World Bank's MIGA. Viewers will witness the vicious cycle of natural resource depletion within which nations are trapped, which if not checked now, will leave most countries devoid of any life-sustaining resources, by the middle of this century. The crisis amounts to economic genocide. The Issue – Mass Poverty: Poverty outranking smoking and AIDS as the world's leading killer. One third of deaths - some 18 million people a year or 50,000 per day - are due to poverty-related causes. That is 270 million people since 1990, roughly equal to the population of the United States. Poverty amid Immense Natural Resource Wealth Yet, a casual examination of "poor" countries and ‘poor’ communities reveals that they actually possess immense wealth in the form of natural resources. Other urgent issues resulting from resource plunder are climate change, water pollution, soil erosion, fish stock collapse, lakes/river system drying, environmental diseases and other pandemics etc. A new international **resource management order** [NIRMO] is therefore the basis for 21st century sustainable living, empowering people to take charge of social, economic, political, and ecological governance within their respective communities. It is the **perfect antidote to runaway** **globalization** that leaves dead children in its wake, destroys the natural environment beyond repair, and causes wars and pandemics that threaten world peace, security and biospheric integrity. Once the new international resource management protocol is adopted, countries would be bound to be signatories to it and apply its principles to natural resource management practices. This would have the effect of reducing mass poverty to negligible levels within a few years of adopting the protocol. The new international resource management protocol will be presented to the United Nations for discussion in July 2007, along with a petition of 100,000 signatures from around the world.

## Management Good – MNCs DA

### Allowing corporations to rule politics prevents aff solvency and ensures destruction in totality

Von-Werlhof 8 – Professor of Political Science

Claudia, Professor of women’s studies and political science @ University of Innsbruck, 2-1-2008, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=7973>.

The notion that capitalism and democracy are one is proven a myth by neoliberalism and its “monetary totalitarianism” (Genth 2006). The primacy of politics over economy has been lost. Politicians of all parties have abandoned it. It is the corporations that dictate politics. Where corporate interests are concerned, there is no place for democratic convention or community control. Public space disappears. The “res publica” turns into a “res privata”, or – as we could say today – a “res privata transnationale” (in its original Latin meaning, “privare” means “to deprive”). Only those in power still have rights. They give themselves the licenses they need, from the “license to plunder” to the “license to kill” (Mies/Werlhof 2003, Mies 2005). Those who get in their way or challenge their “rights” are vilified, criminalized and to an increasing degree defined as “terrorists”, or, in the case of defiant governments, as “rogue states” – a label that usually implies threatened or actual military attack, as we can see in the cases of Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq, and maybe Syria and Iran in the near future. US President Bush has even spoken of the possibility of “preemptive” nuclear strikes should the US feel endangered by weapons of mass destruction (Chossudovsky 2005). The European Union did not object (Chossudovsky 2006). Neoliberalism and war are two sides of the same coin (Altvater/Chossudovsky/Roy/Serfati 2003, Mies 2005). Free trade, piracy, and war are still “an inseparable three” – today maybe more so than ever. War is not only “good for the economy” (Hendersen 1996), but is indeed its driving force and can be understood as the “continuation of economy with other means”. War and economy have become almost indistinguishable (Werlhof 2005 b). Wars about resources (Klare 2001) – especially oil and water – have already begun. The Gulf Wars are the most obvious examples. Militarism once again appears as the “executor of capital accumulation” (Luxemburg 1970) – potentially everywhere and enduringly. Human rights and rights of sovereignty have been transferred from people, communities and governments to corporations (Clarke 1998). The notion of the people as a sovereign body has practically been abolished. We have witnessed a coup of sorts. The political systems of the West and the nation state as guarantees for and expression of the international division of labor in the modern world system are increasingly dissolving (Sassen 2000). Nation states are developing into “periphery states” according to the inferior role they play in the proto-despotic “New World Order” (Hardt/Negri 2001, Chomsky 2003). Democracy appears outdated. After all, it “hinders business” (Werlhof 2005 a). The “New World Order” implies a new division of labor that does no longer distinguish between North and South, East and West – today, everywhere is South. An according International Law is established which effectively functions from top to bottom (“top-down”) and eliminates all local and regional communal rights. And not only that: many such rights are rendered invalid both retroactively and for the future (cf. the “roll back” and “stand still” clauses in the WTO agreements, Mies/Werlhof 2003). The logic of neoliberalism as a sort of totalitarian neo-mercantilism is that all resources, all markets, all money, all profits, all means of production, all “investment opportunities”, all rights, and all power belong to the corporations only. To paraphrase Richard Sennett (2005): “Everything to the Corporations!” One might add: “Now!” The corporations are free to do whatever they please with what they get. Nobody is allowed to interfere. Ironically, we are expected to rely on them to find a way out of the crisis we are in. This **puts the entire globe at risk** since responsibility is something the corporations do not have or know. The times of social contracts are gone (Werlhof 2003 a). In fact, pointing out the crisis alone has become a crime and all critique will soon be defined as “terror” and persecuted as such (Chossudovsky 2005).

## Management Good – Global Warming

### Only foresighted management can solve global warming – the impact is the case

Berg 8 – Advisor @ World Federation of United Nations

Robert, Senior Advisor World Federation of United Nations Associations, 2008, Governing in a World of Climate Change, [http://www.wfuna.org/atf/cf/%7B84F00800-D85E-4952-9E61-D991E657A458%7D/BobBerg'sNewPaper.doc](http://www.wfuna.org/atf/cf/%7B84F00800-D85E-4952-9E61-D991E657A458%7D/BobBerg%27sNewPaper.doc)

If, as Nobel Laureate Paul Crutzen states, humanity is now in the Anthropocene Epoch where forever more **humanity must manage** the environment, the scientific community for centuries to come must take a leading social and institutional role. This places a completely new responsibility on national and global scientific academies. It implies a constructive, serious and sustained dialogue with the public as well as with political leadership. Frankly, few scientific academies are yet up to this task. Building the capacity of scientists to respond If governments and foundations are **far-sighted**, they will help ensure that national scientific academies are strengthened so that they can become **responsible partners** in forming public policies in response to climate change.  Each ecological setting will need specific responses calling for national academies and academic centers to partner with national policy makers.  The Open Society Institute and others are working to strengthen scientific communities, but it is important that scientific communities take even greater leading roles.

## Management Good – Past Intervention 🡺Extinction

### Management is inevitable- it’s only a question of what kind of intervention is used. Past interventions will result in extinction unless actively reversed

Levy 99- PhD @ Centre for Critical Theory at Monash

Neil, “Discourses of the Environment,” ed: Eric Darier, p. 215

If the ‘technological fix’ is unlikely to be more successful than strategies of limitation of our use of resources, we are, nevertheless unable simply to leave the environment as it is. There is a real and pressing need for space, and more accurate, technical and scientific information about the non-human world. For we are faced with a situation in which the processes we have already set in train will continue to impact upon that world, and therefore us for centuries. It is therefore necessary, not only to stop cutting down the rain forests, but to develop real, concrete proposals for action, to reverse or at least limit the effects of our previous interventions. Moreover, there is another reason why our behavior towards the non-human cannot simply be a matter of leaving it as it is, at least in so far as our goals are not only environmental but also involve social justice. For if we simply preserve what remains to us of wilderness, of the countryside and of park land, we also preserve patterns of very **unequal access to their resources and their consolations** (Soper 1995: 207).in fact, we risk exacerbating these inequalities. It is not us, **but the poor** of Brazil, **who will bear the brunt** of the misery which would result from a strictly enforced policy of leaving the Amazonian rain forest untouched, in the absence of alternative means of providing for their livelihood. It is the development of policies to provide such ecologically sustainable alternatives which **we require**, as well as the development of technical means for replacing our current greenhouse gas-emitting sources of energy. Such policies and proposals for concrete action must be formulated by ecologists, environmentalists, people with expertise concerning the functioning of ecosystems and the impact which our actions have upon them. Such proposals are, therefore, very much the province of Foucault’s specific intellectual, the one who works ‘within specific sectors, at the precise points where their own conditions of life or work situate them’ (Foucault 1980g: 126). For who could be more fittingly described as ‘the strategists of life and death’ than these environmentalists? After the end of the Cold War, it is in this sphere, more than any other, that man’s ‘politics places his existence as a living being in question’ (Foucault 1976: 143). For it is in facing the consequences of our intervention in the non-human world that the hate of our species, and of those with whom we share this planet, will be decided?

## AT: Luke/Management – Luke Votes Aff\*\*\*

### Luke concludes that institutional change is necessary to stop extinction – their alternative fails

Luke, 97 – professor of political science at Virginia polytechnic

Timothy, “Ecocritique: Contesting the Politics of Nature, Economy, and Culture”, pg 126-127

It may be true that “the actions of those now living will determine the future and possibly the very survival of the species”, but it is, in fact, mostly a mystification. Only the actions of a very small handful of the humans who are now living, namely, those in significant positions of decisive managerial power in business or central executive authority in government, can truly do something to determine the future. Hollander’s belief that thousands of his readers, who will replace their light bulbs, water heaters, automobiles, or toilets with ecologically improved alternatives, can decisively affect the survival of the species is pure ideology. It may sell new kinds of toilets, cars, appliances, and light bulbs, but it does not guarantee planetary survival. Hollander does not stop here. He even asserts that everyone on the planet, not merely the average consumers in affluent societies, is to blame for the ecological crisis. Therefore, he maintains, rightly and wrongly, that “no attempt to protect the environment will be successful in the long run unless ordinary people—the California executive, the Mexican peasant, the Soviet [*sic*] factory worker, the Chinese farmer—are willing to adjust their life-styles and values. Our wasteful, careless ways must become a thing of the past.” The wasteful, careless ways of the California executive plainly must be ecologically reconstituted, but the impoverished practices of Mexican peasants and Chinese farmers, short of what many others would see as their presumed contributions to “overpopulation,” are probably already at levels of consumption that Hollander happily would ratify as ecologically sustainable if the California executive could only attain and abide by them. As Hollander asserts, “every aspect of our lives has some environmental impact,” and, in some sense, everyone he claims, “must acknowledge the responsibility we were all given as citizens of the planet and act on the hundreds of opportunities to save our planet that present themselves every day.” Nevertheless, the typical consumer does not control the critical aspects of his or her existence in ways that have any major environmental impact. Nor do we all encounter hundreds of opportunities every day to do much to save the planet. The absurd claim that average consumers only need to shop, bicycle, or garden their way to an ecological failure merely moves most of the responsibility and much of the blame away from the institutional center of power whose decisions actually maintain the wasteful, careless ways of material exchange that Hollander would end by having everyone recycle all their soda cans.

## AT: Luke/Management – Luke Votes Aff

### Rejection of managerialism is just as dangerous – their author

Luke, 97 – professor of political science at Virginia polytechnic

Timothy, “Ecocritique: Contesting the Politics of Nature, Economy, and Culture”, pg. 80

Although resource managerialism can be criticized on many levels, it has provisionally guaranteed some measure of limited protection to wilderness areas, animal species, and watercourses in the United States. And, whatever its flaws, the attempt to extend the scope of its oversight to other regions of the world probably could have a similar impact. Resource managerialism directly confronts the existing cultural, economic, and social regime of transnational corporate capitalism with the fact that millions of Americans, as well as billions of other human beings, must be provisioned from the living things populating Earth’s biosphere (the situation of all these other living things, of course, is usually ignored or reduced to an aesthetic question). And, if they are left unregulated, as history as shown, the existing corporate circuits of commodity production will degrade the biosphere to the point that all living things will not be able to renew themselves. Other ecological activists can fault resource managerialism, but few, if any, of them face these present-day realities as forthrightly in actual practice, largely because the prevailing regimes of state and corporate power, now assuming the forms of the “wise-use” movement often regard even this limited challenge as far too radical. Still, this record of “success” is not a license to ignore the flawed working of resource managerialism. In fact, this forthright engagement with resource realities raises very serious questions, as the global tactics of such agencies as the Worldwatch Institute reveal.

## AT: Luke/Management

### Anti-management results in mass extinctions

Soule 95 - Professor of Environmental Studies

Michael E., Professor and Chair of Environmental Studies, UC-Santa Cruz, REINVITING NATURE? RESPONSES TO POSTMODERN DECONSTRUCTION, Eds: Michael E. Soule and Gary Lease, p. 159-160

Should We Actively Manage Wildlands and Wild Waters? The decision has already been made in most places. Some of the ecological myths discussed here contain, either explicitly or implicitly, the idea that nature is self-regulating and capable of caring for itself. This notion leads to the theory of management known as benign neglect – nature will do fine, thank you, if human beings just leave it alone. Indeed, a century ago, a hands-off policy was the best policy. Now it is not. Given natures`s current fragmented and stressed condition, neglect will result in an accelerating spiral of deterioration. Once people create large gaps in forests, isolate and disturb habitats, pollute, overexploit, and introduce species from other continents, the viability of many ecosystems and native species is compromised, resiliency dissipates, and diversity can collapse. When artificial disturbance reaches a certain threshold, even small changes can produce large effects, and these will be compounded by climate change. For example, a storm that would be considered normal and beneficial may, following widespread clearcutting, cause disastrous blow-downs, landslides, and erosion. If global warming occurs, tropical storms are predicted to have greater force than now. Homeostasis, balance, and Gaia are dangerous models when applied at the wrong spatial and temporal scales. Even fifty years ago, neglect might have been the best medicine, but that was a world with a lot more big, unhumanized, connected spaces, a world with one-third the number of people, and a world largely unaffected by chain saws, bulldozers, pesticides, and exotic, weedy species. The alternative to neglect is active caring – in today`s parlance, an affirmative approach to wildlands: to maintain and restore them, to become stewards, accepting all the domineering baggage that word carries. Until humans are able to control their numbers and their technologies, **management is the only viable alternative** to massive attrition of living nature. But management activities are variable in intensity, something that antimanagement purists ignore. In general, the greater the disturbance and the smaller the habitat remnant, the more intense the management must be. So if we must manage, where do we look for ethical guidance?

### Human existence necessarily transforms the environment. Our choice is not whether to intervene, but how – and their style of management excuses unlimited ecological destruction

Barry 99 – Politics Lecturer @ Keele

John, Politics Lecturer at Keele University, RETHINKING GREEN POLITICS: NATURE, VIRTUE AND PROGRESS, p. 101-102

In Chapter 3, I argued that the ecological niche for humans is created rather than naturally given and that a humanized or transformed environment is our natural habitat. The collective management, manipulation and intentional transformation of the environment are thus universal features of all human societies. As a universal requirement they are, in a sense, pre-political. It is *how* human socieities create their humanized ecological niches, the various insititutional mechanisms used to maintain a stable metabolism between the social and the natural system , that raise moot political and moral question. In this chapter, collective ecological management is presented as an institutional form regulating this metabolism based on green values and principles. This idea of active ecological management cuts across the deep – shallow, radical – reformist continuum within green theory. What conceptions of green political theory differ over are the scale, type, institutional structure and normative side-constraints operative upon social-environmental metabolic states, not the necessity for environmental management and transformation. For example, even deep ecologists, for whom a pre-emptive hands-off-cum-nature-knows-best position constitutes a central principle, accept that preserving wilderness requires active social, and particularly institutional, intervention. In other words, preservation from development, as much as conservation for (future) development or ecological restoration, all take place within the broad framework of ecological restoration, all take place within the broad framework of ecological management. The deep ecology ideal of wilderness preservation, the preservation of the non-human world from a certain type of collective human transformation (in the form of development), paradoxically necessitates another form of human management. In the form of institutional structures, practices, etc. which function as a form of social governance to limit and/or transform development, such that wilderness is preserved. What appears as non-management at one level is at another level simple another form of management. Walking lighter on the earth is as much a form of ecological management as economic development. The political and normative issue is that collective purposive-transformative interaction with the environment can simply be more or less extensive, have a different character or be more or less sustainable.

## Permutation / Pragmatism Good

### Must reject radical environmental criticism – undercuts pragmatic environmental change

Reitan 98

Eric Reitan (Seattle University Writer for the Electronic Green Journal) Pragmatism, Environmental World Views, and Sustainability. December 1998

With the urgency of the current environmental crisis, we **cannot afford** to get bogged down in theoretic disputes that mask a common mission and get in the way of making the practical changes that are so pressing. Pragmatic Mediation of Deep Ecology and Christian Stewardship The example I have chosen to discuss is the theoretic debate between two environmental philosophies that have emerged in the last few decades: the philosophy of stewardship that has evolved in Christian communities, and the philosophy of deep ecology. I choose these two not on the basis of any special status they have, but rather because they are the two environmental perspectives with which I have the most personal acquaintance, and because the nature of the debate between them usefully illustrates the value of using pragmatic principles to guide theoretic environmental discourse. Before applying pragmatic principles to this example, some preliminary comments may be helpful. First, it is important to keep in mind that complex worldviews or philosophical systems may impact more than one domain of human life, and that they may have radically opposing pragmatic implications in one or more of those domains while implying substantially the same behaviors in the domain of the human-nature relationship. In such a case, we can say that while the worldviews do not have the same pragmatic meaning overall, they have the same environmental meaning. As such, it is important not to let the real differences in other areas mask the **genuine agreement** in the environmental domain. Second, it is worth noting that there is almost certainly more than one human social arrangement that harmonizes sustainable with the natural environment. Put another way, there is more than one set of human practices that *works* in terms of promoting a healthy human-natural system. And it follows from this observation that more than one worldview can be pragmatically true: while two worldviews may imply environmental behaviors that are different, and hence have a different pragmatic meaning, insofar as they both promote sustainable behaviors they are both true from a pragmatic standpoint. Pragmatic truth is not monistic, but pluralistic. Given the urgent pragmatic goals of environmental philosophy, sustained theoretic debates about meaning differences of this sort appear to be unwarranted, and should be put aside in favor of the task of finding **practical ways** of integrating and accommodating those alternative social arrangements which serve the common goal of sustainable human-natural systems.

### Only the permutation solves

-recognizing areas of compromise is more effective than trying to isolate differences. Only the permutation results in a unified ecological movement

Ellis 96 – MS in Civil Engineering

Jeffrey Ellis, Chief, Environmental, Safety and Health Engineering at United States Air Force, MS in Civil Engineering, 1996, Uncommon ground: rethinking the human place in nature, pg. 260

Because of the complexity and seeming intransigence of environmental problems, it is clearly time for radical environmentalists to focus less on defining their differences and more on determining the common ground that might provide the basis for a more **coherent and unified ecology movement**. As I hope this essay illustrates, if they hope to achieve a working consensus, radicals must strive to resist the well-established tendency in environmental discourse to identify the single most important and fundamental cause of the many environmental problems that have become increasingly apparent in recent decades. The desire to essentialize environmental problems and trace them all to one root cause is obviously a powerful one. If a root cause can be identified, then priorities can be clearly established and a definite agenda determined. Although the intention behind this silver bullet approach to understanding the global environmental crisis has been to provide the environmental movement with a dear focus and agenda, its impact has been very nearly just the opposite. It has repeatedly proven to be **more divisive than productive** in galvanizing a united front against environmental destruction.

## Permutation – Pragmatism / Pure Phil. Bad

### The response doesn’t influence the environment

Killingsworth and Palmer 98

M. Jimmie and Jacqueline S., professor of English at Texas A&M and Associate Director, Writing Programs Office, Landmak Essays on Rhetoric and the Environment, 1998, p. 213-4

To sum up, since ecophilosophical discourse generally flies in the face of the prevailing social paradigm, and offers its ethical insights and ecological panaceas in a language that is not accessible to lay publics, it appears to be null and void from the beginning. In other words, environmental ethics appears to be incapable of moving a democratic majority to support policies leading toward sustainability. From a traditional philosophical point of view, this situation is not a philosophical problem, since emphasis is placed primarily on identifying basic principles and providing supporting arguments. From a rhetorical point of view, however, it is, since effective philosophical discourse necessarily promotes societal transformation. K. M. Sayre, for example, recently tweaked the beard of the lion in its own den, noting that “If norms encouraging conservation and proscribing pollution were actually in force in industrial society, it would not be the result of ethical theory; and the fact that currently they are no in force is not alleviated by any amount of adroit ethical reasoning.” Moreover, empirical studies of public opinion and voting behavior reveal an apparent paradox: more than two-thirds of adult Americans consider themselves environmentalists even while the noose of ecocrisis continues to tighten around their collective necks. This paradox disappears, however, deHaven-Smite argues, once we realize that there is no empirical data to support the hypothesis that the environmental movement involves any general “philosophical reorientation of public opinion….” On the contrary, he continues, people become environmentalists not because of “environmental philosophy”, but rather because of local issues adversely affecting or threatening to affect the quality of their own lives (water quality, siting of a nuclear power plant, waste, and so on). The environmental movement, on this argument, is better conceptualized not as a mass public inspired by environmental ethics, but as a number of so-called local-issue publics addressing ecological dysfunctions.

### But the plan does – legal reform is key

Doremus 2k – law professor at UC-Davis

Holly, Washington & Lee Law Review, v57, p.43

Environmentalists seek expressive law in the nature protection context. They recognize that nature protection can only be effective in the long term if the political community comes to care more deeply about nature. Law is one tool for changing societal values; appropriately framed and enforced, it can “**tip” a society struggling to find consensus on values**. Even if it is not framed with a specific goal in mind, the law in this area inevitably expresses societal values, endorsing certain formulations of the appropriate relationship between human beings and nature and rejecting others. Because the politics of nature protection are necessarily so value-intensive, stories are likely to be indispensable.

## AT: Root Cause – No Single Root Cause – Dooms Alternative

### No single root cause – their emphasis on root cause *dooms* the alternative – permutation solves best

Ellis 96 – MS in Civil Engineering

Jeffrey Ellis, Chief, Environmental, Safety and Health Engineering at United States Air Force, MS in Civil Engineering, 1996, Uncommon ground: rethinking the human place in nature, pg. 260

Because of the complexity and seeming intransigence of environmental problems, it is clearly time for radical environmentalists to focus less on defining their differences and more on determining the common ground that might provide the basis for a more **coherent and unified ecology movement**. As I hope this essay illustrates, if they hope to achieve a working consensus, radicals must strive to resist the well-established tendency in environmental discourse to identify the single most important and fundamental cause of the many environmental problems that have become increasingly apparent in recent decades. The desire to essentialize environmental problems and trace them all to one root cause is obviously a powerful one. If a root cause can be identified, then priorities can be clearly established and a definite agenda determined. Although the intention behind this silver bullet approach to understanding the global environmental crisis has been to provide the environmental movement with a dear focus and agenda, its impact has been very nearly just the opposite. It has repeatedly proven to be **more divisive than productive** in galvanizing a united front against environmental destruction. This is not surprising. It would indeed be convenient if all ecological problems sprang from the same source, but this is far from likely. If nothing else, during the last forty years it has become abundantly clear that environmental problems arc deeply complex. Not only have they proven extremely difficult to unravel scientifically, but they have social and political aspects that further compound their complexity. Global warming, species extinction, pollution human population growth, depletion of resources, and increased rates of life-threatening disease are just some of the many problems that confront us. The idea that there is **a single root cause** to any one of these problems, let alone to all of them taken together, **is**, to put it mildly, **absurd**. Because environmental problems arc each the result of a multiplicity of causal factors, there can be no one comprehensive solution to all of them. And yet radical environmental thinkers are correct in rejecting the piecemeal approach to environmental problems that has become institutionalized in American society. Thus far, reform environmentalism has proven itself inadequate to the task of halting the deterioration of the earth's ecological systems. But an alternative to that approach will not emerge until radicals reject the quixotic and divisive search for a root cause to the spectrum of environmental problems that have been subsumed under the umbrella of the ecological crisis. Instead of arguing with one another about who is most right, radicals must begin to consider the insights each perspective has generated and work toward a more comprehensive rather than a confrontational understanding of problems that have multiple, complex, and interconnected causes.