**\*\*Gender answers\*\***

**-war T/ patriarchy**

**War makes patriarchy more likely – proves the impact short-circuits the alternative**

**Workman 96**

Thom, Poli Sci @ U of New Brunswick, YCISS Paper no. 31, p. 4, January 1996, http://www.yorku.ca/yciss/publications/OP31-Workman.pdf

With **the loosening of the** positivist/**Realist hold on international relations** and the simultaneous rise of feminist analysis, intellectual space has been created to address war in terms of the social relations of power between men and women. This development places war within a broader patriarchal matrix, and **has helped to develop an understanding of war as** one (obviously important) manifestation of **patriarchal violence**. This development also has promoted a more unassuming character with respect to the subject matter itself. **The concerns lies less with warfare or its destructive potential** (although this concern remains) **than it does with the relationship between warfare and the oppression of women**. Primary concern, that is, rests less with war than with the reproduction of patriarchy. This paper addresses the gender critique of war directly. It argues that the gender critique of war has racked enough to be able to identify a preliminary thesis regarding war and the reproduction of patriarchy**. The altered experiences and practices of war, combined with the sometimes dramatic modifications in gender representations** (through propaganda, literature etcetera), **are considerable.** **War produces cultural crises of gender**, especially as it throws the historical contingency and cultural arbitrariness of gendered constructs into relief. There is the suggestion that through war traditional gendered constructs can modulate and unwind. An emerging sense of cultural crisis revolving around gender shifts typically accompanies both war and post-war periods. Indeed, much of the initial research on gender and war, in view of the extensive shifts in representations and practices during war, directly or indirectly explores the emancipatory effect of war upon women. To the extent that war is contingent upon such gendered constructs, constructs that the practice itself appears to threaten and endanger, the relationship between war and gender might be said to be paradoxical. The paradoxical dynamic between gender and war, however, is softened by the profundity of the links between war and patriarchy. **The gendering of experiences during war, along with the restoration of traditional gendered constructs after war, more than compensate for any war- induced sundering of the patriarchal tapestry**. While the practice of **war** suggests that it might encourage a rupture in the gendered fabric of society, it **overwhelmingly contributes to patriarchal reproduction.** Questions oriented around the emancipatory potential of war where women are concerned, therefore, run the risk of losing a perspective on the overall role of modern warfare in the reproduction of women's oppression.

**-perm**

**Perm solves best-- Only starting from within dominant discourses can succeed**

**Saloom JD UGA, 6**

Rachel, JD Univ of Georgia School of Law and M.A. in Middle Eastern Studies from U of Chicago, Fall 2006, A Feminist Inquiry into International Law and International Relations, 12 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 159, Lexis

Tickner's last point that deserves further reflection is the notion that international law and international relations will not become free from gender bias as long as we live in a gendered world. This is not to say that small steps are ineffective, but rather that international law and **international relations are merely a small part of the larger systemic problem of unequal gender relations**. While it is desirable that more women occupy foreign and military policy making positions, this "desire" does not necessarily transform the way international law and international relations work. To allege that this is the case assumes that women have an essential character that can transform the system. This of course is contrary to the very arguments that most gender theorists forward, because it would mean that women have some unique "feminine" perspective. What is needed then is a release from the sole preoccupation on women and men. The state's masculinist nature that gender theorists critique affects everyone in society. Moving beyond the "add and stir" approach is quite difficult, but there must be a starting point from which gender theorists can work. [105](http://web.lexis-nexis.com/scholastic/document?_m=a2ac53a45e1fe17371cdbaa2cf370390&_docnum=3&wchp=dGLbVzW-zSkVk&_md5=2c8e9aab339ea5ca4d4f4fae4578bb53" \l "n105#n105" \t "_self) **If everything is problematized,** paralysis will inevitably occur**. Working within the current framework is truly the only option to bring about change. Lofty abstract criticisms will do nothing to change the practices of international law and international relations. Pragmatic feminist criticisms** of international law and international relations, however, **should be further developed**. Even advocates of realist thought will admit that realism is neither the most accurate nor the only way to view the world. [106](http://web.lexis-nexis.com/scholastic/document?_m=a2ac53a45e1fe17371cdbaa2cf370390&_docnum=3&wchp=dGLbVzW-zSkVk&_md5=2c8e9aab339ea5ca4d4f4fae4578bb53" \l "n106#n106" \t "_self) The changing dynamics of world politics make formulating new ways of understanding international relations quite pertinent. **Keeping some semblance of realism in tact, while at the same time opening up space for theorizing about other possibilities, is necessary**. Critics are quick to note that realism cannot be easily abandoned without some sort of alternative framework. **Casting aside realism now, even given the concerns of gender scholars, is not the most promising option**. Wayman and Diehl note that  [\*180]  "**the abandonment of realism leaves a void, which in the short to medium term is at least as much of a dead end as would be the result of following realism.**" [107](http://web.lexis-nexis.com/scholastic/document?_m=a2ac53a45e1fe17371cdbaa2cf370390&_docnum=3&wchp=dGLbVzW-zSkVk&_md5=2c8e9aab339ea5ca4d4f4fae4578bb53" \l "n107#n107" \t "_self) **New possibilities can be envisioned while still adhering to some of the realist ideologie**s. Wayman and Diehl describe realism as a detour and not a definitive road map. [108](http://web.lexis-nexis.com/scholastic/document?_m=a2ac53a45e1fe17371cdbaa2cf370390&_docnum=3&wchp=dGLbVzW-zSkVk&_md5=2c8e9aab339ea5ca4d4f4fae4578bb53" \l "n108#n108" \t "_self) Thus, **theorists must admit that realism** is not the only way or the correct way to view international law and international relations, but it **cannot be totally abandoned**. Even given all of the criticisms of feminist theories, there must be space, however, for feminist theorization. **A pragmatic approach should not dismiss the benefits of theorizing**. Discussions and debates on feminism and international law and relations are extremely important. Yet even where feminist discourses lack the social power to realize their versions of knowledge in institutional practices, they can offer the discursive space from which the individual can resist dominant subject positions... . Resistance to the dominant at the level of the individual subject

**We must use politics to disrupt gender relations**

**Peterson 92**

Editor V Spike, Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Arizona, Gendered States, pg. 66

In other words, the state as a dealer in power, a wielder of weapons, an inherently violent institution is the object of suspicion and resistance by both antiliberal feminists and liberal internationalists. And, especially now, when the international system is undergoing immense change, pressures for denationalizing change—certainly discourse arguing for it- will be persistent. In the face of such pressures, I believe that **feminist critics of the present state system** should beware**. The very fact that the state creates, condenses, and focuses political power may make it the best friend, not the enemy, of feminists—because the availability of real political power is essential to real democratic control**. Not sufficient, I know, but essential. **My basic premise is that political power can significantly disrupt patriarchal and class (which is to say, economic) power. It holds the potential, at least, for disrupting the patriarchal/economic oppression of those in the lower reaches of class, sex and race hierarchies.** It is indisputable that, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it has been the political power of states that has confronted the massive economic power privately constructed out of the industrial processes and has imposed obligations on employers for the welfare of workers as well as providing additional social support for the population at large. **And the political tempering of economic power has been the most responsive to broad public needs in liberal democracies, where government must respond roughly to the interests of voters. Of course, this is not the whole story**. The nation-states of this period have also perpetrated horrors of torture and war, have aided the development of elite-controlled industrial wealth, and have not sufficiently responded to the human needs of their less powerful constituents. But I believe **it is better to try to restrain the horrors and abuses than to give up on the limits that state organized political power can bring to bear on the forms of class-based, race-based, sex-based power that consistute the greatest sources of oppression we are likely to face.**

-alt fails

**We have an obligation to change material conditions**

**Peterson 92**

Editor V Spike, Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Arizona, Gendered States, pg. 58

**Finally, as we reach toward world security, we can ignore neither the limited security afforded by gendered (welfare) states nor the objective of moving beyond states of gender (territorial states and states of mind).** These are not oppositional but, like reform and revolution, interactive components of long-term, systemwide transformations. **There are no easy “answers” in the face of “multiple binds.” While we seek revolutionary transformations** required for world security,we must alsocare for and about those who are structurally vulnerable**—and realize that means all of us**.

**Alt doesn’t solve – can’t destabilize existing hierarchies**

**Saloom JD UGA, 6**

Rachel, JD Univ of Georgia School of Law and M.A. in Middle Eastern Studies from U of Chicago, Fall 2006, A Feminist Inquiry into International Law and International Relations, 12 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 159, Lexis

Because patriarchy is embedded within society, it is no surprise that the theory and practice of both international law and international relations is also patriarchal. [98](http://web.lexis-nexis.com/scholastic/document?_m=a2ac53a45e1fe17371cdbaa2cf370390&_docnum=3&wchp=dGLbVzW-zSkVk&_md5=2c8e9aab339ea5ca4d4f4fae4578bb53" \l "n98#n98" \t "_self) **Total critique**, however, **presents no method by which to challenge current hegemonic practices. Feminist scholars have yet to provide a coherent way in which total critique can be applied to change the nature of international law and international relations**. Some  [\*178]  feminist scholars are optimistic for the possibility of changing the way the current system is structured. For example, Whitworth believes that "sites of resistance are always available to those who oppose the status quo." [99](http://web.lexis-nexis.com/scholastic/document?_m=a2ac53a45e1fe17371cdbaa2cf370390&_docnum=3&wchp=dGLbVzW-zSkVk&_md5=2c8e9aab339ea5ca4d4f4fae4578bb53" \l "n99#n99" \t "_self) Enloe suggests that since the world of international politics has been made it can also be remade. [100](http://web.lexis-nexis.com/scholastic/document?_m=a2ac53a45e1fe17371cdbaa2cf370390&_docnum=3&wchp=dGLbVzW-zSkVk&_md5=2c8e9aab339ea5ca4d4f4fae4578bb53" \l "n100#n100" \t "_self) She posits that every time a woman speaks out about how the government controls her, new theories are being made. [101](http://web.lexis-nexis.com/scholastic/document?_m=a2ac53a45e1fe17371cdbaa2cf370390&_docnum=3&wchp=dGLbVzW-zSkVk&_md5=2c8e9aab339ea5ca4d4f4fae4578bb53" \l "n101#n101" \t "_self) **All of these theorists highlight the manner in which gender criticisms can destabilize traditional theories. They provide no mechanism**, however, **for the actual implementation of their theories into practice**. While in the abstract, resistance to hegemonic paradigms seems like a promising concept, gender theorists have made no attempt to make their resistance culminate in meaningful change. **The notion of rethinking traditional approaches to** international law and **international relations does not go far enough in prescribing an alternative theoretical basis for understanding the international arena. Enloe's plea for women to speak out about international politics does not go nearly far enough in explaining how those acts could have the potential to actually change the practice of international relations. Either women are already speaking out now, and their voices alone are not an effective mechanism to challenge the system**, or women are not even speaking out about world politics currently. Obviously it is absurd to assume that women remain silent about world politics. If that is the case, then one must question women's ability to speak up, challenge, and change the system.

**Feminist critiques of IR lead to dominating subjectivity – all white male knowledge production is discarded as ontologically flawed**

**Jarvis 2k**

Daryl, Associate Professor & Deputy Director, Centre for Asia and Globalisation PhD, International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism

Much like the strategies employed by male dissidents, then, **feminist postmodemists** too **deflect as illegitimate any criticism that derives from skeptics whose vantage points are labeled privileged. And privilege is vari- ously interpreted historically, especially along lines of race, color, and sex where the denotations white and male, to name but two, serve as inter- generational mediums to assess the injustices of past histories. White males**, for example, **become generic signifiers for historical oppression, indicating an ontologically privileged group by which the historical experiences of the "other" can then be reclaimed in the context of their related oppression, exploitation, and exclusion**. Legitimacy, in this context can then be claimed in terms of one's group identity and the extent to which the history of that particular group has been "silenced." **In this same way, self-identification or "self-situation" establishes one's credentials, allowing admittance to the group and legitimating the "authoritative" vantage point from which one speaks and writes**. Thus, for example, Jan Jindy Pettman includes among the introductory pages to her most recent book, Worlding Women a section titled "A (personal) politics of location," in which her identity as a woman, a feminist, and an academic, makes appar- ent her particular (marginal) identities and group loyalties." Similarly, Christine Sylvester, in the introduction to her book., insists, "It is impor- tant to provide a context for one's work in the often-denied politics of the personal." Accordingly, self-declaration reveals to the reader that she is a feminist, went to a Catholic girls school where she was schooled to "develop your brains and confess something called 'sins' to always male forever priests," and that these provide some pieces to her dynamic objec- tivity." like territorial markers, self-identification permits entry to intel- lectual spaces whose sovereign authority is "policed" as much by marginal subjectivities as they allege of the oppressors who "police" the discourse of realism, or who are said to walk the corridors of the discipline insuring the replication of patriarchy, hierarchical agendas, and "malestream" theory. If S**ylvester's version of feminist postmodernism is projected as tolerant**, per- spectivisr, and encompassing of a multiplicity of approaches, **in reality it is as selective, exclusionary, and** dismissive of alternative perspectives **as mainstream approaches are accused of being**.

**Their alternative is nihilist—it rejects all forms of political action that could improve the way society views gender.**

**Whitworth, Assistant Professor of Political Science York University, 94**

Sandra, Feminism and International Relations: Towards a Political Economy of Gender in Interstate and Non-Governmental Institutions, p. 22-23

**This points also to the serious limitations involved in feminist post-modernist understandings of 'social construction'**. While acknowledging that identities and meanings are never natural or universal, **postmodernists locate the construction of those meanings almost exclusively in the play of an ambiguously defined power, organised through discourse**. This means that identities and meanings are constructed in the absence of knowing actors, and more importantly, that there is very little that knowing actors can do to challenge those meanings or identities. **The ways in which power manifests itself, the particular meanings and identities that emerge,** seem almost inevitable**.** They are unrelated to prevailing material conditions or the activities of agents and institutions. Similarly, **critics may describe the play of power in the construction of meaning, but cannot participate in changing it.**63 As Marysia Zalewski writes: **The post-modernist intention to challenge the power of dominant discourses in an attempt to lead those discourses into disarray is at first glance appealing, but we have to ask what will the replacement be? If we are to believe that all is contingent and we have no base on to which we can ground claims to truth, then 'power alone will determine the outcome of competing truth claims'. Post-modernist discourse does not offer any criteria for choosing among competing explanations and thus has a tendency to lead towards nihilism** - an accusation often levelled at the purveyors of post-modernism and to which they seem unable to provide any answer, except perhaps in the words of one post-modernist scholar 'what's wrong with nihilism'?64 Postmodernists are equally post-feminist, a title they sometimes adopt, for **their analysis loses sight of the political imperatives which inform feminism: to uncover and change inequalities between women and men**. As Ann Marie Goetz suggests, when many of the issues surrounding women and international relations are ones which concern the very survival of those women, **postmodernism's continued back-pedalling and disclaimers are not only politically unacceptable, they are, more importantly, politically irresponsible**.

**-essentialism turn**

**Turn – essentialism – their re-thinking inscribes essentialist conceptions of “woman” that make inequality and anti-feminism more likely**

**Witworth, Prof of political science and female studies @ York U, 94**

Feminism and International Relations, pg 20, 1994

Even when not concerned with mothering as such, **much of the politics that emerge from radical feminism within IR depend on a ‘re-thinking’ from the perspective of women. What is left unexplained is how simply thinking differently will alter the material realities of relations of domination between men and women**. Structural (patriarchal) relations are acknowledged, but not analysed in radical feminism’s reliance on the experiences, behaviours and perceptions of ‘women’. As Sandra Harding notes, **the essential and universal ‘man’, long the focus of feminist critiques, has merely been replaced here with the essential and universal ‘woman’. And indeed, that notion of ‘woman’ not only ignores important differences amongst women, but it also reproduces exactly the stereotypical vision of women and men, masculine and feminine, that has been produced under patriarchy. Those women who do not fit the mould** – who, for example, take up arms in military struggle – **are quickly dismissed as expressing ‘negative’ or ‘inauthentic’ feminine values** (the same accusation is more rarely made against men). In this way, it comes as no surprise when mainstream IR theorists such as Robert Reohane happily embrace the tenets of radical feminism. It requires little in the way of re-thinking or movement from accepted and comfortable assumptions about stereotypes. Radical **feminists find themselves defending the same account of women as nurturing, pacifist, submissive mothers** as men do under patriarchy, anti-feminists and the New Right. As some writers suggest, this in itself

**The K is essentialist, re-entrenches hierarchies**

**Whitworth, Assistant Professor of Political Science York University 94**

Sandra, Feminism and International Relations: Towards a Political Economy of Gender in Interstate and Non-Governmental Institutions, p. 20

Even when not concerned with mothering as such, **much of the politics that emerge from radical feminism within IR depend upon a 're-thinking' from the perspective of women. What is left** unexplained **is how simply thinking differently will alter the material realities of relations of domina­tion between men and women.46 Structural (patriarchal) relations are acknowledged, but not analysed in radical feminism's reliance on the expe­riences, behaviours and perceptions of 'women'. As Sandra Harding notes, the essential and universal 'man', long the focus of feminist critiques, has** merely been replaced **here with the essential and universal 'woman'**.47 And indeed, **that notion of 'woman' not only ignores important differ­ences amongst women, but it also** reproduces exactly the stereotypical vision of women and men**,** masculine and feminine, **that has been produced under patriarchy**.48 **Those women who do not fit the mould - who, for exam­ple, take up arms in military struggle - are quickly dismissed as expressing 'negative' or 'inauthentic' feminine values** (the same accusation is more rarely made against men).49 In this way, it comes as no surprise when main­stream IR theorists such as Robert Keohane happily embrace the tenets of radical feminism.50 It requires little in the way of re-thinking or movement from accepted and comfortable assumptions and stereotypes. Radical fem­inists find themselves defending the same account of women as nurturing, pacifist, submissive mothers as do men under patriarchy, anti-feminists and the New Right. As some writers suggest, this in itself should give feminists pause to reconsider this position.51

**The alternative is essentialist – this specifically dooms their alternative**

**Crenshaw, Professor of Law, 91**

Kimberlie, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, Stanford Law Review, July, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 1241

The concept of political intersectionality highlights the fact that women of color are situated within at least two subordinated groups that frequently pursue conflicting political agendas. **The need to split one's political energies between two sometimes opposing groups is a dimension of intersectional disempowerment that men of color and white women seldom confront**. Indeed, their specific raced and gendered experiences, although intersectional, often define as well as confine the interests of the entire group. For example, racism as experienced by people of color who are of a particular gender -- male -- tends to determine the parameters of antiracist strategies, just as sexism as experienced by women who are of a particular race -- white -- tends to ground the women's movement. The problem is not simply that both discourses fail women of color by not acknowledging the "additional" issue of race or of patriarchy but that **the discourses are often inadequate even to the discrete tasks of articulating the full dimensions of racism and sexism**.Because **women of color experience** racism in ways not always the same as those experienced by men of color and **sexism in ways not always parallel to experiences of white women, antiracism and feminism are limited**, even on their own terms. Among the most troubling political consequences of the failure of antiracist and feminist discourses to address the intersections of race and gender is the fact that, to the extent they can forward the interest of "people of color" and "women," respectively, **one analysis often implicitly denies the validity of the other. The failure of** feminism **to interrogate race means that the resistance strategies of feminism will often replicate and reinforce the subordination of people of color**, and the failure of antiracism to interrogate patriarchy means that antiracism will frequently reproduce the subordination of women. These mutual elisions present a particularly difficult political dilemma for women of color. Adopting either analysis constitutes a denial of a fundamental dimension of our subordination and precludes the development of a political discourse that more fully empowers women of color.

**-at: root cause**

**Gender is not the root cause**

**Hooper, Research Associate @ Bristol, 1**

Charlotte, University of Bristol research associate in politics, Manly States: Masculinities, International Relations, and Gender Politics pp 45-46.

Spike Peterson and Anne Sisson Runyan (1993), in their discussion of gendered dichotomies, appear to drop Lacanian psychoanalytic discourse as an explanation for gendered dichotomies in favor of a more straightforward- ly political account.14Gendered dichotomies, rather than uniformly con- structing gendered social relations through universal psychoanalytic mecha- nisms, are seen more ambiguously, as playing a dual role. Where gendered dichotomies are used as an organizing principle of social life (such as in the gendered division of labor) they help to construct gender differences and in- equalities and thus are constitutive of social reality, but in positing a grid of polar opposites, they also serve to obscure more complex relationships, commonalties, overlaps, and intermediate positions (Peterson and Runyan 1993, 24–25). Elaborating on this view, it can be argued that gendered dichotomies are in part ideological tools that mystify, masking more complex social realities and reinforcing stereotypes. On one level, they do help to produce real gen- der differences and inequalities, when they are used as organizing principles that have practical effects commensurate with the extent that they become embedded in institutional practices, and through these, human bodies. They constitute one dimension in the triangular nexus out of which gender identities and the gender order are produced. But at the same time, **institutional practices are** not always completely or unambiguously **informed by such dichotomies, which may then operate to obscure more complex relationships. It is a** mistake to see the language **of gendered dichotomies as a uniﬁed and totalizing discourse that dictates every aspect of social practice to the extent that we are coherently produced as subjects in its dualistic image. As well as the disruptions and discontinuities engendered by the** inter- sections and interjections **of other discourses (race, class, sexuality, and so on) there is always room for evasion, reversal, resistance, and dissonance be- tween rhetoric, practice, and embodiment, as well as reproduction of the symbolic order, as identities are negotiated in relation to all three dimen- sions, in a variety of complex and changing circumstances**. On the other hand, the symbolic gender order does inform practice, and our subjectivi- ties are produced in relation to it, so to dismiss it as performing only an ide- ological or propagandistic role is also too simplistic.

**Claims of a single root cause deny complex causality and inter-relationships – entirely untrue and justifies other forms of oppression**

**Crenshaw, PhD, 2**

Carrie, PhD, Perspectives In Controversy: Selected Articles from CAD, Scholar

 Feminism is not dead. It is alive and well in intercollegiate debate. **Increasingly, students rely on feminist authors** to inform their analysis of resolutions. While I applaud these initial efforts to explore feminist thought, I am concerned that **such arguments** only **exemplify the general absence of sound causal reasoning** in debate rounds. Poor causal reasoning results from a debate practice that privileges empirical proof over rhetorical proof, fostering ignorance of the subject matter being debated. To illustrate my point, I claim that **debate arguments about feminists suffer from a reductionism that tends to marginalize** the **voices** of significant feminist authors. David Zarefsky made a persuasive case for the value of causal reasoning in intercollegiate debate as far back as 1979. He argued that **causal arguments are desirable for four reasons. First, causal analysis increases the control of the arguer over events by promoting understanding** of them. **Second**, the **use of causal reasoning increases rigor of analysis** and fairness in the decision-making process. **Third, causal arguments promote understanding of the philosophical paradox that presumably good people tolerate the existence of evil**. Finally, **causal reasoning supplies good reasons for "commitments to policy choices or to systems of belief which transcend whim, caprice, or the non-reflexive "claims of immediacy**" (117-9). Rhetorical proof plays an important role in the analysis of causal relationships. This is true despite the common assumption that the identification of cause and effect relies solely upon empirical investigation. For Zarefsky, there are three types of causal reasoning. The first type of causal reasoning describes the application of a covering law to account for physical or material conditions that cause a resulting event This type of causal reasoning requires empirical proof prominent in scientific investigation. A second type of causal reasoning requires the assignment of responsibility. Responsible human beings as agents cause certain events to happen; that is, causation resides in human beings (107-08). A third type of causal claim explains the existence of a causal relationship. It functions "to provide reasons to justify a belief that a causal connection exists" (108). The second and third types of causal arguments rely on rhetorical proof, the provision of "good reasons" to substantiate arguments about human responsibility or explanations for the existence of a causal relationship (108). I contend that the practice of intercollegiate debate privileges the first type of causal analysis. It reduces questions of human motivation and explanation to a level of empiricism appropriate only for causal questions concerning physical or material conditions. Arguments about feminism clearly illustrate this phenomenon. Substantive debates about feminism usually take one of two forms. First, on the affirmative, debaters argue that some aspect of the resolution is a manifestation of patriarchy. For example, given the spring 1992 resolution, "[rjesolved: That advertising degrades the quality of life," many affirmatives argued that the portrayal of women as beautiful objects for men's consumption is a manifestation of patriarchy that results in tangible harms to women such as rising rates of eating disorders. The fall 1992 topic, "(rjesolved: That the welfare system exacerbates the problems of the urban poor in the United States," also had its share of patri- archy cases. Affirmatives typically argued that women's dependence upon a patriarchal welfare system results in increasing rates of women's poverty. In addition to these concrete harms to individual women, most affirmatives on both topics, desiring "big impacts," argued that the effects of patriarchy include nightmarish totalitarianism and/or nuclear annihilation. On the negative, many debaters countered with arguments that the some aspect of the resolution in some way sustains or energizes the feminist movement in resistance to patriarchal harms. For example, some negatives argued that sexist advertising provides an impetus for the reinvigoration of the feminist movement and/or feminist consciousness, ultimately solving the threat of patriarchal nuclear annihilation. likewise, debaters negating the welfare topic argued that the state of the welfare system is the key issue around which the feminist movement is mobilizing or that the consequence of the welfare system - breakup of the patriarchal nuclear family -undermines patriarchy as a whole. **Such arguments seem to have two assumptions in common. First, there is a single feminism**. As a result, feminists are transformed into feminism. Debaters speak of feminism as **a single, monolithic, theoretical and pragmatic entity** and feminists as women with identical m otivations, methods, and goals. Second, **these arguments assume that patriarchy is the single or root cause of all forms of oppression**. Patriarchy not only is responsible for sexism and the consequent oppression of women, it also is the cause of totalitarianism, environmental degradation, nuclear war, racism, and capitalist exploitation. **These** reductionist arguments **reflect an** unwillingness to debateabout the **complexities of human motivation and explanation**. They betray a reliance upon a framework of proof that can explain only material conditions and physical realities through empirical quantification. The transformation of feminists to feminism and the identification of patriarchy as the sole cause of all oppression is related in part to the current form of intercollegiate debate practice. By "form," I refer to Kenneth Burke's notion of form, defined as the "creation of appetite in the mind of the auditor, and the adequate satisfying of that appetite" (Counter-Statement 31). Though the framework for this understanding of form is found in literary and artistic criticism, it is appropriate in this context; as Burke notes, literature can be "equipment for living" (Biilosophy 293). He also suggests that form "is an arousing and fulfillment of desires. A work has form in so far as one part of it leads a reader to anticipate another part, to be gratified by the sequence" (Counter-Statement 124). Burke observes that there are several aspects to the concept of form. One of these aspects, conventional form, involves to some degree the appeal of form as form. Progressive, repetitive, and minor forms, may be effective even though the reader has no awareness of their formality. But when a form appeals as form, we designate it as conventional form. Any form can become conventional, and be sought for itself - whether it be as complex as the Greek tragedy or as compact as the sonnet (Counter-Statement 126). These concepts help to explain debaters' continuing reluctance to employ rhetorical proof in arguments about causality. **Debaters practice the convention of poor causal** reasoning as a result of judges' unexamined reliance upon conventional form. Convention is the practice of arguing single-cause links to monolithic impacts that arises out of custom or usage. Conventional form is the expectation of judges that an argument will take this form. Common practice or convention dictates that a case or disadvantage with nefarious impacts causally related to a single link will "outweigh" opposing claims in the mind of the judge. In this sense, debate arguments themselves are conventional. **Debaters practice the convention of establishing single-cause relationships to large monolithic impacts** in order to conform to audience expectation. Debaters practice poor causal reasoning because they are rewarded for it by judges. The convention of arguing single-cause links leads the judge to anticipate the certainty of the impact and to be gratified by the sequence. I suspect that the sequence is gratifying for judges because it relieves us from the responsibility and difficulties of evaluating rhetorical proofs. We are caught between our responsibility to evaluate rhetorical proofs and our reluctance to succumb to complete relativism and subjectivity. To take responsibility for evaluating rhetorical proof is to admit that not every question has an empirical answer. However, **when we abandon our responsibility to rhetorical proofs, we sacrifice our students'** understanding of causal reasoning**. The sacrifice has consequences for our students' knowledge of the subject matter they are debating.** For example, when feminism is defined as a single entity, not as a pluralized movement or theory, that single entity results in the **identification of patriarchy as the sole cause of oppression**. The result **is ignorance of the subject position of the particular feminist author,** for highlighting his or her subject position might draw attention to the incompleteness of the causal relationship between link and impact **Consequently, debaters do not challenge the basic assumptions of such argumentation and ignorance of feminists is perpetuated**. Feminists are not feminism. The topics of feminist inquiry are many and varied, as are the philosophical approaches to the study of these topics. Different authors have attempted categorization of various feminists in distinctive ways. For example, Alison Jaggar argues that feminists can be divided into four categories: liberal feminism, marxist feminism, radical feminism, and socialist feminism. While each of these feminists may share a common commitment to the improvement of women's situations, they differ from each other in very important ways and reflect divergent philosophical assumptions that make them each unique. Linda Alcoff presents an entirely different categorization of feminist theory based upon distinct understandings of the concept "woman," including cultural feminism and post-structural feminism. Karen Offen utilizes a comparative historical approach to examine two distinct modes of historical argumentation or discourse that have been used by women and their male allies on behalf of women's emancipation from male control in Western societies. These include relational feminism and individualist feminism. Elaine Marks and Isabelle de Courtivron describe a whole category of French feminists that contain many distinct versions of the feminist project by French authors. Women of color and third-world feminists have argued that even these broad categorizations of the various feminism have neglected the contributions of non-white, non-Western feminists (see, for example, hooks; Hull; Joseph and Lewis; Lorde; Moraga; Omolade; and Smith). In this literature, the very definition of feminism is contested. Some feminists argue that "all feminists are united by a commitment to improving the situation of women" (Jaggar and Rothenberg xii), while others have resisted the notion of a single definition of feminism, bell hooks observes, "a central problem within feminist discourse has been our inability to either arrive at a consensus of opinion about what feminism is (or accept definitions) that could serve as points of unification" (Feminist Theory 17). **The controversy over the very definition of feminism has political implications. The power to define is the power both to include and exclude people and ideas in and from that feminism**. As a result, [bjourgeois white women interested in women's rights issues have been satisfied with simple definitions for obvious reasons. Rhetorically placing themselves in the same social category as oppressed women, they were not anxious to call attention to race and class privilege (hooks. Feminist Wieory 18). Debate arguments that assume a singular conception of feminism include and empower the voices of race- and class-privileged women while excluding and silencing the voices of feminists marginalized by race and class status. This position becomes clearer **when we examine** the second assumption of arguments about feminism in intercollegiate debate - **patriarchy is the sole cause** of oppression. **Important feminist thought has resisted this assumption for good reason. Designating patriarchy as the sole cause of oppression allows the** subjugation of resistance to other forms of oppression **like racism and classism to the struggle against sexism. Such subjugation has the effect of denigrating the legitimacy of resistance to racism and classism as struggles of equal importance**. "Within feminist movement in the West, **this led to the assumption that resisting patriarchal domination is a more legitimate feminist action than resisting racism and other forms of domination**" (hooks. Talking Back 19). The relegation of struggles against racism and class exploitation to offspring status is not the only implication of the "sole cause" argument In addition, **identifying patriarchy as the single source of oppression obscures women's perpetration of other forms of subjugation and domination**, bell hooks argues that we should not obscure the reality that women can and do partici- pate in politics of domination, as perpetrators as well as victims - that we dominate, that we are dominated. **If focus on patriarchal domination masks this reality** or becomes the means by which women deflect attention from the real conditions and circumstances of our lives, **then women cooperate in suppressing and promoting false consciousness, inhibiting our capacity to assume responsibility for transforming ourselves and society** (hooks. Talking Back 20). **Characterizing patriarchy as the sole cause of oppression allows mainstream feminists to abdicate responsibility for the exercise of class and race privilege**. It casts the struggle against class exploitation and racism as secondary concerns. Current debate practice promotes ignorance of these issues because debaters appeal to conventional form, the expectation of judges that they will isolate a single link to a large impact Feminists become feminism and patriarchy becomes the sole cause of all evil. Poor causal arguments arouse and fulfill the expectation of judges by allowing us to surrender our responsibility to evaluate rhetorical proof for complex causal relationships. **The result is either the mar-ginalization or colonization of certain feminist voices**. Arguing feminism in debate rounds risks trivializing feminists. **Privileging the act of speaking about feminism over the content of speech "often turns the voices and beings of non-white women into commodity, spectacle**" (hooks, Talking Back 14). **Teaching sophisticated causal reasoning enables our students to learn more concerning the subject matter about which they argue. In this case, students would learn more about the multiplicity of feminists instead of reproducing the marginalization of many feminist voices in the debate itself**. The content of the speech of feminists must be investigated to subvert the colonization of exploited women. To do so, we must explore alternatives to the formal expectation of single-cause links to enormous impacts for appropriation of the marginal voice threatens the very core of self-determination and free self-expression for exploited and oppressed peoples. If the identified audience, those spoken to, is determined solely by ruling groups who control production and distribution, then it is easy for the marginal voice striving for a hearing to allow what is said to be overdetermined by the needs of that majority group who appears to be listening, to be tuned in (hooks, Talking Back 14). At this point, arguments about feminism in intercollegiate debate seem to be overdetermined by the expectation of common practice, the "game" that we play in assuming there is such a thing as a direct and sole causal link to a monolithic impact To play that game, we have gone along with the idea that there is a single feminism and the idea that patriarchal impacts can account for all oppression. In making this critique, I am by no means discounting the importance of arguments about feminism in intercollegiate debate. In fact, feminists contain the possibility of a transformational politic for two reasons. First, feminist concerns affect each individual intimately. We are most likely to encounter patriarchal domination "in an ongoing way in everyday life. Unlike other forms of domination, sexism directly shapes and determines relations of power in our private lives, in familiar social spaces..." (hooks. Talking Back 21). Second, the methodology of feminism, consciousness-raising, contains within it the possibility of real societal transformation. "lE]ducation for critical consciousness can be extended to include politicization of the self that focuses on creating understanding the ways sex, race, and class together determine our individual lot and our collective experience" (hooks, Talking Back 24). Observing the incongruity between advocacy of single-cause relationships and feminism does not discount the importance of feminists to individual or societal consciousness raising.

**Claims of root cause obscure theories of difference – reinforce other forms of oppression**

**Barlett, Professor of Law, 90**

Katharine T, Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law 103 Harv. L. Rev. 829

Despite the valuable insights offered by **feminist** standpoint **epistemology**, however, it **does not offer an adequate account of feminist knowing**. First, **in isolating gender as a source of oppression, feminist legal thinkers tend to** concentrate on the identification of woman's true identity beneath the oppression and thereby **essentialize her characteristics.** Catharine MacKinnon, for example, in exposing what she finds to be the total system of male hegemony, repeatedly speaks of "women's point of view," [186](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/universe/document?_m=96839354e6e5b6298dae2a338f8afac1&_docnum=3&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=c8f484cfda1cd7b1565412684c22a26d" \l "n186#n186" \t "_self) of "woman's voice," [187](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/universe/document?_m=96839354e6e5b6298dae2a338f8afac1&_docnum=3&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=c8f484cfda1cd7b1565412684c22a26d" \l "n187#n187" \t "_self) of empowering women "on our own terms," [188](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/universe/document?_m=96839354e6e5b6298dae2a338f8afac1&_docnum=3&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=c8f484cfda1cd7b1565412684c22a26d" \l "n188#n188" \t "_self) of what women "really want," [189](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/universe/document?_m=96839354e6e5b6298dae2a338f8afac1&_docnum=3&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=c8f484cfda1cd7b1565412684c22a26d" \l "n189#n189" \t "_self) and of standards that are "not ours." [190](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/universe/document?_m=96839354e6e5b6298dae2a338f8afac1&_docnum=3&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=c8f484cfda1cd7b1565412684c22a26d" \l "n190#n190" \t "_self) Ruth Colker sees the discovery of women's "authentic self" [191](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/universe/document?_m=96839354e6e5b6298dae2a338f8afac1&_docnum=3&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=c8f484cfda1cd7b1565412684c22a26d" \l "n191#n191" \t "_self) as a difficult job given the social constructions  [\*874]  imposed upon women, but nonetheless, like MacKinnon, insists upon it as a central goal of feminism. Robin West, too, assumes that woman has a "true nature" upon which to base a feminist jurisprudence. [192](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/universe/document?_m=96839354e6e5b6298dae2a338f8afac1&_docnum=3&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=c8f484cfda1cd7b1565412684c22a26d" \l "n192#n192" \t "_self) Although the essentialist positions taken by these feminists often have strategic or rhetorical value, [193](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/universe/document?_m=96839354e6e5b6298dae2a338f8afac1&_docnum=3&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=c8f484cfda1cd7b1565412684c22a26d" \l "n193#n193" \t "_self) **these positions obscure the importance of differences among women and the fact that factors other than gender victimize women. A theory that purports to isolate gender as a basis for oppression obscures these factors and even reinforces other forms of oppression**. [194](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/universe/document?_m=96839354e6e5b6298dae2a338f8afac1&_docnum=3&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=c8f484cfda1cd7b1565412684c22a26d" \l "n194#n194" \t "_self) **This error duplicates the error of other legal theories that project the meaning speakers give to their own experiences onto the experiences of others.**

**No root cause of war – complexity dooms monocausal explnalations**

**Jabri 96**
Vivienne, Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Kent, Introduction: Conflict Analysis Reconsidered,” Discourses on Violence: Conflict Analysis Reconsidered, Published by Manchester University Press ND, ISBN 0719039592, p. 3

**The study of war has produced a number of often conflicting answers to** Quincy **Wright’s question**, “Why is war thought? **Why is war fought?”**1 The **history** of human political violence **has shown that we** cannot produce monocausal explanations of war**.** Studies which concentrate on assumed innate human characteristics fail to account for the societal factors which are implicated in what is essentially an interactive and dynamic process. Similarly, **investigations which link attributes of the international system,** such as balances of power**, not only produce** contradictory findings**, but seem to negate human decision-making and psychological processes in the onset of war in specific conditions**. Studies of violent conflict aspire to uncover, through empirical investigation, patterns of behaviour which lead to war. As indicated by Holsti, studies of war may be divided into those which emphasise structural or “ecological” variables, such as the distribution of power capabilities within the system, and those which emphasise “decision-making, values, and perceptions of policy-makers” in attempts to isolate common features leading up to the decision for war.2

**The consensus of experts is on our side**

**Holsti 91**
Kalevi Jaakko, Professor of Political Science at the University of British Columbia, On The Study Of War,” Peace And War: Armed Conflicts And International Order, 1648-1989, Published by Cambridge University Press, ISBN 0521399297, p. 3

**Investigators of** conflict, crises, and **war reached a consensus years ago that monocausal explanations are theoretically and empirically** deficient. Kenneth Waltz’ (1957) classic typology of war explanations convincingly demonstrated various problems arising from diagnoses that locate war causation exclusively at the individual, state attribute, or systemic levels. He also illustrated how **prescriptions** based on faulty diagnoses **offer no solution to the problem**. Even Rousseau’s powerful exploration of the consequences of anarchy, updated by Waltz (1979), remains full of insights, but it only specifies why wars recur (there is nothing to prevent them) and offers few clues that help to predict when, where, and over what issues. Blainey (1973), in another telling attack on monocausal theories, continues where Waltz left off. He offers, on the basis of rich historical illustrations, both logical and anecdotal rebuttals of facile explanations of war that dot academic and philosophical thought on the subject. But **rebuttals of the obvious are not sufficient. We presently have myriads of theories of war, emphasizing all sorts of factors that can help explain its etiology**. As Carroll and Fink (1975) note, **there are if anything too many theories, and even too many typologies of theories**. Quoting Timascheff approvingly, they point out that anything might lead to war, but nothing will certainly lead to war.

**-at: state link**

**The state is not inherently patriarchal – reformism is a more effective way to challenge patriarchy**

**Rhode 94**

Deborah L. Rhode, Law Prof @ Stanford, April 1994, “Changing Images of the State,” 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1181, p ln

**Neither can the state be understood solely as an instrument of men's interests.** As a threshold matter, what constitutes those interests is not self-evident, as MacKinnon's own illustrations suggest. If, for example, policies liberalizing abortion serve male objectives by enhancing access to female sexuality, policies curtailing abortion presumably also serve male objectives by reducing female autonomy. n23 In effect, patriarchal frameworks verge on tautology. **Almost any gender-related policy can be seen as either directly serving men's immediate interests, or as compromising short-term concerns in the service of broader, long-term goals, such as "normalizing" the system and stabilizing power relations. A framework that can characterize all state interventions as directly or indirectly patriarchal offers little practical guidance in challenging the conditions it condemns.** And if women are not a homogenous group with unitary concerns, surely the same is true of men. Moreover, if **the state is best understood as a network of institutions with complex, sometimes competing agendas**, then the patriarchal model of single-minded instrumentalism seems highly implausible. **It is difficult to dismiss all the anti-discrimination initiatives of the last quarter century as purely counter-revolutionary strategies. And it is precisely these initiatives, with their appeal to "male" norms of "objectivity and the impersonality of procedure, that [have created**] [\*1186] **leverage for the representation of women's interests.**" n24 Cross-cultural research also suggests that **the status of women is positively correlated with a strong state, which is scarcely the relationship that patriarchal frameworks imply**. n25 While the "tyrannies" of public and private dependence are plainly related, many feminists challenge the claim that they are the same. As Carole Pateman notes, women do not "live with the state and are better able to make collective struggle against institutions than individuals." n26 To advance that struggle, **feminists need more concrete and contextual accounts of state institutions** than patriarchal frameworks have supplied. Lumping together police, welfare workers, and Pentagon officials as agents of a unitary patriarchal structure does more to obscure than to advance analysis. What seems necessary is a contextual approach that can account for greater complexities in women's relationships with governing institutions. Yet despite their limitations, patriarchal theories underscore an insight that generally informs feminist theorizing. As Part II reflects, governmental institutions are implicated in the most fundamental structures of sex-based inequality and in the strategies necessary to address it.

**\*\*\*Continues\*\*\***

These tensions within the women's movement are, of course, by no means unique. **For any subordinate group, the state is a primary source of both repression and assistance in the struggle for equality. These constituencies cannot be "for" or "against" state involvement in any categorical sense. The questions are always what forms of involvement, to what ends, and who makes these decisions**. From some feminist perspectives, liberalism has failed to respond adequately to those questions because of deeper difficulties. In part, the problem stems from undue faith in formal rights. The priority granted to individual entitlements undermines the public's sense of collective responsibility. This critique has attracted its own share of criticism from within as well as from outside the feminist community. As many left feminists, including critical race theorists, have noted, **rights-based claims have played a crucial role in advancing group as well as individual interests. n32 Such claims can express desires not only for autonomy, but also for participation in the struggles that shape women's collective existence. The priority that state institutions place on rights is not in itself problematic.** The central difficulty is the limited scope and inadequate enforcement of currently recognized entitlements. Since rights-oriented campaigns can advance as well as restrict political struggle, evaluation of their strategic value demands historically-situated contextual analysis.

**State key to deconstruct patriarchy**

**Harrington 92**

Mona, lawyer, political scientist, and writer in Cambridge, MA, “The Liberal State as an Agent of Feminist Change,” in *Gendered States: Feminist (Re)Visions of International Relations Theory*, ed. V. Spike Peterson, pg. 66

In the face of such pressures, I believe that **feminist critics of the present state system should beware. The very fact that the state creates, condenses, and focuses political power** may **make it the best friend, not the enemy, of feminists--because the availability of real political power is essential to real** democratic control. **Not sufficient, I know, but essential.** My basic premise is that **political power can significantly disrupt patriarchal** and class (which is to say, economic) **power. It holds the potential, at least, for disrupting the patriarchal/economic oppression of those in the lower reaches of class, sex, and race hierarchies. It is indisputable that,** in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, **it has been the political power of states that has confronted the massive economic power privately constructed out of industrial processes and has imposed obligations on employers for the welfare of workers as well as providing additional social supports for the population at large. And the political tempering of economic power has been the most responsive to broad public needs in liberal democracies, where governments must respond roughly to the interests of voters**.

**These benefits are too important to be ignored**

**Baldwin 97**

Margaret, Assoc. Prof Law @ FSU, Spring 1997, “Public Women and the Feminist State,” 20 Harv. Women’s L.J. 47, p 70

Women have not been strangers to campaigns for and struggles with liberal state democracies. **Feminists**, especially feminist legal activists, **have long participated in and sought benefits for all women within the political and judicial structures** of the United State, Canada and the liberal states of Western Europe. The recent celebration of the 75th anniversary of the federal female suffrage in the United States is a reminder of the longevity and persistence of women’s demands for full political rights in this country, while the repeated defeat of a federal constitutional Equal Rights Amendment inspires continued activism. **Successful campaigns for anti-discrimination legislation and litigation of gender-equity claims were significant advances for women achieved through the normative discourses** and public institutions characteristic **of liberal democracies**. Women also have struggled in South Africa and in the former Soviet bloc to secure basic democratic guarantees. **The continued integrity of the state systems through which these aims have been met is a matter toward which women cannot be indifferent**, theoretically or otherwise.