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## 1AC

### Advantage 1 – Maternal Mobility

#### Complying to normative models of identity such as citizenship, which is demanded by highway presence, sacrifice the self in the case of the woman, severing maternal identity, both literally and spiritually for the sake of the polis or culture

Luce Irigaray, 1996, I Love to You: Sketch for a Felicity within History, pg. 25

Of course we are spirit, we have been told. But what is spirit if not the means for matter to emerge and endure in its proper form, its proper forms? What is spirit if it forces the body to comply with an abstract model that is unsuited to it? That spirit is already dead. An illusory ecstasy in the beyond. The capitalization of life in the hands of a few who demand this sacrifice of the majority. More especially, the capitalization of the living by a male culture which, in giving itself death as its sole horizon, oppresses the female. Thus the master slave dialectic occurs between the sexes, forcing woman to engender life to comply with the exigencies of a universal linked to death. This also forces woman to mother her children so as to subject them to the condition of being citizens abstracted from their singularity, severed from their unique identity, arising from their genealogical and historical conception and birth, adults or adolescents who are subsequently exposed to the risk of actual death for the sake of the polis or to a spiritual death for the sake of culture.

#### Federal highways are a space that allow citizenship on one’s own terms – rights and opportunities are equal on the highway where public identity is performatively affirmed

Cotton Seiler, December 2006, “’So That We as a Race Might have Something Authentic to Travel By’: African American Automobility and Cold War Liberalism” American Quarterly, Volume 58, Number 4

Mobility is a cardinal practice of the modern subject; and the spaces of the regnant mode of American mobility—the city streets, state and federal roads and highways navigable by car—are where that subject performatively affirms his public identity. 3 Those who travel the public road without impediment are the implied citizens of what I call the “republic of drivers”—a political imaginary of anonymity and autonomy that finds expression in the practices and landscapes of automobility. The rhetoric of this republic holds that the driver enters the stream, as the citizen enters the public sphere, as a blank figure, divested of her particularities, and thereby empowered to speak, act, and move. This self-abstraction of the citizen, as Michael Warner and others have argued, disembodied political agency while at the same time making clear that only those with specific types of bodies could assume it. Like the public sphere, the road represents a form of “bad faith” whose promise of universality and uniform access masks an ascriptive hierarchy. 4 Philip Fisher has described vectors of movement such as the American road as democratic social space, “a universal and everywhere similar medium in which rights and opportunities are identical, a space in which the right and even the ability to move from place to place is assured.” This space, the essential characteristics of which are “mobility (and) the right to enter or exit,” provides a stage for the enactment of democratic, egalitarian citizenship. 5 Barbara Klinger has similarly noted the ways in which the road constitutes “a space by definition democratic since in theory no class systems or unfair hierarchies exist there; a space then where individual renewal, property relations, and industry can be achieved within a democratic framework.” 6 The road is thus the representation and product of what Charles W. Mills has called the “ideal nonracial polity,” in which “one’s personhood is guaranteed, independent of race, and as such is stable, not subject to loss or gain.” 7 These authors take various positions toward this idealized conception, but let mine be clear: the space of the American road, like the contours of citizenship, was established under specific regimes of racialized inequality and limited access whose codes it reproduces. As Kathleen Franz asserts, “although white travelers constructed the open road as a technological democracy, open to anyone who owned a car, they simultaneously limited access to automobility through a system of discrimination and representation that positioned nonwhites outside the new motor culture.”8

#### Enforcing the distinction between technology and the self ultimately that is the current dominant narrative in automobility perpetuates heterosexism and patriarchy. In the expression of the mother through the automobile, there is no clear distinction between subject and object, political and technical, breaking down these structures every time she drives

Kevin Douglas Kuswa, July 2009, “Driving Ourselves and the Rise of Maternal Auto/mobility: Wright’s (1939) The Car Belongs to Mother,” Deb(K)ate, <http://puttingthekindebate.com/2012/05/09/transportation-infrastructure-investments-and-maternal-mobility/>

Donna Haraway adds a few dimensions to the subjectivity of mobile Motherhood, especially as transformations in the domestic economy and the meaning of motherhood flow forth from industrialism. When we map the mother as a particular subject generated by the arrival of automobile transportation, one aim is to attach the domestic chauffeur to a dominant narrative perpetuated by heterosexism and patriarchal culture. The way transportation emerges in this country helps to produce a constraining subjectivity in that the mother is subordinate to the family automobile and dehumanized as the vehicle’s insufficient caretaker. Wright demonstrates, however, that the mobile Mother also expresses herself in a complex narrative of frustration and empowerment. The re-telling of the mother’s schizophrenic negotiation (or doubling) of the automobile is another challenge to “perceptions of clear distinctions between subject and object” (Haraway, 1997, p267). Haraway (1997, p269) goes further by interrogating the misplaced distance between science and feminism: “Attention to the agencies and knowledges crafted from the vantage point of nonstandard positions (positions that don’t fit but within which one must live), including the heterogeneous locations of women, and questions about for whom and for what the semiotic-material apparatuses of scientific knowledge production get built and sustained are at the heart of feminist science studies. Interrogating critical silences, excavating the reasons questions cannot make headway and seem ridiculous, getting at the denied and disavowed in the heart of what seems neutral and rational: these notions are all fundamental to feminist approaches to technoscience.”Continuing to borrow from Haraway (1997, p267), the interrogation of knowledge and what counts as meaning “depends, paradigmatically, on undoing the founding border trace of modern science–that between the technical and the political.” The border between the technical and the political collapses in two ways through the abstract diagram of the driver and the concrete diagram of the mobile Mother. First, the initial move connecting the automobile to the subject of the driver conflates the technical advance of motorized travel with the political element of individuality and freedom afforded by the possibility of driving. Second, the duality of the mobile Mother draws a series of angles that are both political and technical: the extension of domesticity into specific public spheres through the operation of a vehicle, the intensification of motherhood brought on by the opportunities and limitations of the automobile, and the exclusion of certain groups of women from the question of how technology is deployed to promote or suppress feminism within the home.

#### Woman is defined by patriarchal location as place, which loses her identity as woman, self, and being – a violent loss. The use of mobility allows woman agency in regard to location, which means she is able to constitute herself as her gender.

Lyn McCredden, 2001, Feminist Poetics of the Sacred: Creative Suspicions, page 214-215

French philosopher and psychologist Luce Irigaray has captured vividly the dynamic of women's marginalization in an androcentric world, using images of envelope and place. Woman, who is defined by patriarchal culture as the “place” or “envelope” for the other (man or child), loses all sense of herself as a separate being. The result is a radical diminishing of her “self” (body and soul), in which she is permitted to exist only for the other but not—in contrast to the man—in and for herself. This damaging withholding of identity from the woman, according to Irigaray, entails both her own psychological demise and also the loss of the other within her undeserved suffering and fall into nothingness. It results, in other words, in the ultimate impoverishing of both female and male: As for woman, she is place. Does she have to locate herself in bigger and bigger places? But also to find, situate, in herself, the place that she is. If she is unable to constitute, within herself, the place that she is, she passes ceaselessly through the child in order to return to herself. She turns around an object in order to return to herself. And this captures the other in her interiority…. Passage from one place to another, for her, remains the problem of place as such, always within the context of the mobility of her constitution. She is able to move within place as place. Within the availability of place. Given that her issue is how to trace the limits of place herself so as to be able to situate herself therein and welcome the other there. If she is to be able to contain, to envelop, she must have her own envelope. Not only her clothing and ornaments of seduction, but her skin. And her skin must contain a receptacle. She must lack • neither body, • nor extension within, • nor extension without, or she will plummet down and take the other with her. (Irigaray 1993:35)

#### **The automobile is a mechanism Mother can use to navigate her subjectivity – just as mother can be passively nurturing and violently protective, driving acts as both an escape and the upholding of the bonds of the family**

Kevin Douglas Kuswa, July 2009, “Driving Ourselves and the Rise of Maternal Auto/mobility: Wright’s (1939) The Car Belongs to Mother,” Deb(K)ate, <http://puttingthekindebate.com/2012/05/09/transportation-infrastructure-investments-and-maternal-mobility/>

How does the figure of the Mother intersect with the mobility afforded by the automobile to produce a certain trajectory of motherhood attached to many middle class married women? Following the schizophrenic protrusions of the figure of the driver (negotiating poles of intimacy and distance in relation to the automobile), we must acknowledge that metaphors can work in complementary and competing directions—the affirmation and confrontation implied by motherhood is a great example. Mothers can be both passively nurturing and violently protective. Of course the woman driver takes many paths, and Wright’s driver is usually more nurturing than violent, but each subject position flows through mixed and contradictory personas. Priscilla Wright walks both sides of the fence when she attaches the newly available automobile to her own sense of worth and freedom, while simultaneously constructing the vehicle as a disciplinary mechanism that locks her into a specific role of domestication. As Evelyn Nakano Glenn (1994, p5) posits in her article on the social constructions of mothering, to “emphasize the social base of mothering is to attend to the variation rather than searching for the universal, and to shift what has been on the margins to the center.” Just as Glenn articulates the duality of the Mother and her fierce compassion, so too does Wright articulate the duality of the mobile Mother: driving to both escape and uphold the family.

#### We must strive toward singularity from the universal, otherwise sacrifice of the maternal body will always be at the forefront, which creates a universal which is damaging to both men and women

Luce Irigaray, 1996, I Love to You: Sketch for a Felicity within History, pg. 26-28

So how can we get way from such an abstract duty, from the sacrifice of sexed identity to a universal defined by man with death as its master, for want of having known how to let life flourish as the universal? How can we discover for ourselves, between ourselves, the singularity and universality of love as the natural and spiritual realization of human identity? It will come from the evolution, the revolution in the relations between man and woman, first and foremost in the couple, and before any question of the family. The changes to be made in mother-daughter relationships are connected to this transformation of relations between the two genders of the human species, requiring the transition to a culture which is not reducible to a single gender, nor reducible to a sexed dimension that is simply genealogical, and thus to patriarchy or matriarchy. In concrete, terms, this means that each woman will no longer love her lover as Man (in general), nor will each man love his lover as a woman (who can be replaced by another). The task of making the transition from the singular to the universal thus remains for each person in his or her own unique singularity, and especially for each sex in the both singular and universal relationship it maintains with itself and with the other sex. Each woman will, therefore, be for herself woman in the process of becoming, the model for herself as a woman and for the man whom she needs, just as he needs her, to ensure the transition from nature to culture. In other words, being born a woman requires a culture particular to this sex and this gender, which it is important for the woman to realize without renouncing her natural identity. She should not comply with a model of identity imposed upon her by anyone, neither her parents, her lover, her children, the State, religion or culture in general. That does not mean she can lapse into capriciousness, dispersion, the multiplicity of her desires, or a loss of identity. She should, quite the contrary, gather herself within herself in order to accomplish her gender’s perfection for herself, for the man she loves, for her children, but equally for civil society, for the world of culture, for a definition of the universal corresponding to reality. With regard to this task, claiming to be equal to a man is a serious ethical mistake because by so doing woman contributes to the erasure of natural and spiritual reality in an abstract universal that serves only one master: death. Aside from her own suicide, she thus deprives man of the possibility of defining himself as a man, that is as a naturally and spiritually sexed person. For each man must remain a man in the process of becoming. He himself has to accomplish the task of being this man he is by birth and a model of humanity, a model that is both corporeal and spiritual. It is not right form him to leave himself to the woman’s cultural maternal care, especially as she, not being him, cannot take responsibility for him. He has to become man by himself, to grow without her and without opposing himself to her in the process. He must be capable of sublimating his instincts and drives himself, not only his partial drives but also his genital drives. Extolling the pre-oedipal as a liberation from the norm of genital sexuality entails all the caprice and immaturity of desire exercised to the detriment of becoming human as a genus, as two genders. And to those who advocate the pre-oedipal against Freud the response is simple: the sublimation of the pre-genital is present in Freud’s work, but not the sublimation of genitality which is reduced to reproduction.

### Plan

#### Plan: The United States federal government should substantially increase its interstate highway investment in the United States

### Solvency

#### Legislative action regarding highway infrastructure key – it is more effective than social movements alone, as highways are a federal issue

Raymond A. Mohl, 2008, “The Interstates and the Cities: The U.S. Department of Transportation and the Freeway Revolt, 1966-1973” The Journal of Policy History, Volume 20, Number 2

The modest success of the Freeway Revolt of the 1960s is generally attributed to the persistence of grassroots, neighborhood opposition movements around the nation. Those movements no doubt had significant impact. However, the anti-expressway movement also must be located and interpreted within the wider context of the shifting political, legislative, and bureaucratic environment in Washington, D.C., during the 1960s and early 1970s. Transportation policymaking at the congressional level, and especially in the House and Senate public works committees, responded to opposition movements, but also to many special-interest groups with much at stake. The executive branch also engaged in policymaking, as presidents Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon sent key transportation bills to the Congress or vetted others through the Bureau of the Budget. Executive and legislative action had important consequences, but this article argues that the crucial response to the Freeway Revolt took place at the level of policy implementation. Beginning in 1966, the new U.S. Department of Transportation (dot), through its constituent agencies—the Federal Highway Administration and the Bureau of Public Roads—had responsibility for getting the interstates completed. But dot leadership balanced that objective against the demonstrated negative impacts of building expressways in built-up urban areas. The first two secretaries of the dot, Alan S. Boyd and John A. Volpe, along with high-level federal highway administrators, mediated highway disputes, promoted alternative methods of urban transit, advocated diversion of highway trust funds for other transportation uses, and made crucial shutdown decisions on several controversial urban expressways. Through policy and procedure manuals, federal highway agencies imposed new rules and regulations that curbed many of the excesses of state highway engineers. Many executive branch transportation bills were first written in the dot. This article, then, focuses primarily on how the federal highway bureaucracy responded to the Freeway Revolt and charted new directions on controversial highway matters.

## Inherency

### Act Now

#### Timing key – must subsidize roads

Louise Nelson Dyble, Associate Director for Research atThe Keston Institute for Public Finance and Infrastructure Policy at University of Southern California, July 2009, “Reconstructing Transportation: Linking Tolls and Transit for Place-Based Mobility,” *Technology and Culture*, 50.3

Timing was crucial for the political development of transportation financing and administration in the United States more than a century ago. Automobiles appeared on the scene just as a nationwide “good roads” movement was gaining momentum, and its leaders lobbied aggressively to secure subsidies for local and regional road systems. This coincided with a general enthusiasm for public enterprise that was an important component of Progressive Era politics. Support for publicly funded road systems was part of that enthusiasm, which propelled the adoption of gasoline taxes by all forty-eight states between 1919 and 1929.3 Even as mass production reduced the price of automobiles and their popularity surged, the institutional framework for providing infrastructure to accommodate this celebrated new technology was already taking shape. And it was fully, securely public. Gas taxes were paid in small increments, easy to collect, distributed by state officials advised by expert engineers, and protected from “diversion”—at first politically, later legally. Promoted as fair and legitimate, this source of funding for roads and highways was popular among local and state officials and easily adaptable to the collaborative, business- and development-friendly “associative state” ideal in the 1920s. Highway engineers, automobile manufacturers, and major industrial and business organizations have supported government-subsidized “free” roads in the United States ever since, not only because they served their financial interests, but also for ideological reasons. Influential policy makers, including U.S. presidents from Herbert Hoover to Barack Obama, have viewed road-building as one of the appropriate ways in which government could promote economic growth and employment opportunities without undue interference in market mechanisms or established business practices.4

## Advantages

### General

#### Interstates require demolishing cities, primarily in urban, poor, racially diverse areas

Raymond A. Mohl, 2008, “The Interstates and the Cities: The U.S. Department of Transportation and the Freeway Revolt, 1966-1973” The Journal of Policy History, Volume 20, Number 2

The interstates were good for the economy, the commuters and truckers, and the suburban developers and retailers, but they had a devastating impact on American cities. In Miami, a single massive interstate interchange of Interstate-95 took up forty square blocks and demolished the black business district and the homes of some 10,000 people. In New York City, the Cross-Bronx Expressway gouged a seven-mile trench through a primarily lower-middle-class Jewish community, ripping through a wall of apartment houses and dislocating thousands of families and small businesses. In Cleveland, a network of expressways displaced some 19,000 people by the early 1970s. A three-and-a-half-mile inner-city expressway in Pittsburgh forced 5,800 people from their homes. A Kansas City, Missouri, midtown freeway was routed through a Model City area and nearby neighborhoods, ultimately destroying 1,800 buildings and displacing several thousand residents. A planned but never built Inner Loop freeway in Washington, D.C., would have demolished 65,000 housing units. In Baltimore, Milwaukee, Indianapolis, and St. Paul, expressways plowed through black communities, reducing thousands of low-income housing units to rubble. And so it went across urban America, as the interstates penetrated the central cities. The Interstate Highway System, transportation scholar Alan Altshuler has written, “subjected cities—particularly older, high-density cities—to major surgery, on a scale without precedent in American history.” 3 By the mid-1960s, the freeway revolt had spread to several dozen cities. In New Orleans, preservationists and neighborhood groups challenged a planned Riverfront Expressway that ran through the city’s historic French Quarter. In Baltimore, a biracial coalition of thirty-five neighborhood organizations called Movement Against Destruction conducted a long-running battle with business leaders and highway engineers who supported inner-city expressways through black communities, historic districts, and the city’s waterfront area. In Nashville, the I-40 Steering Committee worked to save the North Nashville black com-munity from the highwaymen, eventually taking their argument to the federal courts, but unsuccessfully. Protesting the route of Interstate-85 through the Montgomery, Alabama, black community, a Property Owners Committee petitioned directly to President John F. Kennedy, with some modest success. In Washington, D.C., a biracial coalition called the Emergency Committee on the Transportation Crisis (ectc) labeled freeways “an instrument of war against the urban population.” ectc often took to the streets to protest the thirty-eight interstate miles planned for the nation’s capital—actions that contributed to the abandonment of almost all Washington’s planned freeways. Anti-highway activists in Seattle formed several protest organizations to challenge express-way planning in that city. In Memphis, Citizens to Preserve Overton Park went all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court, successfully, to halt plans to build Interstate-40 through the center of one of the nation’s largest urban wilderness parks. 4 As Daniel P. Moynihan pointed out in 1970, “A bare fifteen years after the Interstate program commenced, it is just about impossible to get a major highway program approved in most large American cities.”

### Democracy

#### Highways are an imperative that give a cultural sense of empowerment

Kathleen Franz, January 2009, “Motoring: The Highway Experience in America (review)” Technology and Culture, Volume 50, Number 1

Jakle and Sculle define motoring as a concept through which “drivers, machines, and highways became integrally linked” with a set of distinctive places (p. 1). Examining how motoring transformed American geography in the twentieth century, they focus not only on politicians, automakers, and planners but also the “role of the common motorist” and how the “delights of visual landscape encounter grounded America’s infatuation with a motorized transport system” (p.5). Why did Americans become so invested in motoring? Why did vested interests win over critics of highway development? Jakle and Sculle argue that motoring, through an intoxicating mix of speed and convenience, reconfigured the American landscape and daily life; “highway as open road became a kind of cultural imperative” that gave all Americans a sense of empowerment that outweighed the negatives of higher taxes for highway construction, the frustrations of traffic jams, and the detrimental effects of sprawl (p.6).

### Race

#### Mobility is a raced issue.

Cotton Seiler, December 2006, “’So That We as a Race Might have Something Authentic to Travel By’: African American Automobility and Cold War Liberalism” American Quarterly, Volume 58, Number 4

Because spatial mobility has often been a means to or evidence of the social mobility of racial others, regimes of white supremacy have sought to control or curtail those forms and moments of black mobility that they could not instrumentalize for their own purposes. For example, in addition to imposing the Black Codes and Jim Crow in the decades between Emancipation and World War I, southern legislatures attempted to limit the mobility of African Americans, though such measures were generally piecemeal and unable to pre-vent the migrations to the north during and after Reconstruction. According to William Cohen, these years marked “a time when southern blacks lived at freedom’s edge, suspended between the world of slavery that had once been theirs and a world of freedom that still belonged mostly to whites. The extent of black freedom varied with time and place, but always the right to move without hindrance was one of its most important features.” 9 A chief effect of Jim Crow in the twentieth century was “a geography of thwarted action, of arrested motion” for African Americans. 10 The cold war offered a cruel new dimension to black immobility in the age of white flight, as shown in the civil-defense map of the fictional “River City” in Philip Wylie’s 1954 doomsday novel Tomorrow! which places the “Negro District” at ground zero. 11 Spatial forms, Manuel Castells has written, provide a “fundamental material dimension” of any given society, and will therefore express that society’s relationships of dominance and subordination. Yet “spatial forms will also be marked by resistance from exploited classes (and) oppressed subjects. And the work of this contradictory historical process on space will be accomplished on an already inherited spatial form, the product of history and support of new interests, projects, protests, and dreams.” 12 Ideal figurations of the road disintegrate when one contrasts Coalhouse Walker’s capacities for self-determination and convenient self-erasure with those of Younger Brother. Yet African Americans in the twentieth century, subject to whites’ “extraordinary efforts to limit their freedom to occupy, use, or even move through space,” nonetheless affirmed idealized spaces and moments of freedom. Consequently, the iconic road they crafted through imagery and narrative was both democratic social space and racial minefield. 13 Automobility’s promise was one of escape from Jim Crow: upward through socioeconomic strata and outward across geographical space. Yet Coalhouse Walker’s story synthesizes—and rewrites as revenge tragedy—countless stories of trouble on the road that have informed a black “highway consciousness” distinct from that of white drivers. From the earliest days of automobility, overlapping and mutually sustaining racist laws, social codes, and commercial practices have attenuated the mobility of the black driver: segregated roadside mechanical and medical aid, food, and shelter; the discriminatory membership policies of motoring organizations such as the American Automobile Associa-tion; profiling of minority drivers by law enforcement; the racial-spatial politics of highway planning and placement, especially in urban areas; the race-bound economics of auto financing and insurance underwriting; and the venerable practice of general police harassment for “driving while black.” 14 Moreover, since the advent of mass automobility in the 1920s, participation in the automotive market served to delineate the boundaries of republican personhood. As driving and car ownership were anchored by themes of competence and self-determination, the figures of the driver and the citizen were easily and often conflated, as they were established in racialized (and gendered) terms. A 1923 auto trade journal, for example, defined “illiterate, immigrant, Negro and other families” as aliens in the auto consumer’s polity. 15 Myriad representations of nonwhites and immigrants as physically graceless, technologically inept, and deservedly indigent served as reminders of the incapacity of racial others to fulfill the obligations of citizenship in a modern and complex republic. Even the masterful prizefighter Jack Johnson was not immune from the stereotype of black driving incompetence. Johnson’s unsuccessful 1910 challenge of the white driving champion Barney Oldfield led another white racer, “Wild Bob” Burman, to assert, “Just because Johnson has succeeded in reaching the top in pugilism, it does not alter the fact that he is a Negro and is not entitled to prestige in the cleaner and better sport of automobile racing.” 16 African Americans challenged these representations, supplying counterim-ages and counternarratives emphasizing mastery, elegance, self-possession, and decorum. Paul Gilroy has recently observed that blacks’ “histories of confinement and coerced labour must have given them additional receptivity to the pleasures of auto-autonomy as a means of escape, transcendence and even resistance.” 17 In 1922, the Chicago Defenderchronicled A. L. Headen’s journey from Chicago to Kansas City, celebrating “both the superior design of the car and Headen’s technological expertise and physical prowess.” 18 Charlie Wiggins, “The Negro Speed King,” was held up as a model of guts and wits for his exploits on the segregated racing circuit. 19 Arna Bontemps’s grim 1932 short story “A Summer Tragedy” features an elderly black couple, worn down by years of sharecropping, using “the little rattletrap car [that] had been regarded as a peculiar treasure” as their implement of suicide. Like their decrepit Model T, the couple is “used up,” no longer useful to the regime of production; yet their suicide—dressed in their Sunday best, they drive into a rushing river—testifies to self-possession and dignity even in despair. 20 “It’s mighty good to be the skipper for a change,” wrote Washington, D.C., schoolteacher Alfred Edgar Smith, “and pilot our craft whither and when we will. . . . it’s good for the spirit to give the old railroad Jim Crow the laugh.” 21 Smith’s farewell wave to Jim Crow in the rearview mirror was, in 1933, a year that saw at least twenty-four lynchings, a premature gesture. In Robert MacNeill’s 1938 WPA photograph “New Car,” a proud driver-owner stands with one foot on the running board, smiling cavalierly and surrounded by admirers. 22 Seven years later, Chester Himes’s novel If He Hollers Let Him Gofeatured a protagonist to whom the roadscapes of Los Angeles offer a space for racial combat. This character, Bob Jones, avers that his Buick Roadmaster is “proof of something to me, a symbol”; the car is also his instrument in a score-settling campaign wherein he doles out “stare for stare, hate for hate” to whites in his peregrinations around the city. While the white drivers he challenges and overtakes may well enjoy their morning commute, Jones tells us, “to me it was racial. . . . all I wanted in the world was to push my Buick Roadmaster over some white peckerwood’s face.” 23 Whatever Jones’s personal satisfactions, Jim Crow is diminished not in the slightest. A disproportionate number of black road narratives impress upon the reader the traveler’s near-constant anxiety on unfamiliar roads. Journalist Courtland Milloy recalled from his childhood a menacing environment in which “so many black travelers were just not making it to their destinations.” More recently, writer Eddy Harris has recounted his motorcycle journey through a southern landscape where he is “glared at, threatened, turned away, called names, and made afraid.”24 Given the racist harassment and violence the automobile’s signification of affluence and “a kind of mystically perceived total freedom” could prompt, it is unsurprising that, unlike their white-authored counterparts, black road narratives “do not concern the pursuit of the ideal self ”; rather, they “reveal the fraudulence of space viewed as an essence, transcending class and color” an “resist all utopian fantasies predicated on the virtues of elsewhere.” 25 And yet those narratives, such as the guidebooks examined here, engaged nonetheless with a utopian fantasy peculiar to and animated by the political imaginary of corporate liberalism; that fantasy, glimpsed by bell hooks as a young girl conjures a place “beyond the sign of race” just behind the horizon. 26

#### There is equality on the road

Cotton Seiler, December 2006, “’So That We as a Race Might have Something Authentic to Travel By’: African American Automobility and Cold War Liberalism” American Quarterly, Volume 58, Number 4

There was some truth to automobility’s promise for African Americans. Despite the violence and intimidation directed toward black drivers, the road even in its earlier iteration had to some degree provided a space where the everyday discrimination and coercion African Americans faced in other public spaces—in stores, theaters, public buildings, and restaurants, for example, or on sidewalks and public transportation—could be blunted, circumvented, and even avenged. “Only in automobiles on public roads,” one commentator wrote in 1936, “do landlords and tenants and white people and Negroes of the Black Belt meet on a basis of equality.” Another noted the procedural equality mandated by the “rules of the road” even in the rural South of the early 1900s. “The geographic mobility and equality on the road of automobile travel,” historian Cory Lesseig writes of the early twentieth century, “helped usher in a new age of political, social, and economic opportunity for Mississippi.” 68 “I wasn’t particularly happy about driving in the South,” Chester Himes wrote in his autobiography, The Quality of Hurt. “I had a bad temper and wanted to avoid trouble. But it was like driving anywhere else—priorities were controlled by the traffic laws. They don’t discriminate against cars, just people.” 69

#### Highways are better than state roads – allow anonymity of the driving subject

Cotton Seiler, December 2006, “’So That We as a Race Might have Something Authentic to Travel By’: African American Automobility and Cold War Liberalism” American Quarterly, Volume 58, Number 4

At the same time, the interstate highway as a new, temporarily inhabitable space enabled an emancipatory leveling of the status-oriented social relations that characterized premodernity. Driving on—or, more accurately, within—the more totalized space of the interstates diminished the risk of humiliation of and violence against “marked” drivers, especially when compared to the state roads, which, passing through every town and accessible at myriad crossroads, exposed those drivers to the casual racism of white citizens and the various prejudices and predilections of local businesses and law enforcement. It was the limited-access, high-speed interstate, rather than the automobile, that affected the anonymity of the driving subject. “Once you were on the Interstate,” Tom Lewis observes, “you could be anywhere; an Interstate in the Deep South felt much like an Interstate in the North.” Lewis’s claim that, “at last, African Americans enjoyed the right to move where and when they wanted” is an egregious overstatement; but the neutral space of the interstate system and its standardized gas-food-lodging environs did indeed afford black motorists “a measure of protection . . . however thin a veneer as that protection might be.” 71 The interstate highway, set apart from and above the landscape and local culture through which it cut, provided the spatial opportunity for the obscuring of one’s identity from the scrutiny of others. The self-obscuring speed and procedural regulation of highway driving provides a metaphor for the abstraction of the liberal subject in the political public sphere.

#### Federal highways upset tyrannies, opened horizons for civil rights

Cotton Seiler, December 2006, “’So That We as a Race Might have Something Authentic to Travel By’: African American Automobility and Cold War Liberalism” American Quarterly, Volume 58, Number 4

It is important to see the deterritorialized and standardized space of the interstate highway system in the context of a more overarching federal presence—and with it a progressive weakening of parochialism—effected by World War II and its aftermath, the cold war. Virginia Scharff notes that postwar America saw “new political and economic connections [which] penetrated and disrupted settled patterns of locale and of region, offering unprecedented opportunities and risks. People and places often suffered in the change, but the breaching of local isolation by nationalizing forces also carried the power to upset local tyrannies and offer open horizons.” 72 Certainly, Miami’s black Overtown neighborhood, decimated by the building of I-395, was one of these places that suffered in the change; but so too was rural Florida rendered less menacing to African American drivers, velocitized by the highway and sustained by increasingly national “McDonaldized” amenity businesses at the interchanges. 73 This new national public space of which the interstate system was but one example would be the ground on which the civil rights movement would expand, and in which Jim Crow would be buried. It was this space of and from which Chuck Berry sang in his “motorvatin’” songs “Maybellene” (1955) and “No Particular Place to Go” (1956) as he seized the independence promised by the automobile and hurtled down the highway, bound only by the gas gauge and the limits of the pavement. And this space would also render superfluous the guidebooks that had served the black drivers of the previous decades. “20 years of Service to the Negro Traveler,” the cover of the 1957 edition of the Green Bookreminded readers. But the cover depicted no black travelers, no golf clubs, no Cadillacs, just an overhead view of the sleek, deracinated space of the interstate highway (fig. 5).

### Maternity – Structural

#### **Automobile access helped equalize women within the family structure**

Kevin Douglas Kuswa, July 2009, “Driving Ourselves and the Rise of Maternal Auto/mobility: Wright’s (1939) The Car Belongs to Mother,” Deb(K)ate, <http://puttingthekindebate.com/2012/05/09/transportation-infrastructure-investments-and-maternal-mobility/>

On a less abstract plane, road-users emerged as truckers with specific economic interests tied to the process of driving, as well as private individuals running errands or recreating. Through the advent of motorized vehicles, the body took on new roles and was produced in new and varied ways. The driver was molded into a specific subject capable of distinct modes of circulation. This body was expected to operate the speed and acceleration of a motorized vehicle by strapping to a chair, manipulating a combination of levers and pedals, and following certain speed limits and other road norms to ensure safety and reach the desired destination. Despite these new demands on the body of the driver, the physical requirements of driving were less strenuous than previous forms of transit, per mile traveled. This new efficiency prompted James Flink (1988, p162) to comment: “Because driving an automobile requires skill rather than physical strength, women could control one far easier than they could a spirited team (of horses).” Indeed, the car was not a privilege reserved to men as much as it was an extension of the domestic duties performed by many women. Ruth Schwartz Cowan (1983, p85) explained the significance of the car and the driver to the 20th Century figure of the Mother: “By mid-century, the automobile had become, to the American housewife of the middle classes, what the cast-iron stove in the kitchen would have been to her counterpart of 1850—the vehicle through which she did much of her most significant work, and the work locale where she could be most often found.”

#### **Women have significant influence in the automobile industry**

Kevin Douglas Kuswa, July 2009, “Driving Ourselves and the Rise of Maternal Auto/mobility: Wright’s (1939) The Car Belongs to Mother,” Deb(K)ate, <http://puttingthekindebate.com/2012/05/09/transportation-infrastructure-investments-and-maternal-mobility/>

Even though Pettifer and Turner may erase women from the driving experience prior to 1956, their history does not write over the experiences of the tens of thousands of women who put themselves behind the wheel as the highway machine made its entrance. In 1899, the same year the first U.S. driver’s license was issued to a woman from Chicago, women in society clubs decorated cars with flowers and drove them in a New Port, Rhode Island parade (McShane, 1997, p26). In 1903, Oldsmobile began advertisements in the Ladies’ Home Journal and a group of women drivers formed their own auto club in New York City.[2] From the very beginnings of the auto industry, advertisements had been directed toward women under the assumption that those women who did not drive the family car would at least be directly involved in its purchase. In 1910, Laura Dent Crane published the first of a “six-volume Automobile Girls Series” called Automobile Girls along the Hudson. By 1917, 23 percent of drivers in Los Angeles were women (McShane, 1997, p30-53). Clearly, women were extending themselves into these automobile as drivers. Flink (1988, p163) notes that “most of the comfort and convenience options added to cars—including vanity mirrors, plush upholstery, heaters, air conditioning, and automatic transmissions—were innovated with the ladies especially in mind.”

#### **Mother fulfills negotiates multiple roles through the automobile**

Kevin Douglas Kuswa, July 2009, “Driving Ourselves and the Rise of Maternal Auto/mobility: Wright’s (1939) The Car Belongs to Mother,” Deb(K)ate, <http://puttingthekindebate.com/2012/05/09/transportation-infrastructure-investments-and-maternal-mobility/>

Beginning with the concern that marriage is more about being a chauffeur than being in love, Wright (1939, p1) imagines a set of wedding vows that would include a promise to drive the children to school in foul weather and to pick up the husband’s clothes from the cleaners. She only entertains this rebellious thought momentarily, for such a “disillusioning clause would mean fewer marriages, a lower birth rate, and a marked decline in suburban property values.” Not about to risk such a dramatic restructuring of family life, Wright (1939, p1) consents: “Better that woman should continue to bend her back to the yoke, and keep her hand on the throttle.” This axiom of automobile martyrdom does not hold for single women, working women, or married women who aren’t responsible for driving their husbands to the station—the “keep-to-the-throttle” message is “concerned wholly with the suburban husbands who live too far from the station to walk to it and who wouldn’t walk to it anyway” (Wright, 1939, p2). As the mobile Mother drives the family to and from school, work, baseball practice, the cleaners, music lessons, the market, and the swimming pool, she both fulfills her role as an American housewife and circumvents it at the same time by taking charge through various regulation and management strategies.[4] When the family purchases a new car, the husband attempts to take control of the vehicle by lecturing the rest of the family on its care and use. Even though the mother will eventually discover the peculiarities of their new vehicle, the husband attempts to assert his dominance by lecturing from the pamphlets and instruction books, “and the wife has to listen, perforce” (Wright, 1939, p61). Not only does she have to listen, she has to remain passive and submissive to give her husband the illusion of control. The wife must muster all of her courage as a strategy of self-protection: “During this period, indeed, she can do nothing but call on all her inner resources of courage and strength and remind herself that, like the dew of the morning, it soon will pass, although it may take longer” (Wright, 1939, p61). The point is not to interpret the mindset of the infantalized wife, but to map the way relations among family members operate through the functions of the car. The roles of the mobile Mother seem to shift back and forth in tandem with the car–the car is personified at times as the quiet but dependable servant of the family and the mother is empowered at times as the gatekeeper of transit.[5]

#### **Strategic essentialism around automobiles gives emancipatory potential to women**

Kevin Douglas Kuswa, July 2009, “Driving Ourselves and the Rise of Maternal Auto/mobility: Wright’s (1939) The Car Belongs to Mother,” Deb(K)ate, <http://puttingthekindebate.com/2012/05/09/transportation-infrastructure-investments-and-maternal-mobility/>

In one way, Priscilla Wright (1939) and her interrogation of the relationship between the car and the Mother has generated a genealogy of leaving the house and all that it entails. Indeed, her work could be positioned to operate alongside the notion of an emancipatory potential for selectively deployed technologies. In her move following the articulation of the chauffeur’s social space, Wright embraces a Spivak-style of “strategic essentialism” by critiquing the father’s presence in the sphere of the schoolyard. She does this by isolating the male essence (or masculine traits) implicit in the Father’s arrival at the school and then criticizing his general lack of understanding and effectiveness in such an environment. The schoolyard and its parking lot are almost a “private public” open to mothers and their children but not to fathers and their brash style. It is valuable to chart Wright’s essentialism (of women as masters of the domestic economy and men as incapable of successfully raising or tending to the children) as partially resistant to the male norm. Such transgression may only take place in the school parking lot, but in that arena Wright (1939, p17) associates the father with an unwelcome intruder capable of disrupting the balance of the local environment: “Yet leave the girls to themselves and everything goes off like clockwork, not a fender or bumper scratched and the schoolyard cleaned with swiftness and skill. Let one man come into the yard, however, and there is sure to be trouble….Let one lone father, home for the day and eager to help, drive in, and pandemonium reigns. He utterly fails to grasp the spirit of informality and camaraderie that prevails. When he sees what is to him a jigsaw puzzle of cars, he immediately becomes outraged and panic stricken, and in two minutes has turned a peaceful social schoolyard into a madhouse of honking horns and locked bumpers.”

#### Analysis of motherhood is crucial to gender studies

Judith Still, July 2007, “Continuing Debates About ‘French’ Feminist Theory,” French Studies: A Quarterly Review, Volume 61, Number 3

Motherhood is vitally important in analysis of gender — it is not a marginal¶ question but materially and psychically essential. To return to Moi’s guide:¶ The working class is potentially revolutionary because it is indispensable to the capitalist economy,¶ not because it is marginal to it. In the same way women are central—not marginal—to the process¶ of reproduction. It is precisely because the ruling order cannot maintain the status quo without the¶ continued exploitation and oppression of these groups that it seeks to mask their central¶ economic role by marginalizing them on the cultural, ideological and political levels. (p. 171)24¶ My only query with respect to this helpful point would be to question whether¶ ‘in the same way’ is justified. As Moi herself would point out (in her analysis of¶ Beauvoir), the differences between women as a category and the working class¶ are important. Luce Irigaray argues that mothers, and women in general,¶ should not be assimilated to the natural element in humanity; motherhood is¶ not a passive condition, but (I would say) a kind of hospitality: ‘Il est plutoˆ t¶ question d’accepter librement de partager sa vie, sa chair, son souffle —¶ donc en quelque sorte son aˆme — avec l’enfant a` qui on donne naissance’.25¶ Similarly, Kristeva writes of maternity: ‘Il y a de la vie et elles peuvent la¶ donner: nous pouvons la donner’.26 She argues that giving (everyday) life,¶ giving time, giving meaning are forms of the sacred.27

### Maternity – Cyborg

#### **Driver and automobile are not distinct**

Kevin Douglas Kuswa, July 2009, “Driving Ourselves and the Rise of Maternal Auto/mobility: Wright’s (1939) The Car Belongs to Mother,” Deb(K)ate, <http://puttingthekindebate.com/2012/05/09/transportation-infrastructure-investments-and-maternal-mobility/>

What concrete traits make up our identities as we participate in the highway machine? What are the effects of America’s addiction to cars and speed? What do cars and speed mean for American individualism? What does the emerging notion of the driver do to our communities, our families, or our bodies? How does the motor vehicle take over our lives so quickly and so pervasively? What types of people fall into (and out of) place through the discourse of the driver’s seat? And, interlocking all of these questions: What makes a machine distinct from a horse or even from the human body? Is the driver distinct from the machine being driven? Driving no longer involved building or assembling. Marking this transition, Dunbar (1915) positioned the human race on the cusp of a technological revolution in transportation—the edge of an era where a majority of Americans would ride in cars every day, yet not have a solid idea what made the vehicle move (nor want such knowledge). Human “auto” agency became possible, but always contained by the mechanism of circulation and the availability of roads.

#### **Technology of the automobile has productive and emancipatory potential**

Kevin Douglas Kuswa, July 2009, “Driving Ourselves and the Rise of Maternal Auto/mobility: Wright’s (1939) The Car Belongs to Mother,” Deb(K)ate, <http://puttingthekindebate.com/2012/05/09/transportation-infrastructure-investments-and-maternal-mobility/>

The maneuvering of the automobile necessary for chauffeuring demonstrates a certain mastery of surrounding technology. As much more than a coping strategy, agency abounds in the image “of two women jockeying their cars so that, without shutting of the motors or putting on the breaks, they can draw alongside each other in the middle of the road and pass through the open windows boxes containing costumes for school plays or cakes for food sales” (Wright, 1939, p17). Does this manipulation of space by the mobile Mother resist what Donna Haraway (1991, p19) calls technological applications of the “political principle of domination”? Haraway explains this argument by mapping machinery and its scientific base as complicit in domination: “The political principle of domination has been transformed here into the legitimating scientific principle of dominance as a natural property with a physical-chemical base. Manipulations, concepts, organizing principles–the entire range of the tools of science–must be seen to be penetrated by the principle of domination.[6]“ Yet, Haraway realizes later that science and technology cannot be demonized–at least not without also admitting to their productive potential. As an escape from the specifics of certain oppressive arrangements, machines and their functions must be reclaimed and re-articulated. Put differently, technologies have effects that can be productive and emancipatory, as well as destructive and restrictive.

### Maternity – Psychoanalysis

#### Nostalgia activated by mobility requires a relationship to the maternal

Theresa M. Krier, 2001, Birth Passages: Maternity and Nostalgia, Antiquity to Shakespeare, page 22-24

In this chapter I make constellations of Klein's, Winnicott's, and Irigaray's thinking on relations between infant and mother. Their array of figures for space and aggression (appearing now as mobility, now as hate) will prove resources for the literary-historical arguments of subsequent chapters. Aggression will prove a resource against nostalgia— much as mobility and aggression are resources for Emerson, who presides over this chapter and represents an antecedent American inflection of the British and French thinkers. 1. My thoughts in this chapter are partial in both senses of the word: they comprise a specific argument and they are not meant as a comprehensive overview. It will seem odd at first to read Irigaray along with Klein and Winnicott. Aside from the fact of their inhabiting different historical and intellectual universes, Klein remained committed to specific fantasies of the body's organs, corporeal containers, and alimentary systems in ways that Irigaray rejects; and Winnicott, who had little interest in theorizing language, would probably have deflected Irigaray's pursuits of “male” and “female” as categories within discourse. But Klein and Winnicott open up unexpected, oblique, and fruitful ways to use Irigaray's powerful critiques of gender and figurative writing. And Irigaray's poetic elaborations of movement, passage, fluids, air, interval, and paying the debt to the mother are elegantly anticipated in the gestures of Winnicott's papers and clinical practice. I turn the absence of linguistic theorizing in Klein and Winnicott to positive tactical advantage for the duration of this book: this absence frees us to think about phenomena of poetic language outside the structuralist paradigms undergirding Lacanian and Kristevan analyses of language, paradigms which may block efforts to imagine maternity beyond loss and lack. Lynne Huffer speaks of the “Western, deconstructive tradition of thought that looks at language as the differential play of presence and absence” and argues that deconstruction requires nostalgia for an absent mother: Within that tradition, the logic of replacement can be described as a system whereby a term—the word or the sign—can come to the fore only by effacing another term—the thing or the referent—that it ostensibly sets out to name. If we further contextualize that logic of replacement within a psychoanalytic tradition of thought, the play of presence and absence can be articulated in the vocabulary of gendered subjects. . . . Significantly, this logic of appearance and disappearance, of moving toward something only to erase it, describes [a] nostalgic structure. . . . A nostalgic structure both creates and obliterates a lost object. . . . nostalgia requires an absent mother. 2. Making no structuralist assumptions about language, Winnicott and Klein give us instruments with which to think about maternity in language outside dominant linguistic models; Irigaray turns structuralist implications against themselves and looks to nonstructuralist symbolic traditions (from pre-Enlightenment Europe, from the Far East) for new ways to bring mothers and birth into the symbolic. For instance, Winnicott's and Irigaray's splendid insistence on breath and mobility—effectively a secular pneumatology—activates us to consider how old poems figure animation, inspiration, personification, apostrophe, and voice. 3.

#### Sacrifice of subjectivity happens for the sake of a universal masculine ideal

AnneCaldwell**,** Assistant Professor in Political Science at the University of Louisville, 2002 “Transforming Sacrifice: Irigaray and the Politics of Sexual Difference,” *Hypatia*, Volume 17, Number 4

For Irigaray, **the institution of sacrificial ideals is paralleled by the emergence of male subjectivity as the only subjectivity.** Because this single subjectivity has been male, her work is a critique of masculine subjectivity. However, her **rejection of a sacrifice of men in favor of a single feminine subjectivity indicates she targets any single model of subjectivity.** **The subject identifies with the universal by disavowing any relation to the material or particular, and by projecting this rejected detritus onto others who become the limit marking the subject's universal status** (Deutscher 1994; Lacan 1998, 84). **Because subjectivity is defined by this process of disavowal and transcendence, the development of subjectivity that requires something be set up to be overcome in this way.** Irigaray characterizes this process in her depiction of the excavating male subject. "He can sustain himself only by bouncing back off some objectiveness, some objective. If there is no more 'earth' to press down/repress, to work, to represent, but also and always to desire (for one's own), no opaque matter which in theory does not know herself, then what pedestal remains for the existence of the 'subject'? For what would there be to rise up from and exercise his power over?" (Irigaray 1985a, 133). ¶ **Subjectivity itself becomes sacrificial. It denies the worldly conditions of existence such as embodiment, sexuation, and the relation to others, even as it depends upon them as the suppressed ground of its development.** Like Friedrich Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger, **she sees the origins of sacrifice in the resentment of an ambiguous world and the effort to relieve ourselves "from experiencing the limitations and contingencies that constitute Being-in-the-world"** (Thiele 1995, 71). 4 **In taking itself to be the only subject, Irigaray suggests the male gender denies "its own ambivalence or involves the other gender therein," claiming a "monopoly on simplicity and right"** (1993a, 114). **Just as a single ideal or universal is produced through a disavowal of materiality and multiplicity, a single model of subjectivity denies the existence of others.** "To want the absolute is not to want those frustrations, privations, temperings that occur when we renounce the immediate for the self so as to secure the work of the negative in the relationship with the other" (1993a, 110). ¶ Thus, while Margaret Whitford suggests Irigaray "comes dangerously close to suggesting the possibility that there might be a culture without sacrifice" and that "it is easier to attribute violence to an other (like patriarchy) than to consider the implications of the inevitable violence at the heart of identity" (Whitford 1994, 29), Irigaray claims **it is "sacrificial societies who live or survive on persistent deception"** (Irigaray 1993a, 77). For Irigaray **it is the structure of sacrifice that denies and produces violence when one group or term seeks primacy and evades the conditions of its own existence. Even though her account of sacrifice is offered to explain women's exclusion from philosophy and politics, her analysis of the conditions of producing that exclusion pushes her toward a critique of sacrifice in general**. 5 [End Page 19] ¶ How does Irigaray see the logic of sacrifice working out politically in liberal democracies such as ours? Both *I love to you* (1996) and the "The Question of the Other" (1995) suggest that **liberal democracy also participates in a sacrificial matrix.** "**Even in the reversal constituted by the privilege of the many over the one, a very current reversal often called democracy . . . we just wind up with a stand-in for the model of the one and the many"** (1995, 11). That Irigaray should make such a claim is not surprising. **Her critique of a philosophy of neutrality implicitly extends to a critique of a political system that premises itself on neutrality. Modern liberalism insists difference must be suppressed for individuals to become citizens and for a common public life to be established.** John Rawls, for example, whose *A Theory of Justice* (1971) remains the mainstay of contemporary liberal theory, has **decisions about justice made by people who know nothing of their particularities reinforcing the idea that what defines the subject as a citizen is indifferent to everything material, particular and contextual** (Young 1990, 101-102). ¶ **The need to exclude a chaotic materiality in liberalism historically has taken the form of excluding women** (Pateman 1989; Elshtain 1981). Although contemporary theories of liberalism, such as Rawls's, formally include women, that **inclusion does not diminish liberalism's dependence upon the exclusion of materiality and difference. Thus, such theories do not change liberalism's inability to recognize the differentiated identities and needs of citizens.** Iriga-ray's analysis of the exclusion of women from liberalism examines the general assumptions underlying this specific exclusion. **First, she suggests that liberalism's postulate of a fundamental equality for all is "an ideal aimed at universality, totality, the absolute, and essence by reducing distinctions and dissimilarities"** (1996, 99). **The paradox of such an ideal is that in its very effort to reduce distinctions it must also produce them in order to have a limit against which to measure itself.** As Irigaray argues, **the ideal of equality generates a "second (abstract and unreal) human nature"** (1996, 41) **that acquires its coherence only by measuring itself against a chaotic natural or material world, or against particular groups associated with the material, such as women. ¶ The formation of the ideal citizen parallels the formation of the abstract ideal of equality. Diversity is "thought of and experienced in a hierarchical manner, the many always subjugated by the one. Others were only copies of the idea of man, a potentially perfect idea, which all the more or less imperfect copies had to struggle to equal. These imperfect copies were, moreover, were not defined in and of themselves, in other words, as a different subjectivity, but rather were defined in terms of an ideal subjectivity and as a function of their inadequacies with respect to that ideal . . . the model of the subject thus remained singular and the 'others' represented less ideal examples, hierarchized [End Page 20]** **with respect to the singular subject"** (1995, 7). Irigaray's analysis of sacrificial subjectivity reappears here in the liberal citizen. As we saw, a subject guided by an abstract ideal defines itself through the process of disavowing materiality. Such a subject requires the existence of disavowed others for its own coherence. So just as abstract equality can only appear when measured against nature, **the equality of citizens requires the existence of other quasi subjects, against whom its equality appears. ¶ Irigaray links this definition of citizenship to the longstanding Western association of freedom with mastery. "Teleology, for man, amounts to keeping the source of the horizon in and for the self. It is not conversing with the other but rather suspending the interaction of the relation with the other in order to accomplish the self's own intention, even if it is divine in nature. The whole of Western philosophy is the mastery of the direction of will and thought by the subject, historically man"** (1996, 45). **Freedom as sovereign control reinforces the generative exclusions of abstract equality and abstract citizenship. The subject defines, achieves, and recognizes its freedom precisely by overcoming the presence of others in order to guarantee the freedom and autonomy of the self. ¶ The organization of political life through abstract equality and this form of freedom permeates all political relations, giving them the character of domination. Plurality, as the existence of different citizens with different experiences, needs, and perspectives, is eroded.** As Irigaray points out, the norm of abstract equality excludes the very idea of plurality. Thus, for example, she argues **the notion of a collectivity "means being at least two, autonomous, different. This *we* still has no place, neither between the human genders or sexes, nor in the public realm where male citizens (women not yet being full citizens) form a social whole in the form of one plus one plus one, a sort of undifferentiated magma under the monarchical or oligarchic authority (even in supposedly democratic systems) of a male kind of power"** (1996, 48). 6 **Such an order cannot recognize men's specificity, any more than it can women's. Unable to recognize plurality, politics can only be "crowd control," the form of power suited for an undifferentiated citizenry.**

#### Politics of sacrifice is violent in order to maintain idealized notions of community

Dennis KingKeenan, 2003, “Kristeva, Mimesis and Sacrifice,” *Philosophy Today*, Volume 47, Number 1

**Sacrifice**, therefore, is a violent process that is not merely an unleashing of animal violence. Drawing upon social anthropology, Kristeva thinks that a more accurate view of sacrifice is that it **is simultaneously violent and confining or regulatory. The violent sacrificial process puts an end to previous** (semiotic, presymbolic) violence. The violence of sacrifice is **a focusing of (semiotic, pre symbolic) violence. By focusing semiotic violence-that is, by violently sacrificing semiotic violence-the violent sacrificial process displaces or transfers** (see RLP 45/RPL 47) **semiotic violence onto the symbolic order at the very moment the symbolic order is being established, insofar as violently focusing semiotic violence is** (at the same time) **the establishment of the symbolic order** (RLP 72/RPL 75). The violence of sacrifice, which is a focusing of (semiotic, presymbolic) violence, sets up the symbolic order and the "first" symbol at the same time. The violence of sacrifice is a focusing "that confines violence to a single place, making it a signifier" (RLP 73/RPL 75, emphasis added). This "first" symbol is the victim of the murder (sacrifice). This victim (i.e., semiotic violence as focused/confined, i.e., "after the fact" of the irruption of language; Lacan writes: "The symbol manifests itself first of all as the murder of the thing") represents the fact that language irrupts as the murder (sacrifice) of something (specifically, semiotic violence). As such, the sacrificial process is not only violent, but also (and at the same time) confining or regulatory. **Sacrifice designates, precisely, the watershed on the basis of which the social and the symbolic are instituted: the thetic that confines violence to a single place, making it a signifier. Far from unleashing violence, sacrifice shows how representing that violence is enough to stop it and to concatenate an order. Conversely, it indicates that all order is based on representation: what is violent is the irruption of the symbol, killing substance to make it signify.** (RLP 72-- 73/RPL 75, emphasis added) The sacrifice characteristic of the thetic moment instituting symbolism confines semiotic violence to a single place, making semiotic violence a signifier. This, in turn, tends to be on the way to a unified signified, a monotheism that is the theologized truth of the semiotic chora. It is important to provisionally note at this point that the language Kristeva uses here-"making it [i.e., semiotic violence] a signifier"-echoes her description of mimesis: mimesis is dependent on a subject of enunciation who does not theologize (and therefore repress) the semiotic chora, but instead "raises the chora to the status of a signifier" (RLP 57/RPL 57). This similarity of wording raises the question of the proximity of sacrifice and mimesis. **Although sacrifice exemplifies the a-historical structural law of symbolism, it simultaneously ensures the concrete relation of this a-historical logical phase to social history. Therefore, "the same sacrificial structure takes different forms depending on the development of the relations of production and productive forces"** (RLP 74/RPL 76). As such, the "sacrificial object" (or "victim") representing the thetic (i.e., representing the fact that language irrupts as the murder or sacrifice of something) varies depending on the society's degree of economic development. Although, Kristeva suggests, social anthropology does not yet seem to have systematically studied the history of the different forms of structure of sacrifice, it does make a significant advance by associating the sacrificial with the social. She notes that in Sacrifice: Its Nature and Functions (1899), Henri Hubert and Marcel Mauss write: Sacrifice has a "social function" because "sacrifice is concerned with social matters" (NFS 137/SNF 102; see RLP 74n 109/RPL 25004). Kristeva adds:**It is only from this position bordering on the social that sacrifice can be viewed not only as an imposition of social coherence but also as its outer limit. On the other side of this boundary is the a-symbolic, the dissolution of order, the erasing of differences, and finally the disappearance of the human in animality**. In this light one might well reread Robertson Smith, who ascribes **to rites the function of maintaining the community between man and animal.** (RLP 74/RPL 76) Claude Levi-Strauss, however, questioned this association of the sacrificial with the social. In The Savage Mind (1962), he abandoned (unlike Durkheim) the search for the origin of sacrifice, but he did not abandon Durkheim's social/individual dichotomy, which appears in his theory of sacrifice as filtered through the work of Saussure. Influenced by Durkheim, Saussure's Course in General Linguistics (1916) described language as social (a feature of the transcendent collective conscious) in contrast to speech as individual (idiosyncratic and unpredictable). Like Durkheim's social/individual dichotomy, Saussure's language/speech dichotomy is a soul/body dichotomy. Rather than opposing the sacred and the profane (as in religious systems), Levi-Strauss opposed totemism and sacrifice (as modes of classification): People who have been (mistakenly) described as practicing "totemism" (an institution that, according to Levi-Strauss, does not exist) have really been making systems of classification. **Totemic classification correlates differences between natural species and differences between social groups. By adopting the discontinuous differences between natural species, social groups eliminate their own resemblances, for discontinuity is necessary for order and intelligibility.** In totemic classification, just as "one beast can never be taken for another," the **member of one clan can never be taken for the member of another clan (PS 296/SM 223). Rather than representing the series of natural species as discontinuous, sacrifice, on the contrary, represents them as continuous. In sacrifice** (echoing the work of Hubert and Mauss) the **series of natural species "plays the part of an intermediary between two polar terms, the sacrificer and the deity, between which there is initially no homology nor even any sort of relation," except the one established through the victim "by means of a series of successive identifications"** (PS 297/SM 225). Citing the Nuer substitution of a cucumber for an ox as a sacrificial victim from the work of Evans-Pritchard, Levi-Strauss writes: [Totemism] is a quantified system while [sacrifice] permits a continuous passage between its terms: a cucumber is worth an egg as a sacrificial victim, an egg a fish, a fish a hen, a hen a goat, a goat an ox. And this gradation is oriented: a cucumber is sacrificed if there is no ox but the sacrifice of an ox for want of a cucumber would be an absurdity. In totemism, or so-called totemism, on the other hand, relations are always reversible. In a system of clan appellations in which both figured, the oxen would be genuinely equivalent to the cucumbers, in the sense that it would be impossible to confound them and that they would be equally suitable for manifesting the differentiation between the groups they respectively connote. (PS 296-297/SM 224) **Insofar as it correlates two systems of difference** (natural species and social groups), **totemic classification is a metaphorical system. Insofar as neither natural species nor social groups are** (according to Levi-Strauss) **really continuous, sacrifice establishes relations of continuity (not resemblance), and is therefore a metonymic system. Yet in order to establish a relation (between the sacrificer and the deity), the metonymic chain must be ruptured. Sacrifice is a disrupted metonymy, that is, it is the formation of a (metonymic) relation through rupture (murder).** "Metonymy and rupture, such is the logic of this 'relation' which is not yet an 'is,' but prepares the way for it to be posited" (RLP 75/RPL 77). **The deity and the human being establish a relation within the violent sacrificial process itself. In fact, Kristeva seems to suggest that this disrupted metonymy not only establishes the (metonymic) relation (between the sacrificer and the deity), it sets a deity (as a transcendental signified) in place. This is, according to Kristeva, the theologization of the thetic. It is not as though there is a pre-existing deity and a pre-existing human being that are then brought into relation by means of the violent sacrificial process. The violent sacrificial process itself establishes the relation insofar as it posits a deity and a human being (which regulate semiotic violence). Having set a deity in place, this disrupted metonymy expects an answer from the deity as a reward. The rupture (murder) is, furthermore, followed by a "compensatory continuity" (prayer):** In this way, the entire circuit of symbolic communication between two hierarchized discursive agencies is established (gift-- reward-symbolic praise), a circuit on which symbolic economy is based. In this way, sacrifice stages the advent of this economy, its emergence from the ecological continuum, and the socialization of this ecology. (RLP 75/RPL 77)

### Abjection

#### Geographically closed spaces are oppressive. Must come to terms with fluid boundaries, bodily and through mobility, especially at the site of the maternal body

RobynLonghurst, 2001, Geography and the Body: Exploring Fluid Boundaries, pg. 123-125

In this concluding chapter, I draw together some thoughts on pregnant bodies in public places, men’s bodies in toilets/bathrooms, and managers’ bodies in workplaces in CBDs in order to illustrate that **bodies and spaces are neither clearly separable nor stable.** I attempt to destabilise notions of self/other and subject/object in relation to these spaces. I slip between talking about the body as a space (for example, the interuterine space of the pregnant body) and the intimate spaces that the body inhabits (for example, domestic toilets/bathrooms). **The spaces of the body and its environs become close, intimate, merged and indeterminable as they make each other in fluid and complex ways.** The interuterine spaces of pregnant bodies, defecating men and managers whose bodies attempt, but inevitably fail, to be respectable - conjure up images of **close(t) spaces**. They **are close spaces in that they are familiar, near and intimate. They are also closet spaces in that they are often socially constructed as too familiar, near, intimate and threatening to be disclosed publicly. As closet spaces they function as sites of oppression and resistance** (see Brown forthcoming on ‘closet spaces’ and Sedgwick 1990 on epistemologies of the closet). Homosexual practices are often closeted, so too are a range of other bodily practices. Women are sometimes closeted about being pregnant - ‘coming out’ as pregnant can be both exciting and traumatic. In this book I have exposed the water closet in academic discourse. I have also discussed many managers’ attempts to remain closeted behind the doors of respectability. **I do not mean to imply that a binary division ought to be drawn between ‘in (closet) spaces’ and ‘out spaces’, close spaces and ‘far away’ spaces, the body and the nation, the local and the global, the micro and the macro scale, views from above and below**. Soja (1996:314) argues that ‘[s]uch binarizations … are never enough’. I focus on close(t) spaces not out of a sense of voyeurism but because they are as ‘political’ as any other (‘far away’ or ‘out’) spaces. **The instability of boundaries, whether they be the bodily boundaries of individuals or the collective boundaries of nation-states, causes anxiety and a threat to order. To ignore close(t) spaces is to ignore that which is coded as intimate, ‘queer’, feminine, banal and Other. Such a strategic absence allows masculinism to retain its hegemony in the discipline. Close(t) spaces need an opportunity to come out in geography**. There are many censoring and discriminatory practices that operate to keep particular sights/sites in the closet. Bell (1995) argues that articles are pulled from library collections. Secretaries sometimes refuse to type or copy certain material. There are whispers and silences from colleagues and negative press from the media. Editors have been known to refuse to publish material in geographical journals because it is ‘inappropriate’ (read: they are repelled by and fearful of the material). An editor of a well-known geographical journal once told me that the pregnant body is an ‘inappropriate’ subject for geographers to consider. I am not alone in attempting the further understanding of close(t) spaces - spaces that are not clearly self or Other, subject or object. **Homi Bhabha makes an argument for Third Space.** Bhabha (1994:39) claims that ‘**by exploring this Third Space, we may elude the politics of polarity and emerge as the others of our selves’**. In an interview on the Third Space, Bhabha (1990:211) explains that for him the Third Space is hybridity. **Hybridity,** he explains, **is ‘a process of identifying with and through another object, an object of otherness, at which point the agency of identification - the subject - is itself always ambivalent, because of the intervention of that otherness’** (ibid.). In addition to Third Space, **Bhabha** (1994:38; emphasis in original) **uses a number of other spatial metaphors to articulate his notion of hybridity - these include ‘alien territory’, the ‘split-space of enunciation’ and ‘in-between space’.** Edward Soja, inspired by Henri Lefebvre’s The Production of Space, has devoted an entire book to Thirdspace (1996) in which he encourages readers to think differently about space and spatiality. Others have found the notion of what Plato in the Timaeus calls the chora to be useful in retheorising space and spatiality. The chora (which Kristeva refers to in order to explain her notion of the semiotic) is ‘receptacle, unnameable, improbable, hybrid, anterior to naming, to the one, to the father and consequently maternally connoted’ (Kristeva 1980:133). The chora is the site of the undifferentiated bodily space the mother and child share. ‘A site for the production of the matrix/womb and matter, the chora is the unnameable, unspeakable corporeality of the inextricably tangled mother/child dyad which makes the semiotic possible’ (Wright 1992:195). Currently, there are a number of academics including geographers Gibson-Graham (1997) and Sharpe (1999), sociologists Lechte (1993) and feminist theorist Grosz (1994b) who are using the notion of chora to further understand issues of space, place, architecture and sexual politics. Gibson-Graham (1996) discusses the possibilities of thinking a postmodern pregnant space and notes that the inherent femininity of chora lies in its immanent productiveness.Gibson-Graham (1996:90) refers not only to the chora but also to: ‘the third space of political choice’ depicted by Soja and Hooper (1993:198-199) (drawing on Foucault’s [1986] notion of heterotopia) which is a place of enunciation of a ‘new cultural politics of difference’. Gibson-Graham (1996:90) also refers to Rose’s (1993a: 137-160) discussion of a ‘politics of paradoxical space’ and de Lauretis’s (1986:25) comments on ‘else-whereness’ and ‘space-offs’. For the purposes of this chapter I was tempted to use one or a range of these ideas on Third Space, the chora, and paradoxical space because they convey a sense of ambiguity, hybridity and ambivalence. In the final instance, though, I desired a notion that would speak more directly to a feminist politics of intimacy, fluidity, viscosity, mess and dirt. Moss and Dyck (1999:389) argue for what they call ‘corporeal space’ ‘where the discursive and the material are synchronous’.**Corporeal space consists of context, discursive inscriptions, material - economic and matter-based - inscriptions, the biological, and the physiological … These spaces are fluid, congealing from time to time around the body, only to be destabilized with new boundaries forming when any part of the context, the discourse, or the materiality shifts.** (Moss and Dyck 1999:389) I think **the idea of ‘corporeal space’ is potentially rich for considering body space relationships because it conveys something of the fluidity and messiness of bodies and spaces.** ‘Corporeal space’ is in keeping with what I have chosen to call close(t) spaces. Despite the fact that ‘“The body” is becoming a preoccupation in the geographical literature’ (Callard 1998:387) **it is still difficult to speak of close(t) spaces, liminal zones, abject bodily sights/sites in the discipline. These spaces threaten to spill, soil and mess up, clean, hard, masculinist geography. Codes of respectability place limits on what we can say in geography. We may be able to discuss discursive constructions of embodiment but we still cannot talk easily about the weighty materiality of flesh, or the fluids that cross bodily boundaries in daily life.** The close(t) spaces of the pregnant woman/uterus, of toilets/bathrooms and of supposedly respectable bodies and workplaces are both real and imaginary. They are spaces of tears/blood/sweat and spaces of discourse and representation. The pregnant woman is both self and Other, mother and fetus, one and two, subject and object. The defecating man is also both subject and object. His excrement is both of him and distant from him. Likewise the manager who attempts to remain respectable at all times at work inevitably gives way to belching, burping or farting. S/he is both a respectable self and a loathsome Other. It is worth pursuing each of these ideas in turn.

#### Recognizing fluidity of the body and identity is key – we moved constantly through geographies, and fluid notions of the body through sexual difference is femininized and otherized, maintaining masculinity

RobynLonghurst, 2001, Geography and the Body: Exploring Fluid Boundaries, pg. 19-20

Like Callard (1998) I am interested in the manner in which some ways of theorising and understanding the corporeal in geography in the 1990s have gained predominance. Callard (1998:388) elaborates: … **how the body acts as a methodology by summoning up certain theoretical imperatives in the very mention of corporeality. The call to understand the importance of the body is often simultaneously a call for the fluidity of subjectivity, for the instability of the binary of sexual difference, and for a host of other working assumptions.** Callard argues that ‘**the body’ or ‘mention of corporeality’ in geography has become a shorthand for a number of theoretical imperatives, one of which is ‘fluidity of subjectivity’.** I agree with Callard but want to highlight a particular irony here. **Although the body is used to refer to fluid subjectivity (and identity), geographers seldom refer to the actual materiality and fluidity of the body itself. While it has become highly acceptable to employ postmodernist metaphors of fluidity and mobility, it is still not acceptable for the flesh and boundaries of fluid, volatile, messy, leaky bodies to be included in geographical discourse.** Numerous geographers in the 1990s who were influenced by postmodern theorists such as Judith Butler (1990, 1993), Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (1983, 1986), and Michel Foucault (1979, 1980) now conceive of identity as fluid. **The fluid, volatile flesh of bodies,** however, **tends not to be discussed. There is little in the discipline that attests to the runny, gaseous, flowing, watery nature of bodies. The messy surfaces/depths of bodies, their insecure boundaries, the fluids that seep and leak from them, that which they engulf, the insides and outsides that sometimes collapse into each other remain invisible in the geographical canon. When geographers speak of the body they still often fail to talk about a body that breaks its boundaries - urinates, bleeds, vomits, farts, engulfs tampons, objects of sexual desire, ejaculates and gives birth. The reason this is significant is that the messiness of bodies is often conceptualised as feminised and as such is Othered. Bracketing out questions about the boundaries of body/space relationships functions as an attempt to position geographical knowledge as that which can be separated out from corporeality, the corporeality of its subjects and its producers. Ignoring the messy body is not a harmless omission, rather, it contains a political imperative that helps keep masculinism intact. This exclusion of the material body may be, in part, both a reflection and result of social constructionism which has gained recognition in the discipline over the last decade. Social constructionists sometimes depict bodies as though they were little more than surfaces etched with social messages. Having said this, however, in other ways social constructionism has offered a great deal to geographers. Social constructionism has helped destabilise the longstanding notion that bodies are ‘simply natural’ or biological. It has also reiterated the point that bodies cannot be understood outside of *place*** (see Grosz 1992). **One of the downsides of social constructionism though is that is can render the body incorporeal, fleshless, fluid-less, little more than a linguistic territory. The materiality of bodies becomes reduced to systems of signification.**

#### Confronting sexual difference through the abject is key. The abject and the feminine signify the boundaries that exist spatially and create worry about contamination within our borders.

RobynLonghurst, 2001, Geography and the Body: Exploring Fluid Boundaries, pg. 28-32

Following Anne McClintock’s (1995:71-74) lead in her excellent book *Imperial Leather*, I develop a ‘situated psychoanalysis’paying specific attention to the notion of abjection. McClintock (1995:73) convincingly argues that ‘… **psychoanalysis and material history are mutually necessary for a strategic engagement with unstable power’.** She explains that **psychoanalysis needs to be culturally contextualised and informed by history. Psychoanalytic theory has been criticised for accepting universalist assumptions that identity formation is essentially human rather than culturally, spatially and temporally specific. Situating it would help avoid this pitfall.** McClintock also argues that history ought to be informed by psychoanalysis. She explains that: ‘**Abjection shadows the no-go zone between psychoanalysis and material history, but in such a way as to throw their historical separation radically into question’** (McClintock 1995:72).¶ Abjection (Latin, *ab-jicere*) means to expel, to cast out or away. In *Totem and Taboo* and*Civilizations and its Discontents* Freud was the first to suggest that civilization is founded on the repudiation of certain pre-oedipal pleasure and incestuous attachments.¶ (McClintock 1995:71)¶ Kristeva also examines the notion of abjection. In her book *Powers of Horror* (1982) she studies numerous personalised **bodily horrors**. These horrors **mark the significance for subjects** (subjects as they exist within certain cultures) **of the various boundaries and orifices of the body. Kristeva questions the conditions under which the proper, clean, decent, obedient, law-abiding body is demarcated and emerges.** The cost of the clean and proper body emerging is what Kristeva terms abjection. **Abjection is the affect or feeling of anxiety, loathing and disgust that the subject has in encountering certain matter, images and fantasies - the horrible - to which it can respond only with aversion, nausea and distraction. Kristeva argues that the abject provokes fear and disgust because it exposes the border between self and other. This border is fragile. The abject threatens to dissolve the subject by dissolving the border.** The abject is also fascinating, however; it is as though it draws in the subject in order to repel it (see Young 1990a: 145).¶ Grosz (1994a: 192), in discussing Kristeva’s work on abjection, claims:¶ The abject is what of the body falls away from it while remaining irreducible to the subject/object and inside/outside oppositions. The abject necessarily partakes of both polarized terms but cannot be clearly identified with either.¶ The abject is undecidable, both inside and outside. Kristeva uses the example of ‘disgust at the skin of milk’ (Grosz 1989:74) - a skin which represents the subject’s own skin and the boundary between it and the environment. Abjection signals the tenuous grasp ‘t**he subject has over its identity and bodily boundaries, the ever-present possibility of sliding back into the corporeal abyss out of which it was formed’** (Wright 1992:198). In ingesting objects into itself or expelling objects from itself, the subject can never be distinct from the objects. These ingested/expelled objects are neither part of the body nor separate from it. The abject (including tears, saliva, faeces, urine, vomit, mucus) marks bodily sites/sights which will later ‘become erotogenic zones’ (mouth, eyes, anus, nose, genitals) (Grosz 1989:72; see also Wright 1992:198).¶ McClintock (1995:72; emphasis in original) suggests:¶ With respect to abjection, distinctions can be made, for example, between abject *objects* (the clitoris, domestic dirt, menstrual blood) and abject *states* (bulimia, the masturbatory imagination, hysteria), which are not the same as abject *zones* (the Israeli Occupied Territories, prisons, battered women’s shelters). Socially appointed *agents* of abjection (soldiers, domestic workers, nurses) are not the same as socially abjected*groups* (prostitutes, Palestinians, lesbians). *Psychic* processes of abjection (fetishism, disavowal, the uncanny) are not the same as *political* processes of abjection (ethnic genocide, mass removals, prostitute ‘clean ups’).¶ These are distinct dimensions, but also interdependent, elements of abjection. They are not transhistorical and universal but, rather, are interrelated and, in some instances, contradictory elements of a complex process of psychic and social formation.¶ Young (1990a: 142) makes effective use of the category ‘socially abjected groups’ to argue that some groups are constructed as ‘ugly’. Young (1990a: 145) argues that understanding abjection enhances ‘an understanding of a body aesthetic that defines some groups as ugly or fearsome and produces aversive reactions in relation to members of those groups’. Young (ibid.) states: ‘Racism, sexism, homophobia, ageism and ableism are partly structured by abjection, an involuntary, unconscious judgement of ugliness and loathing’.¶ A great deal of the work on abjection is anchored by Douglas’s insights on boundary rituals and dirt. Douglas (1975:47-59) argues that nothing in itself is dirty, rather, dirt is that which is not in its proper place and upsets order. Douglas (1966:5) claims: ‘Reflection on dirt involves reflection on the relation of order to disorder, being to non-being, form to formlessness, life to death’. Dirt is essentially disorder - it is ‘matter out of place’.¶ If we can abstract pathogenicity and hygiene from our notion of dirt, we are left with the old definition of *matter out of place* … Dirt then, is never a unique, isolated event. Where there is dirt there is system. Dirt is the by-product of a systematic ordering and classification of matter, in so far as ordering involves rejecting inappropriate elements. This idea of dirt takes us straight into the field of symbolism and promises a link-up with more obviously symbolic systems of purity.¶ (Douglas 1966:35; my emphasis)¶ Grosz (1994a: 192 and 202) uses Douglas’s ideas on dirt and Kristeva’s notion of abjection in order to explore the ‘powers and dangers’ of body fluids.¶ In the following paragraph Grosz succeeds in capturing something of the disquiet about and unsettling nature of body fluids or corporeal flows - tears, amniotic fluids, sweat, pus, menstrual blood, vomit, saliva, phlegm, seminal fluids, urine, blood. For this reason I quote her at length.¶ Body fluids attest to the permeability of the body, its necessary dependence on an outside, its liability to collapse into this outside (this is what the death implies), to the perilous divisions between the body’s inside and outside. They affront a subject’s aspiration toward autonomy and self-identity. They attest to a certain irreducible ‘dirt’ or disgust, a horror of the unknown or the unspecifiable that permeates, lurks, lingers, and at times leaks out of the body, a testimony of the fraudulence or impossibility of the ‘clean’ and ‘proper’. They resist the determination that marks solids, for they are without any shape or form of their own. They are engulfing, difficult to be rid of; any separation from them is not a matter of certainty, as it may be in the case of solids. Body fluids flow, they seep, they infiltrate; their control is a matter of vigilance, never guaranteed.¶ (Grosz 1994a: 193-194)¶ Fluids are ‘enduring’; they are ‘necessary’ but often ‘embarrassing’ within western cultures - they are frequently considered to be undignified ‘daily attributes of existence’ that we all must, although in different ways, live with and reconcile ourselves to (Grosz 1994a: 194). The fluids that cross bodily boundaries between inside and outside include tears, saliva, faeces, urine, vomit, sweat and mucus. These fluids often provoke feelings of abjection.¶ But bodily fluids are not all the same. Grosz (1994a: 195) notes that they have ‘different indices of control, disgust and revulsion. There is a kind of hierarchy of propriety governing these fluids themselves.’ Some ‘function with clarity’, that is, they are ‘unclouded by the spectre of infection’ and ‘can be represented as cleansing and purifying’ (ibid.). For example, tears do not carry with them the ‘disgust associated with the cloudiness of pus, the chunkiness of vomit, the stickiness of menstrual blood’ (ibid.). The latter are seen as polluting fluids that mess up the body whereas clean fluids, such as tears, are often considered to cleanse the body (see also Douglas 1966:125). Although there may be bacterial properties associated with specific body fluids - the ‘real’body and the micro-organisms it houses cannot be denied - there is not *necessarily* anything inherently polluting or cleansing about specific body fluids.¶ Douglas (1966:38) refers to Sartre’s analysis of the viscous in *Being and Nothingness* as a part explanation of ‘our’horror of bodily fluids. Grosz (1994a: 194) claims that: ‘For both Douglas and Sartre, the viscous, the fluid, the flows which infiltrate and seep, are horrifying in themselves’. Douglas quotes from Sartre’s essay on stickiness (1956), in which he argued that viscosity repels in its own right as a primary experience. Sartre (1956 cited in Grosz 1994a: 194) explains that: ‘The viscous is a state half-way between solid and liquid. It is like a cross-section in a process of change … to touch stickiness is to risk diluting myself into viscosity. Stickiness is clinging, like a too possessive dog or mistress.’¶ Grosz (1994a: 194) points out that: ‘Like Sartre, Douglas associates this clinging viscosity with the horror of femininity, the voraciousness and indeterminacy of the *vagina dentata*’. It is evident that ‘this fear of being absorbed into something which has no boundaries of its own, is not a property of the viscous itself’ (Grosz 1994a: 194). Like dirt, the viscous and the fluid refuse to conform to the laws governing the proper, the clean and the solid. The viscous is liquid/matter that will not stay in place. Female sexuality is not inherently or essentially viscous, rather, ‘it is the production of an order that renders female sexuality and corporeality marginal, indeterminate, and viscous that constitutes the sticky and the viscous with their disgusting, horrifying connotations’ (Grosz 1994a: 195).¶ Irigaray (1985) argues that **this unease about viscosity is linked to the fact that it is not possible to speak of indeterminacy, ambiguity and fluidity within prevailing western philosophical models of being. Fluids are implicitly associated with femininity, maternity, pregnancy, menstruation and the body. Fluids are subordinated to that which is concrete and solid. In turn, solidity and rationality become linked** (Irigaray 1985:113). ‘**Douglas refers to all borderline states, functions, and positions as dangers, sites of possible pollution or contamination’** (Grosz 1994a, 195). **Douglas conceptualises fluid as a borderline state, as liminal, and as disruptive of the solidity of things and objects (ibid.).¶ Clearly, bodies and their associated fluids are not simply natural or given but rather represent social relations. Their orifices and surfaces symbolise ‘sites of cultural marginality, places of social entry and exit, regions of confrontation or compromise’** (Grosz 1994a: 193). **Lived experiences of body fluids are mediated through cultural representations and through sex/gender.**

## Framing

### Social First

#### Transportation infrastructure represents the polity of a nation

Jim Cohen, September 2009, “Divergent Paths, United States and France: Capital Markets, the State, and Differentiation in Transportation Systems, 1840-1940” Enterprise & Society, Volume 10, Number 3

Cross-national studies support my thesis that distinctive national approaches to transportation have developed within capitalist economies such as France and the United States.7 Comparing the early-nineteenth-century development of French, British, and U.S. railways, Dobbin contends that “the institutionalized principles of political order found in these nations were applied to industry . . ., (so) the economy (including transport) came to reflect the polity.”8 In a similar vein, Dunlavy argues that differing national political structures were primarily responsible for emerging differences in the technology of American and Prussian railways at the beginning of the nineteenth century.9 Other, more theoretical work on a cross-national level describes how governments operate within distinctive institutional frameworks that shape the direction of industrial development.10 In short, the cross-national literature suggests that the distinctive forms of capitalism developed in the United States and Europe in the nineteenth century, produced different forms of development in sectors such as transport.

#### **The car is the site of struggle of space and identity**

Kevin Douglas Kuswa, July 2009, “Driving Ourselves and the Rise of Maternal Auto/mobility: Wright’s (1939) The Car Belongs to Mother,” Deb(K)ate, <http://puttingthekindebate.com/2012/05/09/transportation-infrastructure-investments-and-maternal-mobility/>

Some of the interaction between the automobile and the family comes to light in the notion of the mobile Mother (or maternal driver). Here, we should note that many familial aspirations were not satisfied, reinforcing class divisions. As many as 41 percent of families “still lacked personal automobility in the form of the family car as late as 1950” in the U.S. (Flink, 1988, p131). In particular, segregation in cities like Atlanta and Chicago testified to Flink’s (1988, p135) contention that “blacks were not to share proportionately in the extension of the ‘American dream’ of the automobile commute to a suburban home.” Racial and class divisions marked the driver as a manifestation of white privilege. Discussing various types of drivers in relation to the car as a cultural object, Meaghan Morris (1993, p288) argues that we should “consider cars as mobile, encapsulating vehicles of critical thinking about gender, race, and familial space, articulating a conflict between a ‘society’ and an ‘environment’ that is nonetheless mutually, historically, and perhaps catastrophically, entailed.” The subject of the car, the driver, arises as central to human struggles over space and identity.

## Solvency

### Plan Key

#### Rights discourse provides a framework that illustrates gender oppression.

Ruth EGroenhout**,** Department of Philosophy at Calvin College,2002**,** “Essentialist Challenges to Liberal Feminism,” *Social Theory and Practice*, Volume 28, Number 1

The second reason **feminists should be reluctant to give liberalism up** is that **rights have been and continue to be important conceptual tropes for understanding the wrongness of gender oppression. There may be other moral frameworks for conceptualizing the moral wrong done to women when they are denied their rights, but few that explain that wrong so clearly, so straightforwardly, or so incontrovertibly**. As an example**, consider the arguments by Islamic feminists**, or similar arguments made by Christians for Biblical Equality. In both cases, **there are good reasons given for new interpretations of both religious traditions, arguments that support women's autonomy and independence. But in both cases one faces an uphill battle to convince conservative interpreters of the tradition to change their minds.** In contrast, Wollstonecraft's arguments are relatively straightforward. No new interpretation of the notion of a right is needed to recognize that if rational agents deserve the rights intrinsic to autonomy, women must deserve those rights. The problem in Wollstonecraft's case is to convince others to act and reason in a manner consistent with their own stated principles. **In the case of the Islamic or Biblical feminist**, **one must change others' reading of sacred texts, that is, others must be convinced first to change their principles and then to act consistently with those changes**.

#### State intervention in economic production of transportation fails

Jim Cohen, September 2009, “Divergent Paths, United States and France: Capital Markets, the State, and Differentiation in Transportation Systems, 1840-1940” Enterprise & Society, Volume 10, Number 3

In theoretical terms, the way the American and French public and private sectors influenced structural change in transportation between the mid-nineteenth century and the 1930s is represented best within the overlapping conceptual frameworks of Hall, Zysman, and Thelen and Steinmo, which the last two authors term “historical institutionalism.”122 In this framework, the state is a network of institutions and laws closely related to, and influencing, the nation’s economic system. An important measure of state influence is the degree to which it controls allocation of private investment and credit for the purpose of promoting the development of particular industries or economic sectors (commonly called “industrial policy”).123 A system of direct state intervention in markets, via government owned banks for example, is called an “interventionist state.”124 A system of credit allocation largely determined by private capital markets is termed “corporate capitalism”125 or a “capital market–based system.”126 These categories aptly describe the political economy of the United States and France with regard to transportation development in the period discussed in this paper. Up until the Great Depression the United States was a strongly market-based system in which private banks, insurance companies, and other large financial institutions controlled the allocation of capital and used that power to privately plan the development of American railways. A formidable accomplishment of this market-based system was that it produced a nationwide railway network, which dominated American transportation for almost 100 years. But, that network was also weakened by speculative investment, overbuilding, duplication of lines, and excessive debt. When the Great Depression occurred, American railways faced widespread bankruptcy. In what appears to be a reversal of market control, the Roosevelt Administration responded by authorizing a newly created public financial intermediary, the RFC, to purchase and socialize much of the deflated and illiquid rail debt held by both railways and their major creditors, which freed financial institutions to invest their assets elsewhere. However, RFC interventions were not accompanied by government mandates that railways eliminate duplication of lines and rationalize their services to become more competitive with highway and air transport. Thus, the Roosevelt Administration left private corporations largely in control of deciding where to invest their capital and avoided any specific industrial policy mandates concerning transportation development.

#### State key for protection of rights

Ruth E Groenhout, Department of Philosophy at Calvin College, 2002, “Essentialist Challenges to Liberal Feminism,” *Social Theory and Practice*, Volume 28, Number 1 **Individual rights cannot be protected without some form of governmental structures that protect them against both other individuals and governmental structures themselves.** The liberal political theorist is committed to the notion that one cannot dispense with the state**. Liberalism operates with a view of human nature that assumes that some political structures are needed to prevent humans from mistreating each other. This is not the only role the state can play, but it is a fundamental one. Liberalism thus must reject anarchic theories and utopian Marxist theories that advocate an overthrowing or withering away of the state. Liberals instead operate with a firm conviction that some political structure is a necessity in any well-ordered society.** So the state is necessary, **but the state must also be limited**. Just as humans, left unrestricted by the state, choose 'on occasion to mistreat others, so **the state, left unchecked, will mistreat its citizens. The power of the state must be limited to protect a sphere of liberty for its citizens and for the non-governmental social structures that they create. In taking this stance, liberals find themselves in opposition to certain varieties of communitarism** (4) **and any sort of traditional aristocracy or theocracy.**

## A2: DAs

### Economy

#### Interstate highways good for economy

Raymond A. Mohl, 2008, “The Interstates and the Cities: The U.S. Department of Transportation and the Freeway Revolt, 1966-1973” The Journal of Policy History, Volume 20, Number 2

The 42,500-mile Interstate Highway System, mostly completed between 1956 and 1973, stimulated major patterns of change in the United States. President Eisenhower promoted the highway program as an important public works project that would keep the nation’s economy on an even keel and prevent recession, but he never fully anticipated the enormous economic growth stimulated by a more efficient transportation system. The big new roads connected virtually all the nation’s major cities and speeded long-distance travel by truck and automobile. The interstate system’s urban expressways linked central cities with surrounding suburbs and facilitated auto commuting. They also promoted peripheral development, pushed out the metropolitan fringe to previously unimagined distances, and, as urban geographer Peter O. Muller wrote, essentially “turned the metropolis inside out.” Lobbyists for powerful business and economic interests lined up in support of the 1956 interstate highway legislation. Automobile manufacturers, oil companies, makers of cement and steel and rubber, construction firms and construction unions, truckers and teamsters, hotel, motel, and restaurant chains, big-city politicians and property owners, and many more—all recognized the significance of modern, high-speed, limited-access superhighways. Any remaining opposition to the interstate system withered when the federal government agreed to pick up 90 percent of construction costs through a new Highway Trust Fund, with the states contributing the remaining 10 percent. The state high-way departments had responsibility for building the interstates, with oversight from the federal Bureau of Public Roads. In retrospect, no other legislative or domestic policy initiative of the 1950s brought as much lasting change to the nation as the Interstate Highway System. 2

## A2: CPs

### High Occupancy Vehicles (HOVs)

#### HOV lanes don’t solve

Kenneth A. Small, University of California Irvine, Clifford Winston, Brookings Institution, & Jia Yan, Hong Kong Polytechnic University 2006, “Differentiated Road Pricing, Express Lanes, and Carpools: Exploiting Heterogeneous Preferences in Policy Design,” *Brookings-Wharton Papers on Urban Affairs.*

The U.S. highway system, largely constructed with public funds from the federal road user tax, could be characterized as a public good if it were rarely congested. But like many public goods that are available at little or no charge, its quality has deteriorated with the intensity of use. Today, the nation’s road system has turned into a “tragedy of the commons” as road users experience nearly 4 billion hours of annual delay.1 Of course, even an efficient road system would force motorists to incur some delays, but the current level is regarded by most observers as excessive. Historically, the public has had a status quo bias against economists’ recommendations to use the price mechanism to reduce congestion. 2 Policymakers therefore have pursued other approaches, such as allocating reserved lanes to vehicles carrying two or more people. But recent evidence indicates that these high-occupancy vehicle (HOV) lanes sometimes carry fewer people than general-purpose lanes, attract many family members who would ride together anyhow, and shift some travelers from vanpools or buses to low-occupancy carpools. 3 As a result, HOV lanes are losing favor among state transportation departments.

### High Occupancy Tolls (HOTs)

#### HOT lanes don’t solve

Kenneth A. Small, University of California Irvine, Clifford Winston, Brookings Institution, & Jia Yan, Hong Kong Polytechnic University 2006, “Differentiated Road Pricing, Express Lanes, and Carpools: Exploiting Heterogeneous Preferences in Policy Design,” *Brookings-Wharton Papers on Urban Affairs.*

A recent innovation is to fill the reserve capacity not used by HOVs with solo drivers willing to pay a toll. These so-called high-occupancy toll (HOT) lanes can be found in the Los Angeles, San Diego, Houston, and Minneapolis– St. Paul metropolitan areas, and they are currently under consideration in other cities including Denver, Seattle, San Francisco, and Washington. HOT lanes appeal to a broad set of motorists who are sufficiently inconvenienced by congestion to pay a sizable toll to travel on less-congested lanes, either daily or as dictated by their schedules. Although the adoption of HOT lanes in some urban areas indicates that the public is no longer opposed to all forms of congestion pricing, HOT lanes are questionable on welfare grounds for two reasons. First, motorists continue to impose high congestion costs on each other because most of the highway is unpriced. Second, the express lanes are still underused because a big price differential exists be-tween the two roadways. 4 Indeed, simulations show that HOT lanes some-times lower welfare compared with keeping all lanes in general use, particularly if they are priced high enough to allow motorists to travel at approximately free-flow speeds—a condition that is achieved to promote the service advantages of the lanes among the public.

### Mass Transit

#### Mass transit and highways must coexist, aff is a prerequisite for a political environment that allows mass transit, meaning you should prefer the perm.

Louise Nelson Dyble, Associate Director for Research atThe Keston Institute for Public Finance and Infrastructure Policy at University of Southern California, July 2009, “Reconstructing Transportation: Linking Tolls and Transit for Place-Based Mobility,” *Technology and Culture*, 50.3

The vast majority of Americans rely on a remarkably costly and inefficient means of getting around. They purchase and maintain automobiles that they use to commute to work and carry out daily business, often sitting behind the wheel all alone, often battling traffic congestion. They pay taxes and fees to help pay for a pervasive network of streets and highways, built and maintained by public agencies with dedicated revenue and reliable budgets. In contrast, a minority of Americans rely on more efficient mass-transit systems that are chronically underfunded, serve only limited areas and segments of the population, and are subject to frequent though unpredictable cuts in funding. Despite the social and environmental benefits of mass transit, as well as growing demand that is reflected by the highest ridership since the 1950s, in most places the prospects for its expansion and improvement are uncertain at best.1 Although in theory, integrated, multimodal transportation systems have broad expert and popular support, U.S. policy makers seem to be a long way from an effective strategy for realizing them. Implementing and sustaining a new approach to transportation in the United States requires much more than shifting appropriations and priorities—it requires the reconstruction of fundamental institutions, including the public organizations and bureaucracies responsible for transportation. If mass transit continues to be financed and managed separately from and in competition with infrastructure for motor vehicles, there is little chance of achieving a more sane and stable balance. However, as an integral function of new institutions designed to support mobility and accessibility with the most appropriate technologies, mass transit could become a significant component of more efficient and equitable local and regional transportation systems than the ones we have today. There are a few exceptions to the overall pattern of anemic, neglected mass transit in the United States, and they coincide with regional institutions that transcend modes. In particular, the extensive and heavily used mass-transit systems of metropolitan New York and the San Francisco Bay Area benefit significantly from toll revenue generated by local bridges and tunnels.

### States

#### Permutation is normal means

Raymond A. Mohl, 2008, “The Interstates and the Cities: The U.S. Department of Transportation and the Freeway Revolt, 1966-1973” The Journal of Policy History, Volume 20, Number 2

By the early 1960s, state and federal highway engineers confronted a changing political environment. Local discontent with the urban interstates began bubbling up to Congress in the early 1960s. In the Highway Act of 1962, at the urging of the Kennedy administration, Congress moved tentatively to curb some of the worst excesses of the highway builders and bring other voices to the decision-making process on interstate routing. The 1962 law, according to W. Lee Mertz, a career planner and administrator in the Federal Highway Administration, aimed “to lower the noise level on the urban interstate.” Two provisions of the law were especially important. First, it required state road departments to work with local governments in developing “a cooperative, comprehensive, and continuing urban transportation planning process.” The so-called 3-C mandates represented an early congressional move toward mass transit and the devolution of policy implementation, forcing state highway departments to consider alternative transit methods and rational land-use planning. A second important provision of the law required state highway departments to provide relocation assistance to displaced families and businesses. However, these new mandates for transportation planning and housing assistance did not become effective until July 1, 1965. Essentially, state highway departments had almost three more years to push ahead with their interstate projects. Nevertheless, the new highway legislation established significant government mandates, relocation requirements, and planning principles, setting the stage for tougher highway legislation later in the decade.6

### CEDAW

#### CEDAW misses the point – it’s an act to protect rights abroad and ignores abuses at home

Victoria Pruin **Defrancisco,** Margaret R **Laware, & Palczewski** Catherine Helen **2003,** “Why Hasn’t the Global Found a Home in the U.S.?” *Women and Language*, Volume 26, Number 1

**The treaty recognizes that existing human rights documents fail to account for the unique abuses faced by women and reflects the growing international movement to place the protection of women's human rights at the forefront of both human rights discourse and feminist discourse in the international public sphere.** The heightened awareness of the ways that the women of Afghanistan suffered under the Taliban have reinvigorated efforts for the United States to ratify the treaty, which had been signed by Jimmy Carter in 1980, but had languished in the Senate whose approval is needed for ratification. In the Fall of 2001, President Bush indicated that he saw no reason to block renewed efforts to ratify the treaty, and on July 30, 2002, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted to send the Treaty to the Senate Floor for Ratification (Davis, 2002). It is a step forward, but approval is not guaranteed. The move to finally ratify CEDAW is a profound step forward for the United States. However, **it is troubling that the proponents of the Treaty frame its ratification as a largely symbolic move that would help women in countries abroad and have little or no effect at home.** Further, **it may be a move specifically aimed at building additional support for continuing the War on Terrorism abroad.** As Senators Joseph Biden and Barbara Boxer write in their editorial to the San Francisco Chronicle, "**our Constitution and gender discrimination laws already comply with the treaty requirements**" (Biden & Boxer, 2002, p.1). This **reflects a continuing trend by the U.S. government to view human rights abuses as existing "out there" in the developing world and not at home.** (3)

## A2: Ks

### Generic

#### Aff is a prerequisite to the K

Louise Nelson Dyble, Associate Director for Research atThe Keston Institute for Public Finance and Infrastructure Policy at University of Southern California, July 2009, “Reconstructing Transportation: Linking Tolls and Transit for Place-Based Mobility,” *Technology and Culture*, 50.3

Institutions are defined by their durability, frequently outlasting any of the physical structures they might produce. Economic and political upheaval can reduce or overcome institutional resistance to change and upset the established balance of power, thereby making significant changes in the administration and financing of transportation services and infrastructure much easier to achieve than under ordinary circumstances.2 Policy makers may now have a rare opportunity to transform transportation policy in the United States. Understanding the status quo, including the assumptions, patterns, and relationships that sustain it, is a crucial first step.

### Capitalism

#### Perm solves: Two disparate theories make the project stronger in force and solves the feminine aspects of Marxism. Criticisms of feminism leave Capitalism unmoored.

Alys EveWeinbaum, Associate Professor @ Washington, 1994, “Marx, Irigaray, and the Politics of Reproduction” Differences, Volume 6, Pg. 100-101

**As feminists, we have accounted for the ways in which capitalism mobilizes an essential definition of motherhood; it is perhaps time that we also comprehend that it is Capital that opens up the abstraction necessary to anti-essentialist thinking**. This has been put elegantly by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, who in conversation with Ellen Rooney suggests the two-pronged axiom that **"Capital is anti-essentializing because it is the abstract as such. . . [and that essences] are deployed by capitalisms for the political management of capital"** ( *Outside*13). Following Spivak, what I am suggesting is that pro-abortion feminists begin to capitalize on Capital's abstractions. **For those involved in the reproductive debates have yet to explore what it might mean to comprehend reproductive labor as socially valued, and what that value might mean in the search for new narratives of the mother that locate the specificity of the maternal body without falling back on essential, reified representations of the relationship between mothers and their products. If one thread of this project, then, weaves an argument for rethinking the usefulness of marxism for feminism, another embroiders this marxist understanding of reproduction as productive with a feminist psychoanalytic discussion of the possibilities for renarrativizing the materiality of the maternal body.** **The project of articulating two disparate theoretical styles -modes of thinking that are perceived by many to be incompatible -- is no doubt difficult and perhaps awkward. However, it is the dissonance catalyzed by their articulation that lends this project its force. Lacking a marxist understanding of reproductive labor there is little reason to renarrativize the maternal body; without the insights of feminist psychoanalysis the proposed renarrativization remains unintelligible. If it is marxism that allows women to become conscious of the exploitation of their reproductive labor, it is feminist psychoanalysis that constitutes a lever for reclaiming the maternal body as the appropriable means of production. For it is feminist psychoanalysts whose persistent return to the materiality of the body has opened up the body as a site for radical discursive intervention.** In the texts that I will analyze, I am particularly concerned with how Irigaray both describes and performs such a return. **As** Judith **Butler has observed of Irigaray's work, in it "matter occurs in two modalities: first as a metaphysical concept that serves phallogocentrism; [and] second, as an ungrounded figure, worrisomely speculative and catachrestic, that marks . . . the possible linguistic site of a critical mime"** (47). **When capitalism insists on reducing all women to their role as mothers, it helps to shore up phallogocentrism; when Irigaray approaches the maternal body in order to reconsider its materiality, phallogocentrism and capitalism begin to become unmoored.** It is thus that I put to use what Butler and others have identified as Irigaray's practice of critical mime, explicating and then developing her psychoanalytics as the principal means for renarrativizing the maternal body's materiality. For it is my premise that the possibility of altering the power relations that condition the now limited conceptualization of the "right to abortion" lie in renarrativizing the mother in the very process of collectively pursuing the social and abstract recognition of (re)productive labor.

#### Traditional Marxism fails to address the exploitation of women’s reproductive labor in the private sphere

Alys EveWeinbaum, Associate Professor @ Washington, 1994, “Marx, Irigaray, and the Politics of Reproduction” Differences, Volume 6, Pg. 102

In the 1970s some **marxist feminists** began exploring related, if decidedly distinct propositions. In their work they **pointed to the problems of a traditional marxist analysis which failed to systematically address the exploitation of women's reproductive labor in the private sphere.**5 **Their critique revealed that women's work, both in the household and in the reproduction of workers, is problematically subsumed by the classical marxist texts under and within the analysis of production. As a consequence of its relegation to the home,** these feminists have argued, **the mechanisms by which reproductive labor is exploited remain unanalyzed and** needless to say, **this private labor continues to be unpaid**. Ironically, the remuneration of surrogates can be seen as a perverse redress for these early marxist feminist concerns. The problems with this are many, not the least of which being that ten thousand dollars is hardly adequate compensation for nine months of strenuous physical work. **The key issue is that in the current situation surrogacy as paid reproductive labor that produces babies with price tags exists side by side with women whose labor goes unpaid and whose babies appear to have no price.**

#### Perm. There is a part of nature which is not a construct of capital, and that is the blind spot of the feminine body. We should look at each mode of oppression of that body then analyze the way they interact.

Teresa De Lauretis , 1990, “Eccentric Subjects: Feminist Theory and Historical Conciousness” Feminist Studies, Volume 16, pg. 130-131

**The point missed here is that those heterosexual women who individually manage to avoid sexual or financial domination at home by individual men are still subjected, in the public sphere, to the objective and systematic effects of the institution that defines them, for all men and even for themselves, as women**--and, in fact, as heterosexual women (for example, in issues of employment discrimination, sexual harassment, rape, incest, etc.); the institution of heterosexuality is intimately imbricated in all the "other mechanisms of male dominance" and indeed coextensive with social structure and cultural norms. **The very fact that, in most theoretical and epistemological frameworks, gender or sexual division is either not visible, in the manner of a blind spot, or taken for granted, in the manner of an a priori, reflects a heterosexual presumption--that the sociosexual opposition of "woman" and "man" is the necessary and founding moment of culture,** as Monique Wittig remarks: **Although it has been accepted in recent years that there is no such thing as nature, that everything is culture, there remains within that culture a core of nature which resists examination, a relationship excluded from the social in the analysis--a relationship whose characteristic is ineluctability in culture, as well as in nature**, and which is the heterosexual relationship.40**Thus, it is not a question of *giving* priority to heterosexism over other systems of oppression, such as capitalism, racism, or colonialism, but of understanding the institutional character and the specificity of each and *then* of analyzing their mutual complicities or reciprocal contradictions.**

#### The root of capitalism is the division of labor between men and women. We must focus on what is ignored – earth exploitation and womens rights. To achieve this, we ust question human identity first as a relationship between men and women

Luce Irigaray, 1996, I Love to You: Sketch for a Felicity within History, pg. 19-20

Marx defined the origin of man’s exploitation of man as man’s exploitation of woman and asserted that the most basic human exploitation lies in the division of labor between man and woman. Why didn’t he devote his life to solving the problem of this exploitation? He perceived the root of all evil but he did not treat it as such. Why not? The reason, to some, extent, lies in Hegel’s writings, especially in those sections where he deals with love, Hegel being the only Western philosopher to have approached the question of love as labor. It is, therefore, entirely appropriate for a woman philosopher to start speaking of love. It results from the need to think and practice what Marxist theory and practice have thus far ignored, giving rise to merely piecemeal economic and cultural developments which can no longer satisfy us. To cite just three examples or symptoms of these: the fate of the earth as a natural resource, problems to do with women’s liberation, and the world-wide cultural crisis are exemplified by the student revolts that have arisen, and re-arisen in France and elsewhere since ’68. What is more, it is from this same crucible of cultural revolution that various struggles—students, feminists of difference, ecological movements—have erupted and re-erupted in our countries. Their concerns live on, concerns often suppressed by powers blind to their objectives or by militants who barely understand the profundity and radical nature of what is at stake in these struggles. For it is not a matter of changing this or that within a horizon already defined as human culture. It is a question of changing the horizon itself—of understanding that our interpretation of human identity is both theoretically and practically wrong. Analyzing the relations between men and women can help us to change this situation. If we fail to question what cries out to be radically questioned, we lapse ore relapse into an infinite number of secondary ethical tasks, as Hegel wrote when discussing the failing that has marred our whole culture.2 That failing concerns the lack of ethical relations between the sexes. And those countless ethical tasks, which multiply in proportion to the complexity of our civilizations, do not accomplish the oeuvre to be carried out: to remove the exploitation that exists between the sexes so as to allow humanity to continue developing its History.

#### Only status quo kinship structures require the accumulation of capital. Our aff solves.

Luce Irigaray, 1996, I Love to You: Sketch for a Felicity within History, pg. 23

In fact, for centuries in the West marriage as an institution has bound women to a universal duty for the sake of the development of man’s spirit in the community, and bound men to a regression to the natural to ensure that the interests of the State are served in other respects. Real marriages do not exist to the extent that two legally-defined sexed persons do not exist. Both are enslaved to the State, to religion, to the accumulation of property. What’s more, this absence of two in the couple forces the intervention of other limits deriving from the labor of desires, the real or symbolic dissolution of the citizen in the community, and enslavement to property or capital.

### Race

#### **Targeting specific women in critical analysis is important in regards to the mobile Mother**

Kevin Douglas Kuswa, July 2009, “Driving Ourselves and the Rise of Maternal Auto/mobility: Wright’s (1939) The Car Belongs to Mother,” Deb(K)ate, <http://puttingthekindebate.com/2012/05/09/transportation-infrastructure-investments-and-maternal-mobility/>

Speaking to the flip side of Leavitt’s equation, Wright’s audience was primarily made up of white, middle class, married women who had not submitted to rising inflation or the growing demand for female labor outside of the home. This group was largely the same demographic who would help to populate the suburbs over the remainder of the 20th Century. On the other hand, the positioning of Wright’s book within the history of motherhood in the United States is not a form of criticism that would hinge on uncovering the voices neglected by any particular text. Such interpretation (ideological criticism in Margolis’ frame) is a project distinct from, and subsumed by, this inquiry. The impact of the mobile Mother, within machinic rhetoric, is that the map of subjectivity generated by the highway machine in the U.S. implicates a specific intersection between the woman driver and the motherhood of many predominantly white, married, middle and upper class women. Transformations and transitions in subjectivity, of course, operate through arrangements that include imaginary projections such as an applied audience. Competing audiences help to draw these specific arrangements, even though they are supplemental to the contexts provided by abstract diagrams (the highway machine) and concrete machines (Priscilla Wright’s automobile). The imagined audience of a situated text is different from the “actual” reception of the text, a utopian notion of reception that should not distract criticism from diagramming the “second persona” in its contingency and context. Questions concerning audiences can be worthwhile tracks. Borrowing from Edwin Black (1970, p112), it is important to recognize “the possibility, and in some cases the probability, that the author implied by the discourse is an artificial creation: a persona, but not necessarily a person.” This persona may not be embodied, according to Black (1970, p117), but s/he certainly represents a figure implied by the projection of a given discourse—a “model of what the rhetor” would generate as an identity for the audience at that moment. Going slightly further, Philip Wander (1984) opens up the possibility and probability of an excluded audience and the need to speak for (or with) this marginalized “third persona.”[9] An example of the second persona in Wright’s work is the mobile Mother and all that she entails for women, motherhood, and highway subjectivities. In addition, Margolis marks the third persona (or at least one of them) in Wright’s book by accounting for a discrepancy between the mothers imagined by a given prescriptive history and the material factors constituting motherhood at the time. Thus, the impact of this map is that the subject of the mobile Mother—as she emerges alongside the highway machine and within The Car Belongs to Mother—acts to challenge the assumption that the typical driver is always male as well as the assumption that women do not negotiate their subjectivity as drivers in complex and contradictory ways. The impact of this map is also that the subject of the mobile Mother provides its challenge in ways that are partially defeating. The mobile Mother is complicit in notions of motherhood that exclude many women as well as notions of motherhood that conflate the identity and expression of the mother with the well-being and development of her children.

#### Perm – sex and race cannot be seen as disparate. The fear produced via their competition scenario keeps the socially marginalized in line, preventing resistance, turning their arguments

Marvin Mahan Ellison, 1996,Erotic Justice: A Liberating Ethic of Sexuality, Pg. 44-46

**The social construction of sexuality cannot be understood apart from racism and the cultural construction of white racial supremacy. The cultural obsession with an idealized body is an obsession to maintain the normativity of** (adult) **white men and their right to control others. In this culture affluent white men are assigned the right of access to women, children, and nonwhite men, as well as the right to manage their bodies, including their productive and reproductive labor. Socially powerful men are expected to control the lives of social inferiors.** **In this culture everyone receives moral instruction about how social domination is justified by human differences**, that is**, by measurable deviations from the white, affluent male norm. When human differences are ranked hierarchically and naturalized, people see differences as markers of dominant or subordinate status. They learn to fear that those with more power will harm them or that those with less power will take away their privileges**. Some fear is of course warranted, especially among women and people of color, because of rape, lynchings, and other forms of social control. **This fear**, however, **can** also **be** exaggerated and **used to discourage people from banding together across their differences to challenge abuses of power and to promote safety and mutual respect as community norms. Because difference is routinely associated with domination, a generalized fear is promoted** not of domination, but **of difference itself. This fear keeps the socially marginalized in line and all people mistrustful of efforts to alter power dynamics**. 32 **Fear, suspicion, and intolerance are marks of a social order in which sexism, racism, and other injustices teach the devaluing of difference. Therefore, gaining awareness of and mounting resistance to racist patriarchal standards of superiority and inferiority is a means of transcending fear** and also enlarging human loving. Race and sex/gender oppression constrict people's natural affections to a closed social circle. In a racist culture, people rarely exhibit what sociologist Patricia Hill Collins calls a "big love." Big loving depends on trust that men can love and truly value women, that whites can see blacks as fully human, and that men-loving-men and women-loving-women can be respected as dignified members of the community. **In the midst of multiple oppressions**, however, **our affective knowledge of our common humanity becomes distorted. The capacity to identify with each other and delight in our diversity "must be distorted on the emotional level of the erotic**," Collins suggests, "**in order for oppressive systems to endure.**"33 **Our fear of others lodges in our bodies, not merely in our heads.** Basic human feelings of trust, respect, and playful curiosity about diversity have been corrupted, and our fellow-feeling has been diminished. **Supremacist models of sexuality promote an ethic of alienation, possession, and control. Injustices, including sexism and racism, are eroticized, so that what stirs many people is** not a passion for justice as right-relatedness and mutual regard, but rather **a perverse desire to exercise power over someone else, especially someone "not their kind," or alternately, a felt need to be put down and kept in one's place of inferiority. In a culture of inequality, the sexual problematic**, as Beverly Harrison contends, **is fear of genuine intimacy and mutuality among social equals**.34 **Race itself is not a natural, objective category for dividing groups or assigning differentials of power and status, but rather a political and cultural category, institutionalized in systemic patterns of ownership and control of one group by another**. In the words of Audre Lorde, **racism institutionalizes and culturally represents "the belief in the inherent superiority of one race over all others and thereby the right to dominance**."35 In a racist society, encountering race does not mean encountering difference within social relations of equality, shared power, and mutual respect, but rather within long-standing patterns of inequality, disrespect, and fear. **White supremacy has crafted a social world of permanent race inequality, justified by naturalistic assumptions that white-skinned persons differ from persons of color in those moral and physical aspects that supposedly legitimize white mastery and control.** Furthermore, **white supremacy is a major component of the social construction of sexuality, and racist ideology is tightly intertwined with sex-negativity.** **White racism assumes that sexuality differentiates Euro-Americans from African Americans. The sexuality of black people is seen as chaotic, a power outside white control, and therefore something both deviant and mesmerizing**. As Cornel West points out, "Americans are obsessed with sex and fearful of black sexuality." 36

### Language

#### Perm – Must recognize experience through subjectivity and language. Analysis of language alone is not enough

JohannaOksala, 2004**,** “Anarchic Bodies: Foucault and the Feminist Question of Experience” Hypatia, Volume 19, Number 4

While I agree with Kruks's concern that accounting for the constitution of experience in terms of discursivity alone poses serious theoretical difficulties for **[End Page 98]** feminist theory, I also claim that **feminist criticism influenced by poststructuralism has made it difficult for us to return to a foundational "female experience" grounded in the communalities of women's embodiment.** I argue that **feminist theory must "retrieve experience," but this cannot mean a return to a mute and original female experience. On the contrary, the philosophical challenge facing us is today** is by no means less demanding than the one that has occupied much of twentieth-century philosophical thinking: **trying to understand the relationship between experience and language.** I will focus on a limited aspect of this question in this article by discussing sexual experience and its relationship to discourse in Michel Foucault's philosophy. My aim is to show that Foucault's thought offers feminist theory tools, which are often overlooked by both his feminist critics as well as his appropriators in trying to understand experience. I will thus argue that **the dominance of postmodern questions in feminist theory does not amount to discourse reductionism** as Kruks, for example, claims, **but to genuine efforts to try to understand the relationships between experience, body, discourse, and power. By seeking to understand the historical constitution of experience as well as its discursive limits, Foucault problematizes the philosophical relationship between discourse and experience.**

## A2: Framework

#### Rules are impossible and contestable, and should be contested because of their hegemony, which defines subject positions. The impact to that is abjection and violence!! Only through non-hegemonic performances can multiple subject positions be allowed.

Veronica Vasterling, Associate Professor at the Department of Philosophy and the Center of Women Studies of the University of Nijmegen, the Netherlands, 1999, “Butler’s Sophisticated Constructivism: A Critical Assessment,” *Hypatia*, Volume 14, Number 3

On first sight, the above explication of power does not seem to give any clear indications as to whether or why power may be politically contestable. That discursive power is constraining and exclusionary cannot be held against it, [16](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/hypatia/v014/14.3vasterling.html#FOOT16) for if it were not it would not be enabling and productive either. Constraint and enablement, exclusion and production are two sides of the same coin. **Discursive power enables intelligible speech and action only in so far as it constrains agency, that is, excludes the unintelligible. Unless the distinction between the intelligible and the unintelligible is given up altogether, both sides belong together. To criticize this distinction simply because of its constraining and exclusionary implications does not make sense for it is constitutive of agency.** I do not see how any realistic account of what it means to be able to speak and act can do without this distinction. Yet, **even though the distinction between the intelligible and the unintelligible is *itself* irreducible, every specific instance of it is contingent and, hence, contestable. Any specific demarcation of the intelligible from the unintelligible is contingent because it cannot but rely on conventions that are contingent or arbitrary themselves.** Apart from the contingency inherent in the process of reiteration, from the viewpoint of reflective agency as well conventions are, in principle, arbitrary: we cannot provide them with a conclusive foundation or justification. **No matter how well established or how well argued, no foundation or justification can ever succeed in turning conventions into necessary rules without alternatives. It is always possible**, in principle, **to conceive of an alternative to any specific convention, and consequently to contest its constraints and exclusions and to reinterpret its demarcation of the intelligible and the unintelligible. For example, despite the long tradition and** [End Page 31] **scientific justification of the convention of binary sex/gender differentiation, it is not difficult at all to think up several alternatives, such as plural sex/gender differentiations or the conception of one sex or gender. These alternative conceptions involve a reinterpretation of the body as we know it. What is unintelligible now might become intelligible and vice versa.** Heterosexuality, for instance, would lose its self-evident and perhaps its intelligible character whereas bodies neither male nor female would become intelligible. [17](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/hypatia/v014/14.3vasterling.html#FOOT17) Thus, because of the irreducible contingency of any specific convention discursive power is, in principle, always contestable. The question, however, of why we would contest the power of any specific convention still remains open. Merely the contingency of conventions, that is, the mere fact that it is possible to contest conventions, is no reason to contest them. Butler's discussion of the so-called "law of sex" suggests that **it is the *hegemony* of a convention that provides a reason to contest it.** She uses the expression "law of sex" to indicate the hegemonic status of the conventions or norms that make up this law, that is, heterosexuality and binary sex/gender differentiation. The introduction of the term ***hegemonic* implies a certain hierarchy with respect to the relative force of conventions, namely hegemonic or dominant conventions as the most forceful and minor or subordinate conventions as the weakest. The relative force of a convention affects its power. Whereas the power of hegemonic conventions tends to be *compelling*, the power of minor conventions leaves more room for choice.** From Butler's discussion of the law of sex throughout *Bodies That Matter* (1993), I infer that the **power of hegemonic conventions is compelling in so far as it determines subject status. To qualify for and maintain the status of subject, one has to comply with**, that is, recite, **the law of sex.** In other words, **compliance with the law of sex is a necessary condition for subject status.** [18](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/hypatia/v014/14.3vasterling.html#FOOT18) Whereas noncompliance with minor conventions--for instance the conventions which regulate the practice of teaching--will not disqualify me as a subject but, in this case, as a teacher, noncompliance with the law of sex results in deprivation of subject status. **Those who do not comply are degraded to the status of "abjects": "those who do not enjoy the status of the subject"** (Butler 1993, 3), who do not qualify as "fully human" (1993, 16), **and whose bodies do not matter.** **Whereas hegemonic conventions specify the necessary conditions of subject status, nonhegemonic conventions specify the many variations and forms of subjecthood. Within the confines hegemonic conventions circumscribe, the wide variety of nonhegemonic conventions allows many different ways to shape our identity as a subject or actor. As long as we comply with hegemonic conventions our words and deeds will be acknowledged, even if they are unintelligible. That every now and then my words and actions are unintelligible does not disqualify me as a subject, but the persistent failure to embody and realize those features of subjecthood or humanness which are deemed to be** [End Page 32] **"essential" does. To be disqualified, to be an abject, means that one's words and deeds will be ignored or dismissed, not because they are in or by themselves unintelligible but because they emanate from an unintelligible, unthinkable, and even threatening being, one whose claim to intelligibility and subject status I cannot acknowledge without jeopardizing my own secure status as a subject. As they result in deprivation of subject status, the exclusions effected by hegemonic conventions are dehumanizing and violent. The violence of their exclusionary power provides a good reason to contest and oppose hegemonic conventions.** But what exactly can we achieve, given Butler's concept of power and agency, if we contest and oppose the power of hegemonic conventions, in this case the norms that make up the law of sex? Agency is a "turning of power against itself to produce other modalities of power," that is, it cannot annihilate power. **We cannot simply abolish these norms, we can only undermine their hegemony by resignifying them** in such a way that neither heterosexuality nor binary sex/gender differentiation designate natural or essential humanness. **What we may achieve through resignifications of this kind is a less exclusive definition of subject status, a definition that includes the abjects.** Never, however, can we achieve a totally inclusive definition for "the ideal of a radical inclusivity is impossible" though Butler adds that "this very impossibility nevertheless governs the political field as an idealization of the future that motivates the expansion, linking, and perpetual production of political subject-positions and signifiers" (1993, 193).

#### Their framework assumes commonality as the point of linguistic community, like the debate community, when really it is based on fracture, which is the internal link to clash

Linnell Secomb, a lecturer in Gender Studies at the University of Sydney, Spring 2000, “Fractured Community,” Hypatia, Volume 15, Number 2

This reformulated universalist model of community would be founded on "a moral conversation in which the capacity to reverse perspectives, that is, the willingness to reason from the others' point of view, and the sensitivity to hear their voice is paramount" (1992, 8). Benhabib argues that this model does not assume that consensus can be reached but that a "reasonable agreement" can be achieved.This formulation of community on the basis of a conversation in which perspectives can be reversed, also implies a new understanding of identity and alterity. Instead of the generalized other, Benhabib argues that ethics, politics, and community must engage with the concrete or particular other. A theory that only engages with the generalized other sees the other as a replica of the self. In order to overcome this reductive assimilation of alterity, Benhabib formulates a universalist community which recognizes the concrete other and which allows us to view others as unique individuals (1992, 10).¶ Benhabib's critique of universalist liberal theory and her formulation of an alternative conversational model of community are useful and illuminating. However, I suggest that her vision still assumes the desirability of commonality and agreement, which, I argue, ultimately destroy difference. Her vision of a community of conversing alterities assumes sufficient similarity between alterities [End Page 138] so that each can adopt the point of view of the other and, through this means, reach a "reasonable agreement." She assumes the necessity of a common goal for the community that would be the outcome of the "reasonable agreement." Benhabib's community, then, while attempting to enable difference and diversity, continues to assume a commonality of purpose within community and implies a subjectivity that would ultimately collapse back into sameness.¶ Moreover, Benhabib's formulation of community, while rejecting the fantasy of consensus, nevertheless privileges communication, conversation, and agreement. This privileging of communication assumes that all can participate in the rational conversation irrespective of difference. Yet this assumes rational interlocutors, and rationality has tended, both in theory and practice, to exclude many groups and individuals, including: women, who are deemed emotional and corporeal rather than rational; non-liberal cultures and individuals who are seen as intolerant and irrational; and minoritarian groups who do not adopt the authoritative discourses necessary for rational exchanges.¶ In addition, this ideal of communication fails to acknowledge the indeterminacy and multiplicity of meaning in all speech and writing. It assumes a singular, coherent, and transparent content. Yet, as Gayatri Spivak writes: "the verbal text is constituted by concealment as much as revelation. . . . [T]he concealment is itself a revelation and visa versa" (Spivak 1976, xlvi). For Spivak, Jacques Derrida, and other deconstructionists, all communication involves contradiction, inconsistency, and heterogeneity. Derrida's concept of *différance* indicates the inevitable deferral and displacement of any final coherent meaning. The apparently rigorous and irreducible oppositions that structure language, Derrida contends, are a fiction. These mutually exclusive dichotomies turn out to be interrelated and interdependent: their meanings and associations, multiple and ambiguous (Derrida 1973, 1976).¶ While Benhabib's objective is clearly to allow all groups within a community to participate in this rational conversation, her formulation fails to recognize either that language is as much structured by miscommunication as by communication, or that many groups are silenced or speak in different discourses that are unintelligible to the majority. Minority groups and discourses are frequently ignored or excluded from political discussion and decision-making because they do not adopt the dominant modes of authoritative and rational conversation that assume homogeneity and transparency.¶