# Critical Highways Neg

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## Advantages

### Social – Turn

#### **Driving is always a privileged position**

Kevin Douglas Kuswa, July 2009, “Driving Ourselves and the Rise of Maternal Auto/mobility: Wright’s (1939) The Car Belongs to Mother,” Deb(K)ate, <http://puttingthekindebate.com/2012/05/09/transportation-infrastructure-investments-and-maternal-mobility/>

In Dunbar’s frame, the reward for average Americans outside the invention loop was the opportunity to drive these new technologies. Of course, much of the driver’s circulation was imaginary and hopeful, for only 15 to 20 percent of Americans had the luxury of using the cars and highways that other specialists had crafted. Even among the individuals using the highways and driving vehicles, automobile ownership was more of a privilege than a given.

### Race – Turn

#### Reconfiguring landscapes required for transportation infrastructure is what justifies removal of populations

Cotton Seiler, December 2006, “’So That We as a Race Might have Something Authentic to Travel By’: African American Automobility and Cold War Liberalism” American Quarterly, Volume 58, Number 4

These instances of formal equality on the road no doubt proliferated after 1956, with the coming of the National System of Interstate and Defense Highways. In what we might call their high-modern moment, the highways of the postwar era were more than simply better roads. Fundamental to the interstate project was the extraction of the highways out of their geographical and social context; this elevation minimized their contact with the surround-ing countryside or cityscape and created an enclosed and standardized zone to which access could be limited. The interstate highways and their ancillary built environments enervated what we would call “place” by traumatically reconfiguring a range of landscapes and communities. Nowhere was the obliteration of local spaces of value and the disruption of patterns of everyday life more apparent than in the nation’s urban centers, where highway planners sought to facilitate (white) suburban commuters’ blithe mobility over the defunded and deteriorating (black and brown) city. The destruction of the main African American commercial and residential districts of Miami, Detroit, Nashville, and Birmingham are particularly stark examples of a more wholesale “negro removal” component to the postwar schemes of “urban renewal” to which expressway construction was imperative. 70

#### Highways are only able to be inclusive so long as the subject is “passing”. It negates racial difference the same way liberalism does.

Cotton Seiler, December 2006, “’So That We as a Race Might have Something Authentic to Travel By’: African American Automobility and Cold War Liberalism” American Quarterly, Volume 58, Number 4

Yet highway automobility did not, and does not, inspire a genuinely democratic political imaginary beyond liberalism. Rather, the new interstate highway enabled the African American driver to pass as the blank liberal subject, and to effect, under certain circumstances, the privatist withdrawal that has been such an extravagant and problematic characteristic of American citizenship. “Liberalism,” Christopher Newfield has written, “is a transitional ideology, midway between authoritarian and democratic structures.”74 The limits of highway automobility as an emancipatory practice are coterminous with those of liberalism as a democratic political sensibility: both obscure or negate, in order to manage, racial difference; both offer their subjects only procedural participation in already established regimes. Whatever citizenship under the democratic structures of the future will look like, it won’t look like driving. But the assumption of the figure of the driver by the readers of Travelguideand The Negro Motorist Green Bookcorresponded to Martin Luther King’s invocation of the Declaration of Independence and various foundational myths in his rhetoric: both explicitly tethered the quest for civil rights to a national narrative of exceptionalism, progress, and individual freedom.

### Race – Gender Link

#### Highways ignore women without white privilege

Kevin Douglas Kuswa, July 2009, “Driving Ourselves and the Rise of Maternal Auto/mobility: Wright’s (1939) The Car Belongs to Mother,” Deb(K)ate, <http://puttingthekindebate.com/2012/05/09/transportation-infrastructure-investments-and-maternal-mobility/>

In many ways the permissive school of mothering common during Priscilla Wright’s era was simply a confirmation of the place of the child at the center of the family. Families that did not conform to this norm were not incorporated into the scope of Wright’s work and similar documents operating within the permissive child rearing perspective. An additional problem inherent in relying on prescriptive histories bears itself out in the gap between the familial norm imagined by Priscilla Wright and historical challenges to the universal nature of that norm. The problem can be mapped through the processes that would connect Wright’s excluded audience to the same group of people excluded by the creation of suburbia around policies promoting white privilege. In other words, when Helen Leavitt (1970) writes her book attacking the Interstate Highway, Superhighway-Superhoax, she is talking to many of the people ignored by Wright three decades years earlier. Wright’s work, regardless of her intent, ignored a number of women because they were not part of a middle class family “emboldened” by the power and luxury of the automobile and reliable highways.

### Gender – Turn

#### **Attaching the highway to subject formations results in essentializing and diminishing women**

Kevin Douglas Kuswa, July 2009, “Driving Ourselves and the Rise of Maternal Auto/mobility: Wright’s (1939) The Car Belongs to Mother,” Deb(K)ate, <http://puttingthekindebate.com/2012/05/09/transportation-infrastructure-investments-and-maternal-mobility/>

“Man sees the automobile, invented by him, improved by him, fashioned for his pride and pleasure, become, as he believes, the plaything of Woman….She deals, rather, with the problems of the matron–and her name is truly legion–who, with the one family car at her disposal, transports her husband to and from trains, her children to school, herself to market, club members to their homes on unaccepted streets and relatives on their various whims and vagaries. Truly this woman is a gallant creature, a creature of wit and resourcefulness, of nerve and verve. May she receive consolation and help from these humble pages and may Man, after reading them, meet her more respectfully upon the road and reverently exclaim, ‘God wot. A woman driving!’” The multiple subject positions of our present era were abundant before the close of the 1950s and far before the complete arrival of the highway machine. Attaching the mobile Mother to many of these pre-highway subjects, the stereotyping and essentialism in Wright’s statement constrains women to preconstructed lines within a patriarchal society. Stereotyping occurs when Wright establishes the woman as the domestic servant for her husband, the woman who may be able to operate the automobile but could never invent or build such a thing. Essentialism occurs when Wright reduces the essence of the married woman to a submissive and supporting figure who manages the domestic sphere. On the other hand, there are marks of resistance available in Wright’s perspective that can contribute to a map of radical feminism in opposition to trajectories that would either blame the processes of technology and science or remain in a liberal theory of equality.[3] We return to these cracks of resistance after laying out more of Wright’s text.

#### **Images of woman with the automobile still places her into domestic spheres and diminishes the “private” sphere**

Kevin Douglas Kuswa, July 2009, “Driving Ourselves and the Rise of Maternal Auto/mobility: Wright’s (1939) The Car Belongs to Mother,” Deb(K)ate, <http://puttingthekindebate.com/2012/05/09/transportation-infrastructure-investments-and-maternal-mobility/>

The challenge that Wright offers here may not translate into critical radicalism in relation to the patriarchy. Wright’s protective defense of the schoolyard may indirectly extend her domestication into certain public places such as the mall, the church or the school. When a woman’s activity is acknowledged, “it is commonly held to be less sophisticated, and in many cases less authentically political, than the involvements of men” (Stilanen & Stanworth, 1984, p11). Thus, the activities of a mobile Mother like Wright’s protagonist are “explained as a direct product of a woman’s social role as wife and mother and her mythical status as purity personified. This distortion involves an assumption that women’s present weak political position is necessary and functional” (Bourque & Grossholtz, 1984, p105). The devaluing of housework as well as women’s labor outside of the home lends credence to the view that the limited public spaces available to women were feminized, privatized, or otherwise subordinated to the “real” public sphere governed by men.

### Cyborg – Turn

#### The cyborg takes humanity for granted as a category without taking into account its different cultural contexts

Kumiko Sato, Earlham College, 2004, “How Information Technology Has (Not) Changed Feminism and Japanism: Cyberpunk in the Japanese Context,” Comparative Literature Studies, Volume 41, Number 3

Is technological progress changing our conceptual mode of thinking and learning? Of course it is, in multiple aspects of culture and society, as argued by numerous scholars who explore the terminal space between humanity and information technology. Then, are there ethnic and racial differences in "our" conceptual mode? A potential drawback in the cultural studies of the human-machine interface is the tendency to categorize humans as an entirety of humanity without deliberate examination of cultural diversities encompassing technological progress. The rhetoric of change requires the assumption of transition from an old mode to a new mode, which is in reality less the development of a whole humanity than the sense of a historical progress that classifies certain nations as advanced compared to those presumably advancing yet still behind. Japan is a unique case in this context, for the country has presented itself as a contradiction of advancement and backwardness, or exotic primitivism conjoined with high-tech supremacy. Seen from a context of Japanese culture, the idea of progress presents a rather different set of questions about cyborg identity from that of the Western philosophy forming around the academic world of the US today. How, for example, should cyborg philosophy be contextualized into Japan's adaptation of the philosophy and related literary practices, especially the genre called cyberpunk? Why did Japan become the only non-Western country that vigorously produces stories and images about cyborgs, androids, and cybernetic identities? These questions should not be simply addressed from the viewpoint of technological progress, but also from cultural contexts of identity politics in Japan.

#### Technology only reinforces traditional gender patterns of power

Kumiko Sato, Earlham College, 2004, “How Information Technology Has (Not) Changed Feminism and Japanism: Cyberpunk in the Japanese Context,” Comparative Literature Studies, Volume 41, Number 3

I have mapped out the outline of cyberfeminism because it is important to note that one common assumption still binds them together, that is, the notion that information technology has changed our concept of the human subject. How many times have we witnessed phrases like technology "opens up new spaces" or "new paradigms"? "New" is a seemingly harmless, yet rather tricky concept. On the one hand, it is true that the epistemological boundary of human and machine, or materiality and information, is being challenged today, which urges us to conduct a new configuration of the body, reality, and identity. Katherine Hayle's analysis in **[End Page 337]** *How We Became Posthuman* is an excellent example that enables us to realize how information technology has actually changed, and is changing, our view of "humanity." On the other hand, it is also true that information technology has not changed our concept of body and reality at certain levels. Anne Balsamo, for instance, examines cases of gendered cyborgs in her book, *Technologies of the Gendered Body*, concluding that technologies (as ideological constructs) "serve to reinforce traditional gendered patterns of power and authority" (10). The posthuman body may consist of replaceable parts, but each fragment of the prosthetic body claims its gendered origin. Balsamo's argument also suggests that the logic of gender is applicable to the realms of race and ethnicity. We understand her critique best by looking at the most popular prosthetic part of the female body today, which is the silicon breast implant: technological advance only serves to sustain, or even worse facilitate, the same old sexism based on traditional corporeality. A more radical (and simultaneously conventional) position is presented in Slavoj Žižek's analysis of the Ridley Scott film, *Blade Runner*, which argues that the blurred identity between human and android is a typical example of (Lacanian re-reading of) Descartes' *cogito*. For Lacanian theory, which has traditionally posited the subject as "the void" deprived of the content (meaning, or the enunciated), a person who doesn't know if he is a human or an android is typically a Cartesian subject in its purist form, who becomes truly human by realizing/enunciating that he is not (Žižek 199). Based on these counter-positions to the discourse of "new," it is possible to premise that, whereas it does produce new configurations of humanity, the emergent rhetoric of information technology is not only reinscribing the gendered/colored signs of the body, but even concealing its political ideology by pretending the opposite function.

#### The self-deselection process that results from Cyborgism causes environmental destruction, groupthink, cultural assimilation, psychosis, competition, war, and imperialism

Chris Crittenden, teaches applied ethics at the University of Maine at Machias, 2002,“Self-deselection: Technopsychotic Annihilation Via Cyborg,” Ethics & the Environment, Volume 7, Number 2

First, we are currently in the grips of a serious environmental crisis, one fomented by dysfunction and denial. Generations of modern liberal thinkers have maintained this pathology through the narrowness of their thought. This mirrors a standard theme throughout the history of western civilization: the bulk of the leadership and educated citizenry selfishly advance a political agenda that is in their short-term best interest, which is usually measured in terms of wealth or military power. So, for example, it took thousands of years to challenge slavery, sexism, and naturism, thousands of years to inject notions of equality and universal decency into the mainstream power discussions where they sit only precariously today. We must face the dull, thickheaded, plodding history of ethical reform and accept its indictment, that humans at all levels of echelon are more psychologically and selfishly situated than empathically aware and reasonably considerate, and we must work against such tendencies in ourselves, armed as we are with the knowledge of the phlegmatic resistance of preceding generations. Second, it is not evident that individuals, whether clear-headed or not, are making the key decisions about our collective welfare; rather, certain corporate and governmental entities, which are tightly interwoven in terms of power connections and interlocking goals, are more likely candidates for the driver's seat, if there could be said to be one at all (Bowman 1996, 16). Corporate and governmental entities are not individuals, per se, but collections of individuals and habitual ideologies interacting in holistic ways that tend toward conformity and thus the discouragement of serious dissent. "Groupthink," a tendency for individuals in groups to dampen their creative and critical reactions due to pressure to conform to dogmatic procedure, represents the kind of hazard that can result when humans collect into hierarchical systems (Janis 1982; Moorehead, Ference, and Neck 1991). Another hazard is the tendency of dysfunctional groups faced with a crisis to avoid acknowledgement of the crisis and proceed as if all were well. Some researchers have applied this denial-of-crisis phenomenon directly to capitalism, claiming that capitalism itself has created [End Page 131] a crisis and an accompanying reaction of disavowal (Richardson and Curwen 1995). In the social chemistry of the distressed group many subliminal and ritualized factors come into play that undercut the free-flow of ideas and awareness, and we are all members of many groups of sundry kinds that directly or indirectly feed into our global crisis of environmental degradation. Third, cultures are being rapidly assimilated into the vast machine of consumerist culture, which indicates that this machine is not easily resisted, not by religion, not by morality, not by traditions that existed for thousands of years, not by the most dedicated, intelligent objectors, not by the dictates of an honest conscience, not by anything that groups or individuals without huge amounts of money or political clout or allies with the same can do (Myers 1984; Durning 1993). In the last two hundred years, conquest and capitalism have been spearheading an unprecedently massive expropriation of nature and a homogenization of culture. The values of these disturbingly awesome forces are virtually fanatic in their drive and cannot be easily stopped; indeed, they are probably not the sorts of things that can be 'stopped' at all, but only slowly sapped of transformative power over a considerable period of time. The tendencies inherent in a program of hedonistic consumption coupled with a mantra of capitalist 'growth' are at the nucleus of my concern. The idea that our buying practices are likely to foster a deepseated neurosis (indeed, Lacan writes that capitalism fosters psychosis (Brennan 1993, 4)) cannot, given space considerations, receive full treatment here. But we need look no further than the advertisements that assail us daily to glimpse the psycho-economic system that encompasses our lives. Here the essence of the dogma is revealed: the consumer should never be content but rather always wanting more, whether it concerns body image, financial image, sexual image, whatever image—the very emphasis on image is detrimental in its transportation of matters of health from the realm of who you are to the realm of how you appear. In psychological jargon, this engenders a shift from an "internal locus of control" to an "external locus of control" where the ad companies gain access to the volume knob of self-esteem. In addition to the principle of promoting discontent, there is the principle of insatiable need and its corollaries of envy and competition. Hedonistic capitalism, so excellent at fostering expansion and scientific breakthrough, does so in part through the auspices of desire in the form of [End Page 132] rampant expenditure and insatiable need for ever greater thrill and material accomplishment. Inherent in this drive to get more and enjoy more is a fierce competition to outdo others and also a biting envy that is its inevitable accouterment. Some writers have gone so far as to claim that we are an addicted citizenry, and I will have to stand here with their expertise. Chellis Glendinning, for example, argues that we exhibit telltale symptoms that indicate our enslavement to technology—denial, dishonesty, obsessive need for control, thought disorders, grandiosity, and disconnection from feelings, and she explains in some detail the interrelations between these symptoms and our pathological fixation (1995, 44). It is relevant that Al Gore, a highly public figure reliant on public opinion for his continuing political career, writes that Americans are addicted to consumption and display the dynamic of a dysfunctional family (1992). Apparently, such a blatantly condemnatory claim is 'safe' for a politician of national reputation; enough people find Gore's jeremiad sufficiently plausible and so he safely skirts the danger of being labelled an extremist beyond the pale of political legitimacy, despite Republican efforts to lampoon his radical stance. A comprehensive scenario of dysfunctional self-identity is readily distilled from the themes of envy, callous competition, and the intentional advancement of discontent. In this scenario, social problems are personalized in order to maintain the status quo, thereby avoiding the psychic pain of radical upheaval and maintaining the monetary and political fortunes of the privileged classes (e.g., the top 1 percent who own 90 percent of the wealth, males in traditional family and corporate hierarchies). For example, instead of challenging the existence of beauty norms so exacting and demanding that they promote incessant opportunities for anxiety and self-surveillance, women opt for expensive remedies, including plastic surgery (while countless children languish malnourished across the Earth), encouraged in this direction by sophisticated advertising campaigns and an establishment of respected medical professionals. In short, the competition for success, which requires frequent and repeated victory if one is to remain successful, is so intense that guilt and insecurity are manipulated to invoke body hatred, which in turn motivates behavior that profits those who feed off anxious consumers. If we live in a society where someone will pay several thousand dollars for a cosmetic surgery, driven to such a task by an encompassing, multifaceted environment of socioeconomic pressures—all the while ignoring the suffering of fellow human beings, children [End Page 133] no less—then we live in a society psychologically ready for the road to dysfunctional self-deselection. There is also a 'conquer' side of the conquer/capitalism ideology that I think is at the root of the danger of self-deselection. In the last section of the paper an ecofeminist alternative to the mindset of domination is presented. For now, assume the problem with the conquer/dominative mode lies in the historical propensity for the 'Rational' members of society—those at the top end in the hierarchy of all things, traditionally the 'civilized' male gentry—to control those elements in the non-'Rational' categories, whether they be women, or animals, or nature, or 'primitive' culture or race, or some other unruly force. Perhaps most relevant is the tendency for the Western elite to try to bring 'Emotion', associated with the impractical, inefficient, and chaotic, under the control of 'Rationality', associated with the scientific and political, a theme that precedes the Enlightenment, going back at least to Plato.

#### The self-deselection of cyborgism means that we will conquer ourselves through machinery, also results in Armageddon

Chris Crittenden, teaches applied ethics at the University of Maine at Machias, 2002,“Self-deselection: Technopsychotic Annihilation Via Cyborg,” Ethics & the Environment, Volume 7, Number 2

Why is the path to self-deselection the wrong path to take in the context of early twenty-first- century social conditioning—the time of the "culture of narcissism," according to Christopher Lasch (1979)? First, I should acknowledge that criticisms of technology and machinery are nothing new. The Luddites smashed looms in the early nineteenth century, fearing for their livelihood and ability to subsist. Samuel Butler, in his famous novel [End Page 136] published in 1879, speaks of Erewhon, a society in which machinery has been forsaken because of the danger that it will advance to the point where humans become its slaves. Chapters 24 through 26 are titled "The Book of the Machines" and contain a series of arguments supporting the rejection of a life of dependence on even such basic items as the pocket watch and, the nineteenth-century precursor of the automobile, the carriage (1932). As Hans Achterhuis points out, a central and enduring worry in the face of rapid scientific progress is that we humans will create monsters that eventually destroy us, either sentient machines or massive complexes of gadgets and engines that require so much energy to maintain that life becomes a dreary orbit around their upkeep (1998). The latest incarnation of this kind of consternation perhaps comes from Bill Joy, chief scientist at Sun Microsystems, who worries about astounding rates of advancement in the computer sciences and the artificial sentience he thinks will most likely be produced (2000). There is, additionally, the less fantastic though more pressing possibility of Armageddon-quality destruction in the course of nuclear, genetic, or biological warfare. My thesis, however, deviates somewhat from the frightening possibility that we will create robotic monstrosities that obliterate us. My contention is that we might well, consciously and with frantic abandon, choose to turn ourselves into monsters. The danger is not that the machines will conquer us, but that we will conquer ourselves by choosing a machine existence. This version of technology's danger is not mentioned by Butler, Heidegger, or most other referenced critics, though it occurs in the science fiction literature most freely. In any case, the problem of self-deselection lacks a rigorous philosophical framework that brings out its various aspects—why it is a salient problem, why we might choose it, and, the topic of the current section of this paper, why it is a terrible mistake.

#### Self-deselection leads to environmental impacts such as warming, ozone depletion, species extinction

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There are several reasons why self-deselection is a foolhardy enterprise. The first is that the march to self-deselection is simply reckless. We are currently altering the globe at an amazing rate, through such alarming processes as population expansion, global warming, acid rain, ozone depletion, rapid extinction of species, elimination of rainforests, damage to marine ecosystems such as coral reefs, drastic reduction in the number of free-roaming fish, generation of industrial and nuclear pollutants, and the genetic manipulation of agricultural products. The world of today is not [End Page 137] the world of even our near ancestors. Our great- great-grandparents would be just as amazed at our manipulations as their great- great-grandparents would be at theirs. My point is simply that we don't know where we're going in terms of global upheaval and we don't know why. Free-market mantras about the goodness of growth and the innate selfishness of the human condition are not reassuring. If one is to initiate drastic and enduring changes in the very structure of the living environment and, even more intimately, in the very nature of one's essence, there should be careful study, sound argument, and general learned acceptance of the procedures undertaken. There is none of that to support our current vector toward self-deselection. We are engaged in a precipitous gamble that is driven by anxiety and avarice. These are not good reasons for the radical transformation of our life form, nor are they accepted, either by religious or secular institutions, as salutary foundations for the cause of happy endings.

#### Cyborgs will increase social inequality

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Since the dawn of civilization there has existed a gap between the haves and the have-nots, a sizeable gap in wealth, education, freedom, well-being, and the benefits associated with these. The difference in the various talents between humans and Replacers, however, will most likely exacerbate the ambient social inequalities. The current debate about the power offered by the Internet and the unequal access accorded to the affluent is a miniature model that must be expanded tremendously to get at the sort of division Replacer technology renders conceivable. Children with laptops have advantages over those who don't, but children with computer-jacked brains and accompanying IQs of 200 have even more. With advanced cybernetics, the issue is not simply who has the better tools, but rather who has the better inherent capability to achieve. Humans cannot successfully compete with Replacers who have twice the mental power, twice the endurance, twice the strength, and so on, even if they have access to the same learning environment.

One acute danger is that poor humans who cannot afford to graft circuitry onto their brains will become servants to those who successfully deselect. In any case, the presence of two intelligent life forms on the planet, [End Page 140] both capable of speech and widely creative adaptation, yet nonetheless separated by a large divide in capacity, would herald the beginning of an unprecedented experiment in social dynamics. Although probabilities are difficult to calculate, the potentials for abuse of the poor and the disadvantaged are vast. We should take seriously the possibility that the Replacers will enslave humans or vice versa out of jealousy or fear. Racism, sexism, and other forms of oppression are still rampant today and could infect the future when humans face that daunting moment when they begin to coexist with a life form that is more impressive along many cognitive and physical scales.

#### Cyborgism leads to 1984

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Another problem with self-deselection (and its precursor stages) is the potential it offers for increased control and surveillance. Winston Smith, the main character in George Orwell's dystopic 1984, fretted because everywhere he went cameras watched from the walls (1977). Yet even worse is the invasion of privacy that results from a camera implanted within the head. Or imagine the power to change people's mood by sending radio signals to molecule-sized wires that nest in their brains. The permutations on this sort of theme are endless. In the not-so-distant future, instead of worrying simply about the Internet crashing, Replacers might worry about crashes within their own minds. Someone might object that I am painting the worst-case scenario, one that is unlikely to manifest. Yet we live in a world where monitoring is routine and pervasive. Los Angeles and other large cities have already installed cameras on telephone poles above some urban areas; employee email is commonly and increasingly checked by supervisors using programs such as Spector and Websense; urinalysis and lie detector tests are fairly common business tools. Foucault argues that "panopticon" techniques, that is, surveillance techniques which encompass their subject, are common control mechanisms of the modern era (1979). In the future, there will be new methods of monitoring that involve direct infiltration of the body by nanominiaturized communications; indeed, in a Replacer society, the body itself could be plugged into a larger unit and thereby double as a kind of information storage unit.

#### Cyborgism results in cyberpsychosis – dependence on machines and the anxiety that stems from it

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The term "cyberpsychosis" has emerged in science-fiction circles (originating, perhaps, with the role-playing game CyberPunk produced by R. [End Page 141] Talsorian Games, Inc.) to designate a state of mental illness that results from sacrificing too much of one's humanity in the course of cybernetic modification. When the brain becomes embossed by computer chips, or the body drastically redirected from normal chromosomal development, the question of self-identity takes on new existential urgency. The cybernetically infiltrated person can no longer cling to even the simple protective assertion, "I am human." The sense of dependency on the machine, already the origin of much anxiety in today's world, as Alvin Toffler and W. H. Auden exhort in their separate writings, can hardly cease from magnification when the machine literally penetrates the body and mind (Toffler 1970; Auden 1948). We should not, then, lightly dismiss the possibility that the crisis of identity rendered more likely by the cyborg lifestyle might lead some hybridized persons to experience crippling neurosis or even madness. The danger is exacerbated because a human being is a complex system, much like an ecosystem or a nation in possessing many layers that interact holistically. Tinkering with such multifaceted systems can have unexpected side effects.

## DA Impacts

### Environment – No solvency

#### Addressing the issue of women does not solve other specific environmental issues, and the wholesale rejection links.

Herta Nagl-Docekal, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Vienna, Austria, 1999**,** “The Feminist Critique of Reason Revisited,” *Hypatia*, Volume 14, Number 1

**The thesis that human beings dominate Nature can just as well be formulated without allusion to gender relations.** If it turns out that this thesis itself is in need of critical discussion—for instance in reference to today's environmental crisis—then we are dealing with a specific problem. **We cannot condemn the human domination of Nature simply by underscoring that women's subordination is unacceptable.** In other words, the **demand for women's liberation does not make it necessary**, by the same token**, to give up structures of subordination presumed to be found in any other area of reality.** Though **Keller's** claim to discern explicitly patriarchal thoughts in Bacon's work is doubtlessly justified, her **critique loses plausibility as she considers the detected patriarchal traits a sufficient reason for charging Bacon's entire conception of science to be marked by a masculine bias.** That Keller fails to take issue, in detail, with Bacon's use of gendered comparisons adds an, no doubt, unintended element to her thought: the **wholesale objection** she raises **presupposes** that she, instead of articulating a repudiation, tacitly adopts this very **alignment of scientific rationality with maleness.**

#### Must challenge flawed epistemologies. They equate woman with nature. Wholesale rejection of domination doesn’t solve distinctive problems with the environment.

Herta Nagl-Docekal, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Vienna, Austria, 1999**,** “The Feminist Critique of Reason Revisited,” *Hypatia*, Volume 14, Number 1

Keller's understanding of science is burdened with this problem, as can be seen in the way she seeks to prove the masculine character of modern science's concept of rationality. As illustrated by the previous quotes, she argues that **Nature is oppressed in two ways: on the one hand, insofar as it is the object of knowledge and, on the other, insofar as it is dominated. Supposing this description of Nature's oppression is correct, the decisive question still remains unanswered: Why should this statement be taken to imply necessarily that modern science is based upon a subordination of woman? Evidence for a male claim to supremacy can only be found here on the condition that "woman" has already been identified with Nature.** Yet **this equation** is by no means compelling. On the contrary, it **must be challenged**, especially **from a feminist perspective.** The reason this problematic implication of Keller's argument has hardly been addressed until now may be that some of the motives behind her critique of science as such are legitimate. **It is**, in fact**, necessary to reject an epistemology that hinges on a naive confrontation between subject and object.** Likewise, the **scientism of modern research is in need of critical investigation from the point of view that it introduces into the realm of the humanities a way of looking at people that supports sociotechnological kinds of action.** But **what is problematic here is not that science has connotations of masculinity; rather, the problems are with the specific concepts of subject/object relationship and of scientism that call for a more sophisticated theory.** Further, we must consider that both these issues have already led to very complex debates that are in the center of the contemporary theory of science and the humanities. Keller's work, however, tends to oversimplify. A couple of examples must suffice here. **Where Keller denounces domination in general, a wide range of distinctions is necessary—say, between the justifiably criticized disenfranchisement of human beings** on the one hand **and**, on the other hand, **a use of natural resources that is necessary for** human **survival. Also, considering the world's current ecological crisis, a wholesale dismissal of thoughts about human control over Nature is not advisable.** Rather, in this case, **it is necessary to distinguish between irreversible destruction of natural resources and the kind of use that leaves intact the resources' regenerative potential.**

## Framework

### Exclusion Inevitable

#### Exclusion inevitable

Veronica Vasterling, Associate Professor at the Department of Philosophy and the Center of Women Studies of the University of Nijmegen, the Netherlands, 1999, “Butler’s Sophisticated Constructivism: A Critical Assessment,” *Hypatia*, Volume 14, Number 3

Butler's argument concerning the political ideal of radical inclusivity is somewhat paradoxical: we have to strive for something we will never achieve. Why is radical inclusivity impossible? Why would we be motivated by an ideal we cannot realize? In what sense does radical inclusivity function as a positive political ideal? **Total or radical inclusivity is impossible because no category can be all-inclusive. Unless they are completely empty or meaningless, categories cannot but have exclusionary effects. To be intelligible at all, the category of "the subject" or "the human" has to be interpreted**, that is, **assigned some meaning, and it is this interpretation that produces exclusionary effects. Even when it is very broad or abstract, no interpretation can ever be all-inclusive.** **It always foregrounds one or several signification possibilities at the (implicit) expense of other possibilities.** However, "even if every discursive formation is produced through exclusion, that is not to claim that all exclusions are equivalent" (Butler 1993, 207). Only the violent ones are problematic, that is, the exclusions produced by hegemonic conventions and interpretations. If we cannot simply abolish discursive power and its exclusionary effects, we can, Butler [End Page 33] suggests, change its modality or force. In the process of resignification we may undermine the compelling force of hegemonic conventions or interpretations, and consequently, reduce the violence, if not the exclusionarity, of discursive power.

## K Links

### Capitalism – Highways

#### Labor surrounding highway construction is variable and unstable

Christopher W. Wells, December 2008, “Motorists, Engineer-Administrators, and Muddy-Boots Contractors: New Perspectives on the American Highway Revolution, Reviews in American History, Volume 36, Number 4

Holley’s keen eye for detail and knack for concise description make The Highway Revolution a valuable resource for scholars interested in better understanding the technological and logistical details of highway construction. In addition to providing a complete catalog of road-construction machinery, Holley also does a thorough job of describing the jerky progress toward perfecting asphalt pavements for rural highways, the significant influence that heavy trucks had on early highway engineering standards, and the implications that evolving concrete mixer designs had for the eventual explosion of concrete highway mileage. His most interesting and original chapter, which is based on business records from his father’s work as a highway contractor during this period, highlights the substantial logistical difficulties that con-tractors had to confront as they calculated their bids. With so many variables at work—including the cruel combination of highly seasonal work, a large overhead investment in complex construction machinery, and the unreliable engineering characteristics of available paving materials—making a single poor bid could (and often did) put even skilled, experienced contractors out of business.

#### Appeals to black automobility link to capitalism

Cotton Seiler, December 2006, “’So That We as a Race Might have Something Authentic to Travel By’: African American Automobility and Cold War Liberalism” American Quarterly, Volume 58, Number 4

Poised between the Jim Crow and civil rights eras, Travelguide and The Negro Motorist Green Book simultaneously protested the discrimination that confronted black motorists on American roads and proffered the hegemonic image of American freedom through driving. They articulated a collectivist racial politics, mobilizing their midcentury audiences for social change; yet they also rehearsed the individualistic, market-oriented strategies of black capitalism and the vital center consensus, where, as Lizabeth Cohen notes, “the individual’s access to the free market was a sacred concept.” 49 This dualism was not so novel; many progressive publications by and for African Americans, from The Crisis to Ebony, deployed rhetorics affirming black communal struggle in a society that “spoke individualism” to the exclusion of other social philosophies. The salient and novel element of Travelguide and The Negro Motorist Green Book was their focus on automobility as the practice through which African Americans could reconcile, both in symbolic and practical terms, the competing values of individual agency and collective uplift. 50 Like other black business enterprises catering to black consumers in an era of eroding yet still-compelled deference, these guidebooks were rarely radical in their challenge to the legal segregation that circumscribed the mobility of touring black entertainers and athletes, busi-ness travelers, and other motorists; instead, they mounted a decorous campaign for racial reform informed by liberal principles of market agency, cross-racial “understanding,” the prerogative of free mobility, and the assumption of human goodwill.

#### Drivers subject to state/capital manipulation

Kevin Douglas Kuswa, July 2009, “Driving Ourselves and the Rise of Maternal Auto/mobility: Wright’s (1939) The Car Belongs to Mother,” Deb(K)ate, <http://puttingthekindebate.com/2012/05/09/transportation-infrastructure-investments-and-maternal-mobility/>

From the road-user coalitions, the figure of the driver shot off in multiple directions. Moving to a more abstract plane, the state and the market began to articulate the driver as a political or economic unit. The political unit solidified itself through a driver’s license, access to a means of transit, and an obligation to follow the laws of the road. The economic unit solidified itself through the purchase of an automobile and its fuel, a contribution to the economy’s circulation of goods and services, and as a relatively large source of disposable income. A surge in anti-diversion legislation during the period marked a struggle constituting the driver as an economic unit capable of being taxed in a comprehensive way. Diversion would allow drivers to become a source of revenue for other programs sponsored by the government through a legislative siphoning of highway revenues for competing social needs such as education, defense spending, health care, etc. Highway proponents, naturally, demonized these leaks and passed anti-diversion legislation.[1] Eventually solidified by Constitutional amendments in 21 states that earmarked gas tax revenue for further road construction, state highway trust funds secured a self-propelling transportation infrastructure based on the car.

#### Federal subsidization of highways is empirically the maintenance of capital, which led to disadvantages of the rail industry

Jim Cohen, September 2009, “Divergent Paths, United States and France: Capital Markets, the State, and Differentiation in Transportation Systems, 1840-1940” Enterprise & Society, Volume 10, Number 3

In the early nineteenth century, capital for the construction of major American canals and turnpikes came in significant measure from government purchases of their stock, public loans, and subsidies as well as land grants and rights of eminent domain.17 As a result, government bonds and, to a lesser degree, private company stock, were major securities traded in early American capital markets.18 But, with the rapid growth of railways in the 1840s and thereafter, canal stock and bond values declined in financial markets, so many companies went bankrupt and taxpayer-supported public investment was not repaid. This coincided with scandals involving corruption and mismanagement of canal enterprises. Thus, at the historical moment when railways were rapidly expanding, popular sentiment turned against government funding of internal improvements, 19 which led to an important shift in American financial history. Private financial institutions supplanted government in providing capital for railroad construction and the stocks and bonds of private rail corporations soon became the main securities traded in the U.S. capital markets.20 Not long thereafter, the same financial institutions that used rail finance to take control of capital markets—such as J. P. Morgan and Company, National City Bank, and New York Life Insurance— initiated a wave of rail mergers to protect their capital investment. At the end of the Civil War, hundreds of small, independently owned railroad corporations operated in the United States. These companies proliferated as part of westward expansion so that, between 1865 and 1893, rail track increased from 35,000 to 176,000 miles.21 But, banks and other institutional investors were concerned about problems that often characterized promotion of railroads, such as inflated construction costs, overcapitalization (“watering” of stock), and looting of company assets by promoters.22 They were also concerned that in most regions of the country multiple railway companies competed on lines that frequently paralleled one another,23 leading to rate competition, particularly for freight shipments, that drove down profits. Regional pools and associations among railways were formed to try to tamp down destructive competition and to stabilize rates, but most of these initiatives failed. When state governments tried legislating rates, railway companies used contributions, bribes, and political influence to stymie these efforts. As a result, while some railroads were profitable, many others failed and eventually entered into bankruptcy proceedings.24 In order to protect the stability and continued growth of their rail securities in the capital markets, a relatively small group of unincorporated, private investment banks, such as J. P. Morgan, Kuhn Loeb, and Lehman Brothers, as well as incorporated commercial banks, such as First National Bank of New York, initiated a wave of mergers and reorganizations in the rail industry, often using rail bankruptcy proceedings as a venue for consolidating or merging small competing railroads into larger conglomerates.

### Capitalism – Race

#### Racism marks people for exploitation and capitalism accordingly generates an ideological defense to normalize that exploitation. Eliminating race oppression requires an attack on capital.

Robert Young, Winter/Spring 2006, “Putting Materialism back into Race Theory”, Red Critique <http://www.redcritique.org/WinterSpring2006/puttingmaterialismbackintoracetheory.htm>

My project situates race in relation to the international division of labor. Race emerges historically and within specific political-economic coordinates. These coordinates link the logic of race to the logic of capitalist exploitation. In other words, race is implicated in the historic and ongoing (class) struggle to determine the ratio of surplus value. For me then, race signals a marking for exploitation, and this economic assignment, in turn, generates an accompanying ideological machinery to justify and increase that exploitation. Any understanding of this economic assignment, which represents an historically objective positionality, has been removed from the contemporary intellectual scene. Race represents not just a cultural or political category as many critics attest to, but it represents an historic apparatus for the production, maintenance, and legitimation of the inequalities of wage-labor. Similar to other modes of social difference, like gender and sexuality, race participates in naturalizing asymmetrical social relations.

#### Race oppression is used by capital to ideologically justify economic exploitation—the eradication of racism requires a totalizing critique of capitalism.

Robert Young, Winter/Spring 2006, “Putting Materialism back into Race Theory”, Red Critique <http://www.redcritique.org/WinterSpring2006/puttingmaterialismbackintoracetheory.htm>

This essay advances a materialist theory of race. In my view, race oppression dialectically intersects with the exploitative logic of advanced capitalism, a regime which deploys race in the interest of surplus accumulation. Thus, race operates at the (economic) base and therefore produces cultural and ideological effects at the superstructure; in turn, these effects—in very historically specific way—interact with and ideologically justify the operations at the economic base [[1]](http://www.redcritique.org/WinterSpring2006/printversions/puttingmaterialismbackintoracetheory.htm#_edn1). In a sense then, race encodes the totality of contemporary capitalist social relations, which is why race cuts across a range of seemingly disparate social sites in contemporary US society. For instance, one can mark race difference and its discriminatory effects in such diverse sites as health care, housing/real estate, education, law, job market, and many other social sites. However, unlike many commentators who engage race matters, I do not isolate these social sites and view race as a local problem, which would lead to reformist measures along the lines of either legal reform or a cultural-ideological battle to win the hearts and minds of people and thus keep the existing socio-economic arrangements intact; instead, I foreground the relationality of these sites within the exchange mechanism of multinational capitalism. Consequently, I believe, the eradication of race oppression also requires a totalizing political project: the transformation of existing capitalism—a system which produces difference (the racial/gender division of labor) and accompanying ideological narratives that justify the resulting social inequality. Hence, my project articulates a transformative theory of race—a theory that reclaims revolutionary class politics in the interests of contributing toward a post-racist society. In other words, the transformation from actually existing capitalism into socialism constitutes the condition of possibility for a post-racist society—a society free from racial and all other forms of oppression. By freedom, I do not simply mean a legal or cultural articulation of individual rights as proposed by bourgeois race theorists. Instead, I theorize freedom as a material effect of emancipated economic forms. I foreground my (materialist) understanding of race as a way to contest contemporary accounts of race, which erase any determinate connection to economics. For instance, humanism and poststructuralism represent two dominant views on race in the contemporary academy. Even though they articulate very different theoretical positions, they produce similar ideological effects: the suppression of economics. They collude in redirecting attention away from the logic of capitalist exploitation and point us to the cultural questions of sameness (humanism) or difference (poststructuralism). In developing my project, I critique the ideological assumptions of some exemplary instances of humanist and poststructuralist accounts of race, especially those accounts that also attempt to displace Marxism, and, in doing so, I foreground the historically determinate link between race and exploitation. It is this link that forms the core of what I am calling a transformative theory of race. The transformation of race from a sign of exploitation to one of democratic multiculturalism, ultimately, requires the transformation of capitalism.

### Capitalism – Gender

#### Categories of sexual identity restrict our ability to act against capitalism

Rosemary Hennessy, 2000, “Profit and Pleasure: Sexual Identities in Late Capitalism,” Pg. 219-220)

 I want to propose that sexual identities—indeed, all reified identity categories—might be thought of as forms of restrictive action potence. Sexual identity categories restrict the power to act to the extent that they atomize human potential and social relationships. By this I do not only mean that the organization of gender and desire into the heteropolar norm is an example of restrictive action potence. To the extent that the queering of this binary has tended to close off more comprehensive ways of thinking about sexual identification and desire, it also restricts our ability to understand the history of social relationships that identity formation depends on. Sometimes these restrictions take the form of individualizing, as critical psychology notes, but they also take more postmodern forms where identity is rescripted as a complex of culturally constructed positions. When a way of thinking about identity that promotes restrictive action potence is the starting point for social movement, the consequence is that the power to collectively change existing possibilities and structures becomes restricted as well. The challenge for social movement committed to addressing forms of oppression that target sexual identity is to fold those ways of thinking that encourage restrictive action potence into those that foster more comprehensive action potence. In the next section I look at some of the ways academic social theorists have proposed we might get out of the restrictive action potence of identity politics and redirect social movement by making use of appeals to social justice and democracy. The reorientation I am proposing endorses the aim of full democracy, but from a different starting place: a deeply democratic because fundamentally anticapitalist project. Rooted in the reality of collective human needs, it displaces identity politics with a practice of disidentification that draws attention to the role of human affect in social life and in social movement through the cultivation of what I would call the more comprehensive action potence of “revolutionary love.”

### Plan PIC – State

#### Liberalism relies on rationality, frames the rest of the discussion

Ruth EGroenhout**,** Department of Philosophy at Calvin College,2002**,** “Essentialist Challenges to Liberal Feminism,” *Social Theory and Practice*, Volume 28, Number 1

**Liberal political theory begins with rights, autonomy, and reason. Humans have rights, and their freedom to exercise those rights is properly limited by others' rights. This view of the basic shape of the political terrain is based on certain assumptions about humans. The most basic is the assumption that humans, whatever their other differences, share some basic qualities that make them properly bearers of rights.** In one strand of the liberal tradition **this quality was rationality. Sometimes autonomy** is the basic quality, and in the case of thinkers who trace their theoretical heritage back to Immanuel Kant, **autonomy and rationality become mutually implicative so that together they are the essential qualities for membership in the moral community and ownership of rights. Due to the important role rationality plays in liberal thought, the question of the nature of rationality is a central one for liberal thinkers.** While there have been some who have argued for a minimalist notion of rationality limited to means/ends calculations, **the liberal tradition** in general **has relied on a much richer notion of rationality, including the capacity to reflect on the meaning of one's life, deliberate concerning different conceptions of the good, and engage in public political deliberations over these and other matters. This richer notion of rationality, and of humans as capable of engaging in self-directed behavior based on this conception of reason, provides the basic framework within which liberal moral and political discussions are carried out.**

#### Liberalism leads to public/private distinctions that lead to silencing of women and prioritizes war/politics/empire

Marvin Mahan. Ellison, 1996**,** Erotic Justice: A Liberating Ethic of Sexuality, Pg. 7-9

Liberalism's strength is its placement of human freedom at the core of its theological vision. Responsible moral agency to re-create the world is the primary mark of faithfulness to God. Rethinking moral meaning is encouraged as an ongoing historical task, including searching for more adequate institutional forms of love and justice. We become human by our open participation in equalizing social power relations. However, **liberalism has limitations that have** to date **prevented the development of an adequate social ethic of sexuality. First, liberal social theory splits public from private life. Justice, it says, belongs to the public ordering of social, political, and economic power relations. Love, politically ineffectual and reduced to an affective sentiment, is restricted to private matters among intimates in a separate, autonomous interpersonal sphere. The private is sealed off from the public, the personal from the social. Moreover, sexuality is viewed as nonhistorical and subject**, by and large, **to natural determination. Liberalism's presuppositions, especially about female nature and a naturalized family structure, replicate a nineteenth-century white bourgeois worldview that divides social reality into man's (public) world and women's (private) space. The privatized zone of nonfreedom includes sexuality, reproduction, and the care of children, all matters judged inconsequentialand typically rendered invisible in liberal social theoryin relation to the "real"** (read "manly") **concerns of war, politics, career, and empire-building.**

#### Liberalism is patriarchal and feminism recognizes the way humanity functions as a community

Marvin Mahan. Ellison, 1996**,** Erotic Justice: A Liberating Ethic of Sexuality, Pg. 7-9

Second, **liberalism leaves in place a patriarchal split between thinking and feeling, a gender-based dichotomy in which feeling, associated with women and things female, is devalued, while rationality and abstract reasoning, associated with men and things male, is prized. Liberals fear that passion and strong feeling of any kind will lead inexorably to confused thinking, biased by personal involvement and self-interest.** 6 **Self-assertion, self-interest, and nearly all self-love are consistently met with suspicion. Liberal social theory sees the self as basically nonsocial, self-preoccupied, and able to enteror not enterwith others into community. It fails**, however, **to appreciate the limits of its culturally constructed view as the product of reified masculine consciousness.** In contrast**, feminist theory appreciates how all persons**, male and female, **are fundamentally relational and social beings whose personhood is constituted in the communities** upon which they depend for survival, care, and ongoing development. **Although liberalism professes to value human dignity, its tendency toward individualism places self-regard and other-regard in tension, forever in opposition. Their irreconcilable conflict, liberalism conjectures, can be resolved only by a selfless altruism or, when necessary, by self-denial.** However, **liberalism has not shaken free of misogyny. It continues to assign self-sacrifice selectively to women (and other socially subordinate people) and rarely invokes it as a male virtue or as an obligation for the powerful. In contrast, feminist and gay liberation perspectives encourage self-love as healthy and morally good, especially among marginalized peoples. Self-love is a corrective to internalized oppression and self-hate. Contrary to liberal fears, valuing of self and valuing of others are not mutually exclusive, antagonistic options, but rather reciprocal, fully interdependent possibilities.** 7 Doing justice, in liberation perspective, is a remarkable pathway for deepening love. Finally, liberalism by and large accepts the prevailing cultural model of power as unilateral control. Such power competes with others for scarce, limited resources. Again, this contrasts with feminist theory that envisions power as power-with and power-for others and as the humanizing capacity to sustain relationship and build community through mutual regard and care.8

#### Law and citizenship in their current form are patriarchal

Luce Irigaray, 1996, I Love to You: Sketch for a Felicity within History, pg. 20

This is still the case for us. There are still no civil rights proper to women and to men.2 This is particularly true for women, since existing law is better suited to men than women inasmuch as men have been the model for citizenship for centuries, the adult female citizen being poorly defined by rights to equality that do not meet her needs. Strictly speaking, there is still no civil law in our era that makes human persons of men and women. As sexed persons, they remain in natural immediacy. And this means that real persons still have no rights, since there are only men and women, there are no neuter individuals. The rights of these abstract citizens are, to varying degrees, modeled upon or derived from religious rights and duties, in particular patriarchal ones. Hence the difficulty of distinguishing between these two domains. We do not as yet have civil law pertaining to real persons, concerning first of all women and men. For want of such laws, our sexuality lapses into a barbarity worse at times than that of animal society.

#### Cannot solve racism through laws... The legal systemsystem is inherently racist

Richard Delgado, Professor, Law, University of Colorado, March, 1992 review of “Recasting the American Race Problem: Rethinking the American Race Problem,” by Roy L. Brooks, california law review

Our system of antidiscrimination law is designed to detect and punish breaches of the principle of formal equal opportunity (pp. 51-66). For Brooks, as for most liberals, the problems that afflict this approach lie in its implementation. The tests by which courts evaluate claims of unequal treatment are too stringent (pp. 100-01), the burden of proof incorrectly placed (pp. 152-55), the remedies ill-considered (pp. 120-28), and the requirements of proof of intent and causation too strict (p. 155) to enable the law to function effectively. But an emerging counter view holds that the problems with the principle lie not merely with the means by which courts enforce it. Rather: (A) the principle itself is poorly suited to its task— racism and racial subordination are the norm in our society rather than the exception; and (B) members of our culture--including judges--construct key notions like race and racism so as to maintain relations between the races in roughly their current condition.