# \*\*\*AT: MISC Ks\*\*\*

# AT: Anthro

**Human extinction comes first – turns the kritik**

**Matheny 07** (J. G. Matheny, Ph. D. candidate, Bloomberg School of Public Health, Johns Hopkins University, December 6, 2007, “Ought we worry about human extinction?,” online: <http://jgmatheny.org/extinctionethics.htm>)

Moral philosophers have not written much about human extinction. This may be because they underestimate the potential benefits of human survival and/or the risks of human extinction. If we survive the next few centuries, humanity could allow Earth-originating life to survive a trillion years or more. If we do not survive, Earth-originating life will probably perish within a billion years. **If prolonging the survival of Earth-originating life is morally important, then there may be nothing more important than reducing the near-term risks of human extinction**. Keywords: extinction, population ethics, intergenerational justice, catastrophic risk, existential risk, risk analysis, animal welfare, environmental ethics Word count: 3,400 Introduction It was only in the last century, with the invention of nuclear weapons, that the probability of human extinction could be appreciably affected by human action. Ever since, human extinction has generally been considered a terrible possibility. It’s surprising, then, that a search of JSTOR and the Philosopher’s Index suggests contemporary philosophers have written little about the ethics of human extinction. In fact, they seem to have written more about the extinction of other animals. Maybe this is because they consider human extinction impossible or inevitable; or maybe human extinction seems inconsequential compared to other moral issues. In this paper I argue that the possibility of human extinction deserves more attention. While extinction events may be very improbable, their consequences are grave. Human extinction would not only condemn to non-existence all future human generations, it would also cut short the existence of all animal life, as natural events will eventually make Earth uninhabitable. The value of future lives Leslie (1996) suggests philosophers’ nonchalance toward human extinction is due in large part to disagreements in population ethics. Some people suppose it does not matter if the number of lives lived in the future is small -- at its limit, zero.[2] In contrast, I assume here that moral value is a function of both the quality and number of lives in a history.[3] This view is consistent with most people’s intuition about extinction (that it’s bad) and with moral theories under which life is considered a benefit to those who have it, or under which life is a necessary condition for producing things of value (Broome, 2004; Hare, 1993; Holtug 2001, Ng, 1989; Parfit 1984; Sikora, 1978). For instance, some moral theories value things like experiences, satisfied preferences, achievements, friendships, or virtuous acts, which take place only in lives. On this view, an early death is bad (at least in part) because it cuts short the number of these valuable things. Similarly, on this view, an early extinction is bad (at least in part) because it cuts short the number of these valuable things. I think this view is plausible and think our best reasons for believing an early death is bad are our best reasons for believing an early extinction is bad. But such a view is controversial and I will not settle the controversy here. I start from the premise that we ought to increase moral value by increasing both the quality and number of lives throughout history. I also take it, following Singer (2002), this maxim applies to all sentient beings capable of positive subjective feelings. Life’s prospects The human population is now 6 billion (6 x 109). There are perhaps another trillion (1012) sentient animals on Earth, maybe a few orders more, depending on where sentience begins and ends in the animal kingdom (Gaston, Blackburn, and Goldewijk, 2003; Gaston and Evans, 2004). Animal life has existed on Earth for around 500 million years. Barring a dramatic intervention, all animal life on Earth will die in the next several billion years. Earth is located in a field of thousands of asteroids and comets. 65 million years ago, an asteroid 10 kilometers in size hit the Yucatan , creating clouds of dust and smoke that blocked sunlight for months, probably causing the extinction of 90% of animals, including dinosaurs. A 100 km impact, capable of extinguishing all animal life on Earth, is probable within a billion years (Morrison et al., 2002). If an asteroid does not extinguish all animal life, the Sun will. In one billion years, the Sun will begin its Red Giant stage, increasing in size and temperature. Within six billion years, the Sun will have evaporated all of Earth’s water, and terrestrial temperatures will reach 1000 degrees -- much too hot for amino acid-based life to persist. If, somehow, life were to survive these changes, it will die in 7 billion years when the Sun forms a planetary nebula that irradiates Earth (Sackmann, Boothroyd, Kraemer, 1993; Ward and Brownlee, 2002). Earth is a dangerous place and animal life here has dim prospects. If there are 1012 sentient animals on Earth, only 1021 life-years remain. The only hope for terrestrial sentience surviving well beyond this limit is that some force will deflect large asteroids before they collide with Earth, giving sentients another billion or more years of life (Gritzner and Kahle, 2004); and/or terrestrial sentients will colonize other solar systems, giving sentients up to another 100 trillion years of life until all stars begin to stop shining (Adams and Laughlin, 1997). Life might survive even longer if it exploits non-stellar energy sources. But it is hard to imagine how life could survive beyond the decay of nuclear matter expected in 1032 to 1041 years (Adams and Laughlin, 1997). This may be the upper limit on the future of sentience.[4] Deflecting asteroids and colonizing space could delay the extinction of Earth-originating sentience from 109 to 1041 years. Assuming an average population of one trillion sentients is maintained (which is a conservative assumption under colonization[5]), these interventions would create between 1021 and 1053[billion] life-years. At present on Earth, **only a human civilization would be remotely capable of carrying out such projects**. If humanity survives the next few centuries, it’s likely we will develop technologies needed for at least one of these projects. We may already possess the technologies needed to deflect asteroids (Gritzner and Kahle, 2004; Urias et al., 1996). And in the next few centuries, we’re likely to develop technologies that allow colonization. We will be strongly motivated by self-interest to colonize space, as asteroids and planets have valuable resources to mine, and as our survival ultimately requires relocating to another solar system (Kargel, 1994; Lewis, 1996). Extinction risks Being capable of preserving sentient life for another 1041 years makes human survival important. There may be nothing more important. **If the human species is extinguished, all known sentience and certainly all Earth-originating sentience will be extinguished within a few billion years**. We ought then pay more attention to what Bostrom (2002) has called “existential risks” -- risks “where an adverse outcome would either annihilate Earth-originating intelligent life or permanently and drastically curtail its potential.” Such risks include: an asteroid or comet strikes Earth, creating enough debris to shut down photosynthesis for months; a supervolcano erupts, creating enough debris to shut down photosynthesis; a nearby supernova unleashes deadly radiation that reaches Earth; greenhouse gasses cause a radical change in climate; a nuclear holocaust creates enough debris to cause a “nuclear winter,” shutting down photosynthesis; a genetically engineered microbe is unleashed, by accident or design, killing most or all of humanity; or a high-energy physics experiment goes awry, creating a “true” vacuum or strangelets, destroying the Earth (Bostrom 2002; Bostrom and Cirkovic 2006; Leslie 1996, Posner 2004, Rees 2003). To me, most of these risks seem very unlikely. But dishearteningly, in their catalogs of these risks, Britain ’s Astronomer Royal, Sir Martin Rees (2003), gives humanity 50-50 odds of surviving the next few centuries, and philosophers John Leslie (1996) and Nick Bostrom (2002) put our chances at 70% and 75%, respectively.

# AT: Baudrillard

**Baudrillard is too nihilistic to apply to politics**

**Butterfield 02** Bradley Butterfield , Assistant Professor of English at University of Wisconsin at La Crosse, "The Baudrillardian Symbolic, 9/11, and the War of Good and Evil" Postmodern Culture, volume 13

From Princess Diana to 9/11, Jean Baudrillard has been the prophet of the postmodern media spectacle, the hyperreal event. In the 1970s and 80s, our collective fascination with things like car crashes, dead celebrities, terrorists and hostages was a major theme in Baudrillard's work on the symbolic and symbolic exchange, and in his post-9/11 "L'Esprit du Terrorisme," he has taken it upon himself to decipher terrorism's symbolic message. He does so in the wake of such scathing critiques as Douglas Kellner's Jean Baudrillard: From Marxism to Postmodernism and Beyond (1989), which attacked Baudrillard's theory as "an imaginary construct which tries to seduce the world to become as theory wants it to be, to follow the scenario scripted in the theory" (178). Did Baudrillard seduce 9/11 into being--is he terrorism's theoretical guru?--or did he merely anticipate and describe in advance the event's profound seductiveness? To Kellner and other critics, Baudrillard's theory of postmodernity is a political as well as an intellectual failure: Losing critical energy and growing apathetic himself, he ascribes apathy and inertia to the universe. Imploding into entropy, Baudrillard attributes implosion and entropy to the experience of (post) modernity. (180) To be sure, Baudrillard's scripts and scenarios have always been concerned with the implosion of the global capitalist system. But while Baudrillard's tone at the end of "L'Esprit du Terrorisme" can certainly be called apathetic--"there is no solution to this extreme situation--certainly not war"--he does not suggest that there are no forces in the universe capable of mounting at least a challenge to the system and its sponsors (18).

**Baudrillard’s alternative fails to confront real world politics**

**Best and Kellner, 98** Steven Best and Douglas Kellner, Department of Philosophy at University of Texas-El Paso, 1998 “Postmodern Politics and the Battle for the Future” http://www2.cddc.vt.edu/illuminations/kell28.htm

In the aftermath of the 1960s, novel and conflicting conceptions of postmodern politics emerged. Postmodern politics thus take a variety of forms and would include the anti-politics of Baudrillard and his followers, who exhibit a cynical, despairing rejection of the belief in emancipatory social transformation, as well as a variety of efforts to create a new or reconstructed politics. On the extreme and apolitical position of a Baudrillard, we are stranded at the end of history, paralyzed and frozen, as the masses collapse into inertia and indifference, and simulacra and technology triumph over agency. Thus, from Baudrillard's perspective, all we can do is "accommodate ourselves to the time left to us."

# AT: Link of Omission

**Permutation do both – all texts exclude something – omission is not a link, rather a reason that telling the story in all ways is best.**

**Rorty 02** Richard Rorty, Professor of Comparative Literature at Stanford Peace Review, vol. 14, no. 2

I have no quarrel with Cornell's and pivak's claim that "what is missing in a literary text or historical narrative leaves its mark through the traces of its expulsion." For that seems simply to say that any text will presuppose the existence of people, things, and institutions that it hardly mentions. So the readers of a literary text will always be able to ask themselves questions such as: "Who prepared the sumptuous dinner the lovers enjoyed?" "How did they get the money to afford that meal?" The reader of a historical narrative will always be able to wonder about where the money to finance the war came from and about who got to decide whether the war would take place. "Expulsion," however, seems too pejorative a term for the fact that **no text can answer all possible questions about its own background** and its own presuppositions. Consider Captain Birch, the agent of the East Indian Company charged with persuading the Rani of Sirmur not to commit suicide. Spivak is not exactly "expelling" Captain Birch from her narrative by zeroing in on the Rani, even though she does not try to find out much about Birch's early days as a subaltern, nor about the feelings of pride or shame or exasperation he may have experienced in the course of his conversations with the Rani. In the case of Birch, Spivak does not try to "gently blow precarious ashes into their ghostly shape," nor does she speculate about the possible sublimity of his career. Nor should she. Spivak has her own fish to and her own witness to bear just as Kipling had his when he spun tales of the humiliations to which newly arrived subalterns were subjected in the regimental messes of the Raj. So do all authors of literary texts and historical narratives, and such **texts and narratives should not always be read as disingenuous exercises in repression. They should be read as one version of a story that could have been told, and should be told, in many other ways**.

# AT: Location K – New Orleans Outweighs

**Mississippi evacuation depends on fixing New Orleans – anything else creates congestion. New Orleans is also affected by worse flooding**

**DOH 06** DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY Office of Inspector General A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities in Response to Hurricane Katrina Office of Inspections and Special Reviews OIG-06-32 March 2006 http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/mgmt/oig\_06-32\_mar06.pdf

Because the greater New Orleans metropolitan area sits in the tidal lowlands of Lake Pontchartrain and is generally bordered on its southern side by the Mississippi River, its near sea level elevation makes it uniquely susceptible to flooding. Levees and floodwalls built around the city were expected to greatly reduce the threat of flooding from hurricane-induced storm surges, waves, and rainfalls. However, the levees kept natural silt deposits from the Mississippi River from replenishing the delta, causing Louisiana’s coastal wetlands to wash away and the city of New Orleans to sink even deeper, which when combined with rising sea levels, increased the region’s vulnerability to flooding. **New Orleans’ location also creates unique evacuation issues**. For example, only two main highways provide evacuation routes inland and out of the New Orleans area; one route leads through Mississippi. Should both Mississippi and Louisiana need to evacuate simultaneously, significant congestion problems would occur, and shelters in Mississippi would become overwhelmed in trying to care for evacuees from two states. While Louisiana and Mississippi had an agreement in place to convert all traffic lanes to a northbound direction on specified evacuation routes, the plan’s effectiveness was dependent on Louisiana beginning to evacuate a day before Mississippi. Both states began evacuating on the same day prior to Hurricane Katrina’s landfall.

**There is a fundamental difference between Louisiana and all other areas affected by Katrina**

**DOH 06** DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY Office of Inspector General A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities in Response to Hurricane Katrina Office of Inspections and Special Reviews OIG-06-32 March 2006 <http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/mgmt/oig_06-32_mar06.pdf>

Incident command system (ICS) structures and unified command were implemented with varying levels of success in Mississippi, Alabama, and Louisiana during the response to Hurricane Katrina. Mississippi immediately implemented a comprehensive ICS structure and integrated federal, state, and local personnel at all levels in a unified command. Alabama implemented an ICS structure, but at a smaller scale because Hurricane Katrina did not cause the level of damage in Alabama that it did in Mississippi and Louisiana. **Louisiana experienced difficulty with fully implementing an ICS structure** and establishing a unified command with federal, state, and local officials. Mississippi FEMA’s FCO and Mississippi’s State Coordinating Officer immediately established a unified command with a comprehensive ICS structure. Prior to landfall, FEMA’s Emergency Response Team-Advanced arrived at the state’s EOC and began coordinating commodities and personnel for the response. FEMA and state officials told us that after landfall, federal, state, and local counterparts integrated and worked side-by-side to manage the response. As issues occurred, all were able to immediately address the issue and recommend solutions. Joint incident action planning meetings with federal and state counterparts from all response sections facilitated planning objectives, priorities, and operations for each operational period. Due to the magnitude of the damage, the Operations Section established three geographic branches, each containing multiple divisions, within Mississippi. Branch I included the six most severely damaged coastal counties. Within Branch I, each county was a separate division. Branches II and III consisted of divisions covering two or more counties each. Because FEMA did not have enough personnel to staff all division supervisor positions, personnel from the U.S. Forest Service filled some division supervisor positions. In addition, FEMA established a federal operational staging area in each branch to facilitate the distribution of commodities and other resources in the affected area. FEMA and state emergency management officials in Mississippi recognized early on that a forward location in the disaster area would be necessary so an Area Field Office was established in Biloxi. Federal, state, and local personnel were pushed forward into the disaster area, and they were empowered to act. Division supervisors within the affected area determined their requirements and requests that could not be filled by the state were passed to the Branch. The requests were then passed to the JFO if they could not be filled at the Branch level, and sent forward within the ICS structure until filled. The ICS structure established in Mississippi included geographic branches and divisions, and authority was delegated to personnel at the division level. In addition to establishing a unified command with federal, state, and local response personnel, the structure allowed FEMA, state, and local emergency management officials to manage Hurricane Katrina response efforts even though existing resources were overwhelmed according to FEMA and state officials. Alabama In comparison to Mississippi, Alabama’s ICS structure was much smaller, showing the flexibility and scalability of the ICS system. Only two coastal counties in Alabama received significant damage from Hurricane Katrina. Damage to other counties was not as severe as Mississippi’s. As a result, Alabama’s ICS structure was much less complex. For example, Alabama did not have a need to establish branches or divisions in order to adequately coordinate a response. In addition, FEMA and Alabama Emergency Management Agency personnel worked from the beginning to establish joint objectives and priorities. Joint incident action plans were developed also. Alabama’s FCO recognized that Department of Defense assistance would not be required and, two days after landfall, released the Defense Coordinating Element so it could move to Mississippi for future support operations. Louisiana Louisiana had great difficulty establishing an integrated command structure, and never fully achieved a unified command with FEMA. FEMA’s Emergency Response Team-National arrived at Louisiana’s EOC in Baton Rouge before landfall and attempted to integrate with Louisiana’s Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness personnel. However, extremely limited space at Louisiana’s EOC prevented some FEMA and state personnel from co-locating. Instead, FEMA established an interim operating facility at a separate location, where most FEMA personnel operated until the JFO was established on September 12, 2005. Although the JFO was operational, state operations personnel continued working at the state EOC rather than co-locating with FEMA at the JFO. Therefore, a few FEMA Operations Section personnel continued to work out of the EOC to facilitate and pre-screen Louisiana’s requests for assistance until state operations personnel moved to the JFO. FEMA immediately established positions based on an ICS structure; however, FEMA and state officials told us that because Louisiana had a limited number of trained emergency management staff, the state was not able to provide a counterpart to all federal positions. FEMA officials in Louisiana told us that state emergency management personnel were concerned exclusively with evacuations and did not assign staff to work with FEMA to plan initial response efforts for Louisiana. FEMA officials indicated that its personnel prepared initial plans for commodity and medical needs, and they had to pull a state employee to begin US&R planning. While FEMA does not usually coordinate with local officials, FEMA sent liaisons into the affected Louisiana parishes and attempted to establish a unified command with local officials and the National Guard. However, at the local level in the affected parishes, federal and local counterparts did not coordinate to establish a unified command in most cases according to FEMA officials in Louisiana. In addition, FEMA’s FCO and Louisiana’s State Coordinating Officer did not establish joint priorities and objectives for the response until September 11, 2005. 15 Louisiana’s ICS structure did not include geographic branches or divisions within the Operations Section. A forward operational area was not established in New Orleans until September 5, 2005, when the Deputy PFO arrived in Louisiana. According to FEMA officials, the PFO cell, which later became an Area Field Office, operated as a satellite of the JFO in Baton Rouge. While the Area Field Office was assigned an area of responsibility covering several parishes in the New Orleans area, personnel on the ground there were not delegated authority, as was the case with division supervisors in Mississippi. In contrast to Mississippi, the New Orleans Area Field Office received its action plans and operations from Baton Rouge rather than determining the needs for the area and sending requests for assistance through the JFO. **The limited ICS structure and lack of unified command in Louisiana significantly undercut its response efforts.**

**It is factually correct that more people died in Louisiana**

**DOH 06** DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY Office of Inspector General A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities in Response to Hurricane Katrina Office of Inspections and Special Reviews OIG-06-32 March 2006 <http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/mgmt/oig_06-32_mar06.pdf>

Hurricane Katrina caused 1,326 deaths – 1,096 in Louisiana, 228 in Mississippi, and 2 in Alabama. 3 More than 700,000 people were displaced from the Gulf Coast region as a result of Hurricane Katrina. More than 273,000 people were displaced and evacuated to shelters. An estimated 300,000 homes were destroyed, or received major or minor damage in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. In Mississippi alone, 780 homes and 413 mobile homes were reported destroyed; 6,482 homes and 808 mobile homes sustained major damage; and 42,444 homes and 18,243 mobile homes had minor damage as of September 17, 2005. 4 Major disaster declarations covered over 90,000 square miles of the affected Gulf Coast area.

# AT: No Truth

**Truth Exists – anything else leads to Nazism – partial truth is not a reason to reject it**

**Quodlibet Journal 05**, Quodlibet Journal is a peer-reviewed academic journal of philosophy. Philosophical Objections to the Knowability of Truth: Answering Postmodernism Author: Andrew Uduigwomen Quodlibet Journal: Volume 7 Number 2, April - June 2005 ISSN: 1526-6575

Postmodern philosophers opine that truth is community-based. In other words, whatever we accept as truth is dependent on the community in which we participate. This implies that there is no absolute or objective truth; truth is simply relational. For them, we have only the world of experience in which we are embedded as mere participants. Consequently, we can speak only as we are in it, not by searching for it outside the realm of experience. Postmodern philosophers apply the theory of literary deconstructions of the world as a whole. They maintain that just as a text will be read differently by each reader, so reality will be ‘read’ differently by each knowing self that encounters it. This implies that there is not a single meaning of the world and there is not a transcendant centre to reality as a whole. Thus, there is no single correct world view, but many views and, by extension,many worlds. By implication, there is no knowledge but interpretation. Good, as the above view may sound, it can be argued that truth is objective rather than perspectival. The point is that, if cultural consensus is the measure of reality, **what happens, for instance, when a culture decides that a certain race or gender is non-human** and those non-humans are targeted for extermination? If reality is defined by cultural consensus, it would amount to an act of imperialism for another culture to intervene. In the absence of an absolute standard, **there is no basis for judging a Nazi any more than there is for defining a human life**. The fact that man’s knowledge is imperfect is not a sufficient condition for us to assume that objective knowledge is not possible. The fact that we often make mistakes in our judgments and may sometimes have to change our mind is not sufficient for us to relegate our beliefs to the status of private opinion. Truth seems to be the only thing worth believing and when we have apprehended it, we must hold it with universal intent. Granted that human knowledge is partial, but it does not necessarily follow that it is objectively untrue. It is better to believe that the senses sometimes deceive us than to maintain that they can never be trusted.