# Port Security Negative

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## A2: Solvency

#### Empirically, US funding of ports has been unfocused and ineffective

Marc Thibault, researcher, Homeland Security Institute, Mary R. Brooks, Chair of Commerce, Dalhousie University, and Kenneth J. Button professor of public policy and director at George Mason, 2006, “The Response of the U.S. Maritime Industry to the New Container Security Initiatives” Transportation Journal, Vol. 45, No. 1, Winter 2006, JSTOR //eR

Second, many in the shipping industry feel that government should refocus its supply chain security efforts on achieving a few key objectives. The U.S. government was perceived as responding to the September 11 at tacks in a knee-jerk fashion; it dedicated funding to a wide range of supply chain security issues. These funding decisions, however, were not based on empirical research, risk analysis, or other accepted decision-making tools. The U.S. in the long run cannot make cost-effective maritime container security policy decisions if it attempts to fund every potential security solution. Third, there was widespread debate about overlapping initiatives. Again, industry executives felt focus on the part of government was needed. Fourth, many of those in the maritime industry are also concerned that the U.S. has not yet fully considered how it will facilitate the recovery of port and container supply chain operations in the event of a terrorist attack. The effects of such a disruption would be felt well beyond port boundaries. A container-based terrorist event may force the evacuation of major population centers, shut down the global container supply chain, damage critical infrastructure, and result in shortages of critical goods. On the other hand, control is seen to be better than before 2001. Documentary benefits were, for example, generally perceived to have resulted from the twenty-four-hour rule.

#### Plan fails – detection methods can’t penetrate other substances in a ship

Jonathan Medalia, Specialist in National Defense, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, Congressional Research Center, 12-7-2004. “Port and Maritime Security: Potential for Terrorist Nuclear Attack Using Oil Tankers” http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RS21997.pdf //eR

Detecting an Atomic Bomb in a Tanker. Some technical approaches for detecting atomic bombs in a tanker would fail, especially for a bomb inside an oil tank. Gamma rays, essentially high-energy x-rays, can be used to create x-ray-type pictures of the contents of cargo containers, but a tanker’s sheer mass of oil and steel would prevent any gamma rays from traveling the width of a tanker. Neutrons may also be used to detect fissile material; neutrons of the appropriate energy level cause such material to fission, producing neutrons and gamma rays that can be detected. The hydrogen and carbon atoms of crude oil, however, would block neutrons from penetrating. Another possible approach, muon detection, might work if daunting technical approaches could be overcome.11 Other candidate techniques include chemical sampling of oil for traces of extraneous material, and preparing an acoustic profile of a ship when known to be “clean” to compare with a profile taken as the ship nears port. The vast amount of oil in a supertanker works against the former technique; the complex configuration of tanks on a tanker works against the latter.

#### Plan fails – scanning alone can’t solve

Jonathan Medalia, Specialist in National Defense, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, Congressional Research Center, 12-7-2004. “Port and Maritime Security: Potential for Terrorist Nuclear Attack Using Oil Tankers” http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RS21997.pdf //eR

Securing Tankers. The difficulty of detecting a bomb aboard a tanker underscores the importance of preventing bombs from being placed aboard tankers. Securing tankers at loading terminals would likely involve setting and enforcing a security perimeter (including underwater), and instituting measures to ensure personnel reliability. Items brought on board a ship would have to be screened. A National Nuclear Security Administration program, “Second Line of Defense,” screens people and baggage for fissile material; similar technology might be used to secure tankers. Securing tankers in port might not be adequate if terrorists could smuggle a bomb onto a ship at sea. It may be possible to improve security by using surveillance aircraft or satellites. Security may be a greater issue as tankers slow to navigate straits or approach port. Several issues arise: (1) Would shippers let crew spend time to upgrade security beyond current levels? VLCCs have small crews, perhaps 40 people, who may have no time for added tasks. (2) If intelligence data indicated a plot to board a tanker at sea to place a bomb, could a warning be passed without compromising U.S. intelligence capabilities? (3) This scenario would require the connivance of the entire crew, or silencing those who opposed the plot. Screening for personnel reliability may be the only defense against this prospect.

#### Scanning fails – not feasible and failed before

Stewart Powell; Steward Powell; joined the Houston Chronicle in April 2008 after 21 years with Hearst Newspapers in Washington, D.C., generated daily coverage from the White House, the Pentagon, national security agencies, Congress and various federal departments and agencies for distribution to 600 newspapers served by the New York Times; July 26, 2012; “Homeland security chief defends failure to inspect 100 percent of cargo arriving in U.S.;” Chron.com Houston News;

http://blog.chron.com/txpotomac/2012/07/homeland-security-chief-defends-failure-to-inspect-100-percent-of-cargo-arriving-in-u-s/ ET

Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano faced congressional criticism Wednesday for her department’s failure to inspect 100 percent of arriving cargo containers as required by federal law.¶ Napolitano told the House Committee on Homeland Security that the 100 percent standard was “not yet attainable” and that she had waived the requirement as permitted by Congress.¶ The department of homeland security has “actually done quite a bit to form and strengthen” partnerships with foreign countries and shipping operations “to secure containers and freight as it leaves foreign ports to the extent that we can,” Napolitano said.¶ But the former governor of Arizona and ex-federal prosecutor the Obama administration and Congress are “at odds” over the extent of inspections of inbound cargo.¶ Inspections target so-called high risk shipments from suspicious origins based on probability calculations and random selection of “a small percentage” of other containers, Napolitano said.¶ “There are a lot of ways to protect the ports of the United States and the interior of the United States from dangerous cargo as we keep in mind the 100 percent law,” Napolitano said.¶ Customs and Border Protection teams operate at 58 ports in North and South America, Europe, Asia, Africa and the Middle East covering approximately 80 percent of all maritime containerized cargo imported into the United States, Napolitano said.¶ The Cabinet officer declined to publicly estimate the percentage of inbound containers subjected to searches by Customs and Border Protection.¶ “Sometimes those laws are very difficult standards to attain and we have to move in other directions in the near term to do everything we can with respect to cargo,” Napolitano said.¶ Rep. Bennie Thompson, a Mississippi Democrat and the ranking Democrat on the Republican-led committee, told Napolitano that he was not satisfied with the failure to inspect all inbound cargo.¶ Federal law “mandates” inspection of all inbound cargo, Thompson said. “It was Congress that said you should do it – they didn’t say look at it and come back to us.¶ Thompson added: “It’s not a good omen that you can’t get the numbers” showing the percentage of cargo subjected to inspection, Thompson said.¶ Napolitano said she didn’t have the percentages “at my fingertips at this hearing.”¶ “We have to recognize that Congress also gave the secretary the power to waive that (100 percent) requirement if it’s not feasible, practical, affordable or causes undue interference with cargo that transits into the ports,” she said.¶ The United States economy relies on $2 trillion in annual legitimate trade that could be disrupted by 100 percent inspection, Napolitano said.

## A2: Econ Advantage

### Turn

#### **The plan fails – an increased emphasis on security trades off with economic benefits**

Marc Thibault, researcher, Homeland Security Institute, Mary R. Brooks, Chair of Commerce, Dalhousie University, and Kenneth J. Button professor of public policy and director, George Mason, 2006, “The Response of the U.S. Maritime Industry to the New Container Security Initiatives” Transportation Journal, Vol. 45, No. 1, Winter 2006, JSTOR //eR

The goal of these efforts is to enhance the overall security of the global container supply chain by reducing the vulnerabilities present in the supply chain. The underlying principle of these efforts is that there is a trade-off between security and efficiency. An over-emphasis on security could result in policies that undermine the economic benefits brought about by containerization, relaxation of trade barriers, technological advancements, and managerial improvements.4

#### Increased security mandates kill small ports’ competitiveness – hurts state economies

Marc Thibault, researcher, Homeland Security Institute, Mary R. Brooks, Chair of Commerce, Dalhousie University, and Kenneth J. Button professor of public policy and director at George Mason, 2006, “The Response of the U.S. Maritime Industry to the New Container Security Initiatives” Transportation Journal, Vol. 45, No. 1, Winter 2006, JSTOR //eR

On the other hand, port officials indicated their operating costs have increased substantially. Large ports have enhanced physical security by improving fencing and lighting and by installing surveillance cameras and electronic access control devices. They have hired more security personnel, established specialized units, and purchased advanced security equipment. Small ports have taken similar steps but have focused their efforts primarily on enhancing their physical security and complained about the impact of security on personnel costs. There was widespread disagreement about who needs security training and the nature of this training. Most of the port officers indicated that their ports chose not to impose additional security fees on their tenants for fear that doing so will make them less competitive than other U.S. and foreign ports. This is an important consideration as local and state governments rely on the tax revenue and jobs generated by ports. They have made up some of these costs through federal grants. However, officials have expressed concern that the federal government grants could not be used for personnel, maintenance, or technology refreshment. While shipping lines were more prepared to try to pass all costs on to the customer (usually through a security surcharge), ports were more likely to try to convince government that the costs of improved security were a public good and therefore should be borne by government.

#### The plan can’t stop nuclear smuggling and would actually hurt the economy with more restrictive measures – the aff simplifies complex issues

Henry H. Willis, Associate Director, RAND Homeland Security and Defense Center, 7-6-2012, “Revisiting 100% Inspection” RAND Commentary, http://www.rand.org/commentary/2012/07/06/RAND.html //eR

From this perspective, container shipping is a gaping security vulnerability that can and must be closed before any threat is able to reach U.S. shores. Unfortunately, the story is not that simple and there are several reasons why we should pause before spending billions on container inspection. First, inspecting containers is just one way to reduce risks to the global supply chain. The White House National Strategy for Global Supply Chain Security (PDF) recommends increasing awareness through information sharing and resilience of the system by planning for how to restart shipping following a disruption—views supported by work by RAND and the World Economic Forum. Intelligence, nuclear counter proliferation, and source control also certainly have an important role in reducing the risks of nuclear terrorism. Second, 100 percent inspection may not be enough to deter nuclear terrorism. Game theory, a method of analysis of adversarial behavior, suggests the existence of other smuggling routes and limits on performance of detectors severely constrain the effect of 100 percent scanning on decisions of a terrorist intent on launching a nuclear attack on the United States. Finally, cost-benefit analysis of container inspection suggests that the costs of 100 percent inspection are far larger than the costs of equipment needed to scan containers. The global supply chain is a complex system, optimized for efficiency. Mandating new security rules could lead companies to change which countries they import from and which ports they use to ship goods. This could lead to unintended changes in the global supply chain that may or may not improve security, but will likely decrease the system's efficiency. It is good that the congressmen have asked the Obama administration to revisit supply chain security. However, precipitous changes to how the global supply chain operates do not seem warranted, may not in fact improve security, and could have costly unintended consequences. Instead, the administration and Congress should consider the lessons learned in the past five years, and armed with an objective analysis, decide whether the best choice is adoption of 100 percent scanning, repeal of Section 232 of the Safe Ports Act of 2006, or other changes in law and best practice.

## A2: Terror Advantage

### Uniqueness

#### Status quo counterterrorism already solving the problem

Lisa Daniel, American Forces Press Service, 2-16-2012, “US Faces Broad Spectrum of Threats, Intel Leaders Say,” DoD, <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=67231>, CP

Burgess cited a “broad spectrum of dissimilar threats,” including rising regional powers and highly adaptive and resilient transnational terrorist networks.¶ Intelligence shows the next three years will be a critical transition time in counterterrorism, as groups like al-Qaida diminish in importance and terrorist groups become more decentralized, Clapper said.¶ U.S. counterterrorism has caused al-Qaida to lose so many top lieutenants since 2008 “that a new group of leaders, even if they could be found, would have difficulty integrating into the organization and compensating for mounting losses,” the director said. Al-Qaida’s regional affiliates in Iraq, the Arabian peninsula and North Africa are expected to “surpass the remnants of core al-Qaida in Pakistan,” he said.¶

### Defense

#### The amount of actors involved ensures that even with additional port security, terrorists will still be able to perform attacks

Marc Thibault, researcher, Homeland Security Institute, Mary R. Brooks, Chair of Commerce, Dalhousie University, and Kenneth J. Button professor of public policy and director at George Mason, 2006, “The Response of the U.S. Maritime Industry to the New Container Security Initiatives” Transportation Journal, Vol. 45, No. 1, Winter 2006, JSTOR //eR

U.S. government actions to improve security cost-effectiveness. Industry officials had widely diverging opinions on the actions the U.S. government should take to improve the cost-effectiveness of maritime security. Several shipping executives indicated that the large number of actors and containers involved made it unlikely that the new security requirements would alone prevent a terrorist attack. They indicated that terrorists intent on using containers to carry out attacks would take the time necessary to find and exploit security vulnerabilities. They indicated that the U.S. government should increase its overseas intelligence collection efforts so that maritime security resources could actively target terrorists or organized crime groups who may be attempting to use supply chain vulnerabilities to advance their causes. These executives, however, did state that the new maritime security requirements are important as they reduce the vulnerability of the supply chain and will help speed the resumption of operations in the event of a terrorist attack.

### Link Turn

#### Their attempts at securitization restrict trade and ultimately destroys developing countries’ abilities to develop, meaning they harbor more terrorist organization. Their plan leads to an *increase* in terrorism.

Parker Laite, A Thesis¶ Submitted to the Faculty of¶ The School of Continuing Studies¶ And of¶ The Graduate School of Arts and Sciences¶ in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of¶ Master of Arts¶ In Liberal Studies, 5-2010, “Maritime Trade Security: Promoter of Terrorism?” Georgetown University, <http://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/553351/laiteParker.pdf?sequence=1>, CP

This thesis finds that the increasing cost of international trade resulting from¶ certain post-9/11 maritime trade security policies may help to promote terrorism. By¶ inadvertently levying disproportionate non-tariff trade barriers against those countries¶ most likely to harbor terrorist organizations, these programs restrict lesser-developed¶ nations’ ability to develop, and thus leave them more susceptible to becoming terrorist¶ safe havens. In support of this argument, the thesis is divided into three main sections.¶ The first demonstrates the strong link between a nation’s foreign trade and its level of¶ development through a brief survey of international trade theory, by highlighting the¶ reliance of some international actors on trade promotion as a means for increasing¶ development, and by analyzing several case studies in which it is clear that trade played¶ an instrumental role in increasing overall development. The second section expands upon¶ this argument by examining the relationship between underdevelopment and terrorism. It¶ investigates the issue by quantitatively analyzing terrorist attacks against the United¶ States according to the level of development in those countries liable for producing or¶ harboring the groups responsible for the attack. The third section looks at the effect of¶ post-9/11 maritime trade security measures on trade and more specifically the policies’¶ adverse effects on developing countries. It outlines key U.S. maritime trade security¶ programs – namely the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism and the Container Security Initiative – and how some of their components constitute non-tariff barriers,¶ especially for developing countries. At an international level, the chapter explores the¶ costs associated with the International Ship and Port Security Code as well as Authorized¶ Economic Operator programs. The thesis concludes by acknowledging that if trade¶ promotes development, and low development is related to a nation’s propensity to¶ harboring terrorism, then there is a logical if indirect link between trade and terrorism. If¶ domestic and international maritime trade security programs disproportionately limit¶ trading opportunities for the countries most likely to harbor terrorist groups, it becomes¶ clear that such programs may inadvertently promote the conditions found to be most¶ closely linked to countries that harbor terrorist organizations.

### No Bomb

#### Launching a terrorist strike is far too complicated for a terrorist organization

Stephen Chapman, columnist and editorial writer for the Chicago Tribune, 5-22-2012, “Nuclear Terrorism Unlikely,” OA, <http://www.oaoa.com/articles/chapman-87719-nuclear-terrorism.html>, CP

Ever since Sept. 11, 2001, Americans have had to live with the knowledge that the next time the terrorists strike, it could be not with airplanes capable of killing thousands but atomic bombs capable of killing hundreds of thousands. The prospect has created a sense of profound vulnerability. It has shaped our view of government policies aimed at combating terrorism (filtered through Jack Bauer). It helped mobilize support for the Iraq war.¶ Why are we worried? Bomb designs can be found on the Internet. Fissile material may be smuggled out of Russia. Iran, a longtime sponsor of terrorist groups, is trying to acquire nuclear weapons. A layperson may figure it’s only a matter of time before the unimaginable comes to pass. Harvard’s Graham Allison, in his book “Nuclear Terrorism,” concludes, “On the current course, nuclear terrorism is inevitable.”¶ But remember: After Sept. 11, 2001, we all thought more attacks were a certainty. Yet al-Qaida and its ideological kin have proved unable to mount a second strike.¶ Given their inability to do something simple — say, shoot up a shopping mall or set off a truck bomb — it’s reasonable to ask whether they have a chance at something much more ambitious. Far from being plausible, argued Ohio State University professor John Mueller in a presentation at the University of Chicago, “the likelihood that a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems to be vanishingly small.”¶ The events required to make that happen comprise a multitude of Herculean tasks. First, a terrorist group has to get a bomb or fissile material, perhaps from Russia’s inventory of decommissioned warheads. If that were easy, one would have already gone missing.¶ Besides, those devices are probably no longer a danger, since weapons that are not maintained quickly become what one expert calls “radioactive scrap metal.” If terrorists were able to steal a Pakistani bomb, they would still have to defeat the arming codes and other safeguards designed to prevent unauthorized use. Stealing some 100 pounds of bomb fuel would require help from rogue individuals inside some government who are prepared to jeopardize their own lives. Then comes the task of building a bomb. It’s not something you can gin up with spare parts and power tools in your garage. It requires millions of dollars, a safe haven and advanced equipment — plus people with specialized skills, lots of time and a willingness to die for the cause.¶ Assuming the jihadists vault over those Himalayas, they would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil. Sure, drug smugglers bring in contraband all the time — but seeking their help would confront the plotters with possible exposure or extortion. This, like every other step in the entire process, means expanding the circle of people who know what’s going on, multiplying the chance someone will blab, back out or screw up.¶ That has heartening implications. If al-Qaida embarks on the project, it has only a minuscule chance of seeing it bear fruit. Given the formidable odds, it probably won’t bother.

#### The only terrorist organization that would even kind of acquire a bomb was al-Qaida, and they’re falling apart

John Mueller, Department of Political Science at Ohio State University, 1-1-2008, “The Atomic Terrorist: Assessing the Likelihood,” University of Chicago, <http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSACHGO.PDF>, CP

It is essential to note, however, that making a bomb is an extraordinarily difficult task. Thus, a set of counterterrorism and nuclear experts interviewed in 2004 by Dafna Linzer for the Washington Post pointed to the "enormous technical and logistical obstacles confronting would-be nuclear terrorists, and to the fact that neither al-Qaeda nor any other group has come close to demonstrating the means to overcome them." Allison nonetheless opines that a dedicated terrorist group, al-Qaeda in particular, could get around all the problems in time and eventually steal, produce, or procure a "crude" bomb or device, one that he however acknowledges would be "large, cumbersome, unsafe, unreliable, unpredictable, and inefficient" (2004, 97; see also Bunn and Wier 2006, 139; Pluta and Zimmerman 2006, 61).

#### Building a bomb would be too difficult, too expensive, and too risky

John Mueller, Department of Political Science at Ohio State University, 1-1-2008, “The Atomic Terrorist: Assessing the Likelihood,” University of Chicago, <http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSACHGO.PDF>, CP

The discussion so far has neglected to consider the financial costs of the extended operation in all its cumulating, or cascading, entirely, but these could easily become monumental. There would be expensive equipment to buy, smuggle, and set up, and people to pay--or pay off. Some operatives might work for free out of utter dedication to The Cause, but the vast conspiracy requires in addition the subversion of a considerable array of criminals and opportunists, each of whom has every incentive to push the price for cooperation as high as possible.¶ Alarmists Zimmerman and Lewis (2006) suggest the entire caper could be pulled off for $10 million. The conspirators would be lucky to buy off three people with such a paltry sum. Moreover, the terrorists would be required to expose their ultimate goals to at least some of the corrupted, and at that point (if not earlier) they would become potential extortion victims. They could not afford to abandon unreliable people who know their goals (though they could attempt to kill them), and such people would now enjoy essentially monopoly powers ever to escalate their price. The cost of the operation in bribes alone could easily become ten times the sum suggested by Zimmerman and Lewis [a total of one-hundred million dollars].. And even at that, there would be, of course, a considerable risk that those so purchased would, at an exquisitely opportune moment of their choosing, decide to take the money and run--perhaps to the authorities representing desperate governments with essentially bottomless bankrolls and an overwhelming incentive to expend resources to arrest the atomic plot and to capture or kill the scheming perpetrators.

#### Too many barriers to the bomb

Dafna Linzer, Washington Post Staff Writer, 12-29-2004, “Nuclear Capabilities May Elude Terrorists, Experts Say,” Washington Post, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A32285-2004Dec28.html>, CP

Despite the obvious gravity of the threat, however, counterterrorism and nuclear experts in and out of government say they consider the danger more distant than immediate.¶ They point to enormous technical and logistical obstacles confronting would-be nuclear terrorists, and to the fact that neither al Qaeda nor any other group has come close to demonstrating the means to overcome them.¶ So difficult are the challenges that senior officials on President Bush's national security team believe al Qaeda has shifted its attention to other efforts, at least for now.¶ "I would say that from the perspective of terrorism, the overwhelming bulk of the evidence we have is that their efforts are focused on biological and chemical" weapons, said John R. Bolton, undersecretary of state for arms control and international security. "Not to say there aren't any dealings with radiological materials, but the technology for bio and chem is comparatively so much easier that that's where their efforts are concentrating."

#### Nobody’s actually trying to obtain the materials to build the bomb

Dafna Linzer, Washington Post Staff Writer, 12-29-2004, “Nuclear Capabilities May Elude Terrorists, Experts Say,” Washington Post, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A32285-2004Dec28.html>, CP

According to a database maintained by the United Nations' International Atomic Energy Agency, there have been 10 known incidents of HEU theft in the past 10 years, each involving a few grams or less. Added up, the stolen goods total less than eight kilograms and could not be easily combined because of varying levels of enrichment. Most important, the thieves -- none of whom was connected to al Qaeda -- had no buyers lined up, and nearly all were caught while trying to peddle their acquisitions.¶ "Making the connection between buyer and seller has proved to be one of the most substantial hurdles for terrorists," said Matthew Bunn, a senior researcher at Harvard University's Project on Managing the Atom. Of the few known attempts by al Qaeda to obtain HEU, each allegedly stumbled because there was either no seller or the material on offer was fake. "Each time they tried, they got scammed," said Bruce Hoffman, a counterterrorism expert at the Rand Corporation who has tracked al Qaeda for years.

### A2: Assistance by a State

#### **No state would give a terrorist organization a bomb – empirics prove**

John Mueller, Department of Political Science at Ohio State University, 1-1-2008, “The Atomic Terrorist: Assessing the Likelihood,” University of Chicago, <http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSACHGO.PDF>, CP

A favorite fantasy of imaginative alarmists envisions that a newly nuclear country will palm off a bomb or two to friendly terrorists for delivery abroad. As Langewiesche stresses, however, this is highly improbable because there would be too much risk, even for a country led by extremists, that the ultimate source of the weapon would be discovered (2007, 20; also Kamp 1996, 33; Bunn 2006, 115; Bunn and Wier 2006, 137).6 Moreover, there is a very considerable danger the bomb and its donor would be discovered even before delivery or that it would be exploded in a manner and on a target the donor would not approve (including on the donor itself).¶ It is also worth noting that, although nuclear weapons have been around now for well over half a century, no state has ever given another state--even a close ally, much less a terrorist group--a nuclear weapon (or chemical, biological, or radiological one either, for that matter) that the recipient could use independently. For example, during the Cold War, North Korea tried to acquire nuclear weapons from its close ally, China, and was firmly refused (Oberdorfer 2005; see also Pillar 2003, xxi). There could be some danger from private (or semi-private) profiteers, like the network established by Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan. However, its activities were rather easily penetrated by intelligence agencies (the CIA, it is very likely, had agents within the network), and the operation was abruptly closed down when it seemed to be the right time (Langewiesche 2007, 169-72).

## A2: Trade Advantage

### No Solvency

#### Empirics only prove that there is no linear relationship between trade and economic growth.

Francisco Rodriguez, served as Chief Economist of the Venezuelan National Assembly from 2000 to 2004, AND Dani Rodrick, Professor of International Political Economy @ Harvard, January 2001, “Trade Policy and Economic Growth: A Skeptic's Guide to the Cross-National Evidence,” MIT Press, http://www.nber.org/chapters/c11058.pdf, ZM

Our bottom line is that the nature of the ¶ relationship between trade ¶ policy ¶ and economic ¶ growth ¶ remains ¶ very much an ¶ open question. The ¶ issue is far from having been settled on ¶ empirical grounds. We are in fact ¶ skeptical ¶ that there is a ¶ general, unambiguous relationship between ¶ trade ¶ openness ¶ and ¶ growth waiting ¶ to be discovered. We ¶ suspect ¶ that ¶ the ¶ relationship ¶ is a ¶ contingent one, dependent ¶ on a host of ¶ country ¶ and ¶ external characteristics. Research aimed at ¶ ascertaining ¶ the circumstances under which ¶ open ¶ trade ¶ policies ¶ are conducive to ¶ growth ¶ (as ¶ well as those under which ¶ they may not be) and at ¶ scrutinizing ¶ the ¶ channels ¶ through which trade policies ¶ influence economic performance ¶ is ¶ likely ¶ to prove more productive.

## A2: Oil Advantage

### No impact

#### No impact, empirics prove

**STV** STV’s wide range of programming reflects Scotland’s distinctive political, legal, educational, cultural and sporting institutions via news, current affairs **7/16/2012** “North Sea oil spill will have ‘no impact on the environment’” <http://news.stv.tv/north/111045-north-sea-oil-spill-will-have-no-impact-on-the-environment/> JD

An 8.7-tonne oil spill in the North Sea will have “no impact on the environment”, according to the UK Government’s Department of Energy and Climate Change.¶ The hydrocarbon spill was reported in the vicinity of the Osprey field which feeds back to the Dunlin Alpha installation at approximately 8.30pm on Tuesday.¶ The Dunlin Alpha installation, which is located in the North Sea 195km north-east of Shetland, is operated by Aberdeen-based AMEC on behalf of Fairfield Energy Limited.¶ The Department of Energy and Climate Change said in a statement: “The initial report from the operator was that up to 8.7 tonnes of oil had been released to sea and production from the Osprey field was shut down and depressurised.¶ “The installation standby vessel remains in the vicinity and aerial surveillance is being routinely undertaken.¶ “Visual observations report that there continues to be a very small ongoing release of oil coming to the sea surface but that this dispersing rapidly.”¶ The statement added that the spill presents “no risk to personnel and will have no impact on the environment.”¶ Visual inspections of the manifold using a Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV) were due to take place over the weekend.¶ The Secretary of States Representative for Maritime Salvage and Intervention (SOSREP) have been notified about the incident and the Department of Energy and Climate Change are continuing to monitor the situation.

### Squo solves

#### Squo solves oil

Effie **Antoniou**, Planner and Regional Developer, MSc in Development and Planning, MSc in Environmental Economics and Natural Resources, PhD Candidate **and** Konstantina **Stamatiou**, Solicitor, MSc in Planning and Regional Development, PhD Candidate “ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND MANAGEMENT OF SEA-PORTS. THE CASE OF VOLOS SEA-PORT; 3.2.3 Noxious liquid substances in bulk” <http://connectedcities.eu/downloads/showcases/ENVIRONMENTAL_PROTECTION_AND_MANAGEMENT_OF_VOLOS_SEA-PORT.pdf> JD

Even though general cargo and container-handling ports and terminals generate ¶ small amount of wastes, which are usually restricted to the waste oils from trucks and ¶ other equipment the situation on oil terminal and tank farms is considerably different. ¶ These ships may generate large amounts of waste oils either form operational or ¶ from accidental spills. Operational oil spills are predictable by their nature although ¶ the amounts should be minimised. Accidental oil spills should be prevented and ¶ therefore should be a minor problem in the handling of waste. However, experience ¶ has shown that even in the best kept ports and terminals they do occur. Oil ¶ separators of different kinds are used for that purpose in both kinds of spills (P. H. ¶ Olson 1994) Oil is usually loaded in refinery terminals and the ships have to remove dirty ballast ¶ or tank cleaning waters when they arrive at these. Refineries are generally equipped ¶ with oil water separators to clean their own oil-contaminated storm and process ¶ water. These separators can also handle the oily ballast water transferred from the ¶ ships. Additionally, engine room wastes could be collected by tank trucks or barges ¶ belonging to a contractor authorised to collect and transport environmentally ¶ hazardous wastes or by the port authority. In some port ships move to a berth with a ¶ fixed facility. Such a facility usually consists of a pipeline leading to a shore tank (P. ¶ H. Olson 1994).

#### Squo solves – OILPOL

Effie **Antoniou**, Planner and Regional Developer, MSc in Development and Planning, MSc in Environmental Economics and Natural Resources, PhD Candidate **and** Konstantina **Stamatiou**, Solicitor, MSc in Planning and Regional Development, PhD Candidate **11/20/2012** “ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND MANAGEMENT OF SEA-PORTS. THE CASE OF VOLOS SEA-PORT; 3.2.3 Noxious liquid substances in bulk” <http://connectedcities.eu/downloads/showcases/ENVIRONMENTAL_PROTECTION_AND_MANAGEMENT_OF_VOLOS_SEA-PORT.pdf> JD

Oil pollution of the seas was recognized as a problem in the first half of the 20th ¶ century and various countries introduced national regulations to control discharges of ¶ oil within their territorial waters. In 1954, the United Kingdom organised a conference ¶ on oil pollution which resulted to the adoption of the International Convention for the ¶ Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil (OILPOL), 1954. The following entry into ¶ force of the IMO Convention in 1958, the depository and Secretariat functions in ¶ relation to the Convention were transferred from the United Kingdom Government to ¶ IMO. MARPOL 73/78 is the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution ¶ From Ships, 1973 as modified by the Protocol of 1978. ("Marpol" is short for marine ¶ pollution and 73/78 short for the years 1973 and 1978) (IMO 2002 a). ¶ ¶ MARPOL 73/78 is one of the most important international marine environmental ¶ conventions. It was designed to minimise pollution of the seas, including dumping, oil ¶ and exhaust pollution. Its stated object is: to preserve the marine environment ¶ through the complete elimination of pollution by oil and other harmful substances and ¶ the minimization of accidental discharge of such substances (IMO 2002 a).

## A2: US-Japan Alliance Advantage

#### Strengthening of the US-Japan alliance hurts Chinese relations

Thomas J. Christensen, Professor of World Politics of Peace and War, at Princeton, 1999, “China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia”, The MIT press, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539294?seq=2>, JF

THE CHINA-JAPAN SECURITY DILEMMA AND U.S. POLICY CHALLENGES ¶ For the reasons offered above, most Chinese analysts fear almost any change ¶ in the U.S.-Japan alliance. A breakdown of U.S.-Japan ties would worry pessi- ¶ mists and optimists alike. On the other hand, Chinese analysts of all stripes ¶ also worry to varying degrees when Japan adopts greater defense burden- ¶ sharing roles as part of a bilateral effort to revitalize the alliance. These dual ¶ and almost contradictory fears pose major problems for U.S. elites who are ¶ concerned that the alliance is dangerously vague and out of date and is ¶ therefore unsustainable, but who still want the United States to maintain the ¶ reassurance role outlined in documents such as the 1998 East Asia-Pacific ¶ Strategy Report.27 Especially before the recent guidelines review, the U.S.-Japan ¶ alliance had often been viewed in the United States as lopsided and unfair ¶ because the United States guarantees Japanese security without clear guarantees of even rudimentary assistance from Japan if U.S. forces were to become ¶ embroiled in a regional armed conflict

#### **Japans new prime minister tanks US-Japan relations, and forces the US out of the region**

John Pomfret, Washington Post political analyst, Tuesday, December 29, 2009, U.S. concerned about new Japanese premier Hatoyama, The Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/12/28/AR2009122802271.html?hpid%3Dtopnews&sub=AR

While most of the federal government was shut down by a snowstorm last week, there was one person in particular whom Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton called in through the cold: Japanese Ambassador Ichiro Fujisaki.¶ Once he arrived, Clinton told him in blunt, if diplomatic, terms that the United States remains adamant about moving a Marine base from one part of Okinawa to another. That she felt compelled to call the unusual meeting highlights what some U.S. and Asian officials say is an alarming turn in relations with Japan since Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama led an opposition party to victory in August elections, ending an almost uninterrupted five decades of rule by the Liberal Democratic Party.¶ Since the election, a series of canceled dinners, diplomatic demarches, and publicly and privately broken promises from the new government has vexed senior White House officials, causing new concern about the U.S. friendship with its closest Asian ally. The worry extends beyond U.S. officials to other leaders in Southeast Asia, who are nervous about anything that lessens the U.S. security role in the region.¶ A pledge of assertiveness¶ At the center of concern are Hatoyama and his Democratic Party of Japan. Hatoyama had campaigned on promises he would be more assertive than previous Japanese leaders in dealings with the United States. He and his coalition partners opposed parts of a $26 billion agreement between the two nations to move the Marine base to a less-populated part of Okinawa and to transfer 8,000 Marines from Okinawa to Guam.¶ The United States has seen the moves as central to a new Asian security policy to assure Japan's defense and to counter the rise of China. But Hatoyama and his allies saw the agreement as the United States dictating terms, and wanted the base removed.¶ Increasingly, U.S. officials view Hatoyama as a mercurial leader. In interviews, the officials said he has twice urged President Obama to trust him on the base issue and promised to resolve it before year's end -- once during a meeting between the two in Tokyo last month and another in a letter he wrote Obama after the White House had privately expressed concerns about the Japanese leader's intentions.¶ On Dec. 17, Hatoyama officially informed the Obama administration that he would not make a decision about the air base by the end of the year. He told Clinton the news in conversation at a dinner in Copenhagen at the conclusion of the United Nations climate-change summit.¶ After the dinner, Hatoyama told Japanese reporters that he had obtained Clinton's "full understanding" about Tokyo's need to delay. But that apparently was not the case. To make sure Japan understood that the U.S. position has not changed, Clinton called in the Japanese ambassador during last week's storm, apparently having some impact.¶ "This is a thing that rarely occurs, and I think we should take this [Clinton's action] into account," the ambassador told reporters as he left the State Department.¶ Hatoyama's moves have befuddled analysts in Washington. So far, most still think he and his party remain committed to the security relationship with the United States.¶ They explain his behavior as that of a politician who is not accustomed to power, who needs to pay attention to his coalition partners -- one of which, the Social Democratic Party of Japan, is against any U.S. military presence in the country. They note that Hatoyama has put money aside for the base-relocation plan in Japan's budget and that other senior members of his party have told their U.S. counterparts they will honor the deal.¶ Shifting policy?¶ But some U.S. and Asian officials increasingly worry that Hatoyama and others in his party may be considering a significant policy shift -- away from the United States and toward a more independent foreign policy.¶ They point to recent events as a possible warnings: Hatoyama's call for an East Asian Community with China and South Korea, excluding the United States; the unusually warm welcome given to Xi Junping, China's vice president, on his trip to Japan this month, which included an audience with the emperor; and the friendly reception given to Saeed Jalili, the Iranian national security council secretary, during his visit to Japan last week.¶ Michael Green, senior director for Asia at the National Security Council during the Bush administration, said the concern is that senior officials in Hatoyama's party with great influence, such as Ichiro Ozawa, want to push Japan toward closer ties with China and less reliance on the United States. That would complicate the U.S. position not just in Japan but in South Korea and elsewhere.¶ "I think there are questions about what kind of role Ozawa is playing," Green said, adding that Ozawa has not been to the United States in a decade, has yet to meet the U.S. ambassador to Japan, John Roos, and only grudgingly met Clinton during an earlier trip to Japan.¶ "The prevailing view is that this is basically a populist, inexperienced government sorting out its foreign policy," he said, "but now there is a 10 to 20 percent chance that this is something more problematic."¶ U.S. allies in Singapore, Australia, South Korea and the Philippines -- and Vietnamese officials as well -- have all viewed the tussle between Washington and Tokyo with alarm, according to several senior Asian diplomats.¶ The reason, one diplomat said, is that the U.S.-Japan relationship is not simply an alliance that obligates the United States to defend Japan, but the foundation of a broader U.S. security commitment to all of Asia. As China rises, none of the countries in Asia wants the U.S. position weakened by problems with Japan.¶ Another senior Asian diplomat, speaking on the condition of anonymity in order to be candid, noted that recent public opinion polls show Hatoyama's approval rating slipping below 50 percent, while Obama remains popular.¶ "Let's hope Hatoyama gets the message that this is not the way to handle the United States," he said.

#### **Despite good intentions, the alliance is viewed as “anti-Chinese”**

USCPF, Chinese relation organization, 5-98, “U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY ALLIANCE AND CHINA”, http://www.uscpf.org/html/1998/May/US-Japan.html

The U.S.-Japan "Joint Declaration on Security" issued by President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto in 1996 reconfirmed that the U.S.-Japan security relationship remains a cornerstone for achieving common security objectives.¶ In view of the changes of the post-Cold War environment, the U.S. and Japan agreed to cooperate in situations in areas surrounding Japan that will have an important influence on Japan's peace and security.¶ In September 1997, the U.S. and Japan expanded their security alliance to give the Japanese military its highest profile in Asia since World War II. Under the new agreement, Japan would, for the first time since the war, engage in military activities outside its borders in military conflicts involving the U.S.¶ At that time, China warned the U.S. and Japan not to place Taiwan under the new security agreement, saying that this would infringe its sovereignty. China said that attempts to embrace Taiwan would disturb other Asian nations. China has never ruled out the use of force on Taiwan.¶ The U.S. and Japan have repeatedly assured China that their expanded military alliance does not threaten China. Officials in Beijing nevertheless oppose the expanding military alliance as a threat.¶ Chinese officials protested, for instance, when an official in Hashimoto's government said the new defense guidelines would obligate Japan to become involved if a confrontation erupted between China and Taiwan.¶ Defending his nation's position, Hashimoto visited China to assure officials that Japan's strategic alliance does not mean that Japan has any plan of containing China.¶ As PRC Foreign Minister Qian Qichen stated, "At present, the treaty itself has not changed. However, the relevant discussions being held on the meaning of the treaty and the relevant joint statements that have been issued hint that the role of the treaty may be extended to cover the whole region. That is worrisome."¶ Hashimoto thinks that Qian should not be worried, and he noted, "Japan-U.S. security arrangements are in no sense targeted against any specific country." He said that "the presence of a politically stable, economically prosperous China, bound by ties of trust with the rest of the world, would be in everyone's interest the world over."¶ These statements echo sentiments expressed publicly to President Jiang Zemin by Hashimoto and Clinton during APEC Meetings in November 1996. The Joint Declaration contains similar recognition of the need to cooperate with China.¶ At the March National People’s Conference (NPC), Tang Jiaxuan, the Foreign Ministry’s top Japan specialist, was named the new Foreign Minister.¶ For Japan, the security alliance is a delicate balancing act in its increasingly important and complex three-way relationship with the U.S. and China. Tokyo must constantly weigh its obligations to its closest ally, Washington, against how that relationship is perceived in Beijing.¶ Ironically, while Asian countries worry about Japan inching away from its purely defensive military posture, some Americans argue that Japan should accept a more equal military partnership with the U. S.¶ The issues of how to strengthen the dialogue between Beijing, Tokyo, and Washington should now be at the center of American and Japanese discussions on security. The real challenge is how to reduce tensions between China one the one hand and Japan and the U.S. on the other.¶ The U.S.-Japan alliance can be seen not as anti-China but as pro-peace and pro-stability. It should not take on an anti-China slant unless China presents a clear and present threat to regional stability, and Beijing repeatedly states that it has no such ambitions. The defensive alliance should be seen as promoting Chinese as well as U.S., Japanese, and broader security interests.¶ Under the new guidelines, Japan would:¶ \* Provide mine sweepers;¶ \* Conduct search and rescue missions in international waters;¶ \* Use military ships to conduct inspections of ships at sea to enforce U.N.-sanctioned embargoes;¶ \* Assist communication and surveillance efforts in international waters and airspace;¶ \* Allow its civilian airports, ports and hospitals to be used by American troops; and¶ \* Accept refugees and noncombatants evacuated from war zones and areas of conflict.

#### **US-Japanese relations strong now**

CNN, April 30, 2012, “Obama affirms strong economic, security ties with Japan”, <http://articles.cnn.com/2012-04-30/us/us_japan-us-meeting_1_japan-nuclear-test-okinawa/2?_s=PM:US>

Affirming strong ties in a time of challenges, President Barack Obama and visiting Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda on Monday hailed an agreement to move U.S. Marines from Okinawa and expressed solidarity against North Korea's nuclear weapons program.¶ The two leaders held bilateral talks at the White House and then labeled U.S.-Japan ties an essential alliance for both countries and the Asia-Pacific region.¶ They confirmed that much of their discussion Monday focused on North Korea, which has signaled plans to conduct a nuclear test after its recent failed missile launch. The United States and Japan lead an international effort to get Pyongyang to give up its nuclear arms ambitions.¶ "There is a great possibility they will conduct a nuclear test," Noda said of North Korea, adding that the issue deepened the U.S.-Japan alliance through their cooperative efforts.¶ Obama also noted how consultations between his government and Japan around the failed missile launch earlier this month showed the importance of the alliance.¶ "We continue our close consultations on the provocative actions of North Korea, which are a sign of weakness and not strength and only serve to deepen Pyongyang's isolation," Obama said¶ Noda is Japan's sixth prime minister in five years, a reflection of political volatility amid an economic slowdown worsened by the global recession.¶ He came to power in September as the Pacific power continued struggling with the effects of last year's earthquake and tsunami that killed at least 16,000 people and triggered a nuclear power plant meltdown.¶ In his remarks at a joint news conference, Noda thanked the United States for its support in the aftermath of the disaster and said the Japan-U.S. alliance "has reached new heights."¶ Last week, the two governments addressed a thorny issue of recent years with a plan for the United States to relocate about half of its 19,000 Marines based on Okinawa to other places in the Pacific region.¶ Deal withdraws thousands of Marines from Okinawa¶ While the relocation faces some opposition in Congress and Japan, the announcement of an agreement signaled a desire by the countries to work together on a way forward in bilateral relations.¶ Obama praised Noda for his role in addressing the longstanding problem of opposition on Okinawa to the U.S. military presence.¶ "The realignment approach being taken is consistent with the security interests of both Japan and the United States," Obama said, noting it fit his strategy announced in Australia last year of broadening the U.S. military presence in the region to offset China's growing dominance.¶

#### A strong US-Japan alliance leads to Asian cold war and instability, turns the case

Joseph Nye, University Distinguished Service Professor and ,Richard Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State, Feburary 2007 “The U.S. Japan Alliance”, CSIS, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/070216\_asia2020.pdf

At the same time, however, a bipolar structure with only the United States and ¶ Japan facing China would be ineffective, because it would force other regional ¶ powers to choose between two competing poles. Some might side with the United ¶ States and Japan, but most regional powers would choose strict neutrality or align ¶ with China. Ultimately, this would weaken the powerful example of American ¶ and Japanese democracy and return the region to a Cold War or nineteenth ¶ century balance-of-power logic that does not favor stability in the region or ¶ contribute to China’s potential for positive change. Stability in East Asia will rest ¶ on the quality of U.S.-Japan-China relations, and even though the United States is ¶ closely allied with Japan, Washington should encourage good relations among all ¶ three. ¶ The best structure for Asia rests on sustained U.S. strength, commitment, and ¶ leadership in the region, combined with proactive participation in regional affairs ¶ by Asia’s other successful powers. An open structure in which Japan, India, ¶ Australia, Singapore, and others are leading by example, based on partnerships ¶ with the United States and shared democratic values, is the most effective way to ¶ realize an agenda for Asia that emphasizes free markets, continued prosperity ¶ based on the rule of law, and increasing political freedom. The United States and ¶ Japan should also seek to build relationships with countries such as Vietnam, ¶ which has a growing interest in being a part of Asia’s trading life, and New ¶ Zealand, which shares our values. All these efforts should be coupled with ¶ measures to expand areas of cooperation with China, while being candid with ¶ Beijing about areas of disagreement. Working within Asia in this manner, we ¶ believe, will be key to positively influencing the growth and direction of all of ¶ Asia, including China, thereby “getting Asia right.”

#### Japan’s nuclear program kills the non-proliferation regime, and makes non-proliferation efforts harder of the US

Emma Chanlett-Avery, specialist in Asian affairs, Mary Beth Nikitin, analyst in nonproliferation, 2-19-09, “Japan’s Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospect, and US interests”, Congressional Research Service, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34487.pdf

Japan’s development of its own nuclear arsenal could also have damaging impact on U.S. ¶ nonproliferation policy. It would be more difficult for the United States to convince non-nuclear ¶ weapon states to keep their non-nuclear status or to persuade countries such as North Korea to ¶ give up their weapons programs. The damage to the NPT as a guarantor of nuclear power for ¶ peaceful use and the IAEA as an inspection regime could be irreparable if Japan were to leave or ¶ violate the treaty. If a close ally under its nuclear umbrella chose to acquire the bomb, perhaps ¶ other countries enjoying a strong bilateral relationship with the United States would be less ¶ inhibited in pursuing their own option. It could also undermine confidence in U.S. security ¶ guarantees more generally.

#### US-Japan trade relations is unpopular politically and with the auto industry, to many barriers

Vicki Needham, political analyst, 07-20-12, “Senate Democrats express opposition to Japan joining trade talks”, The Hill, <http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/1005-trade/239255-senate-democrats-express-opposition-to-japan-joining-trade-talks>, JF

Ten Senate Democrats urged the White House to oppose Japan's entry into Asia-Pacific trade deal talks. ¶ The lawmakers, many representing auto industry states, wrote a letter to President Obama calling the U.S.-Japan trade relationship "complicated and unbalanced," saying it's "especially acute in the auto sector."¶ Japan is the last of three nations that has expressed interest in the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations, but the government hasn't decided whether it wants to join the discussions. Mexico and Canada officially joined the talks this month after lobbying for spots since November. ¶ In the letter, the senators argue that Japan has too many barriers in place to U.S. automakers to make them worthy of an invitation.¶ "The United States has attempted to address this imbalance in past trade negotiations, but it has been unsuccessful," they wrote. ¶ "Japan has previously made concessions, including the elimination of tariffs on automobile imports. However, new barriers to trade have arisen to replace the old," the senators wrote. "We are particularly worried about the impact that Japan's inclusion will have on American carmakers and their workers."¶ They say that Japan has made concessions, including the elimination of auto tariffs, but then has followed up by putting other hurdles in their place. ¶ U.S. automakers, especially Ford, have expressed concern about Japan getting a seat at the TPP discussions, arguing that the nation isn't a free trader and locks out foreign competition. ¶ In 2011, the trade deficit with Japan was $63 billion, 70 percent was because of autos. Foreign automakers account for 5 percent of auto sales in Japan, compared with 55 percent of sales for foreign automakers in the United States, they said. ¶ "The history of U.S.-Japanese trade relations gives us little confidence that American negotiators can achieve an agreement that would create a truly level playing field between the two countries in the short timeframe of TPP negotiations," they wrote in the letter released Thursday. ¶ "We believe it would be a mistake to invite Japan to join TPP at this time."¶ The letter was signed by Michigan Sens. Carl Levin and Debbie Stabeow, along with New York's Charles Schumer and Kirsten Gillibrand, Sherrod Brown (Ohio), Claire McCaskill (Mo.), Bob Casey (Pa.), Ben Cardin and Barbara Mikulski (Md.), Bernie Sanders (Vt.) and and Rhode Island's Sheldon Whitehouse.¶ The 13th round of negotiations between the 11 nations — the United States, Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam — begins Sept. 6 in Leesburg, Va.

#### Asian instability leads to more defense spending

Juliana Liu, foreign relations analyst, 2-1-10, “Asian instability attracts defence giants”, BBC, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8492005.stm>, JF

In service since the 1960s, the F-111 Aardvark strike aircraft is going out with a bang at the Singapore Air Show.¶ The Royal Australian Air Force will fly it for the last time in Asia, before decommissioning the storied but ageing fighter jet.¶ As a swansong, the RAAF will perform the famous "Dump and Burn" manoeuvre, a fuel dump in which fuel is ignited, intentionally, using the plane's afterburner. The spectacular, high speed crowd pleaser is the highlight of the aerial display.¶ ¶ China is ultimately the 800 pound gorilla, so whether it's standing still, running around or just scratching, it matters to the world ¶ Dean Cheng, Heritage Foundation¶ Chinese warn Boeing over Taiwan¶ US-China relations hit a bad patch¶ Originally built for service in the Vietnam War, the F-111 is a third-generation fighter.¶ Executives pitching their ware to delegations of defence officials in the chalets below the flying displays are now selling fourth-, and even fifth-generation fighters.¶ To them, Asia is increasingly becoming the commercial battleground of choice for military equipment sales, according to executives and analysts attending the Singapore trade show.¶ "Asian military forces are expanding for a number of reasons," says Dean Cheng, a research fellow at the Washington think tank the Heritage Foundation.¶ "They're just wealthier than they were. With greater wealth comes greater responsibilities."¶ Chinese giant¶ Mr Cheng joins a number of experts at a security conference on the sidelines of the air show in singling out China's rising international status as a major reason for growth in Asian military spending.¶ ¶ When we talk to the Asian customers, they have security needs to meet ¶ Stephen O'Bryan, Lockheed Martin¶ "What are China's intentions? It's unclear," he said.¶ "China is ultimately the 800 pound gorilla, so whether it's standing still, running around or just scratching, it matters to the world."¶ Zhu Feng, a professor at Peking University, says China's neighbours are indeed spending more.¶ Despite a financial crisis, South Korea increased its military budget by 9% in 2009, compared with a 7% jump in 2008.¶ Russia, meanwhile, hiked spending by 43% last year, he says. Australia, which owes much of its economic prosperity to Beijing, plans to spend hundreds of billions of dollars to boost its fire power in the next two decades.¶ Sanction threat¶ China itself spent 14.6% more last year than the year before.¶ "This is all being driven by the uncertainty over China's rise," Professor Zhu says.¶ "From my perspective, it is overstated, but the effect is very real."¶ This week, Beijing loudly protested Washington's plans to sell $6.4bn worth of weapons to Taiwan, which China considers its own territory.¶ The mainland has even threatened sanctions against companies selling weapons to the island.¶ Billion dollar deals¶ Even though China itself is largely off-limits to Western arms sellers, geopolitical tension in Asia helps create an environment for business.¶ ¶ If we succeed in India, then it becomes our biggest market ¶ Patrick Choy, ST Engineering¶ "When we talk to the Asian customers, they have security needs to meet," says Stephen O'Bryan, a vice-president at Lockheed Martin, whose job is to sell the top-of-the-line, fifth-generation F-35 Joint Strike Fighter jets to customers worldwide.¶ "They need to recapitalise their fleet."¶ Mr O'Bryan plans to spend more time in South Korea and Japan this year. Both are expected to hold international competitions to decide which jets to buy. The contracts up for grabs are worth billions of dollars.¶ Indian giant¶ Wedged between Pakistan and China, many consider India to be the world's last great market for fourth-generation fighter jets.¶ New Delhi is still mulling over which of six different types of aircraft to buy for its air force.¶ In competition are Lockheed's F-16, the Eurofighter Typhoon from EADS, Boeing's F-18, Russia's MiG-35 and MiG-29, France's Rafale and Gripen of Sweden's Saab.¶ The contract for 126 planes is believed to be worth some $12bn, the largest in a decade. Lockheed Martin says India's navy had separately made enquiries over its F-35 fighter.¶ Huge markets are up for grabs as Asian countries raise spending on arms¶ For many companies, India is a more accessible arms market than China, because its own industry is less developed.¶ Singapore's ST Engineering has never tried to break into China, but is committed to cracking the sub-continent.¶ Field trials of its 155mm artillery guns will begin in India in February, after New Delhi lifted a freeze on doing business with the group. This contract is also worth billions.¶ "If we succeed in India, then it becomes our biggest market," says Patrick Choy, an executive vice president at the Singaporean firm.¶ "India won't accept Chinese guns, but we provide a very good alternative to the Western big boys in niche products."¶ Asian military budgets are still dwarfed by Washington's. But as long as China's rise evokes mistrust in its neighbours, arms sellers will find a growing market.

## DA Links

### Politics

#### Republicans and the private sector hate the plan

Bobby Calvan, political analyst for The Boston Globe, 7-12-2012, “US to miss target for tighter port security” The Boston Globe, http://articles.boston.com/2012-06-12/nation/32176427\_1\_homeland-security-cargo-containers-nuclear-bomb, //eR

Republicans have been wary of forcing the agency to comply with the scanning mandate because of the presumed cost, perhaps at least $16 billion - a figure disputed by Markey and others who cite estimates that the program could cost a comparatively modest $200 million. Representative Candice Miller, a Michigan Republican who chairs the House subcommittee on border and maritime security, was more inclined to accept the estimate from Homeland Security officials. In light of the country’s budget troubles, “we have to try and prioritize,’’ she said. Scanning cargo “100 percent would be optimal,’’ she conceded, “but it’s not workable.’’ Still, she acknowledged the need to secure the country’s borders, whether by air, land, or sea. There is no dispute that a terrorist attack at a major port could be catastrophic to the global economy. Much of the world’s products - T-shirts sewn in China, designer shoes from Italy, and other foreign-made products - arrives in the United States in large, metal cargo containers. While some countries have voluntarily improved cargo screening, others have not. Large retailers have opposed measures that could increase their costs. Without full scanning compliance, it is often difficult to determine if shipments have been inspected because cargo is sometimes transferred from ship to ship offshore.

#### Port scanning is a highly politicized and poorly understood issue

Henry H. Willis, Associate Director, RAND Homeland Security and Defense Center, 7-6-2012, “Revisiting 100% Inspection” RAND Commentary, http://www.rand.org/commentary/2012/07/06/RAND.html //eR

Last week in a New York Times op-ed, Congressmen Jerrold L. Nadler, Edward J. Markey, and Bennie G. Thompson made a plea for the Obama administration to fully implement the Secure Freight Initiative to comply with Section 232 of the Safe Ports Act of 2006. This provision in the law mandates that 100 percent of cargo containers shipped from overseas to U.S. ports be scanned using noninvasive imaging (e.g., x-ray machines) and radiation detection equipment. Since its passage, this requirement has been among the most highly politicized and poorly understood provisions of homeland security law. Like the congressmen, advocates of 100 percent inspection of U.S.-bound containers paint a picture of a looming catastrophe. My early analysis of securing the global supply chain described how the system's vastness both drives the global economy and makes it an attractive way to move illicit materials.

## CP Solvency

### Private Actor

#### Empirically, the private sector has been able to handle port security and solves better

Marc Thibault, researcher, Homeland Security Institute, Mary R. Brooks, Chair of Commerce, Dalhousie University, and Kenneth J. Button professor of public policy and director, George Mason, 2006, “The Response of the U.S. Maritime Industry to the New Container Security Initiatives” Transportation Journal, Vol. 45, No. 1, Winter 2006, JSTOR //eR

Changes in the scope and scale of maritime container security. Shipping companies shared with us the view that the 2001 terrorist attacks changed the scope and scale of security. Previously, the container shipping industry focused its efforts on reducing cargo theft, smuggling, and stowaways as these activities not only have detrimental effects on profits and reputations but they can also lead to increased government oversight. The attacks resulted in the shipping companies' expanding their security efforts. Container lines are multinational firms that have an intimate knowledge of both global market conditions and the security threats they face. All re-examined established procedures and business processes, and made adjustments to better manage operations from a security perspective. Implementation varied by container line. They helped the international community and the U.S. draft mandatory security requirements that balance the competing demands of business and national security. They took steps to educate government officials, customers, and the general public on the challenges associated with securing the global supply chain. They also cooperated with government in the development of several different voluntary programs, and most opted to participate in CTPAT.

## F-Spec

#### Specification of funding mechanism is essential to solvency

Marc Thibault, researcher, Homeland Security Institute, Mary R. Brooks, Chair of Commerce, Dalhousie University, and Kenneth J. Button professor of public policy and director at George Mason, 2006, “The Response of the U.S. Maritime Industry to the New Container Security Initiatives” Transportation Journal, Vol. 45, No. 1, Winter 2006, JSTOR //eR

First, the U.S. government has not yet determined how maritime security will be funded over the long run. Some container lines and marine terminal operators believe they have a limited ability to pass on their security costs to their customers. Many believe that the necessary security improvements require government funding if they are going to be implemented. The shipping industry is concerned that its security efforts will not be improved or maintained without a dedicated funding mechanism. Most respondents are concerned about what appears to be continuing government-imposed unfunded mandates.

## Processing

John Mueller, Chair of National Security Studies and Professor of Political Science, 8-7-2006 “Why isn’t there more violence?” <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09636410490914031>, CP

For all the attention it evokes, terrorism, in reasonable context, actually¶ causes rather little damage, and the likelihood that any individual will become¶ a victim in most places is microscopic. The number of people worldwide who¶ die as a result of international terrorism is generally only a few hundred a year—¶ tiny compared to the numbers who die in most civil wars or from automobile¶ accidents. In fact, until 2001, far fewer Americans had been killed in any¶ grouping of years by all forms of international terrorism than were killed by¶ lightning. Furthermore, except in 2001, virtually none of these terrorist deaths¶ occurred within the United States itself.¶ Even with the September 11 attacks included in the count, however, the¶ number of Americans killed by international terrorism since the late 1960s¶ (which is when the State Department began tracking this data) is about the¶ same as the number killed over the same period by lightning—or by accident causing¶ deer or by severe allergic reaction to peanuts. In almost all years¶ the total number of people worldwide who die at the hands of international¶ terrorists is not much more than the number who drown in bathtubs in the¶ United States.