Topicality – Development

**Development in outer space includes architecture and structural design**

Weeks, Edythe E. "E-IR » Outer Space Development: Including Everyone in the Process." *E-International Relations*. International Institute of Space Law, International Astronautical Federation Congress, Webster University, Washington University in St. Louis, PhD, JD, 09 July 2010. Web. 03 July 2011. <http://www.e-ir.info/?p=4545>.

Recently we have seen news images of billionaires taking $20,000,000 trips to outer space. Various entrepreneurs are developing fleets of private spaceships. In 2010, President Barack Obama announced that NASA’s Constellation Program would be cancelled, yet NASA’s budget would also be increased by $6,000,000,000. Vast quantities of natural resources such as gold, iridium, osmium, platinum, helium 3 and many others have been found in abundant quantities in outer space. The International Space Station has been in Low Earth Orbit since 1998 and humankind has come to understand what it needs to know regarding human space habitats and living in outer space. Space laws and policies have existed for decades and are ever growing. **Outer space is in the process of being developed.** The first phase of outer space development has already taken place. This phase involved satellite telecommunications industries and the global widespread acceptance of cable television, cell phones, the Internet and a multitude of goods and services linked to these space technologies. Bill Gates and others became very wealthy as the result of the first phase of outer space development. The Geostationary orbit has been colonized and developed. Key thinkers are looking towards the development of other regions of outer space including, Low Earth Orbit, Near Earth Orbit, asteroids, Earth’s Moon, Mars and elsewhere. Only a handful of experts and students are aware of the outer space development phenomenon. **The vast majority of people around the world are still thinking of outer space as an elite field for government astronauts and scientists, not for them**. Meanwhile, unemployment is high, inspiration is low, economies are crashing (even the United States’), job loss is increasingly common, school systems are failing, outdated school curriculum programs are unable to motivate students to lead, and people are searching for ways to create prosperous futures for themselves and their families. So, why not expose more people to outer space development? The term used herein, “**outer space development” involves a culmination of forces – historical, legal, ideological, institutional, political, economic, psychological and structural all operating together in the post Cold War era so that space commercialization and privatization are widespread accepted norms**.[i] Recently, a new trend is being set by U.S. policy. In 2004 a new policy was instituted in accordance with the President’s Commission Report which lays the foundation of U.S. development of the outer space territory[ii]. Also in 2004 a new U.S. law[iii] was passed facilitating the legality of private space travel as a new industry being called “space tourism”. In addition the NASA Authorization Act of 2005 made funding available to carry out the New Vision U.S. Space Exploration Policy.[iv] This policy, to a large extent calls for more participation from the private-sector in space exploration and other programs. Already a critical number of space entrepreneurs have paved the way towards new space industries, as they did during the satellite telecommunications revolution during the 1980s and 1990s. This is only the beginning of a new trend towards further space commercialization and privatization. The result so far has been millions of dollars are being offered through various prizes to spur increased privatization of space. For example the $10,000,000 Ansari X Prize and many other cash prizes are being offered to spur space entrepreneurship/space privatization. Examples include, the NASA Centennial Challenges Prizes ($100,000,000), the America’s Space Prize ($50,000,000 million), the Heinlein Prize for Practical Accomplishments in Commercial Space Activities ($500,000) and the NASA Ralph Steckler/Space Grant Space Colonization Research and Technology Opportunity involved awards totalling $1,000,000. Entrepreneurs have started developing private spaceship development firms and are selling tickets to trips to outer space. The first step toward accomplishing this goal is to expose students, teachers, administrators, civic leaders and public officials to cutting-edge research which highlights emerging industries in the field of outer space development. Exposing students to this type of knowledge while it is being created, is cutting-edge and likely to have a seriously positive impact of their future careers. Preparing them now to lead in newly emerging industries at a time when outer space settlements are being constructed can serve as a powerful motivating force to enable them to want to excel in school. Budding abilities, gifts and talents can be are recruited, nourished and developed**. Outer space development studies involves many disciplines including technology, physics, geology, science, engineering, business, law, politics, hotel and restaurant management, space stations, space hotels, life support systems, psychology, sociology, medicine, international law, physiology, chemistry, intergovernmental organizations, institutions and industries, computer science, astronomy, and many more subject areas**. Applying problem solving techniques usually involves several fields being integrated. Usually space studies require that students be fluent in several disciplines and this is good practice for interdisciplinary studies. Math, chemistry, science, **architecture and other subjects can take on new meanings** for students as they are taught to help solve problems **related to outer space development**. Space has been known to engage and interest students, and it is time to take these possibilities to a place beyond mere fascination and engagement. It is time to take students to a new level – actual meaningful participation in outer space development resulting in tangible careers opportunities.

Space development allows for activities such as the designing of space objects for outer space to occur

Lee, Yoon. "Space Development Promotion Act." Journal of Space Law 33 (2007): 176. 31 May 2007. Web. 3 July 2011.

(a) **The term “space development” means one of the following**: (i) **Research and technology development activities related to design, production, launch, operation, etc. of space objects**; (ii) Use and exploration of outer space and activities to facilitate them; (b) The term “space development project” means a project to promote space development or a project to pursue the development of education, technology, information, industry, etc. related to space development; (c) The term “space object” means an object **designed and manufactured for use in outer space**, including a launch vehicle, a satellite, a space ship and their components; (d) The term “space accident” means an occurrence of damage to life, body or property due to crash, collision or explosion of a space object or other situation; (e) The term “satellite information” means image, voice, sound or data acquired by using a satellite, or information made of their combination, including processed or applied information.

Space development allows for the development and infrastructure and material objects in outer space.

Thomas 11 (J. Thomas. – aerospace physicist and space development researcher. “Obama’s 2011 State of the Union – A response from Space”. http://www.jthomasmedia.com/blog/2011/02/09/2011-state-union-response-space/)

However, the Sputnik Moment metaphor is a suitable reference for his broader point. The launch of Sputnik by the Soviet Union heralded to the world that circumstances had suddenly, and very seriously, changed. Little did we know just what was really in store for us! While I agree that we are again facing just such circumstances, I also think we are making a huge mistake by not including space development as a major part of the solution. **By space development I mean the development of significant infrastructure that can be leveraged by private industry for the expansion of the human sphere and the accessing of the effectively infinite resources of the solar system and beyond for the purpose of improving the human condition.**

“Space development” is creating hardware for peaceful purposes

Hwang 6 (Chin Young, Policy and International Relations Division – Korea Aerospace Research Institute, “Space Activities in Korea—History, Current Programs and Future Plans”, Space Policy, 22(3), August, p. 199)

Space development in Korea has several characteristics. First, space development activities are initiated by a scientific research institute, KARI, and a university, KAIST SaTRec, for peaceful purposes. Most development projects have been proposed by research institutes, not government decision makers. Second, most satellite missions are multipurpose. Since space development has not been initiated by the top levels of government, funding has to be sought by research institutes and MOST. In order to get enough funds, missions must be able to meet various requirements of related ministries. At the same time, each space development project has to justify its feasibility in terms of an economic cost–benefit analysis. Third, Korean space activities have been focused on hardware—development of satellites and launch vehicles—rather than on the development of a full vision and the missions that would accompany this. The national space development plan reflects these characteristics, even though it contains some mention of space science and manned missions to the ISS through the international cooperation program.

Topicality – Substantially

Substantially must be given meaning --- contextual uses are key

Devinsky 2 (Paul, “Is Claim "Substantially" Definite?  Ask Person of Skill in the Art”, IP Update, 5(11), November, http://www.mwe.com/index.cfm/fuseaction/publications.nldetail/object\_id/c2c73bdb-9b1a-42bf-a2b7-075812dc0e2d.cfm)

In reversing a summary judgment of invalidity, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that the district court, by failing to look beyond the intrinsic claim construction evidence to consider what a person of skill in the art would understand in a "technologic context," erroneously concluded the term "substantially" made a claim fatally indefinite.  Verve, LLC v. Crane Cams, Inc., Case No. 01-1417 (Fed. Cir. November 14, 2002). The patent in suit related to an improved push rod for an internal combustion engine.  The patent claims a hollow push rod whose overall diameter is larger at the middle than at the ends and has "substantially constant wall thickness" throughout the rod and rounded seats at the tips.  The district court found that the expression "substantially constant wall thickness" was not supported in the specification and prosecution history by a sufficiently clear definition of "substantially" and was, therefore, indefinite.  The district court recognized that the use of the term "substantially" may be definite in some cases but ruled that in this case it was indefinite because it was not further defined. The Federal Circuit reversed, concluding that the district court erred in requiring that the meaning of the term "substantially" in a particular "technologic context" be found solely in intrinsic evidence:  "While reference to intrinsic evidence is primary in interpreting claims, the criterion is the meaning of words as they would be understood by persons in the field of the invention."  Thus, the Federal Circuit instructed that "resolution of any ambiguity arising from the claims and specification may be aided by extrinsic evidence of usage and meaning of a term in the context of the invention."  The Federal Circuit remanded the case to the district court with instruction that "[t]he question is not whether the word 'substantially' has a fixed meaning as applied to 'constant wall thickness,' but how the phrase would be understood by persons experienced in this field of mechanics, upon reading the patent documents."

Substantial" means of real worth or considerable value --- this is the usual and customary meaning of the term

Words and Phrases 2 (Volume 40A, p. 458)

D.S.C. 1966. The word “substantial” within Civil Rights Act providing that a place is a public accommodation if a “substantial” portion of food which is served has moved in commerce must be construed in light of its usual and customary meaning, that is, something of real worth and importance; of considerable value; valuable, something worthwhile as distinguished from something without value or merely nominal

Substantial means “of considerable amount” --- not some contrived percentage

Prost 4 (Judge – United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, “Committee For Fairly Traded Venezuelan Cement v. United States”, 6-18, http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/04opinions/04-1016.html)

The URAA and the SAA neither amend nor refine the language of § 1677(4)(C).  In fact, they merely suggest, without disqualifying other alternatives, a “clearly higher/substantial proportion” approach.  Indeed, the SAA specifically mentions that no “precise mathematical formula” or “‘benchmark’ proportion” is to be used for a dumping concentration analysis.  SAA at 860 (citations omitted); see also Venez. Cement, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 1329-30.  Furthermore, as the Court of International Trade noted, the SAA emphasizes that the Commission retains the discretion to determine concentration of imports on a “case-by-case basis.”  SAA at 860.  Finally, the definition of the word “substantial” undercuts the CFTVC’s argument.  The word “substantial” generally means “considerable in amount, value or worth.”  Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2280 (1993).  It does not imply a specific number or cut-off.  What may be substantial in one situation may not be in another situation.  The very breadth of the term “substantial” undercuts the CFTVC’s argument that Congress spoke clearly in establishing a standard for the Commission’s regional antidumping and countervailing duty analyses.  It therefore supports the conclusion that the Commission is owed deference in its interpretation of “substantial proportion.”  The Commission clearly embarked on its analysis having been given considerable leeway to interpret a particularly broad term.

Discourse Shapes Reality

Discourse forms our thinking process that leads to our policies

Bleiker, 2003. (Roland, Professor of International Relations Harvard and Cambridge, Discourse

and Human Agency, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. p. 27-28)

‘It is within discourse,’ one of Foucault’s much rehearsed passages (1976, 133) notes, ‘that power and knowledge articulate each other.’ The work of the French historian and philosopher epitomizes what is at stake in questions of discourse and agency. For Foucault, discourses are subtle mechanisms that frame our thinking process. They determine the limits of what can be thought, talked and written in a normal and rational way. In every society the production of discourses is controlled, selected, organized and diffused by certain procedures. This process creates systems of exclusion in which one group of discourses is elevated to a hegemonic status, while others are condemned to exile. Discourses give rise to social rules that decide which statements most people recognize as valid, as debatable or as undoubtedly false. They guide the selection process that ascertains which propositions from previous periods or foreign cultures are retained, imported, valued, and which are forgotten or neglected (see Foucault, 1969, 1971, 1991, 59–60). Not everything is discourse, but everything is in discourse. Things exist independently of discourses, but we can only assess them through the lenses of discourse, through the practices of knowing, perceiving and sensing, which we have acquired over time. Discourses render social practices intelligible and rational and by doing so mask the ways in which they have been constituted and framed. Systems of domination gradually become accepted as normal and silently penetrate every aspect of society. They cling to the most remote corners of our mind, for, as Nietzsche (1983, 17) once expressed it, ‘all things that live long are gradually so saturated with reason that their emergence out of unreason thereby becomes improbable.’

Kritiks provide the crucial link between knowledge and action- a reorientation of political discourse towards epistemological concerns

Owen 02, (David, Reader in Political Theory at the University of Southampton, “Reorienting International Relations: On Pragmatism, Pluralism and Practical Reasoning”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 31, No. 3, http://mil.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/31/3/653)

Another way of elucidating what is involved in this re-orientation is to note that it links knowledge (and the value of knowledge) to action by encouraging reflection on problems and problem-constitution. With respect to the former, it orients IR to questions that are both epistemic and ethical: what are the effects of this kind of practice? Should we seek to govern these practices? If so, how? At what cost? With respect to the latter, it orients IR to critical reflection on both the political constitution of such-and-such practice as a problem potentially requiring government and IR’s own disciplinary constitution of such-and-such practice as a problem requiring government. In other words, it orients IR both to the task of addressing problematic practices but also to the task of reflecting on how these practices are constituted as problematic; that is, the nature of the assumptions, inferences, etc. that are brought to bear in this process of problem-constitution. Thus, for example, IR is oriented to addressing the problem posed by refugees in terms of how this problem is governed and how existing ways of governing it may be improved. However, IR is also oriented to reflection on the background picture against which this problem is constituted as a problem including, for example, the assumption that the liberty and welfare of the human population is best served by its division into the civic populations of sovereign states who have a primary duty to their own populations. In other words, while addressing the refugee problem as it is constituted, IR also involves reflecting on the plausibility and value of features of its current constitution as a problem, such as this assumption concerning sovereignty and human welfare. If this argument has any cogency, it follows that rather than conceiving of IR in terms of a theoretical war of all against all, we acknowledge that there is a role for different kinds of theoretical practice in IR that engage with different issues. How though are we to judge between rival positions within these different levels? Between rival accounts of problems and of problem-constitution? The pragmatist response is to argue that such judgement involves attending to the capacity of the contesting accounts to guide our judgement and action. But how is this capacity to be judged? Responding to this question requires that we turn to the pragmatism’s concern with growth.

A discursive approach which investigates the social dynamics which feed domination and resistance are key. Having these methodologies within politics is critical to human agency- allowing us to challenge the entrenched system.

Bleiker, 00 (Roland, Ph.D. visiting research and teaching affiliations at Harvard, Cambridge, Humboldt, Tampere, Yonsei and Pusan National University as well as the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology and the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague, Popular Dissent , Human Agency and Global Politics, Cambridge University Press)

Discourse is the most central concept in a non-essentialist assessment of human agency. A shift from grand theoretical representations of dissent towards a discursive understanding of power relations is necessary to reach a more adequate understanding of the role that human agency plays in contemporary global politics. A discursive approach is not only able to deal better with entrenched systems of exclusion, but also minimises the danger of imposing one's own subjective vision upon a series of far more complex social events. Instead of focusing on ahistorical theories of power, a discursive approach investigates how social dynamics have been imbued with meaning and how this process of rendering them rational circumscribes the boundaries within which the transversal interaction between domination and resistance takes place. While providing compelling evidence of subtle forms of domination , a discursive approach may run the risk of leaving us with an image of the world in which the capacity for human agency is all but erased, annihilated by impenetrable discursive forces. This risk is particularly acute in a world that is characterised by increasingly heterogeneous and perhaps even elusive cross-territorial dynamics. But recognising these transversal complexities does not necessarily lead into a pessimistic cul de sac . Discourses, even if they take on global dimensions, are not as overarching as some analysts suggest. They contain fissures and cracks, weak points which open up chances to turn discursive dynamics against themselves . The previous chapter has outlined this position in detail. A brief rehearsal — even at the risk of appearing slightly repetitive — is necessary to provide the prerequisite for an adequate discursive conceptualisation of human agency in global politics. For this purpose we must , as the prologue has already stressed , seek to see beyond the levels of analysis problematique that has come to frame international relations theory. Rather than limiting the study of global politics to specific spheres of inquiry — those related to the role of states and the restraints imposed on them by the structures of the international system — an analysis of transversal struggles pays attention to various political terrains and the crossterritorial dynamics through which they are intertwined with each other. One of these terrains is the sphere of dailiness, which is all too often eclipsed by investigations that limit the domain of global politics to more visible sites of transversal struggle, such as wars, diplomatic negotiations, financial flows or trade-patterns. The domain of dailiness, though, is at least as crucial to the conduct of global politics, and an investigation into discursive dynamics illustrates why this the case. Cracks and weaknesses in globalised discursive practices can be seen best by shifting foci from epistemological to ontological issues. This is to say that in addition to analysing how discourses mould and control our thinking process, we must scrutinise how individuals, at the level of Being, may or may not be able to escape aspects of the prevalent discursive order. Being is always a product of discourse. But Being also is becoming. It contains future potential, it is always already that which it is not. Being also has multiple dimensions. Hyphenated identities permit a person to shift viewpoints constantly, to move back and forth between various ways of constituting oneself . Resulting methods of mental deplacement, of situating knowledge, open up possibilities for thinking beyond the narrow confines of the transversally established discursive order. This thinking space provides the opportunity to redraw the boundaries of identity which control the parameters of actions available to an individual. Exploring this thinking space already is action, Heidegger claims, for 'thinking acts insofar as it thinks'. Such action , he continues, is 'the simplest and at the same time the highest, because it concerns the relation of Being to man'. 3 But how is one to understand processes through which critical thinking breaks through the fog of discourse and gives rise to specific and identifiable expressions of human agency? The concept of tactic offers the opportunity to take a decisive step towards exploring the practical dimensions of Dasein, the existential awareness of Being, without losing the abstract insight provided by Heidegger. The sphere of dailiness is where such practical theorising is most effective. Entering this ubiquitous sphere compels us to one more shift, away from contemplating the becoming of Being towards investigating specific ways in which individuals employ their mobile subjectivities to escape discursive forms of domination . The focus now rests on everyday forms of resistance, seemingly mundane daily practices by which people constantly shape and reshape their environment. One can find such forms of resistance in acts like writing, laughing, gossiping, singing, dwelling, shopping or cooking. It is in these spheres that societal values are gradually transformed, preparing the ground for more open manifestations of dissent. Before drawing attention to the inherently transversal character of everyday activities, it is necessary to point out that the effects they produce cannot be understood by drawing direct links between action and outcome. In this sense, the present analysis departs fundamentally from the manner in which agency in global politics has come to be theorised . Most approaches to international theory, including the influential constructivist contributions to the structure—agency debate, display a clear 'commitment to causal analysis'. 4

**Discourse decides everything- there’s no alternative**

Jim **George,** Senior lecturer in international relations in the Department of Political Science, Australian National University, 19**94** (“Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations,” p. 25-26)

The question of reality and realism in postmodernist literature is confronted in terms similar to the (broadly) Hegelian approach of Berki and other criti­cal social theory approaches, including Habermas's Critical Theory. But, more unequivocally than these perspectives, postmodernists stress that real­ity is in a perpetual state of flux—of movement, change, and instability. This is not the common understanding of the nature of reality, of course. Social theory in general and International Relations in particular have, as noted earlier, understood reality in essentialist, unitary, and universalist terms. From a postmodernist perspective, this is not surprising, because, it is maintained, the notion of a singular, stable, knowable reality has been an integral part of a dominant post-Enlightenment story, in which the ascent of Western "rational man" is located as integral to the gradual historicophilo­sophic unfolding of the world's "real" nature. Like all other claims to know the world and its (singular, essential) reality, this is regarded as a narrative fiction, a story of certainty and identi­ty derived from a dominant discursive practice that reduces the flux of existence to a strategic framework of unity and coherence. Discourse in ' this context is not synonymous with language as such. It refers, rather, to a broader matrix of social practices that gives meaning to the way that people understand themselves and their behavior. A discourse, in this sense, generates the categories of meaning by which reality can be understood and explained. More precisely, a discourse makes "real" that which it pre­scribes as meaningful. So doing, a discourse of Realism, for example, establishes the sociolinguistic conditions under which realistic theory and practice can take place, and it establishes, simultaneously, that which, by discursive definition, does not correspond with reality. Understood this way, to be engaged in a discourse is to be engaged in the making and remaking of meaningful conditions of existence. A discourse, then, is not a way of learning "about" something out there in the "real world"; it is rather, a way of producing that something as real, as identifiable, classifiable, knowable, and therefore, meaningful. **Discourse creates the conditions of knowing** [emphasis added].80 This discursive representation of reality in the world is, for postmod­ernism, an integral part of the relations of power that are present in all human societies. Accordingly, the process of discursive representation is never a neutral, detached one but is always imbued with the power and authority of the namers and makers of reality—**it is always knowledge as power**. A major task for postmodernist scholars, consequently, is to interro­gate the conditions of knowledge as power. Discourse analysis seeks, in this way, to explain how power is constituted and how its premises and givens are replicated at all levels of society and to reveal its exclusionary practices in order to create space for critical thought and action. This, simply put, is what Derrida sought to do in locating the dominant modernist discourse in the post-Enlightenment search for an essential, uni­versal rationality. This he described as the logocentric process, a process of textual/social representation, derived, initially, from classical Greek schol­arship, which creates identity, unity, and universalized meaning by exclud­ing from the "meaningful" that which does not correspond to the logo (original, singular, authentic) conception of the rea1.81 In this way, at the core of Western history and philosophy is a textual "past" framed in terms of a whole series of dichotomies that demarcate that which is real and that which, by its definitional relationship with prescribed reality, cannot be. This story, aggregated and institutionalized via its articulations across the contemporary social theory disciplines, is the modernist metanarrative­the discourse of self/other, identity/difference, realism/idealism, illusory certitude, and Realist knowledge as International Relations.82

Korea Threat Construction Bad

**Contemporary threat perception of North Korea is flawed and a reevaluation is necessary to reevaluate policy analysis and choices**

**Smith, 2k** (Hazel Smith, Professor of Security and Resilience at Cranfield University, UK. She was previously Professor of International Relations at the University of Warwick Bad, Mad, Sad or Rational Actor? Why the 'Securitization' Paradigm Makes for Poor Policy Analysis of North Korea Author(s): Hazel Smith Source: International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 76, No. 1(Jan., 2000), pp. 112-113, DA: 6/3/11, CP)

The analysis of north Korea's domestic and foreign politics is now something of a cottage industry-partly because more data are available than ever before and partly because the fear of military conflict on the Korean peninsula has focused minds and attention on this last Cold War arena of tension.' The data come from the now very many humanitarian organizations that have been resident in Pyongyang since the start of the food emergency in I995, as well as from the literally hundreds of political and humanitarian delegations that have visited north Korea (the DPRK) in that period.2 Fear of conflict arises from unresolved tensions generated through the DPRK's suspected nuclear armaments programme and continues because of persistent international antagonism to the continuation of the DPRK's long-range missile development plans.3 There are different strands to the scholarly and policy analysis of north Korean politics but the dominant approach, and that which permeates the media coverage of the DPRK, remains heavily coloured by a security per- spective which is, among other things, curiously old-fashioned in its reliance upon the use and potential of military force as the central analytical notion in foreign policy behaviour.4 The dominant approach shapes much more than just analysis of straight forwardly security issues such as the threat of war, military policy, the potential use of both nuclear weapons and what are today known as weapons of mass destruction (WMD); it also forms the framework within which economic, welfare and humanitarian issues are conceived. In other words, these last issues are securitized. For this reason, I want to term this perspective the securitizing framework; and I want to argue that there are two sets of funda- mental assumptions shaping this perspective. The first is the DPRK as 'bad', often complemented by the vision of north Korea as 'mad'. In this article, I discuss how this paradigm shapes perceptions of DPRK and the policy options open to the international community. I then evaluate the problems faced by international (humanitarian and other) policy-makers who have had to deal directly with the DPRK since the emergence of the food crisis in I995 as their frame of reference was, inevitably, shaped by this dominant perspective. I evaluate the alternatives to the securitization paradigm drawn from the experience of the international community which has been engaged with and in the DPRK since I995. I trace two analytic alternatives-what I want to call the 'sad' and the 'rational actor' perspectives. I argue that the 'sad' category provides some illumination of DPRK policy and behaviour, but that the rational actor perspective is more fruitful in that it can assimilate the anomalies thrown up by the securitization perspective and, further, that it is able to offer a more appropriate base for policy analysis than the 'mad or bad' approach. This is so because it makes visible aspects of DPRK politics and behaviour which are obscured or obliterated by the dominant paradigm. At the same time, the rational actor approach eschews the normative commitment entailed by the securitization paradigm which views the regime as outside the international community of liberal capitalist states and which, implicitly or explicitly, promotes the only solution to the Korean problem as eradication of the DPRK regime. While the latter option may provide one answer, it is self-defeating in that it promotes what it ostensibly seeks to deny- namely, arms-racing behaviour by the DPRK and a belligerent attitude to the international community. I do not argue that the bad, mad, sad or rational actor approaches are mutu- ally exclusive, simply that they offer analytic alternatives for thinking about the DPRK. I argue, however, that alternative paradigmatic choices may help policy analysis into more nuanced policy choices.

**Only through the reconceptualization of what is a rational actor can give us analytical clarity as to how to evaluate the false threat that is North Korea**

**Smith, 2k** (Hazel Smith, Professor of Security and Resilience at Cranfield University, UK. She was previously Professor of International Relations at the University of Warwick Bad, Mad, Sad or Rational Actor? Why the 'Securitization' Paradigm Makes for Poor Policy Analysis of North Korea Author(s): Hazel Smith Source: International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 76, No. 1(Jan., 2000), pp. 129-132, DA: 6/3/11, CP)

Because there are still real security tensions on the Korean peninsula, and if the objective is also to help give analytical clarity to more than just humanitarian policy-makers, it is useful to explore the utility of the historicized and contextu- alized 'rational actor' framework. This approach assumes that the DPRK as an actor in international relations is hugely conditioned by its late twentieth- century experience of war and threats of war and, equally important, its sense of self-directed Korean nationalism. It also assumes a DPRK that is in principle knowable, even while acknowledging the difficulties of researching the country. This approach has produced some of the most credible literature on north Korea, much of which is informed by hard empirical observation and some of which has been cited in this article as a counterpoint to the more obvious failings of the dominant paradigm. Cumings and Harrison are leaders in this field, and it is no coincidence that it was personal intervention from Harrison which underpinned Carter's shuttle diplomacy to Pyongyang in I994 and very directly helped move the United States away from imminent war.72 One perspective for analysis of north and south Korean politics can be provided by classical security studies literature, for instance balance of power theory; but the new security studies which looks at economic instruments as means of achieving security goals is also relevant.73 The security literature is, almost paradoxically, where we can see emerging a body of work which does treat the DPRK as a rational actor and which understands that successful negoti- ating outcomes would involve taking into account north Korea's perceptions and interests. They would also involve cooperation to achieve goals, as opposed to the coercion implied by the securitization paradigm The dominant paradigm proved inadequate as a framework from within which decision-makers could operate in north Korea. It also faced crisis as the empirical work produced by and through the presence of the humanitarian community in the DPRK called into question the rigour and rationality of the approach. Some signs of a revolution in thinking about the DPRK are evident particularly in the 'sunshine' policy of the south Korean government. This policy seeks engagement with the north, and in pursuit of it the Seoul regime is implementing an ambitious set of policy directions designed to deal with an entity it treats as a rational actor, motivated by interest and context. There is also some sign of these alternative assumptions being accepted as more appropriate by those who formerly worked within the dominant paradigm. In I992, for instance, one analyst argued that 'further research ... [on north Korea is] imposs- ible under present circumstances.'75 By I998, the same analyst was acknowledging the increasing availability of data emanating from the humanitarian community, as well as admonishing observers not to treat the DPRK as 'a strange planet, beyond our ken or control'.76 The literature supplied by the humanitarian community and new security studies framework provides a solid research base for a revolution in thinking about the DPRK. Such research can also provide the foundations for more successful international policy options An obvious rational approach would be to support the south Korean policy of engagement with north Korea. Another option for US policy-makers would be to adopt an approach which is informed by the view that cooperation with north Korea would serve the US national interest-helping to achieve stability in East Asia in a way which coercion cannot. In terms of specific policy proposals, some of the more imaginative being floated inside the south Korean policy establishment (but outside the dominant paradigm) are very likely to be greeted by the DPRK with a much greater willingness to cooperate than is acknowledged by the securitization perspective. For instance, a peace deal which replaced US troops with a peacekeeping force which included US troops along with other nationalities could provide a successful way out of the current negotiating impasse at the four-party talks, if it is approached seriously and constructively. The idea of including north Korea in a security pact for East Asia along with the United States, Japan, south Korea and possibly China should be given some serious thought. If the Pentagon baulks at equal membership of such an East Asian pact-as might north Korean generals-an option of associate membership for north Korea could be sought. Economically, development organizations could fund small export- orientated industries (textiles, tourism) in north Korea. Export orientation of itself propels north Korea into the terrain of liberal capitalism, with its external market disciplines which inevitably feed back into what is an already changing north Korean socio-economic landscape. Even now, North Korean business is geared towards foreign markets-in terms of concerns over quality of goods, meeting deadlines, etc.-to a much greater degree than is perhaps generally realized by economic analyses shaped by the securitization lens. Conclusion The securitization paradigm provides a poor guide for policy-makers because it fails to grasp the complexity of north Korean politics and their rapidly changing nature. An alternative approach would accept a rationality on behalf of the DPRK and seek to explore the context and motivation for changes in DPRK policy. Alternative approaches do not have to be normatively committed to either the continuance or the demise of the north Korean regime. They can be committed to supporting a move to peace, stability and freedom from hunger on the Korean peninsula. Retaining the dominant approach reflects not just a crisis of the diplomatic imagination. Securitizing perspectives shape thought so as to make coercion the option of choice in dealing with north Korea. In this way securitization perspectives could well lead to war that would actively involve China and the United States in direct military conflict with each other. The choice, then, is between securitization and war, and rationality and diplomatic engagement. Only those who would never set foot upon the Korean peninsula in the case of a modern war could choose the former. I32

Even if the affirmative alters the policy mechanism of approaching Korea– the representation of North Korea as a threatening rogue state promotes war

Roland Bleiker, PhD in International Relations at ANU, professor of international relations at the University of Queensland, 11/18/2003, International Affairs Volume 79 Issue 4, Pages 719 – 737 (http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/118868835/

abstract).

The purpose of this article is to examine the role of the United States in the Korean nuclear crisis, for no aspect of the past and present dilemmas on the peninsula can be addressed or even understood without recourse to the US. This is why China repeatedly stressed that the latest nuclear crisis was primarily an issue between North Korea and the United States.6 Kim Dae-jung, in his final speech as South Korea’s president, reiterated the same theme: ‘more than anything, dialogue between North Korea and the United States is the important key to a solution.’7 A solution is, however, far from reach. Both the US and North Korea see the other as a threat. And each has good reasons for doing so. But each is also implicated in the production of this threat. The problem is that these interactive dynamics are hard to see, for the West tends to project a very one-sided image of North Korea—one that sees it solely as a rogue outlaw, and thus a source of danger and instability. Nicolas Eberstadt, for instance, stresses that ‘North Korean policies and practices have accounted for most of the volatility within the Northeast Asian region since the end of the Cold War.’8 Very few policy-makers, security analysts and journalists ever the make the effort to imagine how threats are perceived from North Korean perspective, or con- sider how these perceptions are part of an interactive security dilemma in which the West, and US foreign policy in particular, is implicated as deeply as the vilified regime in Pyongyang. The central argument of this article is that the image of North Korea as a ‘rogue state’ severely hinders both an adequate understanding and a possible resolution of the crisis. The rhetoric of rogue states is indicative of how US foreign policy continues to be driven by dualistic and militaristic Cold War thinking patterns. The ‘Evil Empire’ may be gone; not so the underlying need to define safety and security with reference to an external threat that must be warded off at any cost. Rogues are among the new threat-images that serve to demarcate the line between good and evil. As during the Cold War, military means are considered the key tool with which this line is to be defended. In the absence of a global power that matches the US, this militaristic attitude has, if anything, even intensified. Look at Washington’s recent promulgation of a pre- emptive strike policy against rogue states. The consequences of this posture are particularly fateful in Korea, for it reinforces half a century of explicit and repeated nuclear threats against the government in Pyongyang. The impact of these threats has been largely obscured, not least because the highly technical and specialized discourse of security analysis has enabled the US to present the strategic situation on the peninsula in a manner that misleadingly attributes responsibility for the crisis solely to North Korea’s actions. A brief disclaimer is in order at this point. I offer neither a comprehensive review of the Korean security situation nor a detailed analysis of the latest events. As a result, there will be little mention of some admittedly crucial issues, such as the role of China or the increasingly problematic rift between Washington and Seoul. Instead, I identify broad patterns of conflict and embark on a con- ceptual engagement with some of the ensuing dilemmas. Focusing on underly- ing trends inevitably entails glossing over nuances at times. For instance, there are heated debates between hawks and doves within Washington’s policy circles, and as a result periods dominated by hard-line realist positions have alternated with periods during which softer and more liberal policies prevailed. But the persistent pattern of seeing North Korea as a rogue state is far more striking, and in many ways far more significant, than the strategic policy manoeuvring that takes place within these patterns. Focusing on the big picture also entails depart- ing from some of the conventions that prevail in the field of strategic and security studies. Contrary to most treatments of the subject, I do not discuss the technical aspects of nuclear and other weapons, except to show, as indicated above, how these very discussions, jargon-ridden and inaccessible as they are to any but military experts, often serve to stifle debate about some of the underly- ing political and ethical issues.

The affirmatives’ representations of North Korea as an irrational proliferator prevent peace

David Shim, Phd Candidate @ GIGA Institute of Asian Studies, 2008 [Paper prepared for presentation at the 2008 ISA, Production, Hegemonization and Contestation of Discursive Hegemony: The Case of the Six-Party Talks in Northeast Asia, www.allacademic.com/meta/p253290\_index.html]

This paper’s starting point is the consideration that practices within NEA security politics representing the nuclear ambitions and intentions of North Korea as malign and, therefore, as the rationale behind the need of the nuclear disarmament framework, indicate a particular shared understanding or interpretation – presumed by all remaining parties – regarding the actions, policies or statements of the DPRK. It is argued that signifying practices ascribed and fixed a specific meaning with regard to North Korea’s behaviour, which is problematized in terms of certain narratives revolving around nuclear armament, missiles and nuclear proliferation, terrorism, criminal activities, illegitimacy, instability, isolation and irrationality. Regardless of the inner coherence of some arguments the DPRK is represented by the remaining SPT actors as a threat, a danger or a risk. Common to cite, for instance, is its military strength (missile and nuclear program and suspected proliferation of means and know-how), its internal weakness (economic, energy and food crises, potential instability/collapse and flood of refugees), its irrationality (madness, unpredictable behaviour and/or non-compliance of agreements), its rationality (calculative behaviour of coercive or blackmail diplomacy), its lack of transparency and isolation in the international community (no or little information on its condition) which is combined to a certain degree with its ideology/philosophy of *Juche*. In short, it is regarded as a problem in regional security politics and this seems to be the dominant reality or valid knowledge with regard to North Korea. In this vein, the emergence of the Six-Party Talks can be regarded as an institutionalized embodiment of the problematization of North Korea, because it unifies major themes, which contribute to the ascription of a specific meaning towards it. However, the current interpretational and representational practices to make sense of North Korea’s actions or statements are not necessarily or naturally the only way to make its behaviour intelligible. There can also be alternative interpretations (cf. e.g. Cumings 1999, 2004; Sigal 1998; Bleiker 2003, 2005; Smith 2000; Kang 2003; Suh 2006, 2007). For instance, the rationale behind North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons could be seen as a defensive measure or as a deterrent, particularly if one considers the ‘axis or evil’ rhetoric or the (nuclear) pre-emption policy of the United States and its military alliances with South Korea and Japan. Further, one could make sense of its nuclear programme in terms of economic or energy needs or it could be interpreted as a bargaining chip. Its missile programme or the test-firing of such a device could also be seen as the legal right of a sovereign state (cf. Smith 2000: 598; Suh 2007: 157).

North Korea Threat Construction Good

**North Korean people agree- NK is a hell that must be opposed**

**BBC News** **6/25** (6/25/10, " 'If England is heaven then North Korea is hell' ", <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8759301.stm>) MG

At school they taught us that North Korean society is the best in the world and other countries envy North Koreans, but I had seen people die every day from hunger and so many soldiers ran away from the army I could feel the contradiction every day. As many as 30% of the soldiers in one unit were suffering from malnutrition and 20% of soldiers defected. Once I was sent on a mission to find these defectors - while I was on this mission, I went home and found out that my nephew had died of hunger - there was nothing to eat. This made me question the society I was living in even more and strengthened my resolve to defect. Nowadays, North Korea is using international aid for military purposes and developing nuclear weapons and missiles. It is becoming a country which is perceived as a threat to the international community. Recently the North Koreans attacked the South Korean warship, Cheonan - creating tension in the Korean peninsula. That made the North Korean people suffer even more. When I was in North Korea, when I heard of similar stories to this, I always thought that victory for Kim Jong-il or Kim Il-sung was a heroic thing. But now I'm outside North Korea and I realise that the country keeps doing these things in order to avoid isolation. This is part of their strategy. They are at the edge of a cliff and this is the only way to avoid being isolated by the international community. It took a long time for me to decide to defect. That's because I knew what my family, friends and neighbours would go through if I defected. I was worried about my parents. I always wanted to defect but it was very difficult to do it. Everyone who has parents will understand how I felt. I haven't been able to contact my parents since I left and so I don't know what happened to them. When I defected, I was wearing a uniform because I was still in the military, but I had no passport, no visa, and no money when I entered China. All I had was my bare hands. I crossed the river which runs along the border with North Korea and China at night. There were guards on the border and they would have shot me if they had seen me but I managed to swim across to China. Although China was much better than North Korea, I had many difficulties during my year there, I had no money and had to beg on the street every day. An NGO helped me get into Vietnam. I took a train to the border and then a train to Hanoi and then walked for three days. But I realised that Vietnam wasn't a democratic society either, so decided to go to Cambodia. I was arrested twice by Vietnamese guards as I tried to cross the swamps on the border. I escaped from prison and on my third attempt made it into Cambodia. Then I went to Thailand and then finally I came to the UK in October 2007 as an illegal immigrant. I was able to claim asylum status and now I have a family in the UK, and a child. I have learnt what true democracy is. If England is heaven then North Korea is hell. The North Korean people do not know what democracy is. But every day, when I wake up, I feel that I want to build a democratic society in North Korea itself. What I hope for is that Britain and the international community can help North Korea to change its regime so that the North Korean people can end their miserable lives and live in a democracy that respects their human rights.

**North Korea responds to US foreign policy, not discourse**

**Herman, 10** - VOA bureau chief and correspondent based in Seoul (6/28/10, Steve, "North Korea Vows to Boost Nuclear Deterrent," http://

www1.voanews.com/english/news/asia/North-Korea-Vows-to-Boost-Nuclear-Deterrent-97292049.html, SW)

**North Korea on Monday announced it would have to increase its nuclear weapons capability, blaming unspecified threats by the United States' military.** This comes following criticism of North Korea at two summits in Canada, where it was also announced that the transfer of full operational control of South Korean forces to Seoul's command is to be delayed. **North Korea's foreign ministry says a hostile American policy compels it to boost its nuclear capability. A statement from the ministry, carried by the North's central news agency, says the nuclear deterrent will be raised in a new, improved manner. It says this is necessary to counter the military threat from the United States after "the recent disturbing development" on the Korean peninsula.** It did not elaborate. Park Young-ho is a research analyst at the South Korean-government funded Korea Institute for National Unification. He says Pyongyang is responding to what it believes is a hardening stance by the United States and other countries during a summit of world leaders in Canada during the past several days. Park interprets North Korea's announcement as meaning it will weaponize more plutonium and make nuclear warheads small enough to fit atop its missiles. On the sidelines of the G20 meeting in Toronto, U.S. and South Korean leaders agreed to delay the transfer of operational control of the South Korean military from U.S. forces to Seoul until 2015. **Three years ago, South Korea agreed to resume full control of its troops in 2012. But some in both Washington and Seoul warned it would be premature for the South to assume responsibility due to lack of training and equipment. Tension on the Korean peninsula has been rising since the sinking of a South Korean coastal warship in late March.** An international investigation concluded the Cheonan was hit by a North Korean torpedo. Pyongyang denies any involvement and says any moves by the United Nations to punish it for the act could lead to war. **World leaders at a G8 meeting Saturday in Canada criticized North Korea over the sinking and its nuclear program. Concern has been growing about the political stability of the reclusive regime in the North**. There is increasing speculation that ailing leader Kim Jong Il is preparing his youngest son, Kim Jong-Un, to succeed him. North Korea has made a surprise announcement to convene a ruling party members' meeting for the first time since 1966.

Predictions Bad

**Predictions destroy humans’ ability to make decisions and apply them to the world.**

**Bleiker 2000**

(Roland, Professor of International Relations at the University of Queensland. “Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics.” 2000. Pub. Cambridge University Press <http://books.google.com/books?id=sCh3naAd8KIC&pg=PA48&lpg=PA48&dq>= 22The+very+notion+of+prediction+does,+by+its+ own+logic,+annihilate+human+agency.22&source=bl&ots=J3I6bhsBUm&sig=HZmvQ1tHNKDdM4\_7UxpeVV\_1R5k&hl=en&ei=JwURTvn9DNGXtweIt4nbDQ&

sa=X&oi=book\_result&ct=result&resnum=4&ved=0CDIQ6AEwAw#v=onepage&q=%22The%20very%20notion%20of%20prediction%20does%2C%20by%20its%20own%20logic%2C%20annihilate%20human%20agency.%22&f=false)

The very notion of prediction does, by its own logic, annihilate human agency. To assert that international relations is a domain of political dynamics whose future should be predictable through a convincing set of theoretical propositions is to assume that the source of global politics is to a certain extent predetermined. From such a vantage-point, there is no more room for interference and human agency, no more possibility for politics to overtake theory. A predictive app roach thus runs the risk of ending up in a form of inquiry that imposes a static image upon a far more complex set of transversal political practices. The point of a theoretical inquiry, however, is not to ignore the constantly changing domain of internationals relations. Rather, the main objective must consists of facilitating and hindering of transversal struggles that can grapple with those moment when people walk through walls precisely when nobody expects them to do so. Prediction is a problematic assessment tool even if a theory is able to anticipate future events. Important theories, such as realist interpretations of international politics, may well predict certain events only because their theoretical premises have become so objectivised that they have started to shape decision makers and political dynamics. Dissent, in this case, is the process that reshapes these entrenched perceptions and the ensuing political practices. Describing, explaining and prescribing may be less unproblematic processes of evaluation, but only at first sight. If one abandons the notion of Truth, the idea that an event can be apprehended as part of a natural order, authentically and scientifically, as something that exists independently of the meaning we have given it – if one abandons this separation of object and subject, then the process of judging a particular approach to describing and explaining an event becomes a very muddles affair. There is no longer an objective measuring device that can set the standard to evaluate whether or not a particular insight into an event, such as the collapse of the Berlin Wall, is true or false. The very nature of a past event becomes indeterminate insofar as its identification is dependent upon ever-changing forms of linguistic expression that imbue the event with meaning. 56

**Apocalyptic predictions are constructed by alarmists to advance personal interests**

Kurasawa, Associate Professor of [Sociology](http://www.arts.yorku.ca/soci/" \t "_blank), Political Science, and Social and Political Thought at York University in Toronto, 2004 (Fuyuki Karasawa, “Cautionary Tales: The Global Culture of Prevention and The Work of Foresight”, NM, [http://www.yorku.ca/kurasawa/Kurasawa%20Articles/Constellations%20Article.pdf](http://www.yorku.ca/kurasawa/Kurasawa%20Articles/Constellations%20Article.pdf" \t "_blank))

Up to this point, I have tried to demonstrate that transnational socio-political relations are nurturing a thriving culture and infrastructure of prevention from below, which challenges presumptions about the inscrutability of the future (II) and a stance of indifference toward it (III). Nonetheless, unless and until it is substantively ‘filled in,’ the argument is vulnerable to misappropriation since farsightedness does not in and of itself ensure emancipatory outcomes. Therefore, this section proposes to specify normative criteria and participatory procedures through which citizens can determine the ‘reasonableness,’ legitimacy, and effectiveness of competing dystopian visions in order to arrive at a socially self-instituting future. Foremost among the possible distortions of farsightedness is alarmism, the manufacturing of unwarranted and unfounded doomsday scenarios. State and market institutions may seek to produce a culture of fear by deliberately stretching interpretations of reality beyond the limits of the plausible so as to exaggerate the prospects of impending catastrophes, or yet again, by intentionally promoting certain prognoses over others for instrumental purposes. Accordingly, regressive dystopias can operate as Trojan horses advancing political agendas or commercial interests that would otherwise be susceptible to public scrutiny and opposition. Instances of this kind of manipulation of the dystopian imaginary are plentiful: the invasion of Iraq in the name of fighting terrorism and an imminent threat of use of ‘weapons of mass destruction’; the severe curtailing of American civil liberties amidst fears of a collapse of ‘homeland security’; the neoliberal dismantling of the welfare state as the only remedy for an ideologically constructed fiscal crisis; the conservative expansion of policing and incarceration due to supposedly spiraling crime waves; and so forth. Alarmism constructs and codes the future in particular ways, producing or reinforcing certain crisis narratives, belief structures, and rhetorical conventions. As much as alarmist ideas beget a culture of fear, the reverse is no less true.

Utilitarianism Bad

**Normality bias causes us to underestimate the impact of discriminatory outcomes. This justifies a feedback loop where we accept the established order and treat disadvantaged populations as suitable victims necessary for our safety.**

Wang 06(Lu-in, Professor of Law @ University of Pittsburgh School of Law, 2006 “Discrimination by Default: How Racism Becomes Routine” Pg 90-97)

The Normalcy and Normalization of Discrimination Because counterfactual thinking influences our reactions to and explanations of negative events, biases in counterfactual thinking have the potential to distort our assessments of discriminatory outcomes at several levels. First, they can mute our reactions to discrimination generally, leading us to tolerate and even to accept unequal outcomes. Our acceptance of discrimination is not due solely to a general indifference or hardness toward groups that are vulnerable to discrimination, but results in part from the specific ways in which our preference for the normal or customary affects how we process and evaluate events and behavior. That is, the normality bias leads us to react less strongly to (and perhaps to not even notice) misfortunes that we take for granted or that follow an expected pattern. This bias also promotes the entrenchment of those patterns because it leads us to accept the established order but to End jarring, and therefore to resist, challenges to those accepted ways. Furthermore, it makes it easier for us to justify the established patterns by viewing them as rational and even fair. Second, when a case of alleged discrimination does come under scrutiny, biases in counterfactual thinking can distort our causal explanations of the events in question and our evaluations of the parties. Because determining whether discrimination has occurred is “fundamentally an exercise in causal attribution,"7 the relative normality or mutability of the parties' conduct can influence our judgments of their roles in producing the outcome in a way that leads us to reduce the perpetrator’s responsibility and ascribe undue responsibility to the victim. More broadly, our judgments of blame and sympathy create a feedback loop that reinforces the norms, expectations, and practices that contributed to our biased judgments and perpetuate discriminatory reactions and behavior. Immutable Wrongs and Suitable Victims The more easily we can imagine the victim of a tragic fate avoiding it, the more badly we will feel that be has suffered, so that the level of sympathy we feel and the amount of compensation we dole out may turn on trivial differences in the circumstances of a tragedy. In the burglary study discussed earlier, for example, subjects expressed greater sympathy for victims if their homes were burglarized the night before they returned from vacation than if the burglary occurred several weeks before their return. Similarly, subjects in another study recommended significantly higher compensatory awards for a convenience store customer who was shot during a robbery at a store he rarely patronized than for a customer who was shot at his regular store. They also awarded significantly higher amounts to a plane crash victim who managed to walk miles through a remote area only to die one-quarter of a mile from the nearest town than to one who traveled just as far but died seventy-five miles from the nearest town.” In none of the studies did the victims’ losses or suffering differ based on the circumstances of their misfortunes. Nevertheless, the fate of the more highly compensated victims seemed more poignant and the victims themselves more deserving of sympathy, because subjects could more easily imagine positive outcomes for them. A positive counterfactual also may come more easily to mind, as Delgado’s examples suggest, when it is not normal for a person to suffer a particular fate. Recall the bursting of the “dot-com E bubble,” when unemployment figures began to reflect not just the usual losses of blue-collar and lower-skilled service jobs but also substantial losses of high-paying, white-collar jobs. Numerous news articles highlighted and analyzed the trend, labeling the ` downturn a "white-collar recession” and sympathetically profiling the newly idle (and mostly White) college educated professionals for whom unemployment was both a hardship and a shock. Although white collar professionals during that period did A indeed suffer higher rates of unemployment than were typical for that group, they were not, as many assumed, the hardest hit: the groups that “usually get clobbered” by unemployment—blue- collar workers, lower-skilled workers, people of color—continued to bear disproportionately higher job losses. The misfortunes of unemployed professionals drew more attention and greater sympathy in part because, as one economist put it, “They are not the people who come right to mind when you think about the jobless.”·\*° Similarly, our attention and sympathy for crime victims varies according to how accustomed we are to seeing them—or, to be more precise, people like them—suffer crime and violence. Even the same, equally appalling forms of victimization can elicit different degrees of concern depending on race and class. A couple of high-profile cases from recent years illustrate this point. Many readers will likely recall the highly publicized 1989 case of the Central Park jogger—a case so famous that this reference to its victim generally suffices to identify it. As Kimberle Crenshaw has noted, this case, which was believed at the time to have involved the gang rape and brutal beating of a White investment banker by as many as twelve Black youths,” drew massive, sensationalized media Coverage, provoked widespread public outrage, and even prompted Donald Trump to take out “a full page ad in four New York newspapers demanding that New York ‘Bring Back the Death Penalty, Bring Back Our Police."’” While she does not suggest that the Central Park jogger’s ease did not merit great concern, Crenshaw does point out the dramatic disparity between the level of concern that case evoked and the virtual silence of the media with regard to the “twenty-eight other cases of first-degree rape or attempted rape" that were reported in New York that same week—many of which were “as horrific as the rape in Central Park,"” but most of which included victims who were women of color. Similarly, the great attention paid to a more recent and perhaps equally famous case—the June 2002 abduction of Elizabeth Smart, a White teenager from an affluent Utah family—contrasted sharply with the relative lack of coverage given a similar case that same spring: the disappearance of Alexis Patterson, a seven-year-old African American girl, in April 2002. By one account, the Smart story received ten times the media coverage given Patter- son’s case: one thousand newspaper articles and television reports on Smart versus one hundred on Patterson.34 Reporters, editors, and producers denied that the victims’ race played any role in the amount of attention their cases received, pointing out that a number of factors distinguished them: Smart was abducted from her own bedroom in the middle of the night while Patterson disappeared during her walk to school, the police departments may have worked differently in sharing information with the media, and the Smart parents, with their "perfect" family, may have been perceived more sympathetically than the Pattersons. Aside from these circumstantial differences, however, a number of journalists and commentators noted that race probably did make a difference—not because the media consciously resist reporting stories with Black victims, but because of their sense of "what makes a compelling national· story."3 What makes a compelling story, however, often correlates with race and class. As one veteran Black journalist put it bluntly, "whatever happens in a black neighborhood doesn’t really surprise anybody. The public is conditioned to expect that. "37 In other words, the explanation may be simply that crime and violence are an accepted part of Black people’s "rough road in life."38 Their suffering is normal and therefore unremarkable. Furthermore, we take for granted not just who suffers but also how their suffering plays out. That is, we become inured to misfortunes that a story line with which we are familiar, because the victims’ experiences are hard to imagine otherwise. The more muted reactions to deaths from enemy versus friendly illustrate this point. Familiarity accustoms us to racial and other group-based discrimination as well, because that kind of misfortune often follows standard scripts. In their analysis of reactions to the bombing of a synagogue in France that injured several people, social psychologists Dale T Miller and William Turnbull pointed out that one need not embrace a discriminatory viewpoint in order to assimilate the expectation that certain harms are normal for some people but not for others: France’s then Prime Minister publicly denounced the attack and expressed his sympathy for both the jews who were inside the synagogue and the "innocent passersby." The Prime Minister’s differentiation of the victims and innocent passersby provoked considerabl[e] outrage because many interpreted it as implying that he did not consider the jews to be as innocent as the passersby. Certainly the term innocent has a strong moral connotation, but should we assume that the Prime Minister’s remarks reflect anti-Semitism? Not necessarily. His failure to apply the term innocent to the jews inside the synagogue may reflect the fact that his mental representation of a synagogue enabled him to mentally remove passersby from the vicinity more easily than the attending jews. That the passersby were not the intended victims of the attack also makes their injuries less taken-for-granted and thus easier to undo mentally (although no more or less deserved) than those of the jews .... What need not have been, ought not to have been.3’ As this incident suggests, the more readily we recognize the patterns that discrimination follows, the harder it is for us to undo mentally the routine discrimination we expect and witness, the more congruous and less remarkable we find its victims’· losses, and the more acceptable they become. As a result, even extreme acts of discrimination such as bias-motivated violence can play a role in normalizing discrimination to the extent that they define the expected targets for aggression and ill treatment. Observers of bias, crimes understand immediately and viscerally why the victim was singled out because they recognize the pattern that such crime follows. As Iris Marion Young has explained, the social environment surrounding acts of violence, harassment, intimidation, and ridicule of particular groups makes those acts "possible and even acceptable. This pattern of acceptance also characterizes the less dramatic, more mundane types of discrimination that members of some groups experience routinely. Dorothy E. Roberts has pointed out, for example, that habitual racial profiling in law enforcement con- tributes to an environment in which both the imposition of physical suffering on members of certain groups and the infringement of their constitutional rights are expected and minimized. First, discriminatory targeting by law enforcement officers reinforces the perception that some groups are "second-class citizens" for whom police surveillance and even arrest are "perfectly natural." In turn, this belief promotes the view that those groups are entitled to fewer liberties and that their rights are "mere ‘amenities’ that may be sacrificed to protect law-a biding people." Acceptance of this view results in an environment in which a pattern of discriminatory targeting seems benign, for "when social understandings are so uncontested that they become invisible, the social meanings that arise from them appear natural. Similarly, Deseriee A. Kennedy has explained that consumer discrimination—the commercial version of racial profiling in which retail establishments single out Black and Brown shoppers for heightened surveillance and other ill treatment—also insinuates itself into our expectations of how people of color should be treated: "Everyday racism perpetuates itself—it becomes integrated into everyday situations and becomes ‘part of the expected, of the unquestionable, and of what is seen as normal by the dominant group.""’2 And as we shall see, a history of inferior care has led to the view that minorities inevitably will suffer worse health outcomes because “those people" generally don’t do well.43 In addition to being familiar and therefore normal, our scripts, schemas, and prototypes for discrimination incorporate other factors that make discriminatory outcomes seem inevitable and lead us to take them for granted. The standard discrimination schema includes a perpetrator who intentionally targets a member of a disfavored group for ill treatment and whose intentional wrong- doing is triggered by his "taste for discrimination"—a force both irrational and outside his control. Both the assumptions that discrimination is intended and that its perpetrators are driven to it tend to make discrimination seem ineluctable, with all the implications that the appearance of immutability carries. As Miller and Turnbull suggested with reference to the synagogue bombing, when a victim is seen as an intended target, the victim’s fate is harder to undo mentally. As they also have explained, victims’ losses are more easily taken for granted when the harm they suffer was required in order for the perpetrator to achieve his goals—"even when [those] goals [are] reprehensible.”4‘ This tendency was confirmed in yet another victim compensation study, in which subjects showed less sympathy toward and recommended less compensation for a victim whose dog was killed by a burglar when the dog’s barking "threatened the burglar’s mission" than when the dog was killed when no one was nearby to hear the barking. It is also harder to imagine a different outcome if an actor’s behavior is viewed as out of his control than when it is controllable. For example, to the extent that people accept the stereotype of a rapist as being "sex-starved, insane, or both," they have a hard time imagining him behaving differently and refraining from his attack on the victim."6 Taken as a whole--and as unrealistic and inaccurate as they may sometimes be—our scripts, schemas, and prototypes of discrimination lead us to take for granted and thus to accept in- equitable outcomes. And by incorporating the assumptions implicit in these conceptions of discrimination, the legal model of intentional discrimination reinforces and institutionalizes this effect. We come, in other words, to view members of certain groups as appropriate or acceptable targets for the kinds of mistreatment that we are used to seeing them suffer. Even those of us who are vulnerable to common forms of discrimination may adopt this perspective to some degree, as we shall see below. Those who do not see themselves as likely targets of discrimination, on the other hand—that is, members of typically dominant groups—may even find comfort in these patterns. One of the less noble tendencies of human beings is to gauge our own vulnerability to negative events by comparison to others—and to prefer to compare "down- ward,” to less fortunate others. Downward social comparison gives us a favorable, self-enhancing view of ourselves, thereby reducing anxiety and improving our sense of well-being.47 Accordingly, individuals who can distinguish themselves from potential targets are able to reap psychological benefits from drawing that distinction. To the extent that racially discriminatory patterns of mistreatment provide nontarget individuals with more vulnerable, less fortunate groups with which to compare themselves, these patterns also provide nontarget persons with a means of enhancing their positive views of themselves and the world—to see the world as safe and just and themselves as invulnerable and worthy. To the extent that viewing some groups as expected, even accepted, targets for mistreatment provides a nontarget individual with a way of differentiating herself from that victim, she may feel even more insulated from or immune to such treatment because her group identity protects her. The comfort that comes from seeing others as more vulnerable than ourselves in turn serves to reinforce the designation of those others as suitable victims.48

Risk assessment is distorted by poverty – trading on capital reserves exclude the poor

Hope 2000 (Tim, Professor of Criminology @ Keele University, , “Crime, disorder, and community safety” Pg 193-194 )

We live in both a risk society (Beck 1992) and an exclusive society (Young 1999). At the same time as we orient to ourselves around the risks and dangers which we see surrounding us in our everyday lives, so also do our social and political arrangements lend themselves to the magnification of inequalities in access to those goods which reassure, protect or expose ourselves to risk. As our perception of the ‘bads’ increases, so do we seek to gamer the ‘goods’ which would keep them at bay, trading on our capital reserves and capacities across the various spheres of economy, community and culture. The ‘ontological insecurity’ which the condition of late modernity inspires in us (Giddens 1990; Young 1999) fuses with the apprehension of mundane insecurities, pressuring us to invest in the means of risk avoidance (Hope and Sparks 2000). As we feel increasingly that the public sphere alone can no longer guarantee sufficiently the public goods of everyday safety (see Garland 1996), so we are thrown upon our own individual and collective resources and strategies to acquire the private goods which would remedy our perceived security deficit. And our incapacity to protect ourselves from risk leads to frustration with government - still seen as the primary g provider of safety in modem society — and with ourselves, as a reflection of our own powerlessness in the face of the risks and harms that surround us. Yet, access to capital in one sphere - for instance. through income and of such a process is at work in contemporary society we might expect to see consequences in observed structure of outcomes – both of risk and of risk avoidance. Even if we have little access to the decision making processes of individuals, and little chance of observing their pursuit of strategies of risk avoidance in their everyday lives, we may still be able to infer their operation from the observed structural patterns of risk. In this vein, this chapter essays an “actuarial” analysis of the distribution of the risk to private citizens of household property crime victimization in England and Wales, as measured by the British Crime Survey.

**Utilitarianism reduces human value to nothing.**

**Cleveland 2002**

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Another problem with utilitarianism is that it has a very narrow conception of what it means to be a human being. Within Bentham’s view, human beings are essentially understood to be passive creatures who respond to the environment in a purely mechanical fashion. As such, there are no “bad” motives, only “bad” calculations. In these terms, no person is responsible for his or her own behavior. In effect, the idea being promoted is that human action is essentially the same as that of a machine in operation. This notion reduces a human thought to nothing more than a series of bio-chemical reactions. Yet, if this is true, then there is no meaning to human thought or human action and all human reason is reduced to the point of being meaningless.[6] Beyond this problem, it also seems a little absurd to argue that since all human beings seek pleasure and avoid pain, that we can conclude that such a fact ought then be used as the foundation upon which an ethical theory ought to be constructed. As Opitz points out, Words like pleasure happiness, or satisfaction are what might be called “container words.” They are words needing a content, like the word “assistant.” When someone tells you he is an assistant, you are told nothing about his actual job. All you know is that he is not an executive. To make it specific, the job of being an assistant needs some entity to hook up with. Similarly, happiness or pleasure. There is no such entity as pleasure or happiness; these are mental states which may be associated with many different things.[7] Since this is true, pleasure cannot be the goal of human action in and of itself. It is simply the by-product of human action which is actually aimed at the attainment of some specific goal or end. To be sure, people rarely seek to refine their tastes by considering such qualitative issues until they are well fed, clothed, and housed, but that fact does not mean that such issues are unimportant. Even that great proponent of utilitarianism, J. S. Mill, came to understand this point. As a result, he too began to recognize that happiness was not something that could be had directly and tried to introduce qualitative factors into his utilitarianism.

Utilitarians lead to humans to be treated like animals – their logic can make no differential between the live of a human and a sheep

Richard Posner, Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and Lecturer at University of Chicago Law School, 79 (“Utilitarianism, economics, and legal theory”, The Journal of Legal Studies, Vol.8, No. 1 (Jan., 1979))

A. A Critique of Utilitarianism An act or practice is right or good or just in the utilitarian view insofar as it tends to maximize happiness, usually defined as the surplus of pleasure over pain.37 This definition conceals some important ambiguities in utilita- rian theory but these are best left to emerge from an analysis of the criti- cisms of utilitarianism. Two features of the theory, however, require clar- ification at the outset. First, it is a theory both of personal morality and of social justice. A good man is one who strives to maximize the sum total of happiness (his own plus others') and the good society is the society that seeks to maximize that sum total. Second, the maximand, at least as most utilitar- ians now view it, is not a particular psychological state, ecstasy or euphoria or whatever, but is rather the broadest possible concept of satisfaction. Happiness, utility, is maximized when people (or creatures) are able to sat- isfy their preferences, whatever those preferences may be, to the greatest possible extent. This formulation does not exclude the possibility that A may know B's true preferences better than B does-the possibility, that is, of paternalism. The best way both to elucidate and to evaluate utilitarian theory is to examine the principal criticisms that have been made of it. One criticism is that the domain of utilitarianism is uncertain. Whose happiness is to count in designing policies to maximize the greatest happiness? Does the happiness of animals count? J. J. C. Smart has addressed the latter question as follows: Perhaps strictly in itself and at a particular moment, a contented sheep is as good as a contented philosopher. However it is hard to agree to this. If we did we should have to agree that the human population ought ideally to be reduced by contraceptive methods and the sheep population more than correspondingly increased. Perhaps just so many humans should be left as could keep innumerable millions of placid sheep in contented idleness and immunity from depredations by ferocious animals. Indeed if a contented idiot is as good as a contented philosopher, and if a contented sheep is as good as a contented idiot, then a contented fish is as good as a contented sheep, and a contented beetle is as good as a contented fish. Where shall we stop?38 Smart never answers his last question. And although he finds it "hard to agree" to equating the contented sheep with the contented philosopher, he can find no basis in utilitarian theory for distinguishing them and is left in the end to remark lamely: "the question of whether the general happiness would be increased by replacing most of the human population by a bigger population of contented sheep and pigs is not one which by any stretch of the imagination could become a live issue.""39 Since utility in the broad sense used by contemporary utilitarians is pos- sessed by (many) animals, the inclusion of sheep and pigs seems required by the theory. Smart suggests as much. However, there is something amiss in a philosophical system that cannot distinguish between people and sheep. In utilitarian morality, a driver who swerved to avoid two sheep and deliber- ately killed a child could not be considered a bad man, since his action may have increased the amount of happiness in the world. This result is contrary to every ethical intuition we have. Thus, it is not the fact that utilitarianism has a "boundary problem" that is troubling. It is that the obvious solution-the inclusion of animal feelings- is unacceptable. We could of course redefine the maximand to exclude ani- mals. We could say with Frank Knight that people don't want happiness or any other version of preference satisfaction that might embrace what ani- mals want: "The chief thing which the common-sense individual actually wants is not satisfactions for the wants which he has, but more, and better wants."40 But this is just a version of the old utilitarian game, which leads nowhere, of dividing up preferences into "higher" and "lower" on inevitably shifting and subjective grounds.

Utilitarian calculations open space for unlimited instances of public intervention – search for maximal happiness results in morally monstrous policies where all of histories greatest atrocities can be justified

Richard Posner, Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and Lecturer at University of Chicago Law School, 79 (“Utilitarianism, economics, and legal theory”, The Journal of Legal Studies, Vol.8, No. 1 (Jan., 1979))

Another difficulty with utilitarianism is the lack of a method for calculat- ing the effect of a decision or policy on the total happiness of the relevant population.41 Even if attention is confined to the human population, there is no reliable technique for measuring a change in the level of satisfaction of one individual relative to a change in the level of satisfaction of another. Some utilitarians have faith in the eventual discovery of a psychological metric that will enable happiness to be measured and compared across per- sons (and animals?),42 but in the two centuries that have elapsed since Bentham announced the felicific calculus no progress toward the discovery of such a metric has been made. Paretian welfare economics is advanced by some as the solution to the problem of measuring satisfactions. The basic Paretian argument is that a voluntary market transaction-e.g., A offers, and B accepts, $5 for B's bag of oranges, or A proposes marriage, and again B accepts A's offer-must make both parties better off, and so increase the level of welfare or happiness in the society, for if both A and B were not made better off by the transaction at least one of them would refuse to consent to it. This approach does not, however, meet the utilitarian's need for a dependable metric even if we accept (as I am inclined to do, despite arguments, which I cannot hope to address here, that advertising or other features of a market economy lead people to buy things they don't really want) that a market transaction in- creases the happiness of the parties over what it was immediately before the transaction took place. The transaction (or, more plausibly, a series of like transactions) may affect nonparties: by increasing the demand for oranges it may cause the price of oranges to rise to other consumers as well, and the higher price may make those other consumers quite miserable. Moreover, the analysis begs two critical questions: whether the goods exchanged were initially distributed so as to maximize happiness (were the people with money those who derive the most happiness from the things money can buy?) and whether a system of free markets creates more happiness than alternative systems of resource allocation do or could. The Paretian criterion could of course be defined in such a way that no transaction was deemed Pareto optimal unless it raised the level of happiness in the society. Perhaps this definition is implicit in the usual formulation of the criterion: a transaction is Pareto optimal if it makes at least one person better off and no one worse off. But rigorously applied, this test is unwork- able because the total effects of a transaction on human happiness, content- ment, or satisfaction are rarely ascertainable. I conclude that Paretian analy- sis does not solve the utilitarians' problem of measuring happiness. Difficulty in deriving specific policies or guidelines from ethical premises is not, of course, unique to utilitarianism; it is characteristic of ethical discus- sion generally. Rawls's work, as we shall see, strikingly illustrates this point. And among contemporary Kantian legal rights theorists, one has only to compare Fried and Epstein, who, starting from seemingly identical premises regarding human respect and autonomy, derive quite different policy impli- cations.43 If Dworkin is a "genuine" Kantian, and not simply a utilitarian of the egalitarian school,44 the point is made even more dramatically. How- ever, the fact **that utilitarianism is no more indefinite than competing theo- ries of moral obligation may not reconcile one to utilitarianism, especially one who happens to favor limited government**. Suppose, for example, that Bentham and many other utilitarians are right that lacking any real knowl- edge of the responsiveness of different individuals' happiness to income we should assume that every one is pretty much alike in that respect. Then we need only make one additional, and as it happens plausible, assumption- that of the diminishing marginal utility of money income-to obtain a utilitarian basis for a goal of seeking to equalize incomes. For, on these assumptions, it is easily shown that an equal distribution of income and wealth will produce more happiness than any other distribution,45 unless the costs of achieving and maintaining such a distribution equal or exceed the benefits in greater happiness. The qualification is of course critical, but it places the burden of proof on the opponent of income equalization in an area where proof is notoriously difficult to come by. **The example of income equality illustrates a broader point. If the imprac- ticality of the felicific calculus is taken to justify the utilitarian's use of guesswork, the possibilities for plausible public intervention become vir- tually unlimited**. As a trivial example, from the observation that animals are capable of suffering, it is but a few steps to advocating the prohibition of sport fishing.46 The problem of indefiniteness blends insensibly into a related objection to utilitarian thought: what one might term the perils of instrumentalism. Rights in a utilitarian system are strictly instrumental goods. The only final good is the happiness of the group as a whole. If it is maximized by allowing people to own property and marry as they choose and change jobs and so on, then rights to these things will be given to them, but if happiness could be increased by treating people more like sheep, then rights are out the window. People do not seem to be happier in totalitarian than in democratic states, but if they were, the consistent utilitarian would have to support to- talitarianism. Utilitarianism thus seems to base rights of great importance on no firmer ground than an empirical hunch that they promote "happiness." That hunch cannot be verified by any tools we have or are likely to acquire-though some people will find one bit of evidence or another (e.g., the Berlin Wall) persuasive in buttressing it. **Even within the general framework of the liberal state, utilitarians who are not shy about making bold empirical guesses concerning the distribution of happiness can produce rather monstrous policy recommendations**. An example is Bentham's pro- posal for eliminating begging by enslaving beggars.47 "Moral monstrousness" is in fact a major problem of utilitarianism. Two types of monstrousness may be distinguished. One stems from the utilita- rian's refusal to make moral distinctions among types of pleasure. Suppose that A spends his leisure time pulling wings off flies, while B spends his feeding pigeons, and that because A has a greater capacity for pleasure he derives more happiness from his leisure time than B does from his. Putting aside the unhappiness of the fly-which, if we could measure happiness, would probably be found trivial-the consistent utilitarian would have to judge A a better man than B, because A's activity adds more to the sum of happiness than B's. The other type of moral monstrousness associated with utilitarianism arises from the utilitarian's readiness to sacrifice the innocent individual on the altar of social need. Alan Donagan gives the following example: it might well be the case that more good and less evil would result from your painlessly and undetectedly murdering your malicious, old and unhappy grandfather than from your forbearing to do so: he would be freed from his wretched existence; his children would be rejoiced by their inheritances and would no longer suffer from his mischief; and you might anticipate the reward promised to those who do good in secret. Nobody seriously doubts that a position with such a consequence is mon- strous.48 Donagan is correct, I believe, that a consistent utilitarian would have to reckon the murderer a good man. The utilitarian could, of course, point out that a practice of murdering obnoxious grandfathers would probably reduce happiness. Knowledge of the practice would make grandfathers very un- happy, yet in the long run probably not benefit heirs because the practice would deter people from accumulating estates. But any utilitarian objections to creating an exception to the law of murder for killers of obnoxious grand- fathers have no force at the level of personal morality once it is stipulated that the murder will go undetected. Yet to call the murderer in Donagan's example a "good man" does unacceptable violence to conventional moral notions. Monstrousness is a less serious problem of utilitarianism at the level of social than of personal choice. It is one thing to pick an innocent person at random and kill him to achieve some social end and another to establish an institutional structure-criminal punishment, for example-which makes it inevitable that some innocent people will suffer. No punishment system could be devised that reduced the probability of erroneous conviction to zero. Yet even at the level of social choice, utilitarianism can lead occasion- ally to monstrous results. Suppose there were a group of people who were at once so few relative to the rest of the society, so miserable, and so hated that their extermination would increase the total happiness of the society. The consistent utilitarian would find it hard to denounce extermination in these circumstances although he would be entitled to note the anxiety costs that might be imposed on people who feared they would be exterminated next. As another example, the initial and relatively mild anti-Semitic measures taken by Hitler's government against German Jews conceivably increased the total happiness of the German (and world?) population even though some non- Jews may have feared a precedent for other identifiable minority groups to which they belonged. Conceivably, these initial anti-Semitic measures were morally desirable from a utilitarian standpoint.49 If monstrousness is a peril of utilitarianism, moral squeamishness, or fanaticism, is a peril of Kantian theorists. Bernard Williams poses the case of "Jim," the guest of an officer in a backward country who is about to have a group of political prisoners shot.50 The officer tells Jim that if Jim will shoot one of the prisoners, he will release the others. The extreme Kantian would say that Jim has no obligation to shoot a prisoner because there is a crucial difference between doing evil and failing to prevent evil. This is Williams's position. I regard the asserted distinction as precious in the example. If Jim declines the officer's invitation, all the prisoners will die; if he accepts it, all but one will be saved. There is no trade-off. No one will be better off if Jim declines the invitation; all but one will be worse off.

Utilitarian thinking results in mass murder

Cleveland Professor of Business Administration and Economics 2002 (Cleveland 2002 Paul A., Professor of Business Administration and Economics at Birmingham-Southern College, The Failure of Utilitarian Ethics in Political Economy, The Journal of Private Enterprise, <http://www.independent.org/publications/article.asp?id=1602>)

A final problem with utilitarianism that ought to be mentioned is that it is subject to being criticized because of a potential fallacy of composition. The common good is not necessarily the sum of the interests of individuals. In their book, *A History of Economic Theory and Method*, Ekelund and Hebert provide a well-conceived example to demonstrate this problem. They write: It is presumably in the general interest of American society to have every automobile in the United States equipped with all possible safety devices. However, a majority of individual car buyers may not be willing to pay the cost of such equipment in the form of higher auto prices. In this case, the collective interest does not coincide with the sum of the individual interests. The result is a legislative and economic dilemma. Indeed, individuals prone to political action, and held under the sway of utilitarian ethics, will likely be willing to decide in favor of the supposed collective interest over and against that of the individual. But then, what happens to individual human rights? Are they not sacrificed and set aside as unimportant? In fact, this is precisely what has happened. In democratic countries the destruction of human liberty that has taken place in the past hundred years has occurred primarily for this reason. In addition, such thinking largely served as the justification for the mass murders of millions of innocent people in communist countries where the leaders sought to establish the “workers’ paradise.” To put the matter simply, utilitarianism offers no cohesive way to discern between the various factions competing against one another in political debates and thus fails to provide an adequate guide for ethical human action. The failure of utilitarianism at this point is extremely important for a whole host of policy issues. Among them, the issue of the government’s provision of public goods is worth our consideration.

Consequentialism Bad

Consequentialism, by very nature, will fail in public policy to improve the well-being of others

Scheffler, prof philosophy, Princeton, 94

(Samuel Scheffler, prof philosophy, Princeton, 11/24/94, The Rejection of Consequentialism, p. 14-16, http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=M95w6e9pzZsC&oi=fnd&pg=PA14&dq=reject+consequentialism&ots=hbQFBohbTL&sig=VgDh7pP6sAhJ1IKGaBA3BW7hi1Y)

I will maintain shortly that a hybrid theory which departed from consequentialism only to the extent of incorporating an agent-centred prerogative could accommodate the objection dealing with personal integrity. But first it is necessary to give fuller characterization of a plausible prerogative of this kind. To avoid confusion, it is important to make a sharp distinction at the outset between an agent-centred prerogative and a consequentialist dispensation to devote more attention to one’s own happiness and well-being than to the happiness and well-being of others. Consequentialists often argue that a differential attention to one’s own concerns will in most actual circumstances have the best overall results, and that such differential treatment of oneself is therefore required on consequentialist grounds. Two sorts of considerations are typically appealed to in support of this view. First, it is said that one is in a better position to promote one’s own welfare and the welfare of those one is closest to than to promote the welfare of other people. So an agent produces maximum good per unit of activity by focusing his efforts on those he is closest to, including himself. Second, it is said that human nature being what it is, people cannot function effectively at all unless they devote somewhat more energy to promoting their own well-being than to promoting the well-being of other people. Here the appeal is no longer to the immediate consequantialist advantages of promoting one’s own well-being, but rather to the long-term advantages of having psychologically healthy agents who are efficient producers of the good. We find an example of the first type of argument in Sidgwick’s remark that ‘each man is better able to provide for his own happiness than for that of other persons, from his more intimate knowledge of his own desires and needs, and his greater opportunities of gratifying them.’ Mill, in the same vein, writes that ‘the occasions on which any person (except one in a thousand) has it in his power…to be a public benefactor – are but exceptional; and on these occasions alone is he called on to consider public utility; in every other case, private utility, the interest or happiness of some few persons, is all he has to attend to.’ Sidgwick suggests an argument of the second type when he says that because ‘it is under the stimulus of self-interest that the active energies of most men are most easily and thoroughly drawn out’, it would ‘not under actual circumstances promote the universal happiness if each man were to concern himself with the happiness of others as much as with his own.’

Consequentialism leads to alienation and leaves our life qualities like a machine.

**Railto 1984**

(Peter, John Stephenson Perrin Professor of [Philosophy](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy) at the [University of Michigan](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_Michigan,_Ann_Arbor) Studied Ethics, Philosophy of Science, Political Philosophy  “Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality” Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 13, No. 2. (Spring, 1984), pp. 134-171. Date Accessed: 7/3/11 , <http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0048-3915%28198421%2913%3A2%3C134%3AACATDO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-5>, BTN)

Of course, one has adopted no morality in particular even in adopting consequentialism unless one says what the good is. Let us, then, dwell briefly on axiology One mistake of dominant consequentialist theories, I believe, is their failure to see that things other than subjective states can have intrinsic value. Allied to this is a tendency to reduce all intrinsic values to one-happiness. Both of these features of classical utilitarianism reflect forms of alienation. First, in divorcing subjective states from their objective counterparts, and claiming that we seek the latter exclusively for the sake of the former, utilitarianism cuts us off from the world in a way made graphic by examples such as that of the experience machine, a hypothetical device that can be programmed to provide one with what- ever subjective states he may desire. The experience machine affords us decisive subjective advantages over actual life: few, if any, in actual life think they have achieved all that they could want, but the machine makes possible for each an existence that he cannot distinguish from such a happy state of affairs.19 Despite this striking advantage, most rebel at the notion of the experience machine. As Robert Nozick and others have pointed out, it seems to matter to us what we actually do and are a s well as how Me appears to us.20 We see the point of our lives as bound up with the world and other people in ways not captured by subjectivism, and our sense of loss in contemplating a life tied to a n experience ma- chine, quite literally alienated from the surrounding world, suggests where subjectivism has gone astray. Second, the reduction of all goals to the purely abstract goal of happiness or pleasure, as in hedonistic utht a r i an- ism, treats all other goals instrumentally. Knowledge or friendship may promote happiness, but is it a fair characterization of our commitment to these goals to say that this is the only sense in which they are ultimately valuable? Doesn't the insistence that there is an abstract and uniform goal lying behind all of our ends bespeak a n alienation from these par- ticular ends?

A2 China CP

Perm solvency for China c/p

Longan, 08

(Jeffrey, September 29, Specialist in Energy Policy Resources, Science, and Industry Division, Specialist in Energy Policy, China’s Space Program: Options for U.S.-China Cooperation, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22777.pdf , S.M)

Improved transparency. Regular meetings could help the two nations understand each other’s’ intentions more clearly. Currently, there is mutual uncertainty and mistrust over space goals, resulting in the need for worst-case planning. Offsetting the need for China’s unilateral development. Collaborating with China — instead of isolating it — may keep the country dependent on U.S. technology rather than forcing it to develop technologies alone. This can give the United States leverage in other areas of the relationship. Cost savings. China now has the economic standing to support joint space cooperation.Cost-sharing of joint projects could help NASA achieve its challenging work load in the near future. Some have argued that U.S. space commerce has suffered from the attempt to isolate China while doing little to keep sensitive technology out of China.

Perm solves

Chiao, 08

(Leroy, December 3, Why Should NASA Work With China's Space Agency?, NASA astronaut, entrepreneur, motivational speaker and engineering consultant, <http://dsc.discovery.com/space/my-take/china-space-leroy-chiao.html>, S.M)

At that time I didn't see the point of cooperating with a former enemy and objected to using our nation's space program as a foreign policy tool. I also thought that the Russians were technologically backward. Having grown up during the Cold War, I "knew" these things to be true. It wasn't until I started training as a space station crew member that I came to respect the Russians, their technology and their culture. I soon saw the benefits of using U.S. assets and programs to enhance political friendship.Some will argue that cooperation in space with China would benefit their weapons -- but nothing could be farther from the truth. Nothing in such a cooperative effort would make a ballistic missile more accurate or a nuclear warhead more powerful. In fact, trying to isolate China might motivate them to further develop such technologies.And having been rebuffed by the United States on the space station program, the nation recently announced plans for a space station of their own. In order to loft it into orbit, China is developing the Long March 5 rocket -- a true heavy-lift launcher and the most advanced Chinese rocket ever. If the U.S. had cooperated with China earlier on the ISS, would they have committed their resources to making this 800-metric-ton rocket which, by the way, could also lift huge nuclear warheads?

A new wave of military satellite launches is on the way

Techweb, June 29 2011 (LexisNexis)

The Air Force is preparing to launch the first spy satellite for a new program aimed at sending reconnaissance images and data from space to warfighters more quickly. ORS-1, which is set to take off Wednesday on a Minotaur rocket from a NASA launch range at the Wallops Flight Facility and Mid-Atlantic Regional Spaceport in Virginia, is the first satellite in the Department of Defense's Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) office program. The program--which aims to put a number of small spy satellites into orbit--intends to provide enhanced space operations to help warfighters by responding directly to their needs and creating the technology they request within a short period of time, according to information on an Air Force website.

**Tons of future launches inevitable—The new DoD space strategy is to put tons of small and cheap satellites into space**

Popular Science June 2011

(“The Air Force's New Cheap, Simple Spy Sat Will (Hopefully) Head into Orbit Tonight” http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2011-06/air-forces-new-cheap-simple-spy-sat-will-hopefully-head-orbit-tonight)

The launch marks the culmination of a shift in the way the U.S. military approaches its space recon technology and the strategic and financial costs associated with it. The ORS office has been given the task of shrinking the size and price tag associated with lofting reconnaissance hardware into orbit--a priority that unsurprisingly moved up the AF’s list about the same time China started testing anti-satellite missiles.

The idea is two-fold. For one, cheaper satellites means more satellites, which should eventually translate into satellites that are more responsive to troops on the ground. Right now, any old platoon in Afghanistan can’t just call in a satellite to provide intel on the ground. That will change. And of course, there’s those missiles. The military would like to make it cheaper, easier, and faster to put a satellite into orbit so if one gets shot down by an enemy force, another can quickly replace it. Make the satellites plentiful at a fraction of the cost of the missiles, and satellite warfare becomes uneconomical.

NASA plans on launching space satellites in the next few years.

(Turner Brinton, “NASA Racing To Launch Next Landsat Mission Before 2013”

<http://spacenews.com/civil/110314-nasa-racing-launch-next-landsat-mission-before-2013.html> July 3, 2011, CS)

Brinton ‘11

WASHINGTON — NASA and its industry partners are racing to complete development and launch the next Landsat imaging spacecraft by the end of 2012 to avoid launch range conflicts with several high-priority national missions. The U.S. space agency is formally committed to having the $941 million Landsat Data Continuity Mission (LDCM) ready to launch no later than June 2013. But the program has long been managing to a more aggressive December 2012 target to minimize the chances of the current Landsat craft going dark before LDCM reaches orbit. NASA contracted with United Launch Alliance of Denver in 2009 to launch LDCM in December 2012 from Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif., on an Atlas 5 rocket. Because the Atlas 5 manifest is crowded in 2013 with Defense Department and intelligence community launches, NASA cannot afford to miss the 2012 launch date, according to Steve Volz, the NASA Earth Science Division’s associate director for flight programs. NASA Goddard engineers are also preparing to launch a demonstration mission in 2010-the N-POESS Preparatory Project (NPP)—which will test critical sensors slated to fly on the next-generation of environmental satellites. In addition, NPP will ensure that there are no gaps in important data sets started by NASA’s Terra and Aqua satellites. **Credit:** NASA A new generation of satellites is poised to pick up where the POES satellites will leave off. The new program, called the National Polar Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites System (NPOESS), was created as a cost-saving measure in the 1990s. NPOESS will merge the nation's civilian weather satellite programs with the Department of Defense's Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP). An Integrated Program Office (IPO), located within NOAA, is charged with acquiring, managing, and operating this new series of weather satellites. After the launch of N Prime, NOAA will remain responsible for operating NPOESS satellites through 2026. The Department of Defense will build and launch the series. NASA will be responsible for injecting cost-effective new technology into NPOESS satellites. NPOESS aims to launch its first satellite in 2013. NASA engineers are preparing to launch a demonstration mission in 2010—the N-POESS Preparatory Project (NPP)—which will test critical sensors slated to fly on the NPOESS satellites. The NPP mission will also ensure that there are no gaps in key data sets started by NASA’s Terra and Aqua satellites. re no gaps in key data sets started

**DSCOVR and Triana satellites will be launched by 2013**

(Amy Butler,“Triana Satellite Pulled From Storage For Competitive Test Launch”, Funding and Policy; Pg. 5 Vol. 238 No. 26, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/>, July 3, 2011 CS)

Butler‘11

Air Force officials are proposing in their fiscal 2012 budget plan to fund a launch of a NASA satellite to provide competition for potential new entrants to the rocket market.The service is requesting $135 million in the fiscal 2012 budget, sent to Congress in February, to fund the competition for launching NASA’s Deep Space Climate Observatory (DSCOVR) satellite, says Maj. Gen. John Hyten, director of space programs for the Air Force’s acquisition office. The satellite, formerly known as Triana, was proposed by former Vice President Al Gore while in office to provide a near constant stare at Earth from geosynchronous orbit as well as other scientific data. It was pulled from the ill-fated 2003 Columbia Shuttle mission and shelved thereafter during the George W. Bush administration.Though the satellite would provide scientific data to government users, it is not a critical payload; thus it is suitable for boost in a test launch that poses higher risk than other Pentagon launches.Though the parameters for the competition have not yet been sorted out, Hyten says that the launch will be designed to demonstrate a variety of requirements. «They may have to do an upper stage coast, for example ? That is a very important capability for us – getting into geosynchronous orbits,» he tells Aviation Week. «I would imagine it is going to be a fairly interesting launch.» The satellite was designed for it to operate with a continuous sun-lit view of Earth, which will require for it to be positioned at the Earth’s Lagrangian point roughly 932,000 mi. from the planet.The satellite’s size is suitable for launch on rockets in the United Launch Alliance Delta II or SpaceX Falcon 9 class. Air Force officials say this launch, which the service was directed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense to fund, will provide an opportunity for new entrants, such as the Falcon 9, to compete for work.SpaceX expects to fly its Falcon 9 rocket again in 2013, and the DSCOVR launch is slated for fiscal 2014.Though the winning contractor will earn government financial support for the work, future launches are not guaranteed.Meanwhile, the Air Force, together with NASA and officials from the National Reconnaissance Office (which builds and operates the nation’s classified satellite) is crafting a list of criteria for companies seeking to compete for government launches. Would-be entrants include SpaceX as well as Alliant Techsystems, which is teamed with Astrium to offer a capability using an Ariane 5 core. Others, such as Orbital, are proposing concepts for smaller launch vehicles.

A2 Space Militarization

NASA plans on launching space satellites in the next few years.

Brinton ‘11

(Turner Brinton, “NASA Racing To Launch Next Landsat Mission Before 2013”

<http://spacenews.com/civil/110314-nasa-racing-launch-next-landsat-mission-before-2013.html> July 3, 2011, CS)

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No impact—militarization will be covert—Misty satellites prove that neither the public nor other countries will perceive

Easton 2009

(Ian, Specialist on Chinese Aeronautics at the 2049 Institute, “The Great Game in Space” http://project2049.net/documents/china\_asat\_weapons\_the\_great\_game\_in\_space.pdf)

Electro-Optical Satellites. In terms of imagery intelligence (IMINT) assets, the U.S. is reported to have three operationally deployed 15 ton-plus “Improved Crystal” KH-12 EO reconnaissance satellites, which operate in LEO and are believed to be able to image objects down to centimeters in width. These IMINT platforms are said to be further supplemented by an advanced version of the KH-12 reconnaissance imaging spacecraft codenamed “Misty.” It is reported to utilize a unique stealth technology to evade detection and tracking. Like the KH-12 and other national security satellite platforms, Misty satellites (of which there are thought to have been two launched to date with one currently operational and a third scheduled for launch some time around 2009) are designed to be nuclear war, battle hardened spacecraft.

If the U.S. militarizes space, it will be able to prevent an arms race

Leonard **David**, senior writer for space.com, June 17, 20**05** ( Weapons in Space: Dawn of a New Era, page #1)

For those that think space weaponization is impossible, Dolman said such belief falls into the same camp that "man will never fly". The fact that space weaponization is technically feasible is indisputable, he said, and nowhere challenged by a credible authority. "Space weaponization can work," Dolman said. "It will be very expensive. But the rewards for the state that weaponizes first—and establishes itself at the top of the Earth’s gravity well, garnering all the many advantages that the high ground has always provided in war—will find the benefits worth the costs. "What if America weaponizes space? One would think such an action would kick-start a procession of other nations to follow suit. Dolman said he takes issues with that notion. "This argument comes from the mirror-image analogy that if another state were to weaponize space, well then, the U.S. would have to react. Of course it would! But this is an entirely different situation," Dolman responded. “The U.S. is the world’s most powerful state. The international system looks to it for order. If the U.S. were to weaponize space, it would be perceived as an attempt to maintain or extend its position, in effect, the status quo," Dolman suggested. It is likely that most states—recognizing the vast expense and effort needed to hone their space skills to where America is today—would opt not to bother competing, he said.

Must militarize now to avert future space wars.

Leonard **David**, senior writer for space.com, June 17, 20**05**(Weapons in Space: Dawn of a New Era, page #1)

The time to weaponize and administer space for the good of global commerce is now, when the United States could do so without fear of an arms race there." This is the view of Everett Dolman, Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies in the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama Dolman exp. No peer competitors are capable of challenging the United States Dolman explained, as was the case in the Cold War, and so no "race" is possible. The longer the United States waits, however, the more opportunities for a peer competitor to show up on the scene. Dolman argues that, in ten or twenty years, America might be confronting an active space power that could weaponize.

Space Mil threats are exaggerated

DeBlois 98

(Lt Col Bruce M. DeBlois, BS, MS, Union College; PhD, Oxford University, division chief of Strategic Studies and Assessments at the National Reconnaissance Office, Chantilly, Virginia, Space Sanctuary: A Viable NationalStrategy,AerospacePowerJournal-Winter1998, <http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj98/win98/deblois.html>, 7-3-11, DS)

All told, the story of proliferated space access and exploitation in the near future is grossly exaggerated. Since the beginning of the space age, we have readily assumed away the very many technical and political difficulties associated with access to and movement in space. It is a natural thing to do—the skies were readily conquered; why not space? Visions of Buck Rogers “flying” through space reinforce the natural, albeit false, analogy between the conquest of air and space—hence the misnomer spaceflight. This optimism is part of our American heritage. Although it is a positive motivator of our inevitable move into space, it must not cloud rational decisions.

**US doesn’t have the tech to weaponize space**

DeBlois 98

(Lt Col Bruce M. DeBlois, BS, MS, Union College; PhD, Oxford University, division chief of Strategic Studies and Assessments at the National Reconnaissance Office, Chantilly, Virginia, Space Sanctuary: A Viable NationalStrategy,AerospacePowerJournal-Winter1998, <http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj98/win98/deblois.html>, 7-3-11, DS)

Much of the space-weaponization argument hinges upon an assumed capability, given proper investment. Such “technological optimism” warrants a second look. As noted by a distinguished scientist, “Scientists and engineers now know how to build a station in space that would circle the Earth 1,075 miles up. . . . Within the next 10 or 15 years, the Earth will have a new companion in the skies, a man-made satellite that could be either the greatest force for peace ever devised, or one of the most terrible weapons of war—depending on who makes and controls it.”24 Surprisingly, the distinguished scientist is the father of the space rocket, Wernher von Braun, and the year he made this unrealized statement was 1952. More recently, space-shuttle design plans of the 1970s called for 160-hour turnaround times and a minimal-maintenance concept requiring three or four technicians.25 Obviously, we have not attained anything close to this vision either. Such optimistic projections on the future uses of space have been around since the beginning of the US space program, and that tradition continues today. We should remain cautious on several counts:

**No one will authorize Space weapon usage**

DeBlois 98

(Lt Col Bruce M. DeBlois, BS, MS, Union College; PhD, Oxford University, division chief of Strategic Studies and Assessments at the National Reconnaissance Office, Chantilly, Virginia, Space Sanctuary: A Viable NationalStrategy,AerospacePowerJournal-Winter1998, <http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj98/win98/deblois.html>, 7-3-11, DS)

More than being a lot cheaper than a space-weapons strategy, space-sanctuary strategy in practice has many advantages as it relates to global commerce. Space weapons are economically provocative because they can appear to threaten that commerce. During a conflict, distinguishing space friend from space foe would prove difficult since most nations do not overtly “flag” their satellites. Additionally, a number of satellites have many roles and are possessions of many nations. Discriminating impartial, commercial space assets from adversarial space assets will be problematic. Furthermore, even in the event that one can isolate adversarial space assets, the collateral effects of space debris32 will be extremely difficult to control. One cannot posit the benefits of having space-weapons capability without logically thinking through all the ramifications of using them. Given the multinational commercialization of space that is being pursued far more intensely than a weapons program could be, it is very doubtful that the political arm would ever authorize the use of space weapons even if the United States possessed them. Why, then, should we pursue a huge investment toward a suboptimal space-weapons strategy—while the better space-sanctuary strategy is overlooked? Probably because such a strategy comes across as a weak, “do-nothing” approach, something disdainful to American military leaders. On the contrary, though, actively pursuing space sanctuary does not need to be a “sit-on-your hands” approach to national strategy.

Space weapons won’t be used. Terrestrial systems better

DeBlois 98

(Lt Col Bruce M. DeBlois, BS, MS, Union College; PhD, Oxford University, division chief of Strategic Studies and Assessments at the National Reconnaissance Office, Chantilly, Virginia, Space Sanctuary: A Viable NationalStrategy,AerospacePowerJournal-Winter1998, <http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj98/win98/deblois.html>, 7-3-11, DS)

space-weaponization strategies lack the element of survivability. Space systems will not survive if they are targeted. Military systems in space, like all others, follow well-established, fixed orbits (orbital transfers are energy- and cost-prohibitive). This leaves space systems exposed and vulnerable. As predominantly unmanned systems, they also require data link to a controller, leaving them vulnerable to interference in the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum. For instance, a nuclear explosion in space—with force and radiation not attenuated by the atmosphere—could negate the use of vast numbers of orbits. Or direct-ascent ASATs, constructed from modified cold war ICBMs, could disperse something as simple as sand in LEO, leaving anything passing through it (17,000 MPH @ 200 km) severely damaged or destroyed. Many futuristic war games are conducted throughout DOD each year, and the play of space systems has increased. One conclusion persists: the fight for space is first and fast, and many space systems do not survive. As space access matures, the survivability issue will become obvious. Nations will not rely on space systems for crisis situations—they will rely on terrestrial systems (perhaps redundant with more efficient but more vulnerable space counterparts). Hence, the value of space weapons to deny those space systems will be moot.

Space militarization is not in the US best interest.

DeBlois 98

(Lt Col Bruce M. DeBlois, BS, MS, Union College; PhD, Oxford University, division chief of Strategic Studies and Assessments at the National Reconnaissance Office, Chantilly, Virginia, Space Sanctuary: A Viable NationalStrategy,AerospacePowerJournal-Winter1998, <http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj98/win98/deblois.html>, 7-3-11, DS)

Much of the literature flowing from the Department of Defense (DOD) on space and its role for future military operations makes a fundamental assumption: “Space will be weaponized; we only need to decide if the US will take the lead.”2 One cannot so readily make such an assumption. The immediate military advantages of being the first nation to weaponize space are undeniable3 but must be weighed against long-term military costs, as well as against broader social, political, and economic costs. The decision to weaponize space does not lie within the military (seeking short-term military advantage in support of national security) but at the higher level of national policy (seeking long-term national security, economic well-being, and worldwide legitimacy of US constitutional values). At that level, many reasons suggest why the weaponization of space may not be the obvious “best” strategy.

The US lacks political will to militarize Space

DeBlois 98

(Lt Col Bruce M. DeBlois, BS, MS, Union College; PhD, Oxford University, division chief of Strategic Studies and Assessments at the National Reconnaissance Office, Chantilly, Virginia, Space Sanctuary: A Viable NationalStrategy,AerospacePowerJournal-Winter1998, <http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj98/win98/deblois.html>, 7-3-11, DS)

Almost every military theorist from Carl von Clausewitz to B. H. Liddell Hart recognizes that the legitimacy of a military institution is predicated upon its connection with its supporting political instrument. The US Constitution is not subtle in its support of this concept. The fact that there is absolutely no political will to weaponize space calls into question the relevance of any plans to do so. The current administration12 has been clear on its position regarding space, as evidenced in the opening statement of President Clinton’s national space policy: “The United States is committed to the exploration and use of outer space by all nations for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of all humanity.”13 The second statement in that same policy allows for defense and intelligence-related activities in pursuit of national security, but the intent is clearly at odds with current military thrusts for defensive and offensive space systems. Actions of the current administration have been stronger than its predecessors toward maintaining space sanctuary. Even space-weapons research and development efforts short of operational employment, traditionally used to hedge against emerging threats, have been derailed and replaced by terrestrial-based systems.14 This lack of American political will to weaponize space is both a result of and adds credence to the remainder of this space-sanctuary argument.

US won’t militarize space, it’s not who we are

DeBlois 98

(Lt Col Bruce M. DeBlois, BS, MS, Union College; PhD, Oxford University, division chief of Strategic Studies and Assessments at the National Reconnaissance Office, Chantilly, Virginia, Space Sanctuary: A Viable NationalStrategy,AerospacePowerJournal-Winter1998, <http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj98/win98/deblois.html>, 7-3-11, DS)

The United States exports its national values of individual freedoms and democracy and maintains a pattern of not bullying other nations into accepting these ideals. The expectation is that the inherent worth of the ideals is self-evident. Maintaining the moral high-ground in order to support this pattern is essential, even if it requires the United States to take some risks. Historically, it has taken such risks. Not responding in kind to the operational Russian ASAT is one case. More recently, the United States signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (ratified in the US Senate in April 1997) even though Russia, Libya, and Iraq refused to sign.10 Why give potential adversaries such a military advantage? The answer is reputation. The idea of putting weapons in space to dominate the globe is simply not compatible with who we are and what we represent as Americans.11

US won’t militarize Space b/c wants to protect ISR.

DeBlois 98

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(ISR = intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance)

Some foreign ISR threat has existed for many years. As mentioned above, the calculus was accomplished, and the historical pattern of US policy decisions has supported the conclusions that the gains from our own space– ISR/MCG/Comm capability outweigh what we stand to lose from others’ space–ISR/ MCG/Comm capability. The best way to secure that advantage has been to pursue space sanctuary. Arguments that support weaponization often cite the emergence of foreign space-ISR capabilities; yet, the proliferation of worldwide space-ISR capability is stabilizing. Only aggressive nations—with something to hide—would take exception to being monitored. Additionally, concealment, communications and operations security, and deception are all means by which the United States can counter foreign space-ISR, if and when we so choose. In the event of conflict, active measures also include ISR and communications jamming and/or attacks against ground stations (the true vulnerability of any space architecture). While foreign ISR capability is proliferating, one must perceive it as what it is, for the most part—a stabilizing global pattern of watchfulness. Besides, it is not simply a matter of what data one can access from space but, more importantly, what one can do with the data that is accessed. The United States is by no means surrendering its lead on data processing and exploitation. The fact that a third world actor has access to space reconnaissance data should not be alarming, since it must be weighed against the huge, coordinated intelligence infrastructure (tasking, collection, processing, exploitation, dissemination, and archives) possessed and being further developed by the United States. In short, one can use less provocative means than preemptive weaponization to deal with minor gains made on US access to space data. These minor gains on data access may simply be the price of peace.

Space weapons will inevitably be deployed for defense

Oberg 1 [Jim, NBC News 'Space Consultant', previous space engineer for NASA, Space Power Theory. Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Air University]

It is almost certain that sometime early in the 21st Century, the fielding of space-based weapons will occur under the auspices of defense, in much the same manner as the nuclear weapon buildup that occurred within the latter half of the 20th. And, like nuclear weapons, once fielded, there will be no reversing course. This too is an historical lesson of warfare. As the world now grapples with the proliferation of nuclear weapons that were once the province of superpowers, so too will it see the initial weaponization of space be followed by increasingly sophisticated armaments as proliferation occurs there as well. A sobering thought is the prospect that as launch costs go down per unit of mass, the opportunity for other actors to put weapons into orbit about the Earth will go up.

Space mil inevitable- military doctrine

Deblois 3 [Bruce M, Director of Systems Integration at BAE SYSTEMS, “The Advent of Space Weapons”, Astropolitics, Vol 1, No 1, Summer]

Seizing the high ground is a military doctrinal precept as old as warfare itself. As technology opens the new high ground of space and offers the means to exploit it, sound doctrinal development would be grossly remiss to overlook it. Simply put, the coupling of advanced technologies with well-intended and effective military doctrine development will inevitably lead to the acquisition of space weapons. In addition to the power of top-down policy leadership, forces outside the control of high-level policy makers will also drive the acquisition of space weapons. In some circumstances, the institutions involved in the planning processes -- including scientific laboratories, administrative divisions and military consumers -- apply significant pressure outside their formal areas of expertise or responsibility. In explaining one motivation for countries to acquire nuclear weapons, Scott Sagan explains: 'bureaucratic actors are not passive recipients of top-down political decisions; instead, they create the conditions that favor weapons acquisition'. Today we find ourselves in a situation with an absence of clear top-down policy guidance on space weapons, and in such a case, military doctrine can build an inertia of its own, and impact -- or even become -- the default p

Politics – General Defense

Opposition by politicians won’t stop space exploration

Kelly Jun. 24, 2011

(Kelley John, has spent eight years covering the space industry for FLORIDA TODAY, Politics won’t stop space innovation: despite bureaucracy surrounding NASA, visionaries will push forward on space exploration, Jun. 24, 2011,<http://www.floridatoday.com/article/20110626/COLUMNISTS0405/106260312/John-Kelly-Politics-won-t-stop-space-innovation> v.c)

Human curiosity can't be contained. The desire to explore is strong. The longing of innovators and visionaries to venture deeper into our solar system, and beyond, will not be derailed by the political paralysis plaguing the nation's space agency. While NASA studies, starts, cancels -- then restudies and restarts again -- efforts to continue human space exploration, it may seem progress is stymied. The cycle of fits-and-starts development has some losing hope NASA can be the group to, as Captain Kirk said, "go boldly where no man has gone before."The agency is under assault from Congress for not fielding a shuttle follow-up program. The politicos are too focused on micromanaging the "ship-building" or, more specifically, rocketship-building that best benefits their state or district or -- cynics might say -- their favorite contractors. Little of their guidance seems focused on what makes the most sense for the United States or humankind. The big contractors armed with the brightest minds and most experienced aerospace engineers are stuck lobbying politicians and bureaucrats to protect their piece of a multibillion dollar pie, often it seems at the expense of what might make the most long-term sense engineering wise. NASA purports to spurring competitive innovation, but the dollars devoted to that kind of "commercial" space work are chump change compared to the billions ball-and-chained to old-school projects and contractors. Worry not. Innovation will escape those shackles.

Space innovation won’t be contained by bureaucracy

Kelly Jun. 24, 2011

(Kelley John, has spent eight years covering the space industry for FLORIDA TODAY, Politicswon’t stop space innovation: despite bureaucracy surrounding NASA, visionaries will push forward on space exploration, Jun. 24, 2011,<http://www.floridatoday.com/article/20110626/COLUMNISTS0405/106260312/John-Kelly-Politics-won-t-stop-space-innovation> v.c)

One public sign of the Pentagon's interest in revolutionizing space flight is its recent work on an unmanned mini-shuttle (one that basically builds on a project NASA helped develop and then gave up on, obviously prematurely).A bigger one is a new century-long, Nobel Prize-style project called the 100-Year Starship Study. The military's secretive skunk-works arm and NASA's most innovative center -- Ames Research Center near Silicon Valley -- are trying to spur private companies, scientists and even government experts to tackle the big technological questions tied to development of a spaceship that could visit another star system. They're not focusing on how to land on the moon -- again -- or even on desolate Mars. They're chasing the big stuff. Finding Earth-like, life-supporting planets around other stars. Trying to "communicate" with those planets. How people might survive years-long treks in space. Propulsion systems more akin to Star Trek and Star Wars than incremental upgrades to existing technology. They're shooting for figuring out how to send people to another solar system. So don't lose hope for space exploration while you watch NASA and the politicians dawdle and fight. There are people out there; even some within NASA, whose need to innovate won't be contained by the bureaucracy.

Politics Link Turns - Mars

The Republicans’ long term plan is to go to Mars.

RNC 2008

(The National Republican Committee, Platform 2008, Date Accessed: 7/3/11, [http://www.gop.com/2008Platform/Econ omy.htm](http://www.gop.com/2008Platform/Econ%20omy.htm) BTN)

Innovation is our future – in our approach to energy, to education, to health care, and especially to government. As a symbol of that commitment, we share the vision of returning Americans to the moon as a step toward a mission to Mars. In advancing our country’s space and aeronautics program, NASA will remain one of the world’s most important pioneers in technology, and from its explorations can come tremendous benefits for mankind.

Mars popular with public: voters attentive to and interested in space favor the plan—they are the most energized public group with the most influence

Zubrin 1996

(Robert, Founder of Mars Society, The Case for Mars, page 277)

Other forms of statistical data have been collected as well. For a number of years, Jon D. Miller of the Chicago Academy of Sciences has reported on the public understanding of science and technology in the United States." Included in his reports are examinations of that sector of the population termed the "attentive public" to various science and technology issues. The attentive public is that group of individuals who are interested in a specific issue, who feel they are well informed about the issue, and stay current by regularly reading news- papers or magazines. They are informed enough to feel comfortable and confident in perhaps contacting a policymaker on the issue. In other words, the attentive public for an issue is that portion of the public that might be most prone to take action to support, or oppose, an issue. Those who are interested in an issue, but don't believe they are terribly well-informed, Miller classifies as the "interested public." From data collected in 1992, Miller concluded that 6 percent of the American public was attentive to space exploration, and an additional 16 percent were interested in the subject. According to Miller, the large majority of those 22 percent were found to believe that the ben- efits of space exploration outweigh its costs. Twenty-two percent is still a minority. But Miller also found that his "attentive" group had the highest proportion of scientifically literate individuals among its members, and was one of the best educated groups in his study of the u.s. population as a whole.

In other words, Miller's attentive group maps strongly onto the scientific minds of the country, and it is not a small group. The 6 percent Miller identifies as attentive to space represents nearly 11 million adult citizens, and the interested public forms a pool of nearly 30 million citizens. Together they total more than 40 million potential adult voters.

Mission to Mars would be a MASSIVE win

Zubrin 1996

(Robert, Founder of Mars Society, The Case for Mars, page 278)

In other words, Miller's attentive group maps strongly onto the scientific minds of the country, and it is not a small group. The 6 percent Miller identifies as attentive to space represents nearly 11 million adult citizens, and the interested public forms a pool of nearly 30 million citizens. Together they total more than 40 million potential adult voters. In short I believe, and there is every reason to believe, that if an American leader stood up GikeJ.F.K re the Moon) and called for a humans-to-Mars program, and then stood by his guns to fight for the program and rally support, he would find himself leading a growing political juggernaut, just as Kennedy did in the early 1960s. The Mars program proposed would have to be technically and politically sound. A $450 billion price tag coupled to a thirty-year timeline can turn any proposal into a political albatross, but as we've seen, using a plan like Mars Direct, we can get to the Red Planet much cheaper and much quicker.

Public supports Mission to Mars DESPITE the state of the economy

Political Hotsheet, 2009

(“Poll: Americans Say U.S. Should Go To Mars”, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544\_162-5173978-503544.html)

A slim majority of Americans believe the United States should send astronauts to Mars despite the current economic crisis, a newly-released CBS News poll finds.

Fifty-one percent of those surveyed back the journey to Mars. Forty-three percent opposed it. In 2004, 48 percent said the U.S. should send astronauts to Mars, while in 1999 that figure was 58 percent.

Politics Link Turns – District 9

**Alien policy is popular and respected by the public and congress—there has been a SEA CHANGE of support**

New York Times, July 8 2003 (LexisNexis)

Astronomers around SETI and elsewhere said NASA and Congress had recently shown warming attitudes toward the politically embattled subject of intelligent life Out There. Dr. Martin Rees, a cosmologist at the University of Cambridge in England, used an e-mail message to attribute the change partly to growing scientific interest in extraterrestrial biology and the origins of life, as well as, perhaps, "the growing visibility and manifest professionalism of the SETI Institute."

The issue is so important, Dr. Rees said, that "even though the chances of success are exceedingly low, it's worth a moderate effort."

Dr. Michael Turner, an astrophysicist at the University of Chicago, used a football analogy to describe the odds, saying, "SETI is definitely throwing deep, and oh what a touchdown it would be!"Astronomers who testified two years ago to a House subcommittee on space and aeronautics reported that members seemed to support SETI. According to the journal Nature, Representative Lamar Smith, the Texas Republican who called the hearing, said the discovery of life elsewhere in the universe would be "one of the most astounding discoveries in human history.""Funding should match public interest," Mr. Smith said, "and I don't believe it does."

In recent years, the reports from the National Academy of Sciences have endorsed the idea of SETI, and the institute itself, once advised to change its name, has become a respected "brand" in astrobiology, said Dr. Drake, as evidenced by the recent announcement. "All of this is indeed a major sea change," he said.

Republicans want leadership in space

Pew Research Center, June 30, 2011

**(**Pew Research Center for the People & the PressMajority Sees U.S. Leadership in Space as EssentialShuttle Program Viewed as Good Investment , June 30, 2011, <http://people-press.org/2011/06/30/majority-sees-u-s-leadership-in-space-as-essential/2/> **v.c)**

Majorities in nearly all demographic groups say it is essential that the U.S. continue to be at the vanguard of space exploration. And partisan groups largely agree that American leadership is vital, although this view is more prevalent among Republicans. Two-thirds of Republicans (67%) say the nation must continue to play an international leadership role in space exploration; smaller majorities of Democrats (54%) and independents (57%) say this. As the shuttle program comes to a close 30 years after its first mission, 55% of Americans think the program has been a good investment for the country; 36% do not think so. In August 1981, four months after the first shuttle flight, 66% said the program was a good investment. About two-thirds of college graduates (66%) say the shuttle program has been a good investment, as does a smaller majority of those with some college education (57%). Among those with no college experience, assessments of the value of the shuttle program are more mixed:  47% say it has been a good investment, while 43% say it has not. Americans with annual family incomes of $75,000 or more give more positive evaluations to the shuttle program than those with lower incomes. By greater than two-to-one those with higher incomes say the program has been a good investment (67% good vs. 27% not good); those with annual incomes of less than $30,000 are divided in their views (44% good, 47% not good). And while about six-in-ten Republicans (63%) and independents (60%) say the program has been a good investment, Democrats are more muted in their appraisals (48% good investment).

Plan is a win

Washington, Feb 8

(Reps. Posey, Adams and Bishop Join Colleagues in Calling on House Leaders to Reprioritize NASA for Human Space Flight Missions, Drop Climate Change, Feb 8,2011 <http://www.posey.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=224016> v.c)

As House leaders examine ways to cut spending and address the ever growing budget deficits that have plagued Washington for years, U.S. Representatives Bill Posey (R-FL), Sandy Adams (R-FL) and Rob Bishop (R-UT) were joined by several other of their colleagues in calling for a reprioritization of NASA so human space flight remains the primary focus of the nation’s space agency as budget cuts are considered.In their recent letter to House Appropriations Committee Chairman Harold Rogers (R-KY) and Commerce, Justice, and Science Subcommittee Chairman Frank Wolf (R-VA), Posey, Adams and Bishop state that while “moving forward under a constrained budget, it will be critical for the Appropriations Committee to produce legislation that is precise in its budget cuts. For years, Presidents and Congress have charged NASA with completing tasks that fall outside the scope of NASA’s primary mission.“Limited resources force us to make important decisions with regard to the objectives of all federal departments and agencies, including NASA,” said Representative Bill Posey (R-FL). “NASA’s primary purpose is human space exploration and directing NASA funds to study global warming undermines our ability to maintain our competitive edge in human space flight.”“It is counterintuitive to direct millions of dollars to NASA for duplicative climate change programs and at the same time cancel its manned space flight program — the purpose for which the agency was originally created. Far too many forget that at one time in our nation’s history we were losing the space race. With the creation of NASA, we emerged as leaders and have remained so ever since. If NASA’s manned space program disappears, our nation will once again experience a ‘Sputnik Moment.’ Our country will again watch from the sidelines as countries like Russia, China and India charge ahead as leaders in space exploration and missile defense,” said Representative Rob Bishop (R-UT).

The public believes in UFO’s

Pinotti, 1990

[Roberto Pinotti, Degree in Political Science/Applied Sociology at the University of Florence's College of political science, “SPACE POLICY”, “ETI, SETI and today's public” May 1990, July 3, 2011,LMM]

Today it is more and more evident to anyone who deals with the public on these subjects that the question of extraterrestrial life is inseparable from the question of unidentified flying objects (UFOs) in the public mind. In 1982 Dr David W. Swift, professor of sociology at the University of Hawaii, wrote he was sure belief in extraterrestrial

intelligence (ETI) and UFOs is strongest in the most influential stratum of the population in the USA, that is, among better-informed, higher- income people. This opinion has been confirmed by opinion polls. In March 1987, in a Gallup survey, 50% of US adults expressed the belief that there are 'people somewhat like ourselves living on other planets in the universe', while only 34% were skeptical and 16% unsure. These figures are virtually unchanged from those recorded in a previous 978 survey of the same kind (with 51% expressing their belief in extraterrestrial life, 33% denying this possibility and 16% unsure), but considerably more people now than in either 1973 or 1966 believe in the existence of extraterrestrial beings (46% and 34% of believers, 38% and 46% of skeptics and 16% and 20% of unsure subjects respectively). Similarly, today 49% of those who have heard or read about UFOs

think they are real, while 30% are doubtful and 21% uncertain. This means that belief in UFOs is down slightly from its peak in 1978, when 57% of US citizens thought they were real, only 27% considered them imaginary and 16% were unsure. Today's percentages fall between the results of the 1973 and 1966 polls, which yielded 54% and 46% of believers, 30% and 29% of skeptics and 16% and 25% of unsure subjects respectively. These figures show an evident consolidation of the opinion of one-half of the US public in its belief in both ETI and UFOs (50% and

49% respectively), while only one-third still deny their existence.

President Reagan's words prove that the ETI concept is increasingly being absorbed by today’s world

Pinotti, 1990

[Roberto Pinotti, Degree in Political Science/Applied Sociology at the University of Florence's College of political science, “SPACE POLICY”, “ETI, SETI and today's public” May 1990, July 3, 2011,LMM]

President Reagan's words prove that the ETI concept is increasingly being absorbed by today's world. A reaction of mass hysteria of the same uncontrollable type as occurred in 1938 when Orson Welles's programme The Invasion from Mars was broadcast over the radio in the USA would probably not occur today, thanks to all the science-fiction films and extraterrestrial video programmes of the past two decades. In

particular, since 1977 the tremendous success of certain Hollywood SF productions such as Close Encounters of the Third Kind and ET, the Extraterrestrial by Steven Spielberg, Starman by John Carpenter and Cocoon by Ron Howard, all depicting 'good' aliens with the hopeful message 'We are not alone', modified the public's feelings in a positive sense, and unconfessed fear was replaced by hope. Besides, popular interest in UFOs originated a definite interaction between the general impact of SF movies and UFOs, reducing the possibility of negative consequences.

Several national polls over the years have clearly indicated that belief in UFOs is correlated with education and income

[Roberto Pinotti, Degree in Political Science/Applied Sociology at the University of Florence's College of political science, “SPACE POLICY”, “ETI, SETI and today's public” May 1990, July 3, 2011,LMM]

In other words, Dr Swift's opinion proved to be extremely accurate. This should be no surprise. Several national polls over the years have clearly indicated that belief in UFOs is correlated with education and income. If it were all a matter of credulity, superstition and ignorance, one would certainly expect an inverse correlation. A number of scientists have pointed out that belief in such borderline subjects as UFOs, extrasensory perception (ESP), Kirlian photography and so on can be described as an effort to substitute new scientific certainties for the old religious certainties that science has undermined. It has often been remarked that ufologists believe that the Earth is being watched by beings from the heavens who have remarkable powers and who could save humanity from its present plight; the conclusion of the hit movie Close Encounters" of the Third Kind surely emphasized the religious tinge to UFO belief. Erich Von Dfinikcn himself has underlined that the present religious uncertainty is a major reason for the worldwide success of all his books since Chariots of the (7o&?, describing purported ancient astronauts as 'gods' later deified bv our primitive ancestors. 'It must be noted', as award-winning New York Daily News science editor Edward Edelson remarks, that the same sort of faith is at the root of SETI ]Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence]. If a SETI program on Earth is to succeed in making contact with another civilization, that civilization will have to be very advanced, in ways that go far beyond its technology. But even leaving any tinge of religion out of the discussion, the belief that such a civilization could exist is an act of faith in humanity. It is belief that a civilization like ours can break through all the problems that now threaten not only to bring our technological society to its knees but also to destroy the human race. The SETI community wants the human race to assume that such a positive breakthough has taken place elsewhere in the galaxy. It is stated in almost so many words by people in SETI that contact with such a civilization is almost certain to transform mankind..

Kritik Link – Quid Pro Quo

Reciprocity used in international relations is used for control

Larson 88

(Deborah Welch. *UCLA Professor of Political Science*. The psychology of reciprocity in international relations. [Volume 4, Number 3](http://www.springerlink.com/content/0748-4526/4/3/), 281-301. Accessed 7/3/11. EL)

**World politics is** commonly referred to as **anarchic**, meaning that it lacks a common government. Yet a Hobbesian "war of all against all" does not usually ensue: even sovereign governments that recognize no common authority may engage in limited cooperation. **The anarchic structure of world politics does mean**, however, **that the achievement of cooperation can depend neither on deference to hierarchical authority nor on centralized enforcement.** On the contrary, if cooperation is to emerge, whatever produces it must be consistent with the principles of sovereignty and self-help. Reciprocity is consistent with these principles: as Elizabeth Zoller declares, it "is a condition theoretically attached to every legal norm of international law."2 Reciprocity is also often invoked as an appropriate standard of behavior which can produce cooperation among sovereign states. This is true in international trade, where **reciprocity is a central norm** of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),3 as well as **in political relations between the superpowers.** The Basic Principles Agreement signed in Moscow in May1972 by Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev provided that "discussions and negotiations on outstanding issues" **between the United States and the Soviet Union would "be conducted in a spirit of reciprocity, mutual accommodation and mutual benefit.**"4 Nine years later, President Ronald Reagan declared that the Soviet-American relationship must be based upon "restraint and reciprocity."5 In a speech to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations in March 1984, Senator Gary Hart, campaigning for the Democratic presidential nomination, declared that reciprocity would be one of three major foreign-policy themes for his administration**.** This praise for reciprocity by political leaders has recently been echoed by scholars. Robert Axelrod has advised people and **governments** to **practice and teach reciprocity in order to foster cooperation**.7 Convinced by his arguments, I declared two years ago that **reciprocity "seems to be the most effective strategy for maintaining cooperation among egoists.**"8 This applause for reciprocity by politicians and scholars may seem impressive. Yet whenever a concept in international relations becomes popular, particularly as a remedy for conflict, we should be cautious**. The current enthusiasm for reciprocity resembles the revival of balance-of-power thinking in the United States after World War II**. At that time scholars such as Ernst B. Haas and Inis Claude pointed out that **the balance of power could be a useful tool for understanding international relations, or a worth while guide for determining policy**, only if analysts distinguished its various meanings clearly from one another. As Claude put it, " 'Balance of power' is to writers on international relations as 'a pinch of salt' is to cooks, 'stellar southpaw' to baseball writers, and 'dialectical materialism' to Marxist theoreticians."9 **The concept of balance of power** had by then lost much analytical value because it **had been used in many confusing ways: like "national security,"** it had become, in Arnold Wolfers's words, **an "ambiguous symbol."** Wolfers pointed out that **"when political formulas such as 'national interest'** or 'national security' **gain popularity they need to be scrutinized with particular care."**

Kritik Link – Occularcentrism

**The transcendence of the earth’s atmosphere will put humans in a particular viewing position that risks false conceptions of the Earth and it’s Earthlings due to an imperialist form of vision.**

**Redfield in ’93** (Peter, A.B.  Harvard University 1987, M.A. U.C. Berkeley 1989, Ph.D. U.C. Berkeley 1995, Anthropology of Science and Technology; Humanitarianism and Human Rights; Colonial History and Postcolonial Relations; Ethics, Nonprofit Organizations and Transnational Experts; Europe; French Guiana; Uganda, “The Half-Life Empire in Outer Space page 810-812, MDA)

What then to say about those space enthusiasts, dreaming of their extraterrestrial networks?  By surpassing the globe would they really leave it behind?  In an essay first written in the midst of Space Race fervor, Hannah Arendt (1978 [1968]) wonders what the “conquest of space” might do to the “stature of man”.  Her hope is for a renewed appreciation of the earth as “the centre and home of mortal men”, and a recognition of “factual morality” among the conditional limits framing science.  Her fear is of a reduction of technology to a biological process, and language to the “extreme and in itself meaningless formalism of mathematical signs” which would not merely lower the “stature of man” but actively destroy it [Arendt (1978 [1968]): 279-80].  Amid its anachronistic language and European humanist frame, the essay identifies a crucial aspect of space exploration: the promise of achieving an Archimedean point of sorts, a position beyond the earth from which to survey the planet itself, a location with clear relational implications.  The prospect worries Arendt, for she sees the promise as an incomplete one that will be falsely read as an affirmation of power and a transcendence of limits.  Once beyond the atmosphere, humans would imagine themselves to be beyond themselves, and thus lose sight of where they are.  Quoting Franz Kafka, Arendt writes that man “found the Archimedean point, but he uses it against himself; it seems he was permitted to find it only under this condition” [Arendt (1978 [1968]):278].  Four decades later, thinking about a small road in the tropics, Arendt’s fears read somewhat differently.  For all of the dreams of the world’s space agencies, the mythic allusions in rocket and programme names, the indomitable enthusiasm of space aficionados, the multiple imagination of science fiction, and even the farce of the worlds’ first space tourist, human spaceflight has yet really to move beyond the earth.  In the absence of the sure reflection of either a god or an alien above, meaning is still measured from below.  The point is not simply abstract.  As the sky fills with satellites, the prospect of extraterrestrial perspective actively materializes allowing the production and consumption of distinctly global images in support of such diverse causes as corporate profits, environmental awareness and sustainable development.  At the same time, however, the import of Kafka’s phrase shifts along with the expanding field of vision.  For whom and against whom has this partial transcendence been used – which humans and nonhumans, when and where?  Surely the legacy of imperial vision must be incorporated in the act of looking down.  Surely past perspectives of differing elevations, past patterns of contest and association are not simply translated or combined.  Under the bright light of a higher lens, the “man” of Arendt’s essay splits asunder, not only through the acceleration of instrumental reason and its lurch beyond the atmosphere, but also through the widening and lowering of a frame of historical reference to include human difference.  However much astronauts may still try to birth a singular human in the sky, that new being faces multiple demands of ancestry.

Development Discourse Bad

Additionally, development is the single most important tool in perpetuating global capitalism

Michaela Guerin **Hackner**, M.A. Candidate, April 26, **2004** [“Shaping International Development Discourse: The Embeddedness of Economic Theory and Policy Reform,” online, http://www3.georgetown.edu/grad/cct/academics/theses/MichaelaHackner.pdf.]

**Despite the liberating potential of development practices, the power struggle inherent in the discourse has often framed the development discipline with hegemonic intent, according to which the developed world directs the evolution of the developing world, based on its own capitalism-driven success story**. Hegemony is the means by which a dominant social class organizes its rule so it seems natural to its subjects.. Hegemony is not necessarily intentional. Rather it is inherent in the relationships between the powerful and the powerless. As described by Moore: International development agencies and university programs in development studies have made no small contribution to the hegemony of capitalism on a global scale. Most of the people who work within them have promoted the “moral and intellectual leadership,” of the classes who preside over the global political economy (1995, 5). **Ruling groups exercise power not only through their actions, but also by creating the dominant ideas, representations, and discourses that frame the world in terms of “European categories, captured social imaginaries, and constructed identities**.” Globalization combined with hegemony can be a lethal combination insofar as agendas of the powerful permeate the discourse and legitimize otherwise unfounded development approaches. An honest debate about theory can be misshapen when academics involved in making policy recommendations become politicized and start to bend the evidence to fit the idea of those in charge. Describing the way that Western hegemony has permeated the development discourse, Peet and Hartwick note, “**The Western dream of progress became a hegemonic global imagination.**” Moore likewise criticizes this negative aspect of discourse: It may well be that **the simple insertion of the word “development” into the lexicon of legitimacy for global capitalism is the single most important facet of its hegemonic project: the notion of development adds much luster to the dream pursued by most of the world today.** But the lure of benign and munificent capitalism is still held out. Most of those who work in the many offices and agencies of development are still busily extending the bait to the Third World (1995, 6). Thus, **development discourse can greatly impact global power relationships by shaping perceptions throughout society**.

Defining issues as “development” is inherently dehumanizing

Marc DuBois, adaptation of a master’s thesis presented to the Institute of Social Studies, Alternatives, 16, 1991, p. 2-3

A minority within this broad alternative movement, however, has gone further than the rest—defying the economistic essentialism of development thinking and, perhaps most importantly, challenging the preeminence of the development expert. The core of arguments in this vein is that the theoretical models underlying development efforts stray dramatically far from being as value-free as they are presented. Critical of a development based upon Western experience, this sort of alternative program emphasizes self-reliance, local participation, endogenous patterns of development, and satisfying basic needs. These features outline an interesting approach to development, but their most important contribution lies elsewhere—in the establishment of opposition to the venerated external aid/technical transfer approach to problems of underdevelopment. In other words, this alternative program gives birth to a competing paradigm of policy formulation, which in turn weakens the authority of the prevailing paradigm. Unfortunately, there is very little force behind this competing notion so that the apparent "crisis" notwithstanding, development is doing just fine, even flourishing—not the process of development of Third World societies, of course, but the business of its promotion. The effectiveness of radical criticism is diminished because even such alternative frameworks of policy formulation fail to penetrate deep enough to confront the most fundamental assumptions embodied in the dominant development paradigm. To put it more bluntly, strategies have been changed, but the foundations of contemporary development ideology are being reinforced. Above the polemics and disagreements over policy, which appear to distinguish the sundry schools of thought in development studies, there exists a profound unity. The locus of this unity is to be found not in the perception of the causes of underdevelopment or the approaches to solving problems therein, but in the definition and identification of these problems of underdevelopment in the first place. Underdevelopment is defined as a lack—a lack that stands out in relief against the backdrop of a "complete" Western society. The existence of "underdeveloped" (or "developing" or "undeveloped" or "less developed") and "developed" as categories into which human societies are classified is the sine qua non of the development paradigm. The manifold critiques of development leave intact the illusion that development comprises a natural category. Although a myriad of strategies for development has appeared and then fallen from grace, development itself still retains its original moral luster. It is this self-evident naturalness and law-like necessity of development that constitute the base of the development paradigm. Development is therein transformed (revalued) into something much more than just a desideratum: as Skolimowski laments, 'To be primitive is to be backward, almost half- human; to join the West in its quest for progress is an imperative, an advancement, an almost necessary condition of being human."'

The word implies backwardness and implicitly endorses destructive activities

Howard Richards, University of Baroda, Gujarat State, Education for Constructive Development, Summer, 1995

http://www.earlham.edu/~pags/faculty/hr/Lec1.html

I have some misgivings, as I am sure Ms. Muttreja does, about using the word "development" at all, even when it is qualified by the adjective "constructive." The use of the word has been justly criticized. For example, Gustavo Gutierrez of Peru advocates ceasing to speak of "development" because the very idea implies that poor societies are backward and that they should "repeat more or less faithfully the historical experience of the developed countries in their journey towards modern society." Others find that the very concept of "development" implicitly endorses human practices that exhaust the physical resources of the planet; for example, "development" is associated with ever-greater numbers of automobiles and airplanes, which use huge quantities of irreplaceable fossil

The language of development produces colonialism

Drucilla Barker, Hollins University Women’s Studies Chair, Hypatia, Summer, 1998

The language of development economics reads like a chapter in the Enlightenment dream, a dream that promised an orderly progress from poverty and ignorance to prosperity and modernity. It is a discourse infused with the Enlightenment ideal of innocent knowledge, an ideal that masks the instrumental role that development has played in maintaining global structures of neocolonialism and dependency. Instead of progress and prosperity, much of the world has experienced profound poverty, growing income inequality, high debt burdens, and environmental degradation. By the 1980s, even the proponents of development had agreed that their policies had been largely unsuccessful. Policy interventions designed to foster economic growth and alleviate poverty were abandoned in favor of neoliberal orthodoxies (Escobar 1995, 73-94). Privatization, trade liberalization, and fiscal austerity were the new strategies that would enable free-market capitalism to work its magic. Missing from this analysis, however, was any awareness of the role that development rhetoric and policies played in producing underdevelopment, exploitation, and oppression.(1)

Development Discourse Good

Their construction of development as monolithic destroys agency. Development means different things to different people

R.D. Grillo, School of African and Asian Studies, University of Sussex, 1997, Discourses of Development, p. 20-22

While not denying the validity of the idea of a 'development gaze', we should note its limits. Mosse (this volume, p. 280) says, I am not suggesting that development institutions (irrigation bureaucracies or donor agencies) are the creators of social theory, merely that they constrain and select theory [and] nudge the thinking of their members in particular directions -...' There is a tendency - illustrated, for example, by Hobart, Escobar and to a lesser degree Ferguson - to see development as a monolithic enterprise, heavily controlled from the top, convinced of the superiority of its own wisdom and impervious to local knowledge, or indeed common-sense experience, a single gaze or voice which is all-powerful and beyond influence. This underpins what I would call the 'myth of development' which pervades much critical writing in this field. It might also be called the Development Dictionary perspective, as echoed throughout the book of that name (Sachs ed. 1992). The perspective is shared by Escobar, and to a lesser extent Ferguson and in a different way Hobart. Like most myths it is based on poor or partial history, betraying a lack of knowledge of both colonialism and decolonization, and throughout it reflects a surprising ethnocentrism: it is very much the view from North America. Ill-informed about the history of government, it has a Jacobinist conviction of the state's power to achieve miraculous things: the title of Ferguson's book. The Anti- Politics Machine, is an eloquent expression of this. It is also grounded in the 'victim culture'. Rather as those engaged in anti- racist training sometimes argued that there are 'racists' and there are 'victims of racism' (Donald and Rattansi eds 1992; Gilroy 1993), the development myth proposes that there are 'developers' and 'victims of development' (see the unfortunate souls portrayed on the dust-cover of Crush's edited collection, 1995). Escobar adds 'resisters of development', but there is no other way. Thus the myth would, for example, have great difficulty in encompassing the wide range of responses and agendas found among Indian women working in and for development whose work is documented in this volume in the paper by Unnithan and Srivastava. Drinkwater (1992: 169) points to the 'danger of oversimplifying and setting up a dominant position as an easy target'. Although development is sometimes guided by authoritative, monocular visions, Unnithan and Srivastava's paper (this volume), along with Gardner's discussion of a major project in a country in South Asia, underline the point that development knowledge is not usually a single set of ideas and assumptions. Gardner observes correctly (this volume, p. 134) that while our understanding of 'indigenous knowledge' is growing increasingly sophisticated, that of developmental knowledge often remains frustratingly simplistic. This is generally presented as homogeneous and rooted in 'scientific rationalism' . . . [but there is a] need to understand how development knowledge is not one single set of ideas and assumptions. While . . . it may function hegemonically, it is also created and recreated by multiple agents, who often have very different understandings of their work. To think of the discourse of development is far too limiting. To that extent, Hobart is correct to refer to 'several co-existent discourses of development' (1993: 12). But there is as much diversity within the community of 'professional developers' (one of the parties identified by Hobart), as between them and other stakeholders or 'players' (in Hobart's account, local people' and 'national government'). Within development there is and has always been a multiplicity of voices, 'a multiplicity of "knowledges"' (Cohen 1993: 32), even if some are more powerful than others: as Pettier, this volume, points out, 'a simple recording of the plurality of voices' is never enough. Preston, who has written extensively on development, provides an interesting way into this subject. Discourses of Development: State, Market and Polity in the Analysis of Complex Change (1994) is an exercise in political theory written largely from outside anthropology which places the study of discourse less in the work of Foucault than in a wider hermeneutic-critical tradition. However, in broader agreement with Foucauldian perspectives than he might allow, Preston argues that development discourse is both 'institutionally extensive [and] comprises a stock of ideas that informs the praxis of many groups' (ibid.: 4). It is not, however, singular. He identifies three discourses of development, each located in the changing political economy of the second half of the twentieth century. Each 'find their vehicles in particular institutional locations, and of course are disposed to particular political projects' (ibid.: 222).

“Development” must be used to extract its positive connotations while deconstructing its negative ones

Howard Richards, University of Baroda, Gujarat State, Education for Constructive Development, Summer, 1995

<http://www.earlham.edu/~pags/faculty/hr/Lec1.html>

Denis Goulet has written an extensive series of books and articles in which he holds that the word "development" should be used, but only as a "hinge" to promote an "authentic development" based on normative values. In a sense these lectures are a contribution to Goulet's philosophy, because they are about how to make operational a "creative incrementalism" that builds steps toward structural change and a culture of solidarity into every development project. In another sense these lectures try to cope with economic issues I find that Goulet and many liberation theologians cannot cope with effectively, because they are too grounded in a liberal ethics that shares too many premises with liberal economics. See e.g. Denis Goulet, *Mexico: Development Strategies for the Future*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983; "`Development' ...or Liberation?" *International Development* *Review* vol. 13, no. 3 (September, 1971). For a critical review of attempts to rescue the word "development" by qualifying it as "sustainable development," see S. Lele, "Sustainable Development: A Critical Review," *World Development*, volume 19 (1991), pp. 607-621. See generally the *International Journal of Sustainable* *Development*. On the other hand, the term "development" is often given a positive and constructive meaning. For example, "`Development' is taken here to mean the general improvement in human living conditions, including access to more consumption goods, better health care, greater job security, and better working hours and conditions." Clive Hamilton, "Can the Rest of Asia Emulate the NICs?" *The Third World Quarterly*, volume 87 (1987), pp. 1225-1256. "Development" has generally been associated with finding ways to mobilize and put to use the energies of the unemployed and underemployed. See Amartya Sen, "Development: Which Way Now?," *Economic Journal*. vol. 93 (December 1983), pp. 745-62. "Development" has as a connotation creating "linkages" and "complementarities" so that a major social investment is not just an isolated event, but part of a related series which opens up new possibilities and opportunities. See A. O. Hirschman, *The Strategy of Economic* *Development*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958. "Development" has been associated with policies that make efforts to redistribute wealth in order to increase the purchasing power of consumers. See Lance Taylor, *Varieties of Stabilization Experience*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988. A wise development policy has been said to include the principle of "shared growth," so that whatever benefits accrue to a nation are shared even with the poorest of its people. See John Page *et al*, *The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public* *Policy*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993. Part of the purpose of the grassroots empowerment of the poor that I am advocating is to create a cultural and political environment favorable for "sharing" (and for "growth" too if "growth" is defined as Joan Robinson proposed to define it, i.e. in such a way that nothing undesirable counts as "growth"). The widespread use of the term "development" today stems from Josef Schumpeter's use of it to distinguish structural economic change, which was "development," and which required deliberate collective action, from the normal successful operation of a market economy, which leads merely to "growth." See Josef Schumpeter, *The Theory of Economic* *Development*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1934. Similarly Hirschman wrote of "development" as "punctuated disequilibria," i.e. as transitions from one structure to another.