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\*FYI\*

The following advantages will be included and supplemented in the second wave of affirmative assignments:

-Warlords Good

-Air Power Bad

-Terrorism Bad

This affirmative can be read two ways: *for* or *against* nation-building strategies. For that reason, the advantages are modular – you should read the relevant inherency block, and then pick from the following two advantage groups. At the bottom of the file are a series of cards defending against the common arguments against and for nationbuilding.

Nation-building Good

-Drug War

-NATO

[Recommended 1AC: Drug War + Hegemony]

Nation-building Bad

-Hegemony

-NATO

-Warlords

-Terror

[Recommended 1AC: Hegemony + NATO]

Counternarcotics Bad

-Drug War

-Air Power

[Recommended 1AC: Drug War + Air Power]

Plan Text – Nationbuilding Good

Plan: The United States federal government should implement a phased withdrawal of its ground troops engaged in counter-terrorism presence activities in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

Plan Text – Nationbuilding Bad

Plan: The United States federal government should implement a phased withdrawal of its ground troops engaged in population centric counterinsurgency presence activities in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

Plan Text – Counternarcotics Bad

Plan: The United States federal government should substantially reduce its counternarcotics forces in Afghanistan focused on drug interdiction and opium eradication and substantially reduce the presence of the US Air Force and other forces that conduct aerial bombings in Afghanistan.

\*\*\*INHERENCY\*\*

1AC – Inherency – Nationbuilding Good

Contention One – The Status Quo

Obama won’t adhere to his Afghanistan withdrawal timetable – he’s committed to maintaining a hard power approach.

BBC News 6/24 [6/24/10, " Barack Obama on Afghanistan withdrawal timetable ", http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/us\_and\_canada/10409698.stm]

President Barack Obama has said he does not foresee an immediate withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan in July 2011, the date he has set for the start of the drawdown of US forces.

"We didn't say we'd be switching off the lights and closing the door behind us," he said at the White House, a day after naming Gen David Petraeus as his new Afghan commander.

"We said we'd begin a transition phase that would allow the Afghan government to take more and more responsibility."

He also said he did not foresee any other high-level departures from his Afghanistan policy team.

1AC – Inherency – Nationbuilding Bad [1/2]

Contention One – The Status Quo

The current Afghanistan deployment strategy is unwinnable – corruption makes a stable central government impossible and nation-building strategies fail, but a light, counter-terrorist presence is still possible.

Galbraith 2010 [Peter W., former UN Secretary-General's Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan, first US Ambassador to Croatia where he mediated the 1995 Erdut Agreement that ended the Croation war, "The opposition's opening remarks," in the Economist Debates: Afghanistan, May 17, <http://www.economist.com/debate/days/view/516> | VP]

The war in Afghanistan is not winnable because America does not have a credible Afghan partner and there is no prospect that one will emerge.

America is pursuing a counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan and, as General Stanley McChrystal observes, the centre of gravity in counterinsurgency is the people. Although American forces can outfight the poorly equipped Taliban (when they can be found), America and its allies cannot defeat the insurgency without the support of the Afghan people. Thus the essential element of American strategy is an Afghan government that enjoys the loyalty of enough Afghans to turn the population against the insurgents.

Such a government **does not exist.** President Hamid Karzai has been in office since 2002, when he was installed with the support of the Bush administration following the fall of the Taliban. In eight years, he has run a government so ineffective that Afghans deride him as being no more than the mayor of Kabul and so corrupt that his country ranks 179 on Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index, just ahead of last-placed Somalia, which has no government at all.

To make matters worse, Mr Karzai is now in office as a result of an election that he himself admits was massively fraudulent. In 2009, the Karzai-appointed Afghan Independent Election Commission (IEC) rigged the elections so that Mr Karzai ended up with at least 1m phoney votes, or one-third of his total votes. (After a separate, independently appointed, Electoral Complaints Commission eventually rejected enough Karzai votes to force a second round, the IEC adopted procedures to produce an even more fraud-prone second round and the runner up, Abdullah Abdullah, chose not to participate.)

Many Afghans do not see Mr Karzai as a democratically elected leader. Thus, in addition to being corrupt and ineffective, the government that is the keystone of American strategy also suffers from a legitimacy deficit.

Over the past eight years, the military situation has worsened year by year. It is unrealistic to expect Mr Karzai, who has a track record of ineffectiveness and corruption now compounded by illegitimacy, to reform. There is also no indication that he wants to reform. At the beginning of April, he responded to pressure from the Obama administration by blaming the UN and America for the 2009 election fraud and said he might join the Taliban. This led many Afghans and some Americans (myself included) to question his mental stability. During last week's visit to the White House nothing but nice words were exchanged in public, but this was almost certainly because of the administration's concern that Mr Karzai's antics were undercutting public support for the war, not any new-found confidence in the Afghan leader.

Afghanistan's problems extend far beyond Mr Karzai. Tens of billions of dollars have been spent on recruiting and training an Afghan police force with little to show for it. Some 80% of recruits are illiterate and a significant number are drug users. The standard eight-week training course is far too short to produce qualified police, especially since some time is necessarily devoted to teaching survival skills and even basic hygiene. A much longer course might produce better-trained Afghans, but the graduates would then probably not want to be police in a country where, in certain provinces, one in ten is killed each year.

American troops can clear the Taliban from an area. But if the Taliban are to be kept away, American

1AC – Inherency – Nationbuilding Bad [2/2]

efforts must be followed by Afghan soldiers to provide security and Afghan police to provide law and order. Most important, an Afghan government must provide honest administration and win the loyalty of the population. While there has been progress in building an army, this is largely not the case with the police. And there is no prospect that Mr Karzai's corrupt, ineffective and illegitimate government can win the loyalty of the population.

There are still missions that can be accomplished in Afghanistan. These include protecting the non-Pashtun areas from Taliban infiltration (the Taliban movement is almost entirely Pashtun), keeping Kabul relatively secure and striking at terrorists. These missions do not depend on an honest Afghan government and require just a small **fraction** of the troops now committed to the war.

There is a legitimate debate as to how important Afghanistan is to western interests. There is, however, no need to resolve this question to know that it makes no sense to commit valuable national security resources to a counterinsurgency effort that will not succeed. As long as victory is defined as the defeat of the Taliban insurgency, the war in Afghanistan is not winnable.

Inherency – No Timetable

**Obama’s timetable is meaningless – it’s too ambiguous to be a guarantee.**

**Heritage.org 6/22** [6/22/10, " Heritage Foundation Statement on the War in Afghanistan ", <http://blog.heritage.org/2010/06/22/heritage-foundation-statement-on-the-war-in-afghanistan/> | VP]

The artificial Afghanistan withdrawal deadline has obviously caused some of our military leaders to question our strategy in Afghanistan.

That deadline, which President Barack Obama announced to the American people, the military, our allies and our enemies on December 1, 2009, has provoked many — including the government in Kabul, the Afghan people, the military in Pakistan, and our enemies the terrorists &nbsp;– to question America’s resolve to win the War in Afghanistan.

More disconcerting for the American people is that the timeline appears to be putting tremendous unnecessary pressure on our armed forces to accomplish their task: victory on the ground.

We don’t need an artificial timeline for withdrawal. We need a strategy for victory.

Though the president can’t pretend he never set a timeline, he can now exercise his authority as commander in chief to make things right.

He should start by eliminating the timeline and making it clear that winning the war is his top priority. He can do that by giving our military leaders whatever additional forces or resources they need to get the job done.

Together with Afghan forces and NATO, the United States must weaken the Taliban on the battlefield before engaging in serious negotiations with Taliban members who break ties with al-Qaeda. And the president must press Pakistan to deal firmly and unambiguously with all terrorists.

Now is the time for President Obama to recognize that his artificial timeline has had very real consequences. The president must right the ship, change course on his strategy, and make it clear to friend and foe that he is committed to victory in Afghanistan.

Inherency – December Review\*\* [1/2]

Obama’s committed to increased deployment – he’ll use the December review to ask for a new surge but it will fail.

Klein 2010 [Joe, American civilization @ UPenn, journalist and columnist, member of the Council on Foreign Relations, former Guggenheim Fellow, "Can Obama and Petraeus Work Together?" June 24, http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,1999251,00.html | VP]

It isn't well remembered now, but Petraeus was an outcast midway through the Bush Administration. Donald Rumsfeld, Bush's wildly incompetent Defense Secretary, didn't like him; neither did many of his peers, who remained enamored of the Army they knew, a rumbling array of tanks and trucks and heavy artillery constructed to fight the Russians on the plains of Central Europe. Rumsfeld sent Petraeus out to pasture at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., which among other things serves as an Army think tank. There, Petraeus and a group of military intellectuals concocted the military's counterinsurgency field manual — a strategy waiting to be implemented as everything else in Iraq failed. The irony about counterinsurgency (which carries the unfortunate, jingling acronym COIN) is that it is a theory of warfare that should be more acceptable to Democrats — and it was, to smart ones like Hillary Clinton — because it emphasized protecting local populations, providing them with services like schools and health clinics and jobs. When Bush turned to Petraeus and COIN was implemented in Baghdad in 2007, it looked an awful lot like community policing and social services on the South Side of Chicago. And it worked.

But it was not the only thing that worked in Iraq. Petraeus' decision to purchase the Sunni tribes in Anwar province — the Bush Administration had considered tribes "part of the past" until then — undermined the insurgency and separated the professional, al-Qaeda terrorists from the indigenous population. Most important was the untold story of the spectacular success that the special-operations forces led by McChrystal suddenly began to have in rooting out the bad guys (this was, in large part, attributable to the resources President Bush devoted to cultivating human intelligence assets). The success in Iraq was attributable to what the military calls full-spectrum warfare, the use of all the tools in its kit, but it was COIN that emerged as the headliner — an oversimplification that has had dire ramifications in Afghanistan.

By 2009 the gospel of COIN had helped revive the phlegmatic Army. Its two chief promoters, Petraeus and McChrystal, seemingly could do no wrong. They stormed into Obama's extended Afghan-policy review intent on having their way. They sort of got it: 30,000 more troops, on top of the 20,000 Obama had initially dispatched — after a series of pitched battles between Petraeus, who was the most vocal military participant in the process, and Vice President Joe Biden, who was the most vocal civilian.

But the policy featured two caveats that have been misinterpreted — purposely, in some cases — by the military and oversold by the Obama Administration to the Democratic Party base. The first was the deadline of July 2011, at which time a transition would begin to Afghan control of the war. Petraeus, McChrystal and Joint Chiefs Chairman Admiral Mike Mullen agreed to this because it wasn't really a deadline. There was no intention of actually pulling troops from the real Afghan war zones in the south and east in July 2011; the assumption was that if things were going well, some forces would stay for years, in gradually diminishing numbers, doing the patient work of counterinsurgency. The other caveat was more problematic: there would be another policy review in December 2010, to see how well things were going. "I wouldn't want to overplay the significance of this review," Petraeus told the House Armed Services Committee recently.

But Petraeus is wrong; in fact, the review is crucial. The implicit agreement was that if things aren't going well by December, the strategy will have to change. And things haven't been going well. So the military has been quietly working the press, complaining about the July 2011 transition date, pressing for more troops, complaining about the lack of civilian progress in Afghanistan — the failure of the Afghan government and U.S. State Department to provide security and programs for the populace — complaining about the failure of Richard Holbrooke to get all the recalcitrant neighbors (Pakistan, India, Iran and China, among others — what a bunch!) on board with a coherent regional strategy. A lot of this griping was at the heart of the Rolling Stone story. "When

Inherency – December Review\*\* [2/2]

the military says withdrawals should be conditions-based, here's what they mean," says Les Gelb, president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations. "If things are going well, we shouldn't withdraw, because the policy is working. If things aren't going well, we should add more troops. What they really want is no decision on anything until July 2011."

The problem with the military position is that what worked in Iraq is not working in Afghanistan. The policy of funding the tribes is of limited value in Afghanistan because the enemy isn't led by foreign terrorists; it is a native insurgency. Funding some tribes and not others simply aggravates the feuding between them. And COIN depends on having a reliable local government running the security and social programs, which simply isn't going to happen so long as Hamid Karzai is President. The only part of the military spectrum that has worked in both Iraq and Afghanistan is McChrystal's special ops, which is stripping out midlevel Taliban leaders on a nightly basis.

This is the sort of moment that people write books about, a moment when the size of the personalities matches the scale of the stakes they're wrangling over. The real question is whether this Democratic President and the military, symbolized by Petraeus, can make the adjustments necessary to live with each other. It seems obvious that Obama is going to have to be less coy with the public about what is really going to happen in July 2011, even if that risks alienating his party's vestigial antiwar base. He is going to have to make it clear that "significant" troop withdrawals — a word bandied about in recent weeks — are not in the cards unless the situation on the ground changes dramatically, for good or ill. And Petraeus is going to have to reconsider whether the crown jewel in his tiara — the counterinsurgency doctrine — is really feasible in Afghanistan and what strategic modifications will have to be made in order to leave the place in the most stable, humane fashion.

Inherency – December Review

**National Review Online 6/24** [6/24/10, " Is Obama Backing Off the Timetable for Withdrawal in Afghanistan? ", http://corner.nationalreview.com/post/?q=NWJhM2U3NDcyNDhlNzdiMGEzNWYzMTJjMGMzNWY1NTc=]

Obama was careful not to frame July 2011 as a withdrawal date, but the beginning of a transition.

"We didn't say we'd be switching off the lights and closing the door behind us. We said we'd begin a transition phase that would allow the Afghan government to take more and more responsibility," he said.

That part isn't so much news. But immediately after, Obama also said that at the end of this year his administration will undertake a second comprehensive review of its Afghanistan strategy. That point was also hit today by SecDef Gates and CJCS Adm. Mullen. Gates said that the administration would be looking to se if "by December we have enough evidence to demonstrate, if you will, the proof of concept" of the strategy.

By connecting the deadline talk with the strategic review talk, Obama and his national security principals are begging us to add the missing premise: if the review doesn't show things proceeding smoothly in Afghanistan, the deadline could be pushed off, indefinitely. Of course, nobody in the administration wants to say that outright. But the hopes seems to be that it will be reassuring enough to signal it.

Inherency – No Withdrawal

Despite promises there will be no immediate troop withdrawal in Afghanistan.

Times of India 6-25

(No immediate withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan: Obamahttp://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/World/US/No-immediate-withdrawal-of-troops-from-Afghanistan-Obama/articleshow/6088533.cms)

WASHINGTON: US President Barack Obama on Thursday categorically ruled out immediate withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan from July 2011, the date he had earlier set for drawdown of troops from the war torn country.

"We didn't say we'd be switching off the lights and closing the door behind us. We said we'd begin a transition phase that would allow the Afghan government to take more and more responsibility," Obama said at a White House joint press briefing with his Russian counterpart, Dmitry Medvedev.

"Here's what we did not say last year. We did not say that, starting July 2011, suddenly there would be no troops from the US or allied countries in Afghanistan," Obama said in response to a question.

That is the tragedy that was put forward and what we've also said is, is that, in December of this year, a year after this strategy has been put in place, at a time when the additional troops have been in place and have begun implementing strategy, that we'll conduct a review and we'll make an assessment, he said.

"So we are in the midpoint of implementing the strategy that we came up with last year. We'll do a review at the end of this year," he said.

Defending his decision to nominate General David Petraeus as his new war commander in Afghanistan, Obama said Petraeus understands the Afghan strategy because he helped shape it.

"My expectation is that he will be outstanding in implementing it, and we will not miss a beat because of the change in command in the Afghan theater," he said.

Keep in mind that, during this entire time, General Petraeus has been the CENTCOM commander, which means he's had responsibility in part for overseeing what happened in Afghanistan, and that is part of the reason why I think he's going to do such a capable job, Obama said.

"Not only does he have extraordinary experience in Iraq, not only did he help write the manual for dealing with insurgencies, but he also is intimately familiar with the players. He knows President Karzai. He knows the other personnel who are already on the ground," he said.

Obama said he would be insisting on a unity of purpose on the part of all branches of the US government that reflects the enormous sacrifices that are being made by the young men and women who are there.

Inherency – No Withdrawal

No full withdrawal from Afghanistan for at least 5 years

Patrick **Wintour**, political editor for the Guardian, **6/26/10** “Afghanistan withdrawal before 2015, says David Cameron” [http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jun/25/british-soldiers-afghanistan-david-cameron accessed 6/26/10](http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jun/25/british-soldiers-afghanistan-david-cameron%20accessed%206/26/10)

David Cameron yesterday gave the first clear indication of the timing for a full withdrawal of British soldiers \from Afghanistan, saying that he wanted troops home within five years. Asked in Canada at the Toronto G8 summit if he wanted UK forces home before the 2015 general election, he said: "I want that to happen, make no mistake about it. We can't be there for another five years, having been there for nine years already." Cameron said: "I want us to roll up our sleeves and get on with delivering what will bring the success we want, which is not a perfect Afghanistan, but some stability in Afghanistan and the ability for the Afghans themselves to run their country, so they [British troops] can come home." The prime minister's aides insisted his remarks to Sky News were not designed to signal a change of strategy before his first bilateral meeting with Barack Obama today. Cameron added that he preferred not to "deal in too strict timetables". During the election campaign, he said he wanted to see UK troops start to come home by 2015. But this was the first time as prime minister that he has indicated a timetable for withdrawal. Obama has committed himself to a review of the US counter-insurgency strategy next year. Cameron and Obama have already spoken on the phone this week about the implications of the removal of General Stanley McChrystal as Nato commander in Afghanistan, insisting the British did not see his removal as the moment for a further strategic review. But Cameron and his defence secretary, Liam Fox, have made it clear they are impatient with the slow progress in the counter-insurgency campaign in Afghanistan, notably in recruiting and training local security forces, the key to an exit strategy for Nato forces. Both Cameron and Fox have also made it clear they do not share Tony Blair's enthusiasm for "liberal interventionism" in foreign conflicts. They are sceptical about the role of "nation building", as Fox demonstrated in an interview in which he compared Afghanistan to a 13-century state. Fox also rejected the idea that UK troops should next year be deployed in Kandahar, the Taliban's heartland, when Canada withdraws its troops. The coalition government's sceptical attitude about Nato's military operations in Afghanistan, and Britain's role in it, has caused concern in Washington. It is also being observed with apprehension by some British military commanders who fear it might undermine their influence and role in Afghanistan, where the population suspects their troops will pack up and go home as soon as possible. However, Cameron's impatience is likely to find favour with those – including Sherard Cowper-Coles, who recently resigned as the government's special envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan – who want a political settlement, including talks with the Taliban, soon. The prime minister has already braced the public for further British troop casualties this summer, saying this was inevitable as the counter-insurgency seeks to spread itself across Afghanistan. In a separate interview with ITV News, Cameron acknowledged British troops can expect fierce opposition from the Taliban in the coming months. "It will be a difficult summer, there is no doubt about that," he said. "But [that's] partly because we are doing so much more with the Americans in Helmand province, with hundreds of thousands of troops rather than the few thousand we used to have, and it's making a big difference. "It will be a difficult summer, but we are getting to a period where parts of Afghanistan can now be run by the Afghans themselves. That is a very exciting prospect for bringing our troops home." Cameron is due to lead discussions at the G8 today on Afghanistan and Pakistan, including the need for an inclusive political settlement. He added: "Britain should have a long-term relationship with Afghanistan, including helping to train their troops and their civil society, long after the vast bulk of troops have gone home. Obama wants a US withdrawal to begin next summer, although General David Petraeus, the US commander in Afghanistan, has insisted that has to be based on conditions on the ground. Obama and Cameron hold their first meeting as president and prime minister on the fringes of the G8 summit today. Obama will try to reassure Cameron that the war in Afghanistan will not go on indefinitely, in the week that the 300th British soldier died there. A total of 307 UK service personnel have died there since the start of operations in 2001. In the latest incident on Wednesday, four died in Helmand province when their armoured vehicle rolled off a road and ended up underwater in a canal.

Inherency – No Withdrawal

Withdrawal will take much longer than planned

Chris **McGreal**, Guardian's Washington correspondent, has previously been posted in Johannesburg and in Jerusalem, is a former BBC journalist in Central America, Jon **Boone**, staff writer, **6/24/10**, “Barack Obama rejects calls to drop deadline for Afghanistan troop exit,” <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jun/24/us-troop-withdrawal-afghanistan-strategy> accessed 6/26/10

"We did not say, starting in July 2011, suddenly there will be no troops from the United States or allied countries in Afghanistan," Obama said at a press conference with the Russian president, Dmitry Medvedev, who sidestepped a question about whether, in light of the Soviet Union's defeat in Afghanistan, a foreign army can expect to win a war in Afghanistan. "We didn't say we'd be switching off the lights and closing the door behind us. We said we'd begin a transition phase that would allow the Afghan government to take more and more responsibility." Obama added that part of the strategy would include a reassessment at the end of this year. "In December of this year, a year after the strategy has been put in place, at a time when the additional troops have been in place and have begun implementing the strategy, then we'll conduct a review and make an assessment. Is the strategy working? Is it working in part? Are there other aspects of it that aren't working?" he said. Lindsey Graham, a Republican senator who sits on the powerful armed services committee and backed Obama's dismissal of McChrystal, said the July 2011 deadline undercut the war effort: "It empowers our enemies. It confuses our friends. And I think it needs to be re-evaluated." Graham said McChrystal's replacement, General David Petraeus, who led the US troop surge in Iraq, had testified to Congress that he would urge Obama to delay the pullout if he believed it was unwise. "If the president says, no matter what General Petraeus may recommend, we're going to leave in July of 2011, we will lose the war**,"** Graham said. Kissinger, writing in the Washington Post, warned of the potential for a collapse in US public support for the conflict – similar to that which occurred during the Vietnam conflict – that could lead to a political focus on "an exit strategy with the emphasis on exit, not strategy". He said it was a mistake to impose a deadline for US involvement. "The central premise is that, at some early point, the United States will be able to turn over security responsibilities to an Afghan government and national army whose writ is running across the entire country. This turnover is to begin next summer. Neither the premise nor the deadline is realistic," he wrote.

Inherency – AT: Withdrawal Timetable

Obama’s reports of Afghanistan are misleading and abstract

Rory Stewart, Member of British Parliament, 7/9/09, London Review of Books, Vol. 31 No. 13 [Ian Bollag-Miller]

When we are not presented with a dystopian vision, we are encouraged to be implausibly optimistic. ‘There can be only one winner: democracy and a strong Afghan state,’ Gordon Brown predicted in his most recent speech on the subject. Obama and Brown rely on a hypnotising policy language which can – and perhaps will – be applied as easily to Somalia or Yemen as Afghanistan. It misleads us in several respects simultaneously: minimising differences between cultures, exaggerating our fears, aggrandising our ambitions, inflating a sense of moral obligations and power, and confusing our goals. All these attitudes are aspects of a single worldview and create an almost irresistible illusion. It conjures nightmares of ‘failed states’ and ‘global extremism’, offers the remedies of ‘state-building’ and ‘counter-insurgency’, and promises a final dream of ‘legitimate, accountable governance’. The path is broad enough to include Scandinavian humanitarians and American special forces; general enough to be applied to Botswana as easily as to Afghanistan; sinuous and sophisticated enough to draw in policymakers; suggestive enough of crude moral imperatives to attract the Daily Mail; and almost too abstract to be defined or refuted. It papers over the weakness of the international community: our lack of knowledge, power and legitimacy. It conceals the conflicts between our interests: between giving aid to Afghans and killing terrorists. It assumes that Afghanistan is predictable. It is a language that exploits tautologies and negations to suggest inexorable solutions. It makes our policy seem a moral obligation, makes failure unacceptable, and alternatives inconceivable. It does this so well that a more moderate, minimalist approach becomes almost impossible to articulate. Afghanistan, however, is the graveyard of predictions. None of the experts in 1988 predicted that the Russian-backed President Najibullah would survive for two and a half years after the Soviet withdrawal. And no one predicted at the beginning of 1994 that the famous commanders of the jihad, Hekmatyar and Masud, then fighting a civil war in the centre of Kabul, could be swept aside by an unknown group of madrassah students called the Taliban. Or that the Taliban would, in a few months, conquer 90 per cent of the country, eliminate much corruption, restore security on the roads and host al-Qaida.

**Inherency – AT: Petraeus Strategy**

Petraeus won’t change strategy and Obama continues blurring withdrawal goals

Spencer Ackerman, Rutgers Grad, 6/23/10, “With Petraeus Pick, Obama Clarifies His Afghanistan Strategy

Obama Implicitly Endorses Petraeus' Interpretation of July 2011 Target” Washington Independent [Ian Bollag-Miller]

“This is a change in personnel,” President Obama said, announcing Gen. David Petraeus’ takeover of the Afghanistan war, “but not a change in policy.” Yes and no. As I [wrote earlier](http://washingtonindependent.com/88088/petraeus-rides-again-what-about-july-2011), Petraeus’ return to theater command indicates that an ambiguity in that policy has been clarified. It’s never been clear what exactly the pace and scope of troop withdrawals will be after Obama’s July 2011 date to begin the transition to Afghan soldiers and police taking the lead in securing the country. Obama said in his West Point speech announcing the date that “we will execute this transition responsibly, taking into account conditions on the ground.” But what does that really mean? It appeared like a straddle, a line that allowed Vice President Biden to say that troop withdrawals after 2011 would be substantial and also allowed the military not to face a hard and fast deadline. In Kabul and Islamabad, that didn’t work so well, as senior officials in the Afghan and Pakistani governments reportedly disbelieved that the U.S. really did seek a long-term relationship, as Obama repeatedly said. Today Obama clarified what July 2011 means — somewhat. It means what Gen. Petraeus, his new commander, [told the Senate he supports](http://washingtonindependent.com/87265/to-gop-senators-dismay-petraeus-and-flournoy-affirm-july-2011-inflection-point-in-afghan-war): not a “race for the exits,” but a “conditions-based,” open-ended transition. If that *still* sounds unclear, it’s because the policy itself is unclear*.* But by placing Petraeus at the helm, it means that 2012 will probably look more like right now, in terms of troop levels and U.S. troops fighting, than anything Biden prefers. That is, unless Petraeus and Obama come to a consensus that conditions on the ground necessitate more rapid withdrawals. Think of the deadline as getting deliberately blurrier. Tom Ricks called his last book about Petraeus “The Gamble.” It’s sequel time. The strategy is supposed to undergo a review in December. Don’t expect that review to be so substantial. Petraeus will only be in theater for a few months. While he may not want to launch his own strategy review, he’ll surely want to keep his options open, and will be able to argue that the extraordinary conditions that put him back in charge of a war will necessitate that delay. Make no mistake: This is Obama intensifying his strategy. That’s the major change that has emerged after Gen. McChrystal’s unexpected self-immolation.

Obama shy’s away from troop withdrawal date and give Petraeus more power

Richard Sisk, Daily News Washington Bureau, 6/24/10, “Obama hedges on July 2011 drawdown date for Afghanistan, giving leeway to Gen. Petraeus” New York Times, 6/24/10 [Ian Bollag-Miller]

WASHINGTON - President Obama went squishy Thursday on July 2011 as a hard-and-fast date for troop withdrawals from Afghanistan, giving some leeway to new commander Gen. David Petraeus. The drawdown date was set last year in the agreement to send 30,000 more [U.S.](http://www.nydailynews.com/topics/United+States) troops to the combat zone, but "we did not say that starting July 2011 suddenly there would be no troops from the U.S. or allied countries in Afghanistan," Obama said. "We didn't say we'd be switching off the lights and closing the door behind us," Obama added during a joint news conference with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev at the White House. Obama said July 2011 should be seen more as a date for a transfer of responsibility to Afghan forces. He also said he will be relying heavily on Petraeus' advice when the pullout date and war strategy come up for another major administration review in December.

Inherency – AT: Withdrawal Timetable

Drawdown date is more about politics than policy and will likely be subject to change

Brian Montopoli, political analyst and CBS, 6/24/10, “July 2011 Deadline for Afghanistan Troop Withdrawal: Politics Over Policy?” CBS News [Ian Bollag-Miller]

But it's become increasingly clear that the July 2011 deadline is more about politics than policy. That's true for a few reasons. First off, the president said from the beginning that July 2011 was only when forces would **begin** to be brought home - which means he could conceivably bring back just a few thousand troops and still technically meet the deadline. But more importantly, the White House and military have made clear the deadline can simply be changed depending on conditions on the ground. Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, said Thursday that if the strategy doesn't look like it's working at the end of the year, the military may recommend that the timeline be altered. Defense Secretary Robert Gates, meanwhile, stressed that the drawdown plan is "conditions-based," and said while General David Petraeus agrees with the president's overall strategy, "when he gets on the ground, he will assess the situation for himself." "And at some point, he will make recommendations to the president," Gates said. "And that's what any military commander should do. And the president will welcome those recommendations. But at the end of the day, the president will decide whether changes are to be made in the strategy." Mr. Obama, for his part, maintained today that the current plan still stands - but he made clear that there would not be a mass exodus of U.S. forces from Afghanistan.

The US public strongly opposes the war in Afghanistan

Jennifer Agiesta and Jon Cohen, both Washington Post staff writers, 8/20/09, “Public Opinion in U.S. Turns Against Afghan War” Washington Post [Ian Bollag-Miller]

A majority of Americans now see the war in Afghanistan as not worth fighting, and just a quarter say more U.S. troops should be sent to the country, according to a new Washington Post-ABC News poll. Most have confidence in the ability of the United States to meet its primary goals of defeating the Taliban, facilitating economic development, and molding an honest and effective Afghan government, but few say Thursday's elections there are likely to produce such a government. When it comes to the baseline question, 42 percent of Americans say the United States is winning in Afghanistan; about as many, 36 percent, say it is losing. The new poll comes amid widespread speculation that Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, will request more troops for his stepped-up effort to remove the Taliban from Afghan towns and villages. That position gets the backing of 24 percent of those polled, while nearly twice as many, 45 percent, want to decrease the number of military forces there. (Most of the remainder want to keep the level about the same.) In January, before President Obama authorized sending an additional 17,000 troops to the country, public sentiment tilted more strongly toward a troop increase. Should Obama embrace his generals' call for even more forces, he would risk alienating some of his staunchest supporters. Although 60 percent of Americans approve of how Obama has handled the situation in Afghanistan, his ratings among liberals have slipped, and majorities of liberals and Democrats alike now, for the first time, solidly oppose the war and are calling for a reduction in troop levels

Inherency – Nationbuilding Now

Obama is committed to nationbuilding strategies now – G-20 and following statements prove.

Washington Examiner 2010 [Mona Charen, columnist, "Mona Charen: Obama owes Bush an apology," June 30, http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/columns/Obama-owes-Bush-an-apology-97425364.html | VP]

What distinguishes Obama's hopes for Afghanistan from Bush's much-despised aspirations for Iraq? At his press conference following the G-20 summit, Obama sounded like a neoconservative. "... I reject the notion that the Afghan people don't want some of the basic things that everybody wants -- basic rule of law, a voice in governance, economic opportunity, basic physical security, electricity, roads, an ability to get a harvest to market and get a fair price for it without having to pay too many bribes in between. And I think we can make a difference, and the coalition can make a difference, in them meeting those aspirations ..."

The "Come home, America" president is in full nation-building mode now. In that 2007 speech, he had predicted that only the removal of American troops would permit Iraq to thrive: "... it must begin soon. Letting the Iraqis know that we will not be there forever is our last, best hope to pressure the Iraqis to take ownership of their country and bring an end to their conflict. It is time for our troops to start coming home."

No more. Whereas candidate Obama was contemptuous of Bush's "open-ended" commitment in Iraq, President Obama is now walking back his promise to leave Afghanistan by July 2011. "There has been a lot of obsession around this whole issue of when do we leave," he said. "My focus right now is how to we make sure that what we're doing there is successful, given the incredible sacrifices that our young men and women are putting in." The July 2011 departure date is inoperative -- like the promise to close Guantanamo by January 2010.

\*\*\*HEGEMONY\*\*\*

1AC – Hegemony

**Advantage [\_\_] – Hegemony**

**Population centric counterinsurgency multiplies the consequences of occupation – it causes domestic backlash and weakens our ability to respond to global security challenges.**

Preble 2010 [Christopher A., director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, "Is the War in Afghanistan Winnable?" May 21, Cato Institute, originally published on The Economist Online, <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11834> | VP]

The appropriate question is not whether the war is winnable. If we define victory narrowly, if we are willing to apply the resources necessary to have a reasonable chance of success, and if we have capable and credible partners, then of course the war is winnable. Any war is winnable under these conditions.

None of these conditions exist in Afghanistan, however. Our mission is **too broad**ly construed. Our resources are constrained. The patience of the American people has worn thin. And our Afghan partners are unreliable and unpopular with their own people.

Given this, the better question is whether the resources that we have already ploughed into Afghanistan, and those that would be required in the medium to long term, could be better spent elsewhere. They most certainly could be.

More important still is the question of whether the mission is essential to American national security interests — a necessary component of a broader strategy to degrade al-Qaeda's capacity for carrying out another terrorist attack in America. Or has it become an interest in itself? (That is, we must win the war because it is the war we are in.)

Judging from most of the contemporary commentary, it has become the latter. This explains why our war aims have expanded to the point where they are serving ends unrelated to our core security interests.

The current strategy in Afghanistan is flawed. Population centric counterinsurgency (COIN) amounts to large-scale social engineering. The costs in blood and treasure that we would have to incur to accomplish this mission — in addition to what we have already paid — are not outweighed by the benefits, even if we accept the most optimistic estimates as to the likelihood of success.

It is also unnecessary. We do not need a long-term, large-scale presence to disrupt al-Qaeda. Indeed, that limited aim has largely been achieved. The physical safe haven that al-Qaeda once enjoyed in Afghanistan has been disrupted, but it could be recreated in dozens of other ungoverned spaces around the world — from Pakistan to Yemen to Somalia. The claim that Afghanistan is uniquely suited to hosting would-be terrorists does not withstand close scrutiny.

Nor does fighting terrorism require over 100,000 foreign troops building roads and bridges, digging wells and crafting legal codes. Indeed, our efforts to convince, cajole or compel our ungrateful clients to take ownership of their problems might do more harm than good. Building capacity without destroying the host nation's will to act has always proved difficult. This fact surely annoys most Americans, who have grown tired of fighting other people's wars and building other people's countries. It is little surprise, then, that a war that once enjoyed overwhelming public support has lost its lustre. Polls show that a majority of Americans would like to see the mission drawn to a close. The war is even less popular within the European countries that are contributing troops to the effort.

You go to war with the electorate you have, not the electorate you wished you had. But while the public's waning appetite for the war in Afghanistan poses a problem for our current strategy, Hamid Karzai poses a greater one. Advocates of COIN explain ad nauseam that the success of these missions depends upon a reliable local partner, something that Mr Karzai is not. Efforts to build support around his government are likely to fail. An individual who lacks legitimacy in the eyes of his people does not gain from the perception that he is a foreign puppet. Mr Karzai is caught in a Catch-22. His ham-fisted efforts to distance himself from the Obama administration have eroded support for him in America without boosting his standing in Afghanistan.

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America and its allies must narrow their focus in Afghanistan. Rather than asking if the war is

winnable, we should ask instead if the war is worth winning. And we should look for alternative approaches that do not require us to transform what is a deeply divided, poverty stricken, tribal-based society into a self-sufficient, cohesive and stable electoral democracy.

If we start from the proposition that victory is all that matters, we are setting ourselves up for ruin. We can expect an endless series of calls to plough still more resources — more troops, more civilian experts and more money, **much** more money — into Afghanistan. Such demands demonstrate a profound misunderstanding of the public's tolerance for an open-ended mission with ill-defined goals.

More importantly, a disdain for a focused strategy that balances ends, ways and means betrays an inability to think strategically about the range of challenges facing America today. After having already spent more than eight and a half years in Afghanistan, pursuing a win-at-all-costs strategy only weakens our ability to deal with other security challenges elsewhere in the world.

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And, we’re in it for the long haul – extended commitment overstretches our military and undermines our leadership status against rising global rivals.

Engelhardt 2010 [Tom, fellow at The Nation Institute, Teaching Fellow at the Graduate School of Journalism @ UC Berkeley, “Obama Starting to Sound Like Bush,” April 1, Mother Jones, <http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2010/04/obama-sounds-like-bush/> | VP – *Italics in original*]

Starting with that bomber’s jacket, the event had a certain eerie similarity to George W. Bush’s visits to Iraq. As Bush once swore that we would never step down until the Iraqis had stepped up, so Obama declared his war to be “absolutely essential.” General Mohammad Zahir Azimi, a spokesman for the Afghan Defense Ministry, even claimed that the president had used the long-absent (but patented) Bush word “victory” in his meeting with Hamid Karzai. Above all, whatever the talk about beginning to draw down his surge troops in mid-2011 – and he has so far committed more than 50,000 American troops to that country – when it comes to the Afghan War, the president seemed to signal that we are still on Pentagon time.

Particularly striking was his assurance that, while there would be “difficult days ahead… we also know this: The United States of America does not quit once it starts on something… [T]he American armed services does not quit, we keep at it, we persevere, and together with our partners we will prevail. I am absolutely confident of that.” He assured his listeners, and assumedly Americans at home, that we will “finish the job” (however undefined), and made another promise as well: “I’m looking forward,” he told the troops, “to returning to Afghanistan many times in the years to come.”

Many times in the years to come. Think about that and fasten your seatbelt. The U.S. evidently isn’t about to leave Afghanistan anytime soon. The president seems to have set his watch to the Pentagon’s clock, which means that, in terrible financial times, he is going to continue investing staggering sums of our money long-term in a perilous war in a distant land with terrible supply lines and no infrastructure. This represents a perfect Paul Kennedy-style working definition of “imperial overstretch.” Contrast this with the China-on-the-move that Michael Klare, TomDispatch regular and author of Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet describes here. If the world “folly” doesn’t come to mind, what does?

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Imperial overstretch has the unique propensity to disable our superpower status.

Layne 2009 [Christopher, Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and Nat'l Security at the George H.W. Bush School of Gov't and Public Service @ Texas A&M U, "The Waning of U.S. Hegemony -- Myth or Reality?" International Security, Volume 34, Number 1, Summer, MUSE | VP]

U.S. strategic retrenchment would enable rising powers to significantly narrow the current military gap between them and the United States. Brooks and Wohlforth argue that the rise of a single peer competitor capable of challenging the United States globally is unlikely. They overlook, however, other geopolitical mechanisms that can bring U.S. primacy to an end. At the turn of the twentieth century, Britain’s hegemony ended because London lacked the resources to cope with the simultaneous challenges mounted by regional great powers to its interests in Europe, Asia, and North America and also to deal with wars of empire such as the Boer War—not because it was challenged by a single great power globally. In coming years, there is a good chance that an increasingly overstretched United States could see its hegemony overthrown by a similar process. On Britain’s decline, see Aaron Friedberg, *Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895–1905* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988); Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery;* C.J. Lowe and M.L. Dockrill, *The Mirage of Power,* Vol. 1: *British Foreign Policy, 1902–1914* (London: Routledge, 1972); and Correlli Barnett, *The Collapse of British Power* (New York: William Morrow, 1972).

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Hegemony demands flexibility – selective engagement is necessary for effective power projection.

Art 2009 [Robert J., Christian A. Herter Prof. Int'l Relations @ Brandeis U, "The Strategy of Selective Engagement," in The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics, edited by Robert J. Art and Kenneth M. Waltz, pp. 345-6 | VP]

I believe not and think selective engagement preferable to isolationism on four grounds: First, today's isolationists do not embrace all six national interests prescribed above, whereas selective engagers embrace them all. For example, isolationists maintain relative indifference to nuclear spread, and some of them even believe that it may be beneficial because it reduces the probability of war. They assert that America's overseas economic interests no longer require the pro­jection of American military power, and see no great stake in keeping Persian Gulf reserves divided among several powers. To the extent that they believe a deep peace among the Eurasian great powers is important to the United States, they hold that offshore balancing (keeping all American troops in the United States) is as effective as onshore balancing (keeping American forces deployed forward in Eurasia at selected points) and safer. Indeed, most isolationists are pre­pared to use American military power to defend only two vital American inter­ests: repelling an attack on the American homeland and preventing a great‑power hegemon from dominating Eurasia. As a consequence, they can justifiably be called the most selective of selective engagers.

Second, isolationism forgoes the opportunity to exploit the full peacetime political utility of America's alliances and forward‑deployed forces to shape events to its advantage. Isolationism's general approach is to cope with events after they have turned adverse rather than to prevent matters from turning adverse in the first place. Thus, even though it does not eschew the use of force, isola­tionism remains at heart a watching and reactive strategy, not, like selective engagement, a precautionary and proactive one.

Third, isolationism makes more difficult the warlike use of America's military power, when that is required, because it forgoes peacetime forward deployment. This provides the United States with valuable bases, staging areas, intelligence­gathering facilities, in‑theater training facilities, and most important, close allies with whom it continuously trains and exercises. These are militarily significant advantages and constitute valuable assets if war needs to be waged. Should the United States have to go to war with an isolationist strategy in force, however, these assets would need to be put together under conditions ranging from less than auspicious to emergency‑like. Isolationism thus makes war waging more dif­ficult than it need be.

Fourth, isolationism is not as balanced and diversified a strategy as is selec­tive engagement and not as good a hedge against risk and uncertainty. Selective engagement achieves balance and diversity from its hybrid nature: it borrows the good features from its six competitors but endeavors to avoid their pitfalls and excesses. Like isolationism, selective engagement is wary of the **risks** of military entanglement overseas, but unlike isolationism, it believes that some entangle­ments either lower the chances of war or are necessary to protect important Amer­ican interests even at the risk of war. Unlike collective security, selective engage­ment does not assume that peace is indivisible, but like collective security, it believes in operating multilaterally in military operations wherever possible to spread the burdens and risks, and asserts that standing alliances make such oper­ations easier to organize and more successful when undertaken. Unlike global containment, selective engagement does not believe current conditions require a full‑court press against any great power, but like regional containment, it knows that balancing against an aspiring regional hegemon requires the sustained coop­eration of the other powers in the area and that such cooperation is not sustain­able without a visible American military presence. Unlike dominion, selective engagement does not seek to dominate others, but like dominion, it understands the power and influence that America's military primacy brings. Finally, like cooperative security, selective engagement seeks transparency in military rela­tions, reductions in armaments, and the control of NBC spread, but unlike coop­erative security, it does not put full faith in the reliability of collective security or defensive defense should these laudable aims fail.

Compared to selective engagement, isolationism is less balanced because it is less diversified. It allows standing military

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coalitions to crumble, forsakes for­ward deployment, and generally eschews attempts to control the armaments of the other great and not‑so‑great powers. Isolationism's outstanding virtue is that it achieves complete freedom for the United States to act or not to act whenever it sees fit, but the freedom comes at a cost: the loss of a diversified approach. Most isolationists, of course, are prepared to trade balance and diversity for complete freedom of action, because they see little worth fighting for (save for the two interests enumerated above), because they judge that prior military commitments are not necessary to protect them, and because they calculate that alliances will only put the United States in harm's way.

In sum, selective engagement is a hedging strategy; isolationism is not. To hedge is to make counterbalancing investments in order to avoid or lessen loss. Selective engagement makes hedging bets (primarily through alliances and over­seas basing), because it does not believe that the international environment, absent America's precommitted stance and forward presence, will remain benign to Amer­ica's interests, as apparently does isolationism. An isolationist America in the sense defined above would help produce a more dangerous and less prosperous world; an internationalist America, a more peaceful and prosperous one, As a consequence, engagement rejects the free hand for the **selectively** committed hand. Thus, for these four reasons the goals it posits, its proactive stance, its warfighting advan¬tages, and its hedging approach selective engagement beats isolationism.

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U.S. leadership is key to facilitate global peace and deter great power wars.

Thayer 2006 [Bradley A., Assoc. Prof. Defense and Strategic Studies @ Mo. State U, “In Defense of Primacy,” in The National Interest, Nov/Dec, Proquest]

THROUGHOUT HISTORY, peace and stability have been great benefits of an era where there was a dominant power-Rome, Britain or the United States today. Scholars and statesmen have long recognized the irenic effect of power on the anarchic world of international politics. Everything we think of when we consider the current international order-free trade, a robust monetary regime, increasing respect for human rights, growing democratization-is directly linked to U.S. power. Retrenchment proponents seem to think that the current system can be maintained without the current amount of U.S. power behind it. In that they are dead wrong and need to be reminded of one of history's most significant lessons: Appalling things happen when international orders collapse. The Dark Ages followed Rome's collapse. Hitler succeeded the order established at Versailles. Without U.S. power, the liberal order created by the United States will end just as assuredly. As country and western great Ral Dormer sang: "You don't know what you've got (until you lose it)." Consequently, it is important to note what those good things are. In addition to ensuring the security of the United States and its allies, American primacy within the international system causes many positive outcomes for Washington and the world. The first has been a more peaceful world. During the Cold War, U.S. leadership reduced friction among many states that were historical antagonists, most notably France and West Germany. Today, American primacy helps keep a number of complicated relationships aligned-between Greece and Turkey, Israel and Egypt, South Korea and Japan, India and Pakistan, Indonesia and Australia. This is not to say it fulfills Woodrow Wilson's vision of ending all war. Wars still occur where Washington's interests are not seriously threatened, such as in Darfur, but a Pax Americana does reduce war's likelihood, particularly war's worst form: great power wars.

Hegemony – Anti-Americanism – 2AC [1/2]

Afghanistan troop presence breeds anti-Americanism.

Center for Defense Information 2001 [“Lessons from history: US Policy towards Afghanistan 1978-2001,” http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/afghanistan-history.cfm]

In his statements and speeches since Sept. 11, U.S. President George W. Bush has been careful to distinguish the members of Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda organization and the Taliban, from the people of Afghanistan and Muslims of the world.

Still, with military action in Afghanistan expected soon, it is necessary to look hard at Afghanistan's past two decades of turmoil and seek to learn lessons from that past. And while there are many factors leading to the dismal situation of Afghanistan today, it also is the case that missteps in U.S. foreign policy are, in part, to blame. U.S. policy toward Afghanistan, Russia and the region during the 1980s helped, at least indirectly, nurture the growth of anti-American and fundamentalist forces now controlling Kabul, and indeed, even some of the terrorists now being sought by the United States for the Sept. 11 attacks against New York and Washington. In planning for intervention in Afghanistan now, the Bush administration must work hard to avoid the mistakes of the past.

That threatens our grand strategy – America will turn inwards.

Walt 2005 [Stephen M., Academic Dean and Belfer Prof. Int’l Affairs @ Harvard U, Foreign Affairs, Vol 84, Iss 5, Sep/Oct, EBSCO]

Unfortunately, the United States has unwittingly given its critics a great deal of ammunition in recent years. Not only did the Bush administration disregard the UN Security Council when it launched its preventive war against Iraq, but its justification for the war turned out to be false, and its bungled occupation has inflicted new suffering on the Iraqi people. President Bush may truly believe that "life [in Iraq] is being improved by liberty," but the rest of the world sees the invasion as a demonstration of the dangers of unchecked U.S. power. To make matters worse, U.S. policies since September 11 have reinforced the belief that the United States does not abide by its own ideals. The torture and abuse graphically documented at Abu Ghraib prison, the deaths of Muslim prisoners of war in U.S. custody, the desecration of the Koran by U.S. interrogators, the harsh treatment of and denial of due process to prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, and the conspicuous absence of a single high-level resignation in the wake of these revelations have all made it easy for the United States' critics to portray the country as quick to condemn everyone but itself. Given this background, it is hardly surprising that this summer an Italian judge ordered the arrest of 13 people believed to have been involved in a CIA operation that kidnapped a terrorism suspect in Italy and flew him to Egypt for interrogation in February 2003. Like President Bush, who said that the Abu Ghraib abuses did not reflect "the America I know," Americans may dismiss these accusations as false, misleading, or exaggerated. But the issue is not what Americans think of their nation's conduct; the issue is how that conduct appears to others. Some of these accusations may be unfounded, but many are seen as valid. And they are rapidly draining the reservoir of international goodwill that makes the United States' status as a superpower acceptable to the world. The United States is in a global struggle for hearts and minds, and it is losing. If anti-Americanism continues to grow, Washington will face greater resistance and find it harder to attract support. Americans will feel increasingly threatened in such a world, but trying to counter these threats alone will merely exacerbate the fear of U.S. power and isolate the United States even more.

Hegemony – Anti-Americanism – 2AC [2/2]

**And, it damages our international credibility.**

Nye 2004 [Joseph, former Asst. Secretary of Defesne, Dean @ Harvard U JFK School of Gov’t, “The Decline of America’s Soft Power,” <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59888/joseph-s-nye-jr/the-decline-of-americas-soft-power>]

Anti-Americanism has increased in recent years, and the United States' soft power -- its ability to attract others by the legitimacy of U.S. policies and the values that underlie them -- is in decline as a result. According to Gallup International polls, pluralities in 29 countries say that Washington's policies have had a negative effect on their view of the United States. A Eurobarometer poll found that a majority of Europeans believes that Washington has hindered efforts to fight global poverty, protect the environment, and maintain peace. Such attitudes undercut soft power, reducing the ability of the United States to achieve its goals without resorting to coercion or payment.

Skeptics of soft power (Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld professes not even to understand the term) claim that popularity is ephemeral and should not guide foreign policy. The United States, they assert, is strong enough to do as it wishes with or without the world's approval and should simply accept that others will envy and resent it. The world's only superpower does not need permanent allies; the issues should determine the coalitions, not vice-versa, according to Rumsfeld.

But the recent decline in U.S. attractiveness should not be so lightly dismissed. It is true that the United States has recovered from unpopular policies in the past (such as those regarding the Vietnam War), but that was often during the Cold War, when other countries still feared the Soviet Union as the greater evil. It is also true that the United States' sheer size and association with disruptive modernity make some resentment unavoidable today. But wise policies can reduce the antagonisms that these realities engender. Indeed, that is what Washington achieved after World War II: it used soft-power resources to draw others into a system of alliances and institutions that has lasted for 60 years. The Cold War was won with a strategy of containment that used soft power along with hard power.

The United States cannot confront the new threat of terrorism without the cooperation of other countries. Of course, other governments will often cooperate out of self-interest. But the extent of their cooperation often depends on the attractiveness of the United States.

Hegemony – Overstretch – Light Footprint Solves\*\*

Only abandoning nation-building counterinsurgency measures solves – it creates a regional balance of power with dramatically decreased troop presence.

Surhke 2010 [Astri, Chr. Michelsen Institute, the eighth annual Anthony Hyman memorial lecture, School of Oriental and Africa Studies - U of London, "The Case for a Light Footprint: The international project in Afghanistan," March 17, http://www.cmi.no/file/?997 | VP]

The insurgency has had a multiplier effect on the contradictions of the state-building project. The war has produced demands for more and faster results, and hence for more external control and greater presence. Military objectives and institutions are favoured in the reconstruction. Increasing warfare and Western presence undermines the legitimacy of the government. These pressures created counter-pressures which sharpen the tensions.

What, then, can be done? What are the policy implications of this analysis? There are basically two courses of action. One is to add sufficient foreign capital, expertise and forces to in effect overcome the contradictions. The foreign presence would be there for the very long haul and take an overtly direct role in decision-making; in effect, institute ‘shared sovereignty’. This course of action has been tried, albeit on a modest scale, for the past eight years of gradually deepening involvement, culminating in the military and civilian surge announced by President Barack Obama in December 2009. The results have not been convincing. A more radical version of the same policy, entailing resources on a scale that might bring the achievement of the intervention’s stated objectives within reach, is likely to meet political resistance in the Western countries as well as in Afghanistan.

The logical alternative is to place greater reliance on the Afghan government to deal with the problems of both the insurgency and the reconstruction. A reduction in the international presence would at least reduce the associated tensions and contradictions discussed above. This course of action also entails difficulties and conflicts. Any Afghan government has to face the problems of a mounting insurgency, a fragmented society, a deeply divided polity and a complex regional context. Nevertheless, to take only the insurgency, it is clear that in large part it is driven by local conflict over land, water and local power, particularly between the tribes and solidarity groups that were pushed out in 2001 and those who seized power after 200l. Such conflicts can better be addressed without a deeply disturbing foreign military presence. The often-cited fear that a NATO military withdrawal will spark renewed civil war between regional and ethnic factions is more influenced by the memory of the previous civil war in the 1990s than by an assessment of current regional-ethnic relations. Importantly, many faction leaders today have strong economic and political interests in the status quo. A NATO withdrawal, moreover, is unlikely to be total and sudden. Maintaining a residual international force in Kabul would help prevent a repeat of the civil war that occurred in the 1990s, which was fought over control of the capital. Overall, it seems that a gradual reduction in the prominent Western presence may give space for national and regional forces to explore compromises and a regional balance of power that will permit the development of a less violent reconstruction of the state and economy in Afghanistan. By early 2010, this seemed to be the way developments were going.

Hegemony – Overstretch – Nationbuilding Bad

Population-centric counterinsurgency dominates American military strategy – maintaining existing troop levels prevents focused efforts toward stabilizing Afghanistan.

Gentile 2009 [Colonel Gian P., director of the Military History Program at the US Military Academy, PhD History @ Stanford U, "A Strategy of Tactics: Population-centric COIN and the Army," Autumn, http://www.cffc.navy.mil/gentile.pdf | VP]

Good strategy, however, demands the consideration of alternatives, yet the American Army’s fixation on population-centric COIN precludes choice. We may have become adept at appearing to apply Galula’s principles in Iraq and Afghanistan, but we are not good strategists. Strategy is about choice, options, and the wisest use of resources in war to achieve policy objectives. Yet in the American Army’s new way of war, tactics—that is, the carrying out of the “way”—have utterly eclipsed strategy.

Nation-building using population-centric COIN as its centerpiece should be viewed as an operation. It should not be viewed as strategy, or even policy for that matter. But what is occurring now in Afghanistan, for example, at least for the American Army, is a “strategy of tactics.” If strategy calls for nation-building as an operational method to achieve policy objectives, and it is resourced correctly, then the population-centric approach might make sense. But because the United States has “principilized” population-centric COIN into the only way of doing any kind of counterinsurgency, it dictates strategy.

Tactical Orientation

Ironically, the new approach has inverted political scientist Andrew Krepinevich’s damning criticism of the American Army in his hugely influential but deeply flawed 1986 book, The Army in Vietnam. Krepinevich’s strategy of tactics argument for Vietnam was that the American Army was so conventionally minded and hidebound that it was unable to see a better way of population-centric COIN.4 Now the American Army has done the inverse. The Army is so tactically oriented toward population-centric counterinsurgency that it cannot think of doing anything else. General Stanley McChrystal’s recently released command guidance to forces in Afghanistan employs all of the dictums of population-centric counterinsurgency and confirms this strategy of tactics. His statement that success in Afghanistan will not be determined by the number of enemy killed but by the “shielding” of the civilian population could have easily come out of the pages of FM 3-24, or commander’s talking points during the Iraq Surge.5

These population-centric COIN principles have been turned into immutable rules that are dictating strategy in Afghanistan and having a powerful shaping effect on reorganizing the American Army. A few months ago, when asked about the way ahead for the American military in Afghanistan and how Iraq was comparable to Afghanistan, General David Petraeus acknowledged that the two were very different. But the thing to remember, according to General Petraeus, was that the principles of COIN that the Army has learned in Iraq over the past couple of years are applicable to Afghanistan.6

Those principles belong to the population-centric COIN methodology. If we accept that the principles are applicable, then we have already chosen the way ahead in Afghanistan, which is population-centric nation-building requiring large numbers of American ground combat forces, dispersed into the local population in an effort to win their hearts and minds away from the insurgent enemy, and to eventually build a nation.

It is a recipe for a long-term American combat presence in the world’s troubled spots. At present in the American Army there does not seem to be any alternatives. The inability to realistically consider alternatives reveals that the Army has become dogmatic, bound like a Gordian knot to the methods of population-centric counterinsurgency as the sole solution in Afghanistan and, potentially, in any other part of the world where instability and insurgencies are brewing.7

Hegemony – Overstretch – Nationbuilding Bad

Counter-insurgency is total war – it unnecessarily prolongs military conflict and damages our strategic interests across the globe.

Gentile 2009 [Colonel Gian P., director of the Military History Program at the US Military Academy, PhD History @ Stanford U, "A Strategy of Tactics: Population-centric COIN and the Army," Autumn, http://www.cffc.navy.mil/gentile.pdf | VP]

Instead of American Army officers reading the so-called COIN classic texts of Galula, Thompson, Kitson, and Nagl, they should be reading the history of the British Empire in the latter half of the nineteenth century. It is in this period that if they did nothing else right the British Army and government did understand the value of strategy. They understood the essence of linking means to ends. In other words, they did not see military operations as ends in themselves but instead as a means to achieve policy objectives. And they realized that there were costs that had to be paid.27

The new American way of war has eclipsed the execution of sound strategy, producing never-ending campaigns of nation-building and attempts to change entire societies in places like Afghanistan. One can only guess at the next spot on the globe for this kind of crusade.28 Former Army officer and writer Craig Mullaney, who recently penned a book-portrait of himself and what he learned in combat, said that the “Achilles’ heel for Americans is our lack of patience.” But perhaps not; perhaps America’s lack of patience in wars like Iraq and Afghanistan should be seen as a virtue in that it could act as a mechanism to force the US military to execute strategy in a more efficient and successful manner. Doing strategy better would leverage the American Army out of its self-inflicted box of counterinsurgency tactics and methodologies into a more open assessment of alternatives to current military actions in Afghanistan.

The new American way of war commits the US military to campaigns of counterinsurgency and nation-building in the world’s troubled spots. In essence it is total war—how else can one understand it any differently when COIN experts talk about American power “changing entire societies”—but it is a total war without the commensurate total support of will and resources from the American people. This strategic mismatch might prove catastrophic in the years ahead if the United States cannot figure out how to align means with ends in a successful strategy. The new American way of war perverts and thus prevents us from doing so.

The ancient Chinese philosopher of war Sun Tzu had this to say about the conduct of war and implicitly about its nature:

Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory . . . . Tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat . . . . There is no instance of a nation benefitting from prolonged warfare . . . . Speed is the essence of war.29

The new American way of war—wars amongst the people—has turned Sun Tzu’s maxim on its head. These days it is customary to think of war and conflict as prolonged affairs that afflict the farthest-flung precincts of US influence, thereby demanding a long-term American military presence on the ground. We are told by the experts that this new way of war requires time, patience, modest amounts of blood, and vast amounts of treasure. Sun Tzu was highlighting strategy, and strategy is about choice, options, and the wisest use of resources in war to achieve political objectives. Yet in the new way of American war, tactics have buried strategy, and it precludes any options other than an endless and likely futile struggle to achieve the loyalty of populations that, in the end, may be peripheral to American interests.

Hegemony – Overstretch – Readiness

Increased deployment kills readiness.

Dreyer 2006[Colonel Vincent, US Army, Vincent, “Retooling the Nation-Building Strategy in Afghanistan”, submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree at the U.S. Army War College, February 28, 2006 http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA448658&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)

Most critics of the current strategy contend that it is woefully under-resourced, or that the ways employed do not adequately address the fundamental requirements of nation-building. A few pundits even argue that the end state itself is flawed. James Dobbins’ RAND study of past post-conflict efforts shows a direct correlation between resources – numbers of soldiers deployed, money spent – and the capacity to provide security, build democratic institutions, and foster economic development.44 Citing Kosovo as a success story, he notes that the “United States and its allies have put 25 times more money and 50 times more troops per capita into postconflict Kosovo than into postconflict Afghanistan.”45 Substantial increases in money and manpower would undoubtedly contribute to the success of SSR and facilitate the formation of many more PRTs, yet there are at least three risks associated with this approach. First, a larger military presence, especially of American troops, might incite the largely Islamic population and feed claims that “imperial” America is occupying Afghanistan. Second, if the U.S. provides the bulk of the additional troops, this commitment of forces will weaken the nation’s already stressed capacity to respond to other contingencies around the world, as well as exacerbate the relentless optempo experienced by our armed forces. Finally, increased spending will reduce both U.S. and allied capacity to pursue domestic agendas, which could erode public support for continued involvement in the rebuilding effort.

Hegemony – Overstretch – Troops

The military occupation in the middle east has led to imperial overstetch.

Lobe, Washington Bureau Chief of the international news agency [Inter Press Service](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inter_Press_Service), 03

(Jim, Online Asia Times, “US losing the peace in Afghanistan” http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central\_Asia/EF21Ag01.html)

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Continuing challenges to the US military occupation in Iraq, as well as the general insecurity there, has forced the Pentagon to deploy at least 140,000 troops there - twice as many as it had planned before the invasion - and to go begging to its coalition partners, such as Italy, Poland and even El Salvador, for contributions to a peacekeeping force that could replace some US soldiers.

If, as the task forces urges, Washington wanted to enlarge ISAF, which will come under North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) command in August, it will have to ask many of the same governments it is appealing to now for help in Iraq to provide more for Afghanistan.

In addition, tensions with Iran have been rising steadily over the past six weeks as the administration appears increasingly inclined to adopt a policy of "regime change", which could include covert paramilitary action and even military strikes in a country whose population is roughly twice that of Afghanistan and Iraq combined.

"This is what is called 'imperial over-stretch'," noted one congressional aide whose boss has long warned that Bush's post-September 11 strategic ambitions would stretch US forces impossibly thin within a very short time. The task force's pessimism regarding trends in Afghanistan is not much different from a number of analyses since May 1, when Pentagon chief Donald Rumsfeld declared on a visit to Kabul that hostilities had finally ended and that reconstruction could begin in earnest.

Despite that pronouncement, Karzai has been unable to gain substantially greater authority over provincial governors and warlords; disorder has persisted; the Taliban and their allies have escalated their attacks against targets ranging from US Special Forces to foreign travelers and aid workers; and an ambitious, United Nations-backed demobilization and disarmament program launched in May has not progressed far.

Hegemony – Overstretch – Diffuse Commitment

American hegemony is in trouble due to overexpansion and too many military commitments.

Lieber, Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown University, 08

(Robert J, “The Declinists Are Wrong Again” Perspectives Paper on current affairs http://www.biu.ac.il/Besa/perspectives47.html)

Scarcely a day goes by without yet another book, article, speaker or report asserting that America is in trouble. We are told that the rise of China and India, the recovery of Putin’s Russia and the expansion of the European Union signal a profound shift in geopolitical power. War and insurgency in Iraq and the tenacity of the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan are cited as evidence that military commitments are “breaking” the army. The leaders of Iran and North Korea vilify America and frustrate efforts to limit their nuclear programs. President Chavez of Venezuela, fortified by $130 per barrel oil, denounces Yankee imperialism and threatens to cut off oil shipments to the US. Meanwhile, opinion polls show widespread anti-American sentiment abroad.

On the domestic front, the subprime mortgage crisis, investment bank turmoil, a yawning balance of payments deficit, and the falling dollar lead to a warning that, “We are competing – and losing – in a global marketplace.” And America has become an “enfeebled” superpower, according to Fareed Zakaria, who adds that while the US will not be replaced in the foreseeable future, nevertheless, “Just as the rest of the world is opening up, America is closing down.”

The declinists’ central proposition holds that both the rise of other countries and an increasing degree of counterbalancing are transforming the international system and profoundly weakening the leading role of the United States in world affairs.

The new declinism rests not only on a global narrative, but it also makes an argument about fundamental domestic weaknesses. It points to the long-term burdens of entitlement programs, which will face large unfunded liabilities. Deficits in international trade and payments and the federal budget, a major credit crisis, collapse of the residential housing bubble and economic turbulence add to the list of troubles. Another clearly overdue task concerns the need to reduce dependence on imported oil and the resultant economic and security vulnerabilities. America’s infrastructure is aging and in need of repair and modernization. In addition, the effectiveness of government institutions may be less than optimal, as evident in the chaotic response to Hurricane Katrina, ongoing problems at the Department of Homeland Security, cumbersome interaction among intelligence agencies, and the need for more effective coordination of national security policy.

Hegemony – Overstretch – Debts

Afghanistan is hurting the U.S. ability to be global hegemon.

The National 2009 [“Imperial America’s Reckoning Day Has Only Been Delayed”, December, http://www.stephenglain.com/index.php?mact=News,cntnt01,detail,0&cntnt01articleid=211&cntnt01returnid=52]

On February 21, 1947, the British government informed US president Harry Truman that it could no longer afford to subsidize Greece and Turkey in their resistance to communist movements. London appealed to Washington to assume Britain’s burden at a cost of US$500 million a year in financial aid and a garrison of 40,000 troops. It was the end of Pax Britannica and the dawn of the American empire. Today,the value of total debt carried by the US economy is equal to 3.5 times the nation’s GDP. Its defense budget – at $680 billion (Dh2.49 trillion), roughly half of what the rest of the world spends on national defense – is larger than the economy of Poland. Factor in non-Pentagon security-related outlays – maintenance of the country’s nuclear arsenal, for example, the department of homeland security or the US Treasury’s military retirement fund –and America’s real defense commitment expands to nearly $1tn annually. That is equal to about 28 per cent of a total federal budget that is forecast to leak $1.4tn in red ink this year and another $1tn each year for the next decade.   And now, Afghanistan. In his landmark address last week, Barack Obama, the US president, assured Americans he would not set national security objectives “that go beyond our responsibility, our means, or our interests”. Mr Obama then set about listing policy goals that would do just that. The president’s “to do” list in Afghanistan would, by any judicious appraisal, turn a generation of American taxpayers into wards of the Pentagon.  *L'état, c'est moi* -"The state is me" - the 18th-century King Louis XIV of France famously said. If Congress concedes to the defense department its latest wish list for war, *l'état, c'est l'armée*.   The costs of the Afghanistan "surge" will, the congressional research service (CRS) says, extend the price tag for Washington's wars in Iraq and Afghanistan above $1tn. The White House estimates the annual cost of the new deployment of 30,000 new troops at about $1 million a head, although independent estimates put the total figure closer to $40bn. The request for new funding would increase the total bill for next year's US operations in Afghanistan to $100bn, up from $55bn this year and $43bn last year. The CRS says that if troop levels in Iraq and Afghanistan were to average 75,000 over the next decade, the costs for both wars would total an additional $867bn - more than the hotly debated $848bn healthcare bill working its way through Congress. How will politicians finance what is now Mr Obama's war? Certainly not as a budgeted item. The president intends to foot the bill as an off-budget, supplemental expenditure, the same way his predecessor, George W Bush, paid for the two conflicts throughout his two terms. When he assumed the presidency, Mr Obama to his credit reversed this accounting sleight of hand, insisting that the cost of war be reflected in the budget as an additional burden for a heavily indebted nation. Now, only half way into the current fiscal year, he is reversing.  Will the costs of the surge be offset with spending cuts and tax increases? Not likely. Some members of Mr Obama's Democratic Party have proposed a small levy on a population that has, except for a tiny minority, been spared the pain and sacrifice of war. But even their own party elders are unlikely to support such an idea, lest they be tarred by Republicans as "tax and spend" liberals.   Republicans, meanwhile, are eager to underwrite any new military commitment the Pentagon might prescribe, assuming it is paid for with additional borrowings - that is, sales of public debt to the Chinese - or cuts in social programs. This is the same Republican Party that controlled Congress and the White House for six of the last eight years while Mr Bush ran up record budget deficits, only to rediscover the virtue of fiscal restraint the minute Mr Obama was sworn in as president.   The end of the American empire has been the stuff of prophecy at least since 1987 with the publication of The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, the British historian Paul Kennedy's meditation on how "imperial overstretch" would ultimately do the US in as a global supreme leader. Although Mr Kennedy's prediction may have been premature, his thesis - that global or even regional power can be sustained only through a prudent calibration of wealth creation and expenditure - remains sound. By the late 1980s, the US economy had only just begun the process of inflating its way to prosperity after Reagan-era tax cuts and deficit spending. The US has not avoided the reckoning warned of by Mr Kennedy. It has only delayed it.

\*\*\*NATO\*\*\*\*

1AC – NATO

Advantage [\_\_] – NATO

NATO leadership is committed to maintaining existing counterforce levels in Afghanistan despite McChrystal’s departure.

Reuters 2010 [Thierry Roge, Justyna Pawlak, “NATO chief says strategy for Afghanistan,” June 23, <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE65M4XN20100623> | VP]

BRUSSELS (Reuters) - NATO will maintain its approach to Afghanistan after President Barack Obama on Wednesday relieved his top general in the country from command, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said.

"I have taken note that General McChrystal is stepping down as Commander of the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan. While he will no longer be the commander, the approach he helped put in place is the right one," Rasmussen said in a statement.

"The strategy continues to have NATO's support and our forces will continue to carry it out."

Naming General David Petraeus to replace McChrystal, Obama also said the shift did not reflect a change in policy.

McChrystal's dismissal follows remarks he and his aides made in a magazine article that disparaged the U.S. president and other senior civilian leaders.

In his statement, Rasmussen said NATO's top diplomat in Afghanistan Mark Sedwill will continue to oversee political efforts.

"Our operations in Afghanistan are continuing today, and they will not miss a beat," he said.

A NATO spokesman said under the existing structure of the alliance's forces its member states will not have to approve McChrystal's departure.

McChrystal's strategy focused on taking on the Taliban in their spiritual homeland by improving security, alongside a push to boost local governance and development, while training Afghan forces to take control before the start of a gradual U.S. troop withdrawal.

1AC – NATO

But, member countries are unhappy with consistent failure – they are beginning to move toward a total drawdown – the only alternative is an exclusively counter-terrorist force posture.

Wall Street Journal 2010 [Gordon Fairclough, Marcin Sobczyk, “Poland Cautions on NATO Strategy in Afghanistan,” June 24, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704227304575327022540618094.html> | VP]

A top Polish security official warned Thursday that NATO needs to change its approach in Afghanistan or risk a "strategic catastrophe," as allied political support for the U.S.-led counterinsurgency campaign there wavers.

Stanislaw Koziej, director of Poland's National Security Bureau, wrote in an analysis made public Thursday that North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces stationed in Afghanistan are just "passively waiting" for developments as the situation there grows "continuously worse."

Public opinion and official views in Poland, a staunch U.S. ally that has contributed troops to the American-led war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, have been shifting against the country's further involvement in the Afghan conflict.

More than 2,500 Polish troops are now serving in Ghazni, southwest of Kabul. Eighteen Polish soldiers have been killed in the conflict.

The comments by Mr. Koziej, a retired general, come a day after U.S. President Barack Obama replaced the top U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, after the general and his staff were quoted making intemperate comments about senior administration officials.

Mr. Obama said the U.S. would stay on its current strategic course in Afghanistan, with a plan that melds military action and economic development efforts. The U.S. has boosted the number of troops it has deployed in the country. More will be in place by the end of August. Still, in Mr. Koziej’s assessment, NATO’s position in Afghanistan is “deteriorating.” He said the resistance movement there is becoming “increasingly active and strong” and winning support from Afghan security forces as well as ordinary citizens.

He said Poland can’t afford to increase its engagement in Afghanistan further and that the tasks already taken on by Polish forces exceed their capacity. He called for scaling back allied goals and limiting them to preventing Afghanistan from threatening other nations.

Mr. Koziej warned that decisions by Canada and the Netherlands to pull out next year “could be seen as the beginning of allies backing out,” which could lead to a rush to withdraw “that will be **impossible** to stop.”

He said Poland should propose that NATO “redefine the goal of engagement from offensive to defensive,” giving up on the goal of turning Afghanistan into a reliable ally and instead coming up with a plan to effectively protect itself from any future Afghan threat.

1AC – NATO

A consistent grand strategy in Afghanistan is key to NATO cohesion – European nations’ break with the US crushes Alliance credibility.

Khan 2009 [Amina, Research Fellow @ the Institute of Strategic Studies – Islamabad, “President Barack Obama’s Policy on Afghanistan,” Institute of Strategic Studies, in *Reflections*, No. 1, <http://www.issi.org.pk/photos/PRESIDENT_BARAK_OBAMA.pdf> | VP]

Afghanistan has, and continues to be a critical test for the 26 member alliance. Afghanistan remains NATO’s first out of area combat mission and a failure in the Afghan war would risk the Alliance’s **credibility** as a successful organization, particularly in external operations. The US and NATO’s mission in Afghanistan is a case of a ‘large space and insufficient force ratios’. During the last NATO summit in Romania in April 2008, apart from disagreeing over Georgia and Ukraine as possible future NATO members, there were differences of opinion regarding NATO troop’s expansion and combat zones in the north and south of Afghanistan. Although NATO has always been reluctant in sending troops to meet the growing security challenges in Afghanistan, NATO member states must be prepared for US calls to do more regarding troop expansion and deployment particularly in the combat zones. The United States would like NATO to provide more troops and participate more in policing, drug interdiction, poppy eradication, and combat operations than its members states are apparently willing to offer. The worsening security situation has prevented NATO member nations from contributing extra troops needed to curb the growing Taliban insurgency. NATO-led ISAF operations have constantly been hindered by national caveats that restrict the operations of many units deployed in Afghanistan. Such restrictions limit deployment areas and types of missions for particular national contingents or impose other criteria that reduce the effectiveness and flexibility of ISAF operations. In fact many are of the view that Afghanistan is being viewed by the US as a **litmus test** of whether the Europeans can be taken seriously as strategic partners. However, Obama will, without a doubt, find resistance on the subject of getting more troops from NATO allies (with the exception of the UK) and will find it difficult to secure removal of caveats on the employment of troops already in Afghanistan.

While Britain has always contributed troops as well as advocated for other NATO members to contribute more significantly towards/in the ISAF in Afghanistan, other NATO countries, particularly Germany and France, have been less enthusiastic. The German Chancellor, Angela Merkel has insisted she would not send German troops to the volatile north and south. President Nicolas Sarkozy has also implied that further French deployment in Afghanistan would be difficult as French troops are already involved in ongoing operations in Chad, Kosovo, Congo and Lebanon.

NATO member states already provide around half of the 50,000 strong ISAF force in Afghanistan with the British, French, Germans, and Dutch making the principle contributions. However, NATO’s role and commitment in Afghanistan will only become clear after the next NATO summit in April 2009, when the US is likely to urge a recession-hit Europe to send more troops and spend more money on Afghanistan.

1AC – NATO

NATO credibility is key to an effective European nuclear deterrent – collapse leads to global nuclear war.

O’Sullivan 1998 [John, editor of the National Review, founder of the New Atlantic, June, *American Spectator*]

Some of those ideas--notably, dissolution and "standing pat"--were never likely to be implemented. Quite apart from the sociological law that says organizations never go out of business even if their main aim has been achieved (the only exception being a slightly ominous one, the Committee for the Free World, which Midge Decter closed down after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact), NATO's essential aim has not been permanently achieved. True, the Soviet threat is gone; but a nuclear-armed and potentially unstable Russia is still in the game; a major conflict has just been fought in the very Balkans which sparked the First World War; and there are a number of potential wars and civil wars lurking in such regions as the Tyrol, the Basque country, Northern Ireland (not yet finally settled), Corsica, Belgium, Kosovo, and Eastern Europe and the Balkans generally where, it is said, " every England has its Ireland, and every Ireland its Ulster." If none of these seems to threaten the European peace very urgently at present, that is in part because the existence of NATO makes any such threat futile and even counter-productive. No nation or would-be nation wants to take NATO on. And if not NATO, what? There are international bodies which could mediate some of the lesser conflicts: the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe is explicitly given that responsibility, and the European Union is always itching to show it can play a Big Power role. But neither body has the military heft or the prestige to deter or repress serious strife. The OSCE is a collective security organization, and as Henry Kissinger said of a similar body: "When all participants agree, there is no need for it; when they split, it is useless." And the EU only made itself look ridiculous when it attempted to halt the Bosnian conflict in its relatively early stages when a decisive intervention might have succeeded. As for dealing with a revived Russian threat, there is no military alliance in sight other than NATO that could do the job. In a sense, NATO today is Europe's defense. Except for the American forces, Western armies can no longer play an independent military role. They are wedded to NATO structures and dependent on NATO, especially American, technology. (As a French general admitted in the Gulf War: "The Americans are our eyes and ears.") If NATO were to dissolve--even if it were to be replaced by some European collective defense organization such as a beefed-up Western European Union--it would invite chaos as every irredentist faction sought to profit from the sudden absence of the main guarantor of European stability.

NATO – Alliance Casualties High

NATO casualties are on an upward trend.

AFP 6/30 [Karim Talbi, "Taliban attack NATO base in Afghanistan," <http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5i9VfmHh2xf0AFvBiB3GI0CHcssCg> | VP]

Last month, the Taliban attacked the main NATO base in Kandahar, the heartland of the Islamists' insurgency and the focus of a US-led campaign to drive out the militants.

A similar attack in May on Bagram airfield about 60 kilometres (35 miles) north of Kabul triggered several hours of fighting, resulting in the deaths of an American contract worker and 16 militants.

A total of 100 NATO troops serving in Afghanistan have been killed in June, making it the deadliest month for the alliance since the US-led invasion of 2001 that ousted the hardline Islamist Taliban.

The toll for the year to date is 320, compared with 520 in all of 2009, according to an AFP tally based on figures kept by the independent icasualties.org website.

NATO has seen a dramatic upswing in casualties as the alliance steps up military operations and taking the fight to the Taliban in areas where the Islamist militia has previously been unchallenged.

The United States and NATO have a combined 140,000 troops in Afghanistan, set to peak at 150,000 by August under McChrystal's "surge" strategy.

Last month the Taliban threatened a new nationwide campaign of attacks, targeting diplomats, Afghan parliamentarians and foreign contractors, as well as foreign forces.

NATO – Alliance Casualties High

NATO casualties are at their highest levels.

Christian Science Monitory 6/29 [Jonathan Adams, Correspondent - Terrorism & Security, "Deadliest month yet for NATO in Afghanistan," <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/terrorism-security/2010/0629/Deadliest-month-yet-for-NATO-in-Afghanistan> | VP]

More than 100 foreign troops fighting in Afghanistan have already died in June, making it the deadliest month to date in the nine-year war, according to independent monitor icasualties.org. Sources differ on the whether the increase in deaths is because of new Taliban techniques or recent military offensives in militant strongholds.

The high death count comes amid growing debate in the US on the prosecution of the war, in particular over strict rules of engagement for US soldiers. The rules have been credited with reducing civilian deaths, but some have criticized them for exposing troops to more danger.

The website icasualties.org is operated by a US-based monitor who aggregates information from news reports and military press releases. Its death toll is often higher than the official death toll, and AFP notes that NATO officially puts its June death toll at 81. This still exceeds the previous high, of 77 troop deaths in August 2009.

NATO – Allied Withdrawal Inevitable

All major allies are planning a withdrawal – we must realign our strategy now.

Sarro 2010[Doug, Int'l Relations and Peace and Conflict Studies @ U of Toronto, “FiveReasons to Withdraw From Afghanistan Sooner Rather Than Later,” June 23, Huffington Post, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/doug-sarro/five-reasons-to-withdraw_b_621903.html> | VP]

5. The rest of NATO won't be in Afghanistan much longer. Canada, which has been Washington's key ally in Kandahar, will be out by 2011. Britain will likely withdraw soon after, along with most of NATO's European contingent. If Obama does not synch his withdrawal with his allies', it won't be long before America finds itself alone in Afghanistan.

We can't pretend that an early American withdrawal won't have consequences for Afghanistan. But it's difficult to see how U.S. forces can avoid these consequences as long as the Afghan government remains unwilling to clean up its act, and as long as Pakistan's intelligence service remains committed to propping up militant groups.

This is why President Obama should stick to his plan to start withdrawing American troops from Afghanistan in 2011, and finish withdrawing soon after.

NATO – NATO Cohesion Brink

U.S.-NATO relations tense due to issues in Afghanistan

Kenneth Katzman, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs, has served in government and the private sector as an analyst in Persian Gulf affairs, with special emphasis on Iran and Iraq, currently analyzes U.S. policy and legislation on the Persian Gulf region for members of Congress and their staffs; also has written numerous articles in various outside publications, including a book entitled The Warriors of Islam: Iran's Revolutionary Guard; during 1996, Katzman was assigned to the House International Relations Committee; has spoken before several groups and appeared in numerous media outlets discussing his areas of specialty with appearances in CNN, NBC Nightly News, Nightline, The News Hour with Jim Lehrer, MBC (Middle East Broadcasting Company), and Independent Television (London); Katzman holds a Ph.D. in political science from New York University, 5/11/10 “Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy,” <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30588.pdf> accessed 6/26/10

As noted in McChrystal’s assessment, one of the most thorny issues has been the U.S. effort to persuade other NATO countries to adopt flexible rules of engagement that allow all contributing forces to perform combat missions. NATO and other partner forces have not, as they pledged at the NATO summit in April 2008, removed the so-called “national caveats” on their troops’ operations that Lt. Gen. McChrystal says limits operational flexibility. For example, some nations refuse to conduct night-time combat. Others have refused to carry Afghan personnel on their helicopters. Others do not fight after snowfall. These caveats were troubling to those NATO countries with forces in heavy combat zones, such as Canada, which feel they are bearing the brunt of the fighting.

NATO – NATO Cohesion Brink

Tensions rising between US and NATO—transatlantic burden sharing and interoperability issues

Ian **Davis**, consultant for the British American Security Information Council, **3/19/08** “NATO at a Crossroads,” <http://www.fpif.org/articles/nato_at_a_crossroads>

Transatlantic burden sharing – the debate about which countries are pulling their weight is one of the longest running in the alliance. The debate is now widening beyond defense spending to include contributions to non-military international public goods (such as aid to developing countries and reducing emissions of climate-damaging pollutants). European countries tend to be better at the latter, while the United States military budget continues to dwarf those in Europe. Interoperability – a corollary to the burden-sharing debate is the “capabilities gap” between the United States and its allies. This U.S. lead in military technology makes working together difficult for deployed forces, especially in today’s complex and difficult missions;

NATO – NATO Cohesion Brink [1/2]

NATO cohesion is on the brink – a mass excursion from Afghanistan is imminent.

Kulish 2010 [Nicholas, Berlin bureau chief for New York Times/WSJ, “Dutch Pull-Out From War Expected After Government Collapse,” February 21, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/22/world/europe/22dutch.html>]

BERLIN — A day after his government collapsed, Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende said Sunday that he expected Dutch troops to come home from Afghanistan before the end of the year.

A last-ditch effort by Mr. Balkenende to keep Dutch soldiers in the dangerous southern Afghan province of Oruzgan instead saw the Labor Party quit the government in the Netherlands early Saturday, immediately raising fears that the Western military coalition fighting the war was increasingly at risk.

Even as the allied offensive in the Taliban stronghold of Marja continued, it appeared almost certain that most of the 2,000 Dutch troops would be gone from Afghanistan by the end of the year. The question plaguing military planners was whether a Dutch departure would embolden the war’s critics in other allied countries, where debate over deployment is continuing, and hasten the withdrawal of their troops as well.

“The moment the Netherlands says as sole and first country we will no longer have activities at the end of 2010, it will raise questions in other countries and this really pains me,” Mr. Balkenende told the Dutch television program “Buitenhof” in an interview on Sunday, according to Reuters.

The collapse of the Dutch government comes as the Obama administration continues to struggle to get European allies to commit more troops to Afghanistan to bolster its attempts to win back the country from a resurgent Taliban. President Obama has made the Afghan war a cornerstone of his foreign policy and, after months of debate, committed tens of thousands more American troops to the effort.

“If the Dutch go, which is the implication of all this, that could open the floodgates for other Europeans to say, ‘The Dutch are going, we can go, too,’ ” said Julian Lindley-French, professor of defense strategy at the Netherlands Defense Academy in Breda. “The implications are that the U.S. and the British are going to take on more of the load.”

Dutch leaders had promised voters to bring most of the country’s troops home this year. But after entreaties from the United States, Mr. Balkenende tried to find a compromise to extend the Dutch presence, at least on a scaled-back basis. Instead, the Labor Party pulled out of the government after an acrimonious 16-hour cabinet meeting that ran into the early hours of Saturday.

Mr. Balkenende told Dutch television on Sunday that he now expected Dutch troops to leave Afghanistan as planned. "If nothing else will take its place, then it ends," he said, according to Reuters.

The Dutch troops have been important to the war effort, despite their small numbers, because about 1,500 of them were posted in Oruzgan.

Analysts said that new elections in the Netherlands, as well as the departure of the Dutch troops, now appeared inevitable.

The war in Afghanistan has been increasingly unpopular among voters in the Netherlands, as in many other parts of Europe, creating strains between governments trying to please the United States and their own people.

But the tension in the Netherlands also reveals how deep the fissures over the war have grown within the NATO alliance.

As the number of Dutch military casualties has increased — 21 soldiers have died — the public back home has grown increasingly resentful at the refusal of some other allies, in particular the Germans, to join the intense fighting in the south.

The probable loss of the Dutch contingent and the continuing resistance to significant increases in manpower by other allies demonstrate the extent to which the dividend expected from the departure of President George W. Bush, who was so unpopular in capitals across the Atlantic, has not materialized, despite Mr. Obama’s popularity in Europe.

“The support for Obama was always double-faced,” said Stefan Kornelius, foreign editor of the German newspaper

NATO – NATO Cohesion Brink [2/2]

Süddeutsche Zeitung. “It was never really heartfelt. People loved what they heard, but they never felt obliged to support Obama beyond what they were already doing.”

Since taking office, Mr. Obama has been pressing the non-American members of the coalition to increase their contribution, seeking up to 10,000 additional troops. While NATO has pledged around 7,000 troops, critics of the alliance’s efforts accuse it of fuzzy math: counting up to 2,000 soldiers who were already in Afghanistan but had been scheduled to leave after the recent election.

And even the 7,000 figure was notional; NATO is holding a “force generation conference” this week at which time official pledges will be made, and there are questions about whether it will reach that number.

The Dutch contingent is part of the roughly 40,000 troops from 43 countries who are aiding the United States in Afghanistan, most of those from NATO. The United States is fielding about 75,000 troops, but that number is expected to rise to about 98,000 by the end of the summer.

The Dutch troops were deployed to Oruzgan in 2006 and were originally supposed to stay for two years; that mandate already had been extended another two years to August 2010. Analysts in the Netherlands said they expected the Dutch troops to leave on time because any deal to keep them there appeared all but impossible in the tumult following the government’s collapse. “I don’t think there’s room, with a government falling and waiting for elections, for there to be a decision,” said Edwin Bakker, who runs the security and conflict program at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations.

NATO – Afghanistan Key

Afghanistan is the litmus test of US leadership in the alliance.

Vincent Morelli , Section Research Manager, Paul Belkin, Analyst in European affairs, 12/3/09, ARTICLE NAME, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33627.pdf>, , ACCESS DATE

NATO’s mission in Afghanistan also continues to test U.S. leadership of the alliance. The decision in late 2008 by the Obama Administration to send an additional 17,000 U.S. troops to the Afghanistan theatre in 2009 to provide additional security for the national elections had been by some in Europe as a “relief” for a few European capitals beset by public opposition to the war and other political dynamics. These observers, however, believed the U.S. decision would be used as an excuse for some nations to do less, anticipating that the United States would take on an even more enhanced role in the conflict. However, it is estimated that the NATO allies did provide an additional 5,000 military forces to support the August national election and help expedite the training of additional Afghan security forces. Now, in the wake of President Obama’s decision to send additional U.S. military forces to Afghanistan in 2010, the ability of the U.S. government to encourage increased European support for the ISAF mission has become yet a new challenge to the U.S. strategy for addressing the conflict.

NATO – AT: Hegemony = Double Turn

Selective engagement does not involve abandoning international institutions – exertion of NATO military power outside of internationally authorized activities remains a unilateral approach.

Malone and Khong 2003 [David M., president of the International Development Research Centre, former president of the International Peace Institute, frequently cited expert on international relations specifically between the US and the UN, and Yuen Foong, fellow of the Nuffield College and Driector for the Centre for International Studies @ Oxord U, former Assoc. Prof Govt @ Harvard U, "Unilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy: International Perspectives," in Unilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy: International Perspectives, edited by David M. Malone and Yuen Foong Khong, p. 9 | VP]

Use of force. Ekaterina Stepanova agrees with Thakur that Washington is acting multilaterally when it uses the United Nations to legitimize actions involving the use of force, but she considers the use of NATO military power without UN Security Council sanction as more akin to unilateralism than multilateralism. Thus, she regards U.S. efforts to forge the ad hoc multilateral Coalition to oust Iraqi forces from Kuwait in 1990 –1991 as a good benchmark for genuine multilateralism. The involvement of the Security Council was what gave Operation Desert Storm its multilateral identity and legitimacy, although the sheer number of countries participating actively in the Coalition (more than two dozen) also contributed to both aims. In Kosovo, however, the United States acted unilaterally—even though it acted in concert with NATO to bomb Yugoslavia—because it chose to bypass the Security Council when it became clear that Russia and China would not sanction the use of force against Yugoslavia. Stepanova’s analysis leads her to the conclusion that the U.S.-NATO 1999 air campaign against Yugoslavia was an act of “unilateral multilateralism.” She concludes that this approach to the use of force was insufficiently sensitive to the security worries of several major U.S. interlocutors such as Russia and China (and, one might add, India).

NATO – AT: Hegemony = Double Turn

This is specifically true of Afghanistan.

Sennott 2009 [C.M, GlobalPost, "Obama's 'soft unilateralism' with NATO, April 3, http://www.globalpost.com/notebook/worldview/090403/obamas-soft-unilateralism-nato | VP]

In Strasbourg today, President Obama will be asking NATO to step up its commitment in Afghanistan and to support his administration’s escalation of the war.

It will be a hard sell.

Many European countries, like the Netherlands, have committed significant troops and fought hard against the Taliban and Al Qaeda.

But the war is vastly unpopular among the Dutch and the government will be hard pressed to commit any more resources.

France — which begins this summit with a new and more rational role in NATO as a full member since President Nicolas Sarkozy overturned its petulant past position of being a member but not adhering to command — sent an additional battalion to Afghanistan in the fall.

But just as it did so 10 French soldiers were killed in an ambush and their solemn military funerals were aired on national television, riveting the country. The French hardly seem to have the stomach for any further increase of troops in Afghanistan.

Canada, meanwhile, has lost more than 110 soldiers in the conflict, and an escalation of troops isn't popular there, either.

There are visceral aspects to this — whether as Europeans these NATO members “want peace or want to be left in peace?” as Sarkozy framed the question a few weeks ago.

And there are practical aspects: The U.S. is pushing hard for a unity of command in a country where there are too many generals and too complex a command structure that tangles along the lines of U.S. troops and NATO troops.

There is also a profound difference between NATO and the U.S. when it comes to the mission. As Obama clearly outlined in his announcement of the strategic review, the U.S. mission is part of a relentless struggle to defeat the terrorists of Al Qaeda and their ideology in Afghanistan and Pakistan. For NATO, the mission is an exercise in nation building.

If that divide becomes too great, the U.S. will likely go it alone in Afghanistan and Pakistan. If so, Obama will have listened to Europe, invited them to be part of the strategy. He will say the U.S. understands Europe's position, but that the U.S. has clear goals that it must carry out. It is a profound difference in approach from Bush, but it may not be so different in its effect.

The conservative historian Robert Kagan has coined yet another phrase that seems to fit well for the American approach to Europe.

In the era of Obama, he calls it “the soft unilateralism of low expectations.”

\*\*\*WARLORDS\*\*\*

1AC – Warlords

Advantage [\_\_] – Provincialism

Karzai’s government is doomed to failure – abandoning national security initiatives and withdrawing support for the central government allows for the consolidation of provincial regimes that facilitates regional stability.

Fisher 2009 [Max, Assoc. Editor – foreign affairs and nat’l security, The Atlantic, “Can Warlords Save Afghanistan?” November 18, <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2009/11/can-warlords-save-afghanistan/30397/>]

President Obama has made it clear that any strategy he commits to in Afghanistan must stabilize the country while accounting for our exit. But a very significant hurdle stands in the way: the notorious weakness of Afghanistan's police and military. Of the troop-level plans Obama has reportedly considered, even the smallest emphasizes training and assistance for Afghan forces. After all, for us to leave, Afghan institutions must be able to replace the 100,000 foreign troops currently providing security. This makes building a massive, national Afghan military one of our top priorities in the region. Critics of this plan say the Afghan military is hopelessly disorganized, ill-equipped and corrupt. Supporters say it's crucial to our success. But there may be another way.

Bolstering the Afghan military carries significant risks. Given how illegitimate Afghan President Hamid Karzai's government is perceived to be by Afghans, a Karzai-led army would be poorly received and perhaps worsen anti-government sentiment. If a national Afghanistan army has a fraction of the national government's corruption, it could inspire disastrous backlash. Under Karzai's corrupt governance, the application of a national security force would wax and wane with political whims. With no personal stake in security outside Kabul, would Karzai really risk his resources and military strength to counter every threat or pacify every skirmish?

Afghanistan has not been a stable, unified state with a strong centralized government in three decades. The cultural and political institutions for a single national force may simply no longer exist. But Afghanistan, owing in part to necessity and in part to the tumultuous processes that have shaped the country, retains functional, if weak, security infrastructure at the provincial level. In the post-Soviet power vacuum and throughout periods of civil war, warlords arose to lead local militias. Many of them still remain in place--they were among our strongest allies in routing the Taliban's hold on the government--and have settled into more stationary roles somewhere between warlord and governor. Local rule has become the Afghan way. Local leaders who operate their own provincial forces, after all, stake their very lives on the security of their realm. By working with these leaders to establish and train local militias and police, rather than troubled and mistrusted national forces, the U.S. could find its route to Afghan stability and exit.

In parts of Afghanistan, strong provincial leadership has already developed security separate from national leadership. In the relatively peaceful and prosperous northern region of Mazar-E-Sharif, Governor Atta Mohammad Noor, himself a former warlord who fought against the Soviets and Taliban, commands authority rivaling that of President Karzai. Unlike Karzai, Noor is popular among his constituents and his province enjoys remarkable stability. The local military officials are loyal to him before Karzai, if they are loyal to Karzai at all. By promoting local governance and directing our military training and assistance to forces loyal to that governance, the U.S. could promote other strong provincial leaders like Noor.

Like Noor, many of these are likely to be former or current warlords. Warlords, despite their scary name, can be our strongest allies. They tend to be non-ideological and fervently anti-Taliban. Their fates are tied to the local populaces they govern. They're corrupt and tax heavily, but they provide real security and are trusted. Their ambitions are not for anti-Western war or fundamentalism, but sovereignty, security, and

1AC – Warlords

domination. None of these men is Thomas Jefferson, but in a country of many evil and exploitative forces, they are the best that Afghan civilians or American forces are likely to get.

Just as important, local security forces would better suit the region they protect, with more religious militias in the devout south and east but conventional police in the secular north. As General Stanley McChrystal, the top commander in Afghanistan, wrote in his much-discussed report calling for more troops, "Focusing on force or resource requirements misses the point entirely." He insisted that Afghans' "needs, identities and grievances vary from province to province and from valley to valley." A national security force would struggle to overcome the inevitable Goldilocks problem: Either it would be too secular for the south and east or too religious for the north but never just right. After all, the Taliban's initial support came in part from Afghans who desperately wanted religious rule. Though we may find the idea of supporting Islamic militias discomforting, forcing secular rule would risk another Taliban-like uprising. Better, perhaps, to establish local Islamic governance that is religious enough to satisfy the populace it serves but moderate enough to resist the Taliban.

The U.S. is already enacting a micro variant of this strategy by hiring and arming locals to provide security. The informal militiamen must come from within 50 km of their deployment site, which in addition to providing local jobs (Afghanistan's unemployment rate is a catastrophic 40%) also deters insurgents, who would be less likely to attack a familiar neighbor than a foreign invader. The principles that make this so effective would also apply to a larger, standing provincial force.

1AC – Warlords

Afghan instability immediately escalates – the drug trade provides routes for expanding conflict.

Lal 2006 [Rollie, PhD, Asst. Prof. @ Vlerick Management School – Leuven, “Central Asia and its Asian

Neighbors,” <http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=A450305&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>]

The relationship between the Central Asian states and their neighbors is complex and heavily influenced by the situation in Afghanistan. Afghanistan forms the link between regions, and it has endured a great deal of meddling from various sides, asin the past few decades, the United States, Pakistan, India, Iran, Russia, Uzbekistan, and other countries have attempted topush for a friendly government in Afghanistan. Since September 11, 2001, and the fall of the Taliban, Afghanistan has also gained in importance as a feasible key transport route for increased trade and security cooperation between the countries of Central Asia and India and Pakistan.1 Stability in Afghanistan has had a profound effect on Central Asian security as both religious radicalism and drugs emanating from Afghanistan threaten the region. During the Afghan-Soviet war, the UnitedStates in effect, through Pakistan, supported fundamentalist Islamic teachings and military training of Afghan, Pakistani, andother Central Asian militants in an effort to expel the Soviet Union from Afghanistan.2 The growth of Islamicfundamentalism from the Afghan-Soviet war accelerated the spread of a religious ideology throughout the formerlycommunist countries. The Taliban trained Uzbek, Tajik, and Uighur radicals, spurring the growth of destabilizingfundamentalist movements throughout the region.3 In 1992, leaders of the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) fled Tajikistan totake refuge and regroup in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, and Russia.4 During the 1990s, Afghanistan also became a haven forthe IMU.5 Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan all moved to support the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance inthe 1990s in the hopes of defeating the fundamentalist threat.6 The Central Asian states remain concerned by the continued presence of militants in Afghanistan and, now, Pakistan, and also by the booming drug trade that passes through Afghanistan and Central Asia into Europe and Russia.7 Narcotics flow from Afghanistan via multiple routes in the region to foreign markets, and populations of these transit corridors are increasingly consumers of the drugs as well. Traffickers transport opiates north through Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan on to Russia, and west through Iran and Turkmenistan to Turkey and Europe.8 Tajikistan has made efforts to stem the flow of drugs across its border from Afghanistan, establishing two antidrugagencies in Afghanistan to coordinate military and nonmilitary operations with international troops and Afghan forces in theborder areas.9 Since the fall of the Taliban, many local leaders have retained considerable power and maintain some ability to destabilize the Kabul government. In addition, various renegade militant groups and remnants of the Taliban continue to operate in parts of Afghanistan, particularly near the Pakistani border. The ability of these groups to move nimbly across the border to evade counterterrorism forces and border patrols has been a cause for consternation among Afghan border patrols has been a cause for consternation among Afghanistan’s neighbors. Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan areconcerned that Afghanistan could revert to a haven for terrorist training, sending the militants back into their countries to destabilize regimes.11 A political vacuum in Afghanistan has traditionally drawn its neighboring countries in to compete for influence. Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan have an interest in fostering trade and transport linkages both with andthrough Afghanistan, but they face difficulties in maintaining security for the routes.12 Iran has been successful in movingforward with an agreement to trade goods with Uzbekistan through Afghanistan. This agreement has facilitated Uzbekistan’saccess to needed ports for export.13

1AC – Warlords

Only a provincial authority can control drug flows – tribal engagement with cessation aims have been empirically successful.

Mukhopadhyay 2009 [Dipali, Jennings Randolph Dissertation Scholar at the U.S. Institute of Peace, JD @ Harvard Law School, BA Poli. Sci. @ Yale U, she served as a consultant to the Agha Khan Development Network, where she conducted conflict analysis training and research on the drug economy “Warlords As Bureaucrats: The Afghan Experience”, <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/warlords_as_bureaucrats.pdf>]

Counternarcotics

The utility of the governor’s links to the four major tribes of Nangarhar can be observed in his counternarcotics campaign. The 2007–2008 poppy season in Afghanistan witnessed a near-total cessation of cultivation in Nangarhar province, a dramatic shift from the previous season. Field research by David Mansfield, a leading expert on the drug economy in Afghanistan, indicated that “whilst three-quarters of those interviewed reported that they had cultivated opium poppy in the 2006/2007 growing season, **none** produced opium in the 2007/2008 growing season.”9

A counternarcotics advisory team provided the governor with technical support, but the team leader, in an interview with the author, repeatedly attributed the province’s success to Sherzai’s relationships with tribal elders. According to him, Sherzai met with elders routinely, treating them to feasts during Ramadan, providing them with gifts, and advertising development and reconstruction efforts widely. Tribal committees received discretionary funds, foodstuffs, and construction assistance for schools and mosques. In exchange, elders publicly pledged to assist the governor’s administration in ensuring that farmers would not cultivate poppy. When asked to explain the success of Nangarhar’s counternarcotics strategy, the governor himself pointed the author in the direction of the “jirgas [councils] or shuras [consultations] amongst the people,” in which each of the tribes made a decision to curtail poppy cultivation.

Compliance to this degree, particularly in districts that historically remained beyond the reach of government authorities, was very rare in Nangarhar, according to Mansfield. His research findings characterized the governor’s efforts as a “particularly effective campaign.” He attributed success in Nangarhar to a combination, or hybrid, of pointed, punitive legal action with co-optive tribal engagement:

The arrest and incarceration of a number of farmers in some of the more remote districts were critical to deterring cultivation across the province—as was the compliance of a number of key elders from these districts.10

Sherzai’s personal engagement with tribal leaders on counternarcotics created sufficient sociopolitical capital to enforce policies that might otherwise have been ignored. Mansfield’s research indicated that elders and village shuras in Nangarhar served as conduits through which the government relayed its intentions to the population. In contrast, he learned that farmers in southern provinces like Helmand and Kandahar did not learn of the poppy ban from village or tribal leaders, a reflection of the disconnect between the provincial administrations and their citizens: southern Afghan farmers did not believe their government had the inclination or the wherewithal to follow through on its counternarcotics policy. Potential cultivators in Nangarhar, on the other hand, reported to Mansfield that they felt Sherzai’s administration had both the motivation and the capability to implement its counternarcotics strategy effectively. Tribal cooperation signaled the provincial government’s credibility on this issue to the local population and facilitated the campaign’s success. Tribal elders translated the agenda of the governor, and of Kabul, into popular compliance and, in so doing, lent their informal political capital to the formal administration of the state.

1AC – Warlords

The impact is global nuclear war.

Blank 2k [Stephen, Prof. Research at Strategic Studies Inst. @ US Army War College, “U.S. Military Engagement with Transcaucasia and Central Asia”, [www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub113.pdf](http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub113.pdf)]

Washington’s burgeoning military-political-economic involvement seeks, inter alia, to demonstrate the U.S. ability to project military power even into this region or for that matter, into Ukraine where NATO recently held exercises that clearly originated as an anti-Russian scenario. Secretary of Defense William Cohen has discussed strengthening U.S.-Azerbaijani military cooperation and even training the Azerbaijani army, certainly alarming Armenia and Russia. 69 And Washington is also training Georgia’s new Coast Guard. 70 However, Washington’s well-known ambivalence about committing force to Third World ethnopolitical conflicts suggests that U.S. military power will not be easily committed to saving its economic investment. But this ambivalence about committing forces and the dangerous situation, where Turkey is allied to Azerbaijan and Armenia is bound to Russia, create the potential for wider and more protracted regional conflicts among local forces. In that connection, Azerbaijan and Georgia’s growing efforts to secure NATO’s lasting involvement in the region, coupled with Russia’s determination to exclude other rivals, foster a polarization along very traditional lines. 71 In 1993 Moscow even threatened World War III to deter Turkish intervention on behalf of Azerbaijan. Yet the new Russo-Armenian Treaty and Azeri-Turkish treaty suggest that Russia and Turkey could be dragged into a confrontation to rescue their allies from defeat. 72 Thus many of the conditions for conventional war or protracted ethnic conflict in which third parties intervene are present in the Transcaucasus. For example, many Third World conflicts generated by local structural factors have a great potential for unintended escalation. Big powers often feel obliged to rescue their lesser proteges and proxies. One or another big power may fail to grasp the other side’s stakes since interests here are not as clear as in Europe. Hence commitments involving the use of nuclear weapons to prevent a client’s defeat are not as well established or apparent. Clarity about the nature of the threat could prevent the kind of rapid and almost uncontrolled escalation we saw in 1993 when Turkish noises about intervening on behalf of Azerbaijan led Russian leaders to threaten a nuclear war in that case. 73 Precisely because Turkey is a NATO ally, Russian nuclear threats could trigger a potential nuclear blow (not a small possibility given the erratic nature of Russia’s declared nuclear strategies). The real threat of a Russian nuclear strike against Turkey to defend Moscow’s interests and forces in the Transcaucasus makes the danger of major war there higher than almost everywhere else. As Richard Betts has observed, The greatest danger lies in areas where (1) the potential for serious instability is high; (2) both superpowers perceive vital interests; (3) neither recognizes that the other’s perceived interest or commitment is as great as its own; (4) both have the capability to inject conventional forces; and, (5) neither has willing proxies capable of settling the situation.

**Warlords – Withdrawal Solves Provincialism\*\***

Provincialism is the natural tendency of Afghan governance – it is not our responsibility to design local governments and committing to counterinsurgency strategies can only ensure that they fail.

Kissinger 6/23 [Henry A., former Secretary of State of the United States, “America needs an Afghan strategy, not an alibi,” Washington Post, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/23/AR2010062302193.html> | VP]

Afghanistan has never been pacified by foreign forces. At the same time, the difficulty of its territory combined with the fierce sense of autonomy of its population have historically thwarted efforts to achieve a transparent central government.

The argument that a deadline is necessary to oblige President Hamid Karzai to create a modern central government challenges experience. What weakens transparent central governance is not so much Karzai's intentions, ambiguous as they may be, but the structure of his society, run for centuries on the basis of personal relationships. Demands by an ally publicly weighing imminent withdrawal to overthrow established patterns in a matter of months may prove beyond any leader's capacities.

Every instinct I have rebels against this conclusion. But it is essential to avoid the debilitating domestic cycle that blighted especially the Vietnam and Iraq wars, in which the public mood shifted abruptly -- and often with little relation to military realities -- from widespread support to assaults on the adequacy of allies to calls for an exit strategy with the emphasis on exit, not strategy.

Afghanistan is a nation, not a state in the conventional sense. The writ of the Afghan government is likely to run in Kabul and its environs, not uniformly in the rest of the country. The attainable outcome is likely to be a confederation of semi-autonomous, regions configured largely on the basis of ethnicity, dealing with each other by tacit or explicit understandings. American counterinsurgency strategy -- no matter how creatively applied -- cannot alter this reality.

All this leaves only a narrow margin for the American effort. We are needed to bring about the space in which non-jihadist authorities can be established. But if we go beyond this into designing these political authorities, we commit ourselves to a process so prolonged and obtrusive as to risk turning even non-Taliban Afghans against us.

**Warlords – Centralization Bad – General [1/2]**

**Centralized approaches fail – A local governmental strategy increases civic participation and strengthens good governance.**

Haroun Mir 2007 [Former aide to Afghanistan’s Defence Minister <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/IG03Df01.html>]

The Afghan government and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies are struggling to bring stability to Afghanistan as NATO's stabilizing efforts are being undermined by bad governance. Reforming government institutions and rebuilding vital economic infrastructures should have been the priority since the collapse of the Taliban regime in 2001. In fact, during the past three decades of continuous conflicts and civil wars and the Taliban's assumption of power in 1996, Afghanistan's administration and economic system became paralyzed and dysfunctional. The country has not seen economic progress since the Soviet invasion in 1979. The middle class disappeared, the best-educated people left the country, and all signs of modern education and government institutions were replaced by a traditional, not to say archaic or "backward", system. Since the fall of the Taliban, the effectiveness of the governing authority has been mediocre at best. Afghanistan has not been able to reform a corrupt and antediluvian administrative structure. While the Taliban and their foreign allies are the cause of many troubles, bad governance also contributes to the worsening of the country's situation. Despite international attention and the presence of NATO forces, as well as billions of US dollars in aid, nothing substantial in terms of reconstruction has been accomplished. Even in relatively peaceful provinces, popular frustration over government ineptitude is mounting. Two aspects of an efficient and effective administration, performance and accountability, are entirely absent from the Afghan administration. Rampant nepotism eliminates the notion of merit and competency. In the absence of effective government actions and activities, the functionality of the government's vital institutions is reduced even in the immediate periphery of Kabul. Deficiencies in government services force the villagers in the south and east of the country to turn to the Taliban for security, justice, and protection of their private property. Corruption has become a common practice in the country, seriously undermining NATO's effort to win the "hearts and minds" of Afghans. Without an effective monitoring system, administrative corruption could undermine all financial efforts to develop the Afghan economy. Despite widespread cases of corruption and mismanagement of funds, not a single corrupt senior official has been brought to trial, much less seen justice. Ordinary Afghans believe that some of the corrupt high officials are implicitly protected by powerful NATO countries. NATO ends up bearing the brunt of the blame in part because the Afghan Parliament does not have the capacity to monitor the government's activities. But international institutions have made their share of mistakes. With a mandate to reform the Afghan administration, they have failed in their mission. The misunderstanding and lack of communication between foreign advisers and Afghan administrators has ensured that the pace of administrative reforms is very slow, despite the presence of a significant number of foreign advisers and allocation of plenty of financial resources. The majority of Afghan high officials, who have come from Western academic institutions, have limited management skills. Sometimes they have difficulties reconciling modern concepts with the reality on the ground. In addition, higher salaries in non-governmental and other foreign organizations attract the best civil servants from crucial positions in Afghan administration. As a result of dysfunctional administration, President Hamid Karzai is losing the broad popular support and legitimacy that he had enjoyed before the presidential elections in 2004. People in remote provinces distrust the central government and are tired of unfulfilled promises. Until now, Kabul has failed to recognize priorities in each province, and the bulk of aid provided by foreign donors is unaccounted for. Decentralization in public administration has been a major policy in many developing countries. Why should Afghanistan become the exception? A centralized education system, a centralized economic policy, a centralized heath-care system, and similar inefficient and ineffective centralized systems are bound to fail in Afghanistan as well as elsewhere. As in developed countries, the criteria of responsiveness and accountability should become the norm in Afghan public administration. In fact, local-government officials, instead of being accountable to the people and responsive to their needs, are following ill-advised directives from the central government in Kabul. To achieve the long-term goal of stability and progress in the country, people should be given the opportunity to participate directly in their own local political life by electing provincial governors as an alternative to their

**Warlords – Centralization Bad – General [2/2]**

arbitrary appointment by the central government. The initiation of political debates about the possibility of alternative governing systems in Afghanistan, which would provide a greater role and political participation for people living in remote provinces, should be encouraged. Indeed, modern effective governing systems well suited to the geography and ethnic mosaic of the country should be considered as potential alternatives to the current failed centralized governing system

**Warlords – Ethnic Organization Good**

Afghanistan needs ethnic togetherness more than a strong central government

Rhinefield 06 [Master Degree – Naval Academy Graduate <http://www.stormingmedia.us/16/1655/A165544.html>]

Afghanistan is facing the daunting challenge of creating a stable, all inclusive and democratically based government that will be viewed as legitimate among all ethnic, social and religious groups. This will be a great trial for Afghans, who for decades have faced the realities of ethnic fragmentation and its impact on politics, culture and society of Afghanistan. The focus of this thesis will be on ethnic fragmentation, nationalism, and social structure, as they relate to state formation and democratic development. This thesis assumes these concepts are critical for democratic development in societies with multiple ethnic enclaves and multiple ethnic identities. Four former Afghan regimes are examined and used as case studies in this effort. Specifically, these regimes are analyzed in order to determine how each attempted to overcome cleavages within society during the process of state formation. The case study findings are then used prognostically to assess the current attempt to build a democratic Afghanistan. The thesis concludes with an assessment for success of the current Afghan government and presents recommendations for increasing the overall probability for Afghan democratic development and national cohesion.

**Warlords – Karzai Credibility Low**

Karzai credibility low.

Sarro 2010[Doug, Int'l Relations and Peace and Conflict Studies @ U of Toronto, “FiveReasons to Withdraw From Afghanistan Sooner Rather Than Later,” June 23, Huffington Post, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/doug-sarro/five-reasons-to-withdraw_b_621903.html> | VP]

1. Karzai hasn't changed since he fudged his re-election last year. Counterinsurgency only succeeds if you're working in support of a government capable of gaining public trust. Afghan President Hamid Karzai does not lead such a government. A network of well-connected strongmen, most prominently the president's brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai, still run the show in Afghanistan, and remain as unpopular among Afghans as ever. And Karzai's police force, underfunded and demoralized due to widespread graft among its upper echelons and staffed with officers who shake down Afghan civilians to supplement their wages, is utterly incapable of securing the country. In sum, the Afghan president has given NATO no compelling reason to keep writing him blank checks.

Warlords – Karzai Credibility Bad

Karzai’s credibility is directly proportional to anti-Americanism – decreases troop morale and boosts Taliban recruiting.

Haddick 2010(Robert, former officer in the US Marine Corps, former Director of Research to the Fremont Group, has written for The Wall Street Journal, and New York Post, "This Week at War: Learning to Love Crazy Karzai," April 9, *Foreign Policy*, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/04/09/this_week_at_war_learning_to_love_crazy_karzai>)

U.S. officials should be pleased that Karzai is rebranding himself as an anti-Western nationalist. Successful counterinsurgency requires a local partner who is legitimate and credible with the indigenous population. If Karzai has concluded that this attempt at rebranding is necessary to increase his legitimacy, especially among Pashtuns, the U.S. government should not object.

Obviously a rebranded Karzai is insufficient for success. The numerous shortcomings of Karzai and the central government in Kabul will not be repaired by this ploy. More troubling is the collateral damage Karzai's attempt at rebranding could inflict. The president's new hostility could damage the morale of U.S. soldiers, who will wonder why they should risk their lives for an erratic America-basher. Karzai's revised marketing strategy could also spoil U.S. political support for the military campaign and boost the Taliban's recruiting.

\*\*\*DRUG WAR\*\*\*

1AC – Drug War

**Advantage [\_\_] – Drug War**

Current counternarcotics policy undermines the central government and provokes domestic backlash -- it ruins farmers’ livelihoods, which strengthens extremists’ influence.

Felbab-Brown 2005 [Vanda, fellow at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, “Afghanistan:

When Counternarcotics Undermines Counterterrorism,” The Washington Quarterly, Autumn, Lexis]

Eradication, traditionally the U.S. government's preferred counternarcotics policy, seeks to disrupt the drug trade by destroying the illicit crops. It is predicated on the belief that, if peasants face the destruction of their crops, they will have greater incentive to abandon their illicit cultivation and grow legal products. The traffickers will not have any drugs to transport, and pernicious belligerent actors such as terrorists and warlords will not be able to make any money on the drug trade, thereby severely diminishing their financial resources, if not bankrupting them. Despite efforts by Washington and Kabul to persuade local Islamic clerics to issue a fatwa against drug production, eradication remains an unpopular counternarcotics strategy in Afghanistan. This is hardly surprising, given that eradication frequently deprives populations of their sole source of livelihood. The inability of peasants to repay their creditors as a result of eradication only drives them deeper into debt, pushing them to grow even more poppy in the subsequent year. This is exactly what happened in the few regions where drug eradication was carried out in Afghanistan in 2003 and 2004. If farmers fail to repay their debt, they frequently end up in a form of serf labor, growing poppy on their moneylender's land. Some are forced to flee to Pakistan,n29 where they may end up in the radical madrasas of the Deobandi movement, whose harsh interpretation of Islam and strong anti-U.S. stance became the primary ideological and religious influence on the Taliban. Pakistani and Afghan students indoctrinated in these schools during the 1980s and 1990s provided a large portion of the Taliban's fighters, and current students appear to be restocking the ranks of Taliban remnants today. Eradication drives the local population into the hands of regional warlords, even if they now call themselves politicians or have secure government jobs, strengthening the centrifugal forces that historically have weakened Afghanistan as a state. Local warlords can capitalize on popular discontent with eradication by claiming something such as "the evil Karzai government, having sold out to the foreign infidels, is impoverishing the rural people and forcing them into semi-slavery." Predictably, the Afghan government eradication teams that actually attempted to carry out their orders, rather than simply accepting bribes, have frequently met with armed resistance from peasants, even in the restricted and relatively safe areas where they have been deployed. Although the new Pentagon policy of supporting counternarcotics operations is meant to avoid alienating the local population by not involving the U.S. military directly in eradication, it will put U.S. soldiers in the position of fighting against local peasants who violently resist counternarcotics operations. The favorable image of the U.S. military in Afghanistan will be destroyed if U.S. soldiers are forced to return fire at a mob of armed, angry villagers. Wider cooperation and intelligence provision will fall apart rapidly. Aerial eradication, for example, with a fungus, would somewhat reduce the physical danger faced by eradication teams. Yet, spraying, which is always extremely unpopular among populations in drug-producing countries, would further alienate the Afghan people and invite local strongmen to start shooting at eradication planes. U.S. soldiers protecting the spraying planes would once again be placed in danger and enmeshed deeper in armed confrontations with local populations, delegitimizing the U.S. presence. Even if a private contractor such as Dyncorp, which has experience spraying in Colombia, carried out such an operation secretly and both the Kabul government and the international community denied any knowledge or authorization, the United States, which controls Afghanistan's air space, would inevitably receive the blame as a bully sentencing poor Afghan Muslims to starvation, and Karzai's government would face discredit as an impotent U.S. stooge.

1AC – Drug War

It’s on the breaking point – increasing poverty will result in momentum toward insurgency and destabilize the country.

Senlis Council 2006 [“An Assessment of the Hearts and Minds Campaign in Southern Afghanistan,” Chapter 5, Autumn,

http://www.senliscouncil.net/documents/HM\_c5]

One of the common elements of problems associated with crop eradication is that it instils uncertainty and instability in farming communities. The reconstruction effort in Afghanistan relies to a large extent on the twin pillars of rural development and security. Since the opium crisis lies at the heart of this reconstruction nexus, the social protest, political unrest, insurgency, warlordism and internal migration associated with the eradication of farming communities’ sole livelihood is likely to further destabilise the country. Although the illegal opium economy provides subsistence livelihoods for many Afghans, it enriches very few. For most Afghans involved in opium cultivation, opium is virtually the only means by which they can gain access to credit and land for farming. The impact of eradication is felt most acutely by those most impoverished elements in Afghan society: resource-poor farmers and labourers. Where no viable economic alternatives exist, opium poppy eradication cannot succeed when so many poor farmers are dependent on its cultivation for their survival. A recent report on Afghanistan prepared by the United States’ Congressional Research Service found that “Eradication of the industry without a substitute source of income would throw these farmers into destitution, and they violently resist any effort to destroy their crops […] Allied officers believe that destruction of the poppy crop today could fuel an insurgency.”28 The root problem of crop eradication interventions is that they fail to acknowledge the fact that the social, economic and political structures that create and maintain poverty in Afghanistan are the same structures that created and maintain poppy cultivation. Even where crop eradication interventions are integrated with other strategies such as the provision of alternative livelihoods, eradication never creates the conditions necessary for sustained development.

1AC – Drug War

And, it creates a positive feedback loop – forced eradication increases local conflict that undermines efforts to grow alternative crops, and displaces troops necessary for effective nationbuilding strategies.

Weitz 2007 [Richard, Central Asia Caucasus Institute, “U.S.-AFGHAN DIFFERENCES OVER NARCOTICS PERSIST,” Central

Asia Caucasus Institute, August 21, <http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/4675>]

Diminishing Afghanistan’s narcotics problem is widely thought to be important to increase the country’s security. Some Taliban groups collect tolls, protection money, and other financial contributions from drug traffickers in areas they control. The insurgency also indirectly stimulates drug trafficking by impeding anti-narcotics efforts in the affected regions. For example, eradication teams cannot longer travel safely through contested provinces. In addition, the fighting disrupts efforts to encourage farmers to cultivate alternative crops or prevent smuggling into neighboring countries. Besides the direct narcotics-terrorism nexus, drug trafficking has reinforced the power of local warlords and criminal organizations in Afghanistan at the expense of the already weak central government of President Hamid Karzai. U.S. law enforcement personnel point to people like Haji Bashir Noorzai, arrested in April 2005. Noorzai allegedly led a large Central Asian drug trafficking organization while supplying weapons and personnel to the Taliban in return for its protection of his organization. U.S. policy makers argue that the overlap between the Taliban and the drug traffickers means that the counterinsurgency and counternarcotics campaigns in Afghanistan are mutually reinforcing. Forces involved in both operations can exploit synergies by sharing resources and intelligence. From this perspective, vigorously cracking down on the Taliban insurgents will also mitigate Afghanistan’s narcotics problem. But conducting simultaneous counterinsurgency and counternarcotics missions will invariably require making tradeoffs. First, many Afghans involved in the opium industry are currently allied, if only tactically, with the Karzai government and Western forces, providing both with intelligence and other support against the Taliban. Second, troops engaged in one mission may be made unavailable for the other. U.S. policy makers appear to acknowledge these problems, at least in practice if not in rhetoric. American military commanders generally avoid using U.S. troops in direct support of the counternarcotics campaign, typically restricting their role to providing training and logistical support to Afghan security personnel in counternarcotics and counterinsurgency issues. They clearly worry that, despite years of training, the limited number of adequately trained Afghan military and police forces are still unable to pursue a comprehensive counternarcotics campaign. At the end of 2006, the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan had hired only 1,100 of its 2,900 authorized staff. The Afghan National Army is also undermanned.

1AC – Drug War

Failed nationbuilding spills over to cause an extremist coup in Pakistan.

The Nixon Center 2002 [The Nixon Center, “Afghanistan and Pakistan: Is the Glass Half Empty or Half Full?” August 8, <http://www.nixoncenter.org/Program%20Briefs/vol8no13Afghanistan.htm>]

Still, according to Paula Newberg Interim President Hamid Karzai also has limited support. "Karzai does not have support in the west of the country," she said. Moreover, as Strmecki noted, the majority of the ministerial positions, including key posts such as Defense Minister, head of the Security Intelligence Service, and Foreign Minister, went to the Northern Alliance. Anatol Lieven suggested that this disparity creates a danger of the return of chaos to Afghanistan. "This imbalance is not sustainable in the long run," he argued, and it could easily lead to renewed chaos – and renewed opportunities for al Qaeda. External Forces Paula Newberg emphasized that the nature of Afghanistan and Pakistan’s relationship makes them very sensitive to one another’s domestic problems. In fact, she argued that "Afghan security is necessary for Pakistani peace and vice versa." A major concern for the panelists was that the instability in Kabul could spill over to Pakistan and create major problems for the current Pakistani leadership. Strmecki argued that such instability could shift the domestic balance of power against General Pervez Musharraf, who aligned himself with the United States following September 11th, and in favor of the Wahabbi fundamentalists in Pakistan, including radical elements within the government’s own Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) that previously had supported the Taliban regime. charged that the ISI continues its support for Taliban and Al Qaeda elements: "We see a great number of Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders migrating across the border into Pakistan and there they are protected by elements of the ISI.”

**Nuclear war.**

Brookes 2007 [Peter, Senior Fellow @ Heritage, “Barack’s Blunder,” August 2,

<http://www.nypost.com/seven/08022007/postopinion/opedcolumnists/baracks_blunder_opedcolumnists_peter_brookes.htm>]

The last thing we need is for Islamabad to fall to the extremists. That would exacerbate the problem of those terrorist safe havens that Obama apparently thinks he could invade. And it would also put Pakistan's nuclear arsenal into the wrong hands. That could lead to a number of nightmarish scenarios - a nuclear war with India over Kashmir, say, or the use of nuclear weapons by a terrorist group against any number of targets, including the United States.

**Drug War – Industry Strong – Corruption**

Widespread political corruption in Afghanistan promotes the opium industry.

Glaze 2007 [John A. Glaze. Opium and Afghanistan: Reassessing U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy, October2007http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA473431]

Corruption associated with the opium economy has spread to all levels of the Afghan government from the police to the parliament, and is eroding the rule of law. Farmers routinely bribe police and counternarcotics eradication personnel to turn a blind eye. Law enforcement personnel are also paid off by drug traffickers to ignore or, in some cases, protect their movements. Afghan government officials are now believed to be involved in at least 70 percent of opium trafficking, and experts estimate that at least 13 former or present provincial governors are directly involved in the drug trade.31 Furthermore, up to 25 percent of the 249 elected members of parliament are also suspected of being involved in the drug trade.32 When referring to Afghanistan’s Ministry of Interior, Syed Ikramuddin, Afghan’s Minister of Labor, said: “Except for the Minister of Interior himself, all the lower people from the heads of department down are involved in supporting drug smuggling.”33 For example, in a single raid, nine tons of opium were recovered from the offices of the Governor of Afghan’s Helmand Province. While the governor was eventually replaced, no punitive action was taken against him, and he moved on to a high-level position in parliament. 34 This case is not unusual, with corrupt officials routinely being simply reassigned rather than removed from office. For many of Afghanistan’s warlords, the opium trade brings money and power. Therefore, several of Afghanistan’s powerful warlords are also top drug-lords. In some cases, these warlords are the same individuals who cooperated with the United States in ousting the Taliban in 2001. In some provinces, the warlords are now promoting the opium industry by bribing government officials and providing protection to farmers and traffickers. In sum, political corruption is so widespread in Afghanistan that it is undermining public institutions, eroding the rule of law, and creating widespread unstability and volatility. President Karzai himself has complained that “drugs in Afghanistan are threatening the very existence of the Afghan State.”

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**Drug War – Industry Strong – Taliban**

Increasing Taliban control is causing focused drug flow into Pakistan.

Rubin 2000 [Barnett R., BA Yale, PhD UChicago, “The Political Economy of War and Peace in Afghanistan,” Center on International Cooperation @ NYU]

The projected oil and gas pipelines have been stymied by the continuing war and the Taliban’s harboring of Bin Ladin. Today’s war economy in Afghanistan consists of the transit trade, the drug trade, the gem trade, service industries stimulated by the growth of the former three, and the emission of currency. Foreign exchange earned by exports ®nances Afghanistan’s imports of arms as well as food and other necessities (Naqvi, 1999). The Taliban control the transit trade, which seems to be the largest of these sectors. Massoud controls the gem trade. Opium production and trade is expanding in regions controlled by both sides, but in 1999 areas controlled by the Taliban produced 97% of Afghanistan’s poppy (UNDCP, 1999a, d). Control by the Taliban of most of the main road system has cleared a corridor for the smuggling of duty-free consumer goods from Dubai to Pakistan. Until a ban on international flights from Taliban territory imposed under UN Security Council sanctions on November 14, 1999, some goods were down directly to Afghanistan from Dubai (the airline’s only international destination). Most goods cross the Persian Gulf by ship to Iran, from where truckers haul them through Afghanistan to Pakistan. 4 This trade complements smuggling into Pakistan under cover of the ATTA. In June 1998 I noted that many of the trucks appeared to be carrying automotive vehicle tires and spare parts rather than the electronic appliances I had heard so much about. I later learned that since automotive parts had recently been eliminated from the list of goods eligible for import under the ATTA, they were being imported to Pakistan by this alternate route (Naqvi, 1999).

Drug War – Taliban Control Bad

Felbab-Brown 2007 [Vanda, fellow at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs,

Brookings, August, <http://www3.brookings.edu/fp/research/felbab-brown200708.pdf>]

Although interdiction does not target the wider population directly, focusing instead on traffickers, and thus carrying fewer problematic side-effects in terms of strengthening support for the insurgency, it has rarely been effective in substantially suppressing cultivation. Given the difficult terrain, the weakness of the state in patrolling large swaths of the territory as well as the border, and the persisting structural economic drivers of opium cultivation, interdiction remains unlikely to increase efficacy of cultivation suppression. At best, interdiction can hope to reduce the political power of traffickers. • However, interdiction efforts so far have targeted especially small traders while large traffickers with large political power have been left unaffected. This has resulted in vertical integration of the opium economy, further enhancing the political and market power of large traffickers. Moreover, interdiction has been manipulated by the officials at all levels of the government to eliminate drug competi- tion and weaken political opposition.12 • Like eradication, interdiction also led to the reintegration of the Taliban into the Afghan drug trade. The targeted traffickers were in need of protection and forged an alliance of convenience with the Taliban. Interdiction and eradication thus resulted in the reintegra- tion of the Taliban into Afghanistan’s opium economy. Paradoxically, interdiction has also increased the power of criminal groups. • Targeting key traffickers would reduce the level of corruption at the national level and the corresponding sense of impunity that cur- rently prevails, thus sending a strong signal to key elites. However, there is a real danger that the targeted top traffickers could either start supporting the Taliban (many currently do not, and instead occupy positions of power in the government) or unleash other levels of violence through their reconstituted militias or crime gangs. Their attack against the state and its police and judicial representatives at both the national and local level would further weaken the already minimal capacity of the Afghan government.13 Given the political power and tribal following of these top traffickers-cum-government officials, their re- moval could also undermine the fragile tribal balance and generate strong tribal tensions if not outright tribal violence.

Drug War – Central Government Good

Andrew Feickert, Specialist in National Defense Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, ’05, “The War on Drugs”, http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL32758.pdf

Afghanistan’s opium industry is estimated to employ directly or indirectly anywhere between 20 to 30 percent of the Afghan population and provides for almost 60 percent of Afghanistan’s gross domestic product (GDP). Both the Administration and some members of Congress have reportedly called for the eradication of Afghanistan’s illegal narcotics trade and U.S. military involvement in supporting or participating interdiction and eradication operations with Afghan forces. Many analysts as well as senior U.S. military officials suggest that such a policy is not only not achievable given U.S. force levels in Afghanistan but could also significantly undermine its counterinsurgency campaign. The cultivation of poppies — used in making opium for heroin — which was reportedly regulated and taxed under Taliban rule, flourished after the elimination of the Taliban regime. In August 2004, U.S. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld reportedly stated that U.S.-led coalition forces were “preparing a coordinated effort to attack the narcotics trade in the country, recognizing that drug income could be used to fund insurgents and terrorists.” While few doubt the validity of this assertion, others believe that a policy of direct involvement by the U.S. military would not only adversely affect the U.S. military campaign against insurgents but also pose a risk for the Karzai government. The central premise is that many of the regional commanders who have helped the United States in the fight against the Taliban and Al Qaeda derive significant revenues from the drug trade.

Drug War – Nationbuilding Good

**Counter-narcotics policies fail without effective infrastructural development through nationbuilding.**

Rubin 2004 [Barnett R., BA Yale, PhD UChicago, “(Re)Building Afghanistan: The Folly of Stateless Democracy,” April]

Lack of security has made reconstruction much slower and more expensive, even as the slowness of reconstruction has blocked government efforts to increase security. Lack of reconstruction means that illicit activities—mainly opium production, processing, and export—continue to dominate the economy. Hence, economic policies and aid that make it possible to draw people out of the criminalized economy are a precondition for security. The Bonn Agreement does not specifically address Afghanistan’s reconstruction. (An annex to the agreement does call on the international com- munity to provide various forms of assistance, in particular to eradicate opium production and disarm militias.) Indeed, there is a misunderstanding about what reconstruction is in Afghanistan. “Reconstruction” is really the wrong term: it might be appropriate to describe what needs to be done after limited fighting that lasts, say, six months— when the job is to rebuild what was destroyed. But no one is trying to rebuild whatever was in Afghanistan in 1978. That is not reconstruction’s purpose. Nor is it primarily to relieve suffering or help people go to school or rebuild their houses. These changes are absolutely necessary, of course, and I am not denigrating them. But reconstruction has to be part of a political effort, because if people do not have legal livelihoods, they will turn to criminalized livelihoods. If they have criminalized livelihoods, they will have criminal protectors. And if they have criminal protectors, these protectors—the war- lords—will become a permanent interest against stability and the rule of law, and hence perpetuate the anarchy in which terrorists can operate. To build a legitimate army and a police and a government that is sustainable, the government must have a tax base. It has to have an economy from which it can legally derive revenue. (Even if it gets aid, it still must have a tax base,

Drug War – Nationbuilding Good

Nationbuilding efforts like providing food and income maintenance curtails the drug war.

Rubin and Sherman 2008 [Barnett R., BA Yale, PhD UChicago, and Jake, Research Asst. @ CIC, “Counter-Narcotics to Stabilize Afghanistan: The False Promise of Crop Eradication,” February]

From an economic point of view, crop eradication does not meaningfully increase the opportunity cost of illicit cultivation unless the cultivators are able to engage in other cash-earning activities.21 Afghan farmers do not cultivate poppy out of greed for the highest possible return. They cultivate it because for many it is the only way to supplement their subsistence farming with a cash income for food and social security, which has become essential over the past few decades of war-induced inflation and destruction of the rural economy. The drug economy provides the only access to land, credit, water, and employment. There are many potential cash crops and sources of monetary income other than poppy cultivation, but additional investments and more security are required to make these economic opportunities available to most Afghan communities, especially those more distant from markets and in areas with less government presence.

Drug War – Forced Eradication Now

Obama won’t consider alternative counter-narcotics approaches – he’s committed to forced eradication.

Sarro 2010[Doug, Int'l Relations and Peace and Conflict Studies @ U of Toronto, “FiveReasons to Withdraw From Afghanistan Sooner Rather Than Later,” June 23, Huffington Post, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/doug-sarro/five-reasons-to-withdraw_b_621903.html> | VP]

3. Washington wouldn't have to defend drug lords at the UN anymore. Over 30,000 Russians die each year because of opiates, 90% of which come from Afghanistan. But when Russia called on the UN Security Council to launch a crackdown on the Afghan opium trade, the United States, along with other NATO countries on the Council, quickly poured cold water on the idea. Spraying Afghan farmers' opium crops, they said, would alienate farmers and in doing so undermine McChrystal's counterinsurgency strategy.

Drug War – Forced Eradication Bad

**Current counter-narcotics policy fails – forced eradication leads to producer backlash and strengthens Taliban activity.**

Rubin and Sherman 2008 [Barnett R., BA Yale, PhD UChicago, and Jake, Research Asst. @ CIC, “Counter-Narcotics to Stabilize Afghanistan: The False Promise of Crop Eradication,” February]

From an economic point of view, crop eradication does not meaningfully increase the opportunity cost of illicit cultivation unless the cultivators are able to engage in other cash-earning activities.4 The drug economy provides the only access to land, credit, water, and employment. Additional investments and more security are required to make alternative economic opportunities available to most Afghan communities, especially those more distant from markets and in areas with less government presence. From a political point of view, the purpose of counter-narcotics is to win the support of most of those involved with the drug economy by providing them with better security and links to markets than drug traffickers, corrupt officials, and the Taliban. Where communities are confident in alternative livelihoods, they will consent to the eradication of illicit crops. Implementation of “forced eradication” where these opportunities are not available will strengthen insurgency while weakening and corrupting the Afghan government rather than reduce narcotics production and trafficking. Afghans will conclude that foreigners are in Afghanistan only to pursue their own interests, not to help Afghanistan. Licit livelihood investments must precede coerced reduction in cultivation or eradication. Otherwise poor farmers will not be able to benefit from the programs. Introducing enhanced eradication simultaneously with interdiction and alternative livelihood efforts will lead to a decrease in security and strengthen anti-government forces, while rendering interdiction and alternative livelihoods more difficult.

**Drug War – Forced Eradication Bad**

**The current strategy is spotty and ineffective**

Rubin and Sherman 2008 [Barnett R., BA Yale, PhD UChicago, and Jake, Research Asst. @ CIC, “Counter-Narcotics to Stabilize Afghanistan: The False Promise of Crop Eradication,” February]

This regime mandates “counter-narcotics” policies to prevent and punish the prohibited acts. But while the enforcers use policy instruments in order to stop illicit use and transactions in narcotics, the effects of the instru- ments depend on how they structure incentives in the illegal narcotics market. Different counter-narcotics policy instruments intervene at different points of the value chain and thus affect prices, quantity, and the distribution of remaining profits differently. The strategy (combination and sequencing of tools) that lowers the physical supply of drugs the most is not necessarily the strategy that most effectively stops drug money from funding corruption and insurgency. Nor is it necessarily the strategy that improves security or creates stabilizing political alliances.

**Drug War – Forced Eradication Bad**

Forced eradication counter-narcotics approaches have the causality backward – opium production is the result, not cause of instability.

Rubin and Sherman 2008 [Barnett R., BA Yale, PhD UChicago, and Jake, Research Asst. @ CIC, “Counter-Narcotics to Stabilize Afghanistan: The False Promise of Crop Eradication,” February]

Both globally and within Afghanistan, the location of narcotics cultivation is the result – not the cause – of insecurity, as shown by the expansion of poppy cultivation into a destabilized Iraq. The essential condition for Counter-Narcotics to Stabilize Afghanistan implementing counter-narcotics policy is “a state that works.”17 Counter- narcotics can succeed only if political efforts establish the basis for policing, law enforcement, and support for development. Unlike military action, policing and law enforcement require the consent of the population. State building includes military action to defeat armed opponents of the project, but in a weak state such as Afghanistan it succeeds only by limiting the scope of state activity and gaining sufficient legitimacy and capacity so that the population consents to the state’s authority over those areas in which it acts. Winning consent for counter-narcotics requires providing greater licit economy opportunities, and providing security for people to benefit from those opportunities. Scarce resources for coercion should be reserved for targeting political opponents at the high end of the value chain, rather than farmers and flowers. Winning a counter-insurgency while engaging in counter-narcotics also requires acknowledging that the transition from a predominantly narcotics-based economy to a licit one will take years. It is not possible to win the consent of communities to state authority while treating their livelihoods as criminal even where alternatives are not yet reliable. Proponents of escalating forced eradication argue that the government and its international supporters do not have years – if the drug economy continues to expand the whole effort will fail. Escalating forced eradication, however, will only make the effort fail more quickly.18 Escalating forced eradication does not integrate counter-narcotics with counter-insurgency: it makes counter-narcotics a recruiter for the insurgency. What drives rural communities to align themselves with the Taliban is not illicit drugs, but a program to deprive those communities of their livelihoods before alternatives are available. An internationally supported effort to help Afghan communities gradually to move out of dependence on the drug trade without being stigmatized as criminals during the transition will integrate counter- narcotics with counter-insurgency and peace building. Many of the “substitute” crops being suggested by the USAID Alternative Livelihoods Program (ALP) and others, such as saffron, pomegranates, apricots, and roses, have maturation periods of several years during which they will not provide income.

Drug War – Forced Eradication Bad

United states counternarcotics campaign is ineffective because of the Afghani security situation.

Glaze, 2007. John A. Glaze. Opium and Afghanistan: Reassessing U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy, October2007http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA473431

The security situation in much of Afghanistan is simply inadequate to carry out an effective counternarcotics campaign. While some regions of Afghanistan are relatively stable and free of violence, other regions, including the southern provinces, have had marked increases in violence directed at the Karzai government, as well as NATO and U.S. troops. The total number of direct attacks by insurgents increased to 4,542 in 2006 from 1,558 in 2005. 57 In addition, the number of roadside bombs more than doubled to 1,677 in 2006 from 783 a year earlier, while suicide bombings increased five-fold to 139.58 Many of these incidents were related to the eradication campaign.59 To counter anti-government elements, NATO and U.S. forces have stepped up the number of kinetic attacks. In the last 6 months of 2006, U.S. forces conducted over 2,000 air strikes, killing hundreds of insurgents and Taliban fighters along with many innocent civilians.60 In June 2006, President Karzai expressed his concern regarding the security situation and the escalation in violence: “It is not acceptable that in all this fighting, Afghans are dying. In the past 3 to 4 weeks, 500 to 600 Afghans were killed. Even if they are Taliban, they are sons of this land.”61 Security voids in Afghanistan are being filled by insurgents, criminals, corrupt officials, and terrorists, many of whom employ the opium trade for funding. The Taliban have helped fill the security void left by the weak central government by providing Afghan citizens an alternative source of security. While most Afghan citizens were happy to see he Taliban fall, many of them are now disillusioned with U.S. and NATO forces for failing to restore security or to improve their quality of life. In addition, many Afghans are upset with U.S. and NATO forces for what they consider to be excessive collateral damage from the fighting and bombing. As a result, more and more Afghans are turning to the Taliban to meet their security needs.

The United States finds itself in the immensely difficult and tricky position of trying simultaneously to provide security, win the hearts and minds of the people, and dismantle the opium industry. There is great pressure to show progress in addressing the opium crisis because of the widely-held belief that the opium trade is fueling instability and insecurity. Mr. Costa recently called for “robust military action by NATO forces to destroy the opium industry in southern Afghanistan,” adding that the counterinsurgency and counternarcotics efforts “must reinforce each other so as to stop the vicious circle of drugs funding terrorists and terrorists protecting drug traffickers” that are “dragging the rest of Afghanistan into a bottomless pit of destruction and despair.”62 Essentially, the pressure for quick results in the “war on drugs” in Afghanistan has driven the United States to support a strategy that overemphasizes eradication as a means of curbing opium production.

US eradication methods have failed.

Glaze, 2007. John A. Glaze. Opium and Afghanistan: Reassessing U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy, October2007http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA473431

The U.S.-backed opium poppy eradication efforts have not succeeded in reducing the production of opium and have, in many cases, been counterproductive. The aggressive pursuit of eradication has alienated many peasant farmers and resulted in some of them urning against U.S. and NATO forces. The Senlis Council, an international drug policy think tank, argues that the U.S.-backed eradication effort was “the single biggest reason many Afghans turned against the foreigners.”63 While 98 percent of Afghan opium farmers are ready to stop opium poppy cultivation if access to an alternate livelihood is provided, relatively few of them have realistic alternatives available.64 Moreover, the lack of requisite infrastructure such as roads, irrigation systems, and storage facilities makes growing alternative crops extremely difficult. Many peasant farmers find themselves trapped by debt and are left with no alternative but to grow opium poppy. Efforts to eradicate opium are also fueling resistance from drug traffickers, warlords, and corrupt officials who are currently profiting from the opium trade. Consequently, some opium farmers and traffickers have teamed with anti-government forces to strengthen the insurgency in Afghanistan. The Taliban have also exploited U.S.-backed radication efforts to their benefit by providing protection to Afghan farmers and drug traffickers in exchange for their loyalty. The Senlis Council argues that eradication not only ruins small farmers, but drives them into the arms of the Taliban, who offer loans, rotection, and chance to plant again.65 Instead of improving the quality of life for Afghan citizens, the U.S.-backed opium eradication efforts are instead alienating many Afghans, strengthening the Taliban, and increasing instability.

Drug War – Drug Trade Increasing

Narcotics make more than half of Afghanistan’s GDP.

Rubin and Sherman 2008 [Barnett R., BA Yale, PhD UChicago, and Jake, Research Asst. @ CIC, “Counter-Narcotics to Stabilize Afghanistan: The False Promise of Crop Eradication,” February]

The Afghan narcotics industry, the annual gross profit of which is equal to approximately half of the country’s licit GDP, makes a significant proportion of the Afghan population dependent for their livelihood on drug traffickers and those who protect them, whether corrupt officials or insurgents.16 That includes not only the one in seven Afghans who are involved directly in poppy cultivation according to UNODC – a figure that excludes sharecroppers and laborers from outside the village where the question was asked – but also all those involved in trafficking as well as the commerce, construction, and other economic activities that narcotics revenue finances. The political goal of counter-narcotics in Afghanistan is to break those links of dependence and instead integrate the Afghan population into the licit economy and polity, which are in turn integrated with the international community’s institutions and norms. That effort is the equivalent of the counter-insurgency goal of “winning hearts and minds” and the post-conflict reconstruction goal of strengthening legitimate government and reconstruction.

Drug War – Withdrawal Solves Opium Production

Troop levels have a direct effect on opium production – withdrawing troops resolves opium production.

Ivanov 2010 [Vicktor, Head of Drug Enforcement – the Russian Federation, June 22, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sponsored/russianow/politics/7847007/Heroin-production-in-Afghanistan-has-grown-by-40-times-says-Russian-drugs-tsar.html>]

Today Afghanistan produces nearly the world's entire volume of opiates. This is a phenomenon. We invited participants to a Moscow forum to say that the world needs to take responsibility for the fate of Afghanistan; the decision was made to apply military force, so Afghanistan would become a free, democratic, developing state; but since that decision was made, the amount of heroine produced in Afghanistan has grown by **40** times. Obviously, something was wrong about that decision or about its fulfillment. The international community has miscalculated something here – these are the issues our president has brought up many times.

Drug War – Impact – Central Asian Conflict

Drug trade routes make escalating regional conflict inevitable.

Lal 2006 [Rollie, PhD, Asst. Prof. @ Vlerick Management School – Leuven, “Central Asia and its Asian

Neighbors,” <http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=A450305&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>]

The relationship between the Central Asian states and their neighbors is complex and heavily influenced by the situation in Afghanistan. Afghanistan forms the link between regions, and it has endured a great deal of meddling from various sides, asin the past few decades, the United States, Pakistan, India, Iran, Russia, Uzbekistan, and other countries have attempted topush for a friendly government in Afghanistan. Since September 11, 2001, and the fall of the Taliban, Afghanistan has also gained in importance as a feasible key transport route for increased trade and security cooperation between the countries of Central Asia and India and Pakistan.1 Stability in Afghanistan has had a profound effect on Central Asian security as both religious radicalism and drugs emanating from Afghanistan threaten the region. During the Afghan-Soviet war, the UnitedStates in effect, through Pakistan, supported fundamentalist Islamic teachings and military training of Afghan, Pakistani, andother Central Asian militants in an effort to expel the Soviet Union from Afghanistan.2 The growth of Islamicfundamentalism from the Afghan-Soviet war accelerated the spread of a religious ideology throughout the formerlycommunist countries. The Taliban trained Uzbek, Tajik, and Uighur radicals, spurring the growth of destabilizingfundamentalist movements throughout the region.3 In 1992, leaders of the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) fled Tajikistan totake refuge and regroup in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, and Russia.4 During the 1990s, Afghanistan also became a haven forthe IMU.5 Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan all moved to support the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance inthe 1990s in the hopes of defeating the fundamentalist threat.6 The Central Asian states remain concerned by the continued presence of militants in Afghanistan and, now, Pakistan, and also by the booming drug trade that passes through Afghanistan and Central Asia into Europe and Russia.7 Narcotics flow from Afghanistan via multiple routes in the region to foreign markets, and populations of these transit corridors are increasingly consumers of the drugs as well. Traffickers transport opiates north through Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan on to Russia, and west through Iran and Turkmenistan to Turkey and Europe.8 Tajikistan has made efforts to stem the flow of drugs across its border from Afghanistan, establishing two antidrugagencies in Afghanistan to coordinate military and nonmilitary operations with international troops and Afghan forces in theborder areas.9 Since the fall of the Taliban, many local leaders have retained considerable power and maintain some ability to destabilize the Kabul government. In addition, various renegade militant groups and remnants of the Taliban continue to operate in parts of Afghanistan, particularly near the Pakistani border. The ability of these groups to move nimbly across the border to evade counterterrorism forces and border patrols has been a cause for consternation among Afghan border patrols has been a cause for consternation among Afghanistan’s neighbors. Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan areconcerned that Afghanistan could revert to a haven for terrorist training, sending the militants back into their countries to destabilize regimes.11 A political vacuum in Afghanistan has traditionally drawn its neighboring countries in to compete for influence. Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan have an interest in fostering trade and transport linkages both with andthrough Afghanistan, but they face difficulties in maintaining security for the routes.12 Iran has been successful in movingforward with an agreement to trade goods with Uzbekistan through Afghanistan. This agreement has facilitated Uzbekistan’saccess to needed ports for export.13

Drug War – Impact – Afghan Instability

Strong agricultural economy solves Afghan stability.

Vilsack and Rahimi 2010 [Tom, United States Secretary of Agriculture, and Mohammad Assif, Afghan Minister of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock]

The secret as to how Afghanistan will achieve a stable, secure future really is no secret at all: agriculture.So it was not surprising that during this week's meetings in Washington between U.S. and Afghan officials that agriculture was a principal topic of discussion.In Afghanistan, 85% of the population relies on agriculture to earn a living, and strengthening Afghanistan's agricultural sector is a critical element in stabilizing the nation. But until the agriculture sector can support legitimate crops such as wheat and fruits, the Taliban will continue to prey upon disaffected, out-of-work youth and push the production of poppy. Unfortunately, poppy production provides little return to the farmers; pomegranates will earn a farmer five times that of poppy on the open market, almonds will earn seven, and grapes will earn eight times as much. That is why the United States and Afghanistan are working together with a shared strategy to rebuild Afghanistan's once-vibrant agricultural economy. Our efforts are already yielding results in troubled provinces such as Helmand, the heart of Afghan poppy production.

Drug War – Impact – Afghan Instability/Terrorism

Increased opium trade leads to greater instability and global terrorism.

Curtis 2006[Grant Curtis, (senior country program specialist) Afghanistans Opium Economy. December 5. <http://www.adb.org/Documents/Periodicals/ADB_Review/2005/vol37-6/opium-economy.asp>]

Among Afghanistan’s many development challenges, its large and illicit opium economy is among the most intractable, and poses some of the most difficult challenges.

The impact of opium on Afghanistan’s economy, governance, and society is profound. Cultivating opium poppy helps supplement subsistence-level incomes derived from other agriculture-based pursuits. Yet, the opium trade has a harmful impact on Afghanistan’s security, its political normalization, the process of governance and state-building, as well as its longer-term economic development.

It also spreads far beyond the country’s borders. Afghanistan’s poppy fields are the source of three quarters of total world heroin production, and thus contribute to worldwide drug abuse and addiction, as well as the spread of HIV infection. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), at least 100,000 people die annually—directly or indirectly— because of their addiction to Afghan opium. In addition, the lucrative trade in opium and heroin contributes to regional and international insecurity through narco-terrorism, drug trafficking, money laundering, and other illicit activities.

Drug War – Impact – Global War

Afghani opium production causes global chaos.

**BBC News 2009** [October 21, 2009. Afghan Opium Feuls Global Chaos. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8319249.stm>]

UN findings say an opium market worth $65bn (£39bn) funds global terrorism, caters to 15 million addicts, and kills 100,000 people every year.

The UN says corruption, lawlessness and uncontrolled borders result in only 2% of Afghan opiates being seized locally.

The UN says more Russians die annually from Afghan drugs than Soviet soldiers were killed during its Afghan conflict.

Afghanistan produces 92% of the world's opium, with the equivalent of 3,500 tonnes leaving the country each year.

Most of the opium that leaves Afghanistan makes its way through Pakistan, Central Asia and Iran, leaving a trail of addiction, criminality and death in its wake, according to the report by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).

It says more people die globally from Afghan opium than any other drug but just a tiny percentage of what is produced is seized on route.

Antonio Maria Costa, head of the UNODC, said Afghanistan's opium production could create a "perfect storm" in the region.

"The Afghanistan/Pakistan border region has turned into the world's largest free-trade zone in anything and everything that is illicit - drugs of course, but also weapons, bomb-making equipment, chemical precursors, drug money, even people and migrants," he said.

"We have identified the global consequences of the Afghan opium trade.

"Some are devastating but expected; others seem surprising, yet they are very real.

He also had some difficult words for those nations currently involved in Afghanistan: "I urge the friends of Afghanistan to recognise that, to a large extent, these uncomfortable truths may be the result of benign neglect."

**Insignificant seizures**

The report highlights a number of key factors as to why Afghanistan's illegal drugs trade has such an impact around the world

One significant reason is that "lawlessness, corruption and uncontrolled borders" are resulting in very limited seizures by the Afghan authorities. Just 2% of drugs are seized per annum, as compared with Colombia's 36% annually, the report says.

Seizure rates are thought to decline as the drugs move closer to more lucrative key markets, with the value of the drugs doubling with every border crossed.

For example, Iran intercepts about 20% of the opium entering its territory and Pakistan 17% - but Russia and some European countries are seizing less than 5%.

One gram of heroin worth $3 in Kabul is worth up to $100 on the streets of London, Milan or Moscow, it is estimated.

The UNODC is calling for more international resources to tackle the problem at source - in Afghanistan and surrounding areas - where law enforcement costs are cheaper.

Another significant factor includes the vastly increased revenues made by the Taliban and other insurgent groups in taxing opium production in Afghanistan.

An estimated $160m of drug money per year is now available to support terrorists activities, the report suggests.

"The Taliban's direct involvement in the opium trade allows them to fund a war machine that is becoming technologically more complex and increasingly widespread," said Antonia Maria Costa.

"Some profiteers in the heroin trade wear suits and white collars, others wear black turbans."

In addition, the UN says one of its most surprising finds is that addiction is costing more lives in consumers than the numbers of foreign soldiers killed fighting in Afghanistan.

For example, in Nato member states more than 10,000 people die from Afghan heroin each year - a figure five times higher than the total number of Nato troops killed in Afghanistan since 2001.

In Russia, the country worst-affected by the drug, the annual 30,000 death toll is higher than the total Soviet death toll during the USSR's Afghanistan campaign of 1979-1989, the UN says.

In addition, the UNODC says there is a pressing need to locate and destroy massive stockpiles of Afghan opium - an estimated 12,000 tons is being hoarded, it believes.

Drug War – Impact – Cross-Border Conflict Increasing

**Afghan/Pakistan border insurgency is steadily increasing – cross-border conflict is likely**

Rubin and Siddique 2006 [Barnett R., BA Yale, PhD UChicago, Director of Studies, Senior Fellow and Project Coordinator, Afghanistan Regional Project, and Abubakar, Senior Correspondent covering Afghanistan and Pakistan for RFE/RL's Central Newsrooms, “Resolving the Pakistan-Afghanistan Stalemate”, June 25, United States Institute of Peace]

The Taliban and al Qaeda insurgencies today are equally active in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The nationalist insurgency in Pakistani Baluchistan, which Pakistani leaders assert receives support from Indian agents in Afghanistan, also aggravates relations between the two countries. The challenges of violent insurgency require both countries to address their relationship, particularly as it affects the border areas. Formation of such a policy is essential to the vital interests of the United States, NATO, and the international community, which has committed itself to the effort in Afghanistan through UN Security Council resolutions and other measures. Afghanistan and Pakistan have had largely antagonistic relations under all governments but the Taliban since Pakistan was created as part of the partition of India in 1947. Some elements of friction were also inherited from conflicts between Afghanistan an India when it was under British imperial rule. Afghanistan's governments, including that of the Taliban, have never recognized the Durand Line between the two countries as an international border and have made claims on the Pashtun and Baluch regions of Pakistan. Today 's cross-borde insurgencies, with their sanctuaries and support networks in Pakistan, are nurtured by the same sources as previous conflicts, as well as global Islamist movements.

Drug War – Impact – Cross-Border Conflict Increasing

U.S. presence in Pakistan and Afghanistan creating further violence from Pakistani security forces

Anthony 2008 [Staff Writer, Reuters Alert Net, “Pakistan kills militants; tension with U.S. grows,” October 11,

<http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/ISL340843.htm>]

Pakistani security forces have killed 20 militants near the Afghan border, a security official said on Thursday, as tensions surfaced with the United States over how to tackle the Taliban and al Qaeda. An intensifying insurgency in Afghanistan has piled pressure on Pakistan to go after militants operating from sanctuaries in remote enclaves on its side of the border. It has also led to a sharp increase in U.S. strikes on militants in Pakistan. The new government in Islamabad says it is committed to the campaign against militancy, launched after the Sept. 11 attacks seven years ago, but bans incursions by U.S. troops. In the latest fighting in the northwestern Bajaur region, Pakistani security forces backed by air strikes killed 20 militants in an attack on a militant stronghold in the village of Rashkai that began on Wednesday and went on through Thursday. "Troops are advancing and there have been encounters. Troops are also engaging them with artillery," said military spokesman Major Murad Khan. Another military official said four soldiers had been killed, and some Arabs were among the dead militants. Troops have killed more than 600 militants in Bajaur since August, the government says. Militants in Bajaur, where some analysts believe top al Qaeda leaders have been hiding, regularly cross into Afghanistan to attack Western troops and government forces there. Violence in Afghanistan has soared over the past two years as al Qaeda and Taliban fighters have regrouped. The U.S. military said on Wednesday it was not winning there and would revise its strategy to combat militant havens in Pakistan. The New York Times reported that President George W. Bush had secretly approved orders in July that for the first time allowed U.S. special forces to carry out ground assaults inside Pakistan without the approval of the Pakistani government. Pakistani stocks, down 34 percent this year, ended lower on Thursday on concern over what one analyst called an "unwelcome spike of geo-political noise" over the conduct of the U.S.-led war on terrorism.

Drug War – Impact – Cross-Border Conflict Increasing

Afghanistan and Pakistan’s relationship is increasingly antagonistic.

Rubin and Siddique 2006 [Barnett R., BA Yale, PhD UChicago, Director of Studies, Senior Fellow and Project Coordinator, Afghanistan Regional Project, and Abubakar, Senior Correspondent covering Afghanistan and Pakistan for RFE/RL's Central Newsrooms, “Resolving the Pakistan-Afghanistan Stalemate”, June 25, United States Institute of Peace]

Afghanistan and Pakistan have had largely antagonistic relations under all governments but the Taliban since Pakistan was created as part of the partition of India in 1947. Some elements of friction were also inherited from conflicts between Afghanistan and India when it was under British imperial rule. Afghanistan's governments, including that of the Taliban, have never recognized the Durand Line between the two countries as an international border and have made claims on the Pashtun and Baluch regions of Pakistan. Today 's cross-border insurgencies, with their sanctuaries and support networks in Pakistan, are nurtured by the same sources as previous conflicts, as well as global Islamist movements. Arrangements to secure the frontier of the British Empire in the nineteenth century by isolating Afghanistan as a buffer state do not work for a twenty-first-century borderland integrated into networks of global conflict. The United States and other external powers that seek to support the new order in Afghanistan and stabilize both Pakistan and Afghanistan should encourage a multidimensional process of dialogue and peacebuilding focused on the problems of the border region. Pressure may also be needed to convince some actors to engage seriously in such a process, but pressure alone will not succeed.

Violence is escalating between Afghanistan and Pakistan

Rubin and Siddique 2006 [Barnett R., BA Yale, PhD UChicago, Director of Studies, Senior Fellow and Project Coordinator, Afghanistan Regional Project, and Abubakar, Senior Correspondent covering Afghanistan and Pakistan for RFE/RL's Central Newsrooms, “Resolving the Pakistan-Afghanistan Stalemate”, June 25, United States Institute of Peace]

In the first six months of 2006, Afghanistan faced thirty-two suicide attacks, unprecedented in the country 's three decades of violence (Karzai and Jones 2006). Since May 2006 violence has reached new levels. Some 800 insurgents, civilians, and soldiers died in the four southwestern provinces. The reorganized Taliban, operating in Afghanistan from bases in Pakistan, form the bulk of the insurgency, which also includes elements led by Afghan Islamist Gulbuddin Hikmatyar's Hizb-i-Islami and foreign jihadi forces, including the leadership of al Qaeda.The violence, which has spread to both sides of the frontier, escalated in the run-up to President Bush's mid-March 2006 visit to South Asia--especially in Waziristan, a craggy region of 5,000 square miles divided into the South and North Agencies, or tribal districts. Some 300 Islamist militants, civilians, and Pakistani soldiers died in the fighting, which forced tens of thousands of people to flee the Pakistani town of Miran Shah, administrative headquarters of the North Waziristan tribal district. In neighboring South Waziristan, skirmishes, rocketing, assassinations, and land-mine blasts continue (Economist 2006). Since al Qaeda's retreat from Afghanistan in winter 2001, some tribal areas have become a small-scale copy of Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, where Islamist militants can recover and plan fresh operations while gradually imposing their will on the secluded region. Violence also has spread into the adjacent districts of the Northwest Frontier Province.

Drug War – Impact – Cross-Border Conflict Likely

Afghan conflict will spill over to Pakistan, empirics prove

Raziq 2007 [M.Phil US Study(International Relation-History), since 1986, contributing to Pakistan's English dailies, International Organization for Migration as Asisstant Voter Education Officer during Afghan Presidential elections, worked as Researcher and Provincial Coordinator in Governance Institutions Network International Islamabad Pakistan, Ground Report, “Spill over effects of instability in Afghanistan”, <http://www.groundreport.com/Opinion/Spill-over-effects-of-instability-in-Afghanistan/2833380>]

When Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, was termed as an aggressor by US lead free world, Pakistan was being declared frontline state to combat Soviet aggression, Baluchistan and NWFP Provinces of Pakistan became centers of supply of arms and men to Afghan Freedom Fighters, religious seminary students, and university students were motivated to join the fight against Soviet aggressors in Afghanistan, Jamat Islami student wing Islami Jamiat Tuleba and Student wing of Jamiat Ulema Islam, known as Jamiat Tuleba Islam were busy in recruiting young college and university students to get training and join fight against Soviet aggressors in Afghanistan, to combat militant wings of these both religious polititical parties within and outside the campuses, moderate political parties like Pakistan Peoples Party and Muslim League had also created its militant wings, Jamat Islami was using its militants to dominate the campuses and national political scene through its militant wings, Afghan war had introduced Klashinkove Culture in Pakistani society, “ in each home of NWFP and Baluchistan Klashinkove has become valuable possession, and can be found in abundance” a leader of Jamiat Ulema Islam has said. Factories producing weapons in tribal area of Dara Adam Khel became a cheap source of purchasing weapons, gradually Pakistan due to spillover affects of Afghan war was heading towards anarchy, in 1991 finally Soviets had retreated from Afghanistan, due to economic cost of aggression in Afghanistan Soviet Union was dismembered, and prime cold war adversary of USA was utterly defeated on all fronts, due to superior US ideological and technological base USA has emerged as the only world power, capable of leading the world.

Drug War – Impact – Cross-Border Conflict Likely

Rubin and Siddique 2006 [Barnett R., BA Yale, PhD UChicago, Director of Studies, Senior Fellow and Project Coordinator, Afghanistan Regional Project, and Abubakar, Senior Correspondent covering Afghanistan and Pakistan for RFE/RL's Central Newsrooms, “Resolving the Pakistan-Afghanistan Stalemate”, June 25, United States Institute of Peace]

The Taliban and al Qaeda insurgencies today are equally active in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The nationalist insurgency in Pakistani Baluchistan, which Pakistani leaders assert receives support from Indian agents in Afghanistan, also aggravates relations between the two countries. The challenges of violent insurgency require both countries to address their relationship, particularly as it affects the border areas. Formation of such a policy is essential to the vital interests of the Unites States, NATO, and the international community, which has committed itself to the effort in Afghanistan through UN Security Council resolutions and other measures.

Drug War – Impact – Afghan Economy

Afghanistan’s economy is dependent on opium trade.

Glaze, 2007. John A. Glaze. Opium and Afghanistan: Reassessing U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy, October2007http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA473431

Afghanistan’s economy has thus evolved to the point where it is now highly dependent on opium. Although less than 4 percent of arable land in Afghanistan was used for opium poppy cultivation in 2006, revenue from the harvest brought in over $3 billion—more than 35 percent of the country’s total gross national product (GNP).25

According to Antonio Costa, “Opium poppy cultivation, processing, and transport have become Afghanistan’s top employers, its main source of capital, and the principal base of its economy.”26 Today, a record 2.9 million Afghanis from 28 of 34 provinces are involved in opium cultivation in some way, which represents nearly 10 percent of the population.27 Although Afghanistan’s overall economy is being boosted by opium profits, less than 20 percent of the $3 billion in opium profits actually goes to impoverished farmers, while more than 80 percent goes into the pockets of Afghan’s opium traffickers and kingpins and their political connections.28 Even heftier profits are generated outside of Afghanistan by international drug traffickers and dealers. Traditionally, processing of Afghan’s opium into heroin has taken place outside of Afghanistan; however, in an effort to reap more profits internally, Afghan drug kingpins have stepped up heroin processing within their borders. Heroin processing labs have proliferated in Afghanistan since the late 1990s, particularly in the unstable southern region, further complicating stabilization efforts. With the reemergence of the Taliban and the virtual absence of the rule of law in the countryside, opium production and heroin processing have dramatically increased, especially in the southern province of Helmand. In 2006, opium production in the province increased over 162 percent and now accounts for 42 percent of Afghan’s total opium output.29 According to the UNODC, the opium situation in the southern provinces is “out of control.”30

Drug War – Impact – Taliban Consolidation

Taliban control the opium trade to diffuse power.

Glaze, 2007. John A. Glaze. Opium and Afghanistan: Reassessing U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy, October2007http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA473431

The resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan, particularly in the southern provinces, is also closely linked to the opium industry. Despite their draconian strictures against the poppy trade when they were in power, the Taliban are now using Afghan’s opium industry as a source of funds as well as an avenue to gain the allegiance of the Afghan people, particularly poor rural Afghans discontented with the U.S. and NATO-supported Karzai government. Muhammad Daud, former governor of Helmand Province, in describing this linkage to the Taliban, stated: “The Taliban have forged an alliance with drug smugglers, providing protection for drug convoys and mounting attacks to keep he government away and the poppy flourishing.”36 For example, an estimated 70 percent of the Taliban’s income now comes from protection money and the sale of opium.37 Furthermore, the situation appears to be getting worse as evidenced by a Kabul Police Anti-Criminal Branch report stating, “Evidence is growing that the Taliban and their allies are moving beyond taxing the trade to protecting opium shipments, running heroin labs, and even organizing farm output in areas they control.”38 The Taliban are exploiting the opium industry to garner additional power in Afghanistan. Ann Patterson, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Narcotics and Law Enforcement, reports that the Taliban are encouraging farmers to cultivate opium poppy and are protecting drug routes and traffickers.39 British General Richards, ISAF Commander, stated that the violence in southern Afghanistan was inextricably linked to drugs.40 The UNODC reports that the Taliban have distributed leaflets ordering farmers to grow poppy.41 Further, they are paying Afghan men up to $200 a month to fight alongside them against U.S. and NATO troops, compared to a mere $70 a month that the average Afghan police officer is paid by the Karzai government.42

Drug War – Impact – Central Asia

Afghan narcotics cause insecurity, corruption, violence, HIV, and destabilization in Afghanistan’s Central Asian neighbors

Christopher M. Blanchard, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs, August 12, 2009, “Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy” Congressional Research Service

Afghanistan’s opiate trade presents a range of policy challenges for Afghanistan’s neighbors, particularly for the Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union. As a security issue, regional governments face the challenge of securing their borders and populations against the inflow of Afghan narcotics and infiltration by armed trafficking and terrorist groups. Regional terrorist organizations and international criminal syndicates that move Afghan opiates throughout the region have been linked to insecurity, corruption, and violence in several countries.90 As a public health issue, Afghan narcotics have contributed to a dramatic upsurge in opiate use and addiction rates in countries neighboring Afghanistan, a factor that also has been linked to dramatic increases in HIV infection rates in many of Afghanistan’s neighbors. According to the UNODC, by 2001, “Afghan opiates represented: almost 100% of the illicit opiates consumed in ... Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and the Russian Federation.”91 With the exception of Turkey, intravenous use of Afghan opiates is a dominant driver of HIV infection rates in each of these countries.92 These destabilizing factors could provide a powerful pretext for increased attention to and possible intervention in Afghan affairs on the part of regional powers such as Russia, Iran, and Pakistan.

Drug War – Impact – Pakistan

Pakistan is influential in transportation of narcotics from Afghanistan; this results in corruption

Christopher M. Blanchard, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs, August 12, 2009, “Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy” Congressional Research Service

According to the State Department’s 2009 INCSR, Pakistan is a transit country “for opiates and hashish moving to markets around the world and precursor chemicals moving into neighboring Afghanistan.” Trafficking groups routinely use western areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan as staging areas for the movement of opiates into and through Iran. Efforts to control the narcotics trade in Pakistan have historically been complicated by the government’s limited ability to assert authority over autonomous tribal zones, although recent cooperative border security efforts with the United States have increased the presence of government authorities in these regions and improved opiate seizures. According to INCSR reports, the Pakistani government’s efforts to reduce opium poppy cultivation and heroin production since 2001 have been moderately successful. However, the State Department considers Pakistan “a major narcotics producing country with cultivation of poppy still over 1000 hectares.” In March 2003, former U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Wendy Chamberlain told a House International Relations Committee panel that the role of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency in the heroin trade from 1997-2003 had been “substantial.”97 The 2009 INCSR stated that the U.S. government “has no evidence that the [government of Pakistan] or any of its senior officials encourage or facilitate” narcotics trafficking and related money laundering. The report notes that because of low salaries for some officials, the fact that corruption occurs is “not surprising.” The 2006 INCSR stated that corruption “is likely to be associated with the movement of large quantities of narcotics and pre-cursor chemicals.”

Drug War – Impact – Iran

Trafficking poses serious security and health risks; Iran is a significant transit point

Christopher M. Blanchard, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs, August 12, 2009, “Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy” Congressional Research Service

Narcotics trafficking and use continue to present serious security and public health risks to Iran, which, according to the State Department, serves as the transit route for “perhaps 60 percent” of the opiates smuggled from Afghanistan. According to the UNODC 2008 World Drug Report, 37% of all opiates seized worldwide during 2006 were seized in Iran, including 81% of the world’s reported opium seizures and 19% of reported global heroin seizures. Although reported seizure rates may not directly correspond with total trafficking volume, seizure patterns suggest that large shipments of opiates entering Iran from Afghanistan and Pakistan are trafficked onward through Turkey to Eastern Europe, over the Caspian Sea into the Black Sea region, and through the Persian Gulf countries into Africa and beyond. Estimates suggest that up to 67% of HIV infections in Iran are related to intravenous drug use by some of the country’s more than 3 million estimated opiate users.

Drug War – AT: United Nations Report

United Nations claims are disproved by Senlis Council report.

**Daily Afghanistan, 2008**. Daily Afghanistan. Afghan paper blames government, world community for failure to fight narcotics, September 1, 2008.http://www.lexisnexis.com:80/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21\_T9629118158&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29\_T9629097349&cisb=22\_T9629118161&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&selRCNodeID=28&nodeStateId=411en\_US,1&docsInCategory=5&csi=10962&docNo=1

On the basis of the assessment conducted by the United Nations, 2.5 million people grew poppy this year. It is natural that when poppy cultivation increases in southern parts of the country, it means that the government and foreign forces have no control over these areas and that they are unable to take the smallest step against illegal drugs. Therefore, the Taleban and the mafia groups associated with them will reap the maximum benefits. It is the proceeds from illegal drugs that keeps the Taleban war machine lubricated and enables them to buy weapons and other military hardware. In fact, every poppy plant becomes a bullet that cuts through the heart of an Afghan and plunges the Afghan crisis into a new cycle. It is because the government of Afghanistan cannot fight the Taleban and narcotics. Taleban's survival is also connected with illegal drugs. However, while the government has to fight the Taleban, it is unable to destroy the sources that enable the Taleban to buy weapons. Therefore, the crisis continues in Afghanistan every year due to the government's inability to destroy poppy, which feeds the Taleban.

Although the government of Afghanistan and the Untied Nations claim that illegal drugs production has decreased by 6 per cent in Afghanistan this year due to the efforts made by the government of Afghanistan, the Senlis Council, which works to legalize poppy and has presented several proposals to address the poppy issue in Afghanistan, calls the UN report misleading . The Senlis Council report says that the UN report raises a false hope with regards to the Afghan poppy issue. It has further said that even if we pretend that illegal drugs production has decreased by this percentage in Afghanistan, the reason cannot be the government of Afghanistan or international efforts against poppy. The council believes that the reason for the decrease in poppy cultivation is drought and the bad agricultural situation in Afghanistan. It says that poverty will force many farmers to grow poppy in the long term.

At any rate, the main point is not what has caused the 6 per cent decrease in drugs production or whether this amount of decrease has actually happened. The main point is the inability of the government and of the international forces to fight this phenomenon. While foreign forces had come to Afghanistan to fight terrorism and illegal drugs, they have forgotten now about their war on illegal drugs and they are acting only passively against terrorism. They are now unintentionally in a vicious cycle in the war on terror as they cannot fight illegal drugs which feed terrorism. Therefore, the volatile Helmand Province has always been a record holder in Afghanistan and in the world.

**\*\*\*CHINA RELATIONS\*\*\***

2AC China Relations [1/2]

US-China relations are on the brink due to presence in Afghanistan and economic and power conflict

**Chan** (John, Staff writer for WSWS, **2/13**/10, “US-China trade tensions escalate,” http://www.wsws.org/articles/2010/feb2010/usch-f13.shtml)

When Obama came to office, he faced a deep financial crisis and initially attempted to maintain a close relationship with China. At the same time, however, underlying disagreements were already evident. Obama’s aggressive intervention into Afghanistan, foreshadowing a US push into energy-rich Central Asia, threatened Chinese interests in what it regarded as its backyard. US demands this year for tough new UN sanctions against Iran cut across China’s burgeoning economic links with that country. China signalled its determination to take a far more assertive international stance at the Munich Security Conference on February 5. Attending for the first time, Chinese foreign minister, Yang Jiechi, declared that his country represented “one fifth of mankind” and deserved “a chance to express our views on how things should be run in the world… One country, two countries, three or four countries can definitely not decide the future of the world.” Yang criticised the US for selling weapons to Taiwan and defended China’s threat of sanctions, saying: “We approached the US side very seriously on many occasions. Yet, the US went ahead and forced the Chinese government and people to react. We think it is in our sovereign right to do what is necessary.” On Iran, Yang indicated that China was prepared to defend its energy interests in Iran at the UN Security Council, even if Russia, which has sided with China in the past, backed new sanctions. He also rejected US and European criticisms of Beijing’s restrictions on the Internet and of China’s role in opposing their plans at the Copenhagen climate change summit. Behind the intensifying US-China rivalry are fundamental shifts in geo-political relations. As an emerging economic power, China has been compelled to seek raw materials and markets in virtually every corner of the globe bringing it into sharp competition with existing powers. The US, which is in economic decline, has sought to shore up its global dominance by aggressively using its military might in key strategic areas, including the Middle East and Central Asia. This great power competition has now been compounded by the global economic crisis. Tensions are likely to step up another notch when Obama meets Tibet’s Dalai Lama on Thursday. Last year, when the US wanted China’s economic help, Obama declined such a meeting. Now he has decided to get together with the Tibetan figure, knowing full well that it will antagonise Beijing. China has voiced its strong objections and may well announce retaliatory measures against the US.

US withdrawal from Afghanistan creates more support and relations with China

Yang, Director of the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies and Chair of International Studies at the University of Washington, 10

(Anand, Director of the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies and Chair of International Studies at the University of Washington March 2010,**“**Next Steps for the U.S. in Afghanistan,” <https://digital.lib.washington.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/1773/15596/TF_SIS495B_2010.pdf?sequence=1> )

While the U.S. also supports these initiatives, the Minister‘s remarks at the conference revealed the perceived threat China feels concerning a sustained U.S. presence in the region and their interests in seeing an Afghanistan with ―inviolable sovereign independence,‖4 without such heavy U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) involvement.5 China has consistently supported U.S. military withdrawal from Afghanistan, promoted reconciliation efforts ―among the Afghan government, the Taliban and the country‘s major warlords,‖6 and reiterated the need for more support from regional nations, rather than countries with no geographic proximity to Afghanistan.7 These assurances of aid and the push for U.S. withdrawal have been augmented by China‘s voice within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which made headlines in 2005 when Beijing called for Washington to ―set a timeline for withdrawing from military bases in Central Asia.‖

2AC China Relations [2/2]

US-China relations are key to solve the economy, energy security, prolif, terrorism, and climate change

Cohen, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 09

(William S., On the board of trustees of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2009, “Smart Power in U.S.-China Relations,” <http://www.voltairenet.org/IMG/pdf/US-China_smart_power.pdf>)

The evolution of Sino-U.S. relations over the next months, years, and decades has the potential to have a greater impact on global security and prosperity than any other bilateral or multilateral arrangement. In this sense, many alaysts consider the U.S.-China diplomatic relationship to be the most influential in the world. Without question, strong and stable U.S. alliances provide the foundation for the protection and promotion of U.S. and global interests. Yet within that broad framework, the trajectory of U.S.-China relations will determine the success, or failure, of efforts to address the toughest global challenges: global financial stability, energy security and climate change, nonproliferation, and terrorism, among other pressing issues. Shepherding that trajectory in the most constructive direction possible must therefore be a priority for Washington and Beijing. Virtually no major global challenge can be met without U.S.-China cooperation.

\*\*\*RUSSIA RELATIONS\*\*\*

2AC – Russia Relations [1/3]

Russia-NATO relations in ruins; Russia wants NATO to stop enlargement and wants Afghanistan withdrawal

Julianne Smith, Deputy Director of the International Security Program at CSIS, November 2008, “The NATO-Russia Relationship,” <http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/081110_smith_natorussia_web.pdf>

Today, the NATO-Russia relationship is deep in crisis. After war broke out between Russia and Georgia in South Ossetia, NATO suspended all joint activities with the Russians. Before long, both sides were accusing the other of returning to Cold War tactics and making longs lists of policy grievances linked not just to the recent Russia-Georgia conflict but to their entire relationship over the better part of the last two decades. For the Russians, NATO enlargement—from the first round in 1999 to the debate about Georgia and Ukraine in the spring of 2008—remains from the chief complaint. U.S. plans to install a missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic is another sore point. For NATO and the West more broadly, Russia’s behavior toward it neighbors, particularly Georgia and Ukraine but also the Baltic states and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, has spurred a steady stream of heated accusations about Russian hegemony.

NATO’s enlargement and US missile defense all endangering relations with Russia

Ian Davis, consultant for the British American Security Information Council, 3/19/08 “NATO at a Crossroads,” <http://www.fpif.org/articles/nato_at_a_crossroads>

Enlargement – the process of enlargement (discussed further below) was designed to project stability to central Europe and also led to a number of important new cooperative initiatives aimed at strengthening ties with former adversaries. However, enlargement was controversial in the 1990s, and many foresaw the risk that it might eventually destabilize relations with Russia, something that is now happening with the proposed deployment of U.S. missile defense architecture in Poland destabilize relations with Russia and the Czech Republic; Out-of area versus collective defense – with NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan — and previously in Bosnia and Kosovo — NATO is very much now "out of area," but again this was not inevitable during the debates that raged in the 1990s; and

2AC – Russia Relations [2/3]

Russian relations are threatened by the United States presence in Afghanistan

Bhadrakumar 08

(M.K., Former career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service, October 15, 2008, “US, Russia, NATO and the Future of Afghanistan: Taliban Resurgence and the Geopolitics of Oil,” http://www.japanfocus.org/-M\_K-Bhadrakumar/2924)

But what clouds judgment is the geopolitics of the war. The war provided a context for the establishment of a US military presence in Central Asia; NATO's first-ever "out of area" operation; a turf which overlooks the two South Asian nuclear weapon states of India and Pakistan, Iran and China's restive Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region; a useful toehold on a potential transportation route for Caspian energy bypassing Russia and Iran, etc. The situation around Iran; the US's "Great Central Asia" policy and containment strategy towards Russia; NATO's expansion - these have become added factors. Surely, geopolitical considerations lie embedded even within the current attempt to revive the Saudi mediatory role. The interplay of these various geopolitical factors has made the war opaque. Major regional powers - Russia, Iran and India - do not see the US or NATO contemplating a pullout from Afghanistan in the foreseeable future. Tehran has been alleging that the US strategy in Afghanistan is essentially to perpetuate its military presence. As a result, Russian statements regarding the US role in Afghanistan have become highly critical. Moscow seems to have assessed that the US-led war is getting nowhere and blame-game had begun. More important, Russia has began to pinpoint the US's "unilateralism" in Afghanistan. In a major speech recently regarding European security at the World Policy Conference in Evian, France, President Dmitry Medvedev made a pointed reference, saying, "After the overthrow of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the United States started a chapter of unilateral actions ..." He was making a point that the "United States' desire to consolidate its global role" is unrealizable in a multipolar world.

2AC – Russia Relations [3/3]

China and Russia dislike US military presence along their borders in Central Asia

NY Times 05

(Main US newspaper foreign policy division, July 26, 20**05**, “U.S. Military Bases in Central Asia,” <http://www.nytimes.com/cfr/international/slot2_072605.html?pagewanted=2&_r=1>)

The organization says the U.S. bases were not meant to be permanent and were only installed to assist the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan, which SCO members say has ended. China and Russia have long wanted U.S. troops out of Central Asia, an energy-rich region both consider within their sphere of influence, experts say. Russia views the U.S. presence in the post-Soviet region, including the eastward expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), with increasing suspicion after uprisings in Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan unseated leaders loyal to the Kremlin. Many in Moscow argue these so-called "color revolutions" were the work of U.S.-funded nongovernmental organizations. Experts also say Beijing sees the U.S. military presence along its western border as part of Washington's strategy to contain China. Energy is another major Chinese concern, especially securing access to oil and natural gas from the Caspian basin located roughly 1,500 miles to the west.

China and Russia’s aid in Afghanistan are crucial for stability due to their world influence

**Yang 10**

(Anand, Director of the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies and Chair of International Studies at the University of Washington March 20**10,** “Next Steps for the U.S. in Afghanistan,” <https://digital.lib.washington.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/1773/15596/TF_SIS495B_2010.pdf?sequence=1> )

Given the important geopolitical and geostrategic nature of its location at the heart of Central Asia between the Middle East and South Asia, the stability of the entire region is dependent upon peace in Afghanistan. Throughout the last eight years of war, there have been repeated calls for regional collaboration and support of Afghanistan as it has made strides to rebuild after the fall of the Taliban regime. While support from its neighbors and other regional actors has been forthcoming, more will be necessary to maintain stability throughout the entire region, increase ties between nations, and complete the successful transfer of responsibility to the Afghan people. The participation of China, India and Russia is imperative in securing these objectives. Each of these nations is a powerful player on the world stage, both politically and economically, and their support for Afghanistan is vital. While encouraging humanitarian aid, political and economic assistance from these nations, the U.S. must also be aware of preserving its own interests in the energy-rich, geostrategic Central Asian region and balancing the influence of powerful allies.

\*\*\*BUDGET TRADEOFF\*\*\*

2AC – Budget Tradeoff [1/2]

Brigade Combat Team Modernization Program is being cut now; needs funds

UPI (5/13/10, “U.S. army modernization plan gets cut”, http://www.upi.com/Business\_News/Security-Industry/2010/05/13/-US-Army-modernization-plan-gets-cuts/UPI-43071273762060/, 6/26/10)

U.S. House of Representatives appropriators are set to cut $891 million from a 2011 funding request for the U.S. Army's Brigade Combat Team Modernization program. The move comes after House members were said to be unimpressed with the program for which the Army has requested $1.6 billion to modernize and $682.7 million to procure equipment for two brigades.

Military readiness low; unable to respond to potential war scenarios

Amy Belasco (Specialist in U.S. Defense Policy and Budget, 09, “The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War On Terror Operations Since 9/11, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf, 6/25)

For some time, service representatives and Members of Congress have raised concerns about

current readiness levels, particularly the Army’s ability to respond to the full range of potential

war scenarios with trained personnel and fully operational equipment, a concern recently

reiterated to Congress by General Pace, Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.71 According to reports,

current Army readiness rates have declined to the lowest levels since the end of the Vietnam war

with roughly half of all Army units, both active and reserve, at the lowest readiness ratings for

currently available units.

2AC – Budget Tradeoff [2/2]

BCTM solves for military readiness; new tech, capabilities, and versatility

George W. Casey, Jr. (former Commanding General, Multi-National Force-Iraq and current Chief of Staff of the United States Army, 2/19/10, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2010/02/mil-100219-arnews02.htm, 6/27/10)

We are a Nation at war. The security environment is uncertain and complex, and the pace of change is accelerating rapidly. It is the Army's responsibility to provide current and future ground force commanders with relevant capabilities that provide "the maximum possible versatility for the broadest plausible range of conflicts." We must simultaneously adapt current capabilities and develop the new capabilities required to win today's wars, and hedge against an uncertain future. We must learn from both past failures and triumphs. Our BCT Modernization Plan is the blueprint for accomplishing that monumental task. We will incrementally develop and field new capabilities based on advanced technologies, synchronized with our ARFORGEN process. We will be continuously informed by current operations and guided by the insights and experiences of battle-tested Soldiers and the evolving needs of our warfighters. We will field an expansible network with the capacity for incremental upgrades which will connect Soldiers and platforms into a coherent fighting force of unmatched power. We will fully leverage the investments our Nation has made in the MRAP family of vehicles to save the lives of our Soldiers while accomplishing the most dangerous missions. We will accelerate the development and fielding of incremental capability packages to stay ahead of the threat or respond rapidly to surprise. And we will develop and begin fielding a new Ground Combat Vehicle within seven years that will enhance the options available to our joint force commanders for operations across the spectrum of conflict. With the continued leadership and unwavering support of the Administration and Congress, the American Soldier will continue to be the most respected and capable combatant in the world.

Readiness is vital to hege

Spencer 2k - policy analyst at the Heritage Foundation

(Jack, 9/15. http://www.heritage.org/Research/MissileDefense/BG 1394.cfm)

The evidence indicates that the U.S. armed forces are not ready to support America's national security requirements. Moreover, regarding the broader capability to defeat groups of enemies, military readiness has been declining. The National Security Strategy, the U.S. official statement of national security objectives, 3 concludes that the United States "must have the capability to deter and, if deterrence fails, defeat large-scale. cross- border aggression in two distant theaters in overlapping time frames." 4 According to some of the military's highest-ranking officials, however, the United States cannot achieve this goal. Commandant of the Marine Corps General James Jones, former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jay Johnson, and Air Force Chief of Staff General Michael Ryan have all expressed serious concerns about their respective services' ability to carry out a two major theater war strategy. 5 Recently retired Generals Anthony Zinni of the U.S. Marine Corps and George Joulwan of the U.S. Army have even questioned America's ability to conduct one major theater war the size of the 1991 Gulf War. 6 Military readiness is vital because declines in America's military readiness signal to the rest of the world that the United States is not prepared to defend its interests. Therefore, potentially hostile nations will be more likely to lash out against American allies and interests. inevitably leading to U.S. involvement in combat. A high state of military readiness is more likely to deter potentially hostile nations from acting aggressively in regions of vital national interest. thereby preserving peace.

Budget Tradeoff – BCTM Solves Readiness

BCTM key to military readiness; it prepares troops for current and future conflicts

George W. Casey, Jr. (former Commanding General, Multi-National Force-Iraq and current Chief of Staff of the United States Army, 2/19/10, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2010/02/mil-100219-arnews02.htm, 6/27/10)

In his February 2010 report to Congress on the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates asserts that "the United States faces a complex and uncertain security landscape in which the pace of change continues to accelerate." The Secretary further states that "U.S. forces must be sized and shaped to provide the maximum possible versatility for the broadest plausible range of conflicts." That is the essence of the Army's Brigade Combat Team (BCT) Modernization initiative - providing our Nation's leadership with versatile ground force capabilities with applicability across the spectrum of operations, and with the institutional agility to both anticipate emerging challenges and the ability to rapidly adapt. Today, we are fighting wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere while simultaneously preparing for an increasingly complex and uncertain future. For the foreseeable future, the international security environment may best be characterized by persistent conflict - protracted confrontation among state, non-state, and individual actors who are increasingly willing to use violence to achieve their political and ideological ends. To adapt to the vagaries of persistent conflict, the Army is adapting our doctrine, organization, training, leader development programs, and the delivery of materiel with which we equip and outfit our Soldiers and units, as well as the methods we employ to put the right tools in the hands of our Soldiers before they are put in harm's way. This year - 2010 - we are fundamentally changing how we modernize the Army. We are shifting away from a focus on the Future Combat Systems (FCS) program as the centerpiece of our modernization effort, to one that emphasizes getting the right capabilities in the hands of our Soldiers to win the wars we are in, while developing the versatile capabilities required for future challenges. We refer to this new approach as "Brigade Combat Team (BCT) Modernization".

Budget Tradeoff – BCTM Solves Readiness

BCTM key to military readiness; provides needed tech on the battlefield

Amber Corrin (writer for Defense Systems, 1/26/10, “The fundamentals of Army combat team modernization”, 6/26/10)

U.S. House of Representatives appropriators are set to cut $891 million from a 2011 funding request for the U.S. Army's Brigade Combat Team Modernization program. The task of modernizing the Army -– no small feat, to be sure –- has been in the works for close to a decade, beginning at least with the $160 billion Future Combat Systems program that was ordered shut down by Defense Secretary Robert Gates in April 2009. Now, the Army is updating its troops and plans with the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) Modernization plan built on network-centric operations that employ mobility and information-sharing in a new era of warfare. “BCT Modernization is forcing the Army to take a hard look at how we’re structured,” said Maj. Gen. Mark Bowman, director of architecture, operations, networks and space in the Army’s Office of the Chief Information Officer. “We’re working off requirements that are eight years old. Who would have dreamed eight years ago that there would be an iPhone?” Bowman said the modernization effort will result in an Army of networked soldiers. He spoke today at the Institute for Defense and Government Advancement’s Network Enabled Operations conference in Arlington, Va. The BCT program hinges on capability packages, which include the deployment of high-tech communications devices, such as sensors and unmanned vehicles, and capability sets, which involve interoperable, networked communications systems and applications, Bowman said. The two key tenets will improve situational awareness, protection and efficiency in the theater by using advanced technologies, much of which will be based on commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) technology. Soldiers on the ground today are best poised to take advantage of COTS technology because of their upbringing in the information era, Bowman said. “What soldiers in the field can do with COTS [is superior] because they are digital natives, and so are the young officers training them,” which aids in the modernization efforts. Success on the warfront could hang in the balance as the military seeks to go digital on an enterprise scale. “We have to protect ourselves by leveraging technology against the enemy,” Lt. Gen. Michael Vane, director of the Army Capabilities Integration Center, said at the conference.

Budget Tradeoff – Spending High Now

DoD spending for Afghanistan growing

Amy Belasco (Specialist in U.S. Defense Policy and Budget at the Congressional Research Service, 09, “The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War On Terror Operations Since 9/11, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf, 6/25)

How has funding for Afghanistan and other Global War on Terror Operations changed over time

and what does the future hold? As of enactment of the FY2009 Supplemental, Afghanistan has

received about $227 billion in appropriations for DOD, foreign and diplomatic operations, and

VA medical. In recent years, funding for Afghanistan was about $20 billion annually but jumped

by 75% to about $39 billion in FY2007, $43 billion in FY2008, $55 billion in FY2009, and a

request of $73 billion in FY2010 (see **Table 1**).Cost increases reflect higher troop levels, training of Afghan forces, and a share of upgrading and replacing equipment and converting Army and Marine Corps units to a new modular

configuration, higher U.S. troop levels, and other unidentified factors. In FY2009, DOD costs for Afghanistan rise sharply as troop levels from, from $41 billion in FY2008 to $68 billion in the FY2010 request. If additional troops are sent to Afghanistan, costs would be expected to grow.

Afghanistan war means massive spending; current predictions are 4.5 trillion

Lee Teslik ( B.A. from Harvard senior editor at Roubini Global Economics, 08, “Iraq, Afghanistan, and the U.S. Economy”, http://www.cfr.org/publication/15404/iraq\_afghanistan\_and\_the\_us\_economy.html#p1, 6/25)

Following 9/11, the United States launched new military endeavors on a number of fronts, including in Iraq. Estimates for the total costs of these efforts remain sharply politicized. Costs have consistently outpaced government predictions. In September 2002, White House economic adviser Lawrence B. Lindsey estimated the cost of invading Iraq could amount to between $100 billion and $200 billion. Mitch Daniels, who at the time headed the White House budget office, called Lindsey’s estimates “very, very, high”  and said the war would cost $50 billion to $60 billion; shortly thereafter, Lindsey left the White House. In January 2004, a [report](http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdoc.cfm?index=4983&type=0&sequence=0)from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated the total costs of Iraq’s reconstruction would land between $50 billion and $100 billion. But in October 2007, the CBO said in a [new report](http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdoc.cfm?index=8690&type=0) that the United States had already spent $368 billion on its military operations in Iraq, $45 billion more in related services (veterans care, diplomatic services, training), and nearly $200 billion on top of that in Afghanistan. The CBO now estimates the costs of the Iraq war, projected out through 2017, might top $1 trillion, plus an extra $705 billion in interest payments, and says the total cost of Iraq and Afghanistan combined could reach $2.4 trillion. Some experts say even those figures underestimate the true price tag. Joseph E. Stiglitz, the Nobel Prize-winning economist and former economic adviser to President Bill Clinton, projected in a 2006 paper (PDF) with another economist, Linda Bilmes, that the total macroeconomic costs of the Iraq war itself would surpass $2 trillion. This analysis differs from that of the CBO, which measured only the war’s budgetary impact. Stiglitz and Bilmes also predict a somewhat higher budgetary impact than the CBO did, though the CBO responds at the end of its 2007 report that some of the difference may be accounted for by factors like inflation and standard pay increases that have little to do with the Iraq war itself. More recently, a group of Democrats on the U.S. congressional Joint Economic Committee released a [report](http://www.cfr.org/publication/14794/) estimating the total long-term cost of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan would range between $2.6 trillion and $4.5 trillion, depending on how quickly forces are drawn down. These figures drew pointed criticisms from congressional Republicans, who released a statement (PDF)citing dozens of errors in the report’s findings, some of which were subsequently changed.

Budget Tradeoff – Spending High Now

Afghanistan costs rising; there are more troops and activity

Amy Belasco (Specialist in U.S. Defense Policy and Budget at the Congressional Research Service, 09, “The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War On Terror Operations Since 9/11, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf, 6/25)

In the case of Afghanistan, spending rates are growing for operations because of rising troop levels, increasing hostilities, and more spending to upgrade Afghan Security forces. In response to rising levels of violence, DOD deployed additional Army and Marine Corps forces in FY2008. In FY2009 then-President Bush approved an additional 15,000 troops before leaving office in January 2009, and President Obama approved an additional 21,000 troops all of which are expected to be in-place as of September 30, 2009, bringing total troops in Afghanistan to 68,000.33 As of July 2009, obligations are running about $3.6 billion a month in Afghanistan, above the $3.1 billion average for FY2008 as troop levels grow and operational activities intensify. The average for enhanced security (Operation Noble Eagle) has fallen substantially from $520 million per month in FY2003 to $12 million in FY2008 as one-time costs ended and costs have been in day-to-day base operations.

Costs rise; troops and anticipated troops drive costs up

Amy Belasco (Specialist in U.S. Defense Policy and Budget at the Congressional Research Service, 09, “The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War On Terror Operations Since 9/11, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf, 6/25)

What makes war costs change?Changes in war costs would be expected to vary with troops levels, war-related benefits, the intensity of operations, and levels of basing and support. The extent of competition in contracts and the price of oil would also be expected to affect the prices of goods and services purchased by DOD. A list of the primary war cost drivers would be expected to include: the number of troops deployed or anticipated to deploy;

changes in the pace of operations or optempo; changes in the amount of equipment and number of personnel to be transported to the theater of operations; whether support is designed to be temporary or longer-term; force protection needs; how quickly equipment breaks down and how quickly it is to be replaced or upgraded; and military basing plans that underlie construction requests. Troop levels would be expected to be the basic underlying factor that determines the cost of military activities and support ranging from the number of miles driven by trucks (which, in turn, affects how quickly trucks break down), purchases of body armor (varying with the threat), or meals served and housing provided. Troop levels, however, have risen far less than costs.

Military efforts in Afghanistan eating up Congressional savings

Robichaud, 5/26/05, program officer at The Century Foundation, The Century Foundation, “Overstaying our Welcome in Afghanistan?”, <http://www.tcf.org/list.asp?type=NC&pubid=1013>, 6/27/10

Another troubling implication of the over-militarized approach to America's regional goals is that military expenses have crowded out critical state-building investments. America efforts in Afghanistan follow the meringue model of nation-building, with a substantial military crust concealing a broad but airy layer of societal engagement. America sponsors numerous reconstruction initiatives, but many of them lack substance and funding. If budgets reveal priorities, the administration's 2005 supplemental request is illuminating: in a vast request for $82 billion, only $2 billion was set aside for non-military aid to Afghanistan. Military operations in Afghanistan, on the other hand, are estimated at $13 billion per year. It's sad to say that America's anemic levels of assistance are not unique among donors, which pledged last year to provide $8.2 billion in aid over three years, a far cry from the World Bank and Afghan government's estimate that Afghanistan needs $27.5 billion over seven years. What is unique is the military presence that accompanies these aid gestures. The U.S. should work to share the military burden, and then re-invest the savings into measures critical to long-term success: confronting the drug problem, cracking down on smuggling, and expanding government capacity.

Budget Tradeoff – Spending High Now

Even if troop levels are stagnant costs are rising

Amy Belasco (Specialist in U.S. Defense Policy and Budget at the Congressional Research Service, 09, “The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War On Terror Operations Since 9/11, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf, 6/25)

Even if troop strength remains the same, operational costs could grow if operating tempo

intensifies, repair costs increase, or support costs grow. These factors appear to explain some but

not all of the $17 billion increase in operating costs from $43 billion in FY2004 to $60 billion in

FY2006 (see **Table 7**). Based on DOD reporting of obligations, this increase reflects

more body armor and other protective gear for troops (purchased with O&M

funds), growth of $1 billion to $2 billion;

the jump in oil prices and the rise in intensity of operations, growth of about $4

billion;

the coming due of maintenance bills as equipment wears out, growth of $4

billion; and

a $2 billion increase in command, communications, control, computers and

intelligence support.

Exploding deficit; Afghanistan spending is a major factor

Martin Hutchinson (Former Business and Economics Editor at United Press International and international merchant banker, with a honors degree from Trinity and Masters in Business Administration from Harvard, 2/3/10, http://moneymorning.com/2010/02/03/obama-deficit-2/, 6/26)

In 2011, most of the extra spending seems to be devoted to a jobs program and to additional defense expenditures for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. It's somewhat disheartening to see that the administration can't project more progress on the budget-deficit issue during the next few years. After all, the Obama budget even assumes that we'll be helped along by a robust economic recovery. The lowest projected deficit in the next decade is a $706 billion shortfall forecast for the fiscal year that ends in September 2014. That doesn't sound too bad in the context of the 2009-2011 figures, but it's almost $300 billion larger than the highest federal-budget deficit in human history before 2009.

Budget Tradeoff – Debts High Now

Afghanistan spending burdens the U.S. economy with debt

Lee Teslik (B.A. from Harvard senior editor at Roubini Global Economics, 08, “Iraq, Afghanistan, and the U.S. Economy”, http://www.cfr.org/publication/15404/iraq\_afghanistan\_and\_the\_us\_economy.html#p1, 6/25)

The effects of more recent wars are equally disputed. A historical survey of the U.S. economy from the U.S. State Department reports the Vietnam War had a mixed economic impact. The first Gulf War typically meets criticism for having pushed the United States toward a 1991 recession. In a 2003 op-ed in the *Guardian,* economist Stiglitz wrote that the aftermath of the Gulf War exposes the “myth of the war economy.” Indeed, he argues that increased military spending is “unambiguously bad” for the living standards of normal citizens. Other economists argue the opposite. Harvard economist Martin Feldstein, who served as an economic adviser for President Ronald Reagan, wrote recently in *Foreign Affairs* that the United States could moderately increase the Pentagon’s budget without negatively affecting the economy. Apart from abstract questions about whether war spending is helpful or hurtful, economists also debate the specific economic impact of the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Whether one estimates the total long-term cost of the wars at $2.4 trillion or $3.5 trillion—the estimates of the CBO and the congressional Democrats on the Joint Economic Committee—experts debate precisely what direct impact this expenditure would have on the U.S. economy. The analysis differs starkly depending whose numbers you use. If the CBO’s prediction is correct that the wars will cost roughly $2.4 trillion through 2017, assuming current U.S. population levels, that would average out to a total cost of $7,973 per U.S. citizen, or $570 per citizen per year. By contrast, the Democrats on the Joint Economic Committee, which estimated a $3.5 trillion cost through 2017, say the war will cost the average U.S. family $46,400. Per person, the total cost, given these estimates, would be $11,627, or $830 per year. Both estimates factor in interest payments on foreign debt, which the United States has sold in order to help finance the war. These debt payments account for a significant percentage of total costs. For instance, examining long-term costs just for Iraq, the CBO says actual costs through 2017 will amount to roughly $1 trillion, but interest payments on debt will add over $700 billion to that price tag.

Budget Tradeoff – Withdrawal Solves

Withdrawal saves 1.1 trillion and is redirected to Defense Department

Rick Maze (Staff Writer for the Army Time, 9/5/09, Faster troop withdrawal may save 1 trillion”, http://www.armytimes.com/news/2009/09/military\_troopwithdrawals\_cost\_090309w/ ,6/25)

A speedier withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq and Afghanistan would shave $1.1 trillion off the budget in the next decade, a new congressional budget projection says. That would be a sizeable cut in defense-related spending from 2010 through 2019, which the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office estimates at $7.4 trillion. The budget forecast, issued as Congress is about to return from a summer break and confront questions about budget priorities and deficit spending, says defense costs are uncertain because budget analysts cannot predict the number of deployed troops and the pace of operations. The $7.4 trillion price tag is based on the number of deployed troops remaining at about 210,000, but looks at two scenarios for reductions:

• A sharp reduction in troops over three years, resulting in $1.1 trillion in savings. Under this projection, the number of deployed troops falls to 160,000 in 2010; to 100,000 in 2011; to 35,000 in 2012 and to 30,000 from 2013 to 2019.

• A more gradual decline that shaves $700 billion off the $7.4 trillion defense spending estimate. It assumes 210,000 deployed troops in 2010; 190,000 in 2011; 150,000 in 2012; 100,000 in 2013 and 75,000 in 2014 and beyond. The report does not suggest what the money saved from the withdrawal of troops from Iraq and Afghanistan should be used for, but the Defense Department surely would make a bid to keep at least some of it to pay for unfunded weapons modernization programs.

**\*\*\*NATIONBUILDING GOOD\*\*\***

**Nationbuilding Good – Afghan Stability**

Restoring credibility to institutional structures is key to Afghan stability – we should abandon counterforce activities in favor of nationbuilding.

Regehr 2007 [Ernie, Adjunct Prof. Peace and Conflict Studies @ Conrad Grebel U College - U of Waterloo, "It's not really a matter of hate," Centre for International Governance Innovation, May 9, <http://www.cigionline.org/blogs/2007/5/its-not-really-matter-hate>]

Conflicts in which the rights and political/social viability of particular communities are central issues are not evidence of ethnic chauvinism or of hatred for "the other". Such conflicts are reflections of a more fundamental social conflict, borne out of a community's experience of economic inequity, political discrimination, human rights violations, and pressures generated by environmental degradation. Identity conflicts emerge with intensity when a community loses confidence in mainstream political institutions and processes and, in response to unmet basic needs for social and economic security, resolves to strengthen its collective influence and to struggle for political recognition as a community.

In Afghanistan , in other words, achieving relative peace is not a matter of overcoming age-old hatreds; it is more a matter of addressing communal and regional wariness. The southern Pashtun are of course wary of a Kabul Government that has been constructed in such a way that it is regarded as unable, or at least unlikely, to understand and cater to the needs and interests of all Afghans.

You don't defeat that wariness; it has to be dispelled through concrete acts of inclusion and accommodation. Military commanders, Afghan and NATO, make the point, over and over again, that the struggle in Afghanistan is not ultimately a military struggle, but neither they nor their respective political masters have yet managed the wit or the will to give priority to the non-military struggle.

Behind ethnic or communal or regional conflicts are basic economic, social, and political grievances. Failure to redress them has made group solidarity an increasingly attractive political strategy, throw some religious zeal and easy-to-use and easy-to-get small arms into the mix and the result is persistent social/political chaos and public violence - conditions that can be expected to bestir hatred, but that makes it a symptom not a cause.

Does it make a difference that conflict is much more likely to be rooted in distrust than hate? Yes it does - a lot. It means solving conflict doesn't require a change in human nature, just in human institutions. And institutions can be built, and built to function according to agreed rules - and when they do, they become conveyors and purveyors of public trust.

Nationbuilding Good – Offshore Balancing [1/2]

A reduction in counter-terrorist force posture coupled with a focus on nation-building and offshore balancing curtails Anti-American backlash and facilitates stability.

Pape 2009 [Robert A., Prof. Poli. Sci. @ UChicago, former Prof. Int'l Relations @ Dartmouth, “To Beat the Taliban, Fight From Afar,” October 14, New York Times, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/15/opinion/15pape.html?_r=1> | VP]

AS President Obama and his national security team confer this week to consider strategies for Afghanistan, one point seems clear: our current military forces cannot win the war. Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the top American commander there, has asked for 40,000 or more additional United States troops, which many are calling an ambitious new course. In truth, it is not new and it is not bold enough.

America will best serve its interests in Afghanistan and the region by shifting to a new strategy of off-shore balancing, which relies on air and naval power from a distance, while also working with local security forces on the ground. The reason for this becomes clear when one examines the rise of terrorist attacks in Afghanistan in recent years.

General McChrystal’s own report explains that American and NATO military forces themselves are a major cause of the deteriorating situation, for two reasons. First, Western forces have become increasingly viewed as foreign occupiers; as the report puts it, “over-reliance on firepower and force protection have severely damaged the International Security Assistance Force’s legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghan people.”

Second, the central government led by America’s chosen leader, Hamid Karzai, is thoroughly corrupt and viewed as illegitimate: “Local Afghan communities are unable to hold local officials accountable through either direct elections or judicial processes, especially when those individuals are protected by senior government officials.”

Unfortunately, these political facts dovetail strongly with developments on the battlefield in the last few years. In 2001, the United States toppled the Taliban and kicked Al Qaeda out of Afghanistan with just a few thousand of its own troops, primarily through the combination of American air power and local ground forces from the Northern Alliance. Then, for the next several years, the United States and NATO modestly increased their footprint to about 20,000 troops, mainly limiting the mission to guarding Kabul, the capital. Up until 2004, there was little terrorism in Afghanistan and little sense that things were deteriorating.

Then, in 2005, the United States and NATO began to systematically extend their military presence across Afghanistan. The goals were to defeat the tiny insurgency that did exist at the time, eradicate poppys crops and encourage local support for the central government. Western forces were deployed in all major regions, including the Pashtun areas in the south and east, and today have ballooned to more than 100,000 troops.

As Western occupation grew, the use of the two most worrisome forms of terrorism in Afghanistan — suicide attacks and homemade bombs — escalated in parallel. There were no recorded suicide attacks in Afghanistan before 2001. According to data I have collected, in the immediate aftermath of America’s conquest, the nation experienced only a small number: none in 2002, two in 2003, five in 2004 and nine in 2005.

But in 2006, suicide attacks began to increase by an order of magnitude — with 97 in 2006, 142 in 2007, 148 in 2008 and more than 60 in the first half of 2009. Moreover, the overwhelming percentage of the suicide attacks (80 percent) has been against United States and allied troops or their bases rather than Afghan civilians, and nearly all (95 percent) carried out by Afghans.

The pattern for other terrorist attacks is almost the same. The most deadly involve roadside bombs that detonate on contact or are set off by remote control. Although these weapons were a relatively minor nuisance in the early years of the occupation, with 782 attacks in 2005, their use has shot up since — to 1,739 in 2006, nearly 2,000 in 2007 and more than 3,200 last year. Again, these attacks have for the most part been carried out against Western combat forces, not Afghan targets.

The picture is clear: the more Western troops we have sent to Afghanistan, the more the local residents

Nationbuilding Good – Offshore Balancing [2/2]

have viewed themselves as under foreign occupation, leading to a rise in suicide bombings and other terrorist attacks. (We see this pattern pretty much any time an “outside” armed force has tried to pacify a region, from the West Bank to Kashmir to Sri Lanka.)

So as General McChrystal looks to change course in Afghanistan, the priority should be not to send more soldiers but to end the sense of the United States and its allies as foreign occupiers. Our purpose in Afghanistan is to prevent future attacks like 9/11, which requires stopping the rise of a new generation of anti-American terrorists, particularly suicide terrorists, who are super-predators able to kill large numbers of innocent people.

What motivates suicide attackers, however, is not the existence of a terrorist sanctuary, but the presence of foreign forces on territory they prize. So it’s little surprise that Western forces in Afghanistan have provided a key rallying point for the insurgency, playing a central role in the Taliban’s recruitment campaign and propaganda, which threaten not only our troops there but also our homeland.

The presence of our troops also works against the stability of the central government, as it can rely on Western protection rather than work harder for popular support.

Fortunately, the United States does not need to station large ground forces in Afghanistan to keep it from being a significant safe haven for Al Qaeda or any other anti-American terrorists. This can be achieved by a strategy that relies on over-the-horizon air, naval and rapidly deployable ground forces, combined with training and equipping local groups to oppose the Taliban. No matter what happens in Afghanistan, the United States is going to maintain a strong air and naval presence in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean for many years, and these forces are well suited to attacking terrorist leaders and camps in conjunction with local militias — just as they did against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in 2001.

The United States has a strong history of working with local groups, particularly the Tajiks and Uzbeks of the old Northern Alliance, who would ensure that the Taliban does not recapture Kabul and the northern and western regions of Afghanistan. And should more substantial threats arise, our offshore forces and allies would buy time and protect space for Western ground forces to return.

Further, the United States and its allies have made some efforts to lead Pashtun tribal militias in the southern and eastern areas to abandon their support for the Taliban and, if not switch to America’s side, to at least stay neutral. For instance, the largest British gains in the southwest came from winning the support of Mullah Salam, a former Taliban commander who is the district governor of Musa Qala.

Early this year the United States started what it calls the Afghanistan Social Outreach Program, offering monthly stipends to tribal and local leaders in exchange for their cooperation against the Taliban insurgency. The program is financed at too low a level — approximately $20 million a year — to compete with alternatives that the Taliban can offer like protection for poppy cultivation that is worth some $3 billion a year.

One reason we can expect a strategy of local empowerment to work is that this is precisely how the Taliban is gaining support. As General McChrystal’s report explains, there is little ideological loyalty between the local Pashtuns and the Taliban, so the terrorists gain local support by capitalizing on “vast unemployment by empowering the young and disenfranchised through cash payments, weapons, and prestige.” We’ll have to be more creative and rely on larger economic and political carrots to win over the hearts and minds of the Pashtuns.

Changing strategy does not mean that the United States can withdraw all its military power from Afghanistan immediately. As we are now seeing in Iraq, changing to an approach that relies less on ground power and more on working with local actors takes time. But it is the best strategy for Afghanistan. Otherwise we will continue to be seen and mistrusted as an occupying power, and the war will be lost.

Nationbuilding Good – **AT: Counterterror Good [1/2]**

Withdrawal does not negatively impact counter-terrorism – our enemies have no incentive to protract the fight and COIN proponents overstate the utility of presence activities.

Jervis 2009 [Robert, Adlai E. Stevenson Prof. Int'l Affairs @ Columbia U, "Withdrawal without winning?" September 14, http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/09/14/withdrawal\_without\_winning | VP]

Most discussion about Afghanistan has concentrated on whether and how we can defeat the Taliban. Less attention has been paid to the probable consequences of a withdrawal without winning, an option toward which I incline. What is most striking is not that what I take to be the majority view is wrong, but that it has not been adequately defended. This is especially important because the U.S.has embarked on a war that will require great effort with prospects that are uncertain at best. Furthermore, it appears that Obama's commitment to Afghanistan was less the product of careful analysis than of the political need to find a "tough" pair to his attacks on the war in Iraq during the presidential campaign. It similarly appears that in the months since his election he has devoted much more attention to how to wage the war than to whether we need to wage it.

The claim that this is a "necessary war" invokes two main claims and one subsidiary one. The strongest argument is that we have to fight them there so that we don't have to fight them here. The fact that Bush said this about Iraq does not make it wrong, and as in Iraq, it matters what we mean by "them." Presumably if we withdrew the Taliban would take over much of southern and eastern Afghanistan. This would be terrible for the inhabitants, but would it harm us? I don't think anyone believes that the Taliban would launch attacks against us or our allies, so that the menace is not a direct one.

Instead, the fear is of a repetition of the pre-2001 situation in which al Qaeda would have bases that would facilitate attacks. Obviously, this is a danger, but how great a one? The Taliban would not want to repeat what happened after 2001, and so I do not think one can simply assume that Taliban control would automatically lead to al Qaeda control. Nor is Afghanistan the only country that might permit an al Qaeda presence. Somalia is perhaps as troublesome, and yet noone calls for the U.S. to re-intervene there. Furthermore, al Qaeda has some sort of base of operations in Pakistan now (and is not likely to lose it even in the best outcome across the border); how much worse would it be if we withdrew?

In part, this might depend on exactly what "withdrawal" means and on what "bases" mean. Clearly al Qaeda grew by having large training camps in Afghanistan before 9/11, more than they have now in Pakistan and which they might be able to reestablish, presumably on a smaller scale, if we left. But are these still needed? The fact (assuming it is a fact) that 9/11 could not have happened without those camps does not mean that their reestablishment would lead to renewed terrorism. To put this another way -- and this is a genuine question and not a rhetorical one -- what sort of facilities might be established in Afghanistan that would increase the danger to the U.S.? It presumably would be easier for al Qaeda to operate, but would this translate into more and more effective attacks?

The second part of the question is exactly what withdrawal means. What would we keep in the region? What could we achieve by airpower? How much intelligence would we lose, and are there ways to minimize this loss? It is often said that we withdrew before 9/11 and it didn't work. True, but the circumstances have changed so much that I don't find this history dispositive. While al Qaeda resurgence is a real danger, I am struck by the thinness of the argument that in order to combat it we have to fight the Taliban and try to bring peace if not democracy to Afghanistan.

A second argument, made most recently by Frederick Kagan in the September 5-6 Wall Street Journal, is that, to quote from its headline, "A stable Pakistan needs a stable Afghanistan." But does it really? Are there reasonable prospects for a stable Afghanistan over the next decade no matter what we do? Isn't there a good argument that part of the problem in Pakistan stems from our continued presence in Afghanistan? We are told that bases in Pakistan are used to support the insurgents in Afghanistan, while simultaneously being told that it is the fighting in Afghanistan that is endangering Pakistan.

Reciprocal causation is certainly possible, but this modern version of the turbulent frontier doctrine is not backed by solid logic. Pakistan's ISI and army clearly maintain ties to the Taliban in Afghanistan, and although

**Nationbuilding Good – AT: Counterterror Good [2/2]**

they cannot exert anything like complete control, once the danger of a Taliban defeat by the U.S. passes they would have every incentive to reign in their clients.

Furthermore, the stability of Pakistan does not depend on pacifying the tribal areas. While the recent efforts by Pakistan to regain control of some of its territory may owe something to our combating the Taliban, I wonder if the effect is a large one. In parallel, it can be argued that we gain general influence over Pakistan by fighting in Afghanistan, but here not only the magnitude of the effect but its sign is open to question.

A third but subsidiary argument is that withdrawal would undermine American credibility around the world. Again, the fact that this is an echo of Vietnam does not make it wrong, but it does seem to me much less plausible than the other arguments. Who exactly is going to lose faith in us, and what are they going to do differently? Much could depend on the course of events in other countries, especially Iraq, which could yet descend into civil war. But if it does, would American appear more resolute -- and wiser -- for fighting in Afghanistan? Of course if we withdraw and then we or our allies suffer a major terrorist attack many people will blame Obama, and this is a political argument that must weigh more heavily with the White House than it does with policy analysts.

It is worth noting that these issues are much less ideologically-charged than those surrounding the war in Iraq (or in Vietnam). This means that it should be easier for the concerned community to address them seriously, although not necessarily to come up with (correct) answers, and for people to change their minds. This makes it particularly unfortunate that we have not had a searching and thorough discussion. Although some deeply-rooted beliefs are involved, such as those involving the propensity for dominoes to fall and perhaps an estimate of how great a danger terrorism is, we are mostly in a more pragmatic realm.

Of course Yogi Berra was right when he said that prediction is difficult, especially about the future. But once we move beyond the alluring but unsustainable claim that our inability to exclude the possibility that withdrawing would be very harmful means that we must fight, it becomes clear that we are building a large and risky war on predictions that call for closer examination.

Nationbuilding Good – No Military Solution

Nation-building key to success in Afghanistan

Ian Davis, consultant for the British American Security Information Council, 3/19/08 “NATO at a Crossroads,” <http://www.fpif.org/articles/nato_at_a_crossroads>

But the unanswered question in Afghanistan, and one that is at the heart of the divisions within NATO, is what counts as success? Realists, dominant in (but not limited to) the U.S. camp, would probably settle for denying territory to fanatics hell-bent on returning the country to a training ground for 9/11 attacks. But such a limitless “war on terror” is unsustainable and likely to be self-defeating. As NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said in November 2006, “There is no military solution**; the answer is development, nation-building,** building of roads, schools.”

Nationbuilding Good – AT: Taliban Negotiation DA

Only counterterrorist focus affect eventual Taliban negotiation – insurgents don’t care about continued nationbuilding.

Regehr 2007 [Ernie, Adjunct Prof. Peace and Conflict Studies @ Conrad Grebel U College - U of Waterloo, "Are calls for negotiation in Afghanistan premature?" Centre for International Governance Innovation, September 30, <http://www.cigionline.org/blogs/2007/9/are-calls-negotiation-afghanistan-premature> | VP]

The second point, the argument that negotiations should not be accompanied by an easing of military pressure, is relevant only if the tactical military victories of the government and its foreign backers actually produce strategic setbacks for the insurgents. But if ISAF's military victories succeed mainly in building up resentment against the government and its international backers, it is doubtful that continuing military action will work toward more effective negotiations. Current military pressure is as likely to work against the negotiating interests of ISAF and the Government of Afghanistan if that military pressure generates more alienation than trust.

It is no wonder then that the Secretary-General points to the need for a shift in military focus away from assaults on insurgents. "Afghan civilian and military leaders," he says, "need to play a greater role in planning security operations and ensuring that military gains are consolidated with the provision of basic security by State institutions."

In other words, instead of trying to kill more insurgents, and a lot of civilians in the process, the focus needs to be on the delivery of genuine security and consolidating gains through reconstruction and improved government services in those areas already held by the government, and then, from that base, to engage populations and combatants in insurgent-held areas in pursuit of a negotiated consensus in support of a new Afghan political alignment.

\*\*\*NATIONBUILDING BAD\*\*\*

Nationbuilding Bad – Ineffective

Nation-building fails – external influence is ineffective and Afghanistan should recover on its own.

Bandow 2009 [Doug, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, specializing in foreign policy and civil liberties, former special assistant to President Reagan, "Sticking Around Afghanistan Forever?" September 9, http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/2009/09/09/sticking-around-afghanistan-forever/ | VP]

Reports the Washington Post:

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said in an interview broadcast this week that the United States would not repeat the mistake of abandoning Afghanistan, vowing that “both Afghanistan and Pakistan can count on us for the long term.”

Just what does he believe we should have done? Obviously, the Afghans didn’t want us to try to govern them. Any attempt to impose a regime on them through Kabul would have met the same resistance that defeated the Soviets. Backing a favored warlord or two would have just involved America in the ensuing conflict.

Nor would carpet-bombing Afghanistan with dollar bills starting in 1989 after the Soviets withdrew have led to enlightened, liberal Western governance and social transformation. Humanitarian aid sounds good, but as we’ve (re)discovered recently, building schools doesn’t get you far if there’s little or no security and kids are afraid to attend. And a half century of foreign experience has demonstrated that recipients almost always take the money and do what they want — principally maintaining power by rewarding friends and punishing enemies. The likelihood of the U.S doing any better in tribal Afghanistan as its varied peoples shifted from resisting outsiders to fighting each other is a fantasy.

The best thing the U.S. government could do for the long-term is get out of the way. Washington has eliminated al-Qaeda as an effective transnational terrorist force. The U.S. should leave nation-building to others, namely the Afghans and Pakistanis. Only Afghanistan and Pakistan can confront the overwhelming challenges facing both nations.

Nationbuilding Bad – Ineffective

**Success must be measured by reasonable expectations – there are no conditions for nationbuilding.**

Washington Post 2010 [Eugene Robinson, "Nation building in Afghanistan? That's Afghans' job.," 6/25/2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/24/AR2010062404869.html | VP]

Note that I didn't credit Petraeus with "winning" in Iraq. He didn't. What he managed to do was redeem the situation to the point where the United States could begin bringing home its combat troops. If the Obama administration's aims in Afghanistan are recalibrated to accommodate objective reality, then Petraeus can succeed there, too. But this means that the general's assignment should be a narrow one: Lay the groundwork for a U.S. withdrawal to begin next summer, as Obama has pledged.

After relieving McChrystal of his command Wednesday, Obama called in his national security team and read the riot act. No more bickering, sniping, backbiting or name-calling, the president ordered. Play nice.

But all the comity in the world doesn't resolve the essential tension between those who believe our goal in Afghanistan should be defined as "victory" and those who believe it should be defined as "finding the exit." Two thousand years of history are on the side of the "exit" camp, and the fact is that at some point we're going to leave. The question is how much time will pass -- and how many more young Americans will be killed or wounded -- before that inevitable day comes.

McChrystal, who designed the counterinsurgency strategy being attempted in Afghanistan, didn't disguise his opposition to administration officials such as Vice President Biden, Ambassador Karl Eikenberry and special envoy Richard Holbrooke, who questioned whether the strategy could work. Petraeus is far too good a politician to fall into that trap. He won't allow any daylight between himself and the civilian leadership.

But ultimately, there's going to be no way to avoid the central question: What kind of Afghanistan will we leave behind?

One answer would be that we have to leave in place a durable, functional central government that has full legitimacy and control within the nation's borders. This would provide the United States with a reliable ally in a dangerous region and also ensure that Afghanistan would never again be used as a launching pad for attacks by al-Qaeda. But to get the country to that point, given where it is now, could take a decade or more of sustained, concentrated attention. It would mean not just defeating the Taliban but molding the regime of Afghan President Hamid Karzai into a reasonably honest, effective government. This would be a tall order even if Karzai were a stable, consistent, loyal partner. Does anybody believe that he is?

A better answer would be that it's enough to leave behind an Afghanistan that no longer poses a serious threat to the United States or its vital interests. Nation-building would be the Afghans' problem, not ours.

Petraeus was successful in Iraq because he realized that he couldn't create an Athenian democracy in Baghdad. But the highly imperfect Iraqi government is light-years beyond what the general is likely to be able to achieve in Kabul. Even after the war, Iraq was left with modern infrastructure, a highly educated and sophisticated population, and a sizable percentage of the world's proven oil reserves. Afghanistan has none of these advantages. The political culture is stubbornly medieval; the populace is poor, uneducated and wary of foreign influences. Afghanistan does have great mineral wealth, apparently, but no mining industry to dig it out and no railroads to get it to the marketplace.