# Afghanistan NEG: 3rd Week Index

[Afghanistan NEG: 3rd Week Index 1](#_Toc266974104)

[\*\*\*\*\*Disad Links\*\*\*\*\* 3](#_Toc266974105)

[Appeasement Links (1/3) 4](#_Toc266974106)

[Appeasement Links (2/3) 5](#_Toc266974107)

[Appeasement Links (3/3) 6](#_Toc266974108)

[Civil-Military Relations DA Links: Pull backs from Afghanistan will anger Generals 7](#_Toc266974109)

[Leadership DA Links 8](#_Toc266974110)

[Politics Links: Americans Support the War in Afghanistan 9](#_Toc266974111)

[Disad Links: Reverse Spending Links 10](#_Toc266974112)

[\*\*\*\*\*Counterplans\*\*\*\*\* 11](#_Toc266974113)

[Ban Air Strikes Counterplan 12](#_Toc266974114)

[Ban the Timetable Counterplan (1/1) 13](#_Toc266974115)

[Ban the Timetable Counterplan Extensions: Boslters US Leadership 14](#_Toc266974116)

[Ban the Timetable Counterplan: Bolsters Petraeus’ Credibility 15](#_Toc266974117)

[Bolster the CounterInsurgency Counterplan Shell (1/1) 16](#_Toc266974118)

[Constitutional Monarchy Counterplan Shell (1/1) 17](#_Toc266974119)

[Constitutional Monarchy Counterplan: Solvency Extensions 18](#_Toc266974120)

[Consult NATO Counterplan Solvency (1/1) 19](#_Toc266974121)

[Enhanced Parternship with Pakistan Counterplan (1/1) 20](#_Toc266974122)

[Humanitarian Aid Counterplan (1/1) 21](#_Toc266974123)

[Increase Troops Counterplan Shell (1/1) 22](#_Toc266974124)

[Increase Troops Counterplan Extensions 23](#_Toc266974125)

[Increase Troops Counterplan Extensions 24](#_Toc266974126)

[ROZ Counterplan (1/1) 25](#_Toc266974127)

[\*\*\*\*\*Counter-Insurgency NEG\*\*\*\*\* 26](#_Toc266974128)

[Counter-Insurgency NEG: Terrorism Advantage Answers Front-Line 27](#_Toc266974129)

[Counter-Insurgency NEG: Terrorism Advantage Answers Front-Line 28](#_Toc266974130)

[Counter-Insurgency NEG: Terrorism Advantage Answers Front-Line 29](#_Toc266974131)

[Counter-Insurgency NEG: Terrorism Advantage Extensions—Afghan Stability Increasing Now 30](#_Toc266974132)

[Counter-Insurgency NEG: Terrorism Advantage Answers (Extensions) 31](#_Toc266974133)

[Counter-Insurgency NEG: Terrorism Advantage Answers (Extensions) 32](#_Toc266974134)

[Counter-Insurgency NEG: Terrorism Advantage Extensions 33](#_Toc266974135)

[Counter-Insurgency NEG: Uniqueness: Surge working 34](#_Toc266974136)

[Counter-Insurgency Negative Extensions: Air Power Extensions 35](#_Toc266974137)

[Counter-Insurgency Negative Extensions: Air Power Extensions 36](#_Toc266974138)

[Counter-Insurgency NEG: Extensions—Afghan Security Forces Turn 37](#_Toc266974139)

[Counter-Insurgency NEG: Extensions: Petraeus Credibility Turn 38](#_Toc266974140)

[Counter-Insurgency NEG: Extensions: Petraeus Credibility Turn 39](#_Toc266974141)

[Terrorism Advantage Answers: Turn Extensions: Failure in Afghanistan Causes Terrorism 40](#_Toc266974142)

[Terrorism Advantage Answers: Turn Extensions: Failure in Afghanistan Causes Terrorism 41](#_Toc266974143)

[Counter-insurgency NEG: Solvency NEG Front-Line 42](#_Toc266974144)

[Counter-insurgency NEG: Solvency Extensions—Blurring Turn 43](#_Toc266974145)

[Counter-Insurgency NEG: Solvency Extensions—Extensions on NATO Turn--Uniqueness 44](#_Toc266974146)

[Counter-Insurgency NEG: Solvency Extensions—Extensions on NATO Turn--Links 45](#_Toc266974147)

[Uniqueness for Turns: Counter-insurgency will continue now 46](#_Toc266974148)

[Uniqueness for Turns: Obama will renew the Afghanistan Force Now 47](#_Toc266974149)

[Counter-insurgency NEG: AT: Keeping Drone Strikes Enough/Solves 48](#_Toc266974150)

[Afghanistan Stability Alternate Causes 49](#_Toc266974151)

[\*\*\*\*Pakistan Stability Answers\*\*\*\*\* 50](#_Toc266974152)

[Pakistani Stability Advantage Answers 51](#_Toc266974153)

[Pakistani Stability Advantage Answers 52](#_Toc266974154)

[\*\*\*\*\*General Terrorism Defense\*\*\*\*\* 53](#_Toc266974155)

[\*\*\*\*\*Negotiations Turns\*\*\*\*\* 54](#_Toc266974156)

[Negotiations Uniqueness 55](#_Toc266974157)

[Negotiations Good: Solve Terrorism 56](#_Toc266974158)

[Negotiations Bad 57](#_Toc266974159)

[Negotiations Bad: Extensions—Negotiations Will Fail 58](#_Toc266974160)

[Negotiations Bad: Extensions on Turns 59](#_Toc266974161)

[\*\*\*\*\*Drone Strikes NEG\*\*\*\*\* 60](#_Toc266974162)

[Drone Strikes NEG: AT: US-Pakistani Relations 61](#_Toc266974163)

[\*\*\*\*\*AFF Cards\*\*\*\*\* 62](#_Toc266974164)

[Increased Troops Counterplan Fails 63](#_Toc266974165)

[Increased Troops Counterplans Fail 64](#_Toc266974166)

[Total Withdrawal Good 65](#_Toc266974167)

[Drones AFF: Politics Answers 66](#_Toc266974168)

# \*\*\*\*\*Disad Links\*\*\*\*\*

# Appeasement Links (1/3)

## (--) Counter-insurgency strategy seen as a critical signal of US resolve in Afghanistan:

James Phillips, 2009 (Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs). “Success in Afghanistan Requires Firm Presidential Leadership, Not Half-Measures.” Accessed July 15, 2010 at <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/09/Success-in-Afghanistan-Requires-Firm-Presidential-Leadership-Not-Half-Measures>

Do Not Undermine Friends and Embolden Enemies President Obama must give his military commanders the best chance for success by meeting their requests for the troops and resources necessary to fully implement the counterinsurgency strategy adopted by his Administration in March.[2] As General McChrystal warned in his October 1 speech: "We must show resolve. Uncertainty disheartens our allies, emboldens our foe." If the Obama Administration chooses to deny its field commander's request for more troops and instead seeks to engage Taliban leaders in negotiations with the vain hope that these militants will break from their al-Qaeda allies, the results would likely be disastrous. Many Afghans that currently support the Kabul government would be tempted to hedge their bets and establish ties with the Taliban, while Afghans sitting on the fence would be much more likely to come down on the Taliban's side. President Obama must take the long view and avoid shortsighted policies that undermine U.S. friends in Afghanistan and Pakistan while encouraging America's enemies.

## (--) Premature withdrawal from Afghanistan sends a worldwide signal of appeasement:

Liam Fox, 2010 (Secretary of State for Defense in the United Kingdom.) July 7, 2010. “Afghanistan: Standing Shoulder to Shoulder with the United States.” Accessed July 15, 2010 at <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/07/Afghanistan-Standing-Shoulder-to-Shoulder-with-the-United-States>

So the first reason we cannot bring our troops home immediately is that their mission is not yet completed. Were we to leave prematurely, without degrading the insurgency and increasing the capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), we would probably see the return of the destructive forces of transnational terrorism. Not only would we risk the return of civil war in Afghanistan creating a security vacuum, but we would also risk the destabilization of Pakistan with potentially unthinkable regional, and possibly nuclear, consequences. The second reason is that it would be a shot in the arm to jihadists everywhere, re-energizing violent radical and extreme Islamism. It would send the signal that we did not have the moral resolve and political fortitude to see through what we ourselves have described as a national security imperative.

## (--) Pulling back from Afghanistan emboldens generations of terrorists:

Lisa Curtis, 2009 (Senior Research Fellow for South Asia @ Heritage Foundation) “Scaling Back in Afghanistan Would Jeopardize Security of U.S. Homeland.” Accessed July 15, 2010 at

<http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/09/Scaling-Back-in-Afghanistan-Would-Jeopardize-Security-of-US-Homeland>

The imperfect elections in Afghanistan should not deter the Obama Administration from providing the resources necessary to achieve stability in Afghanistan. To be sure, the outcome of the election was certainly less than ideal. But pulling back from Afghanistan would be devastating, as it would embolden a generation of international terrorists who would then be able to strike at will whenever and wherever they choose.

# Appeasement Links (2/3)

**Any wavering in our commitment to Afghanistan emboldens the Taliban—encourages them to stage international acts of terrorism:**

Boot – 09 – Senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations (Max, 11/3/09, Council on Foreign Relations, “How to Win in Afghanitan,” http://www.cfr.org/publication/20127/how\_to\_win\_in\_afghanistan.html#)

If there is **any wavering in our commitment to Afghanistan**, officials in Pakistan will take that as confirmation that their old strategy of cutting deals with Islamic militants is more necessary than ever. That means that the Taliban and related groups, which have been on the defensive lately following a Pakistani army offensive, will be more secure than ever in their sanctuaries. They will then use these bases not only to try to topple the governments in Kabul and Islamabad but also to stage international acts of terrorism. It would be the biggest victory for the jihadists since the Red Army marched out of Afghanistan and the biggest defeat for the U.S. since Vietnam. Such an outcome is by no means inevitable. It is true that winning in Afghanistan—meaning creating sufficient stability for the democratically elected government to secure its own territory without a substantial foreign troop presence—will not be quick or easy. But nor will it be as difficult as in Iraq where we faced not only an insurgency but an incipient civil war. The good news in Afghanistan is that notwithstanding tensions between Hazaras, Pashtuns, Tajiks, and other groups, they are not fighting one another the way that Shiite and Sunni militias were in Iraq. The security problems are largely confined to the Pashtun belt comprising roughly half the country's population of 33 million. And, although violence continues to rise, it is far below the levels seen in Iraq in 2006-2007. Even recently, when fighting has abated in Iraq, more civilians have been dying most months in Iraq than in Afghanistan. (In June, 340 civilians were killed in Iraq as compared to 198 in Afghanistan.) The Taliban and related groups are tough, tenacious foes but they are hardly invincible. Their Achilles heel is lack of popular support. An International Republican Institute poll of 2,400 Afghans in July found that only 19% have a favorable view of the Taliban compared to 62% who have a positive impression of the U.S. and 82% who view the Afghan National Army favorably. A poll taken earlier this year by the BBC and ABC found that only 4% of Afghans want the Taliban to return to power. U.S. forces are not going to replay the experience of the Red Army—popular legitimacy is on our side in a way that it never was for the Russians, despite doubts that are emerging about the integrity of the presidential election. The only reason the Taliban have made gains is because of a governance and security vacuum that they have filled with fear and intimidation. Until now international forces and their Afghan partners have lacked the will and resources to implement a classic counterinsurgency plan designed to secure the populace. But that is precisely what Gen. Stanley McChrystal will undertake—assuming he gets the resources he needs from Washington. To pull the plug on our operations now, when our troops are only beginning to fight in earnest, would be even more foolish than it would have been to short-circuit the surge in Iraq in 2007—as so many who are freely offering advice on Afghanistan today once advocated.

# Appeasement Links (3/3)

**Pulling out Troops will Embolden Taliban and other Rogue states**

Boot – 09 – Senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations (Max, 9/2/09, The Wall Street Journal, “How to Win in Afghanistan,” http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204731804574388630158193104.html)

Given declining poll numbers and rising casualty figures, it is no surprise that the chattering classes are starting to bail out on a war in Afghanistan that was launched with their enthusiastic support. From Sen. Russ Feingold on the left to columnist George Will on the right, these born-again doves seem to be chastened by the fact that the Taliban won’t simply stop fighting. Rather than rise to the challenge, they propose that we stick to what Mr. Will says “can be done from offshore, using intelligence, drones, cruise missiles, airstrikes and small, potent Special Forces units, concentrating on the porous 1,500-mile border with Pakistan, a nation that actually matters.” If only we could. No one wants to see troops risking injury and death in ground combat. It would be nice if it weren't necessary. But it is. We tried the offshore strategy in the 1990s when Afghanistan became a stronghold of al Qaeda. Even after 9/11 we still stuck to a minimalist approach. Recall the failure to capture Osama bin Laden at Tora Bora because we wouldn't commit enough American troops. As recently as 2008 there were only two U.S. Brigade Combat Teams in the entire country (a brigade has roughly 4,000 soldiers), compared to 20 in Iraq at the height of the surge. There are now five brigades engaged in combat in Afghanistan. For most of the Bush administration, we relied on unmanned Predator drones and Special Forces to keep the enemy at bay. Afghan Security Forces were too small and ineffective to pick up the slack. Even today there are only 173,000 Afghan soldiers and police compared to 600,000 in Iraq. The result: The Taliban, which had been routed in 2001, staged a disheartening resurgence. However much advocates of downsizing might want to disguise the fact, there is no alternative to doing the kind of intensive counterinsurgency work on the ground that has paid off in numerous conflicts from Malaya to Iraq. If we don't make a substantial commitment—one that will require raising our troop strength beyond the 68,000 to which the administration is already committed—we are likely to lose. **Losing wars is a bad thing**. **It is especially bad if you are a superpower that depends on an aura of invincibility to keep rogue elements at bay.** That should go without saying, but those calling for a scuttle from Afghanistan seem to have forgotten this elementary lesson. They might cast their minds back to the 1970s when we were reeling from defeat in Vietnam and our enemies were on the march from Nicaragua to Iran. Or back to the 1990s when, following the U.S. pullout from Lebanon and Somalia, Osama bin Laden labeled us a weak horse that could be attacked with impunity. A U.S. drawdown in Afghanistan would lead to defeat with consequences at least as serious. The Taliban would expand their control, probably seizing Kandahar, the principal city of the south. Then they would besiege Herat, Kabul and other urban centers. No doubt the central government could hold out for some time, and the Taliban would be unlikely to ever capture all of northern Afghanistan—territory they did not control even on Sept. 10, 2001. But they could certainly impose their diktat over substantial territories where narco-traffickers and terrorists would have free run. The impact on Pakistan—"a nation that actually matters," in Mr. Will's words—is particularly sobering. To the extent that we have been able to stage successful attacks on al Qaeda strongholds in Pakistan, it is because we have secure bases in Afghanistan. To the extent that we have not been more successful in getting the government of Pakistan to eliminate the militants on its own, it is because we have not convinced all of the relevant decision-makers (particularly in the military and intelligence services) that we will be in the region for the long-term.

# Civil-Military Relations DA Links: Pull backs from Afghanistan will anger Generals

## Civil Military Relations: generals don’t like to lose wars:

VIJAY PRASHAD, 2010 (staff writer) “The right war gone wrong.” The Hindu. Jul. 17-30. <http://www.flonnet.com/stories/20100730271505500.htm>

The Iraq war too remains bloody, although the casualties are now of Iraqis mainly. The political reality in both Iraq and Afghanistan is messy. Elections in Iraq produced a hung parliament with advantage to no faction. Such a circumstance gives the U.S. more impetus to remain on hand; an enfeebled Iraqi political system cannot ensure its swift departure. In Afghanistan, the political condition is worse. The President governs from his palace with the support of a handful of tribal leaders, and with his writ extended thanks only to the American generals. A political elite that is subservient takes shelter in corruption and fattens its overseas bank accounts in anticipation of the deluge that will overrun Kabul soon enough. President Barack Obama's wars bring comfort to none. No promise of withdrawal seems easy to meet. The generals do not like to lose wars. The political commissars handed them two that are unwinnable, or which do not have a clear prospect of victory. Bush had not clearly defined victory. Nor has Obama. But Obama is cannier. He seems to believe that U.S. hegemony cannot be achieved through the gun alone. In that case, wars that are unpopular and that bleed the exchequer need to be brought to an end, not because of the suffering they bring, but because they incapacitate the U.S. to extend its authority over planetary affairs. This is the crucial difference between the strategies of Bush and Obama.

# Leadership DA Links

## Pulling out of Afghanistan would be a foreign policy debacle for Obama:

Linda S. Heard, 2010 (staff writer). “A war fuelled by pride.” July 14, 2010. Online. Accessed July 14, 2010 at:   
<http://www.tehrantimes.com/index_View.asp?code=222918>

Before Washington can pull its military machine out of Afghanistan it needs a ‘win' — or something that can be dressed up to look like a win. That's easier said than done; firstly, because nobody in the U.S. government has been able to describe what a win might look like and, secondly, because the foe isn't an army but rather proponents of an extremist ideology who are able to flit in and out of the shadows. Domestic implications Furthermore, if the U.S. was seen to be cutting and running without being able to show tangible results, the families of those sent home in flag-draped caskets and the public at large will question why their finest were sacrificed in the first place.

Withdrawing of forces angers allies and makes Obama appear weak

Macaskill ‘9 (Ewen MacAskill “Barack Obama 'risks Suez-like disaster' in Afghanistan, says key adviser.” 12 November 2009. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/nov/12/obama-us-troops-afghanistan-kilcullen>)

A key adviser to Nato forces warned today that Barack Obama risks a Suez-style debacle in Afghanistan if he fails to deploy enough extra troops and opts instead for a messy compromise. David Kilcullen, one of the world's leading authorities on counter-insurgency and an adviser to the British government as well as the US state department, said Obama's delay in reaching a decision over extra troops had been "messy". He said it not only worried US allies but created uncertainty the Taliban could exploit. Speaking in an interview with the Guardian, he compared the president to someone "pontificating" over whether to send enough firefighters into a burning building to put a fire out. He was speaking as Obama left Washington for a nine-day trip to Asia without announcing a decision on troop numbers. The options being considered by the US have been narrowed down to four: sending 10,000, 20,000, 30,000 or 40,000, the latter the figure requested by the Nato commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal. These would be on top of 68,000 US troops already deployed.

# Politics Links: Americans Support the War in Afghanistan

## (--) 62% of Americans support the military action in Afghanistan:

Dana Blanton, 2010 (staff writer), July 1, 2010. “Fox News Poll: Obama’s Approval Steady; Most Support Action in Afghanistan.” <http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/07/01/fox-news-poll-obamas-approval-steady-support-action-afghanistan/>

Similarly, views are split on whether Obama has been an "effective" president so far: 50 percent of voters think he has been, while 47 percent disagree. Most Democrats -- 86 percent -- describe Obama as an effective president. To varying degrees, majorities of Republicans (78 percent) and independents (56 percent) think he has not been effective so far. By a 62-31 percent margin, **voters support the military’s efforts in Afghanistan.** Previously, 64 percent supported the action and 27 percent opposed it (September 2009). Despite this significant support for the action, many American voters are uncertain the U.S. can succeed in Afghanistan. Thirty-three percent think it is possible to achieve stability in the region. A 58 percent majority disagrees.

## **(--) Reducing troops unpopular, no one wants to admit failure**

Stewart, 9- Ryan Family Professor of the Practice of Human Rights and Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, studied at Oxford and served briefly in the British army before working in the diplomatic service in Indonesia and as British representative to Montenegro (9/16/09, Rory, “The Future of Afghanistan,” <http://www.hks.harvard.edu/news-events/news/testimonies/rory-stewart-on-afghanistan>)

Such a policy can seem strained, unrealistic, counter-intuitive and unappealing. They appear to betray the hopes of Afghans who trusted us and to allow the Taliban to abuse district towns. No politician wants to be perceived to have underestimated, or failed to address, a terrorist threat; or to write off the ‘blood and treasure’ that we have sunk into Afghanistan; or to admit defeat. Americans are particularly unwilling to believe that problems are insoluble; Obama’s motto is not ‘no we can’t’; soldiers are not trained to admit defeat or to say a mission is impossible. And to suggest that what worked in Iraq won’t work in Afghanistan requires a detailed knowledge of each country’s past, a bold analysis of the causes of development and a rigorous exposition of the differences, for which few have patience.

# Disad Links: Reverse Spending Links

## Afghan war is incredibly costly—it has cost the US a trillion dollars already:

VIJAY PRASHAD, 2010 (staff writer) “The right war gone wrong.” The Hindu. Jul. 17-30. <http://www.flonnet.com/stories/20100730271505500.htm>

BY the end of May, the United States taxpayer had spent a trillion dollars on the country's wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Afghan war has been going on for nine years, the longest military involvement for the U.S. armed forces. It has claimed the lives of 3,000 U.S. troops, a large number of other North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) forces and an untold number of Afghan and Pakistani civilians.

# \*\*\*\*\*Counterplans\*\*\*\*\*

Ban Air Strikes Counterplan

## Text: The North Atlantic Treaty Origination should ban all air strikes in Afghanistan

## Observation 1: Not topical: doesn’t decrease military presence.

## Observation 2: Solvency--

## (--) Banning air strikes solves the popular backlash against Counterinsurgency operations:

Boyle 10 - 1 Lecturer in International Relations and a Research Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St Andrews (3/10/10, Michael, International Affairs, “Do counterterrorism and counterinsurgency go together?” <http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/123318677/abstract>)

Similarly, NATO’s air strikes—employed as part of both counterterrorism missions (targeting Al-Qaeda and senior Taleban targets) and counterinsurgency operations (in support of ground operations)—have generated a popular backlash because of civilian casualties. In 2009, according to the UN, 596 civilians were killed by pro-government forces (including NATO’s): roughly 25 per cent of the total number of civilians killed that year (2,412). 57 Air strikes accounted for 61 per cent of all of the civilian deaths attributed to the government and NATO. An ABC news poll in 2009 found that 66 per cent of Afghans believed that NATO air strikes were ‘unacceptable’. 59 While public opinion polls reveal that Afghans split the blame for civilian casualties between NATO and the Taleban, the Karzai government has come under increasing public pressure to stop these air strikes. Concerned that it would appear to be enabling the violence and doing the bidding of its foreign backers, the Karzai government has recently condemned the air strikes and called on NATO to cease these operations entirely. Recognizing that the use of air strikes carried with it ‘the seeds of our own destruction’ if it undermined the Karzai government, General McChrystal has tightened US policy on their use to avoid operations in populated areas that might risk killing civilians and undermining the counterinsurgency effort.

## (--) Raids Are the key internal link to Afghanistan and Pakistan instability—the counterplan solves

Boyle 10 - 1 Lecturer in International Relations and a Research Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St Andrews (3/10/10, Michael, International Affairs, “Do counterterrorism and counterinsurgency go together?” <http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/123318677/abstract>)

There is considerable evidence that these raids and drone strikes have been successful in degrading Al-Qaeda’s capabilities. 68 Obama administration officials believe that they have eliminated more than half of the top Al-Qaeda targets over the last year. 69 There are numerous anecdotal reports that Al-Qaeda has been demoralized by the strikes, which they see as causing disarray in their ranks. 70 But in Islamabad towards actively countering the US and NATO in Afghanistan. Worse still, Al-Qaeda appears to gain from this dynamic: Hakimullah Mehsud, the former leader of the TTP, stated unequivocally in October 2009 that ‘we have respect for Al-Qaeda and the jihadist organizations—we are with them’. He also declared his allegiance to Afghan Taleban leader Mullah Omar as the ‘amir’ of his movement. The use of commando raids and drone strikes against militant networks in Pakistan has furthered the radicalization of existing groups and expanded the international horizons of militant groups whose focus was previously the Pakistani government or Kashmir. Ironically, the result of the expansion of strikes into Pakistan may be to encourage the process of fusion that Kilcullen described and to pull these groups even closer to Al-Qaeda.

# Ban the Timetable Counterplan (1/1)

## Text: The United States Federal government should end the July 2011 timeline for withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan and tie future withdrawals to conditions on the ground. Questions Ask.

## Observation 1: Not topical—opposite of the topic if anything.

## Observation 2: The counterplan bolsters allied support for the war in Afghanistan and provides uniqueness for our disads.

James Phillips, 2010 (Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs). “Petraeus Hearing: Obama Needs a Victory Plan, Not an Exit Plan.” Accessed July 15, 2010 at <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Commentary/2010/06/Petraeus-Hearing-Obama-Needs-a-Victory-Plan-Not-an-Exit-Plan>

General Petraeus told the committee that the Afghanistan war is “a contest of wills” between the Taliban and the allied forces, and that it will require a long-term commitment. He stepped adroitly around such political landmines as the questionable wisdom of fighting a difficult and protracted war according to a politically motivated timeline devised in Washington. When Republican and Democratic senators sparred over President Obama’s self-imposed July 2011 troop-withdrawal deadline, Petraeus calmly sought to defuse the issue and refused to be drawn into (justifiable) criticism of Vice President Joe Biden for persistently advocating the high-risk gamble of adhering to a rigid deadline (Biden: “You can bet on it”). But the July 2011 target date has been a huge flaw in the Obama administration’s Afghanistan strategy, as Heritage Foundation senior research fellow Lisa Curtis and I explained when the deadline was announced. Indeed, one of the major takeaways from the infamous Rolling Stone article was the tremendous frustration of many high-ranking military officers in Afghanistan (not just McChrystal) with the deadline. As Heritage Foundation national-security expert James Carafano has written, “Timelines need to be set based on the situation on the ground, not the political calendar in Washington. You don’t get your allies to stand shoulder to shoulder with you by threatening to abandon them.”

## Fully committing to Afghanistan bolsters support of the US in Afghanistan:

James Phillips, 2010 (Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs). “Afghanistan: Time to Rethink the Timeline.” June 25th, 2010. Accessed online on July 15, 2010 at <http://blog.heritage.org/?p=37101>

Charles Krauthammer wrote a column today that contrasted Obama’s half-hearted commitment in Afghanistan with President Bush’s determined surge in Iraq and noted that an Afghan facing a life-or-death decision on which side to support is unlikely to bet his life by becoming an ally of a U.S. government that is edging toward withdrawal. Krauthammer observed that one reason the surge in Iraq succeeded was that: “What President Bush’s critics considered mulishness, the Iraqis saw as steadfastness.”

# Ban the Timetable Counterplan Extensions: Boslters US Leadership

## Ending the Afghanistan timeline bolsters Obama’s leadership:

James Phillips, 2010 (Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs). “Afghanistan: Time to Rethink the Timeline.” June 25th, 2010. Accessed online on July 15, 2010 at <http://blog.heritage.org/?p=37101>

President Obama’s decision to set such an unrealistic time limit on the American troop surge, apparently motivated by domestic political considerations, has imposed an impossible burden on U.S. commanders in Afghanistan, who need much more time to execute the Petraeus/McChrystal counterinsurgency strategy. Instead of acting as a decisive commander-in-chief firmly committed to success in Afghanistan, President Obama unfortunately has come across as an uncertain political leader eager to paper over differences within his own divided administration to implement an exit strategy, despite the likely disastrous consequences of such a plan.

# Ban the Timetable Counterplan: Bolsters Petraeus’ Credibility

## Ending the timeline and conditioning withdrawal on the situation on the ground bolsters Petraeus’ credibility:

James Carafano, 2010 ( directs Center for Foreign Policy Studies @ Heritage Foundation). June 24, 2010. Accessed July 15, 2010 at <http://blog.heritage.org/2010/06/24/timelines-gone-wild/>

No right-thinking strategist would sign up for an open ended commitment to keep troops in Afghanistan—but timelines need to be set based on the situation on the ground, not the political calendar in Washington. You don’t get your allies to stand shoulder to shoulder with you by threatening to abandon them. If the President really wants to help Gen. Petraeus win the war, he can publicly state “forget the timeline, we will start to bring the troops home when conditions are right.” He could also pledge to give Gen. Petraeus whatever he needs to get the job done.

# Bolster the CounterInsurgency Counterplan Shell (1/1)

## Text: The United States federal government should provide resources and troops to fully implement the counterinsurgency strategy.

## Observation 1: Not topical: opposite of the topic—we increase troops and resources to Afghanistan.

## Observation 2: Net benefits: The counterplan allows effective implementation of the counterinsurgency strategy and provides uniqueness for our disads and case turns…

James Phillips, 2009 (Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs). “Success in Afghanistan Requires Firm Presidential Leadership, Not Half-Measures.” Accessed July 15, 2010 at <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/09/Success-in-Afghanistan-Requires-Firm-Presidential-Leadership-Not-Half-Measures>

The Administration's new strategy for Afghanistan is promising, but it will not be easily or quickly implemented. Already, casualties are mounting as American troops have deployed in areas formerly controlled by the Taliban in southern and eastern Afghanistan. President Obama must carefully review the McChrystal report and give his military commanders the resources and troops they need to effectively carry out their counterinsurgency strategy. An incremental approach that defers any requested troop reinforcements could jeopardize the success of the strategy.

# Constitutional Monarchy Counterplan Shell (1/1)

## Text: The United States federal government should diplomatically push Afghanistan for a grand council to reinstate a constitutional monarchy. Questions, ask.

**Observation 1: Not topical—doesn’t decrease military presence in Afghanistan.**

**Observation 2: Solves the case:**

## (--) Pushing for a constitutional monarchy in Afghanistan is the only alternative to Taliban rule after forces withdraw:

Shireen K. Burki, 2010 (staff writer). “Bold move to save Afghanistan: Bring back a king.” June 30, 2010. Accessed July 14, 2010 at http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2010/0630/Bold-move-to-save-Afghanistan-Bring-back-a-king.

It’s time that Western leaders answer a politically incorrect but vital question: Do they care more about establishing democracy than stability? Because if the mission is still about ensuring that Afghanistan – as a relatively cohesive state – remains free from Taliban and Al Qaeda, then the West should be willing to consider a dramatic step: reinstatement of a constitutional monarchy.

Pushing for a constitutional monarchy runs counter to America’s traditional antipathy toward monarchies as a form of governance, but in the case of Afghanistan, it’s probably now the only alternative to the Taliban rule that seems almost inevitable once NATO forces withdraw.

## (--) Restoring Afghanistan’s constitutional monarchy stops Taliban rule and creates victory in the war:

Shireen K. Burki, 2010 (staff writer). “Bold move to save Afghanistan: Bring back a king.” June 30, 2010. Accessed July 14, 2010 at http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2010/0630/Bold-move-to-save-Afghanistan-Bring-back-a-king.

If the United States values stability more than democracy, it will recognize that restoring Afghanistan’s constitutional monarchy is the only thing that will prevent Taliban rule and victory in the war.

# Constitutional Monarchy Counterplan: Solvency Extensions

## (--) Overwhleming majority of Afghans want a constitutional monarchy: the counterplan will solve

Shireen K. Burki, 2010 (staff writer). “Bold move to save Afghanistan: Bring back a king.” June 30, 2010. Accessed July 14, 2010 at http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2010/0630/Bold-move-to-save-Afghanistan-Bring-back-a-king.

Thanks to their presence, Afghans were able to resume cherished pastimes banned under the Taliban: They played soccer, flew kites, danced the Attan, and, most importantly, they laughed out loud. Afghans could tend to their beloved rose gardens, or drive their buses and cars, blaring loud music. Woman could seek medical help, and widows could find employment, without running the risk of being beaten, or worse: stoned or shot to death in the soccer stadium. After the fall of the Taliban, the overwhelming majority of Afghans – across ethnic lines – wanted to reinstate the constitutional monarchy that had served Afghanistan so well in the past. During the long reign of King Zahir Shah (1933-1973), Afghanistan blossomed into a modern state. It became the largest exporter of raisins in the world, and was renowned in the region for its carpets, fruits, melons, and semi-precious stones. Kabul rivaled Islamabad as a city of modernity and culture, and was considered by Westerners in the 1960s as the Geneva of Asia.

## (--) A new grand council can determine if Afghans want a constitutional monarchy: this will undermine the Taliban and create legitimacy in the state of Afghanistan:

Shireen K. Burki, 2010 (staff writer). “Bold move to save Afghanistan: Bring back a king.” June 30, 2010. Accessed July 14, 2010 at http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2010/0630/Bold-move-to-save-Afghanistan-Bring-back-a-king.

Today, President Karzai is derisively called the “mayor of Kabul,” as his mandate barely extends outside the cities. The 2004 Constitution does not mirror the hopes and aspirations of its people. The Afghan National Army is dubbed “The Northern Alliance Forces” by Pashtuns. And Kabul tries to exert control over the provinces by direct fiat, defying their history of fierce independence. At this stage, Washington and its coalition partners have tough choices: 1) Leave or 2) Fix the political mess they helped to create. The US military surge that Petraeus now directs will probably just delay the descent into chaos once NATO begins pulling out in 2011. Saving Afghanistan now requires encouraging Karzai and his political and military leadership to accept some painful options that might include comfortable exile. It requires holding another Afghan loya jirga (grand council) to determine if Afghans want a constitutional monarchy reinstated under a charismatic descendant of Zahir Shah. His lineage would serve as a reminder of what was, and what can be. It would be a public relations nightmare for the Taliban. If NATO is serious about its mission it needs to ensure that Afghanistan’s commander-in-chief is seen as legitimate in the eyes of Afghans.

## (--) Afghanistan’s historical rule under a constitutional monarchy created stability in Afghanistan:

Shireen K. Burki, 2010 (staff writer). “Bold move to save Afghanistan: Bring back a king.” June 30, 2010. Accessed July 14, 2010 at http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2010/0630/Bold-move-to-save-Afghanistan-Bring-back-a-king.

There was relative stability in this historically strife-ridden state, which enabled completion of large-scale development projects like dams and roads. Most important, the only “Taliban” were religious students who studied the Koran. Afghans saw their king as fair and inclusive. Under Zahir Shah, the central government established Afghanistan’s first professional standing Army, yet generally left the provinces alone in their handling of day-to-day affairs. Kabul did not try to force its “modernization” program upon the conservative elements, especially in the Pashtun belt inhabited by proud tribes who were deeply skeptical of anything “foreign” being imposed on them. So memorable was this period that Afghans at the Bonn Conference in 2001, which was set up to plan the future of Afghanistan’s government, clamored to reinstate Zahir Shah and the 1964 Constitution that set forth equal rights for all Afghans before the law.

**Consult NATO Counterplan Solvency (1/1)**

(--) NATO says yes- they support afghan policy

Stewart, 9- Ryan Family Professor of the Practice of Human Rights and Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, studied at Oxford and served briefly in the British army before working in the diplomatic service in Indonesia and as British representative to Montenegro (9/16/09, Rory, “The Future of Afghanistan,” <http://www.hks.harvard.edu/news-events/news/testimonies/rory-stewart-on-afghanistan>)

The fundamental problem with the strategy is that it is trying to do the impossible. It is highly unlikely that the US will be able either to build an effective, legitimate state or to defeat a Taliban insurgency . It needs to find another way of protecting the US against terrorist attack. We claim to be engaged in a neutral, technocratic, universal project of ‘statebuilding’ but we don’t know exactly what that means. Those who see Afghanistan as reverting to the Taliban or becoming a traditional autocratic state are referring to situations that existed there in 1972 and 1994. But the international community’s ambition appears to be to create something that has not existed before. Obama calls it ‘a more capable and accountable Afghan government’. The US, the UK and their allies agreed unanimously at the Nato 60th anniversary summit in April to create ‘a stronger democratic state’ in Afghanistan.’

(--) Consultation with NATO Is key to restore confidence

Stewart, 9- Ryan Family Professor of the Practice of Human Rights and Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, studied at Oxford and served briefly in the British army before working in the diplomatic service in Indonesia and as British representative to Montenegro (9/16/09, Rory, “The Future of Afghanistan,” <http://www.hks.harvard.edu/news-events/news/testimonies/rory-stewart-on-afghanistan>)

The greatest risk of our inflated ambitions and fears, encapsulated in the current surge is that it will achieve the exact opposite of its intentions and in fact precipitate a total withdrawal. The heavier our footprint, and the more costly, the less we are likely to be able to sustain it. Public opinion is already turning against it. Nato allies are mostly staying in Afghanistan simply to please the United States and have little confidence in our objectives or our reasons. Contemporary political culture tends to encourage black and white solutions: either we garrison or we abandon.

# Enhanced Parternship with Pakistan Counterplan (1/1)

## Text: The United States Congress should pass and President Obama should sign the Enhanced Parternship with Pakistan Act. Questions, ask.

## Observation 1: Not topical—doesn’t decrease military presence.

## Observation 2: The Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act stems regional and global terrorism.

Lisa Curtis, 2009 (Senior Research Fellow, Heritage Foundation). “Afghanistan and Pakistan: Understanding and Engaging Regional Stakeholders” Accessed July 15, 2010 at <http://www.heritage.org/research/testimony/afghanistan-and-pakistannbsp-understanding-and-engaging-regional-stakeholders>

The U.S. Congress should condition future military assistance to Pakistan on Pakistan's efforts to fight terrorism and permanently break the links between its security services and elements of the Taliban and other extremist groups. The "Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act 2008" introduced last year in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee seeks to simultaneously bolster support for democracy and economic development in Pakistan by tripling non-military assistance, while strengthening Pakistan's commitment to fighting terrorism by tying military assistance to preconditions. Beginning in fiscal year 2010, the bill would require the Secretary of State to certify that Pakistan is making concerted efforts to prevent al-Qaeda and associated terrorist groups from operating on its territory before the U.S. provides additional military assistance to Pakistan. Conditioning military assistance to Pakistan is necessary to demonstrate that the U.S. will not tolerate dual policies toward terrorists--and that there will be consequences for Pakistani leaders if elements of the security services provide support to terrorists. Such consequences are necessary to stem regional and global terrorism. Rather than requiring certification of Pakistani efforts, however, the U.S. Congress can stipulate that all military assistance to Pakistan would come under immediate review if information comes to light that Pakistani officials have provided assistance to such groups or individuals. Assistance should be suspended until such time as the U.S. determines the Pakistani government has taken action against the individuals providing support for terrorism.

Humanitarian Aid Counterplan (1/1)

## Text: The United States federal government should increase funding for works projects for the Afghan people. Questions, ask.

## Observation 1: not topical—doesn’t decrease military presence.

## Observation 2: Work Projects Solve violence and bolster stability in Afghanistan.

Stewart, 9- Ryan Family Professor of the Practice of Human Rights and Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, studied at Oxford and served briefly in the British army before working in the diplomatic service in Indonesia and as British representative to Montenegro (9/16/09, Rory, “The Future of Afghanistan,” <http://www.hks.harvard.edu/news-events/news/testimonies/rory-stewart-on-afghanistan>)

The best Afghan policy would be to reduce the number of foreign troops from the current level of 90,000 to far fewer – perhaps 20,000. In that case, two distinct objectives would remain for the international community: development and counter-terrorism. Neither would amount to the building of an Afghan state or winning a counter-insurgency campaign. A reduction in troop numbers and a turn away from state-building should not mean total withdrawal: good projects could continue to be undertaken in electricity, water, irrigation, health, education, agriculture, rural development and in other areas favoured by development agencies. Even a light US presence could continue to allow for aggressive operations against Al Qaeda terrorists, in Afghanistan, who plan to attack the United States. The US has successfully prevent Al Qaeda from re-establishing itself since 2001 (though the result has only been to move bin Laden across the border.). The US military could also (with other forms of assistance) support the Afghan military to prevent the Taliban from seizing a city or taking over the country. These twin objectives will require a very long-term presence, as indeed is almost inevitable in a country which is as poor, as fragile and traumatized as Afghanistan (and which lacks the internal capacity at the moment to become independent of Foreign aid or control its territory). But a long-term presence will in turn mean a much lighter and more limited presence (if it is to retain US domestic support). We should not control and cannot predict the future of Afghanistan. It may in the future become more violent, or find a decentralised equilibrium or a new national unity, but if its communities continue to want to work with us, we can, over 30 years, encourage the more positive trends in Afghan society and help to contain the more negative.

Humanitarian aid renews our commitment to Afghanistan: gives the people hope in the future.

Stewart, 9- Ryan Family Professor of the Practice of Human Rights and Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, studied at Oxford and served briefly in the British army before working in the diplomatic service in Indonesia and as British representative to Montenegro (9/16/09, Rory, “The Future of Afghanistan,” <http://www.hks.harvard.edu/news-events/news/testimonies/rory-stewart-on-afghanistan>)

While, I strongly oppose troop increases, I equally strongly oppose a total flight. We are currently in danger of lurching from troop increases to withdrawal and from engagement to isolation. We are threatening to provide instant electro-shock therapy followed by abandonment. This is the last thing Afghanistan needs. The international community should aim to provide a patient, tolerant long-term relationship with a country as poor and traumatized as Afghanistan. Judging by comparable countries in the developing world (and Afghanistan is very near the bottom of the UN Human Development index), making Afghanistan more stable, prosperous and humane is a project which will take decades. It is a worthwhile project in the long-term for us and for Afghans but we will only be able to sustain our presence if we massively reduce our investment and our ambitions and begin to approach Afghanistan more as we do other poor countries in the developing world. The best way of avoiding the mistakes of the 1980s and 1990s – the familiar cycle of investment and abandonment which most Afghan expect and fear and which have contributed so much to instability and danger - is to husband and conserve our resources, limit our objectives to counter-terrorism and humanitarian assistance and work out how to work with fewer troops and less money over a longer period. In Afghanistan in the long-term, less will be more.

# Increase Troops Counterplan Shell (1/1)

Text: The United States Federal Government should increase troops, civilian aid workers, and funding for US operations in Afghanistan. Questions ask.

Observation 1: Not topical, doesn’t decrease US presence

Observation 2: It solves the case and provides disad uniqueness.

**Increasing troops, civilian aid workers, and funds will allow the US to beat back the Taliban and re-gain the initiative in the war**

Cordesman – 09 – Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy @ CSIS (Anthony H., 9/15/09 “Winning in Afghanistan,” http://csis.org/publication/winning-afghanistan-1)

No strategy for Afghanistan can be successful unless it answers the most basic question of going to war: can we win? The answer is yes, provided that victory is defined in realistic and practical terms. With the proper US leadership, it is still possible to create an Afghanistan that is stable and secure enough to ensure that it cannot again become a center for international terrorism, a threat to Pakistan and other nations in the region, or a center of Jihadist operations throughout the world. This will not be a victory that achieves the level of development, mature democracy, and Western concepts of human rights called for by the Afghan compact. It can, however, be a kind of victory that allows the Afghans to pursue their destiny in relative peace. The answer is only yes under very demanding conditions. Years of chronic under-resourcing have allowed the Taliban and other insurgents to recover and seize the initiative. This has imposed a significant cost upon the efforts to garner peace. Additionally, failures by the Afghan central government, paired with corruption and waste on all sides, magnified such costs. Furthermore, the situation has been compounded by a lack of effective civil-military cooperation. Anything approaching a real-world unity of effort between the US team, NATO/ISAF, UN, and international agencies hasn’t proven to be effective. The Taliban, Al Qa’ida, and other insurgent groups like Hekmatyer and Haqqani have re-emerged as major threats that influence or control approximately a third of the country, with de facto sanctuaries in Pakistan. These gains are more the fault of the US and its allies, as opposed to a reflection of the strength of Jihadist insurgents. In fact, such developments are largely the result of the US failing to provide adequate resources, decisive leadership, or effective implementation of a coherent civil-military strategy. The US has failed to commit adequate troops, civilian aid workers, and adequate funds. This lack of leadership, paired with a lack of adequate civil-military resources, has been to the detriment of effective Afghan governance and adequate Afghan security forces. Instead, the US has focused on Iraq, while trying to pressure its allies into assuming its responsibilities. The US has treated Pakistan as an ally despite Pakistan’s posture being clearly divided. It covertly tolerates and encourages the Afghan Taliban and other insurgents. The end result has been a power vacuum that a skilled and adaptive set of insurgents has exploited to seize the initiative, and wage a war of political attrition that they are now winning. Nevertheless, the US may well be able to reverse this situation. The Taliban and other insurgents are still weak and unpopular. The strategy of shape, clear, hold, and build that has had substantial successes in Iraq can be adapted to Afghanistan. Ambassador Eikenberry and General McChrystal offer the kind of leadership that has the ability to win. A meaningful form of Afghan NATO/ISAF victory still seems possible—and even probable—if the US changes its strategy, commits the ~~man~~power and money needed to win, and works more effectively with the Afghans and its allies. The US will fail, however, if the Administration and the Congress temporize and delay. Failing to fully implement a new strategy focused on a realistic effort to create true Afghan partners, while allowing domestic politics to supersede the needed troops and funds, will lead to such a defeat. It is clear that the Obama Administration and the US Congress can decisively waste the last opportunity for victory over the coming months by not giving the US team in Afghanistan the authority, support, and resources needed to win. Accordingly, the question that the US and its allies must now face is whether they are willing to act decisively enough, while committing enough resources, to correct the failures of the last eight years.

# Increase Troops Counterplan Extensions

**Increasing troops to Afghanistan and funding the creation of an Afghan security force is critical to not lose the war:**

O’Hanlon – 08 – Senior Fellow, Foreign policy (Michael, 11/14/08, Brookings, “How to Win In Afghanistan,” http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2008/1114\_afghanistan\_ohanlon.aspx)

The war in Afghanistan is not going well, and the critical problem is the same one that dogged our efforts in Iraq for years: grossly inadequate troop levels. Western troop totals there have just inched over 60,000, while Afghan security forces total some 140,000. Let's put this into perspective: We are trying to do with 200,000 personnel what it took 700,000 soldiers and police (plus 100,000 "volunteers") to accomplish in Iraq. But Afghanistan is even larger than Iraq, and more populous. President-elect Barack Obama has wisely promised an increase in U.S. forces for Afghanistan. But his proposed minisurge of perhaps 15,000 more troops, on top of the 30,000 Americans and 30,000 NATO personnel now there, will not suffice as a strategy. More is needed. To be sure, it is not all about numbers. As Gen. David Petraeus has already underscored, Afghanistan is not Iraq, and what worked in one place may not succeed in another. Among other things, the Pakistan sanctuary enjoyed by Taliban fighters, as well as partisans supporting Jalaluddin Haqqani and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and other warlords, complicates the Afghan situation enormously. That said, basic principles of counterinsurgency and stabilization do have a general applicability across missions. The size of security forces always matters. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates finally reached a decision late this summer to help the Afghans double the size of their Army, a policy that will bring their own total security forces to 200,000. Coupled with the two to three additional brigades of American GIs expected to go to Afghanistan in the coming months, we will collectively reach some 275,000 total coalition troops -- an improvement, but still less than half of what has been needed in the smaller country of Iraq. The core reason that aggregate security forces in Afghanistan are so small is because of a conscious decision by Western states to keep them that way. Afghan politics have been part of it, but much of the rationale has been due to Afghanistan's purported inability to fund a large force. For that reason, the army has grown astoundingly slowly -- numbering just 6,000 soldiers in 2003, increasing to about 25,000 through 2005, and then going up to 36,000 in 2006, 50,000 in 2007, and 58,000 in 2008. Police and border-security forces have followed a similar trajectory. As Jason Campbell and Jeremy Shapiro show in the Brookings Institution's new Afghanistan Index, only 30% of army forces and just 3% of existing police forces rank in the top two tiers of combat readiness. Afghanistan's GDP is only $11 billion and its annual federal budget is just $4 billion (more than half from foreign aid). It clearly cannot sustain a large army and police. So why build a large Afghan security force? The answer is simple: because the alternatives are worse. One possibility is to increase the number of NATO forces deployed in Afghanistan, pushing the combined cost of the operation well above the current $4 billion a month. The other possibility is **most likely to lose the war.** The United States has been spending nearly $3 billion a year to fund the Afghanistan security forces of late. This is a great deal of money but far less than our own military costs in that country. We should be willing to double that $3 billion a year if need be. The added expenses need not stay high indefinitely. Once Afghanistan's security forces have their needed equipment, and provided President Obama can cajole and pressure other major countries to foot their share of the bill, American security aid requirements should drop back to current levels.

# Increase Troops Counterplan Extensions

## **Increasing troops solves in Afghanistan:**

Schmitt and Shanker – 09 –Staff writers (Eric and Thom, 11/20/09, The New York Times, “General Calls for More U.S. Troops to Avoid Afghan Failure,” <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/21/world/asia/21afghan.html?_r=2>)

WASHINGTON — The top military commander in Afghanistan warns in a confidential assessment of the war there that he needs additional troops within the next year or else the conflict “will likely result in failure.” The grim assessment is contained in a 66-page report that the commander, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, submitted to Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates on Aug. 30, and which is now under review by President Obama and his top national security advisers. The disclosure of details in the assessment, reported Sunday night by The Washington Post, coincided with new skepticism expressed by President Obama about sending any more troops into Afghanistan until he was certain that the strategy was clear. His remarks came as opposition to the eight-year-old war within his own party is growing. General McChrystal’s view offered a stark contrast, and the language he used was striking. “Failure to gain the initiative and reverse insurgent momentum in the near term (next 12 months) — while Afghan security capacity matures — risks an outcome where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible,” General McChrystal writes. A copy of the assessment, with some operational details removed at the Pentagon’s request to avoid compromising future operations, was posted on The Post’s Web site. In his five-page commander’s summary, General McChrystal ends on a cautiously optimistic note: “While the situation is serious, success is still achievable.” But throughout the document, General McChrystal warns that unless he is provided more forces and a robust counterinsurgency strategy, the war in Afghanistan is most likely lost. Pentagon and military officials involved in Afghanistan policy say General McChrystal is expected to propose a range of options for additional troops beyond the 68,000 American forces already approved, from 10,000 to as many as 45,000. General McChrystal’s strategic assessment could well fuel the public anxiety over the war that has been fast increasing in recent weeks as American casualties have risen, allied commanders have expressed surprise at the Taliban’s fighting prowess, and allegations of ballot fraud Afghanistan’s recent presidential elections have escalated. In a series of interviews on the Sunday morning talk shows, Mr. Obama expressed skepticism about sending more American troops to Afghanistan until he was sure his administration had the right strategy to succeed. “Right now, the question is, the first question is, are we doing the right thing? Are we pursuing the right strategy?” Mr. Obama said on CNN. “When we have clarity on that, then the question is, O.K., how do we resource it?” Mr. Obama said that he and his top advisers had not delayed any request for additional troops from General McChrystal because of the political delicacy of the issue or other domestic priorities. “No, no, no, no,” Mr. Obama said when asked on CNN’s “State of the Union” whether General McChrystal had been told to sit on his request. Mr. Obama said his decision “is not going to be driven by the politics of the moment.” In an interview on CBS’s “Face the Nation,” Mr. Obama said his top priority was to protect the United States against attacks from Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. “Whatever decisions I make are going to be based first on a strategy to keep us safe, then we’ll figure out how to resource it,” the president said. “We’re not going to put the cart before the horse and just think by sending more troops we’re automatically going to make Americans safe,” he said. Mr. Obama and his advisers have said they need time to absorb the assessment of the Afghanistan security situation that General McChrystal submitted three weeks ago — a separate report from the general’s expected request for forces — as well as the uncertainties created by the fraud-tainted Afghan elections. “General McChrystal’s strategic assessment of the situation in Afghanistan is a classified pre-decisional document, intended to provide President Obama and his national security team with the basis for a very important discussion about where we are now in Afghanistan and how to best to get to where we want to be,” Geoff Morrell, the Pentagon press secretary, said Sunday night in a statement. In his report, General McChrystal issues a withering critique of both his NATO command and the Afghan government. His NATO command, he says, is “poorly configured” for counterinsurgency and is “inexperienced in local languages and culture.” “The weakness of state institutions, malign actions of power-brokers, widespread corruption and abuse of power by various officials, and ISAF’s own errors,” General McChrystal says, referring to NATO, “have given Afghans little reason to support their government.” The general also describes an increasingly savvy insurgency that uses propaganda effectively and is using the Afghan prison system as a training ground. Taliban and Qaeda insurgents represent more than 2,500 of the 14,500 inmates in Afghanistan’s overcrowded prisons. “These detainees are currently radicalizing non-insurgent inmates,” the report concludes. Mr. Morrell declined to comment on details of the assessment. Until Sunday, details of General McChrystal’s report had not been made public. Members of Congress were briefed on the reports and allowed to read copies of it in secure offices on Capitol Hill, but the lawmakers were not allowed to take notes. General McChrystal has publicly stated many of the conclusions in his report: emphasizing the importance of protecting civilians over just engaging insurgents, restricting airstrikes to reduce civilian casualties, and sharply expanding the Afghan security forces and accelerating their training. The Afghan government has about 134,000 police officers and 82,000 soldiers, although many are poorly equipped and have little logistical support. General McChrystal has also signaled that he will seek to unify the effort of American allies that operate in Afghanistan, and possibly to ask them to contribute more troops, money and training. Military officers said Sunday that General McChrystal had effectively completed his formal request for forces, and was prepared to send the proposal up through his hierarchy for review by Gen. David H. Petraeus, commander of American forces in the Middle East; Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates.

# ROZ Counterplan (1/1)

## Text: The US Congress should pass and President Obama should sign the Afghanistan and Pakistan Reconstruction Opportunity Zones Act. Questions ask.

## Observation 1: Not topical—doesn’t decrease military presence.

## Observation 2: The counterplan bolsters stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan while undermining support for terrorism.

Lisa Curtis, 2009 (Senior Research Fellow, Heritage Foundation). “Afghanistan and Pakistan: Understanding and Engaging Regional Stakeholders” Accessed July 15, 2010 at <http://www.heritage.org/research/testimony/afghanistan-and-pakistannbsp-understanding-and-engaging-regional-stakeholders>

The U.S. Congress should--immediately--pass the Afghanistan and Pakistan Reconstruction Opportunity Zones Act (ROZ) that provides U.S. duty-free access to items produced in industrial zones in the border areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan. President Obama called for the passage of the ROZ legislation in his speech last Friday, and the Pakistani ambassador to the U.S., Husain Haqqani, and the Afghan ambassador to the U.S., Said Jawad, have jointly supported the initiative, arguing that the establishment of ROZs would draw the Afghan and Pakistani economies closer together, increasing their cooperation and integration. Initiatives like the ROZ Act will give each country a vested interest in the stability of the other and help defuse conflicts that fuel support for radical ideologies and terrorism.

## Regional integration and cooperation among the Afghan & Pakistani people is key to uproot terrorism from South Asia:

Lisa Curtis, 2009 (Senior Research Fellow, Heritage Foundation). “Afghanistan and Pakistan: Understanding and Engaging Regional Stakeholders” Accessed July 15, 2010 at <http://www.heritage.org/research/testimony/afghanistan-and-pakistannbsp-understanding-and-engaging-regional-stakeholders>

A key aspect of the Administration's effort to uproot terrorism from South Asia must include initiatives that encourage regional integration and cooperation among the Afghans, Pakistanis, and Indians. This will require more frequent, intrusive, and intensive interaction between U.S. officials and their Afghan, Pakistani, and Indian counterparts. More specifically, the U.S. will have to consider whether there are initiatives that reduce Pakistani fears of Indian hegemony and how Washington can improve ties to New Delhi without setting off alarm bells in Islamabad.

# \*\*\*\*\*Counter-Insurgency NEG\*\*\*\*\*

# Counter-Insurgency NEG: Terrorism Advantage Answers Front-Line

## (--) Counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan is undermining Al-Qaeda and the Taliban now:

Liam Fox, 2010 (Secretary of State for Defense in the United Kingdom.) July 7, 2010. “Afghanistan: Standing Shoulder to Shoulder with the United States.” Accessed July 15, 2010 at <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/07/Afghanistan-Standing-Shoulder-to-Shoulder-with-the-United-States>

Make no mistake: Al-Qaeda and their Taliban supporters are taking considerable hits; their **global core has been severely degraded.** In Afghanistan, the **counterinsurgency strategy is increasingly being put in place**, measuring its success not in the number of dead terrorists or insurgents **but in the number of the local population protected** and in the number of Afghans who believe we and they are gaining the upper hand and have the will to see the campaign through.

## (--) Turn: Shifting from counterinsurgency to counterrorism empirically fails in Afghanistan—it will cause a Taliban resurgence:

James Phillips, 2009 (Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs). “Success in Afghanistan Requires Firm Presidential Leadership, Not Half-Measures.” Accessed July 15, 2010 at <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/09/Success-in-Afghanistan-Requires-Firm-Presidential-Leadership-Not-Half-Measures>

The war in Afghanistan cannot be effectively waged merely with air power, predator drones, and special forces. In the late 1990s, the Clinton Administration hurled cruise missiles at easily replaceable al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan, but this "chuck and duck" strategy failed to blunt the al-Qaeda threat. The Bush Administration's minimalist approach to Afghanistan in 2001 was a contributing factor that allowed Osama bin Laden to escape from his mountain redoubt at Tora Bora. Afterwards, Washington opted to focus narrowly on counterterrorism goals in Afghanistan--rather than counterinsurgency operations--in order to free up military assets for the war in Iraq. This allowed the Taliban to regroup across the border in Pakistan and make a violent resurgence. The "small footprint" strategy also failed in Iraq, before it was abandoned in favor of General Petraeus's counterinsurgency strategy, backed by the surge of American troops, in early 2007.

## (--) Turn: Afghan security forces

## A) Current Petraeus strategy builds up Afghan security forces—crucial to defeating the Taliban:

James Phillips, 2009 (Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs). “Success in Afghanistan Requires Firm Presidential Leadership, Not Half-Measures.” Accessed July 15, 2010 at <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/09/Success-in-Afghanistan-Requires-Firm-Presidential-Leadership-Not-Half-Measures>

Another critical element necessary to defeat the Taliban is larger and more effective Afghan security forces, which are severely undermanned and poorly equipped. Today there is a total of only 173,000 men in the Afghan army and police, compared to over 600,000 in Iraq, which is a smaller and less populated country. The new strategy proposed by the McChrystal/Petraeus team is likely to put a high priority on expanding and improving these forces with better training, embedded advisers, and the partnering of Afghan units with nearby American units. The Afghan army and police will grow stronger, eventually reducing the need for U.S. troops.

## B) Withdrawal before building up Afghan Security Forces risks a nuclear war:

Liam Fox, 2010 (Secretary of State for Defense in the United Kingdom.) July 7, 2010. “Afghanistan: Standing Shoulder to Shoulder with the United States.” Accessed July 15, 2010 at <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/07/Afghanistan-Standing-Shoulder-to-Shoulder-with-the-United-States>

So the first reason we cannot bring our troops home immediately is that their mission is not yet completed. Were we to leave prematurely, without degrading the insurgency and increasing the capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), we would probably see the return of the destructive forces of transnational terrorism. Not only would we risk the return of civil war in Afghanistan creating a security vacuum, but we would also risk the destabilization of Pakistan with potentially unthinkable regional, and possibly nuclear, consequences.

# Counter-Insurgency NEG: Terrorism Advantage Answers Front-Line

## (--) Turn: Intelligence Gathering:

## A) A strong boots on the ground presence is key to intelligence gathering—crucial to maximizing the effectiveness of air power:

James Phillips, 2009 (Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs). “Success in Afghanistan Requires Firm Presidential Leadership, Not Half-Measures.” Accessed July 15, 2010 at <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/09/Success-in-Afghanistan-Requires-Firm-Presidential-Leadership-Not-Half-Measures>

Despite this record of failure, some stubbornly continue to support an "offshore" strategy for landlocked Afghanistan today. But half-measures--the hallmark of the "small footprint" strategy--will not work. Precise intelligence is needed to use smart bombs smartly. Yet few Afghans would risk their lives to provide such intelligence unless they are assured of protection against the Taliban's ruthless retaliation. Providing such protection requires more American boots on the ground beyond the 68,000 that will be deployed by the end of the year. In Iraq, the surge of American troops encouraged Iraqis to climb down off the proverbial fence and offer a flood of valuable intelligence tips that enabled a much more effective targeting of al-Qaeda in Iraq and other insurgent forces.

## B) Air power targeting is key to disrupting Al-Qaeda and winning the war:

Anderson, ’10 (Kenneth, Visiting Fellow on the Hoover Task Force on National Security and Law and Professor of Law at American University, “Predators over Pakistan,” The Weekly Standard Vol. 15, No. 24, 3/8/10, accessed 6/25/10, <http://www.weeklystandard.com/print/articles/predators-over-pakistan>, SSD)

Targeting terrorists and militants with Predator drone strikes is one campaign promise President Obama has kept to the letter. Missiles fired from remote-piloted “unmanned aerial vehicles” (UAVs) at al Qaeda and Taliban leadership steadily and sharply increased over the course of 2009. Senior U.S. military and intelligence officials have called them one of the most effective tactics available to strike directly at al Qaeda and the Taliban. Indeed, CIA director Leon Panetta says that drones are “the only game in town in terms of confronting or trying to disrupt the al Qaeda leadership.” There is every reason to believe him. In January 2010 alone, a dozen strikes were launched just in the Pakistani tribal region of Waziristan. With the beginning of the promised offensive against the Taliban in Afghanistan, Predator attacks have likewise surged against targets in Pakistan, concurrent with moves by Pakistani intelligence to detain Taliban leaders, and also concurrent with the extensive use of UAVs on the battlefield in the Afghan offensive (primarily as an urban surveillance tool but also for missile strikes). Obama promised that his administration would go after al Qaeda and Taliban in their refuges in Pakistan​—​with or without the permission of the Pakistani government, he pointedly said—and so he has done. The aggressive expansion of the Predator targeted killing program is the Obama administration’s one unambiguous innovation in the war against terrorists. The adaptation of UAV surveillance craft into missile platforms took place as an improvisation in 2002 under the Bush administration—but its embrace as the centerpiece of U.S. counterterrorism operations belongs to Obama. It is not the whole of it—the Obama administration has expanded joint operations with Pakistan and Yemen, and launched commando operations in Somalia against terrorists. But of all the ways it has undertaken to strike directly against terrorists, this administration owns the Predator drone strategy. It argued for it, expanded it, and used it, in the words of the president’s State of the Union address, to “take the fight to al Qaeda.” As al Qaeda, its affiliates, and other transnational jihadists seek shelter in lightly governed places such as Yemen or Somalia, the Obama administration says the United States will follow them and deny them safe haven. Speaking at West Point, the president obliquely referred to so-called targeted killings—we will have to be “nimble and precise” in the use of military power, he said, adding that “high-ranking al Qaeda and Taliban leaders have been killed, and we have stepped up the pressure on al Qaeda worldwide.” The Predator drone strategy is a rare example of something that has gone really, really well for the Obama administration. Counterterrorism “on offense” has done better, ironically, under an administration that hoped it could just play counterterrorism on defense—wind down wars, wish away the threat as a bad dream from the Bush years, hope the whole business would fade away so it could focus on health care. Yet for all that, the Obama administration, through Predator strikes, is taking the fight to the enemy. And, let’s face it, in dealing with terrorist groups in ungoverned places in the world, we have few good options besides UAVs. Drones permit the United States to go directly after terrorists, rather than having to fight through whole countries to reach them. Maybe that’s not enough to win. Maybe “light-footprint” counterterrorism via drones turns out to be just the latest chimera in the perennial effort to find a way to win a war through strategic airpower. Yet even in a serious counterinsurgency on the ground, drones will still be important as a means of attacking terrorists while clearing and holding territory. The upshot? As long as we engage in counterterrorism, drones will be a critical part of our offense.

# Counter-Insurgency NEG: Terrorism Advantage Answers Front-Line

## (--) Turn: Early exit plan from Afghanistan emboldens Islamic extremists world-wide:

James Phillips, 2009 (Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs). “Success in Afghanistan Requires Firm Presidential Leadership, Not Half-Measures.” Accessed July 15, 2010 at <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/09/Success-in-Afghanistan-Requires-Firm-Presidential-Leadership-Not-Half-Measures>

To shore up waning popular support for the war, the President should announce the results of his Afghanistan policy review in a nationally televised speech. He should explain to the American people what is at stake in Afghanistan, why it is necessary to make continued sacrifices to defeat distant enemies there, and why the war is not only necessary, but winnable. His leadership would lay the groundwork for a bipartisan approach to Afghanistan that would attract renewed popular and congressional support. But if the President fails to rein in wavering members of his own party who appear to be more interested in an exit plan than a victory plan, then there is a growing danger that the Administration's new strategy will be defeated in Washington before it can be fully implemented in Afghanistan. This would be a disastrous outcome that would further energize Islamist extremists far beyond Afghanistan and increase the terrorist threat to the United States and its allies.

## Turn: High troop levels key to stopping Talibani resurgence in Afghanistan:

Lisa Curtis, 2009 (Senior Research Fellow for South Asia @ Heritage Foundation) “Scaling Back in Afghanistan Would Jeopardize Security of U.S. Homeland.” Accessed July 15, 2010 at

<http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/09/Scaling-Back-in-Afghanistan-Would-Jeopardize-Security-of-US-Homeland>

In the meantime, the U.S. must prevent the Taliban from regaining influence in Afghanistan, which requires increasing U.S. troop levels. Success in Afghanistan does not require the complete elimination of anyone who has ever associated with the Taliban. But it does require that the Taliban leaders still allied with al-Qaeda and supportive of its destructive global agenda do not have the ability to reassert power in Afghanistan.

## Turn: Petraeus Credibility

## A) Obama’s support of Petraeus critical to Petraeus’ credibility:

James Phillips, 2010 (Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs). “Afghanistan: Time to Rethink the Timeline.” June 25th, 2010. Accessed online on July 15, 2010 at <http://blog.heritage.org/?p=37101>

Bing West, a leading military analyst, yesterday wrote a thoughtful article concerning three key tasks that Gen. Petraeus must accomplish in the immediate future, but noted that he is unlikely to succeed unless he has solid backing from the President: “Petraeus will be a great asset to the President. But in the end, it is Obama’s war, and so far, no one knows how committed he is.”

President Obama needs to make it clear that he has a victory plan, not just an exit plan. He wisely has chosen General Petraeus to replace Gen. McChrystal. Now the President should give Gen. Petraeus the resources and time necessary to accomplish his vital mission.

## B) Petraeus will quickly turn the war in the US favor:

Gregory D. Lee, 2010 (staff writer) June 29, 2010. “Rolling Stone May Have Just Won The War in Afghanistan.” http://www.familysecuritymatters.org/publications/id.6595/pub\_detail.asp

Gen. McChrystal felt that “winning the minds and hearts” of the Afghan people was more important than killing the enemy.

Hopefully this will all change when Gen. David Petraeus takes over. If he allows his men to act like warriors instead of policemen, use battlefield rules of engagement instead of domestic police tactics, the entire war effort will change quickly in our favor. If this happens, you have Michael Hastings to thank. It only made sense for the president to replace Gen. McChrystal with Gen. Petraeus. He **obviously knows what he’s doing.** Already, leaks to the press suggest that he will take a hard look at the currentrules of engagement in Afghanistan and will **probably change them to be more soldier-friendly**.

# Counter-Insurgency NEG: Terrorism Advantage Extensions—Afghan Stability Increasing Now

## (--) Extend our Fox evidence from July 7th—Afghan stability is increasing now—our evidence draws a crucial distinction—while the number of casualties may be increasing—the number of people in Afghanistan who support US presence and who oppose the Taliban are increasing and feel they are being protected.

## (--) Afghanistan stability increasing now—multiple once unstable provinces are now stable:

Liam Fox, 2010 (Secretary of State for Defense in the United Kingdom.) July 7, 2010. “Afghanistan: Standing Shoulder to Shoulder with the United States.” Accessed July 15, 2010 at <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/07/Afghanistan-Standing-Shoulder-to-Shoulder-with-the-United-States>

That is why the work of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams is so important, with civilian experts from a wide range of government departments operating alongside the military to help local Afghans bring improved governance, services, and development. Improvements which reduce the need for ordinary Afghans to turn to the Taliban for work, money, or justice make security and lasting stability more likely. Can it be achieved? I believe it can. We are making real progress. The British effort has been focused in Helmand since 2006, alongside troops from Denmark, Estonia, and most recently Georgia, and now with the significant resources of the U.S. Marine Corps. Afghan government authority now extends to over three-quarters of Helmand districts compared to less than half only two years ago. Areas that were once overrun by insurgents, such as Nad ’Ali, are now slowly returning to a semblance of normal life. I walked round the market there myself just a few weeks ago. In Marjah, the situation is more difficult and complex, with the Taliban still attempting to exert influence through intimidation and brutality. This was always going to be the most difficult challenge. In a campaign which has the allegiance of the population at its heart, it is going to take time to build confidence, for Afghan government institutions to develop and see the improvements that have been made elsewhere.

## (--) Stability increasing in Afghanistan now—international troop presence is a key factor:

Liam Fox, 2010 (Secretary of State for Defense in the United Kingdom.) July 7, 2010. “Afghanistan: Standing Shoulder to Shoulder with the United States.” Accessed July 15, 2010 at <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/07/Afghanistan-Standing-Shoulder-to-Shoulder-with-the-United-States>

Across Afghanistan, stabilization advisers, political officers, and governance experts are on the ground alongside the military and the U.N. establishing community councils; dealing with security, justice, and economic development; helping build hospitals, clinics, and schools; improving irrigation systems for farmers; and enabling major projects to build up infrastructure and commerce. But, of course, without the security that ISAF brings alongside the Afghan National Security Forces, this effect will not last.

## Afghans support international forces in their country:

James Phillips, 2010 (Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs). “Afghanistan: Time to Rethink the Timeline.” June 25th, 2010. Accessed online on July 15, 2010 at <http://blog.heritage.org/?p=37101>

Peter Bergen, CNN’s National Security Analyst, wrote a revealing analysis of Gen. Petraeus’s successful efforts in Iraq and noted that although the challenge in Afghanistan differs in important ways, the scale of violence in Iraq was much greater. Bergen pointed out that although 2,400 Afghan civilians died last year (the majority at the hands of the Taliban), when Petraeus assumed command in Iraq, 3,200 Iraqi civilians were dying every month, making Iraq about fifteen times more violent than Afghanistan is today. Moreover, a recent poll indicated that about 62 percent of Afghans support international forces in their country, compared to only about one third of Iraqis in 2005.

# Counter-Insurgency NEG: Terrorism Advantage Answers (Extensions)

## (--) Extend our Phillips evidence…focusing narrowly on counterrorism goals in Afghanistan rather than counterinsurgency empirically fails in Afghanistan—it allows the Taliban to regroup and make a violent resurgence…the small footprint strategy also empirically failed in Iraq…

## (--) More evidence…the Dand district proves: counter-insurgency succeeds in Afghanistan:

Denis Sinyakov, 2010 (staff writer). “The Badlands of Kandahar: The Counterinsurgency's Testing Ground.” Online. Accessed July 14, 2010 at <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2003073,00.html>

The Dand-district center is a novelty in the badlands of Kandahar province. As the seat of both the top government official and the U.S. forces based in the area, it's a seductive target for Taliban militants looking to make a statement. Yet its walls lack the extra defenses found at other district centers across Afghanistan's embattled south. On any given day, half of the guard towers are unoccupied and the front gate is left open, manned by a single police officer who casually waves visitors through. So calm is the surrounding area that U.S. Army officers living there are lobbying for permission to go outside the wire without body armor. "If there's an ink spot [of stability] forming in southern Afghanistan, I would say it's this district," says Major Edward Ash of the 1-71 Cavalry, 10th Mountain division. Originally destined for Iraq, the 1-71 Cavalry was diverted to Dand as part of President Obama's 30,000-strong troop surge to pacify the Taliban heartland. Its soldiers arrived expecting a fight. But aside from the improvised explosive devices that occasionally blow up under or close to their vehicle convoys, they've mostly focused their energy on the more mundane elements of counterinsurgency, a strategy that places winning public support ahead of killing enemy fighters. In Dand, good governance, better policing and reconstruction are the main priorities — as envisioned by the former commander of international forces, General Stanley McChrystal, and his replacement, General David Petraeus. Though progress is not always easy to gauge by metrics, some officers already go so far as to claim that Dand is the de facto model of counterinsurgency success. In recent weeks, a host of senior NATO officers and journalists have been flown in to take note.(See TIME's multimedia report "Apocalypse Afghanistan.")

## (--) Turn: Reducing the military footprint in Afghanistan for counter-terrorism purposes causes a Taliban victory—creating terrorism & undermining Pakistan

James Phillips, 2009 (Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs). “Success in Afghanistan Requires Firm Presidential Leadership, Not Half-Measures.” Accessed July 15, 2010 at <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/09/Success-in-Afghanistan-Requires-Firm-Presidential-Leadership-Not-Half-Measures>

Ironically, while the Administration's promising new strategy has not yet been implemented, the alternative policy suggested by some critics and some officials within the Administration already has been tried and failed miserably, not only in Afghanistan, but in Iraq as well. Adopting this alternative "small footprint" strategy--which would reduce the number of U.S. troops and scale back the goals of the war to focus solely on al-Qaeda rather than the Taliban-led insurgent coalition--is not a realistic option. Such an abdication would allow the Taliban to carve out sanctuaries within Afghanistan that would gradually be expanded to threaten the Afghan government. In turn, the risk of a Taliban victory would increase, a development that inevitably would bring al-Qaeda back in force to Afghanistan. A Taliban victory in Afghanistan also would increase the Islamist threat to Pakistan, which recently has made progress in combating the Pakistani Taliban.

## (--) Iraq proves: Counter-insurgency solves terrorism: Iraq proves that it discredits Al-Qaeda and undermines terrorists:

Lisa Curtis, 2009 (Senior Research Fellow for South Asia @ Heritage Foundation) “Scaling Back in Afghanistan Would Jeopardize Security of U.S. Homeland.” Accessed July 15, 2010 at

<http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/09/Scaling-Back-in-Afghanistan-Would-Jeopardize-Security-of-US-Homeland>

In his comprehensive assessment of the situation in Afghanistan, which was leaked to the U.S. media earlier this week, U.S. Commander General Stanley McChrystal lays out a strategy for moving forward that would require the deployment of fresh U.S. troops. This is not surprising. On several occasions, President Obama himself has pronounced that the war in Afghanistan has not received the appropriate resources--such as U.S. leadership, troop levels, and financial commitments--necessary to achieve U.S. objectives. General McChrystal argues for increasing the focus on protecting the Afghan population from Taliban advances, a recommendation based in part on the recent American experience in Iraq, where General Petraeus's "people-centric" approach to counterinsurgency paid dividends and ultimately discredited al-Qaeda and its harsh tactics. General McChrystal also makes the case that new U.S. troop deployments must come quickly or the U.S. risks facing a situation in which it will be impossible to defeat the Taliban insurgency.

# Counter-Insurgency NEG: Terrorism Advantage Answers (Extensions)

## (--) Turn: The alternative to troops in Afghanistan is widespread terrorist attacks—Somalia proves:

Richard Spencer, 2010 (staff writer). July 12, 2010. “Al-Shabaab's attack on Uganda: a lesson for Afghanistan?” Online. Accessed July 14, 2010 at <http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/richardspencer/100047039/al-shabaabs-attack-on-uganda-a-lesson-for-afghanistan/>

Al-Shabaab’s shocking and pointlessly brutal attack on a bunch of Ugandan football fans, assuming their claim of responsibility is verified, is ultimately a result of a trend in western politics (and management) I like to call haphazard non-responsible interventionism. If you think the West’s prolonged but carefully thought-out intervention in Afghanistan is an unending cruelty for both us and them – which at times seems hard to deny – **Somalia is a reminder of the alternative**. Al-Shabaab are the violent Islamist rebel group who exercise sway over large parts of Somalia, and regard themselves as the local branch of Al-Qaeda. Uganda would seem like an unlikely target, except that it contributes to the African Union stabilisation force which is trying to maintain and defend the polite fiction that Somalia has a functioning government.

## (--) Counter Insurgency tactics solve- Iraq Proves

David Tate 2007 “Counterinsurgency success in Haswa.”September 13, 2007 <http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/09/counterinsurgency_su.php>)

The impact of the surge in the Haswa region is impossible to ignore. The Sunni insurgency has gone fallow while the Mahdi Army is under assault. Attacks on US forces have dropped significantly. Reconstruction projects are underway. The local markets are open and packed with people, while local farmers and merchants are looking to push their products to markets outside the region. The long-term affects of the surge are rightfully being questioned. The ultimate goal of the increase in forces is to provide the Iraqi government the space needed to push forward with contentious issues such as reconciliation, de-Baathification, and the oil law. But these issues cannot be resolved while the level of violence was at the levels of 2006. The surge has both reduced the violence in Iraq by well over 50 percent and fostered the “bottom-up” reconciliation process promoted by Gen. Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker. Haswa has reaped the short-term benefits of the surge in US forces and the change in the counterinsurgency doctrine. With support from the central government, the success can be sustained in the long term.

## **(--) Counterinsurgency solves: allows the soldiers to make connections with locals**

Peter 10 (Tom A. Peter, Correspondent . “Afghanistan war: Good counterinsurgency, like good politics, is local.” January 27, 2010. <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2010/0127/Afghanistan-war-Good-counterinsurgency-like-good-politics-is-local>)

After US Army Capt. Michael Harrison completed his first tour in Afghanistan almost two years ago, he kept in touch with many of the locals he'd befriended, calling to chat via his old interpreter. When his unit redeployed to the Kunar River Valley, about a two-hour drive from Harrison's former area of operations in the Pesh River Valley, those friendships provided an unexpected benefit. "Afghans are almost like big Italian families, they have family everywhere," explains Harrison of Rural Retreat, Va. "A lot of the people I knew from the Pesh actually had family in this area, so some of the elders from the Pesh came down here and … essentially vouched for me and introduced me to the Afghans here." Most everyone in Harrison's Attack Company, 1-32 Infantry Battalion, credits their commander's and other soldiers' connections from the previous tour with helping to quickly win over the locals. Good counterinsurgency strategy, like good politics, is local. The experience makes these soldiers poster boys for a new US strategy of redeploying units to areas where they've already served. As international forces focus more on protecting the population rather than just hunting the Taliban, commanders hope the strategy will create more continuity with local communities, helping forces cultivate the personal relationships so important in Afghanistan's tribal culture and build a broader institutional memory.

## (--) Counterinsurgency best path to success:

McCain, 2010 (By Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) “Give General Petraeus every opportunity to succeed (Sen. John McCain)” 07/01/10 10:37 AM ET. <http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/106689-give-general-petraeus-every-opportunity-to-succeed-senjohn-mccain>)

Before I go further, let me say a word of praise for another American hero: General Stanley McChrystal. He is a man of unrivaled integrity, and what is most impressive about his long record of military excellence is how much of it remains cloaked in silence. Few understand fully how General McChrystal systematically dismantled al Qaeda in Iraq, or how he began to turn around our failing war in Afghanistan. These achievements, and others like them, are the true measure of Stanley McChrystal, and they will earn him an honored place in our history. We are calling on General Petraeus at a critical moment for the war in Afghanistan. I agree with the president that success in Afghanistan is "a vital national interest," and I support his decision to adopt a counterinsurgency strategy, backed by more troops and civilian resources. This is the only viable path to true success — which I would define as an Afghanistan that is increasingly capable of governing itself, securing its people, sustaining its own development and never again serving as a base for attacks against America and our allies. In short, the same results we are slowly seeing emerge today in Iraq, thanks in large part to the work of General Petraeus and the forces he commanded.

# Counter-Insurgency NEG: Terrorism Advantage Extensions

## Counter-terrorism approach fails: counter-insurgency solves best:

Boot – 09 – Senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations (Max, November 09, Commentary Magazine, “How We Can Win in Afghanistan,” http://www.commentarymagazine.com/viewarticle.cfm/how-we-can-win-in-afghanistan-15257?page=all)

The case against a counterterrorism approach in Afghanistan is laid out most clearly in the Counterinsurgency Guidance. McChrystal’s focus is on explaining why conventional military operations cannot defeat the insurgency in Afghanistan, but the same arguments apply to counterterrorism generally, which is a smaller-scale version of the same conceit—that the U.S. military can defeat an insurgency simply by killing insurgents. McChrystal writes that the math doesn’t add up: From a conventional standpoint, the killing of two insurgents in a group of ten leaves eight remaining: 10 - 2 = 8. From the insurgent standpoint, those two killed were likely related to many others who will want vengeance. If civilian casualties occurred, that number will be much higher. Therefore, the death of two creates more willing recruits: 10 minus 2 equals 20 (or more) rather than 8. He goes on to note that the “attrition” approach has been employed in Afghanistan over the past eight years by a relatively small number of American forces and their NATO allies. Yet, he writes, “eight years of individually successful kinetic operations have resulted in more violence.” He continues: “This is not to say that we should avoid a fight, but to win we need to do much more than simply kill or capture militants.” What else, then, must coalition forces do? McChrystal’s answer: An effective “offensive” operation in counterinsurgency is one that takes from the insurgent what he cannot afford to lose—control of the population. We must think of offensive operations not simply as those that target militants, but ones that earn the trust and support of the people while denying influence and access to the insurgents. The Counterinsurgency Guidance points out that firing guns and missiles can often make it more difficult to win “trust and support.” An anecdote makes the point: An ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] patrol was traveling through a city at a high rate of speed, driving down the center to force traffic off the road. Several pedestrians and other vehicles were pushed out of the way. A vehicle approached from the side into the traffic circle. The gunner fired a pen flare at it, which entered the vehicle and caught the interior on fire. As the ISAF patrol sped away, Afghans crowded around the car. How many insurgents did the patrol make that day? As an example of how “self-defeating” the use of force can be, McChrystal could just as easily have chosen an example involving a Predator drone firing a Hellfire missile or an F-16 dropping a 500-pound bomb—the kind of strike that often causes considerable “collateral damage” and that, if the more limited counterterrorism approach were to be adopted, would become the centerpiece of our strategy. McChrystal counsels his troops to take a different path, to “embrace the people,” to “partner with the ANSF [Afghan National Security Forces] at all echelons,” and to “build governance capacity and accountability.” He urges coalition troops to be “a positive force in the community; shield the people from harm; foster stability. Use local economic initiatives to increase employment and give young men alternatives to insurgency.” This would mean putting less emphasis not only on using force but also on “force protection” measures (such as body armor and heavily armored vehicles), which distance the security forces from the population. As an example of what he expects, McChrystal cites an anecdote involving an “ISAF unit and their partnered Afghan company” that were “participating in a large shura [tribal council] in a previously hostile village.” During the shura, which was attended by “nearly the entire village,” he writes, “two insurgents began firing shots at one of the unit’s observation posts.” The sergeant in charge of the post could have returned fire but he chose not “to over-react and ruin the meeting.” “Later,” this example concludes, “the village elders found the two militants and punished them accordingly.” While counterintuitive to a conventional military mind, such thinking is hardly novel for anyone familiar with the history of counterinsurgency. McChrystal’s advice to embrace the population and be sparing in the use of firepower has been employed by successful counterinsurgents from the American Army in the Philippines at the turn of the 20th century; to the British in Malaya in the 1950s and Northern Ireland from the 1970s to the 1990s; to, more recently, the Americans in Iraq. By contrast, counterinsurgency strategies that rely on firepower have usually failed, whether tried by the French in Algeria, by the U.S. in Vietnam, or by the Russians in Afghanistan.

Counter-Insurgency NEG: Uniqueness: Surge working

## (--) The surge is working-

**Evyatar 6-18**, 2010 [Ilan, citing Richard Kemp, who served in the British army for 30 years before retiring in 2006 with the rank of colonel, The Jerusalem Post, “‘The surge is not yet complete’” http://www.jpost.com/Features/InThespotlight/Article.aspx?id=178738]

It’s not a failure. The surge is not yet complete. American forces are still building up in Afghanistan. Operation Moshtarak, which began a few months back and is still ongoing, has succeeded driving large elements of the Taliban out of areas they formerly controlled. There was reinfiltration and in that situation there will always be reinfiltration, but now there are more forces on the ground to prevent that reinfiltration and to retain greater control of areas that have been taken and I’m optimistic about that. We’re about to see, I think, an offensive begin against the Taliban in the Kandahar area. That’s probably the heartland of the Taliban, and I think they’re going to be quite tenacious in their desire to hold on to that territory, so I think we might see some pretty stiff resistance being put up. We’ve already seen signs of them building up their forces in the area and trying to extend their influence before the inevitable operation against them commences. But I don’t think we could in any way say the troop surge has been a failure.

## (--) The surge is stabilizing the region

**Lubold 4-28**-10 [Gordon, staff writer for the Christian Science Monitor, April 28, 2010 <http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2010/0428/Afghanistan-war-surge-on-cusp-of-bringing-real-change>]

Insurgents in Afghanistan think last year was their most successful year of operations since 2002, according to a new Pentagon report. That perception stems from a plentiful supply of weapons, including roadside bombs, and money, and also from the narrative in Washington for the last several years that the US was losing the Afghanistan war. But armed with the confidence that comes from a surge of 100,000 American forces, US officials now believe they are on the cusp of change, and that insurgent perceptions of their own strength will begin to change, too.“We have the beginnings for the potential for real change,” says a senior defense official, who spoke on background to reporters at the Pentagon.

## (--) Troop surge working, more stable and insurgents losing favor

**Lubold 4-28**-10 [Gordon, staff writer for the Christian Science Monitor, April 28, 2010 <http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2010/0428/Afghanistan-war-surge-on-cusp-of-bringing-real-change>]

The defense official spoke as the Pentagon released a progress report on Afghanistan that the defense official characterized as a “serious and sober” illustration of the challenges the US faces there. Six months ago, the Pentagon issued a similar report that showed that security was stable, not declining, but “fragile.” Today it appears as if the military is still in wait-and-see mode. The trends are mixed. For example, insurgent groups are losing favor among the Afghan people, says the report. And according to a poll taken last month, 52 percent of Afghans believe insurgents are the greatest source of insecurity. On the other hand, only about 24 percent of the population supports the government of Afghanistan in 121 of the districts that are critical to turning the country.

# Counter-Insurgency Negative Extensions: Air Power Extensions

## (--) Drones Critical To Effective Counter-Insurgency and Stabilization Efforts

Callam ’10 (Andrew Callam The George Washington University Emory University Executive Assistant at George Washington University, international affairs review Volume XIX, No. 1: Winter 2010) A.L.

UAVs also proved useful during counterinsurgency operations in Iraq. The stabilization of Sadr City in 2008 is a dramatic example of the utility of drones in counterinsurgency warfare. In this instance, U.S. colonels on the ground could directly control armed drones hovering over the streets of Baghdad. This was the first time drones were used at the brigade level. For example, after militants fired a rocket at an American position, an American battalion would deploy a Predator drone to survey the area as insurgents set up their next shot, then destroy the enemy’s mortar positions. The Predator could also loiter above the battle area, relaying the insurgents’ patterns and tactics to commanders on the ground. In one instance, a Predator drone hovered above a house that was a suspected weapons cache, waited for civilians to leave, and then destroyed the building with a Hellfire missile. The Predator granted the battalion persistent surveillance and strike capabilities, which proved crucial in stabilizing Sadr City.

## (--) Drone Strikes rising now

Boyle 10 - 1 Lecturer in International Relations and a Research Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St Andrews (3/10/10, Michael, International Affairs, “Do counterterrorism and counterinsurgency go together?” <http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/123318677/abstract>)

The effects of this ‘mission creep’ can be seen with commando raids and the use of Predator drones in Pakistan. These were originally used sparingly and only against Al-Qaeda operatives; then the US gradually broadened its target set to include senior Taleban officials in Afghanistan. 63 By 2009, aware that high-ranking Taleban were operating freely across the border in Pakistan, the US expanded commando raids into its tribal regions. 64 At least four raids were conducted, two of which were directed against so-called ‘high-value targets’ near the border. Similarly, in 2008 the US expanded the target list for Predator drone strikes to include Taleban officials and related hostile Islamist networks (such as the Haqqani network) operating across the Pakistani border. In summer 2009, concerned over growing threats to the stability of Pakistan, the US began to direct strikes against factions of the Tehrik-i-Taleban in Pakistan (TTP) and eventually killed its leader, Baitullah Mehsud. 65 From 2007 to 2009, the change in the number of strikes and the target set has been dramatic. According to an analysis by Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedmann, in 2007 the US launched only five drone strikes, three against Taleban targets and two against Al-Qaeda. By contrast, in the first ten months of 2009 it launched 43 strikes against a variety of targets, including 18 against the Taleban, 16 against Baitullah Mehsud, seven against Al-Qaeda and four against the Haqqani network. 66 Under the Obama administration, the number of Predator strikes and the diversification of the targets has actually increased. 67

## (--) Air power is the backbone of U.S. leadership

Hazdra ‘01(Richard, Major – USAF, Air Mobility: The Key to United States National Security Strategy, Fairchild Paper, August, http://aupress.au.af.mil/fairchild\_papers/Hazdra/Hazdra.pdf)

Air mobility is a form of airpower that should be exploited to its fullest because of the positive political gains from noncombat operations, deterrence, and combat when necessary. However, steady-state operations in support of the NSS have created an unprecedented use of AMC forces and resources that are currently targeted for wartime use. The United States is likely to continue a policy of intervention. The concept of rapid global mobility has become the means to achieve military intervention and, as such, has become the backbone of both military and peacetime operations. The force structure of AMC is straining to execute these steady-state operations. Further growth in these operations is beyond the capability of AMC’s current force structure.

## (--) Air power is critical to effective warfighting ---- it enables the U.S. to exploit tech advantages

**Meilinger ‘03**

(Philip S., Retired Air Force Colonel and Dir SAIC, Air and Space Power Journal, 3-10, <http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj03/spr03/vorspr03.html>)

The reason for this emphasis on air and space power among our soldiers, sailors, and marines is their realization that military operations have little likelihood of success without it. It has become the American way of war. Indeed, the major disagreements that occur among the services today generally concern the control and purpose of air and space assets. All of them covet those assets, but their differing views on the nature of war shape how they should be employed. Thus, we have debates regarding the authority of the joint force air component commander, the role of the corps commander in the deep battle, the question of which service should command space, and the question of whether the air or ground commander should control attack helicopters. All the services trumpet the importance of joint operations, and air and space power increasingly has become our primary joint weapon. Air and space dominance also provides our civilian leadership with flexibility. Although intelligence is never perfect, our leaders now have unprecedented information regarding what military actions can or cannot accomplish and how much risk is involved in a given action. For example, our leaders understood far better than ever before how many aircraft and weapons would be needed over Serbia and Afghanistan to produce a specified military effect, weapon accuracy, collateral damage that might occur, and risk to our aircrews. This allowed our leaders to fine-tune the air campaign, providing more rapid and effective control than previously. Other factors affect the way we’ll fight. One hears much talk today of “transforming the military” to meet new threats. The Persian Gulf War, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan- and, for that matter, Somalia and Haiti- indicate that traditional methods, weapons, forces, and strategy will often be inadvisable. Warfare has changed. Stealth, precision weapons, and space-based communication and intelligence-gathering systems are examples of this new form of war. Certainly, the human element in war can never be ignored. People make war, and all their strengths and weaknesses must be considered. Yet, it would be foolish not to exploit new technologies that remove part of the risk and human burden in war. It is not always necessary for people to suffer. Air and space power permits new types of strategies that make war on things rather than on people and that employ things rather than people. It capitalizes on the explosion in computer, electronic, and materials technologies that so characterize the modern era. This is America’s strength- one that we must ensure.

# Counter-Insurgency Negative Extensions: Air Power Extensions

## (--) Air Power solves terrorism

**Peck`7** (Allen G Air Force Institute of Technology, Airpower's Crucial Role in Irregular Warfare, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj07/sum07/peck.html)

In an IW environment, the traditionally recognized ability of airpower to strike at the adversary’s “strategic center of gravity” will likely have less relevance due to the decentralized and diffuse nature of the enemy.3 The amorphous mass of ideological movements opposing Western influence and values generally lacks a defined command structure that airpower can attack with predictable effects. Still, airpower hold)s a number of asymmetric trump cards (capabilities the enemy can neither meet with parity nor counter in kind). For instance, airpower’s ability to conduct precision strikes across the globe can play an important role in counterinsurgency operations. Numerous other advantages (including information and cyber operations; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance [ISR]; and global mobility) have already proven just as important. These capabilities provide our fighting forces with highly asymmetric advantages in the IW environment. Innovation and adaptation are hallmarks of airpower. Cold War–era bombers, designed to carry nuclear weapons, can loiter for hours over the battlefield and deliver individual conventional weapons to within a few feet of specified coordinates. Fighter aircraft, designed to deliver precision weapons against hardened targets, can disseminate targeting-pod video directly to an Air Force joint terminal attack controller who can then direct a strike guided by either laser or the global positioning system (GPS). Unmanned systems such as the Predator, once solely a surveillance platform, now have effective laser designation and the capacity for precision, kinetic strike. Airborne platforms offer electronic protection to ground forces, including attacking insurgent communications and the electronics associated with triggering improvised explosive devices (IED). Exploiting altitude, speed, and range, airborne platforms can create these effects, unconstrained by terrain or artificial boundaries between units. Forward-thinking Airmen developed these innovations by using adaptive tactics, techniques, procedures, and equipment to counter a thinking, adaptive enemy. To be sure, our IW adversaries have their own asymmetric capabilities such as suicide bombers, IEDs, and the appropriation of civilian residences, mosques, and hospitals as staging areas for their combat operations. However, they lack and cannot effectively offset unfettered access to the high ground that superiority in air, space, and cyberspace provides

## (--) Basing in Afghanistan key to global Air dominance

**Timperlake 2010** “The Great Game in the 21st Century” http://www.americanthinker.com/2010/01/the\_great\_game\_in\_the\_21st\_cen.html

The smart geopolitical move in light of a possible PLA base in Pakistan is to deploy the F-22 where it can make a huge statement of U.S. positioning against any PLA/PLAAF maneuvering for basing. This is because it is not a reach to think the PLAAF would like to be part of any PLA planning in Pakistan. Sending a detachment of F-22s to Afghanistan to set up a strip alert would accomplish several important objectives. Among them, it would signal to all world powers that the U.S. is committed to air dominance on the roof of the world. Basing in Afghanistan would also give F-22 pilots and commanders the opportunity to develop operational tactics in a combat theater. It is important to recognize that on the ground, the F-22 is a high-value target. In the air, it tells both our NATO allies and all others that America is committing the best we have to a hot war in a critical part of the world. Both the Times of India and the London Times had important implied questions: What will America do? Both issues can be addressed concurrently by basing the F-22 Raptor on strip alert in Afghanistan. Such a move would signal visionary leadership and action in this most serious and dangerous time.

# Counter-Insurgency NEG: Extensions—Afghan Security Forces Turn

## (--) Extend our Phillips evidence…a key factor in defeating the Taliban is a large and effective Afghan security force—the new Petraeus strategy is placing a high emphasis on expanding and improving these forces—the AFF disrupts that strategy…turning the case…

## (--) Afghan Army increasing now—the NATO commitment is key to continued training of the troops:

Liam Fox, 2010 (Secretary of State for Defense in the United Kingdom.) July 7, 2010. “Afghanistan: Standing Shoulder to Shoulder with the United States.” Accessed July 15, 2010 at <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/07/Afghanistan-Standing-Shoulder-to-Shoulder-with-the-United-States>

The Afghan Army has been growing steadily over the years, and by 20 percent in recent months, to around 125,000. The ANSF already has lead responsibility for security in and around Kabul. But we need to strengthen the training mission even further. Some countries may have political or constitutional problems sending combat troops. We are not happy about that, but we understand it. But there is no reason why any NATO country cannot do more to help train the ANSF; it is a measure of our commitment and resolve as an Alliance.

## (--) Building up the Afghan National Security Forces key to avoiding a security vacuum in Afghanistan:

Liam Fox, 2010 (Secretary of State for Defense in the United Kingdom.) July 7, 2010. “Afghanistan: Standing Shoulder to Shoulder with the United States.” Accessed July 15, 2010 at <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/07/Afghanistan-Standing-Shoulder-to-Shoulder-with-the-United-States>

In military terms, building the size and strength of the Afghan National Security Forces is the route to bringing our troops home without leaving a security vacuum behind. I am heartened by the progress that has been made, but I recognize that the tough times are by no means over.

## (--) And…Afghan security forces key to undermine the Taliban:

Lisa Curtis, 2009 (Senior Research Fellow for South Asia @ Heritage Foundation) “Scaling Back in Afghanistan Would Jeopardize Security of U.S. Homeland.” Accessed July 15, 2010 at

<http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/09/Scaling-Back-in-Afghanistan-Would-Jeopardize-Security-of-US-Homeland>

Success in Afghanistan requires that those Taliban who support international terrorists are not in a position to threaten the stability of the government. This will ultimately require a strong, well-equipped, and well-trained Afghan national army and police force. But this will take time.

# **Counter-Insurgency NEG: Extensions: Petraeus Credibility Turn**

## (--) Counterinsurgency will solve now because Petraeus is in command

Singrello, 2010 6/28 (John Signoriello Military Headlines Examiner . “Critical debate brewing: counter-insurgency vs counter-terrorism.” June 28, 11:58 AMNY. <http://www.examiner.com/x-36464-NY-Military-Headlines-Examiner~y2010m6d28-Critcal-debate-brewing-counterinsurgency-vs-counterterrorism>)

President Obama's firing of Gen. McChrystal and reassignment of General Petraeus last week had one unintended result: a resumption of the debate between two markedly different strategies for combating terrorism: counter-terrorism vs counter-insurgency. Counter-insurgency is the President's avowed approach, and that of Gen. Petraeus, who has codified the strategy as military doctrine. Counter-insurgency encompasses nation building and involves winning the hearts and minds of the populace. As a strategy, it failed miserably in Vietnam, but supposedly succeeded brilliantly, at last, in Iraq, under the stewardship of Gen. Petraeus, now back in charge in Afghanistan, intending to implement a plan both he and Gen. McCrystal have admitted could take a decade to accomplish. A countervailing view regarding Iraq--that we succeeded, tenuously, with regime change there, just that and nothing more--has not gained much currency.

## **(--) Petraeus critical to fend off growing doubts about Afghan war:**

Reuters, 2010 “Q+A: What does Petraeus bring to Afghan war effort?” June 23, 2010. Accessed July 15, 2010 at

<http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE65M55F20100623>

WHY PETRAEUS? Petraeus, credited with salvaging the U.S. war in Iraq, has enormous credibility in Washington and has been deeply involved in shaping Afghan war strategy as the head of U.S. Central Command. There is perhaps no one in the U.S. military with more star power than Petraeus, an asset that could prove indispensable in fending off growing doubts about the war.

# **Counter-Insurgency NEG: Extensions: Petraeus Credibility Turn**

## (--) Petraeus has high credibility now—he’ll take back the momentum from the Taliban in the status quo:

Hall – 7-11 -10 – Press writer (Kristin M., 7/11/10, “Petraeus, 101st Airborne reunited in Afghanistan,” http://www.kentucky.com/2010/07/11/1344817/petraeus-101st-team-up-again-in.html)

NASHVILLE, Tenn. -- Call it a reunion of sorts. Taking command of all units in Afghanistan means Gen. David Petraeus is teamed again with his old division, the 101st Airborne, which he led at the start of the Iraq war. The four-star general, who still wears the 101st's Screaming Eagle combat patch on his right shoulder, is taking over after the deadliest months for NATO troops since the war began and with just a year to make gains before President Barack Obama's target to begin withdrawing troops. He's likely to find plenty of support for his counterinsurgency strategy from the nearly 20,000 soldiers from Fort Campbell who know his reputation as a proven combat commander in Iraq. Current division commander Maj. Gen. John F. Campbell, who is leading NATO operations in eastern Afghanistan, calls it a fortuitous pairing. "He is a proven warrior and a dynamic leader. He was the driving force behind our COIN (counterinsurgency) manual and fully understands the challenges associated with a counterinsurgency fight," Campbell said in an e-mail. Tactically, the 101st Airborne Division has key assets that Petraeus will need to take back momentum from the Taliban. A majority of the division's leadership has had previous experience in Afghanistan and its helicopter units provide extra mobility in a difficult terrain. Some of the division's troops will also be a key element in an upcoming offensive against the Taliban homeland in Kandahar. Petraeus drew early distinction after his command of the division during the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. The division's ability to stabilize Mosul, the country's third largest city, was considered a successful operation in the early part of the war. Mosul had a city council that was considered Iraq's first postwar elected body, and millions were spent on reconstruction efforts in the area. Much of what he was doing in northern Iraq at that time was drawn from lessons he learned in Bosnia in 2002, said U.S. Army Col. Michael Meese, head of the Department of Social Sciences at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point who worked with Petraeus in Bosnia and Iraq. "It was a very different situation than Iraq and Afghanistan but it was working with local forces, building their capacity, ensuring stability while also doing counter terrorism," he said. As a commander, Petraeus' guidance was to encourage his unit leaders down to the brigade and battalion level to develop their own approach to these counterinsurgency principals, a leadership style well-suited to the versatile division that also sent some of the first troops to Afghanistan after Sept. 11, 2001. "The key is that a counterinsurgency fight is very much localized," Meese said. "Empowering the local commanders to be successful was one of the lessons taken from Bosnia, through Iraq and then applying that to Afghanistan." In 2004, Petraeus was tapped to lead the training of the Iraqi security forces so American forces could eventually leave the country. His next assignment, however, would take the general with a Princeton doctorate off the battlefield and put him back in the classroom. While head of the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., he helped rewrite the military's manual on counterinsurgency. In 2007, he returned to the country that was quickly descending into sectarian violence and led a 20,000-strong troop surge to stabilize the country. Retired U.S. Army Col. Peter Mansoor, who was the executive officer under Petraeus during the surge, said the troops have a lot of confidence that the general with three combat tours can again turn around a war that some critics have said is already lost. "There is a sense of urgency to make things happen in Afghanistan," Mansoor said. "But he clearly understands that in counter insurgency warfare, time is a commodity that is pretty precious." Campbell, who was also working in Baghdad during the surge, said it's hard not to draw lines from that experience to a presumption of similar success in Afghanistan. But Campbell said he has to keep in check those expectations among the Afghan provincial and security leaders. "Afghanistan is not Iraq, and as such the challenges are all that much more difficult as Iraq had a strong central government, where Afghanistan has not; Iraq had a strong central identity as Iraqis, where in Afghanistan more of a tribal affiliation; Iraq had a high literacy rate where Afghanistan is less than 20 percent," Campbell said. Campbell said just like the Sons of Iraq movement that eventually led to decreased violence, leaders in Afghanistan need to find some "game changers." "We'll work with our partners on reintegration ... the process of reintegrating ex-combatant and/or supporters must be led by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan," he said. "I think this has the potential to really move us forward in some areas."

# Terrorism Advantage Answers: Turn Extensions: Failure in Afghanistan Causes Terrorism

## (--) Failure in Afghanistan creates a hot bed of terrorism that will target the US:

Rory Stewart, 2009 (director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy @ Harvard). “Afghanistan: a war we cannot win.”

<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/5797197/Afghanistan-a-war-we-cannot-win.html>

Barack Obama, in a recent speech, set out our fears. The Afghan government "is undermined by corruption and has difficulty delivering basic services to its people. The economy is undercut by a booming narcotics trade that encourages criminality and funds the insurgency... If the Afghan government falls to the Taliban – or allows al-Qaeda to go unchallenged – that country will again be a base for terrorists who want to kill as many of our people as they possibly can. "For the Afghan people, a return to Taliban rule would condemn their country to brutal governance, international isolation, a paralysed economy, and the denial of basic human rights to the Afghan people – especially women and girls. The return in force of al-Qaeda terrorists who would accompany the core Taliban leadership would cast Afghanistan under the shadow of perpetual violence."

## (--) Defeating the Taliban crucial to uprooting extremism in Afghanistan & Pakistan:

Lisa Curtis and James Phillips, 2009 (Senior Research Fellow for South Asia and Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs @ Heritage Foundation). “Shortsighted U.S. Policies on Afghanistan to Bring Long-Term Problems.” Accessed July 15, 2010 at <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/10/shortsighted-us-policies-on-afghanistan-to-bring-long-term-problems>

The success of increased drone strikes against al-Qaeda and senior Taliban leaders in Pakistan's tribal border areas over the last year has apparently led some U.S. officials to mistakenly conclude that these types of operations alone can end the threat from al-Qaeda and its extremist allies. Analysis of the Taliban and its evolution over the last 15 years reveals, however, that its ideology, operational capabilities, and close ties with al-Qaeda and other Pakistan-based extremist organizations allows the movement to wield tremendous influence in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Thus the U.S. cannot hope to uproot extremism from the region without denying the Taliban the ability to again consolidate power in Afghanistan.[1]

## (--) Failure in Afghanistan undermines Pakistan:

Lisa Curtis, 2009 (Senior Research Fellow for South Asia @ Heritage Foundation) “Scaling Back in Afghanistan Would Jeopardize Security of U.S. Homeland.” Accessed July 15, 2010 at

<http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/09/Scaling-Back-in-Afghanistan-Would-Jeopardize-Security-of-US-Homeland>

Emboldening a Generation of International Terrorists The Taliban/al-Qaeda threat spans the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan; thus, failure in one country will contribute to failure in the other--just as success in one country will breed success in the other. By appointing Ambassador Richard Holbrooke as the Senior Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan earlier this year, President Obama signaled that he understood this reality.

## (--) Taliban victory in Afghanistan makes it a base for terrorism:

Lisa Curtis, 2009 (Senior Research Fellow for South Asia @ Heritage Foundation) “Scaling Back in Afghanistan Would Jeopardize Security of U.S. Homeland.” Accessed July 15, 2010 at

<http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/09/Scaling-Back-in-Afghanistan-Would-Jeopardize-Security-of-US-Homeland>

In a March 27speech, President Obama was clear on the link between the Taliban and al-Qaeda and the threat posed by al-Qaeda to the governing regimes in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. He rightly said, "And if the Afghan government falls to the Taliban--or allows al Qaeda to go unchallenged--that country will again be a base for terrorists who want to kill as many of our people as they possibly can."

## (--) Taliban control in Afghanistan is a deadly terrorist safe haven:

Lisa Curtis, 2009 (Senior Research Fellow for South Asia @ Heritage Foundation) “Scaling Back in Afghanistan Would Jeopardize Security of U.S. Homeland.” Accessed July 15, 2010 at

<http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/09/Scaling-Back-in-Afghanistan-Would-Jeopardize-Security-of-US-Homeland>

The Taliban and al-Qaeda have a symbiotic relationship, and they support each other's harsh Islamist, anti-West goals. It would be folly to think a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan would be anything but a deadly international terrorist safe haven.

## (--) Taliban still a significant threat:

Liam Fox, 2010 (Secretary of State for Defense in the United Kingdom.) July 7, 2010. “Afghanistan: Standing Shoulder to Shoulder with the United States.” Accessed July 15, 2010 at <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/07/Afghanistan-Standing-Shoulder-to-Shoulder-with-the-United-States>

So in Afghanistan today, the operations of NATO and other Coalition allies are a direct consequence of 9/11. It was there that the Taliban rulers gave al-Qaeda sanctuary, allowed it to run terrorist training camps, and made it a base for terrorist attacks across the world. The Taliban were driven out of power by Afghan and international forces. Al-Qaeda fled to the border areas of Pakistan. Although reduced and under considerable pressure, they are still there and continue to pose a real and significant threat to us.

# Terrorism Advantage Answers: Turn Extensions: Failure in Afghanistan Causes Terrorism

## (--) Pakistani and Afghan stability key to stopping terrorism in South Asia:

Lisa Curtis, 2009 (Senior Research Fellow, Heritage Foundation). “Afghanistan and Pakistan: Understanding and Engaging Regional Stakeholders” Accessed July 15, 2010 at <http://www.heritage.org/research/testimony/afghanistan-and-pakistannbsp-understanding-and-engaging-regional-stakeholders>

In his speech last Friday, President Obama provided a clear signal that his Administration intends to dedicate the time, resources, and, most important, U.S. leadership necessary to stabilize the region and contain the terrorist threat in South Asia. President Obama presented a well-reasoned case for why the U.S. needs to remain committed to the region, reminding the American people that terrorists responsible for the attacks on September 11, 2001 (and subsequent international attacks) are still in Pakistan and continue to threaten regimes there and in Afghanistan. Until Pakistan and Afghanistan are stable and no longer vulnerable to these extremist forces, vital U.S. national security interests will be at risk.

# Counter-insurgency NEG: Solvency NEG Front-Line

## (--) Turn: Blurring—

## A) Establishing doctrines in Afghanistan are unrelated to the actual on the ground strategies: McChrystal proves that generals were interpret doctrinal changes with a broad mandate:

Michael A. Cohen, 2010 (senior fellow at the American Security Project). “Finding the Exit in Afghanistan.” Online at:

<http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/6002/finding-the-exit-in-afghanistan>. Accessed July 12, 2010.

Even after the administration's lengthy Afghanistan review last fall, the gap between Obama's stated goal and McChrystal's ambitious strategy remained unresolved. The president's 18-month timeline to begin drawing down U.S. troops and his order to McChrystal not to occupy territory that couldn't be turned over to Afghan security forces by June 2011 suggested a more minimal goal of stabilizing Afghanistan and speeding the path toward withdrawal. **But McChrystal's military forays** into Taliban-controlled and Pashtun-dominated southern and eastern Afghanistan and his emphasis on U.S.-led nation-building **spoke to a different aspiration**. Indeed, under McChrystal, the U.S. and NATO mission was to both out-fight and out-govern the Taliban -- in short, to "win" in Afghanistan. But victory has not been in the cards in Afghanistan for a very long time. With polling indicating that Americans are souring on both the war and Obama's stewardship of it, the focus must shift to protecting U.S. interests while leaving Afghanistan as stable as possible after our withdrawal.

## B) Conflation of counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency produces an overly interventionist policy—distracting and exhausting the US:

Boyle 10 - 1 Lecturer in International Relations and a Research Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St Andrews (3/10/10, Michael, International Affairs, “Do counterterrorism and counterinsurgency go together?” <http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/123318677/abstract>)

This article will argue that counterterrorism and counterinsurgency are two distinct models of war which can operate at cross-purposes when jointly applied to low-intensity conflicts such as that in Afghanistan. The conflation of these two different models of warfare stems from an intellectual error, which assumes that a fused threat (for example, between a nationalist insurgent group like the Taleban and a transnational terrorist group like Al-Qaeda) must necessarily be met by a joint or blended counterterrorism and counterinsurgency approach. In fact, these two models of warfare involve divergent assumptions about the roles of force, the importance of winning support among the local population, and the necessity of building a strong and representative government. Such approaches are not necessarily mutually reinforcing or even compatible. At the tactical and strategic level, there are at least four possible offsetting costs—popular backlash, countermobilization of enemy networks, a legitimacy gap and diminished leverage—that may be incurred when counterterrorism and counterinsurgency are deployed simultaneously. At the political level, the conflation of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency risks producing an overly interventionist foreign policy which distracts and exhausts the US and UK as they treat an ever-increasing number of localized insurgencies as the incubators of future terrorist threats.

## Turn: NATO

## A) Premature withdrawal from Afghanistan crushes NATO cohesion:

Liam Fox, 2010 (Secretary of State for Defense in the United Kingdom.) July 7, 2010. “Afghanistan: Standing Shoulder to Shoulder with the United States.” Accessed July 15, 2010 at <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/07/Afghanistan-Standing-Shoulder-to-Shoulder-with-the-United-States>

So the first reason we cannot bring our troops home immediately is that their mission is not yet completed. Were we to leave prematurely, without degrading the insurgency and increasing the capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), we would probably see the return of the destructive forces of transnational terrorism. Not only would we risk the return of civil war in Afghanistan creating a security vacuum, but we would also risk the destabilization of Pakistan with potentially unthinkable regional, and possibly nuclear, consequences. The second reason is that it would be a shot in the arm to jihadists everywhere, re-energizing violent radical and extreme Islamism. It would send the signal that we did not have the moral resolve and political fortitude to see through what we ourselves have described as a national security imperative. Premature withdrawal would also damage the credibility of NATO, which has been the cornerstone of the defense of the West for more than half a century. To leave before the job is finished would leave us less safe and less secure. Our resolve would be called into question, our cohesion weakened, and the Alliance undermined. It would be a betrayal of all the sacrifices made by our armed forces in life and limb.

## B) Strong NATO stops nuclear war:

**DUFFIELD**, 1994 assistant professor of government @ University of Virginia,

("http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=0&did=1778229&SrchMode=1&sid=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1122844474&clientId=3552"

Above all, NATO pessimists overlooked the valuable intra-alliance functions that the alliance has always performed and that remain relevant after the cold war. Most importantly, NATO has helped stabilize Western Europe, whose states had often been bitter rivals in the past. By damping the security dilemma and providing an institutional mechanism for the development of common security policies, **NATO has contributed to making the use of force in relations among the countries of the region virtually inconceivable**. In all these ways, NATO clearly serves the interests of its European members. But even the United States has a significant stake in preserving a peaceful and prosperous Europe. In addition to strong transatlantic historical and cultural ties, American economic interests in Europe--as a leading market for U.S. products, as a source of valuable imports, and as the host for considerable direct foreign investment by American companies--remain substantial. If history is any guide, moreover, the United States could easily be drawn into a future major war in Europe, the consequences of which would likely be even more devastating than those of the past, given **the existence of nuclear weapons**.(11)

# Counter-insurgency NEG: Solvency Extensions—Blurring Turn

## (--) Moves away from counter-insurgency are irrelevant: the military will merely rename their current operations something else and continue the status quo.

Boyle 10 - 1 Lecturer in International Relations and a Research Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St Andrews (3/10/10, Michael, International Affairs, “Do counterterrorism and counterinsurgency go together?” <http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/123318677/abstract>)

This episode indicates the extent of the confusion over counterterrorism (CT) and counterinsurgency (COIN) that marks the contemporary debate over Afghanistan. Both CT and COIN would envisage military action in Afghanistan, but to very different ends. A CT mission would focus exclusively on Al-Qaeda while offering little or no support to the Karzai government; a COIN mission envisages a comprehensive commitment to defeating the Taleban and rebuilding the Afghan state while destroying Al-Qaeda operatives there. Yet it has now become commonplace for politicians and military officials alike to mention CT and COIN in the same breath, or to treat them as if they were functionally equivalent. The official US government definition now frames counterterrorism in classic ‘hearts and minds’ counterinsurgency language: ‘actions taken directly against terrorist networks and indirectly to influence and render global and regional environments inhospitable to terrorist networks’. 12 Terrorist threats are now regularly described as insurgencies and vice versa. The influential US Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual states that ‘today’s operational environment also includes a new kind of insurgency, one which seeks to impose revolutionary change worldwide. Al-Qaeda is a well known example of such an insurgency.’ An official from US Central Command (CENTCOM), for instance, has gone so far to define counterterrorism as a ‘whole of government COIN’ approach. Meanwhile, insurgent threats in places such as Chechnya, Indonesia and Thailand are now regularly redescribed as terrorist threats, as analysts speculate on whether local conflicts will become magnets for Al-Qaeda or otherwise spill out into acts of horrific violence on the international stage. 14 13

## (--) No Solvency- the military will still continue both strategies destroying perception of change

Boyle 10 - 1 Lecturer in International Relations and a Research Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St Andrews (3/10/10, Michael, International Affairs, “Do counterterrorism and counterinsurgency go together?” <http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/123318677/abstract>)

Similarly, the fact that terrorists and insurgents operate in the same theatre, and in some cases function in tandem, is not an argument for a response that seamlessly interweaves elements of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. Indeed, there is no reason to assume that counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategies are fully compatible or mutually reinforcing. The record of the war in Afghanistan suggests rather that both models of warfare involve tradeoffs or costs that may offset the gains made by the other. Unless these tradeoffs are properly managed, the simultaneous deployment of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations may operate at cross-purposes and make long-term strategic success more elusive. The fact that US and UK leaders have been so willing to split the difference between counterterrorism and counterinsurgency—and to ignore the offsetting costs of each—may help to account for the current painful stalemate in Afghanistan.

# Counter-Insurgency NEG: Solvency Extensions—Extensions on NATO Turn--Uniqueness

## (--) NATO unity at an unprecedented high right now:

Philip H. **Gordon, 12/9/2009** (Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2009/133417.htm>)

As I said, I began by highlighting Afghanistan because it is emblematic of how the United States and Europe can and do cooperate on the most important global challenges of the day. In that respect, I want to make two points absolutely clear tonight: First, the United States looks forward to working with a strong, cohesive Europe as a partner in meeting the security and economic challenges of the 21st century. And second, we have already seen in the first year of this administration an extraordinarily high—**and possibly unprecedented—level of unity and common purpose as the United States and Europe** have stood shoulder to shoulder to face gathering global threats. I have been working on U.S.-Europe issues for several decades, and would dare say that I don’t think **there has been a time in my professional career when our global strategies are as in sync as they are today**.

## (--) Obama has bolstered US-NATO cooperation now:

Zhang **Wei, 12/25/2009** (<http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-12/25/content_12703762.htm>)

The U.S.-Europe relations have **moved forward constantly in 2009** as both sides see more overlapping interests. Relations between the two sides had soured during the George W. Bush administration amid differences over Iraq between the United States and some of the major EU nations led by France and Germany. Obama intensified exchanges with Europe on many issues after he took office in January this year. The president actively engaged in a series of crucial talks with his European partners, including the London G20, NATO and Europe-U.S. summits. During the NATO summit in April, Obama held a relaxed and town hall style meeting with a French and German audience in Strasbourg, France. He told the audience his plan to repair the damaged relations with Europe. "We must be honest with ourselves," he said, "In recent years, we've allowed our alliance to drift." He pledged the United States would work toward a "better partner," and called for joint efforts to find a way out of their common problems. In the following EU-U.S. summit, **all the bloc's member state leaders were present in a rare display of solidarity with their transatlantic ally**.

# Counter-Insurgency NEG: Solvency Extensions—Extensions on NATO Turn--Links

## (--) Premature withdrawal from Afghanistan undermines NATO credibility:

Liam Fox, 2010 (Secretary of State for Defense in the United Kingdom.) July 7, 2010. “Afghanistan: Standing Shoulder to Shoulder with the United States.” Accessed July 15, 2010 at <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/07/Afghanistan-Standing-Shoulder-to-Shoulder-with-the-United-States>

This is a time of testing in Afghanistan. The price being paid is high, the mission complex, and progress not always obvious to the eye. The truth is that operations in Afghanistan—operations for which the Afghans themselves are paying a heavy price along with NATO and other Coalition forces—are a direct consequence of the terrorist attacks of 9/11. To withdraw prematurely would risk both creation of a security vacuum with the return of civil war and the destabilization of Pakistan, which could have unthinkable regional, and even nuclear, consequences. It would also re-energize violent radical Islamism, signal that we lack the moral resolve and political fortitude to see through a national security imperative, and damage the credibility of NATO, which has been the cornerstone of Western defense for more than half a century. Britain’s relationship with the U.S. remains central to its national security. In addition, the United States remains the United Kingdom’s most important and prized strategic relationship, and NATO will remain the first instrument of choice for responding to the collective security challenges we face.

# Uniqueness for Turns: Counter-insurgency will continue now

## (--) Petraeus will maintain the counterinsurgency doctrine in the status quo:

Michael A. Cohen, 2010 (senior fellow at the American Security Project). “Finding the Exit in Afghanistan.” Online at:

<http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/6002/finding-the-exit-in-afghanistan>. Accessed July 12, 2010.

In the two weeks since Gen. David Petraeus was nominated to be the new commander for U.S. and NATO operations in Afghanistan, continuity has been the dominant theme in describing what his replacement of ousted Gen. Stanley McChrystal represents. After all, Petraeus literally wrote the book on U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine, which McChrystal tried to apply in Afghanistan over the past year. It only seems natural to expect that Petraeus will maintain the same approach.

# Uniqueness for Turns: Obama will renew the Afghanistan Force Now

## (--) Obama will renew the force in Afghanistan now:

VIJAY PRASHAD, 2010 (staff writer) “The right war gone wrong.” The Hindu. Jul. 17-30. <http://www.flonnet.com/stories/20100730271505500.htm>

Obama's initial wariness to let military force go ahead of politics has now withered. His choice of Petraeus is a sign of defeat for that liberal approach. There is even a suggestion that the already weak and underfunded political team (the Ambassador to Afghanistan Eikenberry and the Af-Pak tsar Richard Holbrooke) will be replaced to suit Petraeus' taste. A more muscular political team might replicate what he had in Iraq, with Ambassador Ryan Crocker. Crocker is a career diplomat, fluent in Persian and Arabic, with his own reputation for straight talk (he wrote a 2002 memo warning about chaos if Saddam Hussein's regime were toppled, and told Congress in 2007 that Iraq would remain a “traumatised society”). Eikenberry had already run the military side of things in Afghanistan and knows full well its limitations. Crocker is much keener for the military side. It is this side that seems to be ascendant. “We have a clear goal,” Obama said with Petraeus beside him. “We are going to break the Taliban's momentum.” The war will now be prosecuted with renewed force. It is a runaway war.

# Counter-insurgency NEG: AT: Keeping Drone Strikes Enough/Solves

## (--) Drones insufficient to solve: must have sustained military action:

Lisa Curtis, 2009 (Senior Research Fellow for South Asia @ Heritage Foundation) “Scaling Back in Afghanistan Would Jeopardize Security of U.S. Homeland.” Accessed July 15, 2010 at

<http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/09/Scaling-Back-in-Afghanistan-Would-Jeopardize-Security-of-US-Homeland>

Over the last year U.S. predator strikes in the tribal areas of Pakistan have been effective at disrupting the al-Qaeda leadership, and President Obama deserves credit for aggressively employing this tactic. However, the predator strikes in Pakistan must be accompanied by sustained U.S. and NATO military action against the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan Stability Alternate Causes

## (--) Poverty is the biggest roadblock to stability – prefer this evidence, it’s comparative.

Chris **Herlinger**, Writer for the Catholic News Service. 1/17/**08**. Catholic News Service, “Afghanistan’s Kabul Shows Economic Divide in War-Torn Country.” http://www.catholicnews.com/data/stories/cns/0800319.htm

A recent report by the U.N. Development Program noted gains in education and health care in Afghanistan, as well as some economic progress in the country, where the Islamic-fundamentalist Taliban ruled from 1996 until U.S.-led forces ousted it in 2001. But the report also warned that "the needs of many remain unfulfilled" and noted that Afghanistan's measures of humanitarian benchmarks like health, life expectancy and education remained the lowest among its neighbors. That placed Afghanistan 174th out of 178 countries, with only four countries -- all in sub-Saharan Africa -- with lower marks. Paul Hicks, Afghanistan country representative for the U.S. bishops' Catholic Relief Services, called poverty "the single biggest threat" Afghanistan is facing. And the harsh winter season takes its worst toll on the poor at a time of year when there is little agricultural activity, "the backbone of livelihoods for most people," he told Catholic News Service in late December. "There is destitute poverty in Kabul, hidden behind tall walls or behind the veil of a begging widow whose children live mainly on tea and bread," Hicks said from Herat, in western Afghanistan. "Economic development in Afghanistan will only be superficial if there is not a new focus and commitment on relieving the suffering of the extreme poor." Hicks told CNS the solution to the country's problems is "not a quick fix."

## (--) More instability is coming – a laundry list of factors, including the looming Afghan election make the country permanently unstable.

Ali Ahmad **Jalali**, Former Interior Minister of Afghanistan and Currently Distinguished Professor at the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies at National Defense University. 1/10/**08**. Afghan.cc, “Afghanistan: Regaining Momentum.” http://afghan.cc/blogs/afghan/archive/2008/01/11/2467.aspx

The drivers of instability include insurgency, chronic weakness of the Afghan government and state institutions, exploding drug production, and a weak economy. Uncoordinated military operations by international forces and shifting political dynamics in the region are additional contributing factors. These challenges have serious implications for stabilization efforts and state-building in Afghanistan. Frustrated by increasing insecurity and the ineffectiveness of security forces, the government tends to make tactical deals with corrupt nonstate power brokers and special-interest groups, parties who benefit from instability. These relationships evolve into another source for popular disenchantment. The problem will only intensify as the nation gets closer to presidential elections in 2009. Political deals, posturing, and compromises linked to the election could upset a number of long-term strategic priorities. Within the government, an ongoing destructive blame-game, with its attendant accusations and rhetoric populism, job insecurity, and mutual fear, continues to impair morale and effectiveness. This situation breeds suspicion within the ruling elite and generates mistrust between the executive and legislative branches. The lack of trust has also tainted relations between the Afghan government and its foreign partners. The perception of impending failure drives domestic interest groups and neighboring nations to hedge their bets. Traditionally, nonstate power networks thrive as the central government loses effectiveness. There are often signs of revival and rearming of subnational networks by former militia commanders and local power holders. (1) Moreover, latent and potential spoilers (nonstate power brokers and government officials) try to reach out to insurgent elements and their foreign supporters in an effort to negotiate individual deals. Despite a significant growth of the economy and sociopolitical developments, increased insecurity and poor governance have blunted the public's enthusiasm, even in relatively stable areas. As a result, people are losing confidence in the government and hope for a peaceful future.

# \*\*\*\*Pakistan Stability Answers\*\*\*\*\*

# Pakistani Stability Advantage Answers

## (--) Turn: premature withdrawal from Afghanistan risks a civil war in Pakistan and nuclear war:

Liam Fox, 2010 (Secretary of State for Defense in the United Kingdom.) July 7, 2010. “Afghanistan: Standing Shoulder to Shoulder with the United States.” Accessed July 15, 2010 at <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/07/Afghanistan-Standing-Shoulder-to-Shoulder-with-the-United-States>

This is a time of testing in Afghanistan. The price being paid is high, the mission complex, and progress not always obvious to the eye. The truth is that operations in Afghanistan—operations for which the Afghans themselves are paying a heavy price along with NATO and other Coalition forces—are a direct consequence of the terrorist attacks of 9/11. To withdraw prematurely would risk both creation of a security vacuum with the return of civil war and the destabilization of Pakistan, which could have unthinkable regional, and even nuclear, consequences. It would also re-energize violent radical Islamism, signal that we lack the moral resolve and political fortitude to see through a national security imperative, and damage the credibility of NATO, which has been the cornerstone of Western defense for more than half a century. Britain’s relationship with the U.S. remains central to its national security. In addition, the United States remains the United Kingdom’s most important and prized strategic relationship, and NATO will remain the first instrument of choice for responding to the collective security challenges we face.

## (--) Pakistani stability increasing now:

Lisa Curtis and James Phillips, 2009 (Senior Research Fellow for South Asia and Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs @ Heritage Foundation). “Shortsighted U.S. Policies on Afghanistan to Bring Long-Term Problems.” Accessed July 15, 2010 at <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/10/shortsighted-us-policies-on-afghanistan-to-bring-long-term-problems>

There have been several positive developments in Pakistan over the last six months, such as the Pakistan military's thrust into the Swat Valley to evict pro-Taliban elements and significant improvement in U.S.-Pakistani joint operations along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border that led to the elimination of Baitullah Mehsud in August. Moreover, the Pakistani military is reportedly preparing for an offensive in South Waziristan, where al-Qaeda and other extremists have been deeply entrenched for the last few years.

**(--) Turn: Pulling out of Afghanistan Now would Cause Afghan Civil War and a Destabilized Pakistan**

Gabbatt – 2010 –Staff writer (7/1/10, Adam, The Guardian, “US to cut $4bn in Afghan aid after corruption allegations,” http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jul/01/us-cuts-afghanistan-aid-corruption)

A US House of Representatives panel has voted to cut almost $4bn (£2.68bn) in aid to the Afghanistan government after allegations of corruption. The move to withdraw aid came as the US senate voted unanimously to confirm General David Petraeus as commander of the Afghan war, and the UK defence secretary Liam Fox insisted the British army must not leave Afghanistan "before the job is finished". A subcommittee of the House of Representatives voted yesterday to block $3.9bn (£2.6bn) in aid that the Obama administration sought for Kabul, although the panel's chair, Nita Lowey, said the aid could be reconsidered once the Afghanistan government's efforts to fight corruption have been reconsidered. Last week the Wall Street Journal reported that more than $3bn in cash has been flown out of Kabul International airport in the past three years, while The Washington Post alleged that officials in Karzai's government have been blocking corruption investigations of political allies. "The cash – packed into suitcases, piled onto pallets and loaded into aeroplanes – is declared and legal to move," the Wall Street Journal said. "But US and Afghan officials say they are targeting the flows in major anti-corruption and drug trafficking investigations because of their size relative to Afghanistan's small economy and the murkiness of their origins." Last year the gross domestic product of Afghanistan was $13.5bn, according to the CIA world factbook. Lowey said she has written to US government auditors asking them to audit all US aid to Afghanistan from the last three years. The aid withdrawal came as the US senate voted 99-0 in favour of appointing Petraeus to command the Afghan war, after the dramatic sacking of the previous commander Stanley McChrystal last week. However the unanimous support for Petraeus, seen by some as Obama's last hope in Afghanistan, came amid growing anxiety in among both Democrats and Republicans about an unpopular war, in which casualties are rising, ahead of the November US congressional elections. "Regardless of who is in command, the president's current strategy in Afghanistan is counterproductive," said Democrat Senator Russ Feingold after voting for Petraeus – whom he stressed was "clearly qualified" for the job. In the UK, Liam Fox appeared to defy David Cameron's weekend pledge to withdraw all British troops from Afghanistan by 2015, saying an early withdrawal of coalition troops from Afghanistan would risk a return of civil war and act as a "shot in the arm to jihadists". "Were we to leave prematurely, without degrading the insurgency and increasing the capability of the Afghan national security forces, we could see the return of the destructive forces of transnational terror," he said. "Not only would we risk the return of civil war in Afghanistan, creating a security vacuum, but we would also risk the destabilisation of Pakistan with potentially unthinkable regional, and possibly nuclear, consequences." Fox said Britain would be betraying the sacrifices of its fallen soldiers if it left "before the job is finished", adding that British forces would be among the last to leave Afghanistan, as they are stationed in Helmand, one the most dangerous provinces in the country.

# Pakistani Stability Advantage Answers

## (--) Turn: Scaling back the mission in Afghanistan bolsters extremism in Pakistan:

Lisa Curtis and James Phillips, 2009 (Senior Research Fellow for South Asia and Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs @ Heritage Foundation). “Shortsighted U.S. Policies on Afghanistan to Bring Long-Term Problems.” Accessed July 15, 2010 at <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/10/shortsighted-us-policies-on-afghanistan-to-bring-long-term-problems>

If the U.S. scales back the mission in Afghanistan at a time when the Taliban views itself as winning the war there, it is possible that the recent gains in Pakistan will be squandered. Anti-extremist constituencies in Pakistan that are fighting for their lives and the future of Pakistan are begging the U.S. to "stay the course" in Afghanistan, with full knowledge that a U.S. retreat would embolden extremists region-wide. Washington should listen to these voices.

## (--) Turn: Scaling back military presence in Afghanistan emboldens terrorists in Pakistan:

Lisa Curtis, 2009 (Senior Research Fellow for South Asia @ Heritage Foundation) “Scaling Back in Afghanistan Would Jeopardize Security of U.S. Homeland.” Accessed July 15, 2010 at

<http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/09/Scaling-Back-in-Afghanistan-Would-Jeopardize-Security-of-US-Homeland>

According to media reports, President Obama is considering implementing a plan supported by Vice President Joe Biden to scale back the American military presence in Afghanistan and focus on targeting al-Qaeda cells primarily in western Pakistan. This strategy would be insufficient to curb the terrorist threat emanating from the region. Ceding territory to the Taliban in Afghanistan would embolden international terrorists in the region, including in nuclear-armed Pakistan.

## Pakistan can Handle any Taliban Threat

Sify News - 10 (1/12/10, Sify News, “US in position to ;win 2010’ in Afghanistan: Senator,” http://sify.com/news/us-in-position-to-win-2010-in-afghanistan-senator-news-international-kbmwkddacic.html)

US-led forces in Afghanistan are "in a good position to win 2010" despite worries that neighboring Pakistan is not fully wed to battling Islamist fighters coming over its border, US Senators said Tuesday. "There's a feeling among our troops," from top commander General Stanley McChrystal to rank-and-file soldiers, "that we're in a good position to win 2010," said Republican Senator Roger Wicker. His comments came upon returning from a trip to Afghanistan and Pakistan as part of a US congressional delegation led by Republican Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell. The lawmakers met in Pakistan with Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani and army chief of staff Ashfaq Kayani, and emerged from the talks unconvinced that the US ally would take on Afghan Taliban fighters who had fled to its soil. "The Pakistan government is very much concerned about a portion of the Taliban who are causing trouble in Pakistan," said Republican Senator Mike Crapo, who praised Islamabad's "strong action" against those fighters. "But they are not yet, I don't believe, convinced that they should take action across the board against all Taliban, particularly those Afghan Taliban who have moved across for sanctuary," said Crapo. Pakistan faces its own Taliban insurgents and militants who have killed more than 2,900 people since July 2007. But "the Afghan Taliban, who have moved across the border into Pakistan, have, as of this point, not posed a serious threat to Pakistan. They are minding their manners, if you will, in Pakistan and using it as a sanctuary," said Crapo. The senator said the meetings with top Pakistan officials had left open "whether they will, and, if so, when they will and to what extent they will begin taking action against the Afghan Taliban."

# \*\*\*\*\*General Terrorism Defense\*\*\*\*\*

## (--) Even failure in Afghanistan doesn’t create a hot-bed of terrorism:

Rory Stewart, 2009 (director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy @ Harvard). “Afghanistan: a war we cannot win.”

<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/5797197/Afghanistan-a-war-we-cannot-win.html>

Even if – as seems most unlikely – the Taliban was to take the capital, it is not clear how much of a threat this would pose to US or European national security. Would it repeat its error of providing a safe haven to al-Qaeda? And how safe would this haven be? And does al-Qaeda still require large terrorist training camps to organise attacks? Could it not **plan in Hamburg and train at flight schools in Florida;** or meet in Bradford and build morale on an adventure training course in Wales?

## **(--) Central Asian terrorism won’t affect the US:**

Innocent and Carpenter, 9 - \*foreign policy analyst at Cato who focuses on Afghanistan and Pakistan AND \*\*vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at Cato (Malou and Ted, “Escaping the Graveyard of Empires: A Strategy to Exit Afghanistan,” http://www.cato.org/pubs/wtpapers/escaping-graveyard-empires-strategy-exit-afghanistan.pdf)

Central Asia holds little intrinsic strategic value to the United States, and America’s security will not be endangered even if an oppressive regime takes over a contiguous fraction of Afghan territory. America’s objective has been to neutralize the parties responsible for the atrocities committed on 9/11. The United States should not go beyond that objective by combating a regional insurgency or drifting into an open-ended occupation and nation-building mission.

## (--) No Impact. Terrorist takeover of Afghanistan won’t cause terrorism against the US:

Innocent and Carpenter, 9 - \*foreign policy analyst at Cato who focuses on Afghanistan and Pakistan AND \*\*vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at Cato (Malou and Ted, “Escaping the Graveyard of Empires: A Strategy to Exit Afghanistan,” http://www.cato.org/pubs/wtpapers/escaping-graveyard-empires-strategy-exit-afghanistan.pdf)

Moreover, the worst-case scenario—the resurrection of the Taliban’s fundamentalist regime—does not threaten America’s sovereignty or physical security. Many policymakers who call for an indefinite military presence in Afghanistan conflate bin Laden’s network—a transnational jihadist organization—with the Taliban—an indigenous Pashtun-dominated movement. But the Taliban and other parochial fighters pose little threat to the sovereignty or physical security of the United States. The fear that the Taliban will take over a contiguous fraction of Afghan territory is not compelling enough of a rationale to maintain an indefinite, large-scale military presence in the region, especially since the insurgency is largely confined to predominately Pashtun southern and eastern provinces and is unlikely to take over the country as a whole, as we saw in the 1990s.

# \*\*\*\*\*Negotiations Turns\*\*\*\*\*

# Negotiations Uniqueness

## (--) Karzai is pushing for negotiations with the Taliban now:

Press TV, 2010 (July 12). “Karzai seeks change in UN terror list.” Accessed July 15, 2010 at

<http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=134391&sectionid=351020403>

US special envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke (L) and Afghan President Hamid Karzai

Afghan President Hamid Karzai is reportedly trying to put pressure on the United Nations to remove 50 former Taliban officials from a terrorist list. The Washington Post, citing an unnamed senior Afghan official, reported on Sunday that Karzai plans to reach a political agreement with the militants to end a nearly nine-year-old war in his country.

# Negotiations Good: Solve Terrorism

## (--) Consensus of senior military commanders agrees: Negotiations with the Taliban are key to solve instability in Afghanistan:

Linda S. Heard, 2010 (staff writer). “A war fuelled by pride.” July 14, 2010. Online. Accessed July 14, 2010 at:   
<http://www.tehrantimes.com/index_View.asp?code=222918>

There is a growing consensus among senior military commanders and diplomats that in the absence of a feasible military solution to the nine-year-long Afghanistan conflict, a negotiated peace settlement should be pursued. Now, Robert D. Blackwill, a former U.S. Deputy National Security Adviser, says President Barack Obama's policy “seems headed for failure” and the U.S. should “accept that the Taliban will inevitably control most of its historic stronghold in the Pashtun south”. It is evident, too, that Afghan President Hamid Karzai is anxious to bring the insurgency to a peaceful close so that foreign troops can leave. His efforts in this direction are being blessed or, perhaps, even facilitated by Pakistan which, according to its Foreign Ministry spokesman Abdul Basit, would welcome a NATO withdrawal. With over 1,920 coalition military fatalities and mounting Afghan anger over civilian casualties it's about time that Obama heeded the advice of those in the know. If there is no military solution, then why does he insist on sending in more troops when what he should be doing is engaging in direct or indirect negotiations with the various insurgent groups? Peace talks are inevitable, so why should they be delayed to allow foreign soldiers to strut their stuff for no tangible purpose against the omnipresent risk of being maimed or killed?

## (--) Karzai’s negotiations with the Taliban will decrease violence in Afghanistan:

Michael A. Cohen, 2010 (senior fellow at the American Security Project). “Finding the Exit in Afghanistan.” Online at:

<http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/6002/finding-the-exit-in-afghanistan>. Accessed July 12, 2010.

Obama would also do well to take a page from Petraeus' past willingness to make deals with unsavory actors in pursuit of U.S. interests. In Iraq, the U.S. military joined forces with insurgents when the latter became willing to turn their guns on a common enemy. The same difficult decisions may become necessary in Afghanistan, particularly as the Karzai government increases its political outreach to various Taliban elements -- like the Haqqani network, which maintains a loose affiliation with al-Qaida.

Indeed, accepting a political role for key Taliban leaders is perhaps the most important and overdue shift required in U.S. strategy. Recent statements by CIA Director Leon Panetta that the Taliban must be prepared to "surrender" their arms do not provide a genuine starting point for negotiations. The only red line that should matter to U.S. policymakers is that there be no al-Qaida sanctuary in Afghanistan. In addition, the U.S. should make clear that it is prepared to maintain a military presence in Afghanistan, albeit a small one, until the threat of a Taliban military takeover of the country has abated. Everything else should be left up to the Afghans themselves. Protecting U.S. interests and finding a way out, rather than crafting the perfect political deal, must be the overriding goal of U.S. policymakers. With the change of military command, Obama has a unique opportunity to clarify U.S. goals for Afghanistan and put in place a strategy to end what has become America's longest war. The only road forward for U.S. policymakers is not one that ends in ticker-tape parades, but instead one that can lead us to the light at the end of the tunnel.

# Negotiations Bad

## (--) Negotiations with the Taliban will fail: past efforts to engage Taliban on human rights record proves:

James Phillips, 2009 (Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs). “Success in Afghanistan Requires Firm Presidential Leadership, Not Half-Measures.” Accessed July 15, 2010 at <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/09/Success-in-Afghanistan-Requires-Firm-Presidential-Leadership-Not-Half-Measures>

Negotiation from Position of Weakness Equals Surrender There appears to be some wishful thinking within the Obama Administration regarding the U.S.'s ability to negotiate a political solution with the Taliban in the near term. A survey of the failed attempts by U.S. diplomats in the late 1990s to convince the Taliban to improve their record on human rights and to turn over Osama bin Laden should inform current U.S. deliberations about the efficacy of such attempts at engagement.

## (--) Turn: Democracy Promotion

## A) Negotiations undermine Afghanistani democracy:

James Phillips, 2009 (Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs). “Success in Afghanistan Requires Firm Presidential Leadership, Not Half-Measures.” Accessed July 15, 2010 at <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/09/Success-in-Afghanistan-Requires-Firm-Presidential-Leadership-Not-Half-Measures>

Some in the Obama Administration appear to advocate allowing the Taliban to control certain parts of Afghanistan or including their leaders in governing structures. The risk of pursuing these "top-down" negotiations right now is that the Taliban is in a relatively strong position in Afghanistan and would be able to cow moderate Afghans who support a democratic process.

## B) Democracy promotion key to preventing inevitable extinction

**Diamond**, senior research fellow at Hoover Institution, **95**

(Larry, *Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors and Instruments, Issues and Imperatives,* A Report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, December 1995, p. 6)

This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness.

## (--) Turn: Leadership

## A) Negotiations with the Taliban destroy US credibility the world over:

James Phillips, 2009 (Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs). “Success in Afghanistan Requires Firm Presidential Leadership, Not Half-Measures.” Accessed July 15, 2010 at <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/09/Success-in-Afghanistan-Requires-Firm-Presidential-Leadership-Not-Half-Measures>

A top-down negotiation with hard-line elements of the Taliban at this time would also constitute an abandonment of America's Afghan partners who are fighting for a better future for their country. These Afghans are fighting to avoid a return to Taliban rule, which included complete disregard for citizens' rights--particularly of women (including outlawing education for girls)--and the systematic destruction of the rich historical and cultural traditions of the country in order to force a barbaric interpretation of Islam on the Afghan people. If the U.S. caves in to the Taliban, America would be seen the world over as a weak and unreliable partner, unwilling to defend the very ideals upon which the U.S. itself is founded.

## B) US leadership is essential to prevent global nuclear exchange.

Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND, The Washington Quarterly, Spring 1995

Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.

# Negotiations Bad: Extensions—Negotiations Will Fail

## (--) Zero signs that the Taliban will negotiate in good faith with the US:

James Phillips, 2009 (Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs). “Success in Afghanistan Requires Firm Presidential Leadership, Not Half-Measures.” Accessed July 15, 2010 at <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/09/Success-in-Afghanistan-Requires-Firm-Presidential-Leadership-Not-Half-Measures>

Although there are no signs that the senior Taliban leadership is ready to compromise on a political solution or break its ties with al-Qaeda's destructive global agenda, there is advantage in pursuing local reconciliation efforts that bring the non-ideological "foot soldiers" of the Taliban into the political process. The goal of such a strategy is to put military pressure on the top Taliban leaders and to protect the population from intimidation by the Taliban while simultaneously convincing local insurgents that they are on the losing side and would benefit by laying down their arms and joining the mainstream political process.

## (--) Lebanon proves: Negotiations with the Taliban cause Afghanistan to fall under the sway of the Taliban—it risks unleashing terrorism:

James Phillips, 2010 (Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs). “Afghanistan: Time to Rethink the Timeline.” June 25th, 2010. Accessed online on July 15, 2010 at <http://blog.heritage.org/?p=37101>

Daniel Serwer, Vice President of the Centers for Peacebuilding Innovation at the U.S. Institute of Peace, today wrote an op-ed in the Washington Post which advised President Obama to clearly state his desired end state for Afghanistan and adopt a more realistic timeframe for attaining his goal. Otherwise, Serwer warns, the administration’s strategy for negotiating a political settlement in Afghanistan could end up turning Afghanistan into another Lebanon, an unstable state that has fallen increasingly under the sway of Hezbollah, a radical Islamist organization similar to the Taliban that represses human rights, unleashes terrorism and remains virulently hostile to U.S. interests.

# Negotiations Bad: Extensions on Turns

## (--) Turn: Negotiations with the Taliban bolsters the Taliban—many who currently support Karzai would join the Taliban:

James Phillips, 2009 (Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs). “Success in Afghanistan Requires Firm Presidential Leadership, Not Half-Measures.” Accessed July 15, 2010 at <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/09/Success-in-Afghanistan-Requires-Firm-Presidential-Leadership-Not-Half-Measures>

If the Obama Administration chooses to deny its field commander's request for more troops and instead seeks to engage Taliban leaders in negotiations with the vain hope that these militants will break from their al-Qaeda allies, the results would likely be disastrous. Many Afghans that currently support the Kabul government would be tempted to hedge their bets and establish ties with the Taliban, while Afghans sitting on the fence would be much more likely to come down on the Taliban's side.

# \*\*\*\*\*Drone Strikes NEG\*\*\*\*\*

# Drone Strikes NEG: AT: US-Pakistani Relations

## (--) Pakistani leadership is on board with air strikes in Pakistan now:

GORDON LUBOLD, 2010 (staff writer). “Carl Levin backs strikes inside Pakistan.” July 13, 2010. Online. Accessed July 14, 2010 at <http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0710/39662.html>.

A leading Democrat on defense said the U.S. should be more aggressive in conducting airstrikes against groups inside Pakistan that threaten the mission in neighboring Afghanistan. Sen. Carl Levin (D-Mich.), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, told reporters Tuesday morning that the U.S. should go after networks like the Haqqani network that "directly threaten" the mission in Afghanistan. Levin returned Monday evening from a trip with Sen. Jack Reed (D-R.I.) to Afghanistan and Pakistan. "We know where they are, we know where their headquarters is, and the same thing with the Quetta Shura," Levin told reporters at a breakfast hosted by the Christian Science Monitor. "I don't think they should be off-limits to those strikes – they directly threaten the Afghan mission." Groups like the Haqqani network and the Quetta Shurah, both based in Pakistan, have long frustrated efforts to bring peace and stability to Afghanistan. The American airstrikes, often conducted by drones, are typically performed by the CIA. But they usually engender internal anti-American sentiments, even if many Pakistani leaders believe the airstrikes are helping Pakistan in its own fight against militancy. Levin said those protests against U.S. airstrikes inside Pakistan **have leveled off as the Pakistani leadership has “at least accepted**, off the record, understood and approved" of those missions. That lack of public criticism in Pakistan is a welcome change from what leaders there had previously been doing, he said.

# \*\*\*\*\*AFF Cards\*\*\*\*\*

# Increased Troops Counterplan Fails

**(--) Sending more Troops to Afghanistan won’t work; only pull outs and peace agreements work (--)**

Margolis – 10 – Staff Writer (Eric, 1/29/10, Toronto Sun, “War won with talks, not troops,” http://www.torontosun.com/comment/columnists/eric\_margolis/2010/01/29/12670691.html)

The U.S. and its NATO allies are losing the nine-year-old war in Afghanistan. So Washington and London, both in dire financial straits, say they are now ready for a possible face-saving peace deal with the Pashtun Taliban and its nationalist allies. If you can’t bomb them into submission, buy them off. A conference was held in London last Thursday to raise tens of millions of dollars to try to bribe lower level Taliban to co-operate with the western occupation and/or lay down its arms. Bribery is a time-honoured tool of war. But it’s not the answer in Afghanistan. The bloody Afghan conflict can only be ended by genuine peace negotiations and withdrawal of all foreign troops. U.S. commanders in Afghanistan admit they have lost the military initiative. The resistance is steadily gaining ground. Increasing U.S. and allied troops to 150,000 won’t be enough to defeat Taliban. By year end, U.S. and NATO forces will only equal the number of Soviet forces committed to Afghanistan in the 1980s. Meanwhile Pakistan, without whose co-operation the U.S. cannot wage war in Afghanistan, is in turmoil. The U.S. is infiltrating Xe (formerly Blackwater) and DynCorp mercenaries into Pakistan to protect U.S. military supply routes north from Karachi to Afghanistan, and to operate or defend American air bases in Pakistan. American mercenaries are being used to assassinate militants and enemies of Pakistan’s U.S.-installed government and to target Pakistan’s nuclear installations for future U.S. action. This, and increasing attacks by American killer drones, have sparked outrage across Pakistan and brought warnings of creeping U.S. occupation. U.S. and Canadian forces in Afghanistan are like a man trying to fix a chimney on the roof of a burning house. As Pakistan burns, so will Afghanistan. Washington lacks the men, money and understanding to deal with chaotic Pakistan — never mind chaotic Afghanistan. Washington, London, Ottawa, Berlin and Paris share the same problem: Their war propaganda has so demonized Taliban as terrorists and woman abusers that western politicians are petrified to deal with the tribal movement, and risk being accused of sending soldiers to their deaths in a futile war. The far right will howl “appeasement,” “giving in to terrorism” and “betraying our boys.” Ignore the advocates of permanent war and torture. Afghans have suffered more than 3 million deaths in 30 years of wars. They desperately need peace, political stability and rebuilding, not the current western-installed puppet regime of thieving war lords, drug mafias and thugs of the old Afghan Communist Party. The best thing we can do for our soldiers is to get them out of the Afghan hell hole before they die in this pointless war. The west can’t “win” in Afghanistan. In fact, Washington cannot even define what victory means. The intelligent, straight-talking American ambassador to Kabul, former general Karl Eikenberry, as well as VP Joe Biden insist it’s time to start peace talks. We should heed their sensible advice. Real peace talks are the answer. Not the ruse long proposed by U.S. Gen. Stanley McChrystal to try to bribe away low-ranking Taliban and so split the Afghan resistance. This stratagem worked to a degree with Sunni tribesmen in Iraq, but it is unlikely to succeed with the proud Pashtun tribes who value honour more than money. Theirs is an antique concept most westerners cannot understand. The Taliban, an anti-Communist religious movement, knew nothing about al-Qaida’s plans to attack the United States. That plot was hatched in Europe, not Afghanistan. Many members of the anti-Communist Taliban and its allies were former allies of the West and were hailed by former president Ronald Reagan as “freedom fighters.” After 9/11, the Taliban refused to hand over Osama bin Laden to the enraged United States without proper evidence of his guilt because he was an honoured guest and hero of the anti-Soviet jihad. The Taliban chose war with the U.S. before betraying a guest. Such men are not to be easily bought.

# Increased Troops Counterplans Fail

**(--) The Taliban become more deadly with the increase of troops (--)**

Taylor – 7/13/10 – Staff writer (Rob, 7/13/10, Reuters, “Afghan war unwinnable under Karzai, says rights groups,” http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE66B3LJ20100712)

(Reuters) - It would take "a miracle" to win the war and restore viable peace in Afghanistan under the inept government of President Hamid Karzai despite a massive surge in foreign troops, a rights group said on Monday. The surge had also driven violence to its worst levels since the Taliban's 2001 ousting, with 14 civilians killed or wounded on average each day, Afghanistan Rights Monitor (ARM) said in a new report. "Contrary to President Barrack Obama's promise that the deployment ... would 'disrupt, dismantle and defeat' Taliban insurgents and their al Qaeda allies in the region, the insurgency has become more resilient, multi-structured and deadly," the group said. The 30,000-strong troop lift was also clouding U.S. foreign policy objectives, with regional powers such as Pakistan, India and Iran flexing their muscles in the country ahead of an expected U.S. and NATO pullout, starting next year. Assessing that it would take a miracle to win the war under Karzai, the report (arm.org.af/file.php?id=2) said the crisis of bad governance and inept leadership in Afghanistan had been compounded by a disorganized, half-heartedly committed and concomitantly mistaken international community. Casualties among NATO and U.S. forces fighting the Taliban hit a record monthly high of over 100 in June, and commanders expect violence to rise amid an anti-insurgent offensive in coming months and as the country prepares for lower house parliamentary elections on September 18. At least 1,074 civilians had been killed in the conflict this year and more than 1,500 injured, although the number killed in U.S. and NATO airstrikes fell considerably due to tough restrictions driving down troop reliance on air power, ARM said. Coalition forces spokesman General Josef Blotz said at the weekend that while restrictions would be altered to better protect the 150,000 international troops now in the country, the overall rules of engagement would remain unchanged. Blotz also defended NATO's record in protecting civilians, and said while foreign troops had killed 42 civilians between June 1 and 10 July, 464 died in insurgent bombings and shootings. ARM said 61 percent of its 661 recorded civilian deaths this year were due to insurgents who had "little or no respect to the safety and protection of non-combatants." Improvised bombs, or IEDs, killed 282 civilians, more than any other war activity, followed by insurgent suicide attacks in which 127 civilians lost their lives. Use of homemade bombs, the Taliban weapon of choice, has now risen to record levels and they are blamed for two-thirds of U.S. and NATO fatalities. More than 300 exploded or were detected before detonation in the last week of June, U.S. defense officials said last week. "ALARMING NUMBER" "Because an alarming number of civilians have been killed, wounded and affected by IED attacks, ARM calls on the Afghan government, the United States and NATO, insurgents and other key actors to stop, or at least reduce and control, their production and indiscriminate use," the report said. U.S. and NATO forces were responsible for 210 civilian deaths from January to June, a fifth of the total and down from 26 percent last year. Many were killed in "violent and barbaric intrusions" during counter-insurgency raids, it said. Local security forces loyal to the Afghan government, including the army, police and militias, were responsible for 108 civilian deaths during the six-month period. Afghanistan lacked the basic foundation for a sustainable peace, the report said, including a legitimate and competent leadership, and was entangled in complex regional rivalries. "Many call 2010 the 'make or break' year given the enhanced military presence and the preplanned political show games. We, however, fear it will be more of a "breaking" year mostly for Afghan civilians who are increasingly falling victim," ARM said.

# Total Withdrawal Good

**(--) A Total Removal of Troops Will Stop Terrorism (--)**

Bandow – 2010 – Senior Fellow at the Cato Institution (7/1/10, Doug, Huffington Post, “Terrorism: Why They Want to Kill Us,” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/doug-bandow/terrorism-why-they-want-t\_b\_631942.html)

The horrid attacks of 9/11 led to the cry: Why do they hate us? Most Americans seemed to believe that it was because we are such nice people. But the Times Square bomber reminds us that terrorism is mostly a response to U.S. government policies. After 9/11 President George W. Bush reassured Americans: we were attacked because we are beautiful people, spreading freedom around the world. But often the actions of our government are seen by others as less than beautiful. To seek an explanation for terrorism is not to excuse monstrous attacks on civilians. But understanding what motivates people to kill could help reduce terrorism in the future. Terrorism is not new. It was used against Russian Tsars, the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and British colonial officials. Algerians employed terrorism against the French and later Algerian governments. Basque and Irish separatists freely relied on terrorism. Until Iraq, the most promiscuous suicide bombers were Tamils in Sri Lanka. In none of these cases did the killing occur in response to freedom, whether in America or elsewhere. Robert Pape of the University of Chicago studied the most recent cases: "The central fact is that overwhelmingly suicide-terrorist attacks are not driven by religion as much as they are by a clear strategic objective: to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from the territory that the terrorists view as their homeland. From Lebanon to Sri Lanka to Chechnya to Kashmir to the West Bank, every major suicide-terrorist campaign--over 95 percent of all the incidents--has had as its central objective to compel a democratic state to withdraw." Consider Chechnya. Both suicide bombers in the recent Moscow subway attacks apparently were "Black Widows," whose militant husbands had been killed by Russian security forces. Even some conservatives, who typically decry discussion of "root causes" of terrorism, pointed to Russian brutality in Chechnya. Pape, along with Lindsey O'Rourke and Jenna McDermit, also of the University of Chicago, studied 63 Chechen suicide terrorists and found that few had religious motives. Rather: "As we have discovered in our research on Lebanon, the West Bank, Iraq, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka and elsewhere, suicide terrorist campaigns are almost always a last resort against foreign military occupation. Chechnya is a powerful demonstration of this phenomenon at work." As for America, the Defense Science Board Task Force reported in 2004: "Muslims do not 'hate our freedom,' but rather, they hate our policies."

# Drones AFF: Politics Answers

## Economy, not Afghanistan key to the election:

Dana Blanton, 2010 (staff writer), July 1, 2010. “Fox News Poll: Obama’s Approval Steady; Most Support Action in Afghanistan.” <http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/07/01/fox-news-poll-obamas-approval-steady-support-action-afghanistan/>

On a list of top issues, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan rank fourth as being the most important for the president to be working on right now. The top issue by a wide margin is the economy/jobs, followed by the oil spill, the federal deficit and then Iraq/Afghanistan, which ties with the issue of health care.