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\*\*OPIUM LICENSE COUNTER-PLAN\*\*

1NC – Opium License CP

TEXT: The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan should issue licenses to groups and individuals to manufacture and distribute Lachryma papaveris in Afghanistan.

Solves backlash from War on Drugs and dries up support for terrorism

Brown 7 (Vanda Felbab, Brookings Institute on Foreign Policy, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2007/08afghanistan\_felbab%20brown/felbab%20brown200708.pdf, AD: 7/7/10) jl

Since the state would no longer have to eliminate the population’s livelihood in the licensed areas (as the current government-sanctioned eradication programs do), the alienation of the population from the government would be reduced and the legitimacy of the state would be enhanced. Conversely, the political support of current rogue politicians, government officials, and tribal elites who derive political capital from (tacitly) sponsoring the illicit economy would be reduced, once again enhancing the relative power and authority of the state.

Afghanistan’s state capacity would also be enhanced as the state would derive incomefrom taxing licensed cultivation and the processing of opium into medical analgesics.

Corruption pressure on the police and other law enforcement agencies would be somewhat reduced as they would no longer have to suppress production in the licensed areas. The actual decrease in corruption pressures would, however, be highly contingent on the actual size of the area licensed and the persistence of an illegal economy. But perhaps most importantly, the population in the licensed areas would be given a chance to see the police not as an antagonistic enemy, but as a necessary and positive representative of the state.

2NC – Opium License CP – Solves Backlash

Solves better – strengthens the state and creates culture of legality

Brown 7 (Vanda Felbab, Brookings Institute on Foreign Policy, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2007/08afghanistan\_felbab%20brown/felbab%20brown200708.pdf, AD: 7/7/10) jl

The licensing of opium cultivation could reduce the amount of Afghan opium supplying the illicit drug trade. The opium bought by the state for medical opiates would not enter the Afghan drug trade. However, how much opium would actually be prevented from reaching the illegal trade would be highly contingent on the extent of the area licensed and the operational demand for Afghan medical opiates. • Substantially reducing the area of illicit cultivation and the number of people participating in the illegal opium economy as a result of licensing would decrease the threats to rule of law and enhance a culture of legality, thus strengthening the authority of the state.

2NC – Opium License CP – Solves Terrorism

Solves terrorism

Mili and Townsend 7 (Hayder and Jacob, 2007 Staff Writers, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South\_Asia/IE18Df06.html, AD: 7/7/10) jl

Law-enforcement officers and UNODC officials interviewed by the authors last month believe that the Taliban are completely dependent on the narco-economy for their financing. Where the Taliban are able to enforce it - mostly in the south and some eastern districts - they are said to levy a 40% tax on opium cultivation and trafficking. A low estimate of the amount that the Taliban earn from the opium economy is $10 million, but considering the tradition of imposing tithes on cultivation and activities further up the value chain, the total is likely to be at least $20 million. [5] There are also regular reports of cooperation between political insurgents and profit-driven criminal groups. One example is their collusion to throw small farmers off their land or to indenture them under debts and threats to maintain opium production. More detailed information provided to the authors describes arrangements whereby drug traffickers provide money, vehicles and subsistence to Taliban units in return for protection. [6] The synergy between politically motivated warfare and economic logic is starkly visible and should drive the integration of counter-narcotics and counterinsurgency strategies. Of course, not all violence is linked to transnational jihadis. Across Afghanistan, profit-driven criminality is more pervasive than sympathy for or cooperation with insurgents, even if both benefit from and contribute to general lawlessness. When it comes to the Taliban, however, the centrality of the opium economy in their funding model is both a strength and a weakness. Reducing their financial power would undermine an important component of their recruitment model. It suggests a potential for turning the vicious circle of insecurity and economic stagnation into a virtuous one of coalition military superiority and job creation. The failure to reduce opium cultivation in the early post-invasion years has directly augmented the Taliban's military strength. They have harvested the opium into weapons. The opiate trade and terrorism activity currently overlap to such an extent that some law-enforcement actions fall under counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism simultaneously.

Solves Al-Qaeda

Gertz and Scarborough 4 (Bill and Rowan, 2004, Washington Times Pentagon reporters, <http://www.gertzfile.com/gertzfile/ring012304.html>, AD: 7/7/10) jl

Months before the U.S. Navy seized al Qaeda-linked boats carrying heroin, Rep. Henry J. Hyde, Illinois Republican, was warning the administration of ties between drug trafficking and terrorists, including Osama bin Laden. Mr. Hyde, chairman of the House International Relations Committee, sent a letter to Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld Oct. 30 suggesting the Pentagon become more active in counternarcotics, especially in Afghanistan. There, a burgeoning poppy crop is producing huge quantities of heroin whose proceeds are diverted to bin Laden's al Qaeda network, U.S. officials say. "I am growing increasingly concerned about the reported role which illicit drugs play in financing terrorism," Mr. Hyde said in his letter to Mr. Rumsfeld. "As you know, reports indicate that the proceeds from illegal drug trafficking are supporting many of the foreign terrorist organizations which the Defense Department and law enforcement agencies fight every day around the world."The congressman added, "A greater role by the Defense Department may be called for. In Afghanistan, for example, military intelligence should work cooperatively with the [Drug Enforcement Administration] to identify and destroy the opium depots and heroin production labs in that country when the opportunity presents itself to the military." The staff of Mr. Hyde's committee and of the Appropriations subcommittee on commerce, justice, state and judiciary recently completed a joint, five-day fact-finding trip to Pakistan and Afghanistan. The investigators interviewed sources who said bin Laden's group is now garnering millions of dollars from heroin after the West cut off some of its traditional sources of money.

2NC – Opium License CP – Solves Terrorism

Solves terrorism

Brown 7 (Vanda Felbab, Brookings Institute on Foreign Policy, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2007/08afghanistan\_felbab%20brown/felbab%20brown200708.pdf, AD: 7/7/10) jl

Crucially, the political capital of the Taliban would be greatly reduced, if not altogether eliminated, as a result of a large-scale licensing scheme. The Taliban derives much of its political capital (support from the population and willingness of the population to deny intelligence on the belligerents to Afghan government and NATO units) from protecting the opium poppy fields against eradication.16 Outside of its protection of opium cultivation, the Taliban’s appeal to the population is minimal. If opium were licensed, the larger population would not need the Taliban’s protection services for the preservation of their livelihoods, and the political support for the belligerents would decrease substantially. Given sufficient ability to protect the population against reprisals, intelligence flows to the government and NATO would significantly increase. The link between the Taliban and the population would be severed. The extent of such crucial benefits of licensing for both security improvements and counterdrug effort, however, would be highly contingent on the extent of the licensed production (see Section IV).

2NC – Opium License CP – Solves Poverty

Solves poverty

Brown 7 (Vanda Felbab, Brookings Institute on Foreign Policy, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2007/08afghanistan\_felbab%20brown/felbab%20brown200708.pdf, AD: 7/7/10) jl

Addressing Economic Problems • The state would be able to provide employment to the population in the licensed areas and obtain potential large income from the highly profitable business of producing pharmaceuticals, especially if Afghanistan developed the capacity not simply to cultivate opium but to transform it into actual prescription drugs.

The consumption of durables, the construction boom, and other small and large-business multiplier effects would continue.

The state would be better able to absorb money generated by the opium economy.

\*\*WOD GOOD DISAD\*\*

1NC – WOD Good DA

The US is winning the War on Drugs now

Lee 8 (Matthew, AP Writer, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2008-10-24-250252244\_x.htm, AD: 7/7/10) jl

In a report obtained by The Associated Press ahead of its planned release Friday, the Bush administration claims that production of the heroin precursor will plunge by 31 percent, from 8,800 tons in 2007 to 6,100 tons this year. That's more than five times the drop in production predicted by the United Nations in late August.

That’s key to Afghanistan stability

NSN 8 (National Security Network, http://www.nsnetwork.org/node/858, AD: 7/7/10) jl

In plain view of the United States and the international community, the opium trade is overwhelming Afghanistan’s legitimate government. The facts are stunning: in 2001, after a Taliban ban on poppy cultivation, Afghanistan only produced 11 percent of the world’s opium. Today it produces 93 percent of the global crop; the drug trade accounts for half of its GDP; and nearly one in seven Afghans is involved in the opium trade. In Afghanistan, more land is being used for poppy cultivation than for coca cultivation in all of Latin America. The trade strengthens the government’s enemies and – unless its large place in the Afghan economy is permanently curtailed by crop replacements and anti-poverty efforts – poses a potentially fatal obstacle to keeping the country stable and peaceful. Afghanistan is caught in a vicious cycle. The fall of the Taliban brought the end of their highly coercive crop reduction program. A combination of U.S. inattention and widespread insecurity and poverty allowed poppy cultivation to explode. As the opium economy expanded, it spread corruption and empowered anti-government forces, undermining the Afghan state, leading to more poverty and instability, which in turn only served to further entrench the drug trade. Meanwhile the illicit activity has been a boon to the Taliban insurgency, which has traditionally used poppy cultivation as a lever to improve its own position. Today, the Taliban relies on opium revenues to purchase weapons, train its members, and buy support.

1NC – WOD Good DA

Instability in Afghanistan spills over and causes several scenarios for extinction

Morgan 7 (Stephen J, former member of the British Labour Party Executive Committee, http://www.electricarticles.com/display.aspx?id=639, AD: 7/7/10) jl

They are low on adequate resources and relegated in importance. The former British Commander of NATO forces admitted that last year they came close to losing Kandahar, the second city. It is not ruled out that much of the south and east could fall into Taliban hands this year, paving the way for the fall of Kabul, the year after. The Taliban are ferocious fighters, with a messianic fervour to fight to the death. They bring with them the experience of veterans of the brutal Soviet war and the civil war which followed. Now regrouped, rearmed, their forces are prepared both for unfavourable open combat of almost suicidal proportions. Furthermore they are opportunistically changing tactics, both in order to create maximum urban destabilization and to win local support in the countryside. Boasting of more than 1,000 suicide volunteer bombers, they have also renounced their former policy against heroin cultivation, thus allowing them to win support among the rural population and gain support from local tribes, warlords and criminal gangs, who have been alienated by NATO policies of poppy field destruction. Although disliked and despised in many quarters, the Taliban could not advance without the support or acquiescence of parts of the population, especially in the south. In particular, the Taliban is drawing on backing from the Pashtun tribes from whom they originate. The southern and eastern areas have been totally out of government control since 2001. Moreover, not only have they not benefited at all from the Allied occupation, but it is increasingly clear that with a few small centres of exception, all of the country outside Kabul has seen little improvement in its circumstances. The conditions for unrest are ripe and the Taliban is filling the vacuum. The Break-Up of Afghanistan? However, the Taliban is unlikely to win much support outside of the powerful Pashtun tribes. Although they make up a majority of the nation, they are concentrated in the south and east. Among the other key minorities, such as Tajiks and Uzbeks, who control the north they have no chance of making new inroads. They will fight the Taliban and fight hard, but their loyalty to the NATO and US forces is tenuous to say the least. The Northern Alliance originally liberated Kabul from the Taliban without Allied ground support. The Northern Alliance are fierce fighters, veterans of the war of liberation against the Soviets and the Afghanistan civil war. Mobilized they count for a much stronger adversary than the NATO and US forces. It is possible that, while they won’t fight for the current government or coalition forces, they will certainly resist any new Taliban rule. They may decide to withdraw to their areas in the north and west of the country. This would leave the Allied forces with few social reserves, excepting a frightened and unstable urban population in Kabul, much like what happened to the Soviets. Squeezed by facing fierce fighting in Helmund and other provinces, and, at the same time, harried by a complementary tactic of Al Qaeda-style urban terrorism in Kabul, sooner or later, a “Saigon-style” evacuation of US and Allied forces could be on the cards. The net result could be the break-up and partition of Afghanistan into a northern and western area and a southern and eastern area, which would include the two key cities of Kandahar and, the capital Kabul. Pastunistan? The Taliban themselves, however may decide not to take on the Northern Alliance and fighting may concentrate on creating a border between the two areas, about which the two sides may reach an agreement regardless of US and Allied plans or preferences. The Taliban may claim the name Afghanistan or might opt for “Pashtunistan” – a long-standing, though intermittent demand of the Pashtuns, within Afghanistan and especially along the ungovernable border regions inside Pakistan. It could not be ruled out that the Taliban could be aiming to lead a break away of the Pakistani Pashtuns to form a 30 million strong greater Pashtun state, encompassing some 18 million Pakistani Pashtuns and 12 Afghan Pashtuns. Although the Pashtuns are more closely linked to tribal and clan loyalty, there exists a strong latent embryo of a Pashtun national consciousness and the idea of an independent Pashtunistan state has been raised regularly in the past with regard to the disputed territories common to Afghanistan and Pakistan. The area was cut in two by the “Durand Line”, a totally artificial border between created by British Imperialism in the 19th century. It has been a question bedevilling relations between the Afghanistan and Pakistan throughout their history, and with India before Partition. It has been an untreated, festering wound which has lead to sporadic wars and border clashes between the two countries and occasional upsurges in movements for Pashtun independence. In fact, is this what lies behind the current policy of appeasement President Musharraf of Pakistan towards the Pashtun tribes in along the Frontiers and his armistice with North Waziristan last year? Is he attempting to avoid further alienating Pashtun tribes there and head–off a potential separatist movement in Pakistan, which could develop from the Taliban’s offensive across the border in Afghanistan? Trying to subdue the frontier lands has proven costly and unpopular for Musharraf. In effect, he faces exactly the same problems as the US and Allies in Afghanistan or Iraq. Indeed, fighting Pashtun tribes has cost him double the number of troops as the US has lost in Iraq. Evidently, he could not win and has settled instead for an attempted political solution. When he agreed the policy of appeasement and virtual self-rule for North Waziristan last year, President Musharraf stated clearly that he is acting first and foremost to protect the interests of Pakistan. While there was outrageous in Kabul, his deal with the Pashtuns is essentially an effort to firewall his country against civil war and disintegration. In his own words, what he fears most is, the « Talibanistation » of the whole Pashtun people, which he warns could inflame the already fierce fundamentalist and other separatist movement across his entire country. He does not want to open the door for any backdraft from the Afghan war to engulf Pakistan. Musharraf faces the nationalist struggle in Kashmir, an insurgency in Balochistan, unrest in the Sindh, and growing terrorist bombings in the main cities. There is also a large Shiite population and clashes between Sunnis and Shias are regular. Moreover, fundamentalist support in his own Armed Forces and Intelligence Services is extremely strong. So much so that analyst consider it likely that the Army and Secret Service is protecting, not only top Taliban leaders, but Bin Laden and the Al Qaeda central leadership thought to be entrenched in the same Pakistani borderlands. For the same reasons, he has not captured or killed Bin Laden and the Al Qaeda leadership. Returning from the frontier provinces with

Bin Laden’s severed head would be a trophy that would cost him his own head in Pakistan. At best he takes the occasional risk of giving a nod and a wink to a US incursion, but even then at the peril of the chagrin of the people and his own military and secret service. The Break-Up of Pakistan? Musharraf probably hopes that by giving de facto autonomy to the Taliban and Pashtun leaders now with a virtual free hand for cross border operations into Afghanistan, he will undercut any future upsurge in support for a break-away independent Pashtunistan state or a “Peoples’ War” of the Pashtun populace as a whole, as he himself described it. However events may prove him sorely wrong. Indeed, his policy could completely backfire upon him. As the war intensifies, he has no guarantees that the

>CONTINUED<

1NC – WOD Good DA

>CONTINUED<

current autonomy may yet burgeon into a separatist movement. Appetite comes with eating, as they say. Moreover, should the Taliban fail to re-conquer al of Afghanistan, as looks likely, but captures at least half of the country, then a Taliban Pashtun caliphate could be established which would act as a magnet to separatist Pashtuns in Pakistan. Then, the likely break up of Afghanistan along ethnic lines, could, indeed, lead the way to the break up of Pakistan, as well. Strong centrifugal forces have always bedevilled the stability and unity of Pakistan, and, in the context of the new world situation, the country could be faced with civil wars and popular fundamentalist uprisings, probably including a military-fundamentalist coup d’état. Fundamentalism is deeply rooted in Pakistan society. The fact that in the year following 9/11, the most popular name given to male children born that year was “Osama” (not a Pakistani name) is a small indication of the mood. Given the weakening base of the traditional, secular opposition parties, conditions would be ripe for a coup d’état by the fundamentalist wing of the Army and ISI, leaning on the radicalised masses to take power. Some form of radical, military Islamic regime, where legal powers would shift to Islamic courts and forms of shira law would be likely. Although, even then, this might not take place outside of a protracted crisis of upheaval and civil war conditions, mixing fundamentalist movements with nationalist uprisings and sectarian violence between the Sunni and minority Shia populations. The nightmare that is now Iraq would take on gothic proportions across the continent. The prophesy of an arc of civil war over Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq would spread to south Asia, stretching from Pakistan to Palestine, through Afghanistan into Iraq and up to the Mediterranean coast. Undoubtedly, this would also spill over into India both with regards to the Muslim community and Kashmir. Border clashes, terrorist attacks, sectarian pogroms and insurgency would break out. A new war, and possibly nuclear war, between Pakistan and India could not be ruled out. Atomic Al Qaeda Should Pakistan break down completely, a Taliban-style government with strong Al Qaeda influence is a real possibility. Such deep chaos would, of course, open a “Pandora's box” for the region and the world. With the possibility of unstable clerical and military fundamentalist elements being in control of the Pakistan nuclear arsenal, not only their use against India, but Israel becomes a possibility, as well as the acquisition of nuclear and other deadly weapons secrets by Al Qaeda. Invading Pakistan would not be an option for America. Therefore a nuclear war would now again become a real strategic possibility. This would bring a shift in the tectonic plates of global relations. It could usher in a new Cold War with China and Russia pitted against the US.

2NC – Uniqueness – Winning WOD Now

War on Drugs is winnable now – counternarcotics efforts are solving

Lee 8 (Matthew, AP Writer, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2008-10-24-250252244\_x.htm, AD: 7/7/10) jl

Regardless of the difference in opinion over what the drop will mean for opium production, Walters said the decline in cultivation -- particularly that 18 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces are now poppy-free, up from 15 in 2007 and 12 in 2006 -- is "good news" and a sign that counternarcotics efforts are working after years of failure.

"It gives us a clear indication that we can do this, we just need to sustain it," he said, noting that anti-drug campaigns were working especially well in Afghanistan's north and east, where incentive programs aimed at rewarding local officials for declines in poppy cultivation have been most successful.

The Bush administration has spent $2.8 billion on fighting drugs in Afghanistan since 2002 but until this year, it had seen poppy cultivation on the rise with record harvests in both 2006 and 2007.

Decline in drug production proves head-way is being made

UNODC 9 (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2009/September/afghan-opium-production-in-significant--decline.html, AD: 7/7/10) jl

2 September 2009 - Opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan is down 22 per cent, opium production is down 10 per cent, while prices are at a 10-year low. The number of opium poppy-free provinces has increased from 18 to 20 out of a total number of 34, and more drugs are being seized as a result of more robust counter-narcotics operations by Afghan and NATO forces.

These are the findings contained in the summary findings of the Afghan Opium Survey 2009, released in Kabul today by UNODC Executive Director Antonio Maria Costa. This annual survey covers the planting cycle from May 2008 to June 2009.

"At a time of pessimism about the situation in Afghanistan, these results are a welcome piece of good news and demonstrate that progress is possible", said Mr. Costa.

Policies are beginning to solve Afghanistan’s drug problem

UNODC 9 (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2009/September/afghan-opium-production-in-significant--decline.html, AD: 7/7/10) jl

Opium poppy cultivation has fallen to 123,000 hectares, down from a peak of 193,000 hectares in 2007. This year, the most significant decrease was recorded in Helmand Province, where cultivation declined by a third to 69,833 hectares from 103,590 hectares in 2008. The dramatic turnaround in one of Afghanistan's most unstable provinces can be attributed to an effective mix of sticks and carrots: strong leadership by the governor; a more aggressive counter-narcotics offensive; terms of trade that are more favourable to legal crops; and the successful introduction of "food zones" to promote licit farming.

Don’t risk the link – disruption of counter-narcotics operations could recede all progress

Patience 8 (Martin, BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7582018.stm, AD: 7/7/10) jl

The reduction comes after the record-breaking poppy harvest in 2007, the UN report says.

It declares that that "opium flood waters in Afghanistan have started to recede".

But one Western official who works on the poppy issue has said that any progress has been "fragile" and gains could be reversed in the next year.

2NC – Uniqueness – Winning WOD Now

Robust Counter-narcotics operations are solving drug problems in Afghanistan

Gilmore 9 (Gerry, American Forces Press Service, http://www.centcom.mil/news/un-afghan-poppy-opium-production-on-decline, AD: 7/7/10) jl

 “The link between drugs and insurgency, now recognized, is being attacked militarily,” Costa said in the U.N. release. In fact, according to the release, more drugs are being confiscated in Afghanistan as a result of more robust counter-narcotics operations by Afghan and NATO forces.
In the first half of 2009, according to the report, military operations destroyed more than 90 tons of chemicals used in the production of illicit drugs, 450 tons of opium poppy seeds, 50 tons of opium, 7 tons of morphine 1.5 tons of heroin, 19 tons of hashish and 27 laboratories.
The U.N. survey “certainly is a positive report,” Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman told reporters today. However, he added, “there’s still a lot of work to be done in that area.”

WOD solving now – More than half of the countries provinces are drug free

Patience 8 (Martin, BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7582018.stm, AD: 7/7/10) jl

The area of poppy production in Afghanistan and the yield of opium from these crops have reduced this year compared with 2007, a UN report says.

It says more than half of the country's 34 provinces are now poppy-free - up from 13 provinces in 2007 to 18.

2NC – Impact Helper – Instability = N/W

Destabilization in the middle east goes nuclear and causes extinction

Steinbach 2 (John, Researcher for the Centre for Research on Globalisation, http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/STE203A.html, AD: 6/26/10) jl

Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is gaining momentum(and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major(if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon- for whatever reason- the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration." (44)

2NC – Internals – Opium K 🡪 Terrorism

Opium funding is key to terrorism

Mili and Townsend 7 (Hayder and Jacob, 2007 Staff Writers, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South\_Asia/IE18Df06.html, AD: 7/7/10) jl

Law-enforcement officers and UNODC officials interviewed by the authors last month believe that the Taliban are completely dependent on the narco-economy for their financing. Where the Taliban are able to enforce it - mostly in the south and some eastern districts - they are said to levy a 40% tax on opium cultivation and trafficking. A low estimate of the amount that the Taliban earn from the opium economy is $10 million, but considering the tradition of imposing tithes on cultivation and activities further up the value chain, the total is likely to be at least $20 million. [5] There are also regular reports of cooperation between political insurgents and profit-driven criminal groups. One example is their collusion to throw small farmers off their land or to indenture them under debts and threats to maintain opium production. More detailed information provided to the authors describes arrangements whereby drug traffickers provide money, vehicles and subsistence to Taliban units in return for protection. [6] The synergy between politically motivated warfare and economic logic is starkly visible and should drive the integration of counter-narcotics and counterinsurgency strategies. Of course, not all violence is linked to transnational jihadis. Across Afghanistan, profit-driven criminality is more pervasive than sympathy for or cooperation with insurgents, even if both benefit from and contribute to general lawlessness. When it comes to the Taliban, however, the centrality of the opium economy in their funding model is both a strength and a weakness. Reducing their financial power would undermine an important component of their recruitment model. It suggests a potential for turning the vicious circle of insecurity and economic stagnation into a virtuous one of coalition military superiority and job creation. The failure to reduce opium cultivation in the early post-invasion years has directly augmented the Taliban's military strength. They have harvested the opium into weapons. The opiate trade and terrorism activity currently overlap to such an extent that some law-enforcement actions fall under counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism simultaneously.

Opium funding necessary to sustain terrorist activities

Gertz and Scarborough 4 (Bill and Rowan, 2004, Washington Times Pentagon reporters, <http://www.gertzfile.com/gertzfile/ring012304.html>, AD: 7/7/10) jl

Months before the U.S. Navy seized al Qaeda-linked boats carrying heroin, Rep. Henry J. Hyde, Illinois Republican, was warning the administration of ties between drug trafficking and terrorists, including Osama bin Laden. Mr. Hyde, chairman of the House International Relations Committee, sent a letter to Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld Oct. 30 suggesting the Pentagon become more active in counternarcotics, especially in Afghanistan. There, a burgeoning poppy crop is producing huge quantities of heroin whose proceeds are diverted to bin Laden's al Qaeda network, U.S. officials say. "I am growing increasingly concerned about the reported role which illicit drugs play in financing terrorism," Mr. Hyde said in his letter to Mr. Rumsfeld. "As you know, reports indicate that the proceeds from illegal drug trafficking are supporting many of the foreign terrorist organizations which the Defense Department and law enforcement agencies fight every day around the world."The congressman added, "A greater role by the Defense Department may be called for. In Afghanistan, for example, military intelligence should work cooperatively with the [Drug Enforcement Administration] to identify and destroy the opium depots and heroin production labs in that country when the opportunity presents itself to the military." The staff of Mr. Hyde's committee and of the Appropriations subcommittee on commerce, justice, state and judiciary recently completed a joint, five-day fact-finding trip to Pakistan and Afghanistan. The investigators interviewed sources who said bin Laden's group is now garnering millions of dollars from heroin after the West cut off some of its traditional sources of money.

2NC – Internals – WOD K 🡪 Solving Terrorism

DEA success in the war on drugs is key to fighting terrorism – Without this revenue, support for terrorism would evaporate

Hendin 8 (Robin, CBS News producer, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/07/18/cbsnews_investigates/main4274339.shtml>, AD: 7/7/10) jl

The 2004 Madrid train bombings that killed 191 people cost a mere $70,000 and were financed primarily through the sale of hashish and ecstasy in Spain. US officials say increasingly the sale of illegal drugs is the financing of choice for terrorists. "Nothing generates money like drugs...it is the most lucrative illicit commodity that's trafficked,” Michael Braun, the Chief of Operations for the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) told a panel in Washington. In fact, of the 43 groups identified as known terrorist organizations by the US State Department, 19 are linked to the drug trade. While the men who carried out the Madrid plot had connections to Al Qaeda, they did most of the fundraising on their own. Al Qaeda central, as the Osama Bin Laden group is known, has a history of relying on drug money for support, primarily because of protection granted by the Taliban in Afghanistan. Now US authorities say they are seeing a more direct connection between drug money and funding for Al Qaeda terror activities. Braun pointed out that more than 40% of the Taliban's money comes from the illicit trade of opium made from the widespread growth of poppy plants in Afghanistan, where the Taliban is based. But beyond the Taliban, "we are seeing more and more of an unequivocal connection with respect to Al Qaeda being involved in drug trafficking activities," he said. He told reporters the DEA has many open investigations into the connection, but would not provide further details. While terror operations themselves are cheap, the maintenance of a terror organization on the whole is quite expensive. Recruiting, training, arms, fake documents, safe houses, and movement can cost hundreds of millions of dollars, and that's why many groups, including the leftist Colombian terror group, the FARC, and Mideast terror groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah have turned to drug trafficking to finance operations. A recent UN report, shows that $322 billion was made last year by the global drug trade. $65 billion of that was from American drug users. With so much of the world's cocaine coming from South America and Colombia in particular, the FARC is very involved in every aspect of the cocaine trade around the globe, and according to Braun the organization has become "the single largest cocaine trafficker in the world." The FARC makes money by taxing the drug cartels, drug smugglers and drug farmers. Braun says the Taliban has picked up on the FARC's techniques and is now following the same model. Braun called groups like the FARC, the Taliban, Hamas and Hezbollah: "hybrids -- They are one part terrorist organization and are becoming one part global drug trafficking cartel." To combat the growing nexus between the international drug trade and terrorism, the DEA says it relies heavily on human sources on the ground in many different countries and has more federal agents stationed overseas than any other US law enforcement agency. "This the face of 21st century organized crime," Braun stated. "But they are meaner and uglier than anything we've seen before."

2NC – Internals – WOD K 🡪 Solving Terrorism

Winning the war on drugs solves terrorism – Afghanistan is the key internal link

DEA 3 (<http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/ongoing/narco-terrorism_story052003.html>, AD: 7/7/10) jl

The link between drugs and terrorism has been apparent in Southwest Asia as well, especially in Afghanistan, "Through the taxation of illicit opium production," Mr. Casteel said, "the Taliban were able to fund an infrastructure capable of supporting and protecting Usama bin Laden and the Al-Qaida organization." Last year, Afghanistan produced almost 60 percent of the world's supply of illicit opium. "Globalization has dramatically changed not only the face of legitimate enterprise, but illegitimate enterprise as well," he said. "Criminals, by exploiting advances in technology, finance, communications, and transportation in pursuit of their illegal endeavors, have become criminal entrepreneurs. Perhaps the most alarming aspect of this 'entrepreneurial' style of crime is the intricate manner in which drugs and terrorism may be intermingled. Not only is the proliferation of illegal drugs perceived as a danger, but the proceeds from the sale of drugs provides a ready source for funding for other criminal activities, including terrorism."

2NC – Internals – WOD K 🡪 Solving Afghanistan

The war on drugs is key to stop poppy smuggling in Afghanistan

BBC 8 (British Broadcasting Channel, Lexis) jl

The war on drugs will not be easy unless it is waged with all the strength and possibilities available. This needs the mobilization of the security and military departments and forces so that it yields an achievement and victory against the main factors behind poppy cultivation and drug smuggling in Afghanistan. The war on drugs will prove effective at a time when it is waged against the main factors behind poppy cultivation and drug smuggling.

2NC – Impacts – Terrorism

Terrorism causes extinction

Alexander 3 (Yonah, Inter-University for Terrorism Studies Director, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2003/aug/27/20030827-084256-8999r/, AD: 6/27/10) jl

Last week's brutal suicide bombings in Baghdad and Jerusalem have once again illustrated dramatically that the international community failed, thus far at least, to understand the magnitude and implications of the terrorist threats to the very survival of civilization itself. Even the United States and Israel have for decades tended to regard terrorism as a mere tactical nuisance or irritant rather than a critical strategic challenge to their national security concerns. It is not surprising, therefore, that on September 11, 2001, Americans were stunned by the unprecedented tragedy of 19 al Qaeda terrorists striking a devastating blow at the center of the nation's commercial and military powers. Likewise, Israel and its citizens, despite the collapse of the Oslo Agreements of 1993 and numerous acts of terrorism triggered by the second intifada that began almost three years ago, are still "shocked" by each suicide attack at a time of intensive diplomatic efforts to revive the moribund peace process through the now revoked cease-fire arrangements [hudna]. Why are the United States and Israel, as well as scores of other countries affected by the universal nightmare of modern terrorism surprised by new terrorist "surprises"? There are many reasons, including misunderstanding of the manifold specific factors that contribute to terrorism's expansion, such as lack of a universal definition of terrorism, the religionization of politics, double standards of morality, weak punishment of terrorists, and the exploitation of the media by terrorist propaganda and psychological warfare. Unlike their historical counterparts, contemporary terrorists have introduced a new scale of violence in terms of conventional and unconventional threats and impact. The internationalization and brutalization of current and future terrorism make it clear we have entered an Age of Super Terrorism [e.g. biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear and cyber] with its serious implications concerning national, regional and global security concerns.

Terrorist attacks cause US nuclear retaliation – the impact is extinction

Corr 4

(Anders, Ph.D. Candidate at the Department of Government @ Harvard University http://www.foreignpolicysociety.org/workingpapers/WP7--Corr.pdf, AD: 6/27/10) jl

If a smuggled nuclear explosive detonates in a major American city, how would the United States respond? The most likely targets are New York City and Washington, D.C. In either case, hundreds of thousands would die and hundreds of billions of dollars of damage would be suffered. A severe economic depression would occur. If the blast were in DC, nearly the entire political and/or military leadership would need to be replaced, depending on the kilotonnage. If in New York, the long-term economic impact would be massive. In either case, the international relations of the United States would drastically change course. When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor and killed 2,403 Americans, the US was roused from its largely isolationist and pacifist mood overnight. America became the most formidable war machine on earth, beating Japan in the Pacific and Germany in Western Europe.2 When the September 11 attacks cost approximately 3000 lives and over $100 billion in property damage, the nation responded by invading and overthrowing regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq.3 In both cases, US public opinion was inflamed and fully supported offensive military retaliation. How much greater would be the response of public mood and offensive military action to an unexpected incident of nuclear terror that caused, at a minimum, 50 times the casualties and property damage of Pearl Harbor and September 11 combined? The response would be unprecedented and very likely nuclear, even if the United States had no ex ante doctrine that ensured retaliation. In this case, the United States would bear all the expected costs of military retaliation, without deriving the expected benefits of deterrence that flow from ex ante threats of retaliation.

2NC – Internals – Opium = Instability

Opium production produces massive Afghani instability

IAR 8 (International Affairs Review, http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/39, AD: 7/7/10) jl

Since the 2001 invasion and the lifting of the Taliban opium ban, opium production in Afghanistan has increased from 70 percent of the overall global illicit opium production to 92 percent today. This increase has occurred in tandem with the declining security situation precipitated by the 2001 coalition invasion of the country. The loose relationship between terrorist organizations, violence, decentralized governance, and poverty that existed prior to the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) in Afghanistan, has coalesced into a truly narco-terrorism-driven system. The implications of this are severe to both Afghanistan’s and America’s long-term goals. Corruption, lawlessness, instability, violence, and human suffering all contribute to, and result from, the precipitous increase in opium cultivation and narcotics production and trafficking. Thus, in attempting to subdue the Taliban- and al-Qaeda-led insurgencies, and to forge a stable and effective government in Afghanistan, there must also be effective and socially conscious measures undertaken to eliminate the pervasive narco-economy. As President Karzai has stated, “The question of drugs . . . is one that will determine Afghanistan’s future. . . . [I]f we fail, we will fail as a state eventually, and we will fall back in the hands of terrorism.”

Opium is the greatest threat to afghani state-building

IAR 8 (International Affairs Review, http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/39, AD: 7/7/10) jl

The opium economy by all accounts is a massive source of corruption and undermines public institutions especially in (but not limited to) the security and justice sectors. There are worrying signs of infiltration by the drug industry into higher levels of government and into the emergent politics of the country. Thus the opium trade is widely considered to be one of the greatest threats to state-building, reconstruction, and development in Afghanistan.

\*\*CASE FRONTLINES\*\*

Inherency Frontline

Not Inherent – Obama is already scrapping the program

Youngers 10 (Coletta, AlterNet, May 11 2010, http://www.alternet.org/drugs/146823/is\_obama\_serious\_about\_ending\_the\_war\_on\_drugs?page=1)IM

In March 2009, U.S. Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke described the opium poppy eradication effort in Afghanistan as "the most wasteful and ineffective program that I have seen in 40 years." He bluntly stated that the U.S. government had wasted millions of dollars on a counterproductive program that generates political support for the Taliban and undermines nation-building efforts. And in his trip to Peru this past April, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Arturo Valenzuela noted that the fundamental problem is not coca cultivation itself, but poverty and inequality. That isn't to say that there are no new developments. Important domestic reforms have begun. Following Holbrooke's statements, the United States suspended funding for opium poppy eradication in Afghanistan. In its proposed fiscal year 2011 budget for assistance to Latin America, the Obama administration has shifted some resources from military to economic programs. Yet for now, given its other foreign policy priorities, the White House has little enthusiasm for taking on the entrenched "drug war" bureaucracy or in expending political capital in pushing for reform of international drug policy. This change in approach, however, may already be on shaky ground. According to Vanda Felbab-Brown, a fellow at the Brookings Institution, "Voices for eradication are strong in the United States. The Obama administration has failed to prepare Congress and the international community for how long it takes for rural development to take place and consequently for the likely outcome that — despite a good policy — we may not see deep reductions in poppy cultivation in Afghanistan for several years."

Obama can’t continue the policy much longer – losing key support

Washington Post 10 (June 10 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/behind-the-numbers/2010/06/public\_remains\_unfriendly\_on\_a.html)IM

Today's news that the U.S. military operation in Kandahar will take longer than expected lands amid the American public's least friendly outlook on the war in Afghanistan since 2007, according to the latest Washington Post-ABC News poll. Overall, 53 percent say the war is not worth its costs, a new high in Post-ABC polling. That includes 41 percent who feel that way strongly, matching the previous high in August 2009. The public divides nearly evenly on how things are going there, with 42 percent saying the U.S. is winning and 39 percent losing; 12 percent say neither side has an edge. Views on the war are similar to those in an April Post-ABC poll, but support lags far behind its level in December following President Obama's announcement of a new strategy for the conflict. Republicans, who are the strongest backers of the war, continue to shift against it, with the overall share supportive of the war dipping from 69 percent in April to 62 percent now and the percentage strongly supportive dropping below 40 percent for the first time. Among Democrats, two-thirds consider the war not worth its costs, as do 53 percent of independents. It is unlikely that Obama will be able to continue his strategy much longer without losing critical support. Following his suspension last year, the permanent removal can’t be far behind. Republicans are most optimistic about the current state of affairs in Afghanistan, with six in 10 saying the U.S. is winning the war there. Independents are about evenly split (40 percent say winning, 41 percent losing) and nearly half of Democrats (48 percent) say the U.S. is losing compared with a third (33 percent) who think America is winning.

Inherency Frontline

Not inherent – Obama has already abandoned the eradication policy

Drug War Chronicle 10 (May 11 2010, http://stopthedrugwar.org/chronicle/5920/afghanistan\_US\_stops\_opium\_poppy\_eradication)IM

Thousands of US Marines poured into Afghanistan's southern Helmand province this week to take the battle against the Taliban to the foe's stronghold. But in a startling departure from decades of US anti-drug policy, eradicating Helmand's massive opium poppy crop will not be part of their larger mission. US envoy to Pakistan and Afghanistan Richard Holbrooke told members of the G-8 group of industrialized nations Saturday that attempting to quash the opium and heroin trade through eradication was counterproductive and bad policy. Instead, the US would concentrate on alternative development, security, and targeting drug labs and traffickers. Afghan anti-drug artwork, Nejat Center, Kabul "Eradication is a waste of money," Holbrooke told the Associated Press during a break in the G-8 foreign ministers meeting on Afghanistan. "The Western policies against the opium crop, the poppy crop, have been a failure. It might destroy some acreage, but it didn't reduce the amount of money the Taliban got by one dollar. It just helped the Taliban, so we're going to phase out eradication," he said. "The farmers are not our enemy; they're just growing a crop to make a living. It's the drug system," Holbrooke continued. "So the US policy was driving people into the hands of the Taliban." The Taliban insurgents are estimated to earn tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars a year from the opium and heroin trade, which generates multiple streams of income for them. Taliban commanders tax poppy farmers in areas under their control, provide security for drug convoys, and sell opium and heroin through smuggling networks that reach around the globe. As late as last year, US policymakers supported intensifying eradication efforts, with some even arguing for the aerial spraying of herbicides, as has been done with limited success, but severe political and environmental consequences in Colombia

Solvency Frontline

The only way to solve is to provide subsidies, train farmers, use mycoherbicides and ensure the continued presence of military forces

**ACD 9** (Dr. Rachel Ehrenfeld, director – American Center for Democracy, Oct. 1 2009, http://frontpagemag.com/2009/10/01/winning-the-war-in-afghanistan-by-rachel-ehrenfeld/)IM

An effective solution for the escalating violence, devastating corruption, crime and growing radicalization in Afghanistan has been available for a while, but previous administrations failed to implement it. The Obama Administration should initiate a new policy that includes drug eradication while providing the farmers with subsidies and skills for viable economic alternatives. The Administration should fund the final studies necessary to implement the innovative and safe poppy eradication method that previous U.S. governments spent significant resources developing. This entails the use of mycoherbicides, naturally occurring fungi that control noxious weeds. Unlike chemical controls now in use to eradicate illicit plants such as coca shrub in Colombia, mycoherbicides assail only the targeted plant, rendering its cultivation uneconomical. These fungi continue to live in the soil, preventing the future growth of the opium poppy plant, but are harmless to other crops, people and the environment. On Dec. 29, 2006, then President George W. Bush signed Public Law 109/469, of which Section 1111 requires the Office of National Drug Control Policy to conduct an efficacy study of mycoherbicides’ use on the opium poppy and coca shrub. Yet, the one-year study was never conducted. President Obama should immediately authorize the completion of the study. The use of mycoherbicides in Afghanistan, combined with adequate enforcement by the military, will diminish the production of heroin. It will also cut off the Taliban’s and the warlords’ hefty money supply, which in addition to funds from the Saudis and the Gulf States, fuels political corruption and the war. This strategy would free up the $150 to $200 billion now used to fight the drug trade and its byproducts–crime, addiction, diseases, accidents, etc.–in the U.S., and make these funds available to help fight terrorism directly. Unfortunately, while the Obama administration is considering a new policy to stabilize Afghanistan, it has already shifted focus from the War on Drugs to the War on Drug Traffickers. Instead of eradicating the opium crops in Afghanistan, the Administration is now targeting Taliban-linked traffickers and drug labs. But focusing on the criminal elements alone will do little to stop opium cultivation, or boost the economy, if only because there are very few alternatives for most Afghan farmers. Afghan opium production accounts for 97% of the country’s per-capita annual GDP, or $303 of $310. Implementing this new strategy, while subsidizing the Afghan economy until other crops and industries can replace the illegal heroin trade, seems a better way for America to succeed in fighting the Taliban and the endemic corruption. It would also free up resources for an array of social and governmental reforms, which should be clearly defined and strictly supervised. With no heroin to fund terrorism and subvert the economies and political systems of Afghanistan and Pakistan, the American agenda could take a huge leap forward.

No solvency – Britain and NATO will continue the eradication process

Drug War Chronicle 10 (May 11 2010, http://stopthedrugwar.org/chronicle/5920/afghanistan\_US\_stops\_opium\_poppy\_eradication)IM

That notion was opposed by the Afghan government of President Hamid Karzai, as well as by the US's NATO partners, particularly Britain, which supports expanded manual eradication of the poppy fields. On Sunday, Afghan counternarcotics minister General Khodaidad disputed Holbrooke's claims that eradication was a failure, telling the Canadian Press that Afghanistan had achieved "lots of success" with its anti-drug strategy, which relies heavily on manual eradication of poppy fields. Still, he said he was open to the new American strategy. "Whatever program or strategy would be to the benefit of Afghanistan, we welcome it," Khodaidad said. "We are happy with our policy... so I'm not seeing any pause or what do you call it, deficiency, in our strategy. Our strategy's perfect. Our strategy's good." Britain and US are at odds over opium field eradication plans. According to the London newspaper The Independent, British officials said Sunday they would continue to fund manual eradication in areas under their control. Those officials downplayed any dispute, however, saying details remained to be worked out.

\*\*ADV FRONTLINES\*\*

Poverty Frontline – Alt Causalities

Alt Causalities to Poverty

First, Corruption

Shaaker 5 (Wali, Political Analyst, http://www.institute-for-afghan-studies.org/Contributions/Reports/WaliShaaker/WhyPovertyPersistsinAfghanistan.htm, AD: 7/7/10) jl

To answer this question, one must look closely at political and economic factors in play.  Political causes have deep roots in the weakness of the state’s capacity to establish legitimacy and consolidate political power.  Therefore corruption continues to spread within its own bureaucratic apparatus as well as in the society at large.  Bribery, nepotism, and racial discrimination are among the most prevalent forms of corruption within the Afghan government institutions.  This subsequently reduces the state's authority and capability to design and implement poverty alleviating policies effectively.  It also limits government's ability to cooperate with, support, and at the same time, hold international aid agencies accountable while executing short and long-term development programs.

Second, Dependency

Shaaker 5 (Wali, Political Analyst, http://www.institute-for-afghan-studies.org/Contributions/Reports/WaliShaaker/WhyPovertyPersistsinAfghanistan.htm, AD: 7/7/10) jl

Moreover, economic frailty, and dependency of the government on foreign aid hinders state's ability to address the issue of poverty in an effective manner.  Lack of adequate economic power leads to state's inability to employ and train sufficient civil service, military and police force to implement the law, defend the right of the poor, and end war-lords' claim to authority.  This means that the Afghan government has not yet achieved the political and economic capacity to create the conditions necessary to implement successful anti-poverty policies.

Third, Instable economy

Shaaker 5 (Wali, Political Analyst, http://www.institute-for-afghan-studies.org/Contributions/Reports/WaliShaaker/WhyPovertyPersistsinAfghanistan.htm, AD: 7/7/10) jl

In addition to consolidating political power, economic muscle will enable the government to gain the legitimacy to wage war against poverty.  To do so, it has to control institutional fraud by providing higher wages and benefits to its employees, and taking more unyielding disciplinary actions against those who do not abide by the law.  Nepotism, bribery, embezzlement, and racial discrimination are among the bureaucratic ills that severely affect the ability of the state to provide basic social and economic services to the public, and particularly to the poor.  Corruption also jeopardizes the state's ability to cooperate with, and monitor international aid agencies. Therefore, in the absence of the government’s support, and guidance, the participants in economic reconstruction of Afghanistan would continue to face major impediments to coordinate efforts while trying to reach those struggling in destitute.

Fourth, lack of investor confidence and social services

Shaaker 5 (Wali, Political Analyst, http://www.institute-for-afghan-studies.org/Contributions/Reports/WaliShaaker/WhyPovertyPersistsinAfghanistan.htm, AD: 7/7/10) jl

Furthermore, state’s weakness in creating a safer environment for the investors and business owners discourages their participation in the economy in full capacity.  This could negatively impact the creation of new jobs, particularly in rural parts of the country where the state’s power is highly destabilized by the presence of various militant groups.  If Afghanistan is to achieve any substantial gains in its quest for eradicating poverty, the formation of an empowered state with the economic capacity to provide basic social services such as health, education, and employment opportunity is an absolute necessity. Thus, the question is how could the government augment its economic power in order to fight corruption, and help the poor to rise above poverty?

Poverty Frontline – Alt Causalities

Fifth, no taxes – this multiplies poverty

Shaaker 5 (Wali, Political Analyst, http://www.institute-for-afghan-studies.org/Contributions/Reports/WaliShaaker/WhyPovertyPersistsinAfghanistan.htm, AD: 7/7/10) jl

One of the main venues through which a government is able to generate revenue is to collect sales, payroll and property taxes.  Nevertheless, the Afghan state has limited or no institutional and technological capacity to do so.  In the absence of sufficient military power, the state's authority is limited in collecting taxes from small business, property owners, and producers of agricultural products.  The fact that total tax revenue relative to GDP is only four percentmeans that the state, in the absence of any other major revenue sources, continues to remain weak and dependant on foreign aid.  In another words, economically it remains fragile because it has insufficient capacity to generate budgetary revenue.  Consequently, the government is unable to offer competitive salaries to its own employees, and afford sufficient controlling and or guiding measures for the overall growth and direction of the economy.

Terrorism Frontline – Link Turns

They make terrorism sustainable – sustains revenue for the Taliban

Mili and Townsend 7 (Hayder and Jacob, 2007 Staff Writers, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South\_Asia/IE18Df06.html, AD: 7/7/10) jl

Law-enforcement officers and UNODC officials interviewed by the authors last month believe that the Taliban are completely dependent on the narco-economy for their financing. Where the Taliban are able to enforce it - mostly in the south and some eastern districts - they are said to levy a 40% tax on opium cultivation and trafficking. A low estimate of the amount that the Taliban earn from the opium economy is $10 million, but considering the tradition of imposing tithes on cultivation and activities further up the value chain, the total is likely to be at least $20 million. [5] There are also regular reports of cooperation between political insurgents and profit-driven criminal groups. One example is their collusion to throw small farmers off their land or to indenture them under debts and threats to maintain opium production. More detailed information provided to the authors describes arrangements whereby drug traffickers provide money, vehicles and subsistence to Taliban units in return for protection. [6] The synergy between politically motivated warfare and economic logic is starkly visible and should drive the integration of counter-narcotics and counterinsurgency strategies. Of course, not all violence is linked to transnational jihadis. Across Afghanistan, profit-driven criminality is more pervasive than sympathy for or cooperation with insurgents, even if both benefit from and contribute to general lawlessness. When it comes to the Taliban, however, the centrality of the opium economy in their funding model is both a strength and a weakness. Reducing their financial power would undermine an important component of their recruitment model. It suggests a potential for turning the vicious circle of insecurity and economic stagnation into a virtuous one of coalition military superiority and job creation. The failure to reduce opium cultivation in the early post-invasion years has directly augmented the Taliban's military strength. They have harvested the opium into weapons. The opiate trade and terrorism activity currently overlap to such an extent that some law-enforcement actions fall under counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism simultaneously.

War on Drug prevents Al Qaeda Expansion

Gertz and Scarborough 4 (Bill and Rowan, 2004, Washington Times Pentagon reporters, <http://www.gertzfile.com/gertzfile/ring012304.html>, AD: 7/7/10) jl

Months before the U.S. Navy seized al Qaeda-linked boats carrying heroin, Rep. Henry J. Hyde, Illinois Republican, was warning the administration of ties between drug trafficking and terrorists, including Osama bin Laden. Mr. Hyde, chairman of the House International Relations Committee, sent a letter to Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld Oct. 30 suggesting the Pentagon become more active in counternarcotics, especially in Afghanistan. There, a burgeoning poppy crop is producing huge quantities of heroin whose proceeds are diverted to bin Laden's al Qaeda network, U.S. officials say. "I am growing increasingly concerned about the reported role which illicit drugs play in financing terrorism," Mr. Hyde said in his letter to Mr. Rumsfeld. "As you know, reports indicate that the proceeds from illegal drug trafficking are supporting many of the foreign terrorist organizations which the Defense Department and law enforcement agencies fight every day around the world."The congressman added, "A greater role by the Defense Department may be called for. In Afghanistan, for example, military intelligence should work cooperatively with the [Drug Enforcement Administration] to identify and destroy the opium depots and heroin production labs in that country when the opportunity presents itself to the military." The staff of Mr. Hyde's committee and of the Appropriations subcommittee on commerce, justice, state and judiciary recently completed a joint, five-day fact-finding trip to Pakistan and Afghanistan. The investigators interviewed sources who said bin Laden's group is now garnering millions of dollars from heroin after the West cut off some of its traditional sources of money.

Terrorism Frontline – AT: Terror Impacts

No impact to terrorism

Milholin 2 (Gary, Director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, http://www.wisconsinproject.org/pubs/articles/2002/terror-bomb.htm, AD: 6/27/10) jl

Despite the reports, and despite the attendant warnings, the risk that a terrorist group like al Qaeda could get the bomb (or a "dirty" substitute) is much lower than most people think. That is the good news. There is also bad news: the risk is not zero. THERE ARE essentially two ways for a terrorist group to lay its hands on a nuclear weapon: either build one from scratch or somehow procure an already manufactured one or its key components. Neither of these is likely. Building a bomb from scratch would confer the most power: a group that could build one bomb could build several, and a nuclear arsenal would put it front and center on the world stage. But of all the possibilities, this is the unlikeliest--"so remote," in the words of a senior nuclear scientist at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, "that it can be essentially ruled out." The chief obstacle lies in producing the nuclear fuel--either bomb-grade uranium or plutonium--that actually explodes in a chain reaction. More than 80 percent of the effort that went into making America's first bombs was devoted to producing this fuel, and it is no easy task. To make bomb-grade uranium, a terrorist group would need thousands of high-speed gas centrifuges, machined to exact dimensions, arranged in series, and capable of operating under the most demanding conditions. If they wanted to produce the uranium by a diffusion process, they would need an even greater number of other machines, equally difficult to manufacture and operate. If they followed Saddam Hussein's example, they could try building a series of giant electromagnets, capable of bending a stream of electrically charged particles--a no less daunting challenge. For any of these, they would also need a steady supply of natural uranium and a specialized plant to convert it to a gaseous form for processing. Who would sell these things to would-be nuclear terrorists? The answer is: nobody. The world's nuclear-equipment makers are organized into a cooperative group that exists precisely to stop items like these from getting into unauthorized hands. Nor could a buyer disguise the destination and send materials through obliging places like Dubai (as Iran does with its hot cargoes) or Malta (favored by Libya's smugglers). The equipment is so specialized, and the suppliers so few, that a forest of red flags would go up. And even if the equipment could be bought, it would have to be operated in a place that the United States could not find. If manufacturing bomb-grade uranium is out of the picture, what about making plutonium, a much smaller quantity of which is required to form a critical mass (less than fourteen pounds was needed to destroy Nagasaki in 1945)? There is, however, an inconvenient fact about plutonium, which is that you need a reactor to make enough of it for a workable bomb. Could terrorists buy one? The Russians are selling a reactor to Iran, but Moscow tends to put terrorist groups in the same category as Chechens. The Chinese are selling reactors to Pakistan, but Beijing, too, is not fond of terrorists. India and Pakistan can both build reactors on their own, but, for now, these countries are lined up with the U.S. Finally, smuggling a reactor would be no easier than buying one. Reactor parts are unique, so manufacturers would not be fooled by phony purchase orders. Even if terrorists somehow got hold of a reactor, they would need a special, shielded chemical plant to chop up its radioactive fuel, dissolve it in acid, and then extract the plutonium from the acid. No one would sell them a plutonium extraction plant, either. It is worth remembering that Saddam Hussein tried the reactor road in the 1970's. He bought one from France--Jacques Chirac, in his younger days, was a key facilitator of the deal--hoping it would propel Iraq into the nuclear club. But the reactor's fuel was sabotaged in a French warehouse, the person who was supposed to certify its quality was murdered in a Paris hotel, and when the reactor was finally ready to operate, a squadron of Israeli fighter-bombers blew it apart. A similar fate would undoubtedly await any group that tried to follow Saddam's method today. IF MAKING nuclear-bomb fuel is a no-go, why not just steal it, or buy it on the black market? Consider plutonium. There are hundreds of reactors in the world, and they crank out tons of the stuff every year. Surely a dedicated band of terrorists could get their hands on some. This too is not so simple. Plutonium is only created inside reactor fuel rods, and the rods, after being irradiated, become so hot that they melt unless kept under water. They are also radioactive, which is why they have to travel submerged from the reactor to storage ponds, with the water acting as both coolant and radiation shield. And in most power reactors, the rods are welded together into long assemblies that can be lifted only by crane. True, after the rods cool down they can be stored dry, but their radioactivity is still lethal. To prevent spent fuel rods from killing the people who come near them, they are transported in giant radiation-shielding casks that are not supposed to break open even in head-on collisions. The casks are also guarded. If terrorists managed to hijack one from a country that had reactors they would still have to take it to a plant in another country that could extract the plutonium from the rods. They would be hunted at every step of the way. Instead of fuel rods, they would be better advised to go after pure plutonium, already removed from the reactor fuel and infinitely easier to handle. This kind of plutonium is a threat only if you ingest or inhale it. Human skin blocks its radiation: a terrorist could walk around with a lump of it in his front trouser pocket and still have children. But where to get hold of it? Russia is the best bet: it has tons of plutonium in weapon-ready form, and the Russian nuclear-accounting system is weak. Russia also has underpaid scientists, and there is unquestionably some truth behind all the stories one hears about the smuggling that goes on in that country. But very little Russian plutonium has been in circulation, with not a single reported case of anything more than gram quantities showing up on the black market. This makes sense. Pure plutonium is used primarily for making nuclear warheads, it is in military hands, and military forces are not exactly keen to see it come back at them in somebody else's bombs. One source of pure plutonium that is not military is a new kind of reactor fuel called "mixed oxide." It is very different from the present generation of fuel because it contains weapon-ready material. But precisely because it is weapon-ready, it is guarded and accounted for, and a terrorist group would have to win a gun battle to get close to it. Then they would probably need a crane to move it, and would have to elude or fight off their pursuers. If terrorists did procure some weapon-ready plutonium, would their problems be over? Far from it: plutonium works only in an "implosion"-type bomb,

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which is about ten times more difficult to build than the simple uranium bomb used at Hiroshima. In such a device, a spherical shock wave "implodes" inward and squeezes a ball of plutonium at the bomb's center so that it explodes in a chain reaction. To accomplish all this, one needs precision machine tools to build the parts, special furnaces to melt and cast the plutonium in a vacuum (liquid plutonium oxidizes rapidly in air), and high-precision switches and capacitors for the firing circuit. Also required are a qualified designer, a number of other specialists, and a testing program. Considering who the participating scientists are likely to be, the chances of getting an implosion bomb to work are rather small. THE ALTERNATIVE to plutonium is bomb-grade uranium--and here things would be easier. This is the fuel used in the Hiroshima bomb. Unlike the implosion bomb dropped on Nagasaki, this one did not have to be tested: the U.S. knew it would work. The South Africans built six uranium bombs without testing; they knew their bombs would work, too. All these devices used a simple "gun" design in which one slug of uranium was shot down a barrel into another. The problem with buying bomb-grade uranium is that one would need a great deal of it--around 120 pounds for a gun-type bomb--and nothing near that amount has turned up in the black market.

The probability of your impacts is one in three billion

Choong 9 (William, Senior Writer at The Straits Times, Lexis, AD: 7/7/10) jl

This leaves the second route: terrorists building a nuclear device themselves. And arguably, nuclear terrorists can find do-it-yourself instructions for a nuclear weapon, albeit crude ones, on the Internet.

Having the blueprint for a weapon, however, does not guarantee the production of that weapon. In the estimation of Professor John Mueller, a political scientist at Ohio University, terrorists will have to successfully navigate about 20 steps to build an improvised nuclear device - and all the steps must be achieved. These include processes centred on producing, transporting and detonating the device.

If the terrorist group has a 50 per cent chance of success for each step, the odds of the group pulling off all the steps would be one in a million. If each step involves a 33 per cent chance of success, the odds of pulling off all of them would drop to one in over three billion, Prof Mueller says in an e-mail in reply to questions by this newspaper.

Terrorism Frontline – AT: Heg Impact

No counterbalancing

Liber 5 (Robert, Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown University, *The American Era: Power and Strategy for the 21st* Century, p. 15) jl

Indeed, real balancing against the United States has yet to occur. Opposition at the United Nations, diplomatic wrangles, and public disagreements are in no way comparable to traditional power balanc­ing in the form of arms races or the creation of competing alliances. European governments are by no means agreed in seeking to coun­terbalance the United States. Elsewhere, the United States actually received considerable, mostly unpublicized, cooperation from a num­ber of Iraq’s Arab neighbors, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the Gulf states, and Washington finds its interactions with many other regional powers to be at least satisfactory and often quite good. Russia under Putin has not followed a policy of confrontation. Rela­tions with India are in better shape than they have been for half a century and since 9/11 China, Japan, Indonesia, and Vietnam have conspicuously improved their ties with the United States.In essence, much of the conventional wisdom about contempo­rary foreign policy falls short because it fails to take sufficiently into account the profound implications of the post-9/11 world. A few authors have assimilated those lessons, but others — in part because of the overheated political atmosphere — have not. It is essential to think clearly and without illusions about not only the nature of American power, but also the capabilities and limits of other countries and insti­tutions in the face of the unique perils that now exist. The remainder of this chapter thus examines both the extent of U.S. power and its limits in achieving desired political outcomes, and then goes on to consider the most important competing views about America’s inter­national role and to indicate why they ultimately do not provide ade­quate guidelines for dealing with the world in which we now live.

Hegemony doesn’t deter conflict

Gholz, Press and Sapolsky 97 (Eugene, Daryl – doctoral candidates in the Department of Political Science at MIT, Harvey – Professor of Public Policy and Organization in Political Science at MIT, and Director of MIT defense studies program, International Security vol 21, no 4, spring, pg 30) jl

Several prominent analysts favor a policy of selective engagement.70 These analysts fear that American military retrenchment would increase the risk of great power war. A great power war today would be a calamity, even for those countries that manage to stay out of the fighting. The best way to prevent great power war, according to these analysts, is to remain engaged in Europe and East Asia. Twice in this century the United States has pulled out of Europe, and both times great power war followed. Then America chose to stay engaged, and the longest period of European great power peace ensued. In sum, selective engagers point to the costs of others' great power wars and the relative ease of preventing them. The selective engagers' strategy is wrong for two reasons. First, selective engagers overstate the effect of U.S. military presence as a positive force for great power peace. In today's world, disengagement will not cause great power war, and continued engagement will not reliably prevent it. In some circumstances, engagement may actually increase the likelihood of conflict. Second, selective engagers overstate the costs of distant wars and seriously understate the costs and risks of their strategies. Overseas deployments require a large force structure. Even worse, selective engagement will ensure that when a future great power war erupts, the United States will be in the thick of things. Although distant great power wars are bad for America, the only sure path to ruin is to step in the middle of a faraway fight. Selective engagers overstate America's effect on the likelihood of future great power wars. There is little reason to believe that withdrawal from Europe or Asia would lead to deterrence failures. With or without a forward U.S. presence, America's major allies have sufficient military strength to deter any potential aggressors. Conflict is far more likely to erupt from a sequence described in the spiral model. The danger of spirals leading to war in East Asia is remote. Spirals happen when states, seeking security, frighten their neighbors. The risk of spirals is great when offense is easier than defense, because any country's attempt to achieve security will give it an offensive capability against its neighbors. The neighbors' attempts to eliminate the vulnerability give them fleeting offensive capabilities and tempt them to launch preventive war.71 But Asia, as discussed earlier, is blessed with inherent defensive advantages. Japan and Taiwan are islands, which makes them very difficult to invade. China has a long land border with Russia, but enjoys the protection of the East China Sea, which stands between it and Japan. The expanse of Siberia gives Russia, its ever trusted ally, strategic depth. South Korea benefits from mountainous terrain which would channel an attacking force from the north. Offense is difficult in East Asia, so spirals should not be acute. In fact, no other region in which great powers interact offers more defensive advantage than East Asia.

AT: ME Instability Impact – Defense

Spill over is empirically denied

Cook, Takeyh and Maloney 7 (Steven A, Ray, and Suzanne – Fellows at Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/06/28/opinion/edtakeyh.php, AD: 7/7/10) jl

Finally, there is no precedent for Arab leaders to commit forces to conflicts in which they are not directly involved. The Iraqis and the Saudis did send small contingents to fight the Israelis in 1948 and 1967, but they were either ineffective or never made it. In the 1970s and 1980s, Arab countries other than Syria, which had a compelling interest in establishing its hegemony over Lebanon, never committed forces either to protect the Lebanese from the Israelis or from other Lebanese. The civil war in Lebanon was regarded as someone else's fight. Indeed, this is the way many leaders view the current situation in Iraq. To Cairo, Amman and Riyadh, the situation in Iraq is worrisome, but in the end it is an Iraqi and American fight.

Escalation is impossible—weak armies

Yglesias 7 (Matthew, The Atlantic, http://matthewyglesias.theatlantic.com/archives/2007/09/containing\_iraq.php, AD: 7/7/10) jl

Kevin Drum tries to throw some water on the "Middle East in Flames" theory holding that American withdrawal from Iraq will lead not only to a short-term intensification of fighting in Iraq, but also to some kind of broader regional conflagration. Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay, as usual sensible but several clicks to my right, also make this point briefly in Democracy: "Talk that Iraq’s troubles will trigger a regional war is overblown; none of the half-dozen civil wars the Middle East has witnessed over the past half-century led to a regional conflagration." Also worth mentioning in this context is the basic point that the Iranian and Syrian militaries just aren't able to conduct meaningful offensive military operations. The Saudi, Kuwait, and Jordanian militaries are even worse. The IDF has plenty of Arabs to fight closer to home. What you're looking at, realistically, is that our allies in Kurdistan might provide safe harbor to PKK guerillas, thus prompting our allies in Turkey to mount some cross-border military strikes against the PKK or possibly retaliatory ones against other Kurdish targets. This is a real problem, but it's obviously not a problem that's mitigated by having the US Army try to act as the Baghdad Police Department or sending US Marines to wander around the desert hunting a possibly mythical terrorist organization.

No regional escalation—empirically denied

Drum 7 (Kevin, Washington Monthly Writer, http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/archives/individual/2007\_09/012029.php, AD: 7/7/10) jl

Having admitted, however, that the odds of a military success in Iraq are almost impossibly long, Chaos Hawks nonetheless insist that the U.S. military needs to stay in Iraq for the foreseeable future. Why? Because if we leave the entire Middle East will become a bloodbath. Sunni and Shiite will engage in mutual genocide, oil fields will go up in flames, fundamentalist parties will take over, and al-Qaeda will have a safe haven bigger than the entire continent of Europe. Needless to say, this is nonsense. Israel has fought war after war in the Middle East. Result: no regional conflagration. Iran and Iraq fought one of the bloodiest wars of the second half the 20th century. Result: no regional conflagration. The Soviets fought in Afghanistan and then withdrew. No regional conflagration. The U.S. fought the Gulf War and then left. No regional conflagration. Algeria fought an internal civil war for a decade. No regional conflagration.

AT: ME Instability Impact – Offense

Middle East war would cut off Iranian oil from China, which would set back their global power projection for years

Cetron and Davies 7  (president of Forecasting International Ltd, Owen, former senior editor at Omni magazine and a freelance writer specializing in science, technology, and the future 2007, The Futurist, <http://www.versaterm.com/about_vtm/advisory/53TrendsNowShapingTheFuture.pdf>) KLS

**China** is well supplied with oil from Africa, which it has on long-term contracts. However, it **is even more dependent on Iranian oi**l, which it would be unlikely to receive. **This deficit would lead Beijing to develop its own oil shale, but its reserves are modest. Its hope of supplying its energy needs will continue to depend on the massive development of biomass, a process that is planned but has hardly begun. China is likely to find its economic growth, and its global power, reduced for many years.**

That prevents large-scale US-China war

Mearsheimer 5  (John J. distinguished service professor of political science at the University of Chicago http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=16538) KLS

China cannot rise peacefully, and if it continues its dramatic economic growth over the next few decades, the United State and China are likely to engage in an intense security competition with considerable potential for war. Most of China’s neighbors, including India, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Russia, and Vietnam will likely join the united state to contain China’s power.

Extinction

Straits Times, 00 [“Regional Fallout: No one gains in war over Taiwan,” Jun 25, LN]

THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -- horror of horrors -- raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -- truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation. There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else.