# NEGATIVE

## Economy

### 1nc – Economy

#### 1. Doesn’t help the industry – other factors overwhelm

Ferguson,et al. 11 (John, Abdul Qadar Kara , Karla Hoffman , Lance Sherry- George Mason University, Center for Air Transportation Research “ Estimating domestic US airline cost of delay based on European model” [http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0968090X11001471 Accessed 6/26/12](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0968090X11001471%20Accessed%206/26/12)) KT

Further exploring their cost factors reveals the following costs involved: Fuel cost: The report provides different fuel burn rates for each aircraft type studied and for all segments of the flights. The prices for all cost scenarios and conversion rates from Euro to Dollars are also provided (see Appendix J of the report in Cook et al. (2004)). Extra crew cost: The report defines extra crew cost as the extra cost paid in addition to the usual flight and cabin crew salaries and expenses. It may include employing additional crew (both flight and cabin crew) or incurring additional pay for regular crews due to unexpected increases in hours worked. The report does not specify exactly the methodologies used to obtain the crew cost component of the delay cost factor in order to preserve confidentiality of airline data. However, the report describes under what circumstances the cost factors will be increased. Maintenance cost: The maintenance cost is defined to be the cost of maintaining both the airframe and power plant of the aircraft. The additional maintenance cost incurred is stated in the report as approximately 15% of the Block Hour Direct Operating Cost (BHDOC). The proportions of how maintenance cost is divided into different segments of the flights are given in Annex J of Cook et al. (2004). BHDOC’s are given in the report for low, base and high cost scenarios for the 12 different aircraft systems studied (see Tables 2–11 in Cook et al. (2004)). Passenger delay cost: Passenger delay cost (or PAX delay cost) is defined as the compensation paid by the airlines to passengers who have experienced delayed flights. Passenger delay (in cost per passenger per minute) is given as: zero for low and base cost scenarios, 0.05 for the high cost scenario for 15 min of delay and € 0.32, € 0.40 and € 0.48 for low, base and high cost scenarios respectively for 65 min delay. The load factors assumed are: 50% for low, 70% for base and 90% for high cost scenarios. Other costs: This factor is a catch-all component that attempts to include any other cost factors. Includes depreciation, rental and lease costs and airport charges. No specific cost factors were given in the report, except details for different Airport charges at different EU airports (see Annex L in Cook et al. (2004)). Based on the analysis done, the EC report provides cost of delay factors (in Euros). The delay is divided into three segments of the flight; delay on the ground at the gate (Table 2), delay while taxiing at either airport (Table 3) or delay while airborne (en-route and holding, Table 4). These segments were chosen for discussion because they reflect the fidelity of publically available data.

#### 2. NextGen will just result in extra flights – swamps the benefits

SCHANK 12 ( JOSHUA L.- President & CEO of the Eno Center for Transportation. “Next Generation Air Traffic Control: Looking at the Big Picture” http://www.enotrans.org/eno-brief/next-generation-air-traffic-control-looking-at-the-big-picture Accessed 6/23/12) KT

Airport Congestion The prolonged economic downturn has put this issue on the backburner temporarily, but it will be back with a vengeance when the economy begins to grow quickly. While most airport delays are related to weather, many are also due to the fact that often the number of aircraft seeking to takeoff or land at a given airport at a given time can exceed the capacity at an airport. If bad weather hits at one of these times, and at a crucial hub airport such as Chicago O’Hare or Atlanta Hartsfield, the entire system can be crippled very quickly. In theory, NextGen should help alleviate some of this congestion. Improved ATC technology can increase the effective capacity of the aviation system by reducing separations between aircraft allowing a greater number of planes to land safely in the same period of time. However, the extent to which such improvements actually reduce congestion will depend in large part on policy. Congestion is a tricky thing – providing more capacity does not necessarily reduce delay if there is latent demand. If aircraft operators choose to take advantage of the new capacity by flying more frequent flights – and airlines in particular are prone to do this because frequency and market share are directly related – some of these congestion savings could be negated. We have no comprehensive national policy in place to effectively reduce airport congestion, and many congested airports have struggled in their attempts to add runways or smooth out demand. One way that we could potentially improve the policy and take advantage of the NextGen benefits would be to provide federal incentives for airports that price their runways in an innovative way that reduces delay. Even better would be if the federal government provided funding for multimodal intercity planning that could coordinate across all intercity modes to deliver greater throughput for passengers into congested regions. There may be other ideas out there as well, and it is essential we begin considering them now, not after NextGen is a reality, so that we can tailor NextGen appropriately to support various policy scenarios.

#### 3. NextGen implementation is too slow

Halsey 12 – Halsey, Ashley (Transportation Writer for the Washington Post) "New Guidance System for Skies Could Face Delays." WashingtonPost.com. 04 July 2011. Web. 01 Mar. 2012. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/antidote-to-air-gridlock-is-complex- undertaking/2011/06/30/AG9bdnwH\_story\_4.html>.

The very business of getting aloft — the time that passengers know as the minutes between the “buckle your seat belts” order and “you are free to move about the cabin” — is an intricate choreography between controllers and the cockpit. “Two seventy on the heading, Southwest 658 going to departure,” the pilot says just after liftoff from Dulles, repeating the compass direction given by the Dulles tower. Then he tells a controller based in Warrenton that he’s climbing. “Potomac departure, Southwest 658, passing [1,800 feet] for 3,000, heading 270,” he radios. The new controller tells him to keep climbing to 5,000 feet and maintain that altitude. That keeps him 1,000 feet below flights heading to land at Dulles. When the plane reaches a waypoint known as “Blues,” a new controller takes over and orders Flight 658 to 12,000 feet. When Flight 658 reaches another waypoint, over Linden, Va., the pilot is told to head for 17,000 feet. Then he is handed over to a new controller, on a different radio frequency, who takes the flight to 27,000 feet before handing over to yet another controller who ultimately guides the plane to its 40,000-foot cruising altitude. Now, “you are free to move about the cabin.” If all that sounds complicated and open to human error, one goal of NextGen is to replace almost all of it with new technology, much of it in the cockpit. Can the FAA deliver? NextGen has virtually no credible enemies — not in the administration, not on Capitol Hill and not in the airline industry. But the seemingly simple concept is layered like an onion with complexities. In addition to demanding an enormous investment, there is a confluence of history and technology that creates a hurdle to progress. Airlines fear that the FAA will not meet its timetable for creation of the network of ground-based stations and satellite links that will make it all work. “The FAA’s track record on deployment hasn’t been good,” said Russ Chew, a former airline executive and former FAA chief operating officer. “The FAA could be perfect in meeting NextGen deadlines, but [private investors] are looking at past history.” Michael P. Huerta, the FAA deputy administrator who was given charge of NextGen after an internal shake-up this year, said he is well aware of that. “How can they be sure that FAA will deliver on its commitments? That’s a fair question,” Huerta said As for evidence of the rapid pace of technological advancement, one need look no further than GPS. The technology is advancing so quickly that some car buyers opt against the factory-installed unit for fear that it will be outdated in a year or two. Airlines have the same issue. “If I go first, I’ll have to bear the cost of updating the software, and when [NextGen is] turned on, I’ll have the oldest, most obsolete systems out there,” Chew said. In addition, the FAA must clear through a jungle of procedures and retrain 15,475 air traffic controllers to deal with a system that will entirely replace the old one. “A lot of the tough stuff is new procedures, is human-machine interface and human factors, moving from an air traffic control mind frame to an air traffic management mind frame” that puts greater responsibility in the hands of pilots, said Bobby Sturgell, former acting FAA administrator. Congress has tossed more uncertainty into the mix by extending the current FAA funding plan 20 times rather than approving a comprehensive long-term spending plan that imposes strict NextGen deadlines on the agency. “NextGen is threatened,” Chew said. “Everyone knows it. The FAA budget is under pressure. Even they will say that NextGen is on track, but it’s not.” JetBlue, with $4.2 million in federal funding help, and Southwest Airlines, with federal incentives, have installed some of the technology, but other airlines are reluctant to move ahead. “Absolutely I’m concerned about the schedule,” said Gary Kelly, chief executive of Southwest, which has spent $94 million on NextGen. “I’m concerned that we don’t have metrics in place to measure the progress. Any investment, any project, has to be evaluated based upon the risk of the return, and I’m not going to argue with you, this is a very high risk-return, because we’re not in control of the benefits.”

### Ext 1 – other factors overwhelm

#### Only demand management solves. NextGen creates new capacity that will be quickly filled.

Barkowski 10 (Justin T., J.D. Candidate – Pepperdine University, B.A. in Economics – University of California, Berkeley and Instrument-Rated Private Pilot Certificate, “Managing Air Traffic Congestion Through the Next Generation Air Transportation System: Satellite-Based Technology, Trajectories, and - Privatization?”, Pepperdine Law Review, 37 Pepp. L. Rev. 247, Lexis)

D. Unresolved Demand-Management Policies

With or without an ATC commercialization debate, the airlines and the new Secretary of Transportation, Ray LaHood, strongly believe that NextGen is the key to solving congestion. 223 One author even argues that "airside capacity shortages and suboptimal usage/management of airspace" is the underlying cause of air traffic congestion. 224 While these concerns undoubtedly need to be addressed through NextGen, there is a severe problem when airspace capacity increases but corresponding airport resources and infrastructure do not. This will be the case in high-density areas where any room for expansion is nearly impossible. 225 Even the JPDO is skeptical that NextGen is a "cure-for-all," stating that where "airport infrastructure [development] cannot be accomplished using existing resources," the airports will have to implement "market-based mechanisms such as peak period pricing to ease congestion" in times of high demand. 226

Merely increasing the availability of landing and takeoffs at a high-density airport may not have the desired cure-for-all effect that industry participants might expect. For example, in 2004 American and United Airlines agreed with the FAA to voluntarily reduce the number of scheduled flights out of Chicago O'Hare by 12.5% in order to help fight congestion. 227 In effect, this increased the number of potential flights out of that airport during the agreed upon times through its voluntary reduction, just as NextGen [\*296] would do. However, the opening up of more space simply resulted in other airlines adding "flights while the hub carriers cut their schedules," providing no relief to the airport congestion problem. 228 NextGen essentially creates this increased capacity without any supplemental FAA policies to address how this extra space in the system will be allocated to air carriers that are continuously demanding more flights than the system can handle. 229 To prevent air traffic congestion from resulting after the implementation of NextGen, like it had in Chicago, effective demand-management policies are therefore critically in need. Given the historical struggles, 230 this may be difficult to accomplish.

#### Alt cause --- lack of runways and controllers

Williams 9 (Genevra, J.D. Candidate – Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law and B.B.A. –University of Iowa, “GPS For The Sky: A Survey of Automatic Dependent Surveillance-(ADS-B) and its Implementation in the United States”, Journal of Air Law and Commerce, Spring, 74 J. Air L. & Com. 473, Lexis)

The U.S. aviation infrastructure faces many challenges if it is going to accommodate this expansion in air traffic. For example, there is a shortage in the number of runways from which all of these planes must take off and land. 44 While an in-depth analysis of the airport capacity problems relating to takeoff and landing are outside the scope of this paper, it is worth noting that runway and airport expansion is a special kind of problem. Long takeoff and landing delays, often suffered in the cramped quarters of a plane on the tarmac or circling over an airport, are infuriating to passengers, yet no one wants an already noisy airport further crowding into their neighborhood. 45

Another problem is the profound shortage of qualified air traffic controllers. 46 Over the next ten years, the bulk of today's air traffic controllers must be replaced. 47 The majority of today's controllers were hired in the 1980s after President Reagan fired 10,000 striking controllers, 48 and now they are all approaching the mandatory retirement age of fifty-six years. 49 The FAA has been scrambling to retain experienced air traffic controllers who have not yet hit retirement age by offering six-figure salaries in some locations, and relocation bonuses of up to [\*479] $ 75,000. 50 The shortage is compounded by a protracted labor dispute between the National Air Traffic Controllers Association and the FAA that contributes to serious worker dissatisfaction. 51 Of the 1,876 controllers who retired between 2005 and 2008, only thirty-seven did so because they reached mandatory retirement age. 52 "The attrition rate was 23 percent higher than projected, and even the FAA acknowledges some of that is because of the labor dispute." 53

### Economy Defense

#### Economic declines don’t cause conflict

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[Thomas P.M, “The New Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis,” Aprodex, Asset Protection Index, 8/25/9, <http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules--security-remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspx>]

When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scary predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how globalization's first truly worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever on the international security landscape.

None of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the global recession. Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions.

Looking over the various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global economic trends.

And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn, occasionally pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces.

#### History disproves the link between the economy and conflict

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[Niall Ferguson, “The War of the World”, Penguin Books, pg. xxxviii]

Nor can economic crises explain all the violent upheavals of the century. As noted already, perhaps the most familiar causal chain in modern historiography leads from the Great Depression to the rise of fascism and the outbreak of war. Yet on closer inspection this pleasing story falls apart. Not all the countries affected by the Great Depression became fascist regimes; nor did all the fascist regimes engage in wars of aggression. Nazi Germany started the war in Europe, but only after its economy had recovered from the Depression. The Soviet Union, which started the war on Hitler’s side, was cut off from the world economic crisis, yet ended up mobilizing and losing more soldiers than any other combatant. For the century as a whole, no general rule is discernible. Some wars came after periods of growth; others were the causes rather than the consequence of economic crisis. And some severe economic crisis did not lead to wars. Certainly, it is now impossible to argue (thought Marxists long tried to) that the First World War was the result of a crisis of capitalism; on the contrary, it abruptly terminated a period of extraordinary global economic integration with relatively high growth and low inflation.

### Hegemony Defense

#### US leadership doesn’t solve war.

CONRY 97 (Barbara, Foreign Policy Analyst – Cato, Policy Analysis No. 267, 2-5, “U.S. ‘Global Leadership’: A Euphemism for World Policeman,” <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-267.html>)

Other proponents of U.S. political and military leadership do not point to particular benefits; instead, they warn of near-certain disaster if the United States relinquishes its leadership role. Christopher paints a bleak picture: Just consider what the world would be like without American leadership in the last two years alone. We would have four nuclear states in the former Soviet Union, instead of one, with Russian missiles still targeted at our homes. We would have a full-throttled nuclear program in North Korea; no GATT agreement and no NAFTA; brutal dictators still terrorizing Haiti; very likely, Iraqi troops back in Kuwait; and an unresolved Mexican economic crisis, which would threaten stability at our border. [55] Gingrich has pronounced a future without American leadership "a big mess." [56]And former British prime minister Margaret Thatcher has warned, What we are possibly looking at in 2095 [absent U.S. leadership] is an unstable world in which there are more than half a dozen "great powers," each with its own clients, all vulnerable if they stand alone, all capable of increasing their power and influence if they form the right kind of alliance, and all engaged willy-nilly in perpetual diplomatic maneuvers to ensure that their relative positions improve rather than deteriorate. In other words, 2095 might look like 1914 played on a somewhat larger stage. [57] In other words, if America abdicates its role as world leader, we are condemned to repeat the biggest mistakes of the 20th century--or perhaps do something even worse. Such thinking is **seriously flawed**, however. First, to assert that U.S. leadership can stave off otherwise inevitable global chaos **vastly overestimates** the power of any single country to influence world events. The United States is powerful, but it still can claim only 5 percent of the world's population and 20 percent of world economic output. Moreover, regardless of the resources Americans might be willing to devote to leading the world, today's problems often **do not lend themselves well to external solutions**. As Maynes has pointed out, Today, the greatest fear of most states is not external aggression but internal disorder. The United States **can do little** about the latter, whereas it used to be able to do a great deal about the former. In other words, the coinage of U.S. power in the world has been devalued by the change in the international agenda. [58] Indeed, many of the foreign policy problems that have confounded Washington since the demise of the Soviet Union are the kinds of problems that are likely to trouble the world well into the next century. "Failed states," such as Somalia, may not be uncommon. But, as the ill-fated U.S. and UN operations in that country showed, there is **very little** that outside powers can do about such problems. External powers usually lack the means to prevent or end civil wars, such as those in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, unless they are willing to make a tremendous effort to do so. Yet those types of internecine conflicts are likely to be one of the primary sources of international disorder for the foreseeable future. Despite the doomsayers who prophesy global chaos in the absence of U.S. leadership, however, Washington's limited ability to dampen such conflicts is not cause for panic. Instability is a **normal feature** of an international system of sovereign states, which the United States can tolerate and has tolerated for more than two centuries. If vital American interests are not at stake, instability itself becomes a serious problem only if the United States blunders into it, as it did in Somalia and Bosnia. [59]

### Aerospace not key to heg

#### Air power isn’t key to heg

**Lundy, 2002**, Research Associate at the Council on Foreign Relations

(Derek, LA Times, 1/13, <http://www.cfr.org/publication.html?id=4291>]

In addition to this uneven track record, there is a strong practical reason why it would be unwise for policymakers to rely exclusively on air power to achieve U.S. objectives overseas— the high level of interdependence among U.S. military forces. With no land or sea support, not only would U.S. airmen be more exposed to enemy air defenses, but our military response to crises would be one-sided, predictable and thus vulnerable to future challenges. Bombs alone shouldn't shape our foreign policy.

### A2 jobs

#### NextGen only makes 17 jobs for every million dollars invested.

NEXA Advisors 2011 (NEXA advisors; April 2011; provides economic, financial, M&A and strategic advisory services to the aerospace, defense and geomatics sectors; <http://www.nextgenfund.com/files/downloads/NEF_Economic_Study.pdf>)

The NextGen Fund will create new sustainable jobs as soon as 2013. These jobs include engineers, software developers, and other high‐tech workers to support the development, installation and life cycle support of the NextGen avionics. Without the NextGen Fund, the industry is likely to delay equipage until much closer to the ADS‐B mandated equipage date of 2020. NEXA Advisors believes that without the Fund the industry will not begin retrofitting older aircraft until 2017, or later. The FAA Office of Aviation Policy, Plans, and the Environment estimated that an infusion of $4 billion in funding for NextGen would generate 77,000 jobs based on the Bureau of Labor Statistics data. NEXA Advisors first used FAA’s methodology contained in the FAA’s annual study on the Economic Impact of Civil Aviation on the U.S. Economy to estimate the number of jobs NextGen will create. Based on this analysis, aircraft equipage is estimated to create 24 jobs, defined as Full‐Time Equivalents (FTE), for every $1 million dollars invested in the year the funds are spent.vi The estimate of equipage includes ADS‐B and Ground‐Based Augmentation System (GBAS). NEXA Advisors also researched job creation across other industries (Figure 5) and found an average of 17 jobs are created per million dollars invested. NEXA Advisors finds it reasonable to assume that new technologies avionics equipage, including SWIM and Data Comm, will have the same ratio of jobs to $1 million dollars invested. NEXA Advisors also assumes that the manufacture of the avionics for surveillance and communications will take place in the U.S. while 20 percent of the installation will take place outside of the U.S. since airlines outsource heavy maintenance to other countries.vii NEXA Advisors further assumes that for NextGen equipage, the job creation is divided between avionics manufacturing and installation/maintenance on the aircraft. Therefore, it is assumed that 90 percent of the jobs created will be in the U.S. Using this formula, the NextGen Fund is projected to create between 23,000 and 32,000 sustainable U.S. jobs from 2013 to 2018.

## Environment

### 1nc – Environment

#### 1. Impacts inevitable – can’t offset rising demand

Sebastian and Piltz 7, Thea Sebastian, Director Climate Science Watch Rick Piltz, Director Climate Science Watch, July 2007, “NextGen Air Transportation System Progress Reports Ignore Climate Change”, <http://www.climatesciencewatch.org/file-uploads/NextGen_final_18jul07.pdf>

Third, NextGen/JPDO makes little commitment to alternative options – besides “improved management increases and marginal increases in fuel efficiency” – for airline companies.26 Aviation is going to be dependent on carbon-based fuels for quite some time, barring a major breakthrough. Accordingly, industry officials argue that climate 23 U.N. holds conference to look at cutting aircraft emissions. Greenwire: May 15, 2007 24 White, Aoife. “EU: Airlines Should Join Carbon-Cap Plan.” Associated Press: June 8, 2007 http://www.forbes.com/feeds/ap/2007/06/08/ap3802324.html 25 White, Aoife. “EU: Airlines Should Join Carbon-Cap Plan.” Associated Press: June 8, 2007 http://www.forbes.com/feeds/ap/2007/06/08/ap3802324.html 26 ibid. 7 change concerns should be deflected to the electric utility, industry, buildings, and automobile sectors, which account for a much larger percentage of current carbon dioxide emissions. There are potential alternatives for the aviation industry. Experiments with alternative fuels – including biodiesel, biokerosene and hydrogen – are currently underway, along with new engine and airframe designs. Breakthroughs would be needed to implement these technologies; however, further research could prove fruitful. There is also some potential for reduced emissions due to improvements in aviation operations, including load factors (reducing the amount of fuel spent per passenger by loading airplanes to capacity), airport and air traffic management improvements (doing more direct flights, as opposed to lay-over flights) and setting high fuel efficiency targets. However, NextGen/JPDO does not appear to have a strategy that would pursue changes designed to offset the projected growth of aviation’s carbon footprint.

#### 2. NextGen increases air traffic

Herbert 12 – Keith Herbert (contributing writer for Newsday, Author) March 31, 2012 “LIers: More study of NextGen air traffic” http://www.newsday.com/long-island/nassau/liers-more-study-of-nextgen-air-traffic-1.3635945

The potential for more frequent noise from Kennedy Airport jets -- a result of the FAA's pathbreaking "Next Generation" air traffic control redesign -- has united residents of Long Island's North and South shores to press for a full environmental impact study of the system's cumulative effects. NextGen, predicted to cost at least $20 billion by 2025, is the Federal Aviation Administration's nationwide plan for satellite navigation of commercial flights, replacing the outmoded ground-based radar system in use since the 1950s. Congress has appropriated $2.8 billion for NextGen since 2007, and the system is in the early stages of development. The satellite navigation system is supposed to increase capacity because planes could fly with 3 miles between them instead of the now-required 5-mile separation. Other NextGen positives, the FAA says, include enhanced safety, because pilots will have precise information about the location of other aircraft aloft; reduced jet noise over a wider swath of Nassau; and energy savings due to jets flying at near-idle throttle, burning less fuel. More capacity should ease flight delays in the metropolitan area, which with three major airports and three regional airports is among the nation's busiest and most congested airspaces, the agency said. Chronic delays at Kennedy and LaGuardia airports often have a domino effect on air traffic, with planes held at the gates of other airports because of the inability to land in New York. But for Nassau residents with homes and businesses beneath Kennedy flight paths, NextGen's precision in setting aircraft departure and arrival paths brings the probability of more frequent jet noise.

#### 3. Can’t Solve the Environment- Airlines still Dependent on Oil. Prefer Alternatives Over the plan.

SCHANK 12 ( JOSHUA L.- President & CEO of the Eno Center for Transportation. “Next Generation Air Traffic Control: Looking at the Big Picture” http://www.enotrans.org/eno-brief/next-generation-air-traffic-control-looking-at-the-big-picture Accessed 6/23/12) KT

Fuel Savings and Environmental Benefits Most of the projected fuel savings and environmental benefits from NextGen would be as a result of congestion reduction, already discussed above. Reduced congestion could leave fewer planes burning fuel on the tarmac or circling airports. But some fuel savings would occur independent of what happens with congestion, because NextGen is likely to make aircraft approaches more efficient. Aircraft currently use a “stepped” descent whereby they descend quickly and then maintain altitude several times. This uses more engine power than a constant descent, which would be possible to do safely under NextGen. While these benefits are certainly real and valuable, they do not confront the ultimate policy problem, which is that the aviation system, and practically speaking the entire transportation system, is almost entirely dependent on oil. This has economic, environmental, and national security implications. The economic ones hit the airline industry hard – when fuel prices go up their thin profit margins can vanish in an instant. The environmental impacts are more acute in the automobile sector, where cars and trucks are responsible for as much of a third of annual greenhouse gas emissions. The national security implications, contrary to popular belief, do not go away simply because we are producing more oil domestically. We are still dependent on oil, and oil is priced as a global commodity, so we still put ourselves at risk by being dependent on a global resource of which a substantial amount is in the hands of hostile nations. To get beyond the direct savings and into this core issue, we need to think well beyond moving aircraft or automobiles more efficiently. We need to move aggressively on alternatives to oil-dependent transportation, and it is not likely to happen by throwing more research money at the problem. The federal government needs to begin providing real incentives for innovations that demonstrate results in this area, and this does not mean simply providing tax breaks for Chevy Volts or Boeing 787s. Instead it means providing grants to states and regions than can demonstrate proposed investments and policy actions that will result in real reductions in fuel consumption through specific actions. For example, in the Northeast and in California this might mean shifting passengers from shuttle flights and passenger cars to trains and buses. In the Pacific Northwest it could involve setting up electric vehicle charging stations at major airports. At major airport hubs it could mean pricing landing fees based in part on aircraft efficiency. These innovations and others can harness the initial benefits from NextGen and increase them by an order of magnitude.

### Ext 1 – can’t solve

#### Air travel causes warming --- flight path management can’t solve

FOE ‘9 (Friends of Earth, 2009 the world's largest grassroots environmental network, “Aviation and global climate change” <http://www.foe.co.uk/resource/reports/aviation_climate_change.pdf> )

Aircraft release more than 600 million tonnes of the world’s major greenhouse gas CO2 into the atmosphere each year. • Aircraft cause about 3.5% of global warming from all human activities. • Aircraft greenhouse emissions will continue to rise and could contribute up to 15% of global warming from all human activities within 50 years. • Nitrogen oxides(NOx) and water vapour have a more significant effect on the climate when emitted at altitude than at ground level. Hence any strategy to reduce aircraft emissions will need to consider other greenhouse gases and not just CO2 alone. • An increase in supersonic aircraft flying could further damage the ozone layer as aircraft emissions of NOx deplete ozone concentrations at high altitudes, where these aircraft would typically fly. • Aircraft vapour trails or contrails, often visible from the ground, can lead to the formation of cirrus clouds. Both contrails and cirrus clouds warm the earth’s surface magnifying the global warming effect of aviation. • The impacts on the global atmosphere from air travel will be concentrated over Europe and the USA where 70-80% of all flights occur. Hence the regional climatic impacts of aircraft emissions over these areas are likely to be greater than predicted by the IPCC report(which used global averages). Most significantly the climate scientists concluded that improvements in aircraft and engine technology and in air traffic management will not offset the projected growth in aircraft emissions. That is, we need to slow the growth in air travel if we want to reduce the growth in aircraft greenhouse gas emissions.

### Ext 2 – rising demand

#### NextGen can’t offset rising demand

Sebastian and Piltz 7 Thea Sebastian, Director Climate Science Watch Rick Piltz, Director Climate Science Watch, July 2007, “NextGen Air Transportation System Progress Reports Ignore Climate Change”, <http://www.climatesciencewatch.org/file-uploads/NextGen_final_18jul07.pdf>

Third, NextGen/JPDO makes little commitment to alternative options – besides “improved management increases and marginal increases in fuel efficiency” – for airline companies.26 Aviation is going to be dependent on carbon-based fuels for quite some time, barring a major breakthrough. Accordingly, industry officials argue that climate 23 U.N. holds conference to look at cutting aircraft emissions. Greenwire: May 15, 2007 24 White, Aoife. “EU: Airlines Should Join Carbon-Cap Plan.” Associated Press: June 8, 2007 http://www.forbes.com/feeds/ap/2007/06/08/ap3802324.html 25 White, Aoife. “EU: Airlines Should Join Carbon-Cap Plan.” Associated Press: June 8, 2007 http://www.forbes.com/feeds/ap/2007/06/08/ap3802324.html 26 ibid. 7 change concerns should be deflected to the electric utility, industry, buildings, and automobile sectors, which account for a much larger percentage of current carbon dioxide emissions. There are potential alternatives for the aviation industry. Experiments with alternative fuels – including biodiesel, biokerosene and hydrogen – are currently underway, along with new engine and airframe designs. Breakthroughs would be needed to implement these technologies; however, further research could prove fruitful. There is also some potential for reduced emissions due to improvements in aviation operations, including load factors (reducing the amount of fuel spent per passenger by loading airplanes to capacity), airport and air traffic management improvements (doing more direct flights, as opposed to lay-over flights) and setting high fuel efficiency targets. However, NextGen/JPDO does not appear to have a strategy that would pursue changes designed to offset the projected growth of aviation’s carbon footprint.

### Warming D – slow & adaptation

#### No impact --- warming will be slow and predictable

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[Patrick J. Michaels, 2003, , 10/16/2003The Washington Times]

Here's what every American needs to know about global warming. Contrary to almost every news report and every staged hearing, including one held by Mr. McCain on Oct. 1, scientists know quite precisely how much the planet will warm in the foreseeable future, a modest three-quarters of a degree (C), plus or minus a mere quarter-degree, according to scientific figures as disparate as this author and NASA scientist James Hansen. The uncertainty is so small, in fact, that publicly crowing this figure is liable to result in a substantial cut in our research funding, which is why the hundreds of other scientists who know this have been so reluctant to disgorge the truth in public. All this has to do with basic physics, which isn't real hard to understand. It has been known since 1872 that as we emit more and more carbon dioxide into our atmosphere, each increment results in less and less warming. In other words, the first changes produce the most warming, and subsequent ones produce a bit less, and so on. But we also assume carbon dioxide continues to go into the atmosphere at an ever-increasing rate. In other words, the increase from year-to-year isn't constant, but itself is increasing. The effect of increasing the rate of carbon dioxide emissions, coupled with the fact that more and more carbon dioxide produces less and less warming compels our climate projections for the future warming to be pretty much a straight line. Translation: Once human beings start to warm the climate, they do so at a constant rate. And yes, it's a sad fact that it took $10 billion of taxpayer money to "prove" something so obvious it can be written in a mere 100 words.

**Adaptation solves the impact**

S. Fred **Singer, 2001**, Prof Emeritus Enviro. Sciences – U. Virginia, July 2001 (<http://www.sepp.org/GWbooklet/GW.html>)

The recommended policy to meet any consequences of growing atmospheric greenhouse gases is to rely on human adaptation to any climate change, coupled with a "no-regrets policy" of energy conservation and increased energy efficiency. ("No-regrets" energy policies are those that make economic sense even if no climate change occurs.) Common sense is the key. Over-conservation can waste energy if it destroys energy-imbedded capital stock that requires new energy expenditures to replace. Adaptation has been the traditional method of meeting climate changes; it has worked over thousands of years for human populations that were not as technologically advanced nor as materially endowed as those at present. The resources saved by not restricting energy use through rationing or taxing can be applied to make human societies more resilient to climate change, whether manmade or natural. After all, any effects from climate change over the next century will be minor compared to societal changes brought about by new technology, rising incomes and population growth.

### Warming D – Sea levels inevitable

#### Sea Level Rise is Inevitable even with Green house mitigation

Chestney 7-1-12 (Nina- Senior Environmental Markets Correspondent in London for Reuters.“Rise in sea level can't be stopped, scientists say” [http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/01/climate-sealevel-idUSL6E8HSIDA20120701 Accessed 7-2-12](http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/01/climate-sealevel-idUSL6E8HSIDA20120701%20Accessed%207-2-12))

LONDON, July 1 (Reuters) - Rising sea levels cannot be stopped over the next several hundred years, even if deep emissions cuts lower global average temperatures, but they can be slowed down, climate scientists said in a study on Sunday. A lot of climate research shows that rising greenhouse gas emissions are responsible for increasing global average surface temperatures by about 0.17 degrees Celsius a decade from 1980-2010 and for a sea level rise of about 2.3mm a year from 2005-2010 as ice caps and glaciers melt. Rising sea levels threaten about a tenth of the world's population who live in low-lying areas and islands which are at risk of flooding, including the Caribbean, Maldives and Asia-Pacific island groups. More than 180 countries are negotiating a new global climate pact which will come into force by 2020 and force all nations to cut emissions to limit warming to below 2 degrees Celsius this century - a level scientists say is the minimum required to avert catastrophic effects. But even if the most ambitious emissions cuts are made, it might not be enough to stop sea levels rising due to the thermal expansion of sea water, said scientists at the United States' National Centre for Atmospheric Research, U.S. research organisation Climate Central and Centre for Australian Weather and Climate Research in Melbourne. "Even with aggressive mitigation measures that limit global warming to less than 2 degrees above pre-industrial values by 2100, and with decreases of global temperature in the 22nd and 23rd centuries ... sea level continues to rise after 2100," they said in the journal Nature Climate Change. This is because as warmer temperatures penetrate deep into the sea, the water warms and expands as the heat mixes through different ocean regions. Even if global average temperatures fall and the surface layer of the sea cools, heat would still be mixed down into the deeper layers of the ocean, causing continued rises in sea levels. If global average temperatures continue to rise, the melting of ice sheets and glaciers would only add to the problem. The scientists calculated that if the deepest emissions cuts were made and global temperatures cooled to 0.83 degrees in 2100 - forecast based on the 1986-2005 average - and 0.55 degrees by 2300, the sea level rise due to thermal expansion would continue to increase - from 14.2cm in 2100 to 24.2cm in 2300. If the weakest emissions cuts were made, temperatures could rise to 3.91 degrees Celsius in 2100 and the sea level rise could increase to 32.3cm, increasing to 139.4cm by 2300. "Though sea-level rise cannot be stopped for at least the next several hundred years, with aggressive mitigation it can be slowed down, and this would buy time for adaptation measures to be adopted," the scientists added. The study is available at www.nature.com/nclimate (Reporting by Nina Chestney; Editing by Pravin Char)

## Solvency

### 1nc – Solvency

#### 1. NextGen alone cannot solve- Needs Training and Workforce Development

SCHANK 12 ( JOSHUA L.- President & CEO of the Eno Center for Transportation. “Next Generation Air Traffic Control: Looking at the Big Picture” http://www.enotrans.org/eno-brief/next-generation-air-traffic-control-looking-at-the-big-picture Accessed 6/23/12) KT

Safety We already enjoy the benefits of an incredibly safe air transportation system. Nonetheless, NextGen may still provide some improvements, particularly with respect to General Aviation (GA) aircraft. Giving pilots a better understanding of where they are in the airspace with respect to other aircraft has clear value for reducing total casualties. However, these safety improvements will only matter insofar as they are accompanied by effective training and workforce development. According to the National Transportation Safety Board, pilot error, not ATC technology, is the cause of most aircraft accidents. With accident rates at such a low level, improvements in ATC are going to have a negligible impact unless they are accompanied by appropriate training that enables pilots and controllers to maximize the benefits of the technology. The workforce development problem is even more serious. We face serious challenges in bringing new talent to the aviation industry for several reasons. One is the decline in pay – as pilot salaries and benefits have been cut there is less glamour and financial reward associated with the profession. New airline pilots in particular face low salaries along with a lifestyle that keeps them away from home for long periods of time. A second problem is that the military was once a pipeline for developing and training pilots, but the increased use of drones may be cutting into that substantially. As drones become more prevalent this problem may increase. Without a policy to combat this workforce development problem, we may find ourselves with a less qualified crop of pilots and air traffic controllers, which could ultimately impact safety. Or we may simply face a shortage, which will substantially increase costs for the industry. Either way, the implementation of NextGen should be accompanied by a plan for improving workforce development. This may take the form of a specific policy initiative, or it may not, but it is imperative to consider it when thinking about NextGen.

#### 2. Industry exaggerates the benefits

SCHANK 12 ( JOSHUA L.- President & CEO of the Eno Center for Transportation. “Next Generation Air Traffic Control: Looking at the Big Picture” http://www.enotrans.org/eno-brief/next-generation-air-traffic-control-looking-at-the-big-picture Accessed 6/23/12) KT

The upgrading of our nation’s air traffic control (ATC) system – often referred to as NextGen – is a great example of how technology and policy can be thoroughly intertwined. A technology upgrade would seem to be relatively straightforward, but it turns out to be incredibly complicated, especially when policy is involved. The obvious policy problems are who is going to pay and who is going to benefit. NextGen is further complicated by the various public and private sector roles and the fact that almost all parties need to make substantial investments and don’t want to be left out in the cold by going first and finding that others (particularly the FAA) do not follow. There is also concern on the part of some stakeholders that they could wind up paying for a disproportionate share of the costs relative to the benefits they could potentially accrue. Eno is releasing a paper Wednesday, April 4, on NextGen, and convening a larger working group later this year to address some of these issues. One issue that frequently occurs when technology and policy collide, but is often overlooked, is the tendency to assume benefits based on the capabilities of the technology rather than the likely real world impacts of the policy on business practices. This is likely to happen because we look at the issue as a technology upgrade, and therefore assume the benefits on that basis. But technology is merely one component of the changes to be brought by NextGen, or any similar upgrade to a transportation network, and it is the policy that in the end determines the extent of the benefits from that upgrade.

### Ext 1 – not enough

#### Won’t solve – congress can’t change to keep up – reform is a pre-requisite

BARKOWSKI 10 J.D. Candidate, Pepperdine University, 2010; B.A. in Economics, University of California, Berkeley, 2007; Instrument-Rated Private Pilot Certificate [Justin T. Barkowski, Comment: Managing Air Traffic Congestion Through the Next Generation Air Transportation System: Satellite-Based Technology, Trajectories, and - Privatization?, Pepperdine Law Review, 37 Pepp. L. Rev. 247]

VI. Conclusion

The nation's air transportation system is nearing insolvency, and with air traffic expected to double or triple in the next fifteen years, the government's attempts to create a more efficient system will have increasing impact. The FAA and local governments' bifurcated approaches in managing airport congestion and fueling competition in the aviation industry have had minimal effect. Congress's ambitious efforts to assist through the implementation of NextGen will promulgate much-needed capacity in many of the nation's airports. However, the FAA's liability-escape maneuvers - throwing the "discretionary function" flag - do not maximize the potential [\*335] safety and flexibility needed throughout the airspace system. Without accountability reform within the FAA and ATO, the revolutionary system will fall behind immediately after it clears the starting gates.

Even with the proper adjustments to NextGen, a system with the cost of nearly twenty billion dollars in the end still misses the mark in dealing with the core problem: congestion at high-density airports. If the current airport policies are not addressed, the multi-billion dollar taxpayer investment will fail to solve those costly and irritating flight delays. As the social costs proliferate from misallocating valuable airport facilities, a relatively unknown and underutilized privatization pilot program becomes more appealing - and against much opposition, necessary.

## Privatization CP

### Privatize 1nc

#### The United States federal government should commercialize the Air Traffic Control system by allowing airlines and individual entities to own and operate systems.

#### That solves - Privatizing Air Traffic Control would solve all of the benefits of NextGen while avoiding funding, inefficiency, and political hurdles

POOLE 10 Director of Transportation policy at Reason Foundation, MIT-trained engineer, has advised four presidential administrations on transportation policy issues. [Robert W. Poole Jr. & Chris Edwards, A Brief History of Federal Funding Privatizing Airports The Crisis in Air Traffic Control Commercializing Air Traffic Control, http://www.downsizinggovernment.org/transportation/airports-atc]

The Crisis in Air Traffic Control

Many aviation experts predict serious trouble in coming years as air travel demand grows faster than the ability of the U.S. air traffic control system to expand capacity.22 In the 2003 reauthorization of the FAA, Congress acknowledged the seriousness of the problem by creating the Joint Planning and Development Office to coordinate the transition to a Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen). NextGen will be a major redesign of the ATC infrastructure, as described by the Congressional Budget Office

The new system is designed to accommodate up to three times the volume of current air traffic by making more efficient use of both the national airspace and airport facilities. The new air traffic control system would be more decentralized than the one currently in place in the United States. Guidance systems on planes would work in conjunction with satellites of the Global Positioning System (GPS) to supplement direct supervision by ground-based controllers and radar stations. As a result, each plane would depend less on instructions from an air traffic controller and more on its own resources for maintaining a safe flight pattern and would be better able to adjust to the particular air traffic conditions in its vicinity.23

The JPDO has estimated that not expanding the ATC system's capacity will be costing the U.S. economy $40 billion per year by 2020 because the overburdened system will force significant rationing of flights. That rationing would increase prices and eliminate some trips entirely. To avoid this crisis, JPDO has called for restructuring the ATC system to safely and efficiently handle the heavier demand.

One problem is the mismatch between the growth in air traffic and the projected growth in FAA revenue. The FAA will need about $1 billion more per year over the next 20 years just to implement NextGen. In 2007 the FAA proposed a user-fee-based funding reform that could provide a more efficient and growing revenue source. The idea was to make each air transportation user's burden on the ATC system more closely match that entity's cost for using the system. That approach has thus far been ignored by Congress.

However, the challenge ahead for the ATC system is more complex than just financial. NextGen will be a major paradigm shift—from 20th-century (manual) air traffic control to 21st-century (semi-automated) air traffic management—and it will be more complex and riskier than any other challenge the FAA has previously attempted. Given the FAA's management and cost overrun problems in the past, simply fixing the funding problem for the ATC system without dramatically reforming its governance poses risks of larger and more dramatic failures and greater congestion down the road.

Here are three key problems with the current government-owned and operated system of air traffic control:

Inflexible Funding. Government funding sources tend to be static and subject to political considerations, and they are decoupled from changing market demands. Changes in aviation over the past decade have hurt the FAA's funding base. A large part of the FAA budget comes from aviation excise taxes, especially the 7.5 percent tax on airline tickets. As average ticket prices have fallen over time, ATC funding has been squeezed. Payroll costs of the current labor-intensive ATC system consume most of the available budget, leaving less funding for capital investment.

Making the transition to NextGen will require billions of dollars of new investments in advanced technologies. The FAA's capital budget is still focused mostly on patching up the existing system, such as replacing antiquated display consoles. Such investments are needed in the short-term, but won't add very much capacity to the system. But that is nearly all the FAA can afford under the current funding structure.

Some people argue that Congress could solve the funding problem by appropriating a larger amount of general federal revenue for the ATC system. But given the giant federal budget deficit, federal discretionary spending is going to be severely squeezed in coming years. The solution, as discussed below, is to create a commercialized ATC system that can flexibly respond to changing conditions and access private capital markets for investment.

Technology Implementation Risks. The FAA has been attempting to modernize its system, expand capacity, and increase its productivity for decades. But dozens of reports over the years from the Government Accountability Office and the Office of Inspector General in the Department of Transportation have faulted the FAA for poor management of major projects, which are often delayed and over budget.24 The Advanced Automation System, Wide Area Augmentation System, and other major projects have had large cost overruns and been years behind schedule or cancelled, as discussed above.

In 2005 two OIG researchers presented an overview of the FAA's failed efforts over the years to modernization the National Airspace System.25 In reviewing what went wrong, they concluded that FAA modernization efforts had neither reduced costs nor increased productivity:

NAS modernization plans have been consistently subverted by requirements growth, development delays, cost escalations, and inadequate benefits management. All these things were symptomatic of the fact that FAA didn't think it needed to reduce operating costs.26

Many experts are greatly concerned that the FAA's institutional culture is poorly suited to implementing anything as dramatic as NextGen. In 2004, the National Academy of Sciences convened an expert panel to assist the GAO in understanding the cultural and technical factors that have impeded previous ATC modernization efforts. It found that "the key cultural factor impeding modernization has been resistance to change... [which is] characteristic of FAA personnel at all levels" and that "the key technical factor affecting modernization... has been a shortfall in the technical expertise needed to design, develop, or manage complex air traffic systems."2

As a government agency, the FAA is not designed to judge risks, aim at the most efficient investments, manage people to produce results, reward excellence, or punish incompetence. It is therefore not equipped to fundamentally reform the ATC system. Thus, major institutional change is probably a prerequisite for implementing the advanced ATC system the nation needs to meet rising aviation demand.

Political Constraints. A third impediment to ATC reform is political. The redesign of the ATC system foreseen in NextGen could potentially deliver major cost savings and greatly expand ATC capacity. However, realizing those gains would require retirement of large numbers of costly radars and other ground-based navigation aids and the consolidation of ATC facilities. One current proposal would replace 21 en route centers and 171 terminal radar approach control (TRACON) facilities with just 35 air traffic service hubs in a redesign of U.S. airspace.28 Physical control towers located at many smaller airports would gradually be phased out as "virtual tower" functions are built into the new super-hubs.

However, Congress tends to resist consolidating ATC facilities because of concerns about job losses and the like, which is similar to the political resistance to closing post offices and military bases. A major 1982 proposal for consolidating ATC facilities was quietly dropped after it became clear that getting it through Congress would be very difficult. Similarly, Congress came extremely close to forbidding the FAA's recent success in outsourcing its Flight Service Station system, which involved reducing the system from 58 facilities to 20. The prohibition was defeated only by a credible veto threat from the White House. In sum, as long as ATC remains government-owned and controlled, making the needed reforms to improve efficiency and implement NextGen will be very difficult.

Commercializing Air Traffic Control

The way to address all three of these organizational problems is to take the ATC system out of the federal budget process and make it a self-supporting entity, funded directly by its customers. Variants of this commercialization approach have been recommended by a series of federal studies and commissions over the past 15 years.

As part of Vice President Al Gore's efforts at "reinventing government" in the 1990s, for example, the Clinton administration proposed turning the ATC system into a separate, self-funded, nonprofit government corporation within the Department of Transportation. The 1997 National Civil Aviation Review Commission, which was chaired by Norman Mineta, similarly proposed moving toward a self-supporting air traffic control organization.29

Commercialization would entail shifting from aviation-related taxes paid to the U.S. Treasury to fees for ATC services paid directly by customers to a new self-supporting Air Traffic Organization. This change would allow fees to grow in proportion to the growth of flight activity, rather than being tied to a less-stable variable, such as fuel prices or airline ticket prices. Moreover, a predictable revenue stream that was not subject to the federal budget process would provide the basis for the ATO to issue long-term bonds for funding capital investments.

Commercialization would also address the management problems that have plagued the FAA's efforts to modernize. A non-civil-service ATO could attract the best private-sector managers and engineers skilled at implementing complex technology projects. Such an ATO could hire, fire, and compensate its employees as other high-tech businesses do. Private sector managers would have an incentive to ask tough questions about whether new investments offered real value for the money, a process that often doesn't occur at the FAA or in Congress.

In addition, a separate, self-supporting ATO—no longer part of the FAA—would be overseen at arm's length for aviation safety by the remaining FAA. Numerous studies have pointed out that the FAA's air-safety role is compromised when it comes to the ATC system, since that system is operated "in-house" by a different branch of the same FAA. All other players in aviation—pilots, mechanics, aircraft manufacturers, airlines, and so forth—are regulated at arm's length for safety by the FAA. This separation of ATC operations from safety regulation is especially critical given the major changes entailed by shifting to the semi-automated NextGen, where numerous safety versus capacity questions will need to be addressed in a rigorous and transparent manner.

Finally, a self-supporting ATO would address the political obstacles to improving system efficiency, such as making decisions to close facilities. By passing the enabling legislation for ATC reform, Congress would delegate such contentious issues to the customer-oriented ATO organization.

### Foreign Governments have done it

#### Should privatize – lots of foreign examples

POOLE 10 Director of Transportation policy at Reason Foundation, MIT-trained engineer, has advised four presidential administrations on transportation policy issues. [Robert W. Poole Jr. & Chris Edwards, A Brief History of Federal Funding Privatizing Airports The Crisis in Air Traffic Control Commercializing Air Traffic Control, http://www.downsizinggovernment.org/transportation/airports-atc]

Many experts are predicting major problems with U.S. aviation infrastructure in coming years as large demand growth outstrips the capacity of available facilities. In addition to a rising number of airline passengers, the average size of planes has fallen, which increases the number of planes in the sky that the ATC system needs to handle. On the supply side of the aviation equation, the FAA has long had problems with capital funding, high labor costs, and an inability to efficiently implement new technologies. Major changes are needed because the increased air traffic will soon bump up against the limits of the current air traffic control system.

The United States should embrace the types of reforms adopted around the world to privatize airports and commercialize air traffic control services. Investor-owned airports and commercialized ATC companies can better respond to changing market conditions, and they can freely tap debt and equity markets for capital expansion to meet rising demand. Such enterprises also have greater management flexibility to deal with workforce issues and complex technology implementation.

There is vast foreign experience that can be drawn on in pursuing U.S. reforms, such as European airport privatization and Canadian air traffic control commercialization. The next section provides a brief history of federal involvement in airport funding and air traffic control. The subsequent sections describe the global trend toward airport privatization, the brewing crisis in air traffic control, and ways to reform the ATC system.

A Brief History of Federal Fundin

Federal involvement in air traffic control has a long history. The 1926 Air Commerce Act tasked the Department of Commerce with issuing and enforcing air traffic rules, licensing pilots, certifying aircraft, establishing airways, and operating aids for air navigation.2 In the mid-1930s, the federal Bureau of Air Commerce took over the initial air traffic control centers for en route tracking created by the airlines, which complemented the operation of local control towers by municipal authorities. During the 1940s, the federal government began taking over the operation of local control towers, and following World War II all aspects of air traffic control became federal.

Airport development took a different path. In the early years of commercial aviation, some private airports (e.g., Burbank, California) existed alongside those established by state and local governments. Today, virtually all U.S. commercial airports are owned by state and local governments. The federal government's role has been to regulate and subsidize those facilities. Federal financial aid to airports began with work relief programs in the 1930s, and was followed by the Federal Airport Act of 1946, which provided $500 million in airport grants to state and local governments over seven years.

The coming of jet aircraft and the large number of aviation accidents spurred Congress to pass the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, which created the Federal Aviation Administration. The new administration replaced previous federal agencies involved in air traffic control and airport development.

Congress started taxing the commercial aviation industry soon after it was established. It passed an excise tax on gasoline and aviation fuels in 1932 and an excise on airline passenger tickets in 1941. The revenue from these levies went into the federal government's general fund. That changed in 1970 when Congress passed legislation creating an Airport and Airway Trust Fund, which had dedicated streams of revenue to be used for air traffic control and federal aid to airports. Trust Fund revenue sources included ticket taxes on domestic and international flights, taxes on fuels, and various fees

The Airport and Airway Trust Fund currently raises more than $12 billion annually from a 7.5 percent tax on domestic airline tickets, a tax on each segment flown, taxes on gasoline and jet fuel, international departure and arrival taxes, and half a dozen other fees. Trust Fund revenues pay for almost four-fifths of the FAA's $16.4 billion budget, with the balance coming from general federal funds covering the FAA's safety regulatory and miscellaneous other activities.

While air traffic control is an increasingly technology-intensive industry, labor union issues have long played an important role in the ATC system. A period of labor unrest began in the late 1960s as FAA controllers pushed for job improvements and official status as an employee union. In 1969, about 500 members of the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization stayed home "sick" causing air service interruptions. The following year, 3,000 PATCO members took part in another "sickout" or illegal strike, which caused chaos for the nation's air traffic.3

Labor problems continued during the 1970s, with various work slowdowns and union protests over contract issues. Then in 1981, PATCO declared a major system-wide illegal strike after negotiations on a new contract broke down. That prompted President Ronald Reagan to order controllers to return to work within 48 hours or else face termination. More than 11,000 controllers refused to return to work and were fired by Reagan and initially banned from federal service. PATCO was dissolved and a new controllers union was created in 1987, the National Air Traffic Controllers Association.

Today, an important aspect of the federal ATC system is the high labor costs. In 2010, the operations portion of FAA had about 43,000 workers who earned a total of $6.5 billion in wages and benefits, or about $151,000 per worker.4 Just looking at controllers, a 2005 FAA study found that compensation packages averaged $166,000 annually.5 Labor costs account for two-thirds of the cost of FAA operations.6

While organized labor has created management challenges for the FAA, so has the implementation of new technologies. Delays and cost overruns on major technology projects have been common. For example, the Advanced Automation System project was launched in the early 1980s and was originally expected to cost $2.5 billion and be completed by 1996. But by 1994, estimated project costs had soared to $7.6 billion and the project was seven years behind schedule.7 The FAA terminated some parts of the AAS program and restructured others, but $1.5 billion of spending ended up being completely wasted.

More recently, a 2005 study by the Department of Transportation's Office of Inspector General looked at 16 major air traffic control upgrade projects and found that the combined costs had risen from $8.9 billion to $14.5 billion.8 The cost of the Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System project had jumped 194 percent to $2.7 billion and was seven years behind schedule. The OIG said that the STARS project was "facing obsolescence" even before it was completed.9 Meanwhile, the cost of the Wide Area Augmentation System project had jumped 274 percent to $3.3 billion and was 12 years behind schedule. A Government Accountability Office analysis in 2005 found similar cost overruns and delays in these projects.10

Delays and cost overruns have not been uncommon in federally subsidized airport projects either. For example, Denver's new international airport finally opened in 1995 after many delays and huge cost overruns. The project was originally supposed to cost $1.7 billion but ended up costing almost three times as much at $4.9 billion, with $685 million coming from federal taxpayers.11

In sum, federal funding of airports and the operation of the nation's ATC system have not been models of efficiency over the decades. There is large room for improvement in the management of the nation's aviation infrastructure, and the following sections consider some major structural reforms.

Privatizing Airports

Virtually all commercial airports in the United States are owned by state and local governments.12 But around the world, airports are becoming viewed more as business enterprises, and less as monopoly public services. Governments in both developed and developing countries are turning to the private sector for airport management and development

The benefits of a more entrepreneurial approach to running airports include increased operating efficiency, improved amenities, and more rapid and efficient expansion in capacity to reduce congestion. Airlines, passengers, private-plane owners, and taxpayers can all benefit from this new commercial approach to airport management.

For existing state and local airports, the simplest form of privatization is to contract out management of the airport on a short-term basis. But long-term leases can shift much greater responsibility and entrepreneurial incentive to the airport company, while liberating much of the city's previous investment in the airport. To create new airport facilities, the private sector can be brought in as a partner and granted either a long-term or perpetual franchise to finance, design, own, and operate the new facility. Full private ownership and management of airports is also possible and is becoming fairly common in Europe.

### Improves Efficiency

#### Creates competition – improves airlines across the board

POOLE 10 Director of Transportation policy at Reason Foundation, MIT-trained engineer, has advised four presidential administrations on transportation policy issues. [Robert W. Poole Jr. & Chris Edwards, A Brief History of Federal Funding Privatizing Airports The Crisis in Air Traffic Control Commercializing Air Traffic Control, http://www.downsizinggovernment.org/transportation/airports-atc]

Private airport managers are also more willing to take on the risks of new investments, such as the creation of new terminal space to provide gates for new airlines. By contrast, under typical U.S. airport management practice, the major incumbent airlines have signed long-term exclusive-use gate-lease agreements. From the standpoint of risk-averse airport managers, these long-term agreements give them a guaranteed revenue stream. In exchange for this security, they give up substantial control to the major airlines. Usually, the long-term agreements give airlines what amounts to veto power over terminal expansions. That means that when new-entrant airlines want to start service to such an airport, there are often no gates available, which reduces competition

By contrast, experience has shown that privatized airports generally do not cede de-facto control over their facilities to the large airlines. At most such airports, the gates remain under the control of the airport company, and they are allocated hour by hour to individual airlines, as needed. That is why at many European airports, and the more commercially run airports in Canada, you will observe that the airline signage at each gate is electronic, so that it can be changed in moments from one airline's name to another's.

In sum, airline competition would be expanded and consumers would benefit if we reformed the outmoded ownership and management structures of U.S. airports. Much of the world is moving to a new paradigm—the airport as a for-profit enterprise—that is more consistent with a dynamic, competitive airline market. In the end, all groups—airlines, passengers, and cities—would benefit from airports that were self-funded, more efficient, and more innovative than current U.S. airports following an old-fashioned bureaucratic approach.

## GENERAL OFF CASE

### Politics - Fight in congress

#### Funding NextGen will cause a fight in congress

Bin Salam 12 Fellow, Eno Center for Transportation [Sakib bin Salam, NextGen: Aligning Costs, Benefits and Political Leadership, April 2012, ENO Center for Transportation]

Political Feasibility. No matter how effective and optimal a policy measure in theory, it is impractical unless it can generate Congressional support. This paper aims to propose a funding mechanism that is practical in the existing political environment. Any potential funding mechanism needs to be able to gain support from lawmakers, who have shown strong opposition to tax increases in recent times. However the unavoidable fact is that upgrading the air traffic control system to NextGen is going to require real funding. A policy that minimizes the cost burden while still equitable and transparent is more likely to gain political support.

#### ATC reform causes Congressional backlash

Poole 10 (Robert W. Jr., Director of Transportation Policy and Searle Freedom Trust Transportation Fellow – Reason Foundation, and Chris Edwards, Director of Tax Policy Studies – Cato Institute, “Airports and Air Traffic Control”, June, http://www.downsizinggovernment.org/transportation/airports-atc)

Political Constraints. A third impediment to ATC reform is political. The redesign of the ATC system foreseen in NextGen could potentially deliver major cost savings and greatly expand ATC capacity. However, realizing those gains would require retirement of large numbers of costly radars and other ground-based navigation aids and the consolidation of ATC facilities. One current proposal would replace 21 en route centers and 171 terminal radar approach control (TRACON) facilities with just 35 air traffic service hubs in a redesign of U.S. airspace.28 Physical control towers located at many smaller airports would gradually be phased out as "virtual tower" functions are built into the new super-hubs.

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### Econ Decline Turns the aff

#### Airline industry is Dependent on U.S. Economy- If one goes down the other does too

Federal Aviation Administration Air Traffic Organization (ATO) 08 (The national aviation authority of the United States and an agency of the United States Department of Transportation “The economic impact of civil aviation on the U.S. economy” [http://www.faa.gov/about/office\_org/headquarters\_offices/ato/media/2008\_Economic\_Impact\_Report\_web.pdf Accessed 6/27/12](http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ato/media/2008_Economic_Impact_Report_web.pdf%20Accessed%206/27/12))

Over recent decades, aviation has become an accepted part of everyday life, and civil aviation is now a vital component of the national and global transportation system. But however pervasive aviation becomes, in nearly all cases air transportation serves as a means for achieving some other end, such as a family visit, a client meeting or an overnight delivery of a much-needed component. For this reason demand for aviation services is termed a derived demand which is shaped to a significant degree by the underlying consumer preferences for the goods, services and activities made available through the use of air transportation. This report summarizes estimates of the impact and role of civil aviation within the U.S. economy in 2006 and also discusses changes and trends that have occurred in these estimates over the past few years. . The growth of civil aviation activity is intertwined and closely related to developments in the overall U.S. economy As GDP rises, so too does the demand for all modes of transportation, including air transportation. Thus, the growth in air traffic demand and capacity is in large part a direct consequence of a vital and growing economy. Figure 1 illustrates the close tie between overall U.S. economic growth and the demand for scheduled passenger air service over the past two decades. However, the downturn in aviation activity around the time of the 9/11 attacks shows that industry-specific factors also matter for year-to-year growth patterns. In 2007, annual revenue passenger miles (RPM) for commercial air carriers, a commonly used measure of demand for scheduled passenger service, were roughly 842 billion, while the capacity or supply provided by scheduled airlines, which is measured by available seat miles (ASM), increased to approximately 1,060 billion.1 Although capacity has expanded slightly, the average airfare has increased slightly and annual RPM grew at a slightly faster rate. In addition to the growth in commercial passenger service, air cargo has also experienced considerable growth. Between 2002 and 2007, air cargo carriers responded to a surge in the demand for the air transportation of freight. In 2007, U.S. carriers moved 39.9 billion ton-miles of freight, an increase of 0.3 percent of total revenue ton miles (RTM) compared to 39.8 billion in 20062 and compared to 30.5 billion RTMs in 2002, a total increase of 30.7 percent.

### War turns the aff

#### Any war that happens boosts the price of oil and kills the airline industry—the aff turns the DA

Forbes, June 6 [Airline Stocks Flying High After Big Correction In Oil Prices, http://www.forbes.com/sites/afontevecchia/2012/06/06/airline-stocks-flying-high-after-big-correction-in-oil-prices/]

Investors, though, should be careful when placing bets against the price of oil. While commodities are already inherently volatile, oil has the added onus that it’s one of the most widely used and traded commodities. It is highly sensitive to geopolitics and demand and supply issues. The market remains oversupplied, but seeing the Israeli-Iranian conflict flare up again would definitely takes its toll on the price of crude, and thus on airlines’ stock performance.

### PPP counterplan

#### PPP is key to NextGen success.

Peters 12 (Mary Peters, 2012, Administrator of FHWA, USDOT, NextGen Fund, “This Public Private Partnership is the only way to bridge the gap between the FAA’s NextGen system and the airline industry.” <http://www.nextgenfund.com/fund.html>)

Finding efficiencies and cost-effective ways to meet public needs has never been more important. A proven Public Private Partnership (PPP) structure is the only viable way forward. This is not about privatization. It is about using the strengths, knowledge and resources of all parties to benefit our economy. There are hundreds of examples of PPPs working efficiently in the U.S. and around the world. The NextGen Fund, supported by ITT Corporation and leading aerospace companies and leading financial institutions from Wall Street, will invest $1.5 billion in private-sector capital to overcome the investment barriers that have prevented U.S. airlines from investing in NextGen technologies. The NextGen Fund will enable the retrofit of up to 70 percent of the U.S. commercial air transport fleet — and some general aviation aircraft — with NextGen systems. The airlines' hesitation is understandable, as they need to start making these investments years before the FAA systems are ready to deliver real economic benefits. There are several features of the NextGen Fund that are of key importance to addressing the airlines' concerns. Airlines will be able to upgrade their aircraft without large capital outlays or adding debt to their balance sheets. Payments can be deferred until the FAA delivers specific NextGen services. Using the NextGen Fund, airline commitments can be used to accomplish "Predominant Equipage" where they are most needed in our Nation's skies. We've talked a lot about the commitment and benefit to private companies and industries. There is also a large commitment from the public sector. Congress continues to support and fund NextGen as a national priority. The FAA is already investing in NextGen infrastructure development, and plans to invest billions of dollars to develop and install NextGen systems in our Nation's aging air traffic control system. The first of these NextGen technologies uses advanced satellite position data to track aircraft with more precision. The FAA is on schedule to have this system installed and operating in 2013. As the FAA's first major procurement for an air traffic control system structured as a PPP, its success is a harbinger for future NextGen technology programs. According to the U.S. Department of Transportation,1 PPPs represent a wide variety of project financing and delivery approaches, which offer the potential to expedite projects and cost effectively operate and maintain the resulting infrastructure and services. By leveraging scarce public funds and tapping private sector capital, PPPs can help agencies "do more with less." The common element of a PPP is that public sponsors of transportation projects, in this case the FAA, engage the private sector to a greater degree in the performance of certain functions previously handled by the public sector. This can range from contract maintenance to innovative life-cycle finance, technology and infrastructure development, operations, and preservation. Not too long ago, a senior Department of Transportation official stated, "In a time of funding shortages at all levels of government, it is particularly important that we look to opportunities for the private sector to participate in funding transportation infrastructure improvements."

### Equipage isn’t T

#### Equipage funding is separate from infrastructure

Bin Salam 12 Fellow, Eno Center for Transportation [Sakib bin Salam, NextGen: Aligning Costs, Benefits and Political Leadership, April 2012, ENO Center for Transportation]

Equipage Funding

The preceding sections analyzed potential revenue sources for NextGen infrastructure funding. In this section we consider possible funding solutions to equipage. Under the current program, operators are expected to fund their own equipage. As long as the FAA implements the infrastruc- ture in a timely manner the private operators will have real benefits to equipping. As a financing solution to equipage, a private-public partnership (P3) would not require raising additional taxes or fees and offer a solution to help opera- tors pay for the equipage portion of NextGen moderniza- tion. A P3 is in theory a more efficient way of facilitating equipage than collecting taxes from the operators and using the revenues to pay for equipage. It is more realistic to focus on private sector financing options coupled with incentiviz- ing operators to invest in equipage instead of employing an indirect funding method of taxing them to pay for equipage.