INDEX

INDEX 1

\*\*NEG 2

1NC 2

Link – Transportation Infrastructure 4

Link – Roads/Urban Sprawl 6

Link – Bridges/Dams/Highways 7

Link – Mass Transit 8

Link – ITS/Computation Science 9

Link – Waterways/Ports 10

Link – Bicycles 11

Link – Economy 12

Link – Environment 13

Link – Bataille 15

Impact – Suffering 17

Impact – Eco Destruction 18

Impact – Extinction 19

Impact – Domination/Hierarchies 21

Impact – Empirically Destructive 21

Alt – Questioning 21

Alt – Deep Ecology 23

Alt – Social Ecology 25

Alt Solvency – Extinction 26

Alt Solvency – New Morality 27

Alt Solvency – Knowledge 28

A2: Perm 29

A2: Inevitable/Human Nature 30

A2: Biocentrism Bad 31

\*\*AFF 33

Perm 33

Aff Comes First 34

Alt Turns 35

A2: Ethics 37

\*\*NEG

1NC

Policymakers only care about anthropocentric effects of transportation infrastructure – ignore indirect effects

Bennett, Smith, and Betts 11 (Victoria J. Bennett is a postdoctoral research associate, Department of Forest Ecosystems and Society, Oregon State University; Winston P. Smith is a research wildlife biologist, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Research Station; Matthew G. Betts is an assistant professor of landscape ecology, Department of Forest Ecosystems and Society, Oregon State University, 2011, United States Department of Agriculture, “Toward Understanding the Ecological Impact of Transportation Corridors,” www.fs.fed.us/pnw/pubs/pnw\_gtr846.pdf //nimo)

Transportation corridors (notably roads) affect wildlife habitat, populations, and entire ecosystems. Considerable effort has been expended to quantify direct effects of roads on wildlife populations and ecological communities and processes. Much less effort has been expended toward quantifying indirect effects. In this report, we provide a comprehensive review of road/transportation corridor ecology; in par- ticular, how this new field of ecology has advanced worldwide. Further, we discuss how research thus far has shaped our understanding and views of the ecological implications of transportation infrastructures, and, in turn, how this has led to the current guidance, policies, and management options. We learned that the impacts of transportation infrastructures are a global issue, with the potential to affect a wide variety of taxonomically diverse species and ecosystems. Because the majority of research to date has focused on the direct and more aesthetic and anthropocentric implications of transportation corridors, mainly wildlife-vehicle collisions, it is a fairly standard practice to incorporate underpasses, green bridges (i.e., overpasses), fencing, and barriers into road corridors to alleviate such impacts. Few studies, however, have been able to demonstrate the efficiency of these structures. Further- more, it is becoming increasingly evident that the indirect implications of transpor- tation infrastructures (i.e., behavioral responses of wildlife individuals to roads) may be more pervasive, at least from the standpoint of biological diversity. Under- standing how road corridors influence the functional connectivity of landscapes is crucial if we are to effectively manage species of concern. With these issues in mind, we propose a program of study that addresses the indirect and cumulative implications of transportation infrastructure on species distributions, community structure and ecosystem function

Anthropocentric logic dooms us to a world of calculation and domination—all life on earth is reduced and banished

Kevin Michael DeLuca, Associate Professor of Speech Communication and adjunct in the Institute of Ecology at the University of Georgia, author of *Image Politics: The New Rhetoric of Environmental Activism* and numerous articles exploring humanity-nature relations and technology, 2005, “Thinking with Heidegger Rethinking Environmental Theory and Practice”, in Ethics & the Environment 10.1 p. 67-87

Machination is unconditional controllability, the domination of all beings, the world, and earth through calculation, acceleration, technicity, and giganticism. Calculation represents a reduction of knowing to mathematics and science and a reduction of the world and earth to what is calculable, a step taken decisively by Descartes (1999, 84–96). Machination is the "pattern of generally calculable explainability, by which everything draws nearer to everything else equally and becomes completely alien to itself" (1999, 92). The unrestrained domination of machination produces a totalizing worldview that enchants: "When machination finally dominates and permeates everything, then there are no longer any conditions by which still actually to detect the enchantment and to protect oneself from it. The bewitchment by technicity and its constantly self-surpassing progress are only *one* sign of this enchantment, by **[End Page 75]** virtue of which everything presses forth into calculation, usage, breeding, manageability, and regulation" (1999, 86–87). Heidegger prophetically predicts that machination will produce "a gigantic progress of sciences in the future. These advancements will bring exploitation and usage of the earth as well as rearing and training of humans into conditions that are still inconceivable today" (1999, 108). Animals and plants are reduced to various forms of use value and, more significantly, are banished from Being-in-the-world with us: "What is a plant and an animal to us anymore, when we take away use, embellishment, and entertainment" (1999, 194). "Nature" suffers a similar fate: "What happens to nature in technicity, when nature is separated out from beings by the natural sciences? The growing—or better, the simple rolling unto its end—destruction of 'nature'.... And finally what was left was only 'scenery' and recreational opportunity and even this still calculated into the gigantic and arranged for the masses" (1999, 195). Under the unrestrained domination of machination, humans suffer a "hollowing out" (1999, 91, 348) and Being-in-the-world is replaced by "adventures." (I am here translating *Erlebnis* as adventure. Others translate it as lived-experience.)

We must question whether our political strategies reiterate anthropocentric logic

Kevin Michael DeLuca, Associate Professor of Speech Communication and adjunct in the Institute of Ecology at the University of Georgia, author of *Image Politics: The New Rhetoric of Environmental Activism* and numerous articles exploring humanity-nature relations and technology, 2005, “Thinking with Heidegger Rethinking Environmental Theory and Practice”, in Ethics & the Environment 10.1 p. 67-87

The question moves, then, from asking whether a strategy is effective or moral, to asking, "Does a strategy contribute to machination?" As our discussion should have made clear, machination is about a logic, not a particular machine. (This same point is true of Heidegger's later critique of technology.) Heidegger's critique of the logic of machination has the advantage of being able to be clearly distinguished from any particular machine or technology. Machination, to reiterate, is a logic characterized by calculation, giganticism, acceleration, and technicity wherein animals, plants, and the earth become objects, mere resources, and humans, also, are reduced to the service of a ravenous progress. To ask if a strategy contributes to machination, then, is to ask **[End Page 76]** whether it contributes to the degradation of the earth and the hollowing-out of the world, a particularly pressing question for environmentalists. Obviously, then, the mainstream strategy of setting up headquarters in the political center (Washington, D.C.) of global capitalism—arguably the finest manifestation of the logic of machination; and adopting such practices as lobbying, trading favors, making cash donations, doing fund-raising, hiring MBAs and lawyers to run operations, exchanging board memberships with major corporations, producing glossy magazines funded by advertising from car companies and other suspect sources, practicing media spin and public relations as if environmental groups are no different (except poorer) than GE, Exxon, Monsanto, and Union Carbide, is suspect. Mainstream groups have consciously adopted the politics, organizational structure, and discourse of machination. Yet even the practices of radical grassroots groups that eschew central organization and its attendant dangers deserve scrutiny. Beginning with Greenpeace in the 1970s and intensifying in the 1980s with the emergence of wilderness and environmental justice groups, the radical environmental movement has increasingly relied on managing images and manipulating media, in fact practicing what could be considered an oppositional grassroots public relations. If public relations, along with advertising, is the discourse of machination, a discourse of empty words in service of giganticism (bigger is better) and progress (newer is better), what are the consequences when radical environmental groups deploy that very discourse in efforts to reach the public through mass media? What are the consequences when Greenpeace champions the cause of furry baby harp seals at the neglect of less photogenic indicator species? Are the effects of this any different from when the much more compromised World Wildlife Fund (WWF) adopts the panda as its symbol and cause celebre? What are the consequences when Earth First!, the environmental justice group Kentuckians For The Commonwealth, and other grassroots groups conform to the constraints of the mass media (stunning images, sound bites, conflict focus, emotional appeals, and so on) and deploy the practices of public relations in order to stage image events? Is it possible to fundamentally challenge machination while using the techniques of machination? These are not rhetorical questions. I do not have the answers and I do not think there are easy answers. Instead, Heidegger offers the environmental movement the admonishment to question what **[End Page 77]** it takes for granted, to think about the presuppositions and practices that are reflexively deployed as a matter of course.

Link – Transportation Infrastructure

(1NC)

Policymakers only care about anthropocentric effects of transportation infrastructure – ignore indirect effects

Bennett, Smith, and Betts 11 (Victoria J. Bennett is a postdoctoral research associate, Department of Forest Ecosystems and Society, Oregon State University; Winston P. Smith is a research wildlife biologist, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Research Station; Matthew G. Betts is an assistant professor of landscape ecology, Department of Forest Ecosystems and Society, Oregon State University, 2011, United States Department of Agriculture, “Toward Understanding the Ecological Impact of Transportation Corridors,” www.fs.fed.us/pnw/pubs/pnw\_gtr846.pdf //nimo)

Transportation corridors (notably roads) affect wildlife habitat, populations, and entire ecosystems. Considerable effort has been expended to quantify direct effects of roads on wildlife populations and ecological communities and processes. Much less effort has been expended toward quantifying indirect effects. In this report, we provide a comprehensive review of road/transportation corridor ecology; in par- ticular, how this new field of ecology has advanced worldwide. Further, we discuss how research thus far has shaped our understanding and views of the ecological implications of transportation infrastructures, and, in turn, how this has led to the current guidance, policies, and management options. We learned that the impacts of transportation infrastructures are a global issue, with the potential to affect a wide variety of taxonomically diverse species and ecosystems. Because the majority of research to date has focused on the direct and more aesthetic and anthropocentric implications of transportation corridors, mainly wildlife-vehicle collisions, it is a fairly standard practice to incorporate underpasses, green bridges (i.e., overpasses), fencing, and barriers into road corridors to alleviate such impacts. Few studies, however, have been able to demonstrate the efficiency of these structures. Further- more, it is becoming increasingly evident that the indirect implications of transpor- tation infrastructures (i.e., behavioral responses of wildlife individuals to roads) may be more pervasive, at least from the standpoint of biological diversity. Under- standing how road corridors influence the functional connectivity of landscapes is crucial if we are to effectively manage species of concern. With these issues in mind, we propose a program of study that addresses the indirect and cumulative implications of transportation infrastructure on species distributions, community structure and ecosystem function.

Transportation infrastructure policy steeped in disregard for intrinsic natural value

Forman et al 97 (Richard T. T. Forman, Debra S. Friedman, David Fitzhenry, Jay D. Martin, Allen S. Chen, Lauren E. Alexander, of the Harvard University Graduate School of Design, 1997, Ministry of Transport, “Ecological effects of roads: Toward three summary indices and an overview for North America,” http://www.transwildalliance.com/resources/2010518125311.effects.roads..Habitat.fragmentation\_Forman\_.pdf //nimo)

ISTEA's language also links ecological attributes with the aesthetics of a land- scape, for example, in considering the effects of policy decisions on land use and development, acquisition of scenic easements, landscaping and other scenic beautification, and mitigation of water pollution due to highway runoff (Fa|be| 1993, California Transportation Commission 1995). Linking ecology to aesthetics has the advantage that transportation engineers and society have accepted a role for aesthetics in road construction and maintenance. However, a major disadvantage is that environmental issues central to society. such as biodiversity loss, disruption of natural processes. fragmen- tation of populations, erosion and stream sedimentation. loss of clean water, and reduction in fish populations, are marginalized. ISTEA, which funds improvements in transportation practices, permits but does not emphasize ecologically focused planning and practice. The challenge now is whether these central ecological issues can be effectively addressed by society within the framework of ISTEA. It not. a new framework is required to create an environmentally sustainable future. where human mobility and ecological patterns and processes are mutually benefitted. A large portion of the contiguous United States. apparently well over 10%. is directly impacted ecologically by roads with vehicles. Minimizing road density in large natural-vegetation patches. including remote areas. is critical for maintaining our essential natural processes and richness of native Plants and animals. Roads and highways exist in the context of. and are strongly affected by. a broader landscape. The road also slices through and impacts many eco- systems and land uses within that land mosaic. Roads therefore must be planned, built and widened with a strong understanding of landscape and regional ecology. indeed. because we know context is critical, it is both in- adequate and unethical to not incorporate landscape patterns and processes squarely in the planning and construction process (Forman 1987). Planning for broad processes should reduce local species~by-species conflicts. New road projects and retrofitting of roads built in the 'pre-ecological era“ should now incorporate wildlife-crossing mitigation structures. using the considerable European and some North American experience. Public education, ecological research, and monitoring results of pilot projects should accompany this important step. Environmental impact analyses are normally limited to specific projects and occur after decisions to build a road and the basic route are made. A new planning process is therefore needed. which focuses on the broad landscape. has ecology in its core. and elucidates route options long before a route is selected. A compatibility between an effective transportation system and robust ecological patterns and processes is attainable.

Construction of transportation infrastructure is at the heart of anthropocentrism

Drew et al 2 (Lawrence J. Drew, William H. Langer, and Janet S. Sachs, March 2002, Natural Resources Research, Vol. 11, No. 1, March 2002, “Environmentalism and Natural Aggregate Mining,” acc via summon //nimo)

Anthropocentrism focuses on the environment as it is used by humans as a source of sustenance, recre- ation, and aesthetics. Through the technology of agri- culture and civil engineering, humans use nature to supply themselves with food, fibre, shelter, roads, and bridges and to enhance their spirit through recreation and appreciation of the aesthetics of nature. Anthro- pocentrism emphasizes the maintenance of a clean and wholesome environment for humans and the nat- ural system. The Earth is not to be misused or scarred beyond a certain level. Waste products of all types are to be recycled where possible within an economic context and, in general, minimized. The air and water are to be kept clean by the natural system for human and other uses.

Link – Roads/Urban Sprawl

New road and urban sprawl policy are anthropocentric and ignore the non-human

Low 3 (Nicholas Low of the Omega Centre, 2003, Making Urban Transport Sustainable, Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan Chapter 1 pp. 1-22, “Is Urban Transport Sustainable?” http://www.palgrave.com/PDFs/0333981987.Pdf //nimo)

Transport systems therefore create local environments of varying quality for their human occupants. But an exclusive focus on the environment of humans is regarded by many environmental philosophers as ‘anthropocen- tric’: that is, the only reason for valuing the human species above all others is that we are members of it (see Eckersley, 1992). As an ethical position that is unsatisfactory and probably does even not correspond with most people’s ethical regard for non-human species (Low and Gleeson, 1998). Prudentially also we need non-human species in many known ways and many ways that are not yet discovered. The urban environment, and especially the peri- urban environment on the edge of great cities provides a habitat for many rare and endangered species. The car/road solution sprawls the city further and further into the peri-urban region, damaging the habitats of these species and threatening in some cases species extinction.

City expansion is genocide of the non-human – unforgiveable crime

Low 3 (Nicholas Low of the Omega Centre, 2003, Making Urban Transport Sustainable, Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan Chapter 1 pp. 1-22, “Is Urban Transport Sustainable?” http://www.palgrave.com/PDFs/0333981987.Pdf //nimo)

On the second issue, the earth’s species do not belong to the nation in which they happen to be found but are part of a global human heritage. In less anthropocentric terms, the right of species not to be extinguished is a global right. ‘Genocide’ understood literally as the extinction of a species, whether by deliberation or neglect, may in future be regarded as an unfor- giveable environmental crime. The spatial expansion of cities threatens both species habitats and food production for humans. The latter is beginning to be seen as problematic, especially for countries such as China and India which will have to feed huge populations from a diminishing supply of pro- ductive land as their cities grow. Brown (1999: 123) comments: ‘The effects of the acute cropland scarcity emerging in some countries could affect many other areas of human activity. For example, it could fundamentally alter transportation policy, favoring the development of more land-efficient bicycle-rail transport systems at the expense of the automobile’.

Link – Bridges/Dams/Highways

Bridges, dams and highways are at the core of anthropocentrism

Kristiansen 3 (Roald E. Kristiansen, PhD from Emory, 2003, Encyclopedia of Science and Religion by J. Wentzel Vrede van Huyssteen, published on eNotes, “Anthropocentrism,” http://www.enotes.com/anthropocentrism-reference/anthropocentrism //nimo)

The basic idea of consequentialist anthropocentrism is that human actions are valued according to their consequences for other humans. In a market-oriented society, consequentialist anthropocentrism is often linked to the idea that problems in relation to society and nature are technical. Both human and natural resources are considered unlimited and available for human consumption. If there is a shortage, then replacement products will always be made available on the basis of the law of supply and demand. High status is awarded to technical products such as buildings, bridges, dams, and highways. The basic premise is the idea that human interests rule the world, and that nature is considered relevant only as a resource to be exploited by humans. If a crisis arises with regard to available resources, it is primarily a technical problem, which can be solved by adjustments. In its simplest form this could mean that humans need to move to a new place. When no new place is available, other measures can be taken, such as moving pollutants to a different place or using technology to get rid of toxic elements. The ideal is "business as usual" for the benefit of humans, modified by ad hoc measures to prevent discomfort for human society. Consequentialist anthropocentrism is also the central approach in policies of resource management that respond to the problem of limited resources by adjusting production and consumption, and by avoiding extreme pollution. The anthropocentric attitude is expressed through the ideals of wise use and sustainable development. The central concern is to secure the demands of the present without endangering future needs.

Link – Mass Transit

Urban mass transit is anthropocentric despite possible ecological benefits

Francis 11 (Kaylen Ashley Francis, accepted by: Dr. Caitlin Dyckman, Committee Chair Professor Stephen Sperry Dr. Robert Baldwin, May 2011, “HOW DO PLANNERS PARTICIPATE IN FORMULATING VIABLE GREEN INFRASTRUCTURE PLANS? A Thesis Presented to the Graduate School of Clemson University,” proquest //nimo)

Furthermore, the connectivity of habitat is decreasing non-linearly with the loss of species habitat. Consequently, any loss of natural habitat can fragment wildlife corridors and their connections to contiguous patches (Hanski, 1999, p. 216). Although planners are becoming more involved in creating designated green spaces, it is questionable whether connections in those spaces are considered and whether the land itself has a biocentric or anthropocentric focus, especially in large cities. Despite the continued loss of habitat, maintaining connectivity in highly urbanized areas could potentially aid in its mitigation. Functional and Structural Lands The concept of functional and structural conservation land is an important aspect of habitat connectivity. Structural connectivity is based on the spatial amount and structure of habitat approaches with little or no deference to the needs of the native species as far as movement, cover and food sources. Functional connectivity requires the aforementioned considerations but also incorporates the movement of species throughout the habitat into account (Crooks & Sanjayan, 2006, p. 3). Structural Connectivity Structural connectivity is easier to quantify than functional connectivity, however, those measurements often do not apply across landscapes or species and may only be considered functional for some species of the habitat area and not others (Crooks & Sanjayan, 2006, p. 3). It is often anthropocentric, prioritizing human needs over the needs of native species.

Link – ITS/Computation Science

Computational sciences make anthropocentric assumptions about intelligence

Spivey 2000 (Michael J. Spivey, Professor, School of Social Sciences, Humanities and Arts, UC Merced, March 2000, Connection Science 12.1, “Turning the tables on the turing test: The spivey test,” proquest: http://search.proquest.com/docview/206818438 //nimo)

After several decades of research in artificial intelligence (AI) (e.g. Turing 1950, Rosenblatt 1961, Winograd 1972, Rumelhart and McClelland 1986), and even in comparative cognition (e.g. Schusterman et al.1986, Zentall 1993, Hauser 1996), the cognitive, neural and computational sciences are still loathe to let go of their markedly anthropocentric criteria for `intelligence'. Indeed, the only non-subjective evidence that humans are thinking reasoners at all is the mere fact that most of them vehemently claim to be thinking reasoners. Of course, it is trivially easy to program a computer to insist that it is an intelligent, thinking reasoner as well. Rather than allow a oneline BASIC program to be accepted as `intelligent', most researchers would prefer to set the bar a little higher. Therefore, a more stringent test is necessary.

Computational science system modeling is anthropocentric

Humphreys 7 (Paul Humphreys, Department of Philosophy, University of Virginia, 12.5.07, Synthese (2009), “The philosophical novelty of computer simulation methods,” acc via springlink http://www.springerlink.com/content/7251h261g563822q/ //nimo)

Frigg and Reiss’s claim about the metaphysical consequences of simulations is essentially correct and I have never subscribed to that metaphysical position myself. I have argued in this article that their second and third claims are incorrect. Compu- tational science requires a new non-anthropocentric epistemology and a new account of how theories and models are applied. These requirements are, to me, more than sufficient to justify the claim that computational science is a significantly new sui generis activity accompanied by new, recognizably philosophical, issues. Claims that these methods lie ‘in between’ theorizing and experimentation are, I believe, best interpreted metaphorically. The phrase indicates that computer simulations often use elements of theories in constructing the underlying computational models and they can be used in ways that are analogous to experiments. (For details of one of these ways, see Humphreys 1994). Computational science has also made possible almost everything that takes place in complexity theory, itself a new area of science with its own methods that has powerful cross-disciplinary capabilities; classes dedicated to computational physics, chemistry, and biology along with textbooks dedicated to the topics have been introduced in those departments because the methods involved are different from those taught in their theory classes and in laboratory sessions. Frigg and Reiss make many valuable points in their article; indeed, amongst the sceptical literature in this area, their arguments are the clearest that I have encountered. Nevertheless, these powerful new currents sweeping through the sciences bring with them philosophical challenges that older modeling frameworks cannot address. It is not a matter of lightly abandoning successful methods but of adapting to a different world.

Reductionist tech is anthropocentric and fails at helping the environment

Huesemann 1 (Michael H. Huesemann of Marine Sciences Laboratory, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, 2001, Ecological Economics 37 (2001) 271–287, “Can pollution problems be effectively solved by environmental science and technology? An analysis of critical limitations,” http://ac.els-cdn.com/S0921800900002834/1-s2.0-S0921800900002834-main.pdf?\_tid=704e5a63591724659b80abcdc2f6a05e&acdnat=1343091323\_a4 //nimo)

Considering the limited budgets for environ- mental research, it is obvious that only a few selected cause and effect relationships can ever be studied. But the elucidation of only a few selected issues considered important to humans clearly does not provide sufficient knowledge to protect all of nature. Consequently, the focus of current environmental science is too narrowly an- thropocentric to truly ensure the long-term pro- tection of human health and welfare. As a result, conservation biologist Ehrenfeld, who sees con- temporary science and technology as an expres- sion of an overly anthropocentric humanistic culture, is convinced that ‘there is no true protec- tion of Nature within the humanist system — the very idea is a contradiction of terms’ (Ehrenfeld, 1981, p. 202). This concern was also expressed by policy analyst Sarewitz who stated: ‘Because mainstream science is reductionist while the environment is an interconnected, complex system, much of modern science and technology may be intrinsically unsuited to suc- cessful confrontation of ecological crises ... Ul- timately, therefore, that reductionist science and its technological consequences can save us from ecological crises should be viewed with skepticism’ (Sarewitz, 1996, pp. 107–113).

Link – Waterways/Ports

Waterway transportation infrastructure necessitates destruction for human use causing irreversible damage to the non-human

Weinstein 7 (Michael P. Weinstein, Ph.D., Marine and Environmental Science, Estuaries and Coasts Vol. 30, No. 2, p. 365–370 April 2007, PERSPECTIVES IN ESTUARINE AND COASTAL SCIENCE, “Linking Restoration Ecology and Ecological Restoration in Estuarine Landscapes,” acc via Summon //nimo)

Urban-industrial estuaries are estuarine systems whose physiography and geological settings support intense human uses and populations, principally for living space, navigation, marine transportation, and commercial activity related to port commerce, energy production, or other water intensive uses. Because ecological baselines have shifted dramati- cally in urban-industrial estuaries, concomitant losses in habitat and biodiversity are likely irrevers- ible (Weinstein and Reed 2005). Management priorities in urban-industrial systems focus on re- liability criteria (Roe and van Eeten 2001, 2002) imposed by the need for predictable navigation depths, stable shorelines and berthing areas, cost- effective methods for dredged materials manage- ment, transportation infrastructure and storage facilities, and for managing species adapted to human colonization (Swart et al. 2001).

Link – Bicycles

(“Meh” link)

Bicycles are used as a “technological innovation,” inherently drawing comparison of technology to the non-human – that’s anthropocentric

Furness 5 (Zachary Mooradian Furness, PhD, University of Pittsburgh, October 20, 2005, PhD Dissertation, “PUT THE FUN BETWEEN YOUR LEGS!”: THE POLITICS AND COUNTERCULTURE OF THE BICYCLE,” http://challenger.library.pitt.edu/ETD/available/etd-12052005-210916/ //nimo)

In the late nineteenth century, cycling was linked to a technological narrative of progress and closely tied to a vision of a broader and more mobile civilization that integrated the best aspects of nature and culture.135 Cycling first became popular amongst the upper classes in the U.S. and England, given the necessary income and leisure time that one needed in order to participate in such a hobby. However, innovations in mass production quickly decreased the cost of the bicycle which provided members of the working class access to the new technology. This prompted claims that “as a social revolutionizer [the bicycle] has never had an equal.”136 While history has shown such technologically determinist statements to be fallacious, the effects of the bicycle were significant for a large segment of the working class populations in both the U.S. and Europe who had been otherwise constrained in their mobility. In other words, the bicycle gave working class individuals new access to people and places, and ultimately, new methods for political mobilization. Given the vast geography of the U.S., the effects of the bicycle were especially strong, since it was arguably the first time that non-elites had the ability to utilize personal forms of transportation technology in their daily lives. While horses were certainly instrumentalized as forms of transportation before the bicycle, it is important to note that the upkeep of horses was quite expensive and largely outside the range of most working class budgets: “To keep matched pairs of horses for a single year cost more than most Americans consumed in food during the same length of time.”137 On this point, I would also argue that any paradigm that equates animals with technology is highly anthropocentric and implicitly encourages the debasement of both animal life and the environment.138

Link – Economy

Obsession with the economy and recovery is the worst form of anthropocentrism

Suzuki and Moola 9 (David Suzuki, PhD in zoology from UChicago, and Faisal Moola, 8.20.09, David Suzuki Foundation blog, “It's time for a new economic paradigm,” http://www.davidsuzuki.org/blogs/science-matters/2009/08/its-time-for-a-new-economic-paradigm/ //nimo)

I list ecosystem \_and \_other species deliberately because we have become a narcissistic, self-indulgent species. We believe we are at the centre of the world, and everything around us is an "opportunity" or "resource" to exploit. Our needs or demands trump all other possibilities. This is an anthropocentric view of life. Thus, when faced with a choice of logging or conserving a forest, we focus on the potential economic benefits of logging or not logging. When the economy experiences a downturn, we demand that nature pay for it. We relax pollution standards, increase logging or fishing above sustainable levels, or (as the federal government has decreed) lift the requirement of environmental assessments for new projects. A fundamentally different perspective on our place in the world is called "biocentrism". In this view, life's diversity encompasses all and we humans are a part of it, ultimately deriving everything we need from it. Viewed this way, our well-being, indeed our survival, depends on the health and well-being of the natural world. I believe this view better reflects reality. The most pernicious aspect of our anthropocentrism has been to elevate economics to the highest priority. We act as if the economy is some kind of natural force that we must all placate or serve in every way possible. But wait! Some things, like gravity, the speed of light, entropy, and the first and second laws of thermodynamics, are forces of nature. There's nothing we can do about them except live within the boundaries they delimit. But the economy, the market, currency — we created these entities, and if they don't work, we should look beyond trying to get them back up and running the way they were. We should fix them or toss them out and replace them.

Sustaining the economy requires anthropocentric ideology

Drew et al 2 (Lawrence J. Drew, William H. Langer, and Janet S. Sachs, March 2002, Natural Resources Research, Vol. 11, No. 1, March 2002, “Environmentalism and Natural Aggregate Mining,” acc via summon //nimo)

Sustaining a developed economy and expanding a developing one require the use of large vol- umes of natural aggregate. Almost all human activity (commercial, recreational, or leisure) is transacted in or on facilities constructed from natural aggregate. In our urban and sub- urban worlds, we are almost totally dependent on supplies of water collected behind dams and transported through aqueducts made from concrete. Natural aggregate is essential to the facilities that produce energy—hydroelectric dams and coal-fired powerplants. Ironically, the utility created for mankind by the use of natural aggregate is rarely compared favorably with the environmental impacts of mining it. Instead, the empty quarries and pits are seen as large negative environmental consequences. At the root of this disassociation is the philosophy of environmentalism, which flavors our perceptions of the excavation, processing, and distribu- tion of natural aggregate. The two end-member ideas in this philosophy are ecocentrism and anthropocentrism. Ecocentrism takes the position that the natural world is a organism whose arteries are the rivers—their flow must not be altered. The soil is another vital organ and must not be covered with concrete and asphalt. The motto of the ecocentrist is “man must live more lightly on the land.” The anthropocentrist wants clean water and air and an uncluttered landscape for human use. Mining is allowed and even encouraged, but dust and noise from quarry and pit operations must be minimized. The large volume of truck traffic is viewed as a real menace to human life and should be regulated and isolated. The environmental problems that the producers of natural aggregate (crushed stone and sand and gravel) face today are mostly difficult social and political concerns associated with the large holes dug in the ground and the large volume of heavy truck traffic associated with quarry and pit operations. These concerns have increased in recent years as society’s demand for living space has encroached on the sites of production; in other words, the act of production has engendered condemna- tion. Many other environmental problems that are associated with dust and noise and blasting from quarry and pit operations have been reduced through the efficient use of technology. Recycling concrete in buildings, bridges, and roads and asphaltic pavements will ultimately reduce the demand for virgin natural aggregate. The impact created by the large holes in the ground required for the mining of natural aggregate can be greatly reduced by planning their reclamation before mining begins.

Link – Environment/Sustainability

The way they frame their policies in terms of human benefit is still anthropocentric

Eric Katz, currently Vice President of the International Society for Environmental Ethics, author of “Organism, Community, and the ‘Substitution Problem’, and Lauren Oechsli, an undergraduate biology major at Columbia University, New York, 2003, “Moving beyond Anthropocentrism: Environmental Ethics, Development, and the Amazon”, http://www.umweltethik.at/download.php?id=392

It is not surprising that anthropocentric arguments dominate discussions of policy: arguments for environmental preservation based directly on human interests are often compelling. Dumping toxic wastes into a community’s reservoir of drinking water is clearly an irrational act; in such a case, a discussion of ethics or value theory is not necessary. The direct harm to humans engendered by this action is enough to disqualify it from serious ethical consideration. Nevertheless, other actions in the field of environmental policy are not so clear: there may be, for example, cases in which there are competing harms and goods to various segments of the human population that have to be balanced. The method for balancing these competing interests gives rise to issues of equity and justice. In addition, and more pertinent to our argument, are cases in which human actions threaten the existence of natural entities not usable as resources for human life. What reason do we humans have for expending vast sums of money (in positive expenditures and lost opportunities) to preserve endangered species of plants and animals that are literally nonresources? 2 In these cases, policies of environmental preservation seem to work against human interests and human good. Anthropocentric and instrumental arguments in favor of preservationist policies can be developed in a series and arranged in order of increasing plausibility. First, it is argued that any particular species of plant or animal might prove useful in the future. Alastair Gunn calls this position the “rare herb” theory. According to this theory, the elimination of any natural entity is morally wrong because it closes down the options for any possible positive use. 3 A point frequently raised in discussions of this problem is that the endangered species we are about to eliminate might be the cure for cancer. Of course, it is also possible that it will cause cancer; the specific effects of any plant or animal species might be harmful as well as beneficial. Because we are arguing from a position of ignorance, it is ludicrous to assert either possibility as certain, or to use either alternative as a basis for policy. A better argument is used by Paul and Anne Ehrlich: the metaphor of the airplane rivets. 4 The Ehrlichs tell a parable of an airplane passenger watching as a mechanic removes some of the rivets from the wing assembly of the plane he is boarding. When asked what he is doing, the mechanic replies that for reasons of economy, the airline is cutting down on the number of rivets used on each plane; some of the rivets are being removed and used on other planes. The procedure is not dangerous, continues the mechanic, since up to this point, no planes have been lost. The point of the parable is that although the elimination of individual species might not be directly harmful to human welfare, the aggregate elimination of many species probably will be. It is thus in the interests of humanity to remove as few “rivets” as possible, to preserve natural species even when they are “nonresources.” Without the use of a parable, Bryan Norton makes a similar point. In his discussion of the diversity-stability hypothesis in ecological theory, Norton argues that dynamically stable and mature ecosystems are important elements ofthat total diversity which stabilizes all ecosystems. 5 There is a danger in continually disrupting these diverse and stable ecosystems: Since the biological diversity of the planet has already entered an accelerating downward spiral, losses of species represent further accelerations toward local and global ecosystem breakdowns. The risks of breakdowns are so great and the contribution of species losses to them are so little understood that any rational society would exercise extreme caution in contributing to that acceleration. 6 Diverse species populations thus contribute to stable ecosystems, which have positive impacts on human life. Finally, this argument is broadened into a general concern for ecological function. The preservation of the natural environment insures a biosphere that supports human civilization. Degradation of the natural environment threatens human survival. Nevertheless, knowledge of ecological processes can help humans avoid damage to essential biological and physical links in the natural world. As Norton indicates, the loss of species and ecosystems is a sign that these natural connections are being “cut,” lost, or damaged. The mere preservation of the natural environment halts this process of degradation. Nature thus has to be preserved because it has a value for human beings and human society: it insures the physical basis of human life. In sum, these preservationist arguments based on “human interests” move from a narrow concern for the specific direct use of a natural entity or species, to the indirect importance of species as stabilizers of ecosystems, and finally to a general concern for the maintenance of ecosystems as the basis of human existence. These anthropocentric instrumental arguments for environmental preservation are easily transferred to issues of environmental policy. Recent concern about the destruction of the ozone layer and the increased probability of the “greenhouse effect” reflect the fear that current environmental and economic polices are damaging the environment and threatening human life. Indeed, it is a mark of the success of the environmental movement that the public is now aware of the connections between environmental health and human survival.

Discussion of climate change effects on humans is anthropocentric and undermines biocentrism

Crist 7 (Eileen Crist, PhD in sociology from Boston University, 2007, Telos 141 (Winter 2007): 29–55. “Beyond the Climate Crisis: A Critique of Climate Change Discourse,” http://www.sts.vt.edu/faculty/crist/ //nimo)

And yet, the current framing of climate change as the urgent issue encourages regarding the unwinding of biodiversity as a less critical mat- ter than the forthcoming repercussions of global warming. Attention to the long-standing ruination of biodiversity underway is subverted in two ways in climate-change discourse: either it gets elided through a focus on anthropocentric anxieties about how climate change will specifically affect people and nations; or biodepletion is presented as a corollary of climate change in writings that closely consider how global warming will cause biodiversity losses. Climate change is undoubtedly speeding up the unraveling of life’s interconnectedness and variety. But if global warming has such potential to afflict the natural world, it is because the latter’s “immunity” has been severely compromised. It is on an already profoundly wounded natural world that global warming is delivering its blow. Focusing on the added blow of climate change is important, but this focus should not come at the expense of erasing from view the prior, ongo- ing, and climate-change-independent wounding of life on Earth.

Their “protection” of the environment is anthropocentric – they just allow for future generations

Tomlison 3 (David Tomlinson, January 2003, Faculty of Environmental Studies, York University, Volume 7, Number 6 FES Outstanding Graduate Student Paper Series, “The Bicycle and Urban Sustainability,” http://www.yorku.ca/fes/research/students/outstanding/docs/david-tomlinson.pdf //nimo)

The last half of the 20 th century has witnessed increasing recognition of the significance of global environmental problems, and the importance of local action in both creating and addressing these issues. “Sustainability” has emerged as an idea that captures the essence of an approach to development that is considered by many to be essential to our survival. The concept of sustainable development was brought to the fore by the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), chaired by Gro Harlem Brundtland, in 1987. The Brundtland Commission expressed concern over the negative environmental impacts of current practices of uneven economic development, and the long-term implications of environmental and social degradation for the future of humanity (WCED 1987). While protection of the natural environment is recognised as vital to global sustainability, this recognition springs not from a strictly environmental ethic, but from anthropocentric values. The primary concern is for the survival of future generations of humans. The essence of sustainability lies in finding ways to meet current human needs while leaving enough “natural capital” (clean air and water, and other natural resources) to allow future generations to sustain a similar, or improved, standard of living. This has been called the “principle of inter-generational equity” (Haughton and Hunter 1994: 17).

Calls for “sustainable development” are steeped in anthropocentrism

Hector 8 (Donald Charles Alexander Hector, PhD candidate, July 30, 2008, University of Sydney, “Towards a new philosophy of engineering: structuring the complex problems from the sustainability discourse,” http://hdl.handle.net/2123/2690)

Extensive investigation of the nature of sustainability exposed two distinct philosophical positions, referred to here as “sustainability” and “sustainable development”. The sustainability position is monist approach, which sees humans with no special privilege above other species or ecosystems. Simply stated, it is that other species and ecosystems have a moral status equal to ours and we have a moral obligation not to compromise their future well-being or existence. On the other hand, the sustainable development position is a dualist, anthropocentric philosophy, which places humanity above other species and ecosystems, and conserving them only because it is in our best interests to do so. These positions, which are reflective of fundamentally irreconcilable beliefs and values, contribute to much of the complexity of the type of problem which emerges from the sustainability discourse.

The concept of sustainable development is grounded in protection of the human

Hector 8 (Donald Charles Alexander Hector, PhD candidate, July 30, 2008, University of Sydney, “Towards a new philosophy of engineering: structuring the complex problems from the sustainability discourse,” http://hdl.handle.net/2123/2690)

But a more fundamental concern is whether sustainable development actually heads in the right direction. Two issues are voiced here. First is whether the concept of sustainable development as a pathway to long-term sustainability is actually possible. And second is the consideration of broader philosophical aspects, such as whether the fundamental social imbalances in the world are being adequately addressed, scepticism around globalisation and the dominance of the modern Western culture (Liu and Liu (1997)). There is also concern as to whether the largely anthropocentric nature of sustainable development will achieve long-term improvement if the future of other species and ecosystems is compromised (Robinson (2004)). This in turn leads to consideration of even broader moral and ethical issues such as the moral standing of beings other than humans, of ecosystems, and the moral considerability of the natural environment. Thus, a wider issue around the philosophical framework of sustainable development emerges: whether or not the underlying premise on which the concept of sustainable development is based is flawed and whether it should be set aside in favour of the morally broader concept of sustainability.

Link – Bataille

Bataille’s philosophies are anthropocentric

Tyler 5 (Tom Tyler is Senior Lecturer in Communication, Media and Culture at Oxford Brookes University, July 2005, JOURNAL FOR CULTURAL RESEARCH VOLUME 9 NUMBER 3, “Like Water in Water,” http://www.cyberchimp.co.uk/research/pdf/Tyler\_Water\_In\_Water.pdf //nimo)

We can at this point usefully distinguish at least three modes of anthropocentric thought. First there is the assertion, to coin that infamous phrase, that “man is the measure of all things”. 19 Humanity is here considered to be central to the universe, a spatial characterization illustrative of the term’s Greek roots in νθρωπος (anthropos) meaning “man”, and κ ντρον (kentron) meaning “centre”. In epistemological terms this is the belief that all knowledge will inevitably be determined by the human nature of the knower. It is the belief, of which Heidegger was wary, that “human beings are cornered in the blind alley of their own humanity” (Heidegger 1984, p. 99). Bataille demonstrated precisely this kind of anthropocentric perspective. A second anthropocentrism would sketch a hierarchy, a ladder or chain of being, from the summit of which humanity gazes down on lesser beings. In this alternative spatial characterization the human species is considered to be of greater importance and value than all others. This is the anthropocentrism of secular or Enlightenment humanism, the evaluative anthropocentrism that Derrida detected in Heidegger’s writing. 20 In addition to these more-or-less explicitly stated beliefs, a third anthropocentrism can be identified as the assumption that any attempt to explain experience, understanding or knowledge (of the world, Being, others, et al.) must inevitably start from a human perspective. This we might call the anthropocentric assumption, characterized by a temporal preoccupation whereby the human being arrives or appears before all else. This is first and foremost anthropocentrism, and it is on this “unexamined privilege” that epistemological anthropocentrism depends. Heidegger’s phenomenological method, no less than Bataille’s, exemplifies this temporal prejudice. 21 It is a heavy-handed anthropocentrism, a self-satisfied anthropocentrism, which inscribes too quickly a distinction between humanity and animality.

Bataille’s form of anthropocentrism is uniquely worse than other forms – precludes the possibility of unification

Tyler 5 (Tom Tyler is Senior Lecturer in Communication, Media and Culture at Oxford Brookes University, July 2005, JOURNAL FOR CULTURAL RESEARCH VOLUME 9 NUMBER 3, “Like Water in Water,” http://www.cyberchimp.co.uk/research/pdf/Tyler\_Water\_In\_Water.pdf //nimo)

Heidegger felt his way forward, toward the Abyss, with one hand on the distinct experience of human beings. Bataille tentatively approached with a cautious look at the world of the animal. Whilst Heidegger delimits what the animal can know, Bataille delimits what we can know about what the animal can know. Both start, though, from an implicit understanding of experience which is unashamedly and irretrievably anthropocentric. It is the lot of the animal, or animality, to come after, to follow on, to take second place. 24 Bataille suggested that the consistency of the world of the animal is one of fluid homogeneity, and that self-consciousness has erected a barrier between “us” and those from whom we have “descended”. It has not been my intention to argue positively that he is wrong in these claims. It is conceivable that, on detailed examination, we might wish to assert the existence of a qualitative difference between human and animal cognition, and that the capacity to break the continuity of existence by positing durable objects can be usefully described as “human”. But this must remain, I think, an open question. It should certainly not be our starting point. If we preclude the possibility of recognizing or discovering new kinds of human– animal continuity we are condemned to a particular kind of anthropocentrism, a first-and-foremost anthropocentrism, which restricts what we can think both about human being and about the being of other animals. This first-and-foremost anthropocentrism, though not Bataille’s alone, is exemplified by his chapter on animality. This anthropocentrism, which depends on the animal existing “like water in water”, functions as a kind of self-fulfilling prediction (or predication). By asserting that humans are condemned to see the world as only humans can, that the world of the animal, or animality, is utterly closed to us, Bataille identifies himself principally and irretrievably with “the human” (whatever that may be). In doing so, he instates the very perspective that he discovers. His claim, that humans can see only as humans, his anthropocentrism, is both the starting point and the result of his reflection. This reflection, which Bataille believes to be thrown back by the watery beasts, is in fact his own. 25 By foreclosing what it is possible for animals to experience, what it is possible for animality to be, the possibilities for the human animal are also thereby curtailed.

Bataille makes escaping anthropocentrism impossible

Tyler 5 (Tom Tyler is Senior Lecturer in Communication, Media and Culture at Oxford Brookes University, July 2005, JOURNAL FOR CULTURAL RESEARCH VOLUME 9 NUMBER 3, “Like Water in Water,” http://www.cyberchimp.co.uk/research/pdf/Tyler\_Water\_In\_Water.pdf //nimo)

First, the two claims. On the one hand, the perfect continuity that, according to Bataille, exists between animal and environment, the lack of transcendence, means that phenomena are not distinguished as objects. The animal has no meaning, no knowledge of the world, and exists, as we have seen, like water in water. On the other hand, in virtue of the fact that the existence of the animal consists in this uniformity with the environment, that existence is utterly closed to us. Compelled always to impose precisely those divisions which are denied to the animal, humans cannot entertain any meaningful understanding of animal life. In short, the reason the animal is closed to us, the reason we cannot have knowledge of the animal, is that there is no meaning, no knowledge for the animal. Taken together, the implication of these two claims is that knowledge (meaning, understanding, cognition) is always and only human. We who do and must have knowledge are condemned to our own perspective, to an inevitable anthropocentrism. Any attempt to step outside this limitation, to articulate an understanding or knowledge which is not constrained in this way, will unavoidably descend into poetic babbling.

Impact – Suffering

Anthropocentrism reifies the idea of a dominant group who can inflict suffering on the inferior subject

Pete Singer, Professor of Bioethics at Princeton University; Professor at the Centre for Applied Philosophy at the University of Melbourne, May15, 2003,“Animal Liberation at 30” The New York Review of Books, Vol. 50, No. 8, <http://www.animal-rights-library.com/texts-m/singer04.htm>

In the text that followed, I urged thatdespite obvious differences between humans and nonhuman animals, we share with them a capacity to suffer**,** and this means that they, like us, have interests. If we ignore or discount their interests, simply on the grounds that they are not members of our species, the logic of our position is similar to that of the most blatant racists or sexists who think that those who belong to their race or sex have superior moral status, simply in virtue of their race or sex, and irrespective of other characteristics or qualities. Although most humans may be superior in reasoning or in other intellectual capacities to nonhuman animals, that is not enough to justify the line we draw between humans and animals. Some humans—infants and those with severe intellectual disabilities—have intellectual capacities inferior to some animals, but we would, rightly, be shocked by anyone who proposed that we inflict slow, painful deaths on these intellectually inferior humans in order to test the safety of household products. Nor, of course, would we tolerate confining them in small cages and then slaughtering them in order to eat them. The fact that we are prepared to do these things to nonhuman animals is therefore a sign of "speciesism"—a prejudice that survives because it is convenient for the dominant group— in this case not whites or males, but all humans.

Impact – Eco Destruction

They ignore the ecological destruction occurring all around us.

Hwang 00 (Kyung-Sig Hwang Department of Philosophy, Seoul University)

While our ability to affect the future is immense, our ability to foresee the results of our environmental interventions is not. I think that our moral responsibility grows with foresight. And yet, paradoxically in some cases grave moral responsibility is entailed by the fact of one's ignorance. If the planetary life-support system appears to be complex and mysterious, *humble ignorance* should indicate respect and restraint. However, as many life scientists have complained, these virtues have not been apparent in these generations. Instead they point out, we have boldly marched ahead, shredding delicate ecosystems and obliterating countless species, and with them the unique genetic codes that evolved through millions of years; we have altered the climate and even the chemistry of the atmosphere, and as a result of all this-what?[[18]](http://www.eubios.info/ABC4/abc4304.htm#18) A few results are immediately to our benefit; more energy, more mineral resources, more cropland, convenient waste disposal. Indeed, these short-term payoffs motivated us to alter our natural environment. But by far the larger and more significant results, the permanent results, are unknown and perhaps unknowable. Nature, says poet, Nancy Newhall, "holds answers to more questions than we know how to ask." And we have scarcely bothered to ask.[[19]](http://www.eubios.info/ABC4/abc4304.htm#19) Year and year, the natural habitants diminish and the species disappear, and thus our planetary ecosystem (our household) is forever impoverished.

Impact – Extinction

Anthropocentrism restricts ethical concern to humans leading to extinction of the natural environment

Melanie Ahkin, works at Monash University, 2010, “Human Centrism, Animist Materialism, and the Critique of Rationalism in Val. Plumwood’s Critical Ecological Feminism,” Emergent Australasian Philosophers, Issue 3, <http://www.eap.philosophy-australia.com/issue_3/EAP3_AHKIN_Human_Centrism.pdf>

Such an anthropocentric framework creates a variety of serious injustices and prudential risks, making it highly ecologically irrational.13 The hierarchical value prescriptions and epistemic distortions responsible for its biased, reductive conceptualisation of nature strips the non-human natural realm of non- instrumental value, and impedes the fair and impartial treatment of its members. Similarly, anthropocentrism creates distributive injustices by restricting ethical concern to humans, admitting partisan distributive relationships with non-human nature in the forms of commodification and instrumentalisation. The prudential risks and blindspots created by anthropocentrism are problematic for nature and humans alike and are of especial concern within our current context of radical human dependence on an irreplaceable and increasingly degraded natural environment. These prudential risks are in large part consequences of the centric structure's promotion of illusory human disembeddedness, self-enclosure and insensitivity to the significance and survival needs of non-human nature: Within the context of human-nature relationships, such a logic must inevitably lead to failure, either through the catastrophic extinction of our natural environment and the consequent collapse of our species, or more hopefully by the abandonment and transformation of the human centric framework.15 Whilst acknowledging the importance of prudential concerns for the motivation of practical change, Plumwood emphasises the weightier task of acknowledging injustices to non-humans in order to bring about adequate dispositional change. The model of enlightened self-interest implicit in prudentially motivated action is inadequate to this task insofar as it remains within the framework of human centrism. Although it acknowledges the possibility of relational interests, it rests on a fundamental equivocation between instrumental and relational forms of concern for others. Indeed it motivates action either by appeal to humans' ultimate self-interest, thus failing to truly acknowledge injustices caused to non-human others, remaining caught within the prudentially risky framework of anthropocentrism, or else it accepts that others' interests count as reasons for action- enabling recognition of injustices- but it does so in a manner which treats the intersection of others' needs with more fully-considered human interests as contingent and transient. Given this analysis, it is clear that environmental concern must be based on a deeper recognition of injustice, in addition to that of prudence, if it is to overcome illusions of human disembeddedness and self-enclosure and have a genuine and lasting effect.

Anthropocentrism threatens humanity

Fritjor Capra, Philosopher, 1995 “Deep Ecology in the 21st Century”

“It is becoming increasingly apparent that the major problems of our time cannot be understood in isolation. The threat of nuclear war, the devastation of our natural environment, the persistence of poverty along with progress even in the richest countries – these are not isolated problems. They are different facets of one single crisis, which is essentially a crisis of perception. The crisis derives from the fact that most of us and especially our large social institutions subscribe to the concepts and values of an outdated worldview, which is inadequate for dealing with the problems of our overpopulated, globally interconnected world.”

(1NC)

Anthropocentric logic dooms us to a world of calculation and domination—all life on earth is reduced and banished

Kevin Michael DeLuca, Associate Professor of Speech Communication and adjunct in the Institute of Ecology at the University of Georgia, author of *Image Politics: The New Rhetoric of Environmental Activism* and numerous articles exploring humanity-nature relations and technology, 2005, “Thinking with Heidegger Rethinking Environmental Theory and Practice”, in Ethics & the Environment 10.1 p. 67-87

Machination is unconditional controllability, the domination of all beings, the world, and earth through calculation, acceleration, technicity, and giganticism. Calculation represents a reduction of knowing to mathematics and science and a reduction of the world and earth to what is calculable, a step taken decisively by Descartes (1999, 84–96). Machination is the "pattern of generally calculable explainability, by which everything draws nearer to everything else equally and becomes completely alien to itself" (1999, 92). The unrestrained domination of machination produces a totalizing worldview that enchants: "When machination finally dominates and permeates everything, then there are no longer any conditions by which still actually to detect the enchantment and to protect oneself from it. The bewitchment by technicity and its constantly self-surpassing progress are only *one* sign of this enchantment, by **[End Page 75]** virtue of which everything presses forth into calculation, usage, breeding, manageability, and regulation" (1999, 86–87). Heidegger prophetically predicts that machination will produce "a gigantic progress of sciences in the future. These advancements will bring exploitation and usage of the earth as well as rearing and training of humans into conditions that are still inconceivable today" (1999, 108). Animals and plants are reduced to various forms of use value and, more significantly, are banished from Being-in-the-world with us: "What is a plant and an animal to us anymore, when we take away use, embellishment, and entertainment" (1999, 194). "Nature" suffers a similar fate: "What happens to nature in technicity, when nature is separated out from beings by the natural sciences? The growing—or better, the simple rolling unto its end—destruction of 'nature'.... And finally what was left was only 'scenery' and recreational opportunity and even this still calculated into the gigantic and arranged for the masses" (1999, 195). Under the unrestrained domination of machination, humans suffer a "hollowing out" (1999, 91, 348) and Being-in-the-world is replaced by "adventures." (I am here translating *Erlebnis* as adventure. Others translate it as lived-experience.)

Impact – Domination/Hierarchies

Anthropocentrism is used to justify domination over “inferior” humans.

Penelope Smith, “Animal Communication Specialist”, no date, http://www.anaflora.com/animalliberty/articles/penelope/pene-2.html

Many humans have an attitude that restricts their ability to understand or empathize with non-human animals and other life forms and has some serious consequences for all life on this planet. It is called anthropocentrism, or viewing man as the center or final aim of the universe. I refer to this in my book, Animal Talk, as the "human superiority complex" considering humans as superior to or the pinnacle of all forms of life. From the anthropocentric view, non-human beings that are most like human are usually considered more intelligent, for example, chimpanzees who learn to use sign language or dolphins who signal word or thought comprehension through touching electronic devices in their tanks. Animals or other life forms that don't express themselves in human ways by language or in terms easily comprehensible by common human standards are often considered less developed, inferior, more primitive or mechanistic, and usually of less importance than humans.  This viewpoint has been used to justify using animals as objects for human ends. Since humans are the superior creatures, "dumb, unfeeling" non-humans can be disregarded, mistreated, subjugated, killed or whole species eliminated without much concern for their existence in itself, only their usefulness or lack of it to humankind. Many humans, as they see other animals are more like them in patterns of behavior and expression of intelligence, begin to respect them more and treat them with more regard for their rights. However, this does not transcend the trap of anthropocentrism. To increase harmony of life on Earth, all beings need to be regarded as worthy of respect, whether seen as different or similar to the human species. The anthropocentric view toward animals echoes the way in which many humans have discriminated against other humans because they were of different cultures, races, religions, or sexes. Regarding others as less intelligent or substandard has commonly been used to justify domination, cruelty or elimination of them. Too often people label what they don't understand as inferior, dumb, or to be avoided, without attempting to understand a different way of being. More enlightened humans look upon meeting people, things or animals that are different than themselves as opportunities to expand their understanding, share new realities, and become more whole.

Impact – Empirically Destructive

Anthropocentric thinking made Hurricane Katrina such a terrible disaster.

Sacha Thompson ’08, a Centennial Fellow with the Sustainable Development Legal Initiative of the Leitner Center for International Law and Justice at Fordham Law School, The Role of the Environment in Poverty Alleviation, http://www.rainforest-alliance.org/resources/documents /environment\_role.pdf

In October 2004, Joel K. Bourne published an article in National Geographic depicting the devastation caused by a major hurricane tearing through New Orleans. In his article, hundreds of thousands of New Orleanians, many unable to evacuate before the storm, are drowned or trapped on rooftops as storm surges drive walls of water over the city’s levees. The floodwaters turn the city into a cesspool of contamination, toxic waste, decaying flesh, and disease. It is declared the worst natural disaster in the history of the United States (Bourne, 2004). As fantastic as this story seemed in 2004, the article is not entirely a work of fiction. Bourne interviewed several local engineers, fishermen, business owners, and scientists, all of whom agreed that Louisiana’s severely eroded wetlands—which protect the low-lying city of New Orleans from the severity of hurricanes—made Bourne’s disaster more of an inevitability than a possibility (Bourne, 2004). At 6:10 a.m. on August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina, a high-intensity Category 3 storm, made landfall in Louisiana (Knabb, Rhome, and Brown, 2005) and wreaked havoc on the city of New Orleans as if it used Bourne’s article for a blueprint.1 The destruction of Katrina was written all over the levee walls. New Orleans is a culturally rich and vital city carved out of the wetlands of the Mississippi Delta. Since its founding, it has been struggling to tame its surrounding environment—namely, to prevent the wetlands from swallowing the city whole. The massive feats of engineering that keep New Orleans dry and prosperous are truly a marvel. Ironically, these human-made marvels also aided Hurricane Katrina to cause as much destruction as it did. The destruction of the wetlands, the growth and exploitation of the oil industry, a deeply rooted legacy of racism, and ineffective governance jointly contributed to making Katrina the worst natural disaster in U.S. history. This chapter will explore the role that each of these factors played in the disaster. It will also offer suggestions drawn from the lessons of other disasters that may aid a rebuilt New Orleans in mitigating the devastation of the next, inevitable hurricane.

Alt – Questioning

We must question whether our political strategies reiterate anthropocentric logic

Kevin Michael DeLuca, Associate Professor of Speech Communication and adjunct in the Institute of Ecology at the University of Georgia, author of *Image Politics: The New Rhetoric of Environmental Activism* and numerous articles exploring humanity-nature relations and technology, 2005, “Thinking with Heidegger Rethinking Environmental Theory and Practice”, in Ethics & the Environment 10.1 p. 67-87

The question moves, then, from asking whether a strategy is effective or moral, to asking, "Does a strategy contribute to machination?" As our discussion should have made clear, machination is about a logic, not a particular machine. (This same point is true of Heidegger's later critique of technology.) Heidegger's critique of the logic of machination has the advantage of being able to be clearly distinguished from any particular machine or technology. Machination, to reiterate, is a logic characterized by calculation, giganticism, acceleration, and technicity wherein animals, plants, and the earth become objects, mere resources, and humans, also, are reduced to the service of a ravenous progress. To ask if a strategy contributes to machination, then, is to ask **[End Page 76]** whether it contributes to the degradation of the earth and the hollowing-out of the world, a particularly pressing question for environmentalists. Obviously, then, the mainstream strategy of setting up headquarters in the political center (Washington, D.C.) of global capitalism—arguably the finest manifestation of the logic of machination; and adopting such practices as lobbying, trading favors, making cash donations, doing fund-raising, hiring MBAs and lawyers to run operations, exchanging board memberships with major corporations, producing glossy magazines funded by advertising from car companies and other suspect sources, practicing media spin and public relations as if environmental groups are no different (except poorer) than GE, Exxon, Monsanto, and Union Carbide, is suspect. Mainstream groups have consciously adopted the politics, organizational structure, and discourse of machination. Yet even the practices of radical grassroots groups that eschew central organization and its attendant dangers deserve scrutiny. Beginning with Greenpeace in the 1970s and intensifying in the 1980s with the emergence of wilderness and environmental justice groups, the radical environmental movement has increasingly relied on managing images and manipulating media, in fact practicing what could be considered an oppositional grassroots public relations. If public relations, along with advertising, is the discourse of machination, a discourse of empty words in service of giganticism (bigger is better) and progress (newer is better), what are the consequences when radical environmental groups deploy that very discourse in efforts to reach the public through mass media? What are the consequences when Greenpeace champions the cause of furry baby harp seals at the neglect of less photogenic indicator species? Are the effects of this any different from when the much more compromised World Wildlife Fund (WWF) adopts the panda as its symbol and cause celebre? What are the consequences when Earth First!, the environmental justice group Kentuckians For The Commonwealth, and other grassroots groups conform to the constraints of the mass media (stunning images, sound bites, conflict focus, emotional appeals, and so on) and deploy the practices of public relations in order to stage image events? Is it possible to fundamentally challenge machination while using the techniques of machination? These are not rhetorical questions. I do not have the answers and I do not think there are easy answers. Instead, Heidegger offers the environmental movement the admonishment to question what **[End Page 77]** it takes for granted, to think about the presuppositions and practices that are reflexively deployed as a matter of course.

Alt – Deep Ecology

(1NC)

Rejecting anthropocentrism in favor of deep ecology allows us to become a plain member of the biotic community

Seed 88 (John Seed, founder and director of the Rainforest Information Centre in Australia, 1988, “Introduction,” from Thinking Like A Mountain - Towards A Council Of All Beings, also by John Seed, Joanna Macy, Pat Fleming, and Arne Naess http://www.rainforestinfo.org.au/deep-eco/TLAM%20text.htm //nimo)

The other root of the Council of All Beings, is a new philosophy of nature called "deep ecology.”3 In contrast to reform environmentalism which attempts only to treat some of the symptoms of the environmental crisis, deep ecology questions the fundamental premises and values of contemporary civilization. Our technological culture has co-opted and absorbed all other criticism, so that parts may be questioned but not the whole, while deep ecology as a fountain of revolutionary thought subjects the core of our social existence and our thinking to piercing scrutiny. Deep ecology recognizes that nothing short of a total revolution in consciousness will be of lasting use in preserving the life-support systems of our planet. Within the framework of deep ecology, and contrary to key assumptions of Judeo-Christian/Marxist/humanist tradition, humans are not to be viewed as the ultimate measure of value or as the crown of creation. We are but "a plain member" of the biotic community and our arrogance with respect to this community threatens not only ourselves but all of life. We must learn to "let beings be," to allow other species to follow their separate evolutionary destinies without dominating them. We must come to understand that life-forms do not constitute a pyramid with our species at the apex, but rather a circle where everything is connected to everything else. We must realize that the environment is not "out there," and that when we poison the air or the water or the soil, we poison ourselves because of the vast biological cycles within which we too are inextricably embedded. The themes of deep ecology echo the ancient earth wisdom of native peoples such as Chief Seattle (see page 67). They are further elaborated in this volume in "Beyond Anthropocentrism." (See page 35.) The intellectual acceptance of these concepts is difficult, as our entire socialization in western societies goes against them. An analysis of the political, economic, social and cultural block to a full appreciation of deep ecology would require a book in itself! Furthermore, intellectual acceptance of these concepts is not enough; enormous energies are needed for change to take place on a fundamental level. As Arne Naess points out in his chapter on "Self Realization," this knowledge must permeate us and become part of our very identity. This is not to deny our identity as humans but rather, as Naess argues, to place this identity within its proper perspective, within the larger perspective of our "ecological Self." But while full intellectual acceptance of the truths offered by deep ecology might be extremely difficult to attain, through the power of ritual we may be able to capture a glimpse of the possibilities of Self which are open to us.

Deep ecology allows reconnection and immersion in the natural

Rosenhek 5 (Ruth Rosenhek, MS Organisational Management, is an international environmental justice activist, educator, filmmaker, deep ecologist and Director of the Rainforest Information Centre in Lismore, February 15, 2005, presented at Two Fires Conference, Braidwood, “Deep Ecology Rituals For the New Century,” http://www.rainforestinfo.org.au/deep-eco/de\_rituals\_new\_century.html)

Deep ecology is a contemporary philosophy of nature that emphasizes our complete interdependence with the living Earth. To deep ecology, we humans are one strand in a complex interwoven web of natural relationships. No matter how much we modernize, technologize, consume, extract, manipulate and control, the fact still remains that we are of the Earth, made out of the very same stuff as the plants, the trees and the animals all around us, and the cosmos itself. Arne Naess, the Emeritus Professor of Philosophy of Oslo University who coined the term ‘deep ecology’ in the late 1960s, called for “community therapies” to heal the rift that we feel between ourselves and nature. These community therapies can be seen as the rituals and ceremonies that have long been lost in much of western culture. In fact, every intact indigenous culture that we look at has, at its root, a series of ceremonies and rituals whereby the human community acknowledges and nourishes its interconnectedness with the land and the rest of the Earth community through celebrations of the cycles of the Earth, the four seasons, the sun, the moon, the wind, the rain etc. In my work along with Joanna Macy, John Seed and many others, we have developed deep ecology rituals and ceremonies, creative processes, to ‘re-Earth’ ourselves; that is, to experience and remember our mutual reciprocity with the natural world. Through activities that evoke the imagination and sense of play as well as the strength of the gatherings themselves, many participants find themselves ready to shed the constraints of a busy material lifestyle and dare to re-discover the natural self or what Arne Naess calls the “Ecological Identity’. Thomas Berry, the well known theologian turned geologian, says that such rituals "give promise of a future with the understanding, the power, the aesthetic grandeur, and the emotional fulfillment needed to heal the damage that has already been wrought on the planet and to shape for Earth a viable future, a future with the entrancing qualities needed to endure the difficulties to be encountered and evoke the creativity needed."

Alt – Social Ecology

Reject anthropocentrism in favor of social ecology

Cochrane 6 (Alasdair Cochrane, PhD, Centre for the Study of Human Rights, 2006, originally from Internet Encyplopaedia of Philosophy, edited by James Fieser, Ph.D., founder and general editor and Bradley Dowden, Ph.D., general editor, “Environmental ethics,” http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/21190/1/Environmental\_ethics\_%28LSERO%29.pdf //nimo)

Social ecology shares with deep ecology the view that the foundations of the environmental crisis lie in the dominant ideology of modern western societies. Thus, just as with deep ecology, social ecology claims that in order to resolve the crisis, a radical overhaul of this ideology is necessary. However, the new ideology that social ecology proposes is not concerned with the ‘self-realization’ of deep ecology, but instead the absence of domination. Indeed, domination is the key theme in the writings of Murray Bookchin, the most prominent social ecologist. For Bookchin, environmental problems are directly related to social problems. In particular, Bookchin claims that the hierarchies of power prevalent within modern societies have fostered a hierarchical relationship between humans and the natural world (Bookchin, 1982). Indeed, it is the ideology of the free market that has facilitated such hierarchies, reducing both human beings and the natural world to mere commodities. Bookchin argues that the liberation of both humans and nature are actually dependent on one another. Thus his argument is quite different from Marxist thought, in which man’s freedom is dependent on the complete domination of the natural world through technology. For Bookchin and other social ecologists, this Marxist thinking involves the same fragmentation of humans from nature that is prevalent in capitalist ideology. Instead, it is argued that humans must recognize that they are part of nature, not distinct or separate from it. In turn then, human societies and human relations with nature can be informed by the nonhierarchical relations found within the natural world. For example, Bookchin points out that within an ecosystem, there is no species more important than another, instead relationships are mutualistic and interrelated. This interdependence and lack of hierarchy in nature, it is claimed, provides a blueprint for a non-hierarchical human society (Bookchin, 2001).

Alt Solvency – Extinction

Intellectual rejection of anthropocentrism renders us impervious to extinction

Seed 88 (John Seed, founder and director of the Rainforest Information Centre in Australia, 1988, “Beyond Anthropocentrism,” from Thinking Like A Mountain - Towards A Council Of All Beings, http://www.rainforestinfo.org.au/deep-eco/Anthropo.htm //nimo)

When humans investigate and see through their layers of anthropocentric self-cherishing, a most profound change in consciousness begins to take place. Alienation subsides. The human is no longer an outsider, apart. Your humanness is then recognised as being merely the most recent stage of your existence, and as you stop identifying exclusively with this chapter, you start to get in touch with yourself as mammal, as vertebrate, as a species only recently emerged from the rainforest. As the fog of amnesia disperses, there is a transformation in your relationship to other species, and in your commitment to them. What is described here should not be seen as merely intellectual. The intellect is one entry point to the process outlined, and the easiest one to communicate. For some people however, this change of perspective follows from actions on behalf of Mother Earth. "I am protecting the rainforest" develops to "I am part of the rainforest protecting myself. I am that part of the rainforest recently emerged into thinking." What a relief then! The thousands of years of imagined separation are over and we begin to recall our true nature. That is, the change is a spiritual one, thinking like a mountain (3), sometimes referred to as "deep ecology". As your memory improves, as the implications of evolution and ecology are internalised and replace the outmoded anthropocentric structures in your mind, there is an identification with all life, Then follows the realisation that the distinction between "life" and "lifeless" is a human construct. Every atom in this body existed before organic life emerged 4000 million years ago. Remember our childhood as minerals, as lava, as rocks? Rocks contain the potentiality to weave themselves into such stuff as this. We are the rocks dancing. Why do we look down on them with such a condescending air. It is they that are immortal part of us. (4) If we embark upon such an inner voyage, we may find, upon returning to present day consensus reality, that our actions on behalf of the environment are purified and strengthened by the experience. We have found here a level of our being that moth, rust, nuclear holocaust or destruction of the rainforest genepool do not corrupt. The commitment to save the world is not decreased by the new perspective, although the fear and anxiety which were part of our motivation start to dissipate and are replaced by a certain disinterestedness. We act because life is the only game in town, but actions from a disinterested, less attached consciousness may be more effective. Activists often don't have much time for meditation. The disinterested space we find here may be similar to meditation. Some teachers of meditation are embracing deep ecology (5) and vice versa(6).

Alt Solvency – New Morality

Challenging anthropocentrism allows for adoption of a new morality

Zeitler 99 (Ulli Zeitler, PhD, 1999, Centre for Social Science Research on the Environment (CeSaM) Aarhus University / Denmark, Trafikdag på AUC ́98, “An integrated model of a decision making basis for environmental impact assessment (EIA) of transport infrastructure investments,” http://trid.trb.org/view.aspx?id=639639 //nimo)

Impacts are relative in meaning, significance and extent to the particular moral subjects and their circumstances. For centuries it has been an uncontested assumption in modern liberal society to reserve the status of moral subjects to human beings and that of moral agents to a subclass of humanity, namely rational, experienced people. However recently, not only beyond moderne Western culture, but also as a result of critical reflection within that culture, this classical anthropocentric attitude has been repeatedly challenged. Considering the impact of our activities, Nature (not only human nature) has been awarded the status of moral relevance. Environmental impacts are not only impact of significance for human well-being and survival, but have some kind of moral importance of its own. It is now largely accepted that certain animals, plants and landscapes as well as urban heritages and natural resources should be preserved not only for present and future human societies, but partly also for their own sake and without identifiable utility effect. As a consequence, the class of moral subjects should be kept as open as possible.

Alt Solvency – Knowledge

Alt functions as an expansion of knowledge on human integration

Hayward 97 (Tim Hayward, Professor of Environmental Political Theory; Director of Just World Institute; Programme Director of MSc International Political Theory; University of Edinburgh; Feb 1997, Environmental Values, Vol. 6, No. 1 (February 1997), pp. 49-63, White Horse Press, “Anthropocentrism: A Misunderstood Problem,” via jstor //nimo)

The aim of overcoming anthropocentrism is intelligible if it is understood in terms of improving knowledge about the place of humans in the world; and this includes improving our knowledge about what constitutes the good of nonhuman beings. This kind of knowledge is significantly added to by objectivating science. There may also be a role for other kinds of knowledge - for instance, kinds characterised by empathetic imagining of how it might be like to be a member of another species (Cassano,1989); but here one must always be cautious about unwittingly projecting human perceptions on to beings whose actual perceptions may be radically different, since this would be to reintroduce just the sort of error that characterises ontological anthropocentrism.

A2: Perm

Inclusion of the aff in the alt dooms it to failure – disad to the perm

Papadopoulos 10 (Dr. Dimitris Papadopoulos, teaches politics, culture and organization at the School of Management, University of Leicester. 2010, ephemera, Vol. 10 “Insurgent posthumanism,” http://www.ephemeraweb.org/journal/10-2/10-2papadopoulos.pdf //nimo)

It is true that left politics have largely ignored the complexity and unpredictability of the entanglement between a deeply divided society and that of a deeply divided nonhuman world. The principle avenue for social transformation, at least in the main conceptualisations of the political left 3 , passes through seizing the centres of social and political power. The dominant motivation for left politics after the revolutions of 1848 (and definitely since 1871) has been how to conquer institutional power and the state. Within this matrix of radical left thinking the posthumanist moment becomes invalidated, subsumed to a strategy focused solely on social power. But here I want to argue that a post-humanist gesture can be found at the heart of processes of left political mobilisations that create transformative institutions and alternatives. This was the case even when such moves were distorted at the end, neutralised or finally appropriated into a form of left politics solely concerned with institutional representation and state power. What such an appropriation conceals is that a significant part of the everyday realities put to work through radical left struggles have always had a strong posthumanist character through their concentration on remaking the mundane material conditions of existence beyond and outside an immediate opposition to the state. In what follows I will try to excavate this posthumanist gesture from the main narratives of radical left political struggles along the following three fault lines: the first is about the exit from an alienated and highly regulated relation to the material, biological and technological realms through the making of a self-organised common world – a move from enclosed and separated worlds governed by labour to the making of ecological commons. A second posthumanist move is one that attacks the practice of politics as a matter of ideas and institutions and rehabilitates politics as an embodied and everyday practice – an exit from the representational mind to the embodiment of politics. Finally, the third, involves the decentring of the human subject as the main actor of history making. History is a human affair but it is not made (only) by certain groups of humans – a move towards a post-anthropocentric history.

State participation in the alt destroys any potential – empirically the state guts posthumanism

Papadopoulos 10 (Dr. Dimitris Papadopoulos, teaches politics, culture and organization at the School of Management, University of Leicester. 2010, ephemera, Vol. 10 “Insurgent posthumanism,” http://www.ephemeraweb.org/journal/10-2/10-2papadopoulos.pdf //nimo)

The question is then: how can we think posthumanism and radical left politics outside of mainstream posthumanism as well as outside dominant left traditions that focus solely on the obtaining of social power? How can left politics become more posthumanist (again) and how can posthumanism become more left again? In all previous incarnations of radical posthumanist left politics I described a picture which is not articulated through the fidelity to a situation which supersedes the state but through betraying the political thinking and everyday action regulated by the state. This is because the constituent force of left politics seems to be vanishing and the dialectic of constituent and constitutive power becomes the very ground on which control operates today. The constant focus on the state, which has exhausted the radical political potentials, leaves radical left politics in a space of powerlessness and simultaneously in a space of possibility. What then is radical left politics when it is not an antithetical subjectivity? Perhaps we can start with a speculation: the space of possibility for radical left politics today lies once again in a posthumanist gesture which is about making alternative forms of life.

A2: Inevitable/Human Nature

Inevitability args ignore thousands of years of evolution – and biocentrism solves inevitability

Seed 88 (John Seed, founder and director of the Rainforest Information Centre in Australia, 1988, “Beyond Anthropocentrism,” from Thinking Like A Mountain - Towards A Council Of All Beings, http://www.rainforestinfo.org.au/deep-eco/Anthropo.htm //nimo)

Of all the species that have existed, it is estimated that less than one in a hundred exist today. The rest are extinct. As environment changes, any species that is unable to adapt, to change, to evolve, is extinguished. All evolution takes place in this fashion In this way an oxygen starved fish, ancestor of yours and mine, commenced to colonise the land. Threat of extinction is the potter's hand that molds all the forms of life. The human species is one of millions threatened by imminent extinction through nuclear war and other environmental changes. And while it is true that the "human nature" revealed by 12,000 years of written history does not offer much hope that we can change our warlike, greedy, ignorant ways, the vastly longer fossil history assures us that we CAN change. We ARE the fish, and the myriad other death-defying feats of flexibility which a study of evolution reveals to us. A certain confidence ( in spite of our recent "humanity") is warranted. From this point of view, the threat of extinction appears as the invitation to change, to evolve. After a brief respite from the potter's hand, here we are back on the wheel again. The change that is required of us is not some new resistance to radiation, but a change in consciousness. Deep ecology is the search for a viable consciousness. Surely consciousness emerged and evolved according to the same laws as everything else. Molded by environ mental pressures, the mind of our ancestors must time and again have been forced to transcend itself. To survive our current environmental pressures, we must consciously remember our evolutionary and ecological inheritance. We must learn to think like a mountain. If we are to be open to evolving a new consciousness, we must fully face up to our impending extinction (the ultimate environmental pressure). This means acknowledging that part of us which shies away from the truth, hides in intoxication or busyness from the despair of the human, whose 4000 million year race is run, whose organic life is a mere hair's breadth from finished.(7) A biocentric perspective, the realisation that rocks WILL dance, and that roots go deeper that 4000 million years, may give us the courage to face despair and break through to a more viable consciousness, one that is sustainable and in harmony with life again.

A2: Biocentrism Bad

We’re not comparing the worth of humanity in relation to the environment—we acknowledge that humans are part of their environment

Kevin Michael DeLuca, Associate Professor of Speech Communication and adjunct in the Institute of Ecology at the University of Georgia, author of *Image Politics: The New Rhetoric of Environmental Activism* and numerous articles exploring humanity-nature relations and technology, 2005, “Thinking with Heidegger Rethinking Environmental Theory and Practice”, in Ethics & the Environment 10.1 p. 67-87

 The first stasis point revolves around humanity's relation to nature. To put it plainly, in environmental circles it is still a Cartesian world, wherein the founding act is human thinking (*cogito ergo sum*) and the **[End Page 71]** earth is object to humanity's subject. This position is clear in mainstream environmentalism, where humans act to save the object earth and, fundamentally, this action is motivated by the subject's self-interest. So, we must save the rain forests because they contain potential medical resources and because they alleviate global warming. Now certainly this base anthropocentrism has come under attack from various radical environmentalisms that posit biocentrism or ecocentrism. I would argue, however, that these anti-anthropocentric positions have not escaped the gravity of Cartesianism. This is evident at both theoretical and practical levels. Theoretically, in the effort to avoid the stain of anthropocentrism all beings are posited as having equal intrinsic worth/value and difference is leveled. The banana slug is equal to homo sapiens. There are problems with this. Most obviously, the concept of intrinsic worth/value is philosophically incoherent—worth/value by definition is always relational. More significantly for this discussion, to posit intrinsic worth/value is to deny the ecological insight that all beings are constituted in relation to other beings and their environment. Further, to deny difference is to blunt analysis of our current situation.

We don’t demonize humanity or advocate biocentrism—rather, we believe humanity should be viewed as a part of the biosphere

Kevin Michael DeLuca, Associate Professor of Speech Communication and adjunct in the Institute of Ecology at the University of Georgia, author of *Image Politics: The New Rhetoric of Environmental Activism* and numerous articles exploring humanity-nature relations and technology, 2005, “Thinking with Heidegger Rethinking Environmental Theory and Practice”, in Ethics & the Environment 10.1 p. 67-87

Citing the Cartesian ontology of the world as dominant, Heidegger in *Being and Time* works to "demonstrate explicitly not only that Descartes' conception of the world is ontologically defective, but that his Interpretation and the foundations on which it is based have led him to *pass over* both the phenomenon of the world and the Being of those entities within-the-world which are proximally ready-to-hand" (1962, 128). Briefly, Heidegger critiques Descartes for positing a "bare subject without a world" (1962, 192) and for relying on mathematics, which produces the sort of Reality it can grasp, thus "the kind of Being which belongs to sensuous perception is obliterated, and so is any possibility that the entities encountered in such perception should be grasped in their Being" (1962, 130). Descartes' ontology presumes the dynamic of an isolated subject grasping mathematically world as object. Arguably, it is this perspective that is at the root of the environmental crisis, for the world is reduced to an object laid out before me and I am reduced to a detached subject that has only a use-relation to a dead world. Heidegger disdains "the Cartesian approach of positing a subject one can come across in isolation" (1962, 248) and rejects the "perennial philosophical quest to prove that an 'external world' is present-at-hand" (1962, 250). Instead, Heidegger offers a different foundational starting point: "The Interpretation of the world begins, in the first instance, with some entity within-the-world, so that the phenomenon of the world in general no longer comes into view" (1962, 122). Humanity is never the isolated subject that surveys and grasps the world-as-object displayed before it. Heidegger continues: "Our investigation takes its orientation from Being-in-the-World—that basic state of Dasein by which every mode of its being gets co-determined" (1962, 153). Heidegger concludes: "In clarifying Being-in-the-world we have shown that a bare subject without a world never 'is' proximally, nor is it ever given"(1962, 152). Heidegger explicitly clarifies this point in response to Descartes: "If the '*cogito sum*' is to serve as the point of departure for the existential analytic of Dasein, then it needs to be turned around, and furthermore its **[End Page 73]** content needs new ontologico-phenomenal confirmation. The '*sum*' is then asserted first, and indeed in the sense that "I am in a world." As such an entity, 'I am' in the possibility of Being towards various ways of comporting myself—namely, *cogitationes*—as ways of Being alongside entities within the world" (1962, 254). Heidegger, then, is suggesting a Copernican revolution with respect to humanity's relation to the world, for it is never a matter of "to" but "in." Humanity is never a subject over and against or above the world apart from the world; rather, the subject is always in the world, a part of the world, and, indeed, is constituted by relations in the world. Further, in an important point that is not so clear in *Being and Time* but that becomes evident in later writings, "I am in the world" *on earth,* that Being-in-the-world is always already Being-in-the-world on earth. Earth is "that on which and in which man bases his dwelling.... Upon the earth and in it, historically man grounds his dwelling in the world.... The world grounds itself on the earth, and earth juts through world" (1993, 169, 171, 172). In displacing the subject-object dichotomy that so circumscribes environmental theory and practice, Heidegger's thought opens up a horizon of possibilities of other ways/beginnings/trajectories for environmentalism. What would it mean to approach all environmental issues from a fundamental understanding of Being-in-the-world on earth?

\*\*AFF

Perm

Perm do both – we can reject human domination and anthropocentrism without rejecting the aff

Strong 5 (David Strong, Professor of Philosophy and Environmental Studies at Rocky Mountain Colllege, 2005, Ed. Carl Mitcham. Vol. 2. Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2005. p653-661, Encyclopedia of Science, Technology, and Ethics, “Environmental Ethics,” acc on Gale)

Val Plumwood in particular has shown that concerns about anthropocentrism can be addressed in the same ways concerns with androcentrism are dealt with by her, without giving up personal points of view, which she argues is impossible (Plumwood 1999). More specific analyses of anthropocentrism allow people to devise more alternatives to it. However arguments for an end to the domination of nature entirely are too general. One can criticize a limitless technological domination of nature without claiming that all human domination is unwarranted. Even though Warren rappels down a cliff as opposed to climbing and dominating it, she uses technological devices that lessen the risk involved and insure that the activity is performed safely. Whether humans use bicycles, public transportation, or SUVs to reach such cliffs, they use technology that dominates nature to some extent, albeit almost imperceptibly. What human beings must learn is to carefully limit technology and technological domination.

Aff Comes First

Anthropocentric ideology is a prerequisite to biocentrism

Hayward 97 (Tim Hayward, Professor of Environmental Political Theory; Director of Just World Institute; Programme Director of MSc International Political Theory; University of Edinburgh; Feb 1997, Environmental Values, Vol. 6, No. 1 (February 1997), pp. 49-63, White Horse Press, “Anthropocentrism: A Misunderstood Problem,” via jstor)

To begin with, there are some ways in which humans cannot help being human-centred. Anyone's view of the world is shaped and limited by their position and way of being within it: from the perspective of any particular being or species there are real respects in which they are at the centre of it. Thus, as Ferr6 for instance points out, to the extent that humans 'have no choice but to think as humans' what he calls 'perspectival anthropocentrism' would appear to be inescapable (FerrS, 1994, p.72). It would also appear to be unavoidable that we should be interested in ourselves and our own kind. There may indeed be respects in which human-centredness is unobjectionable - for humans, like any other beings, have legitimate interests which there is no reason for them not to pursue. As Mary Midgley (1994, p.l 1 1) observes, 'people do right, not wrong, to have a particular regard for their own kin and their own species'. She points out, moreover, that human-centredness may in some respects be positively desirable: for just as the term 'self-centred' has been used figuratively in the past to describe well-organised, balanced people, (Midgley, 1994, p. 103) so being human-centred can mean having a well-balanced conception of what it means to be a human, and of how humans take their place in the world - the sort of conception bound up with normative ideas of 'humanity' and 'humaneness'. Furthermore, human-centredness may be positively desirable: if, as various philosophers and psychologists have pointed out, (Cf. Hayward, 1995, pp.54- 62) self-love, properly understood, can be considered a precondition of loving others, so, by analogy, it could be maintained that only if humans know how to treat their fellow humans decently will they begin to be able to treat other species decently. In sum, a positive concern for human well-being need not automati- cally preclude a concern for the well-being of non-humans, and may even serve to promote it.

Alt Turns

Attempts to overcome anthropocentrism are impossible and create worse forms of anthropocentrism

Hayward 97 (Tim Hayward, Professor of Environmental Political Theory; Director of Just World Institute; Programme Director of MSc International Political Theory; University of Edinburgh; Feb 1997, Environmental Values, Vol. 6, No. 1 (February 1997), pp. 49-63, White Horse Press, “Anthropocentrism: A Misunderstood Problem,” via jstor)

But if the project of overcoming speciesism can be pursued with some expectation of success, this is not the case with the overcoming of anthropocentrism. What makes anthropocentrism unavoidable is a limitation of a quite different sort, one which cannot be overcome even in principle because it involves a non-contingent limitation on moral thinking as such. While overcoming speciesism involves a commitment to the pursuit of knowledge of relevant similarities and differences between humans and other species, the criteria of relevance will always have an ineliminable element of anthropocentrism about them. Speciesism is the arbitrary refusal to extend moral consideration to relevantly similar cases; the ineliminable element of anthropocentrism is marked by the impossibility of giving meaningful moral consideration to cases which bear no similarity to any aspect of human cases. The emphasis is on the 'meaningful' here: for in the abstract one could of course declare that some feature of the nonhuman world was morally valuable, despite meeting no determinate criterion of value already recognised by any human, but because the new value is completely unrelated to any existing value it will remain radically indeterminate as a guide to action. If the ultimate point of an ethic is to yield a determinate guide to human action, then, the human reference is ineliminable even when extending moral concern to nonhumans. So my argument is that one cannot know if any judgement is speciesist if one has no benchmark against which to test arbitrariness; and, more specifically, if we are concerned to avoid speciesism of humans then one must have standards of comparison between them and others. Thus features of humans remain the benchmark. As long as the valuer is a human, the very selection of criteria of value will be limited by this fact. It is this fact which precludes the possibility of a radically nonanthropocentric value scheme, if by that is meant the adoption of a set of values which are supposed to be completely unrelated to any existing human values. Any attempt to construct a radically non-anthropocentric value scheme is liable not only to be arbitrary - because founded on no certain knowledge - but also to be more insidiously anthropocentric in projecting certain values, which as a matter of fact are selected by a human, onto nonhuman beings without certain warrant for doing so. This, of course, is the error of anthropomorphism, and will inevitably, I believe, be committed in any attempt to expunge anthropocentrism altogether.

Criticisms of anthropocentrism are fallacious and cause worse anthropocentric ideology

Hayward 97 (Tim Hayward, Professor of Environmental Political Theory; Director of Just World Institute; Programme Director of MSc International Political Theory; University of Edinburgh; Feb 1997, Environmental Values, Vol. 6, No. 1 (February 1997), pp. 49-63, White Horse Press, “Anthropocentrism: A Misunderstood Problem,” via jstor)

Proposals for the 'rejection' of anthropocentrism are unhelpful because they cloud the real problem they think to address. The problem has to do with a lack of concern with nonhumans but the term anthropocentrism can all too plausibly be understood as meaning an excessive concern with humans.4 The latter, however, is not the problem at all. On the contrary, a cursory glance around the world would confirm that humans show a lamentable lack of interest in the well- being of other humans. Moreover, even when it is not other humans whose interests are being harmed, but other species or the environment, it would generally be implausible to suggest that those doing the harm are being 'human- centred'. To see this, one only has to consider some typical practices which are appropriately criticised. Some examples would be: hunting a species to extinc- tion; destroying a forest to build a road and factories; animal experimentation. In the case of hunting a species to extinction, this is not helpfully or appropriately seen as 'anthropocentrism' since it typically involves one group of humans who are actually condemned by (probably a majority of) other humans who see the practice not as serving human interests in general, but the interests of one quite narrowly-defined group, such as poachers or whalers. A similar point can be made regarding the destruction of the forest - for those who derive economic benefit from the destruction oppose not only the human interests of indigenous peoples whose environment is thereby destroyed, but also the interests of all humans who depend on the oxygen such forests produce. The case of animal experimentation, however, brings to the fore a feature which looks as if it could more plausibly be said to be anthropocentric: for if we suppose that the benefits of the experimentation are intended to accrue to any and all humans who might need the medicine or technique experimented, then there would seem to be a clear case of humans benefiting as a species from the use and abuse of other species. But the 'if is important here. A reason why I am inclined to resist calling this anthropocentrism is that the benefits may in fact not be intended or destined for humans generally, but only for those who can afford to pay to keep the drug company in profit. As in the other two cases, it is unhelpful to cover over this fundamental point and criticise humanity in general for practices carried out by a limited number of humans when many others may in fact oppose them. There is in any case no need to describe the practice as anthropocentric when it is quite clearly speciesist - it is not the concern with human welfare per se that is the problem here, but the arbitrary privileging of that welfare over the welfare of members of other species. So a reason why critiques of anthropocentrism are unhelpful is that the problems the term is used to highlight do not arise out of a concern of humans with humans, but from a lack of concern for non-humans. I earlier explained why this lack of concern is not appropriately termed anthropocentrism; I now add the further consideration that practices manifesting a lack of concern for nonhumans very often go hand in hand with a lack of concern for other humans too. Taking this line of argument a step further it becomes evident that anti- anthropocentric rhetoric is not only unhelpful, but positively counterproductive. It is not only conceptually mistaken, but also a practical and strategic mistake, to criticise humanity in general for practices of specific groups of humans. If the point of anti-anthropocentric rhetoric is to highlight problems, to make them vivid in order to get action, then misrepresenting the problem is liable to make solutions all the harder. Something particularly to emphasise is that when radical critics of anthropocentrism see themselves as opposed to defenders of human interests they are seriously in error. From what has just been said about the specificity of environmental, ecological or animal harms merely being disguised by putting the blame on humans in general, it should be evident that those who are concerned about such harms in fact make common cause with those concerned with issues of social justice. The real opponents of both sorts of concern are the ideologists who, in defending harmful practices in the name of 'humans in general', obscure the real causes of the harms as much as the real incidence of benefits: the harms seldom affect all and only nonhumans; the benefits seldom accrue to all humans.5 Yet by appearing to accept the ideolo- gists' own premises, anti-anthropocentric rhetoric plays right into their hands: by appearing to endorse the ideological view that 'humans in general' benefit from the exploitative activities of some, the anti-anthropocentrists are left vulnerable to ideological rejoinders to the effect that challenging those activities is merely misanthropic. The opposite is in fact nearer the truth, I believe, because it will more often be the case that challenging such practices is in the interests of humans more generally.

A2: Ethics

Anti-anthropocentric ethics are misplaced and counterproductive

Hayward 97 (Tim Hayward, Professor of Environmental Political Theory; Director of Just World Institute; Programme Director of MSc International Political Theory; University of Edinburgh; Feb 1997, Environmental Values, Vol. 6, No. 1 (February 1997), pp. 49-63, White Horse Press, “Anthropocentrism: A Misunderstood Problem,” via jstor)

ABSTRACT: Anthropocentrism can intelligibly be criticised as an ontological error, but attempts to conceive of it as an ethical error are liable to conceptual and practical confusion. After noting the paradox that the clearest instances of overcoming anthropocentrism involve precisely the sort of objectivating knowl- edge which many ecological critics see as itself archetypically anthropocentric, the article presents the following arguments: there are some ways in which anthropocentrism is not objectionable; the defects associated with anthropocentrism in ethics are better understood as instances of speciesism and human chauvinism; it is unhelpful to call these defects anthropocentrism because there is an ineliminable element of anthropocentrism in any ethic at all; moreover, because the defects do not typically involve a concern with human interests as such, the rhetoric of anti-anthropocentrism is counterproductive in practice.