# Space-Specific Materials

## Permutation

### The permutation is best—it *re-deploys* space exploration to deconstruct anthropocentrism.

Weston 9 — Anthony Weston, Professor of Philosophy and Environmental Studies at Elon University, 2009 (“Eco-Philosophy in Space,” *The Incompleat Eco-Philosopher: Essays from the Edges of Environmental Ethics*, Published by State University of New York Press, ISBN 9780791476697, p. 171)

Thus the critique. It applies not merely to the space program, of course: that is only one more melancholy case in point. There are all too many familiar examples of “backgrounding” right here on Earth. Likewise we may certainly undertake to foreground Earth, to bring Life Right Here back onto center stage, without reference to the space-age imagination either. Yet I want to suggest that there is at least one way to “foreground” the Earth that can be furthered precisely by the space-age imagination. Here, at least, the invitation is not to simply decry the space program and insist on an Earth-based perspective after all, but instead to use space exploration’s own tools, and the genuinely new imaginative horizons it offers, to bring us back to Earth.

### The alternative *isn’t a reason to reject the plan*—the permutation disconnects space exploration from anthropocentrism.

Weston 9 — Anthony Weston, Professor of Philosophy and Environmental Studies at Elon University, 2009 (“Eco-Philosophy in Space,” *The Incompleat Eco-Philosopher: Essays from the Edges of Environmental Ethics*, Published by State University of New York Press, ISBN 9780791476697, p. 166)

An extraterrestrial perspective may also reframe our thinking about wilderness. Mars has mountains three times the height of Everest. A passing storm on Jupiter or Saturn could swallow the whole Earth and barely notice. The rugged hills of Moon are both strangely familiar and yet unearthly. If “wild” means, in part, self-possessed, “untrammeled,” or sublime, then surely all of this is paradigmatically wild too. Yet that term does not quite work either, and it is only partly because these extraterrestrial “wilds” are so far off the scale of anything terrestrial. We are concerned with “wilderness” on Earth partly because such places are under siege, places where the human presence is not only problematic but sometimes, arguably, ought to be excluded. Some environmentalists, it is true, are willing enough to extend these implications to other worlds. But the cases may not be analogous. When wild places really are in danger, staying out makes sense. That the same kind of restrictiveness applies to entire unexplored and unpressured worlds is not so clear.

More crucial may be the spirit in which we go. Aboriginal peoples, after all, were not trammeling the land in the first place, at least by the European standards that are usually implicit in this sort of discussion. Still, they often did alter the landscape and ecology in significant ways. Nor would most environmentalists claim that Thoreau or Muir, say, or the Romantic poets and painters, should have stayed away from Walden Pond or the Adirondacks or the High Sierra.9 The human presence as such is not necessarily problematic. So we may not want to argue that humans ought not to go into space at all; at any rate, that is not somehow the only possible environmentalist view of the matter. Again, though, the deeper and more challenging point is that our usual normative and conceptual baggage—wilderness, biocentrism, and so on—might not be up to spaceflight either. The appropriate conclusion is at the very least not clear. In these thoughts, then, there is a certain “escape velocity” from the conceptual and ethical environment of Earth as well: not an escape from ethics as such—that had better be emphasized right away—but an invitation to rethink everything in a vastly different and larger context.

## Case Prerequisite To Alt

### Causality only goes our direction—space exploration is a prerequisite to the alternative.

Weston 9 — Anthony Weston, Professor of Philosophy and Environmental Studies at Elon University, 2009 (“Eco-Philosophy in Space,” *The Incompleat Eco-Philosopher: Essays from the Edges of Environmental Ethics*, Published by State University of New York Press, ISBN 9780791476697, p. 164-165)

The space program is a human project, pursuing all-too-human goals not only in the crass sense—planting the flag on the Moon, say, or mining asteroids—but subtly too, as when scientists see in Moon or Mars certain previous phases in Earth’s own geological or (possibly) biological evolution, and hence justify space exploration on the grounds that we will thereby learn more about ourselves. There is also the persistent argument that space-based technologies benefit everyday life back home. Still, all the same, whatever else may be said about space exploration, one basic feature is that it insistently forces upon us a larger-than-human perspective—in fact, a vastly larger-than-human perspective. For environmentalists, still struggling to inch our fellows even just slightly out of an anthropocentric point of view, achieving such a philosophical “escape velocity” is no small thing.

Apollo 11 planted the flag, of course, but the largest TV audience in history tuned in for something far more primal: to share the first direct encounter with another world. The first few landings were in relatively safe and consequently flat and featureless places—no one knew what it would be like to land a spacecraft with so little margin of safety so unimaginably far from home—but once the basic skills were down, they started going to really wild places: edges of craters, up into mountain ranges, down into the canyons of Hadley Rille. Fewer people have seen these photos, but they are as stunning as any landscape photography from Earth—more stunning, maybe, for the setting is, after all, Moon.4 The nationalism, even the anthropocentric self-congratulations (“giant leap for mankind”), gain their power from this primal fascination, not the other way around.

The momentum continues. Mars has been orbited and mapped for decades, and the rovers now on its surface can be followed move- by-move on the Web. Vast reservoirs of Martian water (ice) are known. An earlier mission took a photo of Earth and Moon together from the Martian surface—a perfect complement to Apollo’s world-historical Earth-from-Moon picture.5 The outer gas giants have had close flybys, and now even their moons attract attention: the Cassini Saturn mission swung around Earth once and Venus twice to reach the ringed planet, along the way landing a probe on the dynamic and perplexing surface of Saturn’s moon Titan. Several spacecraft have left the solar system [end page 164] entirely.6 Asteroids, comets, and all sorts of matter and other forces traverse even the so-called emptiness of “space” itself, which physicists tell us is more a matter of relative density than the old Newtonian uniform-but-unoccupied Cartesian “space” anyway—pure “space,” strictly speaking, does not exist.

Just in the last year or so, hundreds of planets, some of them potentially Earth-like, have been discovered in other solar systems. Farther out lie vaster and unimaginably different kinds of objects: black holes, neutron stars, and other galaxies, billions of them, to the edge of the universe itself.

Philosophically too, all of this may end up carrying us very much further than we thought we were going. In Hegelian terms, that photo of the Earth-Moon system from Mars arguably marks a whole new dialectical stage. Now we can begin to see previous opposites in their unity and connection. Looking at Earth from Moon we begin to think past anthropocentrism. Looking at Earth-and-Moon from Mars, we may begin to think past the very opposition between anthropocentrism and “nonanthropocentrism” itself. The whole distinction begins to seem Earth-bound. “Nonanthropocentrism” is just a negation, after all. As nascent “Solarians,” seeing ourselves as one node of a much larger system, we may awaken to the need for a new, more inclusive, positive ethic.

# Generic Materials

## Anthropocentrism Inevitable/Good

### Anthropocentrism is inevitable and good—the alternative links to the critique and makes it impossible to protect the biosphere.

Grey 93 — William Grey, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Queensland, 1993 (“Anthropocentrism and Deep Ecology,” *Australiasian Journal of Philosophy*, Volume 71, Number 4, Available Online at http://www.uq.edu.au/~pdwgrey/pubs/anthropocentrism.html, Accessed 07-27-2011)

The attempt to provide a genuinely non-anthropocentric set of values, or preferences seems to be a hopeless quest. Once we eschew all human values, interests and preferences we are confronted with just too many alternatives, as we can see when we consider biological history over a billion year time scale. The problem with the various non-anthropocentric bases for value which have been proposed is that they permit too many different possibilities, not all of which are at all congenial to us. And that matters. We should be concerned to promote a rich, diverse and vibrant biosphere. Human flourishing may certainly be included as a legitimate part of such a flourishing.

The preoccupations of deep ecology arise as a result of human activities which impoverish and degrade the quality of the planet's living systems. But these judgements are possible only if we assume a set of values (that is, preference rankings), based on human preferences. We need to reject not anthropocentrism, but a particularly short term and narrow conception of human interests and concerns. What's wrong with shallow views is not their concern about the well-being of humans, but that they do not really consider enough in what that well-being consists. We need to develop an enriched, fortified anthropocentric notion of human interest to replace the dominant short-term, sectional and self-regarding conception.

Our sort of world, with our sort of fellow occupants is an interesting and engaging place. There is every reason for us to try to keep it, and ourselves, going for a few more cosmic seconds [10].

## Alternative Bad—General

### It’s *impossible* to escape anthropocentrism—the alt fails.

Grey 93 — William Grey, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Queensland, 1993 (“Anthropocentrism and Deep Ecology,” *Australiasian Journal of Philosophy*, Volume 71, Number 4, Available Online at http://www.uq.edu.au/~pdwgrey/pubs/anthropocentrism.html, Accessed 07-27-2011)

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### The alternative fails—can’t escape anthropocentrism.

Grey 93 — William Grey, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Queensland, 1993 (“Anthropocentrism and Deep Ecology,” *Australiasian Journal of Philosophy*, Volume 71, Number 4, Available Online at http://www.uq.edu.au/~pdwgrey/pubs/anthropocentrism.html, Accessed 07-27-2011)

There is an obvious tension which arises when attempting to rectify the first two worries at the same time. For extolling the virtues of the natural, while at the same time vilifying the man-made or artificial, depends on a distinction between the natural and the artificial which the stress on a continuity between human and nonhuman (the focus of the second worry) undermines. On the one side there is emphasis on continuity and dependency, and on the other on distinctness and separation. It seems that, while we are a part of nature, our actions are nevertheless unnatural. This is one of the points where deep ecologists often risk lapsing into an incoherence, from which they are able to save themselves (as I will illustrate) with the help of a little covert anthropocentrism. Or putting the point another way, a suitably enriched (non-atomistic) conception of humans as an integral part of larger systems—that is, correcting the misconception of humanity as distinct and separate from the natural world—means that anthropocentric concern for our own well-being naturally flows on to concern for the nonhuman world. If we value ourselves and our projects, and part of us is constituted by the natural world, then these evaluations will be transmitted to the world. That we habitually assume characteristically anthropocentric perspectives and values is claimed by deep ecologists to be a defect. And as a corrective to this parochialism, we are invited to assume an "ecocentric" (Rolston 1986, Callicott 1989) or "biocentric" (Taylor 1986) perspective. I am not persuaded, however, that it is intelligible to abandon our anthropocentric perspective in favour of one which is more inclusive or expansive. We should certainly abandon a crude conception of human needs which equates them (roughly) with the sort of needs which are satisfied by extravagant resource use. But the problem with so-called "shallow" views lies not in their anthropocentrism, but rather with the fact that they are characteristically short-term, sectional, and self-regarding. A suitably enriched and enlightened anthropocentrism provides the wherewithal for a satisfactory ethic of obligation and concern for the nonhuman world. And a genuinely non-anthropocentric view delivers only confusion.

### The alternative can’t replace anthropocentric values.

Grey 93 — William Grey, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Queensland, 1993 (“Anthropocentrism and Deep Ecology,” *Australiasian Journal of Philosophy*, Volume 71, Number 4, Available Online at http://www.uq.edu.au/~pdwgrey/pubs/anthropocentrism.html, Accessed 07-27-2011)

Other natural properties—such as biodiversity, beauty, harmony, stability, and integrity—have been proposed to provide a non-anthropocentric basis for value. But unless we smuggle in some anthropocentric bearings, they fare no better than the property of being the outcome of a natural process in providing an intuitively plausible ordering of better and worse states of the world. For example, if biodiversity is taken as a basic value-giving characteristic, then the state of the planet just after the Cambrian explosion (about 570 million years ago) would be rated much more highly than the world of the present, as it was far richer in terms of the range and diversity of its constituent creatures. Most biology textbooks recognize between twenty and thirty extant animal phyla—the phylum being the fundamental design plan of an organism (and the second broadest classification, following 'kingdom', in biological taxonomy). Yet the Burgess Shale, one small quarry in British Columbia dating back some 530 million years, contains the remains of fifteen to twenty organisms so unlike one another, or anything now living, as to each constitute a separate phylum (Gould 1989). In terms of basic diversity, a far greater range of radically different anatomical types existed at that epoch of evolutionary development. These examples disclose a serious difficulty for a view such as Goodin's which seeks a non-anthropocentric naturalistic basis for value [9]. The fundamental problem is that we can rank preferences only given some anthropocentric bearings. An austerely ecocentric or biocentric perspective delivers no determinate answer as to which of the abundant and wonderfully various unfolding planetary biotas should be preferred.

## Alternative Bad—Extinction DA

### Their alternative means we all die—it *makes extinction inevitable*.

Grey 93 — William Grey, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Queensland, 1993 (“Anthropocentrism and Deep Ecology,” *Australiasian Journal of Philosophy*, Volume 71, Number 4, Available Online at http://www.uq.edu.au/~pdwgrey/pubs/anthropocentrism.html, Accessed 07-27-2011)

Suppose that astronomers detect a modest asteroid or comet, say five or ten kilometres diameter, on collision course with planet Earth [8]. The impending collision would be perfectly natural all right, and cataclysmic enough to do to us what another one rather like it probably did to the dinosaurs. Such periodic disruptive events are natural all right, though they probably destroy most of the then extant large life forms. These times of renewal provide opportunities for smaller, flexible organisms to radiate opportunistically into vacated niches, and life goes on. From a biocentric or ecocentric perspective there is little doubt that our demise would provide comparable opportunities for development which we currently prevent. Should we, in <470> such circumstances, step aside so that evolution can continue on its majestic course? I think not, and I think further that interference with the natural course of events, if it could be effected, would be no bad thing—at least from our point of view and in terms of our interests, which it is quite legitimate to promote and favour.

Suppose again that we are entering one of the periodic epochs of reduced solar energy flux. An ice age is imminent, with massive disruptions to the agriculturally productive temperate zones. However suppose further that by carefully controlled emissions of greenhouse gases it would be possible to maintain a stable and productive agriculture. No doubt this would be to the detriment of various arctic plant and animal species, but I do not think that such interference, though "unnatural" would be therefore deplorable. Nature in and of itself is not, I suggest, something to be valued independently of human interests. It could be argued moreover that in thus modifying our natural environment, we would be following the precedent of three billion years of organic evolution, since according to the Gaia hypothesis of Lovelock (1979), the atmosphere and oceans are not just biological products, but biological constructions.

### Life in some form is inevitable but human life is uniquely good—radical ecology makes extinction inevitable.

Grey 93 — William Grey, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Queensland, 1993 (“Anthropocentrism and Deep Ecology,” *Australiasian Journal of Philosophy*, Volume 71, Number 4, Available Online at http://www.uq.edu.au/~pdwgrey/pubs/anthropocentrism.html, Accessed 07-27-2011)

A great deal of hyperbole has been deployed in articulating the claims of deep ecology. It is common, for example, to encounter claims that destructive human activity—and in particular human technology—is threatening life on the planet; that we are disrupting the delicate fabric of the ecosphere, and driving it towards collapse. Such claims are exaggerated. There have been far more traumatic disruptions to the planet than any we can initiate. From a long-term planetary perspective, this is alarmist nonsense. However from an anthropocentric point of view such fears may be well founded.

If the concerns for humanity and nonhuman species raised by advocates of deep ecology are expressed as concerns about the fate of the planet, then these concerns are misplaced. From a planetary perspective, we may be entering a phase of mass extinction of the magnitude of the Cretaceous. For planet earth that is just another incident in a four and a half billion year saga. Life will go on—in some guise or other. The arthropods, algae and the ubiquitous bacteria, at least, will almost certainly be around for a few billion years more. And with luck and good management, some of the more complex and interesting creatures, such as ourselves, may continue for a while longer as well. Of course our present disruptive and destructive activities are, or should be, of great concern to us all. But that is a quite properly human concern, expressing anthropocentric values from an anthropocentric perspec- <469> tive. Life will continue; but we should take steps to maintain and preserve our sort of living planet; one that suits us and, with a few exceptions, our biotic co-existents.

### Anthropocentric values are *the only way* to prevent extinction.

Grey 93 — William Grey, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Queensland, 1993 (“Anthropocentrism and Deep Ecology,” *Australiasian Journal of Philosophy*, Volume 71, Number 4, Available Online at http://www.uq.edu.au/~pdwgrey/pubs/anthropocentrism.html, Accessed 07-27-2011)

This passage is revealing. Note the characterization of the Age of Mammals as "richer" than the Age of Reptiles. As mammal chauvinists we might agree, but it is not clear on what grounds Callicott can justify the claim. It is also easy to agree that our demise, and the demise of the ecosystem which currently supports us, would be a matter of regret. But clearly it would be regrettable because of a decidedly anthropocentric set of values, interests and perceptions—if Callicott really eschews such concerns entirely, the grounds on which his regret is based are deprived of any foundation. There are various levels of description for any natural system, and the level which we adopt is inevitably interest relative. From a perspective which ascribes special value to living systems, Venus and Mars are pretty disappointing planets. However from a purely physical point of view it may be that they are, like Earth, complex equilibrium systems with energy cycles operating through the energy flux of our local star. The reason that the purely physical descriptions are unhelpful for characterizing what makes this planet better than the others in some important respects is that it is the wrong level of organization for explaining what conditions <473> are conducive to the flourishing of creatures like us. It is, once again, interest relative. Conceivably a silicon-based life form would find the temperature and atmosphere of Venus congenial, and of Earth execrable. As carbon chauvinists we should feel free to dissent from that judgement.

## Alternative Bad—Ecocentrism

### Their radical devotion to ecocentrism collapses into nihilism and paralysis.

Brown 95 — Charles S. Brown, Professor of Philosophy at Emporia State University, 1995 (“Anthropocentrism and Ecocentrism: the quest for a new worldview,” *The Midwest Quarterly*, Volume 36, Number 2, Winter, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Information Access)

Deep ecologists regularly urge us to replace our anthropocentrism with an ecocentrism which advocates egalitarian attitudes toward all entities and forms in nature. In this suggestion, too, there is both promise and peril. Its promise lies in the hope that we will be able to see ourselves as enjoying a solidarity with nature. This is an expression of the wholistic motif present in all forms of ecological thinking. The radical egalitarianism of ecocentrism will, however, collapse into nihilism if no distinctions of value are made. To claim that everything has an equal and intrinsic value to everything else is to value nothing above anything else. Due to my place in the evolutionary-ecological system I cannot value the life of a child in a ghetto tenement and the lives of a family of rats equally. To do so would be to abdicate all value and leave me unable to act. It is a part of the predicament of every species to act from its self interest and to choose to spare the life of any innocent person over the lives of a family of rats in an expression of this evolutionary imperative.

### Ecocentrism results in oppression and nihilism.

Brown 95 — Charles S. Brown, Professor of Philosophy at Emporia State University, 1995 (“Anthropocentrism and Ecocentrism: the quest for a new worldview,” *The Midwest Quarterly*, Volume 36, Number 2, Winter, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Information Access)

There is a concern among ecologically minded thinkers that ecocentrism may itself be used as an ideology of domination. It is widely believed that the current level of human interference with the ecosphere cannot be justified and needs to be reduced. It has been argued that some forms of ecocentrism lead to the rejection of individual rights and interests for the good of the whole ecosphere. It is not an unreasonable concern to suspect that such a worldview could possibly sanction efforts to quickly reduce human population to ecologically manageable levels. In spite of these totalitarian dangers the ecocentric model is useful as a foil in the critique of the anthropocentric model. I can only suggest without argument that the development of truly benign forms of anthropocentrism will be consistent with benign forms of ecocentrism. Ecological thinking will remain with us and like all other forms of thinking it is human thinking. If such thinking is to be guided by the sense of justice it can only be the human sense of justice which serves as its beacon.

All three forms of ecological thinking previously mentioned share the vision of a wholistic worldview which is explicitly contrary to the atomism of the mechanistic and organic worldviews. The ecocentric worldview, like the organic, however, sees value in non-human entities. The task that a viable form of ecocentrism faces is to conceive of the value inherent in non-human entities without falling into the nihilism of radical egalitarianism. This is a task yet to be completed.

## Alternative Bad—Nazism DA

### Calls for harmony with nature are dangerous—the underlying assumptions of their alternative are rooted in the logic of Nazism.

Zimmerman 91 — Michael E. Zimmerman, Professor of Philosophy at Tulane University, 1991 (“Deep Ecology, Ecoactivism, and Human Evolution,” *ReVision*, Volume 13, Number 3, Reprinted in ReVision (2002, Vol. 24, No. 4), Available Online via Information Access, p. 43 (in 2002 reprint))

Fascism may be regarded, at least in part, as a phenomenon of recollectivization, a regressive movement in which people willingly surrender the anxiety and guilt associated with responsibility and freedom. The self-assertiveness involved in modern anthrocentrism (whether collectivistic or individualistic) demands actions that cause great harm to natural systems, to the “Mother” from which we spring. Implication in such actions may precipitate a sense of guilt and defilement, as well as a corresponding need for reconciliation and purification. The fact that National Socialism remains secretly fascinating to so many people is indicative of the widespread longing to relinquish the alienation of modernity, to be purified of the defilement caused by the self-assertive transgressions involved in individuation, and to regain lost communal and natural ties. The danger of Heidegger’s view of history as a course of decline and degeneration, then, is that it invites psychological regression and a destructive social recollectivization, a type that we have witnessed too often in this violent century. Deep ecology, then, cannot call for a return to the guilt-free, undefiled days when humankind and nature allegedly existed “in harmony.” Instead, deep ecology must urge that humankind continue the evolutionary developments that led first from original unity toward increasing individuation and that may ultimately lead to Self-realization.

## Permutation—General

### Only the permutation enables tough decision-making—the alternative alone results in *policy and ethical paralysis*.

Grey 93 — William Grey, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Queensland, 1993 (“Anthropocentrism and Deep Ecology,” *Australiasian Journal of Philosophy*, Volume 71, Number 4, Available Online at http://www.uq.edu.au/~pdwgrey/pubs/anthropocentrism.html, Accessed 07-27-2011)

There are a number of problems with such a permissive criterion of moral considerability. One is that there are conflicts of interest between goal-directed entities, and something needs to be said about how these are to be resolved. Smallpox and HIV no doubt have their own viral autonomy (as well as being the products of natural historical processes), but for all that it is perfectly legitimate to disregard their interests when they conflict with our own. Yet it is hard to see how a decision to deny them a place in the scheme of things can be defended except by appeal to a value system which favours human interests. Plumwood allows that in casting the moral net widely we will have to "make distinctions for appropriate treatment within each class of items" (p. 147). It seems reasonable to suspect that human standards of appropriateness will be brought to bear to settle cases where such conflicts arise. Another difficulty with this approach is that goal-directedness is a very general and very pervasive characteristic of both organic and inorganic systems. It is implausible to suppose that we have any obligation to respect the equilibrium states of inorganic systems, goal directed though they may be. Energy moves in the direction of increasing entropy (downhill all the way); planets have stable and predictable paths which are the outcomes of continuing processes. Teleology is just too pervasive and too indiscriminate a characteristic to provide a plausible foundation for moral considerability. It may be prudent to reflect on the consequences of perturbing inorganic systems which have a natural direction, but it is not at all plausible to construe this as an obligation to those systems. Moreover as Thompson (1990, pp. 152f.) has pointed out, the criterion of goal-directedness is problematic even when restricted to the organic world. Parts of organisms, such as kidneys, as well as populations of organisms, can be characterized teleologically, but it is implausible to suppose that this fact carries any moral clout. Plumwood is right in responding to Thompson to say that what is wrong is that this objection ignores the importance of different organic levels of organization (Plumwood 1991, p. 146), but choosing the right level of organization is an interest-sensitive matter.

### The permutation is better than the alternative alone—key to ethical decision-making.

Grey 93 — William Grey, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Queensland, 1993 (“Anthropocentrism and Deep Ecology,” *Australiasian Journal of Philosophy*, Volume 71, Number 4, Available Online at http://www.uq.edu.au/~pdwgrey/pubs/anthropocentrism.html, Accessed 07-27-2011)

My aim however is not to bury anthropocentrism, but to defend it, at least in a qualified form. My claim is that if we attempt to step too far outside the scale of the recognizably human, rather than expanding and enriching our moral horizons we render them meaningless, or at least almost unrecognizable. The grand perspective of evolutionary biology provides a reductio ad absurdum of the cluster of non-anthropocentric ethics which can be found under the label "deep ecology". What deep ecology seeks to promote, and what deep ecologists seek to condemn, needs to be articulated from a distinctively human perspective. And this is more than the trivial claim that our perspectives, values and judgements are necessarily human <464> perspectives, values and judgements. Within the moral world we do occupy a privileged position.

## Permutation—Weak Anthropocentrism

### The permutation is *weak anthropocentrism*—solves their impact and the case.

Brown 95 — Charles S. Brown, Professor of Philosophy at Emporia State University, 1995 (“Anthropocentrism and Ecocentrism: the quest for a new worldview,” *The Midwest Quarterly*, Volume 36, Number 2, Winter, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Information Access)

The feminist critique of deep ecology suggests a strategy for developing a benign form of anthropocentrism by noting that political and ecological oppression have been perpetrated by certain classes in the interest of those classes. Deep ecology is theoretically equipped to handle the charge that it is not humanity in general which is responsible for political oppression and ecological destruction but only certain classes by noting that these oppressive classes have always legitimated their control not on the basis that they were men, or Capitalists, or Christian, but as Fox says "rather on the ground that they have most exemplified whatever it is that has been taken to constitute the essence of humanity (e.g. being favored by God or processing rationality)". Such social classes have implicitly assumed that they were the rightful agents to act in the name of humanity because they, as males, as Christians, as Capitalists, as Marxists, more nearly approached the essence of humanness. It is true that anthropocentrism takes on an androcentric flavor when the most powerful class of social agents is men. When anthropocentrism is in the service of Capitalism it is the Hobbesian man seeking ever greater degrees of power that is seen to constitute the essence of humanity. When anthropocentrism is in the service of Marxism it is the unalienated worker transforming nature into serviceable goods that exemplifies true humanity. Deep ecologists are free to recognize that anthropocentrism has always been articulated from the interests of one class or group which assumes its interests represents the true interest of humanity. Deep ecologists maintain that by eliminating anthropocentrism we shall remove this bottom line legitimation from any group seeking to universalize its own interests. Nevertheless, the fact that anthropocentrism has served as the most fundamental kind of legitimation employed by repressive classes everywhere does not show that anthropocentrism per se is responsible for such repression. At most it shows that anthropocentrism coupled with some class bias concerning the essence of human nature which serves to devalue the interests of weaker classes and absolutize the interests of stronger classes is inherently a non-egalitarian ideology useful for sanctioning the oppression of weaker classes. Deep ecologists, however, are quick to point out that even if anthropocentrism were not infected with some class bias and the legitimating ideologies for non-egalitarian societies were removed, such a framework would still clearly separate the human from the non-human and would be ecologically exploitative. Removing class bias from the articulation of anthropocentrism only alleviates the oppression of classes whose interests are antithetical to the interests of the dominating classes. In any form of anthropocentrism the particular dualism of human and non-human, or culture and nature, remains intact. If all human liberation were to be achieved, nature would still be considered to be inferior and subordinate to anthropocentric concerns. Even if the deep ecologists are right on this point, the feminist critique allows us to see that anthropocentrism comes in a variety of flavors with some possibly more lethal than others. The general strategy of unmasking class-biased articulations of anthropocentrism suggests the possibility that there may exist other articulations of anthropocentrism incorporating biases which transcend those of particular classes. I have in mind biases which reflect the shapes of entire historical epochs. Henryk Skolimowski traces the current ecological crisis to a form of anthropocentrism wedded with the objective thinking inherent in our scientific-technological worldview. The belief present in Christianity and in the ideologies of modern industrial states (Capitalism and Marxism), that nature is the dominion given to humanity for its own use, and our current technological prowess with its emphasis on technological solutions to all problems have generated the ecological disaster towards which we are leading. To quote Skolimowski: The language may be different in each case but the basic premise is the same. Nature and environment are for us; it is a dominion given to man by God (Christianity); it is a natural resource which can and should be used for the amelioration of mankind (Marxism). (110)

## Eco-Pragmatism Good

### Incremental changes add up—pragmatism in the context of ecology is better than their alternative

Hirokawa 2 — Keith Hirokawa, J.D. from the University of Connecticut and LL.M. from the Northwestern School of Law, 2002 (“Some Pragmatic Observations About Radical Critique In Environmental Law,” *Stanford Environmental Law Journal*, Volume 21, June, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Lexis-Nexis)

Changes in each instance create entirely new contexts in which more (or less) progressive arguments find a hold. Every time a change occurs, even if it is incremental or ostensibly seems benign, the change creates a new context within which an entirely new set of possibilities will arise. n230 The pragmatist therefore evaluates progress by the distance a new idea causes practices to move away from past practices and paradigms.

The difference between the pragmatic version of progress and the Kuhnian version is one only of degree. In the end, the results of both versions of progress are the same - we look back at the change and realize that earlier ideas do not make sense anymore. The effectiveness of the pragmatic approach lies in the simple realization that, in adopting an innovative approach to a legal question, courts will find comfort in adopting what appears to be an incremental change, rather than a radical paradigmatic shift. In [\*278] contrast to radical theorists that deny the existence of progress because of a failure to immediately reach the radical goals of alternative paradigms, the pragmatist recognizes that a series of incremental changes eventually add up. Environmental pragmatism enables environmentalists to seek achievable gains by focusing on minor improvements in the law that incrementally close the gap between the values that pre-existed current environmental law and the alternative paradigms of environmental protection.

## Science Good

### Science is key to resolve the negative impacts of anthropocentrism—vote aff to use the master’s tools to break down the master’s house.

Grey 86 — William Grey, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Queensland, 1986 (“A Critique of Deep Ecology,” Journal of Applied Philosophy, Volume 3, Number 2, Available Online at http://www.uq.edu.au/~pdwgrey/pubs/ cde.html, Accessed 10-10-2003)

I said above that there is an internal tension within some common articulations of the deep ecology paradigm. What I have in mind is a tendency to denigrate the systematic, piecemeal, empirical approach to a study of the natural world. Far from being shallow, such a science-based, analytical approach is not (or need not be) an objectionable and manipulative way of interacting with the natural world; it is quite indispensable for the provision of a satisfactory conception of its nature. Indeed an adequate understanding of the destructive predations of technological society, and the development of satisfactory softer alternatives based on the use of renewable resources, can only be based upon systematic scientific conceptions. It is all very well to say that we must tread lightly upon the earth, but this cannot be based upon turning away from the methods of science and controlled experiments, for it is precisely to these we must turn to determine what is and is not treading lightly. This analytical approach, 'counting commas' in the book of nature, as Needleman [8] has expressed it, is indispensable for the systematic understanding of complex systems. It does not preclude the equally indispensable treatment of complex systems as unitary wholes, which is necessary for experiencing and valuing nature, as well as for its proper understanding [9].

The second point which I want to make is that not all primitive resource use is wise, and not all technology is destructive: what is and is not environmentally acceptable can be determined only by developing insights into the effects of our actions (for act we must); it is hardly credible that these insights could be gained by the use of, say, intuitive empathy alone. The maintenance of equilibrium of dynamic living systems requires, inter alia , continuous inputs of energy and the recycling of essential nutrients. To understand how human interference with natural systems perverts both energy flow and the recycling of nutrients, we should not abandon our science-based conceptions but embrace them. Nature may indeed know best, but how, except through systematic empirical inquiry, can we determine what it is that nature tells us?

In practice much of the deep ecology critique of human predations is based precisely on the sorts of empirical studies which, in other passages and other moods, those same critics are prone to denigrate. This seems to me to be an unresolved tension which occurs in a number of articulations of deep ecology. Scientific understanding is not of course a sufficient condition for wisdom, but the insights of science are certainly necessary for acting wisely.

### Science link turns their K—it is explicitly *anti-anthropocentrism*.

Brown 95 — Charles S. Brown, Professor of Philosophy at Emporia State University, 1995 (“Anthropocentrism and Ecocentrism: the quest for a new worldview,” *The Midwest Quarterly*, Volume 36, Number 2, Winter, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Information Access)

Insofar as scientific thinking is atomistic, reductionistic, and value free, it is at odds with all forms of ecological thinking which is wholistic and value laden. Scientific thinking is, however, strangely allied with deep ecological thinking in that it is implicitly anti-anthropocentric. Human beings hold no central place in a world which is conceived of as only matter and energy in motion. It was, of course, Descartes who provided a way of holding on to anthropocentrism and the scientific worldview at the same time. The dichotomy of body and soul as ontological primitives saved anthropocentrism from the hegemony of the scientific worldview only by radically separating humanity and nature. In so far as human beings were thinking, conscious, and rational they were outside of nature. The kind of scientific thinking developed since the time of Descartes has never been content with such a dualism. Naturalistic metaphysics has, in many places, won the day and declared scientific methodology to be the essence of rationality. The ultimate validation of this kind of thinking is the derived technological ability to manipulate and control nature. On the assumption that scientific thinking is the only valid form of thinking it is a short step to the view that technology is the essential form of human activity. We then have the basis for an articulation of anthropocentrism biased not by class interests but by the form of an entire historical epoch, viz. modernism. With the idea that technology is the essential form of human activity comes the inevitable notion that technological societies form the basis for most perfectly realizing and developing human nature. This, in turn, serves as a legitimating ideology for western imperialism in both its Capitalistic and Marxist forms.