# 1NC

## 1NC—Anthropocentrism Critique

### The aff is rooted in anthropocentrism—the desire to explore posits nature as a disposable resource in order to spread the ideology of human-centered values.

Monbiot 10 — George Monbiot, Columnist for the *Guardian*, has held visiting fellowships or professorships at the universities of Oxford (environmental policy), Bristol (philosophy), Keele (politics), Oxford Brookes (planning), and East London (environmental science), 2010 (“After this 60-year feeding frenzy, Earth itself has become disposable,” *Guardian*, January 4th, Available Online at http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/jan/04/standard-of-living-spending-consumerism, Accessed 07-26-2011)

Who said this? "All the evidence shows that beyond the sort of standard of living which Britain has now achieved, extra growth does not automatically translate into human welfare and happiness." Was it a) the boss of Greenpeace, b) the director of the New Economics Foundation, or c) an anarchist planning the next climate camp? None of the above: d) the former head of the Confederation of British Industry, who currently runs the Financial Services Authority. In an interview broadcast last Friday, Lord Turner brought the consumer society's most subversive observation into the mainstream.

In our hearts most of us know it is true, but we live as if it were not. Progress is measured by the speed at which we destroy the conditions that sustain life. Governments are deemed to succeed or fail by how well they make money go round, regardless of whether it serves any useful purpose. They regard it as a sacred duty to encourage the country's most revolting spectacle: the annual feeding frenzy in which shoppers queue all night, then stampede into the shops, elbow, trample and sometimes fight to be the first to carry off some designer junk which will go into landfill before the sales next year. The madder the orgy, the greater the triumph of economic management.

As the Guardian revealed today, the British government is now split over product placement in television programmes: if it implements the policy proposed by Ben Bradshaw, the culture secretary, plots will revolve around chocolates and cheeseburgers, and advertisements will be impossible to filter, perhaps even to detect. Bradshaw must know that this indoctrination won't make us happier, wiser, greener or leaner; but it will make the television companies £140m a year.

Though we know they aren't the same, we can't help conflating growth and wellbeing. Last week, for instance, the Guardian carried the headline "UK standard of living drops below 2005 level". But the story had nothing to do with our standard of living. Instead it reported that per capita gross domestic product is lower than it was in 2005. GDP is a measure of economic activity, not standard of living. But the terms are confused so often that journalists now treat them as synonyms. The low retail sales of previous months were recently described by this paper as "bleak" and "gloomy". High sales are always "good news", low sales are always "bad news", even if the product on offer is farmyard porn. I believe it's time that the Guardian challenged this biased reporting.

Those who still wish to conflate welfare and GDP argue that high consumption by the wealthy improves the lot of the world's poor. Perhaps, but it's a very clumsy and inefficient instrument. After some 60 years of this feast, 800 million people remain permanently hungry. Full employment is a less likely prospect than it was before the frenzy began.

In a new paper published in Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, Sir Partha Dasgupta makes the point that the problem with gross domestic product is the gross bit. There are no deductions involved: all economic activity is accounted as if it were of positive value. Social harm is added to, not subtracted from, social good. A train crash which generates £1bn worth of track repairs, medical bills and funeral costs is deemed by this measure to be as beneficial as an uninterrupted service which generates £1bn in ticket sales.

Most important, no deduction is made to account for the depreciation of natural capital: the overuse or degradation of soil, water, forests, fisheries and the atmosphere. Dasgupta shows that the total wealth of a nation can decline even as its GDP is growing. In Pakistan, for instance, his rough figures suggest that while GDP per capita grew by an average of 2.2% a year between 1970 and 2000, total wealth declined by 1.4%. Amazingly, there are still no official figures that seek to show trends in the actual wealth of nations.

You can say all this without fear of punishment or persecution. But in its practical effects, consumerism is a totalitarian system: it permeates every aspect of our lives. Even our dissent from the system is packaged up and sold to us in the form of anti-consumption consumption, like the "I'm not a plastic bag", which was supposed to replace disposable carriers but was mostly used once or twice before it fell out of fashion, or like the lucrative new books on how to live without money.

George Orwell and Aldous Huxley proposed different totalitarianisms: one sustained by fear, the other in part by greed. Huxley's nightmare has come closer to realisation. In the nurseries of the Brave New World, "the voices were adapting future demand to future industrial supply. 'I do love flying,' they whispered, 'I do love flying, I do love having new clothes … old clothes are beastly … We always throw away old clothes. Ending is better than mending, ending is better than mending'". Underconsumption was considered "positively a crime against society". But there was no need to punish it. At first the authorities machine-gunned the Simple Lifers who tried to opt out, but that didn't work. Instead they used "the slower but infinitely surer methods" of conditioning: immersing people in advertising slogans from childhood. A totalitarianism driven by greed eventually becomes self-enforced.

Let me give you an example of how far this self-enforcement has progressed. In a recent comment thread, a poster expressed an idea that I have now heard a few times. "We need to get off this tiny little world and out into the wider universe … if it takes the resources of the planet to get us out there, so be it. However we use them, however we utilise the energy of the sun and the mineral wealth of this world and the others of our planetary system, either we do use them to expand and explore other worlds, and become something greater than a mud-grubbing semi-sentient animal, or we die as a species."

This is the consumer society taken to its logical extreme: the Earth itself becomes disposable. This idea appears to be more acceptable in some circles than any restraint on pointless spending. That we might hop, like the aliens in the film Independence Day, from one planet to another, consuming their resources then moving on, is considered by these people a more realistic and desirable prospect than changing the way in which we measure wealth.

### Anthropocentrism causes extinction—it divorces our relationship with the natural world and makes ecocide on a cosmic scale inevitable.

Gottlieb 94 — Roger S. Gottlieb, Professor of Humanities at Worcester Polytechnic Institute, holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy from Brandeis University, 1994 (“Ethics and Trauma: Levinas, Feminism, and Deep Ecology,” *Crosscurrents: A Journal of Religion and Intellectual Life*, Summer, Available Online at http://www.crosscurrents.org/feministecology.htm, Accessed 07-26-2011)

Here I will at least begin in agreement with Levinas. As he rejects an ethics proceeding on the basis of self-interest, so I believe the anthropocentric perspectives of conservation or liberal environmentalism cannot take us far enough. Our relations with nonhuman nature are poisoned and not just because we have set up feedback loops that already lead to mass starvations, skyrocketing environmental disease rates, and devastation of natural resources. The problem with ecocide is not just that it hurts human beings. Our uncaring violence also violates the very ground of our being, our natural body, our home. Such violence is done not simply to the other – as if the rainforest, the river, the atmosphere, the species made extinct are totally different from ourselves. Rather, we have crucified ourselves-in-relation-to-the-other, fracturing a mode of being in which self and other can no more be conceived as fully in isolation from each other than can a mother and a nursing child. We are that child, and nonhuman nature is that mother. If this image seems too maudlin, let us remember that other lactating women can feed an infant, but we have only one earth mother. What moral stance will be shaped by our personal sense that we are poisoning ourselves, our environment, and so many kindred spirits of the air, water, and forests? To begin, we may see this tragic situation as setting the limits to Levinas's perspective. The other which is nonhuman nature is not simply known by a "trace," nor is it something of which all knowledge is necessarily instrumental. This other is inside us as well as outside us. We prove it with every breath we take, every bit of food we eat, every glass of water we drink. We do not have to find shadowy traces on or in the faces of trees or lakes, topsoil or air: we are made from them. Levinas denies this sense of connection with nature. Our "natural" side represents for him a threat of simple consumption or use of the other, a spontaneous response which must be obliterated by the power of ethics in general (and, for him in particular, Jewish religious law(23) ). A "natural" response lacks discipline; without the capacity to heed the call of the other, unable to sublate the self's egoism. Worship of nature would ultimately result in an "everything-is-permitted" mentality, a close relative of Nazism itself. For Levinas, to think of people as "natural" beings is to assimilate them to a totality, a category or species which makes no room for the kind of individuality required by ethics.(24) He refers to the "elemental" or the "there is" as unmanaged, unaltered, "natural" conditions or forces that are essentially alien to the categories and conditions of moral life.(25) One can only lament that Levinas has read nature -- as to some extent (despite his intentions) he has read selfhood -- through the lens of masculine culture. It is precisely our sense of belonging to nature as system, as interaction, as interdependence, which can provide the basis for an ethics appropriate to the trauma of ecocide. As cultural feminism sought to expand our sense of personal identity to a sense of inter-identification with the human other, so this ecological ethics would expand our personal and species sense of identity into an inter-identification with the natural world. Such a realization can lead us to an ethics appropriate to our time, a dimension of which has come to be known as "deep ecology."(26) For this ethics, we do not begin from the uniqueness of our human selfhood, existing against a taken-for-granted background of earth and sky. Nor is our body somehow irrelevant to ethical relations, with knowledge of it reduced always to tactics of domination. Our knowledge does not assimilate the other to the same, but reveals and furthers the continuing dance of interdependence. And our ethical motivation is neither rationalist system nor individualistic self-interest, but a sense of connection to all of life. The deep ecology sense of self-realization goes beyond the modern Western sense of "self" as an isolated ego striving for hedonistic gratification. . . . . Self, in this sense, is experienced as integrated with the whole of nature.(27) Having gained distance and sophistication of perception [from the development of science and political freedoms] we can turn and recognize who we have been all along. . . . we are our world knowing itself. We can relinquish our separateness. We can come home again -- and participate in our world in a richer, more responsible and poignantly beautiful way.(28) Ecological ways of knowing nature are necessarily participatory. [This] knowledge is ecological and plural, reflecting both the diversity of natural ecosystems and the diversity in cultures that nature-based living gives rise to. The recovery of the feminine principle is based on inclusiveness. It is a recovery in nature, woman and man of creative forms of being and perceiving. In nature it implies seeing nature as a live organism. In woman it implies seeing women as productive and active. Finally, in men the recovery of the feminine principle implies a relocation of action and activity to create life-enhancing, not life-reducing and life-threatening societies.(29) In this context, the knowing ego is not set against a world it seeks to control, but one of which it is a part. To continue the feminist perspective, the mother knows or seeks to know the child's needs. Does it make sense to think of her answering the call of the child in abstraction from such knowledge? Is such knowledge necessarily domination? Or is it essential to a project of care, respect and love, precisely because the knower has an intimate, emotional connection with the known?(30) Our ecological vision locates us in such close relation with our natural home that knowledge of it is knowledge of ourselves. And this is not, contrary to Levinas's fear, reducing the other to the same, but a celebration of a larger, more inclusive, and still complex and articulated self.(31) The noble and terrible burden of Levinas's individuated responsibility for sheer existence gives way to a different dream, a different prayer: Being rock, being gas, being mist, being Mind, Being the mesons traveling among the galaxies with the speed of light, You have come here, my beloved one. . . . You have manifested yourself as trees, as grass, as butterflies, as single-celled beings, and as chrysanthemums; but the eyes with which you looked at me this morning tell me you have never died.(32) In this prayer, we are, quite simply, all in it together. And, although this new ecological Holocaust -- this creation of planet Auschwitz – is under way, it is not yet final. We have time to step back from the brink, to repair our world. But only if we see that world not as an other across an irreducible gap of loneliness and unchosen obligation, but as a part of ourselves as we are part of it, to be redeemed not out of duty, but out of love; neither for our selves nor for the other, but for us all.

### The alternative is to reject the affirmative and embrace a deep ecological ethical framework – it’s a prerequisite to policymaking

Katz and Oechsli 93 (Eric, Vice President of the International Society for Environmental Ethics, and Lauren, Biology at Columbia, *Environmental Ethics*, vol 15 no 1, 1993 “Moving beyond Anthropocentrism: Environmental Ethics, Development, and the Amazon”)

Can an environmentalist defend a policy of preservation in the Amazon rain forest without violating a basic sense of justice? We believe that the mistake is not the policy of preservation itself, but the anthropocentric instrumental framework in which it is justified. Environmental policy decisions should not merely concern the trade-off and comparison of various human benefits. If environmentalists claim that the Third World must preserve its environment because of the overall benefits for humanity, then decision makers in the Third World can demand justice in the determination of preservation policy: preservationist policies unfairly damage the human interests of the local populations. If preservationist policies are to be justified without a loss of equity, there are only two possible alternatives: either we in the industrialized world must pay for the benefits we will gain from preservation or we must reject the anthropocentric and instrumental framework for policy decisions. The first alternative is an empirical political issue, and one about which we are not overly optimistic. The second alternative represents a shift in philosophical world view. We are not providing a direct argument for a nonanthropocentric value system as the basis of environmental policy. Rather, our strategy is indirect. Let us assume that a theory of normative ethics which includes nonhuman natural value has been justified. In such a situation, the human community, in addition to its traditional human-centered obligations, would also have moral obligations to nature or to the natural environment in itself. One of these obligations would involve the urgent necessity for environmental preservation. We would be obligated, for example, to the Amazon rain forest directly. We would preserve the rain forest, not for the human benefits resulting from this preservation, but because we have an obligation of preservation to nature and its ecosystems. Our duties would be directed to nature and its inhabitants and environments, not merely to humans and human institutions. From this perspective, questions of the trade-off and comparison of human benefits, and questions of justice for specific human populations, do not dominate the discussion. This change of emphasis can be illustrated by an exclusively human example. Consider two businessmen, Smith and Jones, who are arguing over the proper distribution of the benefits and costs resulting from a prior business agreement between them. If we just focus on Smith and Jones and the issues concerning them, we will want to look at the contract, the relevant legal precedents, and the actual results of the deal, before rendering a decision. But suppose we learn that the agreement involved the planned murder of a third party, Green, and the resulting distribution of his property. At that point the issues between Smith and Jones cease to be relevant; we no longer consider who has claims to Green’s wallet, overcoat, or BMW to be important. The competing claims become insignificant in light of the obligations owed to Green. This case is analogous to our view of the moral obligations owed to the rain forest. As soon as we realize that the rain forest itself is relevant to the conflict of competing goods, we see that there is not a simple dilemma between Third World development, on the one hand, and preservation of rain forests, on the other; there is now, in addition, the moral obligation to nature and its ecosystems. When the nonanthropocentric framework is introduced, it creates a more complex situation for deliberation and resolution. It complicates the already detailed discussions of human trade-offs, high-tech transfers, aid programs, debtfor-nature swaps, sustainable development, etc., with a consideration of the moral obligations to nonhuman nature. This complication may appear counterproductive, but as in the case of Smith, Jones, and Green, it actually serves to simplify the decision. Just as a concern for Green made the contract dispute between Smith and Jones irrelevant, the obligation to the rain forest makes many of the issues about trade-offs of human goods irrelevant. 12 It is, of course, unfortunate that this direct obligation to the rain forest can only be met with a cost in human satisfaction—some human interests will not be fulfilled. Nevertheless, the same can be said of all ethical decisions, or so Kant teaches us: we are only assuredly moral when we act against our inclinations. To summarize, the historical forces of economic imperialism have created a harsh dilemma for environmentalists who consider nature preservation in the Third World to be necessary. Nevertheless, environmentalists can escape the dilemma, as exemplified in the debate over the development of the Amazon rain forest, if they reject the axiological and normative framework of anthropocentric instrumental rationality. A set of obligations directed to nature in its own right makes many questions of human benefits and satisfactions irrelevant. The Amazon rain forest ought to be preserved regardless of the benefits or costs to human beings. Once we move beyond the confines of human-based instrumental goods, the environmentalist position is thereby justified, and no policy dilemma is created. This conclusion serves as an indirect justification of a nonanthropocentric system of normative ethics, avoiding problems in environmental policy that a human-based ethic cannot. 1 Policy makers and philosophers in the Third World may not be pleased with our conclusions here. Indeed, Ramachandra Guha has recently criticized the focus on biocentrism (i.e., nonanthropocentrism) and wilderness preservation that per-vades Western environmentalism. These Western concerns are at best, irrelevant to, and at worst, destructive of Third World societies. According to Guha, any justifiable environmental movement must include solutions to problems of equity, “economic and political redistribution.” 14 We agree. Thus, as a final note, let us return from the abstract atmospheres of axiological theory and normative frameworks to the harsh realities of life in the non-industrialized world. If our argument is sound, then any destructive development of the natural environment in the Third World is a moral wrong, and a policy of environmental preservation is a moral requirement. Recognition of this moral obligation to preserve the natural environment should be the starting point for any serious discussion of developmental policy.

# Link Materials

## Link—General Space Exploration/Development

### The affirmative views space as a place for humans to explore and develop—this is an inherently anthropocentric view that puts humanity at the center of the universe.

Foderman and Daly 8 (Erin Moore Daly is , Robert Frodeman is Director of the [Center for the Study of Interdisciplinarity](http://www.csid.unt.edu/" \t "_blank) and Professor of Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy and Religion Studies at the University of North Texas, “Separated at Birth, Signs of Rapprochement: Environmental Ethics and Space Exploration” http://www.csid.unt.edu/files/env\_ethics\_and\_space.pdf , date accessed: 7/19/11)

To date, the discussion of natural places has turned on questions concerning intrinsic and instrumental values. Intrinsic values theorists claim that things have value for their own sake, in contrast to theories of instrumental value where things are good because they can be used to obtain something else of value (economic or otherwise). This debates tends tend to get caught up in attempts at extending the sphere of intrinsically valuable entities. Ethical extensionism depends on human definitions of moral considerability, which typically stem from some degree of identification with things outside us. This anthropocentric and geocentric environmental perspective shows cracks when we try to extend it to the cosmic environment. The few national or international7 policies currently in place that mention the environment of outer space (e.g. NASA’s planetary protection policy, UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space) consider the preservation of planetary bodies for science, human exploration, and possible future habitation, but there is not yet any policy that considers whether these anthropocentric priorities should supersede the preservation of possible indigenous extraterrestrial life, or the environmental or geological integrity of the extraterrestrial environment. Anticipating the need for policy decisions regarding space exploration, Mark Lupisella and John Logsdon suggest the possibility of a cosmocentric ethic, “one which (1) places the universe at the center, or establishes the universe as the priority in a value system, (2) appeals to something characteristic of the universe (physical and/or metaphysical) which might then (3) provide a justification of value, presumably intrinsic value, and (4) allow for reasonably objective measurement of value” (Lupisella and Logsdon, 1997, p. 1). The authors discuss the need to establish policies for pre-detection and post-detection of life on Mars, and suggest that a cosmocentric ethic would provide a justification for a conservative approach to space exploration and science—conservative in the sense of considering possible impacts before we act. v A Copernican shift in consciousness, from regarding the Earth as the center of the universe to one of it being the home of participants in a cosmic story, is necessary in order to achieve the proper environmental perspective as we venture beyond our home planet. Of course, given current and prospective space technology our range is quite limited. The current Pluto New Horizons probe, launched by NASA in January 2006, travels at 50,000 mph, the limit of chemical propulsion. At such speeds Pluto is 9 years8 distant, Alpha Centauri 55,000. On the other hand, there are perhaps 1000 near Earth asteroids greater than 100 meters—not counting those in the Asteroid Belt beyond Mars—with a frequency of impact of perhaps one in a hundred years that would cause a regional scale disaster.

### Exploration is thoroughly anthropocentric – it posits humanity as chosen instruments of progress and nature as a usable resource.

Sessions 85 (George, Professor of Philosophy at Sierra College, *Deep Ecology*, 1985)

A third scenario would be that the environmental/ecology movement would be coopted and incorporated into the New Age Aquarian Conspiracy, which views the Earth as primarily a resource for human use. The popularity of Jesuit scholar Pierre Eilhard de Chardin and technologist R. Buckminster Fuller is testimony to the continuing appeal of anthropocentrism (human-centeredness) and to a teleological vision of humans as God's chosen instruments of progress and evolution. Teilhard is criticized in our discussion of the management of natural resources, but he is an inspiration for many people in industries such as genetic engineering, computer technology, and mass media. California's famed Silicon Valley south of San Francisco has thousands of liberal, articulate, upscale, youngish professionals who are "turned on" by high technology, visions of human colonies o n Mars, space travel, and humans as copilots of "spaceship Earth." Ecologist James Lovelock, in Gaia: A New Look at Life on Earth, states the New Age vision: "In a Gaian world our species with its technology is simply an inevitable part of the natural scene. Yet our relationship with our technology releases ever-increasing amounts of energy and provides us with a similarly increasing capacity to channel and process information. Cybernetics tells us that we might safely pass through these turbulent times if our skills in handling information develop faster than our capacity to produce more energy. In other words, if we can always control the genie we have let out of the bottle. " Many New Age thinkers conclude that humans' role as partner with Earth's natural processes "need not be vile" but coequal.5 The ultimate New Age fantasy is the metaphor of the spaceship Earth. Humans from spaceship Earth will move to totally man-made and manipulated spaceships carrying colonies of humans to Mars, and the expert - the technologist - will be the hero.

### Space exploration/development relies on an anthropocentric worldview that separates us from nature—the affirmative values only what we perceive to be useful to the continuation of the human race.

Salideh 9 (Eligar Sadeh is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Space Studies at the University of North Dakota, “Spacepower and the environment”, <http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/spacepower/space-Ch13.pdf> , date accessed: 7/19/11)

In the anthropocentric view, humans are treated as ends in and of themselves and act as moral agents in relation to the environment. Nature is of instrumental value in that it contributes to human life. Anthropocentrism is rooted in the principle of nature as a utility for human ends. In this vein, the environment can be both exploited and protected to safeguard and further human interests and the persistence of human civilization. The exploitation-of-nature argument is based on the exploitation of the environment to enhance human well being. This view allows humans to extract resources from space and planetary bodies and to create human-supported biospheres in space and on planetary surfaces and terraform celestial bodies. In the realm of national security, such a view suggests spacepower projection without regard for the contamination of the space environment. This is the unregulated view that can lead to a tragedy of the commons of space. The perpetuation of the human species that is linked to spacepower considerations suggests that extending a human presence in space takes place without regard for environmental protection. 48 The exploitation-of-nature argument underlies the view on spacepower discussed in chapter 9 in this book, which examines the use of the Moon's resources for national economic development. Indicative of this is the new U.S. policy "to incorporate the Solar System in our economic sphere," with the fundamental goal of exploration being to advance scientific, security, and economic interests through a robust space exploration program. 49The protection-of-nature argument begins to limit the extent to which resources in space can be incorporated exclusively into the U.S. economic sphere. The argument is that the environment needs to be protected, not because it has intrinsic value of its own, but to safeguard human ends. Environmental protection of some sort is consequently promoted due to instrumental ends that include preventing contamination of planets hospitable to life forms for scientific inquiry; 50 conserving natural resources in space for economic development purposes (that is, a measured distribution of resources so that all can partake and benefit); preserving resources for future generations; preserving aesthetics of planetary surfaces and interplanetary space for human enjoyment; and mitigating environmental contamination, such as orbital debris, to ensure freedom of action in space. International space law is in congruence with these views and designates space and celestial bodies as common resources to be protected from contamination by anthropogenic activities. Indicative of international space law and environmental protection are the planetary protection provisions advanced by the International Council for Science Committee on Space Research (COSPAR), with the first formal guidelines established in 1969 and most recently updated in 2005. COSPAR planetary protection policies are directed at fulfilling the provisions of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty to avoid the harmful contamination of the Moon and other celestial bodies, with foremost thought given to preserving the scientific integrity of planetary bodies. These policies set the context for NASA's planetary protection policies that establish formal guidelines for planetary protection and stipulate that NASA will not participate in international missions unless all partners agree to follow COSPAR's planetary protection policies. COSPAR also formed a panel on planetary protection that is concerned with the development, maintenance, and promulgation of planetary protection knowledge, policy, and plans to prevent the harmful effects of biological contamination on celestial bodies.

### The desire to explore/develop space is rooted in anthropocentrism – human life is seen as the center of value in the universe and exploration is the only way to spread it. This glosses over the destructive potential of humanity and exports it throughout the cosmos.

Kochi and Ordan 8 (Tarik, lecturer in the School of Law, Queen's University, Belfast, Northern Ireland, and Noam, linguist and translator, conducts research in Translation Studies at Bar Ilan University, Israel, 'An argument for the global suicide of humanity', *Borderlands*, December)

By coupling an imagination of a new world or a better place with the production and harnessing of new technologies, humans have for a long time left old habitats and have created a home in others. The history of our species, homo sapiens, is marked by population movement aided by technological innovation: when life becomes too precarious in one habitat, members of the species take a risk and move to a new one. Along with his call for us to go forward and colonise other planets, Hawking does list a number of the human actions which have made this seem necessary. [1] What is at issue, however, is his failure to reflect upon the relationship between environmental destruction, scientific faith in the powers of technology and the attitude of speciesism. That is, it must be asked whether population movement really is the answer. After all, Hawking's suggestion to colonise other planets does little to address the central problem of human action which has destroyed, and continues to destroy, our habitat on the earth. While the notion of cosmic colonisation places faith in the saviour of humanity by technology as a solution, it lacks a crucial moment of reflection upon the manner in which human action and human technology has been and continues to be profoundly destructive. Indeed, the colonisation of other planets would in no way solve the problem of environmental destruction; rather, it would merely introduce this problem into a new habitat. The destruction of one planetary habitat is enough--we should not naively endorse the future destruction of others. Hawking's approach to environmental catastrophe is an example of a certain modern faith in technological and social progress. One version of such an approach goes as follows: As our knowledge of the world and ourselves increases humans are able to create forms of technology and social organisation that act upon the world and change it for our benefit. However, just as there are many theories of 'progress' [2] there are also many modes of reflection upon the role of human action and its relationship to negative or destructive consequences.

## Link—Mining

### Their call to mine (the moon/asteroids/Mars) is rooted in anthropocentrism.

Sadeh 11 (Eligar, American political scientist and academic Assistant Professor, Department of Space Studies University of North Dakota, Ch. 13 Space Power and the Environment, Toward a Theory of Spacepower, June 13, 2011, http://www.opensourcesinfo.org/journal/2011/6/13/toward-a-theory-of-spacepower-selected-essays.html)

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## Link—Resources

### The universe does not belong to humans: any value placed on resources detaches us from nature and entrenches anthropocentrism.

Berry 95 (Thomas, Ph.D. from the Catholic University of America in European intellectual history  “The viable human” in *Deep Ecology for the 21st Century*, ed. George Sessions)

Ecologists recognize that reducing the planet to a resource base for consumer use in an industrial society is already a spiritual and psychic degradation. Our main experience of the divine, the world of the sacred, has been diminished as money and utility values have taken precedence over spiritual, aesthetic, emotional, and religious values in our attitude toward the natural world. Any recovery of the natural world will require not only extensive financial funding but a conversion experience deep in the psychic structure of the human. Our present dilemma is the consequence of a disturbed psychic situation, a mental imbalance, an emotional insensitivity, none of which can be remedied by any quickly contrived adjustment. Nature has been severely, and in many cases irreversibly, damaged. Healing can occur and new life can sometimes be evoked, but only with the same intensity of concern and sustained vigor of action as that which brought about the damage in the first place . Yet, without this healing, the viability of the human is severely limited. The basic orientation of the common law tradition is toward personal rights and toward the natural world as existing for human use. There is no provision for recognition of nonhuman beings as subjects having legal rights. To the ecologists, the entire question of possession and use of the earth, either by individuals or by establishments, needs to be profoundly reconsidered. The naive assumption that the natural world exists solely to be possessed and used by humans for their unlimited advantage cannot be accepted. The earth belongs to itself and to all the component members of the community. The entire earth is a gorgeous celebration of existence in all its forms. Each living thing participates in the celebration as the proper fulfillment of its powers of expression. The reduction of the earth to an object simply for human possession and use is unthinkable in most traditional cultures. To Peter Drucker, the entrepreneur creates resources and values. Before it is possessed and used, “every plant is a weed and every mineral is just another rock” (innovation and Entrepreneurship, 1985 pg. 30). To the industrial entrepreneur, human possession and use is what activates the true value of any natural object.

## Link—Technology

### The affirmative’s dependence on technology detaches humanity from the environment.

Bodain and Naess 88 (Arne, Norwegian philosopher and the founder of [deep ecology](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_ecology). Former professor at the [University of Oslo](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_Oslo), founder of the deep ecology movement. “Simple in Means Rich in Ends An interview with Arne Naess in *Deep Ecology for the 21st Century*, ed. George Sessions, p. 32)

S.B.: Some people, particularly in this country, have great faith that, once we've perfected our computer technology and can process all the available information, we'll be able to make informed decisions. You, on the other hand, have spoken about the importance of admitting that we don't know, admitting our ignorance in the face of the complexity of nature, and at the same time be willing to trust our intuition and stand up and say, "l know in my heart that this is what we need to do." Naess: I think that, one hundred and fifty years ago, in government decision making in America and in Europe, more information was available in proportion to the amount needed than is available today. Today, we are using thousands of new chemicals, and we don’t know their combined long-range effects. We interfere a million times more deeply in nature than we did one hundred years ago, and our ignorance is increasing in proportion to the information that is required. S.B.: In other words, many more questions are being raised, but fewer answers are being provided. NAESS: Exactly. One indication is that, if you take the number of scientific articles published each year with neat, authoritative conclusions and divide it by the number of questions posed to scientists by responsible people concerned with the consequences of our interventions in nature, )you will find that the quotient approaches zero. That is, the number of questions is becoming indefinitely large very quickly, whereas the number of answers is increasing very slowly indeed. And, in any case, within a hundred years, we'll run out of paper to print the billion articles that supply the relevant answers needed each year. S.B.: So you don't think that, if we just perfect our science and technology, our answers will somehow catch up with the number of questions being raised ? NAESS: On the contrary, technology is more helpless than ever before because the technology being produced doesn't fulfill basic human needs, such as meaningful work in a meaningful environment. Technical progress is sham progress because the term technical Progress is a cultural, not a technical term. Our culture is the only one in the history of mankind in which the culture has adjusted itself to the technology, rather than vice versa. In traditional Chinese culture, the bureaucracy opposed the use of inventions that were not in harmony with the general cultural aims of the nation. A vast number of technical inventions were not used by the populace because it was simply not permitted. Whereas here we have the motto, "You can't stop progress," you can't interfere with technology, and so we allow technology to dictate cultural forms.

## Link—Energy

### Centralized energy systems disconnect humanity from nature.

Bodain and Naess 88 (Arne, Norwegian philosopher and the founder of [deep ecology](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_ecology). Former professor at the [University of Oslo](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_Oslo), founder of the deep ecology movement. “Simple in Means Rich in Ends An interview with Arne Naess in *Deep Ecology for the 21st Century*, ed. George Sessions, p. 32-33)

S.B.: In connection with that, it has been pointed out that the hazardous nature of the materials used to generate nuclear power will have unforeseen political consequences. NAESS: Yes. Security, for instance, is a major problem. And even more importantly, such technology presupposes a tremendous, centralized society, whereas, in more ecologically defensible societies, energy creation and energy sources would be decentralized and widely distributed, with small groups in local communities in control of their own resources. As it is now, we have increasing centralization, which fosters diminished self-determination for individuals and local cultures, and diminished freedom of action. The more centralized our energy sources, the more dependent we are on the centralized institutions hundreds of miles away. There's no reason to believe there won't be another war. On the contrary, the statistics give us every reason to believe we will continue to have wars in the future. During World War II, people were highly self-sufficient-they could raise pigs, they could burn wood-whereas, in a war today some nations could be conquered almost immediately because all resources are centralized. We don't know how to grow food; we don't have anything to burn. In the year 2ooo, we will be so dependent that, if an aggressor were to take over the energy sources and the political institutions, ninety-nine percent of the population would have to surrender, whereas in the last war we were able to continue our culture. Deep ecology is concerned with these long-range problems, particularly with the question of war and peace, because, of all manmade ecological catastrophes, nuclear war would be the most devastating.

## Link—Sustainable Development

### Sustainable development destroys nature—it relies on the belief that everything was put here so that humans could use it.

Worster 93 (Donald, Hall Distinguished Professor of American History at the [University of Kansas](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_Kansas).  “The Shaky ground of Sustainability”, ” in *Deep Ecology for the 21st Century*, ed. George Sessions, p. 424-425)

I find the following deep flaws in the sustainable development ideal: First, it is based on the view that the natural world exists primarily to serve the material demands of the human species. Nature is nothing more than a pool of "resources" to be exploited; it has no intrinsic meaning or value apart from the goods and services it furnishes people, rich or poor. The Brundtland Report ,makes., this point clear on every Page: the "our" in its title refers to people. exclusively, and the only moral issue it raises is the need to share what natural resources there are more equitably among our kind, among the present world population and among the generations to come. That is not by any means an unworthy goal, but it is not adequate to the challenge. Second, sustainable development, though it acknowledges some kind of limit on those material demands, depends on the assumption that we can easily determine the carrying capacity of local regional ecosystems. Our knowledge is supposedly adequate to reveal the limits of nature and to exploit resources safely up to that level. In the face of new arguments suggesting how turbulent, complex, and unpredictable nature really is, that assumption seems highly optimistic. Furthermore, in light of the tendency of some leading ecologists to use such arguments to justify a more accommodating stance toward development, any heavy reliance on their ecological expertise seems doubly dangerously they are experts who lack any agreement on what the limits are. Third, the sustainability ideal rests on an uncritical, unexamined acceptance of the traditional worldview of progressive, secular materialism. It regards that worldview as completely benign so long as it can be made sustainable. The institutions associated with that worldview, including those of capitalism, socialism, and industrialism, also escape all criticism, or close scrutiny. We are led to believe that sustainability can be achieved with all those institutions and their values intact.

## Link—Development

### “Development” is inherently anthropocentric.

Sachs 93 (Wolfgang, “The Global Ecology and the Shadow of Development” in *Deep Ecology for the 21st Century*, ed. George Sessions, p. 433-434)

"Development" is, above all, a way of thinking. It cannot, therefore, be easily identified with a particular strategy or program, but ties many different practices and aspirations to a common set of assumptions. . . . Despite alarming signs of failure throughout its history, the development syndrome has survived until today, but at the price of increasing senility. When it became clear in the 1950s that investments were not enough, "man-power development" was added to the aid package; as it became obvious in the 1960s that hardship continued, "social development" was discovered; and in the 1990s, as the impoverishment of peasants could no longer be overlooked, "rural development" was included in the arsenal of development strategies. And so it went on, with further creations like "equitable development" and the "basic needs approach." Again and again, the same conceptual operation was repeated: degradation in the wake of development was redefined as a lack which called for yet another strategy of development. All along, the efficacy of "development" remained impervious to any counterevidence, but showed remarkable staying power; the concept was repeatedly stretched until it included both the strategy which inflicted the injury and the strategy designed for therapy. This strength of the concept, however, is also the reason for its galloping exhaustion; it no longer manifests any reactions to changing historical conditions. The tragic greatness of "development" consists in its monumental emptiness. "Sustainable development," which UNCED enthroned as the reigning slogan of the 1990s, has inherited the fragility of "development." The concept emasculates the environmental challenge by absorbing it into the empty shell of "development" and insinuates the continuing validity of developmentalist assumptions even when confronted with a drastically different historical situation. In Rachel Carson's Silent Spring, the book which gave rise to the environmental movement in 1962, development was understood to inflict injuries on people and nature. Since the "World Conservation Strategy" in r98o and later the Brundtland Report, development has come to be seen as the therapy for the injuries caused by development. What accounts for this shift? Firstly, in the 1970s, under the impact of the oil crisis, governments began to realize that continued growth depended not only on capital formation or skilled manpower, but also on the long-term availability of natural resources. Foods for the insatiable growth machine, such as oil, timber, minerals, soils, genetic material, seemed on the decline; concern grew about the prospects of long-term growth. This was a decisive change in perspective: not the health of nature but the continuous health of development became the center of concern. In 1992, the World Bank summed up the new consensus in a laconic phrase: "What is sustainable? Sustainable development is development that lasts.” Of course, the task of development experts does not remain the same under this imperative, because the horizon of their decisions is now supposed to extend in time, taking into account also the welfare of future generations. But the frame stays the same: "sustainable development" calls for the conservation of development, not for the conservation of nature. Even bearing in mind a very loose definition of development, the anthropocentric bias of the statement springs to mind; it is not the preservation of nature's dignity which is on the international agenda, but to extend human centered utilitarianism to posterity. Needless to say, the naturalist and biocentric current of present-day environmentalism has been cut out by this conceptual operation. With "development" back in the saddle, the view on nature changes. The question now becomes: which of nature's "services" are to what extent indispensable for further development, Or the other way around: which "services" of nature are dispensable or can be substituted by, for example, new materials or genetic engineering In other words, nature turns into a variable, albeit a critical one, in sustaining development. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that "nature capital" has already become a fashionable notion among ecological economists.

## Link—Look Back Satellites

### Satellite data disconnects humanity from nature—the plan is fundamentally anthropocentric.

Sachs 93 (Wolfgang, “The Global Ecology and the Shadow of Development” in *Deep Ecology for the 21st Century*, ed. George Sessions, p. 433-434)

Satellite pictures scanning the globe's vegetative cover, computer graphs running interacting curves through time, threshold levels held up as worldwide norms are the language of global ecology. It constructs a reality that contains mountains of data, but no people. The data do not explain why Tuaregs are driven to exhaust their waterholes, or what makes Germans so obsessed with high speed on freeways; they do not point out who owns the timber shipped from the Amazon or which industry flourishes because of a polluted Mediterranean sea; and they are mute about the significance of forest trees for Indian tribal or what water means in an Arab country. In short, they provide a knowledge which is faceless and placeless; an abstraction that carries a considerable cost: it consigns the realities of culture, power and virtue to oblivion. It offers data, but no context; it shows diagrams, but no actors; it gives calculations, but no notions of morality; it seeks stability, but disregards beauty. Indeed, the global vantage point requires ironing out all the differences and disregarding all circumstances; rarely has the gulf between observers and the observed been greater than between satellite-based forestry and the seringueiro in the Brazilian jungle. It is inevitable that the claims of global management are in conflict with the aspirations for cultural rights, democracy and self-determination. Indeed, it is easy for an ecocracy which acts in the name of "one earth" to become a threat to local communities and their lifestyles. After all, has there ever, in the history of colonialism, been a more powerful motive for streamlining the world than the call to save the planet?

## Link—Death/Suffering

### Their attempt to minimize pain and death reflects a speciesist anti-nature value system

Callicott 89 (J. Baird, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin – Stevens Point, *In Defense of Land Ethics*, 1989)

The "shift of values" which results from our "reappraising things unnatural, tame, and confined in terms of things natural, wild, and free" is especially dramatic when we reflect upon the definitions of *good* and *evil* espoused by Bentham and Mill and uncritically accepted by their contemporary followers. Pain and pleasure seem to have nothing at all to do with good and evil if our appraisal is taken from the vantage point of ecological biology. Pain in particular is primarily information. In animals, it informs the central nervous system of stress, irritation, or trauma in outlying regions of the organism. A certain level of pain under optimal organic circumstances is indeed desirable as an indicator of exertion--of the degree of exertion needed to maintain fitness, to stay in shape, and of a level of exertion beyond which it would be dangerous to go. An arctic wolf in pursuit of a caribou may experience pain in her feet or chest because of the rigors of the chase. There is nothing bad or wrong in that. Or, consider a case of injury. Suppose that a person in the course of a wilderness excursion sprains an ankle. Pain informs him or her of the injury and by its intensity the amount-of further stress the ankle may endure in the course of getting to safety. Would it be better if pain were not experienced upon injury or, taking advantage of recent technology, anaesthetized? Pleasure appears to be, for the most part (unfortunately it is not always so) a reward accom­panying those activities which contribute to organic maintenance, such as the pleasures associated with eating, drinking, grooming, and so on, or those which contribute to social solidarity like the pleasures of dancing, conversation, teasing, and so forth, or those which contribute to the continuation of the species, such as the pleasures of sexual activity and of being parents. The doctrine that life is the happier the freer it is from pain and that the happiest life conceivable is one in which there is continuous pleasure uninterrupted by pain is biolog­ically preposterous. A living mammal which experienced no pain would be one which had a lethal dysfunction of the nervous system. The idea that pain is evil and ought to be minimized or eliminated is as primitive a notion as that of a tyrant who puts to death messengers bearing bad news on the supposition that thus his well-being and security is improved. More seriously still, the value commitments of the humane move­ment seem at bottom to betray a world-denying or rather a life-loathing philosophy. The natural world as actually constituted is one in which one being lives at the expense of others,as Each organism, in Darwin's metaphor, struggles to maintain it own organic integrity. The more complex animals seem to experience (judging from our own case, and reasoning from analogy) appropriate and adaptive psychological ac­companiments to organic existence. There is a palpable passion for self-preservation. There are desire, pleasure in the satisfaction of desires, acute agony attending injury, frustration, and chronic dread of death. But these experiences are the psychological substance of living. To live *is* to be anxious about life, to feel pain and pleasure in a fitting mixture, and sooner or later to die. That is the way the system works. If nature as a whole is good, then pain and death are also good. Environmental ethics in general require people to play fair in the natural system. The neo-Benthamites have in a sense taken the uncourageous approach. People have attempted to exempt themselves from the life/de~ath reci­procities of natural processes and from ecological limitations in the name of a prophylactic ethic of maximizing rewards (l~leasure) and minimizing unwelcome information (pain). To be fair, the humane moralists seem to suggest that we should attempt to project the same values into the nonhuman animal world and to widen the charmed circle--no matter that it would be biologically unrealistic to do so or biologically ruinous if, per impossible, such an environmental ethic were implemented.

## Link—Ethics

### Their ethics are shallow—doesn’t address current threats to the global ecosystem.

Capra 87 (Fritjof, founding director of the [Center for Ecoliteracy](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Center_for_Ecoliteracy), "Deep ecology a new paradigm" in *Deep Ecology for the 21st Century*, ed. George Sessions)

Shallow ecology is anthropocentric. It views humans as above or outside of nature, as the source of all value, and ascribes only instrumental, or use value to nature. Deep ecology does not separate humans from the natural environment' nor does it separate anything else from it. It does not see the world as a collection of isolated objects but rather as a network of phenomena that are fundamentally interconnected and interdependent. Deep ecology recognizes the intrinsic values of all living beings and views humans as just one particular strand in the web of life. The new ecological paradigm implies a corresponding ecologically oriented ethics. The ethical framework associated with the old paradigm is no longer adequate to deal with some of the major ethical problems of today, most of which involve threats to non-human forms of life. with nuclear weapons that threaten to wipe out all life on the planet, toxic substances that contaminate the environment on a large scale, new and unknown micro-organisms awaiting release into the environment without knowledge of the consequences animals tortured in the name of consumer safety-with all these activities occurring, it seems most important to introduce ecologically oriented ethical standards into modern science and technology. The reason why most of old-paradigm ethics cannot deal with these problems is that, like shallow ecology, it is anthropocentric. Thus the most important task for a new school of ethics will be to develop a non-anthropocentric theory of value, a theory that would confer inherent value on non-human forms of life. Ultimately, the recognition of value inherent in all living nature stems from the deep ecological awareness that nature and the self are one, This, however, is also the very core of spiritual awareness, Indeed, when the concept of the human spirit is understood as the mode of consciousness in which the individual feels connected to the cosmos as a whole, it becomes clear that ecological awareness is spiritual in its deepest essence and that the new ecological ethics is grounded in spirituality. The South African novelist Laurens van der Post recently posed the challenge succinctly: "It is not reason that needs to be abolished,” he said, “but the tyranny of reason.” But for the contemporary, existential urban man constantly assaulted by novelties, diversions, and facile, conflicting opinions, such a statement is already meaningless. What is reason if not consensus? And how can any tyranny exist in such a proliferation of choices, such an unprecedented prosperity and scope for self expression? Already for millions of such mean the rationale of the technocracy has become absolute, and the highest use of intelligence consists in maintaining their position in it. To be sure, their lives are fraught with problems and dilemmas, but none of these is insoluble within the terms of the artificial environment, an environment sufficiently elastic to desublimate repressed instincts in harmless ways. Promiscuity, drugs and alcohol, gambling, movies and television, violence and combativeness in sports and games, all are thus enlisted in the State's service. They divert and purge simultaneously, as do the debates generated by their presence, thereby obscuring criticisms of technocracy itself. Meanwhile, the Reason of the technocracy grows stronger by self-confirmation, for it can easily be shown that technological problems demand technological solutions. Everywhere we are acceding to the technocratic dictum that what is not known by experts cannot be known. Only in wilderness is it possible to escape this tyranny. In wilderness a man or woman has physically left behind the milieu of conditioning-the pervasive sociability, the endless "information" from mass media, and so on. To some extent, the wilderness traveler will be reminded of his animal nature, and share again the profound, irrational correctness of trees, lakes, birds, and beasts. For urban men this can be a subverting experience. Some must react violently in an attempt to debase or destroy the source of their disturbance, and to bring ancient terrors to heel. But even on the most superficial level wilderness strengthens independence, for the man who has been freed from regimentation and finds that he can go anywhere at any time has been reminded of a basic animal right. Should he succeed in formulating the idea of right, then in a small but significant way he will become a critic of technological confinement. There is a fundamental difference between this animal freedom and technocracy's most popular accomplishment: the ability to travel thousands of miles in a regulated atmosphere, never once feeling the rain or the sun, never once drinking pure water, hearing a natural sound, or breathing unreconditioned air. The wilderness traveler is apt to find himself in a radical position, for he has passed beyond the "reasonable" arguments about public versus private transportation, or jumbo jets versus the SST, or whether or not we are economically capable of mass-producing a safe automobile. He has bypassed the mass of alternatives posed by the assumptions of the technological society and glimpsed a possibility which his society will tell him is reactionary, archaic, and impossible, but which his body and his spirit tell him is absolutely correct. He has positioned himself to breach the Reason of his society, to jump the Green Wall and confirm that there is something better than being a drugged and gratified utopian.

# Impact Materials

## Impact—Outweighs The Case

### Anthropocentrism is the controlling impact—it allows the destruction of all forms of natural otherness to be reengineered for human purposes.

Lee 99 (Keekok, Visiting Chair in Philosophy at Lancaster University, *The Natural and the Artefactual*, 1999)

To appreciate this dimension one needs to highlight the distinction between the artefactual and the natural. The former is the material embodiment of human intentionality--an analysis in terms of Aristotle's causes shows that all four causes, since late modernity, may be assigned to human agency.'- The latter, ex hypothesi, has nothing to do with human agency in any of its four causes. This shows that the artefactual and the natural belong to two very different ontological categories--one has come into existence and continues to exist only because of human purpose and design while the other has come into existence and continues to exist independently of human purpose and design. In the terminology of this book, the artefactual embodies extrinsic/imposed teleology while the natural (at least in the form of individual living organisms) embodies intrinsic/immanent teleology. However, the more radical and powerful technologies of the late twentieth and the twenty-first centuries are capable of producing artefacts with an ever increasing degree of artefacticity. The threat then posed by modem homo faber is the systematic elimination of the natural, both at the empirical and the ontological levels, thereby generating a narcissistic civilization. In this context, it is, therefore, appropriate to remind ourselves that beyond Earth, nature, out there, exists as yet unhumanized. But there is a strong collective urge, not merely to study and understand that nature, but also ultimately to exploit it, and furthermore, even to transform parts of it into ersatz Earth, eventually making it fit for human habitation. That nature, as far as we know, has (had) no life on it. These aspirations raise a crucial problem which environmental philosophy ought to address itself, namely, whether abiotic nature on its own could be said to be morally considerable and the grounds for its moral considerability If no grounds could be found, then nature beyond Earth is ripe for total human control and manipulation subject to no moral but only technological and/or economic constraints. The shift to ontology in grounding moral considerability will, it is argued, free environmental philosophy from being Earthbound in the millennium about to dawn. In slightly greater detail, the aims of this book may be summarized as follows 1. To show how modem science and its technology, in controlling and manipulating (both biotic and abiotic) nature, transform it to become the~  artefactual. It also establishes that there are degrees of 'artefacticity  depending on the degree of control and precision with which science and  technology manipulate nature. An extant technology such as biotechnology  already threatens to imperil the existence of biotic natural kinds. Furthermore  technologies of the rising future, such as molecular nanotechnology, i~  synergistic combination with biotechnology and microcomputer technology,.  could intensify this tendency to eliminate natural kinds, both biotic and abiotic~  as well as their natural processes of evolution or change. 2. To consider the implications of the above for environmental philosophy, and in so doing, to point out the inadequacy of the extant accounts about intrinsic value in nature. By and large (with some honorable exceptions), these concentrate on arguing that the biotic has intrinsic value but assume that the~ undeniable contingent link between the abiotic and the biotic on Earth would~ take care of the abiotic itself. But the proposed terraformation of Mars (and even of Earth's moon only very recently) shows the urgent need to develop a much more comprehensive environmental philosophy which is not merely Earthbound but can include the abiotic in its own right. 3. The book also raises a central inadequacy of today's approaches in  environmental philosophy and movements. They concentrate predominantly  on the undesirable polluting aspects of extant technologies on human an~  nonhuman life, and advocate the introduction of more ecologically sensitive  technology (including this author's own earlier writing). If this were the most  important remit of environmental philosophy, then one would have to admit  that nature-replacing technologies (extant and in the rising future) could be  the ultimate 'green' technologies as their proponents are minded to maintain  in spite of their more guarded remarks about the environmental risks that ma'  be incurred in running such technologies.' Such technologies would also~  achieve what is seemingly impossible, as they promise to make possible ~  world of superabundance, not only for the few, but for all, without straining  and stressing the biosphere as a sink for industrial waste. But this book argue  that environmental philosophy should not merely concern itself with the  virtuous goal of avoiding pollution risks to life, be that human or nonhuman It should also be concerned with the threat that such radically powerful technologies could render nature, both biotic and abiotic, redundant. A totally artefactual world customized to human tastes could, in principle, be designed and manufactured. When one can create artefactual kinds (from what Aristotle calls 'first. matter,' or from today's analogue, what we call atoms and molecules of familiar elements like carbon, nitrogen, hydrogen, etc.) which in other relevant respects are indistinguishable from natural kinds (what Aristotle calls 'second matter'), natural kinds are in danger of being superseded. The ontological category of the artefactual would replace that of the natural. The upholding of the latter as a category worth preserving constitutes, for this book, the most fundamental task in environmental philosophy. Under this perspective, the worrying thing about modem technology in the long run may not be that it threatens life on Earth as we know it to be because of its polluting effects, but that it could ultimately humanize all of nature. Nature, as 'the Other,' would be eliminated. 4. In other words, the ontological category of the natural would have to be delineated and defended against that of the artefactual, and some account of 'intrinsic' value would have to be mounted which can encompass the former. The book argues for the need to maintain distinctions such as that between human/nonhuman, culture/nature, the artefactual/the natural. In other words, ontological dyadism is required, though not dualism, to combat the transformation of the natural to become the artefactual. The book also argues that the primary attribute of naturally-occurring entities is an ontological one, namely, that of independence as an ontological value. Such an attribute is to be distinguished from secondary attributes like intricacy, complexity, interests-bearing, sentience, rationality, etc., which are said to provide the grounds for assigning their bearers intrinsic value. In this sense, ontology precedes axiology.

### This is a moral side constraint—extinction is irrelevant in impact comparison because the universe will still have value without humanity.

Lee 99 (Keekok, Visiting Chair in Philosophy at Lancaster University, The Natural and the Artefactual, 1999)

We should not delude ourselves that the humanization of nature will stop at biotic nature or indeed be confined only to planet Earth. Other planets in our solar system, too, may eventually be humanized; given the technological possibility of doing so, the temptation to do so appears difficult to resist on the part of those always on the lookout for new challenges and new excitement. To resist the ontological elimination of nature as 'the Other,' environmental philosophy must not merely be earthbound but, also, astronomically bounded (at least to the extent of our own solar system). We should bear in mind that while there may be little pristine nature left on Earth, this does not mean that nature is not pristine elsewhere in other planets. We should also be mindful that while other planets may not have life on them, this does not necessarily render them only of instrumental value to us. Above all, we should, therefore, bear in mind that nature, whether pristine or less than fully pristine, biotic or abiotic, is ontologically independent and autonomous of humankind--natural forms and natural processes are capable of undertaking their own .trajectories of existence. We should also remind ourselves that we are the controllers of our science and our technology, and not allow the products of our intellectual labor to dictate to us what we do to nature itself without pause or reflection. However, it is not the plea of this book that humankind should never transform the natural to become the artefactual, or to deny that artefacticity is not a matter of differing degrees or levels, as such claims would be silly and indefensible. Rather its remit is to argue that in systematically transforming the natural to become the artefactual through our science and our technology, we are at the same time systematically engaged in ontological simplification. Ontological impoverishment in this context is wrong primarily because we have so far failed to recognize that nature embodies its own funda­mental ontological value. In other words, it is not true, as modernity alleges, that nature is devoid of all value and that values are simply humanly conferred or are the projections of human emotions or attitudes upon nature. Admittedly, it takes our unique type of human consciousness to recognize that nature possesses ontological value; however, from this it would be fallacious to conclude that human consciousness is at once the source of all values, or even the sole locus of axiologically-grounded intrinsic values. But most important of all, human con­sciousness does not generate the primary ontological value of independence in nature; nature's forms and processes embodying this value exist whether human­kind is around or not.

## Impact—Environment

### Anthropocentrism is an unsustainable system—it poisons every environment it enters destroying all life.

Berry 95 (Thomas, Ph.D. from the Catholic University of America in European intellectual history  “The viable human” in *Deep Ecology for the 21st Century*, ed. George Sessions)

A deep cultural pathology has developed in Western society and has now spread throughout the planet. A savage plundering of the entire earth is taking place through industrial exploitation. Thousands of poisons unknown in former times are saturating the air, the water, and the soil. The habitat of a vast number of living species is being irreversibly damaged. In this universal disturbance of the biosphere by human agents, the human being now finds that the harm done to the natural world is returning to threaten the human species itself. The question of the viability of the human species is intimately connected with the question of the viability of the earth. These questions ultimately arise because at the present time the human community has such an exaggerated, even pathological, fixation on its own comfort and convenience that it is willing to exhaust any and all of the earth's resources to satisfy its own cravings. The sense of reality and of value is strictly directed toward the indulgences of a consumer economy. This nonsustainable situation can be clearly seen in the damage done to major elements necessary for the continued well-being of the planet. When the soil, the air, and the water have been extensively poisoned, human needs cannot be fulfilled. Strangely, this situation is the consequence of a human centered norm of reality and value. Once we grant that a change from an anthropocentric to a biocentric sense of reality and value is needed, we must ask how this can be achieved and how it would work it. we must begin by accepting the fact that the life community, the community of all living species, is the greater reality and the greater value , and that the primary concern of the human must be the preservation and enhancement of this larger community. The human does have its own distinctive reality and its own distinctive value, but this distinctiveness must be articulated within the more comprehensive context. The human ultimately must discover the larger dimensions of its own being within this community context. That the value of the human being is enhanced by diminishing the value of the larger community is an illusion, the great illusion of the present industrial age, seeks to advance the human by plundering the planet's geological structure and all its biological species' This plundering is being perpetrated mainly by the great industrial establishments that have dominated the entire planetary process for the past one hundred years, during the period when modern science and technology took control not only of natural resources but also of human affairs. If the viability of the human species is now in question, it is a direct consequence of these massive ventures, which have gained extensive control not only of our economies but also of our whole cultural development, whether it be economics, politics, law, education, medicine' or moral values' Even our language is heavily nuanced in favor of the consumer values fostered by our commercial industrial establishment'.

### Anthropocentrism divorces our connection to the natural world – this makes extinction inevitable

Drew 72 (Wayland, BA in English Language and Literature from Victoria College at the University of Toronto “Killing Wilderness” in *Deep Ecology for the 21st Century*, ed. George Sessions, pg. 118-119)

Civilization has triumphed. And yet, it has not. Ecologically our civilization is as mindless as a cancer, and we know that it will destroy itself by destroying its host. Ironically, any remnants of humanity to survive the apotheosis of civilization will be returned, genetically mutilated, to that state which we have thought contemptible. If man does not survive, "interplanetary archeologists of the future will classify our planet as one in which a very long and stable period of small-scale hunting and gathering was followed by an apparently instantaneous efflorescence of technology and society leading rapidly to extinction. 'stratigraphically,' the origin of agriculture and thermonuclear destruction will appear as essentially simultaneous."5 Reason severed from instinct is a monster. It is an affirmation of intellect, therefore, and not an abrogation, to defend as a viable development from civilization a way of life in which both instincts and intelligence have flourished freely; and while wilderness is still able to suggest man's proper place and deportment, it is a narrow, hubristic, suicidal, and tyrannical reason which will not listen. As civilized people, wilderness preservationists have been understandably reluctant to admit this. Together with the benefits of the advanced technological society they share the fallacy of infinite expansion, or seem to do so. Radical decentralization is too anarchistic and too negative a proposal for them to make. Whenever possible they seek positive political solutions, thereby allowing themselves to enter a dialectical process by which rational “concepts” of wilderness are formulated and wilderness itself is circumscribed in thought. Should they recognize the thralldom of politics to technocracy, they will say ruefully that they are at least “buying time.” But while they debate, wilderness shrinks; when they compromise, wilderness is fragmented. To endorse any projection of society's "future needs" is to endorse the growth dynamic in which technology is founded, unless the radical shift to a steady-state economy has already occurred. At the present rate of expansion, technological demands on the environment will have been multiplied by a factor of thirty-two by the year 2040 within the lifetime of children now living. It is an insane projection. Long before then we shall either have scuttled civilization, or we shall have made a reality of the Orwellian nightmare. Such words as "individual" and "wilderness" will long since have been torn from their semantic moorings. Redefinitions are already underway. This century has seen the insinuation of the term "wilderness park" by the technocratic bureaucracy, and its ready acceptance by conservationists. In this maneuver, the State has adroitly undercut the question raised by wilderness, and has reduced all wilderness issues to the status of managerial techniques. Dangerous negative perceptions are thereby deflected into the positivistic enterprise. When the principle of management has been accepted by everyone, then the containment of wilderness will be virtually complete. There will be continuing discussions, of course, but they will be discussions among the wardens and the gardeners. No longer might the phrase "wilderness park" be seen as a contradiction in terms, for what lies within the boundaries of such parks will be wilderness by definition, and it will remain so no matter what further technological ravishment it undergoes. Wilderness hotels, wilderness railroads and airports, wilderness highways, wilderness theaters and shopping plazas-all could ultimately be made to make sense, because there will be no basis for comparison left. "Don't you see," asks one of Winston Smith's colleagues in Nineteen Eighty-four, "that the whole purpose of Newspeak is to narrow the range of thought" Should the State reserve natural areas, it will be as psychic purging-grounds for those atavistic citizens who still require such treatment, but those reserves will be parks, not wilderness.

## Impact—Ontology

### Their ontology is flawed—anthropocentrism disconnects humanity from nature.

Turner 95 (Jack, previous professor of philosophy at the University of Illinois “Gary Snider and The Practice of the Wild” in *Deep Ecology for the 21st Century*, ed. George Sessions, p. 41-42)

With such raw contact we learn what primary cultures learned, that nature can be a ferocious teacher of the way things are a profoundly wild, organic world of system and raw process, a maze of networks, webs, fields, and communities, all interdependent, interrelating, and mirroring each other- Thoreau says, "In wildness is the preservation of the world." Snyder responds, "Wildness is not just the 'preservation' of the world, it is the world. . . . Nature is ultimately in no way endangered; wilderness is. The wild is indestructible, but we might not see the wild." In our emphasis on species loss and habitat destruction we forget our own peril. "Human beings themselves are at risk-not just on some survival of civilization level, but more basically on the level of heart and soul. We are ignorant of our own nature and confused about what it means to be a human being." This confusion stems from judging ourselves independent from and superior to other forms of life rather than accepting equal membership in the seemingly chaotic and totally interdependent world of wildness. To remove an animal or plant or hunter-gatherer from its place automatically compromises its inherent qualities and integrity and leads to the infinite sadness of zoos, aquariums, and reservations. How do we remedy this situation? "To resolve the dichotomy of the civilized and the wild, we must first resolve to be whole." And if we are going to make this resolution we must first figure out what we might mean by "wild." The practice of the wild refines our thinking about the wild, extending it beyond the realm of vacation spots, beyond the facts and equations of scientific explanation, to a place familiar to any child who persists in asking "Why?" Children know that natural metaphors of plants and animals penetrate to the wild place, that fairy tales are true, that they are little animals. That is why they so vigorously oppose the forces of domesticity and civilized education. They know quite well that they would be better off in forests, the mountains, the deserts, and the seas. "Thoreau wrote of 'this vast savage howling mother of ours, Nature, lying all around, with such beauty, and such affection for her children, as the leopard; and yet we are so early weaned from her breast to society.' "

### And—tolerating the destruction of this ecosystem saps us of our humanity—it’s the opening act for nuclear war and human extinction.

Bookchin 87 (Murray, co-founder of the Institute of Social Ecology “An Appeal For Social and Psychological Sanity” 1987)

Industrially and technologically, we are moving at an ever-accelerating pace toward a yawning chasm with our eyes completely blindfolded. From the 1950s onward, we have placed ecological burdens upon our planet that have no precedent in human history.Our impact on our environment has been nothing less than appalling. The problems raised by acid rain alone are striking examples of [end page 106] innumerable problems that appear everywhere on our planet. The concrete-like clay layers, impervious to almost any kind of plant growth, replacing dynamic soils that once supported lush rain forests remain stark witness to a massive erosion of soil in all regions north and south of our equatorial belt. The equator—a cradle not only of our weather like the ice caps but a highly complex network of animal and plant life—is being denuded to a point where vast areas of the region look like a barren moonscape. We no longer "cut" our forests—that celebrated "renewable resource" for fuel, timber, and paper. We sweep them up like dust with a rapidity and "efficiency" that renders any claims to restorative action mere media-hype.  Our entire planet is thus becoming simplified, not only polluted. Its soil is turning into sand. Its stately forests are rapidly being replaced by tangled weeds and scrub, that is, where vegetation in any complex form can be sustained at all. Its wildlife ebbs and flows on the edge of extinction, dependent largely on whether one or two nations—or governmental administrations—agree that certain sea and land mammals, bird species, or, for that matter, magnificent trees are "worth" rescuing as lucrative items on corporate balance sheets.  With each such loss, humanity, too, loses a portion of its own character structure: its sensitivity toward life as such, including human life, and its rich wealth of sensibility. If we can learn to ignore the destiny of whales and condors—indeed, turn their fate into chic cliches—we can learn to ignore the destiny of Cambodians in Asia, Salvadorans in Central America, [end page 107] and, finally, the human beings who people our communities. If we reach this degree of degradation, we will then become so spiritually denuded that we will be capable of ignoring the terrors of thermonuclear war. Like the biotic ecosystems we have simplified with our lumbering and slaughtering technologies, we will have simplified the psychic ecosystems that give each of us our personal uniqueness. We will have rendered our internal mileau as homogenized and lifeless as our external milieu—and a biocidal war will merely externalize the deep sleep that will have already claimed our spiritual and moral integrity. The process of simplification, even more significantly than pollution, threatens to destroy the restorative powers of nature and humanity—their common ability to efface the forces of destruction and reclaim the planet for life and fecundity. A humanity disempowered of its capacity to change a misbegotten "civilization," ultimately divested of its power to resist, reflects a natural world disempowered of its capacity to reproduce a green and living world.

### Self-actualization is impossible through an anthropocentric view—connection with nature is key.

Naess 86 (Arne, Norwegian philosopher and the founder of [deep ecology](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_ecology). Former professor at the [University of Oslo](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_Oslo), founder of the deep ecology movement. “Self-realization an Ecological Approach To Being In The World” in *Deep Ecology for the 21st Century*, ed. George Sessions)

1. We underestimate ourself. And I emphasize "self." We tend to confuse our "self" with the narrow ego. 2. Human nature is such that, with sufficient comprehensive (all-sided) maturity, we cannot help but "identify" our self with all living beings; beautiful or ugly, big or small, sentient or not. The adjective comprehensive ("all-sided") as in "comprehensive maturity" deserves a note: Descartes seemed to be rather immature in his relationship with animals; Schopenhauer was nor very advanced in his relationship to his family (kicking his mother down a staircase?); Heidegger was amateurish-to say the least -ln his political behavior. weak identification with nonhumans is compatible with maturity in some major sets of relationships, such as those towards one's family or friends. And so I use the qualification comprehensive to mean "being mature in all major relationships." 3. Traditionally, the maturity of the self has been considered to develop through three stages: from ego to social self (comprising the ego), and from social self to a metaphysical self (comprising the social self). But in this conception of the maturity of the self, Nature is largely left out. Our immediate environment, our home (where we belong as children), and the identification with nonhuman living beings, are largely ignored. Therefore, I tentatively introduce, perhaps for the very first time, the concept of ecological self. We may be said to be in, and of, Nature from the very beginning of our selves. Society and human relationships are important, but our self is much richer in its constitutive relationships. These relationships are not only those we have with other humans and the human community (I have elsewhere introduced the term mired community to mean those communities where we consciously and deliberately live closely together with certain animals). 4. The meaning of life, and the joy we experience in living, is increased through increased self-realization; that is, through the fulfillment of potentials each of us has, but which are never exactly the same for any two living beings. Whatever the differences between beings, nevertheless, increased self-realization implies a broadening and deepening of the self. 5. Because of an inescapable process of identification with others, with increasing maturity, the self is widened and deepened. We "see ourselves in others." Our self-realization is hindered if the self-realization of others, with whom we identify, is hindered. Our love of ourself will fight this hindering process by assisting in the self-realization of others according to the formula "Live and let live!" Thus, everything that can be achieved by altruism-the dutiful, moral consideration for others-----can be achieved, and much more, by the process of widening and deepening ourselves. Following Kant, we then act beautifully, but neither morally nor immorally. 6. One of the great challenges today is to save the planet from further ecological devastation which violates both the enlightened self-interest of humans and nonhumans, and decreases the potential of joyful existence for all.

# Alternative Materials

## Deep Ecology Good

### Anthropocentrism is based on a flawed epistemology that fails to question humanity’s relationship with the environment—only Deep Ecology can provide a framework for change.

Naess 86 (Arne, Norwegian philosopher and the founder of [deep ecology](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_ecology). Former professor at the [University of Oslo](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_Oslo), founder of the deep ecology movement. “The deep ecology movement some philosophical aspects” in *Deep Ecology for the 21st Century*, ed. George Sessions)

The decisive difference between a shallow and a deep ecology, in practice, concerns the willingness to question, and an appreciation of the importance of questioning, every economic and political policy in public. This questioning is both "deep" and public. It asks "why" insistently and consistently, taking nothing for granted! Deep ecology can readily admit to the practical effectiveness of homocentric arguments: It is essential for conservation to be seen as central to human interests and aspirations. At the same time, people-from heads of state to the members of rural communities-will most readily be brought to demand conservation if they themselves recognize the contribution of conservation to the achievement of their needs as perceived by them, and the solution of their problems, as perceived by them.8 There are several dangers in arguing solely from the point of view of narrow human interests. Some policies based upon successful homocentric arguments turn out to violate or unduly compromise the objectives of deeper argumentation. Further, homocentric arguments tend to weaken the motivation to fight for necessary social change, together with the willingness to serve a great cause. In addition, the complicated arguments in human-centered conservation documents such as the World Conservation Strategy go beyond the time and ability of many people to assimilate and understand. They also tend to provoke interminable technical disagreements among experts. Special interest groups with narrow short-term exploitive objectives, which run counter to saner ecological policies, often exploit these disagreements and thereby stall the debate and steps toward effective action. When arguing from deep ecological premises, most of the complicated proposed technological fixes need not be discussed at all. The relative merits of alternative technological proposals are pointless if our vital needs have already been met. A focus on vital issues activates mental energy and strengthens motivation. On the other hand, the shallow environmental approach, by focusing almost exclusively on the technical aspects of environmental problems, tends to make the public more passive and disinterested in the more crucial non -technical, lifestyle- related, environmental issues. Writers within the Deep ecology movement try to articulate the fundamental Presuppositions underlying the dominant economic approach in terms of value Priorities, philosophy, and religion. In the Shallow movement, questioning and Argumentation comes to a halt long before this. The deep ecology movement is therefore "the ecology movement which questions deeper." A realization of the deep changes which are required, as outlined in the deep ecology eight point platform (discussed in #3 above) makes us realize the necessity of "questioning everything." The terms "egalitarianism," "homocentrism," "anthropocentrism," and "human chauvinism" are often used to characterize points of view on the shallow-deep spectrum. But these terms usually function as slogans which are often open to misinterpretation. They can properly imply that man is in some respects only a "plain citizen" (Aldo Leopold) of the planet on a par with all other species, but they are sometimes interpreted as denying that humans have any "extraordinary" traits, or that, in situations involving vital interests, humans have no overriding obligations towards their own kind. But this would be a mistake: they have! In any social movement, rhetoric has an essential function in keeping members fighting together under the same banner. Rhetorical formulations also serve to provoke interest among outsiders. Of the many excellent slogans, one might mention "nature knows best," "small is beautiful," and "all things hang together." But sometimes one may safely say that nature does not always know best, that small is sometimes dreadful, and that fortunately things hang together sometimes only loosely, or not at all. Only a minority of deep ecology supporters are academic philosophers, such as myself. And while deep ecology cannot be a finished philosophical system, this does not mean that its philosophers should not try to be as clear as possible. So a discussion of deep ecology as a derivational system may be of value to clarify the many important premise/conclusion relations.

## Imagining Global Suicide Good

### Our alternative is to imagine global suicide—this throws into question the ideology of humanist value systems.

Kochi and Ordan 8 (Tarik, lecturer in the School of Law, Queen's University, Belfast, Northern Ireland, and Noam, linguist and translator, conducts research in Translation Studies at Bar Ilan University, Israel, 'An argument for the global suicide of humanity', *Borderlands*, December)

The version of progress enunciated in Hawking's story of cosmic colonisation presents a view whereby the solution to the negative consequences of technological action is to create new forms of technology, new forms of action. New action and innovation solve the dilemmas and consequences of previous action. Indeed, the very act of moving away, or rather evacuating, an ecologically devastated Earth is an example at hand. Such an approach involves a moment of reflection--previous errors and consequences are examined and taken into account and efforts are made to make things better. The idea of a better future informs reflection, technological innovation and action. However, is the form of reflection offered by Hawking broad or critical enough? Does his mode of reflection pay enough attention to the irredeemable moments of destruction, harm, pain and suffering inflicted historically by human action upon the non-human world? There are, after all, a variety of negative consequences of human action, moments of destruction, moments of suffering, which may not be redeemable or ever made better. Conversely there are a number of conceptions of the good in which humans do not take centre stage at the expense of others. What we try to do in this paper is to draw out some of the consequences of reflecting more broadly upon the negative costs of human activity in the context of environmental catastrophe. This involves re-thinking a general idea of progress through the historical and conceptual lenses of speciesism, colonialism, survival and complicity. Our proposed conclusion is that the only appropriate moral response to a history of human destructive action is to give up our claims to biological supremacy and to sacrifice our form of life so as to give an eternal gift to others. From the outset it is important to make clear that the argument for the global suicide of humanity is presented as a thought experiment. The purpose of such a proposal in response to Hawking is to help show how a certain conception of modernity, of which his approach is representative, is problematic. Taking seriously the idea of global suicide is one way of throwing into question an ideology or dominant discourse of modernist-humanist action. [3] By imagining an alternative to the existing state of affairs, absurd as it may seem to some readers by its nihilistic and radical 'solution', we wish to open up a ground for a critical discussion of modernity and its negative impacts on both human and non-human animals, as well as on the environment. [4] In this respect, by giving voice to the idea of a human-free world, we attempt to draw attention to some of the asymmetries of environmental reality and to give cause to question why attempts to build bridges from the human to the non-human have, so far, been unavailing. Subjects of ethical discourse One dominant presumption that underlies many modern scientific and political attitudes towards technology and creative human action is that of 'speciesism', which can itself be called a 'human-centric' view or attitude. The term 'speciesism', coined by psychologist Richard D. Ryder and later elaborated into a comprehensive ethics by Peter Singer (1975), refers to the attitude by which humans value their species above both non-human animals and plant life. Quite typically humans conceive non-human animals and plant life as something which might simply be used for their benefit. Indeed, this conception can be traced back to, among others, Augustine (1998, p.33). While many modern, 'enlightened' humans generally abhor racism, believe in the equality of all humans, condemn slavery and find cannibalism and human sacrifice repugnant, many still think and act in ways that are profoundly 'speciesist'. Most individuals may not even be conscious that they hold such an attitude, or many would simply assume that their attitude falls within the 'natural order of things'. Such an attitude thus resides deeply within modern human ethical customs and rationales and plays a profound role in the way in which humans interact with their environment. The possibility of the destruction of our habitable environment on earth through global warming and Hawking's suggestion that we respond by colonising other planets forces us to ask a serious question about how we value human life in relation to our environment. The use of the term 'colonisation' is significant here as it draws to mind the recent history of the colonisation of much of the globe by white, European peoples. Such actions were often justified by valuing European civilisation higher than civilisations of non-white peoples, especially that of indigenous peoples. For scholars such as Edward Said (1978), however, the practice of colonialism is intimately bound up with racism. That is, colonisation is often justified, legitimated and driven by a view in which the right to possess territory and govern human life is grounded upon an assumption of racial superiority. If we were to colonise other planets, what form of 'racism' would underlie our actions? What higher value would we place upon human life, upon the human race, at the expense of other forms of life which would justify our taking over a new habitat and altering it to suit our prosperity and desired living conditions? Generally, the animal rights movement responds to the ongoing colonisation of animal habitats by humans by asking whether the modern Western subject should indeed be the central focus of its ethical discourse. In saying 'x harms y', animal rights philosophers wish to incorporate in 'y' non-human animals. That is, they enlarge the group of subjects to which ethical relations apply. In this sense such thinking does not greatly depart from any school of modern ethics, but simply extends ethical duties and obligations to non-human animals. In eco-ethics, on the other hand, the role of the subject and its relation to ethics is treated a little differently. The less radical environmentalists talk about future human generations so, according to this approach, 'y' includes a projection into the future to encompass the welfare of hitherto non-existent beings. Such an approach is prevalent in the Green Party in Germany, whose slogan is "Now. For tomorrow". For others, such as the 'deep ecology' movement, the subject is expanded so that it may include the environment as a whole. In this instance, according to Naess, 'life' is not to be understood in "a biologically narrow sense". Rather he argues that the term 'life' should be used in a comprehensive non-technical way such that it refers also to things biologists may classify as non-living. This would include rivers, landscapes, cultures, and ecosystems, all understood as "the living earth" (Naess, 1989, p.29). From this perspective the statement 'x harms y' renders 'y' somewhat vague. What occurs is not so much a conflict over the degree of ethical commitment, between "shallow" and "deep ecology" or between "light" and "dark greens" per se, but rather a broader re-drawing of the content of the subject of Western philosophical discourse and its re-definition as 'life'. Such a position involves differing metaphysical commitments to the notions of being, intelligence and moral activity. This blurring and re-defining of the subject of moral discourse can be found in other ecocentric writings (e.g. Lovelock, 1979; Eckersley, 1992) and in other philosophical approaches. [5] In part our approach bears some similarity with these 'holistic' approaches in that we share dissatisfaction with the modern, Western view of the 'subject' as purely human-centric. Further, we share some of their criticism of bourgeois green lifestyles. However, our approach is to stay partly within the position of the modern, Western human-centric view of the subject and to question what happens to it in the field of moral action when environmental catastrophe demands the radical extension of ethical obligations to non-human beings. That is, if we stick with the modern humanist subject of moral action, and follow seriously the extension of ethical obligations to non-human beings, then we would suggest that what we find is that the utopian demand of modern humanism turns over into a utopian anti-humanism, with suicide as its outcome. One way of attempting to re-think the modern subject is thus to throw the issue of suicide right in at the beginning and acknowledge its position in modern ethical thought. This would be to recognise that the question of suicide resides at the center of moral thought, already. What survives when humans no longer exist? There continues to be a debate over the extent to which humans have caused environmental problems such as global warming (as opposed to natural, cyclical theories of the earth's temperature change) and over whether phenomena such as global warming can be halted or reversed. Our position is that regardless of where one stands within these debates it is clear that humans have inflicted degrees of harm upon non-human animals and the natural environment. And from this point we suggest that it is the operation of speciesism as colonialism which must be addressed. One approach is of course to adopt the approach taken by Singer and many within the animal rights movement and remove our species, homo sapiens, from the centre of all moral discourse. Such an approach would thereby take into account not only human life, but also the lives of other species, to the extent that the living environment as a whole can come to be considered the proper subject of morality. We would suggest, however, that this philosophical approach can be taken a number of steps further. If the standpoint that we have a moral responsibility towards the environment in which all sentient creatures live is to be taken seriously, then we perhaps have reason to question whether there remains any strong ethical grounds to justify the further existence of humanity. For example, if one considers the modern scientific practice of experimenting on animals, both the notions of progress and speciesism are implicitly drawn upon within the moral reasoning of scientists in their justification of committing violence against nonhuman animals. The typical line of thinking here is that because animals are valued less than humans they can be sacrificed for the purpose of expanding scientific knowledge focussed upon improving human life. Certainly some within the scientific community, such as physiologist Colin Blakemore, contest aspects of this claim and argue that experimentation on animals is beneficial to both human and nonhuman animals (e.g. Grasson, 2000, p.30). Such claims are 'disingenuous', however, in that they hide the relative distinctions of value that underlie a moral justification for sacrifice within the practice of experimentation (cf. LaFollette & Shanks, 1997, p.255). If there is a benefit to non-human animals this is only incidental, what remains central is a practice of sacrificing the lives of other species for the benefit of humans. Rather than reject this common reasoning of modern science we argue that it should be reconsidered upon the basis of species equality. That is, modern science needs to ask the question of: 'Who' is the best candidate for 'sacrifice' for the good of the environment and all species concerned? The moral response to the violence, suffering and damage humans have inflicted upon this earth and its inhabitants might then be to argue for the sacrifice of the human species. The moral act would be the global suicide of humanity.

# Answers To Aff Responses

## They Say: “Permutation”

Framing DA: incorporation of the plan invalidates the post-humanist gesture of our alternative—causes it to be lost in human-centered politics.

Papadopoulos 10 (Dimitris, Reader in Sociology and Organisation University of Leicester, Epherema vol 10 “Insurgent posthumanism” 2010)

It is true that left politics have largely ignored the complexity and unpredictability of the entanglement between a deeply divided society and that of a deeply divided nonhuman world. The principle avenue for social transformation, at least in the main conceptualisations of the political left 3 , passes through seizing the centres of social and political power. The dominant motivation for left politics after the revolutions of 1848 (and definitely since 1871) has been how to conquer institutional power and the state. Within this matrix of radical left thinking the posthumanist moment becomes invalidated, subsumed to a strategy focused solely on social power. But here I want to argue that a post-humanist gesture can be found at the heart of processes of left political mobilisations that create transformative institutions and alternatives. This was the case even when such moves were distorted at the end, neutralised or finally appropriated into a form of left politics solely concerned with institutional representation and state power. What such an appropriation conceals is that a significant part of the everyday realities put to work through radical left struggles have always had a strong posthumanist character through their concentration on remaking the mundane material conditions of existence beyond and outside an immediate opposition to the state. In what follows I will try to excavate this posthumanist gesture from the main narratives of radical left political struggles along the following three fault lines: the first is about the exit from an alienated and highly regulated relation to the material, biological and technological realms through the making of a self-organised common world – a move from enclosed and separated worlds governed by labour to the making of ecological commons. A second posthumanist move is one that attacks the practice of politics as a matter of idea and institutions and rehabilitates politics as an embodied and everyday practice – an exit from the representational mind to the embodiment of politics. Finally, the third, involves the decentring of the human subject as the main actor of history making. History is a human affair but it is not made (only) by certain groups of humans – a move towards a post-anthropocentric history.

### The permutation devolves into self-serving rationalizations—ethical compromises are unacceptable.

Lupisella & Logsdon 97 (Mark, masters degree in philosophy of science at university of Maryland and researcher working at the Goddard Space Flight Center, and John, Director, Space Policy Institute The George Washington University, Washington, “DO WE NEED A COSMOCENTRIC ETHIC?” <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.25.7502>)

Steve Gillett has suggested a hybrid view combining homocentrism as applied to terrestrial activity combined with biocentrism towards worlds with indigenous life.32 Invoking such a patchwork of theories to help deal with different domains and circumstances could be considered acceptable and perhaps even desirable especially when dealing with something as varied and complex as ethics. Indeed, it has a certain common sense appeal. However, instead of digging deeply into what is certainly a legitimate epistemological issue, let us consider the words of J. Baird Callicott: “But there is both a rational philosophical demand and a human psychological need for a self-consistent and all-embracing moral theory. We are neither good philosophers nor whole persons if for one purpose we adopt utilitarianism, another deontology, a third animal liberation, a fourth the land ethic, and so on. Such ethical eclecticism is not only rationally intolerable, it is morally suspect as it invites the suspicion of ad hoc rationalizations for merely expedient or self-serving actions.”33

## They Say: “Space is Dead (not alive)”

### The aff commits the Biological Fallacy by equating organisms to life—everything is “alive” and attempts to distinguish between life and non-life cause ecosystem destruction and extinction.

Rowe 96 — Stan Rowe, Professor Emeritus at the University of Saskatchewan, 1996 (“From Shallow To Deep Ecological Philosophy,” *Trumpeter*, Volume 13, Number 1, Available Online at http://trumpeter.athabascau.ca/index.php/trumpet/article/view/278/413, Accessed 07-26-2011)

Organisms can be “alive” one moment and “dead” the next with no quantitative difference. The recently deceased organism has lost none of its physical parts yet it lacks “life”—an unknown quality of organization (perhaps that mystery called “energy?”) but not the organization itself. A still stronger reason exists for not equating “life” and “organisms.” The latter only exhibit “aliveness” in the context of life-supporting systems, though curiously the vitality of the latter has mostly been denied. By analogy, it is as if all agreed that only a tree trunk’s cambial layer is “alive” while its support system—the tree’s bole and roots of bark and wood that envelops and supports the cambium—is “dead.” Instead we perceive the whole tree as “alive.” The separation of “living” organisms from their supportive but “dead” environments is a reductionist convention that ecology disproves. Both organic and inorganic are functional parts of enveloping ecosystems, of which the largest one accessible to direct experience is the global ecosphere. To attribute the organizing principle “life” to Earth—to the ecosphere and its sectoral aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems—makes more sense than attempting to locate it in organisms per se, divorced from their requisite milieus. The aquatic ecologist Lindeman (1942) who pioneered examination of lakes as energetic systems adopted the ecosystem concept because of the blurred distinction between “living” and “dead” in the components of the Minnesota lakes he studied. The Biological Fallacy, equating organisms with life, is the result of a faulty inside-the-system view (Rowe 1991). Pictures of the blue-and-white planet Earth taken from the outside are intuitively recognized as images of a living “cell.” Inside that “cell,” cheated by sight, people perceive a particulate world separable into important and unimportant parts: the “organic” and the “inorganic,” “biotic” and “abiotic,” “animate” and “inanimate,” “living” and “dead.” Religions, philosophies and sciences have been constructed around these ignorant taxonomies, perpetuating the departmentalization of a global ecosystem whose “aliveness” is as much expressed in its improbable atmosphere, crustal rocks, seas, soils and sediments as in organisms. When did life begin? When did any kind of creative organization begin? Perhaps when the ecosphere came into existence. Perhaps earlier at time zero and the Big Bang. Important human attitudes hinge on the idea of life and where it resides. If only organisms are imbued with life, then things like us are important and all else is relatively unimportant. The biocentric preoccupation with organisms subtly supports anthropocentrism, for are we not first in neural complexity among all organisms? Earth has traditionally been thought to consist of consequential entities—organisms, living beings—and their relatively inconsequential dead environments. What should be attended to, cared for, worried about? The usual answer today is “life” in its limited sense of “organisms,” of biodiversity. Meanwhile sea, land and air—classified as dead environment—can be freely exploited. In the reigning ideology as long as large organisms are safeguarded, anything goes. We demean Earth by equating “life” and “organisms,” then proving by text-book definition that Earth is dead because not-an-organism. In this way mental doors are barred against the idea of liveliness everywhere. Certainly Earth is not an organism, nor is it a super organism as Lovelock has proposed, any more than organisms are Earth or mini-Earth. The planetary ecosphere and its sectoral volumetric ecosystems are SUPRA-organismic, higher levels of integration than mere organisms. Essential to the ecocentric idea is assignment of highest value to the ecosphere and to the ecosystems that it comprises. Note the use of “ecosphere” rather than “biosphere,” the latter usually defined as a “life-filled” (read “organism-filled”) thin shell at Earth’s surface. The meaning of “ecosphere” goes deeper; it is Earth to the core, comprising the totality of gravity and electro-magnetic fields, the molten radioactive magma that shifts the crustal plates, vulcanism and earthquakes and mountain building that renew nutrients at the surface, the whole dynamic evolving “stage” where organisms play out their many roles under the guidance of the larger whole, shaped at least in part by the “morphic fields” of the living Gaia (Sheldrake 1991:162). In different times and places the source of life has been attributed to the air, to soil, to water, to fire, as well as to organisms. As with the blind men touching the elephant, each separate part has been the imagined essential component of the whole Earth. Now that the planet has been conceptualized as one integrated entity, can we not logically attribute the creative synthesizing quintessence called “life” to it, rather than to any one class of its various parts? When life is conceived as a function of the ecosphere and its sectoral ecosystem the subject matter of Biology is cast in a bright new light. The pejorative concept of “environment” vanishes. The focus of vital interest broadens to encompass the world. Anthropocentrism and biocentrism receive the jolting shock they deserve. The answer as to where our preservation emphasis should center is answered: Earth spaces (and all that is in them) first, Earth species second. This priority guarantees no loss of vital parts. The implications of locating animation where it belongs, of denying the naive “Life = Organisms” equation, are many. Perhaps most important is a broadening of the Schweizerian “reverence for life” to embrace the whole Earth. Reverence for life means reverence for ecosystems. We should feel the same pain when the atmosphere and the seas are poisoned as when people are poisoned. We should feel more pain at the destruction of wild ecosystems, such as the temperate rain forest of the West Coast, than at the demise of any organism, no matter how sad the latter occasion, because the destruction of ecosystems severs the very roots of evolutionary creativity.

The living/nonliving distinction is irrelevant – even nonliving aspects of the environment have intrinsic value.

Nicholson 92(Shirley J. Nicholson, former chief editor of Quest Books , Krotona Institute of Theosophy in Ojai, CA, "Gaia's Hidden Life: The Unseen Intelligence of Nature" 1992, http://books.google.com/books?id=dLJW84nISZYC&dq=gaia+nicholson&lr=&source=gbs\_navlinks\_s, Google Books)

If this vital force, like Sheldrake's "immaterial" and "subtle" something that makes a body alive, is the energy that is equivalent to all matter (E=mc2), then indeed everything is alive, including those things we usually consider inanimate, such as rocks, water, and molecules. Esoteric philosophy has long held that everything is alive. Helena Petrovna Blavatsky, in her source book of ancient wisdom The Secret Doctrine, confirms this view: "It has been stated before now that Occultism does not accept anything inorganic in the Kosmos. The expression employed by Science, "Inorganic substance,' means simply that the latent life slumbering in the molecules of so called 'inert matter' is incognizable. ALL IS LIFE, and every atom of every mineral dust is a LIFE, though beyond our comprehension and perception, because it is outside the ranger of the laws known to those who reject Occultism" In this view even the remains of a dead animal contain potential life force that permeates everything in the universe, but it becomes obvious to us only when the organism is imbued with purpose and self regulation, as is a living plant or a human being. There are certainly those who would vehemently disagree with this interpretation of what in our world (and perhaps in the universe, too) can be considered as life. Lovelock mentioned in his definition of life, similar to Blavatsky's, that this sort of definition would also apply to flowing streams, to hurricanes, to flames, or possibly even to objects made by humans. However, Lovelock and Margulis,after much soul-searching, have come to observe that the boundary between life and what we consider inanimate (the fire, the flowing steam, rocks), which most of us intuitively believe not to be alive, may not be so easily drawn after all. They studied the complex interactions on our Gaian earth, the way plant becomes rock becomes gas becomes a part of plant again. They considered that matter and energy appear to be completely different yet completely interchangeable. They concluded that one can substitute living organisms and their inorganic environment for each other. This is tantamount to stating that at least all matter on earth is alive, and perhaps this includes all matter in the universe as well. According to Lovelock, "there is no clear distinction anywhere on the Earth's surface between living and nonliving matter. There is merely a hierarchy of intensity going form the 'material' environment of the rocks and the atmosphere to the living cells."

All aspects of the universe are merely occasions of energy – it’s their burden to prove why the human occasion is more intrinsically valuable than the rock.

Merchant 92 (Carol, Ecofeminist and Historian of Science, Radical Ecology “Genesis of Eden” 1992)

Each individual thing, whether a living organism or an atom, has intrinsic value and there is a continuity between human and nonhuman experience. One's attitude toward a dog, which is a compound individual, differs from that toward a plant, which is also a compound individual but has no center of enjoyment, and toward a rock, which, as a mere aggregate, has no intrinsic value. All three, however, have instrumental value in supporting each other in the ecosystem." Process thought is consistent with an ecological attitude in two senses: (1) its proponents recognize the "interconnections among things, specifically between organisms and their total environments," and (2) it implies "respect or even reverence for, and perhaps a feeling of kinship with, the other creatures." Cobb and Griffin argue that process philosophy implies an ecological ethic and a policy of social justice and ecological sustainability: The whole of nature participates in us and we in it. We are diminished not only by the misery of the Indian peasant but also by the slaughter of whales and porpoises, and . . . the 'harvesting' of the giant redwoods. We are diminished still more when the imposition of temperate-zone technology onto tropical agriculture turns grasslands into deserts that will support neither human nor animal life." For Cobb's former student jay McDaniel, intrinsic value includes the entire physical world. Atoms as individual things have intrinsic value. Rocks express the energy inherent within their atoms. They too have intensity and intrinsic value, albeit less than that of living organisms. Outer form is an expression of inner energy. The assumption that rocks have intrinsic value, however, does not mean that rocks and sentient beings would necessarily have equal ethical value, but rather that they would all be treated with reverence. This could result in a new attitude by Christians toward the natural world, one that involves both objectivity and empathy." Philosopher Susan Armstrong-Buck also sees Whitchead's philosophy as providing an adequate foundation for an environmental ethic because intrinsic value is assigned to nonhuman nature. Process is the continuity of occasions or events that are internally related-each present occasion is an integration of all past occasions. Occasions, Whitehead wrote, are "drops of experience, complex, and interdependent." The world is itself a process of fluent energy; actual entities are self-organizing wholes. Differences exist in the actual occasions that constitute each entity. Intrinsic value is not based on an extension of self-interest to the rest of nature, but on the significance of each occasion and its entire interdependent past history. Assigning preferences to biosystems is based on the degree of diversity, stability, freedom of adaptation, and integration of actual occasions inherent in each 30 system.

## They Say: “Extinction Outweighs”

### Framing issue: the aff’s strict utilitarian calculus directly excludes the natural world and cannot accurately make decisions—you should always prioritize an ethic that recognizes the value of the natural world.

Katz 97 (Eric, Director of Science, Technology, and Society Program at the New Jersey Institute of Technology, “Nature as Subject” 1997)

One approach within this conception of environmental philosophy would be to seek these "'environmentally appropriate" ethical princi­ples in the direct application of traditional ethical theories--such as utilitarianism, Kantianism, rights theory, or contractarianism--to the newly emerging problems of the environmental crisis. From this perspective, environmental philosophy would be a version of a basic ap­plied ethics. Its subject matter--the justification of environmental policies--would be new, but the philosophical principles and ethical ideals used to analyze and solve these new problems would be the familiar positions and ideas of Western philosophy. A rather different ap­proach to environmental philosophy would eschew the traditional ver­sions of ethical theory and offer a radical reinterpretation or critique of the dominant philosophical ideas of the modern age. From this critical perspective, traditional ethical systems must be modified, expanded, or transcended in order to deal with the fundamental philosophical issues raised by the existence of the contemporary environmental cri­sis. The crucial change would be an expansion of ethical thought be­yond the limits of the human community to include the direct moral consideration of the natural world. In these essays I have chosen this second path. My basic critical idea is that human-centered (or "anthropocentric") ethical systems fail to account for a moral justification for the central policies of environmen­talism. From this negative account of anthropocentrism I derive my fundamental position in environmental ethics: the direct moral consider­ation and respect for the evolutionary processes of nature. I believe that it is a basic ethical principle that we must respect Nature as an ongoing subject of a history, a life-process, a developmental system. The natural world--natural entities and natural ecological systems--deserves our moral consideration as part of the interdependent community of life on Earth. Hence the title of this collection. I consider Nature as analo­gous to a human subject, entitled to moral respect and subject to tradi­tional ethical categories. I do not anthropomorphize Nature; I do not ascribe human feelings and intentions to the operations of natural processes. I do not consider natural processes to be sentient or alive. I merely place Nature within the realm of ethical activity. The basis of a moral justification of environmental policy is that we have ethical obligations to the natural world, just as we have ethical obligations to our fellow human beings. In these essays I explain and analyze this nonanthropocentric perspective in environmental philosophy. Mass extinction is key to evolution.

### Their anthropocentric impact calculus is just moral prejudice—the burden is on *them* to prove why humans are the center of value.

Regan 90 (Tom, Professor of Philosophy at NC State, “Christianity and Animal Rights: The Challenge and Promise” 1990)

I addressed this question in a recent speech, reminding my audience of a few "extreme" moral positions upon which we are all agreed: The murder of the innocent is *always*wrong. Rape is *always*wrong. Child molestation is *always*wrong. Racial and sexual discrimination are *always*wrong. I went on to note that when an injustice is absolute, as is true of each of the examples just adduced, then one must oppose it absolutely. It is not a reformed, "more humane" rape that an enlightened ethic calls for; it is the abolition of all rape that is required; it is this *extreme*position we must uphold. And analogous remarks apply in the case of the other human evils I have mentioned. Once this much is acknowledged it is evident -- or at least it should be -- that those who oppose or resist the animal rights question will have to do better than merely attach the label "extreme" to it. Sometimes "extreme" positions about what is wrong are right. Of course there are two obvious differences between the animal rights position and the other examples of extreme views I have given. The latter views are very generally accepted, whereas the former position is not. And unlike these very generally accepted views, which concern wrongful acts done to human beings, the animal-rights position concerns the wrongfulness of treating animals (nonhuman animals, that is) in certain ways. Those who oppose or resist the animal rights position might seize upon these two differences in an effort to justify themselves in accepting extreme positions regarding rape and child abuse, for example, while rejecting the "extremism" of animal rights. But neither of these differences will bear the weight of justification. That a view, whether moral or otherwise, is very generally accepted is not a sufficient reason for accepting it as true. Time was when the shape of the earth was generally believed to be flat, and time was when the presence of physical and mental handicaps were very generally thought to make the people who bore them morally inferior. That very many people believed these falsehoods obviously did not make them true. We don’t discover or confirm what’s true by taking a vote. The reverse of the preceding also can be demonstrated. That a view, moral or otherwise, is not generally accepted is not a sufficient reason for judging it to be false. When those lonely few first conjectured that the earth is round and that women are the moral equals of men, they conjectured truly, notwithstanding how grandly they were outnumbered. The solitary person who, in Thoreau’s enduring image, marches to a different drummer, may be the only person to apprehend the truth. The second difference noted above is more problematic. That difference cites the fact that child abuse and rape, for example, involve evils done to human beings, while the animal-rights position claims that certain evils are done to nonhuman animals. Now there is no question that this does constitute a difference. The question is, Is this a *morally*relevant difference -- a difference, that is, that would justify us in accepting the extreme opposition we judge to be appropriate in the case of child abuse and rape, for example, but which most people resist or abjure in the case of, say, vivisection? For a variety of reasons I do not think that this difference is a morally relevant one. Viewed scientifically, this second difference succeeds only in citing a biological difference: the victims of rape and child abuse belong to one species (the species Homo sapiens) whereas the victims of vivisection and trapping belong to another species (the species *canis lupus,*for example). But biological differences *inside*the species Homo sapiens do not justify radically different treatment among those individual humans who differ biologically (for example, in terms of sex, or skin color, or chromosome count). Why, then, should biological differences *outside*our species count morally? If having one eye or deformed limbs does not disqualify a human being from moral consideration equal to that given to those humans who are more fortunate, how can it be rational to disqualify a rat or a wolf from equal moral consideration because, unlike us, they have paws and a tail? Some of those who resist or oppose the animal-rights position might have recourse to "intuition" at this point. They might claim that one either sees that the principal biological difference at issue (namely, species membership) is a morally relevant one, or one does not see this. No reason can be given as to why belonging to the species Homo sapiens gives one a superior moral status, just as no reason can be given as to why belonging to the species canis lupus gives wolves an inferior moral status (if wolves have a moral status at all). This difference in moral status can only be grasped immediately, without making an inference, by an exercise of intuitive reason. This moral difference is self-evident -- or so it will be claimed by those who claim to intuit it. However attractive this appeal to intuition may seem to some, it woefully fails to bear the weight of justification. The plain fact is, people have claimed to **intuit** differences in the comparative moral standing of individuals and groups *inside*the human species, and these alleged intuitions, we all would agree, are painful symptoms of unquestioned and

## They Say: “Nature Doesn’t Matter”

### Humanity is not better than anything else—we are part of a larger biotic community.

Harding 05 (Stephan, doctorate in ecology from the University of Oxford, a degree in Zoology from the University of Durham, and has many years experience of ecological field research and of teaching at University level. “What is deep ecology”, http://biomimicry.typepad.com/bioinspire/files/BioInspire.23-01.31.05.pdf, date accessed: 7/22/11)

Notice that the experience was not looked for, expected or contrived. It happened spontaneously. Something in the dying eyes of the wolf reached beyond Leopold’s training and triggered a recognition of where he was. After this experience he saw the world differently, and went on to develop a land ethic, in which he stated that humans are not a superior species with the right to manage and control the rest of nature, but rather that humans are ‘plain members of the biotic community’. He also penned his famous dictum: “a thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise.” Arne Naess emphasises the importance of such spontaneous experience. A key aspect of these experiences is the perception of gestalts, or networks of relationships. We see that there are no isolated objects, but that objects are nodes in a vast web of relationships. When such deep experience occurs, we feel a strong sense of wide identification with what we are sensing. This identification involves a heightened sense of empathy and an expansion of our concern with non-human life. We realise how dependent we are on the well-being of nature for our own physical and psychological well-being. As a consequence there arises a natural inclination to protect non-human life. Obligation and coercion to do so become unnecessary. We understand that other beings, ranging from microbes to multicellular life-forms to ecosystems and watersheds, to Gaia as a whole, are engaged in the process of unfolding their innate potentials. Naess calls this process self-realisation. For us humans, self-realisation involves the development of wide identification in which the sense of self is no longer limited by the personal ego, but instead encompasses greater and greater wholes. Naess has called this expanded sense of self the ecological self. Since all beings strive in their own ways for self-realisation, we recognise that all are endowed with intrinsic value, irrespective of any economic or other utilitarian value they might have for human ends. Our own human striving for self-realisation is on an equal footing to the strivings of other beings. There is a fundamental equality between human and non-human life in principle. This ecocentric perspective contrasts with the anthropocentric view which ascribes intrinsic value only to humans, valuing nature only if it is useful to our own species. The new sense of belonging to an intelligent universe revealed by deep experience often leads to deep questioning, which helps to elaborate a coherent framework for elucidating fundamental beliefs, and for translating these beliefs into decisions, lifestyle and action. The emphasis on action is important. It is action that distinguishes deep ecology from other ecophilosophies. This is what makes deep ecology a movement as much as a philosophy. By deep questioning, an individual is articulating a total view of life which can guide his or her lifestyle choices. In questioning society, one understands its underlying assumptions from an ecological point of view. One looks at the collective psychological origins of the ecological crisis, and the related crises of peace and social justice. One also looks deeply into the history of the West to find the roots of our pernicious anthropocentrism as it has manifested in our science, philosophy and economics. One tries to understand how the current drive for globalisation of Western culture and of free trade leads to the devastation of both human culture and nature. This deep questioning of the fundamental assumptions of our culture contrasts markedly with the mainstream shallow or reform approach. This tries to ensure the continuance of business as usual by advocating the ‘greening’ of business and industry by incorporating a range of measures such as pollution prevention and the protection of biodiversity due to its monetary value as medicine or its ability to regulate climate. Although deep ecology supporters often have no option but strategically to adopt a reform approach when working with the mainstream, their own deep questioning of society goes on in the background. This may subtly influence the people with whom they interact professionally.

### D-Rule to preserve nature.

Marina 9 (Daniel, Södertörns högskola | Institutionen för Kultur och Kommunikation, “Anthropocentrism and Androcentrism – An Ecofeminist Connection” http://www.projectsparadise.com/anthropocentrism-androcentrism/)

Environmentalism is the movement that works to end naturism. Environmentalists assert that the domination of nature by humans exists and that this domination is wrong. Some environmentalists carry out the work to end naturism from the discipline of philosophy. Environmental philosophy is work carried out within some philosophical field – mainly ethics – that is motivated by the general goal of the environmental movement. Despite the differences between the various positions, there is one assumption shared by most environmental philosophers, namely nature deserves moral consideration in its own right. As Warren explains, mainstream Western ethics has traditionally neglected nature. The standard notion has been that humans only have moral obligations towards humans. Nature has merely had instrumental value. Environmental philosophers endeavour to elucidate the connections between environmental problems and traditional philosophical conceptions. They set themselves the task of identifying how naturism manifest itself in philosophy, that is, of countering when philosophers deliberately or accidentally articulate the already privileged world of humans maintaining its status over nature. Some of the environmental ethical positions are: (1) the individualistic approaches of Peter Singer and Tom Regan: moral consideration is due to all those individuals who possess the morally relevant capacities, namely sentiency (Singer) and to be the subject of a life (Regan); (2) the holistic approach of Aldo Leopold whose focus is on populations, species, ecosystems, and the biosphere: it is not only individual animals that enjoy moral value, but also plants and the non-living elements of the natural world; (3) deep ecology that expects humans to develop an ecological sensitivity: a respect that reflects the fact that each organism is essentially related to the other elements of the “biospherical net” and the fact that every life form possesses an intrinsic value independently of the instrumental values that it may possess in the eyes of a human beholder; (4) social ecology that identifies a structural and institutional root of the environmental crisis, specifically a society that has been permeated by authoritarian hierarchies and a capitalist market economy, and a natural world that has been arranged in accordance with a hierarchal order of beings: it underlines then the vital connection between social problems and environmental problems, that is, between the way humans relate to humans and the way humans relate to nature. Ecofeminism is the approach that merges the goal of the environmental movement with the goal of the feminist movement. Warren explains that it does this because ecofeminists believe that both environmentalism and feminism have their shortcomings, and that they should complement each other. According to her environmentalists will not be able to fully and correctly understand, and consequently successfully abolish, naturism unless they cease to disregard the connections existing between the domination of nature and the domination of women. They will not be able to elaborate theories that do not contribute to oppression unless they recognize the role and configuration of oppressive conceptual frameworks and the conceptual connections between naturism and sexism they give rise to. They will not be sensitive to the specific realities and perspectives of women unless they admit gender as a fundamental category of analysis. Feminism needs, in a similar way, to understand the connections between sexism and naturism.

## They Say: “Alternative Hurts Humans”

### Humans are only excluded from nature by choice—the ethic of the alternative recognizes the multiplicity of centers of value in nature.

Marina 9 (Daniel, Södertörns högskola | Institutionen för Kultur och Kommunikation, “Anthropocentrism and Androcentrism – An Ecofeminist Connection” http://www.projectsparadise.com/anthropocentrism-androcentrism/)

Finally, I would like to summarize some of the reasons why anthropocentrism is open to criticism. I shall focus on those that Val Plumwood adduces. According to her anthropocentrism is basically a framework of beliefs and perceptions that generates a myriad of illusions. Nature is perceived as discontinuous from the human realm, as subordinate, as inessential, as a denied and disorderly Other, as passive, and so on. Anthropocentrism disregards nature’s complexity, her uniqueness as a life-sustaining whole, and the plurality of legitimate centres with genuine interests and needs that it comprises. Humans are perceived as discontinuous from the natural realm, as essentially rational, and are reduced to being masters and conquerors. Humans, as physical and biological beings, can, of course, be allowed to remain within nature. What anthropocentrism especially consigns to an area outside and above nature is that part of the human self that is considered authentically human, i.e. rationality and freedom. Human identity is in such a way construed in opposition to the natural, the physical, the biological, and the animal, including those human traits associated with animality, that the authentically human includes also the “desire to exclude and distance” from the nonhuman. This conception of the human self as separate from, or if anything “accidentally related” to, nature together with the conception of the nonhuman as inferior and antagonistic renders humanity a legitimate oppressor and nature a means to human ends. Anthropocentrism disregards humanity’s vital dependence on nature, the essential character of genuine human traits such as the emotions and the body, as well as other attitudes towards nature than that to master and conquer it.

### They have it backwards—human centered politics destroys the natural other—the alt solves.

Marina 9 (Daniel, Södertörns högskola | Institutionen för Kultur och Kommunikation, “Anthropocentrism and Androcentrism – An Ecofeminist Connection” http://www.projectsparadise.com/anthropocentrism-androcentrism/)

These three terms suggest a spatial image. Something, in this case humanity, is situated at the centre of something. There are numerous settings in which humans can be claimed to occupy the centre. For example, an anthropocentric cosmology would claim that humanity occupies the physical centre of the universe.31 In environmental philosophy the terms are mainly applied to morality. Here I shall analyze the ways in which humans are said to occupy the privileged spot of that specific universe. The starting point shall be Val Plumwood’s liberation model of anthropocentrism. I am beginning with Plumwood because she offers a detailed account of what centrism and anthropocentrism is. Plumwood defines centrism as a structure that is common to and underlies different forms of oppression, like colonialism, racism, and sexism. The role of this structure is to generate a Centre and the Periphery, an oppressor and the oppressed, a Centre and the Other. The shared features are: 1. Radical exclusion: Those in the centre are represented as radically separated from and superior to the Other. The Centre is represented as free from the features of an inferiorized Other, and the Other as lacking the defining features of the Centre. Differences are exaggerated to the point of preventing or hindering any sense of connection or continuity, to the point that “identification and sympathy are cancelled.”32 2. Homogenization: Those on the periphery are represented as alike and replaceable. Similarities are exaggerated and differences are disregarded within that group. “The Other is not an individual but is related to as a member of a class of interchangeable items.”33 Differences are only acknowledged when they affect or are deemed relevant to the desires and well-being of those in the centre. 3. *Denial*: The Other is represented as inessential. Those in the centre deny their own dependency on those on the periphery. 4. *Incorporation*: Those in the centre do not admit the autonomy of the Other. The Other is represented as a function of the qualities of the Centre. The Other either lacks or is the negation of those qualities that characterize those in the centre, being these qualities at the same time the most cherished and esteemed socially and culturally. 5. *Instrumentalism*: Those in the centre deny the Other its independent agency. Those on the periphery are represented as lacking, for instance, ends of its own. The Centre can consequently impose its own ends upon them without any conflict. The Other becomes a means or a resource the Centre can make use of to satisfy its own needs, and is accordingly valued for the usefulness the Centre can find in it. A second reason for beginning with Plumwood is that all the iniquitous senses of anthropocentrism that I have come across in the literature can, I think, be identified as either instrumentalism or denial. Warwick Fox’s *passive sense* of anthropocentrism would be an example of denial. In this sense he speaks of anthropocentric ecophilosophy as one that focuses on social issues only, on interhuman affairs and problems. For these environmentalists “the nonhuman world retains its traditional status as the background against which the significant action – human action – takes place.”34 According to them the environmental crisis would then be solved within that human sphere by ensuring the well-being of humanity. There would be no need to deal with the way humanity relates to nature. The other senses would be examples of either instrumentalism or of outcomes of instrumentalism: Andrew Dobson’s *strong* anthropocentrism (“The injustice and unfairness involved in the instrumental use of the non-human world”35); the account Robert Sessions gives of how deep ecology describes the anthropocentric attitude (“(1) Nonhuman nature has no value in itself, (2) humans (and/or God, if theistic) create what value there is, and (3) humans have the right (some would say the *obligation*) to do as they please with and in the nonhuman world as long as they do not harm other human’s interests”36); Tim Hayward’s account of the ethical criticism of anthropocentrism (“The mistake of giving exclusive or arbitrarily preferential consideration to human interests as opposed to the interests of other beings”37); Andrew Dobson’s description of what environmentalists consider a basic cause of ecological degradation and a potential cause of disaster (“Concern for ourselves at the expense of concern for the non-human world”38); and Warwick Fox’s aggressive sense of anthropocentrism, according to which anthropocentrism is the overt discrimination against the nonhuman world.

## They Say: “Cede the Political”

### The political is already ceded—only a radical form of politics can regain it from transnational companies and political technophiles.

Best 6 (Steven, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Texas El Paso, “Revolutionary Environmentalism: An Emerging New Struggle for Total Liberation” 2006)

George W. Bush’s feel-good talk of progress and democracy, given an endless and uncritical airing by mainstream corporate media, masks the fact that we live in an unprecedented era of social and ecological crisis. Predatory transnational corporations such as ExxonMobil and Maxxam are pillaging the planet, destroying ecosystems, pushing species into extinction, and annihilating indigenous peoples and traditional ways of life. War, globalization, and destruction of peoples, species, and ecosystems march in lockstep: militarization supports the worldwide imposition of the "free market" system, and its growth and profit imperatives thrive though the exploitation of humans, animals, and the earth (see Kovel 2002; Tokar 1997; Bannon and Collier 2003). Against the mindless optimism of technophiles, the denials of skeptics, and complacency of the general public, we depart from the premise that there is a global environmental crisis which is the most urgent issue facing us today. If humanity does not address ecological problems immediately and with radical measures that target causes not symptoms, severe, world-altering consequences will play out over a long-term period and will plague future generations. Signs of major stress of the world’s eco-systems are everywhere, from shrinking forests and depleted fisheries to vanishing wilderness and global climate change. Ours is an era of global warming, rainforest destruction, species extinction, and chronic resource shortages that provoke wars and conflicts such as in Iraq. While five great extinction crises have already transpired on this planet, the last one occurring 65 million years ago in the age of the dinosaurs, we are now living amidst the sixth extinction crisis, this time caused by human not natural causes. Human populations have always devastated their environment and thereby their societies, but they have never intervened in the planet’s ecosystem to the extent they have altered climate. We now confront the “end of nature” where no natural force, no breeze or ripple of water, has not been affected by the human presence (McKribben 2006). This is especially true with nanotechnology and biotechnology. Rather than confronting this crisis and scaling back human presence and aggravating actions, humans are making it worse. Human population rates continue to swell, as awakening giants such as India and China move toward western consumer lifestyles, exchanging rice bowls for burgers and bicycles for SUVs. The human presence on this planet is like a meteor plummeting to the earth, but it has already struck and the reverberations are rippling everywhere. Despite the proliferating amount of solid, internationally assembled scientific data supporting the reality of global climate change and ecological crisis, there are still so-called environmental “skeptics,” “realists,” and “optimists” who deny the problems, often compiling or citing data paid for by ExxonMobil. Senator James Inhofe has declared global warming to be a “myth” that is damaging to the US economy. He and others revile environmentalists as “alarmists,” “extremists,” and “eco-terrorists” who threaten the American way of life. There is a direct and profound relationship between global capitalism and ecological destruction. The capitalist economy lives or dies on constant growth, accumulation, and consumption of resources. The environmental crisis is inseparable from the social crisis, whereby centuries ago a market economy disengaged from society and ruled over it with its alien and destructive imperatives. The crisis in ecology is ultimately a crisis in democracy, as transnational corporations arise and thrive through the destruction of popular sovereignty. The western environment movement has advanced its cause for over three decades now, but we are nonetheless losing ground in the battle to preserve species, ecosystems, and wilderness (Dowie 1995; Speth 2004). Increasingly, calls for moderation, compromise, and the slow march through institutions can be seen as treacherous and grotesquely inadequate. In the midst of predatory global capitalism and biological meltdown, “reasonableness” and “moderation” seem to be entirely unreasonable and immoderate, as “extreme” and “radical” actions appear simply as necessary and appropriate. As eco-primitivist Derrick Jensen observes, “We must eliminate false hopes, which blind us to real possibilities.” The current world system is inherently destructive and unsustainable; if it cannot be reformed, it must be transcended through revolution at all levels—economic, political, legal, cultural, technological, and, most fundamentally, conceptual. The struggles and changes must be as deep, varied, and far-reaching as the root of the problems.

### Radical environmental movements are more effective at creating change – our evidence is comparative.

Best 6 (Steven, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Texas El Paso, “Revolutionary Environmentalism: An Emerging New Struggle for Total Liberation” 2006)

Revolutionary environmentalism is based on the realization that politics as usual just won’t cut it anymore. We will always lose if we play by their rules rather than invent new forms of struggle, new social movements, and new sensibilities. The defense of the earth requires immediate and decisive: logging roads need to be blocked, driftnets need to be cut, and cages need to be emptied. But these are defensive actions, and in addition to these tactics, radical movements and alliances must be built from the perspective total liberation. A new revolutionary politics will build on the achievements of democratic, libertarian socialist, and anarchist traditions. It will incorporate radical green, feminist, and indigenous struggles. It will merge animal, earth, and human standpoints in a total liberation struggle against global capitalism and its omnicidal grow-or-die logic. Radical politics must reverse the growing power of the state, mass media, and corporations to promote egalitarianism and participatory democratization at all levels of society – political, cultural, and economic. It must dismantle all asymmetrical power relations and structures of hierarchy, including that of humans over animals and the earth. Radical politics is impossible without the revitalization of citizenship and the re-politicization of life, which begins with forms of education, communication, culture, and art that anger, awaken, inspire, and empower people toward action and change.

### The political is already ceded—the alternative is the last hope for radical change in the face of environmental destruction.

Best 4 (Steven, professor of philosophy at Texas El Paso, “From Earth Day to Ecological Society” http://www.drstevebest.org/Essays/FromEarthDay.htm, date accessed: 7/27/11

Homo sapiens have embarked on an insane, destructive, and unsustainable path of existence. The human species is driving off a cliff at 100 miles an hour without brakes, and yet people live is if the most urgent issue of the day is Janet Jackson’s “wardrobe malfunction” or who will win American Idol. There is much talk about “national security” but nothing is said about the basis of all security – environmental security. Problems like global warming, desertification, and food and water shortages will wreak havoc throughout the planet. As Homeland Security turns ever-more fascist, environmentalists are vilified as eco-terrorists and legal forms of activism are criminalized under the Patriot Act. While Ashcroft prosecutes activists working to help the planet, corporate eco-terrorists continue to pillage and plunder. Meanwhile, Americans, who make up less than 5% of the world’s population, consume 30% of its resources and produce 25% of total greenhouse gas emissions. Whatever forces striving to save the environment are doing, it is not to ward off corporate and state Pac-men greedily devouring the planet. National environmental organizations such as the Sierra Club are tepid, compromise-based, reform-oriented bureaucracies unable to challenge corporate and state power, and grass-roots forces are not great enough in force and numbers. We are in the midst of a major ecological crisis that stems from a social crisis rooted in corporate power and erosion of democracy. In Greek, the word “crisis” means decision, suggesting that humanity, currently poised at a critical crossroads in its evolution, has crucial decisions and choices to make concerning its existence on the planet. Human identity, values, ethics, worldviews, and mode of social organization need major rethinking and reconstruction. In Chinese, “crisis” means both calamity and opportunity. In a diseased individual, cancer often provides the catalyst for personal growth. As a diseased species, human beings can perish, survive in dystopian futures prefigured by films like Mad Max and Waterworld, or seize their opportunity to learn from egregious errors and rise to far higher levels of social and moral evolution. **The Human Plague** The crisis in human existence is dramatically reflected in the 1996 film, Independence Day. The movie is about hostile aliens with no respect for life; they come to earth to kill its peoples, devour its natural resources, and then move onto other planets in a mad quest to find more fuel for their mega-machines and growth-oriented culture. The film is a veiled projection of our own destructive habits onto monstrous beings from another world. We are the aliens; we are the parasites who live off the death of other life forms; we are the captains of the mega-machines that are sustainable only through violence and ecological destruction. We do to the animals and the earth what the aliens do to human life -- the only difference is, we have no other planet to move on to, and no superheroes to save us. We are trapped in a Dawn of the Dead living nightmare where armies of hideous corpses, people thought long dead and buried, walk again with a will to destroy us. The dead represent all the waste, pollution, and ecological debts accrued to our growth culture that we thought we could walk away from unscathed and never again face. But we are waking up to the fact that the “dead” are storming our neighborhoods, crashing through our doors and windows, and hell-bent on devouring us. In his article entitled “A Plague of Human Proportions,” Mark Lynas frames the crisis this way: “Within the earth's biosphere, a single species has come to dominate virtually all living systems. For the past two centuries this species has been reproducing at bacterial levels, almost as an infectious plague envelops its host. Three hundred thousand new individuals are added to its numbers every day. Its population of bodies now exceeds by a hundred times the biomass of any large animal species that has ever existed on land since the beginning of geological time. The species is us. Now numbering more than six billion souls, the human population has doubled since 1950. Nothing like this has happened before in the earth's history. Even the dinosaurs, which dominated for tens of millions of years, were thinly spread compared to the hairless primate Homo sapiens.” Thus, a single biological type has wreaked havoc on the estimated ten million other species in habiting the planet. Lynas suggests that because Homo sapiens dominates the planet today as dinosaurs did one hundred million years ago, “We are entering a new geological era: the Anthropocene.” According to a March 2004 Earth Policy Institute report, “Humans have transformed nearly half of the planet's ice-free land areas, with serious effects on the rest of nature … Each year the earth's forest cover shrinks by 16 million hectares (40 million acres), with most of the loss occurring in tropical forests, where levels of biodiversity are high … A recent study of 173 species of mammals from around the world showed that their collective geographical ranges have been halved over the past several decades, signifying a loss of breeding and foraging area.” While insipid ideologues like Tibor Machan still publish books such as Putting Humans First: Why we are Nature’s Favorite (2004), it is more accurate to see Homo sapiens as the invasive species and agent of mass extinction par excellence -- not “nature’s favorite” but rather nature’s bete noir.

### The alt solves best for political change.

Best 4 (Steven, professor of philosophy at Texas El Paso, “From Earth Day to Ecological Society” <http://www.drstevebest.org/Essays/FromEarthDay.htm>, date accessed: 7/27/11

If humanity is to survive and flourish in its precarious journey into the future, it needs a new moral compass because anthropocentrism has failed us dramatically. Albert Schweitzer observed that “the problem with ethics so far is that they have been limited to a human-to-human consideration.” In place of the alienated and predatory sensibility of Western life, Schweitzer proposed a new code – an “ethic of reverence for life.” This entails a universal ethic of compassion and respect that includes all humanity, embraces non-human species, and extends to the entire earth. We need a “Declaration of Interdependence” to replace our outmoded “Declaration of Independence.” The demand to cease exploiting animals and the earth is one and the same; we cannot change in one area without changing in the other. Animal rights and environmental ethics are the logical next stages in human moral evolution and the next necessary steps in the human journey to enlightenment and wholeness. Sadly, on Earth Day, as on every other day, the human species continues to invade and damage the planet. As I write, I receive a report from Traffic, a British-based wildlife monitoring group, saying that because of deforestation and trading in its body parts, the Sumatran tiger, Indonesia's last tiger sub-species, is on the brink of extinction. In addition, I read that the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service removed two tropical birds, the Mariana mallard and the Guam broadbill, from its endangered species list – not because they are safe but because they became extinct. In some way we cannot possibly grasp, the entire earth is trying to adjust to their inalterable absence. According to the cliché, “Every day is Earth Day.” Truth be told, every day is Human Growth Day. On April 22, the media might turn away from Michael Jackson or Bush’s terror war for a thirty second fluff piece on the state of the planet, and some individuals might pause for a moment to think about their environment. Like the evil-doer who sins all week and then atones on Sunday, human beings plunder the planet all year long and stop for a moment of guilt and expiation. We congratulate ourselves for honoring Earth Day, when in fact the very concept would be incoherent in an ecological society. In honor of Earth Day it is appropriate to ask: what does it mean to be an environmentalist? Where industries, the state, and toxic nihilists of ever stripe want those who care about the environment to bear stigmas such as “kook,” wacko,” “un-American,” and even “terrorist,” being an environmentalist must become a badge of honor. To be an environmentalist is to realize that one is not only a citizen of human society, one also is a citizen of the earth, an eco-citizen. Our community includes not only our society with other human beings on a national and international scale, but also our relations to the entire living earth, to the biocommunity. We need to act like we are citizens and not conquering invaders. We have not only a negative duty to avoid doing harm to the earth as much as possible, but also a positive duty to help nature regenerate.