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Troop Withdrawal Decreases American Imperialism

**The affirmative decreases military presence overseas which is the bedrock of American imperial ambitions**

**Johnson, 2K4**

(Chalmers, Professor Emeritus at UC-San Diego, America’s Empire of Bases, [**http://www.commondreams.org/views04/0115-08.htm**](http://www.commondreams.org/views04/0115-08.htm) [accessed 6/7/10])

Of all the insensitive, if graphic, metaphors we've allowed into our vocabulary, none quite equals "footprint" to describe the military impact of our empire. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Richard Myers and senior members of the Senate's Military Construction Subcommittee such as Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) are apparently incapable of completing a sentence without using it. Establishing a more impressive footprint has now become part of the new justification for a major enlargement of our empire -- and an announced repositioning of our bases and forces abroad -- in the wake of our conquest of Iraq. The man in charge of this project is Andy Hoehn, deputy assistant secretary of defense for strategy. He and his colleagues are supposed to draw up plans to implement President Bush's preventive war strategy against "rogue states," "bad guys," and "evil-doers." They have identified something they call the "arc of instability," which is said to run from the Andean region of South America (read: Colombia) through North Africa and then sweeps across the Middle East to the Philippines and Indonesia. This is, of course, more or less identical with what used to be called the Third World -- and perhaps no less crucially it covers the world's key oil reserves. Hoehn contends, "When you overlay our footprint onto that, we don't look particularly well-positioned to deal with the problems we're now going to confront."  Once upon a time, you could trace the spread of imperialism by counting up colonies. America's version of the colony is the military base. By following the changing politics of global basing, one can learn much about our ever larger imperial stance and the militarism that grows with it. Militarism and imperialism are Siamese twins joined at the hip. Each thrives off the other. Already highly advanced in our country, they are both on the verge of a quantum leap that will almost surely stretch our military beyond its capabilities, bringing about fiscal insolvency and very possibly doing mortal damage to our republican institutions. The only way this is discussed in our press is via reportage on highly arcane plans for changes in basing policy and the positioning of troops abroad -- and these plans, as reported in the media, cannot be taken at face value.  Marine Brig. Gen. Mastin Robeson, commanding our 1,800 troops occupying the old French Foreign Legion base at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti at the entrance to the Red Sea, claims that in order to put "preventive war" into action, we require a "global presence," by which he means gaining hegemony over any place that is not already under our thumb. According to the right-wing American Enterprise Institute, the idea is to create "a global cavalry" that can ride in from "frontier stockades" and shoot up the "bad guys" as soon as we get some intelligence on them.

Troop Withdrawal Solves Violent Security Politics

**The presence of American troops in foreign countries is essential to national security politics – the affirmative strikes a blow against the essential element of American imperialism**

**Ferguson 2K3**

(Niall, History Professor at Harvard, An empire in denial: the limits of US imperialism, Harvard International Review, <http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb137/is_3_25/ai_n29042822/> [accessed 6/12/10])

In any case, the US empire is--and can afford to be--much less concerned with the acquisition of large areas of overseas territory, than Britain's was. The United States has few formal colonies, but it possesses a great many small areas of territory within notionally sovereign states that serve as bases for its armed services. Before the deployment of troops for the invasion of Iraq, the US military had around 752 military installations located in more than 130 countries. New wars have meant new bases, like Camp Bondsteel in Kosovo, acquired during the 1999 war against Yugoslavia, and the Bishkek airbase in Kyrgyzstan, an "asset" picked up during the war against the "Faliban regime in Afghanistan. When the full extent of US military presence overseas is made plain, then the claim that the United States is not an empire rings hollow indeed. Nor should it be forgotten what formidable military technology, can be unleashed from these bases. Commentators like to point out that the Pentagon's budget equals the combined military expenditures of the next 12 to 15 states. Such fiscal measures nevertheless understate the quantitative and qualitative lead currently enjoyed by US armed forces. In military terms, the British Empire did not dominate the full spectrum of military capabilities, as the United States does today; it was never so far ahead of its imperial rivals. If military power is the sine qua non of an empire, then it is hard to deny the imperial character of the United States today. The US sphere of military influence is now quite literally global. It is, of course, conventional wisdom that large-scale overseas military commitments can have deleterious economic effects. Yet the United States seems a very long way from the kind of "overstretch" Paul Kennedy warned against in the late 1980s. According to one estimate, "America's 31 percent share of world product (at market prices) is equal to the next four countries (Japan, Germany, Britain, and France) combined," which exceeds the highest share of global output ever achieved by Great Britain by a factor of three. In terms of raw resources, then, the United States is already a vastly more powerful empire than Britain ever was. The rapid growth of the US economy since the late 1980s partly explains how the United States has managed to achieve a unique revolution in military affairs while at the same time substantially reducing the share of defense expenditures as a proportion of gross domestic product (GDP). The Defense Department Green Paper published in March 2003 forecast total expenditure on national defense to remain at 3.5 percent of GDP for at least three years, compared with an average figure during the Cold War of seven percent. Bearing in mind Paul Kennedy's "formula" that "if a particular nation is allocating over the long term more than 10 percent of gross national product (GNP) to armaments, that is likely to limit its growth rate," there seems little danger of imminent "overstretch." In short, in terms of military capability and economic resources the United States not only resembles the last great Anglophone empire but exceeds it. Nor are its goals so very different. In September 2002, the Office of the President produced a document on "National Security Strategy" that explicitly states that it is a goal of US foreign policy "to extend the benefits of freedom ... to every corner of the world." There are those who argue that such altruism is quite different from the more self-serving aims of British imperialism, but this betrays an ignorance of the comparably liberal ethos of the "Victorian Empire. In any case, the National Security Strategy also asserts that the United States reserves the right, if the President should deem it necessary, to take pre-emptive ,military action against any state perceived as a threat to US security. If the US population still refuses to acknowledge that they have become an empire, the doctrine of pre-emption suggests--by way of a compromise--a possible neologism. Perhaps the United States today should be characterized as a pre-empire.

A2: Speech K’s

**Critiques of speech produces a reactionary politics in which change is focused on language directly trading off with efforts to reform the socioeconomic root causes of injustice**

**Brown,** Professor Political Science UC Berkeley, **2K1**

(Wendy, Politics Out of History, pg. 35-37)

“**Speech codes kill critique**,” Henry Louis Gates remarked in a 1993 essay on hate speech.14 Although Gates was referring to what happens when **hate speech regulations, and the debates about them, usurp** the **discursive space in which one might have offered a substantive *politi­cal* response to bigoted epithets**, his point also applies to prohibitions against questioning from within selected political practices or institu­tions. But **turning political questions into moralistic ones—as speech codes of any sort do—not only prohibits certain questions and man­dates certain genuflections, it also expresses a profound hostility to­ward political life insofar as it seeks to preempt argument with a legis­lated and enforced truth**. **And the realization of that patently undemocratic desire can only and always convert emancipatory aspi­rations into reactionary ones.** Indeed, it insulates those aspirations from questioning at the very moment that Weberian forces of rational­ization and bureaucratization are quite likely to be domesticating them from another direction. **Here we greet a persistent political para­dox: the moralistic defense of critical practices, or of any besieged identity, weakens what it strives to fortify precisely by sequestering those practices from the kind of critical inquiry out of which they were born**. Thus Gates might have said, “**Speech codes, born of social critique, kill critique**.” And, we might add, **contemporary identity-based institutions, born of social critique, invariably become conserva­tive as they are forced to essentialize the identity and naturalize the boundaries of what they once grasped as a contingent effect of histori­cally specific social powers**.

But **moralistic reproaches to certain kinds of speech or argument kill critique not only by displacing it with arguments about abstract rights versus identity-bound injuries, but also by configuring political injustice and political righteousness as a problem of remarks, attitude, and speech rather than as a matter of historical, political-economic, and cultural formations of power. Rather than offering analytically substantive accounts of the forces of injustice or injury, they condemn the manifestation of these forces in particular remarks or events. There is, in the inclination to ban** (formally or informally) **certain utterances and to mandate others, a politics of rhetoric and gesture that itself symptomizes despair over effecting change at more significant levels**. **As vast quantities of left and liberal attention go to determining what socially marked individuals say, how they are represented, and how many of each kind appear in certain institutions or are appointed to various commissions, the sources that generate racism, poverty, vio­lence against women, and other elements of social injustice remain relatively unarticulated and unaddressed.** **We are lost as how to ad­dress those sources; but rather than examine this loss or disorienta­tion, rather than bear the humiliation of our impotence, we posture as if we were still fighting the** big and **good fight in our clamor over words and names.** Don’t mourn, moralize.

A2: State K’s

**Moralistic crusades aimed at changing the state are misleading about the nature of oppressive forces. This obfuscation denies the potential for radical transformation**

**Brown,** Professor Political Science UC Berkeley, **2K1**

(Wendy, Politics Out of History, pg. 35-37)

But here the problem goes well beyond superficiality of political analysis or compensatory gestures in the face of felt impotence. **A mor­alistic, gestural politics often inadvertently becomes a regressive poli­tics. Moralizing condemnation** of the National Endowment for the Arts for not funding politically radical art, of the U.S. military or the White House for not embracing open homosexuality or sanctioning gay marriage, or even of the National Institutes of Health for not treat­ing as a political priority the lives of HIV target populations (gay men, prostitutes, and drug addicts) **conveys at best naive political expecta­tions and at worst, patently confused ones. For this condemnation implicitly figures the state (and other mainstream institutions) as if it did not have specific political and economic investments, as if it were not the codification of various dominant social powers, but was, rather, a momentarily misguided parent who forgot her promise to treat all her children the same way.** These **expressions of moralistic outrage implicitly cast the state as if it were or could be a deeply demo­cratic and nonviolent institution;** conversely, **it renders** radical art**, rad­ical social movements, and various fringe populations as if they were not potentially subversive, representing a significant political chal­lenge to the norms of the regime, but rather were benign entities and populations entirely appropriate for the state to equally protect, fund, and promote.** Here, **moralism’s objection to politics as a domain of power and history rather than principle is not simply irritating: it re­suits in a troubling and confused political stance. It misleads about the nature of power, the state, and capitalism; it misleads about the nature of oppressive social forces, and about the scope of the project of transformation required by serious ambitions for justice. Such ob­fuscation is not the aim of the moralists but falls within that more general package of displaced effects consequent to a felt yet unac­knowledged impotence. It signals disavowed despair over the pros­pects for more far-reaching transformations.**

A2: State K’s

**We must not reject the state- limited and strategic use of the state is vital to successful politics and prevent violence**

**Derrida,** French philosopher, **2K**

(Jacques, “Intellectual Courage: An Interview” Culture Machine http://culturemachine.tees.ac.uk/Cmach/Backissues/j002/articles/art\_derr.htm)

Q: Two essential problems of globalisation are the dissolution of the state and the impotence of politics. In your recently published text '*Cosmopolites de tous les pays, encore un effort!*', you develop certain ideas concerning a new right to asylum and a new balance of power between the different places of the political in view of a possible new role of the city. How do you think philosophy could and should react to the problems mentioned with a kind of institutional fantasy?

JD: I am not sure I understand what you call 'institutional fantasy'. All political experimentation like the initiative of the 'refugee city', despite its limits and its inevitably preliminary character, has in it a philosophical dimension. It requires us to interrogate the essence and the history of the state. All political innovation touches on philosophy. The 'true' political action always engages with a philosophy. **All action, all political decision making, must invent its norm or rule**. Such a gesture traverses or implies philosophy. Meanwhile, at the risk of appearing self-contradictory, I believe that **one must fight against that which you call the 'dissolution of the state' (for the state can in turn limit the private forces of appropriation, the concentrations of economic power, it can retard a violent depoliticisation that acts in the name of the 'market'), and above all resist the state where it gives in too easily to the nationalism of the nation state or to the representation of socio-economic hegemony. Each time one must analyse, invent a new rule: here to contest the state, there to consolidate it. The realm of politics is not co-extensive with the state, contrary to what one believes nowadays. The necessary repoliticisation does not need to serve a new cult of the state. One ought to operate with new dissociations and accept complex and differentiated practices.**

A2: State K’s

**The negative’s problematizing of the state’s identity has no alternative**

**Cole,** professor of History @ Univ of Michigan, **95**

(Juan R. I. “Feature Review: Power, Knowledge, and Orientalism” Diplomatic History Vol. 19 No. 3 Summer)

In short, Campbell’s imaginative and innovative approach places “the politics of identity” at the very core of U.S. Foreign Policy. Nevertheless, this reviewer must express a few doubts about his inflection of poststructuralist principles and Possibilities. **Even if the “struggle over identity” formed the core of contemporary politics** on the national and international levels, **the crisis of politics could not be reduced to the “crisis of representation**.” As much as we learn from *Writing Security* **about the production of identity, as little do we learn about the reconstitution of politics.** Diplomats, policymakers, industrialists, intellectuals, and social activists, to name but a few, enter the arena of identity politics under conditions that are uneven and change over time. **Campbell**, however, **treats identity struggles, and the strategies of otherness and particular forms of representation that go along with them, as having neither origins nor agency and as being unaccountable to multiple patterns of causality and specific historical moments**. **Some** might **argue that the omissions of the question of agency** **and of conven­tional causal explanations are the very trademarks of poststructuralism The lack of attention to historical details and peculiarities, and to the non­progressive movement of history through time, however, is certainly not an inevitable price of poststructuralist analysis**. **Campbell’s alternative to the realist notion of an essentialist and universalist search for power is a univer­sal and ahistorical search for identity and differentiation from the Other**. Images of the American frontier, for instance, have no doubt a different purpose and significance in an emerging as opposed to a late capitalist order. Furthermore, Campbell’s critique of state- and nation-centered politics is curiously at odds with his focus on the “American” identity.20 Such a sys­temic approach toward the history of identity struggles is perhaps “natural” to political science, but not to poststructuralism. **By claiming that an only vaguely specified2l poststructuralist attitude “sees theory w practice**” (em­phasis in original) (p. **iç), Campbell takes a shortcut and tends to deny any meaningful understanding of the mediation between theory and practice, or between the discursive and the non-discursive.**

A2: State K’s/ Biopower

**Our demand turns the tables on the biopolitical apparatus. We utilize the tension between freedom and control to articulate a series of demands which are a strategic reversement of power relations**

**Campbell**, Professor of IR @ Univ of Newcastle, **98**

(Daivd, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity)

Recognizing the possibility of rearticulating danger leads us to a final question: what modes of being and forms of life could we or should we adopt? To be sure, a comprehensive attempt to answer such a question is beyond the ambit of this book. But it is important to note that asking the question in this way mistakenly implies that such possibilities exist only in the future. Indeed, the extensive and inten­sive nature of the relations of power associated with the society of security means that there has been and remains a not inconsiderable freedom to explore alternative possibilities. While traditional analy­ses of power are often economistic and negative, **Foucault’s under­standing of power emphasizes its productive and enabling nature**. Even more important, **his understanding of power emphasizes the ontology of freedom presupposed by the existence of disciplinary and normalizing practices**. Put simply, **there cannot be relations of power unless subjects are in the first instance free: the need to institute negative and constraining power practices comes about only because without them freedom would abound**. **Were there no possibility of freedom, subjects would not act in ways that required containment so as to effect order**.37 **Freedom, though, is not the absence of power.** On the contrary, **because it is only through power that subjects exercise their agency, freedom and power cannot be separated**. As Foucualt maintains:

**At the very heart of the power relationship**, and constantly provok­ing it, **are the recalcitrance of the will and the intransigence of free­dom**. Rather than speaking of an essential freedom, it would be better to speak of an “agonism” — of a relationship which is at the same time reciprocal incitation and struggle; less of a face-to-face confronta­tion which paralyzes both sides than a permanent provocation.38

**The political possibilities enabled by this permanent provocation of power and freedom can be specified in more detail by thinking in terms of the predominance of the “bio-power**” discussed above. In this sense, **because the governmental practices of biopolitics in Western nations have been increasingly directed towards modes of being and forms of life**—such that sexual conduct has become an object of concern, individual health has been figured as a domain of discipline, and the family has been transformed into an instrument of government—**the ongoing agonism between those pratices and the freedom they seek to contain means that individuals have articulataed a series of counterdemands drawn from those new fields of concern.**  For example, as the state continues to prosecute people according to sexual orientation, human rights activists have proclaimed the right of gays to enter into formal marriages, adopt children, and receive the same health and insurance benefits granted to their straight coun­terparts**. These claims are a consequence of the permanent provoca­tion of power and freedom in biopolitics, and stand as testament to the “strategic reversibility” of power relations: if the terms of governmental practices can be made into focal points for resistances, then the “history of government as the ‘conduct of conduct’ is interwoven with the history of dissenting ‘counterconducts,’”** Indeed, **the emergence of the state as the major articulation of “the political” has involved an unceasing agonism between those in office and those they rule.** **State intervention in everyday life has long incited popular collective action, the result of which has been both resistance to the state and new claims upon the state**. In particular, “the core of what we now call ‘citizenship’ . . .consists of multiple bargains hammered out by rulers and ruled in the course of their struggles over the means of state action, especially the making of war.” In more recent times, constituencies associated with women’s, youth, ecological, and peace movements (among others) have also issued claims on society.

A2: State’s K’s- Perm Card

**Permutation- Do the plan and the alternative. Our advocacy is the first temporary expression of the critique alternative. The division between critcism and transformation is a disabling one. Instead, the perm should be embraced as a necessary reform allowing for the critique to become joined to the political sphere.**

**Foucault,** French Sociologist, **1988**

(Michel, “On Criticism” in Michel Foucault: Politics Philosophy Culture Interviews and other writings 1977- 1984)

D.E. You mean it will be possible to work with this government?

 FOUCAULT**: We must escape from the dilemma of being either for or against**. **After all, it is possible to face up to a government and remain standing. To work with a govern­ment implies neither subjection nor total acceptance. One may work with it and yet be restive**. I even believe that **the two things go together.**

D.E. After Michel Foucault the critic, are we now going to see Michel Foucault the reformist? After all, the reproach was often made that the criticism made by intellectuals leads to nothing.

FOUCAULT First I’ll answer the point about “that leads to nothing.” **There are hundreds and thousands of people who have worked for the emergence of a number of problems that are now on the agenda. To say that this work produced nothing is quite wrong.** Do you think that twenty years ago people were considering the problems of the relationship between mental illness and psychological normality, the problem of prison, the problem of medical power, the problem of the relationship between the sexes, and so on, as they are doing today?

Furthermore**, there are no reforms as such. Reforms are not produced in the air, independently of those who carry them out. One cannot not take account of those who will have the job of carrying out this transformation.**

And, then, above all, I believe that an opposition can be made between critique and transformation, “ideal” critique and “real” transformation.

A critique is not a matter of saying that things are not right as they are. It is a matter of pointing out on what kinds of assumptions, what kinds of familiar, unchallenged, uncon­sidered modes of thought the practices that we accept rest.

**We must free ourselves from the sacrilization of the social as the only reality and stop regarding as superfluous something so essential in human life and in human relations as thought**. Thought exists independently of systems and structures of discourse. It is something that is often hidden, but which always animates everyday behavior. There is always a little thought even in the most stupid institutions; there is always thought even in silent habits.

**Criticism is a matter of flushing out that thought and trying to change it: to show that things are not as self-evident as one believed, to see that what is accepted as self-evident will no longer be accepted as such. Practicing criticism is a matter of making facile gestures difficult.**

**In these circumstances, criticism (and radical criticism) is absolutely indispensable for any transformation. A transform­ation that remains within the same mode of thought, a transformation that is only a way of adjusting the same thought more closely to the reality of things can merely be a superficial transformation.**

**On the other hand, as soon as one can no longer think things as one formerly thought them, transformation becomes both very urgent, very difficult, and quite possible**.

It **is not therefore a question of there being a time for criticism and a time for transformation, nor people who do the criticism and others who do the transforming, those who are enclosed in an inaccessible radicalism and those who are forced to make the necessary concessions to reality**. In fact I **think the work of deep transformation can only be carried out in a free atmosphere, one constantly agitated by a permanent criticism.**

D.E. But do you think the intellectual must have a programmatic role in this transformation?

FOUCAULT **A reform is never only the result of a process in which there is conflict, confrontation, struggle, resistance**

To say to oneself at the outset: what reform will I be able to carry out? That is not, I believe, an aim for the intellectual to pursue. His role, since he works specifically in the realm of thought, is to see how far the liberation of thought can make those transformations urgent enough for people to want to carry them out and difficult enough to carry out for them to be profoundly rooted in reality.

**It is a question of making conflicts more visible, of making them more essential than mere confrontations of interests or mere institutional immobility. Out of these conflicts, these confrontations, a new power relation must emerge, whose first, temporary expression will be a reform.** If at the base there has not been the work of thought upon itself and if, in fact, modes of thought, that is to say modes of action, have not been altered, whatever the project for reform, we know that it will be swamped, digested by modes of behavior and institutions that will always be the same.

Roleplaying the State is good

**Turn- Role playing in debate is essential to break down assumptions, develop critical thinking skills, and deconstruct the state**

**Joyner,** Professor International Law @ Georgetwon, **99** (Christopher “TEACHING INTERNATIONAL LAW: VIEWS FROM AN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS POLITICAL SCIENTIST” ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law, Spring, 5 ILSA J Int'l & Comp L 377)

Use of the debate **can be an effective pedagogical tool for education** in the social sciences. **Debates, like other role-playing simulations, help students understand different perspectives on a policy issue by adopting a perspective as their own. But, unlike other simulation games, debates do not require that a student participate directly in order to realize the benefit of the game. Instead of developing policy alternatives and experiencing the consequences of different choices in a traditional role-playing game, debates present the alternatives and consequences in a formal, rhetorical fashion before a judgmental audience.** Having the class audience serve as jury helps each student develop a well-thought-out opinion on the issue by providing contrasting facts and views and enabling audience members to pose challenges to each debating team.
**These debates ask undergraduate students to examine the** international **legal implications of various U**nited **S**tates foreign **policy actions**. Their chief tasks are to assess the aims of the policy in question, determine their relevance to United States national interests, ascertain what legal principles are involved, and conclude how the United States policy in question squares with relevant principles of international law. Debate questions are formulated as resolutions, along the lines of: "Resolved: The United States should deny most-favored-nation status to China on human rights grounds;" or "Resolved: The United States should resort to military force to ensure inspection of Iraq's possible nuclear, chemical and biological weapons facilities;" or "Resolved: The United States' invasion of Grenada in 1983 was a lawful use of force;" or "Resolved: The United States should kill Saddam Hussein**." In addressing both sides of these legal propositions, the student debaters must consult** the **vast literature** of international law, especially the nearly 100 professional law-school-sponsored international law journals now being published in the United States. This literature furnishes an incredibly rich body of legal analysis that often treats topics affecting United States foreign policy, as well as other more esoteric international legal subjects. Although most of these journals are accessible in good law schools, they are largely unknown to the political science community specializing in international relations, much less to the average undergraduate. [\*386]
**By assessing** the role of international law in United States foreign **policy- making**, **students realize that United States actions do not always measure up to international legal expectations; that at times, international legal strictures get compromised for the sake of perceived national interests, and that concepts and principles of international law, like domestic law, can be interpreted and twisted in order to justify United States policy in various international circumstances. In this way, the debate format gives students the benefits ascribed to simulations and other action learning techniques, in that it makes them become actively engaged with their subjects, and not be mere passive consumers. Rather than spectators, students become legal advocates, observing, reacting to, and structuring political and legal perceptions to fit the merits of their case.
The debate exercises carry several specific educational objectives. First, students on each team must work together to refine a cogent argument that compellingly asserts their legal position on a foreign policy issue confronting the United States. In this way, they gain greater insight into the real-world legal dilemmas faced by policy makers. Second, as they work with other members of their team, they realize the complexities of applying and implementing international law, and the difficulty of bridging the gaps between United States policy and international legal principles, either by reworking the former or creatively reinterpreting the latter. Finally, research for the debates forces students to become familiarized with contemporary issues on the United States foreign policy agenda and the role that international law plays in formulating and executing these policies.** **[8](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=a8d1f92070e6ab744abda8a65fcac725&docnum=1&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkAk&_md5=a1810d7db65250bdddeb51b53137ff40&focBudTerms=joyner%20AND%20use%20of%20the%20debate&focBudSel=all" \l "n8" \t "_self) The debate thus becomes an excellent vehicle for pushing students beyond stale arguments over principles into the real world of policy analysis, political critique, and legal defense.**

A2: Calaculative thought bad

**Calculative thought must be used on behalf of the Other- it’s key to feed the world’s population**

\*Apologize for gendered language in card

**Campbell**, Professor of Int’l Politics @ Newcastle, **99**

(David, Moral Spaces pg. 56)

104. Ibid., 76-79. Levinas has also argued for a politics that respects a double injunction. When asked “Is not ethical obligation to the other a purely negative ideal, impossible to realize in our everyday being-in-the-world,” which is governed by “ontological drives and practices”; and “Is ethics practicable in human society as we know it? Or is it merely an invitation to apolitical acquiescence?” Levinas’s response was that “of course **we inhabit an ontological world of technological mastery and political self-preservation.** Indeed**, without these political and technological structures of organization we would not be able to feed mankind. This is the greatest paradox of human existence: we must use the ontological *for the sake of the other*, to ensure the survival of the other we must resort to the technico-political systems of means and ends**.” Kearney and Levinas, “Dialogue with Emmanuel Levinas,”28.

A2: Biopolitics K

**Zero solvency for the alternative- their talk of freedom and rethinking of the political are rhetorical flourishes that lack the substance necessary to found a new politics**

**Parry,** visiting professor Lewis & Clark Law School, **2k5**

(John T. “PAPER SYMPOSIUM: FEDERALISM AFTER GONZALES V. RAICH: SYMPOSIUM ARTICLE "SOCIETY MUST BE [REGULATED]": BIOPOLITICS AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE IN GONZALES V. RAICH” Lewis & Clark Law Review Winter 9 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 853)

My goal so far has not been to convince readers that biopolitics is good or bad, although the tone of the preceding section leans toward the negative. Instead, I have tried to argue not only that the idea of biopolitics reflects our current social arrangements, but also that constitutional doctrine accepts it, makes room for it, and sometimes endorses it.

That said, I want to close by suggesting **that biopolitics, while perhaps not necessarily good, is at least not wholly bad. Absent realistic alternatives, this claim is certainly worth considering. Foucault**, for example, **never charted a way out of biopolitics beyond developing an individual aesthetic of self-discipline and regulation - the "care of the self."** **[94](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=993c85d9d985fb59854985293bb37c33&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAA&_md5=2b870f41f45f934d059c87fc96ed682d" \l "n94#n94" \t "_self)** **Other writers speak of achieving something like a "new politics," which usually means some combination of personal freedom that includes the substance - but often not the legal baggage - of individual human rights, combined with an ideal of community that fits uneasily with the ideal of personal freedom** (thus the "politics," which are likely to be anything but new), **as well as a more egalitarian economic arrangement and the social safety net of the modern welfare state, but without the modern state itself. Even assuming this vision is desirable, no one has any practical idea how to make it happen**. **[95](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=993c85d9d985fb59854985293bb37c33&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAA&_md5=2b870f41f45f934d059c87fc96ed682d" \l "n95#n95" \t "_self)**

A2: Biopolitics K

**The neg’s argument scapegoats biopolitics- while the level of control has increased these are necessary steps in the emancipation of human beings from the savagery of the dark ages. Biopolitics has many positive features the negative obfuscates.**

**Parry,** visiting professor Lewis & Clark Law School, **2k5**

(John T. “PAPER SYMPOSIUM: FEDERALISM AFTER GONZALES V. RAICH: SYMPOSIUM ARTICLE "SOCIETY MUST BE [REGULATED]": BIOPOLITICS AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE IN GONZALES V. RAICH” Lewis & Clark Law Review Winter 9 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 853)

My basic assertions are that **the ills laid at the feet of biopolitics are not entirely its fault and that they are in any event the costs of "progress**." **Consider**, first, **the charges**. Critics point out that in **the modern, centralized, biopolitical state, our individuality is suppressed to the larger goal of managing the population. As a result, we become detached and alienated, even as we are disciplined and regulated. At best we can resort to coping strategies, but larger transformation of our social environment is impossible**. **[96](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=993c85d9d985fb59854985293bb37c33&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAA&_md5=2b870f41f45f934d059c87fc96ed682d" \l "n96#n96" \t "_self)**

 [\*877]  **The flaw in this diagnosis is that it treats the alienated individual as problematic, as if there were an acontextual, dehistoricized thing known as "an individual" that is capable of being alienated or not, with the result that we should try to make it less, rather than more, alienated**. **Far more likely is that the idea of the individual developed in the modern period along with the modern state and that alienation is part of what defines an individual**.To the extent the "problem" of the alienated individual has significance in the contemporary world, in other words**, it is a direct consequence of the enlightenment and can only be solved through biopolitics.** Indeed, **biopolitics simply reflects the enlightenment project of promoting reason in place of "superstition" and arbitrary power**. **Social structures have become rationalized, so that governments are more likely to operate by articulated policy instead of fiat, the rule of law instead of whim, and democracy instead of hereditary rule or warlordism. The creation of the individual - a rational, rights-bearing but also alienated entity - is critical to all of these developments.**

Importantly, under this account**, these changes may not be liberating in any objective sense, because the freedoms they create come with real costs - the costs of being free in this way as well as the consequences of being part of a power structure in which these particular freedoms are defined, managed, and subject to suspension**. Still, **this process leads** not only to centralization and state violence but also **to rights that channel the exercise of state power,** to pervasive regulation of our lives **and** environment but also **to a significant amount of predictability and security for many people**. **Our modern anxiety can be imperfectly assuaged by the comforts that flow from management and technology, and there is no reason to believe we are any less happy than people were in the past - although neither is it clear that we are any happier**.
How the costs and benefits of the enlightenment and biopolitics shake out, and whether that should even be the way we assess them (it appears to be a loaded standard, after all), are political and moral issues. Even more, however, they are questions of aesthetics. **The comforts and controls of biopolitics will appeal to many people. Others will find fulfillment in acts of resistance along a variety of fronts. Beyond that, and what the future will bring, who can say?**

Kritik not real world

**The critique will lead to endless epistemological discussion. We must look at real world policies along with our rethinking of thinking in order to craft meaningful theory about the world**

**Jarvis,** senior lecturer @ University of Australia, **2K**

(D.S.L. International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism )

**There are**, of course, **problems with ontologically derived forms of the­ory**. Postmodemists naturally dismiss this conception of theory and are not entirely wrong for doing so. Realism is not above criticism, and structural-realism even more so.58 But then again, neither is postmodernism! But this is not the point. I am not here attempting to defend realism against post­modcrnism or to dismiss postmodernism entirely from the purview of Inter national Relations. Rather, **what I am attempting to** do **is defend** the insti­tution of theory against postmodemism which, in its more virulent forms, aims at its deconstruction and obliteration. So too am I attempting to defend **the ontological aspect of theory against those who would engage exclusively in epistemological debate**. **For there to be theory in International Relations, ontological description must be the first order of things; without first defining the domain of international politics, identifying those entities and things we wish to explain and understand, epistemological debate would be altogether pointless.** Save for this, **the discipline threatens to transpose itself into philosophy and not International Relations, to be condemned to perpetual metaphysical reflection but without reference to the social world we are attempting to understand.** Of course, **this does not exonerate us from previous mistakes**. International Relations, largely because of the dominance of positivism in the discipline, has, in the past, been apt to ontological description in the absence of epistemological reflection. Practitioners in the discipline have rarely seen a need to question the epistemological basis of their scholarship as Thomas Biersteker forcefully acknowledged.59 Yet, as he also reminds us, **developing theory and generating knowledge requires judi­cious use of both ontological description and epistemological explanation**. **These are not mutually exclusive dimensions of theoretical discourse, but the elemental ingredients necessary to the construction of discourse itself. The exclusive focus upon one dimension to the detriment of the other probably explains why**, according to William Kreml and Charles Kegley, **“Interna­tional relations research today. . . has failed to reach agreement about** sev­eral **fundamental issues**. . . (1) the central questions to be asked, (2) the basic units of analysis (e.g., states or nonstate actors), (3) the levels of analy­sis at which various questions should be explored, (4) the methods by which hypotheses should be tested and unwarranted inferences prevented, *(5)* the criteria by which theoretical progress is to be judged, and (6) how inquiry should be organized in order to generate the knowledge that will lead to international peace, prosperity, and justice.”

Kritik not real world

**The critique ignores the practical side of life. We must be able to use logic and rationality in order to solve the basic problems of our society. The criticism would leave us in endless questioning over meaning.**

**Jarvis,** senior lecturer @ University of Australia, **2K**

(D.S.L. International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism )

To what end these approaches will prove beneficial, however, to what end their concerns and depictions of current realities prove accurate remains problematic. What does seem obvious, though, is the continuing desire for understanding, the need to examine, comprehend, and make sense of events and, consequently, the need for theoretical endeavor. **Despite “nihilistic despair” or charges of epochal change, most of us will wake up tomorrow confronted by a world much the same as today, one that experiences the recurring problems of inequality, injustice, war, famine, violence, and conflict. Various problems will emerge and solutions to them will be sought. These, surely, cannot be deconstructed as the sub­versive postmodernists insist, but only reinscribed as new questions. And while we might problematize current knowledge and interpretations, question our faith in science, reason, and logic, or reinscribe questions in new contexts, to suppose these endeavors contrary to the activity of the­ory and the search for meaning and understanding seems plainly absurd. If we abandon the principles of logic and reason, dump the yardsticks of objectivity and assessment, and succumb to a blind relativism that privi­leges no one narrative or understanding over another, how do we tackle such problems or assess the merits of one solution vis-à-vis another? How do we go about the activity of living, making decisions, engaging in trade, deciding on social rules or making laws, if objective criteria are not to be employed and reason and logic abandoned?** How would we construct research programs, delimit areas of inquiry or define problems to be stud­ied if we abandon rationalist tools of inquiry?

Representations/Fear of Nuclear War Good

**Our representation of nuclear catastrophe is key- fear of specific nuclear threat is vital to shocking individuals out of there complacency – only through imagining catastrophes can we avert nuclear doom and mobilize action for change**

**Grinspoon 86**

(Lester, Associate Professor of Psychiatry Harvard Medical School, “Introduction” *The Long Darkness: Psychological and Moral Perspectives on Nuclear Winter* pg. 3-6)

The late Archibald MacLeish wrote, "Knowledge without feelings is not knowledge, and can only lead to public irresponsibility and indifference, conceivably to ruin. . . . [When 1 the fact is dissociated from the feel of the fact. . . that people, that civilization is in danger" (Atlantic Monthly 203 [1959]:40-46). Many people repress their fear, anger, and rebelliousness in response to the nuclear threat; instead they anesthetize themselves. They avoid acquiring information that would make vague fears specific enough to require decisive action; they contrive to ignore the implications of the information they do allow to get through; they resign their responsibilities to leaders and experts; they treat the accelerating nuclear arms race as simply none of their business and convince themselves that there is nothing they can do about it. Just as some dangers are too slight to arouse concern, this one is, paradoxically, too vast to arouse concern. It is not an easy task to help people grasp affectively as well as cognitively the immensity of the danger. This is not just because we are all so psychologically well equipped to defend ourselves against anxiety that might threaten to overwhelm, but also because the horror itself is so abstract. Physicians, even though their work is often pressured and stressful, continue to be the professional group that smokes the least, and among physicians, thoracic surgeons have the lowest prevalence of smoking. Clearly, direct exposure to the consequences of smoking makes it difficult to deny them. Similarly, physicians have been in the vanguard of the movement to arouse the consciousness of the populace to the dangers of nuclear war. Working in the emergency room makes suffering from blast, fire, cold, radiation sickness, starvation, and infectious disease less of an abstraction. People who have or have had such experience are less likely to suffer from this failure of imagination. We have to confront the truth in this unprecedented situation. We must rouse ourselves from complacency and passivity and assume responsibility. We need the courage to be afraid and to make our friends, neighbors, and colleagues afraid-with a fear that is not neurotic and panicky but thoughtful, a fear not so much for ourselves as for our children, for civilization, and for this precious world. A problem for anyone who fully assimilates a consciousness of the nuclear threat is that it requires us to redirect our  thoughts and change our lives in certain ways- a demand that many people understandably prefer to avoid. It means taking some time that we would like to devote to insteresting, self-fulfilling work with obvious rewards and devoting. It instead to what seems a frustrating, unfulfilling struggle with few intrinsic rewards and an uncertain chance of success. It does not even bring the pleasure of correcting a visible injustice or relieving visible suffering. In fact, like some techniques of psychotherapy, it heightens suffering in the short run for everyone who is shaken out of numbness or self-delusion and into confrontation of the reality. Psychiatrists have an important role in developing more understanding of how to make these truths available to everyone. Psychotherapy itself is a model for the process of allowing people to deal constructively with disturbing truths. And as psychiatrists we should be strongly impelled to help others confront this unparalleled threat, because our experience makes us acutely aware of both aspects of the situation: the human potential for irrational and self-destructive acts, and also the enormous human capacity for altruism, adaptation, and creative solutions to the most difficult of problems. We know now that the nuclear danger is even more terrible than we have supposed. The reader may recall that at one point in the Stanley Kubrick movie Dr. Strangelove, the title character asks the Soviet ambassador, "You mean you built a doomsday machine and you didn't tell anybody?" The question was meant to be ludicrous and the doomsday machine a fantasy, but in the December 23, 1983, Issue of Science, Dr. Sagan and a group of fellow scientists reported an astonishing discovery: the superpowers have inadvertently built a doomsday machine, and it is operational at this very moment. As in the film, the governments of the superpowers are not telling anybody. They behave as though they do not believe it themselves, let alone feel any obligation to let the inhabitants of the planet know of this threat to their survival. Until great numbers of people come to genuinely appreciate the magnitude of this danger to themselves and future generations and demand of their governments that they reverse the arms race, the risk of setting off the doomsday machine will increase. The Austrian poet and satirist Karl Kraus wrote in 1917, during the darkest days of World War I, "If we still had imagination, we would no longer wage war." If the people of Europe had been able to conceive the horrors of trench warfare, they would not have acquiesced in the policies that made it inevitable, Nuclear war is infinitely more horrible and more difficult to imagine, and most people, including many in high office, do not attempt to imagine it. The authors of this book are contributing to a struggle against unimaginativeness and insensibility either imposed by circumstances or deliberately cultivated. Dr. Sagan will describe the consequences of a nuclear war; the other authors will explain how we have become trapped into risking these consequences and how political use of the nuclear threat affects our lives. H. G. Wells once pointed out that human history has become more and more a race between education and catastrophe; the race has become even more desperate since then. A terrible thought is that our education might be provided by catastrophe itself, by nuclear destruction short of nuclear war-a nuclear weapon detonated by mechanical error or human error or madness-an accident more devastating by orders of magnitude than the one at Three Mile Island that helped so much to educate us about industrial nuclear power. That would be learning the hardest way of all. We present this book in the hope that a better kind of education is still possible, that if we allow ourselves to learn and think about what is being prepared for us, and in our name, we will reject it and make it our business to work for a change.

Representations/Fear of Nuclear War Good

**Fear of nuclear catastrophe is vital to cultural transformations which delegitimize the bomb, war and future weapons of mass destruction**

**Futterman, 94**

(J.A.H., former US nuclear weapons scientist, ““Obscenity and Peace: Meditation on the Bomb” <http://www.dogchurch.org/scriptorium/nuke.html> [accessed 08/12/09])

But the inhibitory effect of reliable nuclear weapons goes deeper than Shirer's deterrence of adventurer-conquerors. It changes the way we think individually and culturally, preparing us for a future we cannot now imagine. Jungian psychiatrist Anthony J. Stevens states, [[15]](http://www.dogchurch.org/scriptorium/nuke.html%22%20%5Cl%20%2215) "History would indicate that people cannot rise above their narrow sectarian concerns without some overwhelming paroxysm. It took the War of Independence and the Civil War to forge the United States, World War I to create the League of Nations, World War II to create the United Nations Organization and the European Economic Community. Only catastrophe, it seems, forces people to take the wider view. Or what about fear? Can the horror which we all experience when we contemplate the possibility of nuclear extinction mobilize in us sufficient libidinal energy to resist the archetypes of war? Certainly, the moment we become blasé about the possibility of holocaust we are lost. As long as horror of nuclear exchange remains uppermost we can recognize that nothing is worth it. War becomes the impossible option. Perhaps horror, the experience of horror, the consciousness of horror, is our only hope. Perhaps horror alone will enable us to overcome the otherwise invincible attraction of war." Thus I also continue engaging in nuclear weapons work to help fire that world-historical warning shot I mentioned above, namely, that as our beneficial technologies become more powerful, so will our weapons technologies, unless genuine peace precludes it. We must build a future more peaceful than our past, if we are to have a future at all, with or without nuclear weapons — a fact we had better learn before worse things than nuclear weapons are invented. If you're a philosopher, this means that I regard the nature of humankind as mutable rather than fixed, but that I think most people welcome change in their personalities and cultures with all the enthusiasm that they welcome death — thus, the fear of nuclear annihilation of ourselves and all our values may be what we require in order to become peaceful enough to survive our future technological breakthroughs.[[16]](http://www.dogchurch.org/scriptorium/nuke.html%22%20%5Cl%20%2216)

Representations/Fear of Nuclear War Good

**End of the World imagery is key to challenging nuclearism and averting extinction**

**Lifton, 86**

(Robert F., professor of psychiatry and psychology at City University of NY, “Imagining the Real” *The Long Darkness: Psychological and Moral Perspectives on Nuclear Winter* pg. 97-98)

I am struck by the possibility of transformation away from nuclearism. That transformation is enhanced by confronting end-of-the-world imagery. Eugene Rabinowitz provides a very good example of just this possibility when he writes about the circumstances in which he and other nuclear scientists drafted one of the earliest petitions against the use of a nuclear weapon: In the summer of 1945, some of us walked the streets of Chicago vividly imagining the sky suddenly lit up by a giant fireball, the steel skeleton of skyscrapers bending into grotesque shapes and their masonry raining into the streets below, until a great cloud of dust rose and settled onto the crumbling city. (Rabinowitz, 1963, p. 156) This image of the "end of the world" inspired him to urge his colleagues to return quickly to their work on the Franck Report, which he, Franck, Szilard, and a number of others in Chicago were instrumental in creating. To be sure, the report's recommendation that the atomic weapon not be used on a human population without warning was not heeded. But it has become a central document in our contemporary struggle to imagine the end of the world in order to preserve the world. Similar, efforts of restitution, which restore symbols of human continuity to our numbed imaginations, are needed by the rest of us as well. Nuclear winter becomes an important *imaginative* resource here. Just as we know that we must imagine our own death in order to live more fully, so must we now imagine the end of the world in order to take steps to maintain human existence.

Representations/Fear of Nuclear War Good

**The Alternative fails- it does not accurately diagnose policymaker thinking making the alternative incapable of challenging the preeminence of nuclear weapons- only policy focus can avert nuclear war**

**Blight, 87**

(James G. “Toward a Policy-Relevant Psychology of Avoiding Nuclear War: Lessons for Psychologists From the Cuban Missile Crisis” *American Psychologist* January 42.1)

This point cannot be emphasized too much; its unravelling represents the critical thrust of this article: Nuclear depth psychology does not lead to policy-relevant conclusions. It is a conceptual cul-de-sac within which psychologists are likely to remain endlessly trapped, without a reasonable hope of contributing to the reduction of nuclear risks, the fear of which drove them into the nuclear arena in the first place. If psychologists seek a realistic hope of influencing nuclear policy, they must, as I argue in the last two sections, begin again after they have divested themselves of their spurious nuclear depth psychology. The nub of their central error was captured many years ago by William James. He called it, on one occasion, “the psychologists’ fallacy par excellence, ” which consists in “confusion of his own standpoint with that of the mental fact about which he is making his report” ([James, 1890](http://csaweb111v.csa.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/ids70/display_fulltext_html.php?SID=n7snfqept5e9b1j52neh750k03&db=psycarticles%2Dset%2Dc&an=1987%2D16803%2D001&f1=0003%2D066X%2C42%2C1%2C12%2C1987&key=AMP%2F42%2Famp%5F42%5F1%5F12&is=0003%2D066X&jv=42&ji=1&jp=12%2D29&sp=12&ep=29&year=1987&mon=01&day=0003%2D066X%2C42%2C1%2C12%2C1987#REF_c29), Vol. 1, p. 196). “We must,” cautioned James, “be very careful, therefore, in discussing a state of mind from the psychologists’ point of view, to avoid foisting into its own ken matters that are only there for ours” ([James, 1890](http://csaweb111v.csa.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/ids70/display_fulltext_html.php?SID=n7snfqept5e9b1j52neh750k03&db=psycarticles%2Dset%2Dc&an=1987%2D16803%2D001&f1=0003%2D066X%2C42%2C1%2C12%2C1987&key=AMP%2F42%2Famp%5F42%5F1%5F12&is=0003%2D066X&jv=42&ji=1&jp=12%2D29&sp=12&ep=29&year=1987&mon=01&day=0003%2D066X%2C42%2C1%2C12%2C1987#REF_c29), Vol. 1, p. 197). But this is precisely what nuclear depth psychologists have not done. In Jamesian terms ([James, 1890](http://csaweb111v.csa.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/ids70/display_fulltext_html.php?SID=n7snfqept5e9b1j52neh750k03&db=psycarticles%2Dset%2Dc&an=1987%2D16803%2D001&f1=0003%2D066X%2C42%2C1%2C12%2C1987&key=AMP%2F42%2Famp%5F42%5F1%5F12&is=0003%2D066X&jv=42&ji=1&jp=12%2D29&sp=12&ep=29&year=1987&mon=01&day=0003%2D066X%2C42%2C1%2C12%2C1987#REF_c29), Vol. 1, pp. 221–223), our nuclear policymakers are well acquainted with the fear of crises leading potentially to nuclear war, and thus they spend much of their time thinking about the determinants of strategic stability in such a way as to try to drive downward the probability that deterrence will fail. This, schematically, is the psychological reality of the nuclear policymakers. It bears no resemblance whatever to the “reality” that nuclear depth psychologists seek to attribute to them: Acquaintance with pathological suspicion and attention to arms “racing,” each of which is ultimately attributable to superpower psychopathology. This, finally, is responsible for the policy irrelevance of the whole approach: Its premises are totally alien, psychologically completely unreal, to those who actually manage the nuclear risks. In an 1899 essay, James generalized this problem of egocentric psychologism by calling it “a certain blindness in human beings” that leads to the “injustice of our opinions, so far as they deal with the significance of alien lives” ([James, 1899/1977a](http://csaweb111v.csa.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/ids70/display_fulltext_html.php?SID=n7snfqept5e9b1j52neh750k03&db=psycarticles%2Dset%2Dc&an=1987%2D16803%2D001&f1=0003%2D066X%2C42%2C1%2C12%2C1987&key=AMP%2F42%2Famp%5F42%5F1%5F12&is=0003%2D066X&jv=42&ji=1&jp=12%2D29&sp=12&ep=29&year=1987&mon=01&day=0003%2D066X%2C42%2C1%2C12%2C1987#REF_c31), pp. 629–630). His remedy was tolerance, based on a radically empirical approach to human knowledge. The more we understand what the lives of others are really like, from the inside, the more likely we are, James believed, to formulate a problem in a way that is appropriate to its context and thus pertinent to plausible solutions. This essay is conceived as just such a Jamesian exercise—in nuclear radical empiricism—of clearing away some of the fallacious depth-psychological assumptions that are leading nowhere. It is also, finally, an attempt to respond to the provocative challenge issued recently by [Morawski and Goldstein (1985)](http://csaweb111v.csa.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/ids70/display_fulltext_html.php?SID=n7snfqept5e9b1j52neh750k03&db=psycarticles%2Dset%2Dc&an=1987%2D16803%2D001&f1=0003%2D066X%2C42%2C1%2C12%2C1987&key=AMP%2F42%2Famp%5F42%5F1%5F12&is=0003%2D066X&jv=42&ji=1&jp=12%2D29&sp=12&ep=29&year=1987&mon=01&day=0003%2D066X%2C42%2C1%2C12%2C1987#REF_c57) to develop a policy-relevant psychology of avoiding nuclear war by engaging in “blunt honesty about the influence of politics, the constraints of methodology, and the risks of expertise” (p. 283). My belief is that if we psychologists are honest with ourselves, if we begin to acknowledge the hard reality of political variables, if we try to face up to the limitations of the analogy between world politics and the consulting room or laboratory, and if we begin to face the fact that nuclear policymakers are almost oblivious to psychology as such, then we will want to chart a new course, one that will begin with phenomenological analyses of nuclear crises ([Blight, 1985a](http://csaweb111v.csa.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/ids70/display_fulltext_html.php?SID=n7snfqept5e9b1j52neh750k03&db=psycarticles%2Dset%2Dc&an=1987%2D16803%2D001&f1=0003%2D066X%2C42%2C1%2C12%2C1987&key=AMP%2F42%2Famp%5F42%5F1%5F12&is=0003%2D066X&jv=42&ji=1&jp=12%2D29&sp=12&ep=29&year=1987&mon=01&day=0003%2D066X%2C42%2C1%2C12%2C1987#REF_c5), [in press-a](http://csaweb111v.csa.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/ids70/display_fulltext_html.php?SID=n7snfqept5e9b1j52neh750k03&db=psycarticles%2Dset%2Dc&an=1987%2D16803%2D001&f1=0003%2D066X%2C42%2C1%2C12%2C1987&key=AMP%2F42%2Famp%5F42%5F1%5F12&is=0003%2D066X&jv=42&ji=1&jp=12%2D29&sp=12&ep=29&year=1987&mon=01&day=0003%2D066X%2C42%2C1%2C12%2C1987#REF_c7), [in press-b](http://csaweb111v.csa.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/ids70/display_fulltext_html.php?SID=n7snfqept5e9b1j52neh750k03&db=psycarticles%2Dset%2Dc&an=1987%2D16803%2D001&f1=0003%2D066X%2C42%2C1%2C12%2C1987&key=AMP%2F42%2Famp%5F42%5F1%5F12&is=0003%2D066X&jv=42&ji=1&jp=12%2D29&sp=12&ep=29&year=1987&mon=01&day=0003%2D066X%2C42%2C1%2C12%2C1987#REF_c8)). If we thus try to enter the “alien lives” of those who manage the nuclear risks under which we all must live, we may indeed begin to assist them in lowering the likelihood of a catastrophic nuclear war.

A2: Heidegger- Over-determine the subject = extermination

**The alternatives over-determination of the subject disables resistance to corporate violence meaning they can’t solve the aff since their alt can’t deal with nuclear weapons, but they can become the lap dog of fascism and extermination.**

**Graham, 99**

(P. “Heidegger’s hippies” <http://www.philgraham.net/HH_conf.pdf> [accessed 02/19/09])

Societies should get worried when Wagner’s music becomes popular because it usually means that distorted interpretations of Nietzsche’s philosophy are not far away. Existentialists create problems about what *is*, especially identity (Heidegger 1947). Existentialism inevitably leads to an authoritarian worldview: this, my Dionysian world of the eternally self-creating, the eternally self-destroying, this mystery world of twofold voluptuous delight, my “beyond good and evil,” without a goal, unless the joy of the circle itself is a goal; without will, unless a ring feels good will towards itself – do you want a *name* for this world? A *solution* to all its riddles? A *light* for you, too, you best-concealed, strongest, most intrepid, most midnightly men? – *This world is the will to power* – *and nothing besides!* And you yourselves are also this will to power – and nothing besides! (Nietzsche 1967/1997). Armed with a volume of Nietzsche, some considerable oratory skills, several Wagner records, and an existentialist University Rector in the form of Martin Heidegger, Hitler managed some truly astounding feats of strategic identity engineering (cf. Bullock, 1991). Upon being appointed to the Freiberg University, Heidegger pronounced the end of thought, history, ideology, and civilisation: ‘No dogmas and ideas will any longer be the laws of your being. The Fuhrer himself, and he alone, is the present and future reality for Germany’ (in Bullock 1991: 345). Heidegger signed up to an ideology-free politics: Hitler’s ‘Third Way’ (Eatwell 1997). The idealised identity, the new symbol of mythological worship, Nietzsche’s European Superman, was to rule from that day hence. Hitler took control of the means of propaganda: the media; the means of mental production: the education system; the means of violence: the police, army, and prison system; and pandered to the means of material production: industry and agriculture; and proclaimed a New beginning and a New world order. He ordered Germany to look forward into the next thousand years and forget the past. Heidegger and existentialism remain influential to this day, and history remains bunk(e.g. Giddens4, 1991, Chapt. 2). Giddens’s claims that ‘humans live in circumstances of … existential contradiction’, and that ‘subjective death’ and ‘biological death’ are somehow unrelated, is a an ultimately repressive abstraction: from that perspective, life is merely a series of subjective deaths, as if death were the ultimate motor of life itself (cf. Adorno 1964/1973). History is, in fact, the simple and straightforward answer to the “problem of the subject”. “The problem” is also a handy device for confusing, entertaining, and selling trash to the masses. By emphasising the problem of the ‘ontological self’ (Giddens 1991: 49), informationalism and ‘consumerism’ confines the navel-gazing, ‘narcissistic’ masses to a permanent present which they self-consciously sacrifice for a Utopian future (cf. Adorno 1973: 303; Hitchens 1999; Lasch 1984: 25-59). Meanwhile transnational businesses go about their work, raping the environment; swindling each other and whole nations; and inflicting populations with declining wages, declining working conditions, and declining social security. Slavery is once again on the increase (Castells, 1998; Graham, 1999; ILO, 1998). There is no “problem of the subject”, just as there is no “global society”; there is only the mass amnesia of utopian propaganda, the strains of which have historically accompanied revolutions in communication technologies. Each person’s identity is, quite simply, their subjective account of a unique and objective history of interactions within the objective social and material environments they inhabit, create, and inherit. The identity of each person is their most intimate historical information, and they are its material expression: each person is a record of their own history at any given time. Thus, each person is a recognisably material, identifiable entity: an identity. This is their condition. People are not theoretical entities; they are people. As such, they have an intrinsic identity with an intrinsic value. No amount of theory or propaganda will make it go away. The widespread multilateral attempts to prop up consumer society and hypercapitalism as a valid and useful means of sustainable growth, indeed, as the path to an inevitable, international democratic Utopia, are already showing their disatrous cracks. The “problem” of subjective death threatens to give way, once again, to unprecedented mass slaughter. The numbed condition of a narcissistic society, rooted in a permanent “now”, a blissful state of Heideggerian Dasein, threatens to wake up to a world in which “subjective death” and ontology are the least of all worries.

Focus on ontology = authoritarianism

**Your aff’s focus on ontology leads to a reduction of history and thinkers that supports authoritarianism**

**Graham, 99**

(P. “Heidegger’s hippies” <http://www.philgraham.net/HH_conf.pdf> [accessed 02/19/09])

Adorno’s (1973) thoroughgoing critique of Heidegger’s ontological metaphysics plays itself out back and forth through the Heideggerian concept of a universalised identity –an essentialist, universalised being and becoming of consciousness, elided from the constraints of the social world. Adorno’s argument can be summed up thus: there can be no universal theory of “being” in and of itself because what such a theory posits is, precisely, non-identity. It obscures the role of the social and promotes a specific kind of politics –identity politics (cf. also Kennedy 1998): Devoid of its otherness, of what it renders extraneous, an existence which thus proclaims itself the criterion of thought will validate its decrees in authoritarian style, as in political practice a dictator validates the ideology of the day. The reduction of thought to the thinkers halts the progress of thought; it brings to a standstill would thought would need to be thought, and what subjectivity would need to live in. As the solid ground of truth, subjectivity is reified … Thinking becomes what the thinker has been from the start. It becomes tautology, a regressive form of consciousness. (Adorno 1973: 128). Identity politics - the ontological imperative - is inherently authoritarian precisely because it promotes regression, internalism, subjectivism, and, most importantly, because it negates the role of society. It is simplistic because it focuses on the thingliness of people: race, gender, ethnicity. It tries to resolve the tension of the social-individual by smashing the problem into two irreconcilable parts. Identity politics’ current popularity in sociological thought, most well evidenced by its use and popularity in “Third Way” politics, can be traced back to a cohort I have called Heidegger’s Hippies –the failed, half-hearted, would-be “revolutionaries” of the 60s, an incoherent collection of middle-class, neo-liberal malcontents who got caught up in their own hyperbole, and who are now the administrators of a ‘totally administered’ society in which hyperbole has become both *lingua franca* and world currency (Adorno 1964/1973 1973).

Perm Solvency

Perm- Instead of privileging one discursive framework at the expense of the other, conceptualize the AFF and NEG’s varying perspectives on the plan holistically. Perm solves- Holistically accepting multiple points of view avoids the exclusion of ontological privilege, allows us to think imaginatively to come up with solutions to problems, and ultimately is opens space for authentic criticism.

**Rorty,** emeritus professor of comparative literature and philosophy at Stanford University, interviewed by Ragg, pragmatist, ’**02** (Richard and E.P., “Worlds or Words Apart? The Consequences of Pragmatism for Literary Studies: An Interview with Richard Rorty,” Philosophy and Literature, 26.2, p369-383, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/philosophy\_and\_literature/v026/26.2rorty.html, retrieved June 23, 2007)

RR: If you weren't some kind of foundationalist you wouldn't bother to get into epistemology. Epistemology only looks attractive if you think that there is a topic called knowledge whose nature can be studied. The idea is that once you have learned its nature, you might get more of it than you had before. Only someone who thinks that **knowledge has foundations located in sense perception, or pure reason, or divine revelation**, or something, would take the idea of studying knowledge, its nature and limits, seriously. **I think of holism as just the view that people change their beliefs** in such a way as **to achieve coherence with their other beliefs**, to bring their beliefs and desires into some sort of equilibrium—**and that that is about all there is to be said about the quest for knowledge. There are no rules for which beliefs you sacrifice** in order to accommodate other beliefs, **or which desires you change to accommodate changed beliefs. Because there aren't any rules, there aren't any methods you can study in order to improve the way you achieve equilibrium. The whole idea of studying how belief is changed is pretty hopeless. It's just too holistic** a process to be an appropriate topic of study. [End Page 369]

ER: Holism is obviously a natural corollary of pragmatism because pragmatists urge bringing as many different useful vocabularies to discussion as we can. This reminds me of your definition of "literariness." In Contingency, irony, and solidarity you describe literary skill as the ability to effect "surprising gestalt switches by making smooth rapid transitions from one terminology to another." 2 Would it be fair to say, then, that thinking holistically is, to some degree, literary?

RR: No, I don't think so. It would be more appropriate to say **thinking holistically, in the sense of not being limited to a given context or disciplinary framework, is a matter of thinking imaginatively. Politicians** and theologians and engineers **think imaginatively just as much as literary people do**. To call it literary would be unduly to privilege literature.

Perm: Accept the criticism as it can be used to supplement our plan. Perm Solves: Philosophy should be incorporated into policy action to the extent that its useful, but when it restricts action we need to know when to keep the two separate.

**Rorty**, emeritus professor of comparative literature and philosophy at Stanford University, interviewed by Ragg, pragmatist, ’**02** (Richard and E.P., “Worlds or Words Apart? The Consequences of Pragmatism for Literary Studies: An Interview with Richard Rorty,” Philosophy and Literature, 26.2, p379-380, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/philosophy\_and\_literature/v026/26.2rorty.html, retrieved June 23, 2007)

ER: As we've already discussed, you want to keep politics in one sphere and philosophy in another, and that people should understand when to employ different vocabularies. Does this mean that pragmatism can only be holistic up to its point of use? Does utility demarcate the extent to which we join various vocabularies with one another? [End Page 380]

RR: Yes, the way it dictates everything else. But works of imagination, or exercises of imagination, can extend our notion of what might be useful. So sometimes you don't know in advance what's going to be useful. As Dewey said, the discovery of the failure of old means to old ends changes your ends as well as changing the means. It isn't as though you can appeal to utility as though it were a criterion. Utility is just a blanket label for whatever rationale you have for doing what you're currently doing.

Perm Solvency

Perm: Take a pragmatic stance towards the discourse used in this round. Perm Solves: The negative’s attempt to investigate the “truth” behind our discourse and to explain what we “really” mean essentializes language. This makes language into an authoritarian structure, which prevents the kritik from ever solving. Instead, we should be pragmatic and incorporate a multiplicity of discourses, because it’s not about changing the language we use, it’s about changing the way we think about language.

**Rorty**, emeritus professor of comparative literature and philosophy at Stanford University, interviewed by Ragg, pragmatist, ’**02** (Richard and E.P., “Worlds or Words Apart? The Consequences of Pragmatism for Literary Studies: An Interview with Richard Rorty,” Philosophy and Literature, 26.2, p379-380, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/philosophy\_and\_literature/v026/26.2rorty.html, retrieved June 23, 2007)

RR: Well, what the logical positivists did was to change the subject to language and then be just as metaphysical about language as previous philosophers had been about reality, experience and so on. They kept saying things like "Now, thanks to the new symbolic logic, we will discover the real structure of language." The nice thing about the later Wittgenstein was the debunking of the notion of the real structure of language, and of language as having a nature to be understood. When the later Wittgenstein is described as a sort of pragmatist what is meant is that he is antiabsolutist, antimonotheist. He reminds us of our ability to use many languages to describe the same things.

ER: But even if pragmatism's place in the linguistic turn could be overexaggerated, wouldn't you agree that pragmatism does have certain things to recommend for literary study: for example, pointing out that ideas are not separate things to language, that ideas about texts are linguistically informed? So that, if pragmatism cannot spawn something called a "pragmatist literary theory," it can nevertheless debunk various metaphysical notions and the tendency to think about texts in an essentialist way: for example, the dubious idea that human beings have a special essence and that their texts have essences that it is the duty of every critic to get to the heart of? Maybe I'm coming out with another banality or platitude, but I would say pragmatism is useful because it is antifoundationalist, antiessentialist, and recommends this holistic interest in multiple vocabularies. Are there any other ways in which you might conceive pragmatism being useful to literary study? [End Page 390]

RR: No, I think that's it. I think antiessentialism is the heart of the matter. 28 In a culture, either religious or scientistic, that says "Yes, but this is appearance, what we want is reality," or "This is accident, what we want is essence," you get a kind of authoritarian sadomasochism: the wish to subordinate oneself to something larger. I think of pragmatism, either when applied to democratic practice in politics, or when applied to literary criticism, as precisely debunking the appearance-reality, essence-accident distinctions. Pragmatists say, "Look, there isn't any authority that we can appeal to to settle the quarrels between us. We're going to have to deal with them ourselves." That's the kind of change in self-description which could in the end make a difference.

ER: Maybe I find pragmatism more exciting than you do simply because I've spent less time with it. But I'm reminded of a point in Contingency where you say that the majority of people are metaphysicians. It's less true in the US, but it's certainly the case in Britain that people have moved generally away from God. Stevens was atypical in trying to find something to replace God; though I don't think he ever got to the stage of suggesting that we didn't in fact need to replace God with anything. Obviously you can be metaphysical without being religious. But this is why I've asked you about a pragmatist attitude to literary texts: because if most people are metaphysicians in some form, surely this must inform the work they will do on texts? For example, asking questions like: "What is the relation of this poem to ideas of truth?" or reality, or morality, or something larger than themselves?

RR: I'd be inclined to say not so much "inform" or "change the way" they work on texts, but rather that a pragmatist view of themselves changes their attitudes towards themselves as readers and as other people as readers. It isn't that they're going to do anything very different; it's that they're going to think about what they're doing differently.

Consequences before ethics

**Existence comes first**

**BOSTROM ‘2,** Philosophy Professor, Yale

[Dr. Nick, Department of Philosophy @ Yale University "Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related

Hazards," *Journal of Evolution and Technology*, Vol. 9 - March 2002, <http://www.jetpress.org/volume9/risks.html> ]

**Existential risks are distinct from** global **endurable risks.** Examples of the latter kind include: threats to the biodiversity of Earth’s ecosphere, moderate global warming, global economic recessions (even major ones), and possibly stifling cultural or religious eras such as the “dark ages”, even if they encompass the whole global community, provided they are transitory (though see the section on “Shrieks” below). To say that a particular global risk is endurable is evidently not to say that it is acceptable or not very serious. A world war fought with conventional weapons or a Nazi-style Reich lasting for a decade would be extremely horrible events even though they would fall under the rubric of endurable global risks since humanity could eventually recover. (On the other hand, they could be a local terminal risk for many individuals and for persecuted ethnic groups.)  I shall use the following definition of existential risks: Existential risk – One where an adverse outcome would either annihilate Earth-originating intelligent life or permanently and drastically curtail its potential. An existential risk is one where humankind as a whole is imperiled. Existential disasters have major adverse consequences for the course of human civilization for all time to come. 2 The unique challenge of existential risks Risks in this sixth category are a recent phenomenon. This is part of the reason why it is useful to distinguish them from other risks. We have not evolved mechanisms, either biologically or culturally, for managing such risks. Our intuitions and coping strategies have been shaped by our long experience with risks such as dangerous animals, hostile individuals or tribes, poisonous foods, automobile accidents, Chernobyl, Bhopal, volcano eruptions, earthquakes, draughts, World War I, World War II, epidemics of influenza, smallpox, black plague, and AIDS. These types of disasters have occurred many times and our cultural attitudes towards risk have been shaped by trial-and-error in managing such hazards. But tragic as such events are to the people immediately affected, in the big picture of things – from the perspective of humankind as a whole – even the worst of these catastrophes are mere ripples on the surface of the great sea of life. They haven’t significantly affected the total amount of human suffering or happiness or determined the long-term fate of our species. With the exception of a species-destroying comet or asteroid impact (an extremely rare occurrence), there were probably no significant existential risks in human history until the mid-twentieth century, and certainly none that it was within our power to do something about.  The first manmade existential risk was the inaugural detonation of an atomic bomb. At the time, there was some concern that the explosion might start a runaway chain-reaction by “igniting” the atmosphere. Although we now know that such an outcome was physically impossible, it qualifies as an existential risk that was present at the time. For there to be a risk, given the knowledge and understanding available, it suffices that there is some subjective probability of an adverse outcome, even if it later turns out that objectively there was no chance of something bad happening. If we don’t know whether something is objectively risky or not, then it is risky in the subjective sense. The subjective sense is of course what we must base our decisions on.[2] At any given time we must use our best current subjective estimate of what the objective risk factors are.[3]  A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.[4] Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankind’s potential permanently. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century. The special nature of the challenges posed by existential risks is illustrated by the following points:  \***Our approach to existential risks cannot be one of trial-and-error. There is no opportunity to learn from errors.** The reactive approach – see what happens, limit damages, and learn from experience – is unworkable. Rather, **we must take a proactive approach. This requires foresight to anticipate new types of threats and a willingness to take decisive preventive action and to bear the costs** (moral and economic) of such actions.  \*We cannot necessarily rely on the institutions, moral norms, social attitudes or national security policies that developed from our experience with managing other sorts of risks. Existential risks are a different kind of beast. We might find it hard to take them as seriously as we should simply because we have never yet witnessed such disasters.[5] Our collective fear-response is likely ill calibrated to the magnitude of threat.  \*Reductions in existential risks are global public goods [13] and may therefore be undersupplied by the market [14]. Existential risks are a menace for everybody and may require acting on the international plane. Respect for national sovereignty is not a legitimate excuse for failing to take countermeasures against a major existential risk.  \***If we take into account the welfare of future generations, the harm done by existential risks is multiplied by another factor,** the size of which depends on whether and how much we discount future benefits [15,16].

Framework for the Aff

A. Our interpretation- The affirmative must defend a policy proposal which is enacted by the United States Federal Government. The negative may test the desirability of this proposal through disadvantages based off of the plan or through a competitive policy option. The negative fails to do this.

B. Reasons to Prefer-

1.) Burden of rejoinder- the affirmative is bound to a policy option. In a competitive activity fairness must be preserved by forcing the negative to either defend the status quo or another competitive policy option. Failing to do so creates a strategic skew for the negative and destroys debate.

2.) Predictable ground- there are hundreds of potential advocacies and philosophies the negative could defend as an alternative. The affirmative can only be prepared to debate arguments that can be reasonably interpreted as negative answers to the resolution. This is crucial to prevent philosophy of the week negative strategies that the affirmative can never be ready for.

3.) Destroys Topic education- the negative changes the debate to a subject matter that is not relevant to the core topic issue. This is unfair to the affirmative and creates a stale debate as critical arguments can be recycled from year to year.

C. Voter- for the reasons above, education, limits and competitive equity

Aff Framework – Ground extensions

Ground – The neg will always win that the principles of their advocacy are good in the abstract – we can only debate the merits of their framework if they defend the specific consequences of political implementation

Michael Ignatieff, Carr professor of human rights at Harvard, 2004 *Lesser Evils* p. 20-1

As for moral perfectionism, this would be the doctrine that a liberal state should never have truck with dubious moral means and should spare its officials the hazard of having to decide between lesser and greater evils. A moral perfectionist position also holds that states can spare their officials this hazard simply by adhering to the universal moral standards set out in human rights conventions and the laws of war. There are two problems with a perfectionist stance, leaving aside the question of whether it is realistic. The first is that articulating nonrevocable, nonderogable moral standards is **relatively easy. The problem is deciding how to apply them in specific cases.** What is the line between interrogation and torture, between targeted killing and unlawful assassination, between preemption and aggression? Even when legal and moral distinctions between these are clear in the abstract, **abstractions are less than helpful when political leaders have to choose between them in practice.** Furthermore, the problem with perfectionist standards is that they contradict each other. The same person who shudders, rightly, at the prospect of torturing a suspect might be prepared to kill the same suspect in a preemptive attack on a terrorist base. Equally, the perfectionist commitment to the right to life might preclude such attacks altogether and restrict our response to judicial pursuit of offenders through process of law. Judicial responses to the problem of terror have their place, but they are no substitute for military operations when terrorists possess bases, training camps, and heavy weapons. To stick to a perfectionist commitment to the right to life when under terrorist attack might achieve moral consistency at the price of leaving us defenseless in the face of evildoers. Security, moreover, is a human right, and thus respect for one right might lead us to betray another.

Without predictable ground debate becomes meaningless and produces political strategy that is wedded to violence and fails to achieve productive change.

Ruth Lessl Shively, Assoc Prof Polisci at Texas A&M, 2000 *Political Theory and Partisan Politics* p. 182-3

The point may seem trite, as surely the ambiguists would agree that basic terms must be shared before they can be resisted and problematized. In fact, they are often very candid about this seeming paradox in their approach: the paradoxical or "parasitic" need of the subversive for an order to subvert. But admitting the paradox is not helpful if, as usually happens here, its implications are ignored; or if the only implication drawn is that order or harmony is an unhappy fixture of human life. For what the paradox should tell us is that some kinds of harmonies or orders are, in fact, good for resistance; and some ought to be fully supported. As such, it should counsel against the kind of **careless rhetoric that lumps all orders or harmonies together as arbitrary and inhumane.** Clearly **some basic accord about the terms of contest is a necessary ground for all further contest.** It may be that if the ambiguists wish to remain full-fledged ambiguists, they cannot admit to these implica­tions, for to open the door to some agreements or reasons as good and some orders as helpful or necessary, is to open the door to some sort of rationalism. Perhaps they might just continue to insist that this initial condition is ironic, but that the irony should not stand in the way of the real business of subversion.Yet difficulties remain. **For agreement is not simply the initial condition, but the continuing ground, for contest. If we are to success­fully communicate our disagreements, we cannot simply agree on basic terms** and then proceed to debate without attention to further agree­ments. For debate and contest are forms of dialogue: that is, they are activities premised on the building of progressive agreements. Imagine, for instance, that two people are having an argument about the issue of gun control. As noted earlier, in any argument, certain initial agreements will be needed just to begin the discussion. At the very least, the two discussants must agree on basic terms: for example, they must have some shared sense of what gun control is about; what is at issue in arguing about it; what facts are being contested, and so on. They must also agree—and they do so simply by entering into debate—that they will not use violence or threats in making their cases and that they are willing to listen to, and to be persuaded by, good arguments. Such agreements are simply implicit in the act of argumentation.

Aff Framework- Education Extensions

Topical Education – By manipulating the topic to access their political project they skirt debate about the implementation of policies by the government. Their education is distrusting of institutional study and pragmatic reform. Even if their intentions are noble, their message results in fascist totalitarianism

Martin Lewis, Assistant Professor at George Washington, 1992 *Green Delusions* p. 258

A majority of those born between 1960 and 1980 seem to tend toward cynicism, and we can thus hardly expect them to be converted en masse to radical doctrines of social and environmental salvation by a few committed thinkers. It is actually possible that a radical education may make them even more cynical than they already are. While their professors may find the extreme relativism of subversive postmodernism bracingly liberating, many of today's students may **embrace only the new creed's rejection of the past**. Stripped of leftist social concerns, radical postmodernism's contempt for established social and political philosophy—indeed, its contempt for liberalism—may well lead to right-wing totalitarianism. When cynical, right-leaning students are taught that democracy is a sham and that all meaning derives from power, they are being schooled in fascism, regardless of their instructors' intentions. According to sociologist Jeffrey Goldfarb (1991), cynicism is the hallmark—and main defect—of the current age. He persuasively argues that cynicism's roots lie in failed left- and right-wing ideologies—systems of thought that deductively connect "a simple rationalized absolute truth ... to a totalized set of political actions and policies" (1991:82). Although most eco-radicals are anything but cynical when they imagine a "green future," they do take a cynical turn when contemplating the present political order. The dual cynical-ideological mode represents nothing less than the death of liberalism and of reform. Its dangers are eloquently spelled out by Goldfarb (1991:9): "When one thinks ideologically and acts ideologically, opponents become **enemies to be vanquished**, political compromise becomes a kind of immorality, and constitutional refinements become inconvenient niceties.

This argument is an independent reason to vote affirmative

Ruth Lessl Shively, Assoc Prof Polisci at Texas A&M, 2000 *Political Theory and Partisan Politics* p. 186

To sum up the argument thus far, the ambiguists cannot support political contest unless they are willing to say "no" to—or to bring closure to—some activities, and unless they are willing to say "yes" to the rational rules of persuasion. Like all other democratic theorists, they must make some foundational assumptions about the goodness of self-determination, the preferability of reasons over force, and the evils of tyranny, among other things. All democratic visions presup­pose that politics is about rational persuasion. Thus, talk of resisting or subverting all orders or all rational foundations is incoherent. At the very least**, the foundations of rational persuasion must be rigidly upheld**. It will not do, then, to say we simply need more contest or more "politics" and less rationality or foundationalism. It will not do to invoke contest as a kind of talisman against the need to make difficult judgments about good and bad, healthy and unhealthy, political ac­tions. For inasmuch as the conditions necessary to political contest require constant support and protection and inasmuch as **we require** **constant education and improvement in upholding and effectively applying them**, **the conditions necessary to political contest require these judgments**.

Aff Framework – Education Extensions

Our interpretation solves – education through participation in policy debates is essential to check manipulation of the government by powerful private interests

Donald S. Lutz, Professor of Polisci at Houston, 2000 *Political Theory and Partisan Politics* p. 36-7

The position argued here is that to the extent such a discussion between political theorists and politicians does not take place we damage the prospects for marrying justice with power. Since the hope of uniting justice with power was the reason for creating politi­cal philosophy in the first place, political theorists need to pursue the dialogue as part of what justifies their intellectual project. Poli­tics is the realm of power. More specifically it is the realm where **force and violence are replaced by debates and discussion about how to implement power**. Without the meaningful injection of consider­ations of justice, politics tends to become discourse by the most powerful about how to implement their preferred regime. Although constitutionalism tends to be disparaged by contemporary political science, a constitution is the very place where justice and power are married. Aristotle first taught us that a constitution must be matched to the realities of the political system—the character, hopes, fears, needs and environment of the people—which requires that constitutional­ism be addressed by men and women practiced in the art of the possible.2 Aristotle also taught us that a constitution (the politeia, or plan for a way of life) should address the improvement of people toward the best life possible, which requires that constitutionalism be addressed by political theorists who can hold out a vision of justice and the **means for advancing toward it**. The conversation between politician and political theorist stands at the center of their respective callings, and a constitution, even though it reflects only a part of the reality of a political system, has a special status in this central conversation. Although the focus of this chapter is on a direct conversation be­tween theorist and politician, there is an important, indirect aspect of the conversation that should not be overlooked—classroom teaching. Too often the conversation between politician and political theorist is described in terms of a direct one between philosophers and those holding power. Overlooked is the **central need** to educate as many young people as possible. Since it is difficult to predict who will, in fact, hold power, and because the various peoples who take seriously the marriage of justice with power are overwhelmingly committed to a non-elitist, broad involvement of the population, we should not overlook or minimize our importance as teachers of the many. Politi­cal leaders drawn from a people who do not understand what is at stake are neither inclined nor equipped to join the conversation. As we teach, we converse with future leaders. Perhaps not everyone who teaches political theory has had the same experience, but of the more than eight thousand students I have taught, I know of at least forty-nine who later held a major elective office, and at least eighty more who have become important political activists. This comes down to about five students per teaching year, and I could not have predicted which five it would be. The indeterminate future of any given student is one argument against directing our efforts at civic education toward the few, best students. A constitutional perspective suggests not only that those in power rely upon support and direction from a broad segment of the public, but also that reliance upon the successful civic education of the elite is not very effective, by itself for marrying justice with power in the long run.

Aff Framework- Voting Issue

This argument provides a-priori reasons to vote affirmative. You must use your ballot to ratify constraints on discourse to preserve a politically-enabling discussion

Ruth Lessl Shively, Assoc Prof Polisci at Texas A&M, 2000 *Political Theory and Partisan Politics* p. 179

To put this point another way, it turns out that to be open to all things is, in effect, to be open to nothing. While the ambiguists have commendable reasons for wanting to avoid closure—to avoid specify­ing what is not allowed or celebrated in their political vision—they need to say "no" to some things in order to be open to things in general. They need to say "no" to certain forms of contest, if only to protect contest in general. For if one is to be open to the principles of democracy, for example, one must be dogmatically closed to the prin­ciples of fascism. If one would embrace tolerance, one must rigidly reject intolerance. If one would support openness in political speech and action, one must ban the acts of political intimidation, violence or recrimination that squelch that openness. If one would expand delib­eration and disruption, one must set up strict legal protections around such activities. And if one would ensure that citizens have reason to engage in political contest—that it has practical meaning and import for them—one must establish and maintain the rules and regulations and laws that protect democracy. In short, openness requires certain **clear limits, rules, closure**. And to make matters more complex, these structures of openness cannot simply be put into place and forgotten. They need to be taught to new generations of citizens, to be **retaught and reenforced** among the old, and as the political world changes, to be shored up, rethought, adapted, and applied to new problems and new situations. It will not do, then, to simply assume that these structures are permanently viable and secure without significant work or justification on our part; **nor will it do to talk about resisting or subverting them**. Indeed, they are such valuable and yet vulnerable goods that **they require the most unflag­ging and firm support that we can give them**.

The deliberative implications of their advocacy are a prior question – pre-conditions of agreement are necessary for your decision to have any political value

Adolf G. Gundersen, Assoc Prof Polisci at Texas A&M, 2000 *Political Theory and Partisan Politics* p. 104-5

Indirect political engagement is perhaps the single most important element of the strategy I am recommending here. It is also the most emblematic, as it results from a fusion of confrontation and separa­tion. But what kind of political engagement might conceivably qualify as being both confrontational and separated from actual political deci­sion-making? There is only one type, so far as I can see, and that is deliberation. Political deliberation is by definition a form of engage­ment with the collectivity of which one is a member. This is all the more true when two or more citizens deliberate together. Yet delibera­tion is also a form of political action that precedes the actual taking and implementation of decisions. It is thus simultaneously connected and disconnected, confrontational and separate. It is, in other words, a form of indirect political engagement. This conclusion, namely, that we ought to call upon deliberation to counter partisanship and thus clear the way for deliberation, looks rather circular at first glance. And, semantically at least, it certainly is. Yet this ought not to concern us very much. Politics, after all, is not a matter of avoiding semantic inconveniences, but of doing the right thing and getting desirable results. In political theory, therefore, the real concern is always whether a circular argument translates into a self-defeating prescription. And here that is plainly not the case, for what I am suggesting is that deliberation can diminish partisanship, which will in turn contribute to conditions amenable to continued or extended deliberation. That "deliberation promotes deliberation" is surely a circular claim, but it is just as surely an accurate description of the real world of lived politics, as observers as far back as Thucydides have documented. It may well be that deliberation rests on certain **preconditions**. I am not arguing that there is no such thing as a deliberative "first cause." Indeed, it seems obvious to me both that deliberators require something to deliberate about and that deliberation presumes certain institutional structures and shared values. Clearly something must get the deliberative ball rolling and, to keep it rolling, the cultural terrain must be free of deep chasms and sinkholes. Nevertheless, however extensive and demanding deliberation's preconditions might be, we ought not to lose sight of the fact that, once begun, deliberation tends to be self-sustaining. Just as partisanship begets partisanship, deliberation begets deliberation. If that is so, the question of limiting par­tisanship and stimulating deliberation are to an important extent the same question.