# Anti-Kritik Tool Box 2012 Institute

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# \*\*\*\*\*Glossary-Explanation of Arguments\*\*\*\*\*

The goal of this project is so that you can be better prepared to answer kritiks, and especially K aff’s. This is a compilation of various k answers and kritiks designed to be run against K teams. A brief explanation of the arguments are below. The arguments are arranged alphabetically so they can be easily located.

**Aesthetics Bad:** Designed to be run against teams that claim aesthetics are good or that we should value things based on beauty.

**American Dream K:**  Designed to be used against teams that say something about/affirm the American Dream.

**Anti-Politics:** Designed to be run against teams that run a representations affirmative or that don’t go through the state.

**Baudrillard Answers:** Primarily against Baudrillard’s simulations argument.

**Bearing Witness bad:** Designed to be run against teams that claim it is important to “bear witness to” harms or atrocities.

**Biological Determinism:** Designed to be run against teams that claim we should value or focus on “the body.”

**Bio-power K Answers:** Designed to be run against teams that claim Foucault’s biopower argument.

**Capitalism K Answers:** Defends that capitalism is good.

**Civil Disobedience:**  An argument that project teams should lose in order to advance their project.

**Coalition Building Good:** Useful against race and project teams to argue that they should be trying to build a coalition with whites/other groups to be successful.

**Coercion K Answers:** Designed to be run against the libertarian style Kritik that we shouldn’t use taxpayer money.

**Colonialism K Answers:** Designed to be run against Kritiks of colonialism.

**Complexity K Answers:** Designed to be run against the International Relations Kritik of Complexity—debuted by Georgetown in the 2012 Finals of the NDT.

**Consult the Natives:** Designed to be run against historical cases that ignore the plight of the Native Americans. Could also be run against cases claiming Natives impacts.

**Crisis Politics Good:** Designed to be run against teams that claim crisis rhetoric is bad.

**Cynicism Kritik:** Designed to be run against teams that claim that language or truth is indeterminate or we can’t have fixed meanings to terms.

**Deep Ecology Answers:** Designed to be run against radical environmentalism style critiques.

**Diversity Forums:** Designed to be run against project teams by claiming that their project is best done outside of competitive debate formats.

**Deontology Kritik Answers:** Designed to be run against teams that say “ethics come first” or that “consequences don’t matter.”

**Epistemology Kritik Answers:** Designed to be run against teams that say epistemology or method comes first.

**Evidence Good:** Defends the use of expert testimony and the use of traditional evidence.

**Feminism Kritik Answers:** Designed to be run against feminism kritiks.

**“Foreign” PIC:** A word pic off the word “foreign.” Can be run as a floating pic against k aff’s.

**“Founding Fathers” K:** Use of the term “Founding Fathers” is sexist and entrenches an imperial mindset.

# Glossary-Explanation of Arguments

**“Fuck” K:** Use of the f-bomb entrenches domination and sexism of women.

**Gendered Language K:** Using mankind or the masculine he in language is bad.

**Genealogies NEG:** Use of historical genealogies trade off with pragmatic solutions to problems.

**“Her-story” Kritik:** Kritik of the term “history.”

**Intervention Good:** Military interventions sustain hegemony, and the world is far less violent now than it was in the past.

**Liberal-Conservative Dichotomy Bad:** We shouldn’t label people as liberals and conservatives—it prevents alliance-building.

**Metaphors Bad:** Metaphors cause people to get wrapped in the metaphor and distract from true problem solving.

**Modernity Good:** A technological, modern society has improved virtually every factor imaginable, and doesn’t lead to the Holocaust.

**Narratives Bad:** Narratives cause people to choose bad stories, and elites will co-opt narratives.

**Neo-Liberalism Kritik Answers:** Countries that impose neo-liberal, free market policies are better on virtually every indicator than countries that don’t.

**Nine-Eleven K:** The use of the term 9-11 is bad—it gets co-opted by conservatives. It was just another day—not anything earth-shattering or life changing.

**Ontology Answers:** Indicts the position that ontology should come first.

**Predictions Good:** Defends that we can and should predict actions.

**Problem-Solution K Answers:** Answers the argument that we find problems when we prescribe solutions.

**Realism Good:** Defends the IR theory of realism—that the state is the center of the geo-political system and that nation-states act in their own self-interest.

**Representations Kritik Answers**: Answers that representations come first.

**Representations Good:** Defends that representations outweigh other issues in case you need to use that for one of your K’s.

**Resource Shortage K Answers:** We won’t run out of resources, and resource wars don’t happen.

**“Retarded” K:** Shouldn’t use “retarded” as a synonym for stupid or bad.

**Science Good:** A defense of science—that it is accurate, helpful, and doesn’t lead to genocide.

**Securitization Answers:** Answers to the securitization Kritik.

**Shining City K:** A kritik of American Exceptionalism.

**Simulations Bad Answers:** Answers Baudrillard’s Kritik of Simulations.

**Specieism K:** Used against cases that claim to solve for human rights or that focus rights based discourse exclusively on human beings.

**Speed Good:** Debating fast is good.

**Statism Answers:** Answers Kritiks of the state—says states are the center of the IR system.

# Glossary-Explanation of Arguments

**Systemic Violence Answers:** Answers kritiks that impact in systemic violence like poverty & domestic violence.

**Terror Reps Good:** It’s good to call those who kill innocent people “terrorists.”

**Threat Construction Answers:** Threats are real, and we need to respond to them.

**Value to Life Answers:** Answers the kritik argument that “there is no value to life” in their framework.

**Upward Mobility Kritik:** Challenges the idea that there is such a thing as upward mobility in society.

**Word PIC’s Good:** Argues that even single words matter.

# \*\*\*\*\*Aesthetics Bad\*\*\*\*\*

## Turn: A focus on aesthetics causes listeners to lose sight of the message itself:

Stephen Lucas, a professor of Communication Arts at the University of Wisconsin, 2001 (*The Art of Public Speaking*, pg. 62)

This story illustrates a very common problem. We tend to judge people by the way they look or speak and therefore don’t listen to what they *say.* Some people become so distracted by a speaker’s accent, personal appearance, or vocal mannerisms that they **lose sight of the message**. As in Tim’s case, this can happen even when a listener is interested in the topic and looking forward to the presentation. **Focusing on a speaker’s delivery** or personal appearance is one of the **major sources of interference** in the speech communication process, and it is something we always need to guard against.

## Turn: Focusing on Lincoln’s aesthetics would have diverted focus from his message about the moral evils of slavery:

Stephen Lucas, a professor of Communication Arts at the University of Wisconsin, 2001 (*The Art of Public Speaking*, pg.64)

If you had attended Abraham Lincoln’s momentous Cooper Union speech of 1860, this is what you would have seen: The long, ungainly figure upon which hung clothes that, while new for this trip, were evidently the work of an unskilled tailor; the large feet and clumsy hands, of which, at the outset, at least, the orator seemed to be unduly conscious; the long, gaunt head, capped by a shock of hair that seemed not to have been thoroughly brushed out, made a picture which did not fit in with New York’s conception of a finished statesman. But although he seemed awkward and uncultivated, **Lincoln had a powerful message about the moral evils of slavery.** Fortunately, the audience of Cooper Union **did not let his appearance stand in the way of his words**.

# \*\*\*\*\*“American Dream” K\*\*\*\*\*

## Continuing to believe in the American Dream furthers the enslavement of the poor and the working class—our K turns their case:

Manuel Valenzuela, 2009 (social critic, commentator, http:<//valenzuelasveritas.blogspot.com/2004/04/system-capitalism-and-its-r>ole-in.html, “The System: Capitalism and its Role in American Society’s Plunge into the Abyss, Part II of III.)

By exploiting our emotions, fantasies and dreams, not to mention the greed and materialism capitalism unearths in our minds, the purveyors of the Dream foster in us a sense that what we see is attainable and what we were born into escapable. Like black widows capitalists and exploiters wait for us to become trapped in the web of lies they market, only then striking us down with their venomous poison running through our veins. Our primitive wants and needs become the tools the capitalists use in pushing us towards greater productivity and consumption. We are pursuing that most noble of American institutions, we are told. The American Dream is within our grasp, if only we work harder and consumer more. The American Dream furthers the enslavement of the poor and working class, entrapping them further into the bowels of exploitation. It advances the enrichment of the oligarchs and capitalists, allowing them increased production through lower wages. Belief in the Dream pushes us toward commitments of greater working hours and harder sacrifice. It fosters the abandonment of individuality and happiness, forcing us to choose our jobs over our lives, our career over our family. But, we are told, if we sacrifice long enough, if we work hard enough, if we give our last breath of air and our last vestige of energy we will move up in the hierarchy, only to realize after years of servitude the futility of it all and the untenable fiction we were led to believe. In the end we become aware that the Dream has become the nightmare, that our energy has been drained, not for our pleasure and happiness, but for the bulging pockets of the capitalist exploiters. Before we realize where time has taken us, the vigor of youth has given way to the frailty of age and the wisdom of experience opens our eyes to the enslavement we have lived in for dozens of years.

## Shattering the myth of the American Dream is necessary to challenge exploitation:

Manuel Valenzuela, 2009 (social critic, commentator, http:<//valenzuelasveritas.blogspot.com/2004/04/system-capitalism-and-its-r>ole-in.html, “The System: Capitalism and its Role in American Society’s Plunge into the Abyss, Part II of III.)

Through the years our masters treat us like the slaves we have become, discarded unappreciated and expendable. If we do not cater to the capitalist demands an entire assembly line of worker ants eagerly awaits to take our place. To our capitalist masters, we are nothing but entities without human emotions or feelings, without lives and families, robotic automatons waiting for the final guillotine to end our working days. They shed not a tear when our Dream becomes a nightmare. We have become complacent and submissive thanks to the tortured lashings of a life working excessive hours, sacrificing our greater good for that of the capitalists, dominated by frustrations and the ever-present demon of exploitation extending its many tentacles over our feudal lives. Society has deemed it so, for capitalism needs exploiter and exploited, oppressor and oppressed, master and slave. The divergence of polar opposites gives capitalism its nectar and nourishment to continue the vicious circle of perpetually unhindered inequality that keeps the difference between poverty and wealth from ever disappearing from our conscious. Capitalism breathes, lives and thrives through the creation of the pyramid of exploitation, where the few at the top enrich themselves at the expense of the many at the bottom. The charade **called the American Dream** is the **illusion needed to continue our exploitation**. After our first few gasps of air our freedom is relinquished and the assembly line of slaves welcomes in a new energy. Those born in wealth and power go on to become the future exploiters of the lower castes, becoming masters destined to rule those born into the lower strata of society. Those born to be exploitable entities, on the other hand, must suffer the consequences of a society that in their childhood prepares them for enslavement, indigence and inequality. This is the reality of the American Dream, a cruel fiction espousing wealth, mobility and happiness but offering only lies, torture and subjugation.

# \*\*\*Anti-Politics Shell (1-4)\*\*\*

## A) They embrace anti-politics—this dooms their project, creates atrocity and creates a vacuum filled by the right:

Carl **Boggs, 1997** (National University, Los Angeles,

The Great Retreat: Decline of the Public Sphere in Late Twentieth-Century

America, <http://steinhardt.nyu.edu/international.olde/mias/readings07/10.pdf>.)

The false sense of empowerment that comes with such mesmerizing impulses is accompanied by **a loss of public engagement**, an erosion of citizenship and a depleted capacity of individuals in large groups to **work for social change**. As this ideological quagmire worsens, urgent problems that are destroying the fabric of American society **will go unsolved** - perhaps even unrecognized - **only to fester more ominously into the future**. And such problems (ecological crisis, poverty, urban decay, spread of infectious diseases, technological displacement of workers) cannot be understood outside the larger social and global context of internationalized markets, finance, and communications. Paradoxically**, the widespread retreat from politics**, often inspired by **localist sentiment**, comes at a time when agendas that ignore or side-step these global realities will, more than ever, be **reduced to impo-tence**. In his commentary on the state of citizenship today, Wolin refers to the increasing sublimation and dilution of politics, as larger num-bers of people **turn away from public concerns toward private ones**. By diluting the life of common involvements, we **negate the very idea of politics** as a source of public ideals and visions.74 In the meantime, the **fate of the world hangs in the balance**. The unyielding truth is that, even as the ethos of anti-politics becomes more compelling and even fashionable in the United States, it is the vagaries of political power that will continue to decide the fate of human societies. This last point demands further elaboration. The shrinkage of politics hardly means that corporate colonization will be less of a reality, that social hierarchies will somehow disappear, or that gigantic state and military structures will lose their hold over people's lives. Far from it: **the space abdicated by a broad citizenry**, well-informed and ready to participate at many levels, can in fact be **filled by authoritarian and reactionary elites** - an already familiar dynamic in many lesser-developed countries. The fragmentation and chaos of a Hobbesian world, not very far removed from the rampant individualism, social Darwinism, and civic violence that have been so much a part of the American landscape, could be the prelude to a powerful Leviathan designed to impose order in the face of disunity and atomized retreat. In this way the eclipse of politics might set the stage for a reassertion of politics in more virulent guise - or it might help further rationalize the existing power structure. In either case, the state would likely become what Hobbes anticipated: the embodiment of those universal, collec-tive interests that had vanished from civil society.75

# Anti-Politics Shell (2-4)

## B) Privileging representations and the micro-political encourages anti-politics—this is especially true in the manner in which they’ve deployed it:

Carl **Boggs, 1997** (National University, Los Angeles,

The Great Retreat: Decline of the Public Sphere in Late Twentieth-Century

America, <http://steinhardt.nyu.edu/international.olde/mias/readings07/10.pdf>.)

Postmodernism and its offshoots (poststructuralism, semiotics, differ-ence feminism, etc.) have indeed reshaped much of academia, including such disciplines as sociology, history, literature, film, and communica-tions. More than that, the theory (if that is the correct label for some-thing so diffuse) amounts to a kind of **anti-paradigm paradigm**, which often refocuses debates around defining motifs of the post-Fordist order: commodification of **culture,** the **media spectacle**, **proliferation of images** and symbols, fragmentation of identities, the dispersion of local movements, and loss of faith in conventional political ideologies and organizations. So far as all this is concerned, post-modernism can be viewed as marking a rather healthy break with the past.50 The problem is that the main thrust of postmodernism so devalues the common realm of power, governance, and economy that the dynamics of social and institutional life vanish from sight. Where the reality of corporate, state, and military power wind up vanishing within a post-modern amorphousness, the very effort to analyze social forces and locate agencies or strategies of change becomes impossible. In its reac-tion against the comprehensive historical scope of Marxism, the **micro approach dismisses in toto macropolitics** and with it any **conceivable modern project of radical transformation**. An extreme "micro" focus is most visible in such theorists as Baudrillard who, as Steven Best and Douglas Kellner put it, in effect "announce the end of the political project in the end of history and society"51 - a stance that **replicates the logic of a profoundly depoliticized culture**.

# Anti-Politics Shell (3-4)

## C) Moving away from anti-politics is vital to check extinction:

Jonathan **Small &** Meg **Buckley, 2006** (former Americorps VISTA for the Human Services Coalition, “Moving Forward,” <http://www.mc.maricopa.edu/other/engagement/Journal/Issue7/Small.pdf>)

What will be the challenges of the new millennium? And how should we equip young people to face these challenges? While we cannot be sure of the exact nature of the challenges, we can say unequivocally that humankind will face them together. If the end of the twentieth century marked the triumph of the capitalists, individualism, and personal responsibility, the new century will present challenges that require **collective action, unity, and enlightened self-interest**. Confronting **global warming, depleted natural resources**, global super viruses, global crime syndicates, and multinational corporations with no conscience and no accountability will require cooperation, openness, honesty, compromise, and **most of all solidarity** – ideals not exactly cultivated in the twentieth century. We can no longer suffer to see life **through the tiny lens of our own existence**. Never in the history of the world has our collective fate been so intricately interwoven. **Our very existence** depends upon our ability to adapt to this new paradigm, to envision a more cohesive society. With humankind’s next great challenge comes also great opportunity. Ironically, modern individualism backed us into a corner. We have two choices, work together in solidarity or **perish together in alienation**. Unlike any other crisis before, the noose is truly around the neck of the whole world at once. Global super viruses will ravage rich and poor alike, developed and developing nations, white and black, woman, man, and child. Global warming and damage to the environment will affect climate change and destroy ecosystems across the globe. Air pollution will force gas masks on our faces, our depleted atmosphere will make a predator of the sun, and chemicals will invade and corrupt our water supplies. **Every single day** we are presented the opportunity to change our current course, to survive modernity in a manner befitting our better nature. Through zealous **cooperation and radical solidarity we can alter the course of human events**. Regarding the practical matter of equipping young people to face the challenges of a global, interconnected world, we need to teach **cooperation, community, solidarity**, balance and tolerance **in schools**. We need to take a holistic approach to education. Standardized test scores alone will not begin to prepare young people for the world they will inherit. The three staples of traditional education (reading, writing, and arithmetic) need to be supplemented by three cornerstones of a modern education, exposure, exposure, and more exposure. How can we teach solidarity? How can we teach community in the age of rugged individualism? How can we counterbalance crass commercialism and materialism? How can we impart the true meaning of power? These are the educational challenges we face in the new century. It will require a radical transformation of our conception of education. We’ll need to trust a bit more, control a bit less, and put our faith in the potential of youth to make sense of their world. In addition to a declaration of the gauntlet set before educators in the twenty-first century, this paper is a proposal and a case study of sorts toward a new paradigm of social justice and civic engagement education. Unfortunately, the current pedagogical climate of public K-12 education does not lend itself well to an exploratory study and trial of holistic education. Consequently, this proposal and case study targets a higher education model. Specifically, we will look at some possibilities for a large community college in an urban setting with a diverse student body. Our guides through this process are specifically identified by the journal Equity and Excellence in Education. The dynamic interplay between ideas of social justice, civic engagement, and service learning in education will be the lantern in the dark cave of uncertainty. As such, a simple and straightforward explanation of the three terms is helpful to direct this inquiry. Before we look at a proposal and case study and the possible consequences contained therein, this paper will draw out a clear understanding of how we should characterize these ubiquitous terms and how their relationship to each other affects our study. Social Justice, Civic Engagement, Service Learning and Other Commie Crap Social justice is often ascribed long, complicated, and convoluted definitions. In fact, one could fill a good-sized library with treatises on this subject alone. Here we do not wish to belabor the issue or argue over fine points. For our purposes, it will suffice to have a general characterization of the term, focusing instead on the dynamics of its interaction with civic engagement and service learning. Social justice refers quite simply to a community vision and a community conscience that values inclusion, fairness, tolerance, and equality.

# Anti-Politics Shell (4-4)

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The idea of social justice in America has been around since the Revolution and is intimately linked to the idea of a social contract. The Declaration of Independence is the best example of the prominence of social contract theory in the US. It states quite emphatically that the government has a contract with its citizens, from which we get the famous lines about life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Social contract theory and specifically the Declaration of Independence are concrete expressions of the spirit of social justice. Similar clamor has been made

over the appropriate definitions of civic engagement and service learning, respectively. Once again, let’s not get bogged down on subtleties.

Civic engagement is a measure or degree of the interest and/or involvement an individual and a community demonstrate around community issues. There is a longstanding dispute over how to properly quantify civic engagement. Some will say that

today’s youth are less involved politically and hence demonstrate a lower degree of civic engagement. Others cite high volunteer rates among the youth and claim it demonstrates a high exhibition of civic

engagement. And there are about a hundred other theories put forward on the subject of civic engagement and today’s youth. But one thing is for sure; today’s youth **no longer see government and politics as an effective or valuable tool** for affecting positive change in the world. Instead of criticizing this judgment, perhaps we should come to sympathize and even admire it. Author Kurt Vonnegut said, “There is a tragic flaw in our precious Constitution, and I don’t know what can be done to fix it. This is it: only nut cases want to be president.” Maybe the youth’s rejection of American politics isn’t a shortcoming but rather a rational and appropriate response to their experience. Consequently,the term civic engagement takes on new meaning for us today. In order to foster fundamental change on the systemic level, which we have already said is necessary for our survival in the twenty-first century, we need to fundamentally change our systems. Therefore, part of our challenge becomes convincing the youth that these systems, and by systems we mean **government** and commerce, **have the potential for positive change**. Civic engagement consequently takes on a more specific and political meaning in this context. Service learning is a methodology and a tool for teaching social justice, encouraging civic engagement, and deepening practical understanding of a subject. Since it is a relatively new field, at least in the structured sense, service learning is only beginning to define itself. Through service learning students learn by experiencing things firsthand and by exposing themselves to new points of view. Instead of merely reading about government, for instance, a student might experience it by working in a legislative office. Rather than just studying global warming out of a textbook, a student might volunteer time at an environmental group. If service learning develops and evolves into a discipline with the honest goal of making better citizens, teaching social justice, encouraging civic engagement, and most importantly, exposing students to different and alternative experiences, it could be a major feature of a modern education. Service learning is the natural counterbalance to our current overemphasis on standardized testing. Social justice, civic engagement, and service learning are caught in a symbiotic cycle. The more we have of one of them; the more we have of all of them. However, until we **get momentum behind them**, we are stalled. Service learning may be our best chance to jumpstart our democracy. In the rest of this paper, we will look at the beginning stages of a project that seeks to do just that.

# Anti-Politics Overview

## They are the Ralph Nader of the American political system—arguing that there is no difference between the right and the left in the American political system—saying that the only solution is to withdraw altogether and focus on our individual ideologies and personal politics—the problem is that their rhetoric of anti-statism gets co-opted while they splinter the fragile leftist coalition of American politics.

## Rejecting the political system doesn’t cause enlightened solutions to spring out of the woodwork, it instead causes the birther movement, the tea parties, and people who crash planes into IRS buildings to protest high taxes to rise to the forefront.

## Their new wave counter-cultural politics is all fun and games until we realize that we have real problems to face, real challenges to confront, real crises we need to solve. Extend our Small & Buckley evidence: without collective political action we can’t confront global warming, corporate capitalism, and the forces that create poverty and discrimination in the world. They are unintentionally their own worst enemy—encouraging a retreat to the Ivory Tower halls of academia while Glenn Beck and Rush Limbaugh fill the void.

## And this turns their objectives: the anti-politics vacuum will be filled by the right—not the left:

Carl **Boggs, 1997** (National University, Los Angeles,

The Great Retreat: Decline of the Public Sphere in Late Twentieth-Century

America, <http://steinhardt.nyu.edu/international.olde/mias/readings07/10.pdf>.)

Both mall culture and mass media symbolize the prevailing mood of **anti-politics**: they reproduce to a deeply-atomized, commodified social life-world which corresponds to the mode of consciousness described by Richard Sennett in The Fall of Public ~~Man,~~ where citizen involvement in a res publica is effaced "by the belief that social meanings are **generated by the feelings of individual human beings**," so that the **common terrain of power relations and social space is obliterated**.15 Sheldon Wolin refers to this development as a "crisis of citizenship," reflected in the **carving up of the public sphere by local, privatized interests**.16 The point has been reached where most Americans can no longer imagine a system truly open to citizen participation, where the ordinary person might have influence. Viewed in this way, modernity is two-sided: it coincides with the spread of technology, knowledge, and expertise but also reinforces widespread feelings of alienation and powerlessness. Individuals feel engulfed by forces beyond their control - bureaucracy, government, huge corporations, the global economy. Under these conditions **psychological retreat from the public sphere** may seem normal enough. The problem, however, is that such **firmly entrenched bastions of power will not vanish** simply because they are denigrated or ignored; on the contrary, their **hegemony will simply go unchallenged**.

# Anti-Politics Links: Kritiks of the State

## (--) Their State K links to anti-politics—its sweeping nature plays into the hands of conservative forces—the tea party movement is more likely to win in American politics than the radical Kritik of the state they endorse:

Carl **Boggs, 1997** (National University, Los Angeles,

The Great Retreat: Decline of the Public Sphere in Late Twentieth-Century

America, <http://steinhardt.nyu.edu/international.olde/mias/readings07/10.pdf>.)

After California anti-tax crusaders launched the Proposition 13 cam-paign in 1978, an upsurge of movements on the right fed into **a rapidly-growing anti-statist current** that transformed the whole terrain of American electoral politics. Winning millions of adherents, these movements took many forms: libertarians, Christian fundamentalists, anti-abortion campaigns, groups, the National Rifle Association, local militias, and so forth. While usually ambivalent toward the public sphere, they nonetheless entered it and often used it to great advantage. Yet popular hostility toward government was **never just a right-wing phenomenon**; it had already **resonated within the new left**, the **counter-culture,** some progressive movements, and a nascent neo-liberalism. As a general mood, anti-politics can be seen as a response to the mounting crisis of the public sector at a time when competitive pressures within the global market began to intensify. It can also be understood **as a growing reaction against bureaucracy in any form**. Anti-statism was further reinforced by the crisis and then eclipse of Communism around the world - a development interpreted by many as validation of free-market capitalism and privatized consumption styles fetishized in the leading industrial nations. When the decline of European social democ-racy is taken into account, the waning of the entire socialist tradition becomes a watershed event for justifying the most extreme (and Uto-pian) forms of anti-statism. In this milieu the "death of socialism" -and with it the discrediting of any government planning or regulation of the economy - is widely interpreted as a sign that state power is fundamentally corrupt and inefficient at all times and all places. American society in the 1990s has seen the resurgence of a fiercely anti- government right-wing populism comprising not only free-marketeers and anti-tax partisans but also a bizarre variety of cults, militias, and enclave groups, mostly but not entirely drawn from the ranks of the familiar "angry white male." Many see themselves caught up in an all-out war against **an evil and oppressive federal government** that taxes and regulates citizens beyond reason. Others see the national state apparatus as some kind of agency of international conspiracies, some-times involving the United Nations. Inevitably, violent confrontations of one sort or another have taken place - the Waco standoff and conflagration at the Branch Davidian compound, the Oklahoma City bombing, the protracted holdout of the Montana Freeman, the Amtrak train derailment, and numerous others. In hundreds of lesser episodes, federal agents and employees around the country have been victims of threats, intimidation, and various hostile acts. A Gallop Poll taken in May 1995 revealed that no less than 39 percent of Americans believe the federal government constitutes an enemy of human rights. In the first ten days following the Oklahoma City events a number of federal agencies received a total of 140 bomb threats. Twice in 1994 and 1995 disgruntled citizens took employees hostage, in San Francisco and Puerto Rico, to protest shoddy treatment at the hands of government agents. Public officials at all levels are frequently the target of verbal assaults. Such manifestations of popular outrage cannot be dismissed as the irrational acts of marginals and crazies, though this element does enter the picture; far more common is the lashing out of working people who feel powerless and believe, quite rightly, that most govern-ment officials and politicians care little about their problems. Whether this revolt against politics can have any strategic value in a period of global interdependence and worsening social crisis raises yet another set of issues. In fact, the historical meaning of contemporary anti-statism is far from clear. Here it is necessary to mention that the neo-conservative and right-wing attack on big government has been, and continues to be, highly selective insofar as these groups would actually hope to strengthen the most oppressive and authoritarian fea-tures of the state (the military, police, prison system, controls over personal life) while tearing down those social programs that account for no more than three percent of the total federal budget. Nor is there the slightest inclination to disturb the most gargantuan and powerful institutions of all - the multinational corporations, huge financial net-works, and their global extensions in the World Bank and IMF. Some- how these huge fortresses of power and wealth escape the conservative attack on "bigness," waste, and lack of accountability. The reality is that the modern state and corporations are thoroughly interwoven, and both are integrated into the permanent war economy. In Theodore Roszak's words: "When we talk about 'big government' in

# Anti-Politics Links: Kritiks of the State

**[continued]**

America, this ought to be the meat of the discussion. It is big war that created and sanctioned the big corporations. It is the big corporations that undergird big government. Big government is quite simply the Ameri- can economy as our local extension of global industrialism."17 Anti-politics thus represents an abstract, ultimately **duplicitous rejec-tion of state power;** retreat from the public sphere does not suggest popular mobilization against big government as such but rather an assault on just the redistributive and welfare functions of the state. Put more simply: the idea of dismantling the welfare state is really a code for lowered taxes, deep cuts in social programs, deregulation, and freeing of more resources for private consumption. The values asso-ciated with citizen participation, much less a recovery of the public sphere, have no place on this agenda. Thus the Reagan presidency, **galvanized and legitimated by its strong opposition to entrenched governmental power**, actually contributed to the expansion of that power year by year. Resources were poured into the military; the space program, intelligence, and law enforcement rose to record levels; taxes were increased; administrative corruption spread; and bureaucracy showed no signs of dissolving. Reagan also concocted his famous Star Wars scheme, which, if enacted, would have been the most expensive government program in history. Still, Republicans persisted in their libertarian blather about the evils of state power, always invoking "free-market" values that, in fact, have no relevance to the United States or any capitalist economy. The reality is that the much-celebrated shift back to an autonomous market, family values, local neighbor-hood, and individual consumption could never occur without eroding the very foundations of state-integrated corporate capitalism.

## (--) Decline in the belief of the state undermines the left more than the right—they won’t win any turns to our position:

Carl **Boggs, 1997** (National University, Los Angeles,

The Great Retreat: Decline of the Public Sphere in Late Twentieth-Century

America, <http://steinhardt.nyu.edu/international.olde/mias/readings07/10.pdf>.)

Survey research demonstrates a profound decline in the general sense of political efficacy - the feeling that, when faced with a deeply- entrenched power structure, nothing the average person does or can

hope to do will matter. **This state of affairs has been far more debilitat-ing for the left than for the right.** As David Croteau points out, a crucial historical goal of the left has been to "socialize the state and politicize society," which becomes impossible where the public sphere shrinks or is simply taken over by controlling interests. **To the extent people internalize a sense of futility,** they will **view the political arena as nothing but a source of alienation and despair**. In Croteau's words, "This belief often leads to a sense that social and political problems are inevitable and that resignation is the only sane response."7 Popular cynicism toward election campaigns and political debates is on the rise. Voting turnouts reached all-time lows by the 1990s, dropping beneath 50 percent in the 1996 Presidential contest, down to less than 40 percent in Congressional elections, and as low as 15 percent in many local and municipal races. The ideal of citizenship is hardly taken seriously in the United States, submerged as it is by people's seemingly more important role as consumers of packaged and advertised goods.

## (--) Rebellions against government frequently manifest themselves in an embrace of the free market:

Carl **Boggs, 1997** (National University, Los Angeles,

The Great Retreat: Decline of the Public Sphere in Late Twentieth-Century

America, <http://steinhardt.nyu.edu/international.olde/mias/readings07/10.pdf>.)

The rebellion against "big government" If the emergence of a depoliticized public sphere is the outgrowth of strong historical trends, it was also pushed along by social forces and popular movements that seized upon the mood of the period. One such early catalyst was the assault on the welfare state that originated with the taxpayers' revolt in the late 1970s and picked up momentum during the Reagan-Bush years, culminating in the Republicans' famous (but short-lived) "Contract with America" in 1994. In part a backlash against oppositional movements of the 1960s and 1970s, this new phase of anti-statism echoed themes with deep roots in American history: personal over collective modes of consumption, worship of the market, populist distrust of elites and bureaucracy, self-reliant individualism. The familiar revolt against "big government" was frequently couched in a libertarian discourse in which freedom is viewed as individual autonomy outside of and against the public sphere. It embraced a primacy of "civil society" tied to laissez-faire principles of free market, minimal government, and local autonomy - in other words, a radical turning-away from the ideology of Keynesian state intervention that had prevailed since the New Deal.

# Anti-Politics Links: Critical Pedagogy

## (--) Critical pedagogy links to anti-politics and creates a vacuum for the Right to fill:

**Alanís 2006** (Jaime Alanís, doctoral student in educational policy studies at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, “How Much are You Willing to Risk? How Far are You Willing to Go”? Cultural Studies <=> Critical Methodologies, 2006; 6; 166,

Ilan Gur-Ze’ev (2000) argues that if critical pedagogy is to become a nonrepressive theory and practice, it must reassume the negative philosophy of the early Frankfurt School and fundamentally shift its position toward what he refers to as a countereducation. Gur-Ze’ev understands countereducation as grounded in philosophical negativism, which he perceives as a particular stance or sensibility in relation to where and how educators locate themselves (in this case) in the context of the classroom. What Gur-Ze ’ev points out is that countereducation as negative dialectics opens a space that moves beyond “dogmatic idealism” and “vulgar collectivism.” For instance, he suggests that the knowledge of oppressed peoples should not be simply viewed as self-evident but complicated instead. However, for Gur-Ze’ev (1998), the idea that the educator is always in the correct position (via critical pedagogy) to raise the consciousness of poor farmers or marginalized students also has a “terroristic potential,” as it uncritically accepts the self-evidence of the oppressed or the leader educator, which therefore goes troublesomely unchallenged. Gur-Ze’ev (1998) puts it the following way: On the one hand, the idea is that the educational leader is responsible for the success of the project, while by the same token he [not she] has to be a total lover and be totally loved. This is within the framework of a praxis whose starting point is the self-evidence of the group and earthly politics. This opens the gate to totalitarianism as earthly politics. (p. 467) Gur-Ze’ev maintains that if critical pedagogy is to be nonrepressive, it must depart from the positive utopian (e.g., overly optimistic emancipatory) stance (as assumed by critical pedagogues) and be philosophically problematized with a healthy dose of negative utopia (e.g., the impossibility of liberation), one that is provisional, comes to terms with the limits of dialogue, and accounts for the specific power relations within their own positionalities. In the end, Gur-Ze’ev believes that in this way, critical pedagogy as countereducation will avoid replacing one form of instrumental rationality (e.g., education as a means for securing a job) with another (e.g., critical pedagogy as hegemonic education).6 Jan Masschelein (1998) and Gert Biesta (1998) insightfully point out that all forms of education, including the wide variety of critical pedagogy, have failed to fully account for the terms of their own technical instrumental and functional characteristics. Indeed, Biesta goes on to problematize all formal education by conceptualizing it as “the impossibility of education.” Biesta purports that one difficulty with critical pedagogy is that in its attempt to demystify consciousness in the name of liberation, it ends up relying too heavily on the Enlightenment conception of knowledge that in turn fails to come to terms with the tensions operative within particular power-knowledge relations.7 Another difficulty with critical pedagogy is that although some critical pedagogues (e.g., Peter McLaren) recognize the need to be careful with checking their universal assumptions, they still end up prescribing much of what must be done. Yet as Biesta notes, but the heart of critical pedagogy does not lie in the execution of a program, as that would close the very space that critical pedagogy want to open up. In the end the only consistent way for critical pedagogy to proceed—and at stake is not a theoretical consistency but a pedagogical and political one—is by a perpetual challenge of all claims to authority including the claims to authority of critical pedagogy itself. (p. 505) Finally, Michael Apple (2000) takes issue with critical pedagogies that produce fancy theoretical postulations with respect to what the problems are but that have failed to alter the material and ideological actualities of current schooling policies. Accordingly, Apple argues that the New Right movement, along with Rightist policies,8 have yet to be seriously challenged or interrupted by critical pedagogies. Apple argues that the common sense of neoliberals and neoconservatives currently couched under management talk of tougher standards has to be contested by concrete counterhegemonic social movements (situated both outside and within schools) that can provide an alternative ideology and logic. Hence, for Apple, schools cannot be the only sites of reform: Eliminating poverty through greater income parity establishing effective and much more equal health and housing programs, and positively refusing to continue the hidden and no-so-hidden politics of racial exclusion and degradation that so clearly still characterize daily life in many nations (and in which marketized plans need to be seen as partly a structure to avoid the body and culture of ‘the Other’)—only by tackling these issues together can substantive progress be made. (p. 243) One strategy that Apple (2000) advances is the articulation and sharing of concrete examples of effective critical pedagogy models within mainstream publications. Apple suggests that critical pedagogues have not sufficiently explored alternative spaces within existing organizations (e.g., the Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development) that have the potential to affect a wider audience. In the end, Apple believes that critical pedagogues must significantly change tactics and focus less on theoretical sophistication and more on forming strategic alliances located within multiple sites. Apple insists that unless critical pedagogues **speak in a language that can be understood by the majority of people** and **link theory to the material**, as well as ideological, struggles of multiple groups, they **will not provide a feasible alternative to Rightist policies.**

# Anti-Politics Links: Deep Ecology

## Deep ecology separates itself from the social world—leading to anti-politics:

Carl **Boggs, 1997** (National University, Los Angeles,

The Great Retreat: Decline of the Public Sphere in Late Twentieth-Century

America, <http://steinhardt.nyu.edu/international.olde/mias/readings07/10.pdf>.)

Such institutions would apparently wither away under the onslaught of new-paradigm values expected to spread rapidly throughout the countryside, much like Charles Reich imagined for urban society twenty-five years ago in The Greening of America.6\* If deep ecologists articulated a powerful critique of Western ration-alism and its norms of possessive individualism, instrumentalism, and domination of nature, their fetishized view of nature **disconnects that critique from the social world in which people live and work.** This suggests a number of intriguing questions: How can nature exist at the present historical juncture apart from any form of human intervention - or domination? How can clear boundaries between the social and the natural be established? How would it be possible to dismantle a com- plex modern urban society, and at what price? How can we arrive at an unmediated form of local communal life, within or outside of the "wild"? Turning to the crucial issue of popular consciousness: how might the vast majority of people whose lives are so thoroughly inter-woven with the industrialized setting ever be convinced to accept a simple pre-industrial lifestyle, with all of its relative hardships and sacrifices? As Peter Dickens argues, the "deep greens" conception of an abstract, idealized nature inevitably gives rise to a wildly Utopian, defensive, and reactive outlook that stands firmly against modernity in all its aspects - in other words, **it produces an anti-politics that refuses to engage the existing public sphere.**69

## Deep ecology causes flight from the politics of society:

Carl **Boggs, 1997** (National University, Los Angeles,

The Great Retreat: Decline of the Public Sphere in Late Twentieth-Century

America, <http://steinhardt.nyu.edu/international.olde/mias/readings07/10.pdf>.)

Philosophical vision is cut off from its historical and social context, eroding the capacity of theory to grasp the dynamics of industrialism, domination, and alien-ation that lie at the core of the modern crisis. Inevitably, the search within Deep Ecology for a "new paradigm" of human consciousness encourages flight **not only from politics** but from society itself. As Murray Bookchin observes, the subjectivity required to understand and change the world must transcend the simple awareness that would detach itself from the accumulated knowledge associated with "first nature."67

## Deep ecology trades off with criticisms of power relations and social hierarchies:

Carl **Boggs, 1997** (National University, Los Angeles,

The Great Retreat: Decline of the Public Sphere in Late Twentieth-Century

America, <http://steinhardt.nyu.edu/international.olde/mias/readings07/10.pdf>.)

The ecocentric worldview of Deep Ecology harkens back to ideals long ago obliterated by modern industrialism: local community, human-scale interaction, regional autonomy, an organic relationship between humans and nature. Even leaving aside the feasibility of this project, the theory fails to confront truly difficult questions about class and power relations, gender and racial divisions - social hierarchy in gen-eral. Such questions are dismissed as if they would no longer be relevant to smaller locales connected to the rhythm and pulse of Mother Earth. Commenting on both Deep Ecology and ecofeminism, Cécile Jackson writes: "Like the broader tradition of populism they offer little analysis of conflicting interests and inequality within the community...."70 Moreover, on the premise that everything local and indigenous is good, Deep Ecology sets forth an untenably innocent view of the family and household, not to mention neighborhood and community, in a world where idealized notions of harmony and cooperation are inevitably forced to give way to the harsh realities of economic struggle, hier-archy, and everyday violence - most of it bound up with those macro economic and political forces the theory sidesteps. The local cannot be separated from the national or global, nor does it automatically take on a more democratic or egalitarian character because of its smaller scope. The parallel here with the urban enclave is obvious, for, as Jackson notes, ecological communalism in the name of radical change often turns out to be profoundly insular and conservative.71 Moreover, as Bookchin points out, Deep Ecology - in its nature worship, its simplistic new-age platitudes, and its vague identification of "humanity" as the source of crisis - expresses the kind of anti-urban, nativistic im-pulse that easily accommodates itself to some of the worst features of the dominant order.72

# Anti-Politics Links: Deep Ecology

## Deep ecology trades off with the social vision necessary to create social change:

Carl **Boggs, 1997** (National University, Los Angeles,

The Great Retreat: Decline of the Public Sphere in Late Twentieth-Century

America, <http://steinhardt.nyu.edu/international.olde/mias/readings07/10.pdf>.)

The systems theory that underpins Deep Ecology rests upon a belief that harmony and equilibrium are the guiding principles of both na-ture and society. As a statement about ultimate ideals this is hardly objectionable. The problem comes with the attempt to apply such a philosophy to a social reality that is anything but harmonious - one in fact that is permeated with hierarchy, exploitation, and conflict. The resulting disjuncture produces an outlook **bereft of historical analysis** and **political vision** grounded in actual social forces or possibilities, consonant with an ideological style that vacillates between adventurism and quietism. Thus, even where local defenders of the wilderness carry out militant action from time to time, it inevitably fails to lead to a transformative politics. Relocating to the countryside is often viewed as an "exit" from industrial society, to use Rudolf Bahro's term,73 which also suggests a decision to **withdraw from the public sphere**. Such retreat converges with a nearly obsessive pursuit of local, communal, domestic lifestyles uncontaminated by oppressive external institutions. And the communal bonds secured in the rural setting are likely to be purchased at the same price as the urban enclave - an escape from politics.

# Anti-Politics Links: Identity Politics

## (--) Identity-based movements lead to an anti-political climate:

Carl **Boggs, 1997** (National University, Los Angeles,

The Great Retreat: Decline of the Public Sphere in Late Twentieth-Century

America, <http://steinhardt.nyu.edu/international.olde/mias/readings07/10.pdf>.)

As pre-industrial society gradually yielded to modernity, politics was transformed in one country after another from the realm of elite dom-ination into a more broadened and democratized public sphere. The rise of the nation-state in the aftermath of the French and American revolutions produced universal norms of consent, citizenship, partic-ipation, rights, and national identity. Modernity was shaped by En-

lightenment ideals of rational discourse made possible by the spread of scientific and technological values, diffusion of education and knowl- edge, and increasing levels of material abundance. With advancing modernization, however, politics in many countries seems to have degenerated into a pale replica of democratic governance, losing much of its capacity to forge citizenship, national community, civic involve- ment, and common forms of identity. Signs of this historical process have been increasingly visible in the United States since the late 1970s with growing anti-statism and popular anger directed against the federal government, **the rise of identity-based movements**, enhanced popular-ity of therapeutic and various new-age indulgences, emergence of a postmodern intellectual culture, and a pervasive sense of cynicism and civil privatism that has swept through broad regions of society. Such phenomena are part of a **deepening mood of anti-politics** character-ized by **widespread alienation from the realm of state power** along with a breakdown of civic culture.

## (--) Identity politics links to anti-politics:

Wolin, 2004 (Richard, professor of history at the City University of New York *The Seduction of Unreason,* p. xiv-xv)

The postmodern left risks depriving democracy of valuable normative resources at an hour of extreme historical need. In times of crisis – such as the current global war on terrorism in which basic rights and liberties have been manifestly jeopardized – that the elements of a “democratic minimum” be preserved is imperative. Postmodern political thought, which devalues coalition building and consensus in favor of **identity politics and political agonistics**, prematurely discounts this heritage. It thereby inherits one of the most problematic traits of “leftism”: the **cynical assumption** that democratic norms are little more than a veil for vested interests. Of course, they can and do serve such purposes, but they also offer a crucial element of ethical leverage by means of which dominant interests may be exposed and transformed. The political gains that have been registered during the last three decades by previously marginalized social groups (women, gays, ethnic minorities) **testify to a logic of political inclusion**. They demonstrate capacities for **progressive political change** that remain lodged in democratic precepts and institutions. To surrender entirely these potentials means **abandoning progressive politics altogether**.

## (--) Identity politics feeds into anti-political thought:

Carl **Boggs, 1997** (National University, Los Angeles,

The Great Retreat: Decline of the Public Sphere in Late Twentieth-Century

America, <http://steinhardt.nyu.edu/international.olde/mias/readings07/10.pdf>.)

The mood of anti-politics has deepened with the corruptions of the Reagan and Bush administrations, the revelations of Iran/Contra, the broken promises that are a regular feature of election campaigns, the

powerful and sometimes secret influence of lobbies and PACs, and the low level of political discourse. Hoping to win over the huge "middle" of the electorate, politicians become masters of vague platitudes (family values, economic growth, personal responsibility, peace) that have no practical meaning for policy-making. The revulsion against career politicians, government agencies, the "welfare state," and cold bureau-crats extends across the ideological spectrum, from libertarians to laissez-faire conservatives to neo-liberals to **many identity-based move-ments on the left**. Such anti-statism is pervasive among youth and students, as a 1995 UCLA survey of 240,000 college fresh~~men~~ from around the country revealed: less than one-third of the students said they keep up with political events, only 16 percent report that they ever discuss politics, and fewer students than at any time in the past 25 years want to become involved in social change. Survey director Alexander W. Astin concluded that even affluent, highly-motivated university students are "people who don't see themselves as being part of the democratic process, who don't even understand how democracy works."9 What Astin fails to add is that, given the very banality of contemporary American politics, it would probably have been difficult for the fresh~~men~~ to view themselves otherwise.

# Anti-Politics Links: Identity Politics

## (--) The undermining of collective identities undermines efforts toward empowerment and change:

Carl **Boggs, 1997** (National University, Los Angeles,

The Great Retreat: Decline of the Public Sphere in Late Twentieth-Century

America, <http://steinhardt.nyu.edu/international.olde/mias/readings07/10.pdf>.)

The depoliticization of American culture signifies a widespread lack of social and psychological **capacity to forge collective identities,** uphold some notion of the public good, and work toward empowerment and change. It means the loss of what Antonio Gramsci stressed: politics as the connecting link between philosophy and everyday life, between history and democratic self-activity. The typical end product is a dis-torted sense of public self where public engagement vanishes or is reduced to an illusion.

# Anti-Politics Links: Feminism

## (--) And Enclave Activism is our link:

## A) Women’s only movements fall prey to enclave activism—this divorces social movements from larger goals:

Carl **Boggs, 1997** (National University, Los Angeles,

The Great Retreat: Decline of the Public Sphere in Late Twentieth-Century

America, <http://steinhardt.nyu.edu/international.olde/mias/readings07/10.pdf>.)

True to their origins, many enclaves do function in such a way as to keep alive local dissent and opposition against the dominant interests. Movements dedicated to consumer, women's, health, and tenants' issues, for example, often make demands that disturb the easy tran-quility of the status quo. But the general trajectory of local organizing **has been toward the enclave**. In Plotkin's words: "Spirited by moral outrage against elite manipulation ... enclave consciousness channels the political activism and resistance of ordinary people mainly **into demands to 'leave us alone.'** With its characteristically defensive, exclu-sionary, and reactive character, the resulting politics is a 'geopolitics of local community,' in which 'deterrence, counterforce, holding ground, securing borders, flanking maneuvers, and standing fast' are 'central organizing concepts.' Each enclave becomes a mini-fortress."38

## B) Enclave activism actually siphons off dissent and shifts it away from the real centers of power:

Carl **Boggs, 1997** (National University, Los Angeles,

The Great Retreat: Decline of the Public Sphere in Late Twentieth-Century

America, <http://steinhardt.nyu.edu/international.olde/mias/readings07/10.pdf>.)

Over time, too, the national government became stronger and more bureaucratized, further reducing the scope of local decision-making and rendering much local empowerment illusory. Meanwhile, the fed- eral state, with its expanded role in the military, foreign policy, and global economy, assumed ever greater control over people's lives. Such realities, along with constitutional and legal obstacles to securing a national foothold, often compelled progressive movements to stress local organizing. At the same time, as Mark Kann observes, commun- ity radicalism could actually serve elite interests by **siphoning off dis-content and deflecting it away from the real centers of power**.40 Like spiritual politics, enclave activism can be understood as a reac-tion against the chaos of urban life and the eclipse of public space, **along with a rejection of normal politics itself**. The globalizing pres-sures exerted on the economy and political system reinforce this trend. Collective action within the enclave has **less to do with rejuvenating public discourse**, making policy, and gaining levers of institutional power than with **erecting barriers against outside intrusions**, just as city-dwellers may look to gated communities as a way of protecting themselves against the Hobbesian features of civil society. The end result of this type of populism is **a widespread turning-away from the concerns of power, governance, and citizen participation** within the general community - **one of the hallmarks of a depoliticized society.**

# Anti-Politics Links: Feminism

## Feminist emphasis on the domestic sphere as the main source of women’s identity cripples feminist movements in the public sphere:

Carl **Boggs, 1997** (National University, Los Angeles,

The Great Retreat: Decline of the Public Sphere in Late Twentieth-Century

America, <http://steinhardt.nyu.edu/international.olde/mias/readings07/10.pdf>.)

Ecofeminist denigration of the public sphere can be seen most clearly in its strong emphasis on the household, or domestic sphere, as the main source of women's identity. Biehl shows that the ecofeminist idea of community scarcely goes beyond the oikos, which **takes precedence over the polis**; indeed "women's values" take on meaning almost ex-clusively within boundaries of the oikos. While a vibrant domestic life can be essential to community, a basic truth has persisted over time: only in the public sphere does human interaction and decision-making with societal-wide implications take place. In romanticizing the house- hold, therefore, Goddess worship puts forth a parochial vision of social life in which politics is either dissolved into the oikos or relegated to a male-dominated polis. In either case, the very ideal of citizenship is ultimately broken up and destroyed.30 This "**feminist" withdrawal from politics** constitutes a form of inverted statism insofar as it allows the patriarchal state apparatus to wield power with relatively few impedi- ments.

# Anti-Politics Links: Indeterminancy-Derrida

## (--) Kritiks of indeterminancy quickly slide into cynicism and political passivity:

Carl **Boggs, 1997** (National University, Los Angeles,

The Great Retreat: Decline of the Public Sphere in Late Twentieth-Century

America, <http://steinhardt.nyu.edu/international.olde/mias/readings07/10.pdf>.)

In politics as in the cultural and intellectual realm, a postmodern fascination with indeterminacy, ambiguity, and chaos easily supports a drift toward cynicism and passivity; the subject becomes powerless to change either itself or society. Further, the pretentious, jargon-filled, and often indecipherable discourse of postmodernism reinforces the most faddish tendencies in academia. Endless (and often pointless) attempts to deconstruct texts and narratives readily become a façade behind which professional scholars **justify their own retreat from political commitment**.

# Anti-Politics Links: Jargon-Ivory Tower Discourse

## Jargon filled academic discourse justifies a political retreat into the Ivory Tower:

Carl **Boggs, 1997** (National University, Los Angeles,

The Great Retreat: Decline of the Public Sphere in Late Twentieth-Century

America, <http://steinhardt.nyu.edu/international.olde/mias/readings07/10.pdf>.)

In politics as in the cultural and intellectual realm, a postmodern fascination with indeterminacy, ambiguity, and chaos easily supports a drift toward cynicism and passivity; the subject becomes powerless to change either itself or society. Further, the **pretentious, jargon-filled, and often indecipherable discourse** of postmodernism reinforces the most faddish tendencies in academia. Endless (and often pointless) attempts to deconstruct texts and narratives readily become a façade **behind which professional scholars justify their own retreat from political commitment**.

# Anti-Politics Links: Localism/Local Politics

## (--) An emphasis on localism causes people to turn inward undermining the political sphere:

Carl **Boggs, 1997** (National University, Los Angeles,

The Great Retreat: Decline of the Public Sphere in Late Twentieth-Century

America, <http://steinhardt.nyu.edu/international.olde/mias/readings07/10.pdf>.)

For all their undeniable successes, however, the Alinksy and new- populist schemes have run up against the limits of their own **localist parochialism and inertia**. Those new forms of empowerment and iden-tity that have been carved out are mostly confined to the realm of neighborhood and locale. Efforts to revive citizenship frequently turn inward, attuned to a defense of turf and material interests consonant with what Allan Heskin describes as the "consumer ethic."35 Instead of a broadened public sphere, localism of this sort tends to reinforce **an ethos of fragmentation and privatism**. The pursuit of human-scale democracy, motivated by progressive designs, thus moves in a defensive and insular direction, laying bare a process of conservative retreat beneath the facile rhetoric of grassroots activism. The end result of much local organizing in the United States follows the pattern of what Sidney Plotkin calls "enclave consciousness": the struggle for local space and identity in a world dominated by powerful interests. In an urban milieu filled with menacing outside forces, people readily come to "see their neighborhood as home territory, a familiar environment of people, buildings and space, surrounded by alien threats. Enclave consciousness is first of all a political orientation to the defense of such a place.... Thus, while celebrating community, neighborhood households that embody the enclave consciousness also regularly strive to preserve privacy and social distance between them- selves to retain their **otherwise individual, apolitical character**."36

## (--) The focus on micro-politics causes a shift away from macro-level politics:

Carl **Boggs, 1997** (National University, Los Angeles,

The Great Retreat: Decline of the Public Sphere in Late Twentieth-Century

America, <http://steinhardt.nyu.edu/international.olde/mias/readings07/10.pdf>.)

One of the theoretical strains of Euro-pean (mostly French) post-Marxism, the postmodern influence has

opened up new vistas appropriate to a world of social fragmentation and political confusion, where reality came to be viewed as highly complex, ambiguous, and forever shifting. The arrogant certitude of grand theories like Marxism or Leninism, with their vast historical sweep and totalizing claims, could no longer hold up to scrutiny. Nor could the idea that social change is the function of a privileged single agency (class, party) or single representation of interests or goals. In its most extreme form, postmodernism **refocused attention away from the macro realm (national state and economy),** **toward a "micro-politics"** grounded in the immediate, local, and more tangible elements of every-day life. Postmodern theory has been interpreted as a current fully in sync **with the mood of political defeat** that has overcome the left in most indus-trialized countries since the early 1980s.52 It is hardly coincidental that postmodernism grew into an academic fashion in the wake of failed hopes after the sixties and the later decline of popular movements in the face of a rising conservative hegemony. The crisis of Marxism and the disintegration of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe further intensified feelings of resignation on the left. The new middle strata that was the backbone of the new left and new social movements turned in larger numbers toward careers and more affluent lifestyles. Radicalism, where it persisted to any extent, took on the veneer of an "aesthetic pose." Thus, at a time of mounting pessimism and retreat, the rhetorical question posed by Alex Callinicos scarcely demands an answer: "What political subject does the idea of a postmodern epoch help constitute?"53 By the 1990s **even the discussion of political sub-jectivity or agency among leftist academics seemed rather passé**.54

# Anti-Politics Links: Metaphysics

## Metaphysical appeals undermine the move toward the political:

Carl **Boggs, 1997** (National University, Los Angeles,

The Great Retreat: Decline of the Public Sphere in Late Twentieth-Century

America, <http://steinhardt.nyu.edu/international.olde/mias/readings07/10.pdf>.)

As Theodor Adorno found from studying the mass appeals of astrol-ogy in the 1950s, **the flight into metaphysics can be compelling** for people longing for a sense of comfort and stability in an environment where the "anonymous totality of the social process" is so overpower-ing that the very idea of **changing the world by political means appears terribly self-defeating,** a waste of time and resources. But metaphysical escape from pressing everyday concerns, hardly unique to the modern period, can help people adapt more painlessly to the existing order of things. In the case of astrology, there is the familiar impulse to seek out higher sources of authority, hoping to find harmonious unity in the stars while knowing that human will cannot possibly create order within existing earthly confines.25 As Adorno suggests, "It means primarily submission to unbridled strength of the absolute power" - a power that is no longer human but is secure in its remote, seemingly universal and fixed character. In this way, external authority compensates for the individual's own sense of weakness and futility, a feeling of power-lessness in the face of insurmountable obstacles.26 Adorno further observes that **escapism along these lines has stronger attraction** where liberal ideals of freedom, individualism, and rights are no longer com-patible with the hierarchical demands of large-scale organization. What Adorno detected in the 1950s seems even more relevant to the contemporary American landscape.

# Anti-Politics Links: Postmodern Thought

## Post-empiricist and post-structuralist thought atomizes the culture—blocking solutions to real problems:

Gergen, 1994 (Kenneth, professor of psychology at Swarthmore College, *After Postmodernism: Reconstructing Ideology Critique, p. 70)*

As I am proposing, the common form of argumentation, with assertion and critique serving as the adjacency pair of focal significance, is deeply problematic. Critique establishes a binary ontology, reifying the terms of disagreement, and removing other entries from the ledger. Further, critique as a rhetorical move has the effect of demeaning the opposition, generating animosity, atomizing the culture and blocking the way to resolution. Contemporary critique, informed by post-empiricist, critical and post- structuralist thought, carries with it the additional difficulties of favouring the very kinds of totalizing discourses against which it is set, and destroying the grounds of its own rationality.

# Anti-Politics Links: Representation Focus

## (--) The focus on symbols and images undermine political activism and concrete struggles:

Carl **Boggs, 1997** (National University, Los Angeles,

The Great Retreat: Decline of the Public Sphere in Late Twentieth-Century

America, <http://steinhardt.nyu.edu/international.olde/mias/readings07/10.pdf>.)

In the splintered, discontinuous world inhabited by Baurdrillard, Fou-cault, and kindred theorists, social bonds are weakened and the link between personal life and the public sphere is fractured. Where truth,

language, and ideology are perpetually contested, nothing is settled or taken for granted. While this ethos corresponds well to an era in which emphasis is placed on local knowledge and identity movements, it is a depoliticizing ethos insofar as it blurs or dismisses macro forms of economic and political power. Where the state is either ignored or broken down into a mosaic of localized and partial entities, politics too winds up obliterated. **Symbols and images become far more im-portant** than **concrete struggles involving rival claims to power**, eco-nomic interests, and **visions of a better society**.58

## (--) The dominance of symbols and images causes a splintering of identity and political opposition:

Carl **Boggs, 1997** (National University, Los Angeles,

The Great Retreat: Decline of the Public Sphere in Late Twentieth-Century

America, <http://steinhardt.nyu.edu/international.olde/mias/readings07/10.pdf>.)

In a social order where **symbols and images dominate mass conscious-ness**, the **splintering of local identities** coincides with the **decline of political opposition**. Corporate colonization is left only feebly challenged by the proliferation of local groups, by the celebration of diversity and multiculturalism that has entered into American public discourse since the 1980s. Dispersed identities, however constructed, are easily assimilated into the sphere of the all-powerful commodity, which coincides with the spread of anti-political sentiment. As com-munities assume what Zygmunt Bauman calls an "imaginary" charac- ter,59 identities become detached from the public sphere, and **politics is allowed to descend into a spectacle**. Hence the eclipse of the collective subject and the **atrophy of political language** that defines so much postmodern theorizing is now linked more and more to the stubborn reality of corporate domination.

# Anti-Politics Links: Truth K’s

## Kritiks of truth undermine political activism:

Carl **Boggs, 1997** (National University, Los Angeles,

The Great Retreat: Decline of the Public Sphere in Late Twentieth-Century

America, <http://steinhardt.nyu.edu/international.olde/mias/readings07/10.pdf>.)

In the splintered, discontinuous world inhabited by Baurdrillard, Fou-cault, and kindred theorists, social bonds are weakened and the link between personal life and the public sphere is fractured. **Where truth,** language, and ideology are **perpetually contested**, nothing is settled or taken for granted. While this ethos corresponds well to an era in which emphasis is placed on local knowledge and identity movements, it is a depoliticizing ethos insofar as it blurs or dismisses macro forms of economic and political power. Where the state is either ignored or broken down into a mosaic of localized and partial entities, politics too winds up obliterated. **Symbols and images become far more im-portant** than **concrete struggles involving rival claims to power**, eco-nomic interests, and **visions of a better society**.58

# Anti-Politics: Perm Answers

## (--) Permutation still links to our Kritik: their emphasis on representations and the micro-political trades-off with the macro-political:

## A) Focus: time we could have spent learning political strategies to challenge state power & domination is instead focusing on the politics of the local.

## B) Ideology: Their advocacy creates a learned helplessness about the political system—activists give up on efforts to fight for governmental change—dooming collective action to solve the world’s problems—that’s the Small & Buckley evidence

## (--) They sever the advocacy of representations being critical from the 1ac: that’s a voting issue

## A) Destroys negative ground: we predicate 1nc strategy on the links provided in the 1ac.

## B) Damage has already been done: can’t re-start the debate over—must vote negative to rectify the imbalance.

## (--) The permutation risks ignoring, deflecting, and trivializing the political system:

Carl **Boggs, 1997** (National University, Los Angeles,

The Great Retreat: Decline of the Public Sphere in Late Twentieth-Century

America, <http://steinhardt.nyu.edu/international.olde/mias/readings07/10.pdf>.)

The depoliticization of American culture signifies a widespread lack of social and psychological capacity to forge collective identities, uphold some notion of the public good, and work toward empowerment and change. It means the loss of what Antonio Gramsci stressed: **politics as the connecting link between philosophy and everyday life**, between history and democratic self-activity. The typical end product is a dis-torted sense of public self where **public engagement vanishes or is reduced to an illusion**. From this standpoint, the narrowing of the public sphere occurs on two levels, reflecting the perversely dualistic nature of modernity in which a rationalized corporate-state order coexists with an atomized civil society, the world depicted by Max Weber juxtaposed against the world described by Thomas Hobbes. The context of this epochal shift is **the eclipse of modern politics itself** - the outgrowth of a thoroughly flawed political system that ensures high levels of public distrust and anger. Enshrouded in the great myths of American democracy is an institutional fabric tied to a syndrome of influence-peddling, false promises, tiresome but expensive campaigns, and endless propagandístic rhetoric. **Urgent issues of the period** - jobs, urban deterioration, decay of education and health care, the environmental crisis - **get ignored, deflected, or trivialized**. With the power structure needing to relegitimate itself at a time of new chal- lenges, one of the main tasks of elites, as Mark Roelefs points out, is "to promulgate the relevant myths, including most importantly the myth of their own and their office's importance."10 The more that systemic rituals like voting, candidate debates, and legislative activity become diluted, the more they are trumpeted as indispensable features of modern citizenship.

# Anti-Politics--Alt Solvency: Political Sphere Good

## A revitalized citizenry key to an effective political sphere:

Carl **Boggs, 1997** (National University, Los Angeles,

The Great Retreat: Decline of the Public Sphere in Late Twentieth-Century

America, <http://steinhardt.nyu.edu/international.olde/mias/readings07/10.pdf>.)

The historic goal of **recovering politics** in the Aristotelian sense, there-fore, suggests nothing less **than a revitalized citizenry** prepared to occupy that immense expanse of public space. Extension of democratic control into every area of social life requires insurgency against the charade of normal politics, since the persistence of normal politics is just another manifestation of anti-politics. If authentic citizenship is to be forged, then information, skills, and attitudes vital to political efficacy need to flourish and be **widely distributed throughout the population**, without this, "consciousness transformation" is impos-sible, or at least politically meaningless. A debilitating problem with the **culture of anti-politics**, however, is that it precisely devalues those very types of information, skills, and attitudes.

# \*\*\*\*\*Baudrillard Answers\*\*\*\*\*

**1. Their argument relies on the notion that form and content are inextricably linked and that the form or medium determines what the content symbolizes. This is disproven by a multitude of counterexamples**

**A. Modern alternative radio and public programming disprove their claims of media saturation**

Douglas **Kellner, 3,** “Baudrillard: A new McLuhan?”, Illuminations, 2003, <http://www.uta.edu/huma/illuminations/kell26.htm>

Against this snide and glib put-down of alternative media, I would argue that alternative television-radio-film provide the possibility of another type of media with different forms, content, goals, and effects from mainstream media.[15] A radical media project would thus attempt to transform both the form and the content of the media, as well as their organization and social functions. In a socialist society, mass media would be part of a communal public sphere and alternative media would be made accessible to all groups and individuals who wished to participate in media communication. This would presuppose dramatic expansion of media access and thus of media systems which would require more channels, technology, and a social commitment to democratic communication. To preserve its autonomy, such systems should be state funded but not controlled -- much like television in several European countries.[16] It would also have to function as the better local public access systems now do in the United States in which a certain number of channels are put aside for public use and available to everyone on a non-discriminatory basis. In Austin, Texas, for instance, we now have a multi-channel access system with two channels reserved for city government, one city educational channel for use by the Austin school system, one for regularly scheduled weekly access shows by groups committed to public access television, and two channels open to anyone for any use whatsover (these two channels are currently dominated by religious, musical, and sports programming). So far this system has proved functional, allowing just about any individual or group the opportunity to make and broadcast their own programming and statements. An alternative media system would thus provide the possibility for oppositional, counterhegemonic subcultures and groups to produce programs expressing their own views, oppositions, and struggles that resist the massification, homogenization, and passivity that Baudrillard and others attribute to the media. Alternative media allow marginal and oppositional voices to contest the view of the world, values, and life-styles of the mainstream, and make possible the circulation and growth of alternative subcultures and communities. Baudrillard's theoreticism, however, completely eschews cultural practice and becomes more and more divorced from the political struggles and issues of the day -- though the question of Baudrillard's politics would take another long and very tortured paper to deal with. Reflecting briefly on Baudrillard's media theory leads me to three provisional conclusions.

## Furthermore, the notion that technological advancements and modern society can totally eradicate wonder, authenticity, or beauty from life is absurd. The mystery of existence is resilient.

**B. subpoint is Ohlman 9**

Dean, The Wonder of Creation. http://wonderofcreation.org/2009/02/23/calling-technologys-bluff/

One of the values of the wild is that helps put technology in its place. One way to understand this is to imagine yourself on a remote wooded ridge—say somewhere in the Ozarks. You’re suddenly engulfed by a violent thunderstorm, and while rushing to find shelter and safety, you find yourself in the company of two others in the same pursuit. Together you find a large overhanging rock ledge and crawl under it for cover. Finally at rest, you seek to begin a conversation but quickly find that verbal communication is hopeless—for the other two, because of some warp in time, are a French explorer from the late 1600′s and an Osage Indian from the 1200′s. Because your cell phone doesn’t work where you are, it’s a mere fascination to the other two, and your iPod, while it creates a sense of awe, soon goes the way of all battery-powered devices and your companions’ wonder ceases. Your clothing, too, is a curiosity—as well as your eye-glasses. But when the storm soon shows that it is but the precursor of a cold front bringing with it several inches of snow, other modern devices, like your classic Swiss Army “knifelet” becomes of little value, and the frustration of leaving that lighter in your car several miles away only adds to your distress. What you discover is that the wild pretty much obliterates all the differences between the generations. But you are also soon delighted that you are not caught in these circumstances with, say, “important people” like Oprah, Michael Jackson, or Donald Trump, who appear to have never have ventured more than a hundred yards away from a light switch and whose wilderness survival understanding could well be limited to the old joke that you start a fire by rubbing two boy scouts together. I like to think that in the wilderness we meet our ancestors, because apart from our technology and heads full of technical knowledge, most of which is of little lasting significance, our common spiritual, emotional, physical, and relational needs have been the same since Adam left the Garden. Further, the importance of the health and fruitfulness of the creation is as important now as it ever was. They could not—and we cannot—remain healthy without good air, good water, good soil, adequate shelter, and health-giving foods—access to which modern technology may as much threaten as provide. Dean and St. Francis Having, as most of us do, a pride of the present, we find ourselves irrationally disconnected from the past—somehow thinking that no forebear would have much to offer us moderns. Yet if we did find ourselves in a raging thunderstorm on a wilderness mountaintop, we’d quickly learn that we are fundamentally no different from any other person living today—or yesterday. The fears, desires, and temptations of the first human beings were at heart no different from ours. The wild is one of the most important venues for compelling us to recognize what is most significant in life and what is common to all people of all ages. In the same clothes, speaking the same language, I believe we’d find Saint Francis, William Penn, and John Muir certainly far wiser and astute companions on life’s journey than Bill Gates or Steve Jobs. [Jacques Ellul](http://www.regent.edu/acad/schcom/rojc/mdic/ellul.html) reminds us of this in his book The Technological Bluff: [Modern technology] causes us to live in a world of diversion and illusion. . . . It finally sucks us into this world by banishing all our ancient reservations and fears. So among its many other values, a walk in the wild links us in an unbroken chain with all who have gone before. Valuing and preserving our natural parks and wilderness areas will permit our descendants to do the same. See you outdoors!

# Baudrillard Answers

**2. Perm do both – rejection over negligent details shatters coalition building and the possibility of actual change – only combining both viewpoints solves**

Sankaran **Krishna**, Dep. Poly Sci @ U. Hawaii, **1993**, Alternatives, v. 18

While this point is, perhaps, debatable, Der Derian’s further assertion, that a postmodern critique of the Gulf War mobilization would be somehow more effective, sounds less convincing. An alternative, late-modern tactic against total war was to war on totality itself, to delegitimize *all* sovereign truths based on class, nationalist, or internationalist metanarratives … better strategically to play with apt critiques of the powerful new forces unleashed by cyberwar than to hold positions with antiquated tactics and nostalgic unities. (AD: 177-178; emphasis in original) **The dichotomous choice presented** in this excerpt **is straightforward: one either indulges in total critique, delegitimizing all sovereign truths, or one is committed to “nostalgic” essentialist unities that have become obsolete and have been the grounds for all our oppressions**. In offering this dichotomous choice, Der Derian replicates a move made by Chaloupka in his equally dismissive critique of the more mainstream nuclear opposition, the Nuclear Freeze movement of the early 1980s, that, according to him, was operating along obsolete lines, emphasizing “facts” and “realities” while a “postmodern” President Reagan easily outflanked them through an illusory Star Wars program. (See KN: chapter 4) Chaloupka centers this difference between his own supposedly total critique of all sovereign truths (which he describes as nuclear criticism in an echo of literary criticism) and the more partial (and issue-based) criticism of what he calls “nuclear opposition” or “antinuclearists” at the very outset of his book. (KN: xvi) Once again, **the unhappy choice forced** upon the reader **is to join** Chaloupka **in** his **total critique of all sovereign truths or be trapped in obsolete essentialisms. This leads to a disastrous politics, pitting groups that have the most in common (and need to unite on some basis to be effective) against each other. Both Chaloupka and Der Derian thus reserve their most trenchant critique for political groups that should, in any analysis, be regarded as the closest to them in terms of an oppositional politics and their desired futures. Instead of finding ways to live with these differences and to (if fleetingly) coalesce against the New Right, this fratricidal critique is politically suicidal. It obliterates the space for a political activism based on provisional and contingent coalitions, for uniting behind a common cause even as one recognizes that the coalition is comprised of groups that have very differing (and possibly unresolvable) views of reality**. Moreover, it fails to consider the possibility that there may have been other, more compelling reasons for the “failure” of the Nuclear Freeze movement or anti-Gulf War movement. Like many a worthwhile cause in our times, they failed to garner sufficient support to influence state policy. The response to that need not be a totalizing critique that delegitimizes all narratives. **The blackmail inherent in the choice** offered by Der Derian and Chaloupka, **between total critique and “ineffective” partial critique** ought to be transparent. Among other things, it **effectively militates against the construction of provisional or strategic essentialisms in our attempts to create space for an activist politics**. In the next section, I focus more widely on the genre of critical international theory and its impact on such an activist politics.

**3. Baudrillard ultimately decides that our form of communication is an accurate description of reality – immediate communication overcomes the barriers of modern simulation**

Douglas **Kellner, 3,** “Baudrillard: A new McLuhan?”, Illuminations, 2003, <http://www.uta.edu/huma/illuminations/kell26.htm>

In this text, Baudrillard conflates all previously revolutionary strategies and models of "subversive communication" to "schematic reducing agents" and manifests here once again a nostalgia for direct, unmediated, and reciprocal speech ("symbolic exchange") which is denied in the media society. Haunted by a disappearing metaphysics of presence, Baudrillard valorizes immediate communication over mediated communication thus forgetting that all communication is mediated (through language, through signs, through codes, etc.). Furthermore, he romanticizes a certain form of communication (speech in the streets) as the only genuinely subversive or revolutionary communication and media. Consistently with this theory, he thus calls for a (neo-Luddite) "deconstruction" of the media "as systems of non-communication," and thus for the "liquidation of the existing functional and technical structure of the media" (CPES, p. 177).

# Baudrillard Answers

**4. No Impact to their argument - Baudrillard’s analysis of politics guarantees inaction, the criticism only serves to demobilize dissent against forms of dominance. They only breed a distrust of action and community, without providing an alternative to take its place.**  
**Luke 1991**(Timothy W Luke, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, “POWER AND POLITICS IN HYPERREALITY: THE CRITICAL PROJECT OF JEAN BAUDRILLARD”, Social Science Journal, 1991, Vol. 28, Issue 3)

Power and politics do seem to assume new forms in hyperreality as their mediations substitute the imaginary for the real, simulations displace actuality, simulacra merge into the real. No longer duplicity or counterfeit, simulation acquires total integrity, actually becoming what is considered the real. In informational society, the community and solidarity of "the masses" appear to be melting into hyperreality.( [n48](http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.samford.edu/ehost/detail?hid=104&sid=20cb9d3d-3f36-4b14-b14b-1a45d9667f46%40sessionmgr112&vid=3&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#bib48)) Where unity or commonality can no longer exist organically, it is created via mobilization of images and illusions, beginning, for example, in the 1960s and 1970s with "the Woodstock Nation," extending through the 1980s with Band Aid-style "we are the world" solidarity and Ronald Reagan's (or Peggy Noonan's) myths of "It's morning again in America," and continuing into the 1990s with George Bush's (or Roger Ailes') visions of "kinder, gentler America." Images now form group identity among the silent majorities. Unifying together and exerting pressure as blocs of like-minded consumers willing to appear at the sites of consumption, individuals make a statement simply by showing up to consume or appearing to accept identity from such signs. By the same logic, exurban consumers shopping at a Banana Republic or Ralph Lauren store at Georgetown Park, Inner Harbor or Union Station believe their buyers' choices are revitalizing Washington, Baltimore, or St. Louis as real cities. Here the silent majorities ironically may take on a voice and accept a vision in the hyperreal presentation of this sort of collective consciousness. Saying it or showing it to be so in this or that particular frame makes it so, and in making it so, makes it hyperreal. Power in hyperreality, derives from controlling the means of simulation, dominating the codes of representation, and managing the signs of meaning that constitute what hyperreality is taken as being at any particular time. By setting the limits of what is hyperreal, and therefore at least temporarily "real," movements on the mediascapes appear to set agendas, determine loyalties, frame conflicts, and limit challenges to the prevailing organization of what is or is not taken as being real. Baudrillard's critical project, then, provisionally sums up the state of society as hyperreal simulacra displace traditional representations of social reality. While his critical project is not perfect, Baudrillard shows how human needs increasingly have no autonomous basis in an authentic conception of humanity outside of sign-driven commodity exchange. In hyperreality, needs are instead grounded in the prepacked expectations of cultural codes conveyed to individuals as part and parcel of their aestheticized duty to consume. Individuals serve as the vital productive force of monopoly capitalism, while the code enforces their productive potential through a free-floating flow of signifiers and signs. Under this regime, art and industry continually "exchange signs" in order to keep "art productive" and industrial production masked in "esthetic signs of prestige." In the postmodern terrains of cybernetic hyperrealism, "we already live out the `esthetic' hallucination of reality."( [n49](http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.samford.edu/ehost/detail?hid=104&sid=20cb9d3d-3f36-4b14-b14b-1a45d9667f46%40sessionmgr112&vid=3&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#bib49)) Still, in the end, there are neither clear political visions nor obvious moral imperatives to be gained from Baudrillard's critique of hyperreality. Paradoxically, his work promotes a deep distrust of collective action, while providing new categories both to define postmodernity and to refine the critical analysis of its operations. Yet, what must be or, at least, might be done to resist or contest the hyperreal webs of simulation effectively is largely left unanswered. Perhaps the "future" will only be like the "present" as it endlessly reiterates the empty play of signs in the never-ending simulations of hyperreality. It remains, however, for others to take these insights and then use them to reinterpret today and tomorrow these still unfolding logics of postmodernity.

**5. The aff is a bad starting point for politics-The plan’s calls to move away from universalism and objecitvity encourages epistemological pluralism – this is seized on by conservatives to justify and project their radical ideologies.**   
**Sherry**, Prof of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Law @ University of Minnesota, **96** [Suzanna, Georgetown Law Journal, “The Sleep of Reason”, February, 84 Geo. L.J. 453]

We all know the Enlightenment story, but this article recounts -- and criticizes -- the rather surprising ending that is currently in vogue. Once upon a time, reason replaced faith as the guiding epistemology. In response, religion became largely rational itself, questioning the sharp distinction between faith and reason. [n6](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.samford.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1300421599582&returnToKey=20_T11508639092&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.550258.4866398325" \l "n6) Despite occasional upsurges, religiosity of the traditional, pre-Enlightenment, antirational kind gradually diminished in the Western world. Originally pure and acontextual, reason eventually came to encompass pragmatism or practical reason. [n7](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.samford.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1300421599582&returnToKey=20_T11508639092&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.550258.4866398325" \l "n7) For good or ill, the reason and empiricism of the Enlightenment -- modified and expanded by later thinkers -- reigned supreme. Occasional critics were discounted as primitive, naive, or uneducated, and rarely gained a foothold in universities. [n8](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.samford.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1300421599582&returnToKey=20_T11508639092&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.550258.4866398325" \l "n8) The first ripple in this once uncontroversial ending came from French postmodernists, whose ideas were quickly adopted in the 1980s by legal academics on the left. Critical legal scholars, radical feminists, critical race theorists, and gay and lesbian theorists [n9](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.samford.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1300421599582&returnToKey=20_T11508639092&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.550258.4866398325" \l "n9) began to attribute the Enlightenment epistemology to powerful straight white men, to suggest that others might have different and equally valid epistemologies, and to argue for a sort of epistemological pluralism. This approach has more recently been adopted by conservative scholars arguing that we ought to afford religion a more central place in our politics and culture. Enlightenment reason, they suggest, is just one of a number of alternative epistemologies, and there is no justification for privileging it over religious ways of knowing such as faith and revelation. Nor is this all merely abstract philosophical speculation: both the radicals and [\*455] the religionists use their critique of the Enlightenment to advocate very real legal change. Questions of epistemology are thus made central to issues of public policy, and the question becomes what sort of epistemology we should use in governance. After first describing the surprising congruence between the left and the right, I will suggest in this article that our history, the basic structure of our government, and serious practical considerations all point to Enlightenment epistemology as the one best suited for public governance.

# Baudrillard Answers

**6. The impact to this argument is that they preclude any hope for change the anti-politics vacuum will be filled by the right—not the left:**

Carl **Boggs, 1997** (National University, Los Angeles,

The Great Retreat: Decline of the Public Sphere in Late Twentieth-Century America, <http://steinhardt.nyu.edu/international.olde/mias/readings07/10.pdf>.)

Both mall culture and mass media symbolize the prevailing mood of **anti-politics**: they reproduce to a deeply-atomized, commodified social life-world which corresponds to the mode of consciousness described by Richard Sennett in The Fall of Public ~~Man,~~ where citizen involvement in a res publica is effaced "by the belief that social meanings are **generated by the feelings of individual human beings**," so that the **common terrain of power relations and social space is obliterated**.15 Sheldon Wolin refers to this development as a "crisis of citizenship," reflected in the **carving up of the public sphere by local, privatized interests**.16 The point has been reached where most Americans can no longer imagine a system truly open to citizen participation, where the ordinary person might have influence. Viewed in this way, modernity is two-sided: it coincides with the spread of technology, knowledge, and expertise but also reinforces widespread feelings of alienation and powerlessness. Individuals feel engulfed by forces beyond their control - bureaucracy, government, huge corporations, the global economy. Under these conditions **psychological retreat from the public sphere** may seem normal enough. The problem, however, is that such **firmly entrenched bastions of power will not vanish** simply because they are denigrated or ignored; on the contrary, their **hegemony will simply go unchallenged**.

# Baudrillard Answers

**7. The impact is extinction**

Jonathan **Small &** Meg **Buckley, 2006** (former Americorps VISTA for the Human Services Coalition, “Moving Forward,” <http://www.mc.maricopa.edu/other/engagement/Journal/Issue7/Small.pdf>)

 What will be the challenges of the new millennium? And how should we equip young people to face these challenges? While we cannot be sure of the exact nature of the challenges, we can say unequivocally that humankind will face them together. If the end of the twentieth century marked the triumph of the capitalists, individualism, and personal responsibility, the new century will present challenges that require **collective action, unity, and enlightened self-interest**. Confronting **global warming, depleted natural resources**, global super viruses, global crime syndicates, and multinational corporations with no conscience and no accountability will require cooperation, openness, honesty, compromise, and **most of all solidarity** – ideals not exactly cultivated in the twentieth century. We can no longer suffer to see life **through the tiny lens of our own existence**. Never in the history of the world has our collective fate been so intricately interwoven. **Our very existence** depends upon our ability to adapt to this new paradigm, to envision a more cohesive society.  With humankind’s next great challenge comes also great opportunity. Ironically, modern individualism backed us into a corner. We have two choices, work together in solidarity or **perish together in alienation**. Unlike any other crisis before, the noose is truly around the neck of the whole world at once. Global super viruses will ravage rich and poor alike, developed and developing nations, white and black, woman, man, and child. Global warming and damage to the environment will affect climate change and destroy ecosystems across the globe. Air pollution will force gas masks on our faces, our depleted atmosphere will make a predator of the sun, and chemicals will invade and corrupt our water supplies. **Every single day** we are presented the opportunity to change our current course, to survive modernity in a manner befitting our better nature. Through zealous **cooperation and radical solidarity we can alter the course of human events**.  Regarding the practical matter of equipping young people to face the challenges of a global, interconnected world, we need to teach **cooperation, community, solidarity**, balance and tolerance **in schools**. We need to take a holistic approach to education. Standardized test scores alone will not begin to prepare young people for the world they will inherit. The three staples of traditional education (reading, writing, and arithmetic) need to be supplemented by three cornerstones of a modern education, exposure, exposure, and more exposure. How can we teach solidarity? How can we teach community in the age of rugged individualism? How can we counterbalance crass commercialism and materialism? How can we impart the true meaning of power? These are the educational challenges we face in the new century. It will require a radical transformation of our conception of education. We’ll need to trust a bit more, control a bit less, and put our faith in the potential of youth to make sense of their world.  In addition to a declaration of the gauntlet set before educators in the twenty-first century, this paper is a proposal and a case study of sorts toward a new paradigm of social justice and civic engagement education. Unfortunately, the current pedagogical climate of public K-12 education does not lend itself well to an exploratory study and trial of holistic education.  Consequently, this proposal and case study targets a higher education model. Specifically, we will look at some possibilities for a large community college in an urban setting with a diverse student body.  Our guides through this process are specifically identified by the journal Equity and Excellence in Education. The dynamic interplay between ideas of social justice, civic engagement, and service learning in education will be the lantern in the dark cave of uncertainty.  As such, a simple and straightforward explanation of the three terms is helpful to direct this inquiry. Before we look at a proposal and case study and the possible consequences contained therein, this paper will draw out a clear understanding of how we should characterize these ubiquitous terms and how their relationship to each other affects our study.  Social Justice, Civic Engagement, Service Learning and Other Commie Crap Social justice is often ascribed long, complicated, and convoluted definitions. In fact, one could fill a good-sized library with treatises on this subject alone. Here we do not wish to belabor the issue or argue over fine points. For our purposes, it will suffice to have a general characterization of the term, focusing instead on the dynamics of its interaction with civic engagement and service learning. Social justice refers quite simply to a community vision and a community conscience that values inclusion, fairness, tolerance, and equality. The idea of social justice in America has been around since the Revolution and is intimately linked to the idea of a social contract. The Declaration of Independence is the best example of the prominence of social contract theory in the US. It states quite emphatically that the government has a contract with its citizens, from which we get the famous lines about life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Social contract theory and specifically the Declaration of Independence are concrete expressions of the spirit of social justice. Similar clamor has been made over the appropriate definitions of civic engagement and service learning, respectively. Once again, let’s not get bogged down on subtleties. Civic engagement is a measure or degree of the interest and/or involvement an individual and a community demonstrate around community issues. There is a longstanding dispute over how to properly quantify civic engagement. Some will say that today’s youth are less involved politically and hence demonstrate a lower degree of civic engagement. Others cite high volunteer rates among the youth and claim it demonstrates a high exhibition of civic engagement. And there are about a hundred other theories put forward on the subject of civic engagement and today’s youth. But one thing is for sure; today’s youth **no longer see government and politics as an effective or valuable tool** for affecting positive change in the world. Instead of criticizing this judgment, perhaps we should come to sympathize and even admire it. Author Kurt Vonnegut said, “There is a tragic flaw in our precious Constitution, and I don’t know what can be done to fix it. This is it: only nut cases want to be president.” Maybe the youth’s rejection of American politics isn’t a shortcoming but rather a rational and appropriate response to their experience. Consequently,the term civic engagement takes on new meaning for us today. In order to foster fundamental change on the systemic level, which we have already said is necessary for our survival in the twenty-first century, we need to fundamentally change our systems. Therefore, part of our challenge becomes convincing the youth that these systems, and by systems we mean **government** and commerce, **have the potential for positive change**. Civic engagement consequently takes on a more specific and political meaning in this context. Service learning is a methodology and a tool for teaching social justice, encouraging civic engagement, and deepening practical understanding of a subject. Since it is a relatively new field, at least in the structured sense, service learning is only beginning to define itself. Through service learning students learn by experiencing things firsthand and by exposing themselves to new points of view. Instead of merely reading about government, for instance, a student might experience it by working in a legislative office. Rather than just studying global warming out of a textbook, a student might volunteer time at an environmental group. If service learning develops and evolves into a discipline with the honest goal of making better citizens, teaching social justice, encouraging civic engagement, and most importantly, exposing students to different and alternative experiences, it could be a major feature of a modern education. Service learning is the natural counterbalance to our current overemphasis on standardized testing. Social justice, civic engagement, and service learning are caught in a symbiotic cycle. The more we have of one of them; the more we have of all of them. However, until we **get momentum behind them**, we are stalled. Service learning may be our best chance to jumpstart our democracy. In the rest of this paper, we will look at the beginning stages of a project that seeks to do just that.

# Baudrillard Answers--Ext # 1 – media good

**( ) We do, in fact, know the difference between simulation and reality—the media plays a healthy role in the public sphere.**

**March, 95**

James Marsh, Professor of Philosophy, Fordham University, 95, Critique, Action, and Liberation, pp. 292-293

Such an account, however, is as one-sided or perhaps even more one-sided than that of naive modernism. We note a residual idealism that does not take into account socioeconomic realities already pointed out such as the corporate nature of media, their role in achieving and legitimating profit, and their function of manufacturing consent. In such a postmodernist account is a reduction of everything to image or symbol that misses the relationship of these to realities such as corporations seeking profit, impoverished workers in these corporations, or peasants in Third-World countries trying to conduct elections. Postmodernism does not adequately distinguish here between a reduction of reality to image and a mediation of reality by image. A media idealism exists rooted in the influence of structuralism and poststructuralism and doing insufficient justice to concrete human experience, judgment, and free interaction in the world.4 It is also paradoxical or contradictory to say it really is true that nothing is really true, that everything is illusory or imaginary. Postmodemism makes judgments that implicitly deny the reduction of reality to image. For example, Poster and Baudrillard do want to say that we really are in a new age that is informational and postindustrial. Again, to say that everything is imploded into media images is akin logically to the Cartesian claim that everything is or might be a dream. What happens is that dream or image is absolutized or generalized to the point that its original meaning lying in its contrast to natural, human, and social reality is lost. We can discuss Disneyland as reprehensible because we know the difference between Disneyland and the larger, enveloping reality of Southern California and the United States.5 We can note also that postmodernism misses the reality of the accumulation-legitimation tension in late capitalism in general and in communicative media in particular. This tension takes different forms in different times. In the United States in the 1960s and 1970s, for example, social, economic, and political reality occasionally manifested itself in the media in such a way that the electorate responded critically to corporate and political policies. Coverage of the Vietnam war, for example, did help turn people against the war. In the 1980s, by contrast, the emphasis shifted more toward accumulation in the decade dominated by the “great communicator.” Even here, however, the majority remained opposed to Reagan’s policies while voting for Reagan. Human and social reality, while being influenced by and represented by the media, transcended them and remained resistant to them.6 To the extent that postmodernists are critical of the role media play, we can ask the question about the normative adequacy of such a critique. Why, in the absence of normative conceptions of rationality and freedom, should media dominance be taken as bad rather than good? Also, the most relevant contrasting, normatively structured alternative to the media is that of the “public sphere,” in which the imperatives of free, democratic, nonmanipulable communicative action are institutionalized. Such a public sphere has been present in western democracies since the nineteenth century but has suffered erosion in the twentieth century as capitalism has more and more taken over the media and commercialized them. Even now the public sphere remains normatively binding and really operative through institutionalizing the ideals of free, full, public expression and discussion; ideal, legal requirements taking such forms as public service programs, public broadcasting, and provision for alternative media; and social movements acting and discoursing in and outside of universities in print, in demonstrations and forms of resistance, and on media such as movies, television, and radio.7

# Baudrillard Answers--Ext # 5 – no impact to their argument

**Baudrillard’s politics are deeply conformist. Playing with the pieces of hyper-reality is to totally buy into the system and shuts down any real alternatives. You feel like an outlaw critic when you actually pose no challenge to the system.**

**Donahue, 01** (Brian, Department of English, Gonzaga University, “Marxism, Postmodernism, Žižek,” Postmodern Culture,12.2, Project Muse).

According to Žižek, theorists of postmodern society who make much of the usurpation of the Real by the simulacrum either long nostalgically for the lost distinction between them or announce the final overcoming of the "metaphysical obsession with authentic Being," or both (he mentions Paul Virilio and Gianni Vattimo, and we might add Baudrillard to the list). In either case they "miss the distinction between simulacrum and appearance": What gets lost in today's plague of simulations is not the firm, true, nonsimulated Real, but *appearance itself.* To put it in Lacanian terms: the simulacrum is imaginary (illusion), while appearance is symbolic (fiction); when the specific dimension of symbolic appearance starts to disintegrate, imaginary and real become more and more indistinguishable.... And, in sociopolitical terms, this domain of appearance (that is, symbolic fiction) is none other than that of politics.... The old conservative motto of keeping up appearances thus today obtains a new twist:... [it] stands for the effort to save the properly political space. ("Leftist" 995-96) Making the same argument about a slightly different version of this problem, Žižek writes that the standard reading of "outbursts of 'irrational' violence" in the postmodern "society of the spectacle" is that "our perception of reality is mediated by aestheticized media manipulations to such an extent that it is no longer possible for us to distinguish reality from its media image" (*Metastases* 75). Violent outbursts in this context are thus seen as "desperate attempts to draw a distinction between fiction and reality... [and] to dispel the cobweb of the aestheticized pseudo-reality" (75). Again with reference to the Lacanian triad of Imaginary-Symbolic-Real, Žižek argues that this analysis is "*right for the wrong reasons*": What is missing from it is the crucial distinction between imaginary order and symbolic fiction. The problem of contemporary media resides not in their enticing us to confound fiction with reality but, rather, in their "hyperrealist" character by means of which they *saturate the void that keeps open the space for symbolic fiction.* A society of proliferating, promiscuous images is thus not overly fictionalized but is, on the contrary, not "fictionalized" enough in the sense that the basis for making valid statements, the structure guaranteeing intersubjective communication, the order permitting shared narratives and, to use Jameson's term, "cognitive mapping"[11](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.library.emory.edu/journals/pmc/v012/12.2donahue.html#foot11)--in short, the realm of the Symbolic--is short-circuited by an incessant flow of images, which solicit not analysis and the powers of thought but rather nothing more than blank, unreflective enjoyment. The kind of subjectivity that corresponds to this hyperreal, spectacularized society without a stable Symbolic order is what Žižek calls in *Looking Awry* the "pathological narcissist" (102). That is, following the predominance of the "'autonomous' individual of the Protestant ethic" and the "heteronomous 'organization man'" who finds satisfaction through "the feeling of loyalty to the group"--the two models of subjectivity corresponding to previous stages of capitalist society--today's media-spectacle-consumer society is marked by the rise of the "pathological narcissist," a subjective structure that breaks with the "underlying frame of the ego-ideal common to the first two forms" (102). The first two forms involved inverted versions of each other: one either strove to remain true to oneself (that is, to a "paternal ego-ideal") or looked at oneself "through the eyes of the group," which functioned as an "externalized" ego-ideal, and sought "to merit its love and esteem" (102). With the stage of the "pathological narcissist," however, the ego-ideal itself is dissolved: Instead of the integration of a symbolic *law*, we have a multitude of *rules* to follow--rules of accommodation telling us "how to succeed." The narcissistic subject knows only the "rules of the (social) game" enabling him to manipulate others; social relations constitute for him a playing field in which he assumes "roles," not proper symbolic mandates; he stays clear of any kind of binding commitment that would imply a proper symbolic identification. **He is a radical conformist who paradoxically experiences himself as an outlaw***.* (102)

# Baudrillard Answers--Ext # 6 – you are anti political

**A. Their valorization of passivity is based on the illusion that we can accomplish a withdrawal from politics – passivity is just another form of ineffective politics – even worse, passivity combined with skepticism about our ability to influence social change is tantamount to giving up on the possibility of social transformation**  
Andy **Robinson, 4,** “Baudrillard, Zizek, and Laclau on “common sense” – a critique, 11-15-04 <http://andyrobinsontheoryblog.blogspot.com/2004/11/baudrillard-zizek-and-laclau-on-common.html>  
  
Baudrillard thinks his account of the masses is confirmed by disinterest in politics and "public" debates (12-13), and that this is a resistance to political manipulation (SSM 39). He is wrong. This disinterest is relative: at the time of The Consumer Society, Baudrillard still recognised that this disinterest can be shattered by sudden uprisings. Further, it is quite possible to explain such disinterest without falling back on the crude kind of theories of mystification Baudrillard cites as the only alternative to his view (SSM 12-13). Brinton, and Albert and Hahnel, for instance, have analysed disinterest as an insulation built into authoritarian character-structures which enables people to cope with capitalism. Baudrillard's earlier work similarly involves a model of how the consumer society produces disinterest. Furthermore, political manipulation is, as Gramsci and others show, closely intertwined with the supposedly "meaningless", "apolitical" discourses of everyday life. It is simply not possible to withdraw from politics; one always participates in practices which influence social outcomes and others' actions, so that the illusion of withdrawal from politics is actually a naturalisation of a particular kind of political system. Baudrillard's explicitly stated view that everyday practice is beyond representation and the politics (SSM 39) is therefore wholly mistaken and leads him to effectively endorse the naturalisation of politics (even though he tries to avoid ENDORSING something he sees as meaningless and therefore not endorsable - 40-1. Actually he does endorse indirectly via loaded language). He also misses the dimension of political INTRUSION into everyday life - for instance, the aggressive police presence which blights so many inner-city communities, and the linked phenomenon of a politicised fear of "crime". At this point, in contradiction to Vaneigem, Reich and Foucault as well as his earlier work, Baudrillard also wants to deny a liberatory potential to resistance in everyday life (SSM 40-1). Baudrillard sometimes substitutes his own views for evidence, as when he discusses what "we" the audience experience (GW 39). Baudrillard's claim that the masses are "dumb", silent and conduct any and all beliefs (SSM 28) and "the reversion of any social" (SSM 49) is problematised by the persistence of subcultures and countercultures, while his claim that any remark could be attributed to the masses (SSM 29) hardly proves that it lacks its own demands or beliefs. He is leaping far too quickly from the confused and contradictory nature of mass beliefs to the idea that the masses lack - or even reject - meaning per se. He wants to portray the masses as disinterested in meaning, instinctual and "above and beyond all meaning" (SSM 11), lacking even conformist beliefs (87-8) and without a language of their own (22). This is contradicted by extensive evidence on the construction of meaning in everyday life, from Hoggart on working class culture to Becker, Lemert, Goffman and others on deviance. Even in the sphere of media effects, the evidence from research on audiences, such as Ang on Dallas viewers and Morley on the Nationwide audience, suggests an active construction of meaning by members of the masses, negotiating with or even opposing dominant codes of meaning. This may well show a decline of that kind of meaning promoted by the status quo - but it hardly shows a rejection of meaning per se. When the masses act stupid, it may well be due to what radical education theorists term "reactive stupidity" - an adaptive response to avoid being falsified and "beaten" by acting stupid. Baudrillard again wrongly conflates the dominant system with meaning as such. Indeed, Baudrillard seems to have changed his mind AGAIN by the time of the Gulf War essays, when he refers to the MEDIA, not the masses, as in control (GW 75), and to stupidity as a result of "mental deterrence" (GW 67-8), which produces a "suffocating atmosphere of deception and stupidity" (GW 68) and a control through the violence of consensus (GW 84). Baudrillard's view that the masses respond to official surveys and the like in a tautological way (SSM 28) may well be true, without proving what Baudrillard claims it does about the absence of meaning in the masses. The attitudes of subaltern groups towards dominant beliefs has often taken such forms throughout history, but this does not preclude the parallel existence of what Jim Scott terms "hidden transcripts" - a parallel set of beliefs with a separate structure of meaning which are not compromised by power. Baudrillard does not dig deep enough into evidence on mass culture to assess whether such transcripts exist or not. He simply assumes the omnipotence of the official, "public" system of meaning. Further, his claim that what passes through the masses leaves no trace (SSM 2) is very problematic, as his claim that the masses are the negation of all dominant meanings (SSM 49). There are some very strange 'proofs' in Baudrillard's work: for instance, the claim that people don't believe the myths they adopt rests on the statement that to claim the opposite is to accuse the masses of being stupid and naive (SSM 99-100). He does not explain why we should not believe this - especially since he elsewhere calls them "dumb like beasts"! Occasionally, Baudrillard acknowledges evidence against his approach: namely, the research of the "two-step flow" theorists on audience effects, and also the kind of syncretic resistances analysed by Scott, which resist the dominant social system and reinterpret or "recycled" its messages towards different codes and ends, often linked to earlier social forms (SSM 42-3). However, he does not dwell on such evidence. This, he says, is simply a different issue, unrelated to the question of the MASSES as "an innumerable, unnameable and anonymous group" operating through inertia and fascination (SSM 43-4). Attempts to recreate meaning at the periphery are a "secondary" matter (SSM 103-4). Similarly, at times, Baudrillard admits both the unsatisfactory nature of the society of the spectacle for many of its participants, and the existence of spheres of belief and discourse beyond its borders. For instance, people don't fully believe the hyperreality which substitutes for reality (SSM 99); some groups, so-called "savages" such as the Arab masses, are not submerged in simulation and can still become passionately involved in, for instance, war (GW 32); the real still exists underground (GW 63). Indeed, although his analysis of the Gulf War suggests that the WEST is trapped in simulacra, his account of the rest of the world suggests it follows a different logic (eg GW 65). Wars or non-wars today are waged by the west against symbolic logics which break with the dominant system, such as Islam (GW 85-6), to absorb everything which is singular and irreducible (GW 86). Also, though he thinks the risk of it is low, he admits that an accident, an irruption of Otherness, or an event which breaks the control exerted by information can disrupt the "celibate machine" of media control (GW 36, 48). If this is the case, however, there is no basis for assuming its totality, and it is still meaningful to try to win people over to alternatives. In SSM Baudrillard retreats from this analysis, suggesting the reduction of society to a rat race is a result of the masses' resistance to 'objective' economic management (SSM 45) - the system benefits as a result but that is not the main issue. This contrasts with Baudrillard's earlier analyses and also those of others such as Illich, who see the destructive social effects of such competition. However, Baudrillard does attack "the social", which he identifies with control through information, simulation, security and deterrence (SSM 50-1) - though how it can be resisted since he thinks it "produces" us is never explained. Baudrillard tends to conflate existing dominant beliefs with thought and meaning per se. As a result, he leaves it impossible to critique dominant ideas in a meaningful way. For instance, he poses political problems in terms of "resistance to the social", with the social in general being conflated with the EXISTING social system (SSM 41); ditto on the existing sign system, which Baudrillard identifies with meaning per se. In such cases, Baudrillard misses the whole question of countercultural practices and the creation of alternative hegemonies. Baudrillard's conflation of meaning per se with dominant beliefs leads to a refusal to countenance the possibility of transforming mass beliefs. Raising the cultural level of the masses, Baudrillard claims, is "Nonsense" because the masses, who want spectacle rather than meaning, are resistant to "rational communication" (SSM 10). An "autonomous change in consciousness" by the masses, Baudrillard tells us, is a "glaring impossibility" (SSM 30) - though he never tells us how he deduces this. Furthermore, he also claims that people who try to raise consciousness, liberate the unconscious or promote subjectivity "are acting in accordance with the system" (SSM 109). This anathematisation is a result of Baudrillard's strange claim that the system's logic is based on total inclusion and speech! It is on this basis that Baudrillard rejects argument based on empirical claims and locates truth outside such claims (SSM 121-2).

# Baudrillard Answers—Anti-Politics Links

**Baudrillard is anti-politics**Douglas **Kellner, 3,** “Baudrillard: A new McLuhan?”, Illuminations, 2003, <http://www.uta.edu/huma/illuminations/kell26.htm>  
  
Undoubtedly, the media are playing an ever greater role in our personal and social lives, and have dramatically transformed our economy, polity, and society in ways that we are only now becoming aware of. Living within a great transformation, perhaps as significant as the transformation from feudalism to industrial capitalism, we are engaged in a process of dramatic mutation, which we are barely beginning to understand, as we enter the brave new world of media saturation, computerization, new technologies, and new discourses. Baudrillard's contribution lies in his calling attention to these novelties and transformations and providing new concepts and theories to understand them. Yet doubts remain as to whether the media are having quite the impact that Baudrillard ascribes to them and whether his theory provides adequate concepts to analyze the complex interactions between media, culture, and society today. In this section, I shall suggest that Baudrillard's media theory is vitiated by three subordinations which undermine its theoretical and political usefulness and which raise questions as well about the status of postmodern social theory. I shall suggest that the limitations in Baudrillard's theory can be related to his uncritical assumption of certain positions within McLuhan's media theory and that therefore earlier critiques of McLuhan can accurately and usefully be applied to Baudrillard. This critique will suggest that indeed Baudrillard is a "new McLuhan" who has repackaged McLuhan into new postmodern cultural capital. First, in what might be called a formalist subordination, Baudrillard, like McLuhan, privileges the form of media technology over what might be called the media apparatus, and thus subordinates content, meaning, and the use of media to its purely formal structure and effects. Baudrillard -- much more so than McLuhan who at least gives some media history and analysis of the media environment -- tends to abstract media form and effects from the media environment and thus erases political economy, media production, and media environment (i.e. society as large) from his theory. Against abstracting media form and effects from context, I would argue that the use and effects of media should be carefully examined and evaluated in terms of specific contexts. Distinctions between context and use, form and content, media and reality, all dissolve, however, in Baudrillard's one-dimensional theory where global theses and glib pronouncements replace careful analysis and critique. Baudrillard might retort that it is the media themselves which abstract from the concreteness of everyday, social, and political life and provide abstract simulacra of actual events which themselves become more real than "the real" which they supposedly represent. Yet even if this is so, media analysis should attempt to recontextualize media images and simulacra rather than merely focusing on the surface of media form. Furthermore, instead of operating with a model of (formal) media effects, I would argue that it is preferable to operate with a dialectical perspective which posits multiple roles and functions to television and other media. Another problem is that Baudrillard's formalism vitates the project of ideology critique, and against his claims that media content are irrelevant and unimportant, I would propose grasping the dialectic of form and content in media communication, seeing how media forms constitute content and how content is always formed or structured, while forms themselves can be ideological, as when the situation comedy form of conflict/resolution projects an ideological vision which shows all problems easily capable of being resolved within the existing society, or when action-adventure series formats of violent conflict as the essence of reality project a conservative view of human life as a battleground where only the fittest survive and prosper.[12] For a dialectical theory of the media, television would have multiple functions (and potential decodings) where sometimes the ideological effects may be predominant while at other times time functions a medium like television functions as mere noise or through the merely formal effects which Baudrillard puts at the center of his analysis. Consequently, there is no real theory or practice of cultural interpretation in Baudrillard's media (increasingly anti-)theory, which also emanates an anti-hermeneutical bias that denies the importance of content and is against interpretation.[13] This brings us to a second subordination in Baudrillard's theory in which a more dialectical position is subordinated to media essentialism and technological determinism. For -- according to Baudrillard -- it is the technology of, say, television that determines its effects (one-way transmission, semiurgy, implosion, extermination of meaning and the social) rather than any particular content or message (i.e. for both Baudrillard and McLuhan "the media is the message"), or its construction or use within specific social systems. For Baudrillard, media technology and semiurgy are the demiurges of media practices and effects, separated from their uses by specific economic and political interests, individuals and groups, and the social systems within which they function. Baudrillard thus abstracts media from social systems and essentializes media technology as dominant social forces. Yet against Baudrillard, one could argue that capital continues to be a primary determinant of media form and content in neo-capitalist societies just as state socialism helps determine the form, nature, and effects of technologies in certain state socialist societies. Baudrillard, like McLuhan, often makes essentializing distinctions between media like television or film, ascribing a particular essence to one, and an opposed essence to the other. Yet it seems highly problematical to reduce apparatuses as complex, contradictory, and many-sided as television (or film or any mass medium) to its formal properties and effects, or to a technological essence. It is therefore preferable, for theories of media in the capitalist societies, to see the media as syntheses of technology and capital, as technologies which serve specific interests and which have specific political and economic effects (rather than merely technological ones). It is also preferable to see the dialectic between media and society in specific historical conjunctures, to see how social content, trends, and imperatives help constitute the media which in turn influence social developments and help constitute social reality. For Baudrillard, by contrast, the media today simply constitute a simulated, hyperreal, and obscene (in his technical sense) world(view), and a dialectic of media and society is shortcircuited in a new version of technological determinism. The political implications of this analysis are that constituting alternative media, or alternative uses or forms of existing media, is useless or worse because media in their very essence for him **militate against emancipatory politics** or any project of social transformation. Such cynical views, however, primarily benefit conservative interests who presently control the media in their own interests -- a point to which I shall soon return.

# Baudrillard Answers--Ext – AntiPolitics links

**Their approach is bankrupt and disabling**  
**The aff is a prototypical example of cultural criticism whose very point is to be unproductive, they will claim to only affect the people in this room and it is exactly that form of naive gazing which prevents us from creating solutions to real problems. Vote neg to keep debate from becoming a stupid underground irrelevant activity**  
**Mann, 95** “postmodern culture” vol 5:3. May.

Apocalyptic cults and youth gangs, garage bands and wolfpacks, \*colleges\* and phalansteries, espionage networks trading in vaporous facts and networks of home shoppers for illicit goods; monastic, penological, mutant-biomorphic, and anarcho-terrorist cells; renegade churches, dwarf communities, no-risk survivalist enclaves, unfunded quasi-scientific research units, paranoid think tanks, unregistered political parties, sub-employed workers councils, endo-exile colonies, glossolaliac fanclubs, acned anorexic primal hordes; zombie revenants, neo-fakirs, defrocked priests and detoxing prophets, psychedelic snake-oil shills, masseurs of undiagnosed symptoms, bitter excommunicants, faceless narcissists, ideological drag queens, mystical technophiles, sub-entrepreneurial dealers, derivative \*derivistes\*, tireless archivists of phantom conspiracies, alien abductees, dupe attendants, tardy primitives, vermin of abandoned factories, hermits, cranks, opportunists, users, connections, outriders, outpatients, wannabes, hackers, thieves, squatters, parasites, saboteurs; wings, wards, warehouses, arcades, hells, hives, dens, burrows, lofts, flocks, swarms, viruses, tribes, movements, groupuscules, cenacles, isms, and the endlessly multiplied hybridization of variant combinations of all these, and more.... Why this stupid fascination with stupid undergrounds? What is it about these throwaway fanzines and unreadable rants, these neo-tattoos and recycled apocalypses, this mountainous accumulation of declassified factoids, these bloody smears, this incredible noise? Why wade through these piles of nano-shit? Why submit oneself to these hysterical purveyors, these hypertheories and walls of sound? Why insist on picking this particular species of nit? Why abject criticism, whose putative task was once to preserve the best that has been known and thought, by guilty association with so fatuous, banal, idiotic, untenable a class of cultural objects? Why not decline, not so politely, to participate in the tiny spectacle of aging intellectuals dressing in black to prowl festering galleries and clubs where, sometime before dawn, they will encounter the contemptuous gaze of their own children, and almost manage to elide that event when they finally produce their bilious reports, their chunks of cultural criticism? No excuse, no justification: all one can put forward is an unendurable habit of attention, a meager fascination, no more or less commanding than that hypnosis one enters in the face of television; a rut that has always led downward and in the end always found itself stuck on the surface; a kind of drivenness, if not a drive; a \*critique\*, if you can forgive such a word, that has never located any cultural object whose poverty failed to reflect its own; a rage to find some point at which criticism would come to an end, and that only intensified as that end-point receded and shrunk to the size of an ideal. [2] Then if one must persist in investigating these epi-epiphenomena, perhaps compelled by some critical fashion (no doubt already out of vogue), perhaps merely out of an interminable immaturity, why not refer the stupid underground back to all the old undergrounds, back to the most familiar histories? Why not cast it as nothing more than another and another and another stillborn incarnation of an avant-garde that wallows in but doesn't quite believe its own obituaries, and that one has already wasted years considering? Why not just settle for mapping it according to the old topography of center and margin, or some other arthritic dichotomy that, for all their alleged postness, the discourses we are about to breach always manage to drag along behind them? Why not simply accede to the mock-heroic rhetoric of cultural opposition (subversion, resistance, etc.) that, after a generation of deconstructions, we still don't have the strength to shake; or to the nouveau rhetoric of multiplicity (plurality, diversity, etc.), as if all one needed was to add a few more disparate topic headings to break the hold of a One that, in truth, one still manages to project in the very act of superceding it? Nothing will prevent us--indeed nothing can save us--from ransoming ourselves again and again to the exhausted mastery of these arrangements; nothing will keep us from orienting ourselves toward every difference by means of the most tattered maps. But at the same time we must entertain--doubtless the right word--the sheer possibility that what we encounter here is not just one more margin or one more avant-garde, however impossible it will be to avoid all the orders and terms attendant upon those venerable and ruined cultural edifices. We must remain open to the possibility that this stupid underground poses all the old questions but a few more as well, that it might suggest another set of cultural arrangements, other topographies and other mappings, however unlikely that might be. In any case, whatever vicarious attractions the stupid underground offers the bored intellectual groping for a way to heat up his rhetoric, if not his thought, whatever else we might encounter here, it is important to insist that you will not find these maps laid out for your inspection, as if on an intellectual sale table, and rated for accuracy and charm. No claim is being staked here; no one is being championed, no one offered up on the critical auction block as the other of the month. There is nothing here to choose; all the choices have already been made. One can only hope, in what will surely prove an idle gesture, to complicate cultural space for a moment or two, for a reader or two, to thicken it and slow one's passage through it, and, as always, to render criticism itself as painful and difficult as possible. Indeed, let us suggest that this tour of the stupid underground is above all else designed--according to a certain imaginary, a certain parody, the curve of a perfectly distorted mirror--not to give us an opportunity to rub elbows with the natives and feel some little thrill of identification with them, but to expose to criticism its own stupidity, its impossibility, its abject necessity. Why go there at all? To pursue a renunciation of culture past the limit, where it precisely leaves us behind, where criticism can no longer observe it, no longer recuperate it; and at the same time to witness the turning-back and collapse of the critical into the very form and function of everything it would seek to distance and negate: a double negation that will end up--what else?--reinvesting in the stupidity of culture. No venture could be more idiotic. Shades have been distributed, the bus is leaving, our stupid-critical theme-park tour is about to begin.

# Baudrillard Answers—Anti-Politics Links

**The politics of the 1AC surrenders by denying agency to the individual – this results in rightist politics and locks in the status quo**  
**Kellner, 89** [Douglas, Professor @ Columbia, Jean Baudrillad: From Marxism to Postmodernism and Beyond p.111-112]

What is most distressing with regard to Baudrillard’s current excursions into transpolitics and paraphysics is that, now, more than ever, critical reconstructive intervention into the field of radical social theory and politics is needed. The social movements and theoretical efforts of the last two decades have not achieved the goals set by the racial movements of the 1960s, though I, for one, am not ready to throw in the towel and declare that our projects were illusions and not worthwhile. Nevertheless, we have learned – and here Baudrillard has something to teach us – that much established social theory and politics of the last two decades is highly flawed, and fails to conceptualize the new social conditions and experiences of our epoch. In other words, we need new theories, ideas and politics to get us out of the morass of the present (of which Baudrillard is an instructive symptom) into a better future. If it is true, as many people are now coming to believe, that we are living in an era of transition from one epoch to another, in which previous boundaries in our theories and social worlds no longer hold, then we need new maps of the social world and new political strategies to produce a better world. Baudrillard is some help here, but if ear that he may well turn out to be an impediment, because his map points to a future world that may never arrive and fails to account for too many aspects of the old order which are still around – in particular, capital, the Right and a conservative academy unwilling to question its beliefs and practices and to surrender its privileges. It is striking that Baudrillard has spent much effort attacking the Left in recent years, but has not to my knowledge expended much, if any, energy in attacking the Right. This constitutes a major failure and aporia of his project, since the Right has been hegemonic in the United States, Britain and many other countries over the past decade, including his own France, despite the French Socialists’ efforts, which Baudrillard totally scorns, without offering any insight into the difficulties entailed in constructing socialism in neocapitalist countries. Against Baudrillard’s indifference and cynicism, I would suggest that a major task for critical social theory today is a critique of conservative ideology and politics in order to prepare the way for a renewal of the Left. To be sure, the Left has labored under many illusions in the past – including a revolutionary proletariat, the certainty of socialism and a belief that socialism will automatically produce disalienation. But it seems too early to surrender belief in the socialist project and the Left – which effectively means surrender to the hegemony of the Right until the day when another, better alternative arrives.

**Their denial of politics ignores the true violence that occurred by conservative movements during the 70s and 80s. The dangerous politics of fascism, imperialism and oppression have not exited society – and their denial only solidifies their existence**  
**Kellner, 89** [Douglas, Professor @ Columbia, Jean Baudrillad: From Marxism to Postmodernism and Beyond p.111-112]

In political terms, this is what I believe Baudriallard’s project comes down to ultimately: capitulation to the hegemony of the Right and a secret complicity with aristocratic conservatism. Of course, Baudrillard would retort that the very categories of Left and Right no longer mean anything, and that politics has been undermined and contorted by media simulations. This view may be comforting to a critical critic in his Paris apartment who no longer wants to go out and do battle in the public sphere, but it will not help the millions being harmed, even killed, as a result of the domestic and foreign policies of the Reagans, Bushes, Thatchers, Bothas and Pinochets of the world.

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# Baudrillard Answers: Their Ptx = relativism/tail chasing

**The fact that people say things that are wrong doesn’t mean that science and logic can’t bring us closer to the Truth—their criticism is the worst form of anti-intellectual relativism.**  
Alan **Sokal**, Professor of Physics at New York University, **1996** (“A Plea for Reason, Evidence and Logic,” Talk Presented at a Forum at New York University, October 26th, Available Online at <http://www.physics.nyu.edu/faculty/sokal/nyu_forum.html>, Accessed 07-31-2010)

I didn't write the parody for the reasons you might at first think. My aim wasn't to defend science from the barbarian hordes of lit crit or sociology. I know perfectly well that the main threats to science nowadays come from budget-cutting politicians and corporate executives, not from a handful of postmodernist academics. Rather, my goal is to defend what one might call a scientific *worldview* -- defined broadly as a respect for evidence and logic, and for the incessant confrontation of theories with the real world; in short, for reasoned argument over wishful thinking, superstition and demagoguery. And my motives for trying to defend these old-fashioned ideas are basically *political*. I'm worried about trends in the American Left -- particularly here in academia -- that at a minimum *divert* us from the task of formulating a progressive social critique, by leading smart and committed people into trendy but ultimately empty intellectual fashions, and that can in fact *undermine* the prospects for such a critique, by promoting subjectivist and relativist philosophies that in my view are inconsistent with producing a realistic analysis of society that we and our fellow citizens will find compelling. David Whiteis, in a recent article, said it well: Too many academics, secure in their ivory towers and insulated from the real-world consequences of the ideas they espouse, seem blind to the fact that non-rationality has historically been among the most powerful weapons in the ideological arsenals of oppressors. The hypersubjectivity that characterizes postmodernism is a perfect case in point: far from being a legacy of leftist iconoclasm, as some of its advocates so disingenuously claim, it in fact ... plays perfectly into the anti-rationalist -- really, anti-*thinking* -- bias that currently infects "mainstream" U.S. culture. Along similar lines, the philosopher of science Larry Laudan observed caustically that the displacement of the idea that facts and evidence matter by the idea that everything boils down to subjective interests and perspectives is -- second only to American political campaigns -- the most prominent and pernicious manifestation of anti-intellectualism in our time. (And these days, being nearly as anti-intellectual as American political campaigns is really quite a feat.) Now of course, no one will admit to being against reason, evidence and logic -- that's like being against Motherhood and Apple Pie. Rather, our postmodernist and poststructuralist friends will claim to be in favor of some new and *deeper* kind of reason, such as the celebration of "local knowledges" and "alternative ways of knowing" as an antidote to the so-called "Eurocentric scientific methodology" (you know, things like systematic experiment, controls, replication, and so forth). You find this magic phrase "local knowledges" in, for example, the articles of Andrew Ross and Sandra Harding in the "Science Wars" issue of *Social Text*. But are "local knowledges" all that great? And when local knowledges conflict, *which* local knowledges should we believe? In many parts of the Midwest, the "local knowledges" say that you should spray more herbicides to get bigger crops. It's old-fashioned objective science that can tell us which herbicides are poisonous to farm workers and to people downstream. Here in New York City, lots of "local knowledges" hold that there's a wave of teenage motherhood that's destroying our moral fiber. It's those boring *data* that show that the birth rate to teenage mothers has been essentially constant since 1975, and is about half of what it was in the good old 1950's. Another word for "local knowledges" is *prejudice*. I'm sorry to say it, but under the influence of postmodernism some very smart people can fall into some incredibly sloppy thinking, and I want to give two examples. The first comes from a front-page article in last Tuesday's *New York Times* (10/22/96) about the conflict between archaeologists and some Native American creationists. I don't want to address here the ethical and legal aspects of this controversy -- who should control the use of 10,000-year-old human remains -- but only the epistemic issue. There are at least two competing views on where Native American populations come from. The scientific consensus, based on extensive archaeological evidence, is that humans first entered the Americas from Asia about 10-20,000 years ago, crossing the Bering Strait. Many Native American creation accounts hold, on the other hand, that native peoples have always lived in the Americas, ever since their ancestors emerged onto the surface of the earth from a subterranean world of spirits. And the *Times* article observed that many archaeologists, "pulled between their scientific temperaments and their appreciation for native culture, ... have been driven close to a postmodern relativism in which science is just one more belief system." For example, Roger Anyon, a British archaeologist who has worked for the Zuni people, was quoted as saying that "Science is just one of many ways of knowing the world. ... [The Zunis' world view is] just as valid as the archeological viewpoint of what prehistory is about." Now, perhaps Dr. Anyon was misquoted, but we all *have* repeatedly heard assertions of this kind, and I'd like to ask what such assertions could possibly mean. We have here two *mutually incompatible* theories. They can't both be right; they can't both even be *approximately* right. They could, of course, both be *wrong*, but I don't imagine that that's what Dr. Anyon means by "just as valid". It seems to me that Anyon has quite simply allowed his political and cultural sympathies to cloud his reasoning. And there's no justification for that: We can perfectly well remember the victims of a horrible genocide, and support their descendants' valid political goals, without endorsing uncritically (or hypocritically) their societies' traditional creation myths. Moreover, the relativists' stance is extremely condescending: it treats a complex society as a monolith, obscures the conflicts within it, and takes its most obscurantist factions as spokespeople for the whole. My second example of sloppy thinking comes from *Social Text* co-editor Bruce Robbins' article in the September/October 1996 *Tikkun* magazine, in which he tries to defend -- albeit half-heartedly -- the postmodernist/poststructuralist subversion of conventional notions of truth. "Is it in the interests of women, African Americans, and other super-exploited people," Robbins asks, "to insist that truth and identity are social constructions? Yes and no," he asserts. "No, you can't talk about exploitation without respect for empirical evidence" -- exactly my point. "But yes," Robbins continues, "truth can be another source of oppression." Huh??? How can *truth* oppress anyone? Well, Robbins' very next sentence explains what he means: "It was not so long ago," he says, "that scientists gave their full authority to explanations of why women and African Americans ... were inherently inferior." But is Robbins claiming that *that* is truth? I should hope not! Sure, lots of people say things about women and African-Americans that are not true; and yes, those falsehoods have sometimes been asserted in the name of "science", "reason" and all the rest. But claiming something doesn't make it true, and the fact that people -- including scientists -- sometimes make false claims doesn't mean that we should reject or revise the concept of truth. Quite the contrary: it means that we should examine with the utmost care the *evidence* underlying people's truth claims, and we should reject assertions that in our best rational judgment are false.

# Baudrillard Answers: Their Ptx = relativism/tail chasing

**Baudrillard ignores the role that physical sources of power play even in the world of hyperreality. No meaningful values or resistance are possible with Baudrillard’s methods, and we are left defenseless against exploitation. Baudrillard’s tactics also cannot create a meaningful challenge to gender-based, everyday acts of oppression. Pragmatic policy makes the criticism worthwhile**  
**Luke 1991**(Timothy W Luke, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, “POWER AND POLITICS IN HYPERREALITY: THE CRITICAL PROJECT OF JEAN BAUDRILLARD”, Social Science Journal, 1991, Vol. 28, Issue 3)

Baudrillard's critical project clearly outlines a fascinating and innovative appraisal of the often confusing and contradictory tendencies in contemporary society that are usually labelled as "postmodernity." Nonetheless, there are considerable weaknesses as well as great strengths in Baudrillard's system of analysis. The tenacity of "reality" or "modernity" in several spheres of everyday life, for example, often still overshadows "hyperreality." Thus, it seems that Baudrillard's major flaw is mistaking a handful of incipient developments or budding trends for a full-blown or completely fixed new social order. The total break with all past forms of social relations cannot be verified either from within or from outside of Baudrillard's frameworks. While he denies finding much systematicity in hyperreal capitalism and sees the end of "production" and "power" in the rise of seduction, Baudrillard still clings to the image of a powerful exploitative system in his call to the masses to recognize "that a system is abolished only by pushing it into hyperlogic."( [n21](http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.samford.edu/ehost/detail?hid=104&sid=20cb9d3d-3f36-4b14-b14b-1a45d9667f46%40sessionmgr112&vid=3&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d" \l "bib21" \o "n21)) This twist in his thinking raises important questions. Why does a social order that no longer really exists need his theoretical intervention to be transformed by mass resistance if it is not real, powerful or productive? Likewise, if the history of power and production has ended, then why does Baudrillard envision today's best radical opposition to capital and the state assuming the form of hyperconformity by pushing "the system" into a hyperlogical practice of itself to induce the crisis that might abolish it? On the other hand, Baudrillard's strategy of "hyperconformity," as a means of radical resistance, does not seriously challenge the consumerist modes of domination intrinsic to transnational corporate capitalism. Moreover, its ties to consumer subjectivity do not even begin to address other possible strategies of resistance following lines drawn by gender, race, ethnicity, language or ecology. Unlike Lyotard, he does not advance any new conceptions of postmodern justice or articulate alternative principles to represent meaningful narratives about values in hyperreality. Thus, Baudrillard also can be tarred with the brush of neoconservatism, like many other postmodernist critics of society.( [n22](http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.samford.edu/ehost/detail?hid=104&sid=20cb9d3d-3f36-4b14-b14b-1a45d9667f46%40sessionmgr112&vid=3&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d" \l "bib22" \o "n22)) Baudrillard tends to misplace the concreteness of the relations that he is investigating, lumping everything into the category of "seduction" which, in turn, totally subsumes such complex factors as power, production, sex, and economy into one universal force. He claims somewhat contradictorily that "seduction . . . does not partake of the real order." Yet, at the same time, "seduction envelops the whole real process of power, as well as the whole real order of production, with this never-ending reversibility and disaccumulation--without which neither power nor production would even exist."( [n23](http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.samford.edu/ehost/detail?hid=104&sid=20cb9d3d-3f36-4b14-b14b-1a45d9667f46%40sessionmgr112&vid=3&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d" \l "bib23" \o "n23)) While Baudrillard makes these claims, he never really demonstrates definitely how this all works with carefully considered evidence. Similarly, Baudrillard spends an immense amount of energy attacking the Marxian and Freudian metanarratives of social analysis. He claims that Marx's labor theory of value and Freud's theory of the instincts are foundationalist myths not only in bourgeois political economy and social relations but also in their allegedly radical political and psychosocial critiques of these same phenomena. In seeking to demystify the workings of repressive capitalist modernity, Baudrillard reasons, Marx and Freud essentially helped to sustain that which they wished to abolish through their new critical consciousness. Yet, he seems to fall into the same traps. That is, Baudrillard's mistaken attribution of some kind of full-fledged maturity to the system of simulation, and his call for average consumers to "resist" it by fully complying with or totally submitting to its cultivation of commodified cravings, also does little more than continue to instantiate, albeit with an objectively ironic awareness, the semiotics of seduction that drive this social order. In fact, Baudrillard's critique of the Marxian and Freudian metanarratives often rings hollow. Even as he decries their univocal, historicist constructions of power, economy and value in terms of surplus value or ego formation, Baudrillard fabricates his own metanarrative tied to the operation of the sign. Like Marx's historical materialism, Baudrillard's historicist semiology advances through discrete stages of historical evolution in the sign's operation from fetishism to counterfeit to mystification to simulation as changing systems of representation operate in accord with these shifting logics of power and production. Everything is read through, and ultimately becomes interpretable, only by speaking in this voice of understanding. In turn, like Freud, Baudrillard establishes distinct reality principles predicated upon how these evolving semiotic cultures construct meaning corresponding to these different sign systems. With the globalization of the mass media, much like Marx's vision of attaining universal capitalism prior to the socialist revolution, Baudrillard's entire system implosively leaps from its pre-history of reality tied to modernist/realist productivism into its true history of hyperreality connected to postmodernist-hyperrealist seductivism with the rise of global mass media. For all of protests against foundationalist metanarratives, then, Baudrillard uncomfortably slips in and out of similar constructs when it suits his purposes. Beyond these reservations, Baudrillard's lack of a consistent theory of the subject at both the individual and mass level makes it difficult to envision a way out of the political contradictions of hyperreality he describes. The "who" and "whom" of these power arrangements are never made concrete--institutional mechanisms, group relations, and political conflicts all still need to be defined much more closely. No moral/ political criteria are elaborated for transforming the simulation regime into some more satisfying system of human organization.( [n24](http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.samford.edu/ehost/detail?hid=104&sid=20cb9d3d-3f36-4b14-b14b-1a45d9667f46%40sessionmgr112&vid=3&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d" \l "bib24" \o "n24)) Despite these weaknesses, however, Baudrillard's critical project does cast new light on the problematics of postmodernism. And, even with its flaws, this framework still is instructive for developing fresh insights into the workings of power and politics within informationalizing systems as they develop hyperreal tendencies in their cultures and societies.

# \*\*\*Bearing Witness Bad\*\*\*

## Bearing witness is code for being entertained by the spectacle of atrocity: it trades off with action to solve problems:

David M. **Smolin, 1999** (prof. of law @ Cumberland Law School—Samford University, 23 Fordham Int'l L.J. 460, “THE FUTURE OF GENOCIDE: A SPECTACLE FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM?” December, 1999; Lexis)

Anti-utopian novels are helpful because they critique certain features of our present and warn us of what our future could become. Given the human condition, we must remain ever aware of the ways in which we are most apt to fall, in the hope of avoiding moral catastrophe. In the spirit of such a novel - but without the entertainment value - this Essay plots the trajectory that could bring us to a future in **which genocide becomes a spectacle**, an event that is presented to the world as an unusually compelling form of entertainment. **The lines between bearing witness** and producing entertainment, between genuine outrage and **self-righteous apathy can be initially difficult to discern**. Such differences lie in the difficult areas of ethics, religion, and the hidden recesses of the human heart. Nonetheless, over thousands of years various world religions have sought to come to terms with the deepest questions pertaining to intention, action, and ethics, and particularly with the manner in which human beings are trained in ways of life or death. This Essay shall include some specifically Christian theological perspectives on the dilemmas that draw us toward the specter of genocide as spectacle. I. BYSTANDERS AS SPECTATORS: GENOCIDE AND THE MORAL EDUCATION OFHUMANKIND A bystander is an interesting and somewhat paradoxical figure in moral, legal, and religious discourse. The bystander observes some wrong, crime, or sin. This act of observing, which may appear passive and insignificant in itself, is in fact the gateway to a profound testing of the human person. If the bystander chooses to intervene and assist the victim, then he or she can become a rescuer, an examplar of neighbor love. If the bystander [\*461] intentionally renders even slight assistance to the perpetrator, then he or she becomes an accomplice in crime, and possibly equally liable for the evil done by others. The bystander who misinterprets the situation and mistakenly assists the aggressor, or who bungles the rescue and leaves matters worse than before, may be termed a meddler, and resented despite the best of intentions. The common response of simply turning away, or walking on the "other side of the road" in Jesus' parable of the Good Samaritan, is in Christian terms a violation of the law of love, even if in some legal systems there is no liability. n1 Much has been written about the failure of bystanders in the Holocaust. The tendency of human beings to turn away from grave human suffering and do nothing has been lamented. n2 The abandonment of the Jews by allied governments during World War II has been criticized. n3 We have worried about the propensity of human beings to remain passive in the face of extreme evil and suffering. Currently, bystanders are often tuning in rather than turning away. Instead of worrying about what happens to human beings who deliberately turn away from evil and suffering, we now must be concerned with what happens to human beings who deliberately choose to observe such suffering.

Those who view a significant crime are, of course, witnesses. Witnessing a crime has a moral significance that brings with it a corollary set of obligations, such as the duty to affirmatively give testimony (i.e., bear witness), the duty to the truth, the duty to the deceased victims, and the duty to warn others. n4 Bystanders who turn in by electronic media will have no such duties, because [\*462] electronic technology will itself provide a clear and true record of the event. Electronic bystanders will thus become, potentially at least, mere spectators. And genocides, particularly where they are broadcast more or less contemporaneously with the event, could become spectacles. The line in the West between being informed and being entertained is already quite thin, for news itself has become, as an industry, closely allied with the entertainment business. The global integration of mass media enterprises has left the news industry controlled by the same mega-corporations involved in various forms of entertainment, such as movies and popular music. n5 Both sides of the thinly-separated news-entertainment line cover genocide as a subject matter, with the news industry providing coverage of unfolding events in, for example, the former Yugoslavia, while the entertainment industry produces movies such as "Schindler's List." THE FUTURE OF GENOCIDE Most recently those who perpetrate mass killings and genocides have tried, with mixed success, to keep their work undercover. The removal of reporters from the scene is a common precursor to brutality. These efforts to prevent media coverage are often only partially successful, and thus there is often some media coverage of at least the immediate results of large-scale atrocities. One can foresee that with the continuing advance of electronic technology there will come a time when live video-communications will be as ubiquitous as audio technologies (i.e., telephones and cellular phones) have already become. There will come a day, in other words, when it will be virtually impossible to prevent contemporaneous images of genocide from emerging into global consciousness, just as the Chinese were unable to prevent the world from watching as their tanks rolled over demonstrators in Tiananmen Square. We watch the bystander in Holocaust films, usually with disdain. How could they have turned away, and done nothing? But what does it mean when by watching we ourselves become the bystanders, for the unfolding horrors are yet in progress?

**CARD CONTINUES ON NEXT PAGE…**

Technological advances in transportation and in military capability make it increasingly obvious that we - or more important our [\*463] Western, powerfully armed nations - could, if they so choose, intervene forcefully anywhere in the world. Our bystander guilt thus becomes, to the degree that our nations do not act, corporate and national. Whole nations and civilizations become bystander nations and civilizations. n6 It is well-known that rescuers faced enormous risks during the Holocaust. Bystanders could only become rescuers by violating the rules of the reigning political and military authorities, and risking becoming, along with their families and loved ones, victims of the same fate as those they would seek to rescue. n7 Yet, how often and how easily are such bystanders criticized for their failures to act, and for their propensity to turn away? How then can we defend ourselves as individuals from bystander guilt when we tune in and then turn away without making any effort, from the safety of our home countries, to urge the responsible authorities to intervene? There is still today, a half-century later, broad criticism of the failure of the Allied Powers to act militarily against the Holocaust, and thereby attempt, for example through the bombing of railway lines or the camps themselves, to save lives. n8 This strategic decision was made within the context of the moral necessity of maximizing efforts toward the defeat of the Axis Powers. n9 Without directly engaging the debate over whether this broader [\*464] context to any degree explains or excuses the failures of the Allied response to the Holocaust, we can nonetheless compare that situation to our own. How much less weighty are our purported reasons for failing to prevent the genocide in Rwanda! Are our geo-political reasons for not intervening in the internal matter of mass killings in Cambodia greater than those faced by the generation of the Holocaust? How favorably do our reasons for delaying and severely limiting responses to the various ethnic cleansings in the former Yugoslavia compare to those that influenced the Allied powers? Why are we willing to place a hyper-critical eye upon prior generations, while excusing our own generation's failures under far less difficult circumstances? n10 The second half of the twentieth century has demonstrated that the prevention of genocide, mass killing, and ethnic cleansing is a secondary value in the post-Holocaust world community. The comforts of inaction and the maintenance of relative "peace," non-interference in the internal affairs of nations, and geo-political alliances and balances of power rank substantially higher in the operational values of the world community. We do not like to admit the rank order of our values, but they are so visibly displayed by our actions that it is difficult to come to any other conclusion. To admit that we are willing to put up with genocide in the interest of comfort, peace, non-interference, and power calculations places us precisely in the position of the bystander individuals and nations who, for varied self-interested reasons of their own, decided not to act in the face of the Holocaust. It appears, in other words, that we have not substantially advanced, in deeds as opposed to words, in our attitudes toward the Holocaust. In the meantime, however, we have elevated the Holocaust itself to a seminal event of religious and moral significance. As opposed to the relative silence that followed the Armenian genocide, of which Hitler took note, we have spoken, and continue to [\*465] speak, repeatedly about the Holocaust. This author, at least, grew up with the overarching question, "what would you have done if you had been alive then?" Once it becomes clear that we will not act decisively to prevent the genocides of our own day, it becomes reasonable to become cynical about ourselves. **The path of cynicism** may lead to unexpected places. From lamenting those who turn away, we may become those who tune in, but remain similarly passive. Tuning into the genocides and mass killings of the past and present can become an attempt to escape from the duty of present action**. Instead of acting, we dutifully watch**. We may call it witnessing, but instead we are really spectators. Repeat the ritual enough - the watching of holocaust movies, the watching of the unfolding of current genocides on the television news, and then someday the real-time video of the actual mass killings - and it may become a form of entertainment. But will this visceral and intense viewing really assuage us from the guilt of inaction? And will we at some point make the subtle transformation toward actually enjoying the atrocities? Like the Roman crowds of old, will we come to admire a particularly brutal act, parsing its methods with the practiced eye of one used to seeing others die? Will live genocide coverage - and not just genocide movies - become an art form, **a way of evoking pathos and rage and other human emotions**, which while moving our emotions replace in us any need for action and responsibility? Eventually, will genocide itself become a virtual sport or art form, with the masses commenting how one brutal act was particularly well-executed, another particularly pathetic?

# Bearing Witness Bad

## Bearing witness is a means of passive viewing:

David M. **Smolin, 1999** (prof. of law @ Cumberland Law School—Samford University, 23 Fordham Int'l L.J. 460, “THE FUTURE OF GENOCIDE: A SPECTACLE FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM?” December, 1999; Lexis)

We are, this would suggest, in a dangerous situation with regard to genocide, mass killings, and crimes against humanity. Like law-abiding families living in a high-crime neighborhood, we have become accustomed to **primarily symbolic responses to these offenses**. In the meantime, genocide has become an ongoing, apparently permanent part of our world. Our capacity to be shocked by such things is necessarily diminishing over time, as atrocities old and new have become an ongoing part of our consciousness. Our knowledge of these horrors, past and present, is used by us primarily to **reassure ourselves of our righteousness and superiority,** rather than to **spur us to compassionate action**. This normalization of such crimes has made us spectators and analysts of inhumanity, passive viewers of the ongoing horror show. And so even as we proclaim our own justification we hide from ourselves the hardening of our hearts.

## Bearing witness fades into forgetting when not coupled with political action:

Dawn **Post, 1999** (Hamline Journal of Public Law and Policy, Fall 1999, 21 Hamline J. Pub. L. & Pol'y 177; Lexis)

To study psychological trauma is to come face to face both with human vulnerability in the natural world and with the capacity for evil in human nature. To study psychological trauma means **bearing witness to horrible events.** When the traumatic events are of human design, those who bear witness are caught in the conflict between the victim and the perpetrator. It is morally impossible to remain neutral in this conflict. The bystander is forced to take sides. It is very tempting to take the side of the perpetrator. **All the perpetrator asks is that the bystander do nothing**. He appeals to the universal desire to see, hear and speak no evil. The victim, on the contrary, asks the bystander to share the burden or pain. The **victim demands action**, engagement and remembering. After every atrocity one can expect to hear the same predictable apologies; it never happened, the victim lies, the victim exaggerates, the victim brought it on herself and in any case there is time to forget the past and move on. The more powerful the perpetrator, the greater is his prerogative to name and define reality and the more completely his arguments prevail. In the absence of strong political movements for human rights, the active process of bearing witness inevitably gives way to the active process of forgetting. Repression, disassociation and denial are [\*192] phenomena of a social as well as individual consciousness. n46

# \*\*\*\*\*Biological Determinism Kritik Shell (use versus kritiks that focus on the body is good) (1/3)\*\*\*\*\*

## A) Assuming that society should be conceived as bodies leads to biological determinism—leading to narrow categories that become rigid and unyielding:

**OYEWUMI, 1999** (OYERONKE. teaches in the Dept. of Black Studies at University of California at Santa Barbara, "Multiculturalism or Multibodism: On the Impossible Intersections of Race and Gender in American White Feminist and Black Nationalist Discourses(1)." The Western Journal of Black Studies 23.3 (1999): 182. Academic OneFile. Web. 5 Mar. 2010.)

In my book titled, The Invention of Women: Making an African Sense of Western Discourses of Gender, I argued that Western thought and social practice through time have been characterized by the idea that **biology is destiny**, and that this **biological determinism** has led to the **conception of society as being constituted as a body and by bodies:** male bodies, female bodies, Jewish bodies, white bodies, and black bodies; with each body type indicating social ranking and worth. Consequently, since the body is at the base of all social categories, **there are ultimately no social categories independent of biology**. I contrast this Western conceptualization with the Yoruba in Nigeria, in which social categories that are not based on the body, and which therefore are truly social, not biological. In view of the visual logic of Western thought as noted by a number of scholars; I contend that the determinative character of the body in constituting social categories is related to the privileging of vision over other senses in the apprehension of reality. Given the binary oppositions that are at the core of Western thinking and the tunnel vision that results from over-reliance on "the gaze," it is not surprising that categories are **narrowly conceptualized, rigid and unyielding**. The focus is on one body part at a time.

# Biological Determinism K Shell (2/3)

## B) This focus on the body unwittingly re-entrenches gendered difference—turning the AFF and worsening oppression:

**OYEWUMI, 1999** (OYERONKE. teaches in the Dept. of Black Studies at University of California at Santa Barbara, "Multiculturalism or Multibodism: On the Impossible Intersections of Race and Gender in American White Feminist and Black Nationalist Discourses(1)." The Western Journal of Black Studies 23.3 (1999): 182. Academic OneFile. Web. 5 Mar. 2010.)

The notion of society that emerges from this conception is **that society is constituted by bodies** and as a body. I am using the concept "body" in two ways: first, as a metonymy for biology, and secondly, to draw attention to the sheer physicality which seems to attend Being in Western culture. Here, the reference is to the corporeal body as well as metaphors of the body. **The body has a logic all its own**, and it is believed that just by looking at it, one can determine people's social location and their thought, or lack thereof. As Naomi Scheman puts it in her discussion of "The Body Politic" in premodern Europe, The ways people knew their places in the world had to do with their bodies and the histories of those bodies, and when they violated those prescriptions for those places, their bodies were punished, often spectacularly. One's place in the body politic was as natural as the places of the organs in one's body and political disorder, as unnatural as the shifting and displacement of those organs (186). Similarly, Elizabeth Grosz remarks on what she calls the "depth" of the body in modern Western societies: Our [Western] body forms are considered expressions of an interior, not inscriptions on a flat surface. By constructing a soul or psyche for itself, the "civilized body" forms libidinal flows, sensations, experiences, and intensities into needs, wants ... The body becomes a text, a system of signs to be deciphered, read, and read into. Social law is incarnated, "corporealized," correlatively, bodies are textualized, read by others as expressive of the subject's psychic interior. A storehouse of inscriptions and messages between its external and internal boundaries, it generates or constructs the body's movement into "behavior," which then have interpersonally and socially identifiable meanings and functions within a social system [emphasis added] (198). Since the body is the bedrock on which the social order is founded, the body is always in view and on view, and, it invites a gaze, a gaze of difference -- the most **historically constant one being the gendered gaze**. There is a sense in which constructs such as the "social body" or the "body politic" are not just metaphors but can be read literally. It is not surprising then that when the **body politic needed to be purified** in Nazi Germany, certain kinds of bodies had to be eliminated.

# Biological Determinism K Shell (3/3)

## C) The alternative reconfigures oppression as stemming from historical and social processes rather than from the politics of the body—this better challenges social hierarchies than the AFF:

**OYEWUMI, 1999** (OYERONKE. teaches in the Dept. of Black Studies at University of California at Santa Barbara, "Multiculturalism or Multibodism: On the Impossible Intersections of Race and Gender in American White Feminist and Black Nationalist Discourses(1)." The Western Journal of Black Studies 23.3 (1999): 182. Academic OneFile. Web. 5 Mar. 2010.)

With the publication in the early 1980's of an anthology with the above title by three black feminist scholars, Gloria Hull, Patricia Bell Scott, and Barbara Smith, the exclusion of black women in both black nationalist and white feminist discourses was no longer allowed to go unchallenged. The contribution of this volume and subsequent writings by many black women scholars has provided the impetus for some of the most important literary developments in the U. S. including postmodernist discourses of deconstruction, identity politics, and multiculturalism. I read the naming of black women as brave in the title of this book as a signal that **anchors the conceptualization of the black women in social attributes rather than in the biological,** of which the other two categories, women and blacks, are believed to be constituted. Black writers and feminists such as Angela Davis, Alice Walker, Audre Lorde, Barbara Christian, Hazel Carby, Hortense Spillers, Deborah McDowell, Nellie McKay, Barbara Johnson, Mary Helen Washington, Michelle Wallace, bell hooks, Paula Giddings, June Jordan, Patricia Hill Collins, Patricia Williams and Rose Brewer have been instrumental in recasting the on-going discussions of race and gender hierarchies. It is important to note that many African American intellectuals have **presented the situation of black women in historical and social processes** rather than engage in the **biological determinism** that has been so much the cornerstone of Western thought. However, the focus on identity politics that has been one of the main themes of post modernist thought seems to be still too close to the body. There is something very static, essentialist, and most importantly individualistic about the concept of "identity" as it is deployed. It is paradoxical to attempt to situate groups, communities, and collectivities with a concept that is essentially individualistic. No one is a black woman or white woman all by herself. These appellations only make sense within the **social context of groups** that have been constituted historically in opposition to one another. The relationship between individual and group identity has to be problematized. A more realistic conceptualization of identity must see it **as socially grounded,** taking into account the multiplicity of situational roles and myriad of relationships in which black women and indeed all human beings make their lives, a concept that captures the moving centers and not the essences that constitute social relationships and historical processes. Social identities are not given but **emerge out of specific circumstances** depending on what is at stake. Understanding the situation of any group in at a moment in time calls for a social situatedness and historical accounting. Finally, it should be noted that the Western somatocentricity has not been totally absent from the writings of some African American women writers. Two examples of these writings on Africa come to mind. African American feminist writers Audre Lorde and Alice Walker falter when they cross the Atlantic to write about or borrow ideas from Africa. Their Western orientation is immediately apparent in their interpretations of African institutions and practices. In Sister Outsider, a collection of essays and speeches, Audre Lorde represents everyday female interactions and female-centered institutions in many African cultures as models of lesbian relationships (122). African scholars like Ifi Amadiume have shown that institutions like "woman marriage" in African cultures are social institutions that have no sexual content (1987). The interpretation of these institutions as models of homosexuality amounts to a grave distortion. Whilst Lorde's approach to Africa may be flawed in some ways, one cannot accuse her of disrespect or malice. In fact, her problem may be due to an over zealousness in reclaiming her African heritage. One cannot say the same for Alice Walker. In 1992, on the heels of the success of the film The Color Purple, she wrote a novel presented as part fiction and part fact, in which she purports to be documenting the practice of female circumcision in some African cultures. As a follow-up, she collaborated with filmmaker Partibar Parmaar in the making of a film-documentary entitled, Warrior Marks, and a book of the same title which details the making of the film. In journeying to Africa "In Search of Her Mother's Garden,"(14) she sets out to dis Africans in no uncertain terms. For one thing, she dedicates the book to "the Blameless vulva" (need I point out that this is a body part?). This is hardly the place to engage in a discussion of Alice Walker on Africa and the Western-based controversy over female circumcision(15). But suffice it to say that although the slogans "culture is not torture" and "mutilating cultures" which she bandies about in the book Warrior Marks are well taken but, genitalia does not a culture make. It is remarkable that in four centuries of writings on Africa by Westerners, nothing has changed; the fixation is still on what Africans do with the lower regions of their bodies. **Bodies and body parts do not exist outside of the histories and cultures in which they are erected.** It is only a Western fallacy that society is composed of bodies and that it is these bodies that constitute social hierarchies and processes in and of themselves.

# Biological Determinism K Overview (1-3)

## (--) Their emphasis on the body misses the boat—Their over-emphasis on the body risks co-option and re-entrenchment of discrimination—extend our A Subpoint Oyewumi evidence—even if their conceptualization of the body is intended to be fluid and open ended, it will lead to rigid and narrow categories where we assume people are who they are because of their body…this is the root cause of otherization and oppression—that’s our B & C subpoint evidence—it is better to examine this issue from the perspective of historical and social processes rather than focusing on the body…

## More evidence and an answer to their perms…

## (--) Their emphasis on the body allows for tokenistic approaches to diversity—the alternative solves better:

**OYEWUMI, 1999** (OYERONKE. teaches in the Dept. of Black Studies at University of California at Santa Barbara, "Multiculturalism or Multibodism: On the Impossible Intersections of Race and Gender in American White Feminist and Black Nationalist Discourses(1)." The Western Journal of Black Studies 23.3 (1999): 182. Academic OneFile. Web. 5 Mar. 2010.)

The call to multiculturalize is made under a consumerist culture in which multiculturalism reduces to consuming sexually or gastronomically ethnic cultures as the shifting definitions allow. This is a kind of flavor-of-the-month approach to diversity. In actuality, there is only one culture, one mode of thinking and one way of being. What is assumed to be multicultural is the fact that **a few individuals from groups that were traditionally excluded now have limited access** to places, spaces, and even to body parts that are considered the key to "making it." The bases of social access and hierarchies have not changed; the same groups of people and texts still enjoy privilege. Remarkably, cultures and social classes are erased as everybody is reduced to interchangeable minorities--in the process discounting history. This brand of multiculturalism, then, is what has been named here **"multibodism,"** because what is seen to be important is not how people are positioned, what they do or think, but what body part they bring to the multicultural table. One is reminded of the statement by James Watt, President Reagan's infamous Environmental Secretary that a particular panel comprised **one woman, one black, and one cripple.** From his viewpoint, **the requirements for diversity had been met in the composition of the panel.** Real diversity is certainly more than this. Many lay people and scholars alike underestimate the difficulty of building a multicultural society after centuries of imposing one culture. Without first addressing the fundamental questions raised by unequal relations of power, the histories of dominance, **and the continuing fixation on biological explanations for social problems,** there is no room for **multiple ways of being in the same human body in one world.**

# Biological Determinism K Overview (2-3)

## (--) The over-focus on the body leads to the assumption that women are the same because of body parts—this leads to the marginalization of African-American women:

**OYEWUMI, 1999** (OYERONKE. teaches in the Dept. of Black Studies at University of California at Santa Barbara, "Multiculturalism or Multibodism: On the Impossible Intersections of Race and Gender in American White Feminist and Black Nationalist Discourses(1)." The Western Journal of Black Studies 23.3 (1999): 182. Academic OneFile. Web. 5 Mar. 2010.)

If gender is truly a social construction then we must be able to understand that it is not only constructed in a variety of ways in different places at different times, but that it need not be constructed at all as a social category in some other societies and in all historical periods. The debate about essentialism is **about the status of the body in feminist theory**. Despite the apparent opposition between the so called feminist social constructionists and the feminist essentialists, Diane Fuss is correct when she notes in her book, Essentially Speaking, that: constructionism (the position that differences are constructed, not innate) really operates as a more sophisticated form of essentialism. The bar between essentialism and constructionism is by no means as solid and unassailable as advocates of both sides assume it to be (xii). She notes further that "essentialism ... can also be read in the accounts of universal female oppression, **the assumption of a totalizing system** which subjugates all women everywhere throughout history and across cultures" (2). At the local level, the manifestation and materialization of somatocentricity in feminist discourse in the U. S. is apparent in **the exclusion of black women whenever the category "woman" is invoked.** Critiques of such exclusions have been the cornerstone of Black Women's Studies and increasingly a main concern of White Women's Studies. The challenge of black women to feminism has contributed in no small way to some of the major theoretical debates in feminist discourse **and the continuing problematization of the category "woman" by a number of feminist scholars**. The work of Elizabeth Spelman is especially relevant here. In her book, Inessential Woman: Problems of Exclusion in Feminist Thought, she shows that the privileging of white women is manifested in feminist thinking: in the assumption that gender identity exists in isolation from race and class identity, in the assumption behind contrasting the situation of Women with (for example) the situation of Blacks or Jews; in the assumption that the meaning of gender identity and the experience of sexism **are the same for all women as women** (x). She accounts for this tendency in dominant and pervasive feminist thinking, as a reflection of centuries-old somatophobia in Western thought, and in what pioneering feminist scholar Adrienne Rich called "white solipsism,": the tendency, "to think, imagine and speak as if whiteness describes the world." Although I agree with Spelman about the mutually reinforcing roles of both white solipsism and somatophobia in feminist prejudice, I disagree with her explanation for this Western and, indeed feminist problem of the body. Feminist somatophobia is just a particular manifestation of what is a general somatocentricity in Western discourses and the construction of social categories. It is not the failure to embrace the body that leads to the exclusion of black women, as she claims; **rather it is an over-embrace of the body, a preoccupation with specific body parts dictating who should be grouped together** and who has faculties for thinking. The focus on certain body parts **becomes the script that defines social worth**.

# Biological Determinism K Overview (3-3)

## (--) A failure to focus on the intersectional nature of discrimination erases black women’s experiences:

**OYEWUMI, 1999** (OYERONKE. teaches in the Dept. of Black Studies at University of California at Santa Barbara, "Multiculturalism or Multibodism: On the Impossible Intersections of Race and Gender in American White Feminist and Black Nationalist Discourses(1)." The Western Journal of Black Studies 23.3 (1999): 182. Academic OneFile. Web. 5 Mar. 2010.)

Spelman notes that even when some feminist scholars like Nancy Chodorow are open to consideration of other forms of oppression such as race and class, there is a tendency to treat gender oppression as more fundamental, and to take the additive approach as if one oppression is piled one on top of the other in an arithmetic fashion. In reality, she observes that "how one form of oppression is experienced is influenced by and influences how another form is experienced" (123). Thus, Spelman appears on the side of a chorus of black women thinkers who have argued that sexism and racism must be seen as interlocking not as piled upon each other. She correctly asserts that, an additive analysis treats the oppression of a Black Woman in a society that is both racist and sexist as if it were a further burden when in fact, it is a different burden. As the work of Davis among others, shows, to ignore the difference is to **deny the particular reality of the Black woman's experience** (123).

# Biological Determinism Link Extensions

## The politics of the body re-entrenches male hierarchies:

Vicki **Kirby, 1991** (Hypatia, vol. 6 #3, accessed via ebsco)

This paradox is not unrelated to the vexed question of sexual difference. Woman’s identity has traditionally been **associated with the body and nature**, just as man’s has been located in their transcendence as mind and culture. Woman is thereby positioned as man’s attenuated inversion, as a mere specular reflection through which his identity is grounded. The brute matter of woman’s embodiment and the immediacy of her lived experience provide the corporeal substratum upon which man erects himself and from which he keeps a safe distance.

# Biological Determinism: Alt Solves Better

## (--) Conceptualizing oppression through the social realm and not the focus on the body solves better for oppression:

**OYEWUMI, 1999** (OYERONKE. teaches in the Dept. of Black Studies at University of California at Santa Barbara, "Multiculturalism or Multibodism: On the Impossible Intersections of Race and Gender in American White Feminist and Black Nationalist Discourses(1)." The Western Journal of Black Studies 23.3 (1999): 182. Academic OneFile. Web. 5 Mar. 2010.)

The additive analyses of racism and sexism in a culture in which the body and not social systems is the focus would mean the piling of bodies or body parts in order to conceptualize black women. Of course this is not feasible given the focus on one body part at a time and binary constructions of black and white, male and female. For these reasons, it is difficult to find the intersections of race and gender categories in both anti-racist and anti-sexist discourses, which leads in turn, to the exclusion of black women. The concept of interlocking oppressions(10) **moves the discourse forward beyond the body into the social realm where it belongs.**

# Biological Determinism Impacts: Focus on the Body Re-entrenches Gender Binaries

## Focus on the body re-entrenches gender binaries:

**OYEWUMI, 1999** (OYERONKE. teaches in the Dept. of Black Studies at University of California at Santa Barbara, "Multiculturalism or Multibodism: On the Impossible Intersections of Race and Gender in American White Feminist and Black Nationalist Discourses(1)." The Western Journal of Black Studies 23.3 (1999): 182. Academic OneFile. Web. 5 Mar. 2010.)

In European thought, despite the fact that society was seen to be inhabited by bodies, it was only women who were perceived to be embodied. Those who qualified as men had no bodies; they were walking minds. Consequently, the two oppositionally constructed social categories that emanated from this construction were the "man of reason" (the thinker) and the "woman of the body." The idea that the man of reason often had the woman of the body on his mind was clearly not entertained. Foucault's History of Sexuality makes it clear that the man of ideas also had other bodies on his mind. A recent anthology questions the dominant representation of Jews as "the People of the Book" and in the process attempts to document a relatively less common image of Jews as "the People of the Body." The editor of the volume makes an in interesting point on "the thinker" and his book by commenting that the book, is evocative of the wisdom and the pursuit of knowledge. In this way, the image of the Jew (who is always male) poring over a book is always misleading. He appears to be elevated in spiritual pursuit. But if we could peer over his shoulders and see what his text says, he may in fact be reading about matters as erotic as what position to take during sexual intercourse. What is going on in "the thinker's" head or more interestingly in his loins? (Elberg-Schwartz, 3).

# Biological Determinism Impacts: Ginger Violence Example

## We’ll use the recent examples of ginger violence and fat killings as examples of how focusing on the body can lead to absurd but dangerous consequences—even seemingly benign biological differences can become anchors for discrimination when the focus is place on the body:

Laura **Kenney, 2009** (Nov, 25, <http://www.stylelist.com/2009/11/25/violence-in-beauty-ginger->killing-for-fat/)

When you think of the cosmetics industry, glossy visions of supermodels, lipstick and mascara wands flash through your head. But this week, we saw the flip side of pretty, a dark underbelly where the repercussions of our beauty ideals came to the forefront in two troubling stories - Red headed kids are **getting beat up in California because of their hair color**, and Peruvian gang members are **killing people to sell their fat for cosmetic surgery**. Last Friday, at least three middle-schoolers in Calabasas, California, an affluent suburb of Los Angeles, were were kicked and hit by dozens of classmates, for nothing besides having red hair. Officials are pointing fingers at an anti-red head Facebook group (there are many, including Ginger Beatdown, Ginger Watch '09 and Opponents of Gingervitis), which deemed the day "Kick a Ginger Day" and urged members to attack anyone with red hair and freckles. The Facebook group was inspired by a 2005 South Park episode that satirized prejudice against "gingers," after the character Cartman claims that redheads have no soul.

While red heads are not usually targeted in the US, "gingerism" is a concern in the UK, where an underlying anti-redhead prejudice stems from the historic tension between the English and the Irish and Scottish. And even more troubling: Police in Lima, Peru have arrested members of a jungle gang suspected of murdering people and draining their fat to sell on the black market for use in cosmetic surgery. Three suspects confessed to slaughtering five victims, but authorities say the gang may have been involved in more, and may not be the only group involved in such killings. The fat is said to be selling for $60,000 a gallon. The Chicago Sun Times reports on the gruesome process to remove the fat from the bodies. Medical experts have expressed skepticism that there is a black market for fat, but in the Huanuco province, where the gang operates, at least 60 people have been listed as missing this year.

While these stories are not directly related to the pretty faces we see staring back at us in beauty advertisements, they both skirt the boundaries of the cosmetics industry. The Peruvian killings illustrate how far some may go to fuel the industry, and the red-head attacks focus on beauty ideals, **punishing people for how they look.**

# Biological Determinism K Impacts: Otherization Module (1-2)

## Focus on the body re-entrenches otherization—those who have bodies unlike our own become otherized:

**OYEWUMI, 1999** (OYERONKE. teaches in the Dept. of Black Studies at University of California at Santa Barbara, "Multiculturalism or Multibodism: On the Impossible Intersections of Race and Gender in American White Feminist and Black Nationalist Discourses(1)." The Western Journal of Black Studies 23.3 (1999): 182. Academic OneFile. Web. 5 Mar. 2010.)

The somatocentric nature of European discourses suggests that the appellation the "People of the Body" may have a wider reach. The foregoing exegesis is hardly the received view of Western history and social thought. Quite the contrary, the history of Western societies until recently, has been presented as a documentation of rational thought in which ideas are framed as the agents of history; if bodies appear at all, they are articulated as the debased side of human nature. The preferred focus has been on the mind, which has remained high above the foibles of the flesh. There emerged early in Western discourse a binary opposition between body and mind. The much-vaunted Cartesian dualism was only an affirmation of a tradition. The body was seen as a trap from which any rational person had to escape. Ironically, even as the body remained at the center of both socio-political categories and discourse, many thinkers deny its existence for certain categories of people, most notably themselves. "Bodylessness" was a precondition for rational thought. **Women, primitives, Jews, Africans, the poor, and all those who qualified for the label of "different"** in various historical epochs were considered to be dominated by instinct and affect, reason being beyond them. They were the Other, and the Other is a body.(5) It is my contention, therefore, that **the common marginalization of black women in discourses of race and gender** is due in part to the fact that **social categories are perceived to be rooted in the body**. As such, given that humans have only one body each and that each social category is elaborated on one body part there is **just no room for those who cannot be pigeon-holed**, precisely because their very existence as a group challenges the idea that humans are essentially body parts. If the Other is a body, what then can we make of the "Other's Other" as black women have been described?

# Biological Determinism K Impacts: Otherization Module (2-2)

## Otherization legitimates murder and results in genocide:

**Diamond,** professor of physiology at UCLA medical school, **92**(Jared, The Third Chimpanzee)  
That our urge to kill is restrained by our ethics almost all the time is obvious. The puzzle is: what unleashes it? Today, while we may divide the world’s people into “us” and “them,” we know that there are thousands of types of “them,” all differing from each other as well as from us in language, appearance, and habits. To waste words on pointing this out seems silly: we all know it from books and television, and most of us also know it from firsthand experience of travel. It is hard to transfer ourselves back into the frame of mind prevailing throughout much of human history and already described in Chapter 13. Like chimpanzees, gorillas and social carnivores, we lived in band territories. The known world was much smaller and simpler than it is today: there were only a few known types of “them,” one’s immediate neighbors. For example, in New Guinea until recently, each tribe maintained a shifting pattern of warfare and alliance with each of its neighbors. A person might enter the next valley on a friendly visit (never quite without danger) or on a war raid, but the chances of being able to traverse a sequence of several valleys in friendship were negligible. The powerful rules about treatment of one’s fellow “us” did not apply to “them,” those dimly understood, neighboring enemies. As I walked between New Guinea valleys, people who themselves practiced cannibalism and were only a decade out of the Stone Age routinely warned me about the unspeakably primitive, vile, and cannibalistic habits of the people whom I would encounter in the next valley. Even Al Capone’s gangs in twentieth-century Chicago made a policy of hiring out-of-town killers, so that the assassin could feel that he was killing one of “them” rather than of “us.” The writings of classical Greece reveal an extension of this tribal territorialism. The known world was larger and more diverse, but “us” Greeks were still distinguished from “them” barbarians. Our word “barbarian” is derived from the Greek barbaroi, which simply means non-Greek foreigners. Egyptians and Persians, whose level of civilization was like that of the Greeks, were nevertheless barbaroi. The ideal of conduct was not to treat all men equally, but instead to reward one’s friends and to punish one’s enemies. When the Athenian author Xenophon wanted to express the highest praise for his admired leader Cyrus, Xenophon related how Cyrus always repaid his friends’ good turns more generously, and how Cyrus always retaliated on his enemies’ misdeeds more severely (e.g., by gouging out their eyes or cutting off their hands). Like the Mungi and Scratching Rocks hyena clans, humans practiced a dual standard of behavior: strong inhibitions about killing one of “us,” but a green light to kill “them” when it was safe to do so. Genocide was acceptable under this dichotomy, whether one considers the dichotomy as an inherited animal instinct or as a uniquely human ethical code.

# Biological Determinism K Impacts: Otherization Extensions

## Biological determinism leads to sociological distinctions—we’ll assume we should treat people differently based on gender, skin color, etc:

**OYEWUMI, 1999** (OYERONKE. teaches in the Dept. of Black Studies at University of California at Santa Barbara, "Multiculturalism or Multibodism: On the Impossible Intersections of Race and Gender in American White Feminist and Black Nationalist Discourses(1)." The Western Journal of Black Studies 23.3 (1999): 182. Academic OneFile. Web. 5 Mar. 2010.)

According to Spelman, the problem is that, "once the concept of woman is divorced from the concept of woman's body, conceptual room is made for the idea of a woman who is no particular historical woman--she has no color, no accent, no particular characteristics that require having a body" (128). It is not clear how the concept of woman can be disconnected from the body. The women in feminist discourses are white, and they speak European languages. What Spelman forgets is that the conceptualization of woman, or black for that matter, immediately acknowledges having a body. Furthermore, the fundamental problem is not that color and accent are disregarded; the question is why color, and not some other factor, should be the basis of social hierarchy. Indeed, what color and how it is constituted are legitimate questions. Acknowledging human embodiment is not the problem. The problem instead is what is done with body parts in the social arena. For example, it is one thing to acknowledge that humans have different eye colors. That would be a case of recognizing embodiment. But it is another thing to say that only those with blue eyes can have 3 square meals per day. That would signal somatocentricity as the basis of social being and access. It is this biological determinism that is especially troubling in Western discourses and social practices--be they feminist or not.

# \*\*\*\*\*Bio-power K Answers\*\*\*\*\*

## Permutation is the best option—endorsing both strategies for change creates space for activist politics.

Sankaran **Krishna, 1993** (Professor of Political Science at the University of Hawai’i at Manoa, Alternatives, Summer, p. 400-401)

Chaloupka centers this difference between his own supposedly total critique of all sovereign truths (which he describes as nuclear criticism in an echo of literary criticism) and the more partial (and issue-based) criticism of what he calls "nuclear opposition" or "antinuclearists" at the very outset of his book. (KN: xvi) Once again, the unhappy' choice forced upon the reader is to join Chaloupka in his total critique of all sovereign truths or be trapped in obsolete essentialisms. This leads to a disastrous politics, pitting groups that have the most in common (and need to unite on some basis to be effective) against each other. Both Chaloupka and Der Derian thus reserve their most trenchant critique for political groups that should, in any analysis, be regarded as the closest to them in terms of an oppositional politics and their desired futures. Instead of finding ways to live with these differences and to (if fleetingly) coalesce against the New Right, this fratricidal critique is **politically suicidal.** It obliterates the space for a political activism based on provisional and contingent coalitions, for uniting behind a common cause even as one recognizes that the coalition is compromised of groups that have very differing (and possibly unresolvable) views of reality. Moreover, it fails to consider the possibility that there may have been other, more compelling- reasons for the "failure" of the Nuclear Freeze movement or anti-Gulf War movement. Like many a worthwhile cause in our times, they failed to garner sufficient support to influence state policy. The response to that need not be a totalizing critique that delegitimizes all narratives. The blackmail inherent in the choice offered by Der Derian and Chaloupka, between total critique and "ineffective" partial critique, ought to be transparent. Among other things, it effectively militates against the construction of provisional or strategic essentialism in our attempts to create space for an activist politics. In the next section, I focus more widely on the genre of critical international theory and its impact on such an activist politics.

## Biopower will not trigger extinction--elites and non-elites need each other.

Zygmunt **Bauman, 2001** (Emeritus professor of Sociology at the University of Leeds, Community: Seeking Safety in an Insecure World, pg. 33-34)

The era of great transformation was, to put it in a nutshell, an era of engagement. The ruled were dependent upon the rulers, but the rulers no less depended on the ruled. For better or worse, the two sides were tied to each other and neither could easily opt out of the wedlock—however cumbersome and repulsive it might feel. Divorce was not a realistic option for either side. When in a flash of inspiration Henry Ford made his historic decision to double his workers’ wages, what he was after was a double bind which would tie them to his factories more strongly and more securely than the mere need of livelihood, which could be met by other employers as well. Ford’s power and wealth were no more extensive and no more solid than his immense factories, heavy machines and massive labour force; he could not afford to lose either. It took some time before both sides, by many trials and more errors still, learned that truth. But once the truth had been learned, the inconvenicence and the high and rising cost of panoptical power (and more generally, of domination-through-engagement) became apparent. A marriage where both sides know that it has been tied together for a long time to come, and neither of the partners is free to take it apart, is by necessity a site of perpetual conflict. The chances that the partners will be of the same mind on all matters that may arise in the unforeseeable future are as small as the probability that one of the partners will in all matters give way to the will of the other, making no attempt to win a better deal. And so there will be numerous confrontations, head-on battles and guerrilla sallies. Only in extreme cases, though, are the war actions likely to lead to the ultimate attrition of one or both partners: an awareness that such attrition can happen and the wish that it preferably should not will in all probability be enough to cut the ‘schismogenetic chain’ just before the ultimate happens (‘since we are bound to stay together whatever happens, let’s rather try to make our togetherness liveable’). So alongside the internecine war there will also be long periods of truce, and between them bouts of bargaining and negotiation. And there will be renewed attempts to compromise on a shared set of rules acceptable to all.

# Bio-power Answers

## Democratic regimes will check the impact of biopower.

Edward Ross **Dickinson, 2004** (University of Cincinnati, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About “Modernity,” Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, March, pg. 18-19)

In an important programmatic statement of 1996 Geoff Eley celebrated the fact that Foucault’s ideas have “fundamentally directed attention away from institutionally centered conceptions of government and the state . . . and toward a dispersed and decentered notion of power and its ‘microphysics.’”48 The “broader, deeper, and less visible ideological consensus” on “technocratic reason and the ethical unboundedness of science” was the focus of his interest.49 But the “power-producing effects in Foucault’s ‘microphysical’ sense” (Eley) of the construction of social bureaucracies and social knowledge, of “an entire institutional apparatus and system of practice” ( Jean Quataert), simply do not explain Nazi policy.50 The destructive dynamic of Nazism was a product not so much of a particular modern set of ideas as of a particular modern political structure, one that could realize the disastrous potential of those ideas.What was critical was not the expansion of the instruments and disciplines of biopolitics, which occurred everywhere in Europe. Instead, it was the principles that guided how those instruments and disciplines were organized and used, and the external constraints on them. In National Socialism, biopolitics was shaped by a totalitarian conception of social management focused on the power and ubiquity of the völkisch state. In democratic societies, biopolitics has historically been constrained by a rights-based strategy of social management. This is a point to which I will return shortly. For now, the point is that what was decisive was actually politics at the level of the state. A comparative framework can help us to clarify this point. Other states passed compulsory sterilization laws in the 1930s — indeed, individual states in the United States had already begun doing so in 1907. Yet they did not proceed to the next steps adopted by National Socialism — mass sterilization, mass “eugenic” abortion and murder of the “defective.” Individual figures in, for example, the U.S. did make such suggestions. But neither the political structures of democratic states nor their legal and political principles permitted such policies actually being enacted. Nor did the scale of forcible sterilization in other countries match that of the Nazi program. I do not mean to suggest that such programs were not horrible; but in a democratic political context they did not develop the dynamic of constant radicalization and escalation that characterized Nazi policies.

## Democracies check the impact of biopolitics.

Edward Ross **Dickinson, 2004** (University of Cincinnati, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About “Modernity,” Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, March)

In short, the continuities between early twentieth-century biopolitical discourse and the practices of the welfare state in our own time are unmistakable. Both are instances of the “disciplinary society” and of biopolitical, regulatory, social-engineering modernity, and they share that genealogy with more authoritarian states, including the National Socialist state, but also fascist Italy, for example. And it is certainly fruitful to view them from this very broad perspective. But that analysis can easily become superficial and misleading, because it obfuscates the profoundly different strategic and local dynamics of power in the two kinds of regimes. Clearly the democratic welfare state is not only formally but also substantively quite different from totalitarianism. Above all, again, **it has nowhere developed** the fateful, radicalizing dynamic that characterized National Socialism (or for that matter Stalinism), the psychotic logic that leads from economistic population management to mass murder.

# Bio-power Answers

## Democratic regimes check the impact of biopolitics.

Edward Ross **Dickinson, 2004** (University of Cincinnati, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About “Modernity,” Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, March)

Again, there is always the potential for such a discursive regime to generate coercive policies. In those cases in which the regime of rights does not successfully produce “health,” such a system can —and historically does— create compulsory programs to enforce it. But again, there are political and policy potentials and constraints in such a structuring of biopolitics that are very different from those of National Socialist Germany. Democratic biopolitical regimes require, enable, and incite a degree of self-direction and participation that is functionally incompatible with authoritarian or totalitarian structures. And this pursuit of biopolitical ends through a regime of democratic citizenship does appear, historically, to have imposed **increasingly narrow limits on coercive policies**, and to have generated a “logic” or imperative of increasing liberalization. Despite limitations imposed by political context and the slow pace of discursive change, I think this is the unmistakable message of the really very impressive waves of legislative and welfare reforms in the 1920s or the 1970s in Germany.90

## Biopolitics isn’t the root cause of genocide.

Edward Ross **Dickinson, 2004** (University of Cincinnati, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About “Modernity,” Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, March)

And yet, it is clear that anti-Semitism and eugenics did not imply, presuppose, or necessitate each other. The Nazi variant of biopolitical modernity was in fact quite idiosyncratic. It is very difficult to assess the place of explicitly ethnic racist thinking in the development of eugenics; but despite a resurgence of interest in the differing “character” and fate of ethnic groups after about 1927, on the whole ethnic racism appears to have become gradually less interesting to eugenicists from the late imperial period forward. The Nazis shifted the balance quite suddenly and forcibly in favor of ethnic racial thought after 1933. It may be that the growing influence of eugenics made National Socialist thinking more plausible for many people in the early 1930s; but it seems equally likely that the moderation of eugenics in the 1920s may have increased the appeal of the Social Democratic Party (as the strongest advocate, among the non-Nazi political parties, of eugenic policies) while actually discrediting the Nazis’ more dated ideas.53

## Nazi totalitarianism, not biopolitics, created genocide in Nazi Germany.

Edward Ross **Dickinson, 2004** (University of Cincinnati, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About “Modernity,” Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, March)

How do we sort out the elements of continuity and discontinuity in this pattern? While debate will no doubt continue, there is now something approaching a plausible consensus on this question.The development of eugenic thought since the 1890s —or for that matter of Darwinian thought since the 1850s— was, as Geoff Eley put it in 1996, a “condition of possibility” for Nazi eugenic policy.44 What made mass murder a reality, however, was not the inheritance of eugenic thinking, but the emergence of a “Massnahmenstaat” — a political system that operated by administrative fiat rather than by law. The massively radicalized sterilization policy adopted by the Nazis — which eventually effected some 400,000 persons— could only be implemented by a regime that had effectively silenced open discussion among eugenic experts and among the broader public; and the murder of some 70,000 in the Nazis’ euthanasia program, and some tens of thousands in less organized fashion later, could only be implemented as a conspiracy by a regime that abhorred legality and silenced critique. This is a conclusion that was common already in the seminal works on eugenics in the 1980s, and was stated with particular vehemence by Hans-Walter Schmuhl in 1987; it is now virtually unchallenged.45 Detlev Peukert pointed out in 1989 that the silencing of public dissent and the abrogation of legality were the key steps toward mass murder in the Third Reich; the “vital factor” leading to mass murder was “the character of the Nazi dictatorship.” 46 Jochen-Christoph Kaiser, Kurt Nowak, and Michael Schwartz stated this view with particular clarity in 1992, arguing that: Without the context of the . . . growing erosion of the state of law in favor of the Massnahmenstaat, the National Socialist “euthanasia” could not have been implemented. Even then, it still required the state of emergency of the war and extensive, if not very effective secrecy to put it into motion. Whatever the long-term preconditions may have been, this specific “solution” to the problem, the “extermination of life unworthy of life,” became possible only under the conditions of the “Third Reich.”47 In short, the development of the science of human heredity and the ambition of total social “renovation” (Fritzsche) made Nazi policies theoretically possible, made them imaginable. What **made them real** was the creation of a totalitarian dictatorship. To put it in few words: **no dictatorship, no catastrophe.**

# Bio-power Answers

## Political factors outweigh biopolitics as the internal link to genocide.

Edward Ross **Dickinson, 2004** (University of Cincinnati, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About “Modernity,” Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, March)

This, then, is the transformation created by the Nazis. Here too, just as in the literature on eugenics, it has become clear that it was not so much a rupture at the level of goals or biopolitical discourse, as a rupture at the level of strategy —of political principle, political organization, and political practice. The decisive differences are to be found not so much in biopolitical discourse as in issues of institutional structure, regime form, and citizenship.

## Their impacts are empirically denied—the absence of mass murder and genocide in the modern world denies the link to biopolitics.

Edward Ross **Dickinson, 2004** (University of Cincinnati, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About “Modernity,” Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, March)

What I want to suggest here is that the function of the rhetorical or explanatory framework surrounding our conception of modernity seems to be in danger of being inverted. The investigation of the history of modern biopolitics has enabled new understandings of National Socialism; now we need to take care that our understanding of National Socialism does not thwart a realistic assessment of modern biopolitics. Much of the literature leaves one with the sense that a modern world in which mass murder is not happening is just that: a place where something is not —yet— happening. Normalization is not yet giving way to exclusion, scientific study and classification of populations is not yet giving way to concentration camps and extermination campaigns. Mass murder, in short, is the historical problem; the absence of mass murder is not a problem, it does not need to be investigated or explained.

## Biopolitics doesn’t lead to eugenics.

Edward Ross **Dickinson, 2004** (University of Cincinnati, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About “Modernity,” Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, March)

By the onset of the Great Depression, then, eugenics advocates in Germany appear to have accomplished strikingly little in concrete terms. In fact, if we compare the successes of eugenicists in Germany with those of their counterparts in the United States or the United Kingdom, what is impressive is how vanishingly little practical influence eugenics had in Germany even at the end of the 1920s. As the above summary suggests and as subsequent events would show, at least among a limited number of ministerial bureaucrats and within key nongovernmental organizations eugenics had effectively established itself as a credible science and a credible basis for an alternative — or more accurately a supplementary— policy structure, should the existing biopolitical policy framework (public health, social insurance, social welfare) fail. That was an impressive and historically important achievement; but it hardly makes eugenics the keystone of the broader biopolitical discourse. In fact, it now seems evident that eugenics was still essentially a very small and somewhat isolated part of that discourse.While the institutional framework of social welfare, public health, and social insurance had been under construction for well over half a century by 1930, eugenics was still not really politikfähig — not really a viable basis for actual policies.

## Biopolitics doesn’t lead to eugenics—they have the history of Germany wrong.

Edward Ross Dickinson, 2004 (University of Cincinnati, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About “Modernity,” Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, March)

We may draw some brief conclusions from this story. First, there clearly was no especially convincing fit between eugenic ideas and totalitarian politics. Second, the Nazis adopted and supported one particular variety of eugenic thought.They were not driven by “the” logic of eugenics; rather, they pursued “a” logic of eugenics. Third, the Nazis imposed this particular variety of eugenics on a biopolitical “establishment”— a complex of institutions, disciplines, practices, and policies —that was not very excited about eugenics of any variety, much less the racist negative eugenics the Nazis favored.

# Bio-power Answers

## Turn: Biopolitics actually bolsters democracies.

Edward Ross **Dickinson, 2004** (University of Cincinnati, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About “Modernity,” Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, March)

At its simplest, this view of the politics of expertise and professionalization is certainly plausible. Historically speaking, however, the further conjecture that this “micropolitical” dynamic creates authoritarian, totalitarian, or homicidal potentials at the level of the state does not seem very tenable. Historically, it appears that the greatest advocates of political democracy —in Germany leftliberals and Social Democrats —have been also the greatest advocates of every kind of biopolitical social engineering, from public health and welfare programs through social insurance to city planning and, yes, even eugenics.102 The state they built has intervened in social relations to an (until recently) ever-growing degree; professionalization has run ever more rampant in Western societies; the production of scientistic and technocratic expert knowledge has proceeded at an ever more frenetic pace. And yet, from the perspective of the first years of the millennium, the second half of the twentieth century appears to be the great age of democracy in precisely those societies where these processes have been most in evidence. What is more, the interventionist state has steadily expanded both the rights and the resources of virtually every citizen — including those who were stigmatized and persecuted as biologically defective under National Socialism. Perhaps these processes have created an ever more restrictive “iron cage” of rationality in European societies. But if so, it seems clear that there is no necessary correlation between rationalization and authoritarian politics; the opposite seems in fact to be at least equally true.

## Biopolitics isn’t the root cause of totalitarianism—it can also be used to bolster progressive liberalism.

Edward Ross **Dickinson, 2004** (University of Cincinnati, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About “Modernity,” Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, March)

Like Fritzsche’s essay, Eley’s accurately reflected the tone of most of those it introduced. In the body of the volume, Elizabeth Domansky, for example, pointed out that biopolitics “did not ‘automatically’ or ‘naturally’ lead to the rise of National Socialism,” but rather “provided . . . the political Right in Weimar with the opportunity to capitalize on a discursive strategy that could successfully compete with liberal and socialist strategies.”63 This is correct; but the language of biopolitics was demonstrably one on which liberals, socialists, and advocates of a democratic welfare state could also capitalize, and did. Or again, Jean Quataert remarked—quite rightly, I believe — that “the most progressive achievements of the Weimar welfare state were completely embedded” in biopolitical discourse. She also commented that Nazi policy was “continuous with what passed as the ruling knowledge of the time” and was a product of “an extreme form of technocratic reason” and “early twentieth-century modernity’s dark side.” The implication seems to be that “progressive” welfare policy was fundamentally “dark”; but it seems more accurate to conclude that biopolitics had a variety of potentials.64

## Biopolitics is just as likely to lead to democracy as fascism.

Edward Ross Dickinson, 2004 (University of Cincinnati, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About “Modernity,” Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, March, pg. 1)

IN recent years the outlines of a new master narrative of modern German history have begun to emerge in a wide range of publications. This narrative draws heavily on the theoretical and historical works of Michel Foucault and Detlev J. K. Peukert, and on the earlier work of the Frankfurt School, Max Weber, and the French theorists of postmodernism. In it, rationalization and science, and specifically the extended discursive field of “biopolitics” (the whole complex of disciplines and practices addressing issues of health, reproduction, and welfare) play a key role as the marker and most important content of modernization. Increasingly, this model has a function in German historiography similar to that long virtually monopolized by the “Sonderweg thesis”: it serves as a broad theoretical or interpretive framework that can guide the construction of meaning in “smaller” studies, which are legitimated by their function in concerning or countering this broader argument. This article seeks to critique this model in two ways. First, there is a strong tendency to see in the elaboration of biopolitical discourse in Germany a drift toward totalitarianism. I will argue that the more recent literature suggests that we need to expand our interpretive framework, placing biopolitics in modern Germany in the context of a history that “explains” not only 1933, 1939, 1942, or 1945, but also the democratic welfare states of the 1920s and 1960s. Second, I will argue that it is now increasingly evident that we need to understand “biopolitics” not only as a project of elites and experts, but as a complex social and cultural transformation, a discourse— a set of ideas and practices —that shaped not merely the machinations of social engineers, but patterns of social behavior much more broadly.

# Bio-power Answers

## Biopower can also lead to democracy—other factors outweigh its influence.

Edward Ross **Dickinson, 2004** (University of Cincinnati, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About “Modernity,” Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, March)

In this system health, professional competence, or active citizenship were constructed as a set of “needs,” and those needs as the origin of a set of “rights” to have them met. In the Weimar model, then, the rights of the individual, guaranteed formally by the constitution and substantively by the welfare system,were the central element of the dominant program for the management of social problems.Almost no one in this period advocated expanding social provision out of the goodness of their hearts. This was a strategy of social management,of social engineering. The mainstream of social reform in Germany believed that guaranteeing basic social rights— the substantive or positive freedom of all citizens — was the best way to turn people into power, prosperity, and profit. In that sense, the democratic welfare state was— and is — democratic not despite of its pursuit of biopower, but because of it.

## Biopolitics does not lead to totalitarianism.

Edward Ross **Dickinson, 2004** (University of Cincinnati, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About “Modernity,” Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, March)

Of course it is not yet clear whether this is an irreversible dynamic of such systems. Nevertheless, such regimes are characterized by sufficient degrees of autonomy (and of the potential for its expansion) for sufficient numbers of people that I think it becomes useful to conceive of them as productive of a strategic configuration of power relations that might fruitfully be analyzed as a condition of “liberty,” just as much as they are productive of constraint, oppression, or manipulation. At the very least, **totalitarianism cannot be the sole orientation** point for our understanding of biopolitics, the only end point of the logic of social engineering.

## Other factors outweigh biopolitics in the creation of oppression or liberation.

Edward Ross **Dickinson, 2004** (University of Cincinnati, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About “Modernity,” Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, March)

Uncoupling “technocracy” from “discourse” is not yet enough, however. We should also be alive to the ways in which new social practices, institutions, and knowledge generated new choices — a limited range of them, constrained by all kinds of discursive and social frameworks, but nonetheless historically new and significant. Modern biopolitics did create, in a real sense, not only new constraints but also new degrees of freedom— new levers that increased people’s power to move their own worlds, to shape their own lives. Our understanding of modern biopolitics will be more realistic and more fruitful if we reconceptualize its development as a complex process in which the implications of those new choices were negotiated out in the social and discursive context. Again, in the early twentieth century many more conservative biopolitical “experts” devoted much of their energy precisely to trying— without any discernable success— to control those new degrees of freedom. For most social liberals and Social Democrats, however, those new choices were a potential source of greater social efficiency and social dynamism. State policy reflected the constant negotiation and tension between these perspectives.

## Regime type determines the nature of biopolitics, not the inverse.

Edward Ross **Dickinson, 2004** (University of Cincinnati, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About “Modernity,” Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, March)

We know that eugenics, public health, and welfare all appealed across the political, religious, and ideological spectrum, and around the world, in the early twentieth century. We know that strategies of biopolitical management that were in important ways fundamentally similar were adopted throughout the European world —in Sweden, Italy, France, England, the United States, even arguably in the Soviet Union— in this period, and in the German Empire, the Weimar Republic, Nazi Germany, and the two postwar German states. “The social” as a discursive field is modern, it is not a peculiarity of any national history. National Socialist racial policy was an extreme case of a general phenomenon. These patterns pose a simple but important question: what was the relationship between biopolitics and regime form? One answer might be to argue— as Michael Schwartz and Peter Fritzsche have suggested— that regimes that arise for reasons having little to do with this aspect of modernity “choose” their biopolitics to suit their needs and principles. Victoria de Grazia, for example, has suggested that differing class coalitions determine regime forms, and that regime forms determine the “shape” of biopolitics.111 This is obviously not the approach that has predominated in the literature on Germany, however, which has explored in great depth the positive contribution that modern biopolitics made to the construction of National Socialism. This approach may well exaggerate the importance of biopolitics; but, in purely heuristic terms, it has been extremely fruitful. I want to suggest that it might be equally fruitful to stand it on its head, so to speak. One could easily conclude from this literature that modern biopolitics “fits” primarily authoritarian, totalitarian, technocratic, or otherwise undemocratic regimes, and that democracy has prevailed in Europe in the teeth of the development of technocratic biopolitics. Again, however, the history of twentieth-century Germany, including the five decades after World War II, suggests that this is a fundamentally implausible idea. A more productive conclusion might be that we need to begin to work out the extent and nature of the positive contribution biopolitics has made to the construction also of democratic regimes.

# Bio-power Answers

## Alt will fail: Challenges to biopower will be ineffective.

Steven V. **Hicks, 2003** (Professor and chair of philosophy at Queens College of the CUNY, Foucault and Heidegger: critical encounters, edited by Alan Milchman & Alan Rosenberg Pg. 102-103)

Hence, the only “ethico-political choice” we have, one that Foucault thinks we must make every day, is simply to determine which of the many insidious forms of power is “the main danger” and then to engage in an activity of resistance in the “nexus” of opposing forces. “Unending action is required to combat ubiquitous peril.” But this ceaseless Foucaludian “recoil” from the ubiquitous power perils of “normalization” precludes, or so it would seem, formulating any defensible alternative position or successor ideals. And if Neitzsche is correct in claiming that the only prevailing human ideal to date has been the ascetic ideal, then even Foucauldian resistance will continue to work in service of this ideal, at least under one of its guises, viz., the nihilism of negativity. Certainly Foucault’s distancing of himself from all ideological commitments, his recoiling from all traditional values by which we know and judge, his holding at bay all conventional answers that press themselves upon us, and his keeping in play the “twists” and “recoils” that question our usual concepts and habitual patterns of behavior, all seem a close approximation, in the ethico-political sphere, to the idealization of asceticism.

## Foucault’s alternatives to biopower prevent positive solutions.

Steven V. **Hicks, 2003** (Professor and chair of philosophy at Queens College of the CUNY, Foucault and Heidegger: critical encounters, edited by Alan Milchman & Alan Rosenberg Pg. 101-102)

At this juncture we should ask whether the lessons that Foucault would have us draw from Heidegger’s account of technology also hark back to another “incomplete” form of nihilism that Nietzsche equally feared: the “nihilism of negativity.” Certain passages in Foucault would suggest as much. In one of the later interviews, Foucault refers to himself as “a hyperactive pessimist” who avoids apathy by seeing everything as “dangerous” precisely because all systems of power, all forms of social and political organization, can inhibit struggle and militate against their contestation. And in a manner reminiscent of the Russian nihilism Nietzsche rejects, Foucault says: “Writing interests me only in the measure that it incorporates the reality of combat, as an instrument, a tactic, a spotlight. I would like my books to be like surgeons’ knives, Molotov cocktails, or galleries in a mine, and like fireworks, to be carbonized after use.” In underscoring the agonal nature of his work, Foucault shares with Nietzsche an almost tragic glorification of struggle of struggle in the face of overwhelming forces (of nihilism). Yet contra Nietzsche, much of Foucault’s analysis of the mechanisms and arrangements of “power-knowledge” undercuts the possibility of formulating positive, alternative ideals for a better future. As one commentator points out, Foucault’s understanding of modern power, as “ubiquitous, inescapable, stemming from [micro-levels] below, and productive of our very identity**,” rules out any “opiate belief in absolute emancipation”:** In the modern world the most insidious forms of power are shown to be productive forces engaged in the subjectification of their participant victims. Modern power not only restricts, it incites—and does so by means of administering over the self-definition of its subjects….[A]n escape from [such] subjectification is impossible. Resistance to forces remains the only alternative….[T]here is no realm of freedom in which we may escape power to assert our nature: we might change our positions on the web [like a captured fly], but there is no jumping off.

# \*\*\*\*\*Capitalism K Answers\*\*\*\*\*

**Any transition is worse and causes worse forms of capitalism**

**Flood ‘04** [Andrew, Anarchist organizer and writer, “Civilization, Primitivism, Anarchism,” <http://www.anarkismo.net/newswire.php?story_id=1451>]

However it is worth doing a little mental exercise on this idea of the oil running out. If indeed there was no alternative what might happen? Would a primitivist utopia emerge even at the bitter price of 5,900 million people dying? No. The primitivists seem to forget that we live in a class society. The population of the earth is divided into a few people with vast resources and power and the rest of us. It is not a case of equal access to resources, rather of quite incredible unequal access. **Those who fell victim to the mass die off would not include** Rubert **Murdoch**, Bill **Gates** **or** George **Bush because these people** have the money and power to **monopolise remaining supplies** for themselves. Instead **the first to die** in huge number **would be** the population of the **poorer** mega **cities** on the planet. Cairo and Alexandria in Egypt have a population of around 20 million between them. Egypt is dependent both on food imports and on the very intensive agriculture of the Nile valley and the oasis. Except for the tiny wealthy elite those 20 million urban dwellers would have nowhere to go and there is no more land to be worked. Current high yields are in part dependent on high inputs of cheap energy. The mass **deaths of millions** of people **is not something that destroys capitalism**. Indeed at periods of history it has been seen as quite natural and even desirable for the modernization of capital. The potato famine of the 1840's that reduced the population of Ireland by 30% was seen as desirable by many advocates of free trade.(16) So was the 1943/4 famine in British ruled Bengal in which four million died(17). For the capitalist class such mass deaths, particularly in colonies afford opportunities to restructure the economy in ways that would otherwise be resisted. **The real result** of an 'end of energy' crisis **would see our rulers stock piling** what energy **sources** remained and using them to power the helicopter gunships that would be used to control those of us fortunate enough to be selected to toil for them in the biofuel fields. **The unlucky majority would** just be kept where they are and allowed to **die off**. More of the 'Matrix' then utopia in other words. The other point to be made here is that **destruction can** serve to **regenerate capitalism**. Like it or not large scale destruction allows some capitalist to make a lot of money. Think of the Iraq war. The destruction of the Iraqi infrastructure may be a disaster for the people of Iraq buts it's a profit making bonanza for Halliburton and co[18]. Not coincidentally the Iraq war, is helping the US A, where the largest corporations are based, gain control of the parts of the planet where much future and current oil production takes place.

**Capitalism solves violence- peaceful venues**

**Fukuyama ‘98** [Francis, Hirst Professor of Public Policy at George Mason University, Foreign Affairs, “Women and the Evolution of World Politics,” <http://people.reed.edu/~ahm/Courses/Reed-POL-240-2009-S3_IP/Syllabus/EReadings/05.1.Feminism_Fukuyama1998Women.pdf>]

Take the human and particularly male desire to dominate a status hierarchy, which people share with other primates. **The advent of liberal democracy and modern capitalism does not eliminate that desire, but it opens up many more peaceful channels for satisfying it**. Among the American Plains Indians or the Yanomam?, virtually the only way for a man to achieve social recognition was to be a warrior, which meant, of course, excelling at killing. Other traditional societies might add a few occupations like the priesthood or the bureaucracy in which one could achieve recognition. **A modern, technological society**, by contrast, **offers thousands of arenas in which one can achieve social status, and in most of them the quest for status leads not to violence but to socially productive activity**. A professor receiving tenure at a leading university, a politician winning an election, or a ceo increasing market share may satisfy the same underlying drive for status as being the alpha male in a chimp community. But in the process, these individuals have written books, designed public policies, or brought new technologies to market that have improved human welfare. Of course, not everyone can achieve high rank or dominance in any given status hierarchy, since these are by definition zero-sum games in which every winner produces a loser. But the advantage of a modern, complex, fluid society is, as economist Robert Frank has pointed out, that small frogs in large ponds can move to smaller ponds in which they will loom larger. Seeking status by choosing the right pond will not satisfy the ambitions of the greatest and noblest individuals, but itw ill bleed off much of the competitive energy that in hunter-gatherer or agricultural societies often has no outlet save war. Liberal democracy and **market economies work well because**, un like socialism, radical feminism, and other Utopian schemes, **they do not try to change human nature**. Rather, **they accept biologically grounded nature as a given and seek to constrain it through institutions, laws, and norms**. It does not always work, but **it is better than living like animals**.

# Capitalism K Answers

**It’s the only moral system- it uniquely allows freedom of thought**

**Shadab ’96** [Houman, philosopher, CAPITALISM: FAQS, 1996, p. <http://www.ocf.berkeley.edu/~shadab/capit-2.html#6>]

In regards to morality, **capitalism is the only moral** (meaning pro-human-life) social **system because it safeguards a human's primary means of survival: his mind. Through upholding individual rights, capitalism recognizes the fact the each and every human being must use his own mind to grasp reality and act accordingly to better his own life. Capitalism is the only political system that is based upon man's true nature as a being who possesses the faculty of reason -- capitalism is the only system that recognizes that human beings can think**. Indeed, **individual rights and capitalism not only protect the individual person and property of each human being, but most importantly, they protect the individual mind of every human being**. Historically speaking, capitalism has been claimed to be consistent with philosophies such as utilitarianism, social Darwinism, and even fundamentalist Christianity. However, these philosophies are in fact antithecal to the true nature of capitalism because they subordinate the good of the individual's life on earth to some "higher good." In fact, the only philosophy that is completely consistent with the theoretical requirements for understanding and promoting capitalism is the philosophy of Objectivism.

**Consequences key to ethics**

**Issac 2002** (Jeffery, professor of political science @ Indiana University. Dissent, Spring 2002, 49: 2, p. 32)

Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of politics. Power is the ability to effect outcomes in the world. Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world, one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters ; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics — as opposed to religion— pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century : it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

# Capitalism K Answers

**Capitalism is self-correcting- solves benevolently and is inevitable**

[**Karshis**](http://www.karshis.com/contact.html) **‘05** (Sean, “Capitalism and the Self Correcting mechanism,” <http://www.karshis.com/>)

**As a government infringes on personal rights**, namely that to live, and dabbles into commerce in its� inefficient and expensive way, **capitalism will be eager to correct it.** The economic system can reinstate infringed personal freedoms and direct government in a positive direction, reducing the costs inherent. There are six ways in which capitalism does this. Competition-To keep competitive (and raise living standards) a country must increase production. As production is increased profits also increase, increasing the incentive of capitalists to partake in the struggle for increased production. If this cycle stagnates through poor resource expenditure, or bureaucratic red tape, productive jobs are lost to other nations, as foreign capitalists compete for productive labor. The bureaucratic nation will economically decline and its citizens may demand change, or other countries more suited to capitalism will advance and eventually dominate the statist nations. Devaluation If a government has a record of poor economic policies, or managed it�s business poorly, the capital markets of the world will penalize them by reducing credit availability and devaluing the currency. This is not a conscious decision of one person, but a general capitalist reaction. Black Market "One tell-tale sign of the excessive regulation of domestic markets is a thriving black economy." Jim Walker, chief Asian economist at Credit Lyonnais, estimates that the "underground economy accounts for 30-50% of GDP in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand, and 20-30% in South Korea Malaysia and Taiwan". These economies are inundated with red tape. **As government extends its reach** (increasing taxes or watering rights by inflation) **people spend more of their time creating their own market, as to avoid the governmentally dominated one.** This lowers tax revenue, decreases the abilities of the government, and **if persistent, can lead to a serious weakening of the state, and prepare it for a revolution and capitalist correction**. Economic Revolution If the nation�s people are not allowed jobs and an increasing standard of living, and other nations are experiencing this, there will be an economic revolution. This begins with a black market and later will spark into a political revolution that demands changes. If the nations that the civilians compared themselves to are capitalist, these free ideals will be demanded. History may prove me wrong, as we are seeing in a rising (yet not dominant) power of Communists and a disenchantment of capitalism in Russia, but the trend of the last 50 years has been toward economic liberalization and capitalism. The Media Sinclair Lewis�s book The Jungle is a perfect example of the market recognizing failings in the system (in this case, the government oversight of the neighbor effect of poor meat packing), and the state was painfully informed as millions of Americans learned of it through this novel. The modern media networks are derived of capital and run for profit; they are a function of a thriving capitalist economy. The more eyes looking for problems (because problems tend to promote sales for the media) the more problems will be found. Noam Chomsky, a noted linguist and political commentator, believes that the media is a direct reflection of the dominant power structures of a nation. I agree, yet he also maintains that there is news deemed by the economic elites as �not fit-to-print� and insinuates that a sort of conspiracy is at work maintaining this. I disagree. Think of the popular media industry (TV, newspapers, magazines, movies, and literature) as a loud sounding board of a population, so loud in fact that that it has the ability to alter the original sounds of the population, when this happens it is called propaganda; Chomsky would agree. Yet the multitude of media services are scrambling for market share, whatever people will buy, they will sell. If the populations want to hear something they will buy it (or watch it and increase Nealson Ratings), increasing profits for the publisher, which could (assuming enough people also wanted to hear such information) create a new market. This cycle has no room for a cultural editor, who if not directly in pulse with the desires of the population will produce the wrong show, and some other media wit will fill the gap. Only if there were a monopoly over media could this be true. In 1989 twenty-five companies produced nearly 50% of our nations news, this is not a monopolyz , these news servers are not in cahoots, in fact rivalry is fierce. There are people who through the power of the dollar are able to pursue what they want to know far easier than those who do not have the financial means. Bill Gates, Rupert Murdock, or Ted Turner all have extraordinary sway in public opinion, yet among the three of them there is not collusion or a conspiracy to assemble world thought. Each is interested in their own self-interests, namely the pursuit of profits. Each acquires profits by increasing market share of their respective product, if this does not suit the populations, profits are lost to a competitor, and a more suiting idea or news is fashioned for the public. Economic Diversion **Governments and other organized bureaucratic institutions have been the developers of humanities worst atrocities**. The harm caused by DDT or Long Island pale in comparison to the horror of the Holocaust in Nazi Germany, or the atrocities of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. The importance of commerce today diverts the attentions of nations from military aggression toward trade. The productive benefits of capitalism can create a positive avenue for the meddling of governments. Through these means **the economic system of capitalism struggles for dominance against the pressures of government.** This is a just cause. **Capitalists thrive on individual freedom, governmental bureaucrats thrive from gathering** as much **freedom** (through taxes and laws) to keep their department (and their job) growing and safe. Capitalism allocates money cheaply and efficiently, government�s pay more per dollar spent, and tend to allocate it inefficiently. Capitalism increases long run productivity, growth, and standards of living, large governments don�t. Through all of this bickering there are two main points. **If the government is acting beyond its purposeful role, capitalism will attempt to gather this control.** Second, if government is acting efficiently by allowing capitalism enough room to grow and innovate, **the nation and its citizens will prosper and realize increased freedom**. In the words of Ayn Rand: "Those that advocate laissez-faire capitalism are the only advocates of a man�s rights."

# Capitalism K Answers

**Tech solves the environment**

**Baumol ’07** [William J professor of economics at NYU, Robert E. Litan, Senior Fellow of Economic Studies at the Brookings Institute, and Carl J. Schramm, President and chief executive officer of the Kauffman Foundation,” 2007, Good Capitalism, Bad Capitalism, and the Economics of Growth and Prosperity]

One line of skepticism about growth arises from individuals and groups who worry that as the world’s population increases and economic growth continues, societies will use up scarce resources and, at the same time, degrade the environment. In the early 1970s, a group called the “Club of Rome” expressed such worries, fearing that eventually (and rather soon) the world would run out of energy and some commodities, so that growth couldn’t continue at anything like the existing pace. Today, there are those who believe, for similar reasons, that growth shouldn’t continue. **The doomsayers who projected that economic growth would come to a standstill were wrong. Since 1975, total world economic output has increased more than sevenfold**.2 **On a per capita basis, world output is more than five times higher than it was thirty years ago. Growth in output, and therefore income, per person throughout the world advanced at a far more rapid pace** (nearly ninefold) **in the twentieth century** than in any other century during the previous one thousand years (to the extent these things can be measured).3 **Per capita output continues to increase because firms around the world continue to make more use of machines and information technology that enable workers to be more productive and because technology itself continues to advance, making it possible for consumers to use new products and services. There is good reason to hope that this process can and will continue**, though there are some lurking dangers, including foolish actions by governments. But should growth continue? What about the supplies of energy that will be depleted in the process or the pollution that will be generated as ever more things are produced and used? Curiously, economists who tend to be quite rational in their lives urge the worriers to have faith—faith that continued technological progress powered by market incentives will ease these concerns. As it turns out, however, economists’ faith has roots in historical fact. In the early 1800s, Thomas R. Malthus famously predicted that the world’s population would eventually starve or, at the least, live at a minimal level of subsistence because food production could not keep pace with the growth of population. Technological advances since that time have proved him wrong. **Through better farming techniques, the invention of new farming equipment, and continuing advances in agricultural science** (especially the recent “green revolution” led by genetic engineering), **food production has increased much more rapidly than population**, so much so that in “real terms” (after adjusting for inflation), the price of food is much lower today than it was two hundred years ago, or for that matter, even fifty years ago. Farmers, who once accounted for more than 50 percent of the population at the dawn of the twentieth century in the United States, now comprise less than 2 percent of population— and are able to grow far more food at the same time.

**Capitalism is inevitable- we make it better**

**Wilson ‘00** [John K., coordinator of the Independent Press Association’s Campus Journalism Project, How the Left can Win Arguments and Influence People, pg 12- 14]

**Progressive capitalism is not a contradiction in terms, for progressives support capitalism in many ways. Even nonprofit organizations and cooperatives are not antithetical to capitalism and the market; these groups simply use capitalism for aims different from the single-minded pursuit of profits**. But the rules of supply and demand, the expenses and revenues, the idea of entrepreneurship and innovation, and the need to adapt to the market are essential. Any progressive magazine or institution that tries to defy the rules of capitalism won't be around for very long and certainly won’t have the resources to mount a serious advocacy of progressive ideas. **One of the most effective tactics of the environmental movement was encouraging consumers to consider environmental values when making capitalist choices about what products to buy. Today, a manufacturer who ignores environmental issues puts its profits at risk** because so many people are looking for environmentally friendly products and packaging. Crusades against Coca-Cola for its massive output of non-recycled plastic bottles in America or against companies supporting foreign dictatorships are part of the continuing battle to force companies to pay attention to consumer demands. Of course, consumer protests and boycotts are only one part of making "capitalism for everyone." Many progressive groups are now buying stock in companies precisely to raise these issues at stockholder meetings and pressure the companies to adopt environmentally and socially responsible policies. Unfortunately, the legal system is structured against progressive ideas. In 2000, Ben and Jerry's Ice Cream was forced to sell out to a big corporation that might ignore its commitment to many progressive causes. The company didn't want to sell, but the law demanded that the company's duty to stockholders was to consider only the money involved. **Imagine what would happen if our capitalist laws were designed to promote progressive ideas instead of impeding them. Instead of allowing a shareholder lawsuit against any company acting in a morally, socially, and environmentally conscious way, American laws should encourage these goals. The claim by some leftists that capitalism is inherently irresponsible or evil doesn't make sense. Capitalism is simply a system of markets. What makes capitalism so destructive isn't the basic foundation but the institutions that have been created in the worship of the "free market." Unfortunately, progressives spend most of their time attacking capitalism rather than taking credit for all the reforms that led to America's economic growth**. If Americans were convinced that social programs and investment in people (rather than corporate welfare and investment in weaponry) helped create the current economic growth, they would be far more willing to pursue additional progressive policies. Instead, the left allows conservatives to dismiss these social investments as “too costly” or “big government.”

# Capitalism K Answers

**Capitalism solves poverty and fascism- bootstraps model**

**Saunders ’07** [Peter Saunders. Australian social researcher, professor emeritus at the Centre for Independent Studies and Adjunct Professor at the Australian Graduate School of Management, Summer 07-08. "Why Capitalism is Good for the Soul". CIS Policy. http://www.cis.org.au/POLICY/ summer%2007-08/saunders\_ summer07.html]

If we want to know if capitalism is bad (or good) for the ‘soul,’ it probably makes more sense to approach the question metaphorically rather than theologically. Approached in this way, saying something is ‘good for the soul’ implies simply that it enhances our capacity to live a good life. On this less literal and more secular interpretation of the ‘soul,’ capitalism fares rather well. We have known since the time of Adam Smith that capitalism harnesses self-interest to generate outcomes that benefit others. This is obvious in the relationship between producers and consumers, for profits generally flow to those who anticipate what other people want and then deliver it at the least cost. But it also holds in the relationship between employers and employees. One of Karl Marx’s most mischievous legacies was to suggest that this relationship is inherently antagonistic: that for employers to make profit, they must drive wages down. In reality, workers in the advanced capitalist countries thrive when their companies increase profits. **The pursuit of profit** thus **results in higher living standards for workers, as well as cheaper and more plentiful goods and services for consumers. The way this has enhanced people’s capacity to lead a good life can be seen in the spectacular reduction in levels of global poverty, brought about by the spread of capitalism on a world scale. In 1820, 85% of the world’s population lived on today’s equivalent of less than a dollar per day**. By 1950, this proportion had fallen to 50%. **Today it is down to 20%.** **World poverty has fallen more in the last fifty years than it did in the previous five hundred**.(11) **This dramatic reduction in human misery** and despair owes nothing to aging rockstars demanding that we ‘make poverty history.’ It **is due to the spread of global capitalism. Capitalism has also made it possible for many more people to live on Earth and to survive for longer than ever before**. In 1900, the average life expectancy in the ‘less developed countries’ was just thirty years. By 1960, this had risen to forty-six years. By 1998, it was sixty-five years. To put this extraordinary achievement into perspective, the average life expectancy in the poorest countries at the end of the twentieth century was fifteen years longer than the average life expectancy in the richest country in the world—Britain—at the start of that century. **By perpetually raising productivity, capitalism has not only driven down poverty rates and raised life expectancy, it has also released much of humanity from the crushing burden of physical labour, freeing us to pursue ‘higher’ objectives instead**. What Clive Hamilton airily dismisses as a ‘growth fetish’ has resulted in one hour of work today delivering twenty-five times more value than it did in 1850. This has freed huge chunks of our time for leisure, art, sport, learning, and other ‘soul-enriching’ pursuits. Despite all the exaggerated talk of an ‘imbalance’ between work and family life, the average Australian today spends a much greater proportion of his or her lifetime free of work than they would had they belonged to any previous generation in history. **There is another sense, too, in which capitalism has freed individuals so they can pursue worthwhile lives, and that lies in its record of undermining tyrannies and dictatorships**. As examples like Pinochet’s Chile and Putin’s Russia vividly demonstrate, a free economy does not guarantee a democratic polity or a society governed by the rule of law. But as Milton Friedman once pointed out, these latter conditions are never found in the absence of a free economy.(12) Historically, **it was capitalism that delivered humanity from the ‘soul-destroying’ weight of feudalism. Later, it freed millions from the dead hand of totalitarian socialism**. While capitalism may not be a sufficient condition of human freedom, it is almost certainly a necessary one.

# Capitalism K Answers

**Capitalism isn’t the root cause of anything, and the alt doesn’t solve**

**Martin ‘90** [Brian Martin, Department of Science and Technology Studies, University of Wollongong, Australia, Uprooting War, 1990 edition <http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/90uw/uw13.html>]

The discussion so far concerns capitalist firms within a particular state. The wider question is, what role does the world capitalist system play in the war system? When examining particular wars, the immediate role of profit and accumulation are often minimal. Examples are World War Two, the Indochinese War and the many Middle East wars. Even in many colonial empires, immediate economic advantages for the capitalist class have played a minor role compared to issues of expansion and maintenance of state power. The role of capitalism mainly entered through its structuring of economic relations which are supervised separately and jointly by capitalist states. The main military service of the state to capitalists in the international system is to oppose movements which threaten the viability of capitalist economic relations. This includes state socialism and all movements for self-management. At the same time, the way this state intervention operates, namely through separate and potentially competing state apparatuses, can conflict with the security of capitalism. Wars and military expenditures can hurt national economies, as in the case of US government expenditures for fighting in Vietnam. Only some struggles against capitalism have potential for challenging the war system. Efforts to oppose capital by mobilising the power of the state do little in this direction. In particular, promotion of state socialism (the destruction of capitalism within a state mode, with the maintenance of bureaucratic control and military power) does little to address the problem of war. The trouble here is that much of the socialist left sees capitalism as the sole source of evil in the world. This approach is blind to the roots of social problems that do not primarily grow out of class domination, including racism, sexism, environmental degradation and war. Because of this blindness, even the struggle against capitalism is weakened, since attention is not paid to systems of power such as patriarchy and bureaucracy which are mobilised to support capitalism as well as other interests.

**Capitalism makes war unprofitable, creates peace**

**Nyquist ‘06** [JR. Financial Sense, “Anatomy of a Delusion,” September 8, <http://www.financialsense.com/stormwatch/geo/pastanalysis/2006/0908.html>]

**The free market teaches men to love peace, while the miserable circumstances of socialist decline teach men the necessity of predatory warfare**. According to Mises, **the market’s love of peace** “does not spring from philanthropic considerations” but **depends on a proper appreciation of economic self-interest. Those who believe in profit and the free market reject war because war signifies the destruction of property**. Wars are not initiated by corporate greed. Wars are initiated by backward cults who seek a return to medieval conditions. **World revolution is the cry of the militant socialists,** the Marxist-Leninists of the People’s Republic of China, North Korea, Vietnam, Cuba and the KGB clique that presently governs the “former” Soviet Union. To understand world events properly we must understand the distinction between socialist and free market economies. **Dictatorship and war belong to the sphere of socialism and economic controls** (or restrictions). Freedom means the freedom to buy and sell, to build and create. **Once you allow a mob of political activists to legislate against the free market** – in accordance with moral or environmental pleas – **your economic decline is foreordained.** Instead of a society guided by environmental angels, you will have a society guided by distorted madmen who (in the words of Mises) “do not approach the study of economic matters with scientific disinterestedness. Most of them are driven by an envious resentment against those whose incomes are larger than their own. This bias makes it impossible for them to see things as they really are. For them the main thing is not to improve the conditions of the masses, but to harm the entrepreneurs and capitalists even if this policy victimizes the immense majority of the people.”

# Capitalism K Answers

**Their depiction of capitalist power just lends it more credibility- kills opposition**

J.K. **Gibson**-**Graham**, the pen name of Katherine Gibson, Senior Fellow of Human Geography at Australian National University, and Julie Graham, professor of Geography at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, **1996**, The End of Capitalism (As We Knew It), p. 1-3

**Understanding capitalism has always been a project of the left**, especially within the Marxian tradition. There, where knowledges of “capitalism” arguably originated, theory is accorded an explicit social role. From Marx to Lenin to the neo-Marxists of the post-World War II period, **theorists have understood their work as contributing** — whether proximately or distantly — **to anticapitalist projects of political action**. In this sense economic theory has related to politics as a subordinate and a servant: we understand the world in order to change it. Given the avowed servitude of left theory to left political action it is ironic (though not surprising) that **understandings and images of capitalism can quite readily be viewed as contributing to a crisis in left politics**. Indeed, and this is the argument we wish to make in this book, **the project of understanding the beast has itself produced a beast**, or even a bestiary; **and the process of producing knowledge in service to politics has estranged rather than united understanding and action**. Bringing these together again, or allowing them to touch in different ways, is one of our motivating aspirations. **“Capitalism” occupies a special and privileged place in the language of social representation. References to “capitalist society” are a common­place** of left and even mainstream social description, **as are references — to the market, to the global economy, to postindustrial society — in which an unnamed capitalism is implicitly invoked as the defining and unifying moment of a complex economic and social formation**. Just as the economic system in eastern Europe used confidently to be described as communist or socialist, so a general confidence in economic classification characterizes representations of an increasingly capitalist world system. But what might be seen as the grounds of this confidence, if we put aside notions of “reality” as the authentic origin of its representations? **Why might it seem problematic to say that the U**nited **S**tates **is a Christian nation, or a heterosexual one, despite the widespread belief that Christianity and heterosexuality are dominant or majority practices** in their respective domains, **while at the same time it seems legitimate and indeed “accurate” to say that the US is a capitalist country?**1 What is it about the former expressions, and their critical history, that makes them visible as “regulatory fictions,”2 ways of erasing or obscuring difference, while the latter is seen as accurate representation? Why, moreover, have embracing and holistic expressions for social struc­ture like patriarchy fallen into relative disuse among feminist theorists (see Pringle 1995; Barrett and Phillips 1992) while similar concep­tions of capitalism as a system or “structure of power” are still preva­lent and resilient? These sorts of questions, by virtue of their scarcity and scant claims to legitimacy, have provided us a motive for **this book**.3 The End of Capitalism (As We Knew It) **problematizes “capitalism”. as an economic and social descriptor**.4 **Scrutinizing** what might be seen as throwaway uses of the term — passing **references**, for example, **to the capitalist system or to global capitalism** — as well as systematic and deliberate attempts to represent capitalism as a central and organizing feature of modern social experience, **the book selectively traces the discursive origins of a widespread understanding: that capitalism is the hegemonic. or even the only, present form of economy** and that it will continue to be so in the proximate future. **It follows from this** prevalent though not ubiquitous view **that noncapitalist economic sites**, if they exist at all, must inhabit the social margins; and, as a corollary, that deliberate attempts to develop noncapitalist economic practices and institutions **must take place in** the social interstices, in the realm of experiment, or in **a visionary space of revolutionary social replacement.** **Representations of capitalism are a potent constituent of the anticapi­talist imagination**, providing images of what is to be resisted and changed as well as intimations of the strategies, techniques, and possibilities of changing it. For this reason, **depictions of “capitalist hegemony” deserve a particularly skeptical reading**. For **in** the vicinity of **these representations**, the very idea of **a noncapitalist economy takes the shape of an** unlikelihood or even an **impossibility**. **It becomes difficult to entertain a vision of the prevalence and vitality of noncapitalist economic forms, or of daily or partial replacements of capitalism by noncapitalist economic practices, or of capitalist retreats and reversals**. In this sense, **“capitalist hegemony” operates not only as a constituent of, but also as a brake upon, the anticapitalist imagination**.5 **What difference might it make to** release that brake and **allow an anticapitalist economic imaginary to develop unrestricted?**6 **If we were to dissolve the image that looms in the economic foreground, what shadowy economic forms might come forward?** In these questions we can identify the broad outlines of our project: to discover or create a world of economic difference, and to populate that world with exotic creatures that become, upon inspection, quite local and familiar (not to mention familiar beings that are not what they seem).

# Capitalism K Answers

**Capitalism prevents war—empirically proven**

Carl J. **Schramm**, CEO, June 28, **2006**, “Capitalism spreads freedom even as democracy falters,” USA Today, p. np

More than the export of democracy, it is the export of entrepreneurial capitalism that can produce a new birth of peace and freedom around our globe. Entrepreneurial capitalism is based on individual invention, and because wealth comes from one's own initiative, it advances human dignity. And here is the good news. Virtually every country, whatever its political system, wants to embrace it. They have seen the success of the American economy. It has been said that when goods cross borders, armies don't. Today, China and India are the world's two largest countries racing toward entrepreneurial capitalism. They are the example and test of that thesis. Several decades ago, their armies clashed. Now no one talks of war, only of their economic emergence. Capitalism has promoted peace and, in China, better -- though still inadequate -- respect for rights. If, with our assistance, Adam Smith's entrepreneurial capitalism were to become ubiquitous, the cross-border investment in the success of our brothers and sisters around the world, and theirs in us, would cause people everywhere to see the futility of ancient struggles, whether based on plunder, conquest or theocratic fervor. In the insight of our invisible founder is the secret for achieving a future of global peace.

**Turn- the revolution is one of genocide, totalitarianism, and mass death**

Lawrence **Osborne**, Contributor to NYT Magazine and The New York Observer, **1999** (“Misadventures in Marxism,” *Salon.com/CNN.com*, September 1, Available Online at http://edition.cnn.com/books/news/9909/01/ marx.salon/index.html, Accessed 10-15-2004)

But **the left's bamboozling rhetoric**, Courtois maintains, **is but the least of Marxism's sins. The radical tradition as a whole**, he argues, **has utterly failed to resolve the paradox of its own terrorism and mass violence, leaving it wide open to its current loss of credibility. Academic Marxism hardly even bothers to ask the question**, except to play the usual good-cop, bad-cop routine: humane Lenin, evil Stalin, etc. **But the failure of Marxism-Leninism goes deeper than its accidental betrayals. It is the ideology itself**, claims the darker of the present volumes, **that contributed to the stupefying tally of 100 million violent deaths under the hammer and sickle -- the largest ideology-driven genocide in history. Mass murder**, they point out with numbing archival thoroughness, **was made the center of the revolutionary state in 1918, not 1931, and by 1920 Lenin had killed more people than 90 years of czarism combined. He was, of course, spectacularly outdone by subsequent "Marxist" dictators who thought history was on their side**. For his chapters on the Bolsheviks, Nicholas Werth of the Institute of Contemporary History draws on newly available sources from the Soviet archives. According to Werth, **the very idea of class warfare in the abstract** -- such vague, antiseptic categories as "bourgeoisie," "kulaks," "counterrevolutionaries," etc. -- **provided the theoretical basis for extermination. Indeed, Marx's notion of the evil "bourgeoisie"** -- an amorphously vague entity Berman invokes on almost every page -- **is the foundation of the original pseudo-scientific hate theory in which an entire abstract class of people is held responsible for all the ills of the race, according to putatively scientific and discernible laws**.

# Capitalism K Answers

**Turn- waiting on the “revolution” will backfire and their reps of an all-encompassing “capitalism” marginalize real world solutions**

Carole **Biewener**, Professor and Director of Gender/Cultural Studies at Simmons College, 19**99** (“A Postmodern Encounter: Poststructuralist Feminism and the Decentering of Marxism,” Socialist Review, Volume 27, Issue 1/2, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via ProQuest)

**Marxism has produced a discourse of Capitalism that ostensibly identifies and defines an object of transformative class politics but that operates more powerfully to discourage and marginalize projects of class transformation. In a sense, marxism has contributed to the socialist absence through the very way in which it has theorized the capitalist presence**.33 **Capitalism has generally been theorized as a unified, singular, and totalizing entity. While this vision of Capitalism as ubiquitous, penetrating, systemic, and hegemonic has enabled certain kinds of radical left political projects and movements, it has also disabled and marginalized others. Gibson-Graham**, along with others in the postmodern materialist tradition, **questions the inevitability of such a vision of "Capitalism" and has begun to investigate the political possibilities that are enabled by an alternative notion of capitalist exploitation** built upon the thin notion of class discussed above. **One exciting and fertile possibility is that of being able to envision class in a myriad of new sites and in a multitude of forms. Class processes are recognized as occurring not only in capitalist industrial enterprises, but also in households and communities, in recreational facilities and religious institutions. Thus, by theorizing the other-than-capitalist modalities of class processes, social formations are understood as having a multiple class character, rather than simply being "capitalist" or "noncapitalist"; and, the other- than-capitalist class processes are not theorized as being subservient to, or shaped by capitalist class processes in any essential or dominant manner**.34 **This understanding of class as local, plural, dispersed, and uncentered enables a radical politics in which class processes are always being negotiated, constituted, and contested. It allows a sense of being actively involved in creating or constituting class processes in new ways in our immediate, daily lives. To the extent that we address the performance of surplus labor, our conversations, explorations, positionings, and actions in our households, communities, and workplaces can now be understood as part of an active project of social transformation in a class sense. If "capitalism" is not conceived of as a systemic, totalizing entity, but rather as local, dispersed, partial, and uncentered, then many spaces are opened up for creating and enacting noncapitalist and even communal or communist class processes**. **Further, with such a fragmentation and multiplicity of class processes, Leftists do not have to insist that effective class politics is linked to the agency of any one well-defined group**, such as "the working class." **Struggle over class is not seen, therefore, as the privileged domain of the proletariat. Rather, a variety of class modalities and sites can be used and struggled over to change class relations and many different social actors may be understood as engaging in struggles over class. Collective production and appropriation of surplus labor can be fostered and enacted in a factory or office, in the production of a journal or in a household, without having to have wait for cataclysmic, systemic, all encompassing, revolutionary change**.

**Turn: the notion that “all oppression stems from capitalism” is a privileged position that blinds us from the specifics of how power operates:**

Chris **Dixon, 2005** (“Reflection of Privilege Reformism, and Activism” <http://www.geocities.com/kk_abacus/ioaa/dixon2.html>)

Unfortunately, beyond this important point, he seems otherwise wholly unconcerned with the consequences and dynamics of racism specifically, **and of many other systems of power more generally**. And this isn't a minor oversight on his part; it's embedded in his assumptions. "The movement of the exploited and excluded," he writes passionately, "which is antagonistic to capitalism and the state…is a movement that grows out of our present social conditions and our desires for a different world." A noble sentiment for sure, but exactly who does "our" refer to? And what are "our" present social conditions? If he refers to us, as in all people, then our social conditions are **widely divergent** as we navigate through a complex matrix of systems that award or oppress us, in finely-tuned degrees, based on our genders, colors, cultures, classes, citizenship statuses, first languages, ages, sexualities, and **much more**. Certainly we have commonalities in our social conditions, yet also very distinct particularities. Any accurate radical analysis requires a focus on both. But I don't think sasha, along with the approach that he represents, cares to notice particularities. The **presumption** is a social reality in **which we are all evenly oppressed**, largely undifferentiated, "enmeshed," as he says, **in "capitalist social relations**." This generalization is actually **easy to make, assuming one is privileged and insulated enough** to ignore the specifics of oppressive systems, especially those that **don't fall under the rubric of "capitalism and the state**."

# Capitalism K Answers

**Capitalism is inevitable- even the alternative is part of the system**

**Wilson ‘00** (John K., coordinator of the Independent Press Association’s Campus Journalism Project, How the Left can Win Arguments and Influence People, pg 12- 14)

**Progressive capitalism is not a contradiction in terms, for progressives support capitalism in many ways. Even nonprofit organizations and cooperatives are not antithetical to capitalism and the market; these groups simply use capitalism for aims different from the single-minded pursuit of profits.** But the rules of supply and demand, the expenses and revenues, the idea of entrepreneurship and innovation, and the need to adapt to the market are essential. Any progressive magazine or institution that tries to defy the rules of capitalism won't be around for very long and certainly won’t have the resources to mount a serious advocacy of progressive ideas. **One of the most effective tactics of the environmental movement was encouraging consumers to consider environmental values when making capitalist choices about what products to buy. Today, a manufacturer who ignores environmental issues puts its profits at risk** because so many people are looking for environmentally friendly products and packaging. Crusades against Coca-Cola for its massive output of non-recycled plastic bottles in America or against companies supporting foreign dictatorships are part of the continuing battle to force companies to pay attention to consumer demands. Of course, consumer protests and boycotts are only one part of making "capitalism for everyone." Many progressive groups are now buying stock in companies precisely to raise these issues at stockholder meetings and pressure the companies to adopt environmentally and socially responsible policies. Unfortunately, the legal system is structured against progressive ideas. In 2000, Ben and Jerry's Ice Cream was forced to sell out to a big corporation that might ignore its commitment to many progressive causes. The company didn't want to sell, but the law demanded that the company's duty to stockholders was to consider only the money involved. **Imagine what would happen if our capitalist laws were designed to promote progressive ideas instead of impeding them. Instead of allowing a shareholder lawsuit against any company acting in a morally, socially, and environmentally conscious way, American laws should encourage these goals. The claim by some leftists that capitalism is inherently irresponsible or evil doesn't make sense. Capitalism is simply a system of markets. What makes capitalism so destructive isn't the basic foundation but the institutions that have been created in the worship of the "free market." Unfortunately, progressives spend most of their time attacking capitalism rather than taking credit for all the reforms that led to America's economic growth**.

# Capitalism 1ar- Solves War

**Capitalism incentivizes peace- outweighs all other factors**

**Bandow ‘05** [Doug, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, Nov 10, *Spreading Capitalism is Good for Peace*, <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=5193>]

But World War I demonstrated that increased trade was not enough. The prospect of economic ruin did not prevent rampant nationalism, ethnic hatred, and security fears from trumping the power of markets. An even greater conflict followed a generation later. Thankfully, World War II left war essentially unthinkable among leading industrialized - and democratic - states. Support grew for the argument, going back to Immanual Kant, that republics are less warlike than other systems. Today's corollary is that creating democracies out of dictatorships will reduce conflict. This contention animated some support outside as well as inside the United States for the invasion of Iraq. But Gartzke argues that "the 'democratic peace' is a mirage created by the overlap between economic and political freedom." That is, democracies typically have freer economies than do authoritarian states. Thus, while "democracy is desirable for many reasons," he notes in a chapter in the latest volume of Economic Freedom in the World, created by the Fraser Institute, "representative governments are unlikely to contribute directly to international peace." **Capitalism is by far the more important factor.** The shift from statist mercantilism to high-tech capitalism has transformed the economics behind war**. Markets generate economic opportunities that make war less desirable**. Territorial aggrandizement no longer provides the best path to riches. Free-flowing capital markets and other aspects of globalization simultaneously draw nations together and raise the economic price of military conflict. Moreover, sanctions, which interfere with economic prosperity, provides a coercive step short of war to achieve foreign policy ends. Positive economic trends are not enough to prevent war, but then, neither is democracy. It long has been obvious that democracies are willing to fight, just usually not each other. Contends Gartzke, "liberal political systems, in and of themselves, have no impact on whether states fight." In particular, poorer democracies perform like non-democracies. He explains: "Democracy does not have a measurable impact, while **nations with very low levels of economic freedom are 14 times more prone to conflict** than those with very high levels." Gartzke considers other variables, including alliance memberships, nuclear deterrence, and regional differences. **Although the causes of conflict vary, the relationship between economic liberty and peace remains.**

**Capitalism makes war unprofitable, creates peace**

**Nyquist ‘06** [JR. Financial Sense, “Anatomy of a Delusion,” September 8, <http://www.financialsense.com/stormwatch/geo/pastanalysis/2006/0908.html>]

**The free market teaches men to love peace, while the miserable circumstances of socialist decline teach men the necessity of predatory warfare**. According to Mises, the market’s love of peace “does not spring from philanthropic considerations” but depends on a proper appreciation of economic self-interest. Those who believe in profit and the free market reject war because war signifies the destruction of property. Wars are not initiated by corporate greed. Wars are initiated by backward cults who seek a return to medieval conditions. World revolution is the cry of the militant socialists**,** the Marxist-Leninists of the People’s Republic of China, North Korea, Vietnam, Cuba and the KGB clique that presently governs the “former” Soviet Union. To understand world events properly we must understand the distinction between socialist and free market economies.Dictatorship and war belong to the sphere of socialism and economic controls (or restrictions). Freedom means the freedom to buy and sell, to build and create. **Once you allow a mob of political activists to legislate against the free market** – in accordance with moral or environmental pleas – **your economic decline is foreordained.** Instead of a society guided by environmental angels, you will have a society guided by distorted madmen who (in the words of Mises) “do not approach the study of economic matters with scientific disinterestedness. Most of them are driven by an envious resentment against those whose incomes are larger than their own. This bias makes it impossible for them to see things as they really are. For them the main thing is not to improve the conditions of the masses, but to harm the entrepreneurs and capitalists even if this policy victimizes the immense majority of the people.”

# Capitalism 1ar- Solves War

**Capitalism prevents wars**

**Leeson ’02** [Peter T. Leeson, social change graduate research fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason and a fellow at the James M. Buchanan Center for Political Economy, 8-22-2002, Chicago Sun-Times, “In America, capitalism is the great uniter,” p. 27, l/n]

The world is a big place and home to innumerable customs, religions, tastes and personalities. Does our globe's unending diversity mean unending conflict between differing peoples? If one looks at America, it's obvious the answer is no. The United States may be the most ethnically, religiously and socially diverse nation in the world. Outside the Civil War, why hasn't our "melting pot" led us to wage war on each other? Because, unlike Afghanistan, America is the home of capitalism. And, as Nobel prize-winning economist Milton Friedman is fond of pointing out, capitalism creates peace. Contrary to the sentiments expressed by globalization protesters, capitalism is founded on the principle of peaceful exchange. In order to get what you want in a capitalist society, you must serve the interests of those you don't know. Similarly, those who desire what you have must serve you in return. Enabled by the market, people of different shapes and sizes realize the mutual gains made available through trade. Capitalism brings the Jew, the Gentile and the Muslim together through a common purpose--profits. The process of peaceful exchange that lies at the heart of the free market aligns the interests of otherwise unconnected people in their pursuit of the almighty dollar. Differences over religion, culture or tastes pose no obstacle. In order to generate personal wealth, differing people must peacefully interact with one another. Fighting, on the other hand, is costly and hurts the bottom line. Realizing this, capitalist countries just don't fight. New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman's "Golden Arches Theory of Peace" demonstrates this truth. No two countries with McDonald's restaurants have ever been at war with one another. In Afghanistan, however, things are different. There, government intervention prevents markets from doing what they do best--fostering peace and prosperity. When servicing others is no longer an option for getting what you want, pummeling others becomes the rule. To paraphrase the great 19th century political economist Frederic Bastiat, when goods don't cross boundaries (be they national, religious, or otherwise), guns do. Thus, while the Hamburgler remains a fictitious figure of fast food in the United States, he is a model of interaction for much of the Middle East. Jihad is more than a holy war--it is a war on the greatest source of prosperity the world has ever seen. Nations such as Afghanistan breed intolerance of diversity because they lack the uniting principle of private property and the profit motive. This intolerance not only destroys these nations internally; if left untreated, it spreads its ugly violence outside its borders, too.

# Capitalism 1ar- Solves environment

**Without capitalism, people will use dirtier technology- hurts the environment**

**Bailey 2** – Ronald Bailey, science correspondent for Reason magazine and Reason.com, member of the Society of Environmental Journalists and the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities, November 20, 2002, “Ethical Poverty: Staying Poor to Save the Planet,” online: http://www.reason.com/news/show/34913.html

With regard to using physical resources, no less an environmental alarmist than Al Gore noted in 1999 that "throughout our economy, skills, intelligence, and creativity are replacing mass and money—which is why, in the past 50 years, the value of our economy has tripled, while the physical weight of our economy as a whole has barely increased at all." In other words, **we got richer not just by using more stuff but by using it more intelligently**. Forests are expanding, and water use per capita in the United States has been going down for two decades. Economic growth is what has paid for both the technological improvements and the compliance with regulations that have made environmental improvements possible. To consider just how wrongheaded Elliott and Lamm are, think how polluted the United States would be if the economy hadn't grown at all since the 1950s**. People would still be using technologically backward cars spewing pollutants.** There would be very few municipal sewage treatment plants on rivers, no filters on coal-fired electric plants, few controls on industrial dumping, and no modern landfills. Forests would have been chopped down to accommodate low-productivity farms.

# Capitalism 1ar- Solves environment

**Commodifying the environment is key to save it**

Barton **Thompson**, professor of natural resources at Stanford, 20**03**, "What Good is Economics" 27 Environs Envtl. L. & Pol'y J. 175, Lexis. [Mills]

**Even the environmental moralist who eschews any normative use of economics may find economics valuable for other purposes. Indeed, economics is indispensable in diagnosing why society currently does not achieve the level of environmental protection desired by the moralist. Those who turn their backs on economics and rely instead on ethical  [\*187]  intuition to diagnose environmental problems are likely to find themselves doomed to failure**. Economic theory suggests that **flaws in economic markets and institutions are often the cause of environmental problems. Three concepts of market failure have proven particularly robust in analyzing environmental problems. The first is the "tragedy of the commons."** [**n28**](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.uwc.edu/us/lnacademic/#n28) **If a resource is open and free for multiple parties to use, the parties will tend to over-utilize the resource, even to the point of its destruction. Economists and others have used the tragedy of the commons to explain such environmental problems as over-fishing, the over-drafting of groundwater aquifers,** the early and inept **exhaustion of oil fields,** and high levels of population growth. [n29](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.uwc.edu/us/lnacademic/#n29) **The second**, more general concept (of which the tragedy of the commons actually is a specialized instance) **is the "negative externality."** [**n30**](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.uwc.edu/us/lnacademic/#n30) **When parties do not bear the full cost to society of environmental harms that they cause, they tend to under-invest in the elimination or correction of the harm. Externalities help explain why factories pollute, why landowners destroy ecologically valuable wetlands** or other forms of habitat, **and why current generations consume high levels of exhaustible resources. The final concept is the problem of "collective action."** [**n31**](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.uwc.edu/us/lnacademic/#n31) **If political or market actions will benefit a large group of individuals and it is impossible to exclude anyone from enjoying the benefits, each individual will have an incentive to "free ride" on the actions of others rather than acting themselves, reducing the possibility that anything will get done**. This explains why the private market does not provide us with more wildlife refuges or aesthetic open space. [n32](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.uwc.edu/us/lnacademic/#n32) Although these economic explanations for environmental problems are not universal truths, accurate in all settings, they do enjoy a robust  [\*188]  applicability. Experimenters, for example, have found that subjects in a wide array of countries succumb to the tragedy of the commons. [n33](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.uwc.edu/us/lnacademic/#n33) Smaller groups sometimes have been able to overcome the tragedy of the commons and govern a resource in collective wisdom. Yet this exception appears to be the result of institutional characteristics peculiar to the group and resource that make it easier to devise a local and informal regulatory system rather than the result of cultural differences that undermine the economic precepts of the tragedy of the commons. [n34](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.uwc.edu/us/lnacademic/#n34) **These economic explanations point to a vastly different approach to solving environmental problems than a focus on environmental ethics alone would suggest. To environmental moralists, the difficulty is that the population does not understand the ethical importance of protecting the environment. Although governmental regulation might be necessary in the short run to force people to do what they do not yet appreciate is proper, the long run answers are education and moral change. A principal means of enlightening the citizenry is engaging them in a discussion of environmental goals. Economic analysis**, by contrast, **suggests that the problem lies in our economic institutions. The solution under economic analysis is to give those who might harm the environment the incentive to avoid the harm** through the imposition of taxes or regulatory fines or the awarding of environmentally beneficial subsidies. The few **studies that have tried to test the relative importance of environmental precepts and of economics in predicting environmentally relevant behavior suggest that economics trumps ethics**. In one 1992 experiment designed to test whether subjects would yield to the tragedy of the commons in a simulated fisheries common, the researchers looked  [\*189]  to see whether the environmental attitudes of individual subjects made any difference in the subjects' behavior. The researchers measured subjects' environmental beliefs through various means. They administered questionnaires designed to elicit environmental beliefs; they asked the subjects how they would behave in various hypothetical scenarios (e.g., if someone asked them to volunteer to pick up litter on the weekend); they even tried to see how the subjects would react to real requests for environmental help (e.g., by asking them to participate in a Saturday recycling campaign). **No matter how the researchers tried to measure the environmental attitudes of the subjects, attitude failed to provide a statistically significant explanation for participants' behavior in the fishing commons. Those who appeared to have strong environmental beliefs behaved just as** tragically as those who did not when fighting for the limited stock of fish. [n35](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.uwc.edu/us/lnacademic/#n35)In another study, researchers examined domestic consumers of high amounts of electricity in Perth, Australia. After administering a survey to determine whether the consumers believed they had a personal and ethical duty to conserve energy, the researchers tried various methods for changing the behavior of those who reported that people have a conservation obligation. Informing these individuals of their high electricity usage and even supplying them with conservation tips did not make a statistically significant difference in their energy use. The only thing that led these individuals to reduce their electricity consumption was a letter reminding them of the earlier survey in which they had espoused a conservation duty and emphasizing the inconsistency of that view with their high electricity usage. In response to this letter, the subjects reduced their energy use. Apparently shame can be a valuable catalyst in converting ethical beliefs into action. But the effect may be short lived. Within two weeks, the Perth subjects' energy use had risen back to its earlier levels. [n36](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.uwc.edu/us/lnacademic/#n36) **Ethical beliefs, in short, frequently fall victim to personal convenience or cost considerations.** Ethical views sometimes can make a difference in how people behave. Examples include the role that ethics has played in encouraging people to recycle or to eat dolphin-free tuna. [n37](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.uwc.edu/us/lnacademic/#n37) But the  [\*190]  personal cost, if any, of recycling or of eating dolphin-free tuna is exceptionally small. **For most of the environmental dilemmas that face the nation and the world today, the economic cost of changing behavior is far more significant. And where costs are high, economics appears to trump most peoples' environmental views. Even if ethics played a more powerful role, we do not know for certain how to create or strengthen environmental norms.** [**n38**](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.uwc.edu/us/lnacademic/#n38) **In contrast, we do know how to change economic incentives. Although environmental moralists should continue trying to promote environmental ethics, economic analysis currently provides the strongest tool for diagnosing and thus helping to resolve environmental problems. The environmental moralist who ignores this tool in trying to improve the environment is doomed to frustration.**

# Capitalism 1ar- Growth Good

**Economic growth is a moral imperative- the alternative would fail and is authoritarian**

**Barnhizer**, Professor of Law, Cleveland State University, **2006** (David, “Waking from Sustainability's "Impossible Dream": The Decisionmaking Realities of Business and Government”, 2006, 18 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 595, lexis)

**The primary concern must be about the ability of the system to meet the reasonable and predictable needs of the billions of inhabitants living on this planet**. While I share an appreciation for the values of social harmony and interconnectedness, from a humane perspective we need to ask what is possible and what is impossible. If we are morally committed to creating the hundreds of millions of decent jobs required to alleviate poverty as well as creating fair opportunities for historically disadvantaged and unjustly treated people, then it is fair to ask: what are the trade-offs and what will it take to accomplish the task? **A central concern is about the degree of economic growth required to keep our system of job growth, resource availability, and wealth creation from collapsing**. As the Great Depression of the 1930s demonstrated, there may well be a "tipping point" or chaos component in the global economic realm that can be triggered if certain fundamentals are not understood and protected. [n52](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.liberty.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.118127.01221199606&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1246071821132&returnToKey=20_T6856264089&parent=docview" \l "n52) **We have not focused** **[\*616]  adequately on such questions but it seems vital to do so before we take actions that could shut down the economic engine on which we depend.** **Our failure to be effective in protecting our critical ecological and social systems while making economic and political decisions is not only a problem of corruption, callousness, greed, and wrong intentions. It is also a reflection of our hubris and limited cognitive and perceptual capacities**. Sustainability is an impossible dream not only due to its extraordinary complexity and the fact that it does not fit how we think and organize, but also because we lack the political will to implement the systems that would be needed. **Even if we somehow developed the capacity to master the complexity implied in the omniscient concept of sustainable development, we will never have the willingness to do so. Neither would we want to if we understood the centralized power structures, enormous national and transnational bureaucracies, and inevitable use of unrelenting power and force that would be required to compel compliance from the recalcitrant "malingerers" who resisted the imposition of such a political system**.

# Capitalism 1ar- Socialism Bad

**Socialism fails- capitalism is the only safe system**

**Perry ’95** [Mark, Professor of Economics at University of Michigan Flint and Adjunct Scholar at the Mackinac Center for Public Policy, The Freeman, “Why Socialism Failed”, Volume 45, Number 6, June, <http://www.fee.org/publications/the-freeman/article.asp?aid=4014>]

Socialism is the Big Lie of the twentieth century. While it promised prosperity, equality, and security, it delivered poverty, misery, and tyranny. Equality was achieved only in the sense that everyone was equal in his or her misery. In the same way that a Ponzi scheme or chain letter initially succeeds but eventually collapses, socialism may show early signs of success. But any accomplishments quickly fade as the fundamental deficiencies of central planning emerge. It is the initial illusion of success that gives government intervention its pernicious, seductive appeal. In the long run, socialism has always proven to be a formula for tyranny and misery. A pyramid scheme is ultimately unsustainable because it is based on faulty principles. Likewise, collectivism is unsustainable in the long run because it is a flawed theory. Socialism does not work because it is not consistent with fundamental principles of human behavior. The failure of socialism in countries around the world can be traced to one critical defect: it is a system that ignores incentives. In a capitalist economy, incentives are of the utmost importance. Market prices, the profit-and-loss system of accounting, and private property rights provide an efficient, interrelated system of incentives to guide and direct economic behavior. Capitalism is based on the theory that incentives matter! Under socialism, incentives either play a minimal role or are ignored totally. A centrally planned economy without market prices or profits, where property is owned by the state, is a system without an effective incentive mechanism to direct economic activity. By failing to emphasize incentives, socialism is a theory inconsistent with human nature and is therefore doomed to fail. Socialism is based on the theory that incentives don't matter! In a radio debate several months ago with a Marxist professor from the University of Minnesota, I pointed out the obvious failures of socialism around the world in Cuba, Eastern Europe, and China. At the time of our debate, Haitian refugees were risking their lives trying to get to Florida in homemade boats. Why was it, I asked him, that people were fleeing Haiti and traveling almost 500 miles by ocean to get to the "evil capitalist empire" when they were only 50 miles from the "workers' paradise" of Cuba? The Marxist admitted that many "socialist" countries around the world were failing. However, according to him, the reason for failure is not that socialism is deficient, but that the socialist economies are not practicing "pure" socialism. The perfect version of socialism would work; it is just the imperfect socialism that doesn't work. Marxists like to compare a theoretically perfect version of socialism with practical, imperfect capitalism which allows them to claim that socialism is superior to capitalism. If perfection really were an available option, the choice of economic and political systems would be irrelevant. In a world with perfect beings and infinite abundance, any economic or political system--socialism, capitalism, fascism, or communism--would work perfectly. However, the choice of economic and political institutions is crucial in an imperfect universe with imperfect beings and limited resources. In a world of scarcity it is essential for an economic system to be based on a clear incentive structure to promote economic efficiency. The real choice we face is between imperfect capitalism and imperfect socialism. Given that choice, the evidence of history overwhelmingly favors capitalism as the greatest wealth-producing economic system available. The strength of capitalism can be attributed to an incentive structure based upon the three Ps: (1) prices determined by market forces, (2) a profit-and-loss system of accounting and (3) private property rights. The failure of socialism can be traced to its neglect of these three incentive-enhancing components. HE Continues… The temptress of socialism is constantly luring us with the offer: "give up a little of your freedom and I will give you a little more security." As the experience of this century has demonstrated, the bargain is tempting but never pays off. We end up losing both our freedom and our security. Programs like socialized medicine, welfare, social security, and minimum wage laws will continue to entice us because on the surface they appear to be expedient and beneficial. Those programs, like all socialist programs, will fail in the long run regardless of initial appearances. These programs are part of the Big Lie of socialism because they ignore the important role of incentives. Socialism will remain a constant temptation. We must be vigilant in our fight against socialism not only around the globe but also here in the United States. The failure of socialism inspired a worldwide renaissance of freedom and liberty. For the first time in the history of the world, the day is coming very soon when a majority of the people in the world will live in free societies or societies rapidly moving towards freedom. Capitalism will play a major role in the global revival of liberty and prosperity because it nurtures the human spirit, inspires human creativity, and promotes the spirit of enterprise. By providing a powerful system of incentives that promote thrift, hard work, and efficiency, capitalism creates wealth. The main difference between capitalism and socialism is this: Capitalism works.

# Capitalism 1ar—Socialism Bad

**Socialism in any form expunges freedom and makes extinction possible**

**Rockwell** Jr., president of the Ludwig von Mises Institute, 5/19/**2008**

(Llewellyn, “Everything You Love You Owe to Capitalism,” http://mises.org/story/2982)

And yet, sitting on the other side of the table are well-educated people who imagine that the way to end the world's woes is through socialism. Now, people's definitions of socialism differ, and these persons would probably be quick to say that they do not mean the Soviet Union or anything like that. That was socialism in name only, I would be told. And yet, if socialism does mean anything at all today, it imagines that there can be some social improvement resulting from the political movement to take capital out of private hands and put it into the hands of the state. Other tendencies of socialism include the desire to see labor organized along class lines and given some sort of coercive power over how their employers' property is used. It might be as simple as the desire to put a cap on the salaries of CEOs, or it could be as extreme as the desire to abolish all private property, money, and even marriage. Whatever the specifics of the case in question, **socialism always means overriding the free decisions of individuals** and replacing that capacity for decision making with an overarching plan by the state. Taken far enough, this mode of thought won't just spell an end to opulent lunches. It will mean **the end of** what we all know as **civilization** itself. It would plunge us back to a primitive state of existence, living off hunting and gathering in a world with little art, music, leisure, or charity. Nor is any form of socialism capable of providing for the needs of the world's six billion people, so the population would shrink dramatically and quickly and in a manner that would **make every human horror ever known seem mild by comparison**. Nor is it possible to divorce socialism from totalitarianism, because if you are serious about ending private ownership of the means of production, you have to be serious about ending freedom and creativity too. You will have to make the whole of society, or what is left of it, into a prison. In short, **the wish for socialism is a wish for unparalleled human evil**. If we really understood this, no one would express casual support for it in polite company. It would be like saying, you know, there is really something to be said for malaria and typhoid and **dropping atom bombs on millions of innocents**.

# Capitalism 1ar- Alternative fails

**No revolution**

**Flood ’05** [Andrew, Anarchist Organizer and Writer, “Is Primitivism Realistic?” <http://www.anarkismo.net/newswire.php?story_id=1890>]

There is also nothing automatic about poverty or a decline in living standards being met with mass revolt.  Capitalism, and the market in particular, is also an inbuilt mechanism though which the population are encouraged to accept the hoarding of scarce resources as natural. In the west today this means the rich have access to fast cars, luxury homes and private yachts - not that much of a hardship for the rest of us. But elsewhere in the world the rich have access to these things while the poor literally starve in the streets. If there was to be a real crisis in world food production then this is what would visit the working class in the USA and beyond. To a minor extent this is what happened in depression era America and in post war Europe. In neither case did it lead to significant revolts never mind the collapse of civilisation.

**Alternative fails- too entrenched**

**Aligica ’03** [Paul Aligica, Fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University and Adjunct Fellow at the Hudson Institute, “The Great Transition and the Social Limits to Growth: Herman Kahn on Social Change and Global Economic Development”, April 21, <http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication_details&id=2827>]

Stopping things would mean if not to engage in an experiment to change the human nature, at least in an equally difficult experiment in altering powerful cultural forces: "We firmly believe that despite the arguments put forward by people who would like to 'stop the earth and get off,' it is simply impractical to do so. Propensity to change may not be inherent in human nature, but it is firmly embedded in most contemporary cultures. People have almost everywhere become curious, future oriented, and dissatisfied with their conditions. They want more material goods and covet higher status and greater control of nature. Despite much propaganda to the contrary, they believe in progress and future" (Kahn, 1976, 164). As regarding the critics of growth that stressed the issue of the gap between rich and poor countries and the issue of redistribution, Kahn noted that what most people everywhere want was visible, rapid improvement in their economic status and living standards, and not a closing of the gap (Kahn, 1976, 165). The people from poor countries have as a basic goal the transition from poor to middle class. The other implications of social change are secondary for them. Thus a crucial factor to be taken into account is that while the zero-growth advocates and their followers may be satisfied to stop at the present point, most others are not. Any serious attempt to frustrate these expectations or desires of that majority is likely to **fail and/or create disastrous counter reactions.** Kahn was convinced that "any concerted attempt to stop or even slow 'progress' appreciably (that is, to be satisfied with the moment) **is catastrophe-prone**". At the minimum, "it would probably require the creation of extraordinarily repressive governments or movements-and probably a repressive international system" (Kahn, 1976, 165; 1979, 140-153). The pressures of overpopulation, national security challenges and poverty as well as the revolution of rising expectations could be **solved only in a continuing growth environment**. Kahn rejected the idea that continuous growth would generate political repression and absolute poverty. On the contrary, it is the limits-to-growth position "which creates low morale, destroys assurance, undermines the legitimacy of governments everywhere, erodes personal and group commitment to constructive activities and encourages obstructiveness to reasonable policies and hopes". Hence this position "increases enormously the costs of creating the resources needed for expansion, makes more likely misleading debate and misformulation of the issues, and make less likely constructive and creative lives". Ultimately "it is precisely this position the one that increases the potential for the kinds of disasters which most at its advocates are trying to avoid" (Kahn, 1976, 210; 1984).

# Capitalism 1ar- Reps empower capitalism

**Their depiction of capitalist power just lends it more credibility- kills opposition**

J.K. **Gibson**-**Graham**, the pen name of Katherine Gibson, Senior Fellow of Human Geography at Australian National University, and Julie Graham, professor of Geography at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, **1996**, The End of Capitalism (As We Knew It), p. 1-3

**Understanding capitalism has always been a project of the left**, especially within the Marxian tradition. There, where knowledges of “capitalism” arguably originated, theory is accorded an explicit social role. From Marx to Lenin to the neo-Marxists of the post-World War II period, **theorists have understood their work as contributing** — whether proximately or distantly — **to anticapitalist projects of political action**. In this sense economic theory has related to politics as a subordinate and a servant: we understand the world in order to change it. Given the avowed servitude of left theory to left political action it is ironic (though not surprising) that **understandings and images of capitalism can quite readily be viewed as contributing to a crisis in left politics**. Indeed, and this is the argument we wish to make in this book, **the project of understanding the beast has itself produced a beast**, or even a bestiary; **and the process of producing knowledge in service to politics has estranged rather than united understanding and action**. Bringing these together again, or allowing them to touch in different ways, is one of our motivating aspirations. **“Capitalism” occupies a special and privileged place in the language of social representation. References to “capitalist society” are a common­place** of left and even mainstream social description, **as are references — to the market, to the global economy, to postindustrial society — in which an unnamed capitalism is implicitly invoked as the defining and unifying moment of a complex economic and social formation**. Just as the economic system in eastern Europe used confidently to be described as communist or socialist, so a general confidence in economic classification characterizes representations of an increasingly capitalist world system. But what might be seen as the grounds of this confidence, if we put aside notions of “reality” as the authentic origin of its representations? **Why might it seem problematic to say that the U**nited **S**tates **is a Christian nation, or a heterosexual one, despite the widespread belief that Christianity and heterosexuality are dominant or majority practices** in their respective domains, **while at the same time it seems legitimate and indeed “accurate” to say that the US is a capitalist country?**1 What is it about the former expressions, and their critical history, that makes them visible as “regulatory fictions,”2 ways of erasing or obscuring difference, while the latter is seen as accurate representation? Why, moreover, have embracing and holistic expressions for social struc­ture like patriarchy fallen into relative disuse among feminist theorists (see Pringle 1995; Barrett and Phillips 1992) while similar concep­tions of capitalism as a system or “structure of power” are still preva­lent and resilient? These sorts of questions, by virtue of their scarcity and scant claims to legitimacy, have provided us a motive for **this book**.3 The End of Capitalism (As We Knew It) **problematizes “capitalism”. as an economic and social descriptor**.4 **Scrutinizing** what might be seen as throwaway uses of the term — passing **references**, for example, **to the capitalist system or to global capitalism** — as well as systematic and deliberate attempts to represent capitalism as a central and organizing feature of modern social experience, **the book selectively traces the discursive origins of a widespread understanding: that capitalism is the hegemonic. or even the only, present form of economy** and that it will continue to be so in the proximate future. **It follows from this** prevalent though not ubiquitous view **that noncapitalist economic sites**, if they exist at all, must inhabit the social margins; and, as a corollary, that deliberate attempts to develop noncapitalist economic practices and institutions **must take place in** the social interstices, in the realm of experiment, or in **a visionary space of revolutionary social replacement.** **Representations of capitalism are a potent constituent of the anticapi­talist imagination**, providing images of what is to be resisted and changed as well as intimations of the strategies, techniques, and possibilities of changing it. For this reason, **depictions of “capitalist hegemony” deserve a particularly skeptical reading**. For **in** the vicinity of **these representations**, the very idea of **a noncapitalist economy takes the shape of an** unlikelihood or even an **impossibility**. **It becomes difficult to entertain a vision of the prevalence and vitality of noncapitalist economic forms, or of daily or partial replacements of capitalism by noncapitalist economic practices, or of capitalist retreats and reversals**. In this sense, **“capitalist hegemony” operates not only as a constituent of, but also as a brake upon, the anticapitalist imagination**.5 **What difference might it make to** release that brake and **allow an anticapitalist economic imaginary to develop unrestricted?**6 **If we were to dissolve the image that looms in the economic foreground, what shadowy economic forms might come forward?** In these questions we can identify the broad outlines of our project: to discover or create a world of economic difference, and to populate that world with exotic creatures that become, upon inspection, quite local and familiar (not to mention familiar beings that are not what they seem).

# \*\*\*\*\*Civil Disobedience Shell (1/1)\*\*\*\*\*

## A) By participating in this tournament while knowingly rejecting the resolution, an agreed upon norm, our opponents are acting as civil disobedients.  Though they have the right to challenge rules they believe to be unjust, their request for the ballot is contradictory to the goals of their resistance.

A.D. Woozley 76 (Professor of Moral Philosophy at University of Virginia, “Civil Disobedience and Punishment,” Ethics, Vol. 86, No. 4. (Jul., 1976), pp. 323-331, accessed via JSTOR)

The civil disobedient stands to gain nothing for ~~him~~self (as the ordinary criminal does) by breaking the law, but ~~he~~ stands to lose-~~he~~ risks the legal consequence of punishment. ~~He~~ knows that and goes ahead: ~~he~~ is not deterred from considerations of (what he believes to be ~~his~~) duty by considerations of self-interest. ~~He~~ believes enough in the issue for which he is acting to risk punishment for it. Can ~~he~~ complain if he takes the risk and loses? If I choose to break one of society's rules, it is hard to see how I can complain if society treats me in the way in which it has declared that it will treat anybody who breaks that rule. Claiming that I did right to break the rule (under certain conditions), even that I had a duty to break it, is one thing; claiming a right to break it with immunity is another; and the first does not carry the second with it. And that is where I am inclined to think that the appearance of consistency by the amnesty demanders breaks down. For what they are doing is demanding to be protected from the risk of punishment, not by taking the usual precautions to minimize the risk, but by demanding the right not to be punished. They are, as it were, complaining in advance about being punished. It is not all right both to take that risk and to make a claim not to be exposed to it. A claim for amnesty, made on behalf of others, may be right; but it has to be wrong for those for whom amnesty is claimed, even for those for whom it is rightly claimed, to demand it for themselves.

## B) If you do believe their stance is sincere and/or you agree with it, you should reward their civil disobedience with a loss.  Punishment is key to enlisting the sympathy of the majority and ensuring the movement succeeds.

Cohen 72 – Marshall, University Professor, Emeritus, Professor of Philosophy and Law, Emeritus, and Dean, Emeritus, College of Letters, Arts and Sciences at USC [“Liberalism and Disobedience,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 3. (Spring, 1972), pp. 283-314, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2265054.pdf]

It is for this reason that the civil disobedient characteristically notifies government officials of the time and place of his actions and attempts to make clear the point of ~~his~~ protest. Obviously, one of the problems of a modern democracy is that many immoral actions taken in the people's name are only dimly known to them, if they are known at all. In such cases, the main difficulty in touching the public's conscience may well be the difficulty in making the public conscious. The civil disobedient may therefore find that in addition to making his actions public it is necessary to gain for them a wide publicity as well. Indeed, Bertrand Russell has suggested that making propaganda and bringing the facts of political life to the attention of an ignorant and often bemused electorate constitute the main functions of disobedience at the present time.3 It is certainly true that nothing attracts the attention of the masses, and of the mass media, like flamboyant violations of the law, and it would be unrealistic of those who have political grievances not to exploit this fact. But it is important, especially in this connection, to recall Gandhi's warning that the technique of law violation ought to be used sparingly, like the surgeon's knife. For in the end the public will lose its will, and indeed its ability, to distinguish between those who employ these techniques whenever they wish to advertise their political opinions and those, the true dissenters, who use them only to protest deep violations of political principle. The techniques will then be of little use to anybody. After openly breaking the law, the traditional disobedient willingly pays the penalty. This is one of the characteristics that serve to distinguish him from the typical criminal (his appeal to conscience is another), and it helps to establish the seriousness of ~~his~~ views and the depth of ~~his~~ commitment as well. Unfortunately, paying the penalty will not always demonstrate that his actions are in fact disinterested. For the youth protesting the draft or the welfare recipient protesting poverty has an obvious and substantial interest in the success of his cause. If the majority suspects that these interests color the disobedient's perception of the issues involved, its suspicions may prove fatal to ~~his~~ ultimate success. This is one reason why the practice of civil disobedience should not be limited to those who are directly injured by the government's immoral or lawless course (as Judge Wyzanski and others have suggested).4 A show of support by those who have no substantial interest in the matter may carry special weight with a confused, and even with an actively skeptical, majority. The majority simply cannot dismiss those over thirty-five as draft dodgers, or those who earn over thirty-five thousand dollars a year as boondogglers. It may therefore consider the issues at stake, and this is the first objective of the civil disobedient.

# Civil Disobedience Overview

## Our argument challenges the fundamental connection between their advocacy and the ballot—taken to its logical extreme their call for the ballot is an attempt to use the master’s tools to deconstruct the master’s house—our argument is that the opposite is true—to illustrate the unjustness of a system the disobedient must ultimately follow rules they deem to be unjust—our Woozley evidence says that a civil disobedient cannot claim immunity from the rules they willingly violate—they are merely complaining in advance of being punished our Cohen evidence says that true dissenters willingly pay the penalty—if they don’t willingly pay the penalty this taints perception of the act of disobedience as being in the violators self-interest which undermines its ultimate success.

## Absent a connection to the ballot you can either vote negative on presumption because they have no reason to vote for them or you can vote to enforce the penalty that they should willingly adhere to. Either way, this position justifies voting negative.

# Civil Disobedience--AT: Framework Style Answers

## (--) They’ve missed the boat entirely—our argument is not whether they are allowed to say their argument in this framework our argument is solely a question of the ballot argument. Our Cohen evidence says the best way to reward a civil disobedient is through punishment. Therefore, the proper remedy is to vote for us in order to help ensure the success of their movement. They have no evidence pointing to a reason why a ballot in a system that they define as fundamentally corrupt does anything to help their cause—our argument is an internal link turn—if their movement is good—vote against it so the corruptness of the system can be fundamentally exposed.

## (--) And their framework argument proves they are civil disobedients—they are violating rules of an unjust system because of a sense of duty or obligation—this means they link to our position:

A.D. Woozley 76 (Professor of Moral Philosophy at University of Virginia, “Civil Disobedience and Punishment,” Ethics, Vol. 86, No. 4. (Jul., 1976), pp. 323-331, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2380227.pdf?acceptTC=true)

I cannot start by proposing a definition of civil disobedience, because that would be to beg the very question which I want to raise. But I can, at the outset, offer the beginnings of a definition, leaving it unsettled whether the following, as well as being the severally necessary elements, are also jointly sufficient. I suggest that an act is one of civil disobedience only if: (1) That act is illegal (violates L,), and is known (or believed) by the agent to be illegal. (2) The agent believes it to be his[sic/her] duty to disobey L1, either because he believes L, itself to be objectionable (and it may be objectionable either as being morally bad or as being illegal, in any of the ways in which it is possible for a law to be illegal; or both); or because he[sic/she] believes he[sic/she] must disobey L1, as a way of "getting at" (e.g., protesting against, or thwarting the operation of) another law L2 or a policy P which he[sic/she] believes to be objectionable. This bifurcation is necessary because it may be that the law which the civil disobedient wishes to protest is not one which it is possible for him to violate. For simplicity's sake, I shall not keep bringing this bifurcation in. I shall take it to be covered by the brief formulation of this second element as: the agent believes it to be his duty to disobey L because he believes L to be objectionable. (3) The agent's beliefs under (2) explain his act under (1). He knowingly disobeys L because he believes it to be his duty to disobey; and he believes it to be his duty to disobey because he believes L to be objectionable. The addition of (3) is needed because without it the connection between (1) and (2) is simply that of conjunction: the man knowingly breaks the law, and he believes it his duty to do so for reasons of the kind mentioned. What (3) does is to substitute 'because' for 'and': he knowingly breaks the law becauseh e believes . . etc. It is not overcynical,I think, to suspect that (3) was missing. for some students, from some of their activities in the anti-Vietnam war campaign. Their beliefs under (2) may have been sincere, but what really got them to perform an act under (1) was that it was the chance of a lifetime to have fun with the motorists and police of Washington. That will do as a starting definition of civil disobedience. Now to dispose of the two issues which are easily enough disposed of.

## (--) None of their framework arguments prove why voting for them is a good idea—all it proves is that they are in fact civil disobedients operating in an unjust system, which is what our entire position is predicated upon.

## (--) Our question is one of how civil disobedients should behave—our argument is their call for a ballot is tactically unwise and they should willingly accept a loss:

A.D. Woozley 76 (Professor of Moral Philosophy at University of Virginia, “Civil Disobedience and Punishment,” Ethics, Vol. 86, No. 4. (Jul., 1976), pp. 323-331, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2380227.pdf?acceptTC=true)

Whether the use of violence in the prosecution of a civil disobedience campaign is tactically unwise, and whether it is morally objectionable, both seem to be clear substantive questions which can be asked about how a civil disobedient should behave, and not to be questions about what civil disobedience is, or what it is to be a civil disobedient.

# Civil Disobedience--Links: They are Civil Disobedience

## Civil disobedience is disobedience of laws deemed to be unjust:

A.D. Woozley 76 (Professor of Moral Philosophy at University of Virginia, “Civil Disobedience and Punishment,” Ethics, Vol. 86, No. 4. (Jul., 1976), pp. 323-331, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2380227.pdf?acceptTC=true)

Gandhi defined civil disobedience as "civil breach of unmoral statutory enactments." 1 Abe Fortas says "civil disobedience is . . . disobedience of laws which are themselves unjust."2 Now, whether Gandhi and Fortas would have agreed with each other on the conditions under which civil disobedience would be justified I do not know, although I rather doubt it; but there is one thing on which they were agreed, as the quotation from each shows, namely, that the laws which the civil disobedient is disobeying are unjust, or more generally immoral. In other words, both of them are including within the concept of civil disobedience that the law which is being disobeyed is objectionable, and therefore they are making it definitionally true that there is always something to be said for any act of civil disobedience. How much there is to be said will depend on other factors of the situation.

# Civil Disobedience--AT: Perm—Endorse Civil Disobedience and Vote For Us

## (--) If the permutation contains voting for them—they still link—extend our Cohen evidence that punishment is necessary for effective civil disobedience—people will be more persuaded by a civil disobedient willing to accept the punishment of an unjust system…

## (--) Attempts to evade punishment undermine the effect of civil disobedience:

Cohen 1972 – Marshall, (Professor of Philosophy and Law, at USC [“Liberalism and Disobedience,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 3. (Spring, 1972), pp. 283-314, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265054]

We may turn, then, to the views of those who argue that the civil disobedient need not accept punishment at all. For instance, Nielsen, in commenting on some observations I have made elsewhere, writes as follows: "Cohen remarks that 'After openly breaking the law, the traditional disobedient willingly pays the penalty.' This might be taken in two ways. It might be taken simply as a description of what people who regard themselves as engaging in civil disobedience do. But then it is surely not the case that all people who engage in what they believe to be civil disobedience are willing to pay the penalty. Their public defiance of a law they regard as so immoral that it requires disobedience is sometimes followed by forms of legal evasion. I think Cohen would reply that in such a circumstance their acts are not properly characterizable as 'civil disobedience.' "14

## (--) Civil disobedience is distinct from merely trying to skirt rules and regulations:

Cohen 1972 – Marshall, (Professor of Philosophy and Law, at USC [“Liberalism and Disobedience,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 3. (Spring, 1972), pp. 283-314, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265054]

For the doctor who performs a clandestine abortion or the youth who surreptitiously evades the draft may be acting out of moral motives-the doctor to fulfill his obligations to a patient, the youth to avoid complicity in an evil undertaking-but they are not defying the law in order to protest the course of public conduct. They can achieve their purposes in private, and their defiance of the law need never come to light. The civil disobedient's actions are political by their very nature, however, and it is essential that they be performed in public, or called to the public's attention.

# **Civil Disobedience--AT: Not really a rule/it goes unenforced a lot**

## **(--) It doesn’t matter if people frequently don’t vote on T—we’re winning they play the role of a civil disobedient against the prevailing structure of debate—they are calling for a form of protest against current debate structures that’s our Woozley & Cohen evidence.**

## **(--) Civil disobedients should accept punishment even if they have no obligation to do so:**

Cohen 1972 – Marshall, (Professor of Philosophy and Law, at USC [“Liberalism and Disobedience,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 3. (Spring, 1972), pp. 283-314, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265054]

It does not follow, then, that those who conscientiously believe the law to be doubtful "have no obligation at all in terms of fair play or anything else to accept the punishment." All that Dworkin argues is that in certain special circumstances such persons should not be prosecuted, and in still more special ones, not convicted if prosecuted. Even if Dworkin had argued that those who conscientiously object to the law or doubt its validity never have an obligation to obey the law or accept punishment, it would not follow that they ought not to accept such punishment. For our argument is that, given certain special circumstances, they ought to accept punishment even if they have no obligation to do so, and this for a variety of reasons that have been suggested.

## Protest does not need to be against a law—it can also be against a policy:

Cohen 1972 – Marshall, (Professor of Philosophy and Law, at USC [“Liberalism and Disobedience,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 3. (Spring, 1972), pp. 283-314, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265054]

Thus, Ralph Abernathy's violation of the law of trespass was meant to protest the government's failure to enact an adequate poverty program, and the obstruction of segregated sites is a familiar technique for protesting the government's failure to enforce fair employment practice statutes that have long been part of the law.37 Even when the object of protest is a wicked law, there may be no way of protesting it directly, as Thoreau had no way of directly protesting the legal provision that a man might own slaves. Then, too, the object of protest may be a governmental policy or order rather than a law, strictly speaking. It would have made no sense to ask Thoreau to "violate" the government's policy of conducting a war against Mexico or its policy of oppressing the Indian population. And it makes no sense today to speak of violating the government's policy of intervening in the affairs of foreign states. Certainly, the ordinary citizen is in no position to defy orders issued to military personnel. It is for this reason that Thoreau employed the technique of tax refusal to protest the Mexican war, and it is for this reason that dissenters today engage in sit-ins at draft boards and mount demonstrations at the Pentagon to protest the government's intervention in Vietnam. It is peculiarly appropriate (the indirect disobedient looks for symbolically appropriate, if he cannot find directly accessible, laws to violate) that men have endured even self-immolation to protest the military's use of fire bombs against a defenseless civilian population. It is unfortunate that Adler finds acts like these 37. It is worth noting the view of the present U.S. solicitor general (and former dean of the Harvard Law School) on a related point. Mr. Griswold writes that he "cannot distinguish in principle the legal quality of the determination ... to block a workman from entering a segregated job site from the determination to fire shots into a civil rights leader's home to protest integration." If all Mr. Griswold means by his fine periphrastic expression ("cannot distinguish in principle the legal quality") is that both actions are illegal, few will dispute his point. If he means anything else-perhaps that they are equally serious violations of the law-it is all to his credit that he couldn't quite bring himself to say so. Erwin N. Griswold, "Dissent-I968 Style," The George Abel Dreyfus Lecture on Civil Liberties, delivered at the Tulane University School of Law, i6 April I968.

# **Civil Disobedience--**AT: Debate Shouldn’t Be A Game

## Their appeal for the ballot proves they are still operating in the game playing paradigm:

Alfred C. Snider, 2003 (Director of Debate at the University of Vermont, “GAMEMASTER: IS IT YOU?” Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, accessed via EBSCO Host)

What happens when a team decides to “step out of the box?” There are an infinite number of alternatives, certainly, but several seem to dominate. The traditional decision rule of policy making is rejected and an alternative proposed. At times the team introducing a new decision rule will call for an evaluation of the discourse in the debate. Arguing that the imaginary policies to be adopted by fiat are less real than the discourse that proceeds from the mouths of the debaters, the team proposes that the judge evaluate the discourse for its appropriateness. For example, a team may have used offensive language (sexist, racist) or marginalizing language (“third world,” or “underdeveloped”) and the other team may call for the decision based on this objectionable discourse. In a slightly different approach, a team may provide a different form of “performance” (it might include narratives, drama, poetry, song, music, etc.) and call for the decision in the debate based on a comparison of their exciting and illuminating performance with the more pedestrian performance of the opposing team. In another approach one team might advocate a “real world” “project” that they are involved in, usually linked to the resolution, but that attempts to change the views of those in the debate as well as others in the debate community about some specific approach to an issue, perhaps using a different form of analysis such as engaging in a genealogy or a historical investigation. The team “stepping out of the box” calls for an affiliation by the judge with their “project” by arguing that it is a real political move and not just a way to win the debate. Of course, it is almost always still an attempt to win the debate. The dance of argument going on inside the game may be different, but it is still inside the game. Introducing the decision rules of discourse, performance, or project to substitute for the definition supplied earlier does not stop all of these events from being competitive academic debates within the gaming construct. The ability to introduce new decision rules to reflect changing times and academic interests is a vast strength of academic debate as a game, because it is flexible and adaptable to the intellectual community expressing themselves through it. As one who loves to read old debate textbooks and hear about debate practices from forty or fifty years ago, I can assure you that I have no desire to return to those decision rules or even those from “when giants walked the earth” (read as “when I debated”). When old debaters come back and find things very much changed, I do not despair along with them since it makes me feel positive about the activity and its progress. These new ways to conceptualize the debate, and those yet to come, are welcome changes and signs of growth and vitality. However, any approach to debate can lead to a poorly crafted and unpleasant performance, especially when new thoughts are finding their way. The challenge is to theorize, utilize, and criticize these new approaches while recognizing that they are decision rules, and analyzing them as such may assist us in creating standards for evaluating “projects” and “performances” once they have been placed in the proper context for the debater and the judge.

## We turn their game playing argument back at them—if they don’t want debate to be treated as a game then they should lose this game to advance their form of social protest:

Cohen 1972 – Marshall, (Professor of Philosophy and Law, at USC [“Liberalism and Disobedience,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 3. (Spring, 1972), pp. 283-314, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265054]

Unfortunately, Zinn offers an extremely tendentious and unacceptable account of what it means to abide by such limits. His full statement is this: "If the protest is morally justified (whether it breaks the law or not) it is morally justified to the very end, even past the point where the court has imposed the penalty. If it stops at that point with everyone saying cheerfully, as at a football match, 'Well, we played a good game, we lost, and we will accept the verdict like sports'-then we are treating social protest like a game. It becomes a token, a 'gesture.'"'19 And again: "The sportsman-like acceptance of jail as the terminus of civil disobedience is fine for a football game, or for a society determined to limit reform to tokens. It does not suit a society that wants to eliminate long-festering wrongs."20 In view of the history of civil disobedience, this is, indeed, a remarkable caricature. To be sure, for the classical disobedient the acceptance of jail may be "the terminus of civil disobedience," but that is far from saying that it is "the end of protest." If one means by "accepting the verdict" that one goes to jail, the civil disobedient accepts the verdict, but ~~he~~ does not thereby "cheerfully" accept defeat. True, he accepts jail as a (signifiig. cant) gesture, but no, this does not mean that he accepts a (mere) token. Accepting punishment does not imply permanent acquiescence in intolerable evil. Nor, as we have said, does the practice of civil disobedience, as described here, preclude an eventual resort to stronger measures. I take this to be clear from a consideration of the tradition of civil disobedience. Going to jail does not "end" one's civil disobedience; on the contrary, it is a crucial part of that disobedience. It is crucial in characterizing the disobedience as being of a certain historically intelligible sort, and this, it is hoped, will have a special effect. For the fact that the disobedient displays his fidelity to law and strictly minimizes his deviation from it, as well as the fact that he is willing to suffer for ~~his~~ views, is meant to reassure and to move the majority. That this is at least sometimes possible is plain from the careers of Gandhi and of Martin Luther King. Gandhi, in any number of his satyagraha campaigns, and King, writing from the Birmingham City Jail, altered the course of history.2' Surely they cannot be dismissed as having "cheerfully" acquiesced in the evils they were protesting or as having confined themselves to empty "gestures." I wish that as much could be said for Zinn's talk about "toppling the government."

## They are still operating in the game playing system:

Alfred C. Snider, 2003 (Director of Debate at the University of Vermont, “GAMEMASTER: IS IT YOU?” Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, accessed via EBSCO Host)

The current critical move in American competitive policy debate exists along with traditional policy debate practices. Sometimes the debate will proceed along one path or the other, at other times the debate will involve a head on collision between these two approaches to debate, and at other times entirely new and different decision rules will be introduced. But, they will be decision rules, not paradigms. The game is still afoot. Despair not and feel free to support the kind of debate you feel is best while maintaining a respectful willingness to listen and consider alternatives.

# **Civil Disobedience--**AT: Debate Shouldn’t Be A Game

## Debate as a game paradigm still allows for minority empowerment

Alfred C. Snider, 2003 (Director of Debate at the University of Vermont, “GAMEMASTER: IS IT YOU?” Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, accessed via EBSCO Host)

Urban debate league advocates have seen the debate “process” as a method for empowerment. During this exercise in grafting debate onto current challenged educational systems another aspect of the debate “process” has manifested itself, the debate across the curriculum concept. Urban debate leagues working with school districts and principals have been the earliest advocates of debate across the curriculum (DAC). Urban debate league teachers have been the shock troops of testing the concept of using debate to teach just about anything. Their support and enthusiasm led to the publication by Maxwell Schnurer and me of a DAC book for teachers (Snider & Schnurer, 2002). This slim volume is currently being translated into Russian, Spanish, Mongolian, and Rumanian. Exciting developments in various school districts herald a rising use of debate as teaching tool for history, literature, culture, politics, social sciences, and others. The real progress of these efforts, however, takes place one classroom at a time as teachers look for new and exciting ways to teach CAD FORUM 23 students about normal subjects in a way that is active, communicative, and develops critical thinking. The debate across the curriculum concept presents a further challenge to the original logic of debate (teach the gifted the super skills of leadership) as well as the original logic of urban debate league proponents (teach critical debate skills to students for whom it can make a huge difference) by arguing that if debate as a process is so valuable then it should be available to everyone and should be strongly integrated into normal classroom practice. Debate, at is flexible best, provides a strong framework for the advancement of these goals, operating as a critical discourse game. Debates can be designed and arranged to pursue different sorts of goals in classrooms and communities. Debate appears not so much as a formalized disputation and communicative processes but rather as a flexible critical discourse game that attempts to attract and attune students and teachers precisely because it is critical and engaging, because it is participative and expresses ideas from the students, and because it is somewhat competitive and strongly socially engaging as a flexible game of intellect and expression.

## (--) Gaming model of education promotes personal responsibility, mutual obligation, and fair play:

Roy Schwartman, 1997 (“Gaming serves as a model for improving learning,” <http://roypoet.com/files/Gaming.pdf>)

If metaphors serve as models (Black, 1962), then gaming furnishes a model for education in two senses. As a normative model, it cultivates values of personal responsibility, mutual obligation and fair play. As a descriptive model, gaming simulates patterns of ongoing human interaction. Their descriptive capacity separates games from sports, because sports do not offer patters for structuring human behavior outside the context of the sporting event (McDonald, 1975). The discontinuity between sports and serious activity surfaces when we disclaim our actions by saying, “I’m just sporting with you.” We ridicule someone by “making sport” of him, and sporting equates with helplessness when we become the “sport of circumstances.” Attention now must turn to how the game metaphor in education functions prescriptively and descriptively. Gaming is employed in a specific sense for educational settings. Gaming as a metaphor must be distinguished from game theory, which determines the probability of particular outcomes in controlled settings. Game theory consists of mathematical models with little relevance to actual behavior (Shubik, 1975). Education, by contrast, certainly cannot predict outcomes with statistical probability. Furthermore, the sense of gaming presented in this context is cooperative rather than zero-sum. Education of one person does not have to occur at the expense of someone else. Games do carry the connotation of being competitive. The question is how to designate the competition. Zero-sum games treat other participants in the game as opponents and potential threats to each other’s success. The entire field of transactional analysis (an unfortunate choice of terms given its commercial overtones) is framed in the language of games, but these games are primarily strategic manipulations instead of structures for learning (Berne, 1976). When conducted fairly and rigorously, games enact an educational philosophy that promotes a cooperative ethic while preserving the thrill of competition. One cynical application of gaming to business warns readers that those “who keep trying to apply lofty standards of human relations in business may well experience a good deal of emotional turmoil…No game of strategy gives prizes for ethics” (Carr, 1968, p. xv). The same book, however, distinguishes the serious strategy of gaming from “one-upping” competitors, attempting to gain advantage at all costs. Apparently the concept of gaming does have its moral side, since pure manipulation is a game where even the winner loses once he or she becomes the object of someone else’s manipulations. While playing games does imply competition, the “competitive [instinct] is not in the first place a desire for power or a will to dominate” (Huizinga, 1950, p. 50). The equation of gaming with “war games” limits the philosophy of gaming to a militaristic mindset that is inapplicable to less cutthroat environments. The ideal of gaming is to develop “a spirit that has more to do with realizing one’s own potential than defeating, much less ‘conquering,’ others” (Keidel, 1985, p. 166). The sense of gaming relevant to education is cooperative, with students and teachers teaming up against their sole opponent: ignorance. This focus directs competition externally, toward the environment instead of against other participants in the game (Shubik, 1975, p. 24). For a game to qualify as cooperative, it need not include equally beneficial outcomes for all participants. Cooperation describes the method of play; it is not a measure of the benefits reaped. Many situations beyond the classroom require all parties to suffer mutually, to bear the consequences and not just share the wealth. The widespread cutbacks of state aid to public education provide an excellent example. Even unpleasant outcomes, however, are more palatable if they are anticipated by everyone involved and result from cooperative effort. Educational models derived from the business world may not account for shared consequences or outcomes. Taking some liberties with Ella Wheeler Wilcox’s poem, “Play and your teammates play with you/Buy and you buy alone.”

## The fun aspect of games encourages participation in educational enterprises:

Roy Schwartman, 1997 (“Gaming serves as a model for improving learning,” <http://roypoet.com/files/Gaming.pdf>)

The game metaphor can add a motivational tool to the classroom if assignments are configured as play instead of work (Schwartzman, 1994). The thrill of competition in the sense of overcoming an obstacle—not in the sense of excelling at the expense of someone else—provides an excellent motivation tool to encourage participation (Shubik, 1975). “Let’s play” is far more appealing as a call to action than “Let’s work.” Play is fun, although the enjoyment results from effort and immersion in the task. “Fun and games” does not deserve the implicit condemnation of the often-added modifier “just.” The fun of games renders play neither frivolous nor foolish (Huizinga, 1950, pp. 5-8). The fundamental difference between play and work lies in the degree of freedom accorded the participants (Huizinga, 1950; McDonald, 1975). Games proceed by agreement to obey rules, play fairly, and play hard. The agreement to play hard directs participants toward the challenge of learning, recognizing that a game is both dull and useless if it is too easy. Games are not fun to play if the players always win. Simultaneously, players must know what it takes to win, with explicit guidelines for tasks.

# **Civil Disobedience--**AT: Debate Shouldn’t Be A Game

## Their criticism puts the cart before the horse—the fact that debate has some problems and it is treated as a game doesn’t mean gaming caused those problems:

Alfred C. Snider, 2003 (Director of Debate at the University of Vermont, “ THE HUNTER GETS CAPTURED BY THE GAME: REPLY TO DAVID FRANK ” Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, accessed via EBSCO Host)

Second, debate across the curriculum is the answer to many of the questions he asks. His demand for pedagogy is completely answered in my advocacy of taking the game of debate into every classroom, molding it to the needs of that classroom, and using it to activate learning in a new way. He complements the book I have written with Maxwell Schnurer, but does not realize how this answers his demand . for a clear pedagogy. The game of debate is not a solipsistic endeavor, but a very empathic one. It is flexible enough to look at the needs of the situation and adapt to them. Debate as a method for studying a variety of subjects is not new, but Schnurer and I are the first to really outline the debate across the curriculum concept in detail. It is no coincidence that my vision of debate as a flexible learning game led me to propose to Schnurer that we write that book. Third, while it is something of a compliment in some ways, I simply cannot be responsible for everything that takes place in modern debate. The syllogism seems far too simplistic. I am sure Frank would reject a similar syllogism about rhetoric (Frank is a rhetorician, rhetorical means were used to launch fascism, fascism is bad, rhetoric is bad, Frank is bad). Both arguments have the same weaknesses – alternate causalities, lack of demonstration of direct causal effects, and the understanding that any tool can be misused, among many others. To say that debate is in a sorry state and then blame my ideas is easy but inaccurate.

## Metaphor of the game is useful in academic settings—their claim that game-playing somehow interferes with education is incorrect:

Alfred C. Snider, 2003 (Director of Debate at the University of Vermont, “ THE HUNTER GETS CAPTURED BY THE GAME: REPLY TO DAVID FRANK ” Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, accessed via EBSCO Host)

Fifth, Frank charges that gaming is trying to ignore the practice and teaching of argumentation. I disagree. Argumentation is all-pervasive in our lives and is totally at the forefront in almost any debate. One wonders what he means by “argumentation,” and my assumption is that he means the classical approach. He complains that argumentation and debate have become intellectual backwaters because “gaming” has divorced it from its natural home, thus depriving it of its support. Every student in every debate learns something about argumentation, even if it is not in the context of understanding the improperly distributed middle term of the syllogism. Rhetoric faces the same dilemma as education, as they are both reflexive concepts; they are methods without specific content (Schwartzman, 1997, p. 9). They are not fields of discrete knowledge in and of themselves and have to seek metaphors to give them meaning. Schwartzman argues that the metaphor of the game is the best way to conceive of the educational endeavor. The perception of both education and rhetoric from the perspective of a “game” gives us new and exciting possibilities for advancing both fields.

## Gaming framework bolsters education because it creates enjoyment & discipline in the educational process:

Roy Schwartman, 1997 (“Gaming serves as a model for improving learning,” <http://roypoet.com/files/Gaming.pdf>)

Placing the educational process in the metaphoric framework of games cultivates a learning environment and ethic absent in educational models derived from business. Conceptualizing education as a game restores enjoyment, healthy competition, cooperation, and discipline to teaching and learning. Despite its insufficient attention to critical thinking, the game metaphor offers a useful addition to the amoral understanding of education solely as management.

## Metaphor of education as gaming serves as a useful antidote to consumerist or children oriented models:

Roy Schwartman, 1997 (“Gaming serves as a model for improving learning,” <http://roypoet.com/files/Gaming.pdf>)

The metaphor of games can serve as an alternative to treating students as children or consumers. Treating students as adults, while appropriate, leaves unanswered the question of what kind of adult relationships should be encouraged. Conceptualizing students as consumers fails to do justice to the process of education or to the mentoring relationships that education fosters (Schwartzman, 1995a). Unlike food, learning is not consumed, absorbed, then discarded. Far more than a series of discrete transactions, the mentoring ideal of student-teacher relationships takes form of an ongoing, mutually enriching dialogue. The ultimate goal of education, in fact, remains diametrically opposed to consumerism. While the “seller” anticipates and encourages continued customer dependence on the provider’s services, the educator prepares students to become their own teachers, generating their own educational needs by means of intellectual curiosity. The metaphor of gaming, with students as participants and teachers as coaches, offers a fruitful way to understand the educational process.

# **Civil Disobedience--**Impacts: Willingness to Accept Punishment Key to Successful Disobedience

## Authorities should neither give in to demands that disobedients should not be punished nor should the disobedients agree not to be punished

A.D. Woozley 76 (Professor of Moral Philosophy at University of Virginia, “Civil Disobedience and Punishment,” Ethics, Vol. 86, No. 4. (Jul., 1976), pp. 323-331, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2380227.pdf?acceptTC=true)

I criticize the authorities for giving in to the students' demands that they should not be made to pay for their principles. They should have insisted that people who claim to believe in a principle sufficiently to be a martyr, that is, a witness, for it should be prepared to wear the martyr's crown. And I criticize the students similarly: they demeaned themselves and their professions by demanding amnesty and by making acceptance of that demand a necessary condition of their agreeing to come out. I criticize them for professing principles and yet not knowing what it is to have a principle, namely. to be prepared to suffer for it. Should we then say the same thing about the civil disobedient, that he ought to be prepared to testify to his principles by being prepared to suffer for them, that one of the ways so to testify is to wait for punishment, and that that is an "ought" which is inseparable from being a civil disobedient? I do not feel able to give an unqualified yes to that; and, to explain why, I must remove the blanket of ambiguity in the expression 'wait for punishment.' The question whether a civil disobedient ought to wait for punishment can be rephrased (near enough) as the question whether it is wrong for a civil disobedient to seek to avoid punishment. And there is more than one way of seeking to avoid it, not just in the sense that fleeing the jurisdiction and going into hiding within the jurisdiction are two different ways, but in the sense that there are different kinds of conduct that would count as seeking to avoid punishment. If a man believes that what he has done was right-as, ex hypothesitsh e civil disobedient does believe-can he also be expected to believe that it would be wrong for him to try to avoid the legal consequences of having done it? Why should he believe that he would be doing wrong in trying to avoid punishment for having done what was (as he believes) right? Yet that he should believe he would be doing wrong is the answer which Socrates gave. His was not exactly a case of civil disobedience, but the points of difference are irrelevant here. He believed that what he had been doing was right, namely, engaging publicly in philosophical discussion of conventional moral and religious beliefs with anybody, young or old, citizen or foreigner, who cared to discuss them with him. He believed that he had been unjustly convicted and unjustly sentenced to death. Nevertheless he believed that it would be wrong for him to avoid execution of sentence by agreeing to the jailbreak which his friends were offering him.

## Willingness to face punishment reinforces the effects of protest and appeal:

Cohen 1972 – Marshall, (Professor of Philosophy and Law, at USC [“Liberalism and Disobedience,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 3. (Spring, 1972), pp. 283-314, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265054]

The disobedient's willingness to face suffering and punishment may be seen, then, as a useful way of reinforcing the effects of ~~his~~ protest and appeal. His[sic/her] actions may force the public to consider, or to reconsider, the law or policy he[sic/she] rejects. But if the majority remains unconvinced, it is free to act as it wishes. In the Vykom Temple Road satyagraha, Gandhi's followers, after dramatizing the issue, and even after negotiating a withdrawal of the police barricades, refrained from entering the Vykom Temple Road until the Brahmans were converted to the Gandhian view of the matter.7 Often enough, however, those who are called disobedients do attempt to coerce the majority-by forcing the majority to secure obedience at a price it finds morally unacceptable. It is for this reason that Gandhi regarded fasting as a form of coercion (even as a form of violence) and regretted his own use of this technique in the Ahmedabad labor satyagraha.8 And it is for this reason that one may question the tactics of the captain and crew of The Golden Rule. For when they sailed into the government's testing grounds in the central Pacific, these men were not simply registering a protest against its testing program and hoping that their arrest would give the public painful second thoughts. Rather, they were telling the government that it would have to incinerate them if it wished to proceed as planned, and this, they hoped, the government would find impossible to do.9 In cases like this, the dissenters cross the line that separates civil disobedience from those forms of action that attempt to paralyze the majority's will or the government's ability to act. No doubt, the fact that the disobedient acts at great cost to himself[sic/herself] (he is the nonviolent equivalent of Camus' meurtrier delicat)10 affects one's judgment of his[sic/her] actions, as does the fact that he[/she] employs moral jujitsu instead of physical violence. Nevertheless, the fact that his coercion is nonviolent is not finally decisive, and it must be understood that he has entered upon a course of action that invites comparison with the public strike, with attempts to make the administration of government impossible (filling the jails as distinguished from accepting punishment), and even with acts of sabotage. He thereby poses a more radical challenge to authority than the civil disobedient wishes to pose.

## Willingness to accept punishment is critical for future reforms:

Piero Moraro, 2007 (University of Stirling, Humboldt State University “Violent Civil Disobedience and Willingness to Accept Punishment”)

The main claim is that what really is important is that the civil disobedients be willing to accept the punishment following their law-breaking behaviour. By doing so, they demonstrate the conscientiousness of their civilly disobedient action. This also shows that they are aiming for future cooperation with the State, and are expecting the State to be sensitive to their concern for the principles of justice.

# **Civil Disobedience--**Impacts: Willingness to Accept Punishment Key to Successful Disobedience

## **Willingness to face punishment is the best way to convince systems of power that their approach is wrong—**

Cohen 1972 – Marshall, (Professor of Philosophy and Law, at USC [“Liberalism and Disobedience,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 3. (Spring, 1972), pp. 283-314, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265054]

Certainly the courts do not do so. It may have taken the Union armies to "reverse" the Dred Scott case, but the courts often admit that they have been in error and agree to reverse themselves. Indeed, the Supreme Court has reversed itself in such momentous cases as Erie R.R. Co. v. Tomkins, Brown v. Board of Education, and West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette. This fact is of importance to the dissenter for a number of reasons. In the first place, it may strengthen the case for disobedience on purely moral grounds. For as Dworkin has observed,25 it is one thing for a man to sacrifice his principles (or to violate his conscience) when it is plain that the law requires him to do so. But it is another thing (though it may still be legally required) for him to do so when the law, or the court's view of it, is of questionable validity. In addition to making a moral difference, the fact that the courts may be wrong makes a practical difference as well. One of the disobedient's aims is to change the existing law, and the most effective way of doing so in a constitutional democracy will often be to persuade the courts that the obnoxious legislation is unconstitutional. Continued defiance of the law may be the only practical way for the dissenter to obtain a rehearing of the questions at issue. Even when other methods are available, the disobedient's willingness to face criminal punishment in defense of his beliefs may help the court to see that it has misjudged the strength and perhaps the nature of ~~his~~ interests.

## Empirical examples are on our side—civil disobedience by Jehovah’s Witnesses convinced the Supreme Court they were wrong:

Cohen 1972 – Marshall, (Professor of Philosophy and Law, at USC [“Liberalism and Disobedience,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 3. (Spring, 1972), pp. 283-314, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265054]

For this reason it is possible to agree with Dworkin's claim that the Jehovah's Witnesses behaved properly in refusing to observe Fortas' canons of correct behavior after the Court found against them in the first "Hag-salute" case.26 As they saw it, the law denied them a basic religious freedom, and they were therefore being asked to violate their fundamental religious convictions on the basis of dubious constitutional doctrine. Continued defiance did not require them to injure the interests or abridge the rights of others in any serious way, and in the end it probably helped to convince the Court that its original decision had been mistaken. In any event, the Court did reverse itself in the well-known case of West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette only a few years later. As it now viewed the matter, the intransigent Witnesses had only been exercising their constitutional rights all along. The moral is plain. It is often those who insist on their legal rights, rather than those who acquiesce in the fallible (and occasionally supine and even corrupt) opinions of courts, who strengthen the "rule of law" that writers like Fortas are so anxious to defend. If the argument for civil disobedience is strengthened when there is reason to believe that the courts are in error, it is strengthened still more when there is reason to believe that the courts will refuse to 25. Dworkin, "Civil Disobedience," p. 6i.

## Sit-ins prove the value of accepting punishment for civil disobedience:

Time, 1968 (“Lawyers: Disobedience & Punishment,” <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,838295,00.html>)

"The current rhetoric—which sometimes seems to consecrate civil disobedience as the noblest response in the pantheon of virtues—has obscured the nature and consequence of this activity." The speaker at Tulane University Law School was Erwin Griswold, 63, former dean of the Harvard Law School and now U.S. Solicitor General; and he wanted to get one major thought across. "One who contemplates civil disobedience," he said, "should not be surprised and must not be bitter if a criminal conviction ensues. It is part of the Gandhian tradition that the sincerity of the individual's conscience presupposes that the law will punish this assertion of personal principle." The punishment must come, Griswold said, simply because the law has been broken. "It is the essence of law that it binds all alike, irrespective of personal motive," he added. This is true whether the protester decides "to halt a troop train to protest the Viet Nam war" or "fire shots into a civil rights leader's home to protest integration." The next day a second voice joined in and spread the message. Speaking at the Syracuse University College of Law, Earl Morris, 59, president of the American Bar Association, echoed Griswold as he said: "Many today seem to be demanding for themselves the unlimited right to disobey law." But "an essential concomitant of civil disobedience is the actor's willingness to accept the punishment that follows." The philosophical "concept has been distorted in these times to justify violence and anarchy. What is reprehensible in these acts is not the end to be achieved, but the methods of achieving it." Both men readily conceded that such disobedience as the Negro sit-ins had shown once again the value of the practice. In those actions of the early 1960s, said Griswold, "perhaps what mattered was not merely the moral fervor of the demonstrators, or the justice of their cause, but also the way in which they conducted themselves." It was clear that neither he nor Morris thought that today's demonstrators possess much of the dignity and restraint that were in evidence then.

## Successful civil disobedience must not be alienating to those who hear it:

A.D. Woozley 76 (Professor of Moral Philosophy at University of Virginia, “Civil Disobedience and Punishment,” Ethics, Vol. 86, No. 4. (Jul., 1976), pp. 323-331, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2380227.pdf?acceptTC=true)

For example, (a) The most prominent and influential practitioners of civil disobedience have also been practitioners of nonviolence, notably Gandhi and Martin Luther King. And, treating them as paradigmatic civil disobedients, it is easy to slide into supposing that a civil disobedient must match their paradigm and so, among other things, be nonviolent. But one of the dangers of the paradigm case argument is that, as it does not clearly distinguish essence and accident, it may tempt one to mislocate the distinction. (b) It is a fact that much (although arguably not all) civil disobedience is an appeal, across the heads of authority, to a hoped-for public conscience or sense of justice. And, as civil disobedience of that kind, if it is to be effective, needs public attention, it is no good getting public attention and alienation simultaneously. As violence turns people off, the use of violence by a civil disobedience campaign is selfdefeating; and therefore civil disobedience must be nonviolent.

# **Civil Disobedience--**Impacts: Moral Obligation to Accept Punishment

## Moral obligation for civil disobedients to accept punishment of the system they indict:

A.D. Woozley 76 (Professor of Moral Philosophy at University of Virginia, “Civil Disobedience and Punishment,” Ethics, Vol. 86, No. 4. (Jul., 1976), pp. 323-331, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2380227.pdf?acceptTC=true)

Finally, if it is true that a civil disobedient must accept punishment, has no right to complain about being punished, is it a conceptual truth, or a nonconceptual moral truth? Perhaps the taxonomy does not matter enough anyway, but I would be inclined to opt for the former: not having the right is not incidental to, but essential to, being a civil disobedient. Not having the right to vote in U.S. elections is incidental to being an alien resident in the United States. The law could easily be changed, and indeed there are good reasons why it should be changed. But, by contrast, not having the right to complain about being punished for a breach, even a principled breach, of the law seems essential to being a civil disobedient. Certainly a convicted civil disobedient, like any other convicted lawbreaker, might have a right to complain about the way in which he was sentenced, about the severity of the sentence, and about the way the sentence was executed. But that he[sic/she] was punished at all, having risked that he would be, or having, like Socrates, made sure that he would be, is something about which he[sic/she] has no business to complain; and, if he thinks he has, I should be inclined to reply that that shows that he does not know what being a civil disobedient is. A civil disobedient has to know (or believe) that he is breaking the law and consequently rendering himself liable to punishment. He may sincerely believe that the judicial system to which he is exposing himself is an unjust onealthough to the extent that he does he is entering the area where the civil disobedient merges into the revolutionary-but in a system where all the offenses carry penalties, he cannot (logically cannot) be surprised that his act renders him liable to punishment, and his indignation at being punished is inconsistent with the purity of his status as a civil disobedient. The civil disobedient claiming a principled right to break the law cannot deny the law enforcer the right to keep it. I do not find it surprising that Socrates, within a few pages of declaring his willingness in certain circumstances as a subject to ignore the law, insists that it was his moral duty, when serving as one of the presidents of a criminal trial, unswervingly to uphold and enforce the law.

## Moral obligation for civil disobedient to being prepared to accept punishment:

A.D. Woozley 76 (Professor of Moral Philosophy at University of Virginia, “Civil Disobedience and Punishment,” Ethics, Vol. 86, No. 4. (Jul., 1976), pp. 323-331, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2380227.pdf?acceptTC=true)

The reason why the simple antithesis presented by Murphy is oversimple is that, although he is right to treat it as an antithesis between a conceptual and a moral problem, he does not allow for the possibility that, as being a civil disobedient involves having moral views and attitudes, it just might involve having that particular one, namely, of being prepared, on moral grounds to wait for punishment. It was the attitude that Socrates had.

# **\*\*\*\*\*Coalition Building Good\*\*\*\*\***

## **Permutation is the best option: mutually supportive collaboration creates praxis:**

McKinley 2009 – Assistant Professor, University of Oregon School of Law, (Michelle A., Fall, “Cultural Culprits”, 24 Berkeley J. Gender L. & Just. 91, Lexis Law)

[\*102] Although two decades of mainstreaming is too short a period for any sustained analysis of social change, I agree with Halley that we should be vigilant against the annexation of feminist projects, in their plurality, and mindful of the power and knowledge effects that are part of the institutionalization process no matter how sincere, participatory, and empowering their agents profess to be. Halley has suggested that feminists take a break from feminism n64 - perhaps even see other people. I do not mean that feminist theorists and advocates should inhabit each other's roles in the anthropological sense. I do mean a mutually supportive collaboration that acknowledges disagreements but is fundamentally committed to the contentions of feminist praxis. n65 As Nancy Fraser has written in the context of feminist social theory more broadly, "critical social theory frames its research program and its conceptual framework with an eye to the aims and activities of those oppositional social movements with which it has a partisan, though not uncritical, identification." n66

## Coalition building with whites is critical to challenging racism:

Ansley 2008 – Distinguished Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Tennessee College of Law (Frances, Winter, “SYMPOSIUM: Immigration Policy: Who Belongs?: COMMENT: Doing Policy from Below: Worker Solidarity and the Prospects for Immigration Reform”, 41 Cornell Int'l L.J. 101, Lexis Law)

In that situation, it seemed evident to me that racism and its power to divide disadvantaged people explained not only the extreme trials that many members of the black community faced but also much of the entrenched power of Southern elites, the retrograde character of state and local policy, the miserliness of the public sector, and the poverty among white people - all of which were obvious features of the region. Racism produced many results but among the most important was its capacity to inhibit and destroy progressive action among have-nots, thereby defining and restricting civil rights gains in a way that left deep power relationships largely unchanged. Therefore, I was ready and eager to respond to the vision of Martin Luther King Jr. when he announced a campaign to build an inter-racial movement of the poor. Further, it made sense to me when the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), issued its controversial request that white students leave the organization. n5 SNCC told white well-wishers like me that if we wanted to change a region scarred by racial disparity, we should first organize poor and working-class white people; we should go talk to white folks and bring them into alliance with the movement for racial justice. n6 In other words, at least as I heard them, the key messages of the Poor Peoples' Campaign n7 and the marching orders sent out by both Dr. King and SNCC were that poor whites were the natural and needed allies in a movement for economic justice both in the South and across the nation.

## Challenges to the economic order requires building cross-race unity:

Ansley 2008 – Distinguished Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Tennessee College of Law (Frances, Winter, “SYMPOSIUM: Immigration Policy: Who Belongs?: COMMENT: Doing Policy from Below: Worker Solidarity and the Prospects for Immigration Reform”, 41 Cornell Int'l L.J. 101, Lexis Law)

Since those civil rights days, the story of race and class in the U.S. South - as in the rest of country and for that matter the world - has unfolded in new and sometimes surprising ways. n9 Nevertheless, the ability of racist ideologies and practices, however fluid, to continue to obstruct class-based understandings and alliances has remained potent. I am convinced that progressive economic change requires building unity among economically disadvantaged people across lines of race. The challenging mandate addressed to white progressives by the drum majors and foot soldiers of the civil rights movement in the late 1960s still dogs my trail and rings true to me today, even though a contemporary reading of that mandate clearly requires new adjustments and understandings.

## Coalition building is necessary to challenge economic injustices:

**Ansley 2008** – Distinguished Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Tennessee College of Law (Frances, Winter, “SYMPOSIUM: Immigration Policy: Who Belongs?: COMMENT: Doing Policy from Below: Worker Solidarity and the Prospects for Immigration Reform”, 41 Cornell Int'l L.J. 101, Lexis Law)

After all, it seemed clear that poor whites had an obvious and demonstrable interest in joining with people of color. Only in unity with African Americans could poor whites hope to advance an economic agenda that might complete the abandoned and inadequate promises of both the post-Civil War Reconstruction and the New Deal and to unseat the conservative powers whose regressive rule depended on keeping blacks and whites securely divided from each other. Although poor white Southerners undeniably gained material and psychological benefits from the fact of being white, the gain came at the cost of a heavy net loss. Evidence all around us in the South demonstrated that time and again whenever poor Southerners moved to demand redistribution of the social surplus or a seat at the table of power, they were disarmed and derailed by the racial divide. n8

# \*\*\*\*\*Coercion K Answers\*\*\*\*\*

## (--) Turn: government involvement protects freedom:

George **Monbiot, 2012** (staff writer), “This bastardised libertarianism makes 'freedom' an instrument of oppression,” Dec. 19, 2011. Retrieved May 30, 2012 at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree> /2011/dec/19/bastardised-libertarianism-makes-freedom-oppression

Rightwing libertarianism recognises few legitimate constraints on the power to act, regardless of the impact on the lives of others. In the UK it is forcefully promoted by groups like the TaxPayers' Alliance, the Adam Smith Institute, the Institute of Economic Affairs, and Policy Exchange. Their concept of freedom looks to me like nothing but a justification for greed. So why have we been been so slow to challenge this concept of liberty? I believe that one of the reasons is as follows. The great political conflict of our age – between neocons and the millionaires and corporations they support on one side, and social justice campaigners and environmentalists on the other – has been mischaracterised as a clash between negative and positive freedoms. These freedoms were most clearly defined by Isaiah Berlin in his essay of 1958, Two Concepts of Liberty. It is a work of beauty: reading it is like listening to a gloriously crafted piece of music. I will try not to mangle it too badly. Put briefly and crudely, negative freedom is the freedom to be or to act without interference from other people. Positive freedom is freedom from inhibition: it's the power gained by transcending social or psychological constraints. Berlin explained how positive freedom had been abused by tyrannies, particularly by the Soviet Union. It portrayed its brutal governance as the empowerment of the people, who could achieve a higher freedom by subordinating themselves to a collective single will. Rightwing libertarians claim that greens and social justice campaigners are closet communists trying to resurrect Soviet conceptions of positive freedom. In reality, the battle mostly consists of a clash between negative freedoms. As Berlin noted: "No man's activity is so completely private as never to obstruct the lives of others in any way. 'Freedom for the pike is death for the minnows'." So, he argued, some people's freedom must sometimes be curtailed "to secure the freedom of others". In other words, your freedom to swing your fist ends where my nose begins. The negative freedom not to have our noses punched is the freedom that green and social justice campaigns, exemplified by the Occupy movement, exist to defend.

## (--) The negative philosophical viewpoint is immoral—liberty should not depend on the suffering of others.

George Monbiot,2012 (staff writer), “This bastardised libertarianism makes 'freedom' an instrument of oppression,” Dec. 19, 2011. Retrieved May 30, 2012 at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree> /2011/dec/19/bastardised-libertarianism-makes-freedom-oppression

Berlin also shows that freedom can intrude on other values, such as justice, equality or human happiness. "If the liberty of myself or my class or nation depends on the misery of a number of other human beings, the system which promotes this is unjust and immoral." It follows that the state should impose legal restraints on freedoms that interfere with other people's freedoms – or on freedoms which conflict with justice and humanity.

## (--) State power necessary to prevent freedoms from being trampled by others.

George Monbiot, (staff writer), “This bastardised libertarianism makes 'freedom' an instrument of oppression,” Dec. 19, 2011. Retrieved May 30, 2012 at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree> /2011/dec/19/bastardised-libertarianism-makes-freedom-oppression

The landlord was exercising his freedom to cut the tree down. In doing so, he was intruding on Clare's freedom to delight in the tree, whose existence enhanced his life. The landlord justifies this destruction by characterising the tree as an impediment to freedom – his freedom, which he conflates with the general liberty of humankind. Without the involvement of the state (which today might take the form of a tree preservation order) the powerful [hu]man could trample the pleasures of the powerless [hu]man. Clare then compares the felling of the tree with further intrusions on his liberty. "Such was thy ruin, music-making elm; / The right of freedom was to injure thine: / As thou wert served, so would they overwhelm / In freedom's name the little that is mine."

## (--) Their simplistic philosophy ignores other constraints on freedom:

George Monbiot, (staff writer), “This bastardised libertarianism makes 'freedom' an instrument of oppression,” Dec. 19, 2011. Retrieved May 30, 2012 at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree> /2011/dec/19/bastardised-libertarianism-makes-freedom-oppression

Modern libertarianism is the disguise adopted by those who wish to exploit without restraint. It pretends that only the state intrudes on our liberties. It ignores the role of banks, corporations and the rich in making us less free. It denies the need for the state to curb them in order to protect the freedoms of weaker people. This bastardised, one-eyed philosophy is a con trick, whose promoters attempt to wrongfoot justice by pitching it against liberty. By this means they have turned "freedom" into an instrument of oppression.

# Coercion K Answers

## (--) Perm: do both-- They have their history wrong—the state is instrumental in the expansion of private property rights.

Gabriel **Winant, 2010** (graduate student in American history at Yale), “The lesson of Rand Paul: libertarianism is juvenile,” May 21, 2010. Retrieved May 30, 2012 at <http://www.salon.com/2010/05/21/libertarianism_who_needs_it/>

There’s the key — “the underlying realities of how the world works.” Because never, and I mean never, has there been capitalist enterprise that wasn’t ultimately underwritten by the state. This is true at an obvious level that even most libertarians would concede (though maybe not some of the Austrian economists whom Rand Paul adores): for the system to work, you need some kind of bare bones apparatus for enforcing contracts and protecting property. But it’s also true in a more profound, historical sense. To summarize very briefly a long and complicated process, we got capitalism in the first place through a long process of flirtation between governments on the one hand, and bankers and merchants on the other, culminating in the Industrial Revolution. What libertarians revere as an eternal, holy truth is in fact, in the grand scheme of human history, quite young. And if they’d just stop worshiping for a minute, they’d notice the parents hovering in the background.

## (--) The permutation solves best—some public interferences in the market are necessary for the protection of private property.

Gabriel **Winant, 2010** (graduate student in American history at Yale), “The lesson of Rand Paul: libertarianism is juvenile,” May 21, 2010. Retrieved May 30, 2012 at <http://www.salon.com/2010/05/21/libertarianism_who_needs_it/>

Think about the New Deal. Although libertarian ingrates will never admit it, without the reforms of the 1930s, there might not be private property left for them to complain about the government infringing on. Not many capitalist democracies could survive 25 percent unemployment, and it doesn’t just happen by good luck. Or, take a couple more recent examples: savvy health insurance executives were quite aware during this past year that, if reform failed again, skyrocketing prices were likely to doom the whole scheme of private insurance (itself a freak accident of federal policy) and bring on single-payer. Here’s a fun sci-fi one: Imagine the moment in, say, twenty years, when the evidence of climate change has become undeniable, and there’s an urgent crackdown on carbon-intensive industries. Then coal companies and agribusiness will be wishing they’d gotten on board with the mild, slow-moving reform that is cap-and-trade.

## (--) The alternative will fail—we can’t just move back to the alleged free market utopia.

Gabriel **Winant, 2010** (graduate student in American history at Yale), “The lesson of Rand Paul: libertarianism is juvenile,” May 21, 2010. Retrieved May 30, 2012 at <http://www.salon.com/2010/05/21/libertarianism_who_needs_it/>

Libertarians like Paul are walking around with the idea that the world could just snap back to a naturally-occurring benign order if the government stopped interfering. As Paul implied, good people wouldn’t shop at the racist stores, so there wouldn’t be any. This is the belief system of people who have been the unwitting recipients of massive government backing for their entire lives. To borrow a phrase, they were born on third base, and think they hit a triple. We could fill a library with the details of the state underwriting enjoyed by American business — hell, we could fill a fair chunk of the Internet, if we weren’t using it all on Rand Paul already. And I don’t just mean modern corporate welfare, or centuries-ago agricultural changes. Most left-of-center policymaking can fit into this category in one way or another.

## (--) Coercion is necessary to protect against intolerant ideas.

Jonah **Goldberg, 2001** (staff writer) “The Libertarian Lie,” Dec. 18, 2001. Retrieved May 30, 2012 at [http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/205102/libertarian-lie/jonah-goldberg#](http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/205102/libertarian-lie/jonah-goldberg)

Kids are born barbarians, as Hannah Arendt noted. Without character-forming institutions which softly coerce (persuade) kids — and remind adults — to revere our open, free, and tolerant culture over others, we run the risk of having them embrace any old creed or ideology that they find most rewarding or exciting, including some value systems which take it on blind faith that America is evil and, say, Cuba or Osama bin Laden is wonderful. That’s precisely why campuses today are infested with so many silly radicals, and why libertarians in their own way encourage the dismantling of the soapboxes they stand on. For cultural libertarians this is all glorious, or at least worth the risks. I just wish more libertarians had the guts to admit it.

## (--) Rights are not moral absolutes

Jonah **Goldberg, 2001** (staff writer) “The Libertarian Lie,” Dec. 18, 2001. Retrieved May 30, 2012 at [http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/205102/libertarian-lie/jonah-goldberg#](http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/205102/libertarian-lie/jonah-goldberg)

Look, the libertarian critique of the state is useful, valuable, important, and much needed. But, in my humble opinion, the libertarian critique of the culture — “established authority” — tends to be exactly what I’ve always said it was: a celebration of personal liberty over everything else, and in many (but certainly not all) respects indistinguishable from the more asinine prattle we hear from the Left. (The great compromise between libertarians and conservatives is, of course, federalism see “Among the Gender Benders“). Personal liberty is vitally important. But it isn’t everything. If you emphasize personal liberty over all else, you undermine the development of character and citizenship — a point Hayek certainly understood.

# \*\*\*\*\*Colonialism K Answers\*\*\*\*\*

## Alt can’t solve – attempts to break down colonialism are always coopted by a different oppressive group

**Gillen & Ghosh 7**

(Paul, Devleena – “Colonialism & Modernity” Google Books)

After World War II colonial rule was rapidly abandoned – the first of two sudden political breakdowns in the 20th century, the second being the even more rapid demise of European Communism in 1989-1991. Japanese colonies became independent or were occupied by China or the United States in 1945. South Asia followed in 1947 and 1948, with Indonesia in 1949. By the late 1960s, nearly all the significant territories of the British and Frence empires had become independent states. Ironically, the Portuguese colonies, among the first to be acquired, were among the last to be abandoned, when the Salazar dictatorship ended in 1974. The process was far from peaceful. France fought two major colonial wars, in Algeria and Vietnam, losing both. Later Portugal fought unsuccessfully to retain Angola and Mozambique. Internecine political and ethnic conflicts frequently coincided with or followed the granting of independence. Examples were the partition of India and Pakistan, civil wars and resistance in Nigeria and Indonesia, and communist insurrections in Korea and Malaya. An important motivation for decolonization stemmed from the growing appeal of the nation-state ideal. What historian Frederick Cooper points out in relation to the French Empire applies across the board, including the dissolution of the Soviet Empire in the 1990s: Demands for equality of wages, benefits, and ultimately standard of living among all people who the government asserted to be French… - backed by well-organized protest movements and in the context of world-wide debates over self-determination and anticolonial revolutions…-resented the French government with the dilemma of either giving up the idea of Greater France or facing its metropolitan citizens with never-ending demands and an unpayable bill. The national conception of France was consolidated in the same process that gave rise to nation-states in North and sub-Saharan Africa.15 The sovereignty of colonial states passed from European governments to governments which at first, and usually for some time, were dominated by the Westernised elite that had led the struggle for independence. IN nearly all cases, the institutional and legal forms of governance were continuous with those of the colonial period.

## Alt can’t solve and would be worse – MNCs will fill-in for governments

**Ozoigbo & Chukuezi 11**

(Bonaventure I., Corresponding Author, Directorate of General Studies, Federal University of Technology, Imo State, Nigeria. Comfort O., Directorate of General Studies, Federal University of Technology. Imo State, Nigeria. “The Impact of Multinational Corporations on the Nigerian Economy” European Journal of Social Sciences. Vol 19, No. 3)

The African states including Nigeria were in the hands of these men when the MNCs came on board mainly to replace the white rulers in the area of economic exploitation. So the exploitation contract was signed and sealed with these ‘Black skins, White masks’, who did not know at that time the implications of the contract, and when and where they knew were helpless about the situation. So whatever the MNCs are doing in Nigeria has the backing of the Nigerian government, no thanks to the unfair contract signed. The way the Nigerian government is protecting and supporting the MNCs against the restive youths of the Niger Delta who are making just and legitimate demands testify to this. The actual implication of the contract signed is that the Nigerian nation is the fake owner of her God-given natural resources who receives only royalties or pittance while the major profit is transferred abroad to the home countries by the MNCs who now are actually the real owners of the raw materials. There was a time during President Buhari and Idiagbon’s regime when the Nigerian government could no longer bear this unfair treatment of the MNCs and tried to circumvent the terms of the agreement by way of increased tariffs and taxes. The MNCs on the other hand undermined this move by way of double accounting. By the principle of double accounting, which goes by way of the MNCs determining the price of the equipment they bring inside the country and at the same time determine the price they pay for what they take from the country. In this situation Nigeria lost more money than ever. However, the unfair treatment by the MNCs has come to stay and Nigeria cannot really do anything positive about it. If Nigeria should ask them to go, the high level of corruption in Nigeria will not allow for effective replacement. If Nigeria attempted to sack them, Nigeria will not find it easy in the international market because there the Western world will conspire against Nigeria. So these MNCs have become a sort of devil’s alternative. The only panacea for Nigeria to come out of this mess is to adopt the policy of independent economy.

# Colonialism K Answers

## MNCs are worse than governmental colonialism

**Ozoigbo & Chukuezi 11**

(Bonaventure I., Corresponding Author, Directorate of General Studies, Federal University of Technology, Imo State, Nigeria. Comfort O., Directorate of General Studies, Federal University of Technology. Imo State, Nigeria. “The Impact of Multinational Corporations on the Nigerian Economy” European Journal of Social Sciences. Vol 19, No. 3)

The clash between multinationals and host countries has been most intense in the less developed economies. Individual critics and public officials have leveled vociferous charges against the policies of international corporations and their alleged negative consequences for the economic well-being and development of the host nations (Gilpin 1987). This view prompted the reaction of Onimode (1982) and to conclude that there is more myth than reality in the developmental activities of the MNCs in Nigeria. He further stated that a thorough empirical analysis of the impact on the Nigerian economy and consciousness will reveal the following: 1) Decapitalization of Nigeria: This thesis argues that most of the capitals in the form of profits are not invested in the country but sent to the home countries of MNCs for investment, thereby rendering Nigeria industrially underdeveloped. The royalties or pittance paid to the government European Journal of Social Sciences – Volume 19, Number 3 (2011) 384 by these MNCs cannot because of its meagerness be employed into heavy industrial projects. In brief, the MNCs export abroad the capital that would have been used to develop Nigeria thus; the MNCs distort the economy and the economic development in Nigeria because the capital needed for development is no longer here in the country but abroad. 2) Technological backwardness: It is in the area that the MNCs are regarded as the worst culprits because it is in this section that the MNCs play their greatest trick imaginable. The MNCs by way of purporting to help industrialize Nigeria create a branch-plant economy of small inefficient firms incapable of propelling overall development. The local subsidiaries exist only as enclaves in the host economy rather than as engines of self-reliant growth. These corporations intentionally and deceitfully introduce inappropriate types of technologies that hinder indigenous technological developments. These MNCs employ capital intensive productive techniques that cause unemployment. All these prevent the emergence of domestic technologies. Before the advent of the MNCs, in Nigeria, there were so many assorted types of technologies all over the country, though they were of low scale type. The MNCs rather than help them grow knocks them off systematically through the introduction of more advanced technologies. The MNC both retain the control of the most advanced technology and do not transfer it to Nigeria or the rest of the developing economies at reasonable prices. The negative impact of MNCs on Nigeria is most noticeable in this area of technology transfer. There are four main reasons for this assertion; a) Most of the imported technologies came under the industrial property system of restrictive patterns and license. This is a very sensitive barrier for Nigeria. The implication of this is that Nigerians cannot copy and internalize these technologies even if they have the capacity and willingness to do so because it is illegal for them to do so. Because of this, Nigeria has to make do with dependent development, which has several deleterious economic consequences. b) The MNCs jealously guard the technological know-how of their technologies by way of refusing to make use of competent staff. The MNCs instead use mere technicians who are at the last rung of productive process and simply assemble together what they knew not how it was produced. By implication Nigerians cannot learn from the technicians the intricacies involved in the production of the material or product. c) Another point of skillful deceit by the MNCs is the fact that where qualified and competent indigenous staff are to be exposed to the technological know-how of a type of production. Sometimes the type of technology they are exposed to is so sophisticated that they are mesmerized by it. In some cases, the high capital that may be needed simply embarrasses the nation in that they cannot afford it instead she prefers to forget about it. d) The MNCs increase the mal-distribution of income in Nigeria and other less developed countries. The case of oil workers earning in a month what some federal civil servants earn in a year does not augur well with the development of the nation. This step creates a class-conscious society, which does not help development as such. Therefore, the type of technology that the MNCs imported into the country is the one that serves the few urban elite because only they have the resources to get at it while the generality of the populace continue to face stark underdevelopment. 1. Structural Distortion: The principle of industrialization in an open economy of the Nigerian government in relation to the MNCs has given the MNCs the freedom to choose their line of operations, the locations of their industry and other productive processes. The MNCs natural base is usually in urban centers of the Nigerian society like Lagos, Kaduna, Enugu and PortHarcourt. The industries in these cities are mainly those of oil and consumer goods. This urban concentration of MNCs distorted the structure of the society by enhancing an uneven “development”. 2. Political Instability: Because these corporations require a stable host government, which of course is sympathetic to capitalism, they try as much as possible to cause directly protect the European Journal of Social Sciences – Volume 19, Number 3 (2011) 385 existing government whenever a reactionary leader or group seems to take over the government. The MNCs try to maintain the status quo that is, dependent development which encourages the emergence of authoritarian regimes in the host country and go ahead to create alliances between international capitalist and domestic capitalist elite. This exploitative alliance is sustained by the intervention of the corporations’ home governments in the internal affairs of the less developed countries. In this fashion foreign investment tends to make the host country politically dependent upon the metropolitan country (Gilpin, 1987). It is on record that the MNCs kept President Mobutu of Zaire in power for so long because he was tutelage to them and with MNCs they sucked dry the economy of Zaire. The MNCs equally were responsible for the early exit and assassination of Patrice Lumumba because he would not allow their exploitative activities. The same story is true of Captain Thomas Sankara of Burkina Fasso and so many others. So the multinationals in the third world and Africa in particular have gained much from the political instability that exists here and there. Africa now has the greatest number of countries experiencing one kind of political crisis or the other. In all these, the wicked hands of the MNCs and their home governments are there very glaringly. Cultural Degradation: The adverse effects of the presence and operations of MNCs in Nigeria are also felt in the area of our cherished cultural heritage. Indeed, there are negative effects of foreign direct investment on the cultural and social well-being of Nigeria and other less developing countries. The domineering presence of the MNCs in Nigeria is characterized as constituting a form of “cultural imperialism or coco-cola-ization of the society” (Gilpin, 1987), through which Nigeria and indeed, the rest of the developing countries lose control over their culture and social development. These multinationals undermine the traditional values of the Nigerian society and introduce through its advertising and business practices new values and tastes inappropriate to the Nigeria nation. An instance of this is the introduction of foreign violent and crime-laden films and videos as well as pornographic materials into Nigeria. It has been rightly observed that these foreign values are not only bad in themselves but are detrimental to the development of the country because they create demands for luxury and other goods that do not meet the true needs of the common masses. In considering the issue of the transfer of inappropriate technology, it has to be noted that Nigeria and other third world economies want not only the most advanced technologies but also labour-intensive technology, which will serve as appropriate technology, in order to maximize employment. Furthermore, the transfer of capital-intensive technology by the MNCs is beneficial to the less developing economies like Nigeria. This is true because what would have taken a lot of time doing, machines do better in a lesser time and thereby save costs. The charge of cultural imperialism, despite its veracity, has to be stated at the same time that the very process of economic growth or development itself is destructive of traditional values, since it necessarily involves the creation of new tastes and unaccustomed desires. MNCs are inherently exploitative. Stopford 1998 states that advocacy groups often portray multinationals as globetrotting sweatshop operators, indifferent polluters, and systematic tax evaders. Exploitation remains a problem. But how much of this is a function of business in general, rather than MNCs in particular? He claims that smaller, local firms often can be much more exploitative than foreigners. Multinationals typically pay at or above the going wage and provide superior training. But even if most MNCs are well intentioned, they suffer from a credibility gap. Perhaps unwittingly, MNCs can fuel public concern by being culturally insensitive, not honoring promises made by their predecessors, and being inconsistent in other aspects of their "social contract" with local society. With regard to the environment, international big business is both the creator of pollution and the only resource available for its cleanup. The MNCs' record on pollution pales in comparison with those of many local businesses and state-owned enterprises. The issue of tax evasion continues to generate acrimonious debate, despite guidelines produced by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Multinational corporations protest that they pay their taxes responsibly. When many MNCs conclude that the host government had abandoned its favorable investment climate. They cut back on capital spending, closed some plants, and moved money offshore.

# \*\*\*\*\*Complexity Kritik Answers\*\*\*\*\*

## (--) Trying to factor in every possible cause is an impossible task and risks paralysis, a good prediction is good enough.

Erich **Loewy, 1991** (associate professor of medicine at the University of Illinois and associate professor of humanities), “Suffering and the Beneficent Community: Beyond Libertarianism,” 1991, p. 17-21.

All of our judgments and decisions ultimately must be grounded in nonverifiable assumptions. The fundamentalist may deny this; but the fundamentalist grounds her judgments and decisions either in a religious belief based on revealed truth or, at least, on the assumption that “somewhere out there” truth exists and that we, in the human condition, can know it. Ultimately, or at least up to this point in time, absolute verification eludes [sic hu]man. At the extreme of this point of view, there are those who claim that truth is not only knowable, but is in fact, known and only the stubborn recalcitrance of the uninitiated prevents it from being generally accepted. This point of view claims not only that morality exists as a discoverable truth, an absolute not fashioned by men but unchanging and immutable, but also that truth has in fact been discovered. Rights and wrongs exist quite apart from the stage on which their application is played out. Situations may differ but, at most, such differences force us to reinterpret old and forever valid principles in a new light. Those who believe themselves to know the truth, furthermore, oftentimes feel compelled not only to persuade others to their point of view but feel morally justified in using considerable force to do so. On the other hand, some of us would deny the existence of immutable truth or, what is not quite the same thing, deny at least that it is knowable in the human condition. Those who flatly deny the existence of unalterable truth find themselves in much the same pickle as do those who flatly assert it: Both lack a standard of truth to which their affirmations can be appealed. Those who concede the possibility that truth exists but not the possibility that man in the human condition can be privy to it, have modified the position without greatly improving it. Their affirmation that man in the human condition can never know absolute truth seems more reasonable but is, once again, not verifiable. Who can know with certainty that tomorrow someone will not discover a way of “getting at” absolute truth and, in addition, be able to provide a simple and brilliant proof which other mortals to date have missed? Only an absolutist could deny such a possibility! That leaves us with a more pragmatic answer: Holding that, in the human condition, truth is not—or at least is not currently—accessible to us leaves more options open and does not fly in the face of the undeniable fact that, unlikely as it seems, our knowing absolute truth may be just around the corner. Outside the religious sphere, no one has ever convinced most thinking people that they are the possessors of absolute truth. Truth, whenever accepted at least for daily use, is **invariably hedged**. If we accept the fact that absolute truth (at least so far) is unknown to us and accept as an axiom that it may well be unknowable, we are left with a truth which for **everyday use** is fashioned rather than discovered. What is and what is not true or what is and what is not morally acceptable, therefore, varies with the culture in which we live. This claim (the claim on which, as we shall see, cultural relativism relies) rests on the assertion that there are many ways of looking at truths and that such truths are fashioned by people. Depending on our vantage point, there are many visions of reality,1 a fact which the defenders of this doctrine hold to be valid in dealing with the concrete, scientific reality of chemistry and physics.2 Such a claim, it would seem, is even more forceful when dealing with morals. As Engelhardt puts it so very well: “Our construals of reality exist within the embrace of cultural expectations.”3 And our “construals of reality” include our vision of the moral life. Furthermore, not only do our “visions of reality occur within the embrace of cultural expectations,” the limits of what we as humans can and what we cannot culturally (or otherwise) expect are biologically framed by the totality of our bodies and their capacities as well as (and inseparable from the rest of the body of which it is a part) by our minds. All human judgments and decisions, then are inevitably grounded to prior assumptions which we accept and do not question for now. There is a story about William James which illustrates the point. James was giving a lecture dealing with the universe at a Chattauqua: one of those events so popular at the turn of the century, which has, regrettably, been replaced by talk shows. At the end of his well-received lecture, a little old lady came up to him and said: “I enjoyed your talk, Mr. James, but you know you are making an error: The universe rests on the back of a tortoise!” “Very well,” James said, “I can accept that. But tell me, what in turn does that other tortoise rest upon?”  “It’s no use, Mr. James, it’s tortoises all the way down.” And so it goes: Every assumption rests on the back of another assumption and if we are to examine all before proceeding with our everyday judgments and decisions we would get **hopelessly mired in mud**. The quest is necessarily endless

## (--) Empirical reasoning should be preferred over complex kritiks of international relations.

David **Owen, 2002** (Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton) Millennium Vol 31 No 3 2002 p. 655-7

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven **rather than problem-driven approach** to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’xx in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of **empirical validity.** The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.

# Complexity Kritik Answers

## (--) Empirical, evidence-based debate is crucial to prevent politics of ideology and serial policy failure from taking over international relations theory.

Lisa **Anderson, 2003** (Dean of the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia) “Scholarship, Policy, Debate and Conflict:Why We Study the Middle East and Why It Matters, 2003. Retrieved May 31, 2012 at <http://www.campus-watch.org/article/id/871>

Yet, there is far more that we must do, as an institution and as individuals. We have a special responsibility, in fostering intellectual exchange, promoting high standards of scholarship, enhancing education and encouraging public awareness of the Middle East to ensure that our academic collaborators and colleagues are not treated like enemy aliens, their religions maligned and motives impugned. Scientific and scholarly exchange should not be impeded and dissemination of ideas must be respected without regard to the national origin, political persuasion or disciplinary loyalty of their authors. We need to be able to acknowledge the failings of our work without embarrassment--remember that no bench scientist is afraid to report negative experimental results--but we must also assertively deploy our unparalleled expertise to provide unique insight and understanding of the Middle East. The Middle East Studies Association is, in fact, where people congregate who speak the languages, fathom the economies, know the histories (and the debates about the histories), appreciate the jokes, understand the insults, and recognize the aspirations in the Middle East today. What does that unique insight and understanding mean, and what relationship might it have to policy? This question is worth reflecting on carefully, for the academy and the policy world cannot afford to be mutually incomprehensible. Certainly, scholars are often dismissive of the lack of analytical rigor that typifies the conduct of public policy--the need to act before all the answers are known--while policy practitioners are bemused by the theoretical pretensions of scholars--the reluctance to act in the absence of all the answers.[[20]](http://fp.arizona.edu/mesassoc/Bulletin/Pres%20Addresses/Anderson.htm" \l "_ftn20" \o ") Yet we have already seen how policy can shape the arena in which scholarship takes place, for good and for ill, and there is a widespread presumption that scholarship should also shape policy. On the part of policymakers, for example, Representative Pete Hoekstra in his press release announcing that the authorization of Title VI has passed the House subcommittee describes the purposes of the Title VI centers: "to advance knowledge of world regions, encourage the study of foreign languages, and train Americans to have the international expertise and understanding to fulfill pressing national security needs."[[21]](http://fp.arizona.edu/mesassoc/Bulletin/Pres%20Addresses/Anderson.htm" \l "_ftn21" \o ") From the scholar's perspective, just last year, my predecessor as MESA President, Joel Beinin, while acknowledging that " we cannot and should not speak with one voice as authorities whose academic expertise give us exact knowledge of the best way to protect Americans from acts of terror, to remove Saddam Husayn from power, to end the Arab-Israeli conflict, or other desirable goals" nonetheless argued that "we should speak publicly about such topics because our opinions are likely to be much better informed than most citizens."[[22]](http://fp.arizona.edu/mesassoc/Bulletin/Pres%20Addresses/Anderson.htm" \l "_ftn22" \o ") Clearly we all believe that knowledge, understanding and issues of public moment should somehow be linked. And, in fact, ever since the creation of research universities in the United States, more than a century ago, academic research, particularly but not exclusively scientific and social scientific research, has been presumed to serve important purposes for policy and policy-makers. Probably since the rise of the early modern state, and certainly since the development of the modern welfare state, it has been assumed that policy should be based on empirical, scientifically developed evidence--as opposed to religious conviction, ideology, personal whims or merely guesswork. This search for evidence in the formulation and conduct of policy led quite naturally to scholars. During the Second World War, for example, as Alexander Stille tells us,

## (--) Predictions don’t have to be perfect, just good enough

BRUCE BUENO **DE MESQUITA, 2011** (Julius Silver Professor of Politics at New York University), “FOX-HEDGING OR KNOWING: ONE BIG WAY TO KNOW MANY THINGS,” July 18th, 2011. Retrieved May 31, 2012 at <http://www.cato-unbound.org/2011/07/18/bruce-bueno-de-mesquita/fox-hedging-or-knowing-one-big-way-to-know-many-things/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium>= feed&utm\_campaign=Feed%3A+cato-unbound+%28Cato+Unbound%29

It is hard to say which is more surprising, that anyone still argues that we can predict very little or that anyone believes expertise conveys reliable judgment. Each reflects a bad habit of mind that we should overcome. It is certainly true that predictive efforts, by whatever means, are far from perfect and so we can always come up with examples of failure. But a proper assessment of progress in predictive accuracy, as Gardner and Tetlock surely agree, requires that we compare the rate of success and failure across methods of prediction rather than picking only examples of failure (or success). How often, for instance, has The Economist been wrong or right in its annual forecasts compared to other forecasters? Knowing that they did poorly in 2011 or that they did well in some other selected year doesn’t help answer that question. That is why, as Gardner and Tetlock emphasize, predictive methods can best be evaluated through comparative tournaments. Reliable prediction is so much a part of our daily lives that **we don’t even notice it.** Consider the insurance industry. At least since Johan de Witt (1625–1672) exploited the mathematics of probability and uncertainty, insurance companies have generally been profitable. Similarly, polling and other statistical methods for predicting elections are sufficiently accurate most of the time that we forget that these methods supplanted expert judgment decades ago. Models have replaced pundits as the means by which elections are predicted exactly because various (imperfect) statistical approaches routinely outperform expert prognostications. More recently, sophisticated game theory models have proven sufficiently predictive that they have become a mainstay of high-stakes government and business auctions such as bandwidth auctions. Game theory models have also found extensive use and well-documented predictive success on both sides of the Atlantic in helping to resolve major national security issues, labor-management disputes, and complex business problems. Are these methods perfect or omniscient? Certainly not! Are the marginal returns to knowledge over naïve methods (expert opinion; predicting that tomorrow will be just like today) substantial? I believe the evidence warrants an enthusiastic “Yes!” Nevertheless, despite the numerous successes in designing predictive methods, we appropriately focus on failures. After all, by studying failure methodically we are likely to make progress in eliminating some errors in the future.

# Complexity Kritik Answers

## (--) Rigorous, evidence based debate is critical for effective international relations scholarship.

Lisa **Anderson, 2003** (Dean of the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia) “Scholarship, Policy, Debate and Conflict:Why We Study the Middle East and Why It Matters, 2003. Retrieved May 31, 2012 at <http://www.campus-watch.org/article/id/871>

In the wars on terror and on Iraq, evidence has been scarce and little regarded. From the questions about "sexed-up" intelligence reports; the suggestion that claims about Weapons of Mass Destruction were really rationales of bureaucratic convenience in creating constituents for the war on Iraq; the cavalier willingness to lock up terror suspects for months or years without any verifiable evidence of wrongdoing; to the deliberate efforts to create popular perceptions of links between Saddam Husayn and al-Qa'ida, we have been living in an era in which evidence plays little or no part in policymaking. Robert Reischauer reflected earlier this year on the importance of evidence in policy in a very different arena--domestic social programs--but his observations are worth pondering for a moment: Public policy in the United States in recent years has increasingly been conceived, debated, and evaluated through the lenses of politics and ideology--policies are Democratic or Republican, liberal or conservative, free market or government controlled. Discussion surrounding even much-vaunted bipartisan initiatives focuses on the politics of the compromise instead of the substance or impact of the policy. The fundamental question--will the policy work?--too often gets short shrift or is ignored altogether. As Reischauer points out, the evidence produced by scholarship and science does not create policy or guarantee its success--it merely frames the choices and identifies the costs of various alternatives--but in its absence, policies are, as he put it, "likely to fail because they may not be grounded in the economic, institutional and social reality of a problem....Politically acceptable doesn't necessarily mean effective, affordable, or otherwise viable."[[24]](http://fp.arizona.edu/mesassoc/Bulletin/Pres%20Addresses/Anderson.htm#_ftn24) Informing policy debates with the sort of evidence scholars bring to bear is an essential part of responsible policymaking in the modern world.

# Complexity Kritik Answers

## The alt fails: Understanding all the factors at play doesn’t necessarily lead to good predictions.

BRUCE BUENO **DE MESQUITA, 2011** (Julius Silver Professor of Politics at New York University), “FOX-HEDGING OR KNOWING: ONE BIG WAY TO KNOW MANY THINGS,” July 18th, 2011. Retrieved May 31, 2012 at <http://www.cato-unbound.org/2011/07/18/bruce-bueno-de-mesquita/fox-hedging-or-knowing-one-big-way-to-know-many-things/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium>= feed&utm\_campaign=Feed%3A+cato-unbound+%28Cato+Unbound%29

Experts are an easy, although eminently justified, target for critiquing predictive accuracy. Their failure to outperform simple statistical algorithms should come as no surprise. Expertise has nothing to do with judgment or foresight. What makes an expert is the accumulation of an exceptional quantity of facts about some place or time. The idea that such expertise translates into reliable judgment rests on the false belief that knowing “the facts” is all that is necessary to draw correct inferences. This is but one form of the erroneous linkage of correlation to causation; a linkage at the heart of current data mining methods. It is even more so an example of confusing data (the facts) with a method for drawing inferences. Reliance on expert judgment ignores their personal beliefs as a noisy filter applied to the selection and utilization of facts. Consider, for instance, that Republicans, Democrats, and libertarians all know the same essential facts about the U.S. economy and all probably desire the same outcomes: low unemployment, low inflation, and high growth. The facts, however, do not lead experts to the same judgment about what to do to achieve the desired outcomes. That requires a theory and balanced evidence about what gets us from a distressed economy to a well-functioning one. Of course, lacking a common theory and biased by personal beliefs, the experts’ predictions will be widely scattered. Good prediction—and this is my belief—comes from dependence on logic and evidence to draw inferences about the causal path from facts to outcomes. Unfortunately, government, business, and the media assume that expertise—knowing the history, culture, mores, and language of a place, for instance—is sufficient to anticipate the unfolding of events. Indeed, too often many of us dismiss approaches to prediction that require knowledge of statistical methods, mathematics, and systematic research design. We seem to prefer “wisdom” over science, even though the evidence shows that the application of the scientific method, with all of its demands, outperforms experts (remember Johan de Witt). The belief that area expertise, for instance, is sufficient to anticipate the future is, as Tetlock convincingly demonstrated, just plain false. If we hope to build reliable predictions about human behavior, whether in China, Cameroon, or Connecticut, then probably we must first harness facts to the systematic, repeated, transparent application of the same logic across connected families of problems. By doing so we can test alternative ways of thinking to uncover what works and what doesn’t in different circumstances. Here Gardner, Tetlock, and I could not agree more. Prediction tournaments are an essential ingredient to work out what the current limits are to improved knowledge and predictive accuracy. Of course, improvements in knowledge and accuracy will always be a moving target because technology, ideas, and subject adaptation will be ongoing.

# Complexity Kritik Answers

## Gathering information from a wide variety of experts can lead to good predictions.

BRUCE BUENO **DE MESQUITA, 2011** (Julius Silver Professor of Politics at New York University), “FOX-HEDGING OR KNOWING: ONE BIG WAY TO KNOW MANY THINGS,” July 18th, 2011. Retrieved May 31, 2012 at <http://www.cato-unbound.org/2011/07/18/bruce-bueno-de-mesquita/fox-hedging-or-knowing-one-big-way-to-know-many-things/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium>= feed&utm\_campaign=Feed%3A+cato-unbound+%28Cato+Unbound%29

How can game theory be harnessed to achieve reliable prediction? Acting like a fox, I gather information from a wide variety of experts. They are asked only for specific current information (Who wants to influence a decision? What outcome do they currently advocate? How focused are they on the issue compared to other questions on their plate? How flexible are they about getting the outcome they advocate? And how much clout could they exert?). They are not asked to make judgments about what will happen. Then, acting as a hedgehog, I use that information as data with which to seed a dynamic applied game theory model. The model’s logic then produces not only specific predictions about the issues in question, but also a probability distribution around the predictions. The predictions are detailed and nuanced. They address not only what outcome is likely to arise, but also how each “player” will act, how they are likely to relate to other players over time, what they believe about each other, and much more. Methods like this are credited by the CIA, academic specialists and others, as being accurate about 90 percent of the time based on large-sample assessments. These methods have been subjected to peer review with predictions published well ahead of the outcome being known and with the issues forecast being important questions of their time with much controversy over how they were expected to be resolved. This is not so much a testament to any insight I may have had but rather to the virtue of combining the focus of the hedgehog with the breadth of the fox. When facts are harnessed by logic and evaluated through replicable tests of evidence, we progress toward better prediction.

## Perm: do both--The best middle ground is to analyze probabilities based on evidence and then draw rational conclusions

Michael **Fitzsimmons, 2006** “The Problem of Uncertainty in Strategic Planning”, Survival, Winter 06/07

Much has been made about the defining role of uncertainty in strategic plan- ning since the end of the Cold War. With the end of bipolar competition, so the argument goes, and the accelerating pace of change in technology and inter- national political and economic relations, forecasting world events even a few years into the future has become exceedingly difficult. Indeed, few in the year 2000 would have described with much accuracy the current conditions facing national-security decision-makers. Moreover, history offers ample evidence, from the Schlieffen Plan to the Soviet economy, that rigid planning creates risks of catastrophic failure. Clearly, uncertainty demands an appreciation for the importance of flexibility in strategic planning. For all of its importance, however, recognition of uncertainty poses a dilemma for strategists: in predicting the future, they are likely to be wrong; but in resisting prediction, they risk clouding the rational bases for making strategic choices. Over-confidence in prediction may lead to good preparation for the wrong future, but wholesale dismissal of prediction may lead a strategist to spread his resources too thinly. In pursuit of flexibility, he ends up well pre- pared for nothing. A natural compromise is to build strategies that are robust across multiple alternative future events but are still tailored to meet the challenges of the most likely future events. Recent US national security strategy, especially in the Department of Defense, has veered from this middle course and placed too much emphasis on the role of uncertainty. This emphasis, paradoxically, illustrates the hazards of both too much allowance for uncertainty and too little. Current policies on nuclear-force planning and the results of the recent Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) are examples of overreaching for strategic flexibility. The record of planning for post-war operations in Iraq, by contrast, indicates that decision-makers, in enlisting uncertainty as a rationale for discounting one set of predictions, have fallen prey to overconfidence in their own alternative set of predictions. A more balanced approach to accounting for uncertainty in strategic planning would address a wide range of potential threats and security challenges, but would also incorporate explicit, transparent, probabilistic reasoning into planning processes. The main benefit of such an approach would not neces- sarily be more precise predictions of the future, but rather greater clarity and discipline applied to the difficult judgements about the future upon which strategy depends.

# \*\*\*\*\*Consult the Natives\*\*\*\*\*

# Consult the Natives Counterplan (1-2)

## Text: The United States federal government should engage in prior, binding, meaningful consultation

## with indigenous tribes regarding the mandates of the Affirmative plan. The United States federal

## government will implement any policy arising out of the consultation. Questions, ask.

## Observation 1: not topical

## 1) The counterplan doesn’t increase social services: it engages in a process of consultation about increasing social services.

## 2) Violates Resolved: which means to stand firm:

**Dictionary.com, 2009** (http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/resolved)

**re⋅solved** /rɪˈzɒlvd/ Show Spelled [ri-zolvd] Show IPA

Use resolved in a Sentence –adjective firm in purpose or intent; determined.

## 3) Violates Should: which means “must do”

**Should** ʃʊd/ Show Spelled [shood] Show IPA Use should in a Sentence

–auxiliary verb 1.pt. of shall. 2.(used to express condition): Were he to arrive, I should be pleased.

3.**must; ought** (used to indicate duty, propriety, or expediency): You should not do that.

# Consult the Natives Counterplan (2-2)

## Observation 2: The counterplan solves the case:

## The Counterplan solves better than the plan: tribal consultation leads to the best policies for each tribe:

EDWARD K. **THOMAS, 1995** (PRESIDENT

CENTRAL COUNCIL OF THE TLINGIT AND HAIDA INDIAN TRIBES OF ALASKA,

May 18, 1995, <http://www.archive.org/stream/biataskforcehear00unit/biataskforcehear00unit_djvu.txt>)

The opportunity for Tribes to participate in the reorganization process was greatly

increased by holding the various meetings close to their Tribal headquarters. Many

Tribal leaders and Tribal members did attend the meetings and many testified at the

times set aside on each agenda for hearing testimony. Witnesses either spoke on the

business of the day or on the reorganization plan and the reorganization planning

process. Their testimony helped Task Force members in their decision-making. We

were better able to understand how they felt on many very important reorganization

issues. Their testimony did make a difference in our final product. That is why Tribal

consultation is important. **Tribes, more than anyone else, know what is best for them**. **They know better than anyone what policies would be bad for them**.

## Observation 3: The net benefit: colonialism:

## Previous consultation processes prove--Consultation processes make tribes full partners in the process—the plan merely continues the legacy of colonization:

WENDELL **CHINO, 1995** (MESCALERO APACHE TRIBE, HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS UNITED STATES SENATE, <http://www.archive.org/stream/biataskforcehear00unit/biataskforcehear00unit_djvu.txt>)

The Joint Tribal BIA Tribal Department of the Interior Advisory Task Force on the reorganization of the Bureau of Indian Affairs task force was chartered on December 20, 1990 by the Secretary of the Interior. The charter was to develop baseline goals and plans for reorganization to strength the BIA's administration of Indian programs. The creation of the task force was based on a congres-sional mandate **in response to tribal concerns** that the Department of the Interior was planning to **move forward with the reorganiza- tion of the Bureau of Indian Affairs** **prior to appropriate participa- tion and consultation with Indian tribes**. The initial task force charter was for 2 years and was extended an additional 2 years by the Secretary of the Interior on November 18, 1992, in order to en- sure that the task force's efforts were tribally driven; yet, at the same time, a joint partnership effort — 36 of the 43 members of the task force were tribal members, 5 were BIA employees and 2 were Department of the Interior employees. The 36 members were 3 rep- resentatives from each of the Bureau's 12 area locations who were nominated by the tribes and appointed by the Secretary. The task force was led by cochairpersons representing the tribal and Federal partnership. The Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs was named the Federal cochair by the Secretary, and the tribal representatives elected Wendell Chino, President of the Mescalero Apache Tribe, the tribal cochair. The task force held its first of 22 meetings on January 22 through 24 1991, in Crystal City, VA. During the 4 years of its charter every effort was made to con- duct its meetings in different administrative areas to allow as many local tribes to participate as possible. To further ensure that this effort was **tribally driven** several steps were taken: One, time was set aside at each meeting to listen to the concerns and comments of the tribal leaders; two, tribal task force members were made responsible and held accountable for meeting with their respective tribes; three, each BIA area appointed Federal coordina- tors to facilitate ongoing consolidated sessions with the tribes; four, all tribes were invited to submit written comments for task force consideration. As a result of this participatory **consultation process**, tribes have been **full partners in the recommendations presented.**

## Bringing indigenous views back into the picture is necessary for global survival:

Dean B. **Suagee, 1992** (J.D., University of North Carolina, University of Michigan Law School,

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, 25 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 671, Lexis, Accessed July 6, 2009)

The global environmental crisis has more than adequately demonstrated that **business as usual will not and cannot ensure global survival**. What is needed is a fundamental shift in consciousness, and this means that **the views of indigenous peoples** -- our laws and rules and relationships to the natural world -- **have to be brought back into the picture.**

# Consult the Natives--Overview

## The Counterplan solves all of the case while best solving for the rights of indigenous peoples…the plan presumes that their approach is the correct option for all indigenous peoples and presumes that it is better for the affirmative to impose that vision upon the natives instead of engaging in meaningful consultation on this question. The Counterplan instead defers to the judgment of native peoples…providing the best solutions for each tribe—that’s our Thomas evidence…while fighting against the legacy of colonialism, our Chino evidence. Our Suagee evidence indicates the US must respect the views of the natives for global survival because respect for indigenous lifestyles is critical for respect for indigenous peoples and preservation of the environment. The line-by-line…

# Consult the Natives--Answers to: Permute: Do Both (Do the Plan + Consult)

## (--) The permutation links to the net benefits: they don’t engage in genuine, prior, binding consultation with native peoples, they presume the answer to the question before they ask. This process trivializes consultation and links to the net benefits:

Derek C. **Haskew, 2000** (Managing Attorney, DNA-People's Legal Services, American Indian Law Review, 24 Am. Indian L. Rev. 21; Lexis)

The proliferation of tribal consultation requirements in federal statutes and policies n3 is arguably a laudable first step toward a mature understanding by the [\*22] [\*23] federal government of the sovereignty of Native American tribes. n4 Indeed, successful consultations between tribal liaisons and federal decision makers--far beyond the halls of Congress--can contribute to the creation of more enlightened, better constructed, and more effective federal policies, projects, and regulations. n5 However, "consultation" remains an ill-defined term in the context of recent (fashionable) use by Congress, the President, and other federal policymakers. Consultation requirements vest tribes with uncertain benefits and create an unsettled set of responsibilities for federal stewards, most prominently the Secretary of the Interior and Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs. A useful definition of "meaningful consultation" is found in Lower Brule Sioux Tribe v. Deer, n6 which explains what potentially takes place during the formal process of consultations between federal agencies and tribal government officials. The typical consultation described in Lower Brule Sioux would have taken place between the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and the tribe: consultation comprised a one to two hour meeting, not more than one half day, during which meeting the [BIA] superintendent notifies the Council of the BIA's proposed action, justifying his reasoning. The Tribal Council may either issue a motion or [\*24] resolution of support for the decision, or reject the decision. The tribe recognizes that the BIA need not obey the Council's decision. Meaningful consultation means tribal consultation **in advance** with the decision maker or with intermediaries with clear authority to present tribal views to the BIA decision maker. The decision maker is to comply with BIA and administration policies. n7 This definition omits all the procedures that would precede any such meeting, such as notice and response, which are generally understood to be a part of the consultation process. n8 But more importantly, while this definition is perhaps a useful starting point, it fails to note the larger perspective, more subtle meanings, and contentious issues that are at the heart of federal-tribal consultations as they have come to be practiced. This article explores the problematic social and political dynamics and legal issues that underlie the obvious meaning of "consultation." A. The Importance of Tribal Consultations The image of an Indian and a white man meeting to talk is evocative of the romanticized negotiations of yesteryear. This image in turn is inextricably linked to lore of the Indian, defeated by fate yet participating in good faith, and the white man's subsequent betrayals. I will not examine the lore, n9 but offer the image as a starting point for the argument that consultations may be one method by which that betrayal is perpetrated today. By this view, the purpose of consultation requirements is to satisfy the desires of Native Americans to be involved in decisions that affect them, while **not binding** the government to anything resembling a commitment. Consultations, therefore, may **confuse the real consent of Indian communities** to federal actions with the **procedural illusion of participation**, in which **Indian consent is never really asked for**, and advice is never really heeded. A more savory view of consultations is that government **recognizes the wisdom** of considering the unique perspectives of Native Americans during policy debate, and is **making every effort to incorporate those views and interests in federal planning**. Or, finally, consultations might be described in both of these ways, depending on which players and which projects are being discussed. Whichever view we choose to adopt at the outset of this inquiry, it should be clear that what may be at stake in consultations **is the heart of this nation's relationship with its indigenous population.**

# Consult the Natives--Answers to: Permute: Do Both (Do the Plan + Consult)

## (--) Tribes must feel their interests are being taken seriously in order for consultation to succeed—the counterplan rigs the game by answering the question prior to the consultation:

Dean B. **Suagee, 1999** (Director, First Nations Environmental Law Program, Arizona State Law Journal, Summer, 1999, 31 Ariz. St. L.J. 483; Lexis)

Consultation between tribes and federal agencies, whether in the framework of NHPA section 106 or ESA section 7 or some other legal authority, can be a trying experience for people on both sides of the interaction. **Tribal people frequently feel that their concerns are not taken seriously**; federal officials sometimes do not appreciate the depth of tribal concerns; and tribal people sometimes do not appreciate the constraints within which federal officials make decisions. There is a need for both sides to work at making consultation work better. One key is to develop on-going [\*531] consultative relationships, and to build reciprocity in these relationships. n183 If both sides in such a relationship actually realize benefits, they will want the relationship to continue. In specific cases, one side or the other may be willing to give more than it otherwise might if it becomes apparent that the other side attaches extraordinary significance to a particular issue.

## (--) Tribes are very wary of any sign that the deck is stacked before the consultation begins: only treating them as true partners solves the net benefit:

Dean B. **Suagee, 1997** (Washington College of Law, the American University, American Indian Law Review, 21 Am. Indian L. Rev. 365; Lexis/Nexis)

n2 In July 1996, the Cherokee Nation issued a position paper which illustrates the **wary attitude that indigenous peoples have when called to consultations**. The paper stated that while "consultation" implies that Native American peoples will be given "a substantive voice in the determination of much of their future," their representatives will "see to it that the paternalism and neocolonialism of the past remains" in the past, and that they attend the meetings **with the intention to "move forward as partners, not wards."** See Indigenous Rights from the Perspective of the Cherokee Nation 1 (July 23, 1996) (position paper prepared for State Department-Tribal Consultation).

# Consult the Natives--Answers to Permute: Do the Counterplan

## (--) Permutation is severance:

## A) Violates Resolved: extend our definition that resolved means to stand firm—they don’t guarantee an increase in social services.

## B) Violates Should: extend our definition that should means that we must increase social services—they must defend that we must increase social services under all circumstances.

## C) Voting issue: if they can sever parts of the plan we can never have disad & counterplan ground

## (--) Counterplan functionally competes: The counterplan takes a fundamentally different action than the plan—you can’t both ask the tribes what we should do and take the plan action at the same time.

## (--) Functional competition is better than textual competition:

## A) Textual competition turns the debate into semantics: destroys policy-making on central questions as to whether or not we should defer to native peoples on central questions.

## B) Textual competition eliminates counterplans that take a fundamentally different action: Ban the plan counterplans merely add the words “ban the” to the plan action.

## C) Context outweighs text—only a functional lens shows how issues interact.

## (--) Err neg on theory:

## A) Aff speaks first and last

## B) Aff gets infinite prep time

## C) Aff gets the moral high ground—counterplan is the only way to rectify this.

# Consult the Natives--Theory: Answers to: Consult Counterplans Bad

## (--) Critical to real world debate- consultations with tribes is a critical question in the literature: our Chino, Thomas, Suagee, and Haskew evidence all illustrate how this happens in the real world.

## (--) We have an obligation to assess the quality of the counterplan versus the plan as policy-makers- the counterplan is a reason to reject the affirmative through opportunity cost

## (--) Consulting the tribes is critical to real world education because of the historic relationship between the US & the tribes.

## (--) The counterplan is a negative right because we need to be able to test immediacy and the resolution of the affirmative—extend our resolved & should definitions in the 1nc.

## (--) Err negative on theory: aff speaks first and last, and they get the moral high ground: the question is how to best solve it.

## (--) Reject argument not team: at best it’s a reason to reject the counterplan not the team.

# Consult the Natives--Theory: Answers to Counterplan Unpredictable/Infinitely Regressive

## (--) There are a finite number of consult counterplans because there is limited literature advocating binding consultation with other actors- extend our specific evidence on the need to consult the tribes.

## (--) Turn: arguing that Natives are a “trivial issue” that can be pushed to the side is the legacy of colonialism—reject their theory argument by giving the natives a voice.

## (--) Counter-interpretation—consulting actors directly related to the plan action are legitimate: the plan gives social services to natives—obviously this is relevant.

## (--) Turn: Education: the counterplan encourages in-depth discussion of issues related to indigenous people.

## (--) Literature checks: need evidence on genuine consultation—which we have.

## (--) Net benefits determine relevance: if these trivial counterplans have no net benefit we can’t win.

## (--) Counterplan provides real world education: how we deal with native peoples is a central point to how policymakers conduct policy with indigenous peoples.

# Consult the Natives--Theory: Answers to: The Yes/No Question Makes the Counterplan Conditional

## (--) Turn: their standard eliminates all aff & cp ground: all aff’s are conditional—they can concede they don’t solve to get out of impact turns.

## (--) There is always a stable target—the counterplan text will never change, and they can always turn the net benefit

## (--) No different than T and disads that the neg kicks—zero abuse.

# Consult Natives Net Benefit: Counterplan Bolsters Right to Self-Determination

## Consulting the tribes necessary to preserve tribal autonomy:

**Army Lawyer, 2001** (February 2001, “Environmental Law Division Notes: New Executive Order on Tribal Consultation,” Lexis, accessed July 6, 2009)

When developing and implementing "policies that have tribal implications," n7 section 3 of EO 13,175 directs federal agencies to adhere to the fundamental principles listed above in order to "respect Indian tribal self-government and sovereignty, to honor tribal treaty rights and other rights, and to strive to meet the responsibilities that arise from the unique legal relationship between the Federal Government and Indian tribal governments." n8 In addition, federal agencies are required, when developing such policies, to encourage tribal development of policies to meet the agency's program objectives, to **defer to tribally established standards**, and to **consult with tribes** to consider the need for federal standards and alternatives that **would preserve tribal authority and prerogatives**. n9

## Consultation respects the tribes right to self-determination:

**Army Lawyer-01** (February 2001, 2001 Army Law. 33, USALSA REPORT: Environmental Law Division Notes: New Executive Order on Tribal Consultation, United States Army Legal Services Agency, Lexis)

On 6 November 2000, President Clinton signed Executive Order (EO) 13,175, Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments. n5 Consistent with the Presidential Memorandum of 29 April 1994, Government-to-Government Relations with Native American Tribal Governments, EO 13,175 recognizes the following fundamental principles: (1) Indian tribes, as domestic dependent nations, exercise inherent sovereignty over their lands and members; (2) the United States government has a unique trust relationship with Indian tribes and deals with them on a government-to-government basis; and, (3) [\*34] **Indian tribes have the right to self-government and self-determination**. n6

## Self-determination includes the right to autonomy and self-government—only we provide this by giving the natives the option what to do:

Dean B. **Suagee, 1992** (J.D., University of North Carolina, University of Michigan Law School,

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, 25 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 671, Lexis, Accessed July 6, 2009)

Throughout the Working Group's decade-long existence, representatives of states and indigenous peoples have debated the principle of self-determination. n78 The draft declaration's treatment of the right to self-determination remains a controversial issue. n79 The first operative paragraph of the draft declaration proclaims: Indigenous peoples have the right of self-determination, in accordance with international law by virtue of which [\*692] they may freely determine their political status and institutions and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. An **integral part of this is the right to autonomy and self-government**. n80

# Consult Natives Net Benefit: Counterplan Bolsters Right to Self-Determination

## Consultation allows the federal government to recognize the wisdom of unique perspectives of Native peoples:

**Haskew-2000** (Derek C. Haskew, Attorney, DNA-People's Legal Services, Inc., Halchita, Navajo Nation, Copyright (c) 2000 American Indian Law Review, 24 Am. Indian L. Rev. 21,ARTICLE: FEDERAL CONSULTATION WITH INDIAN TRIBES: THE FOUNDATION OF ENLIGHTENED POLICY DECISIONS, OR ANOTHER BADGE OF SHAME?, Lexis)

The image of an Indian and a white man meeting to talk is evocative of the romanticized negotiations of yesteryear. This image in turn is inextricably linked to lore of the Indian, defeated by fate yet participating in good faith, and the white man's subsequent betrayals. I will not examine the lore, n9 but offer the image as a starting point for the argument that consultations may be one method by which that betrayal is perpetrated today. By this view, the purpose of consultation requirements is to satisfy the desires of Native Americans to be involved in decisions that affect them, while not binding the government to anything resembling a commitment. Consultations, therefore, may confuse the real consent of Indian communities to federal actions with the procedural illusion of participation, in which Indian consent is never really asked for, and advice is never really heeded. A more savory view of consultations is that government **recognizes the wisdom of considering the unique perspectives of Native Americans** during policy debate, and is making every effort to incorporate those views and interests in federal planning. Or, finally, consultations might be described in both of these ways, depending on which players and which projects are being discussed. Whichever view we choose to adopt at the outset of this inquiry, it should be clear that what may be at stake in consultations is the heart of this nation's relationship with its indigenous population.

# Consult Natives: Extensions: Engagement in the Political Process Undermines Natives

## Consultation solves better than going through the political system: the political system is adverse to Native interests:

Robert Odawi **Porter, 2006** (Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law, Texas Journal on Civil Liberties & Civil Rights, Spring; Lexis/nexis, accessed July 6, 2009)

Lobbying carries at least one other important limitation. In subtle ways, engaging in partisan lobbying activity must be seen as devaluing Indigenous nationhood. To the extent Indigenous nations are viewed by American officials on par with American corporations, public interest organizations, and citizens groups, Indian nations **may be viewed not as sovereign nations**, but merely as "special interest groups." This effect is accentuated by the fact that lobbying activity is rarely done directly by Indigenous leaders but is instead conducted by paid professional lobbyists. n278 In contrast, direct consultations between Native leaders and American officials tend to support Indigenous nationhood. Simply hiring a lobbyist to represent tribal interests, without active engagement by tribal officials, tends to blur the line between being perceived as a sovereign entity and being perceived as simply a private organization.

## Turn: Engagement in the political process undermines Native sovereignty:

Robert Odawi **Porter, 2006** (Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law, Texas Journal on Civil Liberties & Civil Rights, Spring; Lexis/nexis, accessed July 6, 2009)

In the aggregate, then, it is very likely that participating in the American political system serves to **undermine Indigenous sovereignty**. This is the case regardless of the fact that Indians elected to American political office might better serve their Indian constituents than their non-Indian (and maybe Indian-hating) counterparts. Whether taking this approach furthers the self-determination of the Indian nation is doubtful. **Whatever benefit** might be gained is **more than offset** by the erosion of the line that exists between the Indigenous nation and the United States.

# Consult Natives: Extensions: Engagement in the Political Process Undermines Natives

## The political system is unable to protect indigenous people’s rights:

Robert Odawi **Porter, 2006** (Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law, Texas Journal on Civil Liberties & Civil Rights, Spring; Lexis/nexis, accessed July 6, 2009)

The resulting effect of the possible loss of this advocacy strategy is to induce greater reliance on the obedient advocacy strategies - litigation, lobbying, voting, and holding political office - as the primary means of protecting and asserting Indigenous rights. Unfortunately, these strategies over time will only serve to further incorporate Indigenous peoples into American society and **thereby undermine aboriginal Native sovereignty**. Because the United States has been allowed to write the rules of engagement for participating in its political and legal system, this is but another means by which the United States is able to exert its control over Indigenous nations and peoples. Tribal disobedience is an important tool for ensuring Indigenous survival.

# Consult Natives Net Benefit: Modeling Internal Links

## Respecting tribes sovereignty is critical to securing the rights of indigenous peoples throughout the world:

Dean B. **Suagee, 1992** (J.D., University of North Carolina, University of Michigan Law School,

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, 25 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 671, Lexis, Accessed July 6, 2009)

Knowledge of this historical context is also needed if the United States government or the American people or both are to become forces for securing the human rights of indigenous peoples throughout the world. Two important lessons from the United States' experience that should be shared with the rest of the world are that (1) policies of forced assimilation, such as the policies of the allotment and termination eras, have yielded disastrous results; and (2) policies that support tribal self-government can work, especially when they **include the basic legal principle that tribes possess inherent sovereignty**. After more than two hundred years of relations with both federal and state governments, Indian tribal governments have earned the right to be treated as permanent features in the American political landscape.

# Consult Natives Net Benefit: Environment Impact Module

## A) Promoting indigenous peoples’ self-determination critical to save the world’s environment:

Dean B. **Suagee, 1992** (J.D., University of North Carolina, University of Michigan Law School,

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, 25 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 671, Lexis, Accessed July 6, 2009)

Several of the writers whose works have been cited in this Article have called for individuals and communities and nations to change the way we think about the Earth. n353 Indigenous peoples also have called for such a global change of mind. n354 The oral history of the Haudenosaunee (Iroquois) Confederacy provides an inspirational example of what can be accomplished when people change the way they think. When the Peacemaker planted the Great Tree of Peace and brought together the Five Nations to form the Confederacy, one of the keys to his success was persuading individuals to use their powers of rational thought [\*749] to overcome fear and hatred and to act for the common good. n355 This kind of reasoning is what is sometimes called the "discipline of the Good Mind." n356 If we are to **cope effectively with the global environmental crisis**, we will need for people all over the world to exercise such positive mental discipline. The authors of Beyond the Limits suggest that there are essentially three mental models among which we can choose, only one of which offers a chance of **avoiding ecological collapse on a global scale.** n357 This model says That the limits are real and close, and that there is just exactly enough time, with no time to waste. There is just exactly enough energy, enough material, enough money, enough environmental resilience, and enough human virtue to bring about a revolution to a better world. That model might be wrong. All the evidence we have seen, from the world data to the global computer models, suggests that it might be right. There is no way of knowing for sure, other than to try it. n358 This conclusion, based on scientific analysis, bears a striking similarity to a statement made by one of the Kogi religious leaders, a similarity which I think is not entirely coincidental. The words of the Kogi spokesman are these: Many stories have been heard that the sun will go out, the world will come to an end. But if we all act well and think well it will not end. That is why we are still looking after the sun and the moon and the land. n359 Around the world, indigenous peoples are doing their best to fulfill their sacred duties to care for the Earth. The states of the world, nongovernmental organizations, and concerned individuals **can help by respecting**, and by insisting that others respect, **the human rights of indigenous peoples**, including the **right of self-determination.**

# Consult Natives Net Benefit: Environment Impact Module

## B) Environmental destruction leads to a global rash of interstate and civil wars

Thomas Homer-Dixon, assistant professor of political science and director of the Peace and Conflict Studies Programme at the University of Toronto, associate fellow of the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research, 1998, World Security: Challenges for a New Century, Third Edition, edited by Michael Klare and Yogesh Chandrani, p. 342-3

Experts have proposed numerous possible links between environmental change and conflict. Some have suggested that environmental change may shift the balance of power between states either regionally or globally, causing instabilities that could lead to war.4 Another possibility is that global environmental damage might increase the gap between rich and poor societies, with the poor then violently confronting the rich for a fairer share of the world’s wealth.5 Severe conflict may also arise from frustration with countries that do not go along with agreements to protect the global environment, or that “free-ride” by letting other countries absorb the costs of environmental protection. Warmer temperatures could lead to contention over more easily harvested resources in the Antarctic. Bulging populations and land stress may produce waves of environmental refugees, spilling across borders and disrupting relations among ethnic groups. Countries might fight among themselves because of dwindling supplies of water and the effects of upstream pollution.6 A sharp decline in food crop production and grazing land could lead to conflict between nomadic tribes and sedentary farmers. Environmental change could in time cause a slow deepening of poverty in poor countries, which might open bitter divisions between classes and ethnic groups, corrode democratic institutions, and spawn revolutions and insurgencies.7 In general, many experts have the sense that environmental problems will “ratchet up” the level of stress within states and the international community, increasing the likelihood of many different kinds of conflict—from war and rebellion to trade disputes—and undermining possibilities for cooperation.

# Consult Natives Impacts: Genocide

## Respecting indigenous peoples basic human rights is key to ending the destruction of indigenous peoples:

Dean B. **Suagee, 1992** (J.D., University of North Carolina, University of Michigan Law School,

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, 25 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 671, Lexis, Accessed July 6, 2009)

Under the Working Group's definition, cultural genocide has taken place all over the world, even recently in the United States. For instance, the United States' "termination" policy of the 1950s [\*697] and early 1960s clearly fits the concept. n102 Racial prejudice and notions of racial superiority provide the rationalizations for cultural genocide. n103 Despite the human rights norm inherent in the Genocide Convention that all cultural groupings have the right to exist, n104 the **destruction of indigenous peoples continues**, in part because of the notion that indigenous ways of life are somehow inferior to those of modern industrialized societies. Those who seek to defend the rights of indigenous peoples must work to make this notion simply untenable. Indigenous peoples believe that their right to survive and to control their own territories should be respected not only because they are **entitled to basic human rights** but also because they have some values and wisdom to share with the other peoples of the Earth. To put an end to the destruction of indigenous peoples, indigenous rights advocates must help the rest of the world to see that there is real value in what indigenous peoples have to offer, especially in their spiritual relationships with the Earth and with nonhuman living things.

## (-) Genocide causes nuclear war

**Diamond, ’92 (The Third Chimponzee; 277)**

While our first association to the world “genocide” is likely to be the killings in Nazi concentration camps, those were not even the largest-scale genocide of this century. The Tasmanians and hundreds of other peoples were modern targets of successful smaller extermination campaigns. Numerous peoples scattered throughout the world are **potential targets** in the **near future.**  Yet genocide is such a painful subject that either we’d  **rather not think about it at all,** or else we’d like to believe that**nice people don’t commit genocide** only Nazis do. But **our refusal to think about it has consequences** we’ve **done little** to halt the **numerous episodes of genocide** since World War II, and we’re  **not alert**  to where it may happen next. Together with our destruction of our own environmental resources, our genocidal tendencies **coupled to nuclear weapons** now constitute the two most likely means by which the human species may reverse **all its progress virtually overnight.**

# Consult Natives Impacts: Genocide

## Recognition of local autonomy and self-government necessary for the survival of indigenous peoples throughout the world:

Dean B. **Suagee, 1992** (J.D., University of North Carolina, University of Michigan Law School,

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, 25 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 671, Lexis, Accessed July 6, 2009)

Those who would defend the human rights of indigenous peoples can draw many lessons from the long history of the relations between the United States and the indigenous tribes and nations of North America. Although the autonomy possessed by Indian tribes in the United States is less than ideal, tribes do exercise a broad range of governmental powers, and the simple fact that more than 500 federally recognized tribes continue to exist in the United States n105 suggests that positive as well as negative lessons may be drawn. Two of the most important lessons are: (1) forced assimilation does not work and (2) local autonomy and self-government can work. In my view, these two lessons are fundamental for the **survival of indigenous peoples throughout** [\*698] **the world**. n106 The next part of this Article examines tribal autonomy in the United States in some detail, with an emphasis on tribal authority for protection of the environment and the preservation of tribal cultures.

# Consult Natives Impacts: Culture

## Self-determination is critical to ensure the survival of cultures:

Dean B. **Suagee, 1992** (J.D., University of North Carolina, University of Michigan Law School,

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, 25 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 671, Lexis, Accessed July 6, 2009)

Characterizing the right to self-determination in such an absolute way may be counterproductive because doing so gets in the way of fashioning real-world arrangements to ensure the survival of indigenous peoples. Most indigenous peoples do not seek recognition as independent states, n83 but rather seek to establish relationships with states that will provide autonomy within their traditional territories. n84 Professor Hannum stresses that self-determination has both an external aspect, the right to choose to be recognized as an independent state, and an internal aspect, the right of autonomous self-government; he suggests that internal self-determination is much more important for ensuring that indigenous peoples have control over their own lives **and the survival of their cultures.** n85 Many indigenous peoples need protection against private persons (individuals and corporations) who intrude into their territories and against attempts by subnational levels of government to [\*693] assert jurisdiction within their territories. n86 Many, perhaps most, indigenous peoples would forswear freely any claims to external sovereignty in exchange for enforceable promises that states would provide protection against such threats (although indigenous peoples will be wary of such promises until there are enforcement mechanisms under international law). As Professor Anaya says, "The absolutist view of self-determination moreover, misses the principle's essential thrust, which is not fundamentally about exercising a one-shot choice for some degree of 'sovereignty' but, rather, is about securing for individuals and groups a political order that promotes a perpetual condition of freedom." n87 In other words, in its quest for external self-determination, the absolutist view neglects internal self-determination.

# Consult the Natives--Deontology Impacts: Must respect native culture

## Should never trample on the rights of indigenous people—utilitarian rationales aside:

Dean B. **Suagee, 1992** (J.D., University of North Carolina, University of Michigan Law School,

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, 25 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 671, Lexis, Accessed July 6, 2009)

Although some indigenous peoples do not face imminent threats to their survival as distinct peoples, many do, and the forces that threaten them are largely beyond their control. To a large extent, the peoples of the industrialized (and industrializing) world have the power to decide whether indigenous peoples will survive. Utilitarian reasons can be advanced for ensuring indigenous peoples' survival. For instance, we can learn from their experience in balancing human needs with environmental preservation and from their knowledge of herbal medicine. To do this, however, we need to take some time to appreciate the subtleties of teachings which have been handed down over countless generations since mythic time. At another level, however, one can argue that we should not be governed by utilitarian thinking alone. We should act instead on principle. **Indigenous peoples are part of the human family and we should treat them as such**. We should recognize that they are entitled to human rights under international law **as a matter of principle.**

# Consult the Natives--Paternalism Net Benefit

## (--) Consultation allows the United States to engage in genuine bilateral negotiations with indigenous peoples—avoids paternalism:

Robert Odawi **Porter, 2006** (Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law, Texas Journal on Civil Liberties & Civil Rights, Spring; Lexis/nexis, accessed July 6, 2009)

In recent years, the diplomatic approach has re-emerged as the foundation of a new American policy predicated upon **consultation and the maintenance of "government-to-government" relations** with the Indian nations. n243 In many respects, the Consultation Policy was based on the Self-determination Policy that has been in place for the last thirty years. n244 The formal adoption of the Consultation Policy occurred during the administration of President George H.W. Bush and was reflected by the development and enactment of amendments to the 1975 Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, which were spawned by discussions with Indigenous leaders. n245 The central feature of the Self-governance Policy is the ability to enter into a "self-governance compact" between the United States and the Indian nation. n246 This compact is the result of a legitimate, arms-length negotiating process, and is **a striking symbol of a bilateral, as opposed to paternalistic, relationship**. Indeed, the process of developing Self-governance compacts very much resembles the first American policy for dealing with the Indian nations- treaty making.

## (--) Paternalism must be rejected:

**Ross,** Associate Professor, Edward R. Murrow School of Communication, 20**02**  (Communication Law and Policy, Autumn 2002, 7 Comm. L. & Pol'y 401; Lexis)

The Supreme Court **must not allow the government to act as nursemaid to its citizenry**. The Court must **reject paternalism** and recognize that an informed, active polity thrives only amid radical dissent and controversial ideas. By encouraging wide-open public debate, the Supreme Court can protect our liberty and our safety; the Court need only use the tools it has at its disposal. If the Supreme Court will apply the rigorous scrutiny outlined above whenever government restricts fundamental liberties in times of national anxiety, ... if the Court will consistently advocate freedom in the face of fear, ... if the Court will embody the belief that dissonance and disagreement are the lifeblood of democracy, then, and only then, will we as a nation approach the participatory self-governance the framers intended. Then, and only then, will we be truly free to speak.

## (--) The plan merely enacts paternalism—this is the path toward genocide:

Dean B. **Suagee, 1992** (J.D., University of North Carolina, University of Michigan Law School,

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, 25 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 671, Lexis, Accessed July 6, 2009)

It is true that the idea of self-determination for indigenous peoples, or at least the idea of autonomy within legally recognized territories, has gained substantial currency over the last decade or so. Many governmental officials and political figures around the world, however, continue to regard indigenous peoples as members of "primitive" cultures that deserve at most some measure of **paternalistic protection** while they either become assimilated or disappear forever. **Paternalistic protection characterizes one end of the spectrum** along which the beliefs of such politicians are manifested; the **genocidal use of military force** marks the other end.

# \*\*\*\*\*Crisis Politics Good\*\*\*\*\*

## (--) Crisis politics is necessary to bring attention to a situation:

Karen Engle, 2007 (Professor in Law @ University of Texas). “"Calling in the Troops": The Uneasy Relationship Among Women's Rights, Human Rights, and Humanitarian Intervention.” Harvard Human Rights Journal, Spring 2007. Accessed Sept. 9, 2010, Lexis Academic Universe

Perhaps human rights activism, however, can only operate in a "crisis" mentality. In an article that historian Ken Cmiel wrote in the late 1990s comparing the methods of historians with those of human rights activists, he explained the function of "thin description" for human rights activists. In short, "[c]ontemporary historians tend to explore the complexities of cultures . . . . Such thick descriptions are a staple of much contemporary historiography. Yet the way human rights talk has circulated throughout the globe since the 1970s is a reminder of the power of thin descriptions." n156 Cmiel pins this power of thin description on neurological limitations: Human rights politics expects us to keep the whole world in our sights. Yet that is impossible. Our neural synapses will not allow it. We can only assimilate so much. Every time Bosnia is on the front page, something else--Rwanda, say   
is pushed to page 12. And still other things--violence against women or the use of chemical sprays and stun guns in United States prisons--are cut entirely that day . . . . n157 Thin descriptions are thus, according to Cmiel, inherent in human rights activism, given the popular, public responses it hopes to invoke.

## (--) Bursts of public sympathy to a human rights cause come from crisis descriptions:

Karen Engle, 2007 (Professor in Law @ University of Texas). “"Calling in the Troops": The Uneasy Relationship Among Women's Rights, Human Rights, and Humanitarian Intervention.” Harvard Human Rights Journal, Spring 2007. Accessed Sept. 9, 2010, Lexis Academic Universe

Within this setting, human rights activists have power. They make choices about what to bring to the public's attention and how to do so. As Cmiel explains: When the larger public becomes interested in a brutality somewhere in the world, it is usually because some image has successfully conjured up the icon "human rights." From Chile in the 1970s to Rwanda in the 1990s, I think it is safe to say, bursts of public sympathy have not depended upon a "thick" understanding of those cultures. They have depended upon reliable and concrete information about infractions **making its way to key media and political elites**, convincing them that the horrors are really taking place . . . . n158

# \*\*\*\*\*Cynicism Kritik Shell (1-1)\*\*\*\*\*

## A) The destruction of absolute truth claims leads to cynicism—power relations convert to the charismatic unrelated to facts on the ground:

Sharon S. **Harzenski, 2001** (professor of law, Beasley School of Law, American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Lexis)

n101. See Arendt, Past, supra note 28, at 257 (observing that the use of propaganda in the Soviet Union led to a peculiar type of **cynicism**, where the categories of "**truth": and "lies" no longer held any meaning**); see also Robert Presthus, The Organizational Society 27-55 (1962), quoted in Reisman & Schreiber, supra note 1, at 364 ("Hierarchy ... is the result of the separation of personal, charismatic authority from official authority ... . The deference accorded organizational leaders is highly charged with charismatic implications. Such deference validates the individual's need to impute superiority to those above him."); id. at 362 (alleging that such a system anesthetizes "the sense of personal and systemic responsibility of individuals."); Robert W. Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in Politics of law: A Progressive Critique 281 (D. Kairys ed., 1982), reprinted in Reisman & Schreiber, supra note 1, at 466 (speaking about hegemony which moves both the dominant and the dominated classes to believe that the existing order represents pretty much the best anyone can do). "These clusters of belief ... convince people that all the many hierarchical relations in which they live and work are natural and necessary." Id. at 466. Respecting the source of power only because it is the source of power, may be a practical requirement of living with others in the world. Id. This does not eliminate or circumscribe the risks of its misuse. Id. at 467.

## B) Cynicism crates withdrawal and apathy toward atrocities:

VIOLET B. **KETELS, 1996** (associate professor of English at Temple University, The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science, November; Lexis)

THE CONSEQUENCES OF LINGUISTIC ABUSE **AND CYNICISM** Bearing witness is not enough, but it is something. At the dedication of the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, D.C., Elie Wiesel spoke. "We must bear witness," he said. "What have we learned? . . . We are all responsible. We must do something to stop the bloodshed in Yugoslavia." He told a story of a woman from the Carpathian Mountains who asked of the Warsaw Uprising, "Why don't they just wait quietly until after the war?" In one year she was packed into a cattle car with her whole family on the way to Auschwitz. "That woman was my mother," Wiesel said. Vaclav Havel, the humanist intellectual from Bohemia, spoke too: of the Holocaust as a memory of democratic appeasement, **live memory of indifference** to the danger of Hitler's coming to power, of indifference to the Munich betrayal of Prague. "Our Jews went to concentration camps. . . . Later we lost our freedom." We have lost our metaphysical certainties, our sense of responsibility for what comes in the future. For we are all responsible, humanly responsible for what happens in the world. Do we have the right to interfere in internal conflict? Not just the right but the duty. Remember the Holocaust. To avoid war, we watched--silently and, so, complicitly, unleashing darker, deadlier demons. What should we have done about Yugoslavia? Something. Much earlier.

## C) The terminal impact is multiple extinction scenarios:

VIOLET B. **KETELS, 1996** (associate professor of English at Temple University, The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science, November; Lexis)

Characteristically, Havel raises local experience to universal relevance. "If today's planetary civilization **has any hope of survival**," he begins, "that hope lies chiefly in what we understand as the human spirit." He continues: If we don't wish to destroy ourselves in national, religious or political discord; if we don't wish to find our world with twice its current population, half of it dying of hunger; if we don't wish to kill ourselves with ballistic missiles armed with atomic warheads or eliminate ourselves with bacteria specially cultivated for the purpose; if we don't wish to see some people go desperately hungry while others throw tons of wheat into the ocean; if we don't wish to suffocate in the global greenhouse we are heating up for ourselves or to be burned by radiation leaking through holes we have made in the ozone; if we don't wish to exhaust the nonrenewable, mineral resources of this planet, without which we cannot survive; if, in short, we don't wish any of this to happen, then **we must--as humanity**, as people, as conscious beings with spirit, mind and a sense of responsibility--somehow come to our senses. 25 Somehow we must **come together in "a kind of general mobilization of human consciousness**, of the human mind and spirit, human responsibility, human reason." 26 The Prague Spring was "the inevitable consequence of a long drama originally played out chiefly in the theatre of the spirit and the conscience of society," a process triggered and sustained "by individuals willing to live in truth even when things [\*52] were at their worst." 27 The process was hidden in "the invisible realm of social consciousness," conscience, and the subconscious. It was indirect, long-term, and hard to measure. 28 So, too, its continuation that exploded into the Velvet Revolution, the magic moment when 800,000 citizens, jamming Wenceslas Square in Prague, jingled their house keys like church bells and changed from shouting "Truth will prevail" to chanting "Havel to the castle."

# Cynicism Link Extensions—Deconstruction of Language/Fixed Meaning

## (--) Verbal games which erode faith in truthful communication undermine solutions to violence:

VIOLET B. **KETELS, 1996** (associate professor of English at Temple University, The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science, November; Lexis)

ABSTRACT: This article argues the virtue of Vaclav Havel's striking idea "that the world might actually be changed **by the force of truth, the power of a truthful word**, the strength of a free spirit, conscience, and responsibility." We are not powerless when we recognize the power of words to change history for good or ill. Intellectuals, whose work is inherently linguistic, bear unique responsibility for the thinking that shapes the general moral consciousness. Havel calls intellectuals to account for **vacuous verbal games** that **erode faith in human communication**, for complicity in subversive linguistic manipulation, and for ethical indifference. We must become Cassandras, he urges, "warriors of the pen," predicting, warning, bearing witness on the side of truth against lies, holding ourselves and others to account for the integrity of words and for fidelity between words and action. Only such scruple can change moral consciousness enough to **make violence rare and human life sacred again**.

## (--) Linguistic deconstruction of humanist values leads to mass murder:

VIOLET B. **KETELS, 1996** (associate professor of English at Temple University, The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science, November; Lexis)

[\*46] THE political bestiality of our age is abetted by our willingness to tolerate the deconstructing of humanist values. The process begins with the cynical manipulation of language. It often ends in stupefying murderousness before which the world stands silent, frozen in impotent "attentism"--a wait-and-see stance as unsuited to the human plight as a pacifier is to stopping up the hunger of a starving child.

# Cynicism Link Extensions—Deconstruction of Language/Fixed Meaning

## (--) Deconstruction of language to where words don’t matter prevents solutions to genocide:

VIOLET B. **KETELS, 1996** (associate professor of English at Temple University, The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science, November; Lexis)

Preachments about basic human rights, however elegantly urged, do not summon us to virtue or insulate us from the predators who have turned civilized cities into killing fields. What, then, are they worth? Are they merely the fictions they are labeled by intellectuals of skeptical chic who choose disdainful withdrawal from the chaos of history? 13 Fear of mockery tempts even the humanists among us to **retreat into a stance of nonassessment**. The risk of being accused of **vapid moralizing** ties our tongues and retards reaction. Such **failures of nerve** seem justified by the history we are enjoined to plunder. They precipitate descent into a fatalistic nihilism that relieves us from responsibility. **Words do not matter; they rarely mean what they say**. What does it matter, then, how intellectuals use their verbal virtuosity? Values are relative and truth elusive. We stand precisely where many gifted French intellectuals stood during World War II, in spite of the myth of resistance promulgated by the most brilliant among them. They remained glacially unmoved, engrossed [\*49] in **vacuous verbal games**, when the desperation of the situation should have aroused their moral conscience, their humane consciousness, and their civic spirit. They rushed to embrace the position "that language is not referential and the writing of history impossible," 14 because it let them off the hook.

# Cynicism Link Extensions--Nietzsche

## (--) Nietzschean ethics undermine notions of absolute truth and objectivity:

VIOLET B. **KETELS, 1996** (associate professor of English at Temple University, The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science, November; Lexis)

We are intimidated by the "high modernist rage against mimesis and content," 4 monstrous progeny of the union between Nietzsche and philosophical formalism, the grim proposal we have bought into that there is no truth, no objectivity, and no disinterested knowledge. 5 Less certain about the power of language, that "oldest flame of the [\*47] humanist soul," 6 to frame a credo to live by or criteria to judge by, we are vulnerable even to the discredited Paul de Man's indecent hint that "wars and revolutions are not empirical events . . . but 'texts' masquerading as facts." 7 Truth and reality seem more elusive than they ever were in the past; values are pronounced to be mere fictions of ruling elites to retain power. We are embarrassed by virtue.

# Cynicism—Internal Link Extensions

## (--) Radical skepticism opens up a power vacuum—this will be filled by the rich & the powerful creating racism & sexism:

Anthony E. **Cook, 1992** (Associate Professor, Georgetown Law School, New England Law Review, Spring, 26 New Eng.L. Rev. 751; Lexis)

The effect of deconstructing the power of the author to impose a fixed meaning on the text or offer a continuous narrative is both debilitating and liberating. It is debilitating in that any attempt to say what should be done within even our insular Foucaultian preoccupations may be oppositionalized and deconstructed as an illegitimate privileging of one term, value, perspective or narrative over another. **The struggle over meaning might continue ad infinitum**. That is, if a deconstructionist is theoretically consistent and sees deconstruction not as a political tool but as a philosophical orientation, **political action is impossible**, because such action requires a degree of closure that deconstruction, as a theoretical matter, does not permit. Moreover, the approach is debilitating because deconstruction without material rootedness, without goals and vision, **creates a political and spiritual void** into which the socially real power we theoretically deconstruct steps and steps on the disempowered and dispossessed. [\*762] To those dying from AIDS, stifled by poverty, dehumanized by sexism and racism, crippled by drugs and brutalized by the many forms of physical, political and economic violence that characterizes our narcissistic culture, power hardly seems a matter of illegitimate theoretical privileging. When vision, social theory and political struggle do not accompany critique, **the void will be filled by the rich, the powerful and the charismatic**, those who influence us through their eloquence, prestige, wealth and power.

# Cynicism Impact Extensions

## (--) Fixed truths are key to stopping racism, sexism, homophobia and Holocaust denial:

Suzanna **Sherry, 1996** (Earl R. Larson Professor of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Law, University of Minnesota, Georgetown Law Journal, February, 1996, 84 Geo. L.J. 453; Lexis)

The consequences of accepting epistemological pluralism go much deeper than making some epistemological pluralists look inconsistent or undermining attacks on the status quo, and are much more troubling than simply failing to fulfill the expectations of its proponents. If we cannot **confidently assert that the earth is round** or that evolution occurred, because those with a different epistemology present a counterargument that is valid in their world even if not in ours, then the same must be true of other scientific or historical statements. It is only the tools of the Enlightenment tradition that allow us to refute such unsupported claims as that virtually all of what we now consider the accomplishments of Western civilization was stolen from black Africans, 160 or that the tragic bombing of the Oklahoma City federal building was the work of agents of the United States government. It is **only the acceptance of reason and empiricism** as the epistemological standard that allows us to reject such **pseudoscientific theories**, currently fashionable in some quarters, as that melanin is "one of the strongest electromagnetic field forces in the universe" with the power to make its possessors intellectually superior, 161 or that Jewish doctors are injecting black babies with the AIDS virus. 162 Nor is it a defense that the modern alternative epistemologies advocated by radical and religious scholars do not always lead to such absurdity. 163 The point is that antirational epistemologies, unlike the principles of the Enlightenment, offer **no weapons against a variety of intellectual and political atrocities**. As Marvin Frankel points out, "for most of Judaism's 5700-plus years, . . . the great Western religions neither caused democracy to happen nor exhibited discomfort about its absence." 164 [\*483] Even today, the religious epistemologies that **mandate discrimination against gays and lesbians** are indistinguishable from those in the not too distant past that mandated discrimination against blacks. 165 And if the melanin or AIDS myths are not sufficiently silly or frightening, there is a more horrific example of the beliefs that become acceptable when reason and empiricism are demoted as socially constructed epistemologies. Deborah Lipstadt notes that postmodern doctrines have allowed Holocaust denial theories to flourish and to be treated as "the other side," another "point of view," or a "different perspective": 166 [The postmodern doctrines of Fish and Rorty] fostered an atmosphere in which it became harder to say that an idea was beyond the pale of rational thought. At its most radical it contended that there was no bedrock thing such as experience. . . . Because deconstructionism argued that experience was relative and nothing was fixed, it created an atmosphere of permissiveness toward questioning the meaning of historical events and made it hard for its proponents to assert that there was anything "off limits" for this skeptical approach. 167 Thus, those who deny that the Holocaust occurred are, in an epistemologically plural world, as entitled to demand public recognition of their beliefs as are the creationists, the Afrocentrists, and all the others who reject the epistemology of the Enlightenment. They can demand -- and many defenders of epistemological pluralism, if not current case law, would support such demands from other groups -- that textbooks should reflect the existence and potential soundness of denial theories; that if the public schools teach the Holocaust as a historical event, they must also teach that it may not have happened; that if parents object to their children being taught what they consider a historical fabrication, the [\*484] children should be excused from history class; that if a state university funds student speech on historical topics generally it must also fund a group dedicated to denying the Holocaust. Lipstadt sees Holocaust denial as "a threat to all those who believe in the ultimate power of reason," 168 but the converse is also true: the denial of the ultimate power of reason is a threat to those who would keep the memory of the Holocaust alive.

# Cynicism Impacts: Action is Better Than Inaction

## (--) Inaction is worse than actions to solve genocide:

VIOLET B. **KETELS, 1996** (associate professor of English at Temple University, The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science, November; Lexis)

No response to the Holocaust and its murderous wake or to the carnage in the former Yugoslavia could possibly be adequate to the atrocities alphabetized in file folders of perpetrators or to the unspeakable experiences burned into brains and bodies of survivors. **But no response at all breeds new catastrophe**. Saul Bellow warned about the "humanistic civilized moral imagination" that, seized with despair, "**declines into lethargy and sleep**." 15 Imagine the plight of human creatures if it were to be silenced altogether, extinguished or forgotten. "**Humanism did not produce the Holocaust**, and the Holocaust, knowing its enemies, was bent on the extermination of humanism. It is an odd consequence of an all-or-nothing mentality to repudiate humanist values because they are inadequate as an antidote to evil." 16

## (--) Nihilism and detachment prevents solutions to death camps and mass murder:

VIOLET B. **KETELS, 1996** (associate professor of English at Temple University, The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science, November; Lexis)

History has survived them and provides a regenerative, other view **against nihilism and detachment.** It testifies that our terror of being found guilty of phrases too smooth or judgment too simple is not in itself a value. Some longing for transcendence persists in the human spirit, some tenacious faith that truth and goodness exist and can prevail. What happened in the **death camps**, the invasion of Prague by Russian tanks, the rape of Muslim women, the dismembering of Bosnian men, the degrading of a sophisticated society to subsistence and barbarous banditry: these things do not become fictions simply because we cannot **speak of them adequately** or because composing abstractions is safer than responding to the **heinous reality of criminal acts**.

# Cynicism Internals—Undermines Positive Actions

## (--) Undermining the decipherability of language undermines the ability for words to create action:

VIOLET B. **KETELS, 1996** (associate professor of English at Temple University, The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science, November; Lexis)

It really does matter that intellectuals **undermine confidence in words**. In the real world, words are means to power and powerful catalysts to action. When we are convinced that we cannot hold the word to account **or take it at face value**, we are muddled about what is going on in our own lives as well as in the larger human community. Yes, we must qualify inferences by all the variables we can bring to bear. But without a sense that **language can be decipherable**, we will not know what we know or be able to pass it on.

# Cynicism Impacts: Censorship Turn

## A) Turn: Continual attacks on truth and reason leads to a reign of censorship—

Pascal **Engel, 2007** (What’s the Use of Truth? Professor of contemporary philosophy at the University of Geneva; pg. 3-4)

There is a wrong way to put these questions, which is simply to set the postmodernists, the relativists, and all who believe that truth is an empty word—we call them veriphobes—on one side and the defenders of the ideals at which the veriphobes scoff on the other. The result is predictable: not only does each side dig in its heels, they **wind up resembling each other**. Those **who attack truth and reason as oppressive values** (as male values, for example, in some feminist polemics) end up being **just as puritan as those whom they oppose**. In fact, it is not the rationalists who provoke a reign of terror and censorship. It is those who **cultivate a systemic suspicion about words like truth, reason, or objectivity** (“cachez ces guillements que je ne sauris voir”). The same opponents of rationalism pose as victims unjustly attacked by a dogmatic and reactionary establishment. The Sokal hoax furnished us with examples of a conflict of this type, always on the verge of degenerating into rhetoric on both sides. Contemporary anti-rationalism and its political correctness have had such success in dramatizing these oppositions that whoever ventures to recall the existence of certain cognitive values when faced with palpable violations of them is immediately accused of being a puritanical censor or a moralizer.

## B) Censorship leads to hatred of others – it is this mentality that produces aggression & violence:

Vincent **Blasi, 1985** (Corliss Lamont Professor of Civil Liberties, Columbia University Columbia Law Review, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 449; Lexis)

There is reason to believe that susceptibility to pathological challenge is especially characteristic of the central constitutional norms regarding free expression and inquiry. Most constitutional commitments are fragile in the sense that they embody ideals that are easily abandoned or tempered in times of stress. Certain distinctive features of the commitment to free speech enhance that fragility. The aggressive impulse to be **intolerant of others** resides within all of us. It is a powerful instinct. Only the most sustained socialization -- one might even say **indoctrination in the value of free speech** -- keeps the urge to suppress dissent under control. 9 When the constraints imposed by that socialization lose their effectiveness, as most social constraints intermittently do, the power of the instinct toward intolerance usually generates a highly charged collective mentality. Because the instinct to suppress dissent is basic, primitive, and aggressive, it tends to have great momentum when it breaks loose from the shackles of social constraint. **Aggression is contagious**, and hatred of strangers for what they believe is one of the safest and **most convenient forms of aggression**.

# Cynicism Impacts: Resistance Turn

## (--) Destroying all notions of truth prevents opposition & resistance:

Pascal **Engel, 2007** (What’s the Use of Truth? Professor of contemporary philosophy at the University of Geneva; pg. 2-3)

It always used to astonish me, when I was attending Michel Foucault’s courses at the College de France in the 1970s, to hear him explaining to us that the notion of truth was no more than an instrument of power, and that, since all power was bad, truth could only be the expression of some malign intent, and then see him marching in demonstrations under banners bearing the slogan Truth and Justice. Why do journalists, who claim that their professional code of ethics and their duty not to spread untruths are important to them, so often show indulgence toward thinkers who tell them that truth and rationality are empty words? And yet—are these necessarily examples of incoherence and cynicism? Perhaps people mistrust truth as an abstract ideal, in the name of which authorities claim to exert their sway, but aspire to it in their daily lives. Maybe they don’t believe in truth as an intrinsic value, an ultimate goal, while still believing in truth as an instrumental value serving other purposes, like happiness or freedom. We dislike preachers who speak in the name of Truth, but we pay attention to everyday truths, like the ones in the periodic statement of our bank balance. But, then, what is the concept of truth we are meant to reject, and what is the one we are meant to cling to? Should we reject both? Or should we hold on to both? Is it really coherent to say that one doesn’t want Truth but is ready to accept that there are theories, statements, or beliefs that are true?

## (--) Notions of the truth critical for opposition & resistance:

VIOLET B. **KETELS, 1996** (associate professor of English at Temple University, The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science, November; Lexis)

In dozens of public statements, Havel presses his theme that we are rooted in the universe with a responsibility to other people and to the human community. He asserts as ethical imperative for a civil society that citizens refuse to forgive mendacity, especially in the name of expediency or pragmatic politics. We must cry down especially the formal lie. When we do so in sufficient numbers, the game is up. "Even something as seemingly ephemeral as the truth spoken aloud, as an openly expressed concern for the humanity of humans, bears within itself a certain power and . . . even a word is capable of a certain radiation, of leaving a mark on the 'hidden consciousness' of a community." 71

# Cynicism--AT: What we do doesn’t matter/won’t spillover outside the room

## (--) Intellectuals bear the full weight of moral responsibility—even if there is no spillover effect to others we can still turn their ethic:

VIOLET B. **KETELS, 1996** (associate professor of English at Temple University, The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science, November; Lexis)

Intellectuals are not customarily thought of as men and women of action. Our circumstances are ambiguous, our credibility precarious. While our sense of past and future is "radically linguistic," 49 we scarcely have a common human language anymore, and our fashionable linguistic skepticism elevates the denying of verities to an article of faith, out of which we build academic careers of nay-saying. We use the written word as the primary political medium for gaining attention. We are "writing people," who traffic in words and thus carry an unavoidable accountability for what we say with them. 50 Havel defines intellectuals as people who devote their lives "to thinking in general terms about the affairs of this world and the broader context of things . . . professionally," 51 for their occupation. If we aspire to be distinguished from mere scribblers, history demands that we choose between being "the apologist for rulers [and] an advisor to the people; the tragedy of the twentieth century is that these two functions have ceased to exist independently of one another, and intellectuals like Sartre who thought they were fulfilling one role were inevitably drawn to play both." 52 Alternatively, we can choose with Richard Rorty, echoing Max Weber, to stay out of politics, "where passionate commitment and sterile excitation are out of place," keeping "politics in the hands of charismatic leaders and trained officials." We can choose to pursue "[our] own private perfection." 53 That particular stance, however expedient, did not work well in Germany. In Czechoslovakia, it produced wartime Nazi collaborator Gustave Husak, the "President of Forgetting," who sought to perfect totalitarianism by systematically purging "the Party and state, the arts, the universities, and the media of everyone who dared to speak critically, independently, or even intelligently about what the regime defined as politics." 54 It produced Tudjman and Milosevic in Yugoslavia. Intellectuals can choose their roles, but cannot not choose, **nor can we evade the full weight of the consequences attendant on our choices**. "It is always the intellectuals, however [\*57] we may shrink from the chilling sound of that word . . . **who must bear the full weight of moral responsibility**." 55

## (--) Rejecting notions of truth as ordinary individuals destroys the ability of truth to serve as a means to other ends

Pascal **Engel, 2007** (What’s the Use of Truth? Professor of contemporary philosophy at the University of Geneva; pg. 28-29)

Should we succeed, both as philosophers and **as ordinary individuals and citizens** (a distinction Rorty would dislike!), in **overcoming our fascination with a language of truth**, sincerity, and exactness, along with our practical commitment to the values and virtues of truth; in adopting a different language and other commitments more in line with what pragmatism intends; and in conceding that the notions of truth, sincerity, and so on have merely instrumental value, that they are means to other ends (such as democracy, conversation, solidarity, the improvement of our social intercourse and our life as a community)—what is there to say that the values and virtues of truth would still survive in our midst? In other words, if everyone came to the conclusion that truth is not an intrinsic value to be sought for its own sake and that its value is only instrumental, **would truth survive** even as a mere means to other ends? **In my opinion, it would vanish altogether.**

# Cynicism--AT: What we do doesn’t matter/won’t spillover outside the room

## (--) Individuals have the power & responsibility to speak out against oppression:

VIOLET B. **KETELS, 1996** (associate professor of English at Temple University, The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science, November; Lexis)

Havel translates densely philosophical probing into simple principles of action by which individuals can resist alienating pressure. True to his genius for globalizing local experience, Havel defines the alienating pressure so as to include "consumption, [\*53] advertising, repression, technology, or cliche--all of which are the blood brothers of fanaticism and the wellspring of totalitarian thought." 32 All of us, then, wherever we live, under whatever form of government, have a stake in the human struggle and a solution to try, personally, you and I, and all of us together. We are not powerless. Havel learned from his particular experiment in "anti-political politics" something of essential and universal importance: that **a single, seemingly powerless person** who dares to cry out the word of truth and to stand behind it with all his person and all his life, ready to pay a high price, has, surprisingly, greater power, though formally disfranchised, than do **thousands of anonymous voters**.

## (--) Redescriptions have consequences—if we win negative consequences to the way they re-describe reality we win the debate:

Pascal **Engel, 2007** (What’s the Use of Truth? Professor of contemporary philosophy at the University of Geneva; pg. 51-52)

There are certainly many redescriptions that turn out to be inoffensive and insignificant. For example, the students who occupied the Sorbonne in 1968 tended to call what they were doing a revolution. Quite soon after, this revolution came to be called an event. Here we are dealing with a relatively correct redescription. But a redescription **can have quite serious consequences** from the point of view of values. When Jean-Marie Le Pen calls the Shoah a detail, that too is a redescription. But it seems to me a redescription of a quite different kind from the preceding one. So my question is this: does Rorty think the fact that there is a change of vocabulary will have no effect on the values in question? I see no objection to getting rid of the word true. We could perfectly well decide to replace it with the word frue. Thus I would refer to a statement of what I took to be the case as frue rather than as true. But that is not the problem, as Rorty will agree. The problem is not the description but the **kinds of impacts certain redescriptions may have on values**.

## (--) Others will draw practical consequences from what is said:

Pascal **Engel, 2007** (What’s the Use of Truth? Professor of contemporary philosophy at the University of Geneva; pg. 52-53)

In the field of ethics, for example, there are numerous debates on questions of bioethics, applied ethics, and so on. When I read works of this kind, I confess that I quite often find them boring and scholastic; they introduce all kinds of quite useless distinctions or they ignore absolutely fundamental distinctions that have been marked out in the domain of metaethics. I often find them tiresome and theoretically stunted. And yet, paradoxically, as soon as you start doing applied ethics, it is understood that others may possibly draw **practical consequences from what you have to say**.

# \*\*\*\*\*Deep Ecology Answers\*\*\*\*\*

## (--) Perm do both--The permutation is the best option—individual efforts at radical environmentalism will fail unless matched at the governmental level.

Cesar Cuauhtemoc Garcia **Hernandez, 2007** (JD, Boston College Law School, Seattle Journal for Social Justice, Fall/Winter, 2007, Accessed via Academic Lexis/Nexis, May 23, 2011)

Unfortunately, localized efforts, though well intentioned, have not managed to curb climate change. In part, the efforts of individuals to alter their own practices or those of local communities have had limited effect because such efforts have not been met by similar action at the federal level. n24 Most notably, Congress has not ratified the Kyoto Treaty. n25 In addition, skeptics of global warming remain in highly influential governmental positions; significantly, one of these positions is the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works. n26 Moreover, consumption of fossil fuels and emission of carbon into the atmosphere remain disproportionately high in the USA compared to the nation's percentage of the world's human population. n27

## (--) Technological progress is necessary to save the environment—radical environmentalism will fail.

Frank B. **Cross, 2002** (Professor of Business Law, University of Texas at Austin, Case Western Reserve Law Review, Winter, 2002, 53 Case W. Res. 477; Lexis)

An equally critical question is: When we discover a serious environmental problem, what should we do about it? The essence of Lomborg's book is the claim that radical action is not required to deal with environmental problems, that the growth of the economy and technology will itself help to address the problems, with some supplementary government regulation. In the past, the doomsayers have called for a variety of radical responses, such as zero or negative population growth, a halt to economic development or even de-development, and the prohibition of various technological advances, such as genetic modification. While such proposals may have declined in number, they are still heard today. n93 This is the more severe flaw in the environmental movement. They have identified real problems in the past, even as they exaggerated them. Pollution was a serious problem in the twentieth century. But the radical solutions were unnecessary to solve the pollution problem; in fact, they probably would have exacerbated pollution. The world does face a number of serious environmental problems in the developing world. The more developed nations, affluent, with well-developed technology, have gone far toward curing their internal environmental problems. This observation would suggest that the answer to our greatest problems lies not in stopping [\*492] growth or new technologies, **but advancing them.** A plenitude of evidence supports that suggestion.

## (--) The alternative is too radical: Radical environmentalism will not be embraced by the majority of the population.

Cesar Cuauhtemoc Garcia **Hernandez, 2007** (JD, Boston College Law School, Seattle Journal for Social Justice, Fall/Winter, 2007, Accessed via Academic Lexis/Nexis, May 23, 2011)

The federal government's inaction regarding climate change, ostensibly based in a belief that more environmentally protective policies would adversely affect the nation's economy, is reflected at the individual level. n28 While many people are willing to engage in limited actions to reduce their environmental "footprint," **few are willing** or able to drastically restructure their daily affairs to protect the environment. n29 Recently, such strategies as carbon offsets--a market-based approach that allows individuals to "pay to have their greenhouse gas emissions . . . cancelled out by a corresponding emissions reduction elsewhere"--have enabled individuals to limit their own contribution to environmental devastation while only mildly altering their lifestyle. n30

# Deep Ecology Answers—Perm Extensions

## (--) The permutation is the best option—combining technological solutions with deep ecology buys time for the mindset shift to occur.

Jay **Michaelson, 1998** (J.D. Yale Law School, Stanford Environmental Law Journal, January 1998, “Geoengineering: A Climate Change Manhattan Project” Accessed May 23, 2011 on Academic Lexis/Nexis)

I have analogized geoengineering to trying to treat lung cancer instead of trying to quit smoking. A deep environmentalist, one who cares about root causes and philosophical underpinnings rather than just the effects thereof, would want to find and eliminate the factors behind the desire to smoke. But is it trivial in forming policy to take into account that the world really likes to smoke? I think not: politics and policymaking are largely a world of competing preferences, not an academic forum where the ideal theoretical answer is the right answer. Of course, it is sad that the world's smoker would rather suffer serious illness than kick the habit. Thus, it is right for leaders to preach sensibility from their bully pulpits. We should teach "living lightly," simple frugality, and critical thinking to our children. We should try to soften the blow of consumerism and advocate sustainable development in place of rapacious deforestation and biodiversity loss. But while we do all of that, what do we do about climate change? While the preacher is at the bully pulpit, the deacons should be working to solve the problem. Were the planet a teenager trying her first cigarette, it surely would be smarter to address 'root causes' to prevent her from smoking at all. But in the case of climate change, the smoker has been at it for many years, and the addiction is firmly in place. In such a situation, focusing on the "real problem" simply may not work. Strong interests anchor the status quo, and they are not easily condemned "black hats," but a wide range of actors with motives that are not necessarily selfish or shortsighted.

## (--) The permutation solves best for human being’s dilemma regarding nature:

Holly **Doremus, 2000** (Professor of Law, University of California at Davis, Washington & Lee Law Review, Winter 2000, “The Rhetoric and Reality of Nature Protection: Toward a New Discourse.” Accessed via Academic Lexis/Nexis, May 23, 2011)

IV. The Gap Between Rhetoric and Reality The crux of the modern nature problem is the need to find an appropriate human role in nature. Human beings are both of nature, having evolved through the same processes that govern other creatures, and outside nature, having developed the ability to modify and control the environment on a scale far beyond any other creature. The nature problem, therefore, is as much about people as it is about nature. Instead of focusing on how to divide the world between humanity and nature, as we have done so far, **we must consider how best to combine the two**.

## (--) Environmental management is justified to compensate for the effects of past environmental mismanagement:

Holly **Doremus, 2000** (Professor of Law, University of California at Davis, Washington & Lee Law Review, Winter 2000, “The Rhetoric and Reality of Nature Protection: Toward a New Discourse.” Accessed via Academic Lexis/Nexis, May 23, 2011)

Besides potentially inhibiting the creation of large reserves, a strict hands- off strategy is inconsistent with the protection of species, ecosystems, or natural processes. No place in the United States remains entirely unaffected by human actions. **Ongoing management efforts are often necessary** to compensate for the effect of past actions, or current actions outside the designated reserves. Competition with or predation by alien species, for example, is one of the leading threats to domestic biodiversity. n259 Once introduced, alien species often spread rapidly and are difficult, if not impossible to remove. Protecting native species from the threat of such exotics requires ongoing management. n260 Intensive management may also be required to substitute for [\*57] changes in historic fire regimes, n261 predation levels, n262 and other elements of the biophysical environment. Given the extensive changes in background conditions, ecologists tell us that most areas dedicated to the preservation of nature cannot simply be left to their own devices, but will require active human management. n263

## (--) Technological solutions aren’t inconsistent with deep ecology.

Jay **Michaelson, 1998** (J.D. Yale Law School, Stanford Environmental Law Journal, January 1998, “Geoengineering: A Climate Change Manhattan Project” Accessed May 23, 2011 on Academic Lexis/Nexis)

Part V insists that it is time for environmentalists to reclaim the Big Fix, that holists and deep ecologists must, in a Rawlsian vein, learn to **speak the pragmatic language of political discourse**. If for no other reason, they must do this because geoengineering offers hope for solving climate change beyond the too-little, too-lates of Kyoto - essentially if you are one of the people who care about climate change, you should support geoengineering, because most people still do not care enough. But on a deeper level, geoengineering asks environmentalists how much they value their private philosophies, and how much they value the estuaries, islands, and trees that are threatened by climate change.

# Deep Ecology Answers—Perm Extensions

## (--) The permutation gives breathing room for the mindset shift to occur.

Jay **Michaelson, 1998** (J.D. Yale Law School, Stanford Environmental Law Journal, January 1998, “Geoengineering: A Climate Change Manhattan Project” Accessed May 23, 2011 on Academic Lexis/Nexis)

On the practical side, this debate echoes in many quarters of the environmental movement. Should we try to force reduced levels of consumption, or settle for "green fees?" Should we attempt to revalue "living lightly" or try to develop "no-regrets" environmentally-friendly technologies? Should an environmentalist tell McDonald's to "shut its doors" or work to package its unsustainable product in more sustainable containers? n233 Ultimately, it may be that the only way to a sustainable future is for McDonald's to shut its doors, but this will not happen today, or next year. Likewise, other engines of industry will continue to run for a long time. **In the meantime**, ought we not do what we can to address the climate change problem itself?

## (--) Holistic approaches should be kept in mind while creating incremental solutions.

Jay **Michaelson, 1998** (J.D. Yale Law School, Stanford Environmental Law Journal, January 1998, “Geoengineering: A Climate Change Manhattan Project” Accessed May 23, 2011 on Academic Lexis/Nexis)

Finally, holism is flawed because it tries to take the "big picture" into account without necessarily knowing how to frame the picture. Holism multiplies uncertainty. It requires large-scale guessing regarding both present conditions, causes for present conditions, and likely future conditions, with each guess clouded in uncertainties and information costs. Acting holistically makes sense if we know exactly where we are, why we are here, and where we are headed, but in an uncertainty-riddled context such as global climate change, n239 wholesale, holistic alterations radically amplify the risks of making mistakes. Of course, holism remains important; only a fool would not look at causes, contexts, and consequences for points of leverage in battling climate change. In some cases, however, **holistic** **policy prescriptions actually lessen the opportunity** for consensus-building and may magnify the uncertainties and information costs associated with environmental policy.

## (--) Even if the permutation contradicts deep ecology—it is the best solution.

Jay **Michaelson, 1998** (J.D. Yale Law School, Stanford Environmental Law Journal, January 1998, “Geoengineering: A Climate Change Manhattan Project” Accessed May 23, 2011 on Academic Lexis/Nexis)

On the political-philosophical side, the question becomes a Rawlsian one: how to maintain "private" philosophical beliefs and yet also engage in "public" political discourse. n234 I suggest that, in this vein, geoengineering may be a type of "principled self-contra- [\*134] diction" for a deep environmentalist. Even setting aside the practical arguments just advanced - that it is unwise to bet the planet on changing people's deeply held practices - a deep environmentalist ought in principle to advocate policies that are based not on private philosophical ideas, potentially incommensurate with public discourse, but on the limited shared values of a Rawlsian liberalism. n235 Repairing the climate does not reflect deep environmental ideology as does preventive regulation - hence the Rawlsian "contradiction" - but it may be more in accord with values a deep environmentalist shares, in a liberal state, with a non-environmentalist. As such, it is the Rawlsian choice.

## (--) Lack of coalitions will doom holistic environmental solutions.

Jay **Michaelson, 1998** (J.D. Yale Law School, Stanford Environmental Law Journal, January 1998, “Geoengineering: A Climate Change Manhattan Project” Accessed May 23, 2011 on Academic Lexis/Nexis)

Clearly, this is an oversimplified example, but the point should [\*136] be clear: holism is not always effective. Treating the Earth system's problem of climate change, while separately addressing deforestation, fossil fuel consumption, habitat loss, population growth, and so on, may well be the overall best strategy**. Different coalitions may be assembled** to reach a consensus on each individual issue where no one coalition could be assembled to tackle it all together. n238

## (--) Deep ecological approaches risk delaying measures to solve environmental problems.

Jay **Michaelson, 1998** (J.D. Yale Law School, Stanford Environmental Law Journal, January 1998, “Geoengineering: A Climate Change Manhattan Project” Accessed May 23, 2011 on Academic Lexis/Nexis)

D. Summary What the deep environmentalist, holist, and political environmentalist all have in common is an agenda wider than climate change, and the Big Fix lets them down every time. Yet these factions cast a long shadow on the intellectual ambiance of contemporary environmentalism. n243 The desire to "take everything into account" is admirable. It is grounded in good science, respectable philosophy, and seasoned political savvy. Yet the practical, philosophical, and political motivations behind doing so often act at [\*139] cross-purposes with the need to protect the Earth's climate from potentially devastating change.

# Deep Ecology Answers—Alt Fails Answers

## (--) The alternative is too time-consuming and likely to fail—interim steps like the plan are the best we can hope for.

Jay **Michaelson, 1998** (J.D. Yale Law School, Stanford Environmental Law Journal, January 1998, “Geoengineering: A Climate Change Manhattan Project” Accessed May 23, 2011 on Academic Lexis/Nexis)

Perhaps, if regulation is unlikely to succeed in any serious way given the current institutional, economic, and social contexts, we might try to change the deep, underlying causes of climate change--a market economy driven by growth in goods and populations, and the productive capability to meet consumer demand. n119 Although most of the discussion of this point will be deferred to part V, it should be clear that such changes are **very costly and contentious ones**. To say there is a lack of agreement on whether (and how) to remake the world's economic and social structure is **surely an understatement**. Of course, progress can take place [\*103] through evolution rather than revolution, and the role of environmental education, in both shallow and deep modes, should not be minimized. n120 Indeed, it is probably the case that - given the variety of environmental and other issues facing the world - some form of "deep reorientation," however gradual, will eventually be necessary, absent radically new technologies to overcome our current concerns. Unfortunately, in the meantime, **several billion people** remain committed to consumption-based lifestyles and modes of self-definition. Changing deep structures is likely to be a difficult, time consuming, and potentially divisive process that, while it would alter the fundamental assumptions of present cost-benefit curves and consequently yield some kind of "efficient" result, hardly seems like the policy recommendation for a more urgent problem such as global climate change. Again, though a more thorough treatment of this issue must be postponed to the end of this Article, it is clear for present purposes that a "deep structural" approach would be at least as difficult to achieve and as "costly" as ordinary climate change regulation.

## (--) Consumption habits are deeply entrenched—the alternative will fail.

Jay **Michaelson, 1998** (J.D. Yale Law School, Stanford Environmental Law Journal, January 1998, “Geoengineering: A Climate Change Manhattan Project” Accessed May 23, 2011 on Academic Lexis/Nexis)

Moreover, an environmentalist's distaste for the materialistic ideals that undergird the root causes of climate change does not make attempting to thwart those ideals either practical or morally [\*133] justified. Conspicuous consumption is deeply entrenched in American self-conceptions, and in conceptions of Americans by people in the developing world who want to be like them. n231

## (--) Deep environmentalism can’t overcome ideas deeply ingrained in Western culture.

Jay Michaelson, 1998 (J.D. Yale Law School, Stanford Environmental Law Journal, January 1998, “Geoengineering: A Climate Change Manhattan Project” Accessed May 23, 2011 on Academic Lexis/Nexis)

I suggest it is both unwise and counter-democratic to tell billions of consumers that "We Know Better," and set about changing deep structures without regard to the life-defining goals of the consumers themselves. Such action is unwise because it pins the biosphere's integrity on the hope of **overcoming something deeply ingrained in Western culture**. And it is counter-democratic because, until the members of that culture change its constitutive forces, overcoming them in the name of a paternalistic deep environmentalism thwarts their clearly expressed preferences. n232

## (--) We must have advanced industry and technology to support Earth’s current population.

William **Reville, 2010** (Prof., Biochemistry, UCC), IRISH TIMES, Feb. 11, 2010, 17.

Quoting Princeton physicist, Freeman Dyson: People who view industrialization as a source of the earth’s troubles, its pollution, and the desecration of its surface, can only advocate that we give it up. This is something that we can’t do; we have the tiger by the tail. We have 4.5 billion people on earth. We can’t support that many unless we’re industrialized and technologically advanced. So, the idea is not to get rid of industrialization but to move it somewhere else.

# Deep Ecology Answers—Alt Fails Answers

## (--) Solutions to the energy crisis require advanced technologies:

Martin W. **Lewis, 1995** (Green Delusions, assistant professor in the school of the environment @ Duke, pg. 139-140)

The solution to the energy bind lies, as most members of the environmental community realize, in a combination of solar power and conservation. What eco-radicals fail to recognize, however, is that both effective conservation and the commercialization of solar energy demand highly sophisticated technologies. The modern frontiers of energy conservation may be found in such areas as low emissivity windows, energy-sparing fluorescent light bulbs, and computer-integrated sensor systems (Fickett et al, 1990; Bevington and Rosenfeld 1990). Due to a wide variety of such advances, the energy intensity of American industry in fact declined at a rate of 1.5-2 percent per year between 1971 and 1986, allowing industrial production to increase substantially while energy consumption actually fell (Ross and Steinmeyer 1990).

## (--) Alternative energy sources can go a long way to controlling climate change.

Jay **Michaelson, 1998** (J.D. Yale Law School, Stanford Environmental Law Journal, January 1998, “Geoengineering: A Climate Change Manhattan Project” Accessed May 23, 2011 on Academic Lexis/Nexis)

Of course, deep ecologists may not be completely right: some consumption-friendly steps, such as zero-emission vehicles or alternative energy sources, may go a long way toward controlling cli- [\*93] mate change without requiring intrusive regulation or geoengineering marvels. n82 Even these policies, however, necessitate substitutions for environmentally favored goods that have not been at all popular in recent years. n83 Any policy which requires us to change our attitudes must consider whether the cost of doing so is prohibitive.

## (--) Ecologically benign power sources require significant technological advances.

Martin W. **Lewis, 1995** (Green Delusions, assistant professor in the school of the environment @ Duke, pg. 140)

When it comes to harnessing solar power, technological achievements are even more vital. Admittedly, several important solar applications demand little technical sophistication. Simply by placing windows properly a significant power savings can be realized. But in order to do something slightly more complicates—such as heat water—certain high-tech applications are essential. The simplest passive solar water heating systems usually rely on components made of plastic, a substance many eco-radicals would like to ban. But to address our needs for an ecologically benign power source, solar-generated electricity must be commercialized on a massive scale. No matter how this is done, **significant technological advances will be necessary.**

# \*\*\*\*\*Diversity Forums Shell 1NC (1-2)\*\*\*\*\*

## Our counter advocacy is that we should engage in discussion forums outside of competitive debate

## rounds to \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_.[advocate their kritik]

## (--) Discussion forums solve best- we should encourage community-wide forums to discuss their advocacy

**Zompetti ’04** [Joe, Assistant Professor, School of Communication, Illinois State

University, “Contemporary Argumentation and Debate”]

Interjecting the personalized into debate rounds has become highly problematic. As discussions on eDebate demonstrate and my own discussions with folks who have judged teams like Louisville suggest, these arguments have increased anxiety, frustration, anger and resentment. To be fair, **these arguments have also facilitated much soul-searching and self-reflexivity in the community. However, except for the Urban Debate League (UDL) movement little, if anything, is being done to correct for inadequacies and inequities in the community**, contrary to the appeal of the personalized arguments. **In fact, any benefits from the personalization of debate can be accrued from enhancing other strategies: larger community discussions** (as evidenced by some messages on eDebate), **discussion fora at national tournaments,4 special high school debate institutes, clear directives and discussion during the CEDA and NDT business and roundtable meetings, more sensitive topic selection, etc. The drawbacks to personalizing debate**, however, **are**, in my opinion, **enormous**.

## Three net benefits-

## Alliance splitting- personalizing debate risks splitting alliances and fracturing solutions, causing backlash and resistance:

**Zompetti ’04** [Joe, Assistant Professor, School of Communication, Illinois State

University, “Contemporary Argumentation and Debate”]

**The purpose of this essay is to outline what I strongly believe is a fundamental problem with recent debate techniques – the personalizing of debating. The intent is** not to isolate or overly criticize the arguments advanced by the University of Louisville specifically, but rather **to locate their arguments as a case study for how debate rounds have become highly personalized. Even before Louisville's project** (and certainly Louisville is not the only team that currently engages in this type of debating), **individuals and groups alike were personalizing debate arguments, making it difficult for opponents and judges to decipher, understand, analyze and come to grips with such arguments in a forum meant for hypothetical policy-making. In essence, the personalizing of debating has emerged wrought with frustrations, anxiety, resistance and backlash.**

## Structural solutions- personalized debating blocks structural solutions- our counter advocacy solves better

**Zompetti ’04** [Joe, Assistant Professor, School of Communication, Illinois State

University, “Contemporary Argumentation and Debate”]

To be sure, **many have embraced the idea to gain a strategic edge in competitive debate rounds as well as to be self-reflexive of their own participation in an activity that probably does need restructuring. However, the central problem of this new phenomenon – the personalizing of debating – is twofold: it victimizes debate, and it ignores deeper, perhaps more important structural problems within the debate community.**

# Diversity Forums Shell 1NC (2-2)

## Debate rounds are bad forums- lack of time, moving advocacy target, and they deflect from community-wide discussions- turns the case

**Zompetti ’04** [Joe, Assistant Professor, School of Communication, Illinois State

University, “Contemporary Argumentation and Debate”]

**The second major problem with this turn in contemporary policy debate is its deflection, if not downright rejection, of more fundamental or core problems which are the cause of marginalization. Dana Cloud** (1998) **poignantly argues that when focusing on the personalizing of "debating," society stifles dissent, which is probably more important and powerful at ushering-in social change than particularized attention to therapeutic, albeit victimized, perspectives. The will to engage in discourse about transgression is one of individualized therapy, as if the individual's psychological condition is at stake** (e.g., arguments about "discursive violence" are often deployed to this end). **Her argument is primarily one about key progressive change – should we focus on individual notions of psychological distress or the larger group's problem of resource-based scarcity and exploitation? If one is compelled by the argument that we should look self-reflexively2 and comprehensively at the nature of excluding debaters of color and other marginalized groups, then we might be tempted to agree with the outcome of piecemeal solutions** and incoherent policies. On the other hand, we may want to analyze how such relationships occurred and grew when other relationships and situations were not as obvious. In fact, **we may want to even broaden our interpretation of such relationships – exactly how are students of color marginalized? Why do folks believe they have nothing to contribute? Why do students of color feel excluded? It is very difficult**, if not impossible, **to get at these questions during a collegiate debate round. Not only is the limited time in a round an impediment at answering these complex questions, but both debaters of a single team may advance different personalized arguments, creating a moving target of advocacy that the opposing team and judges have difficulty in specifically pinning down for thorough and productive examination**. Or, as Cloud suggests, such therapeutic arguments "deflect [sic] the energy and radicalism of activists," essentially creating a shell-game during private discussions of much larger societal problems (1998, p. 34). In addition, **these questions are often skirted in debate rounds because there is a drive for competition**. While some critical self-reflection has undoubtedly occurred as a result of personalizing debate, **the overwhelming majority of debaters and coaches spend less time thinking about the core problems of marginalization** (and their solutions) **than they do locating debate strategies to beat personalization arguments at the next tournament**. During squad meetings and coaching sessions, one does not hear an opposing team sincerely talk about their privilege or the exclusion of women or people of color in the debate community. Instead, one hears about what topicality argument, framework argument, or counter-narrative will be deployed to win the judge's ballot. **The problem of therapeutic rhetoric underscores how personalized debating prevents examination of more important factors such as resource disparity.**

# Diversity Forums OV

## Our counter-advocacy is that instead of embracing policy debate as a forum for discussing the affirmative advocacy, we should embrace discussion forums

## This is best-

## No time constraints- this means we get to discuss solutions better

## Not competitive- eliminates the competitive nature of debate that turns competitors into enemies where our advocacies are trivialized in the name of competition, which fractures alliances and crushes true change

## Builds allies- solves the reasons why competitors and judges would be alienated by not agreeing with our arguments- we build effective

## Policy debate is a bad forum- if we win that the constraints of policy hurts the legitimacy of their arguments then it means not only does their activism fail, but other movements will as well- public discussion forums solve best because it’s a friendly environment where we avoid heated finger-pointing that kills our ability to create actual change

# Diversity Forums--Everyone Agrees It’s a Problem

## Everyone agrees diversity is a problem- the question is what to do

**Zompetti ’04** [Joe, Assistant Professor, School of Communication, Illinois State University, “Contemporary Argumentation and Debate”]

**There is no question that intercollegiate policy debate** is at a crossroads. It **suffers from a severe lack of diversity, in terms of female debaters as well as debaters of color. Stating the obvious, McRee and Cote declare that "twenty years of data have begun to cement an agreement among forensics educators that there exists a serious lack of diversity in debate"** (2002, p. 29). This problem is especially acute when one looks at the teams clearing into elimination rounds and which debaters receive speaker awards at both regional and national tournaments. **Very few would argue**, I suspect, **that diversity is not a problem**. In fact, the opposite is true (Bartenan, 1995, 1998; Bile, 1999; Bruschke & Johnson, 1994; Crenshaw, 1993a, 1993b; Hunt & Simerly, 1999; Loge, 1991; McRee & Cote, 2002; Rogers et al., 2003; Rowland, 1993; Sowards, 1999a, 1999b; Tuman, 1993; Wilkins & Hobbs, 1997; Williams, McGee & McGee, 1999; Zompetti, 1999). However, **the real debate occurs as to the core causes of this problem and how to address them.**

# \*\*\*\*\*Deontology Bad Frontline (Consequences Good)\*\*\*\*\*

## (--) Their argument creates moral tunnel vision—consequences are ultimately necessary for any meaningful ethics:

Issac 2002 (Jeffery, professor of political science @ Indiana University. Dissent, Spring 2002, 49: 2, p. 32)

Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of politics. Power is the ability to effect outcomes in the world. Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world, one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters ; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics — as opposed to religion— pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century : it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

## (--) Perm: Do the plan and all non mutually-exclusive parts of the alternative: Morality and political theory not mutually exclusive: best mechanism for solvency is a combination of both

Chernoff 2005 (Fred, Prof. of Political Science at Colgate The Power Of International Theory, p. 18-19)

Indeed, moral principles, imperatives and theories require both descriptive and predictive theories, since ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. One must know what is possible and probable in order to make or appraise foreign policy decisions. One may not morally condemn the lifeguard for rescuing only one of the two drowning swimmers if it was physically impossible to save both. Similarly, in international politics one may not blame a state dedicated to just and egalitarian democratic rule for not creating a just and egalitarian order throughout the system, if that state does not have the resources to do so. One must have causal and descriptive theories in order to understand what the state has the capacity to do, even when it comes to appraising how well it lives up to its moral obligations. Policy-making unavoidably requires both theories that are primarily moral and theories that are primarily empirical. This book endorses a proper role for normative theory in world politics in appraising past decisions and in choosing the best future courses of action, though it focuses on the primarily empirical form of theory. Theories of IR inspired by critical theory and postmodernism are on stronger ground when they offer strictly normative arguments. One might object that the emphasis here on the need for empirical theories and the need to know consequences would be vulnerable to charges that it endorses ethical consequentialism, which some philosophers reject. But the position here is clearly not that actions are to be evaluated as morally good or bad in terms of their consequences. Even anti-consequentialist positions generally recognise that a moral agent must have knowledge of conditions to perform moral deeds, even if those actions are appraised on the basis of the agent’s motivations rather than the actions’ consequences.

## (--) Extinction trumps abstract moralizing

Sissela Bok, 1988 (Professor of Philosophy @ Brandeis, Applied Ethics and Ethical Theory, Ed. By David Rosenthal and Fudlou Shehadi)

The same argument can be made for Kant’s other formulations of the Categorical Imperative: “So act as to use humanity, both in your own person and in the person of every other, always at the same time as an end, never simply as a means”; and “So act as if you were always through actions a law-making member in a universal Kingdom of Ends.” No one with a concern for humanity could consistently will to risk eliminating humanity in the person of ~~him~~self and every other or to risk the death of all members in a universal Kingdom of Ends for the sake of justice. To risk their collective death for the sake of following one’s conscience would be, as Rawls said, “irrational, crazy.” And to say that one did not intend such a catastrophe, but that one merely failed to stop other persons from bringing it about would be beside the point when the end of the world was at stake. For although it is true that we cannot be held responsible for most of the wrongs that others commit, the Latin maxim presents a case where we would have to take such a responsibility seriously—perhaps to the point of deceiving, bribing, even killing an innocent person, in order that the world not perish.

# Deontology Bad Frontline (Consequences Good)

## (--) Deontology is unrelated to conceptions of the good:

Gaus 2001 (Gerald, Prof. of Philosophy @ Tulane. THE JOURNAL OF VALUE INQUIRY. Number 35, p.179-193. Online. Internet. Accessed May 29, 06. <http://www.springerlink.com.ezproxy.baylor.edu>)

To maintain that we have a reason to act in some way just because so acting instantiates a rule, principle, or maxim that instructs us to do so implies that our reason to act does not depend simply on our goals, values, or desires. As Prichard stressed, deontic reasons are imperatival rather than attractive: they instruct us to perform our duties because performance is required, not because we find the action attractive. It is relevant that “[t]he term ‘deontology’ derives from the Greek words *deon* (duty) and *logos* (science).” In the broadest sense, then, an ethical theory is deontological if it constitutes a science of duty and obligations. As Charles Fried says, “the whole domain of the obligatory, the domain of duty, [is] the domain of deontology as opposed to the domain of the good.” Thus whereas teleology is the science of what is good and worthy, deontology is the science of duty and obligation. Charles Larmore has argued that in this expansive sense deontological ethics is the distinctively modern view of ethics: deontologists understand ethics as juristic, issuing demands or imperatives regarding what we *must* do.

## (--) Deontology is severly flawed in the context of public policy

Woller 1997 (Gary, professor of economics @ BYU. Policy Currents, June 1997. Accessed at <http://apsapolicysection.org/vol7_2/72.pdf>, p. 11)

At the same time, deontologically based ethical systems have severe practical limitations as a basis for public policy. At best, a priori moral principles provide only general guidance to ethical dilemmas in public affairs and do not themselves suggest appropriate public policies, and at worst, they create a regimen of regulatory unreasonableness while failing to adequately address the problem or actually making it worse. For example, a moral obligation to preserve the environment by no means implies the best way, or any way for that matter, to do so, just as there is no a priori reason to believe that any policy that claims to preserve the environment will actually do so. Any number of policies might work, and others, although seemingly consistent with the moral principle, will fail utterly. That deontological principles are an inadequate basis for environmental policy is evident in the rather significant irony that most forms of deontologically based environmental laws and regulations tend to be implemented in a very utilitarian manner by street-level enforcement officials. Moreover, ignoring the relevant costs and benefits of environmental policy and their attendant incentive structures can, as alluded to above, actually work at cross purposes to environmental preservation. (There exists an extensive literature on this aspect of regulatory enforcement and the often perverse outcomes of regulatory policy. See, for example, Ackerman, 1981; Bartrip and Fenn, 1983; Hawkins, 1983, 1984; Hawkins and Thomas, 1984.) Even the most die-hard preservationist/deontologist would, I believe, be troubled by this outcome. The above points are perhaps best expressed by Richard Flathman, The number of values typically involved in public policy decisions, the broad categories which must be employed and above all, the scope and complexity of the consequences to be anticipated militate against reasoning so conclusively that they generate an imperative to institute a specific policy. It is seldom the case that only one policy will meet the criteria of the public interest (1958, p. 12). It therefore follows that in a democracy, policymakers have an ethical duty to establish a plausible link between policy alternatives and the problems they address, and the public must be reasonably assured that a policy will actually do something about an existing problem; this requires the means-end language and methodology of utilitarian ethics. Good intentions, lofty rhetoric, and moral piety are an insufficient, though perhaps at times a necessary basis for public policy in a democracy.

## The only way to decide if a foreign policy is ethical is if it gives good results. Aiming for good motives has led to atrocities in the past

Gyosdev 2005 (Nikolas, Executive Editor of The National Interest, SAIS REVIEW, Winter-Spring. Online. Internet. Accessed May 28, 06. http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.baylor.edu/journals/sais\_review/v025/ 25.1gvosdev.pdf.)

Realism accepts the reality of imperfect compromises. It does not dismiss as immoral the need to adjudicate conflicts between various preferences and assign priorities consistent with available resources, even if it means that some tasks are left unaddressed. There is no doubt than an emotional idealism—reinforced by horrific television images broadcast on 24-hour news channels—seems much more appealing. Having a policy or “taking a stand” that appears to be “doing something” in the face of violence or suffering is a temptation few officials can resist, even if the end results worsen the situation. In assessing the track record of humanitarian interventions in Africa during the 1990s, J. Peter Pham concluded: Intervention can exacerbate, rather than reduce, the humanitarian crisis. In fact, an ill-timed humanitarian military intervention can cause the very tragedies it was supposed to prevent, intensifying the level of violence Idealists and moralists were forced into all sorts of intellectual contortions to explain how Kosovo Albanians differed from Kurds, Chechens, Rwandans, and Timorese. within a conflict and thus increasing the domestic security threat and spreading regional instability.27 Idealists dismiss many of these concerns. If only the United States would deploy more troops, commit more resources, muster the “will” to act, then there would be no need for setting priorities and making choices. They argue that it is better to have “tried and failed” than not to have tried at all. But with regard to foreign policy, it is difficult to make moral judgments without the benefit of hindsight. This is why realists insist on a morality of results rather than one of intentions in assessing policy. Morgenthau concluded: We cannot conclude from the good intentions of a states~~man~~ that ~~his~~ foreign policies will be either morally praiseworthy or politically successful. Judging ~~his~~ motives, we can say that he will not intentionally pursue policies that are morally wrong, but we can say nothing about the probability of their success. If we want to know the moral and political qualities of his actions, we must know them, not ~~his~~ motives. How often have states~~men~~ been motivated by the desire to improve the world, and ended by making it worse? And how often have they sought one goal, and ended by achieving something they neither expected nor desired? This ought to be our guide.

# Deontology Bad Frontline (Consequences Good)

## The affirmative gives voice to an ethical version of American foreign policy based on global cooperation and conflict resolution

Condron 2000 (David, special technical advisor in the Department of Defense. JOURNAL OF POWER AND ETHICS, July 2000. Online. Internet. Accessed June 12, 06. <http://find.galegroup.com>.)

In the same way, long-term commitment internationally reinforces moral behavior among nations. Thus, an ethical foreign policy would stress long-term commitment in order to further the moral behavior and “character development” of nations. An ethical foreign policy would also promote international order by establishing a forum for discussion of issues and actively utilizing that forum to reach consensus on potentially divisive issues. This helps expand the natural localism of the moral sense toward the universals prevalent in Western ideals. It does this by allowing participation in the process of conflict resolution. While individual nations may still act according to raw self-interest, the point is that they will find it increasingly more difficult to do so when confronted with people on which they depend. International law and order may be inconvenient in many cases, but proves to be in the long-term interest of every nation by allowing them to assess with common standards what is expected of them and what they can expect from others with whom they have a continuing relationship. To further foster international relationship, ethical foreign policy would promote cultural exchanges. This increases sympathy among peoples, developing and maintaining organic relationships, which are so important for application of the moral sense to people who are very different. The planks of an ethical foreign policy are summarized in Table 1 with their corresponding application to the moral sense. Many of these are elements of current U.S. foreign policy. What is provided in this article is a basis for why they should be important parts of U.S. foreign policy. Unless an adequate case is formulated and communicated repeatedly to the American public and influential persons in society, these policy goals will continue to be pursued on an ad hoc basis. By providing a coherent framework for ethical foreign policy, it will be possible to maintain a consistent U.S. foreign policy based on national consensus and validated by universal biological principles. Such is an urgent need in these turbulent times of change.

# Deontology Answers—Answers to: Intervening Actors

## The intention to result in certain consequences is morally irrelevant—we must look at what is actually caused.

Rule 2005 (James, professor of sociology @ SUNY “‘Above all, do no harm’ The war in Iraq and dissent” Dissent, Summer, accessed at <http://www.dissentmagazine.org/menutest/archives/2005/su05/rule.htm>)

The least inspiring figures of all are those who have tried to have it both ways—supporting the invasion of Iraq in advance, while dissociating themselves (also in advance) from the atrocities. In the run-up to the onslaught, Thomas L. Friedman praised Bush’s “audacious” war plan as “a job worth doing,” but only “if we can do it right.” Only Friedman could believe that the war then being readied would be carried out to his specifications. In fact, as for other commentators, his only real choice was to endorse what was clearly in store or to count himself out. Once that or any other war began, no one could claim to know its ultimate directions. But its immediate conduct would clearly be in the hands of a political and military establishment that had already amply displayed its colors. Those who supported the invasion signed over their political power of attorney to these figures. Perhaps—I am not sure—some of the intellectual apologists for the Iraq invasion really did understand that it would be as horrific as it has proved to be. Perhaps they were thoughtful enough to realize that the nature of the oppositions involved, the complexity of the objectives, the ruthlessness of the figures on both sides would guarantee the massive death and repression of civilians, the destruction of vast cityscapes, and the institutionalization of torture. Perhaps this was what Paul Berman had in mind when he characterized the Baath Party as “nearly a classic fascist movement” and (for good measure) “so is the radical Islamist movement, in a somewhat different fashion—two strands of a single impulse, which happens to be Europe’s fascist and totalitarian legacy to the modern Muslim world.” (“A Friendly Drink in a Time of War,” Dissent, Winter 2004, p. 57). Any response short of military assault on these influences, Berman seems to feel, involves “clinging to attitudes that can only be regarded as racist against Arabs.” When the stakes are so high—liberation of the Muslim world from both godly and godless fascism—even the greatest costs en route are acceptable. This is a page from the apocalyptic scriptures of the neoconservatives. We of the democratic left should be first to decry this reasoning. It is much akin to what horrified Karl Popper half a century ago, when he inveighed against what he called historicism. This is the certain conviction that wished-for historical outcomes warrant any and all measures to hasten their arrival. We must always fear those convinced of the certainty and moral superiority of the world they think they are making, Popper held, u. His key target, of course, was Marxist visions that condoned everything from political assassination to mass murder, if such actions could be portrayed as speeding the day when the evils of capitalism were definitively swept away—and with them, presumably, the roots of all human suffering. Popper’s doctrine can be abused, developed into a doctrinaire ideology in its own right. But properly qualified, it provides what ought to be a key tenet of the democratic left. Hypothetical goals of sweeping and definitive cures for political ills can rarely be regarded as certain outcomes of any political action. Political programs favoring massive human costs in the short run in the interest of revolutionary progress later on warrant searing skepticism. Given a measure of humility about our ability to predict the consequences of massive interventions, we do better to favor moderate steps toward incremental improvement than sweeping and costly measures whose consequences, we must admit, we cannot be sure of.

## Intent is irrelevant when extinction is on the line:

Sissela Bok, 1988 (Professor of Philosophy @ Brandeis, Applied Ethics and Ethical Theory, Ed. By David Rosenthal and Fudlou Shehadi)

The same argument can be made for Kant’s other formulations of the Categorical Imperative: “So act as to use humanity, both in your own person and in the person of every other, always at the same time as an end, never simply as a means”; and “So act as if you were always through actions a law-making member in a universal Kingdom of Ends.” No one with a concern for humanity could consistently will to risk eliminating humanity in the person of ~~him~~self and every other or to risk the death of all members in a universal Kingdom of Ends for the sake of justice. To risk their collective death for the sake of following one’s conscience would be, as Rawls said, “irrational, crazy.” And to say that one did not intend such a catastrophe, but that one merely failed to stop other persons from bringing it about would be beside the point when the end of the world was at stake. For although it is true that we cannot be held responsible for most of the wrongs that others commit, the Latin maxim presents a case where we would have to take such a responsibility seriously—perhaps to the point of deceiving, bribing, even killing an innocent person, in order that the world not perish.

## The intervening actors position is morally hollow.

Gasper 1999 (Des, Institute of Social Studies @ The Hague European Journal of Development Research, 11:2, p. 98-99.)

The ‘mission-bounded’ approach claims ‘it’s not our problem’ how others use the resources provided. Evaluation of relief aid stops at the Purpose level, or below, and is restricted to intended effects. Disastrous unintended effects, especially at the higher Goal level, become someone else’s problem, even when foreseeable and foressen. By declaring a narrow set of intentions, one escapes responsibility for other effects. This is a version of ‘the doctrine of double effect’” ‘Where one course of action is likely to have two quite different effects, one licit or mandatory and the other illicit, it may be permissible to take that course intending the [former] one but not the other’ [Pan, 1979]. This handy tool could equally support non-supply to the Rwandese camps, since harm to the non-combatant camp residents is not intended. Pushed hard, as a way of living with the deontological proscriptions in Roman Catholicism, the doctrine has generated much casuistry (such as ‘Contraceptive slot machines labeled “For the prevention of disease only’” (ibid.) and corresponding criticism. For if some effects of one’s actions are the reactions of other actors, and some of their reactions are considered forced.

# Deontology Answers—Answers to: Intervening Actors

**An ethic of consequences enables political responsibility and freedom**

Williams 2005 (Michael, professor of international politics @ University of Wales The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations, p. 174-176)

A commitment to an ethic of consequences reflects a deeper ethic of criticism, of ‘self-clarification’, and thus of reflection upon the values adopted by an individual or a collectivity. It is part of an attempt to make critical evaluation an intrinsic element of responsibility. Responsibility to this more fundamental ethic gives the ethic of consequences meaning. Consequentialism and responsibility are here drawn into what Schluchter, in terms that will be familiar to anyone conversant with constructivism in International Relations, has called a ‘reflexive principle’. In the wilful Realist vision, scepticism and consequentialism are linked in an attempt to construct not just a more substantial vision of political responsibility, but also the kinds of actors who might adopt it, and the kinds of social structures that might support it. A consequentialist ethic is not simply a choice adopted by actors: it is a means of trying to foster particular kinds of self-critical individuals and societies, and in so doing to encourage a means by which one can justify and foster a politics of responsibility. The ethic of responsibility in wilful Realism thus involves a commitment to both autonomy and limitation, to freedom and restraint, to an acceptance of limits and the criticism of limits. Responsibility clearly involves prudence and an accounting for current structures and their historical evolution; but it is not limited to this, for it seeks ultimately the creation of responsible subjects within a philosophy of limits. Seen in this light, the Realist commitment to objectivity appears quite differently. Objectivity in terms of consequentialist analysis does not simply take the actor or action as given, it is a political practice — an attempt to foster a responsible self, undertaken by an analyst with a commitment to objectivity which is itself based in a desire to foster a politics of responsibility. Objectivity in the sense of coming to terms with the ‘reality’ of contextual conditions and likely outcomes of action is not only necessary for success, it is vital for self-reflection, for sustained engagement with the practical and ethical adequacy of one’s views. The blithe, self-serving, and uncritical stances of abstract moralism or rationalist objectivism avoid self-criticism by refusing to engage with the intractability of the world ‘as it is’. Reducing the world to an expression of their theoretical models, political platforms, or ideological programmes, they fail to engage with this reality, and thus avoid the process of self-reflection at the heart of responsibility. By contrast, Realist objectivity takes an engagement with this intractable ‘object’ that is not reducible to one’s wishes or will as a necessary condition of ethical engagement, self-reflection, and self-creation.7 Objectivity is not a naïve naturalism in the sense of scientific laws or rationalist calculation; it is a necessary engagement with a world that eludes one’s will. A recognition of the limits imposed by ‘reality’ is a condition for a recognition of one’s own limits — that the world is not simply an extension of one’s own will. But it is also a challenge to use that intractability as a source of possibility, as providing a set of openings within which a suitably chastened and yet paradoxically energised will to action can responsibly be pursued. In the wilful Realist tradition, the essential opacity of both the self and the world are taken as limiting principles. Limits upon understanding provide chastening parameters for claims about the world and actions within it. But they also provide challenging and creative openings within which diverse forms of life can be developed: the limited unity of the self and the political order is the precondition for freedom. The ultimate opacity of the world is not to be despaired of: it is a condition of possibility for the wilful, creative construction of selves and social orders which embrace the diverse human potentialities which this lack of essential or intrinsic order makes possible.8 But it is also to be aware of the less salutary possibilities this involves. Indeterminacy is not synonymous with absolute freedom — it is both a condition of, and imperative toward, responsibility.

# \*\*\*\*\*Epistemology K Frontline\*\*\*\*\*

## (--) The lack of absolute truths doesn’t deny the necessity of logic and data. Limited truths are possible, and incomplete knowledge is still useful.

Rudra Sil 2000 (assistant professor of political science @ university of pennsylvania) beyond boundaries? disciplines, paradigms, and theoretical integration in international studies, ed. rudra sil & eileen m doherty, p. 161 accessed via google books.

In the end, there may be no alternative to relying on the judgment of other human beings, and this judgment is difficult to form in the absence of empirical findings. However, instead of clinging to the elusive idea of a uniform standard for the empirical validation of theories, it is possible to simply present a set of observational statements—whether we call it “data” or “narrative”—for the modest purpose of rendering an explanation or interpretation more plausible than the audience would allow at the outset. In practice, this is precisely what the most committed positivists and interpretivists have been doing anyway; the presentation of “logically consistent” hypotheses “supported by data” and the ordering of facts in a “thick” narrative are both ultimately designed to convince scholars that a particular proposition should be taken more seriously than others. Social analysis is not about final truths or objective realities, but nor does it have to be a meaningless world of incommensurable theories where anything goes. Instead, it can be an ongoing collective endeavor to develop, evaluate and refine general inferences—be they in the form of models, partial explanations, descriptive inferences, or interpretations—in order to render them more “sensible” or “plausible” to a particular audience. In the absence of a consensus on the possibility and desirability of a full-blown explanatory science of international and social life, it is important to keep as many doors open as possible. This does not require us to accept each and every claim without some sort of validation, but perhaps the community of scholars can be more tolerant about the kinds of empirical referents and logical propositions that are employed in validating propositions by scholars embracing all but the most extreme epistemological positions.

## (--) Perm: Do the plan and all non-competitive parts of the alternatives: Adopting a middle-ground approach to epistemology is key to dialogue between intellectual communities, which is necessary to gain valuable knowledge.

Rudra Sil 2000 (Rudra, assistant professor of political science @ University of Pennsylvania. Beyond boundaries? disciplines, paradigms, and theoretical integration in international studies, ed. rudra sil & eileen m doherty, p. 166 )

In the final analysis, it may be best to regard the entire process of social research as an ongoing collective search for meanings by a community of scholars. This search may not result in any definitive answers to theoretical or practical questions given the diverse foundations informing the puzzles, texts, and models that preoccupy members of this community. Nevertheless, thanks to the mediating role played by those subscribing to a pragmatic epistemological middle-ground, the process can still yield valuable insights, partial explanations, and even modest “lessons” and that can be judged as more or less convincing in the eyes of one’s audience whether this audience consists of academic peers, the lay public at large, or the policy-making community. In an era of increasingly divided disciplines, scholars adopting a more pragmatic epistemological “middle ground,” by virtue of their agnosticism, are likely to make the most critical contributions to whatever cumulation of knowledge is possible in the social sciences. These scholars are in a better position than those at the extreme ends for the purpose of generating and sustaining greater dialogue across different disciplines, theoretical approaches and intellectual movements precisely because their assumptions prevent them from hastily dismissing a study on grounds that are only meaningful to a subgroup within the wider community of scholars. In the absence of meaningful dialogue across different intellectual communities—whether delimited by disciplines, paradigms or methodological schools—the social sciences risk becoming permanently “balkanized,” with scholars passing up opportunities to glean valuable insights from intellectual products developed on the basis of different foundational assumptions.

# Epistemology Extensions: Extensions on Limited Truths are Possible

## Extend our Sil evidence on why limited truths are still possible…their broad indictment doesn’t answer the affirmative in this specific instance…

## A) We don’t need a uniform standard of judgment to prove that our argument is more likely true than false.

## B) Their indictments of grand truths don’t answer our argument—we argue that there is a limited truth in this instance—we are part of an ongoing collective endeavor to develop and evaluate claims in this specific instance.

## (--) Epistemological indictments of international relations ignore the specific contexts in which the affirmative operates—we should privilege specificity over sweeping indictments.

Gearoid Tuathail, 1996 (Department of Geography, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University) The patterned mess of history and the writing of geopolitics: a reply to Dalby. Political Geography, 15: 6-7, p. 663-4.

Dalby’s third point builds upon what he suggests earlier about discourses of IR as a powerful part of the Cold War, an argument he inflates even further in pointing to their importance in ‘policing the global order and maintaining injustice, poverty and violence’. The crucial point that I apparently miss is ‘the function of the discipline’s knowledges as practices of hegemony’. There are two points to be made in response to these exceedingly general claims. First, I would argue that evocations of ‘hegemony’ and ‘power’ often function in decontextualizing ways in some poststructuralist writing. Pronouncing something as hegemonic does not tell us very much about the nature and mechanisms of hegemony; in fact, it seems to substitute for the necessity of documenting the precise nature of hegemony in many instances. I recognize that this is not always possible but, in this case at least, the claim is so broad as to be meaningless. Certainly, the concept of hegemony needs to be carefully considered within critical geopolitics. Second, if we get more precise and examine the specific case of IR, there is an argument to be made that this subfield was actually not as powerful a discursive support for Cold War policies as Dalby claims. The number of top-level US foreign-policy decision-makers with PhDs in international relations is actually quite tiny. Most have backgrounds in industry, finance, law, diplomatic service and the military. The disciplining significance of IR and of academia in general is overestimated by Dalby.

**(--) Privileging epistemology leads to rejection of good ideas—their Kritik is too isolated and trigger happy in rejecting good ideas like the AFF:**

Jarvis 2000 (Darryl, Associate Professor & Deputy Director, Centre for Asia and Globalisation. International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism: Defending the Discipline. pg. 138)

First, I must acknowledge that any theoretical critique of Ashley’s project, including this one, is destined to failure, at least in its ability to affect the course of debate within postmodernism. This problem is not endemic to the nature of the critique(s), but reflects the fact that postmodern theory is as much driven by ideological commitment as by theoretical innovation. Moreover, within international relations theory the postmodernist perspective exists independently of contending approaches, hermetically isolated if only because of its specialized nomenclature and distinctive ideological hue that encloses participants in a select and self-absorbed theoretical-ideological discourse. Membership to this discourse is exclusive and limited to those who promise to take up the faith and propagate it, not question it critically. Thus, regardless of how erudite critiques migh be, or how serendipitous critical analysis proves, we can scarcely expect Ashley to be convinced by intellectual mustings when they are contrary to his political ambitions. For in Ashley’s writings we are confronted as much by ideological intransigence as we debate over ontological and epistemological issues. The postmodernist/modernist divide is more ideological than theoretical, a battle not between contending ontologies so much as between political loyalties. The façade of ontological and epistemological debate has thus been used deceptively to shield the underlying ideological axis upon which these debates ultimately rest. For this reason, we should not be surprised that postmodernists remain unconvinced by modernist theory, or vice versa, or that each is largely uninterested in the others perspective, theory, or arguments. Those views, theories, or paradigms not in accord with one’s own worldview or basic values are rarely considered, let alone studied. And while Ashley would have us believe that these failings are the exclusive prsever of modernist/positivist theory, postmodernist theory too is just as guilty, having evolved in isolation, cocooned by technical nomenclature, reticent to engage contending perspectives in useful dialogue, and trigger happy in rejecting opposing perspectives without first understanding them.

# Epistemology Kritik Extensions: Permutation Extensions

## Extend our permutation evidence:

## A) The best insights in international relations are from those who subscribe to a pragmatic epistemological middle ground that can yield valuable insights.

## B) Our approach borrows the best parts of multiple theories of international relations—if the debate is about method—our method is superior and you should vote AFF.

## (--) Radical epistemological kritiks of International Relations are premature and should be rejected. We can combine the different viewpoints they try to polarize.

Niarguinen 2001 (Dmitri, professor of IR at Central European University. “Transforming realism: Irreducible core gives life to new interpretations and flexible incarnations”. Rubikon E-Journal, December, accessed online at http://web.archive.org/web/20060503234134/http:// venus.ci.uw.edu.pl/ ~rubikon/forum /dmitri.htm)

For the genuine link between constructivism and Realism to be taken seriously, certain elaborations are in order. It is tempting, and, indeed, has been common practice to polarize and dichotomize two grand standpoints: positivism and reflectivism. While positivism has been a dominant notion for at least two centuries now, reflectivism seems to be increasingly gaining momentum and may, over time, switch the pendulum to the other extreme. The tendency is out there: under the banner of reflectivism, scholars receive an opportunity to criticize everything which has a grain of rationality. This might lead to either ‘Sokal-hoax’ type incidents[50] or to a new dogma. In the light of strict positivist/reflectivist dichotomy, hard-core rigid Realism is rightly accused of being blind and stumble. To the same degree may hyper-reflectivism [may] be accused of being chaotic, utopian and irrelevant[51]. Instead of this black-and-white division, we are much more flexible to view things in the shades of gray. To operate on the rationalist/reflectivist continuum then would rather be a virtue than a vice. It is thus important to move from instrumental rationality (Zweckrationalitaet) to value-rationality (Wertrationalitaet).[52] Equally is it important to stay away from pure ideas of reflectivism, which like Sirens in Homer’s Odyssey are luring scholars onto the rocks. As Alexander Wendt has indicated, ideas, after all, are not all the way down. To counter an argument that reflectivism and positivism are epistemologically incompatible, it is plausible to say that much cooperation is possible on the ontological basis alone. Indeed, neither positivism, nor reflectivism tells us about the structure and dynamics of international life. The state of the social sciences of international relations is such that epistemological prescriptions and conclusions are at best premature.

## (--) The permutation solves best: endorsing multiple epistemological frameworks can correct the blindspots of international relations theory

Stern & Druckman 2000 (Paul and Daniel, National Research Council & Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University.“Evaluating interventions in history: The case of international

conflict resolution.” International Studies Review, Spring, p. 62-63, accessed via EBSCO Host)

Using several distinct research approaches or sources of information in conjunction is a valuable strategy for developing generic knowledge. This strategy is particularly useful for meeting the challenges of measurement and inference. The nature of historical phenomena makes controlled experimentation—the analytic technique best suited to making strong inferences about causes and effects—practically impossible with real-life situations. Making inferences requires using experimentation in simulated conditions and various other methods, each of which has its own advantages and limitations, but none of which can alone provide the level of certainty desired about what works and under 52Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1984); Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1985); Reilly and Reynolds, Electoral Systems and Conflict in Divided Societies. 62 Stern and Druckman what conditions. We conclude that debates between advocates of different research methods (for example, the quantitative-qualitative debate) are unproductive except in the context of a search for ways in which different methods can complement each other. Because there is no single best way to develop knowledge, the search for generic knowledge about international conflict resolution should adopt an epistemological strategy of triangulation, sometimes called “critical multiplism.”53 That is, it should use multiple perspectives, sources of data, constructs, interpretive frameworks, and modes of analysis to address specific questions on the presumption that research approaches that rely on certain perspectives can act as partial correctives for the limitations of approaches that rely on different ones. An underlying assumption is that robust findings (those that hold across studies that vary along several dimensions) engender more confidence than replicated findings (a traditional scientific ideal, but not practicable in international relations research outside the laboratory). When different data sources or methods converge on a single answer, one can have increased confidence in the result. When they do not converge, one can interpret and take into account the known biases in each research approach. A continuing critical dialogue among analysts using different perspectives, methods, and data could lead to an understanding that better approximates international relations than the results coming from any single study, method, or data source.

# \*\*\*\*\*Evidence Good\*\*\*\*\*

## (--) Learning to evaluate evidence is good--unsupported evidence allows for suffering, misery, wars, and Nazism:

Warnick & Inch, 1989 (*Critical Thinking and Communication*; pg. 66).

As critics and consumers of argument, we should be aware of the vital role evidence plays in argumentation and decision making. Russel R. Windes and Arthur Hastings have suggested that the acceptance of conclusions and decisions in the absence of evidence “has resulted in **decisions and actions which have led to indescribable human suffering and misery**—to **wars** and material destruction, to political inequities and the suppression of human rights, to **economic catastrophes**, to unjust persecutions, to mob violence, and to **superstition and prejudice**.” If you believe that accepting unsupported or poorly supported claims is harmless, consider Nazi Germany. The Nazi propaganda machine sought to isolate and ostracize the Jewish people. To do this, Nazi publications claimed that Jews had caused the country’s economic problems, had committed atrocities against German women and children, and were devious and untrustworthy. The Nazis presented **either no evidence (only innuendo) or phony evidence** to support their claims. However, if a claim is made often enough, people begin to believe it, and the German people did. One result was the Holocaust, in which millions of people were put to death.

## (--) Arguers and recipients of argument need to be aware of the quality of evidence so that we can judge arguments:

Warnick & Inch, 1989 (*Critical Thinking and Communication*; pg. 71).

Just as any structure is only as strong as the foundation on which it is built, so an argument is only as strong as the evidence used to support it. As arguers and as recipients of argument, we need to **be aware of the quality of evidence** so that we can judge others’ arguments and select strong evidence to support our own arguments. The remainder of this section will list and describe criteria to be applied to various types of evidence. Applying criteria such as reliability, objectivity, relevance, consistency, expertise, and recency to evidence enables us to judge the quality and support provided for claims. The result can **only make us** better **critics and users of argument**.

# Evidence Good

## (--) Research-intensive debate is good because it exposes debaters to new literatures and helps debaters understand and analyze issues: it gives us the tools and the impetus to be socially active

**Dybvig & Iverson ’00 [**[**http://debate.uvm.edu/dybvigiverson1000.html**](http://debate.uvm.edu/dybvigiverson1000.html) **last updated 11/25/2000, Kristin Chisholm Dybvig, Arizona State University, Joel O. Iverson, Arizona State University]**

While past research on academic debate discusses how research techniques and skills used by debaters improved critical thinking and aided in debaters' selection of career choices, no research has addressed the impact on debaters' worldviews. Through exposure to a variety of issues, such as the impact of globalization, debaters are exposed to new areas of knowledge. This paper examines the impact of researching debate topics on debaters' personal advocacy. Recent discussion on the college debat listserves has focused on the benefits of intercollegiate debate. This conversation is not new nor is it likely to go away. One of the primary criticisms of policy debate is that the skills learned are not readily translated into real world public speaking skills. The issues include delivery rate, conversational style, reliance upon evidence and time demands placed upon debaters due to research burdens. There are several differences between parliamentary debate and policy debate as currently practiced in the United States. Parliamentary debate is done at a slow rate of delivery. Policy debate on the other hand, is characterized by a rapid rate of delivery. Parliamentary debate uses a different topic for each round, while policy debate focuses on one topic for an entire year. One substantial difference between the two types of debate is the nature of proof involved in each one. Policy debate is focused on outside research, where parliamentary debate uses common knowledge based arguments and no citation of outside research (Venette, 1998). Addressing all of these differences is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, we focus upon the research process involved in the more research intensive forms of debate: National Debate Tournament (NDT) and Cross Examination Debate Association (CEDA) style debate. We have surmised that research has several beneficial effects on debaters. Research creates an in-depth analysis of issues that takes students beyond their initial presuppositions and allows them to truly evaluate all sides of an issue. Not only is the research involved in debate a training ground for skills, but it also acts as a motivation to act on particular issues. It is our contention that debate not only gives us the tools that we need to be active in the public sphere, but it also empowers some debaters with the impetus to act in the public sphere.

## (--) Research in debate is a critical catalyst for social activism

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Mitchell contends that the laboratory style setting creates barriers to other spheres, creates a "sense of detachment" and causes debaters to see research from the role of spectators. Mitchell further calls for "argumentative agency [which] involves the capacity to contextualize and employ the skills and strategies of argumentative discourse in fields of social action, especially wider spheres of public deliberation" (p. 45). Although we agree with Mitchell that debate can be an even greater instrument of empowerment for students, we are more interested in examining the impact of the intermediary step of research. In each of Mitchell's examples of debaters finding creative avenues for agency, there had to be a motivation to act. It is our contention that the research conducted for competition is a major catalyst to propel their action, change their opinions, and to provide a greater depth of understanding of the issues involved.

## (--) Research-intensive debate about issues outside of our immediate lives creates high value education on issues and helps debaters become better able to be good citizens

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The level of research involved in debate creates an in-depth understanding of issues. The level of research conducted during a year of debate is quite extensive. Goodman (1993) references a Chronicle of Higher Education article that estimated "the level and extent of research required of the average college debater for each topic is equivalent to the amount of research required for a Master's Thesis (cited in Mitchell, 1998, p. 55). With this extensive quantity of research, debaters attain a high level of investigation and (presumably) understanding of a topic. As a result of this level of understanding, debaters become knowledgeable citizens who are further empowered to make informed opinions and energized to take action.

Research helps to educate students (and coaches) about the state of the world. Without the guidance of a debate topic, how many students would do in-depth research on female genital mutilation in Africa, or United Nations sanctions on Iraq? The competitive nature of policy debate provides an impetus for students to research the topics that they are going to debate. This in turn fuels students’ awareness of issues that go beyond their front doors. Advocacy flows from this increased awareness. Reading books and articles about the suffering of people thousands of miles away or right in our own communities drives people to become involved in the community at large.

# Evidence Good

## (--) Research-intensive debate is crucial to empowering people to be activists and history shows that debating does cause activism

**Dybvig & Iverson ’00 [**[**http://debate.uvm.edu/dybvigiverson1000.html**](http://debate.uvm.edu/dybvigiverson1000.html) **last updated 11/25/2000, Kristin Chisholm Dybvig, Arizona State University, Joel O. Iverson, Arizona State University]**

Mitchell claimed that debate could be more than it was traditionally seen as, that it could be a catalyst to empower people to act in the social arena. We surmise that there is a step in between the debate and the action. The intermediary step where people are inspired to agency is based on the research that they do. If students are compelled to act, research is a main factor in compelling them to do so. Even if students are not compelled to take direct action, research still changes opinions and attitudes.

Research often compels students to take action in the social arena. Debate topics guide students in a direction that allows them to explore what is going on in the world. Last year the college policy debate topic was, Resolved: That the United States Federal Government should adopt a policy of constructive engagement, including the immediate removal of all or nearly all economic sanctions, with the government(s) of one or more of the following nation-states: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Syria, North Korea.

This topic spurred quite a bit of activism on the college debate circuit. Many students become actively involved in protesting for the removal of sanctions from at least one of the topic countries. The college listserve was used to rally people in support of various movements to remove sanctions on both Iraq and Cuba. These messages were posted after the research on the topic began. While this topic did not lend itself to activism beyond rallying the government, other topics have allowed students to take their beliefs outside of the laboratory and into action.

## (--) Research can reinforce and/or alter opinions

**Dybvig & Iverson ’00 [**[**http://debate.uvm.edu/dybvigiverson1000.html**](http://debate.uvm.edu/dybvigiverson1000.html) **last updated 11/25/2000, Kristin Chisholm Dybvig, Arizona State University, Joel O. Iverson, Arizona State University]**

In addition to creating awareness, the research process can also reinforce or alter opinions. By discovering new information in the research process, people can question their current assumptions and perhaps formulate a more informed opinion. One example comes from a summer debate class for children of Migrant workers in North Dakota (Iverson, 1999). The Junior High aged students chose to debate the adoption of Spanish as an official language in the U.S. Many students expressed their concern that they could not argue effectively against the proposed change because it was a "truism." They were wholly in favor of Spanish as an official language. After researching the topic throughout their six week course, many realized much more was involved in adopting an official language and that they did not "speak 'pure' Spanish or English, but speak a unique dialect and hybrid" (Iverson, p. 3). At the end of the class many students became opposed to adopting Spanish as an official language, but found other ways Spanish should be integrated into American culture. Without research, these students would have maintained their opinions and not enhanced their knowledge of the issue. The students who maintained support of Spanish as an official language were better informed and thus also more capable of articulating support for their beliefs.

# Evidence Good

## (--) Research is one of the most important skills that debate teaches:

MITCHELL & SUZUKI, 2004 (BEYOND THE DAILY ME: ARGUMENTATION IN AN AGE OF ENCLAVE DELIBERATION; Paper presented at the Second Tokyo Conference on Argumentation; AUGUST 2-5, 2004, http://www.pitt.edu/~gordonm/JPubs/MitchellSuzuki3.rtf)

Research. One of the most important skills in debate involves the ability to discover and produce evidence to support claims. In intercollegiate debate tournament competition, recent, credible, lucid evidence wins rounds. Advances in portable online research technology have accented the power of research in tournament competition as ‘mega-programs’ such as Northwestern and Emory build research combines to churn out evidence updates hourly at major competitions such as the National Debate Tournament. One notable principle regarding research in the tournament context is that evidence must be published prior to the contest round in order to be admissible into debates. Many of the same powerful research skills that produce competitive victories in intercollegiate contest rounds can be used to enter mosaics of proof into the record during public debates. During a 1999 public debate in Pennsylvania, a panel of student debaters asked a question to State Secretary of Education Eugene Hickok, showing that the secretary’s math didn’t add up in official projections of the coverage provided by his school voucher plan (see Suzuki, 2001). Since many members of the media were present, the students were, in effect, publishing new information on the school vouchers issue.

## (--) Evidence essential to critical thinking:

Freeley, 1996 (Austin, John Carroll University; *Argumentation and Debate*; pg. 107)

*Evidence* is the raw material of argumentation. It consists of facts, opinions, and objects that are used to generate proof. The advocate brings together the raw materials and, by the process of reasoning, produces new conclusions. We cannot undertake critical thinking without a sound basis of evidence. The use of evidence is not limited to debates—although debates give us an excellent means of learning about evidence. Even in unstructured disputes in informal settings we must necessarily seek out evidence. Who won the first Heisman trophy? Just what does your warranty cover? I can’t believe the campus paper said that! Those and countless other matters are best settled by referring to the appropriate evidence.

## (--) Understanding evidence is critical to evaluating arguments and constructing good reasons for justifying decisions:

Freeley, 1996 (Austin, John Carroll University; Argumentation and Debate; pg. 107-108)

By understanding evidence and its interrelation with communication, we will be in a better position to evaluate arguments presented for our decision or to construct good reasons to serve as justification for the decisions we desire to secure from others.

## Appealing to authority often necessary to resolve complex issues:

Freeley, 1996 (Austin, John Carroll University; *Argumentation and Debate*; pg. 116-117)

“Argument from authority” is a phrase sometimes used to indicate that expert opinion is presented to establish a contention in an argument. Expert opinion should be used only when a matter at issue cannot be established readily by other evidence. Intercollegiate debaters and others who cannot establish themselves as experts often find it advantageous to introduced the opinions of experts to sustain certain contentions. In debates on the “compulsory wage and price controls” proposition, some negative speakers contended that controls merely intensified inflationary pressures, whereas affirmative speakers maintained they were the solution to inflation. The judges in these debates had little basis for accepting the opinion of one college student in preference to that of another. Consequently, the debaters found it necessary to introduce as evidence the opinion of experts who commanded the respect of the judges.

## Evidence needed to determine the preponderance of opinion on a subject:

Freeley, 1996 (Austin, John Carroll University; *Argumentation and Debate*; pg. 117)

In any matter likely to be the subject of a debate, there will probably be expert opinion on both sides. Economists will differ on the merits of a certain tax policy; physicians will differ on the merits of a certain drug; lawyers will differ in their opinion about whether or not a certain merger violates the antitrust laws; advertising people will differ on the merits of a certain advertising campaign. An important problem in both applied and academic debates is that of establishing a preponderance of expert opinion—not by simply marshaling *more* experts than the opposition but by using testimony from *better qualified* experts whose opinions may be related directly to the matter at hand.

# Evidence Good

## Learning about “tests of evidence” critical in arenas outside the debate realm:

Freeley, 1996 (Austin, John Carroll University; *Argumentation and Debate*; pg. 126)

In constructing their cases, advocates will discover a great deal of evidence. Before they use any of it, they should apply the tests of evidence, rejecting weak and inconclusive evidence and retaining only what stands up under examination. By applying the tests of evidence, they may also anticipate probable refutation of their opponents and prepare to meet it. The tests of evidence should also be applied to problems outside the debate situation. The political leader must weigh intelligence reports, the executive must evaluate reports of market trends, the college student must appraise studies of employment opportunities in various fields. Throughout life, we all have to formulate propositions, gather evidence of those propositions, and evaluate that evidence as a part of the process of making decisions. Intelligent self-interest and our sense of responsibility to those affected by our decisions require that we apply the tests of evidence with care.

## Failure to learn to refute evidence actually enhances the value of faulty evidence:

Freeley, 1996 (Austin, John Carroll University; *Argumentation and Debate*; pg. 126)

While preparing their own cases, advocates must also look for evidence that opponents will find useful, apply the appropriate tests to it, and plan refutation. As a debate develops, advocates will discover the evidence actually used by opponents and be prepared to test and refute it, if possible, during the debate. Note that the responsibility for applying the tests of evidence and for refuting evidence rests on the party whose case is damaged by the evidence. If our case is adversely affected by certain evidence used by our opponents and we do not refute it, we may find that the decision renderers will accept even weak evidence at face value. The absence of refutation may actually enhance the value of the adverse evidence.

## Applying tests of evidence serves as a training ground for evaluating faulty claims in everyday life:

Freeley, 1996 (Austin, John Carroll University; *Argumentation and Debate*; pg. 126-127)

Although we may only participate in a few debates over a lifetime, we constantly have to make decisions. As citizens, as consumers, and simply as social beings, we are confronted with evidence that we have to evaluate on almost a daily basis. If we do not properly evaluate the evidence of a political candidate’s qualifications, we may share the responsibility for a poor government; if we do not evaluate the merits of a product, we may be inconvenienced or lose money. In fact, any time we fail to apply the tests of evidence, we run the risks inherent in an unwise decision. The rewards of applying these tests are correspondingly great. As we apply them, we increase our opportunities for making sound decisions and gaining all the benefits that come with wise decisions.

## A claim is only as strong as the supporting evidence:

Knapp, 1999 (*Parliamentary Debate: A Guide to Public Argument*; pg. 86)

A claim is only as strong as the evidence that supports it; without evidence, a claim is merely an assertion. Therefore, attacking evidence is a key way to begin refuting a case.

## We all have an ethical responsibility to be aware of the absence or misuse of evidence:

Warnick & Inch, 1989 (*Critical Thinking and Communication*; pg. 66).

Not only do we need to be aware of the absence or misuse of evidence in arguments we hear or read, we also should be mindful of the need to use evidence in arguments we make. In situations in which an arguer is unknown to an audience or does not have an established reputation, evidence is particularly vital in establishing the credibility of the claims and arguments made by the arguer. Researchers who have studied the effect of evidence on the persuasiveness of arguments have found that speakers unknown to or only moderately respected by an audience will be more successful if they use evidence to support their claims. As recipients, critics, and producers of arguments it is important to be aware of the vital role played by evidence.

# \*\*\*\*\*Feminist K Frontline\*\*\*\*\*

## (--) Turn: Essentialist feminism reinforces gender stereotypes through valorization of women’s differences, preventing efforts to end oppression, killing the transformative power of their critique, and harming ourselves and those listening.

Young 1990 (Iris, Professor of Public and International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh. THROWING LIKE A GIRL ANDOTHER ESSAYS IN FEMINIST PHILOSOPHYAND SOCIAL THEORY, pg. 89-90)

Within the context of antifeminist backlash, the effect of gynocentric feminism may be accommodating to the existing structure. Gynocentric feminism relies on and reinforces gender stereotypes at just the time when the dominant culture has put new emphasis on marks of gender difference. It does so, moreover, by relying on many of those aspects of women's traditional sphere that traditional patriarchal ideology has most exploited and that humanist feminists such as Beauvoir found most oppressive--reproductive biology, motherhood, s domestic concerns. Even though its intentions are subversive, such renewed attention to traditional femininity can have a reactionary effect on both ourselves and our listeners because it may echo the dominant claim that women belong in a separate sphere. Humanist feminism calls upon patriarchal society to open places for women within those spheres of human activity that have been considered the most creative, powerful, and prestigious. Gynocentric feminism replies that wanting such things for women implies a recognition that such activities are the most humanly valuable. It argues that in fact, militarism, bureaucratic hierarchy, competition for recognition, and the instrumentalization of nature and people entailed by these activities are basic disvalues.24 Yet in contemporary society, men still have most institutionalized power, and gynocentric feminism shows why they do not use it well. If feminism turns its back on the centers of power, privilege, and individual achievement that men have monopolized, those men will continue to monopolize them, and nothing significant will change.

## (--) Perm: Do the plan and all non-mutually exclusive parts of the alternative.

## Acting through the state is key to ending oppressive masculine forces. Non-state actions fail

Young 1990 (Iris, Professor of Public and International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh. THROWING LIKE A GIRL ANDOTHER ESSAYS IN FEMINIST PHILOSOPHYAND SOCIAL THEORY, pg. 89-90)

Feminists cannot undermine masculinist values without entering some of the centers of power that foster them, but the attainment of such power itself requires at least appearing to foster those values. Still, without being willing to risk such co-optation, feminism can be only a moral position of critique rather than a force for institutional change. Despite its intention, I fear that gynocentric feminism may have the same consequence as the stance of moral motherhood that grew out of nineteenth century feminism a resegregation of women to a specifically women's sphere, outside the sites of power, privilege, and recognition. For me the symptom here is what the dominant culture finds more threatening. Within the dominant culture a middle-aged assertive woman's claim to coanchor the news alongside a man appears considerably more threatening than women's claim to have a different voice that exposes masculinist values as body-denying and selfish. The claim of women to have a right to the positions and benefits that have hitherto been reserved for men, and that male dominated institutions should serve women's needs, is a direct threat to male privilege. While the claim that these positions of power themselves should be eliminated and the institutions eliminated or restructured is indeed more radical, when asserted from the gynocentric feminist position it can be an objective retreat. Gynocentrism’s focus on values and language as the primary target of its critique contributes to this blunting of its political force. Without doubt, social change requires changing the subject, which in turn means developing new ways of speaking, writing, and imagining. Equally indubitable is the gynocentric feminist claim that masculinist values in Western culture deny the body, sensuality, and rootedness in nature and that such denial nurtures fascism, pollution, and nuclear games. Given these facts, however, what shall we do? To this gynocentrism has little concrete answer. Because its criticism of existing society is so global and abstract, gynocentric critique of values, language, and culture of masculinism can remove feminist theory from analysis of specific institutions and practices, and how they might be concretely structurally changed in directions more consonant with our visions.

## (--) Feminist theories pointing to female superiority or male inferiority reify gender differences

Gergen 1993 (Kenneth, Prof. of Psychology at Swarthmore College, “The limits of Psychological Critque” as included in Recent Trends in Theoretical Psychology, Volume III. Accessed in Google Books)

As many have pointed out, arguments against male dominance simultaneously reify a distinction between men and women; they operate to essentialize gender as a factual difference. Similarly, as various criticisms are couched in the language of racial conflict, the concept of essential differences between races is sustained; to speak against upper-class domination is to engender the reality of class differences. Once reality has been struck in terms of the binary, the contours of the world are fixed.

# Feminism K Answers: War Turns Women’s Rights

(--) War destroys women’s rights

Marshall, 2004 **founder of the feminist peace network, 04**

(Lucinda Marshall Founder of the Feminist Peace Network, Feminist Writer and Activist, 12-18-04

“Unacceptable: The Impact of War on Women and Children” http://www.commondreams.org/views04/1219-26.htm)

Women and children account for almost 80% of the casualties of conflict and war as well as 80% of the 40 million people in world who are now refugees from their homes. It is one of the unspoken facts of militarism that women often become the spoils of war, their deaths are considered collateral damage and their bodies are frequently used as battlegrounds and as commodities that can be traded.

"Women and girls are not just killed, they are raped, sexually attacked, mutilated and humiliated. Custom, culture and religion have built an image of women as bearing the 'honour' of their communities. Disparaging a woman's sexuality and destroying her physical integrity have become a means by which to terrorize, demean and 'defeat' entire communities, as well as to punish, intimidate and humiliate women," according to Irene Khan of Amnesty International.

Sexual violence as a tool of war has left hundreds of thousands of women raped, brutalized, impregnated and infected with HIV/AIDS. And hundreds of thousands of women are trafficked annually for forced labor and sexual slavery. Much of this trafficking is to service western troops in brothels near military bases. Even women serving in the military are subjected to sexual violence. U.S. servicewomen have reported hundreds of assaults in military academies and while serving on active duty. The perpetrators of these assaults have rarely been prosecuted or punished.

The impact of war on children is also profound. In the last decade, two million of our children have been killed in wars and conflicts. 4.5 million children have been disabled and 12 million have been left homeless. Today there are 300,000 child soldiers, including many girls who are forced to 'service' the troops.

(--) War restricts women’s freedom and suppresses their basic human rights

Abeyesekera, 2003 director of a humans rights organization, 03

(Sunila Abeyesekera, director of Inform, a Sri Lankan human rights organization 02-03

http://www.awid.org/eng/Issues-and-Analysis/Library/A-Women-s-Human-Rights-Perspective-on-War-and-Conflict)

At the same time, wars and conflicts have led to a host of negative consequences for unarmed women civilians and dependent family members, children, the old and the infirm. Figures worldwide point to the fact that the majority of refugees and internally displaced persons are female. The erosion of democratic space that often accompanies conflict and war also propel women into a more active role in political and social life. In moments when men and male-dominated traditional political and social formations, such as political parties and trade unions, are reluctant or unable to come forward in defense of human rights and democratic principles, groups of women have had the courage to stand up to the armed might of both state and non-state actors. War and conflict also push women into decision-making positions in their families and communities, in particular in the role of head of household.

Most conflicts and wars emerge out of processes of identity formation in which competing identity groups and communities resort to violence to affirm their equal status in society. Given this dynamic, conflict and war situations result in the heightening of all forms of conservatism and extremism including religious fundamentalism, ultra-nationalism and ethnic and linguistic chauvinism. The hardening of identity-based roles ascribed to men and women within the community that happen as a part of this process often has disastrous consequences for women. It restricts their mobility and freedom, imposes dress codes, confines them to the domestic sphere, brings them under the rigid control of male members of the family and the community and, most critically, places them in the role of 'bearers of the community's honour' and traditions. Thus, the rape and violation of the women of the 'enemy' community becomes a critical military strategy in all identity-based wars and conflict.

# Feminist K Frontline

## (--) The negative’s associations of women with peace are wrong and cause further subordination of women

Tickner 1992 (J. Ann, Associate professor of political science at the College of the Holy Cross. GENDER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 59)

Such a notion of citizenship cannot come about, however, until myths that perpetuate views of women as victims rather than agents are eliminated. One such myth is the association of women with peace, an association that has been invalidated through considerable evidence of women's support for men's wars in many societies. 79 In spite of a gender gap, a plurality of women rally support war and national security policies; Bernice Carroll suggests that the association of women and peace is that has been imposed on women by their disarmed condition. In the West, this association grew out of the Victorian ideology of women's moral superiority and the glorification of motherhood. This ideal was expressed by feminist Charlotte Perkins Gilman whose book Herland was serialized in The Forerunner in 1915. Gilman glorified women as caring and nurturing mothers whose private sphere skills could benefit the world at large.81 Most turn-of-the-century feminists shared Gilman's ideas. But if the implication of this view was that women were disqualified from participating in the corrupt world of political and economic power by virtue of their moral superiority, the result could be the perpetuation of male dominance. Many contemporary feminists see dangers in the continuation of these essentializing myths that can only result in the perpetuation men's subordination and reinforce dualisms that serve to make men more powerful. The association of femininity with peace lends support to an idealized masculinity that depends on constructing women as passive victims in need protection. It also contributes to the claim that women are naive in matters relating to international politics. An enriched, less militarized notion of citizenship cannot be built on such a weak foundation.

## (--) Alternative doesn’t solve: Using the state is key to the feminist movement. A lack of political engagement will collapse the movement.

Epstein 2001 (Barbara, Professor of History of Consciousness at UC Santa Cruz. MONTHLY REVIEW, Accessed online from monthlyreview.org)

The anarchist sensibility has made important contributions to the radical tradition in U.S. history. It has brought an insistence on equality and democracy, a resistance to compromise of principle for the sake of political expediency. Anarchism has been associated with efforts to put the values of the movement into practice and to create communities governed by these values. Anarchism has also been associated with political theater and art, with creativity as an element of political practice. It has insisted that radical politics need not be dreary. But the anarchist mindset also has its doctrinaire side, a tendency to insist on principle to the point of disregarding the context or likely results of political action. In this regard the anarchist sensibility has something in common with the outlook of Christian radicals who believe in acting on their consciences and leaving the consequences to God. The moral absolutism of the anarchist approach to politics is difficult to sustain in the context of a social movement. Absolute internal equality is hard to sustain. Movements need leaders. Anti-leadership ideology cannot eliminate leaders, but it can lead a movement to deny that it has leaders, thus undermining democratic constraints on those who assume the roles of leadership, and also preventing the formation of vehicles for recruiting new leaders when the existing ones become too tired to continue. Within radical feminism a view of all hierarchies as oppressive led to attacks on those who took on the responsibilities of leadership. This led to considerable internal conflict, and created a reluctance to take on leadership roles, which weakened the movement. Movements dominated by an anarchist mindset are prone to burning out early.

# \*\*\*\*\*“Foreign” CP 1NC\*\*\*\*\*

## A) The language we use in crafting legislation matters—the affirmative's designation of others as "foreign" cultivates a relationship towards otherness premised on fear and hatred.

Cheryl Lynn Wofford **Hill, 2002** Reverand, Lawyer, Chair of the YLD Religion and the Law Committee, ("Restating International Jurisprudence in Inclusive Terms: Language as Method in Creating a Hospitable Worldview," 27 Oklahoma City University Law Review 297)

The terms "neighbor" and "foreigner" communicate different concepts. "Neighbor" communicates a dichotomy of other as opposed to self. In other words, this term creates the sense that a neighbor is one not in the same household or group as the speaker. The neighbor tends to be a welcomed insider in contrast to outsiders named with terms like "alien" or "foreigner." Although clearly a member of a different group, "neighbor" signals insider status because of linguistic connotations. On the other hand, the terms "foreign," "**foreigner**," or "alien" **communicate otherness with stranger and outsider status**. The phrase "neighboring nation" describes a less threatening concept than the phrase "foreign country." **People have been culturally conditioned to fear unknown people residing outside familiar territorial boundaries**. William Polk explains why he believes that fear of strangers is innate: **Getting along with foreigners** note , as the media constantly remind us, **is the most dangerous problem of our age**. . . . [\*339] **Fear of the foreigner note arises not just from a reading of his pronouncements or an analysis of his politics**. It is not just conceptual or intellectual; **it is visceral and inbred**. Polk explains that the term "**foreigner" is a word that has been equated with the term "enemy**" in ancient, medieval, and modern societies. n142 Polk suggests that fears of unknown neighbors "are a mixture of rational and irrational impulses so pervasive and deep-seated as to transcend individual experience or even historical memory." n143 This fear, Polk asserts, is "directed not just toward identified enemies but toward all aliens note." n144 Polk argues that since unknown neighbors cannot be eliminated, n145 relationships with strangers should be improved. **Many people use the term "foreign" without realizing its negative connotations. Developing an awareness of the negative impact of the term "foreign" to describe world neighbors will help to inspire more people to evaluate the effectiveness of language in international relationships**. Christine Chinkin recognizes that **the building of strategies for the development of greater world peace has not been given enough attention in international discourse**. n146 **One method of achieving greater peace among nations is through recognizing the advantage in naming others with words that communicate a sense of community rather than a sense of hostility**. Words like "neighbors" and "friends" have more positive and peaceful connotations than words like "enemies, " "foreigners," "aliens," and "foes." William Polk expresses a desire to help "broaden the concept of foreign note affairs." n147 Since the word "foreign" has a historical use with roots in the United States Constitution n148 and with its use pervasive in the language of law, even Polk, who recognizes the importance of getting along [\*340] with neighbors, n149 uses the historical and masculine phrase "foreign affairs." This phrase, however, is composed of two words that have negative connotations; "foreign" can carry a connotation of the dangerous other, and "affair" can carry a connotation of inappropriate sexual relationships with an identified or secret other.

# “Foreign” CP 1NC

## B) Policy makers have an obligation to rename statutes containing inhospitable language—only the counterplan can stop the cycle of enemy creation and cultivate a relationship of openness and respect towards Otherness.

Cheryl Lynn Wofford **Hill, 2002** Reverand, Lawyer, Chair of the YLD Religion and the Law Committee, ("Restating International Jurisprudence in Inclusive Terms: Language as Method in Creating a Hospitable Worldview," 27 Oklahoma City University Law Review 297)

First, the strategy for word-coining begins with language in the place where lawyers' minds are shaped and trained: the law school. **In choosing words for conversation, students have the opportunity to shape language patterns in the classroom.** For example, when United States Constitutional Law classes are exploring the functions of the executive branch, a student with a hospitable worldview refers to "international policy" rather than to "foreign affairs" in classroom discussion. "Foreign Coin" is "national currency other than U.S. currency," or "the currency of other nations." In Immigration Law classes, "resident aliens" become "legal permanent residents," and "illegal aliens" are "undocumented visitors." University organizations that were once called "Foreign Student Associations" are now usually called "International Student Organizations**." Students have the opportunity to introduce new phrases and expressions to professors and classmates and to communicate injury resulting from inhospitable terms**. Law school professors have an opportunity to participate in hospitable word-coining within classroom conversation and discourse. Professors have [\*344] power to shape language patterns when preparing lectures and in preparing textbooks for study in the law school classroom. Hospitable phrases such as "international" rather than "foreign" will often keep the syntax and meaning of the original phrase undisturbed. On other occasions, "international" refers to a collection of nations, while "foreign" refers to a particular nation. When "international" will not suffice as a substitute**, one solution is to name the country in place of the term "foreign"**: "French currency" or "Russian ruble" rather than "foreign coin," for example. In the Legal Research and Writing classroom, The Bluebook, n159 a style manual for lawyers, shapes language styles. In a hospitable worldview, Bluebook Rule 19's title, "Foreign Materials" becomes "Materials in Languages Other than English." n160 Rule 19.4(a)'s title, "Foreign Constitutions in English" becomes "Constitutions in English." **The deletion of "Foreign" in no way affects the understanding of the rule**, since Rule 11 requires U.S. federal and state constitutions to be cited by country or state. n161 A person with a hospitable worldview would refer to Table 2, currently called "Foreign Jurisdictions" n162 as "Jurisdictions Beyond the United States." Second, legal scholars are encouraged to use hospitable terminology in legal writing**. In a hospitable worldview, exact terminology is appropriate to use when quoting titles and the language of other scholars which include exclusive terms such as "foreign**." However, in rephrasing ideas, authors with hospitable worldviews will notice concepts that have traditionally been expressed in exclusive terms. n163 Legal scholars with a hospitable worldview will craft hospitable phrases and will carefully avoid the use of normative pronouns and assumed nouns. Third, nationally recognized legal organizations have power to transform international relationships. Members of the American Bar [\*345] Association, the American Law Institute, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, and other agencies are encouraged to become aware of exclusive language and draft future revisions of model codes, restatements, and other legal standards with more hospitable phrases. Fourth, individuals within law-making and adjudicatory positions have power to introduce hospitable language styles. Legislators are encouraged to rename acts of Congress that contain exclusive language. Attention to statutory language will result in the revision of statutes where this is possible. New statutes will be constructed with hospitable language. Judges can help to construct a hospitable world by using inclusive language in judicial opinions. Finally, governmental agencies and international organizations can amend language to reflect hospitality toward world neighbors. Referring to a community of nations will foster greater cooperation. "Foreign policy" can easily become "international policy." **This strategic model is designed to create a vision for a world where a hospitable worldview leads to more peaceful relationships among nations**. This strategic model was designed through the use of feminist method. This model is an application of Robin West's challenge to visualize a different kind of world using feminist methods. "Feminism must envision a post[]patriarchal world, for without such a vision we [?] have little direction. We [?] must use that vision to construct and present our [?] present goals, and we [?] should, I believe, interpret our [?] present victories against a backdrop of that vision." Since exclusive terms are so pervasive in the language of international jurisprudence, no single word can begin to replace the many ways that inhospitable terms have been used in traditional language. **Awareness of alternative vocabulary assists in the creation of a more hospitable world in which people around the globe may be referred to with respect**. Bias is inherent in the human experience. People understand the world due to a complex series of relationships and positions within society. [\*346] Biases, like neighbors, will not go away. n166 Language patterns that recognize this reality will enable people to live more peacefully with both their own biases and with their neighbors**. International communication developed from a hospitable worldview that expects peaceful relationships among persons and nations will help to strengthen global security**. Language influences international relationships. **Awareness that exclusive terms stress the normative, insider, dominant nature of one's government and the non-normative, outsider, subordinate nature of all other governments will cause those who shape international jurisprudence to develop more hospitable terms. Restating international jurisprudence in hospitable terms will influence the emergence of international relationships reflecting greater respect for all peoples and nation states.**

# Foreign PIC--AT – Perm

## The CP alone is the better option—the term "foreign" recreates inside/outside binaries, despite their authors' claims to neutrality---use the ballot to enhance hospitable terminology.

Cheryl Lynn Wofford **Hill, 2002** Reverand, Lawyer, Chair of the YLD Religion and the Law Committee, ("Restating International Jurisprudence in Inclusive Terms: Language as Method in Creating a Hospitable Worldview," 27 Oklahoma City University Law Review 297)

Feminist perspectives and methods can enhance word-coining of hospitable terminology in international communication. Christopher C. Joyner and George E. Little have applied feminist methodologies to international environmental law. Joyner and Little suggest that "although the feminist perspective of international jurisprudence has existed for only a short while, it has already carved out a large imprint on international debate" and that "other issue-areas of international law merit similar scholarly attention." The word-coining of new terms proposed here concerns the revision of terms that create insider and outsider groups. These groups are often unintentionally created through implicit inference or through explicit terms. Terms like "foreign," "foreigner," and "alien" create the implicit insider status of the speaker or author while creating an outsider status for the antecedent group. Insider groups may not be aware of the effect of such language, but outsider groups often experience this language as creating an environment that is **more hostile than hospitable**. Particular fields of legal study offer distinct possibilities for creating a hospitable worldview in international communications. International relationships will improve when international legal scholars build a strategy for reconstructing language to reflect hospitality in referring to people, entities, and property beyond national frontiers. In an effort to inspire the needed reconstruction, a model strategic plan follows.

# \*\*\*\*\* “Founding Fathers” K\*\*\*\*\*

## Using phrases like the founding fathers feeds into metaphors that are used to justify interventionist wars

**Malley-Morrison 2011** (Katie, EdD, Professor of Psychology at Boston University; “Values and rhetoric: Lakovian framing, metaphors and stories” March 3. <http://engagingpeace.com/?p=2319>)

George Lakoff, like Albert Bandura, analyzes the ways that people frame deadly behaviors to give them the trappings of morality. On August 26, 2010, our blog introduced Lakoff’s work; today we continue that exploration. According to Lakoff, both liberals and conservatives use linguistic techniques, such as metaphors, storytelling, and framing, to justify political views. For example, people often conceptualize nations as persons or even families, referring to their “founding fathers” or their “homeland,” or equating Iraq with Saddam Hussein. This nation-as-person metaphor presumes that there are : “Adult nations” (those that are “mature” and industrialized) “Nation-children,” which are industrializing and have moral standards but may need guidance, and Backward nations, which are underdeveloped, in need of morals, and must be taught a lesson. Many people justify invasions of other countries through what Lakoff labels the self-defense and rescue stories, each of which involves a blameless victim country, an inherently evil villain country, and a hero country: In the self-defense story, the villain nation commits a crime against the victim nation, and the victim fights the villain off, thus becoming a hero. In the rescue story, the villain threatens or attacks the victim, and the hero comes in and defeats the villain, thereby saving the victim. Other people justify invading another country by using fear-instilling stock phrases such as “terrorist” or euphemisms designed to make inhumane actions seem sterile or even desirable—e.g., calling invasion a “military operation” as though it were something clean and sterile.

# \*\*\*\*\*“Fuck” Kritik\*\*\*\*\*

## (--) “Fuck” is a term used to exhibit patriarchial control over women—it is used to dominate and control women viewed as too emotional by society:

Allan G. **Johnson**, The Gender Knot, 20**05** accessed at: (<http://books.google.com/books?id=3nnxlqbN->IEC&pg=PA194&lpg=PA194&dq=%22fuck%22+%22patriarchal%22&source=web&ots=EhfXrw7QS2&sig=S1\_2JUr7Gc2R7ErnRitmDe6HQU0&hl=en&sa=X&oi=book\_result&resnum=4&ct=result#PPR7,M1)

In other words, the Wild Man represents what is most difficult for humans to control, which from a patriarchal perspective looks more female than male. The most uncontrollable force in human life is nature, which patriarchal culture routinely characterizes as female. Women are regarded as irrational beings ruled by emotion, intuition, and the rhythms, needs, and desires of the body. In patriarchal culture, truly dangerous wildness is female, for it is female wildness that threatens male privilege. This is why so much energy is expended trying to control girls and women. It is why sexually active girls are more likely to be institutionalized as incorrigible than are sexually active boys. It’s why openly sexual women are often regarded by men as “asking for” men to assert control by raping them. It’s why the Wild Woman is so often portrayed as a nymphomaniac whose “wildness” isn’t true wildness at all, but a compulsion that winds up primarily serving men’s sexual fantasies. It’s why “a good fuck” is the standard patriarchal “cure” for women whose “condition” is the wildness of female autonomy and power and a hairy, carnal juiciness that defies male control.

## (--) PATRIARCHY Threatens all life on earth

Betty **Reardon,** Director, Peace Education Program, Columbia, WOMEN AND PEACE, 19**93**, pp. 30-1.

A clearly visible element in the escalating tensions among militarized nations is the macho posturing and the patriarchal ideal of dominance, not parity, which motivates defense ministers and government leaders to “strut their stuff” as we watch with increasing horror. Most men in our patriarchal culture are still acting out old patterns that are radically inappropriate for the nuclear age. To prove dominance and control, to distance one’s character from that of women, to survive the toughest violent initiation, to shed the sacred blood of the hero, to collaborate with death in order to hold it at bay all of these patriarchal pressures on men have traditionally reached resolution in ritual fashion on the battlefield. But there is no longer any battlefield. Does anyone seriously believe that if a nuclear power were losing a crucial, large-scale conventional war it would refrain from using its multiple-warhead nuclear missiles because of some diplomatic agreement? The military theater of a nuclear exchange today would extend, instantly or eventually, to all living things, all the air, all the soil, all the water. If we believe that war is a “necessary evil,” that patriarchal assumptions are simply “human nature,” then we are locked into a lie, paralyzed. The ultimate result of unchecked terminal patriarchy will be nuclear holocaust.

# \*\*\*\*\*Gendered Language K Shell\*\*\*\*\*

## A) Gendered language entrenches micro-political patriarchy:

Jeffrey **Stringer and** Robert **Hopper, 1998** (Quarterly Journal of Speech, pg. 209, accessed via Ebsco)

In the past, secondary school English instructors have often advised their students to use the generic he, a gendered third-person pronoun, to refer to a person of unspecified sex. These teachers emphasized written English. Many observers now argue that generic he unduly emphasizes male humans, **contributing to the micro-politics of patriarchy.** These arguments have continued to emphasize written or hypothetical examples—though writers (and readers) may have presumed that generic he also occurs in conversational interaction.

## B) This outweighs the case: we must critically examine discriminatory discourse in debate before anything else:

REBECCA S. **BJORK, 1992** (former director of debate at the University of Utah, http://groups.wfu.edu/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/Oudingetal1992Pollution.htm)

While reflecting on my experiences as a woman in academic debate in preparation for this essay, I realized that I have been involved in debate for more than half of my life. I debated for four years in high school, for four years in college, and I have been coaching intercollegiate debate for nine years. Not surprisingly, much of my identity as an individual has been shaped by these experiences in debate. I am a person who strongly believes that debate empowers people to be committed and involved individuals in the communities in which they live. I am a person who thrives on the intellectual stimulation involved in teaching and traveling with the brightest students on my campus. I am a person who looks forward to the opportunities for active engagement of ideas with debaters and coaches from around the country. I am also, however, a college professor, a "feminist," and a peace activist who is increasingly frustrated and disturbed by some of the practices I see being perpetuated and rewarded in academic debate. I find that I can no longer separate my involvement in debate from the rest of who I am as an individual. Northwestern I remember listening to a lecture a few years ago given by Tom Goodnight at the University summer debate camp. Goodnight lamented what he saw as the debate community's participation in, and unthinking perpetuation of what he termed the "death culture." He argued that the embracing of "big impact" arguments--nuclear war, environmental destruction, genocide, famine, and the like-by debaters and coaches signals a morbid and detached fascination with such events, one that views these real human tragedies as part of a "game" in which so-called "objective and neutral" advocates actively seek to find in their research the "impact to outweigh all other impacts"--the round-winning argument that will carry them to their goal of winning tournament X, Y, or Z. He concluded that our "use" of such events in this way is tantamount to a celebration of them; our detached, rational discussions reinforce a detached, rational viewpoint, when emotional and moral outrage may be a more appropriate response. In the last few years, my academic research has led me to be persuaded by Goodnight's unspoken assumption; language is not merely some transparent tool used to transmit information, **but rather is an incredibly powerful medium**, the use of which **inevitably has real political and material consequences.** Given this assumption, I believe that it is important for us to **examine the "discourse of debate practice:"** that is, the language, discourses, and meanings that we, as a community of debaters and coaches, **unthinkingly employ in academic debate**. If it is the case that the **language we use has real implications for how we view the world**, how we view others, and how we act in the world, then it is imperative that we critically examine our own discourse practices with an eye to how our language does violence to others. I am shocked and surprised when I hear myself saying things like, "we killed them," or "take no prisoners," or "let's blow them out of the water." I am tired of the "ideal" debater being defined as one who has mastered the art of verbal assault to the point where accusing opponents of lying, cheating, or being deliberately misleading is a sign of strength. But what I am most tired of is how women debaters are marginalized and rendered voiceless in such a discourse community. Women who verbally assault their opponents are labeled "bitches" because it is not socially acceptable for women to be verbally aggressive. Women who get angry and storm out of a room when a disappointing decision is rendered are labeled "hysterical" because, as we all know, women are more emotional then men. I am tired of hearing comments like, "those 'girls' from school X aren't really interested in debate; they just want to meet men." We can all point to examples (although only a few) of women who have succeeded at the top levels of debate. But I find myself wondering how many more women gave up because they were tired of negotiating the mine field of discrimination, sexual harassment, and isolation they found in the debate community. As members of this community, however, we have great freedom to define it in whatever ways we see fit. After all, what is debate except a collection of shared understandings and explicit or implicit rules for interaction? What I am calling for is **a critical examination** of how we, as individual members of this community, characterize our activity, ourselves, and our interactions with others through language. We must become aware of the ways in which our mostly hidden and unspoken assumptions about what "good" debate is function **to exclude not only women**, but ethnic minorities from the amazing intellectual opportunities that training in debate provides. Our nation and indeed, our planet, faces incredibly difficult challenges in the years ahead. I believe that it is not acceptable anymore for us to go along as we always have, assuming that things will straighten themselves out. If the rioting in Los Angeles taught us anything, it is that complacency breeds resentment and frustration. We may not be able to change the world, **but we can change our own community**, and if we fail to do so, we give up the only real power that we have.

\*\*\*\*\*Genealogies NEG: Anti-Politics Links\*\*\*\*\*

Genealogies trade off with solutions, we continually problematize and don't take action to solve problems:

C. Colwell, **1997** Visiting Assistant Professor at Villanova University. He researches and publishes in contemporary French philosophy and philosophy of the bio-sciences with an emphasis on issues of identity formation, 1997 (THEORY & EVENT, v. 1, p. <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v001/1.2colwell.html>)

What genealogy does then, the difference it makes, is that it returns to the virtual structure of the event by problematizing it, by re-actualizing it in such a way as to preclude a singular and specific solution. What marks genealogy, particularly the genealogies of Nietzsche and Foucault, is its inability to provide solutions. Neither of the two had anything to say to their readers who asked when they finished their works -- "What then?" Foucault especially refused to provide programs for the reform or replacement of prisons, mental institutions or an ethics of sexuality. Each sought to problematize anew problems that had supposedly been solved, problems that were only presented as problems to students by teachers who already knew the answers, problems no longer conceived of as real problems

## A close focus on genealogy trades-off with solutions--we get trapped up in where something

## came from and not how it might be useful to solve problems:

Douglas Litowitz, 1997 (Postmodern Philosophy and Law, 84-85, accessed via Amazon Books)

This analysis points up a major problem with Foucault’s understanding of law, namely, that

he focuses too closely on the genealogy of modern law and therefore fails to appreciate the

way in which the modern legal system (especially constitutional law) has protected individuals

against coercion. Even if one grants Foucault’s genealogical point that the judicial system arose

as a way of exploiting the individual, this does not mean that it continues to have this function. In

the United States, for example, the First Amendment rights to a free press, privacy, and association are

intended to prevent the individual from being forced to think in a particular manner, to protect the individual

from domination and normalization. Furthermore, the Fifth Amendment “takings clause,” the Third Amendment

prohibition against quartering soldiers, and the Fourth Amendment right against search and seizure are all designed

to protect the individual against intrusions. It would seem that any plausible program of liberation must

incorporate these rights.

## Anti-politics link:  Genealogies continually problematize and avoid finding solutions to problems:

C.G. Prado, philosophy professor, Smith, STARTING WITH FOUCAULT, 1995, p. 152

This realization is the gist of our review in Chapter 6, that " [t]ruth is a thing this world." It holds that one must be prepared to consider problematic whatever presents itself as evident, manifest, or inescapable. What is so taken must be recognized as always being products of "multiple forms of constraint" and not mirrorings of reality. Genealogy, then, is essentially a readiness to continually problematize established truths through development of alternative accounts and critical analyses of targeted facts, concepts, principles, canons, natures, institutions, methodological truisms, and established practices.

# Genealogies Don’t Solve

Genealogy can't expose dominant truths--no value to it:  
  
C.G. Prado, Philosophy Professor, Smith, STARTING WITH FOUCAULT, 1995, p. 1205

Foucault employs "true" and "truth" in at least five distinct (though certainly overlapping), complementary, and interrelated ways. His relativist, constructivist, and perspectivist uses of truth depend primarily on whether his concern is with the defining practices of discourses, the role of power- relations, or the value placed on truth by the philosophical establishment. Foucault's use of the experiential notion of truth has more to do with the possibility of radical perspectival change and the mode of appropriation of some beliefs. As for the semi- objectivist notion, questions are bound to persist, but given that he is not offering an account of the nature of truth, Foucault has every right to avail himself of the commendatory force of "true" and "truth" and to put aside as unproblematic any number of truths with which he is not immediately concerned. More worrisome is Foucault's presentation of some genealogical claims as having the cogency of a-historical truths. Nor is this a problem limited to what Foucault actually says. Rorty fears that in the final analysis genealogy cannot claim to expose the deployed nature of dominant truths, such as those about penalty and sexuality, without implying that it reveals hidden realities and suppressed truths.

# ****\*\*\*\*\*“Her-Story” K (1-1)\*\*\*\*\*****

## We critique the terminology of HIS-tory…

1. **Tsehelska 2006** (Marina Tsehelska has been teaching English at Kryvyi Rih State Pedagogical University for ten years. During that time she completed a dissertation in Linguistics and became chair of the English Language and Methodology department; “Teaching Politically Correct Language” English Teaching Forum, Vol. 44 No. 1 <http://exchanges.state.gov/englishteaching/forum/archives/docs/06-44-1-e.pdf>)

Politically correct speech became a matter of hot debate in the 1980s, when many native speakers of English became sensitive to biased terms and phrases that exist in the language. In the previous decade, activists of the feminist movement made the first attempts to diminish differences between men and women in society. They criticized the existing language and culture as "male-dominated" and "patriarchal." The history of society, as the feminists argued, was written from the male point of view ("it's HIStory, not HERstory").

## B) In the context of women’s liberation, we advocate the use of the word herstory as it recognizes that women have been written out of regular history

**Wallechinsky and Wallace 1981** (David; and Irving; “Feminism Ideas and Sexism in Language Part 3” <http://www.trivia-library.com/a/feminism-ideas-and-sexism-in-language-part-3.htm>)

The Women's Liberation Movement has attempted to alter the English language as it touches women. Ms. (pronounced "miz") existed before the women's movement in secretarial handbooks as the solution to the sticky problem of unknown marital status, but its use was not ensured until the publication of the most widely circulated magazine associated with the women's movement, Ms. The U.S. Government Printing Office, official stylemaster for government and civil-service publications has condoned the use of Ms. However, a 1973 Gallup poll found that disapproval of its use among women who knew of the term outweighed approval, 5-3. Some women say that "miz" sounds a little too much like "massa," or that the abbreviation already stands for the word "manuscript." The term's acceptance has been primarily as a written and not a verbal form of address. While "Ms." has been the most successful attempt to alter language, other attempts have included using "he/she" or a newer form "s/he" to replace "he." Replacing "men" with "people" or "persons" has become popular (almost a game or joke for some). "Jurymen" becomes "jurypeople," "postmen" becomes "postpeople," and so on. History now has an adjunct "herstory," not because the etymology of history is history (it isn't), but because "herstory" emphasizes that women have been written out of regular history. And the "Madam Chairmen" of the world (a linguistic contradiction to begin with) have been deposed by hundreds of "chairpersons."

## C) Vote Negative to challenge oppression:

**Zainzinger 2010** (Vanessa; “His-/herstory of Gender-Based Language Reform” October 28th. <http://vanessazainzinger.wordpress.com/2010/10/28/his-herstory-of-gender-based-language-reform/>)

While language and gender research has progressed dramatically and attempts at eliminating gender biased language have been ubiquitous in recent years, their relative success is dependent on the social context in which the language reform occurs. The introduction of unbiased language has only been persistent where it was within a larger sociopolitical initiative, formal speech or language forums sensitive to attitudinal changes. So have attempts at popularising new terms in everyday, informal language been widely unsuccessful, while changes in media language and formal contexts have been consistent. However, even if gender-based language reform has not been completely successful, it continues to sensitise individuals to ways in which language is discriminatory. This makes consciousness-raising an ongoing step in the progress against the oppression and marginalisation of women in language.

# \*\*\*\*\*Intervention Good\*\*\*\*\*

## Making war seem clean is key to hege- otherwise the public won’t sustain it- their criticism of interventionism causes U.S. withdrawal which sparks arms races and nuclear conflict

Rosen, Professor National Security Harvard, ‘3 (Stephen Peter, Spring, “An Empire, If You Can Keep It” The National Interest, lexis)

The other unique aspect of American **empire** today, of course, is that **it** is a putative **empire** run by a democracy that embraces the principle of equality and values formal limits on its own state power. These principles contradict the imperial tendency to hierarchy and to the use of unrestrained, extra-legal violence. The United States, to be sure, is capable of hypocrisy and brutality on massive scales. But its most naked expressions of imperial power have really been mere episodes--intense, but limited in time and scope. Since imperial governance must sustain itself for decades to really work, **it** is worth asking whether the United States, given its principles, **can** sustain the kind of actions that an imperial mission requires for years on end. The answer depends on circumstances. As long as the personal and societal safety of American citizens is at risk from external threats, historical precedent suggests that rather few limits will be placed on the use of American military power, or on the constraints the United States will impose on the peoples of other countries. Any use of weapons of mass destruction against targets in the United States, or against American soldiers abroad, will evoke the implacable rage of the American people against a clear enemy. As for imperial rule over other peoples, the United States has always preferred indirect rule: the installation of local governments compatible with American policies. Direct rule will be seen as a temporary measure to prepare conditions for a transfer of power to local inhabitants. But effective transfer could be a long time coming in places like Afghanistan and Iraq, or in other places where the United States establishes military garrisons intended to be temporary. The United States is fully capable of enlarging its army to maintain such garrisons over long periods of time; in living memory, after all, the peacetime U.S. military has had over three million men and women. The real constraint will be political: Will the elites and general population of the United States regard **it** as just to rule other peoples, some of whom hate Americans enough to engage in suicidal attacks, and many of whom may exploit American power for their own malign purposes? Rather than wrestle with such difficult and unpleasant problems, the United States could give up the imperial mission, or pretensions to **it**, now. This would essentially mean the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the Middle East, Europe and mainland Asia. **It** may be that all other peoples, without significant exception, will then turn to their own affairs and leave the United States alone. But those who are hostile to us might remain hostile, and be much less afraid of the United States after such a withdrawal. Current friends would feel less secure and, in the most probable post-imperial world, would revert to the logic of self-help in which all states do what they must to protect themselves. This would imply the relatively rapid acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Iran, Iraq and perhaps Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Indonesia and others. Constraints on the acquisition of biological weapons would be even weaker than they are today. Major regional arms races would also be very likely throughout Asia and the Middle East. This would not be a pleasant world for Americans, or anyone else. **It** is difficult to guess what the costs of such a world would be to the United States. They would probably not put the end of the United States in prospect, but they would not be small. If the logic of American **empire** is unappealing, **it** is not at all clear that the alternatives are that much more attractive.

# Intervention Good

## US hegemony plays an overwhelmingly stabilizing role – democratic constrains on hegemonic excess mean that even if there are some examples of US intervention the longer term trend is peace

**Ikenberry –** IR, Princeton - ‘**1**

G. John, Getting Hegemony Right, <http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_2001_Spring/ai_72345245/>

A critical ingredient in stabilizing international relations in a world of radical power disparities is the character of America itself. The United States is indeed a global hegemon, but because of its democratic institutions and political traditions it is--or can be--a relatively benign one. Joseph Nye's arguments on "soft power" of course come to mind here, and there is much to his point. But, in fact, there are other, more significant aspects of the American way in foreign policy that protect the United States from the consequences of its own greatness.  When other major states consider whether to work with the United States or resist it, the fact that it is an open, stable democracy matters. The outside world can see American policymaking at work and can even find opportunities to enter the process and help shape how the overall order operates. Paris, London, Berlin, Moscow, Tokyo and even Beijing--in each of these capitals officials can readily find reasons to conclude that an engagement policy toward the United States will be more effective than balancing against U.S. power.  America in large part stumbled into this open, institutionalized order in the 1940s, as it sought to rebuild the postwar world and to counter Soviet communism. In the late 1940s, in a pre-echo of today's situation, the United States was the world's dominant state--constituting 45 percent of world GNP, leading in military power, technology, finance and industry, and brimming with natural resources. But America nonetheless found itself building world order around stable and binding partnerships. Its calling card was its offer of Cold War security protection. But the intensity of political and economic cooperation between the United States and its partners went well beyond what was necessary to counter the Soviet threat. As the historian Geir Lundestad has observed, the expanding American political order in the half century after World War II was in important respects an "empire by invitation." [5] The remarkable global reach of American postwar hegemony has been at least in part driven by the efforts of Europe an and Asian governments to harness U.S. power, render that power more predictable, and use it to overcome their own regional insecurities. The result has been a vast system of America-centered economic and security partnerships. Even though the United States looks like a wayward power to many around the world today, it nonetheless has an unusual ability to co-opt and reassure. Three elements matter most in making U.S. power more stable, engaged and restrained. First, America's mature political institutions organized around the rule of law have made it a relatively predictable and cooperative hegemon. The pluralistic and regularized way in which U.S. foreign and security policy is made reduces surprises and allows other states to build longterm, mutually beneficial relations. The governmental separation of powers creates a shared decision-making system that opens up the process and reduces the ability of any one leader to make abrupt or aggressive moves toward other states. An active press and competitive party system also provide a service to outside states by generating information about U.S. policy and determining its seriousness of purpose. The messiness of a democracy can, indeed, frustrate American diplomats and confuse foreign observers. But over the long term, democratic institutions produce more consistent and credible policies--policies that do not reflect the capricious and idiosyncratic whims of an autocrat.  Think of the United States as a giant corporation that seeks foreign investors. It is more likely to attract investors if it can demonstrate that it operates according to accepted accounting and fiduciary principles. The rule of law and the institutions of policymaking in a democracy are the political equivalent of corporate transparency and accountability Sharp shifts in policy must ultimately be vetted within the policy process and pass muster by an array of investigatory and decision-making bodies. Because it is a constitutional, rule-based democracy, outside states are more willing to work with the United States--or, to return to the corporate metaphor, to invest in ongoing partnerships.  This open and decentralized political process works in a second way to reduce foreign worries about American power. It creates what might be called "voice opportunities"--that is, opportunities for political access and, with it, the means for foreign governments and groups to influence the way Washington's power is exercised. In 1990 the political analyst Pat Choate wrote a bestseller entitled Agents of Influence, detailing the supposedly scandalous ways in which Japanese ministries and corporations were manipulating the American political process. High-priced lobbyists were advancing Tokyo's commercial interests within the hallowed halls of the American capital and undermining the pursuit of the U.S. national interest. Today Washington is even more inundated by foreign diplomats and revolving-door lobbyists working to ensure that the interests of America's partners are not overlooked. Looked at from the perspective of the stable functioning of America's hegemonic order, Choate was actually describing one of the brilliant aspects of the United States as a global power. By providing other states opportunities to play the game in Washington, they are drawn into active, ongoing partnerships that serve the long-term strategic interests of the United States. A third and final element of the American order that reduces worry about power asymmetries is the web of multilateral institutions that mark the postwar world. After World War II, the United States launched history's most ambitious era of institution-building. The UN, IMF, World Bank, NATO, GATT and other institutions that emerged provided a more extensive rule-based structure for political and economic relations than anything seen before. The United States had been deeply ambivalent about making permanent security commitments to other states and about allowing its political and economic policies to be dictated by intergovernmental bodies. The Soviet menace was critical in overcoming these doubts. Networks and political relationships were built that--paradoxically--made U.S. power both more far-reaching and durable but also more predictable and malleable. In effect, the United States spun a web of institutions that connected other states to an emerging American-dominated economic and security order. But in doing so, these institutions also bound the United States to other states and reduced--at least to some extent--Washington's ability to engage in the arbitrary and indiscriminate exercise of power. Call it an institutional bargain. The price for the United States was a reduction in Washington's policy autonomy, in that institutional rules and joint decision-making reduced U.S. unilateralist capacities. But what Washington got in return was worth the price. America's partners also had their autonomy constrained, but in return were able to operate in a world where U.S. power was more restrained and reliable.  Secretary of State Dean Rusk spelled out the terms of the bargain in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1965:  We are every day, in one sense, accepting limitations upon our complete freedom of .... We have more than 4,300 treaties and international agreements, two-thirds of which have been entered into in the past 25 years.... Each one of which at least limits our freedom of action. We exercise our sovereignty going into these agreements.  But Rusk argued that these agreements also create a more stable environment within which the United States can pursue its interests. "Law is a process by which we increase our range of freedom" and "we are constantly enlarging our freedom by being able to predict what others are going to do." [6] The United States gets a more predictable environment and more willing partners.  There have been many moments when Asian and European allies have complained about the heavy-handedness of U.S. foreign policy, but the open and institutionalized character of the American order has minimized the possibilities of hegemonic excess over the long term. The untoward implications of sharp power asymmetries are reduced, cooperation and reciprocity are regularized, and the overall hegemonic order is rendered more legitimate and stable. The bargain--on both sides--remains intact.

# Intervention Good

## Hegemony is sustainable if the U.S. holds onto its allies

**Kagan, 2008** Sr. Assoc. Carnegie 10-30-‘8 (Robert-, Washington Post, “Still No. 1”,http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/2008/10/30/ST2008103002048 .html)

One hopes that whoever wins next week will quickly dismiss all this faddish declinism. It seems to come along every 10 years or so. In the late 1970s, the foreign policy establishment was seized with what Cyrus Vance called "the limits of our power." In the late 1980s, the scholar Paul Kennedy predicted the imminent collapse of American power due to "imperial overstretch." In the late 1990s, Samuel P. Huntington warned of American isolation as the "lonely superpower." Now we have the "[post-American world](http://www.newsweek.com/id/135380)." Yet the evidence of American decline is weak. Yes, as Zakaria notes, the world's largest Ferris wheel is in Singapore and the largest casino in Macau. But by more serious measures of power, the United States is not in decline, not even relative to other powers. Its share of the global economy last year was about 21 percent, compared with about 23 percent in 1990, 22 percent in 1980 and 24 percent in 1960. Although the United States is suffering through a financial crisis, so is every other major economy. If the past is any guide, the adaptable American economy will be the first to come out of recession and may actually find its position in the global economy enhanced. Meanwhile, American military power is unmatched. While the Chinese and Russian militaries are both growing, America's is growing, too, and continues to outpace them technologically. Russian and Chinese power is growing relative to their neighbors and their regions, which will pose strategic problems, but that is because American allies, especially in Europe, have systematically neglected their defenses. America's image is certainly damaged, as measured by global polls, but the practical effects of this are far from clear. Is America's image today worse than it was in the 1960s and early 1970s, with the Vietnam War; the Watts riots; the My Lai massacre; the assassinations of John F. Kennedy, Martin Luther King and Bobby Kennedy; and Watergate? Does anyone recall that millions of anti-American protesters took to the streets in Europe in those years? Today, despite the polls, President Bush has managed to restore closer relations with allies in Europe and Asia, and the next president will be able to improve them even further. Realist theorists have consistently predicted for the past two decades that the world would "balance" against the United States. But nations such as India are drawing closer to America, and if any balancing is occurring, it is against China, Russia and Iran. Sober analysts such as Richard Haass acknowledge that the United States remains "the single most powerful entity in the world." But he warns, "The United States cannot dominate, much less dictate, and expect that others will follow." That is true. But when was it not? Was there ever a time when the United States could dominate, dictate and always have its way? Many declinists imagine a mythical past when the world danced to America's tune. Nostalgia swells for the wondrous American-dominated era after World War II, but between 1945 and 1965 the United States actually suffered one calamity after another. The "loss" of China to communism; the North Korean invasion of South Korea; the Soviet testing of a hydrogen bomb; the stirrings of postcolonial nationalism in Indochina -- each proved a strategic setback of the first order. And each was beyond America's power to control or even to manage successfully. No event in the past decade, with the exception of Sept. 11, can match the scale of damage to America's position in the world. Many would say, "But what about Iraq?" Yet even in the Middle East, where America's image has suffered most as a result of that war, there has been no fundamental strategic realignment. Longtime American allies remain allies, and Iraq, which was once an adversary, is now an ally. Contrast this with the strategic setbacks the United States suffered during the Cold War. In the 1950s and 1960s, the pan-Arab nationalist movement swept out pro-American governments and opened the door to unprecedented Soviet involvement, including a quasi-alliance between Moscow and the Egypt of Gamal Abdel Nasser, as well as with Syria. In 1979, the central pillar of American strategy toppled when the pro-American Shah of Iran was overthrown by Ayatollah Khomeini's revolution. That produced a fundamental shift in the strategic balance from which the United States is still suffering. Nothing similar has occurred as a result of the Iraq war. So perhaps a little perspective is in order. The danger of today's declinism is not that it is true but that the next president will act as if it is. The good news is that I doubt either nominee really will. And I'm confident the American people would take a dim view if he tried.

# Intervention Good

## Focus on security through deterrence is inherently reflexive- learning to understand our enemies helps us broaden our world view

**Lupovici 8** – Post-Doctoral Fellow Munk Centre for International Studies University of Toronto (Amir, “Why the Cold War Practices of Deterrence are Still Prevalent: Physical Security, Ontological Security and Strategic Discourse,”  http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2008/Lupovici.pdf

 Since deterrence can become part of the actors’ identity, it is also involved in the actors’ will to achieve ontological security, securing the actors’ identity and routines. As McSweeney explains, ontological security is “the acquisition of confidence in the routines of daily life—the essential predictability of interaction through which we feel confident in knowing what is going on and that we have the practical skill to go on in this context.” These routines become part of the social structure that enables and constrains the actors’ possibilities (McSweeney, 1999: 50-1, 154-5; Wendt, 1999: 131, 229-30). Thus, through the emergence of the deterrence norm and the construction of deterrence identities, the actors create an intersubjective context and intersubjective understandings that in turn affect their interests and routines. In this context, deterrence strategy and deterrence practices are better understood by the actors, and therefore the continuous avoidance of violence is more easily achieved. Furthermore, within such a context of deterrence relations, rationality is (re)defined, clarifying the appropriate practices for a rational actor, and this, in turn, reproduces this context and the actors’ identities. Therefore, the internalization of deterrence ideas helps to explain how actors may create more cooperative practices and break away from the spiral of hostility that is forced and maintained by the identities that are attached to the security dilemma, and which lead to mutual perception of the other as an aggressive enemy. As Wendt for example suggests, in situations where states are restrained from using violence—such as MAD (mutual assured destruction)—states not only avoid violence, but “ironically, may be willing to trust each other enough to take on collective identity”. In such cases if actors believe that others have no desire to engulf them, then it will be easier to trust them and to identify with their own needs (Wendt, 1999: 358-9). In this respect, the norm of deterrence, the trust that is being built between the opponents, and the (mutual) constitution of their role identities may all lead to the creation of long term influences that preserve the practices of deterrence as well as the avoidance of violence. Since a basic level of trust is needed to attain ontological security, 21 the existence of it may further strengthen the practices of deterrence and the actors’ identities of deterrer and deterred actors. In this respect, I argue that for the reasons mentioned earlier, the practices of deterrence should be understood as providing both physical and ontological security, thus refuting that there is necessarily tension between them. Exactly for this reason I argue that Rasmussen’s (2002: 331-2) assertion—according to which MAD was about enhancing ontological over physical security—is only partly correct. Certainly, MAD should be understood as providing ontological security; but it also allowed for physical security, since, compared to previous strategies and doctrines, it was all about decreasing the physical threat of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the ability to increase one dimension of security helped to enhance the other, since it strengthened the actors’ identities and created more stable expectations of avoiding violence.

# Intervention Good

## Global violence decreasing – civilization has become more moral

**Pinker 7**, Johnstone Family Professor at Harvard University, ‘7 (Steven, March 19, “A History of Violence” The New Republic, lexis)

In sixteenth-century Paris, a popular form of entertainment was cat-burning, in which a cat was hoisted in a sling on a stage and slowly lowered into a fire. According to historian Norman Davies, "[T]he spectators, including kings and queens, shrieked with laughter as the animals, howling with pain, were singed, roasted, and finally carbonized." Today, such sadism would be unthinkable in most of the world. This change in sensibilities is just one example of perhaps the most important and most underappreciated trend in the human saga: Violence has been in decline over long stretches of history, and today we are probably living in the most peaceful moment of our species' time on earth. In the decade of Darfur and Iraq, and shortly after the century of Stalin, Hitler, and Mao, the claim that violence has been diminishing may seem somewhere between hallucinatory and obscene. Yet recent studies that seek to quantify the historical ebb and flow of violence point to exactly that conclusion. Some of the evidence has been under our nose all along. Conventional history has long shown that, in many ways, we have been getting kinder and gentler. Cruelty as entertainment, human sacrifice to indulge superstition, slavery as a labor-saving device, conquest as the mission statement of government, genocide as a means of acquiring real estate, torture and mutilation as routine punishment, the death penalty for misdemeanors and differences of opinion, assassination as the mechanism of political succession, rape as the spoils of war, pogroms as outlets for frustration, homicide as the major form of conflict resolution—all were unexceptionable features of life for most of human history. But, today, they are rare to nonexistent in the West, far less common elsewhere than they used to be, concealed when they do occur, and widely condemned when they are brought to light. At one time, these facts were widely appreciated. They were the source of notions like progress, civilization, and man's rise from savagery and barbarism. Recently, however, those ideas have come to sound corny, even dangerous. They seem to demonize people in other times and places, license colonial conquest and other foreign adventures, and conceal the crimes of our own societies. The doctrine of the noble savage—the idea that humans are peaceable by nature and corrupted by modern institutions—pops up frequently in the writing of public intellectuals like José Ortega y Gasset ("War is not an instinct but an invention"), Stephen Jay Gould ("Homo sapiens is not an evil or destructive species"), and Ashley Montagu ("Biological studies lend support to the ethic of universal brotherhood"). But, now that social scientists have started to count bodies in different historical periods, they have discovered that the romantic theory gets it backward: Far from causing us to become more violent, something in modernity and its cultural institutions has made us nobler. To be sure, any attempt to document changes in violence must be soaked in uncertainty. In much of the world, the distant past was a tree falling in the forest with no one to hear it, and, even for events in the historical record, statistics are spotty until recent periods. Long-term trends can be discerned only by smoothing out zigzags and spikes of horrific bloodletting. And the choice to focus on relative rather than absolute numbers brings up the moral imponderable of whether it is worse for 50 percent of a population of 100 to be killed or 1 percent in a population of one billion. Yet, despite these caveats, a picture is taking shape. The decline of violence is a fractal phenomenon, visible at the scale of millennia, centuries, decades, and years. It applies over several orders of magnitude of violence, from genocide to war to rioting to homicide to the treatment of children and animals. And it appears to be a worldwide trend, though not a homogeneous one. The leading edge has been in Western societies, especially England and Holland, and there seems to have been a tipping point at the onset of the Age of Reason in the early seventeenth century. At the widest-angle view, one can see a whopping difference across the millennia that separate us from our pre-state ancestors. Contra leftist anthropologists who celebrate the noble savage, quantitative body-counts—such as the proportion of prehistoric skeletons with axemarks and embedded arrowheads or the proportion of men in a contemporary foraging tribe who die at the hands of other men—suggest that pre-state societies were far more violent than our own. It is true that raids and battles killed a tiny percentage of the numbers that die in modern warfare. But, in tribal violence, the clashes are more frequent, the percentage of men in the population who fight is greater, and the rates of death per battle are higher. According to anthropologists like Lawrence Keeley, Stephen LeBlanc, Phillip Walker, and Bruce Knauft, these factors combine to yield population-wide rates of death in tribal warfare that dwarf those of modern times. If the wars of the twentieth century had killed the same proportion of the population that die in the wars of a typical tribal society, there would have been two billion deaths, not 100 million.

# Intervention Good

## No risk of intervention now

**Mandelbaum 11 (**Michael Mandelbaum, A. Herter Professor of American Foreign Policy, the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington DC; and Director, Project on East-West Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, “CFR 90th Anniversary Series on Renewing America: American Power and Profligacy,” Jan 2011)

I think it is, Richard. And I think that this period really goes back two decades. I think the wars or the interventions in Somalia, in Bosnia, in Kosovo, in Haiti belong with the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, although they were undertaken by different administrations for different reasons, and had different costs. But all of them ended up in the protracted, unexpected, unwanted and expensive task of nation building. Nation building has never been popular. The country has never liked it. It likes it even less now. And I think we're not going to do it again. We're not going to do it because there won't be enough money. We're not going to do it because there will be other demands on the public purse. We won't do it because we'll be busy enough doing the things that I think ought to be done in foreign policy. And we won't do it because it will be clear to politicians that the range of legitimate choices that they have in foreign policy will have narrowed and will exclude interventions of that kind. So I believe and I say in the book that the last -- the first two post-Cold War decades can be seen as a single unit. And that unit has come to an end.

# Intervention Good: The Public Will Support Interventionism

## The public supports military engagement abroad

**World Public Opinion, ‘7** (August 3, “US Role on the World” <http://www.americans->world.org/digest/overview/us\_role/general\_principles.cfm)

Americans show strong support for the US maintaining a global military presence. When asked about the “long term military bases the US has overseas,” in the 2006 Chicago Council poll about two-thirds said the US should either maintain the number it has now (53%) or increase the number (15%). Twenty-seven percent wanted fewer bases abroad. This shows a very slight increase over the findings from June 2004, when support for having fewer bases was stronger (31%) and weaker for having more bases (11%). In the period immediately after the September 11th attacks, support for military bases overseas was understandably more robust. In the June 2002 CCFR poll only 14% called for the US to have fewer long-term military bases overseas, while 57% said the US should have about as many as now, and 25% said the US should have more bases.[[14](javascript:MM_openBrWindow('foot_note1.cfm#14','footnote','menubar=yes,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,width=500,height=500'))] In 2002, 2004, and 2006, the Chicago Council also presented a long list of locations for the US to have such bases. While support was higher in 2002, in 2004 and 2006 substantial majorities favored having US bases on the soil of major allies. These included Germany (57% in 2006 and 2004, 69% in 2002), Japan (57% in 2006, 52% in 2004, and 63% in 2002), and South Korea (62% in 2006 and 2004, and 67% in 2002). Asked specifically in June 2002 about the US having 100,000 troops in Western Europe, just 33% said this was too many, while 53% said it was about right, and 8% said it was too few. This showed increased support relative to an October 1996 poll that asked the same question (43% too many, 47% about right, 3% too few). In the 2002 Chicago Council poll, support for keeping 44,000 troops in Japan was more mixed, with 43% saying this was too many, 45% about right and 5% too few. Only a slight majority of 54% also supported US bases in Guantanamo Bay. This was down from 58% in 2004 and 70% in 2002: presumably a negative reaction to reports of treatment of prisoners there.[[14a](javascript:MM_openBrWindow('foot_note1.cfm#14a','footnote','menubar=yes,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,width=500,height=500'))] Americans’ attitudes about bases in the Middle East are complex and seem to be going through some kind of change particularly when thinking about the future. A majority thinks that at present the US should have bases: asked in December 2006 (WPO/KN) whether they favored or opposed “the US having bases in the Middle East,” 60% said they were in favor (37% opposed). The same poll found a slight majority (53%) saying that long-term US military bases in the Middle East that have been in place “for decades” have had a positive effect on stability in the region, while 41% see it as having a negative effect.[[14b](javascript:MM_openBrWindow('foot_note1.cfm#14b','footnote','menubar=yes,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,width=500,height=500'))]

## (--) Public ignorance decreases opposition to an aggressive foreign policy:

**Astore 10** (William J. Astore, a retired lieutenant colonel (USAF), taught for six years at the Air Force Academy, a TomDispatch regular, he currently teaches at the Pennsylvania College of Technology, "The New American Isolationism: The Cost of Turning Away From War's Horrific Realities," November 1,http://www.huffingtonpost.com/william-j-astore/the-new-american-isolatio\_b\_777149.html)

A new isolationism is metastasizing in the American body politic. At its heart lies not an urge to avoid war, but an urge to avoid contemplating the costs and realities of war. It sees war as having analgesic qualities -- as lessening a collective feeling of impotence, a collective sense of fear and terror. Making war in the name of reducing terror serves this state of mind and helps to preserve it. Marked by a calculated estrangement from war’s horrific realities and mercenary purposes, the new isolationism magically turns an historic term on its head, for it keeps us in wars, rather than out of them. Old-style American isolationism had everything to do with avoiding “entangling alliances” and conflicts abroad. It was tied to America’s historic tradition of rejecting a large standing army -- a tradition in which many Americans took pride. Yes, we signed on to World War I in 1917, but only after we had been “too proud to fight.” Even when we joined, we did so as a non-aligned power with the goal of ending major wars altogether. Before Pearl Harbor in December 1941, Americans again resisted the call to arms, looking upon Hitler’s rise and other unnerving events in Europe and Asia with alarm, but with little eagerness to send American boys into yet another global bloodbath. In the decades since World War II, however, “isolationism” has been turned inside-out and upside-down. Instead of seeking eternal peace, Washington elites have, by now, plunged the country into a state of eternal war, and they’ve done so, in part, by isolating ordinary Americans from war’s brutal realities. With rare exceptions (notably John F. Kennedy’s [call](http://www.bartleby.com/124/pres56.html)for young Americans to pay any price and bear any burden), our elites have not sought to mobilize a new “greatest generation,” but rather to keep a clueless one -- clueless, that is, as to war’s fatal costs and bitter realities -- unmobilized (if not immobilized). Such national obliviousness has not gone unnoticed. In a recent New York Times [op-ed](http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/18/opinion/18brokaw.html)headlined “The Wars that America Forgot About,” former NBC news anchor Tom Brokaw asked the obvious question: Why, in an otherwise contentious political season, have our wars gone so[utterly undebated](http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/26/nyregion/26nyc.html)? His answers -- that we’re in a recession in which people have more pressing concerns, and that we’ve restricted the burdens of war to a tiny minority -- are sensible, but don’t go quite far enough. It’s important to add that few Americans are debating, or even discussing, our wars in part because our ruling elites haven’t wanted them debated -- as if they don’t want us to get the idea that we have any say in war-making at all. Think of it this way: The old isolationism was a peaceable urge basic to the American people; the new isolationism is little short of a government program to keep the old isolationism, or opposition of any sort to American wars, in check**. Americans Express Skepticism about War… So?** When you’re kept isolated from war’s costs, it’s nearly impossible to mount an effective opposition to them. While our elites, remembering the Vietnam years, may have sought to remove U.S. public opinion from the enemy’s target list, they have also worked hard to remove the public as a constraint on their war-making powers. Recall former Vice President Dick Cheney’s dismissive “So?” when asked about opinion polls showing declining public support for the Iraq War in 2008. So what if the American people are uneasy? The elites can always call on a professional, non-draft military, augmented by hordes of privatized hire-a-gun outfits, themselves so isolated from society at large that they’ve almost become the equivalent of foreign legionnaires. These same elites encourage us to “support our troops,” but otherwise to look away.

# Intervention Good: The Public Will Support Interventionism

## Media coverage doesn’t mobilize antiwar movements – it shields war’s costs

**Astore 10** (William J. Astore, a retired lieutenant colonel (USAF), taught for six years at the Air Force Academy, a TomDispatch regular, he currently teaches at the Pennsylvania College of Technology, "The New American Isolationism: The Cost of Turning Away From War's Horrific Realities," November 1, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/william-j-astore/the-new-american-isolatio\_b\_777149.html)

Mainstream media coverage of our wars has only added to the cocoon created by the new isolationism. After all, it [rarely addresses](http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/23/opinion/23herbert.html) the full costs of those conflicts to U.S. troops (including their [redeployment](http://www.truth-out.org/wikileaks-suppression-detainee-harassment-and-collateral-murder64448) to war zones, even when already traumatized), let alone to foreign non-combatants in faraway Muslim lands. When such civilians are killed, their deaths tend to take place under the media radar. “If it bleeds, it doesn’t lead,” could be a news motto for much of recent war coverage, especially if the bleeding is done by civilians. Only the recent release of [classified documents](http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/23/world/middleeast/23casualties.html) and videos by WikiLeaks, for instance, has forced our media to bring the mind-numbing body count we’ve amassed in Iraq out of the closet. If nothing else, WikiLeaks has succeeded in reminding us of the impact of our vastly superior firepower, as in a now infamous video of an Apache helicopter gunship [firing](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/04/05/wikileaks-exposes-video-o_n_525569.html) on non-combatants in the streets of Baghdad. Such footage is, of course, all-too-personal, all-too-real. Small wonder it was shown in a [censored form](http://jotman.blogspot.com/2010/04/outrage-over-cnn-report-on-wikileaks.html) on CNN. Where’s the benefit, after all, for corporate-owned media in showcasing others’ terror and pain, especially if it’s inflicted by “[America’s hometown heroes](http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/175276/william_astore_our_American_heroes)”? Our regular export of large-scale violence (including a thriving trade in the potential for violence via our [hammerlock](http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/175207/tomgram%3A_frida_berrigan,_pimping_weapons_to_the_world/) on the [global arms trade](http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/13/world/13weapons.html)) is not something Americans or the American media have cared to scrutinize. To cite two more willful blind spots: Can the average American say roughly how many Iraqis were killed or wounded in our “liberation” of their country and the mayhem that followed? In mid-October, U.S. Central Command [quietly released](http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/15/world/middleeast/15iraq.html) a distinctly lowball estimate of 200,000 Iraqi casualties (including 77,000 killed) from January 2004 to August 2008. That estimate (lower by 30,000 than the one compiled by official Iraqi sources) did not include casualties from major combat operations in 2003, nor of course did it have any place for the millions of refugees driven from their homes in the sectarian violence that followed. The recent WikiLeaks document dump on Iraq held at least [another 15,000](http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE69L54J20101023) unacknowledged Iraqi dead, and [serious studies](http://www.alternet.org/story/148622/wikileaks_docs_underestimate_iraqi_dead) of the casualty toll often suggest the real numbers are hundreds of thousands higher. Or how about the attitudes of those living in parts of Pakistan and Afghanistan subject to the recent [upsurge](http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20101027/ap_on_re_as/as_pakistan) of U.S. drone [strikes](http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones)? Given the way our robotic wars are written about here, could most Americans imagine what it feels like to be on [the receiving end](http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/175120/tom_engelhardt_war_of_the_worlds) of Zeus-like lightning bolts? Here’s what one farmer in North Waziristan in the Pakistani tribal borderlands [had to say](http://www.salon.com/news/politics/war_room/index.html?story=/politics/war_room/2010/10/14/pakistan_civilian_deaths): “I blame the government of Pakistan and the USA… they are responsible for destroying my family. We were living a happy life and I didn’t have any links with the Taliban. My family members were innocent… I wonder, why was I victimized?” Would an American farmer wonder anything different? Would he not seek [vengeance](http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/glenn_greenwald/2010/10/12/terrorism/index.html) if errant missiles obliterated his family? It’s hard, however, for Americans to grasp the nature of the wars being fought in their name, no less to express sympathy for their victims when they are kept in a state of striking isolation from war’s horrors. **Analgesic War** Once upon a time, America’s Global War on Terror was an analgesic. Recall those “shock and awe” images of explosions that marked the opening days of Iraqi combat operations in 2003. Recall as well all the colorful maps, the glamorous weapons systems, and the glowering faces of Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein interpreted and explained to us on our TV screens by[retired U.S. military officers](http://www.niemanwatchdog.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=background.view&backgroundid=00310http://www.niemanwatchdog.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=background.view&backgroundid=00310) in mufti. In this curiously sanitized version of war, weapons and other military arcana were to serve to ease our pain at the tragedy we had suffered on 9/11, while obscuring the “towers” of dead we were creating in other lands. In fostering analgesic war and insisting on information control, our elites have, yet again, drawn a mistaken lesson from the Vietnam War. In Vietnam, even if it took years, free-to-roam and often skeptical reporters finally began to question the official story of the war. Violent images came home to roost in American living rooms at dinnertime. Such coverage may not have stopped the killing, at least not right away, but it did contribute to a gutsy antiwar movement, as well as to a restive “silent majority” that increasingly rejected official rhetoric of falling dominoes and lights at the end of tunnels. Iraq and Afghanistan, by way of contrast, have been characterized by embedded (mostly cheerleading) reporters and banal images of U.S. troops on patrol or firing weapons at unseen targets. Clear admissions that our firepower-intensive form of warfare leads to the violent deaths of many more of “them” than of “us” -- and that [many of them](http://www.truth-out.org/iraq-hundreds-civilians-gunned-down-checkpoints64491) aren’t, by any stretch of the imagination, our enemies -- are seldom forthcoming. (An exception was former Afghan war commander General Stanley McChrystal’s uncommonly harsh assessment of checkpoint casualties: "We've shot an amazing number of people and killed a number and, to my knowledge, none has proven to have been a real threat to the force.") “We don’t do body counts on other people,” [said](http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,101956,00.html) a cocky Donald Rumsfeld late in 2003 and, even though it wasn’t true (the Pentagon just kept its body counts to itself), an obliging Pentagon press corps generally fell into line and generally stayed there long after our new wars had lost their feel-good sheen. Clearly, military and political elites learned it’s better (for them, at least) to keep vivid images of death and destruction off America’s screens. Ironically, even as Americans seek more lifelike and visceral representations from ever bigger, brighter, high-def TVs, war is presented in carefully sanitized low-def form, largely drained of blood and violence. The result? Uncomfortable questions about our wars rarely get asked, let alone aired. A boon to those who want to continue those wars unmolested by public opposition, even if a bust when it comes to pursuing a sensible global strategy that’s truly in the national interest. In seeking to isolate the public from any sense of significant sacrifice, active participation in, or even understanding of America’s wars, these same elites have ensured that the conflicts they pursued would be strategically unsound and morally untenable. Today, Americans are again an isolationist people, but with a twist. Even as we expand our military bases overseas and spend trillions on national security and wars, we’ve isolated ourselves from war’s passions, its savagery, its heartrending sacrifices. Such isolation comforts some and seemingly allows others free rein to act as they wish, but it’s a false comfort, a false freedom, purchased at the price of prolonging our wars, increasing their casualties, abridging our freedoms, and eroding our country’s standing in the world.

# Intervention Good: Decline of US Primacy = War

## Decline of US military primacy provokes global nuclear conflict

**Zhang, 2011** Researcher Carnegie, and Shi, Consultant for Eurasia Group and World Bank, ’11 (Yuhan and Lin, January 22, “America’s decline: A harbinger of conflict and rivalry” East Asia Forum, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/01/22/americas-decline-a-harbinger-of-conflict-and-rivalry/)

Over the past two decades, no other state has had the ability to seriously challenge the US military. Under these circumstances, motivated by both opportunity and fear, many actors have bandwagoned with US hegemony and accepted a subordinate role. Canada, most of Western Europe, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Singapore and the Philippines have all joined the US, creating a status quo that has tended to mute great power conflicts. However, [as the hegemony that drew these powers together withers](http://www.cfr.org/publication/23537/belttightening_for_us_foreign_policy.html), so will the pulling power behind the US alliance. The result will be an international order where power is more diffuse, American interests and influence can be more readily challenged, and conflicts or wars may be harder to avoid. As history attests, power decline and redistribution result in military confrontation. For example, in the late 19th century America’s emergence as a regional power saw it launch its first overseas war of conquest towards Spain. By the turn of the 20th century, accompanying the increase in US power and waning of British power, the American Navy had begun to challenge the notion that Britain ‘rules the waves.’ Such a notion would eventually see the US attain the status of sole guardians of the Western Hemisphere’s security to become the order-creating Leviathan shaping the international system with democracy and rule of law. Defining this US-centred system are three key characteristics: enforcement of property rights, constraints on the actions of powerful individuals and groups and some degree of equal opportunities for broad segments of society. As a result of such political stability, free markets, liberal trade and flexible financial mechanisms have appeared. And, with this, many countries have sought opportunities to enter this system, proliferating stable and cooperative relations. However, what will happen to these advances as America’s influence declines? Given that America’s authority, although sullied at times, has benefited people across much of Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, as well as parts of Africa and, quite extensively, Asia, the answer to this question could affect global society in a profoundly detrimental way. Public imagination and academia have anticipated that a post-hegemonic world would return to the problems of the 1930s: regional blocs, trade conflicts and strategic rivalry. Furthermore, multilateral institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank or the WTO might give way to regional organisations. For example, Europe and East Asia would each step forward to fill the vacuum left by Washington’s withering leadership to pursue their own visions of regional political and economic orders. Free markets would become more politicised — and, well, less free — and major powers would compete for supremacy. Additionally, such power plays have historically possessed a zero-sum element. In the late 1960s and 1970s, US economic power declined relative to the rise of the Japanese and Western European economies, with the US dollar also becoming less attractive. And, as American power eroded, so did international regimes (such as the Bretton Woods System in 1973). A world without American hegemony is one where great power wars re-emerge, the liberal international system is supplanted by an authoritarian one, and trade protectionism devolves into restrictive, anti-globalisation barriers. This, at least, is one possibility we can forecast in a future that will inevitably be devoid of unrivalled US primacy.

# Intervention Good: No Imperialism

## Economics and past interventions limit US imperialism

Ben **Ami, 2011**, VP of Toledo International Centre for Peace, ’11 (Shlomo, July 1, “Arab Spring, Western Fall” Project Syndicate, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/benami55/English)

The old vocation of what Rudyard Kipling called the "White Man's Burden" - the driving idea behind the West's quest for global hegemony from the days of imperial expansion in the nineteenth century to the current, pathetically inconclusive, Libyan intervention - has clearly run out of steam. Politically and economically exhausted, and attentive to electorates clamoring for a shift of priorities to urgent domestic concerns, Europe and America are no longer very capable of imposing their values and interests through costly military interventions in faraway lands. US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates was stating the obvious when he recently lambasted NATO's European members for their lukewarm response to the alliance's missions, and for their poor military capabilities. (Ten weeks into the fighting in Libya, the Europeans were already running out of munitions.) He warned that if Europe's attitude to NATO did not change, the Alliance would degenerate into "collective military irrelevance." Europe's reluctance to participate in military endeavors should not come as a revelation. The Old Continent has been immersed since World War II in a "post-historical" discourse that rules out the use of force as a way to resolve conflicts, let alone to bring about regime change. And now it is engaged in a fateful struggle to secure the very existence and viability of the European Union. As a result, Europe is retreating into a narrow regional outlook - and assuming that America will carry the burden of major global issues. But America itself is reconsidering its priorities. These are trying economic times for the US, largely owing to imperial overstretch financed by Chinese credit. Admiral Mike Mullen, the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recently defined America’s colossal fiscal deficits as the biggest threat to its national security. Indeed, at a time of painful budget cuts - the US is facing a $52 trillion shortfall on public pensions and health care in the coming decades - the US can no longer be expected to maintain its current level of global military engagement. But the fiscal crisis is not the whole story. The dire lessons of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan will shape future debate about America's international role in the twenty-first century. At an address in February to cadets at the US Military Academy at West Point, Gates said that "any future defense secretary who advises the president to send a big American land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should have his head examined." Gates's recent statements are by no means those of a lonely isolationist in an otherwise interventionist America. He expressed a widely perceived imperative for strategic reassessment. In 1947, in a landmark article, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," which he signed as "X," George Kennan defined America's foreign-policy strategy for the Cold War as one of containment and deterrence. It is difficult to imagine a more marked departure from Kennan's concepts than a report recently released by the Pentagon - A National Strategic Narrative - authored by two active-duty military officers who signed as "Y." The report can be dismissed as just the musings of two senior members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff writing in their "personal capacity." But its real power stems from the degree to which it reflects America's mood in an era of declining global influence and diminishing expectations regarding the relevance of military power to sustaining US global hegemony. Just as Kennan's "X" article was fully reflective of the mood in America at the time, so the Narrative expresses the current American Zeitgeist. Thus, the idea that "Y" might turn out to be a latter-day "X" - defining the nature of America's international role in the twenty-first century - may not be far-fetched. Conspicuously, there is much in the Narrative that coincides with Europe's emphasis on soft power. The authors call for a shift from outdated Cold War strategies of "power and control" to one of civic engagement and sustainable prosperity. Security, they maintain, means more than defense. It means engagement whereby America should not seek "to bully, intimidate, cajole, or persuade others to accept our unique values or to share our national objectives." America, "Y" argues, must first put its own house in order if it is to recover credible global influence as a beacon of prosperity and justice. This would require improving America’s diplomatic capabilities, as well as regaining international competitiveness through greater investment in education and infrastructure at home. The message emanating now from the US is not one of non-interventionism, but a strategy of restraint that assumes that there are limits to American power and seeks to minimise the risk of entanglement in foreign conflicts. As Gates put it in his West Point address, the US Army would no longer be "a Victorian nation-building constabulary designed to chase guerrillas, build schools, or sip tea."

# \*\*\*\*\*Liberal-Conservative Divide Bad K\*\*\*\*\*

## Reifying the liberal-conservative divide restricts individuals and leads to us-them dichotomies:

REV. JAMES V. **SCHALL**, S.J. 20**05** (“On Being Neither Liberal nor Conservative” http://catholiceducation.org/articles/politics/pg0133.html)

**The division of the world into "liberal" and "conservative"** on every topic from politics to our taste in cuisine, clothes, or automobiles is one of the really restricting developments that has ever happened to us. Fr. James V. Schall, S.J. If we are not what is considered popularly a "liberal," then we must, by some convoluted logic, be a "conservative," or vice versa. No third or fourth option is available as is usually the case in the real world. It has to be, we are told, either this way or that. Such a view makes things very simple, I suppose. But it also reduces our minds to utter fuzziness. We are required to define everything as either liberal or conservative even when the two allowable terms of definition are not adequate to explain the reality that they are intended to describe.

## Otherization causes genocide

Diamond, ’92 (The Third Chimponzee; pg. 298-299)

That our urge to kill is restrained by our ethics almost all the time is obvious. The puzzle is: what unleashes it? Today, while we may divde the world’s people into “us” and “them,” we know that there are thousands of types of “them,” all differing from each other as well as from us in language, appearance, and habits. To waste words on pointing this out seems silly: we all know it from books and television, and most of us also know it from firsthand experience of travel. It is hard to transfer ourselves back into the frame of mind prevailing throughout much of human history and already described in Chapter 13. Like chimpanzees, gorillas, and social carnivores, we lived in band territories. The known world wasmuch smaller and simpler than it is today: there were only a few known types fo “them,” one’s immediate neighbors. For example, in New Guinea until recently, each tribe maintained a shifting pattern of warfare and alliance with each of its neighbors. A person might enter the next valley on a friendly visit (never quite without danger) or on a war raid, but the chances of being able to traverse a sequence of several valleys in friendship were negligible. The powerful rules about treatment of one’s fellow “us” did not apply to “them,” those dimly understood, neighboring enemies. As I walked between New Guinea valleys, People who themselves practiced cannibalism and were only a decade out of the Stone Age routinely warned me about the unspeakably primitive, vile, and cannibalistic habits of the people whom I would encounter in the next valley. Even Al Capone’s gangs in twentieth-century Chicago made a policy of hiring out-of-town killers, so that the assassin could feel that he was killing one of “them” rather than of “us.” The writings of classical Greece reveal an extension of this tribal territorialism. The known world was larger and more diverse, but “us” Greeks were still distinguished from “them” barbarians. Our word “barbarian” is derived from the Greek barbaroi, which simply means non-Greek foreigners. Egyptians and Persians, whose level of civilization was like that of the Greeks, were nevertheless barbaroi. The ideal of conduct was not to treat all men equally, but instead to reward on’s friends and to punish one’s enemies. When the Athenian author Xenophon related how Cyrus always repaid his friends’ good turns more generously, and how Cyrus retaliated on his enemies’ misdeeds more severely (e.g., by gouging out their eyes or cutting off their hands). Like the Mungi and Scratching Rocks hyena clans, humans practiced a dual standard of behavior: strong inhibitions about killing one of “us,” but a green light to kill “them” when it was safe to do so. **Genocide** was acceptable under this **dichotomy** whether one considers the dichotomy as an inherited animal instinct or as a uniquely human ethical code.

# \*\*\*\*\*Metaphors Bad\*\*\*\*\*

## (--) TURN: MISDIRECTION--Metaphors misdirect attention from the root cause of problems—we get caught up in the metaphor and ignore examinations of root causes:

**Snowball,** chair of department of speech communication @ Augustana College, **’91** (*Continuity & Change in the Rhetoric of the Moral Majority; pg.128-129)*

A number of scholars have expressed grave concerns about the ability of **metaphor** to **shape our perceptions inaccurately**. One study, by historian William Leuchtenberg, looked at the prevalence of the "war analog" in describing the Great Depression. After giving some 140 examples of the use of war imagery to describe the Depression, its causes, effects, and solutions, Leuchtenberg reached the conclusion that this language might actually have prolonged the Depression by **misdirecting our attention**. As one example, he claimed that the decision to grant business executives the rank of "general" **led us away from an examination** of the possibility that our generals were actually a cause of the war. Their rhetorical title, Leuchtenberg argued, *made them immune to the analysis that might have led us to conclude that distorted business invest­ment patterns actually lay at the heart of the Depression.* His final judgment was that, while the war metaphor may have helped to organize collective action, it ultimately misled reformers and proved to be, in many ways, "treacherous."13

## (--) TURN: CO-OPTION--Metaphors that cross “domains” will be coopted by conservatives:

**Lakoff,** 19**95** (Metaphor, Morality, and Politics, Or, Why Conservatives Have Left Liberals In the Dust

<http://www.wwcd.org/issues/Lakoff.html>)

This example illustrates what a cognitive scientist means when he speaks of "conceptual metaphor." It is an unconscious, automatic mechanism for using inference patterns and language from a source domain (in this case, the financial domain) to think and talk **about another domain** (in this case, the moral domain). It also shows that a mode of metaphorical thought need not be limited to a single culture. Cultures in many parts of the world conceptualize morality in terms of accounting. Moreover, it shows that the same metaphor can be used in different forms by conservatives and liberals. **Conservatives tend to prefer the metaphorical scheme of retribution** to that of restitution.

## (--) Literal language is best used to find the truth—we should avoid metaphor:

**Grey** is a Reader in Philosophy at the University of Queensland, 20**00** (METAPHOR AND MEANING,

<http://www.ul.ie/~philos/vol4/metaphor.html>)

According to the empiricist view championed by Hobbes metaphor is at best an ornament to language. While metaphor may help us to express ourselves more forcefully or more colourfully, Hobbes and his successors claimed that it is **an ornament fraught with dangers**, and if we are to express ourselves as rational thinkers **metaphors are best eschewed**. Metaphor, on this view, is **a dangerous deviation** from the **reliable literal resources** of natural language and we should restrict ourselves to these literal resources in the systematic pursuit of truth. A precursor of this view can be found in Plato, who castigated the poets and playwrights for the distortions which they generated through what he regarded as a systematic misuse of language (Murdoch 1977).

## (--) We can always provide cognitively equivalent literal translations to express the content of all metaphorical statements—they must defend why their project is best done through metaphor:

**Grey 2000** is a Reader in Philosophy at the University of Queensland, 2000 (METAPHOR AND MEANING, <http://www.ul.ie/~philos/vol4/metaphor.html>)

Both the veneration and repudiation of metaphor are overreactions, though I think that Nietzsche was closer to the truth. In particular Nietzsche was right in claiming that metaphor has a central role to play in the way we make sense of the world. However I will also defend the seemingly conflicting claim that we can **provide cognitively equivalent literal translations** which **express the content of all metaphorical statements**. Understanding how metaphor is both essential to creative thought and also in a sense eliminable helps to deepen our understanding of its nature and its role in language.

# Metaphors Bad

## (--) Far-fetched metaphors cause people to get wrapped up in the metaphor over the idea:

Tim **Love**, November 19**96**. (<http://mattressemporium.com/metaphor.htm>)

confusion, obscurity, gaudiness - It isn't always clear how the poet intends the items to be related. Sometimes metaphors distract more than illuminate. Saying that a dress is as "yellow as a banana" is likely to **make people think more about bananas than dresses**. Far-fetched metaphors are called 'conceits'.

## (--) METAPHORS ARE A FORM OF COERCION AND EXCLUSION: IT CREATES IN AND OUT GROUPS:

**COHEN, 1997** (Ted – prof at univ of Chicago, *Philosophy and Literature* 21.2, "Metaphor, Feeling, and Narrative," pp. 223-244, project muse).

In summary: One motive to metaphor is the desire to communicate how one feels and why one feels that way. The use of metaphor certainly is not the only way to do this. Joke-telling is another way of doing it, and so is the use of sheerly literal remarks. What metaphor-making and joke-telling have in common is their solicitation of a complicity in the person to whom they are directed. They aim to induce intimacy and they do this in part by requiring an engagement of the hearer at the outset, just in order to understand what has been said. I suppose they are used in a kind of coercion, forcing the hearer to a special effort. The hearer is induced to join the speaker in a particular intimacy, probably a selective intimacy, not available to everyone; and already thus engaged, the hearer is nudged into the further intimacy of joining the speaker in feeling. (p. 239).

# \*\*\*\*\*Modernity Good\*\*\*\*\*

## (--) The world is getting better and better on almost every measurable indicator—their indictment of modern society is bankrupt.

Frank B. **Cross, 2002** (Professor of Business Law, University of Texas at Austin, Case Western Reserve Law Review, Winter, 2002, 53 Case W. Res. 477; Lexis)

Of course, if the goal is to attack Lomborg's book, the critics had no other alternative. They cannot realistically dispute that the world population with access to safe water has more than doubled over recent decades. n53 There is no denying that rates of death from infectious disease have been cut more than in half. n54 Nor can one really debate that the daily intake of calories in developing nations has increased steadily over recent decades. n55 It is indubitable that ambient levels of the most hazardous air pollutants (such as lead, particulates, and ozone) have declined as the West grew. n56 Nor could the critics deny that environmental concentrations of hazardous chemicals have dropped precipitously over recent years. n57

## (--) Modernity didn’t trigger the Holocaust—the particular practices of Nazi Germany did.

Edward Ross **Dickinson, 2004** (University of Cincinnati, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About “Modernity,” Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, March)

In a particularly provocative passage, Michael Schwartz has suggested that, “each political system in Germany between 1890 and 1945 produced that variant of eugenic science which it ‘needed.’”55 In 1996, Peter Fritzsche, similarly, posed the rhetorical question, “Doesn’t politics choose its own science at least as much as science prefigures political regimes?”56 Both, I think, are making explicit a conclusion that is broadly present, though not often forcefully stated, in the more recent literature: that the realization of the potentials of modernity is a product of choices between alternative possible ideas, and alternative possible policies. To make this kind of suggestion is not to argue that Nazism “perverted” a modern science that was itself value-free and “innocent.” The point is rather that politicians, like scientists themselves, choose from among a broad range of ideas (of greater or lesser credibility) generated by the intellectual and institutional complex of modern science. They also choose what policy conclusions to draw from those ideas.Of course, as Richard Wetzell has remarked, this interpretation has implications for our understanding of the moral significance of National Socialism, as well.57 Modernity and science were not responsible for the crimes of the Nazis. The Nazis were.

## (--) Modernity doesn’t lead to genocide—political and historical factors outweigh the role of modernity.

Edward Ross **Dickinson, 2004** (University of Cincinnati, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About “Modernity,” Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, March)

Again, Peukert was very aware that he was writing the history of only one kind of modernity, and that the most destructive potentials of modern social engineering discourse were only to be realized in a very specific historical context. The “Final Solution” was, as he remarked, “one among other possible outcomes of the crisis of modern civilization,” and one possible only in the context of the concatenation of economic, social, and political disasters through which Germany passed in the two decades before 1933. The fact that Nazism was “one of the pathological developmental forms of modernity does not imply that barbarism is the inevitable logical outcome of modernization,” which also created “opportunities for human emancipation.” And yet, again, the history that Peukert actually wrote was the history of disaster— a disaster that, frequently, does seem at least highly likely. The “fatal racist dynamic in the human and social sciences,” which consists in their assignment of greater or lesser value to human characteristics, does “inevitably become fixated on the utopian dream of the gradual elimination of death,” which is “unfailingly” frustrated by lived reality. In periods of fiscal crisis the frustration of these “fantasies of omnipotence” generates a concern with “identifying, segregating, and disposing of ” those judged less valuable.68

## (--) Modernity can lead either to democracy or totalitarianism—illustrating the importance of other factors.

Edward Ross **Dickinson, 2004** (University of Cincinnati, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About “Modernity,” Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, March)

As Fritzsche’s review makes clear, then, much of the recent literature seems to imply that National Socialism was a product of the “success” of a modernity that ends in 1945; but it could just as easily be seen as a temporary “failure” of modernity, the “success” of which would only come in the 1950s and 1960s. As Paul Betts recently remarked,we should not present the postwar period as a “redemptive tale of modernism triumphant” and cast Nazism as merely a “regressive interlude.” But neither should we dismiss the fact that such a narrative would be, so to speak, half true— that the democratic welfare state is no less a product of modernity than is totalitarianism.61

# Modernity Good--Environment

## (--) Economic growth best protects the environment.

Frank B. **Cross, 2002** (Professor of Business Law, University of Texas at Austin, Case Western Reserve Law Review, Winter, 2002, 53 Case W. Res. 477; Lexis)

When the economy is strong, people demand greater environmental protection, but when the economy struggles, environmental protection measures are sacrificed. n94 Moreover, economic and technological growth create the resources necessary to combat environmental threats. n95 During the 1970s and 1980s, the U.S. economy grew by around seventy percent, yet during this same time period, **virtually all forms of domestic pollution decreased**, some by over ninety percent. n96 Among developed nations, the wealthier countries tend to adopt stronger environmental protection laws and have greater success in reducing air pollution. n97

# Modernity Good—Modern Wars Don’t Escalate

## (--) They are overly pessimistic – modern wars don’t escalate to extinction – 100 years of empirics

**Mack 11**

(Andrew, “A More Secure World?” CATO. Unbound)

The average war in the 1950s killed about 10,000 people a year; in the new millennium the average was a little less than one thousand. The remarkable but extremely uneven reduction in death tolls revealed in Figure 2 has been caused in part by the long-term decline in international conflicts (which kill far more people on average than civil wars), and by the sharp decline in the direct and indirect military interventions by the superpowers in other countries' wars that were characteristic of the major conflicts of the Cold War years. These conflicts—from the Chinese Civil War and the Korean and Vietnam Wars, to the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan—typically involved prolonged engagements between huge armies, at least one of which was equipped with heavy conventional weapons—strike aircraft, tanks, long-range artillery and the like. Death tolls often exceeded 1 million.

In the post–Cold War world, wars are mostly fought within, not between, states and by small armies mostly equipped with small arms and light weapons. While often characterized by extreme brutality toward civilians, these wars have killed relatively few people compared to the major wars of the Cold War period.

And it is not just battle deaths that have declined. Deaths from conflict-exacerbated disease and malnutrition have also been reduced by long-term improvements in public health, notably immunization, that have caused child and adult mortality rates to decline sharply across the developing world over the past 30 years. These improvements have not only steadily reduced mortality rates in peacetime but also saved countless lives in wartime.

In addition there have been major increases in the level, scope, and effectiveness of humanitarian assistance to war-affected populations in countries in conflict. These interventions have reduced wartime death tolls still further.

# \*\*\*\*\*Narratives Bad\*\*\*\*\*

## Narratives cause fascism--allows oversimplification which leads to demagoguery:

Barbara **Warnick, 1987** (Quarterly Journal of Speech; May; pg. 176)

The third and most serious problem of his\* rationality indictment results from Fisher's efforts to argue

that narrativity is more comprehensible and accessible to the public and is therefore to be valued

over rationality. Fisher has claimed that "one does not have to be taught narrative proabability and

narrative fidelity; one culturally acquires them through a universal faculty and experience" ("Narration,"

15). Because the capability for using narrative rationality is univeral, "the 'people' do judge stories that

are told for and about them...and they have a rational capacity to make such judgments" (9). Fisher

has argued that "narrative rationality is no an account of the 'laws of thought' and it is not normative in

the sense that one must reason according to prescribed rules of calculation or inference making" (9).

Noting that the capacity for narrative rationality lies within everyone, Fisher has concluded that "the

people have a natural tendency to prefer the true and the just" (9). Because we are all storytellers,

we are all competent to judge the stories we hear. Contrary to Fisher's observation, the "people" do

*not* always prefer the "true and just" view. Perhaps the most salient counterexample to this claim is

the success of **Nazi propaganda** in persuading the German people that the source of evil in the world

was the Jewish race. In *Mein Kampf*, the Aryan race was depicted as orginal, pure, self-sacrificing,

and the source of all great art, culture, invention, and true achievement in the world. Aryan efforts to

advance civilization were undermined by the schemes of the "Prince of Evil," the international Jew

who was involved in a worldwide conspiracy to live parasitically among Aryans, intermingling with them

and sapping the strength of their ethnic purity. The German masses were to be wooed by a dominating

male of great vision who would win them from the evil seduction of the Jew and restore the German race

to the international dominance to which it was suited and entitled. **A narrative** such as Hitler's is

**invidiously persuasive** precisely because of its narrative fidelity. By discounting the economic factors

resulting from the war and emphasizing race, by providing a convenient and **easily recognizable**

**scapegoat**, and by promising rebirth of the national destiny, Hitler struck a responsive chord in an

alienated, disunified, and despairing people. The narrative of *Mein Kampf* provided a unified explanation

for conditions and facts which the German people could not reconcile in the absence of the narrative it

offered. Furthermore, it is precisely because of the ambiguity and implicitness of its claims that narrative

can be used to account for seemingly discrepant facts. As Kenneth Burke observed, if those skeptical

of Hitler's account point out the existence of Jewish workers not conforming to his stereotype, his

response would be "that is one more indication of the cunning with which the Jewish plot is being

engineered." Or if one noted presumably Jewish traits among Aryans, the response would be: "Very well. That is proof that the Aryan has been 'seduced' by the Jew." The narrative in *Mein Kampf* provides a convenient mode for responding to any questions or issues that those who are not "true believers" might want to raise.

[\*"his" refers to Fisher's--who is Walter Fisher--this is not gender exclusive language]

## Narratives lead to self-delusion:

Barbara **Warnick, 1987**, (Quarterly Journal of Speech, May 1987; pg. 179)

As the example of *Mein Kampf* has shown us, however, a text's appeal to the particular audience does

not prevent self-delusion. A rhetorical narrative may "ring true" in the lives of particular audience

members, may resonate with their own experience and that of those whom they admire, and nevertheless

be a bad story. In fact, Fisher acknowledged that "no guarantee exists that one who uses narrative

rationality will not adopt 'bad stories, rationalizations...Stories...satisfy the need for equilibrium and

the demands of narrative probability and fidelity...*It may be, however, that another observer would think*

*otherwise, that the involved person was rationalizing*" ("Elaboration," 349; emphasis mine).

## Self-delusion and rationalization causes the public to choose "bad stories" over "good ones"

Barbara **Warnick, 1987** (Quarterly Journal of Speech, May 1987; pg. 181)

Second, Fisher promises to get us beyond consensus as a criterion for judging the values in a text, but

he nevertheless insists that the public can and should judge texts based on their narrative features

alone. Fisher **fails to deal with the question** of how we can assure the public will not choose **bad stories** based on self delusion or rationalization.

# Narratives Bad

**Turn: The Poetic:**

A) Narratives must be evaluated according to how useful they are in creating positive social

and political implications--valuing narrative for its aesthetic qualities leads to Nazism:

**Lucaites & Condit, 1985** (Journal of Communciation, August, 105)

In the final analysis, studies of narrative must be judged according to how useful they are

in enhancing critical awareness of human interaction. Such a criterion of evaluation

necessitates careful and sustained attention to the **social and political implications** of

particular narrative forms, as well as to their intertextualization in particular narratives. The

wholesale adoption of **poetic conceptions** of narrative as the basis for a theoretical

description of a narrative paradigm or metacode, for example, could encourage an

**aestheticization of politics** reminiscient of the use to which such forms were put in

National Socialist Germany (see 6, pp. 241-242).

B) To clarify: Lucaites & Condit's conception of the "poetic" use of narrative is one where we

value narratives for their aesthetic & beauty qualities--they draw a distinction between

narratives used for the poetic & the deliberative:

**Lucaites & Condit, 1985** (Journal of Communication, August, 92)

1. *The poetic function*. As we represent it here, the primary goal of poetic discourse is the

expression of beauty. From this perspective, the function of a narrative is precisely to formalize

(or "plot") the temporal and spatial relationships between the persons, objects, and concepts

of a universe of discourse so as to create a pleasurable or entertaining experience (see 1,

1448b5-1449b5; 3; 4, p. 124; 12; 57, pp. 35-75).

## Valuing narratives for their own sake encourages a limited and distorted view of narratives--we must evaluate the effect narratives have on the meaning and structures of culture and society:

**Lucaites & Condit, 1985** (Journal of Communication, August, 91)

The importance of poetic models of narrative to a critical understanding of culture and society

is incontestable; nevertheless, a primary reliance upon them--to the subordination or

exclusion of alternative models that one might find in dialectical or rhetorical discourse--

encourages a limited and distorted view of the scope and function of the narrative metacode.

So, for example, rather than focus attention on how narratives operate in the context of

specific situations to link speaker (narrator) and audience (narratee), most current studies

of narrative privilege a concern for the decontextualized **structure of a discourse** (see 2, 11,

13, 27, 39, 52, 53, 61; cf. 29, 44, 58). Even those studies directly concerned with discourse

*as* human action seem to rely on the literary heritage provided by Kenneth Burke's notion

of dramatism as the framework for exploring the narrative dimensions of socially and politically

consequential discourse (see 7, 9, 10, 19; cf. 28). Such formal, literary analyses provide

insight into the formation of narratives but reveal very little about how narratives function in and

act upon the meaning and structures of culture and society, especially in a mass-mediated

era.

# Narratives Bad

## Must evaluate narratives in their context in society:

Lucaites & Condit, 1985 (Journal of Communication, August, 105)

To study the decontextualized structure of narratives is not only to ignore the fact that those

audiences *use* those narratives to contextualize their own understandings of the world. To fail to

attend to the social and political implications of specific narratives, then, is to undermine our

purpose in searching for a narrative paradigm or metacode in the first place.

## They are out of it if they think narratives exist in isolation--narratives breed counternarratives and elite efforts to mold the narrative into the larger fabric of society--the Rambo phenomenon is an empirical example:

**Lucaites & Condit, 1985** (Journal of Communication, August, 105)

Perhaps more important, however, is the demand for vigilance in attending to the consequences

of intertextualization of various narrative forms in specific narratives. During the summer of

1985, Americans were held hostage by the news media's treatment of terrorism in the

Middle East at the same time that they were cheering Sylvester Stallone's Rambo as he

single-handedly defeated the Communist government of North Vietnam. It should have come

as little surprise when President Reagan **intertextualized these narratives** in the *narratio* of

an address designed **to promote warlike behavior**.

## Narratives must be evaluated by their effects on actual policies:

**McGee & Nelson, 1985** (Journal of Communication, August, 143-144)

Third, to inform practical wisdom and judgment, the theory must stand *powerfully* enough to

generate successful policy. Little good comes from a moral argument if it fails to support

expedient ends that carry through to actual practices. To renew narrative, the theory must

make better sense of what we say and do, must compel opponents to take better notice of

the issues, and must work to produce better policies.

# \*\*\*\*\*Neo-liberalism kritik answers\*\*\*\*\*

## (--) Neo-liberalism solves war.

Eric **Gartzke, 2007** (associate professor of political science and a member of the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, “The Capitalist Peace”, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 51, No. 1, January 2007, Pp. 166–191)

Second, substantial overlap in the foreign policy goals of developed nations in the post–World War II period further limits the scope and scale of conflict. Lacking territorial tensions, consensus about how to order the international system has allowed liberal states to cooperate and to accommodate minor differences. Whether this affinity among liberal states will persist in the next century is a question open to debate. Finally, the rise of global capital markets creates a new mechanism for competition and communication for states that might otherwise be forced to fight. Separately, these processes influence patterns of warfare in the modern world. Together, they explain the absence of war among states in the developed world and account for the dyadic observation of the democratic peace.

## (--) Neo-liberalism is critical to democracy.

Jagdish **Bhagwati, 2004** (professor of economics and law at Columbia) In Defence of Globalization, 2004 pg. 93)

Globalization promotes democracy both directly and indirectly. The direct link comes from the fact that rural farmers are now able to bypass the dominant classes and castes by taking their produce directly to the market thanks to modern information technology, thereby loosening the control of these traditionally hegemonic groups. In turn, this can start them on the way to becoming more-independent actors, with democratic aspirations, in the political arena. Globalization is at the source of this phenomenon in two ways: the computers themselves are available because of trade, and the markets accessed are foreign in many cases, not just domestic. Thus, a recent report from Kamalpur village in India by the Wall Street Journal reporter Cris Prystay documents how the villagers are now selling their crops by computer, cutting out the middlemen. Soybean farmer Mohammed Arif, 24 years old, says the computer allows farmers greater control over their own goods. Farmers often get cheated at markets, or get stuck with whatever price is offered that day. With the computer, he says, they can make a considered decision at home, holding crops until prices improve. 2

## (--) Democracy solves state collapse and saves millions of lives.

Mike **Doyle, 2011** (Development Studies at U Cambridge) “In Defense of Neoliberalism: Part III” Apr. 12, 2011 Retrieved May 31, 2012 at <http://cambridgedevelopmentstudies.wordpress.com/2011/04/12/in-defense-of-neoliberalism-part-iii/>

We have had many discussions about one of the central tenets of liberalism: democracy. We have debated whether it causes or is the cause of development. We talked about how efficient it is and whether it adequately addresses the needs of the very poor. However, I think we have glossed over one of the chief strengths of democracy: its ability to create a marketplace of ideas. In a democracy, new ideas have the ability to come into being, propagate, and put into practice. Just as evolution works to select the best traits to suit a given environment, so does the market place of ideas allow the best ideas to come to the fore. To be sure, this is a slow process full of trial and error, but it does allow societies to adapt effectively to an ever-changing environment. At the beginning of the paper, I talked about the dangers of an ossifying ideology. This danger takes on new heights in an intellectual environment where criticisms and views cannot be freely expressed. I believe the USSR collapsed precisely because there was not a fair exchange of ideas, it was not able to adapt until it was far to late. The following vignette is an example of what can happen when there is no marketplace for ideas: After the reality of the devastation brought about by the Great Leap Forward came to Chairman Mao’s attention, he issued a very interesting statement. To paraphrase, he said that the great Chinese famine would have never occurred in a democracy because the devastation caused by the agricultural reform would have been brought to attention much earlier. Because there was no free press and tolerance of criticism was low, Chinese bureaucrats were able to keep publishing inflated numbers about rice production even though production had been falling. The Chinese government continued to believe these inflated projections until the truth could no longer be ignored. Unfortunately, 20 million people died before this happened. What is more unfortunate is that Mao did not continue his brief flirtation with democracy.

# Neo-liberalism kritik answers

## (--) Neo-liberal growth solves pollution—empirical evidence proves.

Jagdish **Bhagwati, 2004** (professor of economics and law at Columbia) In Defence of Globalization, 2004 pg. 138-139)

As income rises, activities that cause more pollution may contract and those that cause less pollution may expand, so the sulfur dioxide concentration may fall instead of rise. In fact, as development occurs, economies typically shift from primary production, which is often pollution-intensive, to manufactures, which are often less so, and then to traded services, which are currently even less pollution-intensive. This natural evolution itself could then reduce the pollution-intensity of income as development proceeds. Then again, the available technology used, and technology newly invented, may become more environment-friendly over time. Both phenomena constitute an ongoing, observed process. The shift to environment-friendly technology can occur naturally as households, for example, become less poor and shift away from indoor cooking with smoke-causing coal-based fires to stoves using fuels that cause little smoke. 19 But this shift is often a result also of environment-friendly technological innovation prompted by regulation. Thus, restrictions on allowable fuel efficiency have promoted research by the car firms to produce engines that yield more miles per gallon. But these regulations are created by increased environmental consciousness, for which the environmental groups can take credit. And the rise of these environmental groups is, in turn, associated with increased incomes. Also, revelations about the astonishing environmental degradation in the Soviet Union and its satellites underline how the absence of democratic feedback and controls is a surefire recipe for environmental neglect. The fact that economic growth generally promotes democracy, as discussed in Chapter 8, is yet another way in which rising income creates a better environment. In all these ways, then, increasing incomes can reduce rather than increase pollution. In fact, for several pollutants, empirical studies have found a bell-shaped curve: pollution levels first rise with income but then fall with it. 20 The economists Gene Grossman and Alan Krueger, who estimated the levels of different pollutants such as sulfur dioxide in several cities worldwide, were among the first to show this, estimating that for sulfur dioxide levels, the peak occurred in their sample at per capita incomes of $5,000–6,000. 21 Several historical examples can also be adduced: the reduction in smog today compared to what the industrial revolution produced in European cities in the nineteenth century, and the reduced deforestation of United States compared to a century ago. 22

## (--) Pollution threatens all humanity.

Lourdes **Salvador, 2007** (founder of MCS America) “Human Extinction” Apr. 14, 2007. Retrieved May 31, 2012 at http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/24238

The most common pattern of macroevolutionary trends is extinction. In short “when a species is no longer adapted to a changed environment, it may die. Extinction seems, in fact, to be the ultimate fate of all species” (Relethford, 2005). One has to wonder the fate of the human race as the world becomes more and more toxic and people become more ill. Are 60% (Ray & Oakley, 2003) of Americans taking psychiatric medications because they are really mentally ill or is it our society that is sick and we the victims of trying to adapt to a bad environment? How can we justify that 60% is a MAJORITY of the population that is labeled as mentally ill? How long can we deny the damage of modern pollution to the human body before we take action? How long can we sustain reproductive damage before we can no longer reproduce and have children to share our tales of an earlier generation with? Occasionally I have heard statements such as “we will evolve to tolerate air pollution.” Such statements are absurdities. Natural selection only operates on variations that are present. If no genetic variation occurs to aid in breathing polluted air, natural selection will not help us. Even in cases where genetic variation is present, the environment may change too quickly for us to respond to natural selection. All we have to do is examine the fossil record to see how inaccurate this misconception is—that 99% of all past species are extinct shows us that natural selection obviously doesn't always work” (Relethford, 2005). If natural selection does not work and we will not evolve to handle the ever increasing toxic burden then what hope is there for us as the world becomes more and more toxic? How can we ensure our future survival as our bodies become laden with mercury, lead, fire retardants, PCB’s, PBDE’s, Pesticides, Dioxins, pFA’s Phthalates, Bisphenols, and other chemicals of modern day living while the powers that be deny any connection in the name of profits?

# Neo-liberalism kritik answers

## (--) Free trade alone can improve environmental quality—empirics prove.

Jagdish **Bhagwati, 2004** (professor of economics and law at Columbia) In Defence of Globalization, 2004 pg.138-139)

Thanks to the debates between free-traders and environmentalists, most sophisticated environmentalists no longer hold the view that if trade is freed without environmental policies being in place, not only will the environment be harmed but the country’s economic welfare will be set back. But this misconception is still commonplace in the wider environmental community. That this may happen is surely correct. That it must happen is incorrect. I and my GATT colleagues Richard Blackhurst and Kym Anderson addressed this issue in 1991 when I was economic policy adviser to Arthur Dunkel, the director general. The GATT Secretariat was working on a special report on trade and the environment, and we took the occasion to clarify matters. 8 In particular, we provided examples from the real world that showed that, contrary to the environmentalists’ pessimistic certainties, economic welfare increased with trade liberalization even though ideal environmental policies were not in place, and that the environment improved also. 9 The most compelling illustration came from agricultural trade liberalization contemplated in the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations. Anderson calculated that such liberalization would shift agricultural production from higher-cost, pesticide-intensive European agriculture to lower-cost, manure-using agriculture in the poor countries, so that both income and welfare would increase in each set of countries, and total environmental quality would also improve. The GATT report also cited a study by Robert Feenstra that showed (as is illustrated in the following chart) that import quota protection had led, as economists had predicted, to increased imports of larger gasguzzling cars from Japan and reduced imports of smaller, higher-fuelefficiency cars because the bigger cars carried more margin of profit than the smaller ones and it paid the Japanese car manufacturers to export more of the larger cars within a given quota. So the imposition of protectionist quotas had led to **both lower economic welfare and to increased pollution.**

## (--) Neoliberal globalization is the solution to global environmental problems, not the problem

Jeffrey **Frankel, 2000**(Professor at Harvard University) “Globalization: Why and How It Should Continue” 2000 Retrieved May 31, 2012 at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/jfrankel/GloblztnF.pdf

Environmental and social issues increasingly cut across national boundaries, in part because people care increasingly care about what goes on in other countries. These issues are of the sort that are impossible to address if each country goes its own way. A genuinely difficult question, on which reasonable people differ, is whether the category legitimately includes aspects of production processes, such as child labor, which have no effect on the importing country other than offending moral sensibilities. Global agreements to address these issues, for which countries voluntarily sign up, should be the ultimate objective. But this will not be easy, because of the sovereignty issue. Bottom line: Globalization need not be the enemy of the environment, and national sovereignty need not be its friend. Indeed, given the globalization of environmental concerns, national sovereignty will more likely be the enemy of efforts to protect the environment, because those efforts must increasingly be pursued through global agreements. (2) The other reason why global agreements will not be easily achieved is because there is wide disagreement even within a given country such as the United States on goals and priorities regarding, for example, environmental protection. The strongest opponents of the Kyoto Protocol on Global Climate Change, for example, are US labor unions. [They fear a loss in US competitiveness.] The US has also been slow to ratify some ILO agreements, toothless as they are, because of states’ rights issues and domestic disagreement. It is profoundly mistaken to blame such fundamental disagreements within the country on external factors -globalization or multilateral institutions.

# Neo-liberalism kritik answers

## Neo-liberalism eliminates poverty and increases wages.

Jagdish **Bhagwati, 2009** (professor of economics and law at Columbia) “Feeble Critiques: Capitalism’s Petty Detractors,” 2009. Retrieved May 31, 2012 at <http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/feeble-critiques-capitalisms-petty-detractors>)

We had enjoyed almost two decades in which the liberal reforms undertaken by China and India, with nearly half the world’s population between them, had produced an unprecedented prosperity that (and this must be emphasized) had finally made a significant impact on poverty, just as we reformers had asserted that it would. The rich countries, with a steady expansion of liberal policies during the 1950s and 1960s, had also registered substantial prosperity. (This was episodically interrupted by exogenous circumstances like the success of OPEC in 1971 and the Volcker-led purging of the 1980s, but generally always resumed with robust growth.) Meanwhile, an increasing number of the poor countries had turned to democracy, altering the status quo ante in which India had been the one “exceptional nation” to have embraced and retained democracy after independence. Some will object that economies have at times registered high growth rates for long periods despite bad economic policies. But we must ask: are such growth rates sustainable? I tell the story about how my radical Cambridge teacher, Joan Robinson, was once observed many years ago agreeing with the mainstream Yale developmental economist Gus Ranis on the subject of Korea’s phenomenal growth. The paradox was resolved when it turned out that she was talking about North Korea and he about South Korea. Now, more than three decades later, we know who was right. In a similar vein, Soviet growth rates were high for a long period, thanks to exceptionally high investment rates and despite the horrendous absence of incentives and embrace of autarky. But then the Soviet Union descended into a steady decline until a mismanaged transition with perestroika plunged the country into negative growth rates. The effort to make the anomalous into the universal is a polemical exercise. Some economists, such as Dani Rodrik, like to cite occasional high growth rates in countries without liberal—or, as some critics prefer because it sounds more sinister, “neoliberal”—policies as a refutation of liberal policies. This, however, misses both the point of the issue and the sweep of history. Other critics then shift ground, claiming that higher growth is beside the point and that we need to judge capitalism by whether it works for the poor. But slowly growing or stagnant economies cannot rescue the poor from their poverty on a sustained basis. In countries with massive poverty, such as India and China, economic success has had to come principally through rapid growth of incomes and jobs. This is, of course, common sense. Just as firms that make losses cannot finance corporate social responsibility policies, countries with stagnant economic performance cannot rescue the poor from their poverty. It was bad policy that kept China and India from growing in the first place. Only after liberal economic reforms did these countries register accelerated growth rates that, during the last 20 years, finally pulled nearly 500 million people above the poverty line. However grim the current crisis has been, it cannot be used to deny this elemental truth. Arguing the other side of the coin, the AFL-CIO and other labor unions in the United States claim that trade with poor countries has produced paupers in the richer countries by depressing real wages. But this dire conclusion is not supported by empirical findings. My own analysis, dating back at least a decade (and extended in my 2004 book, In Defense of Globalization), argued that, if anything, the fall in wages which labor-saving technical change and other domestic institutional factors would inevitably have brought about was actually moderated by trade with poor countries. This benign conclusion has since been reasserted by Robert Lawrence of Harvard’s Kennedy School (despite an unsuccessful attempt by Paul Krugman in a recent Brookings paper, commissioned by Lawrence Summers, to prove otherwise). Indeed, the same goes for the effect of unskilled immigration on the wages of our unskilled workers. Giovanni Peri of U.C. Davis has shown for unskilled immigration what I showed for trade with poor countries: that the effect is benign. Thus, we need not apologize for liberal policy in terms of its effects on overall prosperity, on poverty in poor countries, or on the wages of the poor in rich countries. To compare an interruption of this remarkable progress to the collapse of the Berlin Wall is like drawing a parallel between a tsunami and a summer storm that brings rain and a rich harvest to parched plains.

# Neo-liberalism kritik answers

## (--) Ongoing poverty threatens millions of people each year.

Stephanie **Spina, 2000** (Ph.D. candidate in social/personality psychology at the Graduate School of the City University of New York) Smoke and Mirrors: The Hidden Context of Violence in Schools and Society, p. 201

This sad fact is not limited to the United States. Globally, 18 million deaths a year are caused by structural violence, compared to 100,000 deaths per year from armed conflict. That is, approximately every five years, as many people die because of relative poverty as would be killed in a nuclear war that caused 232 million deaths, and every single year, two to three times as many people die from poverty throughout the world as were killed by the Nazi genocide of the Jews over a six-year period. This is, in effect, the equivalent of an ongoing, unending, in fact accelerating, thermonuclear war or genocide, perpetuated on the weak and the poor every year of every decade, throughout the world.

## (--) China and India prove that neo-liberalism solves poverty

Jagdish **Bhagwati, 2004** (professor of economics and law at Columbia) In Defence of Globalization, 2004 pg.64-66)

So, with the usual caveat that in the social sciences one can rarely establish the degree of credibility for one’s argument that one can aspire to in the physical sciences, one can conclude that freer trade is associated with higher growth and that higher growth is associated with reduced poverty. Hence, growth reduces poverty. The best way to see that is to focus on the two countries, India and China, that have the largest pool of world poverty. Both shifted to outward orientation roughly two decades ago, and this contributed to their higher growth in the 1980s and 1990s. China adopted aggressively outward-oriented economic policies in 1978. India also began opening its insular economy in a limited fashion in the 1980s and more systematically and boldly in the 1990s. According to World Bank estimates, real income (gross domestic product) grew at an annual average rate of 10 percent in China and 6 percent in India during the two decades ending in 2000. No country in the world had growth as rapid as China’s, and fewer than ten countries (and, except for China, none with poverty rates and population size comparable to India’s) had a growth rate exceeding India’s during these years. What happened to their poverty? Just what common sense suggests: it declined. Thus, according to the Asian Development Bank, poverty declined from an estimated 28 percent in 1978 to 9 percent in 1998 in China. Official Indian estimates report that poverty fell from 51 percent in 1977– 78 to 26 percent in 1999–2000. Contrast what happened in India during the quarter of a century prior to the economic reforms and the abysmally low annual growth rate of 3.5 percent. During that period, the poverty rate remained stagnant, fluctuating around 55 percent. China’s track record on poverty reduction in the pre-reform period is dismal as well, but there were also major adverse effects from the huge famine during the Great Leap Forward of Chairman Mao and from the disruptive Cultural Revolution. This experience, showing how growth will in fact reduce poverty, just as I had predicted and prescribed at the Indian Planning Commission in the early 1960s, has been shown to be valid in other countries where Dollar and Kraay have examined the experience carefully, among them Vietnam and Uganda. More recent estimates by my Columbia colleague Xavier Sala-iMartin have underlined the same conclusion dramatically. He has estimated poverty rates worldwide, using data for ninety-seven countries between 1970 and 1998. His conclusion on the relationship of growth to poverty reduction is as strong a corroboration as I can find of my 1960s conjecture that growth must be reckoned to be the principal force in alleviating poverty: [T]he last three decades saw a reversal of roles between Africa and Asia: in the 1970s, 11% of the world’s poor were in Africa and 76% in Asia. By 1998, Africa hosted 66% of the poor and Asia’s share had declined to 15%. Clearly, this reversal was caused by the very different aggregate growth performances. Poverty reduced remarkably in Asia because Asian countries grew. Poverty increased dramatically in Africa because African countries did not grow. As a result, perhaps the most important lesson to be learned . . . is that a central question economists interested in human welfare should ask, therefore, is how to make Africa grow. 36 So when we have moved away from the anti-globalization rhetoric and looked at the fears, even convictions, dispassionately with the available empirical evidence, we can conclude that globalization (in shape of trade and, I will argue later in Chapter 12, direct equity investment as well) helps, not harms, the cause of poverty reduction in the poor countries.

# Neo-liberalism Kritik Answers—Extensions Solves War

## Neo-liberalism checks war.

Daniel **Griswold, 2006** (director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies @ CATO Institute) “, Peace on earth? Try free trade among men,” 2006. Retrieved May 31, 2012 at <http://www.freetrade.org/node/282>

First, trade and globalization have reinforced the trend toward democracy, and democracies don't pick fights with each other. Freedom to trade nurtures democracy by expanding the middle class in globalizing countries and equipping people with tools of communication such as cell phones, satellite TV, and the Internet. With trade comes more travel, more contact with people in other countries, and more exposure to new ideas. Thanks in part to globalization, almost two thirds of the world's countries today are democracies -- a record high. Second, as national economies become more integrated with each other, those nations have more to lose should war break out. War in a globalized world not only means human casualties and bigger government, but also ruptured trade and investment ties that impose lasting damage on the economy. In short, globalization has dramatically raised the economic cost of war. Third, globalization allows nations to acquire wealth through production and trade rather than conquest of territory and resources. Increasingly, wealth is measured in terms of intellectual property, financial assets, and human capital. Those are assets that cannot be seized by armies. If people need resources outside their national borders, say oil or timber or farm products, they can acquire them peacefully by trading away what they can produce best at home.

# Neo-Liberalism Answers—Solves Patriarchy

## (--) Neo-liberalism solves patriarchy:

Jagdish Bhagwati, 2004 (professor of economics and law at Columbia) In Defence of Globalization, 2004 pg. 74-76)

That globalization can help rather than harm women emerges dramatically when one examines how globalization has affected the women of Japan. In the aftermath of the great outward expansion of Japan’s multinationals in the 1980s and early 1990s, Japanese men executives were sent to the United States, England, France, and other Western nations (Japanese women then rarely made it through a very low glass ceiling). These men brought with them their Japanese wives and children. In New York, they lived in Scarsdale, Riverdale, and Manhattan. And the wives saw at first hand that Western women, though they have some way to go, were treated better. So did the young children become not docile Japanese who are taught the value of social conformity and harmony but rambunctious little Americans who value instead the individualism that every immigrant parent confronts when the children return home from school and say, “That is the way I want to do it.” Schools are where cultural conditioning occurs subliminally, even explicitly. The women and children who then returned to Japan became agents for change. They would never be the same again. Feminism, women’s rights, other human rights, due process for citizens and immigrants, and a host of other attributes of a modern society began slowly to replace the traditional ways of Japanese culture, and globalization in the shape of Japanese corporations’ expansion abroad had played a critical role. That influence has also come, of course, from other (non-economic) forms of globalization such as the vast increase in Japanese students in Western universities in recent years. Just a decade ago at Columbia, where I teach, the largest nationality in an entering class of over four hundred in the School of International and Public Affairs was Japanese. Many of these students steadily adapted themselves to American ways. Instead of bowing low to the “revered teacher,” the sensei, they learned to put their feet on the table, even crudely blow bubble gum, in class. And as they returned to Japan (though now a few began to stay on, like students from most other countries) they brought American responses to the increasing trade feuds with the United States. Thus, when the HosokawaClinton summit in Washington failed in 1993, the Japanese prime minister’s staff essentially said, “If you object to our trade practices, see you in court!” But President Clinton’s staff thought we could still deal with the Japanese in the old ways, through bilateral confrontations and deals. As I explained in an article in Foreign Affairs at the time, we thought we were fighting the samurai, but we were fighting GIs. 2 But the favorable effect on women’s issues in Japan because of globalization in the form of extensive outward flow of Japanese multinationals to the West is not the only example one can find. My favorite example is the study of globalization in trade on the gender wage gap between 1976 and 1993 in the United States by the economists Sandra Black and Elizabeth Brainerd. 3 Such wage discrimination can be explained in alternative ways. One persuasive theory, due to the Nobel laureate Gary Becker, is that men are paid more than women by employers, even though they have no greater merit and productivity within the firm, simply because of prejudice. 4 But this prejudice has its price: any firm that indulges it is going to be at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis firms that hire without this prejudice and pay men no more than they pay women. Now, if we have a closed economy and all domestic firms share this prejudice, it will not make any one firm less competitive: all firms will be equally handicapped. But when we introduce foreign competition, the foreign firms that do not share this prejudice will be able to gain in competitiveness over domestic firms that indulge the prejudice. Liberalized trade, which enables foreign firms to compete with the domestic firms in open markets, therefore puts pressure on domestic firms to shed their prejudice. The gender wage gap will then narrow in the industries that must compete with imports produced by unprejudiced firms elsewhere. But consider a related but different and more potent argument. If markets open to trade, competition will intensify, whatever the reason that enables foreign firms to compete with our firms in our domestic and international markets. Faced with increased competition, firms that were happy to indulge their prejudice will now find that survival requires that any and all fat be removed from the firm; cost cutting will mean that the price paid for prejudice will become unaffordable. Again, the gender wage gap will narrow. The remarkable thing is that Black and Brainerd find that this did actually happen, confirming the predictive power of sophisticated economic reasoning. Firms in the United States that had been subject to relatively less competitive pressure but which then experienced competitive pressure due to openness to trade showed a more rapid reduction in their gender wage gap.

# Neo-Liberalism K Answers—Alt Fails

## Neo-liberal globalization causes universal growth and solves poverty—no alternative comes close.

Gary **Hufbauer and** Kati **Suominen, 2010** (Reginald Jones senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics; resident fellow at the German Marshall Fund in Washington) “The Return of Globalization,” 2010. Retrieved May 31, 2012 at <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/10/21/> The\_Return\_of\_Globalization?page=0,1)

Such policies may have short-term political benefits, but there are **no** good alternatives that **come close** to generating the benefits that emanate from freer economic exchange. A Peterson Institute study shows that the U.S. economy alone has gained $1 trillion annually due to globalization in the postwar era and stands to score another $500 billion per year from future policy liberalization. Matthew Slaughter of Dartmouth College's Tuck School of Business has found that for every job outsourced from the United States, almost two are created in America, and that the prime globalizers -- U.S. multinational companies -- pay up to 24 percent higher wages in the United States than do non-globalized firms. The oft-demonized globalized capital markets are a force of great good, inspiring financial development and entrepreneurship the world over. Peterson Institute fellow William Cline's survey of the literature concludes that general financial openness boosts growth by about 1 percent annually for industrial countries, and 0.5 percent annually for emerging countries. Openness to foreign direct investment contributes about 1 percent annually to growth in industrialized countries and 1.4 percent annually to growth in emerging countries. Globalization has also been among the best foreign-aid programs the world has ever known: The World Bank has found that when it comes to stimulating growth, globalization has a direct, **one-to-one relationship** with poverty reduction.

## The best studies prove that alternatives to neo-liberalism won’t bolster the economy.

Jagdish **Bhagwati, 2004** (professor of economics and law at Columbia) In Defence of Globalization, 2004 pg.61-63)

At the same time, the modern evidence against an inward-looking or import substitution trade strategy is really quite overwhelming. In the 1960s and 1970s, several full-length studies of the trade and industrialization strategies of over a dozen major developing countries, including India, Ghana, Egypt, South Korea, the Philippines, Chile, Brazil, and Mexico, were undertaken at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the National Bureau of Economic Research, the leading research institution in the United States. 29 These studies were very substantial and examined several complexities that would be ignored in a simplistic regression analysis across a multitude of nations. Thus, for instance, in examining whether the 1966 trade liberalization in India worked, T. N. Srinivasan and I wrote a whole chapter assessing whether, after making allowance for a severe drought that blighted exports, the liberalization could be considered to have been beneficial compared to a decision to avoid it. Only after systematic examination of the actual details of these countries’ experience could we judge whether trade liberalization had truly occurred and when; only then we could shift meaningfully to a limited regression analysis that stood on the shoulders of this sophisticated analysis. The result was to overturn decisively the prevailing wisdom in favor of autarkic policies. 30 Indeed, many of us had started with the presumption that inward-looking policies would be seen to be welfare-enhancing, but the results were strikingly in the opposite direction, supportive of outward orientation in trade and direct foreign investment instead. Why? 31 • The outward-oriented economies were better able to gain from trade. The layman finds it hard to appreciate this because, as the Nobel laureate Paul Samuelson has remarked, perhaps the most counterintuitive but true proposition in economics has to be that one can specialize and do better. • Economists today also appreciate that there are scale economies in production that can be exploited when trade expands markets. This is particularly the case for small countries. For this reason, Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya, which had protected themselves with high tariffs against imports in the 1960s, found that the cost of their protection was excessively high, with each country producing a few units of several items. They decided in the 1970s therefore to have an East African Common Market so that they could specialize among themselves and each could produce at lower cost for the larger combined market. • Then there are the gains from increased competition. Restriction of trade often is the chief cause of domestic monopolies. Freer trade produces enhanced competition and gains therefrom.

# \*\*\*\*\*Nine-Eleven K Shell (1-2)\*\*\*\*\*

## A) The rhetoric of 9/11 carries with it a host of dangerous assumptions—it legitimates the war on terror and the very civil liberties abuses they indict

CAROLINE KENNEDY-PIPE AND NICHOLAS RENGGER, 2006 (“Apocalypse now? Continuities or

disjunctions in world politics after 9/11” International Affairs, vol. 82, 3, accessed via EBSCO)

It is now a commonplace of political reflection that the attacks on New York and Washington in September 2001 (to which we will henceforth refer, following common usage, as 9/11), as well as the events that have fl owed from them—the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the US-declared ‘war on terror’, the adoption of an offi cial policy of preventive war by the Bush administration and so on— have reshaped the world politics of the early twenty-fi rst century. Of course, the relative optimism of the early to mid-1990s had already decayed a good deal before 9/11; but since that watershed, it is now often claimed, world politics has taken on a much darker, more apocalyptic hue than at any time in recent history, and this has had profound implications as much for areas such as the global economy and environmental sustainability as for security. Of course, this claim has been expressed in diff erent ways. Ken Booth and Tim Dunne, in the preface to their discussion of the 9/11 attacks, have suggested that ‘For years to come, if not decades, the “war on terrorism” will be the defi ning paradigm in the struggle for global order.’1 The contemporary historian John Lewis Gaddis invokes an even more powerful image to emphasize the ‘newness’ and radically transformative character of 9/11, in his meditation on the US experience in its wake: through the days, weeks and months that followed … most of us managed to return to an approximation of normality. And yet our understanding of what is ‘normal’ is not what it once was. Just as New Yorkers go about their familiar activities in the shadow of an unfamiliar skyline, so something within each of us has also changed. It’s as if we were all irradiated, on that morning of September 11 2001, in such a way as to shift our psychological makeup—the DNA in our minds—with consequences that will not become clear for years to come.2 This article seeks to investigate these claims across a range of theoretically disputed areas, and asks whether, how and to what extent the events of the early twentyfi rst century really presage a fundamental, as opposed to merely epiphenomenal, shift in world politics. While some of the topics that we will look at are not staples of theorizing in IR in general or, at least, in the most dominant forms of IR theory, all of them have important implications for IR theory. Moreover, we would argue that ‘theory’ in IR scholarship—indeed in political studies more generally—is best seen as refl ection upon practice, refl ection of various sorts to be sure—philosophical, historical and of other kinds—but nontheless an activity that takes practice in important ways as prior and thus sees theory as parasitic on practice. Briefly put, our argument is—without denying the obvious importance of 9/11 or suggesting simply that ‘the future will be like the past’—that world politics displays far more continuity than change; that 9/11, rather than heralding a new era in world politics, was merely symptomatic of certain key aspects of world politics that should be familiar to all serious students of the field but which, for a variety of reasons, some of which we will briefl y discuss, seem to have been forgotten in the aftermath of the attacks. The one thing that is new, however—and to this we certainly do wish to draw attention—is the belief that there has been a great change in the architecture of world politics. We argue here that this belief is largely a delusion. Nonetheless, it is shared by important elements both in the West and elsewhere, and has created, and is continuing to create, a very dangerous and unstable set of assumptions that, far from delivering security, is generating far greater insecurity than many of the more familiar and traditional assumptions about world politics. In the context of western policy, this belief is manifested chiefl y in the assumptions that have gone to make up the so-called ‘war on terror’—now redefi ned by the Bush administration as ‘the long war’3—and the associated changes in US and wider security and military doctrine. One example of this is the development of what amounts to a preventive war strategy in the US National Security Strategy of 2002.4 However, a more radical and disturbing example can perhaps be found in the changes that seemed to have occurred with regard to traditional western assumptions about the relationship between law and national security under conditions of threat, with the at least partial defence of ‘robust’ interrogation techniques—seen by some as eff ectively legitimating torture—and special facilities where such interrogations take place (for example, the practice of ‘extraordinary rendition’ and the facilities at Abu Ghraib prison and Guantanamo Bay), and the introduction of new legislation which might limit many traditional civil liberties.

# Nine-Eleven K Shell (2-2)

## **B) The so called post 9/11 era is merely a fiction—belief in it leads to the manipulation of rhetoric and a time period infected with fear:**

University of Leicester, 9/14/2009 (“9/11 has led to a rhetoric - 'Infected with fear'”

<http://www.alphagalileo.org/ViewItem.aspx?ItemId=60969&CultureCode=en>

Eight years on from the 9/11 terrorist attacks, new research from the University of Leicester's Centre for American Studies has examined the impact of the atrocity on language, sense of realism, and how it has led to America's 'current state of fear'. The research, undertaken by Dr Catherine Morley, a lecturer in the School of English at the University of Leicester, reveals that 9/11 not only influenced society's sense of realism and its ability to express this realism, but also let to the manipulation of language, and a rhetoric - 'infected with fear'. She examined different literary responses to the culture of fear and the so-called 'war on terror' looking at how they explore government surveillance, infringement of civil liberties and the role of the media in the new global environment of distrust. As Dr Morley puts it: "In light of this attack on American soil, the first foreign attack since the Second World War, it is not surprising that American writers became more subjective and less dispassionate in their immediate responses, presenting raw personal grief and their perceived sense of the futility of their literary endeavours. There was a general feeling among writers that words would inevitably fail in the face of the extremely visual nature of the attacks. "The events of September 11 engendered a new reality, so close and so familiar it was 'unreal'. When reality becomes a nightmare, realism itself falls apart. And in this context the textual combination of the literary and the visual might come closest to capturing the terrible trauma of 11 September 2001." As writers were called upon to make sense of what the world had witnessed, many commented on the surreal nature of the attacks. Dr Morley explains: "What was immediately striking about a great number of these writers' responses was the emphasis on the visual or on the actual spectacle of the attacks. Many writers described themselves as impotent, as though they were frozen in front of the television screen or, in the case of the New York writers, watching from some city vantage point. "Indeed, for many writers in the weeks and months after the attacks, the heightened visibility of the attacks seemed to render them 'too real'. So the problem for the writer was how to write about events which seemed to defy the logic of traditional narrative realism, and which presented a story that the whole world was already familiar with through an unending televisual loop." Dr Morley's analysis of US government documents finds an 'extraordinarily pervasive rhetoric of fear.' Her research reveals how US military rhetoric and government-fuelled paranoia are conflated within the fiction of the post-9/11 era. The effect, says Morley, is to make a rather deliberate, if subtle, point, which acknowledges the complicity of the West in the propagation of the current state of fear. "It has done so to such an extent that the raised terror alerts which are regularly announced by the global media seem to have engendered a heightened sense of reality, bordering on the surreal in its capacity for inspiring terror." 9/11 fiction continues to be integrated into Dr Morley's courses as she says, "It still feels very relevant and of course all the students remember the atrocity well. They are very interested in it and the effect it has had on society." Literary artists continue to add to the body of comment on what was a terrible historical event. And their reactions, embodied in the fictions produced after 9/11, continue to challenge perceptions and provoke new discussion, eight years on.

## C) The Impact and the Alternative: Hailings of 9/11 are co-opted by conservatives to justify war and imperialism: We should reject appeals to the rhetorical tool of 9/11:

Kalie Gold, 2007 (http://www.watsonblogs.org/matrix/2007/09/from\_kalie\_gold\_should\_we\_forg.html)

Should we forget 9/11? My name is Kalie, I am a senior at Brown University, concentrating in International Relations; I am originally from Washington, DC. I was in DC on 9/11, and still live there. I am taking this class to explore a different way of looking at history—through theoretical frameworks rather than just facts. My first thought is, what is the role of memory? In this case, we should be careful to call it “historical memory.” The complex context surrounding 9/11 pushes us to not just see it as a day of tragedy, but to place it in perspective. Analyzing “tragedy” and truth in the same moment, however, is not an easy task. What an idealistic view. Historical memory is always caught up in complex forces that do not serve a greater good. Historical memory is most often a tool: to define group identity for political purposes, to incite people to action, and to justify means and ends. We have seen 9/11 become this sort of tool. 9/11 left the US with a national feeling of unjust victimization. The idea and feeling of victimization has justified retaliation, and the US took our own violence abroad to Afganistan and Iraq. To forget how the process worked, where it began, and the results, would be wrong. Twenty years from now, the world needs to be able to both learn from our (and others’) mistakes, and appreciate why and from where they came. Does remembering September 11th do us harm? Arguably it already has—regrets about Afganistan, Iraq, and other issues are caught up in the memory of 9/11. Forgetting what happened, and what has happened since, would be a disservice to history.

# Nine-Eleven K--AT: Said it once, no big deal

## A) Irrelevant, our advocacy solves your entire aff, if we win a ghost of a link, we win.

## B) They define 9/11 as demarcating an “era” they literally define history by saying events after a date on the calendar are relevant which feeds into all of our links—we need to stop defining history by this moment in time—this has led to right wing co-option, the creation of a police state, etc, flipping back all of their racialization of Arab and Muslims arguments.

# Nine-Eleven K--Extension Evidence: 9-11 Era Rhetoric Bad

## (--) The judge should vote negative to reject the idea that 9/11 ushered in anything new--

CAROLINE KENNEDY-PIPE AND NICHOLAS RENGGER, 2006 (“Apocalypse now? Continuities or

disjunctions in world politics after 9/11” International Affairs, vol. 82, 3, accessed via EBSCO)

To set about illustrating these themes we will comment briefly on four distinct areas in which the events of the last few years have been much debated (and disputed). These are, first, conceptions of the geopolitical assumptions that govern world politics; second, the character of the ideological debates that increasingly frame world politics; third, the character and outcome of arguments about the use of military force in contemporary world politics; and fourth, the legal and moral issues raised by privileging certain arguments about national security in the context of political freedoms more generally. Obviously, in a short article such as this our arguments can do no more than scratch the surface of the question addressed. However, in each case we want to reject the claim that prevailing conditions require us to think differently about world politics in fundamental ways and assert on the contrary that many of the traditional ways in which we have considered these questions are broadly satisfactory, despite the perceived changes in the conditions of world politics after 9/11.

## (--) The belief that 9/11 created a new world is most evident in changes toward civil liberties—it justifies harsh crackdowns on civil society—vote negative to reject that belief system:

CAROLINE KENNEDY-PIPE AND NICHOLAS RENGGER, 2006 (“Apocalypse now? Continuities or

disjunctions in world politics after 9/11” International Affairs, vol. 82, 3, accessed via EBSCO)

Law, war and the civil condition In perhaps no sphere of western policy have the implications of the perception of the ‘new threats’ created by 9/11 and its aftermath been so controversial—and so radical—as in what we might term the relation between traditional assumptions about civil liberties and the allegedly changed character of the threat, and therefore of the security measures necessary to meet the threat. In both the United States and the United Kingdom (but also in Russia) especially, wholly new legislative and executive powers have been deemed warranted—for example, the creation of a whole apparatus of homeland security in the US,32 and in the UK the new antiterror laws and the government’s new draft legislation against ‘hate crime’ in the UK. Along with these measures have come the decisions by western and other governments to use—let us say—‘quasi-judicial’ techniques that in western politics have long been regarded with suspicion or indeed completely forsworn, at least in theory. Perhaps most notorious is the perceived relaxation of the attitude to torture by the US government.33 This phenomenon, it is argued, is attested to by the creation of the internment camps at Abu Ghraib prison and at Guantanamo Bay,34 a deliberately ‘extra-legal’ area outwith formal US jurisdiction, yet wholly controlled by the US government, and by the now well-documented practice of ‘extraordinary rendition’.35 This latter describes the transfer of suspected or captured terrorists to countries without the usual ‘liberal’ legal restrictions on interrogation, as well but the whole process includes as the less formal but perhaps equally revealing behaviour of some in the detention camps like Abu Ghraib.36 The alleged new situation has even led some in the US—most notoriously the Harvard law scholar Alan Dershowitz—to argue for the incorporation of torture into US law under specifi c circumstances through the creation of what he called ‘torture warrants’.37 Some liberal commentators have suggested that these developments, taken together, amount to some of the greatest threats to the traditional understanding of the relationship between civil liberties and security for well over a hundred years. But on closer inspection, we suggest, what is revealed here are not radically new ideas or practices but really rather old ones. The point is that what is new is the belief that the situation since 9/11 has created a very radical new set of threats and therefore the balance between security and liberty needs to be shifted decisively in favour of the former. As we have already said, it is our belief that this view is incorrect. In no way does the situation in which we now fi nd ourselves represent any kind of radical departure from the normal patterns of world politics that have obtained for a very considerable period of time. Indeed, the kinds of jurisprudential arguments to which we have just alluded featured in the debates that characterized the gradual establishment of the liberal polity at least since the middle of the eighteenth century; and, of course, the modern character of law, and especially of international law, has developed through those arguments. As the Finnish legal scholar Marti Koskiniemmi has argued, modern international law, ‘the gentle civiliser of nations’,38 to use his term, is itself a political project and a broadly liberal one. The relationship of this tradition to other jurisprudential traditions has always been contestable and contested. In the United States, for example, a very strong body of legal opinion has always been—to put it mildly—lukewarm about the idea of the ‘binding’ character of international law, regarding domestic law, rooted in the constitution, as binding, but international law (as, obviously, not being so rooted) as being at best advisory.39 Such jurisprudential arguments, together with the necessarily interpretative character of legal argument in general, account in part for the variety of legal views on whether torture or the invasion of Iraq (or any other possible instance of the use of force) is, or is not, legal. The point, of course, is to suggest that such arguments, far from determining with clarity the rights and wrongs of this or that intervention, are simply part of such debates and cannot therefore be appealed to in order to settle them. The most signifi cant point to make here, however, is that the claims that are made on behalf of the arguments in favour of tipping the balance towards security and away from liberty are dependent upon the truth of the grounding claim that the situation after 9/11 represents something radically different and quite new. As we have suggested already, this claim cannot be sustained. The defence of torture and other shifts in the balance between previously dominant understandings of the relationship between liberty and security must thus depend for their cogency on much older arguments about the balance between liberty and security in a liberal polity. It is our view that nothing in these arguments would support a weakening of the prohibition on torture and associated practices that in general terms has been the default position of liberal states for well over a hundred years.40

# Nine-Eleven K: Extension Evidence: 9/11 Era Rhetoric Bad

## (--) 9-11 ushered in nothing new—it did not fundamentally alter the terms in which international politics was conducted:

CAROLINE KENNEDY-PIPE AND NICHOLAS RENGGER, 2006 (“Apocalypse now? Continuities or

disjunctions in world politics after 9/11” International Affairs, vol. 82, 3, accessed via EBSCO)

Geopolitical frameworks Perhaps the commonest claim after 9/11 was that it fundamentally altered the terms in which international politics was conducted. These claims have come from both commentators on the events and actors in them. On the evening of 9/11, after all, President Bush declared that ‘night fell on a diff erent world’5 and in an essay published the following year, the man who had famously—a short twelve years before—announced the end of history remarked that ‘world politics, it would seem, shifted gears abruptly after September 11th’.6 One of the areas where this was deemed to be most obviously so was in the relationships between the major players in world politics. From a period of relative stability in these relations—one that is largely traceable to the manner in which the Cold War ended in the early 1990s7—we appeared to have moved to one of marked geopolitical fl uctuation. Very quickly, after 9/11, both out of genuine shock and horror and perhaps also out of a recognition of the likely ferocity of the US response, states that had been rivals or even—in the case of Russia—adversaries for much of the previous century stood, and announced that they stood, shoulder to shoulder with the United States. It was a French newspaper that bore the famous headline ‘We are all Americans now’, but the sentiment was shared in many parts of the globe, notwithstanding the celebrations that broke out in parts of the developing world to gloat over the ‘humbling’ of the United States. Yet within three years that alliance, that coalition of the willing that had supported and cooperated with the United States in the invasion of Afghanistan—in many cases in very radical ways indeed: think, for example, of the support extended to the US by certain Central Asian states, or by some Middle Eastern states such as Syria)8—had fractured, perhaps beyond repair, over the American decision to invade Iraq. It is unquestionably true that the events that spun out from 9/11 have created a high level of instability in contemporary international politics; yet it does not seem to us that this is anything other than a fairly natural concomitant of the events themselves, coupled with other—and long-known—aspects of contemporary international politics, such as speed of communication and technological change. ‘It is hardly a surprise’, his biographer Porphyry has the ancient sage Plotinus say, ‘that sticks and stones should fall, and that men, who must die, should die.’ Equally, we would suggest, it is hardly radically new or very surprising that states combine balancing and bandwagoning (and sometimes try to fi nesse a bit of both) in the context of a fl uid and changing world political scene. As Kenneth Waltz has commented, three basic facts about world politics seem remarkably unchanged by 9/11. The fi rst is what he terms the ‘gross imbalance of power’ in the world since the demise of the Soviet Union, i.e. unchallenged US primacy. The second is the gradual proliferation of nuclear weapons in particular and to some extent weapons of mass destruction in general, a trend certainly made worse by events since 9/11 but fi rmly in place long before it and, indeed, in many respects a central feature of international politics almost from the beginning of the nuclear era. The third is the permanence and prevalence of crises in the world, crises in which, given its pre-eminent position, the US is almost certain to be involved to some extent, but which are, again, a well-known feature of international politics in almost any era.9 As will be seen, we will want to challenge at least one aspect of Waltz’s analysis, (the unchallenged nature of US primacy) but in broad terms, and in this context, we accept it. The events of 9/11 and all they have brought in their train provide the context in which international politics, in many aspects at least, is currently played out, but the manner in which it is played out seems very familiar. There does not appear to be anything very radical here.

## (--) 9-11 ushered in nothing new in world politics:

CAROLINE KENNEDY-PIPE AND NICHOLAS RENGGER, 2006 (“Apocalypse now? Continuities or

disjunctions in world politics after 9/11” International Affairs, vol. 82, 3, accessed via EBSCO)

For Bernstein, it is this clash, far more than any specifi c diff erence between ‘Islam’ and ‘the West’, that characterizes our era, and he argues unambiguously that we need to support the doubters and the sceptics and problematize the simple certainties of the true believers on any side. In this respect we would certainly agree with him. But the point surely is to add that this ‘clash’ is an old and complex one, reaching way further back than 9/11; its roots lie in some of the most diffi cult and extensive changes that can be said to characterize the modern world, and its implications are very far-reaching. Indeed, we would argue that, penetrating though his analysis is, Bernstein might perhaps be underestimating the extent of the problem; for the clash might be not simply between absolutist certainty and sceptical fallibilism, but also between competing conceptions of the character and implications of that fallibilism. Bernstein’s version, infl uenced by philosophical pragmatism and a democratic sensibility, may not be the only one on off er. Others might take a still more sceptical view—perhaps, for example, of democracy itself. In any case, though, the problem is not one that has been initiated by 9/11, even if its lineaments have perhaps been shown in clearer outline because of that event; so here again, there **does not seem to be much reason** to suppose 9/11 initiated anything radically new in world politics.

# Nine-Eleven Kritik Extensions

## 9/11 exists as a ghost that continually haunts American discourse—hailings back to 9/11 allow the definition of a group identity for political purposes, incite people to justify violent retaliation…remembering 9/11 does us harm…

## More evidence…We should move beyond a myopic fixation on 9/11—this fixation justifies oppressive foreign and domestic policies—UTSA’s advocacy would be better without the rhetorical marker 9/11:

Jonah Stuart Brundage, 2007 (http://www.watsonblogs.org/matrix/2007/09/from\_jonah\_stuart\_brundage\_sho.html)

Hello, my name is Jonah Stuart Brundage. I am a senior concentrator in International Relations, focusing on the track of Politics, Culture and Identity. This course greatly appeals to me in both its theoretical approach to international relations and its emphasis on the importance of history. I believe that in order to even begin to comprehend contemporary international relations, it is necessary to assume a historical viewpoint, excavating the originating moments in the development of modern IR theory and practice. Moreover, I believe that such cultural and ideational social phenomena as identity and difference, self and other—as emphasized by this course—are essential to explaining IR. Consequently, I am taking this course to further familiarize myself with a set of approaches to and readings on international relations that relate to my own theoretical interests within the discipline, but are nonetheless often shunned by mainstream IR. September 11 was a horribly tragic moment in our nation’s history and we must continue to honor and mourn its victims. Nonetheless, our government’s symbolic usage of this event, as a justification for many foreign and domestic policies, is seriously detrimental to the interests of both the American people and global security. Thus, while we should not forget September 11, it is absolutely necessary to move beyond our often myopic fixation with it. In the first instance, our elevation of September 11 to an act of war, analogous to those committed by states, is certainly not the most effective means of combating terrorism. Terrorist networks, in their very nature, are fundamentally different from national states, and must be combated accordingly. And despite the current administration’s talk of a post-9/11 era (a problematic term, in itself) as necessitating a fundamentally new approach to foreign policy, this approach—from the use of the word “war” to the act of invading state sponsors of terrorism—remains locked in an anachronistic era of inter-state relations. It would probably be much more effective to treat terrorism within the framework of global law enforcement, requiring a pooling of resources on the part of states rather than the traditional state action of war. Moreover, our September 11 fixation not only inadequately combats the real threat of terrorism but furthers the possibility of additional threats to human society. The domestic response of our government, like its foreign policy counterpart, represents, in many respects, not a new paradigm for a globally integrated world but a reassertion of the coercive apparatus of the modern state. Fortunately, we are indeed finally beginning to move beyond September 11, as the decreased media focus on this year’s anniversary seems to suggest. In order to further this process, however, we need to radically reconceptualize our understanding of national and global security. We need to view terrorism as just one of many possible threats facing both our country and humanity, and not necessarily the greatest threat either. In this respect, projects like the Global Security Matrix put us on the right track, inasmuch as they help us view and assess multiple threats simultaneously and urge us to move from a national to a global notion of security. Of course, we can also take concrete political action by electing leaders who will implement more sensible policies regarding the threat of terrorism. Nonetheless, although these actions may help us move beyond our current fixation on September 11, the general problem of our country’s response is, at least in part, the product of deeper structural problems—namely, the continued existence of the modern nation-state coupled with a fundamentally new global system. Although terrorism is merely one of many threats to human beings, it is a much greater threat to the state, for it undermines its very basis for existence—the monopoly on violence (hence the attempt by the United States to reassert that monopoly in both the international and domestic arenas). Although this logic may be somewhat overly deterministic, I do believe it signals that the only way to adequately approach terrorism is to move beyond the modern states system. Until this is the case, the phenomenon of the American response to September 11 will likely be recurring.

## (--) They should have to defend their advocacy—plan-less affirmatives should have to defend the text of their AFF to provide some level of response by the negative. They get the choice of defending either the plan or the rhetorical consequences of their discourse

# Nine-Elevn Kritik Extensions

## Memories of 9/11 perpetuate further violence—we shouldn’t use this as a benchmark reference point--

Marta da Silva, September 18, 2007(http://www.watsonblogs.org/matrix/2007/09/how\_do\_we\_get\_past\_911\_should.html)

How do we get past 911? Should we forget 911?

Upon receiving this assignment and processing this question, I reasoned that the dilemma in dealing with the tragic events of 911 is an issue of the perception and obligation of commemoration. People need to (yet often do not) separate living in the past and learning from the past. Instead of moving forward in aims of peace, memories of violence and the perception of the events on 911 perpetuate further violence; in a primitive sense, the reaction is comparable to schoolyard, or playground revenge. Violence becomes synonymous with action and justified as such, upholding a sense of duty to remember and fight for the victims of the terrorist attacks. An article from the New York Times on September 11th illustrated the prevailing question of “whether the war in Iraq has made the United States safer or more vulnerable to terrorists.” I would even argue that another question prevails: whether the war in Iraq has made the United States more similar to the terrorists. There is a disturbing video online (http://www.current.tv/pods/controversy/PD04399) that demonstrates a torture technique called “water-boarding,” which is one of the methods used against terrorist suspects. The video at one point states that the aim is for torture to prevent terrorism. Which is worse? Does putting a government label on these methods of violence make them logical or acceptable? Does not this method of resolution simply perpetuate the problem? Likewise, are we better off constantly using 911 as our benchmark reference point, or should we move on? Illustrated by the reading from Theories of International Relations, analyses such as that of Maja Zehfuss contend that the “White House has exploited the memory of ‘September 11’ to justify the curtailment of civil liberties at home, and an aggressive military response abroad,” (167). The politics of memory, as argued by postmodernists, has become a powerful tool in policy decision-making. People must be aware of policy actions and their affiliated interpretations; we must differentiate between honoring the victims and creating some semblance of peace in their memory. A time must come when we can remember and honor the tragedies of 911 without relying on that memory to justify current policies of vengeance and violence. We must commemorate the victims without becoming blinded by the remorse.

## ****(--) Their AFF justifies continued over-reactions to 9-11—9/11 has justified a vast military and intelligence build-up that crushes individual freedoms while expanding the state:****

Fareed Zakaria, 2010 (http://www.newsweek.com/2010/09/04/zakaria-why-america-overreacted-to-9-11.html What America Has Lost)

**The error this time is more damaging.** September 11 was a shock to the American psyche and the American system. As a result, we overreacted. **In a crucially important Washington Post reporting project, “Top Secret America,” Dana Priest and William Arkin spent two years gathering information on how 9/11 has really changed America. Here are some of the highlights.** Since September 11**, 2001,** the U.S. government has created or reconfigured at least 263 organizations to tackle some aspect of the war on terror.The amount of money spent on intelligence has risen by 250 percent**, to $75 billion (and that’s the public number, which is a gross underestimate).** That’s more than the rest of the world spends put together**. Thirty-three new building complexes have been built for intelligence bureaucracies alone, occupying 17 million square feet—the equivalent of 22 U.S. Capitols or three Pentagons. Five miles southeast of the White House, the largest government site in 50 years is being built—at a cost of $3.4 billion—to house the largest bureaucracy after the Pentagon and the Department of Veterans Affairs: the Department of Homeland Security, which has a workforce of 230,000 people. This new system produces 50,000 reports a year—136 a day!—which of course means few ever get read. Those senior officials who have read them describe most as banal; one tells me, “Many could be produced in an hour using Google.” Fifty-one separate bureaucracies operating in 15 states track the flow of money to and from terrorist organizations, with little information-sharing.** Some 30,000 people are now employed exclusively to listen in on phone conversations and other communications in the United States**. And yet no one in Army intelligence noticed that Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan had been making a series of strange threats at the Walter Reed Army Medical Center, where he trained. The father of the Nigerian “Christmas bomber” reported his son’s radicalism to the U.S. Embassy. But that message never made its way to the right people in this vast security apparatus. The plot was foiled only by the bomber’s own incompetence and some alert passengers.**

# Nine-Eleven Kritik Extensions

## Biopower risks extinction

**Foucault ‘84 [http://iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?t=108852 , Michel Foucault]**

Since the classical age the West has undergone a very profound transformation of these mechanisms of power... a power bent on generating forces, making them grow, and ordering them, rather than one dedicated to impeding them, making them submit, or destroying them... Yet wars were never as bloody as they have been since the nineteenth century, and all things being equal, never before did regimes visit such holocausts on their own populations. But this formidable power of death... now presents itself as the counterpart of a power that exerts a positive influence on life, that endeavors to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations. Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity: massacres have become vital. It is as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars, causing so many men to be killed. And through a turn that closes the circle, as the technology of wars has caused them to tend increasingly toward all-out destruction, the decision that initiated them and the one that terminates them are in fact increasingly informed by the naked question of survival. The atomic situation is now at the end point of this process: the power to expose a whole population to death is the underside of the power to guarantee an individual's continued existence... the existence in question is no longer the judicial existence of sovereignty; at stake is the biological existence of a population. If genocide is indeed the dream of modern powers, this is not because of a recent return of the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population.

# Nine-Eleven Kritik Impacts: Intervention/Military Occupation = Extinction

## Continued militarism guarantees extinction

Kevin Clements, President of the International Peace Research Association, Director of the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason, April 3, 1996, Toda Institute Seminar, “The Future of Peace and Conflict Studies,” http://www.toda.org/Default.aspx?PageID=39

What I am suggesting by all of this is that peace and conflict studies in the past have been overwhelmingly biased by sets of Western middle class concerns. (I could also add white, male, reformist concerns.) This is not of itself a bad thing since it did result in the evolutionary of a new interdisciplinary field albeit around a rather narrow range of critical problems, e.g., analysis of the conditions for negative peace (or the absence of war and direct violence) or positive peace (the elimination of structural violence and the promotion of social and economic justice and fairness.) Both of these preoccupations, i.e., the causes of war and violence and the conditions for peace and justice remain at the heart of peace and conflict studies but they need to be broadened if we are to make a significant contribution to the survival of the species and if we are to develop a deepened enhancement of the quality of life for all peoples. So how do we wish to do this? In the first place we must build on the traditions that have been established in the field in order to eliminate militarism, national and global violent conflict and the threat of global destruction. In relation to nuclear weapons, for example, although the risk of nuclear confrontation has diminished considerably, there is continuing anxiety about the command and control of such weapons in Russia and far too many states that wish to cross the nuclear threshold to enhance their international bargaining power, e. g., Pakistan, India, Iran, and Iraq, etc. Generally, however, as the recently formed Canberra Commission notes, this is an opportune time to push for the total abolition of nuclear weapons and all weapons of mass destruction. They have no military utility and are increasingly seen as a political liability as well.

## (--) Military interventions turns the case—it feeds a crisis mentality that prevents solutions to underlying rights violations:

Karen Engle, 2007 (Professor in Law @ University of Texas). “"Calling in the Troops": The Uneasy Relationship Among Women's Rights, Human Rights, and Humanitarian Intervention.” Harvard Human Rights Journal, Spring 2007. Accessed Sept. 9, 2010, Lexis Academic Universe

I am critical of this emerging consensus because I am uneasy with the idea that destroying life and infrastructure is a way to demonstrate concern for a particular place or situation, especially when most of history has shown that such intervention--regardless of motivation--rarely improves the lives of the individuals who are the stated subjects of intervention. More importantly for this Article, I object to the way that calls for military intervention feed into a crisis mentality. As military intervention increasingly becomes the norm for protecting victims of "serious" human rights violations, those who seek to redress a particular problem are increasingly pressured to couch it in terms of a crisis that only immediate military intervention can resolve. This focus often distorts the nature of the violation or harm and displaces an awareness of the extent to which both military and nonmilitary interventions--such as colonialism, economic and military assistance, and lack of such assistance--have helped produce the crises. International law itself has condoned, if not facilitated, such crisis-generating interventions. n3

# \*\*\*\*\*Ontology Frontline\*\*\*\*\*

**Existence precedes ontology: their metaphysical arguments are meaningless in the face of our arguments:**

**Wapner 2003** (Paul, associate professor and director of the Global Environmental Policy Program at American University. Leftist Criticism of. Accessed at <http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=539>)

THE THIRD response to eco-criticism would require critics to acknowledge the ways in which they themselves silence nature and then to respect the sheer otherness of the nonhuman world. **Postmodernism prides itself on criticizing the urge toward mastery** that characterizes modernity. But isn't mastery exactly what postmodernism is exerting as it captures the nonhuman world within its own conceptual domain? Doesn't postmodern cultural criticism deepen the modernist urge toward mastery by eliminating the ontological weight of the nonhuman world? What else could it mean to assert that there is no such thing as nature? I have already suggested the postmodernist response: yes, recognizing the social construction of "nature" does deny the self-expression of the nonhuman world, but how would we know what such self-expression means? Indeed, nature doesn't speak; rather, some person always speaks on nature's behalf, and whatever that person says is, as we all know, a social construction. All attempts to listen to nature are social constructions-except one. Even the most radical postmodernist must acknowledge the distinction between physical existence and non-existence. As I have said, postmodernists accept that there is a physical substratum to the phenomenal world even if they argue about the different meanings we ascribe to it. This acknowledgment of physical existence is crucial. We can't ascribe meaning to that which doesn't appear. What doesn't exist can manifest no character. Put differently, yes, the postmodernist should rightly worry about interpreting nature's expressions. And all of us should be wary of those who claim to speak on nature's behalf (including environmentalists who do that). But we need not doubt the simple idea **that a prerequisite of expression is existence.** This in turn suggests that preserving the nonhuman world-in all its diverse embodiments-must be seen by eco-critics as a fundamental good. Eco-critics must be supporters, in some fashion, of environmental preservation.

**Perm: Do the plan and all non-mutually-exclusive parts of the alternative**

**Alternative doesn’t solve: An ontological focus will forever delay political action**

**Jarvis 2000** (Darryl, Associate Professor & Deputy Director, Centre for Asia and Globalisation. International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism: Defending the Discipline. pg. 139-140)

**This we might interpret as faceless description without meaning, commitment without purpose, and theory without reason**. As William Connolly notes, **Ashley creates a poststructuralism bereft of logic, direction, or mission, where “theory does not ‘impose’ a general interpretation; it does not offer ‘a guide’ to the ‘transformation’ of life ‘on a global scale.’” Well might we ask then, what does it do?** After all, is this not the purpose of theory? Apparently not. It is enough for Ashley that we simply fret against transcendental grounds, universal projects, and grand designs. But, as Connolly observers, buy imposing “this set of interwoven self-restrictions, Ashley may have reduced ‘poststructuralism’ to one perpetual assignment to ‘invert the hierarchies’ maintained in other theories. **One might call this recipe for theoretical self-restriction ‘post-ponism.’ It links the inability to establish secure ontological ground for a theory with the obligation to defer indefinitely the construction of general theories of global politics. And it does so during a time when the greatest danger and contingencies in the world are global in character**.

# Ontology Extensions

## Extend Wapner – obviously existence is a pre-requisite to expression – we can’t have ontology if we don’t secure physical existence first.

## And extend 2AC Jarvis – focusing on ontology first precludes decisions that are vital to achieving real change on a global scale – don’t do it.

**An ontological focus causes us to ignore major problems like famine, environmental degredation, poverty, and genocide**

**Jarvis 2000** (Darryl, Associate Professor & Deputy Director, Centre for Asia and Globalisation. International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism: Defending the Discipline. pg. 2)

While Hoffmann might well be correct, **these days one can neither begin nor conclude empirical research without first discussing epistemological orientations and ontological assumptions. Like a vortex, metatheory has engulfed us all and the question of “theory” which was once used as a guide to research is now the object of research**. Indeed, **for a discipline whose purview is ostensibly outward looking and international in scope**, and at a time of ever encroaching globalization and transnationalism, **International Relations [IR] has become increasingly provincial and inward looking.**  Rather than grapple with the numerous issues that confront people around the world, **since the early 1980s the discipline has tended more and more toward obsessive self-examination.** These days the politics of famine, environmental degradation, underdevelopment, or ethnic cleansing, let alone the cartographic machinations in Eastern Europe and the reconfiguration of the geo-global political-economy, seem scarcely to concern theorist of international politics who define the urgent task of our time to be one of metaphysical reflection and epistemological investigation. **Arguably, theory is no longer concerned with the study of international relations so much as the “manner in which international relations as a discipline, and international relations as a subject matter, have been constructed.” To be concerned with the latter is to be “on the cutting edge,” where novelty has itself become an “appropriate form of scholarship**”

**Placing ontology first freezes intellectual development**

**Chernoff 2007** (Fred, Professor in the Department of Political Science at Colgate University. Millennium Journal of International Studies. 35: 406. Accessed via Sage Publications)

Wight opposes ‘unnecessary closure’ that could result from the specification of methodological criteria in advance of ontology. It is, however, difficult to see how, on his view, he can explain the development of theories that postulate entities which do not seem at all plausible, given our previous background knowledge and theories, such as the quantum concept of the atom or relativistic character of the physical universe. The requirement that we must start by specifying the theoretical ontology would restrict all theories that postulate entities that are extremely unfamiliar; those theories could not be considered no matter how much more fully, simply and clearly they explain the observable world and no matter how much better they produce correct predictions of the outcomes of experiments. SR, if understood as requiring a specification of the theoretical ontology before competing theories are tested, would be the approach that leads to closure. It is important to be clear about what commitments investigators must make at various stages of inquiry. In my view, the only possible ontological commitments we should have to start with are commitments to common-sense objects (dogs, cats) and pre-theoretical objects (wars, chess matches). We then formulate precise questions about the observable world and devise theories to answer those questions. The theory that answers the questions best, based on specifiable criteria and available evidence, is accepted. If we are supporters of SR we may include the theoretically postulated entities in our ontology; if we reject SR, we will not. Real-world scientists who endorse SR infer the reality of the entities that the best theories postulate only after the theories are shown, on the basis of available evidence and the accepted criteria of scientific theory choice, to be superior to their rivals. Scientists do not specify a theoretical ontology in advance of inquiry. The key point is that the theoretical entities we include in our ontology are given by our best theory and cannot be specified in advance. There is an interactive process of developing a theoretical ontology out of a common-sense ontology, observations, and a set of methodological and epistemological principles. We have no grounds on which to accept a hegemonic trade regime in nineteenth-century Europe or quarks other than the fact that they play a role in a theory that we value.

# \*\*\*\*\*Predictions Good Frontline\*\*\*\*\*

**Alternative doesn’t solve: Rejection of prediction blocks efforts to create emancipation and dooms all policymaking**

**Chernoff 2005** (Fred, Prof. of Political Science at Colgate The Power Of International Theory, p. 215)

**Various IR theorists have also argued against prediction**. For example, Donald Puchala contends that IR theory ‘does not, because it cannot in the absence of laws…invite us to deduce, and it does not permit us to predict’ (Puchala 1991: 79). Interpetivist and reflectivist IR theorists like Ashley (1986), Onuf (1989), Walker (1993) and others, following the lead of critical theorists and prediction-sceptic philosophers of social science, argue that IR theory (discussed in Chapter 3) is able to facilitate an interpretive understanding of events and deny that IR theory is capable of prediction or scientific-style explanation. **Even though many of these authors hope that IR theory can lead to ‘human emancipation’, their meta-theory undercuts its ability to do so. This trend in the theoretical literature in IR severs the link between IR theory and any significant ability to aid policy-makers to bring about emancipation or any other foreign policy goal. If they do not leave room for rationally grounded expectations about the future, that is, scientific-style prediction, then it will be impossible to formulate policies that can be expected to achieve various aims, including the emancipation of oppressed groups. Without the ability to say that a given action option has a higher probability than any of the other options of achieving the objective, e.g., a greater degree of emancipation of the target group, these theorists cannot recommend courses of action to achieve their desired goals.** The loss of this essential capability has been largely overlooked by constructivsts and reflectivists in the IR literature. **All policy decisions are attempts to influence or bring about some future state of affairs. Policy-making requires some beliefs about the future**, whether they are called ‘expectations’, ‘predictions’, ‘forecasts’ or ‘prognostications’. The next step in the argument is to show how such beliefs can be justified.

**Turn: Right-Wing Fill In--A rejection of predictions causes cults of personality to fill the void—leading to Iraq style invasions and arms build-ups:**

**Fitzsimmons 2006** (Michael, defence analyst in Washington DC “The problem of uncertainty in

strategic planning”. Survival, Winter 2006-2007. Accessed via EBSCO Host.)

**If the effects of stressing uncertainty were limited to contradictory statements in strategic-planning documents and speeches, the harm would be small and redress would be of largely academic interest. But there is strong circumstantial evidence that these effects extend beyond the rhetorical domain**. Three examples illustrate problems arising from an aversion to prediction in strategic planning. **Current nuclear-weapons policy and posture illustrate the strategic costs that uncertainty can exact in the form of keeping options open.** The 2006 QDR shows how **uncertainty can inhibit clear strategic choice in the allocation of resources.** Finally, **the use of intelligence and expert advice in planning for the 2003 invasion of Iraq shows how uncertainty can actually serve to privilege pre-conceptions over analysis and thereby undermine strategic flexibility. Uncertainty** **in the future security environment has been a key organising principle for the posture and planning of the US nuclear arsenal**. In an effort to leave Cold War nuclear-force-sizing logic behind, the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) adopted from the 2001 QDR a 'capabilities-based approach' to establishing requirements for US nuclear weapons. **The premise of the capabilities-based approach is that threats cannot be predicted reliably. As a result**, in the words of then Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith, **'instead of our past primary reliance on nuclear forces for deterrence, we will need a broad array of nuclear, non-nuclear and defensive capabilities for an era of uncertainty and surprise'.17 In practical terms, this meant that the numbers and alert levels of deployed nuclear weapons would need to be considerably higher than would be necessary simply to deter Russia and China.**

# Predictions Good: Alt Doesn’t Solve Extensions

**Extend our Chernoff evidence—he’s a professor of political science at Colgate—he argues that scientific-style predictions are the best way to evaluate arguments to bring about emancipation and other foreign policy goals. Be skeptical of their utopian alternative evidence and make them prove tangibly why their rejection of predictions will lead to better outcomes.**

**And…Even if we can’t know the future with certainty, abandoning the path of predictions is worse:**

**Kurasawa 2004** (Fuyuki, Assistant Professor of Sociology at York University. “Cautionary tales: The global culture of prevention and the work of foresight”. Constellations, 11:4, p. 458-459)

When engaging in the labor of preventive foresight, the first obstacle that one is likely to encounter from some intellectual circles is a **deep-seated skepticism about the very value of the exercise**. A radically postmodern line of thinking, for instance, would lead us to believe that it is pointless, perhaps even harmful, to strive for farsightedness in light of the aforementioned crisis of conventional paradigms of historical analysis. If, contra teleological models, history has no intrinsic meaning, direction, or endpoint to be discovered through human reason, and if, contra scientistic futurism, prospective trends cannot be predicted without error, then the abyss of chronological inscrutability supposedly opens up at our feet. **The future appears to be unknowable, an outcome of chance. Therefore, rather than embarking upon grandiose speculation about what may occur, we should adopt a pragmatism that abandons itself to the twists and turns of history; let us be content to formulate ad hoc responses to emergencies as they arise.** While this argument has the merit of underscoring the fallibilistic nature of all predictive schemes, it conflates the necessary recognition of the contingency of history with unwarranted assertions about the latter’s total opacity and indeterminacy. **Acknowledging the fact that the future cannot be known with absolute certainty does not imply abandoning the task of trying to understand what is brewing on the horizon and to prepare for crises already coming into their own. In fact, the incorporation of the principle of fallibility into the work of prevention means that we must be ever more vigilant for warning signs of disaster and for responses that provoke unintended or unexpected consequences** (a point to which I will return in the final section of this paper). In addition, from a normative point of view, the acceptance of historical contingency and of the self-limiting character of farsightedness places the duty of preventing catastrophe squarely on the shoulders of present generations. The future no longer appears to be a metaphysical creature of destiny or of the cunning of reason, nor can it be sloughed off to pure randomness. It becomes, instead, a result of human action shaped by decisions in the present – including, of course, trying to anticipate and prepare for possible and avoidable sources of harm to our successors.

**Acting on our best guesses is preferable to endless criticism and relativism.**

**Ferguson and Mansbach 2008** (Yale H. and Richard W., profs. of international relations at Rutgers & Iowa State. A world of polities: Essays in global politics. Pg. 59)

Yet in truth (pun intended), both the positivists and extreme relativists fail to convince us, although the latter would insist that that is proof positive of the validity of their arguments. As a gesture of goodwill, we similarly suggest that one familiar criticism of postmodernists does more to affirm the position of the extreme relativists than to refute them, to wit: with no standards for evidence, why should an observer accept their perspective more than any other? Or, as Roger Scruton (cited in Fernandez-Arnesto, 1997: 203) put it: “The man who tells you truth doesn’t exist is asking you not to believe him. So don’t.” Ah yes, but why then should we believe Roger Scruton? Martin Hollis (1994: 241) sums up: “All interpretations become defensible but at the price that none is more justifiable than the rest. If this is indeed the upshot, the circle turns vicious and the hermeneutic imperative to understand from within leads to disaster.” It is precisely this disaster that is unacceptable, especially when there would appear to be more constructive alternatives. Can we not discuss and debate ideas as well as we can, given our personal biases, weasel language, and imperfect information? For instance, we hope the readers of this chapter would agree that, whether or not they accept the arguments we are making, they understand what we are saying well enough—and that there are only a limited number of counterarguments worthy of admission to the dialogue. To be sure, we may all be wrong, but we are not all normally engaged in tales told by idiots or nonsense games.

# Predictions Good: Right-Wing Fill In Extensions

Extend our Fitzsimmons evidence—he illustrates how an emphasis on uncertainty regarding consequences justifies actions to invade countries because we’re not sure if they have Weapons of Mass Destruction and the logic of building up nuclear weapons for the fear of the unknown. The abandonment of causality doesn’t lead to a utopian peace politics—it leads to right-wingers filling in the void and saying we have to be afraid of everything—no matter how remote the likelihood that it will occur is.

**More evidence…This argument is empirically true: conservatives have filled in the gap in the past and weapons build ups cause proliferation and nuclear war**

**Fitzsimmons 2006** (Michael, defence analyst in Washington DC “The problem of uncertainty in strategic planning”. Survival, Winter 2006-2007. Accessed via EBSCO Host.)

**While the NPR is classified, the extent to which its policy is underpinned by the strategic importance of uncertainty is made very clear in a private report published in January 2001 by several strategists who, only months later, were writing nuclear policy in the Pentagon**.18 **The report**, published by the National Institute for Public Policy, **identifies a variety of plausible ways in which the future security environment might change from the status quo, especially in dangerous directions, and evaluates the potential utility of nuclear weapons in adapting to those changes. It does not attempt to assess the likelihoods of any of those alternative futures and, indeed, dismisses the utility of any such assessment**, concluding that 'there can be no logical integrity in the confident assertion that any given force level, even if judged to be appropriate today, will continue to be so in the future'.19 **The problem with this logic, while laudably cautious, is that it does not leave a great deal of scope for deciding on or justifying any course of action whatsoever about weapons deployment. If there were no trade-offs involved with having large numbers of nuclear weapons on high alert, this might be a minor problem. But, of course, this is not the case. Beyond the resources they consume, large numbers of nuclear weapons on alert may be unnecessarily provocative in crises, may hamper non-proliferation efforts, and may raise the risk of accidental launch by other nuclear powers prompted to maintain high alert levels themselves.** The risks of being underprepared for unexpected warfighting contingencies must be weighed against these. A 1997 National Academy of Sciences report summarised this trade-off: 'During the Cold War, reducing the risk of a surprise attack appeared to be more important than the risks generated by maintaining nuclear forces in a continuous state of alert. With the end of that era, the opposite view is now more credible.'20

# Predictions Good: Right-Wing Fill In Extensions

**Turn: Dogma--Failure to use empirical standards of analysis causes dogmatic personal beliefs of policymakers to fill the void.**

**Fitzsimmons 2006** (Michael, defence analyst in Washington DC “The problem of uncertainty in

strategic planning”. Survival, Winter 2006-2007. Accessed via EBSCO Host.)

Why is this important? What harm can an imbalance between complexity and cognitive or analytic capacity in strategic planning bring? Stated simply, **where analysis is silent or inadequate, the personal beliefs of decision-makers fill the void.** As political scientist Richard Betts found in a study of strategic surprise, **in 'an environment that lacks clarity, abounds with conflicting data, and allows no time for rigorous assessment of sources and validity, ambiguity allows intuition or wishfulness to drive interpretation** hellip **The greater the ambiguity, the greater the impact of preconceptions.'16** The decision-making environment that Betts describes here is one of political-military crisis, not long-term strategic planning. But a strategist who sees uncertainty as the central fact of his environment brings upon himself some of the pathologies of crisis decision-making. He invites ambiguity, takes conflicting data for granted and substitutes a priori scepticism about the validity of prediction for time pressure as a rationale for discounting the importance of analytic rigour. It is important not to exaggerate the extent to which data and 'rigorous assessment' can illuminate strategic choices. Ambiguity is a fact of life, and scepticism of analysis is necessary. Accordingly, the intuition and judgement of decision-makers will always be vital to strategy, and attempting to subordinate those factors to some formulaic, deterministic decision-making model would be both undesirable and unrealistic. All the same, **there is danger in the opposite extreme as well. Without careful analysis of what is relatively likely and what is relatively unlikely, what will be the possible bases for strategic choices? A decision-maker with no faith in prediction is left with little more than a set of worst-case scenarios and his existing beliefs about the world to confront the choices before him. Those beliefs may be more or less well founded, but if they are not made explicit and subject to analysis and debate regarding their application to particular strategic contexts, they remain only beliefs and premises, rather than rational judgements. Even at their best, such decisions are likely to be poorly understood by the organisations charged with their implementation. At their worst, such decisions may be poorly understood by the decision-makers themselves.**

**Dismissing predictive models locks in the status quo—turning the kritik.**

**Fitzsimmons 2006** (Michael, defence analyst in Washington DC “The problem of uncertainty in

strategic planning”. Survival, Winter 2006-2007. Accessed via EBSCO Host.)

Moreover, this style of decision-making is self-reinforcing. **A strategist dismissive of explicit models of prediction or cause and effect is likely to have a much higher threshold of resistance to adjusting strategy in the face of changing circumstances. It is much harder to be proven wrong if changing or emerging information is systematically discounted on the grounds that the strategic environment is inherently unpredictable. The result may be a bias toward momentum in the current direction, toward the status quo. This is the antithesis of flexibility**. Facts on the ground change faster than belief systems, so the extent to which a strategy is based on the latter rather than the former may be a reasonable measure of strategic rigidity. In this way, **undue emphasis in planning on uncertainty creates an intellectual temptation to cognitive dissonance on the one hand, and confirmatory bias on the other**.

**Rejecting prediction won’t usher in a utopian alternative—it will merely lock in the status quo.**

**Kurasawa 2004** (Fuyuki, Assistant Professor of Sociology at York University. “Cautionary tales: The global culture of prevention and the work of foresight”. Constellations, 11:4, p. 458-459)

But neither evasion nor fatalism will do. Some **authors have grasped this, reviving hope in large-scale socio-political transformation by sketching out utopian pictures of an alternative world order**. Endeavors like these are essential, for they spark ideas about possible and desirable futures that transcend the existing state of affairs and undermine the flawed prognoses of the post-Cold War world order; what ought to be and the Blochian ‘Not-Yet’ remain powerful figures of critique of what is, and inspire us to contemplate how social life could be organized differently. **Nevertheless, my aim in this paper is to pursue a different tack by exploring how a dystopian imaginary can lay the foundations for a constructive engagement with the future**.

# Predictions Good: Right-Wing Fill In Extensions

**Reliance on predictive tests requires decision-makers to expose their beliefs—this makes them easier to challenge.**

**Fitzsimmons 2006** (Michael, defence analyst in Washington DC “The problem of uncertainty in

strategic planning”. Survival, Winter 2006-2007. Accessed via EBSCO Host.)

Ultimately, though, **the value of prediction in strategic planning does not rest primarily in getting the correct answer, or even in the more feasible objective of bounding the range of correct answers. Rather, prediction requires decision-makers to expose, not only to others but to themselves, the beliefs they hold regarding why a given event is likely or unlikely and why it would be important or unimportant.** Richard **Neustadt and** Ernest **May highlight this useful property of probabilistic reasoning in their renowned study of the use of history in decision-making**, Thinking in Time. **In discussing the importance of probing presumptions, they contend: The need is for tests prompting questions, for sharp, straightforward mechanisms the decision makers and their aides might readily recall and use to dig into their own and each others' presumptions**. And they need tests that get at basics somewhat by indirection, not by frontal inquiry: not 'what is your inferred causation, General?' Above all, not, 'what are your values, Mr. Secretary?'hellip If someone says 'a fair chance'hellip ask, 'if you were a betting man or woman, what odds would you put on that?' If others are present, ask the same of each, and of yourself, too. Then probe the differences: why? This is tantamount to seeking and then arguing assumptions underlying different numbers placed on a subjective probability assessment. **We know of no better way to force clarification of meanings while exposing hidden differences** hellip Once differing odds have been quoted, the question 'why?' can follow any number of tracks. Argument may pit common sense against common sense or analogy against analogy. **What is important is that the expert's basis for linking 'if' with 'then' gets exposed to the hearing of other experts before the lay official has to say yes or no.**'35

**Emphasizing strategic uncertainty re-entrenches bureaucratic political power.**

**Fitzsimmons 2006** (Michael, defence analyst in Washington DC “The problem of uncertainty in

strategic planning”. Survival, Winter 2006-2007. Accessed via EBSCO Host.)

Admittedly, the role played by strategic uncertainty in the decision-making processes at the highest levels in this case is speculative. And, to be fair, neither of the two previous QDRs was notable for codification of difficult choices either. There are considerable inertial political forces, both inside and outside the Pentagon, that slow efforts to implement major programmatic change. Nevertheless, the gap between the QDR's aspiration and its achievement in terms of driving transformational change raises the questions: might different choices have been made if advocates for change could have mustered stronger arguments about the potential bases for making controversial trade-offs? And on what grounds might advocates of paring back procurement of expensive weapon systems have justified their views, if not the diminishing likelihood of conventional conflict with peer or near-peer military competitors? But, if claims about differential likelihoods of various types of major military contingencies are drowned out by the noise of uncertainty, then the intellectual grounds for debating strategic choice become quite slippery. In the process, strategic choice becomes more susceptible than it would otherwise be to the dynamics of bureaucratic political power.

**Predictions Good Extensions: Predictions Work/Succeed**

**Even if strategizing is uncertain, we should plan for the MOST LIKELY future events by looking at a robust range of evidence.**

**Fitzsimmons 2006** (Michael, defence analyst in Washington DC) :The problem of uncertainty in strategic planning” Survival, Winter 2006-2007. Accessed via EBSCO Host. )

Much has been made about the defining role of uncertainty in strategic planning since the end of the Cold War. With the end of bipolar competition, so the argument goes, and the accelerating pace of change in technology and international political and economic relations, forecasting world events even a few years into the future has become exceedingly difficult. Indeed, few in the year 2000 would have described with much accuracy the current conditions facing national-security decision-makers. Moreover, history offers ample evidence, from the Schlieffen Plan to the Soviet economy, that rigid planning creates risks of catastrophic failure. Clearly, uncertainty demands an appreciation for the importance of flexibility in strategic planning. For all of its importance, however, recognition of uncertainty poses a dilemma for strategists: in predicting the future, they are likely to be wrong; but in resisting prediction, they risk clouding the rational bases for making strategic choices. Over-confidence in prediction may lead to good preparation for the wrong future, but wholesale dismissal of prediction may lead a strategist to spread his resources too thinly. In pursuit of flexibility, he ends up well prepared for nothing. A natural compromise is to build strategies that are robust across multiple alternative future events but are still tailored to meet the challenges of the most likely future events.

**The future is not shrouded in mystery—we can make some predictions about future events in international relations.**

**Fitzsimmons 2006** (Michael, defence analyst in Washington DC) :The problem of uncertainty in strategic planning” Survival, Winter 2006-2007. Accessed via EBSCO Host. )

Additionally, **the notion that today's future is less certain than yesterday's is overdrawn.** There is more nostalgia than truth behind the characterisation of the Cold War as 'a time of reasonable predictability'. Presidents from Harry Truman to George H.W. Bush might have taken exception to that description, as might soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines deployed to Korea, Vietnam, Iran, Lebanon, Grenada, Libya, Panama and Iraq, among other places, while Pentagon strategists refined plans for war in Central Europe. By the same token, **today's future may not be shrouded in complete mystery.** Indeed, **much of recent official rhetoric surrounding the 'war on terror' echoes that of the Cold War, identifying the emergence of a mortal enemy, in the form of violent radical Islam, and the prospects for a generational struggle against that enemy**.11 This rhetoric contrasts sharply with claims that uncertainty is central to strategic planning. The 2006 QDR flirts with a little logical tension when it introduces the term 'the long war' and the notion of 'an era of surprise and uncertainty' within one page of each other.12 In sum, **the justification for emphasising uncertainty in strategic planning is questionable. Strategic uncertainty is neither novel to the current security environment nor overwhelming in the face of some clear challenges facing US national security**.

**We do know certain things about the security environment.**

**Fitzsimmons 2006** (Michael, defence analyst in Washington DC) :The problem of uncertainty in strategic planning” Survival, Winter 2006-2007. Accessed via EBSCO Host. )

**In spite of its intuitive appeal, applying uncertainty to strategic planning quickly becomes problematic and can even inhibit the flexibility it was meant to deliver**. The first question we must ask here is: granting the inevitability of surprise, **can we learn anything about the future from the current security environment? We do know a great deal about that. We know, for example, that transnational terrorist networks are actively targeting US interests and allies throughout the world.** Also, Iran, a nation with a track record of xenophobic foreign policy and support for terrorism, is building nuclear weapons. The paranoid, totalitarian regime in North Korea continues to threaten its neighbours with nuclear weapons, sophisticated missile systems, a million-man army, and thousands of artillery tubes within range of Seoul, the heart of one of Asia's largest economies. None of these conditions is likely to disappear in the near future.

**The impossibility of absolute truth doesn’t deny the possibility of productive discourse and action.**

**Ferguson and Mansbach 2002** (Yale H. and Richard W., profs. of international relations at Rutgers & Iowa State. Reconstructing theory in global politics: Beyond the postmodern challenge. In International Relations and the “Third Debate” edited by Darryl Jarvis.)

**The task is daunting**, as the historian Fernandez-Armesto readily acknowledges: “**Historians like me know, at least as well as practioners of any other discipline, how elusive objectivity is. Even if we perform miracles of self-immolation, we are left with sources which derive from other hands and bear the imprint of other subjects—witnesses, reporters, compilers of data and hearsay”** (1997:227). However, to stand paralyzed and utterly ignore history because of the magnitude of the challenge would be absurd. **It is nonetheless important to admit that historical research is inevitably to some extent theory-dependent and subjective, to look at as many sources as possible, to get a firm notion of the range of interpretations**, and then to make one’s own informed judgment as to which interpretation(s) appear(s) to be the most plausible. **The result is few givens—only probabilities, likelihoods, and sometimes only possibilities. We have to live with that ambiguity and proceed as best we can. If our investigations seem to provide a more convincing view of political reality than other constructions, then that may be the most we can hope for. The more varied the cases we consider, the less chance there is that errors of fact or interpretation will completely invalidate our conclusions**.

**Making careful efforts to predict consequences can be effective, especially compared to any alternative which risks randomness.**

**Chernoff 2005** (Fred, Prof. of Political Science at Colgate The Power Of International Theory, p. 215)

**Experience does seem to support (non-point) predictions of human behaviour. For example, there seems to be little problem with predictions of the behaviour of individual humans** such as: the hungry baby will cry some time during the night; or of states such as: France will not invade China in the coming year. **Any theory that prohibits prediction will,** like the metaphysics of Parmenides and Zeno, **require an extraordinarily high standard of proof, because the alternative appears to be so well confirmed**. The examination of anti-predictive arguments drawn from a variety of sources (such as non-linearities, social complexity, the absence of governing regularities) showed that there is no conclusive argument against the possibility of predictive theory. And **prediction indeed seems possible in international relations,** albeit with certain qualifications. The foregoing has acknowledged qualifications on the predictiveness of social science theory. **Predictions are probabilistic and their strength is limited by the value of observed empirical associations and by the future temporal frame** (since they are less reliable as the time-frame is extended, which follows from the axioms of the probability calculus). However, the calculations produce better results than randomly chosen policies. And random policies are the alternative if one rejects belief in rational calculation and causation on which it is based. **The review of the attacks on prediction showed the arguments to be fundamentally flawed**. Either **they derive their conclusions by means of a straw man** (**an uncommonly narrow definition of ‘prediction’ that presupposes many unreasonable conditions) or the accounts supposedly inconsistent with prediction in fact allow, on closer inspection, room for prediction**.

**Predictions are essential to good policymaking: even accounting for any imperfections.**

**Chernoff 2005** (Fred, Prof. of Political Science at Colgate The Power Of International Theory, p. 215)

This chapter has thus sought to show that **the arguments against prediction** offered by each author **are flawed and that the sound elements of the foundational positions sketched out by the various authors** (especially Bohman and Bernstein et al.) **can consistently be brought into line with some notion of ‘prediction’, when that notion is founded on probabilistic rather than deterministic generalisations**. Bernstein et al. attempt to discredit ‘prediction’ by arguing that IR is much more similar to evolutionary theory than to physical sciences like classical mechanics. Is IR very like classical mechanics or evolutionary biology? It shares many features with both but also has many dissimilarities to both and consequently is ‘very like’ neither. A major part of the strategy of the critique of Bernstein et al. has been to show that a further probing of the character of physical science reveals that the dissimilarities that Bernstein et al. claim do not hold. This is not to say that an unrestricted naturalism is justified. Far from it. **Comprehensive theories like those of the physical sciences are not likely to emerge in IR. Nevertheless, theoretical and scientific-style investigation in IR has great value and holds out the possibility, at least within tightly circumscribed domains, to achieve natural-science-like consensus and well-founded prediction.** Indeed, **prediction is necessary for good policy-making, even though there are limitations due to** hermeneutic interpretation, lack of **governing regularities and non-linearities**. These considerations lead to the conclusion that there are limitations on the types of predictions one might propose and the confidence that should be displayed in them but not to conclude that policy-makers should avoid prediction. While prediction is necessary for policy-making, prediction alone is not sufficient, since normative considerations must always be addressed. Probabilistic predictions may inform one of things like ‘socialist states go to war with non-socialist states less often than democratic states go to war with non-democracies’. But normative analysis is clearly required in order to determine whether this is a good or bad thing and what policy initiatives should be pursued.

**Denying strategic predictions precludes strategy altogether.**

**Fitzsimmons 2006** (Michael, defence analyst in Washington DC “The problem of uncertainty in

strategic planning”. Survival, Winter 2006-2007. Accessed via EBSCO Host.)

**This defence of prediction does not imply that great stakes should be gambled on narrow, singular predictions of the future. On the contrary, the central problem of uncertainty in planning remains that any given prediction may simply be wrong. Preparations for those eventualities must be made**. Indeed, in many cases, relatively unlikely outcomes could be enormously consequential, and therefore merit extensive preparation and investment. In order to navigate this complexity, strategists must return to the distinction between uncertainty and risk. While the complexity of the international security environment may make it somewhat resistant to the type of probabilistic thinking associated with risk, a risk-oriented approach seems to be the only viable model for national-security strategic planning. **The alternative approach, which categorically denies prediction, precludes strategy.** As Betts argues, Any assumption that some knowledge, whether intuitive or explicitly formalized, provides guidance about what should be done is a presumption that there is reason to believe the choice will produce a satisfactory outcome - that is, it is a prediction, however rough it may be. **If there is no hope of discerning and manipulating causes to produce intended effects, analysts as well as politicians and generals should all quit and go fishing**.36 **Unless they are willing to quit and go fishing, then, strategists must sharpen their tools of risk assessment. Risk assessment comes in many varieties, but identification of two key parameters is common to all of them: the consequences of a harmful event or condition; and the likelihood of that harmful event or condition occurring.** With no perspective on likelihood, a strategist can have no firm perspective on risk. With no firm perspective on risk, strategists cannot purposefully discriminate among alternative choices. **Without purposeful choice, there is no strategy**.

**Skepticism toward the validity of prediction marginalizes analysis.**

**Fitzsimmons 2006** (Michael, defence analyst in Washington DC “The problem of uncertainty in

strategic planning”. Survival, Winter 2006-2007. Accessed via EBSCO Host.)

But **appreciation of uncertainty carries hazards of its own. Questioning assumptions is critical, but assumptions must be made in the end. Clausewitz's 'standard of judgment' for discriminating among alternatives must be applied. Creative, unbounded speculation must resolve to choice or else there will be no strategy. Recent history suggests that unchecked scepticism regarding the validity of prediction can marginalise analysis, trade significant cost for ambiguous benefit, empower parochial interests in decision-making, and undermine flexibility.** Accordingly, having fully recognised the need to broaden their strategic-planning aperture, **national-security policymakers would do well now to reinvigorate their efforts in the messy but indispensable business of predicting the future**.

**Predictions Good--AT: Tetlock—Or Monkeys Throwing at A Dartboard**

**Philip Tetlock’s “monkeys make better predictions than experts” theory is flawed.**

**Caplan 2005** (Bryan, Associate Professor of Economics at George Mason University, “Tackling Tetlock”, EconLog, <http://econlog.econlib.org/archives/2005/12/tackling_tetloc_1.html>)

And that's tough for me to admit, because it would be easy to interpret Tetlock's work as a great refutation of my own. Most of my research highlights the systematic belief differences between economists and the general public, and defends the simple "The experts are right, the public is wrong," interpretation of the facts. But Tetlock finds that the average expert is an embarassingly bad forecaster. In fact, experts barely beat what Tetlock calls the "chimp" stategy of random guessing. Is my confidence in experts completely misplaced? I think not. Tetlock's sample suffers from severe selection bias. He deliberately asked relatively difficult and controversial questions. As his methodological appendix explains, questions had to "Pass the 'don't bother me too often with dumb questions' test." Dumb according to who? The implicit answer is "Dumb according to the typical expert in the field." What Tetlock really shows is that experts are overconfident if you exclude the questions where they have reached a solid consensus. This is still an important finding. Experts really do make overconfident predictions about controversial questions. We have to stop doing that! However, this does not show that experts are overconfident about their core findings. It's particularly important to make this distinction because Tetlock's work is so good that a lot of crackpots will want to highjack it: "Experts are scarcely better than chimps, so why not give intelligent design and protectionism equal time?" But what Tetlock really shows is that experts can raise their credibility if they stop overreaching.

**Even if sources are wrong on specific predictions, it doesn’t mean their core beliefs are untrue**

**Caplan 2005** (Bryan, Associate Professor of Economics at George Mason University, “Tackling Tetlock”, EconLog, <http://econlog.econlib.org/archives/2005/12/tackling_tetloc_1.html>)

And yes, **Tetlock has data, drawing upon twenty years of observation** of 82,361 forecasts.  Tetlock also finds that "foxes" forecast better than "hedgehogs" and that only the forecasts of foxes have positive value. This is one of the (few) must-read social science books of 2005. **My caveat**: Assume that the experts are usually wrong in their novel predictions.  **The consensus views of a science still might be worth listening to.  Economists cannot forecast business cycles very well, but you should listen when they tell you that a deflationary shock is bad news**.  Each new forecast or new theory is an example of individual hubris and in expected value terms it is stupid.  But **the body of experts as a whole, over time, absorbs what is correct.  A large number of predictions creates a Hayekian discovery process with increasing returns to scale.  Social knowledge still comes out ahead, and in part because of the self-deceiving vanities put forward every day.**  You can find that point in Jonathan Swift's Gulliver's Travels.

# \*\*\*\*\*Problem/Solution Kritik Answers Frontline\*\*\*\*\*

**Rejection of problem solving is elitist and locks in oppression of the marginalized.**

**Jarvis 2000** (Darryl, Associate Professor & Deputy Director, Centre for Asia and Globalisation. International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism: Defending the Discipline. pg. 128-9)

**Certainly it is right and proper that we ponder the depths of our theoretical imaginations, engage in epistemological and ontological debate,** and analyze the sociology of our knowledge. **But to suppose that this is the only task of international theory, let alone the most important one, smacks of intellectual elitism and displays a certain contempt for those who search for guidance in their daily struggles** as actors in international politics. **What does Ashley’s project, his deconstructive efforts, or valiant fight against positivism say to the truly marginalized, oppressed, and destitute? How does it help solve the plight of the poo**r, the displaced refugees, the casualties of war, **or the émigrés of death squads?** Does it in any way speak to those whose actions and thoughts comprise the policy and practice of international relations? **On all these questions one must answer no. This is not to say, of course, that all theory should be judged by its technical rationality and problem-solving capacity as Ashley forcefully argues.** But to suppose that problem-solving technical theory is not necessary—or is in some way bad—is a contemptuous position that abrogates any hope of solving some of the nightmarish realities that millions confront daily. As Holsti argues, **we need ask of those theorists** and these **theories the ultimate question, “So what?” To what purpose do they deconstruct, problematize,** destabilize, undermine, ridicule, **and belittle modernist and rationalist approaches? Does this get us any further, make the world any better,** or enhance the human condition? In what sense can this “debate toward [a] bottomless pit of epistemology and metaphysics” be judged pertinent, relevant, helpful, or cogent to anyone other than those foolish enough to be scholastically excited by abstract and recondite debate.

# Problem/Solution Kritik Answers Frontline

**The alternative fails: Rejection of theories of casuality would cripple social change—there would be no point in studying language or society if we rejected casuality.**

**Kurki 2007** (Milja, Lecturer, Department of Int’l Politics, University of Wales, Aberystwyth. “Critical realism and causal analysis in international relations”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 34(5), accessed via Sage Journals Online.)

Indeed, collaboration with critical realists on causation does not endanger the logic of post-positivist explanations. For example, **accepting discourses as causal in that they shape, constrain and condition the possibility of** agential **actions** does not downgrade poststructuralist arguments on the political consequentiality of discourses – rather (nonpositivist, non-deterministic) causality can be seen as an implicit claim within their theorisations.50 Also, accepting reasons as a type of cause on a critical realist basis does not downgrade Fierke’s constructivist arguments on world politics. While her argument against the use of causal language is persuasive against the positivist conception of causality, it does not refute the critical realist account of causation, which does not entail a ‘when A, then B’ notion of causality, nor does it refute the critical realist argument that reasons must be causal in some sense for agents to possess intentionality.51 Fierke’s account, it seems, is also dependent on a non-positivist conception of causality in that Fierke seems to emphasise ‘justificatory reasons’ agents give precisely because these reasons have consequences for public language and debate on legitimate actions – and hence on the critical realist basis can be conceived to condition identities and actions causally. Recognising language of causality does not downgrade post-positivist arguments: it simply denies the validity of the positivist meaning of the concept of cause in talking about these kinds of complex conditioning situations and, in fact, opens up the usefulness of the wider causal language developed by the critical realists, such as recognising differences between agential causation, intentional causation, and conditioning causation. Beyond these theoretical defences of the critical realist position **there might also be an important further reason for critical realists to maintain their belief in causal language and science,** a reason that post-positivist critics, but also many critical realists themselves, have overlooked. **Critical realism seems**, albeit implicitly, **to affirm the political consequences of applying the notion of causation in social analysis**. Social science for critical realists is an inherently evaluative process, as it is for many other critical social theorists, but **critical realists reinforce the link between causal analysis and critical evaluation of social structures and discourses.** Critical realists argue that **when social scientists study causation they inevitably form ethical judgements, positive or negative, regarding the causal powers of social structures and discourses they study**. It follows that in the light of critical realism, the arguments of critical social theorists – for example the Critical Theorists’ analyses of capitalism or poststructuralists’ analyses of discourses of terrorism – can be seen as forms of causal analysis that seek to identify structures and discourses that enable and constrain actors within them in such ways that are adversely consequential on certain groups of people. **If certain structures, ideas or discourses were not causally consequential on the world and in an adverse way for some actors, why would these theorists ‘waste their breath’ in criticising them?**52 Implicit in the very notion of critical theorising seems to be an acceptance of causality: **it seems that accepting social causation,** although in a non-positivist way, **is not only consistent with the aims of critical theorising** (generally conceived) **but also provides something of a justification for the underlying political drive of critical theorising.** This political justification of talking about causation, even if a possible point of disagreement (for poststructuralists for example), has been ignored by most post-positivist critics. It follows that the ‘politics of causal analysis’ have not really been engaged with in IR as well as many post-positivists would like to think. This is a shame since it seems that the convergences of critical realism and post-positivism are significant: they both share a critique of positivist science, both emphasise methodological openness in social inquiry, both recognise inherent politics of social analysis and both seek critical engagements with social forces in world politics. Yet so far critical realism has not been engaged with seriously by the post-positivists and adequate engagement with critical realist justifications for their position has not been achieved. Through a more constructive appreciation of the critical realist justifications for their position it is be possible that more constructive alliances can be formed in the discipline between critical realists and existing IR theorists.

# Problem/Solution K Answers: Rationality Good

**Problem solving and rationality are inevitable – our form of pragmatism is the best compromise**

**Rowland 97**

(Robin, NDT Winner and Debate Coach, Looks like Wallace Shawn, Professor of Communication – University of Kansas, “In Defense of Rational Argument: A Pragmatic Justification of Argumentation Theory and Response to the Postmodern Critique”, Philosophy & Rhetoric, 28(4), p. 357-358)

Discursive reason and argument as a means of attaining rationality are under strong attack. When viewed from a pragmatic perspective, however, rational argument is easily defended. All aspects of a theory of argument can be tied to a rational problem-solving purpose. Field-invariant and field-dependent standards for evaluation, particular field practices, and the very defining characteristics of argument itself all are shaped by purpose. Defined in this manner, rational argument is the most useful general problem-solving tool available to humans. Modernism was based on optimistic assumptions about what it means to be human. These assumptions related to the perfectibility of knowledge and the possibility of progress toward a truly free and just society. Today, the modernist agenda stands in tatters. We no longer believe that perfect knowledge is possible or that human civilization necessarily will progress toward greater freedom and justice. A pragmatic theory of argument cannot be used to rebuild modernism, but the tools provided by that theory can be used by each of us to further the aims of modernism. If full knowledge is unattainable, a focus on pragmatically justifiable problem-solving tools can help us to find the most effective solutions for any given problem. If no perfect society can be created, then we may use argument to ameliorate societal problems. And if social structures sometimes oppress the individual, then each of us may use argument as a tool for personal empowerment.

# \*\*\*\*\*Realism Good Frontline\*\*\*\*\*

**Studies and pragmatism illustrate that nations act in a realist manner.**

**Mearsheimer 2001** (John, professor of international relations at the University of Chicago. “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics”. Accessed at <http://www.irchina.org/xueke/fangfa/view.asp?id=114>)

**The optimists’ claim that security competition and war among the great powers has been burned out of the system is wrong**. In fact, **all of the major states around the globe still care deeply about the balance of power and are destined to compete for power among themselves for the foreseeable future. Consequently, realism will offer the most powerful explanations of international politics over the next century, and this will be true even if the debates among academic and policy elites are dominated by non-realist theories. In short, the real world remains a realist world**. States still fear each other and seek to gain power at each other’s expense, because international anarchy—the driving force behind great-power behavior—did not change with the end of the Cold War, and there are few signs that such change is likely any time soon**. States remain the principal actors in world politics** and there is still no night watchman standing above them. For sure, **the collapse of the Soviet Union** caused a major shift in the global distribution of power. But it **did not give rise to a change in the anarchic structure of the system, and without that kind of profound change, there is no reason to expect the great powers to behave much differently in the new century than they did in previous centuries**. Indeed, **considerable evidence from the 1990s indicates that power politics has not disappeared from Europe and Northeast Asia**, the regions in which there are two or more great powers, as well as possible great powers such as Germany and Japan. There is no question, however, that the competition for power over the past decade has been low-key. **Still, there is potential for intense security competition among the great powers that might lead to a major war**. Probably the best evidence of that possibility is the fact that the United States maintains about one hundred thousand troops each in Europe and in Northeast Asia for the explicit purpose of keeping the major states in each region at peace.

**Alternatives to realism risk fascism by not providing a clear alternative**

**Mearsheimer 1994**(John, professor of international relations at the University of Chicago.

“The false promise of international institutions”. Winter Accessed via Academic OneFile)

There is another problem with the application of critical theory to international relations. Although critical theorists hope to replace realism with a discourse that emphasizes harmony and peace, critical theory per se emphasizes that it is impossible to know the future. Critical theory according to its own logic, can be used to undermine realism and produce change, but it cannot serve as the basis for predicting which discourse will replace realism, because the theory says little about the direction change takes. In fact, Cox argues that although "utopian expectations may be an element in stimulating people to act...such expectations are almost never realized in practice." (160) Thus, in a sense, the communitarian discourse championed by critical theorists is wishful thinking, not an outcome linked to the theory itself. Indeed, critical theory cannot guarantee that the new discourse will not be more malignant than the discourse it replaces. Nothing in the theory guarantees, for example, that a fascist discourse far more violent than realism will not emerge as the new hegemonic discourse.

# Realism Good Frontline

**The global spread of democracy will check the negative aspects of realism.**

**Lieber 1993**(Robert, Professor of Government @ Georgetown University, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Winter. Nexis. Accessed June 2, 06)

Third, **democratization can operate to mitigate the anarchic nature of the international system. In this case, genuinely democratic states have had a laudable record of not making war against one another. Why this should be so is a matter of conjecture, but one evident factor is that by making policy processes more transparent, democracy eases some of the uncertainty about state intentions that drives the security dilemma. The spread of democratization thus holds the potential for very significantly reducing the level of interstate violence. Indeed, at a conceptual level, democratization may represent a profound challenge to the assumptions on which existential realism is based**. At the same time, however, it is essential to note that democratic states do continue to find themselves in conflict and sometimes at war with nondemocratic states. Moreover, the idea of democratization implies the adoption of a genuinely effective constitutional democracy as widely understood in the West, and not the kind of plebiscitary charade that authoritarian systems sometimes adopt in a bid to provide their rulers with greater legitimacy. Nor does the concept of democracy really include instances when elections are no more than a means by which a group or movement consolidates power and then closes off the process against other competing groups (“one man, one vote, one time”).

**Realism is not amoral: this is merely a false dilemma set up by critics.**

**Solomon 1996** (Hussein, Senior Researcher @ the Institute for Defense Policy, AFRICAN SECURITY REVIEW. Online. Internet. Accessed June 8, 06)

**It has been argued by Walker that realism’s concentration on power-politics results in the development of a dichotomy between power and morality**. He also asserts that realism negates the usefulness, or indeed, the relevance of ethics in the international arena. Vale65 makes a similar point on the power *versus* morality issue. He even goes further by implying a link between realism and immoral apartheid. Is this true? Does realism, both as theory and as practice, separate power from ethics? **Does realism advocate immorality in international politics? On the theoretical side one could repudiate this challenge by simply turning to** Carr’s *The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919 -1939* which is **one of the chief scrolls in the realist faith**. It is generally regarded that this text effectively repudiated the tenets of Wilsonian idealism and set the basic principles of power politics on which Morgenthau, Niebuhr, Reynolds and others had built. However, a closer examination of the book itself provides a more tempered view of the role of power and an appreciation of morality in international politics. For instance, **Carr puts forward the notion of a combination of power and morality, basing thoughts on elements of both utopia and reality, and he describes politics and law as a ‘meeting place’ for ethics and power.**

# Realism Extension: Realism is best

**Realism is empirically valid—the reason why the state and balance of power are analyzed is because the analysis of contemporary empirically conditions indicate this is the best strategy for accuracy and defense of moral principles.**

**Murray 1997** (Alastair, lecturer in the department of politics at the University of Swansea. Reconstructing Realism, pp. 187-188)

Realism does not cease to consider the empirical; rather, its continued analysis of it is vital to its identification of the appropriate mode of practice and to its continued defence of it. Consequently, we arrive back at our starting point with a viable external standard against which the continued appropriateness of the balance of power as a practical scheme can be assessed. If realism does contain the potential to address changes in base conditions, the central argument with which Ashley is left is that it actively seeks to avoid doing so. He suggests that, because the balance of power scheme involves what is effectively an acceptance of the traditional 'rules of the game', it actively reproduces, by its very success, the traditional statist terms of the game, such that realism becomes complicit in a conservative perpetuation of an iniquitous statist order by its endorsement of it.[46](JavaScript:doPopup('EndNote','Page_188_Popup_2.html','width=480,height=384,resizable=yes,scrollbars=yes')) Ashley would, of course, like to treat this as design, and end the matter there. Yet this is to equate implication with purpose. If the balance of power scheme implies the reproduction of the state, this does not prove its dedication to this objective. Realism advocated a scheme for an interstate balance of power not because of any concern to reproduce the state, but because its analysis of contemporary empirical conditions indicated that such a strategy offered the best available fulfilment of moral principles: if states represent the principal receptacles of power in the modern environment, the best level of justice can be achieved by establishing some equilibrium of power between states.[47](JavaScript:doPopup('EndNote','Page_188_Popup_3.html','width=480,height=384,resizable=yes,scrollbars=yes')) Consequently, its position not only moves beyond the state, de-privileges it, and demands its compliance in principles which privilege the individual, but, furthermore, this position is open to the possibility of progress beyond it towards some more universal order. If the state must be employed as the principal agent of international justice and international change, it is only because of its current centrality to international politics.

**Realism is inevitable, and is the best explanation of state behavior.**

**Solomon 1996** (Hussein, Sr. Researcher @ the Institute for Defense Policy, AFRICAN SECURITY REVIEW Internet)

These cases illustrate the fact that **power, or the lack of it, is the central organising principle of international politics,** not international law or organisation; **and that international law and world bodies like the UN are cynically used and abused by the powerful to further their own interests** - as it has been done for centuries. Even more prosaically, **it underlines the correctness of the realist paradigm which views the structure of the international system as a hierarchy based on power capabilities; where the principle of equality between states is non-existent since states have different power capabilities; and where weak states are at the mercy of more powerful states.**

# Realism Extension: Realism is best

**The permutation is the best option: realism as a bridge to understanding the world that is necessary for their Kritik to function**

**Niarguinen 2001** (Dmitri, professor of International Relations at Central European University. “Transforming realism: Irreducible core gives life to new interpretations and flexible incarnations.” Rubikon E-Journal, December, accessed online at http://web.archive.org/web/20060503234134/http:// venus.ci.uw.edu.pl/~rubikon/forum/ dmitri.htm)

**Has, indeed, Realism become anachronistic?** If it were a monolithic rigid theory, the answer would probably be 'yes.' I have argued, however, that Realism is not homogeneous; rather, it has an irreducible core which is able to create flexible incarnations. **At minimum, Realism offers an orienting framework of analysis that gives the field of security studies much of its intellectual coherence and commonality of outlook**[64]. This is true even if Realism stays on the extreme polar of positivism. However, **positivism/rationalism in a pure form is of little value**. In the words of the Nobel laureate Amartya Sen, “the approach of ‘rational behavior,’ as it is typically interpreted, leads to a remarkably mute theory…”[65]. **Realism needs not be predestined to remain stagnant**[66]. **At maximum, thus, when Realism operates in the shades of gray between positivism and reflectivism, its strength is paramount**. Consequently, **there are good reasons for thinking that the twenty-first century will be a Realist century**[67]. Once again I want to stress that Realism should not be perceived as dogmatic. And this is why we do need reflectivist approaches to problematize what is self-evident, and thus to counterbalance naive Realism[68]. In doing so, however, we are more flexible in keeping the 'middle ground' and not in sliding to the other extreme. As Wendt believes, **in the medium run, sovereign states will remain the dominant political actors in the international system**[69]. While this contention is arguable, it is hardly possible to challenge his psychological observation, …Realist theory of state interests in fact naturalizes or reifies a particular culture and in so doing helps reproduce it. Since the social practices is how we get structure – structure is carried in the heads of agents and is instantiated in their practices – **the more that states think like “Realist” the more that egoism, and its systemic corollary of self-help, becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy**[70]. **Even strong constructivists admit that we cannot do away with Realism simply because it is “a still necessary hermeneutical bridge to the understanding of world politics”**[71].

**The permutation of traditional, positivist international relations theories and critical international relations theories offers the best hope for solutions to IR dilemmas**

**Kurki 2007** (Milja, Lecturer, Department of Int’l Politics, University of Wales, Aberystwyth. “Critical realism and causal analysis in international relations”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 34(5), accessed via Sage Journals Online.)

**There are a number of defences that critical realism would resort to against the positivist criticisms. However, need the relationship between critical realism and positivism be acrimonious? While critical realists disagree with the positivist legacies that inform much of contemporary social science, they do not think that positivist knowledge is ‘useless’ in IR, but simply that it does not exhaust the analysis of complex causes in world politics and needs to be complemented by more holistic ontological and methodological avenues. Critical realism emphasises that positivists need to open their minds to different ways of doing causal analysis in IR and engage with alternative causal methodologies and questions in a more serious manner.** Yet much room for dialogue with the positivists also remains: both views recognise the importance of science and causal analysis in shaping our understandings of the world around us, value critical evaluation of existing explanations and emphasise importance of empirical evidence gathering (though with different methodological emphasis). **Critical realism, as an anti-positivist philosophy, does not support a positivist view of science of IR; however, it can understand the partial relevance of positivist knowledge claims, provide tools for complementing these claims with more pluralistic methods and introduce positivists to the possibility of a more open and reflective model of science**.

# Realism Extension: Realism is best

**Realism is the best way to describe how leaders act.**

**Lieber 1993** (Robert, Professor of Government @ Georgetown University. WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Winter. Online. Nexis. Accessed June 2, 06)

**As a consequence of the anarchy problem, states find that they dwell in a kind of self-help system. They either must be prepared to defend their own interests and those of their people, or to seek means of doing so through alliances.** **These realities of existential realism** do not yield iron laws, but they do **create a series of propensities shaping state behavior. Recognition of these propensities, and appreciation that they are not rigidly deterministic but that they condition the environment in which states and their leaders act, is crucial to an understanding of international relations.**

**Postmodern and critical theories of international relations are flawed compared to realism.**

**Solomon 1996** (Hussien, Sr. Researcher @ the Institute for Defense Policy, AFRICAN SECURITY REVIEW, 1996. Internet. Accessed June 8, 06.)

Although ridiculed by critics wearing the mantle of post-modernism and critical theory, it is argued that realism ― both the classical realism of Carr, Morgenthau and Niebuhr, and the structural or neo-realism of Waltz and Krasner ― are best suited as tools to understand the turbulent world in which we live. At all times, the interface between theory and practice is exposed.

**Realist approaches to state policymaking are justified and the key to solving real problems.**

Lieber 1993 (Robert, Professor of Government @ Georgetown University, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Winter. Online. Nexis. Accessed June 2, 06).

As a means of making sense of the external world and the requirements of foreign policy, **realism provides no iron laws of human behavior, but it does offer an approach to reality in which both theory and policy can be grounded. In the post-cold war world, patterns of interdependence and significant areas of cooperation among states are of fundamental importance**. But a continuing realm for power politics exists simultaneously as an enduring feature of the same world, and **international relations remain subject to the basic existential problems identified by realism: states exist in an international system without an overall authority to provide order; this “self-help” system creates imperatives that shape foreign policy behavior, especially in security matters**, and sometimes in other realms; conflicts, **which are inevitable in human affairs, and for which externally devised solutions are unavailable, have the potential for erupting into violence and war. Recognition of these realities is a precondition both for understanding the dynamics of international affairs and for developing policies that are to have any hope of achieving peace and protecting the national interest**.

# Realism Extension: Realism is best

**Critics of realism fail to offer a better alternative to realism.**

**Mearshemier 1995** (John, Professor of Political Science @ Univ. of Chicago, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Summer 1995. Nexis. Accessed June 6, 06)

**Realists believe that state behavior is largely shaped by the material structure of the international system. The distribution of material capabilities among states is the key factor for understanding world politics. For realists, some level of security competition among great powers is inevitable because of the material structure of the international system**. Individuals are free to adopt non-realist discourses, but in the final analysis, the system forces states to behave according to the dictates of realism, or risk destruction. **Critical theorists**, on the other hand**, focus on the social structure of the international system. They believe that “world politics is socially constructed,”** which is another way of saying that shared discourse, or how communities of individuals think and talk about the world, largely shapes the world. Wendt recognizes that “material resources like gold and tanks exist,” but he argues that “such capabilities . . . only acquire meaning for human action through the structure of shared knowledge in which they are embedded.” **Significantly for critical theorists, discourse can change, which means that realism is not forever, and that therefore it might be possible to move beyond realism to a world where institutionalized norms cause states to behave in more communitarian and peaceful ways**. The most revealing aspect of Wendt's discussion is that he did not respond to the two main charges leveled against critical theory in “False Promise.” The first problem with critical theory is that although the theory is deeply concerned with radically changing state behavior, it says little about how change comes about. **The theory does not tell us why particular discourses become dominant, and others fall by the wayside. Specifically, Wendt does not explain why realism has been the dominant discourse in world politics for well over a thousand years, although I explicitly raised this question in “False Promise.” Moreover, he sheds no light on why the time is ripe for unseating realism, nor on why realism is likely to be replaced by a more peaceful, communitarian discourse, although I explicitly raised both questions**.

**Even assuming the rise of new movements, realism is still the best way to describe international relations.**

**Lieber 1993**(Robert, Professor of Government @ Georgetown University, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Winter. Nexis. Accessed June 2, 06)

Together, **these factors (the global economy, international institutions, democratization, transnational and subnational forces, nuclear weapons, and learning) have been significant either in eroding the ability of states to act autonomously, or in shaping state behavior**. Frequently, they have the effect of mitigating or even precluding conflict and war, although they are not always necessarily conducive to cooperation. **Nevertheless, authority still resides with the state, hence the propensities described by existential realism continue to condition state behavior. Moreover, subnational regional and ethnic groups typically speak in the language of statehood and often see this as the goal for which they strive.**

# \*\*\*\*\*Representations Good\*\*\*\*\*

## And…Representations are ethical choices which shape the world in which we live—vote negative to hold the AFF accountable for choices of representations:

Roxanne Lynn Doty, 1997 assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at Arizona State

University, Imperial Encounters, p. 169-171

The cases examined in this study attest to the importance of representational practices and the power that inheres in them. The infinity of traces that leave no inventory continue to play a significant part in contemporary constructions of “reality.” This is not to suggest that representations have been static. Static implies the possibility of fixedness, when what I mean to suggest is an inherent fragility and instability to the meanings and identities that have been constructed in the various discourses I examined. For example, to characterize the South as “uncivilized” or “unfit for self—government~~ is no longer an acceptable representation. This is not, however, because the meanings of these terms were at one time fixed and stable. As I illustrated, what these signifiers signified was always deferred. Partial fixation was the result of their being anchored by some exemplary mode of being that was itself constructed at the power! Knowledge nexus: the white male at the turn of the century, the United States after World War II. Bhabha stresses “the wide range of the stereotype, from the loyal servant to Satan, from the loved to the hated; a shifting of subject positions in the circulation of colonial power” (1983: 31). The shifting subject positions—from uncivilized native to quasi state to traditional “man” and society, for example are all partial fixations that have enabled the exercise of various and multiple forms of power. Nor do previous oppositions entirely disappear. What remains is an infinity of traces from prior representations that themselves have been founded not on pure presences but on differance. “The present becomes the sign of the sign, the trace of the trace,” Derrida writes (1982: 24). Differance makes possible the chain of differing and deferring (the continuity) as well as the endless substitution (the discontinuity) of names that are inscribed and reinscribed as pure presence, the center of the structure that itself escapes structurality. North-South relations have been constituted as a structure of deferral. The center of the structure (alternatively white man, modern man, the United States, the West, real states) has never been absolutely present outside a system of differences. It has itself been constituted as trace—the simulacrum of a presence that dislocates itself, displaces itself, refers itself (ibid.). Because the center is not a fixed locus but a function in which an infinite number of sign substitutions come into play, the domain and play of signification is extended indefinitely(Derrida 1978: z8o). This both opens up and limits possibilities, generates alternative sites of meanings and political resistances that give rise to practices of reinscription that seek to reaffirm identities and relationships. The inherently incomplete and open nature of discourse makes this reaffirmation an ongoing and never finally completed project. In this study I have sought, through an engagement with various discourses in which claims to truth have been staked, to challenge the validity of the structures of meaning and to make visible their complicity with practices of power and domination. By examining the ways in which structures of meaning have been associated with imperial practices, I have suggested that the construction of meaning and the construction of social, political, and economic power are inextricably linked. This suggests an ethical dimension to making meaning and an ethical imperative that is incumbent upon those who toil in the construction of structures of meaning.This is especially urgent in North-South relations today: one does not have to search very far to find a continuing complicity with colonial representations that ranges from a politics of silence and neglect to constructions of terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, international drug trafficking, and Southern immigration to the North as new threats to global stability and peace.The political stakes raised by this analysis revolve around the question of being able to “get beyond” the representations or speak outside of the discourses that historically have constructed the North and the South. I do not believe that there are any pure alternatives by which we can escape the infinity of traces to which Gramsci refers. Nor do I wish to suggest that we are always hopelessly imprisoned in a dominant and all-pervasive discourse. Before this question can be answered—indeed, before we can even proceed to attempt an answer—attention must be given to the politics of representation. The price that international relations scholarship pays for its inattention to the issue of representation is perpetuation of the dominant modes of making meaning and deferral of its responsibility and complicity in dominant representations.

# \*\*\*\*\*Representations Kritik Answers Frontline\*\*\*\*\*

**(--) AFF shouldn’t have to defend discourse—only policy consequences:**

**A) Infinite variety of word PIC’s and floating PIC’s—makes it too hard to be AFF.**

**B) Functional competition is sufficient—gives them advantage counterplan ground, agent counterplans, along with disads without providing a mechanism to steal all the AFF.**

**(--) Institutional, political, and geographic considerations trump representations in foreign policy:**

Gearoid **Tuathail, 1996** (Department of Geography, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University) The patterned mess of history and the writing of geopolitics: a reply to Dalby. Political Geography, 15: 6-7, p. 664.

While theoretical debates at academic conferences are important to academics, **the discourse and concerns of foreign-policy decisionmakers are quite different, so different that they constitute a distinctive problemsolving, theory-averse, policy-making subculture. There is a danger that academics assume that the discourses they engage are more significant in the practice of foreign policy and the exercise of power than they really are**. This is not, however, to minimize the obvious importance of academia as a general institutional structure among many that sustain certain epistemic communities in particular states. In general, I do not disagree with Dalby’s fourth point about politics and discourse except to note that his statement-‘Precisely because reality could be represented in particular ways political decisions could be taken, troops and material moved and war fought’-evades the important question of agency that I noted in my review essay. **The assumption that it is representations that make action possible is inadequate by itself. Political, military and economic structures, institutions, discursive networks and leadership are all crucial in explaining social action and should be theorized together with representational practices**. Both here and earlier, Dalby’s reasoning inclines towards a form of idealism. In response to Dalby’s fifth point (with its three subpoints), it is worth noting, first, that his book is about the CPD, not the Reagan administration. He analyzes certain CPD discourses, root the geographical reasoning practices of the Reagan administration nor its public-policy reasoning on national security. Dalby’s book is narrowly textual; the general contextuality of the Reagan administration is not dealt with. Second, let me simply note that I find that the distinction between critical theorists and poststructuralists is a little too rigidly and heroically drawn by Dalby and others. Third, Dalby’s interpretation of the reconceptualization of national security in Moscow as heavily influenced by dissident peace researchers in Europe is highly idealist, an interpretation that ignores the structural and ideological crises facing the Soviet elite at that time. Gorbachev’s reforms and his new security discourse were also strongly selfinterested, an ultimately futile attempt to save the Communist Party and a discredited regime of power from disintegration. The issues raised by Simon Dalby in his comment are important ones for all those interested in the practice of critical geopolitics. While I agree with Dalby that **questions of discourse are extremely important ones for political geographers to engage, there is a danger of fetishizing this concern with discourse so that we neglect the institutional and the sociological, the materialist and the cultural, the political and the geographical contexts within which particular discursive strategies become significant**. Critical geopolitics, in other words, should not be a prisoner of the sweeping ahistorical cant that sometimes accompanies ‘poststructuralism nor convenient reading strategies like the identity politics narrative; it needs to always be open to the patterned mess that is human history.

# Representations Kritik Answers Frontline

**Permutation: do the plan and reject the representations they indict—this solves their offense and allows for the positive benefits of our plan action:**

Darryl **Jarvis, 2000**. Associate Professor & Deputy Director, Centre for Asia and Globalisation. International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism: Defending the Discipline. Accessed via google books.

**Pointing out silences and omissions from the dominant discourse is always fruitful and necessary, but, arguably, also accomplished under theories and paradigms and from critical quarters that are not necessarily postmodern and which do not seek to “undo” all knowledge simply on the basis of imperfection. Modernist discourse is not unreflective, can make autonomous corrections**, engage in revisionist history, i**dentify injustices, crimes of exclusion, and extend representation to groups that were otherwise not previously represented** (think of liberalism or socialism for example!). This, after all, is why we understand modernity to be progressive and history a forward-moving narrative that is self-effusive. More importantly, given the self-defeating con-tradictions endemic to subversive-deconstructive postmodernism, especially its specious relativism, **it requires no great mind to postulate that the use of modernist/rationalist/Enlightenment discourse will better make the case for a progressive politics of ever greater inclusion, representation, and jus-tice for all than will sloganistic calls for us to “think otherwise.” The simple and myopic assumption that social change can be engineered through linguistic policing of politically incorrect words,** concepts and opinions, **is surely one of the more politically lame** (idealist) **suggestions to come from armchair theorists in the last fifty years**.

# Representations K Answers—1ar Extensions

**(--) Extend our** **Tuathail evidence—their fetishization of discourse risks neglecting the institutional and material characteristics like the plan that are necessary to solve the problem:**

**A) Prefer the plan action—the counterplan alt won’t solve alone**

**B) You can reject the methodology of the K—accepting the idea that discourse shapes reality blinds us to important societal actions that must be taken to solve problems.**

**(--) And, reps aren’t key to policy making: they don’t predict specific outcomes.**

Jennifer **Milliken '99** (Graduate Institute of International Studies) The study of discourse in international relations: A critique of research and methods. European Journal of International Relations, 5(2), p. 240-241

In contrast to International Relations theory studies, foreign policy and diplomacy/organization studies are directly concerned with explaining how a discourse articulated by elites produces policy practices (individual or joint). **These types of discourse analysis** also share an understanding of what it means to explain the production of policy practices, namely to take the significative system which they have analysed, and to argue for that system as structuring and limiting the policy options (joint policies, norms of state practice) that policy-makers find reasonable.9 This approach is an appropriate one, and one which I too have followed. But like the treatment of common sense, it also deserves to be re-examined and refined as a way to explain policy production. The current **approach’s main weakness** (or puzzle, in another idiom**) is that it leaves out what happens after a policy is promulgated** among high-level officials, i.e. the implementation of policy as actions directed towards those objectified as targets of international practices. **Analysing how policies are implemented** (and not just formulated) means studying the operationalization of discursive categories in the activities of governments and international organizations, and the ‘regular effects’ on their targets of interventions taken on this basis (Ferguson, 1994: xiv). The operationalization practices of these entities is a subject rarely taken up in mainstream International Relations, as attested to by the general lack of discussion of implementation in most theories and studies of foreign policy or of international regimes. **When implementation is considered, the discussion is usually couched in very general terms, outlined as a stylized type of act or policy** (e.g. ‘land redistribution’, ‘intervention’, ‘foreign aid’) **but not as explanation of how the actions putatively covered by the term were organized and enacted in particular circumstances.** Governments and international organizations do document and record implementation practices and take measures of their effects, but in an arcane language that, for public consumption, usually involves the use of vague and general labels (e.g. ‘measures taken to improve debt servicing’ to describe IMF demands to Indonesia). Discourse studies which include the implementation of policy practices can potentially problematize such labels and expose readers to the ‘micro-physics of power’ in International Relations (Foucault, 1980: 27). This exposure might in turn give readers a basis with which to ‘question’ and ‘enquire about’ the workings of states and international organizations, a critical goal that discourse studies share (Edkins, 1996a: 575).

# Representations K Answers—1ar Extensions

**(--) Extend our Jarvis evidence: our permutation captures the benefits of their discourse and the tangible benefits of the plan action.**

**A) Plan action is all the AFF should have to defend—there are infinite word PIC’s and floating PIC’s—plan action gives the NEG stable ground**

**B) We should at least be allowed to weigh the impact of our advantages versus their discourse—provides the best middle ground.**

**C) Even if you reject our permutation—the Jarvis evidence still argues that it is simplistic and naïve to assume that mere changing of language changes reality—proving the Kritik alternative solves for nothing at all.**

**(--) And, an individual text tells us nothing about overall discourse—denying their impact claims.**

Jennifer **Milliken '99** (Graduate Institute of International Studies) The study of discourse in international relations: A critique of research and methods. European Journal of International Relations, 5(2), p. 233

I have referred to a text in the singular in my illustration, and research based on predicate analysis would certainly entail systematic analysis of a text’s object space, drawing up lists of predications attaching to the subjects the text constructs and clarifying how these subjects are distinguished from and related to one another. Discourses, though, are background capabilities that are used socially, at least by a small group of officials if not more broadly in a society or among different elites and societies. Also, the concern in discursive analysis is not only with particular distinctions (that made in a text between Japan and the United States), but also with the structuring of relational distinctions, posited to be a ‘center that organizes and makes them [particular distinctions] coherent’ (Doty, 1997: 378). **Since discourses are social systems of signification, it will not do** (as sometimes appears to be the case) **to base a discursive analysis only on one text, even some ‘key’ document** (e.g. NSC-68, the Caribbean Basin Report). **A single text cannot be claimed to support empirically arguments about discourse as a social background**, used regularly by different individuals and groups. Instead, if the analysis is to be about social signification, a discourse analysis should be based upon a set of texts by different people presumed (according to the research focus) to be authorized speakers/writers of a dominant discourse or to think and act within alternative discourses. In order to address issues of selection bias — and to enable better theorization — one might also more narrowly select texts by whether they take different positions on a relevant issue (e.g. whether or not NATO should intervene in Kosovo), and so could provide evidence of a discourse as a social background for meaningful disputes among speakers of the discourse.

# \*\*\*\*\*Resource Shortage K Answers Frontline\*\*\*\*\*

**1. We’ll never run out of resources—technology allows us to create substitute resources to fulfill basic needs.**

Julian **Simon, 1998** (professor of business administration at the University of Maryland, “POPULATION GROWTH, NATURAL RESOURCES, AND FUTURE GENERATIONS.” Accessed May 23, 2011 at <http://www.juliansimon.com/> writings/Ultimate\_Resource/TCHAR28.txt)

**If the family starts with a given plot of land and an additional child is born,** it would seem as if **the result would be less land per child to be inherited**. **But the family can increase its "effective" land by irrigation and multiple cropping and even hydroponics,** and some families respond **by opening up whole new tracts of previously uncultivated land.** Hence **an additional child need not increase the scarcity of land and other natural resources, as appears to be inevitable when one looks at the earth as a closed resource system**; instead, there is an increase in total resources. But, you ask, how long can this go on? Surely not forever? In fact **there is no logical or physical reason why the process cannot indeed go on forever**. Let's return to copper as an example. **Given substitute materials, development of improved methods of extraction, and discoveries of new lodes in the U.S. and in other countries and in the sea and perhaps on other planets, there is no logical reason why** additional **people should not increase the availability of copper or copper equivalents indefinitely.** To make the logical case more binding, **the possibility of recycling** copper **at a faster rate due to population growth also improves the supply of the services we now get** from it. To illustrate, consider a copper jug that one rubs to obtain the services of a genie. If only the single jug exists, and there are two families at opposite ends of the earth, each of them can obtain the genie very infrequently. But if the earth is populated densely, the jug can be passed rapidly from hand to hand, and all families might then have a chance to obtain the recycled jug and its genie more often than with a less dense population. So it could be with copper pots, or whatever. The apparent reason that this process cannot continue - the seeming finitude of copper in the solid earth - is invalid, as we have seen in chapter 3.

**2. Resources aren’t finite—the concept of spaceship Earth is flawed.**

Julian **Simon, 1998** (professor of business administration at the University of Maryland, “POPULATION GROWTH, NATURAL RESOURCES, AND FUTURE GENERATIONS.” Accessed May 23, 2011 at <http://www.juliansimon.com/> writings/Ultimate\_Resource/TCHAR28.txt)

Of course, **it is logically possible that the cost of** the services we get now from **copper and other minerals will be relatively higher in the future than now if there are more people** in the future. But **all past history suggests that the better guess is that cost and price will fall**, just as **scarcity historically has diminished along with the increase in population.** Either way, however, **the concept of mineral resources as "finite" is unnecessary, confusing, and misleading. And the notion of our planet as "spaceship earth,"** **launched with a countable amount of each resource** and hence having less minerals per passenger as the number of passengers is greater, **is dramatic but irrelevant**.

# Resource Shortage K Answers Frontline

**3. Human history disproves their argument—substitution and innovation solves resource scarcity.**

Julian **Simon, 1998** (professor of business administration at the University of Maryland, “POPULATION GROWTH, NATURAL RESOURCES, AND FUTURE GENERATIONS.” Accessed May 23, 2011 at <http://www.juliansimon.com/> writings/Ultimate\_Resource/TCHAR28.txt)

Chapters 1-11 showed that **all natural resources - minerals, food, and energy - have become less** rather than more **scarce throughout human history**. But **it is counter-intuitive, against all common sense, for more people to result in more** rather than less **natural resources**. So here is the theory again: **More people, and increased income, cause problems of increased scarcity of resources in the short run. Heightened scarcity causes prices to rise.** The **higher prices present opportunity, and prompt inventors and entrepreneurs to search for solutions.** Many fail, at cost to themselves. But **in a free society, solutions are eventually found.** And **in the long run the new developments leave us better off than if the problems had not arisen**. That is, **prices end up lower than before** the increased scarcity occurred.

**4. Innovation and technology will solve resource scarcity:**

Julian **Simon, 1998** (professor of business administration at the University of Maryland, “POPULATION GROWTH, NATURAL RESOURCES, AND FUTURE GENERATIONS.” Accessed May 23, 2011 at <http://www.juliansimon.com/> writings/Ultimate\_Resource/TCHAR28.txt)

**The outcome will depend on the net effect of increased demand on the current supplies of energy** as of a given moment, **together with increases in potential supplies through discoveries and technological advances** that will be **induced by the increase in demand**. **In the past, increased demand for energy has been associated with reduced scarcity and cost**. **There is no statistical reason to doubt the continuation of this trend.** More particularly, **there seems to be no reason to believe that we are now at a turning point** in energy history, **and no such turning point is visible in the future**. **This implies a trend toward** lower energy prices and **increased supplies**.

**5. We’ll never run out of energy—multiple different technological solutions solve energy supply shortages:**

Julian **Simon, 1998** (professor of business administration at the University of Maryland, “POPULATION GROWTH, NATURAL RESOURCES, AND FUTURE GENERATIONS.” Accessed May 23, 2011 at <http://www.juliansimon.com/> writings/Ultimate\_Resource/TCHAR28.txt)

It is important to recognize that in the context of population policy, who is "right" about the present state of energy supplies really does not matter. Yes, we will care in the years 2000 and 2010 whether there will be large or small supplies of oil and gas and coal at prices relatively high or low compared to now, and even more so if government intervention in the market worsens the situation (as it usually does) and forces us to wait in line at the service station. And it matters to the State Department and the Department of Defense whether our national policies about energy pricing and development lead to large or small proportions of our energy supply being imported from abroad. But **from the standpoint of our national standard of living it will matter very little even if energy prices are** at the **highest** end of the range of possibilities **as a result of relatively unfruitful technological progress and of maximum increases in demand** due to maximum rises in GNP and population. **At a very unlikely high price of energy** equivalent to, say, $50 per barrel of oil (1992 dollars) **there should be enough energy from coal, shale oil, solar power, natural gas, and fossil oil plus oil from biomass** - **buttressed by the virtually inexhaustible supply of nuclear power** - **to last** so many **hundreds or thousands of years** into the future, **or millions if we include nuclear energy,** that it simply does not matter enough to estimate how many hundreds or millions of years. And **even if energy would sell at such a most-unlikely high price**, rather than the actual 1993 oil price of (say) $15 per barrel, **the difference in our standard of living would hardly be noticeable**.

# Resource Shortage K Answers Frontline

**6. Resource supply shortages will be solved by new technologies.**

Julian **Simon, 1998** (professor of business administration at the University of Maryland, “POPULATION GROWTH, NATURAL RESOURCES, AND FUTURE GENERATIONS.” Accessed May 23, 2011 at <http://www.juliansimon.com/> writings/Ultimate\_Resource/TCHAR28.txt)

But population growth does not constitute a Ponzi scheme: **there is no reason to expect resources to run out**. Instead, as Part I of this book demonstrates (on the basis of the history of long-run price declines in all natural resources, plus theory that fits the data), **resources may be expected to become more available** rather than more scarce. Hence **there is no reason to think that consumption in the present is at the expense of future consumers, or that more consumers now imply less for consumers in the future**. Rather, **it is reasonable to expect that more consumption now implies more resources in the future because of induced discoveries of new ways to supply resources, which eventually leave resources cheaper and more available** than if there were less pressure on resources in the present.

**7. Notions of finite resources are false.**

Julian **Simon, 1998** (professor of business administration at the University of Maryland, “POPULATION GROWTH, NATURAL RESOURCES, AND FUTURE GENERATIONS.” Accessed May 23, 2011 at <http://www.juliansimon.com/> writings/Ultimate\_Resource/TCHAR28.txt)

**There is no persuasive reason to believe that the relatively larger use of** natural **resources that would occur with a larger population would have any** special **deleterious effects upon the economy in the future**. For the foreseeable future, **even if the extrapolation of past trends is badly in error**, the **cost of energy is not an important consideration in evaluating the impact of population growth**. Other natural resources may be treated in a manner just like any other physical capital when considering the economic effect of different rates of population growth. **Depletion of mineral resources is not a special danger for the long run or the short run.** Rather, **the availability of mineral resources,** as measured by their prices, **may be expected to increase** - that is, **costs may be expected to decrease** - **despite all notions about "finiteness."**

**8. No risk of running out of resources—five reasons.**

Julian **Simon, 1998** (professor of business administration at the University of Maryland, “POPULATION GROWTH, NATURAL RESOURCES, AND FUTURE GENERATIONS.” Accessed May 23, 2011 at <http://www.juliansimon.com/> writings/Ultimate\_Resource/TCHAR28.txt)

You might wonder: **Even if the prospect of running out of energy and minerals is small, is it safe to depend on the continuation of technical progress?** Can we be sure that technological progress will continue to forestall growing scarcity and even increase the availability of natural resources? **Would it not be prudent to avoid even a small possibility of a major scarcity disaster?** Would it not be less risky to curb population growth to avoid the mere possibility of natural-resource scarcities even if the chances really are good that higher population will lead to lower costs? A reasonable person may be "risk averse." The matter of risk aversion was considered at length in the discussion of nuclear energy in chapter 13; it will also be considered in the context of population and pollution in chapter 30, where risk is more crucial to the argument and to policy decisions. The reader interested in this topic should turn to those discussions. **Risk aversion is not**, however, **very relevant for natural resources**, for several reasons. **First, the consequences of a growing shortage of any mineral** - that is, of a rise in relative price - **are not dangerous to life or** even to the **standard of living**, as noted above with respect to energy. **Second, a relative scarcity of one material engenders the substitution of other materials** - say, aluminum for steel - **and hence mitigates the scarcity**. **Third, a scarcity of any mineral would manifest itself only very slowly**, **giving plenty of opportunity to alter social and economic policies** appropriately. **Fourth, just as greater affluence and larger population contribute to the demand for more natural resources**, **they also contribute to our capacity to alleviate shortages and broaden our technological and economic capacity**, which makes any particular material ever less crucial. **Fifth** and perhaps most important, **we already have technology in hand - nuclear fission - to supply our energy needs at constant or declining cost forever.**

# Resource Shortage K Answers Frontline

**9. Empirically, technology solves resource shortages.**

Julian **Simon, 1998** (professor of business administration at the University of Maryland, “POPULATION GROWTH, NATURAL RESOURCES, AND FUTURE GENERATIONS.” Accessed May 23, 2011 at <http://www.juliansimon.com/> writings/Ultimate\_Resource/TCHAR28.txt)

Some ask: **can we know that there will be discoveries of new materials and of productivity-enhancing techniques in the future**? Behind the question lies the implicit belief that the production of new technology does not follow predictable patterns of the same sort as the patterns of production of other products such as cheese and opera. But there seems to me no warrant for belief in such a difference, either in logic or in empirical experience. **When we add more capital and labor, we get more cheese; we have no logical assurance of this, but such has been our experience**, and therefore we are prepared to rely upon it. **The same is true concerning knowledge about how to increase the yield of grain, cows, milk and cheese from given amounts of capital and labor. If you pay engineers to find ways to solve a general enough problem** - for example, how to milk cows faster, or with less labor - **the engineers** predictably **will do so**. **There may well be diminishing returns to additional inventive effort spent on the same problem**, just as there are diminishing returns to the use of fertilizer and labor on a given farm in a given year. But **as entirely new forms of technology arise and are brought to bear on the old problems, the old diminishing-returns functions then no longer apply.**

**10. Technology will continue to create new resources.**

Julian **Simon, 1998** (professor of business administration at the University of Maryland, “POPULATION GROWTH, NATURAL RESOURCES, AND FUTURE GENERATIONS.” Accessed May 23, 2011 at <http://www.juliansimon.com/> writings/Ultimate\_Resource/TCHAR28.txt)

**This point of view is not limited to economists**. A technologist writing on minerals put it this way: "In effect, **technology keeps creating new resources**." **The major constraint upon the human capacity to enjoy unlimited minerals, energy, and other raw materials at acceptable prices is knowledge.** And the source of knowledge is the human mind. Ultimately, then, **the key constraint is human imagination acting** together **with educated skills**. This is why **an increase of human beings,** along with causing an additional consumption of resources, **constitutes a crucial addition to the stock of natural resources.**

# \*\*\*\*\*“Retarded” K\*\*\*\*\*

#### The word “retarded” has real-world implications- justifies violence against those considered less intelligent than the masses and shapes how we interact with reality- same logic that Ann Coulter uses to justify hate speech

**Fields-Myer ’11** [Staff writer for Huffington Post, “The Potency of the R-Word,” <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ami-fieldsmeyer/the-potency-of-the-rword_b_808337.html>]

I'm in my trig classroom staring at a whiteboard that's crammed with brackets, exponents, and an array of colorful digits. I'm trying to understand the problem on the board, but I feel like I'm reading a foreign language. My classmates are just as puzzled. One, realizing the problem's complexity, sighs and lets out two words: "That's retarded." **Retarded. It's ubiquitous. I can't escape it. But I have never gotten used to hearing it. In fact, each time I hear "retarded" misused, I feel as though someone has stabbed a piercing blade into my neck. But as much as "retarded" pains me, something holds me back from confronting my classmate. The word renders me helpless and impotent. I can't challenge him because he's not out of the ordinary; everyone says it. And not just kids. I'm standing at the checkout counter of my high school's student store, Rice Krispies in hand. As the register stubbornly refuses to dispense a receipt, a mom volunteering behind the counter becomes more and more flustered. Irritated, she expresses her frustration: "This thing is retarded." Apathy has a major influence on the way my contemporaries use language. "Retarded" has become one of the go-to negative adjectives the Internet generation (alongside words like "gay" and "lame"). And while "retarded" is not usually spoken from a place of deliberate insult, it carries an insulting connotation: "Retarded" is used at the expense of a vulnerable group**. I'm at cross-country practice looking out at a long, rigorous course the coach has just ordered us to tackle. I turn hesitantly toward my teammate, whose exhaustion has clearly been exacerbated. At a loss, he resorts to the only adjective he can attach to his disappointment: "This is retarded." The R-word is a blade in my neck. My body stiffens and my fists clench at the mere mention of the word. But hearing it is unavoidable. So I've developed a sort of sympathy toward the ignorant, an assumption that people don't know how their words hurt; that they're simply in the dark. But it isn't sympathy alone that holds me back from the treacherous brink of confrontation. There's another layer--something simpler that moves me to evade saying "please don't," or "that hurts": 16-year-olds don't have much of a platform to stand on in the arena of language use. And, furthermore, I run the risk of seeming almost sanctimonious; lecturing my friends and family on their choices of words when I'm still trying to discover my own voice. Nonetheless, I've had no such luxury of darkness. Down the hall from my bedroom, my autistic brother struggles to carry on a conversation, getting stuck repeating the same phrases over and over again. (Granted, there are differences between autism and the other sorts of developmental delays that once fell under the umbrella of "retardation.") Most of my peers have not witnessed the deeply rooted frustrations of missing out on a typical childhood. Few of them hear pleas like my brother's to "go to school with the other kids." Sometimes I do leap abruptly at the opportunity to wag a finger. "Do you have a brother with a neurological disorder?" I'll ask, my tone dripping with disdain. "Tell me, what is it about that math problem that's mentally delayed?" But my discomfort with a generation's forceful linguistic trend has changed the way I've chosen to express my displeasure. Public scolding, I've learned, rings hollow and elicits little more than an awkward blank stare. It's not that I'm afraid or timid; but sometimes--even when I feel like my "retarded" bubble is about to burst -- I just have to ask myself, "Is it worth it?" Like it or not, it is. I wish my generation (and their moms, where necessary) would realize something: words can be both powerful and toxic. Some serve a variety of purposes; but some are meant to be attached to one exclusive definition. Those words aren't fit to be taken out of context and attached to scenario after scenario, ad nauseam. The movie you saw last night isn't retarded, the Christmas sweater your Great Aunt Gertrude knit you isn't gay, and your Monday afternoon SAT class isn't lame. The more often we hastily slap one of those labels onto something, the more often we denigrate, disparage, belittle, and inevitably rule out a magnificent portion of our population. The math problem was challenging, sure. The cash register wasn't working and the cross-country course was disheartening. That MSNBC host may have asked some questions that Coulter didn't like . But do any of those scenarios entail any sort of neurological delay? Most certainly not. **To preserve the sanctity of language and defend the integrity of another population of otherwise easy-targets, thought should always precede action and compassion should inform language. The next time you want to express how awful, offensive or frustrating something is, try coming up with another word. My suggestion: Coulterish**.

# \*\*\*\*\*Root Cause Answers (No One Root Cause)\*\*\*\*\*

**Explanations of international relations that rely upon individual causal forces should be rejected in favor of explanations that are nuanced and specific to the situation**

**Kurki 2007** (Milja, Lecturer, Department of Int’l Politics, University of Wales, Aberystwyth) “Critical realism and causal analysis in international relations”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 34(5), accessed via Sage Journals Online)

**While in some natural sciences laboratory experiments can be conducted to isolate individual causal forces,** this is not what defines science in natural sciences: **this is an unrealistic and unnecessary expectation in the social sciences, with dynamic ontological objects. It is true that parsimonious accounts can be helpful in some contexts and that all approaches must engage in some simplification. Yet it does not mean that parsimony should be prioritised: oversimplification entails important weaknesses in social explanations. Simplified analyses of complex social processes do not necessarily provide the most interesting, nor sufficiently nuanced, causal explanations to facilitate adequate understanding of social issues**. As critics have pointed out it is not insignificant theoretically or politically that positivist democratic peace theory, for example, has tended to lack appreciation of the complex historical conditioning of democratic politics within states and actions of democratic states within global economic, political and cultural relations.41

[parsimony: Adoption of the simplest assumption in the formulation of a theory or in the interpretation of data, especially in accordance with the rule of Ockham's razor. American Heritage Dictionary 2009]

**International Relations are empirically proven to be complex and context specific – specifics of a situation should be preferred over grand theories of international relations**

**Jervis 1999** (Robert, Professor of International Politics at Columbia University. “Realism, neoliberalism, and cooperation” International Security 24: 1. Accessed via Academic OneFile)

**Often more fine-grained distinctions about preferences are required to understand what needs to change to increase cooperation. Because states have ladders of means-ends beliefs, some preferences over outcomes are, from a broader perspective, preferences over strategies. Thus many conflicts can be seen as both an avoidable security dilemma and the product of irreconcilable differences. For example, it can be argued that at bottom what Japan sought in the 1930s was security: dominance over the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was desired not as an ultimate value or even for national wealth but as a source of strength and security.** This in turn was needed not because Japan was under immediate Western pressure - this was an effect not a cause of Japan's policy - but rather because of the expectation that eventually the West would menace Japan. Cooperation would have been possible if the United States and Great Britain had been able to reassure Japan of their continuing goodwill (assuming that Japan did not engage in military adventures), but this was difficult if not impossible for states in anarchy. Although Japan's ultimate goals would not have to have changed to produce cooperation, "mere" alterations in images of the other side and the deployment of conflict-reduction strategies could not have kept the peace. Similarly, **even if the United States and the Soviet Union ultimately sought security during the Cold War, deep internal changes were a prerequisite for far-reaching cooperation because each believed that the other would be a menace as long as its domestic system was in place.**

# Root Cause Answers (No One Root Cause)

**Postmodern criticisms must be contextualized to the individual circumstances – specificity should be privilidged over sweeping generalizations**

**Tuathail 1996** (Gearoid, Department of Geography, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. “The patterned mess of history and the writing of geopolitics: a reply to Dalby” Political Geography, 15: 6-7, p. 661).

In so doing, **I hope to illustrate some of my earlier concerns about postmodern narratives and historical complexity using his very comment as an example. If I must state our positions as a divide, I would characterize this divide as one between an approach that skims history to illustrate certain sweeping poststructuralist narratives and an approach that seeks to move beyond the generality of these narratives into a genuine dialogue with** what Michael Mann has termed **the ‘patterned mess’ of history** (Mann, 1986, 1993).

**Academics must engage with the specificities of international relations**

**Tuathail 1996** (Gearoid, Department of Geography, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. “The patterned mess of history and the writing of geopolitics: a reply to Dalby” Political Geography, 15: 6-7, p.663)

Dalby’s second point about **the importance of disciplinary context merely reinforces my own caution about the utility of certain metatheoretical forms of early dissident IR within the distinct disciplinary context of political geography. I accept his point that these deconstructions may have been necessary within the context of IR’s canon, but the method of these deconstructions inevitably reproduced even as they challenged the very project of ‘theories of international relations’.** This is why I found David **Campbell’s attempt to move beyond metatheoretical interrogations of elite theorists to engage histories of the practice of foreign policy so welcome and worthy of note within political geography** (and also why I prefer Walker 119881 over Walker 119931).

# Root Cause Answers (No One Root Cause)

**Hypothesizing about the complex inner working of government is key to creating space for radical politics**

**McClean 2001** (David, “The cultural left and the limits of Social Hope,” AM Phil Conf, www. American philosophy.org/archives/pass conference programs/ pc2001/Discussion%20papers/david\_mcclean.htm

**We who fancy ourselves philosophers would do well to create from within ourselves and from within our ranks a new kind of public intellectual who has both a hungry theoretical mind and who is yet capable of seeing the need to move past high theory to other important questions that are less bedazzling and "interesting" but more important to the prospect of our flourishing** - questions such as "How is it possible to develop a citizenry that cherishes a certain hexis, one which prizes the character of the Samaritan on the road to Jericho almost more than any other?" or "How can we square the political dogma that undergirds the fantasy of a missile defense system with the need to treat America as but one member in a community of nations under a "law of peoples?" The new public philosopher might seek to understand labor law and military and trade theory and doctrine as much as theories of surplus value; the logic of international markets and trade agreements as much as critiques of commodification, and the politics of complexity as much as the politics of power (all of which can still be done from our arm chairs.) **This means going down deep into the guts of our quotidian social institutions, into the grimy pragmatic details where intellectuals are loathe to dwell but where the officers and bureaucrats of those institutions take difficult and often unpleasant, imperfect decisions that affect other peoples' lives, and it means making honest attempts to truly understand how those institutions actually function in the actual world before howling for their overthrow commences. This might help keep us from being slapped down in debates by true policy pros who actually know what they are talking about but who lack awareness of the dogmatic assumptions from which they proceed, and who have not yet found a good reason to listen to jargon-riddled lectures from philosophers and culture critics with their snobish disrespect for the so-called "managerial class."**

# \*\*\*\*\*Science Good Frontline\*\*\*\*\*

**1. Embracing science and objective reason is critical to a progressive social politics—we can’t combat AIDS or warming without it.**

Alan **Sokal, 1996** (Professor of Physics at New York University), “A PHYSICIST EXPERIMENTS WITH CULTURAL STUDIES” Accessed May 23, 2011 at <http://linguafranca.mirror.theinfo.org/9605/sokal.html>

POLITICALLY, I'm angered because most (though not all) of **this silliness is emanating from the self-proclaimed Left.** We're witnessing here a profound historical volte-face. For most of the past two centuries, the Left has been identified with science and against obscurantism; we have believed that **rational thought and the fearless analysis of objective reality** (both natural and social) **are** incisive **tools for combating the mystifications** promoted by the powerful--**not to mention being desirable human ends** in their own right. **The recent turn of many "progressive" or "leftist" academic humanists and** social scientists **toward** one or another form of **epistemic relativism** betrays this worthy heritage and **undermines the already fragile prospects for progressive social critique. Theorizing about "the social construction of reality" won't help us find an effective treatment for AIDS or devise strategies for preventing global warming**. Nor can we combat false ideas in history, sociology, economics, and politics if we reject the notions of truth and falsity.

**2. Scientific reasoning bolsters democracy while checking authoritarianism.**

Edward Ross **Dickinson, 2004** (University of Cincinnati, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About “Modernity,” Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, March)

Second, I would argue that **there is** also **a causal fit between cultures of** expertise, or “**scientism,” and democracy**. Of course, “**scientism” subverted the real, historical ideological underpinnings of authoritarian polities in Europe in the nineteenth century**. It **also** in a sense **replaced them**. **Democratic citizens have the freedom to ask “why**”; and in a democratic system **there is therefore a bias toward pragmatic, “objective” or naturalized answers**— since **values are** often **regarded as matters of opinion,** with which any citizen has a right to differ. **Scientific “fact” is democracy’s substitute for revealed truth**, expertise its substitute for authority. **The age of democracy is the age of professionalization, of technocracy**; **there is a deeper connection** between the two, this is **not merely a matter of historical coincidence.**

**3. Evidence, empiricism, and logic bolster a leftist political agenda—they cede these tools to the right wing.**

Alan **Sokal, 1996** (Professor of Physics at New York University), “A PHYSICIST EXPERIMENTS WITH CULTURAL STUDIES” Accessed May 23, 2011 at <http://linguafranca.mirror.theinfo.org/9605/sokal.html>

I say this not in glee but in sadness. After all, I'm a leftist too (under the Sandinista government I taught mathematics at the National University of Nicaragua). On nearly all practical political issues--including many concerning science and technology--I'm on the same side as the Social Text editors. But **I'm a leftist** (and a feminist) **because of evidence and logic**, not in spite of it. **Why should the right wing be allowed to monopolize the intellectual high ground?** And **why should self-indulgent nonsense--whatever its professed political orientation--be lauded as the height of scholarly achievement?**

# \*\*\*\*\*Securitization kritik answers\*\*\*\*\*

# Securitization Good

**(--) Securitization of threats is good—it allows us to anticipate and prevent danger.**

Joseph **Berke** (Found. And Dir. Arbours Crisis Centre), , Even Paranoids Have Enemies, p. 5-6

Internal and external persecution come together in the theoretical model of ‘the paranoid process’ – **a set of developmental and defensive mechanisms** which **serve to delineate the individual’s inner psychic world and his experience of his emerging self**, while, at the same time, contributing to the shaping of his sense of significant objects in his experiential world (Meissner 1986). One of this model’s core components, ‘the paranoid construction’ refers to a cognitive reorganization taking place in an attempt to sustain a comfortable sense of self which, however, may be at the expense of reality testing. This process, in its extreme form, leads to the formation of a persecutory bond, where a link is established between, on the one hand, the paranoid individual and, on the other, his persecutors and the terrifying forces that threaten to engulf him. This can become a rigid construction that reinforces the spiral of paranoia-persecution-paranoia. **Meissner understands this mechanism as offering a sense of cohesion and durability to a fragile self, though it often involves a high degree of pathology and victimization.** Instances of this process abound in individuals, institutions, and groups (including whole nations) where views of internal and external situations are (ab)used to service a brittle sense of identity. Fully recognizing this predicament, and the dangers involved, requires thinking about and tolerating our own conflictual parts. **Paradoxically, a certain degree of paranoia is desirable as it is a basis for discrimination** (Segal 1994); **when we let a new experience touch us, we acknowledge that it may be bad or good, which enables us to anticipate danger. In leaders of an organization**, for instance, a certain degree of **paranoid potential can be a useful resource**, as **opposed to a dangerous naivety that would prevent the leader from becoming aware** of the situations **of activation of aggression in the group, or regression to primitive levels of functioning.** **Where the leader can be aware of, and apprehend risk and danger, there is the possibility** of preparation for the group **to face them and cope with them**

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# Securitization kritik answers: Securitization Good

**(--) Confronting threats early prevents escalation—WWII proves.**

Young-Kwan **Yoon**(Professor of International Relations at Seoul National University; former Foreign Minister of South Korea) “Introduction: Power Cycle Theory and the Practice of International Relations”, International Political Science Review **2003**; vol. 24; p. 7-8)

In history, **the effort to balance power quite often tended to start too late to protect the security of some of the individual states.** If the balancing process begins too late, **the resulting amount of force necessary to stop an aggressor is** often **much larger than if the process had been started** much **earlier**. For example, **the fate of Czechoslovakia and Poland showed how non-intervention or waiting for the “automatic” working through of the process turned out to be problematic**. Power cycle theory could also supplement the structure-oriented nature of the traditional balance of power theory by incorporating an agent-oriented explanation. This was possible through its focus on the relationship between power and the role of a state in the international system. It especially highlighted the fact that a discrepancy between the relative power of a state and its role in the system would result in a greater possibility for systemic instability. **In order to prevent** this **instability from developing into a war, practitioners of international relations were to become aware of the dynamics of changing power and role,** adjusting role to power. A statesperson here was not simply regarded as a prisoner of structure and therefore as an outsider to the process but as an agent capable of influencing the operation of equilibrium. Thus power cycle theory could overcome the weakness of theoretical determinism associated with the traditional balance of power. **The question is often raised whether government decision-makers could possibly know or respond to such relative power shifts in the real world.** According to Doran, when the “tides of history” shift against the state, the push and shove of world politics reveals these matters to the policy-maker, in that state and among its competitors, with abundant urgency. (2) The Issue of Systemic Stability Power cycle theory is built on the conception of changing relative capabilities of a state, and as such it shares the realist assumption emphasizing the importance of power in explaining international relations. But its main focus is on the longitudinal dimension of power relations, the rise and decline of relative state power and role, and not on the static power distribution at a particular time. As a result, power cycle theory provides a significantly different explanation for stability and order within the international system. First of all, **power cycle theory argues that what matters most in explaining the stability of the international system or war and peace is not the type of particular international system** (Rosecrance, 1963) **but the transformation from one system to another**. For example, in the 1960s there was a debate on the stability of the international system between the defenders of bipolarity such as Waltz (1964) and the defenders of multi-polarity such as Rosecrance (1966), and Deutsch and Singer (1964). After analyzing five historical occasions since the origin of the modern state system, Doran concluded that **what has been responsible for major war was not whether one type of system is more or less conducive to war but that instead systems transformation itself led to war** (Doran, 1971). **A non-linear type of structural change that is massive, unpredicted, devastating to foreign policy expectation, and destructive of security is the trigger for major war,** not the nature of a particular type of international system.

# Securitization kritik answers: Securitization Good

**(--) The security dilemma doesn’t apply to situations where states pose genuine threats.**

Randall **Schweller**, (professor of political science at Ohio State) Security Studies, Spring **1996** p. 117-118)

The crucial point is that **the security dilemma is always apparent, not real**. If states are arming for something other than security; that is, **if aggressors do in fact exist, then it is no longer a security dilemma but rather an example of a state or a coalition mobilizing for the purpose of expansion and the targets of that aggression responding** and forming alliances **to defend themselves**. Indeed, Glenn Snyder makes this very important point (disclaimer?) in his discussion of the security dilemma and alliance politics: “**Uncertainty about the aims of others is inherent in structural anarchy. If a state clearly reveals itself as an expansionist**, however, **the alliance that forms against it is not self defeating as in the prisoners’ dilemma** (security dilemma) model” 89 That is, **if an expansionist state exists, there is no security dilemma/spiral model effect**. Moreover, **if all states are relatively sure that none seeks expansion, then the security dilemma similarly fades away**. It is **only the misplaced fear that others harbor aggressive designs** that **drive the security dilemma**.

## (--) Most wars are caused by deliberate threats, not spiraling insecurities.

Randall **Schweller**, (professor of political science at Ohio State) Security Studies, Spring **1996** p. 120)  
**War is almost always intended by someone.** **Throughout history it has been decided upon in cold blood not for reasons of self-preservation but for** the purpose of **greedy expansion at the expense of others’ security, prestige, and power**. “**What was so often unintentional about war**,” Blainey points out, “**was not the decision to fight but the outcome** of the fighting.” 98  
**(--) War preparation deters aggression, the kritik prevents these efforts.**Edward **Luttwak** (Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies), BOSTON REVIEW, October **1997**, p.11.   
More generally, war-preparation by those actually willing to fight (not just ritualistic preparations, as is mostly the case in advanced countries nowadays) may avert war by dissuading others' hopes of easy victories -- even Bosnia might have done it, had it raised a good army before declaring independence -- whereas wishing for peace, marching for peace, etc., is as relevant as wishing and marching for good weather -- except if it interferes with concrete war-preparations, when it may be counterproductive.

# Securitization kritik answers—Doesn’t Cause War

**(--) Securitization doesn’t cause wars.**

Stuart Kaufman, (Prof Poli Sci and IR – U Delaware) “Narratives and Symbols in Violent Mobilization: The Palestinian-Israeli Case,” 2009 Security Studies 18:3, 400 – 434

**Even when hostile narratives, group fears, and opportunity are strongly present, war occurs only if these factors are harnessed.** **Ethnic narratives and fears must combine to create significant ethnic hostility** among mass publics. **Politicians must also seize the opportunity to manipulate that hostility,** evoking hostile narratives and symbols to gain or hold power by riding a wave of chauvinist mobilization. Such **mobilization is often spurred by prominent events** (for example, episodes of violence) **that increase feelings of hostility and make chauvinist appeals seem timely. If the other group also mobilizes and if each side's felt security needs threaten the security of the other** side, **the result is a security dilemma spiral of rising fear, hostility, and mutual threat that results in violence**. **A virtue** of this symbolist theory **is that symbolist logic explains why ethnic peace is more common than ethnonationalist war. Even if hostile narratives, fears, and opportunity exist, severe violence usually can still be avoided if** ethnic **elites** skillfully **define group needs in moderate ways and collaborate across group lines** to prevent violence: this is consociationalism.17 **War is likely only if hostile narratives, fears, and opportunity spur hostile attitudes, chauvinist mobilization, and a security dilemma.**

**(--) Aggressive states, not security concerns, are the root of conflict**Andrew **Kydd** (Professor of Political Science, University of California, Riverside,) SECURITY STUDIES, Autumn **1997**, p.154. 

In the case of the cold war, **it is again difficult to escape the conclusion that the Soviet Union was indeed expansionist before Gorbachev and not solely motivated by security concerns**. The **increased emphasis within international relations scholarship on explaining the nature and origins of aggressive expansionist states reflects a growing consensus that aggressive states are at the root of conflict, not security concerns.**

# Securitization kritik answers—Doesn’t Cause War

**(--) Violence is proximately caused – root cause logic is poor scholarship**

Matthew **Sharpe**, lecturer, philosophy and psychoanalytic studies Deakin University, **2010**

Žižek and Politics: An Introduction, p. 231 – 233

We realise that this argument, which we propose as a new ‘quilting’ framework to explain Žižek’s theoretical oscillations and political prescriptions, raises some large issues of its own. While this is not the place to further that discussion, we think its analytic force leads into a much wider critique of ‘Theory’ in parts of the latertwentieth- century academy, which emerged following the ‘cultural turn’ of the 1960s and 1970s in the wake of the collapse of Marxism. Žižek’s paradigm to try to generate all his theory of culture, subjectivity, ideology, politics and religion is psychoanalysis. But a similar **criticism would apply**, for instance, **to theorists who feel that the method Jacques Derrida developed for criticising philosophical texts can meaningfully supplant the methodologies of political science, philosophy, economics, sociology and so forth, when it comes to thinking about ‘the political’.** Or, differently, **thinkers who opt for Deleuze** (or Deleuze’s and Guattari’s) **Nietzschean Spinozism as a new metaphysics to explain ethics, politics, aesthetics, ontology and so forth, seem** to us candidates for the same type of criticism, as **a reductive passing over the empirical and analytic distinctness of the different object fields in complex societies.** In truth, we feel that **Theory, and the continuing line of ‘master thinkers’** who regularly appear particularly in the English- speaking world, **is the last gasp of what used to be called First Philosophy. The philosopher ascends out of the city,** Plato tells us, from whence she can espie the Higher Truth, which she must then bring back down to political earth. From outside the city, we can well imagine that **she can see much more widely than her benighted political contemporaries. But from these philosophical heights, we can equally suspect that the ‘master thinker’ is also always in danger of passing over the salient differences** and features of political life – differences only too evident to people ‘on the ground’. **Political life,** after all, **is always a more complex affair than a bunch of ideologically duped fools staring at and enacting a wall** (or ‘politically correct screen’) **of ideologically produced illusions**, from Plato’s timeless cave allegory to Žižek’s theory of ideology. We know that **Theory largely understands itself as avowedly ‘post- metaphysical’**. It aims to erect its new claims on the gravestone of First Philosophy as the West has known it. But it also tells us that people very often do not know what they do. And so **it seems to us that too many of its proponents and their followers are mourners who remain in the graveyard,** propping up the gravestone of Western philosophy under the sign of some totalising account of absolutely everything – enjoyment, différance, biopower . . . Perhaps **the time has come,** we would argue, less for one more would- be global, allpurpose existential and political Theory than for a multi- dimensional and interdisciplinary critical theory that would challenge the chaotic specialisation neoliberalism speeds up in academe, which mirrors and accelerates the splintering of the Left over the last four decades. This would mean that **we would have to shun the hope that one method, one perspective, or one master thinker could single- handedly decipher all the complexity of socio- political life**, the concerns of really existing social movements – which specifically does not mean mindlessly celebrating difference, marginalisation and multiplicity as if they could be sufficient ends for a new politics. It would be to reopen critical theory and non- analytic philosophy to the other intellectual disciplines, most of whom today pointedly reject Theory’s legitimacy, neither reading it nor taking it seriously.

# Securitization kritik answers--Perms

**(--) The permutation solves for securitization**

Richard **Youngs** (Co-ordinator of the Democratisation programme at FRIDE, and lecturer at the University of Warwick in the UK), “Democracy and Security in the Middle East” March **2006**

**While many of the doubts raised against democracy are convincing, the conceptual groundings from which they are argued commonly lead critics to be overly dismissive of democracy’s potential meri**t. One shortcoming, witnessed especially in the United States, is the tendency implicitly to assume that the situation is one of the West/ US deciding whether democracy is a good thing or not in the face of a passive Middle East. In reality, of course, **democracy’s fate is unlikely to be the West’s to decide. Western policy is more a reactive than independent variable**, and **security calculations must be made with this in mind.** Even if the sceptics’ concerns are fully acknowledged, what can perhaps be argued with some certainty is that **as and when the Middle East’s political plates begin to shift it would breed resentment if the West sought actively to discourage change. It is particularly irritating** – for those both in the Middle East and in other Western states – **that debates over democracy promotion are so often couched in a discourse of ‘US values’**. Both the **enthusiasts and the sceptics regularly conflate** – or seem constantly a hair’s breadth away from conflating – their respective **views on democracy with their position on the US seeking to spread its values**. **Democracy must**, rather, **be carefully judged on its own** merits. **Presenting the argument in terms of ‘our security’ being served by spreading ‘our values’** – in fact a favourite formulation not only of president Bush but also of British prime- minister,Tony Blair – **could hardly be better designed to engender counter-productive responses to democracy promotion efforts. Where democracy support is aimed at ensuring that Arabs’ own values and aspirations are not hindered from outside, a more comprehensive approach to political change is invited. Such** a starting point **offers greater possibility of teasing out democracy’s potential, linking support for political reform organically to a broader range of change in the region. A truly holistic approach would be attentive to the pitfalls of political rupture unsynchronised with underlying structural adaptation of economy and social life.** A strategy that fully contextualised political reform within ongoing processes of social, religious and economic change in the Arab world might not magic away strategic threats, but it would go some way to preparing the foundations for the kind of comprehensive transformation that would render containment-based security less necessary. **The value of support for democracy should not be discounted, but must be made to mesh with issues of a structural nature** - and certainly not merely take the form of backing easily-accessible pro-Western democracy activists.

# Securitization kritik answers—Alt Fails

**(--) Lack of a blueprint means the alternative will fail to solve securitization.**

Alastair **Murray** (Professor Politics at the University of Wales) Reconstructing Realism: Between Power Politics and Cosmopolitan Ethics,**1997** p. 188-9

**His disagreement with realism depends on a highly contestable claim** - based on Herz's argument that, with the development of global threats, the conditions which might produce some universal consensus have arisen - that its 'impossibility theorem' is empirically problematic, **that a universal consensus is achievable, and that its practical strategy is obstructing its realisation**. In much the same way, in `The poverty of neorealism', realism's practical strategy is illegitimate only because Ashley's agenda is inclusionary. **His central disagreement with realism arises out of his belief that its strategy reproduces a world order organised around sovereign states, preventing exploration of the indeterminate number of** - potentially less exclusionary - **alternative world orders**. **Realists**, however, **would be unlikely to be troubled by such charges**. **Ashley needs to do rather more than merely assert that the development of global threats will produce some universal consensus, or that any number of less exclusionary world orders are possible**, to convince them. **A universal threat does not imply a universal consensus, merely the existence of a universal threat faced by particularistic actors**. And **the assertion that indeterminate numbers of potentially less exclusionary orders exist carries little weight unless we can specify exactly what these alternatives are and just how they might be achieved.** As such, **realists would seem to be justified in regarding such potentialities as currently unrealizable ideals and in seeking a more proximate good** in the fostering of mutual understanding and, in particular, of a stable balance of power. Despite the adverse side-effects that such a balance of power implies, it at least offers us something tangible rather than ephemeral promises lacking a shred of support. Ultimately, **Ashley's demand that a new, critical approach be adopted in order to free us from the grip of such 'false conceptions depends upon ideas about the prospects for the development of a universal consensus which are little more than wishful thinking,** and **ideas about the existence of potentially less exclusionary orders** which **are little more than mere assertion**. Hence his attempts, in 'Political realism and human interests', to conceal these ideas from view by claiming that the technical base of realism serves only to identify, and yet not to reform, the practical, and then, in 'The poverty of neorealism', by removing the technical from investigation altogether by an exclusive reliance on a problem of hermeneutic circularity. In the final analysis, then, **Ashley's post-structuralist approach boils down to little more than a critique which fails.** **It is predicated on the assumption that the constraints upon us are simply restrictive knowledge practices**, **such that it presumes that the entirety of the solution to our problems is little more than the removal of such false ways of thinking. It offers nothing by way, of alternative - no strategies, no proximate goals**, indeed, little by way of goals at all. **If**, in constructivism, **the progressive purpose** leads to strategies divorced from an awareness of the problems confronting transformatory efforts, and, in critical theoretical perspectives, it produces strategies divorced from international politics in their entirety, **in post-structuralism** it **generates a complete absence of strategies altogether.** **Critique serves to fill the void, yet this critique ultimately proves unsustainable.** With its defeat, post-structuralism is left with nothing. Once one peels away the layers of misconstruction, it simply fades away. **If realism is**, as Ashley puts it, **'a tradition forever immersed in the expectation of political tragedy', it at least offers us a concrete vision of objectives and ways in which to achieve them** which his own position. forever immersed in the expectation of deliverance- is manifestly unable to provide."

# Securitization kritik answers—Alt Fails

**(--) The alternative fails - nationalism is inevitable and reinforced by dominant states - you are utopians**

Stephen **Walt 11** (Professor of International Affairs @ Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, “Nationalism Rules,” July 15, 2011. Retrieved June 1, 2012 at <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/07/15/the_enduring_power_of_nationalism?page=0,1>)

What's the most powerful political force in the world? Some of you might say it's the bond market. Others might nominate the resurgence of religion or the advance of democracy or human rights. Or maybe it's digital technology, as symbolized by the Internet and all that comes with it. Or perhaps you think it's nuclear weapons and the manifold effects they have had on how states think about security and the use of force. Those are all worthy nominees (no doubt readers here will have their own favorites), but my personal choice for **the Strongest Force in the World** would be [**is] nationalism. The belief that humanity is comprised of many different cultures** -- i.e., groups that share a common language, symbols, and a narrative about their past (invariably self-serving and full of myths) -- **and that those groups ought to have their own state has been an overwhelmingly powerful force in the world over the past two centuries**. It was **nationalism** that **cemented most of the European powers in the modern era**, turning them from dynastic states into nation-states, and **it was the spread of nationalist ideology that helped destroy the British, French, Ottoman, Dutch, Portuguese, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian/Soviet empires. Nationalism is the main reason the United Nations had fifty-one members immediately after its founding in 1945 and has nearly 200 members today.** It is why the Zionists wanted a state for the Jewish people and why Palestinians want a state of their own today. **It is what enabled the Vietnamese to defeat both the French and the American armies during the Cold War.** It is also why Kurds and Chechens still aspire to statehood; why Scots have pressed for greater autonomy within the United Kingdom, and it is why we now have a Republic of South Sudan. Understanding the power of nationalism also tells you a lot about what is happening today in the European Union. During the Cold War, European integration flourished because it took place inside the hot-house bubble provided by American protection. Today, however, the United States is losing interest in European security, the Europeans themselves face few external threats, and the EU project itself has expanded too far and badly overreached by creating an ill-advised monetary union. What we are seeing today, therefore, is a gradual renationalization of European foreign policy, fueled in part by incompatible economic preferences and in part by recurring fears that local (i.e., national) identities are being threatened. When Danes worry about Islam, Catalans demand autonomy, Flemish and Walloons contend in Belgium, Germans refuse to bail out Greeks, and nobody wants to let Turkey into the EU, you are watching nationalism at work. The power of nationalism is easy for realists to appreciate and understand, as my sometime collaborator John Mearsheimer makes clear in an important new paper. Nations -- because they operate in a competitive and sometimes dangerous world -- seek to preserve their identities and cultural values. In many cases, the best way for them to do that is to have their own state, because ethnic or national groups that lack their own state are usually more vulnerable to conquest, absorption, and assimilation. Similarly, **modern states also have a powerful incentive to** promote national unity -- in other words, to **foster nationalism -- because having a loyal and united population that is willing to sacrifice** (and in extreme cases, to **fight and die)** for the state **increases its power and thus its ability to deal with external threats.** **In the competitive world of international politics**, in short, **nations have incentives to obtain their own state and states have incentives to foster a common national identity** in their populations. Taken together, these twin dynamics create a long-term trend in the direction of more and more independent nation-states.

# Securitization kritik answers—Alt Fails

**(--) Opening up space for new ways of knowing won’t affect international violence.**

Terry **O'Callaghan** (lecturer in the school of International Relations at the University of South Australia), International Relations and the third debate, ed: Jarvis, **2002**, p. 80-81

**Revolutionary change** of the kind desired by George **ignores that fact that many individuals are not disposed to concerns beyond their family, friends, and daily work** lives. And **institutional, structural transformation requires organized effort, mass popular support, and dogged single-mindedness if societal norms are to be challenged, institutional reform enacted**, consumer tastes altered, **and political sensibilities reformed.** Convincing Nike that there is something intrinsically wrong with paying Indonesian workers a few dollars a week to manufacture shoes for the global market requires considerably more effort than postmodern platitudes and/or moral indignation. **The cycle of wealth creation and distribution that sees Michael Jordan receive multimillion dollar contracts to inspire demand for Nike products, while the foot soldiers in the factory eke out a meager existence producing these same products is not easily, or realistically, challenged by pronouncements of moving beyond International Relations to a new, nicer, gentler nirvana.** More generally, of course, what George fails to consider is **the problem of apathy and of how we get people to care about the plight of others.** What do we with the CEOs of multinational corporations, stockbrokers, accountants, factory workers, and the unemployed, who, by and large, fail to consider the homeless and destitute in their own countries, let alone in places they have never visited and are never likely to visit? **Moral indignation rarely translates into action, and apathy about the plight of others is a structural impediment as strong any idea, theory, or writing.** What George's treatise thus fails to consider is how we overcome this, and how we get others to listen. **He needs to explain how the social, political, psychological, and moral structures that define the parameters of existence for the many millions of ordinary citizens in the first world**, and that deflects attention from the marginalized and the oppressed can be broken down. Unfortunately, there is little to indicate that George has thought much about this, suggesting that his **commitment to postmodern theory is not likely to make much difference. In** fact, **in the academy the postmodern light is already beginning to dim** in certain quarters, having registered scarcely a glimmer in the broader polity, where, if change was to ensue, it needed to burn brightly. Even among those versed in the nomenclature of scholarly debate, **theorists of international politics remain skeptical of the value of postmodern discourse, by and large rejecting it.** This does not portend well for postmodern visionaries and the future of postmodern discourse. But can George really be surprised by this? After all, **his discourse indicts the "backward discipline" for complicity in crimes against humanity, calling for a repudiation of realism and with it a repudiation of the lifelong beliefs and writings of eminent theorists like Kenneth Waltz, Robert Gilpin, and Stephen Krasner** who have otherwise defined the parameters of the discipline, its projects, and research agendas. Can George really expect discipline-wide capitulation to an intellectual diaspora that would see theorists repudiate their beliefs and works in order to take up the creed of postmodernism, as vague, open-ended, and indeterminate as it is? **Without a clear and credible plan of how to get from "incarceration and closure" to intellectual freedom, creativity, and openness**, George's **postmodern musings have understandably attracted few disciples.**

# Securitization kritik answers—Alt Fails

**(--) The alternative isn’t real world and only increases the threat of war.**

John Norton **Moore** (Dir. Center for Security Law @ University of Virginia), Solving the War Puzzle: Beyond the Democratic Peace, **2004**, pages 41-2.

**If major interstate war is** predominantly **a product of a synergy between a potential nondemocratic aggressor and an absence of effective deterrence, what is the role of the many traditional "causes" of war?** Past, and many contemporary, **theories of war** have **focus**ed **on the role of specific disputes between nations, ethnic and religious differences, arms races, poverty or social injustice, competition for resources, incidents and accidents, greed, fear, and perceptions of "honor," or many other such factors.** Such factors may well play a role in motivating aggression or in serving as a means for generating fear and manipulating public opinion. The reality, however, is that while some of these may have more potential to contribute to war than others, **there may well be an infinite set of motivating factors, or human wants, motivating aggression.** It is not the independent existence of such motivating factors for war but rather the **circumstances permitting or encouraging high risk decisions leading to war**that is **[are] the key to more effectively controlling war**. And the same may also be true of democide. The early focus in the Rwanda slaughter on "ethnic conflict," as though Hutus and Tutsis had begun to slaughter each other through spontaneous combustion, distracted our attention from the reality that a nondemocratic Hutu regime had carefully planned and orchestrated a genocide against Rwandan Tutsis as well as its Hutu opponents.I1 **Certainly if we were able to press a button and end poverty, racism, religious intolerance, injustice, and endless disputes, we would want to do so.** Indeed, **democratic governments must remain committed to policies that will produce a better world** by all measures of human progress. **The broader achievement of democracy and the rule of law will itself assist in this progress.**No one, however, has yet been able to demonstrate the kind of robust correlation with any of these "traditional" causes of war as is reflected in the "democratic peace." Further, **given the difficulties in overcoming many of these social problems, an approach to war exclusively dependent on their solution may be to doom us to war for generations to come.**

# \*\*\*\*\*Shining City Kritik (American Exceptionalism) Shell \*\*\*\*\*

**A) Link: Justifying the plan on the grounds of seeking protection from persecution outside the country reinforces notions that foreign cultures are deviant—propping up norms of the American imperialist narrative:**

**McKinley 2009** – Assistant Professor, University of Oregon School of Law, (Michelle A., Fall, “Cultural Culprits”, 24 Berkeley J. Gender L. & Just. 91, Lexis Law)

I have no abiding interest or intellectual investment in "defending the cultural defense" beyond reiterating that law is a deeply ingrained cultural construct that is "raced" and "gendered" even more so by the immigrant status of the defendant. n35 Moreover, as Sarah Song and Cynthia Lee have both argued, the cultural defense is most successfully deployed when it reaffirms gender-biased and racist assumptions of mainstream liberal societies. n36 Thus, my appropriation of the cultural defense departs in important ways from its conventional scholarly [\*97] focus. **The cultural defense cases address crimes that are committed within the United States, while those fearing persecution seek protection from harms committed outside of the country. Nevertheless, both kinds of cases animate the same conceptual framework about "culture" as a monolithic set of norms and practices that prompt actions and behaviors that Americans denounce as deviant or persecutory. My interest here is twofold: first, to point out the ways that essentialist ideas frame and usher in cultural persecution and cultural defense claims; and second, to explore the ways that both of these genres of cases partake of and fortify a broader global imperialist narrative.**

**B) Open immigration policies reaffirm the US as a shining city of tolerance and individual autonomy while creating the savage other:**

**McKinley 2009** – Assistant Professor, University of Oregon School of Law, (Michelle A., Fall, “Cultural Culprits”, 24 Berkeley J. Gender L. & Just. 91, Lexis Law)

Although FGM has been criminalized by statute since 1996, State v. Adem is the first case involving a criminal conviction in a U.S. court. However, the [\*107] scholarly attention to the issue of female genital cutting is extensive. n85 Adem and Nabulwala raise important questions for multicultural debates that voice concerns about the internal vulnerability of sub-groups - notably women, children, and sexual minorities within immigrant communities. n86 **The varying uses of "culture" by feminists, universalists, and relativists (**and the contested visions of "culture" that surface inside and outside of the courtroom) **illuminates its multivalence.** Nabulwala's case is part of an emerging trend in asylum jurisprudence that narrowly recognizes persecution on the grounds of sexual orientation as it is linked with social group membership. n87 Sexual orientation cases like Nabulwala's perform a related though distinct function to Adem or Kasinga. Extreme African homophobia, as opposed to diffident acceptance (don't ask, don't tell) distinguishes the United States as an enlightened, tolerant society vis-a-vis barbaric, intolerant Africa. Crackpot evangelical homophobia (of the Fred Phelps vintage) is still too marginal to de-center the genteel distaste of the heteronormative mainstream. As Wendy Brown notes: In the mid-nineteenth through mid-twentieth centuries, the West imagined itself as standing for civilization against primitivism, and in the cold war years [\*108] for freedom against tyranny; now these two recent histories are merged in the warring figures of the free, the tolerant, and the civilized on one side, and the fundamentalist, the intolerant, and the barbaric on the other. n88 In another, somewhat unrelated vein, Bonnie **Honig has pointed out the rejuvenating role that the "foreigner" plays in democratic debates**. n89 **Indeed, liberal democracy depends on new recruits to assuage doubts about persistent poverty and gendered and racialized inequalities among the domestic poor**. n90 **In the context of asylum and refugee protection, I argue that the claims brought by cultural refugees** like Fauziya Kasinga, n91 Olivia Nabulwala, and Salimatou Bah **succeed because they appeal to the host nation's normative ideals of citizenship, tolerance, and individual autonomy while reaffirming widely held ideas about the differences between "our society and theirs."** n92 Women seeking refuge based on the cultural practices of their social group are racialized "others" whose rescue is effectuated without great monetary cost to the United States and with extraordinary political benefits. To paraphrase Achille Mbembe, Africa constitutes a powerful metaphor through which the West asserts its difference from the rest of the world - its apologetic concerns and its exclusionary and brutal practices towards others. n93

# Shining City Kritik (American Exceptionalism) Shell

**C) These portrayals justify 21st century wars based on a crusader mentality:**

**McKinley 2009** – Assistant Professor, University of Oregon School of Law, (Michelle A., Fall, “Cultural Culprits”, 24 Berkeley J. Gender L. & Just. 91, Lexis Law)

The issue of cultural essentialism in asylum jurisprudence inevitably entailed a renewed look at female genital cutting - a task I approached with considerable reluctance. In this post-CEDAW n37, Cairo+14, Beijing+15, gender-mainstreamed moment, it seemed unduly regressive to examine an issue that had defined the terrain of international women's human rights for over two decades. As many analysts of female genital cutting have observed, the practice of female genital cutting has been exhaustively debated because it encompasses so many thorny issues in human rights: "The sacredness of the family; women's rights as human rights; state obligations in the "private' sphere; human sexuality; ... the West's view of people in other cultures as "exotic Others'; postmodern colonialism; and cultural autonomy." n38 Yet, **the institutionalization of feminist inspired human rights that was evidenced by (increasingly) favorable asylum decisions based on FGM**, n39 **forced marriage**, n40 **state-sponsored coercive sterilization,** n41 **sexual orientation**, n42 **and domestic violence applications** n43 **was**  [\*98] **intriguing, given the intense moral condemnation and counter-accusations of human rights imperialism that had characterized the debates around these issues during the 1980s and 1990s**. n44 **The Pyrrhic victory won by feminist asylum advocates had to be tempered by a sobering realization that the approval of these claims was firmly embedded within a cultural essentialist framework** - **one which trafficked very easily in signs of victimization and racialization**. n45 **Feminist scholars and advocates have voiced concerns with regard to the insufficient questioning about the issue of cultural essentialism in portrayals of gender-based persecution and its infelicitous appropriation as a discursive tool to legitimate our various twenty-first century wars (terror, fundamentalism, drugs,** [\*99] **crime, trafficking, AIDS).** n46 **Indeed, while the institutionalization of women's rights as human rights authorizes the approval of gender-based asylum claims - and should be rightfully claimed as a success of the feminist movement - it should also be treated with a healthy degree of skepticism, caution, and ambivalence**.

# Shining City Kritik (American Exceptionalism) Shell

**D) The alternative is to challenge the AFF’s oversimplified representations—this is critical to create sustainable movements for change to challenge oppression and Western imperialism:**

**Harvard Law Review 2004** (May, “117 Harv. L. Rev. 2365”, “SAVING AMINA LAWAL: HUMAN RIGHTS SYMBOLISM AND THE DANGERS OF COLONIALISM” lexis)

V. **Alternative Approaches to Human Rights Advocacy Challenging this symbolism means seriously examining current human rights campaigns and moving them away from the centuries-old method that confuses women's issues with cultural issues. It requires supporters of the rights of postcolonial women to struggle against the impulse to represent women's oppression as representative of national and cultural iniquity,** even when it may be the quickest and most effective means of galvanizing international interest in a particular problem or case. It also requires creative thinking and action to restructure the terms of present-day discussions about human rights. **Human rights activists must challenge oversimplified representations of human rights violations in postcolonial states.** They should take care to situate campaigns on behalf of specific persons within the social, political, and economic context in which a human rights violation occurs. In a country such as Nigeria, **human rights organizations should strive to counter the focus that the international media places on convenient symbols** such as Ms. Lawal, and instead should use resources such as the Internet to ensure that the stories of all persons affected by the Islamization of Nigeria get some, if not equal, attention. Human Rights Watch's continued reports on Nigeria exemplify this approach by including accounts of cases such as Ms. Lawal's as well as an abundance of information about political developments in the country. n114 In an era of "sound bites," it may be impossible to present nuanced reports to all people; however, sound bites can be used strategically to direct interested persons to sources of more complete information. Through such tools, the human rights community should seek to promote an ethos of informed activism that, as much as possible, avoids the use of simplistic representations to generate support.

The argument for an activism that resists the use of women as symbols does not require that human rights activists abandon gendered analyses or women-focused campaigns - a comprehensive and inclusive human rights discourse should include an understanding of [\*2385] gender oppression. However, **the symbolic use of women and the silencing effect of that use are important elements of gender oppression, and challenging them should be part of any gender-sensitive human rights campaign**. A challenging approach might include the participation of human rights activists in developing more nuanced representations of women and their participation in postcolonial polities. Most major newspapers reporting Ms. Lawal's case failed to note that women have played a major role in protecting people from the human rights violations resulting from Nigeria's application of the Shari"a penal code. Not only was Ms. Hussaini the first person, man or woman, to appeal the imposition of a corporal or capital punishment under the new code, n115 her defense was spearheaded by Hauwa Ibrahim, the first female lawyer from northern Nigeria. n116 Ms. Ibrahim is a Muslim woman who obtained a legal education in a region where most women are not permitted to study beyond an elementary level. n117 She has devoted her career to challenging the constitutional violations in Shari"a cases n118 and was also lead counsel in Ms. Lawal's defense. Also prominent in the struggle to address human rights violations in Nigeria are women's groups such as BAOBAB, a human rights organization that focuses on legal rights issues under Nigeria's customary, statutory, and religious laws. n119 The story of the reintroduction of the Shari"a criminal law is as much a story about the activism and leadership of Nigerian women as it is a story of the victimization and silencing of Ms. Lawal. As the backlash from the conferment of honorary Roman citizenship on Ms. Hussaini demonstrates, when human rights discourse tracks the language of the colonialist project by making use of symbols equating women with victims, it not only obscures the leadership role that women like Ms. Ibrahim play in challenging human rights violations in postcolonial states; it may also trigger resistance (in the name of culture) that can seriously hinder human rights work. To combat this danger, human rights activists should be careful to build international campaigns around the leadership of these women. More nuanced representations and more complicated campaigns, however, are not sufficient on their own because as long as the human rights project remains focused on postcolonial states, the sense that it [\*2386] is a descendant of the colonialist Western interventions of the past will remain. n120 **The full spectrum of the world's failure to meet human rights ideals must be emphasized, including the violations that occur in Western states, in order to challenge the double standard** that many Western leaders apply in their approach to human rights. The Western states that criticize countries like Nigeria for their human rights violations are often the very states that shelter perpetrators of crimes against humanity, as was the case with England's hosting of Libya's ex-president Charles Taylor. n121 Human rights violations in Western states are often categorized differently from - and lack the stigma of "savagery" that attaches to - violations in postcolonial states. Activists should insist that the language of human rights be applied to the "First World" violations in the same way that it is applied to the Third; human rights violations in the "First World" should not be considered simply a violation of a "civil" right or a misapplication of a Western state's otherwise "civilized" law. n122 The history of colonialism has left an indelible mark in the discourses between the societies of former colonizers and colonized. It has created powerful symbols and a vocabulary for intervention in postcolonial states that Western movements have found difficult to replace, precisely because these symbols and this vocabulary can be so effective in mobilizing support for campaigns against oppression in postcolonial states. However, when international movements, such as the human rights project, make use of this vocabulary, they come dangerously close to repeating the mistakes of the colonialist past and provide fodder for criticisms from postcolonial activists. Moreover, **the use of colonialist imagery and vocabulary does little to empower women - and other people who serve as the objects of salvation - to effect change in their countries on their own terms. If human rights advocates seek to create a sustainable international movement, they must actively challenge, rather than reinscribe, the very language of international intervention.**

# Shining City Block Overview

**Give us your tired, give us your poor, give us your hungry huddled masses yearning to breathe free…the American position on immigration carries with it the implicit assumption that the nations from which immigrants come are victims of a savage land that creates poverty, overpopulation, and oppression…while the United States functions as a white knight in shining armor riding to the rescue. Our McKinley link evidence says that new immigrant recruits to the United States assuage our own doubts about persistent poverty and gendered and racial inequalities in the United States while reaffirming the belief that America is a land of tolerance and individual autonomy. This logic is the logic of the war in Afghanistan and humanitarian intervention generally—in the name of protecting innocent victims from savage nations the US must fight a global crusade to save other nations from themselves…this not only entrenches oppression and racism it outweighs the AFF by sustaining the logic that justifies warfare around the globe.**

**Plus, the AFF discourse justifies the mindset that non-western cultures are inherently more sexist, brutal, and intolerant than the land of the free and the home of the brave: justifying that we are a shining city on the hill—turning the case**

**McKinley 2009** – Assistant Professor, University of Oregon School of Law, (Michelle A., Fall, “Cultural Culprits”, 24 Berkeley J. Gender L. & Just. 91, Lexis Law)

**The invocation of "culture"** as a "cracking factor" or **as a justification for criminal behavior in U.S. courtrooms reinforces an already widely held assumption about the incommensurability of gender equality and non-western cultures - i.e., that non-western cultures are inherently more sexist, brutal**, [\*96] **illiberal, and intolerant - and that these attitudes and practices are better left behind in the "old country" than in the land of the free**. n32 Thus, as an initial step, the ideas of culture should be challenged. **Culture is wielded in the courtroom as a monolithic, explicable construct that motivates people to** "crack" - or **act in certain ways. Unlike religion, or the even more ephemeral "values" which have achieved an a priori level of questioning as a means of explaining behavior, culture is fixed.**

# Shining City Block Overview

**And…Representations are ethical choices which shape the world in which we live—vote negative to hold the AFF accountable for choices of representations:**

Roxanne Lynn **Doty, 1997** assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at Arizona State University, Imperial Encounters, p. 169-171

**The cases examined in this study attest to the importance of representational practices and the power that inheres in them.** The infinity of traces that leave no inventory continue to play a significant part in contemporary constructions of “reality.” This is not to suggest that representations have been static. Static implies the possibility of fixedness, when what I mean to suggest is an inherent fragility and instability to the meanings and identities that have been constructed in the various discourses I examined. For example, to characterize the South as “uncivilized” or “unfit for self—government~~ is no longer an acceptable representation. This is not, however, because the meanings of these terms were at one time fixed and stable. As I illustrated, what these signifiers signified was always deferred. Partial fixation was the result of their being anchored by some exemplary mode of being that was itself constructed at the power! Knowledge nexus: the white male at the turn of the century, the United States after World War II. **Bhabha stresses “the wide range of the stereotype,** from the loyal servant to Satan, from the loved to the hated; a shifting of subject positions in the circulation of colonial power” (1983: 31). The shifting subject positions—from uncivilized native to quasi state to traditional “man” and society, for example are all partial fixations that have enabled the exercise of various and multiple forms of power. Nor do previous oppositions entirely disappear. What remains is an infinity of traces from prior representations that themselves have been founded not on pure presences but on differance. “The present becomes the sign of the sign, the trace of the trace,” Derrida writes (1982: 24). Differance makes possible the chain of differing and deferring (the continuity) as well as the endless substitution (the discontinuity) of names that are inscribed and reinscribed as pure presence, the center of the structure that itself escapes structurality. North-South relations have been constituted as a structure of deferral. The center of the structure (alternatively white man, modern man, the United States, the West, real states) has never been absolutely present outside a system of differences. It has itself been constituted as trace—the simulacrum of a presence that dislocates itself, displaces itself, refers itself (ibid.). Because the center is not a fixed locus but a function in which an infinite number of sign substitutions come into play, the domain and play of signification is extended indefinitely(Derrida 1978: z8o). This both opens up and limits possibilities, generates alternative sites of meanings and political resistances that give rise to practices of reinscription that seek to reaffirm identities and relationships. The inherently incomplete and open nature of discourse makes this reaffirmation an ongoing and never finally completed project. **In this study I have sought,** **through an engagement with various discourses in which claims to truth have been staked, to challenge the validity of the structures of meaning and to make visible their complicity with practices of power and domination**. By examining the ways in which structures of meaning have been associated with imperial practices, I have suggested that **the construction of meaning and the construction of social, political, and economic power are inextricably linked. This suggests an ethical dimension to making meaning and an ethical imperative that is incumbent upon those who toil in the construction of structures of meaning.** This is especially urgent in North-South relations today: **one does not have to search very far to find a continuing complicity with colonial representations that ranges from a politics of silence and neglect to constructions of terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, international drug trafficking, and Southern immigration to the North as new threats to global stability and peace.** The political stakes raised by this analysis revolve around the question of being able to “get beyond” the representations or speak outside of the discourses that historically have constructed the North and the South. I do not believe that there are any pure alternatives by which we can escape the infinity of traces to which Gramsci refers. Nor do I wish to suggest that we are always hopelessly imprisoned in a dominant and all-pervasive discourse. Before this question can be answered—indeed, before we can even proceed to attempt an answer—attention must be given to the politics of representation. **The price that international relations scholarship pays for its inattention to the issue of representation is perpetuation of the dominant modes of making meaning and deferral of its responsibility and complicity in dominant representations.**

# Shining City Block Overview

**Rhetorical analysis is a necessary precursor to policy making- you can’t weigh their advantages independently of their representations**

**Dauber 2001**( Cori Elizabeth, Associate professor of communications at the university of North Caroline Chapel Hill, “the shot seen round the world: the impact of the images of Mogadishu on american military operations”; http://muse.uq.edu.au.ts.isil.westga.edu/journals/rhetoric\_and\_public\_affairs/v004/4.4dauber.html)

The impact the Mogadishu images have had on American foreign policy is clear. But their impact is not inescapable or inevitable. It is based on the incorrect assumption that people can only read images unidirectionally. No matter how similar, no matter how powerfully one text evokes another, every image is unique. Each comes from a different historical situation, is placed within a different story, and offers an ambiguous text that can be exploited by astute commentators. **Images matter profoundly, but so do their contexts and the words that accompany them.** The implications of this shift in interpretation are potentially profound. Mogadishu, or the mention of a potential parallel with Mogadishu, need not be a straightjacket or a deterrent to the use of American power**. Rhetoric, whether discursive or visual, has real power in the way events play out.** What this article makes clear is that **rhetoric (and therefore rhetorical analysis) also has power in the way policy is shaped and defined. In a recent book on the conflict in Kosovo, the authors note that when the president spoke to the nation on the night the air war began, he immediately ruled out the use of ground forces. This was done, they argue, due to fears that leaving open the possibility of ground force participation would sacrifice domestic public and congressional (and allied) support for the air war**. But "publicly ruling out their use only helped to reduce Milosevic's uncertainty regarding the likely scope of NATO's military actions," 109 and possibly to lengthen the air war as a result. Yet, they report, National Security Advisor Sandy **Berger,** "who authored the critical passage in the president's speech, **maintains that 'we would not have won the war without this sentence.'**" **110 It would be difficult to find more direct evidence for the profound impact and influence public rhetoric and debate have**--and are understood to have**--on policy, policymaking, and policymakers at the highest level. That means that rhetorical analysis can have a role to play and a voice at the table before policies are determined.** Academic **rhetoricians,** through their choice of projects and the formats in which they publish, **can stake a claim to having an important voice at the table--and they should do so.**

**The Kritik turns their case: their opposition creates a rally around the flag effect to re-entrench oppressive cultural norms:**

Christine J. **Walley, 1997** (New York University). Searching for "Voices": Feminism, Anthropology, and the Global Debate over Female Genital Operations. Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Aug., 1997), pp. 405-438. Accessed Sept. 5, 2010 on JSTOR.

Gender and the Hardening of "Tradition" Attention to colonial history reveals that **cultural arguments can be a doubleedged sword. While such arguments may be used to advocate tolerance in the face of difference, they may also be used to stifle change and impose or buttress particular culturally-defined power relationships. The conceptual fusing of women with culture and tradition has particular implications for women, who may become symbols in a battle to construct particular versions of "modem" or "traditional" society. This tendency is clear in the case of female genital operations. In Kenya in the late 1920s and early 1930s, missionaries of the Church of Scotland waged a campaign to stop the practice of clitoridectomy** among the Kikuyu who lived in the area surrounding Nairobi. **Clitoridectomy, which appeared to be on the wane** despite its importance to the age-grade system, **was revitalized and given new meaning not by "traditionalists," but by the young nationalists** of the Kikuyu Central Association. As Pedersen notes, As a defense of clitoridectomy became entangled with long-standing Kikuyu grievances about mission influence and access to land ,clitoridectomy, always the sign of the "true Kikuyu,"also came to be seen as a mark of loyalty to the incipient, as yet imaginary nation.[ 1991:651] Although women's voices were largely unrecorded in this debate, **Robertson suggests that the fight against the missionary ban on clitoridectomies was also related to the desire of Kikuyu elders and young militant men to control women's trading in Nairobi because it threatened male sexual and economic dominance** (1996:623).

# Shining City - Framework Answers

**(--) The affirmative should be held responsible for their discursive choices—cross-apply our McKinley and Doty evidence from the overview—representations of otherization in the immigration context are unethical and should be rejected.**

**(--) And immigration policy should not be looked at from the position of a government policy maker or those trying to persuade a government policy maker—prefer our evidence because it is specific to the immigration context:**

**Ansley 2008** – Distinguished Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Tennessee College of Law (Frances, Winter, “SYMPOSIUM: Immigration Policy: Who Belongs?: COMMENT: Doing Policy from Below: Worker Solidarity and the Prospects for Immigration Reform”, 41 Cornell Int'l L.J. 101, Lexis Law)

**I do not approach the question of immigration policy from the position of a government policy maker. I do not even approach it as someone whose near-term goal is to persuade a government policy maker**. 8 **As things currently stand**, however, **I believe that the primary task is movement-building across racial and national lines, and the demands of that task are substantial to say the least**. Accordingly, **my priority is to figure out how intellectuals, academics, and professionals like me - and like many of those who attended this symposium or are reading** [\*110] **this issue of the law journal - can best contribute to such a project.** n32

**(--) And they choose their representations—meaning it is ultimately fair for them to debate.**

**(--) And the logic of ignoring representations allows for the unchallenged use of racist and sexist language.**

# Shining City - Framework Answers

**(--) And…their policy impacts will be subverted by their discursive choices—we have to change representations first or the policy will get co-opted:**

Arthur **Kleinman, 1996** Professor of Medical Anthropology and Professor of Anthropology at Harvard, The appeal of experience; the dismay of images: cultural appropriations of suffering in our times," DAEDALUS Winter 1996, p. http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_qa3671/is\_199601/ai\_n8747499/print

Ultimately, **we will have to engage** the more ominous aspects of globalization, such as the commercialization of suffering, **the commodification of experiences** of atrocity and abuse, and the pornographic uses of degradation.(36) Violence in the media, and its relation to violence in the streets and in homes, is already a subject that has attracted serious attention from communities and from scholars.(37) Regarding the even more fundamental cultural question of how social experience is being transformed in untoward ways, **the first issue would seem to be to develop historical, ethnographic, and narrative studies that provide a more powerful understanding of the cultural processes through which the global regime** of disordered capitalism **alters the connections between collective experience and subjectivity**, so that moral sensibility, for example, diminishes or becomes something frighteningly different: promiscuous, gratuitous, unhinged from responsibility and action.(38) **There is a terrible legacy here that needs to be contemplated. The transformation of epochs is as much about changes in social experience as shifts in social structures and cultural representations; indeed, the three sites of social transformation are inseparable. Out of their triangulation, subjectivity too transmutes.** The current transformation is no different; yet perhaps we see more clearly the hazards of the historical turn that we are now undertaking. Perhaps all along we have been wrong to consider existential conditions as an ultimate constraint limiting the moral dangers of civilizational change.

**(--) And…our Kritik operates within their framework—even if you allow them to weigh their case—we’ll win that the Kritik outweighs and turns their case—their plan merely justifies colonial interventions and oppression on a grand scale:**

Christine J. **Walley, 1997** (New York University). Searching for "Voices": Feminism, Anthropology, and the Global Debate over Female Genital Operations. Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Aug., 1997), pp. 405-438. Accessed Sept. 5, 2010 on JSTOR.

Poststructuralist feminist scholars like Judith Butler have criticized this preoccupation with identity politics (Butler 1990; Butler and Scott 1992). **In a challenge similar to that posed against hardened understandings of "culture," Butler criticizes identity politics for building on and encouraging essentialism that is, the reduction of complex human experiences and competing identities to static essences** presumed to emanate from the unambiguous facts of gender, race, or nationality (1990). **While historically, the concept of "culture" provided a space that allowed for respect and understanding of differences, "identity politics" has similarly provided dominated groups with an arena for organizing and demanding rights. If not problematized, however, the terms in which such claims are made can work to create new forms of oppression rather than greater liberation. Hardened conceptions of "culture" can suggest both insurmountable barriers between "us" and "them" and a predetermined "authenticity" to which individuals are pressured to conform.**

# Shining City - Framework Answers

**(--) And intellectuals on immigration policy should focus less on technical details of laws and more on building social movements to bring together workers:**

**Ansley 2008** – Distinguished Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Tennessee College of Law (Frances, Winter, “SYMPOSIUM: Immigration Policy: Who Belongs?: COMMENT: Doing Policy from Below: Worker Solidarity and the Prospects for Immigration Reform”, 41 Cornell Int'l L.J. 101, Lexis Law)

**The essay opens with a partial account of my own motivation and perspective on the question of immigration policy and immigrants' rights** and shares how my journey to this point in my thinking shapes my views. Next, **I urge that many more lawyers and others interested in achieving a just immigration policy should avoid concentrating so much effort on questions of doctrine, draftsmanship, and legislative deal-making. Instead, they should focus their intellectual and practical energies on building social movements that bring workers together across differences of race and nation to advance class-linked demands.** Finally, I describe a few ways that some people are doing what I see as helpful work in the service of that goal.

**(--) And there is no distinction between discourse and practice in the area of gender:**

Christine J. **Walley, 1997** (New York University). Searching for "Voices": Feminism, Anthropology, and the Global Debate over Female Genital Operations. Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Aug., 1997), pp. 405-438. Accessed Sept. 5, 2010 on JSTOR.

Ultimately, however, the theoretical separation between clitoridectomy in Kikhome as ritual practice and the international controversy surrounding female genital operations as discourse is untenable. **Discourse is also practice; it is not simply a way of understanding or thinking about the world, it is also a way of acting in it. Given that our discourse also signals a form of intervention, I would like to encourage feminists of whatever national origins, race, or gender to work against those assumptions being made in Western-oriented media accounts of female genital operations that reproduce colonial and neocolonial ideologies**. Feminist anthropologists can also make a productive contribution by examining the social contexts of both ritual practices and international controversies and by exploring the power dynamics surrounding support and opposition to such practices, whether in rural African villages or urban France. For those interested in more hands-on styles of activism, critics of identity politics and hardened notions of culture are also pointing us in the direction of a feminist politics based on alliances and coalitions (Butler 1990; Haraway 1989; Mohanty 1991); hopefully, this brand of feminist politics will also be capable of critiquing practices such as clitoridectomy and infibulation without resorting to neocolonial ideologies of gender or denigrating the choices of women who support such practices. At the same time, Kenyan anthropologist Achola Pala-Okeyo cautions that "the role of [Western] feminists is not to be in front, leading the way for other women, but to be in back supporting the other women's struggles to bring about change."22 Here Pala-Okeyo forces us to recognize that all of us, along with the debates in which we are engaged, are products of tenacious power relationships with long histories. The hope is that we can bring this recognition to bear at the same time that we form alliances based on shared politics across boundaries of race, nationality, and gender.

# Shining City Links: Crisis Rhetoric

**(--) Crisis mentality glosses over underlying root causes of so called “everyday” oppression—turning the case**

Karen **Engle, 2007** (Professor in Law @ University of Texas). “"Calling in the Troops": The Uneasy Relationship Among Women's Rights, Human Rights, and Humanitarian Intervention.” Harvard Human Rights Journal, Spring 2007. Accessed Sept. 9, 2010, Lexis Academic Universe

Feminists who labeled rapes by Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina as genocide both capitalized on emerging trends toward humanitarian intervention and furthered those trends. Even with the expanded justifications for military humanitarian intervention that have arisen since R2P, the emerging consensus suggests that forceful humanitarian intervention is reserved for crisis situations. States and international organizations are called to intervene or shamed for not intervening because the situation is urgent, because many people have already died or been raped, and because "tomorrow we will be killed." n151 **If crisis is the point at which harm is attended to, every harm must be made into a crisis to receive attention. This focus on crisis both displaces and distorts attention to "the everyday," whether it be "everyday" killing, rape, hunger, or gross wealth disparity. It also reinforces a pre-realist understanding of intervention:** imagining a world in which not acting militarily is "not acting," **and refusing to see the ways in which many of the same powers that ultimately send in the troops often have played a significant role in creating conditions ripe for a crisis.** n152

**(--) Crisis politics glosses over malnutrition and distribution of wealth problems—leading to 30,000 deaths a day:**

Karen **Engle, 2007** (Professor in Law @ University of Texas). “"Calling in the Troops": The Uneasy Relationship Among Women's Rights, Human Rights, and Humanitarian Intervention.” Harvard Human Rights Journal, Spring 2007. Accessed Sept. 9, 2010, Lexis Academic Universe

In a provocative discussion of the debates around Kosovo and the normalizing bureaucratic discourse over whether the loss of five hundred civilian lives was "worth" the intervention and disregard of U.N. Charter rules, Martti Koskenniemi argues that **such discourse "relegates [international law's] own founding violence into the shadow**." n153 **"[W]hat about the violence of a global system," he asks, in which "more than 30,000 children die every day of malnutrition, and the combined wealth of the 200 richest families** [\*225] **in the world was eight times as much as the combined wealth of the 582 million people in all the least developed countries.**" n154 He continues by arguing that "[t**]he more international lawyers are obsessed by the effectiveness of the law to be applied in 'crisis,' the less we are aware of the subtle politics whereby some aspects of the world become defined as 'crisis' whereas others do not.**" n155

**(--) The alternative would take a break from crisis rhetoric—this provides a challenge to the military intervention which their rhetoric justifies:**

Karen **Engle, 2007** (Professor in Law @ University of Texas). “"Calling in the Troops": The Uneasy Relationship Among Women's Rights, Human Rights, and Humanitarian Intervention.” Harvard Human Rights Journal, Spring 2007. Accessed Sept. 9, 2010, Lexis Academic Universe

**Halley has argued for taking "a break from feminism. Not kill it, supersede it, abandon it; immure, immolate, or bury it--merely spend some time outside it exploring theories of sexuality, inhabiting realities, and imagining political goals that do not fall within its terms."** n161 Similarly, in the final chapter of Kennedy's book, considering what international humanitarianism "should become," he suggests: **Imagine an international humanitarianism which took a break from preoccupation with the justifications for "intervention." Which no longer imagined the world from high above, on the "international plane," in the "international community." Which saw itself in a location, among others, as an interest among others, as a culture among others** . . . . **Such a heuristic might . . . prevent us from overestimating the possibilities for a costless, neutral engagement in far away places, or underestimating our ongoing political role in governance.** n162 The current emerging consensus toward the use of military humanitarian intervention makes it increasingly difficult to imagine taking a break from either humanitarianism or from feminism. **Taking full and self-conscious advantage of the very crisis mentality I have critiqued, I would call for such a break now, before the consensus is fully formed.**

# Shining City Links: Culture Links

(--) Putting African traditions on trial in American courtrooms makes African culture appear savage and primitive:

**McKinley 2009** – Assistant Professor, University of Oregon School of Law, (Michelle A., Fall, “Cultural Culprits”, 24 Berkeley J. Gender L. & Just. 91, Lexis Law)

In 1996, Fauziya Kassindja n8 was granted political asylum based on her fear of genital mutilation and resistance to an arranged marriage with an older wealthy man. n9 Most recently, **a US court (after waffling on the issue of whether past female genital mutilation constituted an ongoing harm** n10 **on par with forced sterilization), granted asylum to three Guinean women [\*93] based on their experience of female genital cutting**. n11 **Despite their differences, in these cases "culture" - particularly "African culture" - is on trial in US courtrooms. This culture is sweepingly condemned as primordial, misogynistic, homophobic - capable of inflicting unspeakable harms on one's own children. Such modes of viewing "African culture" are uncritically reproduced in documentaries and other popular media** n12 **and richly illustrate the ways in which ideas about culture - like race - consolidate certain institutional practices.** n13

# Shining City Links: Democracy/Framing Others as Anti-Democratic

**(--) Characterizing other nations as anti-democratic raises the specter of political savagery among other nations:**

Makau **Mutua, 2001** (Professor of Law and Director, Human Rights Center, SUNY). “Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights.” Harvard International Law Journal. Winter, 2001. Accessed Sept. 10, 2010, Lexis/Nexis.

**Elsewhere, non-European political traditions, which lie outside the liberal tradition and do not yield political democratic structures, are demonized in the text of human rights and its discourse**. Take, for example, the view expressed by human rights documents in the area of political participation. Here, the human rights corpus expects all societies to support a pluralist, democratic society. Both the UDHR and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the two key documents in the area of [\*223] civil and political rights, are explicit about the primacy of rights of expression and association. They both give citizens the right to political participation through elections and the guarantee of the right to assemble, associate, and disseminate their ideas. n90 This scheme of rights coupled with equal protection and due process rights implies a political democracy or a political society with a regularly elected government, genuine competition for political office, and separation of powers with judicial independence. **While it is true that the human rights regime does not dictate the particular permutation or strain of political democracy, it suggests a Western-style liberal democracy nevertheless. Systems of government such as monarchies, theocracies, dictatorships, and one party-states would violate rights of association and run afoul of the human rights corpus**. n91 **When it rejects non-Western political cultures as undemocratic, the human rights corpus raises the specter of political savagery.**

# Shining City Links: Female Genital Operations

**(--) Granting asylum for female genital cutting functions as a legitimizing strategy for occupation and broader rights violations—turning the case:**

**McKinley 2009** – Assistant Professor, University of Oregon School of Law, (Michelle A., Fall, “Cultural Culprits”, 24 Berkeley J. Gender L. & Just. 91, Lexis Law)

I begin this article by providing **the longer historical backdrop of colonial interventions**, which, as Gayatri Spivak famously stated, **were devised "to save brown women from brown men."** n67 **Positioned within a maternalist imperial paradigm**, n68 **these interventions have assumed a cyclical pattern** in the ecology of [\*103] colonial and post-colonial human rights, **framing the vulnerability of women's position as a legitimizing strategy for continued occupation and the broader violations of the rights of the population.** n69 Not all maternalist interventions are covered here; that would be insane, if not tediously grim, and many other post-colonial scholars have exhaustively and beautifully covered the subject. n70 Rather, **I focus my historical analysis on the unsuccessful British interventions in Kenya to eradicate female genital cutting beginning in 1906**. I indulge in a longer comparative analysis to reiterate **the repetitive framing of "culture as culprit" and the calls for rescue within the inherited normative and political universes of asylum, refugee, and humanitarian law**. And **I regard asylum - the discretionary grant of sovereign protection - as the paradigmatic example of post-colonial rescue and the contemporary extension of the maternal imperialist project**. n71 **Asylum has always been a tool of foreign policy**, n72 **and with the** [\*104] **insertion of feminist concerns into international lawmaking and governance, female genital cutting became a logical target for inclusion in the pantheon of human rights violations** against which women could seek protection. Thus, I next examine the anti-FGM campaign during the 1980s that culminated in the passage of the Federal Female Genital Mutilation Act of 1996 n73 as an instance of feminist reshaping of American foreign policy and asylum law. **The grant of asylum for past or feared female genital cutting is critical to the credibility of the U.S.'s condemnatory and punitive stance against the practice**. n74 The Female Genital Mutilation Act conditions the receipt of foreign aid among debt-strapped African nations upon the adoption of criminal sanctions against female genital cutting and the implementation of behavioral modification programs intended to eradicate the practice. n75 In response to these pressures, African governments adopted a number of reforms designed to reduce, eradicate, and criminalize the practice of female genital cutting in the 1990s.

# Shining City Links: Female Genital Operations

**(--) Their discourse invokes a series of binary oppositions that creates the United States as a shining city on the hill free of the savage traditions of other nations—this justifies Western imperialism in the name of saving the innocent victim:**

Christine J. **Walley, 1997** (New York University). Searching for "Voices": Feminism, Anthropology, and the Global Debate over Female Genital Operations. Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Aug., 1997), pp. 405-438. Accessed Sept. 5, 2010 on JSTOR.

To summarize, **much of the Western-oriented literature by Euro-Americans that opposes female genital operations invokes a series of binary oppositions, including: First World Third World modernity tradition science superstition civilized barbarous freedom torture/repression women as actors women as oppressed medical knowledge ignorance/disease The cumulative effect of these binary oppositions is to perpetuate a dichotomous understanding of First and Third Worlds, an enduring division between "us" and "them."** This division is strikingly apparent in Walker's Possessing the Secret of Joy (1992), where the dysfunctional sex life, intensely painful childbirth, deformed child, troubled marriage, and tortured soul of the main character, Tashi, are all attributed to "circumcision." Tashi is then contrasted with her U.S. husband's French lover, who emerges as the embodiment of female liberation and for whom birth is orgasmic. Perhaps the sense of a radical separation between First and Third Worlds, however, is most forcefully reproduced in accusations of "torture." Because clitoridectomies or infibulations are usually performed at the request of parents and relatives, those whom WeilCuriel classifies as "the real culprits," this discourse implicitly suggests that even family members in such societies are callous or barbaric enough to "torture" their own. Colonial History and the Debate over the Status of Women **A perusal of the Western-oriented literature opposing genital operations, much of which reproduces such disturbing power hierarchies, makes starkly apparent why gender is a fraught issue between so-called First and Third Worlds**. It is also clear that understanding the tenacity of the discourse discussed above requires understanding its history; and in fact, much recent scholarship has focused on colonial discourses of gender and the uses to which such discourses were put. This scholarship has argued that the alleged overwhelming oppression of "native" women by "native" men was consistently used to justify colonial domination and that Euro-American feminism was itself used toward those ends. The colonial discourse on female genital operations in Africa resembles that on other practices such as sati (widow-burning) in India, foot-binding in China, and veiling in Muslim societies. **Numerous scholars have documented how representations of the domination of non-Western women by non-Western men were used to justify British and French imperialism** (Ahmed 1992; Lazreg 1994; Liddle and Joshi 1989; Mani 1990). **Colonial representations that reified male domination as "traditional" throughout the Third World ignored the ways in which colonialism, and the economic transformations that accompanied it, systematically oppressed both colonized women and men**. It also ignored the ways that colonialism hurt women in particular by economically undermining what was an already vulnerable group and by subverting women's historical sources of power and autonomy.

# Shining City Links: Female Genital Operations

**(--)The plan reaffirms Western attitudes of superiority while glossing over the notion that female genital operations are controversial and contested in the nations from which the refugee flees:**

**McKinley 9** – Assistant Professor, University of Oregon School of Law, (Michelle A., Fall, “Cultural Culprits”, 24 Berkeley J. Gender L. & Just. 91, Lexis Law)

A review of these cases and their progeny highlight the ways that **notions of culture are ossified and castigated in exchange for protection. Immigrant communities that are susceptible to surveillance and hostility are no more protected or welcome in the United States by exercising their right of exit. The legal system that granted relief to** Salimatou Bah, Mariama Diallo, and Haby Diallo n100 - **three Guinean women awarded asylum based on their experience of** [\*110] **genital cutting - also acquitted four officers of all charges in the death of Amadou Diallo, the male Guinean immigrant who was fired on forty-one times as he cowered, unarmed, in the entryway to his Bronx apartment building**. n101 **These types of inconsistencies reaffirm** Sherene **Razack's observation that "while Muslim men have been the target of an intense policing, Muslim women have been singled out as needing protection from their violent and hyper-patriarchal men**." n102 The right of exit celebrated by liberal discourse reifies the only options available under dominant views of culture - exit or silence - leaving little room for negotiation within immigrant communities. Ironically, deliberation - the hallmark of enlightened democratic practice - is not an option in these cases since it is presumed that reason is the exclusive property of liberal, tolerant, culturally temperate societies. n103 Corinne Kratz shows that **media coverage** of Kasinga and its progeny **was devoid of any mention that the practice of circumcision was contested and debated within African nations, despite the fact that the widely publicized asylum cases animated discussions within the countries whose circumcising "cultural traditions" were pejoratively reviewed**. n104 In all likelihood, **if the media had mentioned the internal debates that occur in African societies and communities, it would imperil the claim that African people are cultural automatons incapable of rational reflection on their actions.** **Ironically, the need for asylum within the United States would be vitiated if high-incidence countries both adopted anti-genital cutting laws and proved modifications in the practice as a result of national policies and reflexive debate**. n105 **The asylum context brooks no ambivalent attachments: the realist logic is that people persecuted in one country seeking the protection of another simply do not deserve that protection if they demonstrate allegiance to the country** (read: culture/religion) **from which they flee. Protection is extended in exchange for total cultural repudiation**. Given this scenario, the complex issues raised by balancing the needs of asylum clients for legal immigration status and protection with the goals of transformative anti-racist politics are implicit in the broader challenges of critically engaged, global feminist advocacy. **Can the asylum process serve as an outlet that provides opportunities for dissent and undertakes** [\*111] **localized cultural negotiations given the geopolitical disparities between asylee/refugee producing and resettlement countries? Can we separate the geopolitical tensions that underwrite the zeal with which lawmakers** n106 **and practitioners embrace these cases that highlight a gaping chasm between "our culture and theirs" (given the apocalyptic prediction of a clash of civilizations)? Seemingly besieged by Islamic fundamentalism and torn apart by divisive immigration debates, these cases act as a conduit for mainstream America's cultural anxieties and (national) insecurities.** As Leti Volpp has repeatedly shown, similar crimes are portrayed as cultural pathologies or individual aberrations depending on the ethnic status of the perpetrators. n107

# Shining City Links: Female Genital Operations

**(--) Female genital operations are a touchstone symbol for portraying other nations as backward:**

Christine J. **Walley, 1997** (New York University). Searching for "Voices": Feminism, Anthropology, and the Global Debate over Female Genital Operations. Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Aug., 1997), pp. 405-438. Accessed Sept. 5, 2010 on JSTOR.

Particularly when portrayed for international audiences, **female genital operations have often been a symbol of "backwardness"and a source of "shame" to those in Third World countries who are concerned that their nations live up to Western-defined standards of "modernity."** 21A t the same time, in a cultural nationalist tradition, **defense of these practices has also served as a symbol of cultural integrity or resistance to EuroAmerican domination-ironically, a thoroughly "modern" position. What is disturbing to feminists, however, are the ways that attempts to create particular versions of cultural tradition may be translated into attempts to create, and thus control, particular kinds of women.**

**(--) Historically, opposition to female led circumcision bolsters propaganda of a benign and civilized empire:**

**McKinley 2009** – Assistant Professor, University of Oregon School of Law, (Michelle A., Fall, “Cultural Culprits”, 24 Berkeley J. Gender L. & Just. 91, Lexis Law)

Instrumentally, **the CSM-led female circumcision ban satisfied the need for propaganda that promoted British rule as a benign, uplifting, and civilizing enterprise. Missionaries provided moral commentary on the status of colonial affairs that was often critical of the government while garnering political and financial support for their work among upper class Conservatives** and devout working class congregations in Whitehall, Exeter Hall, and British church halls. n203 The Duchess of Atholl founded the "Committee for the Protection of Coloured Women in the Crown Colonies" after attending one of the CSM's meetings at which the customary initiation rite of irua was described. n204 The Duchess was reportedly outraged and revolted by the missionary's presentation, wondering how "the British Government could countenance such brutal assaults on innocent victims in its colonies in the twentieth century." n205 Missionaries, elite maternal imperialists, and colonial administrators could leverage their respective connections, political capital, and on-the-ground proselytizing labors [\*132] toward a common purpose that simultaneously fulfilled multiple functions under the capacious banner of Christianity, civilization, and commerce. n206

# Shining City Links: Female Genital Operations

**(--) Anti-FGM campaign perpetuates Western hegemony—the plan props up the US ability to condemn other cultures:**

**McKinley 2009** – Assistant Professor, University of Oregon School of Law, (Michelle A., Fall, “Cultural Culprits”, 24 Berkeley J. Gender L. & Just. 91, Lexis Law)

What follows is my attempt to show how these three discourses - the maternalist, the medical, and the universalist - fit together, and how an indigenized maternalism has emerged as "the" dominant respected voice within the contemporary anti-FGM campaign. In doing so, **my aim is not to recount in detail the well-documented strategies or politics of the contemporary anti-FGM campaign, but rather to identify the campaign as constitutive of** certain types of g-feminist **interventions that are profoundly influenced by their colonial past.** In short, my aim is not to take sides with a frankly tiresome moralizing debate, but rather to show how it animates arguments and attitudes about culture that shape Western understandings of the practice long before the asylum cases brought by African women reach a U.S. court. n290 **These cases become part of the arsenal of geopolitical and ideological tools for perpetuating Western hegemony** (and its attendant anxieties) in a polarized yet interdependent world. As mentioned earlier, **asylum cases alleging persecution on the basis of future and past female genital cutting are essential to the credibility of the U.S.'s condemnatory position within the global anti-FGM campaign**. However, **the present case law and the critiques that give rise to it build on erstwhile notions of culture and ideas of Africans as automatons ruled by an oppressive culture and/or religion**. n291 Indeed, as Wendy Brown writes, ""culture' is what nonliberal peoples are imagined to be ruled and ordered by ... . We have culture while they are a culture. Or, we are a democracy while they are a culture." n292 When we refer to ourselves as cultural subjects, we mean for the most part our autonomous ability to indulge in artistic creation, express a preference for a type of cuisine or taste in music - not the "submission to a harrowing practice that has existed for millennia." n293 "Family values" and "the American people" are phrases that are often bandied about by populists and fundamentalists, especially at election times, but adherence to [\*148] these values is imbued with a certain degree of volition. The phrase "American people" may be gently caricatured or archly derided given its impossible descriptive scale. **Contemporary "othering" is strikingly similar to the colonial discursive strategies** that positioned Kikuyu women **under the yoke of a barbaric, repulsive practice from which they could only be liberated by the agents of Western civilization.** As Nyamu points out, **the international community continues to regard African customs as something static and culturally complicit that must be abolished as a precondition for the full realization of women's rights and empowerment.** n294

**(--) Negative depictions of female genital operations create the savage other description:**

Makau **Mutua, 2001** (Professor of Law and Director, Human Rights Center, SUNY). “Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights.” Harvard International Law Journal. Winter, 2001. Accessed Sept. 10, 2010, Lexis/Nexis.

But the reality is far more complex. While the metaphor may suggest otherwise, **it is not the state per se that is barbaric but the cultural foundation of the state. The state only becomes a vampire when "bad" culture overcomes or disallows the development of "good" culture. The real savage, though, is not the state but a cultural deviation from human rights. That savagery inheres in the theory and practice of the one-party state**, military junta, controlled or closed state, theocracy, **or even cultural practices such as the one popularly known in the West as female genital mutilation** (FGM), n10 **not in the state per se. The state itself** is a neutral, passive instrumentality--a receptacle or an empty vessel--that **conveys savagery by implementing the project of the savage culture.**

# Shining City Links: Female Genital Operations

**(--) Current focus on eradicating female genital cutting validates earlier colonial campaigns:**

**McKinley 2009** – Assistant Professor, University of Oregon School of Law, (Michelle A., Fall, “Cultural Culprits”, 24 Berkeley J. Gender L. & Just. 91, Lexis Law)

**The current focus on eradicating female genital cutting through education, grassroots participation, and empowerment echoes an earlier wave of colonial campaigns to ban circumcision in African colonies**. n136 Indeed, the practice and its continued salience in the lives of African women and girls has been an enduring concern for women's rights advocates, legislators, missionaries, health workers, policy makers, and scholars worldwide for the past hundred years. **To explore the historical trajectory of the contemporary global anti-FGM campaign, I rely on Susan Pedersen's framework of maternal imperialism elaborated earlier as "activism over empire,** ... [of] educated and usually well-to-do women, drawing ... on a long experience of single-sex philanthropic work, [that] sought to protect those women and children who were presumed to be less fortunate or more vulnerable." n137 I pay special attention to the **international alliances of maternal imperialists involved in the campaign against female genital cutting** in [\*119] Kenya from 1928-1931 and to the kinds of discourses that were available and useful to advance their concerns. **Predictably, these discourses were medical hygiene, Christianity, and the moral superiority of the British civilization, but these also alternated with abolitionist outrage, anti-Islamism and Orientalism, liberal internationalism** n138 **and New Imperialism** (i.e. formal support for a gradualist policy of self-rule for African and Asian colonies under European tutelage), and an incipient transnational suffragism. I situate the period of activist campaigns against female genital cutting studied here (1928-1931) within the trajectory of British settler colonialism in Africa, which began as a largely masculine endeavor and changed after the relatively late appearance of women on the continent after World War I. n139 I compare this historical period of anti-excision campaigns with contemporary maternalism in the 1980s when international law and a specialized network of UN institutions became more responsive (albeit sluggishly) to feminist concerns about eradicating the practice, which led to the deployment of an indigenized maternalism in the twenty-first century.

**(--) Vast majority of circumcised women support their circumcision:**

Fuambai **Ahmadu, 2008** (Associate professor at the Department of Comparative Human Development). “Hurray for Bondo women in Kailahun.” Online Accessed Sept 5, 2010 at <http://www.thepatrioticvanguard.com/article.php3?id_article=2434>

For sure, **there are some circumcised African women who are against the practice and have their own reasons for it, which should be respected** and, in my opinion, legally protected. There are several women in my family who have not undergone initiation and have no plans to have their daughters initiated. Case closed. **Nonetheless, the vast majority of circumcised women (as well as men)** in Sierra Leone and **across the African sub-Sahara belt support their cultural traditions as well as the aesthetics of their bodily modifications. These women’s traditions are celebrated in parallel with male initiation and circumcision rituals and are important expressions of womanhood and female empowerment.**

# Shining City Links: Female Gential Operations Rhetoric Turns the Case

**(--) The AFF undermines indigenous attempts to change female genital operations practices:**

Christine J. **Walley, 1997** (New York University). Searching for "Voices": Feminism, Anthropology, and the Global Debate over Female Genital Operations. Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Aug., 1997), pp. 405-438. Accessed Sept. 5, 2010 on JSTOR.

**Koptiuch's argument carries implications for international debates over female genital operations. It suggests that the common responses to such practices** both the relativist argument, **which privileges cultural tolerance, and the blatantly ethnocentric argument, which assumes the "backwardness" of African traditions and the inferiority of immigrants-carry male-dominant and colonial legacies based on hardened notions of tradition and culture**. This raises difficult questions for feminist anthropologists: if we resort to cultural relativist arguments in the attempt to divert the racism embedded in much of the international outcry over female genital operations, do we end up undermining those African women who are themselves working to change these practices? Are we participating in leaving them exposed to charges that they are denigrating their own "traditions" and being culturally "inauthentic?" **In using an uncritical notion of "culture," do we in fact create the same sense of difference, of estrangement from each other's lives and worlds, that is also generated in the flagrantly ethnocentric literature that opposes female genital operations?**

# Shining City - Female Genital Operations Link: Patriarchy/Torture Discourse—2nc must read

**(--) We Kritik their discourse: Characterizing female genital operations as a function of patriarchy re-inscribes cultural essentialism by treating women in other nations as passive social agents—the alternative of focusing on diverse approaches to feminism and cultural diversity solves best as a path of opposition to female genital operations and in opposition to hierarchies:**

Christine J. **Walley, 1997** (New York University). Searching for "Voices": Feminism, Anthropology, and the Global Debate over Female Genital Operations. Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Aug., 1997), pp. 405-438. Accessed Sept. 5, 2010 on JSTOR.

In this depiction of female genital operations for an international audience, the practices became largely severed from their sociocultural context (with the exception of El Saadawi's article). While in Kikhome male and female initiations were performed side by side (albeit with very different consequences), **in the Western oriented literature opposing such practices there was an exclusive focus on the tormenting of girls, if not solely by men, then by a monolithic patriarchy.** During the United Nations Decade for Women (1975-85), female genital operations became a prominent and controversial issue. However, the response to the ensuing publicity was not what many **First World feminists** might have expected. Instead of being congratulated for their opposition to female circumcision, they **were called to task by some African and Third World women, including a group that threatened to walk out of the mid-decade international women's conference** in Copenhagen in 1980. **While some of these women themselves opposed female genital operations, they objected to the way the issue was being handled by First World feminists and called attention to the troubling power dynamics that exist between the First and Third Worlds**, as well as between First and Third World women.'9 This confrontation led by African women formed merely one segment of a broader challenge to mainstream EuroAmerican feminism by **women of color, working-class women, lesbians, and many Third World women, who felt that their experiences** and understandings **had been excluded by white, middle-class formulations of feminism** (Jayawardena 1986; Mohanty et al. 1991; Moraga and Anzaldua 1981; Tokarczyk and Fay 1993). **This challenge to Euro-American feminism also resulted in a shift of attention toward** issues of difference among women as well as toward **a reformulation of feminist politics that focused on coalition-building and the recognition of diversity rather than an assumption of homogeneous interests** (Butler and Scott 1992; Haraway 1989; Ramazanoglu 1989). Despite these criticisms of the way Third World women had been represented, Alice Walker's novel (1992), the film Warrior Marks, and its companion volume (Parmar 1993b; Walker and Parmar 1993), as well as essays published by the National Organization for Women (see NOW 1994), have provoked a replay of debates over female genital operations in terms remarkably like those of the 1970s. This frustrating sense of deja vu may be dismissed as Walker's and NOW's refusal to engage the productive aspects of earlier debates. However, **more pertinent to understanding** why these accounts have generated such a barrage of media attention **is the way that** Walker's and **NOW's presentation of female genital operations have fed into powerful and value laden understandings of differences between Africans and Euro-Americans understandings that are being reemphasized with increased immigration from the Third World to the First. Such understandings presume** a radical difference, **a binary opposition between First and Third Worlds that itself is built upon the historical belief in a chasm between "modern" Euro-Americans and "native" colonized others. Reading through much of the Western-based literature opposing female genital operations, the degree to which many of the arguments work to reproduce such beliefs is striking. One common trope in much of the Euro-American-oriented literature opposing female genital operations has been the tendency to characterize African women as thoroughly oppressed victims of patriarchy, ignorance, or both, not as social actors in their own right. Sub-Saharan and North African women are alternately seen as not being allowed to express their voices, or as having defective or confused understandings if they speak in favor of genital operations.**

# Shining City Links: Female Genital Operations Voyeurism Link

**(--) The AFF discourse is voyeuristic—it conveys pleasure in its portrayal of other cultures in a negative light:**

Christine J. **Walley, 1997** (New York University). Searching for "Voices": Feminism, Anthropology, and the Global Debate over Female Genital Operations. Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Aug., 1997), pp. 405-438. Accessed Sept. 5, 2010 on JSTOR.

**Concerning the recent interest in female genital operations, Dawit noted the voyeurism implicit in a CNN newscast that spent nearly ten minutes graphically depicting the infibulation of an Egyptian girl** (Dawit 1994). **Modern medical discourse may in fact perform the dual role of using the "objective" language of science to construct the issue as outside of "culture," while simultaneously offering a sanitized way of continuing the preoccupation with the genitalia and sexuality of African women**. The privileging of Euro-American experience in the medical discourse surrounding genital operations is also apparent in the discussion of pain. Most of the literature lists pain at the forefront of the "medical" consequences or problems associated with genital operations (D. Gordon 1991; Kouba and Muasher 1985:101). And it is pain that leads to accusations that genital operations are "torture."However, for the adolescent initiation rituals that I described for Kikhome, pain is an intrinsic part of the ritual and is socially meaningful-although it is not for infibulation and sunna operations, for which sometimes an anesthetic is used or which are done in the hospital. While all humans presumably have the same range of physiological responses to pain, barring individual differences and learned techniques for controlling pain, the meanings associated with pain and ideas about how one should respond to it vary situationally as well as cross-culturally. Within the context of sub-Saharan African initiation rituals (or for that matter, U.S. military boot camps or Indian ascetic rites), pain may be viewed not simply as something to be avoided but as something to be endured that can result in the positive transformation of the individual.

# Shining City Links: Female Genital Operations--Medical Rationales to Ban FGM

**(--) The medical rationales to indict FGM smuggle in totalizing ideas about motherhood and womanhood—turning the AFF:**

**McKinley 2009** – Assistant Professor, University of Oregon School of Law, (Michelle A., Fall, “Cultural Culprits”, 24 Berkeley J. Gender L. & Just. 91, Lexis Law)

The colonial campaigns in Kenya to eradicate irua highlight **two continuing features of the contemporary anti-FGM campaign**. The first is that the campaigns were caught up in broader cultural conflicts over the terms and scale of "modernity" and "Westernization" (via "missionization" in the past and "globalization" in the present). n261 **The second is the medicalization of the eradication discourse, which continues to be a powerful framing for the contemporary campaign**. I suggest that **this medicalized framing exploits the same putatively benign discursive spaces of maternal imperialism, which are then used instrumentally to smuggle in totalizing ideas about motherhood, womanhood, and modernity** (what Fuambai Ahmadu refers to as the imposition of global homogeneity upon the diverse ways of being a woman in the world). n262 According to Elizabeth Heger Boyle, **medicalization or "the right to health" provides a more neutral discourse for implementing international interventions** than does a human rights framework that is at least rhetorically challenging to the powerful institutional framework of national sovereignty. n263 It was under a right to health platform that the contemporary anti-FGM campaign was re-launched in the 1980s, conforming as it did to the developmentalist policies of the WHO and other specialized organizations within the UN, as well as a consortium of non-profits and religious groups that had ongoing maternal health, nutrition, and family planning programs in Africa. Boyle contends that the right to health had limited traction with feminists, who insisted on viewing female genital mutilation as a violation of universal human rights, expressing in the denunciation process some of the same sentiments of the imperial maternalists in [\*142] terms of moral outrage, disgust, patriarchal bondage, and female oppression. Indeed, I remember as a law student in the early 1990s feeling that the consensual adoption of a right to health and rights of the child framework was a "consolation prize" in the hierarchy of civil and political rights and that radical feminist action demanded a rejection of the diplomatic pandering to state sovereignty. Boyle recounts that the more muted, neutral right to health became untenable to the anti-FGM campaign because it merely medicalized the practice - unwittingly endorsing it instead of eradicating it. n264 However, as Richard Shweder pointedly asks: isn't the concern over female genital cutting largely based on its insalubrious side effects? n265 If we remove the medical risk to childbirth, neonatal mortality, fistula, hemorrhage, painful intercourse, and the myriad ills that are associated with genital cutting - acknowledging, in the process, that many of these dire health indicators result from structural adjustment programs imposed by our financial institutions that severely limit the access of poorer Africans to health services n266 - are we only left with our moral squeamishness about a cultural practice that other women engage in? n267 Can we look at the global anti-FGM campaign as distinct from, or as an integral part of, a larger set of neo-liberal financial arrangements that have had devastating effects on publicly funded health, education, social security, pension, and sanitation programs in debt-strapped and often war-weary African countries?

# Shining City Links: First World Feminism Links

**A) Female genital operations are a major fault-line dividing First World feminism with Third World feminism:**

Christine J. **Walley, 1997** (New York University). Searching for "Voices": Feminism, Anthropology, and the Global Debate over Female Genital Operations. Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Aug., 1997), pp. 405-438. Accessed Sept. 5, 2010 on JSTOR.

As Kandiyoti suggests, in order to understand reactions to "feminism" in many Third World countries, it is necessary to understand the ways in which feminism has been co-opted and monopolized by ruling interests and elites in these countries (1991). Furthermore, **focusing solely on formal "feminist" organizations obscures "indigenous" forms of feminism that do not necessarily accord with the middle-class Euro-American model** (see also Ahmed 1989; Jayawardena 1986). **For example, the activism of peasant, working-class, and minority women may be downplayed when evaluated solely in terms of gender interests rather than the intersection of gender with ethnic and class issues. The reality that First and Third World women have different needs, concerns, and power bases, combined with the particular histories of feminism in former colonies** (Kandiyoti 1991), **has contributed to tensions in the midst of efforts to create an international women's movement** (Moser 1991 ). **Female genital operations have proven to be one of the most powerful fault lines along which such tensions erupt.**

**B) The re-entrenchment of Western feminism justifies 21st century US imperialism:**

**McKinley 2009** – Assistant Professor, University of Oregon School of Law, (Michelle A., Fall, “Cultural Culprits”, 24 Berkeley J. Gender L. & Just. 91, Lexis Law)

**The contemporary call for geopolitical equity, transnational dialogue, and cultural deference is a very different way of framing resistance to female genital cutting from say, clitoral deprivation or female castration. This is especially the case when the interlocutors are elite women because of the association of these concerns with Western arrogance and hegemony**. n131 **This observation may unwittingly reaffirm hegemonic or oppositional tendencies by alluding to something called "Third World feminist discourse,"** which I instinctively regard as a suspect appellation with regard to [\*117] voice and representation. n132 With the caveat that any label that smacks of homogeneity and hegemony should be treated critically, "Third World feminists" cannot legitimately address genital cutting as ancient, patriarchal mutilation without alienating themselves from the constituencies in whose name they purport to speak and whose welfare they seek to ensure. In the same way, **U.S.-based scholars who identify as feminists of color** - myself included - **cannot look at these issues outside of the frame of racism and the perilous twenty-first century U.S. imperialism, nor can we ally ourselves unconditionally with the more intransigent interlocutors of "the" Western feminist positio**n. n133

# Shining City Links: First World Feminism Links

**(--) Their discourse risks re-entrenching the dichotomy between Euro-American women and women in other nations:**

Christine J. **Walley, 1997** (New York University). Searching for "Voices": Feminism, Anthropology, and the Global Debate over Female Genital Operations. Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Aug., 1997), pp. 405-438. Accessed Sept. 5, 2010 on JSTOR.

In other words, how and to what extent do clitoridectomies serve as symbols of ethnic identity and "tradition" within the volatile politics of the Kenyan nation-state?17 Despite the insights provided by the literature on these practices, **stumbling blocks remain for anthropologists in developing a politically-engaged feminist position on female genital operations**. Anthropological accounts that focus on how such practices either function or provide meaning, without attendant focus on how practices are transformed and given new meaning, discourage activism by implying that if such practices ceased, a social "need," symbolic or material, would be left unfulfilled. The transformation of the role of female genital operations in initiation and age sets for Kikuyu women challenges any such rigid link between social "needs" and particular practices. **If our analyses do not emphasize the potential for transformation in practices such as female genital operations, the result can be a dangerous perceived dichotomy between cultural "others" for whom cultural practices "function" (and thus should be respected) and Europe and the United States, where "traditions" are open to challenge.** Alternatively, attempts to provide historically-based, nonessentialized accounts of such practices may offer one route to overcoming the widespread Euro-American tendency to view female genital operations solely in terms of either cultural relativism or moral outrage. **Clearly, the questions raised by female genital operations extend beyond** Kikhome or Hofriyat in Sudan and even beyond **the boundaries of the Kenyan, Sudanese, and other African nation-states.** Even before arriving in western Kenya, my perceptions of "female circumcision" had already been shaped by the vocal international controversy surrounding the issue; I had first learned of the practice from an article by Robin Morgan and Gloria Steinem (1983) that I had read in a women's studies class as an undergraduate. Obviously, I was operating in a particular social and cultural context as much as the villagers of Kikhome, and media accounts of female genital operations in places like Africa formed part of the background noise of the cultural world in which I was an "insider." As I followed the written and televised reports on female genital operations in the United States, I became increasingly intrigued by the cultural dynamics of the debate itself. After living in Kenya, the "commonsense" terms operative in Western accounts of such practices seemed increasingly peculiar and deserving of explanation in their own right. Consequently, I will now leave Kikhome to begin addressing the discourse of this international debate, its historical roots, and its relationship to preexisting Euro-American understandings of Africa and Africans. Although **opposition to female genital operations** by Westerners has a long history extending back at least to the colonial era, it **became an issue of concern to Second Wave feminists in the United States and Europe during the 1970s.**18 Influential articles by Gloria Steinem, Mary Daly, and others, including Third World activists such as Nawal El Saadawi (1980), condemned the practices, and international health organizations also took up the cause.

# Shining City Links: First World Feminism Links

**(--) The plan entrenches the superiority of first-world feminists over third-world feminists:**

**McKinley 2009** – Assistant Professor, University of Oregon School of Law, (Michelle A., Fall, “Cultural Culprits”, 24 Berkeley J. Gender L. & Just. 91, Lexis Law)

Janet Halley has coined the term "**governance feminism**" n48 to **describe the institutionalization of feminist human rights in legal settings, observing that, as feminism "accedes to governance ... [it] disappears into legal technologies that we recognize under other rubrics** (universalism, American hegemony, technocratic best practices ...)." n49 These are precisely the unintended effects of realist bargains that imperil global anti-racist politics. **In the spirit of feminist praxis, critical scholars have probed the implications of broader feminist incursions in international human rights - whether in terms of wartime rape**, n50 **gender and transitional justice**, n51 **domestic violence law reforms**, n52 **femicide**, n53 **sexual and reproductive health**, n54 **or the associated dynamics of migration and trafficking for sex work and domestic work.** n55 **The impressive achievements of** [\*100] **the feminist movement in inserting these issues into the security-sovereigntist realm of international human rights and foreign policy** - indeed their simultaneity in international institutional settings - provides the evidence that women's rights are human rights even if global sisterhood is a negligible proposition. n56 But **the charges of ethnocentrism, hyper-criminalization, and elite/white feminist monopolization within international law scholarship, advocacy, and institutional practice still smolder beneath the surface**. Inderpal **Grewal and** Caren **Kaplan have denounced the "hegemony of first world women's groups to affect women's lives worldwide by creating a "common agenda' that produced women as their subjects and as a target population**." n57 Pragmatic feminists fight the battles in the rarefied ambience of global governance, often impatient with and offended by the interrogation of their motives and representational practices by more cautious or critical analysts. In the context of female genital cutting, the rationale is that mutilation is a violative act, particularly when performed on young girls incapable of consent. Even though the strident tenor of the anti-FGM activists has become somewhat muted [\*101] by dialogue with African activists and a chastened awareness of post-coloniality, most activists rely unflinchingly upon a universalist human rights paradigm to guide their eradication campaigns against the constellation of practices labeled female genital mutilation or female genital torture. n58

**(--) The plan devalues women’s bodies in the name of EuroAmerican feminism:**

Fuambai **Ahmadu, 2008** (Associate professor at the Department of Comparative Human Development). “Hurray for Bondo women in Kailahun.” Online Accessed Sept 5, 2010 at <http://www.thepatrioticvanguard.com/article.php3?id_article=2434>

**Faced with a global media onslaught** depicting the most insidious and racist types of representations of African men and women witnessed since colonial times **and the downright force of anti-FGM campaigns to shame, more and more circumcised African women have come to see and define themselves through these media lenses as “mutilated”. With utter disregard for differences in cultural, social, and historical contexts and experiences of womanhood, the bodies of circumcised African women are measured and devalued (by anti-FGM activists and increasingly by our own women) against a Euroamerican universal prototype**.

# Shining City Links: First World Feminism Links

**(--) Their indictments of female genital cutting ignore women who willingly undergo the practice—completing the domination of 1st world feminism over 3rd world feminism:**

**McKinley 2009** – Assistant Professor, University of Oregon School of Law, (Michelle A., Fall, “Cultural Culprits”, 24 Berkeley J. Gender L. & Just. 91, Lexis Law)

Decades later, with the rise of clitoral signification and female embodiment, we see a shift in the discourse not completely away from health, but with a newly invigorated focus on clitoral/sexual deprivation. Thus Fran Hosken, a tireless crusader in the anti-FGM campaign, attributed the real purpose of female genital cutting as an "attempt to reduce or extinguish sexual pleasure and keep women under male sexual control." n285 The deprivation of sexual stimulation via clitoral excision was a persuasive vehicle for promoting the eradication of female genital cutting on a gyno-centric human rights basis. n286 However, the sexual fulfillment and liberation argument was not as compelling to ears beyond Western audiences. The campaign, lacking the "buy-in" of African women and participation of the protean "grassroots/local" sector to credibly rebut charges of human rights imperialism and ethnocentrism, fared no better than Lady Atholl's cultivated proselytizing efforts. Indeed, **in adopting the view that female genital cutting was symbolic of women's subordination and sexual deprivation, Western women implicitly assumed that no one (in her right mind) would voluntarily choose to undergo the practice**. n287 **When presented with evidence that older girls often actively embraced and requested the practice and that mature women often re-infibulated or re-modified their genitalia in post-partum procedures**, and, more importantly, when presented with gynecological data that clitoral excision was not a priori constitutive of diminished sexual pleasure, n288 **the argument switched awkwardly but unsurprisingly from the clitoral into one of informed consent and children's diminished capacity - a more legalistic, policy-oriented** and maternalist human rights **framework that worked expeditiously with the medicalized "right to health." My sense is that we are currently between the biomedical** (neutral but powerful and immune to contestation) **and the clitoral/castration (strategically retaining the yuck factor** and the protective groin-clutching reflex to drive home the mutilation effect) **paradigms. But today's maternal framing has a deferential cultural overtone, undoubtedly a result of the partnerships of institutional actors and African professionals and activists in the campaign**. Take, for instance, a policy statement issued in 1995 by key institutional players in the anti-FGM campaign (WHO, UNFPA, UNICEF, and UNDP):

# Shining City Links: First World Feminism Links

**(--) Their accounts of female genital operations ignore women who support the practice:**

Christine J. **Walley, 1997** (New York University). Searching for "Voices": Feminism, Anthropology, and the Global Debate over Female Genital Operations. Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Aug., 1997), pp. 405-438. Accessed Sept. 5, 2010 on JSTOR.

**A recent front-page article in the New York Times** concerning Fauziya Kasinga **highlights the assumption of the oppressive nature of "tradition"** (Dugger 1996a). Despite information in the article suggesting Kasinga's elite and "modem" background (for example, Kasinga's father owned a successful trucking business in Togo, and she attended boarding school in Ghana), **the language of the article stresses the exotic, relying on such terms as tribal law, bloody rite, banish[ment], and family patriarchs in their tribe** (Dugger 1996a). Rhetorically, the article suggests the ironic parallels between the alleged fetters of "tribal customs" and actual fetters in a Pennsylvania prison, where Kasinga was detained while seeking political asylum; here, the irony emerges as Dugger challenges the assumption of "freedom" in the United States by suggesting parallels with the (unquestioned) oppression of "tradition" in African countries. **Similarly, Kasinga's televised response to a surprised Ted Koppel, informing him that most young women in Togo are happy to have the procedure done and "think it is something very great," could not dislodge the program's implicit assumption that these women are coerced and would gladly flee their own countries to escape such practices** (Nightline 1996). **Thus, rather than acknowledging Kasinga as a young woman who had dared to resist social norms of which she disapproved** (in part because she was raised in a liberal household that offered alternative life choices), **the media accounts instead emphasized the allegedly coercive and oppressive nature of African cultures and societies as a whole. In other accounts, collective "culture" is judged to be less relevant than "rights" premised on the individual.**

# Shining City Links: Focusing on Health Problems of Female Genital Operations

**(--) Focusing on the health problems associated with female genital operations diverts attention from underlying root causes of health problems in other nations—the sensationalism of the AFF actually prevents solutions to more systemic health harms:**

Christine J. **Walley, 1997** (New York University). Searching for "Voices": Feminism, Anthropology, and the Global Debate over Female Genital Operations. Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Aug., 1997), pp. 405-438. Accessed Sept. 5, 2010 on JSTOR.

As Tilman Hasche, the lawyer for Lydia Oluloro, the Nigerian woman who legally petitioned to remain in the United States to prevent the excision of her daughters, stated in a New York Times article, "Frankly, I don't give a damn if opposing this is a violation of someone's culture. To me, female genital mutilation is a violation of the physical and spiritual integrity of a person" (Egan 1994). In some accounts, cultural beliefs are recognized only as "insanity." For example, A. M. Rosenthal of the New York Times called on the people and governments of the countries where genital operations are practiced "to revolt against the sexual and social insanities that allow the mutilation of half their population" (1992). **In contrast to this image of sub-Saharan and North African societies as tradition-bound and oppressed by culture, Euro-American institutions and values are depicted as exemplars of culture-free reason and rationality, as represented in particular by Western medicine. This binary distinction between a rational West and an overly traditional and cultured "rest" has been underscored in the oppositional literature by emphatic attention to the health problems associated with such practices. Health consequences are real and disturbing.** For clitoridectomies, these include the possibility of hemorrhage and infection, and in the case of infibulation, they include difficulties with urination, intercourse, and childbirth; fluid retention; and cyst formation (Toubia 1994). **Yet as a position statement issued by the Women's Caucus of the African Studies Association noted, these health consequences must be located within a larger context in which women's health may also be severely affected by malnutrition, lack of clean water, and inadequate health care** (1984). Henry Louis Gates asks, "**Is it, after all, unreasonable to be suspicious of Westerners who are exercised over female circumcision, but whose eyes glaze over when the same women are merely facing starvation?"** (1994). **The question of why these particular health issues generate such a barrage of interest deserves closer examination. Clearly, popular interest in female genital operations stems in part from their sensational aspects**, practices that simultaneously horrify and titillate Euro-American audiences. This tendency toward sensationalism draws on a long history in which sub-Saharan and North African women's bodies have been simultaneously exoticized and eroticized, as evidenced in the pickling of a "Bushman" woman's vulva and its display in France in the 19th century (Gould 1985) and erotic French colonial postcards that draw on sexually charged ideas about veiling and the alleged languorous harems of imprisoned Muslim women (Alloula 1986).

# Shining City Links: Gender Cases

**(--) Various forms of gender persecution asylum cases reinforces notions that people in other nations are cruel, backward, and savage while the US is the human rights savior riding to the rescue—we should reject this logic in favor of the alternative:**

**McKinley 2009** – Assistant Professor, University of Oregon School of Law, (Michelle A., Fall, “Cultural Culprits”, 24 Berkeley J. Gender L. & Just. 91, Lexis Law)

**As a result of high-profile litigation strategies** like those undertaken in Kasinga, feminist critiques, and organizing among resettled refugee communities, **political asylum has been extended to women fleeing domestic violence** (although less frequently), **homophobia, forced circumcision, rape and sexual assault, and other forms of gender-based persecution in their home countries**. This reflects a broader understanding of "politics" to encompass the activities and particular forms of persecution that more accurately account for gender and power relations in line with Charlesworth and Chinkin's observations cited earlier. The recognition of these harms as human rights violations substantiates the claims of women who seek asylum in Western states. As a senior asylum officer recently said to me: A lot of people got really excited about gender based asylum claims about ten years ago. But since Kasinga, we [at the asylum office] don't think they are such a big deal when we get them. We check the facts and if we don't find anything conflicting in the interview, we approve them. n120 [\*114] In sum, feminist interpretations of human rights law have profoundly influenced the scholarship and practice of asylum, refugee, and humanitarian law, reorienting our concerns to violations and gendered inequities (and the power dynamics) within the domestic and intimate. **The approval of gender-based asylum claims** reflects fifteen years of successful litigation, public advocacy, and strategic alliances with humanitarian, human rights, and public international law constituencies. It also **reflects, in a less noble narrative, the appropriation of certain types of claims to victimhood that raise the stature of asylum-granting states as human rights saviors**. Critical approaches to human rights law repudiate the victimhood/agency dichotomy that characterizes the field. n121 This coeval representation of the victim with the domestic animates two analytical problems. The first is a strong desire to attribute agency within the realm of individual action that only regards certain types of actions as agentive and rational. Second, the human rights system enables certain types of action to be represented as coercion (victimhood) and denounces other actions as expressions of false consciousness. The emphasis on agency is certainly preferable to the paternalistic portrayals of passive victims enduring the cruelties of their persecutors, but **the dichotomous framework is used to characterize markedly ambivalent human action,** especially in situations of structural violence. **This is most evident in the contexts of material support and trafficking for sex work**, n122 **but the victimhood/agency binary also contaminates the FGM**/C/S **debate. In the depiction of genital cutting for instance, endorsement or continued support for the practice is regarded as patriarchal child abuse, blind adherence to despotic tradition, or sheer stupidity. Plainly speaking, African parents who are capable of maiming, mutilating, and murdering their female children are invariably cruel, backward, loathsome, or cowardly.** n123 It is inconceivable that their resistance to enlightened eradication campaigns could be construed as agency.

**(--) Gender based asylum cases re-entrench the savage-victim-savior division:**

**McKinley 2009** – Assistant Professor, University of Oregon School of Law, (Michelle A., Fall, “Cultural Culprits”, 24 Berkeley J. Gender L. & Just. 91, Lexis Law)

**This article examines the ways in which questions of agency, victimization, and cultural essentialism are framed and acted upon in U.S. asylum adjudication** and cultural defense cases n14 specifically and in international human rights law more broadly. My examination of "culture as culprit" is informed by larger concerns of institutionalizing feminist social activism in international modes of governance raised recently by Janet Halley and other feminist scholars with specific regard to asylum law and jurisprudence. n15 **Cultural and gendered essentialisms have become entrenched components of asylum law and advocacy, even as feminist activists claim victories in gender-based asylum cases. Asylum law and advocacy are structurally dependent on victimhood and rescue, and essentialism is key to the construction of "savages-victims-saviors."** n16

# Shining City Links: Gender Cases

**(--) Rhetorically constructing women in other nations as in need of saving reinforces an attitude of superiority by the West—we should challenge this cultural arrogance:**

Lila Abu-**Lughod, 2002** (Dept. of Anthropology, Columbia University). “Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving? Anthropological Reflections on Cultural Relativism and Its Others” American Anthropologist, Vol. 104, No. 3 (Sep., 2002), pp. 783-790, accessed via JSTOR

**It is deeply problematic to construct the Afghan woman as someone in need of saving. When you save someone, you imply that you are saving her from something. You are also saving her to something**. What violences are entailed in this transformation, and what presumptions are being made about the superiority of that to which you are saving her? **Projects of saving other women depend on and reinforce a sense of superiority by Westerners, a form of arrogance that deserves to be challenged.** All one needs to do to appreciate the patronizing quality of the rhetoric of saving women is to imagine using it today in the United States about disadvantaged groups such as African American women or working-class women. We now understand them as suffering from structural violence. We have become politicized about race and class, but not culture. As anthropologists, feminists, or concerned citizens, **we should be wary of taking on the mantles of those 19thcentury Christian missionary women who devoted their lives to saving their Muslim sisters.**

**(--) Assuming that patriarchy is more severe in the Third World than in the United States creates a generalized assumption about oppression of Third World women that casts the United States as a shining city on the hill as opposed to the backward, irrational people of other nations:**

Christine J. **Walley, 1997** (New York University). Searching for "Voices": Feminism, Anthropology, and the Global Debate over Female Genital Operations. Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Aug., 1997), pp. 405-438. Accessed Sept. 5, 2010 on JSTOR.

**Feminist scholars**, particularly those from non-Western countries, **are increasingly critiquing portrayals that presume Third World women to be dominated by an ahistorical patriarchal" tradition" that is assumed to be more severe than that in Europe or the United States. The anthropological literature does support the view that gender inequality is widespread; nevertheless**, the cultural and historical particulars of how gender relations are constructed differently in different places, and **the alternate sources of power and authority that women often hold, are ignored in these generalized assumptions about the oppression of Third World women** (Mohanty et al. 1991; Ong 1988; Spivak 1988). Much of the Western-oriented literature opposing female genital operations also constructs "culture" and "tradition" in problematic ways. Rather than focusing on "culture" as historically changeable and broadly encompassing beliefs and practices characteristic of a social group, the discourse on genital operations understands culture as ahistorical "customs" or "traditions." Such "traditions" are simultaneously depicted as the meaningless hangovers of a premodern era and as the defining characteristic of the Third World. In this scenario, **"traditions" in the Third World are hardened essences that can only be shed by modernization, while in the West, "backward" cultural traditions are conceived of as being steadily replaced by "rational" ways of life.** To quote Hosken once again, "The myth about the importance of 'cultural traditions' must be laid to rest, considering that 'development'-the introduction of imported Western technology and living patterns-is the goal of every country where the operations are practiced today" (1981:10). "Development," assumed to be the intrinsic property of Europe and the United States, rather than a cultural construct in its own right, emerges in this discourse as the antithesis of cultural traditions**. Culture and traditions are often coded as harmful, coercive, and superfluous.**

# Shining City Links: Gender Cases

**(--) Using sensationalistic victim rhetoric undermines the ability of women to combat oppression:**

**Harvard Law Review 2004** (May, “117 Harv. L. Rev. 2365”, “SAVING AMINA LAWAL: HUMAN RIGHTS SYMBOLISM AND THE DANGERS OF COLONIALISM” lexis)

The Association of African Women for Research and Development, for example, characterized the campaign in harsh terms:

**This new crusade of the West has been led out of the moral and cultural prejudices of Judaeo-Christian Western society: aggressiveness, ignorance or even contempt**, paternalism and activism **are the elements which have infuriated and shocked many people of good will.** In trying to reach their own public, **the new crusaders have fallen back on sensationalism, and have become insensitive to the dignity of the very women they want to "save." ...** **In their conviction that this is a "just cause," they have forgotten that these women from a different race and a different culture are also human beings** ... . n90 Indeed, **the campaign hindered, rather than helped, the efforts of many "third world women" who had been working to eradicate or modify the rituals in the interest of addressing serious gender oppression and health concerns**. n91

**(--) The focus on saving women justifies Western imperialism:**

**Harvard Law Review 2004** (May, “117 Harv. L. Rev. 2365”, “SAVING AMINA LAWAL: HUMAN RIGHTS SYMBOLISM AND THE DANGERS OF COLONIALISM” lexis)

**The second reason for alarm at the focus on "saving" women is that it evokes a colonialist rhetoric** that positions Nigeria's human rights problems **within the framework of a conflict between a Western or "colonialist" human rights ideology and a religion or culture** - in this case, Islam. It is significant, and not surprising, that Ms. Lawal is seen as a symbol of the conflicts between an Islamic "fundamentalist" movement and an international community that espouses a human rights ideology. n14 **The gender focus of the international community's concern for human rights in Nigeria seems alarmingly similar to the use of women in colonialist projects that pitted the values of colonizing powers against those of colonized peoples.**

# Shining City Links: Gender Cases

**(--) The AFF treats the United States as innocent of discriminatory practices against women while stigmatizing other nations:**

Makau **Mutua, 2001** (Professor of Law and Director, Human Rights Center, SUNY). “Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights.” Harvard International Law Journal. Winter, 2001. Accessed Sept. 10, 2010, Lexis/Nexis.

**While there are no cultures that are innocent of discriminatory practices against women, human rights discourse treats non-Western cultures as particularly problematic in this regard**. For example, in its first report, the Women's Rights Project of HRW focused on wife-murder, domestic battery, and rape in Brazil. n86 **Significant here is the fact that** HRW's first **report on violations of women's human rights did not focus on the wife-murder, domestic battery, and rape commonplace in the United States or a European country but rather on Brazil,** a Third World state. **Other reports** by the Women's Rights Project **have concentrated on violations in Indonesia, Botswana, Haiti, and Turkey,** which is Muslim and on the periphery of Europe. n87 **The impression left** by the reports and the activities of powerful INGOs **is unmistakable. While the West is presented as the cradle of a feminist movement, countries in the South have been constructed as steeped in traditions and practices which are harmful to women**. In one of her first reports, Radhika Coomaraswamy, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, confirmed this impression when she noted that "certain customary practices and some aspects of tradition are often the cause of violence against women." n88 She noted that "besides female genital mutilation, a whole host of practices violate female dignity. Foot binding, male preference, early marriage, virginity tests, dowry deaths, sati, female infanticide and malnutrition are among the many practices that violate a woman's human rights." n89 All of these practices are found in non-Western cultures. **Images of practices such as FGM, dowry burnings, and honor killings have come to frame the discourse, and in that vein stigmatize non-Western cultures.**

# Shining City Links: Generic Links--Immigration

**(--) Refugee protections prop up neo-colonial apparatuses of state persecution:**

**McKinley 2009** – Assistant Professor, University of Oregon School of Law, (Michelle A., Fall, “Cultural Culprits”, 24 Berkeley J. Gender L. & Just. 91, Lexis Law)

**The cases also highlight what** Makau **Mutua has called the need for "savages, victims and saviors" within the human rights movement**. n108 Indeed, **within conventional understandings** of refugee and human rights law, **the "savage slot," filled by genocidal dictators, depends upon the stateless victim who then appeals to the West for rescue**. n109 As with refugee law's continued reliance on state sovereignty, **asylum law still retains its commitment to state persecution; however, the jurisprudence has largely shifted from the totalitarian state as persecutor to the state as accomplice in persecution**. n110 In a sense, the positivist insistence on state-sponsored persecution for favorable asylum determinations is eroded not only by feminist insights about the slippery public/private dualism, but also by the eroding state itself. **Today's refugees and asylum seekers generally flee from Southern states characterized by their incapacity and economic non-viability**, which render them evermore incapable of protection. n111 The causes of state failure (an unfortunately patronizing [\*112] neologism) are varied and complex, n112 but they do pose challenges for the classification of the type of harms from which refugees and asylum seekers seek protection. **The 1969 OAU Refugee Convention** n113 **expressly attributes refugee status to anyone who, "owing to external aggression**, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order ... **is compelled to leave his habitual place of residence in order to seek refuge in another place** ... ." n114 **This expanded definition of a refugee is also adopted in the Cartagena Declaration** on Refugees n115 - **both regional instruments that recognize the geopolitical conditions producing refugee flows. It is important to note however, that neither the OAU Convention nor the Cartagena Declaration has a gendered component - rather they are instruments of a neo-colonial (and anti-imperial) struggle that reflect their drafters' attribution of particular kinds of threats to state security**. n116

**(--) The assumption that Western societies are superior to other nations reaffirms the colonial project:**

Makau **Mutua, 2001** (Professor of Law and Director, Human Rights Center, SUNY). “Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights.” Harvard International Law Journal. Winter, 2001. Accessed Sept. 10, 2010, Lexis/Nexis.

**The human rights movement is** not only lacking in Third World legitimacy, but also it is **aimed primarily at the Third World. It is one thing for Europeans and North Americans, whose states share a common philosophical and legal ancestry, to create a common political and cultural template to govern their societies. It is quite another to insist that their particular vision of society is the only permissible civilization which must now be imposed on all human societies**, particularly those outside Europe. The merits of the European and American civilization of human rights notwithstanding, all missionary work is suspect and might easily seem as part of the colonial project. Once again, **the allegedly superior Europeans and North Americans descend on supposedly backward natives in the Third World with the human rights mission to free them from the claws of despotic governments and benighted cultures.**

# Shining City Links: Generic Links--Immigration

**(--) The AFF reproduces the civilized West in opposition to the savage other nation:**

**Harvard Law Review 2004** (May, “117 Harv. L. Rev. 2365”, “SAVING AMINA LAWAL: HUMAN RIGHTS SYMBOLISM AND THE DANGERS OF COLONIALISM” lexis)

**The human rights project has been subject to similar criticisms regarding its uncritical use of colonialist rhetoric and imagery**. Makau **Mutua, a critic of the human rights ideology, has argued that the language of human rights intervention retains the "savages-victims-saviors" metaphor of colonialism**. n92 The metaphor Mutua chooses to illustrate his critique mirrors Spivak's white men - brown women - brown men account of British colonialism. Like the colonialist's "civilizing mission," Mutua argues, **the human rights ideology gains its legitimacy by representing itself as a project to "civilize" or "reform" non-Western states and cultures, which are depicted as savage, barbaric, and oppressive**. n93 Though the "civilizing" ideology it seeks to impart is now couched in terms of "universal human rights" rather than "superior Western civilization," **the superior and subordinate positions of the actors remain unchanged, as does the requirement that postcolonial societies conform their practices to standards imposed from the outside**. n94

**(--) Having the US define what it deems good for humanity bolsters the imperial project:**

Makau **Mutua, 2001** (Professor of Law and Director, Human Rights Center, SUNY). “Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights.” Harvard International Law Journal. Winter, 2001. Accessed Sept. 10, 2010, Lexis/Nexis.

The purpose of this Article is not to assign ignoble intentions or motivations on the individual proponents, leaders, or participants in the human rights movement. **Without a doubt many of the leaders and foot-soldiers of the human rights movement are driven by a burning desire to end human suffering**, as they see it from their vantage point. The white American suburban high school or college student who joins the local chapter of AI and protests FGM in far away lands or writes letters to political or military leaders whose names do not easily roll off the English tongue are no doubt drawing partly from a well of noblesse oblige. The zeal to see all humanity as related and the impulse to help those defined as in need is noble and is not the problem addressed here. A certain degree of human universality is inevitable and desirable. **But what that universality is**, what historical and cultural stew it is made of, and how it is accomplished make all the difference. **What the high school or college student ought to realize is that her zeal to save others--even from themselves--is steeped in Western and European history. If one culture is allowed the prerogative of imperialism, the right to define and impose on others what it deems good for humanity, the very meaning of freedom itself will have been abrogated. That is why a human rights movement that pivots on the SVS metaphor violates the very idea of the sanctity of humanity that purportedly inspires it.**

# Shining City Links: Generic—Viewing the US as unique force of change in the world

**(--) Depicting the US as the unique force for change allows for pre-emptive war and miltary expansion under any justification**

John Graham, 2007 (Canberra reviewer/staff writer) 1-20-07, Canberra Times. [“Deadly notion of US 'divine sanction'”, 7-26-07], Accessed Sept. 10, 2010, Lexis/Nexis

He sees the American reaction to terrorism through the September 11 attacks as real, but also as a **justification for expansion** similar to that provided by the spread of communism. "Its threat was magnified to the point of hysteria, permitting excessive military action abroad and curtailment of civil liberties at home." Arnove also believes the September 11 attacks provided a new impetus to what he calls "the idea of American exceptionalism to justify preemptive war, carried on unilaterally, with unchallenged US military supremacy". Nor does he believe this strategy is a sudden departure from the historical practice of the US. "It has," he says, "for a long time acted as an aggressor, bombing other countries (Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Grenada, Panama, Iraq), and insisting on maintaining nuclear and non-nuclear supremacy. Preemption and unilateralism are familiar characteristics of US foreign policy." In his afterword, Howard Zinn examines the idea of American exceptionalism which he defines as the notion "that the **United States alone has the right**, whether by divine sanction or moral obligation, to bring civilisation, or democracy, or liberty to the rest of the world by violence if necessary" and contends that it is accepted on all sides of the political spectrum in the US.

# Shining City Links: Holocaust Rhetoric

**(--) Rhetorically referring to a situation as like the Holocaust justifies military intervention by the US to save the day:**

Karen **Engle, 2007** (Professor in Law @ University of Texas). “"Calling in the Troops": The Uneasy Relationship Among Women's Rights, Human Rights, and Humanitarian Intervention.” Harvard Human Rights Journal, Spring 2007. Accessed Sept. 9, 2010, Lexis Academic Universe

In the same vein, **MacKinnon referred to the Holocaust to provoke a reaction to rapes by Serbs. If genocide is the clearest and most commonly agreed-upon justification for intervention, the Holocaust would seem to provide the clearest and most commonly agreed-upon example of genocide.** Thus, as the terrain of the debate has largely shifted to the precise meaning of genocide, the question is often whether a particular crisis is more or less like the Holocaust. **The closer the situation is to the Holocaust, the more likely that a call for intervention will go unchallenged.** Following this logic, MacKinnon at one point asserted: "These rapes are to everyday rape what the Holocaust was to everyday anti-Semitism. Without everyday anti-Semitism [\*222] a Holocaust is impossible, but anyone who has lived through a pogrom knows the difference." n138 MacKinnon simultaneously invoked the Holocaust and critiqued those feminists who refused to see the rapes as uniquely genocidal as involved in a cover-up that functioned "to exonerate the rapists and to deflect intervention." n139

# Shining City Links: Rape Cases—Calling Rape a Genocide

**(--) Labeling certain kinds of rape as genocide bolsters the case for military intervention:**

Karen **Engle, 2007** (Professor in Law @ University of Texas). “"Calling in the Troops": The Uneasy Relationship Among Women's Rights, Human Rights, and Humanitarian Intervention.” Harvard Human Rights Journal, Spring 2007. Accessed Sept. 9, 2010, Lexis Academic Universe

**For those who called for intervention against the Serbs, labeling the rape genocide served at least two complementary functions.** **The focus on genocide demonstrated that the rape constituted a serious crime** worthy of international attention, **and the focus on systematic rape addressed the intent requirement for genocide.** n143 **Together, they supported a call for military intervention.**

**(--) Calling rape genocide legitimates military intervention in the name of rescuing the woman:**

Karen **Engle, 2007** (Professor in Law @ University of Texas). “"Calling in the Troops": The Uneasy Relationship Among Women's Rights, Human Rights, and Humanitarian Intervention.” Harvard Human Rights Journal, Spring 2007. Accessed Sept. 9, 2010, Lexis Academic Universe

**Thus, the rape-as-genocide argument identified a perpetrator one could target with military intervention. The label of genocide and the call for intervention often went hand-in-hand.** As Alexandra Stiglmayer noted at the time, "**Bosnian and Croatian feminists contend that the mass rapes of their countrywomen are an attempt at genocide, unique in the history of rapes, and many of them demand military intervention to rescue the women."** n137

**(--) The rape as genocide position converts women into passive actors—reinforcing their role as victims:**

Karen **Engle, 2007** (Professor in Law @ University of Texas). “"Calling in the Troops": The Uneasy Relationship Among Women's Rights, Human Rights, and Humanitarian Intervention.” Harvard Human Rights Journal, Spring 2007. Accessed Sept. 9, 2010, Lexis Academic Universe

Feminists also played a role in the form the interventions took. I have discussed elsewhere, for example, how **the rape as genocide position informed the** ICTY's **jurisprudence, with two perhaps unintended consequences: the essentialization of ethnic differences in the region, and the reinforcement of women as victims rather than perpetrators, resisters, or sexual beings**. n129 **These outcomes, I now want to suggest, were due in large part to an idea that claims of genocide or ethnic cleansing (and the two were often equated) would be taken more seriously than "ordinary" war crimes. Pressure built to find at the very least large-scale crimes against humanity. The emerging consensus** with regard to R2P **explains and reinforces such pressure.**

**(--) More evidence referring to rape as genocide justifies military intervention:**

Karen **Engle, 2007** (Professor in Law @ University of Texas). “"Calling in the Troops": The Uneasy Relationship Among Women's Rights, Human Rights, and Humanitarian Intervention.” Harvard Human Rights Journal, Spring 2007. Accessed Sept. 9, 2010, Lexis Academic Universe

**If connecting rape and genocide is a way for some to call attention to the horrors of rape, it provides others a way to focus on genocide. Once the two are connected in a certain way, the rapes come to represent the genocide, and both rape and genocide can equally be offered to justify or demand the use of force.**

# Shining City Links: Rape Cases—Calling Rape a Genocide

**(--) References to rape abroad bolster the call for military intervention:**

Karen **Engle, 2007** (Professor in Law @ University of Texas). “"Calling in the Troops": The Uneasy Relationship Among Women's Rights, Human Rights, and Humanitarian Intervention.” Harvard Human Rights Journal, Spring 2007. Accessed Sept. 9, 2010, Lexis Academic Universe

**Various calls for military intervention in Darfur demonstrate the use of rape as a stand-in for genocide.** A 2005 column by Nicholas Kristof in the [\*223] New York Times, for example, is entitled A Policy of Rape, and the opening lines read: "All countries have rapes, of course. But here in the refugee shantytowns of Darfur, the horrific stories that young women whisper are not of random criminality but of a systematic campaign of rape to terrorize civilians and drive them from 'Arab lands'--a policy of rape." n144 **Especially after the U.S. Congress and President Bush had declared that genocide was occurring in Darfur, some supporters of military intervention used a focus on the rapes to call for military action.** Rocky Anderson, Mayor of Salt Lake City, speaking on behalf of the U.S. Conference of Mayors with regard to a resolution sent to Congress in spring 2006, appealed for intervention by stressing the rapes: "Wouldn't we each do what we could to stop a rape in our front yards? Why do so few people pick up a pen to demand that our President and . . . Congress take immediate action to stop the brutal rapes of women in Darfur . . . ?" n145

**(--) Conflating rape with genocide justifies military intervention:**

Karen **Engle, 2007** (Professor in Law @ University of Texas). “"Calling in the Troops": The Uneasy Relationship Among Women's Rights, Human Rights, and Humanitarian Intervention.” Harvard Human Rights Journal, Spring 2007. Accessed Sept. 9, 2010, Lexis Academic Universe

**There is an additional consequence to the conflation of rape and genocide**. The contemporary discussions about Darfur show how **rape is used alongside and often indistinguishably from genocide to call for intervention. The more rape is seen as genocidal, the more those calling for intervention invoke rape as a justification.** Somewhat ironically, **charges of rape are used much the way they have long been invoked--to demonstrate harm against a particular ethnic group (i.e., rape means genocide). Invoking rape in this way often displaces the attention from the harm to women as a group that advocates for defining rape as a war crime and a crime against humanity had hoped to instill.**

**(--) Referring to rapes as genocide furthers the end of justifying military interventions:**

Karen **Engle, 2007** (Professor in Law @ University of Texas). “"Calling in the Troops": The Uneasy Relationship Among Women's Rights, Human Rights, and Humanitarian Intervention.” Harvard Human Rights Journal, Spring 2007. Accessed Sept. 9, 2010, Lexis Academic Universe

**Feminists who labeled rapes by Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina as genocide both capitalized on emerging trends toward humanitarian intervention and furthered those trends**. Even with the expanded justifications for military humanitarian intervention that have arisen since R2P, **the emerging consensus suggests that forceful humanitarian intervention is reserved for crisis situations. States and international organizations are called to intervene or shamed for not intervening because the situation is urgent,** because many people have already died or been raped, **and because "tomorrow we will be killed."** n151 **If crisis is the point at which harm is attended to, every harm must be made into a crisis to receive attention.**

# Shining City Links: Rape as Genocide Position Turns the AFF

**(--) Equivocating rape with genocide actually blunts the ability to solve rape which occurs on an everyday basis:**

Karen **Engle, 2007** (Professor in Law @ University of Texas). “"Calling in the Troops": The Uneasy Relationship Among Women's Rights, Human Rights, and Humanitarian Intervention.” Harvard Human Rights Journal, Spring 2007. Accessed Sept. 9, 2010, Lexis Academic Universe

[\*191] In the feminist context, the proliferation of calls for intervention based on existing or impending genocides suggests a new motivation for claiming that rape is genocide. Moreover, **as some feminists have succeeded in equating rape and genocide, rape itself has become a significant justification for intervention. Documentation of rape helped drum up support, for example, for sending troops into Darfur**. n4 **Although some may view an increased call to action on this basis as a victory for women's human rights, the emphasis on a genocidal crisis produced by rape downplays the significance of the other, "ordinary" harms that occur during war and peace (including rape).**

**(--) Calling certain rapes genocidal risks rendering other forms of rape invisible:**

Karen **Engle, 2007** (Professor in Law @ University of Texas). “"Calling in the Troops": The Uneasy Relationship Among Women's Rights, Human Rights, and Humanitarian Intervention.” Harvard Human Rights Journal, Spring 2007. Accessed Sept. 9, 2010, Lexis Academic Universe

**Catharine MacKinnon was one of the most vocal proponents of the position that the rape in the Balkans by Serbs was "genocidal."** In her recent work, she suggests that violence against women is genocidal, aimed at women as a group. n131 Ironically, this argument is similar to that made by some of her feminist opponents in the 1990s. n132 In the 1990s, however, **MacKinnon attempted to articulate an international legal understanding of rape in the Balkans that would distinguish everyday wartime rape** committed on "all sides" **from the wartime rape committed by Serbs. The latter was seen as genocidal, while the former was not. Other feminists disagreed. Rhonda Copelon, for example, argued that "to emphasize as unparalleled the horror of genocidal rape is factually dubious and risks rendering rape invisible once again**." n133

# Shining City Links: Same Sex Rights

**(--) Assuming greater homophobia in other nations than the US entrenches the US as an enlightened shining city:**

**McKinley 2009** – Assistant Professor, University of Oregon School of Law, (Michelle A., Fall, “Cultural Culprits”, 24 Berkeley J. Gender L. & Just. 91, Lexis Law)

Although FGM has been criminalized by statute since 1996, State v. Adem is the first case involving a criminal conviction in a U.S. court. However, the [\*107] scholarly attention to the issue of female genital cutting is extensive. n85 Adem and Nabulwala raise important questions for multicultural debates that voice concerns about the internal vulnerability of sub-groups - notably women, children, and sexual minorities within immigrant communities. n86 **The varying uses of "culture" by feminists, universalists, and relativists (**and the contested visions of "culture" that surface inside and outside of the courtroom) **illuminates its multivalence. Nabulwala's case is part of an emerging trend in asylum jurisprudence that narrowly recognizes persecution on the grounds of sexual orientation as it is linked with social group membership**. n87 **Sexual orientation cases** like Nabulwala's **perform a related though distinct function** to Adem or Kasinga. **Extreme African homophobia, as opposed to diffident acceptance (don't ask, don't tell) distinguishes the United States as an enlightened, tolerant society vis-a-vis barbaric, intolerant Africa**. Crackpot evangelical homophobia (of the Fred Phelps vintage) is still too marginal to de-center the genteel distaste of the heteronormative mainstream. As Wendy Brown notes: **In the mid-nineteenth through mid-twentieth centuries, the West imagined itself as standing for civilization against primitivism, and in the cold war years** [\*108] for freedom against tyranny; **now these two recent histories are merged in the warring figures of the free, the tolerant, and the civilized on one side, and the fundamentalist, the intolerant, and the barbaric on the other**. n88 In another, somewhat unrelated vein, Bonnie Honig has pointed out the rejuvenating role that the "foreigner" plays in democratic debates. n89 Indeed, liberal democracy depends on new recruits to assuage doubts about persistent poverty and gendered and racialized inequalities among the domestic poor. n90 In the context of asylum and refugee protection, I argue that the claims brought by cultural refugees like Fauziya Kasinga, n91 Olivia Nabulwala, and Salimatou Bah succeed because they appeal to the host nation's normative ideals of citizenship, tolerance, and individual autonomy while reaffirming widely held ideas about the differences between "our society and theirs." n92 Women seeking refuge based on the cultural practices of their social group are racialized "others" whose rescue is effectuated without great monetary cost to the United States and with extraordinary political benefits. To paraphrase Achille Mbembe, Africa constitutes a powerful metaphor through which the West asserts its difference from the rest of the world - its apologetic concerns and its exclusionary and brutal practices towards others. n93

# Shining City Links: Sensationalism

**(--) Sensationalistic claims of human rights abuses create a callous attitude toward the very women the AFF is trying to save:**

Makau **Mutua, 2001** (Professor of Law and Director, Human Rights Center, SUNY). “Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights.” Harvard International Law Journal. Winter, 2001. Accessed Sept. 10, 2010, Lexis/Nexis.

**This new crusade of the West has been led out of the moral and cultural prejudices of Judaeo-Christian Western society: aggressiveness, ignorance or even contempt**, paternalism and activism **are the elements which have infuriated and then shocked many people of good will. In trying to reach their own public, the new crusaders have fallen back on sensationalism, and have become insensitive to the dignity of the very women they want to "save."** n108

# Shining City Links—Threat Construction

**Threat rhetoric justifies exceptionalist expansion:**

John A. **Agnew, 1983** Developments of Geography and Social Science, Syracuse University, April 1983, Political Geography Quarterly [“An excess of 'national exceptionalism': towards a new political geography of American foreign policy”, vol. 2, no. 2, pg 151-166, 7-26-07] p. ScienceDirect

The political geography of national exceptionalism relies heavily upon the twin metaphors of containment and expansion. From the earliest years on the Frontier to the present in Central America and Western Europe, American exceptionalists see a consistent pattern of containment in the face of expansionist threats. American expansion as a result of meeting such threats is, by definition, viewed as purely reactive. In the previous section, however, an attempt has been made to place American foreign policy in the context of a world political economy which, though changing over time in the scope and nature of its reach, has had as its central principle of operation territorial, economic, and cultural competition between member states. The United States as an active and successful participant in this Hobbesian world is thus seen as consistently competitive and expansionist. Other states have been less successful if no less hopeful. This is a world of few winners and many losers.

# Shining City Links: Trafficking Links

**(--) The plan misses the forest for the trees—trafficking is a manifestation of an unjust world order:**

**McKinley 2009** – Assistant Professor, University of Oregon School of Law, (Michelle A., Fall, “Cultural Culprits”, 24 Berkeley J. Gender L. & Just. 91, Lexis Law)

**How then are we to navigate the complexities of human behavior,** structural geopolitical realities, **without reproducing the dichotomies of "victims and saviors" and their attendant essentialist and imperialist baggage?** n134 **Infibulation, marital rape,** intimate partner and family violence, **and trafficking for sexual slavery are arguably extreme manifestations of patriarchy,** female dependence, and the deprivation of sexual rights. **However, they are also manifestations of the myriad ways that oppression is experienced and compounded by the systemic inequities of poverty, warlordism, insurgency, and other humanitarian crises like politically-induced famine and ethnic cleansing**, [\*118] **all of which structure the lives of displaced peoples, economically disadvantaged transmigrants, and asylum seekers**. n135 **I believe it is flippant to ignore those structural realities to highlight the types of harms or construct a certain kind of victim with whom the public would sympathize - it is a perverse exercise in seeing the forest while ignoring the trees.**

# Shining City Links: Victim Rhetoric

**(--) Victimage is the key to creating the savage and the savior:**

Makau **Mutua, 2001** (Professor of Law and Director, Human Rights Center, SUNY). “Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights.” Harvard International Law Journal. Winter, 2001. Accessed Sept. 10, 2010, Lexis/Nexis.

**The metaphor of the victim is the giant engine that drives the human rights movement. Without the victim there is no savage or savior, and the entire human rights enterprise collapses**. This section examines the victim from the perspective of the United Nations, human rights treaties, human rights law, and, especially, human rights literature. Also, race and the legacy of colonialism, as intertwined in the victim identity, are examined. The basic purpose of the human rights corpus is to contain the state, transform society, and eliminate both the victim and victimhood as conditions of human existence. **In fact, the human rights regime was designed to respond to both the potential and actual victim, and to create legal, political, social, and cultural arrangements to defang the state.** The human rights text and its discourse present political democracy, and its institutions of governance, as the sine qua non for a victimless society. On the international level, the United Nations pursues civilizing campaigns that ostensibly seek to prevent conditions that create human victims, [\*228] to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war," n110 to "establish conditions under which justice" can be maintained, n111 and to "reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights." n112 Human rights treaties are therefore a series of obligations assumed by states to prevent the creation of victims. To accomplish this, the state obligates itself to three basic duties for every basic human right: to avoid depriving, to protect from deprivation, and to aid the deprived. n113 The first duty, being negative, may be the least costly and mainly requires self-restraint; the latter two are positive and demand the expenditure of more resources and the implementation of programs.

**(--) Characterizing victims as powerless is crucial to the creation of a savage culture metaphor:**

Makau **Mutua, 2001** (Professor of Law and Director, Human Rights Center, SUNY). “Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights.” Harvard International Law Journal. Winter, 2001. Accessed Sept. 10, 2010, Lexis/Nexis.

**A basic characteristic of the victim is powerlessness, an inability for self-defense against the state or the culture in question**. The usual human rights narrative generally describes victims as hordes of nameless, despairing, and dispirited masses. To the extent they have a face, it is desolate and pitiful. Many are uneducated, destitute, old and infirm, young, poorly clad, and/or hungry. **Many are peasants, the rural and urban poor, marginalized ethnic groups and nationalities**, and lower castes, whose very being is a state of divorce from civilization and a large distance from modernity. **Many are women and children twice victimized because of their gender and age**, n117 **and sometimes the victim of the savage culture is the female gender itself**. n118

**(--) The representations of the victim cause a messianic ethos to spring forward in the minds of the West—creating colonization:**

Makau **Mutua, 2001** (Professor of Law and Director, Human Rights Center, SUNY). “Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights.” Harvard International Law Journal. Winter, 2001. Accessed Sept. 10, 2010, Lexis/Nexis.

**The representations of the victim in human rights literature spring from a messianic ethos in** both the INGO and **the United Nations. There is a colonial texture to the relationship between the human rights victim and the West. In the colonial project, for example, the colonizer justified** ~~his~~ mission [\*232] **by drawing a distinction between the "native" and the "civilized" mind**. In one case, which was typical of the encounter between Africa and the West, a European missionary compared what he called the "Bantu mind" to that of a "civilized man": It is suggested that the mere possession on the part of the Bantu of nothing but an oral tradition of culture creates a chasm of difference between the Native 'mind' and that of civilized man, and of itself would account for a lack of balance and proportion in the triple psychological function of feeling, thinking and acting, implying that thinking is the weakest of the three and that feeling is the most dominant. The Native seeks not truth nor works, but power--the dynamical mood. n128

# Shining City Links: Women’s Rights

**(--) Allowing immigrants to come to the US on the grounds of poverty in the home country reaffirms the US as a shining city of tolerance and individual autonomy while creating the savage other:**

**McKinley 2009** – Assistant Professor, University of Oregon School of Law, (Michelle A., Fall, “Cultural Culprits”, 24 Berkeley J. Gender L. & Just. 91, Lexis Law)

Although FGM has been criminalized by statute since 1996, State v. Adem is the first case involving a criminal conviction in a U.S. court. However, the [\*107] scholarly attention to the issue of female genital cutting is extensive. n85 Adem and Nabulwala raise important questions for multicultural debates that voice concerns about the internal vulnerability of sub-groups - notably women, children, and sexual minorities within immigrant communities. n86 **The varying uses of "culture" by feminists, universalists, and relativists (**and the contested visions of "culture" that surface inside and outside of the courtroom) **illuminates its multivalence.** Nabulwala's case is part of an emerging trend in asylum jurisprudence that narrowly recognizes persecution on the grounds of sexual orientation as it is linked with social group membership. n87 Sexual orientation cases like Nabulwala's perform a related though distinct function to Adem or Kasinga. Extreme African homophobia, as opposed to diffident acceptance (don't ask, don't tell) distinguishes the United States as an enlightened, tolerant society vis-a-vis barbaric, intolerant Africa. Crackpot evangelical homophobia (of the Fred Phelps vintage) is still too marginal to de-center the genteel distaste of the heteronormative mainstream. As Wendy Brown notes: In the mid-nineteenth through mid-twentieth centuries, the West imagined itself as standing for civilization against primitivism, and in the cold war years [\*108] for freedom against tyranny; now these two recent histories are merged in the warring figures of the free, the tolerant, and the civilized on one side, and the fundamentalist, the intolerant, and the barbaric on the other. n88 In another, somewhat unrelated vein, Bonnie **Honig has pointed out the rejuvenating role that the "foreigner" plays in democratic debates**. n89 **Indeed, liberal democracy depends on new recruits to assuage doubts about persistent poverty and gendered and racialized inequalities among the domestic poor**. n90 **In the context of asylum and refugee protection, I argue that the claims brought by cultural refugees** like Fauziya Kasinga, n91 Olivia Nabulwala, and Salimatou Bah **succeed because they appeal to the host nation's normative ideals of citizenship, tolerance, and individual autonomy while reaffirming widely held ideas about the differences between "our society and theirs."** n92 **Women seeking refuge based on the cultural practices of their social group are racialized "others" whose rescue is effectuated without great monetary cost to the United States and with extraordinary political benefits**. To paraphrase Achille Mbembe, Africa constitutes a powerful metaphor through which the West asserts its difference from the rest of the world - its apologetic concerns and its exclusionary and brutal practices towards others. n93

# Shining City Links: AT: Our plan deals with culture/not race

**(--) Don’t be fooled: Elites will use the substitution of “culture” for “race” as the new code word for justifying colonial dominance over other nations:**

**McKinley 2009** – Assistant Professor, University of Oregon School of Law, (Michelle A., Fall, “Cultural Culprits”, 24 Berkeley J. Gender L. & Just. 91, Lexis Law)

In the final section, I look **in** greater depth at **asylum law** and its deployment of culture in the adjudication of contemporary asylum cases that claim culture as a basis for persecution. My point there is to illustrate the ways in which **culture is increasingly used as a proxy for race in the developing jurisprudence of refugee and asylum law. Ironically, the politically correct substitution of culture for race in the contemporary period is eerily reminiscent of the erstwhile colonial justifications for outlawing customs "repugnant to natural justice and morality."** n76 In sum, this article explores the intersection of asylum **claims based on "cultural persecution,"** which **ultimately encodes a racialized view of culture, with humanistic and ethnographic approaches to the processes of identity formation, alterity, and membership.**

# Shining City Permutation Answers

**(--) The perm begs the question of the Kritik: Our McKinley evidence indicates that allowing so called foreigners to come into the United States is crucial to reaffirming the image of the United States as superior to the savage other nations—this mindset leads to interventions around the globe.**

**(--) Our Harvard Law Review alternative evidence answers the permutation: it says that entrenching colonialist discourse prevents successful change and the only alternative is to reject such discourse outright.**

**(--) Their permutation begs the question of all our representations and ethics first evidence in the overview—the AFF plan action and discourse are unethical and should be rejected.**

**(--) Their permutation will be co-opted: the victimhood dichotomy they create constrains the criticism—we must be vigilant in our critique of the savage-victim-savior distinction to challenge the root cause of oppression they identify:**

**McKinley 2009** – Assistant Professor, University of Oregon School of Law, (Michelle A., Fall, “Cultural Culprits”, 24 Berkeley J. Gender L. & Just. 91, Lexis Law)

From the perspective of the defenders of genital cutting (or at least those who are, like myself, extremely uncomfortable with the self-pronounced omniscience of the anti-FGM global campaign), consent, contention, and agency [\*115] are social facts that are bound up with the continued endorsement, adoption, n124 abandonment of, and modifications to the practice. But we are **unduly constrained** by the **victimhood/agency dichotomy** **even as critics of the process.** **I do agree that there are theoretical trends inspired by post-structuralism and intersectionality that influence the skepticism with which critical scholars regard victimization portrayals, but we need to be more vigilant about the context of our critique**. As Benita Parry has cautioned, **we should not replace one totalizing paradigm for another when examining distinct modes of oppression**. n125 Over-agentivizing is just as pernicious as passivity, particularly when it privileges dissent and exit as the only permissible manifestations of agency. It also ignores strategic uses of victimhood narratives by applicants themselves who exploit the astonishing lack of knowledge about African cultures (and modernities) and frame their experiences in the agreed-upon script to gain asylum. n126 **This script naturalizes global asylum flows from the poverty-stricken, intolerant, barbaric South to the affluent, tolerant North while ignoring the way that these flows depend on the profoundly inequitable global distribution of financial resources and the heightened risk of unauthorized presence in Europe and North America**. The script also stymies our recognition of the way that issues like genital cutting have galvanized discussions about gender, colonization, cultural integrity, and poverty more broadly within countries and multicultural societies where the practice is debated. As Rogaia Abusharaf stated, "The well-informed efforts of African men and women to extirpate female circumcision are an obvious sign of significant social transformations that testify to new and emerging forms of internal self-criticism and cultural change." n127 Clearly, then, the binary construction encompassed by victimhood/agency is analytically insufficient.

**(--) Their permutation severs the advocacy of the 1ac: the 1ac advocates the paradigm of the US as a savior protecting the immigrant victim from the savage nation they flee from—this form of severance destroys critical ground and the ability to engage the AFF at a philosophical level—making this a voting issue.**

# Shining City Permutation Answers

**(--) The use of colonialist discourse creates a rhetorical trap for the permutation—vote negative to escape the logic of savage-victim-savior:**

**Harvard Law Review 2004** (May, “117 Harv. L. Rev. 2365”, “SAVING AMINA LAWAL: HUMAN RIGHTS SYMBOLISM AND THE DANGERS OF COLONIALISM” lexis)

In positioning women as the object of contestation, **the human rights project pursues its objectives by using the terms of colonialist discourse, invoking the opposites of colonialism and resistance that these terms indicate. Some group of persons is cast in the role of "saving brown women from brown men." Within this framework in which the women-victims are passive, there is room for only two active positions: the "savages,"** who here are the proponents of Shari"a, **and the** [\*2382] **"saviors,"** who are human rights advocates. **Caught in rhetorical trap, the only options for those placed in the position of "savage" are the two options of colonialism - submission or resistance.** Thus, the Nigerian government's confirmation of Ms. Lawal's constitutional rights becomes a concession to the demands of concerned beauty pageant contestants. n103 Even if the Shari"a Appeals Court decision was completely unaffected by the international outcry (as indeed it purported to be), it remains tainted by the suspicion that it was a submission to the demands of the "savior" group. Those who do not want to be viewed as submitters must act in ways blatantly antagonistic to the desires of the international human rights community. **This pressure creates a backlash that pushes nationalist leaders into increasingly extreme positions.** In an earlier case involving a teenage girl sentenced to flogging for premarital sex, letters of complaint from "infidels" provoked the state governor to push the execution of her sentence forward. n104 The riots in Kaduna were largely considered a backlash against the Miss World pageant and the comments of the pageant's participants regarding Ms. Lawal. Even though the riots began as a protest against an offensive newspaper article, n105 there were "screaming headlines around the world" attributing the violence to the "physical presence of the [pageant contestants] in Nigeria." n106 Concerns over a potential nationalist backlash affected the ability of Nigerian activists to make full use of the international support. Despite serious financial constraints, Ms. Lawal's legal team refused offers of financial assistance from international donors for fear that such assistance would damage its credibility. n107 Despite the efforts that Nigerian human rights activists took to distance Ms. Lawal's case from the international attention it was receiving, many activists were labeled "anti-Islam" by other Muslims. n108 **By casting women** like Ms. Lawal **as symbols of victimhood and by increasing the costs associated with speaking out, international activists decrease the likelihood that women in postcolonial states will participate** [\*2383] **in the development of their societies.** In Ms. Lawal's case, the "saved woman" remained a silent partner in her defense. She gave no interviews and never aired her opinions about the political and social changes in Nigeria. Ms. Hussaini's symbolic status has had a similarly silencing effect. She caused an uproar in the fall of 2002 when she was invited to Rome for the Annual Festival of the Dionysia International Center for Arts and Cultures, which included a roundtable discussion on the appeal of her case. A prominent Nigerian women's rights organization distanced itself from Ms. Hussaini's decision to attend the event and to accept an honorary citizenship from the City of Rome, after that decision became a major focus of criticism. n109 The content of Ms. Hussaini's participation at an international dialogue was lost amid accusations and denials of participation in a "gimmick of Christianity," n110 overshadowed by the symbolism of Nigeria's most famous "adulteress" accepting an award from the Western city.

**(--) The AFF’s cultural framing prevents serious exploration into the root causes of human suffering:**

Lila Abu-**Lughod, 2002** (Dept. of Anthropology, Columbia University). “Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving? Anthropological Reflections on Cultural Relativism and Its Others” American Anthropologist, Vol. 104, No. 3 (Sep., 2002), pp. 783-790, accessed via JSTOR

In other words, **the question is why knowing about the "culture" of the region**, and particularly its religious beliefs and treatment of women, **was more urgent than exploring the history of the development of repressive regimes in the region and the U.S. role in this history. Such cultural framing, it seemed to me, prevented the serious exploration of the roots and nature of human suffering in this part of the world. Instead of political and historical explanations, experts were being asked to give religiocultural ones. Instead of questions that might lead to the exploration of global interconnections, we were offered ones that worked to artificially divide the world into separate spheres-recreating an imaginative geography of West versus East,** us versus Muslims, cultures in which First Ladies give speeches versus others where women shuffle around silently in burqas.

# Shining City Permutation Answers

**Turn: Cultural Essentialism**

**A) Colonialist representations of other nations block efforts to create fruitful collaboration—undermining the effectiveness of the permutation and locking in cultural essentialism:**

**Harvard Law Review 2004** (May, “117 Harv. L. Rev. 2365”, “SAVING AMINA LAWAL: HUMAN RIGHTS SYMBOLISM AND THE DANGERS OF COLONIALISM” lexis)

Moreover, **in tracking the language of colonialism, this characterization of "third world women" reproduces the women's rights-cultural resistance opposition, further undermining the possibility for fruitful collaboration. Because the language regarding postcolonial women remains unchanged, the picture of the "Third World" that emerges seems very similar to colonialist representations of nations in which social problems were attributed to a "static" and "traditional" culture, rather than to social, economic, and political processes.** n88 Using this "cultural improvement" model, international feminist campaigns often follow the patronizing steps of colonialist intervention. The Western movement against female circumcision, or female genital mutilation (FGM), aptly illustrates this point. As the loaded term "female genital mutilation" - coined by Western feminists - suggests, a complex social practice was represented by the anti-FGM campaign as a cruel, barbaric ritual, perpetrated only to oppress women and lacking in any redeeming value. n89 **This campaign to "save" postcolonial or "third world women" remained bound by colonial representation of women as victims of a savage and backward culture and thus elicited a sharp rebuke from the very women targeted for "salvation."**

**B) Cultural essentialism causes oppression—it creates insurmountable barriers between us & them:**

Christine J. **Walley, 1997** (New York University). Searching for "Voices": Feminism, Anthropology, and the Global Debate over Female Genital Operations. Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Aug., 1997), pp. 405-438. Accessed Sept. 5, 2010 on JSTOR.

Poststructuralist feminist scholars like Judith Butler have criticized this preoccupation with identity politics (Butler 1990; Butler and Scott 1992). **In a challenge similar to that posed against hardened understandings of "culture," Butler criticizes identity politics for building on and encouraging essentialism that is, the reduction of complex human experiences and competing identities to static essences** presumed to emanate from the unambiguous facts of gender, race, or nationality (1990). **While historically, the concept of "culture" provided a space that allowed for respect and understanding of differences, "identity politics" has similarly provided dominated groups with an arena for organizing and demanding rights. If not problematized, however, the terms in which such claims are made can work to create new forms of oppression rather than greater liberation. Hardened conceptions of "culture" can suggest both insurmountable barriers between "us" and "them" and a predetermined "authenticity" to which individuals are pressured to conform.**

# Shining City Alt Solvency Extensions

**Extend our Harvard Law Review evidence—challenging oversimplified representations of the West as being a shining beacon free of oppression is critical to creating a sustainable movement for change that both challenges oppression and Western imperialism.**

**(--) And bottom up grass-roots social movements create better hope for change than either Congress, the Courts or the states—prefer this evidence it is specific to immigration policy:**

**Ansley 2008** – Distinguished Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Tennessee College of Law (Frances, Winter, “SYMPOSIUM: Immigration Policy: Who Belongs?: COMMENT: Doing Policy from Below: Worker Solidarity and the Prospects for Immigration Reform”, 41 Cornell Int'l L.J. 101, Lexis Law)

In concluding this essay, **it strikes me that I should concede that a reader might well ask whether my soupy call to movement building is nothing but an argument from desperation.** When ejected from all formal channels of influence, where else does a person have to go? **Looking to the** [\*114] **federal judiciary for immigration reform, for instance, would appear to be delusional in light of the Supreme Court's ugly decision in Hoffman** Plastic Compounds v. NLRB n48 as well as in other cases. n49 **In its turn, Congress has proven itself incapable of taking present action on the issue.** n50 **Meanwhile, at least among a seriously agitated minority of the citizenry, anti-immigrant sentiment is at a fever pitch,** n51 **discouraging progressive policy reform in most state and local arenas.** My argument, however, is not born only of the times. In my view, **policy is always best imagined, won, and made real when those most affected by its terms are in motion and in full voice.** Perhaps the current bleak landscape makes it unusually clear that **winning decent political change will require "looking to the bottom."** Even if the channels to power were more open to the massive policy changes that I believe are needed, I would still argue that **more people like those of us** who gathered at Ithaca for this symposium **should do immigration policy not from above but from below.** Even if Congress were less paralyzed, immigration deliberations in that body would produce unacceptable results unless and until a stronger movement of low-wage immigrants and other working people can exert the political and ideological clout to change the terms of the debate. **The movement that is needed - one that** reaches beyond a class-purged civil rights frame to **embrace a broad and combative vision of economic justice - is necessary both to achieve a decent version of immigration reform and to tackle the many other problems that flow from the development model** currently dominating the world economy. **We know from other popular movements, not least the African American freedom movement in our own country** that touched and transformed so many lives, my own included, **that seemingly invincible systems can indeed change,** once people find each other and a way to stir.

# Shining City Alt Solvency Extensions

**(--) Abandoning Savage-Victim-Savior rhetoric is a prerequisite to solving human rights abuses around the globe—the AFF has zero hope of solving its advantages: vote negative on presumption even if you think the alternative solves nothing:**

Makau **Mutua, 2001** (Professor of Law and Director, Human Rights Center, SUNY). “Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights.” Harvard International Law Journal. Winter, 2001. Accessed Sept. 10, 2010, Lexis/Nexis.

**The human rights movement must abandon the SVS metaphor if there is going to be real hope in a genuine international discourse on rights. The relentless efforts to universalize an essentially European corpus of human rights through Western crusades cannot succeed. Nor will demonizing those who resist these efforts achieve a truly international approach. The critiques of the corpus from** Africans, Asians, Muslims, Hindus, and **a host of critical thinkers from around the world are the one avenue through which human rights can be redeemed and truly universalized.** This multiculturalization of the corpus could be attempted in a number of areas: balancing between individual and group rights, giving more substance to social and economic rights, relating rights to duties, and addressing the relationship between the corpus and economic systems. This Article does not develop those substantive critiques, but it is important that these issues be raised. Further work must done on these questions to chart out how such a vision affects or distorts non-European societies. **Ultimately, a new theory of internationalism and human rights, one that responds to diverse cultures, must confront the inequities of the international order. In this respect, human rights must break from the historical continuum--expressed in the metaphor and the grand narrative of human rights--that keeps intact the hierarchical relationships between European and non-European populations**. Nathaniel Berman is right in his prognosis of what has to be done. The contradictions between commitments to sovereign equality, stunning political and economic imbalances, and paternalistic humanitarianism cannot be definitively resolved logically, doctrinally, or institutionally; rather, they must be confronted in ongoing struggle in all legal, political, economic, and cultural arenas. Projections of a unitary international community, even in the guise of the inclusive U.N., or a unified civilizational consensus, even in the guise of human rights discourse, [\*244] may be provisionally useful and important but cannot indefinitely defer the need to confront these contradictions. n173

# Shining City Alt Solvency Extensions

**(--) And grassroots resistance to colonialism is necessary to reaffirm the value to life—their paradigm makes everyone expendable:**

Pam **Solo, 1992** Executive Director of Cultural Survival. Cultural Survival Journal. Issue 16.2 “Who Do We Think We

Are? April 30,1992. http://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/csq/csq\_article.cfm?id=000002E9-0000-0000-

0000-000000000000&region\_id=0&subregion\_id=1&issue\_id=5

That questions is particularly potent now that the Cold War is over. In the Third World, centuries of colonialism and decades of superpower rivalry have left a damaging legacy. Southern countries and other peoples victimized by colonial expansion and its consequent political and economic systems are intensifying their calls for justice, not charity. The challenge is made even more difficult because a major export of the developed world has been the concept of the nation state, with its emphasis on militarization and internal security. On the positive side, one lesson to be drawn from the collapse of communism is that grassroots politics can lead to revolutionary changes in governments and institutions of all kinds. In Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, new thinking, developed and embraced first by local actors, opened up political possibilities on an international scale. As the next millennium approaches, Cultural Survival hopes to take that lesson toward a second wave of political action that will help turn around relations between North and South, just as ordinary citizens helped reverse the tide of East-West relations. But while Western movements have focused on the weapons of war, the politics of the 1990s will center on a single interlocking agenda: human rights, the environment, and development. As its heart are some 600 million indigenous people. Their fate is a pathway and litmus test of our progress toward a peaceful and sustainable world order. From the periphery of political, economic, and social power, they are moving to the center of world attention. Our survival depends on ensuring that no one, particularly the poorest of the poor, is thrown out of the canoe or viewed as dispensable. This is a **moral and a practical imperative.**

# Shining City Alt Solvency Extensions

**(--) Rejection is sufficient: discourse IS practice in this instance—the judge should operate to avoid reproducing colonial ideologies:**

Christine J. **Walley, 1997** (New York University). Searching for "Voices": Feminism, Anthropology, and the Global Debate over Female Genital Operations. Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Aug., 1997), pp. 405-438. Accessed Sept. 5, 2010 on JSTOR.

Ultimately, however, the theoretical separation between clitoridectomy in Kikhome as ritual practice and the international controversy surrounding female genital operations as discourse is untenable. **Discourse is also practice; it is not simply a way of understanding or thinking about the world, it is also a way of acting in it. Given that our discourse also signals a form of intervention, I would like to encourage feminists of whatever national origins, race, or gender to work against those assumptions** being made in Western-oriented media accounts of female genital operations **that reproduce colonial and neocolonial ideologies**. Feminist anthropologists can also make a productive contribution by examining the social contexts of both ritual practices and international controversies and by exploring the power dynamics surrounding support and opposition to such practices, whether in rural African villages or urban France. For those interested in more hands-on styles of activism, critics of identity politics and hardened notions of culture are also pointing us in the direction of a feminist politics based on alliances and coalitions (Butler 1990; Haraway 1989; Mohanty 1991); hopefully, this brand of feminist politics will also be capable of critiquing practices such as clitoridectomy and infibulation without resorting to neocolonial ideologies of gender or denigrating the choices of women who support such practices. At the same time, Kenyan anthropologist Achola Pala-Okeyo cautions that "**the role of [Western] feminists is not to be in front, leading the way for other women, but to be in back supporting the other women's struggles to bring about change**."22 Here Pala-Okeyo forces us to recognize that all of us, along with the debates in which we are engaged, are products of tenacious power relationships with long histories. The hope is that we can bring this recognition to bear at the same time that we form alliances based on shared politics across boundaries of race, nationality, and gender.

**(--) The alternative embraces a commitment to challenge all sources of human rights violations—including ones in the United States:**

Makau **Mutua, 2001** (Professor of Law and Director, Human Rights Center, SUNY). “Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights.” Harvard International Law Journal. Winter, 2001. Accessed Sept. 10, 2010, Lexis/Nexis.

**In the last decade in Africa, however, a more politically educated activist and thinker, one who questions the human rights project more seriously and who seeks a culturally grounded program for social change, has started to emerge**. n172 **This activist and thinker understands the connections among power relations, human rights, economic domination, and the historical relationships between the West and the rest of the world. Such a thinker is aware of the deep contradictions that mark the human rights enterprise and seeks the construction of a different human rights movement. While this new actor is still being defined**, and constitutes but a small fraction of the human rights movement on the African continent, he is now increasingly at the center of innovative thinking and action. At **the core of this new activism and thinking is the push for intellectual originality and self-reliance, local and not Western foundation support, and a commitment to challenge all sources of violations, be they local or foreign. This development represents the cultivation of a truly local human rights culture in terms of the definition of rights and their enforcement.**

# Shining City Alt Solvency Extensions

**(--) The alternative challenges the necessity of strategic and military demands in favor of challenging global injustice--**

Lila Abu-**Lughod, 2002** (Dept. of Anthropology, Columbia University). “Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving? Anthropological Reflections on Cultural Relativism and Its Others” American Anthropologist, Vol. 104, No. 3 (Sep., 2002), pp. 783-790, accessed via JSTOR

**We do not stand outside the world, looking out over this sea of poor benighted people, living under the shadow-or veil-of oppressive cultures; we are part of that world**. Islamic movements themselves have arisen in a world shaped by the intense engagements of Western powers in Middle Eastern lives. **A more productive approach, it seems to me, is to ask how we might contribute to making the world a more just place. A world not organized around strategic military and economic demands**; a place where certain kinds of forces and values that we may still consider important could have an appeal **and where there is the peace necessary for discussions, debates, and transformations to occur within communities.** We need to ask ourselves what kinds of world conditions we could contribute to making such that popular desires will not be overdetermined by an overwhelming sense of helplessness in the face of forms of global injustice. Where we seek to be active in the affairs of distant places, can we do so in the spirit of support for those within those communities whose goals are to make women's (and men's) lives better (as Walley has argued in relation to practices of genital cutting in Africa, [1997])? **Can we use a more egalitarian language of alliances, coalitions, and solidarity, instead of salvation?** Even RAWA, the now celebrated Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan, which was so instrumental in bringing to U.S. women's attention the excesses of the Taliban, has opposed the U.S. bombing from the beginning. They do not see in it Afghan women's salvation but increased hardship and loss. They have long called for disarmament and for peacekeeping forces. Spokespersons point out the dangers of confusing governments with people, the Taliban with innocent Afghans who will be most harmed. They consistently remind audiences to take a close look at the ways policies are being organized around oil interests, the arms industry, and the international drug trade. They are not obsessed with the veil, even though they are the most radical feminists working for a secular democratic Afghanistan. Unfortunately, only their messages about the excesses of the Taliban have been heard, even though their criticisms of those in power in Afghanistan have included previous regimes. **A first step in hearing their wider message is to break with the language of alien cultures, whether to understand or eliminate them. Missionary work and colonial feminism belong in the past. Our task is to critically explore what we might do to help create a world in which those poor Afghan women, for whom "the hearts of those in the civilized world break," can have safety and decent lives**.

**(--) Stepping back from Savage-Victim-Savior rhetoric is crucial to restoring human dignity:**

Makau **Mutua, 2001** (Professor of Law and Director, Human Rights Center, SUNY). “Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights.” Harvard International Law Journal. Winter, 2001. Accessed Sept. 10, 2010, Lexis/Nexis.

**Stepping back from the SVS rhetoric creates a new basis for calculating human dignity and identifies ways and societal structures through which** [\*245] **such dignity could be protected or enhanced. Such an approach** would not assume, ab initio, that a particular cultural practice was offensive to human rights. It **would respect cultural pluralism as a basis for finding common universality on some issues.** With regard to FGM, for instance, such an approach would first excavate the social meaning and purposes of the practice, as well as its effects, and then investigate the conflicting positions over the practice in that society. **Rather than demonizing and finger-pointing, under the tutelage of outsiders and their local supporters, the contending positions would be carefully examined and compared to find ways of either modifying or discarding the practice without making its practitioners feel shameful of their culture and of themselves. The zealotry of the SVS approach leaves no room for a deliberative intra-cultural dialogue and introspection.**

# Shining City Alt Solvency Extensions

**(--) Human rights discourse cannot productively alter society until the Savage-Victim-savior metaphor is abandoned:**

Makau **Mutua, 2001** (Professor of Law and Director, Human Rights Center, SUNY). “Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights.” Harvard International Law Journal. Winter, 2001. Accessed Sept. 10, 2010, Lexis/Nexis.

The purpose of this Article is not to raise or validate the idea of an original, pure, or a superior Third World society or culture. Nor is it to provide a normative blueprint for another human rights corpus, although such a project must be pursued with urgency. Rather, **the Article is a plea for a genuine cross-contamination of cultures to create a new multicultural human rights corpus. The human rights movement should rethink and re-orient its hierar-chical, binary view of the world in which the West leads the way and the rest of the globe follows. Human rights can play a role in changing the unjust international order and particularly the imbalances between the West and the Third World. Still, it will not do so unless it stops working within the SVS metaphor. Ultimately, the quest must be for the construction of a human rights movement that wins for all**.

# Shining City Alt Solvency: Must Challenge Shining City Rhetoric

**Human rights advocates must come to terms with the troubling rhetoric of the human rights movement:**

Makau **Mutua, 2001** (Professor of Law and Director, Human Rights Center, SUNY). “Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights.” Harvard International Law Journal. Winter, 2001. Accessed Sept. 10, 2010, Lexis/Nexis.

**This Article** attempts to elicit from the proponents of the human rights movement several admissions, some of them deeply unsettling. It **asks that human rights advocates be more self-critical and come to terms with the troubling rhetoric and history that shape, in part, the human rights movement**. At the same time, the Article does not only address the biased and arrogant rhetoric and history of the human rights enterprise, but also grapples with the contradictions in the basic nobility and majesty that drive the human rights project--the drive from the unflinching belief that human beings and the political societies they construct can be governed by a higher morality. This first section briefly introduces the three dimensions of the SVS metaphor and how the metaphor exposes the theoretical flaws of the current human rights corpus.

**The vision of the good society must be vigorously questioned and contested:**

Makau **Mutua, 2001** (Professor of Law and Director, Human Rights Center, SUNY). “Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights.” Harvard International Law Journal. Winter, 2001. Accessed Sept. 10, 2010, Lexis/Nexis.

This Article is not merely about the language of human rights or the manner in which the human rights movement describes its goals, subjects, and intended outcomes. It is not a plea for the human rights movement to be more sensitive to non-Western cultures. Nor is it a wholesale rejection of the idea of human rights. n25 Instead, **the Article is fundamentally an attempt at locating--philosophically, culturally, and historically--the normative edifice of the human rights corpus. If the human rights movement is driven by a totalitarian or totalizing impulse, that is, the mission to require that all human societies transform themselves to fit a particular blueprint, then there is an acute shortage of deep reflection and a troubling abundance of zealotry in the human rights community. This vision of the "good society" must be vigorously questioned and contested.**

**The US has to be willing to place its practices under scrutiny and not assume we are a shining city immune from criticism:**

Harold Hongju **Koh, 2003** Gerard C. and Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of International Law @ Yale Law School, May 2003, Stanford Law Review [“FOREWORD: On American Exceptionalism”, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1479, 7-25-07] p. Lexis

This third face of American exceptionalism Louis Henkin long ago dubbed "America's flying buttress mentality." Why is it, he asked, that in the cathedral of international human rights, the United States is so often seen as a flying buttress, rather than a pillar, willing to stand outside the structure supporting it,  [\*1485]  but unwilling to subject itself to the critical examination and rules of that structure? The short answer is that compliance without ratification gives a false sense of freedom. By supporting and following the rules of the international realm most of the time, but always out of a sense of political prudence rather than legal obligation, the United States tries to have it both ways. On the one hand, it enjoys the appearance of compliance. On the other, it maintains the illusion of unfettered sovereignty. It is a bit like the driver who regularly breaks the speed limit but rarely gets a ticket, because he uses radar detectors, cruise control, ham radios, and similar tricks to stay just this side of the law. He complies, but does not obey, because to obey visibly would mean surrendering his freedom and admitting to constraints, while appearing "free" better serves his self-image than the more sedate label of being law-abiding. [20](file:///C:\Users\rwgallow\Desktop\Debate%2010-11\Immigration%20Topic%20'10\Immigration%20Finished%20Work\_blank#_blank) Like "distinctive rights" and "different labels," the flying buttress mentality is ultimately more America's problem than the world's. For example, it is a huge embarrassment that only two nations in the world - the United States and Somalia, which until recently did not have an organized government - have not ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Nevertheless, this ultimately is more America's loss than that of the world. Why? Because the United States rarely gets enough credit for the large-scale moral and financial support that it actually gives to children's rights around the world, in no small part because of its promiscuous failure to ratify a convention with which it actually complies in most respects. [21](file:///C:\Users\rwgallow\Desktop\Debate%2010-11\Immigration%20Topic%20'10\Immigration%20Finished%20Work\_blank#_blank) But once one weighs in the unfavorable alignment of proratification votes in the Republican-controlled Senate, and considers the amount of political capital that U.S. activists would require to obtain the sixty-seven votes needed for ratification any time soon, one soon concludes that children's rights advocates are probably better off directing their limited energies not toward ratification, but rather, toward real strategies to reduce the exploitation of child labor or to expand the prohibitions in the child-soldiers protocol. [22](file:///C:\Users\rwgallow\Desktop\Debate%2010-11\Immigration%20Topic%20'10\Immigration%20Finished%20Work\_blank#_blank)

# Shining City Alt Solvency: Female Genital Cutting

**Our alternative solves better—our focus on respecting culture while avoiding harmful practices is superior to their condemnation of culture:**

**McKinley 2009** – Assistant Professor, University of Oregon School of Law, (Michelle A., Fall, “Cultural Culprits”, 24 Berkeley J. Gender L. & Just. 91, Lexis Law)

**We must work from the assumption that human behaviours and cultural values, however senseless they may look to us from our particular personal and cultural standpoints, have meaning and fulfill a function for those who practice** [\*147] **them. People will change their behavior only when they themselves understand the hazards and indignity of the harmful practices and perceive the new practices proposed as meaningful, functional, and at least as effective as the old ones. Therefore, what we must aim for is to convince people, including women, that they can give up a specific practice without giving up meaningful aspects of their own cultures**. n289

# Shining City K-Bomb: Language Key

**Language sustains our perception of the world if we can win that the understanding of the AFF is bunk, their plan is suspect.**

Veronica **Vasterling, 1999** Associate Professor in Philosophy at U of Nijimegen, Butler's Sophisticated Constructivism:

A Critical Assessment, Hypatia 14.3, 1999, pg. 17-38

Whereas everything that is intelligible to us is also accessible to us, the reverse is not true. Phenomena that are intelligible to us are phenomena we do understand in some way or other. At the most basic level, to understand something means to be able to name or refer to it. **As understanding** i**nvolves the capacity to name, to refer**, or to articulate that which is understood, **it is always mediated by language.** To equate intelligibility and accessibility would mean that we cannot have access to phenomena we do not understand, that is, phenomena we cannot articulate. That does not seem plausible. By following the hermeneutic model of understanding, I try to show that we can have access to phenomena we do not understand, that is, cannot articulate, though this access is not completely independent of linguistically mediated understanding. In daily life, **our behavior and actions are guided by a mostly implicit understanding of the world we inhabit, an understanding that is based upon the ways in which this world is semantically constructed.** Even so**, our daily routines are** on occasion slightly, and sometimes profoundly, **disrupted because we are confronted with people, situations, actions, images, texts, things, bodily sensations etcetera that defy our understanding. The context of habitual understanding enables these confrontations or encounters. 5 To become aware of something we do not understand, we need a context of what we do understand. 6 By giving us access to what we do not understand, the context of habitual understanding does, as it were, indicate its own limits.** We register these limits not simply as a lack of understanding but, more precisely, as a lack of our capacity to articulate. The nagging feeling or awareness of something we cannot put in words is nothing unusual. This fact of everyday life implies that the range of accessibility is wider than, though not independent of, the range of intelligibility. Whereas the latter more or less coincides with our linguistic capacities, the former indicates that these capacities do not (fully) determine our awareness of and contact with reality.

# Shining City Impacts: Biopower Impact Add-on

**A) Lower level bureaucrats will re-interpret the plan in a colonialist fashion—imposing the power of the state on individuals:**

**McKinley 2009** – Assistant Professor, University of Oregon School of Law, (Michelle A., Fall, “Cultural Culprits”, 24 Berkeley J. Gender L. & Just. 91, Lexis Law)

Instead of creating a triumphalist account of asylum decisions upholding the formulation of improbable social groups, n77 **I explore the workings of the** [\*105] **administrative state in rendering the "legibility"** n78 **of cultural subjects through the adjudication of asylum claims alleging persecution based on cultural practices**. **My objective is to scrutinize the asylum process as a critical site for the production and deployment of culture as it relates to citizenship, state protection, and humanitarian intervention**. As Gregor Noll has observed, **culture and asylum "co-produce each other" throughout the legal proceedings with hearings, affidavits, and pleadings that are "culture creating" rather than merely "culture evaluating."** n79 Indeed, **it is the administrative state, in the hands of bureaucrats, that both operationalizes and naturalizes "culture" through the decisions of immigration judges, interviewing asylum officers**, consular officials, and a host of other low and mid-level agency workers within the asylum and refugee legal system. These bureaucrats are largely removed from the loftier conversations about rights and citizenship that occur among academic political philosophers, yet their decisions are critical to enforcing decisions about refugee and asylum status, and, by extension, the effective enjoyment of citizenship. n80

# Shining City Impacts: Biopower Impact Add-on

**B) Exercises of biopower justify administration over the body politic – the ultimate impact is global nuclear conflict, genocide, and extinction**

Michel **Foucault**, 19**78** Professor of the History of Systems of Thought at the Collège de France, **1978**, The History of Sexuality Volume 1: An Introduction, translated by Robert Hurley, p. 135-137

For a long time, one of the characteristic privileges of sovereign power was the right to decide life and death. In a formal sense, it derived no doubt from the ancient patria potestas that granted the father of the Roman family the right to “dispose” of the life of his children and his slaves; just as he had given them life, so he could take it away. By the time the right of life and death was framed by the classi­cal theoreticians, it was in a considerably diminished form. It was no longer considered that this power of the sovereign over his subjects could be exercised in an absolute and un­conditional way, but only in cases where the sovereign’s very existence was in jeopardy: a sort of right of rejoinder. If he were threatened by external enemies who sought to over­throw him or contest his rights, he could then legitimately wage war, and require his subjects to take part in the defense of the state; without “directly proposing their death,” he was empowered to “expose their life”: in this sense, he wielded an “indirect” power over them of life and death. But if someone dared to rise up against him and transgress his laws, then he could exercise a direct power over the offender’s life: as punishment, the latter would be put to death. Viewed in this way, the power of life and death was not an absolute privilege: it was conditioned by the defense of the sovereign, and his own survival. Must we follow Hobbes in seeing it as the transfer to the prince of the natural right possessed by every individual to defend his life even if this meant the death of others? Or should it be regarded as a specific right that was manifested with the formation of that new juridical being, the sovereign? In any case, in its modern form—relative and limited—as in its ancient and absolute form, the right of life and death is a dissymmetrical one. The sovereign exercised ~~his~~ right of life only by exercising ~~his~~ right to kill, or by refraining from killing; he evidenced his power over life only through the death he was capable of requiring. The right which was formulated as the “power of life and death” was in reality the right to *take* life or *let* live. Its symbol, after all, was the sword. Perhaps this juridical form must be re­ferred to a historical type of society in which power was exercised mainly as a means of deduction (*prelevement*), a subtraction mechanism, a right to appropriate a portion of the wealth, a tax of products, goods and services, labor and blood, levied on the subjects. Power in this instance was essentially a right of seizure: of things, time, bodies, and ultimately life itself; it culminated in the privilege to seize hold of life in order to suppress it. Since the classical age the West has undergone a very profound transformation of these mechanisms of power. “Deduction” has tended to be no longer the major form of power but merely one element among others, working to incite, reinforce, control, monitor, optimize, and organize the forces under it: a power bent on generating forces, mak­ing them grow, and ordering them, rather than one dedicated to impeding them, making them submit, or destroying them. There has been a parallel shift in the right of death, or at least a tendency to align itself with the exigencies of a life-adminis­tering power and to define itself accordingly. This death that was based on the right of the sovereign is now manifested as simply the reverse of the right of the social body to ensure, maintain, or develop its life. Yet wars were never as bloody as they have been since the nineteenth century, and all things being equal, never before did regimes visit such holocausts on their own populations. But this formidable power of death—and this is perhaps what accounts for part of its force and the cynicism with which it has so greatly expanded its limits—now presents itself as the counterpart of a power that exerts a positive influence on life, that endeavors to adminis­ter, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations. Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire popula­tions are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity: massacres have become vital. It is as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars, causing so many men to be killed. And through a turn that closes the circle, as the technology of wars has caused them to tend increasingly toward all-out destruction, the decision that initiates them and the one that terminates them are in fact increasingly informed by the naked question of survival. The **atomic situation is now at the end point of this process**: the power to expose a whole population to death is the underside of the power to guarantee an individual’s con­tinued existence. The principle underlying the tactics of bat­tle-that one has to be capable of killing in order to go on living-has become the principle that defines the strategy of states. But the existence in question is no longer the juridical existence of sovereignty; at stake is the biological existence of a population. If genocide is indeed the dream of modern powers, this is not because of a recent return of the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population.

# Shining City Impacts: Cultural Essentialism Justifies Interventions

**Creating cultural essentialism justifies interventions in the name of freeing the victim from the savage other:**

**McKinley 2009** – Assistant Professor, University of Oregon School of Law, (Michelle A., Fall, “Cultural Culprits”, 24 Berkeley J. Gender L. & Just. 91, Lexis Law)

Before answering these sets of questions, I want to explore the genealogy of one unique set of ideas - **cultural essentialism** - and its role in post-colonial campaigns against female genital cutting. Essentialism **is used to connote the idea that things, women, culture, races, have fixed, innate, and identifiable** [\*122] **properties, or essences**. n150 **Cultural essentialism offers a scientific, systematizing view of a social group's beliefs, life worlds,** material expressions, sensibilities, traditions, and rituals. Its empirical offering is premised on the legitimacy of external "objective" observation. Anthropology, the discipline most closely invested in the study of culture, had been a constant perpetrator of the essentialist view until its wholesale rejection by interpretivist scholars, insider and activist practitioners, post-colonial intellectuals, and feminists. n151 In a similar vein, "race" also conveyed a biological, innate, and naturalized essence rather than a social construction to describe human similarity and difference. Racial membership and racial boundaries are actively created and policed through institutional and intellectual practices - of which essentialism is part - but also through scientific racism, evolutionism, phrenology, eugenics, census taking and enumeration, human genome and other genetic research projects, and in legal regimes like Jim Crow and apartheid. n152 As Christine Walley notes, the "tendency to understand female genital [cutting] in "either/or' terms," that is, "moral opprobrium or relativistic tolerance," reveals that both sides are deeply invested in a "hardened view of "culture' based on a rigid essentialist notion of difference that can be historically traced to the colonial era." n153 While not all critics agree upon the methodological tools used to attack the more pernicious forms of essentialism (or the ways that class, sexual orientation, gender, generation, and birthplace complicate essentialism), three dominant signifiers converge in the debate about female genital cutting. Both denouncers and defenders of female genital cutting invoke [\*123] essentialist, totalizing notions of "woman, culture, and race." n154 These are not terms that refer to some neutral, transparent reality; rather they are embedded within the context of a history of ideas and of Western institutionalized knowledge that give rise to certain practices that change over time. n155 **Today, "savagery" coded as race would appear ethnocentric as a basis for humanitarian intervention, but it was perfectly legitimate as a justification for rescuing vulnerable native women in the expansion of Empire within a period when ideas about the natural ordering of races dominated European and American thought.** n156 How did these signifiers historically interact with each other to produce ideologies of colonial rule: Woman as wayward, childlike, sexually promiscuous, vulnerable, and remediable? Or Culture as empirically observable, and "uplift-able" through exposure, commerce, and religious tutelage? And Race as determinative of savagery/enlightenment and hierarchies of difference that naturalized racial orders of subjugation? n157 Inquiries of this nature highlight how gender is implicated in colonial and post-colonial processes and how sexuality and reproduction are often cast as national, public policy concerns. n158 Even the most cursory look at colonial and post-colonial campaigns against female genital cutting demonstrates the inscription of larger political struggles onto the bodies of young women and girls. Female genital cutting was initially framed as a matter of public censure and humanitarian concern and then recast as colonial resistance and tribal cohesion in Kenya during the late 1920s-1950s by the incipient independence movement. Susan Pedersen addresses why the particular significance of irua, [\*124] "the ritual unmaking and reworking of women's bodies became so central to the construction of national identity." n159 Pedersen uses the "female circumcision controversy" to look more broadly at sexual politics in African nationalism and British colonial policy and how the female body became a metonym for the "woman question" in incipient nationalist movements. n160 As Lydia Liu has noted, women as a "social category" developed in tandem with anti-colonial, nationalist struggles to become a "state category." n161 Indeed, vanguard nationalist leaders addressed the "woman question" as part of the resistance movement in almost every colonial struggle, despite their marked ambivalence and anti-feminist politics after Independence. n162 **There is a wealth of feminist writing analyzing the gender politics of nationalisms (particularly with regard to nationalist civil wars or competing nationalisms outside of the West**), n163 the rising fundamentalist retrenchment of women's physical mobility, n164 and the reification of the spiritual realm with the domestic, womanly domain. n165 Building on the influential insights of Yuval-Davis and Anthias's volume Woman-Nation-State, n166 we are keenly aware of the inscription of political struggles onto women's bodies, the feminization of the nation (i.e. the "motherland"), and the re-signification of "woman" in the patriotic process of constructing and imagining political communities in Independence struggles and colonial encounters. n167

# Shining City Impacts: Cultural Essentialism Justifies Interventions

**Cultural Essentialism leads to us-them dichotomies:**

**McKinley 2009** – Assistant Professor, University of Oregon School of Law, (Michelle A., Fall, “Cultural Culprits”, 24 Berkeley J. Gender L. & Just. 91, Lexis Law)

**The dangers of cultural essentialism are decried principally in the anthropological literature**, and I have alluded to many of the debates throughout this article. My point is that we are not dealing with a nuanced, critical debate between liberal feminists and multiculturalists; rather, **we are dealing with crude essentialisms in the courts adjudicating cultural citizenship, which then translate into ways of ordering the world into enemies and allies. This presents tremendous difficulties for respectful cross-cultural dialogue among advocates, practitioners and scholars** when African women are perpetually cast as victims, and urged "to revolt against the social ... insanities that allow the mutilation of half their population." n349

**Cultural essentialism causes oppression—it creates insurmountable barriers between us & them:**

Christine J. **Walley, 1997** (New York University). Searching for "Voices": Feminism, Anthropology, and the Global Debate over Female Genital Operations. Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Aug., 1997), pp. 405-438. Accessed Sept. 5, 2010 on JSTOR.

Poststructuralist feminist scholars like Judith Butler have criticized this preoccupation with identity politics (Butler 1990; Butler and Scott 1992). **In a challenge similar to that posed against hardened understandings of "culture," Butler criticizes identity politics for building on and encouraging essentialism that is, the reduction of complex human experiences and competing identities to static essences** presumed to emanate from the unambiguous facts of gender, race, or nationality (1990). **While historically, the concept of "culture" provided a space that allowed for respect and understanding of differences, "identity politics" has similarly provided dominated groups with an arena for organizing and demanding rights. If not problematized, however, the terms in which such claims are made can work to create new forms of oppression rather than greater liberation. Hardened conceptions of "culture" can suggest both insurmountable barriers between "us" and "them" and a predetermined "authenticity" to which individuals are pressured to conform.**

# Shining City Impacts: Cultural Essentialism Justifies Interventions

**(-) Otherization causes genocide**

Diamond, ’92 (The Third Chimponzee; pg. 298-299)

That our urge to kill is restrained by our ethics almost all the time is obvious. The puzzle is: what unleashes it? Today, while we may divde the world’s people into “us” and “them,” we know that there are thousands of types of “them,” all differing from each other as well as from us in language, appearance, and habits. To waste words on pointing this out seems silly: we all know it from books and television, and most of us also know it from firsthand experience of travel. It is hard to transfer ourselves back into the frame of mind prevailing throughout much of human history and already described in Chapter 13. Like chimpanzees, gorillas, and social carnivores, we lived in band territories. The known world wasmuch smaller and simpler than it is today: there were only a few known types fo “them,” one’s immediate neighbors. For example, in New Guinea until recently, each tribe maintained a shifting pattern of warfare and alliance with each of its neighbors. A person might enter the next valley on a friendly visit (never quite without danger) or on a war raid, but the chances of being able to traverse a sequence of several valleys in friendship were negligible. The powerful rules about treatment of one’s fellow “us” did not apply to “them,” those dimly understood, neighboring enemies. As I walked between New Guinea valleys, People who themselves practiced cannibalism and were only a decade out of the Stone Age routinely warned me about the unspeakably primitive, vile, and cannibalistic habits of the people whom I would encounter in the next valley. Even Al Capone’s gangs in twentieth-century Chicago made a policy of hiring out-of-town killers, so that the assassin could feel that he was killing one of “them” rather than of “us.” The writings of classical Greece reveal an extension of this tribal territorialism. The known world was larger and more diverse, but “us” Greeks were still distinguished from “them” barbarians. Our word “barbarian” is derived from the Greek barbaroi, which simply means non-Greek foreigners. Egyptians and Persians, whose level of civilization was like that of the Greeks, were nevertheless barbaroi. The ideal of conduct was not to treat all men equally, but instead to reward on’s friends and to punish one’s enemies. When the Athenian author Xenophon related how Cyrus always repaid his friends’ good turns more generously, and how Cyrus retaliated on his enemies’ misdeeds more severely (e.g., by gouging out their eyes or cutting off their hands). Like the Mungi and Scratching Rocks hyena clans, humans practiced a dual standard of behavior: strong inhibitions about killing one of “us,” but a green light to kill “them” when it was safe to do so. **Genocide** was acceptable under this **dichotomy** whether one considers the dichotomy as an inherited animal instinct or as a uniquely human ethical code.

**(-) Genocide causes nuclear war**

**Diamond, ’92 (The Third Chimponzee; 277)**

While our first association to the world “genocide” is likely to be the killings in Nazi concentration camps, those were not even the largest-scale genocide of this century. The Tasmanians and hundreds of other peoples were modern targets of successful smaller extermination campaigns. Numerous peoples scattered throughout the world are **potential targets** in the **near future.**  Yet genocide is such a painful subject that either we’d  **rather not think about it at all,** or else we’d like to believe that**nice people don’t commit genocide** only Nazis do. But **our refusal to think about it has consequences** we’ve **done little** to halt the **numerous episodes of genocide** since World War II, and we’re  **not alert**  to where it may happen next. Together with our destruction of our own environmental resources, our genocidal tendencies **coupled to nuclear weapons** now constitute the two most likely means by which the human species may reverse **all its progress virtually overnight.**

# Shining City Impacts: Gender Case Turns (K turns Gender Cases)

**Turn: the AFF’s discourse of victimage stifles the ability of women to operate as an agent of social change—**

**Harvard Law Review 2004** (May, “117 Harv. L. Rev. 2365”, “SAVING AMINA LAWAL: HUMAN RIGHTS SYMBOLISM AND THE DANGERS OF COLONIALISM” lexis)

**The costs of this focus on gender should concern human rights activists. Particularly because the bulk of human rights intervention is directed toward postcolonial or "Third World" states**, n15 **the suggestion of colonialism can polarize debate, generating backlash and silencing women living in these states**. Pressure from the international community may have had a positive impact on the outcome of Ms. Lawal's case; n16 nonetheless, many involved in her case were concerned about the effects of overenthusiastic international participation, particularly when such participation was tinged with religious or cultural criticism. n17 **When a particular class of people - in this case women - is continually and consistently used as the vehicle through which such criticism is lodged, that class is effectively prevented from participating in debates over social change. Women cannot speak out against injustices or rights violations in their countries without risking the label** [\*2368] **of culture-traitors, as their own opposition to practices and customs targeted by the Western or international human rights community will be interpreted as "siding with" the colonialist intervenors**. n18 **This silencing is troubling not only because it inhibits democratic participation, but also because it prevents women in postcolonial states from contributing important insights and creative alternatives stemming from their specific experiences.**

**Exclusive gender focus in human rights violations diverts attention from underlying causes of oppression:**

**Harvard Law Review 2004** (May, “117 Harv. L. Rev. 2365”, “SAVING AMINA LAWAL: HUMAN RIGHTS SYMBOLISM AND THE DANGERS OF COLONIALISM” lexis)

This single-minded focus on Ms. Lawal and other women accused of adultery and sentenced to stoning is alarming for two reasons. First, **focusing on this narrow category of crimes** to represent victims of Shari"a law in Nigeria **tends to cast the problem as a matter of gender** [\*2366] **inequality and sexual repression, simplifying and obscuring other complex issues affecting a variety of Nigerians.** This bias toward issues involving gender and sexuality ignores the breadth of Nigeria's Shari"a-related human rights violations: **Despite gender disparities in Islamic** substantive and procedural **law**, n8 **men have also been sentenced to death by stoning**. n9 People have already lost limbs under Nigeria's newly instituted Shari"a law as punishment for thefts of items worth less than one hundred dollars. n10 Yet in the West, knowledge of Shari"a in Nigeria for the most part remains limited to Ms. Lawal's case other cases involving women sentenced to hudud n11 punishments for unlawful intercourse. n12 The international public's understanding of and involvement in Nigeria's human rights problems are thus informed and shaped by this focus on the women-victims of Shari"a - indeed, their names have become shorthand for the problem. n13 Although gender oppression and sexual repression are important concerns regarding Shari"a law, **the larger conflict surrounding Islamic fundamentalism** in Nigeria **is much more complex, involving transitions** [\*2367] **from authoritarianism, power struggles among elites, popular concern over poverty and crime, and the weaknesses of a rapidly changing legal structure. The gender focus diverts attention from the underlying reasons for the increasing Islamization of northern Nigeria, and addressing these reasons may be more effective in stopping human rights abuses.**

# Shining City Impacts: Gender Case Turns (K turns Gender Cases)

**The cultural essentialism of the AFF discourse blocks the ability of women to demand social change from within:**

**Harvard Law Review 2004** (May, “117 Harv. L. Rev. 2365”, “SAVING AMINA LAWAL: HUMAN RIGHTS SYMBOLISM AND THE DANGERS OF COLONIALISM” lexis)

**This symbol-status has serious consequences for the ability of postcolonial women to demand social change from within**. Gayatri Chakravorty **Spivak demonstrates the silencing effect of colonialism's "civilizing mission"** and its linking of women with culture and nation through analysis of the resulting discourse. She constructs the sentence "white men are saving brown women from brown men" n69 and the nativist response "the women actually wanted to die" n70 to illustrate debates over sati-suicide, or widow sacrifice, in colonial India. **Through these opposing sentences, Spivak demonstrates how colonialism was posited as the "establisher of the good society" by rendering women into "objects of protection from [their] own kind**." n71 Spivak does not challenge the need to address sati-suicide and its potentially coercive effects; rather, she demonstrates how the ritual itself was constructed in British imperial discourse to symbolize the "bad Hindu ... given to savage atrocities." n72 In doing so, the British oversimplified a complicated and contested practice, which was neither universal nor culturally fixed. n73

**The AFF discourse justifies moral crusading while ignoring gender issues in our own country:**

**Harvard Law Review 2004** (May, “117 Harv. L. Rev. 2365”, “SAVING AMINA LAWAL: HUMAN RIGHTS SYMBOLISM AND THE DANGERS OF COLONIALISM” lexis)

The debate over the supposed conflict between "native culture" and "universal human rights" n57 - in which women's issues commingle with questions of nation and culture - originated in the colonial era, when European powers justified the colonial project as a "civilizing mission" whose tenets included the "saving" of colonized women from cultural oppression. n58 Leila Ahmed's examination of British colonialism in Egypt demonstrates the emergence of **a symbolism that positioned women as objects of colonial salvation in a Muslim state.** Ahmed [\*2374] writes that though **women's issues** were first linked with nationalism, national advancement, and cultural change by Egyptian scholars who sought to align domestic practices with European norms, n59 they **only became a centerpiece of the relationship between the West and Islam when Europeans began to colonize Muslim countries during the late nineteenth century**. n60 **As colonialist intervention increased, the protection of women as mothers and molders of children played an increasingly important role in the "moral crusade" or "civilizing mission" of colonialism**. n61 Thus feminism, an emerging ideology in European countries, became an important tool. **Even as colonial leaders suppressed the feminist movement "on the home front,**" n62 **they coopted the movement's language and redirected it toward "Other men and the cultures of Other men."** n63 **Over time, women came to symbolize culture: attacks on customs affecting women became a tool for demanding adherence to Western norms, and the language of "feminism" became suspect, as it fused in the colonial context with the project of Western domination**. n64

# Shining City Impacts: Gender Case Turns (K turns Gender Cases)

**The reinscription of colonialist narratives causes a nationalist backlash which undermines rights for women:**

**Harvard Law Review 2004** (May, “117 Harv. L. Rev. 2365”, “SAVING AMINA LAWAL: HUMAN RIGHTS SYMBOLISM AND THE DANGERS OF COLONIALISM” lexis)

The consequences of setting up Ms. Lawal and other women as symbols of the Shari"a debate in Nigeria are twofold. First, **in reinscribing the colonialist narrative regarding a postcolonial Islamic state, the symbolization of women creates the potential for nationalist backlash against the human rights project and its proponents,** particularly those who work from within Nigerian society. Second, **this potential backlash, combined with the representation of women as "objects" of an ideological contest, limits the space within which Nigerian women can actively participate in discussions about social change and gender equality**.

# Shining City Impacts: Genocide

**Colonialism is genocidal and results in extinction**

Robert **Porter, 1998** associate professor of law and Director of the Tribal Law and Government Center at the University of Kansas, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the Sac & Fox Nation of Kansas and Missouri, Member (Heron Clan) and former Attorney General of the Seneca Nation of Indians, Summer 1998, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, 31 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 899, p. 953-4

I do not mean to suggest that Indigenous people would not have changed in the absence of colonization. Inevitably, any society that does not evolve naturally by adapting to change will be unable to sustain itself and will run the risk of extinction. Indigenous societies, of course, are subject to these same fundamental rules, and even had there not been colonization of our lands, there likely would have been some form of change in our way of life. Nonetheless, this otherwise natural process was dramatically altered by colonization. These colonizing efforts were accomplished by force and often with great speed, producing dramatic changes within Indigenous societies and interfering with the natural process of adaptation and change. This disruption has had a genocidal effect; groups of Indigenous peoples that existed 500 years ago no longer exist. There should be no doubt that their extinction was not an accident - it was the product of a concerted effort to subjugate and eliminate the native human population in order to allow for the pursuit of wealth and manifest destiny. As a result, extinction is the most dramatic effect of colonization. Allowed to run its full course, colonization will disrupt and destroy the natural evolutionary process of the people being colonized to the point of extinction.

# Shining City Impacts: Intervention/Military Occupation

**The rhetoric of the “savage other” justifies warfare:**

Dana **Cloud, 2004** (prof. of rhetoric @ UT Austin). *Visual Rhetoric*. Book chapter, “To Veil the Threat of Terror.” Accessed via google books; pg. 394.

The phrase “clash of civilizations,” popular-ized in the l990s by Samuel Huntington refers to the idea that the United States and its people face an incontrovertible conflict with Others, particularly Islamic Others, whose civi-lizations are inferior and hostile to Western capi-talism. This rhetoric of the clash of societies destined by nature to be enemies is not a recent invention. however. David Spurr has argued that the idea of immutable clash between allegedly superior and inferior civilizations has been part of the rhetoric of U.S. imperialism since at least the end of the 19th century. He writes. "The colo-

nizer’s traditional insistence on difference from the colonized . . . establishes a notion of the sav-age as Other, the antithesis of civilized values."’ Likewise. rhetorical scholar **Robert Ivie has noted that justifications for war often involve representations of the "enemy" as savage and barbaric: “The usual strategy is to construct the image indirectly through contrasting references to the adver-sary's coercive, irrational, and aggressive attempts to subjugate a freedom-loving, rational, and pacific victim."** The discourse of enmity between “civilized” people and “savages” is not the only dimension of the rhetoric of civilization clash, however**. Images of the oppressed in an “inferior” civiliza-tion can prompt a patemalistic response along-side an aggressive one. Descriptions of the people of an enemy society as ignorant, abject victims of an enemy regime warrant intervention on the allegedly humanitarian grounds of saving people from themselves.** Thus, **the idea of the “white man's burden" is a core element in the belief in a clash between white, Western societies and infe-rior Others requiring policing and rescue.**

**Imageries of civilization clashes justify war—Afghanistan proves this:**

Dana **Cloud, 2004** (prof. of rhetoric @ UT Austin). *Visual Rhetoric*. Book chapter, “To Veil the Threat of Terror.” Accessed via google books; pg. 394.

This article is an attempt to answer the ques-tion, “What does the clash of civilizations look like?" This question is significant because **the imagery of civilization clash has long been as important as verbal political rhetoric in warrant-ing U.S. policies of war and occupation. Although the strategy of contrasting images of Others is not new to political discourse, it was prominent and influential in the political and cultural discourses justifying the 2001-2002 war with Afghanistan** that began after terrorist attacks on U.S. targets on September 11, 2001. This article explores the role of widely circu-lated images of Afghans, with emphasis on those of Afghan women, in national news mag-azines and their web sites during this war, argu-ing that images of Afghan women and men establish a binary opposition between a white, Westem. modem subject and an abject foreign object of surveillance and military action. **These images construct the viewer as a patemalistic savior of women and posit images of modem civilization against depictions of Afghanistan as backward and pre-modern. Through the con-struction of binary oppositions of self and Other, the evocation of a paternalistic stance toward the women of Afghanistan, and the figuration of modernity as liberation, these images participate in justifications for the war that belie the actual motives for the war.** This contradiction has a number of irnplications for democratic delibera-tion and public life during wartime. The main purpose of this article is to docu-ment the ways that the imagery of the war on terrorisrn justifies the imperial thrust of U.S. foreign policy. In addition, however, this study has implications for theory, criticism, and prac-tical politics. For rhetorical theory, this article extends the Idea of the visual ideograph intro-duced by Janis Edwards and Carol Winkler.” I argue below that visual ideographs are more than recurring iconic images that shift in mean-ing depending on context; they also index verbal ideographic slogans, making abstractions such as <clash of civilizations> concrete. For criti-cism. the essay defends what John Thompson calls “depth hemeneuctics,” seeking underlying truths veiled by a misleading ideological com-mon sense.'° Finally, for politics, the article exhorts readers to answer the real (rather than only the image of) clash of war with protest and solidarity across national borders.

# Shining City Impacts: Intervention/Military Occupation

**Feminist rhetoric can be used to justify military occupation—Afghanistan proves the link:**

**McKinley 2009** – Assistant Professor, University of Oregon School of Law, (Michelle A., Fall, “Cultural Culprits”, 24 Berkeley J. Gender L. & Just. 91, Lexis Law)

In sum, there are reasons to be both critical and supportive of the anti-FGM campaign. **There are other reasons to be hesitant about humanitarian hawks using feminist concerns to justify military occupation**. n358 **During a radio broadcast to the nation** on November 17, 2001, U.S. **First Lady Laura Bush claimed, "Because of our recent military gains in much of Afghanistan, women are no longer imprisoned in their homes. They can listen to music and teach their daughters without fear of punishment**... . **The fight against terrorism is also a fight for the rights and dignity of women.**" n359 **Cherrie Blair, wife of** British Prime Minister **Tony Blair, also portrayed the Afghan invasion in glowing,** though extremely flippant, **terms in her own public comments: "In Afghanistan if you wear nail polish, you could have your nails torn out... . The women in Afghanistan are entitled ... to have the same hopes and aspirations as ourselves and our daughters:** for good education, a career outside the home, if they want one; the right to health care, and, of course, most importantly, the right for their [\*164] voices to be heard." n360 **Certainly these are noble sentiments, but they do not truly express the objectives of the invasion and the installation of the Karzai government**. n361 As Lila Abu-Lughod has commented on the First Ladies' interviews:

**The logic of putting women in the victim’s role who need to be saved justifies military intervention: Afghanistan proves this is true:**

**Harvard Law Review 2004** (May, “117 Harv. L. Rev. 2365”, “SAVING AMINA LAWAL: HUMAN RIGHTS SYMBOLISM AND THE DANGERS OF COLONIALISM” lexis)

The debates over Shari"a in Nigeria suggest that **the human rights project's use of colonialist symbolism also extends to its use of women, who continue to occupy the "victim" position.** This is particularly true in the case of the human rights response to Islamic fundamentalism, in which women serve as both the "litmus test" for the validity of religious traditions and the "bearers of [Muslim] norms and values." n95 [\*2380] **The focus on women - a focus that is not arbitrary, but derives from a history of colonialism and resistance - reduces the debate into one of cultural compatibility or defense against cultural imperialism**. The Islamic fundamentalist movements that are often the target of human rights criticism are not primarily religious or cultural organizations, but political ones. When the Taliban imposed restrictions on women, they were not merely applying a "fundamental," or even "textualist" Islamic law; n96 they were also pursuing a political and social agenda developed through years of instability, violence, and poverty. n97 Similarly, **when the U.S. government used the language of "saving" women as one of the justifications for its military intervention in Afghanistan,** n98 **it elided the complex political reality of which gender disparity is only one aspect. More importantly, it reduced the discussion to an adversarial cultural struggle, in which anything but concession is seen as resistance.**

# Shining City Impacts: Intervention/Military Occupation

**The logical conclusion of the otherization dichotomy is a missionary zeal to get involved to help others:**

Makau **Mutua, 2001** (Professor of Law and Director, Human Rights Center, SUNY). “Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights.” Harvard International Law Journal. Winter, 2001. Accessed Sept. 10, 2010, Lexis/Nexis.

**The view that the "native" is weak, powerless**, prone to laziness, **and unable** on ~~his~~ own **to create the conditions for** ~~his~~ **development was a recurrent theme in Western representations of the "other."** Early in the life of the organization, an International Labor Organization report concluded, for example, that indigenous peoples could not by themselves overcome their "back-wardness." It noted, "It is now almost universally recognized that, left to their own resources, indigenous peoples would have difficulty in overcoming their inferior economic and social situation which inevitably leaves them open for exploitation." n129 **In the culture of the human rights movement, whose center is in the West, there is a belief that human rights problems afflict people "over there" and not people "like us." The missionary zeal to help those who cannot help themselves is one of the logical conclusions of this attitude.**

# Shining City Impacts: Intervention/Military Occupation = Extinction

**Continued militarism guarantees extinction**

Kevin **Clements**, President of the **International Peace Research Association**, Director of the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason, April 3, **1996**, Toda Institute Seminar, “The Future of Peace and Conflict Studies,” http://www.toda.org/Default.aspx?PageID=39

What I am suggesting by all of this is that peace and conflict studies in the past have been overwhelmingly biased by sets of Western middle class concerns. (I could also add white, male, reformist concerns.) This is not of itself a bad thing since it did result in the evolutionary of a new interdisciplinary field albeit around a rather narrow range of critical problems, e.g., analysis of the conditions for negative peace (or the absence of war and direct violence) or positive peace (the elimination of structural violence and the promotion of social and economic justice and fairness.) Both of these preoccupations, i.e., the causes of war and violence and the conditions for peace and justice remain at the heart of peace and conflict studies but they need to be broadened if we are to make a significant contribution to the survival of the species and if we are to develop a deepened enhancement of the quality of life for all peoples. So how do we wish to do this? In the first place we must build on the traditions that have been established in the field in order to eliminate militarism, national and global violent conflict and the threat of global destruction. In relation to nuclear weapons, for example, although the risk of nuclear confrontation has diminished considerably, there is continuing anxiety about the command and control of such weapons in Russia and far too many states that wish to cross the nuclear threshold to enhance their international bargaining power, e. g., Pakistan, India, Iran, and Iraq, etc. Generally, however, as the recently formed Canberra Commission notes, this is an opportune time to push for the total abolition of nuclear weapons and all weapons of mass destruction. They have no military utility and are increasingly seen as a political liability as well.

# Shining City Impacts: Plans Will Increase Cultural Persecution

**The courtroom will reinforce cultural persecution in these cases:**

**McKinley 2009** – Assistant Professor, University of Oregon School of Law, (Michelle A., Fall, “Cultural Culprits”, 24 Berkeley J. Gender L. & Just. 91, Lexis Law)

**A strikingly similar level of objectification occurs in the courtroom during cultural persecution and cultural defense cases. Adem's trial court proceedings in fact begin with an introduction to the dysfunctional African family with the painstaking process of the court reporter and judge trying to pronounce and spell their impossible last names and places and countries of birth.** When examining Fortunate Adem, the prosecutor asked: "For those of us who don't know our world geography ... maybe you can help up us. South Africa is on - that's a country; correct? And it is part of a continent? What is the name of the continent? So the big continent has South Africa as one of its countries." n98 Ms. Adem dutifully illuminated the prosecutor's geographic knowledge of Africa and identified her tribal affiliation as Sulu [sic]. When ascertaining the Adems' marital status, the prosecutor asked the defendant if it was true that he went "down there to Ethiopia with a bunch of women to get married to Fortunate." n99

# Shining City Impacts: Racism

**The savage-victim-savior dichotomy re-entrenches racial hierarchies in international human rights:**

Makau **Mutua, 2001** (Professor of Law and Director, Human Rights Center, SUNY). “Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights.” Harvard International Law Journal. Winter, 2001. Accessed Sept. 10, 2010, Lexis/Nexis.

The fifth flaw concerns the role of race in the development of the human rights narrative. **The SVS metaphor of human rights carries racial connotations in which the international hierarchy of race and color is reintrenched and revitalized. The metaphor is in fact necessary for the continuation of the global racial hierarchy. In the human rights narrative, savages and victims are generally non-white and non-Western, while the saviors are white. This old truism has found new life in the metaphor of human rights. But there is also a sense in which human rights can be seen as a project for the redemption** [\*208] **of the redeemers, in which whites who are privileged globally as a people--who have historically visited untold suffering and savage atrocities against non-whites--redeem themselves by "defending" and "civilizing" "lower," "unfortunate," and "inferior" peoples. The metaphor is thus laced with the pathology of self-redemption.**

# Shining City Impacts: Turns the Female Genital Operations Case

**Depictions of the savage-victim-savior in the context of female genital operations undermine efforts to eliminate the practice—we must see women in other nations as being agents of social change and not victims to be pitied:**

Christine J. **Walley, 1997** (New York University). Searching for "Voices": Feminism, Anthropology, and the Global Debate over Female Genital Operations. Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Aug., 1997), pp. 405-438. Accessed Sept. 5, 2010 on JSTOR.

Conclusion: Who Speaks? **Soon after the opening of the film Warrior Marks** (1993), **an op-ed piece appeared in the New York Times written by two African professional women,** Seble Dawit and Salem Mekuria, **with the named support of six others, all of whom oppose and have been working to abolish female genital operations. They wrote, We take great exception to the recent Western focus on female genital mutilation in Africa,** most notably by the author Alice Walker. **Ms. Walker's new film** "Warrior Marks" **portrays an African village where women and children are without personality, dancing and gazing blankly through some stranger's script** of their lives. The respected elder women of the village's Secret Society turn into slit-eyed murderers wielding rusted weapons with which to butcher children. **As is common in Western depictions of Africa, Ms. Walker and her collaborator**, Pratibha Parmar, **portray the continent as a monolith, African women and children are the props, and the village the background against which Alice Walker, heroine-savior, comes to articulate their pain and condemn those who inflict it.** Like Ms. Walker's novel "Possessing the Secret of Joy," **this film is emblematic of the Western feminist tendency to see female genital mutilation as the gender oppression to end all oppressions. Instead of being an issue worthy of attention in itself, it has become a powerfully emotive lens through which to view personal pain-a gauge by which to measure distance between the West and the rest of humanity.** [1993] They concluded by noting: Neither Alice Walker nor any of us here can speak for them [African women on the continent]; but if we have the power and the resources, we can create the room for them to speak, and to speak with us as well.

# Shining City Impacts: Turns the Case

**(--) Military interventions turns the case—it feeds a crisis mentality that prevents solutions to underlying rights violations:**

Karen **Engle, 2007** (Professor in Law @ University of Texas). “"Calling in the Troops": The Uneasy Relationship Among Women's Rights, Human Rights, and Humanitarian Intervention.” Harvard Human Rights Journal, Spring 2007. Accessed Sept. 9, 2010, Lexis Academic Universe

I am critical of this emerging consensus because **I am uneasy with the idea that destroying life and infrastructure is a way to demonstrate concern for a particular place or situation, especially when most of history has shown that such intervention**--regardless of motivation--**rarely improves the lives of the individuals who are the stated subjects of intervention**. More importantly for this Article, **I object to the way that calls for military intervention feed into a crisis mentality. As military intervention increasingly becomes the norm for protecting victims of "serious" human rights violations, those who seek to redress a particular problem are increasingly pressured to couch it in terms of a crisis that only immediate military intervention can resolve. This focus often distorts the nature of the violation or harm and displaces an awareness of the extent to which both military and nonmilitary interventions--such as colonialism, economic and military assistance, and lack of such assistance--have helped produce the crises. International law itself has condoned, if not facilitated, such crisis-generating interventions**. n3

**(--) The discourse of “saving” women in other nations deflects attention from solving structural root causes of the violence they indict—we must be vigilant in rejecting this rhetoric:**

Lila Abu-**Lughod, 2002** (Dept. of Anthropology, Columbia University). “Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving? Anthropological Reflections on Cultural Relativism and Its Others” American Anthropologist, Vol. 104, No. 3 (Sep., 2002), pp. 783-790, accessed via JSTOR

**How should we manage the complicated politics and ethics of finding ourselves in agreement with those with whom we normally disagree? I do not know how many feminists who felt good about saving Afghan women from the Taliban are also asking for a global redistribution of wealth or contemplating sacrificing their own consumption radically so that African or Afghan women could have some chance of having what I do believe should be a universal human right-the right to freedom from the structural violence of global inequality and from the ravages of war, the everyday rights of having enough to eat**, having homes for their families in which to live and thrive, having ways to make decent livings so their children can grow, and having the strength and security to work out, within their communities and with whatever alliances they want, how to live a good life, which might very well include changing the ways those communities are organized. Suspicion about bedfellows is only a first step; it will not give us a way to think more positively about what to do or where to stand. For that, **we need to confront two more big issues. First is the acceptance of the possibility of difference. Can we only free Afghan women to be like us or might we have to recognize that even after "liberation" from the Taliban, they might want different things than we would want for them?** What do we do about that? **Second, we need to be vigilant about the rhetoric of saving people because of what it implies about our attitudes**. Again, when I talk about accepting difference, I am not implying that we should resign ourselves to being cultural relativists who respect whatever goes on elsewhere as "just their culture." I have already discussed the dangers of "cultural" explanations; "their" cultures are just as much part of history and an interconnected world as ours are. **What I am advocating is the hard work involved in recognizing and respecting differences-precisely as products of different histories, as expressions of different circumstances, and as manifestations of differently structured desires. We may want justice for women, but can we accept that there might be different ideas about justice and that different women might want, or choose, different futures from what we envision as best** (see Ong 1988)? We must consider that they might be called to personhood, so to speak, in a different language.

# Shining City Impacts: Turns the Case

**(--) Isolating human rights violations as only belonging to other cultures prevents human rights progress in other nations—blocking the universal consensus on human rights:**

Makau **Mutua, 2001** (Professor of Law and Director, Human Rights Center, SUNY). “Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights.” Harvard International Law Journal. Winter, 2001. Accessed Sept. 10, 2010, Lexis/Nexis.

Fourth, **the issue of power is largely ignored in the human rights corpus**. There is an urgent need for a human rights movement that is multicultural, inclusive, and deeply political. Thus, **while it is essential that a new human rights movement overcome Eurocentrism, it is equally important that it also address deeply lopsided power relations among and within cultures, national economies, states, genders, religions, races and ethnic groups**, and other societal cleavages. **Such a movement cannot treat Eurocentrism as the starting point and other cultures as peripheral.** The point of departure for the movement must be a basic assumption about the moral equivalency of all cultures. Francis **Deng has correctly pointed out that to "arrogate the concept [of human rights] to only certain groups, cultures, or civilizations is to aggravate divisiveness on the issue, to encourage defensiveness or unwarranted self-justification on the part of the excluded, and to impede progress toward a universal consensus on human rights.**" n26

**(--) Continuing the ideology of the shining city prevents human rights successes globally:**

Makau **Mutua, 2001** (Professor of Law and Director, Human Rights Center, SUNY). “Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights.” Harvard International Law Journal. Winter, 2001. Accessed Sept. 10, 2010, Lexis/Nexis.

**As currently constituted** and deployed, **the human rights movement will ultimately fail because it is perceived as an alien ideology in non-Western societies. The movement does not deeply resonate in the cultural fabrics of non-Western states, except among hypocritical elites steeped in Western ideas. In order ultimately to prevail, the human rights movement must be moored in the cultures of all peoples.**

**(--) The humanitarian impulse to provide asylum exacerbates geopolitical tensions that drive refugee flows—turning the case:**

**McKinley 2009** – Assistant Professor, University of Oregon School of Law, (Michelle A., Fall, “Cultural Culprits”, 24 Berkeley J. Gender L. & Just. 91, Lexis Law)

In closing, I urge those concerned with the long term implications of raising the culture flag to consider the rejuvenation of Kant's call for cosmopolitan "hospitality": n363 an unconditional extension of safe haven with possibilities for respectful dialogue about contested notions of culture without requiring acceptance or conversion to any particular side. n364 This would not require a retreat from impassioned advocacy. It would nonetheless acknowledge that **the humanitarian imperative to provide asylum is cheapened through realist deals that demand cultural condemnation, and in the long run, exacerbate geopolitical tensions that drive refugee flows. Although lawyers, anthropologists, feminist critics, and post-colonial critics disagree on the more insidious effects of essentialism and the persecutory nature of genital cutting, we converge on the rights of all to safe haven and hospitality,** in the Kantian sense [\*165] of the word. **Hopefully, we can use our points of convergence to work toward consensus on the greater harms of cultural condemnation.**

# Shining City Impacts: Us-Them Dichotomies

**The savage-victim-savior metaphor creates us-them dichotomies of good versus evil:**

Makau **Mutua, 2001** (Professor of Law and Director, Human Rights Center, SUNY). “Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights.” Harvard International Law Journal. Winter, 2001. Accessed Sept. 10, 2010, Lexis/Nexis.

**The human rights movement** n1 **is marked by a damning metaphor. The grand narrative of human rights contains a subtext that depicts an epochal contest pitting savages, on the one hand, against victims and saviors, on the other**. n2 The savages-victims-saviors (SVS) n3 construction is a three-dimensional [\*202] compound metaphor in which each dimension is a metaphor in itself. n4 **The main authors of the human rights discourse**, n5 **including** the United Nations, **Western states**, international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), n6 and senior Western academics, **constructed this three-dimensional prism. This rendering of the human rights corpus and its discourse is unidirectional and predictable, a black-and-white construction that pits good against evil.**

**(-) Otherization causes genocide**

Diamond, ’92 (The Third Chimponzee; pg. 298-299)

That our urge to kill is restrained by our ethics almost all the time is obvious. The puzzle is: what unleashes it? Today, while we may divde the world’s people into “us” and “them,” we know that there are thousands of types of “them,” all differing from each other as well as from us in language, appearance, and habits. To waste words on pointing this out seems silly: we all know it from books and television, and most of us also know it from firsthand experience of travel. It is hard to transfer ourselves back into the frame of mind prevailing throughout much of human history and already described in Chapter 13. Like chimpanzees, gorillas, and social carnivores, we lived in band territories. The known world wasmuch smaller and simpler than it is today: there were only a few known types fo “them,” one’s immediate neighbors. For example, in New Guinea until recently, each tribe maintained a shifting pattern of warfare and alliance with each of its neighbors. A person might enter the next valley on a friendly visit (never quite without danger) or on a war raid, but the chances of being able to traverse a sequence of several valleys in friendship were negligible. The powerful rules about treatment of one’s fellow “us” did not apply to “them,” those dimly understood, neighboring enemies. As I walked between New Guinea valleys, People who themselves practiced cannibalism and were only a decade out of the Stone Age routinely warned me about the unspeakably primitive, vile, and cannibalistic habits of the people whom I would encounter in the next valley. Even Al Capone’s gangs in twentieth-century Chicago made a policy of hiring out-of-town killers, so that the assassin could feel that he was killing one of “them” rather than of “us.” The writings of classical Greece reveal an extension of this tribal territorialism. The known world was larger and more diverse, but “us” Greeks were still distinguished from “them” barbarians. Our word “barbarian” is derived from the Greek barbaroi, which simply means non-Greek foreigners. Egyptians and Persians, whose level of civilization was like that of the Greeks, were nevertheless barbaroi. The ideal of conduct was not to treat all men equally, but instead to reward on’s friends and to punish one’s enemies. When the Athenian author Xenophon related how Cyrus always repaid his friends’ good turns more generously, and how Cyrus retaliated on his enemies’ misdeeds more severely (e.g., by gouging out their eyes or cutting off their hands). Like the Mungi and Scratching Rocks hyena clans, humans practiced a dual standard of behavior: strong inhibitions about killing one of “us,” but a **green light to kill “them”** when it was safe to do so. **Genocide** was acceptable under this **dichotomy** whether one considers the dichotomy as an inherited animal instinct or as a uniquely human ethical code.

**(-) Genocide causes nuclear war**

**Diamond, ’92 (The Third Chimponzee; 277)**

While our first association to the world “genocide” is likely to be the killings in Nazi concentration camps, those were not even the largest-scale genocide of this century. The Tasmanians and hundreds of other peoples were modern targets of successful smaller extermination campaigns. Numerous peoples scattered throughout the world are **potential targets** in the **near future.**  Yet genocide is such a painful subject that either we’d  **rather not think about it at all,** or else we’d like to believe that**nice people don’t commit genocide** only Nazis do. But **our refusal to think about it has consequences** we’ve **done little** to halt the **numerous episodes of genocide** since World War II, and we’re  **not alert**  to where it may happen next. Together with our destruction of our own environmental resources, our genocidal tendencies **coupled to nuclear weapons** now constitute the two most likely means by which the human species may reverse **all its progress virtually overnight.**

# Shining City Impacts: War turns the case

**(--) War destroys women’s rights**

**Marshall, 2004 founder of the feminist peace network, 04**

(Lucinda Marshall Founder of the Feminist Peace Network, Feminist Writer and Activist, 12-18-04

“Unacceptable: The Impact of War on Women and Children” http://www.commondreams.org/views04/1219-26.htm)

Women and children account for almost 80% of the casualties of conflict and war as well as 80% of the 40 million people in world who are now refugees from their homes. It is one of the unspoken facts of militarism that women often become the spoils of war, their deaths are considered collateral damage and their bodies are frequently used as battlegrounds and as commodities that can be traded. "Women and girls are not just killed, they are raped, sexually attacked, mutilated and humiliated. Custom, culture and religion have built an image of women as bearing the 'honour' of their communities. Disparaging a woman's sexuality and destroying her physical integrity have become a means by which to terrorize, demean and 'defeat' entire communities, as well as to punish, intimidate and humiliate women," according to Irene Khan of Amnesty International. Sexual violence as a tool of war has left hundreds of thousands of women raped, brutalized, impregnated and infected with HIV/AIDS. And hundreds of thousands of women are trafficked annually for forced labor and sexual slavery. Much of this trafficking is to service western troops in brothels near military bases. Even women serving in the military are subjected to sexual violence. U.S. servicewomen have reported hundreds of assaults in military academies and while serving on active duty. The perpetrators of these assaults have rarely been prosecuted or punished. The impact of war on children is also profound. In the last decade, two million of our children have been killed in wars and conflicts. 4.5 million children have been disabled and 12 million have been left homeless. Today there are 300,000 child soldiers, including many girls who are forced to 'service' the troops.

**(--) War restricts women’s freedom and suppresses their basic human rights**

**Abeyesekera, 2003** director of a humans rights organization, 03

(Sunila Abeyesekera, director of Inform, a Sri Lankan human rights organization 02-03

http://www.awid.org/eng/Issues-and-Analysis/Library/A-Women-s-Human-Rights-Perspective-on-War-and-Conflict)

At the same time, wars and conflicts have led to a host of negative consequences for unarmed women civilians and dependent family members, children, the old and the infirm. Figures worldwide point to the fact that the majority of refugees and internally displaced persons are female. The erosion of democratic space that often accompanies conflict and war also propel women into a more active role in political and social life. In moments when men and male-dominated traditional political and social formations, such as political parties and trade unions, are reluctant or unable to come forward in defense of human rights and democratic principles, groups of women have had the courage to stand up to the armed might of both state and non-state actors. War and conflict also push women into decision-making positions in their families and communities, in particular in the role of head of household. Most conflicts and wars emerge out of processes of identity formation in which competing identity groups and communities resort to violence to affirm their equal status in society. Given this dynamic, conflict and war situations result in the heightening of all forms of conservatism and extremism including religious fundamentalism, ultra-nationalism and ethnic and linguistic chauvinism. The hardening of identity-based roles ascribed to men and women within the community that happen as a part of this process often has disastrous consequences for women. It restricts their mobility and freedom, imposes dress codes, confines them to the domestic sphere, brings them under the rigid control of male members of the family and the community and, most critically, places them in the role of 'bearers of the community's honour' and traditions. Thus, the rape and violation of the women of the 'enemy' community becomes a critical military strategy in all identity-based wars and conflict.

# Shining City Impacts: Zones of Exclusion

**(--) The savage depictions of other nations leave them outside the realm of political democracy:**

Makau **Mutua, 2001** (Professor of Law and Director, Human Rights Center, SUNY). “Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights.” Harvard International Law Journal. Winter, 2001. Accessed Sept. 10, 2010, Lexis/Nexis.

Second, **the SVS metaphor and narrative rejects the cross-contamination** n17 **of cultures and instead promotes a Eurocentric ideal. The metaphor is premised on the transformation by Western cultures of non-Western cultures into a Eurocentric prototype and not the fashioning of a multicultural mosaic.** n18 **The SVS metaphor results in an "othering" process that imagines the creation of inferior clones, in effect dumb copies of the original**. For example, Western political democracy is in effect an organic element of human rights. n19 "**Savage" cultures and peoples are seen as lying outside the human rights orbit, and by implication, outside the regime of political democracy. It is this distance from human rights that allows certain cultures to create victims**. Political democracy is then viewed as a panacea. Other textual examples anchored in the treatment of cultural phenomena, such as "traditional" practices that appear to negate the equal protection for women, also illustrate the gulf between human rights and non-liberal, non-European cultures.

**(--) Zones of exclusion deny the value to life in their framework:**

Agamben 98 **(Giorgio, professor of philosophy at university of Verona, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, pg. 139-140)**

3.3. It is not our intention here to take a position on the difficult ethical problem of euthanasia, which still today, in certain coun­tries, occupies a substantial position in medical debates and pro­vokes disagreement. Nor are we concerned with the radicaliry with which Binding declares himself in favor of the general admissibility of euthanasia. More interesting for our inquiry is the fact that the **sovereignty** of the living man over his own life **has its immediate counterpart in the determination of a threshold beyond which life ceases to have any juridical value and can, therefore, be killed without the commission of a homicide. The new juridical category of “life devoid of value**” (or “life unworthy of being lived”) **corre­sponds exactly**—even if in an apparently different direction—**to the bare life of homo sacer and can easily be extended beyond the limits imagined by Binding. It is as if every valorization and every “politicization” of life** (which, after all, is implicit in the sovereignty of the individual over his own existence) **necessarily implies a new decision concerning the threshold beyond which life ceases to be politically relevant, becomes only “sacred life,” and can as such be eliminated without punishment**. Every society sets this limit; every society—even the most modern—decides who its “sacred men” will be. It is even pos­sible that this limit, on which the politicization and the *exceprio* of natural life in the juridical order of the state depends, has done nothing but extend itself in the history of the West and has now— **in the new biopolitical horizon of states with national sovereignty—moved inside every human life and every citizen. Bare life is no longer confined to a particular place or a definite category. It now dwells in the biological body of every living being.**

**(--) The AFF discourse creates a zone of exclusion around so called savage nations:**

Makau **Mutua, 2001** (Professor of Law and Director, Human Rights Center, SUNY). “Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights.” Harvard International Law Journal. Winter, 2001. Accessed Sept. 10, 2010, Lexis/Nexis.

Using political democracy as one medium through which the human rights culture is conveyed, one is able to capture the imperial project at work. First, **the choice of a political ideology that is necessary for human rights is an exclusionary act**. Thus, **cultures that fall outside that ideological box immediately wear the label of the savage.** To be redeemed from their culture and history, which may be thousands of years old, a people must then deny themselves or continue to churn out victims. **The savior in this case becomes the norms of democratic governments,** however those are transmitted or imposed on the offending cultures. Institutions and other media--both those that purport to have a universalist warrant and those that are the obvious instruments of a particular nation's foreign policy and its interests--are critical to the realization of the grand script and metaphor of human rights explored in this Article. However, **the imposition of the current dogma of human rights on non-European societies contradicts conceptions of human dignity and rejects the contributions of other cultures in efforts to create a universal corpus of human rights. Proponents of human rights should first accept the limitations of working within the metaphor. Then they must reject it and seek a truly universal platform.**

# Shining City - Role of the Ballot

**The judge should view the debate as a will to power—that we are speaking not only for others but for ourselves—and evaluate the consequences of such discourse:**

Karen **Engle, 2007** (Professor in Law @ University of Texas). “"Calling in the Troops": The Uneasy Relationship Among Women's Rights, Human Rights, and Humanitarian Intervention.” Harvard Human Rights Journal, Spring 2007. Accessed Sept. 9, 2010, Lexis Academic Universe

[\*226] **Human rights non-governmental and intergovernmental organizations** (both feminist and non-feminist) have played an important role in providing such "reliable and concrete" information. In doing so, they have exercised significant power in producing public sympathy for particular causes. Increasingly in the past decade, in attempting to convince "key media and political elites" that "horrors are really taking place," human rights activists **have begun to name those horrors in ways they believe would most likely justify military intervention. And at what cost?** In his book The Dark Side of Virtue, David **Kennedy urges humanitarians to recognize their own will to power--to acknowledge that they are not only speaking for them but for us, and that there are significant costs to doing so**. n159 **I would urge feminist humanitarians to do the same**. At least some feminists, as Janet Halley has put it, have been involved in a project of governance. n160 **In the context of military intervention, I hope to have demonstrated how they have not only aligned with, but strengthened, the positions of human rights hawks.**

# Shining City AT: Our Intent is Good

**Intent is irrelevant: images of third world women in need of “saving” justify Western intervention:**

**Harvard Law Review 2004** (May, “117 Harv. L. Rev. 2365”, “SAVING AMINA LAWAL: HUMAN RIGHTS SYMBOLISM AND THE DANGERS OF COLONIALISM” lexis)

**The use of the term "third world women" in this manner was not necessarily intended as a colonizing move**. Because this image has currency with the international public, it can be useful for drumming up support for individual women's causes. Consider the media images of Ms. Lawal, who is depicted with downcast eyes, swathed in her veil, baby in tow, silent, in need of "saving." n84 An exuberant, smiling, powerful woman probably would have made for a less effective campaign photo. More importantly, **the victim rhetoric was intended to be a solution to the problem of creating solidarity among women across national and cultural lines - serving as a "common foundation" for an international feminism in which Western, or "First World," women could ally themselves with their third world counterparts**. n85 **Regardless of intent, such images remain problematic in that they uncritically reinscribe colonialist images into the discussions of postcolonial culture. And in fact, this depiction of postcolonial women contributes to a repetition of the colonialist construction of women as justifications for Western intervention. The "common foundation" quickly becomes "salvation" when, as is often the case, these images of powerless "third world women" are juxtaposed with self-representations of "First World" women as educated, modern, and liberated** [\*2378] **politically as well as sexually.** n86 **In this comparison, Western feminists alone become the "true subjects" of the feminist counterhistory, capable of action and resistance, while "third world women" remain the objects that justify Western feminist intervention**. n87 Spivak's sentence has changed, but not in its essence; "brown women" are still being saved, albeit now by white (or First World) women.

# Shining City AT: US Won’t Militarily Intervene

**(--) The call for military intervention to solve human rights disasters unites Americans from across the political spectrum:**

Karen **Engle, 2007** (Professor in Law @ University of Texas). “"Calling in the Troops": The Uneasy Relationship Among Women's Rights, Human Rights, and Humanitarian Intervention.” Harvard Human Rights Journal, Spring 2007. Accessed Sept. 9, 2010, Lexis Academic Universe

n28 **This enthusiasm for military intervention mirrors the views of policymakers and foreign policy experts in the West more generally**. As David Rieff explains: The enthusiasm in the U.S. Congress during the summer of 2004 to declare that the ethnic cleansing in the western Sudanese region of Darfur constituted genocide in the legal sense of the term; the demand by candidate John Kerry that President Bush go to the UN and help organize a humanitarian military intervention; the support that these demands received in much of Europe; the offer by both Britain and Australia to commit troops to any "humanitarian" deployment: all of these things testified to the extent to which faith in the idea of imposing human rights or alleviating humanitarian suffering norms at the point of a gun remained a powerful and compelling idea. DAVID RIEFF, AT THE POINT OF A GUN: DEMOCRATIC DREAMS AND ARMED INTERVENTION 3 (2006). Indeed, the central argument of Rieff's book is that "**the tendency [toward using force to ensure the prevention of "humanitarian or human rights disasters"] is so widespread that it unites American neoconservatives and human rights activists, humanitarian relief groups and civilian planners in the Pentagon."** Id. at 5.

**(--) Both conservatives and liberals now consider military intervention to be a reasonable response to human rights violations:**

Karen **Engle, 2007** (Professor in Law @ University of Texas). “"Calling in the Troops": The Uneasy Relationship Among Women's Rights, Human Rights, and Humanitarian Intervention.” Harvard Human Rights Journal, Spring 2007. Accessed Sept. 9, 2010, Lexis Academic Universe

In the spring of 1988, the Harvard Human Rights Yearbook (as it was then called) was about to publish its first volume. I was a second-year law student, and decided to write my third-year paper on women's human rights. I recall my advisor, Duncan Kennedy, asking me whether I believed that the concerns about women I hoped to see addressed internationally warranted "calling in the troops." He was not, of course, proposing that we call in the troops for anything, but I gather he was pushing me to articulate the extent to which I considered violations against women to be serious, and to be precise about how I believed they should be addressed. The question challenged me on a number of levels. The cultural feminist in me at the time wondered whether it would be a "victory" for feminism if troops were called in on women's behalf. The recovering pacifist in me was curious whether, if I resisted the desire to send in soldiers, I would be suggesting that women's rights were not human rights. The human rights student in me knew that there were many ways to respond to human rights violations without military intervention. Indeed, few human rights activists seemed to be talking about using military force to respond to human rights violations against anyone, male or female. **International human rights law and discourse have changed markedly** since I wrote my third-year paper. As the Harvard Human Rights Journal celebrates its twentieth anniversary, **women's rights have become largely accepted as human rights, and military humanitarian intervention** n1 **has become** [\*190] **a response to certain human rights violations increasingly accepted and advocated by both conservatives and liberals. Conservatives have begun to use the discourse of human rights, even women's rights, to justify their calls for intervention, and liberals have begun to use military discourse and rhetoric to support their commitment to human rights**. The U.S. intervention in Afghanistan provides an example of the first trend, while calls for military intervention in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina by those who call themselves "human rights hawks" offer an example of the latter.

# Shining City AT: US Won’t Militarily Intervene

**(--) More evidence…there is now an emerging consensus in favor of military intervention to solve human rights violations:**

Karen **Engle, 2007** (Professor in Law @ University of Texas). “"Calling in the Troops": The Uneasy Relationship Among Women's Rights, Human Rights, and Humanitarian Intervention.” Harvard Human Rights Journal, Spring 2007. Accessed Sept. 9, 2010, Lexis Academic Universe

In this Article, I explore these changes in human rights law and discourse and suggest that **feminists have participated in, even contributed to, the shift in discourse on both the right and the left. For the most part, for example, women's rights advocates opposed neither the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan nor the use of women's human rights to justify the invasion**. n2 Moreover, **some of the women's rights advocates who sought intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina to respond to what they considered "genocidal rape" hoped to appeal to conservative hawks as well as liberal human rights advocates. Both of these appeals to or support for military force to respond to women's rights in the 1990s participated in the development of an emerging consensus on humanitarian intervention.**

**(--) Human rights organizations increasingly support military intervention:**

Karen **Engle, 2007** (Professor in Law @ University of Texas). “"Calling in the Troops": The Uneasy Relationship Among Women's Rights, Human Rights, and Humanitarian Intervention.” Harvard Human Rights Journal, Spring 2007. Accessed Sept. 9, 2010, Lexis Academic Universe

**The past two decades have also seen changes in the attitude toward using force to respond to human rights violations. While "humanitarian purposes" (including saving women) have long been used to justify colonialism and other interventions, today's human rights NGOs, intergovernmental organizations, and scholars increasingly support military intervention**. At the very least, there seems to be a growing consensus that **there is an emerging norm of military intervention in instances of genocide, ethnic cleansing, and systematic human rights abuses.** The Journal's table of contents over the years is somewhat representative of the trend.

**(--) An emerging consensus supports military intervention to respond to human rights violations:**

Karen **Engle, 2007** (Professor in Law @ University of Texas). “"Calling in the Troops": The Uneasy Relationship Among Women's Rights, Human Rights, and Humanitarian Intervention.” Harvard Human Rights Journal, Spring 2007. Accessed Sept. 9, 2010, Lexis Academic Universe

**This increasing support for forceful humanitarian intervention has pressured some warring factions and their advocates to argue that opponents are committing atrocities worthy of intervention**. n31 **Humanitarian intervention**--which has long relied on neutrality for its legitimacy n32--**is often proposed or encouraged by those who would like to see assistance given to one side of a conflict**. n33 **Today, such claims are buttressed by an emerging consensus among states and many NGOs that such intervention is justified, if not required**, under R2P. The next Part will discuss the various justifications states and NGOs alike offer for humanitarian intervention. The remainder of this Part will describe how the consensus has emerged that, at least in principle, military intervention may be considered a legitimate response to human rights violations.

# Shining City AT: US Won’t Militarily Intervene

**(--) Feminists have increasingly called for military intervention to protect women’s rights:**

Karen **Engle, 2007** (Professor in Law @ University of Texas). “"Calling in the Troops": The Uneasy Relationship Among Women's Rights, Human Rights, and Humanitarian Intervention.” Harvard Human Rights Journal, Spring 2007. Accessed Sept. 9, 2010, Lexis Academic Universe

**MacKinnon's Women's September 11th,** for example, **relates attacks on women to acts of terrorism and gross human rights violations to indicate a crisis in need of immediate response. Noting a trend in the increase of calls for military intervention**, n123 **she proposes that the treatment of women "be injected into all levels of discussion of humanitarian intervention** . . . ." n124 In particular, **she suggests that the U.N. Security Council consider using Chapter VII to respond militarily to** certain **systematic** forms of **violence** [\*218] **against women.** **MacKinnon argues that as long as the United States and the "international community" are rethinking justifications for humanitarian intervention** and are willing to intervene to respond to actions by private actors against private actors, **they should rethink when and how to intervene to protect women from multiple forms of violence**. She focuses in particular on what she calls "brutal systematic violence against women." n125 Her article oscillates between pointing to the hypocrisy of the United States and the U.N. more generally--**arguing that international legal response on behalf of private actors is accepted when men's security is at risk**--**and suggesting calling in the troops to protect women,** assuming that these troops do not further abuse women. n126 As suggested above, I believe that MacKinnon overstates the extent to which the "international community" accepts terrorism as a justification for war. At the same time, **she understates the extent to which humanitarian intervention has often been used to protect the "private" from the "private,**" especially to "protect" women. Gayatri Spivak and others have shown how **England largely justified colonialism as an attempt to save "brown women from brown men."** n127 Deborah Weissman reminds us that **the United States has long justified military intervention**--in Cuba, the Philippines, Hawaii--in large part **to "protect" women**. n128 **MacKinnon** herself **has appealed** in the past **to the use of military and other types of intervention to protect women**. Indeed, her work on Bosnia and Herzegovina in the early 1990s embroiled her in a debate among feminists--both in the United States and abroad--over how international law should treat rape in the Balkans, and particularly over whether rape should be seen as genocidal.

# Shining City AT: Your Intervention Cards Don’t Assume Military Intervention

**Humanitarian intervention means forceful military intervention justified for a humanitarian cause:**

Karen **Engle, 2007** (Professor in Law @ University of Texas). “"Calling in the Troops": The Uneasy Relationship Among Women's Rights, Human Rights, and Humanitarian Intervention.” Harvard Human Rights Journal, Spring 2007. Accessed Sept. 9, 2010, Lexis Academic Universe

n1 **Unless indicated otherwise, when I use the term "humanitarian intervention" in this piece, I mean forceful military intervention primarily justified with humanitarian reasons.**

# \*\*\*\*\*Simulations K Answers\*\*\*\*\*

**1. The world is real and Truth exists**  
Alan **Sokal**, Professor of Physics at New York University, 19**96** (“A Physicist Experiments With Cultural Studies,” *Lingua Franca*, May/June, Available Online at <http://linguafranca.mirror.theinfo.org/9605/sokal.html>, Accessed 07-31-2010)

WHY DID I do it? While my method was satirical, my motivation is utterly serious. What concerns me is the proliferation, not just of nonsense and sloppy thinking per se, but of a particular kind of nonsense and sloppy thinking: one that denies the existence of objective realities, or (when challenged) admits their existence but downplays their practical relevance. At its best, a journal like *Social Text* raises important issues that no scientist should ignore--questions, for example, about how corporate and government funding influence scientific work. Unfortunately, epistemic relativism does little to further the discussion of these matters. In short, my concern about the spread of subjectivist thinking is both intellectual and political. Intellectually, the problem with such doctrines is that they are false (when not simply meaningless). There *is* a real world; its properties are *not* merely social constructions; facts and evidence *do* matter. What sane person would contend otherwise? And yet, much contemporary academic theorizing consists precisely of attempts to blur these obvious truths. *Social Text*'s acceptance of my article exemplifies the intellectual arrogance of Theory--postmodernist *literary* theory, that is--carried to its logical extreme. No wonder they didn't bother to consult a physicist. If all is discourse and "text," then knowledge of the real world is superfluous; even physics becomes just another branch of cultural studies. If, moreover, all is rhetoric and language games, then internal logical consistency is superfluous too: a patina of theoretical sophistication serves equally well. Incomprehensibility becomes a virtue; allusions, metaphors, and puns substitute for evidence and logic. My own article is, if anything, an extremely modest example of this well-established genre. POLITICALLY, I'm angered because most (though not all) of this silliness is emanating from the self-proclaimed Left. We're witnessing here a profound historical volte-face. For most of the past two centuries, the Left has been identified with science and against obscurantism; we have believed that rational thought and the fearless analysis of objective reality (both natural and social) are incisive tools for combating the mystifications promoted by the powerful--not to mention being desirable human ends in their own right. The recent turn of many "progressive" or "leftist" academic humanists and social scientists toward one or another form of epistemic relativism betrays this worthy heritage and undermines the already fragile prospects for progressive social critique. **Theorizing about "the social construction of reality" won't help us find an effective treatment for AIDS or devise strategies for preventing global warming. Nor can we combat false ideas in history, sociology, economics, and politics if we reject the notions of truth and falsity.**

# Simulations K Answers

**2. Our claims are “true” in the sense that they are pragmatically useful for solving a particular set of problems. Factual statements can be understood as provisional truths --- which have limitations but must be accepted in the short-term to address immediate risks  
Rowland 95**

(Robin, NDT Winner and Debate Coach, Looks like Wallace Shawn, Professor of Communication – University of Kansas, “In Defense of Rational Argument: A Pragmatic Justification of Argumentation Theory and Response to the Postmodern Critique”, Philosophy & Rhetoric, 28(4), p. 354-356)  
  
The first step in developing a justifiable theory of rational argument that can account for the epistemological and axiological attacks is to recognize the performative contradiction at the heart of the postmodern critique. Postmodernists rely on rational argument in order to attack rational argument and they consistently claim that their positions are in some way superior to those of their modernist opponents. Writing of post-structuralism, Amanda Anderson notes "the incommensurability between its epistemological stance and its political aims, between its descriptions and its prescriptions, between the pessimism of its intellect and, if not the optimism, at least the intrusiveness of its moral and political will" (1992, 64). The performative contradiction at the heart of postmodernism is nowhere more evident than in the epistemological critique of modernism. The two most important points made by postmodernists in relation to epistemology are that humans can understand the world only through their symbols and that there is no means of using "reality" to test a symbolic description. Advocates of traditional approaches to rationality have not been able to satisfactorily answer these positions, precisely because they seem to be "true" in some sense. This "truth," however, suggests that a theory of rational argument may be salvageable. If postmodernists can defend their views as in some sense "truer" than those of their modernist opponents, then there must be some standard for judging "truth" that can withstand the postmodern indictment. That standard is pragmatic efficacy in fulfilling a purpose in relation to a given problem. Both modernists and postmodernists generally assume that *truth and fact* are equivalent terms. Thus, a "true" statement is one that is factually correct in all circumstances. By this standard, of course, there are no totally "true" statements. However, if no statement can be proved factually true, then a focus on facts is an inappropriate standard for judging truth. I suggest that knowledge and truth should be understood not as factual statements that are certain, but as symbolic statements that function as useful problem-solving tools. When we say that a view is true, we really mean that a given symbolic description consistently solves a particular problem. Thus, the statement "the sun will come up tomorrow" can be considered "true," despite ambiguities that a postmodernist might point to in regard to the meaning of *sun* or *tomorrow,* because it usefully and consistently solves a particular epistemic problem. The standard for "truth" is pragmatic utility in fulfilling a *purpose* in relation to a *particular problem.* A true statement is one that "works" to solve the problem. Both the nature of the problem and the arguer's purpose in relation to that problem infiuence whether a given statement is viewed as true knowledge. This explains why biological researchers and physicians often seem to have different definitions of *truth* in regard to medical practice. The researcher is concerned with fully understanding the way that the body works. His or her purpose dictates application of rigorous standards for evaluating evidence and causation. By contrast, the physician is concerned with treating patients and therefore may apply a much lower standard for evaluating new treatments. The pragmatic theory of argument I am defending draws heavily on the work of William James, who believed that "the only test of probable truth is what works" (1982, 225). Alan Brinton explains that for junes "the ultimate question of truth is a question about the concepts and their fruitfulness in serving the purposes for which they were created and imposed. Ideas are true insofar as they serve these purposes, and false insofar as they fail to do so" (1982, 163). Some contemporary pragmatists take a similar view. For example, Nicholas Rescher writes in relation to methodology that "the proper test for the correctness or appropriateness of anything methodological in nature is plainly and obviously posed by the paradigmatically pragmatic questions: Does it *work?* Does it attain its intended purposes?" (1977, 3). Similarly, Celeste Condit Railsback argues that "truth is . . . relative to the language and purposes of the persons who are using it" (1983, 358-59). At this point, someone like Derrida might argue that while the pragmatic approach accounts for the symbolic nature of truth, it does not deal with the inability of humans to get at reality directly. Although the postmodern critique denies that humans can directly experience "the facts," it does not deny that a real-world exists. Thus, a pragmatist endorses a given scientific theory because the symbolic description present in that theory does a better job than its competitors of fulfilling a set of purposes in a given context. Because it fulfills those purposes, we call the theory "true." We cannot attain knowledge about "the facts," but we can test the relative adequacy of competing problem-solving statements against those facts. Michael Redhead, a professor of history and philosophy of science at Cambridge University, notes that "we can always conjecture, but there is some control. *The world kicks back"* (in Peterson 1992,175; emphasis added). Knowledge is not about "facts." It is about finding symbolic descriptions of the world that work, that is, avoiding nature's kicks in fulfilling a given purpose. The foregoing suggests that a principled pragmatic theory of argument sidesteps the postmodern critique. Argumentation theory should be understood as a set of pragmatic rules of thumb about the kinds of symbolic statements that effectively solve problems. These statements exist at varying levels of generality. A consistency principle , for example, is really a rule of thumb stating something like "All other things being equal, consistent symbolic descriptions are more likely to prove useful for solving a particular problem in relation to a given purpose than are inconsistent descriptions." Other principles are linked to narrower purposes in more specific contexts. Thus, the standards for evaluating arguments in a subfield of physics will be tied to the particular purposes and problems found in that subfield. The key point is that all aspects of a theory of argument can be justified pragmatically, based on their value for producing useful solutions to problems.

# Simulations K Answers

**3. The scope and magnitude of global violence are trending down and correlated with the spread of Reason  
Pinker 7** (Steven, Johnstone Family Professor in the Department of Psychology – Harvard University, “A History of Violence”, Edge: The Third Culture, 3-28, <http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/pinker07/pinker07_index.html>)  
In sixteenth-century Paris, a popular form of entertainment was cat-burning, in which a cat was hoisted in a sling on a stage and slowly lowered into a fire. According to historian Norman Davies, "[T]he spectators, including kings and queens, shrieked with laughter as the animals, howling with pain, were singed, roasted, and finally carbonized." Today, such sadism would be unthinkable in most of the world. This change in sensibilities is just one example of perhaps the most important and most underappreciated trend in the human saga: Violence has been in decline over long stretches of history, and today we are probably living in the most peaceful moment of our species' time on earth. In the decade of Darfur and Iraq, and shortly after the century of Stalin, Hitler, and Mao, the claim that violence has been diminishing may seem somewhere between hallucinatory and obscene. Yet recent studies that seek to quantify the historical ebb and flow of violence point to exactly that conclusion. Some of the evidence has been under our nose all along. Conventional history has long shown that, in many ways, we have been getting kinder and gentler. Cruelty as entertainment, human sacrifice to indulge superstition, slavery as a labor-saving device, conquest as the mission statement of government, genocide as a means of acquiring real estate, torture and mutilation as routine punishment, the death penalty for misdemeanors and differences of opinion, assassination as the mechanism of political succession, rape as the spoils of war, pogroms as outlets for frustration, homicide as the major form of conflict resolution—all were unexceptionable features of life for most of human history. But, today, they are rare to nonexistent in the West, far less common elsewhere than they used to be, concealed when they do occur, and widely condemned when they are brought to light. At one time, these facts were widely appreciated. They were the source of notions like progress, civilization, and man's rise from savagery and barbarism. Recently, however, those ideas have come to sound corny, even dangerous. They seem to demonize people in other times and places, license colonial conquest and other foreign adventures, and conceal the crimes of our own societies. The doctrine of the noble savage—the idea that humans are peaceable by nature and corrupted by modern institutions—pops up frequently in the writing of public intellectuals like José Ortega y Gasset ("War is not an instinct but an invention"), Stephen Jay Gould ("Homo sapiens is not an evil or destructive species"), and Ashley Montagu ("Biological studies lend support to the ethic of universal brotherhood"). But, now that social scientists have started to count bodies in different historical periods, they have discovered that the romantic theory gets it backward: Far from causing us to become more violent, something in modernity and its cultural institutions has made us nobler. To be sure, any attempt to document changes in violence must be soaked in uncertainty. In much of the world, the distant past was a tree falling in the forest with no one to hear it, and, even for events in the historical record, statistics are spotty until recent periods. Long-term trends can be discerned only by smoothing out zigzags and spikes of horrific bloodletting. And the choice to focus on relative rather than absolute numbers brings up the moral imponderable of whether it is worse for 50 percent of a population of 100 to be killed or 1 percent in a population of one billion. Yet, despite these caveats, a picture is taking shape. The decline of violence is a fractal phenomenon, visible at the scale of millennia, centuries, decades, and years. It applies over several orders of magnitude of violence, from genocide to war to rioting to homicide to the treatment of children and animals. And it appears to be a worldwide trend, though not a homogeneous one. The leading edge has been in Western societies, especially England and Holland, and there seems to have been a tipping point at the onset of the Age of Reason in the early seventeenth century. At the widest-angle view, one can see a whopping difference across the millennia that separate us from our pre-state ancestors. Contra leftist anthropologists who celebrate the noble savage, quantitative body-counts—such as the proportion of prehistoric skeletons with axemarks and embedded arrowheads or the proportion of men in a contemporary foraging tribe who die at the hands of other men—suggest that pre-state societies were far more violent than our own. It is true that raids and battles killed a tiny percentage of the numbers that die in modern warfare. But, in tribal violence, the clashes are more frequent, the percentage of men in the population who fight is greater, and the rates of death per battle are higher. According to anthropologists like Lawrence Keeley, Stephen LeBlanc, Phillip Walker, and Bruce Knauft, these factors combine to yield population-wide rates of death in tribal warfare that dwarf those of modern times. If the wars of the twentieth century had killed the same proportion of the population that die in the wars of a typical tribal society, there would have been two billion deaths, not 100 million. Political correctness from the other end of the ideological spectrum has also distorted many people's conception of violence in early civilizations—namely, those featured in the Bible. This supposed source of moral values contains many celebrations of genocide, in which the Hebrews, egged on by God, slaughter every last resident of an invaded city. The Bible also prescribes death by stoning as the penalty for a long list of nonviolent infractions, including idolatry, blasphemy, homosexuality, adultery, disrespecting one's parents, and picking up sticks on the Sabbath. The Hebrews, of course, were no more murderous than other tribes; one also finds frequent boasts of torture and genocide in the early histories of the Hindus, Christians, Muslims, and Chinese. At the century scale, it is hard to find quantitative studies of deaths in warfare spanning medieval and modern times. Several historians have suggested that there has been an increase in the number of recorded wars across the centuries to the present, but, as political scientist James Payne has noted, this may show only that "the Associated Press is a more comprehensive source of information about battles around the world than were sixteenth-century monks." Social histories of the West provide evidence of numerous barbaric practices that became obsolete in the last five centuries, such as slavery, amputation, blinding, branding, flaying, disembowelment, burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, and so on. Meanwhile, for another kind of violence—homicide—the data are abundant and striking. The criminologist Manuel Eisner has assembled hundreds of homicide estimates from Western European localities that kept records at some point between 1200 and the mid-1990s. In every country he analyzed, murder rates declined steeply—for example, from 24 homicides per 100,000 Englishmen in the fourteenth century to 0.6 per 100,000 by the early 1960s. On the scale of decades, comprehensive data again paint a shockingly happy picture: Global violence has fallen steadily since the middle of the twentieth century. According to the Human Security Brief 2006, the number of battle deaths in interstate wars has declined from more than 65,000 per year in the 1950s to less than 2,000 per year in this decade. In Western Europe and the Americas, the second half of the century saw a steep decline in the number of wars, military coups, and deadly ethnic riots. Zooming in by a further power of ten exposes yet another reduction. After the cold war, every part of the world saw a steep drop-off in state-based conflicts, and those that do occur are more likely to end in negotiated settlements rather than being fought to the bitter end. Meanwhile, according to political scientist Barbara Harff, between 1989 and 2005 the number of campaigns of mass killing of civilians decreased by 90 percent. The decline of killing and cruelty poses several challenges to our ability to make sense of the world. To begin with, how could so many people be so wrong about something so important? Partly, it's because of a cognitive illusion: We estimate the probability of an event from how easy it is to recall examples. Scenes of carnage are more likely to be relayed to our living rooms and burned into our memories than footage of people dying of old age. Partly, it's an intellectual culture that is loath to admit that there could be anything good about the institutions of civilization and Western society. Partly, it's the incentive structure of the activism and opinion markets: No one ever attracted followers and donations by announcing that things keep getting better. And part of the explanation lies in the phenomenon itself. The decline of violent behavior has been paralleled by a decline in attitudes that tolerate or glorify violence, and often the attitudes are in the lead. As deplorable as they are, the abuses at Abu Ghraib and the lethal injections of a few murderers in Texas are mild by the standards of atrocities in human history. But, from a contemporary vantage point, we see them as signs of how low our behavior can sink, not of how high our standards have risen. The other major challenge posed by the decline of violence is how to explain it. A force that pushes in the same direction across many epochs, continents, and scales of social organization mocks our standard tools of causal explanation. The usual suspects—guns, drugs, the press, American culture—aren't nearly up to the job. Nor could it possibly be explained by evolution in the biologist's sense: Even if the meek could inherit the earth, natural selection could not favor the genes for meekness quickly enough. In any case, human nature has not changed so much as to have lost its taste for violence. Social psychologists find that at least 80 percent of people have fantasized about killing someone they don't like. And modern humans still take pleasure in viewing violence, if we are to judge by the popularity of murder mysteries, Shakespearean dramas, Mel Gibson movies, video games, and hockey. What has changed, of course, is people's willingness to act on these fantasies. The sociologist Norbert Elias suggested that European modernity accelerated a "civilizing process" marked by increases in self-control, long-term planning, and sensitivity to the thoughts and feelings of others. These are precisely the functions that today's cognitive neuroscientists attribute to the prefrontal cortex. But this only raises the question of why humans have increasingly exercised that part of their brains. No one knows why our behavior has come under the control of the better angels of our nature, but there are four plausible suggestions.

# Simulations K Answers

**4. Voting Aff affects the “real world” --- advocacy of political reform causes familiarity and engagement --- key pedagogical vehicles for change  
Joyner 99**

Christopher C., Professor of International Law – Georgetown U., 5 ILSA J Int’l & Comp L 377, June)  
  
Use of the debate can be an effective pedagogical tool for education in the social sciences. Debates, like other role-playing simulations, help students understand different perspectives on a policy issue by adopting a perspective as their own. But, unlike other simulation games, debates do not require that a student participate directly in order to realize the benefit of the game. Instead of developing policy alternatives and experiencing the consequences of different choices in a traditional role-playing game, debates present the alternatives and consequences in a formal, rhetorical fashion before a judgmental audience. Having the class audience serve as jury helps each student develop a well-thought-out opinion on the issue by providing contrasting facts and views and enabling audience members to pose challenges to each debating team. These debates ask undergraduate students to examine the international legal implications of various United States foreign policy actions. Their chief tasks are to assess the aims of the policy in question, determine their relevance to United States national interests, ascertain what legal principles are involved, and conclude how the United States policy in question squares with relevant principles of international law. Debate questions are formulated as resolutions, along the lines of: "Resolved: The United States should deny most-favored-nation status to China on human rights grounds;" or "Resolved: The United States should resort to military force to ensure inspection of Iraq's possible nuclear, chemical and biological weapons facilities;" or "Resolved: The United States' invasion of Grenada in 1983 was a lawful use of force;" or "Resolved: The United States should kill Saddam Hussein." In addressing both sides of these legal propositions, the student debaters must consult the vast literature of international law, especially the nearly 100 professional law-school-sponsored international law journals now being published in the United States. This literature furnishes an incredibly rich body of legal analysis that often treats topics affecting United States foreign policy, as well as other more esoteric international legal subjects. Although most of these journals are accessible in good law schools, they are largely unknown to the political science community specializing in international relations, much less to the average undergraduate. [\*386] By assessing the role of international law in United States foreign policy- making, students realize that United States actions do not always measure up to international legal expectations; that at times, international legal strictures get compromised for the sake of perceived national interests, and that concepts and principles of international law, like domestic law, can be interpreted and twisted in order to justify United States policy in various international circumstances. In this way, the debate format gives students the benefits ascribed to simulations and other action learning techniques, in that it makes them become actively engaged with their subjects, and not be mere passive consumers. Rather than spectators, students become legal advocates, observing, reacting to, and structuring political and legal perceptions to fit the merits of their case. The debate exercises carry several specific educational objectives. First, students on each team must work together to refine a cogent argument that compellingly asserts their legal position on a foreign policy issue confronting the United States. In this way, they gain greater insight into the real-world legal dilemmas faced by policy makers. Second, as they work with other members of their team, they realize the complexities of applying and implementing international law, and the difficulty of bridging the gaps between United States policy and international legal principles, either by reworking the former or creatively reinterpreting the latter. Finally, research for the debates forces students to become familiarized with contemporary issues on the United States foreign policy agenda and the role that international law plays in formulating and executing these policies. [n8](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.samford.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1296540963734&returnToKey=20_T11130219953&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.311647.5977967493#n8) The debate thus becomes an excellent vehicle for pushing students beyond stale arguments over principles into the real world of policy analysis, political critique, and legal defense.

# Simulations K Answers

**5. Research-focused debate about immigration counters anti-immigrant hysteria and empowers movements to create social change**  
Michael **Hale**, Director of Communications, Campaign for Migrant Worker Justice, Ohio, **‘9** “Teaching the Immigration Debate in Freshman Composition,” Radical Teacher 84: 18–30, <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/radical_teacher/v084/84.hale.html>

After the largest immigration raid in U.S. history to date, the *New York Times* ran an editorial entitled “The Great Immigration Panic” condemning the antiimmigrant hysteria sweeping our country. It suggests that a time will come “once the enforcement fever breaks, when we look at what has been done and no longer recognize the country that did it . . . . A nation of immigrants is holding another nation of immigrants in bondage, exploiting its labor while ignoring its suffering . . . .” While the language is clear and moving, the tone is one of defeat because it concedes, “There are few national figures [read politicians] standing firm against restrictionism.” The editorial concludes, “Children someday will study the Great Immigration Panic of the early 2000s, which harmed countless lives, wasted billions of dollars and mocked the nation’s most deeply held values.” Sadly, much of the immigrant rights movement has taken a similar poignant yet defeated tone since 2006. Looking at the current crisis in the immigrant rights movement from the perspective of a progressive teacher, I had to ask myself what I am doing to engage my students—not “someday”—but right now in this national debate. Not only do students need the critical tools to look beyond the vast amounts of disinformation and propaganda in order to construct more informed, reasoned opinions (a point the editorial agreed with), but they also need to develop a sense of agency that enables them to participate actively in the struggles against anti-immigrant hysteria (a point that liberal publications will rarely concede). Only intelligent decisions arrived at through reflection and research fused with an understanding that change only happens with the active participation of masses of people, peppered with a healthy sense of outrage, will begin to overcome one of the most dangerous and recurrent tendencies in American society. I have been involved in immigrant rights movements since my childhood in Los Angeles, from the Sanctuary Movement for Central American refugees in the 1980s to the fights against Proposition 187 in the 1990s to the struggles against antiArab hostility after 2001 to the massive immigrant rights marches in 2006. Most recently, I moved to Toledo, Ohio, and worked for the Farm Labor Organizing Committee (AFL-CIO) helping to organize migrant farmworkers, mostly of Mexican and indigenous descent, in the Midwest and South. In my experience, the most successful immigrant rights movements do not wait on politicians to solve problems, but rather empower immigrants to speak for themselves and educate fellow immigrants and allies about the root causes of immigration. At the same time, successful movements create more allies and empower them to go into their communities and defuse the scapegoating and disinformation that consumes too many U.S. citizens. This article will discuss how I developed a freshmen composition class that tries to transfer the lessons I learned as an immigrant rights organizer into the freshmen composition classroom. The debate over undocumented immigration lends itself well to a research focused composition class. With my syllabus structured around purpose-driven writing situations, I try to break the larger debate down into a series of problems that students must confront in order to understand the issues, obtain reliable information, and form well-reasoned opinions. Each problem, and the strategies I teach in order to overcome the problem, matches with an objective of the composition course. Thus, all students learn about and engage in the issue while developing the writing skills needed to succeed in the course and in their future classes. At the same time, the class helped a small percentage of students develop an activist consciousness that motivated them to participate in the immigrant rights marches, a union conference, and a campus-wide panel discussion on The North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

**6. Over-proliferation of evidence is good. The method of testing and constant revision has produced huge progress. Recent human history proves.  
Harris 92**

(James Franklin, Against Relativism: A Philosophical Defense of Method, p. 1-2)

One factor which explains why there are so few people rushing in to pick up the fallen banner of reason and method is that the relativists have succeded in attaching a very negative connotation to any form of non-relativism. To defend Modernism or traditional Western understandings of science and epistemology is now viewed by many to be, at best, “narrow” or “overly structured” and, at worst, “bigoted”, “racist”, “sexist”, and “Ethnocentric”. Modernism has been represented in such a manner that to be a modernist is to be intensive to and intolerant of other cultures with new and different ideas. For example, Paul Feyerabend describes the belief that there is some universal notion of human understanding which might be used to provide some theoretical approach to solving human conflicts as “conceited, ignorant, superficial, incomplete, and dishonest.” And we can add “sexist” to the list of pejorative adjectives since many contemporary feminist philosophers view the objectivity of modern science is uniquely masculine and the methodology of traditional Western science and epistemology as male-biased. So powerful have these negative connotations become that most modernists who are left have, for the most part, become “closet modernists” and appear to come out only on rare occasions and with numerous qualifications and great trepidation.

# Simulations K Answers

**7. The standard of pragmatic efficacy solves the over-proliferation of evidence checks a slide into relativism that makes problem-solving impossible**  
**Rowland 95**

(Robin, NDT Winner and Debate Coach, Looks like Wallace Shawn, Professor of Communication – University of Kansas, “In Defense of Rational Argument: A Pragmatic Justification of Argumentation Theory and Response to the Postmodern Critique”, Philosophy & Rhetoric, 28(4), p. 357-358)

The pragmatic perspective I have described is quite different from that of interpretive pragmatists such as Richard Rorty (1979, 1982, 1985, 1987) and Stanley Fish (1980, 1989a, 1989b). Rorty, while denying the existence of legitimate formal or content-based standards for "proof" (1982,277), endorses a processual epistemology based on "the idea of [substituting] 'unforced agreement' for that of 'objectivity' " (41-42). Janet Home summarizes Rorty's views, noting that "the difference between 'certified knowledge' and 'mere belief is based upon intersubjective agreement rather than correspondence" (1989, 249). By contrast. Fish grounds reason in the practices of particular "interpretive communities" (1989b, 98). In this view, "Particular facts are firm or in question insofar as the perspective . . . within which they emerge is firmly in place, settled" (Fish 1989a, 308). Unfortunately, a theory of argumentation cannot be salvaged merely by grounding reason in conversational practice or community assent. If there are no agreed upon standards, then how does one "rationally" test a claim intersubjectively or in process? Fish and Rorty beg the question when they ground reason in community and conversational process. Unlike Rorty and Fish, who reject the ideas of "truth" and "knowledge," I argue that those concepts must be redefined in relation to problem solving. The pragmatic theory of argument that I have advanced provides a principled means of choosing among competing alternatives, regardless of the context. One always should ask whether or not a particular symbolic description of the world fulfills its purposes. In so doing, methodological principles for testing knowledge claims, such as tests of evidence, fallacies, and more precise iield standards, can be justified, and then they can be applied within the conversation or by the community. The approach, therefore, provides standards to be applied in Rorty's process or by Fish's community and avoids the tautology that otherwise confronts those approaches. The perspective neatly avoids the problems associated with modernism, but also provides a principled approach to argument that does not lead to relativism. In defense of rational argument When argument is viewed as a pragmatic problem-solving tool, the power of the postmodern critique largely dissipates. At the most basic level, a pragmatic theory of argument is based on premises such as the following: 'Statements supported by evidence and reasoning are more likely to be useful for satisfactorily solving a problem than ones that lack that support. 'Consistent arguments are more likely to be generalizable than inconsistent ones. 'Experts are more likely to have useful viewpoints about technical questions tied to a particular field than nonexperts. These statements are not "true" in the factual sense, but they are *universally* recognized as useful, a point that is emphasized in the work of even the most committed postmodernist. Even someone like Derrida demands that his opponents support their claims with evidence and consistent reasoning. In so doing, Derrida clearly recognizes the functional utility of general standards for testing argument form and process. Arguing should be understood as a pragmatic process for locating solutions to problems. The ultimate justification of argument as a discipline is that it produces useful solutions. Of course, not all arguments lead to successful solutions because the world is a complex place and the people who utilize the form/process are flawed. However, the general functional utility of argument as *a* method of invention or discovery and *the* method of justification is undisputed.

# Simulations K Answers

**8. Facing extinction is a pre-requisite to the alt**

Brent Dean **Robbins**, doctoral student in clinical psychology at Duquesne University, **‘99**

(Medard Boss, <http://mythosandlogos.com/Boss.html>)

"Death is an unsurpassable limit of human existence," writes Boss (119). Primarily, however, human beings flee from death and the awareness of our mortality. But in our confrontation with death and our morality, we discover the "relationship" which "is the basis for all feelings of reverance, fear, awe, wonder, sorrow, and deference in the face of something greater and more powerful." (120). Boss even suggests that "the most dignified human relationship to death" involves keeping it--as a possibility rather than an actuality--constantly in awareness without fleeing from it. As Boss writes: "Only such a being-unto-death can guarantee the precondition that the Dasein be able to free itself from its absorption in, its submission and surrender of itself to the things and relationships of everyday livingn and to return to itself." (121) Such a recognition brings the human being back to his responsibility for his existence. This is not simply a inward withdrawal from the world--far from it. Rather, this responsible awareness of death as the ultimate possibility for human existence frees the human being to be with others in a genuine way. From this foundation--based on the existentials described above--Boss is able to articulate an understanding of medicine and psychology which gives priority to the freedom of the human being to be itself. By freedom, Boss does not mean a freedom to have all the possibilites, for we are finite and limited by our factical history and death. Yet within these finite possibilities, we are free to be who we are and to take responsibility for who we are in the world with others and alongside things that matter. Psychotherapy comes into play in cases in which people suffer from "pathological deficiencies of freedom," who, while constricted, still retain a degree of freedom, but a freedom which includes a suffering from constrictedness. The therapist, in this regard, provides the client with a space to free up this constricted existence in order to discover previously foreclosed possibilities of being in the world.

# Simulations Answers--Ext #1+2 – truth claims OK

**Extend our #1 Rowland 95 ev – the aff is not just a construction of random textual bits – it is formulated based on empirics and contingent truths. The “true” solution is the one that effectively solves the problem at hand. Just like a medical doctor rigorously analyzes the body to formulate his diagnosis, our aff is formulated**

**upon specific research to solve a specific problem.**

**Even if the case is ontologically flawed, it’s still true**

**Miller in 02** (Katherine Miller, Prof. of Communication at Texas A&M, Communication theories: Perspectives, processes, and contexts, 2002, p 35-36)

If positivism, in its classical and logical forms, is largely rejected, what philosophical foundation should take its place as a framework for social research? Very different answers to this question have been proposed. Some social researchers argue that flaws in the positivist foundation require a radically different philosophy of sci- encee, one in which the realist ontology, objec- ive epistemology, and value-free axiology of positivism are vehemently rejected and replaced with forms of inquiry that honor nominalism, subjectivism, and omnipresent values. The posi- tions of these scholars are discussed in great detail in Chapters 4 and 5 as we consider interpretive and critical petspectives on communication theory. However, some scholars believe that a rejection of positivism does not require a total rejection of realism, objectivity, and the scientific goal of value-free inquiry. However, these scholars reject the notion of absolute truth, reject the unassailable foundation of observation, and reject the assumption of an always steady and upward accumulation of knowledge. In these rejections, scholars have forged a new philosophy of science that D. C. Phillips (1987, 1990, 1992) has called post-positivism. The metatheoretical tenets of this position are discussed in the next section. Metatheoretical Commitments Ontology In Chapter 2, we discussed three ontological positions: the realist, the nominalist, and the social constructionist. To summarize, a realist believes in a hard and solid reality of physical and social objects, a nominalist proposes that the reality of social entities exists only in the names and labels we provide for them, and a social constructionist emphasizes the ways in which social meanings are created through historical and contemporary interaction. Both the realist and the social constructionist positions make contributions to the ontology of post-positivist researchers in the communication discipline. Researchers in the post-positivist tradition can be seen as realists in that they support the position that phenomena exist independent of our perceptions and theories about them (Phillips, 1987). However, this realism is tempered by the argument that humans cannot fully apprehend that reality and that the driving mechanisms in the social and physical world cannot be fully understood. As J. D. Smith (1990, p. 171) states, "Realism is essential . . . because it poses 'at least in principle, a standard by which all human societies and their beliefs can be judged: they can all have beliefs about the world which turn out to be mistaken'" (Trigg, 1985, p. 22). Phillips argues, however, that a post-positivist ontology does not deny the notions inherent in approaches advocating a "social construction of reality" (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). Rather, Phillips (1990) draws the distinction between beliefs about the reality and the objective reality (pp. 42-43). Making this distinction allows a post-positivist scholar to appreciate (and investigate) multiple realities that are constructed by social collectives through communicative inter-action. For example, a post-positivist scholar could study the ways that beliefs about the imminent end of the world influence the behaviors of mountain survivalists, members of cults, and fundamental religious groups. However, the fact that a social group has arrived at certain beliefs about the world does not make those beliefs about the social or physical world necessarily true. As Phillips (1990) notes, "It is clear that Freudians believe in the reality of the id and superego and the rest, and they act as if these are realities; but their believing in these things does not make them real" (p. 43). It could be further argued that post-positivism is consistent with social constructionist views in two important ways. First, many post-positivists would argue that the process of social construction occurs in relatively patterned ways that are amenable to the type of social scientific investigation undertaken by post-positivists. Individuals have free will and creativity but they exercise that creativity in ways that are often (though not always, certainly) patterned and predictable. In the field of mass communication, Barbara Wilson (1994) argues convincingly for this point regarding her own study of children's responses to the mass media: I believe that children's interpretations and responses are as richly individualistic as snow-flakes. However, I also believe that there are common patterns that characterize a majority of young viewers and that those patterns are as predictable and explainable as the basic process by which all those unique snowflakes are formed from water, (p. 25) Second, many post-positivists would argue that social constructions are regularly reified and treated as objective by actors in the social world. Thus, it is reasonable to study the impact of these reified constructions on our communicative lives. Tompkins (1997) has made this argument with regard to his organizational communication research with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA): The engineers, scientists, managers, bureau-crats, and other kinds of members did not believe in a socially constructed world. They believed the rockets they made did in fact go to the moon. Moreover, they believed that NASA and the contractor firms who worked for them were real. They believed that these organizations could succeed or fail by objective criteria and that their bosses could hire or fire, reward or penalize individuals—actions with real consequences, (p. 369) Thus, a social constructionist ontology is consistent with a post-positivist position that emphasizes both the patterned nature of the social construction process and the regular and predictable effects that reified social constructions have on social actors. Thus, the ontology of post-positivism is not necessarily the belief in a hard, immutable, and unchanging social world implied in a strict realist stance. Rather, a post-positivist ontology entails a belief in regularity and pattern in our interactions with others. The ways in which these regularities and patterns are studied within post-positivist theory are considered in the next section.

# Simulations Answers--Ext #3 – Enlightenment good

**Extnd our #3 argument. The Pinker evidence indicates that their postmodern attacks upon rationality and reason are flawed and empirically disproven. The spread of reason and enlightenment ideals shares a strong and direct correlation with peace and decline in violence. The alternative is Stalin, Hitler, and Mao.**

**( ) Enlightenment reason is necessary to prevent a new wave of domestic conflicts. Epistemological pluralism leads to power as the only legitimate means for resolving disputes. The affirmative cedes the political sphere to those in power.**  
**Sherry**, Prof of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Law @ University of Minnesota, **96** [Suzanna, Georgetown Law Journal, “The Sleep of Reason”, February, 84 Geo. L.J. 453]

Some, however, have suggested that the historical era of the Enlightenment was unique, and that epistemological pluralism would, in the modern world, create little danger of internecine warfare. [n139](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.samford.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1300421599582&returnToKey=20_T11508639092&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.550258.4866398325" \l "n139) This optimism overlooks one of the fundamental differences between rational and antirational epistemologies: [\*479] because the latter rest on faith rather than reason, they are likely to be impervious to persuasion and resistant to compromise. [n140](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.samford.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1300421599582&returnToKey=20_T11508639092&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.550258.4866398325" \l "n140) Moreover, without the skeptical cast of mind fostered by Enlightenment epistemology, antirational epistemologies -- especially religion, with its extrahuman source of authority -- are likely to be conducive to particularly deep conviction. Deep conviction, in turn, is a breeding ground for exactly the religious wars of previous centuries: In Abrams v. United States, Justice Holmes argued that a logical result of deep conviction is intolerance. As Dean Bollinger has added, failing to attempt to silence what one believes to be false might be seen as a sign of weak conviction. . . . To the zealous adherent, intolerance and persecution become, in a sense, the measure of her commitment to her religious beliefs. [n141](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.samford.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1300421599582&returnToKey=20_T11508639092&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.550258.4866398325" \l "n141) Even in the United States, where religion has largely been domesticated (as Michael Perry puts it), [n142](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.samford.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1300421599582&returnToKey=20_T11508639092&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.550258.4866398325" \l "n142) we have not been spared all of the violence associated with pre-Enlightenment religious wars. Although, as Perry points out, "we are not the former Yugoslavia or India," [n143](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.samford.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1300421599582&returnToKey=20_T11508639092&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.550258.4866398325" \l "n143) the Branch Davidians, the World Trade Center bombers, the abortion clinic killings, and the growth of various organizations -- on the left and the right, not all of them religious -- that use irrational arguments to reject and resist the authority of government, by violence if necessary, should give us pause before abandoning the fruits of the Enlightenment. [n144](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.samford.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1300421599582&returnToKey=20_T11508639092&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.550258.4866398325" \l "n144) Indeed, as one historian has pointed out: If we have now entered an era in which those on the right have been joined by some on the left in assailing reason as faulty because it does not correspond to the essential and incontestable truths they have come to know emotionally, or by virtue of their membership in particular groups, the prospects for deliberative democracy are bleak indeed. . . . If truth resides in difference and emotion, then war rather than persuasion is the only possible consequence of speaking such a truth to power. [n145](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.samford.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1300421599582&returnToKey=20_T11508639092&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.550258.4866398325" \l "n145) Even where violence is unlikely, the practical implications of epistemological pluralism are not likely to please the pluralists. For example, Gertrude Himmelfarb points out that different perspectives on history will inevitably conflict: "If the feminist historian can and should write history from her perspective . . . why should the black historian not do the same -- even if such a history might 'marginalize' women? And why not the working-class historian, who might marginalize both women and blacks?" [n146](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.samford.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1300421599582&returnToKey=20_T11508639092&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.550258.4866398325" \l "n146) Currently popular antirationalisms [\*480] seem indeed to have little in common except their rejection of the Enlightenment. Try to imagine a public school curriculum designed jointly by Bob and Alice Mozert (the religious parents who objected to a standard public school curriculum as secular humanism) [n147](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.samford.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1300421599582&returnToKey=20_T11508639092&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.550258.4866398325" \l "n147) and Stanley Fish, Duncan Kennedy, or William Eskridge. Find a single point of agreement -- other than that the Enlightenment was a failure -- between Michael McConnell and Catharine MacKinnon. Even allies within the multiculturalist wing of epistemological pluralism are on the brink of war: women are complaining about sexism within the NAACP, [n148](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.samford.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1300421599582&returnToKey=20_T11508639092&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.550258.4866398325" \l "n148) federal laws requiring equality for women in college athletics are viewed as hurting black male athletes, [n149](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.samford.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1300421599582&returnToKey=20_T11508639092&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.550258.4866398325" \l "n149) and feminists are themselves divided over whether to accord respect to non-Western cultures that practice female circumcision, a mutilation of female genitalia. [n150](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.samford.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1300421599582&returnToKey=20_T11508639092&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.550258.4866398325" \l "n150) The more radical of the social constructivists accept -- and even embrace -- the inevitable consequence of their theory that there is no knowledge, just power. [n151](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.samford.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1300421599582&returnToKey=20_T11508639092&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.550258.4866398325" \l "n151) Their project is to expose and alter the hidden power relations. A few even remain epistemologically faithful by refusing to use reason in their scholarship at all, relying instead on "narratives" to communicate what are necessarily private and personal truths. Just as religious conversion cannot be prompted by reason (pace Pascal), this use of narratives is a nonrational attempt to transform beliefs. [n152](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.samford.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1300421599582&returnToKey=20_T11508639092&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.550258.4866398325" \l "n152) But whether or not all epistemological pluralists explicitly recognize that their position leaves power as the only means of resolving disputes, it is an inevitable consequence of granting alternative epistemologies equal status. None of the epistemological pluralists seem willing to confront the practical [\*481] implications of this reduction of knowledge to power. [n153](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.samford.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1300421599582&returnToKey=20_T11508639092&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.550258.4866398325" \l "n153) Stephen Carter, for example, notes that the problem with creationism is not its epistemological pedigree but that, like the proposition that the earth is flat, it is "factually in error." [n154](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.samford.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1300421599582&returnToKey=20_T11508639092&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.550258.4866398325" \l "n154) According to both religious and radical social constructivists, however, one cannot make the claim that any proposition is "factually in error" except from within a particular epistemological system. Thus, an epistemological pluralist like Carter should not be making such a statement at all, since he maintains that the rationalism and empiricism on which such "factual" claims are based are no more valid than an epistemology of faith and revelation that might lead to opposite conclusions. Similarly, many of the religious epistemological pluralists castigate Justice Scalia's opinion in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith. [n155](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.samford.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1300421599582&returnToKey=20_T11508639092&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.550258.4866398325" \l "n155) But Scalia's position instantiates the notion that only power can mediate between different epistemological systems: he is comfortable in "leaving accommodation to the political process" even though that will "place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in." [n156](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.samford.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1300421599582&returnToKey=20_T11508639092&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.550258.4866398325" \l "n156) The radical cris de coeur pleading for progressive changes in the law are similarly unpersuasive in the face of the current stolid conservatism of the American people: unless moved emotionally by the academic appeals -- an unlikely scenario -- there is no reason for either citizens or politicians to change their views. "For if ideas are mere reflections of the exercise of power, it becomes difficult to find a basis for criticizing social arrangements." [n157](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.samford.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1300421599582&returnToKey=20_T11508639092&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.550258.4866398325" \l "n157) And if reason is not a universal epistemology that can mediate between the different beliefs, but only the belief system favored by the powerful, then whoever is in power will reify his own epistemology. That is the nature of the social constructivist critique. One rather prosaic example may illustrate, close to home, the dangers of abandoning epistemological objectivity in favor of structures of power. Most academic journals use a blind reviewing system, in order to minimize institutional authority and maximize intellectual authority. They rely, in other words, as much as possible on objective standards rather than on hierarchies of power within academia. [n158](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.samford.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1300421599582&returnToKey=20_T11508639092&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.550258.4866398325" \l "n158) Law reviews are an exception; those who select articles are fully aware of the identity, past scholarly achievements, and institutional affiliation [\*482] of the authors who submit manuscripts. Because law reviews are therefore able to rely more heavily on these indicia of institutional authority, they provide us with a concrete example of the results when epistemological objectivity gives way to power. Those results are not encouraging, especially to those who would challenge the status quo. Unsurprisingly, prestigious law reviews disproportionately publish well-known authors, authors at well-known institutions, and authors at their own institutions. [n159](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.samford.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1300421599582&returnToKey=20_T11508639092&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.550258.4866398325" \l "n159) If epistemological pluralists expect that abandoning reason and empiricism will favor their political agendas over those currently in favor, they are likely to be sorely disappointed.

# Simulations Answers—Enlightenment Good

**( ) Our argument is not that Enlightenment reason is the only epistemology – however it is the one best suited for determining public policies. There is a difference between objective truth and justified beliefs.  
Sherry**, Prof of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Law @ University of Minnesota, **96** [Suzanna, Georgetown Law Journal, “The Sleep of Reason”, February, 84 Geo. L.J. 453]

In order to make even such a limited defense, however, I must first confront  [\*473]  the broad epistemological challenge: that truth -- or intellectual authority -- does not exist apart from the social and political hierarchies that create and sustain it. If the most radical social constructivists are right, and there is no such thing as truth or objectivity, defending the Enlightenment is like trying to collect water in a sieve. Fortunately, it is not necessary to resolve this philosophical dispute in order to proceed. First, the question I am addressing is not whether the Enlightenment reliance on reason and empiricism is in fact the only epistemology, but whether we ought to proceed as if it were, at least in the public arena. Even if there are multiple and contradictory truths, some may be better suited for public adoption than others. There is a difference between objective truth and justified beliefs, and suggesting that only beliefs informed by reason are justified does not take any stand on the existence or accessibility of objective truth. [n110](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.samford.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1300421599582&returnToKey=20_T11508639092&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.550258.4866398325" \l "n110) Further, neither reason nor truth need be transcendent or objective to inform debate. As many scholars have recognized, postmodernism has not prevented us from acting as if truth exists. [n111](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.samford.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1300421599582&returnToKey=20_T11508639092&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.550258.4866398325" \l "n111) Indeed, we can probably do no less: to act on the postmodern insights would be "like saying that, since philosophers are still debating Descartes' epistemology, one need not take notice of traffic signals in the meantime (since they might not really exist)." [n112](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.samford.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1300421599582&returnToKey=20_T11508639092&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.550258.4866398325" \l "n112) Moreover, although it may be less relevant in "soft" disciplines like law, some truth does exist: "If there were no facts, surgeons couldn't operate, buildings would collapse, and airplanes wouldn't get off the ground." [n113](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.samford.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1300421599582&returnToKey=20_T11508639092&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.550258.4866398325" \l "n113) Finally, as William Marshall has pointed out, the search for truth remains an important human enterprise even if objective truth does not exist, because "the human imagination is compelled not only by truth but also by the idea of truth." [n114](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.samford.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1300421599582&returnToKey=20_T11508639092&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.550258.4866398325" \l "n114) Similarly, even if there is no epistemology unconnected to power relationships, we tend to -- and perhaps we must -- behave as if there were. It remains only to give that epistemology content.

# Simulations Answers--Ext #4 – We = Change

**Extend number 4 – the Joyner evidence indicates there is real world change associated with voting Aff. Practicing being an advocate is a pedagogical vehicle that allows students to become familiar and engaged with political issues of relevance.**

**Their impact claim is just wrong. Incomplete knowledge does not preclude action – we can use contingent truths to make change  
Solt** – Ross K. Smith Coach of the Year Award Winner – **93** (Roger, Debate Coach – University of Kentucky, “Demystifying the Critique”, <http://groups.wfu.edu/debate/> MiscSites/DRGArticles/Solt1993Health.htm)

The critique of rationality provides another good example of why critiques are likely not to be absolute. "Reason" may be a flawed instrument; there may be occasions when we should give greater weight to our emotions or intuitions. But rationality clearly has a vital place in human life. If you had been falsely accused of murder, you would want the jury to listen to the reasons you could give for your innocence, not just vote on whether they like you or not. The fact that you were in Lexington at the time that this murder was being committed in Austin is a sound logical reason for why you couldn't have committed it. My point is that no critique of rationality can discredit all forms of rational thought. Furthermore, it cannot do so with complete certainty. It should be next to impossible for the negative to win that rational reasons have no probative value. It's better to decide on the basis of a flawed rationality than it is to flip a coin. The third main approach to attacking the critique is to argue it in its own terms. While I would not recommend this as a sole strategy, I believe that it has considerable merit in combination with other arguments. Most critiques simply are not that strong. There may well be a good reason why the assumption that the critique attacks is rarely questioned. At minimum, it is likely to be an assumption which most people (including most judges) happen to share. Thus, the degree of persuasion required to sustain that assumption may be minimal. Consider the rationality example. The necessity of reason in a public policy debate seems obvious. We try to give reasons for our conclusions because reasons can be evaluated and compared. If one side claims that its intuition is that a policy is wrong and the other says that its intuition is that the policy is right, we have no grounds for debate. We can emote or intuit at each other all day without getting anywhere. Reasoned argument offers our only real hope of peacefully settling intuitive disagreements. It can never he established logically that logic is correct; to do so would be circular. But the elementary rules of logic are simply self-evident. If I was in Lexington, Kentucky at the time which someone was stabbed to death in Austin, Texas, I couldn't have been the one to do the stabbing. Similarly, given the way in which our minds are constructed, empiricism seems to be by nature compelling. Logically, we can't know that the sun will rise tomorrow; the future may not repeat the past. But our past experience is the best thing that we have to go on; life requires that we act and judge with some degree of uncertainty.

# Simulations Answers--Ext #7 + 8 – overprolif of evidence is good

**Extend our #7 argument. Harris 92 – the proliferation of evidence in policy debate is good – it allows constant testing that acts like Occam’ s razor, peeling away irrelevant excess to pare down the best argument. This solves any of their proliferation of meaning arguments because the unuseful information is pared away.**

**Extend #8 – our Rowland 95 evidence indicates that the pragmatic efficacy of determining quality checks us from sliding into textual irrelevancy. The pragmatic necessity of choosing one policy makes a slide into relativism impossible**

Alternatives to expert-driven evidence qualifications are equally dangerous

Solt ‘04

(Roger, Debate Coach – U. Kentucky, “Debate’s Culture of Narcissism”, *Contemporary Argumentation and Debate*, p. 58)

Kritik debaters often indict “experts” because of their narrowly focused specialization. But radical critics are the ultimate debate specialists. They acquire extreme expertise in the execution of certain themes and forms of argument. As a results, they generally fail to engage with the broader issues that more mainstream debaters commonly encounter. Radical kritik is sometimes strong on persuasion and conviction, but it is all too often short on critical thinking and especially self-criticism. Reliance on experts obviously has its dangers, though it is difficult to avoid in a complex world in which the experts usually know a lot more about a given subject than one does oneself. (This is, of course, the ultimate rationale for the employment of experts, whether they are doctors, lawyers, auto mechanics, scholars, or debate coaches.) But reliance on personal experience is **also no panacea**. One’s personal experience may not be representative. It is also filtered through the opaque glass of all of our own prejudices and preconceptions, most of which we acquire from our close social associates. And personal experience is subject to interpretation and reinterpretation. A given “experience” can have many interpretations, all partial, all selective, some paranoid. A salutary skepticism towards the experts should be accompanied by an **equally important** skepticism with regards to our own infallibility.

Evidence is the foundation for productive debate

Ericson ‘03

(Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 40)

As you can see, evidence is the **foundation** of good debate, whether that evidence is in the form of general information you have read and remember or in the form of specific materials you have copied onto note cards and have available during the debate itself. Good evidence leads to strong arguments, development of issues and cases, and good refutation. Good research generates good evidence, so if you follow the guidelines, even if they seem time-consuming at first, they will pay off as your begin to debate.

# Simulations Answers-- overprolif of evidence is good

**Even if they’re right about the constant revision of evidence --- it’s not universally true. Some meta-questions are tough to answer, but the local claims of the 1AC aren’t. Killing people is wrong. Evil exists. You don’t have to come to grand** **conclusions to realize that the Aff is a good idea**.  
**Tushnet 92** (Mark, Professor of Law – Georgetown University, “The Left Critique Of Normativity: A Comment”, Michigan Law Review, August, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 2325, Lexis)  
  
The answer lies in their definition of normativity. In Pierre Schlag's terms, the "aim" of "normative legal thought" is "to articulate or develop a norm that is complete, self-sufficient, discrete, separable, trans-situational, non-contradictory, and non-paradoxical within its intellectual or legal jurisdiction." [n5](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.samford.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1296541295665&returnToKey=20_T11130232692&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.993773.0464627317" \l "n5) For Richard Delgado, the target is "grand normative theory." [n6](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.samford.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1296541295665&returnToKey=20_T11130232692&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.993773.0464627317#n6) For these authors, then, "normativity" is what I label comprehensive normative rationality. They argue that the claims for comprehensive normative rationality cannot be sustained. Their reasons need not be addressed in this essay, whose topic is not the merits of the arguments deployed in the critique of normativity. Yet the articles contain a number of obviously normative statements, and those statements provide my starting point. As Margaret Jane Radin and Frank Michelman noted in their comment on the principal articles, the very statement, "We should talk more normatively," [n7](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.samford.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1296541295665&returnToKey=20_T11130232692&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.993773.0464627317#n7) which they quote from another of Schlag's articles, is itself a normative statement. For rhetorical purposes, Schlag gives the normative sentence, "[T]hey [certain normative questions] are the wrong ones," a prominent place in his symposium article. [n8](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.samford.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1296541295665&returnToKey=20_T11130232692&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.993773.0464627317#n8) Delgado says that we could replace normative [\*2327] legal thought by legal thought pure and simple, "actually observing it and describing it. . . . We might begin to notice things like beggars or the countless other wounded that our system throws up. We might focus for the first time on subsistence claims, appreciate the dance between huge bureaucracies and those they serv(ic)e." [n9](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.samford.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1296541295665&returnToKey=20_T11130232692&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.993773.0464627317#n9) Winter writes that "we are saddled by a futile and increasingly counterproductive model of social order," and urges "more productive attention on fostering the kinds of conditions of community that might enable a more meaningful normative practice." [n10](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.samford.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1296541295665&returnToKey=20_T11130232692&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.993773.0464627317" \l "n10) In an earlier critique of comprehensive normative rationality, Joseph Singer offered a normative agenda that began with these paragraphs: We should prevent cruelty. Right now, people are being dragged from their homes, in darkness, and even in broad daylight. It is someone's daughter, someone's son, someone's husband. They are tortured and raped and made to endure cruel games. Then they are killed in gruesome and inventive ways. In some instances, the American government subsidizes the people who commit these acts. The government reprimands the people, sternly. And the subsidies continue. [n11](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.samford.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1296541295665&returnToKey=20_T11130232692&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.993773.0464627317" \l "n11) These normative statements, unlike those associated with comprehensive normative rationality, are small scale. They make what have been called "local" claims about good and bad practices, [n12](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.samford.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1296541295665&returnToKey=20_T11130232692&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.993773.0464627317" \l "n12) without attempting to offer what their authors believe will inevitably be inadequate -- or futile -- general, or abstract, or comprehensive, accounts of why the practices are good or bad. The problem with comprehensive normative rationality, then, must be that it is comprehensive and/or rational, not that it is normative. Arthur Leff's famous prose poem pointed to one obvious difficulty with small-scale or local normativity. Left concluded his skeptical critique of normativity: As things now stand, everything is up for grabs. Nevertheless: Napalming babies is bad. Starving the poor is wicked. Buying and selling each other is depraved. Those who stood up to and died resisting Hitler, Stalin, Amin, and Pol Pot -- and General Custer too -- have earned salvation. [\*2328] Those who acquiesced deserve to be damned. There is in the world such a thing as evil. [n13](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.samford.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1296541295665&returnToKey=20_T11130232692&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.993773.0464627317" \l "n13)

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# Simulations Answers--Ext #9 – extinction first

**Extinction outweighs- values can be reversed but double death precludes it**

Joseph S. **Nye 86**, Jr., professor of government at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, former chair of the National Security Council Group on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 19**86**, Nuclear Ethics, p. 65

The equal access approach assumes that each generation would wish to make the tradeoffs for themselves. The current generation cannot avoid imposing some risks upon the future. As Derek Parfit argues, the risk does not do injustice to identifiable persons, since they do not yet exist. Later the harm may become real. Nonetheless, if the risks are kept low and values are successfully preserved, the gamble benefits a next generation, who then make their own decisions about risks and benefits to be passed on to further generations. Keeping risks to the survival of the species at a low level is essential to a sense of proportionality. Survival is not an absolute value, but it is important because it is a necessary condition for the enjoyment of other values. The loss of political values may (or may not) be reversed with the passage of time. The extinction of the species would be irreversible. Thus proportionality requires that we rate survival very highly, but it does not require the absence of all risk. Proportionality in risks is easier to judge if we think in terms of passing the future to our children and letting them do the same for their children rather than trying to aggregate the interests of centuries of unknown (and perhaps nonexistant) people at this time. While the contemplation of species extinction—or what Schell calls “double death”—may reduce the meaning of life to some people in the current generation, that is a value to be judged against others in assessing the risks that are worth running for this generation. It is not a cause of injustice to a future generation.

# \*\*\*\*\*Speciesism Kritik\*\*\*\*\*

# \*Speciesism 1nc (vs. policy affs)\*

**A. Their appeal to political action reinforces human-centric politics.**

**Dell’Aversano ‘10** [Carmen, “the love whose name cannot be spoken: queering the human-animal bond” journal for critical animal studies, volume III issue 1 and 2, 2010]

And reciprocally, everything that concerns animals, however well-founded and urgent, by definition cannot make its way into political discourse. If the child is ―the prop of the secular theology on which our social reality rests: the secular theology that shapes at once the meaning of our collective narratives and our collective narratives of meaning‖ (Edelman 12), the animal, as the prop for the performance of ―dehumanization‖, is the locus of the permanent denial of all meaning and relevance. If, as Edelman writes, queerness names the side of those not ‗fighting for the children‘, the side outside the consensus by which all politics confirms the absolute value of reproductive futurism. […] [while] queerness, by contrast, figures […] the place of the social order‘s death drive […] queerness attains its ethical value precisely insofar as it accedes to that place, accepting its figural status as resistance to the viability of the social (Edelman 2004: 3) nothing could be queerer than the love for animals, which, by its very nature, which entails a serious and irrevocable commitment to the dismantling of the performances and devices on which social order as such rests, ―marks the ‗other‘ side of politics: […] the side outside all political sides, committed as they are, on every side, to futurism‘s unquestioned good‖ (Edelman 2004: 7). It is thus no coincidence that the fetish of the Child should be omnipresent in the many-sided polemic against animal rights. In public debates, anti-vivisection activists are routinely asked by experimenters whether they would rather kill a mouse or a child (the answer is, of course, neither); and every time the subject of animal rights is brought up not merely as a topic of academic discussion but in appeals for practical or Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume VIII, Issue 1/2, 2010 (ISSN1948-352X) 106 financial support, the most common form of refusal invariably brings up starving children as the more appropriate recipients of concern and aid. That the people who give this kind of answers do nothing whatsoever to relieve the plight of children in need does not matter rhetorically: what does matter is that the appeal for children ―is impossible to refuse […] this issue, like an ideological Möbius strip, only permit[s] one side‖ (Edelman 2004 2).. And any animal queer human can, from systematic and bitter personal experience, agree with Edelman that this is ―oppressively political […] insofar as the fantasy subtending the image of the Child invariably shapes the logic within which the political itself must be thought‖ (Edelman 2004 2). The emotions, feelings, thoughts and actions which make up the fabric of life for an animal queer person decentre the human and humanity from their positions as the taken-for granted subjects, and implicitly but powerfully question reproductive futurism. What Edelman calls the ideological limit on political discourse as such, preserving in the process the absolute privilege of heteronormativity, by rendering unthinkable, by casting outside the political domain, the possibility of a queer resistance to this organizing principle of human relations (Edelman 2004: 2) is shattered by an animal queer perspective. In its animal incarnation, more than in any other of its innumerable avatars, ―[t]he queer comes to figure the bar to every realization of futurity, the resistance […] to every social structure or form‖ (Edelman 2004 4)‖. And the real reason why liberalism grants a place to ―the queer‖ in its LGBT incarnation but marginalizes, ridicules, represses and murders animal queer is that the denial and repression of ―the queerness of resistance to futurism and thus the queerness of the queer‖ (Edelman 2004 27) are perfectly compatible with a civil rights perspective on same-sex love, but utterly incompatible with animal rights. An animal queer perspective is indeed [i]ntent on the end, not the ends, of the social, [...] insists that the drive toward that end, which liberalism refuses to imagine, can never be excluded from the structuring fantasy of the social order itself. (Edelman 2004: 28) The ―deliberate[...] severing of us from ourselves‖ that Edelman (5) mentions as the hallmark of queer is implicit in the love for an animal. Animal queer severs us from Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume VIII, Issue 1/2, 2010 (ISSN1948-352X) 107 ourselves because it decentres our perspective: suddenly, other values, other interests, other feelings, though incommensurable and unimaginable, become equivalent to our own. The queerest expression of this attitude in the animal rights field (or, for that matter, anywhere, at least as far as I know...) is VHEMT, the Voluntary Human Extinction Movement, which unwittingly but appropriately takes up Edelman‘s challenge that ―Queerness should and must redefine such notions as ―civil order‖ through a rupturing of our foundational faith in the reproduction of futurity‖ (Edelman 2004 16-17) and embodies the only oppositional status to which our queerness could ever lead [which] would depend on us taking seriously the place of the death drive […] and insisting […] that we do not intend a new politics, a better society, a brighter tomorrow, since all of those fantasies reproduce the past, through displacement, in the form of the future. (Edelman 2004 31) The Voluntary Human Extinction Movement Motto: ―May we live long and die out‖ VHEMT (pronounced vehement) is a movement not an organization. It‘s a movement advanced by people who care about life on planet Earth. [...] As VHEMT Volunteers know, the hopeful alternative to the extinction of millions of species of plants and animals is the voluntary extinction of one species: Homo sapiens... us.[...] When every human chooses to stop breeding, Earth‘s biosphere will be allowed to return to its former glory, and all remaining creatures will be free to live, die, evolve (if they believe in evolution), and will perhaps pass away, as so many of Nature‘s ―experiments‖ have done throughout the eons. It‘s going to take all of us going. At first glance, some people assume that VHEMT Volunteers and Supporters must hate people and that we want everyone to commit suicide or become victims of mass murder. It‘s easy to forget that another way to bring about a reduction in our numbers is to simply stop making more of us. Making babies seems to be a blind spot in our outlooks on life. (http://www.vhemt.org/) Instead of worshipping the Child as the guarantee of our own eternity in a future where progress will always confirm we were right, VHEMT calls for a voluntary and lucid renunciation of the Child both as a symbol and as a reality, and for restoring the beauty, glory and holiness of the planet by returning it to its rightful, non-human, Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume VIII, Issue 1/2, 2010 (ISSN1948-352X) 108 owners, the ones who kept it for half a billion years without making a mess of it. The mission of VHEMT actualizes what Edelman wrote about: ―the death drive names what the queer, in the order of the social, is called forth to figure: the negativity opposed to every form of social viability‖ (Edelman 2004 9). In envisioning a world where no opposition to the social will be necessary, because the social will no longer be a possibility, VHEMT radically refuses this mandate by which our political institutions compel the collective reproduction of the Child [and therefore] must appear as a threat not only to the organization of a given social order but also, and far more ominously, to social order as such, insofar as it threatens the order of futurism on which meaning always depends. (Edelman 2004: 11) Because of its refusal of any ―identification both of and with the Child as the pre-eminent emblem of the motivating end, though one endlessly postponed, of every political vision as a vision of futurity‖, VHEMT is the most coherent and most radical incarnation of ―a queer oppositional politics‖ (Edelman 2004: 13).

# Speciesism 1nc (vs. policy affs)

**B. We must deny the urge to align ourselves with their human-centric politics – it is an all or nothing question.**

**Dell’Aversano ‘10** [Carmen, “the love whose name cannot be spoken: queering the human-animal bond” journal for critical animal studies, volume III issue 1 and 2, 2010]

A real ―oxymoronic community of difference‖, embracing not only all possible variants of ―gender trouble‖ but also the queering of the human-animal barrier, would not need to teach anybody anything, because it would have made violence unthinkable, since the human oppression of non-human animals is not a peripheral case of no political relevance but, as Zimbardo‘s own analysis of ―dehumanization‖ shows, the archetype, model and training ground of all forms of oppression and injustice.xxvi In this respect animal queer, more than any form of queer, radically threatens the very foundations of human society as we know it, since taking it seriously, not simply as another interesting category for academic analysis but as an ethical and political imperative, implies doing everything we can to dismantle the linguistic, conceptual and performative apparatus which makes all kinds of violence and oppression possible. In animal queer the dichotomy between liberation theory and civil right politics, which has been discussed at length in queer literature,xxvii has no substance: crossing the line dividing our species from the other ones means eradicating the very categories of thought needed to conceive of inequality and injustice. If the definition of queer politics is radical opposition to the established social order as such, and the measure of success of queer political action is the extent to which it smashes the system, then animal rights activism is the queerest possible form of political action, because it is structurally incompatible with continuing to live the way the system expects us to. The reason why animal queer is structurally and intrinsically subversive, and why it is perceived as radically threatening, and is, accordingly, ruthlessly marginalized, by all forms of cultural and political discourse, is that it replaces sameness with otherness as the criterion of emotional, social and political inclusion: whoever supports animals, Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume VIII, Issue 1/2, 2010 (ISSN1948-352X) 101 fights for animals, loves an animal loves, supports and fights not for the self but for the other (―the wholly other that they call animal […]Yes, the wholly other, more other than any other, that they call an animal‖, as Derrida 1999 380 would put it), and knows in advance that no middle ground will ever be found, no assimilation will ever be possible, that in one, one hundred or one million years animals will be just as puzzling, as foreign, as alien to all that we can be and understand as they are now. If true love is felt not for the self but for the Other, and if ―[a]imer l‘autre, c‘est préserver son étrangeté, reconnaître qu‘il existe à côté de moi, loin de moi, non avec moi‖xxviii (Bruckner & Finkielkraut 1977 256), then love in its animal queer form is indeed the purest, most coherent and most radical form of love, and as such it has the potential not to reform society or to facilitate social ―progress‖ but to replace it with the unthinkable, with something radically contradicting all assumptions, expectations and definitions, to create the possibility of a happiness we can‘t even imagine, because to fathom it we would already have to be different from what we are, to have moved beyond ourselves.

# Speciesism 1nc (vs. policy affs)

**C. Vote neg to reject the 1ac —maintaining the human-non-human binary dooms them to endless cycles of subordination and violence- this is also the site of protest that we should focus on**

**Best ’07**, Associate Professor, Departments of Humanities and Philosophy University of Texas, El Paso [Steven, Charles Patterson, The Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust New York: Lantern Books, 2002, 280 pp]

While a welcome advance over the anthropocentric conceit that only humans shape human actions, the environmental determinism approach typically fails to emphasize the crucial role that animals play in human history, as well as how the human exploitation of animals is a key cause of hierarchy, social conflict, and environmental breakdown. A core thesis of what I call “animal standpoint theory” is that animals have been key driving and shaping forces of human thought, psychology, moral and social life, and history overall. More specifically, animal standpoint theory argues that the oppression of human over human has deep roots in the oppression of human over animal. In this context, Charles Patterson’s recent book, The Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust, articulates the animal standpoint in a powerful form with revolutionary implications. The main argument of Eternal Treblinka is that the human domination of animals, such as it emerged some ten thousand years ago with the rise of agricultural society, was the first hierarchical domination and laid the groundwork for patriarchy, slavery, warfare, genocide, and other systems of violence and power. A key implication of Patterson’s theory is that human liberation is implausible if disconnected from animal liberation, and thus humanism -- a speciesist philosophy that constructs a hierarchal relationship privileging superior humans over inferior animals and reduces animals to resources for human use -- collapses under the weight of its logical contradictions. Patterson lays out his complex holistic argument in three parts. In Part I, he demonstrates that animal exploitation and speciesism have direct and profound connections to slavery, colonialism, racism, and anti-Semitism. In Part II, he shows how these connections exist not only in the realm of ideology – as conceptual systems of justifying and underpinning domination and hierarchy – but also in systems of technology, such that the tools and techniques humans devised for the rationalized mass confinement and slaughter of animals were mobilized against human groups for the same ends. Finally, in the fascinating interviews and narratives of Part III, Patterson describes how personal experience with German Nazism prompted Jewish to take antithetical paths: whereas most retreated to an insular identity and dogmatic emphasis on the singularity of Nazi evil and its tragic experience, others recognized the profound similarities between how Nazis treated their human captives and how humanity as a whole treats other animals, an epiphany that led them to adopt vegetarianism, to become advocates for the animals, and develop a far broader and more inclusive ethic informed by universal compassion for all suffering and oppressed beings. The Origins of Hierarchy "As long as men massacre animals, they will kill each other" –Pythagoras It is little understood that the first form of oppression, domination, and hierarchy involves human domination over animals. Patterson’s thesis stands in bold contrast to the Marxist theory that the domination over nature is fundamental to the domination over other humans. It differs as well from the social ecology position of Murray Bookchin that domination over humans brings about alienation from the natural world, provokes hierarchical mindsets and institutions, and is the root of the long-standing western goal to “dominate” nature. In the case of Marxists, anarchists, and so many others, theorists typically don’t even mention human domination of animals, let alone assign it causal primacy or significance. In Patterson’s model, however, the human subjugation of animals is the first form of hierarchy and it paves the way for all other systems of domination such as include patriarchy, racism, colonialism, anti-Semitism, and the Holocaust. As he puts it, “the exploitation of animals was the model and inspiration for the atrocities people committed against each other, slavery and the Holocaust being but two of the more dramatic examples.” Hierarchy emerged with the rise of agricultural society some ten thousand years ago. In the shift from nomadic hunting and gathering bands to settled agricultural practices, humans began to establish their dominance over animals through “domestication.” In animal domestication (often a euphemism disguising coercion and cruelty), humans began to exploit animals for purposes such as obtaining food, milk, clothing, plowing, and transportation. As they gained increasing control over the lives and labor power of animals, humans bred them for desired traits and controlled them in various ways, such as castrating males to make them more docile. To conquer, enslave, and claim animals as their own property, humans developed numerous technologies, such as pens, cages, collars, ropes, chains, and branding irons. The domination of animals paved the way for the domination of humans. The sexual subjugation of women, Patterson suggests, was modeled after the domestication of animals, such that men began to control women’s reproductive capacity, to enforce repressive sexual norms, and to rape them as they forced breeding in their animals. Not coincidentally, Patterson argues, slavery emerged in the same region of the Middle East that spawned agriculture, and, in fact, developed as an extension of animal domestication practices. In areas like Sumer, slaves were managed like livestock, and males were castrated and forced to work along with females. In the fifteenth century, when Europeans began the colonization of Africa and Spain introduced the first international slave markets, the metaphors, models, and technologies used to exploit animal slaves were applied with equal cruelty and force to human slaves. Stealing Africans from their native environment and homeland, breaking up families who scream in anguish, wrapping chains around slaves’ bodies, shipping them in cramped quarters across continents for weeks or months with no regard for their needs or suffering, branding their skin with a hot iron to mark them as property, auctioning them as servants, breeding them for service and labor, exploiting them for profit, beating them in rages of hatred and anger, and killing them in vast numbers – all these horrors and countless others inflicted on black slaves were developed and perfected centuries earlier through animal exploitation. As the domestication of animals developed in agricultural society, humans lost the intimate connections they once had with animals. By the time of Aristotle, certainly, and with the bigoted assistance of medieval theologians such as St. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, western humanity had developed an explicitly hierarchical worldview – that came to be known as the “Great Chain of Being” – used to position humans as the end to which all other beings were mere means. Patterson underscores the crucial point that the domination of human over human and its exercise through slavery, warfare, and genocide typically begins with the denigration of victims. But the means and methods of dehumanization are derivative, for speciesism provided the conceptual paradigm that encouraged, sustained, and justified western brutality toward other peoples. “Throughout the history of our ascent to dominance as the master species,” Patterson writes, “our victimization of animals has served as the model and foundation for our victimization of each other. The study of human history reveals the pattern: first, humans exploit and slaughter animals; then, they treat other people like animals and do the same to them.” Whether the conquerors are European imperialists, American colonialists, or German Nazis, western aggressors engaged in wordplay before swordplay, vilifying their victims – Africans, Native Americans, Filipinos, Japanese, Vietnamese, Iraqis, and other unfortunates – with opprobrious terms such as “rats,” “pigs,” “swine,” “monkeys,” “beasts,” and “filthy animals.” Once perceived as brute beasts or sub-humans occupying a lower evolutionary rung than white westerners, subjugated peoples were treated accordingly; once characterized as animals, they could be hunted down like animals. The first exiles from the moral community, animals provided a convenient discard bin for oppressors to dispose the oppressed. The connections are clear: “For a civilization built on the exploitation and slaughter of animals, the `lower’ and more degraded the human victims are, the easier it is to kill them.” Thus, colonialism, as Patterson describes, was a “natural extension of human supremacy over the animal kingdom.” For just as humans had subdued animals with their superior intelligence and technologies, so many Europeans believed that the white race had proven its superiority by bringing the “lower races” under its command. There are important parallels between speciesism and sexism and racism in the elevation of white male rationality to the touchstone of moral worth. The arguments European colonialists used to legitimate exploiting Africans – that they were less than human and inferior to white Europeans in ability to reason – are the very same justifications humans use to trap, hunt, confine, and kill animals. Once western norms of rationality were defined as the essence of humanity and social normality, by first using non-human animals as the measure of alterity, it was a short step to begin viewing odd, different, exotic, and eccentric peoples and types as non- or sub-human. Thus, the same criterion created to exclude animals from humans was also used to ostracize blacks, women, and numerous other groups from “humanity.” The oppression of blacks, women, and animals alike was grounded in an argument that biological inferiority predestined them for servitude. In the major strain of western thought, alleged rational beings (i.e., elite, white, western males) pronounce that the Other (i.e., women, people of color, animals) is deficient in rationality in ways crucial to their nature and status, and therefore are deemed and treated as inferior, subhuman, or nonhuman. Whereas the racist mindset creates a hierarchy of superior/inferior on the basis of skin color, and the sexist mentality splits men and women into greater and lower classes of beings, the speciesist outlook demeans and objectifies animals by dichotomizing the biological continuum into the antipodes of humans and animals. As racism stems from a hateful white supremacism, and sexism is the product of a bigoted male supremacism, so speciesism stems from and informs a violent human supremacism -- namely, the arrogant belief that humans have a natural or God-given right to use animals for any purpose they devise or, more generously, within the moral boundaries of welfarism and stewardship, which however was Judaic moral baggage official Chistianithy left behind.

# \*Speciesism 1nc (human rights affs)\*

**A. The affirmative’s appeal for “human rights” is fundamentally human-centric —it perpetuates and legitimizes speciesism.**

**Tittle ’98, Professor of Philosophy** [Peg, The Humanist View of Speciesism, <http://tittle.humanists.net/humview.htm>]

First, if humanism 'just' emphasized human-as-opposed-to-god, that is, if it were merely a reaction to belief in the supernatural, it would put at its centre, the natural. But it goes one further, it goes one narrower, it puts at its centre the human. It's called humanism, not naturalism. In fact, humanism seems to pride itself on not being merely 'a reaction to.' On more than one occasion, and in "Are You a Humanist?" in particular, it compares itself to atheism: atheism is merely reactionary, negative, anti-religion; humanism, on the other hand, is proactive, positive, pro-human. So whereas naturalism is more general and would include non-human animals, humanism seems specifically, almost intentionally, to exclude them. Second, humanism, "as defined in most dictionaries, [is] a way of life centred on human interests and values..." ("The Humanist Alternative" p.1, emphasis added). Now this is not to say that non-humans can't also be in the centre. But the word 'human' appears in so many principles, the specific-ness seems hardly accidental: "Humanism aims at the full development of every human being" (#1, emphasis added); "Humanists uphold the broadest application of democratic principles in all human relationships" (#2, emphasis added); "Humanists affirm the dignity of every person and the right of the individual to maximum possible freedom compatible with the rights of others" (#4 emphasis, added); "Humanists acknowledge human interdependence, the need for mutual respect, and the kinship of all humanity..." (#5, emphasis added); "Humanists call for continuous improvement of the quality of life so that no living human being may be deprived of the basic necessities of life" (#6, emphasis added); "Humanists support the development and extension of fundamental human rights..." (#7 emphasis added). Given such a relentless focus on human development, relationships, and quality of life, one hardly needs to ask, regarding the third principle, "Humanists advocate the use of the scientific method, both as a guide to distinguish fact from fiction, and as a tool to develop beneficial and creative uses of science and technology"--beneficial for who? And though a hierarchy with humans at the top is not described, I believe this view of human at the centre puts animals as much in a subordinate area. Indeed, "...humanists regard ethical inquiry as evolving like any other human endeavour, changing over time to meet the changing needs of the human species" ("The Humanist Alternative" p.2, emphasis added) [5]. My third reason for thinking that the humanist view leans away from animal rights is that any extrapolations I can make from the principles that might support animal rights are rather weak. The fourth principle insists that the rights of the individual to freedom must be compatible with "the rights of others" and the ninth principle speaks of "a sense of responsibility to oneself and to others." Could those others include animals? It didn't say "the rights of other humans" or "the responsibility to...other humans." But I think I'm grasping at straws here. The eleventh principle states that "Humanists affirm that human and world problems can be resolved only by means of human reason, compassion, and intelligent effort." World problems might involve animals, yes? And the compassion we are directed to use might at least justify their right not to be tortured, yes? Maybe. Given these weak arguments and the overwhelmingly strong focus on human interests, it seems to me that the only animal rights arguments humanists would accept are instrumental ones. Instrumental arguments, such as those put forth by Baxter [6], Passmore [7], and Guthrie [8], claim that animals have rights only insofar as they are of value to us. Animals are viewed, thus, as means to our ends, as instruments for our development, our interests, our quality of life. Contrary, perhaps, to initial assumptions, instrumental arguments do not necessarily lead to rather limited animal rights. Animals may have scientific and medical value (they may be good for research), commercial value (parts of them can be sold, they can be used for income-generating activities), game value (they're used for food), observational value (we like to look at them, in zoos and sanctuaries), recreational value (they're fun to play with), and/or ecological value (the species may be important to the ecosystem) [9]. So insofar as their rights are derived from their value [10], they may have many rights (or at least the most important ones). Humanists can argue that cows have the right to graze (rather than be fed a chemical diet) because it's in our best interests to eat such cows (and not the ones pumped full of steroids and what have you). And I can argue that because my happiness depends on chessie's happiness [11], she has a right to be happy (and therefore will get a new stuffed toy for her birthday). In fact, the more we understand that we live in a complex web of life, that we depend on the ecosystem's stability for our survival, the more favourably we'll consider the other lifeforms in that ecosystem [12]. So humanists may argue that plankton have rights too. Even though instrumental arguments might justify a sufficiently broad range of animal rights, I'm uncomfortable with stopping here. There's something a little distasteful about using others--any others--as a means to one's own ends. And there's something very egocentric, very speciesist [13] in the anthropocentricity of this view. Isn't it selfish exploitation, pure and simple? If it gives pleasure and thus improves the quality of our lives to injure and sometimes kill animals just for the hell of it, well, that would be justified on instrumental grounds. It seems then that humanism must condone sport hunting.

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As he puts it, “the exploitation of animals was the model and inspiration for the atrocities people committed against each other, slavery and the Holocaust being but two of the more dramatic examples.” Hierarchy emerged with the rise of agricultural society some ten thousand years ago. In the shift from nomadic hunting and gathering bands to settled agricultural practices, humans began to establish their dominance over animals through “domestication.” In animal domestication (often a euphemism disguising coercion and cruelty), humans began to exploit animals for purposes such as obtaining food, milk, clothing, plowing, and transportation. As they gained increasing control over the lives and labor power of animals, humans bred them for desired traits and controlled them in various ways, such as castrating males to make them more docile. To conquer, enslave, and claim animals as their own property, humans developed numerous technologies, such as pens, cages, collars, ropes, chains, and branding irons. The domination of animals paved the way for the domination of humans. The sexual subjugation of women, Patterson suggests, was modeled after the domestication of animals, such that men began to control women’s reproductive capacity, to enforce repressive sexual norms, and to rape them as they forced breeding in their animals. Not coincidentally, Patterson argues, slavery emerged in the same region of the Middle East that spawned agriculture, and, in fact, developed as an extension of animal domestication practices. In areas like Sumer, slaves were managed like livestock, and males were castrated and forced to work along with females. In the fifteenth century, when Europeans began the colonization of Africa and Spain introduced the first international slave markets, the metaphors, models, and technologies used to exploit animal slaves were applied with equal cruelty and force to human slaves. Stealing Africans from their native environment and homeland, breaking up families who scream in anguish, wrapping chains around slaves’ bodies, shipping them in cramped quarters across continents for weeks or months with no regard for their needs or suffering, branding their skin with a hot iron to mark them as property, auctioning them as servants, breeding them for service and labor, exploiting them for profit, beating them in rages of hatred and anger, and killing them in vast numbers – all these horrors and countless others inflicted on black slaves were developed and perfected centuries earlier through animal exploitation. As the domestication of animals developed in agricultural society, humans lost the intimate connections they once had with animals. By the time of Aristotle, certainly, and with the bigoted assistance of medieval theologians such as St. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, western humanity had developed an explicitly hierarchical worldview – that came to be known as the “Great Chain of Being” – used to position humans as the end to which all other beings were mere means. Patterson underscores the crucial point that the domination of human over human and its exercise through slavery, warfare, and genocide typically begins with the denigration of victims. But the means and methods of dehumanization are derivative, for speciesism provided the conceptual paradigm that encouraged, sustained, and justified western brutality toward other peoples. “Throughout the history of our ascent to dominance as the master species,” Patterson writes, “our victimization of animals has served as the model and foundation for our victimization of each other. The study of human history reveals the pattern: first, humans exploit and slaughter animals; then, they treat other people like animals and do the same to them.” Whether the conquerors are European imperialists, American colonialists, or German Nazis, western aggressors engaged in wordplay before swordplay, vilifying their victims – Africans, Native Americans, Filipinos, Japanese, Vietnamese, Iraqis, and other unfortunates – with opprobrious terms such as “rats,” “pigs,” “swine,” “monkeys,” “beasts,” and “filthy animals.” Once perceived as brute beasts or sub-humans occupying a lower evolutionary rung than white westerners, subjugated peoples were treated accordingly; once characterized as animals, they could be hunted down like animals. The first exiles from the moral community, animals provided a convenient discard bin for oppressors to dispose the oppressed. The connections are clear: “For a civilization built on the exploitation and slaughter of animals, the `lower’ and more degraded the human victims are, the easier it is to kill them.” Thus, colonialism, as Patterson describes, was a “natural extension of human supremacy over the animal kingdom.” For just as humans had subdued animals with their superior intelligence and technologies, so many Europeans believed that the white race had proven its superiority by bringing the “lower races” under its command. There are important parallels between speciesism and sexism and racism in the elevation of white male rationality to the touchstone of moral worth. The arguments European colonialists used to legitimate exploiting Africans – that they were less than human and inferior to white Europeans in ability to reason – are the very same justifications humans use to trap, hunt, confine, and kill animals. Once western norms of rationality were defined as the essence of humanity and social normality, by first using non-human animals as the measure of alterity, it was a short step to begin viewing odd, different, exotic, and eccentric peoples and types as non- or sub-human. Thus, the same criterion created to exclude animals from humans was also used to ostracize blacks, women, and numerous other groups from “humanity.” The oppression of blacks, women, and animals alike was grounded in an argument that biological inferiority predestined them for servitude. In the major strain of western thought, alleged rational beings (i.e., elite, white, western males) pronounce that the Other (i.e., women, people of color, animals) is deficient in rationality in ways crucial to their nature and status, and therefore are deemed and treated as inferior, subhuman, or nonhuman. Whereas the racist mindset creates a hierarchy of superior/inferior on the basis of skin color, and the sexist mentality splits men and women into greater and lower classes of beings, the speciesist outlook demeans and objectifies animals by dichotomizing the biological continuum into the antipodes of humans and animals. As racism stems from a hateful white supremacism, and sexism is the product of a bigoted male supremacism, so speciesism stems from and informs a violent human supremacism -- namely, the arrogant belief that humans have a natural or God-given right to use animals for any purpose they devise or, more generously, within the moral boundaries of welfarism and stewardship, which however was Judaic moral baggage official Chistianithy left behind.

# \*Speciesism 1nc (Questioning / K affs)\*

**A. Their criticism does not challenge the preconception that human problems are those worth solving – modern philosophical discussions are necessarily human-centered.**

**Singer ’89**, Professor of Bioethics at Princeton University and Laureate Professor at the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics at the University of Melbourne[All Animals Are Equal, TOM REGAN & PETER SINGER (eds.), Animal Rights and Human Obligations, New Jersey, 1989, pp. 148-162]

Experimenting on animals, and eating their flesh, are perhaps the two major forms of speciesism in our society. By comparison, the third and last form of speciesism is so minor as to be insignificant, but it is perhaps of some special interest to those for whom this article was written. I am referring to speciesism in contemporary philosophy. Philosophy ought to question the basic assumptions of the age. Thinking through, critically and carefully, what most people take for granted is, I believe, the chief task of philosophy, and it is this task that makes philosophy a worthwhile activity. Regrettably, philosophy does not always live up to its historic role. Philosophers are human beings, and they are subject to all the preconceptions of the society to which they belong. Sometimes they succeed in breaking free of the prevailing ideology: more often they become its most sophisticated defenders. So, in this case, philosophy as practiced in the universities today does not challenge anyone's preconceptions about our relations with other species. By their writings, those philosophers who tackle problems that touch upon the issue reveal that they make the same unquestioned assumptions as most other humans, and what they say tends to confirm the reader in his or her comfortable speciesist habits.

# \*Speciesism 1nc (Questioning / K affs)\*

**B. We must deny the urge to align ourselves with their human-centric politics – it is an all or nothing question.**

**Dell’Aversano ‘10** [Carmen, “the love whose name cannot be spoken: queering the human-animal bond” journal for critical animal studies, volume III issue 1 and 2, 2010]

A real ―oxymoronic community of difference‖, embracing not only all possible variants of ―gender trouble‖ but also the queering of the human-animal barrier, would not need to teach anybody anything, because it would have made violence unthinkable, since the human oppression of non-human animals is not a peripheral case of no political relevance but, as Zimbardo‘s own analysis of ―dehumanization‖ shows, the archetype, model and training ground of all forms of oppression and injustice.xxvi In this respect animal queer, more than any form of queer, radically threatens the very foundations of human society as we know it, since taking it seriously, not simply as another interesting category for academic analysis but as an ethical and political imperative, implies doing everything we can to dismantle the linguistic, conceptual and performative apparatus which makes all kinds of violence and oppression possible. In animal queer the dichotomy between liberation theory and civil right politics, which has been discussed at length in queer literature,xxvii has no substance: crossing the line dividing our species from the other ones means eradicating the very categories of thought needed to conceive of inequality and injustice. If the definition of queer politics is radical opposition to the established social order as such, and the measure of success of queer political action is the extent to which it smashes the system, then animal rights activism is the queerest possible form of political action, because it is structurally incompatible with continuing to live the way the system expects us to. The reason why animal queer is structurally and intrinsically subversive, and why it is perceived as radically threatening, and is, accordingly, ruthlessly marginalized, by all forms of cultural and political discourse, is that it replaces sameness with otherness as the criterion of emotional, social and political inclusion: whoever supports animals, Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume VIII, Issue 1/2, 2010 (ISSN1948-352X) 101 fights for animals, loves an animal loves, supports and fights not for the self but for the other (―the wholly other that they call animal […]Yes, the wholly other, more other than any other, that they call an animal‖, as Derrida 1999 380 would put it), and knows in advance that no middle ground will ever be found, no assimilation will ever be possible, that in one, one hundred or one million years animals will be just as puzzling, as foreign, as alien to all that we can be and understand as they are now. If true love is felt not for the self but for the Other, and if ―[a]imer l‘autre, c‘est préserver son étrangeté, reconnaître qu‘il existe à côté de moi, loin de moi, non avec moi‖xxviii (Bruckner & Finkielkraut 1977 256), then love in its animal queer form is indeed the purest, most coherent and most radical form of love, and as such it has the potential not to reform society or to facilitate social ―progress‖ but to replace it with the unthinkable, with something radically contradicting all assumptions, expectations and definitions, to create the possibility of a happiness we can‘t even imagine, because to fathom it we would already have to be different from what we are, to have moved beyond ourselves.

# \*Speciesism 1nc (Questioning / K affs)\*

**C. Vote neg to reject the 1ac —maintaining the human-non-human binary dooms them to endless cycles of subordination and violence- this is also the site of protest that we should focus on**

**Best ’07**, Associate Professor, Departments of Humanities and Philosophy University of Texas, El Paso [Steven, Charles Patterson, The Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust New York: Lantern Books, 2002, 280 pp]

While a welcome advance over the anthropocentric conceit that only humans shape human actions, the environmental determinism approach typically fails to emphasize the crucial role that animals play in human history, as well as how the human exploitation of animals is a key cause of hierarchy, social conflict, and environmental breakdown. A core thesis of what I call “animal standpoint theory” is that animals have been key driving and shaping forces of human thought, psychology, moral and social life, and history overall. More specifically, animal standpoint theory argues that the oppression of human over human has deep roots in the oppression of human over animal. In this context, Charles Patterson’s recent book, The Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust, articulates the animal standpoint in a powerful form with revolutionary implications. The main argument of Eternal Treblinka is that the human domination of animals, such as it emerged some ten thousand years ago with the rise of agricultural society, was the first hierarchical domination and laid the groundwork for patriarchy, slavery, warfare, genocide, and other systems of violence and power. A key implication of Patterson’s theory is that human liberation is implausible if disconnected from animal liberation, and thus humanism -- a speciesist philosophy that constructs a hierarchal relationship privileging superior humans over inferior animals and reduces animals to resources for human use -- collapses under the weight of its logical contradictions. Patterson lays out his complex holistic argument in three parts. In Part I, he demonstrates that animal exploitation and speciesism have direct and profound connections to slavery, colonialism, racism, and anti-Semitism. In Part II, he shows how these connections exist not only in the realm of ideology – as conceptual systems of justifying and underpinning domination and hierarchy – but also in systems of technology, such that the tools and techniques humans devised for the rationalized mass confinement and slaughter of animals were mobilized against human groups for the same ends. Finally, in the fascinating interviews and narratives of Part III, Patterson describes how personal experience with German Nazism prompted Jewish to take antithetical paths: whereas most retreated to an insular identity and dogmatic emphasis on the singularity of Nazi evil and its tragic experience, others recognized the profound similarities between how Nazis treated their human captives and how humanity as a whole treats other animals, an epiphany that led them to adopt vegetarianism, to become advocates for the animals, and develop a far broader and more inclusive ethic informed by universal compassion for all suffering and oppressed beings. The Origins of Hierarchy "As long as men massacre animals, they will kill each other" –Pythagoras It is little understood that the first form of oppression, domination, and hierarchy involves human domination over animals. Patterson’s thesis stands in bold contrast to the Marxist theory that the domination over nature is fundamental to the domination over other humans. It differs as well from the social ecology position of Murray Bookchin that domination over humans brings about alienation from the natural world, provokes hierarchical mindsets and institutions, and is the root of the long-standing western goal to “dominate” nature. In the case of Marxists, anarchists, and so many others, theorists typically don’t even mention human domination of animals, let alone assign it causal primacy or significance. In Patterson’s model, however, the human subjugation of animals is the first form of hierarchy and it paves the way for all other systems of domination such as include patriarchy, racism, colonialism, anti-Semitism, and the Holocaust. As he puts it, “the exploitation of animals was the model and inspiration for the atrocities people committed against each other, slavery and the Holocaust being but two of the more dramatic examples.” Hierarchy emerged with the rise of agricultural society some ten thousand years ago. In the shift from nomadic hunting and gathering bands to settled agricultural practices, humans began to establish their dominance over animals through “domestication.” In animal domestication (often a euphemism disguising coercion and cruelty), humans began to exploit animals for purposes such as obtaining food, milk, clothing, plowing, and transportation. As they gained increasing control over the lives and labor power of animals, humans bred them for desired traits and controlled them in various ways, such as castrating males to make them more docile. To conquer, enslave, and claim animals as their own property, humans developed numerous technologies, such as pens, cages, collars, ropes, chains, and branding irons. The domination of animals paved the way for the domination of humans. The sexual subjugation of women, Patterson suggests, was modeled after the domestication of animals, such that men began to control women’s reproductive capacity, to enforce repressive sexual norms, and to rape them as they forced breeding in their animals. Not coincidentally, Patterson argues, slavery emerged in the same region of the Middle East that spawned agriculture, and, in fact, developed as an extension of animal domestication practices. In areas like Sumer, slaves were managed like livestock, and males were castrated and forced to work along with females. In the fifteenth century, when Europeans began the colonization of Africa and Spain introduced the first international slave markets, the metaphors, models, and technologies used to exploit animal slaves were applied with equal cruelty and force to human slaves. Stealing Africans from their native environment and homeland, breaking up families who scream in anguish, wrapping chains around slaves’ bodies, shipping them in cramped quarters across continents for weeks or months with no regard for their needs or suffering, branding their skin with a hot iron to mark them as property, auctioning them as servants, breeding them for service and labor, exploiting them for profit, beating them in rages of hatred and anger, and killing them in vast numbers – all these horrors and countless others inflicted on black slaves were developed and perfected centuries earlier through animal exploitation. 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# \*\*\*Speciesism 2nc/1nr blocks\*\*\*

# Speciesism O/V –

**Speciesism is the root cause of every impact – every system of hierarchy – racism, sexism, and homophobia – is all premised on the human animal/nonhuman animal divide. Our Best evidence says equating people with animals is precondition for violence. The alt unmasks all of these systems of hierarchy.**

**The human-non-human animals complex is at a crisis point – it is the internal link to every extinction scenario.**

**Best et al ’07** [Steven Best, Anthony J. Nocella, II, Richard Kahn, Carol Gigliotti, and Lisa Kemmerer, Introducing Critical Animal Studies, VOLUME V, ISSUE I,http://www.criticalanimalstudies.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/Introducing-Critical-Animal-Studies-2007.pdf]

The aim of the Institute for Critical Animal Studies (ICAS) is to provide a space for the development of a ―critical‖ approach to animal studies, one which perceives that relations between human and nonhuman animals are now at a point of crisis which implicates the planet as a whole. This dire situation is evident most dramatically in the intensified slaughter and exploitation of animals (who die by the tens of billions each year in the United States alone); the unfolding of the sixth great extinction crisis in the history of the planet (the last one being 65 million years ago); and the monumental environmental ecological threats of global warming, rainforest destruction, desertification, air and water pollution, and resource scarcity, to which animal agriculture is a prime contributor.

**Democracy is not possible without unmasking speciesism**

**Best ’07, Associate Professor, Departments of Humanities and Philosophy University of Texas, El Paso** [Steven, Charles Patterson, The Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust New York: Lantern Books, 2002, 280 pp]

Still, to spin the dialectical wheel back again, **social change cannot take the first step in the right direction without a “new awareness” of how human liberation is impossible without animal liberation, without recognition that enlightenment, democracy, and moral progress are impossible without dismantling speciesism in favor of a truly non-violent, egalitarian, and inclusive community**.

# Speciesism AT: Perm--do both

**all of our links are DAs to the perm – the justification for the aff is to make life better for “us” a socially constructed boundary between human and nonhuman animals—this is the basis for literally all forms of violence.**

**severs out of the entire framing, agent, justifications for the 1ac - this severance destroys critical ground and the ability to engage the AFF at a philosophical OR policy making level—voting issue.**

**The inconsistency inherent in the perm make their impacts inevitable.**

**Irvine ’06, Ph.D. in sociology and teaches at the University of Colorado** [Leslie, Animals in Disasters: Issues for Animal Liberation Activism and Policy, Animal Liberation Philosophy and Policy Journal, Volume IV, Issue 1,http://www.criticalanimalstudies.org/JCAS/Journal\_Articles\_download/Issue\_5/irvine.pdf]

Some researchers point out that all disasters are human-caused, because we choose to live, work, and play in disaster-prone areas. As we incorporated animals into human 14 society, we also exposed them to hazards. Because companion animals share our homes, they face the same risks from fire, weather, and other hazards that might cause injury, threaten lives, or require evacuation. We are therefore responsible for their welfare. However, in disaster responses, human lives have priority. Although an evaluation of the justifications for this moral decision lies beyond the scope of this paper, the decision itself implies that we cannot save animals as well as humans. The kinds of policies that would value all lives would challenge the dualistic thinking behind the simplistic categories of “humans” and “animals.” Activists must continually challenge speciesism, wherever it appears. The anthropocentric assumptions that permeate our culture are a disaster waiting to happen.

# Speciesism AT: Perm--do both

**The perm is a disad to the K – it merely extends the logic of the 1ac to non-humans, which ensures cooptation.**

**Perlo ’07, animal rights activist since 1983; she obtained a Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of Dundee** [Katherine, Extrinsic and Intrinsic Arguments: Strategies for Promoting Animal Rights,http://www.animalliberationfront.com/Philosophy/strategies.pdf]

Animal rights campaigners disagree as to whether empirical arguments, based on facts such as those concerning nutrition, or ethical arguments, based on values such as the wrongness of hurting sentient beings, have greater validity and potential effectiveness. I want to address the issue in terms of “extrinsic” and “intrinsic” arguments – a distinction that corresponds only partly to the empirical and ethical couplet – and to make the case that animal rights campaigns are most effectively advanced through intrinsic appeals. “Extrinsic arguments” are those that seek to promote an aim and its underlying principle by appealing to considerations politically, historically, or logically separable from that aim and that principle. “Intrinsic arguments” appeal to considerations within and inseparable from the aim and principle. In this case, the aim is animal liberation and the principle is the moral equality of species. For example, the claim that vegetarianism (ideally, veganism) helps reduce animal suffering is an intrinsic argument, but it can also be justified on extrinsic grounds through appeal to its environmental benefits. You can separate vegetarianism from the benefit to the environment, since it is logically possible that the one might not lead to the other, and environmentalism is an independent political cause. But you cannot separate vegetarianism from the benefit to animals, since the word vegetarianism, whatever its etymology, is used to mean abstention from meat or from all animal products. You might say that “benefit to animals” is an independent issue in that there are other means of ameliorating animal suffering besides vegetarianism, or you might promote vegetarianism only for human health benefits. But in terms of animal rights campaigning, vegetarianism is advanced for the intrinsic reasons that it benefits the animals themselves. The case for intrinsic arguments rests not on a concern for ideological purity, but on the need to reach a public that, although partly responsive to our ideas in some areas, has stopped far short of the acceptance needed to make significant breakthroughs. At some point in the encounter with us, the reaction sets in of either, “Yes, it’s terrible, but it’s justified if it saves human lives,” or, “Yes, it’s terrible and unjustifiable, but we have more important [i.e. human] things to worry about.” We need to tackle speciesism head-on, instead of relying on less challenging extrinsic arguments – “widely-accepted and existing frames” in Yates’s (2006) formulation – which tacitly consign “animal rights” and its policy demands to a marginal, indeed “extreme,” position. Besides disowning animal rights, extrinsic arguments contain inconsistent or evasive implications that can leave the audience doubtful and confused without being able to pin down what is wrong. It is true that extrinsic arguments have had some positive effect. If, for non-animal rights reasons, even one person has turned vegan or decided to oppose vivisection, while another has taken a small step in the right direction, such as by giving up “red meat,” there are nonetheless benefits for animals and the planet. But what is truly needed to free billions of animals is a qualitative transformation in people’s thinking. Without a moral paradigm shift, the public may never be motivated to overcome either its own self-interest in using animals or governments’ aggressive protection of animal-abusing industries.

# Speciesism AT: Perm--do both

**Turn - the perm reasons from the inside out, undermining our stance against speciesism.**

**Rowe ’96, Professor of Plant Ecology at the University of Saskatchewan** [Stan, Ecocentrism: the Chord that Harmonizes Humans and Earth, <http://www.ecospherics.net/pages/RoweEcocentrism.html>]

As heirs to several centuries of rampant individualism culminating today in the frenetic pursuit of self-esteem and personal authenticity, most of us will be burdened throughout our lives with an indissoluble kernel of egocentrism and, by extension, anthropocentrism. This should not deter people of good will from proclaiming the truth that, relative to Earth, humanity is not the center. A few hundred years ago, with some reluctance, Western people admitted that the planets, sun and stars did not circle around their abode. In short, our thoughts and concepts though irreducibly anthropomorphic need not be anthropocentric. Wherever our sense of greatest importance lies, there also will our ethics be. The attempt to build ethical concern for the Ecosphere from the inside out, by add-ons starting with our selves and the human race, may soothe consciences for a little while, but it will be the kiss of death for wild nature. Aldo Leopold has been the influential exponent of ethics-by-extension, rationalized as an expedient for human survival. Unfortunately this approach only strengthens anthropocentrism, making it certain that land, air, water and other organisms will always in the crunch take second place to the welfare of self, family and friends. More sensible, but more difficult, is the ecocentric ethic that confers highest valuation on the Ecosphere which, by proxy, bestows ethical merit and concern on its subsidiary contents according to their compliance and cooperation. The self finds its ecological values in the welfare of the non-self. Ecological ethics - guidelines for human behavior here on Earth - are derivative, founded in Earth care. Blessed are those who make sacrifices to preserve and sustain the non-human, human-containing world. Cursed are those who wilfully destroy Earth's creativity and beauty. If religions cannot incorporate such ethics in their theologies, they too stand condemned.

# Speciesism AT: Perm--do both

**If we win our root cause arguments, that means only the rejection of the aff solves their offense since it provides the only relevant FW for linking oppressions.**

**Framing DA: the human-centric politics of the permutation guarantee the alternative will be coopted by the aff’s drive for power**

**Papadopoulos 10** (Dimitris, Reader in Sociology and Organisation University of Leicester, Epherema vol 10 “Insurgent posthumanism” 2010)

It is true that left politics have largely ignored the complexity and unpredictability of the entanglement between a deeply divided society and that of a deeply divided nonhuman world. The principle avenue for social transformation, at least in the main conceptualisations of the political left 3 , passes through seizing the centres of social and political power. The dominant motivation for left politics after the revolutions of 1848 (and definitely since 1871) has been how to conquer institutional power and the state. Within this matrix of radical left thinking the posthumanist moment becomes invalidated, subsumed to a strategy focused solely on social power. But here I want to argue that a post-humanist gesture can be found at the heart of processes of left political mobilisations that create transformative institutions and alternatives. This was the case even when such moves were distorted at the end, neutralised or finally appropriated into a form of left politics solely concerned with institutional representation and state power. What such an appropriation conceals is that a significant part of the everyday realities put to work through radical left struggles have always had a strong posthumanist character through their concentration on remaking the mundane material conditions of existence beyond and outside an immediate opposition to the state. In what follows I will try to excavate this posthumanist gesture from the main narratives of radical left political struggles along the following three fault lines: the first is about the exit from an alienated and highly regulated relation to the material, biological and technological realms through the making of a self-organised common world – a move from enclosed and separated worlds governed by labour to the making of ecological commons. A second posthumanist move is one that attacks the practice of politics as a matter of idea and institutions and rehabilitates politics as an embodied and everyday practice – an exit from the representational mind to the embodiment of politics. Finally, the third, involves the decentring of the human subject as the main actor of history making. History is a human affair but it is not made (only) by certain groups of humans – a move towards a post-anthropocentric history.

**The permutation devolves into self-serving rationalizations—ethical compromises are unacceptable.**

**Lupisella & Logsdon 97** (Mark, masters degree in philosophy of science at university of Maryland and researcher working at the Goddard Space Flight Center, and John, Director, Space Policy Institute The George Washington University, Washington, “DO WE NEED A COSMOCENTRIC ETHIC?” <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.25.7502>)

Steve Gillett has suggested a hybrid view combining homocentrism as applied to terrestrial activity combined with biocentrism towards worlds with indigenous life.32 Invoking such a patchwork of theories to help deal with different domains and circumstances could be considered acceptable and perhaps even desirable especially when dealing with something as varied and complex as ethics. Indeed, it has a certain common sense appeal. However, instead of digging deeply into what is certainly a legitimate epistemological issue, let us consider the words of J. Baird Callicott: “But there is both a rational philosophical demand and a human psychological need for a self-consistent and all-embracing moral theory. We are neither good philosophers nor whole persons if for one purpose we adopt utilitarianism, another deontology, a third animal liberation, a fourth the land ethic, and so on. Such ethical eclecticism is not only rationally intolerable, it is morally suspect as it invites the suspicion of ad hoc rationalizations for merely expedient or self-serving actions.”33

# Speciesism AT: Perm--do both

**Impossible to do both – the conversion to non-humanism must be a complete and total surrender – tantamount to religious conversion – we must shut our eyes to the possibility of the world being any other way.**

**Best ’07, Associate Professor, Departments of Humanities and Philosophy University of Texas, El Paso** [Steven, Charles Patterson, The Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust New York: Lantern Books, 2002, 280 pp]

“At the moment our human world is based on the suffering and destruction of millions of non-humans. To perceive this and to do something to change it in personal and public ways is to undergo a change of perception akin to a religious conversion. Nothing can ever be seen in quite the same way again because once you have admitted the terror and pain of other species you will, unless you resist conversion, be always aware of the endless permutations of suffering that support our society." Arthur Conan Doyle “The vast majority of Holocaust survivors are carnivores, no more concerned about animals’ suffering than were the Germans concerned about Jews’ suffering. What does it all mean? I will tell you. It means that we have learned nothing from the Holocaust.” Arthur Kaplan By this point in Patterson’s narrative, many readers may be offended by the audacity of comparing the suffering of animals and human beings, but Patterson disarms this speciesist objection quite effectively in the third section of Eternal Treblinka. Here, often using original research and interviews, he discusses the experiences of numerous Holocaust survivors and Jewish people currently living in Germany and Austria, many of whom lost family members to Nazi terror. While many Jews scarred by the human Holocaust never made the connection to the animal Holocaust, and remained speciesists and carnivores, numerous Jewish activists, artists, and intellectuals did, as their experiences of Nazism and concentration camps gave them a greater empathy for all oppressed life and, logically, led them to vegetarianism. As beautifully stated by Edgar Kupfer-Koberwitz, a prisoner in Dachau (1940-1945), “I eat no animals because I don’t want to live on the suffering and death of other creatures. I have suffered so much myself that I can feel other creatures’ suffering by virtue of my own.” Through a series of compelling narratives, Patterson discusses the lives and moral epiphanies of many distinguished Jewish people who learned to connect the important dots, including Alex Hershaft, founder and president of the Farm Animal Reform Movement (FARM); Peter Singer, ethicist and author of Animal Liberation; and Henry Spira, noted animal rights activist. Another notable Jewish figure Patterson describes is Isaac Bashevis Singer, the 1978 Nobel Prize winner in Literature. Many of the characters in Singer’s short stories and novels are vegetarians as well as proponents of a universal ethics of compassion that extends beyond human society to include animals. Singer denounces the hypocrisy of those who speak against bloodshed while themselves causing it in their daily food choices, and he spoke through his characters in poignant statements such as: “You cannot be gentle while you’re killing a creature, you cannot be for justice while you take a creature who is weaker than you and slaughter it, and torture it.” “People should live in such a way that they did not build their happiness on the misfortune of others.” “The man who eats meat ... upholds with every bite … that might is right.” Singer draws broad connections between the violence humans inflict on animals and the cruelties they heap upon one another, and criticized the “Might is Right” ideology as a fascist ideology at its core. “The smugness with which man could do with other species as he pleased,” Singer writes, “exemplified the most extreme racist theories, the principle that might is right.” For Singer, “There is only one little step from killing animals to creating gas chambers a la Hitler and concentration camps a la Stalin ...There will be no justice as long as man will stand with a knife or with a gun and destroy those who are weaker than he is.” Singer insists that “what the Nazis had done to the Jews, man was doing to the animals.” Most famously, in his short story, “The Letter Writer,” Singer drew an apt analogy between the violence German Nazis used against human victims and the tyranny humans throughout the globe impose on animals: "What do they know -- all these scholars, all these philosophers, all the leaders of the world? 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# Speciesism Perm Answers--(intersectionality perm answers)

**The perm begs the question of the Kritik and is only a reason to vote neg - our link evidence is pretty clear that their framing of 1ac as something that will make life better for “us” further ruptures the socially constructed boundaries between human and nonhuman animals—this is the basis for literally all forms of violence.**

**Clearly severs out of the entire framing, agent, justifications for the 1ac - this extreme form of severance destroys critical ground and the ability to engage the AFF at a philosophical OR policy making level—making this a voting issue.**

**The inconsistency inherent in the perm make their impacts inevitable.**

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Some researchers point out that all disasters are human-caused, because we choose to live, work, and play in disaster-prone areas. As we incorporated animals into human 14 society, we also exposed them to hazards. Because companion animals share our homes, they face the same risks from fire, weather, and other hazards that might cause injury, threaten lives, or require evacuation. We are therefore responsible for their welfare. However, in disaster responses, human lives have priority. Although an evaluation of the justifications for this moral decision lies beyond the scope of this paper, the decision itself implies that we cannot save animals as well as humans. The kinds of policies that would value all lives would challenge the dualistic thinking behind the simplistic categories of “humans” and “animals.” Activists must continually challenge speciesism, wherever it appears. The anthropocentric assumptions that permeate our culture are a disaster waiting to happen.

**If we win our root cause arguments, that means only the rejection of the aff solves their offense since it provides the only relevant FW for linking oppressions.**

**Turn - intersectionality is not inclusive, rather it fractures groups into competing factions—we should instead unify our opposition to oppression under the all-inclusive banner of anti-speciesism.**

**Spelman ‘07** [Hypatia 22.3 (2007) 201-204 Muse]

Naomi Zack's new book offers a kind of Humpty-Dumpty version of the recent career of feminist theory. The story begins about twenty years ago, when the feminist movement fell into conceptual and political disarray. Feminist theory imploded in response to charges that although it purported to be about all women it was in fact narrowly focused on white, middle-class, heterosexual, able-bodied women of the Western world. Feminism came to acknowledge the kinds of differences race, class, culture, and other variables make to women's identities and lives, but did so in such a way as to undermine the possibility of a unified women's movement. As Zack argues, Intersectionality is believed to be democratic because women of color now have the authority, demanded by them and sanctioned by white feminists, to create their own feminisms. But, as a theory of women's identity, intersectionality is not inclusive insofar as members of specific intersections of race and class can create only their own feminisms. (2) And so, instead of a unified women's movement grounded in a theory of women's commonality, we ended up with the shards and splats of narrowly focused identity-based feminisms. The good news, according to Zack, is that it is possible for feminists not simply to put Humpty back together again (why do that, if Humpty was myopically constructed to begin with?) but to craft a new and much better version.

# Speciesism Links--(intersectionality perm answers)

**Impossible to do both – the conversion to non-humanism must be a complete and total surrender – tantamount to religious conversion – we must shut our eyes to the possibility of the world being any other way.**

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“At the moment our human world is based on the suffering and destruction of millions of non-humans. To perceive this and to do something to change it in personal and public ways is to undergo a change of perception akin to a religious conversion. Nothing can ever be seen in quite the same way again because once you have admitted the terror and pain of other species you will, unless you resist conversion, be always aware of the endless permutations of suffering that support our society." Arthur Conan Doyle “The vast majority of Holocaust survivors are carnivores, no more concerned about animals’ suffering than were the Germans concerned about Jews’ suffering. What does it all mean? I will tell you. 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# Speciesism Links--(intersectionality perm answers)

**Turn - the perm reasons from the inside out, undermining our stance against speciesism.**

**Rowe ’96, Professor of Plant Ecology at the University of Saskatchewan** [Stan, Ecocentrism: the Chord that Harmonizes Humans and Earth, <http://www.ecospherics.net/pages/RoweEcocentrism.html>]

As heirs to several centuries of rampant individualism culminating today in the frenetic pursuit of self-esteem and personal authenticity, most of us will be burdened throughout our lives with an indissoluble kernel of egocentrism and, by extension, anthropocentrism. This should not deter people of good will from proclaiming the truth that, relative to Earth, humanity is not the center. A few hundred years ago, with some reluctance, Western people admitted that the planets, sun and stars did not circle around their abode. In short, our thoughts and concepts though irreducibly anthropomorphic need not be anthropocentric. Wherever our sense of greatest importance lies, there also will our ethics be. The attempt to build ethical concern for the Ecosphere from the inside out, by add-ons starting with our selves and the human race, may soothe consciences for a little while, but it will be the kiss of death for wild nature. Aldo Leopold has been the influential exponent of ethics-by-extension, rationalized as an expedient for human survival. Unfortunately this approach only strengthens anthropocentrism, making it certain that land, air, water and other organisms will always in the crunch take second place to the welfare of self, family and friends. More sensible, but more difficult, is the ecocentric ethic that confers highest valuation on the Ecosphere which, by proxy, bestows ethical merit and concern on its subsidiary contents according to their compliance and cooperation. The self finds its ecological values in the welfare of the non-self. Ecological ethics - guidelines for human behavior here on Earth - are derivative, founded in Earth care. Blessed are those who make sacrifices to preserve and sustain the non-human, human-containing world. Cursed are those who wilfully destroy Earth's creativity and beauty. If religions cannot incorporate such ethics in their theologies, they too stand condemned.

# Speciesism Links--(intersectionality perm answers)

**The perm is a disad to the K – it merely extends the logic of the 1ac to non-humans, which ensures cooptation.**

**Perlo ’07, animal rights activist since 1983; she obtained a Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of Dundee** [Katherine, Extrinsic and Intrinsic Arguments: Strategies for Promoting Animal Rights,http://www.animalliberationfront.com/Philosophy/strategies.pdf]

Animal rights campaigners disagree as to whether empirical arguments, based on facts such as those concerning nutrition, or ethical arguments, based on values such as the wrongness of hurting sentient beings, have greater validity and potential effectiveness. I want to address the issue in terms of “extrinsic” and “intrinsic” arguments – a distinction that corresponds only partly to the empirical and ethical couplet – and to make the case that animal rights campaigns are most effectively advanced through intrinsic appeals. “Extrinsic arguments” are those that seek to promote an aim and its underlying principle by appealing to considerations politically, historically, or logically separable from that aim and that principle. “Intrinsic arguments” appeal to considerations within and inseparable from the aim and principle. In this case, the aim is animal liberation and the principle is the moral equality of species. For example, the claim that vegetarianism (ideally, veganism) helps reduce animal suffering is an intrinsic argument, but it can also be justified on extrinsic grounds through appeal to its environmental benefits. You can separate vegetarianism from the benefit to the environment, since it is logically possible that the one might not lead to the other, and environmentalism is an independent political cause. But you cannot separate vegetarianism from the benefit to animals, since the word vegetarianism, whatever its etymology, is used to mean abstention from meat or from all animal products. You might say that “benefit to animals” is an independent issue in that there are other means of ameliorating animal suffering besides vegetarianism, or you might promote vegetarianism only for human health benefits. But in terms of animal rights campaigning, vegetarianism is advanced for the intrinsic reasons that it benefits the animals themselves. The case for intrinsic arguments rests not on a concern for ideological purity, but on the need to reach a public that, although partly responsive to our ideas in some areas, has stopped far short of the acceptance needed to make significant breakthroughs. At some point in the encounter with us, the reaction sets in of either, “Yes, it’s terrible, but it’s justified if it saves human lives,” or, “Yes, it’s terrible and unjustifiable, but we have more important [i.e. human] things to worry about.” We need to tackle speciesism head-on, instead of relying on less challenging extrinsic arguments – “widely-accepted and existing frames” in Yates’s (2006) formulation – which tacitly consign “animal rights” and its policy demands to a marginal, indeed “extreme,” position. Besides disowning animal rights, extrinsic arguments contain inconsistent or evasive implications that can leave the audience doubtful and confused without being able to pin down what is wrong. It is true that extrinsic arguments have had some positive effect. If, for non-animal rights reasons, even one person has turned vegan or decided to oppose vivisection, while another has taken a small step in the right direction, such as by giving up “red meat,” there are nonetheless benefits for animals and the planet. But what is truly needed to free billions of animals is a qualitative transformation in people’s thinking. Without a moral paradigm shift, the public may never be motivated to overcome either its own self-interest in using animals or governments’ aggressive protection of animal-abusing industries.

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# Speciesism Links--(Natural disaster scenarios)

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**Turn - the type of information used to justify action MATTERS. Speciesist information will create “piggy back” problems and undermine the perm.**

**Irvine ’06, Ph.D. in sociology and teaches at the University of Colorado** [Leslie, Animals in Disasters: Issues for Animal Liberation Activism and Policy, Animal Liberation Philosophy and Policy Journal, Volume IV, Issue 1,http://www.criticalanimalstudies.org/JCAS/Journal\_Articles\_download/Issue\_5/irvine.pdf]

The recent attention paid to the needs of animals in disasters points out what I have elsewhere referred to as the paradox of progression (Irvine 2003). The phrase captures how one 13 social problem develops into new problems or “piggybacks” new versions onto existing ones. For example, an ongoing problem for companion animals in disasters is displacement. In Hurricanes Andrew and Katrina, abandoned and stray animals caused additional disasters. However, when animal evacuation plans succeed, as they did in Hurricane Charley, the problem is no longer displaced animals but fears about “dangerous dog packs.” The current solution to that problem—shooting suspicious strays—is clearly unacceptable. Thus, the new problem becomes one of disabusing law enforcement and the public of the notion that dog packs pose a serious threat. Similarly, emergency responders face the “problem” of SUVs. The solution has been to create a position within the ICS to convey information to the public about how they can help. The problem then becomes one of what kind of information to convey, as the potential for negative public relations is high. The SUV problem might some day be resolved, raising new concerns. At present, though, it remains a pitfall for all situations involving animal handling.

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# Speciesism Perm Answers--(K affs)

**The human-centric basis of the philosophical question behind the aff is incompatible with a genuine reframing of their approach to non-human animals. The perm cannot happen without abandonment of the entirety of the 1ac …**

**Singer ’89, Professor of Bioethics at Princeton University and Laureate Professor at the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics at the University of Melbourne** [All Animals Are Equal, TOM REGAN & PETER SINGER (eds.), Animal Rights and Human Obligations, New Jersey, 1989, pp. 148-162]

It is significant that the problem of equality, in moral and political philosophy, is invariably formulated in terms of human equality. The effect of this is that the question of the equality of other animals does not confront the philosopher, or student, as an issue itself—and this is already an indication of the failure of philosophy to challenge accepted beliefs. Still, philosophers have found it difficult to discuss the issue of human equality without raising, in a paragraph or two, the question of the status of other animals. The reason for this, which should be apparent from what I have said already, is that if humans are to be regarded as equal to one another, we need some sense of "equal" that does not require any actual, descriptive equality of capacities, talents or other qualities. If equality is to be related to any actual characteristics of humans, these characteristics must be some lowest common denominator, pitched so low that no human lacks them—but then the philosopher comes up against the catch that any such set of characteristics which covers all humans will not be possessed only by humans. In other words, it turns out that in the only sense in which we can truly say, as an assertion of fact, that all humans are equal, at least some members of other species are also equal—equal, that is, to each other and to humans. If, on the other hand, we regard the statement "All humans are equal" in some non-factual way, perhaps as a prescription, then, as I have already argued, it is even more difficult to exclude non-humans from the sphere of equality. This result is not what the egalitarian philosopher originally intended to assert. Instead of accepting the radical outcome to which their own reasonings naturally point, however, most philosophers try to reconcile their beliefs in human equality and animal inequality by arguments that can only be described as devious. As a first example, I take William Frankena's well-known article "The Concept of Social Justice." Frankena opposes the idea of basing justice on merit, because he sees that this could lead to highly inegalitarian results. Instead he proposes the principle that all men are to be treated as equals, not because they are equal, in any respect, but simply because they are human. They are human because they have emotions and desires, and are able to think, and hence are capable of enjoying a good life in a sense in which other animals are not.[8] But what is this capacity to enjoy the good life which all humans have, but no other animals? Other animals have emotions and desires and appear to be capable of enjoying a good life. We may doubt that they can think—although the behavior of some apes, dolphins, and even dogs suggests that some of them can—but what is the relevance of thinking? Frankena goes on to admit that by "the good life" he means "not so much the morally good life as the happy or satisfactory life," so thought would appear to be unnecessary for enjoying the good life; in fact to emphasize the need for thought would make difficulties for the egalitarian since only some people are capable of leading intellectually satisfying lives, or morally good lives. This makes it difficult to see what Frankena's principle of equality has to do with simply being human. Surely every sentient being is capable of leading a life that is happier or less miserable than some alternative life, and hence has a claim to be taken into account. In this respect the distinction between humans and nonhumans is not a sharp division, but rather a continuum along which we move gradually, and with overlaps between the species, from simple capacities for enjoyment and satisfaction, or pain and suffering, to more complex ones. Faced with a situation in which they see a need for some basis for the moral gulf that is commonly thought to separate humans and animals, but can find no concrete difference that will do the job without undermining the equality of humans, philosophers tend to waffle. They resort to highs sounding phrases like "the intrinsic dignity of the human individual";[9] they talk of the "intrinsic worth of all men" as if men (humans?) had some worth that other beings did not,[10] or they say that humans, and only humans, are "ends in themselves," while "everything other than a person can only have value for a person.''[11]

# Speciesism Perm Answers--(K affs)

**The perm begs the question of the Kritik and is only a reason to vote neg - our link evidence is pretty clear that their framing of 1ac as something that will make life better for “us” further ruptures the socially constructed boundaries between human and nonhuman animals—this is the basis for literally all forms of violence.**

**Clearly severs out of the entire framing, agent, justifications for the 1ac - this extreme form of severance destroys critical ground and the ability to engage the AFF at a philosophical OR policy making level—making this a voting issue.**

**The inconsistency inherent in the perm make their impacts inevitable.**

**Irvine ’06, Ph.D. in sociology and teaches at the University of Colorado** [Leslie, Animals in Disasters: Issues for Animal Liberation Activism and Policy, Animal Liberation Philosophy and Policy Journal, Volume IV, Issue 1,http://www.criticalanimalstudies.org/JCAS/Journal\_Articles\_download/Issue\_5/irvine.pdf]

Some researchers point out that all disasters are human-caused, because we choose to live, work, and play in disaster-prone areas. As we incorporated animals into human 14 society, we also exposed them to hazards. Because companion animals share our homes, they face the same risks from fire, weather, and other hazards that might cause injury, threaten lives, or require evacuation. We are therefore responsible for their welfare. However, in disaster responses, human lives have priority. Although an evaluation of the justifications for this moral decision lies beyond the scope of this paper, the decision itself implies that we cannot save animals as well as humans. The kinds of policies that would value all lives would challenge the dualistic thinking behind the simplistic categories of “humans” and “animals.” Activists must continually challenge speciesism, wherever it appears. The anthropocentric assumptions that permeate our culture are a disaster waiting to happen.

**If we win our root cause arguments, that means only the rejection of the aff solves their offense since it provides the only relevant FW for linking oppressions.**

# Speciesism Perm Answers--(K affs)

**Impossible to do both – the conversion to non-humanism must be a complete and total surrender – tantamount to religious conversion – we must shut our eyes to the possibility of the world being any other way.**

**Best ’07, Associate Professor, Departments of Humanities and Philosophy University of Texas, El Paso** [Steven, Charles Patterson, The Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust New York: Lantern Books, 2002, 280 pp]

“At the moment our human world is based on the suffering and destruction of millions of non-humans. To perceive this and to do something to change it in personal and public ways is to undergo a change of perception akin to a religious conversion. Nothing can ever be seen in quite the same way again because once you have admitted the terror and pain of other species you will, unless you resist conversion, be always aware of the endless permutations of suffering that support our society." Arthur Conan Doyle “The vast majority of Holocaust survivors are carnivores, no more concerned about animals’ suffering than were the Germans concerned about Jews’ suffering. What does it all mean? I will tell you. It means that we have learned nothing from the Holocaust.” Arthur Kaplan By this point in Patterson’s narrative, many readers may be offended by the audacity of comparing the suffering of animals and human beings, but Patterson disarms this speciesist objection quite effectively in the third section of Eternal Treblinka. Here, often using original research and interviews, he discusses the experiences of numerous Holocaust survivors and Jewish people currently living in Germany and Austria, many of whom lost family members to Nazi terror. While many Jews scarred by the human Holocaust never made the connection to the animal Holocaust, and remained speciesists and carnivores, numerous Jewish activists, artists, and intellectuals did, as their experiences of Nazism and concentration camps gave them a greater empathy for all oppressed life and, logically, led them to vegetarianism. As beautifully stated by Edgar Kupfer-Koberwitz, a prisoner in Dachau (1940-1945), “I eat no animals because I don’t want to live on the suffering and death of other creatures. I have suffered so much myself that I can feel other creatures’ suffering by virtue of my own.” Through a series of compelling narratives, Patterson discusses the lives and moral epiphanies of many distinguished Jewish people who learned to connect the important dots, including Alex Hershaft, founder and president of the Farm Animal Reform Movement (FARM); Peter Singer, ethicist and author of Animal Liberation; and Henry Spira, noted animal rights activist. Another notable Jewish figure Patterson describes is Isaac Bashevis Singer, the 1978 Nobel Prize winner in Literature. Many of the characters in Singer’s short stories and novels are vegetarians as well as proponents of a universal ethics of compassion that extends beyond human society to include animals. Singer denounces the hypocrisy of those who speak against bloodshed while themselves causing it in their daily food choices, and he spoke through his characters in poignant statements such as: “You cannot be gentle while you’re killing a creature, you cannot be for justice while you take a creature who is weaker than you and slaughter it, and torture it.” “People should live in such a way that they did not build their happiness on the misfortune of others.” “The man who eats meat ... upholds with every bite … that might is right.” Singer draws broad connections between the violence humans inflict on animals and the cruelties they heap upon one another, and criticized the “Might is Right” ideology as a fascist ideology at its core. “The smugness with which man could do with other species as he pleased,” Singer writes, “exemplified the most extreme racist theories, the principle that might is right.” For Singer, “There is only one little step from killing animals to creating gas chambers a la Hitler and concentration camps a la Stalin ...There will be no justice as long as man will stand with a knife or with a gun and destroy those who are weaker than he is.” Singer insists that “what the Nazis had done to the Jews, man was doing to the animals.” Most famously, in his short story, “The Letter Writer,” Singer drew an apt analogy between the violence German Nazis used against human victims and the tyranny humans throughout the globe impose on animals: "What do they know -- all these scholars, all these philosophers, all the leaders of the world? They have convinced themselves that man, the worst transgressor of all the species, is the crown of creation. All other creatures were created merely to provide him with food, pelts, to be tormented, exterminated. In relation to them, all people are Nazis; for the animals it is an eternal Treblinka." The ideology of speciesism – or human supremacism -- has buttressed systems of domination over animals for over ten thousand years. In his own astute grasp of the links in the gigantic chain of violence, Dachau survivor Koberwitz wrote, “I believe as long as man torture and kills animals, he will torture and kill humans as well---and wars will be waged—for killing must be practices and learned on a small scale.” In addition to compelling characters such as Koberwitz, Patterson chronicles the life and thought of Dr. Helmut Kaplan. In a protest outside of a giant pharmaceutical firm in Frankfurt, Kaplan enjoined German citizens to recognize that in addition to the revisionist lie that concentration camps never existed, there is a second lie that death camps no longer exist, that society is civilized and no longer rooted in violence and barbarism. With Isaac Bashevis Singer, Kaplan argues that “Everything the Nazis did to Jews we are today practicing on animals,” and that what is happening to them “is exactly analogous to the Holocaust of the Nazis.” Just like the Holocaust, people do not want to know what is happening to animals and are in denial; the “good Germans” who went about their business while the smoke of cremated humans drifted through the air has its analogue in the “good humans” who feign moral goodness and compassion, but ultimately are prejudiced hypocrites whose food choices perpetuate the ongoing Holocaust against animals.

# Speciesism Perm Answers--(K affs)

**Turn - the perm reasons from the inside out, undermining our stance against speciesism.**

**Rowe ’96, Professor of Plant Ecology at the University of Saskatchewan** [Stan, Ecocentrism: the Chord that Harmonizes Humans and Earth, <http://www.ecospherics.net/pages/RoweEcocentrism.html>]

As heirs to several centuries of rampant individualism culminating today in the frenetic pursuit of self-esteem and personal authenticity, most of us will be burdened throughout our lives with an indissoluble kernel of egocentrism and, by extension, anthropocentrism. This should not deter people of good will from proclaiming the truth that, relative to Earth, humanity is not the center. A few hundred years ago, with some reluctance, Western people admitted that the planets, sun and stars did not circle around their abode. In short, our thoughts and concepts though irreducibly anthropomorphic need not be anthropocentric. Wherever our sense of greatest importance lies, there also will our ethics be. The attempt to build ethical concern for the Ecosphere from the inside out, by add-ons starting with our selves and the human race, may soothe consciences for a little while, but it will be the kiss of death for wild nature. Aldo Leopold has been the influential exponent of ethics-by-extension, rationalized as an expedient for human survival. Unfortunately this approach only strengthens anthropocentrism, making it certain that land, air, water and other organisms will always in the crunch take second place to the welfare of self, family and friends. More sensible, but more difficult, is the ecocentric ethic that confers highest valuation on the Ecosphere which, by proxy, bestows ethical merit and concern on its subsidiary contents according to their compliance and cooperation. The self finds its ecological values in the welfare of the non-self. Ecological ethics - guidelines for human behavior here on Earth - are derivative, founded in Earth care. Blessed are those who make sacrifices to preserve and sustain the non-human, human-containing world. Cursed are those who wilfully destroy Earth's creativity and beauty. If religions cannot incorporate such ethics in their theologies, they too stand condemned.

# Speciesism Perm Answers--(K affs)

**The perm is a disad to the K – it merely extends the logic of the 1ac to non-humans, which ensures cooptation.**

**Perlo ’07, animal rights activist since 1983; she obtained a Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of Dundee** [Katherine, Extrinsic and Intrinsic Arguments: Strategies for Promoting Animal Rights,http://www.animalliberationfront.com/Philosophy/strategies.pdf]

Animal rights campaigners disagree as to whether empirical arguments, based on facts such as those concerning nutrition, or ethical arguments, based on values such as the wrongness of hurting sentient beings, have greater validity and potential effectiveness. I want to address the issue in terms of “extrinsic” and “intrinsic” arguments – a distinction that corresponds only partly to the empirical and ethical couplet – and to make the case that animal rights campaigns are most effectively advanced through intrinsic appeals. “Extrinsic arguments” are those that seek to promote an aim and its underlying principle by appealing to considerations politically, historically, or logically separable from that aim and that principle. “Intrinsic arguments” appeal to considerations within and inseparable from the aim and principle. In this case, the aim is animal liberation and the principle is the moral equality of species. For example, the claim that vegetarianism (ideally, veganism) helps reduce animal suffering is an intrinsic argument, but it can also be justified on extrinsic grounds through appeal to its environmental benefits. You can separate vegetarianism from the benefit to the environment, since it is logically possible that the one might not lead to the other, and environmentalism is an independent political cause. But you cannot separate vegetarianism from the benefit to animals, since the word vegetarianism, whatever its etymology, is used to mean abstention from meat or from all animal products. You might say that “benefit to animals” is an independent issue in that there are other means of ameliorating animal suffering besides vegetarianism, or you might promote vegetarianism only for human health benefits. But in terms of animal rights campaigning, vegetarianism is advanced for the intrinsic reasons that it benefits the animals themselves. The case for intrinsic arguments rests not on a concern for ideological purity, but on the need to reach a public that, although partly responsive to our ideas in some areas, has stopped far short of the acceptance needed to make significant breakthroughs. At some point in the encounter with us, the reaction sets in of either, “Yes, it’s terrible, but it’s justified if it saves human lives,” or, “Yes, it’s terrible and unjustifiable, but we have more important [i.e. human] things to worry about.” We need to tackle speciesism head-on, instead of relying on less challenging extrinsic arguments – “widely-accepted and existing frames” in Yates’s (2006) formulation – which tacitly consign “animal rights” and its policy demands to a marginal, indeed “extreme,” position. Besides disowning animal rights, extrinsic arguments contain inconsistent or evasive implications that can leave the audience doubtful and confused without being able to pin down what is wrong. It is true that extrinsic arguments have had some positive effect. If, for non-animal rights reasons, even one person has turned vegan or decided to oppose vivisection, while another has taken a small step in the right direction, such as by giving up “red meat,” there are nonetheless benefits for animals and the planet. But what is truly needed to free billions of animals is a qualitative transformation in people’s thinking. Without a moral paradigm shift, the public may never be motivated to overcome either its own self-interest in using animals or governments’ aggressive protection of animal-abusing industries.

# Speciesism Perm Answers--(K affs)

**Most important to force philosophers to recognize non human animals as equal – reason to vote neg – that would force their hand instead of ask for a compromise.**

**Singer ’89, Professor of Bioethics at Princeton University and Laureate Professor at the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics at the University of Melbourne** [All Animals Are Equal, TOM REGAN & PETER SINGER (eds.), Animal Rights and Human Obligations, New Jersey, 1989, pp. 148-162]

This idea of a distinctive human dignity and worth has a long history; it can be traced back directly to the Renaissance humanists, for instance to Pico della Mirandola's Oration on the Dignity of Man. Pico and other humanists based their estimate of human dignity on the idea that man possessed the central, pivotal position in the "Great Chain of Being" that led from the lowliest forms of matter to God himself; this view of the universe, in turn, goes back to both classical and Judeo-Christian doctrines. Contemporary philosophers have cast off these metaphysical and religious shackles and freely invoke the dignity of mankind without needing to justify the idea at all. Why should we not attribute "intrinsic dignity" or "intrinsic worth" to ourselves? Fellow-humans are unlikely to reject the accolades we so generously bestow on them, and those to whom we deny the honor are unable to object. Indeed, when one thinks only of humans, it can be very liberal, very progressive, to talk of the dignity of all human beings. In so doing, we implicitly condemn slavery, racism, and other violations of human rights. We admit that we ourselves are in some fundamental sense on a par with the poorest, most ignorant members of our own species. It is only when we think of humans as no more than a small sub-group of all the beings that inhabit our planet that we may realize that in elevating our own species we are at the same time lowering the relative status of all other species.

**It’s got to be all or nothing – any level of complicity with speciesist institutions leads to co-optation by speciesists.**

**Sztybel ’07, Fellow with the Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics** [David, Animal Rights Law: Fundamentalism versus Pragmatism, Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume V, Issue 1,http://www.criticalanimalstudies.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/animal-rights-law.pdf]

The opponent of “welfarist” suffering-reduction laws can say that we do not face a moral dilemma if option (3), which permits “welfarism,” is morally wrong “merely” to reduce animal suffering. This can be expressed in various ways. Fundamentalists might contend that (3), even if it does mean less suffering for animals, involves complicity (i.e., partnership in wrong-doing) with speciesists. Not every improvement of welfare, they would warn, is compatible with moral rightness. Theft might improve the welfare of a thief after all. Complicity allegedly leads to a co-opting of animal rights people by animal industries and speciesists more generally. Another way of stating the fundamentalist point is that there is a departure from what is morally right, as embodied by animal liberation, and therefore some proponents of suffering-reduction laws are morally wrong. Yet another way to express this idea is that certain suffering-reduction advocates such as PETA are part of the problem, not the solution of the abolition of animal exploitation.10

# Speciesism--FW (for using gov’t link)

**We operate within their framework – we criticize the way the gov’t frames and carries out its policies.**

**They are aff – it is fair to expect them to be prepared to defend every part of the resolution.**

**Our Kritik operates within their framework—even if you allow them to weigh their case—we’ll win that the Kritik outweighs and turns their case—their plan makes war inevitable.**

**Best ’07, Associate Professor, Departments of Humanities and Philosophy University of Texas, El Paso** [Steven, Charles Patterson, The Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust New York: Lantern Books, 2002, 280 pp]

“Auschwitz begins wherever someone looks at a slaughterhouse and thinks: they’re only animals." Theodor Adorno "As long as there are slaughterhouses, there will be battlefields." Tolstoy Aware of the deep continuities between the animal and human holocaust, and inspired by Patterson’s book and the words of some progressive Jewish scholars, in February 2002, the People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) launched a new exhibit which was to travel to over 100 American and foreign cities. The “Holocaust on Your Plate” exhibit consisted of "eight 60-square-foot panels that juxtaposed photos of suffering and death in factory farms and slaughterhouses alongside parallel images of scenes of the horrors of Nazi concentration camps." Employing its usual method shock tactics to disrupt complacency and provoke thought, PETA hoped that the exhibit would "stimulate contemplation of how the victimization of Jews, Gypsies, homosexuals, and others characterized as 'life unworthy of life' during the Holocaust parallels the way that modern society abuses and justifies the slaughter of animals." According to PETA, the photos “graphically depicts the point that Singer made when he wrote, `In relation to [animals], all people are Nazis.’” Newkirk explained the rationale behind the exhibit in this way: “The `Holocaust on Your Plate’ Campaign was designed to desensitize [people] to different forms of systematic degradation and exploitation, and [to show that] the logic and methods employed in factory farms and slaughterhouses are analogous to those used in concentration camps. We understand both systems to be based on a moral equation indicating that `might makes right’ and premised on a concept of other cultures or other species as deficient and thus disposable. Each has it own unique mechanisms and purposes, but both result in immeasurable, unnecessary suffering for those who are innocent and unable to defend themselves.”

**Even if you don’t think we meet – this is more important…Speciesism comes first—before analyzing human relations, we must first ask what it means to be “human.”**

**Vancouver Sun ’06** [Speciesism comes first—before analyzing human relations, we must first ask what it means to be human, <http://www.canada.com/vancouversun/columnists/story.html?id=f2f526c4-f757-4218-ae3d5-dac18ca5db31>]

Despite the skepticism, though, a discussion of speciesism is among the most important discussions that could take place in school. And this is not primarily because it might lead future generations to treat animals better than we do, although that would be an unqualified good. No, the reason schools, and society in general, ought to grapple with the concept of speciesism, rather than dismissing it out of hand, is because it tells us a lot more about ourselves than about non-human animals. Indeed, a discussion of speciesism is ultimately a discussion about what it means to be human.

# Speciesism--FW (for using gov’t link)

**Changing the way we talk about nhas is the first step to building movements.**

**Jacobs ’04, PhD and President, Vegetarian Society (Singapore)** [George, Speaking Vegetarian:

Toward Nonspeciesist Language, <http://www.ivu.org/congress/2004/lectures/Jacobs.html>]

Language shapes and reflects how we think about the world, but language is not static. Language changes. What is viewed as typical today may not have been the norm or considered correct 200 years ago and may change in another 200 years, or even two years. For instance, in the case of English, much of the grammar of Shakespeare’s day would not be acceptable today, nor would Shakespeare have any idea what a disk drive is or what frequent flyer miles are. What leads to language change? The key force behind language change is change in society. Society changes, and language changes along with it in a kind of chicken and egg manner with each influencing the other. For instance, new inventions, such as airplanes and computers, change the way we live, and vocabulary related to these inventions comes into widespread use, such as frequent flyer miles and disk drive mentioned earlier. Similarly, the use of these new terms can accelerate the use of the phenomena they represent.

**Educational settings key.**

**Jacobs ’04, PhD and President, Vegetarian Society (Singapore)** [George, Speaking Vegetarian:

Toward Nonspeciesist Language, <http://www.ivu.org/congress/2004/lectures/Jacobs.html>]

We can change language to make it more respectful to other animals, as Goodall did in such areas as the use of who with nonhuman animals. Furthermore, in regard to the use of who, some of the larger dictionaries, such as the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary (http://www.m-w.com), and larger scholarly works on grammar state that who can be used with nonhuman animals (Jacobs, 2004). For example, the Wikipedia, an online encyclopedia, states that who can be used with sentient beings. Future actions to popularize language that promotes equality among animals include research (see Jacobs, 2004 for suggestions), language use, and educational efforts. Research involves studying what it means to speak Vegetarian, i.e., what changes in vocabulary, grammar, usage, and other language areas might promote vegetarian lifestyles. Research also involves finding out what people are already writing and saying in magazines, novels, textbooks, radio shows, conversations at birthday parties, etc. Language use can also be compared across time, place, and language.

**(--) And they choose their representations—meaning it is ultimately fair for them to debate.**

**(--) And the logic of ignoring representations allows for the unchallenged use of racist and sexist language.**

# Speciesism--FW (for using gov’t link)

**(--) And…their policy impacts will be subverted by their discursive choices—we have to change representations first or the policy will get co-opted:**

Arthur **Kleinman, 1996** Professor of Medical Anthropology and Professor of Anthropology at Harvard, The appeal of

experience; the dismay of images: cultural appropriations of suffering in our times," DAEDALUS Winter 1996, p.

http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_qa3671/is\_199601/ai\_n8747499/print

Ultimately, we will have to engagethe more ominous aspects of globalization, such as the commercialization of suffering, the commodification of experiencesof atrocity and abuse, and the pornographic uses of degradation.(36) Violence in the media, and its relation to violence in the streets and in homes, is already a subject that has attracted serious attention from communities and from scholars.(37) Regarding the even more fundamental cultural question of how social experience is being transformed in untoward ways, the first issue would seem to be to develop historical, ethnographic, and narrative studies that provide a more powerful understanding of the cultural processes through which the global regimeof disordered capitalism alters the connections between collective experience and subjectivity, so that moral sensibility, for example, diminishes or becomes something frighteningly different: promiscuous, gratuitous, unhinged from responsibility and action.(38) There is a terrible legacy here that needs to be contemplated. The transformation of epochs is as much about changes in social experience as shifts in social structures and cultural representations; indeed, the three sites of social transformation are inseparable. Out of their triangulation, subjectivity too transmutes. The current transformation is no different; yet perhaps we see more clearly the hazards of the historical turn that we are now undertaking. Perhaps all along we have been wrong to consider existential conditions as an ultimate constraint limiting the moral dangers of civilizational change.

# Speciesism--A2: Link of Omission

**The omission is a deliberate act – they made a value choice to exclude nonhumans from their inquiry**Conaghan 3 – Joanne, Professor of Kent Law School  
[Apr, “SYMPOSIUM: BEYOND RIGHT AND REASON,” Miami Law Review]

As critical lawyers, however, we recognize this to be absolute humbug. The act/omission dichotomy is a sham--in Derridean terms, it is a "logocentric hierarchy," part of a "categorical regime" that constrains, enables, and organizes the discursive practice of law. n10 It is also a dichotomy that is impossible to draw with any certainty, with efforts to do so inherently value-laden. In particular, the attribution of cause and consequence is almost always preceded by unarticulated, morally predetermined assumptions about responsibility. An omission can be just as morally heinous as an act (besides which, it is an act depending on how you choose to look at it), and it can certainly carry consequences, perhaps serious ones.

**If we win our root cause claims you still vote NEG – proves a discussion of speciesism is a prerequisite to accomplishing the aff**

**Institutional thinking leads to discursive distinctions that ruptures the human-nonhuman relationship and renders non-human animals outside of meaning.**

**Irvine ’06, Ph.D. in sociology and teaches at the University of Colorado** [Leslie, Animals in Disasters: Issues for Animal Liberation Activism and Policy, Animal Liberation Philosophy and Policy Journal, Volume IV, Issue 1,http://www.criticalanimalstudies.org/JCAS/Journal\_Articles\_download/Issue\_5/irvine.pdf]

Because institutional thinking can only frame problems selectively, the proffered solutions often fall short of addressing the problems as experienced by those outside the institution’s purview. In other words, institutional thinking overlooks relevant aspects of the situation or circumstances that are salient for those experiencing the problem. As Loseke (2001) argues, institutional formulations may not capture the complexities of lived experience. This failure leads to “discursive disjunctions” between incompatible systems of meaning (Chase 1995, 123). An example appeared in Hurricane Katrina, when rescuers forced people to leave their companion animals. Residents faced the choice between leaving animals they considered family members and risking their own lives. Because of institutional thinking, new problems may emerge later, through the cracks of the “organizationally embedded” solutions (Gubrium 1992; see also 1987). As I explain later, disaster myths about dogs in the aftermath of Hurricane Charley offer a good illustration of this.

# Speciesism--A2: Speciesism Good

**Humans are only excluded from nature by choice—the ethic of the alternative recognizes the multiplicity of centers of value in nature.**

**Marina 9** (Daniel, Södertörns högskola | Institutionen för Kultur och Kommunikation, “Anthropocentrism and Androcentrism – An Ecofeminist Connection” http://www.projectsparadise.com/anthropocentrism-androcentrism/)

Finally, I would like to summarize some of the reasons why anthropocentrism is open to criticism. I shall focus on those that Val Plumwood adduces. According to her anthropocentrism is basically a framework of beliefs and perceptions that generates a myriad of illusions. Nature is perceived as discontinuous from the human realm, as subordinate, as inessential, as a denied and disorderly Other, as passive, and so on. Anthropocentrism disregards nature’s complexity, her uniqueness as a life-sustaining whole, and the plurality of legitimate centres with genuine interests and needs that it comprises. Humans are perceived as discontinuous from the natural realm, as essentially rational, and are reduced to being masters and conquerors. Humans, as physical and biological beings, can, of course, be allowed to remain within nature. What anthropocentrism especially consigns to an area outside and above nature is that part of the human self that is considered authentically human, i.e. rationality and freedom. Human identity is in such a way construed in opposition to the natural, the physical, the biological, and the animal, including those human traits associated with animality, that the authentically human includes also the “desire to exclude and distance” from the nonhuman. This conception of the human self as separate from, or if anything “accidentally related” to, nature together with the conception of the nonhuman as inferior and antagonistic renders humanity a legitimate oppressor and nature a means to human ends. Anthropocentrism disregards humanity’s vital dependence on nature, the essential character of genuine human traits such as the emotions and the body, as well as other attitudes towards nature than that to master and conquer it.

# Speciesism--A2: Speciesism Good

**They have it backwards—human centered politics destroys the natural other—the alt solves.**

**Marina 9** (Daniel, Södertörns högskola | Institutionen för Kultur och Kommunikation, “Anthropocentrism and Androcentrism – An Ecofeminist Connection” http://www.projectsparadise.com/anthropocentrism-androcentrism/)

These three terms suggest a spatial image. Something, in this case humanity, is situated at the centre of something. There are numerous settings in which humans can be claimed to occupy the centre. For example, an anthropocentric cosmology would claim that humanity occupies the physical centre of the universe.31 In environmental philosophy the terms are mainly applied to morality. Here I shall analyze the ways in which humans are said to occupy the privileged spot of that specific universe. The starting point shall be Val Plumwood’s liberation model of anthropocentrism. I am beginning with Plumwood because she offers a detailed account of what centrism and anthropocentrism is. Plumwood defines centrism as a structure that is common to and underlies different forms of oppression, like colonialism, racism, and sexism. The role of this structure is to generate a Centre and the Periphery, an oppressor and the oppressed, a Centre and the Other. The shared features are: 1. Radical exclusion: Those in the centre are represented as radically separated from and superior to the Other. The Centre is represented as free from the features of an inferiorized Other, and the Other as lacking the defining features of the Centre. Differences are exaggerated to the point of preventing or hindering any sense of connection or continuity, to the point that “identification and sympathy are cancelled.”32 2. Homogenization: Those on the periphery are represented as alike and replaceable. Similarities are exaggerated and differences are disregarded within that group. “The Other is not an individual but is related to as a member of a class of interchangeable items.”33 Differences are only acknowledged when they affect or are deemed relevant to the desires and well-being of those in the centre. 3. *Denial*: The Other is represented as inessential. Those in the centre deny their own dependency on those on the periphery. 4. *Incorporation*: Those in the centre do not admit the autonomy of the Other. The Other is represented as a function of the qualities of the Centre. The Other either lacks or is the negation of those qualities that characterize those in the centre, being these qualities at the same time the most cherished and esteemed socially and culturally. 5. *Instrumentalism*: Those in the centre deny the Other its independent agency. Those on the periphery are represented as lacking, for instance, ends of its own. The Centre can consequently impose its own ends upon them without any conflict. The Other becomes a means or a resource the Centre can make use of to satisfy its own needs, and is accordingly valued for the usefulness the Centre can find in it. A second reason for beginning with Plumwood is that all the iniquitous senses of anthropocentrism that I have come across in the literature can, I think, be identified as either instrumentalism or denial. Warwick Fox’s *passive sense* of anthropocentrism would be an example of denial. In this sense he speaks of anthropocentric ecophilosophy as one that focuses on social issues only, on interhuman affairs and problems. For these environmentalists “the nonhuman world retains its traditional status as the background against which the significant action – human action – takes place.”34 According to them the environmental crisis would then be solved within that human sphere by ensuring the well-being of humanity. There would be no need to deal with the way humanity relates to nature. The other senses would be examples of either instrumentalism or of outcomes of instrumentalism: Andrew Dobson’s *strong* anthropocentrism (“The injustice and unfairness involved in the instrumental use of the non-human world”35); the account Robert Sessions gives of how deep ecology describes the anthropocentric attitude (“(1) Nonhuman nature has no value in itself, (2) humans (and/or God, if theistic) create what value there is, and (3) humans have the right (some would say the *obligation*) to do as they please with and in the nonhuman world as long as they do not harm other human’s interests”36); Tim Hayward’s account of the ethical criticism of anthropocentrism (“The mistake of giving exclusive or arbitrarily preferential consideration to human interests as opposed to the interests of other beings”37); Andrew Dobson’s description of what environmentalists consider a basic cause of ecological degradation and a potential cause of disaster (“Concern for ourselves at the expense of concern for the non-human world”38); and Warwick Fox’s aggressive sense of anthropocentrism, according to which anthropocentrism is the overt discrimination against the nonhuman world.

# Speciesism--A2: Speciesism Good

**The distinctions you args rely upon are impossible to prove.**

**Bernstein ’04, Professor of the Practice of Political Science @ USC** [Mark, Neo-Speciesism, Journal of social philosophy, Vol 35, Iss 3, EBSCO]

For virtually all of the last two thousand years, human speciesism has been defended by selecting certain inherent qualities purportedly shared by all and only humans. Aristotle focused on rationality, Descartes on linguistic ability, and theologians on ensoulment. No natural property seems to turn the trick. They fail on three counts. First, it is simply untrue that all humans have any of these allegedly morally relevant properties; we need only consider the so-called marginal humans, those who suffer from debilitating mental disorders.2 Second, it is simply untrue that no nonhumans have these qualities. By any nontechnical definition, some animals can think and some can use language. Third, and most important, it is scarcely transparent why rationality, linguistic ability, or any other natural property enhances the significance of an individual’s interests. Undoubtedly different interests result, but even assuming commensurability, a compelling argument is needed to show why the interests of the rationally and linguistically gifted are more significant than those who are challenged.

# Speciesism--AT: “Cede the Political”

**The political is already ceded—only a radical form of politics can regain it from transnational companies and political technophiles.**

**Best 6** (Steven, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Texas El Paso, “Revolutionary Environmentalism: An Emerging New Struggle for Total Liberation” 2006)

George W. Bush’s feel-good talk of progress and democracy, given an endless and uncritical airing by mainstream corporate media, masks the fact that we live in an unprecedented era of social and ecological crisis. Predatory transnational corporations such as ExxonMobil and Maxxam are pillaging the planet, destroying ecosystems, pushing species into extinction, and annihilating indigenous peoples and traditional ways of life. War, globalization, and destruction of peoples, species, and ecosystems march in lockstep: militarization supports the worldwide imposition of the "free market" system, and its growth and profit imperatives thrive though the exploitation of humans, animals, and the earth (see Kovel 2002; Tokar 1997; Bannon and Collier 2003). Against the mindless optimism of technophiles, the denials of skeptics, and complacency of the general public, we depart from the premise that there is a global environmental crisis which is the most urgent issue facing us today. If humanity does not address ecological problems immediately and with radical measures that target causes not symptoms, severe, world-altering consequences will play out over a long-term period and will plague future generations. Signs of major stress of the world’s eco-systems are everywhere, from shrinking forests and depleted fisheries to vanishing wilderness and global climate change. Ours is an era of global warming, rainforest destruction, species extinction, and chronic resource shortages that provoke wars and conflicts such as in Iraq. While five great extinction crises have already transpired on this planet, the last one occurring 65 million years ago in the age of the dinosaurs, we are now living amidst the sixth extinction crisis, this time caused by human not natural causes. Human populations have always devastated their environment and thereby their societies, but they have never intervened in the planet’s ecosystem to the extent they have altered climate. We now confront the “end of nature” where no natural force, no breeze or ripple of water, has not been affected by the human presence (McKribben 2006). This is especially true with nanotechnology and biotechnology. Rather than confronting this crisis and scaling back human presence and aggravating actions, humans are making it worse. Human population rates continue to swell, as awakening giants such as India and China move toward western consumer lifestyles, exchanging rice bowls for burgers and bicycles for SUVs. The human presence on this planet is like a meteor plummeting to the earth, but it has already struck and the reverberations are rippling everywhere. Despite the proliferating amount of solid, internationally assembled scientific data supporting the reality of global climate change and ecological crisis, there are still so-called environmental “skeptics,” “realists,” and “optimists” who deny the problems, often compiling or citing data paid for by ExxonMobil. Senator James Inhofe has declared global warming to be a “myth” that is damaging to the US economy. He and others revile environmentalists as “alarmists,” “extremists,” and “eco-terrorists” who threaten the American way of life. There is a direct and profound relationship between global capitalism and ecological destruction. The capitalist economy lives or dies on constant growth, accumulation, and consumption of resources. The environmental crisis is inseparable from the social crisis, whereby centuries ago a market economy disengaged from society and ruled over it with its alien and destructive imperatives. The crisis in ecology is ultimately a crisis in democracy, as transnational corporations arise and thrive through the destruction of popular sovereignty. The western environment movement has advanced its cause for over three decades now, but we are nonetheless losing ground in the battle to preserve species, ecosystems, and wilderness (Dowie 1995; Speth 2004). Increasingly, calls for moderation, compromise, and the slow march through institutions can be seen as treacherous and grotesquely inadequate. In the midst of predatory global capitalism and biological meltdown, “reasonableness” and “moderation” seem to be entirely unreasonable and immoderate, as “extreme” and “radical” actions appear simply as necessary and appropriate. As eco-primitivist Derrick Jensen observes, “We must eliminate false hopes, which blind us to real possibilities.” The current world system is inherently destructive and unsustainable; if it cannot be reformed, it must be transcended through revolution at all levels—economic, political, legal, cultural, technological, and, most fundamentally, conceptual. The struggles and changes must be as deep, varied, and far-reaching as the root of the problems.

# Speciesism--AT: “Cede the Political”

**The political is already ceded—the alternative is the last hope for radical change in the face of environmental destruction.**

**Best 4** (Steven, professor of philosophy at Texas El Paso, “From Earth Day to Ecological Society” http://www.drstevebest.org/Essays/FromEarthDay.htm, date accessed: 7/27/11

Homo sapiens have embarked on an insane, destructive, and unsustainable path of existence. The human species is driving off a cliff at 100 miles an hour without brakes, and yet people live is if the most urgent issue of the day is Janet Jackson’s “wardrobe malfunction” or who will win American Idol. There is much talk about “national security” but nothing is said about the basis of all security – environmental security. Problems like global warming, desertification, and food and water shortages will wreak havoc throughout the planet. As Homeland Security turns ever-more fascist, environmentalists are vilified as eco-terrorists and legal forms of activism are criminalized under the Patriot Act. While Ashcroft prosecutes activists working to help the planet, corporate eco-terrorists continue to pillage and plunder. Meanwhile, Americans, who make up less than 5% of the world’s population, consume 30% of its resources and produce 25% of total greenhouse gas emissions. Whatever forces striving to save the environment are doing, it is not to ward off corporate and state Pac-men greedily devouring the planet. National environmental organizations such as the Sierra Club are tepid, compromise-based, reform-oriented bureaucracies unable to challenge corporate and state power, and grass-roots forces are not great enough in force and numbers. We are in the midst of a major ecological crisis that stems from a social crisis rooted in corporate power and erosion of democracy. In Greek, the word “crisis” means decision, suggesting that humanity, currently poised at a critical crossroads in its evolution, has crucial decisions and choices to make concerning its existence on the planet. Human identity, values, ethics, worldviews, and mode of social organization need major rethinking and reconstruction. In Chinese, “crisis” means both calamity and opportunity. In a diseased individual, cancer often provides the catalyst for personal growth. As a diseased species, human beings can perish, survive in dystopian futures prefigured by films like Mad Max and Waterworld, or seize their opportunity to learn from egregious errors and rise to far higher levels of social and moral evolution. **The Human Plague** The crisis in human existence is dramatically reflected in the 1996 film, Independence Day. The movie is about hostile aliens with no respect for life; they come to earth to kill its peoples, devour its natural resources, and then move onto other planets in a mad quest to find more fuel for their mega-machines and growth-oriented culture. The film is a veiled projection of our own destructive habits onto monstrous beings from another world. We are the aliens; we are the parasites who live off the death of other life forms; we are the captains of the mega-machines that are sustainable only through violence and ecological destruction. We do to the animals and the earth what the aliens do to human life -- the only difference is, we have no other planet to move on to, and no superheroes to save us. We are trapped in a Dawn of the Dead living nightmare where armies of hideous corpses, people thought long dead and buried, walk again with a will to destroy us. The dead represent all the waste, pollution, and ecological debts accrued to our growth culture that we thought we could walk away from unscathed and never again face. But we are waking up to the fact that the “dead” are storming our neighborhoods, crashing through our doors and windows, and hell-bent on devouring us. In his article entitled “A Plague of Human Proportions,” Mark Lynas frames the crisis this way: “Within the earth's biosphere, a single species has come to dominate virtually all living systems. For the past two centuries this species has been reproducing at bacterial levels, almost as an infectious plague envelops its host. Three hundred thousand new individuals are added to its numbers every day. Its population of bodies now exceeds by a hundred times the biomass of any large animal species that has ever existed on land since the beginning of geological time. The species is us. Now numbering more than six billion souls, the human population has doubled since 1950. Nothing like this has happened before in the earth's history. Even the dinosaurs, which dominated for tens of millions of years, were thinly spread compared to the hairless primate Homo sapiens.” Thus, a single biological type has wreaked havoc on the estimated ten million other species in habiting the planet. Lynas suggests that because Homo sapiens dominates the planet today as dinosaurs did one hundred million years ago, “We are entering a new geological era: the Anthropocene.” According to a March 2004 Earth Policy Institute report, “Humans have transformed nearly half of the planet's ice-free land areas, with serious effects on the rest of nature … Each year the earth's forest cover shrinks by 16 million hectares (40 million acres), with most of the loss occurring in tropical forests, where levels of biodiversity are high … A recent study of 173 species of mammals from around the world showed that their collective geographical ranges have been halved over the past several decades, signifying a loss of breeding and foraging area.” While insipid ideologues like Tibor Machan still publish books such as Putting Humans First: Why we are Nature’s Favorite (2004), it is more accurate to see Homo sapiens as the invasive species and agent of mass extinction par excellence -- not “nature’s favorite” but rather nature’s bete noir.

# Speciesism--AT: “Cede the Political”

**Radical environmental movements are more effective at creating change – our evidence is comparative.**

**Best 6** (Steven, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Texas El Paso, “Revolutionary Environmentalism: An Emerging New Struggle for Total Liberation” 2006)

Revolutionary environmentalism is based on the realization that politics as usual just won’t cut it anymore. We will always lose if we play by their rules rather than invent new forms of struggle, new social movements, and new sensibilities. The defense of the earth requires immediate and decisive: logging roads need to be blocked, driftnets need to be cut, and cages need to be emptied. But these are defensive actions, and in addition to these tactics, radical movements and alliances must be built from the perspective total liberation. A new revolutionary politics will build on the achievements of democratic, libertarian socialist, and anarchist traditions. It will incorporate radical green, feminist, and indigenous struggles. It will merge animal, earth, and human standpoints in a total liberation struggle against global capitalism and its omnicidal grow-or-die logic. Radical politics must reverse the growing power of the state, mass media, and corporations to promote egalitarianism and participatory democratization at all levels of society – political, cultural, and economic. It must dismantle all asymmetrical power relations and structures of hierarchy, including that of humans over animals and the earth. Radical politics is impossible without the revitalization of citizenship and the re-politicization of life, which begins with forms of education, communication, culture, and art that anger, awaken, inspire, and empower people toward action and change.

**The alt solves best for political change.**

**Best 4** (Steven, professor of philosophy at Texas El Paso, “From Earth Day to Ecological Society” <http://www.drstevebest.org/Essays/FromEarthDay.htm>, date accessed: 7/27/11

If humanity is to survive and flourish in its precarious journey into the future, it needs a new moral compass because anthropocentrism has failed us dramatically. Albert Schweitzer observed that “the problem with ethics so far is that they have been limited to a human-to-human consideration.” In place of the alienated and predatory sensibility of Western life, Schweitzer proposed a new code – an “ethic of reverence for life.” This entails a universal ethic of compassion and respect that includes all humanity, embraces non-human species, and extends to the entire earth. We need a “Declaration of Interdependence” to replace our outmoded “Declaration of Independence.” The demand to cease exploiting animals and the earth is one and the same; we cannot change in one area without changing in the other. Animal rights and environmental ethics are the logical next stages in human moral evolution and the next necessary steps in the human journey to enlightenment and wholeness. Sadly, on Earth Day, as on every other day, the human species continues to invade and damage the planet. As I write, I receive a report from Traffic, a British-based wildlife monitoring group, saying that because of deforestation and trading in its body parts, the Sumatran tiger, Indonesia's last tiger sub-species, is on the brink of extinction. In addition, I read that the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service removed two tropical birds, the Mariana mallard and the Guam broadbill, from its endangered species list – not because they are safe but because they became extinct. In some way we cannot possibly grasp, the entire earth is trying to adjust to their inalterable absence. According to the cliché, “Every day is Earth Day.” Truth be told, every day is Human Growth Day. On April 22, the media might turn away from Michael Jackson or Bush’s terror war for a thirty second fluff piece on the state of the planet, and some individuals might pause for a moment to think about their environment. Like the evil-doer who sins all week and then atones on Sunday, human beings plunder the planet all year long and stop for a moment of guilt and expiation. We congratulate ourselves for honoring Earth Day, when in fact the very concept would be incoherent in an ecological society. In honor of Earth Day it is appropriate to ask: what does it mean to be an environmentalist? Where industries, the state, and toxic nihilists of ever stripe want those who care about the environment to bear stigmas such as “kook,” wacko,” “un-American,” and even “terrorist,” being an environmentalist must become a badge of honor. To be an environmentalist is to realize that one is not only a citizen of human society, one also is a citizen of the earth, an eco-citizen. Our community includes not only our society with other human beings on a national and international scale, but also our relations to the entire living earth, to the biocommunity. We need to act like we are citizens and not conquering invaders. We have not only a negative duty to avoid doing harm to the earth as much as possible, but also a positive duty to help nature regenerate.

# Speciesism--AT: We don’t exclude Non-Human Animals

**The assumptions behind your rhetoric distorts reality and creates the divide.**

**Fox ’79, Humane Society of the United States** [Michael W., THE BIO·POLITICS OF SOCIOBIOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY, Between the Species, <http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1126&context=bts&sei-redir=1#search="speciesist>" – google scholar]

This "speciesist thinking" is a reflection of our own values, especially of our valuing intelligence as some special virtue. Such valuation can distort our perceptions of other animals and influence hON we treat them and value them in and for themselves. A "dumb beast," ION in the sapience or I.Q. hierarchy, would not be accorded the same respect as a more intelligent species (i.e., one "uore human" in sane respect). Yet, all animals should be respected equally, since they are all sentient, having the capacity to feel and to suffer. l'ihile comparing different species is one avenue to understanding evolution, adaptation, and the structure and functi.on of living things, making comparisons on the basis of biased, human-centered values can have pernicious ramifications. Any hierarchy (of superior-inferior, greater-lesser) sets up a false view of reality, and when it is imposed upon the animal kingdan, it can break the circle of compassion within which all creatures should be regarded and treated with equal reverence and respect.

# Speciesism--AT: You K one word

**Single words key – even if it the start of slow change, it is effective.**

**Jacobs ’04, PhD and President, Vegetarian Society (Singapore)** [George, Speaking Vegetarian:

Toward Nonspeciesist Language, <http://www.ivu.org/congress/2004/lectures/Jacobs.html>]

In addition to inventions, another force driving social change involves changes in people’s outlook. A fairly recent case in point centers on changes in the relative role of females in society. In many societies, females have taken more equal public roles, and language has changed correspondingly (Nilsen, 1987; Rubin, Greene, & Schneider, 1994). Language changes in regard to the relative place of females and males in human society include changes in grammar and vocabulary. A prominent grammatical change has been the move from generic he (use of male pronouns – he, his - and the male possessive adjective – his – in a way that implies males are representative of females and males), such as using “A doctor should take care of his patients” to include all doctors, female and male. Instead, people nowadays are more likely to use, “Doctors should take care of their patients,” “A doctor should take care of her/his patients,” “A doctor should take care of their patients,” and other alternatives that do not place males as representatives of all humans. Similarly, in the area of vocabulary, alternatives have arisen for generic man (the use of male nouns to imply that males are representative of females and males). For instance, instead of fireman and policeman, people nowadays are more likely to use firefighter and police officer. Instead of man and wife, we might use husband and wife. These language changes in regard to the roles of the sexes have both reflected change and promoted change. However, this change has not been automatic or uncontroversial. Nor is the change complete. Generic he and generic man are still in use. How does an actual language change happen? Does some governing body of English (or some other language) meet to decide? In the case of the change in English just discussed, the change has been happening slowly as individuals make conscious decisions about how they speak and write. Some publications have changed their practices; dictionaries and scholarly descriptions of contemporary grammar first began to list what came to be called “nonsexist language” as an acceptable alternative and later as the desired option. The point is that we can all be factors in shaping language, just as language is a factor in shaping us.

# Speciesism--AT: Language Doesn’t Matter/Shape Reality

**Our linguistic choices are the most powerful way of sustaining cultural models.**

**Stibbe ’03, Professor in the English Department, Chikushi Jogakuen University** [Arran, As Charming as a Pig:The Discursive Construction of the Relationship Between Pigs and Humans, Society and Animals, Vol 11, Iss 4, EBSCO]

Even a cursory glance at this table reveals the overwhelmingly negative attitude toward pigs expressed in everyday British English. With only a few exceptions such as, “you lucky pig” and “happy as a pig in the mire,” the expressions seem to be attributions of unpleasant or negative characteristics to a third party. Examination of the context in which such expressions occur reveals presuppositions, taken-for-granted facts about the world that lie behind the expressions (Kadmon, 2000; Gazdar, 1978). Thus, “You are as fat as a pig” presupposes, and takes it to be, common knowledge that, pigs are (very) fat animals. Extracting and analyzing presuppositions is an effective way of revealing the cultural model, or in Barthes’ (1957/1972) terms, the mythology underlying linguistic usage. Presuppositions are a particularly powerful way of building and sustaining the models on which a culture is based. The expression “as selsh as a pig” presupposes that pigs are (very) selsh, without any kind of overt statement, such as “pigs are selsh,” which could be proved wrong. As expressions are repeated in the general currency of society, the mythology of pigs as selsh creatures is perpetuated.

**Language choices are particularly powerful in terms of our treatment of nhas.**

**Jacobs ’04, PhD and President, Vegetarian Society (Singapore)** [George, Speaking Vegetarian:

Toward Nonspeciesist Language, <http://www.ivu.org/congress/2004/lectures/Jacobs.html>]

This paper has two main points. First, language is powerful – it reflects and shapes how we think and act (Crystal, 1995; Halliday, 1978; Whorf, 1956). Second, vegetarians can help to change language and, thereby, use the power of language to influence how we and our fellow humans act toward our fellow animals (Dunayer, 2001). This paper considers only the English language; however, parallel situations almost certainly exist in other languages. The Power of Language Advertisers recognize the power of words to shape our thinking. To make us desire the products they are selling, they use purr words: words that make us as contented as a cat with a comfortable place to nap. Words such as new, stronger, natural, and research-tested are used to bring happy images to our minds and influence us to like what the advertisers are selling. Politicians also use words to convince us to vote for them. Some politicians attempt to label their opponents with snarl words: words that make us as upset as a cat who has been awakened from a nap. Words such as incompetent, flip-flopper, terrorist, and old are used to bring negative images to our minds and influence us to dislike the politicians’ opponents. The point is that words shape our view of the world. Of course, words do not completely control our view of the world. We may refuse to buy particular products despite all the purr words the advertisers may use, or we may not support particular politicians despite all the snarl words they attempt to smear upon their opponents. Language not only plays a role in shaping our thinking; it also reflects our thinking. We use purr words for that which we enjoy and snarl words for what we dislike. For example, meat eaters might see a picture of a large fish being cooked on a barbecue and talk about “the succulent fillet laced with a tomato-based sauce full of herbs, spices, and bell peppers,” whereas a vegetarian might describe the same scene as “slices of a poor fish’s flesh being cooked, with plant food used to disguise the disgusting taste of seared flesh.” At the same time, just as the words around us only influence but do not control our thinking, the words we use may only partially mirror what we think. Thus, vegetarians may due to ignorance of alternatives or for other reasons use language that is not in line with vegetarianism. One of the goals of this article is to help vegetarians speak in ways consistent with vegetarian lifestyles.

# Speciesism--AT: Language Doesn’t Matter/Shape Reality

**Language choices are vital bc language shapes our laws.**

**Vaughan ’01** [Animal Equality: Language and Liberation. The Joan Dunayer Interview. By Claudette Vaughan, http://www.animalliberationfront.com/ALFront/Interviews/Animal%20Equality%20Language%20and%20Liberation\_%20The%20Joan%20Dunayer%20Interview.htm]

A. Because nonhuman animals lack all political power and usually differ from humans more than humans differ from one another, speciesism will be harder to overcome than sexism or racism. Humans always will have speciesist tendencies, so the law must protect nonhuman animals from speciesism. Law is language. Currently, the law defines nonhuman animals as human property. Instead, it should define them as persons, with their own legal rights. Worldwide, "animal" laws that ostensibly protect nonhumans largely perpetrate their abuse because such laws operate within a framework of enslavement. "Animal" law is slave law. Like the former US laws that legitimised black enslavements, "animal" laws must be abolished. The same body of law that protects humans must protect nonhumans, extending to them all applicable rights currently reserved for humans. Legislators won't take the necessary steps until we persuade enough of the general public that any needless harm to nonhuman animals is morally wrong. We should continually emphasis that humans don't need to exploit, hurt or kill nonhuman animals-and don't have the moral right to-except in extremely rare circumstances (eg, when a nonhuman directly threatens our lives). We don't need to go to aquaprisons or zoos. We don't need to wear cow skin, sheep hair or coats with fox pelt-trim. Unless we otherwise would starve, we don't need to eat flesh, eggs or cow milk. Convincing people that the exploitation of nonhuman animals is needless and wrong will require changing the way we speak about that exploitation. We humans have a verbal monopoly, and our language transmits our prejudices. Speciesists have an easier task than racists or sexists. Their victims can't speak for themselves. We animal rights advocates must do more than express concern for nonhuman animals. We must, to the best of our ability, speak as they would if they could. The wounded buck would never call himself "game". The vivisected rat never would refer to vivisection as "biomedical research". The imprisoned sow never would say that she is "farmed".

# Speciesism--AT: Comparisons to racism bad

**It is easy to balk at these comparisons BUT reducing animals to “things” was the very first act of dehumanization and it set the stage for all future acts – including racism. It is an important discussion to have!**

**Afrospear ’08** [7/29, A Think Tank for People of African Descent, <http://afrospear.com/2008/07/29/do-animals-possess-rights-we-are-bound-to-respectand-should-a-nigga-care/>]

Whenever animal rights activists compared the treatment of blacks to the abuse suffered by animals, I balked. I was not alone. Many black folks find the comparison an insult. How dare you mention black people in the same sentence with fur or a chicken or a cow being led to slaughter. It feels reductive to compare people to animals because…we are more than that. We can think. We can speak. We have feelings. Was the first dehumanizing act of “mankind” to reduce animals to “things”, to set them beneath us, to claim that they are soul-less, emotionless tools granted by God – to provide us with their labor, their hides, their flesh? Does that act run in a straight line to the domestication of women, to the enslavement of people of color, to the African and Jewish Holocausts (“Eternal Treblinka“), to all of the organized brutality man heaps upon man, woman, child and planet? Could it be that the seeds of global oppression, the idea of a hierarchical order that has the divine right to call the shots for the planet, sprouted once man claimed himself separate from and better than animals while claiming dominion over them? This is not territory that I envisioned trodding. I’m the last nigga that believed in giving animals an even break if I gave any thought to animals at all. But today, at this moment, I see the unity of oppressions.

# Speciesism--AT: Comparisons to racism bad

**Comparisons to racism are NOT inappropriate or demeaning – their claim rests upon the assumption that there is a relevant distinction between human and non-human animals – makes speciesism inevitable and turns their impacts.**

**Best ’07, Associate Professor, Departments of Humanities and Philosophy University of Texas, El Paso** [Steven, Charles Patterson, The Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust New York: Lantern Books, 2002, 280 pp]

Yet Patterson shows that it is by no means inappropriate to draw analogies between animal and human slavery or between the animal and human holocaust and that visceral reactions to such comparisons, while understandable on many levels, is morally myopic, exhibits the same type and structure of hierarchy and devaluation Nazis used against Jews, and failed to understand the larger meanings of the human Holocaust. First, Patterson provides a powerful argument that the human holocaust built on the animal holocaust in significant ways, both ideologically and technologically, and thus there are important and relevant analogies to be made. In both cases, groups of beings are branded as inferior, separated from their families and homes, shipped and processed in rationalized bureaucratic ways, reduced to slave labor and often to experimental subjects of “science,” and ultimately murdered and disposed when their existence was no longer useful or convenient. There is a significant parallel between animals and humans confined in cages or cells, sick and scrawny, crammed into trucks or railcars on the way to slaughter, forced to labor unto death, and killed in gas chamber rooms (or meeting worse fates in the case of animals, such as being sliced apart while still conscious). Second, as demonstrated throughout the third section of Patterson’s book, many Jewish people and Nazi victims themselves urge the importance of grasping the relationship between the animal and human holocaust, in both thought and practice, so why is it necessarily insensitive or anti-Semitic if non-Jewish people do the same. Here it is important to note that the PETA exhibit was inspired by Jewish writer, Charles Patterson; that it relied extensively on quotes by Jewish Holocaust victims and survivors; that it was funded by an anonymous Jewish philanthropist; and that it was put together by Matt Prescott, a PETA activist who lost several relatives in the Holocaust. The point of the exhibit was not to ignore obvious differences between the animals and humans, as well as between their respective holocausts, but rather to underscore the profound similarities. Here, in reference to the shared nature of oppressed animals and humans, the bottom line is that pain is pain and suffering is suffering, that all species live in psychological and physical torment stripped from their environment and families, when isolated and confined in small cages, when forced to labor until exhaustion or death, when experimented on, when living in fear and anxiety before finally being murdered.

# Speciesism--AT: Plan key to ALL equality

**Failure to account for non-human beings is an egregious offense to equality – impossible to access their internal links in this framework.**

**Singer ’89, Professor of Bioethics at Princeton University and Laureate Professor at the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics at the University of Melbourne** [All Animals Are Equal, TOM REGAN & PETER SINGER (eds.), Animal Rights and Human Obligations, New Jersey, 1989, pp. 148-162]

It is significant that the problem of equality, in moral and political philosophy, is invariably formulated in terms of human equality. The effect of this is that the question of the equality of other animals does not confront the philosopher, or student, as an issue itself—and this is already an indication of the failure of philosophy to challenge accepted beliefs. Still, philosophers have found it difficult to discuss the issue of human equality without raising, in a paragraph or two, the question of the status of other animals. The reason for this, which should be apparent from what I have said already, is that if humans are to be regarded as equal to one another, we need some sense of "equal" that does not require any actual, descriptive equality of capacities, talents or other qualities. If equality is to be related to any actual characteristics of humans, these characteristics must be some lowest common denominator, pitched so low that no human lacks them—but then the philosopher comes up against the catch that any such set of characteristics which covers all humans will not be possessed only by humans. In other words, it turns out that in the only sense in which we can truly say, as an assertion of fact, that all humans are equal, at least some members of other species are also equal—equal, that is, to each other and to humans. If, on the other hand, we regard the statement "All humans are equal" in some non-factual way, perhaps as a prescription, then, as I have already argued, it is even more difficult to exclude non-humans from the sphere of equality.

# Speciesism AT: Will trade off w/ human rights/ immediate solvency

**The trade off is constructed and irrelevant since their human-centric thinking means they can’t really solve their impacts…**

**We must resist their call to make this forced choice – it’s a false choice.**

**Francione ’04** [Gary Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions, eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum]

Because animals are property, we treat every issue concerning their use or treatment as though it presented a genuine conflict of interests, and invariably we choose the human interest over the animal interest even when animal suffering can be justified only by human convenience, amusement, or pleasure. In the overwhelming number of instances in which we evaluate our moral obligations to animals, however, there is no true conflict. When we contemplate whether to eat a hamburger, buy a fur coat, or attend a rodeo, we do not confront any sort of conflict worthy of serious moral consideration. If we take animal interests seriously, we must desist from manufacturing such conflicts, which can only be construed in the first place by ignoring the principle of equal consideration and by making an arbitrary decision to use animals in ways in which we rightly decline to use any human.

# Speciesism AT: anti-speciesim = devalue retarded people

**Rejection of speciesism does not mean devaluing the life of humans with decreased mental level.**

**Courier Mail ’01** [Respect for all life, LN]

Controversially, Singer argued that at the same time, once we realise that being human in itself does not protect us from being killed, we may come to reconsider our policy of preserving human lives at all costs. Especially when there is no prospect of a meaningful life or of existence without terrible pain. He concluded that a rejection of speciesism does not imply that all lives are of equal worth. "It is not arbitrary to hold that the life of a self-aware being, capable of abstract thought, of planning for the future, of complex acts of communication and so on, is more valuable than the life of a being without these capacities," Singer wrote. He said the preference, in normal cases, for saving a human life over the life of an animal when a choice has to be made, is a preference based on the characteristics that normal humans have, and not on the mere fact that they are members of our own species. This is why when we consider members of our species who lack the characteristics of normal humans, we can no longer say that their lives are always to be preferred to those of other animals. In general, though, the question of when it is wrong to kill (painlessly) an animal is one to which we need give no precise answer, Singer said. As long as we remember that we should give the same respect to the lives of animals as we give to the lives of those humans at a similar mental level, we shall not go far wrong.

# Speciesism AT: Forgetting

**“Forgetting” creates a psychological numbing that necessitates the worst forms of violence…oh yeah, it won’t solve speciesism either.**

**Dell’Aversano ‘10** [Carmen, “the love whose name cannot be spoken: queering the human-animal bond” journal for critical animal studies, volume III issue 1 and 2, 2010]

This ―forgetting‖ is considerably facilitated by the veil of secrecy and concealment which shrouds the violent practices which constitute animal identities and ensure the enslavement of animals; insensitivity to the suffering of others is achieved at considerable neurological and psychological cost, and can never be complete: just as the Nazis, because of the devastating impact the systematic killings of civilians were having on the morale of their troops, had to settle for a system of mass murder in which the psychologically most stressful tasks were executed by prisoners, so today we can maintain the system of animal exploitation and murder on which we subsist only by ―farming out‖ the most violent and most repulsive tasks to a class of disenfranchised and exploited marginals who, like the Nazi Sonderkommandos, are in no position to rebel; Eisnitz 2006 is one of the few places in which their voices, and their unique perspective on their grueling situation, can be heard.

# Speciesism AT: Loyalty arg

**This appeal fails on all levels**

**Bernstein ’04, Professor of the Practice of Political Science @ USC** [Mark, Neo-Speciesism, Journal of social philosophy, Vol 35, Iss 3, EBSCO]

Family loyalties likewise proceed over time in predictable ways. Mothers and fathers tell their children about their own history, and so, simultaneously, about the children’s. Ideas are exchanged over dinner. Values and goals become discussed and imparted, explicitly or implicitly, during a period of many years. Mutual affection, appreciation, and love thrive. It is no surprise that family and friend environs are the homes for the fiercest loyalties. Consider the lifeboat case where you are safely sailing in a boat and find two flailing swimmers in the middle of the ocean. One is your friend, the other a stranger. If only one can be saved, loyalty to your friend justifies saving him over the other. In this circumstance, you need not abide by the dictates of impartial morality by, say, flipping a coin to decide whom to save. In fact, it may be reasonably argued that the loyalty of the friendship obligates you to save your friend at the expense of the stranger; flipping a coin is not merely unnecessary but wrong. Loyalty appeals are legitimate not only to tip the scales in an otherwise balanced situation but also to reverse some decisions made purely on impartial grounds. Your friend needs a ride to the grocery store while an acquaintance needs a ride to the dentist for his annual checkup. Loyalty permits, if not requires, giving preference to your friend. Of course there are limits to loyalty’s moral power. If a friend needs a ride to the grocery store and the acquaintance requires immediate attention for a complex fracture, impartial consideration of interests holds sway.3 Buoyed with these concessions about loyalty, the speciesist argues by analogy. Just as loyalty legitimizes, if not obligates, privileging the interests of friends over the like interests of acquaintances or strangers, so too, loyalty permits, if not requires, privileging the interests of members of our species over the interests of members of foreign species. We cannot, of course, conveniently forget that part of the analogy that constrains the use of loyalty appeals. Loyalty does not confer a moral carte blanche and so when the interests of another species are significantly greater than those of a human, impartiality rules. This leaves plenty of space to discuss whether, in any particular case, the interests are significantly different to frustrate loyalty appeals, but by any honest reckoning the almost unimaginable suffering that animals experience on factory farms far outweighs the gustatory delights provided by carnivorism. Hunting faces the same huge disparity of significant interests and, although this is not the venue for debate, I believe vivisection, as well, cannot be saved by appeal to loyalty. Nevertheless, these practical considerations do not challenge the adequacy of the analogy and the propriety of appealing to loyalty as grounds for privileging the interests of humans.

**Loyalty appeal is morally repugnant – justifies all forms of bigotry.**

**Bernstein ’04, Professor of the Practice of Political Science @ USC** [Mark, Neo-Speciesism, Journal of social philosophy, Vol 35, Iss 3, EBSCO]

Finally, species loyalty cannot be legitimately used to preferentially treat human interests on pain of proving too much. Although classification by species is under serious attack, species are usually distinguished either by DNA structure or interbreeding populations. As in the cases of loyalties to one’s race and sex, co-membership is not a product of any intentional acts that might ground special preferencing of interests. As we rightfully decry loyalties to one’s race and sex as euphemisms for the bigotries of racism and sexism, we should extend our negative attitudes toward those who forward species loyalty as justification for preferential consideration.

# Speciesism AT: Solidarity arg

**This is an appeal to faulty logic**

**Bernstein ’04, Professor of the Practice of Political Science @ USC** [Mark, Neo-Speciesism, Journal of social philosophy, Vol 35, Iss 3, EBSCO]

It seems to me that an appeal to solidarity is illegitimate. To see this, consider a case structurally similar to Self but where solidarity rather than loyalty plays the operable relationship. (S) Moses is the lone Jew in a small German town in 1942 when antiSemitism is at its peak. Awell-armed Swede fortuitously walks by Moses’ house. If, but only if, Moses kills the Swede will he gain access to the guns that he needs to have a reasonable expectation of escape from the German village. Moses can only turn to himself for help; in all likelihood, his very existence depends upon him taking the innocent Swede’s life. Yet, surely Moses cannot legitimize his murdering the Swede by appealing to self-solidarity. As with 386 Mark Bernstein Phil in Self, we can empathize with Moses’ plight and even concede that if we were in his situation we very well might kill the Swede to survive. Nevertheless, Moses’ action transcends the limits of what we can morally do in the name of self-defense. It is worth noting that the appeal to solidarity is even less convincing when it is used to justify speciesist practices regarding animals. In (B) and (S), we had the innocents Ida and the Swede fortuitously entering our lifeboat cases. Animals, on the other hand, are coerced by us into lifeboat situations; cows, chickens, and pigs do not just happen to roam into a factory farm nor do mice, dogs, and cats casually saunter into vivisectionist laboratories. Animals are in the position they are not because of poor reasoning or even bad luck, but because we intentionally and deliberately place them there without their consent. Does this coercion matter? Consider (B) again but with the addition that Sarah is kidnapped by Jan to be a hostage, or return to (S) now modified so that the arrival of the innocent Swede is a result of a deceitful letter from Moses telling the Swede that his wife is being held hostage by the Nazis in the German village. If there is a change in moral judgment, it is that Jan’s throwing Sarah from the boat or Moses’ killing the Swede become more despicable. History matters; how lifeboat situations are generated is morally relevant and so whatever moral residue appeals to solidarity may have in the unadorned intrahuman cases disappears when we realize how animals, in fact, become unfortunate innocents. And, finally, it is difficult to see how neo-speciesists, who use solidarity as a defense of the preferential consideration of the interests of humans can justify ‘humanity’ as their favored group. It is true that help can come only from humans but it is also true that help can come only from the animal kingdom. While it is unlikely that Boomer will help me recover some social protections, it is equally unlikely that an Australian aboriginal will bring any comfort. I find myself, as a Jew whose ancestors were continually oppressed, more like Boomer (in this way, at least) than, say, the royal family in Great Britain. If the Japanese and the Inuit can have a solidarity relationship that allows them to inflict harm on the innocent Egyptian, I see no reason why such a relationship cannot exist between a human and a dog that permits, under certain circumstances, bringing about pain and death to other humans.

# Speciesism AT: Sacrifice Arg

**This may seem like a super tricky way to answer our affirmative but the fact that it is the non-human animals they choose to sacrifice is just another big fat link to our argument.**

**This is a hypocritical pretense to ethics that will drive us towards extinction.**

**Best ’07, Associate Professor, Departments of Humanities and Philosophy University of Texas, El Paso** [Steven, Charles Patterson, The Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust New York: Lantern Books, 2002, 280 pp]

A truly revolutionary social theory and movement seeks to emancipate members of one species from oppression, but rather all species and the earth itself from the grip of human domination and colonization. A future “revolutionary movement” worthy of the name will grasp the ancient roots of hierarchy, such as took shape with the emergence of agricultural societies, and incorporate a new ethics of nature that overcomes instrumentalism and hierarchies of all forms. Humanism is a form of prejudice, bias, bigotry, and destructive supremacism; it is a stale, antiquated, immature, and dysfunction dogma; it is a form of fundamentalism, derived from the Church of “Reason” and, in comparison with the vast living web of life still humming and interacting, however tattered and damaged, it is, writ large, a tribal morality – in which killing a member of your own “tribe” is wrong but any barbarity unleashed on another tribe is acceptable if not laudable. Ultimately, humanism is pseudo-universalism, a Kantian quackery, a hypocritical pretense to ethics, a dysfunctional human identity and cosmological map helping to drive us ever-deeper into an evolutionary cul-de-sac.

**Their notion of sacrifice is psychologically damaging – only unconditional non-violence can liberate the self and solve for the global psyche that necessitates violence in all forms.**

**Joy ’03, social psychologist, professor, and personal coach** [Melanie, Toward a Non-Speciesist Psychoethic, Society & animals, Vol 11, Iss 1, EBSCO]

Speciesism is a ubiquitous ideology in which countless nonhuman beings are sacrificed to serve human ends (Singer, 1990). Moreover, the system may well be supported by a web of deleterious psychosocial processes (Arluke & Sanders, 1996) and, as such, can be detrimental to humans as well as nonhumans. Psychology, as the eld that seeks to understand human motivation and denes the parameters of social values and normative behavior, is ideally positioned to challenge the speciesist status quo. However, the widespread practice of using animals other than human for psychological research (Sharpe, 1988), the failure to consider that speciesist practices may incur psychological repercussions, and the dearth of literature on the paradoxical human-nonhuman relationship demonstrate psychology’s apparent sanction of speciesism. Indeed, the received psychological view is based upon a set of implicit assumptions that shape and support anthropocentric beliefs and behaviors. Most notable is the assumption that the only psycho-emotionally and ontologically meaningful relationships are inter-human. By assuming that the nonhumanhuman relationship is of little or no consequence, Society & Animals 11:1 © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2003 psychology disregards the ways in which humanity’s treatment of other species may both reect and reinforce mental wellness and illness. Speciesist psychological assumptions have taken shape over the years of psychology’s evolution and emerged from the theoretical constructs that have guided the development of psychological thought. To date, virtually all psychological paradigms, perhaps unwittingly, have bolstered an anthropocentric ideology. Even ecopsychology (Pilisuk & Joy, 2000), with its emphasis on biocentrism, often condones speciesist practices such as carnism (Joy, 2001) and hunting. Thus, there is a need for a new psychological paradigm in which the emancipation of all life is central to the liberation of the self. Placing the principle of unconditional non-violence within the rubric of mental health ultimately can revolutionize assumptions about psychology and its role in healing the individual and global psyche.

# \*\*\* Speciesism Links\*\*\*

# Speciesism Links: Human Rights

**The aff externalizes violence as a problem to be solved by human agency. – inherently speciesist.**

**Kochi and Ordan ‘08** [An argument for the global suicide of humanity borderlands, December]

When thinking about whether the human species is worth saving the naïve view sees these good and bad aspects as distinct. However, when thinking about ‘human nature’ as a whole, or even the operation of human reason as a characteristic of the Enlightenment and modernity, it is not so easy to draw clear lines of separation. As suggested by Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer (1997), within what they call the ‘dialectic of enlightenment’, it is sometimes the very things which we draw upon to escape from evil, poverty and harm (reason, science, technology) which bring about a situation which is infinitely more destructive (for example the atom bomb). Indeed, it has often been precisely those actions motivated by a desire to do ‘good’ that have created profound degrees of destruction and harm. One just has to think of all the genocides, massacres and wars within history justified by moral notions such as ‘civilisation’, ‘progress’ and ‘freedom’, and carried out by numerous peoples acting with misguided, but genuine intentions. When considering whether humanity is worth saving, one cannot turn a blind eye to the violence of human history. This is not to discount the many ‘positive’ aspects of the human heritage such as art, medicine, the recognition of individual autonomy and the development of forms of social organisation that promote social welfare. Rather, what we are questioning is whether a holistic view of the human heritage considered in its relation to the natural environment merits the continuation of the human species or not. Far too often the ‘positive’ aspects of the human heritage are viewed in an abstract way, cut off from humanity’s destructive relation with the natural environment. Such an abstract or one-sided picture glorifies and reifies human life and is used as a tool that perpetually redeems the otherwise ‘evil’ acts of humanity. Humanity de-crowned Within the picture many paint of humanity, events such as the Holocaust are considered as an exception, an aberration. The Holocaust is often portrayed as an example of ‘evil’, a moment of hatred, madness and cruelty (cf. the differing accounts of ‘evil’ given in Neiman, 2004). The event is also treated as one through which humanity might comprehend its own weakness and draw strength, via the resolve that such actions will never happen again. However, if we take seriously the differing ways in which the Holocaust was ‘evil’, then one must surely include along side it the almost uncountable numbers of genocides that have occurred throughout human history. borderlands 7:3 10 Hence, if we are to think of the content of the ‘human heritage’, then this must include the annihilation of indigenous peoples and their cultures across the globe and the manner in which their beliefs, behaviours and social practices have been erased from what the people of the ‘West’ generally consider to be the content of a human heritage. Again the history of colonialism is telling here. It reminds us exactly how normal, regular and mundane acts of annihilation of different forms of human life and culture have been throughout human history. Indeed the history of colonialism, in its various guises, points to the fact that so many of our legal institutions and forms of ethical life (i.e. nation-states which pride themselves on protecting human rights through the rule of law) have been founded upon colonial violence, war and the appropriation of other peoples’ land (Schmitt, 2003; Benjamin, 1986). Further, the history of colonialism highlights the central function of ‘race war’ that often underlies human social organisation and many of its legal and ethical systems of thought (Foucault, 2003). This history of modern colonialism thus presents a key to understanding that events such as the Holocaust are not an aberration and exception but are closer to the norm, and sadly, lie at the heart of any heritage of humanity. After all, all too often the European colonisation of the globe was justified by arguments that indigenous inhabitants were racially ‘inferior’ and in some instances that they were closer to ‘apes’ than to humans (Diamond, 2006). Such violence justified by an erroneous view of ‘race’ is in many ways merely an extension of an underlying attitude of speciesism involving a long history of killing and enslavement of non-human species by humans. Such a connection between the two histories of inter-human violence (via the mythical notion of differing human ‘races’) and interspecies violence, is well expressed in Isaac Bashevis Singer’s comment that whereas humans consider themselves “the crown of creation”, for animals “all people are Nazis” and animal life is “an eternal Treblinka” (Singer, 1968, p.750). Certainly many organisms use ‘force’ to survive and thrive at the expense of their others. Humans are not special in this regard. However humans, due a particular form of self-awareness and ability to plan for the future, have the capacity to carry out highly organised forms of violence and destruction (i.e. the Holocaust; the massacre and enslavement of indigenous peoples by Europeans) and the capacity to develop forms of social organisation and communal life in which harm and violence are organised and regulated. It is perhaps this capacity for reflection upon the merits of harm and violence (the moral reflection upon the good and bad of violence) which gives humans a ‘special’ place within the food chain. Nonetheless, with these capacities come responsibility and our proposal of global suicide is directed at bringing into full view the issue of human moral responsibility. borderlands 7:3 11 When taking a wider view of history, one which focuses on the relationship of humans towards other species, it becomes clear that the human heritage – and the propagation of itself as a thing of value – has occurred on the back of seemingly endless acts of violence, destruction, killing and genocide. While this cannot be verified, perhaps ‘human’ history and progress begins with the genocide of the Neanderthals and never loses a step thereafter. It only takes a short glimpse at the list of all the sufferings caused by humanity for one to begin to question whether this species deserves to continue into the future. The list of human-made disasters is ever-growing after all: suffering caused to animals in the name of science or human health, not to mention the cosmetic, food and textile industries; damage to the environment by polluting the earth and its stratosphere; deforesting and overuse of natural resources; and of course, inflicting suffering on fellow human beings all over the globe, from killing to economic exploitation to abusing minorities, individually and collectively. In light of such a list it becomes difficult to hold onto any assumption that the human species possesses any special or higher value over other species. Indeed, if humans at any point did possess such a value, because of higher cognitive powers, or even because of a special status granted by God, then humanity has surely devalued itself through its actions and has forfeited its claim to any special place within the cosmos. In our development from higher predator to semi-conscious destroyer we have perhaps undermined all that is good in ourselves and have left behind a heritage best exemplified by the images of the gas chamber and the incinerator. We draw attention to this darker and pessimistic view of the human heritage not for dramatic reasons but to throw into question the stability of a modern humanism which sees itself as inherently ‘good’ and which presents the action of cosmic colonisation as a solution to environmental catastrophe. Rather than presenting a solution it would seem that an ideology of modern humanism is itself a greater part of the problem, and as part of the problem it cannot overcome itself purely with itself. If this is so, what perhaps needs to occur is the attempt to let go of any one-sided and privileged value of the ‘human’ as it relates to moral activity. That is, perhaps it is modern humanism itself that must be negated and supplemented by a utopian antihumanism and moral action re-conceived through this relational or dialectical standpoint in thought. The banality of evil, the banality of good In order to consider whether any dialectical utopian anti-humanism might be possible, it becomes necessary to reflect upon the role of moral action which underlies the modern humanist view of the subject as drawn upon by thinkers such as Hawking. Our argument is that the logical end-point of ethically motivated technical action is a certain type of human apoptosis – the global suicide of humanity. In what follows we set out some aspects of the problematisation of the borderlands 7:3 12 modern humanist view of moral action and the way in which this causes difficulties for not only Hawking’s project of cosmic colonisation, but also for many in the environmental movement more generally. Faced with what seems to be a looming environmental crisis spiralling out of control and an awareness of a history of human action which has caused this crisis, the reaction of many environmentalists is, contra Hawking, not to run away to another habitat but to call for new forms of action. The call for urgent political and social action to change human behaviour in relation to the environment is echoed globally not only by environmentalists and activists but also by celebrities and politicians. [6] The response is highly modern in the sense that a problem such as global warming is not considered to be something ordained by fate or the outcome of divine providence. Instead it is understood as something caused by human action for which humans bear the responsibility and, further, that disaster may still be averted if we act in such a way to change the course of history. [7] The move towards critical historical reflection, the assuming of responsibility, and action guided by such an attitude, is certainly a better approach than shutting one’s eyes to the violence and errors of human history or placing blind faith in technology. Indeed, criticism of these latter views is heard from within eco-ethics circles themselves, either by labelling such endeavours as ‘technofix’ or ‘technocentric’ (Smith, 1998), or by criticizing the modes of action of green-politics as ‘eco-bureaucracy’ and ‘men-politics’ (Seager, 1993). However, even if we try to avoid falling into the above patterns, maybe it is actually too late to change the course of the events and forces that are of our own making. Perhaps a modern discourse or belief in the possibilities of human action has run aground, hamstrung by its own success. Perhaps the only forms of action available are attempts to revert to a pre-industrial lifestyle, or a new radical form of action, an action that lets go of action itself and the human claim to continued habitation within the world. In this case, the action of cosmic colonisation envisaged by Hawking would not be enough. It would merely perpetuate a cycle of destructive speciesist violence. Further, general humanist action, guided by some obligation of ‘care’ for the environment, would also not be enough as it could not overcome an individual’s complicity in systematic and institutional speciesist violence.

# Speciesism Links: Immigration

**Immigrants to the US change their diet to one that necessitates the killing of millions of non-human animals.**

**Pinkerton ’08, columnist, author, political analyst and former White House Staffer** [James, PETA wants to advertise vegan message on border fence, <http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/front/5937293.html>]

"We think that Mexicans and other immigrants should be warned if they cross into the U.S. they are putting their health at risk by leaving behind a healthier, staple diet of corn tortillas, beans, rice, fruits and vegetables," said Lindsay Rajt, assistant manager of PETA's vegan campaigns. The Department of Homeland Security is working to meet a deadline to complete 670 miles of fencing and other barriers on the Southwest border by Dec. 31. The fencing operation has run into stiff opposition by landowners fighting government efforts to obtain their land through condemnation. PETA says its billboards would picture "fit and trim" Mexicans in their own country, where their diet is more in line with the group's mission. Another image on the sign would portray obese American children and adults "gorging on meaty, fat- and cholesterol-packed American food."

# Speciesism Links: Natural Disaster

**Disaster response is speciesist.**

**Irvine ’06, Ph.D. in sociology and teaches at the University of Colorado** [Leslie, Animals in Disasters: Issues for Animal Liberation Activism and Policy, Animal Liberation Philosophy and Policy Journal, Volume IV, Issue 1,http://www.criticalanimalstudies.org/JCAS/Journal\_Articles\_download/Issue\_5/irvine.pdf]

In addition to the pitfalls of institutional thinking, the disaster response system, at least as currently practiced through the command and control model, reveals thoroughgoing speciesism and a paternalistic attitude about the right to use force and violence. To be sure, the command and control model should not be singled out for accusations of speciesism; our entire anthropocentric culture is to blame. The point I focus on here concerns the speciesist assumptions that direct emergency responders to save human lives first, and often at the expense of animal lives. Coupled with this, the use of state-sanctioned force and the threat and reality of violence poses an intriguing paradox for animal rights activists. For example, following Hurricane Katrina, the lack of government response required subsequent animal rescuers to engage in tactics such as breaking and entering, which are denounced when engaged in by the Animal Liberation Front (ALF). For a deeper exploration of these and other issues, I turn now to the case studies.

**Disaster response scenarios reflect speciesist assumptions.**

**Irvine ’06, Ph.D. in sociology and teaches at the University of Colorado** [Leslie, Animals in Disasters: Issues for Animal Liberation Activism and Policy, Animal Liberation Philosophy and Policy Journal, Volume IV, Issue 1,http://www.criticalanimalstudies.org/JCAS/Journal\_Articles\_download/Issue\_5/irvine.pdf]

Non-human animals face significant risks in meteorological, geological, technological, and terrorist disasters. A large network of rescue organizations and policies has developed in response to the needs of animals. This paper examines the animal response system through four case studies, revealing issues and conflicts that can inform animal rights policy and activism. The first case examines the response to Hurricane Katrina, pointing out that emergency response plans reflect speciesist assumptions that give human lives priority, in all circumstances. The media highlighted accusations of racism during the Katrina response, but activists need to educate the public about the connections between these forms of discrimination. Second, a train derailment in which residents evacuated without their animals resulted in a bomb threat on the animals’ behalf. Faced with negative publicity, responders conducted a rescue operation, proving that the government responds selectively to direct action. Third, Hurricane Charley revealed a myth about the behavior of dogs that has parallels to myths about direct action on behalf of animals. Understanding how myths function can help activists undermine them. Finally, an evacuation exercise at an animal shelter emphasized the importance of training volunteers in the handling of animals. This lesson translates well to animal liberation actions and other situations in which animal safety is paramount.

# Speciesism Links: Natural Disasters

**Disaster response always prioritizes humans.**

**Irvine ’06, Ph.D. in sociology and teaches at the University of Colorado** [Leslie, Animals in Disasters: Issues for Animal Liberation Activism and Policy, Animal Liberation Philosophy and Policy Journal, Volume IV, Issue 1,http://www.criticalanimalstudies.org/JCAS/Journal\_Articles\_download/Issue\_5/irvine.pdf]

The overwhelming numbers of homeless animals after Katrina highlighted the speciesist assumptions in the disaster response. Emergency responders make human lives their first priority. Fire fighters, police officers, and other first responders will not rescue a dog or cat instead of a human being.9 This policy draws a line between different kinds of life, and assumes that the lives on the human side of the line are more valuable. The debate about the relative value of lives is, I believe, misguided. The speciesism inherent in the construction of a human-animal boundary assumes that rescue cannot be reinvented in such a way that can spare the lives of animals and humans. The policy of putting humans first inhibits thinking about disaster response “outside the box,” as it were. If disaster response policy were examined with an eye to eliminating speciesist assumptions, small changes could improve the situation for people and animals. For example, in a conversation I had with a veterinarian volunteer about six months after Katrina, I learned that Red Cross responders are not permitted to carry dog and cat food in their vehicles. This particular veterinarian had traveled through New Orleans in Red Cross vehicles several times as part of his service, during a time early in the response when travel in the city was restricted to emergency vehicles. He pointed out the need for dog and cat food at his site, and requested that the Red Cross bring some on their next trip. The responders told him that they were prohibited from carrying animal feed or animals. The veterinarian explained that the food was human-grade, securely packaged, and unlikely to cause any contamination of any sort. The rule prevailed. Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of dogs and cats starved because emergency vehicles were reserved for human needs. Only once animal response teams were allowed in the city could food be made available to stranded and stray animals.

**Creation of disaster myths shape the way we view nhas.**

**Irvine ’06, Ph.D. in sociology and teaches at the University of Colorado** [Leslie, Animals in Disasters: Issues for Animal Liberation Activism and Policy, Animal Liberation Philosophy and Policy Journal, Volume IV, Issue 1,http://www.criticalanimalstudies.org/JCAS/Journal\_Articles\_download/Issue\_5/irvine.pdf]

Disaster myths have a parallel in animal rights activism, particularly direct action. For example, similar myths shape the way the government, corporations, and the public understand direct action on behalf of animals.13 Equating direct action with terrorism creates the impression that it always involves violence and intends at intimidation. The equation of the two in the media shapes public perceptions. Members of the public begin to believe that they are vulnerable to violence committed by animal rights activists. Consequently, any direct action will elicit state-sanctioned force and violence, not because the action itself was violent, but because the public, as well as the police and other responders, believe the myth. Even if the responders understand the action correctly, they will be required to take drastic action as a public relations move, to demonstrate that citizens are protected from “terrorism.”

# Speciesism Links: Human Rights

**The discourse and philosophical justifications are grounded in speciesism**

**Ash ’05** [Kyle Ash, European Environmental Bureau, 2005, Animal Law, Volume 11:1]

The most commonly stated basis for international human rights is human dignity. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights set the stage with Article I, to which all subsequent human rights treaties refer. Article I states, “[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood . . . .”2 Human dignity traditionally has been defined by legal theorists and philosophers in a manner that derives from arrant human chauvinism.3 This is unfortunate for two reasons. First, relying on a speciesist definition of human dignity undermines the cogency of human rights because it is scientifically and philosophically untenable. Second, basing human rights on irrational or metaphysical concepts makes it more difficult to debunk speciesism because of the subsequent recognition that legal rights are manufactured. With the goal of scientific and multi-cultural legitimacy, international human rights law might otherwise refer to non-metaphysical and permanent bases. This requires eradicating the species-based element.

**International human rights law is inherently speciesist**

**Ash ’05** [Kyle Ash, European Environmental Bureau, 2005, Animal Law, Volume 11:1]

Since international law today broadly draws its germination from Europe, both of the above reasons for excluding other animals from legal entitlement can be traced in part to the Judaeo-Christian tradition, in which the Bible explains in the book of Genesis, inter alia, that the Earth and all Earth’s nonhuman inhabitants are man’s to rule.10 Although, like the Judaeo-Christian tradition, other dominant world religions generally preach compassion and responsibility toward other animals, they all profess man’s inherent existential superiority.11 This is influenced by the much more pervasive roots of the secular aspect of speciesism, which conspire to determine that other species are inferior with several different explanations.12 What the explanations all have in common is the claim that other animals either lack or are deficient in qualities for which humans claim pride; for example, human reason, language, and use of symbols, humor, reflective capacity, and self-awareness. 13 Our tendency to infer these differences between us and other creatures has created a heuristic riddle, to which our answer has been to shift human supremacist claims from one reputed human-only asset to another, as sciences like biology, genetics, and anthropology have revealed evidence that one “uniquely human” trait after another turns out to be not so unique.14 The law has not kept up, and continues to validate our value-laden misconceptions.

# Speciesism Links: Human Rights

**Appeals to a common humanity reify the human-non-human animal divide**

**Clark ’94** [Stephen R. L. Clark, professor of philosophy at Liverpool University, 1994, The Great Ape Project: equality beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer]

They thought, that is, that our conspecificity should make a difference to the extent and nature of our obligations. Whereas what is now called ‘racism’ claims the right to treat human beings of other races less favorably than the racist’s own, UNESCO’s demand was that no differences of race, sex, age, intellect, capacity or creed should license what would otherwise be an obvious injustice. It may be that one historical explanation of the slogan’s popularity in the West, in addition to the shocked discovery of what racist jibes about “backward races’ had led to in the West, was the converse discovery that, for example, the Japanese so heartily despised the smelly, hairy Europids they captured. We all began to realize how vulnerable we were. The natural conclusion has been that species differences do license such injustice, perhaps because such differences are real and predictable, and relevant to the nature of the putative injustice. Those reasons are not wholly wrong, but of course they hardly touch the real point: some of our conspecifics would not be injured by acts that injure us, just as some creatures not of our species would be injured by those acts. If what matters is only the quality of the putative injury, then there will be many occasions when, if we ought not to injure those capable of being injured, we ought not injure those outside our species, and may do to our conspecifics what, in their case, will be no injury. That we are conspecifics plays no central role in the argument. Nor are any of the merely rationalist arguments very successful: respect for humankind’s unity is not well represented by respect for rational autonomy, since not all human beings are thus rational. If UNESCO wished to oppose the Nazi project (and of course it did) it could hardly do so by endorsing the Nazi preoccupation with such forms of human living as they deemed rational. The object of the declaration was to oppose the extermination of the “mentally unfit” or the “backward races”, and not merely to dispute the Nazi’s identifications, as though their error was only a case of mistaken identity.

**Human rights are solely justified by our distinction from nhas.**

**Ash ’05** [Kyle Ash, European Environmental Bureau, 2005, Animal Law, Volume 11:1]

Mutua claims that a universal notion across all societies is that humans deserve special protections for the simple reason that we are not “animals.” Makau Mutua, The Banjul Charter: The Case for an African Cultural Fingerprint in Cultural Transformation and Human Rights in Africa 79 (A.A. An Na’im ed., Zed Books 2002). Cohen states that “any human being granted personhood has rights by virtue of species membership.” Ronald Cohen, Endless Teardops: Prolegomena to the Study of Human Rights in Africa, in Human Rights and Governance in Africa 3, 4 (Ronald Cohen, Goran Hyden & Winston P. Nagan, eds., U. Press of Fla. 1993).

# Speciesism Links: International law

**I-laws def of human rights is speciesist.**

**Meyer ’01** [Michael Meyer, Professor Philosophy, Santa Clara University, 2001, Journal of Social Philosophy, Vol. 32, No. 2, Summer]

Does the very idea of “human dignity” entail some moral disrespect for nonhuman animals? Put otherwise, does the notion of “human dignity” smack of speciesism (roughly, a view whereby nonhuman, sentient individuals are denied [adequate] moral standing on essentially arbitrary grounds)? Animal advocates, like James Rachels, often allege[s] that there is a serious clash between the traditional view of human dignity and adequate moral recognition of nonhuman animals: “The traditional doctrine of human dignity is speciesist to the core, for it implies that the interests of humans have priority over those of all other creatures.”There is a further reason—beyond those put forth in a critique like Rachels’s—to be concerned with the claim that the very idea of human dignity is an impediment to the proper moral recognition of animals. The ascendancy of an important modern moral notion like human dignity should not, it seems, also become an occasion for the subjugation of animals—for example, by providing an alleged rationale for harming them. It would be a cruel irony indeed for an idea that is seen as a source of moral progress—by providing a ground for our moral respect for humans regardless of social class, race, etc.—to become a source for rationalizing harm toward nonhuman animals.

# Speciesism Links: Intersectionality

**Intersectionality is necessarily speciesist – it creates exclusion by specifying which differences matter**Dekcha 8 – [Maneesha, Associate Professor, University of Victoria Faculty of Law Fall, “INTERSECTIONALITY AND POSTHUMANIST VISIONS OF EQUALITY,”]

The turn toward intersectionality within feminist legal theory and beyond has been a productive development within critical theorizations. It has cultivated sophisticated sensibility of the multidimensionality of the workings of power and the mutually constitutive dynamics of differences in producing our social locations and experiences of the world. Paradoxically, however, intersectionality creates its own areas of exclusion by specifying which differences matter. Like most humanist theory, intersectional theory relies on the fictive animal/human boundary that formatively inhabits Western thought in general. The zone of critique is typically the human with the animal Other, on which the idea of the human relies, left suppressed and subordinated. While this critique could logically be leveled at the whole gamut of critical humanist theory, intersectionality is especially vulnerable to it due to the emphasis on interrogations of unexamined difference that intersectionality itself champions. Whereas, say, Marxism never purported to extend primacy to all differences but rather elevate one – class – in its analysis, intersectionality insists on the relevance to all sites of difference in exploring and imagining in/justice. 10

# Specieism--Value to Life claims

**Claims like “no value to life” promote human-centric arrogance—all life is meaning.**

**Cline ’06, Regional Director for the Council for Secular Humanism and a former Publicity Coordinator for the Campus Freethought Alliance** [Austin, Meaning of Life: Is there a Question to be Answered? (Book Notes: Losing Faith in Faith), <http://atheism.about.com/b/2006/04/04/meaning-of-life-is-there-a-question-to-be-answered-book-notes-losing-faith-in-faith.htm>]

Who said life must have meaning? Why can’t life just be life? My family has three cats, We enjoy watching them play, eat, sleep, lie in the sun and chase bugs. Do they ask themselves what is the meaning of life? Is their life any less livable because they possess no coherent purpose for existence? Since we humans have larger brains with a greater rational capacity and self consciousness than other animals we somehow assume we must be worthy of a higher purpose. Isn’t that arrogance? To ask the question about the meaning in life one must first assume the presence of someone to bestow bestow that meaning. This usually amounts to granting the existence of a transcendent reality, a supernatural realm to which we can somehow relate in a “meaningful manner.” If you can live without the need for meaning in life, then you will likewise not need the invented frame of reference, the plan and purpose of a divine will. To many people life is its own meaning, and the word “meaning” becomes meaningless.

# Speciesism Links: Fighting “isms”

**Human centric identity politics are rooted in speciesist assumptions that pits oppressed groups against each other, ensuring classism, racism, xenophobia, tyranny, and marginalization.**

**Salomon ’10**, MA in Research from Andover Newton Theological School, a Graduate Certificate in Science and Religion from the Boston Theological Institute[Daniel, From Marginal Cases to Linked Oppressions: Reframing the Conflict between the Autistic Pride and Animal Rights Movements, Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume VIII, Issue 1/2, 2010 (ISSN1948-352X), <http://www.criticalanimalstudies.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/JCAS-Vol-VIII-Issue-I-and-II-2010-Full-Issue1.pdf>]

Second, nonhuman animals do in fact get significant libratory benefits from autists reaching out to animalkind. Consider Dawn Prince-Hughes‘s lifework with gorillas; her work might not have happened, if she were not an autist. I am another example. I identify myself as an animal rights activist and have published books which constructively address and sympathetically engage animal issues. I am a vegetarian, have recently started an animal ministry with www.allcreatures.org, and have been militantly against hunting for population control and the ethical hunting position since I was a youth. I do not attend circuses, rodeos, or bullfights; I avoid wearing animal products when possible; and I do not hunt, fish, or trap. My practices reflect not only my principles, but also a fundamental difference in my mindset: I do not get pleasure from these activities. Unquestioningly, nonhuman animals receive at least some libratory benefits from my existence. The third issue, the identity politics argument, implicitly assumes that there are ―deserving and undeserving poor,‖ revealing an acceptance of the implicit paternalism of the oppressor, and holding that some group‘s issues are categorically more important than others, e.g., consider the conflicts between African-Americans and Latinos, between illegal and legal immigrants, between earlier and newer immigrants, and between the working poor and those on welfare. This argument quantifies suffering, e.g., physical suffering is greater suffering than psychological suffering or more of this group died in a genocide than that group, rather than embracing everyone‘s suffering as legitimate, e.g., both physical and psychological suffering both qualifies as suffering, or the fact that members of any group died in a genocide is a serious justice problem. It is fundamentally dualistic, e.g., one group getting justice, while another does not. This line of thinking also enables oppressors to get two or more oppressed groups fighting among themselves, as the above examples imply, rather than uniting against their common oppressor, e.g., classism, xenophobia, Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume VIII, Issue 1/2, 2010 (ISSN1948-352X) 58 poverty, unjust barriers, and unlivable wages. Also, it assumes a scarcity of resources, compassion, and good-will that is available to help the marginalized, e.g., the unquestioned paradigm in economics of a presumed scarcity or an unquestioned cynicism in the power for individuals and societies to change. The alternative is to negotiate with the oppressors to more equitably distribute goods and services, e.g., activism and moral suasion, now disproportionately controlled by the dominant group in society, e.g., neurotypical, speciesist power holders.

**Attempts to dismantle racism and sexism legitimize speciesist discourse and ensure its destructiveness.**

**Chrulew ’04** [Matthew Chrulew, Department of English, University of Western Australia, 2004, H-Net Reviews in the Humanities & Social Sciences, March,

http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showpdf.cgi?path=255911083547452]

Wolfe’s most important contribution is, I believe, his insistence on "the irreducibility of species discourse" (p. 124). In a disciplinary context justifiably concerned with the categories of race, class, gender (and so on), too often concern for animals is marginalized. The discourse of species is habitually reduced to a site onto which the real and determinative cultural forces are projected, a field always manipulated according to other ends. It is precisely the racist deployment of "animality" to exclude the non-white, or the sexist deployment of "nature" to exclude the female, which has motivated antiracist and antisexist movements to reclaim the space of the human subject for their own liberation. But the problem, as Wolfe points out on a number of occasions, is not only that such moves fail to challenge the speciesist dominance of the human over the animal--a failure which Wolfe admirably reverses in his foregrounding of the species discourse in these texts--but also the massively destructive institutional context of such discourse.

# Speciesism Links: Fighting isms

**Struggles for HUMAN equality are rooted in speciesism.**

**Cavelieri ’05** [Paola Cavalieri, Editor of the International philosophy journal Etica & Animali, 2005, “Are Human Rights Human?”, http://www.logosjournal.com/issue\_4.2/cavalieri.htm]

While not being altogether overlooked by philosophers, the first argument is, owing to its simplicity, powerful and widespread mainly at the societal level. To the question of what may draw what we might call, following Bentham, the “insuperable line” between us and the other animals,[8] this argument replies: the fact that they are not human. On such a perspective, what makes the difference is simply the possession, or lack, of a genotype characteristic of the species Homo sapiens.

Is it an acceptable reply? One can doubt it. Those who appeal to species membership work in fact within the framework of the intra-human egalitarian paradigm. And yet, it is just the line of reasoning that has lead to the defense of human equality which implies, by denying moral relevance to race and sex membership, the rejection of the idea that species membership in itself can mark a difference as far as moral status is concerned. If one claims that merely biological characteristics like race and sex cannot play a role in ethics, because ethics is a theoretical inquiry endowed with its own standards of justification, in which criteria imported from other domains cannot be directly relevant,[9] how can one attribute a role to a another merely biological characteristic such as species? Ethical views that, while rejecting racism and sexism, accept speciesism - as was defined, with a neologism that alludes to the parallel intra-human prejudices, the view that grants to the members of our own species a privileged status with respect to all other creatures - and racism are twin doctrines.[10]

**Equality discourse excludes nhas.**

**Anstotz 94, professor of special education at Univerity of Dortmund** [The Great Ape Project: equality beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer]

Anyone who interprets the idea of equality so as to find the criterion of equality only in membership of the species Homo sapiens can include profoundly mentally disabled people in the community of equals. It is done as Stolk describes, ‘regardless of their abilities and qualities.’ This interpretation is as psychologically strong as it is morally weak. For it prefers all and only members of that group who created this interpretation, discriminating without valid reason against all other living beings who are not members of this privileged community of equals.The attempt to realize the idea of equality is made more difficult when those who are not members of the relevant moral community are unable to appeal against their exclusion. Not even the most intelligent chimpanzee can protest, either directly or through representative drawn from their own kind, against the deprivation of liberty, against being used in painful medical experiments, against being killed for food, or against being exhibited in zoos and circuses. On the other hand, according to the Declaration of the United Nations, the profoundly mentally disabled human is protected from any kind of abuse and degradation, merely on the grounds of membership of the species Homo sapiens. Should the deeper sense of the idea of equality, on which human rights is based, demand that we provide for the interests and needs of humans but allow discrimination against the interests of non-human beings? Wouldn’t it be strange if the same idea contains the claim for equality and the permission for discrimination too? Can this idea really involve sympathy and cruelty at the same time?

**The very foundation of the idea of “equality” is speciesist.**

**Thomas ’78** [D. A. Lloyd Thomas, 1979, Mind, Volume 88, No. 352, October, pp. 538-553 [JSTOR], p. 539]

In the European tradition the assumption that there is some fundamental respect in which people are equal is probably an inheritance of Christianity, and in some ways that version of the doctrine of human equality offers the most straightforward idea of what is being attempted. Being a member of a certain natural species is not, as such, the important respect in which people are equal. However, being a member of that species confers, ‘ex officio’, the required characteristic: all people are equal in that they have a soul, and in the eyes of God all souls are equally worthy. The possession of this characteristic by all can then be used to support demands for certain forms of equal treatment.

# Speciesism Links: Specific Rhetoric Links – Survival

**Link – “survival” rhetoric.**

**Dell’Aversano ‘10** [Carmen, “the love whose name cannot be spoken: queering the human-animal bond” journal for critical animal studies, volume III issue 1 and 2, 2010]

―The instant of survival is the instant of power. The horror upon the sighting of death dissolves into satisfaction, since one is not oneself the dead. He lies, the survivor stands. It is as though a struggle had taken place and one had killed the dead oneself. In survival each is the enemy of the other […]. […] Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume VIII, Issue 1/2, 2010 (ISSN1948-352X) 123 The lowest form of survival is that of killing. Just as one has killed the animal one eats, just as it lies defenceless in front of one, and one can cut it into pieces and distribute it, as booty that he and his own will consume, so one also wants to kill the human who stands in one‘s way, who stands up against one, who stands against one as an enemy. One wants to lay him down in order to feel that one still exists, and he no longer does.‖ xxiv Haraway‘s specious distinction between killing and ―making killable‖ (Haraway 2008 80-81 and 105-106) shows itself to be particularly untenable in this context; unless a class of beings is ―made killable‖, killing is not only attended by grave sanctions but is performed only for reasons which are perceived (however misguidedly) to be serious: if humans (including Burger King patron Haraway) did not implicitly and unproblematically consider animals ―killable‖ it would not occur to them to kill them purely in order to consume their corpses any more than it occurs to them to kill other humans in order to consume their corpses. This issue can be illuminated by observing that the systematic spoliation of corpses in order to obtain raw materials is a far from negligible part of the horror we feel for the mass murders in Nazi concentration camps, and the reason is that this act, because of its instrumentality and ultimate frivolity, redefines murder as killing, and its victims as killable, that is, as non-human. All the dead are not equally dead. The dead who have been murdered by having been first designed as killable are vastly more dead than others, since their peculiar fate is to become, in Carol Adams‘ words, ―absent referents‖: Behind every meal of meat is an absence: the death of the animal whose place the meat takes. The ―absent referent‖ is that which separates the meat eater from the animal and the animal from the end product. The function of the absent referent is to keep our ―meat‖ separated from any idea that she or he was once an animal, […] to keep something from being seen as having been someone. Once the existence of meat is disconnected from the existence of an animal who was killed to become that ―meat‖, meat becomes unanchored by its original referent (the animal), becoming instead a free-floating image […]. (Adams 1990-2000 14) Butchering is the quintessential enabling act for meat eating. It enacts a literal dismemberment upon animals while proclaiming our intellectual and emotional separation from the animals‘ desire to live. […] Through butchering, animals become absent referents. Animals in name and body are made absent as animals for meat to exist. If animals are alive they cannot be meat. Thus a dead body replaces the live animal. Without animals there would be no meat eating, yet they are absent from the act of eating meat because they have been transformed into food. (Adams 1990-2000 51)

# Specific Rhetoric Links – Danger

**“Danger” rhetoric is inherently speciesist.**

**Dell’Aversano ‘10** [Carmen, “the love whose name cannot be spoken: queering the human-animal bond” journal for critical animal studies, volume III issue 1 and 2, 2010]

xi The role of killing and, in general, of ―danger‖ in the discourse of speciesism exactly parallels its use in racist discourse. Just as the ethnicity of minority criminals is prominently displayed in the media while the much more serious and numerous aggressions which victimize minorities are granted little or no visibility, a great many animal species are represented as fierce or dangerous even though the number and seriousness of their attacks on humans bear no comparison to those of human attacks against them, as should be clear at least from the fact that all these species are now on the brink of extinction while ours is multiplying beyond reason. The point is, of course, that in racist or speciesist discourse minorities and animals respectively are ―natural victims‖; therefore, their victimization is not newsworthy but is, quite simply, the way things should work, while their, no matter how rare and reasonable, attempts at retaliation or self-defense must be savagely stigmatized, and used to justify further victimization. The social function of animals in this capacity will be explored in greater depth in section 4 below.

# \*\*\*Speciesism Impacts\*\*\*

# Impacts - Extinction

**The human-non-human animals complex is at a crisis point – it is the internal link to every extinction scenario.**

**Best et al ’07** [Steven Best, Anthony J. Nocella, II, Richard Kahn, Carol Gigliotti, and Lisa Kemmerer, Introducing Critical Animal Studies, VOLUME V, ISSUE I,http://www.criticalanimalstudies.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/Introducing-Critical-Animal-Studies-2007.pdf]

The aim of the Institute for Critical Animal Studies (ICAS) is to provide a space for the development of a ―critical‖ approach to animal studies, one which perceives that relations between human and nonhuman animals are now at a point of crisis which implicates the planet as a whole. This dire situation is evident most dramatically in the intensified slaughter and exploitation of animals (who die by the tens of billions each year in the United States alone); the unfolding of the sixth great extinction crisis in the history of the planet (the last one being 65 million years ago); and the monumental environmental ecological threats of global warming, rainforest destruction, desertification, air and water pollution, and resource scarcity, to which animal agriculture is a prime contributor.

**Abolishing the arbitrary distinction between humans and nonhumans is key to survival.**

**Best ’07, Associate Professor, Departments of Humanities and Philosophy University of Texas, El Paso** [Steven, Charles Patterson, The Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust New York: Lantern Books, 2002, 280 pp]

“Compassion, in which all ethics must take root, can only attain its full breadth and depth if it embraces all living creatures and does not limit itself to humankind.” Albert Schweitzer “The animals of the world exist for their own reasons. They were not made for humans any more than black people were made for white, or women created for men.” Alice Walker The construction of industrial stockyards, the total objectification of nonhuman animals, and the mechanized murder of innocent beings should have sounded a loud warning to humanity that such a process might one day be applied to them, as it was in Nazi Germany. If humans had not exploited animals, moreover, they might not have exploited humans, or, at the very least, they would not have had handy conceptual models and technologies for enforcing domination over others. “A better understanding of these connections,” Patterson states, “should help make our planet a more humane and livable place for all of us – people and animals alike, A new awareness is essential for the survival of our endangered planet.”

# Speciesism Impacts – outweighs anything

**Anthropocentrism causes extinction—it divorces our relationship with the natural world and makes ecocide on a cosmic scale inevitable.**

**Gottlieb 94** — Roger S. Gottlieb, Professor of Humanities at Worcester Polytechnic Institute, holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy from Brandeis University, 1994 (“Ethics and Trauma: Levinas, Feminism, and Deep Ecology,” *Crosscurrents: A Journal of Religion and Intellectual Life*, Summer, Available Online at http://www.crosscurrents.org/feministecology.htm, Accessed 07-26-2011)

Here I will at least begin in agreement with Levinas. As he rejects an ethics proceeding on the basis of self-interest, so I believe the anthropocentric perspectives of conservation or liberal environmentalism cannot take us far enough. Our relations with nonhuman nature are poisoned and not just because we have set up feedback loops that already lead to mass starvations, skyrocketing environmental disease rates, and devastation of natural resources. The problem with ecocide is not just that it hurts human beings. Our uncaring violence also violates the very ground of our being, our natural body, our home. Such violence is done not simply to the other – as if the rainforest, the river, the atmosphere, the species made extinct are totally different from ourselves. Rather, we have crucified ourselves-in-relation-to-the-other, fracturing a mode of being in which self and other can no more be conceived as fully in isolation from each other than can a mother and a nursing child. We are that child, and nonhuman nature is that mother. If this image seems too maudlin, let us remember that other lactating women can feed an infant, but we have only one earth mother. What moral stance will be shaped by our personal sense that we are poisoning ourselves, our environment, and so many kindred spirits of the air, water, and forests? To begin, we may see this tragic situation as setting the limits to Levinas's perspective. The other which is nonhuman nature is not simply known by a "trace," nor is it something of which all knowledge is necessarily instrumental. This other is inside us as well as outside us. We prove it with every breath we take, every bit of food we eat, every glass of water we drink. We do not have to find shadowy traces on or in the faces of trees or lakes, topsoil or air: we are made from them. Levinas denies this sense of connection with nature. Our "natural" side represents for him a threat of simple consumption or use of the other, a spontaneous response which must be obliterated by the power of ethics in general (and, for him in particular, Jewish religious law(23) ). A "natural" response lacks discipline; without the capacity to heed the call of the other, unable to sublate the self's egoism. Worship of nature would ultimately result in an "everything-is-permitted" mentality, a close relative of Nazism itself. For Levinas, to think of people as "natural" beings is to assimilate them to a totality, a category or species which makes no room for the kind of individuality required by ethics.(24) He refers to the "elemental" or the "there is" as unmanaged, unaltered, "natural" conditions or forces that are essentially alien to the categories and conditions of moral life.(25) One can only lament that Levinas has read nature -- as to some extent (despite his intentions) he has read selfhood -- through the lens of masculine culture. It is precisely our sense of belonging to nature as system, as interaction, as interdependence, which can provide the basis for an ethics appropriate to the trauma of ecocide. As cultural feminism sought to expand our sense of personal identity to a sense of inter-identification with the human other, so this ecological ethics would expand our personal and species sense of identity into an inter-identification with the natural world. Such a realization can lead us to an ethics appropriate to our time, a dimension of which has come to be known as "deep ecology."(26) For this ethics, we do not begin from the uniqueness of our human selfhood, existing against a taken-for-granted background of earth and sky. Nor is our body somehow irrelevant to ethical relations, with knowledge of it reduced always to tactics of domination. Our knowledge does not assimilate the other to the same, but reveals and furthers the continuing dance of interdependence. And our ethical motivation is neither rationalist system nor individualistic self-interest, but a sense of connection to all of life. The deep ecology sense of self-realization goes beyond the modern Western sense of "self" as an isolated ego striving for hedonistic gratification. . . . . Self, in this sense, is experienced as integrated with the whole of nature.(27) Having gained distance and sophistication of perception [from the development of science and political freedoms] we can turn and recognize who we have been all along. . . . we are our world knowing itself. We can relinquish our separateness. We can come home again -- and participate in our world in a richer, more responsible and poignantly beautiful way.(28) Ecological ways of knowing nature are necessarily participatory. [This] knowledge is ecological and plural, reflecting both the diversity of natural ecosystems and the diversity in cultures that nature-based living gives rise to. The recovery of the feminine principle is based on inclusiveness. It is a recovery in nature, woman and man of creative forms of being and perceiving. In nature it implies seeing nature as a live organism. In woman it implies seeing women as productive and active. Finally, in men the recovery of the feminine principle implies a relocation of action and activity to create life-enhancing, not life-reducing and life-threatening societies.(29) In this context, the knowing ego is not set against a world it seeks to control, but one of which it is a part. To continue the feminist perspective, the mother knows or seeks to know the child's needs. Does it make sense to think of her answering the call of the child in abstraction from such knowledge? Is such knowledge necessarily domination? Or is it essential to a project of care, respect and love, precisely because the knower has an intimate, emotional connection with the known?(30) Our ecological vision locates us in such close relation with our natural home that knowledge of it is knowledge of ourselves. And this is not, contrary to Levinas's fear, reducing the other to the same, but a celebration of a larger, more inclusive, and still complex and articulated self.(31) The noble and terrible burden of Levinas's individuated responsibility for sheer existence gives way to a different dream, a different prayer: Being rock, being gas, being mist, being Mind, Being the mesons traveling among the galaxies with the speed of light, You have come here, my beloved one. . . . You have manifested yourself as trees, as grass, as butterflies, as single-celled beings, and as chrysanthemums; but the eyes with which you looked at me this morning tell me you have never died.(32) In this prayer, we are, quite simply, all in it together. And, although this new ecological Holocaust -- this creation of planet Auschwitz – is under way, it is not yet final. We have time to step back from the brink, to repair our world. But only if we see that world not as an other across an irreducible gap of loneliness and unchosen obligation, but as a part of ourselves as we are part of it, to be redeemed not out of duty, but out of love; neither for our selves nor for the other, but for us all.

# Speciesism Impacts—outweighs anything

**Anthropocentrism is the controlling impact—it allows the destruction of all forms of natural otherness to be reengineered for human purposes.**

**Lee 99** (Keekok, Visiting Chair in Philosophy at Lancaster University, *The Natural and the Artefactual*, 1999)

To appreciate this dimension one needs to highlight the distinction between the artefactual and the natural. The former is the material embodiment of human intentionality--an analysis in terms of Aristotle's causes shows that all four causes, since late modernity, may be assigned to human agency.'- The latter, ex hypothesi, has nothing to do with human agency in any of its four causes. This shows that the artefactual and the natural belong to two very different ontological categories--one has come into existence and continues to exist only because of human purpose and design while the other has come into existence and continues to exist independently of human purpose and design. In the terminology of this book, the artefactual embodies extrinsic/imposed teleology while the natural (at least in the form of individual living organisms) embodies intrinsic/immanent teleology. However, the more radical and powerful technologies of the late twentieth and the twenty-first centuries are capable of producing artefacts with an ever increasing degree of artefacticity. The threat then posed by modem homo faber is the systematic elimination of the natural, both at the empirical and the ontological levels, thereby generating a narcissistic civilization. In this context, it is, therefore, appropriate to remind ourselves that beyond Earth, nature, out there, exists as yet unhumanized. But there is a strong collective urge, not merely to study and understand that nature, but also ultimately to exploit it, and furthermore, even to transform parts of it into ersatz Earth, eventually making it fit for human habitation. That nature, as far as we know, has (had) no life on it. These aspirations raise a crucial problem which environmental philosophy ought to address itself, namely, whether abiotic nature on its own could be said to be morally considerable and the grounds for its moral considerability If no grounds could be found, then nature beyond Earth is ripe for total human control and manipulation subject to no moral but only technological and/or economic constraints. The shift to ontology in grounding moral considerability will, it is argued, free environmental philosophy from being Earthbound in the millennium about to dawn. In slightly greater detail, the aims of this book may be summarized as follows 1. To show how modem science and its technology, in controlling and manipulating (both biotic and abiotic) nature, transform it to become the~  artefactual. It also establishes that there are degrees of 'artefacticity  depending on the degree of control and precision with which science and  technology manipulate nature. An extant technology such as biotechnology  already threatens to imperil the existence of biotic natural kinds. Furthermore  technologies of the rising future, such as molecular nanotechnology, i~  synergistic combination with biotechnology and microcomputer technology,.  could intensify this tendency to eliminate natural kinds, both biotic and abiotic~  as well as their natural processes of evolution or change. 2. To consider the implications of the above for environmental philosophy, and in so doing, to point out the inadequacy of the extant accounts about intrinsic value in nature. By and large (with some honorable exceptions), these concentrate on arguing that the biotic has intrinsic value but assume that the~ undeniable contingent link between the abiotic and the biotic on Earth would~ take care of the abiotic itself. But the proposed terraformation of Mars (and even of Earth's moon only very recently) shows the urgent need to develop a much more comprehensive environmental philosophy which is not merely Earthbound but can include the abiotic in its own right. 3. The book also raises a central inadequacy of today's approaches in  environmental philosophy and movements. They concentrate predominantly  on the undesirable polluting aspects of extant technologies on human an~  nonhuman life, and advocate the introduction of more ecologically sensitive  technology (including this author's own earlier writing). If this were the most  important remit of environmental philosophy, then one would have to admit  that nature-replacing technologies (extant and in the rising future) could be  the ultimate 'green' technologies as their proponents are minded to maintain  in spite of their more guarded remarks about the environmental risks that ma'  be incurred in running such technologies.' Such technologies would also~  achieve what is seemingly impossible, as they promise to make possible ~  world of superabundance, not only for the few, but for all, without straining  and stressing the biosphere as a sink for industrial waste. But this book argue  that environmental philosophy should not merely concern itself with the  virtuous goal of avoiding pollution risks to life, be that human or nonhuman It should also be concerned with the threat that such radically powerful technologies could render nature, both biotic and abiotic, redundant. A totally artefactual world customized to human tastes could, in principle, be designed and manufactured. When one can create artefactual kinds (from what Aristotle calls 'first. matter,' or from today's analogue, what we call atoms and molecules of familiar elements like carbon, nitrogen, hydrogen, etc.) which in other relevant respects are indistinguishable from natural kinds (what Aristotle calls 'second matter'), natural kinds are in danger of being superseded. The ontological category of the artefactual would replace that of the natural. The upholding of the latter as a category worth preserving constitutes, for this book, the most fundamental task in environmental philosophy. Under this perspective, the worrying thing about modem technology in the long run may not be that it threatens life on Earth as we know it to be because of its polluting effects, but that it could ultimately humanize all of nature. Nature, as 'the Other,' would be eliminated. 4. In other words, the ontological category of the natural would have to be delineated and defended against that of the artefactual, and some account of 'intrinsic' value would have to be mounted which can encompass the former. The book argues for the need to maintain distinctions such as that between human/nonhuman, culture/nature, the artefactual/the natural. In other words, ontological dyadism is required, though not dualism, to combat the transformation of the natural to become the artefactual. The book also argues that the primary attribute of naturally-occurring entities is an ontological one, namely, that of independence as an ontological value. Such an attribute is to be distinguished from secondary attributes like intricacy, complexity, interests-bearing, sentience, rationality, etc., which are said to provide the grounds for assigning their bearers intrinsic value. In this sense, ontology precedes axiology.

# Speciesism Impacts—outweighs anything

**This is a moral side constraint—extinction is irrelevant in impact comparison because the universe will still have value without humanity.**

**Lee 99** (Keekok, Visiting Chair in Philosophy at Lancaster University, The Natural and the Artefactual, 1999)

We should not delude ourselves that the humanization of nature will stop at biotic nature or indeed be confined only to planet Earth. Other planets in our solar system, too, may eventually be humanized; given the technological possibility of doing so, the temptation to do so appears difficult to resist on the part of those always on the lookout for new challenges and new excitement. To resist the ontological elimination of nature as 'the Other,' environmental philosophy must not merely be earthbound but, also, astronomically bounded (at least to the extent of our own solar system). We should bear in mind that while there may be little pristine nature left on Earth, this does not mean that nature is not pristine elsewhere in other planets. We should also be mindful that while other planets may not have life on them, this does not necessarily render them only of instrumental value to us. Above all, we should, therefore, bear in mind that nature, whether pristine or less than fully pristine, biotic or abiotic, is ontologically independent and autonomous of humankind--natural forms and natural processes are capable of undertaking their own .trajectories of existence. We should also remind ourselves that we are the controllers of our science and our technology, and not allow the products of our intellectual labor to dictate to us what we do to nature itself without pause or reflection. However, it is not the plea of this book that humankind should never transform the natural to become the artefactual, or to deny that artefacticity is not a matter of differing degrees or levels, as such claims would be silly and indefensible. Rather its remit is to argue that in systematically transforming the natural to become the artefactual through our science and our technology, we are at the same time systematically engaged in ontological simplification. Ontological impoverishment in this context is wrong primarily because we have so far failed to recognize that nature embodies its own funda­mental ontological value. In other words, it is not true, as modernity alleges, that nature is devoid of all value and that values are simply humanly conferred or are the projections of human emotions or attitudes upon nature. Admittedly, it takes our unique type of human consciousness to recognize that nature possesses ontological value; however, from this it would be fallacious to conclude that human consciousness is at once the source of all values, or even the sole locus of axiologically-grounded intrinsic values. But most important of all, human con­sciousness does not generate the primary ontological value of independence in nature; nature's forms and processes embodying this value exist whether human­kind is around or not.

# Speciesism Impacts – Environment

**Anthropocentrism is an unsustainable system—it poisons every environment it enters destroying all life.**

**Berry 95** (Thomas, Ph.D. from the Catholic University of America in European intellectual history  “The viable human” in *Deep Ecology for the 21st Century*, ed. George Sessions)

A deep cultural pathology has developed in Western society and has now spread throughout the planet. A savage plundering of the entire earth is taking place through industrial exploitation. Thousands of poisons unknown in former times are saturating the air, the water, and the soil. The habitat of a vast number of living species is being irreversibly damaged. In this universal disturbance of the biosphere by human agents, the human being now finds that the harm done to the natural world is returning to threaten the human species itself. The question of the viability of the human species is intimately connected with the question of the viability of the earth. These questions ultimately arise because at the present time the human community has such an exaggerated, even pathological, fixation on its own comfort and convenience that it is willing to exhaust any and all of the earth's resources to satisfy its own cravings. The sense of reality and of value is strictly directed toward the indulgences of a consumer economy. This nonsustainable situation can be clearly seen in the damage done to major elements necessary for the continued well-being of the planet. When the soil, the air, and the water have been extensively poisoned, human needs cannot be fulfilled. Strangely, this situation is the consequence of a human centered norm of reality and value. Once we grant that a change from an anthropocentric to a biocentric sense of reality and value is needed, we must ask how this can be achieved and how it would work it. we must begin by accepting the fact that the life community, the community of all living species, is the greater reality and the greater value , and that the primary concern of the human must be the preservation and enhancement of this larger community. The human does have its own distinctive reality and its own distinctive value, but this distinctiveness must be articulated within the more comprehensive context. The human ultimately must discover the larger dimensions of its own being within this community context. That the value of the human being is enhanced by diminishing the value of the larger community is an illusion, the great illusion of the present industrial age, seeks to advance the human by plundering the planet's geological structure and all its biological species' This plundering is being perpetrated mainly by the great industrial establishments that have dominated the entire planetary process for the past one hundred years, during the period when modern science and technology took control not only of natural resources but also of human affairs. If the viability of the human species is now in question, it is a direct consequence of these massive ventures, which have gained extensive control not only of our economies but also of our whole cultural development, whether it be economics, politics, law, education, medicine' or moral values' Even our language is heavily nuanced in favor of the consumer values fostered by our commercial industrial establishment'.

# Speciesism Impacts--Extinction

**Anthropocentrism divorces our connection to the natural world – this makes extinction inevitable**

**Drew 72** (Wayland, BA in English Language and Literature from Victoria College at the University of Toronto “Killing Wilderness” in *Deep Ecology for the 21st Century*, ed. George Sessions, pg. 118-119)

Civilization has triumphed. And yet, it has not. Ecologically our civilization is as mindless as a cancer, and we know that it will destroy itself by destroying its host. Ironically, any remnants of humanity to survive the apotheosis of civilization will be returned, genetically mutilated, to that state which we have thought contemptible. If man does not survive, "interplanetary archeologists of the future will classify our planet as one in which a very long and stable period of small-scale hunting and gathering was followed by an apparently instantaneous efflorescence of technology and society leading rapidly to extinction. 'stratigraphically,' the origin of agriculture and thermonuclear destruction will appear as essentially simultaneous."5 Reason severed from instinct is a monster. It is an affirmation of intellect, therefore, and not an abrogation, to defend as a viable development from civilization a way of life in which both instincts and intelligence have flourished freely; and while wilderness is still able to suggest man's proper place and deportment, it is a narrow, hubristic, suicidal, and tyrannical reason which will not listen. As civilized people, wilderness preservationists have been understandably reluctant to admit this. Together with the benefits of the advanced technological society they share the fallacy of infinite expansion, or seem to do so. Radical decentralization is too anarchistic and too negative a proposal for them to make. Whenever possible they seek positive political solutions, thereby allowing themselves to enter a dialectical process by which rational “concepts” of wilderness are formulated and wilderness itself is circumscribed in thought. Should they recognize the thralldom of politics to technocracy, they will say ruefully that they are at least “buying time.” But while they debate, wilderness shrinks; when they compromise, wilderness is fragmented. To endorse any projection of society's "future needs" is to endorse the growth dynamic in which technology is founded, unless the radical shift to a steady-state economy has already occurred. At the present rate of expansion, technological demands on the environment will have been multiplied by a factor of thirty-two by the year 2040 within the lifetime of children now living. It is an insane projection. Long before then we shall either have scuttled civilization, or we shall have made a reality of the Orwellian nightmare. Such words as "individual" and "wilderness" will long since have been torn from their semantic moorings. Redefinitions are already underway. This century has seen the insinuation of the term "wilderness park" by the technocratic bureaucracy, and its ready acceptance by conservationists. In this maneuver, the State has adroitly undercut the question raised by wilderness, and has reduced all wilderness issues to the status of managerial techniques. Dangerous negative perceptions are thereby deflected into the positivistic enterprise. When the principle of management has been accepted by everyone, then the containment of wilderness will be virtually complete. There will be continuing discussions, of course, but they will be discussions among the wardens and the gardeners. No longer might the phrase "wilderness park" be seen as a contradiction in terms, for what lies within the boundaries of such parks will be wilderness by definition, and it will remain so no matter what further technological ravishment it undergoes. Wilderness hotels, wilderness railroads and airports, wilderness highways, wilderness theaters and shopping plazas-all could ultimately be made to make sense, because there will be no basis for comparison left. "Don't you see," asks one of Winston Smith's colleagues in Nineteen Eighty-four, "that the whole purpose of Newspeak is to narrow the range of thought" Should the State reserve natural areas, it will be as psychic purging-grounds for those atavistic citizens who still require such treatment, but those reserves will be parks, not wilderness.

# Speciesism Impacts – Ontology

**Their ontology is flawed—anthropocentrism disconnects humanity from nature.**

**Turner 95** (Jack, previous professor of philosophy at the University of Illinois “Gary Snider and The Practice of the Wild” in *Deep Ecology for the 21st Century*, ed. George Sessions, p. 41-42)

With such raw contact we learn what primary cultures learned, that nature can be a ferocious teacher of the way things are a profoundly wild, organic world of system and raw process, a maze of networks, webs, fields, and communities, all interdependent, interrelating, and mirroring each other- Thoreau says, "In wildness is the preservation of the world." Snyder responds, "Wildness is not just the 'preservation' of the world, it is the world. . . . Nature is ultimately in no way endangered; wilderness is. The wild is indestructible, but we might not see the wild." In our emphasis on species loss and habitat destruction we forget our own peril. "Human beings themselves are at risk-not just on some survival of civilization level, but more basically on the level of heart and soul. We are ignorant of our own nature and confused about what it means to be a human being." This confusion stems from judging ourselves independent from and superior to other forms of life rather than accepting equal membership in the seemingly chaotic and totally interdependent world of wildness. To remove an animal or plant or hunter-gatherer from its place automatically compromises its inherent qualities and integrity and leads to the infinite sadness of zoos, aquariums, and reservations. How do we remedy this situation? "To resolve the dichotomy of the civilized and the wild, we must first resolve to be whole." And if we are going to make this resolution we must first figure out what we might mean by "wild." The practice of the wild refines our thinking about the wild, extending it beyond the realm of vacation spots, beyond the facts and equations of scientific explanation, to a place familiar to any child who persists in asking "Why?" Children know that natural metaphors of plants and animals penetrate to the wild place, that fairy tales are true, that they are little animals. That is why they so vigorously oppose the forces of domesticity and civilized education. They know quite well that they would be better off in forests, the mountains, the deserts, and the seas. "Thoreau wrote of 'this vast savage howling mother of ours, Nature, lying all around, with such beauty, and such affection for her children, as the leopard; and yet we are so early weaned from her breast to society.' "

# Speciesism Impacts—Value to Life

**And—tolerating the destruction of this ecosystem saps us of our humanity—it’s the opening act for nuclear war and human extinction.**

**Bookchin 87** (Murray, co-founder of the Institute of Social Ecology “An Appeal For Social and Psychological Sanity” 1987)

Industrially and technologically, we are moving at an ever-accelerating pace toward a yawning chasm with our eyes completely blindfolded. From the 1950s onward, we have placed ecological burdens upon our planet that have no precedent in human history.Our impact on our environment has been nothing less than appalling. The problems raised by acid rain alone are striking examples of [end page 106] innumerable problems that appear everywhere on our planet. The concrete-like clay layers, impervious to almost any kind of plant growth, replacing dynamic soils that once supported lush rain forests remain stark witness to a massive erosion of soil in all regions north and south of our equatorial belt. The equator—a cradle not only of our weather like the ice caps but a highly complex network of animal and plant life—is being denuded to a point where vast areas of the region look like a barren moonscape. We no longer "cut" our forests—that celebrated "renewable resource" for fuel, timber, and paper. We sweep them up like dust with a rapidity and "efficiency" that renders any claims to restorative action mere media-hype.  Our entire planet is thus becoming simplified, not only polluted. Its soil is turning into sand. Its stately forests are rapidly being replaced by tangled weeds and scrub, that is, where vegetation in any complex form can be sustained at all. Its wildlife ebbs and flows on the edge of extinction, dependent largely on whether one or two nations—or governmental administrations—agree that certain sea and land mammals, bird species, or, for that matter, magnificent trees are "worth" rescuing as lucrative items on corporate balance sheets.  With each such loss, humanity, too, loses a portion of its own character structure: its sensitivity toward life as such, including human life, and its rich wealth of sensibility. If we can learn to ignore the destiny of whales and condors—indeed, turn their fate into chic cliches—we can learn to ignore the destiny of Cambodians in Asia, Salvadorans in Central America, [end page 107] and, finally, the human beings who people our communities. If we reach this degree of degradation, we will then become so spiritually denuded that we will be capable of ignoring the terrors of thermonuclear war. Like the biotic ecosystems we have simplified with our lumbering and slaughtering technologies, we will have simplified the psychic ecosystems that give each of us our personal uniqueness. We will have rendered our internal mileau as homogenized and lifeless as our external milieu—and a biocidal war will merely externalize the deep sleep that will have already claimed our spiritual and moral integrity. The process of simplification, even more significantly than pollution, threatens to destroy the restorative powers of nature and humanity—their common ability to efface the forces of destruction and reclaim the planet for life and fecundity. A humanity disempowered of its capacity to change a misbegotten "civilization," ultimately divested of its power to resist, reflects a natural world disempowered of its capacity to reproduce a green and living world.

# Speciesism Impacts—Value to Life

**Self-actualization is impossible through an anthropocentric view—connection with nature is key.**

**Naess 86** (Arne, Norwegian philosopher and the founder of [deep ecology](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_ecology). Former professor at the [University of Oslo](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_Oslo), founder of the deep ecology movement. “Self-realization an Ecological Approach To Being In The World” in *Deep Ecology for the 21st Century*, ed. George Sessions)

1. We underestimate ourself. And I emphasize "self." We tend to confuse our "self" with the narrow ego. 2. Human nature is such that, with sufficient comprehensive (all-sided) maturity, we cannot help but "identify" our self with all living beings; beautiful or ugly, big or small, sentient or not. The adjective comprehensive ("all-sided") as in "comprehensive maturity" deserves a note: Descartes seemed to be rather immature in his relationship with animals; Schopenhauer was nor very advanced in his relationship to his family (kicking his mother down a staircase?); Heidegger was amateurish-to say the least -ln his political behavior. weak identification with nonhumans is compatible with maturity in some major sets of relationships, such as those towards one's family or friends. And so I use the qualification comprehensive to mean "being mature in all major relationships." 3. Traditionally, the maturity of the self has been considered to develop through three stages: from ego to social self (comprising the ego), and from social self to a metaphysical self (comprising the social self). But in this conception of the maturity of the self, Nature is largely left out. Our immediate environment, our home (where we belong as children), and the identification with nonhuman living beings, are largely ignored. Therefore, I tentatively introduce, perhaps for the very first time, the concept of ecological self. We may be said to be in, and of, Nature from the very beginning of our selves. Society and human relationships are important, but our self is much richer in its constitutive relationships. These relationships are not only those we have with other humans and the human community (I have elsewhere introduced the term mired community to mean those communities where we consciously and deliberately live closely together with certain animals). 4. The meaning of life, and the joy we experience in living, is increased through increased self-realization; that is, through the fulfillment of potentials each of us has, but which are never exactly the same for any two living beings. Whatever the differences between beings, nevertheless, increased self-realization implies a broadening and deepening of the self. 5. Because of an inescapable process of identification with others, with increasing maturity, the self is widened and deepened. We "see ourselves in others." Our self-realization is hindered if the self-realization of others, with whom we identify, is hindered. Our love of ourself will fight this hindering process by assisting in the self-realization of others according to the formula "Live and let live!" Thus, everything that can be achieved by altruism-the dutiful, moral consideration for others-----can be achieved, and much more, by the process of widening and deepening ourselves. Following Kant, we then act beautifully, but neither morally nor immorally. 6. One of the great challenges today is to save the planet from further ecological devastation which violates both the enlightened self-interest of humans and nonhumans, and decreases the potential of joyful existence for all.

# Speciesism Impacts– turns democracy

**Key to solve democracy**

**Best ’07, Associate Professor, Departments of Humanities and Philosophy University of Texas, El Paso** [Steven, Charles Patterson, The Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust New York: Lantern Books, 2002, 280 pp]

Still, to spin the dialectical wheel back again, **social change cannot take the first step in the right direction without a “new awareness” of how human liberation is impossible without animal liberation, without recognition that enlightenment, democracy, and moral progress are impossible without dismantling speciesism in favor of a truly non-violent, egalitarian, and inclusive community**.

# Speciesism Impacts – turns any other “ism”

**Speciesism is the internal link to solving all other “isms.”**

**Best ’07, Associate Professor, Departments of Humanities and Philosophy University of Texas, El Paso** [Steven, Charles Patterson, The Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust New York: Lantern Books, 2002, 280 pp]

The most important objective of the book, indeed, is to promote a new ethics and mode of perception. Eternal Treblinka affects a radical shift in the way we understand oppression, domination, power, and hierarchy. It is both an effect of these changes, and, hopefully, a catalyst to deepen political resistance to corporate domination and hierarchy in all forms. Given its broad framing that highlights the crucial importance of human domination over animals for slavery, racism, colonialism, and anti-Semitism, Eternal Treblinka could and should revolutionize fields such as Holocaust studies, colonial and postcolonial studies, and African American studies. But this can happen only if, to be blunt, humanists, “radicals,” and “progressives” in academia and society in general remove their speciesist blinders in order to grasp the enormity of animal suffering, its monumental moral wrong in needless and unjustifiable exploitation of animals, and the larger structural matrix in which human-over-human domination and human-over-animal domination emerge from the same prejudiced, power-oriented, and pathological violent mindset. Political resistance in western nations, above all, will advance a quantum leap when enough people recognize that the movements for human liberation, animal liberation, and earth liberation are so deeply interconnected that no one objective is possible without the realization of the others.

# Speciesism Impacts– turns cap

**Key to solve capitalism.**

**Best ’07, Associate Professor, Departments of Humanities and Philosophy University of Texas, El Paso** [Steven, Charles Patterson, The Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust New York: Lantern Books, 2002, 280 pp]

The crisis in the natural world reflects a crisis in the social world, whereby corporate elites and their servants in government have centralized power, monopolized wealth, destroyed democratic institutions, and unleashed a brutal and violent war against dissent. Corporate destruction of nature is enabled by asymmetrical and hierarchical social relations, whereby capitalist powers commandeer the political, legal, and military system to perpetuate and defend their exploitation of the social and natural worlds. To the extent that the animal and earth exploitation problems stem from or relate to social problems, they thereby require social and politics solutions that bring out deep structural transformation and radical democratization processes. One cannot change destructive policies without changing the institutions and power systems that cause, benefit from, and sustain them. An effective struggle for animal liberation, then, means tackling issues such as poverty, class, political corruption, and ultimately the inequalities created by transnational corporations and globalization.

# Speciesism Impacts– turns disability rights

**Key to disability rights which are at the heart of the all rights**

**Salomon ’10, MA in Research from Andover Newton Theological School, a Graduate Certificate in Science and Religion from the Boston Theological Institute** [Daniel, From Marginal Cases to Linked Oppressions: Reframing the Conflict between the Autistic Pride and Animal Rights Movements, Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume VIII, Issue 1/2, 2010 (ISSN1948-352X), <http://www.criticalanimalstudies.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/JCAS-Vol-VIII-Issue-I-and-II-2010-Full-Issue1.pdf>]

I propose a variation of the linked oppression model, namely that there is a correlation between how autists are treated by neurotypical society and how neurotypical society, as a whole, treats nonhuman animals, and that the causes of autist pride and animal liberation are intricately linked, interdependent on one another. Both oppressions have the same primary cause: the ideology of neurotypicalism. When those without a fully functioning vermis, including autists and nonhuman animals, do not conform to the wishes of neurotypical society, neurotypical society starts to ―interfere with, censor, and control‖ (Houston and Frith 2000: 43) those understandings or behaviors which do not conform to neurotypical standards or desires. Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume VIII, Issue 1/2, 2010 (ISSN1948-352X) 60 This model is consistent with reality and it helps resolve the conflict between animal rights and disability rights which is manifested in some religious, ethical, and public policy debates. It also has the power to break down another powerful false dualism: the choice between preserving human dignity at all costs and giving the nonhuman world significant moral consideration. This is a false choice, between being for Peter Singer‘s ―argument for marginal cases‖ or being for Pope John Paul‘s ―dignity of man‖ argument. Each of these two approaches is inadequate.

**Key to solve neurotypicalism which undermines disability rights**

**Salomon ’10, MA in Research from Andover Newton Theological School, a Graduate Certificate in Science and Religion from the Boston Theological Institute** [Daniel, From Marginal Cases to Linked Oppressions: Reframing the Conflict between the Autistic Pride and Animal Rights Movements, Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume VIII, Issue 1/2, 2010 (ISSN1948-352X), <http://www.criticalanimalstudies.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/JCAS-Vol-VIII-Issue-I-and-II-2010-Full-Issue1.pdf>]

First, neurotypical society sees autists and nonhuman animals as peripheral in terms of social justice (Houston and Frith 2000). Autists and nonhuman animals are considered by neurotypical society to be the ―undeserving poor,‖ versus homosexuals, women, the economic poor, or African-Americans, ―the real poor,‖ which are considered legitimate, because they demand less and are considered more like the dominant society (Johnson). Moreover, if the autist struggle for justice is addressed at all, it is oftentimes as a tacked-on issue appealing to people‘s self-interests, whether in the form of ―segregationist charity‖ (Eisland 1994: 73-75) for autists and others with disabilities or ―compassion‖ (Nussbaum 2006: 2, 325) for nonhuman animals. Second, neurotypical society sees autists and nonhuman animals as expendable (Houston and Frith 2000). If autists or nonhuman animals get in the way of the neurotypical agenda, they are sacrificed to the common good of neurotypical society. If he or she is disruptive, an autist is expelled from a community, such as when an elementary school teacher in Florida, disciplined a troublesome five-year-old who was in the process of being diagnosed with Asperger‘s, by letting all his fellow students vote him out of the class, as well as publicly chastising and humiliating him (Wixon 2008). If he or she is found to be a nuisance, a nonhuman animal is killed, such as the standard policy of wildlife managers of addressing overpopulated and invasive species problems through hunting and other methods of eradication, as has been employed to deal with white tailed deer, resident Canada geese, or nutria problems. Even reintroduced wild wolves are not above being eradicated, even through they are endangered.

# Speciesism Impacts – turns racism

**Speciesism predates and makes racism possible**

**Afrospear ’08** [7/29, A Think Tank for People of African Descent, <http://afrospear.com/2008/07/29/do-animals-possess-rights-we-are-bound-to-respectand-should-a-nigga-care/>]

There is no question that the “spiritual vivisection” of humanity, begun by Plato and his cronies, their crazed belief in “rationality”, hierarchy, in the ‘philosopher king,” their cleaving of the brain from the body and spirit, their creation of a profane, analytic, abstractive monster (this according to Marimba Ani in her brilliant “Yurugu”)….this is why we are the way that we are. We are the soul-less, conscienceless monster that we decry. Its not the shark that is vicious – it is you. It is not the black slave that is vicious – it is you. It is not the whore who deserves what’s coming to her – it is you. It is the culture and its people who make a folly of the Goddess’ handiwork, denigrating two and four legged creatures and the earth itself – before abusing and destroying it. The prepubescent serial killer, the gangbanger, the Christian, genocidal President, the Marine rapist, the stockyards, the chicken plant, the Southern plantation are all part of the same continuum. Speciesm begat Sexism begat Racism begat begat begat. Part of our challenge as people who classify themselves as human, is to see the connections between us and everything, particularly other living things. We are trained and we train ourselves to stay in our mental shoe boxes, support only those causes within the shoe box, leave our brains in a safety deposit box – in our shoe box. DO NOT THINK OUTSIDE OF THE SHOE BOX. I don’t want to talk about sexism when we’re talking about racism…I don’t want (white) you changing the subject. But I need to be able to see the intersection of racism and sexism, need to see how women are played off against men, how “minorities” are set in competition with each other, unable to see who is manipulating them, see who is behind the curtain. This “inability to see” to see the obvious relationship between all things is conditioned; the shutters are scientifically implanted from day one. If one truly wants to be correct, the root of oppression, the first oppression that one can identify clearly is that of animals. The ability to separate ones’ feeling self from what’s between their fork and their knife, the ability to care about some life – but not all life, the ability to laugh at or laugh off the suffering of animals…It took a long time and a steady dose of serious indoctrination to make people dead to these connections. That deadening and the “selective compassion’ that results, is why we sit on our hands as Iraqis are blown to pieces, or now blow themselves to pieces in rage, in despair at the barbaric treatment that they suffer. Its why Darfur is happening and nobody is doing anything about it. Its why Bush can steal two elections. We pretend we’re better than animals but we are not…We are simply the tamest, most domesticated, most brutally detached animals on the planet. As long as we are that, heaven help this world.

**Speciesism predates and undergirds all other oppressions**

**Korea Herald ’02** [Jan. 1, Down with speciesism, LN]

Then along came the 70s and we had a whole string of new isms on our hands, starting with sexism in 1970. How in the world did people make do without that word before 1970? Sexism is one of the oldest types of discrimination, dating all the way back to the Garden of Eden. In fact, if the Bible is to be taken literally, God Himself invented sexism. It's all described in the second chapter of Genesis, where God decides that it's not good for man to be alone and that He'd better make a woman to serve as a proper assistant to Adam, or as God said, "I will make an help meet for him." (That's in Genesis 2:18. Of course, God was speaking Hebrew, but since I couldn't find my copy of the Torah, I thought you'd settle for the King James version, which is a very faithful translation - in fact, it is read and quoted by many as if it were The Original.)Another somewhat short-lived ism came along in the early 70s when a bunch of people tried to raise a ruckus about prejudiced hiring practices favoring tall people. ("Too much socialist idealism stunts the growth," was what my old Uncle Reuben, who is tall, thought of them.) This movement was called "antiheightism," and living up to its name, it never got very far off the ground. Finally, in 1973 the oldest form of discrimination of all was given a name: speciesism. Speciesism was also invented by God but is even older than sexism, going back all the way to the first chapter of Genesis, verse 26: "And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness; and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth." Now God made a mistake in using the plural pronoun "them" in reference to the singular antecedent "man," but I think we can forgive Him for this little slipup. It can happen to the best of us when we are preoccupied, as He was, on a spree of creativity, and it's just one more proof that we were indeed made in His image.

# Speciesism Impacts—Turns Racism & Sexism

**Root of racism and sexism.**

**Muhammad ’02, Senior Lecturer in the Departments of Political Science and English, Bar-Ilan University** [Amara, Joan Dunayer, Animal equality: Language and liberation, Language policy, Vol 1, Iss 3, EBSCO]

Speciesism is clearly related to sexism and racism because they share certain features in common. Joan Dunayer provides the following example Cow characterizes a woman as fat and dull. Kept perpetually pregnant or lactating, with swollen belly or swollen udder, cows enslaved for their milk are seen as fat. Confined to a stall, denied the active role of nurturing and protecting a calf (so that milking becomes something done to them rather than by them), they’re seen as passive and dull. “Milk cows” then become emblematic of these traits. Their image easily transfers to women because their exploitation focuses on uniquely female capacities to produce milk and “replacement” offspring. When these capacities decline, a cow is slaughtered. (pp. 158–159) In English, like other languages, many animal metaphors are used to describe women, carrying negative attributes and varying degrees of insult (e.g. old crow, catty, shrew, dumb, bunny, queen bee, sow). This kind of language usage, viewed from speciesism, fosters the oppression of women and contributes to their political inequality. This is not confined to metaphor but also found in pronoun use (e.g. the generic pronoun “he” includes “she”), and syntax. The sexist use, for instance, of “my woman” instead of “my spouse,” is similar in a sense to “my cat” instead of “my cat friend,” as if their very beings are owned. Racist language is also directed at weak groups, groups thought to be less than the superior groups, whether in feelings or thinking. As in the case of women, animal terms have been employed as racist epithets. “For centuries whites figuratively and literally have identified blacks with supposedly inferior non-human animals” (p. 161). Three centuries ago, enslaved blacks were frequently named monkey, ape, or baboon in mainland America.

# Speciesism Impacts--turns case (all impacts inev)

**Speciesism is the root of all oppression – turns and makes all of their impacts inevitable**

**Rossini ’06, postdoctoral Fellow ASCA (Amsterdam School for Cultural Analysis)** [Manuela, To the Dogs: Companion speciesism and the new feminist materialism, Volume 3, September 2006, ISSN 1552-5112]

What is equally sobering, however, is the fact that the most radical metaposthumanists (and the humanities more broadly) do not quite manage to make an epistemological break with liberal humanism, insofar as their writing is also marked by an unquestioned “speciesism”; i.e., in the definition of ethicist Peter Singer who popularised the term three decades ago in his book Animal Liberation, “a prejudice or attitude of bias in favour of the interests of members of one’s own species and against those of members of other species.”[17] Both postcolonial, feminist and queer theories and discussion of subjectivity, identity, and difference as well as the claims on the right to freedom by new social movements have recourse to an Enlightenment concept of the subject whose conditio sine qua non is the absolute control of that subject over the life of nonhuman others/objects. The rhetorical strategy of radically separating non-white, non-male and non-heterosexual human beings from animals in order to have the subject status of these members of the human species recognised was and is successful and also legitimate – given that the racist, sexist and homophobic discourse of animality or an animalistic „nature“ has hitherto served to exclude most individuals of those groups of people from many privileges – but the speciesist logic of the dominance of human animals over nonhuman animals has remained in place. If we fight racism and (hetero)sexism because we declare discrimination on the basis of specific and identifiable characteristics – such as “black“, “woman” or “lesbian“ to be wrong and unjust, then we should also vehemently oppose the exploitation, imprisoning, killing and eating of nonhuman animals on the basis of their species identity. Moreover, if our research and teaching as cultural critics endeavours to do justice to the diversity of human experience and life styles and feel responsible towards marginalised others, should we then not seriously think about Cary Wolfe’s question „how must our work itself change when the other to which it tries to do justice is no longer human?“[18] Wolfe is not making a claim for animal rights here – at least not primarily. This is also why his book puns on “rites/rights“: Animal Rites is the intervention of the anti-speciesist cultural critic who scrutinizes the rituals that human beings form around the figures of animals, including the literary and cinematic enactments of cannibalism, monstrosity and normativity. Wolfe subsumes all of these stagings under the heading the discourse of species, with “discourse“ understood in the sense of Michel Foucault as not only a rhetoric but above all as the condition for the production and ordering of meaning and knowledge in institutions like medicine, the law, the church, the family or universities. In addition, Wolfe wants to sharpen our awareness that a speciesist metaphysics has also a deadly impact on human animals, especially because speciesism is grounded in the juridical state apparatus: “the full transcendence of the ‘human‘ requires the sacrifice of the ‘animal‘ and the animalistic, which in turn makes possible a symbolic economy in which we engage in what Derrida [calls] a ‚non-criminal putting to death‘ of other humans as well by marking them as animal.“[19] The dog lies buried in the singular: “The animal – what a word!”, Derrida exclaims: “[t]he animal is a word, it is an appellation that men have instituted, a name they have given themselves the right and authority to give to another living creature [à l'autre vivant].” [20] In order to problematise this naming, Derrida has created the neologism l'animot: I would like to have the plural of animals heard in the singular. […] We have to envisage the existence of ‘living creatures’ whose plurality cannot be assembled within the single figure of an animality that is simply opposed to humanity. […] The suffix mot in l’animot should bring us back to the word […]. It opens onto the referential experience of the thing as such, as what it is in its being, and therefore to the reference point by means of which one has always sought to draw the limit, the unique and indivisible limit held to separate man from animal. As I propose in what follows, this clearly defined caesura of the „anthropological machine”,[21] which according to Giorgio Agamben was already set in motion by the old Greeks and the messianic thinkers and then accelerated by scientific taxonomies and the birth of anthropology, can be bridged with the help of a zoontological approach and companion speciesism. Posthumanist zoontologies The desperate cry of the historical person Joseph Carey Merrick (in the movie The Elephant Man of 1980), “I am not an animal! I am a human being! I...am...a man!” – for recognition of his human identity through which he claims his right to social integration and personal integrity, is very understandable and hurts. But his words nevertheless reflect the poverty of the humanist stance, insofar as traditional humanism can only secure the “proper” essence of humanitas via a rigid separation from animalitas. If one reads the reports by the victims and witnesses of the tortures in the military prison of Abu Ghraib, it seems to me that it is precisely the continued insistence and reinforcement of the animal-human boundary that legitimises the committed atrocities: Some of the things they did was make me sit down like a dog, … and … bark like a dog and they were laughing at me … One of the police was telling me to crawl … A few days before [this], … the guy who wears glasses, he put red woman's underwear over my head … pissing on me and laughing on me … he put a part of his stick … inside my ass … she was playing with my dick … And they were taking pictures of me during all these instances. … [Another prisoner] was forced to insert a finger into his anus and lick it. He was also forced to lick and chew a shoe. … He was then told to insert his finger in his nose during questioning … his other arm in the air. The Arab interpreter told him he looked like an elephant. [They were] given badges with the letter ‘C’ on it.[22] The US soldiers reduce their prisoners to their corporeal being, to animal being, and then make fun of this “bare life“[23] Instead of accepting their own vulnerability and mortality that they share with their victims as well as with other living beings, the torturers use the “systematic bestialization“[24] of the prisoners to strengthen their own sense of freedom and autonomy and to concomitantly withdraw the right to protection guaranteed by the humanitarian rights of the Geneva Conventions; after all, as barking dogs, crawling insects and ‘elephant men’, these ‘creatures’ cannot respond to the name, the word, the interpellation “human.“ The implicit and explicit analogies between racism, sexism, homophobia that accompany the above description of the torture methods, confirm that the power of the “discourse of species” to affect human others depends on the prior acceptance of the institution “speciesism;” i.e. on taking for granted that the inflicting of pain and the killing of nonhuman animals by human animals does not constitute a criminal act but, on the contrary, is legal. This is why Derrida speaks of the “carnophallogocentrism“[25] of Western metaphysics. And here Wolfe’s argument comes full circle: [Since] the humanist discourse of species will always be available for use by some humans against other humans as well, to countenance violence against the social other of whatever species – or gender, or race, or class, or sexual difference. . . we need to understand that the ethical and philosophical urgency of confronting the institution of speciesism and crafting a posthumanist theory of the subject has nothing to do with whether you like animals. We all, human and nonhuman alike, have a stake in the discourse and institution of speciesism; it is by no means limited to its overwhelmingly direct and disproportionate effects on animals.[26]

**Humanism makes impacts inevitable – war will never end.**

**Best ’07, Associate Professor, Departments of Humanities and Philosophy University of Texas, El Paso** [Steven, Charles Patterson, The Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust New York: Lantern Books, 2002, 280 pp]

“Auschwitz begins wherever someone looks at a slaughterhouse and thinks: they’re only animals." Theodor Adorno "As long as there are slaughterhouses, there will be battlefields." Tolstoy Aware of the deep continuities between the animal and human holocaust, and inspired by Patterson’s book and the words of some progressive Jewish scholars, in February 2002, the People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) launched a new exhibit which was to travel to over 100 American and foreign cities. The “Holocaust on Your Plate” exhibit consisted of "eight 60-square-foot panels that juxtaposed photos of suffering and death in factory farms and slaughterhouses alongside parallel images of scenes of the horrors of Nazi concentration camps." Employing its usual method shock tactics to disrupt complacency and provoke thought, PETA hoped that the exhibit would "stimulate contemplation of how the victimization of Jews, Gypsies, homosexuals, and others characterized as 'life unworthy of life' during the Holocaust parallels the way that modern society abuses and justifies the slaughter of animals." According to PETA, the photos “graphically depicts the point that Singer made when he wrote, `In relation to [animals], all people are Nazis.’” Newkirk explained the rationale behind the exhibit in this way: “The `Holocaust on Your Plate’ Campaign was designed to desensitize [people] to different forms of systematic degradation and exploitation, and [to show that] the logic and methods employed in factory farms and slaughterhouses are analogous to those used in concentration camps. We understand both systems to be based on a moral equation indicating that `might makes right’ and premised on a concept of other cultures or other species as deficient and thus disposable. Each has it own unique mechanisms and purposes, but both result in immeasurable, unnecessary suffering for those who are innocent and unable to defend themselves.”

# Speciesism Impacts--Turns biolpolitics

**Speciesism necessitates biopolitics**

**Fox ’79, Humane Society of the United States** [Michael W., THE BIO·POLITICS OF SOCIOBIOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY, Between the Species, <http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1126&context=bts&sei-redir=1#search="speciesist>" – google scholar]

There are certain views being advanced by academicians that are relevant to how we, as a society, relate to and treat animals and Nature. As will be shown, these views give support to the bio-politics of animal and Nature exploitation and, therefore, should be challenged on ethical as well as scientific grounds. The view that is being advanced is that humans are superior to other animals. Those who adhere to such a belief may then be incapable of ethically objective and responsible action toward animals, because they perceive animals as being inferior. With this preconceived notion that humans are superior (and that serne animal species are lOClre or less superior to others) the ethical1y objective principle of giving animals equal and fair consideration--which is a basic premise of animal rights philosophy--is anathema.

# Speciesism Impacts--Turns bioplitics/imperialism

**Speciesism is the foundation for biopolitics, facism and imperialism**

**Fox ’79, Humane Society of the United States** [Michael W., THE BIO·POLITICS OF SOCIOBIOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY, Between the Species, <http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1126&context=bts&sei-redir=1#search="speciesist>" – google scholar]

In conclusion, I have endeavored to derronstrate, by selecting sane of the ideas of contemporary thinkers in the fields of biology, fi1ilosofi1y, and theology, how these disciplines can be used to alienate people from animals and Nature. 'This alienation process, whereby people are led to believe that they are superior to animals and that there is no moral or ethical issue in the wholesale exploitation of animals and nature, is the bio-politics of contemporary science, philosofi1y, and theology whose worldview is self-serving and anthropocentric--and thus lacking in scholarly objectivity and ethical sensibility. &lucators, scientists, P1ilosofi1ers, and others need to be aware of the subtle and insidious ramifications of the worldview espoused by those whose attitude tONard animals and Nature is neither derrocratic nor egalitarian. Rather, it can lead to the bio-politics of fascism and imperialism under the guise of academia's infallible wisdom and scholarly facade of scientific objectivity and truthfulness.

# Speciesism Impacts Turns violence/genocide

**Legitimizes slavery and genocide.**

**Best ’07, Associate Professor, Departments of Humanities and Philosophy University of Texas, El Paso** [Steven, Charles Patterson, The Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust New York: Lantern Books, 2002, 280 pp]

After analyzing how the domination of animals provides the conceptual model for the domination of humans, Patterson turns, in Part II, to the task of identifying the linkages between animal breeding and eugenics measures such as sterilization, euthanasia killings. Still more provocatively, he unearths the hidden connections between the industrialized killing of animals in early twentieth century slaughterhouses and the bureaucratic and technological machinery used by the German Nazis during the Holocaust. Some readers may be surprised to learn the full extent to which the US (most notably, the “educated” and “liberal” elite as well as the mainstream press) was poisoned by racist ideologies throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Certainly, a virulent racism initiated, perpetuated, and legitimated slavery and the genocidal war against the Native American nations, but racism also shaped the thinking of scientists and elites in a way that decisively influenced the thinking and policies of Hitler and German Nazism.

**Histories worst atrocities are a result of humanist hierarchies.**

**Best ’07, Associate Professor, Departments of Humanities and Philosophy University of Texas, El Paso** [Steven, Charles Patterson, The Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust New York: Lantern Books, 2002, 280 pp]

More insidiously still, eugenics became hugely influential in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, especially in the US and Germany. The attempt to manipulate and “improve” the human gene stock originated in early agricultural society through attempts to breed the largest and strongest animals. The Nazi vilification of huge swaths of human society, including blacks, Jews, and those deemed intellectually and physically “unfit” or “inferior,” was dependent upon dehumanization by identifying them with animals. Eugenics had real consequences in the US, for by the 1920s tens of thousands of people had been sterilized. These campaigns were a direct and formidable influence on German Nazism. Hitler studied US policies and ultimately was inspired to surpass the pioneering lead of the US by pushing eugenics to its ultimate conclusions -- to the “final solution” realized in the massacre of millions of undesirables Hitler likened to animals, insects, and even bacteria.

# Speciesism Impacts—Turns Genocide

**Human centric mindset sets the stage for eugenics.**

**Best ’07, Associate Professor, Departments of Humanities and Philosophy University of Texas, El Paso** [Steven, Charles Patterson, The Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust New York: Lantern Books, 2002, 280 pp]

“We have been at war with the other creatures of this earth ever since the first human hunter set forth with spear into the primeval forest. Human imperialism has everywhere enslaved, oppressed, murdered, and mutilated the animal peoples. All around us lie the slave camps we have built for our fellow creatures, factory farms and vivisection laboratories, Dachaus and Buchenwalds for the conquered species. We slaughter animals for our food, force them to perform silly tricks for our delectation, gun them down and stick hooks in them in the name of sport. We have torn up the wild places where once they made their homes. Speciesism is more deeply entrenched within us even than sexism, and that is deep enough.” Ronnie Lee, founder of the Animal Liberation Front Patterson argues that the US roots of German Nazism grew not only through the widespread influence of eugenics, but also through the industrialized slaughter of animals. Both ideologically (racism and eugenics) and technologically (mass production/destruction models), Nazis took their inspiration from the US, such that “the road to Auschwitz traveled through America” and ultimately “begins at the slaughterhouse.” More than anyone else in the US, automobile mogul Henry Ford helped paved the way to Auschwitz and Dachau. Ford was a rabid anti-Semite who began in 1920 to publish screeds against the Jews through his weekly newspaper. Ford organized his columns as a book and The International Jew sold a half-million copies in the US and Europe and “became the bible of the postwar anti-Semitic movement.” Hitler extolled Ford’s book and disseminated it widely among officers and troops. Hitler regarded Ford as a pioneer, visionary, and comrade, declaring that “I regard Henry Ford as my inspiration” – so much so that he even kept a life-size portrait of Ford in his office. Ford proudly received the honors bestowed on him, and a Ford subsidiary company was a major supplier of vehicles for the German army. In addition to his virulent anti-Semitism, Ford helped to incubate German Nazism in another key way through the development of industrial technology methods. The same techniques that Ford pioneered for the mass production of automobiles were used by Nazis for the administration of mass killing. A crucial but little-known fact, however, is that these techniques were first developed in the slaughterhouses for the kind of streamlined killing and disassembly of animal bodies such as were required to satisfy growing consumer demand for meat. In 1865, amidst the colossal stockyards of Chicago, meatpackers introduced the conveyor belt to increase the speed and efficiency of the killing. Slaughterhouses pioneered the division of labor techniques – whereby a grisly team of “knockers,” “splitters,” “boners,” and “trimmers” specialized in different tasks --used for all subsequent forms of mass production. Ford’s visit to a Chicago slaughterhouse inspired his adaptation of assembly line and division of labor techniques to churn out an endless procession of identical automobiles. But the technological grafting did not end there. “As the twentieth century would demonstrate,” Patterson observes, “it was but one step from the industrialized killing of American slaughterhouses to Nazi Germany’s assembly-line mass murder.” Thus, historians should look not to Henry Ford as the innovator of mass production, but rather to meatpacking giants Gustavus Swift and Philip Armour. To facilitate their brutal butchery, Nazis aimed to make killing people seem like slaughtering animals. The “Might is Right” ideology that humans employ to justify their brutality against animals was central to Nazi ideology, for, as Hitler stated: “Man owes everything that is of importance of the principle of struggle and to one race [Aryan race] which has carried itself forward successfully. Take away the Nordic Germans and nothing remains but the dance of apes.” Hitler’s basic outlook was that nature is ruled by the law of struggle, and he summarized his worldview in this way: “He who does not possess power loses the right to life.” In the rationalized production systems of Chicago and Auschwitz, the goal is speed, efficiency, and maximized killing, and the process unfolds through a division of labor with workers specializing in different tasks. Similarly, from transportation to gassing, by way of a gigantic social production line, Nazis tried to keep the movement of prisoners constant, such that as quickly and smoothly as possible one group followed another to their doom. As with slaughterhouses, the sick and lame were cleared away. Both animals and humans were crammed together and transported in mass in rail cars to their final destination. The Nazis shipped Jews to their death in cattle cars, they temporarily unloaded them in slaughterhouses where they were confined in animal pens, and then dispatched them to their death through the same rail lines paths used to transport and slaughter animals.

# \*\*\*Speciesism ALT Solvency\*\*\*

# Specieism Alt – Solves Racism/Whiteness

**Cultural strategies of racial identification via the interrogation of whiteness merely perpetuates the dialectic between white supremacy and survival strategies that reifies domination.  An eco-centric ethic that problematizes the construction of race by finding intrinsic value in all organic and non-organic components of the world solves better.**

**Seshadri-Crooks 2K** (Kalpana, assistant professor of English at Boston College, Desiring Whiteness: A Lacanian analysis of race, p. 8-9//)

My contention that the category of race is inherently a discourse of supremacy may seem inattentive to the advances that our legal systems and liberal social ideologies have made precisely in relation to “racism” and “racist” practices. Modern civil society refuses to permit its subjects the enjoyment of supremacist rhetoric, the rhetoric of exceptionality, by distinguishing between race and racism. It draws this distinction between a supposed ontology (the study of physical or cultural differences) and an epistemology (discriminatory logic) in the name of preserving a semblance of inter-subjectivity. Race, it suggests, is a neutral description of human difference; racism, it suggests, is the misappropriation of such difference. The liberal consensus is that we must do away with such ideological mis- appropriation, but that we must “celebrate difference.” It is understood as a “baby and the bath water” syndrome, in which the dirty water of racism must be eliminated, to reveal the cleansed and beloved “fact” of racial identity. This rather myopic perspective refuses to address the peculiar resiliency of “race,” the subjective investment in racial difference, and the hyper-valorization of appearance. It dismisses these issues or trivializes them because race seems a historical inevitability. The logic is that people have been constituted for material and other reasons as black and white and that this has had powerful historical consequences for peoples thus constituted. Whether race exists or not, whether race and racism are artificial distinctions or not, racialization is a hard historical fact and a concrete instance of social reality. We have no choice, according to this reasoning, but to inhabit our assigned racial positions. Not to do so is a form of idealism, and a groundless belief that power can be wished away. In making this ostensibly “pragmatic” move, such social theorists effectively reify “race.” Lukács, who elaborated Marx’s notion of reification in relation to the commodity form in *History and Class Consciousness,* is worth recalling here: Its basis is that a relation between people takes on the character of a thing, and thus acquires a ‘phantom objectivity,’ an autonomy that seems so strictly rational and all-embracing as to conceal every trace of its fundamental nature: the relation between people. (1923:89) To arrest analysis of race at the point where one discerns and marks its historical effects is to reproduce those very relations of power that one intends to oppose. It is to render race so objective that it is impossible to conceive human difference or inter-subjectivity anew. Modern civil society engages in such reification because ultimately its desire is to keep the dialectic between races alive. It must thus prohibit what it terms “racism” in order to prevent the annihilation not so much of the “inferior” races but of the system of race itself. This is how the system of “desiring Whiteness” perpetuates itself, even in the discourses that are most pragmatically aimed against racism. The resilience and endurability of race as a structure can thus be attributed to its denials and disavowals. On the one hand, it is never in the place that one expects it to be: it disavows its own historicity in order to hold out the promise of being to the subject—the something more than symbolic—a sense of wholeness, of exceptionality. On the other hand, as a social law, it must disavow this object in order to keep the system viable and to perpetuate the dialectic: the race for Whiteness. Exploring the structure of race requires a toleration of paradox, an appreciation of the fact that it is an inherently contradictory discourse, and a willingness to see beyond relations of power in order to mine the depth of subjective investment in it.

# Specieism Alt--Our K is politically effective

**Voting for us is politically effective.**

**Dell’Aversano ‘10** [Carmen, “the love whose name cannot be spoken: queering the human-animal bond” journal for critical animal studies, volume III issue 1 and 2, 2010]

That some humans love animals (not ―their‖ ―pets‖ but animals in general, with no regard for the speciesistic categories of ―domestic‖, ―farm‖ or ―wild‖) is obvious; that society is unwilling to grant this fundamental aspect of their identity social existence, except insofar as it can be conveniently subsumed under the hegemonic identity of ―consumer‖, is just as obvious: I am free to purchase for the animals in my care both extravagant objects of consumption manufactured by the burgeoning ―pet industry‖ (which won‘t make any difference to their well-being) and state-of-the-art medical care (which might); but the law does not afford to their lives (again, with no distinction between ―categories‖) anything like the protection it affords to inanimate items of property (it is much more expedient to harm a disliked human by killing her companion animals than by damaging her property, since this is very likely to lead to a police investigation, while any attempt to interest the police in the violent death of an animal is sure to be met by condescendingly raised highbrows, or worse): throughout the world animals (of any ―category‖) are poisoned, shot, trapped, run over; some of these animals have humans who love them, who anxiously wait for them to come back, who grieve for them: Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume VIII, Issue 1/2, 2010 (ISSN1948-352X) 118 that love, that anxiety, that grief has no place in social discourse except as an object of ridicule. And, of course, that someone should display shock and outrage at the violent death of an animal with whom she was unacquainted like she would for a human is simply inconceivable. To me, one point of affirming animal queer is to provide some form of recognition and support to the innumerable humans who feel completely alienated and alone in a society which does not grant their most heartfelt values and emotions any recognition. It is just as relevant, both politically and theoretically, that, even when some animals‘ needs are given precedence over those of some humans (some companion animals undoubtedly have access to better nutrition and medical care than most of the human population in the Third World), it is always humans who decide this, and their decision is always both arbitrary and final: of three puppies or kittens from the same litter, one might grow up to be the cherished companion of an affluent animal-rights activist, one to be tortured to death in a research facility, and one to be ―euthanized‖ in a ―shelter‖. Because animal queer is not about the narcissistic investment in one ―pet‖ but about identification with, and love for, animals in general, this state of things is incompatible with animal queer.

# Specieism Alt Each time key

**Must be critical every time we speak.**

**Jacobs ’04, PhD and President, Vegetarian Society (Singapore)** [George, Speaking Vegetarian:

Toward Nonspeciesist Language, <http://www.ivu.org/congress/2004/lectures/Jacobs.html>]

Language use to promote change toward means that every time we write or speak as members of vegetarian organizations or as individuals, we should give some thought to our language to see whether we are using Vegetarian. Here, the Style Guide and Thesaurus chapters of Dunayer’s (2001) book, ideas from which appear in Table 1, will be especially useful. The language we use should be consistent with the ideas we are expressing about concern for our fellow animals.

# Specieism Alt Solves Rights

**Basing rights on sentience rather than humanness vacates an arbitrary standard and allows us to actually realize rights.**

**Best ’05, chair of philosophy at the University of Texas at El Paso** [Steve, The New Abolitionism: Capitalism, Slavery and Animal Liberation,http://www.pressaction.com/news/weblog/full\_article/best02222005/]

Just as nineteenth century abolitionists sought to awaken people to the greatest moral issue of the day, so the new abolitionists of the 21st century endeavor to enlighten people about the enormity and importance of animal suffering and oppression. As black slavery earlier raised fundamental questions about the meaning of American “democracy” and modern values, so current discussion regarding animal slavery provokes critical examination into a human psyche damaged by violence, arrogance, and alienation, and the urgent need for a new ethics and sensibility rooted in respect for all life. Animal liberation is not an alien concept to modern culture; rather it builds on the most progressive ethical and political values Westerners have devised in the last two hundred years—those of equality, democracy, and rights—as it carries them to their logical conclusion. Whereas ethicists such as Arthur Kaplan argue that rights are cheapened when extended to animals, it is far more accurate to see this move as the redemption of rights from an arbitrary and prejudicial limitation of their true meaning. The next great step in moral evolution is to abolish the last acceptable form of slavery that subjugates the vast majority of species on this planet to the violent whim of one. Moral advance today involves sending human supremacy to the same refuse bin that society earlier discarded much male supremacy and white supremacy. Animal liberation requires that people transcend the complacent boundaries of humanism in order to make a qualitative leap in ethical consideration, thereby moving the moral bar from reason and language to sentience and subjectivity. Animal liberation is the culmination of a vast historical learning process whereby human beings gradually realize that arguments justifying hierarchy, inequality, and discrimination of any kind are arbitrary, baseless, and fallacious. Moral progress occurs in the process of demystifying and deconstructing all myths—from ancient patriarchy and the divine right of kings to Social Darwinism and speciesism—that attempt to legitimate the domination of one group over another. Moral progress advances through the dynamic of replacing hierarchical visions with egalitarian visions and developing a broader and more inclusive ethical community. Having recognized the illogical and unjustifiable rationales used to oppress blacks, women, and other disadvantaged groups, society is beginning to grasp that speciesism is another unsubstantiated form of oppression and discrimination.

# Specieism Alt Key to any other movement

**Key to any liberation / movements.**

**Singer ’89, Professor of Bioethics at Princeton University and Laureate Professor at the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics at the University of Melbourne** [All Animals Are Equal, TOM REGAN & PETER SINGER (eds.), Animal Rights and Human Obligations, New Jersey, 1989, pp. 148-162]

A liberation movement demands an expansion of our moral horizons and an extension or reinterpretation of the basic moral principle of equality. Practices that were previously regarded as natural and inevitable come to be seen as the result of an unjustifiable prejudice. Who can say with confidence that all his or her attitudes and practices are beyond criticism? If we wish to avoid being numbered amongst the oppressors, we must be prepared to re-think even our most fundamental attitudes. We need to consider them from the point of view of those most disadvantaged by our attitudes, and the practices that follow from these attitudes. If we can make this unaccustomed mental switch we may discover a pattern in our attitudes and practices that consistently operates so as to benefit one group—usually the one to which we ourselves belong—at the expense of another. In this way we may come to see that there is a case for a new liberation movement. My aim is to advocate that we make this mental switch in respect of our attitudes and practices towards a very large group of beings: members of species other than our own—or, as we popularly though misleadingly call them, animals. In other words, I am urging that we extend to other species the basic principle of equality that most of us recognize should be extended to all members of our own species.

**Language is powerful.**

**Jacobs ’04, PhD and President, Vegetarian Society (Singapore)** [George, Speaking Vegetarian:

Toward Nonspeciesist Language, <http://www.ivu.org/congress/2004/lectures/Jacobs.html>]

In this paper, I have attempted to make two main points. One, we should appreciate the power of language as a medium that mirrors and manipulates how we view the world in which we live. Two, vegetarian organizations should seek to utilize this medium as we strive for a healthier, happy world. However, changing a language is a huge task. Is it too huge a mountain to move? Not at all! If we do research to understand the current situation, use Vegetarian language every chance we have, and educate others about why and how to speak Vegetarian, little by little we can succeed. Language is an inseparable part of everyday life, and modern technology brings us even more ways to use this vital tool. Let’s use this tool to improve our lives and those of all our fellow beings.

**Language changes = enough to solve.**

**Jacobs ’04, PhD and President, Vegetarian Society (Singapore)** [George, Speaking Vegetarian:

Toward Nonspeciesist Language, <http://www.ivu.org/congress/2004/lectures/Jacobs.html>]

At times, speaking Vegetarian may mean using language that appears unusual, perhaps even incorrect, to others. For instance, nonhuman animals and humans and other animals may sound strange, but such language use makes the point that we humans are animals too, rather than standing separate from and above our fellows. Furthermore, nonsexist terms, such as firefighter, also sounded strange at first. Similarly, in some cases, when we use the pronoun who with nonhuman animals, we may be accused of being grammatically incorrect. Such objections provide excellent opportunities for explaining why we believe that other animals merit who, not which, just as humans do. Indeed, the whole topic of nonspeciesist language can be seen as just one more way that we can encourage our fellow humans to examine their beliefs and practices regarding food and other aspects of human-nonhuman interaction.

# \*Specieism--\*“Pig” K\*

# Specieism--No Pigs! 1nc

**A. Comparing “bad” humans to pigs justifies the exploitation of animals.**

**Stibbe ’03, Professor in the English Department, Chikushi Jogakuen University** [Arran, As Charming as a Pig:The Discursive Construction of the Relationship Between Pigs and Humans, Society and Animals, Vol 11, Iss 4, EBSCO]

In the past, pigs were kept near their guardians’ (owners’) homes, ate leftovers from their guardians’ kitchens and enjoyed a generally close relationship with humans. The closeness of the relationship, combined with its ultimate end in the killing of the pig, led to a sense of shame (Leach, 1964). This shame manifested itself in negative expressions about pigs within the English language, which remain to this day. However, the relationship between humans and pigs is becoming increasingly distant, with decisions affecting pigs’ lives made in the ofces of agricultural industry executives far from the intensive farms on which the pigs live. The new relationship has led to the evolution of a new discourse about pigs, that of the modern pork industry. Because of its technical and scientic nature, this new discourse does not contain the explicit insults of mainstream discourse.Yet, embedded within it are a series of implicit ideological assumptions designed to justify the connement and exploitation of pigs in high intensity farms. This paper investigates the discourses surrounding pigs in both mainstream (British) culture and the pork industry and discusses attempts to challenge these discourses.

**B. Voting aff turns all their impacts —maintaining the human-non-human binary dooms them to endless cycles of subordination and violence.**

**Best ’07, Associate Professor, Departments of Humanities and Philosophy University of Texas, El Paso** [Steven, Charles Patterson, The Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust New York: Lantern Books, 2002, 280 pp]

While a welcome advance over the anthropocentric conceit that only humans shape human actions, the environmental determinism approach typically fails to emphasize the crucial role that animals play in human history, as well as how the human exploitation of animals is a key cause of hierarchy, social conflict, and environmental breakdown. A core thesis of what I call “animal standpoint theory” is that animals have been key driving and shaping forces of human thought, psychology, moral and social life, and history overall. More specifically, animal standpoint theory argues that the oppression of human over human has deep roots in the oppression of human over animal. In this context, Charles Patterson’s recent book, The Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust, articulates the animal standpoint in a powerful form with revolutionary implications. The main argument of Eternal Treblinka is that the human domination of animals, such as it emerged some ten thousand years ago with the rise of agricultural society, was the first hierarchical domination and laid the groundwork for patriarchy, slavery, warfare, genocide, and other systems of violence and power. A key implication of Patterson’s theory is that human liberation is implausible if disconnected from animal liberation, and thus humanism -- a speciesist philosophy that constructs a hierarchal relationship privileging superior humans over inferior animals and reduces animals to resources for human use -- collapses under the weight of its logical contradictions. Patterson lays out his complex holistic argument in three parts. In Part I, he demonstrates that animal exploitation and speciesism have direct and profound connections to slavery, colonialism, racism, and anti-Semitism. In Part II, he shows how these connections exist not only in the realm of ideology – as conceptual systems of justifying and underpinning domination and hierarchy – but also in systems of technology, such that the tools and techniques humans devised for the rationalized mass confinement and slaughter of animals were mobilized against human groups for the same ends. Finally, in the fascinating interviews and narratives of Part III, Patterson describes how personal experience with German Nazism prompted Jewish to take antithetical paths: whereas most retreated to an insular identity and dogmatic emphasis on the singularity of Nazi evil and its tragic experience, others recognized the profound similarities between how Nazis treated their human captives and how humanity as a whole treats other animals, an epiphany that led them to adopt vegetarianism, to become advocates for the animals, and develop a far broader and more inclusive ethic informed by universal compassion for all suffering and oppressed beings. The Origins of Hierarchy "As long as men massacre animals, they will kill each other" –Pythagoras It is little understood that the first form of oppression, domination, and hierarchy involves human domination over animals. Patterson’s thesis stands in bold contrast to the Marxist theory that the domination over nature is fundamental to the domination over other humans. It differs as well from the social ecology position of Murray Bookchin that domination over humans brings about alienation from the natural world, provokes hierarchical mindsets and institutions, and is the root of the long-standing western goal to “dominate” nature. In the case of Marxists, anarchists, and so many others, theorists typically don’t even mention human domination of animals, let alone assign it causal primacy or significance. In Patterson’s model, however, the human subjugation of animals is the first form of hierarchy and it paves the way for all other systems of domination such as include patriarchy, racism, colonialism, anti-Semitism, and the Holocaust. As he puts it, “the exploitation of animals was the model and inspiration for the atrocities people committed against each other, slavery and the Holocaust being but two of the more dramatic examples.” Hierarchy emerged with the rise of agricultural society some ten thousand years ago. In the shift from nomadic hunting and gathering bands to settled agricultural practices, humans began to establish their dominance over animals through “domestication.” In animal domestication (often a euphemism disguising coercion and cruelty), humans began to exploit animals for purposes such as obtaining food, milk, clothing, plowing, and transportation. As they gained increasing control over the lives and labor power of animals, humans bred them for desired traits and controlled them in various ways, such as castrating males to make them more docile. To conquer, enslave, and claim animals as their own property, humans developed numerous technologies, such as pens, cages, collars, ropes, chains, and branding irons. The domination of animals paved the way for the domination of humans. The sexual subjugation of women, Patterson suggests, was modeled after the domestication of animals, such that men began to control women’s reproductive capacity, to enforce repressive sexual norms, and to rape them as they forced breeding in their animals. Not coincidentally, Patterson argues, slavery emerged in the same region of the Middle East that spawned agriculture, and, in fact, developed as an extension of animal domestication practices. In areas like Sumer, slaves were managed like livestock, and males were castrated and forced to work along with females. In the fifteenth century, when Europeans began the colonization of Africa and Spain introduced the first international slave markets, the metaphors, models, and technologies used to exploit animal slaves were applied with equal cruelty and force to human slaves. Stealing Africans from their native environment and homeland, breaking up families who scream in anguish, wrapping chains around slaves’ bodies, shipping them in cramped quarters across continents for weeks or months with no regard for their needs or suffering, branding their skin with a hot iron to mark them as property, auctioning them as servants, breeding them for service and labor, exploiting them for profit, beating them in rages of hatred and anger, and killing them in vast numbers – all these horrors and countless others inflicted on black slaves were developed and perfected centuries earlier through animal exploitation. As the domestication of animals developed in agricultural society, humans lost the intimate connections they once had with animals. By the time of Aristotle, certainly, and with the bigoted assistance of medieval theologians such as St. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, western humanity had developed an explicitly hierarchical worldview – that came to be known as the “Great Chain of Being” – used to position humans as the end to which all other beings were mere means. Patterson underscores the crucial point that the domination of human over human and its exercise through slavery, warfare, and genocide typically begins with the denigration of victims. But the means and methods of dehumanization are derivative, for speciesism provided the conceptual paradigm that encouraged, sustained, and justified western brutality toward other peoples. “Throughout the history of our ascent to dominance as the master species,” Patterson writes, “our victimization of animals has served as the model and foundation for our victimization of each other. The study of human history reveals the pattern: first, humans exploit and slaughter animals; then, they treat other people like animals and do the same to them.” Whether the conquerors are European imperialists, American colonialists, or German Nazis, western aggressors engaged in wordplay before swordplay, vilifying their victims – Africans, Native Americans, Filipinos, Japanese, Vietnamese, Iraqis, and other unfortunates – with opprobrious terms such as “rats,” “pigs,” “swine,” “monkeys,” “beasts,” and “filthy animals.” Once perceived as brute beasts or sub-humans occupying a lower evolutionary rung than white westerners, subjugated peoples were treated accordingly; once characterized as animals, they could be hunted down like animals. The first exiles from the moral community, animals provided a convenient discard bin for oppressors to dispose the oppressed. The connections are clear: “For a civilization built on the exploitation and slaughter of animals, the `lower’ and more degraded the human victims are, the easier it is to kill them.” Thus, colonialism, as Patterson describes, was a “natural extension of human supremacy over the animal kingdom.” For just as humans had subdued animals with their superior intelligence and technologies, so many Europeans believed that the white race had proven its superiority by bringing the “lower races” under its command. There are important parallels between speciesism and sexism and racism in the elevation of white male rationality to the touchstone of moral worth. The arguments European colonialists used to legitimate exploiting Africans – that they were less than human and inferior to white Europeans in ability to reason – are the very same justifications humans use to trap, hunt, confine, and kill animals. Once western norms of rationality were defined as the essence of humanity and social normality, by first using non-human animals as the measure of alterity, it was a short step to begin viewing odd, different, exotic, and eccentric peoples and types as non- or sub-human. Thus, the same criterion created to exclude animals from humans was also used to ostracize blacks, women, and numerous other groups from “humanity.” The oppression of blacks, women, and animals alike was grounded in an argument that biological inferiority predestined them for servitude. In the major strain of western thought, alleged rational beings (i.e., elite, white, western males) pronounce that the Other (i.e., women, people of color, animals) is deficient in rationality in ways crucial to their nature and status, and therefore are deemed and treated as inferior, subhuman, or nonhuman. Whereas the racist mindset creates a hierarchy of superior/inferior on the basis of skin color, and the sexist mentality splits men and women into greater and lower classes of beings, the speciesist outlook demeans and objectifies animals by dichotomizing the biological continuum into the antipodes of humans and animals. As racism stems from a hateful white supremacism, and sexism is the product of a bigoted male supremacism, so speciesism stems from and informs a violent human supremacism -- namely, the arrogant belief that humans have a natural or God-given right to use animals for any purpose they devise or, more generously, within the moral boundaries of welfarism and stewardship, which however was Judaic moral baggage official Chistianithy left behind.

# Specieism Alt AT: Language doesn’t shape reality (pig specific)

## Challenging bad humans as pigs challenges the speciest dichotomy they create:

**Stibbe ’03, Professor in the English Department, Chikushi Jogakuen University** [Arran, As Charming as a Pig:The Discursive Construction of the Relationship Between Pigs and Humans, Society and Animals, Vol 11, Iss 4, EBSCO]

Now the relationship between pigs and humans is one of distance, as the relentless push for cheap pork has led to pigs’ being kept indoors in intensive conditions. With the aid of technology and machinery, a few people look after hundreds of pigs, and the only contact most people have with pigs is on the dinner plate. However, the intense negativity toward pigs within the English language remains. Because language is bound up intimately with culture, the image of the pig continues to play a part in English culture. Fairclough (2003, p. 18) points out, “cultures exist as languages, or what I shall rather call discourses.”

**Language choices key to combating speciesism.**

**Stibbe ’03, Professor in the English Department, Chikushi Jogakuen University** [Arran, As Charming as a Pig:The Discursive Construction of the Relationship Between Pigs and Humans, Society and Animals, Vol 11, Iss 4, EBSCO]

In addition to raising critical language awareness, Dunayer (2001, pp. 179201) provides a complete set of guidelines for “countering speciesism,” which could be considered a form of verbal hygiene (Cameron, 1995). Among the many guidelines Dunayer gives is the suggestion that the term, “farm animal,” is a term to avoid, alternatives being “enslaved nonhuman” or “foodindustry captive” (Dunayer, p. 193). For “bacon, ham, pork (etc.),” the guidelines recommend “pig esh” (Dunayer, p. 193). An alternative for “pork producer” is “pig enslaver;” “cull” is “murder;” a “farm” is a “connement facility” (Dunayer, p. 194) and the farmer, a “nonhuman-animal exploiter” (Dunayer, p. 195).

**Discourse has the power to legitimize relationships in which one group imposes immense suffering on another.**

**Stibbe ’03, Professor in the English Department, Chikushi Jogakuen University** [Arran, As Charming as a Pig:The Discursive Construction of the Relationship Between Pigs and Humans, Society and Animals, Vol 11, Iss 4, EBSCO]

In the end, a pig farm essentially is a relationship: a relationship between two groups who happen to be from different species, one human and one porcine. The trend toward the end of the twentieth and the start of the twentyrst century is for this relationship to be increasingly remote, with decisions that have profound consequences on the lives of pigs being taken in distant, As Charming as a Pig • 389 air-conditioned ofces. In addition, the increasingly citied general population is far more likely to come across pigs in **insulting linguistic expressions than face-to-face**. The relationship, therefore, becomes more and more mediated by language. Textual mediation in itself is neither good nor bad. Clearly, discourse has the power to legitimize relationships in which one group causes immense suffering to the other. The many examples from the pork industry discussed in this paper suggest that the discourse of the pork industry is doing exactly that.

# Specieism Alt “Pig” worse than/diff other words

**“Pig” comparisons are worse than any other animal comparisons.**

**Stibbe ’03, Professor in the English Department, Chikushi Jogakuen University** [Arran, As Charming as a Pig:The Discursive Construction of the Relationship Between Pigs and Humans, Society and Animals, Vol 11, Iss 4, EBSCO]

Examining the uses of the word, “pig,” in a corpus of contemporary English such as the British National Corpus (BNC) reveals just how widespread and negative are the constructions of pigs. The BNC consists of 100 million words extracted from a wide range of books, newspapers, television programs, magazines, and recorded everyday speech. Within the BNC is an astonishingly large range of metaphors, similes, and idioms about pigs—far more than for any other nonhuman animal. Rats, snakes, dogs, and cats do not even come close, showing how deeply the pig is entrenched in British culture. There are 62 different non-literal uses of the words, “pig,” “hog,” and “swine” in the corpus, and these are summarized in Table 1.

# Specieism—Pig K--Impacts – racism/sexism

**Same logic that creates cultural models justifying racism and sexism.**

**Stibbe ’03, Professor in the English Department, Chikushi Jogakuen University** [Arran, As Charming as a Pig:The Discursive Construction of the Relationship Between Pigs and Humans, Society and Animals, Vol 11, Iss 4, EBSCO]

While the cultural model bears little relation to actual pigs, it bears all the hallmarks of cultural models in other areas, such as racism or sexism. Members 378 • Arran Stibbe of the dominant group base their feelings of superiority and self-worth on the supposed shortcomings of another group, “basking in the reection a negatively constituted other” (Valentine, 1998, p. 2). However, this is a very unstable base for self esteem because, deep down, everyone knows that the other group does not have these shortcomings. Rather than nding a new basis for self-esteem such as co-operation and respect, the supposed shortcomings are simply trumpeted more loudly and entrenched ever more deeply in everyday language. In Victorian times, the inferior image of pigs presumably helped provide a barrier between humans and pigs, overcoming cultural taboos against **killing those who are close to us.** The discourse of the pork industry could be argued equally to provide a barrier between humans and pigs, although, in this case, it is a barrier justifying not only killing pigs but also keeping them conned indoors in high intensity facilities for their whole lives.

# Specieism Alt--Language Key to movement

**Critical language awareness regarding human-nha relationship is critical to success of animal rights movement.**

**Stibbe ’03, Professor in the English Department, Chikushi Jogakuen University** [Arran, As Charming as a Pig:The Discursive Construction of the Relationship Between Pigs and Humans, Society and Animals, Vol 11, Iss 4, EBSCO]

When ideology is implicit, it cannot be resisted through direct opposition of the propositional content of the language in which it is embedded, because the ideology appears only indirectly in presuppositions. However, ideology can be challenged through **critical analysis of the language itself**, which exposes presuppositions and the interests they serve. Critical language awareness has been a part of the animal rights movement since its inception. Singer (1975) describes the appalling conditions on pig farms and intersperses his description with quotations from pork industry sources, implicitly revealing the relationship between industry discourse and the conditions in which pigs are forced to live and die. Dunayer (2001) goes further by explicitly describing the relationship between language and oppression and conducting linguistic analysis of a variety of discourses that construct pigs and other animals. Such critical language awareness has the potential to undermine discourses by revealing their hidden ideological assumptions, thus taking away the power that implicitness gives them (Fairclough, 1992a, 1999; Males, 2000).

# \*\*\*\*\*SPECIEISM AFF ANSWERS\*\*\*\*\*

**Turn – the idea that species in itself is a characteristic lays the foundation for the very discrimination they criticize.**

**Elstein ’03** [Daniel, Paper for the Animal Liberation Philosophy and Policy Journal, Species as a Social Construction: Is Species Morally Relevant?, <http://www.criticalanimalstudies.org/JCAS/Journal_Articles_download/Issue_1/Elstein.PDF>]

In what follows, I will argue that the concept of species is socially constructed in significant ways. This will mean that speciesism, or the doctrine that species in itself is a characteristic that can justifiably be used as a criterion for discriminating between individuals, cannot be valid. I will argue that speciesists tend to see species as a concept that marks essential natures and boundaries, and they use this fiction in forming moral judgments about individuals. I should preface this by saying that it seems to me that such an argument is unnecessary. It is an implicitly accepted fact amongst the majority of philosophers that the burden of proof always lies on the side of the philosopher who wants to argue that a quality is morally relevant. Those who want to argue that language ability is morally relevant, for instance, will give reasons for their position (whether adequate or inadequate)- they will not simply challenge their opponent to prove them wrong. Most philosophers on both sides of the animal rights debate, with some exceptions, have followed this common-sense notion and accepted that until someone presents an argument that species is morally relevant, we should go with the default position that it is not. It is for these few exceptions that I am writing this paper and presenting a positive case against the moral relevance of species.

**The only way to really solve is to abandon this idea of “species.”**

**Elstein ’03** [Daniel, Paper for the Animal Liberation Philosophy and Policy Journal, Species as a Social Construction: Is Species Morally Relevant?, <http://www.criticalanimalstudies.org/JCAS/Journal_Articles_download/Issue_1/Elstein.PDF>]

Once the origins and meanings of the concept "species" are revealed, it becomes clear that there is no such thing as species that transcends its aggregate parts. If the aggregate parts are not relevant to morality, neither is species; and species can only be morally relevant in the ways that its component parts are. Species has no essential “core” nature. Therefore, to make moral distinctions based on species in itself, without reference to what species consists of, is to make moral distinctions based on nothing. In other words, it is to commit Washoe’s fallacy. It seems to me that this is a sufficient reason for 4 both ethical realists, and all but the most extreme ethical relativists, to give up any conviction that species may be morally relevant.

**“Species” do not exist – it is a socially constructed categorization.**

**Elstein ’03** [Daniel, Paper for the Animal Liberation Philosophy and Policy Journal, Species as a Social Construction: Is Species Morally Relevant?, <http://www.criticalanimalstudies.org/JCAS/Journal_Articles_download/Issue_1/Elstein.PDF>]

I look at the term species as one arbitrarily given for the sake of convenience to a set of individuals closely resembling each other, and that it does not essentially differ from the term variety. -Darwin, 1859, 52, (emphasis added) When I say that species is socially constructed it does not imply that differences between humans and non-humans do not exist (e.g. we are taller than hampsters). Nor does it necessarily imply that species concepts are useless in science, everyday language, or even in philosophy. Indeed, the concept has been constructed largely because it is often found to be useful within certain contexts. And further, it is very likely useful because there are patterns in the world that loosely map onto many of our common conceptions of species. In part, evolution can explain the patterns that we see. Geographical and genetic isolation tend to lead to greater differences between, rather than within, groups of organisms- but not always. In fact, there is no "objective" way to decide what is a significant enough “gap,” and this is further complicated by the fact that we are 6 dealing with an almost unlimited number of characteristics. To quote one biologist, “How similar is ‘similar enough’ and in what sense of ‘similar’?” (Hull, pg. 35 in Species) To a large extent, the patterns that we see will depend upon what we find useful for our purposes. But what is useful or “convenient” in one context may be detrimental or even nonsensical in another. Historically contingent forces have played a significant role in shaping the species concepts that we have in the West, and therefore the concept is meaningful only within certain contexts.

# SPECIEISM AFF ANSWERS

**“Species” is too vague and interest-relative to serve any role in criticism or moral claims.**

**Elstein ’03** [Daniel, Paper for the Animal Liberation Philosophy and Policy Journal, Species as a Social Construction: Is Species Morally Relevant?, <http://www.criticalanimalstudies.org/JCAS/Journal_Articles_download/Issue_1/Elstein.PDF>]

Species concepts are interest-relative. This is true within the field of biology and beyond. Robert A. Wilson writes in Realism, Essence, and Kind: Resuscitating Species Essentialism: It is widely accepted that there are strong objections to the claim that any of [the] proposalspheneticism, reproductive views, or genealogical views- are adequate… The different species concepts reflect the diverse biological interests of (for example) paleontologists, botanists, ornithologists, bacteriologists, and ecologists, so these concepts depend as much on our epistemic interests and proclivities as on how the biological world is structured. (Wilson, Species, 192) Biologists whose main interest is in evolution tend to use species concepts that focus on evolution; ecologists tend to use species concepts that stress ecological niches; biologists interested in morphology focus on morphological characteristics in their species concepts, etc. Thus there is currently no universally accepted species concept in the scientific community. Biologists have their own uses for their own species concepts, and for laypeople species distinctions serve as a convenient way of describing collections of large numbers of variables. The question is whether “the species concept” is ever useful in moral philosophy, and if so, when? In asking this, which species concept we mean is automatically in question. Is it the everyday-language concept of laypeople, and if so, whose? Or is it one of the more than a dozen species concepts currently held by 7 biologists? Anyone who argues that “the species concept” is useful in moral philosophy must first specify which species concept they have in mind. One cannot simply say "species" is morally relevant as if the term has some precise and obvious meaning- as if species were some sort of essential thing that needs no explanation, because it is Godgiven and beyond question.

# SPECIEISM AFF ANSWERS

**Turn – racism.**

**Elstein ’03** [Daniel, Paper for the Animal Liberation Philosophy and Policy Journal, Species as a Social Construction: Is Species Morally Relevant?, <http://www.criticalanimalstudies.org/JCAS/Journal_Articles_download/Issue_1/Elstein.PDF>]

It is only because the species concept in animal rights debates has not been thoroughly deconstructed that philosophers like Cohen are able to rely upon it in their philosophical arguments against animal rights. At one point in time, this was also the case with race. Racists may claim that race is a morally relevant category with no explanation. But we can then ask them what they mean by race, rather than allowing them to hide behind vague, undefined, and equivocal terms. If they answer "skin color,” or "geographical origin,” we can then ask them why skin color or geographical origin should have anything at all to do with moral principles. Although, at this point in history, skin color perhaps seems no more arbitrary a factor than "race" (since almost everyone considers race irrelevant to moral principles), at one point in time this was probably not the case. Thus, deconstructing race reveals the absurdity of using race as a moral criterion. We can similarly deconstruct the term "species" in animal rights debates. When philosophers argue that species is a morally relevant characteristic, we can ask what they mean by species. If they reply that a species is determined by how an individual looks, (the most honest answer, in my opinion), or the capacity to mate and have fertile offspring with certain other individuals, we can then ask them why appearance or an 12 ability to mate with certain individuals might have anything to do with moral principles.1 Here, they are on much weaker ground than when they are allowed to simply call this "species.” It is much more apparent to most people that appearance and mating capacities are irrelevant to morality than it is that "species,” whatever that may be, is irrelevant to morality. The claim that species is morally significant seems to hold more water when we have not said what species is. Regardless of any definitions that may be placed upon the term "species" by biologists, it is clear that for most people, distinctions of species are based solely upon difference of appearance. For example, I distinguish a chimpanzee from a gorilla by the fact that they look different to me. This conforms to Darwin's statement that begins this section to the effect that species determinations are based upon "resemblance.” Furthermore, this resemblance is clearly not mental resemblance, but physical resemblance (just like race). In Franz Kafka's Metamorphosis, we say that the main character has turned into an insect, not that he has merely acquired the body of an insect while remaining a human because of his mind. This indicates the commonsense fact that the primary criteria we typically use for determining the species of an individual is the physical traits of the individual, not mental traits. Just because someone has the mind of a human does not make him human- what matters to determinations of species, at least in everyday conceptions, is our perceptions of physical qualities.

# Specieism AFF Answers--Perm Ev

**Perm – some level of complicity with speciesist norms can still conduce towards removing the entirety of speciesism.**

**Sztybel ’07, Fellow with the Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics** [David, Animal Rights Law: Fundamentalism versus Pragmatism, Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume V, Issue 1,http://www.criticalanimalstudies.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/animal-rights-law.pdf]

This is a powerful argument. It has strong emotional resonances since people often resent complicity in any form. But the complicity charge could never be fully made since the pragmatists’ long-term goal of abolition is by all accounts not cooperating with speciesists but trying to convert them. Also, we accept complicity with governments by paying taxes even if we strongly disagree as to how some public monies are spent, or vegans may indirectly be complicit in the profiteering of grocers who traffic in animal corpses. I would argue that some “welfarist” suffering-reduction laws lead to a lessening of wrong-doing on the part of speciesists by curbing their cruelty. If I am right, such laws also help conduce towards eventually removing the whole wrong of speciesism (see III. below).

# Specieism AFF Answers Ext. – AT: perm links to disads

**Holding out for total rejection of speciesism is tantamount to idol worship that undermines real world changes.**

**Sztybel ’07, Fellow with the Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics** [David, Animal Rights Law: Fundamentalism versus Pragmatism, Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume V, Issue 1,http://www.criticalanimalstudies.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/animal-rights-law.pdf]

I also reverse the charge of complicity. I argue that there is tacit or passive complicity in allowing the wrongs of cruelty to continue without effective challenge, or permitting them to continue longer than necessary, or failing to do what is most conducive to animal rights by failing to advocate such “welfarist” suffering-reduction laws (more on this below). Indeed, by not favoring what is best for sentient beings at every turn, one is in danger of being complicit in wronging these beings. This is not to say that a pragmatist would automatically donate $100 to groups promoting larger cages. I might give it to a group promoting veganism. But I would not criticize but rather support the United Farm Workers, founded by Cesar Chavez, who are trying to improve conditions for workers and animals alike. Of course not everyone need agree with my ultimate ethical principle. Some people might act only for animal rights. But to me that is like idol worship—performing excessive homage to a mere thing. The “real” solution, to me, is doing what is morally right at every stage of personal and social development. Now Francione will say that not rights but “proto-rights” are best for animals in the short-term. So rather than urging tactics that “merely” reduce suffering, he favors measures consistent with abolishing suffering altogether. He is right that this is concretely best in the short-term if it is possible, but if it is not, I argue that “merely” reducing suffering may be the best for animals that can really be achieved. Less suffering is often better for animals than advocating a proto-right only that dies in a legislature, leaving in its wake a largely wasted campaign (save for its educational value— although it may teach wrong lessons about animal rights law unlike wiser campaigns).

# Specieism AFF Answers

**Don’t be fooled by this irrational idea of a forced choice – small steps to reduce animal suffering will be effective even if there is some compromise, complicity.**

**Sztybel ’07, Fellow with the Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics** [David, Animal Rights Law: Fundamentalism versus Pragmatism, Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume V, Issue 1,http://www.criticalanimalstudies.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/animal-rights-law.pdf]

Francione’s insistence on (proto-)rights only might become entirely appropriate one day, once animal rights activism and indeed “welfarist” initiatives have reached a certain level of progress for animals. As said, once animals’ interests are afforded greater consideration, there might be nothing pragmatically but to advocate either strong proto-rights (perhaps much as Francione construes them) or rights full-out. Proto-rights might well precede rights, although if any legislature can skip proto-rights and go directly to rights all the better for everyone. Francione may be right but at the wrong time. That he is ahead of his time does not mean that he is of no contemporary relevance. There is a vital role for visionaries 27 in any idealistic movement: they give us something to look forward to. Francione’s approach is not purely visionary though, but rather short-sighted regarding what is best for animals in the short- and long-terms. Fundamentalist and pragmatist animal rights law strategies will converge at some point in the medium- or long-term, depending on the specific context, although Francione would not agree with that assessment. In rare cases though, legal initiatives can and do happen today that meet his criteria such as the banning of circus animal acts. In general, however, we must not allow our utopian dreams for the future to cloud our judgment as to what is really best for animals today. I hope the pragmatist approach incorporates the strengths of Francione’s approach for the far-future without the dangers of fundamentalism for the short- and long-terms, even as I aim to have the strengths of allowing “welfarist” reforms without the weakness of omitting to advocate abolition. Still, there may be an indirect pragmatic benefit—although as I have said there are strong liabilities—in having a spectrum of demands, including those who ask for nothing less than the full recognition of interests, so long as that is a minority and “outsider” position as it is now. That outsider stance may make it more likely that a more modest proposal might pass due to fear of—or a positive desire to meet part-way with—something more radical. In the course of history, anti-speciesist irrationality may help to balance out speciesist irrationality. In dilemmas, it is the most caring thing we can do to try to salvage the most good. Francione wrote a key work about animal rights movement strategy entitled Rain without Thunder, the idea presumably being that we cannot get the rain of animal liberation without the thunder of abolitionist activism. In this he is correct. Yet reducing animal suffering also plays an important part in seeding the thunder that shakes up the establishment before the day will dawn that wholly illuminates animal rights laws.

# Specieism AFF Answers--Framework

**Since NOTHING will solve for 100% for speciesism, we must focus on solving more immediate dangers.**

**Sztybel ’07, Fellow with the Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics** [David, Animal Rights Law: Fundamentalism versus Pragmatism, Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume V, Issue 1,http://www.criticalanimalstudies.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/animal-rights-law.pdf]

It may help to think of these options for the short-term as a dilemma in which none of the options deliver animals from speciesism, so we should choose the best one(s). Think of the classic burning house situation. In such a case, one can only rescue one animal from the fire, and so not everyone’s right to life can be satisfied. This is an important way in which a rights proponent accepts that rights cannot dictate the outcome of every single decision. Perhaps we can likewise only choose in the short-term among laws that fall short of anything strongly resembling rights.

**Small steps are more effective than wholesale kritiks.**

**Sztybel ’07, Fellow with the Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics** [David, Animal Rights Law: Fundamentalism versus Pragmatism, Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume V, Issue 1,http://www.criticalanimalstudies.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/animal-rights-law.pdf]

We can move towards the goods named by animal rights (including freedom and welfare on my framework) by degrees. I favor short-term laws that approximate animal rights in the greatest degree. Laws permitting factory farming are non-animal rights laws. However laws banning factory farming may be proto-animal rights laws in my sense although not necessarily in Francione’s sense (e.g., pragmatists may accept larger cages unlike Francione). Note that proto-forms need not even be much recognizable, like a redwood seedling or sapling may not be seen for what it will become. Thus proto-animal rights laws need not much resemble animal rights. Banning whole areas of exploitation such as animal circuses are by contrast very strong forms of proto-animal rights laws.18 Securing maximum proto-animal-rights law I argue is a goal of progressive animal rights law.19 Animal rightists must as surely be concerned with proto-animal rights law, even in certain cases modest degrees of it, even as farmers are concerned with proto-forms of plantlings before the harvest. Francione’s proto-rights require eliminating suffering when suffering is an issue, but my proto-rights view allows substantial reduction of suffering as well. I will illustrate this contrast with examples later on.

# Specieism AFF Answers--Pragmatism

**Pragmatism solves best for animal rights.**

**Sztybel ’07**, Fellow with the Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics[David, Animal Rights Law: Fundamentalism versus Pragmatism, Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume V, Issue 1,http://www.criticalanimalstudies.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/animal-rights-law.pdf]

Animal rights law involves a long-term goal of animal rights, as fundamentalists such as Francione agree.120 However animal rights pragmatism would argue that we must choose that which is closest to animal rights and best for animals in the short-term, and what is maximally conducive to animal rights in the long-term. Ushering in “welfarist” legislation plays with fire because the end result will still be morally wrong in terms of moral perfectibility, but it honorably passes on the torch of moral progress for animals. These laws are “progressive” not in the sense of making what is good better, but what is unjust less horrific. The majority of animal rights advocates the world over I suspect would be in agreement with this general strategy since something like it is deployed by mainstream animal rights groups such as PETA. A minority of fundamentalists, influenced by Francione, would disagree, and lodge predictable objections to my position, advocating strong proto-rights exclusively as permissible incremental reforms. I have considered these objections and shown that they fail to discover any flaw in the pragmatist animal rights law position. Indeed, Francione’s own ideas are logically faulty, and ironically, not maximally conducive towards animal rights. Fundamentalist objections themselves are objectionable. On the road to abolition, smaller but significant increments of progress may still be progressive in terms of both ethics and efficacy.

**Pragmatism is in the best interest of nhas.**

**Sztybel ’07, Fellow with the Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics** [David, Animal Rights Law: Fundamentalism versus Pragmatism, Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume V, Issue 1,http://www.criticalanimalstudies.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/animal-rights-law.pdf]

Francione falsely claims that hybrid theorists “sacrifice” animal rights today to gain such rights tomorrow, as if animal rights are now achievable. He insists that welfare reforms are somehow inherently futile so long as animals are considered property, ignoring, for example, the clear counter-instance of Sweden banning factory farming. He criticizes the idea that animal “welfare” laws somehow cause abolition. In this paper I have offered a much more realistic model according to which “welfarist” laws may conduce towards abolition. The concern that “mere” suffering-reduction laws for animals lead to complacency is well taken. However I have argued that pragmatists, far from being complacent, are constantly vigilant about what is really best for animals. It is also unlikely that allowing cruelty to persist without “welfarist” laws would lead to an emotional upset sufficient to ensure animal rights as the next stage of animal law, but rather just the same animal “welfarism” which fundamentalists propose to delay. Francione’s position may complacently promote pipedream demands that are doomed in the short-term and make matters worse by delaying long-term progress for animals. I have shown that his own proto-rights, if passed into law, significantly risk even greater complacency. His charge about increased consumption of animals may well be reversible. He suggests that pragmatists approve of speciesism when that is really not the case; meantime, his own proposed amendments would equally form a part of speciesist laws. He constructs a demeaning label, “new welfarist,” none of the specifications of which apply to the animal rights pragmatist position outlined in this essay. We would do well to replace “new welfarist” with “animal rights pragmatist.” All this I have argued.

# Specieism AFF Answers--Cap Key

**Capitalism is the root cause. Resisting speciesism specifically re-entrenches the global capitalism that makes their impact claims inevitable.**

**Irvine ’06, Ph.D. in sociology and teaches at the University of Colorado** [Leslie, Animals in Disasters: Issues for Animal Liberation Activism and Policy, Animal Liberation Philosophy and Policy Journal, Volume IV, Issue 1,http://www.criticalanimalstudies.org/JCAS/Journal\_Articles\_download/Issue\_5/irvine.pdf]

What is missing from this section, and from contemporary animal rights discourse more generally, however, is a careful and sustained analysis of how global capitalism itself, combined with specific modes of anthropocentrism, gives rise to these problems—which is another way of saying that one of the chief problems facing animals today is global capitalism. By focusing on specific reforms/abolitions of specific practices, as is done in this section of book, it is easy to lose sight of the fact that the spread of global capitalism is at the very heart of the problems under discussion here (namely, the growth of factory farms, invasive animal experimentation, and the more general marketing of animals). Capitalism is not a side effect of these practices or something that might potentially thwart reforms made in the name of animal defense; it is one of the chief causes of these problems as well as one of the main obstacles in the way of achieving and sustaining genuine reforms/abolitions. It strikes me as naïve in the extreme to believe that thoroughgoing changes for animals are going to occur without simultaneously developing alternatives to global capitalism. If animal defense activists decide to accept global capitalism as the only game in town, they should likewise decide to accept the fact that the fate of animals on this planet will only get increasingly worse in future years. It is high time, especially in this era of “second wave” animal defense, to confront squarely the problem of animals within global capitalism and to begin to imagine and enact alternatives to the current state of affairs.

# \*\*\*\*\*Speed Good\*\*\*\*\*

## Faster and more evidence oriented debate increases critical thinking skills—moving towards slower debate risks reversing the critical thinking gains of the activity:

**Korcok**, 20**05** (Michael, edebate post, August 28, 2005)

No research to date has performed a factor analysis of what in 2-person policy debate results in the substantial critical thinking gains that are reported. No one knows whether and to what extent those critical thinking gains are because of speedy speech, dense research, arguing in a competitive framework, or whether it is all of those and various other elements of "policy debate" functioning together. We do know, because of Kent Colbert's 1986 PhD dissertation, that the relatively much faster and much more evidence intensive policy debate practiced in the NDT of the mid-80s resulted in substantially greater critical thinking gains than did the slower, less evidence-oriented, more philosophical debating that occurred in the CEDA of the mid-80s. In the absence of additional research, we risk eliminating or even reversing the critical thinking gains of policy debate every time we slow down or de-emphasize the use of traditional debate evidence. In short, traditional, fast, evidence-based, competitive policy debate substantially increases the critical thinking ability of its participants and **no evidence indicates that any alternative** inside or outside of the classroom can **substitute for those improvements**.

## Speed evaluations are arbitrary: there is no way to tell how fast is too fast; whether we went too fast, etc.

## Not a voting issue: if speed prevents comprehensibility of individual arguments reject those: no reason to take a blanket approach.

## It’s not exclusionary: any listener can easily adjust to faster speech rates two to three times the “normal” rate.

**JANSE, ’03** [Esther; Ph.D. @ Utrecht institute of Linguistics OTS; “Production and Perception of Fast Speech”]

**Listeners can adapt to very fast rates of speech. They can quite easily learn to understand speech which is compressed to rates that are much faster than can ever be attained in natural fast speech.** In the Introduction Chapter, the question was raised whether this fact provides a challenge to the Motor theory of speech perception. The central claim of the Motor theory is that “to perceive an utterance, then, is to perceive a specific pattern of intended gestures”. But what then, if what listeners perceive cannot possibly be a pattern of intended gestures produced by a human speaker? For the perception of synthetic speech, Liberman & Mattingly (1985) claim that synthetic speech will be treated as speech if it contains sufficiently coherent phonetic information. In their view, “it makes no difference that the listener knows, or can determine on auditory grounds, that the stimulus was not humanly produced; because linguistic perception is informationally encapsulated and mandatory, he will hear synthetic speech as speech” (p.28). Consequently, the fact that people can listen to speech which is time-compressed to much faster rates than can be produced by human speakers is not a strong argument against the Motor theory. Time-compressed speech is still sufficiently phonetically coherent to be perceived as speech. Listeners will only have to perform a time-scaling step in order to derive the original gestures. In normal everyday speech, speaker and listener tune in to each other. Listeners need to adapt to the speaker’s voice characteristics and dialect or regional accent. On the speaker’s side, speakers adapt their speech to the requirements of the communicative situation (Lindblom 1990; Nooteboom & Eefting 1994). An example of this type of co-operative behaviour is accentuation and deaccentuation. Accentuation is used by the speaker to guide the listener’s attention to new and informative words in the speech stream, whereas given or more redundant information is usually deaccented. Likewise, speech rate can also be varied according to contextual redundancy. Speakers may have to speak relatively slowly and carefully when they are conveying new information, but they can use a relatively fast speech rate when they are, e.g., recapitulating what they have just said. However, this pact between speaker and listener does not hold for time-compressed speech. Now the listener is presented with a global speech rate which is much faster than the speaker intended. In this chapter we hope to give some insight into how listeners deal with these unco-operative situations. **In order to adapt to strongly time-compressed speech (two to three times the original rate), listeners need only a small amount of training** (Pallier et al. 1998). When adapting to time-compressed speech, **listeners are assumed to learn to make acoustic transformations on the signal in order to derive the correct speech segments and words.**

# Speed Good

## Listeners only need a short amount of time to comprehend faster time-compressed speech.

J**ANSE, ’03** [Esther; Ph.D. @ Utrecht institute of Linguistics OTS; “Production and Perception of Fast Speech”]

**Subjects need only a limited amount of speech material to show significant improvement, or even plateau performance, in the identification of highly time-compressed speech.** At the same time, the adaptation effect does not seem to be lasting. This proves the flexibility of the speech perception mechanism: listeners tune in to a fast speech rate quickly, but once they are no longer presented with time-compressed speech, they gradually lose the initial adaptation to it. Secondly, the results disprove Foulke’s (1971) point that **successful processing of heavily time-compressed speech is possible** as long as the listener has enough processing time. The duration of a segment’s steady-state portion, and also the care of articulation of the segment itself, determine whether the segment can be identified after strong time compression. Obviously, there is a limit to what listeners can adapt to: the segmental intelligibility of speech, as measured in the identification of the nonwords, remains rather low at these heavy time-compression rates.

## Studies show that much faster speech is still intelligible.

**JANSE, ’03** [Esther; Ph.D. @ Utrecht institute of Linguistics OTS; “Production and Perception of Fast Speech”]

The duration study described in the previous section shows that the prosodic pattern at word level is made more pronounced with increasing speech rate. These production data then lead to the expectation that the intelligibility of time-compressed speech will be improved if its temporal organisation is closer to that of natural fast speech. **Experiments in our laboratory have shown that speech remains intelligible at rates that are much faster than can ever be attained in natural fast speech. Speech that is time-compressed to the fastest rate which human speakers can achieve is still almost perfectly intelligible. It would seem reasonable to evaluate the perceptual effects of applying fast speech timing to time-compressed speech at the fast rate which is produced by the speakers.** However, the perceptual effects of more natural fast speech patterns will first be established for a much faster rate of speech. There are two reasons for this. First, a practical reason is that intelligibility of artificially time-compressed speech is very high, even at rates twice the normal rate. This ceiling effect would make any intelligibility differences between linearly time-compressed and nonlinearly time-compressed speech difficult to find. Second, a more fundamental reason is that the role of prosody is expected to become more important as the listening situation becomes more difficult. The information carried by the more salient prosodic pattern might be exploited in difficult listening situations. For these two reasons, the rules of fast speech timing were extrapolated to even faster rates.

# Speed Good

## Adaptation to faster speech is caused by several thoroughly researched factors.

**JANSE, ’03** [Esther; Ph.D. @ Utrecht institute of Linguistics OTS; “Production and Perception of Fast Speech”]

**Dupoux & Green (**1997) **speculate that the adjustment to time-compressed speech may be the result of two processes operating simultaneously: a short-term adjustment to local speech rate parameters, and a longer-term, more permanent, perceptual learning process. The studies by Pallier** et al. (1998), **Altmann & Young** (1993), and **Sebastián-Gallés, Dupoux, Costa & Mehler** (2000) **were set up to investigate the mechanisms that are responsible for these adaptation effects. They argued that adaptation to time-compressed speech may also involve certain phonological processes. Subjects who were trained with time-compressed sentences in a foreign language which was phonologically similar to their own native language** (e.g., Spanish-speaking subjects adapted to Italian or Greek) **showed an adaptation effect when they were subsequently presented with time-compressed sentences of their own language. Even though they did not understand the language they had been presented with first, they still performed better when presented with sentences of their own language in comparison to subjects who had not had any training at all. More importantly, these listeners also performed better than listeners who had been trained with a language that was phonologically distant from their own language** (e.g., Spanish-speaking subjects adapted to English or Japanese). The authors argue that certain pairs of languages show transfer of adaptation, while others do not. This suggests that adaptation does not rely on raw acoustic properties, but on phonological or rhythmic properties. This is in line with the distinction between different broad language classes, as laid out by, amongst others, Abercrombie (1967). In his study, stress-timed languages (such as English, Dutch and German), which are said to exhibit nearly equal intervals between stresses or rhythmic feet, are distinguished from syllable-timed languages (such as Italian and Spanish), which display near isochrony between successive syllables (a third category are mora-timed languages, such as Japanese). More recent work on rhythmic differences between languages has refined this dichotomy between stress-timed and syllable-timed languages. Dauer (1983) observed that the rhythmic classes differ with respect to, amongst others, syllable type inventory and spectral vowel reduction. Ramus, Nespor & Mehler (1999) argue that the proportion of vocalic intervals in an utterance (%V) is the best acoustic correlate of rhythm class: stress-timed languages having, on average, a lower %V than syllable-timed languages. Low, Grabe & Nolan (2000) propose a pairwise variability index (the mean absolute difference between successive pairs of vowels, combined with a normalisation procedure for speaking rate) to capture rhythmic differences between languages or between language varieties. Importantly, a number of studies have shown that languages within such a class show particular language processing mechanisms (Cutler & Mehler 1993; Cutler, Mehler, Norris & Segui 1986; Ramus et al. 1999). Processing a language that belongs to the same class as one’s native language should then be easier than processing a more distant language.

# Speed Good

## Don’t believe the hype. Studies show that speech rate adaptation is simply an issue of the listener tuning in.

**JANSE, ’03** [Esther; Ph.D. @ Utrecht institute of Linguistics OTS; “Production and Perception of Fast Speech”]

**Altmann and Young** (1993) **showed that adaptation also occurs when listeners are trained with time-compressed** (phonotactically legal) **nonwords**. **Subjects who had been trained with time-compressed nonsense sentences (sentences in which all content words had been replaced by nonsense words) performed equally well on (meaningful) test sentences as subjects who had been trained with time-compressed meaningful sentences.**

In this thesis, we will not be concerned with the exact level at which adaptation takes place. Adaptation is assumed to take place at some pre-lexical level, whether phonological or not. **The fact that adaptation has been shown to be fast** (Dupoux & Green 1997; Pallier et al. 1998) **suggests that it is not an explicit learning procedure, but rather a quick process of tuning in.**

It seems reasonable to assume that lexical redundancy plays an important role in the perception of time-compressed speech. The more degraded the segmental information is, the more one has to rely on extra non-segmental information. Most of the studies employing time-compressed speech have used meaningful sentences as test material. Thus, listeners could make use of both the segmental information and the non-segmental sources of information. The present study was set up to examine segmental intelligibility and the effect of lexical redundancy separately. By disentangling these two factors, we hope to shed more light on the mechanisms underlying the robustness of the speech perception mechanism.

**Listeners’ inability to cope with extremely strongly time-compressed speech has been ascribed to a limit on storage capacity by Foulke** (1971). According to Foulke, **complete processing of speech is possible as long as there is processing time available in between stretches of highly time-compressed speech. This would mean that the identifiability of the time-compressed representations is not so much at stake, but that problems mainly arise because of the lack of processing time and because some words actually fall out of the crowded memory.**

## Spreading boosts short-term memory, which is key to education and remembering everyday tasks.

**PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, ‘92** [October 1992 (report of the results of the Raine et al study)]

"If friends criticize you for talking too fast, at least they can't also accuse you of having a bad memory. **Speech rate is a strong index of short term memory span... 'Therefore, the faster you can talk, the greater your short-term memory**,' says Adrian Raine, PhD, a University of Southern California psychologist. **The link has been established for adults for some time**, Raine reports in Child Development. Now, he and his colleagues find **the correlation holds for kids as well**, a finding that promises short-term payoff in the classroom and long-term payoff in life. **Short-term memory is the power behind recall of phone numbers, directions, and other everyday tasks. It is also the foundation of arithmetic and reading skills... That raises the possibility that speech- training may be a short-cut to achievement**." (p.14)

# Speed Good

## Talking faster increases memory, preventing losses with age.

**HULME + MCKENZIE, ’92** [Charles & Susie. (1992). Working Memory and Severe

Learning Difficulties. Hillsdale, USA: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Pg 45]

"**These results are striking in that the same linear function relating recall to speech rate fits the results for all age groups. Subjects of different ages in this study all recalled, on average, as much as they could say in roughly 1.5 seconds. Increases in memory span with age are seen to be very closely related to changes in speech rate with age. Thus the results of these different studies are remarkably clear and consistent**. **The dramatic improvements in serial recall performance with increasing age are closely and quantitatively related to changes in speech rate**. In terms of the articulatory loop theory, which gave impetus to these studies, the length of the loop appears to remain constant across different ages; more material is stored in this system because it can be spoken and so rehearsed more rapidly. **These results, relating developmental increases in speech rate to increases in short-term memory efficiency, lead quite directly to a simple causal theory: That increases in memory span with age depend upon increases in speech rate**. Needless to say, however, such a theory is not necessitated by the findings. The findings are essentially correlational; as children get older their speech rate increases and in line with this so does their memory performance. It could be that both these changes depend upon some other factor. The obvious way to test this causal theory is to conduct a training study. If short-term memory depends upon speech rate, if we can successfully train children to speak faster, then this should, according to the theory, lead to a corresponding increase in short-term memory. (p.45)

## TURN: Working memory is critical to literacy and math

**HULME + MCKENZIE, ’92** [Charles & Susie. (1992). Working Memory and Severe

Learning Difficulties. Hillsdale, USA: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Pg 45]

"In its broadest sense, **working memory refers to the use of temporary storage mechanisms in the performance of more complex tasks. So, for example, in order to read and understand prose, we must be able to hold incoming information in memory. This is necessary in order to compute the semantic and syntactic relationships among successive words, phrases, and sentences and so construct a coherent and meaningful representation of the meaning of the text**. This temporary storage of information during reading is said to depend on working memory. In this view **the ability to understand prose will depend o**n, among other things, **the capacity of a person’s working memory system**. **Such temporary storage of information is obviously necessary for the performance of a wide variety of other tasks apart from reading, such as mental arithmetic** (Hitch, 1978) **and verbal reasoning** (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974)."

## Speed is critical to linguistic abilities.

**STINE, WINGFIELD, + POON, ’96** [Elizabeth L., Arthur, & Leonard. “How much

and how fast: Rapid processing of spoken language in later adulthood.” Psychology and Aging, vol. 1, no. 4, 303-311]

"**At a very fast rate, several things must be accomplished. The various processes required to recode linguistic stimuli into meaning have been articulated for both spoken language** (Just & Carpenter, 1980; Marslen-Wilson & Tyler, 1980) **and written text** (Kintsch & vanDijk, 1978; J. Miller & Kintsch, 1980). **There must be some initial phase in which the stimulus is encoded, physical features** (visual or acoustic) **are extracted, and lexical access is achieved** (Just & Carpenter, 1980). **Next, the language content must be parsed into meaningful idea units in which relationships are determined among words** (Kintsch & vanDijk, 1978). **These relationships are typically represented in terms of propositions consisting of a predicate and one or more arguments that are related by the predicate. Third, relationships between idea units of the text must be established in order to construct overall structural coherence in the text. Finally, the text must be related to and integrated with world knowledge. Although such processes would undoubtedly have to work in both a top-down and bottom-up fashion, the output at each of these stages would have to be held in an online working memory for an effective integration of meaning**."

# \*\*\*\*\*Statism Frontline\*\*\*\*\*

# Statism Frontline (1/4)

**1. Alternative doesn’t solve: states are still the center of the international relations system. Efforts to end violence most focus on the actions of the state:**

**Wendt 1999** (Alexander, Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago. Social Theory of International Politics, p. 9)

It should be emphasized that “state-centrism” in this sense does not preclude the possibility that non-state actors, whether domestic or transnational, have important, even decisive, effects on the frequency and/or manner in which states engage in organized violence. “State-centrism” does not mean that the causal chain in explaining war and peace stops with states, or even that states are the “most important” links in that chain, whatever that might mean. Particularly with the spread of liberalism in the twentieth century this is clearly not the case, since liberal states are heavily constrined by non-state actors in both civil society and the economy. The point is merely that **states are still the primary medium through which the effects of other actors on the regulation of violence are channeled into the world system. It may be that non-state actors are becoming more important than states as initiators of change, but system change ultimately happens through states. In that sense states still are at the center of the international system, and as such it makes no more sense to criticize a theory of international politics as “state-centric” than it does to criticize a theory of forests for being “tree-centric.”**

**2. Perm: Do the plan and all non-competitive parts of the alternative: Focusing on the state does not block out the potential for structural change**

**Wendt 1999** (Alexander, Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago. Social Theory of International Politics, p. 10)

This state-centric focus is not politically innocent**. Critics might argue that its insights are inherently conservative, good only for “problem-solving” rather than radical change. That is not my view. Neorealism might not be able to explain structural change, but I think there is potential in IR to develop state-centric theories that can. A key first step in developing such theory is to accept the assumption that states are actors with more or less human qualities: intentionality, rationality, interests, etc**. This is a debatable assumption. Many scholars see talk of state “actors” as an illegitimate reificiation or anthropomorphization of what are in fact structures or institutions. On their view the idea of state agency is at most a useful fiction or metaphor. I shall argue that **states** *really are* **agents. Decision-makers routinely speak in terms of national “interests,” “needs,” “responsibilities,” “rationality,” and so on, and it is through such talk that states constitute themselves and each other as agents.** International politics as we know it today would be impossible without attributions of corporate agency, a fact recognized by international law, which explicitly grants legal “personality” to states. T**he assumption of real corporate agency enables states actively to participate in structural transformation.**

**3.Turn: Anarchy—Civilization is based upon the idea of a nation-state.**

**Kelly 1999** (Michael, Director of Legal Research @ Detroit College of Law, DRAKE LAW REVIEW. Nexis. Accessed May 17, 06)

Consequently, **it is premature to announce the demise of the nation-state as the pre-eminent creature in the international arena. Indeed,** **while seeking to redefine and defend the continued relevancy of the nation-state, publicists noting that “there are indications that could suggest that the nation-state, the universally realized form of political organization of societies (people), may become obsolete” conclude that it is still the nation-state that is both the primary actor on the international plane and the organizing principle around which civilizations are built.**

# Statism Frontline (2/4)

**4. Collapse of the nation state causes extinction.**

**Rubin** **2008.** (Dani, Earth Editor for PEJ News, Master’s student at the University of Victoria, and Associates holder in Chemistry. “Beyond Post-Apocalyptic Eco-Anarchism,” January 9th, <http://www.pej.org/html/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=7133&mode=thread&order=0&thold=0>)

Unlike twenty-five years ago, increasingly, people are adopting the anarcho-apocalyptic, civilization-must-fall-to-save-the-world attitude. It is a fairly clean and tight worldview, zealously bulletproof, and it scares me. I want the natural world, the greater community of life beyond our species, with all its beautiful and terrifying manifestations, and its vibrant landscapes to survive intact – I think about this a lot. **A quick collapse of global civilization, will almost certainly lead to greater explosive damage to the biosphere, than a mediated slower meltdown**. When one envisions the collapse of global society, one is not discussing the demise of an ancient Greek city-state, or even the abandonment of an empire like the Mayans. The end of our global civilization would not only result in the death of six billion humans, just wiping nature’s slate clean. We also have something like 5,000 nuclear facilities spread across the planet’s surface. And this is just one obvious and straightforward fact cutting across new radical arguments in favor of a quick fall. We have inserted ourselves into the web of life on planet Earth, into its interstitial fibers, over the last 500 years. We are now a big part of the world’s dynamic biological equation set – its checks and balances. If we get a “fever” and fall into social chaos, even just considering our non-nuclear toys laying about, the damage will be profound. It will be much more devastating than our new visionaries of post-apocalyptic paradise have prophesized. If one expands upon current examples of social chaos that we already see, like Afghanistan or Darfur, extrapolating them across the globe, encompassing Europe, Asia, North and South America, and elsewhere, then one can easily imagine desperate outcomes where nature is sacrificed wholesale in vain attempts to rescue human life. The outcomes would be beyond “ugly”; they would be horrific and enduring. That is why I cannot accept this new wave of puritanical anarcho-apocalyptic theology. The end-point of a quick collapse is quite likely to resemble the landscape of Mars, or even perhaps the Moon. I love life. I do not want the Earth turned barren. I think that those who are dreaming of a world returned to its wilderness state are lovely, naive romantics – dangerous ones. Imagine 100 Chernobyl’s spewing indelible death. Imagine a landscape over-run with desperate and starving humans, wiping out one ecosystem after another. Imagine endless tribal wars where there are no restraints on the use of chemical and biological weapons. Imagine a failing industrial infrastructure seeping massive quantities of deadly toxins into the air, water and soil. This is not a picture of primitive liberation, of happy post-civilized life working the organic farm on Salt Spring Island.

**5. Empirically denied – Nation-states have been around for thousands of years and extinction has not happened yet.**

# Statism Frontline (3/4)

**6. Turn: Morality—Collapse of the nation-state causes tribalism that makes protecting morality and equality impossible**

**Addis 2001** (Adeno, Professor of Law @ Tulane University, ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL, Fall Nexis. Accessed May 16, 06)

**It is not quite clear what the institutional response of the cosmopolitan liberal is other than to rejoice in the demise of the nation-state,** which is unlikely to happen in the foreseeable future. **What institutional structures replace the nation-state and how do those institutions precisely resolve the language problem of minorities? There are** perhapstwo alternative institutional **consequences of the demise of the nation-state. One consequence may be the** ultimate in decentralization. **Nation-states fragment into the lowest possible linguistic components.** Each linguistic group will be allowed to form its own political community**. This is** what Professor Thomas Franck has called **“postmodern tribalism.”** Of course, **this would resolve the question of linguistic minorities, but at a higher price of political chaos. Given the fact that there are thousands of linguistic minorities in the world this voluntary separation is likely to lead us to political chaos and instability,** precisely the problems that dealing with linguistic minorities is supposed to solve. True, there is a chance that after being allowed to separate, these linguistic groups could actually reconstitute themselves voluntarily as larger multilingual and politically viable communities. But in that case we are back to the question of which language is to be chosen as a national or official language, the very issue that the cosmopolitan liberal claims would be resolved (or would be irrelevant) with the process of decentralization. In any case, **it appears that decentralization may in fact make it harder, not easier, to treat all individuals with equal moral concern. Decentralization intensifies and multiplies divisions and boundaries. This is not exactly the structure one would want to put in place if one were trying to ensure that individuals have a global moral stature and are treated equally as units of moral concern.**The alternative is in a double bind: either the alternative affects too few people to solve or it uses utopian fiat, which is bad for the following reasons--

**A) Not real world: they fiat a mindset change/movement that would never happen, and real world education is crucial because it is the only thing that helps debaters outside the context of debate**

**B) Unfair: utopian fiat justifies fiating an utopian world, a debate that the affirmative could obviously never win.**

# Statism Frontline (4/4)

**7. Turn: Free Trade—The nation-state is key to the continual existence of many international organizations, including the WTO, the promotes freedom by protecting free trade and international law.**

**Bacchus 2003** (James. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, Summer. Nexis. Accessed May 17, 06)

**The demise of the nation-state has been much exaggerated**. For the most part, the Westphalia System still prevails. **The WTO is not by any means alone among international institutions in being member-driven by nation-states. The future of the WTO will be shaped by the shared will of the nation-states and other customs territories that comprise the members of the WTO. Their combined will to achieve a multilateral consensus is the key to the future of the WTO as both an engine for the trading system and an exemplar for the international rule of law. Their will is the key to unlocking the way to freedom.**

**Free trade ends the nationalism that drives conflicts – a global body politic ensures peace**

**Brook 1999** (Jason, Department of Journalism at Carleton University, Independent Institute “Make Trade, Not War” http://www.independent.org/tii/students/GarveyEssay99Brooks.html)

Different people have different solutions to war; none are as logical as free trade. The war hawks have pursued a policy of mutual assured destruction, arguing that bigger weapons make better deterrents. Others have argued for disarmament. While the causes of war are undoubtedly varied, protectionism clearly invites conflict. To this, free trade is a remedy. While diplomacy is important, there can be no better diplomacy than that which exists between common citizens of the world every day in a thousand spheres of life. The more free trade we have, the more the invisible hand of the market helps us to, while working for our own advancement, create a world of peace. The wellbeing of others becomes our own. There is no reason why, in a world of perfect free trade, people worldwide shouldn't get along as well as the citizens of the happiest, most prosperous democracies. For in a world of free trade it matters little where borders are drawn. "Make love, not war," was a slogan once bandied about as an answer to war. It was a catchy phrase -- and an appealing message given the two options. But it wasn't too practical. The real solution to war, if condensed to the size of a placard, would instead read, "Make trade, not war."

# \*\*\*Statism Answers (Extensions)\*\*\*

# Statism: Alt. fails

USFG focus good

**Focusing on USFG politics creates positive social change and develops activists**

**Joyner 99**

Christopher C., Professor of International Law – Georgetown U., 5 ILSA J Int’l & Comp L 377, June)

A debate exercise is particularly suited to an examination of United States foreign policy, which in political science courses is usually studied from a theoretical, often heavily realpolitik perspective. In such courses, international legal considerations are usually given short shrift, if discussed at all. As a result, students may come to believe that international law plays no role in United States foreign policy-making. In fact, serious consideration is usually paid by government officials to international law in the formulation of United States policy, albeit sometimes ex post facto as a justification for policy, rather than as a bona fide prior constraint on consideration of policy options. In addition, lawyers are prominent advisers at many levels of the foreign-policy-making process. Students should appreciate the relevance of international law for past and current US actions, such as the invasion of Grenada or the refusal of the United States to sign the law of the sea treaty and landmines convention, as well as for [\*387] hypothetical (though subject to public discussion) United States policy options such as hunting down and arresting war criminals in Bosnia, withdrawing from the United Nations, or assassinating Saddam Hussein. Through collaborative learning students become problem solvers, contributors and analytical discussants. The more undergraduate students learn through these exercises to form and test their own ideas about international law, the more significant the professor's role becomes as the class mentor and source of authority in the learning process. Teaching international law offers a unique opportunity to depart from the traditional approach to classroom learning from lecture and rote regurgitation of dates, events and situations. The interactive quality of the learning environment allows for students to move from a strategy of peer competition to one of peer collaboration. Participation in these exercises can be important for the learning process, particularly since students are encouraged to develop keener judgment on the merits of legal questions, gain insights into the potential of group decision-making, and acquire greater self-confidence about their contribution to planning and decision-making for the class presentation.

**Reforming the state is a strategic necessity – non-state alternatives will either be crushed by the state or result in less accountable tyrannies**

**Chomsky 1998** (Noam, Professor of Linguistics at MIT. The Common Good: Noam Chomsky Interviewed by David Barsamian, p. 84-85)

So Argentina is “minimizing the state”—cutting down public expenditures, the way our government is doing, but much more extremely. Of course, when you minimize the state, you maximize something else—and it isn’t popular control. What gets maximized is private power, domestic and foreign. I met with a very lively anarchist movement in Buenos Aires, and with other anarchist groups as far away as northeast Brazil, where nobody even knew they existed. We had a lot of discussions about these matters. They recognize that they have to try to use the state—even though they regard it as totally illegitimate. The reason is perfectly obvious: When you eliminate the one institutional structure in which people can participate to some extent—namely the government—you’re simply handing over power to unaccountable private tyrannies that are much worse. So you have to make use of the state, all the time recognizing that you ultimately want to eliminate it. Some of the rural workers in Brazil have an interesting slogan. They say their immediate task is “expanding the floor of the cage.” They understand that they’re trapped inside a cage, but realize that protecting it when it’s under attack from even worse predators on the outside, and extending the limits of what the cage will allow, are both essential preliminaries to dismantling it. If they attack the cage directly when they’re so vulnerable, they’ll get murdered. That’s something anyone ought to be able to understand who can keep two ideas in their head at once, but some people here in the US tend to be so rigid and doctrinaire that they don’t understand the point. But unless the left here is willing to tolerate that level of complexity, we’re not going to be of any use to people who are suffering and need our help—or, for that matter, to ourselves.

**Abolishing the state won’t solve patriarchy, class oppression, or racism**

**Dixon 2005** (Chris, author. “Reflection of Privilege Reformism, and Activism” Accessed at: <http://www.geocities.com/kk_abacus/ioaa/dixon2.html>)

Meanwhile, the opposing 'liberatory' vision offered is no better. Take, for instance, sasha's version of an "**anarchist ethics": "an affirmation of the creativity, desire and power of the individual; it is an affirmation of the ability of individuals to come together and decide their own fate without the need of any imposed decision coming in from the outside whether in 'totalitarian' or 'democratic' form." Again, a noble sentiment, but what about culture, gender, class, sexuality, race, and the so many other differences and ties between us? Whether we are generalized as the "exploited and excluded" or abstracted as one-dimensional "individuals," the systems of power that differentiate and exploit us don't disappear; and neither does resistance firmly situated in marginalization and difference**, from the Lesbian Avengers to the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People in Nigeria.

# Statism Extensions: Must fight within the state

**Power and oppression circulate through institutions like the state – we must fight within these structures in order to challenge domination**

**Grossberg 1992** (Lawrence, Professor of Communication Studies @ University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. We Gotta Get Out of This Place: Popular Conservativsm and Postmodern Culture, p. 390-391)

But this would mean that **the Left could not remain outside the systems of governance. It has sometimes to work with, against, and within bureaucratic systems of governance. Consider the case of Amnesty International, an immensely effective organization when its major strategy was** (similar to that of the Right) **exerting pressure directly on the bureaucracies of specific governments. In recent years** (marked by the recent rock tour), **it has apparently redirected its energy and resources, seeking new members** (who may not be committed to actually doing anything; **membership becomes little more than a statement of ideological support for a position that few are likely to oppose) and public visibility. In stark contrast, the most effective struggle on the Left in recent times has been the dramatic** (and, one hopes, continuing) **dismantling of apartheid in South Africa. It was accomplished by mobilizing popular pressure on the institutions and bureaucracies of economic and governmental institutions, and it depended upon a highly sophisticated organizational structure. The Left too often thinks that it can end racism and sexism and classism by changing people’s attitudes and everyday practices** (e.g., the 1990 Black boycott of Korean stores in New York). Unfortunately, while such struggles may be extremely visible, they are often less effective than attempts to move the institutions (e.g., banks, taxing structures, distributors) which have put the economic relations of Black and immigrant populations in place and which condition people’s everyday practices. **The Left needs institutions which can operate within the systems of governance, understanding that such institutions are the mediating structures by which power is actively realized. It is often by directing opposition against specific institutions that power can be challenged. The Left has assumed for some time now that, since it has so little access to the apparatuses of agency, its only alternative is to seek a public voice in the media through tactical protests. The Left does in fact need more visibility, but it also needs greater access to the entire range or apparatuses of decision making and power. Otherwise, the Left has nothing but its own self-righteousness. It is not individuals who have produced starvation and the other social disgraces of our world, although it is individuals who must take responsibility for eliminating them. But to do so, they must act within organizations, and within the systems of organizations which in fact have the capacity (as well as the moral responsibility) to fight them.**

**The state should be included in larger progressive agendas**

**Wendt 1999** (Alexander, Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago. Social Theory of International Politics, p. 10)

In sum, for critical IR theorists to eschew state-centric theorizing is to concede much of international politics to Neorealism. I show that state-centric IR theory can generate insights that might help move the international system from the law of the jungle toward the rule of law. It is true that knowledge always is more useful for some purposes than for others, and knowledge gained from an analysis of states and organized violence might do little to empower non-state actors interested in trade or human rights. But that simply means that state-centered IR theory can only be one element of a larger progressive agenda in world politics, not that it cannot be an element at all.

**States can function as rational actors**

**Koh 1997** (Harold, Professor Emeritus @ Harvard, YALE LAW JOURNAL, June. Nexis. Accessed 06/01/06)

A close reading of Henkin's discussion of the “politics of law observance” shows that **his defense of international law rests largely on utilitarian, rationalistic premises. Starting with the assumption “that nations act deliberately and rationally, after mustering carefully and weighing precisely all the relevant facts and factors,” Henkin posited “that barring an infrequent non-rational act, nations will observe international obligations unless violation promises an important balance of advantage over cost**.”

# \*\*\*\*\*Systemic Violence Frontline\*\*\*\*\*

# Systemic Violence Frontline (1-5)

**1. Sophisticated data shows that the values of the Enlightenment bolster the quality of life across factors.**

Francis **Heylighen &** Jan **Bernheim** (research professor at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel & professor of Medicine at the Free University of Brussels) “Global Progress I: empirical evidence for ongoing increase in quality-of-life,” **2000.** Retrieved May 31, 2012 at http://cleamc11.vub.ac.be/papers/ProgressJHS.pdf

5 . S u m m a r y a n d C o n c l u s i o n.

Cultural relativism has led post-modernist thinkers to argue that the 18th century concept of progress has become meaningless. At the same time, **the emphasis by the media on social and environmental problems has fostered an atmosphere of gloom and doom.** **This paper set out to show that both the relativist and the pessimist positions are flawed. This means that we had to: 1) define progress in a universally acceptable, culture-independent manner; 2) show that progress defined in this way effectively occurs**. We have attempted to update the concept of progress by replacing the materialistic and reductionistic assumptions underlying the philosophy of the Enlightenment by a more evolutionary and holistic framework. The resulting holistic concept of progress had to be operationalized, so as to make it empirically testable**. Our definition of progress as increase in global quality of life led us to study the different indicators of quality of life. The extensive data from the World Database of Happiness allowed us to determine which objective social, economic and psychological variables have a significant correlation with QOL. The results confirm the values that most people intuitively hold: health, wealth, security, knowledge, freedom, honesty and equality all seem to contribute to our feelings of well-being. These factors together explain between 63% and 81% (depending on the size of the country sample) of the variance in QOL for the 50-odd countries for which data are available (Veenhoven, 1996b, 1997).** We then checked to what extent each of these factors has increased for the world population as a whole. Representative data for roughly the last half century seem to indicate that all these factors have indeed progressed. This makes a strong case for the objective existence of progress. Yet, **in the absence of longitudinal, direct measurements of QOL, it can always be argued that however extensive the list of indicators that we have considered, it lacks some important factors (e.g. amount of pollution). If these factors would show deterioration, then our thesis of global progress could again be put into question. Because our conception of QOL is holistic, we can of course never discuss all possible factors that contribute to it. Therefore, we must analyse progress in the most general, most abstract way.** This will be attempted in part II of this paper (Heylighen & Bernheim, 2000). The resulting theoretical framework will be connected back to reality17 HEYLIGHEN & BERNHEIM by considering those factors that are most often associated with pessimistic prognoses: pollution, global change, population growth, acceleration of change, and information overload

**2.Society is solving violence in multiple factors—the world is getting better and not worse.**

Francis **Heylighen &** Jan **Bernheim** (research professor at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel & professor of Medicine at the Free University of Brussels) “Global Progress I: empirical evidence for ongoing increase in quality-of-life,” **2000**. Retrieved May 31, 2012 at http://cleamc11.vub.ac.be/papers/ProgressJHS.pdf

The same progress appears if we use the most reliable of the "objective" indicators, the Human Development Index (UNDP, 1999): **the percentage of the world's population ranked "low" in terms of human development has shrunk from 73% in 1960 to 35% by 1990. Between 1975 and 1997, most countries have made substantial progress in human development** (UNDP, 1999), while only one (Zambia) among those for which full data are available experienced a decrease in HDI value (mostly because of the AIDS epidemic). **This general trend may be exemplified by the probability of accidental death (Holen, 1995). This factor is both strongly correlated with QOL, and consistently decreasing.** Unlike the increases in some more ideologically-loaded factors, such as wealth, equality, or freedom, nobody would deny that decrease in accident rates constitutes an objective improvement. Yet, there is not any single, obvious cause for this decline**. It is rather a combined effect of a multitude of small improvements in the most diverse domains, from seat belts in cars to better fire detection, more reliable technologies, higher awareness of objective risks, more stringent regulations for dangerous work, and more responsible behavior by better educated citizens. The only thing these diverse developments have in common is that they decrease the probability of serious misfortune, and thereby improve the control people have over their fate.**

# Systemic Violence Frontline (2-5)

**3. Modern day economic and political systems are not the root cause of systemic violence.**

Richard **Aberdeen** (Author & Philanthropist), Uncommon Sense.  **2003**. Accessed May 31, 2012 via google books.

**A view shared by many modern activists is that capitalism, free enterprise, multi-national corporations and globalization are the primary cause of the current global Human Rights problem and that by striving to change or eliminate these, the root problem of what ills the modern world is being addressed.  This is a rather unfortunate and historically myopic view,** reminiscent of early “class struggle” Marxists who soon resorted to violence as a means to achieve rather questionable ends.  And like these often brutal early Marxists, **modern anarchists who resort to violence to solve the problem are walking upside down and backwards, adding to rather than correcting, both the immediate and long-term Human Rights problem.  Violent revolution, including our own American revolution, becomes a breeding ground for poverty, disease, starvation and often mass oppression leading to future violence**. Large, publicly traded corporations are created by individuals or groups of individuals, operated by individuals and made up of individual and/or group investors.  These **business enterprises are deliberately structured to be empowered by individual (or group) investor greed**.  For example, a theorized ‘need’ for offering salaries much higher than is necessary to secure competent leadership (often resulting in corrupt and entirely incompetent leadership), lowering wages more than is fair and equitable and scaling back of often hard fought for benefits, is sold to stockholders as being in the best interest of the bottom-line market value and thus, in the best economic interests of individual investors.  Likewise, **major political and corporate exploitation of third-world nations is rooted in the individual and joint greed of corporate investors and others who stand to profit from such exploitation.  More than just investor greed, corporations are driven by the greed of all those involved, including individuals outside the enterprise itself who profit indirectly from it.** If one examines “the course of human events” closely, it can correctly be surmised that the “root” cause of humanity’s problems comes from individual human greed and similar negative individual motivation.  **The Marx/Engles view of history being a “class” struggle ¹  does not address the root problem and is thus fundamentally flawed from a true historical perspective (see for more details).**  So-called “classes” of people,unions, corporations and political groups are made up of individuals who support the particular group or organizational position based on their own individual needs, greed and desires and thus, an apparent “class struggle” in reality, is an extension of individual motivation.  Likewise, **nations engage in wars of aggression, not because capitalism or classes of society are at root cause, but because individual members of a society are individually convinced that it is in their own economic survival best interest.  War, poverty, starvation and lack of Human and Civil Rights have existed on our planet since long before the rise of modern capitalism, free enterprise and multi-national corporation avarice, thus the root problem obviously goes deeper than this.**

**4. Life expectancy is increasing around the world now—the kritik has got its logic backwards.**

Francis **Heylighen** & Jan **Bernheim** (research professor at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel & professor of Medicine at the Free University of Brussels) “Global Progress I: empirical evidence for ongoing increase in quality-of-life,” **2000.** Retrieved May 31, 2012 at http://cleamc11.vub.ac.be/papers/ProgressJHS.pdf

4.1. Physical progress Fig. 1 shows the increases in life expectancy for the world as a whole, the developed and the less developed countries. **It turns out that life expectancy for the world is increasing with over 3 years every 10 years, while in the developed countries it has slowed down to little over 1 year, showing that the poor countries are quickly catching up with the rich ones in this respect**. Yet, f**urther medical advances and more healthy life styles promise a continuing increase even in the richest countries for the foreseeable future**. **Life expectancy is probably the most reliable measure of the physical component of QOL.** Other physical indicators such as the amount of calories available for nutrition per head of the population, or the average height of individuals also show a steady increase for practically every country for which data are available**. The most spectacular improvement is perhaps the steep decline in child mortality, which appeared first in the most developed countries, and now has reached even the poorest countries.** **Needless to say, these mortality statistics also indicate an immense decrease in the emotional suffering caused by the loss of loved ones.**

# Systemic Violence Frontline (3-5)

**5. Industrial society has advanced human well-being across variables.**

Indur **Goklany** (policy analyst for the Department of the Interior – phd from MSU), “Population, Consumption, Carbon Emissions, and Human Well-Being in the Age of Industrialization (Part III — Have Higher US Population, Consumption, and Newer Technologies Reduced Well-Being?)”, April 24**, 2010.** Accessed May 31, 2012 at <http://www.masterresource.org/2010/04/population-consumption-carbon-emissions-and-human-well-being-in-the-age-of-industrialization-part-iii-have-higher-us-population-consumption-and-newer-technologies-reduced-well-being/#more-9194>

In my previous post I showed that, notwithstanding the Neo-Malthusian worldview**, human well-being has advanced globally since the start of industrialization more than two centuries ago, despite massive increases in population, consumption, affluence, and carbon dioxide emissions.** In this post, I will focus on long-term trends in the U.S. for these and other indicators. Figure 1 shows that **despite several-fold increases in the use of metals and synthetic organic chemicals, and emissions of CO2 stoked by increasing populations and affluence, life expectancy, the single best measure of human well-being, increased from 1900 to 2006 for the US.** Figure 1 reiterates this point with respect to materials use. These figures indicate that since 1900, U.S. population has quadrupled, affluence has septupled, their product (GDP) has increased 30-fold, synthetic organic chemical use has increased 85-fold, metals use 14-fold, material use 25-fold, and CO2 emissions 8-fold. **Yet life expectancy advanced from 47 to 78 years. Figure 2 shows that during the same period, 1900–2006, emissions of air pollution, represented by sulfur dioxide, waxed and waned. Food and water got safer, as indicated by the virtual elimination of deaths from gastrointestinal (GI) diseases between 1900 and 1970. Cropland, a measure of habitat converted to human uses — the single most important pressure on species, ecosystems, and biodiversity — was more or less unchanged from 1910 onward despite the increase in food demand.** For the most part, life expectancy grew more or less steadily for the U.S., except for a brief plunge at the end of the First World War accentuated by the 1918-20 Spanish flu epidemic. **As in the rest of the world, today’s U.S. population not only lives longer, it is also healthier. The disability rate for seniors declined 28 percent between 1982 and 2004/2005 and, despite quantum improvements in diagnostic tools, major diseases** (e.g., cancer, and heart and respiratory diseases) now occur 8–11 years later than a century ago. Consistent with this, data for New York City indicate that — despite a population increase from 80,000 in 1800 to 3.4 million in 1900 and 8.0 million in 2000 and any associated increases in economic product, and chemical, fossil fuel and material use that, no doubt, occurred —crude mortality rates have declined more or less steadily since the 1860s (again except for the flu epidemic). Figures 3 and 4 show, once again, that **whatever health-related problems accompanied economic development, technological change, material, chemical and fossil fuel consumption, and population growth, they were overwhelmed by the health-related benefits associated with industrialization and modern economic growth. This does not mean that fossil fuel, chemical and material consumption have zero impact, but it means that overall benefits have markedly outweighed costs.** The reductions in rates of deaths and diseases since at least 1900 in the US, despite increased population, energy, and material and chemical use, belie the Neo-Malthusian worldview**. The improvements in the human condition can be ascribed to broad dissemination** (through education, public health systems, trade and commerce) **of numerous new and improved technologies in agriculture, health and medicine supplemented through various ingenious advances in communications, information technology and other energy powered technologies** (see here for additional details). The continual increase in life expectancy accompanied by the decline in disease during this period (as shown by Figure 2) indicates that the new technologies reduced risks by a greater amount than any risks that they may have created or exacerbated due to pollutants associated with greater consumption of materials, chemicals and energy, **And this is one reason why the Neo-Malthusian vision comes up short. It dwells on the increases in risk that new technologies may create or aggravate but overlooks the larger — and usually more certain — risks that they would also eliminate or reduce. In other words, it focuses on the pixels, but misses the larger picture, despite pretensions to a holistic worldview.**

# Systemic Violence Frontline (4-5)

**6. Cognitive bias causes them to overlook the beneficial changes taking place in society**

Francis **Heylighen** & Jan **Bernheim** (research professor at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel & professor of Medicine at the Free University of Brussels) “Global Progress I: empirical evidence for ongoing increase in quality-of-life,” **2000**. Retrieved May 31, 2012 at http://cleamc11.vub.ac.be/papers/ProgressJHS.pdf

Why cannot society fully enjoy its undeniable successes? **One factor is that negative events simply receive much more attention.** Psychological research has shown that there is an asymmetry between positive and negative emotions: neutral situations produce a mildly positive feeling, the positivity offset, while unpleasant or potentially dangerous situations elicit a strong negative reaction, the negativity bias (Ito, Berntson & Cacioppo, 1999). **This can be explained straightforwardly through evolutionary mechanisms: the positivity offset helps the organism to explore its environment and thus discover opportunities, while the negativity bias helps it to avoid dangers. Since much more can be lost by ignoring a danger than by ignoring an opportunity, the strength of the negative reaction tends to be much larger than the strength of the positive reaction. Thus, our brains are programmed to get much more aroused by negative than by positive or neutral stimuli.** This psychological mechanism influences our perception of progress in society. A phenomenon will only attract attention if it deviates from the default expectation of no **change. Negative developments are usually the result of a sudden, unexpected disturbance: an error, an accident, a conflict, or a natural disaster. Such situations require quick action, and they arouse the immediate and full attention of the people involved. Positive developments, on the other hand, are usually the accumulated result of the sustained efforts of many people. They merely require further continuation of the activities, without much emotion. Thus, because of the asymmetry between positivity offset and negativity bias, negative changes are much more likely to be noticed and remembered than on-going progress.** Although this negativity bias has always existed, the present problem is its amplification by the media. Something is deemed newsworthy only if it is likely to grab the attention of many people. This excludes most of the slow, predictable processes of improvement, while favoring negative events such as murders, wars, famines or kidnappings. Marshall MacLuhan summarized this phenomenon as "good news is no news". Simon (1999) called it the "bad news bias", discussing many examples of how it works in practice. One of these concerned data about the catastrophic loss of farmland in the USA that had been making the headlines. When Simon investigated the situation, he found that the statistics were simply wrong. He even managed to make the authorities admit that they had made a mistake. Yet, no newspaper seemed interested in publishing the corrected—but less spectacular—statement that farmland was actually increasing. The irony of the situation is that on-going progress increases the bad news bias. As communication technologies improve, and journalists and investigators become more competent, they will be able to gather and publish more news. As people's access to information and general education level increase, they will be subjected to more news. Given a growing amount of news about all possible events, a stable proportion of negative events, and a stable tendency to publicize only the negative events, the overall amount of bad news is bound to grow. The effect on the public's mood can be illustrated most simply by contrasting people's appreciation of their own situation with the appreciation they have of society at large. Eckersley (2000) calls the former "personal QOL", the latter "social QOL". He notes that personal QOL is typically positive, while social QOL is typically negative. **In other words, people tend to judge the state of society to be much worse than their own situation. But this is paradoxical: if most people are quite happy, how can society as a whole then be so bad? The positivity offset explains why people on the average tend to be rather satisfied: if they haven't experienced any major problems themselves, they will feel good. The bad news bias explains why they tend to believe that other people are so much worse off: as they are constantly bombarded by warnings about crime, corruption, poverty, drug abuse, etc., they naturally, but incorrectly, infer that these problems are the rule rather than the exception. The more worrying phenomenon is that, according to Eckersley's survey data, a sizeable percentage of people admit that their personal QOL is affected by their worries about society at large.** Thus, although the negativity bias and the increasing reach of the media are intrinsically positive phenomena, that help us to tackle problems at an early stage, together they may have created a bad news bias strong enough to reduce our QOL, thus providing another example of overshoot.

**7. Poverty is on the decline worldwide—present day assumptions are working.**

Francis **Heylighen** & Jan **Bernheim** (research professor at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel & professor of Medicine at the Free University of Brussels) “Global Progress I: empirical evidence for ongoing increase in quality-of-life,” **2000**. Retrieved May 31, 2012 at http://cleamc11.vub.ac.be/papers/ProgressJHS.pdf

4.2. Economic **progress The average increase in wealth for most countries is well-documented. Poverty on the world level has decreased from over 70% in 1960 to 30% at present**. Averaged over the different decades, a yearly increase in GNP of about 2% seems normal for the developed countries**. This increase is primarily due to an increase in productivity of about the same amount**. Although more difficult to measure, the underlying increase in productivity is more stable or reliable, as it is less dependent on the "boom and bust" cycles of the economy than GNP, where periods of stagnation or recession are followed by increases of 6% or more. The increased productivity means that less resources and labor are needed to produce the same amount of goods. Buckminster Fuller (1969) called this on-going trend to do more with less "ephemeralization". Perhaps the most spectacular illustration of the underlying technological progress is Moore's Law, the observation that the speed of microprocessors doubles every 18 months, while the price halves. This improvement results mainly from miniaturization, so that more (processing power) is achieved with less (materials). Ephemeralization explains the stable or declining prices (corrected for inflation) of physical resources and energy. The decline is particularly evident if the value of a resource is expressed as a percentage of the average income (Simon, 1995). **The richer people become, the less they need to spend on basic resources such as food, energy and materials. This refutes the widely quoted pessimistic predictions** (Ehrlich, 1976a**) according to which our resources are near to exhaustion**. This was illustrated by a famous 1980 bet (Tierney, 1990) between the economist Julian Simon, who wagered that the price of $1000 worth of 5 natural resources would decrease, and the ecologist13 HEYLIGHEN & BERNHEIM Paul Ehrlich who betted that they would increase. In 1990, ten years later, all five resources chosen by Ehrlich as being near to exhaustion, had in fact become cheaper, providing Simon with a handsome $600 gain.

# Systemic Violence Frontline (5-5)

**8. Sexual and political equality is increasing now.**

Francis **Heylighen &** Jan **Bernheim** (research professor at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel & professor of Medicine at the Free University of Brussels) “Global Progress I: empirical evidence for ongoing increase in quality-of-life,” **2000**. Retrieved May 31, 2012 at http://cleamc11.vub.ac.be/papers/ProgressJHS.pdf

4.3. Social progress For the social variables, somewhat less clear statistics are available, although Estes (1984) has developed a comprehensive International Index of **Social Progress which includes such diverse variables as number of years since introducing unemployment compensations, violations of civic liberties and female primary school enrolment as per cent of males. Over the longer term, there does seem to be a clear increase in equality between the sexes (world-wide) and a less pronounced increase in equality in income (although this trend presently seems to be reversed in the developed countries**). Even though the wealth gap between rich and poor countries does not seem to decrease, the gap in other QOL indicators such as life expectancy, child mortality and literacy has definitely been reduced (cf. Easterly, 1998). **With the collapse of the communist block and the gradual disappearance of right wing dictatorships (Spain, Portugal, Philippines, Latin America, etc.), the last decades have witnessed a quite spectacular increase in democracy and general freedom of expression**. The number of countries that can be broadly called "democratic" has risen from 6 (out of 43) in 1900, to 37 (out of 121) in 1980, and 117 (out of 193) in 1998 (Emmott, 1999).

# Systemic Violence Answers: War Causes Structural Violence

**War causes structural violence—not the other way around.**

Douglas **Bulloch**(IR Department, London School of Economics and Political Science) Millennium - Journal of International Studies May **2008** vol. 36 no. 3 575-595

But the idea that poverty and peace are directly related presupposes that wealth inequalities are – in and of themselves – unjust, and that the solution to the problem of war is to alleviate the injustice that inspires conflict, namely poverty. However, it also suggests **that poverty is a legitimate inspiration for violence, otherwise there would be no reason to alleviate it in the interests of peace**. It has become such a commonplace to suggest that poverty and conflict are linked that it rarely suffers any examination. **To suggest that war causes poverty is to utter an obvious truth, but to suggest the opposite is – on reflection – quite hard to believe**. **War is an expensive business in the twenty-first century,** even asymmetrically. **And just to examine Bangladesh for a moment is enough at least to raise the question concerning the actual connection between peace and poverty. The government of Bangladesh is a threat only to itse**lf, and despite 30 years of the Grameen Bank, **Bangladesh remains in a state of incipient civil strife**. So although Muhammad Yunus should be applauded for his work in demonstrating the efficacy of micro-credit strategies in a context of development**, it is not at all clear that this has anything to do with resolving the social and political crisis in Bangladesh, nor is it clear that this has anything to do with resolving the problem of peace and war in our times.** It does speak to the Western liberal mindset – as Geir Lundestad acknowledges – but then perhaps this exposes the extent to which the Peace Prize itself has simply become an award that reflects a degree of Western liberal wish-fulfilment. It is perhaps comforting to believe that poverty causes violence, as it serves to endorse a particular kind of concern for the developing world that in turn regards all problems as fundamentally economic rather than deeply – and potentially radically – political.

# Systemic Violence: Alt Fails

**Post-modern alternatives will fail to solve the conditions of inequality and violence—data is firmly on the side of Western style governments.**

Francis **Heylighen &** Jan **Bernheim** (research professor at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel & professor of Medicine at the Free University of Brussels) “Global Progress I: empirical evidence for ongoing increase in quality-of-life,” **2000**. Retrieved May 31, 2012 at http://cleamc11.vub.ac.be/papers/ProgressJHS.pdf

is also worth noting that the basic values which come out of this correlation analysis largely correspond to those formulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. **Although human rights discussions tend to focus on the violations of the rights to freedom and to physical security, the Declaration also includes the rights to equal treatment, adequate standard of living, social security, health care, and education**. **The emphasis of Western governments and media on the freedom-related rights often leads to the accusation that the declaration is culturally biased. However, if the other rights are taken into due account, the World Database of Happiness data can be taken as empirical evidence that the Universal Declaration provides a pretty accurate, culture-independent inventory of the basic conditions for happiness**. In conclusion, although we started by defining the basic value of QOL through people's subjective feeling of happiness or satisfaction, a review of statistical correlates brought us to a set of objective indicators that seem largely independent of subject or culture. **This indicates that the postmodernist focus on the relativity of values, although a valuable reminder that there are many different contexts or points of view from which to consider a statement, is misguided if it is used to deny the possibility of progress.**

**History proves—the alternative will become corrupted and make society worse.**

Richard **Aberdeen** (Author & Philanthropist), Uncommon Sense.  **2003**. Accessed May 31, 2012 via google books.

**Lenin and the Communist party overthrew a very oppressive capitalist Czarist system.  It did not take long for one corrupt system to be replaced by another, where even without capitalism and free enterprise to aggravate the Human Rights problem,** people of power within the Communist political structure began, similar to their counterparts of capitalistic excess in Europe and America, exploiting the mass population for their own individual benefit, comfort and excess.  **Thus the root problem is exposed as going deeper than simply changing an oppressive capitalist or other system.**  Quite obviously, c**hanging a corrupt system does not by itself, change the corrupt people who invented and supported it, neither does it change negative individual motivation leading to group oppression based on irrational disparagement of others regarding sex, color, intelligence or other perceived difference and neither does it prevent waste, laziness, murder, theft and rape by individuals within a perceived economic “class”.**

# Systemic Violence: Alt Fails

**Neither revolution nor pointing out the flaws in a society will cause a new society to come about.**

Andrew **Kliman** (professor of economics @ Pace University) “Alternatives to Capitalism: What Happens After the Revolution?” **2004.** Retrieved June 1, 2012 at http://akliman.squarespace.com/writings/

I. Concretizing the Vision of a New Human Society We live at a moment in which it is harder than ever to articulate a liberatory alternative to capitalism. As we all know, th**e collapse of state-capitalist regimes that called themselves “Communist,” as well as the widespread failures of social democracy to remake society, have given rise to a widespread acceptance of Margaret Thatcher’s TINA – the belief that “there is no alternative.”** Yet the difficulty in articulating a liberatory alternative is not mostly the product of these events. It is an inheritance from the past. To what extent has such an alternative ever been articulated? **There has been a lot of progress – in theory and especially in practice – on the problem of forms of organization – but new organizational forms by themselves are not yet an alternative**. A great many leftists, even revolutionaries, did of course regard nationalized property and the State Plan, under the control of the “vanguard” Party, as socialism, or at least as the basis for a transition to socialism. But even before events refuted this notion, it represented, at best, an evasion of the problem. It was largely a matter of leftists with authoritarian personalities subordinating themselves and others to institutions and power with a blind faith that substituted for thought. **How such institutions and such power would result in human liberation was never made clear.** Vague references to “transition” were used to wave the problem away. Yet as Marxist-Humanism has stressed for more than a decade, the anti-Stalinist left is also partly responsible for the crisis in thought. It, too, failed to articulate a liberatory alternative, offering in place of private- and state-capitalism little more than what Hegel (Science of Logic, Miller trans., pp. 841-42) called “the empty negative … a presumed absolute”: The impatience that insists merely on getting beyond the determinate … and finding itself immediately in the absolute, has before it as cognition nothing but the empty negative, the abstract infinite; in other words, a presumed absolute, that is presumed because it is not posited, not grasped; grasped it can only be through the mediation of cognition … . The question that confronts us nowadays is whether we can do better. Is it possible to make the vision of a new human society more concrete and determinate than it now is, through the mediation of cognition? According to a long-standing view in the movement, it is not possible. **The character of the new society can only be concretized by practice alone, in the course of trying to remake society**. Yet if this is true, we are faced with a vicious circle from which there seems to be no escape, because acceptance of TINA is creating barriers in practice**. In the perceived absence of an alternative, practical struggles have proven to be self-limiting at best. They stop short of even trying to remake society totally – and for good reason.** As Bertell Ollman has noted (Introduction to Market Socialism: The Debate among Socialists, Routledge, 1998, p. 1), “People who believe [that there is no alternative] will put up with almost any degree of suffering. Why bother to struggle for a change that cannot be? … people [need to] have a good reason for choosing one path into the future rather than another.” Thus the reason of the masses is posing a new challenge to the movement from theory. **When masses of people require reasons before they act, a new human society surely cannot arise through spontaneous action alone. And exposing the ills of existing society does not provide sufficient reason for action when what is at issue is the very possibility of an alternative.**

# Systemic Violence: Alt Fails

**Their understanding of violence cannot possibly be solved**

Brian **Martin**, (professor of science, technology, and society – University of Wollongong) Uprooting War. **1990.** Accessed June 1, 2012 at http://www.bmartin.cc/pubs/90uw/uw13.html

In this chapter and in the six preceding chapters I have examined a number of structures and factors which have some connection with the war system. There is much more that could be said about any one of these structures, and other factors which could be examined. Here I wish to note one important point: **attention should not be focussed on one single factor to the exclusion of others. This is often done for example by some Marxists who look only at capitalism as a root of war and other social problems, and by some feminists who attribute most problems to patriarchy.** **The danger of monocausal explanations is that they may lead to an inadequate political practice. The 'revolution' may be followed by the persistence or even expansion of many problems which were not addressed by the single-factor perspective.** The one connecting feature which I perceive in the structures underlying war is an unequal distribution of power. **This unequal distribution is socially organised in many different ways, such as in the large-scale structures for state administration, in capitalist ownership, in male domination within families and elsewhere, in control over knowledge by experts, and in the use of force by the militar**y. Furthermore, these different systems of power are interconnected. They often support each other, and sometimes conflict**. This means that the struggle against war can and must be undertaken at many different levels. It ranges from struggles to undermine state power to struggles to undermine racism, sexism and other forms of domination at the level of the individual and the local community. Furthermore, the different struggles need to be linked together. That** is the motivation for analysing the roots of war and developing strategies for grassroots movements to uproot them.

**Total rejection will only fragment resistance.**

J.K. **Gibson-Graham**, (feminist economist) The End Of Capitalism (As We Knew It): A Feminist Critique of Political Economy, 1996. Retrieved June 1, 2012 through google books

One of our goals as Marxists has been to produce a knowledge of capitalism. Yet as “that which is known,” Capitalism has become the intimate enemy. W**e have uncloaked the ideologically-clothed, obscure monster, but we have installed a naked and visible monster in its place.** In return for our labors of creation**, the monster has robbed us of all force. We hear – and find it easy to believe – that the left is in disarray. Part of what produces the disarray of the left is the vision of what the left is arrayed against.** **When capitalism is represented as a unified system coextensive with the nation or even the world, when it is portrayed as crowding out all other economic forms, when it is allowed to define entire societies, it becomes something that can only be defeated and replaced by a mass collective movement (or by a process of systemic dissolution that such a movement might assist). The revolutionary task of replacing capitalism now seems outmoded and unrealistic, yet we do not seem to have an alternative conception of class transformation to take its place.** The old political economic “systems” and “structures” that call forth a vision of revolution as systemic replacement still seem to be dominant in the Marxist political imagination. The New World Order is often represented as political fragmentation founded upon economic unification. In this vision the economy appears as the last stronghold of unity and singularity in a world of diversity and plurality. But why can’t the economy be fragmented too? If we theorized it as fragmented in the United States, we could being to see a huge state sector (incorporating a variety of forms of appropriation of surplus labor), a very large sector of self-employed and family-based producers (most noncapitalist), a huge household sector (again, quite various in terms of forms of exploitation, with some households moving towards communal or collective appropriation and others operating in a traditional mode in which one adult appropriates surplus labor from another). None of these things is easy to see**. If capitalism takes up the available social space, there’s no room for anything else. If capitalism cannot coexist, there’s no possibility of anything else. If capitalism functions as a unity, it cannot be partially or locally replaced. My intent is to help create the discursive conception under which socialist or other noncapitalist construction becomes “realistic” present activity rather than a ludicrous or utopian goal. To achieve this I must smash Capitalism and see it in a thousand pieces. I must make its unity a fantasy, visible as a denial of diversity and change.**

# \*\*\*\*\*Terror Reps Good\*\*\*\*\*

# Terror Reps Good

**Fluid definitions of terror allow states to exclude violent allies from that definition – gives terrorist groups carte blanch**

**Ganor 2**

(Boaz, “Defining Terrorism: Is One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom Fighter?” *Police Practice and Research*, 2002, Vol. 3, No. 4, pp. 287-304)

At the same time, there are others who say that a definition of terrorism is necessary, but that such a definition must serve their own political ends (Martha, 1995). States that sponsor terrorism are trying to persuade the international community to define terrorism in such a way that the particular terror groups they sponsor would be outside the definition – and thus to absolve them from all responsibility for supporting terrorism. Countries such as Syria, Libya, and Iran have lobbied for such a definition, according to which ‘freedom fighters’ would be given carte blanche permission to carry out any kind of attacks they wanted, because a just goal can be pursued by all available means.

**Failure to label terrorists creates moral relativism that triggers the cycle of C/T “whack-a-mole” they criticize**

**Ganor 2**

(Boaz, “Defining Terrorism: Is One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom Fighter?” *Police Practice and Research*, 2002, Vol. 3, No. 4, pp. 287-304)

The definition of terrorism proposed here can serve as a guide for including or excluding various countries in the international antiterror coalition, as well as for identifying those organizations and countries to be targeted by the coalition. But its main significance is in the drafting and enforcement of international legislation aimed at forcing states to act against terror organizations operating on their territory. **Without an objective and authoritative definition, accepted by all nations, the fight against terrorism will always suffer from ‘cultural relativism.**’ Without a change in the priorities of all the enlightened countries, and their determination to fight against terrorism apart from any other political or economic interest, it will not be possible to wage an effective war against terrorism. And without such a unified stand by all nations, **the September 11th attacks** in the United States **will be insignificant compared to the attacks yet to come**. The free world must understand that ‘**cultural relativism’ applied to terrorism – whatever the terrorists’ goals – will lead only to more terrorism.**

# Terror Reps Good

**Clearly defining terror is key to build international coalitions against terrorism and to reform the practice of terror itself**

**Ganor 2**

(Boaz, “Defining Terrorism: Is One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom Fighter?” *Police Practice and Research*, 2002, Vol. 3, No. 4, pp. 287-304)

A correct and objective definition of terrorism can be based upon accepted international laws and principles regarding what behaviors are permitted in conventional wars between nations. These laws are set out in the Geneva and Hague Conventions, which in turn are based upon the basic principle that the deliberate harming of soldiers during wartime is a necessary evil, and thus permissible, whereas the deliberate targeting of civilians is absolutely forbidden. These Conventions thus differentiate between soldiers who attack a military adversary, and war criminals who deliberately attack civilians. This normative principle relating to a state of war between two countries can be extended without difficulty to a conflict between a nongovernmental organization and a state. This extended version would thus differentiate between guerrilla warfare and terrorism. Exactly in parallel with the distinction between military and civilian targets in war, the extended version would designate as ‘Guerilla Warfare’ the ‘deliberate use of violence against military and security personnel in order to attain political, ideological and religious goals.’ ‘Terrorism,’ on the other hand, would be defined as ‘the deliberate use or the threat to use violence against civilians in order to attain political, ideological and religious aims’ (an attack aimed against government personnel should therefore be defined as terrorism if the target was not in a decision making position of the state’s Counter-Terrorism policy). What is important in these definitions is the differentiation between the goals and the means used to achieve these goals. The aims of terrorism and guerrilla warfare may well be identical; but they are distinguished from each other by the means used – or more precisely, by the targets of their operations. The guerrilla fighter’s targets are military ones, while the terrorist deliberately targets civilians. **By this definition, a terrorist organization can no longer claim to be ‘freedom fighters’ because they are fighting for national liberation or some other worthy goal. Even if its declared ultimate goals are legitimate, an organization that deliberately targets civilians is a terrorist organization**. There is no merit or exoneration in fighting for the freedom of one population if in doing so you destroy the rights of another population. If all the world’s civilian populations are not to become pawns in one struggle or another, terrorism – the deliberate targeting of civilians – must be absolutely forbidden, regardless of the legitimacy or justice of its goals. The ends do not justify the means. **By carrying out terrorist attacks, the perpetrators make themselves the enemies of all mankind. Only on the basis of an international agreement on the definition of terrorism will it be possible to demand that all nations withhold all support from terrorist organizations. Only on this basis can countries be required to act against terrorists, even when they agree with and support the terrorists’ goals.** The worldwide acceptance of the above definition of terrorism – and the adoption of international legislation against terrorism and support for terrorism based upon this definition – could bring about a change in the cost-benefit calculations of terrorist organizations and their sponsors. At present, terrorist organizations may carry out either terrorist or guerrilla attacks according to their preferences and local conditions only, with no external reason to choose one type of attack over the other. After all, as far as the rest of the world is concerned, the two types of attack are morally equivalent; punishment is identical in both cases. However, **should these organizations and their sponsors be made aware that the use of terror will bring them more harm than good, they may opt to focus on guerrilla warfare rather than on terrorism. This would be a great achievement for Counter-Terrorism.**

**Their critique of the US as a terrorist organization is vacuous and nonunique – war crimes legislation solves the impact**

**Ganor 2**

(Boaz, “Defining Terrorism: Is One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom Fighter?” *Police Practice and Research*, 2002, Vol. 3, No. 4, pp. 287-304)

Yet another question to be answered is, can countries as well as organizations be held responsible for carrying out terrorist acts? In effect, this question has already been answered in the form of existing international legislation (United Nations, 1949). **The term ‘terrorism’ is superfluous when describing the actions of sovereign states – not because states are on a higher moral level, but because, according to the international conventions, any deliberate attack upon civilians in wartime by regular military forces is already defined as a war crime**. Should such an attack be carried out during peacetime, the act is defined by convention as a ‘crime against humanity.’ In both cases, such acts are already covered by international law, and provisions exist for dealing with the perpetrators. It is when these actions are carried out by politically-motivated individuals or groups that the lack of legislation is felt. **Ironically, under current international law, organizations are not specifically prohibited from perpetrating actions that are considered illegal and abhorrent when carried out by sovereign states.**

# Terror Reps Good

**Keeping the definition of terror murky prevents non-violent, legislative approaches to C/T – makes intervention the only option**

**Ganor 2**

(Boaz, “Defining Terrorism: Is One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom Fighter?” *Police Practice and Research*, 2002, Vol. 3, No. 4, pp. 287-304)

As noted, defining terrorism is not merely a theoretical issue but an operative concern of the first order. Terrorism is no longer a local problem of specific countries but an issue involving a number of international aspects. Terrorist organizations may perpetrate attacks in a variety of countries; the victims of attacks can be of different nationalities; the offices, headquarters, and training camps of terrorist organizations function in various countries; terrorist organizations receive direct and indirect assistance from different states, enlist support from different ethnic communities, and secure financial help throughout the world. Since terrorism is an international phenomenon, **responses to terrorism must also be on an international scale**. **Developing an effective international strategy requires agreement on what it is we are dealing with, in other words, we need a definition of terrorism. International mobilization against terrorism, such as that which began in the mid-nineties and culminated in the international conventions in the G-7 countries, the Sharem el-Sheik Conference, etc., cannot lead to operational results as long as the participants cannot agree on a definition.** **Without answering the question of ‘what is terrorism,’ no responsibility can be imposed on countries supporting terrorism, nor can steps be taken to combat terrorist organizations and their allies**. Without a definition of terrorism, i**t is impossible to formulate or enforce international agreements against terrorism**. A conspicuous example of the need to define terrorism concerns the extradition of terrorists. Although many countries have signed bilateral and multilateral agreements concerning a variety of crimes, extradition for political offenses is often explicitly excluded, and the background of terrorism is always political. **This loophole allows countries to shirk their obligation to extradite individuals wanted for terrorist activities.**

**Fluid definitions of terror allow terrorists to recruit and to gloss over their violent actions**

**Ganor 2**

(Boaz, “Defining Terrorism: Is One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom Fighter?” *Police Practice and Research*, 2002, Vol. 3, No. 4, pp. 287-304)

The prevalent definitions of terrorism entail difficulties, both conceptual and syntactical. It is thus not surprising that alternative concepts with more positive connotations – guerrilla movements, underground movements, national liberation movements, commandos, etc. – are often used to describe and characterize the activities of terrorist organizations. Generally these concepts are used without undue attention to the implications, but at times the use of these definitions is tendentious, grounded in a particular political viewpoint. By resorting to such tendentious definitions of terrorism, terrorist organizations and their supporters seek to gloss over the realities of terrorism, thus establishing their activities on more positive and legitimate foundations. Naturally, terms not opposed to the basic values of liberal democracies, such as ‘revolutionary violence,’ ‘national liberation,’ etc., carry fewer negative connotations than the term, ‘terrorism.’

# \*\*\*\*\*Terror Reps Good Extensions\*\*\*\*\*

# Terror Reps Good: Ext – solves international cooperation

**Labeling and defining terrorists is key to shore up international consensus and to break up safe-havens**

**Young 6**

(Reuven, “Defining Terrorism: The Evolution of Terrorism as a Legal Concept in Internatioanl Law and Its Influence on Definitions in Domestic Legislation” B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 23 (2006))

The Article concludes that there is a core definition of terrorism at international law that provides guidance to states enacting terrorism legislation, but that to have an effect, states must look to international law and accept its guidance. Although the four domestic definitions are substantively similar to the international definition, all states should treat the international alw definitional jurisprudence as setting a minimum level, not a maximum. The international definition of terrorism is destined to develop very slowly, and states need to tailor their legislation to specific national circumstances and respond to threats. The east with which terrorists can cross borders means states cannot protect themselves simply by enacting and enforcing domestic legislation prescribing terrorism within their borders. Rather, every state must have legislation denying terrorists safe havens and safe places of operation. An established minimum international law definition of terrorism that informs states’ domestic criminal law is required to ensure a baseline of consistency and to facilitate international cooperation. The core definition identified in this Article provides that minimum as well as a yardstick against which to measure states’ legislation.

# Terror Reps Good: Ext – solves interventionism

**Calling people terrorists doesn’t cause interventionism – it reduces it and prevents states from curtailing human rights in the name of “counter-terror”**

**Young 6**

(Reuven, “Defining Terrorism: The Evolution of Terrorism as a Legal Concept in Internatioanl Law and Its Influence on Definitions in Domestic Legislation” B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 23 (2006))

The existence of a definition of terrorism is important. It shapes states’ understanding of the problem, delimits their responses to it, and helps to distinguish lawful from unlawful responses. The perceived absence of an accepted international law definition is said by some largely to explain the inadequacy of international law’s ability to combat terrorism. Do states share a common definition of international terrorism? Do states share a common definition of international terrorism? Or at least, is there sufficient conceptual consensus to facilitate international cooperation in the “war on terrorism”? Is the enemy in the war sufficiently well defined to give “war” a real meaning? 11 Or is the enemy so broad to render speaking of “war” meaningless? Perhaps George Orwell’s *Nineteen Eighty-Four* is prophetic?12 Furthermore, many international instruments require states to take steps to fight terrorism. Without a clear definition of what to fight, states can unduly curtail civil rights and suppress political opposition under the pretext of fighting terrorism.13 The grant of police powers triggered by terrorism without defining terrorism is inconsistent with the rule of law.

# Terror Reps Good: Ext – solves intel gathering

**Labeling terrorists boosts intel-gathering and limits the scope of the “war on terror” – denies their claims about interventionism**

**Young 6**

(Reuven, “Defining Terrorism: The Evolution of Terrorism as a Legal Concept in Internatioanl Law and Its Influence on Definitions in Domestic Legislation” B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 23 (2006))

The exclusion of terrorism from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court37 is consistent with the international community’s approach of creating a web of overlapping national criminal jurisdictions to outlaw terrorist acts rather than creating comprehensive international regime. Notwithstanding this approach, a universally accepted definition is crucial, as it harmonizes the operation and interaction of the overlapping domestic criminal jurisdictions (for example, facilitating extradition). An accepted definition would enhance intelligence sharing and international cooperation36 and permit tighter goal definition in the “war against terrorism,” which might facilitate coalition building and strengthen the legitimacy of the “war.” Imposing sanctions and criticizing states that support terrorism would attract broader support once a definition of terrorism is established.

# Terror Reps Good: Ext – solves nonviolent C/T

**Labeling terrorists bolsters legal attempts to fight terror like extradition – not mindless interventionism**

**Young 6**

(Reuven, “Defining Terrorism: The Evolution of Terrorism as a Legal Concept in Internatioanl Law and Its Influence on Definitions in Domestic Legislation” B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 23 (2006))

In the United States, criminal prosecution of terrorists is a critical, if not the dominant, method of counter-terrorism.99 The effectiveness and fairness of such an approach turns on whether there is a clear definition of terrorism in the applicable laws. The mobility of international terrorists allows them to select their place of operation and strike at targets beyond their home state’s borders. Simply prohibiting terrorism in one state is not sufficient to stop terrorist attacks in all states. A common definition is needed to provide a sufficient “least common denominator” jurisdiction worldwide. Even if all acts done by terrorists – for example, murder, property damage, and kidnapping – *should* be crimes in all domestic jurisdictions notwithstanding the obligations under the various conventions,40 the conventions focus international attention, voice the commitment of states to fight terrorism, and help to ensure consistent criminalization.41

# Terror Reps Good: Ext – their strategy = HR abuses

**Failure to define and fight terrorism allows human-rights abuses to be legally obuscured**

**Young 6**

(Reuven, “Defining Terrorism: The Evolution of Terrorism as a Legal Concept in Internatioanl Law and Its Influence on Definitions in Domestic Legislation” B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 23 (2006))

Security Council Resolution 1373 of 2001 imposes significant obligations on stats to fight terrorism.42 Nevertheless, without a common understanding of against whom or what states should be fighting, counter-terrorism obligations can be avoided or sued to mask human rights abuses. Human rights organizations have rported acts of repression against legitimate political opposition or dissidents under the pretext of fighting terrorism, 48 and, although not necessarily corrective, an accepted definition would make it harder to engage in such acts.

# Terror Reps Good: Ext - Laundry list

**Terror reps are good – laundry list**

**Schmid 4**

(Alex, “Terrorism – The Definitional Problem” Case W. Res. J. INT’L L. Vol 36: 375)

Table 4: Why it is important to have a common understanding of what constitutes "terrorism', 15 1. Developing an effective international strategy requires agreement on what it is we are dealing with, in other words, we need a definition of terrorism. 2. International mobilization against terrorism **...** cannot lead to operational results as long as the participants cannot agree on a definition. 3. Without a definition, it is impossible to formulate or enforce international agreements against terrorism. 4. Although many countries have signed bilateral and multilateral agreements concerning a variety of crimes, extradition for political offences is often explicitly excluded, and the background of terrorism is always political. *5.* The definition of terrorism will be the basis and the operational tool for expanding the international community's ability to combat terrorism. 6. It will enable legislation and specific punishments against those perpetrating, involved in, or supporting terrorism, and will allow the formulation of a codex of laws and international conventions against terrorism, terrorist organizations, states sponsoring terrorism, and economic firms trading with them. 7. At the same time, the definition of terrorism will hamper the attempts of terrorist organizations to obtain public legitimacy, and will erode support among those segments of the population willing to assist them (as opposed to guerrilla activities). 8. Finally, the operational use of the definition of terrorism could motivate terrorist organizations, due to moral and utilitarian considerations, to shift from terrorist activities to alternate courses (such as guerrilla warfare) in order to attain their aims, thus reducing the scope of international terrorism. It is widely agreed that international terrorism can only be fought by international cooperation. In the field of mutual legal assistance, one of the basic principles for judicial cooperation in general and extradition in particular, is the principle of dual criminality **-** an act must be a crime in both countries involved. If states disagree about whether or not an act constitutes terrorism, chances of interstate cooperation are clearly diminished.

# Terror Reps Good: Alt can’t solve

**Academic rethinking of terrorism fails – its nonunique, and governments wont pay attention – can’t affect real world change**

**Badey 7**

(Thomas J., “Defining international terrorism: A pragmatic approach” Terrorism and Political Violence)

That is not to say, however, that the United States government has been more effective. After more than a decade of using the same definition of international terrorism, the passage of new US counter-terrorist legislation in 1995 was temporarily stalled. The reason, according to Illinois Representative Henry Hyde, chairman of the House Judiciary Committee and one of the sponsors of the bill, was the bill's 'broad definition'.2 One of the most comprehensive and frequently cited, academic definitions of terrorism is offered by Alex P. Schmid. Schmid, who elicited the aid of more than fifty scholars in developing and refining his definition, concludes that: Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby — in contrast to assassination - the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human targets of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence- based communication processes between terrorists (organization), (imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought.3 Not surprisingly, even Schmid later concedes that his 'precise but lengthy definition is not likely to be used by governments'.4 Schmid's definition is the product of the synthesis of 109 definitions. It incorporates 16 of 22 identifiable elements and is a classic example of an academic definition. As such, it has been rightfully criticized for being 'convoluted and somewhat contradictory' and for having 'diminishing utility'.5 As is the case with many academic definitions, its encompassing parameters are designed to facilitate the inclusion of numerous diverse incidents into a data base. Simultaneously, it seeks to establish a basis for an internal classification of these incidents. This dual function leads to over-specification and complication.

# \*\*\*\*\*Threat Construction Answers (Frontline)\*\*\*\*\*

# Threat Con Frontline (1-3)

**1. Real threats exist: aggressor states are common and can cause conflict.**

Robert **Jervis, 1999** (Professor of International Politics at Columbia University) Realism, neoliberalism, and cooperation. International Security 24: 1. Accessed via Academic OneFile.

In many cases, it is the interactive process among states that generates conflict rather than merely reveals or enacts the preexisting differences in goals. Both sides would be satisfied with mutual security; **international politics represents tragedy rather than evil as the actions of states make it even harder for them to be secure**. This is not true in all cases, however. **Aggressor states are common; security and other interests often create differences that are irreconcilable. In these and only these instances, defensive realists see conflict as unavoidable**.

**2. Threats are real and confronting them early prevents escalation—WWII proves.**

**Yoon 2003** (Young-Kwan, Professor of International Relations at Seoul National University; former Foreign Minister of South Korea. “Introduction: Power Cycle Theory and the Practice of International Relations”, International Political Science Review 2003; vol. 24; p. 7-8*)*

In history, the effort to balance power quite often tended to start too late to protect the security of some of the individual states. If the balancing process begins too late, the resulting amount of force necessary to stop an aggressor is often much larger than if the process had been started much earlier. For example, the fate of Czechoslovakia and Poland showed how non-intervention or waiting for the “automatic” working through of the process turned out to be problematic. Power cycle theory could also supplement the structure-oriented nature of the traditional balance of power theory by incorporating an agent-oriented explanation. This was possible through its focus on the relationship between power and the role of a state in the international system. It especially highlighted the fact that a discrepancy between the relative power of a state and its role in the system would result in a greater possibility for systemic instability. In order to prevent this instability from developing into a war, practitioners of international relations were to become aware of the dynamics of changing power and role, adjusting role to power. A statesperson here was not simply regarded as a prisoner of structure and therefore as an outsider to the process but as an agent capable of influencing the operation of equilibrium. Thus power cycle theory could overcome the weakness of theoretical determinism associated with the traditional balance of power. The question is often raised whether government decision-makers could possibly know or respond to such relative power shifts in the real world. According to Doran, when the “tides of history” shift against the state, the push and shove of world politics reveals these matters to the policy-maker, in that state and among its competitors, with abundant urgency. (2) The Issue of Systemic Stability Power cycle theory is built on the conception of changing relative capabilities of a state, and as such it shares the realist assumption emphasizing the importance of power in explaining international relations. But its main focus is on the longitudinal dimension of power relations, the rise and decline of relative state power and role, and not on the static power distribution at a particular time. As a result, power cycle theory provides a significantly different explanation for stability and order within the international system. First of all, power cycle theory argues that what matters most in explaining the stability of the international system or war and peace is not the type of particular international system (Rosecrance, 1963) but the transformation from one system to another. For example, in the 1960s there was a debate on the stability of the international system between the defenders of bipolarity such as Waltz (1964) and the defenders of multi-polarity such as Rosecrance (1966), and Deutsch and Singer (1964). After analyzing five historical occasions since the origin of the modern state system, Doran concluded that what has been responsible for major war was not whether one type of system is more or less conducive to war but that instead systems transformation itself led to war (Doran, 1971). A non-linear type of structural change that is massive, unpredicted, devastating to foreign policy expectation, and destructive of security is the trigger for major war, not the nature of a particular type of international system.

# Threat Con Frontline (2-3)

**3. Threats are real—debating them is the key to survival in the modern world:**

Louis Rene **Beres, 2003** (professor of international law at Purdue) Anarchy and international law on an endangered planet. June 5, 2003. Accessed via Lexis/Nexis.

For us, other **rude awakenings are unavoidable, some of which could easily overshadow the horrors of Sept. 11.** There can be little doubt that, **within a few short years, expanding tribalism will produce several new genocides and proliferating nuclear weapons will generate one or more regional nuclear wars**. Paralyzed by fear and restrained by impotence, various governments will try, desperately, to deflect our attention, but it will be a vain effort. Caught up in a vast chaos from which no real escape is possible, we will learn too late that there is no durable safety in arms, no ultimate rescue by authority, no genuine remedy in science or technology. **What shall we do? For a start, we must** all begin to look carefully behind the news. **Rejecting superficial analyses of day-to-day events in favor of penetrating assessments of world affairs, we must learn quickly to distinguish what is truly important from what is merely entertainment. With such learning, we Americans could prepare for growing worldwide anarchy not as immobilized objects of false contentment, but as authentic citizens of an endangered planet. Nowhere is it written** that we people of Earth are forever, **that humankind must thwart the long-prevailing trend among all planetary life-forms (more than 99 percent) of ending in extinction**. Aware of this, **we may yet survive**, at least for a while, **but only if our collective suppression of purposeful fear is augmented by a complementary wisdom;** that is, that our personal mortality is undeniable and that the harms done by one tribal state or terror group against "others" will never confer immortality. This is, admittedly, a difficult concept to understand, but the longer we humans are shielded from such difficult concepts the shorter will be our time remaining. **We must also look closely at higher education in the United States,** not from the shortsighted stance of improving test scores, but **from the urgent perspective of confronting extraordinary threats to human survival.** For the moment, some college students are exposed to an occasional course in what is fashionably described as "global awareness," but such exposure usually sidesteps the overriding issues: We now face a deteriorating world system that cannot be mended through sensitivity alone; our leaders are dangerously unprepared to deal with catastrophic deterioration; our schools are altogether incapable of transmitting the indispensable visions of planetary restructuring. To institute productive student confrontations with survival imperatives, **colleges and universities must soon take great risks, detaching themselves from a time-dishonored preoccupation with "facts" in favor of grappling with true life-or-death questions**. In raising these questions, it will not be enough to send some students to study in Paris or Madrid or Amsterdam ("study abroad" is not what is meant by serious global awareness). Rather, all students must be made aware - as a primary objective of the curriculum - of where we are heading, as a species, and where our limited survival alternatives may yet be discovered. There are, of course, many particular ways in which colleges and universities could operationalize real global awareness, but one way, long-neglected, would be best. I refer to the study of international law. For a country that celebrates the rule of law at all levels, and which explicitly makes international law part of the law of the United States - the "supreme law of the land" according to the Constitution and certain Supreme Court decisions - this should be easy enough to understand. Anarchy, after all, is the absence of law, and knowledge of international law is necessarily prior to adequate measures of world order reform. Before international law can be taken seriously, and before "the blood-dimmed tide" can be halted, America's future leaders must at least have some informed acquaintance with pertinent rules and procedures. Otherwise we shall surely witness the birth of a fully ungovernable world order, an unheralded and sinister arrival in which only a shadowy legion of gravediggers would wield the forceps.

**4. Turn: Enemies are real and pose a danger to other groups. We must recognize these threats to prevent atrocity.**

**Wendt 1999** (Alexander, Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago. Social Theory of International Politics, p.261-2)

**Enemy images have a long pedigree, and some states continue to position each other in such terms today.** The Greeks represented the Persians as “barbarians”’ the Crusaders perceived the Turks as “infidenls”; medieval Europeans feared their defeat at Liegnitz at the hands of the Mongols heralded Armageddon; later Europeans treated the peoples of the Americas as savages; conservatives though civilization was threatened by the French Revolution; and in our own century**, we have the Armenian genocide, the Holocaust, the early Cold War, Northern Ireland, Pol Pot, Palestinian and Israeli fundamentalists, the Bosnian Civil War, Hutus and Tutsis—all based on representations of the Other as intent on destroying or enslaving the Self.** It is important to emphasize that this concept implies nothing about whether enemy images are justified**. Some enemies are “real,” in that the Other really does existentially threaten the Self, as the Nazis did the Jews**, and others are “chimeras,” as the Jews were to the Nazis. This difference may affect the dynamic of enmity and whether it can be overcome, but it does not affect the reality of Hobbesian cultures. Real or imagined, **if actors think enemies are real then they are real in their consequences.**

# Threat Con Frontline (3-3)

**5. Alternative doesn’t solve: social constructions are inevitable and must be responded to:**

**Wendt 2000** (Alexander, Professor of International Security, Dept. of Political Science at Ohio State University. International Relations: Critical Concepts in Political Science, edited by Andrew Linklater, p. 629)

Let us assume that processes of identity- and interest-formation have created a world in which states do not recognize rights to territory or existence-a war of all against all. In this world, anarchy has a "realist" meaning for state action: be insecure and concerned with relative power. Anarchy has this meaning only in virtue of collective, insecurity-producing practices, but if those practices are relatively stable, they do constitute a system that may resist change. **The fact that worlds of power politics are socially constructed, in other words, does not guarantee they are malleable, for at least two reasons. The first reason is that once constituted, any social system confronts each of its members as an objective social fact that reinforces certain behaviors and discourages others**. Self-help systems, for example, tend to reward competition and punish altruism. **The possibility of change depends on whether the exigencies of such competition leave room for actions that deviate from the prescribed script.** If they do not, the system will be reproduced and deviant actors will not. **The second reason is that systemic change may also be inhibited by actors' interests in maintaining relatively stable role identities. Such interests are rooted not only in the desire to minimize uncertainty and anxiety**, manifested in efforts to confirm existing beliefs about the social world, **but also in the desire to avoid the expected costs of breaking commitments made to others-notably domestic constituencies and foreign allies in the case of states-as part of past practices. The level of resistance that these commitments induce will depend on the "salience" of particular role identities to the actor**. The United States, for example, is more likely to resist threats to its identity as "leader of anticommunist crusades" than to its identity as "promoter of human rights." **But for almost any role identity, practices and information that challenge it are likely to create cognitive dissonance and even perceptions of threat, and these may cause resistance to transformations of the self and thus to social change**. **For both systemic and "psychological" reasons, then, intersubjective understandings and expectations may have a self-perpetuating** **quality**, constituting path-dependencies that new ideas about self and other must transcend. This does not change the fact that through practice agents are continuously producing and reproducing identities and interests, continuously "choosing now the preferences [they] will have later." But it does mean that choices may not be experienced with meaningful degrees of freedom. This could be a constructivist justification for the realist position that only simple learning is possible in self-help systems. The realist might concede that such **systems are socially constructed and** still argue **that after the corresponding identities and interests have become institutionalized, they are almost impossible to transform.**

# \*\*\*\*\*Value to Life Frontline\*\*\*\*\*

# Value to Life Frontline (1-3)

**1. We affirm choice: life itself is a prerequisite to the idea that individuals can choose how to give their own life meaning: their view is the worst form of totalitarian logic:**

**Szacki 1996** (Jerzy, Professor of Sociology at Warsaw University. Liberalism After Communism, p. 197)

Liberalism does not say which of these different moralities is better than others. It is neutral on this question and regards its neutrality as a virtue. Liberalism as a political doctrine assumes that – as Joseph Raz wrote – ‘there are many worthwhile and valuable relationships, commitments and plans of life which are mutually incompatible’ It recognizes that—as John Rawls put it—‘a modern democratic society is characterized not simply by a pluralism of comprehensive religious, philosophical and moral doctrines but by a pluralism of incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines’. What is more, for a liberal this is not only a fact to take note of; he or she is ready to acknowledge that ‘now this **variety of conceptions of the good is itself a good thing**, that is, it is rational for members of a well-ordered society to **want their plans to be different’**. Thus, the task of politics cannot and should not be to resolve the dispute among different conceptions of life. This is completely unattainable or is attainable only by a **totalitarian enslavement** of society in the name **of some one conception**. This being the case, according to Dworkin, ‘political decisions must be **as far as possible independent** of conceptions of the good life, or **what gives value to life.** Since citizens of a society **differ in these conceptions**, the government does not treat them as equals if it prefers one conception to another.’

**2. Maximizing as many lives as possible is the best way to give meaning to life:**

**Cummiskey 1996** (David, Associate Philosophy Professor at Bates College. Kantian Consequentialism. Pp. 145-146)

We must not obscure the issue by characterizing this type of case as the sacrifice of individuals for some abstract “social entity.” It is not a question of some persons having to bear the cost for some elusive “overall social good.” Instead, the question is whether some persons must bear the inescapable cost for the sake of other persons. Robert Nozick, for example, argues that “to use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has.” But why is this not equally true of all those whom we do not save through our failure to act? By emphasizing solely the one who must bear the cost if we act, we fail to sufficiently respect and take account of the many other separate persons, each with only one life, who will bear the cost of our inaction. In such a situation, what would a conscientious Kantian agent, an agent motivated by the unconditional value of rational beings, choose? A morally good agent recognizes that the basis of all particular duties is the principle that “rational nature exists as an end in itself” (GMM 429). Rational nature as such is the supreme objective end of all conduct. If one truly believes that all rational beings have an equal value, then the rational solution to such a dilemma involves **maximally promoting the lives and liberties of as many rational beings as possible** (chapter 5). In order to avoid this conclusion, the non-consequentialist Kantian needs to justify agent-centered constraints. As we saw in chapter 1, however, even most Kantian deontologists recognize that agent-centered constraints require a non- value-based rationale. But we have seen that Kant’s normative theory is based on an unconditionally valuable end. How can a concern for the value of rational beings lead to a refusal to sacrifice rational beings even when this would prevent other **more extensive losses** of rational beings? If the moral law is based on the value of rational beings and their ends, then what is the rationale for prohibiting a moral agent from maximally promoting these two tiers of value? If I sacrifice some for the sake of others, I do not use them arbitrarily, and I do not deny the unconditional value of rational beings. Persons may have “dignity, that is, an unconditional and incomparable worth” that transcends any market value (GMM 436), but persons also have a fundamental equality that dictates that some must sometimes give way for the sake of others (chapters 5 and 7). The concept of the end-in-itself does not support the view that we may never force another to bear some cost in order to benefit others. If one focuses on the **equal value of all rational beings**, then equal consideration suggests that one may have to sacrifice some to save many.

**3. Perm: Do the plan and all non-competitive parts of the alternative.**

# Value to Life Frontline (2-3)

**4. The uncompromising position of valuing human beings is the most moral way to live—if it’s an ethics debate you can vote that our ethical framework is better and vote AFF:**

**Cummiskey 1996 (**David, Associate Philosophy Professor at Bates College. Kantian Consequentialism. Pp. 150-151)

Consequentialism thus provides an indirect justification for our intuitive conviction that we should not demand that the innocent sacrifice themselves, and also that we should not sacrifice the innocent. Kant’s moral theory, however, simply does not provide a more direct and indefeasible justification for deontological constraints. In principle, a conscientious Kantian moral agent may be required to kill one in order to save two. Nonetheless, if someone is unable to do so, this may well not be grounds for reproach. Similarly, if I cannot amputate a leg to save a life—either my own or that of another—I may not be blameworthy for my failure, although it is true that I should have done the nasty deed. Still, in such a situation I must try to force my attention on the good I am doing and thereby enable myself to act. Similarly, in the highly unusual case where it would truly be best to kill some to save others, a good person should also try to focus on the lives to be saved rather than becoming fixated exclusively on those who will be killed. Nonetheless, even though sacrificing some to save others is sometimes the right thing to do, one should still feel regret and mourn the people who are lost. After all, the goal is to save each and every person; thus, one should indeed feel the loss of even one. According to Kant, the objective end of moral action is the existence of rational beings. Respect for rational beings requires that in deciding what to do, one must give appropriate practical consideration to the unconditional value of rational beings and to the conditional value of happiness. Since agent-centered constraints require a non-value-based rationale, the most natural interpretation of the demand that one give equal respect to all rational beings leads to a consequentialist normative theory. We have seen that there is no sound Kantian reason for abandoning this natural consequentialist interpretation. In particular, a consequentialist interpretation does not require sacrifices that a Kantian ought to consider unreasonable, and it does not involve doing evil so that good may come of it. It simply requires an uncompromising commitment to the equal value and equal claims of all rational beings and a recognition that in the moral consideration of conduct, one’s own subjective concerns do not have overriding importance.

**5. Existence and choice come first. People should be able to choose their value to life**

**Kymlicka 2003** (Will, professor of philosophy @ Queens University. Contemporary Political Thought: A Reader And Guide. Edited by Alan Finlayson, pp. 496-498)

The defining feature of **liberalism** is that it **ascribes certain fundamental freedoms to each individual. In particular, it grants people a very wide freedom of choice in terms of how they lead their live**s**. It allows people to choose a conception of the good life, and then allows them to reconsider that decision, and adopt a new and hopefully better plan of life.** Why should people be free to choose their own plan of life? After all, we know that some people will make imprudent decisions, wasting their time on hopeless or trivial pursuits. **Why** then **should the government not intervene to protect us from making mistakes, and to compel us to lead the truly good life?** There are a variety of reasons why this is not a good idea: **governments may not be trustworthy; Some individuals have idiosyncratic needs which are difficult for even a well-intentioned government to take into account; supporting controversial conceptions of the good may lead to civil strife**. Moreover, paternalistic restrictions on liberty often simply do not work — **lives do not go better by being led from the outside, in accordance with values the person does not endorse.** Dworkin calls this the ‘endorsement constraint’, and argues that ‘no component contributes to the value of a life without endorsement … it is implausible to think that someone can lead a better life against the grain of his profound ethical convictions than at peace with them’ (Dworkin 1989: 486). However, **the fact that we can get it wrong is important**, because (paradoxically) it provides another argument for liberty. **Since we can be wrong about the worth or value of what we are currently doing, and since no one wants to lead a life based on false beliefs about its worth, it is of fundamental importance that we be able rationally to assess our conceptions of the good in the light of new information or experiences, and to revise them if they are not worthy of our continued allegiance**. This assumption that our beliefs about the good life are fallible and revisable is widely endorsed in the liberal tradition — from John Stuart Mill to the most prominent contemporary American liberals, such as John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin. (Because of their prominence, I will rely heavily on the works of Rawls and Dworkin in the rest of this chapter.) As Rawls puts it, **individuals ‘do not view themselves as inevitable tied to the pursuit of the particular conception** of the good and its final ends which they espouse at any given time’. Instead, **they are ‘capable of revising and changing this conception’**. They can ‘stand back’ from their current ends to ‘survey and assess’ their worthiness (Rawls 1980: 544; cf. Mill 1912: 122; Dworkin 1913). So we have two preconditions for leading a good life**. The first is that we lead our life from the inside, in accordance with our beliefs about what gives value to life. Individuals must therefore have the resources and liberties needed to lead their lives in accordance with their beliefs about value, without fear of discrimination or punishment**. Hence the traditional liberal concern with individual privacy, and opposition to ‘the enforcement of morals’**. The second precondition is that we be free to question those beliefs, to examine them in light of whatever information, examples, and arguments our culture can provide. Individuals must therefore have the conditions necessary to acquire an awareness of different views about the good life, and an ability to examine these views intelligently**. Hence the equally traditional liberal concern for education, and freedom of expression and association. These liberties enable us to judge what is valuable, and to learn about other ways of life.

# Value to Life Frontline (3-3)

**6. Choice is fundamental – deciding some lives have no value negates the value of life**

**Gould 1995** (Carol, Professor of Philosophy and Government @ George Mason University. Rethinking Democracy: Freedom and Social Cooperation in Politics, Economy, and Society, p. 130)

**Acts of choice are, however, not merely the ground or source of those values with which the things chosen are endowed**. In addition, they are reflexive affirmations of the agent’s capacity of choice as characteristic of his or her mode of activity or mode of being. The act of choice thus necessarily affirms its own value in the act of choosing. The objective ground of freedom is thus the exercise of this freedom itself. And since the exercise of choice is, as I argued earlier, the characteristic mode of being human, this freedom has its objective ground in the nature of human activity as such. One may say further that this freedom as the characteristic mode of life activity of human beings is of primary value in the sense that it is a necessary condition for the possibility of any other value and is moreover valued in itself**. Freedom is thus necessarily affirmed in the mode of being of human beings. As I argued earlier, the exercise of this freedom, however, is not merely a repetition of this bare capacity of choice in one instance after another but rather involves the development of the individual through the activities that such choices engend**er. **It also involves the development of a world created by the activities of these individuals, a world which embodies the values that they have given it.** Thus **the capacity for choice becomes concretely realized in the self- development of individuals which thus constitutes the meaning and the value of freedom in the full sense. Self-development may therefore be seen as the highest value to which a process of individual acts of choice tends.**

**7. Attempting to change the world is crucial to celebrating life. Refusing to try denies our own lives while condemning others to unnecessary suffering  
Todd May, prof @ Clemson. “To change the world, to celebrate life,” Philosophy & Social Criticism 2005 Vol 31 nos 5–6 pp. 517–531**

To change the world and to celebrate life. This, as the theologian Harvey Cox saw, is the struggle within us.1 It is a struggle in which one cannot choose sides; or better, a struggle in which one must choose both sides. The abandonment of one for the sake of the other can lead only to disaster or callousness. Forsaking the celebration of life for the sake of changing the world is the path of the sad revolutionary. In his preface to *Anti-Oedipus*, Foucault writes that one does not have to be sad in order to be revolutionary. The matter is more urgent than that, however. One *cannot* be both sad and revolutionary. Lacking a sense of the wondrous that is already here, among us, one who is bent upon changing the world can only become solemn or bitter. He or she is focused only on the future; the present is what is to be overcome. The vision of what is not but must come to be overwhelms all else, and the point of change itself becomes lost. The history of the left in the 20th century offers numerous examples of this, and the disaster that attends to it should be evident to all of us by now. The alternative is surely not to shift one’s allegiance to the pure celebration of life, although there are many who have chosen this path. It is at best blindness not to see the misery that envelops so many of our fellow humans, to say nothing of what happens to sentient nonhuman creatures. The attempt to jettison world-changing for an uncritical assent to the world as it is requires a self-deception that I assume would be anathema for those of us who have studied Foucault. Indeed, it is anathema for all of us who awaken each day to an America whose expansive boldness is matched only by an equally expansive disregard for those we place in harm’s way. This is the struggle, then. The one between the desire for lifecelebration and the desire for world-changing. The struggle between reveling in the contingent and fragile joys that constitute our world and wresting it from its intolerability. I am sure it is a struggle that is not foreign to anyone who is reading this. I am sure as well that the stakes for choosing one side over another that I have recalled here are obvious to everyone. The question then becomes one of how to choose both sides at once.

# \*\*\*\*\*“Upward Mobility” K\*\*\*\*\*

# Upward Mobility K

**The myth that upward mobility even exists reaffirms capitalism:**

**The Standard, 2009** (<http://thestandard.org.nz/the-myth-of-upward-mobility/>, The myth of upward mobility)

Yesterday, **we looked at what a vastly unfair and unequal system capitalism is.** plutocracyThe control of the fruits of production by the few means that wealth accumulates to them and the rest of us get a pittance. The wealthiest 10% of people own over half of the wealth of this country – net worths of $650,000 each (actually, a small fraction of them will control most of that wealth too). 50% of us have just 3% of New Zealand’s wealth amongst ourselves – with average net worths of $7,000. **But a lot of people have the notion that although they’re being screwed now, it’s OK because** a) it’s the ‘natural’ order (I’ll come back to that some time) and b) **one day they’ll be the ones doing the screwing. It’s a myth. If you’re working class or middle class odds are you’ll stay working class or middle class. And the wealthy nearly always stay wealthy**. This Stats NZ study looked at the movement of people among income deciles over a five-year period (2002-2007, but there’s no reason to think it wouldn’t be the same over any five-year period).The size of the circles is the percent of people who had been in each decile in 2002 who were in a given decile in 2007: income mobilityAs you can see, most people are in the same decile five years later or very close to it. There’s some mobility among the lower deciles and some mobility among the higher deciles but very few people (only 18%) who were in the 10th (richest) decile in 2002 were below the 8th five years later. **Only 10% of people who started off in the lower five deciles made it into the top two or three. In fact, the mobility you can see is largely a factor of life-cycle – students moving into high paid jobs etc.** The study breaks down the age groups and income mobility is very low with life-cycle movement taken out. So **not only is our political economic system designed to concentrate wealth in the hands of a few people, who those people are doesn’t change either. If you’re not one of them now, the odds are you never will be. So the question arises – why support a system that steals the wealth you produce with your hard work and gives it to them? Are the crumbs that fall from their table enough?**

**Challenging the myth of upward mobility exposes the American Dream as a vacant fantasy—**

Manuel **Valenzuela, 2009** (social critic, commentator, http:[//valenzuelasveritas.blogspot.com/2004/04/system-capitalism-and-its-r](file://localhost//valenzuelasveritas.blogspot.com/2004/04/system-capitalism-and-its-r)ole-in.html, “The System: Capitalism and its Role in American Society’s Plunge into the Abyss, Part II of III.)

**The American Dream is the slogan to strive for, the mantra to hum in our misconceived perception of upward mobility even as we delve further into our predetermined caste. It is our battle hymn as we march merrily to work**, eager to jump into the next stage of our caste-filled lives. The Dream, implanted from birth through television and culture, has become ingrained in our hypnotized minds as we seek to emulate the perfection we see on the screen. We have become Pavlovian dogs drooling at the fiction we think is within our grasp. Yet the fantasy we desperately crave and the reality we want to escape are mutually exclusive, never attaining the former and never evading the latter. **The American Dream is the nightmare we cannot seem to wake up from; it is the mirage that grips us until death**. In its potential most everyone has been made to believe in; in its promise our minds seem to dwell, unable to escape the wonderment of its hollow assurances. **Espoused as the greatness of the American nation, the Dream is but a vacant fantasy for hundreds of millions that cannot, and unfortunately will not ever escape the destiny of their creation nor the predicament of their environments. Perfected over the last century, the Dream is but that most perfect marketing tool designed to capture those who seek better lives. Espousing the greatness of escaping the caste we have been born into, inculcating into our minds the benefits of a better life, it dictates that our lives become the stress-inducing calling of a drill sergeant. It dictates that we become marching grunts and soldier ants, never ceasing in our commitment to work tirelessly for ourselves, the state and especially the capitalists enriching themselves through their exploitation of our energies and at the expense of our lives and happiness.**

# Upward Mobility K--2nc Links

**The great hope of American capitalism is that your life won’t always be like this—the idea of upward mobility that if you work hard and play by the rules you will be rewarded quiesces and obscures criticisms of capitalism—you convince yourself if you just keep working harder and harder that you’ll finally get a piece of the pie. Their criticism falls prey to their own trap, by affirming the notion that there is a concept known as upward mobility at all it obscures the fact that the truth is that the poor stay poor and the rich get rich, that’s how it goes.**

**The myth of upward mobility sustains capitalism and the American Dream—it is the psychological cog of the capitalist engine:**

Manuel **Valenzuela, 2009** (social critic, commentator, http:[//valenzuelasveritas.blogspot.com/2004/04/system-capitalism-and-its-r](file://localhost//valenzuelasveritas.blogspot.com/2004/04/system-capitalism-and-its-r)ole-in.html, “The System: Capitalism and its Role in American Society’s Plunge into the Abyss, Part II of III.)

**Social classes are today an illusion designed to create the impression that upward mobility, even in this age of capitalistic exploitation, can be easily achieved. The American Dream is one such instrument of deception that**, while at one time a functioning reality, **now assures those who exploit of the hard and ceaseless work of those seeking to escape their lifetime subjugation. For decades the utopian idea of the American Dream has captivated the masses. Indeed, it is the psychological cog that runs the American capitalistic engine, making hundreds of millions nothing more than obedient producers and consumers whose enslavement is the backbone of the effervescent and continually expanding economy.**

# Upward Mobility K--2nc Links

**The concept of upward mobility hides the flaws in capitalism—it convinces the working class to keep at it and someday they’ll have a good life:**

Basil **Enwegbara , 2002** (“Saving American Capitalism” http://tech.mit.edu/V122/N30/col30basil.30c.html)

**From its inception, capitalism has remained historically controversial and morally vulnerable. And with each period of rejection, capitalism reemerges reformed**. One of the most critical periods for capitalism was between the two world wars when the attitude of most Protestant ethical thinkers, once custodians of capitalism, became strongly anti-capitalistic, culminating into the first Assembly of the World Council of Churches at Amsterdam in 1948 that sought the transformation of capitalism. But why has capitalism witnessed so many criticisms, in contrast to the politically and economically centralized collectivism? In other words, why is it that notwithstanding its ability to guarantee all forms of freedom, capitalism remains constantly challenged by many? The answers are found in how free-market capitalism is practiced. **Free-market capitalism as practiced in the United States today is not different from the notion of capitalism in the ancient Greece, where economic opportunity and possibility of upward mobility had no caste or class limitations.** From Aristotle to Thucydides to Plato and to Pericles was the recognition of the concept of individual worth as the foundation for democratic self-government to the extent that for Pericles: “the shame (and the shame) is not in being poor, but in not doing anything to escape from poverty.” **The ancient Greeks completely understood the free market economy, where individual upward mobility is demanded and rewarded.** But they also understood that the struggle could end up very cruel since everyone was on their own. **The founding fathers of American democracy and capitalism shared this truth with the ancient Greeks. Therefore, the American concept of “inalienable rights” to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, as enshrined in the Constitution, not only enhanced individualism, it went further to celebrate individualism beyond capitalist entrepreneurialism,** beyond Protestant convenant, and beyond democratic citizenship. But the questions here are two. Is improving oneself at all costs because not doing so one is to blame, not limited to some ethical values? And **how much emphasis should modern society place on individual self-development, culture of selfishness, and a ‘me-first’ mentality without a drawn line to prevent self-aggrandizement?** While the obsession with money-making is central to the capitalist economic system -- which remains good for the purposes of economic expansion, entrepreneurial creativity, and for building a large pool of capital to further economic and technological development -- a problem arises when this obsession becomes the only perspective in a society. **The problem here is that the capitalist system, does not having a single mechanism for dealing with this, other than simply legitimizing the accumulation of wealth, which poses some ethical nightmares to those individuals whose obsession with making money conflicts with both respect for the law and adherence to some societal ethical codes and cultural norms**. The inability to reconcile these conflicts is the weakness of free market capitalism. Even the “philosopher-guardians” of the state in ancient Greece found themselves unable to solve these problems. But the good news is that despite the enormous self-destructing forces in capitalism, it always emerges winner all time, saved by its custodians. Bismarck, in the 1880s, saved capitalism from collapse in Germany by inventing the public pensions and health care. Churchill did the same in Britain by introducing a large-scale public unemployment insurance system in 1911. Roosevelt knew that the days of capitalism were numbered, had those who fought to defend it come back from the battlefield to discover they remained excluded from the benefits of capitalism. So, he invented the social welfare state, as the new postwar capitalism. Even America’s Marshall Plan in Europe and the helping of Japan to build a new postwar economy, knew that that was the only way to restore faith in capitalism in those countries after the war. **Capitalism** remains without alternative. It has transformed the conditions of human existence in many remarkable ways. If it **has survived all this long, including the years of great assault from Marx, it did so precisely because of its self-correcting forces and the smartness of its custodians, who completely understood that capitalism’s long survival is dependent on its ability to minimize revolutionary conditions inherent in the middle-class.** There is no doubt that capitalism will survive the present assaults from corporate financial scandals. And as Professor Lester Thurow rightly stated in a recent New York Times article, corporate scandal is always part of capitalism.

# “Upward Mobility” Links to Capitalism

**Continuing to believe in the American Dream furthers the enslavement of the poor and the working class—our K turns their case:**

Manuel **Valenzuela, 2009** (social critic, commentator, http:[//valenzuelasveritas.blogspot.com/2004/04/system-capitalism-and-its-r](file://localhost//valenzuelasveritas.blogspot.com/2004/04/system-capitalism-and-its-r)ole-in.html, “The System: Capitalism and its Role in American Society’s Plunge into the Abyss, Part II of III.)

**By exploiting our emotions, fantasies and dreams**, not to mention the greed and materialism capitalism unearths in our minds**, the purveyors of the Dream foster in us a sense that what we see is attainable and what we were born into escapable.** Like black widows capitalists and exploiters wait for us to become trapped in the web of lies they market, only then striking us down with their venomous poison running through our veins. Our primitive wants and needs become the tools the capitalists use in pushing us towards greater productivity and consumption. **We are pursuing that most noble of American institutions, we are told. The American Dream is within our grasp, if only we work harder and consumer more. The American Dream furthers the enslavement of the poor and working class,** entrapping them further into the bowels of exploitation. **It advances the enrichment of the oligarchs and capitalists, allowing them increased production through lower wages. Belief in the Dream pushes us toward commitments of greater working hours and harder sacrifice. It fosters the abandonment of individuality and happiness, forcing us to choose our jobs over our lives, our career over our family. But, we are told, if we sacrifice long enough, if we work hard enough, if we give our last breath of air and our last vestige of energy we will move up in the hierarchy, only to realize after years of servitude the futility of it all and the untenable fiction we were led to believe**. In the end we become aware that the Dream has become the nightmare, that our energy has been drained, not for our pleasure and happiness, but for the bulging pockets of the capitalist exploiters. **Before we realize where time has taken us, the vigor of youth has given way to the frailty of age and the wisdom of experience opens our eyes to the enslavement we have lived in for dozens of years**.

**Affirming upward mobility is bad—it stamps out previous working class identity**

Bruce Robbins, 2007 (Upward mobility and the common good , accessed via google books)

Michael Denning, The Cultural Front: The Laboring of American Culture in the Twentieth Century (London: Verso, 1996). **An alternative genre concept that has the advantage of recognizing the existence of interclass movement is Renny Christopher’s “narratives of unhappy upward mobility.**” Renny Christopher, “Rags to Riches to Suicide: Unhappy Narratives of Upward Mobility; Martin Eden, Bread Givers, Delia’s Song, and Hunger of Memory,” College Literature 29:4 (Fall 2002), 79-108. **Christopher argues that “to rest happy with upward mobility, one must completely stamp out one’s previous, working-class self**” (80).

# \*\*\*\*\*Word PIC’s—Even Single Words Matter\*\*\*\*\*

# Word PIC’s—Even Single Words Matter

**Even single words matter --- turns the case within their framework**

**Reeves 2005** (Richard, Lecturer – Annenberg School for Communication at the University of Southern California “Words Matter in Politics”, The New Statesman, 1-24, http://www.newstatesman.com/200501240022)

What's in a word? In politics, everything, argues Richard Reeves. Get the language right and you can win arguments before they begin. US Republicans know this, but new Labour still has much to learn Words get a bad press. On both sides of the principal divide in British politics - the one between the media and politicians - the use of language is a familiar target. Journalists accuse politicians of spouting mere "rhetoric"; MPs on the Today programme suggest that their interlocutor is playing at "semantics". Politicians are said to be all spin and no substance, hacks to be interested in the juiciest, rather than most apposite, quotations. Yet rhetoric and semantics are not the froth of politics, but its most important ingredients. There can be no politics without words. And the precise meaning of words - for example, in the phrase "a representative House of Lords" - is hardly a trivial matter. Labour - sorry, new Labour - is all too aware of the significance of words. "Language," Aristotle wrote in the Politics, "serves to declare what is advantageous and what is the reverse . . . It is the peculiarity of man . . . that he alone possesses a perception of good and evil, of the just and unjust." In other words, what makes a political community ("a city", as Aristotle called it) is the shared concepts of good and evil, right and wrong - and only through language can this sharing take place. This insight is as valuable in the modern world as in antiquity. Those who worry about a United States of Europe can stop fretting: the absence of a common language prevents a commonly articulated vision of Europe. The gap extends even to musical pitch. The note "A" is different in France, Germany and Britain, so musicians squabble when they play together - a clear-cut case, surely, for EU harmonisation. By contrast, the US, which is a more diverse social, economic and cultural region than Europe, has a sense of Americanness that depends vitally on linguistic unity. (Note that John Kerry's ability to speak French counted against him in last year's election.) If a nation is defined, in the Cornell University professor Benedict Anderson's terms, as a shared "imagined community", the role of a shared language in filling the imagination becomes clear. If language shapes who we are, it also helps to determine where we are going. As Norman Fairclough, author of New Labour, New Language? says, words "do political work". Words do not simply express an already perfectly formed idea; they often help to test, refine and develop an idea. Ideas and words are like a chicken and an egg. Labour's search for the right language is a good example of the way language can determine political action. Early in 1996, for example, it looked as if "stakeholding" would be Labour's big idea. Popularised by Will Hutton in his book The State We're In the previous year, it was at the heart of a speech by Tony Blair in Singapore. But, after a brief moment in the sun, it was replaced by "rights and responsibilities" and then "the Third Way". Philip Gould, Blair's disciple and polling guru, argues that while "the language of stakeholding has withered, the new approach underpinning it has prospered". But he underestimates the power of language. If Labour had stuck with stakeholding, some of its policies would almost certainly have been different. In Singapore, Blair said: "It is surely time to assess how we shift the emphasis in corporate ethos from the company being a mere vehicle for the capital market - to be traded, bought and sold as a commodity - towards a vision of the company as a community of partnership in which each employee has a stake." It is not possible to square these words - a "community . . . in which each employee has a stake" - with Labour's laissez-faire attitude in government to company law, structure and capital financing. Another critical intersection between language and politics is the way words "frame" an issue in people's minds - often in ways which virtually predetermine their reaction. George Lakoff, a US linguist and semi-hero in some Democratic circles, shows how brilliantly effective the Republicans have been at using language frames. His latest book is entitled Don't Think of an Elephant!: and the point is, you can't. Once the word has been uttered, the image of a big grey animal is unstoppably in your mind. The frame is in place. The Republicans understand this. Two of their most effective framing devices are the relabelling of tax cuts as "tax relief" and the invention of the term "partial-birth abortion". The first of these is a powerful metaphor. Once "relief" is added to tax, Lakoff points out, it becomes "an affliction. The person who takes it away is a hero, and anyone who tries to stop him is a bad guy." The Republicans use the phrase repeatedly: some right-wing think-tanks have swear-boxes for anyone who says "tax cut". Soon the media followed suit, referring to the Republicans' "tax relief plan". And once the Democrats were using it, the game was pretty much over. "Should we have tax relief?" is a question that contains its own answer. Bush has similarly used the metaphor of not needing a "permission slip" to defend America - which frames the issue of multinational talks in such a way as to suggest that anyone taking the UN seriously is clearly a schoolchild asking for teacher's say-so. (Someone in Michael Howard's office has clearly read Lakoff, because he, too, used the term recently. The trouble is that it is American English, and no one knew what he was on about.) "Partial-birth abortion" refers to a rare procedure where the surgeon partly delivers the baby but leaves the head in the womb while he removes the brain. But if it is so rare - 1 per cent of all abortions - why all the right-wing fuss? "Because," as Lakoff notes, "it is the first step to ending all abortion. It puts out there a frame of abortion as a horrendous procedure, when most operations ending pregnancy are nothing like this." Paul Chilton, in his Analysing Political Discourse, calls these "ready-made moulds for the thinking of thoughts". So far British politicians - along with most US Democrats - are amateurs at this stuff. Yet perhaps the best reframing in recent UK politics was by the left, in the successful rebadging of the Tory community charge as a poll tax. Who could oppose a simple charge for something as lovely as a community? On the other hand, who could support a tax on such a fundamental democratic right as the vote? When Conservative ministers started to slip up and refer to "the poll tax" in media interviews, you knew the fight was over. Framing is going on all the time, whether consciously or not. Even apparently banal terms such as "welfare-dependent", "yobs" and (the current favourite) "hard-working families" carry with them a heavy load of assumptions and implications. The political right uses the term "nanny state" very effectively, with the frame carrying associations of bossiness, dependency and childishness. Once a Labour politician defensively says "it's not a question of the nanny state, but of . . .", the rest of the sentence is almost not worth bothering with. The damage has been done. The choice of even single words can matter. As Chilton points out, the meanings of the words kill, murder, assassinate and execute can be defined "in terms of stored frames in which different types of actor fill the agent and the victim roles, the killing is legal or not legal", and so on. Similarly, the question of whether a person receiving treatment in a hospital is a "patient", "client", "user" or "customer" is a hugely important semantic one. The chosen frame carries a range of implications for where power lies, how doctors should interact with people and how the success of medical institutions is defined.