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The development and exploration of space always occurs under the rubric of militarization—the logic of sovereignty understands space as just another biopolitical possibility of security management.

MacDonald 2007 [Fraser, Professor at the University of Melbourne, “Anti-Astropolitik – outer space and the orbit of geography,” in *Progress in Human Geography* 31.5]

In post-Cold-War unipolar times the strategic rationale for the United States to maintain the prohibition against weaponizing space is diminishing (Lambakis, 2003), even if the rest of the world wishes it otherwise. In 2000, a UN General Assembly resolution on the ‘Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space’ was adopted by a majority of 163–0 with 3 abstentions: the United States, Israel and the Federated States of Micronesia (United Nations, 2000). Less than two months later, a US Government committee chaired by Donald Rumsfeld5 issued a report warning that the ‘relative dependence of the US on space makes its space systems potentially attractive targets’; the United States thus faced the danger, it argued, of a ‘Space Pearl Harbor’ (Rumsfeld, 2001: viii). As space warfare was, according to the report, a ‘virtual certainty’, the United States must ‘ensure continuing superiority’ (Rumsfeld, 2001: viii). This argument was qualified by obligatory gestures towards ‘the peaceful use of outer space’ but the report left little doubt about the direction of American space policy. Any difficult questions about the further militarization (and even weaponization) of space could be easily avoided under the guise of developing ‘dual-use’ (military/civilian) technology and emphasizing the role of military applications in ‘peacekeeping’ operations. Through such rhetoric, NATO’s satellite-guided bombing of a Serbian TV station on 23 April 1999 could have been readily accommodated under the OST injunction to use outer space for ‘peaceful purposes’ (Cervino et al., 2003). Since that time new theatres of operation have been opened up in Afghanistan and Iraq, for further trials of space-enabled warfare that aimed to provide aerial omniscience for the precision delivery of ‘shock and awe’. What Benjamin Lambeth has called the ‘accomplishment’ of air and space power has since been called into question by the all too apparent limitations of satellite intelligence in the tasks of identifying Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction or in stemming the growing number of Allied dead and wounded from modestly armed urban insurgents (Lambeth, 1999; Graham, 2004; Gregory, 2004: 205). For all its limitations, even this imagery has been shielded from independent scrutiny by the military monopolization of commercial satellite outputs (Livingstone and Robinson, 2003). Yet, far from undermining Allied confi dence in satellite imagery or in a ‘cosmic’ view of war (Kaplan, 2006), it is precisely these abstract photocartographies of violence – detached from their visceral and bloodied ‘accomplishments’ – that have licensed, say, the destruction of Fallujah (Gregory, 2004: 162; Graham, 2005b). There remains, of course, a great deal more that can be said about the politics of these aerial perspectives than can be discussed here (see, for instance, Gregory, 2004; Kaplan, 2006). The geopolitical effects of reconnaissance from space platforms are by no means confi ned to particular episodes of military confl ict. Like the high-altitude spy plane, its Cold War precursor, satellite surveillance also gives strategic and diplomatic powers. Unlike aerial photography, however, satellite imagery is ubiquitous and high-resolution, and offers the potential for real-time surveillance. The emerging field of surveillance studies, strongly informed by critical geographical thought, has opened to scrutiny the politics and spaces of electronic observation (see, for instance, the new journal Surveillance and Society). The writings of Foucault, particularly those on panopticism, are an obvious infl uence on this new work (Foucault, 1977; Wood, 2003), but they have seldom been applied to the realm of outer space. As Foucault pointed out, the power of Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon prison design is enacted through the prisoner–subjects internalizing the disciplinary gaze: the presence of the gaoler was immaterial, as the burden of watching was left to the watched. Similarly, the power of panoptic orbital surveillance lies in its normalizing geopolitical effects.

The result is a violent ontology that refuses to question itself in favor of remaining a champion certainty and arbiter metaphysical truths guaranteeing systematic error replication and conservativism

Burke, 7 (Anthony, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at UNSW, Sydney, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason”, Theory and Event, 10.2, Muse)

By itself, such an account of the nationalist ontology of war and security provides only a general insight into the perseverance of military violence as a core element of politics. It does not explain why so many policymakers think military violence works. As I argued earlier, such an ontology is married to a more rationalistic form of strategic thought that claims to link violent means to political ends predictably and controllably, and which, by doing so, combines military action and national purposes into a common -- and thoroughly modern -- horizon of certainty. Given Hegel's desire to decisively distil and control the dynamic potentials of modernity in thought, it is helpful to focus on the modernity of this ontology -- one that is modern in its adherence to modern scientific models of truth, reality and technological progress, and in its insistence on imposing images of scientific truth from the physical sciences (such as mathematics and physics) onto human behaviour, politics and society. For example, the military theorist and historian Martin van Creveld has argued that one of the reasons Clausewitz was so influential was that his 'ideas seemed to have chimed in with the rationalistic, scientific, and technological outlook associated with the industrial revolution'.54 Set into this epistemological matrix, modern politics and government engages in a sweeping project of mastery and control in which all of the world's resources -- mineral, animal, physical, human -- are made part of a machinic process of which war and violence are viewed as normal features. These are the deeper claims and implications of Clausewitzian strategic reason. One of the most revealing contemporary examples comes from the writings (and actions) of Henry Kissinger, a Harvard professor and later U.S. National Security Adviser and Secretary of State. He wrote during the Vietnam war that after 1945 U.S. foreign policy was based 'on the assumption that technology plus managerial skills gave us the ability to reshape the international system and to bring about domestic transformations in emerging countries'. This 'scientific revolution' had 'for all practical purposes, removed technical limits from the exercise of power in foreign policy'.55 Kissinger's conviction was based not merely in his pride in the vast military and bureaucratic apparatus of the United States, but in a particular epistemology (theory of knowledge). Kissinger asserted that the West is 'deeply committed to the notion that the real world is external to the observer, that knowledge consists of recording and classifying data -- the more accurately the better'. This, he claimed, has since the Renaissance set the West apart from an 'undeveloped' world that contains 'cultures that have escaped the early impact of Newtonian thinking' and remain wedded to the 'essentially pre-Newtonian view that the real world is almost entirely internal to the observer'.56 At the same time, Kissinger's hubris and hunger for control was beset by a corrosive anxiety: that, in an era of nuclear weapons proliferation and constant military modernisation, of geopolitical stalemate in Vietnam, and the emergence and militancy of new post-colonial states, order and mastery were harder to define and impose. He worried over the way 'military bipolarity' between the superpowers had 'encouraged political multipolarity', which 'does not guarantee stability. Rigidity is diminished, but so is manageability...equilibrium is difficult to achieve among states widely divergent in values, goals, expectations and previous experience' (emphasis added). He mourned that 'the greatest need of the contemporary international system is an agreed concept of order'.57 Here were the driving obsessions of the modern rational statesman based around a hunger for stasis and certainty that would entrench U.S. hegemony: For the two decades after 1945, our international activities were based on the assumption that technology plus managerial skills gave us the ability to reshape the international system and to bring about domestic transformations in "emerging countries". This direct "operational" concept of international order has proved too simple. Political multipolarity makes it impossible to impose an American design. Our deepest challenge will be to evoke the creativity of a pluralistic world, to base order on political multipolarity even though overwhelming military strength will remain with the two superpowers.58 Kissinger's statement revealed that such cravings for order and certainty continually confront chaos, resistance and uncertainty: clay that won't be worked, flesh that will not yield, enemies that refuse to surrender. This is one of the most powerful lessons of the Indochina wars, which were to continue in a phenomenally destructive fashion for six years after Kissinger wrote these words. Yet as his sinister, Orwellian exhortation to 'evoke the creativity of a pluralistic world' demonstrated, Kissinger's hubris was undiminished. This is a vicious, historic irony: a desire to control nature, technology, society and human beings that is continually frustrated, but never abandoned or rethought**.** By 1968 U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, the rationalist policymaker par excellence, had already decided that U.S. power and technology could not prevail in Vietnam; Nixon and Kissinger's refusal to accept this conclusion, to abandon their Cartesian illusions, was to condemn hundreds of thousands more to die in Indochina and the people of Cambodia to two more decades of horror and misery.59 In 2003 there would be a powerful sense of déja vu as another Republican Administration crowned more than decade of failed and destructive policy on Iraq with a deeply controversial and divisive war to remove Saddam Hussein from power. In this struggle with the lessons of Vietnam, revolutionary resistance, and rapid geopolitical transformation, we are witness to an enduring political and cultural theme: of a craving for order, control and certainty in the face of continual uncertainty. Closely related to this anxiety was the way that Kissinger's thinking -- and that of McNamara and earlier imperialists like the British Governor of Egypt Cromer -- was embedded in instrumental images of technology and the machine: the machine as both a tool of power and an image of social and political order. In his essay 'The Government of Subject Races' Cromer envisaged effective imperial rule -- over numerous societies and billions of human beings -- as best achieved by a central authority working 'to ensure the harmonious working of the different parts of the machine'.60 Kissinger analogously invoked the virtues of 'equilibrium', 'manageability' and 'stability' yet, writing some six decades later, was anxious that technological progress no longer brought untroubled control: the Westernising 'spread of technology and its associated rationality...does not inevitably produce a similar concept of reality'.61

**The alternative is critique *Astropolitik.* Space provides an opportunity to challenge entrenched regimes of militarization and globalization.**

**Stuart 9** – Fellow in Global Politics in the Department of Government at the London School of Economics and Political Science (Jill, “Unbundling sovereignty, territory and the state in outer space Two approaches” From Securing Outer Space, Edited by Borrman and Sheean—Chapter 1)

As well as considering ongoing events in outer space politics (such as cooperation, militarization and commercialization), this text explores the ways in which we continue to evaluate and develop conceptual frameworks to help us understand outer space politics. This chapter furthers the engagement with how **political ideas are reconceptualized in relation to outer space, and also how outer space has implications for our understanding of those political ideas. The ways in which we approach the study of outer space politics helps to construct the meanings by which it is imbued, and to suggest ways of developing our theoretical approaches. One area in which outer space both challenges traditional political notions and also political and legal practice is in the definition and practice of sovereignty.** This chapter argues that Westphalian sovereignty (also "modern" or "classical" sovereignty), which delineates a clear relationship between sovereignty, territory and the state, does not conceptually grasp sovereignty in outer space (and by a normative account, how sovereignty should and could be transforming). **As such I argue that sovereignty has been "unbundled" in outer space, both practically through legal approaches which allow for a different relationship between sovereignty, territory and the state, and also theoretically in terms of leaving open the potential to reconceptualize sovereignty in a way that better embraces sovereignty in a globalized world** (and indeed, going one step further, in a world where not all politics even occur within the "globe", i.e. in outer space). The challenge to traditional notions of sovereignty can be seen partly as a product of (and reconstitutive of) globalization, whereby transterritorial issues and the "shrinking" of the planet challenge the straightforward relationship between sovereignty, territory and the state.! **The reality of space exploration can be seen as another radical and unique issue-area in which theoretical approaches to "global" politics must be reconceived. This chapter explores the ways in which outer space poses unique challenges to conceptual and legal approaches to governance. I also argue that there may also be a dialectical relationship between territorially-based politics and outer space politics, whereby notions of sovereignty are mutually reconstituting globalization and its conceptual challenge to classical notions of sovereignty.**

Link – Generic

Space development and exploration usher in an “empire of the future” which reproduces the imperial visions of the US on a truly global scale.

Duvall and Havercroft 2008 [Raymond of the Department of Political Science at the University of Minnesota and Jonathan, Assistant Professor at Department of Political Science at the University of Oklahoma, “Taking Sovereignty Out of This World,” in *Review of International Studies* 34.4]

Each of the three forms of space weapons has important constitutive effects on modern sovereignty, which, in turn, are productive of political subjectivities. Exclusive missile defence constitutes a ‘hard shell’ of sovereignty for one state, while compromising the sovereign political subject status of other states. Space control reinforces that exclusive constitution of sovereignty and its potentiality for fostering unilateral decision. It also constitutes the ‘space-controlling’ state, the US, as sovereign for a particular global social order, a global capitalism. Space weapons capable of direct force application obliterate the meaning of territorial boundaries for defence and for distinguishing an inside from an outside with respect to the scope of policing and law enforcement – that is an authorised locus for deciding the exception. States, other than the exceptional ‘American’ state, are reduced to empty shells of de jure sovereignty, sustained, if at all, by convenient fiction – for example, as useful administrative apparatuses for the governing of locals. And their ‘citizens’ are produced as ‘bare life’ subject to the willingness of the global sovereign to let them live. Together and in conjunction, these three sets of effects constitute what we believe can appropriately be identified as an empire of the future, the political subjects of which are a global sovereign, an exceptional ‘nation’ linked to that sovereign, a global social order normalised in terms of capitalist social relations, and ‘bare life’ for individuals and groups globally to participate in that social order. If our argument is even half correct, the claim with which this article began – that modes of political killing have important effects – would be an understatement!

Link – Generic

Space exploration and development is uncritical—it represents an extension of old-fashioned earthly imperial concerns.

MacDonald 2007 [Fraser, Professor at the University of Melbourne, “Anti-Astropolitik – outer space and the orbit of geography,” in *Progress in Human Geography* 31.5]

My basic claim, then, is that a geographical concern with outer space is an old project, not a new one. A closely related argument is that a geography of outer space is a logical extension of earlier geographies of imperial exploration (for instance, Smith and Godlewska, 1994; Driver, 2001). Space exploration has used exactly the same discourses, the same rationales, and even the same institutional frameworks (such as the International Geophysical Year, 1957–58) as terrestrial exploration. Like its terrestrial counterpart, the move into space has its origins in older imperial enterprises. Marina Benjamin, for instance, argues that for the United States outer space was ‘always a metaphorical extension of the American West’ (Benjamin, 2003: 46). Looking at the imbricated narratives of colonialism and the Arianne space programme in French Guiana, the anthropologist Peter Redfi eld makes the case that ‘outer space reflects a practical shadow of empire’ (Redfi eld, 2002: 795; see also Redfi eld, 2000). The historian of science Richard Sorrenson, writing about the ship as geography’s scientific instrument in the age of high empire, draws on the work of David DeVorkin to argue that the V-2 missile was its natural successor (Sorrenson, 1996: 228; see also DeVorkin, 1992). A version of the V-2 – the two-stage ‘Bumper WAC Corporal’ – became the fi rst earthly object to penetrate outer space, reaching an altitude of 244 miles on 24 February 1949 (Army Ballistic Missile Agency, 1961). Moreover, out of this postwar allied V-2 programme came the means by which Britain attempted to reassert its geopolitical might in the context of its own ailing empire. In 1954, when America sold Britain its first nuclear missile – a refined version of the WAC Corporal – its possession was seen as a shortcut back to the international stage at a time when Britain’s colonial power was waning fast (Clark, 1994; MacDonald, 2006a). Even if the political geography literature has scarcely engaged with outer space, the advent of rocketry was basically Cold War (imperial) geopolitics under another name. Space exploration then, from its earliest origins to the present day, has been about familiar terrestrial and ideological struggles here on Earth.

Link – Space Missile Defense

Space-based missile defense threatens the territorial sovereignty of other states.

Duvall and Havercroft 2008 [Raymond of the Department of Political Science at the University of Minnesota and Jonathan, Assistant Professor at Department of Political Science at the University of Oklahoma, “Taking Sovereignty Out of This World,” in *Review of International Studies* 34.4]

The first weapons in space will probably be deployed for missile defence. The US military is testing several prototypes of components of such a system, one of which, the MDA Space Test Bed, is being funded as 2008, with the aim of integrating already existing space technologies into a system that, from orbital space, can intercept ballistic missiles in their boost phase.34 Such a system, when/if highly effective, replaces mutual deterrence with the singular US capability (perhaps extended to allies) to launch unilateral pre-emptive and preventative attacks freed from concerns of retaliation through ballistic missile counter-attacks. The missile defence system now envisioned by the US thus undermines the logic of mutual deterrence. States not included under its umbrella become increasingly vulnerable to (even nuclear) attack by the state that controls it.35 The sovereignty of a state is conceptually and practically linked to its ability to maintain territorial integrity by deterring enemies from attacking. During the Cold War, the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons was acknowledged as a primary means by which ‘great power’ states in conflict protected their territorial integrity, and, in turn, their sovereignty.36 Kenneth Waltz argued that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would extend deterrent effects to otherwise not-yet ‘great powers’, thereby strengthening the security of larger numbers of sovereign states and stabilising the international system.37 Following the logic of Herz’s nuclear ‘one-worldism’, an effective missile defence system, by contrast, will strip states of whatever ‘hard shell’ of territorial defensibility that had been or might be provided by mutual deterrence of missile attacks. The realist argument that has largely carried the day for the past half century in critical response to Herz (that the deterrent effect of mutual assured destruction of two states possessing nuclear weapons reinscribes territorial state sovereignty) accordingly is brought into doubt. If the US were to develop a sufficiently sophisticated missile defence shield, the deterritorialising effect on the sovereignty of all other states would be precisely those that Herz forecasted – their ‘hard shell’ of defensibility would be lost. There would be a significant twist, however, because, for the US, control of an effective missile defence system would markedly reinscribe its territorial ‘hard shell’ and its sovereignty in exclusively shielding it from the threat of (missile-based) attack by others. The sovereignty of one state is reinscribed, while that of other states, most notably ‘great powers’ that have depended thus far on their deterrent capacities, is eroded.

Link – Orbital Control

Orbital control becomes the condition for the capitalization of outer space and ensures that the market imperialism of the US has new resources to harness and exploit.

Duvall and Havercroft 2008 [Raymond of the Department of Political Science at the University of Minnesota and Jonathan, Assistant Professor at Department of Political Science at the University of Oklahoma, “Taking Sovereignty Out of This World,” in *Review of International Studies* 34.4]

The doctrine of space control has emerged out of the belief that assets in space represent a potential target for enemies of the US.38 There are two kinds of vulnerable US assets: private-commercial; and military. One concern is that rivals may attack commercial satellites, thereby disrupting the flow of information and inflicting significant harm on global markets.39 Militarily, the concern is that, through increasing reliance on satellites for Earth-based military operations, the US has created an ‘asymmetrical vulnerability’. An adversary (including a non-state, ‘terrorist’ organisation) could effectively immobilise US forces by disabling the satellites that provide communication, command, and control capabilities. Consequently, the project of space control is designed to protect commercial and military satellites from potential attacks. Its broader purpose, however, is to prevent rivals from having any access to space for activities antithetical to US interests; this is the imperative for ‘denial of the use of space to adversaries’. Thus space control has dual functions – it is both a privatising of the commons of orbital space and a military exclusion – in a form of ‘inclusive exclusion’.40 Space control represents the extension of US sovereignty into orbital space. Its implementation would reinforce the constitutive effect identified in the previous section on missile defence, namely to reinscribe the ‘hard shell’ border of the US, now extended to include the ‘territory’ of orbital space. US sovereignty is projected out of this world and into orbit. Under Article II of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, ‘Outer Space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means’. The US project of space control would entail a clear violation of this article.41 In addition to expanding the scope of US sovereignty, however, this violation of international law has a second constitutive effect of importance, namely to produce a distinctly capitalist sovereignty. In Volume One of Capital, Marx chided classical political economists for their inability to explain how workers became separated from the means of production. Whereas political economists such as Adam Smith argued that a previous accumulation of capital was necessary for a division of labour, Marx argued that this doctrine was absurd. Division of labour existed in pre-capitalist societies where workers were not alienated from their labour. Instead, Marx argued that the actual historical process of primitive accumulation of capital was carried out through colonial relations of appropriation by force.42 While not a perfect analogy, because of the lack of material labour, the value of which is to be forcibly appropriated in orbital space, space control is like such primitive accumulation in constituting a global capitalist order through the colonisation of space as previously common property. One of the purposes of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty was to preserve a commons where all states, regardless of technical ability or economic or military power, could participate in the potential benefits space has to offer. In the years since this treaty was signed, the primary economic use of space has been for commercial communications satellites. This industry has expanded dramatically in the last two decades. Total revenues for commercial space-related industries in 1980 were $2.1 bn; by 2003 this figure had expanded to $91 bn and it was expected to increase at least as rapidly into the foreseeable future.43 Space control is about determining who has access to this new economy. Positions in orbit for satellites are a new form of ‘real estate’. By controlling access to orbital space the US would be forcibly appropriating the orbits, in effect turning them into primitively accumulated private property.44 In this way, the US becomes even more than it is now the sovereign state for global capitalism, the global capitalist state.

Link – Space Weaponization

Space weaponization is just another branch of US imperialism and allows the US to effectively transcend earthly limitations to its imperial aspirations.

Duvall and Havercroft 2008 [Raymond of the Department of Political Science at the University of Minnesota and Jonathan, Assistant Professor at Department of Political Science at the University of Oklahoma, “Taking Sovereignty Out of This World,” in *Review of International Studies* 34.4]

In what kind of military operations, then, would space-based weapons for force application be useful? Military analysts have speculated on just such questions: Alternatively, a space weapon might be the weapon of choice for an otherwise lower-value target if the space weapon were the only choice available in time, particularly for a time critical political effect. For example, a locomotive might not be worth a space-delivered smart munition. However, it might be well worth the use of a space-delivered smart munition to target a locomotive pulling a train full of people forced from their homes for transport to the border or to a concentration camp at the beginning of an ethnic cleansing campaign – particularly if aircraft and helicopters cannot reach the train because air defenses have not been suppressed, basing and overflight rights have not been granted, or coalition consensus on the action has not been reached.51 This scenario is fascinating for the political logic at work within it – force application from space is required to attack an otherwise inaccessible target. All three reasons stated for inaccessibility involve potential gaps in US capacity to project its power globally. Either the defences of the target country have not been suppressed, or other states have not consented to let US forces fly through their airspace, or other coalition members – presumably in NATO or the UN – have not consented to the action. What places targets ‘out of reach’ in this scenario, then, is the sovereignty of other states as exercised through their abilities to defend their territory, control their airspace, and/or participate (jointly) in authorised decision of the (global) exception to international law. As Schmitt has argued with respect to domestic law, the sovereign is constituted through the capacity to decide the exception to the application of law in a moment of crisis.52 The effect of space weapons for force application is to erase that sovereignty – states are constituted as subjects lacking authorisation of decision, and lacking a boundary effectively demarcating inside from outside. While other weapons systems can be used to intervene in affairs within a state’s borders, their constitutive logic (with the possible exception of nuclear and some forms of biological weapons) is not, per se, corrosive of sovereignty, because in principle, even if not in every instance, they can be defended against. Precision space-based strikes happen so rapidly, however, that a defensive response is not possible. As such they strip states of the defensive ‘hard shell’ that, classical realists argued, is constitutive of sovereignty. All three justifications thus buttress the exclusive capacity of the US to ‘decide the exception’ globally, while diminishing, by circumvention, the sovereignty of other states. The hypothetical use of space weapons in this scenario is an imperial project.53 Furthermore, these weapons would be most useful against small targets, such as groups and individuals. While the justification for the use of space-based weapons in the quoted scenario was to prevent genocide, the hypothetical attack constitutes their possessor as global police, punishing without trial those specific actors it deems responsible for genocide. Even if the specific act provoking space-based attack is not a violation of international law, the political society with the capacity to intervene – and with it the capacity to decide when to intervene – constitutes itself as sovereign police of the international system.54 Space-based weapons for force application, then, are most useful at targeting individuals and groups at short notice in order to achieve the policing objective of ‘order’ and control under a rule of law, even as that sovereign policing decision is made outside of the very law in whose name it is made.

Link – Weaponization

Modes of political killing matter: they constitute the conception of sovereignty and power at work in constructing and maintaining the powers of states.

Duvall and Havercroft 2008 [Raymond of the Department of Political Science at the University of Minnesota and Jonathan, Assistant Professor at Department of Political Science at the University of Oklahoma, “Taking Sovereignty Out of This World,” in *Review of International Studies* 34.4]

Scholars and practitioners have long recognised that technologies of destruction and economies/cartographies of violence affect the form and character of relations within and among political societies.7 A substantial literature on the war-inducing/ war-preventing effects of offensive versus defensive military balances provides testimony to that recognition,8 as do arguments commonplace in realist theory that changes in military technology can bring about changes in the distribution of power and, in turn, often violent international systemic change.9 These lines of thought, and others, assume that the dynamics of political interaction and even systemic structure of international relations are causally affected by the availability and use of technologies of violence. The significant effects of modes of political killing, however, are not limited to causally shaping social-political relations of stability and instability within and among existing political societies. Effects can be in terms of constitutive processes, as well. Technologies of destruction and economies/cartographies of violence are, in part, constitutive of what political society is. That is to say, modes of political killing are productive of political subjects. Research by Charles Tilly10 and others11 on the development of the modern states-system rests on and expresses this point. In this highly influential interpretation, the modern, territorial state was socially constituted and produced as the dominant form of political society in relationship to and through newly emerging technologies of destruction and economies/cartographies of violence (in conjunction, of course, with other processes).12 On a different register, Alexander Wendt’s argument about teleology and the inevitability of a world state rests on an assumption that endogenously changing technologies and economies of violence alter what it means to be a state seeking security in relation to other states.13 If the constitutive effects of modes of political killing are to be adequately theorised with respect to the changing subjectivity of the dominant form of political society in the contemporary era, a central issue must concern consequences for the constitution of sovereignty. Regrettably, few scholars have addressed that crucially important question. A significant exception is the strand of political realism that Daniel Deudney labelled ‘nuclear one worldism’.14 That tradition, initiated by Hans Morgenthau and especially John Herz early in the nuclear era, offered an incisive argument about nuclear weapons’ deterritorialising effects on states.15 Herz begins with the assumption that ‘Throughout history, that unit which affords protection and security to human beings has tended to become the basic political unit; people, in the long run, will recognise that authority, any authority, which possesses the power of protection’.16 In his view, the power of protection is completely eroded by nuclear weapons. The state loses its ‘hard shell’ of defensibility, and with it the foundations of its sovereignty. For Herz, nuclear weapons conjoined with air warfare capabilities mean that ‘Whatever remained of the impermeability of states seems to have gone for good’,17 because even the possibility of their use ‘obliterate[s] the very meaning of unit and unity, power and power relations, sovereignty and independence’.18 Succinctly put, ‘the meaning and function of the basic protective unit, the ‘‘sovereign’’ nation-state itself, have become doubtful’.19 As Deudney points out, this initially influential argument has mostly fallen out of favour with the passage of time, as the horrific potential of nuclear war has receded in political imaginaries, and as a different strand of realist thought emphasising the stabilising effect of nuclear deterrence has become widely accepted. According to the latter view, which Deudney labels ‘deterrence statism’, nuclear war can be, and is, deterred by the assurance of mutual destruction. This deterrent effect serves to reinscribe the territorial integrity of sovereign state authority. But as Deudney argues: The current near consensus among international relations theorists that the state has weathered the nuclear revolution could turn out to be as far off the mark as the widely held view, proclaimed by Zbigniew Brzezinski in 1986, that the US-Soviet rivalry was ‘an effectively permanent feature of world politics.’ In short, the simplest nuclear one world scenario of ‘after the deluge, the covenant’ retains a residual credibility that forbids us from ever completely dismissing it.20 That ‘residual credibility’, Deudney believes, should and can be given new theoretical life if a more complex appreciation of the forms and effects of military technologies is developed than that provided by the ‘nuclear one worldists’, and if a fuller theorisation is offered of the constitution of political societies/political subjects. We take up that challenge, extending but appreciably modifying the ‘nuclear one worldist’ basic insight, by asking how orbital space weapons have significant constitutive effects on sovereignty, constitutive of a new political form: empire of the future.

Link – Realism

The use of space by a state will always be within the realist frame; since the advent of the space age it has always been about military power

Sheehan ‘7.(BSc, PhD, professor at Swansea University, former professor at University of Aberdeen, Director of the Scottish Centre for International Security, *The International Politics of Space,* 2007, <http://books.google.com/books?id=5LUR6CiBwusC&source=gbs_navlinks_s>, AG, pages 10-11)

While classical realism saw state power as embracing more than the military dimension, nevertheless military power was emphasized to a greater extent than other forms. Apart from its specific use in deterring attack, supporting allies, acquiring resources and so on, it was seen as a shield behind which all other tools of influence could be exercised. The military potential of space was recongnised at the outset of the space age. The movement into space opened up ‘unprecedented possibilities of a military nature’.23 Even before the end of the Cold War the growing importance of satellites in the conduct of strategy and foreign policy encouraged the belief that ‘conventional wisdom regarding the conduct of world affairs is rapidly being dispelled’.24 The strategic significance of space has been brought about by the tremendous advances in communications, surveillance and navigation that they have made possible. Satellite systems have advanced to the point where they have become the eyes, ears and voices of the major powers. But, as the increasing dependency of great power strategy has become apparent, the satellites that make it possible have themselves become attractive military targets. As with the skies in the early twentieth century, space evolved from being seen simply as an environment in which the use of force on the ground might be aided, to a dimension in which combat would take place, as each side sought to exploit the military use of space, and deny its use to the enemy. The logic of the inevitability of such developments in line with the realist approach to international relations, and it is similarly a self-fulfilling prophecy to the extent that states act as if it was true.

Link – Realism

**No US space program can move away from realism: the only way the USFG sees space as helpful is to carry out power-maximizing programs even if they get marked as classified or hidden within non-military programs.**

Weeden ‘8 (technical advisor for Secure World Foundation, former officer in United States Air Force, U.S. Strategic Command’s Joint Space Operations Center, Arms Control Today, *Space Weaponization: Aye or Nay?* , November 2008, Vol. 38, Iss. 9; pg. 57, 4 pgs, AG)

Although the 1967 Outer Space Treaty banned military installations on celestial bodies, including the moon, today's military visions of space are nearly as flawed. Much of the military still sees space as only existing to support the war-fighter on the ground, land, and sea and considers doing "space for space reasons" a waste of money and resources. Large numbers of military leaders are still ignorant of the fundamental physics of outer space, which leads to serious discussion of fantasy ideas such as space planes dropping Marines into combat anywhere around the world. Similarly, as Dwayne Day recalls, the military has long toyed with the idea of a military space plane. Day examines previously classified Air Force plans from their inception in 1958, before NASA and Project Mercury, to when they went underground after President Dwight Eisenhower's mandate that NASA should assume the manned spaceflight role. The program eventually led to two threads: plans for military space vehicles and military space stations, of which only certain aspects, Dyna-Soar and Manned Orbiting Laboratory, have previously been known. Although the military years ago realized that unmanned spacecraft could do a far better and cheaper job in orbit and abandoned serious plans in this arena, the concept of a military space plane has not gone away. At least once a decade, the idea is dusted off and given new funding and rhetoric, only to result years later in failure and wasted taxpayer funds.

Link – Realism

**The sphere of realist power balancing is continued into space; China’s and the United States’ response to space moves prove.**

Zhang ‘11 (Associate Professor of Political Science, Director of the Center for Asia Pacific Studies at Linegnan University in Hong Kong, Asian Survey, *The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China Military Space Relationship: The Prospects for Arms Control*, 2011, Vol. 51, Number 2, pg 311-313, AG)

Indeed, in the wake of China’s January 2007 anti-satellite (ASAT) test, many U.S. experts have attempted to identify China’s motives. One driver of China’s military space program is its perception of a forthcoming revolution in military affairs. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) sees space as a new and critical dimension of future warfare. The comment by the commander of the Chinese Air Force captures this perception of the PLA.2 In addition, China’s military space program is seen as part of a broad asymmetric strategy designed to offset conventional U.S. military advantages. For example, as observed by Ashley J. Tellis in 2007, “China’s pursuit of counterspace capabilities is not driven fundamentally by a desire to protest American space policies, and those of the George W. Bush administration in particular, but is part of a considered strategy designed to counter the overall military capabilities of the United States.”3 Richard J. Adams and Martin E. France, U.S. Air Force officers, contend that “Chinese interests in space weapons do not hinge on winning a potential U.S.-Chinese ASAT battle or participating in a space arms race.” Instead, they argue, China’s military space program is driven by a desire to “counter the space-enabled advantage of U.S. conventional forces.”4 This perspective implies that given the predicted U.S. superiority in conventional warfare, China feels compelled to continue its offensive military space program. Inevitably, this perspective sees China as the main instigator of a possible space arms race, whether implicitly or explicitly. China’s interpretation of the revolution in military affairs and its quest for asymmetric warfare capabilities are important for understanding the 2007 ASAT test. This article suggests that the Chinese military space program is also influenced by the security dilemma in international relations. Due to the anarchic nature of the world order, “the search for security on the part of state A leads to insecurity for state B which therefore takes steps to increase its security leading in its turn to increased insecurity for state A and so on.”5 The military space relationship between China and the U.S. clearly embodies the tragedy of a security dilemma. In many ways, the current Chinese thinking on space warfare reflects China’s response to the perceived U.S. threat to its national security. This response, in turn, has triggered American suspicion about China’s military intentions in outer space. Thus, the security dilemma in the U.S.-China space relationship has inevitably led to measures and countermeasures. As Joan Johnson-Freese, a scholar at the Naval War College, observed after the January 2007 ASAT test, China and the U.S. “have been engaged in a dangerous spiral of action-reaction space planning and/or activity.”6

Link – Realism

**The United States will never stop striving for space domination, and is the only current country that can achieve it. This recreates the classic security dilemma, but in the more dangerous environment of space.**

Zhang ‘11 (Associate Professor of Political Science, Director of the Center for Asia Pacific Studies at Linegnan University in Hong Kong, Asian Survey, *The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China Military Space Relationship: The Prospects for Arms Control*, 2011, Vol. 51, Number 2, pg 315-316, AG)

The first factor that caused the security dilemma in the Sino-U.S. military space relationship is the professed American quest for space dominance. This quest is a reflection of the U.S. obsession with primacy that predates the Obama administration. The primacy strategy demands undisputed military dominance in different areas, including space, to ensure the best possible protection of U.S. national security. The U.S. is the only country in the world that has articulated a coherent national strategy for space dominance. As emphasized by Michael W. Wynne, former Air Force secretary, “America’s domination of the space domain provides an unrivaled advantage for our nation and remains critical to creating the strategic and tactical conditions for victory.”12 The U.S. is the leader in the militarization of space. It was the first country that established a dedicated command, the U.S. Space Command, to unify military operations in space. In fact, as its Vision for 2020 proclaims, the Space Command seeks to achieve “full spectrum dominance” in space.13 Furthermore, it envisions permanent dominance in the military dimension of space operations: “Today, the U.S. is the preeminent military space power. Our vision is one of maintaining that preeminence—providing a solid foundation for our national security.”14 General Lance W. Lord, former commander, Air Force Space Command, points out the importance of space dominance: “Space superiority is the future of warfare. We cannot win a war without controlling the high ground, and the high ground is space.”15 In December 2007, the U.S. Air Force released a White Paper called The Nation’s Guardians: America’s 21st Century Air Force, in which General T. Michael Moseley made a similar statement: “No future war will be won without air, space and cyberspace superiority”; thus, “the Air Force must attain cross-domain dominance. Cross-domain dominance is the freedom to attack and the freedom from attack in and through the atmosphere, space and electromagnetic spectrum.”16 This strategy of space dominance, however, generates the classic security dilemma between the U.S. and other countries. Although the U.S. may be motivated by defensive purposes, such as shielding the American population from nuclear weapons and other threats, other countries have to assume the worst in an anarchic world. As observed by Joan Johnson-Freese, “I would argue that the rest of the world accepts U.S. space supremacy. What the Bush Administration claims is space dominance, and that’s what the rest of the world won’t accept.”17

Link – Threat Construction

Space is just another theater used by the US to maximize their power: all past decisions prove

Sheehan ‘7.(BSc, PhD, professor at Swansea University, former professor at University of Aberdeen, Director of the Scottish Centre for International Security, *The International Politics of Space,* 2007, <http://books.google.com/books?id=5LUR6CiBwusC&source=gbs_navlinks_s>, AG, pages 18-19)

The exploitation of space refers to the actual use of space as another political theater, where states in the long term might seek to exploit cosmic resources for their power potential, but in the sort term exploit space because of its ability to produce ‘force multiplier’ effects on their existing terrestrial military capabilities,51 or as an economic asset.52 Here, space is simply a medium for the acquisition or exercise of power, strategic, economic, ideological, but always with profound political implications. This dichotomy was present from the beginning of the space age. It can be seen in the schizophrenic attitude of the German and Soviet rocketry pioneers in the interwar rocket societies VfR and GIRD who had scientific and spaceflight-ideological goals favouring space exploration, but had to subordinate them to the demands of the military. This dichotomy between competition and cooperation is of great political significance for the major powers in relation to their foreign policy interests in space activity. On the one hand they will cooperate where refusal to do so is likely to ‘stimulate moves towards space independence by other nations’.53 On the other hand, they wish to preserve their hegemonic positions unchallenged and will therefore restrict cooperation to those areas of space activity that will not affect the stable and predominant position enjoyed by the major space powers, particularly when they fear the transfer of technology with critical military or commercial value.54 The continuing centrality of this dilemma can be seen in the United States’ space policy, which has become focused on the requirement to gain and maintain ‘space control’. The United States has edged steadily closer to the acquisition of the military and infrastructural capabilities necessary to conduct space warfare and ensure that the US is able to exercise an effective monopoly of military space use in wartime. But the United States has so far resisted the temptation to cross the threshold of space weaponisation and move swiftly to deploy such capabilities because, so long as America’s hegemonic position in space is under no significant challenge, the it is preferable to maintain the current cooperative and non-weaponised space environment, since it meets all the United States’ requiremnts.55

Link – Security

Security is the metaphysical foundation for all modern political arrangements.

Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security*,pp. 12-14]

There is a preoccupation which links both the beginning and the end of metaphysics, and so also the beginning and the end of metaphysical politics. It is something which, because it furnishes the fundamental link between politics and metaphysics, affords me my entry into the relationship which obtains between them. That something is security. If the question of the political is to be recovered from metaphysical thinking, therefore, then security has to be brought into question first. Security, of course, saturates the language of modern politics. Our political vocabularies reek of it and our political imagination is confined by it. The hypocrisy of our rulers (whosoever ‘we’ are) consistently hides behind it. It would, therefore, be an easy task to establish that security is the first and foundational requirement of the State, of modern understandings of politics, and of International Relations, not only by reference to specific political theorists but also by reference to the discourses of States. But I want to explore the thought that modern politics is a security project for reasons which are antecedent to, and account for, the axioms and propositions of (inter)national political theorists, the platitudes of political discourse, and the practices of States, their political classes and leaders. Consequently, to conceive of our politics as a politics of security is not to advance a view held by particular thinkers or even by particular disciplines. It is to draw attention to a necessity (which Heidegger’s history of metaphysics will later allow us to note and explore) to which all thinkers of politics in the metaphysical tradition are subject. In pursuing this thought it follows that security turns-out to have a much wider register—has always and necessarily had a much wider register, something which modern international security studies have begun to register—than that merely of preserving our so-called basic values, or even our mortal bodies. That it has, in Chapter 1 Security, philosophy and politics 13 fact, always been concerned with securing the very grounds of what the political itself is; specifying what the essence of politics is thought to be. The reason is that the thought within which political thought occurs—metaphysics—and specifically its conception of truth, is itself a security project. For metaphysics is a tradition of thought defined in terms of the pursuit of security; with the securing, in fact, of a secure arche, determining principle, beginning or ground, for which its under-standing of truth and its quest for certainty calls. Security, then, finds its expression as the principle, ground or arche—for which metaphysical thought is a search—upon which something stands, pervading and guiding it in its whole structure and essence. Hence, as Leibniz wrote: If one builds a house in a sandy place, one must continue digging until one meets solid rock or firm foundations; if one wants to unravel a tangled thread one must look for the beginning of the thread; if the greatest weights are to be moved, Archimedes demanded only a stable place. In the same way, if one is to establish the elements of human knowledge some fixed point is required, on which we can safely rest and from which we can set out without fear.1 (emphasis added) It is for this reason, therefore, that metaphysics first allows security to impress itself upon political thought as a self-evident condition for the very existence of life—both individual and social. One of those impulses which it is said appears like an inner command to be instinctive (in the form, for example, of the instinct for survival), or axiomatic (in the form of the principle of self-preservation, the right to life, or the right to self defence), security thereby became the value which modern understandings of the political and modern practices of politics have come to put beyond question, precisely because they derived its very requirement from the requirements of metaphysical truth itself. In consequence, security became the predicate upon which the architectonic political discourses of modernity were constructed; upon which the vernacular architecture of modern political power, exemplified in the State, was based; and from which the institutions and practices of modern (inter)national politics, including modern democratic politics, ultimately seek to derive their grounding and foundational legitimacy. Thus, for example, and in a time other than our own, the security of an ecumene of belief in the ground of a divinely ordained universe promising salvation for human beings—something that, constituting the Christian Church, provided an ideal of community which continues to pervade the Western tradition—insisted: ‘extra ecclesiam nulla salus’2 (no salvation outside the Church). Salvation was the ultimate form of spiritual security. And that security was to be acquired through being gathered back into where we belong; a belonging, in other words, to God. What is crucial here is not what happens to us after death, but salvation as the expression of the longing for the return to a pure and unadulterated form of belonging; a final closing-up of the wound of existence by returning to a lost oneness that never was. The reverse of Cyprian’s dictum was, of course, equally 14 Security, philosophy and politics true. No Church without salvation. The outcome of this project was a rejection of the world through the constitution of an ideal world which—not least because of the model it offered, the resentment which it fostered and the economy of salvation and cruelty which it instantiated—acted in the world to constitute a form of redeeming politics.3 In a way that indicates the continuity of the metaphysical tradition, however, this slogan can be, and was, easily adjusted to furnish the defining maxim of modern politics: no security outside the State; no State without security. And this, in its turn, has given rise to powerful forms of what I would call the disciplinary politics of Hobbesian thought and the actuarial politics of technologised thought. Each of these is also concerned to specify the principle, ground or rule that would satisfy the metaphysically sequestered compulsion for security; thus relieving human being of the dilemmas and challenges it faces to discover, in its changing circumstances, what it is to be—to act and live—as humans. The basic thought to be pursued is one which, in simultaneously drawing both our current politics and our tradition of political thought into question by challenging their mutual foundation in security, serves, in addition, to illustrate and explore some important aspects of the political implications of Heidegger’s thought. My thought, then, is that modern politics is a security project in the widest possible—ontological—sense of the term because it was destined to become so by virtue of the very character or nature of the thinking of truth within which, through which, and by continuous and intimate reference to which, politics itself has always been thought. What is at issue first of all, for me, therefore, is not whether one says yes or no to our modern (inter)national regimes of security, but what Foucault would have called the overall discursive fact that security is spoken about at all, the way in which it is put into political discourse and how it circulates throughout politics and other discourses. I think Heidegger’s account of metaphysics provides a means of addressing that fundamental question.

Link – Security

Their discourse of danger is preoccupied with eluding death, justifying atrocities and nuclear war in the name of avoiding security problems – This way of thinking reduces life to avoiding death, making it impossible to articulate a value to life

Campbell 98 (David- PHD, Prof of cultural & poli geog @ U of Durham, *Writing Security*, p.54-55)

It requires an emphasis on the unfinished and endangered nature of the world. In other words, discourses of 'danger' are central to the discourses of the `state' and the discourses of `man.'43 In place of the spiritual certitude that provided the vertical intensity to support the horizontal extensiveness of Christendom, the state requires discourses of 'danger' to provide a new theology of truth about who and what 'we' are by highlighting who or what `we' are not, and what 'we' have to fear. This is not to suggest that fear and danger are modern constructs which only emerged after the relative demise of Christendom. On the contrary, the church relied heavily on discourses of danger to establish its authority, discipline its followers, and ward off its enemies. Indeed, although this disposition was important to the power of the church throughout its history, for the three centuries between the Black Death of 1348 and the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the agents of God propagated a woeful vision of life marked by a particular attitude towards death.' Thinking that western civilization was besieged by a horde of enemies (Turks, Jews, heretics, idolaters, and witches, to name but a few), the church saw the devil everywhere and encouraged introspection and guilt to such an extent that a culture of anxiety predominated. The literary tradition of contemptus mundi (`contempt for the world'), which was pivotal to the culture of anxiety and the acute sense of endangeredness it encouraged, bespoke hatred for the body and the world, the pervasiveness of sin, the fleeting nature of time, and the fragility of life. Moreover, it was this `evangalism of fear’ which produced a preoccupation with death. As the promise of an escape from earthly vices, the religious leitmotif of 'salvation' obliged all those who sought this transcendence 'to think continually about death in order to avoid sin, because sin plus death could land them in Hell.'" Meditation on death was thus the principal form of a moral pedagogy which sought to ensure salvation. In fostering an evangelism of fear, with death as its impetus and salvation as its goal, the cultural agents of the period were not simply responding to danger as an external condition. The required familiarity with death demanded of individuals an eternal vigilance against the self: 'One should always keep death in mind, just as one would always mount guard against an enemy who might suddenly appear' (indeed, for essayists like Montaigne, 'death' was a synonym for `enemy').47 But it was this vigilance against the self, encouraged by the experience of finitude, and required in the name of salvation, which constituted the conditions of contemptus mundi from which one sought salvation. In the Speculum peccatoris (`Sinner's Mirror') — a manuscript attributed to St Augustine — the author declares: `Consideration of the brevity of life engenders contempt for the world'; and Rethinking foreign policy continues: 'is there anything that can increase man's vigilance, his flight from injustice, and his saintly behavior in the fear of God more than the realization of his [future] alteration, the precise knowledge of his mortal condition and the consequent thought of his horrible death, when man becomes nonman?'48 The logic of the evangelism of fear thus ferments the very conditions which it claims necessitate vigilance against the enemies of the self; put simply, it produces its own danger. The evangelism of fear and its logic of identity is not a thing of the past, however. In our own time, argues Delumeau, we can witness its operation: Does not our own epoch help us to understand the beginnings of European modernity? The mass killings of the twentieth century from 1914 to the genocide of Cambodia — passing through various holocausts and the deluge of bombs on Vietnam — the menace of nuclear war, the ever-increasing use of torture, the multiplication of Gulags, the resurgence of insecurity, the rapid and often more and more troubling progress of technology, the dangers entailed by an overly intensive exploitation of natural resources, various genetic manipulations, and the uncontrolled explosion of information: Here are so many factors that, gathered together, create a climate of anxiety in our civilization which, in certain respects, is comparable to that of our ancestors between the time of the plague and the end of the Wars of Religion. We have reentered this 'country of fear' and, following a classic process of 'projection,' we never weary of evoking it in both words and images . . . Yesterday, as today, fear of violence is objectified in images of violence and fear of death in macabre visions.' To talk of the endangered nature of the modern world and the enemies and threats which abound in it is thus not to offer a simple ethnographic description of our condition; it is to invoke a discourse of danger through which the incipient ambiguity of our world can be grounded in accordance with the insistences of identity. Danger (death, in its ultimate form) might therefore be thought of as the new god for the modern world of states, not because it is peculiar to our time, but because it replicates the logic of Christendom's evangelism of fear.

Link – Security

Danger is life, “a call to being” – Controlling danger orders the living out of life

Campbell 98 (David- PHD, Prof of cultural & poli geog @ U of Durham, *Writing Security*, p.92-93)

Danger, argues Mary Douglas, is always present at the border. Danger might involve pressure on the external boundaries; it might involve the violation of internal boundaries; it might be located in the margins of the boundary; or danger might arise with contradictions from within.29 Were there no borders, there would be no danger — but such a condition is at odds with the logic of identity, for the condition of possibility for experience entails (at least to some extent) the disciplining of ambiguity, the containment of contingency, and the delineation of borders. In other words, given that difference is a requisite for identity, danger is inherent to that relationship: 'Where there is no differentiation there is no defilement.'39 As such, danger is not an external condition that can be either tempered or transcended; danger is a part of all our relationships with the world. And as Jean Delumeau concluded with respect to fear, danger can be experienced positively as well as negatively: it can be a creative force, 'a call to being,' that provides access to the world.31 The issue, then, is how do we orient ourselves to danger, particularly at an historical juncture in which many novel dangers seem to abound? Can we do more than simply extend the old register of security to cover the new domains? What modes of being and forms of life could we or should we adopt? Do we have an alternative to the continued reproduction of sovereign communities in an economy of violence? However one might begin to fathom the many issues located within those challenges, our current situation leaves us with one certainty: because we cannot escape the logic of differentiation we are often tempted by the logic of defilement. To say as much, however, it not to argue that we are imprisoned within a particular and permanent system of representations. To be sure, danger is more often than. not represented as disease, dirt, or pollution. As one medical text argues: 'Disease is shock and danger for existence.'32 Or as Karl Jaspers maintains: 'Disease is a general concept of non-value which includes all possible negative values.'33 But such concerns have less to do with the intrinsic qualities of those conditions than the modernist requirements of order and stability: 'Dirt offends against order. Eliminating it is not a negative moment, but a positive effort to organize the environment.'34 One might suggest that it is the extent to which we want to organize the environment — the extent to which we want to purify our domain — that determines how likely it is that we represent danger in terms of dirt or disease. Tightly defined order and strictly enforced stability, undergirded by notions of purity, are not a priori conditions of existence; some order and some stability might be required for existence as we know it (i.e., in some form of extensive political community), but it is the degree of tightness, the measure of strictness, and the extent of the desire for purity which constitutes danger as dirt or disease.

Link – Environment

Environmental management is an act of security- specifies threats that need to be secured.

Dalby 2 ( Simon- PHD, Prof @ Carleton U, *Environmental Security*, Intro- pg XXXII, 2, ET)

Environmental politics is very much about the politics of dis-course, the presentation of "problems," and of who should deal with the concerns so specified. These discourses frequently turn complex political matters into managerial and technological issues of sustainable development where strategies of "ecological modernization" finnesse the questions by promising technical solutions to numerous political difficulties and, in the process, work to co-opt or marginalize fundamental challenges to the contemporary world order.51 In Tim Luke's apt summation: "Underneath the enchanting green patina, sustainable development is about sustaining development as economically rationalized environment rather than the development of a sustaining ecology." Linking such themes to security, with its practices of specifying threats and its managerial modes for responding to dangers, suggests a broad congruency of discourse and practice.53 But what ought to be secured frequently remains unexamined, as does the precise nature of what it is that causes contemporary endangerments. Like other disciplinary endeavors, both environmental management and security studies have their practices for the delimitation of appropriate objects, methods, and procedures. Making these explicit and showing how they both facilitate and simultaneously limit inquiry is an unavoidable task for any study that takes Foucault's for-mulation of critique seriously. Challenging conventional wisdom is rarely easy, and disrupting geopolitical categories can be especially "unsettling." Asking unsettling questions about the identities of those who think in the conventional categories is not easy either. But it seems very necessary now, given the limitations of both the security and the environmental discourses we have inherited from the past and the pressing need to think intelligently about what kind of planet we are making.

Environmental thinking through sustaining of globalization is used as a manner of securitization.

Dalby 2 ( Simon- PHD, Prof @ Carleton U, *Environmental Security*, p 167- 168, 2, ET)

The globe, so often the symbol of endangerment in environmental thinking, has also been appropriated as a powerful icon by numerous advertisers to peddle all sorts of commodities and invoke a multiplicity of anxieties.8 Globalization is in this sense a cultural process relating to identities and the symbol of the globe itself, as well as an economic one.9 In television advertising in North America in the late 199os, Sprint Canada literally reduced the size of the spinning globe in its commercials that implied that reduced overseas phone call charges made the world a smaller place, and Malibu cars went four times around the world through numerous landscapes before they needed a tune-up. Perhaps most significant for the argument in this book were the Chevy Blazer sport utility vehicles (SUVs) seen negotiating numerous hazards on their journeys through a variety of environments before arriving unscathed either at a beach or at a large suburban home. The vehicles were sold with the slogan "a little security in an insecure world." Security is a matter of a safe space provided technologically to keep external dangers at bay. But this is an individualist's technological response to a "dangerous" world, a response that, however, only the global corporations can provide. It is one that uses technology to ensure that the autono-mous subject and family are not endangered. But there is a very powerful irony here in that the vehicle uses fossil fuels to propel itself and its passengers through storms, the frequency of which may be increased by the global climate changes brought on precisely by the use of fossil fuels. Big vehicles, specifically the popular sport utility vehicles like the Chevy Blazer, are fuel inefficient and, if buying trends at the turn of the century are maintained, will ensure that many states have little hope of meeting carbon dioxide emissions levels agreed to in international climate change agreements in the 199os. Kaplan's metaphor of the rich in their limousine might be updated to specify sport utility vehicles because the potholes are much worse. 3 This theme further links to the discussions of neoliberalism, to the contemporary reduction of state functions, and to the provision of public transport. Suburban families in the North increasingly use vehicles to transport children to schools and to numerous other so-cial events. The rationale for using vehicles is frequently an assumption of safety in a political culture of personal insecurity where either strangers are viewed as dangerous predators or vehicles themselves are understood as a threat to pedestrians. In environmental terms, this raises the question of whether the modern subject is sustainable, but it also points very directly to the assumptions about what is to be secured and how security is to be provided. In particular, it suggests once again that the suburban consumer lifestyle aspirations of modern autonomous citizens are premised on an unsustainable global economy.

Link – Economy

Threats to global capitalism revolve around the idea that the poorer nations on earth are a threat to economic stability – They authorize wars in the name of finance

Lipschutz 98 (Ronnie D, Professor, Department of Politics @ The UC Santa Cruz, *On Security,* "8. Negotiating the Boundaries of Difference and Security at Millennium's End," Cioanet,http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz18.html, AD: 7/10/09) jl

Today, a similar set of circumstances, brought on by economic globalization, seems to be developing and imposing costs and risks on the very people it is intended to benefit. In this context, talk of "economic security" becomes, once again, a speech act that seeks to legitimate a policy that promises very real insecurity for many. The market is a place full of risks, and only those who are willing to take risks in the market are likely to reap great benefits; given the logic of the market, these same individuals also risk bankruptcy and personal economic insecurity (an outcome only too evident in Orange County California's declaration of bankruptcy and Mexico's economic travails). Indeed, as Beverly Crawford's chapter seems to suggest, in a world of economic globalism, in which states must collaborate to foster global capitalism, and the processes of production, consumption, and accumulation become decoupled from individual states, it becomes more and more difficult to constitute an Other that might be transformed into a threatening enemy, thereby legitimating the differential degrees of personal and national security awarded by the market. We have seen some feeble efforts, based on notions of economic competitiveness and technological innovation, and given illustration in Michael Crichton's xenophobic and misogynistic Rising Sun , but these seem not to be very persuasive. A few argue that we (the United States) must become more like the Other (Japan) if we are to be made secure. [16](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz18.html#note16) How different this is from the world(s) of Morgenthau and Waltz! Business and capital are only too aware of this paradox, whereas the world of states and military power seems blissfully oblivious to it. For capital, there are no enemies, only competitors; indeed, the market, while competitive, is a realm of cooperation , not conflict, as is often assumed. [17](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz18.html#note17) Markets are rule-governed institutions and, to get along, you must go along. In the marketplace, nonexclusive identities are prized, not shunned, and multiple identities are encouraged in the name of consumer taste and "autonomy." This world is, as Kenichi Ohmae puts it, truly "borderless." [18](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz18.html#note18) Not only are there no borders between countries, there are no borders between market and consumer, either. What can security possibly mean in such a world? Not everyone is, of course, a participant in the market; indeed, there are billions of people and dozens of countries that are not. In spite of warnings about instability as the "enemy," these people and "states" are neither enemies nor threats to us in either an objective or intersubjective sense. Rather, the places in which many of them are found are more akin to realms constituted or consumed by chaos. The inhabitants of these zone participate in neither statist politics nor  global markets as we understand them, not so much out of choice or desire as out of the logic of economic globalization driven by capitalism and the industrial coalition. But these zones of chaos are not just places "outside" of space or time; paradoxically, perhaps, they are sites of political experimentation, from which are emerging "world systems" that, if successful, could ultimately undermine the relative orderliness of the peaceful zones of the industrial coalition.

Link – Hegemony

By defining security around the predominance of US influence, every conflict of interests becomes justification for militarization, escalating to war.

Campbell 98 (David, Professor International Politics at University of New Castle, *Writing Security; United States Foreign Policy the Politics of Identity,* 31-33)

Most important just as the source of danger has never been fixed, neither has the identity that it was said to threaten. The contours of this identity have been the subject of constant (re)writing; no rewriting in the sense of changing the meaning, but rewriting in the sense of inscribing something so that which is contingent and subject to flux is rendered more permanent. While one might have expected few if any references to national values or purposes in confidential prepared for the inner sanctum of national security policy (after all, don't they know who they are or what they represent?) the texts of foreign policy are replete with statements about the fulfillment of the republic, the fundamental purpose of the nation, God given rights, moral codes, the principles of European civilization, the fear of cultural and spiritual loss, and the responsibilities and duties thrust upon the gleaming example of America. In this sense, the texts that guided national security policy did more than simply offer strategic analysis of the "reality" they confronted: they actively concerned themselves with the scripting of a particular American identity. Stamped "Top Secret" and read by only the select and power few, the texts effaced the boundary between inside and outside with their quasi-Puritan figurations. In employing this mode of representation, the foreign policy texts of the postwar period recalled the seventeenth-century literary genre of the jeremiad, or political sermon, in which Puritan preachers combined searing critiques with appeals for spiritual renewal. Later to establish the interpretive framework for national identity, these exhortations drew on a European tradition of preaching the omnipresence of sin so as to instill the desire for order but they added a distinctly affirmative moment: The American Puritan jeremiad was the ritual of a culture on an errand - which is to say, a culture based on a faith in process. Substituting teleology for hierarchy, it discarded the Old War ideal of stasis for a New World vision of the future. Its function was to create a climate of anxiety that helped release the restless "progressivist" energies required for the success of the venture. The European jeremiad thrived on anxiety, of course. Like all "Traditionalist" forms of ritual, it used fear and trembling to teach acceptance of fixed social norms. But the American jeremiad went much further. It made anxiety its end as well as its means. Crisis was the social norm it sought to inculcate. The very concept of errand after all, implied a state of *un*fulfillment. The future, though divinely assured, was never quite there, and New England's Jeremiahs set out to provide the sense of insecurity that would ensure the outcome. Whereas the Puritan jeremiads were preached b y religious figures in public, the national security planners entreated in private the urgency of the manifold dangers confronting the republic. But the refrains of their political sermons have occupied a prominent place in postwar political discourse. On two separate occasions (first in 1950, and t hen in 196), private citizens with close ties to the foreign policy bureaucracy established a "Committee on the Present Danger" to alert a public they perceived as lacking resolve and will to necessity of confronting the political and military threat of communism and the Society Union. More recently, with Pentagon planners concerned about the "guerillas, assassins, terrorists, and subversives" said to be "nibbling away" at the United States, proclamations that the fundamental values of the country are under threat have been no less insistent. As Oliver North announced to the U.S. Congress: "It is very important for the American people to know that this is a dangerous world; that we live at risk and that this nation is at risk in a dangerous world." And in a State Department report, the 1990s were foreshadowed as an era in which divergent political critiques nonetheless would seek equally to overcome the "corruption" and "profligacy" induced by the "loss" of "American purpose" in Vietnam the "moral renewal." To this end, the rendering of Operation Desert Shield-turn-Storm as an overwhelming exhibition of America's rediscovered mission stands as testament. The cold war, then , was both a struggle that exceeded the military threat of the Soviet Union and a struggle into which any number of potential candidates, regardless of their strategic capacity, were slotted as a threat. In this sense, the collapse, overcoming, or surrender of one of the protagonists at this historical junction does not mean "it" is over. The cold war's meaning will undoubtedly change, but if we recall that the phrase cold war was coined by a fourteenth century Spanish writer to represent the persistent rivalry between Christians and Arabs, we come to recognize that the sort of struggle the phrase demotes is a struggle over identity: a struggle that is no context-specific and thus not rooted in the existence of a particular kind of Soviet Union. Besides, the United States-led war against Iraq should caution us to the fact that the Western (and particularly American) interpretive dispositions that predominated in the post-World War II international environment - with their zero-sum analyses of international action, the sense of endangerment ascribed to all the activities of the other, the fear of internal challenge and subversion, the tendency to militarize all response, and the willingness to draw the lines of superiority/inferiority between us and them - were not specific to one state or ideology. As a consequence, we need to rethink the convention understanding of foreign policy, and the historicity of the cold war in particular.

Link – China

US conceptions of China as a threatening other create the “China threat” and spur the actions of policymakers.

Pan 4 (Chengxin, Dept, of Poli Sci and Int. Rel’ts, Australian National University, *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, Vol. 29, No. 3, p. 306)

While U.S. China scholars argue fiercely over "what China precisely is," their debates have been underpinned by some common ground, especially in terms of a positivist epistemology. Firstly, they believe that China is ultimately a knowable object, whose reality can be, and ought to be, empirically revealed by scientific means. For example, after expressing his dissatisfaction with often conflicting Western perceptions of China, David M. Lampton, former president of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, suggests that "it is time to step back and look at where China is today, where it might be going, and what consequences that direction will hold for the rest of the world." (2) Like many other China scholars, Lampton views his object of study as essentially "something we can stand back from and observe with clinical detachment." (3) Secondly, associated with the first assumption, it is commonly believed that China scholars merely serve as "disinterested observers" and that their studies of China are neutral, passive descriptions of reality. And thirdly, in pondering whether China poses a threat or offers an opportunity to the United States, they rarely raise the question of "what the United States is." That is, the meaning of the United States is believed to be certain and beyond doubt. I do not dismiss altogether the conventional ways of debating China. It is not the purpose of this article to venture my own "observation" of "where China is today," nor to join the "containment" versus "engagement" debate per se. Rather, I want to contribute to a novel dimension of the China debate by questioning the seemingly unproblematic assumptions shared by most China scholars in the mainstream IR community in the United States. To perform this task, I will focus attention on a particularly significant component of the China debate; namely, the "China threat" literature. More specifically, I want to argue that U.S. conceptions of China as a threatening other are always intrinsically linked to how U.S. policymakers/mainstream China specialists see themselves (as representatives of the indispensable, security-conscious nation, for example). As such, they are not value-free, objective descriptions of an independent, preexisting Chinese reality out there, but are better understood as a kind of normative, meaning-giving practice that often legitimates power politics in U.S.-China relations and helps transform the "China threat" into social reality. In other words, it is self-fulfilling in practice, and is always part of the "China threat" problem it purports merely to describe. In doing so, I seek to bring to the fore two interconnected themes of self/other constructions and of theory as practice inherent in the "China threat" literature--themes that have been overridden and rendered largely invisible by those common positivist assumptions. These themes are of course nothing new nor peculiar to the "China threat" literature. They have been identified elsewhere by critics of some conventional fields of study such as ethnography, anthropology, oriental studies, political science, and international relations. (4) Yet, so far, the China field in the West in general and the U.S. "China threat" literature in particular have shown remarkable resistance to systematic critical reflection on both their normative status as discursive practice and their enormous practical implications for international politics. (5) It is in this context that this article seeks to make a contribution.

Link – China

**The discursive construction of the “China threat” creates policies of containment and instigates the use of power politics.**

Pan 4 (Chengxin, Dept, of Poli Sci and Int. Rel’ts, Australian National University, *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, Vol. 29, No. 3, p. 315)

The discursive construction of the U.S. self and the "Chinese threat" argument are(is) not (an) innocent, descriptive accounts of some "independent" reality. Rather, they are always a clarion call for the practice of power politics. At the apex of this power-politics agenda is the politico-strategic question of "what is to be done" to make the United States secure from the (perceived) threats it faces. At a general level, as Benjamin Schwarz proposes, this requires an unhindered path to U.S. global hegemony that “means not only that the United States must dominate wealthy and technologically sophisticated states in Europe and East Asia-- America's "allies"--but also that it must deal with such nuisances as Saddam Hussein, Slobodan Milosevic and Kim Jong Il, so that potential great powers need not acquire the means to deal with those problems themselves. And those powers that eschew American supervision--such as China--must be both engaged and contained. The upshot of "American leadership" is that the United States must spend nearly as much on national security as the rest of the world combined. (67)” This "neocontainment" policy has been echoed in the "China threat" literature. In a short yet decisive article titled "Why We Must Contain China," Washington Post columnist Charles Krauthammer insists that "containing China" and "undermining its ruthless dictatorship" constitute two essential components of "any rational policy toward a rising, threatening China." Not only is a policy other than containment considered irrational, but even a delay to implement it would be undesirable, as he urges that "containment of such a bully must begin early in its career." To this end, Krauthammer offers such "practical" options as strengthening regional alliances (with Vietnam, India, and Russia, as well as Japan) to box in China; standing by Chinese dissidents; denying Beijing the right to host the Olympics; and keeping China from joining the World Trade Organization on the terms it desires. (68) Containing China is of course not the only option arising from the "China threat" literature. More often than not, there is a subtle, business-style "crisis management" policy. For example, Bernstein and Munro shy away from the word containment, preferring to call their China policy management. (69) Yet, what remains unchanged in the management formula is a continued promotion of controlling China. For instance, a perusal of Bernstein and Munro's texts reveals that what they mean by management is no different than Krauthammer's explicit containment stance. (70) By framing U.S.-China relations as an issue of "crisis management," they leave little doubt of who is the "manager" and who is to be "managed." In a more straightforward manner, Betts and Christensen state that coercion and war must be part and parcel of the China management policy: “In addressing the China challenge, the United States needs to think hard about three related questions: first, how to avoid crises and war through prudent, coercive diplomacy; second, how to manage crises and fight a war if the avoidance effort fails; third, how to end crises and terminate war at costs acceptable to the United States and its allies. (71)” This is not to imply that the kind of perspectives outlined above will automatically be translated into actual China policy, but one does not have to be exceedingly perceptive to note that the "China threat" perspective does exert enormous influence on U.S. policy making on China. To illustrate this point, I want now to examine some specific implications of U.S. representations of the "China threat" for U.S.-China relations in relation to the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait missile crisis and the "spy plane" incident of 2001.

Link – China

The aff leads to war and escalating violence – empirically proven.

Pan 4 (Chengxin, Dept, of Poli Sci and Int. Rel’ts, Australian National University, *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, Vol. 29, No. 3, p. 330)

In the eyes of many U.S. China watchers, China's approach to the Taiwan question is a microcosm of its grand strategy to dominate Asia. The argument is that nowhere is the threatening ambition more palpable than in China's saber-rattling missile tests near Taiwan's coast in 1995-1996, in addition to its long-standing refusal to renounce the use of force as a last resort to settle the dispute. (72) While the 1995-1996 missile crisis has been a favorite "starting point" for many pundits and practitioners to paint a frightening picture of China and to justify U.S. firm response to it, what is often conveniently overlooked is the question of how the "China threat" discourse itself had played a constitutive role in the lead-up to that crisis. Limits of space forbid exploring this complex issue here. Simply put, the Taiwan question was created largely as a result of widespread U.S. perceptions of China as a "Red Menace" in the wake of the "loss of China" and the outbreak of the Korean War. To thwart what it saw as an orchestrated Communist offensive in Asia, the United States deployed the U.S. Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait as part of its Cold War containment strategy, thereby effectively preventing the reunification of Taiwan with mainland China. While the United States abandoned its containment and isolation policy toward China in the 1970s and the two countries established full diplomatic relations in 1979, the conventional image of the "Red Menace" lingered on in the United States. To manage such a "threat," the U.S. Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act shortly after the normalization of U.S.-China relations, renewing U.S. commitment to Taiwan's defense even though diplomatic ties with the island had been severed. (73) Thus, even in the face of such a potentially explosive incident, the self-fulfilling effect of the "China threat" discourse has not been acknowledged by mainstream U.S. China analysts. To the contrary, deterring and containing China has gained new urgency. For example, in the aftermath of this standoff, neoconservative columnists Robert Kagan and William Kristol (chairman of the Project for the New American Century) wrote that "not only is the sale of Aegis [to Taiwan] ... the only appropriate response to Chinese behavior; We have been calling for the active containment of China for the past six years precisely because we think it is the only way to keep the peace." (87) Although the sale of the Aegis destroyers was deferred, President George W. Bush approved an arms package for Taiwan that included so-called "defensive" weapons such as four Kidd class destroyers, eight diesel submarines, and twelve P-3C submarine-hunting aircraft, as well as minesweeping helicopters, torpedoes, and amphibious assault vehicles. On this arms sale, David Shambaugh, a Washington-based China specialist, had this to say: "Given the tangible threats that the Chinese military can present to Taiwan--particularly a naval blockade or quarantine and missile threats--this is a sensible and timely package." (88)

Link – K Affs

The development and exploration of space constitutes a new form of hegemonic imperial control of which neither the liberal critics of imperialism nor the postmodern critics of Empire take account. The militarization of space both disperses and centralizes the power of the sovereign.

Duvall and Havercroft 2008 [Raymond of the Department of Political Science at the University of Minnesota and Jonathan, Assistant Professor at Department of Political Science at the University of Oklahoma, “Taking Sovereignty Out of This World,” in *Review of International Studies* 34.4]

Broadly speaking, recent theorising on empire has posited two competing pictures. On one side, some scholars see in existence an effectively imperial global hegemony, in which the United States, through a combination of hard and soft power, dominates the international system in a manner of territorial control analogous to the British or Roman empires (often debating which of the two is the more appropriate analogy).62 On the other side, theorists such as Hardt and Negri have posited a decentred system in which a network of loosely integrated institutions govern the various facets of the lives of all political subjects under a single, dispersed biopolitical regime that they have labelled Empire.63 Each of these images is conceptually and theoretically evocative; in our view both have much to recommend them despite their being opposing visions. This is because each captures a crucially important conceptual dimension – in the case of arguments about putative American empire, the centralisation of sovereign power; and in the case of Hardt and Negri’s post-modern Empire, the deterritorialisation of sovereignty. At the same time, however, each view is held to negate the other, seeing the two core principles as mutually contradictory. We argue instead that space weapons constitute a third version of empire that is neither the de-centred post-modern vision of Hardt and Negri, nor the territoriallydefined hegemonic vision of advocates and opponents of American imperialism. If our analysis of constitutive logics is correct, theorists of empire must acknowledge that there is not a necessarily contradictory relation between deterritorialisation and centralisation of sovereign power – the two conjoin in empire of the future.64 In his later work Marshall McLuhan introduced ‘the tetrad’ as a heuristic device for examining the impact the introduction of a new technology would have on a society.65 The tetrad was designed to arrest the tendency of theorists to describe the impact of technology in purely causal terms. McLuhan’s tetrad involves asking a set of four questions: What will the technology extend, enlarge or enhance? What will it erode or amputate? What will it reverse or flip into when pushed to its limits? What will the new technology retrieve that earlier technologies had rendered obsolescent? By addressing the four moments in McLuhan’s tetrad, we clarify how space weapons are constitutive of a new sovereignty, situated in the space-based empire of the future, which conjoins deterritorialisation (of Hardt and Negri’s Empire) with the centralisation of sovereign power (of classical imperial forms).

Link – “Astronomy” Advs

Seemingly benign “science” affs link too—the development of a “merely” scientific exploration and/or development of space has its roots in the militarization of Cold War technologies.

MacDonald 2007 [Fraser, Professor at the University of Melbourne, “Anti-Astropolitik – outer space and the orbit of geography,” in *Progress in Human Geography* 31.5]

In this discussion so far, I have been drawing attention to geography’s recent failure to engage outer space as a sphere of inquiry and it is important to clarify that this indictment applies more to human than to physical geography. There are, of course, many biophysical currents of geography that directly draw on satellite technologies for remote sensing. The ability to view the Earth from space, particularly through the Landsat programme, was a singular step forward in understanding all manner of Earth surface processes and biogeographical patterns (see Mack, 1990). The fact that this new tranche of data came largely from military platforms (often under the guise of ‘dual use’) was rarely considered an obstacle to science. But, as the range of geographical applications of satellite imagery have increased to include such diverse activities as urban planning and ice cap measurements, so too has a certain refl exivity about the provenance of the images. It is not enough, some are realizing, to say ‘I just observe and explain desertification and I have nothing to do with the military’; rather, scientists need to acknowledge the overall context that gives them access to this data in the fi rst place (Cervino et al., 2003: 236). One thinks here of the case of Peru, whose US grant funding for agricultural use of Landsat data increased dramatically in the 1980s when the same images were found to be useful in locating insurgent activities of Maoist ‘Shining Path’ guerrillas (Schwartz, 1996). More recently, NASA’s civilian Sea- Wide Field Studies (Sea-WiFS) programme was used to identify Taliban forces during the war in Afghanistan (Caracciolo, 2004). The practice of geography, in these cases as with so many others, is bound up with military logics (Smith, 1992); the development of Geographical Information Systems (GIS) being a much-cited recent example (Pickles, 1995; 2004; Cloud, 2001; 2002; see Beck, 2003, for a case study of GIS in the service of the ‘war on terror’).

Internal Link – Calculation

Modern political relations are reduced to objects of calculation by the imperative to secure security; calculation replaces valuation, and we are confronted with the technologized arm of modern politics which would reduce us to cogs in the machine

Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security*,pp. 20-22]

The reduction of metaphysics, and so also of political understanding, to calculation, results from the very inception of metaphysical thought. Because the appearance of things is inevitably various, because we ourselves always encounter them from a manifold of perspectives and because, finally, we ourselves are also mortal and fallible creatures, whatever the secure ground of things is that metaphysics seeks, it cannot actually be the sensible world of the appearance of things themselves. For they are too…well, insecure. It has, ultimately, to be suprasensible, situated outside the realm of the appearance of things, otherwise the ground that is sought would be as mutable (read insecure) as the coming and going, and apparently endless variation, of the world itself. It could not serve, therefore, as the guarantor which the answer to metaphysics’ guiding question requires. Literally, it could not offer any security for the sensible world of appearances if it were already located within, and therefore also contaminated by, the very insecurity of the comings and goings of that world. Metaphysics, then, is the masque of mastery; securing some foundation upon which to establish the sum total of what is knowable with certainty, and conforming one’s everyday conduct—public and private—to the foundation so secured. Such foundations may go by different names but that of the project itself does not. Hence, the responsibility, traditionally incumbent upon the philosopher—his ‘true’ mission—consisted in securing ultimate referents or principles. Philosophy was, as Nietzsche put it, a matter of valuation, ‘that is, establishment of the uppermost value in terms of which and according to which all beings are to be’.14 In as much as these were precisely what were to be secured, for without them no beings would be, without them, it was said, where would we be? The philosopher therefore spoke as a security expert. A security expert not merely in respect of what the substantial values were, but increasingly only in terms of how they were to be Security, philosophy and politics 21 secured, whatever they were to be taken to be; hence the rise of theory and of method. The philosopher became a security expert, then, in the sense of being able to tell you how to secure security. He or she was someone skilled in determining the means by which the invariable standards to establish meaning in discourse, soundness in mind, goodness in action, objectivity in knowledge, beauty in art, or value in life were to be secured (guaranteed). In such wise, whatever was said— meant; done; understood; esteemed; or valued—was authorised and secured by reference to such a standard, principle or reference. The philosopher’s task had to be to tell you how to secure such a thing even after they had come-up with an essential value of one description or another. Their security project could not then cease, but only intensify. For having secured this secure value, the value then had to be located securely, and securely policed, so that it could never be forgotten or lost again. Even with Nietzsche, in order for the will to power, as the essence of the Being of beings, to secure itself it has continuously to extend itself; that is to say, it secures itself in its essence as never-ending increase continuously extending itself. Hence, though Nietzsche’s will to power may be differentiated as self-overcoming— against the Darwinian, or even Spinozan, principle of self-preservation— it is arguable that this represents the security project à l’outrance. The charge levelled at philosophy at the end of metaphysics—the ‘end of philosophy’ thesis which has consequently turned philosophical thought into a contemplation of the limit; where limit is, however, thought liminally and not terminally—is that the philosopher has simply run out of things to say. It is that the philosopher cannot, in fact, secure any particular value for you and is, therefore, confronted with the manifest impossibility of discharging the traditional security function, other than to insist upon securing security itself. All that remains of the great project of Western philosophy, then, is the continuing, increasingly violent, insistence upon the need to secure security; hence its nihilism. The savage irony is that the more this insistence is complied with, the greater is the violence licensed and the insecurity engendered. The essence of metaphysics, then, is nihilistic, as the best of the realists fear that it is, precisely because it does not matter what you secure so long as security itself is secured. That is to say, so long as things are made certain, mastered and thereby controllable. Securing security does not simply create values. In essence indifferent to any particular value, and committed as it must ultimately be merely to rendering things calculable so that the political arithmetic of securing security can operate, it must relentlessly also destroy values when they conflict with the fundamental mathesis required of the imperative to secure. Its raison d’être, in other words, masquerading as the preservation of values, is ultimately not valuation at all but calculation. For without calculation how could security be secured? And calculation requires calculability. Whatever is must thereby be rendered calculable—whatever other value might once have been placed upon it—if we are to be as certain of it as metaphysics insists that we have to be if we are to secure the world. Western understanding of the political is, therefore, continuously suborned by metaphysics’ will to the calculative truth of correspondence, and its various regimes of power and knowledge to which Foucauldian genealogy alerts us. It is consequently Foucault’s indebtedness not only to Nietzsche but also to Heidegger which antecedes, while it remains nonetheless integrally related to, the task of genealogy.15 In order to pursue the recovery of the question of the political from metaphysics, therefore, I not only have to be able to pose the question which I have used Foucault to pose, I have to use it to bring security into question and explore that question through the sources which Foucault himself drew upon. Metaphysics is itself unwittingly an aid here, for it bears its own deconstruction within itself. Consider the outcome of the guiding question—why is there something rather than nothing?—for with its closure we are challenged to rethink the question.

Internal Link – Imperialism

A large group of the USFG and academic community want to militarize space, no US space mission is possible without being tainted with American triumphalism

Logsdon ‘8. (Professor Emeritus of Political Science and International Affairs at George Washington University, founder and former director of GW’s Space Policy Institute, Issues In Science and Technology, *Achieving Space Security*, Summer 2008, Vol. 24, Iss. 4; pg. 90, AG)

Mike Moore is the former editor of The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, a periodical with a strong arms control perspective, and thus it is not surprising that Twilight War is an extended tract arguing against the desirability of U.S. space dominance. This concept is defined as an overwhelming advantage in space capability that would allow the United States to control who has access to outer space and what is done there, and, if it so chooses, to use space as an arena for the projection of U.S. military power. Moore suggests that a coherent group of "space warriors" in the Department of Defense, the Air Force, various think tanks, Congress, the aerospace industry, and, at least during its first term, the Bush administration, believes that the capability to dominate space should be a top priority U.S. goal. Moore writes that this view "is uniquely in tune with twenty-first century American triumphalism," defined as the belief that "America's values, perhaps divinely inspired, ought to be the world's values." Indeed, throughout the book he suggests that such exceptionalism, not geostrategic security considerations, is the underlying motivation behind the U.S. rhetoric regarding space dominance, thus giving the United States the right to define for the rest of the world, not just itself, what is acceptable behavior beyond Earth's atmosphere.

Biopolitics Link/Impact

Astropolitik is biopower; it rests on decisions regarding what sorts of people would most efficiently accomplish the exploration and colonization of space. The militarization of space extends this biopolitical decision over the whole of the citizenry.

MacDonald 2007 [Fraser, Professor at the University of Melbourne, “Anti-Astropolitik – outer space and the orbit of geography,” in *Progress in Human Geography* 31.5]

To his credit, Dolman does give some attention to the divisive social consequences of this concentrated power. Drawing on earlier currents of environmental determinism and on the terrestrial model of Antarctic exploration, he ponders the characteristics of those who will be first to colonize space. They will be ‘highly educated, rigorously trained and psychologically screened for mental toughness and decision-making skills, and very physically fit’; ‘the best and brightest of our pilots, technicians and scientists’; ‘rational, given to scientific analysis and explanation, and obsessed with their professions’ (p. 26). In other words, ‘they are a superior subset of the larger group from which they spring’ (p. 27). As if this picture is not vivid enough, Dolman goes on to say that colonizers of space ‘will be the most capably endowed (or at least the most ruthlessly suitable, as the populating of America and Australia … so aptly illustrate[s])’ (p. 27; my emphasis). ‘Duty and sacrifice will be the highest moral ideals’ (p. 27). Society, he continues, must be prepared ‘to make heroes’ of those who undertake the risk of exploration (p. 146). At the same time, ‘the astropolitical society must be prepared to forego expenditures on social programs … to channel funds into the national space program. It must be embued with the national spirit’ (p. 146). Dolman slips from presenting what would be merely a ‘logical’ outworking of Astropolitik to advocating that the United States adopt it as their space strategy. Along the way, he acknowledges the full anti-democratic potential of such concentrated power, detaching the state from its citizenry: the United States can adopt any policy it wishes and the attitudes and reactions of the domestic public and of other states can do little to challenge it. So powerful is the United States that should it accept the harsh Realpolitik doctrine in space that the military services appear to be proposing, and given a proper explanation for employing it, there may in fact be little if any opposition to a fait accompli of total US domination in space. (Dolman, 2002: 156) Although Dolman claims that ‘no attempt will be made to create a convincing argument that the United States has a right to domination in space’, in almost the next sentence he goes on to argue ‘that, in this case, might does make right’, ‘the persuasiveness of the case’ being ‘based on the self-interest of the state and stability of the system’ (2002: 156; my emphasis). Truly, this is Astropolitik: a veneration of the ineluctable logic of power and the permanent rightness of those who wield it. If it sounds chillingly familiar, Dolman hopes to reassure us with his belief that ‘the US form of liberal democracy … is admirable and socially encompassing’ (p. 156) and it is ‘the most benign state that has ever attempted hegemony over the greater part of the world’ (p. 158). His sunny view that the United States is ‘willing to extend legal and political equality to all’ sits awkwardly with the current suspension of the rule of law in Guantanamo Bay as well as in various other ‘spaces of exception’ (see Gregory, 2004; Agamben, 2005).

Impact – Laundry List

The development and exploration of space enables the production of bare life on a global scale and the depoliticization of US sovereignty.

Duvall and Havercroft 2008 [Raymond of the Department of Political Science at the University of Minnesota and Jonathan, Assistant Professor at Department of Political Science at the University of Oklahoma, “Taking Sovereignty Out of This World,” in *Review of International Studies* 34.4]

Thus, application of force from orbital space would have at least three crucially important constitutive effects. First, it would constitute the US, as possessor of these weapons, as the centre of a globally extensive, late-modern empire,55 a sovereign of the globe. But this sovereign would exercise its power in a new way. Rather than needing to have occupying forces in place to control the Earth’s lands and seas, it could rely heavily on space weapons to exercise social-political control. While these weapons are not particularly useful in fighting large-scale wars, or in the conquest of territory, there would no longer be a need to hold territory. All the global sovereign would have to do is to kill, or perhaps even threaten to kill, potential adversaries around the world in order to ‘police’ social and political activities throughout its global empire.56 Second, these weapons, just as space-based missile defence, would effectively strip other states of their territorial sovereignty. While de jure sovereignty may remain intact, de facto sovereignty would be effectively erased, in a manner reminiscent of classical empire. For decades, realist international relations scholars have promoted the idea that states secure their sovereignty through self-help.57 If states lack the capacity to defend themselves from adversaries, they are particularly vulnerable to attack and conquest. While liberal and constructivist scholars have questioned how closely sovereignty is linked to military capability, realists have responded that throughout history states with disproportionate military power have repeatedly violated the sovereignty of weaker states.58 While space-based weapons in and of themselves would not enable conquest of another state, they could be used very effectively to achieve precise political objectives on the territories nominally under the sovereign authority of other states. Imagine what impact these weapons would have on US foreign policy with respect to two of its currently most pressing objectives. Consider, for one, how useful such weapons might be with respect to preventing a rival state, such as Iran or North Korea, from acquiring nuclear weapons. While there has been speculation that the US or Israel may launch air strikes against potential nuclear weapons manufacturing facilities in these countries, the logistics – getting access to airspace from neighbouring countries, and the possibility of retaliation against military forces in the area – make such operations difficult. Using weapons in space would avoid these logistical difficulties, thereby making the missions easier (and presumably more likely). Threatening spaced-based attack on either manufacturing sites of weapons or on the political leadership of an adversary might be sufficient in many cases to alter the behaviour of targeted governments. In short, if the US were to deploy such weapons in space, they would likely be used to similar effect as the gunboat diplomacy of the 19th century. A second contemporary policy objective is to fight specific non-state actors. The 9/11 Commission Report discussed in great detail the logistical obstacles that prevented the Clinton administration from capturing or killing Osama Bin Laden,59 principally the difficulty in either launching cruise missiles into Afghanistan through another state’s airspace or deploying US Special Forces in an area remote from US military bases. Had the US possessed space-based weapons at the time, they probably would have been the weapons of choice. When combined with intelligence about the location of a potential target, they could be used to kill that target on very short notice without logistical hurdles. The sovereignty of states would no longer be an obstacle to killing enemies. All that would stand in the way would be international norms against assassination and the potential political backlash of imperial subjects. While much has been made by constructivists in recent years of the capacity of norms and taboos to restrain state behaviour in a world of sovereign states, it does not necessarily follow that in a world of only one effectively global sovereign such taboos and norms would continue to function or even exist. The example of using space weapons to target non-state actors such as Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda points to a third constitutive effect of space weapons capable of force application. Because these weapons could target anyone, anywhere, at anytime, everyone on Earth is effectively reduced to ‘bare life.’60 As Agamben demonstrates, sovereign power determines who is outside the laws and protections of the state in a relationship of ‘inclusive exclusion.’ While human rights regimes and the rule of law may exist under a late-modern global empire policed by space weapons,61 the global sovereign will have the ability to decide the exception to this rule of law, and this state of exception in many cases may be exercised by the use of space weapons that constituted the sovereign in the first place.

Impact – War

Weaponization of space makes peace impossible. **Space weapons are ill-advised and kill international relations: five scenarios.**

Lewis ‘4 (Executive Director of the Association of Professional Schools of International Affairs, formerly worked in the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, degrees in Philosophy and Political Science from Augustana College, “What if Space Were Weaponized?: Possible Consequences for Crisis Scenarios”, <http://ccc-media.110mb.com/eBooks/What%20if%20Space%20Were%20Weaponized.pdf>, pgs 4-5, AG)

The U.S. denigration of mutual deterrence has caused consternation in China and Russia, which express concern that American rhetoric about moving beyond the Cold War belies an interest in acquiring the capability for highly intrusive, preemptive actions. Beijing and Moscow have pressed for negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on the issue of “preventing an arms race in outer space.” The U.S. position has been that there is no space arms race cur- rently underway and that negotiations are unnecessary. The prospect that space weapons might render the United States invulnerable to any kind of at- tack will remain tempting. And, for the foreseeable future, it will remain out of reach, for myriad reasons. Many warn that space weapons will be technologically daunting and cost-prohibitive, while alienating nations allied to the United States and antagonizing others. These five scenarios at- tempt to explain a different, complicated idea: In a world with space weapons, the United States may be better armed, but we may well be less secure. • Scenario 1 argues that our anti-satellite (ASAT) programs are likely to inspire and aid the ASAT programs of others. In world where many states have ASATs, the United States, which is heavily dependent on space systems, has the most to lose. • Scenario 2 argues that the tremendous value provided by space-based military systems is also very vulnerable to attack, creating perverse incentives for a U.S. president to rapidly escalate conflict in a crisis situation. • Scenario 3 argues that Russia and China are likely to change their nuclear postures in re- sponse to expanding U.S. military capabilities in outer space, increasing the readiness of their forces at the expense of operational control, and undermining years of efforts at risk reduction. • Scenario 4 argues that the space-enabled war-fighting strategies tangle nuclear and space forces together in way that creates unnecessary risks of accident — such as a piece of space debris striking a Russian early-warning satellite that could be interpreted as an attack. • Scenario 5 considers the possibility of conflicts that escalate into space threatening American space assets through collateral damage, even if the United States is a third party. In many of these scenarios, space weapons merely exacerbate underlying instabilities. In others, space capabilities, by reinforcing the belief that vulnerability is a choice, may blind U.S. policy- makers to the need to complement military power with political and diplomatic efforts. The over- riding message is that, at best, space weapons simply change the vulnerabilities faced — substi- tuting one unstable situation for another. Public policy choices will always be about balancing risks and opportunity costs. Arms control and other types of international agreements may play an important, though not exhaustive, role in addressing some of these security challenges One criticism leveled against arms control in particular, as well as those concerned with military activities in outer space, is that there is no definition of a “space weapon.” This is true, but it is irrelevant. The capabilities identified in this monograph may or may not be defined as “space weapons.” Still, many of these types of systems have little use in non-war-fighting strategies and some may even be counterproductive to winning a war. For these and other reasons (such as in- ternational opprobrium), a decision to invest heavily in them is one that the United States may come to regret. It would therefore be incomprehensible if such decisions were to be made in a public policy vac- uum, as is currently the situation. The Pentagon is moving forward with a number of research efforts to develop the capabilities to fight a war in, through and from space, and yet there has been almost no public discussion of the costs vs. benefits of such a strategy. The goal of this monograph is to help start that critical debate.

Impact – War

**Astropolitical securitization justifies all atrocities to secure our lives – it makes Others as enemies to be eliminated through endless war**

Odyssesos 2 (Louiza, *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 27(3), Questia, no page numbers)JFS

The ontological premises of the Hobbesian account are hinged upon the occurrentness (substance or, in Heidegger's idiom, presence-at-hand) of entities, which enables Hobbes to make "ample use of it to structure his accounts of the human mind and of society." (81) The Hobbesian configuration of subjectivity links anxiety and death (in the form of the "anxious anticipation of death") to an external source, to the other, encountered as an enemy. (82) Enmity becomes omnipresent and "structural" in the context of the state of nature. The other-as-enemy is not truly other; it is not, in other words, considered as alterity because he is gathered into the fold of the same by Hobbes's account of human nature, where otherness mirrors sameness. Both reflect the quarrelsome disposition of man, his search for glory, and material security. Otherness is as knowable to the modern subject as itself: the Hobbesian theoretic construction achieves the equivalence of the Other with the Same. While the account of the primacy of conflict in the state of nature might be understood to signify some sort of initial relationality with "world" and other, upon reflection one can see that the political-theoretic intention of this primacy is precisely the opposite. It suggests the impossibility of "civil" relationality prior to regulatory government, reducing, in this way, coexistence to the sum of merely present, nonrelational, and dangerous entities. (83) In the presocial state of nature of Leviathan, the other serves to generate a suspicious and pessimistic heterology, where the fearful anticipation of death renders survival as the primary responsibility of the self, which might be called "an ethos of survival." (84) Death is to be avoided at all costs: in order to prevent violent death, understood as the self's demise, the subject rationally (that is, in recognition of its interest) agrees to a Covenant by which he gives up all his rights (except the right of self-preservation) for the safety provided by the Leviathan. There is a reiterative process of self-control and self-mastery at work here, and its theoretic result is an account of sociopolitical interaction in which "civil society ... [is considered] the result less of natural inclination than of design and planning." (85) What is equally important to note is that the subject's innate "flash of reason," through which it recognizes the need for government, is brought to the fore by the configuration of self-interest, reason, and anxiety induced by the fearful anticipation of death, resulting, as Leo Strauss has noted, in the self-interested subject rationally realizing that death is the common or real enemy. (86) Therefore, the configuration of the Hobbesian subject around security and self-control usefully results into a theory of controlled interaction.

**Impact – War**

Security leads to anxiety and fear which we externalize on the Other – This is the root cause of war

Odyssesos 2 (Louiza, *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 27(3), Questia, no page numbers)JFS

Viewed phenomenologically, the subject's desire to secure itself against want indicates that the modern subject "wants to cover over its very being as needy, as Darbung," (95) In this vein, John Caputo suggests that "it is because factical life is disturbed by everyday concerns," because its Being is an issue for it, "that it seeks to secure itself against want"; the Hobbesian subject's will to making-secure arises from the need to "look whole not privatio ... as if it were without care, sine cura, secure--even though that very desire for security is itself a (deficient) mode of care [Sorge]." (96) Hobbesian subjectivity has a right to the world: man's natural right results in the creation of a perspective on the world as possessed and authored by the subject. This perspective denies an understanding of Dasein's Being as care (in the sense of concern and anxiousness for its being) and its ground as nothingness (in Heidegger's formulation "Being-the-basis-of-a-nullity"). The subject conceals the anxiety induce d both by being an entity thrown into a world not of its own making and by having no certain ground. It suppresses its anxiety about its Being by conceiving of the world as a state of nature, a "warre of all against all," whose structural conditions and the presence of widespread enmity lead to the externalization of anxiety about its own Being, and linking it to a fear of the other. When Heidegger's analysis of anxiety is brought to bear on the Hobbesian schema, Hobbes' schema becomes evident that it is confused, or better still, conflated with the phenomenon of fear. Anxiety, Heidegger insists, cannot be confused with the phenomenon of fear as, arguably, occurs in Leviathan. Heidegger agrees that "obviously these are kindred phenomena" and their confusion or conflation is further complicated "by the fact that for the most part they have not been distinguished from one another: that which is fear, gets designated as 'anxiety,' while that which has the character of the anxiety, gets called 'fear'." (97) While fear is an affect that corresponds to something in the world that is fearsome, and becomes more so as it approaches Dasein, what Heidegger designates as "anxiety" has no concrete worldly referent: "Anxiousness as attunement is a way of Being-in-the-world; that in the face of which we have anxiety is thrown Being-in-the-world; that which we have anxiety about is our ability to be in t he world. Thus the entire phenomenon of anxiety shows Dasein as factically existing Being-in-the-world." (98) Anxiety is generated from the general constitution of Dasein as care and as being-thrown, which cause Dasein to flee in the face of itself constituted as such. "In falling, Dasein turns away from itself. That in the face of which it thus shrinks back must, in any case, be an entity with the character of threatening; yet this entity has the same kind of Being as the one that shrinks back: it is Dasein itself." (99) It cannot, then, be fear that guides Dasein's falling, for fear is that affect that "comes from entities within-the-world." (100) The conflation of anxiety and fear in Hobbes results in the causal attribution of anxiety, which is related to Dasein's constitution as "care" (Sorge), to otherness. In seeking an external referent, fear is displaced toward the other. The encounter of the other-as-enemy and the assignment of fear to the other can be understood, then, within the framework of Dasein's inability to accept itself having no ground, as being the basis of a nullity. Othering is disclosed as an inauthentic response to Dasein's own anxious Being in an attempt to externalize the anxiety that emerges from Dasein's finitude and groundlessness and to direct it toward otherness. The heterophobia found in Hobbes's reworking of early modern subjectivity is shown to be displaced, from anxiety about Dasein's thrownness and care for its Being to the other. The assumption that the fear! anxiety is the result of the omnipresent other-as-enemy, moreover, leads to a political theory in which such fear/anxiety can be avoided through the right sort o f regulation and governance. "In the last instance," writes John Dunn, "humans' political authority is a rational response to the overwhelming motivational power of human fearfulness. It rests practically upon the systematization of the passion of fear." (101)

Impact – Sovereign Power

The militarization of space reifies sovereignty *totally*—the state becomes the Hand of God, sans the omnibenevolence and omniscience.

Duvall and Havercroft 2008 [Raymond of the Department of Political Science at the University of Minnesota and Jonathan, Assistant Professor at Department of Political Science at the University of Oklahoma, “Taking Sovereignty Out of This World,” in *Review of International Studies* 34.4]

First, space weapons will extend the capacity of their possessor to project force globally and to defend its own territory. While the US, by virtue of its military pre-eminence, already has this capacity to some extent, space weapons significantly deepen it – by compressing the time required to attack a target (from days and hours for airborne weapons to minutes and seconds for space-based weapons); by sharpening precision of targeting; and by further reducing the ability of others to deliver force against the US. Force application from orbital space is an extension of the modes of precision killing now associated with laser-guided smart bombs, unmanned aerial vehicles, and GPS-guided cruise missiles. These existing forms of US air power rely heavily on space-based technology, such as GPS satellites, for their targeting, and thus represent the vanguard of the space age. Moving the weapons systems themselves into space will extend the range of their Earth-based counterparts and compress the time necessary to launch an attack. The current air power regime, on which the US relies, requires a vast network of bases around the world to serve as staging and supply areas to support attacks.66 In extending the speed and range of modes of precision killing and destruction, empire of the future dispenses with the need for such a network of bases. This brings us to the second moment of the tetrad: amputation. Previous empires – whether founded on land, sea or air power – have relied upon control of territory. In land-based empire, control is through territorial ‘occupation’. In sea-and air-based empires, the imperial power needn’t maintain absolute control over all the territories it governs, but it does require strategically-located bases from which to project force. Space weapons will amputate need for reliance on such imperial control of territory. This decreased dependency on exerting imperial power through control of foreign territories is the most revolutionary aspect of empire of the future. For the first time in history, it will be possible to maintain empire through a combination of panoptic surveillance capacity – exercised largely through space-based observatory satellites – and the ability to project force precisely and instantaneously anywhere on Earth, while denying these capacities to others and hardening the defensive shell of the empire’s centre. Amputation also consists in making many of the technologies and strategies of the nuclear age obsolescent. The most notable obsolescence would be the capacity of nuclear weapons to deter attack. A successful space-based missile defence would effectively strip nuclear powers of the capacity to deter the US through the threat of a retaliatory strike. The empire of the future will, thus, be able to replace the nuclear era’s doctrine of MAD with discretionary pre-emptive and preventive strikes strategies. While space-based empire would be deterritorialised on Earth, it would also flip the area of control from the Earth to Earth’s orbital space. The third moment of the tetrad, then, is the reversal of territoriality. Under current international law no state may claim sovereignty over any portion of outer space. The one territory that the empire of the future must own and control access to, however, is orbital space. So, the deterritorialisation of Earth goes hand in hand with the territorial control of orbital space around Earth. Everett Dolman expresses this idea succinctly when he writes, ‘[w]ho controls low-earth orbit controls near-Earth space. Who controls near-Earth space dominates Terra. Who dominates Terra determines the destiny of humankind.’67 Space-based empire must control low-Earth orbit, and through the control of this ‘territory’, the control of all points on Earth – without the need to physically occupy them – becomes possible. In the final moment of the tetrad – retrieval – the empire of the future retrieves the centralised authority of the absolute state. As Carl Schmitt observes, modern political concepts are secularised versions of theological concepts, and sovereignty is merely the secularised version of God’s power brought down to Earth.68 The possessor of space weapons would in effect be a human-made God, able to rain down punishment on disobedient subjects from the heavens. As such, while space-based empire will deterritorialise sovereignty on Earth, it will retrieve absolute, centralised sovereign power and place it (back) in the extra-terrestrial.

Impact – Otherization

Security politics make the worst forms of violence and loss of value to life possible because they eliminate the value of the individual and continually seek the destruction of life’s inevitable insecurities.

Gorelick 8 (Nathan, Ph.D. student of Comparative Literature at the State University of New York at Buffalo, *Theory and Event* Vol. 11 Issue 2)

The problem with legal confrontations, though, is not simply that they continue to be side-stepped by the offending parties, but that they presuppose the legitimacy of the war on terror, a project which has become a floating signifier for neoconservative political agendas, easily attaching itself to any effort toward the advancement of Pax Americana, the geopolitical hegemony of a militarized, neoliberal United States. The most disturbing and violent of state secrets remain tenable, necessary war-fighting tactics precisely because they are secret, and they will not be revealed through any strategy of confrontation or representation that acquiesces to the ground rules for political participation laid out by the state. Any such strategy grants legitimacy to the violent state apparatus of which torture is only a small part, and strengthens the humanitarian legitimacy of neoimperialism. Prior to the publication of his report to the Council of Europe, Marty demonstrated the truth of this contention when he explained the "moral obligation" to reveal any illegal detention or interrogation activities: "We do not want to weaken the fight against terrorism... but this fight has to be fought by legal means. Wrongdoing only gives ammunition to the terrorists and their sympathizers."31 Here, Marty is clearly not criticizing the larger project underpinning the war on terror; rather the specific tactics through which this project attempts to actualize itself are considered in need of adjustment, so that the moral authority of American expansionism may be preserved. But if torture operates as a metaphor for brutal, authoritarian statism, this is so because it speaks to an entire epistemology of security wherein the life of the individual is only valuable insofar as it maintains some utility for the biopolitical population of which it is a part. The population, increasingly in need of protection from the disorderly world of threats, is harnessed in opposition to its dangerous others. This is particularly true for the war on terror; as Giorgio Agamben warned immediately after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, "A state which has security as its only task and source of legitimacy is a fragile organism; it can always be provoked by terrorism to turn itself terroristic."32 Aimé Césaire noted this phenomenon in his articulation of the full brutality of colonialism, and in his equation, "colonization = thingification"; as extraordinary rendition demonstrates, the total securitization of everyday life, like colonization, conceptually transforms people into objects through (and against) which to define state authority.33 This radical objectification manifests as "force, brutality, cruelty, sadism... forced labor, intimidation, pressure... contempt, mistrust, arrogance, self-complacency, swinishness, brainless elites, degraded masses."34 Yet, as Césaire demonstrates, this "thingification" of life is not an accidental byproduct of European liberal humanism. Instead, the worst forms of violence are, in a very real sense, necessitated by the Enlightenment and the western metaphysical tradition of which it is a product. In Césaire's words, "through the mouths of the Sarrauts and the Bardes, the Mullers and the Renans, through the mouths of all those who considered -- and consider -- it lawful to apply to non-European peoples 'a kind of expropriation for public purposes' for the benefit of nations that were stronger and better equipped, it was already Hitler speaking!"35 Moreover, as Césaire and many other colonial and post-colonial thinkers suggest, the cultivation of the fundamental unit of political and moral account -- the sovereign subject -necessitates an other against which to define legitimate subjectivity. The other is constituted in opposition to everything that the sovereign, rational, autonomous self supposedly is not. The irrational other, thus devalued, can be abused, erased or exterminated with impunity. Extraordinary rendition contains all of these relations of domination -- the rational, calculating subject, in the interests of "national security" and under the auspices of a benevolent liberal humanism, attempts to forcibly extract information from the "subject supposed to know," but only by proxy; accountability for terror and for torture are thus excised from the state's own behavior. All of this, of course, takes place in the shadows of state secrecy. "This is info-war," notes Paul Gilroy, "and these terrorists will not be given the platform of a public trial. Their dubious struggle will not be sustained by 'the oxygen of publicity.'"36 So, what is at stake in the struggle to render visible the dark chambers of extraordinary rendition is not simply the legality or illegality of this particular practice; rather, this struggle is an attempt to disrupt the exclusive authority over the powers and limits of representation currently enjoyed by the agents of the war on terror, and by history's victors, the champions of the Enlightenment, in whose shadow this war is now being fought. If the violence contained within the dark chamber, as Coetzee suggests, is a metaphor "for relations between authoritarianism and its victims," then it ought to also stand as a metaphor for the dark, terrifying failure of the Enlightenment, for the violence which inevitably results from the grand project of world ordering that will never be rid of its disordered and dangerous others, despite increasingly paranoid and frenetic attempts to totally rigidify and control all things Other. Maurice Blanchot calls this failure the night, the other night, the void from which the light of the will to knowledge desperately attempts to escape. This other night is not a recognizable object; it is not the totalitarian communist or the uncontrollable terrorist -- the Manichean double, or dialectical antithesis, of liberal democracy -- who reacts to the violence of empire with empire's own obscene methods. Rather, it is the 'no-thing' of Being, the absence at the center of rationality, the irrationality and disorder against which knowledge and order are opposed and which their systems nevertheless and necessarily contain; it is the unknowable, unintelligible pebble of darkness which cannot be lighted by the force of reason; "it is what one never joins; it is repetition that will not leave off, satiety that has nothing, the sparkle of something baseless and without depth."37 It is the interminable insecurity at the heart of every systematic securitization. The United States' recent efforts -- following European colonialism's lead -- to constitute the globe as an impenetrable burrow, impervious to the other night and its "always more threatening threat," are ultimately efforts to hem liberal democracy into a coffin with this threat; security against the untamed outside, radical intimacy, draws the terror ever closer.38

Impact – Zero-Point

The economies of value created by the technologisation of the political allow for all subject to the political to be both valued and consequentially devalued, because death is the frame of reference within which these calculations operate any comparative devaluation of an aspect of humanity is justifiable, there is nothing abstract about this, this is the zero-point of holocaust.

Dillon 1999 [Michael, “Another Justice,” *Political Theory* 27:2]

Philosophy's task, for Levinas, is to avoid conflating ethics and politics. The opposition of politics and ethics opens his first major work, Totality and Infinity, and underscores its entire reading. This raises the difficult question of whether or not the political can be rethought against Levinas with Levinas. Nor is this simply a matter of asking whether or not politics can be ethical. It embraces the question of whether or not there can be such a thing as an ethic of the political. Herein, then, lies an important challenge to political thought. It arises as much for the ontopolitical interpretation as it does for the under- standing of the source and character of political life that flows from the return of the ontological. For Levinas the ethical comes first and ethics is first phi- losophy. But that leaves the political unregenerated, as Levinas's own defer- ral to a Hobbesian politics, as well as his very limited political interventions, indicate.32 In this essay I understand the challenge instead to be the necessity of thinking the co-presence of the ethical and the political. Precisely not the subsumption of the ethical by the political as Levinas charges, then, but the belonging together of the two which poses, in addition, the question of the civil composure required of a political life. Otherness is born(e) within the self as an integral part of itself and in such a way that it always remains an inherent stranger to itself.33 It derives from the lack, absence, or ineradicable incompleteness which comes from having no security of tenure within or over that of which the self is a particular hermeneutical manifestation; namely, being itself. The point about the human, betrayed by this absence, is precisely that it is not sovereignly self-possessed and complete, enjoying undisputed tenure in and of itself. Modes of justice therefore reliant upon such a subject lack the very foundations in the self that they most violently insist upon seeing inscribed there. This does not, however, mean that the dissolution of the subject also entails the dissolution of Justice. Quite the reverse. The subject was never a firm foundation for justice, much less a hospitable vehicle for the reception of the call of another Justice. It was never in possession of that self-possession which was supposed to secure the certainty of itself, of a self-possession that would enable it ulti- mately to adjudicate everything. The very indexicality required of sovereign subjectivity gave rise rather to a commensurability much more amenable to the expendability required of the political and material economies of mass societies than it did to the singular, invaluable, and uncanny uniqueness of the self. The value of the subject became the standard unit of currency for the political arithmetic of States and the political economies of capitalism.34 They trade in it still to devastating global effect. The technologisation of the political has become manifest and global. Economies of evaluation necessarily require calculability.35 Thus no valuation without mensuration and no mensuration without indexation. Once rendered calculable, however, units of account are necessarily submissible not only to valuation but also, of course, to devaluation. Devaluation, logically, can extend to the point of counting as nothing. Hence, no mensuration without demensuration either. There is nothing abstract about this: the declension of economies of value leads to the zero point of holocaust. However liberating and emancipating systems of value-rights-may claim to be, for example, they run the risk of counting out the invaluable. Counted out, the invaluable may then lose its purchase on life. Herewith, then, the necessity of championing the invaluable itself. For we must never forget that, "we are dealing always with whatever exceeds measure."36 But how does that necessity present itself? Another Justice answers: as the surplus of the duty to answer to the claim of Justice over rights. That duty, as with the advent of another Justice, is integral to the lack constitutive of the human way of being. The event of this lack is not a negative experience. Rather, it is an encoun- ter with a reserve charged with possibility. As possibility, it is that which enables life to be lived in excess without the overdose of actuality.37 What this also means is that the human is not decided. It is precisely undecidable. Undecidability means being in a position of having to decide without having already been fully determined and without being capable of bringing an end to the requirement for decision. In the realm of undecidability, decision is precisely not the mechanical application of a rule or norm. Nor is it surrender to the necessity of contin- gency and circumstance. Neither is it something taken blindly, without reflection and the mobilisation of what can be known. On the contrary, know- ing is necessary and, indeed, integral to 'decision'. But it does not exhaust 'decision', and cannot do so if there is to be said to be such a thing as a 'dec- ision'. We do not need deconstruction, of course, to tell us this. The manage- ment science of decision has long since known something like it through the early reflections of, for example, Herbert Simon and Geoffrey Vickers.38 But only deconstruction gives us it to think, and only deconstructively sensible philosophy thinks it through. To think decision through is to think it as het- erogeneous to the field of knowing and possible knowing within which it is always located.39 And only deconstruction thinks it through to the intimate relation between 'decision' and the assumption of responsibility, which effect egress into a future that has not yet been-could not as yet have been-known: The instant of decision, if there is to be a decision, must be heterogeneous to this accumu- lation of knowledge. Otherwise there is no responsibility. In this sense only must the per- son taking the decision not know everything.40 Ultimately one cannot know everything because one is advancing into a future which simply cannot be anticipated, and into which one cannot see.

Impact – Geofencing

The technologization of space transforms social relations and thinking; we cannot take an uncritical stance toward space technology without giving ourselves over to repressive powers of social production.

MacDonald 2007 [Fraser, Professor at the University of Melbourne, “Anti-Astropolitik – outer space and the orbit of geography,” in *Progress in Human Geography* 31.5]

In this way, the gadgetry of space-enabled espionage is being woven into interpersonal as well as interstate and citizen–state relations. If the movements of a car can be tracked by a jealous boyfriend, they can also be tracked by the state for the purposes of taxation: this is surely the future of road tolls in the UK. A British insurance company is already using satellite technology to cut the premiums for young drivers if they stay off the roads between 11pm and 6am, when most accidents occur. Information about the time, duration and route of every single journey made by the driver is recorded and sent back to the company (Bachelor, 2006). The success of geotechnologies will lie in these ordinary reconfi gurations of life such as tracking parcels, locating stolen cars, transport guidance or assisting the navigation of the visually impaired. Some might argue, however, that their impact will be more subtle still. For instance, Nigel Thrift locates the power of new forms of positioning in precognitive sociality and ‘prerefl exive practice’, that is to say in ‘various kinds of culturally inculcated corporeal automatisms’ (Thrift, 2004b: 175). In other words, these sociotechnical changes may become so incorporated into our unconscious that we simply cease to think about our position. Getting lost may become diffi cult (Thrift, 2004b: 188). Perhaps we are not at that stage yet. But one can easily envisage GPS technologies enhancing existing inequalities in the very near future, such as the device that will warn the cautious urban walker that they are entering a ‘bad neighbourhood’. In keeping with the logic of the panopticon, this is less ‘Big Brother’ than an army of little brothers: the social life of the new space age is already beginning to look quite different. And it is to this incipient militarization of everyday life that the emerging literature on ‘military geographies’ (Woodward, 2004; 2005) must surely turn its attention. Mention must also be made of ‘geofencing’ technologies. This is not merely a matter of tracking dogs, children or friends, but an even more active expression of geographic power. Take, for example, the case of networked cows.6 Zack Butler, an academic computer scientist at the Rochester Institute of Technology, has pioneered a form of satellite herding technology which would allow a farmer to move livestock by means of ‘virtual fences’ controlled by a laptop computer: ‘basically we downloaded the fences to the cows’ Butler told the New Scientist (2004). Each cow wears a collar with a GPS ‘cowbell’ that activates a particular electric or sound stimulation which discourages the animal from proceeding in a given direction whenever it arrives at the virtual fence. It is of passing interest to learn that Butler also compares this new era of satellite-guided farming to ‘playing a computer game’. This may be a relatively minor example, but it gives some indication of the potentially wide array of applications that await geofencing technologies.

Impact – Dehumanization

Securitization of the logic of exception makes dehumanization inevitable.

Burke 7 (Anthony, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of New South Wales, Sydney, June 2007, *What security makes possible: Some thoughts on critical security studies*)

Even if threats are credible and existential, I do not believe that they warrant invoking the ‘state of exception’, which has in our time been more commonly enacted in the detention and rendition of terrorism suspects, immigration detention centres and the use of arbitrary arrest and deportation powers. The ‘state of exception’ also haunts much legal innovation in counter-terrorism policy.33 And, as Agamben, Judith Butler and Arendt have argued, such approaches have their roots in processes (namely colonialism and the Holocaust) that systematically dehumanised their victims producing lives that were ‘bare’, ‘ungrievable’, ‘unliveable’ and ‘superfluous’.34 If nothing else, it ought to raise serious doubts as to how securitisation theory can be helpful in resignifying security as emancipation. It also precludes the ability to speak of human or environmental security in terms consistent with democratic political processes in a state of normalcy. The existential threat to human beings may be real enough, but it should generate a very different policy logic than outlined by the Copenhagen School. As Roxanne Lynn Doty and Karin Fierke have argued, the Copenhagen School’s conceptualisation blocks the path to human security.35 This would seem to be implicit in the way Wæver, in his 1995 article, attempts to provide security with an ontological grounding. There he states that ‘as concepts, *neither individual nor international security exist*’: National security, that is the security of a state, is the name of an ongoing debate, a tradition, an established set of practices … there is no literature, no philosophy, no tradition of security in non-state terms ... the *concept* of security refers to the state.36 This is a powerful act of analytical closure, which is not softened by his use of an hourglass figure, with a ‘conceptual focus on state sovereignty’ at its centre, to which international and individual level ‘dynamics’ refer. As he states, ‘“security” has to be read through the lens of national security’.37 He in turn argues that it the survival of the unit as a basic political unit—the sovereign state—that is the key. Those issues with this undercutting potential must be addressed prior to all others because, if they are not, the state will cease to exist as a sovereign unit and all other questions will become irrelevant. This, then, provides us with a test point, and shows us what is lost if we ‘de-compose’ the state by individualising security … even if the challenges can operate on the different components of the state they must still pass through one focus: Do the challenges determine whether the state is to be or not to be?38 This formulation is consistent with the argument I make that security historically has taken ‘the form and promise of a metaphysical discourse: an overarching political goal and practice that guarantees existence itself, that makes the possibility of the world possible’.39 What seems especially clear in Wæver’s work is that such a space of possibility is limited to the nationstate, precluding the emergence of alternative conceptualisations of political community and existence such as cosmopolitanism or what we might call ‘non-ontologies’ of primally interconnected being, such as can be found in the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas and Martin Buber.40

Impact – Inner Space

The militarization of outer space results in a consequent militarization of inner space where every person on earth becomes a participant in the global production of violence.

Orr 2004 [Jackie, Department of Sociology at Syracuse University, “The Militarization of Inner Space,” in *Critical Sociology* 30.2]

If the militarization of outer space is an essential component of Full Spectrum Dominance, and if the so-called ‘war against terrorism’ must be situated within broader U.S. ambitions for global empire, 8 it is perhaps useful for today’s civilian-soldier to wonder just how wide and deep is a “full spectrum” of dominance? What borders must be crossed to fully dominate such an infinity of space? Perhaps the domination of outer space in the interests of militarized technologies and intelligence requires the militarization of a somewhat more covert spatial territory – a territory more spectral, less smoothly operationalized but no less necessary to global dominion. What happens in that elusive terrain of ‘inner space’ as outer space becomes an overt field for fully militarized command posts? Is the ‘inner’ psychic terrain of today’s U.S. civilian-soldier another battlefield on the way to full spectrum dominance of the globe? What kind of militarized infrastructure is needed ‘inside’ the soldierly civilian called upon to support the establishment of military superiority across the spectrum of spaces ‘outside’? To what extent might Full Spectrum Dominance depend intimately on commanding ‘space power’ in both outer and inner space? The psychology of the civilian-soldier, the networks of everyday emotional and perceptual relations, constitute an ‘inner space’ that is today, I suggest, one volatile site of attempted military occupation. But the occupying forces I’m concerned with here are not those of an invasive, enemy ‘other.’ Rather, a partial and urgent history of attempts by the U.S. government, media, military, and academy to enlist the psychological life of U.S. citizens as a military asset – this is the embodied story that occupies me here. The militarization of inner space, a complex, discontinuous story that nowhere crystallizes into the clear knot of conspiracy but which leaves its uneven traces throughout the scattered archives of the 20th century United States, is now as it has been before a major concern of those most responsible for the business of war. Militarization, defined by historian Michael Geyer as “the contradictory and tense social process in which civil society organizes itself for the production of violence,” constitutes at its core a border-crossing between military and civilian institutions, activities and aims (1989: 79). The militarization of inner space can be conceived, then, as the psychological organization of civil society for the production of violence, an important feature of a broader – tense and contradictory – social process. It is not my intention to reify ‘psychology’ or psychological processes as if they could be separated from social, historical, or economic contexts. Quite the contrary. By naming the constructed ‘inner space’ of psychological activities as increasingly militarized – with the events of September 11 serving as an accelerator and intensifier of processes that are by no means new – my hope is to deepen a critical sociological commitment to contesting the ‘space’ of psychology as the radically social matter of political struggle, as one radically material weapon of war. Or its refusal. While I refer to this psychological space as ‘inner,’ it of course is not irreducibly individual, and is never connected to a neat interiority. Inner space both produces and is produced by deeply social ways of seeing, profoundly cultural technologies of perception. And though I want to reject any notion of a homogeneous collective psyche, I do want to conjure the dense sociality and historicity of psychology spaces. Psychological life occupies a difficult borderland, a ‘between-space’ where the question and human confusions of what is ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ are repetitiously experienced, and consciously and unconsciously lived. Indeed, the space of psychology is the very site where everyday sensations of what’s ‘inside’ and what’s ‘outside,’ what’s ‘them’ and what’s ‘us,’ what feels safe and what seems fatally frightening are culturally (re)produced or resisted; it is an intensely border-conscious space. The politics of borders – how they’re made and unmade, what they come to mean – is one shifting center of the politics of nationalism, of language, of memory, of race, gender, class, of terror. What has come in the modern West to be called the ‘psychological’ plays a dramatic, power-charged role within each of these entangled political fields. The militarization of psychological space can be imagined then as a strategic set of psychological border operations aimed at the organization of civil society for the production of violence.

Impact – Self-Fulfilling Prophecy

Security is a self-fulfilling prophecy—Discourse is the constitutive root of the fear that engenders conflict

Lipschutz 98 (*On Security*, Assistant Professor of Politics, Director of the Adlai Stevenson Program on Global Security, University of California, Santa Cruz Ronnie D. Lipschutz, editor)

How do such discourses begin? In his investigation of the historical origins of the concept, James Der Derian (Chapter 2: "The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche and Baudrillard") points out that, in the past, security has been invoked not only to connote protection from threats, along the lines of the conventional definition, but also to describe hubristic overconfidence as well as a bond or pledge provided in a financial transaction. To secure oneself is, therefore, a sort of trap, for one can never leave a secure place without incurring risks. (Elsewhere, Barry Buzan has pointed out that "There is a cruel irony in [one] meaning of secure which is `unable to escape.' " 16 ) Security, moreover, is meaningless without an "other" to help specify the conditions of insecurity. Der Derian, citing Nietzsche, points out that this "other" is made manifest through differences that create terror and collective resentment of difference--the state of fear--rather than a preferable coming to terms with the positive potentials of difference. As these differences become less than convincing, however, their power to create fear and terror diminish, and so it becomes necessary to create ever more menacing threats to reestablish difference. For this purpose, Der Derian argues, reality is no longer sufficient; only the creation of a "hyperreal" world of computer and media-imaged and -imagined threats will do. Or, to cite Baudrillard, as Der Derian does: "It is no longer a question of a false representation of reality (ideology), but of concealing the fact that the real is no longer real." It is the imagined, unnamed party, with the clandestinely assembled and crude atomic device, and not the thousands of reliable, high-yield warheads mounted on missiles poised to launch at a moment's notice, that creates fear, terror, and calls for greater surveillance and enforcement. Yet, according to Der Derian, describing how the solitary computer wargaming of the Iraqi and American militaries were literally joined together in battle on the deserts of the Persian Gulf littoral, hyperreal threats do sometimes have an odd way of becoming material. The Gulf War created a "real" simulation, broadcast to the watching billions, that was later found out to have been a less-than-accurate representation. This does not mean that those who died suffered simulated deaths. Simulated threats may be imagined, but their ultimate consequences are all too real. What this process suggests is that concepts of security arise, to a great degree, out of discursive practices within states and, only secondarily, among states. 17 Ole Wæver (Chapter 3: "Securitization and Desecuritization") illuminates this aspect of security, framing it not as an objective or material condition, but as a "speech act," enunciated by elites in order to securitize issues or "fields," thereby helping to reproduce the hierarchical conditions that characterize security practices. Thus, according to Wæver, much of the agenda of "redefining security" is a process of bringing into the field of security those things that, perhaps, should remain outside (but this struggle to redefine a concept can also be seen as an effort by heretofore-excluded elites to enter the security discourse). He warns, therefore, that redefining security in a conventional sense, either to encompass new sources of threat or specify new referent objects, risks applying the traditional logic of military behavior to nonmilitary problems. This process can also expand the jurisdiction of already-expansive states as well. As Wæver puts it, "By naming a certain development a security problem, the `state' [claims] . . . a special right [to intervene]." In intervening, the tools applied by the state would look very much like those used during the wars the state might launch if it chose to do so. This contradiction was apparent in the initial landing of U.S. Marines in Somalia in December, 1992. Demonstrably, there was a question of matching force to force in this case, but the ostensible goal of humanitarian assistance took on the appearance of a military invasion (with the added hyperreality of resistance offered only by the mass(ed) media waiting on shore). This does not mean that Wæver thinks that "security as a speech act" should not be applied to anything at all; only that it is necessary to consider with care what is implied or involved if we are indiscriminate in doing so. Security is, to put Wæver's argument in other words, a socially constructed concept: It has a specific meaning only within a specific social context. 18 It emerges and changes as a result of discourses and discursive actions intended to reproduce historical structures and subjects within states and among them. 19 To be sure, policymakers define security on the basis of a set of assumptions regarding vital interests, plausible enemies, and possible scenarios, all of which grow, to a not-insignificant extent, out of the specific historical and social context of a particular country and some understanding of what is "out there." 20 But, while these interests, enemies, and scenarios have a material existence and, presumably, a real import for state security, they cannot be regarded simply as having some sort of "objective" reality independent of these constructions. 21 That security is socially constructed does not mean that there are not to be found real, material conditions that help to create particular interpretations of threats, or that such conditions are irrelevant to either the creation or undermining of the assumptions underlying security policy. Enemies, in part, "create" each other, via the projections of their worst fears onto the other; in this respect, their relationship is intersubjective. To the extent that they act on these projections, threats to each other acquire a material character. In other words, nuclear-tipped ICBMs are not mere figments of our imagination, but their targeting is a function of what we imagine the possessors of other missiles might do to us with theirs . 22

Impact – Genocide

The biopolitics of security make genocide inevitable

Dillon and Neal 8 (Micheal,, Andrew W., Professor of Politics at the Department of Politics and International Relations of the University of Lancaster, Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Edinburgh, *Foucault on politics, security and war,* pg. 10-11)

War and politics, by Foucault's account, therefore always seem to form complex, mutually informing and strategically interactive, grids of intelligibility for one another. He also observes, finally, that how ever pacified, marginalised and restricted to the right of the sovereign modern war became, in that very collection of processes it also became ever more lethal and destructive as well. Under the impetus, espe cially, of biopolitically driven and bio-economically organised global processes, the modern way of war was to become 'world war' and sov ereigns began waging war in the name less of the limited territorial and dynastic jousting of the eighteenth century and more in the name of life itself: 'Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sover eign who must be defended', Foucault added in a passage from The History of Sexuality, which is directly concerned with the issues raised in these lectures, they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire popula tions are mobilised for the purposes of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity; massacres have become vital.... The principle underlying the tactics of battle - that one has to become capable of killing in order to go on living - has become the principle that defines the strategy of states. (1990: p. 137) And then, in a passage of quite brilliant insight, Foucault brings the problematic he has been struggling to articulate in the lectures to a denouement whose force impinges on us even more powerfully today than it did back in the mid-1970s. It is a familiar passage, often quoted. We make no apologies for quoting it again. Here Foucault is not so much declaring an end to political modernity as concluding how it has become a terminal problem to itself. The implication is inescapable. The future of politics no longer lies in the realisation of the modern, if there is to be a future it lies in escaping the problem which modern politics now sets for itself. For, 'what might be called a society's "thresh old of modernity" has been reached when the life of the species is wagered on its own political strategies ... modern man is an animal whose politics places his existence as a living being in question' (1990: p. 143). This story, however novel and traditional in its re-telling by Foucault, and however dramatic in its climax, is nonetheless also critically lim ited. There is more we could have asked of Foucault in the re-telling of it. He does not give us any extended account, for example, of how the modern re-made war. Nor does he extend his interrogation of war into the relation of war to political economy as he pursues the translation of political economy into biopolitical governmentality. He does not ask, directly at least, how the strategical model of power relations he identifies conforms with the logic of both war and political economy as well. He does not directly observe that the strategical model of power may well be the very thing that links both war and political economy in the burgeoning mechanisms of biopower. Here, too, logistics surfaces but is not directly addressed. Do economy and war not combine in construing politics and power as a strategic game in which competition and violent conflict reduce 'mere life' to the logistics of a standing reserve? A reserve which, to the degree that it has encompassed the co- evolutionary exploitation of both 'men and things', is now critically depleted, fragile and ecologically vulnerable.

Impact – Liberties

The legitimization of security logic takes away human liberties

Neocleous 6 [Professor of the Critique of Political Economy; Security, Liberty and the Myth of Balance Head of Department of Politics & History at Brunel University http://www.palgrave-journals.com/cpt/journal/v6/n2/full/9300301a.html pp 131-149]

The examples here are too numerous to mention, but the British Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act (1974) is a good enough one: through its regular Parliamentary scrutiny (that should be 'scrutiny') and periodic renewal, the Act was finally transformed from the temporary to the permanent. The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 has recently undergone the same process, with the temporary clauses being made permanent (in March 2006). Whatever example we use, the pattern is the same: an 'emergency' occurs in which 'security' is threatened; existing emergency powers are exercised and new ones put in place; these are then gradually 'stretched' beyond their original scope; this stretching is gradually justified and legitimized, until the police and security forces are exercising the powers way beyond their original context, to the extent that are become part of the everyday functioning of the rule of law: the emergency becomes permanent, the exceptional becomes the rule, and the sun fails to set on the sunset clauses (see Gross, 2001). And the reason for this is simple: emergency powers are the highpoint of security politics. The intensified demand for security results in ever more draconian legislation, ever less space for the exercise of everyday liberties expected in a liberal democracy, and further entrenches the permanent state of emergency in which more and more security measures are then enacted. Hence the inclusion in every known liberal democratic constitution and international convention of the possible suspension of basic rights and liberties, a suspension always conducted on security grounds but often legitimized in liberal terms. As much as liberal concepts of liberty came to protect individuals from state power, the permanent crises of security management that allowed for their suspension became very quickly deeply written into the logic of the 'rule of law'. And, being written into the logic of the rule of law, liberty has come to be subsumed — and liberties suppressed — under the ideological discourse of security. While this loss of liberty 'for security reasons' is quite minor compared to, say, what takes place in a fascist regime, the practices involved, the wider state of emergency to which it gives rise, and the intensification of the security obsession, have a disquieting tendency to push contemporary politics further and further towards entrenched authoritarian measures. Liberalism is not only unable to save us from this possibility, but actually had a major role in its creation and continuation.

Impact – Camp

The logic of Security forces citizens of the state to live within the confines of pseudo-concentration camps

O’Connor 09 [“Redemptive Remnants: Agamben’s Human Messianism,” Journal of Cultural Research]

The state of exception consolidates sovereign power by virtue of the suspension of legal normality. The exception should only take place in the case of emergency. However, since it exists outside of the normal legal order, at the same time it gives definition to the entire legal edifice; both belonging and not-belonging to the life of the polis. Sovereign power is thus ultimately founded on the ability to decide the exception. Those who hold this power can therefore demarcate those who belong and do not belong. Once an exception has been decided, it has the ability to perpetuate undecidability and anomie. This is because it is in itself founded on being at once internal and external, an “inclusive exclusion” to political community. This inclusive exclusion’s most severe consequence is the unrestricted application of sovereign power. The most intense consequence of this power is the production of bare life rather than human life. Bare life is life stripped of potentiality and possibility. The “state of exception” is coefficient with deciding on those who deserve the life of the polis and those who do not. The more evidence we see of exceptionalism, the more nihilism takes hold, and the more it enacts a stranglehold on global life. Furthermore, the state of exception, as well as deciding on what belongs and does not belong, has the capacity to create a skewed normalcy of division and differentiation. The “new” normal is a state in which divisions of belonging and not belonging, saved and not saved, are taken for granted. This is symptomatic of a much wider malaise for Agamben, which has the concentration camp as its ultimate end; the nadir of modern nihilism. The formation of belonging and non-belonging is precisely what Agamben wishes to combat. The state of exception resides in violence that is founded on an indifferent and indeterminate creation of inside and outside, the outcome of which is the creation of divisions, differences and hierarchies, since the possibility of distinction is always held in suspension and always invokable. This undermines the possibility of coherent commonality or human solidarity which transcends these differences. Thus, the expression of sovereign power is founded on the creation of difference, borders, and the perpetuation of inside and outside. This analysis is reflected in Agamben’s (1998) Homo Sacer. If there is difference, this implies an outside, since an outside can only define itself in opposition to an inside. This logic presupposes the power of death, since death necessarily implies transformation and is intimate with difference. Lack of transformation conversely implies a life without decay. This is the great loss of modern biopolitics — the forgetting of the true meaning of human generic and untransformed life ever since Aristotle separated zoe¯em[,] arc the actuality of living common to all living REDEMPTIVE REMNANTS: AGAMBEN’S HUMAN MESSIANISM 341 beings, and bios, which signifies the particular manner of living peculiar to humans or groups. The exception has the capacity to produce the concentration camp. The link between the exception and the camp is the power to perform absolute separation. In the camp, it is no longer only a question of separating belonging and not belonging; the camp intensifies the process of division and separation, separating life from death through the production of bare life. To control and demarcate this generic core of humanity, of that which transcends belonging and not belonging, is to have the capacity of performing the most absolute form of domination, enacted through the mechanization and proliferation of death. The power to put to death, and the mechanization of this power, is the lowest point of modern nihilism, defining the systematic destruction of humanity’s most resilient and revolutionary being. To overcome this trajectory is the most urgent task of contemporary politics and philosophy. What Agamben tries to remind us of is the significance of human life after the possibility of the concentration camp. If the power of the sovereign is the power of life over death, or the power to put to death, what is valuable for Agamben are forms of thought which mitigate against these catastrophic consequences.

Impact – Disasters

Realism is blind to non-state disasters

**Edkins and Williams 09** (Jenny Edkins and Nick Vaughan- Williams, *Critical Theorists and International Relations*)

Prior to September 11, 2001, national borders were thought to be necessary and sufficient to keep our enemies at bay; upon entry to Baghdad, a virtuous triumphalism and a revolution in military affairs were touted as the best means to bring peace and democracy to the Middle East; and before Hurricane Katrina, emergency preparedness and an intricate system of levees were supposed to keep New Orleans safe and dry. The intractability of disaster, especially its unexpected, unplanned, unprecedented nature, erodes not only the very distinction of the local, national, and global, but, assisted and amplified by an unblinking global media, reveals the contingent and highly interconnected character of life in general. Yet **when it comes to dealing with natural and unnatural disasters, we continue to expect** (and, in the absence of a credible alternative, understandably so) if not certainty and **total safety at least a high level of probability and competence from our national and homeland security experts.** However, between the mixed metaphors and behind the metaphysical concepts given voice by US Homeland Security Director Michael Chertoff early into the Katrina crisis, there lurks an uneasy recognition that this administration—and perhaps no national government—is up to the task of managing incidents that so rapidly cascade into global events. Indeed, they suggest that our national plans and preparations for the “big one”—**a force-five hurricane, terrorist attack, pandemic disease—have become part of the problem, not the solution.** His use of hyberbolic terms like “ultra-catastrophe” and “fall-out” is telling: such **events** exceed not only local and national capabilities, but the capacity of conventional language itself. An easy deflection would be to lay the blame on the neoconservative faithful of the first term of US President George W. Bush, who, viewing through an inverted Wilsonian prism the world as they would wish it to be, have now been forced by natural and unnatural disasters to face the world as it really is—and not even the most sophisticated public affairs machine of dissimulations, distortions, and lies can close this gap. However, the discourse of the second Bush term has increasingly returned to the dominant worldview of national security, realism. And if language is, as Nietzsche claimed, a prisonhouse, realism is its supermax penitentiary. **Based on linear notions of causality, a correspondence theory of truth, and the materiality of power, how can realism possibly account—let alone prepare or provide remedies**—for complex catastrophes, like the toppling of the World Trade Center and attack on the Pentagon by a handful of jihadists armed with box-cutters and a few months of flight-training? A force-five hurricane that might well have begun with the flapping of a butterfly’s wings? A northeast electrical blackout that started with a falling tree limb in Ohio? A possible pandemic triggered by the mutation of an avian virus?

Impact – Exception = Root Cause of all Violence

Exception is the law of pure violence without logos: it declares itself as the decider of which violences are and are not legitimate.

Doxdater 2008 [Eric, “The [Rhetorical] Question of Exception, For Now,” in *Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies* 5.2]

 ‘‘Will Americans Understand What It Means to Live in a State of Emergency?’’ On the day after the day, this perceptive question was asked of me by a friend who struggled against the emergency in South Africa that ran between 1985 and 1990. The answer could only be, ‘‘By and large, no.’’ And, little has changed. In ‘‘relatively traditionless America,’’ as Hannah Arendt once put it, the promise of a return to progress has done well to obscure the ‘‘grey zone’’ that forms when a sovereign(’s) rule of law strives to sanctify and negate the normative power of its own precedent.11 A reflection of his concern for the nature and cost of this hypocrisy, Agamben’s letter is more than a rehearsal of Foucault’s thesis on biopolitics. Expressing a preference not to participate in ‘‘efforts to convince us to accept as normal and humane those means of control which have always been considered exceptional and properly inhumane,’’ the letter offers an important clue about the operativity of the exception, that which is both ‘‘an anomic space in which what is at stake is a force of law without law’’ and a mythic violence ‘‘by means of which law seeks to annex anomie itself.’’12 Paradoxically, one is never fully in a state of exception. An unformulatable manifestation of sovereignty’s structure, the declaration of exception is also an event that dissolves and then appropriates the question of the political itself; when everything and everyone is deemed suspect, the task of deciding the humanity of living man is converted into a spiraling causality of fate, a form of life that is guilty as such.13 If Agamben’s philosophical claim about the paradigm of the camps confounded the New York Times’ politically correct editorial desk, the exception’s unraveling of citizenship into bare life can also be understood in terms of what Arendt called ‘‘general subjectivity,’’ a law of ‘‘pure violence without logos’’ and a logos that obscures the power\*the word and deed in concert\*which appears before and constitutes the law.14

Impact – Exception = Unending Wars

Founding politics on exception renders a people impossible to think of a world of peace, where war won’t always be a necessary guard against the contamination of life not worth living.

Moretti 2003 [Ben, *Der Standard*, 2/3, http://www.mail-archive.com/nettime@bbs.thing.net/msg00101.html]

It is the suspension of such procedures that, according to Giorgio Agamben, characterizes the state of emergency, in which all sovereign power is assumed by the police. It surely is no coincidence that the new interventions are often likened to police operations, quite as if they were a matter of the superpower's official duties. In a paradoxical way, this state of emergency seems to establish itself as a permanent condition in which the difference between "war" and "peace" becomes obsolete because both terms are dissolved in the technological spectacle of "security" - a kind of cold peace that rests on the permanent possibility of war. Consequently, the appeal speaks of "peace" only in conjunction with "security", while arguing in favour of war. Already now many speak of "the war" against Iraq, not of "a possible" war. But "the war" has always already begun, it has its place in peace. As Brecht writes, "Their war kills what their peace has left". The appeal of the "new Europe" shows that the argument for peace as security is an implicit argument for war, and postulates war as an instrument of peace. This becomes possible when in the state of emergency the moral criterion of justice is dissolved in the technological criterion of "precision" (strategists have already pointed at the increased precision of the weapons systems to be used against Iraq), and the democratic criterion of an open debate is substituted by the tactical criterion of speed and trick. In this way, the justification of war is annulled by being placed within the police / military logic of the state of emergency, where and can be deployed smoothly and efficiently, much like an artillery gun or a aircraft carrier. The military notion of unity is placed above the democratic notion of difference. In all this, the present can only be understood as a result of past wars (more precisely: victories), and violence becomes more natural with each further war: more difficult to identify and name, more difficult to distinguish from what happens anyway, more problematic to ward off. With every new war, it becomes more difficult to argue in favour of peace without being viewed as insane or irresponsible. As a result, aside from killing of people and destroying resources, aside from the suffering generated, wars such as the one which is now being prepared turn the intellectual landscape into a desert. Their unnamed casualties include the intellectual foundations which would make it possible to think of politics as something different from security. Perhaps, after "Desert Shield" and "Desert Storm", it would be appropriate to name the coming invasion "Desert Peace". (How could we not think that a system that can no longer function at all except on the basis of emergency would not also be interested in preserving such an emergency at any price?) This is that case also and above all because naked life, which was the hidden foundation of sovereignty, has meanwhile become the dominant form of life everywhere. Life — in its state of exception that has now become the norm — is the naked life that in every context separates the forms of life from their cohering into a form-of-life. The Marxian scission between man and citizen is thus superceded by the division between naked life (ultimate and opaque bearer of sovereignty) and the multifarious forms of life abstractly recodified as social-juridical identities (the voter, the worker, the journalist, the student, but also the HIV-positive, the transvestite, the porno star, the elderly, the parent, the woman) that all rest on naked life. The state of exception is the reduction of humanity to the homo sacer, the life that can be killed but not sacrificed. The person stripped of citizenship, held at undisclosed locations, possibly subject to torture, unable to make any claim whatever to human rights (in as much as those rights are predicated on the power of a nation-state to recognize them) can be killed or disappeared but nothing more. This "recognition" of human rights, the power of the State to see in us a humanity deserving of such rights, is failing under a system where proof of our guilt has become always already visible. Identity papers are no longer visible evidence of rights inasmuch as a piece of clothing, a gesture, an utterance is enough to supercede our citizenship and banish us to naked life.

Impact – Exception = Annihilation

Exceptional production of the inhuman leads to absolute annihilation.

Odysseos 2004 [Louiza, “Carl Schmitt and Martin Heidegger on the Line(s) of Cosmopolitanism and the War on Terror,” *Conference on the International Political Thought of Carl Schmitt*]

The second criticism has to do with the imposition of particular kind of monism: despite the lip-service to plurality, ‘liberal pluralism is in fact not in the least pluralist but reveals itself to be an overriding monism, the monism of humanity.” Similarly, Timothy Brennan traces the same tendency in current cosmopolitan perspectives in that they show ‘an enthusiasm for customary differences, but as ethical or aesthetic material for a unified polychromatic culture – a new singularity born of a blending and merging of multiple local constituents.’ There are two ways in which the discourse of a ‘universal humanity’ has a strong disciplining effect on peoples and politics. The first, noted by a number of commentators, involves the political refutation of the tolerance witnessed in the cultural or private sphere; in other words, politically, cosmopolitanism shows little tolerance for what it designates as ‘intolerant’ politics, which is any politics that moves in opposition to its ideals, rendering political opposition to it illegitimate. Cosmopolitan discourses are also defined by a claim to their own exception and superiority. They naturalise the historical origins of liberal societies which are no longer regarded as ‘contingency established and historically conditioned forms of organization’; rather, they Become the universal standard against which other societies are judged. Those found wanting are banished, as outlaws, from the civilized world. Ironically, one of the signs of their outlaw status is their insistence on autonomy, on sovereignty. The second disciplining effect on the discourse of humanity is seen in the tendency to normalize diverse peoples through ‘individualisation’. The paramount emphasis placed on legal instruments such as human rights transforms diverse subjectivities into ‘rights-holder’. As Rasch argues ‘the other is stripped of his otherness and made to conform to the universal ideal of what it means to be human’. The international human rights regime, which cosmopolitanism champions as a pure expression of the centrality of the individual and to which it is theoretically and ontologically committed, is the exportation of modern subjectivity around the globe. The discourse of humanity expressed through human rights involves a transformation of the human into the rights-holder: ‘[o]nce again, we see that the term “human” is not descriptive, but evaluative. To be truly human, one needs to be corrected.’ Thirdly, ‘humanity is not a political concept, and no political entity corresponds to it. The eighteenth century humanitarian concept of humanity was a polemical denial of the then existing aristocratic federal system and the privileges accompanying it.’ Outside of this historical location, where does it find concrete expression? The discourse of humanity finds expression in an abstract politics of neutrality, usually in the name of an international community which acts, we are assured, in the interest of humanity. James Brown Scott, a jurist and prominent political figure in the United States in the beginning of the 20th Century, wrote in the interwar years of the right of the international community to impose its neutral will: The “international community,” Scott writes, “is coextensive with humanity – no longer merely with Christianity,” it has become “the representative of the common humanity rather than of the common religion binding the States. Therefore, the international community “possesses the inherent right to impose its will…and to punish its violation, not because of a treaty, or a pact or a covenant, but because of an international need” (283). If in the sixteenth century it was the Christian Church that determined the content of this international need, in the twentieth century and beyond it must be secularized “church” of “common humanity” that performs this all-important service. Finally, and most importantly, there is the relation of the concept of humanity to the other, and to war and violence. In its historical location, the humanity concept had critical purchase against aristocratic prerogatives, but its utilization by liberal discourses in the individualist tradition, Schmitt feared, could bring about new and unimaginable modes of exclusion. Rasch explains: The humanism that Schmitt opposes is, in his words, a philosophy of absolute humanity. By virtue of its universality and abstract normativity, it has no localizable polis, no clear distinction between what is inside and what is outside. Does humanity embrace all humans? Are there no gates to the city and thus no barbarians outside? If not, against whom or what does it wage its wars? ‘Humanity as such’ Schmitt noted ‘cannot wage war because it has no enemy, at least not on this planet’. As Ellen Kennedy notes, humanity ‘is a polemical word that negates its opposite.’ In The Concept of the Political Schmitt argued that humanity ‘excludes the concept of the enemy, because the enemy does not cease to be a human being’. In the Nomos, however, it becomes apparent that, historically examined, the concept of humanity could not allow the notion of justus hostis, of a ‘just enemy’, who is recognized as someone with whom one can make war but also negotiate peace. Schmitt noted how only when ‘man appeared to be the embodiment of absolute humanity, did the other side of the concept appear in the form of a new enemy: the inhuman’ (NE 104). It is worth quoting Rasch’s account at length: We can understand Schmitt's concerns in the following way: Christianity distinguishes between believers and nonbelievers. Since nonbelievers can become believers, they must be of the same category of being. To be human, [End Page 135] then, is the horizon within which the distinction between believers and nonbelievers is made. That is, humanity per se is not part of the distinction, but is that which makes the distinction possible. However, once the term used to describe the horizon of a distinction also becomes that distinction's positive pole, it needs its negative opposite. If humanity is both the horizon and the positive pole of the distinction that that horizon enables, then the negative pole can only be something that lies beyond that horizon, can only be something completely antithetical to horizon and positive pole alike—can only, in other words, be inhuman. Without the concept of the just enemy associated with the notion of non-discriminatory war, the enemy had no value and could be exterminated. The concept of humanity, furthermore, reintroduces substantive causes of war because it shutters the formal concept of Justus hostis, now designated substantively as an enemy of humanity as such. In Schmitt’s account of the League of Nations in Nomos, he highlights that compared to the kinds of wars that can be waged on behalf of humanity the Interstate European wars from 1815 to 1914 in reality were regulated, they were bracketed by the neutral Great Powers and were completely legal procedures in comparison with the modern and gratuitous police actions against violators of peace, which can be dreadful acts of annihilation (NE 186). Enemies of humanity cannot be considered ‘just and equal’ enemies. Moreover, they cannot claim neutrality: one cannot remain neutral in the call to be for or against humanity or its freedom; one cannot, similarly, claim a right to resist or defend oneself in the sense we understand this right to have existence in the jus publicum Europeaum. As will examine below in the context of the war on terror, this denial of self-defence and resistance ‘can presage a dreadful nihilistic destruction of all law’ (NE 187). When the enemy is not accorded a formal equality, the notion that peace can be made with him is unacceptable, as Schmitt detailed through his study of the League of Nations, which had declared the abolition of war, but in rescinding the concept of neutrality only succeeded in the ‘dissolution of “peace” (NE 246). It is with the dissolution of peace that total wars of annihilation and destruction becomes possible, where the other cannot be assimilated, or accommodated, let alone tolerated: the friend/enemy distinction is no longer taking place with a justus hostis but rather between good and evil, human and inhuman, where ‘the negative pole of the distinction is to be fully and finally consumed without remainder. With this in mind, I turn to the next section to the war on terror and its relation to the discourse of humanity and cosmopolitanism.

Impact – Biopolitics

Modern forms of biopolitics is not a power of life and death but rather the ability to make live in a certain way and the right to expose unworthy life to precariousness.

Ajana 2005 [Btihaj, “Surveillance and Biopolitics,” *Electronic Journal of Sociology*]

Embedded within this biopolitical overdetermination is a murderous enterprise. Murderous not insofar as it involves extermination (although this might still be the case) but inasmuch as it exerts a biopower that exposes ‘someone to death, increasing the risk of death for some people, or, quite simply, political death, expulsion, rejection, and so on’ (Foucault 2003 [1976]: 256), and inasmuch as it is ‘based on a certain occluded but inevitable and thus constitutive violence’ (Zylinska, 2004: 530); a symbolic violence (manifested, for instance, in the act of ‘naming’ as Butler (in Zylinska, 2004) and Derrida argue ‘asylum seekers’, ‘detainees’, ‘deportees’, ‘illegal immigrants’, etc) as well as a material one (for example, placing ‘asylum seekers’ and ‘illegal immigrants’ in detention centres), attesting to that epistemic impulse to resuscitate the leftover of late modernity and the residual of disciplinary powers that seek to eliminate and ostracise the unwanted-other through the insidious refashioning of the ‘final solution’ for the asylum and immigration ‘question’. Such an image has been captured by Braidotti (1994: 20): Once, landing at Paris International Airport, I saw all of these in between areas occupied by immigrants from various parts of the former French empire; they had arrived, but were not allowed entry, so they camped in these luxurious transit zones, waiting. The dead, panoptical heart of the new European Community will scrutinize them and not allow them in easily: it is crowded at the margins and non-belonging can be hell. The biopolitics of borders stands as the quintessential domain for this kind of 11 sorting, this kind of racism pervading Western socio-political imaginary and permeating the rhetoric of national and territorial sovereignty despite its monolithic use of euphemism. It is precisely this task of sorting and this act of fragmenting that contemporary modes of border security and surveillance are designed making ‘the management of misery and misfortune … a potentially profitable activity’ (Rose, 1999: 260) and evaporating the political into a perpetual state of technicism (Coward, 1999: 18) where ‘control’ and ‘security’ are resting upon vast investments in new information and communications technologies in order to filter access and minimise, if not eradicate, the infiltration and ‘riskiness’ of the ‘unwanted’. For instance, in chapter six of the White Paper, ‘Secure Borders, Safe Haven’ (2002), the UK government outlines a host of techniques and strategies aimed at controlling borders and tightening security including the use of Gamma X-ray scanners, heartbeat sensors, and millimetric wave imaging to detect humans smuggled in vehicles.

Impact – Biopolitics = Camp

The biopolitical order requires bare life; the fringe elements of life are produced and required by the majority because their exclusion constitutes the norm—this is why Agamben says that the camp is the political space of modernity.

Lee 2010 [Charles, “Bare Life, Interstices, and the Third Spaces of Citizenship,” *Women’s Studies Quarterly*, 38.1/2]

In Homo Sacer, Agamben looks at the modern concentration camp as the paradigmatic case of the ultimate state sovereignty that intersects juridical power and biopower. Constituted as a state of exception, the Charles T. Lee 59 camp designates a space where the inmates are neither living as political subjects endowed with juridical protections nor declared dead or outside the rule of law (Agamben 1998). Rather, placed in a lingered state of “bare life,” the camp dwellers are stripped of political rights and reduced to a biological minimum, a state of “suspended life and suspended death” (Butler 2004, 67). As a state of exception, the camp signifies an external space while remaining immanent and attached to the juridico-political order (Isin and Rygiel 2007, 183). In Agamben’s words, “The exception does not subtract itself from the rule; rather, the rule, suspending itself, gives rise to the exception and, maintaining itself in relation to the exception, first constitutes itself as a rule” (1998, 18). Inside the camp, the norm and the exception are indistinguishable: the exception is found to be part of the rule, and sovereign power is both legal and outside the law, both “outside and inside the juridical order” (15). In “legally” suspending the validity of the law, sovereignty interjects normalcy and exceptionality and defines its power through interstitiality in constituting the camp where “exclusion and inclusion, outside and inside, bios and zoē, right and fact, enter into a zone of indistinction” (9). For Agamben, this interstitial zone signifies a breakdown of “subjective right and juridical protection,” a space of abjection where laws are completely suspended and anything becomes possible (170). The subjects caught within the camp are “so completely deprived of their rights and prerogatives that no act committed against them could appear any longer as a crime” (171). Furthermore, the zone of bare life is not only juxtaposed to the democratic order, but is necessary for its continuing function. In the words of Prem Kumar Rajaram and Carl Grundy-Warr, “It is through the exclusion of the depoliticized form of life that the politicized norm exists” (2004, 33). The normalcy of biopolitical life depends upon the fringe elements of bare life to signify itself as the norm. Sovereignty and biopower are inextricable: “sovereignty is the ability of the sovereign to step outside the law in order to (re)establish the biopolitical regularity or normalcy of life necessary for law itself, the juridical order, to function” (Hannah 2008, 59). Sovereignty perpetuates interstitial zones in maintaining the normalcy of the body politic. As Agamben argues, rather than being bound to a determinate time and place, the camp has transformed into “the political space of modernity” and become “the nomos of the modern” (Agamben 1998, 166–80; 2000, 60 Bare Life, Interstices, and the Third Space of Citizenship 39–40). One sees “camps,” metamorphosed into all sorts of sites in everyday life, manifested in inner cities, gated communities, airports, and the indefinite detention of “enemy combatants” at Guantánamo Bay (Agamben 1998, 174–75; 2000, 41; Rajaram and Grundy-Warr 2004, 39; Walters 2008, 187). Critical migration scholars have further seized on Agamben’s thesis to theorize the materialization of camps at state borders and refugee detention centers (Rajaram and Grundy-Warr 2004; Salter 2008). Here, I point to two central aspects in Agamben’s thoughts that critically link to the social condition of refugees and undocumented workers: the immanence of interstitiality and the depoliticized state of bare life.

Impact – Biopolitics = Genocide

Biopolitics makes the eugenic control of life inevitable because it reduces life to mere instrumental substance

Agamben 1998 [Giorgio, professor of philosophy at university of Verona, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, pg. 145-147]

Hence the radical transformation of the meaning and duties of medicine, which is increasingly integrated into the functions and the organs of the state: “Just as the economist and the merchant are responsible for the economy of material values, so the physician is responsible for the economy of human values.. . . It is absolutely necessary that the physician contribute to a rationalized human economy, that he recognize that the level of the people’s health is the condition for economic gain.... Fluctuations in the biological sub­stance and in the material budget are usually parallel” (ibid., p. 40). The principles of this new biopolitics are dictated by eugenics, which is understood as the science of a people’s genetic heredity. Foucault has documented the increasing importance that the sci­ence of police assumes starting in the eighteenth century, when, with Nicolas De Lemare, Johan Peter Franc, andJ. H. G. von Justi, it takes as its explicit objective the total care of the population (Dits et tCcrzts, 4: I5o—6i). From the end of the nineteenth century, Francis Galton’s work functions as the theoretical background for the work of the science of police, which has by now become biopolitics. It is important to observe that Nazism, contrary to a common prejudice, did not limit itself to using and twisting scien­tific concepts for its own ends. The relationship between National Socialist ideology and the social and biological sciences of the time—in particular, genetics—is more intimate and complex and, at the same time, more disturbing. A glance at the contributions of Verschuer (who, surprising as this may seem, continued to teach genetics and anthropology at the University of Frankfurt even after the fall of the Third Reich) and Fischer (the director of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Anthropology in Berlin) shows beyond a doubt that the genetic research of the time, which had recently dis­covered the localization of genes in chromosomes (those genes that “are ordered,” as Fischer writes, “like pearls in a necklace”), gave National Socialist biopolitics its fundamental conceptual structure. “Race,” Fischer writes, “is not determined by the assembly of this or that measurable characteristic, as in the case, for example, of a scale of colors. . . . Race is genetic heredity and nothing but heredity” (in Verschuer, ≤tat et sant4 p. 84). It is not surprising, therefore, that the exemplary reference studies for both Verschuer and Fischer are T. H. Morgan and J. B. S. Haldane’s experiments on drosophila and, more generally, the very same works of Anglo-Saxon genetics that led, during the same years, to the formation of the first map of the X chromosome in man and the first certaln identification of hereditary pathological predispositions. The new fact, however, is that these concepts are not treated as external (if binding) criteria of a sovereign decision: they are, rather, as such immediately political. Thus the concept of race is defined, in accordance with the genetic theories of the age, as “a group of human beings who manifest a certain combination of homozygotic genes that are lacking in other groups (Verschuer, ttat et sante’, p. 88). Yet both Fischer and Verschuer know that a pure race is, according to this definition, almost impossible to identify (in particular, neither the Jews nor the Germans constitute a race in the strict sense—and Hitler is just as aware of this when he writes Mein Kampf as when he decides on the Final Solution). “Racism” (if one understands race to be a strictly biological con­cept) is, therefore, not the most correct term for the biopolitics of the Third Reich. National Socialist biopolitics moves, instead, in a horizon in which the “care of life” inherited from eighteenth-century police science is, in now being founded on properly eu­genic concerns, absolutized. Distinguishing between politics (Pol­itik) and police (Polizei), von Justi assigned the first a merely negative task, the fight against the external and internal enemies of the State, and the second a positive one, the care and growth of the citizens’ life. National Socialist biopolitics—and along with it, a good part of modern politics even outside the Third Reich— cannot be grasped if it is not understood as necessarily implying the disappearance of the difference between the two terms: the police now becomes politics, and the care of life coincides with the fight against the enemy. “The National Socialist revolution,” one reads in the introduction to State and Health, “wishes to appeal to forces that want to exclude factors of biological degeneration and to maintain the people’s hereditary health. It thus aims to fortify the health of the people as a whole and to eliminate influences that harm the biological growth of the nation. The book does not discuss problems that concern only one people; it brings out problems of vital importance for all European civilization.” **O**nly from this perspective is it possible to grasp the full sense of the extermination of the Jews, in which the police and politics, eugenic motives and ideological motives, the care of health and the fight against the enemy become absolutely indistinguishable.

Impact – Biopolitics Destroys Value to Life

No value to life in a biopolitical framework—everyone is exposed to the possibility of being reduced to bare (read: valueless) life in the name of instrumentality

Agamben 1998 [Giorgio, professor of philosophy at university of Verona, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, pg. 139-140]

3.3. It is not our intention here to take a position on the difficult ethical problem of euthanasia, which still today, in certain coun­tries, occupies a substantial position in medical debates and pro­vokes disagreement. Nor are we concerned with the radicaliry with which Binding declares himself in favor of the general admissibility of euthanasia. More interesting for our inquiry is the fact that the sovereignty of the living man over his own life has its immediate counterpart in the determination of a threshold beyond which life ceases to have any juridical value and can, therefore, be killed without the commission of a homicide. The new juridical category of “life devoid of value” (or “life unworthy of being lived”) corre­sponds exactly—even if in an apparently different direction—to the bare life of homo sacer and can easily be extended beyond the limits imagined by Binding. It is as if every valorization and every “politicization” of life (which, after all, is implicit in the sovereignty of the individual over his own existence) necessarily implies a new decision concerning the threshold beyond which life ceases to be politically relevant, becomes only “sacred life,” and can as such be eliminated without punishment. Every society sets this limit; every society—even the most modern—decides who its “sacred men” will be. It is even pos­sible that this limit, on which the politicization and the *exceprio* of natural life in the juridical order of the state depends, has done nothing but extend itself in the history of the West and has now— in the new biopolitical horizon of states with national sovereignty—moved inside every human life and every citizen. Bare life is no longer confined to a particular place or a definite category. It now dwells in the biological body of every living being.

Impact – Empire

Weaponization and control of space re-constitutes sovereignty into new forms of empire and imperialism

Duvall and Havercroft 2008 [Raymond of the Department of Political Science at the University of Minnesota and Jonathan, Assistant Professor at Department of Political Science at the University of Oklahoma, “Taking Sovereignty Out of This World,” in *Review of International Studies* 34.4]

In the third section, we develop the primary argument of the article: space weapons under the control of a single state logically constitute a new structure of imperial power through the counteracting forces of centralisation of sovereign power and deterritorialisation of sovereignty. Specifically, we explore the constitutive effects of each of the three types of space weapons discussed in section two. As many critics have argued, space-based missile defence undermines the logic of deterrence by simultaneously reinscribing the territorial borders of the United States and stripping from all other states the ability to deter attacks from the United States through missile-based retaliation. Space control, in denying potential adversaries access, privatises the commons of orbital space for (US) commercial and strategic interests, thereby expanding the frontier of American empire into low-earth orbit. Finally, force application from space enables the US as sole possessor of such weapons to project lethal force to any target, at any location on Earth, on very short notice. In addition to exploring the constitutive effects of each of these specific space weapons programmes separately, we consider, most importantly, their conjoint effects in constituting a new, historically unprecedented, type of global political rule, which is simultaneously centralised but deterritorialised – sovereign empire of the future.

\*\*\*Framing/Alternative\*\*\*

Alternative – Critique

We must critique the strategic logic of sovereignty in all of its forms in order to build up a new conception of sovereignty which is not constituted merely by violence.

Duvall and Havercroft 2008 [Raymond of the Department of Political Science at the University of Minnesota and Jonathan, Assistant Professor at Department of Political Science at the University of Oklahoma, “Taking Sovereignty Out of This World,” in *Review of International Studies* 34.4]

Given these grim prospects for a deterritorialised global rule,69 what are the possibilities for resistance? Historically, every advance in the weaponry of imperial powers has been met with an advance in counter-hegemonic strategy. Most recently, insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq have been able to counter the technological superiority of US forces with very simple yet effective Improvised Explosive Devices. In these instances, those subjugated by the technologies and scientific knowledge linked to emerging weapons systems have reappropriated these weapons systems to resist their imperial overlords. As such, it is reasonable to conclude that space weaponry could be countered through a variety of asymmetrical tactics such as: disabling space weapons while in orbit through kinetic energy, or even nuclear anti-satellite attacks; destroying the facilities where space weapons are produced or launched, or the research and development centres (such as universities) that are integral to the production of these systems; organising strikes for the workers involved in harvesting the necessary raw materials; and refusing to pay taxes to the political apparatuses that control these systems. While it is difficult to imagine what precise forms resistance to space weapons might take, it is not unreasonable to conclude that even in a context of space-based empire, some form of political and military resistance will be possible, and will occur. Indeed, China’s recent launch of an Anti-Satellite system is an example of a state actor at the boundaries of imperial order engaging in such a reappropriation of a weapons technology. One of the reasons Chinese military strategists have given for developing Anti-Satellite technology is that this technology exposes an asymmetrical vulnerability in the US military structure. The US military is already dependent on satellite systems to co-ordinate its communications and weapons targeting systems. By developing a technology that can disable US communications and targeting satellites, the Chinese military would hope to disrupt the operational abilities of conventional US forces should an actual shooting war between the two powers take place.70 The development gives us some idea of how state and non-state actors at the margins of an empire of the future might resist space power by reappropriating its technologies. Sovereignty as strategy Yet, even as China’s ASAT test points to one possible way of resisting the empire of the future it also points to one way in which this empire is currently being constituted. Within US strategic planning circles China’s ASAT test has been used as an impetus to increase funding to American space weapons research and development initiatives. This reaction by the US defence policy establishment is indicative of the strategic logic at work in the empire of the future. This strategic logic accelerates processes of deterritorialisation by pursuing the development of technologies that make the control of territory irrelevant; yet the logic simultaneously pursues the reterritorialisation of the US and orbital space as areas that should be off-limits to non-American actors. We are explicitly drawing on Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation here.71 In their writings deterritorialisation refers to ‘the movement by which ‘‘one’’ leaves the territory’. Reterritorialisation is the process that accompanies deterritorialisation, whereby the sovereign state apparatus recombines the deterritorialised elements to constitute a new assemblage. This is precisely the logic of the singular control by the US of weapons in Earth’s orbital space. The strategy of the empire of the future undermines the binary logic of a states-system predicated either on territorially bounded sovereign states or a globally diffused, decentralised and deterritorialised biopolitical Empire as proposed by Hardt and Negri. Our analysis reveals a third possibility: in the empire of the future space power combines a set of otherwise heterogeneous processes. Space based missile defence strips all states – except the possessor of the system – of their hard shells by eroding nuclear deterrence capabilities, while providing the possessor of missile defence with a territory more secure from nuclear attack. Space control denies all states with the exception of the controlling power unfettered access to space. Furthermore it annexes orbital space as a territory of the space power. Finally, force application from orbital space makes any point on earth a potential target for the military force of empire of the future. This makes the traditional imperial imperative to project force through controlling territory no longer necessary. Empire of the future combines strategies of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation to simultaneously undermine some features of state sovereignty and reinforce others. Therefore the current assumption that many IR theorists make that international society must be based on either a collection of sovereign territorial states or deterritorialised biopolitical apparatuses ignores the possibility that these two processes can be co-constitutive. In the empire of the future the locus of authority is centralised but this authority governs a deterritorialised political entity. While this new constellation of political power will present new possibilities for resistance, we should not underestimate how this empire’s new modes of killing will constitute structures of domination potentially more terrifying than anything humanity has yet encountered.

Alternative – Critique

We must think outer space as an imaginative geography wherein we constitute its meaning. Their approach takes space as a given and US imperial power as inevitable; rather we should think the constructive possibilities afforded us by the development and exploration of space.

MacDonald 2007 [Fraser, Professor at the University of Melbourne, “Anti-Astropolitik – outer space and the orbit of geography,” in *Progress in Human Geography* 31.5]

Stephen Graham, following Eyal Weizmann, has argued that geopolitics is a flat discourse (Weizmann, 2002; Graham, 2004: 12). It attends to the cartographic horizontality of terrain rather than a verticality that cuts through the urban landscape from the advantage of orbital supremacy. Just as, for Graham, a critical geopolitics must urgently consider this new axis in order to challenge the practices and assumptions of urbicide, so too – I would argue – it must lift its gaze to the politics of the overhead. Our interest in the vertical plane must extend beyond terrestrial perspectives; we must come to terms with the everyday realities of space exploration and domination as urgent subjects of critical geographical inquiry. A prerequisite for this agenda is to overcome our sense of the absurdity and oddity of space, an ambivalence that has not served human geography well. The most obvious entry point is to think systematically about some of the more concrete expressions of outer space in the making of Earthly geographies. For instance, many of the high-profi le critical commentaries on the recent war in Iraq, even those written from geographical perspectives, have been slow to address the orbital aspects of military supremacy (see, for instance, Harvey, 2003; Gregory, 2004; Retort, 2005). Suffice to say that, in war as in peace, space matters on the ground, if indeed the terrestrial and the celestial can be sensibly individuated in this way. There is also, I think, scope for a wider agenda on the translation of particular Earthly historical geographies into space, just as there was a translation of early occidental geographies onto imperial spaces. When Donald Rumsfeld talks of a ‘Space Pearl Harbor’, there is plainly a particular set of historicogeographical imaginaries at work that give precedence, in this case, to American experience. Rumsfeld has not been slow to invoke Pearl Harbor, most famously in the aftermath of 11 September 2001; notably, in all these examples – Hawaii in 1941; New York in 2001; and the contemporary space race – there lurks the suggestion of a threat from the East.9 All of this is a reminder that the colonization of space, rather than being a decisive and transcendent break from the past, is merely an extension of long-standing regimes of power. As Peter Redfield succinctly observed, to move into space is ‘a form of return’: it represents ‘a passage forward through the very pasts we might think we are leaving behind’ (Redfield, 2002: 814). This line of argument supports the idea that space is part and parcel of the Earth’s geography (Cosgrove, 2004: 222). We can conceive of the human geography of space as being, in the words of Doreen Massey, ‘the sum of relations, connections, embodiments and practices’ (Massey, 2005: 8). She goes on to say that ‘these things are utterly everyday and grounded, at the same time as they may, when linked together, go around the world’. To this we might add that they go around and beyond the world. The ‘space’ of space is both terrestrial and extraterrestrial: it is the relation of the Earth to its firmament. Lisa Parks and Ursula Biemann have described our relationship with orbits as being ‘about uplinking and downlinking, [the] translation [of] signals, making exchanges with others and positioning the self ’ (Parks and Biemann, 2003). It is precisely this relational conception of space that might helpfully animate a revised geographical understanding of the Outer Earth. As has already been made clear, this sort of project is by no means new. Just as astropolitics situates itself within a Mackinderian geographical tradition, so a critical geography of outer space can draw on geography’s earlymodern cosmographical origins, as well as on more recent emancipatory perspectives that might interrogate the workings of race, class, gender and imperialism. Space is already being produced in and through Earthly regimes of power in ways that undoubtedly threaten social justice and democracy. A critical geography of space, then, is not some far-fetched or indulgent distraction from the ‘real world’; rather, as critical geographers we need to think about the contest for outer space as being constitutive of numerous familiar operations, not only in respect of international relations and the conduct of war, but also to the basic infrastructural maintenance of the state and to the lives of its citizenry.

Alternative – Rejection

The alternative is to reject the logic of security. rejection of the aff’s security politics opens space for liberating political engagement.

Neocleous, 2008 (Mark Neocleous, professor of the Critique of Political Economy, Head of Department of Politics & History, Brunel University, “Critique of Security” p. 185-186)

**The only way out** of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, **is** perhaps **to eschew the logic of security altogether** - to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up. **That** is clearly something that **cannot be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual**. It is also something that the constant iteration of the refrain 'this is an insecure world' and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do. But it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security. This impasse exists because security has now become so all-encompassing that it marginalises all else, most notably the constructive conflicts, debates and discussions that animate political life. The constant prioritising of a mythical security as a political end - as the political end constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in which the conflicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible - that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security politics simply removes this; worse, it removes it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing it suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve 'security', despite the fact that we are never quite told - never could be told - what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics,"' dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. **We** therefore **need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more 'sectors' to it in a way that simply** expands the scope of the state and **legitimises state intervention in** yet more and **more areas of our lives**. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that's left behind? But I'm inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole."' **The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision** or revision **of security** in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. **All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary**, and consequently end up reaffirming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. **The real task is not to fill the supposed hole** with yet another vision of security, **but to fight for an** alternative political language **which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state**. That's the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then **to keep harping on** about **insecurity** and to keep demanding 'more security' (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn't damage our liberty) **is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that 'security' helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms**. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centred on a different conception of the good. **We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security**. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But **it** certainly **requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion**; it requires recognising that security is not the same as solidarity; **it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for** the certainty of **security** and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and 'insecurities' that come with being human; it requires accepting that 'securitizing' an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift."'

Alternative – Knowledge-Production

Geographies of space are made, not given. The way in which space is constructed by discourses of militarization circumscribe the possibilities of social relation be associate with space.

MacDonald 2007 [Fraser, Professor at the University of Melbourne, “Anti-Astropolitik – outer space and the orbit of geography,” in *Progress in Human Geography* 31.5]

The historic relationship between knowing a space and exerting political and strategic dominion over it is entirely familiar to geographers. Just as the geographical knowledge of Empire enabled its military subjugation, colonization, and ultimately its ecological despoliation, this same pattern is being repeated in the twenty-first-century ‘frontier’.4 It is also worth remembering that the geographies of imperialism are made not given. In what follows, I want to examine how the geographies of outer space are being produced in and through contemporary social life on Earth. Such an account inevitably throws up some concerns about the politics and socialities of the new space age. Against this background, I set my argument on a trajectory which is intermittently guided by two key writers on technology with very different sensibilities. It is my intention to hold a line between the dark anticipations of Paul Virilio and the resplendent optimism of Nigel Thrift. This discursive flight may well veer off course; such are the contingencies of navigating space.

Alternative – Difference

We must account for difference in representations of space in popular science.

Punt et al 2006 [Michael, Martha Blassnig, and David Surman, Trans-Technology Research at the University of Plymouth, “From Méliès to Galaxy Quest: The Dark Matter of the Popular Imagination,” in *Leonardo* 39.1]

I would like to suggest that “difference,” that everyday determinant against which we develop our identity, is needed in the representation of space in popular science. The role of gender, sexuality, race, class, physical ability, even hair color, is necessary to the future plausibility of represented space. Identification is a fiercely contested principle in the humanities, and there are vast tracts devoted to often-opposing theories of how identification functions. Be it cognitive, psychoanalytic, phenomenological or narratological, all theories of identification, and specifically those in film studies, locate difference as the core principle through which audience participants relate to the world of representation. All representation functions through the articulation of types, and yet the representation of the human in the space of popular science has been woefully devoid of difference, choosing instead to recall tenuous continuities to the (now distant) moon landing. For popular science to plausibly represent our ongoing role in space, it must necessarily engage with a more sophisticated representational approach to space, one that locates difference at the core of the scientific imaginary. Modernist accounts of the audience no longer account for the heterogeneity and complexity of mass culture. The realization that the vast majority of space is unknowable echoes the topography of the popular imaginary, whose complexity has evaded scholarship since the 1960s. It is, however, possible to observe the continuities and discontinuities, what is permitted to rehearse its codes of representation and what is disavowed. In Metz’s terms, the most plausible of images, primarily those that recall our foundational experiences of difference, will presumably be those toward which popular science may move if it is to articulate its message in the vocabulary of the popular imaginary.

Alternative – Critique Comes First

The structural logic of weaponization determines the character of a society—only our ontological analysis can predict how space militarization will transform political relationships.

Duvall and Havercroft 2008 [Raymond of the Department of Political Science at the University of Minnesota and Jonathan, Assistant Professor at Department of Political Science at the University of Oklahoma, “Taking Sovereignty Out of This World,” in *Review of International Studies* 34.4]

In examining constitutive effects scholars ask how structured social relations, such as systems of signification (Foucaultian discourses), and the processes of their (re-)production constitute what a referent object is as a social kind. To engage in constitutive analysis, then, is to investigate the social determination of the ontology of a being or form.21 Our concern, however, is with not-yet-realised social beings and social forms of the future. How does one analyse the social constitution of that which does not yet exist? The answer, we maintain, lies in examination of the structural logics of social production. Structured social relations entail (often very powerful) reproductive logics, the constitutive implications of which can be discerned even prior to their effectuation. Those constitutive implications are structural potentialities and tendencies – likelihoods – not determinant products, of course. But to the extent that operative reproductive logics of generative structures are strong, future constitutive effects can be identified with some degree of confidence. This is precisely the character of Marx’s analysis of capital, as well as Wendt’s argument about teleology and the inevitability of a world state and Herz’s argument about the loss of the state’s ‘hard shell’.22

Ontology Comes First (General)

**Ontology must come first, our actions and even our very selves are shaped by the ontology which we intentionally or unintentionally prescribe to. Especially in the context of the issues of modernity the foundations of all thought: political, philosophical, and technological are shaped by ontology.**

Dillon 1999 [Michael, “The Scandal of the Refugee: Some Reflections on the ‘Inter’ of International Relations and Continental Thought,” in *Moral Spaces: Rethinking Ethics and World Politics*, eds. David Campbell and Michael Shapiro (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999) pg. 97-99]

As Heidegger-himself an especially revealing figure of the deep and mutual implication of the philosophical and the political-never tired of pointing out, the relevance of ontology to all other kinds of thinking is fundamental and inescapable. For one cannot say anything about that is, without always already having made assumptions about the is as such. Any mode of thought, in short, always already carries an ontology sequestered within it. What this ontological turn does to other-regional-modes of thought is to challenge the ontology within which they operate. The implications of that review reverberate through the entire mode of thought, demanding a reappraisal as fundamental as the reappraisal ontology has demanded of philosophy. With ontology at issue, the entire foundations or underpinnings of any mode of thought are rendered problematic. This applies as much to any modern discipline of thought as it does to the question of modernity as such, with the exception, it seems, of science, which, having long ago given up the ontological questioning of when it called itself natural philosophy, appears now, in its industrialized and corporatized form, to be invulnerable to ontological perturbation. With its foundations at issue, the very authority of a mode of thought and the ways in which it characterizes the critical issues of freedom and judgment (of what kind of universe human beings inhabit, how they inhabit it, and what counts as reliable knowledge for them in it) is also put in question. The very ways in which Nietzsche, Heidegger, and other continental philosophers challenged Western ontology, simultaneously, therefore reposed the fundamental and inescapable difficulty, or *aporia*, for human being of decision and judgment. In other words, whatever ontology you subscribe to, knowingly or unknowingly, as a human being you still have to act. Whether or not you know or acknowledge it, the ontology you subscribe to will construe the problem of action for you in one way rather than another. You may think ontology is some arcane question of philosophy, but Nietzsche and Heidegger showed that it intimately shapes not only a way of thinking, but a way of being, a form of life. Decision, a fortiori political decision, in short, is no mere technique. It is instead a way of being that bears an understanding of Being, and of the fundaments of the human way of being within it. This applies, indeed applies most, to those mock-innocent political slaves who claim only to be technocrats of decision making. While Certain continental thinkers like Blumenberg and Lowith, for example, were prompted to interrogate or challenge the modern’s claim to being distinctively “modern,” and others such as Adorno questioned its enlightened credentials, philosophers like Derrida and Levinas pursued the metaphysical implications (or rather the implications for metaphysics) of the thinking initiated by Kierkegaard, as well as by Nietzsche and Heidegger. The violence of metaphysics, together with another way of thinking about the question of the ethical, emerged as the defining theme of their work. Other, notably Foucault, Deleuze, Lyotard, Baudrillard, and Bataille turned the thinking of Nietzsche and Heidegger into a novel kind of social and political critique of both the regimes and the effects of power that have come to distinguish late modern times; they concentrated, in detail, upon how the violence identified by these other thinkers manifested itself not only in the mundane practices of modern life, but also in those areas that claimed to be most free of it, especially the freedom and security of the subject as well as its allied will to truth and knowledge. Questioning the appeal to the secure self-grounding common to both its epistemic structures and its political imagination, and in the course of reinterrogating both the political character of the modern and the modern character of the political, this problematization of modernity has begun to prompt an ontopolitcally driven reappraisal of modern political thought.

Ontology Comes First (Logic)

Ontology logically precedes other approaches to the world – it is the basis for those other approaches…

Tillich 60 (Paul, Harvard Divinity School, Love, Power, Justice: Ontological Analysis and Ethical Applications, p.18-19)

**Ontology does not try to describe the nature of beings**, either in their universal, generic qualities, or in their individual, historical manifestations. **It does not ask about stars and plants,** animals and men, **It does not ask about events** and those who act within these events. **This is the task of scientific analysis and historical description. But ontology asks the simple** and infinitely difficult **question: What does it mean to be?** What are the structures, common to everything that is, to everything that participates in being? **One cannot avoid this question** by denying that there are such common structures. **One cannot deny that being** in one **and that the qualities and elements of being constitute a texture of connected and conflicting forces.** **This texture** is one, in so far as it is and **gives the power of being to each of its qualities and elements**. It is one but it is neither a dead identity nor a repetitions sameness. It is one in the manifoldness of its texture. **Ontology is the attempt to describe this texture, to reveal its hidden nature** through the word which belong to being and in which being comes to itself. Yet let us not make a mistake: **ontology does not describe the infinite variety of beings, living and dead, subhuman and human. Ontology characterizes the texture of being itself**, which is effective in everything that is, in all beings, living and dead, subhuman and human. **Ontology precedes every other cognitive approach to reality. It precedes all sciences**, not always historically, but always **in logical dignity and basic analysis. One does not need to look** back **at past centuries** of far-removed parts of the world **to discover** the primacy of **the ontological question**. **The best method for discovering it to-day is a careful analysis of the writings of leading anti-ontological philosophers** or of anti-philosophical scientists and historians. One will easily discover that on almost every page of the writings of these men a certain number of basic ontological concepts are used, but surreptitiously and therefore often wrongly. **One cannot escape ontology if one wants to know!** For knowing means recognizing something as being. And **being is an infinitely involved texture, to be described by the never-ending task of ontology**.

Ontology Comes First (Value)

Ontology defines who we are and what we value; it is the frame through which so-called political actions are made meaningful. This means that the way we think about the world and others predetermines what counts as problems and solutions in the political sphere.

Beesy and Bellamy 3 (Mark, Alex, *The Australian Journal of Politics and History*, no page numbers, Questia)JFS

The great danger in constructing such different worlds is that it lends intellectual support to simplistic sloganeering. George W. Bush's attempt to demonise countries and regions as part of an "axis of evil" is a clear example of the way in which language can be utilised to construct or give shape to what might otherwise be frustratingly nebulous and elusive security threats. Indeed, it is also important to point out that the attacks on the symbolic centres of American power reflect a similar process of identity construction: American hegemony is associated with a morally corrosive world order that actively works against the interests of the third world generally and the Arab world in particular. (6) While both of these constructions may be little more than self-serving caricatures, they highlight the manner in which such discourses are mutually constitutive and construct powerful pictures of international society. At a time when the ontological status of a world populated by discrete national entities has become less certain as a consequence of pervasive transnational processes that are eroding national borders and control, (7) IPE-oriented scholars have recognised that deciding "who is us" has become an increasingly problematic exercise. (8) In both the practice and conceptualisation of security, by contrast, the increasingly uncertain and contested nature of nationally based identities is frequently ignored. Defining who "we" are not only helps shape "our" values, interests and behaviour, but it inevitably defines who "they" are as well, and the sorts of policies that might be appropriate as a consequence. Even this kind of simplistic discursive bifurcation has become more problematic and implausible, however. One of the most noteworthy shortcomings of much strategic theorising and practice is that it remains overwhelmingly state-centric. According to some observers, the USA is currently enjoying an unprecedented "unipolar moment", with the potential "to last for many decades". (9) The preservation of America's dominant position is predicated upon "reassuring and engaging potential challengers", who are invariably conceived as other states. (10) However, such analyses ignore some of the most striking qualities of the contemporary global era. Firstly, in a world haracterised by malleable borders and transnational networks, military might alone has been revealed as a blunt instrument incapable of achieving desired outcomes in conflicts as diverse as Vietnam, Yugoslavia, and Somalia. Secondly, and more fundamentally, opponents of the contemporary world order include transnational networks (such as the anti-globalisation network and al-Qaeda) that make use of the products of globalisation (the internet, porous borders, cheap travel and communication) in order to oppose it. The state-centric ontology that informs traditional ways of thinking about and pursuing security fails to recognise that states are embedded in a complex web of institutions (11) which, while delivering them tangible benefits, place constraints on their autonomy and expose them to new systemic vulnerabilities. The responsiveness of global stock-markets to security issues in the wake of 11 September highlights just how interconnected more traditional security issues are with a deeply interconnected, but surprisingly fragile, international economic system. There are other compelling reasons for questioning whether a state-centric focus remains analytically or pragmatically useful. In a post-Cold-War era in which direct conflict between the major powers is unthinkable, (12) any recourse to the sorts of military challenges that have shaped realist analyses of international contestation are quite simply edundant. (13) What the events of 11 September demonstrate with devastating clarity is that in the contemporary era threats against the USA and its allies will not emanate primarily from other states (not even "rogue" states like North Korea but from an array of forces that operate outside conventional state boundaries and auspices. The 11 September terror was not delivered by missiles or armies. The perpetrators arrived in the USA quite legally on scheduled international flights. The tools they used were American. Although commentators have argued that only an organisation with state sponsorship would be capable of such an attack, (14) the subsequent collapse of the Taliban made it clear that al-Qaeda was not dependent on the Taliban regime but that the Taliban regime (that is, the Afghan state) was in fact dependent on al-Qaeda (a transnational network). It has also become apparent that one of the more effective ways of combating such sub-state networks is by "following the money trail" and targeting the economic, rather than the military capacity of such organisations.

Ontology Comes First (Education)

Their conception of knowledge is securitized; they think knowledge is that which grounds the possibility of a human relationship to truth.

Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security*,pp. 17-18]

The very alliance of security and knowledge, so characteristic of modern (inter)national politics, is what excites my suspicion most, and generates my sympathy for the genealogist.9 ‘Look,’ insisted the first genealogist, ‘isn’t our need for knowledge precisely this need for the familiar, the will to uncover under everything strange, unusual, and questionable, something that no longer disturbs us?’ ‘Is it not the instinct of fear’, he asked—making explicit the crucial connection between the will to truth and the will to secure—‘that bids us to know?’: And is the jubilation of those who attain knowledge not the jubilation over the restoration of a sense of security.10 Hence: security as knowledge (certainty); security’s reliance upon knowledge (surveillance); security’s astonishing production of knowledge in response to its will to know (calculability); and the claim of knowledge which gives security its licence to render all aspects of life transparent (totality). All these constitutive elements of our contemporary manifold politics of security excited my suspicion because they comprise a monumental enterprise of power-knowledge whose insatiable maw threatens to consume not only all thought, and not only that relating to the question of the political, but of what it is to be human. Rather, and by first noting and questioning the already hypertrophic register of security, I want to call the entire scheme of security into question. For that way lies a modest contribution to making ‘our way back from the world to the life already betrayed by knowledge; knowledge that delights in its theme and is absorbed in the object to the point of losing its soul and its name there, of becoming mute and anonymous’.11 ‘Foucault’s genius is evidenced not in the pasting together of unrelated anecdotes’, a recent Foucault commentator noted, but in illustrating that historical coherences are formed from the confluence of multiple strategies and tactics of power and knowledge. History, he shows, is not the product of grand narratives with teleological movements but of diverse struggles that nonetheless become organised into coherent (that is to say, more or less continuous) patterns of domination, subjectification, and government.12 One of those constellations of struggles, however, indeed the one which informs all others, is the recurring struggle for the political itself. For whatever politics is allowed or taken to be—how it is captured, fixed and determined in its foundations; in short secured—is a decisive element in all power struggles. And yet I think that the very surfeit of information about politics which academic and media technologies create has made us so ignorant of the political, and the way that it is secured, that we are hardly even capable of formulating, much less posing and pursuing, the question of the political itself.

Their framework conceives of knowledge as a relation to the world whereby we *appropriate* the world—this inevitably reproduces the calculative and technological relationship to the world which reproduces the dangers of the security paradox. Instead, we need to think of knowledge as an ethical encounter.

Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security*,pp. 48-49]

Appropriation usually means to take into one’s possession. In Heidegger it has the additional senses of being taken over, or caught-up by, as well as of entering into and making one’s own, and it occurs as he tries to think more about the presencing of things and the intimate way human being belongs to that presencing. Human beings, therefore, exist in the sense that they are ‘given-to’, simultaneously in receipt of and captured by, existence (in the way that some are given-to drink). Hence, Ereignis is the event of that play of existing in which there is an ineradicable belonging together of Being and the ‘there’ of Being, namely human being (hence the term Dasein), in which human beings find themselves ‘given-to’ existence, and wherein their own existence is at play as they find themselves challenged to make it their own in accordance with it as a possibility which has continuously to be assumed. The play, of course, is deadly serious; although it has its funny side— funny peculiar, as well as funny ‘ha! ha!’. Truth, then, is no longer a property of thought or discourse. Neither is it any longer a product of representative-calculative technique. Rather, it is a heterogeneous event of disclosure with which untruth is integrally involved as well; hence the originary and radical uncanniness of the opening whose lighting (revealing presencing) is always also traversed by darkness (the concealment of the superabundance of what is not).43 In other words, for beings to be there has to be a space or clearing for them to be in. For there to be the presence of things there has not only to be presencing as such but also, integral to that presencing, concealment; because to be manifest means not to be concealed, or to have been brought out of concealment, where concealment is the plenitude of what is not. Because Heidegger does not give-up on this crucial point, however, you cannot give-up on it either if you are to respond seriously to his thinking. But that does not mean that you must rest with Heidegger’s account of, or rather with what seems most to preoccupy him about, the clearing; namely, what many charge him with, his privileging of Being, his essentialising of Being and his particular brand of mythologising. Caputo, for example, taking his cue from Emmanuel Levinas, radicalises this declension of truth as disclosure into the event of manifestation by lifting it out of Heidegger’s history of Being, wherein he suspects it of a mythologising privileging of a certain historical epoch (that of the Greeks), and gives it a new critical function on behalf of Justice by insisting that every time is a manifestation of manifesting. Thus ‘possessed of its own grace and its own malice’, each time, including of course our own, is a time of presencing, argues Caputo, in which the event of the obligatory freedom of human being has to be responsibly assumed and Justice is called for.44 Even with Heidegger, however, it is nonetheless powerfully evident that this Radical hermeneutical phenomenology 49 clearing is a site of ethical encounter. For, in calling the entire epistemological background and ambitions of contemporary philosophy into question, Heidegger was attempting to provide a radical—‘that meant a more ethical’45—understanding of human being-in-the-world. It must be emphasised that ‘ethical’, here, does not mean a system of ethics in the form of a regional ontology of metaphysical thought. Nor is it a command ethic specified and handed down by some sovereign unappealable authority exegetically elaborated through theology. Just as Heidegger was attacking the epistemological hubris of contemporary philosophy by insisting that his hermeneutical phenomenology was a way of indicating the general structures of being-in-the-world for a being that had nonetheless to take-up its being in its own ways—and that he was therefore not attempting to offer a secure, or securing, epistemological account of such a being—so also the very ethicality of that being equally derives from being thrown into the world in a way that obliges it to takeup its being there. In each instance, Heidegger is showing something not claiming, or aspiring to, adequation between his concepts and the thing itself, simply because the thing itself here, namely human being, necessarily exceeds the concept.

Their conception of knowledge is intimately related to certainty which betrays its commitment to political securitization.

Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security*,pp. 90-91]

If we think the political in the way that we do because of the way that we think, the way that we think truth is most decisive for the way in which we think the political because the way that we think truth, for Heidegger, determines our being. More than that. Because we are not dealing with a unifocal concept of truth, here, but with a complex bi-focal belonging together of both truth and untruth, in which the issues of freedom and Justice also arise, it is the way in which we think that complex which matters most. For the way in which we think truth and untruth stages the entire problematic not only of politics but also of law and freedom. Heidegger’s entire life’s work was devoted to exploring what he thought of as a transformation in the essence of truth in the tradition of the ‘West’. Indeed, the extent to which one can talk about ‘the tradition’ or ‘the West’ depends upon this story about truth, its emergence in the Greek world and its transformation through the Roman and Medieval worlds into the Modern. The point about the transformation of the essence of truth is that it is a story about the transformation of the essence of politics, law and freedom as well, because of the ways in which these all depend upon how truth is disclosed, what truth is understood to be and how such a disclosive understanding pervades and grounds a way of life or a world. A transformation in the essence of truth necessarily, therefore, also entails a transformation in the essence of politics, and it is this story which Heidegger The topos of encounter 91 recounts in an extraordinarily dense fashion in the Parmenides lectures. That is the only place in which he connects-up the transformation in the essence of truth to the transformation in the essence of politics in any extended way. Even then, the argument is cryptic and undeveloped. But the conclusion to which it points is, nonetheless, very clear. Whereas the Greek polis is founded on, or grounded in the understanding of truth as *aletheia*, the transformation in the essence of truth means that politics is no longer determined upon the basis of *aletheia* but on the understanding of truth as certainty and correctness. It is there also, therefore, that he demonstrates how the transformation in the essence of truth is intimately connected with security. For, in addition to arguing that the essence of truth as disclosure first becomes lost, and then transformed through its Latinisation, so also he argues further that: The inception of the metaphysics of the modern age rests on the transformation of the essence of *veritas* into *certitudo*. The question of truth becomes the question of the secure, assured and self-assuring use of *ratio*.35

We live before we know: the value of education is determined by the political calculations we make of it. Vote neg to change our relationship to life and truth.

Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security*,pp. 49-50]

It does so, first, because for Heidegger, as a ‘phenomenologist’, the brute fact of factical life is that we exist. But this existing is not the brute factical life of being a prey to so-called mere sense data, it is existing always already in a domain of meaning and value whatever we may yet come to think about it. In a cognitive sense he thinks we only come to think about it formally when it breaks down. Hence, we first live. Therefore we know how to live. Thus we live before we ‘know’. Consequently there is a fore-knowing in living. Seeing this is not merely phenomenological seeing whose task is to point out the fore-knowing and retrieve it for us again. It is precisely hermeneutical phenomenology because it is concerned to bring this fore-knowing, or pre-hension of existing which life itself has, forward through an interpretive act. This is not an epistemology of cognitive conceptualisation but the how of human being as such. Thus ‘The primary relation to Dasein is not that of contemplation, but being it’.46 Secondly, in having its being to be human being is both responding to the Otherness which, in harbouring it, human being is nonetheless also exceeded by, and to the call to take-up its being in a project the specific realisation of which happens to take place in particular historical circumstances. Thus: As uttered sentences, all expressions about the being of Dasein…have the character of indication: they only indicate Dasein, though, as uttered sentences, they at first mean something present-at-hand…but they indicate the possible understanding of the structures of Dasein and the possible conceptualising of them that is accessible in such an understanding. (As sentences indicating such a hermeneuein, they have the character of hermeneutical indication.)47 In this hermeneutical phenomenology of manifest being, existence is, therefore, nothing but being possible: ‘Dasein as human life is primarily being possible’.48 The singular and the possible thus comprise human being-in-the-world and are consequently always already higher than the general and the actual which derive from a certain kind of cognitive reflection (that, now, of representative-calculative thought) upon it. This is why the concept can never be adequate to existence.

A/T: Policymaking Good

Critique comes before policymaking: problem-solution models follow from epistemological and ontological assumptions about the world in which they function.

Dillon and Reed 2000 [Michael, Professor of Politics at Lancaster, and Julian, Lecturer in International Relations at Kings College, “Global Governance, Liberal Peace, Complex Emergency,” in *Alternatives* 25:1]

As a precursor to global governance, governmentality, according to Foucault's initial account, poses the question of order not in terms of the origin of the law and the location of sovereignty, as do traditional accounts of power, but in terms instead of the management of population. The management of population is further refined in terms of specific problematics to which population management may be reduced. These typically include but are not necessarily exhausted by the following topoi of governmental power: economy, health, welfare, poverty, security, sexuality, demographics, resources, skills, culture, and so on. Now, where there is an operation of power there is knowledge, and where there is knowledge there is an operation of power. Here discursive formations emerge and, as Foucault noted, in every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organised and redistributed by a certain number of procedures whose role is to ward off its powers and dangers, to gain mastery over its chance events, to evade its ponderous, formidable materiality.[ 34] More specifically, where there is a policy problematic there is expertise, and where there is expertise there, too, a policy problematic will emerge. Such problematics are detailed and elaborated in terms of discrete forms of knowledge as well as interlocking policy domains. Policy domains reify the problematization of life in certain ways by turning these epistemically and politically contestable orderings of life into "problems" that require the continuous attention of policy science and the continuous resolutions of policymakers. Policy "actors" develop and compete on the basis of the expertise that grows up around such problems or clusters of problems and their client populations. Here, too, we may also discover what might be called "epistemic entrepreneurs." Albeit the market for discourse is prescribed and policed in ways that Foucault indicated, bidding to formulate novel problematizations they seek to "sell" these, or otherwise have them officially adopted. In principle, there is no limit to the ways in which the management of population may be problematized. All aspects of human conduct, any encounter with life, is problematizable. Any problematization is capable of becoming a policy problem. Governmentality thereby creates a market for policy, for science and for policy science, in which problematizations go looking for policy sponsors while policy sponsors fiercely compete on behalf of their favored problematizations. Reproblematization of problems is constrained by the institutional and ideological investments surrounding accepted "problems," and by the sheer difficulty of challenging the inescapable ontological and epistemological assumptions that go into their very formation. There is nothing so fiercely contested as an epistemological or ontological assumption. And there is nothing so fiercely ridiculed as the suggestion that the real problem with problematizations exists precisely at the level of such assumptions. Such "paralysis of analysis" is precisely what policymakers seek to avoid since they are compelled constantly to respond to circumstances over which they ordinarily have in fact both more and less control than they proclaim. What they do not have is precisely the control that they want. Yet serial policy failure—the fate and the fuel of all policy--compels them into a continuous search for the new analysis that will extract them from the aporias in which they constantly find themselves enmeshed.[ 35] Serial policy failure is no simple shortcoming that science and policy--and policy science--will ultimately overcome. Serial policy failure is rooted in the ontological and epistemological assumptions that fashion the ways in which global governance encounters and problematizes life as a process of emergence through fitness landscapes that constantly adaptive and changing ensembles have continuously to negotiate. As a particular kind of intervention into life, global governance promotes the very changes and unintended outcomes that it then serially reproblematizes in terms of policy failure. Thus, global liberal governance is not a linear problem-solving process committed to the resolution of objective policy problems simply by bringing better information and knowledge to bear upon them. A nonlinear economy of power/knowledge, it deliberately installs socially specific and radically inequitable distributions of wealth, opportunity, and mortal danger both locally and globally through the very detailed ways in which life is variously (policy) problematized by it. In consequence, thinking and acting politically is displaced by the institutional and epistemic rivalries that infuse its power/ knowledge networks, and by the local conditions of application that govern the introduction of their policies. These now threaten to exhaust what "politics," locally as well as globally, is about.[ 36] It is here that the "emergence" characteristic of governance begins to make its appearance. For it is increasingly recognized that there are no definitive policy solutions to objective, neat, discrete policy problems. The "subjects" of policy increasingly also become a matter of definition as well, since the concept population does not have a stable referent either and has itself also evolved in biophilosophical and biomolecular as well as Foucauldian "biopower" ways.

A/T: Case Outweighs

Our argument is not that astropolitik is ineffective; rather, our objection is that its effectiveness is premised upon the reduction of the lives it is supposed to govern to pieces on a game board.

MacDonald 2007 [Fraser, Professor at the University of Melbourne, “Anti-Astropolitik – outer space and the orbit of geography,” in *Progress in Human Geography* 31.5]

Two things should now be clear. First, outer space is no longer remote from our everyday lives; it is already profoundly implicated in the ordinary workings of economy and society. Second, the import of space to civilian, commercial and, in particular, military objectives, means there is a great deal at stake in terms of the access to and control over Earth’s orbit. One cannot overstate this last point. The next few years may prove decisive in terms of establishing a regime of space control that will have profound implications for terrestrial geopolitics. It is in this context that I want to briefly introduce the emerging field of astropolitics, defined as ‘the study of the relationship between outer space terrain and technology and the development of political and military policy and strategy’ (Dolman, 2002: 15). It is, in both theory and practice, a geopolitics of outer space. Everett Dolman is one of the pioneers of the field. An ex-CIA intelligence analyst who teaches at the US Air Force’s School of Advanced Airpower Studies, he publishes in journals that are perhaps unfamiliar to critical geographers, like the modestly titled Small Wars and Insurgencies. As what follows is uniformly critical of Dolman’s work, I should say that his Astropolitik: classical geopolitics in the space age (Dolman, 2002) is unquestionably a significant book: it has defined a now vibrant field of research and debate. Astropolitik draws together a vast literature on space exploration and space policy, and presents a lucid and accessible introduction to thinking strategically about space. (In the previous section I drew heavily on Dolman’s description of the astropolitical environment.) My critique is not founded on scientific or technical grounds but on Dolman’s construction of a formal geopolitics designed to advance and legitimate the unilateral military conquest of space by the United States. While Dolman has many admirers among neoconservative colleagues in Washington think-tanks, critical engagements (eg, Moore, 2003; Caracciolo, 2004) have been relatively thin on the ground.

A/T: Must Act

Their “must act” mentality ignores the fact that the greatest dangers of the status quo derive from a way of thinking about the world.

Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security*,pp. 2]

Reimagining politics is, of course, easier said than done. Resistance to it— especially in International Relations—nonetheless gives us a clue to one of the places where we may begin. For although I think of this project as a kind of political project, resistance to it does not arise from a *political* conservatism. Modern exponents of political modernity pride themselves on their realistic radicalism. Opposition always arises, instead, from an extraordinarily deep and profound conservatism of *thought*. Indeed, conservatism of thought in respect of the modern political imagination is required of the modern political subject. Reimagining politics therefore means thinking differently. Moreover, the project of that thinking differently leads to thinking ‘difference’ itself. Thought is therefore required if politics is to contribute to out-living the modern; specifically, political thought. The challenge to out-live the modern issues from the faltering of modern thought, however, and the suspicion now of its very own project of thought, *as much as it does* from the spread of weapons of mass destruction, the industrialisation and ecological despoliation of the planet, or the genocidal dynamics of new nationalisms. The challenge to out-live the modern issues, therefore, from the modern condition of both politics and thought. This so-called suspicion of thought—I would rather call it a transformation of the project of thought which has disclosed the faltering of the modern project of thought—is what has come to distinguish continental thought in the last century. I draw on that thought in order to think the freedom of human being against the defining political thought of modernity; that ontological preoccupation with the subject of security which commits its politics to securing the subject. Motivated, therefore, by a certain sense of crisis in both philosophy and politics, and by the conviction that there is an intimate relation between the two which is most violently and materially exhibited globally in (inter)national politics, the aim of this book is to make a contribution towards rethinking some of the fundamentals of International Relations through what I would call the political philosophy of contemporary continental thought. Its ultimate intention is, therefore, to make a contribution toward the reconstruction of International Relations as a site of political thought, by departing from the very commitment to the politics of subjectivity upon which International Relations is premised. This is a tall order, and not least because the political philosophy of continental thought cannot be brought to bear upon International Relations if the political thought of that thought remains largely unthought. [Emphasis Added]

A/T: Dolman

Astropolitik is no different than Realpolitik; they don’t get to claim that space somehow changes the calculations of conventional geopolitics because they merely repeat conventional analysis beyond the mesosphere.

MacDonald 2007 [Fraser, Professor at the University of Melbourne, “Anti-Astropolitik – outer space and the orbit of geography,” in *Progress in Human Geography* 31.5]

Dolman’s astropolitical project is by no means exceptional. The journal Astropolitics, of which he is a founding editor, contains numerous papers expressing similar views. It is easy, I think, for critical geographers to feel so secure in the intellectual and political purchase of Ó Tuathailian critiques (Ó Tuathail, 1996), that we become oblivious to the undead nature of classical geopolitics. It is comforting to think that most geography undergraduates encountering geopolitics, in the UK at least, will in all likelihood do so through the portal of critical perspectives, perhaps through the excellent work of Joanne Sharp or Klaus Dodds (Dodds, 2005; Sharp, 2005). But the legacies of Mackinder and Mahan live on, and radical critique is as urgent as ever. While this is not the place for a thoroughgoing reappraisal of astropolitics in the manner of Gearòid Ó Tuathail, a few salient points from his critique can be brought out. (1) Astrography and astropolitics, like geography and geopolitics, constitute ‘a political domination and cultural imagining of space’ (Ó Tuathail, 1996: 28). While commentators like Colin Gray have posited an ‘inescapable geography’ (eg, ‘of course, physical geography is politically neutral’), a critical agenda conceives of geography not as a fi xed substratum but as a highly social form of knowledge (Gray, 1999: 173; Ó Tuathail, 1999: 109). For geography, read ‘astrography’. We must be alert to the ‘declarative’ (‘this is how the Outer Earth is’) and ‘imperative’ (‘this is what we must do’) modes of narration that astropolitics has borrowed from its terrestrial antecedent (Ó Tuathail, 1999: 107). The models of Mackinder and Mahan that are so often applied to the space environment are not unchanging laws; on the contrary they are themselves highly political attempts to create and sustain particular strategic outcomes in specific historical circumstances. (2) Rather than actively supporting the dominant structures and mechanisms of power, a critical astropolitics must place the primacy of such forces always already in question. Critical astropolitics aims to scrutinize the power politics of the expert/ think-tank/tactician as part of a wider project of deepening public debate and strengthening democratic accountability (Ó Tuathail, 1999: 108). (3) Mackinder’s ‘end of geography’ thesis held that the era of terrestrial exploration and discovery was over, leaving only the task of consolidating the world order to fi t British interests (Ó Tuathail, 1996: 27). Dolman’s vision of space strategy bears striking similarities. Like Ó Tuathail’s critique of Mackinder’s imperial hubris, Astropolitik could be reasonably described as ‘triumphalism blind to its own precariousness’ (Ó Tuathail, 1996: 28). Dolman, for instance, makes little effort to conceal his tumescent patriotism, observing that ‘the United States is awash with power after its impressive victories in the 1991 Gulf War and 1999 Kosovo campaign, and stands at the forefront of history capable of presiding over the birth of a bold New World Order’. One might argue, however, that Mackinder – as the theorist of imperial decline – may in this respect be an appropriate mentor (Ó Tuathail, 1999: 112). It is important, I think, to demystify Astropolitik: there is nothing ‘inevitable’ about US dominance in space, even if the USA were to pursue this imperial logic. (4) Again like Mackinder, Astropolitik mobilizes an unquestioned ethnocentrism. Implicit in this ideology is the notion that America must beat China into space because ‘they’ are not like ‘us’. ‘The most ruthlessly suitable’ candidates for space dominance, we are told – ‘the most capably endowed’ – are like those who populated America and Australia (Dolman, 2002: 27). (5) A critical astropolitics must challenge the ‘mythic’ properties of Astropolitik and disrupt its reverie for the ‘timeless insights’ of the so-called geopolitical masters. For Ó Tuathail, ‘geopolitics is mythic because it promises uncanny clarity … in a complex world’ and is ‘fetishistically concerned with …. prophecy’ (Ó Tuathail, 1999: 113). Ó Tuathail’s critical project, by contrast, seeks to recover the political and historical contexts through which the knowledge of Mackinder and Mahan has become formalized.

A/T: Permutation

Optimism about space-based technology’s capacity to transform human relations must be qualified in terms of the geopolitical and military realities which make said transformations possible.

MacDonald 2007 [Fraser, Professor at the University of Melbourne, “Anti-Astropolitik – outer space and the orbit of geography,” in *Progress in Human Geography* 31.5]

For all its clunky punnage, ‘a-whereness’ nevertheless gives a name to a set of highly contingent forms of subjectivity that are worth anticipating, even if, by Thrift’s own admission, they remain necessarily speculative. Reading this body of work can induce a certain vertigo, confronting potentially precipitous shifts in human sociality. The same sensation is also induced by engagement with Paul Virilio (2005). But, unlike Virilio, Thrift casts off any sense of foreboding (Thrift, 2005b) and instead embraces the construction of ‘new qualities’ (‘conventions, techniques, forms, genres, concepts and even … senses’), which in turn open up new ethicopolitical possibilities (Thrift, 2004a: 583). It is important not to jettison this openness lightly. Even so, I remain circumspect about the social relations that underwrite these emergent qualities, and I am puzzled by Thrift’s disregard of the (geo)political contexts within which these new technologies have come to prominence. A critical geography should, I think, be alert to the ways in which state and corporate power are immanent within these technologies, actively strategizing new possibilities for capital accumulation and military neoliberalism. To the extent that we can sensibly talk about ‘a-whereness’ it is surely a function of a new turn in capitalism, which has arguably expanded beyond the frame (but not the reach) of Marx and Engels when they wrote that: the need for a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere. (Marx and Engels, 1998: 39) The current struggle for orbital supremacy, as the next section will make clear, is an extension of these relations into space in order to consolidate them back on Earth. Indeed, outer space may become, to use David Harvey’s term, a ‘spatio-temporal fix’ that can respond to crises of over-accumulation (Harvey, 2003: 43). While this might seem like shorthand for the sort of Marxist critique that Thrift rejects (Amin and Thrift, 2005), it is an analysis that is also shared by the advocates of American Astropolitik, who describe space as the means by which ‘capitalism will never reach wealth saturation’ (Dolman, 2002: 175). The production of (outer) space should, I think, be understood in this wider context.

A/T: Permutation

We are not technological determinists; the possibility of the loss of agency inherent in any new technology is realized when we as human agents forget our responsibilities to critically interrogate the new relations new forms of technology inaugurate

MacDonald 2007 [Fraser, Professor at the University of Melbourne, “Anti-Astropolitik – outer space and the orbit of geography,” in *Progress in Human Geography* 31.5]

I should emphasize that I am not advancing some technologically determinist argument to the effect that if something is military in origin it is somehow ‘tainted’ or forever in the service of militarism. Walter Benjamin reminds us that the meaning of technology has no umbilical link to its origins: he noted that the Eiffel Tower ‘found’ its purpose as a military radio transmitter long after it had been built simply as a monument to industrial confidence in iron (Benjamin, 1999: 568). But we should be concerned when the needs of basic civilian infrastructure come to be regarded as coterminous with those of military strategy, particularly in circumstances when technologies of the state are so readily adaptable to monitoring the lives of its citizenry. Another consequence of this conflation is that dual-use systems underpinning normal life have become a ready target of military efforts, being exempt from the usual civilian protections of international law (Graham, 2005c). To use Stephen Graham’s phrase, US air and space power is increasingly aimed at ‘switching cities off’ (Graham, 2005c). This may very easily develop from targeting electricity networks (Belgrade, Baghdad, Beirut) to the destruction of satellite provision on which so much of our civilian infrastructure depends. As Tim Luke observed: many more human beings live highly cyberorganized lives, totally dependent upon the Denature of machinic ensembles with their elaborate extra-terrestrial ecologies of megatechnical economics. This is true for the Rwandans in the refugee camps of Zaire [sic] as it is for the Manhattanites in the luxury coops of New York City. (Luke, quoted in Graham, 2005c: 171) I am reluctant to reiterate Paul Virilio’s preoccupation with the crash and the accident as defining features of modernity (Virilio, 2000; Leslie, 2000), but one cannot avoid the fact that systems that have become vital for sustaining our current mode of existence are now obvious and accessible targets. Concerns have even been raised that constellations of satellites are vulnerable to hackers with destructive intent (Kent, 2006). The point of all this gloomy talk is to qualify rather than to overturn the emphases of Nigel Thrift’s recent work. Moreover, I hope to contextualize some of the tendencies Thrift describes within the systems of geopower from which they have materialized. In the final section I want to show something of the strategic struggle for space; a struggle that is by no means distant from the discipline of geography.

A/T: Permutation

The very structure of the affirmative’s thinking makes questioning security impossible.

Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security*,pp. 24-26]

We now know that neither metaphysics nor our politics of security can secure the security of truth and of life which was their reciprocating raison d’être (and, raison d’état26). More importantly, we now know that the very will to security— Security, philosophy and politics 25 the will to power of sovereign presence in both metaphysics and modern politics— is not only a prime incitement to violence in the Western tradition of thought, and to the globalisation of its (inter)national politics, but also self-defeating;27 in that it does not in its turn merely endanger, but actually engenders danger in response to its own discursive dynamic. One does not have to be persuaded of the destinal sending of Being, therefore, to be persuaded of the profundity—and of the profound danger—of this the modern human condition. That, then, is why the crisis of Western thought is as much a fundamental crisis of (inter)national politics, as the crisis of (inter)national politics is a crisis of thought. Moreover, that is why in doubting the value of security, and doubting in a Nietzschean mode better than Descartes,28 we are also enjoined by the circumstances of this critical conjunction of the philosophical and the political to doubt metaphysical truth. For the political truth of security is the metaphysical truth of correspondence and adequation in declension to mathesis; the mere, but rigorously insistent, mensuration of calculability. To bring the value of security into question in the radical way required by the way it now, ironically, radically endangers us, correspondingly requires that we attend to metaphysics’ own continuous process of deconstruction. In doing this, however, we go beyond mere doubting—which, after all, is the mere counterpart of the desire for certainty— and find non-apocalyptic ways of affirming and so continuing to enjoy and celebrate (in)security; that is to say human being’s own obligatory freedom. Ultimately, now, our (inter)national politics of security is no longer even distinguished or driven by humanistic considerations. It is a security simply ordering to order. But it is only by virtue of the fact that our (inter)national politics of security has come to this end that we can in fact begin to consider the relationship between its end and its beginning. Through this we do not, in a sense, go back to anything at all. Neither does this turn disguise some covert nostalgia for a phantom past. Rather, attention is turned towards consideration of what is entailed in the preparation and inception of continuous new political growth. This is also why, at the limit, it is useful to think about these origins and limits again. Not because they hold an answer that is now lost but because, antecedent to metaphysics, they make us think about the very liminal character of origins and limits, of the relationship which obtains between them, and of what proceeds from them, in ways that are not utterly determined by metaphysics. That way we may get some clues to some ways of thinking that are not metaphysical; nor, indeed, pre-metaphysical, because we cannot be premetaphysical at the end of metaphysics. What happens, instead, is that the whole question of emergence and origination, of the very possibility of repeating ourselves, opens-up again; specifically in the sense of the historical possibilities of the obligatory freedom of human being now terminally endangered globally by its very own (inter)national ‘civilising’ practices. There is no going back, but there is also no stepping outside of this condition. Humankind has attained a certain limit here in our time and our thinking. And this limit, by virtue of the globalisation of Western thought and politics, now increasingly conditions the future of human being. Politics at the end, or rather in the extremis, of security consequently confronts the same tasks as philosophy at the end, or in the extremis, of metaphysics. That extremis, or limit, is the insecurity of security itself. Because there is no overcoming this limit, modern thought and modern politics are each an encounter, therefore, with that limit. An encounter that has to be designed to defer both the closure of thought and the termination of politics threatened by the terminal construal of limits in general, and of this limit in particular.29 That, critically, means thinking limits differently. This global conjunction of the limit of the philosophical and the political, therefore itself, constitutes a new political experience. It is one which compounds the deconstruction of the way political experience, or rather the understanding of political life, has hitherto been thought, because that new experience cannot be addressed—much less ‘resolved’—in the traditional terms and categories of political philosophy.

A/T: Permutation

We do not genuinely question if our answers do not risk our leaving everything behind [i.e., the aff becomes a question in the alt, but the aff remains unconditionally true in the permutation]

Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security*,pp. 45-46]

Heidegger thus ontologises both phenomenology and hermeneutics, which hitherto had consequently been neither phenomenological nor hermeneutical enough for him, when enlisting them to deconstruct the philosophical tradition in order to get at what it covered-over; namely the ontological difference between Being and beings, presencing rather than presence, difference as such; the very uncanniness of Being and thus of human being and of Language, in which each is disclosed. Such destructuring—like the later Derridaean version of deconstruction32—was not, of course, a radical turn away from or step out of tradition, because tradition is not something which is first given and then decided upon. Tradition is only tradition in the act of taking something up in one way or another, which is to say also saying in the process what that something is. Destructuring was, therefore, a radical new turn towards the history of philosophy, or step back into it. Rather than disowning what has gone before, the tradition here becomes tradition in being re-won and newly owned. If the target of the destructive move of this deconstruction was consequently not the tradition as if it was some reified object but the processes of reception by which the tradition comes to be as tradition, its prize was a more original, thoughtful, and thoughtprovoking appropriation of that tradition. Heidegger’s way of doing this, Auseinandersetzung, was deliberately and forcefully agonistic: Auseinandersetzung brings philosophers into the sharpest focus and it unfolds their meaning in the history of philosophy by taking each thinker seriously as an adversary, as someone who demands that certain decisions be made about essential understandings of the world and of Being. By forcing a confrontation with one’s faith, ideas of nature, or ideals of political belonging, such decisions can wound, even kill, before they are complete in this duel—demanding that we defend, give-up or transfigure cherished beliefs and conceptions which order our lives. In confrontation, what—or rather how—we are is at stake. Without this principle of interpretation, a thinker cannot make out his own standpoint, so that he also cannot get at the opposition he wants.33 Here it is worth reinforcing the point that the contemporary thinker who has taken Heidegger’s method most to heart—and, indeed, practised it most directly and forcefully upon Heidegger himself, precisely because of the vital importance of what he thinks is at stake there—has been Emmanuel Levinas. While it seeks to rediscover something in the past, rather than of the past, like genealogy, however, a term which Heidegger uses twice, the critique of this deconstructive Auseinandersetzung is not ‘fault finding or underlining of errors’.34 Rather, it is an insistence upon formulating and meeting today’s challenges by posing more originally those questions the answers to which, having formed the present, threaten to entrap us, unsustainably and unsurvivably, within it if they are not reformulated and re-posed (recovered) in response to our present need to think and live-out our existence futurally. Such thinking is not only forcefully aimed at the present, therefore, it is also aimed at rethinking past questions and ways of posing questions, the answers to which have given rise to the present.35 For: ‘Every answer keeps its force as answer only so long as it is rooted in questioning’.36 The release of the present into a different future is, then, propelled less by new answers—architectonic principles and systems—or by the reoccupation of positions established by previous questions.37 Instead, it comes through new ways of formulating old questions or, rather, by the new questions which such reformulation poses in and to the challenges of a present which becomes a fatal cul de sac—deathly enclosure—if it cannot be renewed by such appropriative questioning.

\*\*\*Asteroid Securitization Module\*\*\*

Link – Threat Construction

Asteroids are a constructed threat, and directly linked to both space weapon development and U.S. and global culture.

Mellor ‘7 (course leader of Imperial College’s Science Communication group, PhD in theoretical physics from Newcastle University, “Colliding Worlds: Asteriod Research and the Legitimization of War in Space”, Social Studies of Science, August 2007, Vol. 37 No. 4, pages 499-531, AG)

Since the late 1980s, a small group of astronomers and planetary scientists has repeatedly warned of the threat of an asteroid impacting with Earth and causing global destruction. They foretell a large impact causing global fires, the failure of the world’s agriculture and the end of human civilization. But, these scientists assure us, we live at a unique moment in history when we have the technological means to avert disaster. They call for support for dedicated astronomical surveys of near-Earth objects to provide early warn- ing of an impactor and they have regularly met with defence scientists to discuss new technologies to deflect any incoming asteroids.The scientists who have promoted the asteroid impact threat have done so by invoking narratives of technological salvation – stories which, like the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), promise security through a superweapon in space. The asteroid impact threat can therefore be located within the broader cultural history of fantasies about security and power, which, Bruce Franklin (1988) has argued, is inextricably linked to the century-old idea that a new superweapon could deliver world peace. Howard McCurdy (1997:78–82), in his study of the ways in which the US space programme was shaped by popular culture, has suggested that the promotion of the impact threat can be seen as the completion of Cold War fantasies, which had used a politics of fear to justify space exploration. McCurdy highlights the align- ment between the promotion of the impact threat and works of fiction. In this paper, I consider the reconceptualization of asteroid science that this alignment entailed.

Link – Threat Construction

**Asteroids have been constructed as threats comparable to rogue states, even in peer-reviewed journals.**

Mellor ‘7 (course leader of Imperial College’s Science Communication group, PhD in theoretical physics from Newcastle University, “Colliding Worlds: Asteriod Research and the Legitimization of War in Space”, Social Studies of Science, August 2007, Vol. 37 No. 4, pages 499-531, AG)

A sense of narrative agency was evoked even in texts that were not pri- marily narratival. Crucially, asteroids were no longer seen as signifiers of the mathematically exacting Newtonian system, distant objects moving through the empty backdrop of space. Rather, they were configured as proximate beasts, acting subjects that could turn against humanity at any moment. Thus in their many popular books on the subject, the scientists described asteroids as belonging to a ‘menagerie’ or a ‘cosmic zoo’ (Steel, 2000a: 120); they were ‘menacing’ (Kring, 2000: 171) and had ‘teeth’ (Clube & Napier, 1990: 154); they were ‘global killers’ (Lewis, 1997: 209) that could unleash ‘ferocious assaults’ (Steel, 1995: 247) on the Earth; they were the ‘enemy’ (Steel, 2000a: 153). Likewise, in their paper in Nature, Chapman & Morrison (1994: 33) stated that Earth ‘resides in a swarm of asteroids’.The construction of asteroids as the enemy was accompanied by a range of other militaristic metaphors. In the popular books, asteroids became ‘mis- siles’, ‘pieces of ordnance’ or ‘stealth weapons’ (Lewis, 1997: 37), which bombard the Earth with a ‘death-dealing fusillade’ (Clube & Napier, 1990: 7). In a technical paper, too, they were construed as ‘astral assailant[s]’ (Simonenko et al., 1994: 929). Where the military and the politicians talked of rogue states,27 the scientists talked of ‘rogue asteroids’ (Steel, 1995; Ailor, 2004: 3). This analogy was further reinforced by the construction of scenar- ios in which a small impact might be mistaken for the detonation of a nuclear warhead. One technical paper speculated on what would have happened dur- ing the first Gulf War if an atmospheric explosion that had been caused by a meteor burning up over the Pacific had actually occurred over Baghdad or Israel (Tagliaferri et al., 1994). The authors suggested that such an event would have been mistaken for a missile detonation by the opposing state. In such scenarios, the actions of interplanetary bodies were not just compared with those of rogue states but came to be identified with them.With the swarming asteroids filling space, space itself was also resigni- fied. What had been an abstract mathematical space became a narrative place, the location where particular and contingent events occurred. Although the scientists continued to appeal to the predictability of celestial dynamics – it was this that would enable a survey of near-Earth objects to identify any that might pose a threat – they also noted that chaotic processes disturbed the orbits of comets and also, to a lesser degree, aster- oids (for example, Yeomans & Chodas, 1994; Milani et al., 2000). The inherent unpredictability of the orbits was enhanced by the current state of scientific uncertainty. These chaotic and uncertain processes were pro- jected onto space itself, construed as a place of random violence. In the popular books, the Solar System became a ‘dangerous cosmic neighbour- hood’ (Sumners & Allen, 2000b: 3), ‘a capricious, violent place’ (Verschuur, 1996: 217), a place of ‘mindless violence’ (Verschuur, 1996: 18) and ‘wan- ton destruction’ (Levy, 1998: 13). Even in a peer-reviewed paper, Chapman (2004: 1) described space as a ‘cosmic shooting gallery’.

Link – Hero Narrative

**Asteroid defense has been paraded as a moral goal: justifying military goals, and creating a security-oriented narrative with a predetermined end.**

Mellor ‘7 (course leader of Imperial College’s Science Communication group, PhD in theoretical physics from Newcastle University, “Colliding Worlds: Asteriod Research and the Legitimization of War in Space”, Social Studies of Science, August 2007, Vol. 37 No. 4, pages 499-531, AG)

Through such claims, the issue of planetary defence became a moral frame through which other threats of more human origin could also be addressed. Increased knowledge and surveillance of asteroids, the scientists insisted, would help stop mistakes by the military decision-makers by pre- venting the misidentification of asteroid airbursts as enemy nuclear warheads (Chapman & Morrison, 1994: 39). At the same time, destroying asteroids would provide us with a way of using up those unwanted bombs. As John Lewis (1997: 215) put it: ‘The net result of the asteroid deflection is really a twofold benefit to Earth: a devastating impact would be avoided and there would be one less nuclear warhead on Earth.’ Similarly, Duncan Steel saw the use of SDI technologies in asteroid missions such as Clementine II as ‘a prime example of beating swords into ploughshares’ (quoted in Matthews, 1997). Furthermore, the international tensions that led to the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the first place, would also be resolved by uniting against the common enemy of the asteroid. Thus Carl Sagan and Steve Ostro, although largely critical of the promotion of the impact threat, suggested that: In an indirect way the threat of interplanetary collision may have a politi- cal silver lining. They represent a common enemy to all nations and ethnic groups. By posing two different classes of danger to the human species, one natural and the other of our own making, Earth-approaching objects may provide a new and potent motivation for maturing international relations, ultimately helping to unify the human species. (Sagan & Ostro, 1994b: 72; see also Gehrels, 1988: 303) Even for Sagan and Ostro, then, as for the other civilian scientists, the impact threat offered hope of salvation. Like the impact threat, SDI’s technological solution to the stalemate of the Cold War was also embedded within a moral frame of technological salvation. As Spencer Weart (1988: 385, 399) points out in his history of nuclear imagery: In promoting the Star Wars program Reagan was apparently working to restore ... trust by affirming that technology, even weapons technology, could be inherently moral and humane. ... Through all this talk [about SDI] ran the idea of salvation by way of technology in the heavens. Appropriating images of nuclear holocaust from the anti-nuclear cam- paigners, the supporters of SDI spoke of protective, defensive technologies that would, in Reagan’s words, render nuclear weapons ‘impotent and obsolete’ (quoted in FitzGerald, 2000: 23). For Reagan, SDI was a moral programme to be pursued by the scientific community for ‘the cause of mankind and world peace’. Others in the defence community also spoke of a ‘moral imperative’ and of protecting the American people rather than avenging them.32 ‘Mutually assured destruction’ was to be replaced by ‘mutually assured survival’. The moral programme of SDI hinged on the notion of defensive weapons to replace offensive ones. At the level of rhetoric, therefore, SDI helped consolidate the switch from an offensive to a defensive posture. Research into the asteroid impact threat celebrated this posture. Impact- threat science created an external enemy and deployed the same moral argument of ‘defence-shields-as-salvation’ as did Reagan and his support- ers. Indeed, Thomas Ahrens went so far as to describe the nuclear weapons that might be used to deflect asteroids as ‘weapons of mass protection’ (quoted in Lewis, 1997: 221). The construal of asteroids as acting agents, of astronomy as the means to salvation, and of human intervention in space as a moral cause, were also elements of the stories told in the fictional works. Direct references to works of science fiction in the writings of the asteroid scientists were there- fore just the most explicit traces of the asteroid scientists’ dependence on narratives of technological salvation. Science and science fiction existed in a mutually reinforcing relationship in which civilian scientists, defence experts and science fiction writers all narrated the impact threat. As science and fiction became aligned, asteroids became incorporated into the world of narrative cause-and-effect with its movement towards closure. The aster- oid scientists’ reliance on such narratives meant that they could not avoid the closure demanded by their stories – they were subject to a narrative imperative. Regardless of their personal feelings about weapons in space, they regularly met with defence scientists to discuss weapons technologies to deflect or destroy an incoming asteroid, for only this could provide a satisfactory resolution to their impact stories. Despite their suspicions about each other’s motives, the civilian and defence scientists’ dependence on similar narratives of technological salvation meant that they were both drawn towards the same endings.

Link – Hero Narrative

**Current science on asteroid impacts has been influenced and based on science fiction, becoming highly narratarized in order to create a credible threat, and insist on salvation through technology.**

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Despite their disagreements over technical details and funding priorities, both civilian and defence scientists appealed to narratives of technological salvation. In his study of the superweapon in the American imagination, Bruce Franklin (1988) has shown how a century-long tradition of future- war fiction shaped an apocalyptic ideology in which American technologi- cal genius was to put an end to all war and fulfil America’s manifest destiny. Franklin argues that this cultural fantasizing has been materially significant in producing actual superweapons and developing defence pol- icy. As David Seed (1999) has also shown, SDI was made imaginable, and was explicitly defended, by science fiction writers. The impact-threat sci- entists took this cultural fantasizing a step further as they attempted to establish the reality of that threat. It was now nature, rather than any human foe, which was configured as the warring enemy whose technolog- ical defeat would bring Earthly harmony. Until the 1970s, most science fiction stories about asteroids imagined them as objects to be exploited for their mineral wealth.24 Scientists’ writ- ings would occasionally reflect this interest.25 Indeed, the only paper in the 1979 volume Asteroids to allude to a future impact of an asteroid with Earth was framed in terms of the exploitation of asteroids. In a bizarre paper, which had been rejected for an earlier publication after being judged ‘out- rageously innovative’ and ‘premature’, Samuel Herrick (1979) proposed that portions of the asteroid Geographos could be targeted at specific points on the Earth to produce ‘constructive’ effects, such as the excavation of a new Central American canal to join the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. However, by the time of Herrick’s technical fantasy, science fiction writers had begun to explore the more destructive consequences of an asteroid impacting with Earth. Most notably, Arthur C. Clarke, in his 1973 novel Rendezvous with Rama (Clarke, 1991 [1973]) described an asteroid impact in 2077. A detection survey called ‘Spaceguard’ is established in response to the impact and the rest of the story deals with the investigation of what actually turns out to be an alien spacecraft that is detected by the Spaceguard survey some 60 years later. Clarke developed the Spaceguard idea further in another novel, Hammer of God (Clarke, 1995) [1993] after writing a short story on the same theme for Time magazine the previous year (Clarke, 1992b). Clarke’s impact novels were well regarded by the scientists promoting the impact threat and were cited in some of their peer-reviewed papers and policy documents as well as in their popular books. For instance, in theirinfluential paper in Nature, Chapman & Morrison (1994: 38) introduced the idea of deflecting a possible impactor with a reference to Hammer of God, noting that: ‘Just such a scenario ... is the theme of a recent novel’ (see also Morrison et al., 1994: 84; Atkinson, 2000: 36). Indeed, the sci- entists named their own international survey the Spaceguard Survey and their promotional organization the Spaceguard Foundation in tribute to Clarke, as they acknowledged in their technical papers (for example, Milani et al., 2002: 55). Clarke became a Trustee Member of Spaceguard, and he was a personal friend of Duncan Steel and Tom Gehrels, and wrote the foreword for one of Steel’s popular books on the impact threat and the afterword for another one (Gehrels, 1988: 236; Steel, 1995, 2000a). As Clarke himself remarked in the acknowledgements for one of his novels, ‘the strands of fact and fiction are becoming inextricably entwined’ (Clarke, 1995 [1993]: 247). Also mentioned by the scientists was Larry Niven and Jerry Pournelle’s Lucifer’s Hammer. This 1977 novel is essentially a survivalist tale about the aftermath of a comet impact. In the lawless devastation following the impact, a former Senator sets up a community that attempts to re-establish a civilized, technologized society. This predominantly white community is attacked by various predominantly violent black gangs, one of which has turned to canni- balism as an initiation rite. Despite its racism, which always went unacknowl- edged in the scientists’ comments, they praised this novel in their popular books. For instance, planetary scientist John Lewis (1997: 151) stated that no novel had better visualized the effects of ocean impacts, and Steel cited it as an example of ‘good science fiction’ based on ‘real science’ (Steel, 2000a: 124). Acknowledging limits to the expertise of natural scientists, Clark Chapman and David Morrison (1989: 279) suggested that ‘estimating socio- logical responses to catastrophe are more nearly in the purview of science- fiction writers, like Jerry Pournelle and Larry Niven, who addressed these matters in Lucifer’s Hammer (see also Morrison et al., 2004: 378). Like Clarke, Niven had direct contact with the scientists promoting the impact threat, attending the 2004 Planetary Defense Conference in California. Despite their very different political affinities, Clarke, Niven and Pournelle all portrayed technology as a force for good. With his proposal for a Spaceguard survey in Rendezvous with Rama and with the action of Hammer of God based on board a research space vessel charged with deflect- ing the incoming asteroid, Clarke’s impact novels promoted salvation through technology. Despite his earlier criticisms of SDI, in 1992 Clarke gave ‘two faint cheers for Son-of-SDI’, given certain provisos, because the technology might be needed to deflect an asteroid (Clarke, 1992a: 12). Niven and Pournelle also promoted an ideology of technological salvation in their novel, despite setting Lucifer’s Hammer in the technologically com- promised aftermath of an impact. The story’s denouement has the Senator’s group defending a nuclear power station, which they see as offering the means to recover civilization – a civilization fully attainable only through its technological artefacts. In this, as in other impact narratives, technology offers not the source of destruction but the means of salvation.In addition to referring to these novels, the scientists studying the impact threat also acknowledged film treatments of the asteroid impact threat – including the 1979 film Meteor and the 1998 films Deep Impact and Armageddon. For instance, a paper in the journal Space Policy includes a general reference to ‘novels and Hollywood films’ (Garshnek et al., 2000: 218) and NASA’s Deep Impact probe shares its name with the film. The report of the UK’s Task Force on near-Earth objects lists the release of all three films, as well as the publication of Clarke’s Rendezvous with Rama, as significant events in a chronology of the understanding of asteroids and comets (Atkinson, 2000: 36–37). These films were themselves influenced by the scientific work of the day. Meteor was inspired by the 1967 student project at MIT (Kleiman, 1979 [1968]) and the 1998 films used scientists as consultants (Davis, 2001). As David Kirby (2003) has argued, as well as enabling film studios to claim that their films are scientifically accurate, such consultancy work provides scientists with opportunities to promote a particular version of reality. The scientists also used narrative to present the impact threat in their own writings. The popular books written by the asteroid scientists often included narrative accounts of particular asteroid impacts that are hard to distinguish from the accounts found in fictional texts. For instance, in his popular book Rain of Fire and Ice, planetary scientist John Lewis described the approach of an asteroid as seen from ships in the North Atlantic sea- lanes just off England.26 The following lines give a flavour of the narra- tivized style through which he establishes a causally connected sequence of events: [The] crews, watching the brilliant fireball approaching them almost head-on, are at first dazzled by the light, but the vastly brighter flare of the final explosion literally burns out their eyes. Ships ... fill with smoke as they careen on, unpiloted, into hell. (Lewis, 1997: 195–96) This is one of several scenarios, which, Lewis says, are narrative accounts of computer simulations ‘just as they came off the computer’ (Lewis, 1997: 188). However much Lewis might wish to credit his computer with the authorship of these narratives, by naming real places, fixing times, estab- lishing a causal sequence of events and alluding to proto-characters, he converts the generalized predictions of collision statistics and asteroid properties into concrete narrative scenarios familiar to his readers. Through such narration, the data of a speculative science becomes a realistic and immediate threat. Technical reports of similar computer simulations, while lacking the colour of Lewis’s popular account, allude to similar narrative scenarios. For instance, a conference paper by two Los Alamos scientists combines the particularity of place with the immediacy of the present tense: ‘The East Coast of the United States is hit very hard by the surge. ... Delaware, Long Island, and all of Maryland below the Piedmont Plateau are completely inundated as are all coastal cities in this area’ (Hills & Mader, 1995; see also Hills & Goda, 1999). Like Lewis’s narratives, this is an account of events that have not happened – events which are construedout of computer models of possible kinetic energies, rock densities and atmospheric resistance applied to real locations in a possible future present.

Link – Weaponization

The cooperation between civilian scientists and defense scientists has created a unique narrative that leads to a predetermined end, and justifies moral dilemmas like space weapons.

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A number of studies (for example, McDougall, 1985; Forman, 1987; Kevles, 1990; DeVorkin, 1992; Leslie, 1993; Dennis, 1994) have revealed the ways in which US research programmes and nominally-civilian scien- tific institutions originated in military programmes.1 One aim of this paper is to demonstrate how the boundary between civilian and military science is blurred not just institutionally, but also at a fundamental conceptual level. The civilian scientists discussed here followed different working prac- tices and traded in different forms of expertise than did the defence scien- tists. They were typically astronomers or planetary scientists who worked for NASA or on NASA-funded research programmes at universities and private institutes. They saw themselves as distinct from the defence scien- tists who were typically physicists and engineers working on new weapons systems or other technologies of national security at the Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories or at armed services institu- tions.2 Yet the two groups came to share an interest in asteroids and with that a set of assumptions about the nature of human society, the role of technology and our place in outer space. As they came into contact, their differing backgrounds meant they disagreed over a number of issues, yet both sides pursued the collaboration despite the tensions. Many studies of the interaction between military and civilian science have focused on sources of funding and shared technologies.3 Important as these are, they fail to capture fully the dynamic between the two communi- ties. In particular, a cynical picture of scientists simply pursuing sources of funding on any terms cannot reveal the far-reaching ways in which civilian research can become entrenched in particular patterns of thinking which are supportive of militaristic programmes. For military/civilian collaborations to be sustained, civilian scientists need to share with their counterparts in the defence sector an understanding of the overall trajectory of their research. For shared technologies to be developed, they need first to be imagined. Military/civilian interactions are therefore predicated on, and mediated through, a shared technoscientific imaginary. Despite expressing concerns about the motives and methods of the weapons scientists, the civilian scientists who promoted the asteroid impact threat drew on narratives that configured a human role in space in a similar way to SDI. These narratives helped make asteroids conceivable as a threat, yet they also served to make acceptable, and even necessary, the idea of space-based weaponry. Despite their disagreements, at the level of their shared narratives the discourses of the civilian and defence scientists were mutually supportive. Several studies of the role of narrative in the production of scientific knowledge have identified it as a means of generating coherence in science that both enables and constrains further research (Haraway, 1989; O’Hara, 1992; Rouse, 1996; Brown, 1998). Richard Harvey Brown is the most explicit about what constitutes a narrative, defining it as ‘an accounting of events or actions temporally that explains them causally or motivationally’ (Brown, 1998: 98). Brown’s definition of narrative fits with that of narrative theorists such as Mieke Bal (1997) who have stressed that narrative entails not a random unfolding of events but a sequenced ordering involving a tran- sition from one state to another brought about or experienced by actors. One implication of this is the fundamental role of causality and agency. Another is that a narrative beginning always anticipates an ending – a reso- lution or closure to the events that have been set in motion. Historian Hayden White (1981: 23) has argued that the tendency to present history as narrative ‘arises out of a desire to have real events display the coherence, integrity, fullness, and closure of an image or life that is and can only be imaginary’. He finds that narrative closure involves a passage from one moral order to another. ‘Where, in any account of reality, narrativity is pres- ent, we can be sure that morality or a moralizing impulse is present too’ (White, 1981: 22). In this sense, narrative is inherently teleological and ide- ological. The inexorable movement of a narrative towards a predetermined end ensures that its many assumptions go unchallenged. An analytical approach to the interaction between military and civilian science that recognizes the ideological function of narrative can help side- step some of the difficulties associated with the distortionist thesis often attributed to Paul Forman’s (1987) landmark paper on the military basis of US post-war physics. Forman has been criticized for implying that without military patronage, physics would have followed an ideal direction unaf- fected by outside interests (for example, Kevles, 1990). By looking at what sorts of narratives scientists draw on, we can avoid Forman’s supposed ide- alism. The question is not so much whether science has been distorted, but through which of many possible stories a research programme has been articulated. To ask which stories have been invoked is to ask which ideolo- gies have implicitly been accepted. And to ask that is to allow that, on ide- ological grounds, some stories are preferable to others.

Link – Moral Fable

Asteroid impact has reconceputalized the identity of astronomers and civilian scientists- making them and their technology the saviors of the world rather than passive individuals seeking knowledge.

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During the 1980s and 1990s, a small group of planetary scientists and astronomers set about actively promoting the asteroid impact threat. They drew on an expanded empirical base, but also on narratives of technologi- cal salvation. Despite their concerns that their warnings were greeted by a ‘giggle factor’ and that funding remained too low, they succeeded in cap- turing the attention of the media and of some policy-makers and in estab- lishing the impact threat as a legitimate and serious topic for scientific study. By the eve of the new millennium, the meaning of asteroids had undergone a significant transformation. Asteroids had gone from being dis- tant relics of Solar System history to being a hidden enemy that could strike at any time with catastrophic consequences. The reconceptualization of asteroids was accompanied by a reconcep- tualization of both space and astronomy. In Newtonianism, space had been conceived as an empty geometrical abstraction in which God’s handiwork was displayed to the knowing observer. Space was both predictable and dis- tant. Now, with the promotion of the impact threat, space was configured as the source of an enemy against which we must defend ourselves. This threatening conception of space matched the conception of space as a the- atre of war promoted by the supporters of SDI. Space had become a place, a technologized location for human action where wars could be fought and human salvation sought. Thus astronomy was also reconceptualized. Further developing the violent metaphors already appropriated by impact–extinction theory (Davis, 2001), astronomers recast their role as impassioned prophets of doom and saviours of mankind rather than as cold calculators of cosmic order. Traditionally, Solar System astronomy had dealt with the grand narratives of planetary history and the timeless certainties of celestial dynamics. The technologies of astronomy – telescopes and, later, space probes – were the tools through which new knowledge had been sought. They were not, on the whole, instruments of action. Now, however, astronomy was to be prophetic and interventionist. As comets had been in a far earlier period, both asteroids and comets were now treated as ‘monsters’ – portents of Earthly calamities. It was the purpose of planetary astronomy to watch for these portents. Equally, it was the duty of astronomers to warn the unsus- pecting public and to intervene to save the world. Planetary astronomy was transformed from the passive observation of the heavens to the active sur- veillance of the heavens, and the instruments of astronomy were to be sup- plemented with the technologies of war.

Link – Moral Fable

**Asteroid impact creation paints a picture with scientists as heros, space as a battlefield, and technology as a necessary savior.**

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Despite the agency attributed to the asteroids themselves, in the narra- tives of technological salvation it was the human agents, acting through new technologies, who moved the narratives forward. Narrative progres- sion was thus generated through an assumption of technological progress. Through technology, humans intervene in space and become agents of cosmic events. The scientists’ promotion of the impact threat shared this assumption of technological progress. Like the US Air Force study, their technical papers on mitigation systems considered speculative technologies such as solar sails and mass drivers as well as more established explosive technologies (for example, Ahrens & Harris, 1992; Melosh & Nemchinov, 1993; Ivashkin & Smirnov, 1995; Gritzner & Kahle, 2004). Even those sci- entists who warned that it was too early to draw up detailed blueprints of interception technologies accepted the narratival implication that there was a problem that needed addressing, that the problem could be addressed by human action, and that this action would involve a technological solution. Technology, in this picture, was configured as inherently progressive. As Morrison & Teller (1994: 1137) put it: ‘The development of technology in the past few centuries has been towards increasing understanding and con- trol of natural forces in an effort to improve human life.’ Those scientists who argued against the immediate development of mitigation technology shared with its proponents a belief in the inexorable progress of technology. Future generations, they argued, would be better equipped than we are at the moment to meet the technological challenge of an impacting asteroid (for example, Ahrens & Harris, 1992). In contrast to traditional astronomical systems, which passively watched the skies, asteroid detection systems were to be surveillance systems that actively hunted the skies for objects of human import. The Spaceguard Survey was predicated on a will to action in a way in which the earlier Spacewatch Survey was not. Similarly, when it fired its impactor at Comet Tempel 1, NASA’s Deep Impact mission took a far more active interven- tion in space than did earlier generations of probes. This was not far from Edward Teller’s call for ‘experimentation’ with near-Earth objects to test defence technologies (Tedeschi & Teller, 1994; Teller, 1995), an idea dis- missed at the time as extreme by some civilian scientists (Chapman, 1998). Likewise, one of the recommendations of the 2004 Planetary Defense Conference was that deflection techniques should be demonstrated on an actual asteroid (Ailor, 2004: 5).28 The technologization of space promoted in both the fictional works and the scientists’ technical proposals, also formed an integral part of the imagery and rhetoric that surrounded SDI, as its detractors highlighted when they re-named the project Star Wars. SDI was always premised on a vision of space as a technologized theatre of war. In the hands of a techno- enthusiast such as Edward Teller, SDI was configured as a space-based technological extravaganza with few limits.29 In SDI, as in asteroid research and science fiction, space became a dynamic arena through which our tech- nologies would move, in which our weapons would be placed, and across which our wars were to be waged.30 As discussed in the introduction to this paper, narrative is an inherently teleological form. In conventional narratives, the action is moved towards closure by the heroes of the story. In the impact narratives, the heroes are technological heroes set the task of saving the world. By drawing on these narratives and following the call for human agency inherent in the narrative structure, the scientists implicitly accepted this role as a necessary one. Having shifted apocalypse from the realm of nuclear politics to that of nat- ural science, the impact-threat scientists were able to position themselves as heroes whose combined far-sightedness and technological know-howwould save us all. Emphasizing the role of the unacknowledged hero in a foreword to a volume of conference proceedings, astronomer Tom Gehrels (2002: xiii) claimed: ‘There is a beauty also in hazards, because we are tak- ing care of them. We are working to safeguard our planet, even if the world does not seem to want to be saved.’ In a paper in another volume of con- ference proceedings, astrophysicist Eugene Levy was even more explicit about the scientists’ expanded role: In the arms race, the motivating dynamic was a political one. A dynamic in which scientists and engineers provided the technical tools, but, as a group, brought no special and unique wisdom to the table in making judgements about what to do. In the present case, the dynamic is differ- ent. The adversary is not another nation; the calculus is not one of politi- cal fears, anxieties, and motivations, for which we scientists have no special expertise. Rather the ‘adversary’ is the physical world. In assessing this adversary, we scientists have special and unique expertise. (Levy, 1994: 7; italics in original) Eclipsing the political dimension of the impact threat with their appeals to the natural, the scientists appropriated for themselves a heroic role. This technological hero was a moral hero – he would warn us of the danger and save us despite ourselves. Thus the scientists frequently quoted Representa- tive George Brown’s opening statement to a Congressional hearing when he warned that if we were to do nothing about the impact threat, it would be ‘the greatest abdication in all of human history not to use our gift of rational intellect and conscience to shepherd our own survival and that of all life on Earth’.31

Impact – Asteroid Securitization

**The securitization of asteroid impacts validated fear projection, space weaponry, and continuation of the rhetoric used by the United States military.**

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The asteroid impact threat offered a scientifically validated enemy onto which could be projected the fears on which a militaristic culture depends. Far from providing a replacement outlet for weapons technologies, the pro- motion of the asteroid impact threat helped make the idea of war in space more acceptable and helped justify the continued development of space- based weaponry. Arguably, with the Clementine and Deep Impact mis- sions, the asteroid impact threat even facilitated the testing of SDI-style systems. The asteroid impact threat legitimized a way of talking, and think- ing, that was founded on fear of the unknown and the assumption that advanced technology could usher in a safer era. In so doing, it resonated with the politics of fear and the technologies of permanent war that are now at the centre of US defence policy.

Narrativity Key

**Links to science fiction is not only present in popular and ‘dumbed down’ scientific literature, but is also found in highly technical peer-reviewed journals and government policy. This fiction is at the root of all we know about asteroid impacts.**

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Despite their own use of the narrative form and their explicit references to works of science fiction, the asteroid scientists expressed concerns about the proximity of their science to science fiction. They frequently com- plained of a ‘giggle factor’ (Verschuur, 1996: vi; Lewis, 1997: 220; Ailor, 2004: 6; Morrison et al., 2004: 354) and would insist on a clear separation between ‘science fact’ and ‘science fiction’ (Steel, 1995: 2, 247; Kring, 2000: 169). This double strategy of appealing to science fiction while cre- ating distance from it is also found in popularizations of other areas of sci- ence. As I have argued elsewhere (Mellor, 2003), this appeal to science fiction should not simply be dismissed as a popular hook aimed to draw readers into the ‘real’ science. As noted above, in the case of impact-threat science, although the references to science fiction are more common in popular accounts, they can also be found in some peer-reviewed papers and policy documents. The means of framing a text, be it popular or technical, is not some innocent bolt-on device, but fundamentally structures how we conceptualize the subject. Articulating a science of asteroids necessarily involves imagining asteroids. The asteroid scientists’ references to fictional narratives suggest that the technoscientific imaginary on which they drew was shared with, and informed by, the narratives of science fiction.

Science fiction permeates United States military space planning.

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Like the civilian scientists, the US defence scientists interested in the impact threat also worked in a community influenced by science fiction. Indeed, in some sectors of the military planning community, including those in which the promoters of SDI moved, explicit links with science fic- tion authors were cultivated regularly. As Chris Hables Gray (1994) has noted, ‘militaristic science fiction and military policy coexist in the same discourse system to a surprising degree’ (see also Franklin, 1988; James, 1994: 200). The Air Force Academy held annual ‘Nexus’ conferences on science fiction and military policy, and other conferences, such as the ‘Futurist’ conferences, also brought together military policy-makers and science fiction authors. At one typical conference held in 1985 at Ohio Air Force base, the authors present included prominent proponents of SDI such as Jerry Pournelle (Seed, 1999: 192). Pournelle was director of ‘orga- nizational support’ for the Heritage Foundation’s High Frontier project, which campaigned for SDI, and he was chair of a panel that in 1984 had published the pro-SDI tract, Mutually Assured Survival (Gray, 1994). He was also, for many years, the editor of the annual anthology series ‘There Will Be War!’, which mixed pro-war science fiction stories with pro-SDI non-fiction to claim that war was inevitable. The scientists promoting and working on SDI weapons were avid con-sumers of science fiction and some had direct links to science fiction authors. Rod Hyde, one of the Lawrence Livermore scientists who studied the impact threat, belonged to the Citizen’s Advisory Council on National Space Policy, an organization founded by Pournelle (Broad, 1985: 141). Another Lawrence Livermore scientist included references to works by Pournelle, Niven and other science fiction authors in his doctoral thesis on the X-ray laser. In an interview with journalist William Broad, he explained that he turned to such authors for ideas about his own work. ‘Writers of sci- ence fiction are supposed to look into the future. So I started looking to see what they had in mind for the X-ray lasers’ (Broad, 1985: 120). Such links were part of a broader futures planning culture within the military that relied heavily on fictional constructs. Gray (1994) argues that standard military practices, such as war-gaming and scenario construction, are works of military fiction and that this fiction-making is both directly and indirectly influenced by the ideas of pro-war science fiction authors. The 1996 US Air Force study into the asteroid impact threat is an exam- ple of such fiction-making. The study was part of a futures planning exer- cise that considered several possible ‘alternate futures’ for the year 2025, drawing on a ‘concepts database’ that included such science-fictional ideas as ‘force shields’ and ‘gravity manipulation’. The authors of the study noted the science fiction provenance of these ideas, at one point referring directly to Star Trek, but they took the ideas seriously nonetheless. They noted, with some understatement, that gravity manipulation was an ‘unde- veloped technology’, but made no such comment about other speculative technologies such as solar sails, mass drivers or biological ‘eaters’, which were supposed to munch their way through the threatening comet or aster- oid (Urias, 1996: 41–54).

Alternative – Rethink Narrative

Only rethinking solves- we must challenge the ideological assumptions made by security-oriented narratives of asteroid impacts and space science.

Mellor ‘7 (course leader of Imperial College’s Science Communication group, PhD in theoretical physics from Newcastle University, “Colliding Worlds: Asteriod Research and the Legitimization of War in Space”, Social Studies of Science, August 2007, Vol. 37 No. 4, pages 499-531, AG)

In this post-Cold War period, scholars of the relation between military and civilian science need to examine carefully claims about ‘ploughshare’ or ‘conversion’ technologies. New technologies arise not just out of fund- ing and policy decisions, but also out of the social imaginaries in which new weapons can be imagined and construed as necessary. Concepts such as ‘dual use’ or ‘cover’ also need to be assessed critically.35 One way of char- acterizing the Clementine missions would be as dual-use technologies whose scientific aims served as cover for the testing of SDI technologies. Yet this fails to reveal the ways in which these missions were just one con- crete output of a more fundamental conceptual alliance between weapons designers and astronomers. In this paper, I have attempted to show that by also considering the narrative context in which such initiatives are located, it is possible to throw some light on the cultural web that binds civilian sci- ence to military programmes. But the focus on narrative also begs a question: Which stories would we prefer to frame our science? Should science be driven by fear or by curiosity? Should it be aimed at creating technologies of war or cultures of compassion? These are normative questions, but they are also precisely the questions that make the military influence on science such an important issue. Narratives are inherently ideological and a refusal to see them as such does no more to enhance the scholar’s objectivity than it does the scien- tist’s. The stories told by the asteroid scientists led them into collaborations with weapons scientists and helped fuel a discourse of fear that served a particular ideological purpose. This should be both recognized and chal- lenged, not for the sake of regaining some impossible ideal of an undis- torted science but because there are other stories, based on different ideological assumptions, that we could tell in order to guide science towards more peaceful ends.

\*\*\*Affirmative Answsers\*\*\*

Link Turn

**Space technology, under the proper motive, can be hugely beneficial to society—we should strive towards cooperation rather than colonization**

**Dickens 10**, Peter Dickens, Affiliated Lecturer in the Department of Sociology, Faculty of Politics, Psychology, Sociology and International Studies, University of Cambridge, “The Humanization of the Cosmos – to what end?” Monthly Review, November 2010, Vol. 62, Issue 2, Start Page 13.

But humanizing outer space can be for good as well as for ill. It can either, as is now happening, be in a form primarily benefiting those who are already in positions of economic, social, and military power. Or humanization can be something much more positive and socially beneficial. What might this more progressive form of cosmic humanization look like? Most obviously, the technology allowing a human presence in the cosmos would be focused mainly on earthly society. There are many serious crises down here on Earth that have urgent priority when considering the humanization of outer space. First, there is the obvious fact of social inequalities and resources. Is $2 billion and upwards to help the private sector find new forms of space vehicles really a priority for public funding, especially at a time when relative social inequalities and environmental conditions are rapidly worsening? The militaryindustrial complex might well benefit, but it hardly represents society as a whole. This is not to say, however, that public spending on space should be stopped. Rather, it should be addressed toward ameliorating the many crises that face global society. Satellites, for example, have helped open up phone and Internet communications for marginalized people, especially those not yet connected by cable. Satellites, including satellites manufactured by capitalist companies, can also be useful for monitoring climate change and other forms of environmental crisis such as deforestation and imminent hurricanes. They have proved useful in coordinating humanitarian efforts after natural disasters. Satellites have even been commissioned by the United Nations to track the progress of refugees in Africa and elsewhere.

Permutation

Realism bridges the gap between the critique and the need for pragmatic action.

Murray 97 (Alastair J.H., Politics Department, University of Wales Swansea, *Reconstructing Realism* p. 202-3)

If the cosmopolitan‑communitarian debate seems at times to be avoiding practical questions by going around in circles, the critical literature seems at times to be utterly unsure whether there are such things as practical questions. Yet, unless international relations theory is to become a purely intellectual exercise devoid of practical relation, such concerns must be juxtaposed to a consideration of the problems posed by the current framing of international politics. Ultimately, the only result of the post‑positivist movement's self‑styled 'alternative' status is the generation of an unproductive opposition between a seemingly mutually exclusive rationalism and reflectivism. Realism would seem to hold out the possibility of a more constructive path for international relations theory. The fact that it is engaged in a normative enquiry is not to say that it abandons a concern for the practical realities of international politics, only that it is concerned to bridge the gap between cosmopolitan moral and power political logics. Its approach ultimately provides an overarching framework which can draw on many different strands of thought, the 'spokes' which can be said to be attached to its central hub, to enable it to relate empirical concerns to a normative agenda. It can incorporate the lessons that geopolitics yields, the insights that neorealism might achieve, and all the other information that the approaches which effectively serve to articulate the specifics of its orientation generate, and, once incorporated within its theoretical framework, relate them both to one another and to the requirements of the ideal, in order to support an analysis of the conditions which characterise contemporary international politics and help it to achieve a viable political ethic. Against critical theories which are incomprehensible to any but their authors and their acolytes and which prove incapable of relating their categories to the issues which provide the substance of international affairs, and against rationalist, and especially neorealist, perspectives which prove unconcerned for matters of values and which simply ignore the relevance of ethical questions to political action, realism is capable of formulating a position which brings ethics and politics into a viable relationship. It would ultimately seem to offer us a course which navigates between the Scylla of defending our values so badly that we end up threatening their very existence, and the Charybdis of defending them so efficiently that we become everything that they militate against. Under its auspices, we can perhaps succeed in reconciling our ideals with our pragmatism.

The perm should be interpreted as a “critical realism,” where we take the best parts of constructivism and realism together to work toward solutions in the political sphere.

Fairclough 5 (Norman, [emeritus Prof. of Linguistic](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emeritus_Professor)s @ [Lancaster University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lancaster_University), "Discourse Analysis in Organization Studies: The Case for Critical Realism" European Group for Organizational Studies *Organization Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 6 page  3)

I shall take a critical stance towards one prominent tendency within the work which has been carried out in the study of organizational discourse, on the grounds that it equates a shift in focus towards discourse in organization studies with the adoption of postmodernist and extreme social constructivist positions. My position is that commitment to such positions does not in any way follow from a commitment to giving discourse analysis its proper place within organization studies. I shall argue instead for a critical realist position which is moderately socially constructivist but rejects the tendency for the study of organization to be reduced to the study of discourse, locating the analysis of discourse instead within an analytically dualist epistemology which gives primacy to researching relations between agency (process, and events — see note 1) and structure on the basis of a realist social ontology. I shall argue that this form of critical discourse analysis has more to offer organization studies than broadly postmodernist work on organizational discourse. In the final section of the paper, I shall justify this argument through a discussion of organizational change. So, in sum, this paper is simultaneously an argument that the analysis of discourse is an essential and unavoidable part of organization studies, and an argument against certain prominent forms of discourse analysis which are currently carried out within organization studies.

State Key

The state and large-scale institutions are inevitable and the only actors which can address the harms

Buzan 4 (Barry , December, Montague Burton Prof. of International Relations @ the London School of Economics and honorary prof. @ the University of Copenhagen, "Realism vs. Cosmopolitanism" http://www.polity.co.uk/global/realism-vs-cosmopolitanism.asp

**A.Mc.:** But would not a realist response be that the very issues David seeks to highlight are largely marginal to the central dilemmas of world politics: the critical issues of war and peace, life and death.

**B.B.:** Again, that is a difficult question for realism because in traditional realism there was a rather clear distinction between 'high' and 'low' politics, high politics being about diplomacy and war, and low politics being about economics and society and many issues like the weather and disease. And because of the change in the importance of the different sectors that I mentioned earlier, this becomes problematic for realism. But the realists have been fairly agile. The realist line of defence would be that in most areas of world politics - again the emphasis on politics - states are still the principle authorities. And there is nothing that stops them from co-operating with each other. Thus, realists, or at least a good proportion of realists, can live quite comfortably with the idea of international regimes in which states, as the basic holders of political authority in the system, get together sometimes with other actors, sometimes just with other states, to discuss issues of joint concern, and sometimes they can hammer out of a set of policies, a set of rules of the game, which enable them to co-ordinate their behaviour. Now, this certainly does not feel like traditional power politics realism. You can think of it to some extent in terms of power politics by looking at issue power; who are the big players in relation to any big issue? Who are the people who have any kind of control? Who loses out?, etc.. There is, therefore, an element of power politics in this whole notion of regimes, and it does retain a strong element of state centrism. I think the realist would say: if you discount the state, where is politics? Where is it located? You cannot eliminate politics, as some liberals sometimes seem to do. To wish the state away, to wish politics away, is not going to generate results. The good dyed-in-the-wool realist would argue that power politics is a permanent condition of human existence. It will come in one form or another, in one domain or another, in relation to one issue or another, but it will always be there. It will be politics and it will be about relative power. And at the moment the state is still an important player in the game.

States are the key actors who solve violence – plan accesses this best.

Weingast 9 (Barry, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and \Professor in the Department of Political Science at Stanford U, “Why are developing countries so resistant to the rule of law,” February 2009, accessed 7/10/09, http://cadmus.eui.eu/dspace/bitstream/1814/11173/1/MWP\_LS\_2009\_02.pdf ) KSM

All states must control the fundamental problem of violence. In natural states, a dominant coalition of the powerful emerges to solve this problem. The coalition grants members privileges, creates rents through limited access to valuable resources and organizations, and then uses the rents to sustain order. Because fighting reduces their rents, coalition members have incentives not to fight so as to maintain their rents. Natural states necessarily limit access to organizations and restrict competition in all systems. Failing to do so dissipate rents and therefore reduces the incentives not to fight. We call this order the natural state because for nearly all of the last 10,000 years of human history – indeed, until just the last two centuries – the natural state was the only solution to the problem of violence that produced a hierarchical society with significant wealth. In comparison with the previous foraging order, natural states produced impressive economic growth, and even today we can see the impressive wealth amassed by many of the early civilizations. In contrast to open access orders, however, natural states have significant, negative consequences for economic growth.

Alternative Fails – Realism

Their alt can’t solve the aff discourse or the overall regime of truth described by realist thought

Williams 3 (Michael, Prof. of International Politics at the Univ. of Wales, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 47, No. 4, pp. 511-531)

This stance allows the Copenhagen School to argue simultaneously for both an expansion and a limitation of the security agenda and its analysis. On the one hand, treating security as a speech-act provides, in principle, for an almost indefinite expansion of the security agenda. Not only is the realm of possible threats enlarged, but the actors or objects that are threatened (what are termed the ‘‘referent objects’’ of security) can be extended to include actors and objects well beyond the military security of the territorial state. Accordingly, the Copenhagen School has argued that security can usefully be viewed as comprising five ‘‘sectors,’’ each with their particular referent object and threat agenda (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, 1998).6 In the ‘‘military’’ sector, for example, the referent object is the territorial integrity of the state, and the threats are overwhelmingly defined in external, military terms. In the ‘‘political’’ sector, by contrast, what is at stake is the legitimacy of a governmental authority, and the relevant threats can be ideological and sub-state, leading to security situations in which state authorities are threatened by elements of their own societies, and where states can become the primary threat to their own societies. Even further from an exclusively military-territorial focus is the concept of ‘‘societal’’ security, in which the identity of a group is presented as threatened by dynamics as diverse as cultural flows, economic integration, or population movements. Conversely, while treating security as a speech-act allows a remarkable broadening of analysis, securitization theory seeks also to limit the security agenda. Security, the Copenhagen School argues, is not synonymous with ‘‘harm’’ or with the avoidance of whatever else might be deemed malign or damaging (Buzan et al., 1998:2–5, 203–12). As a speech-act, securitization has a specific structure which in practice limits the theoretically unlimited nature of ‘‘security.’’ These constraints operate along three lines. First, while the securitization process is in principle completely open (any ‘‘securitizing actor’’ can attempt to securitize any issue and referent object), in practice it is structured by the differential capacity of actors to make socially effective claims about threats, by the forms in which these claims can be made in order to be recognized and accepted as convincing by the relevant audience, and by the empirical factors or situations to which these actors can make reference. Not all claims are socially effective, and not all actors are in equally powerful positions to make them. This means, as Buzan and Wæver put it, that the ‘‘Conditions for a successful speech-act fall into two categories: (1) the internal, linguistic-grammatical-to follow the rules of the act (or, as Austin argues, accepted conventional procedures must exist, and the act has to be executed according to these procedures); and (2) the external, contextual and social-to hold a position from which the act can be made (‘The particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked’)’’ (Buzan et al., 1998:32). The claims that are likely to be effective, the forms in which they can be made, the objects to which they refer, and the social positions from which they can effectively be spoken are usually deeply ‘‘sedimented’’ (rhetorically and discursively, culturally, and institutionally) and structured in ways that make securitizations somewhat predictable and thus subject to probabilistic analysis (Wæver, 2000)Fand not wholly open and expandable. Finally, while empirical contexts and claims cannot in this view ultimately determine what are taken as security issues or threats, they provide crucial resources and referents upon which actors can draw in attempting to securitize a given issue.

Alternative Fails – Nihilism

The alternative’s focus on interpretations leads to an endless and useless cycle of “floating signifiers” which results in a nihilistic worldview.

Jarvis 2K (Darryl S. L., Assoc. Prof. of Public Policy at Univ. of Singapore, *International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism,*, pp. 199-200)

As scholars reconstituted under this "appropriate posture," or in later writings a "critical posture of estrangement," we would be condemned to read, to play with words, to interpret without purpose, and to sit amid a solipsistic intertext where words, meanings, referents, signifiers, authors, and subjects have no meaning or reality other than those we would con¬struct individually." With the knowledge that there is no true knowledge because of the absence of secure ground upon which to build knowledge, we would abandon the Enlightenment project and squander away our time in linguistic play as "floating signifiers" vied for our attention among the simulacra of images that each of us consumed. Knowing that we could not know, the task at hand would devolve into one of repudiating the entire stock of knowledge, understanding, and practices that constitute International Relations and developing instead an historical amnesia that favored "a view from afar, from up high."" Even interpretation, Ashley insists, a method permissible to most postmodernists, would eventually have to be abandoned along with theory." Since "there is no there there" to be explained, and since interpretation would be but another method of affixing intrinsic meaning to a metaphysical nonreality, it too would have to be abandoned. In this newly constituted enterprise, nothing would await discovery, nothing would have intrinsic meaning, nothing would actually be present other than "absence," and hence nothing could be named. The state would not really exist, subjects would be transcendental fabrications who chase their empty identity throughout history, and history would be a mere interpretation, yet another "practice of domination."44 Within this nihilistic chasm, subversive postmodernists would have us devolve our disciplinary enterprise into a form of philosophical mentalism, an attempt "to resist the metaphysical temptation in our culture, to assume that something so important must be namable and that the name must indicate a definite referent, an already differentiated identity and source of meaning that just awaits to be named."'" Only minds situated amid their various contexts would exist and reality would be constituted not through the "realm of immediate sense experience" or "by direct observation of an independently existing world of 'facts," but through the thoughts of the mind." What, then, would we be left with and what could this newly constituted enterprise offer? As Ashley freely admits, it could offer little. It could not "claim to offer an alternative position or perspective" since there would be no secure ontological ground upon which these could be established.47 Nor could it offer alternative interpretations save it would attempt to impose "interpretation upon interpretation" and capture history by imposing fixed meanings and understandings. Least of all could it offer theory, the very tyranny of modernist narratives that tends to "privilege" and "marginalize." Absent any theoretical legacy or factual knowledge, we would be forced into an endless intertextual discourse predicated on the consumption of words and the individual thoughts they evoke: a kind of purified anarchism albeit in a perpetual state of self-dispersal." We would live in a world of relativistic knowledge claims, each "true" to those that think it, but its truthfulness unobtainable to those who would read it or wish to communicate it. Above all, we would be left without theory- knowledge as a basis for decision, judgment, prescription, and action, sur¬rendering us to "a view from afar, from up high." But as Nicholas Onuf asks, "What does this leave for dealing with those close at hand?'

Realism Good

**Realism is the only way the government can maintain democracy and peace. Dolman ’02**

(Everett C. Dolman, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL *Astropolitik: Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age*)

Likewise, the United Nations is not a regime in and or itself. It is the manifestation of a belief (principle) that national or individual state sovereignty can best be achieved within the norms of open negociation through collective means (a permanent coalition oppose to aggression), structured within the norms of open negotiation and constant vigilance. Rules and decision-making procedures (international agreements and the physical presence of he United Nations as a negotiating, public forum) can be formulated in a variety of ways that comply with the extant principles and norms of a regime, and so changes or modifications in the agreements/institutions do not overturn- though they can seriously weaken – the regime itself. Changes in principles or norms, however, do require that acceptance or establishment of a new regime. Should the principle that all states are sovereign be revoked over time or by circumstances, the United Nations as an organization would crumble.

Realism Good

Nationalism is the root cause to securitization not realism

Mearsheimer 11 (Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, “Kissing Cousins: Nationalism and Realism”, Yale Workshop on International Relations, http://irworkshop.sites.yale.edu, pg, 11, CGW)

Nations, of course, have good reason to worry about their survival in a world where nation-states sometimes threaten each other and where hypernationalism is commonplace. However, they also care about survival when they do not have their own nation-state, because there is always the possibility in that circumstance that a more powerful nation in their own country might attack them and possibly try to annihilate them. But even if that does not happen, there is the real danger that the dominant nation will eviscerate their culture by incorporating it into its own culture. This matter will be discussed in more detail below, but suffice it to say here that survival is a crucial concern of nations, whether they have their own state or not.

Realism True and Inevitable

**Realism is true and inevitable – a shift away collapses into chaos.**

**Mearsheimer 2001** [professor of political science at University of Chicago, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, pg. 361]

The optimists' claim that security competition and war among the great powers has been burned out of the system is wrong. In fact, all of the major states around the globe still care deeply about the balance of power and are destined to compete for power among themselves for the foreseeable future. Consequently, realism will offer the most powerful explanations of international politics over the next century, and this will be true even if the debates among academic and policy elites are dominated by non-realist theories. In short, the real world remains a realist world. States still fear each other and seek to gain power at each other's expense, because international anarchy-the driving force behind greatpower behavior-did not change with the end of the Cold War, and there are few signs that such change is likely any time soon. States remain the principal actors in world politics and there is still no night watchman standing above them. For sure, the collapse of the Soviet Union caused a major shift in the global distribution of power. But it did not give rise to a change in the anarchic structure of the system, and without that kind of profound change, there is no reason to expect the great powers to behave much differently in the new century than they did in previous centuries. Indeed, considerable evidence from the 1990s indicates that power politics has not disappeared from Europe and Northeast Asia, the regions in which there are two or more great powers, as well as possible great powers such as Germany and Japan. There is no question, however, that the competition for power over the past decade has been low-key. Still, there is potential for intense security competion among the great powers that might lead to a major war. Probably the best evidence of that possibility is the fact that the United States maintains about one hundred thousand troops each in Europe and in Northeast Asia for the explicit purpose of keeping the major states in each region at peace.

Realism Inevitable

The realist balance of power is a concept created from diplomatic necessity – no alternative system can fill that same role.

Guzzini 98 (Stefano, Senior Researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies, *Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy*, pp. 231)

Hedley Bull (1977) writes that although we do, of course, know that there is no such a thing as a balance of power, it is a concept we cannot do without. He is right in a double sense. First, the balance of power is a concept that diplomats use to make their trade. Second, for the first reason and only this, the observer cannot do without it. Power might not be fungible, but diplomats work on measures to give power a translatable meaning. Traditional compensation politics must rely on some measure across different power sectors. Before diplomats can count, they must decide what counts. Hence, the balance of power or any equilibrium idea of this kind is based upon a social construction, sometimes an agreemen,. of the diplomatic community. They share a common measure of power although they would be hard-pressed to define it exactly. Hence, as with the security discourse, measurement of power is a political act. The diplomats who represent states endowed with one particular power resource will do their best to enhance the Uitler's value. The Soviet government's stress on military, and not economic, factors was a case in point. The rush for mass-destructive weapons is as much a concern of security as a question of power in the sense of acquiring a resource which is commonly considered to be at the top rank. The prestige, in turn, is traded for particular compensations or attentions. Sometimes, such agreements on measures and treatments, if generally shared, might diplomatically recreate something similar to the supposedly mechanical balance of power (Kivi 1996). On the second level of observation, the existence of balance of power as a social construct means that we cannot simply forget about it because we found out that no mechanical balance exists. The concept does not refer to anything in the objective structures of the international system. It is a fallacy to think that since it is reproduced in the diplomatic culture, it must correspond to an objectified reality, a fallacy which has daunted much realist writings, both scientific and classical. But it is a device used by diplomats, and as such it exists, and is consequential for international politics. In his inaugural lecture in Zurich, the Swiss scholar Daniel Frei (1969) urged his fellow political scientists to help practical policy with a neutral and measurable concept of power. He was perfectly aware both of the practical needs of such a concept and of its difficult scientific underpinning. This lucid text shows the political value of concepts which travel between the academic and the political community. Power is a device used by academics and as such has effects on the production of knowledge and the reproduction of the traditional diplomatic culture.

**Realism Inevitable**

**The power politics of realism enter into any possible system – even a critical approach leads back into realism.**

Murray 97 (Alastair J.H., Prof. of Poli. Theory at Univ. of Edinburgh, *Reconstructing Realism: Between Power Politics and Cosmopolitan Ethics*, pp. 130)

The other members of the group varied in their emphases, but there are clear parallels to this formulation in their conceptions which suggest its employment as a framework to assist understanding. The extent to which power infuses all social relations, the extent to which all social structures are marred by relations of domination and subordination, forms a pervasive theme throughout their work. It was this awareness of the intrusion of power into all social relations that generated their emphasis on 'the inevitable imperfections of any organization that is entangled with the world. l 1 " As Morgenthau once put it, the ideal 'can never be fully translated into political reality but only at best approximated ... there shall always be an element of political domination preventing the full realization of equality and freedom'. "9 The principal focus of this critique of the corrupting influence of power was, of course, international relations. Here, economic and legal mechanisms of domination are ultimately reduced to overt violence as the principal mechanism of determining political outcomes. The diffusion of power between states effectively transforms any such centrally organized mechanisms into simply another forum for the power politics of the very parties that it is supposed to restrain. As Kennan put it: ‘The realities of power will soon seep into anv legalistic structures which we erect to govern international life. They will permeate it. They will become the content of it; and the structure will replace the form.' 1:1 The repression of such power realities is, however, impossible; the political actor must simply 'seek their point of maximum equilibrium'. This conception of the balance of ultimately aimed, in Morgenthau’s words, 'to maintain the stability of the system without destroying the multiplicity of the elements composing it'. First, it was designed to prevent universal domination, to act as a deterrent to the ambitions of any dominant great power and as a safeguard against any attempt to establish **its** sway over the rest of the system.]-'4 Second, it was designed to preserve the independence and freedom of the states of the system, particularly the small states. **1"** I Only through the operation of the balance of power between great powers can small powers gain any genuine independence and any influence in the international system.1-" However, as Morgenthau pointed out, whilst, in domestic society, the balance of power operates in a context characterized by the existence of a degree of consensus and by the presence of a controlling central power, these factors are lacking in international relations and, thus, the balance is both much more important and yet much more flawed, the maintenance of equilibrium being achieved at the price of large-scale warfare and periodic eliminations of smaller states.] 7

Realism Inevitable

States inherently compete with each other through any means necessary – realism is the only possible system.

Mearsheimer 1 (John, Prof. of Poli Sci at the Univ. of Chicago, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, pp. 35)

All states are influenced by this logic, which means that not only do they look for opportunities to take advantage of one another, they also work to ensure that other states do not take advantage of them. After all, rival states are driven by the same logic, and most states are likely to recognize their own motives at play in the actions of other states. In short, states ultimately pay attention to defense as well as offense. They think about conquest themselves, and they work to check aggressor states from gaining power at their expense. This inexorably leads to a world of constant security competition, where states are willing to lie, cheat, and use brute force if it helps them gain advantage over their rivals. Peace, if one defines that concept as a state of tranquility or mutual concord, is not likely to break out in this world.

States naturally act based upon external influences of competition – this forces realism to be the only viable system of international relations.

Mearsheimer 1 (John, Prof. of Poli Sci at the Univ. of Chicago, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, pp. 17)

This gloomy view of international relations is based on three core beliefs. First, realists, like liberals, treat states as the principal actors in world politics. Realists focus mainly on great powers, however, because these **states dominate and shape international politics and they also cause the deadliest wars.** Second, realists believe that **the behavior of great powers is influenced mainly by their external environment, not by their internal characteristics**. The structure of the international system, which all slates must deal with, largely shapes their foreign policies. Realists tend mint to draw sharp distinctions between “good” and “bad” states, because **all great powers act according to the same logic regardless of their culture, political system, or who runs the government**.27 It is therefore difficult to discriminate among states, save for differences in relative power. In essence, great powers are like billiard balls that vary only in size.28 Third, realists hold that **calculations about power dominate states’ thinking, and** that **states compete for power among themselves. That competition sometimes necessitates going to war,** which is considered an acceptable instrument of statecraft. To quote Carl von Clausewitz, the nineteenth-century military strategist, **war is a continuation of politics by other means**.29 Finally, a zero-sum quality characterizes that competition, sometimes making it intense and unforgiving. **States may cooperate with each other on occasion, but at root they have conflicting interests.**

Critical Realism

**REALISM IS KEY TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE – THE CRITIQUE ATTACKS THE WORST ASPECTS OF REALIST POLITICS, THE PLAN EMBODIES THE BEST.**

Jarvis 98 [Robert Jervis, President, American Political Science Association, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, Autumn 1998, ASP.]

Realism can also speak to the conditions under which states are most likely to cooperate and the strategies that actors can employ to foster cooperation. This line of theorizing is sometimes associated with neoliberalism, but the two are hard to distinguish in this area. Making a distinction would be easy if realism believed that conflict was zero-sum, that actors were always on the Pareto frontier. This conclusion perhaps flows from the view of neoclassical economics that all arrangements have evolved to be maximally efficient, but realists see that politics is often tragic in the sense of actors being unable to realize their common interests. Although “offensive realists” who see aggression and expansionism as omnipresent (or who believe that security requires expansion) stress the prevalence of extreme conflict of interest, “defensive realists” believe that much of international politics is a Prisoners’ dilemma or a more complex security dilemma. The desire to gain mixes with the need for protection; much of statecraft consists of structuring situations so that states can maximize their common interests. The ever-present fear that others will take advantage of the state – and the knowledge that others have reciprocal worries – leads diplomats to seek arrangements that will reduce if not neutralize these concerns. Even if international politics must remain a Prisoners’ Dilemma, it can often be made into one that is more benign by altering the pay-offs to encourage cooperation, for example, by enhancing each state’s ability to protect itself should the other seek to exploit it and increasing the transparency that allows each to see what the other side is doing and understand why it is doing it. The knowledge that even if others are benign today, they may become hostile in the future due to changes of mind, circumstances, and regimes can similarly lead decision makers to create arrangements that bind others – and themselves, as previously noted.

Threats are Real

**The alternative can’t address a root cause or end enemy creation- it only causes war**

**Andrew Sullivan, PhD Harvard, 2003** "Sheryl Crow, brain-dead peacenik in sequins.” <http://www.salon.com/opinion/sullivan/2003/01/15/crow/index.html>

One is also required to ask: **If war is "not the answer," what exactly is the question?** I wonder if, in her long interludes of geopolitical analysis, Ms. Crow even asks herself that. Perhaps if she did -- let's say the question is about the threat of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorists -- we might have an inkling about what her "answer" might actually be. Mercifully, Ms. Crow provides us with what she believes is an argument. Are you sitting down? Here it comes: "I think war is based in greed and there are huge karmic retributions that will follow. **I think war is never the answer to solving any problems. The best way to solve problems is to not have enemies." Let's take this bit by bit. "War is based in greed." Some wars, surely. The pirate wars of the 17th century. Saddam's incursion into Kuwait. Early British forays in the Far East and India. But all wars? The United States' intervention in the Second World War? The Wars of Religion in the 17th century? Many wars are fueled by nationalism, or by ideology, or by expansionism.** And many wars have seen their protagonists not enriched but impoverished. Take Britain's entry into the war against Nazi Germany. It would have been far more lucrative for the Brits to have made a deal with Hitler, to preserve their wealth and empire. Instead, they waged war, lost their entire imperial project and ransacked their own domestic wealth. **Where would that fit into Ms. Crow's worldview? And then there's the concept of a just war -- wars that have to be fought to defeat a greater evil. Wars of self-defense.** Wars of prevention. Wars against tyrants. Ms. Crow's remarks seem to acknowledge no such distinction. Does she believe that removing Hitler from power solved nothing? That preventing further genocide in the Balkans solved nothing? That ending 50 years of Soviet tyranny meant nothing? Apparently so. There's only one word for this kind of argument: Asinine. **Then we have this wonderful insight: "The best way to solve problems is to not have enemies." Wow. Like, wow. Like, war. It's bad. Bad karma. But, ahem, what if you have no choice in the matter? What if an enemy decides, out of hatred or fanaticism or ideology, simply to attack you? I'm not sure where Ms. Crow was on Sept. 11, 2001. But the enemy made its point palpably clear.** Does wishing that these crazed religious nuts were not our enemies solve any problems? I'm taking her too seriously, of course. I should ignore her. But the "antiwar" movement (I put it in quotation marks because any kind of appeasement this time will only make a bloodier future war inevitable) is happy to use celebrities for its own purposes. **And so their presence in the debate has to be acknowledged, if only to be decried. So let's decry this moronic celebrity convergence. The weak arguments of the appease-Saddam left just got a little weaker. And the karmic retributions are gonna be harsh, man. Way harsh.**

Weaponization Inevitable

**Space development is inevitable and the alternative hurts our progress made. Bolt’05** (Paul J. Bolt,Damon V. Coletta, and Collins G. Shackelford, Jr., American Defense Policy: Eighth Edition, 2005)

The best argument for the proposition that space weaponization is inevitable is that the military utility of space weapons will soon be so great that even if the United States chooses not to build space weapons, other countries will certainly do so, in a large part because of the great and still growing degree to which U.s military operations deend upon what has traditionally been known as “space force enhancement”: the use of satellites to provide a vast array of services, including communications, reconnaissance, navigation, and missle launch warning, without which American military power would be greatly diminished. This parallels the argument that the importance of satellites to the U.S economy will make them an irresistible target, expect that military and intellectual satellites are far more indispensable, and successful attacks against a relatively small number of them could have a considerable military impact, for example by concealing preparations for an invasion or by disrupting U.S operations at a critical juncture. Rivals of the United States might also find STEWs to be a very attractive way to counter US advantages in military power projections.

Weaponization Inevitable

The weaponization of space is inevitable, and absent a wholesale space weapons ban, the best available option is to militarize.

Deblois ‘3. (director of Systems Integration at BAE Systems- an aerospace defense and security systems, former Adjunct Senior Fellow for Science and Technology at the Counclil on Foreign Relations, Astropolitics, *The Advent of Space Weapons*, Vol. 1, No. 1, Summer 2003, AG)

If a weapons-free space environment, as a first step toward a global environment largely free of warfare, is a future we would have, it will require global cooperation unprecedented to date; a global and collective exercise of that which distinguishes man from all else – an ability and determination to make decisions counter to his own natural inclination and the natural design. The leading countries of the world, and the only states currently capable of weaponizing space, would be the most credible advocates of a space compact to ban space weapons as a first step toward perpetual peace. In the discussion of these propositions and counter-propositions, two alternative futures are apparent – one where a natural evolution to space weapons is allowed to occur, and the other where an aggressive multi-national posture is pursued to inhibit that natural or even inevitable weaponization. The latter is predicated upon establishing means of adjudicating space-related differences among nations. There is a third and lesser alternative to these worth mentioning, that is, the path that we are currently on: indecision. This constitutes the future of a half-hearted, mediocre attempt to prohibit space weaponization that ties the hands of responsible nations, but does not provide the international structure to prohibit belligerents from weaponizing space. If we are to pursue the option to prohibit the weaponization of space, we must pursue it with fervor. If we find establishment of a strong and credible multinational adjudication arrangement not practical or unworkable, we ought to strongly consider a measured move to weaponize space to the advantage of states that have the self-restraint to not misuse it. In the absence of such adjudication, armed preparation and even armed conflict is not necessarily as bad as ‘this kind of peace’.52

Weaponization Good

Space weaponization good- shifts military focus away from more dangerous conventional weaponry

Dolman 06 (Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the US Air Force’s School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, “U.S. Military Transformation and Weapons in Space”, SAIS Review, 26.1 (2006) 163-175, CGW)

There is another, perhaps far more compelling reason that weaponizing space would in time be less threatening to the international system than the failure to do so. The weaponization of space would decrease the likelihood of an arms race by shifting spending away from conventional weapons systems. One of the more cacophonous refrains against weapons procurement of any kind is that the money needed to purchase them is better spent elsewhere. It is a simple cliché but a powerful one. Space weapons in particular will be very, very expensive. Are there not a thousand better ways to spend the money? But funding for weapons does not come directly from education, housing or transportation budgets. It comes from military budgets. Thus the question should be directed not at particular weapons, but at all weapons. The immediate budget impact of significant funding increases for space weapons would be to decrease funding for combat aircraft, the surface battle fleet, and ground forces. This may well set the proponents of space weaponization at odds with both proponents and opponents of increased defense spending. Space advocates must sell their ideas to fellow pro-weapons groups by making the case that the advantages they provide outweigh the capabilities forgone. This is a mighty task. The tens or even hundreds of billions of dollars needed to develop, test and deploy a minimal space weapons system with the capacity to engage a few targets around the world could displace a half-dozen or more aircraft carrier battle groups, entire aircraft procurement programs such as the F-22, and several heavy armored divisions. This is a tough sell for supporters of a strong military. It is an even more difficult dilemma for those who oppose weapons in general, and space weapons in particular. Ramifications for the most critical current function of the Army, Navy, and Marines—pacification, occupation, and control of foreign territory—are profound. With the downsizing of traditional weapons to accommodate heightened space expenditures, the U.S. ability to do all three would wane significantly. At a time when many are calling for increased capability to pacify and police foreign lands, in light [End Page 170] of the no-end-in-sight occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan, space weapons proponents must advocate reduction of these capabilities in favor of a system that will have no direct potential to do so.

Weaponization Good

**Space weaponization good- saves the environment and stops innocent deaths**

Dolman 06 (Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the US Air Force’s School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, “U.S. Military Transformation and Weapons in Space”, SAIS Review, 26.1 (2006) 163-175, CGW)

Hence, the argument that the unilateral deployment of space weapons will precipitate a disastrous arms race is further eroded. To be sure, space weapons are offensive by their very nature. They deter violence by the omnipresent threat of precise, measured, and unstoppable retaliation. But they offer no advantage in the mission of territorial occupation. As such, they are far less threatening to the international environment than any combination of conventional weapons employed in their stead. What would be more threatening to a state in opposition to American hegemony: a dozen lasers in space with pinpoint accuracy, or (for about the same price) 15 infantry divisions massed on the border? A state employing offensive deterrence through space weapons can punish a transgressor state, but it is in a poor position to challenge that state's sovereignty. A transgressor state is less likely to succumb to the security dilemma if it perceives that its national survival is not at risk. Moreover, the tremendous expense of space weapons would inhibit their indiscriminate use. Over time, the world of sovereign states would recognize that the United States could not and would not use space weapons to threaten another country's internal self-determination. The United States still would challenge any attempts to intervene militarily in the politics of others, and it would have severely restricted its own capacity to do the latter. Judicious and non-arbitrary use of a weaponized space eventually could be seen as a net positive, an effective global police force that punishes criminal acts but does not threaten to engage in aggressive behavior.

Weaponization Good

Space weaponization would allow the US to police the earth- solves Heg

Dolman 06 (Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the US Air Force’s School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, “U.S. Military Transformation and Weapons in Space”, SAIS Review, 26.1 (2006) 163-175, CGW)

Moreover, if the United States were willing to deploy and use a military space force that maintained effective control of space, and did so in a way that was perceived as tough, non-arbitrary, and efficient, such an action [End Page 171] would serve to discourage competing states from fielding opposing systems. Should the United States use its advantage to police the heavens and allow unhindered peaceful use of space by any and all nations for economic and scientific development, over time its control of low-Earth orbit could be viewed as a global asset and a public good. In much the same way the British maintained control of the high seas, enforcing international norms of innocent passage and property rights, the United States could prepare outer space for a long-overdue burst of economic expansion. There is reasonable historic support for the notion that the most peaceful and prosperous periods in modern history coincide with the appearance of a strong, liberal hegemon. America has been essentially unchallenged in its naval dominance over the last 60 years, and in global air supremacy for the last 15 or more. Today, there is more international commerce on the oceans and in the air than ever. Ships and aircraft of all nations worry more about running into bad weather than about being commandeered by a military vessel or set upon by pirates. Search and rescue is a far more common task than forced embargo, and the transfer of humanitarian aid is a regular mission. Lest one think this era of cooperation is predicated on intentions rather than military stability, recall that the policy of open skies advocated by every president since Eisenhower did not take effect until after the fall of the Soviet Union and the singular rise of American power to the fore of international politics. The legacy of American military domination of the sea and air has been positive, and the same should be expected for space.

Weaponization Good (Heg/Econ)

The United States Weaponizing space is crucial to maintaining US heg and the world economy

**Weeden in 08** (“How China “Wins” a Potential Space War”, China Security, Vol. 4 No. 1 winter 2008, pp. 134-147, 2008 World Security Institute, CGW)

While it is true that space power is an important foundation of overall U.S. military power, it is also true that U.S. prowess in power is closely linked to America’s economic power and, in turn, the world’s economy as a whole. Any permanent degradation or damage to critical space systems, such as GPS or commercial communications satellites, would have a devastating impact on the American economy, the global economy, and thus the economy of the very nation that brought conflict to outer space. China does possess the ability to significantly affect U.S. space power. But this conclusion does not mean that the United States should respond to the Chinese space threat by further weaponizing space; in fact precisely the opposite should be done. It can be argued that one of the factors driving the dichotomy between the Chinese rhetoric banning weaponization of space and their pursuit of counterspace capabilities is current U.S. space policy

Astropolitik Good

Astropolitics is key to the “golden age” of space exploration

Dolman 02 (Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the US Air Force’s School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, “Astropoltik- Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age”, Cass Series: Strategy and History- Series Editors: Colin Gray and Williamson Murray ISSN: 1473–6403, pg. 73, CGW)

This brief description has outlined only a few of the more salient astropolitical concepts. It is not an exhaustive list. The purpose is to combine sophisticated astronomical concepts with political theory in a manner that is heuristic. As space technology progresses, many of the above assertions will become dubious or even moot. New hypotheses will surface that have not yet been considered. However, the astropolitical dictum that control of certain terrestrial and outer-space locations will provide a distinct advantage in efficiency and will lead the controller to a dominant position in commercial and military power seems assured. None of this analysis may matter if the ongoing moribund efforts to conquer space continue at their current lackluster pace. The likelihood of a golden age of space exploration seems remote given the current conditions. The following chapters veer away from the astropolitical model to describe the conditions and circumstances prompting the Cold War inspired entry of mankind into space. This compilation from the historical and legal record is used as the foundation of an argument to reinvigorate humanity’s entry into outer space with a reintroduction of the motivator that began it all, national rivalry and self-interested competition. This time, however, the competition needs to be on an economic playing field, and not a nuclear war battlefield. If done properly, the tenets of Astropolitik can be invoked fruitfully.