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## NEG

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#### Transportation infrastructure planning and construction normalizes people and processes and makes government power inevitable.

Richardson and Jensen ‘7 [Tim and Anne, 'New Region, New

Story: Imagining Mobile Subjects in Transnational Space', Space and Polity, December 2nd, 2007, http://vbn.aau.dk/files/13255995/New\_Region\_\_New\_Story.pdf

Governmentalities entail particular logics, or rationalities and particular practices, that embed certain ideas of the subjects who are to be governed, and may be traced in policy discourse. In exploring our case, we therefore ask questions of ‘what forms of person, self and identity are presupposed by different practices of government?’ (Dean, 1999). In planning terms, this means that when particular subjects are imagined in particular ways, this will play a more or less visible part in the formation of policies and plans. Articulated in policy discourses, these particular imaginaries articulate who the subjects of the plans are, what they want and how they act and become normalised, over time and through practice. Being normalised also means that for the planners and policy-makers, these subjectivities enter the journey from being merely ‘imaginary subjects’ to stand as images of real, living persons that the plans and policies are directed to. From a mobilities perspective, we see plans reﬂecting ideas about how certain citizens are imagined to dream and scheme about their future lives within the modern condition of mobility. In other words, for some groups of citizens, transport and communications infrastructures are designed, and urban and regional maps are drawn to ﬁt with the planners’ and policy-makers’ imaginaries of how these particular groups of citizens will want to move in time and space. Looking at European corridors, this entails a rescaling of levels of governance and of what can be thought of as urban (Brenner, 2004; Dabinett and Richardson, 2005). Those subjectivities which in plans and policies are imagined in a mobility context we call mobile subjects. This means, ﬁrst, that in concrete plans and policies there might be several types of mobile subjects present, each with related imagined mobilities. Secondly, it means that the governing technologies and the domains of knowledge embedded in the logic of governing may work strategically to shape these ideas of mobile subjects. Thirdly, it means that in the actual construction of infrastructures and design of urban and regional spaces, these mobile subjects and their anticipated mobilities are present, legitimising new infrastructures such as international high-speed railway projects and crossborder bridges and tunnels, and setting the conditions of what is possibile for the everyday lives of citizens. In this sense, the concept of mobile subjects becomes a key to the interface between the actions in transnational governmental spaces of borderwork, and the (future) everyday life of citizens. Future mobile subjects are imagined and narrated across the complex intertextual ﬁeld of an emergent policy space. Their imagined mobilities are predicated upon, and are used to make thinkable, and normal, proposed interventions such as new highspeed transport or communication infrastructures. In a governmentality perspective, actors emerge as different formations of selves that embody the governing logic but are not necessarily disciplined by it. Hence, from the perspective of the governed, subjectivities also denote practices of resistance and freedom (Foucault, 1988; Rose, 1999), emphasising the tension between normalising (disciplining) and freedom within Foucault’s work (Triantaﬁllou, 2004). Consequently, we do not suggest that these rather top– down policy processes of imagining mobile subjects are uncomplicated practices of governmental control. Rather, we view them as more or less concerted attempts to mobilise imaginaries to legitimise and progress a governmental project. We would expect that such interventions will vary in ‘success’ and in any case will result in unintended consequences and that subjects involved in or excluded from everyday mobility practices may appropriate new infrastructures or modes of mobility in unpredictable ways. This suggests the importance of paying close attention to the interfaces between the construction of mobile subjects in planning processes and the actual practices of everyday life in the corridor. This is clearly a crucial aspect of how imagined mobilities make a difference to material, practised mobilities. In this paper, however, we concentrate on early moments in the birth of the governmental project itself, rather than on the consequences or resistances resulting from the subsequent engagements between governance, territory and population. What we do seek to capture is a sense of how emergent governance of nascent cross-border territories involves routine practices of mobilising visions of future mobility that have implications for the engagement between planning and everyday life across borders. Inspired by Scott (1998), Anderson (1991) and Brenner (2004), we explore how transnational governance creates an ability to ‘see’ new cross-border state spaces, their territories and the imagined cross-border communities that will move among them.

#### **The impact is ecological collapse, endless war, and the glossing over of systemic deaths – permutations fail because antagonisms are intrinsic to every version of the automobile system – attempts to solve problems within the system just replicate the impacts and create a self-fulfilling prophecy**

Böhm et al 6 (Steffen Böhm, Ph.D., Director of the Essex Sustainability Institute and Professor in Management and Sustainability at the University of Essex, Campbell Jones, Director of the Centre for Philosophy and Political Economy and Senior Lecturer in Critical Theory and Business Ethics at the University of Leicester, Chris Land, Lecturer in Management at the University of Essex, and Mat Paterson, Professor of Political Science at the University of Ottawa. “Part One Conceptualizing Automobility: Introduction: Impossibilities of automobility”, September 18, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-954X.2006.00634.x/full>)

If we are to move beyond the description of the regime of automobility and act against and beyond it, then we need to expose the inconsistencies, contradictions and antagonisms of the present regime of automobility. This might begin by pointing to the obvious ‘side-effects’ of the automobile: pollution, death and injury, specific formations of geopolitics, the transformation of the urban landscape and modern mindscape. The impossibility of automobility does indeed contain the meaning that if continued, a car-based regime generates widespread problems – ecological collapse, war, widespread death and ill-health and economic dysfunctionality, to name but a few – which cannot be resolved without abandoning the regime itself. In this sense the continuation of automobility is impossible in its current form. Four specific antagonisms inherent to the current regime of automobility can serve to illustrate its impossibility. One of the most obvious ones is congestion. Once ‘universalized’, in the sense of a substantial number – in most industrialized countries over 40 percent of adults having regular use of a car – the pursuit of individual mobility becomes collective immobility. In many of the world’s largest cities, complete gridlock is an immanent possibility, if not reality, which transport planners have to develop elaborate contingency plans for, and even without gridlock, the economic and social costs of congestion are now very considerable. A second antagonism, which seems well established and understood today, points to the concerns about ecological sustainability of the contemporary regime of automobility. Automobile use contributes significantly to three principal forms of environmental degradation. It contributes significantly to the depletion of non-renewable resources, notably oil (including production of plastics), rubber, platinum, lead, aluminium and iron (Freund & Martin, 1993: 17–19). It is important in the generation of a range of pollution problems, including urban air pollution, acid rain, global warming, and water pollution from road building and run-off. Finally, it dominates space, especially urban space, accounting for in the extreme case of Los Angeles 67 percent of all space, and has contributed to the radical re-organization of urban space which means towns and cities are now much more spread out, both displacing land from other uses and transforming the use of cars themselves from choice to necessity. There are a range of potential technological fixes for this environmental antagonism, which is built into the regime of automobility, but only the most technologically optimistic (eg, Hawken, Lovins and Lovins, 2000) suggest that it can be resolved by a series of technological fixes. The dependency on oil, a natural resource which, when burnt, creates vast environmental problems ranging from air pollution to global warming, defines the third antagonism of automobility. The fact that oil is a scarce resource, which has only a finite lifetime (most suggesting a century at best), yet is the single most important fuel for the organization of mass transport, connects the regime of automobility to a host of global geopolitical problems. To satisfy the developed world’s thirst for oil, access to cheap oil has to be maintained and enormous amounts of money have to be spent in order to explore, produce, transport, refine and store oil so that it can finally be consumed at a petrol station in Washington, London or Berlin. Automobility is not just a system of car transport; it is a defining geopolitical factor that may even influence governments’ decisions to go to war (see Martin-Jones, this volume). In this sense automobility quite literally kills, even though the victims of these wars remain largely invisible to the driver gliding through post-industrial suburbia. But automobility is not only an invisible killing machine because Western governments go to war to secure access to oil. The car delivers death much more directly, much closer to ‘home.’ The fourth antagonism, then, is that the regime of automobility cannot be disconnected from the mass ‘accident’. Once you have millions of cars, steered by individual drivers, failures of that system are predictable. Annually around 1.2 million deaths are produced directly by the global regime of automobility, that is, by traffic ‘accidents’, significantly outstripping warfare as the leading cause of violent death (WHO/World Bank, 2004; Dauvergne, 2005). In the OECD countries alone, 107,406 people were killed in car ‘accidents’ in 2001, approximately one every five minutes (IRTAD/OECD, 2003). Yet these failures of the system remain largely invisible in the sense that they are regarded as ‘normality’. The US might go to war because three thousand people die in a horrific attack on two skyscrapers, and a plane crash might make the headline news for a few days; roughly the same number (around 3200) of people are killed in car crashes on a daily basis, but their deaths are not spectacular enough to make it into the news. What we have got here, then, is not a stable, well-working machinery but a regime that is characterized by fundamental antagonisms. The regime of automobility is impossible because it is inherently fragile. It depends on a range of contingencies for its continued success, including the ability of geopolitical intervention and dominance to secure access to oil, the ability of planners and traffic engineers continually to provide for the mitigation of chronic congestion, the ideological success in rendering thousands of human deaths annually as ‘normal’ and acceptable, the ability to overcome opposition to road building, the capacity to navigate the fiscal crisis of the state to generate sufficient funds to promote automobile use, and so on. It depends also on the continued capacity to articulate the particularity of the car as the universal form of automobility to shake off alternatives and challengers, from eco-warriors to the internet. Such efforts to shore-up the regime are ubiquitous and occupy significant amounts of time for many politicians, bureaucrats, car company strategists, environmentalists, and others. The government of automobility (pollution control regulations, safety technologies, many road construction schemes, for example) is itself the historical and ongoing legacy of such efforts. Because of the above discussed conceptual impossibility of automobility itself, however, such interventions fail to close the wounds they are designed to ‘heal’ but either leak round the edges (or through the middle), or generate their own knock-on unintended consequences, their own iatrogenic diseases, and which in turn are articulated as problems requiring their own remedies. The antagonisms of automobility, then, are not temporary ‘bruises’ of an otherwise well-working machinery. Instead they are inherent to the ‘normal goings-on’ of automobility. In other words, automobility, the way it works today, would not be possible without these antagonisms. It has been one of the tasks of this book to expose and oppose these antagonisms in the regime of automobility. What this critique points to is the fact that it is literally impossible to go on with the way modern mass transport has been organized.

#### **Vote neg – only by exposing the fragilities of the regime can we create a radical new space to envision future social possibilities. And, the permutation fails – reform is another link**

Böhm et al 6 (Steffen Böhm, Ph.D., Director of the Essex Sustainability Institute and Professor in Management and Sustainability at the University of Essex, Campbell Jones, Director of the Centre for Philosophy and Political Economy and Senior Lecturer in Critical Theory and Business Ethics at the University of Leicester, Chris Land, Lecturer in Management at the University of Essex, and Mat Paterson, Professor of Political Science at the University of Ottawa. “Part One Conceptualizing Automobility: Introduction: Impossibilities of automobility”, September 18, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-954X.2006.00634.x/full>)

In our view, reforming automobility is not enough. In order radically to change the way automobility works today, it is not sufficient to expose the particular antagonisms of the regime and make it once again, temporarily, ‘possible’ by introducing new techniques of government. Instead, what is needed is a broadening awareness of the fragility of the entire regime of automobility. When in the year 2000 protests against high fuel prices brought most of the UK almost to a standstill, this fragility of the regime was made clear by a relatively small number of people within a few days: as almost the entirety of social life of the developed world depends on the steady flow of oil, a break of this flow has radical consequences for the normal maintenance of the regime of automobility. Such breaks in the normal flows of automobility, even if they intended to achieve the opposite, expose the fragility of the regime. It is an act of subversion that has the potential to put into question the entire ‘goings-on’ of automobility. Such acts do not only aim to engage with a particular antagonism of automobility but to redefine the grounds on which automobility can be thought. Such acts are therefore radically unaccountable; one can never fully foresee their consequences. In our view, this is the task of today: radically to put into question the universality of automobility and engender a space that imagines not only different automobilities that cannot yet be foreseen, but also a social form which recognizes the necessity of disentangling its twin conceptual bases – to delink autonomy from mobility and to put both in context. In this sense, we are proposing interventions that quite literally propose to reconfigure the very co-ordinates of what is perceived as ‘possible’. Faced with an antagonistic and impossible regime of automobility, we hope that the essays collected in this volume contribute to the recognition of that impossibility and to the collective possibility of moving beyond it.

## Links

### Link—Transportation Infrastructure/Planning

#### Transportation infrastructure planning and construction normalizes people and processes and makes government power inevitable.

Richardson and Jensen ‘7 [Tim and Anne, 'New Region, New

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Governmentalities entail particular logics, or rationalities and particular practices, that embed certain ideas of the subjects who are to be governed, and may be traced in policy discourse. In exploring our case, we therefore ask questions of ‘what forms of person, self and identity are presupposed by different practices of government?’ (Dean, 1999). In planning terms, this means that when particular subjects are imagined in particular ways, this will play a more or less visible part in the formation of policies and plans. Articulated in policy discourses, these particular imaginaries articulate who the subjects of the plans are, what they want and how they act and become normalised, over time and through practice. Being normalised also means that for the planners and policy-makers, these subjectivities enter the journey from being merely ‘imaginary subjects’ to stand as images of real, living persons that the plans and policies are directed to. From a mobilities perspective, we see plans reﬂecting ideas about how certain citizens are imagined to dream and scheme about their future lives within the modern condition of mobility. In other words, for some groups of citizens, transport and communications infrastructures are designed, and urban and regional maps are drawn to ﬁt with the planners’ and policy-makers’ imaginaries of how these particular groups of citizens will want to move in time and space. Looking at European corridors, this entails a rescaling of levels of governance and of what can be thought of as urban (Brenner, 2004; Dabinett and Richardson, 2005). Those subjectivities which in plans and policies are imagined in a mobility context we call mobile subjects. This means, ﬁrst, that in concrete plans and policies there might be several types of mobile subjects present, each with related imagined mobilities. Secondly, it means that the governing technologies and the domains of knowledge embedded in the logic of governing may work strategically to shape these ideas of mobile subjects. Thirdly, it means that in the actual construction of infrastructures and design of urban and regional spaces, these mobile subjects and their anticipated mobilities are present, legitimising new infrastructures such as international high-speed railway projects and crossborder bridges and tunnels, and setting the conditions of what is possibile for the everyday lives of citizens. In this sense, the concept of mobile subjects becomes a key to the interface between the actions in transnational governmental spaces of borderwork, and the (future) everyday life of citizens. Future mobile subjects are imagined and narrated across the complex intertextual ﬁeld of an emergent policy space. Their imagined mobilities are predicated upon, and are used to make thinkable, and normal, proposed interventions such as new highspeed transport or communication infrastructures. In a governmentality perspective, actors emerge as different formations of selves that embody the governing logic but are not necessarily disciplined by it. Hence, from the perspective of the governed, subjectivities also denote practices of resistance and freedom (Foucault, 1988; Rose, 1999), emphasising the tension between normalising (disciplining) and freedom within Foucault’s work (Triantaﬁllou, 2004). Consequently, we do not suggest that these rather top– down policy processes of imagining mobile subjects are uncomplicated practices of governmental control. Rather, we view them as more or less concerted attempts to mobilise imaginaries to legitimise and progress a governmental project. We would expect that such interventions will vary in ‘success’ and in any case will result in unintended consequences and that subjects involved in or excluded from everyday mobility practices may appropriate new infrastructures or modes of mobility in unpredictable ways. This suggests the importance of paying close attention to the interfaces between the construction of mobile subjects in planning processes and the actual practices of everyday life in the corridor. This is clearly a crucial aspect of how imagined mobilities make a difference to material, practised mobilities. In this paper, however, we concentrate on early moments in the birth of the governmental project itself, rather than on the consequences or resistances resulting from the subsequent engagements between governance, territory and population. What we do seek to capture is a sense of how emergent governance of nascent cross-border territories involves routine practices of mobilising visions of future mobility that have implications for the engagement between planning and everyday life across borders. Inspired by Scott (1998), Anderson (1991) and Brenner (2004), we explore how transnational governance creates an ability to ‘see’ new cross-border state spaces, their territories and the imagined cross-border communities that will move among them.

Transportation planning renders mobile subjects as disposable and silences those who are not central to the function of the system

Jensen 11 (Anne, Department of Policy Analysis, National Environmental Research Institute, Aarhus University, Denmark, “Mobility, Space and Power: On the Multiplicities of Seeing Mobility”, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17450101.2011.552903#tabModule>)

Hence, governmentality offers a way to include space, and subjectivities, in the study of a productive power. When focusing on contested rationalities and mundane practices in particular cases, this also applies when including mobility. In a study of the contested making of a European space through e.g. ‘thin simplifications’ and the actual, nitty‐gritty planning of transport infrastructures, Tim Richardson demonstrates the very tangible consequences of governing rationalities and particular governing practices related to European mobility (Richardson, 2006; see also Jensen & Richardson, 2004; Jensen & Richardson, 2007). The notion of ‘mobile subjects’ demonstrates how the governing rationalities and particular practices inherent in urban/regional policymaking embed perceptions of modern urban citizens who are assumed to crave for more mobility and more cosmopolitan networks at higher speeds and with less friction (Jensen & Richardson, 2007). Meanwhile, other mobile subjects are rendered bi‐products in not being fit to use, lacking the resources to use or being denied access to the high‐speed trains, airports, etc (Richardson & Jensen, 2008). This implies a focus on the particular ways in which mobility, places and subjects are part of imaginaries, rationalities and related practices of modern life and urban policies/planning. What this amounts to is a persistent emphasis on a clear power character and spatiality of mobility and mobility related practices. This way of conceiving a mobility related power mechanism finds a parallel in Cresswell. He stresses how ‘[m]obility … as a thoroughly social facet of life imbued with meaning and power is composed of elements of social time and social space’ (Cresswell, 2006, p. 4), and thus points to those ideas that are embedded in and which are shaped by mobility. And significantly, such ideas are not innocent but crucially linked to particular categorisations of people (subjectivities), e.g. tramps, dancers, cosmopolitan workforce, US citizens, migrants, female car drivers, etc., and to particular morally good or bad, correct or wrong, legal or illegitimate mobile practices, whether these are dancing, travelling, working or a way of life. Considering mobility’s significance as a basic principle for the rationalities embedded in urban development, this further indicates that mobility is an ingredient in a basic social and political logic, where e.g. the politics of mobility plays an active part in the constitution of the city (Kesselring, 2001, pp. 183–184). The technologies of automobility are in this respect particularly powerful in imprinting ‘their’ logics on the making of modern selves, as stressed by Urry (2007, pp. 127–133). A special twist to this is represented by Deleuze, who in his persistence with regard to Foucault’s twin conception of power picks up on power’s ability to make things ‘sayable’ and visible, as introduced above (Deleuze, 1988). Perceptions and daily practices of mobility rest on a special gaze that produces particular social aspects of mobility while simultaneously silencing others, and which is embedded in governing and planning a city/region. It is a matter of seeing mobility in particular ways, thus also delineating how future mobility can be imagined. Such imagined mobilities and e.g. imagined mobile subjects emerge and take shape also through the aspects of the city and urban life that its users and designers see mobility as part and parcel of, assume or neglect. This is for example the case when new regions are pushed through representations of moving people as cosmopolitan, knowledge intensive workers who desire easy access to opera houses in Berlin and Oslo and shopping in New York, or when bicycle mobility is pictured as a future oriented, rational, trendy and smooth urban mobility for all which advances the urban identity, vitalism and liveability of Copenhagen (Jensen & Richardson, 2007; Jensen, forthcoming). In this sense, ‘seeing mobilities’ also defines what is actually within the realm of mobilities and for whom. Thus a governmentality perspective offers a way to see mobility as part of a governing logic. In this perspective, the mobile subjects and their real practices, based on logics of mobility and ideas of wants, needs and desires among particular people can be included in relation to the spaces they inhabit, enact, produce and move around, give meaning to and are shaped by. This shows how governmental practices of normalising, disciplining, forming modern selves and also rationalities relating to mobility rely on particular measurements, conceptualisations, imaginaries and productions of urban spaces. Further it stresses how such – contested – ways of seeing modern selves as e.g. ‘mobile selves’ in urban spaces also possesses the potential to become part of urban subjects’ own shaping of their selves, under the constraint of freedom and individual autonomy.

### Link—Transportation

Efficient transport processes reduce travelers to economical units and justifies the further expansion of managerial power and social exclusion

Bonham and Cox 10 (Jennifer Bonham is a lecturer in Geographical and Environmental Studies at theUniversity of Adelaide. Peter Cox teaches in the Faculty of Social Science at the University of Chester as aSenior Lecturer, specialising in the area of social change and sustainability and theimpacts and processes of globalisation. He is author of Moving People: SustainableTransport Development (Zed Books 2010). “The disruptive traveller?A Foucauldian analysis of cycleways”, June 2010, <http://adelaide.academia.edu/JenniferBonham/Papers/372359/The_Disruptive_Traveller_A_Foucauldian_Analysis_of_Cycleways>)

In contrast to the broader transport literature, we do not theorise the individual as a natural, pre-social being simply choosing one mode of travel over others. Drawing on Michel Foucault, we are interested in the techniques through which people in contemporary societies come to think of themselves as individuals and regulate themselves towards, alter or resist the subjectivities (or subject positions – e.g. as cyclists, pedestrians, motorists)available to them (Foucault 1982). We take the view that the production of knowledge about human beings – which has proliferated since the eighteenth century – and the operation of power which enables that knowledge is central to our capacity to think of ourselves first as individuals (Digeser 1992) and then as particular types of subjects (Foucault 1977,1978). In this sense, those who produce and utilize transport knowledge participate both in shaping how people can think about their journeys and in structuring the field of action of individual travellers. It is impossible to review the key elements of Foucault’s work in this article, instead we offer a brief introduction accompanied by an example of how Foucault’s work can be utilised in transport. Readers unfamiliar with Foucault are directed to McHoul and Grace (1995) for a concise introduction and Bacchi (2009) on applying Foucault to policy analysis. Foucault offers an understanding of power as productive, as producing particular types of being and knowledge (Bacchi 2009:37–8). He identifies different types of power (Hindess 1996:96–136)and, although governmental 1 and bio power are important to transport, our paper focuses on discipline as it foregrounds the role of ‘spatialising’ practices 2 in processes of objectification and subjectification (the formation of subjects).Disciplinary power, fundamental to the self-regulation that characterises modern societies(Foucault 1991:101), has enabled the production of knowledge about the capabilities and capacities of human beings that, in turn, facilitates innovations in the exercise of power (Foucault 1977:224). It is through the operation of power at a micro-scale, the sorting and physical separation of the human mass– constituting difference through the discursive mechanisms (records keeping, data collection)involved in separating, scrutinising and monitoring bodies – that knowledge of singular bodies has been produced (Foucault 1977:191–2). From the moment we are born – separated from our mothers, gendered male or female, weighed, measured, named, allocated the special space of acot and monitored at regular intervals – we are subjected to and made subjects through myriad practices involving the operation of power and the production of knowledge. The procedures of inscription which bring individuals into effect and objectivise bodies in specific ways – as healthy or ill, learned or illiterate, political or passive, law abiding or deviant, mobile or stationary –simultaneously enable the aggregation of those singular histories into knowledge of populations where norms, the limits to normal, and deviations from the norm are constituted (Foucault 1977, 1982).An important point here is that these are not necessary ways of knowing individuals. Rather, conditions at different moments enable objectification of bodies in new ways. With this knowledge, individuals are worked upon through systems of punishment and reward to regulate themselves according to the norm while those found wanting – disruptive, abnormal– might be removed altogether. Travel is but one domain in which bodies have been objectivised and subjectivised 3; separated, scrutinised and worked upon and, in the case of cycleways, removed altogether. Through the late nineteenth but especially the twentieth century it became thinkable, practicable and meaningful to study urban movement. Until recently, the meaning of that movement has been asserted and widely accepted as ‘transport’ – the journey from a to b specifically to accomplish some activity or task at point b (Bonham 2000). Over time, the journey, or trip, has come to appear as ‘self-evident’, as mechanisms for the study of journeys –origin–destination studies, household travel surveys, vehicle counts – excise particular practices from the mass of daily activities and bring them under scrutiny. Objectifying travel as ‘transport’ establishes the journey as a by-product of its endpoints – derived demand – and provides the imperative for trips to be accomplished as quickly, or as economically, as possible (Bonham and Ferretti1999). ‘Derived demand’ functions as a ‘statement’(Foucault 1976:102–17) within the field of transport, a statement that both disciplines those who would study travel, and discounts, if not excludes, the many other possibilities of our journeys. Drawing on Foucault’s (1980:119) understanding of power as productive, the objectification of travel as transport is productive in that it has enabled the development of a vast body of knowledge and brought new subjects into effect – the pedestrian, cyclist, motorist, passenger. These subjects have been facilitated through the operation of power at a micro-scale involving practices of differentiation and separation of users of public space, identifying those who are stationary and those who move(Bonham 2002; Frello 2008), and subsequently scrutinising, sorting, categorising and disciplining 45 The disruptive traveller? A Foucauldian analysis of cycleways Vol 19 No 2 June 2010 Road & Transport Research those who move according to the conduct of their journey (Bonham 2006). A number of practices –particular ways of moving, particular types of observations, pauses, conversations – have been separated out, excluded as NOT-transport and marginalised in the space of the street. Other practices – keeping to course, attuning hearing, sight and reflexes to the operation of vehicles – have been worked upon in disciplining the mobile body(Bonham 2006; Paterson 2007). In cities across the world, the contemporary division and regulation of the public space of the street (and road) has been guided by a transport rationalization of urban travel (Bonham 2000). Streets have been divided lengthwise and travellers allocated space according to the speed and order with which they travel (Bonham 2000). The mobile body has been incited to move at speed to ensure the efficient operation of the city. However, in the early twentieth century, widespread concern over motor vehicle-related deaths and injuries underpinned debate over prioritising speed or safety. The debate was resolved (but never quite fixed) in favour of speed, with ‘vulnerable’ road users giving way to the fast(Bonham 2002). The slow and disorderly –pedestrians, horses and carts – were removed to the margins, checked by the fast and orderly, or excluded altogether. Overall efficiency, measured in time, could only be assured if each traveller agreed to be orderly – hence all those road safety techniques and programs that train bodies in ‘correct movement’(Bonham 2006). The public space of the street, often identified in political discourse as a site available to all citizens, effectively becomes an economic space where the subject of transport discourse, conducting the economical journey, gains primacy. Subjugating oneself within the discourse on transport – becoming the efficient or economical traveller, which in the twentieth century has meant taking up the subject position of the motorist – is rewarded with priority in the use of public space. These individual rewards invoke wider social rewards through the increase in the reproduction of capital through the facilitation of movement (Cox2010). Indeed, an entire literature on globalization has employed this metaphor of increased flows in speed, volume and depth to describe globalization of capitalism from the end of the twentieth century (Boran and Cox 2007). Transport discourses are thus woven into discourses on the nature of public good and of socio-economically responsible behaviour, reinforcing the linkage between travel behaviours and ‘responsible citizens’. The knowledge produced about individual travellers is not only enabled by the exercise of power but also facilitates the further exercise of power. Power–knowledge relations operate at a micro-scale subjectivising singular bodies while, at a macro-scale, the subjectivities constituted within different disciplines (e.g. economics, demography)are deployed in the government of populations(Foucault 1981, 1982, 1991). Further, the aggregation of data about singular bodies not only allows the calculation of norms (and deviations from those norms) but in liberal societies, where citizens are constituted as free and incited to exercise freedom of choice (Huxley 2008), this knowledge is central to government as populations are guided rather than directed toward particular ends (Rose 1990;Gordon 1991; Rose and Miller 1992). In terms of transport, knowledge produced about individual travellers and singular journeys is combined into knowledge of urban populations and used to guide the choices of the population toward economical movement and the economical operation of the city. This process values speed and prioritises the reduction of travel time ahead of the impacts on health, environment and social exclusion that accompany increases in speed and travel energy consumption (Lohan and Wickham 1998; Whitelegg1993, 1997).

#### Transportation has become a manageable entity – the discourse of transport has reshaped notions of freedom of movement to freedom of access

Bonham ’06 (Jennifer, September 08“Part Two Governing Automobility: Transport: disciplining the body that travels” <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-954X.2006.00637.x/full> The Sociological Review, 54: 55–74. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-954X.2006.00637.x)

This chapter locates the proliferation of automobile usage within a broader study of how urban populations have been incited to think about and conduct their journeys. The approach I have taken draws on the insights of Michel Foucault’s genealogical studies (Foucault, 1977; 1978) as it examines the micro techniques by which bodies have been disciplined to the use of ‘public’ space and the practice of travel. Discipline, to paraphrase Foucault, ‘. . . centres on the body as a machine, optimizing its capabilities, increasing its usefulness and docility, integrating it into systems of efficient and economic controls’ (Foucault, 1978: 139). The body of the traveller – motorist, pedestrian, child – is not a ‘natural’ body but a body worked upon through relations of power and knowledge to conduct the journey in particular ways. It is argued in this chapter that disciplining the travelling body has been essential to the government of urban mobility. Bodies have been disciplined to and subsequently governed through two interrelated ways of thinking about mobility. First, changes in travel technologies have been linked, both positively and negatively to freedom, as individuals are able physically to remove themselves from their daily routines, everyday responsibilities and immediate social networks (Kern, 1982: 111–4; Creswell, 1997). The second way of thinking about travel is that of transport: movement from one point to another in order to participate in the activities at the ‘trip destination’ (Schumer, 1955; Hensher, 1976; Allan et al., 1996). This innovation, more significant than the train, tram or automobile, has made it possible to objectify travel practices and create knowledge about the efficient completion of the journey. The production of transport knowledge has involved separating out, classifying, and ordering travel practices in relation to their efficiency. This ordering of travel establishes a hierarchy which not only values some travel practices (rapid, direct, uninterrupted) and some travellers (fast, orderly, single-purpose) over others but also enables their prioritization in public space. All trips, not just those to sites of production, consumption, and exchange, can be made economically. The journey to a friend’s house, the beach, or the doctor (so called ‘social’ journeys) can be made with greater or lesser economy. As transport experts (from engineers and transport modellers to sociologists, environmentalists, and feminists) deploy the logic of the economical journey they are fundamentally implicated in the ordering of urban travel and the consequent prioritization of some travellers – specifically motorists – over others. The conceptualization of urban travel as transport has rendered urban movement calculable while at the same time ameliorating the dangers of too much freedom to move. Travel has been made manageable as it has been anchored between an origin and destination. ‘Freedom of movement’ has been re-conceptualized through traffic and transport discourses into ‘freedom to access destinations’. Thinking about urban travel in terms of transport has made it possible to govern the movement of urban populations, to maximize choice and to secure the economical operation of the urban environment. The motor vehicle is centred in transport discourse as maximizing travel choice while the motorist’s field of action can be structured toward the efficient conduct of the journey.

#### The aff’s reconfiguration of transportation infrastructure stifles autonomous vehicular movement and constrains social life

Featherstone ’04 (Michael, Theory Culture and Society “Automobilities : An Introduction” The online version of this article can be found at:

<http://tcs.sagepub.com/content/21/4-5/1> 2004 21: 1 DOI: 10.1177/0263276404046058)

The term automobility works off the combination of autonomy, and mobility. In its broadest sense we can think of many automobilities – modes of autonomous, self-directed movement. The auto in the term automobile initially referred to a self-propelled vehicle (a carriage without a horse). The autonomy was not just through the motor, but the capacity for independent motorized self-steering movement freed from the confines of a rail track. The promise here is for self-steering autonomy and capacity to search out the open road or off-road, encapsulated in vehicles which afford not only speed and mobility, but act as comforting protected and enclosed private spaces, increasingly a platform for communications media, that can be enjoyed alone or in the company of significant others. Not only an attract- ive marketing image in which cars are positioned traversing the wild parts of the planet such as deserts and mountain passes, but something which also speaks to powerful cultural dreams of adventure and freedom: the capacity to go anywhere, to move and dwell without asking permission, the self-directed life free from the surveillance of the authorities (cf. Bell, 1976; Cohan and Hark, 1997; Eyerman and Löfgren, 1995).

Yet as John Urry (2004) argues in his piece on ‘The “system” of Auto- mobility’, in this issue, however tempting it is to emphasize the dwelling in movement, the various forms of emotional and sensory habitation of the hybrid car-driver, the focus should be in the first instance on the system. For Urry automobility should be seen as a ‘self-organizing autopoetic, non- linear system’ which links together cars, car-drivers, roads, petroleum supplies and other ‘novel objects, technologies and signs’, in an expanding relatively stable system which generates unintended consequences. Social life has become locked into the modes of mobility that automobility generates and presupposes. Something which as the 20th century unfolded has seen a shift from public transport (railways, buses, trams, ships etc.) to the private car. As time-space structures becomes refigured there is a concomitant shift in forms of sociality, living together and inhabitation. Automobility makes possible the division of the home from the workplace, of business and industrial districts from homes, of retail outlets from city centres. It encourages and demands an intense flexibility as people seek to juggle and schedule their daily set of work, family and leisure journeys, not around the train timetable, but on the calculation of the vagaries of traffic flows.

### Link—Transportation Discourse

#### **Transport policy discourse masks the prioritization of elite groups - you should be highly skeptical of the affirmative’s assertions**

Richardson 1 (Tim Richardson is a lecturer in the Department of Town and Regional Planning, University of Sheffiel, “The Pendulum Swings Again: In Search of New Transport Rationalities”, The Town Planning Review, Vol. 72, No. 3 (Jul., 2001), pp. 299-319, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/40112456.pdf?acceptTC=true>)

Clearly, there are many open questions about whether radical concepts such as reducing mobility will become embedded in the new discourse, or whether more flexible ideas like 'integration' and 'choice' will allow the most difficult challenges to be sidestepped. As Banister recognises, in spite of a decade of apparently radical and fundamental change, transport thinking has not yet reached the stage of 'realisation that the only way to improve both environment and congestion is to reduce the need to travel' (Banister, 1997, 439). This is but one illustration of how the nature and extent of policy change remain unclear. A Foucauldian analysis would further suggest that these different constructions of what the new realism should be about are manifestations of different discoursive positions. As well as being debated within the transport policy community, competing ideas about the extent to which personal mobility should be restrained are contested through many power struggles across society. In this way barriers and resistance to the progress of some of the 'difficult' new ideas of the new realism can be mounted, yet a sense of change and reform can be maintained. Such discoursive struggles form the shifting sands upon which transport policy is built, institutionalising the boundaries of the thinkable and unthinkable in transport policy. The new language of transport is peppered with references to sustainability and the environment, to economy, and to integrated measures. Conflicts between apparently incompatible discourses remain, yet are rarely addressed explicitly. The Foucauldian perspective suggests that assertions of a common, universally accepted transport policy discourse are likely to mask serious conflicts and inconsistencies which arise partly from the conflicts between these broader discourses. In fact, such assertions may well be tactical ploys to promote particular interests above others. Furthermore, the increasingly fragmented nature of transport policy making means that these competing discourses are being variously advocated, planned for, or resisted, by governmental institutions as well as by fluctuating coalitions of actors from the public, private and voluntary sectors and citizens.

Transportation policymaking ignores the power structures inherent in transport systems – the aff replicates their own impacts

Richardson 1 (Tim Richardson is a lecturer in the Department of Town and Regional Planning, University of Sheffiel, “The Pendulum Swings Again: In Search of New Transport Rationalities”, The Town Planning Review, Vol. 72, No. 3 (Jul., 2001), pp. 299-319, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/40112456.pdf?acceptTC=true>)

The rationality of transport policy making has important implications for space. As Foucault explained how discourses of control and punishment are expressed in the physical form of prisons, so transport discourse is expressed in the design and form of transport systems - of street patterns and motorway networks, highspeed railway stations, cycle routes and pedestrian areas. Patterns of mobility are affected by the changes and growth of these systems, and neighbourhoods, cities and regions are gradually reshaped, redefining boundaries of opportunity and exclusion. In the UK, transport policy has been busily restructuring space to meet the expectations and needs of a late-modern high-mobility society - creating a trunk road system for rapid inter-urban travel and facilitating a longdistance goods distribution network. However, the fragmentary nature of transport policy discourse, discussed above, suggests that the impact of transport and mobility on space is not determined by a coherent ideology. The spatial effects of transport policy are likely, then, to be complex and contested, rather than harmonious and coherent. In the formal processes of transport policy making, space is often reduced to either an engineering problem, to a series of economic indicators, or to models where generic traffic flows between point spaces. What seems clear is that as transport policy changes physical space, and the possibilities for movement within it, it also 'defines, shapes and transforms social relationships and daily practices' (Swyngedouw, 1993, 310). These subtle socio-spatial effects are not generally captured in policy making. However, in losing these effects, what is also lost is the possibility of understanding how 'mobility itself is part and parcel of the process of uneven development and of consolidating asymmetrical power relationships' (Swyngedouw, 1993, 323). In grounding the new realism, it seems necessary to integrate an understanding of these socio-spatial effects. This need to understand socio-spatial effects needs to be placed within the context of the politics of space. Worsening transport conditions and new transport agendas create new spatial tensions and recast old ones. As a result, we should expect to see contests over the local construction of transport 'spaces'. Transport policies in many cases favour particular interests over others - for example motorised vehicles over cyclists or pedestrians, buses over cars, moving traffic over parked vehicles, parked vehicles over public space, freight over private traffic, travellers over non-travellers. Goodwin (1996b) has explained this as a contest for scarce road space. However, it seems likely that the spatial conflicts caused by transport policies extend beyond the physical boundaries of roads, affecting spaces occupied by other modes of infrastructure as well as other land uses causing a range of effects including blight, bisecting communities, channelling new development and creating shadow and corridor effects. For example, engineering improvements to a particular road may improve speeds and safety for cars and commercial traffic, but may at the same time worsen conditions and create new dangers for those who may wish to make slower or shorter journeys on that road or the adjacent pavement. As time is saved for one group of travellers car dependency is increased, making alternatives less attractive and reducing accessibility for those who do not have access to a car.

### Link—Mobility/Freedom

The affirmative’s attempt to increase freedom through mobility destroys personal liberty – turns case

Sager 6 (Prof Tore Sager, Department of Town & Regional Planning, Faculty of Architecture, Planning and Fine Art (Norwegian University of Science and Technology). “Freedom as Mobility: Implications of the Distinction between Actual and Potential Travelling”, November 21, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17450100600902420)

Enormous sums of money are spent on the improvement of mobility. The budgets are backed by a political rhetoric giving prominence to efficiency gains and the value of free movement. Yet travellers may curtail each others' freedom by causing mutual delays, by letting the hegemony of auto‐mobility erode the feasibility of low‐mobility lifestyles, and by control and intrusive protection devices. It is important to impart nuances to the mainstream political rhetoric by discussing and problematising the idea of promoting freedom by heightening the level of personal mobility. The aim is to increase awareness of the fact that attempts to achieve freedom by more mobility should take into account some consequences of excessive travel that tend to have the opposite effect of what is intended. The essay pursues this aim by arguing that: the advantages meant to follow from higher mobility are not necessarily realised with rapidly increasing transport; mobility rights, like other rights, have to be balanced against democratic aims and are problematic in principle; tracks left by people on the move open up opportunities for surveillance thus offsetting the freedom gains of being mobile; and uncertainties created by absence are often countered by strategies seriously impeding the freedom associated with the mobility causing the absence. The following paragraphs on ‘mobility’ and ‘freedom’ give some definitions and important categorisations.

#### State imposed mobility constraints deny freedom.

Sloop ‘08 [John M, Professor and Associate Dean of the College of Arts and Science at Vanderbilt University, “Thoughts on Democracy and Mobility”, 2008, http://artsandsciences.sc.edu/engl/rhet\_theory\_conf/2008\_papers/Sloop.pdf

The link between mobility and state regulation exists, Packer argues, because “Ultimately, it is the conduct of the individual, not devotion and loyalty, that strengthens the state, through increased production, longevity, and population growth.” Because citizens have access to all different types of mobility, it is necessary for govern-mentality that the citizen be held in place in order to remain productive and healthy (to the degree that health is tied to the strength of the economy). Hence, for Packer, “the goal of governing is not to simply guard against too much freedom, but to produce the type of freedom that accords with the expansive demands of culture and economy.” When we turn to discourse about the combined use of cell phone technology and auto-mobility, then, (my research area of interest) we are in effect asking about the type of freedom being produced around this nexus. The degree that freedom—already a problematic concept—is constrained—is the degree to which democracy is impossible.

#### Biopolitical control of movement entrenches disciplinary power.

Bigo 10 [Didier, “Freedom and Speed in Enlarged Borderzones”, Published in The Contested Politics of Mobility. Borderzones and Irregularity, 2010, http://www.didierbigo.com/documents/FreedomandSpeedinEnlargedBorderzones.pdf]

A biopolitical argument concerning numbers, statistics and not individual cases push towards

more flexibility, more speed in the movement. Productivity is needed. The non-systematicity

of control is considered as central in order to accelerate the flow. Good management becomes

the value of travel (not only the economic value but the comfort value, its easiness), and is

more important than the potential infiltration of one unwanted among millions of travellers. It

is with this form of power as biopolitics that movement is associated with freedom and mainly

with economy (consumers/workers). The regulation is statistical, not individual. The benefits

of a centrifugal dynamics extending growth and life as such (family reunification, children,

etc.) are preferred over military and police investigations at the borders or before. The idea of

creating an ‘area’ of freedom (of movement), of security (of the community living in the

area), of justice (of fair trial and punishment with the minimum differentiation possible inside

the area between sentences) is a by-product of this biopolitics (Dillon and Reid, 2007). But

the sovereign and disciplinary forms of power nevertheless re-invest this economic biopolitical model of mobility controls, of comfortable surveillance with high-speed travel.

The ‘abolition’ of the systematicity of controls is replaced by control in advance, as well as by

a modernisation of aleatory forms of control where only some profiled groups, some categories of suspicious populations are controlled. Indeed, the sovereign states have accepted

a displacement of their sovereignty beyond their borders for these techniques to work, though

this does not imply the dislocation or erosion of state sovereignty. They have ‘pooled’ their

sovereignties, or so they say. They have constituted mechanisms of collaboration and have

developed common tools (e.g. the Schengen Information System, Schengen Visas), while

refusing to have common passports or common ID cards. Moreover, they have largely

externalised their sovereign technologies and policing practices by obliging their ‘neighbours’

to participate actively to their controls towards movement of population coming from outside

and rebranded as third country nationals. Biopolitical control in this regard both exceeds yet

also comes within the remit of sovereign power.

Automobility increases state power

Böhm et al 6 (Steffen Böhm, Ph.D., Director of the Essex Sustainability Institute and Professor in Management and Sustainability at the University of Essex, Campbell Jones, Director of the Centre for Philosophy and Political Economy and Senior Lecturer in Critical Theory and Business Ethics at the University of Leicester, Chris Land, Lecturer in Management at the University of Essex, and Mat Paterson, Professor of Political Science at the University of Ottawa. “Part One Conceptualizing Automobility: Introduction: Impossibilities of automobility”, September 18, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-954X.2006.00634.x/full>)

Regimes of power have also developed as elements in a more overarching regime of automobility. There are obvious and crude elements of power in automobile systems, perhaps the most obvious of which is the brutal power of the Sports Utility Vehicle or SUV, the brutishness of which is analysed by Dery as well as Shukin in this volume. But beyond this there are the perhaps more subtle relations of power that are embodied in the government of automobility. Hence in Part Two of this book we find several analyses of governmentality with respect to automobility (see Bonham, Forstorp and Merriman, all in this volume). Automobility has entailed a plethora of regulatory schemes, regulating speed of travel, the places of travel, direction of travel, where one can park, orders of priority in movement, all designed to regularize the forms of movement in cars. At the same time, the power of cars, fuel efficiency, the sorts of emissions coming out of their exhaust, their safety, is similarly regulated. And for both sorts of regulatory schemes, a whole range of governmental institutions have emerged, engaged in monitoring, shaping, disciplining, drivers (and non-drivers) into behaving in ways consistent with an ordered, regulated, movement of automobiles (arguably, of course, attenuating the ‘freedom’ of driving to a significant degree). Automobility, exemplifying freedom, has thus gone hand in hand with a deepening of state power. But automobility has also entailed other transformations in power relations. It is entwined with the reorganization of capital’s power in the workplace, exemplified by the term ‘Fordism’ which was a regime of accumulation, structuring growth from the 1910s to the 1970s (at least), but at the same time a particular mode of control of the labour force and culture at large (see Martin-Jones and Shukin, this volume). The third element involves a regime of subjectivity. Again, there are several elements here. Perhaps the most fundamental is the intertwining of automobile discourses with those of individualism, where the two mutually inform and support each other (see especially Rajan and Thacker, this volume). In many respects the subject of automobility is also the subject of the contemporary political arena. Particularly assumed in neo-liberal formations of the subject is the idea that an individual is self-motivating. Whether voting or consuming, the subject should know its own mind and interests and act in accordance with them. The subject so conceived is, or should be, both autonomous from external control and self-moving as opposed to the victim of external influence. A chain of equivalence is constructed whereby to drive is to embody a modernist subjectivity (see Thacker, this volume), and to be in favour of such a subjectivity is to regard driving as unproblematically legitimate (Lomasky, 1997). Such a chain of equivalence creates at the same time a normalization of driving and car ownership – that car driving is what normal people do – which both produces and is legitimized by the construction of alternative modes as deviant. ‘Margaret Thatcher once said that a man who after the age of 30 finds himself on a bus can count himself a failure in life’ (Parris, 2003). Cyclists, for example, are routinely rendered as deviant, both in planning processes which assume their non-existence, and where the car driver is manifestly the ‘normal subject’, and in more active moral panics such as the one about ‘lycra louts’ (see Fincham, this volume). Such normalizations frequently involve differentiation of subjectivities around standard categories of class, gender or race. These serve to produce hierarchies of difference among car drivers, with different makes and models serving to signify (and be signified by) different subject positions along these lines, and also serving as sites of resistance to this subjectification, as in the appropriation of BMWs by African Americans serving to signify a certain resistance to such racial hierarchies (Gilroy, 2001), and of course to the policing of such boundaries as these drivers are then harassed for being seen in cars regarded as inappropriate for their ‘station’. But these categories also produce such differentiated subjectivities through their intertwining with patterns of car ownership itself – with access to jobs and services structured significantly by access to cars, poverty (itself already gender and ethnically differentiated) is automobilized. These three principal elements – truth, power, and subjectivity – tend to act in mutually supportive ways. The attribution of deviance to alternatives to the car means that those advocating such alternatives have trouble articulating successfully their own regime of truth regarding cars – we don’t believe their statements of ‘fact’ because they are already regarded as deviant. Regimes of power connected to the governance of automobility produce truth effects about driving or driven subjects, including those concerning the deviance of certain subjects (and of course is reproduced in daily life by the ‘brute’ power of cars to bully alternatives off the road). But such mutual support doesn’t lend itself to interpretation as self-replicating ‘system’. Nor can its tripartite components be thought of as clearly separable from one another. Rather it is their interrelations that determine them as components of a regime. But as with other triangular formations, so apparently stable when applied to architectural construction, closer inspection reveals a tendency to multiply their number. Power is productive of subjects and exercised by means of regimes of truth that in turn constitute power.

#### Despite surveillance – automobility was seen as a means to break free of panoptic effect of gov’t

Hensley ’10 (Karl, “One Nation Behind the Wheel Automobility in U.S. Culture” American Quarterly, Volume 62, Number 1, March 2010, pp. 173-180 (Review) The Johns Hopkins University Press https://netfiles.uiuc.edu/rfouche/www/readings/hensley.pdf)

Drawing heavily on the work of Foucault, Seiler charts the rise of automobility at the turn of the twentieth century as a technology of the self, as a disciplinary technology, and as a form of capital deeply inscribed by state and commercial systems of surveillance and control. He explores “how mobility itself informs and structures modern liberal subjectivity, the contested ‘prize’ that its disparate groups seek to realize through the practices of automobility” (11). Seiler understands driving as an “apparatus” similar to the way that Foucault understood sexuality, simultaneously liberating as it disciplines: Like sex, driving is imbued with emancipatory pleasures and destructive potential “called for the construction of an apparatus, consisting of legal, technical, medical, cultural, economic, political, ethical, and architectural/spatial elements, that would simultaneously enable and constrain, cultivate and regulate, govern and license it” (62–63). In the early days of the automobile, shifts in the capitalist mode of production, coupled with the emergence of discourses exhibiting anxieties over modernization and a perceived loss of subjectivity, created a crisis to which automobility was able to respond. The implementation of Taylorist forms of scientifically managed manufacturing were key, as alienation in the workplace created a space to generate a new “expressive” ideal of individualism, à la Herbert Hoover. Workers were not only likened to a mass by figures such as Frederick Taylor, but these laborers, typically white men, were subjected to a mode of surveillance previously associated with women and people of color. This alienation and perceived emasculation in the workplace created a desire not only for self-expression but also for mobility and individual freedom of choice. The new brand of individualism was meant to restore agency (often read as masculinity) to the individual. As commodities became the primary mode of self-expression, the automobile was positioned as the quintessential product to meet these ends. Seiler argues that ultimately the automobile was championed as “both the instrument for the performative recuperation of the ‘sovereign self’ of the republican past and the facilitator of the blithely masterful new subjectivity of the consumer-citizen” (13). Driving came to be seen as a performance of freedom, and thus analogous to citizenship.

#### **Automobility deepens state power via biopolitical regulations**

Bohm et al 3 (Steffen Böhm, Ph.D., Director of the Essex Sustainability Institute and Professor in Management and Sustainability at the University of Essex, Campbell Jones, Director of the Centre for Philosophy and Political Economy and Senior Lecturer in Critical Theory and Business Ethics at the University of Leicester, Chris Land, Lecturer in Management at the University of Essex, and Mat Paterson, Professor of Political Science at the University of Ottawa, “Against Automobility,” http://www.scribd.com/doc/54682082/Bohm-Against-Auto-Mobility-Black-Well-2003)

Regimes of power have also developed as elements in a more overarching regime of automobility. There are obvious and crude elements of power in auto-mobile systems, perhaps the most obvious of which is the brutal power of the Sports Utility Vehicle or SUV, the brutishness of which is analysed by Dery as well as Shukin in this volume. But beyond this there are the perhaps more subtle relations of power that are embodied in the government of automobility. Hence in Part Two of this book we ﬁnd several analyses of governmentality with respect to automobility (see Bonham, Forstorp and Merriman, all in this volume). Automobility has entailed a plethora of regulatory schemes, regulat-ing speed of travel, the places of travel, direction of travel, where one can park, orders of priority in movement, all designed to regularize the forms of move-ment in cars. At the same time, the power of cars, fuel efﬁciency, the sorts of emissions coming out of their exhaust, their safety, is similarly regulated. And for both sorts of regulatory schemes, a whole range of governmental institu-tions have emerged, engaged in monitoring, shaping, disciplining, drivers (and non-drivers) into behaving in ways consistent with an ordered, regulated, move-ment of automobiles (arguably, of course, attenuating the ‘freedom’ of driving to a signiﬁcant degree).Automobility, exemplifying freedom, has thus gone hand in hand with a deepening of state power. But automobility has also entailed other transformations in power relations. It is entwined with the reorganization of capital’s power in the workplace, exempliﬁed by the term ‘Fordism’ which was a regime of accumulation, structuring growth from the1910s to the 1970s (at least),but at the same time a particular mode of control of the labour force and culture at large (see Martin-Jones and Shukin, this volume)

#### **The relationship between autonomy and mobility perpetuates a systemic system of biopolitical domination**

Bohm et al 3 (Steffen Böhm, Ph.D., Director of the Essex Sustainability Institute and Professor in Management and Sustainability at the University of Essex, Campbell Jones, Director of the Centre for Philosophy and Political Economy and Senior Lecturer in Critical Theory and Business Ethics at the University of Leicester, Chris Land, Lecturer in Management at the University of Essex, and Mat Paterson, Professor of Political Science at the University of Ottawa, “Against Automobility,” http://www.scribd.com/doc/54682082/Bohm-Against-Auto-Mobility-Black-Well-2003)

As its name implies, automobility can be understood as a patterned system which is predicated in the most fundamental sense on a combination of notions of autonomy and mobility. Autonomy and mobility are to be understood in the terms of this system as both values in themselves, but also as conjoined – one expresses and achieves autonomy when mobile. Similarly, true mobility can only be achieved autonomously – the distinction between moving and being moved, a passive and decidedly dependent (as opposed to autonomous) state. These concepts of autonomy and mobility come together around material and symbolic artefacts through which the combination is expressed. In our era, the predominant artefact is the car. In contemporary societies, the car stands in¶ place of automobility itself. It is so thoroughly invested with the constitutive ﬂows of modernity – material, ﬁnancial, and libidinal – that it has come to appear universal and incontestable. These connections operate in terms of what Laclau and Mouffe (1985) call ‘chains of equivalence’ in which things which bear no¶ a priori ¶ relation to each other are made to be the same. These connec-tions become, ironically, ‘automatic’. The production and consumption of the automobile becomes the production and consumption of automobility itself. To refer to automobility as a¶ system¶ is to talk of the patterned and struc-tured manner in which a range of social developments have operated to rein-force each other, making the widespread use of automobiles both possible and in many instances necessary. We could describe this system in a variety of ways(for one description see Urry, this volume) but the point here is simply that auto-mobility¶ is¶ structured and systemic (see also Shove,1998).To say that auto-mobility is systemic is to insist that it is not simply the experience of automobile use by drivers, the way in which car use is seen by them to express their control of their own lives (as emphasized by pro-car enthusiasts, such as Lomasky,1997).It is also the range of images through which the meanings of cars are understood and marketed, the dependences of such use on a range of environ-mental resources (oil, steel, plastics, etc) and the generation of environmental consequences (noise, air pollution, deforestation, global warming, etc).Perhaps most importantly for the notion of a ‘system’ is the range of investments involved in what Urry calls a ‘machinic complex’ which are the conditions of possibility of individual and, more importantly, mass automobile use. Road building and maintenance, trafﬁc regulations, parking arrangements, insurance, criminal justice systems, healthcare, pollution control rules and mechanisms, forward and backward economic linkages (from oil production to garages to maintenance of cars) only serve as a list of the principal elements in this complex which have emerged during the twentieth century to make automobile use pos-sible, to maximize the political and economic beneﬁts such use might bring and to regulate the side effects of such use. Although automobility is patterned in the way that systems are, at a certain point the language of ‘system’ loses its value. To speak of a system is to convey the impression of something autopoietic, a set of interlocking features which reinforce each other, and where elements in the system emerge for functional reasons, to ‘correct imbalances’ or to ‘improve performance’of the system as a whole. For example, Urry (2004) talks about automobility as a ‘self-organizingnon-linear system’, and invokes a viral metaphor of the expansion of the car, where cars, once sufﬁciently established in the ‘host body’, then create the con-ditions for their own continued expansion, driving out their competitors. While this may work as a metaphorical description, as an explanation it leaves crucial features out of the picture. The notion of system tends to underplay collective human agency in the production of automobility and to avoid the political ques-tions about the shaping of the automobile ‘system’. At the extreme it can create a sense of ‘lock-in’ where the only possibilities for shaping automobility or of moving away from its dominance arise from within the system itself.

#### Automobility transcends through practice of governmentality and strips “drivers” of their identities

Rajan ’06 (Sudhir Chella, September 18 2006 “Automobility and the liberal disposition” Volume 54, Issue Supplement s1, pages 113–129, October 2006 http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-954X.2006.00640.x/full)

My interest in this regard is directed mainly towards texts written in the tradition of liberal political theory, not those of self-proclaimed ‘political liberals’ who do literary criticism, cultural studies, or even critical social theory. But I also maintain more generally that automobility is a remarkably thin object of theoretical enquiry across the field. That this is remarkable ought not to require too much explanation. After all, automobility concerns more than just the car-object, it secures a particular form of social and material life for both drivers and non-drivers virtually around the world through its myriad practices, in part through the political economy of the automobile manufacturing and marketing enterprise and the highway and gasoline delivery infrastructure, but also more dramatically through the governmentality of traffic rules, parking structures, licensing procedures, and sundry regulatory institutions. Its ‘machine space’ produces both driver and non-driver subjects, often stripping the latter of certain claims to citizenship, and places countless requirements on both – licensing, registration, insurance, attention to the road and their private behaviour, risks of accidents, pollution and access to jobs and housing.4 Particularly in North America, the state’s powerful patronage of automobility is unmatched, except when compared with the military, whose own rationale is the subject of much hand-wringing in liberal international relations theory. Just as importantly, an enduring legacy to liberal theory from Mill to Hobhouse and beyond concerns the need to ensure freedom of individual expression in the face of the ‘tyranny of the majority’, which is perhaps not an erroneous way to portray the vast physical and cultural landscape occupied by the personal car. For political theorists, therefore, automobility might be explored richly in terms of facilitating the universal exercise of individual liberty; the massive public expenditures and extraordinary political power of auto and oil corporations might be read as prefiguring a special variety of accumulation crisis, resulting in unexplored diversions within late capitalism itself; or the peculiar demands it places on drivers and non-drivers alike might raise serious questions about already shaky political concepts involving bodies, high-speed prosthetics, and sovereignty (eg, Connolly, 2002). That automobility and its politics are not problematized as such by any breed of theorist with any degree of detail is itself a matter of substantial critical interest but one that remains beyond the scope of this inquiry; that mainstream liberal political analysis in particular ignores it leads me to employ the question as a wedge to pry open other curious features concerning the family resemblances between the ideas of liberal theory and the practices of automobility.

#### It says biopower a lot

Packer ’10 (Jeremy, 2010 Automobility and apparatuses: commentary on Cotten Seiler’s Republic of Drivers , History and Technology: An International Journal, 26:4, 361-368http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/07341512.2010.528619)

One way of attempting to approach this dispute between not only Foucauldian and Marxist conceptions of history, but also regarding how to ascribe historical importance to technology would be to ask if a given technology need be part of only one apparatus. In other words, might automobility be a ‘strategic response’ to more than one ‘urgent need’? Might not the automobile be subsumed and coordinated according to multiple apparatuses? While both Seiler and I draw from the same theoretical well and in many cases from the same primary documentation, we come to focus on different elements of the apparatus or, possibly, different apparatuses all together. One further difference between our two analyses may in some ways be tied to our disciplinary background. For Seiler he will ultimately name the subject produced by the automobility apparatus in the United States American. He sees in the character of this form of subjectivity and in automobility more generally the substance that might best summarize ‘the dominant meanings of America and American in the twentieth century.’22 I would not disagree. Yet, where Seiler’s prime mover seems to be economic in nature, in my account bio-political concerns take center stage. I argue that ‘disciplined mobility’ is dependent upon the creation of ‘safe subjects’ who situate them- selves within popular discourses of risk.23 At times there are clear economic imperatives at play, but the ‘urgent need’ was preventing the potential social chaos and biological destruction of wide-spread automobile use while harnessing it as a productive force, hence ‘mobility without mayhem.’ Yet, the story is still macroscopic in its narrative structure. The generalized ‘urgent need’ involves the maximization of the productive capacity of life. In Foucault’s terms, biopolitics is witnessed through the wide spread and intensive application of pastoral forms of power. Finally, there is a significant strain of subcultural work in the field of Cultural Studies. So while for Seiler the primary struggle is an ideological battle to reestablish corporate capital’s hegemony, my work often focuses upon the struggle over the conditions which define one’s relationship to risk, health, safety, or security. For instance, the subcultural practices of hitchhikers were examined in order to detail the workings of biopolitical struggles that have taken place which redefined unacceptable levels of risk thereby outlawing cultural affiliation, political activism, and alternative economic formations practiced by youth of the late 1960s and early 1970s.24

#### Politics of mobility is inextricably linked to the concept of power

Jensen ’11 (Anne, March 23, 2011 Department of Policy Analysis, National Environmental Research Institute, Aarhus University, Denmark “Mobility, Space and Power: On the Multiplicities of Seeing Mobility, Mobilities, 6:2, 255-271” http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/17450101.2011.552903)

The politics of mobility moreover includes aspects which articulate mobility as related to freedom-based ‘rights’ and innately concerned with socio-spatial contexts, co-forming public presence (Sheller, 2004b, p. 42; Sheller, 2008; see also Cresswell 2006). To approach mobility from these perspectives also indicates a democratic dimension, evident in Sheller (2004b, 2008) and Cresswell (2006, p. 147). Such perspectives further lead to considerations over rights to mobility, including questions of mobility for whom, at what cost (individually and for others) and with which obligations attached (Sheller, 2008). Cresswell here adds another critical layer when he repeatedly stresses how mobility for some is based on and assumes the immobility of others (Cresswell, 2006, p. 249). Additionally, the politics of mobility have been addressed in investigations of how mobility and logics of mobility appear in political rationalities, ideas, representations and images (see e.g. Jensen & Richardson, 2004; Cresswell, 2006; Jensen, 2006; Jensen & Richardson, 2007). Noting that ‘as people, capital, and things move they form and reform space itself’ (Sheller & Urry, 2006, p. 216), Sheller and Urry emphasise how the diverse power effects of mobility relate strongly to space. Here, space is included in the analysis of mobility in a mutually constitutive manner. Another take on the relation between mobility and space is to place both in a relationship ridden with tension, as e.g. when a sedentarism that is intimately tied to place and community is opposed to a nomad- ism that establishes mobility as a progressive force (Cresswell, 2006). To others, mobility and space are linked in a productive sense that builds on a relational conception of power (Jensen & Richardson, 2007) where for example Ole B. Jensen and Tim Richardson demonstrate a key role for mobility in the ‘making of European space’. Their analyses of the emergence of a European planning field show how the very relational and socially constructed character of (transnational) space makes this a site for power struggles and political tensions (Jensen & Richardson, 2004). Building on these insights, this article tracks such workings of power in the making of spatialised mobility.

#### Government practices and forms of knowledge shape the way subjects behave

Jensen ’11 (Anne, March 23, 2011 Department of Policy Analysis, National Environmental Research Institute, Aarhus University, Denmark “Mobility, Space and Power: On the Multiplicities of Seeing Mobility, Mobilities, 6:2, 255-271” http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/17450101.2011.552903)

A now well-known shorthand definition of governmentality is to see it as the ‘conduct of conduct’ (Foucault, 1982, pp. 220–221). In other words, governmentality coins ‘government [as] an activity that shapes the field of action’ (Dean, 1999, p. 13) for its subjects and which builds on ‘convictions about how people can govern them- selves’ (Pløger, 2004, p. 73). In this sense, governmentality refers to the logics and practices of government as these unfold and show in forms of knowledge, ‘truths’, practices and techniques of government. It highlights how governing is always embedded in particular rationalities which are local and historically produced. Those rationalities provide a blueprint for logics, i.e. what can meaningfully be seen as (policy) problems, as causes and effects, and who can legitimately govern and who can be governed. One key insight here is that this rationality is equally entwined in particular forms of knowledge that frame the area and through which it makes sense (Jensen, 2006) and which are ‘inextricably entangled with governmental practices ... also because practices and truths are mutually constitutive’ (Huxley, 2007, p. 189). The practices in question are daily and often routinised ways of carrying out particular forms of governing, and in the perspective of rationalities they can be seen as governing techniques. Via particular forms of knowledge, framings and practices, the subjects of governing are informed on how to behave, perform and shape their identities in ways that align with taken-for-granted knowledge and accepted true perceptions of the field, rather than commanded to particular behaviours. These subjects are thus produced in historically particular ways that become taken for granted, e.g. as urban citizens who want to behave in certain ways as they move around urban space (Rose, 1999: p. 22; Huxley, 2002, p. 145; Jensen, 2006). Put simply, these forms of knowledge and techniques become enmeshed with the daily practices of the urban citizens and so to say inform them in their ‘free’ moulding of their own selves through being internalised during the exercise of ‘practices of freedom’ (Foucault, 2003a). The rationalities and logics, the practices and mundane routines in politics and daily lives, and the selves these assume, encourage and produce subjects in suggestive ways rather than dictating them.

#### Notions of power don’t come directly from coercive forces – structures discretely regulate ambience, atmosphere and senses to continue to exert power of our lives

Jensen ’11 (Anne, March 23, 2011 Department of Policy Analysis, National Environmental Research Institute, Aarhus University, Denmark “Mobility, Space and Power: On the Multiplicities of Seeing Mobility, Mobilities, 6:2, 255-271” http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/17450101.2011.552903)

The Foucauldian-inspired governmentality perspectives show how mobility as well as space are intimately linked to rationalities at the heart of late-modern governing as this is exercised by authorities and people, including the way cities are designed and planned, represented and lived in. Thereby, mobility and space do not primarily work through disciplining and normalising behaviour. Both are also powerful in the course of producing modern selves and modes of being through the very practices that are enmeshed in daily life and in urban policies and plans. At the same time, imaginaries and ‘truths’, emotional, sensory experiences and ambiences are embedded in mobility and its technologies and spatialities. These power mechanisms work through moulding mobility as a modern desire and outlook on life when the embodied experience and perception of spatialised mobility is shaped in particular ways. In the perspective of mobility as a general principle, power contributes to shaping our emotions, desires and wants towards mobility dependency, e.g. as the sensory and ambient powers of especially automobility indicate. The focus suggested in this article thus points at a powerful means by which particular behaviours are induced without coercion or force and equally without discipline and surveillance as primary ways to normalisation. Powers working through emotions, senses and ambiences emphasises how the experiences of mobile technologies and urban places play on nodes of e.g. inclusiveness and openness in shaping desires, senses and affections of urban subjects. As a way to shape conduct in particular ways and with particular technologies, this indicates that the atmosphere and feel of particular modes of mobility and particular mobile spaces are additional aspects of the workings of power connected to mobility.

### Link – HSR

#### HSR is the epitome of elite control over city planning -- exterminates freedom

Anderson ’10 (Cassandra, February 1, 2010 Info Wars “Agenda 21 Alert: Obama Railroads Us With the Bullet Train” <http://www.infowars.com/agenda-21-alert-obama-railroads-us-with-the-bullet-train/>)

The Globalists have allowed Obama to throw you and me under the bus again, continuing the collectivist blueprint, set by Agenda 21, Sustainable Development, with the new High Speed Rail system. “PJ O’Rourke sums it up in simple terms: High Speed Rail system. “Politicians love trains. Why? Because they can tell where the tracks go. They know where everybody’s going. For politicians it’s all about control and power. Politicians hate cars because cars make people free.” (1) Before detailing the specifics of why bullet trains are impractical, we will switch tracks here to gain a deeper understanding of the Globalists’ scheme and how bullet trains fit into the agenda. “In an interview with Michael Shaw, www.freedomadvocates.org, he explained that”when you understand the intent of the Globalists’ action plan, Agenda 21, Sustainable Development, it becomes very clear that the government spending and debt not only serve to bankrupt individuals, but also to install new structures of control. “These structures at the local level are called “Smart Growth”. The transportation system of the New World Order excludes private auto mobility. “In an effort to remove people from cars, traffic congestion is allowed to grow exponentially, with a refusal, by planners, to expand highways and accommodate more traffic. “Of course, local and state governments are influenced by federal money, and thereby under its control, falling prey to its designs. Smart Growth solutions are offered as a substitute increase Collectivists’ control. “These “solutions” include creating living areas where travel is discouraged (high rises on top of storefronts so you never have to leave the area) and offering public transportation, in order to get us out of our private automobiles. “This evaporates our unalienable rights on several levels: exterminating freedom by limiting movement, travel and choice, as well as ultimately abolishing private property (privately owned cars- and everything else you think you own). Shaw explained that there are 2 plans that the collectivists have prepared to implement their program of complete domination: 1. Maintaining a controlled industrialized society, achieved by depopulation of the planet by 85%, down to 1 billion people, or 2. Creating peasant societies that can “sustain” 5 to 7 billion people worldwide (2) [efoods] A modern version of one world government mandates an end to personal mobility, via private cars. “The purpose of this is not only total control, but to clear humans from 50% of America’s landscape. “Please refer to the Agenda 21 map to see the heavy concentration of populations in cities, while vast swathes of land are vacated for “Wildlands”. “Because a limited amount of mobility will be required in a controlled society, trains are the perfect solution to regulate travel and destroy choice. “Remember that the Globalists take a long view when designing their infrastructures. Agenda 21 Sustainable Development has already barreled, like a locomotive, into your“city, county and state. “For example, many cities have “light rail” systems, designed to get individuals out of their cars. “This is achieved by city and urban planners encouraging growth in some areas, and stifling it in other areas, thus directing where humans live. “The common methods used are limiting road expansion, limiting parking, subsidizing public transportation, etc. Regarding “light rail” systems, the local junior partner to the High Speed Rail, a great example of the failure of this infrastructure, which was designed to consolidate people and mobility, is in San Jose. “The problem with the system lies in the fact that San Jose is a post- automobile city- meaning it was built mainly after 1950. “Few jobs are located downtown; instead, they are spread throughout the urban area. “Rail is totally inappropriate for such an urban area, and the cost is not viable, so the taxpayers pick up the tab. (3)

### Link—Cars/Driving

#### People are encapsulated within their cars – they conform the vehicular environment to mimic home

Featherstone ’04 (Michael, Theory Culture and Society “Automobilities : An Introduction” The online version of this article can be found at:

<http://tcs.sagepub.com/content/21/4-5/1> 2004 21: 1 DOI: 10.1177/0263276404046058)

This falls in line with a dominant image we have of driving in the city: of the urban freeways, where driving entails focusing on the road ahead, with minimal peripheral information from the featureless drab concrete to excite the gaze.12 Here the act of driving can become just one of a series of multiple activities, each carried out with varying degrees of distraction within the car. The automobile becomes a new form of communications platform with a complex set of possibilities. One line of communication for the driver goes out through the windscreen, windows and mirrors to the inter-automobile moving figuration of cars, and involve interactions and modes of presentation of the auto-self to others in the temporary ‘fluid choreography’ of the shifting reference group of traffic. Other lines of mediated communication such as telephone and Internet, go in and out to link the driver to distant significant others to help the daily business get done (co-workers, clients, friends, family, lovers etc.). Yet others come in via radio or television, or are physically imported as recordings (CDs, tapes etc.). All these forms of communication can be enjoyed in the increasingly elaborate or customized, sealed sound-booth which is the car (for a discussion of the car as media/mediated see Hay and Packer, 2004). The car, then, becomes not just a vehicle for independent travel, but a platform for multi-tasking. In his piece ‘Doing Officework on the Motorway’, Eric Laurier (2004/this issue) discusses the ways in which the car can become a mobile office. Laurier examines the case study of a car- based mobile worker Ally, whose workload and itinerary meant that she had to work while driving. Ally regularly worked her way through sets of printed- off emails balanced on her lap while travelling fairly rapidly on the motorway. She also would hold selected documents on the steering wheel in front of her while making ‘phone calls to clients’.13 Michael Bull (2004/this issue) in his piece ‘Automobility and the Power of Sound’, examines the ways in which the experience of the aural has become the definitive form of car habitation for many contemporary car drivers. Many drivers automatically switch on the radio when they get into the car and talk about the feeling of discomfort if they spend time in the cars alone with the sound of the engine. Mediated sound, therefore, becomes a component part of what it is to drive. It provides a ‘sonic envelope’, a sealed world which functions as a personalized listening environment. This form of management of experience provides a greater sense of time control, to the extent that drivers often prefer driving alone; in effect the car becomes a sort of refuge. Bull (2004) refers to Adorno’s work on television in which he discusses the way in which it provides something familiar in a world threateningly devoid of warmth. For Bull the experience of driving is one in which the mediated role of sound provides the ‘warmth’ associated with various normative conceptions of ‘home’, in contrast to the ‘chill’ associated with everyday urban public space. In effect people use sound in a desire to make the public spaces of the city conform to their notion of intimate, domestic private space. This brings out Baudrillard’s (1996: 67) depiction of the paradoxical ambiguous nature of the automobile: it is simultaneously a dwelling place and a projectile; he adds: The car rivals the house as an alternative zone of everyday life; the car, too, is an abode, but an exceptional one; it is a closed realm of intimacy, but one released from the constrains that usually apply to the intimacy of the home, once endowed with a formal freedom of great intensity . . . Baudrillard’s remarks suggest the car as cosy cocoon belies the engineering design input which make it a projectile, something with the potential of a weapon. Yet great engineering energy also goes into making the car a command centre, an enclosed dwelling space of control in which at the touch of a finger the balance can be shifted from a communications module via phone, television, Internet etc., a place of work and instrumental tasking, to a place of refuge, to enjoy the comforting emotional decontrol via the sound system. Part of the enjoyment of driving, despite the hazards of traffic and potential crashes is this sense of being in control, of the communicative world and comforting refuge zone as something which can be opened, closed and blended at the touch of a switch. Something which requires the generation of a new set of dispositions and competences, a more flexible driving habitus in which the senses are reconfigured and extended through the technology, in which drivers learn to inhabit technology in new ways. Something which increasingly depends on the software.

#### Transportation has been designed to track drivers perpetuating a panotopic effect

Featherstone ’04 (Michael, Theory Culture and Society “Automobilities : An Introduction” The online version of this article can be found at: <http://tcs.sagepub.com/content/21/4-5/1> 2004 21: 1 DOI: 10.1177/0263276404046058)

Nigel Thrift (2004/this issue) points to the ways in which automobiles become more and more hybrid entities in which the separation between the human and machine becomes blurred. It is not just the driver who possesses intelligence and has intentionality and capacity to act, the governance of the car is increasingly delegated to the machinic complex of the car which is able to sense its environment, make judgements and act accordingly. Now software controls works a complex feedback system to govern engine management, breaking, suspension, wipers, lights, speed via cruise control, parking manoeuvres, speech recognition systems, communications and entertainment, sound systems, heating and conditioning, in-car navigation and security. The software platform of the car becomes an increasingly important selling point for manufacturers which can command greater loyalty, as vehicles designed for multitasking and comfortable intensive dwelling become familiar ‘to hand’ environments to which our bodies and sensorium become attuned and habituated. Hence new software environments are coupled with careful ergonomic design dedicated to making new and friendlier interfaces, in which the car software remembers the driver’s unique set of physical characteristics and adjusts seats, instruments, controls etc. The corollary of intelligent vehicles is intelligent roads which communicate with vehicles and manage and control traffic flow. Such vehicle management systems also have a potential panoptic, tracking function. The car under software surveillance and communication (trans- mitter for unique chip vehicle identifier ‘tagging’, satellite geo-positioning systems etc.), not only uses information technology for the driver to find out where she or he is, the system can also find out where the car is. The driver uses digital systems to survey her/his world, but all the time the driving system has the vehicle under surveillance.

#### In attempts to access freedom purchasing into the consumer car culture feeds into panoptiscm

Phillips ’02 (Ryan, March 20, 2002 “The Driving Ideology” http://bitman.freeshell.org/essays/the.driving.ideology.html)

Society relies heavily upon having an efficient means of transportation available. Students and employees use transportation on a daily basis when commuting. Trade becomes pointless when the cost of moving goods exceeds the value of the items. Developments in transportation have a profound effect on society, making life and business function more smoothly. Those who use such developments gain a measure of power by attaining a greater freedom of movement. Whoever dictates what developments occur holds even greater power, for that person or institution then controls the distribution of power. Throughout much of the twentieth century, the automobile has been the dominant means of transportation in the United States. Driving has become both a discipline and an ideology, for most people today have been molded into accepting driving as the ideal form of transportation - not perfect yet, but heading in the right direction. A common view of the future displays "flying cars" as the fate of transportation, where the form of the vehicle has changed while the personal nature of the transportation which defines driving has not. To maintain driving as such a discipline, a model of power is evoked which Michel Foucault calls "panopticism." In his essay, aptly titled "Panopticism," Foucault presents a model where an institution may achieve its goals by employing enforcement, surveillance, and another form of discipline which holds these three things together. Institutions which have an interest in maintaining the discipline of driving - automobile manufacturers, local police departments, and the Transportation Department, among others - each employ the panoptic model to keep this ideology alive. Driving offers greater freedom of movement and more choice in destination than many other means of transportation, such as riding the bus, taking an airline flight, or car-pooling. Driving becomes a means of avoiding the discipline of time: there is no need to consult a schedule or a coworker whenever one must travel. Instead of being subjected to the stark discipline of the clock, the driver falls into a far more subtle discipline. Driving has every appearance of being a complete void of discipline simply because of the vast freedom offered. Yet driving is something which people must be trained in, a mold into which one must fit as a means of functioning in society. If a person cannot drive, either by inexperience or lack of a vehicle, he or she is severely impaired in the ability to work and run life's errands. The requirement to drive is so strong in American society that a driver's license functions as the de facto means of identification, even though not everyone is required to possess one. By molding and shaping people into accepting the idea that driving is necessary to modern survival, driving is established as a discipline, despite the fact that driving offers an escape from other disciplines that are much more obvious. The popularity of driving can then be explained, in part, by the appeal of avoiding discipline. Automobile manufacturers make use of this appeal by presenting their vehicles as symbols of freedom and rugged individualism. Commercials for sport utility vehicles show their automobile as being perfectly capable of handling the toughest mountain passes, as though their owners would actually risk scratching the paint on such an expensive vehicle. Sports cars are often filmed on open country roads far from the obligations of city life. Rarely is a car commercial set within a city. Each of these methods creates an imaginary ideology of the automobile as a means of escaping the humdrum of everyday life. This triggers a panoptic discipline where people are put in the habit of purchasing or leasing the newest vehicles which conform best to the present ideology. Surveillance of purchase patterns is used by marketing departments to test the effectiveness of the presented ideology in maintaining this discipline. Manufacturers do not have the power to force the incessant purchasing of new cars on consumers, yet enforcement is still achieved by incentives from yet another institution: the government. By creating and funding a transportation infrastructure tailored specifically to the automobile, the government makes it very difficult for another mode of transportation to enter the market. This deficiency in the ability of automobile companies to complete the panoptic model within their own means causes a huge dependance on the government to supply the final key.

#### Government exercises control through driving law

Phillips ’02 (Ryan, March 20, 2002 “The Driving Ideology” http://bitman.freeshell.org/essays/the.driving.ideology.html)

Government agencies throughout the United States have many reasons for supporting the role of the automobile in modern society. Licensing of both drivers and vehicles creates both a source of revenue an another means of panoptic power. Police provide both surveillance and enforcement of driving laws by patrolling the road system and issuing tickets to offenders of the law. Drivers discipline themselves into following the "rules of the road" for fear of the police car which may be hiding behind a large bush or around the next corner. Foucault says of the creation of the police as an institution: ... the type of power that it exercises, the mechanisms it operates and the element to which it applies them are specific. It is an apparatus that must be coextensive with the entire social body and not only by the extreme limits that it embraces, but by the minuteness of the details it is concerned with. Police power must bear 'over everything'... (323) Enforcement of driving law becomes an excellent tool for extending such extreme limits to police power. Many criminals accused of crimes unrelated to driving are caught by the police first because of some small driving violation. In the United States, police are denied the level of surveillance described by Foucault - citizens are protected against unreasonable search and seizure. Only after a person has been deemed guilty of a crime, even a minor traffic violation, can a search for contraband or a criminal record check can begin. Such an extension of power gives governments a huge incentive to support the ideology of driving. The most prominent effort on the part of governments in the United States to support driving has been the construction of the Interstate Highway System. A join venture between the states and the federal government, which each bearing half the cost, the Interstates greatly favor the automobile by making travel by car comparatively easy, especially for long range travel. Even within cities, Interstates prove essential in the daily commute. Benefits to the state include improved commerce and models of power such as those created for the police. For the federal government, the benefit is much more subtle. Aside from the political popularity which stems from endorsing the driving ideology, the federal government benefits by gaining a measure of power over the states. The Constitution of the United States authorizes Congress to regulate commerce "among the several states" (Article I, Section 8), which encompasses the funding of Interstates highways used in commerce. However, to receive that funding, the federal government is able require that each state agree to follow guidelines on certain unrelated matters. For example, this has been especially effective in creating a federal education policy, where the federal government has no stated power to enforce such a policy. Enforcement takes a contractual form instead. Surveillance arises when each state prepares a report of its success in implementing federal policy, and a discipline arises where each state is willing to do anything to prevent the transportation money that it rightfully deserves from being funneled into other states. Foucault sums up this phenomena best: And, although the universal juridicism of modern society seems to fix limits on the exercise of power, its universally widespread panopticism enables it to operate, on the underside of the law, a machinery that is both immense and minute, which supports, reinforce, multiplies the asymmetry of power and undermines the limits that are traced around the law. (331)

#### **Automobility is the product of political elites to coerce us into driving subordinating other modes of transportation**

Henderson 06 (Jason Henderson works at the Department of Geography and Human Environmental Studies at the San Francisco State University. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Volume 30.2 June 2006 293–307. “Secessionist Automobility: Racism, Anti-Urbanism, and the Politics of Automobility in Atlanta, Georgia”.)

This idea of a love affair arises in part from the claim that the automobile is a logical¶ expression of values like individualism, freedom and democracy (Dunn, 1998). But this¶ contradicts the reality that automobility derives from a system calculated to coerce¶ individuals into driving, that subordinates all other modes of transport and ways of¶ dwelling, that requires enormous state subsidy and regimentation of urban space for¶ maximum throughput and speed, and requires a centralized state-backed capitalist¶ oligopoly of oil, highway, automotive manufacturing and real estate control over¶ transportation policy (Freund and Martin, 1993; Urry, 2004).¶ In the US, think-tanks with signiﬁcant inﬂuence on public policy ignore this¶ hegemonic and coercive power of automobility and instead insist that Americans¶ individually love their cars and will not ride transit or live in compact, walkable cities¶ (Gordon and Richardson, 1997; O’Toole, 2001). The inevitability hypothesis is reduced¶ to one of consumer choice. Furthermore, Dunn (1998) argues that an ‘anti-auto¶ vanguard’ of academic elites, environmentalists and urban advocates are delusional¶ because they think they can actually roll back the inﬂuence of cars over cities.¶ Such rhetoric has had a chilling effect on the direction of policymaking about urban¶ space, has severely limited what is considered practical and possible, and thwarts serious¶ efforts to create an ecologically sound and socially just urban future — both in the US¶ and globally. Most of all, this essentialization is overly simplistic and deeply misguided.¶ So what undergirds the supposed universal love affair with automobility?¶ By probing deeper into the discourse and motivations of stakeholders in debates over¶ automobility and urban growth, the idea of a hegemonic car culture can be disassembled.¶ Let us begin by thinking about how mobility is not just movement but also an extension¶ of ideologies and normative values about how the city should be conﬁgured and by¶ whom. That is, just as Lefebvre (1991) theorized that the character and nature of¶ produced space reﬂects the dominant modes of production and social relations within a¶ given society, we must give consideration to how certain forms of mobility contain¶ embedded social relations. For example, Sheller and Urry (2000) refer to automobility¶ as the dominant culture that sustains discourses about what constitutes the good life.¶ Miller (2001) explains automobility as mediating contemporary human relations and as¶ a material expression of cultural life. Automobiles are not just a way of moving, they¶ objectify personal and social values. Indeed Lefebvre remarked that automobility was¶ the epitome of objects and was falsely inculcated into individuals by consumer¶ capitalism (quoted in Inglis, 2004: 204). Moreover, just as Purcell (2001) argues that¶ the ‘suburban idea’ is a spatial vision in places like Los Angeles, embodying a set of¶ distinct social values, automobility and its spaces contain a package of social values that¶ can be thought of as a ‘mobility vision’.

#### Driving ideology

Phillips ’02 (Ryan, March 20, 2002 “The Driving Ideology” http://bitman.freeshell.org/essays/the.driving.ideology.html)

The federal government capitalizes on the power behind the ideology of driving as a means of exercising a power which it does not actually possess. The role of the contract becomes important here, for a state can only become involved in this model of power by common agreement. Incentives are used to initiate the contract - a state would seem foolish to give up the huge sums of money and power associated with driving. Unfortunately for the state, the federal government plays the dominant role once the contract is signed. There the funding originates and there the attached policy is formed. Foucault explains that this is typical when a panoptic model of power is combined with a contract: ... the way in which it is imposed, the mechanisms it brings into play, the non-reversible subordination of one group of people by another, the 'surplus' power that is always fixed on the same side, the inequality of position of the different 'partners' in relation to the common regulation, all these distinguish the disciplinary link from the contractual link, and make it possible to distort the contractual link systematically from the moment it has as its content a mechanism of discipline. (Foucault 331) The state is disciplined into accepting transportation contracts without regard to the effects on its sovereignty. The contract is then distorted into something to which the state no longer agrees to for the merits of the contract, but instead because it is what the state has been doing since Interstates were first constructed. The state thus exercises self-discipline. Countless disciplines have formed around the automobile, not the least of which is driving itself. These disciplines greatly obscure the merits of the automobile as a means of transportation. The success of the automobile in modern society is easy to measure - almost everyone owns a car or truck of some kind. But determining how much success stems from the actual superiority of the automobile over any other mode of transportation becomes very difficult. An ideology of driving has formed not from debate of its merits, but from the disciplines that have strengthened the role of the automobile throughout the twentieth century. Arguments can certainly be made for and against the automobile - alternatives such as public bus systems, monorails, and even the return of trains have been proposed and implemented, but never with as much success as the established driving ideology. Either the arguments in favor of such systems are flawed or somehow their superiority is not realized because of the difficulty in upsetting the current system. Which of these possibilities is true cannot be determined so long as the government persists in dictating transportation policy, for its policy is subverted to models of power which serve a completely independent agenda. Even car manufacturers rely upon the government to provide the infrastructure - the road system - without which their product would be completely useless. The ultimate power over transportation has been usurped by the government, and that power has been abused.

### Link – Highways

#### Interstate highways system was created to restrain access and create an American identity

Packer ’10 (Jeremy, 2010 Automobility and apparatuses: commentary on Cotten Seiler’s Republic of Drivers , History and Technology: An International Journal, 26:4, 361-368http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/07341512.2010.528619)

Seiler argues that during both periods driving functioned to iron-out the ideological inconsistencies in the uniquely American contradiction between individual freedom and societal normalization or what, as Seiler points out, the sociologist David Riesman famously described in The Lonely Crowd11 saw as the ‘groupism’ of being ‘other-directed’ versus being ‘inner-directed.’ For Seiler, the primary question to answer for each period was how the hegemonic struggle over ideological composition of this subjectivity played out. In the first period the struggle was manifest in the seeming loss of autonomy that resulted from Fordism and Taylorism. Here Seiler investigated ‘the ways in which the trauma of Taylorization necessitated the ideological production of a new, compensatory subjectivity characterized by self- determination.’12 In the post-war period the political economic struggle was not to be found in factories per se, rather it took place between (cold) warring empires. The creation of the Interstate Highway System was not only a massive public works project that solidified the growth of suburbs and the triumph of the automobile over the train and other forms of mass- transit. It also performed an ideological feat. ‘(T)he limited access highway that communicated freedom as it limited the possibility of deviation provided a spatial metaphor for the narrowed political culture of the cold war.’13 Seiler makes clear that his thesis differs from those who depend upon a conception of the automobile as a commodity whose fetishistic value masks the exploitative nature of the work they must perform to garner the wages necessary to buy into a consumer culture. Rather, he sees driving, not owning, an automobile as that which performs the ideological work of producing the experience and belief that one is free. Seiler sums up the historical sweep of his narrative by concluding that ‘the apparatus of mobility that surrounds us and within which we conduct our daily lives deters us from imagining and especially undertaking other forms of association. This is an ideological accomplishment that some applaud and others condemn (italics in the original).’14 Seiler clearly condemns ‘the republic of drivers’ that is built upon a social and political vision that is perfectly modeled by the false freedom and individualism entailed in driving. It is a republic that lacks empathy, community, and, ultimately, a clear vision of democracy.15 Seiler’s narrative is a powerful one. It deftly weaves together a discursive formation comprised of contemporaneous social theory and primary documentation of public speeches, safety manuals, highway plans, periodicals, industry statements and advertisments, as well as popular culture resources. It does so in order to situate what forces were in play that reconnected the social, cultural, economic, and political composition of the USA in accordance with automobility. Throughout Republic of Drivers two prominent strains of Seiler’s intellectual heritage stand together uneasily; his clearly stated Foucauldianism and his more subtle Marxism. I say uneasily not because of differing political assumptions or prescriptions, but rather in terms of how we might approach the role of ideology and the relative causal power of economic forces as part of and in their relation to technology.

### Link—Transnational Corridors (Bering Strait)

#### Transnational corridors create new spaces for governmentality; its reconstitution of selective motilities creates a governmental truth model.

Richardson and Jensen ‘7 [Tim and Anne, 'New Region, New

Story: Imagining Mobile Subjects in Transnational Space', Space and Polity, December 2nd, 2007, http://vbn.aau.dk/files/13255995/New\_Region\_\_New\_Story.pdf

The corridor establishes its own life, as it seeks to redeﬁne the conditions for mobility both within and beyond its territory. Its borders are reconﬁgured by corridor transnationality and their meanings are altered. Corridor subjectivities are produced. Local struggles and resistances play a part. Making, or territorialising, COINCO rests on forming a particular governmental domain of knowledge and practice which lends its framing and strength to articulating, representing and performing the imagined corridor. The transnational corridor is one of the new practices of European spacemaking, of Europeanisation. It requires and creates a new space for governmentality that reconﬁgures the relations between territory, mobility and population in a very particular way, reconstituting subjects within it—albeit initially in imagined ways. The practices of making a transnational corridor, then, can be seen as the reproduction of a new model of truth, as the incremental institutionalisation of a European spatiality. Yet the transnational corridor is more than this. The construction of the corridor as a spatial practice does not simply materialise a European spatial logic—it also creates its own logic. Imagined mobilities are selectively distributed, reshaping mobilities and immobilities both inside and outside the imagined space of the region. In other words, as actors start to play with the potentials of creating a new transnational region, they do not simply follow the logic of the abstract machine of Europeanisation (Jensen and Richardson, 2004). The dominant discourses of ‘Europe’ are never completely put to work and the production and reproduction of the meanings of ‘Europe’ and ‘Europeanisation’ are reshaped through this engagement between imaginaries. Whilst the business of producing future mobile subjects may provide a powerful and politically persuasive means of articulating a transnational spatial project, it does not follow that these mobile subjects actually stand for future citizens, or determine their future mobile practices. What we have concentrated on in this article is, in a sense, the moment of birth of a strategy to create a particular set of meanings of future mobility. It should not be read as a full account of the politics of mobility: it is but one part of the story of the contested production of future transnational mobility in Europe.

### Link—Airport Security

#### Airport security entrenches the strategic gaze of governmentality.

Adey 10[Peter, “Aerial Views: Bodies, Bordersand Biopolitics”, June 4th, 2010, http://www.scribd.com/doc/56156374/12/Aerial-Views-Bodies-Borders-and-Biopolitics]

There is, however, another vantage point from which the aerial gaze has looked. Others present a far more complicated and diffuse picture than aerial survey. In fact, on the electronic battlefield and in the airport, ‘the lived’, which de Certeau saw was so alien to the aerial view, draws the aerial gaze down to more grounded bodily performances of mobility. The security of these pathways is dependent less and less on overarching visions – sayfrom CCTV that monitors the terminal space – and relies on a more honed focus, trained on the bodily signatures of the population (Klauser 2009).The gaze with which we are familiar is a gaze of scrutiny. Akin to the aerial photo, the airport gaze is a strategic one. The emergence of biometrics in contemporary airports, border zones, security spaces and everyday life sees the systematic use of biological and bodily data as a means to identify and manage risky mobile populations, focusing upon not territory but vectors (see previous chapter). The origins of biometrics are actually quite old. Even earlier than aerial survey, in the colonial context of the British Raj, which was engaged in all manners of surveying the land and its population, surfaced the pioneering technique of fingerprinting. Mobile and nomadic tribes consisting of habitual and deviant criminals made portable by the railway needed to be managed as a graspable population by methods that could differentiate one person from the next (Sengoopta 2003). The research of Francis Galton, Alphonse Bertillion and Henry Mead saw anthropometric techniques of identification give way to fingerprints in the wake of the Criminal Tribes Act of 1871. Previously indistinguishable subjects, now distinguished by the relative static pattern of their fingertips, could be enrolled by the new technology of fingerprinting into a searchable population of records against which traces could be measured, judged and verified. As with colonial survey, fingerprints could help solidify possession: through identification one could ascertain the identification of someone purchasing or selling land, drawing a pension or signing a contract.

#### Biometric security infrastructure reduces populations to calculable parts.

Adey 10[Peter, “Aerial Views: Bodies, Bordersand Biopolitics”, June 4th, 2010, http://www.scribd.com/doc/56156374/12/Aerial-Views-Bodies-Borders-and-Biopolitics]

Like the aerial photo, the biometric airport/border is able to ‘foresee’ in order to pre-empt or prevent certain futures: these might include the risk of terrorism, unwelcome migrants seeking residence, or drug smugglers. The biometric border does this by using imagery of the body in order to locate who the passenger is. And as with the aerial camera, the technological methods of completing this task are many. In Canada, Colleen Bell notes how vision detection strategies are employed through a range of ‘border security enhancements’ such as ‘Live Scan digital fingerprinting […], an RCMP RealTime Identification project that enables the electronic recording of finger-prints for instant verification, and biometrically enabled smart chips that use facial recognition technologies “to interrupt the flow of high-risk travel-lers” ’ (cited in Bell 2006: 159).As a magic bullet, biometrics is the technological foundation of progress in airport security and the management and securitization of mobilities across borders (Lyon 2003). Airport biometrics, like the aerial survey and photography, constructs strategized spaces. These spaces do not hold or capture populations within them but add up to pictures of individuals who make up larger populations of mobile people. The biometric airport terminal conjoins both body and image. The passenger-subject is recognized as a sign – a number facilitating the airport’s function as a ‘machine of representation that Laustsen, the airport resembles a ‘zoopolis’, where ‘citizens’ are ‘reduced to naked bodies because the biometric technologies of surveillance can only “scan” and recognize the subject as a body or body parts’ (2006: 450).Systems such as US-VISIT perform as tools which manage populations through verification and identification. With this information, ‘decisionmakers’ are able to judge whether a passenger should be allowed through or halted and returned. Before entry and in the event of it, biometric programmes such as US-VISIT enable Consular Officers to collect biometric along with biographic data, whilst passengers under visa-waiver programmes submit their details for the first time. These are both a means to establishing identity. Immigrant biometric schemes have been used such as the Eurodac, which stores the fingerprints of all asylum seekers across the EuropeanUnion in order for states to id entify a passenger’s identity (Van der Ploeg1999, 2003)

### Link—Airport Infrastructure

#### Airport infrastructure enables the targeted biopolitical gaze and the management of people—colonial history proves.

Adey 10[Peter, “Aerial Views: Bodies, Bordersand Biopolitics”, June 4th, 2010, http://www.scribd.com/doc/56156374/12/Aerial-Views-Bodies-Borders-and-Biopolitics]

The infrastructure of air-routes and pathways necessary to conduct aerial photography would have to be built, constructing a symbolic and material presence in colonial regions – the aerial survey as harbinger of development. Requiring considerable infrastructure to support the mobilities and maintenance of aircraft, air survey was a conduit through which development could be piped. The infrastructure necessary for air-routes and commercial services could already be in place for colony development. The aerial view revealed a reality that demanded improvement and development. As Chrsitine Boyer explains, for Le Corbusier in his *Aircraft* and The Four Routes (1947), the aeroplane ‘enlightened us’, archiving a documentary record of the miseries of urban existence which justified its renewal as the truth of the city could not be ignored. The aircraft ‘observes, works quickly, sees quickly, never tires’ (Le Corbusier in Boyer 2003: 101; see also Morshed 2002). For the planner, the view revealed both the problem of and the solution to spatial and social disorder (Matless 1998; Mort 2004). Stepping stones to tie territories together was one thing, but aerial vision permitted a rather different kind of gaze; this gaze was abstract and it was targeted. Aerial surveying and photography were enrolled as key ‘weapons’ in the colonial authority’s ability to administer and manage their territory’s inhabitants and resources. Along with the Ordnance Survey (Collier and Inkpen2003), the Air Survey Committee, a sub-committee of the Colonial Survey Committee which acted as the right hand of British colonial mapping, was to be instrumental in this role and the development of techniques utilized in the Second World War (Collier 2006). The Colonial Survey Conference of 1927 and its subsequent discussion saw various military personnel as well as aviation experts come together to discuss the utility and potential of air survey in the empire. Aerial survey marked the application of professional knowledge and scientific expertise to warfare and colonial administration. At the conference, Sir Herbert Stanley articulated the vital role aerial survey would play in Northern Rhodesia. ‘[A] map is absolutely essential’, he said, ‘if we want to make roads or open up the country at all’. In South America, opening up the country to the gaze and the reach of the colonial authorities required the initial penetration of dense forest paths that were invisible from below: ‘[O]ne can almost say with assurance that the almost impenetrable yet very valuable rubber forests of the Upper Amazon, to take one example, will never be successfully mapped until the services of the aeroplane are requisitioned.’ The aeroplane could be used, Stanley argued, to trace the river courses – their navigability, nature and direction – so ena-bling their subsequent penetration by boat.

### Link—Privatization/P3’s

#### Incorporation of private methods and interests into core governmental functions masks and decentralizes traditional state power

Ferguson and Gupta 05[James and Akhil, Anthropologies of Modernity, “Spatializing States: Toward an Ethnography of Neoliberal Governmentality, 2005, http://illinois.academia.edu/JonathanInda/Books/396166/Anthropologies\_of\_Modernity\_Foucault\_Governmentality\_and\_Life\_Politics]

More recently, scholars working in this tradition have sought to refine the analysis of governmentality to deal with the shift from the Keynesian welfare state toward so-called free-market policies in Western democracies. Although this move to neoliberalism has often been understood (and variously celebrated or lamented, depending on one’s politics) as a ‘‘retreat’’ or ‘‘rolling back’’ of the state, Barry et al. stress that it has, rather, entailed a transfer of the operations of government (in Foucault’s extended sense) to nonstate entities, via ‘‘the fabrication of techniques that can produce a degree of ‘autonomization’ of entities of government from the state’’ (1996: 11–12). The logic of the market has been extended to the operation of state functions, so that even the traditionally core institutions of government, such as post offices, schools, and police, are, if not actually privatized, at least run according to an ‘‘enterprise model’’ (Burchell1996). Meanwhile, the social and regulatory operations of the state are increasingly‘‘de-statized,’’and taken over by a proliferation of‘‘quasi-autonomous non-governmental organizations’’ (Rose 1996: 56).But this is not a matter of less government, as the usual ideological formulations would have it. Rather, it indicates a new modality of government, which works by creating mechanisms that work ‘‘all by themselves’’ to bring about governmental results through the devolution of risk onto the ‘‘enterprise’’ or the individual (now construed as the entrepreneur of his or her own ‘‘firm’’) and the ‘‘responsibilization’’ of subjects who are increasingly ‘‘empowered’’ to discipline themselves (see Barry et al.1996; Burchell 1996; cf. Burchell et al. 1991; O’Malley 1998; Rose 1996;Rose and Miller 1992).

### Link – Apparatuses?

#### Apparatuses produce their subjects

Packer ’10 (Jeremy, 2010 Automobility and apparatuses: commentary on Cotten Seiler’s Republic of Drivers , History and Technology: An International Journal, 26:4, 361-368http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/07341512.2010.528619)

Further, Agamben suggests we can draw a fourth characteristic from Foucault’s work: apparatuses produce their own subjects.8 Agamben’s two, albeit brief, examples of apparatuses are the cellular telephone and the TV. As with Seiler, a seemingly banal and ubiquitous technology comes to center understanding of the concept. Though Foucault never says so outright, we might ask ‘Are technologies central to the workings of apparatuses?’ Seiler’s account may help clarify such a conjecture as he carefully accounted for the two historical moments that provide explanation of the automobility apparatus’s emergence. Most fundamentally for Seiler, automobility is an apparatus comprised of ‘commodities, bodies of knowledge, laws, techniques, institutions, environments, nodes of capital, sensibilities, and modes of perception.’9 He asks what sort of apparatus was created that could account for the vast proliferation of the automobile and the reorganization of the USA into a ‘republic of drivers’ governed in part through the use of the automobile? He pinpoints two key periods of emergence. First, from the turn of the twentieth century to 1929 the number of registered automobiles grew from 8000 to 29.3 million.10 Second, following the Second World War the USA embarked on what was the largest public works project ever, the Interstate Highway System. This was accompanied by a significant increase in automobile use, particularly for women and African Americans.

## Impacts

### Impact—Extinction/Perpetual War

#### Biopolitical regimes of automobility lead to perpetual war and extinction

Packer 7 [Jeremy, Associate Professor in the Department of Communication and the Director of the Communication, Rhetoric, and Digital Media PhD Program. He is also a faculty member in the Science Technology and Society program. He teaches undergraduate courses in critical media analysis and cultural studies, though he has also taught courses in surveillance, cinema, and media history. His graduate courses cover such topics as cultural studies, communications theory, qualitative research methods, network society, technology, and the work of Michel Foucault. Dr. Packer's research areas are cultural studies and communication technologies. More specifically, he has considered the interrelationships of communications and transportation technologies and the political implications that arise from their use and governance. In particular he has looked at the historical formations of safety and security as the means for justifying and organizing automotive governance. He has published on these and other topics in Cultural Studies, Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies, The Communication Review, and a number of collected volumes. He serves as the Book Review Editor for the journal Communication Review and serves on the Editorial Boards of Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies and Communication Inquiry “Conference lectured at the Symposium "Architectures of fear. Terrorism and the Future of Urbanism in the West", May 17th, 2007, http://www.publicspace.org/en/text-library/eng/b032-automobility-and-the-driving-force-of-warfare-from-public-safety-to-national-security

“Automobility and the driving force of warfare: From public safety to national security”

One of the problematic elements of such attacks for a military operating under the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and biopolitical formations of Empire, is that the suicide bomber makes apparent “the ontological limit of biopower in its most tragic and revolting form” (Hardt and Negri, 2004, p. 54). Where RMA military strategy minimizes its own military casualties in acknowledgement of the productive capacity of life, the suicide bomber inverts this notion to acknowledge and exploit the destructive (resistant) capacity of life. As a problematic of governance, the suicide bomber exposes the limits of disciplinarity as a means for governing at a distance; that is, organizing, regulating, and making productive the mobility of individuals and the population alike without direct or excessive governmental control.9 If all automobiles are potential bombs, then in a time when the U.S. government is operating under a state of perpetual warfare, governing at a distance can not merely depend upon panopticism and disciplinarity as a means for creating docile citizens. In a biopolitical order, the pastoral relation of state and subject makes life the end-goal of and motor for creating a productive population and, thereby, nation (Foucault, 1978). When life is not equally invested as a desired ends by both state and citizen, life is not only that which must be groomed and cared for, but rather treated as a constant and immanent threat which needs diffusing or extinguishing.10¶ The governance of automobility then needs to be understood in terms of this new problematic, mobility as immanent threat. In the “new normal” of perpetual war, the subject is no longer treated as a becoming accident, but a becoming bomb. For the regime of Homeland Security in the United States, it is not the safety of citizens that is at stake, but rather the stability of Empire’s social order most generally, and more specifically the security of the U.S. state form.11 It is a war in which the state form fears all that may become problematic, become bomb. So the new mode of problematization treats all mobilities as potential bombs and thus technologies of control are being developed and applied to the automobile as a means for addressing such perceived threats.

### **Impact—Social Exclusion**

#### **Focusing on mobility destroys freedom and causes social exclusion – the K is a prior question**

Sager 6 (Prof Tore Sager, Department of Town & Regional Planning, Faculty of Architecture, Planning and Fine Art (Norwegian University of Science and Technology). “Freedom as Mobility: Implications of the Distinction between Actual and Potential Travelling”, November 21, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17450100600902420)

Widespread mobility, and auto‐mobility in particular, has obvious indirect consequences that detract from the common welfare in terms of freedom as well as economic efficiency. Autonomy regarding transport may be translated into the individual right to travel where, when, and how one wishes (Hiscock et al., 2002). However, in the case of the automobile, having all the levers of control in one's own hands is likely to lead to encroachment on others' private spheres. Noise and pollution from my driving might interfere with others' sleep, health, and enjoyment of attractive environments. Furthermore, congestion and barriers point to a conflict between personal autonomy in mobility matters and others' opportunity to achieve. Extensive driving causes delays and waiting time, which have a bearing on freedom. Waiting time (Gasparini, 1995) is also an intrinsic feature of most public transport systems. In the extreme case in which one would have to wait forever in order to take advantage of an option in the choice set, that particular option is not really available. Generally, extended waiting time makes the choice set less valuable and might detract from the freedom of choice. There is an analogy between waiting time and transport time when it is assumed that transport is without inherent utility. Time spent on transport is then part of the time the individual has to wait to take part in a desired activity. An option requiring extremely long transport time is not really available. Thus, transport involving too long distances in time and space, compared with what is found reasonable, affects freedom of choice negatively. Great distance brings net gains towards zero; and in the extreme case, the option of participating in the particular activity will be more of an illusion than a real possibility. In recent years, big differences in mobility have been linked to the problems of social exclusion (Cass et al., 2005; Lyons, 2003). This has strengthened the interest in the borderland between mobility and freedom, even though social exclusion refers more broadly to disadvantage, injustice, alienation, and lack of freedom. Referring back to Sen's concepts of freedom described earlier, social exclusion affects the positive freedom to choose between different ways of living, and it thus constrains the pursuit of substantive opportunities. The literature on social exclusion often deals with the right to participate in major social arenas such as employment, health care, and education – or, more generally, people's ability to participate in activities, obtain resources, and benefit from opportunities. For some – Pritchard (2000), for example – mobility is a wholly inadequate index of freedom. She finds it ‘scandalous to continue valorizing the rhetoric of mobility when so many persons cannot move about as the elite do and when so many are desperately seeking safe shelter’ (Pritchard, 2000, p.59).

#### Government planning explicitly excludes the immobile and amplifies social inequality

Jensen ’11 (Anne, March 23, 2011 Department of Policy Analysis, National Environmental Research Institute, Aarhus University, Denmark “Mobility, Space and Power: On the Multiplicities of Seeing Mobility, Mobilities, 6:2, 255-271” http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/17450101.2011.552903)

Practising and making mobility is hence also about producing and moulding the perceptions, imaginaries and experiences of mobile – or immobile – urban people, and thus involves mechanisms of power. These have implications for social (in)equality that potentially amplify the social inequality related to access and forced (im)mobility. In the governmentality perspective, inequality surfaces for example as not being among those who partake in imagining mobile subjects. Further, it surfaces when subjects do not recognise their daily lives in the policy documents’ imagined future mobile city, for example, when subjects desire other means of movement than car automobility or when ownership of a car is outside ones financial means in (American) cities void of pavements or bike lanes. Thus social inequality in the discussed workings of power concerns exclusion, but in ways that appear more governed by the free behaviours and experiences of subjects than by prohibitions, rules and surveillance. For mobility where freedom is a central signifier in many representations (Cresswell, 2006) (consider for example car sales or air travel advertisements), the sensory experiences and the representations of for example freedom on the road reinforce and rework the uneven opportunities and inequality connected to lack of access to mobility systems, to the use of sparse urban spaces and to the confinement, restrictions and limitations to autonomy, produced almost as a bi-product by in particular automobility.

#### Planning practices are built to exclude immobile people

Jensen ’11 (Anne, March 23, 2011 Department of Policy Analysis, National Environmental Research Institute, Aarhus University, Denmark “Mobility, Space and Power: On the Multiplicities of Seeing Mobility, Mobilities, 6:2, 255-271” http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/17450101.2011.552903)

Hence, governmentality offers a way to include space, and subjectivities, in the study of a productive power. When focusing on contested rationalities and mundane practices in particular cases, this also applies when including mobility. In a study of the contested making of a European space through e.g. ‘thin simplifications’ and the actual, nitty-gritty planning of transport infrastructures, Tim Richardson demonstrates the very tangible consequences of governing rationalities and particular governing practices related to European mobility (Richardson, 2006; see also Jensen & Richard- son, 2004; Jensen & Richardson, 2007). The notion of ‘mobile subjects’ demonstrates how the governing rationalities and particular practices inherent in urban/regional policymaking embed perceptions of modern urban citizens who are assumed to crave for more mobility and more cosmopolitan networks at higher speeds and with less friction (Jensen & Richardson, 2007). Meanwhile, other mobile subjects are rendered bi-products in not being fit to use, lacking the resources to use or being denied access to the high-speed trains, airports, etc (Richardson & Jensen, 2008). This implies a focus on the particular ways in which mobility, places and subjects are part of imagi- naries, rationalities and related practices of modern life and urban policies/planning. What this amounts to is a persistent emphasis on a clear power character and spatiality of mobility and mobility related practices.

### Impact—Everything/Laundry List

The impact is ecological collapse, endless war, and the glossing over of systemic deaths – permutations fail because antagonisms are intrinsic to every version of the automobile system – attempts to solve problems within the system just replicate the impacts and create a self-fulfilling prophecy

Böhm et al 6 (Steffen Böhm, Ph.D., Director of the Essex Sustainability Institute and Professor in Management and Sustainability at the University of Essex, Campbell Jones, Director of the Centre for Philosophy and Political Economy and Senior Lecturer in Critical Theory and Business Ethics at the University of Leicester, Chris Land, Lecturer in Management at the University of Essex, and Mat Paterson, Professor of Political Science at the University of Ottawa. “Part One Conceptualizing Automobility: Introduction: Impossibilities of automobility”, September 18, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-954X.2006.00634.x/full>)

If we are to move beyond the description of the regime of automobility and act against and beyond it, then we need to expose the inconsistencies, contradictions and antagonisms of the present regime of automobility. This might begin by pointing to the obvious ‘side-effects’ of the automobile: pollution, death and injury, specific formations of geopolitics, the transformation of the urban landscape and modern mindscape. The impossibility of automobility does indeed contain the meaning that if continued, a car-based regime generates widespread problems – ecological collapse, war, widespread death and ill-health and economic dysfunctionality, to name but a few – which cannot be resolved without abandoning the regime itself. In this sense the continuation of automobility is impossible in its current form. Four specific antagonisms inherent to the current regime of automobility can serve to illustrate its impossibility. One of the most obvious ones is congestion. Once ‘universalized’, in the sense of a substantial number – in most industrialized countries over 40 percent of adults having regular use of a car – the pursuit of individual mobility becomes collective immobility. In many of the world’s largest cities, complete gridlock is an immanent possibility, if not reality, which transport planners have to develop elaborate contingency plans for, and even without gridlock, the economic and social costs of congestion are now very considerable. A second antagonism, which seems well established and understood today, points to the concerns about ecological sustainability of the contemporary regime of automobility. Automobile use contributes significantly to three principal forms of environmental degradation. It contributes significantly to the depletion of non-renewable resources, notably oil (including production of plastics), rubber, platinum, lead, aluminium and iron (Freund & Martin, 1993: 17–19). It is important in the generation of a range of pollution problems, including urban air pollution, acid rain, global warming, and water pollution from road building and run-off. Finally, it dominates space, especially urban space, accounting for in the extreme case of Los Angeles 67 percent of all space, and has contributed to the radical re-organization of urban space which means towns and cities are now much more spread out, both displacing land from other uses and transforming the use of cars themselves from choice to necessity. There are a range of potential technological fixes for this environmental antagonism, which is built into the regime of automobility, but only the most technologically optimistic (eg, Hawken, Lovins and Lovins, 2000) suggest that it can be resolved by a series of technological fixes. The dependency on oil, a natural resource which, when burnt, creates vast environmental problems ranging from air pollution to global warming, defines the third antagonism of automobility. The fact that oil is a scarce resource, which has only a finite lifetime (most suggesting a century at best), yet is the single most important fuel for the organization of mass transport, connects the regime of automobility to a host of global geopolitical problems. To satisfy the developed world’s thirst for oil, access to cheap oil has to be maintained and enormous amounts of money have to be spent in order to explore, produce, transport, refine and store oil so that it can finally be consumed at a petrol station in Washington, London or Berlin. Automobility is not just a system of car transport; it is a defining geopolitical factor that may even influence governments’ decisions to go to war (see Martin-Jones, this volume). In this sense automobility quite literally kills, even though the victims of these wars remain largely invisible to the driver gliding through post-industrial suburbia. But automobility is not only an invisible killing machine because Western governments go to war to secure access to oil. The car delivers death much more directly, much closer to ‘home.’ The fourth antagonism, then, is that the regime of automobility cannot be disconnected from the mass ‘accident’. Once you have millions of cars, steered by individual drivers, failures of that system are predictable. Annually around 1.2 million deaths are produced directly by the global regime of automobility, that is, by traffic ‘accidents’, significantly outstripping warfare as the leading cause of violent death (WHO/World Bank, 2004; Dauvergne, 2005). In the OECD countries alone, 107,406 people were killed in car ‘accidents’ in 2001, approximately one every five minutes (IRTAD/OECD, 2003). Yet these failures of the system remain largely invisible in the sense that they are regarded as ‘normality’. The US might go to war because three thousand people die in a horrific attack on two skyscrapers, and a plane crash might make the headline news for a few days; roughly the same number (around 3200) of people are killed in car crashes on a daily basis, but their deaths are not spectacular enough to make it into the news. What we have got here, then, is not a stable, well-working machinery but a regime that is characterized by fundamental antagonisms. The regime of automobility is impossible because it is inherently fragile. It depends on a range of contingencies for its continued success, including the ability of geopolitical intervention and dominance to secure access to oil, the ability of planners and traffic engineers continually to provide for the mitigation of chronic congestion, the ideological success in rendering thousands of human deaths annually as ‘normal’ and acceptable, the ability to overcome opposition to road building, the capacity to navigate the fiscal crisis of the state to generate sufficient funds to promote automobile use, and so on. It depends also on the continued capacity to articulate the particularity of the car as the universal form of automobility to shake off alternatives and challengers, from eco-warriors to the internet. Such efforts to shore-up the regime are ubiquitous and occupy significant amounts of time for many politicians, bureaucrats, car company strategists, environmentalists, and others. The government of automobility (pollution control regulations, safety technologies, many road construction schemes, for example) is itself the historical and ongoing legacy of such efforts. Because of the above discussed conceptual impossibility of automobility itself, however, such interventions fail to close the wounds they are designed to ‘heal’ but either leak round the edges (or through the middle), or generate their own knock-on unintended consequences, their own iatrogenic diseases, and which in turn are articulated as problems requiring their own remedies. The antagonisms of automobility, then, are not temporary ‘bruises’ of an otherwise well-working machinery. Instead they are inherent to the ‘normal goings-on’ of automobility. In other words, automobility, the way it works today, would not be possible without these antagonisms. It has been one of the tasks of this book to expose and oppose these antagonisms in the regime of automobility. What this critique points to is the fact that it is literally impossible to go on with the way modern mass transport has been organized.

### Impact—Freedom

#### Automobility synonymous with cold war ideology – destroys freedom

Hensley ’10 (Karl, “One Nation Behind the Wheel Automobility in U.S. Culture” American Quarterly, Volume 62, Number 1, March 2010, pp. 173-180 (Review) The Johns Hopkins University Press https://netfiles.uiuc.edu/rfouche/www/readings/hensley.pdf)

The cold war era presented yet another crisis regarding individualism. Re- coiling from a collectivism that permeated the years of the Great Depression and faced with ostensible threats of Soviet communalism, U.S. rhetoricians, thinkers, and pop cultural producers, from Jack Kerouac to R. W. Lewis, became newly obsessed with the propagation of individualism and a fear of conformity. Challenging the “utility thesis”—that cars became the primary mode of modern transportation due to military and civilian imperatives during the postwar economic boom—Seiler sees automobility as part of the cold “war of ideology,” and in fact as a major piece of propaganda, espousing the American ideals of motion, speed, and autonomy, all of which were circumscribed by the state and the highway patrol. In this light the freeway became a stage of nearly 43,000 miles of road where citizens could perform freedom while assuaging the “crisis of the individual.” Seiler continues, “The figure of the driver, moreover, embodied the ideological gulf separating the United States from its communist antagonists, and proved . . . the continuing vitality of the essential individual freedom enjoyed under liberalism and capitalism” (72). Such performances of freedom were fundamental to the development of a new brand of American individualism: autonomous yet cooperative and responsible. These acts of automotive freedom, however, are of an uneven and precarious nature. Here Seiler furthers the discussion of Kevin Borg, who reminds his readers that automotive breakdowns strip a driver of such freedoms, and that their restoration lay in the hands of a class of the highly skilled, yet hardly esteemed, mechanics. On a more political note, Seiler highlights the undemocratic nature of such freedoms, and shows that automobility, like U.S. citizenship, has not been made equally available to all in this country. Interested in the normative power of “American character,” Seiler explores the question “Who is served by automobility?” He writes that “assigning the honorific ‘American’ . . . has been bound up with legitimating particular regimes of accumulation and policies of exclusion, assimilation, and conquest throughout the nation’s history” (7). This ideology of freedom is defined by a periphery of unfreedom and restriction, as the notion of the authentic American renders some as “inauthentic.”

### Impact—War

#### Automobility causes war

Bohm et al 3 (Steffen Böhm, Ph.D., Director of the Essex Sustainability Institute and Professor in Management and Sustainability at the University of Essex, Campbell Jones, Director of the Centre for Philosophy and Political Economy and Senior Lecturer in Critical Theory and Business Ethics at the University of Leicester, Chris Land, Lecturer in Management at the University of Essex, and Mat Paterson, Professor of Political Science at the University of Ottawa, “Against Automobility,” http://www.scribd.com/doc/54682082/Bohm-Against-Auto-Mobility-Black-Well-2003)

The dependency on oil, a natural resource which, when burnt, creates vast environmental problems ranging from air pollution to global warming, deﬁnes the third antagonism of automobility. The fact that oil is a scarce resource, which has only a ﬁnite lifetime (most suggesting a century at best), yet is the single most important fuel for the organization of mass transport, connects the regime of automobility to a host of global geopolitical problems. To satisfy the developed world’s thirst for oil, access to cheap oil has to be maintained and enormous amounts of money have to be spent in order to explore, produce, transport, reﬁne and store oil so that it can ﬁnally be consumed at a petrol station in Washington, London or Berlin. Automobility is not just a system of car transport; I t is a deﬁning geopolitical factor that may even inﬂuence gov-ernments’ decisions to go to war (see Martin-Jones, this volume). In this sense automobility quite literally kills, even though the victims of these wars remain largely invisible to the driver gliding through post-industrial suburbia.

### Impact—Warming

#### Automobility causes environmental degradation and global warming

Bohm et al 3 (Steffen Böhm, Ph.D., Director of the Essex Sustainability Institute and Professor in Management and Sustainability at the University of Essex, Campbell Jones, Director of the Centre for Philosophy and Political Economy and Senior Lecturer in Critical Theory and Business Ethics at the University of Leicester, Chris Land, Lecturer in Management at the University of Essex, and Mat Paterson, Professor of Political Science at the University of Ottawa, “Against Automobility,” http://www.scribd.com/doc/54682082/Bohm-Against-Auto-Mobility-Black-Well-2003)

A second antagonism, which seems well established and understood today, points to the concerns about ecological sustainability of the contemporary regime of automobility. Automobile use contributes signiﬁcantly to three prin-cipal forms of environmental degradation. It contributes signiﬁcantly to the depletion of non-renewable resources, notably oil (including production of plas-tics),rubber, platinum, lead, aluminium and iron (Freund & Martin,1993:17–19).It is important in the generation of a range of pollution problems, including urban air pollution, acid rain, global warming, and water pollution from road building and run-off. Finally, it dominates space, especially urban space, accounting for in the extreme case of Los Angeles 67 percent of all space, and has contributed to the radical re-organization of urban space which means towns and cities are now much more spread out, both displacing land from other uses and transforming the use of cars themselves from choice to necessity. There are a range of potential technological ﬁxes for this environmental antagonism, which is built into the regime of automobility, but only the most technologically optimistic (eg, Hawken, Lovins and Lovins,2000) suggest that it can be resolved by a series of technological ﬁxes.

### Impact – Nazism

#### Spatial planning and knowledge uses similar to calculations as the Nazis did, and today’s contemporary immigration police

Jensen ’11 (Anne, March 23, 2011 Department of Policy Analysis, National Environmental Research Institute, Aarhus University, Denmark “Mobility, Space and Power: On the Multiplicities of Seeing Mobility, Mobilities, 6:2, 255-271” http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/17450101.2011.552903)

In modern governing, rationalities and practices also include reflections on space.2 Spatiality and space constitute a focus which received significant but indirect attention in Foucault’s own texts, especially as affected by and enabling the mundane disciplinary techniques of schools, clinics, prisons, etc. (see e.g. Foucault, 1978, 1979, 1984, 1986). From the perspective of governmentality, paying attention to space reveals additional aspects, since ‘[g]overnmentality is also indelibly spatial, both in terms of the spaces it seeks to create and in the causal logics that imbue such attempts with its rationality’ (Huxley, 2007, p. 199). Stuart Elden and Jeremy Crampton in particular promote the spatialities of governmentality in emphasising how particular ways of ‘thinking out space’ are embedded in the constant and complex formation of social/ political institutions and rationalities, and, also, forms of knowledge.3 ‘Thinking out space’ produces and is co-produced by the spatial distributions where institutions and rationalities find themselves (Elden & Crampton, 2007, p. 9). In a governmentality perspective, it becomes apparent that the population, i.e. the body of subjects to be governed, has ‘to be known in its spatial dispersion’ (Elden & Crampton, 2007, p. 7). Techniques to create fields of knowledge that can make the population known in these ways, as spatially dispersed, push a growth of governing tools such as statistics, personal identification numbers, GIS mapping and zoning of cities. Such spatialisation tools have made particular forms of rule possible and have very real effects, as Elden shows in a study of Nazism’s use of calculations and statistics to codify and categorise groups of people, e.g. Jews and homosexuals (Elden, 2006), and as in the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate immigrants in contemporary politics of immigration in Europe.

## Alt

Vote neg – only by exposing the fragilities of the regime can we create a radical new space to envision future social possibilities. And, the permutation fails – reform is another link

Böhm et al 6 (Steffen Böhm, Ph.D., Director of the Essex Sustainability Institute and Professor in Management and Sustainability at the University of Essex, Campbell Jones, Director of the Centre for Philosophy and Political Economy and Senior Lecturer in Critical Theory and Business Ethics at the University of Leicester, Chris Land, Lecturer in Management at the University of Essex, and Mat Paterson, Professor of Political Science at the University of Ottawa. “Part One Conceptualizing Automobility: Introduction: Impossibilities of automobility”, September 18, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-954X.2006.00634.x/full>)

In our view, reforming automobility is not enough. In order radically to change the way automobility works today, it is not sufficient to expose the particular antagonisms of the regime and make it once again, temporarily, ‘possible’ by introducing new techniques of government. Instead, what is needed is a broadening awareness of the fragility of the entire regime of automobility. When in the year 2000 protests against high fuel prices brought most of the UK almost to a standstill, this fragility of the regime was made clear by a relatively small number of people within a few days: as almost the entirety of social life of the developed world depends on the steady flow of oil, a break of this flow has radical consequences for the normal maintenance of the regime of automobility. Such breaks in the normal flows of automobility, even if they intended to achieve the opposite, expose the fragility of the regime. It is an act of subversion that has the potential to put into question the entire ‘goings-on’ of automobility. Such acts do not only aim to engage with a particular antagonism of automobility but to redefine the grounds on which automobility can be thought. Such acts are therefore radically unaccountable; one can never fully foresee their consequences. In our view, this is the task of today: radically to put into question the universality of automobility and engender a space that imagines not only different automobilities that cannot yet be foreseen, but also a social form which recognizes the necessity of disentangling its twin conceptual bases – to delink autonomy from mobility and to put both in context. In this sense, we are proposing interventions that quite literally propose to reconfigure the very co-ordinates of what is perceived as ‘possible’. Faced with an antagonistic and impossible regime of automobility, we hope that the essays collected in this volume contribute to the recognition of that impossibility and to the collective possibility of moving beyond it.

#### **The transportation planning of the affirmative is a calculated attempt to eradicate autonomy – only an escape of the biopolitical system can solve**

Sager 6 (Prof Tore Sager, Department of Town & Regional Planning, Faculty of Architecture, Planning and Fine Art (Norwegian University of Science and Technology). “Freedom as Mobility: Implications of the Distinction between Actual and Potential Travelling”, November 21, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17450100600902420)

Bauman (2000) emphasises that mobility and power are intertwined. Partly for this reason, mobility is not a good that tends to be equally distributed among people; rather, it tends to reflect power differences. According to Bauman, ‘people who move and act faster … are now the people who rule’ (2000, p.119). If this is so, it is not an unambiguous tendency, however. Albertsen and Diken (2001) note that whereas mobility is a matter of choice for some, for others it is a fate. Some people are constantly forced to move on and are denied the right to settle down in a suitable place. ‘Do we dare assume that their mobility, their border‐crossing is liberating?’, Pritchard (2000, p.59) asks rhetorically. Compelled movement creates problems for an ideology that associates mobility with freedom. It would seem that these displaced people, always being passed on to another territory and another authority, are forced to be free in the sense of being mobile. However, this counterintuitive result is problematic only when mobility is defined as revealed transport. In this essay mobility is defined as potential transport, and it is stressed that freedom of movement implies the right not to move. It is thus clear that the potentiality aspect of mobility prevents an awkward problem concerning mobility's relationship to freedom. The possibility that individuals might be forced to be free was discussed by Jean‐Jaques Rousseau as part of his work on participative democracy. The aim here is to reformulate the dilemma in a mobility context. The collective decision‐making body might provide mobility to the population, but in order to succeed the decision‐makers might have to organise society so as to ensure a high volume of transport (or person‐kilometres). Private investment in transport infrastructure and vehicles will not be generated without anticipated demand. A break‐even point for the established supply might require more travelling than most people are comfortable with. Focusing on freedom as mobility, one could say that the mobile population is in this case forced to be free. However, it seems to be a contradiction in terms that freedom can be forced on the citizens (Simhony, 1991). In general, this paradoxical situation might arise in a market society where freedom is associated with a high and diversified transport supply, which gives ample opportunities for choice. The problem is that high supply will not be offered in the market in the absence of high demand. Hence, the ability to enjoy the services of the producers is conditional on high willingness to pay among the consumers. They have to reveal their high demand. If they choose not to travel, they will lose the opportunity to travel. Actual transport is a prerequisite for mobility. Consumers do not escape the constraining have to if they want to enjoy the freedom of having the opportunity to. They have to make a lot of trips in order to be mobile – even in the sense of being potentially able to travel. In this lies the parallel to Rousseau's forced‐to‐be‐free dilemma. Because of the 1/n effect, the single individual is not likely to feel that the requirement for a sufficient overall volume of trips limits his or her freedom. Each individual relies on the others to do the travelling and feels no personal responsibility to pay for the supply that essentially provides mobility. The favourable view of freedom as mobility, freedom as potential transport, depends on the majority's belief that they could actually travel far less and still maintain their existing level of mobility. However, if too many individuals were to enjoy merely the potentiality of transport, the system would break down. In many cases, planners counteract this breakdown, although not necessarily consciously. The more transport they plan for, the more society is designed in ways making people dependent on transport, and the less opportunity remains to enjoy mobility in the sense of potential transport. A threat to the idea of freedom as mobility comes from the behavioural principle of maximising a notion of utility made up entirely from the consumption of goods and services, as is standard procedure in economics. Freedom as mobility, as potential transport, has no explicit value in this maximisation process. The difference between potential and actually implemented transport is of no significance to human action with this idea of utility. The intrinsic ‘value’ of any potential travelling would be offset by the slightest increase of utility stemming from the commodity bundle that might be acquired on an extra trip. When everything is connected to everything else in physical space in a vast and seamless web, when ‘distance is dead’ and zero friction has brought cause and effect into an intimate embrace, nothing can be controlled unless everything is controlled. Then the prediction paradigm of planners (Sager, 2005) makes them enemies of freedom. Predictability comes at the expense of flexibility. To the degree that transport planners successfully control ever more variables that might possibly be obstacles to prediction, utility maximisation and transport in search of better bargains, freedom as mobility is lost.8 What from the perspective of transport planners appears as the fatal flaw in their art – their inability to eliminate friction, the Herculean task of turning physical space into an integrated and fine‐woven structure of premium circulation networks – is instead the condition of freedom. Where the circulation systems become indeterminate, in the gaps between them, the high‐friction interstices and transfer points, we might exercise the independent choice of keeping further movement as a potentiality. We can stop to think, exit the system if we so wish, and in this respect we are autonomous (compare Friedmann, 1979, p.38). In the quest for freedom, the main point is not necessarily to cross borders, but to exploit the ambiguity of the border zone. Crossing borders is often to move from one system, one solid structure, and one firmly cemented tangle of power relations to another. Escape means to exploit the possibilities, weaknesses, and uncoordinated control found in the gaps between the systems. Sometimes it is a question of rejecting the either/or, breaking with the regimentation of code/space‐formatted premier circulation systems, and playfully exploring the scope for hybrid movement, using low‐tech modes on part of the journey. Escape for some groups in some settings is as incredibly easy as walking out a door. For others, formal restrictions, deep‐seated habits, or internalised conventions raise almost insurmountable barriers in matters of mobility (Gerzina, 2001). When transport becomes too easy, ‘excess travel’ proliferates (Handy et al., 2005), and the domain of potentiality is shrinking. Paradoxically, when distance is dead, so is freedom as mobility. The self‐destructive capacity of omnipotence, Hegel's vivid description of the lord destroying himself as master the moment he destroys the slave, is also recognised in this ambivalence (Bernstein, 1971, pp.26–27). Just when the planners seem to have succeeded completely, when control is gained over the last variable that could possibly interfere with movement, transport planning has demolished its own rationale of freedom as mobility. There is no longer any reason not to travel. Potential transport becomes an oxymoron, and no one rests in peace.

#### **Increasing mobility increases institutionalized control over the population – recognition of potential transport is key to solve**

Sager 6 (Prof Tore Sager, Department of Town & Regional Planning, Faculty of Architecture, Planning and Fine Art (Norwegian University of Science and Technology). “Freedom as Mobility: Implications of the Distinction between Actual and Potential Travelling”, November 21, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17450100600902420)

A discussion of some of the more general difficulties of maintaining freedom as mobility in a society where mobility is ever‐increasing has been the purpose of this essay. There are advantages of connecting liberal notions of freedom with a concept of mobility based on the possibilities of travelling, as distinguished from actual transport. Freedom as potential travel avoids the difficulty that journeys might be forced, and it does not lead to the unreasonable conclusion that policies should maximise transport in order to enhance freedom. Furthermore, freedom seen as potential travel clarifies the distinction between having rights and exercising them. With the spread of on‐the‐road surveillance, more freedom is sometimes found by staying put (while retaining the possibility of moving), than by actually taking the trip while being controlled. Finally, the possibility of travel best captures the ambiguity and freedom potential embedded in simultaneous presence and absence allowed by new information and communication technologies. A few conclusions are as follows: The question of defining mobility as potential or revealed transport has great bearing on the meaning of freedom as mobility. Mobility as potential transport is preferred, because freedom as mobility then includes the option of not going. Mobility rights conflict with society's respect for unanimity, when rights imply that each citizen be a dictator over at least one pair of social alternatives. The many systems of surveillance installed in modern transport networks indicate that mobility generates uncertainty and easily triggers the need for control. There are several ways of mastering the uncertainty following from imperfect information due to others' absence. The strategies of trust, surveillance, mobility rules, and simultaneous presence and absence push society in very different directions with respect to freedom. It is in the nature of liberal societies for some individuals to exploit the freedom of choice for self‐serving purposes, even when the result takes away welfare from the collective. Khisty and Zeitler (2001) contend that the value of freedom has to be balanced against other aspects of mobility, and that freedom as mobility is not necessarily at the top of the hierarchy of values. The claim that motorists have a right to drive their cars wherever and whenever they wish overlooks the fact that freedom comes with social obligations. Freedom as mobility is part of a complex dialectic. The more the interaction between freedom and obligations of individuals is downplayed, the stronger will be the need of society to protect itself, and the more germinative will be the seeds of institutionalised control inherent in the dialectic of mobility.

#### **Resistance is key to challenge power structures that dominate the transportation policy sphere**

Jensen 11 (Anne, Department of Policy Analysis, National Environmental Research Institute, Aarhus University, Denmark, “Mobility, Space and Power: On the Multiplicities of Seeing Mobility”, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17450101.2011.552903#tabModule>)

Practising and making mobility is hence also about producing and moulding the perceptions, imaginaries and experiences of mobile – or immobile – urban people, and thus involves mechanisms of power. These have implications for social (in)equality that potentially amplify the social inequality related to access and forced (im)mobility. In the governmentality perspective, inequality surfaces for example as not being among those who partake in imagining mobile subjects. Further, it surfaces when subjects do not recognise their daily lives in the policy documents’ imagined future mobile city, for example, when subjects desire other means of movement than car automobility or when ownership of a car is outside ones financial means in (American) cities void of pavements or bike lanes. Thus social inequality in the discussed workings of power concerns exclusion, but in ways that appear more governed by the free behaviours and experiences of subjects than by prohibitions, rules and surveillance. For mobility where freedom is a central signifier in many representations (Cresswell, 2006) (consider for example car sales or air travel advertisements), the sensory experiences and the representations of for example freedom on the road reinforce and rework the uneven opportunities and inequality connected to lack of access to mobility systems, to the use of sparse urban spaces and to the confinement, restrictions and limitations to autonomy, produced almost as a bi‐product by in particular automobility. However, and as pointed out by Foucault (1978), power is always joined by resistance. Through performing the lived imaginaries, providing alternative mobile imaginaries and sensescapes and shaping mobile sensescapes ‘from below’, the subjects whose actions and spaces for living are targeted, participate in shaping and making mobility and mobile practices. One example of this resistance is de Certeau’s walking practices which produce the urban through lived everyday practices (de Certeau, 1984). Thus when we integrate power and space/spatiality in the analysis of mobility then the discussed perspectives reveal a potential for the forms of power connected to practising, imagining and sensing mobility. It shows how mobile practices, mobile imaginaries and sensations relating to movement and mobile technologies such as the private car are imbued with particular forms of power. These (also) work in subtle ways and are potentially taken for granted to the extent where they slip from daily view and reflection. These mobility related forms of power hinge on the urban spatialities that grant them particular meaning and make them real. Without the particular spatialisations, sensing and experiencing movement loose significance as scripts for forming selves, perceptions, planning and behaviours. What we see, then, is a mobility which is a powerful co‐player in the shaping of modernity that may be used strategically by policy and social actors and which is taken for granted as a part of the fabric upon which the city and social relations are built. Focus on formation of modern selves through mobility related rationalities, on emotions and the feeling of mobile technologies and places, on ambiences and atmospheres thus suggests that power in relation to mobility and spatialities also works in ways that connect just as much to what we do as to what is put into words and which soon becomes unnoticed and taken for granted. Thinking together the power of conditioning how spatialised mobility is represented in forms of knowledge, rationalities and subjectivities and the power of shaping the emotional and sensory experience of the spatial, mobile world thus reveals certain workings of power. These concern seeing spatialised mobility in two dimensions. In one, it exposes how power as actions upon other actions is exerted through shaping particular ways to experience, engage with and make sense of mobility and specific mobile practices. In the other, it creates a language apt for ‘seeing’ spatialised mobility analytically which reaches beyond representations of mobility on the one hand and automotive (or more generally, mobile) emotions, on the other, and thus engages with Deleuze’s ‘seeing’ mobility. The arguments discussed in this article jointly add to a fuller understanding of how mobility is embodied as well as practised, perceived and imagined and how this embodiment can be worked on and be included in power’s repertoire for making and shaping mobility. Seeing mobility as spatialised and including diverse ways of seeing may thus expand our language for engaging with questions of mobility, space and power.

#### **Contesting automobility can reclaim the urban space from automobiles**

Henderson 06 (Jason Henderson works at the Department of Geography and Human Environmental Studies at the San Francisco State University. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Volume 30.2 June 2006 293–307. “Secessionist Automobility: Racism, Anti-Urbanism, and the Politics of Automobility in Atlanta, Georgia”.)

Over the last 50 years there have been numerous economic, environmental and social critiques of automobility, or the combined impact on the built environment of the motor vehicle (cars, trucks), the automobile industry, the highway and street networks, and corollary services, plus the centering of society and everyday life around the car and its spaces (Freund and Martin, 1993; Newman and Kenworthy, 1999). These critiques have asserted, like Sheller and Urry (2000), that the automobile is more than just a status symbol or a neutral technology that permits patterns of life that would happen anyway; it has configured modern urban life through distinctive ways of dwelling, production, consumption, circulation and sociality to such an extent that civil society in the US, Western Europe, and increasingly global cities, are societies of automobility. What is more, detractors argue that any reasonable transformation of cities based on ecological sustainability and social justice will surely require political contestation of automobility (Freund and Martin, 1993; Sheller and Urry, 2000). Such political contestation of automobility is unfolding in the US, Europe and globally. Scholars, activists and policymakers advocate curtailing automobility by reconfiguring urban space into denser, transit-oriented and walkable built forms — a development pattern broadly labeled ‘smart growth’ or ‘new urbanism’ in the US, or ‘compact cities’ in Europe. This contestation of automobility is about reclaiming urban spaces from automobiles, limiting their use, and more broadly, changing cultures so that the whole concept of high speed mobility and car ownership is de-emphasized (Whitelegg, 1993; Sheller and Urry, 2000).

#### Only exposing the fragility of automobility can engage the negative effects of automobilty and reconceptualize how we approach forms of mobility

Bohm et al 3 (Steffen Böhm, Ph.D., Director of the Essex Sustainability Institute and Professor in Management and Sustainability at the University of Essex, Campbell Jones, Director of the Centre for Philosophy and Political Economy and Senior Lecturer in Critical Theory and Business Ethics at the University of Leicester, Chris Land, Lecturer in Management at the University of Essex, and Mat Paterson, Professor of Political Science at the University of Ottawa, “Against Automobility,” http://www.scribd.com/doc/54682082/Bohm-Against-Auto-Mobility-Black-Well-2003)

In our view, reforming automobility is not enough. In order radically to change the way automobility works today, it is not sufﬁcient to expose the par-ticular antagonisms of the regime and make it once again, temporarily,‘possi-ble’ by introducing new techniques of government. Instead, what is needed is a broadening awareness of the fragility of the entire regime of automobility. When in the year 2000 protests against high fuel prices brought most of the UK almost to a stand still, this fragility of the regime was made clear by a relatively small number of people within a few days: as almost the entirety of social life of the developed world depends on the steady ﬂow of oil, a break of this ﬂow has radical consequences for the normal maintenance of the regime of automobility. Such breaks in the normal ﬂows of automobility, even if they intended to achieve the opposite, expose the fragility of the regime. It is an act of subver-sion that has the potential to put into question the entire ‘goings-on’ of auto-mobility. Such acts do not only aim to engage with a particular antagonism of automobility but to redeﬁne the grounds on which automobility can be thought. Such acts are therefore radically unaccountable; one can never fully foresee their consequences. In our view, this is the task of today: radically to put into ques-tion the universality of automobility and engender a space that imagines not only different automobilities that cannot yet be foreseen, but also a social form which recognizes the necessity of disentangling its twin conceptual bases – to delink autonomy from mobility and to put both in context. In this sense, we are proposing interventions that quite literally propose to reconﬁgure the very co-ordinates of what is perceived as ‘possible’. Faced with an antagonistic and impossible regime of automobility ,we hope that the essays collected in this volume contribute to the recognition of that impossibility and to the collective possibility of moving beyond it.

#### Discussion of power in the context of mobility is critical to understanding how communities develop

Jensen ’11 (Anne, March 23, 2011 Department of Policy Analysis, National Environmental Research Institute, Aarhus University, Denmark “Mobility, Space and Power: On the Multiplicities of Seeing Mobility, Mobilities, 6:2, 255-271” http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/17450101.2011.552903)

From Gilles Deleuze we learn that things must become visible to the mind and body before we can conceive them. Notably, seeing a phenomenon is epistemologically different from ‘saying’ this phenomenon; seeing entails distinctive ways of perceiving the phenomenon and making it accessible and as such is constitutive for the becoming of the phenomenon (Deleuze, 1988). In his reading of Michel Foucault, this differentiation is presented as crucial in order to understand the modern workings of power as a process and an enabling force in the social. In addressing the driving forces of mobility in late modernity, and building on Deleuze, we may learn from how subjects and communities see mobilities. Seeing mobility involves the subjects whom mobility concerns and who as (im)mobile people or policymakers act on mobility. The point of departure for this article is the questions of seeing mobility and it addresses the still very open question of the role of power in mobility. As indicated by Mimi Sheller and John Urry, power is among the key issues at the core of the emerging field of mobilities studies (Sheller & Urry, 2006). Power is by no means absent in the new mobilities literature; indeed, a considerable body of literature takes power to be fundamental to mobility in late modern societies, whether in the politics of mobility, political rationalities or in everyday mobilities (Jensen & Richardson, 2007). In these studies, power is however often taken for granted, though with notable exceptions. At the same time, mobility is often taken to deal with the twin notions of space and time. Time is included as acceleration and speed of movement (Cresswell, 2006) and is tucked into the modern quest for the frictionless (see e.g. Hajer, 2000). Often the rela- tion between mobility and space is assumed to be central, or rather, the ‘spatiality in people’s ... social practices’ (Bærenholdt, 2008b, p. 6) is treated as immanent to the analysis of mobilities. Viewed in conjunction, however, approaching mobility as inter- twined with space and power promises additional insights into the driving forces of mobility. When we recognise that mobility is seen in multiple ways, our language for talking about power in mobility is expanded, thus enhancing our ability to understand mobile lives, politics and cities. In this perspective, the above observations call for an exploration of mobility, space and power and this article opens such an exploration. It investigates how the making of mobility intertwines with spatialities and is played out under the workings of multiple forms of power. The starting point, however, is to clarify how power and space are covered in the mobilities literature.

### **Constant Criticism Alt**

#### Only the alt reconceptualizes automobility – only deeper examinations of its role in community can it spillover

Henderson ’06 (Jason, June 2006 International Journal of Urban and Regional Research “Secessionist Automobility: Racism, Anti-Urbanism, and the Politics of Automobility in Atlanta, Georgia” Volume 30.2 pgs. 293–307 http://bss.sfsu.edu/jhenders/Writings/ijur\_final.pdf)

The politics of automobility is complex and nuanced. There are diverse factions in the debate over automobility and a more sophisticated analysis and critique of automobility needs to replace the fatalistic assertion that a love affair makes political challenges to automobility impossible. Essentializing automobility is misleading, unconstructive, and dampens the politics of possibilities. Automobility is not just about movement or the convenience of getting from point ‘A’ to point ‘B’, nor is it adequate to conceptualize it as a neutral agent in providing consumer preference or market demand. Rather, automobility embodies deeper social conflicts. One of these embodiments is secessionist automobility, or automobility as a medium for physical separation and physical expression of racialized, anti-urban ideologies. While some secessionists are both racist and anti-urban, not all secessionists are racist. Nevertheless the shared vision is one of secession from urban space, resistance to the compact patterns that support transit, and abhorrence to resolving difficult urban problems through cooperation and consensus — secession by car is easier. Secessionists’ automobility is arbitrated by capitalists, which in Atlanta sought to mitigate air pollution and congestion, both of which threatened the exchange value of the region. Articulators of secessionist automobility contested corporate elite policies of expanding transit, and out of that struggle evolved a transit détente that provides a limited geography of transit service. Secessionists also stood in the way of Atlanta’s highway builders, who sought to build a massive new outer beltway that by design was meant to spur further automobility. Ironically this positioned the secessionists, who waged what amounts to a culture war against cities, as unwitting allies of the corporate, environmental and social justice interests who at the same time battled them over expansion of transit. The transit détente reflects that transit policy is not aimed at reorienting everyday life for the entire region in order to reduce automobility, but rather, it is a stalemate in a struggle, a stalemate negotiated by Atlanta’s capitalist growth machine in attempts to maintain the exchange value of the metropolitan region and remain competitive in the global competition between cities. We can conceptualize this stalemate over automobility as a spatial struggle that transcends traditional class struggle over urban space, or simplistic defense of locality, and invoke Lefebvre’s assertion that contemporary urban struggles are about how space is configured and for whom. In cities throughout the world, automobility is a central site of such struggles. This framework enables more clarity in efforts to truly address the plethora of ecological, social and economic problems that stem from automobility. If automobility is framed in a way that focuses on what ends people are trying to achieve, rather than as an essentialized love affair, could arguments against the proliferation of automobility take a different trajectory? What other conceptualizations of how space should be organized are deployed in the struggle over automobility? How will conceptualizations centered on ecological and social justice, which are very much present in global debates about sustainability and cities, counter secession, or negotiate the capitalist arbitrated stalemate in cities like Atlanta? This calls for deeper examination of how automobility is contested locally, nationally and globally, for the struggle against the deleterious effects of automobility will not only continue in the US and Europe, but will likely intensify globally.

#### **Constant criticism of the automobile opens up space to counter automobile hegemony and post-car societies**

Henderson 09 (Jason Henderson works at the Department of Geography and Human Environmental Studies at the San Francisco State University, “Car Troubles: Critical Studies of Automobility and Auto-Mobility,” http://books.google.com/books?id=8wxRs8rE2vAC&pg=PA161&lpg=PA161&dq=lefebvre+AND+automobility&source=bl&ots=MxKbxHa\_Vi&sig=xMewv0WmQYMXgHtVZXiBj9UvkV8&hl=en&sa=X&ei=2fkNUPT1OorJqgGnv4HIDw&ved=0CGAQ6AEwCA#v=onepage&q&f=false)

Political contestation of automobility is unfolding around the world, as noted in Martin's chapter. New discourses and practices that temper automobility are attempting to reconfigure urban space into a development pattern broadly labelled 'smart growth'(a development strategy based on increased density, transit corridors and regional coordination) and 'new urbanism' (an architectural concept focused on mixed use, walkable neighbourhoods) in North America, and 'compact cities' in Europe and globally. These new movements have the potential to lead to what Dennis and Urry (this volume) call a 'post car future' tipped into a different path from the privatized petroleum-steel automobility system.¶ Yet, because of the self-expanding character of the car system, Dennis and Urry suggest, the automobility system is impossible to undo and the spatial configurations facilitating public transit are irreversibly lost. In a compelling look into how Chilean neoliberalism has adopted automobility as an important element in its expanding agenda, Trumper and Tomic's chapter suggests that any confrontation with automobility may require changing neoliberal consumerist, individualistic values, which have become globally intractable. In this light automobility appears as a given, making political challenges to automobility seem futile, and overlooking how it is a site of struggle. For many the automobile has been essentialized.¶ My case study of the politics of mobility in Atlanta, Georgia, illustrates how local-scale contestation of hyperautomobility can provide insights into the complexity of discourses and practices related to motorization resistance and post-car mobilities. This analysis of contestation calls into question essentialized discourses about automobility and provides an opening to counter automobile hegemony. In particular I examine how some neoliberal capitalist interests may oppose excessive automobility and engage in local political debates to temper the car, yet centre their opposition on an essentialization of automobility.

#### **Constant criticism of the harms produced by the automobile?**

Henderson 06 (Jason Henderson works at the Department of Geography and Human Environmental Studies at the San Francisco State University. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Volume 30.2 June 2006 293–307. “Secessionist Automobility: Racism, Anti-Urbanism, and the Politics of Automobility in Atlanta, Georgia”.)

Secessionists’ automobility is arbitrated by capitalists, which in Atlanta sought to¶ mitigate air pollution and congestion, both of which threatened the exchange value of¶ the region. Articulators of secessionist automobility contested corporate elite policies¶ of expanding transit, and out of that struggle evolved a transit détente that provides a¶ limited geography of transit service. Secessionists also stood in the way of Atlanta’s¶ highway builders, who sought to build a massive new outer beltway that by design was¶ meant to spur further automobility. Ironically this positioned the secessionists, who¶ waged what amounts to a culture war against cities, as unwitting allies of the corporate,¶ environmental and social justice interests who at the same time battled them over¶ expansion of transit. The transit détente reﬂects that transit policy is not aimed at¶ reorienting everyday life for the entire region in order to reduce automobility, but rather,¶ it is a stalemate in a struggle, a stalemate negotiated by Atlanta’s capitalist growth¶ machine in attempts to maintain the exchange value of the metropolitan region and¶ remain competitive in the global competition between cities.¶ We can conceptualize this stalemate over automobility as a spatial struggle that¶ transcends traditional class struggle over urban space, or simplistic defense of locality,¶ and invoke Lefebvre’s assertion that contemporary urban struggles are about how space¶ is conﬁgured and for whom. In cities throughout the world, automobility is a central¶ site of such struggles. This framework enables more clarity in efforts to truly address¶ the plethora of ecological, social and economic problems that stem from automobility.¶ If automobility is framed in a way that focuses on what ends people are trying to achieve,¶ rather than as an essentialized love affair, could arguments against the proliferation of¶ automobility take a different trajectory? What other conceptualizations of how space¶ should be organized are deployed in the struggle over automobility? How will¶ conceptualizations centered on ecological and social justice, which are very much¶ present in global debates about sustainability and cities, counter secession, or negotiate¶ the capitalist arbitrated stalemate in cities like Atlanta? This calls for deeper examination¶ of how automobility is contested locally, nationally and globally, for the struggle against¶ the deleterious effects of automobility will not only continue in the US and Europe, but¶ will likely intensify globally.

#### Constant criticism solves

Freund and Martin 93 (Peter, professor of sociology at Montclair State University, PhD from the New School for Social Research and George, professor of sociology at Montclair State University, senior research fellow in the Sociology Department, University of California, Santa Cruz, PhD from the University of Chicago. “The Ecology of the Automobile,” pg. 183)

Ultimately, if these strategies are to succeed, the political and economic context of transport has to be expanded from a focus on market considerations to include much more focus on the common good. Transport, like education and other vital societal activities, is far too critical to be left to the vagaries of the profit-driven market place. Additionally, modification of auto-centred transport will have to be accompanied by a recasting of psychopolitical ideologies that are linked to class and gender; for example, ways need to be found to curtail macho attitudes toward speed and power. Thus, it is clear that reconfiguring transport requires a systematic analysis and a com­prehensive political programme.

### **Potential Alt**

#### **The only way break down automobility is to confront the power arrangements of the status quo – only the alt solves**

Freund and Martin 93 (Peter, professor of sociology at Montclair State University, PhD from the New School for Social Research and George, professor of sociology at Montclair State University, senior research fellow in the Sociology Department, University of California, Santa Cruz, PhD from the University of Chicago. “The Ecology of the Automobile,” pg. 174)

As we have argued, one's social position influences the quality of one's geographic mobility and one's ecological spaces. The contin-¶ gencies of an individual's class, gender, age, and physical ability af­fect her or his degree of empowerment in auto-centred transport sys­tems. German Greens advocate a "right to mobility" in which all citizens—old and young, rich and poor—are guaranteed at least a minimum level of mobility and access to shopping, educational, and other facilities.5 This right to mobility can be conceptualized as similar to the medieval "right to the city" (le droit a la ville) that has been eroded in industrial capitalist society.6¶ Any vision of alternative transport has to confront the power ar­rangements of society. Green and feminist insights about masculine notions of power over others and over nature, and about the humanization of social space, need to be integrated into transport policies. Auto-centred transport creates groups of transport-disad-vantaged persons. The very young and the old, people with dis­abilities, people with low income, and women may be included among those groups whose perspectives are often ignored in transport policy. The transport planners, politicians, and officials who shape policy generally experience the world from behind the windshield. Their view is filtered through the ideology of automobility and through gender (masculine) and class {bourgeois) biases—a professional ideology that is auto-centred, so to speak. The ideology of automobility, in turn, informs discourses about transport needs, and veils the systemic effects of auto-centred transport (for ex­ample, congestion and pollution).¶ Those who shape auto-centred transport systems only dimly per­ceive the perspectives of children forced to avoid streets, of elderly people and people with disabilities confronted by the demands and barriers of auto-centred space, of general experiences of placeless-ness and aesthetic impoverishment engendered by auto structures, and the experience of managing housework and transport work in dispersed communities. The subtle interplay among subjective ex-, perience, mobility, and social space are essential considerations in the configuration of transport technology. Chapter 6 and other parts of this book have highlighted the politics of subjectivity in human-auto interactions.

### **“Prioritize Other Forms of Transport” Alt**

The domination of the automobile has left other modes neglected – we need a better transportation system, not more highways

Freund and Martin 93 (Peter, professor of sociology at Montclair State University, PhD from the New School for Social Research and George, professor of sociology at Montclair State University, senior research fellow in the Sociology Department, University of California, Santa Cruz, PhD from the University of Chicago. “The Ecology of the Automobile,” pg. 180)

An auto-centred transport ecology is not sufficiently diversified. Despite its appearance of complexity and flexibility, it is a remarkably homogeneous system of transport, as Lewis Mumford noted over a quarter century ago:¶ The fatal mistake we have been making is to sacrifice every other form of transportation to the private motorcar—and to offer, as the only long-distance al­ternative, the airplane. But the fact is that each type of transportation has its special use; and a good transportation policy must seek to improve each type and make the most of it .... There is not one ideal mode or speed: human purpose should govern the choice of the means of transportation. That is why we, need a better transportation system, not just more highways. The projectors of our national highway program plainly had little interest in transportation. In their fanatical zeal to expand our highways, the very allocation of funds indicates that they are ready to liquidate all other forms of land and water transportation. The result is a crudely over-simplified and inefficient method of mono-transportation: a regression from the complex many-sided transporta­tion system we once boasted.18

#### **Alt solves – more alternatives prevents system collapse**

Freund and Martin 93 (Peter, professor of sociology at Montclair State University, PhD from the New School for Social Research and George, professor of sociology at Montclair State University, senior research fellow in the Sociology Department, University of California, Santa Cruz, PhD from the University of Chicago. “The Ecology of the Automobile,” pg. 180)

A diverse transport system is less vulnerable to failure and to disrup­tion. For instance, had there not been alternatives to driving avail­able in the San Francisco Bay Area after the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake, the disruption of travel and all that depends on it, in­cluding economic activity, would have been far greater. As it was, the¶ costs of the disruption were still greater than necessary because the density of available alternatives was lacking. Mass transit and ferries do not serve all areas in the region. A fully diversified transport sys­tem is characterized by a ready availability of alternative means of mobility; this enhances access for all in an urban population and at the same time decreases its vulnerability to disruption.

### **Place vs. Space**

#### **The compression of time and space facilitated by automobility tends to produce a false sense of expanded horizons and efficiency of movement**

Freund and Martin 93 (Peter, professor of sociology at Montclair State University, PhD from the New School for Social Research and George, professor of sociology at Montclair State University, senior research fellow in the Sociology Department, University of California, Santa Cruz, PhD from the University of Chicago. “The Ecology of the Automobile,” pg. 179)

Like rail, auto-centred transport favours a particularly rational-, ized and geometrical space. The infrastructure of the auto, with its ribbons and plots of asphalt and concrete, covers a more extensive area than that of rail. The flexible movements and incursions of the auto through the landscape are followed by ever-growing inflexible infrastructures which appropriate space in a way that is at odds with social ecology and social needs. The compression of time and space facilitated by automobility tends to produce a false sense of expanded horizons and efficiency of movement Furthermore, time and space compression require transformations that homogenize—near and far become more and more indistinguishable, not only because of compressed time and distance but because they become more alike in appearance.

#### **Automobility promotes a false relationship between individuals and their societies**

Freund and Martin 93 (Peter, professor of sociology at Montclair State University, PhD from the New School for Social Research and George, professor of sociology at Montclair State University, senior research fellow in the Sociology Department, University of California, Santa Cruz, PhD from the University of Chicago. “The Ecology of the Automobile,” pg. 7-8)

Auto travel promotes a subtle form of false consciousness about the relationship of the individual to society; as E.R Thompson noted, driving fosters "the illusion of self-motivated freedom" and "disem-powers people from confronting the determinism of the larger social process."15 On a practical level, individuals have become wedded to auto use and its advantages, including travel flexibility and con­venience. Auto use has become habitual. Now that modern societies have transport systems which are based on the auto, it is difficult or impossible for individuals—on their own—to contemplate alterna­tives. In this way, practical and ideological factors are woven together in a way that impede full consciousness of the effects of auto-centred transport and the possibilities for changing it. A significant part of the ideology of auto transport is that it maxi­mizes individual choice, and to some extent it does. However, while it has been widely.hailed as the quintessentially democratic means of transport, the auto actually is not usable by, or available to, large sec­tors of populations, even in the most auto-saturated societies. In this sense one may speak of groups in society that are transport-disad-vantaged, including many poor persons. It is in this way that auto use has political outcomes. In addition, dependence on the auto more generally reduces individual choice for those who prefer another form of transport at some time.

#### **The dominance of the auto inhibits the ability for drivers to interact with the environment through which they move**

Freund and Martin 93 (Peter, professor of sociology at Montclair State University, PhD from the New School for Social Research and George, professor of sociology at Montclair State University, senior research fellow in the Sociology Department, University of California, Santa Cruz, PhD from the University of Chicago. “The Ecology of the Automobile,” pg. 119)

The dominance of the auto in urban areas has contributed to the decline of street life: "Because even the pedestrian is treated as some­one going to and from a car, we miss or ignore opportunities to design spaces that promote truly public modes of seeing and moving."28 Suburban communities encourage a turning inward to private worlds. Outside of one's home these private worlds consist of mini environments—favoured restaurants and malls, etc. Movement between these private worlds is through dead public spaces by car; hence, drivers in suburban landscapes often develop "environmental blinders."29 Dead public spaces inhibit alternatives to the auto as well as opportunities to exercise and to socialize. Accommodations to auto traffic sacrifice public spaces used for resting, playing, pausing, and interacting. Sidewalks are viewed as "pedestrian movers" and many suburbs do not even build them. Even in areas where pedestrian travel is the dominant mode of transport, space is disproportionately allocated to auto use. For instance, in midday Manhattan two-thirds of all travel'is on foot but only one-third of transport space is avail-able to the pedestrian.30 Another study of a midtown Manhattan area showed that only 22 percent of the people were in vehicles but they occupied 66 percent of the available space.31

### **Alternatives Modes of Transport**

#### **We should diversify our transportation system to emphasize rail, bus, walking, and cycling**

Freund and Martin 93 (Peter, professor of sociology at Montclair State University, PhD from the New School for Social Research and George, professor of sociology at Montclair State University, senior research fellow in the Sociology Department, University of California, Santa Cruz, PhD from the University of Chicago. “The Ecology of the Automobile,” pg. 144)

In this chapter we discuss examples of achievable alternatives to auto-centred transport. The alternatives are achievable because they have already been demonstrated to work, at least on the local level. Some of the alternatives build upon previous successes, for example, strengthening and widening regulation to improve auto safety and fuel efficiency and to reduce auto emissions. Some of the alternatives involve the elaboration of new approaches for planning and for urban development based on access by proximity rather than by transport, an approach that results in greater job and residential den­sity. Throughout this discussion of achievable alternatives our focus is on the overall necessities to relate land use to transport needs and to integrate and diversify transport modes. The auto has an impor­tant place in transport but so do rail, bus, walking, and cycling.

#### **We need to highlight public transit and construct transportation systems that are not auto-dependent**

Freund and Martin 93 (Peter, professor of sociology at Montclair State University, PhD from the New School for Social Research and George, professor of sociology at Montclair State University, senior research fellow in the Sociology Department, University of California, Santa Cruz, PhD from the University of Chicago. “The Ecology of the Automobile,” pg. 153)

There are a number of strategies available for diversifying transport and reducing automobility. Upgrading mass transit by all the strategies available is achievable and desirable on both efficiency and equity grounds. Auto control and disincentive strategies are also necessary but care must be taken to prevent punishment of autoists and to ensure reasonable equity for various social groupings.¶ Stimulation is a key to the success of alternatives to the auto. The auto's present popularity is based in some measure on stimulation for its consumption and on the construction of a built environment that is dependent on auto transport. In order to change this situation we need to stimulate use of public transit and other alternatives, and we-need to construct built environments that are not auto-dependent:¶ There are three principal alternatives to the auto for transport in urbanized areasrr-public transit, bicycle, and walking. All are quite underdeveloped in the United States. Only 3.4 percent of-Americans-use public transit for urban trips, while 26 percent of Italians and 20 percent of the Swiss do. Less than 1 percent of Americans bike for their urban trips, while 20 percent of Danes and 10 percent of Swedes do. Only 10.7 percent of Americans walk for their urban trips, while 39 percent of Swedes and 31 percent of Austrians do.36\*

### Framework—K First

#### Analysis of informational and organizational phenomenology/reps comes first—key to breaking down the unitary and calculable planning in the squo.

Viscusi et al 12 [Gianluigi, University of Milan Bicocca, Italy, Gian Marco Campagnolo, University of Edinburg, UK, Ylenia Curzi, University of Modena and Reggio Emilia, Italy, “Phenomenology, Organizational Politics, and IT Design: The Social Study of Information Systems”, Introduction, March 2012 http://www.igi-global.com/book/phenomenology-organizational-politics-design/59730#preface]

“When approaching an organizational phenomenon we encounter at least two distinct forms of evidence. First, we are ready to deploy a set of ideas and models taken for granted in the domain of organization theories or consulting models. These ideas and models come almost to be identified with the phenomenon we want to grasp, or at least they provide an unquestioned context in which to grasp it.” A first challenge for information systems design is to deal with these formal representations, because “information systems is concerned with representation in general” (Boland, 1999, p. 239). Whereas in the literature formal representations are considered to be at odds with situated actions and analyses (Suchman, 1987; Winograd & Flores, 1986). As to these issues, the work of Claudio Ciborra (in particular, Ciborra 1999, 2002) shows how the adoption of phenomenological perspectives in information systems design allows to 1) challenge reified notions, such as the one of “situation,” with living concepts as in the case of situatedness (Ciborra, 2006); 2) let emerge relevant concepts that are peculiar to the information systems domain, such as the critical concept of infrastructure (see also Section 3, this volume). The above-mentioned contraposition between formal representations-situated actions reflects the “hybrid” nature (Avgerou, et al., 2004, p. 1) of information systems discipline and design (Ciborra, 2002; Currie & Galliers, 1999) as “an area of research positioned between management studies and applied computing, where it is influenced by numerous kindred of reference disciplines” (Avgerou, et al., 2004, p. 1). Despite this recognized hybrid nature of the field, it is still valid the claims that “a common and unified paradigm has been adopted across the board to deal with its human and natural dimensions: the paradigm of natural sciences and the collateral methodologies of measurement, formalization, and calculation” (Ciborra, 2002). The lack of a common and unified paradigm for information systems design is even more true if we consider the definition of design as science and the specific roles of representations as ways to simplify the view on the complexity of the context for problem-solving activities:

### AT Inevitability

#### Inevitability is an illusion— automobility can be broken down

Urry 4 [John Urry, Professor of Sociology at Lancaster University, 2004, Theory Culture Society, <http://books.google.com/books?id=lbGs2laJQNoC&pg=PA27&lpg=PA27&dq=This+system+of+automobility+stemmed&source=bl&ots=43c_AZ7B72&sig=9LPPUc8VQlVg2daLK8JKFpy6E-c&hl=en&sa=X&ei=HFIMUKLSMM32rAHEu6zrCg&ved=0CEYQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=This%20system%20of%20automobility%20stemmed&f=false>] The system of automobility stemmed from the path-dependent pattern laid down from the end of the 19th century. Once economies and societies were ‘locked in’ to what I conceptualize as the steel-and-petroleum car, then huge increasing returns resulted for those producing and selling the car and its associated infrastructure, products and services (see Arthur, 1994, on increasing returns). Social life more generally was irreversibly locked in to the mode of mobility that automobility generates and presupposes. This mode of mobility is neither socially necessary nor inevitable but has seemed impossible to break down (but see below). From relatively small causes an irreversible pattern was laid down and this ensured the preconditions for automobility’s self-expansion over the past astonishing century, surely, if we want to give it a name, the ‘century of the car’. I now examine automobility’s exceptional power to remake time-space, especially because of its peculiar combination of flexibility and coertion. It is this remaking that has ensured the preconditions for its own self-expansion. But I consider in the following section some small changes that might tip the car system into a different direction, changes that through their dynamic interdependence could provoke a shift beyond automobility, beyond the steel-and-petroleum car, towards a new system of mobility. I term this potentially emergent system the ‘post car’. I employ the language of path-dependence, increasing returns, emergence and tipping points to examine these complex system changes.

### **AT Perm**

Perm fails and replicates the impacts of the K – only a complete rejection of the automobile regime can create the possibility to move beyond it

Böhm et al 6 (Steffen Böhm, Ph.D., Director of the Essex Sustainability Institute and Professor in Management and Sustainability at the University of Essex, Campbell Jones, Director of the Centre for Philosophy and Political Economy and Senior Lecturer in Critical Theory and Business Ethics at the University of Leicester, Chris Land, Lecturer in Management at the University of Essex, and Mat Paterson, Professor of Political Science at the University of Ottawa. “Part One Conceptualizing Automobility: Introduction: Impossibilities of automobility”, September 18, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-954X.2006.00634.x/full>)

Although automobility is patterned in the way that systems are, at a certain point the language of ‘system’ loses its value. To speak of a system is to convey the impression of something autopoietic, a set of interlocking features which reinforce each other, and where elements in the system emerge for functional reasons, to ‘correct imbalances’ or to ‘improve performance’ of the system as a whole. For example, Urry (2004) talks about automobility as a ‘self-organizing non-linear system’, and invokes a viral metaphor of the expansion of the car, where cars, once sufficiently established in the ‘host body’, then create the conditions for their own continued expansion, driving out their competitors. While this may work as a metaphorical description, as an explanation it leaves crucial features out of the picture. The notion of system tends to underplay collective human agency in the production of automobility and to avoid the political questions about the shaping of the automobile ‘system’. At the extreme it can create a sense of ‘lock-in’ where the only possibilities for shaping automobility or of moving away from its dominance arise from within the system itself. We therefore propose to speak not of a system but of a regime of automobility. Speaking of a regime allows us not only to emphasize the systemic aspects of automobility but also to bring out the relations of power that make this system possible. At the same time, it attempts to avoid the sense of closure in the notion of system, where its internal relations, feedback mechanisms, create a closed loop reproducing its logics relentlessly. Our intention, then, in this introduction and throughout the volume, is not simply to describe a system of automobility, which might naturalize this system and take it for granted, but to engage in a critique that draws out its political character, its tensions and problems, and the possibilities of moving beyond it. One element in such a critique is to question the universality of today’s regime of automobility. This has two elements. First, cars are typically presented as the embodiment of automobility itself, in universal, transcendent terms. But other modes or regimes of automobility are possible. There are other transport modes which themselves can lay claim to being perhaps more ‘real’ modes of automobility – apart from walking (see eg, Macauley, 2000), cycling is perhaps the most obvious here, as discussed by Fincham in this volume. There are also modes of mobility which do not in themselves involve bodily travel. A range of information technologies, from the telephone to the internet, themselves create forms of travel which express and embody notions of autonomy, as discussed by Miller and by Latimer and Munro in this volume. The most basic part of this critique is that there are automobilities that do not depend upon the car. The car is only a particular universality, a particular regime of automobility that is nevertheless universalized, regarded universally as the embodiment of progress. In this sense automobility is a hegemonic project. It is a generalization of particular visions, interests and normativities. But nevertheless, while the car is everywhere, it is also everywhere contested. From the deep protests after the first car related death, of Bridget Driscoll on 17 August 1896 in the UK, the restrictions in car use across many countries, or the anti-car novels in the early twentieth century (of which The Wind in the Willows is perhaps the most famous), through to the direct action protests against road building and car culture in the new millennium, automobility has been actively challenged and alternatives promoted. In the face of such adversity those with interests in the development of the system of automobility, and the particular version of automobility embedded in the car, have actively and continuously organized to reproduce it. But this raises the immediate question, how has automobility been politically sustained?

Automobility is fundamentally impossible

Böhm et al 6 (Steffen Böhm, Ph.D., Director of the Essex Sustainability Institute and Professor in Management and Sustainability at the University of Essex, Campbell Jones, Director of the Centre for Philosophy and Political Economy and Senior Lecturer in Critical Theory and Business Ethics at the University of Leicester, Chris Land, Lecturer in Management at the University of Essex, and Mat Paterson, Professor of Political Science at the University of Ottawa. “Part One Conceptualizing Automobility: Introduction: Impossibilities of automobility”, September 18, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-954X.2006.00634.x/full>)

In addition to these practical antagonisms lies a deeper conceptual impossibility. Automobility is ultimately impossible in its own terms. Its impossibility is contained in the very combination of autonomy and mobility. At the point at which a subject attempts to move, the specifics of that movement – the technologies deployed, the spaces which need to be made available, the consequences of the form and place of movement, and so on – require a set of external interventions to render it possible. Cars need roads, traffic rules, oil, planning regulations, and the representation of car driving as autonomous movement involves disguising such conditions. It seems obvious that the more cars are around, the more rules have to be invented (eg, congestion charges and motorway tolls) to allow the regime of automobility to work ‘normally’, even though this ‘normality’ might be contradictory to the image of a completely autonomous movement. The investment of cars with the concept of autonomy thus contradicts these dependencies that are needed to make automobility work. Instead of an autonomous subject that moves freely in space (it is no coincidence that television advertisements show cars on traffic-free mountainous roads with their drivers enjoying the freedom of movement), what we have is a continuously increasing disciplining of drivers. Rajan (1996) has shown this in great detail in relation to air pollution policy in California; in order not to challenge the universal goal of automobile use, legitimized as it was in terms of individual freedom, policymakers intruded ever more intrusively in the manufacture of the cars themselves, in the maintenance regimes owners were forced to operate, in the identification of ‘sick cars’. Bonham (this volume) similarly shows the disciplining both of car drivers and of other road users in early twentieth century Adelaide, while Merriman (this volume) shows the necessity of fostering new driving sensibilities in the context of the development of motorways in the UK. At the most extreme, contemporary developments present the possibility of completely automated automobile use, raising fundamental questions about who, or what, is in the driving seat. Such difficulties and dependencies are, of course, not unique to a regime of automobility built around cars. The representation of any form of mobility as autonomous is similarly impossible. Even walking (at least in modern conditions) requires external labour to construct paths, clear land, etc. But given the sense that the later chapters in the book, in particular Fincham and Miller, posit the possibility of regimes of automobility not premised on cars, the question that remains is whether such regimes are themselves possible. It seems to us that any regime of automobility would be inherently impossible, precisely because automobility as such is conceptually impossible. There will always be dependencies – complete autonomy of movement is an illusion. The concept of autonomous mobility is riven with antagonisms that have a philosophical heritage harking back to scholastic debates on the possibility of an unmoved prime mover. In this sense the auto-mobile liberal humanist has ascended to take the place of a now dead God. Again the connections proliferate: automobile subjects not only transport themselves efficiently from A to B, but should also be self-motivated, self-starters whose social mobility is a reflection of moral worth and effort (see Bonham, this volume). In a car it is fairly clear that autonomous mobility is impossible. If it were ever doubted then, in the UK at least, the fuel protests of 2000 made this all too evident, with queues of cars stretching for miles in hope of a gallon of petrol. A car’s movement is beyond the control of an individual subject given its systematic interdependencies. Traffic is itself a socially negotiated phenomenon where trajectories cross and intersect in a complex but never independent movement. In the term ‘automobile’ itself there are also a number of unresolved tensions. It is ambiguous whether the autonomy in movement refers to the machine or the person. Is it the auto that is mobile or moved by the driver? Reflecting a complexification of mind/body dualism, should we consider the motor of movement to be primary (literally the engine), or the increasingly amputated and immobilized body of the driver whose physical movements are minimized whilst the driver’s (autonomous?) desire determines the direction and trajectory of movement? To resolve, or sometimes reflect, this tension we have seen the rise of discourses of hybrid subjectivities: cyborgs and ‘carsons’ (car/persons) who are part machine part human agent but always already socially and technically situated and constituted in their subjectivity as a driver (see Michael, 2001; Lupton, 1999). But whilst this human-auto hybridity proliferates alongside the wider networks of heterogeneous elements that constitute ‘automobility’, it is simultaneously hidden by a parallel moment of purification (see Latour, 1993). The complex hybrid network of automobility produces, as one of its effects, the appearance of independent automobility. Whilst the heterogeneous interdependencies that make mobility possible would threaten the apparent autonomy of the subject in motion, this parallel movement of purification enables ‘the car’ to be dismissed as just a tool or prosthesis to be mastered and controlled by an autonomous subject. To paraphrase Latour, the Gordian knot of hybrid automobility is severed to reinstate a clear separation of subjects and their objects: drivers and their cars are seen as fetishised commodities independent of any social relations. In this sense, ‘automobility’ is an effect of parallel movements of hybridization and purification. On one hand proliferating heterogeneous rhizomes constituting bodies, rulebooks, licensing authorities, pressure groups, expertise, capital, tarmac and steel; and on the other, their simultaneous sundering into the automobile subject and the objects of the car and traffic system. Without hybridity, automobility would be impossible. Without purification, automobility would be impossible. On both counts, automobility is impossible.

### Seiler Indict/Review

#### In attempts to access freedom purchasing into the consumer car culture feeds into panoptiscm

Phillips ’02 (Ryan, March 20, 2002 “The Driving Ideology” http://bitman.freeshell.org/essays/the.driving.ideology.html)

Society relies heavily upon having an efficient means of transportation available. Students and employees use transportation on a daily basis when commuting. Trade becomes pointless when the cost of moving goods exceeds the value of the items. Developments in transportation have a profound effect on society, making life and business function more smoothly. Those who use such developments gain a measure of power by attaining a greater freedom of movement. Whoever dictates what developments occur holds even greater power, for that person or institution then controls the distribution of power. Throughout much of the twentieth century, the automobile has been the dominant means of transportation in the United States. Driving has become both a discipline and an ideology, for most people today have been molded into accepting driving as the ideal form of transportation - not perfect yet, but heading in the right direction. A common view of the future displays "flying cars" as the fate of transportation, where the form of the vehicle has changed while the personal nature of the transportation which defines driving has not. To maintain driving as such a discipline, a model of power is evoked which Michel Foucault calls "panopticism." In his essay, aptly titled "Panopticism," Foucault presents a model where an institution may achieve its goals by employing enforcement, surveillance, and another form of discipline which holds these three things together. Institutions which have an interest in maintaining the discipline of driving - automobile manufacturers, local police departments, and the Transportation Department, among others - each employ the panoptic model to keep this ideology alive. Driving offers greater freedom of movement and more choice in destination than many other means of transportation, such as riding the bus, taking an airline flight, or car-pooling. Driving becomes a means of avoiding the discipline of time: there is no need to consult a schedule or a coworker whenever one must travel. Instead of being subjected to the stark discipline of the clock, the driver falls into a far more subtle discipline. Driving has every appearance of being a complete void of discipline simply because of the vast freedom offered. Yet driving is something which people must be trained in, a mold into which one must fit as a means of functioning in society. If a person cannot drive, either by inexperience or lack of a vehicle, he or she is severely impaired in the ability to work and run life's errands. The requirement to drive is so strong in American society that a driver's license functions as the de facto means of identification, even though not everyone is required to possess one. By molding and shaping people into accepting the idea that driving is necessary to modern survival, driving is established as a discipline, despite the fact that driving offers an escape from other disciplines that are much more obvious. The popularity of driving can then be explained, in part, by the appeal of avoiding discipline. Automobile manufacturers make use of this appeal by presenting their vehicles as symbols of freedom and rugged individualism. Commercials for sport utility vehicles show their automobile as being perfectly capable of handling the toughest mountain passes, as though their owners would actually risk scratching the paint on such an expensive vehicle. Sports cars are often filmed on open country roads far from the obligations of city life. Rarely is a car commercial set within a city. Each of these methods creates an imaginary ideology of the automobile as a means of escaping the humdrum of everyday life. This triggers a panoptic discipline where people are put in the habit of purchasing or leasing the newest vehicles which conform best to the present ideology. Surveillance of purchase patterns is used by marketing departments to test the effectiveness of the presented ideology in maintaining this discipline. Manufacturers do not have the power to force the incessant purchasing of new cars on consumers, yet enforcement is still achieved by incentives from yet another institution: the government. By creating and funding a transportation infrastructure tailored specifically to the automobile, the government makes it very difficult for another mode of transportation to enter the market. This deficiency in the ability of automobile companies to complete the panoptic model within their own means causes a huge dependance on the government to supply the final key.

#### Through driving law, the gov’t is able to exercise control

Phillips ’02 (Ryan, March 20, 2002 “The Driving Ideology” http://bitman.freeshell.org/essays/the.driving.ideology.html)

Government agencies throughout the United States have many reasons for supporting the role of the automobile in modern society. Licensing of both drivers and vehicles creates both a source of revenue an another means of panoptic power. Police provide both surveillance and enforcement of driving laws by patrolling the road system and issuing tickets to offenders of the law. Drivers discipline themselves into following the "rules of the road" for fear of the police car which may be hiding behind a large bush or around the next corner. Foucault says of the creation of the police as an institution: ... the type of power that it exercises, the mechanisms it operates and the element to which it applies them are specific. It is an apparatus that must be coextensive with the entire social body and not only by the extreme limits that it embraces, but by the minuteness of the details it is concerned with. Police power must bear 'over everything'... (323) Enforcement of driving law becomes an excellent tool for extending such extreme limits to police power. Many criminals accused of crimes unrelated to driving are caught by the police first because of some small driving violation. In the United States, police are denied the level of surveillance described by Foucault - citizens are protected against unreasonable search and seizure. Only after a person has been deemed guilty of a crime, even a minor traffic violation, can a search for contraband or a criminal record check can begin. Such an extension of power gives governments a huge incentive to support the ideology of driving. The most prominent effort on the part of governments in the United States to support driving has been the construction of the Interstate Highway System. A join venture between the states and the federal government, which each bearing half the cost, the Interstates greatly favor the automobile by making travel by car comparatively easy, especially for long range travel. Even within cities, Interstates prove essential in the daily commute. Benefits to the state include improved commerce and models of power such as those created for the police. For the federal government, the benefit is much more subtle. Aside from the political popularity which stems from endorsing the driving ideology, the federal government benefits by gaining a measure of power over the states. The Constitution of the United States authorizes Congress to regulate commerce "among the several states" (Article I, Section 8), which encompasses the funding of Interstates highways used in commerce. However, to receive that funding, the federal government is able require that each state agree to follow guidelines on certain unrelated matters. For example, this has been especially effective in creating a federal education policy, where the federal government has no stated power to enforce such a policy. Enforcement takes a contractual form instead. Surveillance arises when each state prepares a report of its success in implementing federal policy, and a discipline arises where each state is willing to do anything to prevent the transportation money that it rightfully deserves from being funneled into other states. Foucault sums up this phenomena best: And, although the universal juridicism of modern society seems to fix limits on the exercise of power, its universally widespread panopticism enables it to operate, on the underside of the law, a machinery that is both immense and minute, which supports, reinforce, multiplies the asymmetry of power and undermines the limits that are traced around the law. (331)

#### State contracts blah blah

Phillips ’02 (Ryan, March 20, 2002 “The Driving Ideology” http://bitman.freeshell.org/essays/the.driving.ideology.html)

The federal government capitalizes on the power behind the ideology of driving as a means of exercising a power which it does not actually possess. The role of the contract becomes important here, for a state can only become involved in this model of power by common agreement. Incentives are used to initiate the contract - a state would seem foolish to give up the huge sums of money and power associated with driving. Unfortunately for the state, the federal government plays the dominant role once the contract is signed. There the funding originates and there the attached policy is formed. Foucault explains that this is typical when a panoptic model of power is combined with a contract: ... the way in which it is imposed, the mechanisms it brings into play, the non-reversible subordination of one group of people by another, the 'surplus' power that is always fixed on the same side, the inequality of position of the different 'partners' in relation to the common regulation, all these distinguish the disciplinary link from the contractual link, and make it possible to distort the contractual link systematically from the moment it has as its content a mechanism of discipline. (Foucault 331) The state is disciplined into accepting transportation contracts without regard to the effects on its sovereignty. The contract is then distorted into something to which the state no longer agrees to for the merits of the contract, but instead because it is what the state has been doing since Interstates were first constructed. The state thus exercises self-discipline. Countless disciplines have formed around the automobile, not the least of which is driving itself. These disciplines greatly obscure the merits of the automobile as a means of transportation. The success of the automobile in modern society is easy to measure - almost everyone owns a car or truck of some kind. But determining how much success stems from the actual superiority of the automobile over any other mode of transportation becomes very difficult. An ideology of driving has formed not from debate of its merits, but from the disciplines that have strengthened the role of the automobile throughout the twentieth century. Arguments can certainly be made for and against the automobile - alternatives such as public bus systems, monorails, and even the return of trains have been proposed and implemented, but never with as much success as the established driving ideology. Either the arguments in favor of such systems are flawed or somehow their superiority is not realized because of the difficulty in upsetting the current system. Which of these possibilities is true cannot be determined so long as the government persists in dictating transportation policy, for its policy is subverted to models of power which serve a completely independent agenda. Even car manufacturers rely upon the government to provide the infrastructure - the road system - without which their product would be completely useless. The ultimate power over transportation has been usurped by the government, and that power has been abused.

### Capitalism

#### **Automobility is inherently capitalist – the best link card you’ve ever seen**

Freund and Martin 93 (Peter, professor of sociology at Montclair State University, PhD from the New School for Social Research and George, professor of sociology at Montclair State University, senior research fellow in the Sociology Department, University of California, Santa Cruz, PhD from the University of Chicago. “The Ecology of the Automobile,” pg. 172)

The political economic system of global capitalism influences the social ecology of transport on a number of levels. First of all the dynamic of contemporary capitalism accelerates a tendency found throughout the history of capitalism—time and space compression. As Marx noted about 130 years ago, time-space compression was a central feature of industrial capitalism.1 Such compression is fed by new transport and communication technologies that reduce the con­straints of time and space on production and consumption. Further­more, time-space compression is reproduced in the subjective experiences of everyday life. Accelerated movement and speeded-up time are archetypical features of both industrial and post-industrial landscapes. Speeded-up time schedules and widely dispersed sites of human activity are some of the objective correlates of experiences such as placelessness, community deterioration, and ecological degradation.¶ As Glenn Yago has shown, transport systems are shaped by the imperatives of capital, such as the need to move labour and products.2 Capitalist systems do not have ecological or social equity considerations as a top priority. In general, auto-truck transport sys­tems have provided capitalist enterprises with a new flexibility to reach markets and to decentralize production. Autos and trucks pro­vide greater flexibility than rail alone, but they do so at greater social and environmental costs.¶ The growth and entrenchment of auto-centred transport has it­self provided a market for the expansion of capitalism. Auto-centred transport has an affinity with global capitalism not only because it is part of its infrastructure, but because it requires resource and energy-intensive consumption. Time-space compression speeds up con­sumption. Furthermore, the social and material conditions of everyday life become so transformed by widespread auto use as to eventually make the patterns of auto consumption necessities (for ex-¶ ample, autos-suburbs-malls), not options. In the process of entrench­ing such patterns, a lifestyle and accompanying cultural formation emerge. The auto-industrial complex, through advertising, lobbying, and other influences on public discourse, helps to sustain an auto culture. One critical feature of auto ideology is the masking of its" problematic and costly features. The belief in the individualized sur­face appearance of automobility and the masking of its social nature are central features of auto^-and capitalist—culture.

#### **Critical analysis exposes the harms of automobility and solves its capitalist tendencies**

Freund and Martin 93 (Peter, professor of sociology at Montclair State University, PhD from the New School for Social Research and George, professor of sociology at Montclair State University, senior research fellow in the Sociology Department, University of California, Santa Cruz, PhD from the University of Chicago. “The Ecology of the Automobile,” pg. 173)

In this way, a complex of factors has embedded automobility in our lives, our environments and our consciousness. Its destructive features occasionally surface in our discourse but generally they remain denied or invisible—hidden behind ideological appearances of efficiency, freedom and mobility. A critical ¶ analysis of auto-centred transport can highlight its collectively irrational use of resources and energy and its undemocratic features. Such a critical analysis also enables us to see the dangers of allowing the logic of ¶ capitalist expan­sion to shape transport policy. Capitalist logic is ¶ predicated on growth; it drives the rapid consumption of resources and ¶ energy through the saturation of world markets with commodities such as the auto. This logic is now truly global; it has become dominant in the former centrally-planned economies as well as in the Third World. However, the globalization of auto-centred transport ultimately is not economically feasible, and it is not in the best interests of the earth's ecology and human transport needs.

#### Foucault concedes that automobility is a product of capitalism

Packer ’10 (Jeremy, 2010 Automobility and apparatuses: commentary on Cotten Seiler’s Republic of Drivers , History and Technology: An International Journal, 26:4, 361-368http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/07341512.2010.528619)

In The Republic of Drivers we find an alternative vision of the relationship between an apparatus, ideology, and capital. In the very paragraph in which Seiler first describes Foucault’s model of the apparatus he ends by stating that ‘as I will argue below, automobility emerged during and as a strategic response to the crises precipitated by the transition from proprietary to corporate capitalism in the United States.’19 This paragraph animates the difficult tension in Seiler’s account. Did automobility arise ‘in the last instance’ because of changes in the nature and structure of capitalism or did the automobility apparatus come into being as ‘the multifaceted, coordinating network of power’ that ‘bridges the ground between the more textual “discourse” and the materiality of practice.’20 Or could it have been both? As Foucault says the apparatus always ‘has as its major function at a given historical moment that of responding to an urgent need. The apparatus thus has a dominant strategic function (Foucault as cited by in Seiler).’21 Can the ‘urgent need’ be changes in capitalism or does that amount to the very sort economic of reductionism of which Foucault was so critical?

### Virillio

#### Development of new transportation accelerates the potential for catastrophe

Árnason et al ‘07(Arnar Hafsteinsson, Sigurjón Baldur Grétarsdóttir & Tinna November 21, 2007 Acceleration Nation: An Investigation into the Violence of Speed and the Uses of Accidents in Iceland, Culture, Theory and Critique, 48:2, 199-217http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14735780701723314)

While automobility may instill in drivers a sense of invulnerability, as Cubitt states, Virilio sees accidents, catastrophes, sudden changes and upheavals as vital components of the dromocratic condition,2 especially in relation to technology (see Armitage 2000a: 26). Virilio argues that every technology, ‘produces, provokes, programs a specific accident’ (Virilio and Lotringer 1997: 38). The car and the road gave us the car crash; the airplane gives us the plane crash. The accident is integral to the dromocratic condition. As Virilio says: When you work on speed, you work on accidents. Why? Because there is a loss of control. What is speed, what is acceleration? A loss of control and emotions just as much as a loss of transportation. A plane crashes because it is out of control and crashes more surely the faster it is going. [...] now we are caught in the race for speed, which means we have not only accelerated the means of transportation, the means of production and the means of information, but we have also accelerated the catastrophes themselves. (Virilio and Lotringer 2005: 98–99)

#### Virllio’s claims are universal and fail to tailor the accident to a social and cultural context

Árnason et al ‘07(Arnar Hafsteinsson, Sigurjón Baldur Grétarsdóttir & Tinna November 21, 2007 Acceleration Nation: An Investigation into the Violence of Speed and the Uses of Accidents in Iceland, Culture, Theory and Critique, 48:2, 199-217http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14735780701723314)

Now, our objection to Virilio’s individualism and humanism is not primarily philosophical. Rather, what we object to is the limits it imposes. And so what we want to suggest here is that, while acceleration and accidents are arguably important aspects of modernity – modernity being probably best understood in the plural (Comaroff and Comaroff 1993; Appadurai 1996; Mitchell 2000) – the articulation of technologies of acceleration and accidents has to be explored in their more specific social, political and cultural context than Virilio has ever attempted or indeed suggested. Starting from the premise of a universal, experiencing human subject, Virilio’s story can only be a universal story – universalism itself being the peculiar parochialism of European modernity (Comaroff and Comaroff 1992: 20) – of increasing speed and acceleration, of progress, or, more accurately, in fact of catastrophe and destruction. This, we suggest, limits insight through the unnecessary adoption of ontological certainties. In what follows we explore the areas that Virilio has opened up for research, but do so through ethnography with its slide towards the culturally specific rather than the universal. Specifically we address the complexities of speed and acceleration in Iceland in connection with roads and road safety, cars and car crashes, and in their articulation with modernity and history (to be understood as project and imagination as much as anything else), the ‘nation-form’ (Berlant 1998), neo-liberal governmental- ity and what Lauren Berlant has termed ‘technologies of patriotism’ (1998).

### Heidegger

#### Intelligent automobility is key – movement requires actualization of the environment around us

Lomasky ’97 (Loren E., “Autonomy and Automobility” The Independent Review, v.II, n.1, Summer 1997, ISSN 1086-1653, pp. 5–28. http://www.independent.org/pdf/tir/tir\_02\_1\_lomasky.pdf)

The conception of motion has a wider scope than traveling from place to place. We retain residual traces of this broader meaning in expressions such as “a moving experience” and in the etymological history of “emotion,” but in the philosophical language of the Greeks the more inclusive sense is primary. Any transformation of a subject from a state of potentiality with regard to some quality to the actual realization of that quality is deemed motion.5 So going from here to there constitutes movement, but so also do an organism’s growth, someone’s coming to know something, the development of a faculty, and so on. In an Aristotelian universe, motion is ubiquitous because everything tends to progress toward the highest possible self- realization. For simple inorganic forms like a rock, this potential is correspondingly simple, involving only the capacity to fall when unsupported. In organisms the transition from potency to act is more complex. The oak, for example, moves to its actuality through the complex chain of maturation that commences from the acorn stage. For animals, such self- realization incorporates consciousness and self-propulsion. Human actualization adds deliberation and choice. Only for a completely actualized being would movement be otiose (or counterproductive). And indeed, Aristotle hypothesizes that a god dubbed the “Unmoved Mover” occupies the pinnacle of the metaphysical hierarchy because in its enduring perfection it has transcended all reason to change, whereas anything else in the universe, insofar as it realizes any of its potential, is approaching to some greater or lesser degree, consciously or unconsciously, this state of full actualization. Encountering Greek philosophical thought, Christians applied this concept of an unchanging perfection to the Book of Genesis’s Creator of Heaven and Earth. Movement, therefore, does not simply describe getting from here to there; it has normative richness. To move is to progress—though, of course, it can also be to backslide. Only stasis is morally neutral, and ours is a dynamic universe. The greater the variety of dimensions through which an individual transforms itself and things it encounters, the greater the scope for evaluative concerns. The grounds on which human beings appraise them- selves and their fellows will be much richer than, say, the standards applied to horses or bottles of wine or the performance of machines. For people, there is not only a better or worse but a chosen better or worse toward which we deliberately direct ourselves. Intelligent automobility is crucial to the elevated status of human beings vis-à-vis other beings.

### Misc

#### Mass transit = good alt for driving and automobility is inevitable/good

Hensley ’10 (Karl, “One Nation Behind the Wheel Automobility in U.S. Culture” American Quarterly, Volume 62, Number 1, March 2010, pp. 173-180 (Review) The Johns Hopkins University Press https://netfiles.uiuc.edu/rfouche/www/readings/hensley.pdf)

Seiler seeks to historicize the rise of the automobile, a commodity that, in the words of scholar Kristin Ross, is so “completely integrated into the banality of the everyday” that it appears as one of those “goods whose habitual use effectively removed them from the discursive realm” (quoted on 36). The car is so mundane and integral to daily existence that most assume utility to be its raison d’être. Of course, other viable options for transportation were available, but they were not developed as thoroughly as the automobile. One of Seiler’s strengths is his sensitivity to the many alternatives available to this history, such as mass transit. Just as the language of driving has become an unavoidable and naturalized metaphor for history (for instance, “Karl Marx argued that class struggle is the driving force of history”), the ubiquity of automobility appears as a necessity for life in the United States. In a democracy, Seiler argues, freedom, specifically freedom of individual movement, is imperative to the definition of the citizen. He writes, “The legitimacy of modern liberal societies depends to a large degree on their capacity not merely to tolerate but to enable performances of self-determination in all those individuals identified as citizens” (130). Thus automobility, seen as a fusion of self-directed mobility and consumerist self-expression, becomes a synecdoche for normative citizenship in the United States.

#### Driver disengagement cedes control to the vehicle – makes accidents inevitable

Featherstone ’04 (Michael, Theory Culture and Society “Automobilities : An Introduction” The online version of this article can be found at: <http://tcs.sagepub.com/content/21/4-5/1> 2004 21: 1 DOI: 10.1177/0263276404046058)

Paradoxically we can be speeding down the motorway, yet we are accustomed to a mode of dwelling in motion in which digital communications speed data to us which is increasingly refigured into image formats which can simulate and enhance our perception of the world outside. Something we find in the computer-driven aircraft, such as the sophisticated fighter jet with its head-up display data projections onto the cockpit windscreen or helmet visor of the pilot, of flight information, or a simplified ‘humanized’ simulated version of the complexities of the speeding world outside. The limited human eye and brain processing powers are just not good enough to handle the complex information flows and it is increasingly the intelligent technologies which see and reformat the world for us. The logic of this prospective worlding process is for the driver to become the pilot and the automobile to become a sort of datasuit wrap. It is not just that the driver-car is a hybrid assemblage of man and machine, but that the software revolution of car driving has made possible an increasing disengagement of the driver from the work of doing driving. As Jörg Beckmann (2004) remarks ‘if the future car-driver is indeed replaced by an auto-pilot one would even want to reconsider the notion of the car-driver hybrid, since this very traffic-unit is now just as much a screen-worker hybrid in an auto-office, a web-surfer hybrid encapsulated by a rolling play-station, or a phone-speaker hybrid in a moveable phone booth’. For Beckmann the price of handing over agency to the intelligent vehicle system marks a shift from automobility which functions around independence to the autopilot hybrid which suffers isolation. This increasing isolation from other traffic and the physical surroundings outside the car, which occurs as other multitasking activities take over, can lead not only to ‘absenteeism’, but also to accidents. Beckmann (2004) mentions that car collisions frequently occur while drivers are engaged in activities other than driving (dialing a telephone number, fiddling with the radio, television or CD deck, listening to music, surfing the web etc.). This shift from subconscious reactions to electronic adjustments of speed and direction, which allegedly free the car driver from the tiresome act of driving, create a whole new series of problems around trust. We see a shift in the mode of trust from trusting other drivers (that they will see and avoid your vehicle, not cause you to swerve or crash through aggressive or unpredictable behaviour), to trust in the experts who designed the software systems which automatically pilot the car. Well-designed auto- piloted cars should never crash. Hence there is a potential shift away from trust in the mobile social figuration of car drivers which we call traffic and which depends on communication via different types of vehicle signs and signals along with embodied signs and gestures from the driver (hand waving, thumbs-up signs, deliberate mimed gestures of looking in the mirror etc.), towards trust in the software. Yet even if such systems become wide- spread there is the danger that some drivers will refuse to switch on the new technology and operative with different codes of trust and mistrust. It is then not just the overdependence on software systems and reaping the multi- tasking benefits (passengering while one should be driving), but also the different regimes of trust and trust-switching which can cause communication problems which can lead to accidents. A further reminder of Virilio’s statement that the integral accident accompanies each new ‘advance’ in technology.

#### Consumer car culture has reconfigured notions of identity

Featherstone ’04 (Michael, Theory Culture and Society “Automobilities : An Introduction” The online version of this article can be found at:

<http://tcs.sagepub.com/content/21/4-5/1> 2004 21: 1 DOI: 10.1177/0263276404046058)

When we consider the embodied experience of riding in the car, it is not surprising that people respond to the thrum of the engine, the smell of the interior, the feel of the car seat, given that the kinaesthetic pleasures of the car ride are often experienced from infancy onwards. As Mimi Sheller (2004/this issue) remarks in her piece ‘Automotive Emotions: Feeling the Car’, the embodied emotional responses to driving are central to understanding the place of the car within different car cultures. She quotes one driver as remarking ‘When I am driving, I am nearly always happy. Driving towards virtually anywhere makes me excited, expectant: full of hope.’ This sense of freedom of movement, the pull of the open road, the expectancy of new experiences, all are central to the advertising and consumer culture images of car travel. They speak to many people’s actual experiences and hoped for potential of the car. This is particularly the case for women, whose relationship to the car was for a long time depicted by men as based on a form of ‘technological incomprehension’ which made them ill-suited to driving, as we find in the multitudinous male jokes about ‘women drivers’. Yet with the increase in the numbers of working women, the separation of home from work, the need for mothers to transport children to school and friends and the key role women have in organizing household consumption, the car has become essential in juggling the everyday time economy. For many women the car is central to the logistics of maintaining mundane everyday household relationships. At the same time it can also be the avenue of escape or inversion of this routine multi-tasking. It has the potential to provide a liminal inversion of everyday concerns. For some of the young working-women in Norway studied by Pauline Garvey (2001) the car offered a release from domesticity, the potential of ‘a dramatic “flip” across from accepted and conventional behaviour’. This sense of the car as a vehicle for ‘doing something crazy’ in one’s own time and space, such as turning the sound system up and singing at the top of one’s voice, swerving around while driving drunk, or parking in a lay-by and having sex in the back seat, is part of the freedom associated with the car. The car as a device for a whole range of emotional expressivity is something which the consumer culture advertisers understand well. Cars not only offer consumer culture comforts and forms of kinaesthetic and ergonomic design, which suggest a comfortable and effective private ‘home’ space, they also encourage identification. Drivers are asked to identify with the particular ‘affordances’18 which are presented as characteristics of different brands: the smooth ride of a Rolls Royce, the hard ride and close to the road feel of an MG sports-car, or the more bouncier ride of a Renault (Edensor, 2004). The attunement to this sensibility which is wide- spread within car cultures, is particularly evident in particular groups – such as American teenage hot-rodders, or car customisers and restorers, the aficionados of a particular classic model etc. Around each specialist or classic type of car a whole cultural world develops with its own form of specialist knowledge and publications, practices and argot, which seek to explore and define the details of car anatomy, ‘look’, styling, image and ride. A world which offers the pleasures of common knowledge and distinctive classifications, which work with shared embodied habitus and membership, through car talk as much as car driving.

#### Speed culture dominates American identity

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This combination of expressive and instrumental action should not be surprising to anyone who has watched a Hollywood action movie or American detective television series, as they invariably contain a car chase with cars been thrown around the road at high speed, squealing tires, grim- acing faces on the edge of losing control and the inevitable crash of the villain’s car at the end, sometimes enhanced by exploding petrol and burn out. Given the United States’ global dominance over media industries, the spectacular car chase and crash have become a recognizable global vernacular. We think here of movies such as Bullitt (dir. Peter Yates, 1968), The French Connection (dir. William Friedkin, 1971) Gone in 60 Seconds (dir. H.B. Haliki, 1974) Smokey and the Bandit (dir. Hal Needham, 1977), Mad Max (dir. George Miller, 1979), Lethal Weapons 4 (dir. Richard Donner, 1998), Gone in 60 Seconds (remake, dir. Dominic Sena, 2000), The Fast and the Furious (dir. Rob Cohen, 2001), The Matrix Reloaded (dir. Wachowski Brothers, 2003), Ronin (dir. John Frankenheimer, 1998).19 In one sense we should not be surprised that car chases are so central a part of car culture, given that racing and the quest to attain high speeds were prominent from the early days of the automobile. The first motor car race took place in 1895, organized by the Chicago Times Herald (Elias, 1995: 17). Henry Ford, who began production with the Model A automo- bile, soon followed with the Model B touring car and to advertise it he entered it into races, himself making a successful attempt to break the speed record (Wollen, 2002: 18). From these early beginnings there has been a constant quest for increased automobile speed and the demonstration of driving skills in a series of public events which have consistently drawn in the crowds and media coverage: motor races, rallies, drag racing, hot- rodding. This process has culminating in the Formula One Grand Prix races which attract massive crowds around the world and are present as global television spectacles. Speed has been described as ‘the mechanical soul of modernity’ and modern identity seems to involve movement between the home and the road and various intermediaries forms of ‘dwelling in movement’ and ‘static vehicles’ which speed images to us (McQuire, 1998; see also Millar and Schwarz, 1998).

#### Car culture is inextricably linked with a culture of death making the accident inevitable

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The dark side of the speeding car, whether in the stadium racetrack or on the roads, is the crash and the inevitable serious injuries and death. As Peter Wollen argues ‘The crash is irretrievably established at the centre of car culture’ (Wollen, 2002: 17; see also Boyne, 1999). While the road death and injury statistics are rarely dwelled upon in the media, a dramatic crash, especially of a celebrity, captures the public imagination. The ‘untimely death’ of those who stand as icons of worldly success and are presented as exemplars of ‘the happy life’ or ‘happy life gone wrong’ are a source of endless fascination. Here we think of the deaths of movie stars and celebrities such as Isadora Duncan, Tom Mix, James Dean, Jayne Mansfield, Marc Bolan, Grace Kelly and Princess Diana (Brottman, 2001). The public death of a celebrity has become one of the most emotionally disturbing and fascinating contemporary events (Brottman and Sharrett, 2002: 207). The celebrity who is often accredited with charismatic powers and a special expressivity under the gaze of the public, suddenly loses his or her revelatory power and becomes a broken disfigured body. The term accident is often preferred to car crash, as it doesn’t suggest the attribution of blame and points to the intrusion of fate into life. The split second conjunction of events which give rise to a car crash, the potential to enjoy a ‘lucky’ or ‘narrow’ escape, or succumb to a ‘freak accident’, the sense that for people who seek to challenge their fate on the road death is inevitable (James Dean being the archetypical case here), the playing with fate,22 the reintroduction of metaphysics and the religious into life. The quest for the accident, to live life on the edge of the crash and to explore and enjoy the aesthetic possibilities, is the subject of J.G. Ballard (1975) controversial novel Crash, which was made into a movie directed by David Cronenberg (1996).23 For Ballard the car driver lives within ‘a huge metallized dream’ which depends on ‘our sense of speed, drama and aggression, the worlds of adver- tising and consumer goods, engineering and mass manufacture, and the shared experience of moving together through an elaborately signalled land- scape’ (cited in Wollen 2002: 16). A world of traffic overload in which motor- ways would eventually become the dominant feature of the landscape. Given that a culture of the car amounted to a culture of death, the only way out for Ballard would be to dehumanize driving with electronically controlled cars and traffic flow.

#### **Transport policies are decided by a few elite groups that oppose the public interest groups necessary for the alternative (?)**

Freund and Martin 93 (Peter, professor of sociology at Montclair State University, PhD from the New School for Social Research and George, professor of sociology at Montclair State University, senior research fellow in the Sociology Department, University of California, Santa Cruz, PhD from the University of Chicago. “The Ecology of the Automobile,” pg. 134)

In the United States three groups of interests dominate govern­ment transport policies. The first of these is the private-sector high­way lobby, which includes oil companies, the auto industry, trucking companies, and road construction companies. The second consists of central city business interests, including the headquarters of transna­tional corporations, which seek to facilitate access to businesses and to increase property values in downtown areas.18 The third interest group is composed of public-sector highway and transport depart­ments, including professionals and bureaucrats whose jobs depend upon the building and maintenance of highways and other road­ways. Taken together, these three interest groups can be said to com­prise the auto-industrial complex, a potent player in U.S. politics—far more powerful than public interest groups which often oppose it. ¶

#### thought this card was cool because it talks about elected representatives…

Freund and Martin 93 (Peter, professor of sociology at Montclair State University, PhD from the New School for Social Research and George, professor of sociology at Montclair State University, senior research fellow in the Sociology Department, University of California, Santa Cruz, PhD from the University of Chicago. “The Ecology of the Automobile,” pg. 140)

It is clear that transport policy in the United States, even more¶ than in Europe, is constrained by market forces that favour auto-¶ centred transport. A particularly central role in these constraints is¶ played by the auto-industrial complex and its influence over public¶ policy. These constraints prevent the development of an ecological-¶ ly and socially healthy transport policy that would, emphasize less energy-' and resource-intensive modes in more diversified systems. However, it is also clear that any efforts at reform of auto-centred transport must deal effectively with the realistic concerns of many persons about the threat of such reforms to their jobs, firstly, and secondly, to their individual choice.¶ The 1990s may witness a renewed critique of automobility. There is evidence that vehicular traffic is viewed as a major problem by the American public. For example,-a 1990 San Francisco poll found that transport problems were, regarded as the top local issue—ahead of drugs, homelessness, pollution, and crime. This was the eighth con­secutive year of the annual San Francisco Bay Area Poll in which transport was deemed the leading local problem. A few months later the same poll found that traffic and gridlock continued to be seen as the most important local problem, ranking ahead of (in order) drugs, drought, homelessness, and crime. In 1991, transport held its number one position as the most important problem facing the Bay Area;jn 1992, it slipped to second place, behind the economy and jobs.38¶ Currently two general conditions provide a backdrop for suc­cessful challenges to auto-centred transport. These conditions are the energy and environmental crises. There are a number of specific ob­jective reasons that now make autos an increasing social liability: (1) auto emissions are a growing problem as increased auto use outpaces technical gains in emission reduction; (2) congestion and its economic costs are an increasing problem in urban areas; (3) the Per­sian Gulf War of 1991 highlighted yet again the costs and vul-¶ nerability of petroleum supplies. However, these conditions alone will not produce more diversified transport systems. In order to chal­lenge the embedded structures of auto-centred transport, varied con­stituencies have to be mobilized; in turn, these constituencies have to put pressure on their elected representatives and on officials. Finally, achievable reforms have to be developed so that we have viable alter­natives to auto-centred transport. We now turn our attention to this subject.

#### **Despite difficult sacrifices a shift away from automobility towards a more equitable transportation system must be made**

Freund and Martin 93 (Peter, professor of sociology at Montclair State University, PhD from the New School for Social Research and George, professor of sociology at Montclair State University, senior research fellow in the Sociology Department, University of California, Santa Cruz, PhD from the University of Chicago. “The Ecology of the Automobile,” pg. 164)

The sensual, erotic, or irrational wellsprings of automobility can­not be ignored. The pleasure as well as the convenience that auto driving ¶ provides is a boon to many people. However, what is needed is a diversified transport system that allows people to find pleasure in many ways of travel. New policies must be as non-punitive as pos­sible in discouraging auto use, and must develop seductive as well as affordable and efficient alternatives to the auto. How changes can be implemented without causing people hardship and inconvenience is an important consideration. It has been argued by some that any serious attempt to transform auto-centred transport systems must en­tail painful sacrifices for citizens.76 It is our contention that if sacrifice is required, it can be mitigated in several ways, including making the sacrifice a shared one throughout society.

#### Automobility is a self-fulfilling prophecy?

Freund and Martin 93 (Peter, professor of sociology at Montclair State University, PhD from the New School for Social Research and George, professor of sociology at Montclair State University, senior research fellow in the Sociology Department, University of California, Santa Cruz, PhD from the University of Chicago. “The Ecology of the Automobile,” pg. 121)

The transformation of urban space and social life through in­creased dominance of auto traffic has been a gradual process, one that has been characterized by a self-propelling momentum. Again, Jacobs offered an excellentdescription of this process: No step in this process is, in itself, crucial. But ¶ cumula­tively the effect is enormous. At each step, it not only adds its own bit to the total change, but actually ac­celerates the process. Erosion of cities by automobiles is thus an example of what is known as "positive ¶ feed­back." In cases of positive feedback, an action produces a reaction ¶ which, in turn, intensifies the condition\* responsible for the first action. ¶ This intensifies the need for repeating the first action, which, in turn, intensifies the reaction, and so on, ad infinitum. It is something like the grip of a habit forming addiction.36 Auto addiction creates a space.in its own image which makes alter­nate forms of mobility difficult or impossible.-What is operating here is a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy. What is missing in Jacobs' description is an analysis of the role that the political economy, espe­cially corporate interests, play in enhancing the feedback (see Chap­ter 8). Such feedback is fuelled by continuous underfunding of mass transit and overfunding of highways.

## AFF

### Automobility Good

#### Lack of automobility was key in tragedy of New Orleans

O’Toole ’05 (Randal, September 5, 2005 The Thoreau Institute “Lack of Automobility Key to New Orleans Tragedy: http://www.planetizen.com/node/17253)

The real cause of the tragedy in New Orleans was the lack of automobiles for evacuees, argues Randall O'Toole. "Those who fervently wish for car-free cities should take a closer look at New Orleans. The tragedy of New Orleans isn't primarily due to racism or government incompetence, though both played a role. The real cause is automobility -- or more precisely to the lack of it. ...The ... people who got out were those with automobiles. Those who stayed, regardless of color, were those who lacked autos. What made New Orleans more vulnerable to catastrophe than most U.S. cities is its low rate of auto ownership. According to the 2000 Census, nearly a third of New Orleans households do not own an automobile. This compares to less than 10 percent nationwide. There are significant differences by race: 35 percent of black households but only 15 percent of white households do not own an auto. But in the end, it was auto ownership, not race, that made the difference between safety and disaster."

#### Turn – automobility revives autonomy which destroys planning

Lomasky ’97 (Loren E., “Autonomy and Automobility” The Independent Review, v.II, n.1, Summer 1997, ISSN 1086-1653, pp. 5–28. http://www.independent.org/pdf/tir/tir\_02\_1\_lomasky.pdf)

People who drive automobiles upset the patterns spun from the policy intellectual’s brain. The precise urban design that he has concocted loses out to suburban sprawl; neat integration of work, residence, and shopping within compact, multipurpose developments gives way to bedroom communities here, industrial parks there, and malls everywhere in between. If people rode buses and trains whenever they could, less oil would be burned and fewer acres of countryside would be paved over. Perhaps the races and classes would mix more. Perhaps communities of an old-fashioned sort, where everyone knew his neighbor, would return. Perhaps the central city would come alive again in the evenings. Perhaps...but why go on? These lovely visions give way before the free choices of men and women who resist all blandishments to leave their cars in the garage. They wish to drive, and by doing so they powerfully express their autonomy, but their exercises of choice also have the effect of rendering the planners’ conceptions moot. So the intellectuals sulk in their tents and grumpily call to mind utopias that might have been. Although this essay was stimulated in the first instance by a conviction that the critics of the automobile had, at best, offered distinctly one-sided appraisals, my aim here has been to develop the positive case for the value of automobility, not to respond point by point to the items in the brief against the automobile. (And, of course, I staunchly agree with some of these points.) Many of the argumentative missiles launched at the automobile become more fully intelligible if one understands them as motivated at least as much by a disinclination to tolerate individual autonomy as by any particular facet of automobile technology.

#### Knowledge we obtain from transportation has value in itself their authors refuse to acknowledge

Lomasky ’97 (Loren E., “Autonomy and Automobility” The Independent Review, v.II, n.1, Summer 1997, ISSN 1086-1653, pp. 5–28. http://www.independent.org/pdf/tir/tir\_02\_1\_lomasky.pdf)

How much weight should one give this sort of knowledge? The question deserves an answer. Few of the automobile’s critics have a word to say about the knowledge-enhancing aspects of automobility, either because they have never considered the automobile from the perspective of information gathering or because they implicitly suppose that what one learns while behind a steering wheel is trivial. But these critics do not represent the population at large. They are intellectuals and information processors of one stripe or an- other, most comfortable with information that can be synthesized in books or graphs or computerized databases. They tend to depreciate information that can’t be measured, quantified, and represented symbolically. But the information to be gained from reading a history book or running a regression is not the only sort that individuals can use effectively in their pursuits. Knowledge need not be grand or profound to have value in itself and to complement choice. By driving north along the lake to see how the autumn leaves have turned and whether the Canadian geese are still milling or have flown, I may gain an inherently worthwhile experience. Driving through the various neighborhoods of a city reveals where the bakeries, hairdressers, and Thai restaurants are located; who is having a garage sale this week; and which parts of town are becoming distinctly seedier. Teenagers cruising the “main drag” are conducting an epistemological mission motivated by the hope of sniffing out the whereabouts of others of a desirable age and gender. And even the stereotypically boorish Bermuda-shorts-clad tourists with their vans, videocams, and surly children in tow may actually be uplifted by the sights of the Civil War battlefield or seaside to which they have driven. When the range within which one moves about becomes extended, so too does the range of one’s potential knowledge. The automobile is the quintessential range extender, not only by lengthening the trips one can take but also by multiplying the number of available routes. Knowledge by acquaintance has been emphasized in the preceding discussion, but auto- mobility also extends one’s ability to acquire other kinds of knowledge. Cars go not only to malls and theme parks but to libraries, universities, and museums. Cars provide regular access to urban centers of learning to those who live many miles distant. The traditional derogatory image of the unlettered “country bumpkin” has been rendered increasingly obsolete by new technologies—telephone, television, computer and, not least, the automobile.

#### **Automobility is beneficial for everyone – solves the worst offenses of wealth disparities**

DiCarlo 6 (Rachel is a Phillips Foundation fellow, “Hit the Road The fallacy of anti-car environmentalism”, January 24, The Weekly Standard, <http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/006/604rvamr.asp?page=1>)

Some schools devote whole lessons to teaching the evils cars have wrought. This author learned in sixth grade that a vicious animal, the "sacred rac," destroys cities and towns, ruins the countryside, depletes our resources, and has created a hole in the ozone layer that makes it harder for us to breathe. By the end of the lesson someone finally guessed that "rac" is "car" spelled backwards. This anti-car agitprop reveals nothing so much as an ignorance of what cars mean to real people. Yes, cars do cause noise, pollution, and congestion. But picture, for a moment, what life would be like if the anti-car activists got their way: Politicians ban cars or tax them so heavily they become unaffordable to most; gas taxes increase several more dollars to discourage driving; and the construction of new highways, even in the busiest cities, is forbidden. (In some cities this last hypothetical is now a reality.) For everyone not living in the core of a major city, a car-free America would be a nightmare. Like each new transportation invention before it--the railroad, the horse-drawn carriage, the subway, and the streetcar--the automobile created new levels of mobility. It is the most convenient mode of ground transportation in history. Traveling in a car, on average, takes half as long as a ride on mass transit. According to transportation expert Wendell Cox, the average American commute in a car is 30 miles per hour, while heavy and light rail are 25 and 15 miles per hour, respectively. Automobile opponents look back fondly to the early 20th century when streetcars and rail systems served as the dominant modes of transportation. At the peak of rail travel in 1920, the average American traveled about 1,400 miles a year on urban transit and 440 miles a year on inter-city rail, transportation expert Randal O'Toole reports in his book The Vanishing Automobile and Other Urban Myths. No one, except businessmen and the wealthy, ventured farther than a few miles from home. Today, the average American drives 14,000 miles a year and travels more than 10 times as much as his early 20th century counterpart. The automobile has made life better for everyone. It has done so by creating not just mobility, but choice, wealth, freedom, and time. The Car, the Common Man, and Work Let's begin with the working poor. In many ways, they have benefited most from the rise of car. As car enthusiasts often point out--most recently Stephen Moore in the Wall Street Journal--the car dramatically changed the quality-of-living gap between rich and poor, probably more than any other invention of the 20th century. Before mass car ownership, mobility was the exclusive privilege of the most affluent members of society, who went anywhere they wanted in carriages. Everyone else had to walk, or, if they lived in the city at the start of the 20th century, ride a streetcar. A working-class woman without an automobile might have to pass the time at an unglamorous job most of her life. But if she has a car--as more than 90 percent of Americans do--she doesn't have to narrow the scope of job possibilities to places near home or the mass transit stop. She can work late hours if she needs to, or overtime for extra money, without worrying about personal safety after dark or a transit schedule. Early in his presidency, Bill Clinton acknowledged that, "twice as many welfare recipients with cars were working than those without cars." Studies by Evelyn Blumenberg and Margy Waller at the Brookings Institution have revealed a correlation between car ownership and employment. In Illinois, 25 percent of former welfare recipients in a sample interview said transportation makes it hard to get to work. In Iowa, one of the more rural states, 61 percent of long-term welfare recipients reported that getting to work is a problem. THE RISE OF THE CAR also means that people living in isolated areas can escape their surroundings. Without cars, some neighborhoods, both those that are too far out and those that aren't situated near transit stops, would be off limits to non-residents. Medical care, too, is easily accessible for everyone who owns a car. "Discouraging autos for the poor essentially means they have to go through life with one more disadvantage," notes Ronald Utt, a transportation scholar at the Heritage Foundation.

#### **Automobility saves people in natural disasters and enabled the civil rights movement – the alternative is poverty and oppression**

DiCarlo 6 (Rachel is a Phillips Foundation fellow, “Hit the Road The fallacy of anti-car environmentalism”, January 24, The Weekly Standard, <http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/006/604rvamr.asp?page=1>)

In an item called "Mobility Injustice in New Orleans," the editors of the Czech magazine Carbusters lamented that residents of the Big Easy didn't have enough mass transit options during Hurricane Katrina: The highways were effective in evacuating those who had wheels. Sixty thousand residents, according to the Economist, did not own cars. However, as Hurricane Rita approached, hundreds of thousands of motorized would-be Houston evacuees sat in snail-like highway conditions in the mid-day heat, often running out of gasoline or heading back home in desperation . . . Can't planners learn from New Orleans and recognize the benefit of alternative transportation, both for the everyday, and in cases of evacuation? New Orleans had mass transportation--lots of it, including the famous St. Charles streetcar. But as Katrina approached the city, the streetcar shut down. Amtrak cancelled all service in and out of the city. And when Mayor C. Ray Nagin went on Meet the Press afterward, he claimed couldn't find anyone to drive buses out of New Orleans. Indeed, dozens of yellow school buses sat in parking lots across the city hours before the hurricane bore down. People without rides were trapped. But what if no one had had a car and everyone instead had had to rely on city officials to keep transit running to get him or her out? Many more than 1,000 people would have died waiting to be rescued. It has been determined, Moore reports, that during the rescue and recovery phase the SUV saved more lives than the sum total efforts of local police and fire departments, FEMA, the Salvation Army, and the Red Cross. Americans who live many latitudinal degrees above New Orleans, in places like New England and the Midwest, have a different weather problem: They live under a blanket of snow all winter long. What would they do without cars and SUVs? They'd literally spend hours of their days walking or waiting for transportation, or else go back to living like early American settlers with a few modern conveniences. Freedom History abounds with examples of the car becoming synonymous with freedom. Waldemar Hanasz describes in his essay "Engines of Liberty: Cars and the Collapse of Communism" that during the Cold War, when Communists in Poland got their hands on the movie The Grapes of Wrath, they decided it would serve as a good warning about the evils of capitalism. Yet, rather than being horrified by images of the Great Depression, audiences were stunned that in America even the poorest farmers who owned their own cars and trucks could drive wherever they wanted. Car boosters often point out that the 1955 Montgomery bus boycott--the one Rosa Parks inspired--worked precisely because many blacks owned cars and could carpool around the city. Indeed, many civil rights protests would have been impossible to organize without private transportation. Some countries have banned cars. North Korea, one of the world's most brutal dictatorships, forbade the use of private cars until last year. When Communist Albania abolished the car, its economy disappeared with it. The absence of cars and highways is consistent in the poorest, most oppressed countries in the world.

#### **The benefits of automobility outweigh the costs – every neg impact is negligible**

Bast and Lehr 2k (Joseph Bast and Jay Lehr, PhD, The Heartland Institute, “The Future of Automobility: Cars and Trucks in the 21st Century”, May 1, <http://heartland.org/policy-documents/future-automobility-cars-and-trucks-21st-century>)

This Policy Study examines the sustainability of cars and trucks in the first decades of the twenty-first century. The authors find that private ownership of cars and trucks produces benefits that far exceed their costs to society, and that concern over future shortages of oil, loss of farmland, air quality, and global warming do not justify restrictions on our freedom to travel. Advanced gasoline- and diesel-fueled internal combustion engines will comprise 90 percent of new car sales in 2020 due to their superior cost, performance, and safety features. Current command-and-control regulations should be replaced with a "means-based approach" in the areas of air pollution emissions, motor fuel taxes, land-use management, fuel economy standards, and alternative fuels mandates. 1. Cars and trucks produce tremendous benefits to individuals and to society. The benefits of private ownership of cars and trucks are often overlooked because they are woven into the warp and woof of our daily lives. These benefits include: Cars and trucks are generally faster and less expensive than alternatives because they provide uninterrupted door-to-door delivery of people and products. Short trips taken in private cars cost less than traveling by trains or buses when the value of travelers' time is taken into account. Cars expand our choice of where to live and work by making commuting faster and less expensive. The car was largely responsible for the rise in home ownership from 44 percent to 66 percent in the last 50 years. Cars, trucks, and buses expand educational and shopping opportunities by putting a larger number of schools, shops, and markets within a convenient distance of our homes, thereby expanding our choices and inspiring innovation and efficiency among competing schools and stores. Trucks and vans reduce the prices of virtually all consumer and producer goods by lowering shipping costs and by making it possible to deliver small amounts of products to retailers at frequent intervals (thereby reducing the need for storage facilities) or directly to customers. Automobility produces an important political benefit by empowering the individual against governments and others who would seek to limit his or her civil and economic freedoms. 2. The price of automobility is very modest compared to its benefits. The costs associated with widespread private ownership of trucks and cars include: Traffic fatalities: Some 41,000 people died in traffic fatalities in 1999. Thankfully, traffic fatalities have been falling, both in absolute numbers and even more dramatically per mile traveled. The number of fatalities per 100 million miles traveled was just 1.5 in 1999. Air pollution: Cars and trucks produce two-thirds of man-made carbon monoxide emissions, one-third of nitrogen oxide emissions, and one-fifth of volatile organic compounds and particulate matter (soot). The threat to public health is either small or nonexistent. Air pollution from all sources accounts at most for just 1 percent of all U.S. cancer deaths, and scientists have not found evidence linking air pollution to asthma, or particulate air pollution to human mortality. "Sprawl" and loss of farmland: Government data show that the area of the U.S. devoted to cropland stood at 24 percent in 1992, the same as it was in 1945. One popular estimate of the amount of farmland lost each year to "sprawl," 1.5 million acres, is only 0.16 percent of the total area devoted to farming and ranching in the lower 48 states. Subsidies: Road users in 1992 paid taxes totaling $114 billion, while total government spending on roads that year (including law enforcement and administration) was $76 billion. The difference, some $38 billion, was used to finance other social services, mass transit, and infrastructure needs. 3. Private ownership of cars and trucks is increasingly sustainable as energy supplies grow more abundant and car and truck exhausts get cleaner. Are there enough minerals and fossil fuels in the world to sustain the growing fleet of privately owned cars and trucks? Do trends in air quality and auto emissions require that we phase out our reliance on cars and trucks? We found the following: Ample supplies of fossil fuels and other minerals exist: Supplies of petroleum are sufficient to last 114 years, and supplies of natural gas and coal, which can readily be converted into substitutes for oil, are sufficient to last 200 and 1,884 years, respectively. Even the Worldwatch Institute, long a source of doomsday forecasts, concluded in 1992 that "scarcity of mineral deposits does not appear likely to constrain the production of most important minerals in the foreseeable future." Air quality is improving: Between 1991 and 1995, the number of "bad air days" (when air quality failed to meet federal standards) fell 74 percent in New York, 30 percent in Los Angeles, 49 percent in Chicago, and 63 percent in Milwaukee. Ambient air concentrations of five of the six "criteria" air pollutants tracked by EPA have fallen dramatically since 1975. Global warming is no reason to restrict automobility: Over 17,000 scientists have signed a petition saying "there is no convincing scientific evidence that human release of carbon dioxide, methane, or other greenhouse gases is causing or will, in the foreseeable future, cause catastrophic heating of the Earth's atmosphere and disruption of the Earth's climate." U.S. cars and trucks contribute an almost imperceptible 0.29 percent to worldwide greenhouse gas emissions.

#### **Automobility enhances knowledge through travel and their authors are the intellectual elite who have no actual bearing on public thought**

Lomasky 97 (Loren, professor of philosophy at Bowling Green State University in Ohio, “Autonomy and Automobility”, Summer 1997, The Independent Review, <http://www.independent.org/pdf/tir/tir_02_1_lomasky.pdf>)

Automobiles enhance mobility, and mobility enhances knowledge. Recall the discussion of the relationship between self-moving and perception in Aristotle’s biological theory. As the area in which people can direct their self-aware movements increases, so too does the range of their knowledgegathering capacities. The knowledge in question is, in the first instance, local knowledge. By traveling through, around, and within a place, one comes to know it in its particularity. This kind of knowledge has no very close substitute. I may have read a score of books about Paris, but if I have never visited the City of Lights, if I have never traversed its streets and bridges and marketplaces, then I could not truly claim, “I know Paris.” One can no more reduce knowledge of a place to possessing many facts about that place than one can reduce knowing another person to having read a very detailed resume. Philosophers often distinguish between knowledge by description and knowledge by acquaintance. To acquire the latter, one often needs mobility. Of course automobiles are not the only form of transportation that serves to increase local knowledge, and for some types of local knowledge they may serve poorly. One such case is that described in the preceding paragraph: for acquiring up-close knowledge of a city like Paris, shoes serve better than tires. All forms of transportation—from walking to bicycling to trains, buses, ships, and airplanes—enhance knowledge. But with the possible exception of the motorcycle, another means of transportation assailed by no shortage of critics, none combines local maneuverability with extended range to the degree that the automobile does. The train can move me from one city to another at intermediate distance and afford me the opportunity of viewing the terrain in between. But it allows only a limited number of stops along the way, the speed may be slower or faster than one would wish for optimal information gathering, and the route will be exactly the same on the thousandth trip as on the first. Airplanes excel for speed, but everything between points of departure and destination is indistinct. Walking is a won-derful way to observe a neighborhood, but inadequate to take in even the opposite end of a village, let alone a state or country. For genuine exploration at long or intermediate range, the car dominates all alternatives. How much weight should one give this sort of knowledge? The question deserves an answer. Few of the automobile’s critics have a word to say about the knowledge-enhancing aspects of automobility, either because they have never considered the automobile from the perspective of information gathering or because they implicitly suppose that what one learns while behind a steering wheel is trivial. But these critics do not represent the population at large. They are intellectuals and information processors of one stripe or another, most comfortable with information that can be synthesized in books or graphs or computerized databases. They tend to depreciate information that can’t be measured, quantified, and represented symbolically. But the information to be gained from reading a history book or running a regression is not the only sort that individuals can use effectively in their pursuits. Knowledge need not be grand or profound to have value in itself and to complement choice. By driving north along the lake to see how the autumn leaves have turned and whether the Canadian geese are still milling or have flown, I may gain an inherently worthwhile experience. Driving through the various neighborhoods of a city reveals where the bakeries, hairdressers, and Thai restaurants are located; who is having a garage sale this week; and which parts of town are becoming distinctly seedier. Teenagers cruising the “main drag” are conducting an epistemological mission motivated by the hope of sniffing out the whereabouts of others of a desirable age and gender. And even the stereotypically boorish Bermuda-shorts-clad tourists with their vans, videocams, and surly children in tow may actually be uplifted by the sights of the Civil War battlefield or seaside to which they have driven.

#### **Automobility solves privacy and individual autonomy**

Lomasky 97 (Loren, professor of philosophy at Bowling Green State University in Ohio, “Autonomy and Automobility”, Summer 1997, The Independent Review, <http://www.independent.org/pdf/tir/tir_02_1_lomasky.pdf>)

For twentieth-century American society, the automobile serves as the quintessential bastion of privacy. For many of us the Honda, not the home, is the castle. Ironically or not, those minutes between home and office on a freeway clogged past capacity with multitudes of other cars may be one’s most private time of the day. (I do not mean to slight the benefits of the other great solitude-enhancing device of our culture, the bathroom.) Even those who love their spouse and children, delight in the company of friends, and work compatibly alongside colleagues may nonetheless relish a short time each day to be alone. Such interludes do not indicate an antisocial impulse. Intermediate periods of solitude can fuel bouts of gregariousness and sociality just as an astringent serves to clean the palate between sumptuous courses. Social planners are wont to gnash their teeth at the number of motorists who could arrange to commute by car pool but instead “inefficiently” take up roadway space with solitary-occupant cars. Diamond lanes and other inducements have only a limited effect on the average occupancy. This outcome may be viewed as a failure of policy, but it can also be seen as a reasonable and in some ways estimable response to the valid human desire for privacy. “It is not good for the man to be alone,” says Scripture, but for those who live among a surfeit of others, it is sometimes very good indeed to be alone. The closing of the car door can provide a welcome shutting out of the rest of the world, allowing a recapture of the self by the self—as opposed to its usual embeddedness in an array of intersecting public spaces. Car pools are not necessarily a bad thing; in demonstrable respects, we might be better off if more people doubled and tripled up before taking to the roads. Privacy in virtually all its forms, including that afforded by the automobile has significant costs. (Think of the private room versus the hospital ward.) I shall not inquire here whether the costs of automotive privacy exceed the benefits; my point is simply that driving solo has genuine benefits that go beyond merely instrumental facility in getting from here to there. Any unbiased cost-benefit analysis must acknowledge that privacy has a positive value and proceed from there. Being alone is one aspect of privacy but not, I believe, the most central. More salient to privacy than the distancing of oneself from others is a (re)gaining of control over one’s immediate environment. I may be surrounded by other people, but if I can determine to a significant degree what they shall be allowed to perceive of me and know about me and impose on me, then to that extent I have retained a private self. Surely one reason for people’s fondness for their cars and for automobility in general is the control afforded over one’s immediate environment. Drivers make choices by turn-ing the wheel clockwise and counterclockwise, determining the external environment to which they will move themselves; by other manipulations they arrange the internal environment to their liking. Pushing one button turns on the radio. Pushing others changes the station, lowers the volume, turns off the radio and switches to the tape player. Individuals choose for themselves whether to listen to news reports, Beethoven, the Beatles, or nothing at all. Next to the switches for the stereo are those for climate control, windshield washing, blinking one’s lights, and perhaps a cellular phone. (Because the last item supplies incoming as well as outgoing calls, an assessment of whether it extends or diminishes privacy is double edged.) The vehicle’s make, model, style, color, and options are more permanent objects of one-time choice. Automobile reviewers write about “responsiveness.” This has a limited meaning in the context of evaluating how a vehicle performs, but automobiles, unique among all forms of personal transportation, have a larger responsiveness. Individuals exercise control over the internal environment of their cars in a manner not possible with any alternate mode of getting around.

### **Alt Fails**

#### **The alternative is nonsensical – pragmatic approaches can resolve the worst impacts of automobility**

Lomasky 97 (Loren, professor of philosophy at Bowling Green State University in Ohio, “Autonomy and Automobility”, Summer 1997, The Independent Review, <http://www.independent.org/pdf/tir/tir_02_1_lomasky.pdf>)

Consider an example. If the critics love anything less than cars, it is the roads they are driven on. If existing highways are too congested to support the quantity of traffic that squeezes along them, would it not be desirable to build more roads to relieve that gridlock? No! respond the critics. They oppose the construction of more highways on the grounds that as soon as a spanking new road opens to divert some of the flow from overused arteries, it too becomes engorged with traffic. The ultimate consequence is yet another venue for tedious stop-and-go automotive crawling. Better, then, not to waste any more dollars on futile freeway building. And at this point the subject usually turns to mass-transportation subsidies and new imposts on automobiles. Most readers, I am sure, have heard the argument. But consider how odd it would sound in another context. I am in the business of teaching philosophy classes. Suppose that my class in the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant were very popular, with every seat filled and a waiting list for admission. (Alas, the supposition is counterfactual.) And suppose further that when the philosophy department opens a new section of the class, it too becomes quickly oversubscribed. And the same for a third and then a fourth section. Should we conclude that continuing to pump resources into Kant pedagogy is futile, that instead we ought to use the money for a Nautilus machine in the football training room? That conclusion would be preposterous. Instead, my colleagues and I would rejoice in a renaissance of philosophy in northwestern Ohio. No renaissance of Kant instruction is occurring, at least not yet. But for other items, one can observe such overflowing demand. McDonald’s enjoys success at selling hamburgers. The company has thousands of establishments, many of them filled at rush hour with lines of people in pursuit of Big Macs and Chicken McNuggets. When McDonald’s opens a new franchise, it too soon becomes congested with consumers waiting in lines to place their orders. Should we conclude that investing resources in more Golden Arches is futile? No matter how many millions of instructions per second microprocessors perform, people keep demanding more and faster CPUs. Intel gives them the new generation top-of-the-line chip, and almost immediately people start impatiently clamoring for its successor. Should we conclude from this observed insatiability that investing in computing power wastes resources? Big Macs and Pentium processors improve people’s lives. Similarly, millions of people demand the use of highways because driving enhances their well-being. The striking feature of the critique of highway-building programs is that what should be taken as a sign of great, indeed overwhelming, success is presented as a mark of failure. But the only failure has been the critics’ attempt to talk people out of their cars and out of the neighborhoods and workplaces their cars have rendered accessible. If my argument is sound, it shows that the critics’ persuasive appeals deserved to fail. Automobile motoring is a good because people wish to engage in it, and they wish to engage in it because it is inherently good.

#### Transportation enhance range of community knowledge – the alt fails

Lomasky ’97 (Loren E., “Autonomy and Automobility” The Independent Review, v.II, n.1, Summer 1997, ISSN 1086-1653, pp. 5–28. http://www.independent.org/pdf/tir/tir\_02\_1\_lomasky.pdf)

Automobiles enhance mobility, and mobility enhances knowledge. Recall the discussion of the relationship between self-moving and perception in Aristotle’s biological theory. As the area in which people can direct their self-aware movements increases, so too does the range of their knowledge- gathering capacities. The knowledge in question is, in the first instance, local knowledge. By traveling through, around, and within a place, one comes to know it in its particularity. This kind of knowledge has no very close substitute. I may have read a score of books about Paris, but if I have never visited the City of Lights, if I have never traversed its streets and bridges and marketplaces, then I could not truly claim, “I know Paris.” One can no more reduce knowledge of a place to possessing many facts about that place than one can reduce knowing another person to having read a very detailed resume. Philosophers often distinguish between knowledge by description and knowledge by acquaintance. To acquire the latter, one often needs mobility. Of course automobiles are not the only form of transportation that serves to increase local knowledge, and for some types of local knowledge they may serve poorly. One such case is that described in the preceding paragraph: for acquiring up-close knowledge of a city like Paris, shoes serve better than tires. All forms of transportation—from walking to bicycling to trains, buses, ships, and airplanes—enhance knowledge. But with the possible exception of the motorcycle, another means of transportation assailed by no shortage of critics, none combines local maneuverability with extended range to the degree that the automobile does. The train can move me from one city to another at intermediate distance and afford me the opportunity of viewing the terrain in between. But it allows only a limited number of stops along the way, the speed may be slower or faster than one would wish for optimal information gathering, and the route will be exactly the same on the thousandth trip as on the first. Airplanes excel for speed, but everything between points of departure and destination is indistinct. Walking is a wonderful way to observe a neighborhood, but inadequate to take in even the opposite end of a village, let alone a state or country. For genuine exploration at long or intermediate range, the car dominates all alternatives.

### A2: Biopower – Democracy Checks

#### Biopolitics good—creates effective forms of resistance to challenge the most repressive aspects of power structures through a bottom up approach

Dickinson ‘04 (Edward Ross, University of Cincinnati, March 2004 “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About “Modernity,” Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, p.41-44 http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=2807648&jid=CCC&volumeId=37&issueId=01&aid=2758180)

#### In any case, the focus on the activities and ambitions of the social engineers in the literature on biopolitical modernity has begun to reach the point of diminishing returns. In the current literature, it seems that biopolitics is almost always acting on (or attempting to act on) people; it is almost never something they do. This kind of model is not very realistic. This is not how societies work. The example of the attempt to create a eugenic counseling system in Prussia should be instructive in this respect. Here public health and eugenics experts— technocrats— tried to impart their sense of eugenic crisis and their optimism about the possibility of creating a better “race” to the public; and they successfully mobilized the resources of the state in support of their vision. And yet, what emerged quite quickly from this effort was in fact a system of public contraceptive advice — or family planning. It is not so easy to impose technocratic ambitions on the public, particularly in a democratic state; and “on the ground,” at the level of interactions with actual persons and social groups, public policy often takes on a life of its own, at least partially independent of the fantasies of technocrats.¶ This is of course a point that Foucault makes with particular clarity. The power of discourse is not the power of manipulative elites, which control it and impose it from above. Manipulative elites always face resistance, often effective, resistance. More important, the power of discourse lies precisely in its ability to set the terms for such struggles, to define what they are about, as much as what their outcomes are. As Foucault put it, power— including the power to manage life —“comes from everywhere.”105 Biomedical knowledge was not the property only of technocrats, and it could be used to achieve ends that had little to do with their social-engineering schemes.106 Modern biopolitics is a multifaceted world of discourse and practice elaborated and put into practice at multiple levels throughout modern societies. And of course it is often no less economistic—no less based on calculations of cost and benefit —at the level of the individual or family than it is in the technocrats’ visions of national efficiency.¶ In fact, the literature of the past twenty years has made it abundantly clear that a great deal of “official” biopolitical discourse generated by academics and civil servants was essentially reactive. A vast amount of discussion among eugenics, population policy, and welfare experts focused on the concrete “problem” of the demographic transition of the early twentieth century. It was the use of reproductive knowledge and reproductive technology by millions of Europeans to limit their fertility — the Geburtenrückgang or decline of births, in German parlance — that was the center of concern. While much of the historical literature stresses the role of science in shaping technocratic ambition, of course actually a large proportion of the technocrats’ discourse was concerned with orchestrating a return to more “natural” and less technologically-enabled reproductive patterns. The problem, particularly for the more influential moderate and pronatalist branch of eugenics, was not only how to apply modern science to humanity, but more importantly how to get humanity to stop applying modern science to itself.¶ Atina Grossmann, in her history of the organized mass popular movement for fertility control in Germany in the 1920s, has given us a good example of what this shift in perspective can reveal. Grossmann stresses the technocratic ambition and relatively conservative intent of many medical sex reformers, the power of the “motherhood-eugenics consensus” to shape and limit acceptable definitions of women’s social and sexual roles and aspirations in this period, and the prevalence of the rhetoric of “social health, medicalization, cost effectiveness, and national welfare.” And yet, in the final analysis she describes a powerful reform movement that helped to spread contraceptives and contraceptive knowledge widely among the German population. Popular groups were “increasingly insistent that the working class also had a right to the benefits of scientific progress” (in the form of contraceptive technologies); and while most of the medical establishment opposed the widespread use of contraceptives, the popular movement garnered critical support from radical socialists within the med-ical profession. As Grossmann remarks, “the German case is instructive precisely because it illustrates the fallacies of setting up rigid categories of ‘popular’ and ‘professional.’”107¶ In short: is the microphysics of modern power/knowledge always the microphysics of oppression, exploitation, and manipulation? Are technocratic elites always in charge of the imperatives of discourse — or do discourses have their own logic, which ¶ technocrats can define, escape or direct no more (or less) than can anyone else? Discourse may or may not be a locomotive, driving down a pre-determined track and dictating individual decisions and fates by its own internal logic; but even if it is, the technocrats aren’t driving it, and in fact their schemes may get field of state activity was often the product of technocratic “readings” of biopolitical discourse. But it was only one small part of a much broader process by which a large proportion of the German population came to define their needs and aspirations in new ways. We need not exaggerate the degrees of freedom that process generated to be able to appreciate that in some cases, to some extent, and sometimes willy-nilly, discourse and policy were actually a response to that broader process of redefinition — in short, to “demand-side” pressures.**¶** Uncoupling “technocracy” from “discourse” is not yet enough, however. We should also be alive to the ways in which new social practices, institutions, and knowledge generated new choices — a limited range of them, constrained by all kinds of discursive and social frameworks, but nonetheless historically new and significant. Modern biopolitics did create, in a real sense, not only new constraints but also new degrees of freedom— new levers that increased people’s power to move their own worlds, to shape their own lives. Our understanding of modern biopolitics will be more realistic and more fruitful if we reconceptualize its development as a complex process in which the implications of those new choices were negotiated out in the social and discursive context. Again, in the early twentieth century many more conservative biopolitical “experts” devoted much of their energy precisely to trying— without any discernable success— to control those new degrees of freedom. For most social liberals and Social Democrats, however, those new choices were a potential source of greater social efficiency and social dynamism. State policy reflected the constant negotiation and tension between these perspectives.¶ Nor should we stop at a reexamination of knowledge and technology. It might make sense, too, to reexamine the process of institution-building, the elaboration of the practices and institutions of biopolitics. No doubt the creation of public and private social welfare institutions created instruments for the study, manipulation, or control of individuals and groups. But it also generated opportunities for self-organization and participation by social groups of all kinds. Grossmann’s birth control movement was but one instance of the explosive growth of the universe of associational life in the field of biopolitics, which itself was only one small part of a much broader development: the self-creation of a new, urban industrial social order, the creation of a self-government of society through myriad nongovernmental organizations. In these organizations, citizens were acting to shape their own lives in ways that were often fundamentally important as part of lived experience — of the “life world.” Of course there was nothing inherently democratic about these organizations or their social functions — many were authoritarian in structure, many cultivated a tendentially elitist culture of expertise, and some pursued exclusionary and discriminatory agendas. Nevertheless, they institutionalized pluralism, solicited participation, enforced public debate, and effectively sabotaged simple authoritarian government. Again, National Socialist totalitarianism was in part a response precisely to the failure of political, social, and cultural elites to contain and control this proliferation of voices, interests, and influence groups.108

#### **Democratic checks in countries like the US ensure no slippery slope to biopolitical extermination**

Ojakangas, ‘5 (Mike Ojakangas, Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, in Foucault Studies No. 2 2005 p. http://www.foucault-studies.com/no2/ojakangas1.pdf)

A comparative framework can help us to clarify this point. Other states passed compulsory sterilization laws in the 1930s — indeed, individual states in the United States had already begun doing so in 1907. Yet they did not proceed to the next steps adopted by National Socialism — mass sterilization, mass “eugenic” abortion and murder of the “defective.” Individual figures in, for example, the U.S. did make such suggestions. But neither the political structures of democratic states nor their legal and political principles permitted such policies actually being enacted. Nor did the scale of forcible sterilization in other countries match that of the Nazi program. I do not mean to suggest that such programs were not horrible; but in a democratic political context they did not develop the dynamic of constant radicalization and escalation that characterized Nazi policies.

### **A2: Nazis Prove**

#### **Nazi Germany was the exception, not the rule, to biopolitical modernity**

Ojakangas, ‘5 [Mike Ojakangas, Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, in Foucault Studies No. 2 2005 p. http://www.foucault-

studies.com/no2/ojakangas1.pdf]

And yet, it is clear that anti-Semitism and eugenics did not imply, presuppose, or necessitate each other. The Nazi variant of biopolitical modernity was in fact quite idiosyncratic. It is very difficult to assess the place of explicitly ethnic racist thinking in the development of eugenics; but despite a resurgence of interest in the differing “character” and fate of ethnic groups after about 1927, on the whole ethnic racism appears to have become gradually less interesting to eugenicists from the late imperial period forward. The Nazis shifted the balance quite suddenly and forcibly in favor of ethnic racial thought after 1933. It may be that the growing influence of eugenics made National Socialist thinking more plausible for many people in the early 1930s; but it seems equally likely that the moderation of eugenics in the 1920s may have increased the appeal of the Social Democratic Party (as the strongest advocate, among the non-Nazi political parties, of eugenic policies) while actually discrediting the Nazis’ more dated ideas.53

#### **Modernity doesn’t kill people- NAZIS kill people**

Ojakangas, ‘5 (Mike Ojakangas, Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, in Foucault Studies No. 2 2005 p. http://www.foucault- studies.com/no2/ojakangas1.pdf)

In a particularly provocative passage, Michael Schwartz has suggested that, each political system in Germany between 1890 and 1945 produced that variant of eugenic science which it ‘needed.’”55 In 1996, Peter Fritzsche, similarly, posed the rhetorical question, “Doesn’t politics choose its own science at least as much as science prefigures political regimes?”56 Both, I think, are making explicit a conclusion that is broadly present, though not often forcefully stated, in the more recent literature: that the realization of the potentials of modernity is a product of choices between alternative possible ideas, and alternative possible policies. To make this kind of suggestion is not to argue that Nazism “perverted” a modern science that was itself value-free and “innocent.” The point is rather that politicians, like scientists themselves, choose from among a broad range of ideas (of greater or lesser credibility) generated by the intellectual and institutional complex of modern science. They also choose what policy conclusions to draw from those ideas .Of course, as Richard Wetzell has remarked, this interpretation has implications for our understanding of the moral significance of National Socialism, as well.57 Modernity and science were not responsible for the crimes of the Nazis. The Nazis were.

### Automobility = Freedom

#### Freedom must be delinked from movement

Meyer ’11 (John M, September 03, 2011 Professor Dpt. Humboldt State University “Automobility and Freedom” http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=1911180)

More broadly, we must delink freedom from movement in the sense that more movement is understood to facilitate greater human flourishing. While my freedom is clearly limited when my movement is restricted, this does not mean that greater movement is an expression of greater freedom. While I can express my freedom by looking for a job at some distance from my home, feeling trapped in a long commute can instead seem a source of un-freedom. The potential freedom expressed in the first instance is an idealized form that comes without the practical limitations such as the commute, in the same sense that Jake’s idea of the freedom from having a car comes without the actuality of monetary and work obligations that would finance it. Similarly, the opportunities for movement afforded by the car also “entail obligations... to be present in a variety of family, work and leisure time events and situations.”59

#### Mobility is directly correlated to freedom

Seiler ’03 (Cotton, 2003 “Statist Means to Individualist Ends: Subjectivity, Automobility, and the Cold-War State “American Studies, 44:3 (Fall 2003): 5-36 https://journals.ku.edu/index.php/amerstud/article/viewFile/3015/2974)

Conceptions of individual freedom in the United States have been nurtured by spatial and social mobility; or, rather, mobility and individualism have been parallel and mutually dependent myths. Leslie Dale Feldman has recently identified a strain of liberal individualism, derived from the political theory of Thomas Hobbes, that conceives of the freedom to move as primary and essential to a range of other freedoms.35 "The intrinsic relationship between movement and personal freedom," Gerald R. Houseman has similarly observed, "is verified by historical experience which ranges from feudalism to the contrasting conditions of black and white settlement in America, from Horatio Alger dreams of maximum mobility, social as well as physical, to the hopeless finality of Dachau."36 The geographer Eric Leed has also examined the the persistent trope of "travel as a demonstration of freedom and means to autonomy":

The right to travel had entered into the Western definition of the free autonomous individual whose associations to others are a result of conscious acts of connection, of allegiance and contract. . . . These factors—the voluntariness of departure, the freedom implicit in the indeterminacies of mobility, the pleasure of travel free from necessity, the notion that travel signifies autonomy and is a means for demonstrating what one "really" is independent of one context or set of defining associations—remain the characteristics of the modern conception of travel.37

Mobility has thus been idealized as freedom's inaugural moment and its affirming performance. Of course, self-determined mobility—as opposed to that of the refugee—has generally been a perquisite of social, political, and economic power. The traveler, James Clifford has observed, "is someone who has the security and privilege to move about in relatively unconstrained ways."38 Hence the free traveler as a cultural and political symbol reinforces and is reinforced by specific discourses that distribute power along lines of race, gender, ethnicity, class, nationality, and other visible markers of identity. Mobility, ostensibly a universal right, has remained a condition of status insofar as its true goal is "not movement as such; it is access to people andfacilities."39 Hence the mobility of the traveler has symbolized proprietorship and mastery over both space and self.40

#### Automobility provides opportunities for human flourishing

Meyer ’11 (John M, September 03, 2011 Professor Dpt. Humboldt State University “Automobility and Freedom” http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=1911180)

It has often been noted that the vast majority of trips taken with a car were not taken prior to its availability and indeed would not be taken without it today.27 Yet those added trips have enabled greater freedom of choice regarding where one lives and where one works, which need not be in close proximity either to each other or to a transit line. They allow for easier exit in search of better schools for one’s children and they accommodate the scheduling challenges of households with two wage-earning adults. They enable travel with far less advanced planning and enable vacationing in more diverse and less congested locations. In all these senses, increased mobility appears to increase individual freedom. It is not merely the absence of restriction, or freedom of movement (a potential that need not be actualized; sometimes termed “motility”28) that is valued and sought to be maximized here, but freedom as movement (mobility itself). It is the new trips that automobility enables us to take that can increase opportunities for human flourishing.29 Whereas the earlier manifestations of “auto-freedom” discussed here focused upon the instrumental value of automobility to individual freedom, if it can be persuasively linked to human flourishing itself, then the increased mobility that automobility enables could be argued to have intrinsic value. Lomasky argues that “...automobile transport is a good for people in virtue of its intrinsic features. Automobility has value because it extends the scope and magnitude of self direction.”30

### Link D - Consumer Choice

#### People choose automobiles, they’re not coerced

Schwartz 5 (Joel, a visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, where he studies air pollution, transportation, climate change, and chemical risks, bachelor's in chemistry from Cornell University, master's degree planetary science from the California Institute of Technology, “The Social Benefits and Costs of the Automobile,” October 1, 2005,http://www.joelschwartz.com/pdfs/Schwartz\_Automobile.pdf)

This view is mistaken. If Americans were ¶ forced into suburbs and driving against their ¶ will, we would expect transportation and land ¶ use to look quite different in other countries ¶ with policies less favorable to automobile hav- ¶ el. Yet people all over the world choose subur- ¶ ban lifestyles and automobile-based trans- ¶ portation as soon as they become wealthy ¶ enough to afford them. This is true in Europe, ¶ where, despite $5-per-gallon gasoline and ¶ other high automobile-related taxes, as well as ¶ widely available public transportation, auto- ¶ mobiles account for about 78 percent of all ¶ motorized travel and transit accounts for about ¶ 16 percent.' Transit's share of all European ¶ motorized travel dropped 35 percent from 1970 ¶ to 2000 and continues to decline. Europe's old ¶ central cities are now surrounded by suburbs ¶ that look very much like their American coun- ¶ terparts. People also choose driving in the ¶ developing world, where demand for automo- ¶ biles is rising faster than income, despite poor ¶ roads and high levels of traffic congestion. ¶ Even without reference to other countries, ¶ the claim that Americans had the automobile ¶ forced on them does not stand up to scrutiny. ¶ By 1930, Americans already owned an average ¶ of three automobiles for every four households, ¶ showing that Americans embraced automobile ¶ travel long before there were interstate high- ¶ ways and long before the postwar suburban- ¶ ization of American metropolitan areas.

#### **People choose automobiles for their benefits over other modes of transportation – cheaper and faster**

Schwartz 5 (Joel, a visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, where he studies air pollution, transportation, climate change, and chemical risks, bachelor's in chemistry from Cornell University, master's degree planetary science from the California Institute of Technology, “The Social Benefits and Costs of the Automobile,” October 1, 2005,http://www.joelschwartz.com/pdfs/Schwartz\_Automobile.pdf)

¶ The critics have it exactly backwards. The ¶ ¶ automobile is a powerful enabling technolo- ¶ ¶ gy, allowing people the world over to satisfy ¶ ¶ what seems to be a deep-seated human desire ¶ ¶ for space, privacy, mobility, and autonomy. ¶ ¶ Automobile travel has vastly increased ¶ ¶ humankind's wealth and prosperity. Com- ¶ ¶ pared to other modes of travel, the speed and ¶ ¶ flexibility of automobile travel gives people ¶ ¶ access to many times more choices of hous- ¶ ¶ ing, jobs, and consumer goods, and gives ¶ ¶ employers a much wider pool of potential ¶ ¶ employees. Automobile travel is also far ¶ ¶ cheaper than transit, with direct costs only ¶ ¶ about one-fourth as much per passenger-mile ¶ ¶ of travel. Even after including the most ¶ ¶ extreme and implausible estimates for the ¶ ¶ health costs of air pollution and other nega- ¶ ¶ tive side effects of automobile travel, automo- ¶ ¶ biles still cost only about half as much as tran- ¶ ¶ sit. The automobile also creates new social ¶ ¶ opportunities, allowing people to visit friends ¶ ¶ and relatives who would be too far away by ¶ ¶ other transport modes. Not only do wealthier ¶ ¶ people choose automobiles-automobiles ¶ ¶ also help people become wealthier.

#### **Automobility is a result of consumer choice**

Schwartz 5 (Joel, a visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, where he studies air pollution, transportation, climate change, and chemical risks, bachelor's in chemistry from Cornell University, master's degree planetary science from the California Institute of Technology, “The Social Benefits and Costs of the Automobile,” October 1, 2005,http://www.joelschwartz.com/pdfs/Schwartz\_Automobile.pdf)

Based on evidence to be presented below, ¶ this chapter will show the following: The ¶ dominance of automobile transportation over ¶ other modes is mainly the result of consumer ¶ choice, rather than subsidies or coercion, and ¶ overall, the automobile and its associated ¶ road and street infrastructure delivers huge ¶ net benefits to Americans that could not be ¶ obtained by any other means currently avail- ¶ able or likely to be available for the foresee- ¶ able future. In addition, as will be shown here ¶ and in other chapters of this book, the bene- ¶ fits of automobile travel can be retained and ¶ augmented while, at the same time, undesir- ¶ able side effects can continue to be reduced.

#### **People chose automobiles before government-built highway systems and post-war suburbanization**

Schwartz 5 (Joel, a visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, where he studies air pollution, transportation, climate change, and chemical risks, bachelor's in chemistry from Cornell University, master's degree planetary science from the California Institute of Technology, “The Social Benefits and Costs of the Automobile,” October 1, 2005,http://www.joelschwartz.com/pdfs/Schwartz\_Automobile.pdf)

These data suggest that high automobile ¶ ownership in the US. is due largely to high ¶ incomes rather than to specific policies toward ¶ automobiles. Per capita income in the United ¶ States has been and continues to be about 15 ¶ percent to 40 percent higher than in other West- ¶ em countries.? This would be expected to be ¶ associated with greater per capita automobile ¶ ownership. Americans adopted the automo- ¶ bile as their main form of ¶ transportation long before ¶ the creation of the inter- ¶ state highway system or ¶ the postwar suburbaniza- ¶ tion of metropolitan areas ¶ that supposedly facilitated ¶ the automobile's domi- ¶ nance. By 1930, American5 ¶ already owned more than ¶ three automobiles for ¶ every four households.4 ¶ Once differences in ¶ income are accounted for, ¶ these data show nothing ¶ particularly special about ¶ the United States in terms ¶ of automobile ownership. ¶ All around the world, ¶ people purchase automo- ¶ biles as soon as they ¶ become wealthy enough ¶ to afford them. Given that ¶ automobiles represent a ¶ major expenditure, this ¶ suggests that people ¶ around the world perceive ¶ large net benefits from ¶ automobile travel.

#### **People choose automobility – the alternative inhibits freedom**

Lomasky 97 (Loren, professor of philosophy at Bowling Green State University in Ohio, “Autonomy and Automobility”, Summer 1997, The Independent Review, <http://www.independent.org/pdf/tir/tir_02_1_lomasky.pdf>)

The automobile, definitionally, promotes automobility. The complementarity of autonomy and automobility is only slightly less evident. In the latter part of the twentieth century, being a self-mover entails, to a significant extent, being a motorist. Because we have cars we can, more than any other people in history, choose where we will live and where we will work, and separate these two choices from each other. We can more easily avail ourselves of near and distant pleasures, at a schedule tailored to individual preference. In our choice of friends and associates, we are less constrained by accidents of geographical proximity. In our comings and goings, we depend less on the concurrence of others. We have more capacity to gain observational experience of an extended immediate environment. And for all of the preceding options, access is far more open and democratic than it was in preautomobile eras. Arguably, only the printing press (and perhaps within a few more years the microchip) rivals the automobile as an autonomyenhancing contrivance of technology. No one who has been caught in rush-hour gridlock will maintain that commuting to and from work is an unalloyed joy. Competing with tens of thousands of other motorists for scarce expanses of asphalt reminds one of the Hobbesian war of all against all. For critics of the automobile this complaint is not a negligible point. But neither are its implications entirely clear-cut. Just as worthy of notice as the unpleasantness of stop-and-go commuting is how many people voluntarily subject themselves to it. Have they not realized how much time they are wasting in overly close proximity to their steering wheels? Such inadvertence is not plausible. Evidently, people who, individually and collectively, could have devised for themselves residential and occupational patterns not incorporating lengthy commutes chose to do otherwise. In their judgment, the costs of commuting are compensated by the benefits thereby derived. The more the critics emphasize the magnitude of the costs, the more these critics underscore, often unwittingly, the extent of the benefits.

### A2: V2L

#### Autonomy is not key to VTL

Lomasky ’97 (Loren E., “Autonomy and Automobility” The Independent Review, v.II, n.1, Summer 1997, ISSN 1086-1653, pp. 5–28. http://www.independent.org/pdf/tir/tir\_02\_1\_lomasky.pdf)

It would be overly contentious to maintain, as some exponents do, that without autonomy one fails to lead a fully human life. Countervailing virtues grace traditional modes of life. Individuals do not so much craft these virtues for themselves as they receive and don them as hand-me-downs from others. The monk’s life of humility and abasement and the traditionally female roles of nurturance and support within the family display their own quiet dignity. Still, no mode of nonautonomous living fully expresses individuated human agency or so firmly opposes servile conformism. To cite Mill again: In our times, from the highest class of society down to the lowest, every one lives as under the eye of a hostile and dreaded censor- ship. Not only in what concerns others, but in what concerns only themselves, the individual or the family do not ask themselves—what do I prefer? or, what would suit my character and disposition? or, what would allow the best and highest in me to have fair play, and enable it to grow and thrive? They ask themselves, what is suitable to my position? what is usually done by persons of my station and pecuniary circumstances? or (worse still) what is usually done by persons of a station and circumstances superior to mine?... It does not occur to them to have any inclination, except for what is customary. Thus the mind itself is bowed to the yoke. ([1859] 1989, 61) Autonomous people “Just Say No” to the yoke.

### A2: Planning

#### Neg’s burden to prove we’re the bad form of power and planning

Mohammadi ’10 (Dr. Hamid Mohammadi, Assistant Professor at Yazd University and also holds an Urban Planning PhD from Kassel University – from the Book Citizen Participation in Urban Planning and Management: The Case of Iran, Shiraz City, Saadi Community – Page 33-34 http://books.google.com/books?id=Tue8HJKIPrkC&pg=PA148&lpg=PA148&dq=Jurgen+Habermas's+theory+of+communicative+action+has+been+basis+of+communicative+planning+theory.+Communicative+planning+concentrates+on+bottom-up+approach&source=bl&ots=AZZWTDwJ-o&sig=\_P1pb8HH0JFnuadQcYOqHRGHSqE&hl=en&sa=X&ei=mg0UUMbbM5KBrQHAi4C4Bw&ved=0CEsQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=Jurgen%20Habermas's%20theory%20of%20communicative%20action%20has%20been%20basis%20of%20communicative%20planning%20theory.%20Communicative%20planning%20concentrates%20on%20bottom-up%20approach&f=false)

Jurgen Habermas's theory of communicative action has been basis of communicative planning theory. Communicative planning concentrates on bottom-up approach and real citizen participation in decision-making. Both of the two 'bottom-up' and 'top-down\* planning approaches have been faced with certain limits and potentials. While top-down planning emphasizes on governmental authority, bottom-up planning pays particular attention to local communities as main actors in planning process. Similar to many other theories, communicative planning theory has also been widely criticized. These critiques can be divided into three main categories—theoretical critiques, critiques in practice, and critiques regarding the relations between power and planning—among which, I believe that critiques concerned with power is more important due to strong and mutual relations between power and planning and their mutual effects on each other. It is clear that power 'can’ mislead, corrupt or limit planning rationality in practice, but it only 'can’. The question is that under which condition? In fact, it should be mentioned that there are different forms of power and rationality which appear within different political and institutional situations. There are conditions under which rational critiques of existent and dominant power is possible. Moreover, we should distinguish the power which detriments people from the power which may help people and leads to educate them.

#### Alt doesn’t solve – gives corporate elites a cover to advance their interests in planning

Mohammadi ’10 (Dr. Hamid Mohammadi, Assistant Professor at Yazd University and also holds an Urban Planning PhD from Kassel University – from the Book Citizen Participation in Urban Planning and Management: The Case of Iran, Shiraz City, Saadi Community – Page 28-29 http://books.google.com/books?id=Tue8HJKIPrkC&pg=PA148&lpg=PA148&dq=Jurgen+Habermas's+theory+of+communicative+action+has+been+basis+of+communicative+planning+theory.+Communicative+planning+concentrates+on+bottom-up+approach&source=bl&ots=AZZWTDwJ-o&sig=\_P1pb8HH0JFnuadQcYOqHRGHSqE&hl=en&sa=X&ei=mg0UUMbbM5KBrQHAi4C4Bw&ved=0CEsQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=Jurgen%20Habermas's%20theory%20of%20communicative%20action%20has%20been%20basis%20of%20communicative%20planning%20theory.%20Communicative%20planning%20concentrates%20on%20bottom-up%20approach&f=false)

Based on their statements, an actor within a communicative planning discourse, can intentionally use strategies and tactics to reach his or her desired aims. It is possible that a participant tends to act teleologically, despite acceptation of an open, honest, and trustworthy discursive style of argumentation. There is also possibility of an occurrence of normatively regulated action within the communicative discourse arena. When members of a group (for example, members of an environmental lobbying group, paid employees or shareholders of a property development company, or professional planning representatives of a local planning auriiority) participate in a communicative planning discourse, maybe have common values and shared agendas to ensure their viewpoints affect the negotiation and support their clients' interests, despite of their signing up of honesty and trustworthiness in the debate. Moreover, occurrence of dramaturgical action is not impossible in an arena of collaborative planning discourse. As Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger stated, "Individual stakeholders within the discourse arena might attempt to constitute a particular image of the self in presenting viewpoints, either to evoke an acceptable image to the audience, or to present a completely false position to minimize argumentation and debate." They added, despite of Forester's work (1989), this point has been absent in Healey's works. Here, the participants may employ deceiving ways to reach desired outcomes. Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger believe that communicative planning is founded on the rationale that "individuals will decide 'morally', and that negotiative processes within collaborative discourse arenas are founded on truth, openness, honesty, legitimacy, and integrity. It fails to include the possibility' that individuals can deliberately obfuscate the facts and judgments for their own benefits, and for the benefit of their own arguments." That is to say, the idea that "the individuals change their behavior and personality as soon as they take part in a communicative planning process" is an Utopian and unrealistic expectation in practice. As it has been previously mentioned, John Forester (1989) discussed this point systematically, but Habermas and communicative planning theorists have not paid enough and appropriate attention to this point. The familiar NIMBYism"1 that has been referred by Fainstein (2000). confirms this problem. This famous English idiom in planning literature denotes that participants in communicative discourses try to achieve the most amounts of benefits and bear the least amounts of costs to reach consensus in communicative planning processes. They usually agree with the projects and decisions which impose them the least costs. NIMBYism, despite the expectation of the planners, appears mostly in small municipalities. Referring to the above mentioned problems, Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger (1998) concluded that a really successful process of communicative planning is impossible as long as power and political action are the dominant factors. In other words, in a severe political field like planning, reaching to consensus is completely Utopian and unrealistic. There are always winners and losers and it can hardly be imagined all participants behave neutrally and impartially and relinquish their own interests and political positions forever.

#### Alt is doomed to fail – attemps to wish away power don’t succeed

Mohammadi ’10 (Dr. Hamid Mohammadi, Assistant Professor at Yazd University and also holds an Urban Planning PhD from Kassel University – from the Book Citizen Participation in Urban Planning and Management: The Case of Iran, Shiraz City, Saadi Community – Page 30-31 http://books.google.com/books?id=Tue8HJKIPrkC&pg=PA148&lpg=PA148&dq=Jurgen+Habermas's+theory+of+communicative+action+has+been+basis+of+communicative+planning+theory.+Communicative+planning+concentrates+on+bottom-up+approach&source=bl&ots=AZZWTDwJ-o&sig=\_P1pb8HH0JFnuadQcYOqHRGHSqE&hl=en&sa=X&ei=mg0UUMbbM5KBrQHAi4C4Bw&ved=0CEsQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=Jurgen%20Habermas's%20theory%20of%20communicative%20action%20has%20been%20basis%20of%20communicative%20planning%20theory.%20Communicative%20planning%20concentrates%20on%20bottom-up%20approach&f=false)

The critics of communicative planning disagree with the above argument, as Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger (1998) wrote; "The distribution of power between individual stakeholders is recognized, but communicative rationalists suggest that, by building up trust and confidence across these fissures in interpersonal relations, new relations of collaboration and trust ... [will] shift power bases (Healey, 1997, page 263). To say that this is optimistic would be an understatement. The theorists are advocating a redesigning of institutions to foster collaborative social learning processes; they are arguing for the replacement of existing power structures with inclusionary argumentative governance, and this is the weakness of the theory. The planning theorists, even Habernias himself, argue for communicative rationality to foster an alternative to existing power structures. By simply changing the institutional framework of governance, it is argued that a more open discursive style of governance can develop. This, however, displays little regard for individual perception and motivation. It tackles only the institutional aspect of power structures, and denies the existence of power inherent within the individual.'"

#### Alt prioritizes process over outcomes – case is a DA to the alt

Mohammadi ’10 (Dr. Hamid Mohammadi, Assistant Professor at Yazd University and also holds an Urban Planning PhD from Kassel University – from the Book Citizen Participation in Urban Planning and Management: The Case of Iran, Shiraz City, Saadi Community – Page 27=28 http://books.google.com/books?id=Tue8HJKIPrkC&pg=PA148&lpg=PA148&dq=Jurgen+Habermas's+theory+of+communicative+action+has+been+basis+of+communicative+planning+theory.+Communicative+planning+concentrates+on+bottom-up+approach&source=bl&ots=AZZWTDwJ-o&sig=\_P1pb8HH0JFnuadQcYOqHRGHSqE&hl=en&sa=X&ei=mg0UUMbbM5KBrQHAi4C4Bw&ved=0CEsQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=Jurgen%20Habermas's%20theory%20of%20communicative%20action%20has%20been%20basis%20of%20communicative%20planning%20theory.%20Communicative%20planning%20concentrates%20on%20bottom-up%20approach&f=false)

Focusing on the process instead of outcomes has also been challenged by Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger. They stated that the theory of communicative planning and rationality emphasizes on the process instead of the outcomes. They believe that participation of citizens, stakeholders and interest groups in planning process is acceptable and reasonable, but it is unacceptable to focus only on the planning process as the final aim without reaching the outcomes. The participants would like to be aware of final decisions and outcomes, otherwise we will have only talking shops. They relied on the experience from South Africa and added the studies in South Africa show that the organizers of communicative planning have been faced several problems because of strong emphasis on the process and lack of attention to the outcomes and practical processes (Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger, 1998). Although the communicative planning theorists do not discuss only the planning process, and the outcome of the planning has also been discussed by them, however, like Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger I believe that the opponents of the communicative planning have not paid enough and sufficient attention—at least until the present—to the planning outcomes.

### Perm Solves

#### **Permutation solves – negative impacts are not intrinsic to automobility and policy approaches are key**

Lomasky 97 (Loren, professor of philosophy at Bowling Green State University in Ohio, “Autonomy and Automobility”, Summer 1997, The Independent Review, <http://www.independent.org/pdf/tir/tir_02_1_lomasky.pdf>)

Critics have driven home the case against the automobile with lengthy recitations of the social ills it fosters. I listed several of them in the opening section of this essay: polluting the air and littering the landscape with rusting steel cadavers, dependence on foreign oil suppliers, gridlock, the multitude of bodies mangled each year in road accidents, and so on. Let us grant that each is an evil. Still, they are not intrinsic to automobility as such but undesirable side effects. In a proper accounting, one will balance them against the various goods for whose attainment the automobile is instrumental. The overwhelming popularity of automobility among ordinary shoppers, commuters, suburbanites schlepping around the kids, and Sunday drivers out for a spin offers presumptive evidence that people value these goods highly. Precise measures can be left to the econometricians and their professional kin. I shall confine myself to making two different points. First, the cited ills do not support a general indictment of the automobile and attempts to roll back its use. Rather, the indicated remedy is to adopt policies that reduce spillover costs. Legislators should aim taxes and regulatory controls at the vehicles that pollute excessively or present more than normal dangers to others; differential pricing for peak and off-peak access to highways lies well within the capabilities of currently available technology; and so on. 11 Well-aimed attentiveness to particular avoidable costs is commendable; wholesale denunciations of automobility are not. Second, the balance sheet of instrumental values and disvalues ignores the intrinsic goodness of automobility in promoting autonomy and complements of autonomy—such as free association and privacy. Even if purely instrumental calculations did not unambiguously display a positive balance in favor of automobility, its autonomy-enhancing aspects are so pronounced both qualitatively and quantitatively that any plausibly adequate normative evaluation of the status of automobile usage must give them primary attention.

### Complexity Permutation

#### Perm: Do the affirmative utilizing a complexity planning paradigm.

#### Complexity planning recognizes contingencies—solves the K.

Dodder 2000 [Rebecca, Technology and Policy Program, MIT, “The Evolving Systems View of Transportation: Implications for Policy”, http://web.mit.edu/esd.83/www/notebook/Final%20Dodder.PDF]

For the purposes of strategy in industry, David Levy notes that the complexity paradigm, by¶ rejecting the reliance upon “traditional reductionist framework” enables managers to understand¶ that industries are dynamic, non-linear systems. He points to several implications of complexity¶ theory for strategy (as quoted in Sussman, 2000b):¶ · Long-term planning is impossible¶ · Dramatic change can occur unexpectedly¶ · Complex systems exhibit patterns and short-term predictability¶ · Organizations can be tuned to be more innovative and adaptive¶ While Levy speaks to industry in this example, similar concepts are also valid in managing¶ transportation systems. Two of the lessons of complex adaptive systems, which could be most¶ useful to transportation decisionmakers and policymakers, relate to the ideas of 1)¶ counterintuitive systems behavior, and 2) policy resistant systems. While this might not¶ necessarily give policymakers a clear indication as to what types of specific policies would best¶ overcome these problems, an appreciation of the dynamics could enable policymakers to¶ recognize the potential for the unanticipated impacts of policies and lock-in to particular system¶ patterns.

#### Recognition of complexity of transportation systems enables decentralization of information and power.

Dodder 2000 [Rebecca, Technology and Policy Program, MIT, “The Evolving Systems View of Transportation: Implications for Policy”, http://web.mit.edu/esd.83/www/notebook/Final%20Dodder.PDF]

Viewing this problem through the lens of complexity theory, a different possible approach would¶ involve an even greater decentralization of information to the individual agents, drivers and¶ operators of vehicles. In this case, rather than centrally processing the information, in order to¶ find an optimal real-time strategy for controlling network flows, using mandatory speed limits¶ ramp-metering rates and routing instructions, the system would directly provide agents with that¶ information. The clear hazard in this type of strategy, in which the individual agents adapt to¶ information, rather than having the system itself response to that information, lies in the¶ capricious nature of emergent systems. While the notion of adaptation might seem to indicate¶ that the emergent behavior would eventually converge to more efficient network operation, there¶ is really no guarantee that the system would necessarily be optimal. While the emergent state¶ could be a smooth flow of traffic, with people quickly learning how to use information to choose¶ the appropriate routes, speed or timing of travel, the emergent state follow a more destructive¶ non-linear trajectory, with individual decisions leading perhaps to hyper-congestion and¶ gridlock.¶ Perhaps one manner in which adaptation to a desired system state may be more quickly¶ precipitated is through agent learning processes. Do drivers soon learn to recognize certain¶ persistent patterns in the system, and make decisions that actually lead to a “better” system state?¶ The question here is the relationship between information and behavior of agents. As noted by¶ Lloyd (1995) dynamical systems can be viewed not just “as simply behaving, obeying the laws¶ of physics,” but also “as processing information: how systems get and use information¶ determines how they behave.” An agent’s procedure for processing information will alter itself¶ as it gains further information about the system - this learning process takes the form of agents¶ modifying their predictions about the system, in response to whether their previous predictions¶ were correct or not. For example, if a driver’s strategy to avoid traffic actually puts that driver¶ right in the middle of a traffic bottleneck, the strategy will probably be revised when a similar¶ pattern arises in the future.

#### Our arguments aren’t totalizing depictions of reality—central planning recognizes inherent complexity of transportation systems

Dodder 2000 [Rebecca, Technology and Policy Program, MIT, “The Evolving Systems View of Transportation: Implications for Policy”, http://web.mit.edu/esd.83/www/notebook/Final%20Dodder.PDF]

Among the early groups of scientists working to develop theories of Complexity, many have found urban transportation systems to be an intriguing system to study through simulation modeling. Examples of these models can be found in Resnick (1994) and Casti (1997). However, for the purposes of planning, managing and policymaking with respect to transportation systems, the more relevant question is to what extent researchers and practitioners in transportation employ the complexity framework. Referring to Sussman (2000b), this work indicates that transportation systems are increasingly being examined in this framework: Transportation systems are complex, dynamic and internally interconnected as well as interconnected with other complex dynamic systems. They vary in space and time (at different scales for different components). Service is provided on complex network. Systems are stochastic in nature. Human decision-makers with complex decision calculi make choices that shape the transportation system. Modeling the entire system is almost unthinkable. Our challenge is to choose relevant subsystems and model them appropriately for the intended purpose, mindfully reflecting the boundary effects of the unmodeled components (Sussman, 2000b). In fact, in Introduction to Transportation Systems, transportation is emphasized as prototypical of Complex, Large, Integrated, Open Systems (CLIOS). Although most of the literature linking transportation systems to the ideas of complexity theory focuses on urban transportation networks, typically in the form of agent-based modeling of individual drivers, the concept of CLIOS is extended to all transportation modes from freight transport, railroads, ocean shipping (Sussman, 2000a),

### **Misc**

#### Policy makers and scholars have adopted inevitability of automobility to appease the public

Henderson ’06 (Jason, June 2006 International Journal of Urban and Regional Research “Secessionist Automobility: Racism, Anti-Urbanism, and the Politics of Automobility in Atlanta, Georgia” Volume 30.2 pgs. 293–307 http://bss.sfsu.edu/jhenders/Writings/ijur\_final.pdf)

The broad ambit of this article is that many scholars, planners and public officials seeking to reduce or eliminate the negative impacts of automobility are frustrated by the claims of a universal car culture making political challenges to automobility seem futile. For example, Vuchic (1999) lamented that academics and policymakers have adopted an ‘inevitability hypothesis’ in the discourse over automobility. This hypothesis suggests that present trends in the growth of automobility are natural and inevitable. Vuchic notes that very influential scholars and prestigious research bodies like the Transportation Research Board (TRB) in the US have adopted the inevitability hypothesis. Indeed, the TRB, which provides advice to the US Congress on transport matters, concluded in 2001 that American politicians are not interested in making cities more transit-friendly and less automobile- dependent if it means limiting parking supply, increasing fuel taxes, or taking away road space — in other words, directly contesting the spaces of automobility (TRB, 2001). Similarly, in the UK, Vigar (2002) notes that a ‘predict and provide’ policy towards automobiles dominates transportation discourses even with calls for sustainable transport investments, and Docherty (2003) laments failures of the Labour Party in implementing policies to reduce automobility. Meanwhile in China bicycles are being restricted in some cities in order to prioritize automobility, and automobility is increasing rapidly, with the media claiming a ‘love affair’ with cars in much of the developing world (Luard, 2003; Sperling and Claussen, 2004). Broadly, automobility is cast as a natural result of the free market and technology, and although there are many unfortunate side effects, people ‘naturally’ want to drive and will continue to choose to drive regardless of public policies targeted to reduce driving. Transportation policymakers are resigned to resist policies that restrict or limit automobility out of fear of upsetting an electorate that is perceived to be universally ‘in love’ with automobility.