\*\*\*Allied Assurance DA\*\*\*

\*\*\*Allied Assurance DA\*\*\* 1

Allied Assurance 1nc 2

Allied Assurance 1nc 3

Allied Assurance 1nc 4

Uniqueness – Proliferation Decreasing 5

Uniqueness – AT: Rogue Proliferation 6

Link – Troops Key 7

Link – Perception 8

Internal Link – US Key 9

Internal Link Magnifier – NPT 10

Assurance MPX – Nuclear War 11

Assurance MPX – Bioweapons 12

Proliferation Bad – Nuclear War 13

Proliferation Bad – Nuclear War 14

Proliferation Bad – Laundry List 15

Proliferation Bad – Accidents 17

Asian Assurance MPX 18

Asian Prolif MPX 20

Asian Prolif MPX 21

Asian Prolif Mechanics – Spills Over 22

Asian Prolif Mechanics – AT: Slow 23

AT: Proliferation Inevitable 24

AT: No Proliferation / AT: Iran / North Korea 25

AT: No Wildfire Proliferation 26

AT: No Wildfire Proliferation 27

AT: Prolif Good – Prefer Our Evidence 28

AT: Prolif Good – Prefer Our Evidence 29

AT: Prolif Good – No Deterrence 30

\*\*\*South Korea\*\*\* 31

South Korea 1nc 31

South Korea 1nc 32

South Korea Link 33

South Korea Link 34

South Korea Link 35

South Korea Link 36

South Korea MPX – Japan Prolif / Chinese Aggression 37

South Korea MPX – Relations 38

South Korean Relations – Peace in Asia 39

South Korean Relations – Laundry List 40

South Korea – AT: Nuclear Guarantee Checks 41

\*\*\*Turkey DA\*\*\* 42

Turkey 1nc 42

Turkey 1nc 43

Turkey – Terrorism Impact Extension 44

Turkey Link 45

Turkey Link 46

Turkey Link – TNW’s 47

Turkey Impact – Spillover / Nuclear War 48

Turkey Impact – Relations 49

US-Turkish Relations Good – Democracy 50

US-Turkish Relations Good – Balkans 51

\*\*\*Afghanistan DA\*\*\* 52

Afghanistan Link – Credibility 53

Afghanistan Link – Adversaries 54

Afghanistan Link – Iran Extension 55

\*\*\*Japan DA\*\*\* 56

Japan 1nc 56

Japan 1nc 57

Japan Uniqueness 58

Japan Uniqueness – AT: North Korea 🡺 Prolif 59

Japan Uniqueness – AT: Squo Threats 60

Japan Link 61

Japan Link 62

Japan Link – Okinawa 63

Japan Link – Symbol Key 64

Japan Mechanics – AT: No Prolif 65

Japan Mechanics – AT: No Prolif 66

Japan Mechanics – AT: Prolif Good 67

Japan Mechanics – Quick 68

Japan Mechanics – AT: Other Constraints 69

Japan MPX – Arms Race 70

Japan MPX – Chinese Pre-emption 71

Japan MPX – Regional Stability 72

Japan MPX – US Heg 73

\*\*\*Affirmative\*\*\* 74

Non-Unique – AT: Russell 74

Non-Unique – Assurances Low 75

Non-Unique – US Nuclear Forces 76

Non-Unique – Proliferation Now 77

Non-Unique – Rogue Proliferation Now 78

Non-Unique – Rogue Proliferation Now 79

Allied Proliferation Link Turn 80

AT: Japanese Proliferation 81

AT: Japanese Proliferation 82

Allied Assurance 1nc

US extended deterrent is credible now – in-country and physical presence is key

Russell, PhD Candidate in War Studies, 10

James, Co-Dir. @ Center for Contemporary Conflict at Naval Postgraduate School, Former Advisor to the Sec. Def. on Persian Gulf strategy, PhD Candidate in War Studies – King’s College U. London, “Extended Deterrence, Security Guarantees and Nuclear Weapons: U.S. Strategic and Policy Conundrums in the Gulf”, 1-5, http://www.analyst-network.com/article.php?art\_id=3297

The Gulf Security dialogue is but the latest chapter of an active and ongoing practice of reassurance that dates to the early 1990s, and, in the case of Saudi Arabia, to 1945 and the assurances made by President Roosevelt to the Saudi leader, King Abdul Aziz al-Saud. The United States has worked assiduously to operationalize conventionally-oriented extended deterrence commitments and security guarantees in the Gulf. As noted by Kathleen McKiness: “Extended deterrence is not a hands-off strategy. It cannot be created from a distance through a submarine capability in the Persian Gulf or a troop deployment in another country such as Iraq. It is a real, tangible, physical commitment, to be palpably felt both by allies and adversaries.”[[23](http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2009/Dec/russellDec09.html#references)] The United States has indeed worked hard at this in the Gulf largely through its ever-efficient military bureaucracies. In the aftermath of Operation Desert Storm, the United States actively sought and concluded a series of bilateral security agreements with each of the Gulf States that became operationlized under something called defense cooperation agreements, or DCAs. These commitments between the United States and the regional signatories contained a number of critical elements: (1) that the United States and the host nation should jointly respond to external threats when each party deemed necessary; (2) permitted access to host nation military facilities by U.S. military personnel; (3) permitted the pre-positioning of U.S. military equipment in the host nation as agreed by the parties; (4) and status of forces provisions which addressed the legal status of deployed U.S. military personnel. The United States today has agreements with all the Gulf States except Saudi Arabia, which is subject to similar bilateral security commitments conveyed in a variety of different forums. Under these agreements, the United States and the host nation annually convene meetings to review regional threats and developments in their security partnerships. One of the principal purposes of these meetings is for both sides to reassure the other side of their continued commitment to the security relationship. In short, this process operationalizes the conveyance of security guarantees in ways that reflect the principles in the DCAs. Using this Cold War-era template, the United States built an integrated system of regional security in the 1990s that saw it: (1) preposition three brigades worth of military equipment in the Gulf in Qatar, Kuwait and afloat with the Maritime Pre-positioning ships program; (2) build host nation military capabilities through exercises, training and arms sales; and, (3) build out a physical basing infrastructure that continues its expansion today. Each of the Central Command’s major service components today have forward headquarters in the region today spread between Arifjan in Kuwait, Al Udied Air Base in Qatar and the 5th Fleet Naval Headquarters in Manama. After the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the United States further added to this infrastructure with bases in Iraq and a space at Al Dhafra Air Base in the United Arab Emirates used by the Air Force for ISR missions. As is the case in Northeast Asia, there is a substantial basing infrastructure with significant numbers of forward deployed U.S. military personnel. The major difference in Northeast Asia is that a hostile actor (North Korea) has already achieved a nuclear capability while in the Gulf, Iran may aspire to achieve North Korea’s nuclear status. In Northeast Asia, the nuclear component of U.S. extended deterrence and security guarantees is palpable, whereas in the Gulf it is more implicit, or existential. Conventional and Nuclear Deterrence The build out of the U.S. military infrastructure points around the region provide the hosting states with tangible evidence of the credibility of the American military commitment to their security. The military footprint today in the Gulf is no “trip-wire” force, but is engaged in tangible military operations, such as the multi-national maritime security operations conducted in the Gulf and the Arabian Sea by the combined task force command operating out of the 5th Fleet Headquarters in Manama. Since the British withdrawal from the Gulf in the early 1970s, the United States has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to deploy its conventional forces to the region in response to regional instability. Starting with Operation Earnest Will in 1988, the United States slowly but inexorably inserted itself into the role played by the British for over a century as protecting the Gulf States from external threats. Following Operation Desert Storm, the United States kept sufficient forces in theater to enforce the United Nations’ cease fire resolutions on a recalcitrant Saddam. Last, but not least, it flowed significant forces and absorbed the monetary costs of toppling Saddam and providing a protective conventional force that can be readily called upon by the Iraq regime if needed. Given this history it is difficult to see how any state could doubt the credibility of the United States’ commitments to use its conventional forces as an instrument of regional defense. This history suggests an overwhelming emphasis on the role of conventional force in operationalizing American security guarantees and extended deterrent commitments. In the Gulf—unlike Northeast Asia—the role of nuclear weapons has never been explicitly spelled out and has very much remained in the background. However, while reference to nuclear weapons might remain unstated, the reality is that they are explicitly committed to defend American forces whenever the commander-in-chief might deem it necessary. The entire (and substantial) American military regional footprint operates under a quite explicit nuclear umbrella—headlines or no headlines. If a nuclear umbrella is indeed draped over America’s forward deployed Gulf presence, it’s hard not to see how that umbrella is similarly draped over the states that are hosting those forces. The only problem with Secretary Clinton’s recent statements is that she seems unaware of this fact, i.e., the United States already maintains a nuclear umbrella backed by nuclear weapons in the region.

Allied Assurance 1nc

Perceived decrease in US deterrent credibility causes fast allied proliferation in multiple hotspots – no risk of a turn from rogue proliferation

Campbell, PhD and Einhorn, Senior Advisor @ CSIS, 4

Kurt Campbell, PhD, Chief Executive Officer and Co-Founder of the Center for a New American Security and Robert Einhorn, senior adviser in the CSIS International Security Program, 2004, The Nuclear Tipping Point, pg. 321

Given the unprecedented power and influence of the United States today, what it says and does will have a significant impact on the nuclear behavior of individual countries. For example, although a severe new security threat (especially a new nuclear threat) would strongly motivate a country to reconsider its nuclear renunciation, such a threat probably would not be sufficient to elicit this reaction if the country has an American security guarantee that is not perceived to be weakening. Thus as long as the U.S. nuclear umbrella remains credible and U.S. relations with Japan and South Korea remain strong, even a nuclear-armed North Korea would not necessarily lead these two countries to decide to acquire nuclear capabilities of their own. The case studies suggest that the perceived reliability of U.S. security assurances will be a critical factor, if not the critical factor, in whether such countries as Japan, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Taiwan, and Turkey reconsider their nuclear options. It is noteworthy that both Taiwan and South Korea became most interested in pursuing nuclear weapons pro- grams in the mid-to-late 1970s, a time when the United States appeared to have adopted a pot icy of security disengagement or detachment from East Asia following the huml1iation of the Vietnam War. (Germany, which currently does not face a serious threat to its security, has the lux- ury of having both a U.S. nuclear guarantee and dose ties with other nuclear weapons states through NATO and the EU.)

Allied Assurance 1nc

Proliferation risks extinction – any benefit doesn’t justify nuclear unpredictability

Krieger, PhD in Political Science, 9

David, JD, Pres. Nuclear Age Peace Foundation and Councilor – World Future Council, “Still Loving the Bomb After All These Years”, 9-4, https://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2009/09/04\_krieger\_newsweek\_response.php?krieger

Jonathan Tepperman’s article in the September 7, 2009 issue of Newsweek, “Why Obama Should Learn to Love the Bomb,” provides a novel but frivolous argument that nuclear weapons “may not, in fact, make the world more dangerous….” Rather, in Tepperman’s world, “The bomb may actually make us safer.” Tepperman shares this world with Kenneth Waltz, a University of California professor emeritus of political science, who Tepperman describes as “the leading ‘nuclear optimist.’” Waltz expresses his optimism in this way: “We’ve now had 64 years of experience since Hiroshima. It’s striking and against all historical precedent that for that substantial period, there has not been any war among nuclear states.” Actually, there were a number of proxy wars between nuclear weapons states, such as those in Korea, Vietnam and Afghanistan, and some near disasters, the most notable being the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Waltz’s logic is akin to observing a man falling from a high rise building, and noting that he had already fallen for 64 floors without anything bad happening to him, and concluding that so far it looked so good that others should try it. Dangerous logic! Tepperman builds upon Waltz’s logic, and concludes “that all states are rational,” even though their leaders may have a lot of bad qualities, including being “stupid, petty, venal, even evil….” He asks us to trust that rationality will always prevail when there is a risk of nuclear retaliation, because these weapons make “the costs of war obvious, inevitable, and unacceptable.” Actually, he is asking us to do more than trust in the rationality of leaders; he is asking us to gamble the future on this proposition. “The iron logic of deterrence and mutually assured destruction is so compelling,” Tepperman argues, “it’s led to what’s known as the nuclear peace….” But if this is a peace worthy of the name, which it isn’t, it certainly is not one on which to risk the future of civilization. One irrational leader with control over a nuclear arsenal could start a nuclear conflagration, resulting in a global Hiroshima. Tepperman celebrates “the iron logic of deterrence,” but deterrence is a theory that is far from rooted in “iron logic.” It is a theory based upon threats that must be effectively communicated and believed. Leaders of Country A with nuclear weapons must communicate to other countries (B, C, etc.) the conditions under which A will retaliate with nuclear weapons. The leaders of the other countries must understand and believe the threat from Country A will, in fact, be carried out. The longer that nuclear weapons are not used, the more other countries may come to believe that they can challenge Country A with impunity from nuclear retaliation. The more that Country A bullies other countries, the greater the incentive for these countries to develop their own nuclear arsenals. Deterrence is unstable and therefore precarious. Most of the countries in the world reject the argument, made most prominently by Kenneth Waltz, that the spread of nuclear weapons makes the world safer. These countries joined together in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, but they never agreed to maintain indefinitely a system of nuclear apartheid in which some states possess nuclear weapons and others are prohibited from doing so. The principal bargain of the NPT requires the five NPT nuclear weapons states (US, Russia, UK, France and China) to engage in good faith negotiations for nuclear disarmament, and the International Court of Justice interpreted this to mean complete nuclear disarmament in all its aspects. Tepperman seems to be arguing that seeking to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons is bad policy, and that nuclear weapons, because of their threat, make efforts at non-proliferation unnecessary and even unwise. If some additional states, including Iran, developed nuclear arsenals, he concludes that wouldn’t be so bad “given the way that bombs tend to mellow behavior.” Those who oppose Tepperman’s favorable disposition toward the bomb, he refers to as “nuclear pessimists.” These would be the people, and I would certainly be one of them, who see nuclear weapons as presenting an urgent danger to our security, our species and our future. Tepperman finds that when viewed from his “nuclear optimist” perspective, “nuclear weapons start to seem a lot less frightening.” “Nuclear peace,” he tells us, “rests on a scary bargain: you accept a small chance that something extremely bad will happen in exchange for a much bigger chance that something very bad – conventional war – won’t happen.” But the “extremely bad” thing he asks us to accept is the end of the human species. Yes, that would be serious. He also doesn’t make the case that in a world without nuclear weapons, the prospects of conventional war would increase dramatically. After all, it is only an unproven supposition that nuclear weapons have prevented wars, or would do so in the future. We have certainly come far too close to the precipice of catastrophic nuclear war. As an ultimate celebration of the faulty logic of deterrence, Tepperman calls for providing any nuclear weapons state with a “survivable second strike option.” Thus, he not only favors nuclear weapons, but finds the security of these weapons to trump human security. Presumably he would have President Obama providing new and secure nuclear weapons to North Korea, Pakistan and any other nuclear weapons states that come along so that they will feel secure enough not to use their weapons in a first-strike attack. Do we really want to bet the human future that Kim Jong-Il and his successors are more rational than Mr. Tepperman?

Uniqueness – Proliferation Decreasing

Proliferation is decreasing – current arsenals won’t trigger instability

Miller, Senior Counselor @ Cohen, 9

Frank Miller, Senior Counselor @ Cohen Group, February 2009, “Disarmament and Deterrence: A Practitioners’ View” – Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: A Debate,” http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/abolishing\_nuclear\_weapons\_debate.pdf

A Rationale for Abolition? At the outset, the authors indicate that the primary reason for abolishing the nuclear weapon stockpiles of the five nuclear-weapon states and the other nuclear-armed powers is halting nuclear proliferation. “[T]he problem [is] of states resisting strengthened non-proliferation rules because they say they are frustrated by the nuclear-weapons states’ refusal to uphold their side of the NPT bargain .…”1 While it is true that such protests are often made by the professional rhetoricians (many times without their capitals’ knowledge, by the way) in the Conference on Disarmament and in Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conferences, a dispassionate look at the facts suggests that the nuclear-weapon states are indeed fulfilling their NPT commitments. First, even using as a baseline the number of nuclear weapons that existed at the time the NPT entered into force (let alone the size of the U.S. and Soviet arsenals at the height of the Cold War), the nuclear-weapon states have been steadily reducing their nuclear forces and stockpiles. The U.S. nuclear arsenal today, for example, is 90 percent smaller than it was in 1972, and, it will be reduced by an additional 15 to 30 percent (relative to its current size) by 2012. Second, “the nuclear arms race,” whose end is called for by Article VI of the NPT, was, for all intents and purposes, halted in the late 1980s While all this was occurring, two new nuclear nations emerged (India and Pakistan), North Korea repudi- ated its treaty obligations and developed and detonated a weapon, Iran is on the brink of developing a weapon, and two other emerging nuclear weapon programs (Iraq and Libya) were terminated by superior force and skillful diplomacy. Additionally, the actions of regimes motivated by deterring U.S. conventional military forces has nothing at all to do with the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Nor do the actions of states such as Pakistan, which are motivated by regional considerations. Finally, it is important to note that rogue states and would-be nuclear terrorists seek to disrupt international stability; their desire for nuclear weapons derives directly from their own nefarious agendas and are detached completely from any reductions in the arsenals of the nuclear-weapon states. (Indeed, there is a case to be made that these states’ nuclear capabilities would serve to deter rogues and terrorists from using nuclear weapons should they actu- ally obtain them.) It is not immediately evident therefore that proliferation is linked to the existing arsenals of the five nuclear-weapon states or to the fact that four of the five continue to move toward fulfilling their obligations. In fact, the history of the past few decades seems to indicate that hard-core proliferators pursue nuclear-weapon programs independent of other states’ reductions in their arsenals. Thus the prima facie case for abolition remains to be made. How and in what way would the elimina- tion of all nuclear weapons by the five states make the world a safer place?

Obama’s disarm pledge doesn’t trigger the link

Perkovich, Director of Nuclear Policy @ Carnegie, 9

George, VP for Studies and Dir. Nuclear Policy Program – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “EXTENDED DETERRENCE ON THE WAY TO A NUCLEAR-FREE WORLD”, May, http://www.icnnd.org/research/Perkovich\_Deterrence.pdf

Hand-wringing over extended deterrence in a nuclear-weapon-free world is a bit premature. Neither the U.S. nor the wider world is close to eliminating all nuclear weapons. We are not close to zero in terms of numbers of weapons or, more importantly, in terms of the political-security relations that would be required to get us close to zero. As long as anyone else has nuclear weapons, the U.S. will too. If the U.S. were to eliminate its nuclear arsenal, it would do so only if and when all others did the same. There is not a question of exposing allies to other actors’ nuclear weapons.1 Moreover, as long as the U.S. has nuclear weapons, and as long as it has alliance commitments, the deterrent that the U.S. provides will inherently have a nuclear component. Whatever the declaratory policy of the U.S. is, as long as the U.S. has any nuclear weapons, an adversary threatening an American ally would have to calculate that the U.S. could use these weapons in fulfilling its alliance commitments. Whether the U.S. has 5,000 nuclear weapons or 500, if a large share of these weapons can survive an adversary’s first strike and be used to retaliate, the adversary would be committing national suicide if it undertook aggression that would trigger a U.S. nuclear response. Therefore, the question is not whether the U.S. is abandoning or would abandon extended nuclear deterrence in a world when it and others have nuclear weapons. The questions are: what are the threats that the U.S. and its allies must deter, and how should they deter them? Can relations between Russia and its NATO neighbors, for example, be made more stable and cooperative? What sort of U.S. nuclear policy would make stability and cooperation more, or less, likely? In East Asia, what level of nuclear forces and declaratory doctrine best contributes to North Korea’s denuclearization and, in the meantime, non-aggression? What policies would be most likely to facilitate stability and cooperation between China and its neighbors?

Uniqueness – AT: Rogue Proliferation

Iran won’t proliferate – Iranian officials concede

BBC Worldwide Monitoring, "No slot for nukes in Iran policy - envoy," 7/23, lexis, Alex Agne

Iran's policies exclude the production of nuclear weapons as the country seeks to promote civilian nuclear programme for all nations, says an Iranian envoy. The Islamic Republic's defence doctrine does not advocate the proliferation of nuclear arms and only "seeks nuclear energy for all countries entitled to it," IRNA reported Iranian Ambassador to Serbia Abolqasem Delfi as saying on Thursday [22 July]. Delfi also challenged the efficacy of the West-brokered sanctions against Iran's nuclear programme and argued that the country has flourished even further despite years of sanctions. "The sanctions lack legal grounds and will backfire on the West," said the Iranian diplomat in Belgrade. "Iran will actualize its creative potential through the application of its massive human resources and natural riches for more expansion," he further explained. Iranian officials have on different occasions stressed that the Islamic Republic will turn the situation under sanctions into an opportunity to indigenize foreign technologies and set in motion the country's growth. Iranians would use the new sanctions resolution as a platform to move towards self-reliance in different sectors, the country's authorities maintain. They say four rounds of UN Security Council sanctions and new unilateral measures by the United States against Iran are an integral part of efforts aimed at pressuring Tehran into abandoning its civilian nuclear programme, amid Israeli-led charges that Iran is harbouring a military agenda. Iranian officials say that as a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty the country has the right to peaceful nuclear technology for civilian electricity generation and medical research.

Link – Troops Key

Link debate – the plan undermines the credibility of US extended deterrence – security guarantees are useless of not accompanied by conventional force deployments – that’s Russell and Campbell

Conventional forces are key to a credible extended deterrent

Perkovich, Director of Nuclear Policy @ Carnegie, 9

George, Director, Nonproliferation, Carnegie, EXTENDED DETERRENCE ON THE WAY TO A NUCLEAR-FREE WORLD, May, <http://www.icnnd.org/research/Perkovich_Deterrence.pdf>

The most credible and perhaps least dangerous way to assure allies of U.S. commitments to defend them is to station U.S. conventional forces on allied territories, as is already the case in original NATO states and in Japan and South Korea. With U.S. conventional forces in harm’s way, an adversary attacking a U.S. ally would draw the U.S. into the conflict with greater certainty than if nuclear weapons were directly and immediately implicated. Indeed, the greater credibility that U.S. conventional forces bring to extended deterrence is one reason why Poland has been keen to have U.S. missile defense personnel based on Polish soil. Were U.S. personnel attacked, the U.S. would respond forcefully. Arguably the best way to strengthen the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence would be to stress that conventional capabilities of the U.S. and its allies alone are sufficient to defeat all foreseeable adversaries in any scenario other than nuclear war. And as long as adversaries can threaten nuclear war, the U.S. will deploy nuclear weapons to deter that threat.

Even small changes trigger allied proliferation

Campbell, PhD, Co-Founder @ CNAS, 4

Kurt Campbell, PhD, Chief Executive Officer and Co-Founder of the Center for a New American Security, 2004, The Nuclear Tipping Point, pg. 22

It is worth pointing out that perceived U.S. unilateralismn could cut both ways. If U.S. actions are seen as necessary to cope with perceived lnterna.tlonal security threats, Such efforts could allay Concerns of friends and allies and demonstrate that the U.S. is willing to tackle tough security problems. Strong action against North Korea for example will reassure Asian .friends, most notably Japan and South Korea. Still, 'predictability over time is key-you never know when the unilateralism will break for or against you. So the United States must be careful to balance a tough stance with international norms; even subtle changes in nuclear doctrine and deployments can have dramatic unintended consequences among U.S. allies and friends.

Link – Perception

Decreased US commitments triggers quick and widespread proliferation

Millot, JD, Senior Social Scientist @ RAND, 94

Marc Dean Millot, Senior Social Scientist @ RAND, 1994, “Facing the Emerging Reality of Regional Nuclear Adversaries,” Washington Quarterly, pg. np

If the allies of the United States come to believe that it no longer shares their view of regional security, is no longer automatically committed to their defense, can no longer be counted as prudent, and may suffer from a paralytic fear of nuclear conflict, the burden of proof in any debate over national security in any allied capital will shift to those who argue for continuing to rely on U.S. security guarantees. Decisions to pursue national nuclear weapons programs may not be far behind.   The Disintegration of U.S. Alliances Will Exacerbate Regional Military Instability   The lack of credible security assurances will push allies of the United States toward nuclear arsenals of their own to restore the military equilibrium upset by their local nuclear adversaries or by more general regional nuclear instabilities. These allies may well see a realization of their virtual nuclear arsenal as the only alternative to losing all influence over their own national security. This development, however, would lead down a worrisome path, with dangerous implications for regional stability and ultimately for the security of the United States itself.

The plan is perceived as the United States lacking the will to lead; that encourages allied proliferation

Khalilzad, Former Professor of Political Science, 95

Zalmay Khalilzad, Former Professor of Political Science at Columbia and Director of Project Air Force at RAND, Current US Ambassador to Iraq, Spring 1995, “Losing the Moment?,” Washington Quarterly, pg. np

Maintaining the zone of peace requires, first and foremost, avoiding conditions that can lead to renationalization of security policies in key allied countries such as Japan and Germany. The members of the zone of peace are in basic agreement and prefer not to compete with each other in realpolitik terms. But this general agreement still requires U.S. leadership. At present there is greater nervousness in Japan than in Germany about future ties with Washington, but U.S. credibility remains strong in both countries. The credibility of U.S. alliances can be undermined if key allies such as Germany and Japan believe that the current arrangements do not deal adequately with threats to their security. It could also be undermined if, over an extended period, the United States is perceived as either lacking the will or the capability to lead in protecting their interests.

Our link outweighs the link turn – historically true

Yoshihara and Holmes, Professors of Strategy @ US Naval College, 9

Toshi and James, associate professors of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College, Naval War College Review, Summer 2009, <http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0JIW/is_3_62/ai_n32144580/>.

Indeed, historical precedents in Cold War Asia provide ample evidence of the proliferation-related consequences of real or perceived American indifference to the region. Perceptions of declining U.S. credibility and of weaknesses in the nuclear umbrella spurred concerted efforts on the part of past American allies to break out. Under the Nixon Doctrine, which called on allies to bear heavier burdens, Washington withdrew a combat division from the Korean Peninsula in 1971. As a consequence, according to Seung-Young Kim, “Korean leaders were not sure about U.S. willingness to use nuclear weapons,” despite the presence of tactical nuclear weapons on Korean soil.36 Such fears compelled President Park Chung-hee to initiate a crash nuclear-weapons program. To compound matters, President Jimmy Carter’s abortive attempt to withdraw all U.S. forces and nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula accelerated Park’s pursuit of an independent deterrent.

Internal Link – US Key

Perceptions of US strategic reliability is the most important factor security calculation for allied proliferation

Campbell, PhD, Co-Founder @ CNAS, 4

Kurt Campbell, PhD, Chief Executive Officer and Co-Founder of the Center for a New American Security, 2004, The Nuclear Tipping Point, pg. 20

Perhaps the most important ingredient in a new international calculation of the attractiveness-or perceived necessity-of acquiring nuclear weapons is the questions of the future direction of U.S. foreign and security policy. For decades U.S. friends and allies-such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Germany, Egypt, and others- have come to depend on several aspects of American policy when making calculations about their own security and the question of forswearing nuclear weapons. These aspects include the stability of the American nuclear deterrent and U.S. security guarantees**;** U.S. rhetorical commitment to, active pursuit of, and participation in global non-proliferation policies and regimes; Amer- ican restraint in publicly contemplating the use of nuclear weapons, par- ticularly against a state that does not possess weapons of mass destruction; and U.S. commitments not to decouple U.S. security from that of its allies through the development of defensive systems. A number of recent developments may suggest directional changes in some of these areas. And indeed, it is precisely the anxieties associated with such new directions in American security policy that potentially could spur some serious reconsideration of formerly forsworn nuclear options.

Even small changes are widely perceived and incorporated into proliferation decisions

Campbell, PhD, Co-Founder @ CNAS, 4

Kurt Campbell, PhD, Chief Executive Officer and Co-Founder of the Center for a New American Security, 2004, The Nuclear Tipping Point, pg. 23

Certainly, the United States is not the only factor in the calculations countries make about their own security, but it is a major one. The poli- cies and actions of the most powerful and influential country in the world affect every nation and have an impact on everything from global and regional security to economic stability, international norms and practices, and the sustainability of whatever global consensus exists. Much like the brilliant (or simply martinet) professor whose students write down his every sneeze or cough lest they miss something that will be on the final exam, U.S. actions are closely observed, noted, and inter- preted by states around the world. American policy can, sometimes inadvertently, increase or decrease confidence substantially -a key component in any country's evaluation of whether--or when-a nuclear capability is required.

Internal Link Magnifier – NPT

Credible US assurances are key to the NPT

Record, Professor of Int’l Security @ Air War College, 4

Jeffrey, Prof. Strategy and Int’l. Security @ U.S. Air Force’s Air War College and Former Professional Staff – Senate Armed Services Committee, Cato Policy Analysis #519, 7-8, “Nuclear Deterrence, Preventive War, and Counterproliferation”, 7-8, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa519.pdf

The success of the NPT has been reinforced by U.S. defense commitments that reassure allies that they can foreswear nuclear weapons without endangering their security. To the extent that insecurity is a motive for acquiring nuclear weapons, a U.S. defense guarantee reduces that insecurity to tolerable levels as long as the guarantee remains credible. This reassurance has been especially critical for South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and Germany, all of which have had the capacity to “go nuclear” and would have had the incentive to do so absent the extension of credible nuclear deterrence by the United States. As Michael Tkacik at Stephen F. Austin State University observes: “There are many reasons to believe nuclear proliferation would have been far greater without U.S. possession of large, usable forces. Allies and enemies alike would have been driven to acquire such weapons: enemies, because such weapons would then matter; allies, to protect themselves.”21

The non-prolif regime solves all conflict escalation – the impact is human extinction

Mueller, Professor of IR, 1

Harald, Prof International Relations at Univ. Frankfurt “The Future of Arms Control”, Nuclear Weapons: A New Great Debate

Globally, non-proliferation or prohibition agreements, particularly those relating to weapons of mass destruction (WMD), are a precondition for banning existential dangers for global stability, ecological safety and, in extremis, even the survival of the human race. Arms control can create sufficient security and stability to motivate countries to commit themselves to cooperation in other sectors where it is mutually profitable and indeed indispensable for solving problems for society and the economy in the age of globalisation. Such agreements also impact heavily on regional balances and help, if successful, to prevent the greatest dangers of escalation of existing regional conflicts. Successful arms control agreements build shared security interests among erstwhile rivals and enemies. Hence, they even help to de-escalate the general level of regional conflict. This brings us to the second major significance of the triad of arms control, disarmament and humanitarian law. Taken together, these present an important and powerful alternative to a security policy based entirely on self-help and its extension, defensive alliances. While defence capabilities present, in the final instance, the essential backbone of any security system, arms control, disarmament and humanitarian law form a first line of security that consists of internationally agreed rules. The security dilemma which leads to costly and risky arms races and, in extreme circumstances, even to war, can be considerably lessened if there are generally accepted rules for upper limits of troops, military equipment, for the shape of military doctrines and the form of exercises, which give states the confidence that their neighbours do not harbour aggressive intentions. These rules delineate clear distinctions between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour, and thus help to distinguish between the rule-abiding membership of such a security regime and the (hopefully very few) rule-breakers against which the capabilities of the lawful majority can then be directed.

Assurance MPX – Nuclear War

Allied proliferation causes nuclear war

Lee, Professor of Ethics, 3

Steven Lee, Professor of Ethics @ Hobart and Smith College, 1993, Morality, Prudence, and Nuclear Weapons, p. 299

First, nuclear war could result from the behavior of other states, especially those that had formerly seen themselves as receiving protection from the nation's opponent under the nuclear umbrella. Some of theses states might well seek to acquire nuclear weapons, or to enlarge their arsenals if they were already nuclear powers, in order to provide better protection of their own against the opponent. Were such armament to occur, the uncertainties on all sides may make major nuclear war more likely that it was prior to the nation's unilateral nuclear disarmament.

DA turns the case – allied instability and conflict ensures US draw-in

Lieber, Professor of Government and Int’l Affairs, 5

Robert Lieber, Prof. Gov and Int’l. Affairs @ Georgetown U, 2005, The American Era: Power and Strategy for the 21st Century”, pg. 53-54

Withdrawal from foreign commitments might seem to be a means of evading hostility toward the United States, but the consequences would almost certainly be harmful both to regional stability and to U.S. national interests. Although Europe would almost certainly not see the return to competitive balancing among regional powers (i.e., competition and even military rivalry between France and Germany) of the kind that some realist scholars of international relations have predicted," elsewhere the dangers could increase. In Asia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan would have strong motivation to acquire nuclear weapons – which they have the technological capacity to do quite quickly. Instability and regional competition could also escalate, not only between India and Pakistan, but also in Southeast Asia involving Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, and possibly the Philippines. Risks in the Middle East would be likely to increase, with regional competition among the major countries of the Gulf region (Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq) as well as Egypt, Syria, and Israel. Major regional wars, eventually involving the use of weapons of mass destruction plus human suffering on a vast scale, floods of refugees, economic disruption, and risks to oil supplies are all readily conceivable. Based on past experience, the United States would almost certainly be drawn back into these areas, whether to defend friendly states, to cope with a humanitarian catastrophe, or to prevent a hostile power from dominating an entire region. Steven Peter Rosen has thus fit-tingly observed, "If the logic of American empire is unappealing, it is not at all clear that the alternatives are that much more attractive."2z Similarly, Niall Ferguson has added that those who dislike American predominance ought to bear in mind that the alternative may not be a world of competing great powers, but one with no hegemon at all. Ferguson's warning may be hyperbolic, but it hints at the perils that the absence of a dominant power, "apolarity," could bring "an anarchic new Dark Age of waning empires and religious fanaticism; of endemic plunder and pillage in the world's forgotten regions; of economic stagnation and civilization's retreat into a few fortified enclaves.

Assurance MPX – Bioweapons

Troop withdrawal leads to allied proliferation – includes bioweapons

Rosen, Professor of National Security, 3

Stephen Peter Rosen, Professor of National Security at Harvard, Spring 2003, “An Empire if you can Keep it,” National Interest, pg. np

Rather than wrestle with such difficult and unpleasant problems, the United States could give up the imperial mission, or pretensions to it, now. This would essentially mean the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the Middle East, Europe and mainland Asia. It may be that all other peoples, without significant exception, will then turn to their own affairs and leave the United States alone. But those who are hostile to us might remain hostile, and be much less afraid of the United States after such a withdrawal. Current friends would feel less secure and, in the most probable post-imperial world, would revert to the logic of self-help in which all states do what they must to protect themselves. This would imply the relatively rapid acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Iran, Iraq and perhaps Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Indonesia and others. Constraints on the acquisition of biological weapons would be even weaker than they are today. Major regional arms races would also be very likely throughout Asia and the Middle East. This would not be a pleasant world for Americans, or anyone else. It is difficult to guess what the costs of such a world would be to the United States. They would probably not put the end of the United States in prospect, but they would not be small. If the logic of American empire is unappealing, it is not at all clear that the alternatives are that much more attractive.

Bioweapons lead to extinction

Ochs 2

Richard, June 9, pg. <http://www.freefromterror.net/other_articles/abolish.html>.

Of all the weapons of mass destruction, the genetically engineered biological weapons, many without a known cure or vaccine, are an extreme danger to the continued survival of life on earth. Any perceived military value or deterrence pales in comparison to the great risk these weapons pose just sitting in vials in laboratories. While a "nuclear winter," resulting from a massive exchange of nuclear weapons, could also kill off most of life on earth and severely compromise the health of future generations, they are easier to control. Biological weapons, on the other hand, can get out of control very easily, as the recent anthrax attacks has demonstrated. There is no way to guarantee the security of these doomsday weapons because very tiny amounts can be stolen or accidentally released and then grow or be grown to horrendous proportions. The Black Death of the Middle Ages would be small in comparison to the potential damage bioweapons could cause. Abolition of chemical weapons is less of a priority because, while they can also kill millions of people outright, their persistence in the environment would be less than nuclear or biological agents or more localized. Hence, chemical weapons would have a lesser effect on future generations of innocent people and the natural environment. Like the Holocaust, once a localized chemical extermination is over, it is over. With nuclear and biological weapons, the killing will probably never end. Radioactive elements last tens of thousands of years and will keep causing cancers virtually forever. Potentially worse than that, bio-engineered agents by the hundreds with no known cure could wreck even greater calamity on the human race than could persistent radiation. AIDS and ebola viruses are just a small example of recently emerging plagues with no known cure or vaccine. Can we imagine hundreds of such plagues? HUMAN EXTINCTION IS NOW POSSIBLE.

Bioweapons most likely scenario for extinction – its effects cannot be predicted making response impossible and spread immediate

Steinbruner, Senior Fellow @ Brookings, 97

John, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and Sydney Stein, Jr. chair in international security and vice chair of the committee on international security and arms control of the National Academy of Sciences, "Biological weapons: a plague upon all houses." Foreign Policy.

Although human pathogens are often lumped with nuclear explosives and lethal chemicals as potential weapons of mass destruction, there is an obvious, fundamentally important difference: Pathogens are alive, weapons are not. Nuclear and chemical weapons do not reproduce themselves and do not independently engage in adaptive behavior; pathogens do both of these things. That deceptively simple observation has immense implications. The use of a manufactured weapon is a singular event. Most of the damage occurs immediately. The aftereffects, whatever they may be, decay rapidly over time and distance in a reasonably predictable manner. Even before a nuclear warhead is detonated, for instance, it is possible to estimate the extent of the subsequent damage and the likely level of radioactive fallout. Such predictability is an essential component for tactical military planning. The use of a pathogen, by contrast, is an extended process whose scope and timing cannot be precisely controlled. For most potential biological agents, the predominant drawback is that they would not act swiftly or decisively enough to be an effective weapon. But for a few pathogens - ones most likely to have a decisive effect and therefore the ones most likely to be contemplated for deliberately hostile use - the risk runs in the other direction. A lethal pathogen that could efficiently spread from one victim to another would be capable of initiating an intensifying cascade of disease that might ultimately threaten the entire world population. The 1918 influenza epidemic demonstrated the potential for a global contagion of this sort but not necessarily its outer limit.

Proliferation Bad – Nuclear War

Proliferation leads to global nuclear war

Taylor, former Deputy Director of DNA, 1

Theodore, Chairman of NOVA, Former Nuclear Weapons Designer, Recipient of the US Atomic Energy Commission’s 1965 Lawrence Memorial Award and former Deputy Dir. of Defense Nuclear Agency, “Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”, in “Breakthrough: Emerging New Thinking”, http://www-ee.stanford.edu/~hellman/Breakthrough/book/chapters/taylor.html

Nuclear proliferation - be it among nations or terrorists - greatly increases the chance of nuclear violence on a scale that would be intolerable. Proliferation increases the chance that nuclear weapons will fall into the hands of irrational people, either suicidal or with no concern for the fate of the world. Irrational or outright psychotic leaders of military factions or terrorist groups might decide to use a few nuclear weapons under their control to stimulate a global nuclear war, as an act of vengeance against humanity as a whole. Countless scenarios of this type can be constructed. Limited nuclear wars between countries with small numbers of nuclear weapons could escalate into major nuclear wars between superpowers. For example, a nation in an advanced stage of "latent proliferation," finding itself losing a nonnuclear war, might complete the transition to deliverable nuclear weapons and, in desperation, use them. If that should happen in a region, such as the Middle East, where major superpower interests are at stake, the small nuclear war could easily escalate into a global nuclear war.

Proliferation Bad – Nuclear War

Proliferation leads to miscalculation and escalating conflict, ends in nuclear wars – every new state magnifies the risk

 Gareth Evans, Professorial fellow in the School of Social and Political Sciences @ University of Melbourne, and Yoriko Kawaguchi, Co-chair of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, 12/15/2009, “Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers,” [http://www.icnnd.org/ reference/reports/ent/ downloads.html](http://www.icnnd.org/reference/reports/ent/downloads.html)

Ensuring that no new states join the ranks of those already nuclear-armed must continue to be one of the world’s top international security priorities. Every new nuclear-armed state will add significantly to the inherent risks – of accident or miscalculation as well as deliberate use – involved in any possession of these weapons, and potentially encourage more states to acquire nuclear weapons to avoid being left behind. Any scramble for nuclear capabilities is bound to generate severe instability in bilateral, regional and international relations. The carefully worked checks and balances of interstate relations will come under severe stress. There will be enhanced fears of nuclear blackmail, and of irresponsible and unpredictable leadership behaviour. In conditions of inadequate command and control systems, absence of confidence building measures and multiple agencies in the nuclear weapons chain of authority, the possibility of an accidental or maverick usage of nuclear weapons will remain high. Unpredictable elements of risk and reward will impact on decision making processes. The dangers are compounded if the new and aspiring nuclear weapons states have, as is likely to be the case, ongoing inter-state disputes with ideological, territorial, historical – and for all those reasons, strongly emotive – dimensions. The transitional period is likely to be most dangerous of all, with the arrival of nuclear weapons tending to be accompanied by sabre rattling and competitive nuclear chauvinism. For example, as between Pakistan and India a degree of stability might have now evolved, but 1998–2002 was a period of disturbingly fragile interstate relations. Command and control and risk management of nuclear weapons takes time to evolve. Military and political leadership in new nuclear-armed states need time to learn and implement credible safety and security systems. The risks of nuclear accidents and the possibility of nuclear action through inadequate crisis control mechanisms are very high in such circumstances. If this is coupled with political instability in such states, the risks escalate again. Where such countries are beset with internal stresses and fundamentalist groups with trans-national agendas, the risk of nuclear weapons or fissile material coming into possession of non-state actors cannot be ignored. The action–reaction cycle of nations on high alerts, of military deployments, threats and counter threats of military action, have all been witnessed in the Korean peninsula with unpredictable behavioural patterns driving interstate relations. The impact of a proliferation breakout in the Middle East would be much wider in scope and make stability management extraordinarily difficult. Whatever the chances of “stable deterrence” prevailing in a Cold War or India–Pakistan setting, the prospects are significantly less in a regional setting with multiple nuclear power centres divided by multiple and cross-cutting sources of conflict.

Proliferation Bad – Laundry List

Proliferation dramatically increases the risk of accidental, preemptive and terrorist based nuclear war – mass slaughter of entire nations is likely

Utgoff, PhD, 2

Victor, Deputy Director of the Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of the Institute for Defense Analyses and former Senior Member of the National security Council Staff, Survival, “Proliferation, Missile Defense and American Ambitions”, 44:2, Summer, p. 87-90

Many readers are probably willing to accept that nuclear proliferation is such a grave threat to world peace that every effort should be made to avoid it. However, every effort has not been made in the past, and we are talking about much more substantial efforts now. For new and substantially more burdensome efforts to be made to slow or stop nuclear proliferation, it needs to be established that the highly proliferated nuclear world that would sooner or later evolve without such efforts is not going to be acceptable. And, for many reasons, it is not. First, the dynamics of getting to a highly proliferated world could be very dangerous. Proliferating states will feel great pressures to obtain nuclear weapons and delivery systems before any potential opponent does. Those who succeed in outracing an opponent may consider preemptive nuclear war before the opponent becomes capable of nuclear retaliation. Those who lag behind might try to preempt their opponent’s nuclear programme or defeat the opponent using conventional forces. And those who feel threatened but are incapable of building nuclear weapons may still be able to join in this arms race by building other types of weapons of mass destruction, such as biological weapons. Second, as the world approaches complete proliferation, the hazards posed by nuclear weapons today will be magnified many times over. Fifty or more nations capable of launching nuclear weapons means that the risk of nuclear accidents that could cause serious damage not only to their own populations and environments, but those of others, is hugely increased. The chances of such weapons falling into the hands of renegade military units or terrorists is far greater, as is the number of nations carrying out hazardous manufacturing and storage activities. Increased prospects for the occasional nuclear shootout Worse still, in a highly proliferated world there would be more frequent opportunities for the use of nuclear weapons. And more frequent opportunities means shorter expected times between conflicts in which nuclear weapons get used, unless the probability of use at any opportunity is actually zero. To be sure, some theorists on nuclear deterrence appear to think that in any confrontation between two states known to have reliable nuclear capabilities, the probability of nuclear weapons being used is zero.3 These theorists think that such states will be so fearful of escalation to nuclear war that they would always avoid or terminate confrontations between them, short of even conventional war. They believe this to be true even if the two states have different cultures or leaders with very eccentric personalities. History and human nature, however, suggest that they are almost surely wrong. History includes instances in which states known to possess nuclear weapons did engage in direct conventional conflict. China and Russia fought battles along their common border even after both had nuclear weapons. Moreover, logic suggests that if states with nuclear weapons always avoided conflict with one another, surely states without nuclear weapons would avoid conflict with states that had them. Again, history provides counter-examples. Egypt attacked Israel in 1973 even though it saw Israel as a nuclear power at the time. Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands and fought Britain’s efforts to take them back, even though Britain had nuclear weapons. Those who claim that two states with reliable nuclear capabilities to devastate each other will not engage in conventional conflict risking nuclear war also assume that any leader from any culture would not choose suicide for his nation. But history provides unhappy examples of states whose leaders were ready to choose suicide for themselves and their fellow citizens. Hitler tried to impose a ‘victory or destruction’ policy on his people as Nazi Germany was going down to defeat.4 And Japan’s war minister, during debates on how to respond to the American atomic bombing, suggested ‘Would it not be wondrous for the whole nation to be destroyed like a beautiful flower?’5 If leaders are willing to engage in conflict with nuclear-armed nations, use of nuclear weapons in any particular instance may not be likely, but its probability would still be dangerously significant. In particular, human nature suggests that the threat of retaliation with nuclear weapons is not a reliable guarantee against a disastrous first use of these weapons. While national leaders and their advisors everywhere are usually talented and experienced people, even their most important decisions cannot be counted on to be the product of well-informed and thorough assessments of all options from all relevant points of view. This is especially so when the stakes are so large as to defy assessment and there are substantial pressures to act quickly, as could be expected in intense and fast-moving crises between nuclear-armed states.6 Instead, like other human beings, national leaders can be seduced by wishful thinking. They can misinterpret the words or actions of opposing leaders. Their advisors may produce answers that they think the leader wants to hear, or coalesce around what they know is an inferior decision because the group urgently needs the confidence or the sharing of responsibility that results from settling on something. Moreover, leaders may not recognise clearly where their personal or party interests diverge from those of their citizens. Under great stress, human beings can lose their ability to think carefully. They can refuse to believe that the worst could really happen, oversimplify the problem at hand, think in terms of simplistic analogies and play hunches. The intuitive rules for how individuals should respond to insults or signs of weakness in an opponent may too readily suggest a rash course of action. Anger, fear, greed, ambition and pride can all lead to bad decisions. The desire for a decisive solution to the problem at hand may lead to an unnecessarily extreme course of action. We can almost hear the kinds of words that could flow from discussions in nuclear crises or war. ‘These people are not willing to die for this interest’. ‘No sane person would actually use such weapons’. ‘Perhaps the opponent will back down if we show him we mean business by demonstrating a willingness to use nuclear weapons’. ‘If I don’t hit them back really hard, I am going to be driven from office, if not killed’. Whether right or wrong, in the stressful atmosphere of a nuclear crisis or war, such words from others, or silently from within, might resonate too readily with a harried leader. Thus, both history and human nature suggest that nuclear deterrence can be expected to fail from time to time, and we are fortunate it has not happened yet. But the threat of nuclear war is not just a matter of a few weapons being used. It could get much worse. Once a conflict reaches the point where nuclear weapons are employed, the stresses felt by the leaderships would rise enormously. These stresses can be expected to further degrade their decision-making. The pressures to force the enemy to stop fighting or to surrender could argue for more forceful and decisive military action, which might be the right thing to do in the circumstances, but maybe not. And the horrors of the carnage already suffered may be seen as justification for visiting the most devastating punishment possible on the enemy.7 Again, history demonstrates how intense conflict can lead the combatants to escalate violence to the maximum possible levels. In the Second World War, early promises not to bomb cities soon gave way to essentially indiscriminate bombing of civilians. The war between Iran and Iraq during the 1980s led to the use of chemical weapons on both sides and exchanges of missiles against each other’s cities. And more recently, violence in the Middle East escalated in a few months from rocks and small arms to heavy weapons on one side, and from police actions to air strikes and armoured attacks on the other. Escalation of violence is also basic human nature. Once the violence starts, retaliatory exchanges of violent acts can escalate to levels unimagined by the participants beforehand.8 Intense and blinding anger is a common response to fear or humiliation or abuse. And such anger can lead us to impose on our opponents whatever levels of violence are readily accessible. In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear ‘six-shooters’ on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.

Proliferation Bad – Accidents

New states accidentally launch- money, human error, false warning

Chock, Professor of Political Science, 6

Karl Heinz Chock, Professor of Political Science at the University of Vienna 2006, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons – More May be Worse, www.iuvienna.edu/788\_EN-Documents-PDFs-Spread-of-Nuclear-Weapons-Paper.pdf -

Besides above mentioned evidences, there are strong reasons to expect that new nuclear states will face even greater risk of nuclear accidents: lack of financial and organizational resources to produce safe weapons design features, weapons that are developed in secret manner tend to be less safe, geographical proximity between conflicting states, and fearing of decapitation attack by the enemy may produce many accidents. In his own book, The Limits of Safety, Sagan adds political dimension to normal accidents theory which could produce even greater pessimism about the likehood of organizational accidents. Conflicting objectives inevitably exist inside any large organization that manages hazardous technology: some top level authorities may place a high priority on safety, but others may place a higher value on more parochial objectives such as increasing production levels, enhancing the size of their subunit, promoting their individual careers, etc. As a result, organizational learning about safety problems is often severely limited. Normal accidents theory suggests that each of the three basic strategies used to improve organizational safety is highly problematic. For example, adding redundant back-up systems can be very counterproductive; redundancy makes the system agan also emphasizes that the politics of blame inside organizations also reduces trial and error learning from accidents because organizational leaders have great incentives to find operators at lower levels at fault; this absolves higher leaders from responsibility and moreover it is usually cheaper to fire the operator than to change accident-prone procedures or structures. Knowing this however, field-level operators have strong incentives not to report safety incident whenever possible. Even though, these nuclear states still did not experience any serious nuclear accident, there are good reasons to anticipate that the probabilities will be high over time. It can happen from false warning or unauthorized use of weapons. (Sagan, the Limits of Safety)

Asian Assurance MPX

Credible US assurances are key to East Asian stability and U.S. global leadership – the impact is rapid Japan remilitarization, Taiwan conflict and instability in India-Pakistan and Korea

Goh, Professor at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 8

Evelyn, Lecturer in International Relations in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the Univ of Oxford, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, “Hierarchy and the role of the United States in the East Asian security order,” 2008 8(3):353-377, Oxford

The centrality of these mutual processes of assurance and deference means that the stability of a hierarchical order is fundamentally related to a collective sense of certainty about the leadership and order of the hierarchy. This certainty is rooted in a combination of material calculations – smaller states' assurance that the expected costs of the dominant state conquering them would be higher than the benefits – and ideational convictions – the sense of legitimacy, derived from shared values and norms that accompanies the super-ordinate state's authority in the social order. The empirical analysis in the next section shows that regional stability in East Asia in the post-Second World War years can be correlated to the degree of collective certainty about the US-led regional hierarchy. East Asian stability and instability has been determined by U.S. assurances, self-confidence, and commitment to maintaining its primary position in the regional hierarchy; the perceptions and confidence of regional states about US commitment; and the reactions of subordinate states in the region to the varied challengers to the regional hierarchical order. 4. Hierarchy and the East Asian security order Currently, the regional hierarchy in East Asia is still dominated by the United States. Since the 1970s, China has increasingly claimed the position of second-ranked great power, a claim that is today legitimized by the hierarchical deference shown by smaller subordinate powers such as South Korea and Southeast Asia. Japan and South Korea can, by virtue of their alliance with the United States, be seen to occupy positions in a third layer of regional major powers, while India is ranked next on the strength of its new strategic relationship with Washington. North Korea sits outside the hierarchic order but affects it due to its military prowess and nuclear weapons capability. Apart from making greater sense of recent history, conceiving of the US' role in East Asia as the dominant state in the regional hierarchy helps to clarify three critical puzzles in the contemporary international and East Asian security landscape. First, it contributes to explaining the lack of sustained challenges to American global preponderance after the end of the Cold War. Three of the key potential global challengers to US unipolarity originate in Asia (China, India, and Japan), and their support for or acquiescence to, US dominance have helped to stabilize its global leadership. Through its dominance of the Asian regional hierarchy, the United States has been able to neutralize the potential threats to its position from Japan via an alliance, from India by gradually identifying and pursuing mutual commercial and strategic interests, and from China by encircling and deterring it with allied and friendly states that support American preponderance. Secondly, recognizing US hierarchical preponderance further explains contemporary under-balancing in Asia, both against a rising China, and against incumbent American power. I have argued that one defining characteristic of a hierarchical system is voluntary subordination of lesser states to the dominant state, and that this goes beyond rationalistic bandwagoning because it is manifested in a social contract that comprises the related processes of hierarchical assurance and hierarchical deference. Critically, successful and sustainable hierarchical assurance and deference helps to explain why Japan is not yet a ‘normal’ country. Japan has experienced significant impetus to revise and expand the remit of its security forces in the last 15 years. Yet, these pressures continue to be insufficient to prompt a wholesale revision of its constitution and its remilitarization. The reason is that the United States extends its security umbrella over Japan through their alliance, which has led Tokyo not only to perceive no threat from US dominance, but has in fact helped to forge a security community between them (Nau, 2003). Adjustments in burden sharing in this alliance since the 1990s have arisen not from greater independent Japanese strategic activism, but rather from periods of strategic uncertainty and crises for Japan when it appeared that American hierarchical assurance, along with US' position at the top of the regional hierarchy, was in question. Thus, the Japanese priority in taking on more responsibility for regional security has been to improve its ability to facilitate the US' central position, rather than to challenge it.13 In the face of the security threats from North Korea and China, Tokyo's continued reliance on the security pact with the United States is rational. While there remains debate about Japan's re-militarization and the growing clout of nationalist ‘hawks’ in Tokyo, for regional and domestic political reasons, a sustained ‘normalization’ process cannot take place outside of the restraining framework of the United States–Japan alliance (Samuels, 2007; Pyle, 2007). Abandoning the alliance will entail Japan making a conscience choice not only to remove itself from the US-led hierarchy, but also to challenge the United States dominance directly. The United States–ROK alliance may be understood in a similar way, although South Korea faces different sets of constraints because of its strategic priorities related to North Korea. As J.J. Suh argues, in spite of diminishing North Korean capabilities, which render the US security umbrella less critical, the alliance endures because of mutual identification – in South Korea, the image of the US as ‘the only conceivable protector against aggression from the North,’ and in the United States, an image of itself as protector of an allied nation now vulnerable to an ‘evil’ state suspected of transferring weapons of mass destruction to terrorist networks (Suh, 2004). Kang, in contrast, emphasizes how South Korea has become less enthusiastic about its ties with the United States – as indicated by domestic protests and the rejection of TMD – and points out that Seoul is not arming against a potential land invasion from China but rather maritime threats (Kang, 2003, pp.79–80). These observations are valid, but they can be explained by hierarchical deference toward the United States, rather than China. The ROK's military orientation reflects its identification with and dependence on the United States and its adoption of US' strategic aims. In spite of its primary concern with the North Korean threat, Seoul's formal strategic orientation is toward maritime threats, in line with Washington's regional strategy. Furthermore, recent South Korean Defense White Papers habitually cited a remilitarized Japan as a key threat. The best means of coping with such a threat would be continued reliance on the US security umbrella and on Washington's ability to restrain Japanese remilitarization (Eberstadt et al., 2007). Thus, while the United States–ROK bilateral relationship is not always easy, its durability is based on South Korea's fundamental acceptance of the United States as the region's primary state and reliance on it to defend and keep regional order. It also does not rule out Seoul and other US allies conducting business and engaging diplomatically with China. India has increasingly adopted a similar strategy vis-à-vis China in recent years. Given its history of territorial and political disputes with China and its contemporary economic resurgence, India is seen as the key potential power balancer to a growing China. Yet, India has sought to negotiate settlements about border disputes with China, and has moved significantly toward developing closer strategic relations with the United States. Apart from invigorated defense cooperation in the form of military exchange programs and joint exercises, the key breakthrough was the agreement signed in July 2005 which facilitates renewed bilateral civilian nuclear cooperation (Mohan, 2007). Once again, this is a key regional power that could have balanced more directly and independently against China, but has rather chosen to align itself or bandwagon with the primary power, the United States, partly because of significant bilateral gains, but fundamentally in order to support the latter's regional order-managing function. Recognizing a regional hierarchy and seeing that the lower layers of this hierarchy have become more active since the mid-1970s also allows us to understand why there has been no outright balancing of China by regional states since the 1990s. On the one hand, the US position at the top of the hierarchy has been revived since the mid-1990s, meaning that deterrence against potential Chinese aggression is reliable and in place.14 On the other hand, the aim of regional states is to try to consolidate China's inclusion in the regional hierarchy at the level below that of the United States, not to keep it down or to exclude it. East Asian states recognize that they cannot, without great cost to themselves, contain Chinese growth. But they hope to socialize China by enmeshing it in peaceful regional norms and economic and security institutions. They also know that they can also help to ensure that the capabilities gap between China and the United States remains wide enough to deter a power transition. Because this strategy requires persuading China about the appropriateness of its position in the hierarchy and of the legitimacy of the US position, all East Asian states engage significantly with China, with the small Southeast Asian states refusing openly to ‘choose sides’ between the United States and China. Yet, hierarchical deference continues to explain why regional institutions such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN + 3, and East Asian Summit have made limited progress. While the United State has made room for regional multilateral institutions after the end of the Cold War, its hierarchical preponderance also constitutes the regional order to the extent that it cannot comfortably be excluded from any substantive strategic developments. On the part of some lesser states (particularly Japan and Singapore), hierarchical deference is manifested in inclusionary impulses (or at least impulses not to exclude the United States or US proxies) in regional institutions, such as the East Asia Summit in December 2005. Disagreement on this issue with others, including China and Malaysia, has stymied potential progress in these regional institutions (Malik, 2006). Finally, conceiving of a US-led East Asian hierarchy amplifies our understanding of how and why the United States–China relationship is now the key to regional order. The vital nature of the Sino-American relationship stems from these two states' structural positions. As discussed earlier, China is the primary second-tier power in the regional hierarchy. However, as Chinese power grows and Chinese activism spreads beyond Asia, the United States is less and less able to see China as merely a regional power – witness the growing concerns about Chinese investment and aid in certain African countries. This causes a disjuncture between US global interests and US regional interests. Regional attempts to engage and socialize China are aimed at mediating its intentions. This process, however, cannot stem Chinese growth, which forms the material basis of US threat perceptions. Apprehensions about the growth of China's power culminates in US fears about the region being ‘lost’ to China, echoing Cold War concerns that transcribed regional defeats into systemic setbacks.15 On the other hand, the US security strategy post-Cold War and post-9/11 have regional manifestations that disadvantage China. The strengthening of US alliances with Japan and Australia; and the deployment of US troops to Central, South, and Southeast Asia all cause China to fear a consolidation of US global hegemony that will first threaten Chinese national security in the regional context and then stymie China's global reach. Thus, the key determinants of the East Asian security order relate to two core questions: (i) Can the US be persuaded that China can act as a reliable ‘regional stakeholder’ that will help to buttress regional stability and US global security aims;16 and (ii) can China be convinced that the United States has neither territorial ambitions in Asia nor the desire to encircle China, but will help to promote Chinese development and stability as part of its global security strategy? (Wang, 2005). But, these questions cannot be asked in the abstract, outside the context of negotiation about their relative positions in the regional and global hierarchies. One urgent question for further investigation is how the process of assurance and deference operate at the topmost levels of a hierarchy? When we have two great powers of unequal strength but contesting claims and a closing capabilities gap in the same regional hierarchy, how much scope for negotiation is there, before a reversion to balancing dynamics? This is the main structural dilemma: as long as the United States does not give up its primary position in the Asian regional hierarchy, China is very unlikely to act in a way that will provide comforting answers to the two questions. Yet, the East Asian regional order has been and still is constituted by US hegemony, and to change that could be extremely disruptive and may lead to regional actors acting in highly destabilizing ways. Rapid Japanese remilitarization, armed conflict across the Taiwan Straits, Indian nuclear brinksmanship directed toward Pakistan, or a highly destabilized Korean peninsula are all illustrative of potential regional disruptions. 5. Conclusion To construct a coherent account of East Asia's evolving security order, I have suggested that the United States is the central force in constituting regional stability and order. The major patterns of equilibrium and turbulence in the region since 1945 can be explained by the relative stability of the US position at the top of the regional hierarchy, with periods of greatest insecurity being correlated with greatest uncertainty over the American commitment to managing regional order. Furthermore, relationships of hierarchical assurance and hierarchical deference explain the unusual character of regional order in the post-Cold War era. However, the greatest contemporary challenge to East Asian order is the potential conflict between China and the United States over rank ordering in the regional hierarchy, a contest made more potent because of the inter-twining of regional and global security concerns. Ultimately, though, investigating such questions of positionality requires conceptual lenses that go beyond basic material factors because it entails social and normative questions. How can China be brought more into a leadership position, while being persuaded to buy into shared strategic interests and constrain its own in ways that its vision of regional and global security may eventually be reconciled with that of the United States and other regional players? How can Washington be persuaded that its central position in the hierarchy must be ultimately shared in ways yet to be determined? The future of the East Asian security order is tightly bound up with the durability of the United States' global leadership and regional domination. At the regional level, the main scenarios of disruption are an outright Chinese challenge to US leadership, or the defection of key US allies, particularly Japan. Recent history suggests, and the preceding analysis has shown, that challenges to or defections from US leadership will come at junctures where it appears that the US commitment to the region is in doubt, which in turn destabilizes the hierarchical order. At the global level, American geopolitical over-extension will be the key cause of change. This is the one factor that could lead to both greater regional and global turbulence, if only by the attendant strategic uncertainly triggering off regional challenges or defections. However, it is notoriously difficult to gauge thresholds of over-extension. More positively, East Asia is a region that has adjusted to previous periods of uncertainty about US primacy. Arguably, the regional consensus over the United States as primary state in a system of benign hierarchy could accommodate a shifting of the strategic burden to US allies like Japan and Australia as a means of systemic preservation. The alternatives that could surface as a result of not doing so would appear to be much worse.

Asian Prolif MPX

New Asian proliferators will make deterrence less stable – historical animosity, short-range and civil-military relationships

Cimbala, Professor of Political Science @ Penn State, 7

Stephen, Distinguished Prof. Pol. Sci. @ Penn. State Brandywine, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND DETERRENCE IN ASIA: THE VIEW FROM VLADIVOSTOK, 20, InformaWorld

Nuclear proliferation in Asia, as opposed to Europe, does change the political background for proliferation. The Cold War Americans and Soviets deployed nuclear forces and engaged in other political-military competition on account of disagreements about ideology. In Asia, states have other, and potentially more volatile, things to disagree about, including: contiguous territory with disputed ownership; grievances left over from past wars; issues of identity and communal membership; and feelings of wounded national pride or emerging empowerment. In addition to the political differences between nuclear weapons in Cold War Europe and post-Cold War Asia, there are important military differences. Two stand out. First, actual and possible future nuclear states in Asia are within catastrophic reach of short or medium range as well as long range delivery systems for nuclear weapons. Geography matters. “Tactical” weapons can have “strategic” effects. Second, the variable character of regimes in Asia results in a complicated mosaic of civilmilitary relationships. Assured positive control of the armed forces by civilians and negative control against accidental-inadvertent war, as operative in the United States and in other democratic states, cannot be assumed. Or even if assumed as valid, controls are obscure in detail to foreign intelligence services or other outsiders.

Asian Prolif MPX

Asian prolif uniquely contributes to war – lack of rationality, bad command and control and short distances

Cimbala, Professor of Political Science @ Penn State, 8

Stephen, Distinguished Prof. Pol. Sci. @ Penn. State Brandywine, Comparative Strategy, Anticipatory Attacks: Nuclear Crisis Stability in Future Asia, 27, InformaWorld

If the possibility existed of a mistaken preemption during and immediately after the Cold War, between the experienced nuclear forces and command systems of America and Russia, then it may be a matter of even more concern with regard to states with newer and more opaque forces and command systems. In addition, the Americans and Soviets (and then Russians) had a great deal of experience getting to know one another’s military operational proclivities and doctrinal idiosyncrasies, including those that might influence the decision for or against war. Another consideration, relative to nuclear stability in the present century, is that the Americans and their NATO allies shared with the Soviets and Russians a commonality of culture and historical experience. Future threats to American or Russian security from weapons of mass destruction may be presented by states or nonstate actors motivated by cultural and social predispositions not easily understood by those in the West nor subject to favorable manipulation during a crisis. The spread of nuclear weapons in Asia presents a complicated mosaic of possibilities in this regard. States with nuclear forces of variable force structure, operational experience, and command-control systems will be thrown into a matrix of complex political, social, and cultural crosscurrents contributory to the possibility of war. In addition to the existing nuclear powers in Asia, others may seek nuclear weapons if they feel threatened by regional rivals or hostile alliances. Containment of nuclear proliferation in Asia is a desirable political objective for all of the obvious reasons. Nevertheless, the present century is unlikely to see the nuclear hesitancy or risk aversion that marked the Cold War, in part, because the military and political discipline imposed by the Cold War superpowers no longer exists, but also because states in Asia have new aspirations for regional or global respect.12 The spread of ballistic missiles and other nuclear-capable delivery systems in Asia, or in the Middle East with reach into Asia, is especially dangerous because plausible adversaries live close together and are already engaged in ongoing disputes about territory or other issues.13 The Cold War Americans and Soviets required missiles and airborne delivery systems of intercontinental range to strike at one another’s vitals. But short-range ballistic missiles or fighter-bombers suffice for India and Pakistan to launch attacks at one another with potentially “strategic” effects. China shares borders with Russia, North Korea, India, and Pakistan; Russia, with China and NorthKorea; India, with Pakistan and China; Pakistan, with India and China; and so on. The short flight times of ballistic missiles between the cities or military forces of contiguous states means that very little time will be available for warning and attack assessment by the defender. Conventionally armed missiles could easily be mistaken for a tactical nuclear first use. Fighter-bombers appearing over the horizon could just as easily be carrying nuclear weapons as conventional ordnance. In addition to the challenges posed by shorter flight times and uncertain weapons loads, potential victims of nuclear attack in Asia may also have first strike–vulnerable forces and command-control systems that increase decision pressures for rapid, and possibly mistaken, retaliation. This potpourri of possibilities challenges conventional wisdom about nuclear deterrence and proliferation on the part of policymakers and academic theorists. For policymakers in the United States and NATO, spreading nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in Asia could profoundly shift the geopolitics of mass destruction from a European center of gravity (in the twentieth century) to an Asian and/or Middle Eastern center of gravity (in the present century).14 This would profoundly shake up prognostications to the effect that wars of mass destruction are now passe, on account of the emergence of the “Revolution in Military Affairs” and its encouragement of information-based warfare.15 Together with this, there has emerged the argument that large-scale war between states or coalitions of states, as opposed to varieties of unconventional warfare and failed states, are exceptional and potentially obsolete.16 The spread of WMD and ballistic missiles in Asia could overturn these expectations for the obsolescence or marginalization of major interstate warfare.

Asian Prolif Mechanics – Spills Over

Absent a strong US presence Asian proliferation spills over

Brzezinski, former Professor @ Harvard, 4

Zbigniew, Former Professor @ Harvard, State Department Official, The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership

Ultimately, war or peace in the Far East will be determined largely by how China and Japan interact with each other and with the United States. If the United States were to withdraw its forces from the region, a repetition of the twentieth century European scenario would be very probable. Japan would have little choice but to rapidly unveil and accelerate its ongoing rearmament; China would be likely to engage in a rapid buildup of its nuclear forces, which till now have been designed to give China a minimal deterrent; the Taiwan Straits would become the locus of Chinese national self-assertion; Korea would most likely experience a violent end to its partition and perhaps emerge unified as a nuclear power; and the Chinese-Indian-Pakistani nuclear triangle could provide a dangerous umbrella for the resumption of open conventional warfare. A single match could then set off an explosion. [P. 110-111]

Costs of war are insufficient to deter – no forces preventing conflict

Friedberg, Professor of Politics, 94

Aaron, Princeton University International Security, Winter, p. 8

On the Eastern half of the Eurasian landmass, as on its western wing, a new multipolar sub-system is beginning to emerge out of the wreckage of the Cold War. While firm predictions are impossible (or, in any case, imprudent), the workings of this new Asian system could turn out to be far different from those of its European counterpart. In Europe, as the neo-liberal optimists suggest, there appears to be an abundance of factors at work that should serve to mitigate the troubling tendencies to which multipolar systems have often been prone in the past. In Asia, by contrast, many of these same soothing forces are either absent or of dubious strength and permanence. While civil wars and ethnic strife will continue for some time to smolder along Europe’s peripheries, in the long run it is Asia that seems far more likely to be the cockpit of great power conflict. The half millennium during which Europe was the world’s primary generator of war (as well as of wealth and knowledge) is coming to a close. But, for better and for worse, Europe’s past could be Asia’s future. [p. 7]

Proliferation in Northeast Asia will be rapid – threshold states will quickly crossover, sparking new cascades globally

Moltz, research professor @ CNS, 6

James Clay, deputy director and research professor at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Nonproliferation Review, “Future Nuclear Proliferation Scenarios in Northeast Asia”, Nov.

Over the next 10 years, Northeast Asia could become one of the most volatile regions of the world when it comes to nuclear weapons. Compared to other areas, it has a higher percentage of states with not only the capability to develop nuclear weapons quickly, but also the potential motivation.1 With the exception of Mongolia, all the countries in the region\*Russia, China, North Korea, South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan\*already have civilian nuclear power infrastructures. They also have experience with nuclear weapons. Northeast Asia has two established nuclear weapon states\*Russia and China\*and North Korea is a presumed nuclear power. Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are considered ‘‘threshold’’ states” all have had nuclear weapons development programs and could resume them in the future. Adding potential volatility to the mix, Northeast Asia suffers from underlying political and security fault lines: the legacy of the Cold War on the Korean Peninsula; enduring Korean and Chinese enmity over Japanese atrocities committed before and during World War II; Russo-Japanese disputes over the Kuril Islands; and the tensions created by China’s growing effort to rein Taiwan into its governance. For these and other reasons, regional security institutions in Northeast Asia are weak and tend to be based around bilateral commitments (Sino-North Korean, U.S.-Japanese, U.S.-South Korean, and U.S.-Taiwanese). The nuclear character of Northeast Asia is further defined by the fact that the United States used nuclear weapons twice against Japan in August 1945 and eventually stationed 3,200 nuclear weapons in South Korea, Guam, the Philippines, Taiwan, and the formerly U.S.-held islands of Chichi Jima, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa.2 Major and minor wars involving regional powers were fought in the years from 1945 to 1991: the Chinese Civil War, the Taiwan Strait crisis, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, border skirmishes between China and the Soviet Union, and the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War. Given this violent history, it is remarkable that further nuclear proliferation did not occur. The role of U.S. security guarantees with Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan clearly played a major role in this sometimes less-than-willing restraint. In recent years, however, there has been a gradual erosion of political support for U.S. forces in both South Korea and Japan. North Korea’s withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 2003 also has caused both states to reevaluate their decisions to halt nuclear weapons programs. Moreover, the views of some top officials in the George W. Bush administration regarding the acceptability of nuclear weapons may be eroding national restraint and increasing the willingness of countries to go the final step, using their nuclear capabilities to make up for any conventional defense gaps. This essay examines potential nuclear proliferation trends among the states of Northeast Asia to 2016 from the context of early post-Cold War predictions, current capabilities, and possible future ‘‘trigger’’ events. It offers the unfortunate conclusion that several realistic scenarios could stimulate horizontal or vertical nuclear proliferation.3 Indeed, if left unattended, existing political and security tensions could cause Northeast Asia to become the world’s most nuclearized area by 2016, with six nuclear weapon states. Such a scenario would greatly exacerbate U.S. security challenges and probably spark nuclear proliferation elsewhere in the world

Asian Prolif Mechanics – AT: Slow

Asian proliferation will be too fast to adapt to new security realities – leads to war

Friedberg, Professor of Politics @ Princeton, 94

Aaron, Professor of Politics @ Princeton University International Security, Winter

Most of the mitigating factors discussed here are likely, by their very nature, to evolve at a modest pace. Even nations that have experienced revolutions do not always change their characters overnight. The maturation of democracy in Russia and Korea and its birth in China will take time, as will the fading of decades-old national grievances and the resolution of the disputes that have helped keep them alive. The development of powerful international institutions in Europe took many years. A similar achievement will not be accomplished in Asia, under less auspicious circumstances, with the mere wave of a hand. Economic interdependence is advancing at a rapid pace, but its geographic scope is still limited, its political effects mixed, and its future course uncertain. Nuclear weapons could spread quite quickly across Asia and, by fundamentally altering the balance between the perceived costs and benefits of war, their proliferation could conceivably promise more stability than insecurity. Needless to say, however, this scenario is fraught with uncertainties and dangers. While they may only just be beginning to do so, the competitive interactions conducive to greater instability could gain strength quite rapidly. The security dilemma is, in essence, an amplifier or anxieties, in which the defensive exertions of the participants stimulate each other and feed back upon themselves. Once initiated, a multi-sided security scramble could accelerate quickly to high levels of competitive military and diplomatic activity. Among its other consequences, this turn of events would likely disrupt the further evolution of whatever mitigating tendencies are presently developing in Asia. Mounting insecurity could intensify feelings of nationalism, slow the construction of sturdy economic and institutional ties, and weaken or reverse any trend toward increasing democratization. If they did not actually promote it, these developments, in turn, would certainly do nothing to discourage further competitive behavior. The anticipation of war, like the expectation of peace, can be a self-fulfilling prophecy. Virtuous upward spirals can become vicious downward ones.

AT: Proliferation Inevitable

Proliferation is not inevitable

Kurt Campbell, PhD, Chief Executive Officer and Co-Founder of the Center for a New American Security and Robert Einhorn, senior adviser in the CSIS International Security Program, 2004, The Nuclear Tipping Point, pg. 328

Whatever path countries may take toward the tipping point, we are almost certainly not there yet-in fact, we do not appear to be close. Indeed, a welcome overall conclusion from the case studies explored in this volume is that the global nonproliferation regime may be more durable and less fragile than has sometimes been suspected or feared. Worrisome developments in recent years have given rise to a widespread concern that a world of more and more nuclear powers is essentially inevitable-that JFK's nightmare vision had only been postponed, not avoided. To be sure, the risks of further proliferation are very real. But despite widely held feelings of pessimism about the regime itself, our focus on the individual cases in the study reveals that it is not so easy to reverse longstanding decisions to forswear nuclear weapons. The evi- dence suggests that there is a hidden robustness in the fraying fabric of the global non-nuclear compact.

US can constrain wildfire proliferation

Kenneth Bialkin et al, Trustee National Committee on American Foreign Policy, 4/29/2009, “The Greater Middle East: Is Nuclear Proliferation Inevitable?,” pg. 4

Perhaps another conference of a similar title will be held next year to discuss one such question. If so, the contents if not the title is certain to connote the perverse actions of Iran. Meanwhile, though offering no cause for optimism, the answers given by the experts provide assurance that nuclear proliferation is not inevitable. Reinforcing that assurance is the grand diplomatic return of the United States to the region and its commitment to match deceitful deeds with tough sanctions and reduce U.S. nuclear weapons arsenals in consort with Russia. A small start toward achieving nonproliferation, it can be said, has been made.

Strong US action can prevent proliferation – not inevitable

Jon Wolfsthal, co-author of [Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction](http://www.ceip.org/deadly) and a former advisor to the U.S. Department of Energy, 2004, The Key Proliferation Questions, <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=1487>

Lastly, the United States needs to do more hard work in addressing proliferation threats. Washington must reconfigure our policies to demonstrate it understands the nature of this threat and ensure that it takes priority over almost all other security considerations. This includes how the U.S. handles its own nuclear facilities and weapons, the support it provides to organizations like the International Atomic Energy Agency, how it invests its defense and security budgets, and how the United States prioritizes its relations with other countries. Despite the challenges we face, proliferation is not inevitable and our knowledge of how and where proliferation takes place is better than most people think. The problem is that officials may not always make non-proliferation the priority it deserves to be.

AT: No Proliferation / AT: Iran / North Korea

New proliferation is likely and will be fast – Iran and North Korea alone don’t trigger the impact

Cirincione, Director of Nuclear Policy @ CAP, 7

Joe, Pres. Ploughshares Fund and Senior Fellow and Dir. Nuclear Policy – Center for American Progress, National Interest, “Symposium: Apocalypse When?” November/December, Lexis

Let me be clear: Nuclear proliferation is a real danger. George Bush and John Kerry were correct when they agreed in a 2004 debate that it is the number one threat to America. The threat comes in four flavors. Most serious is nuclear terrorism. As terrible as another 9/11 attack would be, a nuclear 9/11 would destroy an entire city, kill hundreds of thousands, wreck the economy and change the political life of the nation, perhaps permanently. Our number one priority must be to make sure any further terrorist attack is non-nuclear. Second is the danger from existing arsenals. There are still 26,000 nuclear weapons in the world, enough to destroy the planet several times over. Even a small regional war in South Asia using one hundred weapons would trigger a nuclear winter that could devastate food crops around the world. Accidental or unauthorized use is a real risk. Consider the September flight of a B-52 with six nuclear weapons that the crew didn't know they had. If the most sophisticated command-and-control mechanism in the world fails to stop the unauthorized possession of the equivalent of sixty Hiroshimas, what is going on in other nations? Third is the risk of new nuclear nations. I agree with Mueller that the danger here is not that Iran or North Korea would use a nuclear bomb against America or their neighbors. Deterrence is alive and well; they know what would happen next. Nor is it that these states would intentionally give a weapon they worked so hard to make to a terrorist group they could not control. Rather it is the risk of what could happen in the neighborhood: a nuclear reaction chain where states feel they must match each other's nuclear capability. Just such a reaction is underway already in the Middle East, as over a dozen Muslim nations suddenly declared interest in starting nuclear-power programs. This is not about energy; it is a nuclear hedge against Iran. It could lead to a Middle East with not one nuclear-weapons state, Israel, but four or five. That is a recipe for nuclear war. Finally, there is the risk of the collapse of the entire non-proliferation regime. Kennedy was right to worry about ten, fifteen or twenty nuclear nations. He did not make this number up. It was based on a 1958 NPT that warned that while there were then only three nuclear nations (the United States, the USSR and the United Kingdom), "within the next decade a large number of individual countries could produce at least a few nominal-yield weapons." Indeed, several nations already had programs underway. Subsequent NPTs confirmed the proliferation danger and the linkage to existing arsenals. Other nations' decisions on proceeding with programs, the intelligence agencies concluded, were linked to "further progress in disarmament-aimed at effective controls and reduction of stockpiles." Kennedy negotiated a limited nuclear test ban and began the process to get the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty completed by Lyndon Johnson and ratified by Richard Nixon. This bipartisan dam held back the nuclear wave; its abandonment by the current administration risks a return to the 1950s nuclear free-for-all.

AT: No Wildfire Proliferation

Proliferation snowballs and escalates

Victor A. Utgoff, Deputy Director of Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division, 2002, “Proliferation, Missile Defence and American Ambitions,” Institute for Defense Analyses, Survival, v. 44, pg. np

As proliferation continues, it generates increased pressures for further proliferation. For example, some states may be discouraged by each failure of international efforts to limit proliferation and come to see runaway proliferation as inevitable. Accordingly, such states may feel it prudent to make contingency preparations to become nuclear powers themselves, in turn causing other states to do the same. In addition, states may feel encouraged to develop WMD by the extra attention and other types of political and economic gains won by states that have previously done so. Indeed some states will feel that they must have their own nuclear deterrent forces simply because their spread ultimately makes them a key symbol of a modern state. The strongest increases in pressures to proliferate are felt by states that see themselves as potential targets of aggression by those who have gone nuclear or are about to. Prospective victims cannot expect to counter an opponent’s nuclear weapons solely by increases in their own conventional forces.

This is especially true of the United States reneges on commitments

Victor A. Utgoff, Deputy Director of Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division, 2002, “Proliferation, Missile Defence and American Ambitions,” Institute for Defense Analyses, Survival, v. 44, pg. np

What would await the world if strong protectors, especially the United States, were no longer seen as willing to protect states from nuclear-backed aggression? At least a few additional states would begin to build their own nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them to distant targets, and these initiatives would spur increasing numbers of the world’s capable states to follow suit. Restraint would seem ever less necessary and ever more dangerous. Meanwhile, more states are becoming capable of building nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. Many, perhaps most, of the world’s states are becoming sufficiently wealthy, and the technology for building nuclear forces continues to improve and spread. Finally, it seems highly likely that at some point, halting proliferation will come to be seen as a lost cause and the restraints on it will disappear. Once that happens, the transition to a highly proliferated world would probably be very rapid. While some regions might be able to hold the line for a time, the threats posed by wildfire proliferation in most other areas could create pressures that would finally overcome all restraint.

AT: No Wildfire Proliferation

Yes wildfire proliferation – collapse of regime stability makes proliferation unpredictable and limits any benefit

Roberts 99

Brad, Member, Research Staff, Institute for Defense Analyses, “Proliferation and Nonproliferation in the 1990s: Looking for the Right Lessons,” The Nonproliferation Review, Fall 1999, p. 70-82

WHAT’S AT STAKE? This brings us then to the question of what is at stake in the effort to combat proliferation. There are two standard answers to the question of what’s at stake: human lives, and stability. NBC weapons are weapons of mass destruction—all of them, though in different ways. The most deadly of these weapons systems can kill millions—and much more quickly than conventional weaponry (though it too is capable of killing millions). A regional war employing mass destruction as a matter of course could cause suffering and death unknown in human experience. Such a war would cast a harsh light on the argument now in vogue that landmines, small arms, even machetes in the hands of drunk young men are the real weapons of mass destruction. Strictly from the perspective of limiting the effects of war, then, the world community has an interest in preventing the emergence of an international system in which the possession and use of NBC weapons is accepted as normal and customary. The stability argument relates to the unintended consequences associated with acquiring weapons of mass destruction. It focuses on the weapons-acquiring state and its neighbors and the risk of war that grows among them, including both preemptive and accidental wars. Although it is an old truism that proliferation is destabilizing, it is not always true—not where the acquisition of strategic leverage is essential to preservation of a balance of power that deters conflict and that is used to create the conditions of a more enduring peace. But those circumstances have proven remarkably rare. Instead, the risks associated with the competitive acquisition of strategic capabilities have typically been seen to outweigh the perceived benefits to states that have considered nuclear weapons acquisition. Argentina and Brazil, for example, like Sweden and Australia before them, have gotten out of the nuclear weapons business because they see no reason to live at the nuclear brink even if living there is within their reach. But the standard answers don’t really take us very far into this problem any more. To grasp the full stake requires a broader notion of stability—and an appreciation of the particular historical moment in which we find ourselves. It is an accident of history that the diffusion of dual-use capabilities is coterminous with the end of the Cold War. That diffusion means that we are moving irreversibly into an international system in which the wildfire-like spread of weapons is a real possibility. The end of the Cold War has brought with it great volatility in the relations of major and minor powers in the international system. What then is at stake? In response to some catalytic event, entire regions could rapidly cross the threshold from latent to extant weapons capability, and from covert to overt postures, a process that would be highly competitive and risky, and which likely would spill over wherever the divides among regions are not tidy. This would sorely test Ken Waltz’s familiar old heresy that “more may be better”7—indeed, even Waltz assumed proliferation would be stabilizing only if it is gradual, and warned against the rapid spread of weapons to multiple states. At the very least, this would fuel NBC terrorism, as a general proliferation of NBC weaponry would likely erode the constraints that heretofore have inhibited states from sponsoring terrorist use of these capabilities. Given its global stature and media culture, America would be a likely target of some of these terrorist actions. What kind of catalytic event might cause such wildfire- like proliferation? The possibilities are not numerous and thus we should not be too pessimistic, although history usually surprises. One catalyst could be a major civil war in a large country in which NBC weapons are used. Another catalyst might be a crisis in which NBC weapons are used to call into question the credibility of US security guarantees. Such a crisis would have farreaching consequences, both within and beyond any particular region. If the threat of the use of such weapons is sufficient to dissuade the United States from reversing an act of aggression, or if their use is successful in defeating a US military operation, there would be hell to pay. How, for example, would Japan respond to a US decision not to seek to reverse NBC-backed aggression on the Korean peninsula? How might NATO partners respond to a collapse of US credibility in East Asia? This stake isn’t just America’s stake. Any country whose security depends to some extent on a regional or global order guaranteed by Washington has a stake in preventing such wildfire-like proliferation. This is truest of America’s closest security partners, but it is true of the many small and medium-sized states that depend, to some degree, on collective mechanisms for their security. It seems reasonable to expect that many of these states would respond to a loss of US credibility and to the fear of greater regional instability by moving up the latency curve. If they were also to cross the threshold to weapons production, the international system would have a hard time coping. It seems likely that such proliferation would cause the collapse of nonproliferation and arms control mechanisms. This, in turn, would precipitate a broader crisis of confidence in the other institutions of multilateral political and economic activity that depend on some modicum of global stability and cooperation to function. The consequences could be very far-reaching. These international mechanisms and institutions have been a primary means of giving order to an anarchic international system. The United States, in particular, has found them useful for exercising influence and power. What’s at stake, then, is the international order built up over the last half century—the multilateral institutions of economic and security governance, the patterns of cooperation among states, and the expectations of a more orderly future. This is an order that the United States played a central role in creating and sustaining. It is built largely on American-style liberal political and economic values. It is run by and through formal and informal institutions that operate according to rules Washington helped formulate. This is an order backed by US security guarantees in those regions where the threat of interstate war remains real and system-threatening—and more generally by collective security principles safeguarded at the United Nations by the United States, among others. Were it to unravel, the world would change fundamentally. Would such a crisis actually play out in this way? A catalytic event might well have the opposite effect to the one described here: it could well galvanize the international community into strengthening the institutions of multilateral cooperation, assuming that the United States is willing and able to reenergize its commitment to their leadership. Let us hope so. Moreover, there may be no such catalytic event. Instead, and in the absence of reinvigorated leadership of the antiproliferation effort, we may see something more subtle but no less destructive, and that is a growing number of states that move up the latency curve without also formally abandoning their treaty obligations, creating a dangerously misleading fiction in the form of an extant legal regime with little or no impact on the behavior of states. But let us also set aside the complacent assumption that the current distribution of NBC assets is somehow fixed in perpetuity—or that a radical erosion of the current order would not have serious consequences. Among many US policymakers and analysts, there is still great resistance to the notion that the collapse of the antiproliferation project would have far-reaching implications. Most analysts seem to believe that international politics would then proceed much as they do today. Perhaps some partial collapse would have this effect— some further loss of credibility of one or two instruments of arms control, for example, might not actually precipitate the collapse of the treaty regime. But if wildfire-like proliferation somehow comes to pass, it seems likely that a lot would be up for grabs in international politics. Basic relations of power would be in great flux. New coalitions would form, with new forms of competition among those seeking to lead them. American influence abroad could be eclipsed—and quite rapidly. Americans might like to believe that, in such a world, they could retreat into a Fortress America. Whether others would allow us this luxury is very much an open question, especially if America’s retreat occasions some particular pain on their part that

AT: Prolif Good – Prefer Our Evidence

We outweigh generic theory arguments – the risk that we are right in even a single instance outweighs all prolif good arguments

Knopf 2

Jeffrey, Department of National Security Affairs at Naval Postgraduate School, Security Studies, “Recasting the Proliferation Optimism-Pessimism Debate”, Oct. 2002

DEVELOPING AND testing theories are core tasks in the social sciences. Accordingly, social scientists have established criteria for judging which theories are best. When confronted with rival theories about a subject like proliferation, academics naturally turn to these familiar criteria to evaluate which of the two contending camps has the better argument. Determining which is the better theory, however, does not necessarily tell us what is the best policy; any attempt to infer policy lessons from theory tests should be done carefully. It makes no sense to test theories in the most rigorous manner possible, only to be casual in how one derives policy advice from the results of these tests. Optimists and pessimists have increasingly sought to conform their work to standard social science procedures. Faced with two different theories on a question—in this case, whether proliferation will lead to stability—scholars tend to treat the two theories as competing alternatives. They therefore pit the two theories against each other in a superiority contest,21 where the ultimate test is how well each theory matches empirical evidence. If one theory’s predictions are generally confirmed while the other’s are frequently falsified, there will be a natural inclination to favor the policy position associated with the stronger theory. This is not always justified, however. Policymakers have to be concerned with the incorrect predictions. It is little comfort to be told that a theory is far better than its rival if that theory turns out to be wrong in the individual case you care about. Many pessimists have pointed this out when they are simply critiquing the optimist position. As Feaver notes: At best, rational deterrence theory can predict that nuclear deterrence should assure peace most of the time….[I]f RDT could successfully predict peace 99.5 percent of the time it would therefore miss .5 percent of the time. This would qualify for the social science hall of fame, but it would not make nuclear proliferation trivial…[g]iven the stakes involved ….22 Even some nonpessimists acknowledge this point. Peter Lavoy, in a review of the Waltz-Sagan debate that sides with Waltz on many of the issues, nonetheless concludes on a cautionary note: “Policymakers…must worry about exceptions to the rule.…[O]ne exception would…dwarf the significance of the theory.…Even if Waltz is correct 99 percent of the time, the 1 percent of exceptional cases is what U.S. policymakers must worry about.”23 Richard Betts argues that this concern also follows from a classical realist outlook, which he takes pains to distinguish from Waltz’s “neo-” or structural realist approach. Betts notes further that it is not clear what else might happen once there is even a single exception to the prediction of stability and that this is a further reason for caution. As he puts it, “the ramifications of the first breakage of the half-century taboo on nuclear use are too unpredictable to tempt us to run the experiment.”24

AT: Prolif Good – Prefer Our Evidence

Their argument is only attractive because of a limited empirical record – impossible to justify proliferation because can’t guarantee deterrence theory

Knopf 2

Jeffrey, Department of National Security Affairs at Naval Postgraduate School, Security Studies, “Recasting the Proliferation Optimism-Pessimism Debate”, Oct. 2002

Even if RDT [rational deterrence theory] is the more accurate theory, however, this does not alone make it valid to conclude that nuclear proliferation would in some cases be for the best. For policy purposes, there is a world of difference between a probabilistic theory and an iron law. If the probability of nuclear war is very low but not zero—that is, if the nuclear peace hypothesis is probabilistic, not ironclad— there may simply not have been enough interactions between nuclear-armed states to produce a deterrence failure. In this case, if enough nuclear weapon states interact over a long enough period of time, it becomes likely that nuclear weapons will again be used against populated areas, as they were twice previously in 1945. To claim that the tacit acceptance or selective promotion of proliferation is the clearly superior policy recommendation, it is necessary (though not sufficient) that the chances of nuclear war must be so close to zero that the benefits expected from the greater incentives to avoid major conventional wars could not plausibly be offset by a risk of nuclear use. Otherwise, the issue becomes a trade-off in which one must decide what level of risk of nuclear destruction is tolerable in order to achieve the anticipated benefits of a reduced probability of conventional war. FOR POLICY PURPOSES, therefore, it is not enough to evaluate which theory has the highest correlation with the empirical observations to date; evaluating risk is also important. One risk that must be addressed is whether there is a realistic possibility that RDT’s predictions of stability could be wrong. For two reasons, I will argue in this section, optimists have underestimated the likelihood of nuclear war when proliferation occurs. First, the theories of optimists and pessimists are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but are instead potentially complementary. Second, one can deduce logical reasons why a country acting rationally (as social scientists use that term) might nonetheless get into a nuclear war even when the other side has survivable nuclear forces.

Prefer specific scenarios – only way to accurately test their general theories

Knopf 2

Jeffrey, Department of National Security Affairs at Naval Postgraduate School, Security Studies, “Recasting the Proliferation Optimism-Pessimism Debate”, Oct. 2002

In response, other scholars have argued there are reasons to anticipate deterrence failures and accidents involving nuclear weapons, a position that has been labeled “proliferation pessimism.” A 1994 article by Scott Sagan describing “the perils of proliferation” served as an important milestone in the development of the pessimist position.4 Waltz and Sagan subsequently published a book containing modified versions of their original essays plus rebuttals to each other’s arguments.5 For this reason, the optimism-pessimism debate is also often referred to as “the Waltz-Sagan debate.” Most of the contributions to this debate have sought to inform policy, both in states that advocate nonproliferation and in states that are potential proliferators. 6 Waltz’s Adelphi Paper, for example, includes a section laying out the “implications for American policy,” while Sagan’s “Perils” article closes with a discussion of “policy implications.”7 Because academic social science is often skeptical or openly dismissive of policy-oriented work, the scholars who have studied proliferation deserve credit for seeking to address an important policy issue. Unfortunately, as an effort to help the international community and potential proliferators make better decisions, the optimism-pessimism debate constitutes an inadequate and potentially misleading source of guidance. Three conceptual problems reduce the value of the advice offered to policymakers. First, the debate has increasingly been framed as a contest between rival theories. Ascertaining which theory is stronger, however, does not necessarily lead directly to sound policy advice. A theory will be seen as superior if its predictions are correct more often than those of its rivals. If, however, even a few predictions are wrong, and the outcomes in those cases are major conventional wars or nuclear exchanges, it might not make sense to adopt the policy recommendation that has been associated with the theory in question. Determining which theory is stronger is still a relevant task, but great care must be exercised in moving from theory evaluation to the drawing of policy inferences.

AT: Prolif Good – No Deterrence

Even if weapons induce caution, they inflame regional tension and change risk calculus – ensures escalation

Knopf 2

Jeffrey, Department of National Security Affairs at Naval Postgraduate School, Security Studies, “Recasting the Proliferation Optimism-Pessimism Debate”, Oct. 2002

Two other reasons why nuclear war is possible under standard rationality assumptions involve the intrinsic nature of nuclear weapons themselves. Because nuclear weapons are so destructive, proliferation optimists expect states to behave extremely carefully. Fear of nuclear devastation, however, can cut two ways. It can make national leaders shrink away from the brink, as optimists expect. In addition, though, the danger of nuclear attack can also be provocative, triggering action intended to forestall the danger. In short, both “flight” and “fight” responses are possible. Their awesome destructive power means nuclear weapons are dualistic in their effects: they are likely both to dampen and to inflame tensions in regions where they are introduced. Nuclear weapons can exacerbate tensions in two ways: by creating an increased perception of threat and by prompting efforts to limit damage in the event of nuclear war. On the first point, proliferation optimists write as if potential adversaries exist at a given, fixed level of hostility. This is unlikely to be the case. Rather, a state that acquires nuclear weapons is likely to be perceived as more threatening than it was before. This will be partly because of the new, more destructive capabilities at its disposal. In some cases, however, a state’s pursuit of nuclear weapons may also change how other states view its intentions. This is especially likely because new and aspiring nuclear states are not always circumspect in their pronouncements. In March 1994, in the midst of a crisis over North Korea’s suspected nuclear weapons program, the North’s chief negotiator threatened his South Korean counterpart that a war could break out in which the South would be turned into “a sea of fire.”47 After the May 1998 nuclear tests in India, Prime Minister Vajpayee wrote President Clinton and explicitly cited a threat from China as a motivation for the tests. Statements by Defense Minister Fernandes shortly before and again shortly after the tests also described China as “potential threat number one” to India.48 Other Indian officials publicly warned Pakistan to end its support for separatist insurgents in Kashmir. Home Minister Advani called on Islamabad to “realize the change in the geostrategic situation” and said that in the new circumstances even the option of “hot pursuit” would not be ruled out.49 Such statements are bound to be provocative to the states against which they are directed. States on the receiving end of new, public nuclear threats will likely feel a need to display their toughness as a way to show they will not be intimidated. While nuclear weapons do encourage caution, they can also create pressures to demonstrate resolve, and any such demonstration carries with it some risk of escalation.

\*\*\*South Korea\*\*\*

South Korea 1nc

US extended deterrent to South Korea strong now – key to credible assurance

Kim, Fellow @ CSIS, 7-2

Seung Taek, Colonel, Rethinking Extended Deterrence, http://csis.org/publication/rethinking-extended-deterrence

The Republic of Korea (ROK) and the United States are allies that signed the Mutual Defense Treaty. The primary mission of the Mutual Defense Treaty is to prevent war and maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. The experience from the past sixty years shows that this security alliance has successfully served its purpose. For the U.S., it has effectively dissuaded and deterred North Korea from taking overt military actions on the Korean Peninsula by providing the ROK with “extended deterrence, including the nuclear umbrella” and displaying its overwhelming military force and political will to defend its ally from the North’s aggression. The ROK, confident in U.S. extended deterrence and security commitment to its defense, has also been assured of its security and has believed that the deterrence would hold effective. Such belief has been affirmed as the relative peace and status quo on the Korean Peninsula has lasted over the past sixty years.

Reduced US presence in South Korea leads to ROK proliferation – spills over to East Asian proliferation

Scales and Wortzel 99

Robert, Major Gen. and former Deputy Chief of Staff for Base Operations and former Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine at Headquarters Training and Doctrine Command – US Army and PhD in History – Duke, and Larry, Col. – US Army, Dir. Strategic Studies Institute – US Army War College, and PhD in Pol. Sci. – U. Hawaii, “THE FUTURE U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN ASIA: LANDPOWER AND THE GEOSTRATEGY OF AMERICAN COMMITMENT”, 4-6, https://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB75.pdf

The presence of American military forces in the region was one of the reasons that U.S. nuclear deterrence was extended to our allies in Korea and Japan. As in Europe, the stationing of U.S. conventional forces provided a deterrent option that is reinforced by the nuclear dimension. American nuclear deterrence, therefore, is also welcome in Northeast Asia for its contribution to security and stability in the region. China’s military strategists may complain that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is a threat to China; but they acknowledge in private discussion that without extended deterrence, as provided for in the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Republic of Korea defense treaties, Korea might develop nuclear weapons and Japan could follow suit.23 China’s leaders even realize that without the defensive conventional arms provided to Taiwan by the United States under the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, Taiwan might develop nuclear weapons. Japanese military strategists express their own concerns about South Korea.24 Threatened by the probability that North Korea has developed a nuclear capability, without the protection of U.S. extended deterrence, the South would probably respond in kind by developing its own weapons. Certainly South Korea has the requisite technological level to develop nuclear weapons. In the event of the reunification of the Korean peninsula, because the North already has a nuclear capability, Japan would face a nuclear-armed peninsula. Tokyo might then reexamine its own commitment to defense relying on conventional weapons with the support of the Japanese populace. Strategic thinkers in China and Japan acknowledge that the continuation of extended deterrence might inhibit Japan from going nuclear in such a case.25 Barry Posen and Andrew Ross, two Americans, make this same argument: “. . . Japan’s leaders would be less likely to develop a nuclear arsenal as a hedge against Korean pressure.”26 Strong U.S. diplomacy combined with continued extended deterrence, argue some of Korea and Japan’s strategic thinkers, might convince the regime in charge of a reunified Korea to dismantle whatever devices the North has built instead of improving them.

South Korea 1nc

Nuclear war

Cirincione, Director of Non-prolif @ Carnegie 2k

Joseph, Director of the Non-Proliferation Project – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Foreign Policy, “The Asian nuclear reaction chain”, Issue 118, Spring, Proquest

The blocks would fall quickest and hardest in Asia, where proliferation pressures are already building more quickly than anywhere else in the world. If a nuclear breakout takes place in Asia, then the international arms control agreements that have been painstakingly negotiated over the past 40 years will crumble. Moreover, the United States could find itself embroiled in its fourth war on the Asian continent in six decades--a costly rebuke to those who seek the safety of Fortress America by hiding behind national missile defenses. Consider what is already happening: North Korea continues to play guessing games with its nuclear and missile programs; South Korea wants its own missiles to match Pyongyang's; India and Pakistan shoot across borders while running a slow-motion nuclear arms race; China modernizes its nuclear arsenal amid tensions with Taiwan and the United States; Japan's vice defense minister is forced to resign after extolling the benefits of nuclear weapons; and Russia-whose Far East nuclear deployments alone make it the largest Asian nuclear power-struggles to maintain territorial coherence. Five of these states have nuclear weapons; the others are capable of constructing them. Like neutrons firing from a split atom, one nation's actions can trigger reactions throughout the region, which in turn, stimulate additional actions. These nations form an interlocking Asian nuclear reaction chain that vibrates dangerously with each new development. If the frequency and intensity of this reaction cycle increase, critical decisions taken by any one of these governments could cascade into the second great wave of nuclear-weapon proliferation, bringing regional and global economic and political instability and, perhaps, the first combat use of a nuclear weapon since 1945.

South Korea Link

Trip-wire forces hold back proliferation – key signal of resolve

Davis et al 9

Jacquelyn, Ex. VP – Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Pres. – IFPA and Prof. Int’l. Sec. Studies – Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy of Tufts U. and former DOD Consultant, Charles M. Perry , VP and Dir. Studies – IFPA, and James L. Schoff, Associate Dir. Asia-Pacific Studies – IFPA, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis White Paper, “Updating U.S. Deterrence Concepts and Operational Planning: Reassuring Allies, Deterring Legacy Threats, and Dissuading Nuclear "Wannabes"”, February, http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/Updating\_US\_Deterrence\_Concepts.pdf, p. 7-8

 No such formula was put into place in Asia, which in any case lacked a multilateral framework comparable to that of NATO. Instead, for Japan and South Korea, the U.S. extended deterrence guarantee was explicitly tied to the bilateral U.S. security relationships that were developed with each country and were made manifest in the forward deployment of American forces. As in NATO, these were regarded by their host governments as “trip-wire forces” necessary to ensure the steadfast nature of the U.S. commitment to come to their defense in a crisis, even one where nuclear escalation was possible.5 In South Korea, the United States deployed as it still does a sizable contingent of U.S. Army and Air Force troops to deter a renewed North Korean attack and to signal U.S. resolve to escalate to whatever level might be necessary to repel such an attack, thereby underscoring America’s extended deterrent commitment to the Republic of Korea (ROK). In Japan, the United States Navy has home-ported one of its aircraft carriers at Yokosuka, while the Marines deployed forces on Okinawa, the Army at Camp Zama, and the Air Force at bases near Tokyo and Misawa, to reinforce the notion of extended deterrence. That said, the extended deterrence concept has not always seemed convincing to U.S. allies, and, were it not for the forward deployment of American troops, the willingness of the United States to put itself at risk to protect Allied interests would probably have been more widely questioned than it has been to date. Nonetheless, despite the fact that some U.S. allies, such as France and Israel, chose to go down the nuclear path themselves, most NATO nations, Japan, and even the ROK, despite putting into place the capacity for exercising a nuclear option should political and/or strategic circumstances change, have been satisfied that they shared with the United States a common threat perception and trusted that the United States would come to their defense if necessary.

Troop removal drastically changes South Korean calculus

Campbell and Einhorn 4

Kurt, PhD, Chief Executive Officer and Co-Founder of the Center for a New American Security and Robert, senior adviser in the CSIS International Security Program, The Nuclear Tipping Point, pg. 42

Alleviate Security Concerns With the exception of Syria, all the countries covered in this study derive substantial security benefits from their association with the United States. Some (Germany, Japan, South Korea, Turkey) are formally allied with the United States through bilateral or multilateral (that is, NATO) security treaties; one (Taiwan) has received commitments in the form of U.S. legislation and presidential policies; another (Saudi Arabia) has relied on informal understandings and close defense cooperation; and still another (Egypt) has been an intimate partner of the United States in regional peace arrangements and bilateral security ties. These various security relationships with the United States have been instrumental in each country’s nuclear calculus. Indeed, in the cases of South Korea and Taiwan, the historical record suggests that perceived erosion in the reliability of security guarantees from the United States can dramatically change the calculation of the costs and benefits of remaining non-nuclear. In the period ahead, questions may arise about the continued value of the U.S. factor in the security equations of a number of the countries studied. In response to fundamental changes in the international security environment since the end of the cold war – especially the demise of the Soviet threat to Europe, the spread of WMD and other asymmetrical military capabilities, the emergence of failed states and militant Islamic movements, and the growth of well-financed, capable terrorist networks operating on a global basis – the United States is now proceeding with a massive overhaul of its force deployments overseas. As U.S. forces are reconfigured and repositioned to meet the evolving requirements of the war on terrorism, friends and allies (including some whose perceptions of the terrorist threat and prescriptions for dealing with it differ from those of Washington) may wonder whether these changes are fully consistent with their own security priorities. For example, many South Koreans, including strong supporters of the U.S.-South Korean alliance, are troubled by plans to relocate U.S. troops away from the demilitarized zone and out of Seoul, especially while the impasse over North Korea’s nuclear program remains unresolved. Japanese are speculating about how U.S. force realignments in Korea and elsewhere will eventually affect them. In Southwest Asia, while U.S. forces are now heavily committed to stabilizing and rebuilding Iraq and Afghanistan, major questions exist about the future of America’s military presence in the region.

South Korea Link

The symbolic effect is key – deters South Korean belligerent response

Payne et al 10

Keith, Pres. – National Institute for Public Policy, Prof. and Dept. Head of Graduate Defense and Strategic Studies – Mo. St. U., Chair – Policy Panel of theh US Strategic Command’s Senior Advisory Group, Thomas Scheber, VP – National Institute for Public Policy and former Dir. Strike Policy and Integration – Office of the Sec. Def., and Kurt Guthe, Dir. Strategic Studies – NIPP and former Deputy assistant Sec. Def. for Forces Policy, “U.S. Extended Deterrence and Assurance for Allies in Northeast Asia”, NIPP

The forward presence of U.S. military forces has value for deterrence and assurance that is well recognized. Forces routinely deployed on or near the territory of an ally not only, or even primarily, augment the armed strength of that country, but also serve as a concrete and continuing reminder that the United States has a strong interest in its security and will fight in its defense. Permanently stationed ground forces, in particular, seem to have an assurance effect not duplicated by temporary deployments (port calls to show the flag, for example), probably because they are unlikely to be withdrawn overnight and often are positioned where they will be directly engaged by an enemy attack, thus ensuring U.S. involvement in a conflict. The likelihood, if not certainty, that U.S. forces would be engaged in a conflict can lend credibility to an associated nuclear guarantee. If forward deployments include U.S. nuclear weapons, those arms themselves offer a tangible assurance that the ally is covered by the nuclear umbrella. The United States has deployed general purpose forces in South Korea for more than a half century. From the mid-1950s to the late 1960s, the U.S. troop level in the ROK was 60,000-70,000. During the Vietnam War, in line with his “Guam Doctrine” to make U.S. allies in Asia shoulder more of the defense burden, President Nixon ordered the withdrawal of some 18,000 troops from South Korea, reducing the total there to 43,000. In the 1976 presidential campaign, Jimmy Carter pledged to pull out all U.S. ground forces from South Korea, but as president removed only a token number (roughly 3,000 troops). The Carter cut subsequently was reversed by President Reagan to bolster the U.S. commitment to the ROK. As part of the post-Cold War retraction of American forces from overseas deployments, President George H.W. Bush ordered the troop level in South Korea reduced to 36,000 and then suspended further withdrawals in light of concern about the North Korean nuclear weapons program. The U.S. force on the peninsula increased slightly and stabilized at somewhat more than 37,000 during the Clinton administration. Between 2004 and 2006, as a result of the Global Posture Review conducted by the George W. Bush administration, the number of troops dropped to 28,500, where it remains today.54 At this level, South Korea is the country with the third largest peacetime deployment of American troops, behind only Germany (54,000) and Japan (33,000).55 One South Korean observer cites this ranking as an indication of the high priority the United States assigns to the defense of the ROK**.**56 According to an opinion survey conducted in early 2008, most South Koreans (70 percent) see the overall U.S. military presence in East Asia as contributing to regional stability.57 The disposition of U.S. troops in South Korea has been as important as their number. Since the end of the Korean War, U.S. ground forces have been deployed astride the invasion corridors between the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and Seoul. Stationed in this manner, they have functioned as a trip wire that, by making U.S. involvement in a war “automatic,” presumably has helped deter the North from launching an attack and certainly has helped allay fear in the South of abandonment by the United States. This situation is changing, however. In a process initiated by the Global Posture Review, the United States is repositioning its forces away from the DMZ to locations farther south on the peninsula. The objectives of the relocation are several: to move U.S. forces beyond the range of North Korean artillery; strengthen their ability to counterattack an invasion; increase their availability for contingencies outside Korea (by consolidating forces around two basing “hubs” with ready access to air- and sealift); achieve a better balance between U.S. and South Korean military responsibilities (by improving ROK capabilities and making U.S. capabilities more “air and naval-centric”); and lessen tensions with the South Korean population (by reducing the number of bases and returning land for civilian use).58 This changed disposition of U.S. forces has raised two concerns in South Korea. First, without the trip wire of American troops near the DMZ, the deterrent to North Korean attack might be weaker.59 Second, the availability of U.S. forces on the peninsula for other contingencies could result in “the denuding and decoupling of the U.S. security presence.”60 In response to these concerns, American officials argue that the United States remains firmly committed to the defense of South Korea and that the “trip wire” for that commitment is not “how many U.S. troops are arranged in any particular location on the peninsula,” but “the letter and spirit of our mutual defense treaty, backed up by the substance of our alliance and our strong military forces.”61 They also point to plans for three-year, family-accompanied tours of duty by U.S. military personnel in South Korea as a clear sign that the United States intends to maintain its commitment to the ROK for the long haul. By 2020, up to 14,000 families of American service members could be on the peninsula.62 While longer, accompanied tours offer a number of advantages over the current one-year stints (reduced training demands, for example), their assurance value has been emphasized by Secretary of Defense Gates, Adm. Michael Mullen, the Joint Chiefs chairman, and Gen. Walter Sharp, the commander of U.S. forces in Korea: Secretary Gates: “[T]he United States will maintain an enduring and capable military presence on the Korean Peninsula. Our long-term commitment is signified by our plans to make three year accompanied tours the norm for most U.S. troops in Korea—similar to arrangements we have in Europe.”63 Adm. Mullen: “The whole issue of extending the tours, bringing the families, investing the money is a significant increase in the commitment to the Republic of Korea and to the alliance….”64 Gen. Sharp: “[Family-accompanied tours] hugely shows our commitment to Northeast Asia. One of the fears you hear on OpCon Transition in Korea is what is the US going to do on the 18th of April 2012, after OpCon Transition? Are you all out of here? We remind the Koreans we would be really stupid to do that. They remind us occasionally we have done stupid things in the past. But then when we point to the fact that hey, we’re bringing all of these families over. And it’s not just about North and South Korea, it is about the importance of the region to the United States, the vital national interest. …the more presence we have in Korea of families shows the commitment of the United States and I think that in and of itself reduces the likelihood of [North Korean leader] Kim Jong Il making a mistake in doing an attack. Many of us lived in Germany in the mid ‘80s across the Fulda Gap where there were lots of nuclear weapons. …it’s not exactly the same [in Korea], but there is a parallel there of being shown that you’re dedicated and that you’re not leaving is a great deterrent value that’s there.”65 In short, U.S. troops in South Korea no longer may be a trip wire, but they—and now their dependents as well—still provide an immediate presence that symbolizes the U.S. commitment to the defense of the ROK.

South Korea Link

South Korea will develop nuclear weapons – US is key and no conventional fill-in

Choi and Park 8

Kang, Director-General and Professor of American Studies – Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, Seoul, and Joon-Sung, Distinguished Researcher – Department of National Security and Reunification, Institute for Foreign Affairs and National Security, Seoul, The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia, p. 392-393

The possibility of either a decision by South Korea to go nuclear or a regional nuclear arms race still seems remote, but neither can be ruled out completely. Unless timely and appropriate measures are taken, nonnuclear states in the re­gion, including South Korea and Japan, may be compelled to consider their own nuclear options. At this time, the United States is believed to hold the key to pre­venting this worrisome development. The key is the continued provision of the U.S. nuclear umbrella.41 The latest reaffirmation of the U.S. extended deterrence commitment to South Korea was made at the thirty-eighth SCM in 2006. What is notable about the SCM was that the term extended nuclear deterrence was inserted in the Joint Communique upon South Korea's insistence.42 Due to this, the excessive fear of nuclear threat in South Korea has been largely mitigated. The insertion of the term altered nothing significant in the ROK-U.S. security relationship. Why then did South Korea so persistently request this wording in the Joint Communi‑ que? To answer this question, it is important to revisit the evolution of the ROK's defense strategy. As discussed earlier, it is now clear that "ground-based" nuclear deterrence has been replaced by "offshore" deterrence. The former was viewed as particularly strong since it consisted of a "trip-wire" strategy with forward deployment of the USFK and the presence of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons on South Korean soil. Though more flexible, "offshore" deterrence is mainly conventional and is largely symbolic in nature. The trip-wire strategy, which deliberately made the USFK "hostage" in the event of a North Korean attack, was perceived to ensure an automatic U.S. mili­tary involvement. It assuaged the FoA among South Koreans. Despite the recent drawdown of USFK strength, the remaining U.S. 2nd Ill still serves this func­tion. Nowadays, though, U.S. officials say that a trip-wire strategy is outdated and no longer valid:43 yet they argue that the United States is firmly committed to the defense of South Korea. Having agreed on a wide range of outstanding military-related issues, such as the relocation of the Yongsan garrison and the 2nd ID, the USFK's strategic flexibility, and the transfer of OPCON to the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff ( JCS), all of which would ultimately dissolve the trip-wire strategy, South Korea and the United States have already moved from trip-wire deterrence to real "offshore deterrence." The present problem is that both Seoul's and Washington's efforts to compen­sate for the loss of physical links and a weaker security guarantee have fallen short of each other's expectations. Certainly the United States will provide a "bridg­ing capability" for South Korea in the form of time and know-how as the ROK military prepares to assume the current roles and missions of the USFK.44 These military preparations will inevitably take considerable time and money. In par­ticular, their enormous budgetary implications could impede policy implementa­tion. There is only a slim chance that South Korea would acquire enough strategic assets, such as C4ISR, counter-ABC (atomic/biological/chemical), air-defense, long-range strike, and lift capabilities, to meet the schedule. Something has to fill the security gap, and this is exactly why the insertion of the term extended deterrence matters to South Korea. Strangely, though, the continued provision of U.S. extended deterrence seems to have opposite effects on FoA and FoE in South Korea: The continued provision of the U.S. nuclear umbrella for South Korea helps reduce FoA, but the new U.S. nuclear doctrine also increases the level of FoE. Basically, the FoA and FoE issues relate to how the United States will handle the North Korean nuclear problem. South Korea's FoA could soar if the United States tacitly accepted North Korea's nuclear weapon status with a condition of nonproliferation. Conversely, the FoE would linger as long as the public believes that a U.S. military strike on North Korea is possible.45 U.S. missile defense and PSI are concerns as well. To assuage Seoul's concerns, the United States has shown greater flexibility and enthusiasm for diplomatic negotiations while maintaining a strong combined military deterrence.46 Strong reaffirmation of the U.S. extended deterrence com­mitment has raised South Korea's confidence in its security and strengthened the U.S. position when dealing with North Korea.

South Korea is dependent on US nuclear umbrella

International Relations and Security Network (ISN). “The Future of Extended Deterrence: A South Korean Perspective.” March 2010. <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=cab359a3-9328-19cc-a1d2-8023e646b22c&lng=en&id=116468>. Accessed 7/26/2010.

Amid the emerging trend of nuclear proliferation, South Korea faces a direct nuclear threat from North Korea. The Korean peninsula seems to be one of the heavily armed places in the World. South Korea shares the territorial border with North Korea which claimed itself as a nuclear weapon state in public. As a result, Pyongyang poses military threat to Seoul with conventional and nuclear capabilities as well. The latter joined non-proliferation and arms control regime and pursued denuclearization policy within the framework of “The Joint Declaration of Denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula” in 1992. More striking is that South Korea continues to abide by the accord so far despite the North’s violation of the agreement. Even though South Korea occupies 5th rank in terms of number of nuclear reactor, it is not permitted both to enrich uranium and to separate plutonium. This precludes the potential that Seoul is able to build nuclear weapon. Now facing North Korea’s nuclear threat, Seoul is completely relying on extended deterrence with the nuclear umbrella provided by the United States. That is the reason why South Korea is so sensitive to North Korea’s nuclear test and raise questions about credibility of the U.S. nuclear guarantee and assurance. The recent national-wide debate on what is called ‘nuclear sovereignty’ offers the case.

South Korea Link

Extended deterrence key to nuclear non-proliferation in East Asia

Patrick Morgan, Thomas and Elizabeth Tierney Chair in Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of California. “Considerations Bearing On a Possible Retraction of the American Nuclear Umbrella Over the ROK.” October 2009. http://www.ncnk.org/resources/publications/Morgan%20Considerations%20Bearing\_on\_a\_Possible\_ Retraction\_ of\_the\_American\_Nuclear\_Umbrella.pdf. Accessed 7/22/2010.

American extended nuclear deterrence has, for some years, performed a number of functions in Northeast Asia. Any detailed list would have to include the following: 1) Protecting the ROK, via deterrence, from another huge and very destructive conventional war. It was the Eisenhower administration that initially announced that a nuclear response would be likely for another war like the one in Korea, and made plans and nuclear weapons deployments accordingly. That threat has never been abandoned as the US has never adopted a no-first-use posture on nuclear weapons. What it did do, after the Cold War, was to remove its nuclear weapons stored in the ROK and all nuclear weapons, except on SLBMs, from its ships at sea. 2) Compensating the ROK for not developing nuclear weapons and huge conventional forces with an attack orientation. The US-ROK alliance was meant by Washington to provide a degree of control, of restraint, on the ROK to prevent it from starting or provoking a war. This was a serious concern from the start of the alliance, in the Syngman Rhee era, (and dated back to before the the Korean War). The US provided a convincing level of protection against North Korea and China, and the ultimate component was the nuclear umbrella. 3) Offsetting the superiority in conventional forces the North enjoyed for years, which persisted at least partly because of American restraints on South Korean military development. The nuclear umbrella restricted the political leverage the North could gain from its conventional military superiority. Thus it was a notable component of containment of the North. 4) Offsetting the North Korean nuclear program and the North’s eventual development of nuclear weapons, deterrence that benefited both the ROK and Japan. 5) Helping reassure Japan (as did the alliance and USFK) that the US will not “lose” South Korea to forces hostile to Japan and threatening to its security. 6) Reassuring Japan that the US would not retreat from Northeast Asia – the same reassurance to Japan conveyed by keeping American forces in the ROK. 7) Adding to deterrence of attacks on Japan. This has partly compensated Japan for not developing nuclear weapons, and also has allowed Japan to contain (and mostly avoid) what would otherwise have been a very divisive domestic political debate about nuclear weapons, the constitution, large conventional forces, etc. That contributed to the national consensus behind the Yoshida Doctrine emerged which, with its successors, has shaped Japan’s foreign policy and national security strategy. 8) Discouraging development of nuclear weapons by Japan – supplementing the US nuclear umbrella for Japan in doing this. Restraining Japan’s military capabilities, the renationalization of its security policy, by deterrence of a direct attack and by maintaining a congenial regional system for Japan therefore contributed to stabilizing the entire region. 8) Adding to American power projection capability in the region for purposes of containment and regional security management. American nuclear deterrence, directly and via deterrence for the ROK, helped secure access for US forces to bases in Japan. Thus this was a major contribution to US hegemony. Many of these no longer apply or are much less relevant now. The threat of a huge conventional war from a North Korean attack is now much smaller, in large part because of US and ROK military superiority. The ROK has not pursued nuclear weapons for several decades. While it now has a growing superiority in conventional forces, this is primarily to take responsibility for its own defense – the dominant ROK policy on the North for some time has been engagement. What remains is the possibility that even a successful conventional war would still be very costly and destructive, making deterrence of it a major ROK concern. Having a US nuclear umbrella for the ROK to reinforce deterrence of threats to Japan is less necessary for the time being but is not something Japan pays no attention to. Reassuring Japan about the durability of the US military presence in the region and its commitments to its friends there is also less necessary as well as easier. The reassurance now flows from the greater integration of US and Japanese military forces and the American desire to sustain USFK several different contingencies – the US military presence in Korea is not simply linked to protecting Korea and in having more projected missions looks much more durable. However, US extended nuclear deterrence is still deemed somewhat or strongly useful for offsetting the North Korean nuclear weapons program, discouraging development of nuclear weapons by Japan (and potential imitators), deterring potential threats to Japan from China and Russia, easing Japan’s domestic defense debate, and sustaining the US power projection capability and related hegemony in East Asia.

South Korea MPX – Japan Prolif / Chinese Aggression

Withdrawal from South Korea leads to Japanese proliferation – triggers Chinese aggression – leads to war

Dao 3

James, BA Yale, national correspondent for The New York Times covering military and veterans affairs, NY Times, Why Keep U.S. Troops in South Korea?, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/05/weekinreview/05JDAO.html

Deciding if now is the time depends on how well the United States is able to project power across the Pacific, as well as on its responsibilities as the globe's presumptive supercop. Withdrawing forces in Korea would reverberate powerfully in Tokyo, Beijing, Taipei and beyond, raising questions in an already jittery region about Washington's willingness to maintain stability in Asia. "In the present mood, the Japanese reaction could be quite strong," said Zbigniew Brzezinski, the national security adviser to Jimmy Carter. "And under those circumstances, it's hard to say how the Chinese might respond." In the 1970's, Mr. Brzezinski took part in the last major debate over reducing American forces in Korea, when President Carter, motivated by post-Vietnam doubts about American power, proposed withdrawing ground forces from the peninsula. He faced resistance from the South Korean government, the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency. The arguments against withdrawal then still apply today, Mr. Brzezinski says. A secure Korea makes Japan more confident, he contends. An American withdrawal from Korea could raise questions about the United States' commitment to the 40,000 troops it has in Japan. And that could drive anxious Japanese leaders into a military buildup that could include nuclear weapons, he argues. "If we did it, we would stampede the Japanese into going nuclear," he said. Other Asian leaders would be likely to interpret a troop withdrawal as a reduction of American power, no matter how much the United States asserts its commitment to the region. China might take the opportunity to flex its military muscle in the Taiwan Straits and South China Sea. North Korea could feel emboldened to continue its efforts to build nuclear arms. "Any movement of American forces would almost certainly involve countries and individuals taking the wrong message," said Kurt Campbell, a deputy assistant secretary of defense during the Clinton administration. "The main one would be this: receding American commitment, backing down in the face of irresponsible North Korean behavior. And frankly, the ultimate beneficiary of this would be China in the long term." "Mind-sets in Asia are profoundly traditional," he said. "They calculate political will by the numbers of soldiers, ships and airplanes that they see in the region."

South Korean acquisition would lead to Asian wars – draws in China and Japan

Christian Jung, Op-ed contributor, 6/24/2009, The Nuclear Non-Option, Korea Times, pg. np

Acquiring a nuclear weapon to balance the ostensible South-North power asymmetry may provide immediate relief and perhaps a thinly veiled sense of security, but it would nonetheless be devastating to the South's long-term interests in a number of ways.   The most obvious result of the acquisition of nuclear weapons would be further regional destabilization. It would needlessly flare up tensions between the South and its neighboring countries, particularly China and Japan.   More significantly, a nuclear South would aggravate tensions with the North, and may culminate in a North-South arms race in a worst-case scenario.   None of these outcomes would be conducive to any of the goals that the South wishes to achieve, both within the peninsula and throughout the greater Northeast Asian region.  From a more global perspective, the acquisition of nuclear weapons would undermine the international status that the South has built as a non-nuclear weapon state.

South Korea MPX – Relations

South Korean modernization tanks relations

Japan Times 6

A positive U.S.-ROK summit”, Lexis

While Japan has focused on the modernization of its alliance with the United States, the Republic of Korea (ROK) has been seeking a new equilibrium in its relationship with Washington, too. The maturing of South Korea's economy and political system, and the coming to power of a new generation have shifted the center of gravity in that bilateral relationship. Both sides are working to find a new balance; it has been a sometimes messy process but dire predictions of the end of the alliance are not destined to come true. Both Washington and Seoul realize that the mutual interests that provided a foundation for their alliance a half century ago remain. They both desire security and stability on the Korean Peninsula; they worry about the North Korean threat and South Korea's room for maneuver as "a shrimp among whales." And, perhaps most significant, they recognize that the U.S. is an honest broker - and the government best suited to that role among all the contenders. But changes in both countries and in the region require a modernization of their alliance. At their summit last week, U.S. President George W. Bush met South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun and proved that predictions of the death of the alliance were exaggerated. Yet it is also important that the two governments acknowledge the problems that they confront and deal with them honestly: Papering over the cracks in the U.S.-ROK alliance will provide only the briefest of respites. Mr. Roh was elected president in 2002, seizing upon anti-American sentiment to storm to victory. Fears of a rupture in the alliance with the U.S. have since not abated, even though Mr. Roh has reiterated his commitment to the alliance and backed the U.S. on key foreign-policy issues, even dispatching troops to Iraq. Yet Mr. Roh has also made plain his readiness to disagree with Washington on key issues, the most important of which is relations with North Korea. To Mr. Roh, and many of his party, the greatest threat from Pyongyang emanates not from strength but from weakness. Their concern is not invasion, but collapse. This puts the Roh administration at odds with Mr. Bush, who has characterized the regime in North Korea as "evil." The U.S. has confronted North Korea about its nuclear-weapons program, its human-rights practices and its other alleged illegal activities. The U.S. prefers a diplomatic solution to the problems that the world has with Pyongyang, but it has taken a hard line to compel the North to hew to international standards. Seoul prefers engagement, fearing isolation could prompt the North to lash out or to collapse. Either scenario is grim for South Korea. There have been fears that this divergence would drive a permanent wedge into the U.S.-ROK alliance. But North Korea's recent brinkmanship - missile tests in July and the prospect of a nuclear test - have helped bring Seoul and Washington closer together. At their summit last weekend, Mr. Bush and Mr. Roh restated their commitment to the stalled six-party talks on the North's nuclear program. They spend more time emphasizing their agreements now rather than their differences. The problem is that the potential differences are profound. In addition to the North Korea question, the two governments have also begun negotiations on a free-trade agreement and the two militaries are working out the transition to South Korean control of military forces in the event of war. The first item is designed to broaden the foundation of the bilateral relationship by strengthening its economic pillar. The second is designed to reflect new capabilities in South Korea and its military's readiness to assume the primary burden in the event of a conflict. Both are in the long-term interest of the two countries. Detractors argue that failure to reach a trade deal will create even more bad blood between the two countries. They also worry that the military handoff will lead to the dissolution of the military alliance and the end of the U.S. commitment to defend the South in the event of war. Japan has a powerful stake in these issues. Free-trade negotiations between Seoul and Washington raise two questions: why aren't the U.S. and Japan pursuing negotiations and why are Japan-ROK talks stalled? Will Japan be disadvantaged if the U.S.-ROK deal is concluded? Japan must also be concerned about the prospect of a weakening of the U.S.-ROK alliance. If such a step creates instability in the region, then Japan will have to contemplate the implications for its own defense and security policies. Presidents Bush and Roh are right to focus on the issues that unite their countries. They must convince their publics that the interests that bind them together provide ample reason for a continuing alliance. They must also recognize that the two countries have changed, however, and their relationship must be updated. Both realism and optimism can sustain the U.S.-ROK alliance as it faces a difficult future.

South Korean Relations – Peace in Asia

Alliance is key to Asian peace – enforces democracy and confidence-building throughout the region

Denmark 9

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Through our Alliance we aim to build a better future for all people on the Korean Peninsula, establishing a durable peace on the Peninsula and leading to peaceful reunification on the principles of free democracy and a market economy. We will work together to achieve the complete and verifiable elimination of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, as well as ballistic missile programs, and to promote respect for the fundamental human rights of the North Korean people. In the Asia-Pacific region we will work jointly with regional insti- tutions and partners to foster prosperity, keep the peace, and improve the daily lives of the people of the region. We believe that open societies and open economies create prosperity and support human dignity, andour nations and civic organizations will promote human rights, de- mocracy, free markets, and trade and investment liberalization in the region. To enhance security in the Asia-Pacific, our governments will advocate for, and take part in, effective cooperative regional efforts to promote mutual understanding, confidence and transparency re- garding security issues among the nations of the region. Our governments and our citizens will work closely to address the global challenges of terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, piracy, organized crime and narcotics, climate change, poverty, infringement on human rights, energy security, and epidemic disease. The Alliance will enhance coordination on peacekeeping, post- conflict stabilization and development assistance, as is being under- taken in Iraq and Afghanistan. We will also strengthen coordination in multilateral mechanisms aimed at global economic recovery such as the G20. The United States of America and the Republic of Korea will work to achieve our common Alliance goals through strategic co- operation at every level. Proven bilateral mechanisms such as the Security Consultative Meeting and the Strategic Consultations for Allied Partnership will remain central to realizing this shared vision for the Alliance.

South Korean Relations – Laundry List

US-South Korean relations are key to regional stability, checking US-China war, and preserving US heg in Asia

Kim, Professor @ Myongiji, 3
Seung-Hwan Kim, Int’l Affairs Prof @ Myongji, 2003, “Anti-Americanism in Korea,” Wash. Q., <http://www.thewashingtonquarterly.com/03winter/docs/03winter_kim.pdf>

Even worse, Korean attitudes toward the United States in turn reverber- ate back through U.S. attitudes toward South Korea. The rise of anti-Ameri- can sentiment in South Korea only means that U.S. resentment toward South Korea will likely grow in response to negative Korean attitudes and policies. This dynamic has the potential to become a dangerous, downward spiral of increasing tensions between populations and even governments. An escalating clash between anti-Americanism in South Korea and anti- Koreanism in the United States could undermine the U.S.-Korean alli- ance—exactly what the North Korean leadership would like to see. Some U.S. citizens feel that the Korean public has unfairly blamed the United States for no apparent reason, as was the case in the gold medal con- troversy in Utah. In recent years, benign U.S. policies seem to have gone un- appreciated in South Korea. The United States has served as a shield to protect South Korea over the past five decades in accordance with the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty. Yet, when terrorists threatened U.S. security, South Korea’s political leadership and the Korean people provided lukewarm support in response to the U.S. request for help. The future of the U.S.-Korean alliance is too important for Washington and Seoul to overlook this current trend of rising anti-Americanism and the potential rise of anti-Koreanism, as they directly threaten the special U.S.- ROK symbiotic relationship. The alliance with the United States is critical for South Korea to preserve stability on the peninsula and in the region. In addition, Korean instability that could arise in the absence of a U.S. security commitment would complicate Korean efforts to sustain current and ex- pected levels of foreign investments throughout the country, thus threaten- ing continued economic progress. Regional stability is also critical for South Korea because it conducts more than two-thirds of its trade in the Asia-Pa- cific region, with the volume of current South Korean trade through Asian naval transport routes exceeding 40 percent of its total trade. Even after unification, South Korea’s alliance with the United States will continue to be important to protect the peninsula from once again becoming the politi- cal, if not the military, battleground where the major Asian powers have his- torically sought regional hegemony. The alliance with South Korea is also critical for the United States to maintain its leadership position in the Asia-Pacific region. The partnership helps prevent the eruption of hostilities on the Korean peninsula, which could otherwise draw China into a reenactment of the Korean War. It helps preserve a stable balance of power in the region by hedging against the rise of an aggressive regional power and regional rivalries, and it helps protect U.S. economic interests. More than one-third of total U.S. trade is con- ducted with the Asia-Pacific region, and millions of U.S. jobs would be at stake if continued regional growth and development were jeopardized.

South Korea – AT: Nuclear Guarantee Checks

Troop removal undermines US nuclear guarantee

Michisita, Research Associate @ NIDS, 99

Narushige, Research Associate @ National Institute for Defense Studies, Alliances After Peace in Korea, Survival

Finally, without the maintenance of US forces in Korea, a US nuclear guarantee would ring hollow. By their presence, US forces would discourage Korea from developing a nuclear capacity, other weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) or offensive capabilities such as medium-range ballistic missiles. This, too, would have the effect of calming tensions between Japan and Korea, and between Korea and China. As South Korean President Kim Dae Jung has said, 'The US forces stationed on the Korean Peninsula and in Japan are decisive to the maintenance of peace and balance of power not only on the Peninsula but also in Northeast Asia. By the same token, the US forces in Europe are an indispensable factor for peace and stability of all of Europe'.'2 Despite the words 'balance of power', what Kim said sounds much more like reassurance than conflictive balance of power.

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Turkey 1nc

Turkish prolif on the brink – plan leads to indigenous nuclear proliferation

Tertrais, PhD in Political Science, 6

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The only “European” country that could seriously consider a nuclear weapons program in the coming decades is Turkey. The country hosts 50 U.S. nuclear weapons for U.S. use and 40 for Turkish use at its Inccedilirlik Air Base.7 At various times in the past, Ankara contemplated the possibility of a national nuclear program. It signed the NPT in 1969 but ratified it only in 1980, possibly due to its reluctance to abandon the nuclear option.8 In 1998, after India and Pakistan's nuclear tests, Turkey reportedly discussed the possibility of nuclear cooperation with Pakistan.9 In 2000, a government minister openly advocated Turkish possession of nuclear weapons.10 A combination of two factors could make Ankara think seriously about going nuclear. One is the advancement of Iran's nuclear program. Relations between Turkey and Iran generally have been difficult since the Iranian Revolution, and the establishment of a strategic partnership between Turkey and Israel in the 1990s has further strained the association. If Iran were to go as far as to attain nuclear weapons (even covertly), then the nuclear question would be posed in Turkey. A researcher noted recently: “Voices are starting to be heard from within Turkish society promoting the idea of going nuclear, particularly if Iran manages to develop [a] nuclear weapons capability.”11 The second factor that would steer Ankara in this direction is a sense of alienation vis-a-vis the rest of the Western community. This is already happening to some extent. Since 2001, Turkey has been experiencing a change in its political culture and seems to be moving away from the West. Moderate Islamists won the 2002 elections. The invasion of Iraq was the occasion of one of the most severe U.S.-Turkish crises in decades, when the parliament refused in March 2003 to allow U.S. land forces to cross Turkish territory to enter Iraq from the north. Since then, U.S. popularity has plummeted to record lows. Only 12 percent of Turks now have a favorable opinion of the United States, and just 17 percent have a favorable opinion of Americans.12 Two of the most popular Turkish works in decades, the 2004 novel Metal Storm and the 2005 movie Valley of the Wolves, have depicted U.S.-Turkey wars. American and Turkish forces have even occasionally clashed in Iraqi Kurdistan; perhaps most notable was the July 4, 2003 incident in which U.S. troops detained Turkish soldiers, prompting some in Turkey to believe that “had we had nuclear weapons, Americans could not have treated our brave soldiers like that.”13 These developments have occurred in parallel with growing doubts about the relevance of the NATO security guarantee. In 1991, Turkey was shocked as some Atlantic Alliance members (including Germany) showed reluctance at the deployment of NATO defenses on Turkish territory, raising questions about the validity of the security guarantee from which Ankara was to benefit. Immediately before the March 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, a crisis of confidence developed within NATO as several alliance members refused to invoke Article IV of the Washington Treaty, which calls for consultations among members in case one of them believes its security is threatened, thus repeating, in Turkey's eyes, the experience of 1991. As Ian Lesser puts it, “In the absence of a predictable Western security guarantee, Ankara might also consider deterrent capabilities of its own, although the prospect for this is complicated and politically risky for Turkey.”14 Meanwhile, the prospect of Turkey's entry into the EU has become even more unlikely. Negotiations were formally opened in 2005, after several decades of hesitation from Europe, but the growing uncertainties about the direction of the European integration project, the failure of the constitutional referendum, and the open opposition to Turkish membership from several mainstream EU political parties have made Turkey's membership a distant prospect at best. The post-September 11, 2001 context and growing questions in Europe about the place of Islam in the West have fueled these uncertainties. The Turks clearly realize this: In the latest “Eurobarometer” opinion poll, only 43 percent of Turks now have a “positive” image of the EU, and barely more than a third, 35 percent, “trust” the EU.15 Given these circumstances, a Turkish nuclear capability is no longer in the realm of the farfetched. It would certainly take Ankara some time before it was able to have nuclear weapons. Since Ankara abandoned its Akkuyu nuclear plant project in July 2000, its nuclear-related infrastructure is very limited. Turkey has only a small, U.S.-origin research reactor in Istanbul, a pilot-fuel fabrication plant, and the Cekmece Nuclear Research and Training Center. However, Ankara recently has indicated that it might consider expanding its nuclear complex for the sake of electricity generation. It should also be noted that the participation of some Turkish firms in Pakistani nuclear imports and exports at various times since the early 1980s might give Turkey possible access to some components or equipment more quickly than if it started entirely from scratch.

Turkey 1nc

Spills over

Sokolski 7

Henry, 6/14, Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, Former Fellow @ National Institute for Public Policy and Heritage, MA @ U Chicago. “What Nuclear Challenges Might the EU Meet?” Keynote Address @ Conference The EU Facing Nuclear Weapons Challenges, http://www.npec-web.org/Presentations/20070616-Sokolski-Talk-AixEnProvence-Conference.pdf

One country that might disagree with this view, though, is Turkey. It is trying to figure out how to live with a nuclear weapons armed neighbor, Iran; is disappointed by its inability to be fully integrated into the EU; and is toying with getting its own nuclear capabilities. Whether or not Turkey does choose to go its own way and acquire a nuclear weapons-option of its own will depend on several factors, including Ankara’s relations with Washington, Brussels, and Tehran. To a very significant degree, though, it also will depend on whether or not the EU Members States are serious about letting Turkey join the EU. The dimmer these prospects look, the greater is the likelihood of that Turkey will chose to hedge its political, economic, and security bets by seeking a nuclear weapons-option of its own. This poses a difficult choice for the EU. Many key members are opposed to letting Turkey join the EU. There are arguments to favor this position. Yet, if Turkey should conclude that its interests are best served by pursuing such a nuclear weapons-option, it is almost certain to fortify the conviction of Egypt, Algeria, and Saudi Arabia to do the same. This will result in the building up a nuclear powder keg on Europe’s doorstep and significantly increase the prospect for nuclear terrorism and war.

Specifically – Saudi nuclearization collapses US-Saudi relations – leads to terrorism

Mcdowell 3

Steven, Lt US Navy, Post Graduate Thesis, Is Saudi Arabia A Nuclear Threat?, http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/research/theses/McDowell03.asp

This U.S.-Saudi relationship would face tremendous strain if the Saudis acquired a nuclear capability. In the event of a coup, Saudi nuclear capability could potentially fall into the hands of a new and unstable leadership. In the event of a failed Saudi state following a “coup gone wrong,” the effects would be even more catastrophic for the United States and the Gulf region. The purported nuclear weapons could also fall into the hands of Al-Qaeda members or other radical fundamentalist groups, which could attempt to hold the United States hostage, levy demands, and further hamper U.S. efforts in the war on terrorism.

Nuclear war

Speice 6

Patrick F., Jr. "Negligence and nuclear nonproliferation: eliminating the current liability barrier to bilateral U.S.-Russian nonproliferation assistance programs." William and Mary Law Review 47.4 (Feb 2006): 1427(59). Expanded Academic ASAP.

The potential consequences of the unchecked spread of nuclear knowledge and material to terrorist groups that seek to cause mass destruction in the United States are truly horrifying. A terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon would be devastating in terms of immediate human and economic losses. (49) Moreover, there would be immense political pressure in the United States to discover the perpetrators and retaliate with nuclear weapons, massively increasing the number of casualties and potentially triggering a full-scale nuclear conflict. (50) In addition to the threat posed by terrorists, leakage of nuclear knowledge and material from Russia will reduce the barriers that states with nuclear ambitions face and may trigger widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons. (51) This proliferation will increase the risk of nuclear attacks against the United States or its allies by hostile states, (52) as well as increase the likelihood that regional conflicts will draw in the United States and escalate to the use of nuclear weapons. (53)

Turkey – Terrorism Impact Extension

Nuclear terrorism leads to nuclear war

Ayson, Professor of Strategic Studies, 10

Robert, [Studies in Conflict & Terrorism](file:///C%3A%5CDocuments%20and%20Settings%5CDebate%20Team%5CLocal%20Settings%5CTemp%5Ctitle~db%3Dall~content%3Dt713742821), Volume 33, Issue [7](file:///C%3A%5CDocuments%20and%20Settings%5CDebate%20Team%5CLocal%20Settings%5CTemp%5Ctitle~db%3Dall~content%3Dg923247215)July

Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington's relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington's early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country's armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response.

Turkey Link

Decline in the credibility of US security guarantee triggers Turkish proliferation

Tertrais 9

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Like most Arab countries, Turkey has announced its intention to restart its civilian nuclear program. It already has a very significant nuclear infrastructure. Its main research center (Cekmece Nuclear Research and Training Center) has two modern (1986) pilot installations for conversion and fuel fabrication.[51] The involvement of several Turkish firms in the AQ Khan network indicates that there is industrial know-how in the country which could be of use to a uranium enrichment program. However, Ankara claims to be uninterested by enrichment.[52] The country operates two research reactors: a light-water 5 MWth reactor;[53] and a small Triga Mark- II unit, which is being converted to operated on LEU.[54] It also has a small waste treatment facility (Radioactive Waste Processing and Storage Facility). Scientists have made computer simulations of reprocessing with the Purex process.[55] Generally speaking, nuclear science and technology is very active in the country. Also, Turkey is one of the only States in the region to have started setting up the regulatory mechanisms needed for larger-scale nuclear programs, under the aegis of the Turkish Atomic Energy Commission (TAEK). Turkey is moderately worried about the Iranian nuclear program. It has generally good relations with its neighbor. It is covered by a formal nuclear guarantee, backed by a multilateral alliance, and has nuclear weapons on its territory (including for use by Turkish aircraft). However, Ankara may be losing its sense of confidence about NATO. At two occasions—1991 and 2003—its allies were perceived as hesitant to fulfill their security commitments. The new generation of Turkish officers do not trust NATO as much as the previous one.[56] In addition, political relations with the West have become more difficult because of Iraq, controversy about the 1915 events, and a European reluctance to give a clear perspective for entry into the European Union. Turkish public opinion has an extremely negative view of the United States.[57] (It is also opposed to the continued stationing of U.S. nuclear weapons.)[58] Ankara’s perception of the Western security guarantee will be a key for its future nuclear choices.[59] The military option would be an extreme one: a choice in that direction would require a deepening of the crisis in confidence with both the United States and Europe. Additionally, domestic power games may come into play: a nuclear program might be a way to consolidate the place of the military in the political decision-making process. Defiance vis-à-vis Iran is stronger in the so-called “kemalist” circles.[60]

Troops are the largest signal of US commitment to NATO allies

Yost 9

David, Prof. at Naval Postgraduate School and PhD in IR – USC, International Affairs, “Assurance and US extended deterrence in NATO”, 85:4, Wiley Interscience, p. 767-768

The US military presence in Europe has historically been viewed as an essential proof of Washington’s commitment to the security of the NATO allies, signifying the certainty of direct US involvement in meeting any aggression against the alliance. This deterrence role remains pertinent, although the United States has substantially reduced its conventional military force levels in Europe since the early 1990s. It is noteworthy in this regard that new allies in Eastern and Central Europe have expressed a willingness to host US and NATO facilities. One of the main reasons given by Czech and Polish supporters of the deployment of US missile defence system elements has been to gain the presence of US troops on their soil. Whatever happens with the missile defence plans under the new US administration, these countries remain interested in hosting US or NATO facilities. Radek Sikorski, the Polish foreign minister, declared in November 2008 that, although Poland joined the alliance in 1999, it had so far received only a promise of a NATO conference centre. ‘Everyone agrees’, he added, ‘that countries that have US soldiers on their territory do not get invaded.’36 Hungary’s willingness to host NATO’s new strategic airlift capability initiative is significant in this respect. The base at Papa will host three C-17 aircraft and over 150 personnel, with the majority scheduled to arrive from the United States in the spring and summer of 2009. The commander of the heavy airlift wing will be a US Air Force officer. Hungary will make a disproportionate contribution to the staffing of the base facilities. It is reasonable to presume that the Hungarian government sees a deterrence benefit in hosting a NATO installation with substantial US military participation.

Turkey Link

Forward military presence prevents Turkish threat perception

Department of Defense, 1995

Security Strategy for Europe and NATO, <http://www.dod.gov/pubs/europe/chapter_3.html>

U.S. forward military presence in Europe is an essential element of regional security and America's global military posture. Forward deployed conventional and nuclear forces are the single most visible demonstration of America's commitment to defend U.S. and allied interests in Europe. Simultaneously, the presence of overseas forces strengthens the U.S. leadership role in European affairs and supports our efforts to extend stability to the developing democracies to the East. Overall, the presence of U.S. forces deters adventurism and coercion by potentially hostile states, reassures friends, enhances regional stability, and underwrites our larger strategy of engagement and enlargement. The forward stationing of these forces in Europe and the day-to-day interaction of our forces with those of our European allies helps to build and maintain the strong bonds of the Alliance. Our forces train with the forces of our NATO allies on a daily basis, creating a degree of interoperability among NATO forces that we do not share with most other militaries of the world. As a result of these routine interactions, we have the ability to conduct high-intensity joint and combined military operations with our NATO allies both in Europe and in other areas of common interests. The successful DESERT STORM operation to expel Iraqi invaders from Kuwait in 1991 provides the best example of the tangible benefits of forward stationing U.S. forces in Europe to the defense of Western interests beyond Europe. Because of our close cooperation with the NATO militaries in Europe, we were able to conduct sophisticated, large-scale military operations with the forces of the United Kingdom, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Turkey. These operations were conducted using NATO standardization agreements (STANAGs) for everything from doctrine for land warfare to specifications for refueling nozzles for fighter aircraft. The routine military interaction and habits of cooperation facilitated by forward stationing a sizable operational force in Europe made all this possible.

Turkey Link – TNW’s

US withdrawal of TNWs causes a domino effect of proliferation across the middle east

Richard Weitz, Ph.D., is Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis, the Hudson Institute, 4-12-10, <http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/inside/turkey/2010/100412A.html>, accessed: 7-20-10

The United States and other countries might also need to consider how removing the weapons might affect Turkey’s calculations about whether it might develop its own nuclear deterrent, which would contribute to the feared proliferation wave in the greater Middle East that could undermine the non-proliferation agenda of the Obama administration and other NATO governments. Some Turkish officials see having physical access to TNWs as part of their bargain with the United States and the other allies for not developing an independent Turkish nuclear arsenal. As part of the current NATO deliberation, there have been proposals to increase the number of U.S. nuclear weapons stored in Turkey as part of an alliance-wide consolidation of NATO’s TNW arsenal. Some proponents of retaining NATO’s nuclear-sharing arrangements favor removing them from those European countries that no longer want them on their soil and relocating them into those countries that do, which might only include Turkey and perhaps Italy. If NATO withdrew U.S. TNW from all other European countries, the Turkish government could find it uncomfortable remaining the only NATO nuclear-hosting state, and might request their removal from its territory as well. But then Turkey might proceed to develop an independent nuclear deterrent in any case for the reasons described above.

Turkey Impact – Spillover / Nuclear War

Turkey proliferation would lead to nuke war

Inbar 06 Efraim Inbar s a Professor in Political Studies at Bar-Ilan University and the Director of its Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies. “The Need to Block Nuclear Iran” Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 1 (March 2006) http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/meria/meria\_mar06/meria\_10-1g.pdf.

Indeed, the emergence of a nuclear-armed Iran would have a chain-effect, generating further nuclear proliferation in the immediate region. Middle Eastern leaders, who invariably display high threat perceptions, are unlikely to look nonchalantly on a nuclear Iran. States such as Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and, of course, Iraq would hardly be persuaded by the United States that it can provide a nuclear umbrella against Iranian nuclear blackmail or actual nuclear attack. American extended deterrence is very problematic in the Middle East.16 Therefore, these states would not resist the temptation to counter Iranian influence by adopting similar nuclear postures. The resulting scenario of a multi-polar nuclear Middle East would be a recipe for disaster. This strategic prognosis is a result of two factors: a) the inadequacy of a defensive posture against nuclear tipped missiles, and b) the difficulties surrounding the establishment of stable nuclear deterrence in the region.

Middle East proliferation leads to regional war

Said 01. (Maj. Gen. (ret.) Dr Mohamed Kadry Said is Head of the Military Studies Unit and Technology Advisor at the Al Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies (Cairo), Professor of Missile Flight Mechanics at the Military Technical College (Cairo))Disarmament Forum. “Missile proliferation in the Middle East:

a regional perspective”

For historical reasons the Middle East has failed to build security structures or dialogue forums to handle global changes in military technology and its impact on regional security. The absence of rules and constraints has led to further searching for new missile capabilities and basing options to guarantee security. The rapid spread of information, know-how and technology will soon put these weapons in the hands of more countries as well as enhance their lethal capabilities. The growing proliferation of missiles in the Middle East increases the potential for long-range missile exchange in any future regional war. This has produced a major shift in military thinking and gives threat perceptions generated by missile acquisition new strategic dimensions. The dangers of a miscalculation leading to conflict with nuclear, biological or chemical warheads will increase.

Turkey Impact – Relations

Turkish proliferation tanks relations

Al-Marshi and Goren 9

Ibrahim, PhD in History from Oxford and, Nishu, Monterrey Institute for Non-Proliferation Studies, Turkish Perceptions and Nuclear Proliferation, http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2009/Apr/marashiApr09.asp#author

As official state policy, Turkey complies with the Nonproliferation Treaty, Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions, Comprehensive test-ban Treaty (CTBT), and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Even if Turkey were to build a nuclear arsenal it would not be able to deploy nuclear weapons without disrespecting the rule of international law, i.e. noncompliance with the international regimes it has adhered to. In this case, the benefits of acquiring nuclear weapons do not outweigh the costs of economic and political sanctions that the country would face leaving the NATO umbrella and breaking its strategic alliance with United States.

US-Turkish relations solve global stability

Lt. Colonel MacWillie 2

Donald M., http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA401681&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the world has experienced continuous changes to the hierarchy of global power, resulting in increased regional instabilities and the emergence of new threats to global security. Asymmetric pressures, terrorism, international crime, the procurement and use of weapons of mass destruction MMD). along with ethnic and religious radicalism are today's realities. Add to this the view in many parts of the world that America has become "preemptory and domineering-[even] imperial..." .as well as the phenomenon that a growing number of established nation-states are grouping themselves into larger entities to counter the dominance of the United States, and it is clear the list of potential threats against the United States will grow. The result has been an ongoing transformation in the very concept of state security. By definition, national security has traditionally relied more on military power and less on diplomatic and economic strength built on partnerships.2 But emerging trends, such as those cited above, defy this description. And U.S. policy makers acknowledge the changes are producing larger. complex trans-regional blocks that no longer respond in a predictable manner toward Western security needs. As a consequence, the longstanding strategies for the protection of the United States no longer fit.3 Washington will have to adjust its security approaches to match the geopolitical responsibilities and consequences of being the lone hyper-power in an instable world. One promising concept is to utilize a pivotal states' strategy. 4 In addition to managing relationships with Europe, Japan. Russia, and China, America would concentrate on several developing nations that can affect not only their surrounding regions but also emerging geopolitical unions, to the benefit of U.S. security interests. Pivotal states might include Mexico, Brazil, Algeria, Egypt, South Africa, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Turkey. For Turkey, its location on the Eurasian landmass-at the ethnic, religious, economic and military crossroads of Europe, the Middle East and Central Asia-give it heightened importance as a U.S. strategic and security partner. This fact was emphasized when President Clinton declared, A democratic, secular, stable and Western-oriented Turkey has supported U.S. efforts to enhance stability in Bosnia, the NIS and the Middle East, as well as to contain Iran and Iraq Its continued ties to the West and its support for our overall strategic objectives in one of the world's most sensitive regions is critical.6

US-Turkish Relations Good – Democracy

US-Turkish relations are key to democracy
Kaymakcalan 2

Orhan, Washington Times, April 21, LN

Turkey gives lie to the proposition that Islam and democracy are doomed to clash. That message is a tonic to the United States campaign for democratic regimes in Muslim nations - not only in the Middle East but in the Balkans, Central Asia and Asia. The national security interests of the United States and Turkey generally overlap. Turkey proved a stalwart ally during the United States military interventions in Bosnia and Kosova to foil the villainies of indicted war criminal Slobodan Milosevic and his henchman. Turkey's cooperation with the U.S. has contained Saddam Hussein's regime and its would-be repression of Iraqi Kurds. Both nations have worked hand-in-glove to promote pipelines transiting the Caucasus and Turkey to carry coveted oil and natural gas supplies to Western markets in the Mediterranean Sea without hazarding Black Sea pollution. A thickening United States alliance with Turkey will be worth substantially more than the price of admission in fighting terrorism, promoting democracy, and spreading human rights.

Global democratic consolidation prevents many scenarios for war and extinction

Diamond 95

Larry Diamond, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, December 1995, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s, http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/1.htm

OTHER THREATS This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.

US-Turkish Relations Good – Balkans

US-Turkish relations key to Balkans stability

Cagaptay 3

Soner, 6/20, pg. http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-cagaptay062003.asp

If Ankara were to study Turkish-American relations over the past decade, it would find much worth noting. In the 1990s, the underlying foundation of the bilateral relationship was Turkey's geostrategic importance. Turkey's position between southeastern Europe, the Near East, and the Caucasus made the country an irresistible strategic asset. Without Ankara, America could not stabilize the Balkans, tap Caspian oil, or hope to settle the Middle East conflict. At the nexus of Europe and Asia, Turkey proved a great help to America. In return, Washington looked after Turkey's global interests in Central Asia, Europe, and the Mediterranean. During the Iraq war, though, this partnership collapsed as the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) failed to make Turkey's geostrategic importance — its most valuable possession — available to Washington.

Impact is the most likely scenario for global nuclear war

Brezinski 3

Zbigniew Brzezinski, Professor of American Foreign Policy @ Johns Hopkins, The National Interest, Winter 2003 i74 p5(12)

FOR THE next several decades, the most volatile and dangerous region of the world--with the explosive potential to plunge the world into chaos--will be the crucial swathe of Eurasia between Europe and the Far East. Heavily inhabited by Muslims, we might term this crucial subregion of Eurasia the new "Global Balkans." (1) It is here that America could slide into a collision with the world of Islam while American-European policy differences could even cause the Atlantic Alliance to come unhinged. The two eventualities together could then put the prevailing American global hegemony at risk.

\*\*\*Afghanistan DA\*\*\*

Failure in Afghanistan tanks credible assurances – leads to allied and rogue proliferation

Brookes, PhD Candidate @ Georgetown, 9

Peter Brookes. “Afghanistan: Why We Can’t Walk Away.” Family Security Matters. November 10, 2009. Accessed July 25, 2010.

And, of course, failure in Afghanistan will affect America's stature in the world. As the Afghan situation unfolds in the months to come, both friends and foes will be watching closely for even subtle signs of American intentions, especially its commitment to continuing the fight. Not surprisingly, a lot of strategic hedging is going on among stakeholders in Afghanistan as America works out its strategy. Even a seeming lack of resolve will have consequences, as Afghanistan Commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal said recently in a speech in London: "Uncertainty disheartens our allies, emboldens our foe." But it goes beyond that. Perceptions of who is winning and who is losing and who is staying and who is going affect the civilian population in Afghanistan -- one that is famous for bending with the prevailing political winds. Having the population on the right side is critical to any counterinsurgency campaign. It is also not outlandish to assume that defeat in Afghanistan to the Taliban would leave the United States looking soft and undependable with both allies and enemies, having a negative effect on American interests across the globe. For example, failure in Afghanistan will ripple into NATO, where America's leadership will be undermined, perhaps, convincing the Europeans of the soundness of their parallel effort to establish a European Union defense policy and force. Asian allies would certainly wonder about their American partner, too. Moreover, coming up short in Afghanistan certainly would not encourage the likes of the recalcitrant regimes in Iran or North Korea to come around to our way of thinking on negotiations over their nuclear and ballistic missile programs.

Afghanistan Link – Credibility

Presence in Afghanistan is key to US credibility

Carroll 9

Conn Carroll, the Assistant Director for The Heritage Foundation's Strategic Communications and he serves as editor of The Foundry, the think tank's rapid-response policy blog, 19 Reasons To Win In Afghanistan, Heritage Foundation, http://blog.heritage.org/?p=16195, accessed 7/22/10

U.S. Credibility is at stake. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United Nations support the U.S.-led war effort in Afghanistan. Over 500 coalition soldiers from countries other than the U.S. have died in Afghanistan. Abandoning Afghanistan could lead to significant weakening of NATO cohesion/structure and undermine potential future requests for security assistance. The Fallout from a Afghanistan withdrawal can potentially be far worse than remaining. Following the Fall of Vietnam, U.S. experienced setbacks in Cambodia, Philippines, Fall of Iran, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Egypt-Israeli conflict, Angola, Lebanon, Libya, El Salvador, Colombia, and Nicaragua due to the loss of U.S. credibility.

Overall credibility rests on US success in Afghanistan

Carroll 9

Conn Carroll, the Assistant Director for The Heritage Foundation's Strategic Communications and he serves as editor of The Foundry, the think tank's rapid-response policy blog, 19 Reasons To Win In Afghanistan, Heritage Foundation, http://blog.heritage.org/?p=16195, accessed 7/22/10

The Taliban is largely unpopular and can be defeated. While the Taliban have some following among their Pashtun co-ethnics, especially in the southern part of the country, the Taliban are generally hated by the Uzbeks, Tajiks, Hazarra and other non-Pashtun groups that together make up a numerical majority in Afghanistan. The memory of Taliban persecution is fresh and motivational for all the non-Pashtun groups. Wherever they have gone since 2004, the Taliban have used barbaric tactics to win the obedience of the local populations. They win “hearts and minds” by murder, violence and coercion. Nearly all opinion polls indicate very little support for the Taliban. The Taliban can be defeated and blocked by strategies that protect the population and build up the security capacity of the Afghan state, its provinces and its districts. Counter-sanctuary activities by Pakistani forces could easily disrupt their base areas and training grounds. Better coordination with Persian Gulf allies and stronger counternarcotics efforts could dry up their financial base. The Taliban cannot win unless the West quits. In Summary, multiple threats are being addressed by the U.S. presence in Afghanistan. They include: dealing with the primary threats of Al Qaeda and the Taliban, preparing for a destabilized Pakistan with nuclear weapons, posturing for a future hostile Iran, and reducing the long-term recruitment of radical Islamic terrorists from this region. At the center of debate, however, is the question of whether the average U.S. voter truly believes that Al Qaeda and Taliban can seriously pose a threat to U.S. national security interests at home and abroad? If yes, then it becomes questionable for a decision to willfullydeliver strategic victory to a weakened terrorist network by pulling out of Afghanistan. There are significant ramifications for U.S. credibility abroad to our detriment. When the first nuclear device explodes in a heavily populated U.S. city, who will be held responsible for this incident?

Afghanistan Link – Adversaries

Withdrawal emboldens adversaries

Carroll 9

Conn Carroll, the Assistant Director for The Heritage Foundation's Strategic Communications and he serves as editor of The Foundry, the think tank's rapid-response policy blog, 19 Reasons To Win In Afghanistan, Heritage Foundation, http://blog.heritage.org/?p=16195, accessed 7/22/10

Afghanistan and Pakistan – This Region is Ground Zero for Anti-U.S. Radical Islamic Violence. As the host nations for the primary terrorist organization that successfully conducted multiple attacks against the U.S. personnel and facilities, this region, by definition, is important to U.S. national security interests. Between Pakistan and Afghanistan, the preponderance of radical Islamic combatants, their recruitment base, and Al Qaeda central headquarters are current adversaries. Allowing the Taliban and Al Qaeda to return to power in Afghanistan, without their proper acceptance of a clear political defeat, can only: 1) embolden other U.S. adversaries, 2) increase radical Islamic recruitment, 3) undermine those Afghan civilians who supported the U.S., and 4) set back the notion of moderate Muslim governance for decades to come. This is not just a conflict to terminate Bin Laden but to ultimately diminish the future recruiting base of radical Islam. With realistic projections for a significant youth bulge Afghanistan and Pakistan, the potential for future violence is high for the near future.

That tanks allied credibility

Scheber, Vice President, National Institute for Public Policy, 9

Thomas, Contemporary Challenges for Extended Deterrence, Scholar

Significant changes in the global landscape over the past two decades include the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, expansion of membership in the NATO alliance, and the emergence of new WMD threats to the United States and its allies. In this new environment, U.S. extended deterrence guarantees remain in effect, but changes in contextual factors require a close and fresh look at the contemporary challenges of deterrence to include perspectives of allies who rely on these guarantees. The discussion that follows examines the implications for extended deterrence from three types of challenges in the contemporary environment: 1. Continuing proliferation of WMD and delivery systems that directly threaten allies; 2. New and emerging direct threats to the United States; and 3. A newly assertive Russia with a strategy of increased reliance on nuclear weapons.

Afghanistan Link – Iran Extension

Extend 1nc Brookes evidence – premature pullout of Afghanistan triggers rogue proliferation – prefer our evidence – predictive and from a PhD candidate @ Georgetown

Iranian proliferation spills over to the Middle East, destabilizing the entire region

Kathleen McInnis, coordinator of the Project on Nuclear Issues and a research

associate at CSIS. “Extended Deterrence: The U.S. Credibility Gap in the Middle East.” Center for Strategic and International Studies. Summer 2005. Accessed electronically on July 20, 2010. <http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/177624\_918013288\_918386648.pdf>.

Arecent UN report recently warned that "[w]e are approaching a point at which the erosion of the nonproliferation regime could become irreversible and result in a cascade of proliferation."1 One major challenge to the nonproliferation regime appearing on the strategic horizon is the likely development of an Iranian nuclear capability, which could spark a wave of proliferation throughout the Middle Eastern region. With this in mind, can U.S. nuclear, conventional, and missile defense capabilities help bolster the security of U.S. allies against the threats posed by Iranian nuclear proliferation? In addition to deterring its own adversaries, the U.S. nuclear arsenal has in the past played a vital but often overlooked role of reassuring U.S. allies against their adversaries. This assurance was a key tool in preventing nuclear proliferation among allies in the European and Asian theaters during the Cold War, despite the threat posed by the nuclear capabilities of their enemies. In today's security environment, assurance remains an important policy objective for the U.S. arsenal. The 2002 Nuclear Posture Review states that "U.S. nuclear forces will continue to provide assurance to security partners This assurance can serve to reduce the incentives for friendly countries to acquire nuclear weapons of their own to deter such threats and circumstances."2 Will this strategy work in practice? In the Asian theater, extended deterrence has been effective, and the United States possesses some decent options for ensuring its effectiveness in the future. The long-standing commitment of the United States to the survival of democratic states in the region, reinforced by security treaties with Japan and South Korea, has created a great deal of U.S. political credibility in the region. This political credibility, combined with U.S. military capabilities, could be employed to deter the North Korean threat and assure U.S. allies in the region, thereby reducing the chance that they will respond to Pyongyang by building their own nuclear weapons program. The U.S. political commitment to its allies in Asia has been and remains robust, bolstered by the U.S. troop presence in Japan and South Korea for the past 50 years. This remains true despite the drawdown of U.S. forces in the Asian theater. Furthermore, should allies begin to doubt U.S. nuclear assurances, steps can be taken to reinforce the policy's credibility. As such, despite the major challenges presented by Pyongyang's nuclear declaration in February 2005, it is reasonably likely that East Asian allies will continue to choose to rely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella well into the future rather than set off a regional nuclear domino effect. U.S. relationships in the Middle East, however, have a strikingly different character, more akin to hesitant engagement than to Washington's well-established partnerships in Asia. A rising tide of Islamic fundamentalism, coupled with growing anti-U.S. sentiment, has strained these tenuous relations. As then-Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton recently stated, "Iranian nuclear capabilities would change the perceptions of the military balance in the region and could pose serious challenges to the [United States] in terms of deterrence and defense." 3 One such challenge is the prospect of multiple nuclear powers emerging in an already volatile Middle East. The outcome of this scenario depends in part on the capacity and credibility of U.S. strategic capabilities, including the nuclear deterrent. Ultimately, if key "nuclear dominos" in the region, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, decide that U.S. security guarantees are insufficient, they may be tempted to acquire their own nuclear weapons. A U.S. extended deterrent policy in the Middle East would lack credibility, not due to a lack of physical capability or presence in the region, but rather as a result of the fragility of U.S. relations with its allies in the region, creating a uniquely dangerous situation.

Iran proliferation spills over

McInnis, Kathleen J. 2005, Coordinator of the Project on Nuclear Issues and a research associate, CSIS, Extended deterrence: The U.S. credibility gap in the Middle East', The

Washington Quarterly, <http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/707746_918013288_918386648.pdf>, accessed: 7-22-10

According to one line of argument, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia would not build its own nuclear weapons because the regime is burdened by other demands. The acquisition of a nuclear capability would be too difficult and too expensive and would greatly jeopardize Saudi relations with the United States. As a result, their military posture has arguably been and will remain defensive in nature. Although this argument may have been true in the past, especially before the Iraqi regional counterweight was eliminated, the emergence of a nuclear-armed Iran would shake Saudi perceptions of their regional security environment. As former U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia Chas M. Freeman notes, "Senior Saudi officials have said privately that, if and when Iran acknowledges having, or is discovered to have, actual nuclear warheads, Saudi Arabia would feel compelled to acquire a deterrent stockpile."17 Some form of nuclear capability would be the most effective way to restore a fragile regional balance of power.18

\*\*\*Japan DA\*\*\*

Japan 1nc

Withdrawal from Japan signals an end to allied assurance – sends signal of weakness to key Asian allies

Auslin 10

Michael, AEI Fellow, U.S.-Japan Relations: Enduring Ties, Recent Developments, House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global Environment, http://www.aei.org/speech/100130

Despite this litany of problems both real and perceived, the U.S.-Japan alliance, and the broader relationship it embodies, remains the keystone of U.S. policy in the Asia-Pacific region. There is little doubt that America and Japan share certain core values that tie us together, including a belief in democracy, the rule of law, and civil and individual rights, among others, which should properly inform and inspire our policies abroad. Moreover, after the cataclysm of World War II, we have worked together to maintain stability in the western Pacific, throughout the Cold War and after. Without the continued Japanese hosting of U.S. forces, our forward-based posture is untenable, particularly in a period of growing Chinese military power in which the acquisition of advanced weapons systems indicates increased vulnerability of U.S. forces over time. There are over 35,000 U.S. military personnel in Japan, and another 11,000 afloat as part of the 7th Fleet, while three-quarters of our military facilities are in Okinawa. Maintaining this presence is a full-time job for officials on both sides of the Pacific. Both Washington and Tokyo have revised the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) governing the U.S. military in Japan to respond to local concerns over judicial access to U.S. service members, and domestic pressures to reduce Japan's $4 billion annual Host Nation Support (HNS) are a continuing feature of bilateral discussions. The new Japanese government has indicated its desire to consider further revision of SOFA and HNS, which portends continued, sometimes difficult negotiations between both sides, though I would be surprised by any significant changes in either. It is clear, however, that the presence of U.S. military forces is welcomed by nearly all nations in the Asia-Pacific region and sends a signal of American commitment to the region**.** From a historical standpoint, the post-war American presence in the Asia-Pacific has been one of the key enablers of growth and development in that maritime realm. And today, for all its dynamism, the Asia-Pacific remains peppered with territorial disputes and long-standing grievances, with few effective multilateral mechanisms such as exist in Europe for solving interstate conflicts. Our friends and allies in the area are keenly attuned to our continued forward-based posture, and any indications that the United States was reducing its presence might be interpreted by both friends and competitors as a weakening of our long-standing commitment to maintain stability in the Pacific. The shape of Asian regional politics will continue to evolve, and while I am skeptical of what can realistically be achieved by proposed U.S.-Japan-China trilateral talks, it seems evident that we must approach our alliance with Japan from a more regionally oriented perspective, taking into account how our alliance affects the plans and perceptions of other nations in the region.

Japan 1nc

Japanese rearm freaks out all neighboring countries—causes East Asian arms race and instability that escalates war

Stephanie Lieggi, is a Research Associate at the CNS East Asia Nonproliferation Program and Mark Wuebbels works in East Asia Nonproliferation Program Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), East Asia Nonproliferation Program Will Emerging Challenges Change Japanese Security Policy?December 2003 accessed July 17,2010 http://www.nti.org/e\_research/e3\_37a.htmlDonnie

As security dynamics in East Asia evolve, Japanese defense planners and policymakers continue to re-examine Japan’s defense strategy. Tokyo’s reaction to these security dynamics—and how these reactions are perceived by Japan’s neighbors—could have an enduring effect on East Asian security. The transformation occurring in Japan’s defense thinking has also affected discussions on the once taboo subjects of offensive capabilities and nuclear weapons development. While the Japanese public (and the majority of politicians) still opposes moves toward offensive capabilities, especially nuclear capabilities, the fact that these conversations are occurring within the Japanese leadership is itself a radical change from the policy discussions of the last few decades. Since the beginning of 2003, Koizumi’s government has used the shift in public sentiment to press for readjustments in Japan’s military policies. In June 2003, Koizumi pushed legislation through the Diet that widened the mandate of the SDF. The new legislation was the first since the drafting of the Japanese constitution in 1946 to detail specific measures to respond to actual or imminent attacks on Japan. Opposition parties claimed that the legislation was too ambiguous and potentially defied Japan’s pacifist constitution. However, support from the two largest parties allowed the motion to pass overwhelmingly.[15] This legislation was followed by Diet approval for sending of 1,000 troops to Iraq assist with reconstruction efforts. On the procurement side, the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) has requested funding to build or acquire a helicopter carrier, ballistic missile defenses, and air-refueling tankers. As was true in the Cold War, Japan’s sense of security reflects the degree of confidence Tokyo has in the U.S. commitment to protect Japan. Therefore, faith in the U.S. nuclear umbrella, or lack thereof, has a far-reaching influence on Japan’s evolving security doctrines. Increased U.S. force commitments in other parts of the world and plans for decreasing the number of troops stationed in East Asia have many defense analysts in Japan wondering—similar to the concerns expressed in 1970—whether the U.S. commitment to Japan’s security could be fading.[16] If this uncertainty spurs a push for self-reliance within the Japanese government, efforts to strengthen Japan’s military forces are likely to increase. Potential proliferation of nuclear weapons has also influenced shifts in Japan’s attitude toward defense. Japan’s support of the nuclear nonproliferation regime is tied to the belief that the NPT has played a vital role in ensuring Japan’s national security. The existence of a credible, universally accepted treaty curtailed the development of nuclear weapons by nations that had the latent capacity to construct their own arsenals. With these nations dissuaded from developing nuclear weapons, Japan felt sufficiently secure to abide by the *Three Non-nuclear Principles.* However, with the nuclear nonproliferation regime in danger, some politicians in Japan are rethinking the logic of adhering to anti-nuclear pledges in the long-term. Japan is poised to make decisions that will have long-term ramifications on its standing in the international community, as well on future security developments in the region. In the past Japan has made regional concerns about possible remilitarization an important factor in its security policies. However, as concerns over North Korea and China’s military development become more pressing, the opinions of other countries are likely to play less of a role. If pro-military factions are able to push their agenda through, Japan’s security policy could change significantly in coming years. Many Asian countries still distrust Japan’s intentions and suspect that current military constraints are superficial. This reflects a chronic fear in the region that Japan is more disposed to re-arming than it is willing to admit. Tokyo’s policies towards offensive capabilities would therefore have an immediate effect on the defense policies of neighboring countries. The result could be a regional arms race or other forms of insecurity and conflict.

Japan Uniqueness

Japanese re-arm is on the brink – credible US extended deterrence is key

Toki 9

Masako, Project Manager and Research Associate for the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute for International Studies, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, http://www.nti.org/e\_research/e3\_japan\_north\_korea\_threats.html

U.S. extended deterrence has been the cornerstone of Japan's security, even in the aftermath of the Cold War. The Japanese government is trying to complement extended deterrence with missile defense which is widely viewed consistent to Japan's exclusively defensive defense policy. Now Japan stands at the crossroads that its defense policy might depart from the exclusively defense oriented posture with the increasing discussion over a preemptive strike capability. If this discussion becomes more realistic, it is very likely to undermine regional stability. This will make the regional cooperation to tackle the North Korea's missile and nuclear issues more difficult. Both South Korea and China are adamantly opposing Japan's acquisition of such a capability. If Japan seriously seeks to form a unified front with the regional players, Tokyo must apply more pragmatic and sustainable options. Intensifying missile defense and preemptive option, if not counter-productive, cannot be seen not long term solutions; instead Tokyo should seek out more regional cooperation and strengthen arms control and nonproliferation regimes. Japan is uniquely placed to uphold and promote the principles of nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament as the only country to have been attacked by nuclear weapons. Many survivors of those attacks, referred to as Hibakusha, expressed anger against North Korea's nuclear weapon test. The tests are seen as running contrary to the recent increasing momentum in nuclear disarmament, especially after President Obama's historical speech calling for a world without nuclear weapons in Prague in April. Some Hibakusha also expressed concern that the test could refuel debate on Japan's nuclearization and more hawkish defense policy.[42] Moreover, several disarmament advocate groups in Japan questioned Tokyo's perpetual reliance on the extended nuclear deterrence of the United States. With the global movement toward a world without nuclear weapons led by world leaders including president Obama, Japan still needs to be protected under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. For Japan, the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is an essential condition for Tokyo to get rid of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The extended nuclear deterrence has been perceived as an essential factor for a strong alliance between the two countries. In fact, in the wake of this nuclear weapon test, both countries confirmed that the extended deterrence needs to be reinforced. But once global nuclear disarmament has become more realistic undertaking after the United Stated and Russia have achieved a significant reduction in nuclear arsenals through their bilateral arms control negotiation, extended deterrence issues need to be more seriously discussed among U.S. allies. Japan is now facing a serious dilemma in deciding between nuclear umbrella and nuclear abolition. Increasing nuclear threats from North Korea force Japan to seriously consider which direction the country should go. At the same time, this could be the opportunity for Japan to conduct more pragmatic debate for nuclear disarmament with its allies and other countries, including China. Neither initiative in creating a more secure and peaceful regional framework nor global nuclear disarmament movement should be less prioritized.

US extended deterrence is on the brink – reassurance is key

Schoff 9

James, Associate Dir. Asia-Pacific Studies – Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, “Realigning Priorities: The U.S.-Japan Alliance & the Future of Extended Deterrence”, March, http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/RealignPriorities.pdf

Extended deterrence in the U.S.-Japan alliance is under pressure because it is more complicated than before (thanks largely to missile proliferation, China’s expansion of air and sea power, and nuclear modernization in the region), and this challenge comes at a time when America’s and Japan’s security priorities are diverging. For decades, extended deterrence was thought of in simple terms, characterized by robust U.S. security commitments to its allies overseas and underwritten predominately by the provision of a nuclear umbrella to deter war with the Soviet bloc. The U.S. commitment to counter the Soviet threat was largely unquestioned in Tokyo, and the details about how deterrence worked mattered little. Today, deterrence is still a primary concern for defense planners, but there is less consensus regarding exactly who is to be deterred and how. U.S. deterrence doctrine has become muddled, as some emphasize the role of defenses, some push for bigger and better conventional options or seek more assertive alliance partners, and others talk about deterrence tailored to fit different situations. It is time to bring clarity to this important subject, not by simplifying the policy but by realigning priorities and deepening Japan’s understanding of the policy. U.S. verbal assurances to Japan will continue to be useful, but increasingly a more concrete and common understanding about how deterrence functions in East Asia will also be necessary. The United States is deemphasizing the role of nuclear weapons in supporting extended deterrence, which is acceptable provided Washington works proactively with Tokyo to shore up the multiple other components of deterrence (strong political and economic relations, conventional air and sea power, missile defenses, intelligence sharing, and scenario-based planning involving military, diplomatic, and economic cooperation). Deterrence has always been about more than just the nuclear umbrella, but this fact is often overlooked, given the power and symbolism of those weapons. Deemphasizing the role of nuclear weapons is a welcome development, but it should be accompanied by an intense period of political, diplomatic, and strategic consultations covering non-proliferation policies, regional diplomatic and security initiatives, and bilateral security cooperation.

Japan Uniqueness – AT: North Korea 🡺 Prolif

North Korean provocations won’t cause Japan nuclearization – but it’s on the brink

Rublee 9

Maria Rost Rublee, Ph.D., Strategic Insights, The Future of Japanese Nuclear Policy, http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2009/Apr/rubleeApr09.asp#author

In the short term, however, Tokyo seems quite unlikely to respond to the North Korean provocations with a nuclear capability of its own. LDP officials, after all, were not calling for a Japanese nuclear weapons program—only to open discussion about the possibility. The public remains strongly anti-nuclear; a Yomiuri Shimbun poll conducted a month after the North Korea nuclear tests revealed that 80 percent of the populace supported upholding the three non-nuclear principles, while only 18 percent believed they should be revised.[19] Japanese defense and nuclear experts expressed surprise at the lack of serious discussion about a nuclear option; one noted, “It surprised me how calm the Japanese public was after the NK test. I heard few people saying Japan should go nuclear. The media were saying, ‘Japan should not go nuclear in response.’ Even the conservative papers did not argue Japan should go nuclear.”[20] Others noted that the country remained much more focused on abduction issues.[21] Nonetheless, the North Korea nuclear test has provoked a number of more subtle changes in Japanese attitudes. First, the public is much more accepting of discussion of a nuclear option, and government officials are more willing to engage in such discussion. Previously, any discussion of a military nuclear capability was taboo; officials who raised the issue either were dismissed or had to retract their statements. While opposition leaders demanded the same after the LDP officials raised the possibility of a nuclear Japan, public response was minimal and the officials were not dismissed. The difference in public reaction was noted by the opposition: “Ozawa pointed out that former DPJ lawmaker Shingo Nishimura resigned as a parliamentary vice minister in 1999 after saying in a magazine interview that Japan should debate whether to possess nuclear weapons. ‘Even the parliamentary vice minister resigned,’ Ozawa said. ‘That is how serious (this issue) is.’”[22] Defense officials argued privately that discussion of a nuclear option should be allowed to show that it is not a good choice for Japan. “As long as we adhere to the three non-nuclear principles, why can’t we talk about it?”[23] The second change prompted by the North Korean nuclear tests is the number of analysts arguing that Japan should consider hosting U.S. nuclear weapons on Japanese soil, to enhance the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence.[24] This would require revision of the third non-nuclear principle—allowing the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan—but experts argued this would be preferable and more practical than Japan developing its own nuclear capability. Such a change is extremely unlikely, but the fact that people are talking about it is notable. These two changes do mark an openness to military nuclear capacity, but the fact that North Korea’s nuclear tests produced only these changes—and not a Japanese commitment to its own nuclear deterrent—shows that Japan is not likely to develop nuclear weapons any time soon.

Japan won’t nuclearize now – North Korea and China won’t cause it

Chanlett-Avery and Nikitin 9

Emma (specialist in Asian affairs) and Mary Beth (analyist in nonproliferation). “Japan’s nuclear future: policy debate, prospects, and US interests.” Congressional Research Service. 2/19/9. Online.

Japan, traditionally one of the most prominent advocates of the international non-proliferation regime, has consistently pledged to forswear nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, evolving circumstances in Northeast Asia, particularly North Korea’s nuclear test in October 2006 and China’ s ongoing military modernization drive, have raised new questions about Japan’s vulnerability to potential adversaries and, therefore, the appeal of developing an independent nuclear deterrent. The previous taboo within the Japanese political community of discussing a nuclear weapons capability appears to have been broken, as several officials and opinion leaders have urged an open debate on the topic. Despite these factors, a strong consensus — both in Japan and among Japan watchers — remains that Japan will not pursue the nuclear option in the short-to-medium term.

Japan Uniqueness – AT: Squo Threats

North Korea isn’t enough of a threat – US umbrella key

Schoff 9

James. Associate director of Asia-Pacific Studies. @ Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. “Realigning Priorities: The US-Japan Alliance & the Future of Extended Deterrence.” March 2009. Online.

The short answer to the nuclear question in Japan is “no.” We have found no evidence to suggest that Japan has notably more interest in developing an indigenous nucle­ar deterrent as a result of North Korea’s test, and we have not detected any specific new steps that Japan has tak­en to shorten its theoretical lead time for launching a do­mestic nuclear weapons program.1 The perceived threats are not sufficient to warrant such a dramatic policy shift, and the alliance with the United States is still considered up to the challenges at hand. Moreover, the Japanese pub­lic would not be supportive of a nuclear push. In fact, a few of Japan’s policy moves in the past few years arguably make it harder to embark on such a path (the discontinu­ation of its M-V solid-fueled rocket program and the quiet return of five hundred kilograms of highly enriched ura­nium to the United States over the past decade are two such steps). By many estimates (including our own), Japan remains about two years away from a functioning, mini­mal nuclear deterrent, which is consistent with U.S. intel­ligence assessments from as far back as 1966. This two-year nuclear lead time appears to strike the right balance for policy makers in Tokyo between political realities and diplomatic prudence, while maintaining a strategic hedge in case of a drastic change in circumstances.

Status quo threats don’t cause nuclearization – breakdown in the umbrella will – leads to prolif

Barnaby 9

Frank. Nuclear physicist and consultant to the Oxford Research Group on nuclear issues. 5/14/9. <http://scitizen.com/stories/future-energies/2009/05/Will-Japan-react-to-North-Korea-s-missile-and-nuclear-programmes/>.

Japan has the technical means to build advanced nuclear weapons within months. Whether or not it does so will depend on the political judgment of Japan’s ruling elite. The political leaders will first assess the country’s strategic needs, its national interest, and the political consequences of becoming a nuclear-weapon power. Japan is currently defended by the American nuclear umbrella, provided by US nuclear forces in the Asia/Pacific region, and there is no current security need for Japan to acquire nuclear weapons. However, because of events such as the North Korean nuclear and missile developments, the nuclear issue is under discussion and the public seems to being softened up for a possible decision. This discussion is not new. Since the 1950s, leading politicians have, for time to time, argued that Japan should seriously consider acquiring nuclear weapons (9). Throughout most of this period, the main justification has been national security, but usually explicit threats have not been defined. Today, the threats are more explicitly spelt out. Nevertheless, Japan may not acquire nuclear weapons unless it feels its security is significantly threatened, particularly by a weakening of the American nuclear umbrella. However, according to a report by the US Congressional Research Service, if it does acquire them it “could set off an arms race with China, South Korea, and Taiwan. India and/or Pakistan may then feel compelled to further expand or modernize their own nuclear weapons capabilities” (10). The consequences for global security would indeed be severe.

Japan Link

Only troop presence ensures Japanese non-proliferation – nuclear guarantee alone is insufficient

Nye 9

Joseph, Prof. IR – Harvard U., Korea Times, “Will US-Japan Alliance Survive”, 7-14, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2009/07/137\_48423.html

Japan officially endorses the objective of a non-nuclear world, but it relies on America's extended nuclear deterrent, and wants to avoid being subject to nuclear blackmail from North Korea (or China). The Japanese fear that the credibility of American extended deterrence will be weakened if the U.S. decreases its nuclear forces to parity with China. It is a mistake, however, to believe that extended deterrence depends on parity in numbers of nuclear weapons. Rather, it depends on a combination of capability and credibility. During the Cold War, the U.S. was able to defend Berlin because our promise to do so was made credible by the NATO alliance and the presence of American troops, whose lives would be on the line in the event of a Soviet attack. Indeed, the best guarantee of American extended deterrence over Japan remains the presence of nearly 50,000 American troops (which Japan helps to maintain with generous host-nation support). Credibility is also enhanced by joint projects such as the development of regional ballistic missile defense.

Trip-wire forces hold back proliferation – key signal of resolve

Davis et al 9

Jacquelyn, Ex. VP – Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Pres. – IFPA and Prof. Int’l. Sec. Studies – Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy of Tufts U. and former DOD Consultant, Charles M. Perry , VP and Dir. Studies – IFPA, and James L. Schoff, Associate Dir. Asia-Pacific Studies – IFPA, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis White Paper, “Updating U.S. Deterrence Concepts and Operational Planning: Reassuring Allies, Deterring Legacy Threats, and Dissuading Nuclear "Wannabes"”, February, http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/Updating\_US\_Deterrence\_Concepts.pdf, p. 7-8

 No such formula was put into place in Asia, which in any case lacked a multilateral framework comparable to that of NATO. Instead, for Japan and South Korea, the U.S. extended deterrence guarantee was explicitly tied to the bilateral U.S. security relationships that were developed with each country and were made manifest in the forward deployment of American forces. As in NATO, these were regarded by their host governments as “trip-wire forces” necessary to ensure the steadfast nature of the U.S. commitment to come to their defense in a crisis, even one where nuclear escalation was possible.5 In South Korea, the United States deployed as it still does a sizable contingent of U.S. Army and Air Force troops to deter a renewed North Korean attack and to signal U.S. resolve to escalate to whatever level might be necessary to repel such an attack, thereby underscoring America’s extended deterrent commitment to the Republic of Korea (ROK). In Japan, the United States Navy has home-ported one of its aircraft carriers at Yokosuka, while the Marines deployed forces on Okinawa, the Army at Camp Zama, and the Air Force at bases near Tokyo and Misawa, to reinforce the notion of extended deterrence. That said, the extended deterrence concept has not always seemed convincing to U.S. allies, and, were it not for the forward deployment of American troops, the willingness of the United States to put itself at risk to protect Allied interests would probably have been more widely questioned than it has been to date. Nonetheless, despite the fact that some U.S. allies, such as France and Israel, chose to go down the nuclear path themselves, most NATO nations, Japan, and even the ROK, despite putting into place the capacity for exercising a nuclear option should political and/or strategic circumstances change, have been satisfied that they shared with the United States a common threat perception and trusted that the United States would come to their defense if necessary.

Japan Link

Coming nuclear cuts magnify the link

Nye, Professor of IR @ Harvard, 9

Joseph, Prof. IR @ Harvard U., CQ Transcriptions, DEL. ENI H. FALEOMAVAEGA HOLDS A HEARING ON JAPAN'S CHANGING ROLE, 6-25, Lexis

And, this raises the following paradox, which is that part of the reason that there hasn't been more proliferation is because we have been able to extend guarantees of our nuclear umbrella over others. Japan, obviously, has the capacity to go nuclear, if it so wished. It hasn't felt the need, because we've extended deterrents. So, the dilemma is that if we were to go too fast, too hard, too close to zero, we would bring nuclear deterrents, extended deterrents, into question. And, I think that's why I said in my testimony, it's important to focus on the fact that extended deterrents rest very heavily on credibility, not just capability. Now, the fact that there is 50,000 American troops forward-based in Japan, is tremendously important. Just like the presence of American troops in Berlin, allowed us to defend Berlin in the cold war, in situations when the soviets had local superiority. So, I think as we try to implement a policy to which we are committed, under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, of reducing our arsenals and getting to lower numbers, we have to make sure that we do it in such a way that it doesn't call into question, the credibility of our extended deterrents, because, that paradoxically, would actually increase rather than decrease proliferation.

Japanese policymakers base policy off realism, not culture. Security guarantee is the only thing preventing nuclear proliferation

Lavoy and Walker 7

Peter, PhD in Pol. Sci. @ USC, Former Dir. Center for Contemporary Conflict, and Robin, Senior Lecturer in National Security Affairs – Naval Postgraduate School and Research Associate – Center for Contemporary Conflict, Sctrategic Insights, “Over-the-Horizon Threats: WMD Proliferation 2020,” Strategic Insights, August, http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2007/Aug/lavoyAug07.asp

The Japanese presenter said that Japan first began considering nuclear weapons as an option in the 1960s, and that, to this day, external factors remain the main driver of Japan’s perspective on the nuclear option. While the culture in Japan is generally characterized by disgust of nuclear weapons, policymakers’ thinking is more shaped by realism and the desire to avoid positioning Japan as a second-class country. As long as U.S. security guarantee is credible, Japan is unlikely to develop nuclear weapons, but the issue has been considered strongly at least five times: when China first tested nuclear weapons, during the Vietnam War, when U.S. President Nixon visited China, during the North Korean crisis in the 1990s, and following the 2006 North Korean missile test. The consistent characteristics of each situation include the Strategic and technical implications when the strategic environment shifts, but in each case the risks outweighed the value added, and the consideration was almost always reported to the United States, and resulted in a strengthening of U.S.-Japan alliance. Technologically speaking Japan has not perfected the technology that could be applicable for controlling warhead of operational missiles and would probably take three to five years to produce a prototype small nuclear warhead with an investment of around $2 billion. However, if it was deemed necessary Japan could probably produce a crude but effective nuclear device within a year. Japan lacks a large amount of fissile Uranium-238 and Plutonium-239, but could probably revise the core of a light water reactor. Their most practical method would probably be to create an explosive lens, a task within their existing technological capability, but they have not taken any steps in that direction. Additionally Japan’s nuclear human resources are declining since nuclear energy is regarded as a losing industry and a trend of pacifism among the Japanese scientific and academic community. The presenter argued that the real value of a nuclear weapon for Japan is in possibly sending a warning sign to China, but it’s a pundits’ debate that holds little water among policymakers in Japan. The conditions under which Japan might consider the nuclear option include the collapse of the international arms control regime; a perceived increase of threats; a reduction of U.S. extended deterrence; combined with a change of belief on the part of the government. One key factor that could decrease the unlikely even of a re-armed Japan would be increased knowledge about U.S. extended deterrence policy, strategy, direction, and capability.

Japan Link – Okinawa

Okinawa strategically important – prevents Japanese perception of NK and Chinese threat

 Dr. Rajesh Kapoor 6/10/10, is Associate Fellow at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi, “The Strategic Relevance of Okinawa,” Institute for Defense Studies & Analyses. http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/Th eStrategicRelevanceofOkinawa\_rkapoor\_100610

Notwithstanding popular criticism and opposition, the US-Japan security alliance and the presence of USFJ remain vital to Japanese foreign and security policies. The relocation of USFJ facilities and troops outside Japan may create an imbalance between the two countries over sharing responsibilities under the terms of the security treaty. It is an obligation for the US to defend Japan under Article 5 of the Japan-US Security Treaty, while Japan is obliged to provide the use of facilities and areas in Japan under Article 6 of the treaty. This treaty is quite unlike the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which provides only for shared defence by the contracting states. USFJ also acts as an “effective deterrent” against any armed aggression. In case attack takes place, the US is bound to protect Japan and even send reinforcements for which the bases are extremely important. In a nutshell, the USFJ is essential for the security of Japan and the presence of US troops in Japan has ensured peace and stability in the region. USFJ in Okinawa might not be welcomed by the people of Okinawa, but Okinawa will remain strategically important for the US. Given the covert security threat from China and overtly manifested threat from North Korea, Japan will always choose in favour of hosting US bases in Okinawa.

Japan Link – Symbol Key

Symbols are key – the plan would be devastating for the credibility of deterrence

James Schoff, Associate Director of Asia-Pacific Studies at IFPA, March 2009, “Realigning Priorites,” Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis

In terms of balancing the security equation for Japan or stemming the slide from security surplus to security deficit, the preferred option is to minimize the potential threat side of the equation and eliminate the need for the allies to react stridently to bolster deterrence. As House of Representatives Speaker Kono Yohei explained in 2008, “We should establish a peaceful diplomatic environment in East Asia, improve security conditions there, and make, at least, a large U.S. military presence at the current level unnecessary.” If Kono’s vision comes to pass and Chinese and Russian military modernization programs level out, North Korea denuclearizes, and regional tensions wane, then pressure on the deterrence question and the future of the U.S.-Japan alliance will similarly be reduced. This would of course be the best option for all concerned. But if China does not restrain itself, for example, or if North Korea is emboldened by new missile and WMD capabilities, then deterrence must be considered in prudent ways that do not contribute to a security dilemma in the region. This is more easily said than done, for one country’s deterrent is often another nation’s perceived threat demanding a response, contributing to a vicious cycle. Symbols have always been important to the U.S.-Japan alliance and to the concept of deterrence, whether the symbol is the nuclear umbrella, basing a U.S. aircraft carrier in Japan, or forward deploying a hundred thousand U.S. military personnel in East Asia (including a sizable contingent of Marines in Okinawa). Some of these symbols remain intact, but others are changing and seem less visible. High-ranking U.S. officials have disparaged the future viability of technology supporting the nuclear umbrella during the RRW debate, and the number of forward-deployed U.S. troops in South Korea and Japan is declining. The Pentagon talks more about stability operations and counterinsurgency as core missions for the military, while it lists “deterring conflict” as only the fourth of five objectives in the 2008 National Defense Strategy. Some Japanese defense planners fear that Washington is distracted by conflict in the Middle East and Central Asia, viewing everything through a prism of hunkered-down homeland defense. The reality is quite different, and an interesting dichotomy has developed whereby an American visitor to Tokyo can hear worry about a U.S. pullback, and the same week in Beijing listen to concern about America’s build-up in the region! Objectively speaking, overall the United States is increasing its military capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region, not pulling back. This mild build-up is actually one of the many objectives of its global repositioning of forces in response to a perceived shifting of “the global community’s ‘center of gravity’ [toward] the Asia-Pacific region.” The build-up is hard to quantify, however, as it relies mostly on less visible measures such as upgrading equipment, more frequent and longer rotational deployments (of F-22s, B-2s, SSGNs, among other assets), access agreements with partners in the region to broaden deployment flexibility in times of crisis, and similar incremental moves. Taken together, all of these improvements suggest that external balancing vis-à-vis North Korea and China has actually been achieved to some degree, even if those in Japan who worry about America’s security commitments do not realize it. Part of the reason for this is that as old symbols of deterrence are phased out, they are being replaced with a diffuse range of more capable (but only vaguely understood) assets, oftentimes deployed from farther away. The assurance effect is less concrete and immediate, though the deterrence effect might actually be stronger, given the flexibility of use. The problem is that the relationship of these new assets to specific deterrence scenarios involving the alliance has not been explored adequately. Through continued explanation and consultations with Japan (beyond ad hoc briefings), many of America’s regional posture adjustments described in this report should reassure Japan in the short term. Still, the United States is also reaching the limit of what it can invest in East Asian security, and longer-term questions remain about how deterrence is expected to function in the alliance. Part of this challenge can be addressed through the current bilateral dialogue focused on base realignment in Japan and alliance transformation (which includes a reassessment of the allies’ roles, missions, and capabilities, or RMC). The rest of the challenge might require a new forum for bilateral dialogue and policy making, which we discuss later.

Japan Mechanics – AT: No Prolif

Credibility of extended deterrence outweighs other concerns

Rublee 9

Maria Rost Rublee, Ph.D., Strategic Insights, The Future of Japanese Nuclear Policy, http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2009/Apr/rubleeApr09.asp#author

Accurately predicting whether Japan will remain non-nuclear in the next decades requires a crystal ball. Nonetheless, examining the factors that push Tokyo away from and toward a nuclear option help us to understand both why the country may reverse its policy of nuclear forbearance and the likelihood of such a situation occurring. Currently, most domestic factors pressure Japan into maintaining its non-nuclear stance. However, severe exogenous shocks—from U.S. withdrawal to a North Korean nuclear attack—can override the influence of these domestic determinants, both by weakening them directly and by creating new security concerns that a nuclear option could potentially address. The fact that the most critical external factor in the Japanese nuclear equation—U.S. extended deterrence—lies within the control of U.S. policymakers should reassure Washington, as well as challenge it to address the other potential scenarios that could undermine Japanese nuclear forbearance.

The link outweighs their takeouts

Chanlett-Avery & Nikitin 9

Emma, Specialist in Asian Affairs and Mary Beth, Analyst in Nonproliferation at the Congressional Research Service, Japan’s Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects and U.S. Interests, http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/09024CRS.pdf

Perhaps the single most important factor to date in dissuading Tokyo from developing a nuclear arsenal is the U.S. guarantee to protect Japan’s security. Since the threat of nuclear attack developed during the Cold War, Japan has been included under the U.S. “nuclear umbrella,” although some ambiguity exists about whether the United States is committed to respond with nuclear weapons in the event of a nuclear attack on Japan.25 U.S. officials have hinted that it would: following North Korea’s 2006 nuclear test, former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, in Tokyo, said, “ ... the United States has the will and the capability to meet the full range, and I underscore full range, of its deterrent and security commitments to Japan.”26 Most policymakers in Japan continue to emphasize that strengthening the alliance as well as shared conventional capabilities is more sound strategy than pursuing an independent nuclear capability.27 During the Cold War, the threat of mutually assured destruction to the United States and the Soviet Union created a sort of perverse stability in international politics; Japan, as the major Pacific front of the U.S. containment strategy, felt confident in U.S. extended deterrence. Although the United States has reiterated its commitment to defend Japan, the strategic stakes have changed, leading some in Japan to question the American pledge. Some in Japan are nervous that if the United States develops a closer relationship with China, the gap between Tokyo’s and Washington’s security perspectives will grow and further weaken the U.S. commitment.28 These critics also point to what they perceive as the soft negotiating position on North Korea’s denuclearization in the Six-Party Talks as further evidence that the United States does not share Japan’s strategic perspective.29 A weakening of the bilateral alliance may strengthen the hand of those that want to explore the possibility of Japan developing its own deterrence. Despite these concerns, many long-time observers assert that the alliance is fundamentally sound from years of cooperation and strong defense ties throughout even the rocky trade wars of the 1980s. Perhaps more importantly, China’s rising stature likely means that the United States will want to keep its military presence in the region in place, and Japan is the major readiness platform for the U.S. military in East Asia. If the United States continues to see the alliance with Japan as a fundamental component of its presence in the Pacific, U.S. leaders may need to continue to not only restate the U.S. commitment to defend Japan, but to engage in high-level consultation with Japanese leaders in order to allay concerns of alliance drift. Disagreement exists over the value of engaging in a joint dialogue on nuclear scenarios given the sensitivity of the issue to the public and the region, with some advocating the need for such formalized discussion and others insisting on the virtue on strategic ambiguity.30 U.S. behavior plays an outsized role in determining Japan’s strategic calculations, particularly in any debate on developing nuclear weapons. Security experts concerned about Japan’s nuclear option have stressed that U.S. officials or influential commentators should not signal to the Japanese any tacit approval of nuclearization**.**31 Threatening other countries with the possibility of Japan going nuclear, for example, could be construed as approval by some quarters in Tokyo. U.S.-Japanese joint development of a theater missile defense system reinforces the U.S. security commitment to Japan, both psychologically and practically. The test-launch of several missiles by North Korea in July 2006 accelerated existing plans to jointly deploy Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) surface-to-air interceptors as well as a sea-based system on Aegis destroyers. If successfully operationalized, confidence in the ability to intercept incoming missiles may help assuage Japan’s fear of foreign attacks. This reassurance may discourage any potential consideration of developing a deterrent nuclear force. In addition, the joint effort would more closely intertwine U.S. and Japan security, although obstacles still remain for a seamless integration.32

Japan Mechanics – AT: No Prolif

Despite their current anti-nuclear stance, Japan could reconsider nuclear development

Kurt Campbell, PhD, Chief Executive Officer and Co-Founder of the Center for a New American Security, and Tsuyoshi Sunohara, Senior Fellow at the International Security Program of the Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2004, The Nuclear Tipping Point, pg. 218

At the same time, suspicion and speculation have persisted that, given the right set (really the wrong set) of international and domestic condi- tions, japan might seriously consider the nuclear option. Recently, prominent Japanese have openly broached the issue of japan's acquiring a nuclear arsenal to help manage what many in Japan see as severely untoward developments in the regional and international security envi- ronment. japan is one of the most technologically advanced countries, relies heavily on nuclear power for its domestic energy consumption, and has vast stores of plutonium that could be used in nuclear weapons. If it ever did cross the Rubicon into the realm of the atomically armed, there is near-universal recognition that the potential consequences would be enormous and unpredictable-and quite possibly extremely dangerous .

Public opposition doesn’t prevent proliferation

Kurt Campbell, PhD, Chief Executive Officer and Co-Founder of the Center for a New American Security, and Tsuyoshi Sunohara, Senior Fellow at the International Security Program of the Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2004, The Nuclear Tipping Point, pg. 243

Finally, although public sentiment against nuclear weapons remains strong, its ability to fully inhibit the decisions of japanese leaders should not be exaggerated. For many decades, despite its government's pro- fessed policy of nuclear disarmament, japan has relied on the United States to defend japan, even with nuclear weapons if necessary. Antimil- itarism in Japan has not prevented the country from becoming the fourth-highest military spender in the world. Nor have antinuclear senti- ments impeded Japan's extensive reliance on civilian nuclear power. Just as the Japanese people today appreciate that Japan has no choice but to rely on nuclear power to meet its energy needs, so in the future they might accept that international threats left japan with no choice but to develop nuclear weapons.

Japan Mechanics – AT: Prolif Good

Our impacts happen before any stabilizing effect of Japan’s weapons – window of vulnerability

Ogawa in ‘3

Shinichi, director of the research department of Japan's National Institute for Defense Studies, “A Nuclear Japan Revisited”, The National Institute for Defense Studies News, April 2003 (No. 64)

Likewise, the political and security repercussions of Japanese nuclear weapon development would be very negative indeed. Most worrisome would the reaction of Japan’s neighboring countries. Japanese nuclear weapon development, even its intention were totally defensive, would be likely to invite caution and countermeasures from China, Russia, and South Korea even in its early stages. As a result, Japan might face a serious security problem before it succeeded in attaining the necessary SSBN/SLBM force. Although nuclear weapons, depending on their survivability and capability, can have a positive effect in helping prevent war among nuclear powers, Japan’s nuclearization may invite a serious security threat well before a strategically meaningful nuclear force can be built and deployed.

Japan Mechanics – Quick

Japan could proliferate quickly

Barnaby 9

Frank, PhD Nuclear Physics, Worked for the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, Former Dir. Stockholm InternationL peace Research Institute, former Prof. --- Free U. Amsterdam and Visiting Prof. – U. Minnesota, “Will Japan react to North Korea's missile and nuclear programmes?” 5-14, http://scitizen.com/stories/future-energies/2009/05/Will-Japan-react-to-North-Korea-s-missile-and-nuclear-programmes/

If Japan, at some future date, takes the political decision to acquire nuclear weapons, how quickly could it do so? The technology needed to produce nuclear weapons is the same as civil nuclear technology. Japan has a very advanced civil nuclear technology – one of the world’s most advanced. It has, therefore, the fissile materials, highly-enriched uranium and plutonium, and the nuclear physicists and engineers needed to produce nuclear weapons in a short time – months rather than years. Japan is, therefore, regarded as a latent nuclear-weapon country, which could relatively quickly become an actual nuclear-weapon power.

Japan Mechanics – AT: Other Constraints

Japanese non-prolif is tied entirely to credible US commitments

Satoh 9

Yukio, Former President of the Japan Institute of International Affairs and Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations, 3/5/9. <http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/09018Satoh.html>.

For obvious reasons, the Japanese are second to none in wishing for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. However, given Japan's vulnerability to North Korea's progressing nuclear and missile programs and China's growing military power, ensuring American commitment to deterring threats from nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction is a matter of prior strategic importance for Tokyo. Japan has long been committed to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles of not possessing nuclear weapons, not producing them and not permitting their entry into the country. A prevalent and strong sentiment against nuclear weapons among the Japanese people lies behind the policy to deny themselves the possession of nuclear weapons in spite of the country's capabilities to do otherwise. The nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki remain vivid national memories. Yet, strategically, Japan's adherence to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles depends largely, if not solely, upon the credibility of the Japan-US Security Treaty, or more specifically, that of the United States' commitment to defend Japan from any offensive action, including nuclear threats. In response, the US government has been steadfastly assuring the Japanese in an increasingly clear manner of American commitment to provide deterrence for Japan by all means, including nuclear. Against this backdrop, the argument made by the aforementioned four eminent strategists in the tone-setting joint article published in The Wall Street Journal of January 4, 2007, that "the end of the Cold War made the doctrine of mutual Soviet-American deterrence obsolete", was received with mixed reactions in Japan: welcome for the sake of nuclear disarmament and caution from the perspectives of security and defense. As depending upon the US' extended nuclear deterrence will continue to be Japan's only strategic option to neutralize potential or conceivable nuclear and other strategic threats, the Japanese are sensitive to any sign of increased uncertainties with regard to extended deterrence.

Japan MPX – Arms Race

Japanese prolif would lead to a rapid destabilizing arms race

Emma Chanlett-Avery, Specialist in Asian Affairs, Mary Beth Nikitin, Nonproliferation analyst, 2-19-2009, “Japan’s Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and U.S. Interests,” Congressional Research Service

To many security experts, the most alarming possible consequence of a Japanese decision to develop nuclear weapons would be the development of a regional arms race.33 The fear is based on the belief that a nuclear-armed Japan could compel South Korea to develop its own program; encourage China to increase and/or improve its relatively small arsenal; and possibly inspire Taiwan to pursue nuclear weapons. This in turn might have spill-over effects on the already nuclear-armed India and Pakistan. The prospect—or even reality—of several nuclear states rising in a region that is already rife with historical grievances and contemporary tension could be deeply destabilizing. The counter-argument, made by some security experts, is that nuclear deterrence was stabilizing during the Cold War, and a similar nuclear balance could be achieved in Asia. However, most observers maintain that the risks outweigh potential stabilizing factors.

Japanese prolif would undermine the NPT and threaten the credibility of U.S. security guarantees

Emma Chanlett-Avery, Specialist in Asian Affairs, Mary Beth Nikitin, Nonproliferation analyst, 2-19-2009, “Japan’s Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and U.S. Interests,” Congressional Research Service

“Japan’s development of its own nuclear arsenal could also have damaging impact on U.S. nonproliferation policy. It would be more difficult for the United States to convince non-nuclear weapon states to keep their non-nuclear status or to persuade countries such as North Korea to give up their weapons programs. The damage to the NPT as a guarantor of nuclear power for peaceful use and the IAEA as an inspection regime could be irreparable if Japan were to leave or violate the treaty. If a close ally under its nuclear umbrella chose to acquire the bomb, perhaps other countries enjoying a strong bilateral relationship with the United States would be less inhibited in pursuing their own option. It could also undermine confidence in U.S. security guarantees more generally.

Japan MPX – Chinese Pre-emption

China is super scared of Japan rearm—PLA reports prove they will launch pre-emptive nuclear strikes in response

Kelly Fink BS at Senton Hal University “Japans Evolving Military: East Asia the United States and the International System” May 7, 2008 accessed July 16, 2010 http://domapp01.shu.edu/depts/uc/apps/libraryrepository.nsf/resourceid/AD96FEF19144767185257737004E0F9C/$File/Fink-Kelly-T\_Masters.PDF?Open

As is evident, the "remilitarization" of Japan has many possible facets. Some are inherently connected, while others are not. Thus, analyzing possible reactions of the key parties provoking the Japanese to move towards making any of these key decisions is also more complicated. The Chinese interest in Japan's decision to revise article 9 is a consequence of the two countries' volatile histories. In his article about Chinese "realpolitik", Tomas Christensen argues that the Chinese are very much concerned about Japanese militarization. However, instead of recognizing their own role in the matter, they closely tie Japanese militarization to the status of Japan's relationship with the United States; either the withdrawal of the United States from the region at any level, or further encouragement of Japan's military excess by the US and Japan's ultranationalists will be the leading causes of official militarization. Chinese officials identify the potential for Japan's rearmament as high, and claim it has been Japan's intention since the end of World War I1 to regain power and hegemony.169 According to Christiansen, while Chinese foreign policy analysts recognize that post-World War I1 cultural pacifism, domestic politics, and economic issues in Japan will stand in the way of militarization, they do not think such roadblocks will remain indefinitely. They "anticipate and fear Japan's renaissance as a world-class military power in the early 21'' century."170 is a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace China's fear has been reflected in the many symbolic battles that the two countries have fought over the years. Former Prime Minister Koizurni's and others' visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, where the souls of war criminals, as well as of millions of ordinary soldiers are said to rest, is a source of resentment and the cause of protests by the Chinese. They further object to the toning down in textbooks of some of the Japanese atrocities committed during World War 11, and Japan's bid to become a member of the UN Security ~ o u n c i l . 'A~ls~o , the growth of the Japanese "defense" forces has not been lost on the Chinese government. It is difficult to gauge exactly how the Chinese government would respond if Japan were to remilitarize, however, there are likely to be two possible scenarios, and China's final reaction is certainly contingent on how far Japan decides to go with its remilitarization efforts: just amending Article 9, or acquiring nuclear weapons. If the former is true, Chinese authorities will probably continue to protest, and use the event as another way to bolster unity within their own country without actually acting in such a way to damage economic ties between the two powers. is a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace However, if Japan were to go nuclear, there is the potential that China would feel a real threat and thus act more dynamically. The first possibility is based on theories about Chinese nationalism discussed in Caroline Rose's article, 'Patriotism is not taboo': Nationalism in China and Japan and Implications for Sino-Japanese Relations. Rose essentially describes the Chinese government as using specific events to direct Chinese feelings toward a common enemy, thus boosting national unity. In her article, Rose states that, "patriotic rhetoric is not necessarily translated into an aggressive foreign policy. In China's case it is more often aimed at creating the illusion of internal unity in the face of a perceived foreign or domestic threat."17' The majority of problems between the two countries since World War I1 have been purely symbolic issues. Accordingly, the response has been essentially all bark and no bite, and overall, most incidents tend to end in cooperation. Rose also cites Downs and Saunders' economic theories for why the two countries will, for the most part, continue to act passively. Downs and Saunders have suggested that, because the two economies are so intertwined, both governments have been acting in such a way as to maintain bilateral relations. While Japan and China have had the opportunity to act more aggressively, during specific conflicts the Chinese government has taken a moderate stance.173 Along the same lines, according to Yang Bojiang, China's next strategic diplomatic task will be to improve its soft power and moral image within the international community [in light of its recent economic growth] to avoid unnecessary obstacles to its continued development. Japan may be helpful to China in this regard because neighboring countries will use China's relationship with Japan as an important index by which to gauge how China will treat its neighbors during its rise."174 If this is the case, then acting too strongly in response to Japan's remilitarization would make the PRC look foolish to the rest of the international community, and provide Japan with additional justification for its belief that it need to compete with China militarily. While there is always the possibility is that China will take action against Japan by cutting diplomatic ties, or putting into place trade barriers, this would be a clear violation of its own policy against mixing business with politics. In 1995, when Japan tried to contain China's military activity by sanctioning aid, the Chinese responded with the public statement that, "China opposes Japan's attempt to attach political conditions to the economic cooperation between the two countries because this attempt will harm the healthier development of bilateral re~ations."'~~ On the other hand, it is necessary to also consider the possible reactions of China to nuclear expansion in Japan. It is in this case that Japan has reason to worry. According to an annual report to Congress about the military power of the People's Republic of China issued in 2007, texts from the People's Liberation Army support the idea of preemptive strikes: PLA authors describe preemption as necessary and logical when confronting a more powerful enemy. Chinese doctrinal materials stress that static defenses are insufficient to defend territory based on the speed and destructive power of modem forces. As a result, PLA operational concepts seek to prevent enemy forces from massing and to keep the enemy off balance by seizing the initiative with offensive strikes. According to PLA theorists, an effective defense includes destroying enemy capabilities on enemy territory before they can be employed.'76 The Chinese have proven in the past that they are willing to use this excuse, and one can see now through smaller acts of intimidation against Japan, Taiwan, and other countries in the region that they are not past utilizing military means. The most worrisome issue is China's own possession of nuclear weapons, and the concern that should they feel so threatened, they might use them. However, as long as the United States promises to provide its nuclear umbrella, China might be hesitant to use them.

Japan MPX – Regional Stability

Japanese rearm causes South Korea to proliferate to keep up and Japan to become more aggressive, insures nuclear conflict over control of the Senkaku Islands, the division of Korea, or Taiwan

Dr. David Robinson, prof @ Edith Cowan University Why the West should Discourage Japanese Military Expansion Mar 29,2010 accessed July 16, 2010 www.japss.org/upload/10.robinson.pdf

Japan’s Self-Defense Force is already considered a powerful regional force, and Japan’s previous decisions not to acquire nuclear weapons have been, “on purely strategic grounds, unrelated to antimilitarism or pacifism” [Bukh, 2010, pp7-8]. As Japan has a stockpile of plutonium and extremely sophisticated rocket technology, the possibility remains that Japan could become a major nuclear power within a decade if sufficiently provoked by regional competitors like North Korea [Matthews, 2003, p78], and neo-realist Kenneth Waltz has argued that Asia’s security environment will eventually compel Japan to nuclearise [Mirashita, 2001, p5]. China and Japan are each dominant in the others’ strategic thinking regarding economic, political and military issues, and the enhancement of Japanese military power must influence China’s own strategic vision [Pyle, 2007, p312-315]. China and Korea also remain “convinced that Japanese militarism, supported by an invigorated nationalist right wing, lurks just beneath the surface” [Samuels, 2007, p2]. At the very least Japan’s new foreign policy could escalate into a regional arms race, with the potential for both Japan and South Korea to nuclearise. Issues like control of the Senkaku Islands, the division of Korea, and Chinese claims on Taiwan provide continuing fault-lines around which conflict might develop [Matthews, 2003, p81].

Japan MPX – US Heg

Japanese rearm hurts US heg – causes counterbalancing

Dr. David Robinson, prof @ Edith Cowan University Why the West should Discourage Japanese Military Expansion Mar 29,2010 accessed July 16, 2010 www.japss.org/upload/10.robinson.pdf

While the US had urged Japanese remilitarisation since the late 1960s, it was only after the collapse of the Soviet Union that Japan was forced onto this path [Mackerras, 1998, p49]. Bhubhindar Singh notes that the Gulf Crisis demonstrated a new element of uncertainty in international affairs which could best be dealt with through multilateral military cooperation [Singh, 2008, pp313-314]. Thus in 1991 Japan was called upon to support the war against Iraq amid an unexpected “storm of international criticism” [Pyle, 1998, pp126-127]. In 1992 the UN Peacekeeping Operations Cooperation Bill allowed Japan to deploy troops overseas in limited logistical and humanitarian roles, which they did in Cambodia [Pyle, 1998, pp126-127]. This was a shift in Japanese strategic attitudes. Ichiro Ozawa, who oversaw Japan’s political realignment from 1993, “expressed his desired course for Japan to be a ‘normal country’ that pursues its own interests by using all the foreign policy tools that other countries use: economic might, military prowess, and diplomatic skills” [Sata, 2001, p200]. Since then the Self-Defense Force has been authorised to use an increasingly wide range of weaponry in their operations, and public support for Japan’s use of force for defensive purposes has risen [Inoguichi, 2006, pp4-5]. So far Japanese security policy remains triangulated between its still-pacifist constitution, the UN Charter, and the US-Japanese Security Treaty [Singh, 2008, p314]. However, sections of the Japanese media and political establishment increasingly call for Japan to acquire a greater range of defence systems, including long-range fighters, nuclear submarines, a missile defence system, and intelligence-gathering satellites [Inoguichi, 2006, pp13-15]. Self-Defence Force spending is increasing dramatically, and there are calls to amend Article 9 of the constitution, and even to produce nuclear weapons [Matthews, 2003, p76]. Eugene Matthews argues that Japan nationalism is rising and, “This development could have an alarming consequence: namely, the rise of a militarized, assertive, and nuclear-armed Japan” [Matthews, 2003, pp74-75]. Japan is slowly shifting its political attitudes and institutional capabilities towards force projection outside of its borders, with the encouragement of the United States. Matthews writes that mainstream Japanese nationalists want, “the respect, political influence, and power commensurate with being the world’s second most important economy and a major contributor to world affairs” [Matthews, 2003, p85]. Meanwhile, for America there is less motivation to carry Japan’s defence load, as technology lessens the US Navy’s reliance on Japanese bases – which are themselves high-value targets for enemy nations [Samuels, 2007, p192]. Japan’s new strategy involves contributing to the international community responsibly, while being seen as increasingly independent from the United States [Singh, 2008, p316]. Pyle notes that, ironically, in the past the Yoshida Doctrine actually denied Japan the opportunity to demonstrate its responsibility as a military power [Pyle, 1998, p130]. Most analysts recognise that a more independent Japanese foreign policy will lead to divergences from American policies and goals [Sata, 2001, p2198]. Pyle writes that Japanese cooperation, is not so much the result of shared values as it is of the realist appraisal of the value of the alliance. … Japan will seek maximum autonomy for its own purposes … It will not wish to be hostage to the global strategy of the United States or to its relations with China and Korea [Pyle, 2007, p368]. Inoguichi and Bacon hypothesize that the new relationship might conform to patterns such as the ‘British Model’ of a special relationship, a ‘German Model’ of ‘regional embeddedness’ and institutionalism, or a ‘French Model’ of strong autonomy [Inoguichi, 2006, pp4-5]. But these limited scenarios echo the sentiment of George Friedman that, “Conventional political analysis suffers from a profound failure of imagination” [Friedman, 2009, p3]. While Japanese political moderates may maintain the current relationship with America, more nationalistic elements could, shift Japanese doctrine from a tethered, defensive realism to an untethered, offensive realism, in which strategists would be ever alert to exploit opportunities to expand Japan’s power. … It would join the other great powers in a permanent struggle to maximize national strength and influence [Samuels, 2007, p193]. American domination of Japanese foreign policy helped to stabilise Asia during the Cold War. Détente with China, founded on having a common Soviet enemy, would have been complicated by an independent Japan; and removing any Japanese threat to Southeast Asia helped to focus their efforts on combating Communist influence. It is possible that a newly-militarised Japan may either pose a renewed threat to other Asian states, and thus generate instability, or alternatively enhance its relationship with regional powers like China, potentially to the detriment of US regional influence.

\*\*\*Affirmative\*\*\*

Non-Unique – AT: Russell

Obama’s nuclear strategy triggers the link – conclusion of their Russell evidence

Russell 10

James, Co-Dir. – Center for Contemporary Conflict at Naval Postgraduate School, Former Advisor to the Sec. Def. on Persian Gulf strategy, PhD Candidate in War Studies – King’s College U. London, “Extended Deterrence, Security Guarantees and Nuclear Weapons: U.S. Strategic and Policy Conundrums in the Gulf”, 1-5, http://www.analyst-network.com/article.php?art\_id=3297

Conclusion Nuclear weapons have historically helped implicitly and explicitly support America’s far flung global commitments in the Gulf and elsewhere. The system of Gulf security built by the United States reflects a time-honored template of regional defense and security honed in decades of Cold War experience. In the Gulf, the dual tools of extended deterrence and security assurances have proven a cornerstone of a system of regional security efficiently administered by America’s military organizations. Nuclear weapons today undeniably form part of this system—explicitly protecting U.S. forces and implicitly protecting regimes hosting those forces. It remains to be seen how today NPR drafters will addresses the historic context of these commitments in the Gulf and the role of nuclear weapons in helping maintain a Cold War-era template of regional security. Actively promoting nuclear disarmament on the one hand while also drawing upon nuclear weapons on the other to prevent a regional nuclear arms race in the Gulf is a contradiction that must be addressed by the NPR drafters. They must therefore try and square a series of circles of competing and contradictory requirements in relating nuclear weapons to global and regional strategic priorities. The Obama Administration’s aggressive disarmament agenda is sure to emphasize continued cuts in the strategic arsenal and will almost certainly include an attempt to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. A reduced number of warheads will need to be apportioned to national-level protection and extended deterrent commitments in Northeast Asia and the Gulf region. The possible signing of the CTBT will represent another nail in the coffin of what may become a “wasting asset” of strategic nuclear weapons in the American arsenal.[[27](http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2009/Dec/russellDec09.html#references)] That stockpile is slowly withering away as aging weapons deteriorate and the human and material infrastructure around those weapons becomes more difficult and expensive to maintain.[[28](http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2009/Dec/russellDec09.html#references)] In short, the United States is slowly but surely disarming itself—a scenario that must be addressed in NPR. This trend will mean that the United States will one day be unable to draw upon any nuclear weapons to back extended guarantee commitments in the Gulf and elsewhere around the world. This inevitability will lead planners down some of the same paths of the 2002 report, which spent proposed using conventional weapons for missions once assigned to nuclear weapons. In the Middle East, the problem of targeting hardened and deeply buried targets will rear its head in 2010 as it did in 2002.

Non-Unique – Assurances Low

Allied prolif now—NMD cut killed confidence in the umbrella, guarantees nuclear tipping point for our allies

Jack David, deputy assistant secretary of defense for combating weapons of mass destruction from 2004-2006, 9/18/2009, WallStreet Journal, pg. np

The "smarter" missile-defense system that President Obama announced yesterday won't replace that capability. The mobile and sea-based system could help protect Berlin and Paris from short-range or medium-range missiles, but it won't protect New York from an ICBM. The administration's plan is a blow to the security architecture that protects the American homeland. The administration's move also signals U.S. friends and allies whose own security architectures heretofore relied heavily on the existence of U.S. support that they should re-evaluate the continuing validity of such reliance. They will be skeptical of longstanding U.S. assurances and Mr. Obama's future promises and explanations. None will be more skeptical than the 30 countries that the U.S. has encouraged to forego the development of nuclear weapons by promising protection under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. If the U.S. walks away from its missile defense commitments so easily, the promises that its nuclear deterrent affords are plainly diminished. Consider the unanimous finding of a recent bipartisan congressional commission on the U.S. nuclear posture, led by former secretaries of Defense William Perry and James Schlesinger. The commission warned of a coming "tipping point" in proliferation, when more nations might decide to go nuclear if U.S. allies lose confidence in Washington's ability to protect them.

Current trends prove rampant proliferation is occurring now

Barry Blechman, Stimson Center Co-Founder, Stimson Center Nuclear Disarm Distinguished Fellow, Ph.D., 9/29/2008, “Nuclear Proliferation: Avoiding a Pandemic,” <http://www.stimson.org/> Presidential\_Inbox\_2009/ BBlechman\_Final\_Format.pdf

There is serious risk that the international agreements and processes that have kept the number of nations armed with nuclear weapons fairly low are breaking down. Over the past ten years, three nations joined the six previously declared nuclear powers and a tenth is in the offing. Unless strong actions are taken during the first 18 months of the administration, we could see a world of twenty or even thirty nuclear-armed states by the 2020s. Meeting this challenge requires specific, near-term steps to shore up the current regime plus bold actions to move eventually to a world completely free of nuclear weapons.

US deterrent in East Asia isn’t credible now

Kathleen Bailey, National Security Consultants, Senior Associate, National Institute for Public Policy, 2009, Tailoring the U.S. Strategic Nuclear Posture in Northeast Asia, pg. np

Although the U.S. has extended the nuclear umbrella over Japan and South Korea, and has pledged to defend Taiwan, the current U.S. nuclear force posture in East Asia may not be properly tailored to provide effective deterrence and assurance of the defense of these countries. One reason is that the type of planning employed in the NATO context, for example, has not been applied in East Asia. Another reason that the current strategic posture may not be sufficient or capable to meet the needs of the future is force composition, as well as deployment and delivery options. When the current strategic posture was developed, there was little credibility lent to the idea that nuclear weapons would ever be used in a limited way—limited both in terms of numbers of weapons (perhaps only one or two) and yield (subkiloton). That has changed; both Russia and China emphasize “useable” nuclear weapons with, for example, low yield and/or enhanced radiation, and with more accurate delivery systems. The present U.S. nuclear force was tailored to bust hardened Soviet silos and our nuclear delivery systems are inaccurate compared to today’s precision conventional systems.

Non-Unique – US Nuclear Forces

US nuclear force credibility is failing now – tanks assurance

Scheber, Vice President, National Institute for Public Policy, 9

Thomas, Contemporary Challenges for Extended Deterrence, Scholar

In addition to the three challenges for extended deterrence in the contemporary environment discussed above, one additional problem is important to consider—uncertainty among allies regarding the long-term U.S. commitment to sustain an effective and credible nuclear force. Both allies and potential adversaries carefully watch developments in the United States. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has reduced the size of its operationally deployed strategic nuclear force by almost 80 percent and has retired and dismantled most of its nonstrategic nuclear warheads. In sharp contrast with the other nuclear powers recognized by the Non-Proliferation Treaty (Russia, Britain, France, and China), the United States has not implemented a nuclear modernization plan for a nuclear force appropriate for the twenty-first century. Foreign observers of U.S. politics will note the high-profile debates over studies of nuclear weapon concepts and the termination of recent initiatives such as the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator and the Reliable Replacement Warhead. Allies and possibly adversaries alike are watching this trend and questioning the long-term viability of the U.S. nuclear force. This discussion of contemporary challenges for extended deterrence has identified the contextual changes in the global security environment that have occurred and the issues that should be addressed if extended deterrence guarantees are to continue to be effective for deterrence, credible for assurance, and a stabilizing contribution to the U.S. security strategy. Without periodic close examination and appropriate adjustments in extended deterrence relationships, these and future contextual changes are likely to pose significant strains on alliance relationships and may result in the eventual failure of either deterrence, assurance—or both.

Failing arsenal would tank assurance

McInnis, Kathleen J. 2005, Coordinator of the Project on Nuclear Issues and a research associate, CSIS, Extended deterrence: The U.S. credibility gap in the Middle East', The

Washington Quarterly, <http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/707746_918013288_918386648.pdf>, accessed: 7-22-10

In addition to deterring its own adversaries, the U.S. nuclear arsenal has in the past played a vital but often overlooked role of reassuring U.S. allies against their adversaries. This assurance was a key tool in preventing nuclear proliferation among allies in the European and Asian theaters during the Cold War, despite the threat posed by the nuclear capabilities of their enemies. In today's security environment, assurance remains an important policy objective for the U.S. arsenal. The 2002 Nuclear Posture Review states that "U.S. nuclear forces will continue to provide assurance to security partners This assurance can serve to reduce the incentives for friendly countries to acquire nuclear weapons of their own to deter such threats and circumstances."2 Will this strategy work in practice? In the Asian theater, extended deterrence has been effective, and the United States possesses some decent options for ensuring its effectiveness in the future. The long-standing commitment of the United States to the survival of democratic states in the region, reinforced by security treaties with Japan and South Korea, has created a great deal of U.S. political credibility in the region. This political credibility, combined with U.S. military capabilities, could be employed to deter the North Korean threat and assure U.S. allies in the region, thereby reducing the chance that they will respond to Pyongyang by building their own nuclear weapons program. The U.S. political commitment to its allies in Asia has been and remains robust, bolstered by the U.S. troop presence in Japan and South Korea for the past 50 years. This remains true despite the drawdown of U.S. forces in the Asian theater. Furthermore, should allies begin to doubt U.S. nuclear assurances, steps can be taken to reinforce the policy's credibility. As such, despite the major challenges presented by Pyongyang's nuclear declaration in February 2005, it is reasonably likely that East Asian allies will continue to choose to rely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella well into the future rather than set off a regional nuclear domino effect.

Non-Unique – Proliferation Now

Nuclear non-proliferation is totally shot – 30 countries will get nukes in the next decade

Richardson, visiting senior research fellow at the Institute of South-East Asian Studies, "Erosion of restrictions raises spectre of nuclear proliferation," 7/12, lexis, Alex Agne

Slowly but surely, the barriers preventing the spread of nuclear technology and materials that can be used to make weapons of mass destruction are being eroded. The most brazen cases involve North Korea and Iran. The former left the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, conducted at least two nuclear explosive tests in the past few years and has threatened to carry out more. Iran remains in the NPT but refuses to cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nations nuclear watchdog, and is widely suspected of seeking nuclear weapons. However, less obvious pressures are also undermining nuclear arms control as both big and emerging powers seek strategic and commercial gains. China is planning to provide more nuclear power reactors and fuel to Pakistan, even though Pakistan refuses to join the NPT and accept rigorous IAEA surveillance of all its nuclear facilities. In a clear sign that the deal will proceed, two Chinese state-owned companies last month signed a contract to cooperate in building the reactors to generate electricity at Pakistan's Chasma atomic complex, advancing a program that worries the United States and India. The US and Indian governments can hardly be surprised. Their own agreement in 2005 to reopen civilian nuclear trade blew a hole in international arrangements to stop proliferation. The agreement with the US was sealed despite India's nuclear weapons tests in 1998, which triggered follow-on tests by its long- time rival Pakistan. A key part of the counter- proliferation system is the Nuclear Suppliers Group of 46 participating governments that between them control much of the know-how, equipment and material needed for both civilian and military nuclear programs. They regulate the most powerful technology and fissile materials so far developed. Australia, which has about 40 per cent of the world's commercially recoverable uranium resources, is a member of the informal cartel. The suppliers group was established in 1975 to reinforce the non-proliferation treaty. Its voluntary guidelines were designed to prevent the transfer of sensitive nuclear technologies and block nuclear commerce with states that did not observe basic non- proliferation standards. The NSG barred trade with non-treaty countries. India was one of only three states never to have signed the treaty. The others were Pakistan and Israel. Yet in 2001, Russia, a prominent NSG member, sold uranium to India and agreed to build two additional reactors for India, without NSG approval. Under US pressure, but with strong backing from Russia, France and Britain, the NSG agreed in 2008 to exempt nuclear transfers to India. All India's backers sought closer ties with South Asia's leading power and wanted to cash in on India's expansion of its civilian nuclear power market worth about $170 billion. At least India had no record of transferring its nuclear know-how abroad. Pakistan has been the source of clandestine nuclear weapons and missile technology transfers to North Korea, Iran and Libya. It is expanding its capacity to produce plutonium and highly enriched uranium for weapons and has blocked the start of international negotiations on a treaty to ban production of fissile material for nuclear arms. Yet since the suppliers group exemption granted to India, China has been seeking equal treatment for its ally Pakistan so that it can expand civilian nuclear power. Israel, too, has sought exemption. Both moves have been unsuccessful. When China joined the suppliers group in 2004, it had already built a power reactor at Pakistan's Chasma site. China said at the time it was entitled to build a second reactor because it was part of the original agreement with Pakistan. However, building a third and fourth reactors, as China plans to do, would be another major breach in NSG standards. Even Japan, the only country to have suffered a nuclear attack, may be ready to bend its strict controls on nuclear exports. Japan and India last month held their first round of negotiations on a civilian nuclear pact. As the nuclear power industry expands, particularly in Asia, Japan wants to compete with China and South Korea in lucrative nuclear exports. It is also under pressure from the US and European countries whose nuclear companies have formed joint ventures with Japanese firms that are circumscribed by Japan's strict compliance with the treaty and suppliers group guidelines. Hinting at new flexibility, Japan's Trade Minister, Masayuki Naoshima, said recently that India's use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes "has already been internationally accepted". The US, Russia, France, Britain, Argentina, Canada, Kazakhstan, Namibia and Mongolia have already signed civil nuclear cooperation agreements with India. The last four are major uranium export competitors of Australia. Australia has yet to indicate whether it, too, will shift ground and lift its ban on selling uranium to India. At a meeting of the NSG in New Zealand last month, China side- stepped questions about its plan to sell Pakistan two additional reactors. The meeting also failed to agree on tougher guidelines on transfer of uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing technology. Some emerging powers that are NSG members, including Brazil, South Africa and Turkey, fear that UN Security Council sanctions imposed on Iran by the US, Russia, China, France and Britain the five big nuclear powers may make it more difficult in future for them to enrich their own uranium for energy security and export. More than 30 countries are planning to start nuclear power programs, doubling the number that already do so. Many are in Asia, the Middle East, South America and Africa. Without strict international rules on nuclear trade, the technologies and materials that can be used to make weapons of mass destruction will become more widely available, triggering regional nuclear arms races and opening the door for terrorists to get the ultimate weapons of fear and blackmail.

Non-Unique – Rogue Proliferation Now

Iran will get nuke capabilities at the end of the year – triggers all of their impacts

Washington Post, "A show of force for Iran," 7/9, lexis, Alex Agne

First, current trends suggest that Iran could achieve nuclear weapons capability before the end of this year, posing a strategically untenable threat to the United States. Contrary to a growing number of voices in Washington, we do not believe a nuclear weapons-capable Iran could be contained. Instead, it would set off a proliferation cascade across the Middle East, and Iran would gain the ability to transfer nuclear materials to its terrorist allies. Meanwhile, even as it continued to threaten Israel's existence, Tehran would be able to dominate the energy-rich Persian Gulf, intensify its attempts to destabilize moderate Arab regimes, subvert U.S. efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, violently oppose the Middle East peace process, and increase support for terrorism across the region. An Iran emboldened by nuclear weapons clearly might overstep its boundaries, pulling the Middle East and the United States into a treacherous conflict. An even more likely scenario, however, is that Israel would first attack Iranian nuclear facilities, triggering retaliatory strikes by Iran and its terrorist proxies. This would put the United States in an extremely difficult position. If we remained neutral in such a conflict, it would only invigorate Tehran, antagonize our regional allies and lead to greater conflict. On the other extreme, the United States could be dragged into a major confrontation at a time not of its choosing

Preventing North Korean proliferation is a joke – weapons can’t be negotiated away

Washington Times, "Slouching toward a new Korea strategy; Bush blew it, Obama is blowing it; time for a different plan," 6/2, lexis, Alex Agne

North Korea's brazen, unprovoked torpedoing of a South Korean warship last month has refocused international attention - and criticism - on the Stalinist regime situated above the 38th Parallel. Beyond the public outrage now coming from Washington, however, it's painfully clear that the White House doesn't possess much by way of a coherent approach toward the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) or its "Dear Leader," Kim Jong-il. To be fair, this is not a new phenomenon. For much of the past two decades, the United States has suffered from an acute strategy deficit on the Korean Peninsula. During the Bush years, this dearth of ideas took the form of a haphazard strategy of carrots and sticks, as the U.S. government alternated between sanctions and engagement in an attempt to buy time until a real strategy, better leverage and more robust involvement from allies could materialize. Since taking office, the Obama administration has done much the same. Early on, in keeping with its overtures toward other troublesome states, it flirted with the idea of deeper diplomatic engagement with the DPRK. North Korea, however, showed little interest in negotiating with Washington. Instead, it responded with renewed provocations, sowing lasting confusion at the White House in the process. North Korea's most recent transgression has made painfully clear that that status quo cannot hold. Far less clear, however, is what should come next for the U.S. vis-a-vis North Korea. Whatever the specifics, the ultimate approach that emerges in Washington should proceed from three broad realizations. The first is that the ill-fated diplomatic adventure known as the six-party talks is well and truly dead. Truth be told, that negotiating track - launched in 2003 and encompassing the U.S., Russia, China, South Korea, Japan and the DPRK - never stood much chance of success. The official goal of the off-again, on-again process, after all, was and remains the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. But there's no real evidence that the DPRK's nuclear effort is negotiable. To the contrary, the Kim dynasty's persistent pursuit of the "bomb" in the face of tremendous domestic hardship and international isolation suggests that the powers that be in Pyongyang see nuclearization as the key to regime stability - and to international credibility. Western strategy, then, would be much better served by assuming that the North's nukes cannot simply be negotiated away. Instead, they need to be contained and deterred. This means greater investments in steps that could help blunt North Korea's nuclear menace to its neighbors, including the provision of additional missile defenses to regional allies like South Korea and Japan. It also requires more stringent interdiction of North Korea's illicit proliferation activities, so that Pyongyang's nuclear and ballistic missile advances don't become more of an export commodity than they already are.

Non-Unique – Rogue Proliferation Now

Burma will proliferate – loophole in NPT

BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, "Report says loophole in IAEA's rules allows Burma to escape inspection," 7/23, lexis, Alex Agne

Thanks to a loophole in the international regime to control the proliferation of nuclear weapons, military-ruled Burma could very well carry out its reported intent to go nuclear behind a veil of secrecy, free of scrutiny from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). That is the privilege the Southeast Asian nation enjoys under the Small Quantities Protocol it signed with the Vienna-based IAEA in April 1995, three years after Burma, also known as Myanmar, became party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This protocol allows parties to the treaty, which seeks to build a global nuclear non-proliferation regime, to have up to 10 tonnes of natural uranium and 2.2 pounds of plutonium without having to report such possessions to the IAEA. This means also that countries like Burma do not have to open their doors to IAEA inspection teams and can avoid disclosing details about new nuclear facilities until six months before these start operations. It is of little wonder, then, why a former IAEA director is urging Burma to clear the air about its reported nuclear plans by becoming a party to the Additional Protocol of the NPT, which gives the IAEA more powers to inspect nuclear activity in a country. "They have nothing to lose if they have nothing to hide," Robert Kelly, a recently retired director of the IAEA, told IPS in an exclusive interview. "It is a protocol that countries have volunteered to be a party to. Chad just became the 100th member of the Additional Protocol." Burma's silence on this front, along with its denials of violating its commitment to the NPT, "is very strange; it is very suspicious," added Kelly, a nuclear engineer, during the telephone interview from Vienna. "They are exploiting a loophole in the Small Quantities Protocol and getting away (with it)."

Oil companies have given billions to Burmese government to purchase nuclear weapons

Korea Times, "'Oil firms fuel nuclear proliferation in Myanmar'," 7/5, lexis, Alex Agne

Three oil companies, Total, Chevron and PTTEP, have provided Burma's military junta with half of their revenue, worth nearly $5 billion earned from the Yadana Natural Gas Project, an environment watchdog claimed Monday. If confirmed to be true, this suggests that part of the cash could have gone to North Korea which reportedly exported nuclear and weapons technology to Burma (Myanmar). EarthRights International, an environment group headquartered in Washington D.C., claimed that "the funds have enabled Burma's autocratic junta to maintain power and pursue a nuclear weapons program while participating in illicit weapons trade with North Korea." The group made the allegations during a news conference held in Paris. According to its 49-page report, titled "Energy Insecurity: How Total, Chevron, and PTTEP Contribute to Human Rights Violations, Financial Secrecy and Nuclear Proliferation in Burma," the three oil companies have generated over $9.03 billion in profits through the pipeline project in Burma from 1998 to 2009. "The Burmese regime's share, after costs, was approximately $4.59 billion, of which $915 million was taken for domestic gas use, while the rest was taken in cash," the watchdog claimed. "Given the evidence of Burma's illegal nuclear ambitions, illicit weapons trade with North Korea and its ongoing and severe repression in the lead up to its widely discredited national elections, now is the time for the international community to focus on the Burmese generals' nerve center, its gas revenues," it said. The accusation came approximately a month after the U.S. State Department expressed apprehension about the relations between North Korea and Burma. During a press briefing on June 3, Philip Crowley, spokesman of the State Department, said the United States has been concerned about Burma's relationship with North Korea and the transactions that take place between the two sides. "We are very conscious that North Korea is a serial proliferator of dangerous materials and weapons, and this is something that we have expressed directly to Burma and that continues to be a major concern of ours," he said. Earlier, the United Nations accused North Korea of exporting nuclear and missile technology to several countries and companies, including those in Burma.

Allied Proliferation Link Turn

Troops are insufficient to prevent proliferation

Davis et al 9

Jacquelyn, Ex. VP – Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Pres. – IFPA and Prof. Int’l. Sec. Studies – Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy of Tufts U. and former DOD Consultant, Charles M. Perry , VP and Dir. Studies – IFPA, and James L. Schoff, Associate Dir. Asia-Pacific Studies – IFPA, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis White Paper, “Updating U.S. Deterrence Concepts and Operational Planning: Reassuring Allies, Deterring Legacy Threats, and Dissuading Nuclear "Wannabes"”, February, http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/Updating\_US\_Deterrence\_Concepts.pdf, p. 8

In the first decade of the twenty-first century, however, that satisfaction and trust is no longer a given, and divergent threat perceptions have given rise to contending approaches to dealing with would-be proliferators and legacy challenges. Consequently, reassuring and discouraging a nuclear cascade of allies, or former allies, has emerged as a crucial element of deterrence planning, and, in the absence of consensus about the nature of the threats that we are facing, that reassurance function has become more complex and subject to more varied interpretations than it was in the past. In the wake of Iraq and in the midst of the Afghanistan war, as the United States endeavors to “reset” its forces and transform its overseas (military) “footprint,” the forward deployment of U.S. troops may not be sufficient in itself to convince American allies that our commitment to extended deterrence remains credible, especially in the case of political differences over preferred ways for dealing with emerging threats and legacy challenges. This, in turn, may lead some U.S. allies or coalition partners to conclude that their interests would better be served by pursuing their own nuclear options. As the Interim Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, previously cited, points out: Our non-proliferation strategy will continue to depend upon U.S. extended deterrence strategy as one of its pillars. Our military capabilities, both nuclear and conventional, underwrite U.S. security guarantees to our allies, without which many of them would feel enormous pressures to create their own nuclear arsenals. So long as the United States maintains adequately strong conventional forces, it does not necessarily need to rely on nuclear weapons to deter the threat of a major conventional attack. But long-term U.S. superiority in the conventional military domain cannot be taken for granted and requires continuing attention and investment. Moreover, it is not adequate for deterring nuclear attack. The U.S. deterrent must be both visible and credible, not only to our possible adversaries, but to our allies as well.6

Forward presence leads to proliferation

Calleo 9

David Calleo, Prof., International Studies, Johns Hopkins U.), Follies of Power: American’s Unipolar Fantasy, 73

Not surprisingly, U.S. administrations have, in recent years, grown increasingly concerned about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weapons in particular, to unstable states or terrorist groups. Here a perverse military logic works against the United States. The more America's overweening military power threatens smaller countries with forcible regime change, the more they will seek asymmetric solutions. Their options are terrorism, on the one hand, and rogue strategic weapons, on the other. Combining the two into terrorism using nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons offers still more striking prospects. These prospects, intrinsic to the post-Soviet strategic dispensation, bode ill for a unipolar America pressing regime change around the world. More interventions give incentive to more proliferation.

Reducing military threats slows the rate of proliferation

Mueller 10

John, Prof., Political Science, Ohio State U., Atomic Obsession, 145

One way to reduce the likelihood that new nuclear states will emerge is a simple one: stop threatening them. That is, the intense hostility toward particular regimes, due in considerable part to worst-case fantasies over what might conceivably happen should they obtain an atomic bomb, has had the perverse effect of enhancing the appeal of such weapons to the threatened regimes for the sake of deterrence if nothing else.

AT: Japanese Proliferation

Economic constraints check Japanese posture changes

Glosserman and Madsen 10

Brad, executive director of the Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic and International Studies and Robert, senior fellow at the Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1-25, [Japan’s security options limited by economic realities](http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/01/25/japans-security-options-limited-by-economic-realities/), http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/01/25/japans-security-options-limited-by-economic-realities/

A policy of much greater self-reliance is also improbable. The Japanese public is still uncomfortable with a fully functional military. The scars on the political landscape from the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have not fully healed, leaving a sincere and deep anti-nuclear pacifism. The transformation of the Japan Defense Agency into a ministry did little to overcome that popular skepticism regarding both conventional and nuclear armament. To the contrary, the aging of the population implies a gradual turn in a more conservative direction – not the sort of thing that would encourage political parties to undertake bold new security initiatives. Yet these political and diplomatic obstacles are just foothills. Behind them stand the mountains of economic exigency, mountains that definitively block the path to a new security system. All of the alternatives would require raising the military budget far above the 1 per cent of GDP that Japan has maintained for several decades. Self-reliance, to adduce one example, would require that Tokyo shoulder the entire financial burden of national defense while a shift toward China or regional defense would necessitate retooling the existing, US-based weapons systems. Such changes would inevitably prove expensive. The importance of economic considerations may be inferred from the established direction of security policy. Although the economy grew robustly in the middle 2000s, bringing the government significantly more tax revenue, during these years, successive governments reduced the defense budget, which fell from ¥4.94 trillion in 2002 to ¥4.74 trillion in 2008. Critical armament programs were scaled back over this period, which meant that Japan gradually grew more dependent on the US security guarantee. Reversing this trend is something that the Ministry of Finance, other relatively parsimonious parts of the civil service, and large portions of the electorate would firmly oppose. The trend toward economisation will presumably intensify under the DPJ government. Although Ozawa Ichiro and other DPJ luminaries want Japan to adopt a more independent and assertive foreign policy, the government’s focus is squarely on domestic affairs. Its foremost objectives are [asserting control](http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/01/22/why-japans-hatoyama-government-matters/) over the civil service and winning this summer’s Upper House election. If those goals are attained, the prime minister and his Cabinet will then embark on their domestic agenda of promoting green technology, offering more subsidies for farmers and other favored lobbies, expanding childcare support and other assistance to families, and meeting the immense healthcare needs of a rapidly aging population. These priorities matter both because they indicate the government’s lack of interest in strategic departures and because they will consume resources that would otherwise be available for military expansion. Therefore, it is not surprising that Prime Minister Hatoyama has postponed indefinitely the formulation of the new National Defense Program Guidelines as well as the Mid-Term Defense Program. More restrictive than the direction of government policy, however, is a lack of money. Put simply, Japanese GDP will not grow fast enough over the next decade to fund expensive new demarches. In the short term, the country could produce a burst of growth if there were sufficient demand to employ the swathes of excess capacity that presently exist. But the scope for increased fiscal stimulus and greater overseas demand are both fairly predictable and, unfortunately, limited. Over time, companies will close down excess facilities and the potential rate of GDP growth will fall below 1.5 per cent. The combination of inadequate demand in the short term and the inability to expand supply quickly in the medium term means that the actual rate of economic growth through 2015 will probably barely exceed 1.0 per cent per annum. This leaves little margin for Tokyo to expand defense expenditures through tax revenues. The remaining option for financing a new defense strategy is borrowing, but here too, Japan’s room for maneuver is severely constrained. The gross national debt is already approaching 200 per cent of GDP, a vertiginous level by international standards and one that alarms government officials and much of the electorate. Furthermore, that debt is rising fast because, after shrinking during the commercial efflorescence of the middle 2000s, the government budget deficit has widened again. New borrowing will reach 8 per cent of GDP in 2010 before – assuming a politically questionable degree of fiscal discipline – dropping back to just under 6 per cent of that standard by 2016 and slightly less in subsequent years. Interest rates are now so depressed that there is little danger of a financial crisis anytime soon, but there is widespread agreement that it would be rash to undertake significant additional burdens.

AT: Japanese Proliferation

Political assurances are the core of extended deterrence – the plan isn’t key

Satoh 9

Yukio, Former President of the Japan Institute of International Affairs and Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations, ARE THE REQUIREMENTS FOR EXTENDED DETERRENCE CHANGING?,

Yet the United States for its part has been steadfastly assuring the Japanese in increasingly clear manner of its commitment to provide deterrence for Japan by all means, including nuclear. For example, the Japan-U.S. joint statement issued at the last Security Consultative Committee meeting held in May 2007 recognized that “the U.S. extended deterrence underpins the defense of Japan and regional security”. This committee meeting was attended by the Japanese ministers of foreign affairs and defense and the U.S. secretaries of State and Defense. With this shared recognition, the United States then reaffirmed that the full range of U.S. military capabilities, - both nuclear and non-nuclear strike forces and defense capabilities - formed the core of extended deterrence and supported U.S. commitment to the defense of Japan. Most recently, President Barack Obama assured the Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso of the continuing U.S. commitment to the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. By the way, quite symbolically, the Japanese prime minister was the first foreign visitor the president received at the Oval Office, and Japan was the first foreign country Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited in her new capacity.

Other military components check proliferation

-nuclear umbrella

-BMD

-weapons modernization

Scheber, Vice President, National Institute for Public Policy, 9

Thomas, Contemporary Challenges for Extended Deterrence, Scholar

Even prior to the nuclear test by North Korea, Japanese security experts were examining the relative value of U.S. extended deterrence guarantees. Japanese concerns over a growing regional threat and uncertainty over U.S. extended deterrence guarantees were featured in An Image of Japan in the 21st Century, a report issued on September 5, 2006, from the Institute for International Policy Studies, headed by former Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone. The report noted the potential for tremendous future change in the international situation. It stated, “Japan, maintaining its position as a non-nuclear weapons state and working to strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty system, should study the nuclear issue in order to be prepared in the event of tremendous future change in the international situation.” Nakasone, when questioned by the press on the report, noted that Japan was currently dependent on U.S. nuclear weapons but that it was uncertain whether U.S. willingness to provide nuclear-related guarantees would continue. Following the North Korean nuclear test, Japanese officials conducted an internal review of national security needs. One Japanese press report stated that senior defense ministry officials and military experts generally agreed on three principles to guide Japan’s actions: 1) reinforce the U.S. nuclear and conventional deterrent capability; 2) install missile defense systems in Japan; and 3) possess the capability to attack military bases of an enemy country. The report asserted that, “To better ensure the U.S. nuclear arsenal achieves its desired deterrent effect, a clear manifestation of such U.S. intent would have an important meaning.” The same article also reported that, “Defense Minister Fumio Kyuma spoke in no uncertain terms about strengthening the deterrence of U.S. nuclear weapons. The strongest deterrence would be when the United States explicitly says, 'If you drop one nuclear bomb on Japan, the United States will retaliate by dropping 10 on you,' he said.”