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AT: China Rise

China won’t rise- no desire. Even if they do rise it’s a long way off

Nayyar 6/9

(Dhiraj, research Scholar in Political Economy of India, Trinity College, Cambridge 6/9/10, “ Will not seek to be a hegemon: China’s Binggou”, <http://www.financialexpress.com/news/Will-not-seek-to-be-a-hegemon--China-s-Binggou/631198/> //da:7/28)

 China made a strong pitch for greater democracy in international relations at the third summit meeting of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA). Speaking at the summit, state councillor Dai Bingguo, who is also responsible for border talks with India, said, “Where we live today, is a world witnessing growing trends towards pluralism, diversity and multipolarity, a world adapting to globalised allocation of resources and movement of capital, goods and people. Such a world can no longer tolerate hegemony of any form or a single value system.” Dai Binggou also sought to allay fears about the rise of China, particularly its role as a potential hegemon. “China will never seek to be a superpower and will never seek hegemony in the world. This is not our tradition, not our desire, and still less, our policy,” he said. The state councillor also pointed out that China is still a developing country—in the process of seeking revitalisation—and that it still has a long and challenging journey ahead. He said even when China becomes a developed country, it will remain committed to peace and development in Asia.

Their cards don’t assume changing opinions that will block a Chinese hegemon

Inboden 6/16

(Will, Ph.D., M.Phil., and M.A. degrees in history from Yale University, and his A.B. from Stanford University, Foreign Policy, “ The reality of the 'China Fantasy”, <http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/06/16/the_reality_of_the_china_fantasy> //da:7/29)

Is the "China Fantasy" starting to get deflated by reality? Three years ago, Jim Mann's provocative book of that title identified the "China Fantasy" as the dogmatic belief of many Western political and commercial elites that China's economic liberalization and growth would lead inevitably to democracy at home and responsible conduct abroad. The operative word was "inevitably" -- the assumption being that China's remarkable economic success would automatically produce a middle class that demanded greater political rights, and that China's growing integration with the global economy would produce benign and responsible international behavior. Based on this assumption, the corollary policy prescription for the West was to pursue a policy of engagement and encouragement towards China's rise. This paradigm seems to be shifting. I recently participated in a conference in Europe on China, attended by a cross-section of policy, academic, and commercial leaders from Europe, the United States, and China, and came away struck by palpable attitude changes in at least three dimensions. Taken together, these are signposts that the previous conventional wisdom on China is coming under question: \* European attitudes. Many of the Europeans present voiced a pronounced skepticism towards China, both for the Chinese Communist Party's ongoing refusal to liberalize the political system as well as for what they perceive as China's irresponsible international posture. Various reasons were suggested for this change in European attitudes from even two years ago, but the most salient one seems to be European ire over China's obstreperous conduct at last year's Copenhagen climate change conference. If Europe has a litmus test for international good citizenship, it is climate change. But China's behavior on that front seems to be prompting increased European frustration with China on other issues as well, including human rights, Iran's nuclear program, and China's military build-up. \* Business attitudes. American and European business leaders with extensive China experience also expressed significant disillusionment. As one noted, whereas 5 or 10 years ago the business community was virtually unanimous in its enthusiasm for the China market and in support of closer political ties between China and the West, now the consensus is fractured. Causes for this disenchantment include widespread corruption, intellectual property rights violations, the protectionism of the new "indigenous innovation" policy, and the general restraints on private sector flourishing imposed by China's state capitalism model. To be sure, many multinational companies remain profitably invested in what is still the world's largest emerging market, and many more are eager to get in. But Google's recent exit from China may not be the only one, and some multinationals looking at China are weighing a new set of cost-benefit analyses. \* Chinese attitudes. If assessments in the West are changing, so are elite Chinese attitudes. Most of the Chinese participants were from universities or think-tanks (i.e. not People's Liberation Army hard-liners), but even they displayed a nationalistic confidence and rather defiant posture towards the West, especially the United States. At its most benign, this is an understandable attitude of a proud rising power. But in too many ways it is not benign, especially considering that the Chinese participants took worrisome stances on issues such as human rights, Taiwan, Tibet, mercantilist nationalism, Iran's nuclear program, shielding North Korea, and especially the security "threat" purportedly posed by the United States.

Non-Unique: Aggression Now

And, Non-unique – China is aggressive now

AP 6/25

(" Chinese nationalists increasingly strident ", Pg online @

 <http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5gMEFC7eXk74KBudZVCpBKWr_Mr6wD9GIDB180> //da:7/27)

BEIJING — Upcoming joint U.S.-South Korean naval drills have sparked an unexpected outcry from Chinese nationalists, whose fiery rhetoric has been stoked by their country's rising economic strength and global clout. While North Korea often issues diatribes condemning the routine war games off South Korea, this time, it was Chinese blogs and websites that exploded in anger at word that an American aircraft carrier might join the drills, bringing it close to Chinese waters. Some hawks even urged their country's military to make its own show of force. **"China** should cover the Yellow Sea with ships and missiles and open fire and drive them back should the American military dare invade our territorial waters," a commentary on the popular ccvic.com news website demanded, though Beijing has given no sign it will make any military response. Such nationalist rhetoric jibes with a growing outspokenness among ranking members of the People's Liberation Army that is stirring concern abroad and could hamper **China'**s quest to be regarded as a rising — and responsible — member of international society. While Chinese nationalism has been growing for the better part of two decades, the unusually vociferous response this time reflected a sense among Chinese that their soaring economy and rising profile on the international scene deserve greater respect.

Non-Unique: U.S. Weak Now

US retreating now

Krauthammer 2k10

(Charles, Smartest Dude on the Planet, “Obama's many retreats signal U.S. weakness,” Washington Post, Friday, May 21, 2010, Pg. <http://www.commercialappeal.com/news/2010/may/21/charles-krauthammer-obamas-many-retreats-signal/?print=1> //da:7/29)

WASHINGTON -- It is perfectly obvious that Iran's latest uranium maneuver, brokered by Brazil and Turkey, is a ruse. Iran retains more than enough enriched uranium to make a bomb. And it continues enriching at an accelerated pace and to a greater purity (20 percent). Which is why the French foreign ministry immediately declared that the trumpeted temporary shipping of some Iranian uranium to Turkey will do nothing to halt Iran's nuclear program. It will, however, make meaningful sanctions more difficult. America's proposed Security Council resolution is already laughably weak -- no blacklisting of Iran's central bank, no sanctions against Iran's oil and gas industry, no nonconsensual inspections on the high seas. Yet Turkey and Brazil -- both current members of the Security Council -- are so opposed to sanctions that they will not even discuss the resolution. And China will now have a new excuse to weaken it further. But the deeper meaning of the uranium-export stunt is the brazenness with which Brazil and Turkey gave cover to the mullahs' nuclear ambitions and deliberately undermined U.S. efforts to curb Iran's program. The real news is that already notorious photo: the president of Brazil, our largest ally in Latin America, and the prime minister of Turkey, for more than half a century the Muslim anchor of NATO, raising hands together with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the most virulently anti-American leader in the world. That picture -- a defiant, triumphant take-that-Uncle-Sam -- is a crushing verdict on the Obama foreign policy. It demonstrates how rising powers, traditional American allies, having watched this administration in action, have decided that there's no cost in lining up with America's enemies and no profit in lining up with a U.S. president given to apologies and appeasement. They've watched President Obama's humiliating attempts to appease Iran, as every rejected overture is met with abjectly renewed U.S. negotiating offers. American acquiescence reached such a point that the president was late, hesitant and flaccid in expressing even rhetorical support for democracy demonstrators who were being brutally suppressed and whose call for regime change offered the potential for the most significant U.S. strategic advance in the region in 30 years. They've watched America acquiesce to Russia's re-exerting sway over Eastern Europe, over Ukraine (pressured by Russia last month into extending for 25 years its lease of the Black Sea naval base at Sevastopol) and over Georgia (Russia's de facto annexation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is no longer an issue under the Obama "reset" policy). They've watched our appeasement of Syria, Iran's agent in the Arab Levant -- sending our ambassador back to Syria even as it tightens its grip on Lebanon, supplies Hezbollah with Scuds, and intensifies its role as the pivot of the Iran-Hezbollah-Hamas alliance. The price for this ostentatious flouting of the U.S. and its interests? Ever more eager U.S. "engagement." They've observed the administration's gratuitous slap at Britain over the Falklands, its contemptuous treatment of Israel, its undercutting of the Czech Republic and Poland, and its indifference to Lebanon and Georgia. And in Latin America, they see not just U.S. passivity as Venezuela's Hugo Chavez organizes his anti-American "Bolivarian" coalition while deepening military and commercial ties with Iran and Russia. They saw active U.S. support in Honduras for a pro-Chavez would-be dictator seeking unconstitutional powers in defiance of the democratic institutions of that country. This is not just an America in decline. This is an America in retreat -- accepting, ratifying and declaring its decline, and inviting rising powers to fill the vacuum. Nor is this retreat by inadvertence. This is retreat by design and, indeed, on principle. It's the perfect fulfillment of Obama's adopted Third World narrative of American misdeeds, disrespect and domination from which he has come to redeem us and the world.

China Wont Use its Military

China won’t use its military

Feng 2k10

(Professor at the International Studies and Deputy Director of Center for International & Strategic Studies (CISS) of Peking University, Research Fellow at the Fairbank Center for East Asian Studies and Center for International and Strategic Studies (5/10/10, “An Emerging Trend in East Asia: Military Budget Increases and Their Impact,” <http://www.fpif.org/articles/an_emerging_trend_in_east_asia>)

With its military modernization, China does not seek to undermine the current status quo, regain historically lost territory, or expand its “sphere of influence.” A small and strong military force, with the self-proclaimed mission of resolving all historic grievances, is a perennial preoccupation of the Chinese leadership. Additionally, it reflects China’s growing integration into the global economy and its turn seawards. China will maintain the momentum of modernizing its military—this is a political imperative for the ruling party—but it will not risk damaging its global links by using the military. As long as there is no dramatic change in external relations, an arms race is not Beijing’s preference.

Link Turn (1/2)

Afghanistan and Iraq Presence Trades-off with a China Hedging Strategy

Akita 2k7

(Program on U.S.-Japan Relations Harvard University, M.A. in International Relations, While at Harvard, Mr. Akita examined the U.S.-Japan-China Triangle since 1972, “U.S.-China Relations And Management Of The U.S.-Japan Alliance,” pg online @ <http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/us-japan/research/pdf/07-01.Akita.pdf> //ef)

In Chapter 1, this paper mainly analyzes two major approaches driving U.S. China policy. Although there is a debate over what is the best combination of hedging and engagement elements in this policy, most U.S. policy makers agree that the United States should maintain a strong military commitment to Asia to better hedge or engage a rising China. The next major question is to gauge the long-term U.S. capability to carry out its intentions. If this capability weakens in the foreseeable future, options for U.S.-China strategy, as well as Japan-China policy, may be constricted. For the United States to maintain a strong commitment to Asia, at least two kinds of resources will be required. The first is physical resources, such as the defense budget and military forces. The second is political support to sustain such a commitment. In other words, the U.S. government needs to ensure strong public support in order to continuously pay the costs and take the risks necessary to maintain a strong military presence in Asia. Constraints to Physical Resources Even with military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, current U.S. defense spending is relatively small in terms of its share of the gross domestic product (GDP). During the Korean (1953) and Vietnam (1968) conflicts, total defense spending was some 14.2 percent and 9.4 percent, respectively, of the GDP; in 2007, this figure is likely to be only about 4.5 percent.54 In this respect, the burden of defense spending on the U.S. economy as a whole is not so great as in the past. Some supporters of heavy defense outlays, therefore, insist that the United States can afford more in this regard. The trend over the past few years, however, is not indicating such an optimistic prospect. From FY 2000 to 2006, the regular “non-war” defense budget rose by about 22 percent after inflation.55 This increase, which does not include funding for wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, pushed the level of defense spending above the peacetime average during the Cold War.56 Unclear prospects in the two present conflicts are also a heavy burden for federal spending. More importantly, **pressures to reduce the federal budget deficit will be constraints on defense spending**. According to a prediction by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the federal budget deficit will increase to more than $2 trillion over the next decade, even under optimistic projections.57 In order to tackle this serious deficit issue, in February 2007, the Bush Administration announced its intention to reduce the budget deficit very drastically starting in FY 2008 and to bring the budget into the black by FY 2012. Within the budget, mandatory programs such as Social Security and Medicare are likely to increase constantly, as the baby boomers reach full retirement age starting around 2010. Therefore, **pressure on defense spending will increase, leaving less room for further drastic expansion**. The structure of defense spending is also showing some constraints. Operation and maintenance spending is rising constantly due to the pressure to improve the quality of life in the military, and this trend will likely continue. Since the Korean War, this expenditure per troop has increased at a yearly average of 2.6 percent above inflation.58 Even if the U.S. government ensures a certain growth of defense spending every year, the increase of these fixed costs may offset it. For example, the FY 2006 defense budget request was $131 billion more than that in FY 2000, but $77 billion (almost 60 percent) of this was in the “Military Personnel” and “Operation and Maintenance” accounts.59 Increases of these spending items are not directly linked to the QDR’s plan to expand naval forces in the Asia-Pacific, which is mainly aimed at better hedging against China’s military expansion. Whether the United States can maintain a strong military commitment to the Asia-Pacific will largely depend upon the future posture of the naval and air forces. In February 2006, in order to execute the QDR plan, the U.S. Navy outlined a requirement for a fleet of 313 ships, which included 11 aircraft carriers, 66 submarines, and 62 guided missile destroyers. Yet, in addition to federal budget constraints, the rising cost of shipbuilding makes this plan more difficult for the U.S. military to afford. It is widely believed that the Navy’s budget projections for shipbuilding associated with the 313-ship fleet plan largely underestimate the sharp rise in the costs of shipbuilding in recent years.60 In short, although the Bush Administration has the clear intention to strengthen the U.S. military commitment to the Asia-Pacific region, **there is the serious danger that the U.S. military cannot ensure the necessary funding to execute its defense plan**. **There is a significant gap between the resources that the U.S. military requires and what is actually available.**

Link Turn (2/2)

Only a military withdrawal allows Japan and South korea to prevent Chinese adventurism

Bandow 2k4

(Doug, senior fellow at the Cato Institute “Withdrawal of U.S. forces a good start,” Japan Times, August 22 pg nexis)

Japan understandably looks at China with unease, but Tokyo should construct a defensive force capable of deterring Chinese adventurism. Taiwan is an obvious potential flash point, but no sane American president would inaugurate a ground war with China. Still, critics contend, having troops nearby would better enable the U.S. to intervene in some future crisis. But most potential conflicts, like past ones in the Balkans, would not warrant American involvement. Moreover, allies often limit Washington's options. France would not even grant overflight rights to Washington to retaliate against Libya for the Berlin disco bombing. Seoul and Tokyo would be unlikely to let Washington use their bases in a war with China over Taiwan. Changing technology has reduced the value of propinquity. As Bush observed, our forces are "more agile and more lethal, they're better able to strike anywhere in the world over great distances on short notice." A major conflict like that in Iraq would require an extended build-up, irrespective of where the forces were located. In contrast, the benefits of withdrawing are obvious. As the president observed: "Our service members will have more time on the home front, and more predictability and fewer moves over a career... The taxpayers will save money as we configure our military to meet the threats of the 21st century." Drawing down unnecessary overseas garrisons would reduce pressure on personnel resulting from the unexpectedly difficult Iraqi occupation. Roughly 40 percent of the 140,000 troops now stationed in Iraq are Reserve or National Guard. Bush also contended that his proposal would "strengthen our alliances around the world." Actually, pulling out troops would not improve existing relationships. Indeed, former U.N. Ambassador Richard Holbrooke complained that "the Germans are very unhappy about these withdrawals. The Koreans are going to be equally unhappy." A few officials in Asia might fear for their security. Some Europeans complain that the administration is retaliating for their opposition to the U.S. invasion of Iraq. However, most critics most worry about the economic impact on local communities surrounding American bases. Washington's response should be, so what? Proposals for drawing down U.S. forces were made long before the Iraq war and are justified by changing strategic realities, whatever the Bush administration's private intentions. Moreover, Americans aren't responsible for making Germans and Koreans happy. The economic health of small German villages is a problem for Berlin, not Washington. Still, some U.S. devotees of the status quo worry about the impact of Bush's initiative. Charged Wesley Clark, who commanded President Bill Clinton's misbegotten war on Serbia: the move would "significantly undermine U.S. national security." Even if trans-Atlantic ties loosened, the U.S. would be better off. America's alliances are mostly security black holes, with Washington doing the defending and allies doing the carping. Withdrawal would force friendly states to take on full responsibility for their own defense, which would enhance U.S. security. Why do Americans patrol Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia, which are of only peripheral interest to Europe and of no concern to the U.S.? Japan should take on a front-line role in deterring potential Chinese adventurism. Why does Washington treat populous and prosperous South Korea as a perpetual defense dependent?

Containment Bad --> NW

And, Containment Causes Nuclear war

Hadar, Adjunct Scholar of the Cato Institute, 96 (Leon, Jan 26th, “The Sweet-and-Sour Sino-Americna Relationship”, Cato Policy Analysis No. 428 <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-248.html>)

The containment hawks and geoeconomic and geocultural nationalists in Washington and the military hawks and cultural chauvinists in Beijing are a classic case of "rival twins." They accelerate the confrontation between the two nations, as each group feeds into the other's misconceptions. The Chinese follow the debate and policies emanating from Washington and see them as part of a campaign to slow their country's rise to power; the Americans monitor the rhetoric and actions of Beijing and assume that the Chinese leadership is hostile. That creates a trail of misperceptions and a vicious circle of policies and counterpolicies that could threaten at some point to get out of hand and produce a major international crisis. Systemic Factors While misperceptions on both sides of the Pacific can be exacerbated by the way presidential leadership, bureaucratic factors, or domestic politics affects U.S. policy toward China, there is another, possibly more profound and systemic, dimension to the current Sino-American tensions. The end of the Cold War, like any other revolutionary change in the international system, tends to produce new confrontations between various powers that want to dominate or at least influence the new global structure. In many cases, the international competition ushered in by a new era is between rising and hegemonic powers. A rising "have-not" power usually strives to change the status quo, including the rules of the international military and economic game, in a way that will benefit its interests and help it to translate its new economic power into military and diplomatic influence. The hegemonic "have" power wants to preserve the global status quo, thereby maintaining its dominant economic and military position. Sometimes, as in the case of Great Britain and Germany during the early 20th century, the rivalry erupts into a major hegemonic war. Sometimes, as in the rivalry between the United States and Great Britain in the late 1800s and early 1900s, the tension ends in a gradual and peaceful transition of dominant status from the old to the new power. In still other instances, as in the case of the United States, Germany, and Japan in the post-World War II era, it evolves into a peaceful, albeit complex, sharing of economic and military influence.(63) The Chinese leaders and people believe that with the geostrategic and geoeconomic changes taking place in the world, their nation should and could gain its rightful place in the ranks of global great powers. The consensus that unites "moderates" and "radicals," or conservatives and reformists, in Beijing is that, in the aftermath of the Cold War, "the world has moved from a bipolar system to a multi-polar system," according to a Western diplomat in the Chinese capital. "China intends to be a pole or significant actor" in that system. That means "defining its own sphere--and even using confrontation with the U.S. to send a signal to other countries that dealing with Taipei, for example, is courting trouble."(64) The rhetoric of top Clinton administration officials suggests that while the United States is expecting occasional problems with Beijing, Washington is nevertheless willing to peacefully accommodate the rising power of China. "Our policy is engagement, not containment," insists Lord. He adds, however, "We're not naive. We cannot predict what kind of power China will be in the 21st century. God forbid we may have to turn, with others, to a policy of containment. I would hope not. We're trying to prevent that."(65) But history suggests that things rarely remain as simple as Lord's formulation. Maintaining a stable balance of power between an old hegemon and a new competitor is at best difficult, especially if the two powers and the system in which they operate are undergoing dramatic changes. Post-Deng China: Post-Bismarck Germany or Post-1945 Russia? Some analysts, including Nicholas D. Kristof, former Beijing chief of the New York Times, have drawn a historical parallel between the rise of Germany as a world economic and military power at the end of the 19th century and China's rise in the last decade of the 20th century. They suggest that, given the similar authoritarian and insecure nature of the regimes in post-Bismarck Germany the post-Deng China, China could emerge as a leading anti-status quo player, challenging the dominant position of the United States, which like Great Britain in the 19th century occupies the leading economic and military position in the world. "The risk is that Deng's successor will be less talented and more aggressive--a Chinese version of Wilhelm II," writes Kristof. "Such a ruler unfortunately may be tempted to promote Chinese nationalism as a unifying force and ideology, to replace the carcass of communism." For all the differences between China and Wilhelmine Germany, "the latter's experience should remind us of the difficulty that the world has had accommodating newly powerful nations," warns Kristof, recalling that Germany's jockeying for a place in the front rank of nations resulted in World War I.(66) Charles Krauthammer echoes that point, contending that China is "like late 19th-century Germany, a country growing too big and too strong for the continent it finds itself on."(67) Since Krauthammer and other analysts use the term "containment" to describe the policy they urge Washington to adopt toward China, it is the Cold War with the Soviet Union that is apparently seen as the model for the future Sino- American relationship. Strategist Graham Fuller predicts, for example, that China is "predisposed to a role as leader of the dispossessed states" in a new cold war that would pit an American-led West against an anti-status quo Third World bloc.(68) Although Krauthammer admits that China lacks the ideological appeal that the Soviet Union possessed (at least in the early stages of the Cold War), he assumes that, like the confrontation with the Soviet Union but unlike the British-German rivalry, the contest between America and China will remain "cold" and not escalate into a "hot" war. That optimism is crucial. Advocates of containment may be able to persuade a large number of Americans to adopt an anti-China strategy if the model is the tense but manageable Soviet-American rivalry. However, not many Americans are likely to embrace containment if the probable outcome is a bloody rerun of World War I--only this time possibly with nuclear weapons. The Cold War as a Dangerously Misleading Model Trying to use the paradigm of the Soviet-American rivalry to draw historical lessons and policy conclusions for dealing with China, however, is insidiously misleading. Even if one assumes that the Soviet Union did stand formally for the radical revision of the international status quo after the Bolshevik revolution, its conduct in the post-1945 era was less disruptive. It acted more as a "challenger," a global player committed to maintaining many features of the status quo while chafing at an American-dominated system. Moscow did challenge U.S. interests, but for the most part, it did so at the margins. Moreover, by the late 1970s the Soviet Union had become a "declining challenger" whose economic weakness, resulting from disastrous domestic policies and the failure to integrate into the world system, led eventually to its demise.(69) Current U.S. policymakers need to ask themselves whether China is an anti-status quo power, or even a "challenger" trying to harm core U.S. national interests, or a competitive player attempting to join the multipolar system and the global economy--more like post- Gorbachev Russia and less like the post-1917 or even post- 1945 Soviet Union. If China is a competitive player, a containment policy would be not only inappropriate but foolishly provocative. Indeed, if U.S. policymakers attempt to keep China from joining the ranks of the great powers, there is a high probability that Beijing will not become a "challenger" playing according to a set of international rules as the Soviet Union did during the Cold War. Instead, China may turn into an anti-status quo power similar to Germany in the pre-World War I era or, perhaps even more applicable, Japan on the eve of Pearl Harbor. "If you treat China as an enemy, China will become an enemy," warned Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye in July 1995.(70) Moreover, whereas the Germany of Kaiser Wilhelm II had strong lines of communication with Britain based on close political, economic, cultural, and even royal ties, China for most Americans, including many foreign policy experts, still remains an enigma, and the American political culture and policymaking process is misunderstood in Beijing. The potential for misconceptions and misperceptions in Sino-American relations, leading eventually to dangerous diplomatic and military crises that could be mismanaged, is significantly greater than that which existed in the pre-1914 German- British rivalry or even in the Soviet-American Cold War. The Last Pacific War--And the Next One? The historical analogy that may be most relevant to the long-term problems that American leaders face in dealing with China is the deterioration in Japanese-American relations in the 1930s. As journalist Jonathan Marshall says in a new study on the origins of the Pacific War, the conflict resulted in large part from the demand by the "have-not" power, Japan, to be recognized as the leading economic and military power in the Pacific and resistance by the principal status quo power, the United States (and its ally, Great Britain) to that demand. It was Japan's refusal to permit the United States and Britain to continue exercising total control over the mineral resources (including such industrial materials as rubber and tin) of Southeast Asia that was seen in Washington and London as a threat to the existing balance of power and was the main factor in the U.S. decision (which was made before Pearl Harbor) to go to war against Japan if Japanese expansionism continued. "The war was about much more than resources, of course," admits Marshall. The fact that the "have" nations represented a generally liberal order and Japan presented a militarist or totalitarian challenge gave the conflict "a deeply ideological cast." And such factors as cultural misconceptions and the personality traits of leaders also influenced the events leading to Pearl Harbor. But along with the contest of political philosophies and policy miscalculations was "a baser clash of power and interests, a struggle for economic hegemony over vast stretches of the world."(71) The violent struggle between "have" and "have-not" powers, between the United States and Japan and between Great Britain and Germany, was not inevitable. The way countries define their national interests affects the foreign policy process more than anything else. What is seen in retrospect as a tragedy, attributed to misunderstandings on all sides, a "March of Folly" to use Barbara Tuchman's term, was really the product of decisions and judgments motivated by self-interest and made by politicians, officials, lawmakers, experts, and journalists. The general public in Britain and the United States never fully comprehended that "national interest," as it was defined by the makers of foreign policy in Washington in the 1930s and in London in the first years of the 20th century, was based on the need to resist demands for changes in the international system--if need be by military force. Today, in the era of CNN-based public diplomacy, the American people have a better opportunity to determine the way the post-Cold War national interest in general and with regard to China in particular is defined. Like Americans who fought in World War II or the British who suffered the horrible consequences of the Great War, they will have to pay the high costs of policies for containing China, which are now being sketched in Washington. Conclusion: Living in Interesting, but Not Costly, Times China's emergence as a world power and its complex relationship with the United States are seen now by most Americans as quite relevant to the U.S. national interest. According to one recent study measuring public interest in international issues, in the last four years the number of people who believe that China is important to the vital interests of the United States has increased more than the number who believe any other country is important. Both opinion leaders and the general public believe that China's influence will grow dramatically over the next 10 years. More than half of the public and slightly less than half of the leaders believe that the emergence of China as a world power might be a "critical" threat to vital U.S. interests in the next decade. Heightened concern about China is further reflected by the fact that two-thirds of the public and more than four-fifths of the leaders believe that the United States should be spying on the Chinese government.(72) Unfortunately, despite heightened public interest in China, the fact that the two military and economic giants of the Pacific have been drifting apart has not received the attention it deserves in Washington, where the foreign policy debate has continued to be dominated by the civil war in Bosnia. Contributing to the lack of any comprehensive discussion of the Sino-American relationship has been the haphazard and crisis-oriented media coverage of the China story and the preoccupation with Beijing's human rights conduct. Consequently, most Americans are probably not aware of the potentially very high stakes involved in the Sino-American relationship. Indeed, the prospect the the United States might find itself drawn into a costly diplomatic and military conflict with China over the future of several tiny islands in the South China Sea or an escalation in tensions between Taipei and Beijing has not been considered by most Americans--who in all probability are not sure of the spelling of Spratly and are certainly not familiar with the distinctions between "Chinese" and "Taiwanese" nationalism. Yet China and the United States could drift toward a costly armed conflict if the containment strategy advocated by many first-term Republican members of Congress is adopted. Those Republicans propose a policy that is out of line with the aspirations of the American people and raises questions about the Republicans' commitment to the "populist" agenda they propagate. Indeed, a recent poll indicates that 71 percent of Americans do not think that the United States should defend Taiwan if China launches a military invasion.(73)

Containment Bad: Coop

Containment spurs anti-Americanism – prevents Chinese cooperation

Dorn 2k5

(James, Vice President at Cato for International Affairs, Professor of Economics at Towson University in Maryland, editor of the Cato Journal, Director of Cato’s annual monetary conference, Visiting Scholar at the Central European University in Prague and at Fudan University in Shanghai, Winter, “How to Improve US-China Relations in the Wake of CNOOC” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol XVII No 3)

Yes, U.S.- China relations are “complex,” but they have always been so. Allowing Congress to steer those relations only adds to the uncertainty and complexity. The United States needs a firm commitment to engagement, and China needs to adhere to “peaceful development.” Little will be gained by constantly treating China as a threat, on the basis of presumed intentions. At the same time, we must not underestimate the willingness of hardliners in the Chinese Communist Party—who have little regard for the rule of law and want to retain their monopoly on power—to revert to military means to achieve their ends, especially in the case of Taiwan. Consequently, we need to be realistic and cautious, but not unreasonable. The administration appears to be moving in that direction. In a pathbreaking speech to the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations in New York on September 21, Deputy Secretary of State Robert B. Zoellick avoided confrontation and instead called upon the PRC “to become a responsible stakeholder in the international system.”40 At the same time, the United States must recognize that China is a rising normal power and will pursue its own interests. As Liu Jianfei, a journalist with the China Daily, recently wrote: “Currently the biggest obstacle in Sino-U.S. ties comes from misgivings held by some Americans toward China and their Cold War mentality. If such an outdated view is overcome, the two nations can build a strategic mutual trust and open new cooperation in the future.”41 It is a grave mistake to use the national security card to deny Chinese firms the right to purchase natural resources in the open market when there is no credible security risk. Beijing will view such behavior as yet another attempt by the United States to widen its power at the expense of China’s development, further increasing anti-American sentiment. China’s thirst for oil and natural gas has driven world demand upward and increased prices, and that trend is likely to continue. Over time, production and consumption will respond to higher prices as producers search for new supplies and consumers conserve and switch to cheaper alternatives. If the U.S. government interferes with the market process, future production will suffer, and U.S. energy companies will find it more difficult to operate in foreign countries.

Containment Bad: Heg

Containment kills US hegemony

Hadar, Adjunct Scholar at the Cato Institute, ’96

(Leon, March 23, “Avoiding a Nasty Collision with China” Chicago Tribune, lexis)

But hard-line U.S. policies, based on the assumption that China poses strategic, economic and cultural threats, could create a tragic self- fulfilling prophecy. The influence of the China-bashers in Congress (which may become more pronounced if the Republicans capture the White House), interacting with the growing independence movement in Taiwan and the insecure and repressive leadership in Beijing, could produce a volatile and dangerous mixture that would pose serious risks to U.S. security and economic interests. It could even lead to a military crisis in East Asia. Indeed, recent tensions in the Taiwan Straits are an indication of trouble. China's extensive military exercises, including missile tests, in waters near Taiwan are a reaction by Beijing to signs that Washington, under the influence of lobbying by a more assertive Taipei and its supporters in Congress, may be abandoning its "one-China" policy and drifting toward the recognition of Taiwan's independence. The tough military posture is Beijing's signal to the White House to start taking China's warnings on Taiwan seriously. Washington's decision to respond to China's military maneuvers by sending the aircraft carrier Nimitz through the Taiwan Straits, and the harsh Chinese criticism of that move, demonstrate how Sino-American tensions could easily degenerate into an all-out military confrontation. Beijing's concern that the U.S. Congress may force the Clinton administration to abandon its policy of "strategic ambiguity" and side with the Philippines and Vietnam in their disputes with China over the oil-rich Spratly Islands in the South China Sea is another source of growing friction. Moreover, as part of an election strategy aimed at placating the powerful Democratic constituencies of big labor and Hollywood, and denying a campaign weapon to the GOP's economic nationalists, the Clintonites are toughening their trade policy against China, threatening to punish it with sanctions for its alleged piracy of American-made entertainment products and continuing to oppose its drive to join the World Trade Organization. Instead of mollifying the China-bashers, however, that hard-line trade posture is bound to play into the hands of the coalition of liberal human right activists and the conservative "America-firsters," who will try this year to annul China's most-favored-nation status and re-establish the links between its human rights conduct and U.S. trade policy. Taking place at the height of the post-Deng succession struggle, a coercive U.S. economic policy would only intensify fears in Beijing that Washington is trying to thwart China's emergence as a global power. That atmosphere would strengthen the position of the hard-liners. It would also spell the final collapse of Clinton's "comprehensive engagement" with China and create the environment for a new cold war, which is exactly what the China-bashers are hoping for. While the onset of Cold War II might serve the interests of economic nationalists and pro-Taiwan lobbyists, it runs contrary to overall American interests. It would lead to the diplomatic isolation of the United States in Asia, deny American consumers and businesses an opportunity to enjoy the fruits of the accelerating Chinese economic boom, bring about a major increase in U.S. military spending and threaten a war with China.

Nuclear war

Khalilzad ‘95

(Zalmay, US Ambassador to Iraq, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Islamic Outreach and Southwest Asia Initiatives, Director of the Strategy, Doctrine and Force Structure program for RAND's Project Air Force, Spring, “Losing the Moment” Washington Quarterly, lexis)

Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.

Containment Bad --> NW

Containment causes nuclear war

Eland, Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace and Liberty at the Independent Institute, ’05

(Ian, April 11, “Coexisting With a Rising China” http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=1494)

Instead of emulating the policies of pre-World War I Britain toward Germany, the United States should take a page from another chapter in British history. In the late 1800s, although not without tension, the British peacefully allowed the fledging United States to rise as a great power, knowing both countries were protected by the expanse of the Atlantic Ocean that separated them. Taking advantage of that same kind separation by a major ocean, the United States could also safely allow China to obtain respect as a great power, with a sphere of influence to match. If China went beyond obtaining a reasonable sphere of influence into an Imperial Japanese-style expansion, the United States could very well need to mount a challenge. However, at present, little evidence exists of Chinese intent for such expansion, which would run counter to recent Chinese history. Therefore, a U.S. policy of coexistence, rather than neo-containment, might avoid a future catastrophic war or even a nuclear conflagration.

Status quo military presence is geared towards Chinese containment --- this causes Asian warf and a Sino Taiwan conflict

Klare 2k6

(Michael, professor of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College, “Containing China: The US's real objective”, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/HD20Ad01.html//da>: 7/27)

Accompanying all these diplomatic initiatives has been a vigorous, if largely unheralded, effort by the Department of Defense (DoD) to bolster US military capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region. The broad sweep of US strategy was first spelled out in the Pentagon's most recent policy assessment, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), released on February 5. In discussing long-term threats to US security, the QDR begins with a reaffirmation of the overarching precept first articulated in the DPG of 1992: that the United States will not allow the rise of a competing superpower. This country "will attempt to dissuade any military competitor from developing disruptive or other capabilities that could enable regional hegemony or hostile action against the United States", the document states. It then identifies China as the most likely and dangerous competitor of this sort. "Of the major and emerging powers, China has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States and field disruptive military technologies that could over time offset traditional US military advantages" - then adding the kicker - "absent US counter-strategies." According to the Pentagon, the task of countering future Chinese military capabilities largely entails the development, and then procurement, of major weapons systems that would ensure US success in any full-scale military confrontation. "The United States will develop capabilities that would present any adversary with complex and multidimensional challenges and complicate its offensive planning efforts," the QDR explains. These include the steady enhancement of such "enduring US advantages" as "long-range strike, stealth, operational maneuver and sustainment of air, sea and ground forces at strategic distances, air dominance, and undersea warfare". Preparing for war with China, in other words, is to be the future cash cow for the giant US weapons-making corporations in the military-industrial complex. It will, for instance, be the primary justification for the acquisition of costly new weapons systems such as the F-22A Raptor fighter, the multi-service Joint Strike Fighter, the DDX destroyer, the Virginia-class nuclear attack submarine, and a new intercontinental penetrating bomber - weapons that would just have utility in an all-out encounter with another great-power adversary of a sort that only China might someday become. In addition to these weapons programs, the QDR also calls for a stiffening of present US combat forces in Asia and the Pacific, with a particular emphasis on the US Navy (the arm of the military least used in the ongoing occupation of and war in Iraq). "The fleet will have a greater presence in the Pacific Ocean," the document notes. To achieve this, "The navy plans to adjust its force posture and basing to provide at least six operationally available and sustainable [aircraft] carriers and 60% of its submarines in the Pacific to support engagement, presence and deterrence." Since each of these carriers is, in fact, but the core of a large array of support ships and protective aircraft, this move is sure to entail a truly vast buildup of US naval capabilities in the Western Pacific and will certainly necessitate a substantial expansion of the US basing complex in the region - a requirement that is already receiving close attention from Admiral Fallon and his staff at PACOM. To assess the operational demands of this buildup, moreover, this summer the US Navy will conduct its most extensive military maneuvers in the Western Pacific since the end of the Vietnam War, with four aircraft-carrier battle groups and many support ships expected to participate. Add all of this together, and the resulting strategy cannot be viewed as anything but a systematic campaign of containment. No high administration official may say this in so many words, but it is impossible to interpret the recent moves of Rice and Rumsfeld in any other manner. From Beijing's perspective, the reality must be unmistakable: a steady buildup of US military power along China's eastern, southern and western boundaries. How will China respond to this threat? For now, it appears to be relying on charm and the conspicuous blandishment of economic benefits to loosen Australian, South Korean, and even Indian ties with the United States. To a certain extent, this strategy is meeting with success, as these countries seek to profit from the extraordinary economic boom now under way in China - fueled to a considerable extent by oil, gas, iron, timber, and other materials supplied by China's neighbors in Asia. A version of this strategy is also being employed by President Hu Jintao during his current visit to the United States. As China's money is sprinkled liberally among such influential firms as Boeing and Microsoft, Hu is reminding the corporate wing of the Republican Party that there are vast economic benefits still to be had by pursuing a non-threatening stance toward China. China, however, has always **responded to perceived threats of encirclement in a vigorous and muscular fashion** as well, and so we should assume that Beijing will balance all that charm with a military buildup of its own. Such a drive will not bring China to the brink of military equality with the United States - that is not a condition it can realistically aspire to over the next few decades. But it will provide further justification for those in the United States who seek to accelerate the containment of China, and so will **produce a self-fulfilling loop of distrust, competition and crisis.** This will make **the amicable long-term settlement of the Taiwan problem** and of North Korea's nuclear program that much more difficult, and increase **the risk of unintended escalation to full-scale war in Asia**. There can be no victors from such a conflagration.

Engagement Good: Nationalism

Lack of engagement emboldens nationalism

Fewsmith, Professor of IR and Director of East Asian Studies Program at Boston, 4-25-1 (Joseph, “Before The House Committee On International Relations Subcommittee On East Asia And The Pacific,” Federal News Service)

This last point raises one further issue that is of critical importance: Confrontation is good for nationalism. Last year, during the debate over PNTR, many were worded that giving up the annual approval of MFN (later NTR) would be giving up leverage over China's human rights situation. The problem was that this so-called leverage was, in fact, negative leverage. As mentioned above, this was one of the issues that contributed to Chinese nationalism. The danger that the United States faces is that in trying to bring about a more democratic China, we in fact create a more hostile one. The problem, as suggested above, is not just that international tension reinforces popular nationalism but that those members of the political elite, both civilian and military, who are most opposed to various types of reform are strengthened. The fact of the matter is that a tense relationship between the United States and China inevitably weakens those we should be trying to support and strengthens those we should be trying to undermine. This makes devising policy difficult and sometimes unsatisfying, but it is a truth that we must face more squarely than we have. The conclusion is that China is in the middle of a complex transition that is necessarily messy. Negative trends and events coexist with positive trends and events. There is no reason to believe that China will solve its problems (economic, social, or political) in a short period of time. On the contrary, there will be real difficulties in Chinese society, particularly as China experiences further dislocations associated with its entry into the WTO. This does not mean that progress is not being made; it simply means that there is a very long way to go. It is difficult to counsel patience at a time when passions are aroused over an incident such as we have recently experienced off of Hainan Island. Yet understanding of the enormity of China's transition requires appreciation of the time it will take. Patience, of course, does not mean acquiescence. The United States can and should set out expectations, as it has in its negotiations over China's accession to the WTO and other issues. But demands that China change immediately, or worse, efforts to "contain" China will clearly invoke a nationalistic backlash in China that will only make its transition more difficult, more costly, and more dangerous for the United States and the countries in the region.

Upswing In Popular Nationalism Forces Hu To Take A Harder Line, Risks War With The U.S.

Gries 2k4

(Peter Hays Greis, Political Science, University of Colorado-Boulder, China’s New Nationalism, 2004, p. 136-137)

Awareness of the ways Chinese nationalism engages with other nations and the ways it narrates the past reveals how it is shaped by the passions of the Chinese people. Thus, awareness of these factors forces a revision of the mainstream view that Chinese nationalism is a tool fo the elite: that with the slow death of communist ideology, the Community Party forments nationalism to legitimize its rule, In my discussion of China’s apolitical diplomacy in chapter 5, I addressed the ways nationalism implicates our identities and emotions and argued that it should never be reduced to simply an instrument or tool used to maintain political legitimacy. The ways nationalism emerges out of interaction correspond to the ways we as individuals interact with others. To the extent that we identify with a group, our personal self-esteem is tied to its fate. We want our groups to be seen as good. Perceived slights to our groups are frequently met with anger and resistance. National identities are no different. Nationalists are frequently motivated to save national face or preserve national self-esteem. Many Chinese understood the 1999 bombing of the Chiense embassy in Belgrade and the 2001 spy plane collision as American assaults on Chinese dignity. Little wonder that they were angry and sought to restore their self-respect as Chinese by denouncing the United States, Such passionate responses account for the increasingly vital role popular nationalists are playing in regime legitimation in China today, as I argued in chapter 7. Hence Chinese nationalism is not an exclusively elite, top-down phenomenon,. The Communist Party has lost its hegemony over Chinese nationalist discourse. Popular nationalists now ocmmand a large following and exert tremendous pressure on those who decide the PRC’s foreign policy. In fact, the legitimacy of the current regime depends upon its abilty to stay on top of popular nationalist demands. [137] These arguments about Chinese nationalism might help answer the pressing question of what China policy American should pursue at the onset of the twenty-first century. China policy debate in the United States is driven, as political scientist Robert Ross has noted, by “diametrically opposed understandings of Chinese intentions.” Conservative hawks and liberal human rights advocates frequently invoke the image of China as the last “Red Menace” to advocate a policy of containment or even confrontation with China. In contrast, conservative business interests seeking increased trade with China and liberals with vision of a “global village” led by America depict China as a staus quo power to promote a policy of engagement. In the end, both views tell us more about American politics and ideology than they do about China’s own foreign policy goals and motivations. That China policy debate has become so polarized is potentially disastrous. Rather than taking stock of how those who determine Chinese foreign policy might be affected both by the policies of other states and by emotional investment in the nation, analysts are tempted to infer Chinese intentions from Chinese capabilities alone. China bashers thus rant away, oblivious to the impact that their words and deeds have on Chinese nationalists, who (not surprisingly) respond with equally virulent America bashing. Such diatribes feed off of one another, eroding the trust that binds the U.S.-China relationship. Even more ominiously, hard-liners on both sides, seeking to save face, advocate “demonstrations of resolve,” increasing the likelihood that the U.S.-China conflict they predict will come to pass.

Engagement Good: Regime Collapse

Engagement critical to preventing conservative backlash that undermines reforms which collapse the regime

Economy, Director of Asia Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, 4 (Elizabeth, “DON'T Break The Engagement,” Foreign Affairs, May / June)

After almost three years of calm, the American debate over China policy is set to heat up again. Like Bill Clinton, George W. Bush came into office pushing for a tougher approach to Beijing. And like his predecessor, Bush soon changed his tune. But if the Clinton administration's shift reflected a deep-rooted embrace of the logic of engagement, the Bush administration's shift has appeared more tactical, reflecting a realist appreciation for alliances of convenience during times of crisis. Now that the initial and most urgent phases of the war on terrorism have passed, China policy is likely to find its way back onto the agenda of hard-liners who consider the country a strategic competitor. They are likely to be joined by those who think that tough talk about trade deficits and China's human rights violations makes for good campaign politics. With the bilateral trade deficit now at $120 billion, Beijing's reported backsliding on human rights, and its heavy-handed diplomacy with Hong Kong and Taiwan, 2004 could be a banner year for the critics of engagement. Yet a return to China-bashing and to a strategy of containment would be a mistake. The past 30 years have demonstrated that engagement works -- if not exactly in the way its advocates predicted. Supporters of engagement long argued that it would help tame China through a traditional pattern of modernization: economic growth and increased connection with the outside world would spur the development of a Chinese middle class that would in turn press for capitalism, democracy, and peace. But in fact, although China has gotten richer, economic reforms have not led directly to political ones. Economic liberalization is indeed breeding a middle class with a new set of demands, including protection of private assets, access to unfiltered information, and a greater political voice. So far, however, the middle class has not organized in any meaningful way to push for wholesale political change. Instead, that change is occurring primarily in response to the negative effects of China's market transition. For the past several decades, as China's leaders have banked on the country's striking economic success to legitimize their leadership, they have ignored the political and institutional changes necessary to ensure that markets function smoothly and transparently and that the social challenges arising from economic reform are addressed effectively. The result has been a dramatic rise in corruption and the decline of the country's social welfare system, which together have bred widespread popular discontent and undermined the legitimacy of the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP). China's leaders recognize that they must assuage this discontent in order to survive. They have responded by adopting a strategy of political reform that harks back to Deng Xiaoping's approach to economic reform a generation ago: decentralization, experimentation, and opening up to the outside world. President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao are trying to enhance the efficiency of the system by establishing new political processes and institutions, inviting domestic and foreign experts into the process, and permitting local experiments to test what does and does not work. In so doing, Hu and Wen have unleashed great popular expectations. Wide swaths of society -- including journalists, lawyers, property owners, environmentalists, and intellectuals -- are pushing for more reforms. At the same time, a strong current of resistance has developed within the CCP itself, which is fearful of losing its power. Even reform-minded party members are wary of pushing too far too fast and incurring social instability or a conservative backlash. Since a gradual and benign transformation of China's authoritarian regime is in everyone's interest, the policy message for the United States is clear: stay the course of engagement and do what can be done to make economic and political liberalization succeed. U.S. policy cannot drive change in China by itself, but it can help provide the most supportive international context in which such change will thrive.

1 Billion Die

San Renxing, journalist, “CCP Gambles Insanely to Avoid Death,” EPOCH TIMES, August 3, 2005, [www.theepochtimes.com/news/5-8-3/30931.html](http://www.theepochtimes.com/news/5-8-3/30931.html) //da: 7/31)

Since the Party’s life is “above all else,” it would not be surprising if the CCP resorts to the use of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons in its attempt to postpone its life. The CCP, that disregards human life, would not hesitate to kill two hundred million Americans, coupled with seven or eight hundred million Chinese, to achieve its ends. The “speech,” free of all disguises, lets the public see the CCP for what it really is: with evil filling its every cell, the CCP intends to fight all of ~~mankind~~ in its desperate attempt to cling to life. And that is the theme of the “speech.” The theme is murderous and utterly evil. We did witness in China beggars who demanded money from people by threatening to stab themselves with knives or prick their throats on long nails. But we have never, until now, seen a rogue who blackmails the world to die with it by wielding biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Anyhow, the bloody confession affirmed the CCP’s bloodiness: a monstrous murderer, who has killed 80 million Chinese people, now plans to hold one billion people hostage and gamble with their lives. As the CCP is known to be a clique with a closed system, it is extraordinary for it to reveal its top secret on its own. One might ask: what is the CCP’s purpose to make public its gambling plan on its deathbed? The answer is: the “speech” would have the effect of killing three birds with one stone. Its intentions are the following: Expressing the CCP’s resolve that it “not be buried by either heaven or earth” (direct quote from the “speech”). But then, isn’t the CCP opposed to the universe if it claims not to be buried by heaven and earth? Feeling the urgent need to harden its image as a soft egg in the face of the Nine Commentaries. Preparing publicity for its final battle with mankind by threatening war and trumpeting violence. So, strictly speaking, what the CCP has leaked out is more of an attempt to clutch at straws to save its life rather than to launch a trial balloon. Of course, the way the “speech” was presented had been carefully prepared. It did not have a usual opening or ending, and the audience, time, place, and background related to the “speech” were all kept unidentified. One may speculate or imagine as one may, but never verify. The aim was obviously to create a mysterious setting. In short, the “speech” came out as something one finds difficult to tell whether it is false or true.