# BMD Aff – 2 Week

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## Rogue States Advantage – Iran Style (1/9)

### Advantage \_: Iran

### Iran developing space-based missiles

Richardson '7 (Doug Richardson, editor of defense journal Jane's Missiles and Rockets, “Iran: Defense Expert Discusses Iran's Missile Capabilities”, Radio Free Europe Radio Libert, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1076911.html)

In order to get to Moscow you would have to get a missile of 2,000 kilometers range. We hear rumors of such developments from Iran but nothing very firm. We honestly don't have any real hard information on Iran's future missile plans, we've heard talk of something allegedly called the Shahab-3B; the story is rather vague. The reports talked about 2,000-2,500-kilometer range. There've been reports [about] Shahab-4 [but] the Iranians have said there is no such thing as Shahab-4. We have seen some pronouncement that there is a Shahab-4 but it's not a missile, **it's going to be a satellite-launch vehicle.** So there's just no hard information. We know they are doing a lot of rocket development work, 2,500 would not quite get you to Rome, it would probably get you to Zagreb, Budapest, you'd get most of Slovakia, it would get you a bit into the Czech Republic [and] up to Warsaw, Minsk, and not quite St. Petersburg.

### Iran has Nuclear Weapons

Newsmax '10 (Ken Timmerman, Staff Writer, “Iran Admits it Could Pull Nuke Trigger on US”, October 5, 2010, <http://www.newsmax.com/Headline/iran-nuclear-weapons-israel/2010/10/05/id/372644>)

For the first time since the expansion of Iran’s nuclear program was exposed in 2002, the Iranian government is dropping the pretense that it is developing nuclear technology purely for peaceful purposes. **Iran has developed nuclear war plans to deter U.S. and Israeli aggression and retaliate against it**, a top adviser to Defense Minister Ahmad Vahidi announced in a strategic analysis. Defense Ministry analyst Alireza Saeidabadi’s detailed analysis, published last week on a website that Iran’s intelligence ministry runs, examines several scenarios in which Iran could become embroiled in a shooting war with the United States or Israel. One of the scenarios Iranian military planners must consider is a strategic nuclear U.S. strike on Iran, he writes. If that occurred, Iranian planning documents call for attacks against U.S. interests “on the world stage,” his analysis says. The Iranian military should “prioritize its air force and ballistic missile fleet” in dealing with a conventional attack from Israel, Saeidabadi writes. But in the event Israel uses unconventional weapons against Iran, “then **Iran should employ a nuclear strategy**.” Similarly, if Iran and the United States get engaged in naval clashes in the Persian Gulf, Iran should “use its sea power for hit-and-run attacks, commando attacks, and use anti-shipping missiles” against U.S. naval vessels. “**But if the United States launches an unconventional attack, Iran needs to respond with a nuclear strategy,” the Iranian defense ministry analyst contends.**

Rogue States Advantage – Iran Style (2/9)

### Four internal links to Iranian nuclear missile impacts –

### 1. Iranian Missiles can reach Europe – distances prove

Richardson '7 (Doug Richardson, editor of defense journal Jane's Missiles and Rockets, “Iran: Defense Expert Discusses Iran's Missile Capabilities”, Radio Free Europe Radio Libert, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1076911.html)

They do have a capability to hit some of Eastern Europe and southern Russia but not particularly deep into those countries. Obviously, we don't have very solid information on Iran's missiles, they don't release a lot of information but we think that their Shahab-3 has got a range about 1,300 kilometers while it's improved the version of Shahab-3A, it's stretched its length to get some more fuel into the tanks and they've cut the weight of the warhead by more than half; **we think that can do up to 1,800 kilometers**. Now if you look at the map of Europe, Volgograd is 1,100 kilometers from Iran and certainly Volgograd was in Europe the last time I looked. That sort of narrow range would get you just about to Istanbul; there's certainly no argument that bit of Turkey is in Europe, that's about 1,400 kilometers from just inside the Iranian border. If you move to the longer-range figure (1,800 kilometers), then you get more cities of East Europe starting to come into range. Eighteen hundred [kilometers] will give you Iran to Kyiv, just about Iran to Athens, I suspect, Iran to Bucharest.

### Hundreds of Iranian Missiles ready to be shot at Europe – Secretary of Defense Robert Gates statement

Mail Online '10 (Mail Foreign Service, “Europe could face hundreds of missiles in Iran attack, U.S. Defence Secretary warns”, June 18th, 2010, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1287651/Iran-capable-firing-hundreds-missiles-Europe-warn-U-S.html>)

I**ran could shower Europe with ‘scores or even hundreds’ of missiles in a single attack, America’s defence secretary warned today.** Robert Gates said U.S. intelligence units have reported a growing threat in Iran’s ballistic missile capability. Today, Mr Gates said: ‘One of the elements of the intelligence that contributed to the decision on the phased adaptive array (approach) was the realisation that if Iran were actually to launch a missile attack on Europe, it wouldn't be just one or two missiles, or a handful. ‘It would more likely be a salvo kind of attack, where **you would be dealing potentially with scores or even hundreds of missiles.’**

### Insert generic Europe Nuclear War Impact here

Rogue States Advantage – Iran Style (3/9)

### 2. Iran has all intention to attack the US – recent tests

Newsmax '8 (Kenneth R. Timmerman, Staff Writer, “U.S. Intel: Iran Plans Nuclear Strike on U.S.”, July 29th 2008, <http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/iran-nuclear-plan/2008/07/29/id/324724#ixzz1O4Ro0WKT>)

Iran has carried out missile tests for **what could be a plan for a nuclear strike** on the United States, the head of a national security panel has warned. In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee and in remarks to a private conference on missile defense over the weekend hosted by the Claremont Institute, Dr. William Graham warned that the U.S. intelligence community “doesn’t have a story” to explain the recent Iranian tests.

### One nuclear missile strike on the US leads to extinction – Economic, Infrastructure, Transportation collapsed

Lambakis '7 (Steven Lambakis, National Security and International Affairs Analyst specializing in Space Power policy studies, “Missile Defense From Space”, Policy Review, No. 141, February & March 2007,

<http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/5516446.html>)

Now just imagine the costs imposed by a ballistic missile nuclear strike against a U.S. city. The economic toll from a single nuclear attack against a major city, which would involve extensive decontamination activities and impact the national economy, could rise above $4 trillion. The economy could also be devastated by the electromagnetic pulse generated by a high-altitude nuclear explosion. The resulting electromagnetic shock would fry transformers within regional electrical power grids. The interdependent telecommunications (including computers), transportation, and banking and financial infrastructures that people and businesses rely on would be significantly damaged. Such an event would leave us, in some cases, with nineteenth-century technologies. **This situation could jeopardize the very viability of society** and the survival of the nation. Moreover, the paralysis leaders would experience would leave the country and its allies exposed to highly lethal twenty-first century threats. The blackmail possibilities of these weapons are as mind-numbing as they are terrifying.

Rogue States Advantage – Iran Style (4/9)

### 3. Iran wants to nuke Israel – Iran clearly wants

Bard '11 (Dr. Mitchell Bard, Executive Director of the nonprofit American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise, Policy Analyst, “Potential Threats to Israel: Iran”, June 27th, 2011,

<http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Threats_to_Israel/Iran.html>)

"The only way to confront the Zionist enemy is the continuation and fortification of resistance and Jihad," Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was quoted as saying September 3, 2005, in a meeting with the militant group Islamic Jihad's secretary general Ramazan Abdullah (AFP, September 3, 2005). In October 2005, recently elected President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad quoted Ayatollah Khomeini and declared, **“As the Imam said, Israel must be wiped off the map.”** The president added: “And God willing, with the force of God behind it, **we shall soon experience a world without the United States and Zionism”** (AP, October 26, 2005). President Bush said February 16, 2005, “Iran has made it clear that they don't like Israel, to put it bluntly. And the Israelis are concerned about whether or not Iran develops a nuclear weapon, as are we, as should everybody....Clearly, if I was the leader of Israel, and I listened to some of the statements by the Iranian ayatollahs that regarded my security of my country, I'd be concerned about Iran having a nuclear weapon, as well. And in that Israel is our ally, and in that we've made a very strong commitment to support Israel, we will support Israel if their security is threatened.” Iran's nonconventional weapons are not a threat only toward Israel, they also pose a danger to the United States and its interests around the world. And the American people recognize this danger. According to a January 2006 Gallup poll, 19% of Americans see Iran as an immediate threat to the United States and another 65% said Iran is a long-term threat.

### MAD does not apply to Iran – they believe the end will come anyways

Bard '11 (Dr. Mitchell Bard, Executive Director of the nonprofit American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise, Policy Analyst, “Potential Threats to Israel: Iran”, June 27th, 2011,

<http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Threats_to_Israel/Iran.html>)

Iran would never launch a nuclear attack against Israel, some argue because, as the old Sting song used to say about the Russians, the Iranians “love their children too.” In the days of the Cold War we used to refer to this idea as MAD or Mutually Assured Destruction. No Muslim leader would risk an Israeli counterstrike that might destroy them. **MAD also doesn’t work, however, if the Iranians believe there will be destruction anyway at the end of time.** What matters, Bernard Lewis observed, is if the infidels go to hell and believers go to heaven. And if you believe that killing the nonbelievers will earn you a place in Paradise with 72 virgins, what difference does it make if you go out in a blaze of glory as a suicide bomber or in the shadow of a mushroom cloud?

Rogue States Advantage – Iran Style (5/9)

### 4. Iran Proliferating to other Muslim Countries – leading to middle east arms race

Bard '11 (Dr. Mitchell Bard, Executive Director of the nonprofit American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise, Policy Analyst, “Potential Threats to Israel: Iran”, June 27th, 2011,

<http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Threats_to_Israel/Iran.html>)

If Iran has nuclear weapons it can also pose an indirect threat by sharing the technology or an actual weapon with other Muslim countries or terrorists. Iran is a signatory to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which allows the peaceful pursuit of nuclear technology, including uranium mining and enrichment, under oversight by the IAEA, but Ahmadinejad raised worldwide concern about nuclear proliferation when he told the UN General Assembly in September 2005, “ Iran is ready to transfer nuclear know-how to the Islamic countries due to their need.” Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, repeated the proliferation threat several months later when he told the president of Sudan, “Iran’s nuclear capability is one example of various scientific capabilities in the country....**The Islamic Republic of Iran is prepared to transfer the experience, knowledge and technology of its scientists**.” If Iran succeeds in getting a bomb, it will also **create a potential arms race as Arab states** see the need to obtain weapons to deter the Iranians. In fact, since 2006, 12 Middle East countries (Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey, Syria, Yemen, Iraq, Libya, and the Gulf Cooperation Council) have either announced plans to explore atomic energy or signed nuclear cooperation agreements. All say they are only interested in peaceful uses of nuclear technology, but the fear is that some or all may follow the Iranian example and work toward building a bomb.

Rogue States Advantage – Iran Style (6/9)

### Many extremist Muslims believe in wiping Israel off the map

Bard '11 (Dr. Mitchell Bard, Executive Director of the nonprofit American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise, Policy Analyst, “Potential Threats to Israel: Iran”, June 27th, 2011,

<http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Threats_to_Israel/Iran.html>)

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad believes the most important task of the Iranian Revolution was to prepare the way for the return of the Twelfth Imam, who disappeared in 874, bringing an end to Muhammad’s lineage. This imam, the Mahdi or “divinely guided one,” Shiites believe, will return in an apocalyptic battle in which the forces of righteousness will defeat the forces of evil and bring about a new era in which Islam ultimately becomes the dominant religion throughout the world. The Shiites have been waiting patiently for the Twelfth Imam for more than a thousand years, but **Ahmadinejad believes he can now hasten the return through a nuclear war**. Ayatollah Hussein Nuri Hamdani explicitly said in 2005 that “the Jews should be fought against and forced to surrender to prepare the way for the coming of the Hidden Imam.” It is this apocalyptic world view, Middle East scholar Bernard Lewis notes, that distinguishes Iran from other governments with nuclear weapons. Lewis quotes a passage from Ayatollah Khomeini cited in an 11th grade Iranian schoolbook, “I am decisively announcing to the whole world that if the world-devourers [the infidel powers] wish to stand against our religion, we will stand against the whole world and will not cease until the annihilation of all of them. Either we all become free, or we will go to the greater freedom, which is martyrdom. Either we shake one another’s hands in joy at the victory of Islam in the world, or all of us will turn to eternal life and martyrdom. In both cases, victory and success are ours.” There are those who think that Muslims would never use such weapons against Israel because innocent Muslims would be killed as well, but Saddam Hussein did not hesitate to use poison gas on his own people. During the war in Lebanon in 2006, Hezbollah did not worry that rocketing cities with large Arab populations such as Haifa and Nazareth would kill non-Jews (and 24 of the 52 Israeli casualties were non-Jews). Muslims murder each other every day in post-Saddam Iraq. And Iran fought a ten-year war with Iraq in which as many as one million Muslims were killed. Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani explicitly said he wasn’t concerned about fallout from an attack on Israel. “If a day comes when the world of Islam is duly equipped with the arms Israel has in possession,” he said “the strategy of colonialism would face a stalemate because application of an atomic bomb would not leave any thing in Israel but the same thing would just produce damages in the Muslim world.” As even one Iranian commentator noted, Rafsanjani apparently wasn’t concerned that “the destruction of the Jewish State would also means the mass killing of the Palestinian population as well.”

Rogue States Advantage – Iran Style (7/9)

### Iranian War causes extinction

Hirsch 6' (Jorge Hirsch, a professor of physics at the University of California San Diego. He is one of the originators of the physicists' petition on nuclear weapons policies started at the UCSD, 1/3/2006, America's nuclear ticking bomb, http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20060103/news\_mz1e3hirsch.html)

If only conventional bombs are used in an unprovoked U.S. or Israeli aerial attack against Iran's facilities, Iran is likely to retaliate with missiles against coalition forces in Iraq and against Israel, as well as possibly a ground invasion of southern Iraq, that the 150,000 U.S. troops in Iraq would not be able to withstand. Iranian missiles could potentially contain chemical warheads, and it certainly would be impossible to rule out such possibility. Iran has signed and ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (in 1993 and 1997 respectively), however it is still likely to have supplies, as determined by the U.S. State Department in August 2005. Early use by the United States of low-yield nuclear bombs with better bunker-busting ability than conventional bombs targeting Iranian nuclear, chemical and missile installations would be consistent with the new U.S. nuclear weapons doctrine and could be argued to be necessary to protect the lives of 150,000 U.S. soldiers in Iraq and of Israeli citizens. It would also send a clear message to Iran that any response would be answered by a far more devastating nuclear attack, thus potentially saving both American and Iranian lives. However, the nuclear threshold is a line of no return. Once the United States uses a nuclear weapon against a nonnuclear adversary, the 182 countries that are signatories of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty will rightly feel at risk, and many of them will rush to develop their own nuclear deterrent while they can. A new world with many more nuclear countries, and **a high risk of any regional conflict exploding into all-out nuclear war, will be the consequence**. The scientific community (which created nuclear weapons) is alarmed over the new U.S. nuclear weapons policies. A petition to reverse these policies launched by physicists at the University of California San Diego has gathered over 1,500 physicists' signatures including eight Nobel laureates and many prominent members of the U.S. scientific establishment (http://physics.ucsd.edu/petition/). Scientists object strongly to the concept of WMD, that lumps together nuclear weapons with other "weapons of mass destruction" and blurs the sharp line that separates immensely more destructive nuclear weapons from all other weapons. An escalating nuclear war could lead to the destruction of civilization. There is no fundamental difference between small nuclear bombs and large ones, nor between nuclear bombs targeting underground installations versus those targeting cities or armies.

Rogue States Advantage – Iran Style (8/9)

### Only Space BMD Solves –

### Traditional missile defense insufficient – Ship based launches bypass

Newsmax '8 (Kenneth R. Timmerman, Staff Writer, “U.S. Intel: Iran Plans Nuclear Strike on U.S.”, July 29th 2008, <http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/iran-nuclear-plan/2008/07/29/id/324724#ixzz1O4Ro0WKT>)

One group of tests that troubled Graham, the former White House science adviser under President Ronald Reagan, **were successful efforts to launch a Scud missile from a platform in the Caspian Sea.** “They’ve got [test] ranges in Iran which are more than long enough to handle Scud launches and even Shahab-3 launches,” Dr. Graham said. “Why would they be launching from the surface of the Caspian Sea? They obviously have not explained that to us.” Another troubling group of tests involved Shahab-3 launches where the Iranians "detonated the warhead near apogee, not over the target area where the thing would eventually land, but at altitude,” Graham said. “Why would they do that?” Graham chairs the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack, a blue-ribbon panel established by Congress in 2001. The commission examined the Iranian tests “and without too much effort connected the dots,” even though the U.S. intelligence community previously had failed to do so, Graham said. “The only plausible explanation we can find is that the **Iranians are figuring out how to launch a missile from a ship and get it up to altitude and then detonate it,**” he said. “And that’s exactly what you would do if you had a **nuclear weapon** on a Scud or a Shahab-3 or other missile, and you wanted to **explode it over the United States.**” The commission warned in a report issued in April that the **United States was at risk of a sneak nuclear attack by a rogue nation** or a **terrorist group** designed to take out our nation’s critical infrastructure.

Rogue States Advantage – Iran Style (9/9)

### Space BMD only solution to cover Iran – truly global in nature

Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis '6 (Independent Working Group, “Missile Defense, the Space Relationship, & the Twenty-First Century”, http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/IWGreport.pdf)

Other things being equal, it is preferable to intercept threatening ballistic missiles as far away from their intended targets as possible and as early in their flight trajectory as possible. Best of all would be to have the capability to destroy an attacking missile shortly after it is launched, while its rockets still burn and any perturbation will lead to its destruction -- with, in many cases, the debris falling back onto the area where the attack was launched in the first place. The capability to interdict a missile and its warheads in any phases of their flight (boost, midcourse, and terminal) requires an ability to detect and intercept the attack within a very few minutes and to track and destroy the attacking missile and its warheads during their longer **midcourse traverse through space** before they begin to re­enter the atmosphere so that the debris will burn up on reentry. Finally, the last ditch defense would be to destroy the attacking missile as they reenter and pass through the atmosphere in the terminal phase enroute to their target. The best defense capability would be layered so that it could provide o­pportunities for destruction in all three phases of flight. **Only space-based defenses inherently have this global capa­bility and permanence.** While sea-based defenses can move free­ly through the two-thirds of the earth's surface that are oceans, their capability is limited by geography and by the specific operations of the fleet -- including where the sea-based missile defense happens to be deployed at any given time, and how quick­ly it could be redeployed to meet a crisis situation. Air-based and ground-based defenses, meanwhile, can have global capa­bilities, but **frequently take considerable time to deploy** when and where needed and are also dependent on the cooperation of U.S. friends and allies in permitting the necessary support­ing activities on their territories. Thus, **only a space-based missile defense will possess both constancy and global availability**, irrespective of allied support and agreement. As such, **space-based missile defense constitutes the only truly global system, with all the rest being either "regional" or "local."**

## Advantage: Space BMD’s Capable of Shooting Down EMP 1/6

### EMPs collapse all US electronics by hitting the grid—causes tech failure

Cooper and Pfaltzgraff ’10 (Henry F. Cooper and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Chairman of High Frontier and Professor of international security studies at Tufts University, 2010, International Foreign Policy Institute, Countering the EMP threat the role of missile defense,

<http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/IWGWhitePaper.pdf>)

The destruction and mayhem caused by an EMP explosion would be far more substantial today given the ubiquity of more fragile electronics and our greater reliance on them to run critical infrastructures. More­over, an EMP burst could directly affect the 3,000 commercial and mil­itary flights airborne over the United States at any given time, possibly causing them to crash. Most of those aircraft, equipped with electron­ic-interface fly-by-wire control systems, would become unguided mis­siles, plummeting to Earth and leading to many thousands of fatalities and enormous physical damage. Such a weapon need not be detonated directly over the United States itself to produce major damage to America’s critical infrastruc­tures such as telecommunications, banking and finance, fuel/energy, transportation, food and water supply, emergency services, govern­ment activities, and space systems. U.S. satellites, both civilian and military, are vulnerable to a range of attacks that include EMP, espe­cially in low-Earth orbits. Again, as the EMP Commission concluded, “The national security and homeland security communities use com­mercial satellites for critical activities, including direct and backup communications, emergency response services, and continuity of op­erations during emergencies.” Such satellites could be disabled by col­lateral radiation effects from an EMP attack on ground targets. Thus, it is obvious that an EMP attack would have cascading ef­fects. Disabling even one of the elements of our critical infrastructure, such as telecommunications or electricity, would have severe conse­quences for others – effects from which an advanced, technologically dependent society such as the United States might not easily recover.

Advantage: Space BMD’s capable of Shooting Down EMP 2/6

### EMPs devastate and Space BMD solves—prevents US technological devolution and econ collapse

Kennedy ‘8 (Brian T Kennedy, President of Claremont Institute, 2008 Novemeber 24, Wall Street Journal, “What a Single Nuclear Warhead Could Do”, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122748923919852015.html)

Think about this scenario: An ordinary-looking freighter ship heading toward New York or Los Angeles launches a missile from its hull or from a canister lowered into the sea. It hits a densely populated area. A million people are incinerated. The ship is then sunk. No one claims responsibility. There is no firm evidence as to who sponsored the attack, and thus no one against whom to launch a counterstrike. But as terrible as that scenario sounds, there is one that is worse. Let us say the freighter ship launches a nuclear-armed Shahab-3 missile off the coast of the U.S. and the missile explodes 300 miles over Chicago. The nuclear detonation in space creates an electromagnetic pulse (EMP). Gamma rays from the explosion, through the Compton Effect, generate three classes of disruptive electromagnetic pulses, which permanently destroy consumer electronics, the electronics in some automobiles and, most importantly, the hundreds of large transformers that distribute power throughout the U.S. All of our lights, refrigerators, water-pumping stations, TVs and radios stop running. We have no communication and no ability to provide food and water to 300 million Americans. This is what is referred to as an EMP attack, and such an attack would effectively throw America back technologically into the early 19th century. It would require the Iranians to be able to produce a warhead as sophisticated as we expect the Russians or the Chinese to possess. But that is certainly attainable. Common sense would suggest that, absent food and water, the number of people who could die of deprivation and as a result of social breakdown might run well into the millions. Let us be clear. A successful EMP attack on the U.S. would have a dramatic effect on the country, to say the least. Even one that only affected part of the country would cripple the economy for years. Dropping nuclear weapons on or retaliating against whoever caused the attack would not help. And an EMP attack is not far-fetched. Twice in the last eight years, in the Caspian Sea, the Iranians have tested their ability to launch ballistic missiles in a way to set off an EMP. The congressionally mandated EMP Commission, with some of America's finest scientists, has released its findings and issued two separate reports, the most recent in April, describing the devastating effects of such an attack on the U.S. The only solution to this problem is a robust, multilayered missile-defense system. The most effective layer in this system is in space, using space-based interceptors that destroy an enemy warhead in its ascent phase when it is easily identifiable, slower, and has not yet deployed decoys. We know it can work from tests conducted in the early 1990s. We have the technology. What we lack is the political will to make it a reality. An EMP attack is not one from which America could recover as we did after Pearl Harbor. Such an attack might mean the end of the United States and most likely the Free World. It is of the highest priority to have a president and policy makers not merely acknowledge the problem, but also make comprehensive missile defense a reality as soon as possible.

Advantage: Space BMD’s Capable of Shooting down EMP 3/6

### Now is the time and MAD won’t work—EMPs immediate threat, Space BMD solves

Kennedy ‘8 (Brian T. Kennedy, President of the Claremont Institute, 2008 September, Hillsdale College, “Ballistic Missile Defense is not yet reality,” http://www.hillsdale.edu/news/imprimis/archive/issue.asp?year=2008&month=09)

Opponents of missile defense call such scenarios far-fetched, on the basis that the U.S. would launch a nuclear attack against whatever nation attacks us. That is, they continue to rely on the doctrine of mutually-assured destruction that our leaders prior to Reagan relied on during the Cold War. But in my scenarios, we would not know who attacked us, so that doctrine is no help. And in any case, even if Iran could be identified as the attacker, who is to say that it wouldn’t gladly sacrifice itself to destroy the Great Satan? As the Ayatollah Khomeini said in 1979, during the American hostage crisis: “I say let [Iran] go up in smoke, provided Islam emerges triumphant in the world.” I do not use the word “destroy” lightly: An EMP attack on the U.S. would mean the end of American civilization, and dropping nuclear weapons on or retaliating against whoever caused the attack will not bring our civilization back. Nor is this science fiction. Twice, in the Caspian Sea, the Iranians have tested their ability to launch ballistic missiles in a way to set off an EMP. And the congressionally-mandated EMP Commission, including some of America’s finest scientists, has released its findings and issued two separate reports, the most recent in July, describing the effects of such an attack on the U.S. The only solution to this problem is the building of a robust, multi-layered missile defense system. Our land-based system in Alaska and California will go far toward stopping a North Korean missile launched at the U.S. But it has very limited capabilities. It will not defend us against an EMP attack of the kind I have described. The most effective form of missile defense is from space, using space-based interceptors that destroy an enemy warhead in its ascent phase when it is easily identifiable, slower, and has not yet deployed decoys. We know this can work from tests conducted in the early 1990s. We have the technology. What we lack is the political will to make it a reality. Despite the growing Iranian, Chinese, and Russian arsenals, it is said we are postponing serious missile defense because we must win the war on terror first, as if we cannot do both simultaneously. It is also said that we need the help of Russia and China in the war on terrorism, and that such help will not be forthcoming if we build a missile defense. But the Iranian threat makes such concerns meaningless, and it should be our national policy to defend ourselves from the Russian and Chinese arsenals in any event. In the nuclear age, one does not have the luxury—if one could call it that—of a Pearl Harbor, after which we were able to regroup and rebuild and fight on to victory. In the face of the threat of an EMP attack, the time for missile defense is now. Our enemies should understand that we will defend our freedom at any cost. In the words of Ronald Reagan, who put America on the road to missile defense: “If we lose freedom here, there is no place to escape to. This is the last stand on Earth.”

Advantage: Space BMD’s Capable of Shooting Down EMP 4/6

### Space missile defense key to protection—works ground and sea tech and solves for EMP disasters

Lambakis ‘7 (Steven Lambakis, Senior Analyst for the National Institute of Public Policy, 2007 February-March, Hoover Institution,

http://www.gees.org/documentos/Documen-02177.pdf)

While space assets generally follow predictable orbital paths, they do provide a unique form of mobility — they can be present and persistent over many places on the globe. Indeed, in 2007, the Missile Defense Agency will begin demonstrations with two satellites hosting sensors designed to provide very fine surveillance and tracking data on in-flight ballistic missiles and payloads. A constellation of these satellites would become the sensor backbone of a global missile defense capability and would make possible the global mission endorsed by the Bush administration: the protection of the United States, its deployed forces, and allies and friends. Similarly, a space-based interceptor layer would enable a global on-call missile defense capability and a timely response to rapidly evolving threats, even threats emanating from unpredicted locations with very different azimuths from those we plan to be able to defeat today.10 A space-defense capability also would allow the country to engage longer-range threats originating from deep within the interior of a threat country. It is also known that enemies of the United States can put a nuclear weapon over U.S. territory using a ballistic missile. The detonation of this weapon at a high altitude could unleash an electromagnetic pulse that would wipe out satellite and airborne navigation, intelligence, and communications systems and impede any U.S. military response to the aggression. Such a pulse of energy would disable or destroy the unprotected technological infrastructure of a region or the nation. According to the emp Commission, “a regional or national recovery would be long and difficult and would seriously degrade the safety and overall viability of our nation. . . . [A]t some point the degradation of infrastructure could have irreversible effects on the country’s ability to support its population.” Space-based interceptors may be the only effective way to counter this threat and mitigate the effects of an electromagnetic pulse resulting from the intercept. Engaging the missile close to its launch point would release the resulting explosion of gamma rays closer to the attacker’s territory. Relying on an intercept in space, in the midcourse of a missile’s flight, risks damaging unprotected satellites (i.e., just about all commercial and civilian satellites), regardless of who owns them. Because the missile defense system is “layered” and will have multiple elements working together synergistically, sharing information, sharing existing sensors, communicating as a single system worldwide, even a small constellation of space-based interceptor platforms would allow the entire system to work more efficiently. The massive constellations projected back in the heady days of the Strategic Defense Initiative, in other words, do not seem to be necessary, especially when the targeted adversaries have very limited ballistic missile inventories. By attacking even just a portion of the threat missiles in boost and midcourse, the space layer has the effect of thinning out the number of attacking missiles so that the other elements of the system, which are based on the ground or at sea (midcourse and terminal systems), can be more effective.

Advantage: Space BMD’s Capable of Shooting Down EMP 5/6

### No defense against EMP—need space BMD to protect us from collapse of America (would work well with an impact card that says US collapse = world collapse, I can’t find one though)

Timmerman ‘8 (Kenneth R. Timmerman, journalist, political writer, and writer on weapons of mass destruction in the middle east, 2008 July 29th, Newsmax, http://www.bomb-shelter.net/pdf/threats.pdf )

“As of today, we have no defense against such an attack. We need space-based missile defenses to protect against an EMP attack,” he told Newsmax. Rep. Franks said he remains surprised at how partisan the subject of space-based missile defenses remain. “Nuclear missiles don’t discriminate on party lines when they land,” he said. Arizona Republican Sen. Jon Kyl, a long-standing champion of missile defense, told the Claremont conference on Friday that Sen. Obama has opposed missile defense tooth and nail and as president would cut funding for these programs dramatically. “Senator Obama has been quoted as saying, ‘I don’t agree with a missile defense system,’ and that we can cut $10 billion of the research out — never mind, as I say, that the entire budget is $9.6 billion, or $9.3 billion,” Kyl said. Like Franks, Kyl believes that the only way to eventually deter Iran from launching an EMP attack on the United States is to deploy robust missile defense systems, including space-based interceptors. The United States “needs a missile defense that is so strong, in all the different phases we need to defend against . . . that countries will decide it’s not worth coming up against us,” Kyl said. “That’s one of the things that defeated the Soviet Union. That’s one of the ways we can deal with these rogue states . . . and also the way that we can keep countries that are not enemies today, but are potential enemies, from developing capabilities to challenge us. “

Advantage: Space BMD’s Capable of Shooting Down EMP 6/6

**China is already a growing military space threat, already have space weapons programs and anti-satellite weapons**

Quigley ‘9[Erik, “Geo-Political Considerations to China's Rise in Space Power,” The Defense Technical Information Center,

http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA539644]

China`s military space threat to the US hegemon status is real and growing. Evidence of China`s recent rise in space military capability is evident through their recent anti-satellite (ASAT) demonstrations, robust R&D programs, and national motives to become a regional power. China understands the geo-political importance of using military space as an avenue for regional and worldwide recognition and is posturing itself with a historically-proven military 'active defense' culture within their military space programs. The US response to China`s emerging threat is slow and under-prioritized. This lack of a response is apparent with a current unbalanced national strategy for China and sub-standard funding levels for significant national and DoD military space acquisition programs. Competing national security priorities such as the GWOT are crippling the ability for the US to provide the best response to overmatch China`s rise in military space power. Through the use of open source information, this research follows a problem/solution methodology to address the above problems in reacting to China`s rise in military space. The solution to this problem recommends five building-blocks or steps that if adopted, can enable new US leadership to better posture its national strategy, funding priorities, and its guidance to Geographical Combatant Commander`s (GCCs) to adequately address China`s military space capability. For instance, one recommendation is to implement a stronger military Instrument of Power (IOP) to complement the US`s existing diplomatic and economic emphasis with China. To achieve a solution, the US must find a way to encourage China to be more transparent with its military space intentions.

## Advantage: US needs defense against China

### China hopes to prevail against U.S. with space weapons, U.S. must militarize space to defend interests

Tellis 7’ [Ashley, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Senior Associate, July 23, The Wall Street Journal, “China‘s Space Weapons,” http://www.carnegieendowment.org/2007/07/23/china-s-space-weapons/hgx]

Consistent with this calculus, China has pursued, for over a decade now, a variety of space warfare programs, which include direct attack and directed-energy weapons, electronic attack, and computer-network and ground-attack systems. These efforts are aimed at giving China the capacity to attack U.S. space systems comprehensively because, in Chinese calculations, this represents the best way of "leveling the playing field" in the event of a future conflict. The importance of space denial for China's operational success implies that its counterspace investments, far from being bargaining chips aimed at creating a peaceful space regime, in fact represent its best hope for prevailing against superior American military power. Because having this capacity is critical to Chinese security, Beijing will not entertain any arms-control regime that requires it to trade away its space-denial capabilities. This would only further accentuate the military advantages of its competitors. For China to do otherwise would be to condemn its armed forces to inevitable defeat in any encounter with American power. This is why arms-control advocates are wrong even when they are right. Any "weaponization" of space will indeed be costly and especially dangerous to the U.S., which relies heavily on space for military superiority, economic growth and strategic stability. Space arms-control advocates are correct when they emphasize that advanced powers stand to gain disproportionately from any global regime that protects their space assets. Yet they are wrong when they insist that such a regime is attainable and, therefore, ought to be pursued. Weaker but significant challengers, like China, simply cannot permit the creation of such a space sanctuary because of its deleterious consequences for their particular interests. Consequently, even though a treaty protecting space assets would be beneficial to Washington, its specific costs to Beijing -- in the context of executing China's national military strategy -- would be remarkably high. Beijing's attitude toward space arms control will change only given a few particular developments. China might acquire the capacity to defeat the U.S. despite America's privileged access to space. Or China's investments in counterspace technology might begin to yield diminishing returns because the U.S. consistently nullifies these capabilities through superior technology and operational practices. Or China's own dependence on space for strategic and economic reasons might intensify to the point where the threat posed by any American offensive counterspace programs exceed the benefits accruing to Beijing's own comparable efforts. Or the risk of conflict between a weaker China and any other superior military power, such as the U.S., disappears entirely. Since these conditions will not be realized anytime soon, Washington should certainly discuss space security with Beijing, but, for now, it should not expect that negotiation will yield any successful agreements. Instead, the U.S. should accelerate investments in solutions that enhance the security of its space assets, in addition to developing its own offensive counterspace capabilities. These avenues -- as the Bush administration has correctly recognized -- offer the promise of protecting American interests in space and averting more serious threats to its global primacy.

## Adv: Other Nations Developing 1/2

### Russia is already developing anti satellite weapons

AP 9’[March 5, The Independent, “Russia building anti-satellite weapons,” http://www.carnegieendowment.org/2007/07/23/china-s-space-weapons/hgx]

Russia is working on anti-satellite weapons to match technologies developed by other nations and will speed up modernization of its nuclear forces, a deputy defense minister was quoted as saying today. The statement by Gen. Valentin Popovkin signaled the government's intention to pursue its ambitious plans to strengthen the military despite the money crunch caused by a worsening financial crisis. He said the military will procure enough new missiles to deploy near Poland if the US goes ahead with its European missile defense plans. Popovkin said Russia continues to oppose a space arms race but will respond to moves made by other countries, according to Russian news reports. "We can't sit back and quietly watch others doing that; such work is being conducted in Russia," Popovkin was quoted as saying. Russia already has some "basic, key elements" of such weapons, he said without elaboration. Popovkin, who previously was the chief of Russian military Space Forces, reportedly made the statement at a news conference in response to a question about US and Chinese tests of anti-satellite weapons

### India has begun developing space weapons to destroy satellites

de Selding 10[ Peter, Space News Staff Writer, January 11, Space News International, "India Developing Means To Destroy Satellites," http://www.space.com/7764-india-developing-anti-satellite-spacecraft.html]

PARIS — India has begun development of lasers and an exoatmospheric kill vehicle that could be combined to produce a weapon to destroy enemy satellites in orbit, the director-general of India’s defense research organization said Jan. 3.

“The kill vehicle, which is needed for intercepting the satellite, needs to be developed, and that work is going on as part of the ballistic missile defense program,” said V.K. Saraswat, director-general of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), which is part of India’s Ministry of Defence.

In a televised press briefing during the 97th Indian Science Congress in Thiruvananthapuram, Saraswat said the program includes the development of lasers “which will be able to give you a concrete picture of the satellite, and use that picture to guide your kill vehicle towards that. That work has yet to be done.”

Adv: Other Nations Developing 2/2

### U.S. must weaponize space to defend from anti-satellite attacks

Schendzielos 8’[Kurt, “Protection in Space: A Self-Defense Acquisition Priority for U.S. Satellites,” The Defense Technical Information Center, http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA485553]

America is critically reliant upon space exploitation for a wide variety of activities. These range from strictly military capabilities such as intelligence gathering and secure communications to civilian financial transaction timing and remote Earth sensing for environmental analysis. Recent developments in anti-satellite technologies signal a dangerous threat to U.S. space dominance. Specifically, zero-warning threats such as ground-based lasers or direct-ascent kinetic-kill vehicles present the biggest challenge for which there is little or no defense. Until recently, the U.S. had been reasonably secure that its satellites were free from disablement. Unfortunately, many adversary nations acquired anti-satellite technologies and proliferated them; threatening permanent disablement of almost any American satellite. This monograph surveys available unclassified literature to assess current and emerging threats to U.S. satellites and evaluates open source defenses available, ranging from policy mechanisms to physical defenses. The level of protection is wanting and the monograph reviews various promising technologies in development currently that could be obtained to defend U.S. satellites in the timeframe commensurate with the proliferation and risk of anti-satellite threats. An advocacy suggesting that increased national resources and efforts be devoted to protecting Low-Earth Orbiting satellites from zero-warning attacks is proposed.

# NMDs Asteroid Advantage

## Inherency (Asteroid Advantage)

### Not enough going on now about how to solve the asteroid problem.

Schweickart et al 2010

(Russell L. Chairman, B612 Foundation (Task Force Co-Chair)Report of the NASA Advisory Council Ad Hoc Task Force on Planetary Defense October 6, T http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/490945main\_10-10\_TFPD.pdf)

Findings on Planetary Defense 1. NASA’s search for near-Earth objects has discovered at least 87% of the large asteroids whose impacts could pose a global threat to our civilization. None pose a credible threat of a collision with Earth for the foreseeable future. But the discovery rate of the much more numerous smaller NEOs, representing a regional or local impact hazard, will soon confront us with objects presenting worrisome but uncertain probabilities for a future collision with Earth. Such situations will appear more frequently as the discovery rate increases, and the nation presently has no clear policy on how to address such a situation. 2. The National Research Council’s (NRC) 2010 report, “Defending Planet Earth,” presents a thorough collection of background information describing the hazard of NEO impacts and NASA’s current search, impact analysis, and warning programs. The NRC report authors examined several search options for detecting asteroids down to the 140-meter- size target specified by the George E. Brown NEO Survey legislation. The Task Force recommendations are largely based on the conclusions of the NRC report. 3. However, the NRC report authors had very limited time to examine emerging capabilities to discover, track, and provide warning for near-term impact of the smallest objects with damage potential (ten to several tens of meters in size). The Task Force supplemented the NRC’s work to recognize that short-term warning could enable effective evacuation of affected areas. 4. This discussion of near-Earth objects encompasses active near-Earth comets (NECs) as well as near-Earth asteroids (NEAs). Both short- and long-period NECs comprise ~1 percent of the NEO population. The population of long-period comets, with orbits originating in the outer solar system, represents a small part of the total comet threat, and thus an even smaller part of the total impact hazard.

## Solvency 1/2 (Asteroid Advantage)

### Space weapons prevent asteroid/comet impacts.

[Kunich, John C.](http://www.spacedebate.org/author/2083) "[Planetary Defense: The Legality of Global Survival](http://afls14.jag.af.mil/dscgi/ds.py/Get/File-71020/part4.DOC)." [Air Force Law Review](http://www.spacedebate.org/source/Air%20Force%20Law%20Review). Vol. 41 (1997): 119-160.

Mitigation, or response, could take several forms, depending in part on the nature and magnitude of a given threat, once it has been detected and evaluated. One possible response would be evacuation of the impact zone, to minimize loss of life. A closely related response is preparation to minimize the resultant damage due to fires, tidal waves, earthquakes, acid rain, and other after-effects, and to provide medical care to the victims. These forms of response, though important, would be grossly inadequate when dealing with a truly massive threat such as those discussed previously. In the event of a massive strike from space, the resultant apocalyptic disasters would render such efforts as fruitless as rearranging the deck chairs while the Titanic sinks. The only meaningful response to a massive strike is some form of direct intervention. Direct intervention may entail deflection or destruction of the approaching space object to prevent or mitigate any impact with Earth. The means for achieving this fall partially within the realm of existing military capabilities, and partially within the ambit of technologies superficially similar to some proposed/experimental aspects of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Depending on the physical size and other attributes of the threatening object, a variety of countermeasures might be effective in diverting or destroying it. Earth-based nuclear devices such as Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) or their submarine-launched counterparts might suffice. Non-nuclear options conceivably would work, including kinetic energy or laser systems such as were explored under SDI. Some of these may require space-basing to be effective, while others may work in an Earth-based mode.

Solvency 2/2 (Asteroid Advantage)

### Scientists say weapons in space best for deflecting asteroids.

Mellor 7

[Dr. Felicity, Humanities Program, Imperial College, London. “Colliding Worlds: Asteroid Research and the Legitimization of War in Space.” SAGE Publications. [Online] ]

Since the late 1980s, a small group of astronomers and planetary scientists have repeatedly warned of the threat of an asteroid impacting with Earth and causing global destruction. They foretell a large impact causing global fires, the failure of the world’s agriculture and the end of human civilisation. But, these scientists assure us, we live at a unique moment in history when we have the technological means to avert disaster. They call for support for dedicated astronomical surveys of near-Earth objects to provide early warning of an impactor and they have regularly met with defence scientists to discuss new technologies to deflect any incoming asteroids. The scientists who have promoted the asteroid impact threat have done so by invoking narratives of technological salvation – stories which, like the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), promised security through a superweapon in space. The asteroid impact threat can therefore be located within the broader cultural history of fantasies about security and power which Bruce Franklin (1988) has argued is inextricably linked to the century-old idea that a new superweapon could deliver world peace. Howard McCurdy (1997: 78-82), in his study of the ways in which the US space programme was shaped by popular culture, has suggested that the promotion of the impact threat can be seen as the completion of Cold War fantasies which had used a politics of fear to justify space exploration. McCurdy highlights the alignment between the promotion of the impact threat and works of fiction. In this paper, I consider the reconceptualisation of asteroid science which this alignment entailed.

## Optional Nuclear Solvency

### NMDs delivering nukes solves asteroids by deflecting their course toward Earth.

Gerrard and Barber 98

[Michael B. and Anna W. Asteroids and Comets: U.S. and International Law and Lowest-Probability, Highest Consequence Risk. NYU Environmental Law Journal V. 6 No.3.]

<http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/nyuev6&div=8&g_sent=1&collection=journals>

The idea is simply to move the asteroid or comet enough so that it and the Earth will not be at the same place at the same time. In the words of John S. Lewis, codirector of NASA/University of Arizona Space Engineering Research Center, “We are not trying to banish the asteroid from the inner solar system; we are merely trying to avoid a single predicted impact with Earth. Suppose our asteroid-search team finds a 250 meter body that I due to hit Earth dead center a few hundred years from now. This same body has probably been crossing Earth’s orbit for 10 million to 100 million years without an impact. If we can just ease it by Earth without an impact on this one occasion, we may well buy ourselves another 30 million years to figure out what to do the next time it threatens us.” To accomplish this diversion, nuclear devices seem to be the only currently available technology that can deliver enough energy to move a large object far enough to avoid an Earth impact. According to analysis, the method that may transfer the momentum from the blast to the object most effectively involves burying the device below the surface of the asteroid. Case must be taken not to inadvertently fragment the object. Many of the technologies that would be necessary for such a mission-data processing, telemetry, power supply, sensors, propulsion, etc., have been under development for military purposes by the US Department of Defense’s Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, formerly known as the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (and popularly known as “Star Wars”

## Terminal Impacts

### Even if collision is rare we shouldn’t wait to prepare for it

Bridges, 4 [Andrew Bridges, Science Writer, “Scientists call for strategy to fend off space rocks,” MSNBC, 2/23/2004,

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4356390/ns/technology\_and\_science-space/t/scientists-call-strategyto-fend-space-rocks/]

The asteroid believed to have wiped out dinosaurs 65 million years ago was rare but hardly unique, say scientists gathered to discuss ways of aggressively defending our planet from another such space rock, including by detonating nukes in space. Asteroids capable of inflicting damage on a global scale hit Earth roughly every million years, and we shouldn’t dawdle in developing a method of deflecting them, according to the scientists attending a four-day planetary defense conference in suburban Orange County.

### It’s not a question of probabilities, absent the plan extinction is inevitable from an asteroid strike

Kunich 97

(Lt. Col. John C. Kunich, Staff Judge Advocate, 50th Space Wing, Falcon Air Force Base – “Planetary Defense: The Legality of Global Survival,” The Air Force Law Review, Volume 41 [41 A.F.L. rev. 119). [Online] LexisNexis)

It is true that destructive impacts of gigantic asteroids and comets are extremely rare and infrequent when compared with most other dangers humans face, with the [\*126] intervals between even the smallest of such events amounting to many human generations... No one alive today, therefore, has ever witnessed such an event, and indeed there are no credible historical records of human casualties from impacts in the past millennium. Consequently, it is easy to dismiss the hazard as negligible or to ridicule those who suggest that it be treated seriously. n32 On the other hand, as has been explained, when such impacts do occur, they are capable of producing destruction and casualties on a scale that far exceeds any other natural disasters; the results of impact by an object the size of a small mountain exceed the imagined holocaust of a full-scale nuclear war... Even the worst storms or floods or earthquakes inflict only local damage, while a large enough impact could have global consequences and place all of society at risk... Impacts are, at once, the least likely but the most dreadful of known natural catastrophes. n33 What is the most prudent course of action when one is confronted with an extremely rare yet enormously destructive risk? Some may be tempted to do nothing, in essence gambling on the odds. But because the consequences of guessing wrong may be so severe as to mean the end of virtually all life on planet Earth, the wiser course of action would be to take reasonable steps to confront the problem. Ultimately, rare though these space strikes are, there is no doubt that they will happen again, sooner or later. To do nothing is to abdicate our duty to defend the United States, and indeed the entire world, and place our very survival in the uncertain hands of the false god of probabilities. Thus, the mission of planetary defense might be considered by the United States at some point in time, perhaps with a role played by the military, including the United States Air Force.

## Space Militarization Inevitable (1/3)

### 1. Space Militarization has already happened

### A. US shot down a satellite from a F-15 in 1985

Miller '2 (John J. Miller, National Review, “Our Next Manifest Destiny”, Vol. 54, No. 13, July 15, 2002: 35-7)

ON the morning of September 13, 1985, Air Force Major Doug Pearson smashed through the sound barrier in his F-15. Pointed almost directly upward more than seven miles above the Pacific Ocean, he tapped a little red button on the side of his control stick, and released a missile strapped to the belly of his plane. The missile blazed out of sight, leaving the earth's atmosphere quickly and reaching a speed of 13,000 miles per second[Corrected, ed.] hour. Pearson wondered if it would hit anything. The mission was classified, so Pearson had developed a code with the folks back at Edwards Air Force Base: The radioman would tell him to level off at a certain altitude if his missile struck its target, an obsolete scientific probe orbiting 345 miles over Hawaii. As it happened, the code wasn't necessary. When Pearson checked in a few minutes after firing, he could hear cheering in the background from the control room. It was the one time an **American pilot had ever destroyed an object in outer space**. People still talk about Pearson as the country's first "space ace." He remains its only space ace. A few weeks after the satellite was destroyed, Congress banned further tests. "We had hoped to conduct more," recalls Pearson, now a general. "But politics were what they were, and the nation decided to go another way.

### B. Space has been militarized for 60 years now – happening all the time

Lambakis '7 (Steven Lambakis, National Security and International Affairs Analyst specializing in Space Power policy studies, “Future Security in Space: Commercial, Military, and Arms Control Trade-Offs.”, Ed. James Clay Moltz. Monterey, CA: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, <http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/5516446.html>)

Second, there is historical context to consider. Critics of expanding the military uses of space are wont to make a clean-cut distinction between 'militarizing' space, on the one hand, which they say already has happened, and 'weaponizing' space on the other, which they say has yet to occur. But this is a distinction without a meaningful difference, because the combat or force function, which naturally involves the use of arms, is a potential part of any military activity. Even some peacekeepers carry arms. Viewed in this light, the term 'weaponization' may be used, in a general way, to characterize activities that countries have undertaken for nearly 60 years. In other words, **the so-called weaponization of space is happening under our very noses.**

Space Mil Inevitable (2/3)

### C. The US shooting down of satellites is a symbol of space weaponization

NYT '8 (Steven Lee Myers, “Look Out Below. The Arms Race in Space May Be On”, New York Times, March 9, 2008,

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/09/weekinreview/09myers.html)

The consequences of war in space are in fact so cataclysmic that arms control advocates like Mr. Kimball would like simply to prohibit the use of weapons beyond the earth's atmosphere. But it may already be too late for that. In the weeks since an American rocket slammed into an out-of-control satellite over the Pacific Ocean, officials and experts have made it clear that the **United States**, for better or worse, **is already committed to having the capacity to wage war in space**. And that, it seems likely, will prompt others to keep pace. What makes people want to ban war in space is exactly what keeps the Pentagon's war planners busy preparing for it: The United States has become so dependent on space that it has become the country's Achilles' heel.

### D. China has crossed the space weaponization line

Kueter '7 (Jeff Kueter, President of the George C. Marshall Institute, “Crossing the Rubicon in Space Again: Iacta Alea est”, January 23, 2007, http://www.marshall.org/pdf/materials/492.pdf)

"The die is cast," Suetonius reports Julius Caesar said as he exhorted his men to cross the river Rubicon and created the popular idiom for a point of no return. The long-held Rubicon in space, the deployment and use of **so-called space weapons, was crossed long ago by both the former Soviet Union and the United States**. Still, many have claimed that it is possible to turn back history’s pages and preserve space as a sanctuary. If there were ever serious doubts about the impossibility of that dream, they are dispelled now. Last fall, when reports that China had used lasers to "blind" a U.S. satellite were made public, **the Rubicon of space was crossed (again)** and now we learn that **China has demonstrated successful anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities** launched from earth.1 In destroying their own satellite, China has signaled to the world its capability to threaten essential satellites directly, by physically destroying them, and indirectly, by using lasers and other jamming techniques to deny free use of them.

Space Mil Inevitable (3/3)

### 2. Space Militarization easy – Even underdeveloped nations can militarize space – Tonga and Indonesia prove

Shaw & Simon '2 (John E. Shaw and Simon P. Worden, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University, “Whither Space Power?: Forging a Strategy for the New Century”, https://research.au.af.mil/papers/ay2002/fairchild/wordenshaw.pdf)

It is also widely believed that only sophisticated states or groups will be able to mount attacks on global communications, particularly against the space nodes. In fact, this is not true. Consider an incident in 1996 between the states of Tonga and Indonesia -- neither highly developed technologically. Both states had claimed a GEO satellite communications slot. When Tonga moved its national communications satellite into this disputed spot, Indonesia protested. However, it appears that **Indonesia did more than just protest,** for Tongan soon began having difficulties in using their satellite; apparently it was being jammed. Although it is now widely accepted that Indonesia was deliberately interfering with the Tongan satellite, it took considerable time before any clear idea of what was happening emerged. The lesson here is not that a satellite can be jammed, but that relatively undeveloped nations have both the will and the means to interfere with an-other state's space-based infrastructure. **Add to this the will and determination of not only nation-states, but also nonstate actors such as terrorist groups, and the spectrum of threats becomes very wide indeed.**

### 3. Space Militarization inevitable – economic reasons

Hitchens '5 (Theresa Hitchens, vice president, and director of space security, at the Center for Defense Information, a non-partisan think tank in Washington, D.C. "Safeguarding Space: Building Cooperative Norms to Dampen Negative Trends." Disarmament Diplomacy. No. 81 (Winter 2005), <http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd81/81th.htm>)

Up to now, humankind's exploitation of space has been relatively non-contentious and space has largely remained a zone of cooperation rather than a zone of conflict. But the possibilities for conflict in space are growing ever more worrisome. As civil society, commercial industry and, in particular, national militaries become more dependent on the use of space systems, t**here is a growing potential for tension, suspicions and outright disputes.** This dependency is coupled with the fact that, physically, space systems are quite vulnerable to deliberate disruption, in large part due to the technological advances that have made space more useful. Increased **perceptions of vulnerability have given rise to concerns about protecting those assets.** In addition, the advantages that space systems have for civil activities, such as providing global telecommunications, make space systems more and more coveted by militaries for enhancing power projection.

# Topicality

## A2: BMD Not Development: Definitions

### 1. The affirmative plan involves evolution of space BMD from pre-existing technology, making the plan topical.

Oxford English Dictionary 11**.** Online Version 6/11.

http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/51427?redirectedFrom=develop#eid

“Develop. …To evolve (as a product) from pre-existing materials; to cause to grow or come into active existence or operation.”

### 2. BMD technology has only been introduced on ground and sea; thus, by definition, space based BMD will be improving and employing elementary technology and is topical.

**Oxford English Dictionary 11.** Online Version 6/11.

<http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/51427?redirectedFrom=develop#eid>

“Develop. …To bring forth from a latent or elementary condition (a physical agent or condition of matter); to make manifest what already existed under some other form or condition.”

## A2: BMD Not Development: Part of Space Capabilities and Protection (1/4)

### 1. Defense forms part of our space exploration and development. Furthermore, our activities in space and “use of space capabilities” would include missile defense.

Ms. Theresa Hitchens Director, Center for Defense Information **07**. “The Perfect Storm: International Reaction to the Bush National Space Policy.” *Air Force Space Command High Frontier*, a journal for space and missile professionals.” Volume 3 Number 2. March 2007. <http://www.spacedebate.org/hf/v3n2.pdf>

The United States: • Rejects any limitations on the fundamental rights of the United States to operate in and acquire data from space. • Will … dissuade or deter others from either impeding those rights or developing the capabilities intended to do so. • Will take those actions necessary to protect its space capabilities, respond to interference and deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities to US national interests. • Will oppose the development of new legal regimes or other restrictions that seek to prohibit or limit US access to or use of space. Proposed arms control agreements or restrictions must not impair the rights of the United States to conduce research, development, testing and operations or other activities in space for US national interests.1 4.

### 2. National security in space is considered by military powers as part of space development. That is executed by weaponry such as BMD’s.

Major Robert A. Ramey 99, chief of space and international law at the U.S. Air Force Space Command “Space Warfare and the Future Law of War.” August 1999.

<http://digitool.library.mcgill.ca/webclient/StreamGate?folder_id=0&dvs=1309454969005~478>

Quietly, but persistently, India continued its rise as a space power through the first three decades of the twenty-first century. 115 estimated $10 billion annual military budget in 1998 ballooned to ten times that amount in just 15 years. This was driven in large part by its increasing sense of isolation over cooperative relations between its bitter adversaries in the Northwest, Pakistan, and to the Northeast, China.38 For India, as with all other military powers, space development was a fundamental component of national security policy. Because of its relentless accumulation of modem weaponry, India remained a persistent threat to its neighbors. However, though India would have been a natural ally of the Western, democratic nations, it took no part in the war

A2: BMD not Development; Part of Space capabilities and protection (2/4)

### 3. Space development includes security of space. In fact, any activity in space is categorized as important to “any given nation’s development and national security.

Ms. Theresa Hitchens Director, Center for Defense Information **07**. “The Perfect Storm: International Reaction to the Bush National Space Policy” *Air Force Space Command High Frontier*, a journal for space and missile professionals Volume 3 Number 2. March 2007. <http://www.spacedebate.org/hf/v3n2.pdf>

At the same time, the reaction overseas—especially amongst allies—should be troubling to US ofﬁcials, and not just those charged with space-related portfolios. Public opinion matters and governments (at least those in democratic countries) are obliged to take that into account. It should be obvious that the US approach to space and especially space security is not, to put it mildly, widely accepted. And to the extent that US policies and actions regarding space serve to deepen already negative views about US leadership and motivations, US ‘soft power’ could be further eroded. And while no nation (even China at this time) may have the economic or military clout to directly challenge the US in the exercise of space power, it is possible for others to act individually or in concert to economically and politically isolate and/or ‘soft-power’ and asymmetric ‘hard-power’ responses. Nor is it realistic to assume that the US can simply impose its will upon other space actors, given the growing importance of space activities to any given nation’s development and national security. At a minimum, the current situation behooves the United States to do more to explain its views, policies, strategies and intentions regarding space, especially to allies and friendly nations; to exhibit more willingness to hear and seriously take into account the concerns of others; and to recognize that rejection of rules of behavior in space opens the way for more overtly negative behavior, as the conﬁrmation of a Chinese ASAT test attests. Unfortunately, rather than clarifying US intentions, the new NSP only further muddied the waters.

A2: BMD not Part of Development; Part of space capabilities and protection (3/4)

### 4. Space capabilities, including both exploration and development require development of space defense such as BMD’s, thus the aff is topical

Dr. Robert L. Butterworth 07. “To Get There, Go There.” *Air Force Space Command High Frontier*, a journal for space and missile professionals Volume 3 Number 2. March 2007. <http://www.spacedebate.org/hf/v3n2.pdf>

These developments create a new context that challenges legacy thinking about national security space. US military today depends heavily on space systems, and those systems can be attacked by an adversary who has good military reasons to do so. US planners now confront the need to ensure the delivery of those militarily essential services that come from space systems operating in a militarily contested medium. Until recently the strategic context left plans for space defense with little programmatic support beyond funding for research and limited technology exploration. Money spent on satellite protection was money lost to collection for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). Intelligence and defense program managers alike saw the contest in the budget arena as between protection and capability. But the strategic context is different now: in contested space, there will be no capability without protection. In that sense, the US for the ﬁrst time is challenged to devise a truly military space architecture 10.

A2: BMDs not Development; Part of Space Capabilities and Protection (4/4)

### 5. Missile defense falls under the development of space systems and US outer space capabilities, making the aff an integral part of space development.

Dr. Dana J. Johnson 07, Senior Analyst, Northrop Grumman Analysis Center.“National Space Policy: Opportunities and Challenges in Shaping the International Space Regime.” *Air Force Space Command High Frontier*, a journal for space and missile professionals Volume 3 Number 2. March 2007. <http://www.spacedebate.org/hf/v3n2.pdf>

First, the new US policy declares space capabilities (including ground and space segments and supporting links) to be vital to US national interests. The “vital” nature of space systems reﬂects the fundamental relationship between the US government, society, ﬁnancial institutions, transportation, public safety, and critical national infrastructure with the space systems supporting them. Accordingly, it contains more explicit guidance on the need to deter threats and deny the use of space capabilities to elements hostile to US national interests. The long-held US right of self-defense and the rejection of claims to sovereignty by any nation over outer space and celestial bodies are consistent with Article 51 of the United Nations Treaty and the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST), respectively. This has direct implications for the development of space superiority and missile defense capabilities, for example. Actual deployment and use of such capabilities remains a US policy decision. Secondly, the new policy goes further than its predecessors by stating that the US will oppose new legal regimes that seek to prohibit or limit US space access and use. Furthermore, “proposed arms control agreements or restrictions must not impair the rights of the US to conduct research, development, testing, and operations or other activities in space for US national interests.”3 The US continues to fulﬁll its legal obligations regarding the OST and related space agreements and to support enforcement of treaty compliance, but to accede to a new multilateral agreement that might unduly constrain US space access and use is ofﬁcially viewed as “unnecessary and counterproductive.”4 Such new or proposed legal regimes might impose “rules of the road” or “keep-out zones,” or carry more restrictive language than the OST, for example11

## A2: BMD Not Topical: Context 1/2

### Even the National Space Policy passed under Clinton and updated by Bush treats defense such as BMD’s as integral to space development and capabilities.

Brig Gen Robert M. Worley II **07,** Director of Strategic Plans, Programs, Analyses, Assessments and Lessons Learned Air Force Space Command, Peterson AFB, Colorado.

“The New National Space Policy and Air Force Space Command’s Role in International Cooperation.” *Air Force Space Command High Frontier*, a journal for space and missile professionals Volume 3 Number 2. March 2007. <http://www.spacedebate.org/hf/v3n2.pdf>

Additionally, the policy [The National Space Policy] is clear that space capabilities, including space segments and supporting links are “vital to its national interests,” and that the US will preserve freedom of action in space. 8 It even goes so far to say that, “Freedom of action in space is as important to the United States as air power and sea power.” 9 New to this space policy is the mention of homeland security with respect to the stated space policy goals. It speciﬁcally calls on the Nation’s space leadership to ensure that “space capabilities are available in time to further US national security, homeland security, and foreign policy objectives.” 10 This policy also promotes the need for “a robust science and technology base supporting national security, homeland security, and civil space activities.” 11 Other goals in the policy include seeking to enable a competitive domestic commercial space sector, unhindered operations in and through space, and increasing the beneﬁts of exploration. The policy also provides general guidelines which address the development of space professionals, improving space system development and procurement, strengthening interagency partnerships, and bolstering US space-related science, technology, and industrial base. The policy goes on to provide more speciﬁc guidelines in the areas of national security, civil space, commercial space, space nuclear power, radio frequency spectrum, and orbital debris.

A2: BMD Not Topical: National Space Policy Context 2/2

### The US’s national space policy illustrates how missile defense are part of our policy of space development and protection.

Brig Gen Robert M. Worley II **07,** Director of Strategic Plans, Programs, Analyses, Assessments and Lessons Learned Air Force Space Command, Peterson AFB, Colorado. “The New National Space Policy and Air Force Space Command’s Role in International Cooperation.” *Air Force Space Command High Frontier*, a journal for space and missile professionals Volume 3 Number 2. March 2007. <http://www.spacedebate.org/hf/v3n2.pdf>

It also must be remembered that the European public, in particular, has traditionally been actively hostile to the concept of ASAT operations and weapons in space—for example, President Ronald W. Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative in the early 1980s prompted widespread controversy (and even demonstrations) in Europe. While the new NSP[National Space Policy] does not explicitly commit the US to the development and/or deployment of ASATs, spacebased missile defenses, and space-based offensive weapons, it does not rule out such actions—and its language arguably threatens the use of force in space against adversaries, thus implying the use of such weaponry.13 Further, statements by administration ofﬁcials and other ofﬁcial DoD documents regarding spacebased missile defenses and “space control” make clear that there is a desire within the US government to pursue these capabilities and technologies. 14 For example, in June 2006, John Mohanco, deputy director of the State Department’s Ofﬁce of Multilateral Nuclear and Security Affairs, told the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva that the US government “will continue to explore the possible role that space-related weapons may play in protecting our assets.”1

## A2: NMDs Non-Topical; Mesosphere Arg.

### The missiles we aim to develop in space are far beyond the mesosphere as well as the thermosphere. The question of topicality on this issue cannot be argued.

Kaufman et al, Cox, Arrow, Gold, Jones 03, “Full Costs of Ballistic Missile Defense” Economists Allied for Arms Reduction, Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation; http://www.epsusa.org/publications/papers/bmd/bmd.pdf

Technically, terminal defenses operate against the missile warhead in the terminal stage of the trajectory, and this is usually understood to mean the last part of the trajectory after the warhead has entered the atmosphere. Interceptor kill vehicles that operate above and within the atmosphere generally use different physical principles and thus usually are designed differently. However, there has been some overlap between exoatmospheric (late-midcourse) and endoatmospheric (terminal) technical objectives in US TMD programs. **THAAD’s hit-to-kill interceptors were designed, for example, to operate both in the thin upper atmosphere and above the atmosphere**. The Navy’s NAD program was clearly only endoatmospheric in capability, but the objectives of the NTW development programs (Block I and Block II) have been ambivalent and are still subject to evolution. Our assumption here is that both **exo- and endoatmospheric interceptor principles have been employed** in US TMD planning **to function as terminal defenses** (i.e., to be used in a “terminal defense mode” for local area and point defense of US and allied military forces). Viewed thus in terms of objectives, rather than exclusively in terms of interception at one or another physical stage of offensive missile trajectories, local US terminal defenses of the homeland against ballistic missile threats probably would be derived from US TMD programs or their technologies, and thus would operate in both late midcourse and endoatmospheric domains. It follows that such terminal defenses would be inherently layered.

## A2: Topicality: NMDs Only Earth Based

### The location of NMDs is flexible; they are usable at any position, not solely on the ground or sea.

Dr. Steven Lambakis (PhD, World Politics, Catholic University of America) 07 is a senior defense analyst at the National Institute for Public Policy in Fairfax, Virginia.

http://www.nipp.org/Publication/Downloads/Publication%20Archive%20PDF/141LambakisOffprint.pdf

The adversaries of the US are looking hard at ballistic missiles because they represent a challenging threat. An intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) can travel at extremely high speeds—at times more than 15,000 mph. **Kinetic energy interceptors collide with targets in space thousands of miles away** at closing speeds that can exceed 25,000 mph. Besides hurling very small objects through air and space at very high speeds, **ballistic missiles can be launched from anywhere at any time from multiple directions, to anywhere on the globe**. Adding to this challenge, we can expect adversaries to employ countermeasures to foil missile defense calculations and disrupt system operations.

## A2: Topicality: NMD Are Not Located in Space

### Space, the region beyond Earth, is home to National Missile defense systems currently, proving that the negative’s claim that we don’t expand beyond the mesosphere is fallacious.

1. Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary. Online Version. 11 http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/space

Definition of **SPACE** 5 : **the** region beyond the earth's atmosphere **or beyond the solar system**

2. NuclearFiles.org, received the Academic Info Award and the Critical Mass Award. (The website was also featured as USA Today's Site of the Day)

**A National Missile Defense system would have** missile interceptors located in space. There is no air resistance or friction in space which means that an ICBM can release decoys during flight that travel at the same speed as the missile. It is possible for a typical missile to release as many as ten decoys for each warhead. This makes it nearly impossible for a defense system to detect the actual warheads. The attacker may also disguise the warheads by hiding them in metallic ballon decoys. One alternative counter measure to the decoy method would be to enclose the warhead inside of a metallic shroud which would be cooled with a bit of liquid nitrogen. This reduces the range at which an "infrared-homing kill vehicle" could detect the warhead

## A2: NMDs not located Beyond Atmos.

### Navy-developed KVs, a type of missile defense, are designed to function beyond the atmosphere, which is inclusive of the mesosphere.

Kaufman et al, Cox, Arrow, Gold, Jones 03, “Full Costs of Ballistic Missile Defense” Economists Allied for Arms Reduction, Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation; http://www.epsusa.org/publications/papers/bmd/bmd.pdf

**The Navy’s “upper tier” program**, NTW, also planned for AEGIS ships and the VLS, **is intended to** defend bigger areas and to reach beyond the atmosphere using a light exoatmospheric KV (designated LEAP) against attacking missiles in their midcourse phase. For NTW, the Navy has been developing three-stage Standard Missiles (SM-3); the first generation (Block I) is planned for deployment between 2006 and 2010. A more capable, VLS-compatible, follow-on NTW interceptor (SM-3, Block II) is in development, for planned deployment after 2010.

## A2: Not beyond Mesosphere

### US has plans to develop weapons capable of functioning in the thermosphere, the layer beyond the mesosphere.

1. National Weather Service. 2011 “Layers of the Atmosphere”

http://www.srh.noaa.gov/jetstream/atmos/layers.htm

**Thermosphere–**Above the mesosphere, **the thermosphere extends up to near 375 miles (600 km) above the earth**. This layer is known as the upper atmosphere.

A2: Not beyond Mesosphere

### tag

Lyman 08. Editor-in-chief of Journal of Foreign Studies; Master European Studies at the University of Amsterdam in the Netherlands in 2008 where he concentrated on missile defense and disarmament treaties. “Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence and Threats in the 21st Century: A Multivariate Analysis” Journal of Foreign Affairs. http://www.jofr.org/2008/08/15/nuclear-weapons-deterrence-and-threats-in-the-21st-century-a-multivariate-analysis/

**Currently there is a system in** the **design and implementation phase that would**, if successful, **be able to destroy a ballistic missile while in the boost phase**. **The midcourse phase describes the missile as it enters the upper atmosphere, typically the thermosphere. During this phase the missile would be tracked and should the United States develop a laser system that** would be effective within the thermosphere the object would be destroyed within this layer. Presently, **the United States is able to intercept objects at this altitude and destroy them by conventional means**, through the use of Standard Missiles 3 or SM-3. On February 20, 2008 a U.S. Navy AEGIS warship was able to destroy a satellite in the upper atmosphere through a “network of land-, air-, sea- and spaced-based sensors [which] confirm(ed)s that the **U.S. military intercepted a non-functioning** National Reconnaissance Office **satellite** which was **in its final orbits before entering the earth’s atmosphere**.”

## A2: BMD Not Topical: Context From Opposing Argument

### BMD’s are clearly topical as even an opposing argument advocates that development of space involves the use or putting of our property or defense systems in space.

Brig Gen Robert M. Worley II 07**,** Director of Strategic Plans, Programs, Analyses, Assessments and Lessons Learned Air Force Space Command, Peterson AFB, Colorado.

“The New National Space Policy and Air Force Space Command’s Role in International Cooperation.” *Air Force Space Command High Frontier*, a journal for space and missile professionals Volume 3 Number 2. March 2007. <http://www.spacedebate.org/hf/v3n2.pdf>

Interestingly, US space policy has been relatively consistent since the days of the Eisenhower administration during which time the decision was made to pursue the peaceful uses of outer space. This thinking greatly shapes how people use space today and how people view space use for tomorrow. The current outer space legal regime recognizes that “the exploration and use of outer space … shall be carried out for the beneﬁt and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of the degree of their economic or scientiﬁc development, and shall be the province of all mankind.”2 Moreover, it declares that “outer space … is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty.” 3 It also abides by the rules and decision-making procedures calling for registration of space objects and restrictions on weapons of mass destruction in space. 4 Although the release of the new space policy resulted in some criticism of the US, there is no question in my mind that this country is committed to the existing space legal regime. All actions taken in space by this nation are consistent with US law, regulations, treaties and other agreements to which it is party, as well as applicable international law and US foreign policy

# Disads

## Plan Popular 1/5

### Military leaders support bmd systems

DiMascio ’11 (Jen, staff writer for Aviation Week, 6/11/11, “Gates, Mullen Defend European Missile Defense”,

<http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=defense&id=news/asd/2011/06/16/05.xml&headline=Gates,%20Mullen%20Defend%20European%20Missile%20Defense>)

The military’s top leaders defended the U.S. approach to missile defense on Capitol Hill June 15 when questioned about a new report that a key senator says shoots holes in the Obama administration’s European Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) for defending the continent against ballistic missile attacks. During a hearing of the Senate Appropriations defense subcommittee, Sen. Richard Shelby (R-Ala.) referenced a report being written by the Defense Science Board (DSB) about early intercept, the post-launch, pre-apogee portion of a missile’s trajectory.

Plan popular 2/5

### The military has a lot of influence on congress because of all the conflict the US is in

Dickson ’03 (Dr. Thomas I. Jr., Associate Professor of Political Science, Auburn University, 9/29/03, “Military Influence in Government- Theoretical and Practical Aspects”, <http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1974/may-jun/dickson.html>)

The extent of military influence in the United States government has been a source of acerbic controversy for some time. The issue was heightened in recent years as a result of dissatisfaction with national security policies that developed during the unhappy Vietnam venture. Much of the voluminous criticism of the military-industrial complex has been based on assumptions about the nature and degree of an assumed military prominence in domestic and foreign affairs. The usual premise is that military influence has been increasing. “Increasing,” however, could be taken to imply a straight-line progression. Even within the post-World War II period, when the role of the military is generally recognized to be an expanded one, it seems that the tendency has been for military sway to be cyclical, rather than constantly growing.1 While to many the term *military* is self-evident, commentary on the subject of military influence in government shows that the distinction between the uniformed services and civilian administrators often is lost in attempting to press home a point. So the meaning of the term needs to be specified. *Military* we shall assign to the man in uniform, including retired military professionals where they are in positions of importance relating directly to national security matters. More practically for our purpose here, this means the upper ranks of the regular officer corps and retired ranking officers in defense industries. While others have a military-related (reserve officers, for instance), their primary role is not military. Much of the problem with this representation, and where much influence analysis founders, lies in the area of causality. Without becoming embroiled in the complexities of this issue, let us say that the verb “causes” here does not involve explicit coercion but that it does require the Actor to exert an effort toward the Target and Goal. Some writers would have the Target acting somewhat against his will.2 It seems more realistic, however, to accept as a guiding rule that, while the Target might have acted differently if not influenced by the Actor, his actions need not go against the grain. Thus, if a husband and wife want to go on a trip, and the husband has no preference about where to go while the wife wants Bermuda and persuades him to buy tickets for there, the husband still can be contented with the decision. (All married couples will spot instantly the “joker” in this scenario: What happens to his contentment if the trip goes badly? And the same type of relationship problem can occur in political influence.) Still, no matter how the relationship is phrased in abstract terms, in practice there remains a “chameleon” or “mirror-image” problem in that it is difficult to determine who influences whom. The military might request “x” of the Congress largely because military leaders think that “x” is what influential Congressmen want them to ask for. This is a familiar problem in government and one that illustrates the mutual symbiosis that often characterizes political relationships. The foregoing equation obviously does not solve many difficult problems of influence analysis. Hopefully, however, it does provide some clarity on a crucial point that much of the writing on political-military relations glosses over: it avoids the *post* *hoc*, *ergo* *propter* *hoc* fallacy, in which it is assumed that those who benefit from a situation must have caused it. This aberration from logic is found in much of the critical commentary about military influence on civil government in the United States. With this in mind, if we eschew the more extreme forms of analysis that claim to see a military conspiracy or resurrect the old (interestingly enough formerly “conservative”) bugaboo of runaway bureaucracy,3 we profitably can view the military, with its associated industrial and other elements (often lumped together under the rubric “military-industrial complex”), as a significant interest or pressure group of the within-government, without-government type.4 By approaching the proposition from this perspective, we can consider the bases for military influence in more or less the same manner as might be done with other interest groups. The most crucial asset of an interest group is its “position” in society.5 This may, but need not, depend on variables such as leadership capability, wealth, size, and membership cohesion. Important to its “position” is the opinion that competitors, the public, and decision-makers have formed about the group, and the group itself must adjust to the distribution of effective political power within the political system. For purely private interest groups, factors such as wealth and size probably are more meaningful than for the military. While these factors are stressed in many analyses of military influence, and there is a great unresolved problem of when and to what degree politically acquired advantages tend to become self-perpetuating, wealth and size are fundamentally derived characteristics for the military. Thus, the more important factors for analyzing military political influence seem to be those that bear on political elites and popular opinion. At least this is likely to be so in an open, pluralistic, competitive, and democratic society like that of the United States, Many items could be considered in the context of the military’s “position” with the public and political elites, including the “selling of the Pentagon” and race relations in the barracks. However, two items seem to stand out for the post-World War II period: (1) the sense of a threat requiring military preparedness and possibly military response, joined with a belief in the utility and acceptability of the military instrumentality (organized force) to attain political purposes; and (2) the extent of competition for available resources that must be shared by the military with other public purposes. Possibly also worth noting, although it may be linked in cause and effect patterns with (1) above, is the prestige of the military in American society and views held of the military institution. This aspect may be disposed of at least in part if we accept Professor Huntington’s6 assertion that the period of high popularity of individual ranking officers largely ended with the passing of popular World War II commanders and James Clotfelter’s7 finding that the occupational prestige of the military never has been very high, even during that post-World War II epoch when the military institution was expanding rapidly. Laurence Radway,8 among others, has noted how, in the late 1940s and early 1950s, Americans, with relatively little protest, abandoned their erstwhile isolationist views, reversed the trend of demobilization, and adopted and militarized a policy of containment. Many reasons might be given for this phenomenon, and Radway cites three: (1) the realization of a new U.S. strength; (2) the ethnic composition of the population, containing as it does many whose blood-countrymen were suffering Communist occupation; and (3), most important, hostility to totalitarian Communism and a resolve not again to permit a wave of totalitarian expansionism to engulf Europe and the world. Revisionist historians have argued that this apocalyptic vision of the world was unreal. We may choose to believe the revisionists or not. But the tenor of the times was such that a fundamentalist anti-Communism served as the core attitude for policies that, with tactical variations between “massive retaliation” and “flexible response,” showed a high propensity, albeit still without unrestrained abandon, to favor at least readiness for military solutions to political problems or, in another interpretation, military responses to provocations of force, of which the Soviet Union usually was thought to be the author. This was and to a degree still is a situation tailored to the pursuit of the military “interest.” But even here we must tread with caution. We often encounter a simplistic syllogism that runs like this: Major premise: The military are the possessors and proponents for the use of force in international relations. Minor premise: The United States gets into a lot of wars. Conclusion: Therefore, the military are formulating American foreign policy. Whatever military influence is in the making of United States foreign policy, it does not seem to be of that nature. The military have espoused preparedness but have been reserved in advising commitment of forces to armed action.9 The reasons vary for specific cases, but the pattern seems to be one of greater caution by military leaders than by top civilian decision-makers.

Plan Popular (3/5)

### Obama supports missile defense as is showed in the change between early term and now

McClanahan ’11 (Thomas E., staff writer for Kansas City Star, 6/11/11, “Did Obama Change His Mind on Missile Defense?”, <http://www.kansascity.com/2011/06/11/2943316/did-obama-change-his-mind-on-missile.html#ixzz1QtcxJFYR>)

When President Barack Obama came into office, many people (this writer included), expected him to mothball the nation’s missile defense program, much as President Bill Clinton had done. During his campaign, Obama gave lip service to the concept but promised to slice funding for “unproven” systems. Putting it that way was clever. It made him sound reasonable and moderate. But his phrasing hinted at a Catch-22, because the only way any such system can be “proven” is to test it, and that requires money. Many feared that under this administration, the “unproven” would always remain so. Nor were Obama’s initial moves encouraging. In his first year in office, he tore up plans for strategic anti-missile installations in Poland and the Czech Republic. In doing so, he bent to Russian pressure and stiffed key allies. But since then, the administration’s approach overall has been more level-headed, although it has drawn little attention from the media. In last year’s periodic reappraisal of defense policy, the administration called for regular upgrades in theater-level, or regional missile defense, with the goal of fielding a robust theater-level system by 2020. Last week, [StrategyPage.com](http://strategypage.com/) reported the delivery to the Army of the first two production-model versions of an interceptor called the THAAD, or Terminal High Altitude Area Defense. The Army already has two THAAD batteries equipped with 24 missiles, each 18-feet long. Two more such batteries will be formed this year. THAAD can shoot down incoming missiles with ranges of 2,000 kilometers — a distance considered medium range. It has a perfect record in its last seven tests. Meanwhile, the Patriot, which debuted during the Gulf War, has been steadily upgraded to better handle shorter-range missiles at lower altitudes. Then there’s the Aegis system deployed on warships, which fires missiles with longer ranges than the THAAD but still within the medium-range category. “All these systems work very well,” said Dan Gouré, who follows missile defense at the Lexington Institute in Washington. Even so, they’re spread very thin. The overall theater-level defense, Gouré said, is technologically capable but not “robust.” Unfortunately, not much is taking place on the strategic level, which involves intercontinental missiles that fly high and fast, generally above the reach of THAAD and its kin. To be sure, the United States does have a strategic anti-missile system. Interceptors now sit in their silos in California and Alaska. But the technology remains iffy — the last two tests have been failures — and these installations are oriented toward threats from the west, meaning North Korea. There’s little coverage for missiles launched from the east. On the strategic level, the administration has chosen to monitor the threat and upgrade as needed — what the Pentagon calls a “phased, adaptive approach.” The thinking is that even if the Iranians develop a crude nuclear bomb, it will take more time for them to build intercontinental missiles and even more time to miniaturize a nuke and put it on a nosecone. In an era of tight defense dollars, perhaps the phased adaptive approach is the least-bad choice. But it would be much better to accelerate improvements in the strategic-level system because it would directly undermine the Iranians’ heavy investment in nukes and missiles. Moreover, we should not discount the risk that some rogue state may achieve a quantum leap in missile technology. As Gouré noted, these countries share technology, often test recklessly and then share the results. As we have learned in the past, our ability to know what adversaries are up to is somewhat short of flawless. In any case, at some point Obama may have had a change of heart on missile defense. “Somebody persuaded him,” Gouré said. “Or as people say, ‘He got the threat briefing.’ ” The president was informed that if Iran, for example, launched a couple of long-range missiles, we would have no credible way to stop them. The interceptors in California and Alaska probably wouldn’t be up to the job. Obama could order a massive retaliation, but the nation would still suffer the incalculable loss of a major city. That lack of alternatives is what prompted President Ronald Reagan to begin a missile-defense program to begin with. It shouldn’t be surprising if Obama, too, found the implications of the threat briefing unacceptable.

Plan Popular (4/5)

### Reyes supports BMD and is keeping the program alive

Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance ’06 (site dedicated to missile defense, “A tribute to Democratic Congressman Silvestre Reyes”, 9/15/06, <http://www.missiledefenseadvocacy.org/news_Category.aspx?categoryID=2&news_id=93>)

Last week in El Paso, Texas at the El Camino Hotel, a few blocks from the border of Mexico, MDAA had the honor to pay tribute to our country's leading Democrat on Missile Defense, the Honorable Representative from the 16th district in Texas, Mr. Silvestre Reyes. How symbolic that our congressional representative from one of America's primary international thorough ways and one of this country's poorest districts has led the fight for development and deployment of missile defense. Mr. Reyes spent over 20 years on the Border Patrol prior to being elected as the first Hispanic in Congress from this district. Mr. Reyes has led legislation and political support for Missile Defense since he began in 1996 and continues today as the ranking minority leader in the House Armed Service Committee's subcommittee on Strategic Forces. He is also a member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and is knowledgeable about the threat posed by terrorists and rogue nations. This combined with his Border Patrol experience offers a unique perspective on asymmetrical threats. Congressman Reyes has focused on protection of troops and allies from ballistic missile attack through two administrations and several attempts to stop funding and missile defense programs. In 1998, under the Clinton Administration, Secretary of Defense William Cohen had requested to eliminate the THAAD program and Mr. Reyes along with his Democratic colleagues Rep Murtha (PA) and Rep Cramer (AL) convinced the Secretary to continue with the development of the program. This summer, THAAD intercepted a single stage missile at the White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico is scheduled to be deployed in 2008 to defend large areas and begin protecting tens of thousands of lives. In 2000, under the Bush Administration, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld had requested taking the majority of funds directed to Missile Defense away from short and medium range missile defense systems. Mr. Reyes stepped up along side his Republican colleagues Rep Weldon (R-Pa.) and Rep Everett (R-AL) and changed the Department of Defense's allocation to ensure continued support of both the Patriot and THAAD systems. The Honorable Reyes continues to be a fierce advocate of missile defense, and said it best when he concluded to our audience in El Paso "missile defense is about protecting the lives of my grandchildren and their generation." Today, the United States has deployed 52 Patriot Batteries, each battery having 4 launchers and 8 missiles per launcher. These 52 effective missile defense systems which proved their value by engaging and destroying 9 SCUD missiles in 2003 during Operation Iraqi Freedom saving thousands of lives. The Patriot 3 systems have been deployed to South Korea and Germany where they are available to be transported by airlift anywhere in the world if needed. Additionally, countries such as Japan, Saudi Arabia, Netherlands, Kuwait, and Germany have their own Patriot battery's for their own protection. The picture given to Representative Silvestre Reyes with the Patriot 3 and THAAD systems flanking his portrait is a symbolic tribute to those critical systems that would not be in existence today without his leadership.

Plan Popular (5/5)

### Reyes has power in congress and is getting more

Fields ’11 (Gary, Staff writer for the Florida Public Policy Articles, 5/3/11, “Black, Hispanic Caucus Members Gain Clout”, <http://info.fshcc.com/florida-public-policy-articles/bid/52881/Minority-Caucus-Gain-Clout-in-Congress>)

While centrist Democrats bore the brunt of the midterm election losses, members of the black and Hispanic caucuses, all Democrats and most of them liberal, won 56 of 60 re-election bids. They will gain seniority as the minority-party members on congressional committees and will carry a louder voice among the Democratic House contingent. Hispanic caucus member Rep. Silvestre Reyes of Texas will likely become the ranking member of the Armed Services Committee, as the four Democrats ahead of him in seniority lost their elections. The black caucus's Rep. Maxine Waters of California is set to become the No. 2 Democrat on the Financial Services Committee. Caucus members acknowledge that as members of the minority party in the House, they aren't likely to be setting the agenda. "We'll have to make our case for our priorities from a minority position so it will obviously be more difficult to advance the CBC agenda," said Bobby Scott (D., Va.), who will become the crime subcommittee ranking member. "What we spend our time on will depend to a large extent on what the majority does." Members of the caucuses said, for instance, they might seek to serve as a barrier if Republicans attempt to roll back health care and banking regulations.

## A2: Spending 1/8

### Lots of these cards are recycled from the NMD Aff file – this is just a block

### 1. Turn – Space BMD Spending helps the econ –

### A. Strategic “spin-offs” from space technologies key to high tech sector

Caleca 9 (Ben Caleca,   Staff Writer for the Michigan Daily. Published January 8, 2009 “Ben Caleca: NASA’s Secret

Success” http://www.michigandaily.com/content/2009-01-09/column-ben-caleca)

But no matter the cost, NASA’s projects are worth it. For every dollar put into NASA, the technology has developed returns several times over in new products in fields ranging from medicine to sportswear. And the average American gets to enjoy the benefits. The sensor systems developed for the over-budget Hubble Space Telescope are what allow you to document your night on the town with your digital camera. The expensive corrections made to the Hubble when it was found to be flawed turned out to be a boon for medical imaging systems, giving doctors the ability to detect cancers extremely early and saving countless lives a year. Of course, there are two big questions that always end up being asked: why not directly invest in medicine, and why not let the private sector handle space flight? The truth is that investing in one specific science doesn’t always give you the right answers. We fund medicine, we fund other fields, but it’s in the cross-section of these innovations that the most creative solutions to our problems are found. Diversity of thought and experience generates more overall knowledge and valuable lessons are learned even when the projects fail.

### B. Space technologies invest in the future for technological leadership

Smith 11 (Josh Smith National Journal May 18, 2011 (received state, regional and national awards for his political and policy reporting) “As shuttle program winds down, uncertainty looms for NASA” http://www.govexec .com/dailyfed/0511/051811-shuttle-future.htm)

Reducing space budgets may be an attractive option, but in the long term it could hurt the U.S. economy, said Frank Slazer, vice president of the Aerospace Industries Association. "While cutting the federal deficit is essential to assuring our economic future, cutting back on exploration investments is a penny-wise but pound-foolish approach that will have infinitesimal impact on the budget deficit," he said. "Cutting exploration further threatens our economic growth potential and risks our continued national technical leadership overall, even as emerging world powers increase their investments in this important arena." Space exploration has real impact back on earth, said Republican Sen. Marco Rubio, who represents Florida, which hosts the Kennedy Space Center and other NASA facilities and space industries. "America's space program is not something we simply do for fun," he said. "Many industries exist because of the space program." Rubio called for a better-defined goal for NASA. And losing the competitive edge in space could undermine American economic power and national security,” said Elliot Pulham, CEO of the Space Foundation.

A2: Spending 2/8

### C. U.S. Military Spending cornerstone of economy – jobs

Pollin and Garrett-Peltier ‘07 (Robert Pollin and Heidi Garrett-Peltier Department of Economics and Political Economy Research Institute University of Massachusetts, Amherst. October 2007. University of Massachusetts. <http://www.ips-dc.org/reports/071001-jobcreation.pdf>.)

The U.S. government spent an estimated $572 billion on the military in 2007. This amounts to about $1,800 for every resident of the country. The level of military spending has risen dramatically since 2001, with the increases beginning even before September 11, 2001. In total dollar terms (after controlling for inflation), military spending has risen at an average rate of 10 percent per year from 2000 – 2006, the full years of the Bush presidency to date. By contrast, the overall U.S. economy grew at an average annual rate of 2.7 percent. As a share of GDP, the military budget rose from 3.0 to 4.4 percent of GDP during the Bush Presidency. At the current size of the economy, a difference between a military budget at 4.4 rather than 3.0 percent of GDP amounts to $134 billion. The largest increases in the military budget during the Bush presidency have been associated with the Afghanistan and especially the Iraq wars. The Iraq war alone now costs an average of $360 million a day (according to the Congressional Research Service), or $138 billion over the 2007 fiscal year. Thus, the $138 billion spent on Iraq in 2007 was basically equal to the total increase in military spending resulting from moving the military budget from 3.0 to 4.4 percent of GDP. Amid the debates on the political and strategic merits of the Iraq war, one aspect of the current level of military spending by the U.S. government that has been largely neglected is its effects on the U.S. economy. $600 billion is a vast sum of money—greater than the combined GDP of Sweden and Thailand, and eight times the amount of U.S. federal spending on education. It is therefore reasonable to ask what the benefits might be to U.S. taxpayers if some significant share of the $600 billion now going to the military were instead devoted to alternative domestic purposes, such as health care, education, or the environment. A view is often expressed that the military budget is a cornerstone of the U.S. economy. The Pentagon is often said to be a major underwriter of, and stimulus to, important technical innovations. It is also often cited as a major employer, providing good jobs—jobs that are stable and at least decently paid—to millions of Americans.

A2: Spending 3/8

### D. Military Spending key to Economy – Studies Prove

UAB 10. (University of Alabama Birmingham study led by Assistant Professor of Sociology Casey Borch, Ph.D. June 17, 2010. “UAB Study Confirms Military Spending Helps States Survive Poor Economy”

 http://main.uab.edu/Sites/MediaRelations/articles/78097/.)

States in which defense spending is high are better equipped to withstand the effects of an economic downturn than others, according to a new study led by The University of Alabama at Birmingham Assistant Professor of Sociology Casey Borch, Ph.D. The study, published this week in the June issue of the journal Social Forces, confirms that states with high levels of defense spending have lower poverty rates, less income inequality, lower unemployment and higher median family income. It also demonstrates that the U.S. economy is increasingly dependent on military spending. "Politicians always have assumed that military spending helps the economy, but there have been very few studies to prove that it's true. No studies have examined the effects of military spending on as many measures of economic well-being at the state level as our study," said Borch, who teaches in the UAB Department of Sociology and Social Work. For this study, Borch and his team examined data taken from 49 states during the post-Vietnam War era, from 1977 to 2004, to determine the role of military spending in a peacetime economy. The time span coincided with a 30-year decline in and dependence on manufacturing in the United States, Borch said. The researchers reviewed spending on defense contracts and military personnel and compared it to changes in economic indicators over time - poverty and unemployment rates, median family income and income disparities. The researchers also adjusted for variables such as the dominant political party in a state, strength of labor unions, number of Fortune 500 companies, gross state product (GSP) from manufacturing and proportion of military and non-military federal spending. The researchers found, for example, that an increase in a state's dependence on military spending, from 5 to 10 percent of its total GSP, increased employment about 1 percent - despite nationwide declines in manufacturing - and a $14,000 per household increase in median family income. In addition, the Gini Index, a measure of income distribution across a population, fell about 6 percent. Poverty rates fell about 2 percent. Data in the study showed that decreased military spending coincided with times of economic hardship in the states. For example, the 1990s were marked by slowdowns in military spending, and many state economies dependent on military spending suffered higher unemployment, slow economic growth and widening income inequality, Borch said. "For some cities and states, military spending is an incredibly important part of the local economy," said Borch. "For example, in places like Virginia, which has military bases and a shipbuilding center, there is an enormous amount of military spending, and Huntsville, Ala., is the third most dependent metropolitan statistical area in the country. Other states like Montana and Idaho enjoy less. Therefore, you have politicians and community leaders who work to get military spending funneled into their states because it helps the state economy." The United States ranks No. 1 in the world for military spending, said Borch. Russia ranks second, with a military budget about seven times smaller than the United States.

A2: Spending 4/8

### 2. Turn – BMD protects space assets, saves money in the long run

Kleinberg '11 (Howard Kleinberg, member of the graduate faculty of the Department of Public & International Affairs at University of North Carolina Wilmington, April 2011. US Army Field Artillery Association, “A Global Missile Defense 'networK': Terrestrial High-Energy Lasers and Aerospace Mirrors,” p. Lexis)

Fortunately, this recently -revealed, real-world ASAT threat also brings a silver lining in it. As is the case with ballistic missiles, SBBMD weapons can also defend against ASATs. All ASATs, at least, whether direct-ascent or co-orbiting, must first be launched from the Earth's surface, regardless of the launch platform, and must first go through a boost phase. And since SB-BMD provides the single best way to stop any such missile attack from taking place, Robert Butterworth, suggests inhis article, "Assuring Space Support Despite ASATs," it would also provide the single best way to defend against ASAT attacks; same mission, different payload inside the threat missile. SB-BMDs could also intercept ASATs in other phases of their flight, at least within lower Earth orbit. For instance, the Missile Defense Agency's GMD can intercept ICBM warheads at the peak of their trajectories, some 1, 100 km (500 miles) or so. Similarly, an ASAT (direct-ascent or co-orbiting) on terminal approach towards a satellite in LEO would present a target of comparable size, density and velocity as a "mid-course" ICBM warhead (if not even larger), at a similar altitude, and possibly similar speed and trajectory. As a result, the AS AT could also be targeted and interceptedby a midcoursedefense-capable SB-BMD weapon, in addition to its primary role of boost-phase defense, giving a "second-chance" round of shots with which to try to stop any ASAT.

### 3. No Link – Space BMD not Expensive – The Space BMD program costs only between 22 and 44 billion dollars

Hitchens '3 (Theresa Hitchens, vice president and director of the Space Security Project at the Center for Defense Information, “Space-Based Missile Defense: Not So Heavenly”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 21, 2003, <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/2003/07/24/space-based-missile-defense-not-so-heavenly/b9d>)

While the study, "Report of the American Physical Society Study Group on Boost-Phase Intercept Systems for National Missile Defense: Scientific and Technical Issues," did not provide any cost analysis, doing the math is fairly simple. Average launch costs have hovered for decades at about $22,000 per kilogram. A metric ton equals 1,000 kilograms. So, this best-case scenario for space-based missile defenses would cost $44 billion just to get the interceptors into orbit. Some experts argue that, given the volume of space launches that would be required to boost the system, launch costs could conceivably over time come down to half that per kilogram sum: $11,000. If this is true, then such a system could be **put into orbit for only $22 billion.**

**4. No Brink – No difference between 14 trillion dollars in debt and 14.3 trillion dollars**

A2: Spending 5/8

### 5. N/U – The War in Afghanistan regularly costs 120 billion every year

Cooper '10 (Helen Cooper is a White House correspondent with The New York Times. “Cost of Wars a Rising Issue as Obama Weighs Troop Levels”. “Cost of War a rising issue as Obama Weighs Troop Levels”.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/22/us/politics/22costs.html>.)

As Mr. Obama begins trying to untangle the country from its military and civilian promises in Afghanistan, his critics and allies alike are drawing a direct line between what is not being spent to bolster the sagging economy in America to what it is spending — $120 billion in Afghanistan this year alone. On Monday, the United States Conference of Mayors made that connection explicitly, saying that American taxes should be paying for bridges in Baltimore and Kansas City, not in Baghdad and Kandahar. The mayors’ group approved a resolution calling for an early end to the American military role in Afghanistan and Iraq, asking Congress to redirect the billions now being spent on war and reconstruction costs toward urgent domestic needs. The resolution, which noted that local governments cut 28,000 jobs in May alone, was the group’s first anti-war vote since it passed a resolution four decades ago calling for an end to the Vietnam War. And in a speech on the Senate floor on Tuesday, Senator Joe Manchin III, Democrat of West Virginia, said: “We can no longer, in good conscience, cut services and programs at home, raise taxes or — and this is very important — lift the debt ceiling in order to fund nation-building in Afghanistan. The question the president faces — we all face — is quite simple: Will we choose to rebuild America or Afghanistan? In light of our nation’s fiscal peril, we cannot do both.” Demonstrators describing themselves as “angry jobless citizens” said they would picket the Capitol on Wednesday to urge members of Congress to use any savings from Mr. Obama’s troop reductions to create more jobs. The group sponsoring the demonstration, the Prayer Without Ceasing Party, said in a statement on Tuesday that it was “urging the masses to call their congressmen and the president to ensure that jobs receive a top priority when the troops start returning to America.” Spending on the war in Afghanistan has skyrocketed since Mr. Obama took office, to $118.6 billion in 2011. It was $14.7 billion in 2003, when President George W. Bush turned his attention and American resources to the war in Iraq. The increase is easy to explain. When Mr. Obama took office, he vowed to aggressively pursue what he termed America’s “war of necessity” (Afghanistan) and to withdraw from America’s “war of choice” (Iraq). He has done so; the lines on Iraq and Afghanistan war spending crossed in 2010, when the United States spent $93.8 billion in Afghanistan versus $71.3 billion in Iraq, according to the Congressional Research Service. But the White House is keenly aware that the president is heading into a re-election campaign; with the country’s jobless rate remaining high, topping 9 percent, his poll numbers on his handling of the domestic economy have plummeted. “Do we really need to be spending $120 billion in a country with a G.D.P. that’s one-sixth that size?” asked Brian Katulis, a national security expert at the Center for American Progress, a policy group with close ties to the Obama administration. “Most Americans would be shocked to know that we’re spending that kind of money for jobs programs for former Taliban, and would wonder where are our jobs programs for Detroit and Cleveland?” In 2010, Congress — at the Obama administration’s request — set aside $100 million to support programs in Afghanistan aimed at moving former insurgents off the battlefields and into the country’s mainstream economy. Those efforts — similar to what the Bush administration did in Iraq — have yet to bear much fruit; the 1,700 fighters who have enrolled in the reintegration program represent only a fraction of the estimated 20,000 to 40,000 Taliban insurgents, The New York Times reported Monday.

### 6. No Link – Spending is Offset

Dolman 05 (Everett Dolman is an Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies. 14 September 2005. http://www.e-parl.net/pages/space\_hearing\_images/ConfPaper%20Dolman%20US%20Military%20Transform%20&%20Space.pdf.)

The immediate budget impact of significant funding increases for space weapons would be to decrease funding for combat aircraft, the surface battle fleet, and ground forces. This may well set the proponents of space weaponization at odds with both proponents and opponents of increased defense spending. Space advocates must sell their ideas to fellow pro-weapons groups by making the case that the advantages they provide outweigh the capabilities forgone. This is a mighty task. The tens or even hundreds of billions of dollars needed to develop, test and deploy a minimal space weapons system with the capacity to engage a few targets around the world could displace a half-dozen or more aircraft carrier battle groups, entire aircraft procurement programs such as the F-22, and several heavy armored divisions. This is a tough sell for supporters of a strong military.

A2: Spending 6/8

### 7. No Impact – Tech bubble burst of '01 and economic downturn of '08 did not cause wars

### 8. Impact Inevitable – Democrats refuse any cuts

WNR '11 (Wheeling News Register, “Liberals Blocking Any Fiscal Control,” 6-1, http://www.news-register.net/page/content.detail/id/555717/Liberals-Blocking-Any-Fiscal-Control.html?nav=511)

Liberals in the U.S. Senate have made it clear they will not under any circumstances consider even baby steps toward reining in the federal spending spree. Various proposals to reduce deficit spending - not eliminate it - have been made during the past year. The most recent one, approved by the House of Representatives, was put forth by U.S. Rep. Paul Ryan, R-Wis. But that proposal was rejected in the Senate, which remains under the tight-fisted control of liberal Democrats. Still, the Ryan plan remains in play, to the point liberals have made it their primary target. During the weekend, Sen. Charles Schumer, D-N.Y., stressed the Ryan plan is unacceptable to liberals. "We will oppose (Republicans) in the budget negotiations if they don't abandon Ryan," he vowed. Consider just what it is Schumer and company are rejecting: Under current policies, the government would engage in $9.5 trillion in deficit spending during the next 10 years. That is on top of the current $14.3 trillion national debt. Ryan's plan would curb just $4 trillion of that 10-year deficit - less than half. The liberals won't even agree to that. Clearly, they have chosen to draw a line in the sand - in red ink.

A2: Spending 7/8

### 9. Turn – Space BMD solves Iranian EMP attacks that collapse the economy

Kennedy '8 (Brian Kennedy, president of the Claremont Institute and a member of the Independent Working Group on Missile Defense, 2008. “What a single nuclear warhead could do,”

 <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122748923919852015.html>)

Third, America will remain in a condition of strategic vulnerability as long as it fails to build defenses against the most powerful political and military weapons arrayed against us: ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads. Such missiles can be used to destroy our country, blackmail or paralyze us. Any consideration of how best to provide for the common defense must begin by acknowledging these facts. Consider Iran. For the past decade, Iran -- with the assistance of Russia, China and North Korea -- has been developing missile technology. Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani announced in 2004 their ability to mass produce the Shahab-3 missile capable of carrying a lethal payload to Israel or -- if launched from a ship -- to an American city. The current controversy over Iran's nuclear production is really about whether it is capable of producing nuclear warheads. This possibility is made more urgent by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's statement in 2005: "Is it possible for us to witness a world without America and Zionism? But you had best know that this slogan and this goal are attainable, and surely can be achieved." Mr. Ahmadinejad takes seriously, even if the average Iranian does not, radical Islam's goal of converting, subjugating or destroying the infidel peoples -- first and foremost the citizens of the U.S. and Israel. Even after 9/11, we appear not to take that threat seriously. We should. Think about this scenario: An ordinary-looking freighter ship heading toward New York or Los Angeles launches a missile from its hull or from a canister lowered into the sea. It hits a densely populated area. A million people are incinerated. The ship is then sunk. No one claims responsibility. There is no firm evidence as to who sponsored the attack, and thus no one against whom to launch a counterstrike. But as terrible as that scenario sounds, there is one that is worse. Let us say the freighter ship launches a nuclear-armed Shahab-3 missile off the coast of the U.S. and the missile explodes 300 miles over Chicago. The nuclear detonation in space creates an electromagnetic pulse (EMP). Gamma rays from the explosion, through the Compton Effect, generate three classes of disruptive electromagnetic pulses, which permanently destroy consumer electronics, the electronics in some automobiles and, most importantly, the hundreds of large transformers that distribute power throughout the U.S. All of our lights, refrigerators, water-pumping stations, TVs and radios stop running. We have no communication and no ability to provide food and water to 300 million Americans. This is what is referred to as an EMP attack, and such an attack would effectively throw America back technologically into the early 19th century. It would require the Iranians to be able to produce a warhead as sophisticated as we expect the Russians or the Chinese to possess. But that is certainly attainable. Common sense would suggest that, absent food and water, the number of people who could die of deprivation and as a result of social breakdown might run well into the millions. Let us be clear. A successful EMP attack on the U.S. would have a dramatic effect on the country, to say the least. Even one that only affected part of the country would cripple the economy for years. Dropping nuclear weapons on or retaliating against whoever caused the attack would not help. And an EMP attack is not far-fetched. Twice in the last eight years, in the Caspian Sea, the Iranians have tested their ability to launch ballistic missiles in a way to set off an EMP. The congressionally mandated EMP Commission, with some of America's finest scientists, has released its findings and issued two separate reports, the most recent in April, describing the devastating effects of such an attack on the U.S. The only solution to this problem is a robust, multilayered missile-defense system. The most effective layer in this system is in space, using space-based interceptors that destroy an enemy warhead in its ascent phase when it is easily identifiable, slower, and has not yet deployed decoys. We know it can work from tests conducted in the early 1990s. We have the technology. What we lack is the political will to make it a reality. An EMP attack is not one from which America could recover as we did after Pearl Harbor. Such an attack might mean the end of the United States and most likely the Free World. It is of the highest priority to have a president and policy makers not merely acknowledge the problem, but also make comprehensive missile defense a reality as soon as possible.

A2: Spending 8/8

### 10. Turn –

### A. BMD solves ASAT

Kleinberg '11 (Howard Kleinberg, member of the graduate faculty of the Department of Public & International Affairs at University of North Carolina Wilmington, April 2011. US Army Field Artillery Association, “A Global Missile Defense 'networK': Terrestrial High-Energy Lasers and Aerospace Mirrors,” p. Lexis )

Fortunately, this recently -revealed, real-world ASAT threat also brings a silver lining in it. As is the case with ballistic missiles, SBBMD weapons can also defend against ASATs. All ASATs, at least, whether direct-ascent or co-orbiting, must first be launched from the Earth's surface, regardless of the launch platform, and must first go through a boost phase. And since SB-BMD provides the single best way to stop any such missile attack from taking place, Robert Butterworth, suggests in his article, "Assuring Space Support Despite ASATs," it would also provide the single best way to defend against ASAT attacks; same mission, different payload inside the threat missile. SB-BMDs could also intercept ASATs in other phases of their flight, at least within lower Earth orbit. For instance, the Missile Defense Agency's GMD can intercept ICBM warheads at the peak of their trajectories, some 1, 100 km (500 miles) or so. Similarly, an ASAT (direct-ascent or co-orbiting) on terminal approach towards a satellite in LEO would present a target of comparable size, density and velocity as a "mid-course" ICBM warhead (if not even larger), at a similar altitude, and possibly similar speed and trajectory. As a result, the AS AT could also be targeted and intercepted by a midcourse defense-capable SB-BMD weapon, in addition to its primary role of boost-phase defense, giving a "second-chance" round of shots with which to try to stop any ASAT.

### B. ASAT Collapses the economy

Easton '9 (Ian Easton, Research Fellow at the 2049 Project Institute, 2009. “The Great Game in Space,”

http://www.project2049.net/documents/china\_asat\_weapons\_the\_great\_game\_in\_space.pdf)

Many specialists also argue that aside from the U.S. military dependency on orbital space, the U.S. economy, and in turn, much of the world economy, is also rapidly becoming dependent on space-based systems. They posit that, in effect, the U.S. is now a “spacefaring” nation whose very way of life is tied to the myriad capabilities provided by the orbital space medium. War games conducted as part of U.S. national security protocols, such as the Army-After-Next, Navy Global and Air Force Global Engagement series, Space Game 2 and Schriever 1 & 2, as well as the privately conducted “DEADSATS” war games, conducted from the late 1990s and the early 2000s, confirm this view. According to some space experts who were intimately involved with the war games, the exercises exposed “a critical national Achilles heel that politicians, economists and corporate CEOs have largely ignored…losses in space can quickly affect the economic, social, and national security fabric not only of the United States, but of the entire world.” These experts further speculate that “large military powers,” such as the United States, could “be held hostage by the unknowns inherent in a new kind of war.” 36 These concerns are directly linked with China’s ASAT weapons and their potential applicability in any future U.S.-Sino conflict. A more recent war game, “Pacific Vision,” conducted by Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) underscored the vulnerability of the unprotected commercial communication satellite channels on which the Air Force relies, as well as its cyber and radar vulnerabilities to Chinese attack.