## Notes

There are two versions of this K – ‘Expenditure’ and ‘Death Drive.’ Expenditure is most easily thought of as a link turn to nuclear extinction – the aff makes death more likely. Death drive is most easily thought of as an impact turn – their relationship to death is bad. For that reason, the best expenditure tricks are in a sub-section under the Expenditure 1nc and the best death drive tricks are under the Death Drive 1nc.

I don’t think these arguments are mutually exclusive – the argument with death drive isn’t ‘death good’ but ‘their approach to death is bad.’ Therefore, I don’t think it’s a double-turn to read the two arguments simultaneously. However, there is some potential tension and to avoid confusion these two arguments are separated.

## 1nc – Expenditure

Excess is inevitable – the 1AC’s attempt to contain and transcend it through utility inevitably fails

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Belonging alongside ‘sacrifice’ in Bataille’s work is the word ‘expenditure’, dépense. This word operates in a network of thought that he describes as general or solar economy: the economics of excess, outlined most fully in the same shaggy and beautiful ‘theoretical’ work—The Accursed Share—in which he writes: ‘the radiation of the sun is distinguished by its unilateral character: it loses itself without reckoning, without counterpart. Solar economy is founded upon this principle’ [VII 10]. It is because the sun squanders itself upon us without return that ‘The sum of energy produced is always superior to that which was necessary to its production’ [VII 9] since ‘we are ultimately nothing but an effect of the sun’ [VII 10]. Excess or surplus always precedes production, work, seriousness, exchange, and lack. Need is never given, it must be constructed out of luxuriance. The primordial task of life is not to produce or survive, but to consume the clogging floods of riches—of energy—pouring down upon it. He states this boldly in his magnificent line: ‘The world…is sick with wealth’ [VII 15]. Expenditure, or sacrificial consumption, is not an appeal, an exchange, or a negotiation, but an uninhibited wastage that returns energy to its solar trajectory, releasing it back into the movement of dissipation that the terrestrial system—culminating in restricted human economies— momentarily arrests. Voluptuary destruction is the only end of energy, a process of liquidation that can be suspended by the acumulative efforts whose zenith form is that of the capitalist bourgeoisie, but only for a while. For solar economy ‘[e]xcess is the incontestable point of departure’ [VII 12], and excess must, in the end, be spent. The momentary refusal to participate in the uninhibited flow of luxuriance is the negative of sovereignty; a servile differance, postponement of the end. The burning passage of energetic dissipation is restrained in the interest of something that is taken to transcend it; a future time, a depredatory class, a moral goal… Energy is put into the service of the future. ‘The end of the employment of a tool always has the same sense as the employment of the tool: a utility is assigned to it in its turn—and so on. The stick digs the earth in order to ensure the growth of a plant, the plant is cultivated to be eaten, it is eaten to maintain the life of the one who cultivated it…The absurdity of an infinite recursion alone justifies the equivalent absurdity of a true end, which does not serve anything’ [VII 298].

**Our alternative is to refuse the 1ac’s utilitarian ethics as a revolutionary act of sacrifice – that’s the only way to reverse nuclear annihilation, slavery and escape the current political order**

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In chapter 4, I examine how the renegade surrealist Georges Bataille used the sacrificial ideas developed by his predecessors to challenge the basic premise of the French discourse on sacrificial violence. Although Bataille agrees with Maistre, Sor,el, and the French revolutionaries that sacrificial violence can be adapted to modern political settings, Bataille disputes the historical association of sacrifice with political foundation and authority. Maistre, Sorel, and the French revolutionaries sought to place sacrifice in the service of moral revolutions in order to ground new forms of politics and legitimate power. For Bataille, however, human liberation requires not better politics, achieved through violent political foundation, but rather the sacrificial dismantling of the constitutive elements of modern political activity. Taking aim at liberalism and utilitarianism in particular, Bataille pursues an idea of revolutionary sacrifice that liberates human beings from all forms of servility, including morality authority, identity, community the whole modern political enterprise. Bataille argues that **revolutionary liberation requires the retrieval of sacrificial activities that subvert** rational, useful, and productive modes of thought and action anything that transforms human beings into things. Rather than producing something that the sacrificer can use, such as power rendered sacred, Bataillian sacrifice generates an ecstatic experience of self loss. In Bataille's vie sacrifice must free humanity from politics, not support, establish, or reestablish it. Bataffle thus envisions that unproductive sacrificial activities will give birth to a metapoitical community paradoxically defined by its permanent lack of foundation. In this way Bataille uses the works of Maistre and Sorel to repudiate the basic assumptions of the French discourse on sacrificial violence. Batalile's radical reformulating of political sacrifice reveals what is at stake in using sacrificial violence to found politics. During the t93os, Bataille increasingly distanced sacrificial practices from the realm of politics because he was fearful that founding violence would generate fascism rather than freedom. On the eve of World War II, Bataille extended this logic as far as it would go, imagining that sacrificial violence would achieve ecstatic liberation if it were practiced in the bedroom or on and through the text. Although Bataille never evinces any reticence about violence or cruelty I argue that he ultimately realized that sacrifice practiced in either a French revolutionary, Maistrian, or Sorelian fashion led to tyranny. Batallle's contribution to the French discourse on sacrificial violence is thus ironical. On one hand, he pushes the idea of sacrificial violence to its logical conclusion by arguing that the sacrifice of another being for the sake of political change cannot generate anything useful or productive. On the other hand, the legendary sacrificial crime to borrow again from Machiavelli permanently alters the sacrificers as well as the basis upon which they can form a community with others. Thus, Bataille recognized that seeking political change through sacrifice permanently destabilizes the basic elements of modern Western politics. Although Bataille lays bare the risk of using sacrificial violence to found politics, he also succumbs to the same temptation as his predecessors who condemned the use of sacrifice by others, but wished to harness it for themselves. Bataille criticizes the French revolutionaries, Maistre, and Sorel for placing sacrifice in the service of authoritarian structures of power. Like the other members of the discourse on sacrificial violence, however, Bataille never abandons the idea that sacrificial violence is a sacred, spectacular form of bloodshed that plays a vital role in the formation of human communality. During the Cold War, Bataille uncharacteristically developed this position into a quasi scientific, general theory of political economy Representing a systematic critique of utilitarianism, this postwar theoretical work illustrates Bataille's effort to find contemporary examples of sacrificial loss that will save the modern world from the dangers of political sclerosis and the possibility of nuclear annihilation. In setting sacrifice to work, Bataille contradicts his prewar claims about the absolute uselessness of sacrifice. At the same time, he also demonstrates the sublime appeal the attraction and danger of adapting ancient ideas about violence and loss to modern political conditions. It was precisely this particular quality of sacrificial violence that originally attracted the French revolutionaries,.leading them to inaugurate the discourse on sacrificial violence. Defining sacrifice is difficult because of the ambiguity inherent in violence. Violence is generally defined in terms of physical injury or harm to subjects and objects. Violence directed against humans involves injury to or constraint of the body and mind. Against objects, violence entails damage or destruction. Metaphoric violence, the broadest aspect of the definition, includes innumerable symbolic, culturally specific notions of harm. The modern meaning of violence is limited and, unfortunately, confused by the fact that it is distinguished from "force," which today is often used to mean legitimate violence. Because there are various, irreconcilable concepts of right, there is also irresolvable debate about the difference between force and violence. In the ancient world, however, the concept of violence retained the ambiguity eschewed by the modern world, Vi "force," is the root of the Latin vi/coda, "violence," collapsing the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate bloodshed. I/jo lentus denotes "acting with (unreasonable) force towards others, violent, savage, aggressive."' In this case, "unreasonable" describes not the illicitness or illegality of a violent act, but rather its disproportionate, extraordinary; or distinctive quality: This definition of plo/cows is negative and thus departs from the more ambiguous meaning of vLs, which retains a positive quality. In addition to signifying the use of physical strength to compel or constrain vigorously as well as the unlawful use of force, pbs also implies binding force or authority.' J/ls thus encompasses the essential uncertainty of violence, the fact that it can be "good" or "bad," depending on the context. A subcategory of violence, sacrifice is etymologically an act that renders holy or sacred. If rendering sacred entails a process of setting apart from the quotidian or profane, then sacrificial violence is a paradoxical practice: it is a form of violence capable of breaking and forming distinctions or erasing and drawing boundaries. This definition is counterintuitive because the modern view of violence exclusively associates it with the breaking down of social distinctions, chaos, mayhem, disruption, anarchy, loss of control, and the like. In contrast, sacrificial violence involves a double movement; it transgresses limits in order to inscribe or reinscribe them. 'What is more, this is not necessarily a conservative operation. **The** purpose of sacrifice is not limited to the restoration of a particular order, limit, boundary, or status quo. The function of sacrifice is contingent upon how it "makes sacred." Some sacred things are pure, elevated, divine, majestic, and absolute; others are impure, debased, demonic, abject, and inassimilable. When violentia denotes the capacity to transgress, pollute, or profane things that are pure or sacred, it captures only the negative aspect of the violent dou ble movement of sacrifice.Viewed from the standpoint of force or legitimate violence, sacrifice holds the potential to generate a positive sacredness, which mimics the legitimacy of political power. In this respect, sacrifice describes a variety of practices that transform the negativity of violence into something socioculturally acceptable. Like any other social phenomenon, violence has normal and exceptional manifestations. Socially acceptable violence does not call attention to itself or to its author; it is woven into the fabric of everyday life. Exceptional, spectacular; or transgressive violence creates a tear in that fabric and, in so doing, sets its authors and their victims apart from their fellow human beings.This separation by dint of violence is the essence of the sacrificial mechanism and the reason why such bloodshed is considered sacred. A process of collective destruction, sacrificial violence is often ritualized or culturally prefigured. Although this book is concerned with the meanings of human sacrifice in a modern political context, sacrifice has, more often than not, involved animal, vegetable, and inanimate objects. Ritual sacrificial practices and their meanings are typically inherited from the past and are usually invoked only in particular circumstances. As the very term implies, ritual sacrifice is anticipated, orchestrated, and socially acceptable; like Mass or potlatch, it is a symbolic form of violence that conforms to a regularized set of expectations. The participants in the ritual know what kind of violence will take place; they know how that violence will be conducted, and by whom; most important, they know whit category of victim (pridner ofwar, woman, racial or religious minority, etc.) will be selected. Although the actual function ofritual sacrifice may remain a mystery to those who practice it, its total meaning is predetermined. Thus, ritual sacrifice can be compared to a game of chance: the rules may not be written down, but they are fixed. These rules govern the selection ofthe victim, even though the specific victim and the actual outcome remain unknown. Finajly, like games of chance, sacrificial rites can have various outcomes, a reflection of their "success" or "failure?' Sacrifice is not always ritually prescribed. Two factors separate spontaneous sacrificial violence from its ritual cousin: the absence of agreement about sacrificial legitimacy and procedure. Without ritual prescription knowing whom, when, and how to kill communities that spontaneously sacrifice inevitably find themselves deeply divided about the reasons for and methods of killing. Indeed, in such cases, sacrifice may simply heighten communal conflict. Whifr ritual sacrifice expresses the rigidity and hierarchy of the social order that it serves, spontaneous sacrifice has no specific allegiance to any set of cultural symbols or social distinctions. Spontaneous sacrificial violence is potentially revolutionary when it symbolically manifests' ociocuIrural meanings and symbols that compete with dominant, traditional ones. Disconnected from an orchestrated and au¬thorized set of practices, spontaneous sacrifice can, through violence, open a space of contestation that serves to challenge status quo views and practices. It is a telltale sign that a community in crisis is pregnant with a new political order.

### 2nc – Nuclear Annihilation

**Destroying excess and limits now is critical to averting a nuclear holocaust**

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I stress the importance of LeBlanc’s thesis— that violent conflict arising out of ever-growing population pressures and diminishing carrying capacity of the environment characterizes all developmental levels of human society— because it highlights another apparent weakness of Bataille’s theory. LeBlanc would argue that there is no model of what we held so dear in the 1960s: a noble savage— Native American, Tibetan, or whoever— who is or was “in harmony with the environment.” Bataille’s theory would seem to posit just such a harmony, albeit one that involves the violence of sacrifice rather than the contentment of the lotus-eater. **Man in his primitive state was in harmony not with the supposed peace of Eden but with the violence of the universe, with the solar force of blinding energy: The naïve man was not a stranger in the universe. Even with the dread it confronted him with, he saw its spectacle as a festival to which he had been invited.** He perceived its glory, and believed himself to be responsible for his own glory as well. (OC, 7: 192) While LeBlanc’s theory of sacrifice is functional— he is concerned mainly with how people use sacrifice in conjunction with warfare to maximize their own or their group’s success— **Bataille’s theory is religious in that he is concerned with the ways in which people commune with a larger, unlimited, transcendent reality. But in order to do so they must** apparently **enjoy an unlimited carrying capacity**. And yet, if we think a bit more deeply about these two approaches to human expenditure (both LeBlanc and Bataille are, ultimately, theorists of human violence), we start to see notable points in common. Despite appearing to be a theorist of human and ecological scarcity, LeBlanc nevertheless presupposes one basic fact: there is always a tendency for there to be too many humans in a given population. Certainly populations grow at different rates for different reasons, but they always seem to outstrip their environments: there is, in essence, always an excess of humans that has to be burned off. Conversely, **Bataille is a thinker of limits to growth, precisely because he always presupposes a limit: if there were no limit,** after all, **there could be no excess of anything (yet the limit would be meaningless if there were not always already an excess: the excess opens the possibility of the limit).** As we know, for Bataille too there is never a steady state: energy (wealth) can be reinvested, which results in growth; **when growth is no longer possible, when the limits to growth have been reached, the excess must be destroyed. If it is not, it will only return to cause us to destroy ourselves: war**. For **if we aren’t strong enough to destroy**, on our own, **excessive energy, it cannot be used; and, like a healthy animal that cannot be trained, it will come back to destroy us, and we will be the ones who pay the costs of the inevitable explosion**. (OC, 7: 31; AS, 24) In fact, Bataille sounds a lot like LeBlanc when he notes, in The Accursed Share, that the peoples of the “barbarian plateaus” of central Asia, mired in poverty and technologically inferior, could no longer move outward and conquer other adjacent, richer areas. They were, in effect, trapped; their only solution was the one that LeBlanc notes in similar cases: radical infertility. This, as noted by Bataille, was the solution of the Tibetans, who supported an enormous population of infertile and unproductive monks (OC, 7: 106; AS, 108). **Bataille does,** then, **implicitly face the question of carrying capacity**. Perhaps **the ultimate example of this is nuclear war. The modern economy**, according to Bataille, **does not recognize the possibility of excess and therefore limits;** the Protestant, and then the Marxist, **ideal is to reinvest all excess back into the productive process**, always augmenting output in this way. “**Utility” in this model ends up being perfectly impractical: only so much output can be reabsorbed into the ever-more-efficient productive process**. As in the case with Tibet, **ultimately the excess will have to be burned off**. This can happen either peacefully, through various postcapitalist mechanisms that Bataille recommends, such as the Marshall Plan, which will shift growth to other parts of the world, or violently and apocalyptically through the ultimate in war: nuclear holocaust. One can see that, in the end, **the world itself will be en vase clos, fully developed, with no place for the excess to go. The bad alternative— nuclear holocaust— will result in the ultimate reduction in carrying capacity: a burned-out, depopulated earth. Humanity is,** at the same time, **through industry, which uses energy for the development of the forces of production, both a multiple opening of the possibilities of growth, and the infinite faculty for burnoff in pure loss** [facilité infinie de consumation en pure perte]. (OC, 7: 170; AS, 181)

### 2nc – Burnoff

**Extinction is inevitable- energy is finite- our orientation towards energy is what matters**

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The labor of the construction of civilization is not over, in other words, history is not at an end, because labor itself is not autonomous: you can’t work or produce anything if you don’t have the fuels (the sources of energy) to do it. The great myth that Man “forms himself ” by forming, and transforming, brute matter is over. The idea that Nature is dead is over because fossil fuels were not made by Man, they were only extracted by “him.” They are brutally natural, and their shortage too is a natural shortage (their lack is natural). And when a profound, irremediable shortage of those fuels supervenes, history opens back up. History will not, as some critics of the “end of history” thesis claimed, return merely as localized struggles and revolts that put the superpowers on the spot. Instead, History now is the fight for a resource that will allow History as we have come to think of it— the flourishing of civilization and the establishment of the definitive dignity of Man— to continue and triumph. No one yet wants to think about how History should continue in the absence of an adequate supply of fossil fuels. It is too horrible to think about. Human die-off is quite natural, but it also constitutes an incontrovertible historical event. 3 With the finitude of cheap energy, alas, the end of history is itself finite. But how do we think the end of the end of history?

### 2nc – Turns Transport

**The modern centripetal movement of the city inevitably accelerates and leads to violence**

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For Bataille, the theocentric city is a lateral construct that is nevertheless inseparable from the hierarchical, fixed form of the monument. The city could be said to be, on the horizontal plane, the adjunct of the verticality of the monument. The city is the base, the obligatory spatial organization that underlies that which rises above. The city draws in people and goods from the boondocks; it concentrates them in central places where they are bought, sold, stockpiled, and sacrificed. As we have seen (in chapter 4), the modern city for Bataille is a problematic space because it transforms, translates, this centrifugal movement to a centripetal one. The markers of the elevated, the timeless, the holy, have become so abstract, so ideal, volatilized, that they are on the point of toppling. They no longer fulfill their role of maintaining and strengthening the profane order that supports them: through their absence, they deprive the secular order of the coherence necessary to its sense of purpose. The markers that stand in for the gods, for God, reveal themselves to be what they always were: unseen, not worthy of being seen, meaningless, radically heterogeneous to the profane order but no longer tied to a transcendent realm capable of justifying activity. In the indifferent atheism of the modern world, God, the sun, or whatever, has revealed itself as the dead node around which activity— indifferent motorized traffic— turns. It is just a matter of recognizing the emptiness of the ultimate signified— and the whole structure will crash. It is as if by intensifying, speeding up the movement of a theocentric, logical, and legal world, by making the seemingly isolated “particles” spin around the center at an ever faster rate, modernity has revealed the emptiness of the universal signified. The universal, the sovereign, was empty all along, base in its heterogeneity, a capstone meaning nothing, leading to nothing else, providing nothing, but it had always been taken, at least in the Christian tradition, as a plenitude, a holy, pristine guarantee of permanence and happiness. Now it is what it is, when we have really witnessed it, really circled it, moving as fast as we can go (in our cars): nothing, that which leads nowhere else, means nothing else. How much longer then can the cars blindly rush? Why circle what does not exist? We have followed the movement of the elevated sacred, mimed it in our cars, parodied it, gone all the way with it, and it has, or is about to, collapse. The world of conservation and concentration is about to blow. The madman— Bataille himself, the narrator that mimes “Bataille”—stands in the public square, at the very center, and inaugurates the next phase of the drama: the fall, the “tumble” (dégringolade) back down and out— to the base of the monument, to the most remote locale of the most outlying region. Moving up and in, miming the arrival at perfect knowledge and divinity, infinite resource stockpiling and disposal, is inseparable from a crash: death, infinite wandering. Another era, of violence, deicide, sacrificial (dis)aggregation, is about to begin: the era of the recognition of the limit, of the deleterious movement of time.

**The concept of global transportation infrastructure retrenches Bataille’s cultural prada – this makes transportation placeless and forces a possessionless deadzone of moralism**

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Miuccia Prada has stamped her name on an era by alleviating the isolation of creative people. For such sensitive types, the ultimate luxury is to feel that they are part of a community. This is the service Prada provides. She has made the world safe for people with overdeveloped inner lives. Fashion is one of the techniques she has used to accomplish this. Her outspoken ambivalence about fashion is another. Some designers struggle to make a statement. Prada evidently struggles not to. She is an artist: she would rather hide than speak. Sometimes, Prada hides behind the art of others. The Prada Foundation, established in 1995 by Prada and her husband, Patrizio Bertelli, is a shop window filled with masks. Directed by the legendary critic and curator Germano Celant, the foundation sponsors exhibitions and other worthy cultural causes. (The foundation has a Web site: [www.fondazioneprada.org](http://www.fondazioneprada.org/).) In the past decade, it has presented exhibitions by Tom Friedman, Anish Kapoor, Michael Heizer, Sam Taylor-Wood and Louise Bourgeois, among others. Beautifully produced catalogs accompany the shows. Last year the foundation branched out into philosophy. In November, it financed a new chair in aesthetics at the University of Vita-Salute San Raffaele in Milan. The position will be held by Massimo Cacciari, a former mayor of Venice who is perhaps Italy's most celebrated theorist of art. In the United States, Cacciari is best known for his scholarship on the art and architecture of Vienna at the turn of the last century. Most recently, Prada sponsored the production of an hourlong film by the Milanese artist Francesco Vezzoli. A dual tribute to Italian art-house cinema and American kitsch, the film features appearances by Catherine Deneuve, Jeanne Moreau and Marianne Faithfull. It had its premiere in Milan last month, along with Vezzoli's ghost theater: an installation of 120 embroidered Charles Rennie Mackintosh chairs. All this is Prada. Prada, Prada, Prada. As are the Prada shops designed by Rem Koolhaas and Herzog and de Meuron; the church in suburban Milan transformed by Dan Flavin into a radiant grotto; and the 2002 conference on contemporary social challenges organized in collaboration with a Milanese prison. That's a lot for a company that started out as a maker of tastefully understated luggage. Or for a woman who started out as a political activist for left-wing causes. But I confess I will not be satisfied until Prada has personally designed an airport. And perhaps even an airline to go with it. Global transportation infrastructure: this seems to me the direction in which Prada is headed. From baggage to baggage claim, Prada, Prada, Prada. With some shopping, art and philosophy along the way. Prada's cultural projects interest me chiefly because they help to clarify the personality and intentions of a fashion genius. No one needs Prada to gain access to the work of Louise Bourgeois or Anish Kapoor. We admire her for the same reason we have always admired Italians. No one can match their talent for engineering mythologies of daily life. Since the 1960's, the Italians have exercised that talent only sporadically on the world stage. Yet those with memories of the postwar decades will not find it difficult to regard design as a serious form of communication. Nor should we see any inherent contradiction between Prada's political sympathies and her success in business. Poets hold things together. Italian poets -- in design, film and fine art -- have been working the contradictions between politics and art for a century and more. The work of Gio Ponti, Joe Colombo, the Castiglione brothers still activate living memory, even if Milan is no longer the design center it once was. The world is not what it was. What good are home furnishings for a time when people are living out of suitcases and scarcely have time to unpack? Prada is onto something. People want experiences now more than they want things. They want something other than TV. They want excuses to be together in social space so they can figure out how the contemporary city is supposed to work. Things provide the excuses. They are pretexts for the authentic errand of being outside. The Prada store that opened in New York's SoHo district in December 2001 is a prime example of this. For weeks before the opening, those of us who live downtown found ourselves at the mercy of two equally unwelcome fantasies. Pundits wanted Lower Manhattan to remain a dead zone, a backdrop for their moralistic pronouncements. City planners wanted the place to be a shopping mall thronged with happy-go-lucky but somber tourists. We kept hearing that the community wanted this, that the community didn't want that, and after all that irrelevant chatter it was startling to come face to face with the community itself at the opening of the Prada store. What the community wanted was to be here. If there was luxury in the air, it wasn't coming from the clothes, the fancy in-store technology or even the fabulous blocklong space. The luxury was making contact with people you hadn't seen together in one place since 9/11. It was the experience of being with the most solipsistic people on earth and loving them more than ever. Georges Bataille argued that all culture is luxury. It's what we do with the energy that is left over after our material needs are met. Luxury, in the modern sense, means the transformation of the commonplace, in Arthur Danto's phrase. It means the creation of value from unpromising situations. Frank Lloyd Wright created luxury from empty space, Chanel from jersey sportswear, Louis Kahn from poured concrete. Prada creates it out of the desire to be rescued from the isolation that a creative life demands. Francesco Vezzoli creates it from old 60's movies, television game shows and the desire for continuity with a period he is too young to have known. Vezzoli's film is inspired by ''Comizi D'Amore,'' a 1964 documentary by Pier Paolo Pasolini. The movie consists of brief interviews, conducted with people across a broad spectrum of Italian society, on the subjects of love and sexual mores. Vezzoli recasts Pasolini for the age of Berlusconi. Why are so many young artists fascinated by the 1960's? Because the romantic concept of an avant-garde bohemia breathed its last gasp then, I suppose. Thereafter, artists and thinkers would have to share their space with pop musicians, fashion photographers, advertisers and tourists. The space is getting crowded. But in the labyrinth where ideas take shape, there is still only room for one.

## 1nc – Death Drive

**The Aff is a misguided enlightenment move to avoid our *inevitable* encounter with death – this** narcissistic anxiety **rationalizes mass slaughter and culminates in its own end**

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An utter intoxication such as this is quite different from its Kantian anticipation, although Kant too contests the right of dogmatic theology to guide his journey: Nothing but the sobriety of a critique, at once strict and just, can free us from this dogmatic delusion, which through the lure of an imagined felicity keeps so many in bondage to theories and systems. Such a critique confines all our speculative claims rigidly to the field of possible experience; and it does this not by shallow scoffing at ever-repeated failures or pious sighs over the limits of our reason, but by an effective determining of these limits in accordance with established principles, inscribing nihil ulterius on those Pillars of Hercules which nature herself has erected in order that the voyage of our reason may be extended no further than the continuous coastline of experience itself reaches—a coast we cannot leave without venturing upon a shoreless ocean which, after alluring us with ever-deceptive prospects, compels us in the end to abandon as hopeless all this vexatious and tedious endeavour [K IV 392– 3]. For Kant it is not enough to have reached the ocean, the shoreless expanse, the nihil ulterius as positive zero. He recognizes the ocean as a space of absolute voyage, and thus of hopelessness and waste. Only another shore would redeem it for him, and that is nowhere to be found. Better to remain on dry land than to lose oneself in the desolation of zero. It is for this reason that he says the ‘concept of a noumenon is…a merely limiting concept’ [K IV 282]. In this way the Occidental obsession with the object consummates itself in the blind passivity of its nihilism. Beyond experience, it is suggested, there must be thought ‘an unknown something’ [K III 283], although ‘we are unable to comprehend how such noumena can be possible’ [K III 281]. More precisely: [The noumenon]…is not indeed in any way positive, and is not a determinate knowledge of anything, but signifies only the thought of something in general, in which I abstract from everything that belongs to the form of sensible intuition [KIII 281]. That no transcendent object is found is an event which retains the sense of a lost or absent object, rather than that of a contact with or through objectlessness. The ocean has no sense except as a failure of the land. Even whilst supposedly knowing nothing of the noumenon, which, we are told, has ‘no assignable meaning’ [K III 303], one somehow still knows that it would be something other than objectless waste without end, or the void-plane touched upon at zero-intensity. Kant is peculiarly adamant in this respect: [W]e cannot think of any way in which such intelligible objects might be given. The problematic thought which leaves open a place for them serves only, like an empty space, for the limitation of empirical principles, without itself containing or revealing any other object of knowledge beyond the sphere of those principles [K III 285]. The noumenon is the absence of the subject, and is thus inaccessible in principle to experience. If there is still a so-called ‘noumenal subject’ in the opening phase of the critical enterprise it is only because a residue of theological reasoning conceives a stratum of the self which is invulnerable to transition, or synonymous with time as such. This is the ‘real’ or ‘deep’ subject, the self or soul, a subject that sloughs-off its empirical instantiation without impairment, the immortal subject of mortality. It only remains for Hegel to rigorously identify this subject with death, with the death necessitated by the allergy of Geist to its finitude, to attain a conception of deaths for itself. But this is all still the absence of the subject, even when ‘of’ is translated into the subjective genitive, and at zero none of it makes any difference. With Kant death finds its theoretical formulation and utilitarian frame as a quasiobjectivity correlative to capital, and noumenon is its name. The effective flotation of this term in philosophy coincided with the emergence of a social order built upon a profound rationalization of excess, or rigorous circumscription of voluptuous lethality. Once enlightenment rationalism begins its dominion ever fewer corpses are left hanging around in public places with each passing year, ever fewer skulls are used as paperweights, and ever fewer paupers perish undisturbed on the streets. Even the graveyards are rationalized and tidied up. It is not surprising, therefore, that with Kant thanatology undergoes the most massive reconstruction in its history. The clerical vultures are purged, or marginalized. Death is no longer to be culturally circulated, injecting a transcendent reference into production, and ensuring superterrestrial interests their rights. Instead death is privatized, withdrawn into interiority, to flicker at the edge of the contract as a narcissistic anxiety without public accreditation. Compared to the immortal soul of capital the death of the individual becomes an empirical triviality, a mere re-allocation of stock. In the Analytic of the Sublime in his Third Critique Kant tentatively raises the possibility that we might taste death—even if only through a ‘negative pleasure’—but nowhere does he raise the possibility that death might savage us. Even when positivized as noumenon, death remains locked in the chain of connotations that passes through matter, inertia, femininity, and castration, resting in its pacified theistic sense as toothless resource and malleable clay. There is no place, no domain, for base matter in Kant’s thinking, since even auto-generativity in nature is conceived as a regulative analogue of rational willing. One must first unleash the noumenon from its determination as problematic object in order to glimpse that between matter and death there is both a certain identity and an intricate relation, or, in other words: a unilateral difference appending matter to the edge of zero. Not that this complicity has anything to do with the inertia crucial to the mathematical idealization of matter, or with any other kind of mechanical sterility. Matter is no more simply dead than it is simply anything else, because simplicity is the operator of the transcendent disjunction between subject and object which effaces base materiality. The death ‘proper’ to matter is the jagged edge of its impropriety, its teeth. If death can bite it is not because it retains some fragment of a potency supposedly proper to the object, but because it remains uncaged by the inhibition objectivity entails. Death alone is utterly on the loose, howling as the dark motor of storms and epidemics. After the ruthless abstraction of all life the blank savagery of real time remains, for it is the reality of abstraction itself that is time: the desert, death, and desolator of all things. Bataille writes of ‘the ceaseless slippage of everything into nothing. If one wants, time’ [V 137], and thinks of himself as ‘a tooth of TIME’ [I 558]. It could also be said—in a more Nietzschean vein—that zero-becoming has its metaphor in a bird of prey, for which every object is a lamb. Repression always fails, but nowhere is there a more florid example of such failure than the attempt to bury death quietly on the outskirts of the city and get down to business. Only the encrusted historical superficies of zero are trapped in the clay, distilling death down to its ultimate liquidity, and maximizing its powers of infiltration. Marx notes this filtration process in Capital, where he remarks about money/death that it ‘does not vanish on dropping out of the circuit of the metamorphosis of a given commodity. It is constantly being precipitated into new places in the arena of circulation vacated by other commodities’ [Cap 114]. Dead labour is far harder to control than the live stuff was, which is why the enlightenment project of interring gothic superstition was the royal road to the first truly vampiric civilization, in which death alone comes to rule.

The Aff must explain why your response to **death should be worry – the alt doesn’t embrace of extinction but refuses to subordinate life to fear**

Bataille 45 (Georges, “On Nietzsche”, pg. 173-176)[rkezios]

"'Life." I said. "is bound to be lost in death, as a river loses itself in the sea, the known in the unknown" (Inner Experiena). And death is the end life easily reaches (as water does sea level). So why would I wish to tum my desire to be persuasive into a worry? I dissolve into myself like the sea-and I know the roaring waters of the torrent head straight at me! Whatever a judicious understanding sometimes seems to rude, an inunense folly connected with it (understanding is only an infinitesimal part of that folly), doesn't hesitate to give back. The certainty of incoherence in reading, the inevitable crumbling of the soundest constructions, is the deep truth of books. Since appearance constitutes a limit, what truly exists is a dissolution into common opacity rather than a development of lucid thinking. The apparent unchangingness of books is deceptive: each book is also the sum of the misunderstandings it occasions. So why exhaust myself with efforts toward consciousness? I can only make lun of myself as I write. (Why write even a phrase if laughter doesn't immediately join me?) It goes without saying that, lor the task. I bring to bear whatever rigor I have within me. But the crumbling nature of thinking's awareness of itself and especially the certainty of thinking reaching its end only in failing, hinder any repose and prevent the relaxed state that facilitates a rigorous disposition of things. Committed to the casual stance-l think and express myself in the free play of hazard. Obviously, everyone in some way admits the importance of hazard. But this recognition is as minimal and unconsdous as possible. Going my way unconstralned. unhampered. I develop my thoughts, make choices with regard to expression-but I don't have the control over myseH that I wanl. And the actual dynamic of my intelligence is equally uncontrollable. So that l owe to other dynamics-to lucky chance and to fleeting moments of relaxation-the minimal order and relative learning that I do have. And the rest of the time . . . Thus, as I see it my thought proceeds in harmony with its object, an object that it attains more and perfectly the greater the state of its own ruin. Though it isn't necessarily conscious of this. At one and the same time my thinking must reach plenary illumination and dissolution . . . In the same individual, thought must construct and destroy itself. And even that isn't quite right. Even the most rigorous thinkers yield to chance. In addition, the demands inherent in the exerdse of thought often take me far from where I started. One of the great difficulties encountered by understanding is to put order into thought's interrelations in time. In a given moment, my thought reaches considerable rigor. But how to link it with yesterday's thinking? Yesterday, in a sense, I was another person, responding to other worries. Adapting one to the other remains possible, but . . . This insufficiency bothers me no more than the insuffidency relating to the many woes of the human condition generally. Humanness is related in us to nonsatisfaction. a nonsatisfaction to which we yield without accepting it, though; we distance ourselves from humann ess when we regard ourselves as satisfied or when we give up searching for satisfaction. Sarue is right in relation to me to recll the myth Of Sisyphus, though "in relation to me""' here equates to "in relation to humanity," I suppose. What can be expected of us is to go as far as possible and not to stop. What by contrast. humanly speaking. can be aitidzed are endeavors whose only meaning is some relation to moments of completion. Is it possible for me to go further? I won't wait to coordinate my efforts in that case-I'll go further. I'll take the risk. And the reader. free not to venture after me, will often take advantage of that same freedom! The critics are right to scent danger here! But let me in turn paint out a greater danger, one that comes from methods that, adequate only to an outcome of knowledge, confer on individuals whom they limit a sheerly fragmentary existence-an existence that is mutilated with respect to the whole that remains inaccessible. Having recognized this, I'll defend my position. I've spoken of inner experience: my intention was to make known an object. But by propo!iing this vague title, T didn't want to confine myself sheerly to inner facts of that experience. It's an arbitrary procedure to reduce knowledge to what we get from our intuitions as subjects. This is something only a newborn can do. And we ourselves (who write) can only know something about this newborn by observing it from outside (the child is only our object). A separation experience, related to a vital continuum (our conception and our birth) and to a return to that continuum (in our first sexual feelings and our first laughter), leaves us without any clear recollections, and only in objective operations do we reach the core of the being we are. A phenomenology of the developed mind assumes a coinddence of subjective and objective aspects and at the same time a fusion of subject and object.\* This means an isolated operation is admissible only because of fatigue (so, the explanation I gave of laughter, because I was unable to develop a whole movement in tandem with a conjugation of the modalities of laughter would be left suspended-since every theory of laughter is integrally a philosophy and. similarly, every integral philosophy is a theory of laughter . . . ). But that is the point­ though I set forth these principles, at the same time I must renounce following them. Thought is produced in me as uncoordinated flashes, withdrawing endlessly from a term to which its movement pushes it. I can't tell if I'm expressing human helplessness this way, or my own . . . I don't know. though I'm not hopeful of even some outwardly satisfying outcome. Isn't there an advantage in creating philosophy as I do? A flash in the night-a language belonging to a brief moment . . . Perhaps in this respect this latest moment contains a simple truth. In order to will knowledge, by an indirect expedient I tend to become the whole universe. But in this movement I can't be a whole hwnan beinSt since I submit to a particular goal. becoming the whole. Granted. if I could become it, I would thus be a whole hwnan being. But in my effon, don't I distance myself from exactly that? And how can I become the whole without becoming a whole human being? I can't be this whole hwnan being except when I let go. I can't be this through willpower: my will necessarily has to will outcomes! But if misfortune (or chance) wills me to let go, then I know I am an integral whole humanness. subordinate to nothing. In other words. the moment of revolt inherent in willing a knowledge beyond practical ends can't be indefinitely continued. And in order to be the whole universe, humankind has to let go and abandon its principle, accepting as the sole criterion of what it is the tendency to go beyond what it is. This existence that I am is a revolt against existence and is indefinite desire. For this existence God was simply a stage-and now here he is, looming large, grown from unfathomable experience, comically perched on the stake used for impalement.

The aff must also explain the distinction between life and death – their ‘science’ and ‘technics’ are a ruse

Baudrillard 76 (Jean, “Symbolic Exchange and Death”, pg. 188)[rkezios]

There is therefore no distinction on the symbolic plane between the living and the dead. The dead have a different status, that is all, which requires certain ritual precautions. But visible and invisible do not exclude each other since they are two possible states of a person. Death is an aspect of life. The Canaque arriving in Sydney for the first time, stupefied by the crowds, soon explains the thing by the fact that in this country the dead walk amongst the living, which is nothing strange. "˜Do Kamo"˜\_ for the Canaques (Maurice Leenhardt, Do Kama: Person and Myth in the Melanesian World |tr. Basia Miller Gulati, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, l979| ), is that "˜which lives', and everyone may belong to this category. There again the living/non-living is a distinctive opposition that we alone make, and we base all our 'science' and our operational violence on it. Science, technics and production assume this rupture of the living and the non-living, privileging the living on which alone science in all its rigour is based (cf. J. Monod, Chance and Necessity). Even the `reality` of science and technics is also the separation of the living and the dead. The very finality of science as a pulsion, as the death drive (the desire to know), is inscribed in this disjunction, so that an object is only real insofar as it is dead, that is, relegated to inert and indifferent objectivity, as were initially, above everything else, the dead and the living.

### 2nc – Death Drive

**The aff fears death without any conception of what it entails – their conception of life’s end is tragically flawed**

**Land 92** – lecturer in Continental Philosophy at Warwick University (Nick, “The Thirst for Annihilation” pg. 128-129)[rkezios]

How much dying can a body do? At least one dose, and even this figure is conservative except in the case of the most elementary life. A more complex organism is a true economy of death, running off a perpetuated inner catastrophe, shedding its cells into the ocean of ruin. It is the crudest type of error to reserve the word death for total systemic collapse: for the end of dying. Human bodies do not echo the neuroses that inhabit them, staving off disintegration, clutching at postponement, sealing death out, no, they glut themselves on death, traders in devastation, turning themselves over from within. Matter is in flight from the possibility of essence as if from an original pertinency of ontology, and life is merely the most aberrant and virological variant of this flight; the convulsive fringe of being’s relinquishment. Life is an exploration of death, whose motor is an exteriority from which it can never separate itself. It comes closest to co-extension with a principle in its deviation from the echoes of real essence; in its turnover or metabolism. Life smears itself across death as the migration from concrete existence; the meanderings of an ever accentuated vagrant reproducibility through confusion. ‘No particle is the same’, we happily admit, when discussing a body differentiated from itself by a few years. We try not to understand that we are thus accepting the final abandonment by complex life of all allegiance to existence. Life evolves into the embrace of death, becoming a mere turbulence of disappearance, indifferent to its pullulating inner mass, to its inner ruthlessnesses …To be part of an organism is to become dispensable, and ever more dispensable. No course is more suicidal than that of the living substance that becomes an organ. Bataille writes of the human being for ‘whom the components die incessantly (such that none of the elements that we were subsists beyond a certain number of years)’ [V 98]. We are still determined to believe that we have one single and conclusive death awaiting us, a death tailored to the dimensions of a soul. But if a body is a river of death, what makes us so sure ‘a self isn’t one? Is it likely that ‘we’ should really remain the same? It is the most elementary common sense to believe in our existence of course, but then, would it really be convenient for the body to admit to the ephemera in its nerves that it has so little attachment to them?

**Death is a meaningless construct. The drive of the 1AC speech act to eliminate death through their appeal to solvency. This will inevitably fail – we all die, but in the process of avoiding the inevitable they destroy any sort of value in the journey itself. Instead we should embrace the excess of death and annihilation – the alt is key to restoring any meaning to life.**

**Land 92** – lecturer in Continental Philosophy at Warwick University (Nick, “The Thirst for Annihilation” pg. 136)[rkezios]

Bataille’s obsession is with ‘the unity of death, or of the consciousness of death, and eroticism’ [X 585], which he also describes as the ‘essential and paradoxical accord’ of ‘death and eroticism’ [X 597], and ‘the intimate accord between life and its violent destruction’ [II 247], a cohesion that finds fragmentary attestation in the writings of Sade, in the trajectory of psychoanalysis, and perhaps most pointedly, in the characterization of orgasm within the French language as the little death. ‘Voluptuosity is so close to ruinous dilapidation that we call its moment of paroxysm the “little death” ’[X 170], leading to a question as to ‘the identity of the “little death” and a death that is definitive’ [X 577]. This is a matter both of identity and difference, of unilateral difference, or of scale. Orgasm provisionally substitutes for death, fending-off the impetus towards terminal oblivion, but only by infiltrating death into the silent core of vitality. ‘It is true: speaking within the utilitarian limits of reason, we perceive the practical sense and the necessity of sexual disorder. But were those who gave the name “little death” to its terminal phase…wrong to have perceived its funereal sense’ [X 586]? The little death is not merely a simulacrum or sublimation of a big one—of a true and virginal inexistence—but a corruption that leaves the bilateral architecture of life and death in tatters, a communication and a slippage which violates the immaculate alterity of darkness. Eroticism traces out the labyrinth, the maze, the riddle, from which death cannot be precipitated into lucidity. Death is enmeshed irresolvably in confusion. ‘If the result of eroticism is envisaged under the perspective of desire, independently of the possible birth of a child, it is a loss, to which the paradoxically valuable expression “the little death” responds. It is not obvious what the “little death” has to do with death, with the cold horror of death…But is the paradox displaced whilst eroticism is in play?’ [X 592]. ‘My rage to love opens onto death as a window onto a courtyard’ [VI 76], because death is the only place we profoundly touch each other. ‘And death is not mine alone. We all die incessantly. The little time that separates us from emptiness has the flimsiness of a dream’ [VI 155]. Intimacy is not fusion, but unless it is the lip of fusion, it is nothing. Like eroticism, literature is communication, and communication is opened by death alone (but in the end everything is death, even the confusion that encrusts it). This is why to love is to bleed, which is not due to the pain of lack, but to excess. ‘Erotic conduct opposes itself to the habitual kind, as expenditure to acquisition’ [X 169]. It is only in an unrestrained debauching of the means to live that the desolate expanses of continuity are reached. ‘We have no true pleasure except in expending uselessly, as if a wound opens in us’ [X 170]. The impoverished bond of social connectedness is broken on the reef of deep community, where fusion is consummated in the impossible, ‘it is under the condition of rupturing a communion that limits it that eroticism finally reveals the violence which is its truth’ [X 167]. Only in a betrayal of life is there merging. ‘The truth of eroticism is treason’ [X 170].

### 2nc – Baudrillard

Reducing death to simply the biological negative of life renders the world a cemetery – no knowledge or meaning can be obtained but in death

Baudrillard 76 (Jean, “Symbolic Exchange and Death”, pg. 185)[rkezios]

Pursued and censured everywhere, death springs up everywhere again. No longer as apocalyptic folklore, such as might have haunted the living imagination in certain epochs; but voided precisely of any imaginary substance, it passes into the most banal reality, and for us takes on the mask of the very principle of rationality that dominates our lives. Death is when everything functions and serves something else, it is the absolute, signing, cybernetic functionality of the urban environment as in Jacques Tati`s film Play-Time. Man is absolutely indexed on his function, as in Kafka. the age of the civil servant is the age of a culture of death. This is the phantasm of total programming, increased predictability and accuracy, finality not only in material things, but in fulfilling desires. In a word, death is confused with the law of value - and strangely with the structural law of value by which everything is arrested as a coded difference it a universal nexus of relations. This is the true face of ultra-modern death, made up of the faultless, objective, ultra-rapid connection of all the terms in a system. Our true necropolises are no longer the cemeteries, hospitals, wars, hecatombs; death is no longer where we think it is, it is no longer biological, psychological, metaphysical, it is no longer even murder' our societies' true necropolises are the computer banks or the foyers, blank spaces from which all human noise has been expunged, glass coffins where the world`s slerilised memories are lrozen. Only the dead remember everything in something like an immediate eternity of knowledge, a quintessence of the world that today we dream of burying in the form of microfilm and archives, making the entire world into an archive in order that it be discovered by some future civilisation. The cryogenic freezing of all knowledge so that it can be resurrected, knowledge passes into immortality as sign-value. Against our dream of losing and forgetting everything, we set up an opposing great wall of relations, connections and information, a dense and inextricable artificial memory, and we bury ourselves alive in the fossilized hope of one day being rediscovered. Computers are the transistorized death to which we submit in the hope of survival. Museums are already there to survive all civilizations, in order to bear testimony But to what? It is of little importance. The mere fact that they exist testifies that we are in a culture which no longer possesses any meaning for itself and which can now only dream of having meaning for someone else from a later time. Thus everything becomes an environment of death as soon as it is no longer a sign that can be transistorised in a gigantic whole, just as money reaches the point of no return when it is nothing more than a system of writing.

The alternative is a suicidal gesture to subvert political norms

Baudrillard 76 (Jean, “Symbolic Exchange and Death”, pg. 175-176)[rkezios]

Amongst these is suicide, which in our societies has taken on a different extension and definition, to the point of becoming, in the context of the offensive reversibility of death, the form of subversion itself. While there are fewer and fewer executions, more and more commit suicide in prison, an act of subverting [detournement] institutional death and turning it against the system that imposes it: through suicide, the individual tries and condemns society in accordance with its own norms, by inverting the authorities and reinstating reversibility where it had completely disappeared, while at the same time regaining the advantage. Even suicides outside prison become political in this sense (hari-kiri by fire is only the most spectacular form of this): they make an infinitesimal but inexpiable breach, since it is total defeat for a system not to be able to attain total perfection. All that is needed is that the slightest thing escapes its rationality. The prohibition of suicide coincides with the advent of the law of value. Whether religious, moral or economic, the same law states 'no-one has the right to remove any capital or value' Yet each individual is a parcel of capital (just as every Christian is a soul to be saved), and therefore has no right to destroy himself. It is against this orthodoxy of value that the suicide revolts by destroying the parcel of capital he has at his disposal. This is unpardonable: we will go so far as to hang the suicide for having succeeded. It is therefore symptomatic that suicide increases in a society saturated by the law of value, as a challenge to its fundamental rule. But we must also take another look at its definition: if every suicide becomes subversive in a highly integrated system, all subversion of and resistance to this system is reciprocally, by its very nature, suicidal. Those actions at least that strike at its vitals. For the majority of so-called 'political' or 'revolutionary' practices are content to exchange their survival with the system, that is, to convert their death into cash. There are rarely suicides that stand against the controlled production and exchange of death, against the exchange-value of death; not its use-value (for death is perhaps the only thing that has no use-value, which can never be referred back to need, and so can unquestionably be turned into a weapon) but its value as rupture, contagious dissolution and negation. The Palestinians or the rebellious Blacks setting fire to their own district become suicidal, as is resistance to the security forces in all its forms, as are the neurotic behaviour and multiple breakdowns by which we challenge the system's capacity to ever fully integrate us. Also suicidal are all political practices (demos, disorder, provocation, etc.) whose objective is to arouse repression, the 'repressive nature of the system', not as a secondary consequence, but as the immediacy of death: the game of death unmasks the system's own function of death. The order has possession of death, but it cannot play it out - only those who set death playing against itself win.

Views of death as something to be avoided at all costs renders life valueless – our drive to repress death results in incasing the body in the protective sarcophagus amounting the body to a corpse

Baudrillard 76 (Jean, “Symbolic Exchange and Death”, pg. 177-178)[rkezios]

Security is another form of social control, in the form of life blackmailed with the afterlife. It is universally present for us today, and 'security forces' range from life assurance and social security to the car seatbelt by way of the state security police force.39 'Belt up' says an advertising slogan for seatbelts. Of course, security, like ecology, is an industrial business extending its cover up to the level of the species: a convertibility of accident, disease and pollution into capitalist surplus profit is operative everywhere. But this is above all a question of the worst repression, which consists in dispossessing you of your own death, which everybody dreams of, as the darkness beneath their instinct of conservation. It is necessary to rob everyone of the last possibility of giving themselves their own death as the last 'great escape' from a life laid down by the system. Again, in this symbolic short-circuit, the gift-exchange is the challenge to oneself and one's own life, and is carried out through death. Not because it expresses the individual's asocial rebellion (the defection of one or millions of individuals does not infringe the law of the system at all), but because it carries in it a principle of sociality that is radically antagonistic to our own social repressive principle. To bury death beneath the contrary myth of security, it is necessary to exhaust the gift-exchange. Is it so that men might live that the demand for death must be exhausted? No, but in order that they die the only death the system authorises: the living are separated from their dead, who no longer exchange anything but the form of their afterlife, under the sign of comprehensive insurance. Thus car safety· mummified in his helmet, his seatbelt, all the paraphernalia of security, wrapped up in the security myth, the driver is nothing but a corpse, closed up in another, non-mythic, death, as neutral and objective as technology, noiseless and expertly crafted. Riveted to his machine, glued to the spot in it, he no longer runs the risk of dying, since he is already dead. This is the secret of security, like a steak under cellophane: to surround you with a sarcophagus in order to prevent you from dying 40 Our whole technical culture creates an artificial milieu of death. It is not only armaments that remain the general archetype of material production, but the simplest machine around us constitutes a horizon of death, a death that will never be resolved because it has crystallised beyond reach. fixed capital of death, where the living labour of death has frozen over, as the labour force is frozen in fixed capital and dead labour. In other words, all material production is merely a gigantic 'character armour' by means of which the species means to keep death at a respectful distance. Of course, death itself overshadows the species and seals it into the armour the species thought to protect itself with. Here again, commensurate with an entire civilisation, we find the image of the automobile-sarcophagus: the protective armour is just death miniaturised and become a technical extension of your own body The biologisation of the body and the technicisation of the environment go hand in hand in the same obsessional neurosis. The technical environment is our over-production of pollutant, fragile and obsolescent objects. For production lives, its entire logic and strategy are articulated on fragility and obsolescence. An economy of stable products and good objects is indispensable: the economy develops only by exuding danger, pollution, usury, deception and haunting. The economy lives only on the suspension of death that it maintains throughout material production, and through renewing the available death stocks, even if it means conjuring it up by a security build up: blackmail and repression. Death is definitively secularised in material production, where it is reproduced on a large scale as capital. Even our bodies, which have become biological machinery, are modelled on this inorganic body, and therefore become, at the same time, a bad object, condemned to disease, accident and death. Living by the production of death, capital has an easy time producing security' it's the same thing. Security is the industrial prolongation of death, just as ecology is the industrial prolongation of pollution. A few more bandages on the sarcophagus. This is also true of the great institutions that are the glory of our democracy' Social Security is the social prosthesis of a dead society (,Social Security is death!' - May '68), that is to say, a society already exterminated in all its symbolic wheels, in its deep system of reciprocities and obligations, which means that neither the concept of security nor that of the 'social' ever had any meaning. The 'social' begins by taking charge of death. It's the same story as regards cultures that have been destroyed then revived and protected as folklore (d. M. de Certeau, 'La beaute du mort' [in La culture au pluriel, Paris: UGE, 1974]). The same goes for life assurance, which is the domestic variant of a system which everywhere presupposes death as an axiom. The social translation of the death of the group - each materialising for the other only as social capital indexed on death. Death is dissuaded at the price of a continual mortification: such is the paradoxical logic of security In a Christian context, ascesis played the same role. The accumulation of suffering and penitence was able to play the same role as character armour, as a protective sarcophagus against hell. And our obsessional compulsion for security can be interpreted as a gigantic collective ascesis, an anticipation of death in life itself: from protection into protection, from defence to defence, crossing all jurisdictions, institu­ tions and modern material apparatuses, life is no longer anything but a doleful, defensive book-keeping, locking every risk into its sarcophagus.

Imposing life is fascist – the affs denies the right to death, and instead ontological enslaves us

Baudrillard 10 (Jean, “Carnival and Cannibal”, pg. 63-70)[rkezios]

There is no difference between the ‘free market’ Yes and the European ‘social’ No. This is why the No, which is merely a No to a particular kind of Europe, isn’t really a No – the only No that genuinely constitutes an event is this strange, non-political, non-dialectical, elusive No, since it runs counter to enlightened self-interest. It is a No that isn’t the opposite of a Yes (the No of the things that can exist without their opposites), but might be said to be closer to a silent rejection of the kind that makes Bartleby say, ‘I would prefer not to!’ I am not playing the game! (But without aspiring to provide a reason.)” You have to be able to fight everything that wishes to do Good to you. Against the Axis of Good: the parallax of Evil. Gilmore (The Executioner’s Song) and his refusal of a pardon. Bartleby and his tenacious rejection. Those who vote No to Divine Europe. The immigrants who burn their schools. They are all fighting against that which wishes to do them good. This is what Gilmore does in The Executioner’s Song and it is what makes this mundane story of a condemned man funny and paradoxical. He fights – he is forced to fight – against his staunchest defenders (those who refuse to let him be executed in the name of the absolute principle of the right to life, a principle which does, however, show itself for what it is: the moral obligation to live at all costs, the categorical imperative to exist, that principle in whose name they hanged suicides, dead or alive, in the Middle Ages). It is against this ultimatum that Gilmore rebels – not that he is in favour of the death penalty, but he is equally opposed to the injunction that he must live, opposed to that institutional ‘human right’, against which he sets another – unconditional human right: the right to die. He thereby transcends his own crime and any idea of punishment and transforms his particular case into a metaphysical duel with the forces of Good. The very people who want to save him (despite himself) come to detest him for having demanded to die. This is quite a fetching contradiction of the whole system of moral values – and the fact is that, at bottom, condemning someone to death and condemning them to life ‘on principle’ involves the same kind of legal violence. And it must be rejected in every case, even when – especially when – the desire is to ‘do you good’. Gilmore doesn’t at all think he ‘deserves’ to die, nor does he think he must allow his life to be taken to expiate his crime. Having been condemned to death, he simply demands that the authorities face up to the sentence, as he is prepared to do. He thereby shows how every sentence is a double edged sword and that it can be returned to the sender. It is a challenge which the price to be paid is his own death, but what is at stake is making the whole of a society lose face when that society, in its arrogance, reserves the right to grant him mercy against his own will (putting in play their own deaths, not suicidally but as a weapon of defiance, is also the terrorists’ strategy). If he wins out in this duel, then admittedly, he loses his life, but he recovers a glorious image of himself – far from the paths of pardon and repentance which he despises. It is a bit like the Student of Prague who dies when he shoots the mirror from which his image has been stolen, but re-finds himself in the fragments of the mirror of the moment of his death. It is like the woman in the coma who was given a life-sentence of life – it is forbidden to unplug her. Gilmore wants to be unplugged. At issue here, as ever, is the gift. The gift you reject because it is inflicted on you unilaterally – which amounts to a humiliation and a symbolic dispossession. We can see this clearly in the rage of those who defend existence at any price, the same rage as shown by the advocates of the Yes against the No. The extraordinary, misplaced anger of the well-wishing against those who reject their overtures. It is the anger of the people of God (of Divine Europe), of those who have universal right no their side and hence the right to exterminate the apostates. This hatred on the part of the disappointed of conquering Good and hegemonic Reason is much fiercer than the hatred felt by the dispossessed, by those who have things taken from them, who are exploited and whose material means of life are snatched away from them. They have no other outlet than a liberatory violence, a violence of protest and demands. Quite different is the violence of those whom one gives, to whom one gives forcibly, or whose lives one spares. They have only symbolic revenge left to them. Now, for want of anything better, this revenge crystallizes in the unconditional withdrawal from the social order, from the planetary order, from the conventional order, from the advantages of reason. This is why the case of Gilmore, who wants to be killed – to be unplugged – who rejects any leniency on the part of the law, which would cause him to lose face, is the reflection today of a universal situation and a universal challenge: a challenge to the ascendancy of all the networks, to that enframing by all the blessings of reason, Technology and Science. Must we accept this unconditional conditioning or not? We are all reduced today to saving the little bit of singularity, the little bit of symbolic space and territory left to us, against a global machinery, a global enterprise of Doing-Good, which demands of us the sacrifice of any will and intellect (this is still the pact that was proposed by Dostoevsky’s Grand Inquisitor: wellbeing and servitude)/ And where might this ‘left-field’ energy come from? From that impenetrable zone there is in every individual; from that ‘heart’ that is resistant to the injunction of all the apparatuses, of all the machinery of rationalization. It is all this that is in play in Gilmore’s fantastic defense.

### 2nc – Framing/Stoekl

**Life is meaningless without death – evaluating value based upon the future presupposes a future beyond death**

**Razinsky 9** (Liran, University of Wisconsin, “How to Look Death in the Eyes: Freud and Bataille”)[rkezios]

Our usual world, according to Bataille, is characterized by the duration of things, by the “future” function, rather than by the present. Things are constituted as separate objects in view of future time. This is one reason for the threat of death: it ruins value where value is only assured through duration. It also exposes the intimate order of life that is continuously hidden from us in the order of things where life runs its normal course. Man “is afraid of death as soon as he enters the system of projects that is the order of things” (“The Festival” 312; 214). Sacrifice is the opposite of production and accumulation. Death is not so much a negation of life, as it is an affirmation of the intimate order of life, which is opposed to the normal order of things and is therefore rejected. “The power of death signifies that this real world can only have a neutral image of life […]. Death reveals life in its plenitude” (309; 212). Bataille’s “neutral image of life” is the equivalent of Freud’s “shallow and empty” life. What Freud denounces is a life trapped within the cowardly economical system of considerations. It is precisely the economy of value and future-oriented calculations that stand in opposition to the insertion of death into life. “Who is to take the son’s place with his mother, the husband’s with his wife, the father’s with his children.” Of course there is an emotional side to the story, but it is this insistence on replacement that leaves us on the side of survival and stops us sometimes from living the present. “The need for duration,” in the words of Bataille, “conceals life from us” (“The Festival” 309; 212). For both authors, when death is left out, life “as it is” is false and superficial.

**Your conception of death is rooted in the self – death is nothing more than a natural occurrence, it is not an end, nor a beginning, but a continuation of a labyrinthine ontology. Determining life based value from a chemical and biological standpoint of death is irrelevant**

**Land 92** – lecturer in Continental Philosophy at Warwick University (Nick, “The Thirst for Annihilation” pg. 122-123)[rkezios]

A provisional differentiation is obviously possible between elementary sponges (such as Bataille’s groping example of the siphonophore) and scaled sponges for which ‘being is composed’ [VII 265] irreducibly (such as Menger’s). An elementary sponge might also be a scaled sponge, but of an extremely disequilibriated kind. It has a privileged stratum of fission, which is a threshold at which death vertiginously transforms its sense. A siphonophore can be dissolved to the level of its cells and still recompose itself, but dissolution below this level annihilates it. In the same way, a hive of bees or a colony of termites can be disaggregated without irreparable damage, which does not hold for the dismemberment of the individual insects composing them. Yet even in these cases the matter is more complex; sex cells, viruses, nutrient compounds, and other components circulate upon differentiated strata, irreducible to specifiable economies of life and death. The death of a highly organized animal triggers a crisis across a large spectrum of its biochemical composition, but it does not precipitate a return to some zero-degree of chemical organization. Under ‘natural circumstances’ the compositional stock of such a creature is rapidly plundered; its proteins and fats redistributed into new hierarchies by scavangers of all kinds. Cultural organisms are able to treat texts and other detritus of life in an analagous fashion. Sade’s thought begins to stray into the labyrinth when he writes: Now then, what value can Nature set upon individuals whose making costs her neither the least trouble nor the slightest concern? The worker values his labour according to the labour it entails and the time spent creating it. Does man cost Nature anything? And, under the supposition that he does, does he cost her more than an ape or an elephant? I go further: what are the regenerative materials used by nature? Of what are composed the beings that come into life? Do not the three elements of which they are formed result from the prior destruction of other bodies? If all individuals were possessed of eternal life, would it not become impossible for Nature to create any new ones? If Nature denies eternity to beings, it follows that their destruction is one of her laws. Now, once we observe that destruction is so useful to her that she absolutely cannot dispense with it, and that she cannot achieve her creations without drawing from the store of destruction which death prepares for her, from this moment onward the idea of annihilation which we attach to death ceases to be real; there is no more veritable annihilation; what we call the end of the living animal is no longer a true finis, but a simple transformation, a transmutation of matter, what every modern philosopher acknowledges as one of Nature’s fundamental laws [S III 514]. What is crucial to the labyrinth, maze, or ‘composition of beings’ [II 293] is that the ‘word individual is not able…to serve as a designation for a degree of the scale of forms’ [II 293–4]. Each element is corrupted by an irreducible organizational fabric that opens across the difference of scale. ‘I am led…to propose to speak of aggregate [amas] if it is a matter of associations which do not modify the parts forming it, of “composed beings” when it is a matter of atoms, cells, or elements of the same order’ [II 295]. Simple animals such as sponges and starfish are characterized by a relatively loose assemblage of cells, whilst linear animals—such as insects or vertebrates—exhibit a ‘more complex mode of composition’ [II 294] in which the organic elements succumb more profoundly to their integration. In his early ‘sacred sociology’ writings Bataille employs the distinction between colonies and societies to mark this difference between aggregated and scaled multiplicities. A society is an assemblage or composition which does not consist of individuals possessing a greater ontological density than its own, and this absence of privileged scale meshes it inextricably with death (the unrealizable zero of community). The ‘elements’ of a society are thus vampirically drained towards the nuclear whole, just as they are agitated in their integrity by the ineliminable flows at ‘a lower degree on the scale of composition’ [II 305], lending the labyrinth a ‘double aspect’ [II 292, 293]. Such particles—more spongiform than sponges themselves—are irreparably violated by their constellation into the dissipative mass of the labyrinth.

**Ignore their death claims- characterizing human existence as an end results in war. Our characterizing survival as a means results in an ethical aftereffect**

**Stoekl 7** professor of French and comparative literature at Penn State University (Allan, 8 October 2007, “Bataille's Peak : Energy, Religion, and Postsustainability,” ­­­45-46, Ebrary) //KP

**Modern war is** first of all **a renunciation: one produces and amasses wealth in order to overcome a foe. War is an adjunct to economic expansion; it is a practical use of excessive forces.** And **this** perhaps **is the ultimate danger of the present-day (**1949) **buildup of nuclear arms: armament**, seemingly a practical way of defending one’s own country or spreading one’s own values, in other words, of growing, **ultimately leads to the risk of a “pure destruction” of excess— and even of carrying capacity. In** the case of **warfare, destructiveness is masked**, made unrecognizable, **by the appearance of an ultimate utility: in this case the spread of the American economy and the American way of life around the globe.** Paradoxically, there is a kind of self-consciousness concerning excess, in the “naïve” society— which recognizes expenditure for what it is (in the form of unproductive glory in primitive warfare)—and a thorough ignorance of it in the modern one, which would always attempt to put waste to work (“useful” armaments) even at the cost of wholesale destruction. Bataille, then, like Le Blanc, can be characterized as a thinker of society who situates his theory in the context of ecological limits. From Bataille’s perspective, however, **there is always too much** rather than too little**, given the existence of ecological (“natural”) and social (“cultural”) limits. The “end” of humankind**, its ultimate goal, **is** thus the destruction of this surplus. While Le Blanc stresses war and sacrifice as a means of obtaining or maintaining what is essential to bare human (personal, social) survival, **Bataille emphasizes the maintenance of limits and survival as mere preconditions for engaging in the glorious destruction of excess. The meaning of the limit and its affirmation is inseparable from the senselessness of its transgression in expenditure** (la dépense). **By seeing warfare as a mere (group) survival mechanism, Le Blanc makes the same mistake as that made by the supporters of a nuclear buildup**; he, like **they, sees warfare as practical, serving a purpose, and not as the sheer burn-off it really is**. If, however, our most fundamental gesture is the destruction of a surplus, the production of that surplus must be seen as subsidiary. **Once we recognize that everything cannot be saved and reinvested, the ultimate end** (and most crucial problem) **of our existence becomes the disposal of excess wealth** (concentrated, nonusable energy). All other activity leads to something else, is a means to some other end; the only end that leads nowhere is the act of destruction by which we may— or may not— assure our (personal) survival (there is nothing to guarantee that radical destruction— consumation— does not turn on its author). **We work in order to spend. We strive to produce sacred (charged) things, not practical things. Survival and reproduction alone are not the ultimate ends of human existence.** We could characterize **Bataille** for this reason as a thinker of ecology who nevertheless **emphasizes the primacy of an ecstatic social act (destruction). By characterizing survival as a means not an end (the most fundamental idea in “general economy”), expenditure for Bataille becomes a limitless, insubordinate act— a real end** (that which does not lead outside itself ). I follow Bataille in this primacy of the delirium of expenditure over the simple exigency of personal or even social survival (Le Blanc). **This does not preclude,** however, **a kind of ethical aftereffect of** Bataille’s **expenditure: survival for this reason can be read as the fundamentally unintentional consequence of expenditure rather than its purpose.** **Seeing a nuclear buildup as the wrong kind of expenditure**— because it is seen as a means not an end— **can lead**, in Bataille’s view, **to a rethinking of the role of expenditure in the modern world and hence**, perhaps, **the world’s** (but not modernity’s) **survival**.

## Links – Policy

### \*Generic

**The Modern World is driven by the search for a solution- a solution that always disappoints. This search is a struggle that estranges the person from their self. Only expenditure offers a solution.**

**Bataille 67** (Georges, historian, librarian and philosopher, The Accursed Share, P. 129, ADP)

At the origin of industrial society, based on the primacy and autonomy of commodities, of things, we find a contrary impulse to place what is essential – what causes one to tremble with fear and delight – outside the world of activity – outside the world of activity, the world of things. But however this is show~ it does not controvert the fact that in general a capitalist society reduces what is human to the condition of a *thing* (of a commodity). Religion and economy were delivered in one and the same movement from that which indebted them to one another: the former from profane calculation, the latter from limits given from the outside. But this fundamental opposition (this unexpected contradiction) is more interesting than it might seem at first. The problem that Calvinism so boldly solved is not limited to the interest that the historical study of religious matters always arouses. In fact it is still the problem that dominates us. Religion in general answered the desire that man always had to find himself, to regain an intimacy that was always - strangely lost. But the mistake of all religion is to always give man a contradictory answer: *an external form of intimacy.* So the successive solutions only exacerbate the problem: Intimacy is never separated from external elements, without which it could not be *signified.* Where we think we have caught hold of the Grail, we have only grasped a *thing,* and what is left in our hands is only a cooking pot .... Man's current quest does not differ from those of Galahad or Calvin either in its object or in the disappointment that comes once the object is found. But the modern world goes about it in a different way: It does not look for anything illusory and it means: to achieve an essential conquest by directly solving the problems that are posed by *things.* Perhaps it is absolutely right: Often a complete separation seems necessary. If we are in search of an object of possession, then we can only propose to look for *things,* since only *things* are within the province of activity and the search always commits us to activity. The Protestant critique of the Roman Church (i.e., of the pursuit of activity expressed in works) was not due to a strange scruple; and its ultimate (indirect) consequence, which commits mankind only to *do-* without any further aim - that which can be done *in the order of things,* is indeed the only solution. But if man is to find himself in the end, he looks in vain when he follows the paths that have led him to self-estrangement. All he could expect by following them was to adapt, for service, those *things* that are such, however, only to serve him.It is reasonable then to think that man cannot rediscover his truth without solving the problem of economy; but with respect to this *necessary* condition, he can say and believe it is *sufficient,* he can affirm that he will be free once he has complied with the exigencies given in *things* that are necessary, in the physical arrangements without which his needs cannot be satisfied. An obstacle will stop him, however: He will not be able to grasp that which he is bereft of any better than if he had taken paths more open to criticism; what he grasps will be no different from what was grasped by those who preceded him in his quest: As always he will only catch hold of *things* and will take the shadow which they are for the prey he was hunting. I maintain that the argument according to which the solution of the material problem is *sufficient* is the most admissible one at first. But even if the problems of life- the key to which is a man’s not becoming merely *a thing,* but *of being in a* *sovereign manner* - were the unavoidable Consequence of a satisfactory response to material exigencies, it remains radically distinct from that response, with which it is often confused. For this reason I can say concerning Calvinism, having capitalism as a consequence, that it poses a fundamental problem: *How can man find himself- or regain himself- seeing that the action to which* *the search commits him in one way or another is precisely what estranges* *him from himself.* The different statements, in modern times, of this disconcerting problem help to make us aware both of what is at issue now, in history, and of the projected fulfillment that is offered us.

[Western politics condemns its actions to one of servitude to utility – Death is feared because it is useless and the end of utility. Death is feared because it has no value. The ‘good’ of society is colonized by this fear, our sacrifice violently liberates us from servility an collapses the transcendent object of the world. This erotically allows us to transcend all taboos and prohibitions against desire in the status quo allows us to release life back into its unpredictable path]

**Land 92** – lecturer in Continental Philosophy at Warwick University (Nick, “The Thirst for Annihilation” pg. xi-xii)[rkezios]

Life appears as a pause on the energy path; as a precarious stabilization and complication of solar decay. It is most basically comprehensible as the general solution to the problem of consumption. Such a solar- or general-economic perspective exhibits production as an illusion; the hypostatization of a digression in consumption. To produce is to partially manage the release of energy into its loss, and nothing more. Death, wastage, or expenditure is the only end, the only definitive terminus. ‘Utility’ cannot in reality be anything but the characterization of a function, having no sense short of an expenditure which escapes it utterly. This is ‘relative utility’. The order of Western history has as its most pertinent symptom the drift of utility away from this relative sense, towards a paradoxical absolute value. A creeping slave morality colonizes value, subordinating it to the definition ‘that which serves’. The ‘good’ becomes synonymous with utility; with means, mediation, instrumentality, and implicit dependence. The real trajectory of loss is ‘immanence’, continuity, base matter, or flow. If the strictly regional resistance of everything that delays, impedes, or momentarily arrests the movement of dissolution is abstracted from the solar flow it is interpretable as transcendence. Such abstract resistance to loss is characterized by autonomy, homogeneity, and ideality, and is what Bataille summarizes as ‘(absolute) utility’. The (inevitable) return of constricted energy to immanence is religion, whose core is sacrifice, generative of the sacred. Sacrifice is the movement of violent liberation from servility, the collapse of transcendence. Inhibiting the sacrificial relapse of isolated being is the broad utilitarianism inherent to humanity, correlated with a profane delimitation from ferocious nature that finds its formula in theology. In its profane aspect, religion is martialled under a conception of God; the final guarantor of persistent being, the submission of (ruinous) time to reason, and thus the ultimate principle of utility. Cowering in the shadow of its gods, humanity is the project of a definitive abrogation of expenditure, and is thus an impossibility. The humanizing project has the form of an unsustainable law. Despite the fortifications of prohibition, the impossible corrodes humanity in eroticism;the eruption of irreducible excess, which is the base unity of sexuality and death. Eroticism gnaws us as the inevitable triumph of evil (utter loss). It is this passionate submission to fate (= death) that guides Bataille’s own readings, in Literature and Evil for instance, the greatest work of atheological poetics. Literature and Evil is a series of responses to writing that exhibit the complicity between literary art and transgression. Bataille’s insistent suggestion is that the nonutilitarian writer is not interested in serving mankind or furthering the accumulation of goods, however refined, delicate, or spiritual these may be. Instead, such writers—Emily Brontë, Baudelaire, Michelet, Blake, Sade, Proust, Kafka, and Genet are Bataille’s examples in this text—are concerned with communication, which means the violation of individuality, autonomy, and isolation, the infliction of a wound through which beings open out into the community of senseless waste. Literature is a transgression against transcendence, the dark and unholy rending of a sacrificial wound, allowing a communication more basic than the pseudo-communication of instrumental discourse. The heart of literature is the death of God, the violent absence of the good, and thus of everything that protects, consolidates, or guarantees the interests of the individual personality. The death of God is the ultimate transgression, the release of humanity from itself, back into the blind infernal extravagance of the sun.

### Bio-D

**The global warming impacts of the status quo are a reversal of the master slave dialect between humanity and nature. Their attempt to keep nature servile only creates greater outbursts in the future – makes extinction inevitable.**

**Stoekl 7** - Professor of French and comparative literature at Penn State University (Alan, “Bataille's Peak : Energy, Religion, and Postsustainability”, pg. 197)[rkezios]

If for a moment we assume that the global world of commerce, replete with electronic media, the Internet, virtual television, and whatnot, is the replacement for and the simulacrum of the nonuniversal city, we can only conclude that it can be so only as long as "nature no longer exists." But the fact that nature no longer exists, or at least seems no longer to exist, depends, ironically, on a natural given: the presence of fossil fuels in the earth‑oil and coal, primarily. Labor power discovered these fuels, put them to work, "harnessed" them, transformed their energy into something useful. But labor power did not put the fuels in the earth. And perhaps more important from our perspective, it will be hard‑pressed to replace them when they are gone. Nature‑produced energy‑the "homogeneous" energy that lends itself to work and the other, "heterogeneous" energy that is sovereign, not servile.22 If the very term "nature" is contestable, one thing that cannot be contested is that the primary sources of energy come from natural sources: millions of years of algae accumulating in certain ecosystems, for example.23 Thus pollution, dependent on this energy from natural sources, is ultimately natural; so too is global warming. So too is the incomprehensible unharnessed energy of the universe, which our labor and knowledge can only betray. So too will be massive die‑off of humans and other organisms at the point of depletion. Man as the author of his own creation-homo faber‑is opened by the radical exteriority the finitude, the heterogeneity, but also the infinite richness of nature. Man, as Sade would remind us, can never hope to have his reason domesticate a nature that "threatens the adequacy of rational systematicity"24 or that defies the seeming necessity of all human activity. Nature deals death, and there is no way, finally, to grasp it by simply exploiting it ("knowing" it) as a resource or analyzing away its threat as sublime difference.

### Climate

**Global warming, pollution, and consequently death is natural and inevitable**

**Stoekl 7** professor of French and comparative literature at Penn State University (Allan, 8 October 2007, “Bataille's Peak : Energy, Religion, and Postsustainability,” ­­­197, Ebrary)//KP

I raise this issue of energy in order to resituate the argument of Empire. If for a moment we assume that the global world of commerce, replete with electronic media, the Internet, virtual television, and whatnot, is the replacement for and the simulacrum of the nonuniversal 21 city, we can only conclude that it can be so only as long as “nature no longer exists.” But the fact that nature no longer exists, or at least seems no longer to exist, depends, ironically, on a natural given: the presence of fossil fuels in the earth— oil and coal, primarily. Labor power discovered these fuels, put them to work, “harnessed” them, transformed their energy into something useful. But labor power did not put the fuels in the earth. And perhaps more important from our perspective, it will be hard-pressed to replace them when they are gone. Nature-produced energy— the “homogeneous” energy that lends itself to work and the other, “heterogeneous” energy that is sovereign, not servile. 22 If the very term “nature” is contestable, one thing that cannot be contested is that the primary sources of energy come from natural sources: millions of years of algae accumulating in certain ecosystems, for example. 23 Thus pollution, dependent on this energy from natural sources, is ultimately natural; so too is global warming. So too is the incomprehensible unharnessed energy of the universe, which our labor and knowledge can only betray. So too will be massive die-off of humans and other organisms at the point of depletion. Man as the author of his own creation— homo faber— is opened by the radical exteriority, the finitude, the heterogeneity, but also the infinite richness of “nature.” Man, as Sade would remind us, can never hope to have his reason domesticate a nature that “threatens the adequacy of rational systematicity” 24 or that defies the seeming necessity of all human activity. Nature deals death, and there is no way, finally, to grasp it by simply exploiting it (“knowing” it) as a resource or analyzing away its threat as sublime difference.

**Fossil fuel consumption is a necessity – this waste establishes meaning**

**Stoekl 7** professor of French and comparative literature at Penn State University (Allan, 8 October 2007, “Bataille's Peak : Energy, Religion, and Postsustainability,” ­­­201-202, Ebrary)//KP

The burning of fossil fuel in a sense makes this doubleness of depletion evident. We burn these fuels because we have to. We waste them because we have no other choice, it is necessary to our freedom, our destiny, or whatever. This senseless waste in its deepest intention is the establishment, outside itself, of what must be: wealth, Man, the security of our lives, our Law, and Meaning. Our nonnegotiable lifestyle. But this waste is not simply opposed to another expenditure because its heedless burning already introduces an irremediable loss at the heart of the necessary. A loss, a fall: from comfortable, driven Man to the straining muscles of the mover, the walker, the cyclist, the dancer. From the comfortable knowledge of Man to the risk of the human in a general economy. From the unconditioned as guarantee of meaning (God) to the unconditioned as unconditioned: monstrous, incomprehensible, joy and anguish before death. “Nature” in the violence of her transmutations, as the line transgressed to another energy, that of celestial bodies. Energy in and as human muscle power is not so much quantifiable or comprehensible, like a Foucauldian “bio-power,” but is instead material (heterological, Bataille would say), the arousal, shuddering, and opening of organs and orifices— vehicles of transport— their communication with and in the night. The radical finitude of fossil fuel— the Nature that refuses to die, even when it gives itself up and runs out (and its running out is its reaffirmation of its singular autonomy)—is the opening of muscle expenditure, the squandering of excited organs. The (im)possibility of the city as locus of transport, in all the senses of the word, in an era of postsustainability, entails a finitude inseparable from the movement of generosity, as among the gleaners in Varda’s film.

### Disease

**The medical valuation of the healthy over the ill limits access to self-enlightened truth and desire.**

**Morris 7** (David B. Morris. Professor at the University of Virginia. New Literary History 38.3 (2007) 419-441. “Un-forgetting Asclepius: An Erotics of Illness.” Full Date: 2007. Accessed: 7/19/12. [muse](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/new_literary_history/v038/38.3morris.html))//CL

It is presence—the experience of the body beyond all rational knowledge—that allies illness with eros. Woolf's multiple transgressions follow from the fundamental reversal that identifies illness as ultimate closeness to truth. This transvaluation of values divides the world between two opposing groups: the upright (healthy but deceived) and the recumbent (ill but undeceived). The upright armies of good health go to work, build cities, establish empires, and define orthodox values—an enterprise in delusion and self-deception—while the recumbent ill abstain. What the bedridden invalid gains in resigning worldly power is access to truth. While health involves an unwitting immersion in everyday falsehood and hypocrisies, the ill experience life as it truly is, daring to utter the unspeakable: "There is, let us confess it (and illness is the great confessional), a childish outspokenness in illness; things are said, truths blurted out, which the cautious respectability of health conceals. About sympathy for example—we can do without it" (OBI 11). Health conceals not only the solitude of the individual, which illness chillingly exposes, but also the compensating link between illness and eros. If law, as Woolf claims, sides with normality, the ill ("outlaws that we are") respond unlawfully, abnormally, with senses heightened. Illness reveals the body's inescapable participation in our mental and emotional states; it requires in effect a new language, "more primitive, more sensual, more obscene." Woolf's essay resists a direct confession of her erotic feelings for Vita Sackville-West, but the extended and very indirect conclusion (akin to her extravagant opening sentence) offers a closing tribute to what illness always leaves unsaid, as the fictional Lady Waterford upon the death of her husband silently crushes the velvet curtains in a wordless bodied pain. The conclusion invests the essay with a retrospective erotic charge and invites reconsideration of how illness, as Woolf puts it, "often takes on the disguise of love" (OBI 6). Anatole Broyard lends a postmodern (surface-oriented) directness to the transgressive values that Woolf half-conceals in modernist depths and indirections. Broyard's account of his prostate cancer openly affirms erotic truths that medicine—in representing orthodox social and scientific values—represses. His visitors, who assumed they would need to offer consolation, found him surprisingly cheerful and talked about his courage. "But it has nothing to do with courage," Broyard countered, "at least not for me. As far as I can tell, it's a question of desire. I'm filled with desire—to live, to write, to do everything. . . . While I've always had trouble concentrating, I now feel as concentrated as a diamond or a microchip."28 Desire for Broyard is not an abstract concept but an erotic, fleshly current directly connected to sex and to its transformative powers. Although the Greek word eros denotes a generalized want, lack, or desire for what is missing, desire in classical Greek poetry specifically [End Page 428] characterizes the lover, whose want or lack is embodied in the beloved. Moreover, desire for the beloved transforms the lover, providing glimpses of a new, previously unknown self.29 Broyard finds that serious illness, like love, is transformative, heightening desire, aligning him with Woolf's illusion-free outlaw/recumbents in their immunity from sentimental lies and well-meant sympathies. "I remain outside of their solicitude, their love and best wishes," he insists of his consoling friends. "I'm isolated from them by the grandiose conviction that I am the healthy person and they are the sick ones. Like an existential hero, I have been cured by the truth while they still suffer the nausea of the uninitiated" (II 6). Illness and desire have transformed him, much as desire transforms the lover, not into a lessened old self (uninitiated and deceived), but into a new self enlightened as to the truth.

### Econ

**Our current economic processes is leading us towards a third world war- rethinking our economic processes is key to prevent catastrophic consequences**

**Bataille 47** (Georges, historian, librarian and philosopher, “The Accursed Share,” P. 185, ADP)

From the outset, the Marshall Plan tends toward a raising of the standard of living world-wide. (It may even have the effect of raising the Soviet standard of living, at the expense of the growth of .· productive forces.) But under capitalist conditions the raising of· the standard of living is not a sufficient relief from the continual growth of the productive forces. The Marshall Plan is also, from the start, a means *external to capitalism* of raising the standard of living. (In this respect, it does not matter whether the effect occurs outside of America.) Thus a shift begins toward a structure less different from that of the USSR, toward a relatively state-controlled economy, the only type possible where, the growth of productive forces being curbed, capitalist accumulation, and consequently profit, would no longer have a sufficient margin. Moreover, the form of aid to Europe is not the only indicator of a development that is generally favored by working-class agitation. The United States is struggling with insoluble contradictions. It defends free enterprise, but it thereby increases the importance of the state. It is only advancing, as slowly as it can, toward a point where the USSR rushed headlong. The solving of social problems no longer depends on street uprisings, and we are far from the time when expanding populations, short of economic resources, were constrained to invade the wealthiest regions. (Besides, military conditions work in favor of the rich nowadays, the opposite being true in the past.) Hence the consequences of politics apart from wars are of utmost interest. We cannot be sure that they will save us from disaster; but they are our only chance. We cannot deny that war often precipitated the development of societies: Aside from the Soviet Union itself, our least rigid social relations, and our nationalized industries and services, are the result of two wars that shook Europe. It is even true that we come out of the last war with an increased population; living standards themselves are still improving overall. Nevertheless, it is hard to see what a third war would bring us, other than the irremediable reduction of the globe to the condition of Germany in 1945. Henceforth we need to think in terms of a peaceful evolution without which the destruction of capitalism would be at the same time the destruction of the *works* of capitalism, the cessation of economic development, and the dissipation of the socialist dream. We must now expect from the *threat* of war that which yesterday it would have been callous but correct to expect from war. This is not reassuring, but the choice is not given.

**Our current policies make another war inevitable- unless the US assigns a large share of exess to achieve dynamic peace.**

**Bataille 47** (Georges, historian, librarian and philosopher, “The Accursed Share,” P. 187, ADP)

We only need to bring a clear principle into political judgments. If the threat of war causes the United States to commit the major part of the excess to military manufactures, it will be useless to still speak of a peaceful evolution: In actual fact, war is " bound to occur. *Mankind will move peacefully toward a general resolution* *of its problems only* if *this threat causes the U.S. to assign a large* *share of the excess* - *deliberately and without return* - *to* raising *the global* *standard of living, economic activity thus giving the surplus energy produced* *an outlet other than war.* It is no longer a matter of saying that the lack of disarmament means war; but American policy hesitates between two paths: Either rearm Europe with the help of a new lend-lease, or use, at least partially, the Marshall Plan for equipping it militarily. Disarmament under the present conditions is a propaganda theme; by no means is it a way out. But if the Americans abandon the specific character of the Marshall Plan, the idea of using a large share of the surplus for nonmilitary ends, this surplus will explode exactly where they will have decided it would. At the moment of explosion it will be possible to say that the policy of the Soviets made the disaster inevitable. The consolation will be not only absurd but false as well. It needs to be stated, here and now, that, on the contrary, to leave war as the only outlet for the excess of forces produced is to accept responsibility for that result. It is true that the USSR is putting America through a difficult trial. But what would this world be like if the USSR were not there to wake it up, tes-t it and force it to "change"? I have presented the inescapable consequences of a precipitous armament, but this in no way argues for a disarmament, the very idea of which is unreal. A disarmament is so far from being a possibility that one cannot even imagine the effects it would have. To suggest that this world be given a rest is fatuous in the extreme. Rest and sleep could only be, at best, a preliminary to war. Only a *dynamic peace15* answers a crying need for change. It is the only formula that can be opposed to the revolutionary determination of the Soviets. And *dynamic peace* assumes that their resolute determination will maintain the threat of war; it means the arming of opposite camps.

### Energy

**The only way we can truly glorify the excess – to spend unrelentlessly is to break free of the categorization of energy as a utility**

**Stoekl 7** – Professor of French and comparative literature at Penn State University, (Allan, Bataille’s Peak: Energy, Religion and Postsustainability, Pg xvi -xviii)[rkezios]

Bataille’s energy is inseparable from that which powers cars and raises elevators, but it is different as well. It is excess energy, and in that sense it is left over when a job is done, when the limits of growth are reached, or, in the current situation, when fossil fuels themselves reveal their profound limitations. Bataille’s energy is a transgression of the limit, it is what is left over in excess of what can be used within a fundamentally limited human field. As such, it is quite different from what can be used: it is not just left over in the sense of not being consumed; it is fundamentally unusable. At the point at which quantification reveals its finitude, energy asserts itself as the movement that cannot be stockpiled or quantified. It is the energy that by definition does not do work, that is insubordinate, that plays now rather than contributing to some effort that may mean something at some later date and that is devoted to some transcendent goal or principle. It is, as Bataille reminds us a number of times, the energy of the universe, the energy of stars and “celestial bodies” that do no work, whose fire contributes to nothing. On earth, it is the energy that traverses our bodies, that moves them in useless and time-consuming ways, that leads to nothing beyond death or pointless erotic expenditure, that defies quantification in measure: elapsed moments, dollars per hour, indulgences saved up for quicker entry into heaven. Energy is expended in social ritual that is pointless, that is tied not to the adhesion of a group or the security of the individual but to the loss of group and individual identity-”sacrifice. Bataille’s religion is thus inseparable from Bataille’s energy. Sacrifice is the movement of the opening out, the “communication,” of self and community with death: the void of the universe, the dead God. These are not entities that can be known or studied, but sovereign moments, moments of unconditional expenditure. This entails the expenditure of certainties, of any attempt to establish a transcendent, unconditioned meaning that grounds all human activity, a referent such as Man or God. Precisely because it really is unconditioned, this meaning-”God, if you will-”is sovereign, dependent on nothing, and certainly not on Man and his petty desire or demands. Religion, in the orgiastic movement of the body, is the loss of transcendent meaning, the death of God as virulent force, the traversing of the body by an energy that overflows the limits it recognizes but does not affirm. If there is community it is the unplanned aftereffect and not the essential meaning of this energy of this movement of the death or void of God. Thus ethics for Bataille, the community, and its meaning and survival are aftereffects of the expenditure of the sacred. Bataille’s theory is profoundly ethical but only in the sense that the instant of preservation, of meaning, of conservation, of knowledge, is the unforeseen offshoot of another movement, that of the drive to spend without counting, without attempting to anticipate return. To deny the ethical moment, the moment in which conservation and meaning are established only the better to affirm the destruction of expenditure, is to relegate that destruction to the simple, homogeneous movement of the animal, unaware of limit, meaning, and purposive act. Expenditure, in other words, is not the denial of the human, its repression, but instead its affirmation to the point at which it falls: the sacrificial act, the recognition of an energy that does not do “work” for the maintenance of the human, is the affirmation of a God who is not the slave of the human. It is the impossible moment in which awareness doubles the unknowable loss of energy and the virulence of a God who disbelieves in himself. The ethics of Bataille, then, entail a vision of the future in which the “left-hand sacred,” the sacred of impurity, of eroticism, of the radically unconditioned God, spins off a community in and through which expenditure can be furthered (a community of those with nothing in common). Not nuclear war, but the channeling of excess in ways that ensure survival so that more excess can be thrown off. And (one can continue along these lines) not generalized ecocide, but an affirmation of another energy, another religion, another waste, entailing not so much a steady state sustain- ability (with what stable referent? Man?) but instead a postsustainable state in which we labor in order to expend, not conserve. Hence the energy, and wealth, of the body-”the energy of libidinous and divine recycling, not the stockpiled, exploited, and dissipated energy of easily measured and used fossil fuels. This book has two goals: in the first part, to sketch out Bataille’s posit ions on energy expenditure, religion of and against the Book, and the city in the second, to extrapolate from those positions and consider current questions of energy use and depletion, religious literalism and fervor, and urban “life.” Urban space is a crucial problem for Bataille in that for him the city is the privileged locus of the physical and geographical elaboration of the sacred: either the right-hand sacred of concentration, hierarchy, and God as repressive force or the left-hand sacred of dispersal, the fall of meaning and sense, and God as figure of the sovereign expenditure of authority8 The city is, finally, the locus of concentration in and as the modern, and any consideration of a transition from an energy-religion complex of Man to one of the death of Man entails a reconsideration of the city as spatial and economic structure: a reconsideration that proposes not just energy efficiency and sustainability, but those elements as aftereffects of a more profound burn-off.

**Their idea that energy use is infinite does not assume limits. This ideology is flawed and we must reject the aff to reduce consumption and avoid becoming lost in a world of consumptionism.**

**Bataille 67** (Georges, historian, librarian and philosopher, The Accursed Share, P. 22, ADP)

Minds accustomed to seeing the development of productive forces as the ideal end of activity refuse to recognize that energy, which constitutes wealth, must ultimately be spent lavishly (without return), and that a series of profitable operations has absolutely no other effect than the squandering of profits. To affirm that it is necessary to dissipate a substantial portion of energy produced, sending it up in smoke, is to go against judgments that form the basis of a rational economy. We know cases where wealth has had to be destroyed (coffee thrown into the sea), but these scandals cannot reasonably be offered as examples to follow. They are the acknowledgment of an impotence, and no one could find in them the image and essence of wealth. Indeed, involuntary destruction (such as the disposal of coffee overboard) has in every case the meaning of failure; it is experienced as a misfortune; in no way can it be presented as desirable. And yet it is the type of operation without which there is no solution. When one considers the *totality* of productive wealth on the surface of the globe, it is evident that the products of this wealth can be employed for productive ends only insofar as the living organism that is economic mankind can increase its equipment. This is not entirely- neither always nor indefinitely- possible. A surplus must be dissipated through deficit operations: The final dissipation cannot fail to carry out the movement that animates terrestrial energy. The contrary usually appears for the reason that the economy is never considered in *general.* The human mind reduces operations, in science as in life, to an entity based on typical *particular* systems (organisms or enterprises). Economic activity, considered as a whole, is conceived in terms of particular operations with limited ends. The mind generalizes by composing the aggregate of these operations. Economic science merely generalizes the isolated situation; it restricts its object to operations carried out with a view to a limited end, that of economic man. It does not take into consideration a play of energy that no particular end limits: the play of *living matter in general,* involved in the movement of light of which it is the result. On the surface of the globe, for *living matter* in *general,* energy is always in excess; the question is always posed in terms of extravagance. The choice is limited to how the wealth is to be squandered. It is to the *particular* living being, or to limited populations of living beings, that the problem of necessity presents itself. But man is not just the separate being that contends with the living world and with other men for his share of resources. The general movement of exudation (of waste) of living matter impels him, and he cannot stop it; moreover, being at the summit, his sovereignty in the living world identifies him with this movement; it, destines him, in a privileged way, to that glorious operation, to useless consumption. If he denies this, as he is constantly urged to do by the consciousness of a *necessity,* of an indigence inherent in separate beings (which are constantly short of resources, which are nothing but eternally *needy* individuals), his denial does not alter the global movement of energy in the least: The latter cannot accumulate limitlessly in the productive forces; eventually, like a river into the sea, it is bound to escape us and be lost to us.

**More energy opportunities aren’t necessary for life- all species can still sustain life**

**Bataille 67** (Georges, historian, librarian and philosopher, The Accursed Share, P. 27, ADP)

That as a rule an organism has at its disposal greater energy resources than are necessary for the operations that sustain life (functional activities and, in animals, essential muscular exercises, the search for food) is evident from functions like growth and reproduction. Neither growth nor reproduction would be possible if plants and animals did not normally dispose of an excess. The very principle of living matter requires that the chemical operations of life, which demand an expenditure of energy, be gainful, productive of surpluses. Let us consider a domestic animal, a calf. (In order not to go too deeply into the matter, I will first leave aside the different contributions of animal or human energy that enable its food to be produced; every organism depends on the contribution of others, and if this contribution is favorable, it extracts the necessary energy from it, but without it the organism would soon die.) Functional activity utilizes part of the available energy, but the animal commands an excess that ensures its growth. Under normal conditions, a part of this excess is lost in comings and goings, but if the stock grower manages to keep it inactive, the volume of the calf benefits; the saving appears in the form of fat. If the calf is not killed the moment comes when the reduced growth no longer consumes all of an increased excess; the calf then reaches sexual maturity; its vital forces are devoted mainly to the turbulence of the bull in the case of a male, or to pregnancy and the production of milk in the case of a female. In a sense, reproduction signifies a passage from individual growth to that of a group. If the male is castrated, its individual volume again increases for a time and a considerable amount of work is extracted from it. In nature there is no artificial fattening of the newborn, nor is there castration. It was convenient for me to choose a domestic animal as an example, but the movements of animal matter are basically the same in all cases. On the whole, the excess energy provides for the growth or the turbulence of individuals. The calf and the cow, the bull and the ox merely add a richer and more familiar illustration of this great movement. Plants manifest the same excess, but it is much more pronounced in their case. They are nothing but growth and reproduction (the energy necessary for their functional activity is neglible). But this indefinite exuberance must be considered in relation to the conditions that make it possible – and that limit it.

### Heg

The hegemony of the 1ac sustains itself on war – turning individual expenditures into state utility

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Let us consider three elements of what might constitute Bataille's own mode of excess, writing as he is, when consumer capitalism and Soviet socialism retain their status as historical projects, and war adheres snugly to a Keynesian metaphysic. Bataille, of course is writing under the sign of what came to be called Fordism, a regulatory apparatus that mass produced consumption as a disciplinary realm parallel to but outside that of production. While the externality was mutual, it was also directional-domesticity was the sphere where cars and people started out new and became old, where time was free, leisure expressed substantive rationality, and used luxuries could be put out in the garbage. Despite, or perhaps more precisely because of the way in which the Keynesian welfare state was involved in the economy, subventions for public assistance and military contracting stood as anti-productive. In the dream realm of popular culture and consumer markets, of manufactured desires, the state needed to be absent to locate excess in a space that would be free of coercion and domination-hence the formal distinction from work and government. The state operates for Bataille in a universe of general interest that can never use up the erotic extensive energies of the accursed share. "The State (at least the modern, fully developed State) cannot give full reign to a movement of destructive consumption without which an indefinite accumulation of resources situates us in the universe in exactly the same way as cancer is inscribed in the body, as a negation." (Bataille 1993: 160) Â Â Â Â War is the consummate category of expenditure that can be stolen back by state and particularizing economic exchange, especially as it seeks an equilibrium between destruction and profit in what is intended as a virtuous cycle of demand absorbing supply that Franklin Delano Roosevelt dubbed, "Dr. Win The War." Like the partition between production and consumption, this political economy of war assumes that death and profitability belong to separate accounts, and that civic devastation will be restored by a reincorporating policy framework like the Marshall Plan. As Bataille observes: "Of course, what we spend in one category is in principle lost for the others. There are many possibilities of slippage: alcohol, war and holidays involve us in eroticism, but this means simply that the possible expenditures in one category are ultimately reduced by those we make in the others, so that only the profits found in war truly alter this principle; even so, in most cases these profits correspond to the losses of the vanquished.... We need to make a principle of the fact that sooner or later the sum of excess energy that is managed for us by a labor so great that it limits the share available for erotic purposes will be spent in a catastrophic war."(Bataille 1993: 188) Under these circumstances, the political choice becomes clear, expenditure can be wasted in war or applied to increase the standard of living.

### Growth

**Growth allows us to dominate nature by reducing it by using it as a tool for our own well being- each rejection of growth is key**

**Bataille 67** (Georges, historian, librarian and philosopher, The Accursed Share, P. 28, ADP)

I will speak briefly about the most general conditions of life, dwelling on one crucially important fact: solar energy is the source of life's exuberant development. The origin and essence of our wealth are given in the radiation of the sun, which dispenses energy- wealth - without any return. The sun gives without ever receiving: Men ertr conscious of this long before astrophysics measured that ceaseless prodigality; they saw it ripen the harvests and they associated its splendor with the act of someone who gives without receiving. It is necessary at this point to a dual origin of moral judgments. In former times value was given to unproductive glory, whereas in our day it is measures in terms of production. Precedence is given to energy acquisition over energy expenditure. Glory itself is justified by the consequences of a glorious deed in the sphere of utility. But, dominated though it is by practical judgment and Christian morality, the archaic sensibility is still alive: In particular it reappears in the romantic protest against the bourgeois world; only in the classical conceptions of the economy does it lose its rights entirely. Solar radiation results in a superabundance of energy on the surface of the globe. But, first, living matter receives this energy and accumulates it within the limits given by the space that is available to it. It then radiates or squanders it, but before devoting an appreciable share to this radiation it makes maximum use of it for growth. Only the impossibility of continuing growth makes way for squander. Hence the real excess does not begin until the growth of the individual or group has reached its limits. The immediate limitation, for each individual or each group, is given by the other individuals or other groups. But the terrestrial sphere (to be exact, the *biosphere*), which corresponds to the space available to life, is the only real limit. The individual or group can be reduced by another individual or another group, but the total volume of living nature is not changed; in short, it is the size of the terrestrial space that limits overall growth.

**Depletion is a result of growth- extinction it required**

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Depletion was there from the outset: in the first lump of coal burned, there was energy derived from the destruction of a resource. The fossil fuels, and the electricity, that drive Empire are depletion: if they could not be depleted, burned up, they could not provide energy. Fossil fuel is the passage of time as decay, as petrifaction, the shift from life to death as living things are transformed into valuable and exploitable reserves; it is also the ticking time of the loss of resources, of the limit. Empire in its seeming posthistorical timelessness, in its adialectical spread, tends nevertheless toward depletion, toward death as a wasting of the ideal figures of consumption, meaning, Man as speed. Empire necessarily, from the first, in its energy profile, implies its own extinction. For the statues to fall requires massive energy inputs. Waste as “practical”—all movement of Empire— depletes itself, reveals itself as the death, the emptiness at the heart of a fossil fuel globalization and the technoscientific realization. Man caught in his timeless location in Empire is ejected at the moment the economy fails: the moment of the exhaustion of resources, the point at which the growth economy falters because the ever increasing accumulation of debt, based on the seemingly endless increase in the availability of human-friendly energy (the power to “do work”), grinds to a halt. 27 The logic of growth is inseparable from the logic of depletion: finitude at the heart of the seemingly infinite.

**Surpluses of growth aren’t for the good of man kind, but to build military superiority- empirics prove**

**Bataille 67** (Georges, historian, librarian and philosopher, The Accursed Share, P. 28, ADP)

One would not arrive at the real cause in this instance if one did not first perceive the general law of economy: On the whole a society always produces more than is necessary for its survival; it has a surplus at its disposal. It is precisely the use it makes of this surplus that determines it: The surplus is the cause of the agitation, of the structural changes and of the entire history of society. But the surplus has more than one outlet, the most common of which is growth. And growth itself has many forms, each one of which eventually comes up against some limit. Thwarted, demographic growth becomes military; it is forced to engage in conquest. Once the military limit is reached, the surplus has the sumptuary forms of religion as an outlet, along with the games and spectacles that derive therefrom, or personal luxury. History ceaselessly records the cessation, then the resumption of growth. There are states of equilibrium where the increased sumptuary life and the reduced bellicose activity give the excess its most humane outlet. But this state itself dissolves society little by little, and returns it to disequilibrium. Some new movement then appears as the only bearable solution. Under these conditions of malaise, a society engages as soon as it can in an undertaking capable of increasing its forces. It is then ready to recast its moral laws; it uses the surplus for new ends, which suddenly exclude the other outlets. Islam condemned every form of prodigal behavior, valorizing military activity instead. At a time when its neighbors enjoyed a state of equilibrium it commanded a growing military force that nothing could resist. A renewed critique of the forms of luxury - Protestant at first, then revolutionary - coincided with a possibility of industrial development, implicit in the technical advances of the new age. The largest share of the surplus was reserved, in modern times, for capitalist accumulation. Islam rather quickly met its limits; the development of industry is beginning to approach them in its turn. Islam easily returned to the forms of equilibrium of the world it had conquered; 12 by contrast, industrial economy is involved in a disorderly agitation: It appears condemned to grow, and already it lacks the possibility of growing. The position of Tibet in this schema is in a sense opposite to those of Islam or the modern world. From time immemorial the waves of successive invasions from the immense plateaus of central Asia had swept toward the regions where life was easier, to the east, to the west and to the south. But after the fifteenth century this overflow from the barbarian plateaus ran up against the effective resistance of cannons.l3 The urban civilization of Tibet already represented in Central Asia an incipient outlet for the surplus in a different direction. No doubt the hordes of Mongol conquerors used every possibility of invasion (of growth in space) available to them in their time. Tibet offered itself another solution, which the Mongols themselves were to adopt in turn in the sixteenth century. The populations of the poor tablelands were periodically condemned to attack the rich areas: *Otherwise they* *would cease to grow;* they would have to abandon the barbarians' outlet of warfare and find another use for their energy overflow. Monasticism is a mode of expenditure of the excess that Tibet undoubtedly did not discover, but elsewhere it was given a place *alongside* other outlets. In Central Asia the extreme solution consisted in giving the monastery *all* the excess. Today one needs a clear grasp of this principle: A population that cannot somehow develop the system of energy it constitutes, that cannot increase its volume (with the help of new techniques or of wars), must wastefully expend *all* the surplus it is bound to produce. The paradox of Lamaism, which reached a perfect form after the invention of firearms, answered this necessity. It is the radical solution of a country that has no other diversion and ultimately finds itself in a closed container. Not even the outlet consisting in the need to defend oneself, to have resources and human lives available for that purpose. A country that is too poor does not really try. One invades it without occupying it and "the books" that a monk spoke of to Bell could not lie, assuring that Tibet would be invaded from time to time, but no one would stay. Thus, in the midst of a richer and well-armed world, the poor country in its closed container must give the problem of surplus a solution that checks its explosive violence *within:* an internal construction so perfect, so free of controversion, so conducive to accumulation, that one cannot envisage the least growth of the system. The celibacy of the majority of monks even presented a threat of depopulation. (This was the concern confided to Bell by the commander-in-chief of the army.) The revenue of the monasteries ensured the consumption of resources, supporting a mass of sterile consumers. The equilibrium would soon be jeopardized if this mass were not unproductive and childless. The labor of the laity suffices to feed them, and the resources are such that their number could scarcely be increased. The life of most of the monks is hard (problems would result if there were an advantage in doing nothing). But the parasitism of the lamas resolves the situation so well that the living standard of the Tibetan worker, according to Charles Bell, is higher than that of the Hindu or Chinese worker. Furthermore, writers on Tibet agree in noting the happy disposition of the Tibetans, who sing when they work, are easy to get along with, morally permissive, and light-hearted (yet the winter cold is terrible and the houses have no glass in the windows and no fireplace). The piety of the monks is another matter: It is of secondary importance, but the system would be inconceivable without it. And there is no doubt that lamaic enlightenment morally realizes the essence of consumption, which is to open, to give, to lose, and which brushes calculations aside. The Tibetan system spread to Mongolia at the end of the sixteenth century. The conversion of the Mongols, even more a change of economy than of religion, was the peculiar denouement of the history of Central Asia. The age-old outlet of invasions being closed, this last act of the drama defines the meaning of Lamaism: This totalitarian monasticism answers the need to stop the growth of a closed system. Just as Islam reserved all the excess for war, and the modern world for industrial development, Lamaism put everything into the contemplative life, the free play of the sensitive man in the world.

**Their extensions of growth are unnecessary- it merely speeds up consumptionism, forcing us to inevitably reach our limits.**

**Bataille 67** (Georges, historian, librarian and philosopher, The Accursed Share, P. 28, ADP)

Man's activity is basically conditioned by this general movement of life. In a sense, in *extension,* his activity opens up a new possibility to life, a new space (as did tree branches and bird wings in nature). The space that labor and technical know-how open to the increased reproduction of men is not, in the proper sense, one that life has not yet populated. But human activity transforming the world augments the mass of living matter with supplementary apparatuses, composed of an immense quantity of inert matter, which considerably increases the resources of available energy. From the first, man has the option of utilizing part of the available energy for the growth (not biological but technical) of his energy wealth. The techniques have in short made it possible to extend - to develop - the elementary movement of growth that life realizes within the limits of the possible. Of course, this development is neither continuous nor boundless. Sometimes the cessation of development corresponds to a stagnation of techniques; other times, the invention of new techniques leads to a resurgence. The growth of energy resources can itself serve as the basis of a resumption of biological (demographic) growth. The history of Europe in the nineteenth century is the best (and best known) illustration of these vast living proliferations of which technical equipment is the ossature: We are aware of the extent of the population growth linked at first to the rise of industry. In actual fact the quantitative relations of population and tool making- and, in general, the conditions of economic development in history -are subject to so many interferences that it is always difficult to determine their exact distribution. In any case, I cannot incorporate detailed analyses into an overall survey that seems the only way of outlining the vast movement which animates the earth. But the recent decline in demographic growth by itself reveals the complexity of the effects. The fact is that the revivals of development that are due to human activity, that are made possible or maintained by new techniques, always have a double effect: Initially, they use a portion of the surplus energy, but then they produce a larger and larger surplus. This surplus eventually contributes to making growth more difficult, for growth no longer suffices to use it up. At a certain point the advantage of extension is neutralized by the contrary advantage, that of luxury; the former remains operative, but in a disappointing - uncertain, often powerless - way. The drop in the demographic curves is perhaps the first indicator of the change of sign that has occurred: Henceforth what matters primarily is no longer to develop the productive forces but to spend their products sumptuously. At this point, immense squanderings are about to take place: After a century of populating and of industrial peace, the temporary limit of development being encountered, the two world wars organized the greatest orgies of wealth - and of human beings – that history has recorded. Yet these orgies coincide with an appreciable rise in the general standard of living: The majority of the population benefits from more and more unproductive services; work is reduced and wages are increased overall. Thus, man is only a roundabout, subsidiary response to the problem of growth. Doubtless, through labor and technique, he has made possible an extension of growth beyond the given limits. But just as the herbivore relative to the plant, and the carnivore relative to the herbivore, is a luxury, man is the most suited of all living beings to consume intensely, sumptuously, the excess energy offered up by the pressure of life to conflagrations befitting the solar origins of its movement.

**Their extensions of growth is a refusal to see the truth, causing their impacts- a recognition of the truth allows us to examine our self-consciousness, solving the real problems at hand**

**Bataille 67** (Georges, historian, librarian and philosopher, “The Accursed Share,” P. 40, ADP)

But it has to be added at once that, however well-defined the solutions, their implementation on the required scale is so difficult that from the outset the undertaking hardly looks encouraging. The theoretical solution exists; indeed, its necessity is far from escaping the notice of those on whom the decision seems to depend. Nevertheless, and even more clearly, what general economy defines first is the explosive character of this world, carried to the extreme degree of explosive tension in the present time. A curse obviously weighs on human life insofar as it does not have the strength to control a vertiginous movement. It must be stated as a principle, without hesitation, that the lifting of such a curse depends on man and only on man. But it cannot be lifted if the movement from which it emanates does not appear clearly in consciousne*ss.* In this regard it seems rather disappointing to have nothing more to propose, as a remedy for the catastrophe that threatens, than the "raising of the living standard." This recourse, as I have said, is linked to a refusal to see, in its truth, the exigency to which the recourse is intended to respond. Yet if one considers at the same time the weakness and the virtue of this solution, two things become immediately apparent: that it is the only one capable of rather wide acceptance; and that, due to its equivocal nature, it provokes and stimulates an effort of lucidity all the greater for seeming to be far removed from such an effort. In this way the avoidance of the truth ensures, in reciprocal fashion, a recognition of the truth. In any case, the mind of contemporary man would be reluctant to embrace solutions that, not being negative, were emphatic and arbitrary; it prefers that exemplary rigor of consciousness which alone may slowly make human life commensurate with its truth. The exposition of a general economy implies intervention in public affairs, certainly; but first of all and more profoundly, what it aims at is consciousness, what it looks to from the outset is the self-consciousness that man would finally achieve in the lucid vision of its linked historical forms. Thus, general economy begins with an account of the historical data, relating their meaning to the present data.

**Their extensions of growth justifies catastrophes- only a rejection and embracing communism solves**

**Bataille 67** (Georges, historian, librarian and philosopher, “The Accursed Share,” P. 169, ADP)

Apart from the communist enterprise and doctrine, the human mind accepts uncertainty and is satisfied with shortsightedness. Outside the Soviet world, there is nothing that has the value of an ascendant movement, nothing advances with any vigor. There persists a powerless dissonance of moans, of things already heard, of bold testimony to resolute incomprehension. This disorder is more favorable no doubt to the birth of an authentic *self-consciousness* than is its opposite, and one might even say that without this powerlessness - and without the tension that is maintained by communism's aggressiveness -consciousness would not be free, would not be alert. In truth, the situation is painful and certainly of a nature to bring individuals out of their apathy. A "schism," a complete rift, divides not just minds, but the mind in general, for between the parties in question everything is originally in common. The division and the hatred are nonetheless complete and what they portend, it appears, is war: an inexpiable war, ineluctably the cruelest and most costly in history. Moreover, reflection at the threshold of war is subject to singular conditions: Indeed, however one manages it, one cannot imagine- assuming it takes place- pursuing it beyond a conflagration. What would be the meaning, in the event of a Russian victory, of a world generally ruined, where the United States, far from assisting other countries, would be more completely devastated than Germany today? The USSR would then also be ravaged, and the Marxism that would be established in the world would bear no resemblance to the one demanded by the development of productive forces. What would be the meaning of a destruction of capitalism that would be at the same time the destruction of capitalism's achievements? Obviously it would be the crudest possible denial of Marx's lucidity. The humanity that would have destroyed the work of the industrial revolution would be the poorest of all time; the memory of the recent wealth would finish the job of making that humanity unbearable. Lenin defined socialism as "the soviets, plus electrification." As a matter of fact, socialism does not just require the power of the people, but wealth as well. And no reasonable person can imagine it based on a world in which shanty towns would take the place of the civilization symbolized by the names of New York and London. That civilization is perhaps detestable; it sometimes seems to be only a bad dream; and there is no question that it generates the boredom and irritation that favor a slide toward catastrophe. But no one can reasonably consider something that only has the attraction of unreason in its favor. Of course, one still has the option of imagining a victory of the United States over Russia that would not devastate the world so completely. But the "schism" would not be reduced for the fact that the victory was won at little cost to the victor. Apparently world dominion would then belong to the single holder of the decisive weapons, but in the way that the victim belongs to the executioner*.* This executioner's burden is so unenviable, the awareness that such a bloody solution would certainly poison social life is so strong, there there does not exist, on the American side, any substantial opinion in favor of war in the near future. Hence it is clear, or at least probable, that time is on the side of Russia.

### Renewables

**The alternative is inherently sustainable – destruction is only possible without expenditure**

**Stoekl 7** professor of French and comparative literature at Penn State University (Allan, 8 October 2007, “Bataille's Peak : Energy, Religion, and Postsustainability,” 139-142, Ebrary) //KP

It should not be surprising that **sustainability and autonomism are two versions of essentially the same mode of “challenging”** (in the Heideggerian sense). **They are both technological solutions to the dread of human temporality and mortality**. Both entail an ideally stable subject that conceives of a natural world as a collection of resources at Man’s disposal. The only difference is that **the autonomist world is one that emphasizes speed, movement, consumption, and destruction, while the sustainable one stresses consumption, conservation, and recycling. In both cases the standing reserve is there**, at the ready; **raw materials are there to be used for Man’s survival and comfort**. Both exist to procure for Man a certain emotional state that is deemed to be morally superior: autonomism supposes a joy in the heedless exercise of individual will (“freedom”), sustainability supposes a dogged contentment through renunciation and the sense of superiority engendered by a virtuous feeling of restraint. In both cases the human self as overweening, protected, permanent jewel is inextricably bound to the destiny of all matter. Bataillean generosity from this perspective is unthinkable. All matter is capable of taking, and holding, beautiful or significant or quantifiable shape; all energy can be refined and concentrated so that it can do “work.” The universe wears a frock coat, as Bataille put it in “Formless”: What [the word “formless”] designates has no rights in any sense and gets itself squashed everywhere, like a spider or an earthworm. In fact, for academic men to be happy the universe would have to take shape. All of philosophy has no other goal: it is a matter of giving a frock coat to what is, a mathematical frock coat. (OC, 1: 217; VE, 31) I suppose **if I were given a choice** between the two versions of the world picture, **I would pick the sustainable one because it is**, well, sort of **sustainable— in principle, anyway. In an era of fossil fuel depletion**, in any case**, we will get sustainability, voluntarily or involuntarily**. And certainly planning sustainability in the mode of “powerdown” (Heinberg 2004) is preferable to resource wars and unevenly distributed depletion. **Believing in a completely sustainable (unchanging) world is**, however, **akin to believing in a coherent God**. But **unless one derives grim satisfaction from renouncing things and contentment with a sense of how much one has had to give up, sustainability** as conceived by Newton, for example**, is always bound to come out second best.** That is why, **as long as refined fossil fuels are cheap and no one has to think too much about the future, the suburbs will always win out over,** say, **sustainable cohousing**. 11 **An environmentalism that promises only a beautiful smallness, or a “prosperous way down,” is bound to have little appeal in a culture**— and not just the American culture— that values space, movement, and a personal narrative of continuous improvement and freedom (financial, sexual, experiential)—even if those versions of the “tendency to expend” remain in thrall to the self as ultimate signified. Where does that leave Bataille’s future? Recall our analysis of The Accursed Share in chapter 2: **the Marshall Plan would save the world from nuclear war not because it was the goal of the plan to do so, but because the aftereffect of “spending without return” is the affirmation of a world in which resources can be squandered differently: the alternative is World War III. The world is inadvertently sustained**, so to speak, **and the glory of spending can go on: this is what constitutes the ethics of “good expenditure**.” Now of course we can say, from today’s perspective, that Bataille was naive, that the “gift-giving” engaged in by the United States under Harry Truman was a cynical attempt to create a bloc favorable to its own economic interests, thereby saving Europe for capitalism and aligning it against the Soviet Union in any future war— and that was probably the case. But Bataille himself was perfectly aware of the really important question: after all, as he himself puts it, “Today Truman would appear to be blindly preparing for the final— and secret— apotheosis” (OC, 7: 179; AS, 190). Blindly. Even if Bataille may have been mistaken about Truman, who after all was giving the gift of oil-powered technological superiority, the larger point he is making remains valid: giving escapes the intentions of its “author.” What is important is **gift-giving itself, and the good or bad (or selfish) intentions of the giver are virtually irrelevant. What counts**, in other words**, is how one spends, not what one hopes to accomplish by it**. Intentionality, with its goals proposed by a limited and biased self, reveals its limits. Derrida noted in his famous controversy with Jean-Luc Marion about gifting that there can never be a real gift because the intentions of the giver can never be completely unselfish. 12 Thus the very idea of the gift is incoherent: a completely unselfish gift could not be given, because it would be entirely without motive. It could not even be designated as a gift. To give is to intentionally hand something over, and as soon as there is intention there is motive. One always hopes to get or accomplish something. But, as Marion would counter, there is a gifting that escapes the (inevitable) intentions of the giver and opens another economy and another ethics. This is a gift that, past a certain point, always defies the giver. Of course, one “knows” what one is giving; there are criteria for the evaluation of the gift— but then that knowledge is lost in non-knowledge. The left hand never really knows what the right is doing. Nor does the right necessarily know what it is doing, for that matter. The ethics of The Accursed Share**: by giving, instead of spending for war, we inadvertently spare the world and thus make possible ever more giving. Energy is squandered in the production of wealth rather than in nuclear destruction**. As we have seen, however, Bataille never adequately distinguishes between modes of spending and modes of energy. Heidegger does: **quantified, stockpiled energy has as its corollary a certain objectified subjectivity, a certain model of utility associated both with the object and with the self. Another spending**, another “bringing-forth” is that of the ritual object, **which** (even though Heidegger does not stress it) **entails another energy regime: not the hoarding and then the programmed burning-off of quantified energy, but energy release in a ritual that entails the ecstatic and anguished movements of the mortal, material body**. If we read Bataille from a Heideggerian perspective, we can therefore propose another giving, another expenditure. This one too will not, cannot, know what it is doing, but it will be consonant with the post-Sadean conceptions of matter and energy that Bataille develops in his early writings. Bataille’s alternative to the standing reserve is virulent, unlike Heidegger’s, no doubt because Bataille, following Sade, emphasizes the violence of the energy at play in ritual. Bataille’s world is intimate, and through this intimacy it gains a ferocity lacking in Heidegger’s cool and calm chalice or windmill (though both represent, in different ways, the lavish expenditure of unproductive energy). Bataille’s matter now is certainly not quantified, stockpilable; it is a “circular agitation” that risks, rather than preserves, the self. Through contact with this energy-charged matter, and the nonknowledge inseparable from it, the dominion of the head, of reason, of man’s self-certainty, is overthrown: God doubts himself, reveals his truth to be that of atheism; the human opens himor herself to the other, communicates in eroticism, in the agony of death, of atheistic sacrifice. **Just as in The Accursed Share, where the survival of the planet will be the unforeseen, unintended consequence of a gift-giving (energy expenditure) oriented not around a weapons buildup but around a squandering (giveaway) of wealth, so too in the future we can posit sustainability as an unintended aftereffect of a politics of giving. Such a politics would entail not a cult of resource conservation and austere selfhood but,** instead, **a sacrificial practice of exalted expenditure and irresistible glory. Energy expenditure, fundamental to the human** (the human as the greatest burner of energy of all the animals), **would be flaunted on the intimate level, that of the body, that of charged filth. The object would not be paraded as something useful, something that fulfills our needs; its virulence would give the lie to all attempts at establishing and guaranteeing the dominion of the imperial self.**

### Sustainability

**Postsustainability is the result of embracing our death-bound bodies – must embrace depletion**

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Following Bataille, we can argue that the future, the fall into the void of certainties (God, Man, quantifiable and usable energy) may lead to another kind of spending, “on the scale of the universe,” which, in spite of itself, would entail what I have called postsustainability. We do not know; what is clear is that one kind of matter, one energy, one plenitude, is dying; another, monstrous, already here, already burning, announces itself. Hubbert’s peak announces it, yet betrays it, for Hubbert envisaged only one version of energy. Up until now the development of thought, of philosophy, has been inseparable from the fossil fuel–powered growth curve, from “civilization.” The downside of the bell curve is non-knowledge because the event of the decline of knowledge, the disengagement of philosophy from economic and social growth, cannot be thought from within the space of knowledge growth (the perfection of modern truth) or its concomitant absence. We are in unknowable, unthinkable territory— an era of disproportion, as Pascal might call it. The era of Bataille’s peak. “I love the ignorance concerning the future,” wrote Nietzsche, and Bataille seconded him. For Bataille, any assurances concerning the future, either good or bad, were beside the point, even silly; instead, there was the play of chance, the affirmation of what has happened, what will happen. The left hand spends, in gay blindness as well as science, and the future is affirmed, in the night of non-knowledge. 36 Does this mean that we should despair, and use this “ignorance” as an excuse to do nothing? Not at all; we know the difference between sustainability and catastrophic destruction; we know the difference between global warming and a chance for some, even limited, species survival. But we also recognize, with Bataille, the inseparability of knowledge and non-knowledge, the tilt point at which, rather than cowering in fear, we throw ourselves gaily into the future, accepting whatever happens, embracing everything, laughing at and with death. We will a return of recalcitrant bodily and celestial energy, of the sacrifice of the logic of the standing reserve; we bet against the vain effort to will an endless autonomist freedom. We know that sustainability, if such a thing ever were to come about, would be inseparable not from simple calculation and planning but from the blowback of the movement of an embrace of the transgressed limit, the intimacy of the world willed to ritual consumation, the embrace of death-bound bodies: postsustainability. 37 In other words, after Bataille, we refuse to take the downside of the bell curve as a simple and inevitable decline into feudalism, fundamentalism, extinction. We understand all that depletion implies, and we embrace it, affirming the movement of expenditure at its Varda-esque heart. 38 Who is this “we”? Not the self-satisfied “we” of a closed community or multitude, jealous of its rights and serene in its self-reflection. Rather, a notwe, emptied of meaning, unjustified— a community of those with nothing in common (Lingis 1994).

### Terrorism

Terrorism is the excess of international relations. Attempts to eliminate terrorism are not only doomed to failure, but ensure future eruptions.

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If the Cold War contested the future, its apparent heir, the war on terror battles over the present. This is more than the hyper-vigilance of a politics of fear. The terrorist is the quintessential figure of bad risk however effectively it may be deployed. We cannot await it. The only safety lies in bringing its moment into our midst, that is, by pre-emptive strike. Terror's temporality is anti-utopian, it implies the immanence of the future in the present. The risk economy, the investment action upon a possible future difference in the present, shares the same sensibility. Foreign and domestic applications of risk management forge a nefarious connection in George W. Bush's 2002 National Security Document. In this proud proclamation of imperial doctrine, pre-emption is bequeathed to one nation and friends (whether old or newly acquired) affirm their allegiance by replicating U.S. anti-inflationary monetary policy. Low and behold this same language turns up in Iraq 's strategy for national development. Inflation, when it is not an assault on labor (as low unemployment or high wages) anthropomorphizes the world of goods (supply being chased by demand and puffing itself up accordingly). · Just as industrialization forced association upon self-sufficient labor, and consumerism wove a common web of dreams in the marketplace, financialization imposes a generalized condition of mutual indebtedness. Personal finance, like free wage labor, amounts to an enormous aggregation of the capacity to produce financial value while assuming the risks of failure to realize value. Like production and consumption, financialization is also a form of dispossession of one array of life-making circumstances that forces an elaboration of what people must subsequently do and be together. The future itself becomes a factor of production as each possible outcome is shifted into an actionable present. The derivative represents the moment when a small intervention, an arbitrager's momentary opportunity, seizes upon a highly dispersed volatility and leverages it to extensive effect. Unlike the entrepreneur, born of initiative, the arbitrager exists only through the action of others, deriving themselves as a cluster of volatilities. The derivative is the extensive energy within the body of finance. It is also incorporated into the grand strategy for engaging and negating unsupportable risk and excess. Terror wars are in this respect derivative wars. They "deter forward" using small deployments of risk capable special forces to leverage imperial intervention. They succeed in their initial displacements (of toppling regimes) but produce the very thing they claim to fight but that are in actuality their condition of further circulation, namely terror. Terror is an inassimilable excess that occasions intervention without end. Unlike earlier imperialisms that sought to extract, civilize and develop, this logic of occupation quickly becomes indifferent to its prize and impatient with itself. · It would be tempting to see in the gap between a general interest in combating terror everywhere, and a particular occupation of two energy states an affirmation of Bataille's equilibration of devastation and profit. Afghanistan 's geo-strategic potential for transshipment of oil and gas, Iraq 's prized proven oil reserves, Halliburton's corrupt profiteering would seem to affirm the straightforward arithmetic captured by the slogan, "blood for oil." Control of energy consumption would prove the ultimate colonization of Bataille's accursed share. As compelling as the slogan has been to lay bare the motives of imperial excess, Bataille's thought would also have us refuse the enclosure of our own surplus capacity in so certain a lock down of interest-borne scarcity. There can be no denying oil's requirement to the present economic convention. But the necessity of oil politics as they are presented must be contested if the present mode of excess is to be seen as other than laying us all to waste as an inexorable drive to war to control supply in the face of imminent scarcity. · Specifically, blood for oil is a pipeline that has smuggled in a Malthusian logic of genocidal scarcity. The argument goes like this. The days of expanding oil supply are behind us. The rate at which new wells are drilled has been eclipsed by the rate at which new demand has expanded, in consequence, a bell-shaped forecast named for the geo-physicist who made it, "Hubbert's Peak," pinpoints the date of diminishing returns. Population growth assures that there will not be enough oil to go around. Security for the imperium dictate that it grabs hold of whatever remains. Oil and war are fraternal twins. Yet Hubbert's peak, so pointed in sounding the alarm, is also vulnerable on its own economic foundations. As oil prices rise, abandoned fields again become profitable, along with the rationale for further investment to extract oil from otherwise unappealing shale. The conflation of access to oil with control of its sources certainly lines up with imperial history. But that history discloses how the very regimes installed to control oil territories repress domestic populations and wind up destabilizing access, a lesson reflected in the fully financialized oil futures markets by meeting volatility with arbitrage. i · While financial protocols have been installed as governing ideas, the occupation of Iraq looks like anything but a design for control. Instead, oil exports have held steady, and risk has been distributed throughout a population that has been cleaved from its national form and from its own productive capacities. Iraq 's Public Distribution System, the last remnant of Baathist socialism is to be displaced by small cash handouts to fuel the now rampant speculative economy. ii But to render socialism scarce is to commit an error of measurement and concept. The extensive energy of consumption privileged the erotic as the alter to commodification, and maintained socialism as that portion of the world devoted to a social economy that capital could not absorb. The erotic which animated consumer desire has now been displaced by risk, which inhabits the intensities of circulation. Populations at risk may be treated instrumentally but they are also freed from instrumentality-they exist, not to accomplish further accumulation, but as human assemblages in their own right. · The war on terror claims that population makes no difference and touts its capacity to intervene anywhere at anytime. Its excess belies another. The notion that intervention can be anywhere raises the prospect that it could be for anything. The empire of indifference passes intervention from necessity to the realm of discretion, acting upon difference becomes a luxury within reach. Added to this is the discretionary force of something like the derivatives market, a hitherto unfathomable wealth sundered from use that exists only to further itself. The recourse to war that cannot discern between foreign and domestic, that attacks terror, but also crime, drugs, culture, and the like, sketches in negative relief the magnitude of the difference that state and capital now resist. Never mind that they had a hand in proliferating it all. The abundance of difference in our midst, along with excess wealth advertised for all-purposes, presents the immanence of the social as a self-expanding luxury for all. The war on terror is not the only project legible in the transfer of Bataille's mode of excess into the present. Terror gives urgency to the proliferation of financial risk but it also deflects attention from that excess which the state has increasing trouble concealing--its own criminality. If capital morphs under the present mode of excess, so too does its strange bed-fellow, the state-form.

### Trade

**Micro level commerce blurs lines of opposition- results in an omnipresent enemy**

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All is movement, contact, on a global scale. Goods and services cross space in “real time,” or the closest possible simulation of it. There is no longer any private, as opposed to public, space: all space has been privatized, but privatized in such a way that it is omnipresent, neither inside nor outside. Without public space, “The place of modern liberal politics has disappeared, and thus from this perspective our postmodern and imperial society is characterized by a deficit of the political” (Hardt and Negri 2000, 188). Terms such as inner and outer, natural and artificial, real event and simulated spectacle no longer stand in opposition; working as a giant deconstructor, Empire disarticulates these oppositions; it entails a realm in which their duality is no longer effective. Binarism in itself no longer obtains, and lost along with it is all opposition to an Other, an enemy; “Today it is increasingly difficult for the ideologues of the United States to name a single, unified enemy; rather there seem to be minor and elusive enemies everywhere” (189). Simulation, spectacle, are everywhere in this global rhizome of connection and articulation. Commerce, communication, crisis, everything operates on a micro level, nothing is clearly localizable in a nation, a people, a soil, a city. The very dialectical operation (Marxism) by which such a movement could be analyzed no longer obtains: any dialectics is itself subsumed and rendered inoperative by a movement that generates and degenerates all play of oppositions. There are crises, indeed there are tiny movements of duality, of opposition, but these “minor and indefinite” crises add up only to an apparently inchoate “omni-crisis.”

## Links – K Affs

### Generic K Link

**The philosophical musings of the 1AC are simply masked utility – we must disintegrate philosophy as a means of destroying the servile nature of knowlege**

**DeBoer 99** (Jason, “Bataille versus Theory”, [http://www.absintheliteraryreview.com/archives/fierce2.htm)[rkezios]](http://www.absintheliteraryreview.com/archives/fierce2.htm)//RK)

The writings of Georges Bataille have recently become the object of a certain resurgence, or rather, a recuperation, within the academy. As Bataille's death in 1962 recedes into the past, the number of critical essays and articles about him continues to grow at an incredible rate. Most of this criticism has taken the approach of situating Bataille and his ideas into a pre-determined framework of "postmodern" thought, either through the systematic embellishment of his role as an intellectual influence on Foucault, Derrida, and others, or his role as an intermediary figure between Nietzsche and the French postmodernists. While there certainly is merit and validity in linking Bataille intellectually to these writers, it is the radicalness and originality of Bataille's writing that ultimately become lost in these analyses when viewed through such an historical lens. It seems inevitable that Bataille, like Nietzsche, will be subjected to a critical scrutiny, which, in the guise of earnest analyses and close readings, serves foremost to dispel the threat that such writers pose to academia. A calculated process of taming is deployed against these radical thinkers, assuring that this procession of commentaries and dissections will leave nothing but an amelioration of the original work. To avoid this, I will not concern myself with situating Bataille's writings within the present state of theory (whether it be philosophical, critical, sociological, or psychological). Rather, I think it would be more noble to attempt a critique of the theoretical enterprise by analyzing it through Bataille's own array of concepts. If the ideas of thinkers such as Nietzsche, Sade, or Bataille are to be afforded the credence they deserve, it is only fitting that theory itself be judged according to their claims, which may run in opposition to the claims made by traditional theory. Georges Bataille organizes his writings around many core concepts or ideas, many of which remain diffuse and somewhat underdeveloped in their definitions or meanings. Communication, sovereignty, heterology, inner experience, the sacred, dépense or expenditure, transgression, excess, etc., each concept appears in his texts as a momentary connotation, a brief enunciation that creates an impact in the reader, then disappears before becoming fully ensnared within the parameters of conceptualization. Perhaps it is this vagueness or ambiguity inherent in all of Bataille's concepts that prevents them from being appropriated by the theoretical mainstream and being put to work in a dogmatic system. In order for an idea to be put to work, for it to be able to perform a function, it must first perhaps have a proper definition, which many of Bataille's concepts lack. The broadness of his terms -- indeed, Bataille's move from a restrictive to a general economy shows a digression from the specific, from specialization -- may keep them from being utilized by others; this subversion of utility arises from the difficulty of pinpointing where or when a Bataillean concept begins or ends. This sacrifice of clarity certainly is an intentional strategy, Bataille's own "employment" of unworkable concepts. It is within this arena of thought that I wish to examine the contemporary state of theory. When one wants to discuss things such as philosophy, literature, and poetry, as such, in their broadest sense, it seems impossible to provide a working definition that encapsulates enough of the defined to provide a basis for meaningful discourse. As soon as one makes statements about "philosophy" et al. the stage is set for interpretive breakdown. Without a general concept of "philosophy" there will be confusion as to the term's meaning. With such a normative concept, there will be disagreement over the validity of such a norm. Traditionally, philosophers have countered the problems of conceptual vagueness by imposing stricter and stricter specialization on their terms. Bataille, on the other hand, has reveled in the imprecision of such terms as "philosophy," and, instead of specializing and building on such traditional notions, he has deployed his own set of concepts from the basis of whim (which he saw as the opposite of specialization). His attacks against philosophy strike it as a generality, before the complexities and specialties of epistemology, ontology, philosophy of language, etc. muddy the issue and make such a meta-critique more difficult. For Bataille, philosophy must be attacked insofar as it is a general project, not in its particular and multiple manifestations, and this can only be done by contrasting philosophy with other general concepts that differ from and oppose it -- the sacred, excess, communication, etc. With this view in mind, I will attempt to compare and critique the theoretical enterprise itself, using Bataille's notions as both guidelines and weapons. First, though, I should remark on the victim, the generality referred to as "theory." Theory -- again, whether it be philosophical, critical, sociological, etc. -- can be said to consist of a variety of related movements. It can be considered as the analyses of givens, predictions for the future, the systematic organization of knowledge, the very path along which thought must follow, or even thought itself. Theory is almost invariably a process that maintains knowledge -- guaranteed by certainty -- as its end result. Bataille contests the claim that a process of examination leads somehow to knowledge, because for him this external theorizing can only depart from or deny the only certain knowledge that humans may have: "We have in fact only two certainties in this world -- that we are not everything and that we will die." Bataille posits knowledge of death not as the end result of a theoretical operation, but as an inner experience from which everything else radiates. This knowledge of death is in no way an understanding or comprehension of death; it is only the certainty that death will some day consume us, only a knowledge of mortality. Death cannot be regarded as an object of knowledge because it cannot be managed or subordinated by thought. Death is sovereign, hence inconceivable. Knowledge of our own mortality can only be peripheral to death itself. (Bataille's other certainty, "that we are not everything," paves the way for his notions of heterology and discontinuity.) Thus, the supposed end-product of theory, knowledge, is declared impossible by Bataille, except for the certainties of death and the discontinuity of beings. He writes: "we can have no knowledge except to know that knowledge is finite." Death, in the end, consumes thought. Any truth claims of theory are not sustainable according to Bataille's rigid criteria for knowledge -- namely, that only absolute certainty could guarantee knowledge. Bataille's thought desires to exceed the very notion that knowledge is possible or that theory produces what it claims: "going to the end means at least this: that the limit, which is knowledge as a goal, be crossed." Bataille continues to attack knowledge insofar as it relates to the strivings of theory, with knowledge either as the end product of theory's work or as the presumed foundation from which theory issues. Since knowledge is always linked to work and project, it is always servile to a concern for the future; it takes us away from the sovereignty of inner experience, which is only concerned with the moment. This inner experience is incapable of theorization; it evades the project-oriented grasp of language: "Everyday the sovereignty of the moment is more foreign to the language in which we express ourselves, which draws value back to utility: what is sacred, not being an object, escapes our apprehension. There is not even, in this world, a way of thinking that escapes servitude, an available language such that in speaking it we do not fall back into the immutable rut as soon as we are out of it." Bataille's suspicion, even hatred, of language runs deep. However, this does not prevent him from according theory, philosophy, and science their place in the world. He believed that man should relegate such operations to a less prominent role in his thought, and instead concentrate more on his own inner experience. Bataille creates a dichotomy between experience and theory --with silence, sovereignty, and concern with the moment functioning as aspects of inner experience, and language, servility, and preparation for the future existing as inherent aspects of theory. By opposing language with inner experience, Bataille creates a dilemma for himself and his own writings. His steadfast position makes him something of an idealist regarding inner experience; Bataille leaves little room for reconciliation between a true silence that resists definitions and a sovereign use of language that is able to resist project. It is poetry, he finally decides, that is able to occupy this space, as a form of language that is sacred -- a term Bataille used atheistically to mean opposed to utility, usefulness, and concern for the future. Even with his extreme cynicism that theory could ever transgress the servile nature of language in order to offer a glimpse into inner experience, Bataille continued to write -- and not just poetry. In order to justify the agenda behind theoretical writings like Nietzsche's or his own, which were able to perform a metaphilosophical critique of theory while still using some of its forms of questioning, Bataille needed to temper his idealism with a modified definition of project: "Nevertheless inner experience is project, no matter what. It is such -- man being entirely so through language which, in essence with the exception of its poetic perversion, is project. But project is no longer in this case that, positive, of salvation, but that, negative, of abolishing the power of words, hence of project." In other words, his is a theory that questions itself by attacking the foundation of theory itself -- language. In this way, through a type of writing that strives for silence, even topics such as inner experience can be broached. "Principle of inner experience: to emerge through project from the realm of project." Although Bataille writes that "the nature of experience is, apart from derision, not to be able to exist as project," it is this derisive character of experience that can be expressed in a theory that ridicules itself, that acknowledges the impossibility of its own goal -- knowledge. Bataille finds the perfect form of such anti-foundational thinking in the aphoristic writings of Nietzsche: "I am talking about the discourse that enters into darkness and that the very light ends by plunging into darkness (darkness being the definitive silence). I am talking about the discourse in which thought taken to the limit of thought requires the sacrifice, or death, of thought. To my mind, this is the meaning of the work and life of Nietzsche." Not only did Nietzsche mirror Bataille's own disgust for Christianity and philosophy, but the writing form which Nietzsche championed, the aphorism, became another weapon in Bataille's arsenal, a "useful" tool against the utility of philosophical language. Only an aphoristic, fragmentary writing can harbor the violent, sacred qualities of poetry; only an incomplete form of writing can trace or elucidate the impossibility of knowledge as a product of theory, by revealing a lack within knowledge itself. For Bataille, the swift violence of aphorism was the most effective method of attacking philosophical theory, by critiquing all theoretical foundations in a series of broad strokes: "A continual challenging of everything deprives one of the power of proceeding by separate operations, obliges one to express oneself through rapid flashes, to free as much as is possible the expression of one's thought from a project, to include everything in a few sentences..." It was this stylistic strategy that Bataille adopted for circumventing theoretical project, and he understood the difficulty -- in fact, the impossibility -- of proceeding any other way. Bataille believed that only a violent theory could usurp a utilitarian one, only a violent theory could clear the way for violence, which would put an end to the possibility of language. The excess of violence is silent, "the opposite of the solidarity with other people implicit in logic, laws and language." In a way, violence consumes theory; its very excess countermines reason. He writes: "the expression of violence comes up against the double opposition of reason which denies it and of violence itself which clings to a silent contempt for the words used about it." And there is certainly a violent nature to Bataille's nihilistic critique of theory and philosophy. Indeed, he may consider one deficit of philosophy to be that it does not strive violently for silence, but instead only labors meekly over question after question: "Philosophy cannot escape from this limit of philosophy, of language, that is. It uses language in such a way that silence never follows, so that the supreme moment is necessarily beyond philosophical questioning. At any rate it is beyond philosophy as far as philosophy claims to answer its own questions." Philosophical theory, lost in the servility of work, is doomed to struggle from an untenable foundation (a non-arbitrary basis for language) to an impossible end-product (certain knowledge, besides that of mortality or the discontinuity of beings). Bataille believed that "goal and authority are the requirements for discursive thought" and that subsequently "discourse forms projects." If this goal is knowledge, this authority, for philosophy, is ultimately external and metaphysical, hence religious. For Bataille, the only authority is inner experience, but its authority is in no way externalized. Outside the self, there was only chance and the randomness of the universe. "Instead of God, chance." If theory sought the guarantee of a god to support its claims, it was both misguided and ultimately empty of value. "For those who grasp what chance is, the idea of God seems insipid and suspicious, like being crippled." Bataille was no irrationalist, but his critique of the metaphysics anchoring theory ultimately involved a rejection of reason itself, in order to purge the mind of any need for a connection with a god or metaphysical foundation: "But the supreme abuse which man ultimately made of his reason requires a last sacrifice: reason, intelligibility, the ground itself upon which he stands--man must reject them, in him God must die; this is the depth of terror, the extreme limit where he succumbs." It is an ecstatic moment of doubt. He believed that "one reaches ecstasy by a contestation of knowledge." Bataille's challenge to theory reaches its zenith as the abandonment or transgression of reason's need for God. "Salvation is the summit of all possible project and the height of matters related to projects." Bataille's atheology replaces the authority of metaphysical foundation with the sovereign authority of experience, and the work of philosophy is overcome in an act of transgression: "Compared with work, transgression is a game. In the world of play, philosophy disintegrates. If transgression became the foundation-stone of philosophy (this is how my thinking goes), silent contemplation would have to be substituted for language. This is the contemplation of being at the pinnacle of being." It is at this pinnacle that theory itself becomes a victim, a sacrifice at the hands of a great, "silent" theorist -- Georges Bataille.

### Action

All action mutilates the totality of our existence, tapering it off in subordination to a goal. Only through positive processes of enactment can we truly encounter freedom

Bataille 45 (Georges, “On Nietzsche”, pg. xxiii-xxv)[rkezios]

Nonetheless, I don't want my inclination to make fun of myself or act comic to lead readers astray. The basic problem tackled in this chaotic book (chaotic because it has to be) is the same one Nietzsche experienced and attempted to resolve in his work-the problem of the whole human being. "'The majority of people," he wrote, ... are a fragmentary, exclusive image of what humanity is; you have to add them up to get humanity. In this sense, whole eras and whole peoples have something fragmentary about them; and it may be necessary for humanity's growth for it to develop only in parts. It is a crucial matter therefore to see that what is at stake is always the idea of producing a synthetic humanity and that the inferior humans who make up a majority of us are only preliminaries. or preparatory attempts whose concerted play allows a whole human being to appear here and there like a military boundary marker showing the extent of humanity's advance." (The Will to Power) But what does that fragmentation mean? Or better, what causes it if not a need to act that specializes us and limits us to the horizon of a particular activity? Even if it turns out to be for the general interest (which normally isn't true), the activity that subordinates each of our aspects to a specific result suppresses our being as an entirety. Whoever acts, substitutes a particular end for what he or she is, as a total being: in the least specialized cases it is the glory of the state or the triumph of a party. Every action specializes insofar as it is limited as action. A plant usually doesn't act, and isn't specialized; it's specialized when gobbling up flies I cannot exist mtirt/y except when somehow I go beyond the stage of action. Otherwise I'm a soldier, a professional, a man of learning, not a "total human being.' The fragmentary state of humanity is basically the same as the choice of an object. When you limit your desires to possessing political power, for instance, you act and know what you have to do. The possibility of failure isn't important-and right from the start, you insert your existence advantageously into time. Each of your moments becomes useful. With each moment, the possibility is given you to advance to some chosen goal and your time becomes a march toward that goal-what's normally called living. Similarly, if salvation is the goal, every action makes you a fragmentary existence. I hold onto my nature as an entirety only by refusing to act-or at least by denying the superiority of time, which is reserved for action. We is whole only when it isn't subordinate to a specific object that exceeds it. In this way, the essence of entirety is freedom. Still I can't choose to become an entire human being by simply fighting for freedom, even if the struggle for freedom is an appropriate activity for me-because within me I can't confuse the state of entirety with my struggle. It's the positive practice of freedom, not the negative struggle against a particular oppression, that has lifted me above a mutilated existence. Each of us learns with bitterness that to struggle for freedom is first of all to alienate ourselves. I've already said it: the practice of freedom lies within evil, not beyond it, while the struggle for freedom is a struggle to conquer a 900d. To the extent that life is entire within me, I can't distribute it or let it serve the interests of a good belonging to someone else, to God or myself. I can't acquire anything at all: I can only give and give unstintingly, without the gift ever having as its object anyone's interest. (In this respect, I look at the other's good as deceptive, since if I will that good. it's to find my own, unless I identify it as my own. Entirety exists within me as exuberance. Only in empty longing. only in an unlucky desire to be consumed simply by the desire to burn with desire, is entirety wholly what it is. In this respect, entirety is also longing for laughter, longing for pleasure, holiness, or death. Entirety jacks further tasks to fulfill.)

### Aid

**Your claims of aiding people are irrelevant, the state dissociates it from society, takes out aff solvency**

**Bataille 85** (Georges, historian, librarian and philosopher, “Visions of Excess: Selected Writings, 1927-1939,” P. 40, ADP)

Even in difficult circumstances, the State is able to neutralize those *heterogeneous* forces that will yield only to its constraints. But it can succumb to the internal dissociation of that segment of society of which it is but the constrictive form. Social homogeneity fundamentally depends upon the homogeneity (in the general sense of the word) of the productive system. Every contradiction arising from the development of economic life thus entails a tendential dissociation of homogeneous social existence. This tendency towards dissociation exerts itself in the most complex manner, on all levels and in every direction. But it only reaches acute and dangerous forms to the extent that an appreciable segment of the mass of *homogeneous* individuals ceases to have an interest in the conservation of the existing form of homogeneity (not because it is *homogeneous,* but on the contrary, because it is in the process of losing that character). This part of society then spontaneously affiliates itself with the previously constituted heterogeneous forces and becomes indistinguishable from them. Thus, economic circumstances act directly upon homogeneous elements and promote their disintegration. But this disintegration only represents the negative form of social effervescence: the dissociated elements do not act before having undergone the complete alteration that characterizes the positive form of this effervescence. From the moment that they rejoin the heterogeneous formations that already exist in either a diffuse or an organized state, they acquire from the latter a new character: the general positive character of heterogeneity*.* Furthermore, social *heterogeneity* does not exist in a formless and disoriented state: on the contrary, it constantly tends to a split-off structure; *and when social elements* *pass over to the* heterogeneous *side, their action still finds itself determined by* *the* actual structure *of that side.* Thus, the mode of resolving acute economic contradictions depends upon both the historical state and the general laws of the heterogeneous social region in which the effervescence acquires its positive form; it depends in particular upon the relations established between the various formations of this region when homogeneous society finds itself materially dissociated.The study of *homogeneity* and of the conditions of its existence thus necessarilyleads to the essential study of *heterogeneity.* In fact, it constitutes the first phase of such study in the sense that the primary determination of heterogeneity defined as non-homogeneous supposes a knowledge of the homogeneity that delineates it by exclusion.

### Cap

**Marxist methodology idolizes the utility of the revolution, ultimately dooming the project. Epistemologies of unimpeded consumption solve the kritik**

**Baudrillard 98** (Jean, prof of sociology at Université de Paris-IX Dauphine, When Bataille Attacked the Metaphysical Principle of Economy, Bataille: A Critical Reader, 1998) [rkezios]

The central idea is that the economy which governs our societies results from a misappropriation of the fundamental human principle, which is a solar principle of expenditure. Bataille's thought goes, beyond proper political economy(which in essence is regulated through exchange value), straight to the metaphysical principle of economy. Batailles's target is utility, in its root. Utility is, of course, an apparently positive principle of capital: accumulation, investment, depreciation, etc. But in fact it is, on Bataille's account, a principle of powerlessness, an utter inability to expend. Given that all previous societies knew how to expend, this is, an unbelievable deficiency : it cuts the human being off from all possible sovereignty. All economics are founded on that which no longer can, no longer knows how to expend itself [se d6penser], on that which is incapable of becoming the stake of a sacrifice. It is therefore entirely residual, it is a limited social fact; and it is against economy as a limited social fact that Bataille wants to raise expenditure, death, and sacrifice as total social facts--such is the principle of general economy. Georges Bataille, Oeuvres Completes: vol. VII. Paris: Gallimard. 618pp.' The principle of utility (use value) blends with the bourgeoisie, with this capitalist class whose definition for Bataille (contrary to Marx) is negative: it no longer knows how to expend. Similarly, the crisis of capital, its increasing mortality and its immanent death throes, are not bound, as in the work of Marx, to a history, to dialectical reversals [p6rip6dies], but to this fundamental law of the inability to expend, which give capital over to the cancer of production and unlimited reproduction . There is no principle of revolution in Bataille's work: "The terror of revolutions has only done more and more (de mieux en mieux) to subordinate human energy to industry." There is only a principle of sacrifice-the principle of sovereignty, whose diversion by the bourgeoisie and capital causes all human history to pass from sacred tragedy to the comedy of utility. This critique is a non-Marxist critique, an aristocratic critique; because it aims at utility, at economic finality as the axiom of capitalist society. The Marxist critique is only a critique of capital, a critique coming from the heart of the middle and petit bourgeois classes, for which Marxism has served for a century as a latent ideology: a critique of exchange value, but an exaltation of use value-and thus a critique, at the same time, of what made the almost delirious greatness of capital, the secular remains of its religious quality:3investment at any price, even at the cost of use value. The Marxist seeks a good use of economy. Marxism is therefore only a limited petit bourgeois critique, one more step in the banalization of life toward the "good use" of the social! Bataille, to the contrary, sweeps away all this slave dialectic from an aristocratic point of view, that of the master struggling with his death. One can accuse this perspective of being pre or post-Marxist . At any rate, Marxism is only the disenchanted horizon of capital-all that precedes or follows it is more radical than it is.

**They are an accumulation of anti capitalist utility – ultimately forming a new kind of utilitarian capitalism. Only through expenditure can we break the cycle**

**Wendling, 6** – Assistant Professor of Philosophy @ Creighton College (Amy, Reading Bataille Now. Ed. Winnubst. P 64-51)[rkezios]

Sovereignty and the Revolutionary Subject Bataille's discussion of "sovereignty" occupies the entire third volume of The Accursed Share. This volume explains the final two chapters of volume 1, in which Bataille sketches the forms of consumption characteristic of Soviet industrialization as a modality of the forms of consumption characteristic of the bourgeois world, as a cruel accumulation. In sovereign consumption, consumption is not subjected to an end outside of itself. In the terms of classical Marxism, to act sovereignly is to privilege use over exchange value, or individual over productive consumption. In a temporal schema, to act sovereignly is to privilege the present over the past or future. We might recognize sovereign consumption as noncoercive pleasure or play, consumption that exceeds a productive, work driven economy. A sovereign world would have the vision and the language to accommodate such a recognition and to accommodate it in a mode other than dubbing it irresponsible, irrational, childlike, or mad. Let me offer an example of sovereign consumption from the realm of sexuality, a realm that Bataille also highlights in both his fiction and his philosophy. The compulsory productive heterosexuality characteristic of bourgeois cultures is also part of the coercion to production. Bataille's por¬ [p. 47] nography, all of which describes nonreproductive if mostly heterosexual sex, fits into his project for this reason. Nonreproducrive sex sex for sex's sake, queer sex, or sex for pleasure are all modes of nonproductive, or sovereign consumption: consumption that does no work, produces no new workers, and uses energy without recompense. All bourgeois cultural taboos about sexuality are rooted in the coercion to production. For Bataille, the sovereign individual, a version of the Nietzschean noble or Hegelian master (1991b, 219; 1973, 267), "consumes and doesn't labor" (199lb, 198; 1973, 248). Like Nietzsche, Bataille argues that bourgeois societies we readily recognize them as our own have made this sort of consumption impossible for us by inverting the values attached to it. Accumulation eclipses the character of the sovereign: we stockpile, hoard, and hold in reserve rather than use or enjoy. Our deepest pleasures derive from the hoarding itself: from the security of knowing it is there, should we want it. Because of this out pleasures remain vicarious, theoretical, indefinitely deferred and abstract. In an inversion of economic values, the pressure to accumulate eclipses Bataille's sovereign consumption. Similarly, in Nietzsche, the priest's inversion of moral values eclipses the goodness of nobility. For Bataille, the bourgeois class is the first and ultimately only r revolutionary class: an ascetic class that revolts specifically against the sovereign nobility in favor of accumulation. The bourgeois revolution over against sovereignty conditions and inescapably schematizes all subsequent revolution and appeals to revolution. The very idea and practice of revolution is itself bourgeois. Revolution is a bourgeois concept, and the world in which Bataille finds himself continues to be the world of a feudal order that is breaking down. Bataille writes: 1 cannot help but insist on these aspects: I wish to stress, against both classical and present day Marxism, the connection of all the great modern revolutions, from the English and the French onward, with a feudal order that is breaking down. There have never been any great revolutions that have struck down an established bourgeois domination. All those that overthrew a regime started with a revolt motivated by the sovereignty that is implied in feudal society, (1991b, 279; 1973, 321) Conceptually, revolution demarcates the transition from sovereignty to accumulation. Revolution will always be connected with the dissolution of a feudal order and the privileges emblematized by such an order: access to nonproductive consumption, enjoyment, or use value itself, by right of birth. [p. 48] But why not, rather, a conception of plenitude and entitlement for all, also by right of birth, instead of competition and struggle for survival? Such a view is impossible when Nietzschean ressentiment is the impetus for liberation, because postrevolutionary subjects have learned to demonize the very things that they most desire. This point goes some distance toward explaining why revolutionary class hatred is insufficiently analytic and confuses the aristocracy with the bourgeoisie. It also explains why the revolution attempted in 1848 was a disaster. Bataille writes: The days ofJuue, the Commune, and Spartakus are the only violent convulsions of the working masses struggling against the bourgeoisie, but these movements occurred with the help of a misunderstanding. The workers were misled by the lack of obstacles encountered a little earlier when the bourgeoisie, in concert with them, rose up against men born of that feudality which irritated everybody. (1991b, 289) Under this historical error, born of the precipitous mixing of classes, the particularity of the bourgeoisie is misunderstood. The bourgeois is no lord or lady waited upon, but a money grubbing, guilt ridden, obsessive worker, too cheap to hire help, self righteously confirmed in his or her work ethic and ascetic way of life. I am not suggesting that the bourgeois does not have privileges. He or she does, but not in the same way as the feudal lord or lady. The bourgeois goal is always further accumulation, never consumption, and therefore never sovereignty. Bataille writes, "The masses have never united except in a radical hostility to the principle of sovereignty" (l99lb, 288; 1973, 329). The masses do not unite against accumulation, except when that accumulation is expressed as sovereignty, and therefore not as accumulation at all, but as consumption. The proletarian worker perceives an excessive consumption as the necessary result of the bourgeois accumulation of property. But this is a misperception, for the bourgeois does not enjoy but accumulates. When the proletarian worker comes to power, a bourgeois revolution recurs because this mass worker, the slave ascendant, forever operates in an economy of scarcity: hoarding resources from the memory of being deprived. The problem of accumulation begins again. The structure is of actual scarcity, followed by perceived scarcity and hoarding that holds on as a historical remainder. Never fully overcome, this remainder becomes part of the historically sedimented fear through which bourgeois cultures function. The problem is that a resentful revolutionary subject is unfit and unable to enjoy wealth and, by extension, political sovereignty. In The German Ideal¬ [p. 49] ogy, Marx answers this criticism by claiming that through the process of revolutionary action, the proletariat is able to overcome accumulated habit and conditioning, learn to consume well, and thus become fit for rule (1978, 193). Only an upsurge of violent revolutionary action will be a sufficient lesson in consumption, a trial by violence that returns the bondsman back to the scene of the struggle to the death. For Marx, the emergent subject, baptized by fire, is transformed into a being capable of sovereignty or dead at the end of the process. But we have seen that the process of revolutionary action instills not liberation but a fearful repetition of servitude, now internal. In short, transformation is never so neat as Marx would have it. The problem of how subjects who have lived through oppression wield power has been notoriously sticky, reappearing in all thoughtful considerations of postrevolutionary subjects.

**The thoughtlessness of the capitalist ideology are isolated calculations which we won’t stop until break from the cycle, and re-consider our economic methods.**

**Bataille 47** (Georges, historian, librarian and philosopher, “The Accursed Share,” P. 175, ADP)

Francois Perroux starts from the Bretton Woods agreements – and from their failure. He has no trouble showing that at Bretton Woods nothing of importance was considered that was not consistent with the rules of "classical economy." By this, he means "that general doctrine" which "is not found in its rigor in any of the classical English economists of the eighteenth century," but which "springs from them and follows its course, in unbroken meanders, from Adam Smith to A. C. Pigou."12 For the classical economists the rational and normal use of resources "proceeds from *isolated* calculations."l3 These calculations "are the work of firms" and "as a rule exclude the transactions that proceed from, or result in, a grouping." In other words, the lender and the borrower view the transactions "each in terms of his own interest and without considering the repercussions on his neighbors" (p. 97). Under these conditions, the transactions remain unconnected nwith any *general* interest whatever; thus, political ends and group interests are not taken into account. The only things worth considering are the costs, the yield and the risks. There is in fact no other law than the profit of the isolated entities, of the firms involved in the transactions. Credit is granted insofar as the calculable interest of the creditor can be demonstrated to him. Now, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Economic Development restricted itself to principles defined in this way. "Instead of superimposing on the anarchy of individual loans a coherent and coordinated investment based on general calculations, it aims to perpetuate the old ways of distributing international credit, as a function of individual initiatives" (p. 155). Doubtless, "by its very existence, the International Bank constitutes a first attempt at bringing about, if not a grouping of needs, at least a grouping of parties destined to negotiate loan agreements among themselves" (p. 156 ). But a statutory clause "obliges it to study each demand *one by one,* considering the demand's particular advantage alone, without correlation to the ensemble formed by the aggregate of needs or even by the aggregate of demands actually formulated" (p. 155). It could be said in short that the Bretton Woods agreements gave a precise definition to the impasse of the international economy. Established within the limits of the capitalist world, according to the rule of *isolated* profit- without which no transaction is conceivable14- it had to renounce its founding principles, or, in order to maintain them, renounce the conditions without which it could not continue to exist. The inadequacy of the International Bank and the Monetary Fund presented a negative version of the Marshall Plan's positive initiative. It is the paradox of the capitalist economy that it is oblivious to general ends, which give it its meaning and value, and that it is never able to go beyond the limits of the isolated end. Further on, I will show that a basic error of perspective results from this: Our view of general ends is a reflection of isolated ends. But without making too hasty a judgment of the practical consequences, it is very interesting to observe this sudden passage from one world to another, from the primacy of the *isolated* interest to that of the *general* interest. Francois Perroux has very rightly drawn a definition of the Marshall Plan from this fundamental opposition: It is, he says, "an investment in the world's interest" (p. 160). In this operation, "the nature and scale of the risks run, the size and fate of the stakes involved would make calculations of *net* interest illusory." The operation "was prepared, decided, and will be conducted on the basis of political options and macroscopic calculations which classical analysis does not really help us to understand" (pp. 172-73 ). Henceforth, "the demands for and distribution of credit depend on collective calculations that have no relation to the isolated calculations on which liberalism liked to dwell" (pp. 99-100). There is a "collective supply, meeting a collective demand." Of course, "this grouping of supplies and demands is in obvious contrast with the classical doctrine and practice of investment" (p. 167). The economic ensembles, the states, that are integrated into the global operation are led to change over from the primacy of their *isolated* interest to the interest of regional understandings. The protectionism of industries, maintained out of ignorance, or in negation of the neighbors' interests, is replaced by the need for systematic agreements with a view to the distribution of labor. But the regional understanding is itself only a stage in world integration. There is no isolated entity aware only of itself and the world - or the state in a world dominated by the economy – but a generalized contesting of isolation. The very movement that "makes it depend on its neighbors" integrates each economy into the world (p. 110). Under these conditions, "the distribution of credit has ceased to be a *profession* and has become a *function"* (p. 157). One might say more precisely that mankind considered in general would use credit for ends it would decide on without any longer having to serve the interest of that credit, without having to stay within the limits defined by the creditor's interest. Mankind embodied in a manager, an administrator of the E.C.A. (Economic Cooperation Administration) would share the investment through constant negotiations, according to a basic law that is the negation of the rule of profit. The old expression of this new law is familiar. An operation in the interest of the world is necessarily based on this unquestionable principle: "From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs."

### Empire

**The Empire is digging its own grave – it relies on fossil and other finite fuels to sustain it, setting itself up for inevitable collapse**

**Stoekl 7** – Professor of French and comparative literature at Penn State University (Allan, Bataille’s Peak: Energy, Religion and Postsustainability, Pg 198 – 201) [rkezios]

Depletion was there from the outset: in the first lump of coal burned, there was energy derived from the destruction of a resource. The fossil fuels, and the electricity, that drive Empire are depletion: if they could not be depleted, burned up, they could not provide energy; Fossil fuel is the passage of time as decay, as petrifaction, the shift from life to death as living things are transformed into valuable and exploitable reserves; it is also the ticking time of the loss of resources, of the limit. Empire in its seeming posthistorical timelessness, in its adialectical spread, tends nevertheless toward depletion, toward death as a wasting of the ideal figures of consumption, meaning, Man as speed. Empire necessarily, from the first, in its energy profile, implies its own extinction. For the statues to fall requires massive energy inputs. Waste as “practical”— all movement of Empire—depletes itself, reveals itself as the death, the emptiness at the heart of a fossil fuel globalization and the technoscientific realization. Man caught in his timeless location in Empire is ejected at the moment the economy fails: the moment of the exhaustion of resources, the point at which the growth economy falters because the ever increasing accumulation of debt, based on the seemingly endless increase in the availability of human-friendly energy (the power to “do work”), grinds to a halt.27 The logic of growth is inseparable from the logic of depletion: finitude at the heart of the seemingly infinite. And this fall teaches us of another incarnation of God, another incarnation of Man, because like God in the Middle Ages, or like Man in the twentieth century, the continued availability of fossil fuel energy today is an article of faith. It is almost impossible to speak of Hubbert’s peak nowadays because people assume, for no good reason at all, that “it will never happen.”28 In medieval times not everyone was a believer, but everyone in some way took God’s existence for granted. And the existence and centrality of Man was equally evident in the twentieth century. So too today, many of the experts and directors of our culture do not “believe in” fossil fuel energy—they know that it is finite, that “other sources must be found.” But they cannot not believe in it either. So they go on, assuming its presence, that useful energy will always be there, will always be invisible, making effective work possible, effacing itself before the all-powerful Man, human labor, human creativity, the spirit of human invention, the human mind.29 Man is the ultimate avatar of cheap energy. The death of Man—following its double, the death of God—is thus inseparable from the event of the finitude of fossil fuel. And the transgression of that finitude is nothing more than the affirmation of an intimate world, a world of the expenditure of, or “communication” with, another energy, one whose exile was necessary for the establishment of the dominion of energy that “does work.” When we recognize that human labor is not the sole source of value, and that energy slaves are indispensable to all the cultural, not to mention industrial, production we associate with modernity; then we confront the fact that everything must be rethought. “Growth” is not a function of a certain economy, of the borrowing and printing of ever more dollars, but of (for the time being) constantly increasing supplies of fossil fuel resources. How do we think the corollary of growth, retraction, in an era of depletion? Are democracy and liberalism separable from a rich fossil fuel mix? Women’s rights, gay rights? Can philosophy in its various stages of development be directly linked to the fuel mix obtaining at different moments of history? What are the implications for philosophy of, say, a constantly rising or shrinking number, per person, of “energy slaves”? (Shrinking, perhaps, to the actual return of slavery.) What are the ethical implications of a massive die-off of billions of people? It is tempting to assume a simple reverse dialectic: the return of the feudal. Thus one can anticipate the return of feudal (solar and slave) energy, feudal oppression (think of the Incas), feudal religion (literalism, the Book). But there is more than an energy blip that separates us from the Middle Ages: just as Bataille doubled Kojève, reenacting absolute knowledge, definitive reason, and then miming it, we may take for granted the knowledge that has evolved in modernity—its utility, its truth value, its radical limitations.3’ In that sense we need not assume that a downside of the culture curve will exactly parallel the downside of the fuel production curve. Such determinism is inevitably defeated by non-knowledge. The fossil fuel regime nevertheless “falls” into the material, the particular, its knowledge into non-knowledge: the cursed matter of the body, the sacrifice of a comfortable particle enshrined in a fast personal vehicle. Negativity passes from an era of its putative full employment to an era of fundamental unemployment—”negativity out of a job,” as Bataille dubbed it.32 The homogeneous energy of the standing reserve falls into the heterogeneous, recalcitrant energy of ritual expenditure. Depletion and expenditure, Hubbert’s peak and Bataille’s peak, converge.33 Heterogeneous energy is insubordinate, not only as that which is “left over” and “unemployed” after the job is done, but above all as that which is a priori unemployable, always situated just beyond the limits of sense and growth. In this sense it is inseparable from the sort of “base matter” that cannot lend itself to constructive purposes or scientific edifice building, which Bataille discusses in such early essays as “Formless,” “The Big Toe,” and “Base Materialism and Gnosticism.” Energy in Bataille is therefore dual, as is matter. Perhaps it is in this sense, and this alone, that Bataille can state (in The Accursed Share) that there are infinite quantities of energy in the universe. All that energy, however, is precisely not employable: it is energy that is burned off, that accomplishes nothing on a mere practical human scale. It transgresses the limits of depletion. In this sense one has to be wary of official definitions of energy that would hold that it is the “power to do work.” The very use of the term “work,” albeit in this context a purely neutral, scientific term, nevertheless does tend to anthropomorphize energy: its power not only, say, moves or hears: it accomplishes something in a purposeful, human sense. Similarly, does the expenditure of energy, on a cosmic scale, necessarily entail the transformation of a more “ordered” energy into a lesser “ordered” one? Ordered for whom? Without the presence of a (human) subjectivity demanding the highly “ordered” energy can one speak or order? Can it even be said to exist? In speaking of the finitude of energy supplies, we are only speaking of the limits to the human, the fundamentally limited availability of ordered energy capable of doing “work” for Man. We are speaking, in other words, of death, of the incommensurability of intimate Nature. There is a limit to order: establishing order, fueling it, so to speak, but necessarily excluded by it, the infinite energy of the universe is a kind of black hole in which the ordered energy of creation is incessantly lost. The universe’s energy is that of celestial and orgiastic bodies. “Heterogeneous” energy is nevertheless also the opening of the possibility of the distinction between useful and useless energy; it thus opens the possibility of work, but it cannot be subordinated to this distinction, which itself is useful (in opposing energy and entropy, utility and waste, sustainability and nonsustainability). It violates the limit of this distinction. (Once again the right hand is ignorant of what the left hand does.) The “tendency to spend” on the part of people in society is nothing more, as Bataille often reminds us, than the tendency to identiy,’ with the extravagance of the universe— the extravagance, in other words, of energy not subordinate to the dictates and “needs” of Man (the energy of the death of God and Man at the points of their greatest coherence). Energy is expended only in relation to Man: when Man is confounded with the universe, energy is neither expended nor conserved; it spends itself, we might say, opening but indifferent to the possibility of its use and waste. Indifference indeed: the indifference of ruins.

### Heidegger

**The drive to sustainability is rooted in technological ontology – the earth is preserved only to extract more resources. Means the alternative is key to solve**

**Stoekl 7** – professor of French and comparative literature at Penn State University (Allan, Bataille’s Peak: Energy, Religion and Postsustainability, Pg 132 – 133) [rkezios]

The vaunted subject of the autonomists is for that reason autonomous only in its slavery to a “monstrous” energy regime. Energy is surely wasted in a challenging, but it is a wastage that goes hand in hand with the production and wastage of a subjectivity that is closed in on itself, concerned with its own comfort, stability, and permanence. The freedom of car culture, of the fossil fuel era, is the freedom of a subject whose imperial grasp is inseparable from its weakness as a quantifiable “dust mote” (as Bataille would put it). Once we have seen the fundamental cult of subjectivity on the part of the autonomists, we can return and consider the model of subjectivity of the sustainability partisans. For them too the chief raison d’être of their model of the future is a subjectivity. Now, however, subjectivity entails not so much the lavish expenditure of a stockpiled energy (cars, freeways, consumer waste) as it does an even more rigorously stockpiled resource base. While Heidegger’s retro-grouch analysis implied a wanton destruction of the stockpiled energy base (the concentration camp as extreme and no doubt self-exculpating example), the sustainability proponents imagine a standing reserve that would somehow not deplete but rather conserve the resources that go into it. “Humanity” would appropriate and store those resources in such a way that they would be perpetually ready to hand. But nature would still consist of a reserve to be tapped and resources to be expended; the goal of the operation would still be the furthering of the stable human subject, the master of its domain. Now the world is really to be useful, and nature is to be pristine exactly to the extent that that untouched state furthers man’s permanence and comfort on Earth. The quantified, mechanized destruction of Earth becomes the quantified, mechanized preservation of Earth. No doubt the sustainable future as sketched out by moral critics such as Newman would be preferable to the dystopian future that would result from a continent completely chewed up and covered with sprawl as celebrated by Lomasky and Brooks. But the sustainable vision is to the autonomist vision what Calvinism is to High-Church Anglicanism. The autonomous, overweening self is consecrated in its subjectivity not through a wild ride on the freeway—which might give the semblance of extravagance and freedom—but through the virtuous sense of renunciation one gets from darning one’s socks or writing on the backs of envelopes. The world is small, small is beautiful, it is a prosperous way down, and we will be content, we will be superior in our lowered expectations. We will save the earth from the destruction mandated by the profligate autonomists only by a frugal renunciation that will be sober, clear-headed, modest. The wildness, the irrationality, the aggressive ecstasy of James Dean in his Porsche—heedless, death-driven, glorious—will be, thankfully, discarded.

### Psychoanalysis

Lacan is not radical enough – psychoanalysis is just a watered down version of Bataillian ideology

Zizek 07 (Slavoj, senior researcher at the Institute of Sociology at the University of Ljubljana, <http://www.lacan.com/zizchemicalbeats.html>) [rkezios]

Even Lacan himself, in his Ethics of Psychoanalysis, comes dangerously close to this standard version of the "passion of the Real." [2] Do the unexpected echoes between this seminar and the thought of Georges Bataille, THE philosopher of the passion of the Real, if there ever was one, not unambiguously point in this direction? Is Lacan's ethical maxim "do not compromise your desire" (which, one should always bear in mind, was never used again by Lacan in his later work) not a version of Bataille's injunction "to think everything to a point that makes people tremble," [3] to go as far as possible – to the point at which the opposite coincide, at which infinite pain turns into the joy of the highest bliss (discernible on the photo of the Chinese submitted to the terrifying torture of being slowly cut to pieces), at which the intensity of erotic enjoyment encounters death, at which sainthood overlaps with extreme dissolution, at which God himself is revealed as a cruel Beast? Is the temporal coincidence of Lacan's seminar on the ethics of psychoanalysis and Bataille's Eroticism more than a mere coincidence? Is Bataille's domain of the Sacred, of the "accursed part," not his version of what, apropos Antigone, Lacan deployed as the domain of hate? Does Bataille's opposition of "homogeneity," the order of exchanges, and "heterogeneity," the order of limitless expenditure, not point towards Lacan's opposition of the order of symbolic exchanges and the excess of the traumatic encounter of the Real? "Heterogeneous reality is that of a force or shock." [4] And how can Bataille's elevation of the dissolute woman to the status of God not remind us of Lacan's claim that Woman is one of the names of God? Not to mention Bataille's term for the experience of transgression – impossible – which is Lacan's qualification of the Real...

**Psychoanlaysis confuses the lack with the excess**

**Winfree 9** – Associate Professor of Philosophy at California State University (Jason, “The Obsessions of Georges Bataille: Community and Communication pg 39-44)[rkezios]

In giving expression to the sense of elective communities, Bataille's exposition relies heavily on the figure lovers. Lovers are exemplary of elective community, finding one another by chance, attracted by one another [p. 40] with a momentum and intensity indifferent to the demands of work and social cohesion. The appearance of the beloved on the scene falls with the swiftness and decisiveness of an ax, tearing the lover away from all other interests, including that of self preservation, bestowing on him the exhilaration of total risk. The beloved shines with a "precarious radiance" that exerts upon the lover a violence and suspension like that of falling dice, which arrange existence anew. "The lovers' world, like life," writes Bataille, "is built on a set of accidents that give an avid, powerful will to be the response it desires" (CS 51/20). In other words, the attraction configured by chance requires the lover to stake herself, putting her entire being in play, ut it requires this as an obsession and not an obligation. As Bataille puts it n On Nietzsche, "the desire in us defines our luck," shapes the chance constellation of beings and events wherein it finds itself, and it does so by risking itself and by virtue of the risk it itself is (OC 6: 88/ON 73; tm). And that means the coincidence of wills in the face of chance which is the contact of love itself results from a gamble and not a calculation. "It 'risks' me and the one I love"; it plays us [II inc 'use! en jets, met en jets l'être aiiné], says Bataille of carnal love. The lover's response to the radiance of the beloved is incomprehensible and outrageous! So much so that "[c]ompared to the person I love, the universe seems poor and empty" (OC 6: 84/ON 69). The example of lovers is of particular importance because it articulates both the insufficiency and the innocence that dominate Bataille's ontological considerations. In a sense, the tenuousness and tenderness of lovers reflects a more generally constitutive condition of human life, that "[t}here exists at the basis of human life a principle of insufficiency" (OC 5: 97/IE 81). When that insufficiency is repressed and mythologized into the ontological primacy of the individual, making of sociality a contract added on for the sake of security, existence is rendered guilty. But guilty insufficiency is as restricted a sense of human being as Marxist economic analysis is of community; indeed, both subsist on the refusal of chance, the one staking its future on the calculated probability of survival, the other on dialectical necessity. The lovers who chance everything and are constituted in that risk (hasard), however, exhibit all the "magnificence" of an existence "created in the image of a universe untouched by the defilement of merit or intention" (CS 53/21). Their contact is so innocent that it excises itself altogether from the world of reward and punishment, justification and critique, their insufficiency excessive to the impoverished world of need. Thus, Bataille insists, "What characterizes man from the outset and what leads up to the completed rupture at the summit is not only the will for sufficiency, but the cunning, timid attraction on the side of insufficiency" (OC 5: 105/EE 88). And "what attracts isn't immediate being, but a wound" (OC 6: 45/ON 22). Excessive insufficiency is an ontological condition, since "[aj being that isn't cracked [p. 41] isn't possible;' writes Bataille (OC 5: 259/G23). The cracked being, however, is at once, at the very point where its self enclosure ends and it opens onto the world, exposed and naked, falling outside itself, a lucky being, a chance being. Insufficiency and the excess of suffering that characterizes it is the condition of play. with it and through it "we go from enduring the cracks (from decline) to glory (we seek out the cracks)" (OC 5: 259/G 23). Community is not, therefore, an extant division or willed unity within the social order, but a configuration of luck and chance where one being opens onto another and is what it is only through this opening. The language of exposure and ex position goes a long way in articulating the structural conditions of this occurrence, but it is nevertheless insufficient to characterize the contact here at issue. Bataffle insists rather that this opening is a wound and elective community the affective attraction of one lacerated insufficiency by another. Community is constituted in the overlapping of wounds, the sharing not only of what cannot be shared, but the sharing of a suffering that is neither mine nor yours, a suffering that does not belong to us, but which gives us to one another, and in doing so both maintains and withdraws the beings so configured. In community, the other does not complete me but completes my insufficiency, shares the luck which is never only mine. Elective community is like a lovers' kiss an exhilarating affirmation of chance, the will to be what befalls it but that its will could never produce. With respect to the lover, we desire like a gambler wagers. "Like the winnings of a gambler;' writes Bataille, "sexual, possession prolongs desire or extinguishes it" (OC 6: 106/ON 86).The sheer momentum of the movement requires that its strength be squandered. Desire is unsatisfied not because it fails, but because it exceeds the search for satisfaction, because it is also raw expenditure. For this reason, desire is misunderstood if it is represented as the infinite tragic movement toward an inaccessible object, as though desire not only is prohibited by its very structure from attaining its aim, but as though its structure is fundamentally teleological. The obsession with this logic is always mournful (psychoanalysis) or moral (transcendental philosophy) and in both cases remains theological insofar as the concern is governed by or measured against an imaginary sense of propriety or ownership or end. The desire that binds lovers is not so much directed toward an unattainable sumnut, however, as it is itself the summit, the point "where life is impossibly at the limit."' Desire and summit can no more be separated than lightning and its flash. In this respect Bataille is unequivocal: "The summit isn't what we 'ought to reach,' " (OC 6: 57/ON 39; tni)). Rather, "It's what is. Never what should be" (OC 6: 111/ON 91). If desire is unsatisfied, that is because it exceeds the conservative search for satisfaction, because it is not teleological, because we are driven beyond the need of satisfaction without being driven to anything, because our unfinished character is in this very way excessive, [p. 42] not impoverished. If love is unsatisfied it is because it has perished, leaving us wasted and ruined. The lovers' love is sacred. It does not belong to the profane order of work and its accumulated labor, the profane and banal order of capital. For Bataille, the sacred designates an object that is beyond all others in value, but the sacred character of our carnal love has nothing to do with divine love. The sacrifices brought about by the love of lovers require expenditure without recuperation; we give up our careers as dancers, we speak on the phone for hours on end, we waste the day in bed, and we give ourselves over entirely to that waste and identify ourselves with it.

### State

**Their bourgeois ideology becomes inherent with the use of the state, causes violence and authoritarianism**

**Bataille 85** (Georges, historian, librarian and philosopher, “Visions of Excess: Selected Writings, 1927-1939,” P. 40, ADP)

In the contemporary period, social homogeneity is linked to the bourgeois class by essential ties: thus the Marxist conception is justified whenever the State is shown to be at the service of a threatened homogeneity. As a rule, social homogeneity is a precarious form, at the mercy of violence and even of internal dissent. It forms spontaneously in the play of productive organization, but must constantly be protected from the various unruly elements that do not benefit from production, or not enough to suit them, or simply, that cannot tolerate the checks that homogeneity imposes on unrest. In such conditions, the protection of homogeneity lies in its recourse to imperative elements that are capable of obliterating the various unruly forces or bringing them under the control of order. The State is not itself one of these imperative elements; it is distinct from kings, heads of the army, or of nations, but it is the result of the modifications undergone by a part of homogeneous society as it comes into contact with such elements. This part is an intermediary formation between the homogeneous classes and the sovereign agencies from which it must borrow its obligatory character, but whose exercise of sovereignty must rely upon it as an intermediary. It is only with reference to these sovereign agencies that it will be possible to envision the way in which this obligatory character is transferred to a formation that nevertheless does not constitute an existence valid in itself *(heterogeneous),* but simply an activity whose usefulness with regard to another part is manifest. In practical terms, the function of the State consists of an interplay of authority and adaptation. The reduction of differences through compromise in parliamentary practice indicates all the possible complexity of the internal activity of adaptation required by homogeneity. But against forces that cannot be assimilated, the State cuts matters short with strict authority. Depending on whether the State is democratic or despotic, the prevailing tendency will be either adaptation or authority. In a democracy, the State derives most of its strength from spontaneous homogeneity, which it fixes and constitutes as the rule. The principle of its sovereignty-the nation-providing both its end and its strength, is thus diminished by the fact that isolated individuals increasingly consider themselves as ends with regard to the State, which would thus exist for them before existing for the nation.And, in this case, personal life distinguishes itself from homogeneous existence as a value that presents itself as incomparable.

## Impact

### Generic

**The mindset of preservation and stockpiling resources is inseparable from the justification of laying waste to excess populations**

**Stoekl 7** professor of French and comparative literature at Penn State University (Allan, 8 October 2007, “Bataille's Peak : Energy, Religion, and Postsustainability,” ­­­131-132, Ebrary)//KP

The rise of subjectivity, of the isolated, active self, conquering nature, storing its energy, is inseparable from the appearance of an “anthropology” through which “observation and teaching about the world change into a doctrine of man” (133). Or, we might say, observation and teaching about the world become observation and teaching about man: the measurement of nature’s resources and their stockpiling— and wanton expenditure— are inseparable from the stockpiling and wastage of the human in technoscientific methods. Man the subject for whom the objective world exists as a resource is quickly reversed and becomes man the object who, under the right conditions, is examined, marshaled, and then releases a specific amount of energy before he himself is definitively depleted. Although Heidegger does not stress this point in “The Age of the World Picture,” he does make this point elsewhere, noting what for him is the inevitable link between the transformation of the world into a giant energy reserve and the transformation of man into a resource to be exploited in, for example, concentration camps. 8 **Subject/object; this is the infernal duo that,** for Heidegger, **characterizes modernity. The world is quantified in order to be exploited by “man,” but man himself is a consequence of this mode of expenditure. The man who hoards, who works to preserve his individual existence** and protect it from all threats, **is inseparable from a natural world completely transformed and rendered “monstrous” by a kind of instrumental mania. Man himself becomes a resource to be scientifically investigated, fully known, perfected, made fully human** (with an identity and consciousness) **and put to use.**

**Attempts to manage excess subordinates expenditure and results in the destruction of our planet**

**Stoekl 7** professor of French and comparative literature at Penn State University (Allan, 8 October 2007, “Bataille's Peak : Energy, Religion, and Postsustainability,” ­­­142-143, Ebrary) //KP

**One cannot deny the tendency to expend** on the part of humans; on the contrary, following Bataille, we can say that this conscious tendency to lose is what both ties us to the cataclysmic loss of the universe, of the endless, pointless giving of stars, and at the same time distinguishes us through our awareness, our savoir, of what cannot be known (sheer loss). **It is vain to try to deny this tendency**, to argue that destruction is ultimately somehow useful, that our role here on the planet is necessary, and necessarily stingy. **Parsimonious sustainability theory ends only in a cult of the self,** jealous in its marshalling of all available resources. **We are,** on the contrary, **gratuitous losers** (like any other animal, but more so, and conscious of it), **and this is our glory, our pleasure, our death trip, our finitude, our end. If** on the other hand **we try to substitute a mechanized, quantified, objectified version of expenditure and claim that it addresses all of our needs, our freedom, extravagance will be subordinated to our personal demand, energy will become mere refined power, and we end up running the risk of destroying ourselves on a planet where every atom has been put to work, made to fulfill human goals— and where every usable resource has been pushed to the point of depletion**. 13 But most of all, **in wasting in this way**, engaging in this blind travesty of the tendency to expend, **we deny any communication with** and through **the intimate world**, the other torn in erotic ecstasy, the movement of celestial bodies, the agony of God.

### Cap

**Capitalism is Satan. The Bourgeoisie continues to destroy our ethics, reducing people and their freedoms to units, and to become only a thing.**

**Bataille 47** (Georges, historian, librarian and philosopher, “The Accursed Share,” P. 124, ADP)

Capitalism in a sense is an unreserved surrender to things, heedless of consequences and seeing nothing beyond them. For common capitalism, *things* (products and production) are not, as for the Puritans, what is becoming and wants to become; if things are within it, if it is itself the *thing,* this is in the way that Satan inhabits the soul of someone possessed, unbeknown to him, or that the possessed, without knowing it, is Satan himself. Self-denial, which in Calvinism was the affirmation of God, was an unattainable ideal in a sense: It could be the act of strong personalities, capable of imposing the values with which they identified, but exceptions always came into play. On the other hand, freedom given to things was the common possibility. There was no need to maintain the purest- and poorest- spirituality, which alone was rigorous enough in the beginning to counterbalance the subjection of the whole body and of activity to *things.* But once the principle of servitude was granted, the world of *things* (the world of modern industry) could develop of itself, without any further thought of the absent God. The advantage was clear, in minds always quick to grasp the *real* object, of allowing intimacy to recede beyond the threshold of consciousness. The reign of things was supported, moreover, by the natural propensity to servitude. It corresponded in the same movement to that *pure* will to power (to growth for its own sake) that, outwardly contrary to the servile spirit, is basically only its complement. In the service of a power that is not used - the perfect form of the absorption of resources in growth - is found the only genuine nullification, the least slippery renunciation of life. But this attitude is often difficult to distinguish from that of the pure Calvinist, although it is the latter's opposite. At least the Calvinist was at the highest point of alertness and tension. The man of industrial growth - having no other purpose than growth - on the contrary is the expression of somnolence. No tension around him, no desire to adapt a world to his standards. The men whose action resulted in modern industry were not even aware, the idea not having occurred to them, that such a world might be possible: They were utterly unconcerned about an impotence in the movement that carried them along, that could not reduce the world to its law. They even used, for the development of enterprise, the openings that were maintained by the continued existence of various movements contrary to theirs. In the capitalist world there was no principled preference given to the production of the means of production (this preference was to appear only in communist accumulation). The bourgeoisie was unaware of any opposition between the primacy of growth and its contraries: unproductive expenditures of all sorts, institutions and values that create expenditures. The opposition only concerned (and only affected) the amount of the expenditure. Bourgeois capitalism was opposed to luxury, but only in a feeble and illogical way: Its avarice and its action did actually reduce luxury, but if one excludes the uncalculated effects, it never departed from laissez-faire. Thus the bourgeoisie created the world of confusion. It was essentially a world of *things,* but as man's reduction was no longer linked to his nullification before God, all that did not enter into the sleep of growth suffered from the abandonment of the search for a beyond. However, no paths were closed: Precisely because *things* generally prevailed and dominated the movement of the multitude, all the aborted dreams remained available; life (the global movement oflife) became detached from them no doubt, but they still serve as consolation for troubled beings. A chaos began, where, in the most contrary ways, everything became equally possible. Society's unity was maintained owing to the unquestioned importance and success of the dominant activity. In this uncertainty, the temptations of the past easily survived their invalidation. The contradictions to which they had led ceased to be felt, in a world where reality was all the more hateful for being publicly the measure of man. The romantic protest itself was free. But that freedom in every sense meant that man, regarded in his unity (in the undifferentiated aggregate), consented to be only a *thing.*

**Proletarian capitalism reduces people to strict subordination, in which they are reduced to hopeless, exploited things, who’s freedom has been revoked**

**Bataille 47** (Georges, historian, librarian and philosopher, “The Accursed Share,” P. 140, ADP)

A radical position, to which the working-class world has given its political consequences, emerges from the above. In a sense it is a strange position. It is first of all a radical affirmation of real material forces, and a no less radical negation of spiritual values. The communists always give precedence to things, as against that which dares not have their subordinate character. This attitude is based solidly on the tastes of the proletarians, who commonly lack a sense of spiritual values, who of their own accord reduce man's interest to interest pure and simple, and who see the human universe as a system of *things* subordinated to one another: the plow ploughs the field, the field produces wheat, the wheat feeds the blacksmith, who forges the plow. This in no way excludes the higher aspirations, but these are changeable, vague, open, by contrast with those of the old type of populations, which are usually traditional and immutable. Indeed, the proletarians undertake man's liberation starting from *things* (to which they were reduced by a world whose values were-almost inaccessible to them). They do not involve him in ambitious projects; they do not construct a rich and variegated world, modeled on the ancient mythologies or the medieval theologies. Their attention is apt to be limited to *what is there*, but they are not closely bound by the elevated phrases that express their feeling. In their universe there is no firm limit opposed to the general linkage of *things subordinating* *one another.* A rigorously practical politics, a brutal politics, reducing its reasons to strict reality, is still what best corresponds to their passion, a politics that reveals the intentions of a selfish group, and is all the more ruthless. A militant of this persuasion is easily reduced to a strict subordination. He readily accepts being finally reduced, by the work of liberation, to the condition of a *thing,* which is the case, for example, when discipline prescribes two contradictory slogans in succession. This radical attitude has a strange consequence: It gives to the bourgeois, to the exploitation which the workers want to abolish, the feeling of upholding freedom for mankind, of avoiding the reduction of individuals to *things.* And yet, what is involved is only an enormous effort whose aim is self-determination. In actual fact, the bourgeois cannot really forget that the freedom of their world is the freedom of confusion. In the end they are merely helpless. The immense results of working-class politics, the generalized provisional servitude that is its only sure consequence, frightens them, but they can only bemoan the situation. They no longer have a sense of their historical mission; the fact is that as a response to the ascendant movement of the communists, they cannot give rise to the least hope.

**Capitalist states believe the planet is an infinite resource, creating inevitable problems displaying moral emptiness. Only communism allows for a recognition of their moral emptiness.**

**Bataille 47** (Georges, historian, librarian and philosopher, “The Accursed Share,” P. 147, ADP)

It has always been possible to say, "The moral emptiness of today's world is appalling." To some degree the fact of never being assured defines the future, just as that of having an impenetrable night ahead of one defines the present. Yet there are good reasons at present for dwelling on the distress. I am thinking not so much of the increased danger of catastrophe - more invigorating than it appears - as of the absence of faith, or rather the absence of ideas, that abandons modern thought to impotence. Thirty years ago a number of conflicting speculations illuminated a future that was adapted to man. The general belief in indefinite progress made the entire planet and all time to come a domain that seemed at one's disposal without restriction. Since then the situation has greatly changed. When a crushing victory ensured the return to peace, a feeling of *inferiority* vis-a-vis the inevitable problems gradually seized hold of the majority. Only the communist world -the USSR and affiliated parties - was an exception, a monolith in the midst of an anguished, incoherent humanity, possessing no other unity than anguish. Far from helping to maintain a fragile optimism, this bloc - which possesses an unshakeable assurance on its own behalf- is making the distress complete. A boundless hope for itself, it is at the same time a terror for those who reject its law and do not automatically concur with its principles. Marx and Engels exclaimed in 184 7 (these are the first words of the *Manifesto):* "A specter is haunting Europe - the specter of Communism." In 1949 communism ceased to be a phantom: It is a state and an army (by far the most powerful *on earth),* supplemented by an organized movement and maintained in a monolithic cohesion by a negation of every form of personal interest. And Europe is not alone in being shaken, but Asia as well; despite its military and industrial superiority, America itself is growing tense, and the indignation it expresses in the name of narrow individualism poorly conceals an exasperated fear. Today the fear of the USSR obsesses and disheartens the whole noncommunist world. Nothing is resolved, sure of itself, endowed with an uncompromising will to organize, except for the USSR. Essentially, the rest of the world lines up against the latter through inertia: It willingly surrenders to the contradictions that it bears within it; it lives from day to day, blind, rich or poor, *depressed,* and its speech has become an impotent protest- even a groan.

### Econ

**Their ideology of economics and energy is unsustainable- changing our perspective is key to prevent destruction**

**Bataille 67** (Georges, historian, librarian and philosopher, The Accursed Share, P. 23, ADP)

Incomprehension does not change the final outcome in the slightest. We can ignore or forget the fact that the ground we live on is little other than a field of multiple destructions. Our ignorance only has this incontestable effect: It causes us to *undergo* what we could *bring about* in our own way, if we understood. It deprives us of the choice of an exudation that might suit us. Above all, it consigns men and their works to catastrophic destructions. For if we do not have the force to destroy the surplus energy ourselves, it cannot be used, and, like an unbroken animal that cannot be trained, it is this energy that destroys us; it is we who pay the price of the inevitable explosion. These excesses of life force, which locally block the poorest economies, are in fact the most dangerous factors of ruination. Hence relieving the blockage was always, if only in the darkest region of consciousness, the object of a feverish pursuit. Ancient societies found relief in festivals; some erected admirable monuments that had no useful purpose; we use the excess to multiply "services" that make life smoother,2 and we are led to reabsorb part of it by increasing leisure time. But these diversions have always been inadequate: Their existence *in excess* nevertheless (in certain respects) has perpetually doomed multitudes of human beings and great quantities of useful goods to the destruction of wars. In our time, the relative importance of armed conflicts has even increased; it has taken on the disastrous proportions of which we are aware. Recent history is the result of the soaring growth of industrial activity. At first this prolific movement restrained martial activity by absorbing the main part of the excess: The development of modern industry yielded the period of relative peace from 1815 to 1914. Developing in this way, increasing the resources, the productive forces made possible in the same period the rapid demographic expansion of the advanced countries (this is the fleshly aspect of the bony proliferation of the factories). But in the long run the growth that the technical changes made possible became difficult to sustain. It became productive of an increased surplus itself. The First World War broke out before its limits were really reached, even locally. The Second did not itself signify that the system could not develop further (either extensively or in any case intensively). But it weighed the possibilities of a halt in development and ceased to enjoy the opportunities of a growth that nothing opposed. It is sometimes denied that the industrial plethora was at the origin of these recent wars, particularly the first. Yet it was this plethora that both wars exuded; its size was what gave them their extraordinary intensity. Consequently, the general principle of an excess of energy to be expended, considered (beyond the too narrow scope of the economy) as the effect of a movement that surpasses it, tragically illuminates a set of facts; moreover, it takes on a significance that no one can deny. We can express the hope of avoiding a war that already threatens. But in order to do so we must divert the surplus production, either into the rational extension of a difficult industrial growth, or into unproductive works that will dissipate an energy that cannot be accumulated in any case. This raises numerous problems, which are exhaustingly complex. One can be skeptical of arriving easily at the practical solutions they demand, but the interest they hold is unquestionable. I will simply state, without waiting further, that the extension of economic growth itself requires the overturning of economic principles - the overturning of the ethics that grounds them. Changing from the perspectives of *restrictive* economy to those of *general* economy actually accomplishes a Copernican transformation: a reversal of thinking- and of ethics. If a part of wealth (Subject to a rough estimate) is doomed to to destruction or at least to unproductive use without any possible profit, it is logical, even inescapable to surrender commodities without return. Henceforth, leaving aside pure and simple dissipation, analogous to the construction of the Pyramids, the possibility of pursuing growth is itself subordinated to giving: The industrial development of the entire world demands of Americans that they lucidly grasp the necessity, for an economy such as theirs, of having a margin of profitless operations. An immense industrial network cannot be managed in the same way that one changes a tire .... It expresses a circuit of cosmic energy on which it depends, which it cannot limit, and whose laws it cannot ignore without consequences. Woe to those who, to the very end, insist on regulating the movement that exceeds them with the narrow mind of the mechanic who changes a tire.

### Ontology

**The subversive nature of the sacrificial decapitation renders us ontologically open, allowing for a meaningful community**

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I propose to assume as a law that human beings are never united with each other except through tears or wounds, an idea that has a certain logical force in its favor. When elements arrange themselves to create the whole, this is easily produced when each of them loses, through a tear in its integrity, a portion of its particular being for the benefit of the communal being. Initiations, sacrifices, and festivals represent just such moments of loss and communication between individuals.78 This passage captures the important interconnectedness of sacrifice, ontology, and community in Bataille's thought. Human beings are not united by self interest or altruism; they are not bound together by fear, faith, or contract. Community begins only when useless, violent, and wasteful activities force humans to confront death, calling the integrity of their selves into question. This confrontation with nonbeing is liberating because it generates a nonservile ontology: Indeed, in this state of being, one is not even a slave to one's self. Bataille writes: "The sacrificial tear opening the festival is a liberating tear. The individual who participates in the loss is vaguely aware that this loss engenders the community sustaining him."" Community and liberty thus paradoxically arise during frenzied, violent moments of self disintegration, when communication between individuals is nondiscursive and ecstatic. The group Acéphale, Bataille's final collaboration of the as, attempted to use sacrificial practices in order to conjure a Bataillian community into existence. Unlike the Cercle or Contre¬Attaque, Acéphale was a secret society whose members expressed no interest in engaging in politics or organizing a mass movement. Instead, Acéphale met and conducted sacrificial rites in the Saint Nom la Bretbche forest outside Paris. In an effort to practice what the College had been content merely to debate, Acéphale sought to reconstitute the sacred in everyday life. Its goal, according to Stoekl, was "to stimulate the rebirth of the kind of social values Bataille had espoused in the Critique sociale essays: expenditure, risk, loss, sexuality, death ? In creating Acéphale, Bataille wished to bypass politics, which had proved to be only an impediment to the formation of his sacrificial community. The members of Acéphale ominously contemplated conducting a real human sacrifice, but no one was willing to play the role of executioner. The failure of these sorcerer's apprentices the term used by Bataille to describe Acéphale's "work" illustrates the exhaustion of Bataille's concept of sacrifice. There is a direct connection between Bataille's reading of the regicide of Louis XVI and Acéphale's conjuring of a sacrificial community. The sacrifice of the king and of politics prepares for the possibility of a community formed by a tragic but joyful disposition toward death. Death is vital to communal formation because, as Richmart remarks, "it reveals to all persons both their finitude and extension into unbounded ecstasy." In notes titled "Joy in the Face of Death:' Bataille ruminates on the regicide's principal mystery, which inaugurated the discourse on sacrificial violence: "Human hearts never beat as hard for anything else as they do for death?' Maistre marvels at soldiers' enthusiasm on the battlefield. Sorel reflects on the attractive, contagious, and sublime qualities of martyrdom. Bataille responds similarly to the importance of the experience of sublime violence:"It seems that a sort of strange, intense communication is established among men each time the violence of death is near them?' Batailie, like Maistre and Sorel, believes that the individual experience of death promotes a kind of ecstatic communication that possesses important social effects. Unlike them, however, Bataille points to a fundamental disruption of being as the impulse to communicate: The grave, decisive change that results from death is such a blow to spirits that, far from the usual world, they are cast, transported and breathless, somewhere between heaven and earth, as if they suddenly perceived the dizzying, ceaseless motion possessing them. This motion then appears to be partly dreadful and hostile, but external to the one threatened by death or the one dying; it is all that is left, depriving the one who watches the dying as much as the one who dies. Thus it is that, when death is present, what remains of life only lives on outside, beyond and beside itself. Ecstatic experience life that "lives on outside, beyond and beside itself" is the basis for the kind of communication that renders Bataillian community possible. This experience is instantiated sacrificially, allowing the sacrificer to participate in the unrecoverable loss of the sacrificed. The cumulative effect of such a confrontation with death is ontological destabilization, which Bataille characterizes as a permanently wounded self. For Bataille, the regicide involves such a total loss that it augurs the formatioi of a community in which all political concepts, including man himself, have been sundered, leaving nothing behind save unemployed negativity itself. While participating in Ac6phale, Bataille held that sacrifice's tearing of being would join humans together through communication that invoked a unique. communality: "Those who look at death and rejoice are already no longer the individuals destined for the body's rotten decay, because simply entering into the arena with death already projected them outside themselves, into the heart of the glorious community of their fellows where every misery is scoffed at ...•• The community is necessary to them in order to become aware of the glory. bound up in the instant that will see them torn from being.""

### VTL

Our thirst for annihilation allows for new conceptions of life and its value

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Every production and articulate word, every morsel of nourishment, every second of sleep, is an atrocity against love and a provocation to despair. Erotic passion has no tolerance for health, not even for bare survival. It is for this reason that love is the ultimate illness and crime. Nothing is more incompatible with the welfare of the human species. ‘I search only for the terror of evil’ [IV 219], writes Bataille, in his adherence to the violent refusal of integral being. ‘Evil is love’ [III 37], ‘the need to deny an order with which one is unable to live’ [III 37]. The terrestrial problematic at its most furious finds a useless undoing in eroticism, so that the descent into love is also fundamental economy, which is perhaps a tragedy, or a joke (something truly hideous and sacred in any case). That the root of love is a thirst for disaster is exhibited throughout its erratic course. At its most elementary love is driven by a longing to be cruelly unrequited; fostering every kind of repellent self-abasement, awkwardness, and idiocy. Sometimes this provokes the contempt that is so obviously appropriate, and the tormented one can then luxuriate in the utter burning loss that each gesture becomes. One wastes away; expending health and finance in orgies of narcosis, breaking down one’s labour-power to the point of destitution, pouring one’s every thought into an abyss of consuming indifference. At the end of such a trajectory lies the final breakage of health, ruinous poverty, madness, and suicide. A love that does not lead such a blasted career is always at some basic level disappointed: ‘to love to this point is to be sick (and I love to be sick)’ [III 105]. Yet there are times in which the morbid horror of love infects the beloved, or one is oneself infected by the passion of another, or two strains of love collide, so that both spiral together into a helix of strangely suspended disintegration, cheated of innocent disaster. Each competes to be destroyed by the other, drifting into the hopeless ecstasies that follow from the severing of all moorings, attempting to exceed the other in mad vulnerability. When propelled by an extremity of impatience this too can lead to suicide of course, but such an outcome is uncommon. The adequate pretext for such a conclusion is lacking, since the capacity to wound is melted from the world, which becomes a softened—and often almost imperceptible—backdrop, whilst the beloved, who is invested with such a capacity to a degree inconceivable to the utilitarian mind, strives entirely to annul it. Thus it is that the lovers conspire to protect each other from the lethal destiny of their passion, either succeeding in this, and relapsing into the wretched sanity of mutual affection, or compacting their fever to new scratch-patches of intensity. In the latter case all legible charts are lacking, and if the real has a splinter-fringe of utter exploration this is it… …Sickness is something I understand. My corpse trembles in a euphoria of allergy each day that it drags itself across the surface of the earth. The weather ravages me, my joints become inflamed, ankylose, my lungs are shredded and torched to the point that they scarcely resist any longer, my skin is greenish pale, and the sockets of my eyes are withdrawn into black pits of foulness. As for my nervous-system—charred and threequarters unstrung—that is my true pathological exhibit. No movement that does not seem like the twitching of an animal tortured to the brink of collapse, no thought that is not an experiment in damnation. Between ecstasy and torment there is no longer an interval of moderation; there is not even an alteration. I writhe on the spit of a devastated vitality, laughing with hunger for each ratcheting of descent… I have the hope of coming to the end of my health, perhaps even to the end of a life without reason to be [III 414]

**Advancements of growth enslaves people, kills our value to life**

**Bataille 47** (Georges, historian, librarian and philosopher, “The Accursed Share,” P. 45, ADP)

I will describe sets of social facts manifesting a general movement of the economy. I want to state a principle from the outset: By definition, this movement, the effect of which is prodigality, is far from being equal to itself. While there is an excess of resources over needs (meaning real needs, such that a society would suffer if they were not satisfied), this excess is not always consumed to no purpose. Society can grow, in which case the excess is deliberately reserved for growth. Growth regularizes; it channels a disorderly effervescence into the regularity of productive operations. But growth, to which is tied the development of knowledge, is by nature a transitory state. It cannot continue indefinitely. Man's science obviously has to correct the perspectives that result from the historical conditions of its elaboration. Nothing is more different from man enslaved to the operations of growth than the relatively free man of stable societies. The character of human life changes the moment it ceases to be guided by fantasy and begins to meet the demands of undertakings that ensure the proliferation of given works. In the same way, the face of a man changes if he goes from the turbulence of the night to the serious business of the morning. The serious humanity of growth becomes civilized, more gentle, but it tends to confuse gentleness with the value of life, and life's tranquil duration with its poetic dynamism. Under these conditions the clear knowledge it generally has of things cannot become a full self-knowledge. It is misled by what it takes for full humanity, that is, humanity at work, living in order to work without ever fully enjoying the fruits of its labor. Of course, the man who is relatively idle or at least unconcerned about his achievements - the type discussed in both ethnography and history - is not a consummate man either. But he helps us to gauge that which we lack.

**Advancements of growth enslaves people, kills our value to life**

**Bataille 47** (Georges, historian, librarian and philosopher, “The Accursed Share,” P. 124, ADP)

If, following Weber, one considers this position as it relates to the spirit of capitalism, one cannot imagine anything more favorable to the rise of industry. A condemnation of idleness and luxury on the one hand, an affirmation of the value of enterprise on the other. Immediate use of the infinite wealth that is the universe being strictly reserved for God, man for his part was unreservedly dedicated to labor, to the allocation of wealth - time, materiel and every kind of resource - to the development of the production apparatus. Tawney points out nonetheless that capitalism requires an additional element: It is an unrestricted growth of impersonal productive forces; it is the liberation of the natural movement of the economy, whose general momentum depends on the individual pursuit of profit. Capitalism is not just an accumulation of riches for commercial, financial or industrial ventures, but general individualism, free enterprise. Capitalism could not have coexisted with the old economic legislation, whose moral principle was the subordination of enterprise to society, which imposed price controls, combatted financial schemes and placed serious restrictions on loans at interest. Tawney observes that in countries where Calvinism was dominant (this was the case in Geneva, with Calvin and Theodorus Beza, or in Scotland, with John Knox), it tended toward a collective dictatorship.9 But it was only "a minority, living on the defensive beneath the suspicious eyes of a hostile government"; it slipped toward extreme individualism. In reality it was only in England, in the second half of the seventeenth century, that Puritans linked the principle of the free pursuit of profit to the Calvinist tradition. It was only at that late date that the independence of economic laws was posited, and that the abdication of the moral sovereignty of the religious world in the sphere of production came to pass. But the lateness of this development is a fact whose importance should not be exaggerated. Implicit in the first formulation, it needed to resolve a basic difficulty. What was crucially at stake in the Reformation, from the economic standpoint, did not so much depend on the stating of principles as on the swaying of minds; the latter could not effectively be achieved except on one condition, that it be concealed at first. The change would be meaningful only if it was the doing of men of unassailable moral authority, speaking to down-to-earth interests on behalf of higher powers. What was needed was less to give complete freedom to the natural impulses of the merchants than to tie them to some dominant moral position. It was first a matter of destroying the authority that founded the medieval economy. This could not have been done by stating the principle of capitalist interest directly. What accounts for the late moment when the consequences of the doctrines of the Reformation emerged is the difficulty of defending the nature of capitalism *a priori*. It is remarkable that the spirit and the ethic of capitalism have almost never been expressed in a pure form. It is only by way of an exception that one can say, as Weber does concerning those principles, set forth in the middle of the eighteenth century by Benjamin Franklin, that they express the spirit of capitalism with an almost classical purity. But in citing them, I will show in fact that it would have been impossible to give them free rein without a preamble without first giving them the mask of an inaccessible divinity.

### War

**Affirmations of their economic ideology makes war inevitable due to their thoughtlessness**

**Bataille 47** (Georges, historian, librarian and philosopher, “The Accursed Share,” P. 171, ADP)

If one envisages, on the one hand, the silence of communism universally imposed by concentration camps, and, on the other, *freedom* exterminating the communists, there can be no remaining doubt: The situation could hardly be better for an awakening of the mind. But while it is the result of menace, and though it was once linked to the feeling of a useless effort, of the game already lost, the alert consciousness cannot in any way surrender to anguish; it is dominated rather by the assurance of the moment (the laughable idea that darkness alone will be the answer to the will to see). But, up to the last, it will not be able to give up the *tranquil* pursuit of *good fortune.* It will give up only in the happy event of death. *In this situation of absolute schism, what prevents one from believing* *war to be inevitable is the idea that under the present conditions "the* *economy," to alter Clausewitz's phrase, might "continue it by other means."* The conflict that is engaged in the economic sphere opposes the world of industrial development - of nascent accumulation - to that of developed industry. In a fundamental sense, it is from the side of exuberant production that the danger of war comes: If exportation is difficult, *and if no other outlet is open,* only war can be the client of a plethoric industry. The American economy is in fact the greatest explosive mass the world has ever known. True, its explosive pressure is not favored as it was in Germany, both externally by the proximity of dense military populations and internally by a disequilibrium between the different parts of the development of the productive forces. In return, the idea that that enormous machinery, driven by an *inevitable* movement of growth, is viable - balanced and rational - implies all the dangers of thoughtlessness. The fact that it was discharged in two world wars is not especially reassuring. In any case it is painful to see a dynamic society given over unreservedly and without long-range plans to the movement that propels it. It is painful to know that it is largely unacquainted with the laws of its development and that it produces without assessing the consequences of the production. This economy was capable of two wars; assuming its movement of growth continues, what sudden spell might make it capable of peace? Those who keep it running are naively convinced of having no other purpose. But should they not be asked whether they are not unconsciously pursuing the opposite of what their consciousness admits? The Americans are used to seeing others start wars, and experience has shown them the advantage of waiting.

## Alt

### Sacrifice the Head Alt

**Thus the alternative is to sever the head of the 1AC speech act as a means of glorifying the excess. Our sacrifice is key to bringing us face to face with death, to bring us to a state of transfiguration, bringing the fullest meaning to life**

**Razinsky 9** (Liran, University of Wisconsin, “How to Look Death in the Eyes: Freud and Bataille”)[rkezios]

Thus we see that the stakes are high. What is at stake is the attempt  of the subject to grasp itself in totality. This attempt necessitates bringing  death into the account, but death itself hampers this very attempt. One  never dies in the first person.  Returning to Bataille, why does he believe sacrifice to be a solution  to Hegel’s fundamental paradox? For him, it answers the requirements of  the human, for Man meets death face to face in the sacrifice, he sojourns  with it, and yet, at the same time, he preserves his life. In sacrifice, says  Bataille, man destroys the animal within him and establishes his human  truth as a “being unto death” (he uses Heidegger’s term). Sacrifice provides  a clear manifestation of man’s fundamental negativity, in the form of  death (Bataille, “Hegel” 335-36; 286). The sacrificer both destroys and  survives. Moreover, in the sacrifice, death is approached voluntarily by  Man.  In this way the paradox is overcome, and yet remains open. We can  approach death and yet remain alive, but, one might ask, is it really  death that we encountered, or did we merely fabricate a simulacrum?  Bataille insists elsewhere, however, that sacrifice is not a simulacrum,  not a mere subterfuge. In the sacrificial ritual, a real impression of horror  is cast upon the spectators. Sacrifice burns like a sun, spreading radiation  our eyes can hardly bear, and calls for the negation of individuals as  such (“The Festival” 313; 215). We did not fool death; we are burned in its  fire. Bataille’s idea of the sacrifice also addresses Freud’s paradox. It might  be impossible to imagine our own death directly, but it is possible to  imagine it with the aid of some mediator, to meet death through an other’s  death**.** Yet on some level this other’s death must be our own as well for it  to be effective, and indeed this is the case, says Bataille. He stresses the  element of identification: “In the sacrifice, the sacrificer identifies himself  with the animal that is struck down dead. And so he dies in seeing himself  die” (“Hegel” 336; 287). “**There is no sacrifice,”** writes Denis Hollier, **“unless  the one performing it identifies,** in the end**, with the victim”** (166). Thus it  is through identification, through **otherness that is partly sameness,** that  a solution is achieved. If it were us, we would die in the act. If it were a  complete other, it would not, in any way, be our death.  Also noteworthy is Bataille’s stress on the involvement of sight: “and  so he dies in seeing himself die” **(**“Hegel” 336; 287), which brings him  close to Freud’s view of the nature of the problem, for Freud insists on the  visual, recasting the problem as one of spectatorship, imagining,  perceiving. Bataille’s description recapitulates that of Freud, but renders  it positive. Yes, we remain as a spectator, but it is essential that we do so.  Without it, we cannot be said to have met death. Significantly**,** meeting  death is a need, not uncalled-for. We must meet death, and we must  remain as spectators. Thus it is through identification and through visual  participation in the dying that a solution is achieved, accompanied by  the critical revaluation of values, which renders the meeting with death  crucial for “humanness.”  Note that both possibilities of meeting death—in the sacrificial-ritual  we have just explored, and in theatre or art, to which we now turn—are  social.Thus Freud’s text, although it insists on the irrepresentability of death,  actually offers, unintentionally perhaps, a possible way out of the  paradox through turning to the other. Death perhaps cannot be looked at  directly, but it can be grasped sideways, indirectly, vicariously through  a mirror, to use Perseus’s ancient trick against Medusa. The introduction  of the other, both similar to and different from oneself, into the equation  of death helps break out of the Cartesian circle with both its incontestable  truth and its solipsism and affirmation of oneself.  The safety that theater provides, of essentially knowing that we will  remain alive, emerges as a kind of requirement for our ability to really  identify with the other. In that, it paradoxically enables us to really get a  taste of death. Bataille radicalizes that possibility.  Although Freud deems the estrangement of death from psychic life a  problem, as we have seen and shall see, theater is not a solution for him.  With Bataille however, theater emerges as a much more compelling  alternative. Again, it is a matter of a delicate nuance, but a nuance that  makes all the difference. The idea common to both authors—that we can  meet death through the other and yet remain alive—is ambiguous. One  can lay stress on that encounter or on the fact of remaining alive.  11   Freud SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009  75  Looking Death in the Eyes: Freud and Bataille  tends to opt for the second possibility, but his text can also be read as  supporting the first. The benefit in bringing Freud and Bataille together  is that it invites us to that second reading.  An Encounter with Death  Death in Freud is often the death of the other. Both the fear of death  and the death wish are often focused on the other as their object. But almost always it is as though through the discussion of the other Freud  were trying to keep death at bay. But along with Bataille, we can take  this other more seriously. Imagining our own death might be impossible,  yet we can still get a glimpse of death when it is an other that dies.  In one passage in his text, the death of the other seems more explicitly  a crucial point for Freud as well—one passage where death does not  seem so distant. Freud comments on the attitude of primeval Man to  death, as described above—namely that he wishes it in others but ignores  it in himself. “But there was for him one case in which the two opposite  attitudes towards death collided,” he continues.  It occurred when primeval man saw someone who belonged to him  die—his wife, his child, his friend […]. Then, in his pain, he was  forced to learn that one can die, too, oneself, and his whole being  revolted against the admission. (“Thoughts” 293)   Freud goes on to explain that the loved one was at once part of himself,  and a stranger whose death pleased primeval man.  It is from this point, Freud continues, that philosophy, psychology  and religion sprang.  12   I have described elsewhere (Razinsky, “A Struggle”)  how Freud’s reluctance to admit the importance of death quickly  undermines this juncture of the existential encounter with death by  focusing on the emotional ambivalence of primeval man rather than on  death itself. However, the description is there and is very telling. Primeval  man witnessed death, and “his whole being revolted against the  admission.” ”Man could no longer keep death at a distance, for he had  tasted it in his pain about the dead” (Freud, “Thoughts” 294).  Once again, it is through the death of the other that man comes to  grasp death. Once again, we have that special admixture of the other  being both an other and oneself that facilitates the encounter with death.  Something of myself must be in the other in order for me to see his death  as relevant to myself. Yet his or her otherness, which means my  reassurance of my survival, is no less crucial, for if it were not present,  there would be no acknowledgement of death, one’s own death always  being, says Freud, one’s blind spot.  13  Liran Razinsky  SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009  76  I mentioned before Heidegger’s grappling with a problem similar to  Bataille’s paradox. It is part of Heidegger’s claim, which he shares with  Freud, that one’s death is unimaginable. In a famous section Heidegger  mentions the possibility of coming to grasp death through the death of  the other but dismisses it, essentially since the other in that case would  retain its otherness: the other’s death is necessarily the other’s and not  mine (47:221-24). Thus we return to the problem we started with—that  of the necessary subject-object duality in the process of the representation  of death. Watching the dead object will no more satisfy me than imagining  myself as an object, for the radical difference of both from me as a subject  will remain intact. But the possibility that seems to emerge from the  discussion of Freud and Bataille is that in-between position of the person  both close and distant, both self and other, which renders true  apprehension of death possible, through real identification.  14   As Bataille  says, regarding the Irish Wake custom where the relatives drink and  dance before the body of the deceased: “It is the death of an other, but in  such instances, the death of the other is always the image of one’s own  death” (“Hegel” 341; 291).  Bataille speaks of the dissolution of the subject-object boundaries in  sacrifice, of the “fusion of beings” in these moments of intensity (“The  Festival” 307-11; 210-13; La Littérature 215; 70). Possibly, that is what  happens to primeval man when the loved one dies and why his “whole  being” is affected. He himself is no longer sure of his identity. Before, it  was clear—there is the other, the object, whom one wants dead, and  there is oneself, a subject. The show and the spectators. Possibly what  man realized before the cadaver of his loved one was that he himself is  also an object, taking part in the world of objects, and not only a subject.  When he understood this, it seems to me, he understood death. For in a  sense a subject subjectively never dies. Psychologically nothing limits  him,  15   while an object implies limited existence: limited by other objects  that interact with it, limited in space, limited in being the thought-content  of someone else. Moreover, primeval man understood that he is the same  for other subjects as other subjects are for him—that is, they can wish  him dead or, which is pretty much the same, be indifferent to his existence.  The encounter made primeval man step out of the psychological position  of a center, transparent to itself, and understand that he is not only a  spirit but also a thing, an object, not only a spectator; this is what really  shakes him.  16  The Highest Stake in the Game of Living  Thus far we have mainly discussed our first two questions: the  limitation in imagining death and the possible solution through a form SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009  77  Looking Death in the Eyes: Freud and Bataille  of praxis, in either a channeled, ritualized or a spontaneous encounter  with the death of an other, overcoming the paradox of the impossibility  of representation by involving oneself through deep identification. We  shall now turn to our third question, of the value of integrating death  into our thoughts. We have seen that Bataille’s perspective continuously  brings up the issue of the value of approaching death. The questions of  whether we can grasp death and, if we can, how, are not merely abstract  or neutral ones. The encounter with death, that we now see is possible,  seems more and more to emerge as possessing a positive value, indeed as  fundamental. What we shall now examine is Freud’s attempt to address  that positive aspect directly, an attempt that betrays, however, a deep  ambivalence.  As mentioned, Freud’s text is very confused, due to true hesitation  between worldviews (see Razinsky, “A Struggle”). One manifestation of  this confusion is Freud’s position regarding this cultural-conventional  attitude: on the one hand he condemns it, yet on the other hand he accepts  it as natural and inevitable. For him, it results to some extent from death’s  exclusion from unconscious thought (“Thoughts” 289, 296-97). Death  cannot be represented and is therefore destined to remain foreign to our  life.  17  But then Freud suddenly recognizes an opposite necessity: not to  reject death but to insert it into life. Not to distance ourselves from it, but  to familiarize ourselves with it:  But this attitude [the cultural-conventional one] of ours towards death  has a powerful effect on our lives. Life is impoverished, it loses in  interest, when the highest stake in the game of living, life itself, may  not be risked. It becomes as shallow and empty as, let us say, an  American flirtation, in which it is understood from the first that nothing  is to happen, as contrasted with a Continental love-affair in which  both partners must constantly bear its serious consequences in mind.  Our emotional ties, the unbearable intensity of our grief, make us  disinclined to court danger for ourselves and for those who belong  to us. We dare not contemplate a great many undertakings which are  dangerous but in fact indispensable, such as attempts at artificial flight,  expeditions to distant countries or experiments with explosive  substances. We are paralyzed by the thought of who is to take the  son’s place with his mother, the husband’s with his wife, the father’s  with his children, if a disaster should occur. Thus the tendency to  exclude death from our calculations in life brings in its train many  other renunciations and exclusions**.** Yet the motto of the Hanseatic  League ran: ‘Navigare necesse est, vivere non necesse.’ (“It is necessary  to sail the seas, it is not necessary to live.”) (“Thoughts” 290-91)  Readers unfamiliar with Freud’s paper are probably shaking their  heads in disbelief. Is it Freud who utters these words? Indeed, the oddity  of this citation cannot be over-estimated. It seems not to belong to Freud’s  Liran Razinsky  SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009  78  thought. One can hardly find any other places where he speaks of such  an intensification of life and fascination with death, and praises  uncompromising risk-taking and the neglect of realistic considerations.  In addition to being unusual, the passage itself is somewhat unclear.  18  The examples—not experimenting with explosive substances—seem  irrelevant and unconvincing. The meaning seems to slide. It is not quite  clear if the problem is that we do not bring death into our calculations,  as the beginning seems to imply, or that, rather, we actually bring it into  our calculations too much, as is suggested at the end  But what I wish to stress here is that the passage actually opposes  what Freud says in the preceding passages, where he describes the  cultural-conventional attitude and speaks of our inability to make death  part of our thoughts. In both the current passage and later passages he  advocates including death in life, but insists, elsewhere in the text, that  embracing death is impossible. In a way, he is telling us that we cannot  accept the situation where death is constantly evaded. Here again Bataille  can be useful in rendering Freud’s position more intelligible. He seems to  articulate better than Freud the delicate balance, concerning the place of  death in psychic life, between the need to walk on the edge, and the flight  into normalcy and safety. As I asserted above, where in Freud there are  contradictory elements, in Bataille there is a dialectic.  Bataille, as we have seen, presents the following picture: It might be  that, guided by our instincts, we tend to avoid death. But we also seem to  have a need to intersperse this flight with occasional peeps into the  domain of death. When we invest all of our effort in surviving, something  of the true nature of life evades us. It is only when the finite human being  goes beyond the limitations “necessary for his preservation,” that he  “asserts the nature of his being” (La Littérature 214; 68).  The approaches of both Bataille and Freud are descriptive as well as  normative. Bataille describes a tendency to distance ourselves from death  and a tendency to get close to it. But he also describes Man’s need to  approach death from a normative point of view, in order to establish his  humanity: a life that is only fleeing death has less value. Freud carefully  describes our tendency to evade death and, in the paragraph under  discussion, calls for the contrary approach. This is stressed at the end of  the article, where he encourages us to “give death the place in reality and  in our thoughts which is its due” (“Thoughts” 299). Paradoxically, it  might be what will make life “more tolerable for us once again” (299).  But since Freud also insists not only on a tendency within us to evade  death, but also on the impossibility of doing otherwise, and on how death simply cannot be the content of our thought, his sayings in favor  of bringing death close are confusing and confused.  Freud does not give us a reason for the need to approach death. He  says that life loses in interest, but surely this cannot be the result of  abstaining from carrying out “experiments with explosive substances.”  In addition, his ideas on the shallowness of a life without death do not  seem to evolve from anything in his approach. It is along the lines offered  by Bataille’s worldview that I wish to interpret them here.  **Sacrifice,** Bataille says, **brings together life in its fullness and the  annihilation of life. We are not mere spectators** in the sacrificial ritual.  Our participation is much more involved. Sacrificial ritual creates a  temporary, exceptionally heightened state of living. **“The sacred horror**,”  he calls the emotion experienced in sacrifice: “the richest and most  agonizing experience.” It **“opens** itself**, like a theater curtain,** on to a realm  beyond this world” **and every limited meaning is transfigured** in it  (“Hegel” 338; 288).  Bataille lays stress on vitality. Death is not humanizing only on the  philosophical level, as it is for Hegel or Kojève. Bataille gives it an  emotional twist. **The presence of death,** which he interprets in a more  earthly manner, **is stimulating, vivifying, intense. Death and** other related  elements **(violence)** bring life closer to a state where individuality **melts,  the mediation of the intellect** between us and the world lessens**, and life  is felt at its fullest.** Bataille calls this state, or aspect of the world,  immanence or **intimacy:** “immanence between man and the world,  between the subject and the object” (“The Festival” 307-311; 210-213).  Moments of intensity are **moments of excess and** of **fusion of beings** (La  Littérature 215; 70). They are a demand of life itself, even though they  sometimes seem to contradict it. Death is problematic for us, but it opens  up for us something in life.  This line of thought seems to accord very well with the passage in  Freud’s text with which we are dealing here, and to extend it. Life without  death is life lacking in intensity, an impoverished, shallow and empty  life. Moreover, the repression of death is generalized and extended: “the  tendency to exclude death from our calculations in life brings in its train  many other renunciations and exclusions.” Freud simply does not seem  to have the conceptual tools to discuss these ideas. The intuition is even  stronger in the passage that follows, where Freud discusses war (note  that the paper is written in 1915): When war breaks out, he says, this  cowardly, conservative, risk-rejecting attitude is broken at once. War  eliminates this conventional attitude to death. “Death could no longer be  Liran Razinsky  SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009  80  denied. We are forced to believe in it. People really die. . . . Life has, indeed,  become interesting again; it has recovered its full content” (“Thoughts”  291). Thus what is needed is more than the mere accounting of  consequences, taking death into consideration as a future possibility.  What is needed is exposure to death, a sanguineous imprinting of death  directly on our minds, through the “accumulation of deaths” of others.  Life can only become vivid, fresh, and interesting when death is witnessed  directly.  Both authors speak of a valorization of death, and in both there is a  certain snobbery around it. While the masses follow the natural human  tendency to avoid death, like the American couple or those who are busy  with the thought of “who is to take our place,” the individualists do not  go with the herd, and by allowing themselves to approach death, achieve  a fuller sense of life, neither shallow nor empty.  19  Yet again, Freud’s claims hover in the air, lacking any theoretical  background. Bataille supplies us with such background. He contests, as  we have seen, the sole focus on survival. **Survival,** he tells us**, has a price.  It limits our life.** As if there were an inherent tension between preserving  life and living it. Freud poses the same tension here. Either we are totally  absorbed by the wish to survive, to keep life intact, and therefore limit  our existence to the bare minimum, or else we are willing to risk it to  some extent in order to make it more interesting, more vital and valuable**.**Our usual world, according to Bataille, is characterized by the  duration of things, by the “future” function, rather than by the present.  Things are constituted as separate objects in view of future time. This is  one reason for **the threat of death: it** **ruins value where value is only  assured through duration.** It also exposes the intimate order of life that is  continuously hidden from us in the order of things where life runs its  normal course. Man “is afraid of death as soon as he enters the system of  projects that is the order of things” (“The Festival” 312; 214). **Sacrifice is  the opposite of production** **and** **accumulation.** Death is **not** **so much** **a  negation of life, as** it is **an affirmation of the intimate** order of life, which  is **opposed to the normal order of things** and is therefore **rejected.** “The  power of death signifies that this real world can only have a neutral  image of life […]. Death reveals life in its plenitude” (309; 212).  Bataille’s “neutral image of life” is the equivalent of Freud’s “shallow  and empty” life. What Freud denounces is a life trapped within the  cowardly economical system of considerations. It is precisely **the  economy of value and future-oriented calculations** that **stand in  opposition to the insertion of death into life**. “Who is to take the son’s  place with his mother, the husband’s with his wife, the father’s with his  children.” Of course there is an emotional side to the story, but it is this  insistence on replacement that leaves us on the side of survival and stops  us sometimes from living the present. “**The need for duration,”** in the  words of Bataille, **“conceals life from us**” (“The Festival” 309; 212). For  both authors, when death is left out, life “as it is” is false and superficial.  Another Look at Speculation  Both authors, then, maintain that **if** elements associated with death  invade our life anyway, we might as well succumb and give them an  ordered place in our thoughts. The necessity **to meet death** is not due to  the fact that we do not have a choice. Rather, familiarization with death  **is necessary if life is to have its full value, and is part of what makes us  human.**  But the tension between the tendencies—to flee death or to embrace  it—is not easily resolved, and the evasive tendency always tries to assert  itself. As seen above, Bataille maintains that in sacrifice, we are exposed  through death to other dimensions of life. But the exposure, he adds, is  limited, for next comes another phase, performed post-hoc, after the event:  the ensuing horror and the intensity are too high to maintain, and must  be countered. Bataille speaks of the justifications of the sacrifice given by  cultures, which inscribe it in the general order of things.

### Alt Sustainable

Happiness is beyond consumption and conservation- the aftereffects of alternative thoughts result in sustainability

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In the coming years **we will all become futurologists**, whether we want this or not. **We will be forced to think about energy: how its availability**, at least in usable form**, is constantly dwindling** (amid the seemingly infinite quantities squandered in nature); and about religion: **how it offers an alternative,** a consolation, **in modes of psychic or cultural satisfaction or warfare. We will then be forced to think about** alternatives: **energy alternatives**, spiritual alternatives. **We will be obliged to conserve and to recycle** even as we recognize that recycling cannot be on the scale of cautious planning alone. This book is a small effort that tries to suggest that **there are other ways of thinking about how we power our lives, with energy** and with religion: these ways, these directions have been there all along. **These other ways are not so much opposed to sustainability** (as it is conventionally conceived) **as they logically precede it and spin it off not as a goal but as an aftereffect. The energy of stars, always “lost**” (nonrecoverable); **the energy of our bodies in pain or ecstatic movement; the energy of sacrifice** or religious orgy**; the energy of art or recycled junk charged with insubordinate power**— in and **through** all of **this the “tendency to expend” may very well come to be recognized, and “experienced**”—as we plunge into the deep recesses of human and inhuman activity. If **in a future** (and imminent) **era of scarcity we rethink what it means to be happy**— thereby recognizing that **happiness is tied not to the mere consumption and disposal of materials, but to their wise use**— we will perhaps also realize that **happiness means something more,** or other, **than a meager conservation** or a placid contentment grounded in a placid sociability. 10 Now, in other words, is the time to start thinking about how we will spend and expend in the twenty-first century.

**The alternative results in a sustainable world with a new energy regime- conservation is an aftereffect of expenditure**

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**By separating** this **loss from industrial postconsumer waste, we** inadvertently **open the space of a postsustainable world. We no longer associate sustainability with a closed economy of production-consumption; rather, the economy of the world may be rendered sustainable so that the glory of expenditure can be projected into the indefinite future.** What is sustained, or hopefully sustained (since absolute sustainability makes no sense), is not a permanent subjectivity that slices and dices and doles out an inert and dangerously depletable (but necessarily static, posthistorical) world; instead, **the world is sustained as a fundamentally unplanned aftereffect of the tendency to expend. Unplanned** not **in the sense that recycling, reuse, and so on**, are to be ignored, but in that they **are an integral part, inseparable from and a consequence of, a blind spending** of the intimate world. The logic of conservation, in other words, is inseparable from expenditure**: we conserve in order to spend**, gloriously, **just as the worker** (according to Bataille), unlike the bourgeois, **works in order to have money to blow**. **Thus postsustainability**: sustainability not as a definitive knowledge in and as a final, unalterable historical moment, but rather **a knowledge as nonknowledge, practice as the end of practice, the affirmation of “nature”— including its fossil fuel energy reserves— that refuses to see it simply as a thing, as a concatenation of energy inputs that need only be managed**. Rather, **nature is what sustains itself when we sustain ourselves not as conservers but as profligate spenders— not of stockpiled energy, but of the energy of the universe** (as Bataille would put it) **that courses through our bodies,** above us, below us, and hurls us, in anguish, into communication with the violence, the limit, of time. The postsustainable economy is a general economy; beyond the desires and needs of the human “particle,” it entails the affirmation of resources conserved and energy spent on a completely different scale. **Rejecting mechanized waste, the world offers itself as sacred victim. The world we face, the world of “Hubbert’s peak”** (see Deffeyes 2001) **and the rapid decline of inert energy resources, is thus, paradoxically, a world full of expendable energy**— just as Bataille’s austere postwar era was wealthy in a way his contemporaries could not comprehend. **The peak of consumption and the revelation of the finitude, the depletion, of the calculable world is the opening of another world of energy expenditure and the opening of a wholly different energy regime**. And it is the blowout at the summit of a reason through which society has tried to organize itself. **The available energy that allows itself to be “perfected,” refined, and that therefore makes possible the performance of the maximum amount of work,** in service to the ghostly identity of Man, gives way to another energy, one that cannot simply be retrieved and refined, that defies any EROEI, that does work only by questioning work, that traverses our bodies, transfiguring and “transporting” them. We just need to understand fully what energy expenditure means. **Wealth is there to be grasped, recycled, burned, in and on the body, in and through the body’s death drive, as a mode of energy inefficiency, in the squandering of time, of effort, of focus.**

### Alt Solvency

**“Sacrifice is nothing other than the production of sacred things.” – Georges Bataille**

**The alternative rearrange dominant Western epistemologies – the simultaneously chaotic and structural nature of sacrifice end violence through violence – French Revolution proves**

**Goldhammer 5** - Ph.D. in political science from the University of California, Berkeley (Jesse, “The Headless Republic”, pg 23-25)[rkezios]

Turner argues that sacrifice permits human collectivities to cope with the "negative sentiments" that accumulate as a result of hierarchical social structures. His point about the origin of sacrificial rites is political: the distribution of power in any society ancient or modern produces conflict, which, in turn, finds an outlet in sacred practices. Turner overemphasizes the extent to which sacrifice serves as a valve for the release of social pressure. Sacrifice has too many different modalities and meanings to be reduced to one function. At the same time, however, Turner makes clear that one important function of sacrifice is the reduction of conflict, which he characterizes as the fostering of "generic human communality" Unlike René Girard, who limits the role of sacrifice to the reduction of intracommunal violence, Turner recognizes that sacrifice is also a ritual stage upon which communities play out social, political, and economic conflicts, sometimes with the intention of renovating them, sometimes with the goal of reconfiguring them altogether.32 In claiming that sacrifice fosters communal unity, Turner assumes a distinct political attitude toward sacrifice. This attitude hinges upon his recognition that sacrifice is an ambiguous and process oriented form of violence that alternates between structure and chaos. According to Turner's terminology, sacrifice is, on one hand, a prophylaxis, which functions to maintain, reinforce, or construct socio moral boundaries. In this form, sacrifice is highly ritualistic, a preventive talisman against communal disaggregation and harm. On the other hand, Turner writes that sacrifice "may be an indicator of the dissolution of all structuralfines or boundaries, an annihilator of artificial distances, restorative of communitas however transiently,' In contrast to prophylactic sacrifice, this description of sacrificial "abandonment" captures the capacity of sacrifice to dissolve the bounding limits of social life. Together, these opposing sacrificial impulses illustrate that the sacrificial process is not, strictly speaking, a movement to or from an ordered society. Instead, the sacrificial process contains opposite movements consistent with Nietzsche's Apollonian and Dionysian forces that contribute in different ways to communal unity and coherence. Describing this double movement Turner writes: In the sacrifice of abandonment, the classical theological notions of sin, redemption, and atonement all find their places as phases in a process which seeks personal and social renewal through the surgical removal, interiorly in the will, exteriorly by the immolation of a victim, of the pollution, corruption, and division brought about by mere participation in the domain of social structure. Sacrifice is here regarded as a limeo, or entry into the domain of corrununitas, where all that is and ever has been human and the forces that have caused humanity to be are joined in a circulation of mutual love and trust. In the sacrifice of prophylaxis, structure certainly is cleansed, but left intact; here enlightened self interest prevails. Turner's sacrificial process holds in tension and displays opposing Violent impulses. The sacrifice of abandonment restores a "primitive," undifferentiated unity to the sacrificing community; the prophylactic sacrifice instantiates moral frameworks and structural bonds. According to Turner, prophylactic sacrifice "employs the metaphor of death to establish or reestablish structures of society and culture, with which orderly life may be lived?' Thus, the prophylactic sacrifice captures the dominant meaning of martyrdom, which uses the "metaphor of death" to highlight a set of ideals or particular way of life. In contrast, the sacrifice of abandonment generally maps to scapegoats, in whose destruction communities cathartically participate. Finally, Turner reveals that sacrifice is not exclusively a reaction to crises, to the natural or human forces of dissolution. Sacrifice can also serve to set in motion disuniing forces in order to es¬tablish power relations on a new basis. For Turner, sacrifice is ultimately a potent structuring, restructuring, and "destructuring" force capable of bonding communities. 34 Turner's political attitude toward sacrifice is instructive for thinking about the French Revolution, which encompassed such a variety of sacrificial practices. Paradoxically anachronistic and modern, these practices formed a sacrificial process through which different segments of French society alternately sought political protection and dissolution. In the hands of the revolutionaries, who were self consciously aware of their intention to transform French politics radically, sacrifice came to serve both functions. The revolutionaries used sacrifice to demolish the Old Regime and to shore up the new Republic. The instrumental use of sacrifice during the French Revolution illustrates that there is no conservatism intrinsic to the sacrificial mechanism. Echoing Nietzsche, it also demonstrates that ancient ideas of communal violence can participate in as well as mask modern political struggles for power. Those who dismiss the sacrificial practices of the French revolutionaries as anachronistic barbarism fundamentally miss how those selfsame acts contributed to the dissolution and establishment of political obedience. According to this violent tradition, which has such powerful roots in ancient Western politics and religion, authority and communit' begin with neither the word, the deed, nor the contract. Instead, in the beginning, there is only sacrificial blood.

### Solves Cap

**The chaos of the sacrifice is key to spur the revolution**

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Conclusion T remain hopeful about postrevolurionary subjects and the abilities of such subjects to occupy positions of power in critical and self aware ways. I also remain hopeful about a notion of sovereignty partially liberated from the context of oppression in which it was forged and about consumption as enjoyment that somehow exceeds a context of production, or work. In seeking to keep sovereignty alive, Baraille too does not envision a return to the oppreslive sovereignty characteristic of a feudal system. Sovereignty operates for Bataille more as a conceptual, methodological, and practical postulate rather than as a historical nostalgia. But it is precisely because of this that sovereignty can stage its insurgency anywhere. Baraille suggests that enjoyaunt itself is the upsurge of sovereignty: "The enjoyment of production is in opposition to accumulation (that is, [in opposition) to the production of the means of production) . . . [Sovereignty is] neither anachronistic nor insignificant [because it is the general) condition of each human being" (1991b, 281; 1973, 322, my emphasis). Sovereignty is the overcoming of the urge to hoard; the overcoming of bourgeois subjectivity; the refusal of the historical sedimentation of cruelty, accumulation, and the bad conscience, Acting sovereignly, I leave behind fear, and I stop living in expectation of death. I fear the loss of enjoyment more than death. Bataille's sovereignty anticipates the existentialist refrain of freedom at any cost. But unlike in existentialism, Bataille's sovereignty preserves corporeality: I live sovereignly, not despite my feats of death, but because of my enjoyment of life. For according to Baraille, "if we live sovereignly, the representation of death is impossible, for the present is not subject to the demands of the future. That is why, in a fundamental sense, living sovereignly is to escape, if not death, at least the anguish of [p. 51] death. Not that dying is hateful but living servilely is hateful" (1991b, 219). Nor has Bataille given up on communism: "Sovereignty is no longer alive except in the perspectives of communism" (1991b, 261; 1973, 305). For communism is the only kind of thinking and practice that tries to restore individual consumption, to restore use value and with it enjoyment as the general condition of life. Bataille knows that the jury is out on communism: its historical moment is too near to rake a clear view of its implications as a whole. Because of its historical proximity, communism has fallen between the cracks of dogmatic and politicized positions. Bataille writes that "the lack of interest in understanding communism evinced by practically all noncommunists and the involvement of militants in a cohort acting almost without debate according to directives in which the whole game is not known have made communism a reality that is foreign, as it were, to the world of reflection" (1991b, 264). Bataille's comments on communism in volume 3 of The AccnrsedShare seek to redress this gap, forcing the owl of Minerva to rake her customary flight earlier than usual. Cleansed of teleology, communist revolution becomes the theoretical and practical pursuit of such enjoyment, of a different kind of liberation. And in contemporary thinkers as diverse as Jacques Derrida, Donna Haraway, and Antonio Negri, we find sketches of non teleological liberations, which are no longer revolutions that reinstate repressive subjectivities. Derrida speaks of ongoing, underground practices of resistance (1994, 99). Haraway insists on the non innocence and impurity of all positions of resistance that appear alongside hegemonic cultural ideals (1991, 1997). Addressing the temporal deferral of communism itself, Negri writes, "Communism does not come in a 'subsequent period,' it springs up contemporaneously as a process constituting an enormous power of antagonism and of real supersession" (1991, 181). Anticipating these thinkers, Bataille situates the real interest of communism in its vision of a human being whose general condition is to play without labor in an economy of plenty. No price must be exacted for enjoyment, and there is no question of entitlement. The eclipse of this assertion, in favor of the accumulating and stockpiling of the means of production for future use, is communism missing its own best point

**Sacrifice is uniquely key to break down capitalism**

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Another body of critiques of capitalism emerging in French intellectual circles (Schrift 1997, Botting and Wilson 1998) offers a very different approach from the more dominant tradition of political economy which privileges the tropes of labor and production. Inspired by Marcel Mauss’s (1967) classic work on primitive gift economies and by a Nietzschean challenge to the asceticist ethics and utilitarianism of capitalism, these writers include Georges Bataille (1985, 1989a, 1989b), Jean Baudrillard (1975), Pierre Bourdieu (1977), Marshall Sahlins (1972, 1976), and Pierre Clastres (1987). Instead of taking capitalism as the subject of analysis, these writings seek to mount their critique from outside capitalism, focusing on the radical difference of primitive economies and the way in which primitive gift, **sacriﬁcial**, ritual, and festival **economies** **present oppositional logics** and harbor the potential for **alternative social orders.** Despite certain shortcomings, these works are more conducive to re- conceptualizing capitalism in such a way as to reveal the multiplicity of economies, the tensions between them, and their differential embeddings within the larger social formation. The passage from The Grundrisse with which we began is also cited by Baudrillard in The Mirror of Production (1975:86–87), but he does so in order to launch his unique critique of historical materialism. Baudrillard ob jects to Marx’s assumption that the contradictions of labor and ownership in capitalism can be projected back to precapitalist societies such as primitive, archaic, and feudal forms as their structural pivots. Although **Marx** .challenged bourgeois society, his theories **did not** go far enough to **extricate** themselves **from the** productivist and **utilitarian ethic of capitalism found in such concepts as subsistence,** **labor, economic exchange, and relations and means of production**. For Baudrillard, **this failure to achieve a radical break from capitalist epistemology means that Marxism liberates workers from the bourgeoisie but not from the view that the basic value of their being lies in their labor and productivity**. **Historical materialism is thus unable to grasp the profound difference between societies based on symbolic circulation and societies based on ownership and exchange of labor and commodities**. Notions of labor and production do violence to these societies, where the point of life and the structural order are predicated not on production but on symbolic exchange with humans, spirits, and ancesors. Historical materialism cannot see that **these societies possess mechanisms for the collective consumption of the surplus and deliberate antiproduction** whenever accumulation threatens the continuity of cycles of reciprocity (p. 143). It fails to recognize that they did not separate economics from other social relations such as kinship, religion, and politics or distinguish between infra- and superstructure. **It also perpetuates the Enlightenment invention of Nature as a resource for human production rather than an encompassing symbolic ﬁeld whose offerings to humans must be compensated through sacriﬁce.**13 Baudrillard’s emphasis on consumption and the radical difference of precapitalist formations owes much to the earlier work of Georges Bataille. Bataille produced a very different kind of critique of capitalism, one focused not on production but on consumption. He found that in archaic economies “production was subordinated to non- productive destruction” (1989a:90). The great motive force of these societies was not the compulsion to pro- duce (which unleashes a process of objectiﬁcation whereby all forms of life, including humans, become things) but a desire to escape the order of things and to live for the present moment through exuberant consumption in the form of excesses of generosity, display, and sacriﬁce. The societies of Kwakwa \_ka \_’wakw potlatch feasting, Aztec human sacriﬁce, Islamic militarism, and Tibetan monastic Lamaism all understood the necessity of nonproductive expenditure (Bataille 1989b). They set aside a major proportion of their wealth for expenditures which ensured the “wasting” and “loss” of wealth rather than rational accumulation. This destructive consumption allowed them to avoid the deadly hand of utility and to restore some of the lost “intimacy” of an existence without a separation between sacred and profane. Whereas Weber (1958) looked to religion to explain the origins of the capitalist ethic, Bataille looked to archaic religion for seeds of a subversion of capitalism. If forms 13. of archaic ritual prestation and sacriﬁcial destruction of wealth could be reintegrated into modern economies, capitalism would have built-in mechanisms for social redistribution and for limiting its utilitarian productiv- ism and incessant commodiﬁcation of nature and culture. Its expansionary tendencies would suffer frequent shutdowns and reversals. Baudrillard contests the functional explanation that primitive magic, sacriﬁce, and religion try to accomplish what labor and forces of production cannot. Rather than our rational reading of sacriﬁce as producing use values, **sacriﬁce is engagement in reci- procity with the gods for taking the fruits of the earth** (1975:82–83). **Bataille’s project called for widening** the frame of our economic inquiry **to** what he called **a general economy,** which accounted not only for such things as production, trade, and ﬁnance but also for social consumption, of which **ritual and** religious **sacriﬁce**, feasting, and festival were important components in precapitalist economies. In Bataille’s approach, religion was not an epiphenomenal derivative of the infrastructures of production but an economic activity in itself. A general economy treats economic wealth and growth as part of the operations of the law of physics governing the global ﬁeld of energy for all organic phenomena, so that, when any organism accumulates energy in excess of that needed for its sub- sistence, this energy must be expended and dissipated in some way. What he proposed in his enigmatic and mes- merizing book The Accursed Share was that, in our mod- ern capitalist **productivism,** we have lost **sight of this** **fundamental law** of physics and material existence: tha**t the surplus** energy and wealth left over after the basic conditions for subsistence, reproduction, and growth have been satisﬁed **must be expended**. **If this energy is not destroyed, it will erupt** of its own **in an uncontrolled explosion such as war**. Given the tremendous productive power of modern industrial society and the fact that its productivist ethos has cut off virtually all traditional avenues of ritual and festive expenditures, energy surpluses have been redirected to military expenditures for **modern warfare on a scale unknown** in traditional societies. Ba- taille thought that the incessant growth machine that is the post-World War II U.S. economy could be deﬂected from a catastrophic expenditure on violent warfare only by potlatching the entire national economy. In giving away its excess wealth to poorer nations, as in the Mar-shall Plan to rebuild war-torn Europe, the United States could engage in a nonmilitary rivalry for prestige and inﬂuence with the Soviet Union, that other center of industrial modernity’s radical reduction of nonproductive expenditure.14 Thus, Bataille wished to resuscitate an important dimension of the economy, nonproductive expenditure, that has all but disappeared in both capitalist and state socialist modernity.

### Solves Growth

**Recognizing expenditure, including our inevitable death, creates sustainable growth- limits confine us to the ultimate destruction**

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Limits **Carrying capacity poses a limit to growth: a society can destroy the excess through sacrifice, infanticide, ritual, festival; or excess can be put to work through the waging of war, in which case carrying capacity may be expanded through the appropriation of another society’s land**. War too, however, shows some elements of religious, ruinous expenditure in that it entails, as does sacrifice, glory. Especially in modern times, war also brings with it the possibility of defeat: in that case there is no glory, and certainly no possibility of the expansion of carrying capacity. Indeed, as **in the case of nuclear holocaust, societies run the risk of completely obliterating**— wasting— **the carrying capacity of their land**. In accord with Bataille’s implicit ethical model, one can argue that **the limits imposed by carrying capacity evoke two possible responses from societies. First, a society can recognize limits.** Here, paradoxically, **one violates limits, consciously transgresses them,** so to speak, **by recognizing them. Through various forms of ritual expenditure one ultimately respects limits by symbolically defying the very principle of conservation and measured growth**— of, in other words, limits. “**Spending without reserve” is the spending of that which cannot be reinvested because of the limit, and yet the very act of destruction is the transgression of the logic of the limit, which would require**, in its recognition, **a sage and conservative attentiveness to the dangers of excessive spending. If there is a limit to the production of goods and resources**, however, **we best respect and recognize that limit through its transgression— through**, in other words, **the destruction of precious but unusable energy resources**. **To attempt to reinvest, or put to use, the totality of those resources, to guarantee maximum productivity and growth, would only ignore the limit (rather than transgressing it), thereby eventually lowering the limit if not eliminating it entirely (elimination of carrying capacity, ecological destruction, desertification).** 25 For this reason, **a theory of expenditure is inseparable from**, is even indistinguishable from, **a theory of depletion. Such an affirmation— of limits and expenditure— entails a general view of economy and, we might add, ecology**. **In positing such a respect for limits through their transgression, we forgo an individual concern, which would customarily be seen as the human one** (but which is not, in Bataille’s view): **a concern with personal survival, enrichment, and advancement.** From a larger perspective, **we forego the needs of Man as a species or moral category** (or the needs of God as Man’s moral proxy). The supremacy of self-interest is tied for Bataille to the simple ignorance of limits: not their transgression, but their heedless violation. In the case of transgression of limits, **we risk what might be personally comfortable or advantageous in order to attain a larger “glory” that is tied to unproductive expenditure and entails a possible dissolution of the self**. From a general perspective, **this expenditure is** (as Bataille would say) **on the scale of the universe; it must also be, in principle, on the scale of the carrying capacity of a given landscape or ecology** (else the expenditure would very quickly cancel itself out). This version of limits and their transgression can be associated with Bataille’s conception of eroticism. **What separates humans from the animals,** according to Bataille, **is the interdiction of “immediate, unreserved, animal pleasure** [jouissance] ” (OC, 8: 47). Decency, the rules against sexual expression, incest, and intense pleasure that characterize human society are fundamental to an organized society. But the human is not exclusively to be found in the interdiction: its ultimate “self-consciousness” is derived through the ecstatic transgression of that interdiction. **Interdiction is an aftereffect of transgression, just as conservation is an aftereffect of expenditure (we produce and conserve in order to expend). What ultimately counts for us as humans** (for us to be human) **is an awareness of the necessity of expenditure (including that of our own death)—an awareness that animals lack**. Of course, respect is only the detour of violence. On the one hand, **respect orders the humanized world, where violence is forbidden; on the other, respect opens to violence the possibility of a breakout into the domain where it is inadmissible.** The interdiction does not change the violence of sexual activity, but, by founding the human milieu, it makes possible what animality ignored: the transgression of the rule.... What matters is essentially that a milieu exists, no matter how limited, in which the erotic aspect is unthinkable, and moments of transgression in which eroticism attains the value of the greatest overthrow [renversement]. (OC, 8: 47–48; italics Bataille’s) Eroticism, the general or collective experience of transgression, is impossible without the knowledge of human limits, interdictions. In the same way, we can say that the destruction of excess in an economy is only “on the scale of the universe” if it maintains and respects limits. We could even go beyond this and say that the maintenance of those limits, the carrying capacity in today’s terminology, is only possible through the ritual, emotionally charged destruction of excess wealth (and not its indefinite, seemingly useful, but indifferent reproduction), just as interdictions are only meaningful, and therefore maintainable, when they are periodically transgressed. The only other approach to limits, as I have indicated, **is to ignore them: the consumption of scarce resources should go on forever; growth is limitless.** In the realm of eroticism, this would be either to be entirely unaware of moral limits (interdictions)—as are animals— or on the other hand, to see limits as so absolute that no meaningful transgression can take place; in this case all eroticism would be so minor, so secondary, that no intimate relation between interdiction and eroticism could be imagined, and no dependence of interdiction on the transgressive expression of eroticism could be conceived. **In this case limits would be so overwhelming that they would not even be limits: in effect one could not violate them since they would be omnipresent**, omnipotent. Their transgression would be inconceivable (to try to violate them would simply manifest one’s own degeneracy or evil, one’s status outside the community, in an asylum or hell). Not coincidentally, this position is that of a religious-social orientation in which flamboyant expenditure— sexual, religious, phantasmic— is inconceivable, or unworthy of conception, and in which all excess must therefore be reinvested in material productive processes (even eroticism is subordinated to the production of more people): Calvinism, the Protestant ethic, various fundamentalisms, and so on. This is the narrow view, that of the restricted economy, the economy of the “individual”: Each investor demands interest from his capital: that presupposes an unlimited development of investment, in other words the unlimited growth of the forces of production. Blindly denied in the principle of these essentially productive operations is the not unlimited but considerable sum of products consumed in pure loss [en pure perte]. (OC, 7: 170; AS, 182) **This restricted economy, which hypostatizes limits** (moral, personal) **only ultimately to ignore them or degrade them, is the economy that values war as a mode of expansion** (typified, for Bataille at least, by Islam) and as utility (self-defense, deterrence, mutually assured destruction). **The limit is ignored in the restricted economy only at the risk of reimposition of an absolute limit, cataclysmic destruction, or ecological collapse** (nuclear holocaust, the simple elimination of carrying capacity). **Bataille’s ethics**, then, **entail a choice between these two alternatives: recognition of limits through the affirmation of expenditure in a general economy, and the ignorance of limits through a denial of expenditure in a closed or restricted economy. The first entails the affirmation of glorious pleasure, sacred matter and energy, and anguish before death, while the latter entails the ego-driven affirmation of utility and unlimited growth with all the attendant dangers** (the untheorized and quite sudden imposition of the limits to growth). The irony in all this is that the first, transgressive, and “human” ethics will inevitably be sensitive to ecological questions— respectful of carrying capacity— through its very affirmation of loss. The second, **attempting to limit severely or do away with waste and thereby affirm the particular interests of an individual, a closed social group, or a species** (Man) **in the name of “growth,” will only universalize the wasting— the ultimate destruction— of the carrying capacity that serves as the basis of life. Conservation is therefore a logical aftereffect of expenditure; we conserve in order to expend.** In other words, **we conserve not to perpetuate our small, monadic existences or the putative centrality of our species, but rather to make possible a larger generosity, a larger general economy that entails the transgression** (in angoisse) **of our narrow, selfish “practicality,” our limitedness** (i.e., the inevitable postponement of pleasure). **By expending we conserve. Bataille’s utopian ethics foresees a society that creates, builds, and grows in and through loss. Bataille** thereby **affirms the continuation of a human collectivity whose humanity is inseparable from that general**— collective and ecstatic— **expenditure**. **Inseparable**, in other words, **from a loss of the very selfish fixation on knowledge, authority, and even comforting immortality with which the word humanity is usually associated.** The raison d’être of society, so to speak, will lie in the very unreasoned logic of its excessive and transgressive expenditure. **This highest value will be maintained and known through recognition of limits, which is ultimately reasonable but to which the act of expenditure nevertheless cannot be reduced (because the affirmation of limits entails their transgression at the “highest” point of development and knowledge).**

### Solves Transcendence

**The cling to life ignores the true horizontal nature between ‘life’ and death.’ The alternative is key to abolition the vertical dichotomies the aff imposes to truly accept death as a liberating transcendence**

**Land 92** – lecturer in Continental Philosophy at Warwick University (Nick, “The Thirst for Annihilation” pg. 123-124)[rkezios]

General economy is a traffic system; marking routes within the complex immanence or quasi-horizontality that infests the axis of transcendence. Every vertical difference is collapsible onto a tangled horizontal flow. It is not that base materialism denies the necessity of vertical articulation; there is no tendency to delete the vocabulary of summits and troughs, differences in intensity, compositional strata. The elimination of such an axis from materialist thought would leave nothing but a theologically constituted reality abandoned by God (a colony of particles). Scaling is the positive superfluity of God inherent to matter, but its gradations of relative transcendence must be commensurated with an impersonal nature exhausting the real: genealogically rather than metaphysically explored. The labyrinth is the unconscious of God, or the repressed of monotheism. The illusion of ego in general requires that it remain unthought. What God really was is something incompatible with anything ‘being’ at all. Real composition is not extrinsically created nature, but if this is a Spinozism, it is one in which substance itself is sacrificed to the scales. So that atheism is in the end (an end without end) an immense sponge, a mega-sponge, the dissolution of boundaries in all of its positive complexity. It is an inexhaustible porosity, saturated with negation, pregnant with swarming lethalities, and drunk upon the sea. Sponge-matter—encroached without limit by silence—is the same thing as fate. In any traffic system real transition precedes articulation (which means that there are no boundaries, but only digressions). Sponge-vectors do not connect pre-existing points, but spawn decomposable patches from out of the subtilization of speeds and the intricate criss-crossing of routes. Absolute points are transcendent mirages, hyperbolically projected out of dismantled vector nets. The reality of space is only the possibility of flow. ‘Were you to stop a short moment: the complex, the gentle, the violent movements of worlds will make of your death a splashing foam’ [V 112], writes Bataille. The word ‘death’ has the same mix of referential richness and conceptual poverty as the sign lifting a speed restriction. It would designate a concept only if this semiotic transition were treated as the representation of absolute velocity, rather than an incitement to free-flow. Dying is the departure from a traffic system, but this emigration is not transcendentally governed by a pure destination. The slipping-away of an animal into death is no less intricately positive than the arterial pulse pumping the blood from its heart. We are all fictional suicides, some impatient, some less so, but all demonstrating by our meticulousness the taciturnity of death. ‘In effect, death is nothing in immanence, but due to the fact that it is nothing, no being is ever truly separated from it’ [VII 308]. Death answer sponge streaming with solar dreams [V 186].

### Solves Gender

**Sacrifice acts as castration – the lens of the alternative turns normative gender conceptions.**

**Goldhammer 5** - Ph.D. in political science from the University of California, Berkeley (Jesse, “The Headless Republic”, pg 179-181)[rkezios]

Although virility is commonly defined as an accumulation of male force, especially sexual potency Bataille views it through the lens of unproductive expenditure. The result is a concept of male power that relies on an ontology of waste, not accumulation. For Bataille, the male erection has no purpose other than to waste itself, an image captured by Troppman, the main character in Bataille's novel Le Bleu du clef (Blue of Noon), written in 1935 but not published until 3957. Susan Rubin Suleiman remarks that Troppman is symbolically castrated, a reflection of Bataffle's characterization of the impotence felt by antifascist French intellectuals in the I93 0s. For instance, when Troppman is unable to make love to a beautiful woman named Dirty, she euphemistically taunts him: "If only you could lose your head?'60 Suleiman argues that this slippage between castration and decapitation indicates increased virility from a uniquely Bataillian perspective: Decapitation is a symbolic castration, if Freud is to be believed; but Troppman is already symbolically castrated, so his decapitation would be redundant. (Troppnian, incidentally, was the name of a mass murderer beheaded in Paris in 5870.) Unless, of course, "losing his head" restored his potency, according to that characteristically Baraillian equation which states that a violent loss of control is the precondition ofjouisaauce, a radical letting go. 61 It is precisely this "violent loss of control:' anticipated by unproductive expenditure, celebrated in Blue of Noon, and captured in Bataille's Contre Attaque writings, that characterizes Bataille's concept of virility. Virility is paradoxically a form of orgiastic powerlessness or jouissance, a sort of antiauthoritarian authority. This state of being forms an exact parallel to Bataille's notion of subersive or acephalic sovereignty In disposing of itself effervescently, virility permits ontological self sacrifice in the service of a revolution that wastes unproductively all that it opposes. The revolutionary role of sovereign virility is thus metapolitical because it promises a self wounding masculinity that turns the proletariat inward and upon itself. Sovereign virility also thwarts traditional notions of political foundation, which require idealism and elevated authority.

## AT:

### AT: Util Good

**Utilitarianism is worse for society – leads to more violence**

**Itzkowitz 99** (Kenneth. Associate professor of philosophy at Marietta College. College Literature. “To Witness Spectacles of Pain: The Hypermorality of Georges Bataille. Accessed: 7/18/12. Jstor)//CL

**It would be pointless to deny that most illegal violence is abhorrent or immoral. At the same time, however, given the violence of the life of our culture, we need to understand immoral violence more deeply than any blanket condemnation of it will allow.** Beyond our condemnations, **we need to recognize that the acts we most prohibit are** paradoxically **also the very ones we most celebrate. A foremost proponent of this need is** the French philosopher and writer Georges **Bataille**. Relying on a notion of excess energy and the problem of its expenditure, Bataille argues that **the transgression of law is what he calls an accursed yet ineluctable part of our lives. We make laws in the name of prohibiting acts of violence, yet the problem of the expenditure of an excess of energy requires behaviors that violate the very same rules we cherish and intend to uphold.** The commentator Jean Piel took note of how Bataille managed “to view the world as if it were animated by a turmoil in accord with the one that never ceased to dominate his personal life” (1995, 99). Here, **the fact of an individual-in-turmoil reflects the surplus of energy distributing life in general, rather than a moral deficiency for which an individual can be held accountable.** For Bataille **an individual’s wasteful behaviors are ultimately reflections of the problem of the surplus of solar energ**y. Piel but it this way: “The whole problem is to know how, at the heart of this general economy, the surplus is used” (1995, 103). **How should the surplus of** solar **energy be used**? **Bataille contends that this surplus is never extinguished and that its expenditure always leads towards the commission of violence. The surplus of energy is accursed and finally cannot serve us productively. The accursed excess confronts us with the problem of how to expend energy when this results in usages that cannot made be useful. Thus the production of violence has a value for us as those condemned to the realm of non-productive expenditures**. We undoubtedly deny this value, as Bataille notes, when **“Under present conditions, everything conspires to obscure the basic movement that tends to restore wealth to its function, to gift giving, to squandering without reciprocations**” (1988, 38). Nonetheless, as Bataille puts it, “**the impossibility of useful expenditure is ignored, then we fail to recognize ourselves on the deepest level as who we most fundamentally are**. **Against this failure** and in the name of a kind of inverted Hegelian self-recognition, **Bataille calls for the transgression of our prohibitionist moral values. We need an ethics of squandering goods, of squandering what is good, in recognition of an overabundance over and beyond all others i.e. an overabundance that can only, at best, be squandered.** He writes, **Life suffocates within limits that are too close; it aspires in manifold ways to an impossible growth; it releases a steady flow of excess resources, possibly involving large squanderings of energy.** **The limit of growth being reached, ... enters into ebullition. Without exploding, its extreme exuberance pours out into a movement always bordering on explosion**. (Bataille 1988, 30) **As living lives that must enter into ebullition, we find ourselves fundamentally committed no more to moral righteousness than to immoral outpourings of energy to sudden and violent outbursts exceeding all rational considerations**. The protests of moralism are secondary and never responsive to Bataille’s questioning of morality: “**Supposing there is no longer any growth possible, what is to be done with the seething energy that remains**?” (1988, 31). We **are told by reason and morality to do what is best, which is to prohibit behaviors that are nonproductive or harmful. Our morality identifies the right with the useful and productive with whatever makes us better. Bataille however, argues against this morality and for the requirement of useless, non-productive, violent outpourings of energy – a requirement for what he calls “a draining-away, a pure and simple loss, which occurs in any case**” (1988, 31). **These violent nonproductive outpourings according to Bataille, are required of us all as living beings regardless of whether or not we take the responsibility to manage and arrange their occurrence in our lives. At issue, for Bataille, is energy in excess, energy as an excess. As an excess, such energy must be discharged explosively in outpourings that, in the end, are inevitable.**

**Utilitarians are psychopaths**

**Wilkinson 11 (**Will. Former research fellow with the Cato institute. He’s citing a study done by Daniel Bartels from Columbia University and David Pizarro from Cornell. “The wicked souls of utilitarians” Full Date: September 27, 2011. Accessed: 7/19/12.)//CL

**Dr Bartels and Dr Pizarro** then correlated the results from the trolleyology with those from the personality tests. They **found a strong link between utilitarian answers to moral dilemmas** (push the fat guy off the bridge) **and personalities that were psychopathic, Machiavellian or tended to view life as meaningless. Utilitarians, this suggests, may add to the sum of human happiness, but they are not very happy people themselves.** If you think utilitarianism is the correct theory, you might infer, as does Roger McShane, my colleague at Democracy in America that **"If we really want the greatest happiness of the greatest number, we should be electing psychopathic, Machiavellian misanthropes."** Set aside the truth or falsity of utilitarianism. This is a mistake. **Utilitarianism is a theory of the good** (happiness, pleasure, what have you) **and of the right** (do that which brings about the most good). **So, according to utilitarianism, one should accept utilitarianism only if accepting utilitarianism leads one to do more good than accepting one of the many alternatives to utilitarianism. As one of philosophy's greatest utilitarian theorists** (and an early president of the Cambridge Moral Sciences Club) **taught:** **[A] Utilitarian may reasonably desire, on Utilitarian principles, that some of his conclusions should be rejected by mankind generally; or even that the vulgar should keep aloof from his system as a whole, in so far as the inevitable indefiniteness and complexity of its calculations render it likely to lead to bad results in their hands**. Henry **Sidgwick here is holding on to the possibility that the influence of utilitarianism may be benign if limited to a technocratic elite, a convenient opinion for the colonial overseers of the British Empire, who knew they had to break a few eggs to bring civilized omelets to the savage races. But Sidgwick's point is general: a utilitarian may desire, on utilitarian principles, that all of his conclusions should be rejected by mankind entirely. That utilitarianism as a creed leads to good utilitarian results is an empirical matter impossible to settle through philosophical argument**. Since it seems implausible that we are best off governed by Machiavellian psychopaths, I take **the findings of Bartels and Pizarro**--that those attracted to utilitarianism tend toward the psychopathic and Machiavellian--**as prima facie evidence that utilitarianism is "self-effacing," that it recommends its own rejection. This is a study about how, if you are a utilitarian, you should probably do the world some good and shut up about what you really think is best.**

**Utilitarian calculations simplify ontological issues, dichotomizing everything into the ‘greater good’ and the evil that must be stopped. This logic has empirically lead to genocide – Holocaust proves**

**Stone 6** – Professor of Modern History at University of London (Dan, “Theoretical Interpretations of the Holocaust”)[rkezios]

In his Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789), a book originally intended as the preface to a huge tract on crime and punishment, Bentham sought 'to rear the fabric of felicity by the hands of reason and of the law'.4 In this first 'scientific' penal code, Bentham argued that human nature was governed by two basic feelings: pleasure and pain. He believed these feelings existed as empirical facts and required no special proof. But from this basic premise he jumped [p. 71] to a value judgement that people desired the maintenance of pleasure at all times, a kind of psychological hedonism, which he described thus:  By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question: or, what is the same thing in other words, to promote or to oppose that happiness. [PML: 11‑121  Bentham's 'calculus of felicity', the support of the majority for a given policy, required no justification, because it was necessarily bringing the greatest happiness to the greatest number.  Given the possibility for immoral applications of Bentham's utilitarianism, we can see why so many today feel appalled by it. For example, how is the liberty of a rapist to be balanced with the pain of the victim? Benthamite arbitration is based not on concerns of equality but on vague notions of 'general welfare'. Clearly, one cannot countenance a philosophy which necessitates a degree of pain commensurate with the degree of happiness to be attained, and that has no moral argument against the misery of the few.  The extermination of the Jews was justified (when it was mentioned at all) on similar utilitarian grounds ‑ the creation of the Volksgenieinschaft. It would thus appear to be the ultimate proof of the unacceptability of Bentham's philosophy. But can the origin of the Nazis' goal be explained rationally? Since it is borne of 'irrational' fears of racial pollution and so forth, the justification complies with utilitarianism, but the birth of the thought and its realisation do not: 'Only the truly mad could have believed that it was war that they were waging against the Jews.'5 Thus, no matter how indebted to the workings of Zweckrationcditdt (purposive rationality) the bureaucracy of mass murder was, the utilitarian justification of genocide for rhetorical purposes seems only to scratch the surface of the Holocaust.6  The Nazis did justify their actions on utilitarian grounds, and without formally deviating from the hedonistic psychology of Bentham. But one never escapes the feeling that this was merely a cover. Despite the findings of historians with regard to what ordinary people knew at the time, so that it is no longer possible to claim 'Niemand war dabei and keiner hat's gewujlt',7 the extermination of the Jews was not (other than tacitly) a publicly mandated policy. And since Bentham himself worried that increased state intervention would only diminish the possibilities for the pursuit of individual happiness, the utilitarian claim becomes, in the Nazi context of the '55 State', simply an official [p. 72]  lie, although those involved in the actual killings attempted to convince themselves and others of the veracity of this he. As SS‑Obersturmfiihrer Karl Kretschmer wrote to his wife on 27 September 1942: 'As I said, Jam in a very gloomy mood. I must pull myself out of it. The sight of the dead (including women and children) is not very cheering. But we are fighting this war for the survival or non‑survival of our people.'8 Nor can one equate Hitler with the Benthamite ideal of the lawmaker, even given the claim that the 'happiness of the individuals, of whom a community is composed ... is the end and the sole end which the legislator ought to have in view', that it is 'the sole standard, in conformity to which each individual ought, as far as depends upon the legislator, to be made to fashion his behaviour' (PML: 34, Bentham's emphasis).  The trouble is that Bentham equated utilitarianism with conscious calculation, hence usefulness, even though this was not consistent with his basic definition of the principle of utility. In other words, for Bentham, the greatest happiness for the greatest number must necessarily be with the aim of increasing production, of providing benefits for its recipients. And as Hannah Arendt reminds us, it is precisely the absence of utilitarian criteria for the concentration camps which lends them their 'curious air of unreality'.9  What is required here is a utilitarianism that goes beyond utility, that accounts for the apparent paradox that utilitarian goals can aim at uselessness as much as at 'usefulness'. This might provide a clearer response to the Holocaust than the statements so typical of earlier commentators, caught in the same trap as Bentham. They, on the one hand, claimed that the Holocaust must be irrational precisely because it served no useful purpose. It is usually the fact that the murders diverted energy away from the war effort that is cited in order to back up this claim; as Alain I'inkielkraut writes: 'We know today that the Germans went against their own interests by eliminating an often irreplaceable labour force which fed their wartime economy."° An emphasis on the usefulness of the 'useless' might provide more insight than those theories which, on the other hand, sought to account for the Holocaust within some sort of Malthusian scheme of the ridding of surplus populations (Rubenstein/Aly and Heim), or within a 'Marxist' framework in which the language of the 'Jewish Question' was merely a front for the economic gains to be had from the elimination of the Jews (Kraus and Kulka). Both interpretations can be disproved on straightforward empirical grounds)' An interpretation of utilitarianism founded on uselessness would be thoroughly consistent with the logic of Bentham, but fundamentally out of step with his emphasis on the benefits to be derived from it.  Such a system of thought is to be found in the writings of Bataille. Central to his work is a denial that the energy within human society is [p. 73] adequately accounted for by the notions of production and conservation contained within classical economic theories. Such theories, he claims, are therefore those of a 'limited economy'. As much a critique of Marx as of Smith, Bataille argues, from his essay 'The Notion of Expenditure' (1933) to Eroticism (1957), that the production and distribution of wealth cannot encompass the entirety of human activity:  The living organism, in a situation determined by the play of energy on the surface of the globe, ordinarily receives more energy than is necessary for maintaining life; the excess energy (wealth) can be used for the growth of a system (e.g., an organism); if the system can no longer grow, or if the excess cannot be completely absorbed in its growth, it must necessarily be lost without profit; it must be spent, willingly or not, gloriously or catastrophically.12  Indeed, Bataille affirms that the excess can never be completely absorbed into the rational economy, that profit will unavoidably be squandered by 'dissipat[ing] a substantial portion of energy produced, sending it up in smoke' (AS, I: 22). The 'general economy' comprises both the 'limited economy' of Marxists and liberals, as well as the energy which cannot be used 'profitably' for the increase of equipment.3 The experience of this 'life beyond utility' Bataille terms 'sovereignty' (AS, II: 198). Where Bentham talked of affect in terms of pleasure and pain, and the controlled balance between them to be maintained by calculated action, Bataille's concept of sovereignty was to give full reign to affect: sovereignty is 'the negation of prohibition' (AS, II: 254; cf. 403). In contrast to the utilitarian goal of the production of production (that is, spending on the basis of an expectation of future returns), sovereignty justified all useless consumption, all nonproductive spending (AS, II: 312). Sovereignty was the experience of society's 'heterogeneous energy', entirely dissociated from instrumental action.  Failure to permit the functioning of the general economy, that is to say, failure to permit the squandering of excess energy, leads to bottlenecks in the system and 'deprives us of the choice of an exudation that might suit us' (AS, I: 23‑4), with potentially catastrophic results. Already we can see where such thought is leading us with regard to the Holocaust. Can the Holocaust be seen as the attempt, under the bourgeois 'limited economy', to attain a life ruled by banished sovereign values?

### AT: Non Falsifiable

**Bataille uses science to back his philosophy.**

**Hochcroth 95** (Lysa. Ph.D. Teacher of French at Columbia University and researcher of French philosophers for Semiotext€ Configurations 3.1 (1995) 47-77. “The Scientific Imperative: Improductive Expenditure and Energeticism” Accessed: 7/19/12. <http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/configurations/v003/3.1hochroth.html)//CL>

Before getting into the specifics, and as the point is not often discussed, **we must** first pause to **examine Bataille's relationship to the** [End Page 55] **natural sciences. Bataille himself repeatedly called attention to his interest in (pure) science.** 21 O**n one occasion, he mentioned his scientific background regarding La part maudite, in a note for a text called "La limite de l'utile" related to the preface of the book:** "Dans la préface, ma vie et le principe de l'extrême. Sur aucun des points traités, rien de plus qu'une compétence douteuse--formation scientifique toutefois." 22 Yet **this short passage only begins to support the idea proposed herein that Bataille was driven by an epistemological reevaluation of the scientific bases of social philosophy.** In short, **he accorded science with a preponderant role in explaining thought and consciousness. Science also proves the relativity of utility as a category and opens up onto the investigation of universal matter**: "Si je continue d'en passer par la science, je suis amené à voir ces galaxies entraînant des étoiles sans nombre." 23 **The human condition has become isolated, not only due to alienation in the restricted economics of the capitalist world, but also as a manifestation of a more general fact, that man has become isolated from the universe to which he belongs. Bataille defined his scientific approach as critical, aware of his own hesitations, and yet capable of pushing science beyond its affective limitations and bent on making an effort toward detachment to arrive at a greater understanding of the world**: On dit souvent que les données de science sont abstraites et vides de sens. Mais de telles vérités faciles n'enferment rien. J'imagine un esprit enclin à l'intériorité mais n'admettant rien que la science ne fonde (encore qu'il la considère de sang-froid, comme il convient). La science lui paraîtrait sans doute un piège: il dirait aux savants son effroi de les voir vains, sans angoisse. Mais [End Page 56] ce qu'il apprend du monde dans les livres ne pourrait lui sembler vide. Il lirait ce qui suit dans ses études. 24 This passage leads directly into the above-cited text "La limite de l'utile." The limits of utility are literally preceded by scientific considerations. This is reiterated, and Bataille, after describing the galaxies, their movements, the stars, and the planets, pinpoints the fundamental value of these scientific premises: "Sans la science, je n'aurais pu dire ce qui précède et la science m'autorise à m'attarder. La suite du livre se développe à partir de ces prémices: elle fait voir dans la vie humaine à la fois l'avidité économique, propre aux éléments divisés de la terre, et la nostalgie d'une gloire qui n'appartient vraiment qu'aux cieux." 25 **Scientific thought, just like naive contemplation, opens up the universe--and is, in short, Bataille's passport to the extreme realm of improductive expenditure**.

**Standards of falsifiability guarantee massive skepticism – both undermines the aff’s predictions and fails to access the foundational sacrifice of the alternative**

Garcia, 06 – professor of philosophy, at the University of Florida, former professor at the University of Bogota, citing and extrapolating on the studies of Karl Popper, winner of the Kyoto Prize in Arts and Philosophy, philosopher and professor at the London School of Economics, (Carlos, “Popper’s Theory of Science: An Apologia (Continuum Studies in Philosophy)”, 2006, Print)//JKahn

Lakatos then argues that even if his evaluation of assumptions (a) and (b) above were wrong, no theory would ever meet the criterion falsifiability in the sense of prohibiting an observable state of affairs. Lakatos tells how a Newtonian scientist confronted with the anomalous behavior of a planet is able to engage in an endless process of inventing ingenious conjectures instead of considering every deviation from the predicted values as an instance of a state of affairs prohibited by the theory. In other words, the Newtonian scientist saves the theory from falsification by tirelessly introducing auxiliary hypotheses as needed. In contradistinction to Popper, Lakatos thinks that irrefutability, in the sense of tenacity of a theory against empirical evidence, should become the hallmark of science. )2 Moreover, anyone who accepts dogmatic falsificationalism tie. the demarcation criterion and the idea that facts can prove factual statements‘) should reach the exact opposite conclusions that Popper endorses: the dogmatic falsificationalist would have to consider the most important scientific theories ever proposed metaphysical; he would he forced to redefine completely the notion of scientific progress (denying that we have reached any real progress so far) and lastly would be compelled to admit that most of the work (10116 in the history of science is irrational. Dogmatic falsificationism leads to rampant skepticism: If all scientific st21tcmcnts arc [all the theories, one can criticize them only for inconsistency. But then, in what sense, if‘ any, is science empirical? If scientific theories are neither provable, nor probabilifi;1blc7 nor disprovable, then the specticism to he finally right: science is no more than vain speculation and there is no such thing as progress in scientific knowledge. A methodological falsificationist (like Popper) applies the fallible) theories, in the light of which he interprets the facts, as unproblematic background knowledge while the testing is performed. In this respect, he uses successful theories as extensions of the senses and widens the range of theories that can be used in testing, compared with the limited range of the dogmatic falsificatioI1ist.5“l' The methodological falsificationist adopts an heroic stance: in order to escape skepticism he is willing to grant observational status to a theory by accepting certain test-statements as true but fallible, without making any concession to justificationism. In this way, he appeals to the empirical basis but is not committed to its foundational character. Furthermore, he provides methodological rules that lead to the rejection of a falsified theory, but unlike the dogmatic falsificationist (who eonllated rejection and disprool‘), he maintains that fallibilism does not put any limits on the critical attitude.

**The aff is just as tautological – it can’t confirm auxiliary hypothesis that the foundational understanding of the kritik can**

**Margolis and Laurence, 99** – professor of philosophy at the University of British Columbia, Ph.D. from Rutgers University, former professor at Rive University and the University of Wisconsin, AND\* professor of philosophy at the University of Sheffield, Ph.D. in philosophy from Rutgers University, former professor at the University of Manchester, Hampshire College, the London School of Economics, and the University of Hull, (Eric and Stephan, “Concepts Core Readings”, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, Print)//JKahn

The theory that analytic statements are tautologies also helped the positivists in addressing a long-standing difficulty for empiricism, namely, how to account for the fact that people are capable of a priori knowledge of factual matters even though, according to empiricism, all knowledge is rooted in experience. Mathematics and logic, in particular, have always been stumbling blocks for empiricism. The positivists’ solution was to claim that logical and mathematical statements are analytic. Since they also held that analyticities are tautologies, they were able to claim that we can know a priori the truths of logic and mathematics because, in doing so, we don't really obtain knowledge of the world (see, e.g., Ayer 1946/1952; Hahn 1933/1959). As is clear from this brief account of the role of analyticity in logical positivism, the positivists’ program was driven by epistemological considerations. The problem was, assuming broadly empiricist principles, how to explain our a priori knowledge and how to account for our ability to know and speak of scientific truths that aren't directly observable. Considering the vast range of scientific claims—that atoms are composed of protons, neutrons, and electrons, that the universe originated from a cosmic explosion 10 to 20 billion years ago, that all animals on Earth descended from a common ancestor, etc.——it is clear that the positivists’ program had truly enormous scope and ambition. Quine’s attack on the notion of analyticity has several components. Perhaps the most influential strand in Quine’s critique is his observation, following Pierre Duhem, that confirmation is inherently holistic, that, as he puts it, individual statements are never confirmed in isolation. As a consequence, one can't say in advance of empirical inquiry what would confirm a particular statement. This is partly because confirmation involves global properties, such as considerations of simplicity, conservatism, overall coherence, and so on. But it's also because confirmation takes place against the background of auxiliary hypotheses, and that, given the available evidence, one isn't forced to accept, or reject, a particular statement or theory so long as one is willing to make appropriate adjustments to the auxiliaries. On Quine’s reading of science, no statement has an isolatable set of confirmation conditions that can be established a priori, and, in principle, there is no guarantee that any statement is immune to revision. Some examples may help to clarify these points and ground the discussion. Consider the case of Newton's theory of gravitation, which was confirmed by a variety of disparate and (on a priori grounds) unexpected sources of evidence, such as observations of the moons of Jupiter, the phases of Venus, and the ocean tides. Similarly, part of the confirmation of Darwin's theory of evolution is owing to the development of plate tectonics, which allows for past geographical continuities between regions which today are separated by oceans. This same case illustrates the dependency of confirmation on auxiliary hypotheses. Without plate tectonics, Darwin's theory would face inexplicable data. A more striking case of dependency on auxiliary hypotheses comes from an early argument against the Copernican system that cited the absence of annual parallax of the fixed stars. Notice that for the argument to work, one has to assume that the stars are relatively close to the Earth. Change the assumption and there is no incompatibility between the Earth's movement and the failure to observe parallax.

### AT: Framework

**“I believe that truth has only one face: that of a violent contradiction.” – Georges Bataille**

**Their framework perpetuates a politics of exclusion and war**

**Mansfield** **8 –** Prof Cultural Studies at Macquarie University (Nick, “Theorizing War: From Hobbes to Badiou” <http://dajialai.org/ziliao1/%CE%F7%B7%BD%D0%C2%D7%F3%C5%C9/Badiou/Mansfield,%20Nick%20-%20Theorizing%20War.%20From%20Hobbes%20to%20Badiou.pdf>)

In Clausewitz, war emerges easily when society opens its hand. Peace is not ashamed of war and uses it. Policy extends itself into war, drawing the whole of the society with it. The argument is even stronger than this, because policy does not represent the cynical manipulation of the social, seducing or tricking it into war. The impulse of the social is controlled by policy, without which the drive to violence for its own sake, a violence of annihilation of the other, would be even stronger, even wilder. We have here two very different versions of the social and its relationship with war. Yet both reveal how the alternation of war and the social (war as the social's other, war as the execution of collective social intention) leads to a collapse of the foreign‑ness between the two. This foreign‑ness is assumed, then elaborately disproved, even if from opposite directions. In Hobbes, society moves away from war, but always drags it with it, as its compelling and unshakeable underside. War accompanies every flexing of the social, every moment, and threatens to overwhelm what is determined to suppress or conceal it. In Clausewitz, society stoops, through policy, to the war that would seem to contradict it, but that is in fact the fullest activation of its energies. In Michel Foucault's account of the social war, we see something similar, when Foucault cheekily, cleverly, reverses Clausewitz's statement. At the outset of the series of lectures that comprise Society Must be Defended, he announces his hypothesis: "[plower is war," he writes, "the continuation of war by other means" (Foucault, 2003, p. 15). What this claim implies is that the relations of power in a society do not quell or disable war, but continue it, because they were founded in a real war that really happened and that can be specified. It also means that the establishment of supposedly peaceful social relations by the institution of formal putatively legitimate power is not intended to end or preclude the inequality in relations established in the violent struggle for power. Indeed, the purpose of the establishment of formal power as peace is to reinvigorate war throughout the social, "in institutions, economic inequalities, language, and even the bodies of individuals" [p. 121] (Foucault, 2003, p. 16). What this means, according to Foucault, is that within all social practices war is continuing in displaced, disguised or re‑represented form, undiminished if translated into a wholly other language of articulation. "We are always writing the history of the same war, even when we are writing the history of peace and its institutions" (p. 16). Foucault sets two ways of analysing power against one another, On the one hand, we have a theory of power in terms of its legitimacy. Sovereignty claims a legal authority underwritten by a civil contractual logic, in which the natural "primal" (Foucault, 2003, p. 16) right of the individual is surrendered. When this legal authority exceeds itself, the result is tyranny or oppression. On the other hand is another theory of power altogether, one in which the excess of power is not an abuse, but merely the inevitable extension of the logic of dominance that defines social relations, because it is its ancestry. The former is a model of order and hierarchy, where a legally constituted governing power has its limits strictly defined. It may overstep these limits and brutalise, but this violence is always seen as a transgression of its proper power, perhaps one that can be explained in terms of the psychology or incompetence of the historical players periodically entrusted with that power. Beneath the excess, however, the legitimacy of the contract endures, embarrassed by violence and ostensibly separate from it. Violence in the contract system is a mistake. In the alternative model, social power merely translates the divisions and antagonisms of war into another form. Social institutions merely continue the war already well underway‑perhaps so long underway, it is rarely recognised as war, even taken for granted. In what Foucault calls here the "war‑repression" schema (Foucault, 2003, p. 17), what is at stake is not legitimacy but merely "dominance and submission" (p. 17). An account of society seen from the point of view of relations of domination, rather than from the evaluation of legitimacy, will reveal a wholly other social logic. Foucanit outlines systematically the difference between the two. Foucault claims that European political thought since the Middle Ages has been preoccupied with the issue of the legitimacy of royal power, at the behest of that power. He quotes approvingly Petrarch's complaint "Is there nothing more to history than the praise of Rome?" (Foucault, 2003, p. 74), The sovereign progress of sovereignty as the ostensible clarification and consolidation of the good leads discourse to twin emphases: the legal elaboration of the right of the sovereign and the concomitant explanation of the duties of the subject. In this discourse, the duty to justify legitimacy leads to the assumed obligation to cleanse power[p. 122] of what might seem to compromise it: its reliance on violent domination. Domination is made to disappear and is not seen as intrinsically part of the sovereign power that accompanies it. Foucault produces here an inversion of the relationship between sovereignty and domination. Instead of adopting the more conventional line that dominance is a mere instrument of a sovereign power that pretends to be legitimate but is simply the rationalisation of the centralisation of power in the hands of the few, Foucault locates sovereignty within a larger unfolding of dominance. His recent work, he says, has been given over to stress the fact of domination in all its brutality and its secrecy, and then to show not only that right is an instrument of that domination... but also how, to what extent, and in what form right... serves as a vehicle for and implements relations that are not relations of sovereignty, but relations of domination. (Foucault, 2003, p. 27) It is not that dominance merely serves an established regime by arguing its legitimacy and disguising its violence by formulations of sovereign order. The doctrine of right is merely one aspect of a larger technique of dominance, and is subsequent, subordinate and junior to it. It is this elaborate and widespread mechanics of domination that needs to be revealed. Subordination is not the duty of those subject to legitimate power, but the fate of the dominated, not the acceptance of an authority necessary to save us from ourselves, but the continuation of a brutal violence in which many must forever be kept in check. The mode of analysis most appropriate to this situation must be unconventional. First, it must look at power not in terms of how its most petty manifestations can be justified from the logic of legitimacy at the putative centre. It must look at power in its most local and peripheral manifestations, at its extremities (Foucault, 2003, p. 27). Secondly, it must not see what is going on at these extremities as explained or reducible to what is intendedby sovereignty. To continue to reduce what happens at the periphery to what is intended at the centre ends by obscuring the detailed and particular forms of the operation of power produced as the mariner by which we live: "rather than asking ourselves what the sovereign looks like from on high, we should be trying to discover how multiple bodies, forces, energies, matters, desires, thoughts and so on are gradually, progressively, actually and materially constituted as subjects, or as the subject" (p. 28). It is here that Foucault stresses the difference between what he is trying to do and the Hobbesian schema, whereby the particularities of the operation of [p. 123] power in specific local contexts are made sense of by the construction of a single magnificent if monstrous body, where the localisation, plurality, incommensurability and fragmentation of social relations are denied, and where everything is seen as subordinate to a single logic of necessary legitimacy, a legitimacy to which all local grievances and desires are to be subject. As we have seen, this legitimacy is partly justified by its claim to be the only way in which our desires can in fact be satisfied. If we were left to our desires, our desires would not be fulfilled. Only by denying our desire can we have it. If, as in Foucault's view, the Leviathan is the "central soul" (p. 29) which obscures the detailed operation of power in its peripheral effects, then its complex logic of desire can be explained in another way: the desire of the individual subject is always and forever wrong, an illegitimate desire to be measured against the desire legitimated by the imagined social centre. The Leviathan thus produces an apparently "natural" desire whose function is to be contradicted by the correct desire sovereignty makes acceptable. Following the logic of Foucault's argument, therefore, sovereignty's imagined centralisation is really just itself something that operates to pressure what happens at the peripheral and local. The centre is just an image deployed at the periphery. The choice of terms like "centre" and "periphery" therefore is merely a way of disputing a political fiction on its own terms, not a reversal of priorities. Foucault is not arguing that we must suppress the centre and pay attention to the under‑privileged periphery: there is only a periphery, where the centre functions merely as an image of an absent and unreachable ideal, one whose only function is to influence what happens locally. This is because power operates in endlessly mobile and fluid networks, where individual localities are constantly reinventing their relationship with one another, not as regions of a hierarchical system that makes sense from the top down. The local both operates and receives these flows of power. In sum, then, Foucault sees political analysis that concentrates on the issue of legitimacy imagined by Hobbes as the Leviathan as overlooking the more compelling and pragmatic issue of the techniques of the operation of dominance within which we live. Sovereignty is a seductive issue, a "trap" (Foucault, 2003, p. 34). Each side of the social struggle has used sovereignty for its own purposes, ignoring the new modality of power that has risen alongside sovereignty, producing its own prolix discourses, not of the legitimacy of sovereign right, but of the standards of normalising truth. This new style of power that Foucault calls "disciplinary power" (p. 36) is "absolutely incompatible" (p. 35) with sovereignty. Yet, it is between these two styles of power that since the nineteenth century, modern political life has unfolded [p. 124] in a tortuous negotiation between overt and tactical discourses of right and hall‑concealed but insistent routines of discipline. The two cannot be reduced to one another and are radically disjunctive but they "necessarily go together" (p. 37). The saturation of the social body by petty relations of domination reveals a political organisation whose tendency is not towards the clarification and refinement of right, but towards an endless struggle. This struggle, Foucault argues, lies behind the structures of law. Law, he says, was "not born of nature‑ but but of real battles, victories, massacres and conquests" (p. 50). These wars are not abstract or hypothetical. They can be precisely identified. He writes, Law is not pacification, for beneath the law, war continues to rage in all the mechanisms of power, even in the most regular. War is the motor behind institutions and order. In the smallest of its cogs, peace is waging a secret war... we have to interpret the war that is going on beneath peace; peace itself is a coded war. We are therefore at war with one another; a battlefront runs through the whole of society, continuously and permanently, and it Is this battlefront that puts us all on one side or the other. There is no such thing as a neutral subject. We are all inevitably someone's adversary. (Foucault, pp. 50‑1) This perpetual struggle, which will be decided not by an adjudication of right, but by someone's victory and someone else's defeat, is immanent to all social relations. The discourse of sovereignty, which has done so much to distract us from this unfolding struggle, is merely a tactic in this battle, producing seductive and mystifying discourses of law and right. Beneath the condescension of universalising right, struggle goes on without let‑up, the real struggle, the social war, the persistence of a war, explained away or supposedly overcome by right. Foucault's own writing then sees itself as both commemorating and activating an alternative concealed tradition of historico‑political writing, the first legitimate one, he claims, since medieval times (Foucault, 2003, p. 52). This legitimacy derives from the discourse's awareness that it is itself taking sides and is a weapon in a struggle. The discourse of sovereignty denies its implication in, even subordination to, this struggle, setting up the chimera of legitimacy as worse than a ruse. The discourse of struggle has its own logic of right, but not of a universal transcendental right, or particular and partisan rights, once owned, then lost, now to be recovered. This discourse is unashamedly "perpectival" (p. 52). [p. 125] When it gives a complete account of the social struggle, arguing its own truth, presenting its own map of others' positions and motives, it does so tendentiously, using the truth as a weapon in its own campaigns, resisting the claim to universal, eternal and impersonal truthfulness. Truth as a tactic, then, not as an identity. The "pacified universality" (p. 53) of juridico‑political discourse ascendant since Ancient Greece is challenged, under threat. This discourse does not descend from the abstract and totalising domain of the super‑human metaphysical. It rises from the below of society (p. 54), from the chaos, confusion and dim perceptions that are all available within the bitter and desperate grounds of the struggle itself. The partisanship is on the ground of the fight. It is deflected into dim disproportions, refracted by particular angularities. It is in and of the struggle, it is the struggle itself. It is praised and activated by Foucault, even in its dark and poisonous hatred, and in its cruel and desperate luxury, he half‑identifies his own hard discourse with it. We see here the cool historian‑jurist‑‑philosopher revealing what lies behind his own tropes of violence and war, of deployments, tactics, of occupation and regimen. The sound of politics may seem to be vociferous debate, but that is merely misheard gunfire. It is that double sound with which Foucault wants to compare his own writing. This writing of history as struggle must remain bitter. It cannot be allowed to make sense. The risk of dialectical thinking as an alternative model of social struggle is that it ends by subordinating itself to a logic of order, resolution and identification, the redemption of the cruelty of struggle in the piety of sensible progress (Foucault, 2003, p

**Reducing debate to nothing more than rational discource destroys any communicative meaning**

**Li 5** – Teaches in the English Department at the University of Toronto (Viktor, “The Neo-primitivist Turn”)[rkezios]

Though aided by the life-world’s intuitively known and unquestioned background convictions, communicative participants nonetheless still have to work to achieve mutual understanding or agreement when they are faced with an action situation or interpretive problem that emerges in the everyday world. They can reach agreement only through a conscious yes or no position they take on three differentiated ‘validity claims’ that are raised respectively in the objective, social and subjective domains of their world: the claims are to truth, rightness or justice and expressive truthfulness or sincerity.19 Up to this point, the life-world has been described as a stabilizing and conservative factor in the process of reaching understanding. Habermas in fact sees the life-world as ‘the conservative counterweight to the risk of disagreement that arises with every actual process of reaching understanding; for communicative actors can achieve an understanding only by way of taking yes/no positions on criticizable validity claims’.20 However, as Habermas points out, italicizing his statement for emphasis, ‘The relation between these weights changes with the decentration of worldviews’.21 The decentration of worldviews becomes possible through the growing reflexivity achieved in ontogenetic learning processes that act as pacemakers for the socio-cultural development of modernity. Thus as we become more and more reflexively modern, our worldview also becomes increasingly decentred. Correspondingly, the more our worldview is decentred, the harder it is to achieve consensual understanding since we can no longer rely on a pre-interpreted, critique-proof life-world, but have to turn instead to rational procedures for reaching understanding. Habermas characterizes this transition as ‘the rationalization of the life-world’ and sees it as a switch from ‘normatively ascribed agreement’ to ‘communicatively achieved understanding’.22 The rationalization of the life-world thus appears to follow a developmental trajectory much like that of the socio-cultural evolution from pre-modern mythic to modern decentred worldviews. Habermas puts it this way: ‘A directional dynamics is built into the communicatively structured life-world in the form of the polarity between a state of pre-established pre-understanding and a consensus to be achieved: in the course of time, the reproductive achievements switch from one pole to the other’.23 This ‘directional dynamics’ as shown in the rationalization of the life-world resembles the larger scale rationalization of society which Habermas, following thinkers like Durkheim and Weber, describes as the transition from primitive tribal groups with their pre-reflective, ‘collectively shared, homogeneous life-world’ to the reflexive, differentiated, and communicatively achieved life-world of modern politics.24 Recognizing the similarity between pre-modern societies and the life-world in its original, concrete, pre-rationalized state, Habermas writes: ‘The life-world concept of society finds its strongest empirical footing in archaic societies […] [which in their ideal state are] almost homogeneous, and nearly ultrastable’.25 Just as the ‘nearly ultrastable’, normative authority of the sacred and the mythic in pre-modern societies is ‘linguistified’, that is, dissolved by reflexive communicative action oriented to understanding, so too the rationalization of the life-world involves a process in which the pre-established agreements and prelinguistically guaranteed norms of the everyday concrete life-world are opened up to reflexive forms of discourse or argumentation with their yes/no stance on validity claims raised in the course of communicative interactions. ‘By the rationalization of the life-world’, Seyla Benhabib notes, ‘is meant nothing other than the increase in argumentative practices within the everyday world’.26 Modern societies thus undergo a process of rationalization that Habermas also calls ‘the linguistification of the sacred’. The modern rationalized life-world is no longer beholden to the authority of the sacred, but depends solely on rationally motivated forms of understanding that lead to a consensus based on the authority of the better argument.27 In the idealized or fully rationalized life-world, we have a ‘constant revision of fluidized traditions, i.e. traditions which have become reflexive; […] a state in which legitimate orders depend on discursive procedures for positing and justifying norms’.28 It should be noted, however, that the critical reflexivity, the constant sceptical revision of all pre-established traditions and norms we find in the rationalization process lands the life-world in an aporetic situation. On the one hand, the life-world is the ever- present, intuitively understood background within which all communicative action and forms of understanding occur; it also provides a store of pre-interpreted knowledge which enables cultural understanding, forms group solidarity and shapes the competences of socialized individuals.29 On the other hand, the life-world’s rationalization gains it the critical reflexivity and autonomy that threaten to devalue, if not destroy, the very context in which it stands and the resources on which it draws. To his credit, Habermas recognizes this problem, though, as we shall see, his attempts at resolving it result in what Stephen Crook has described as an example of his ‘having the honesty to make his own problem worse’.30 The rationalization of the life-world thus involves a rather destructive hermeneutics of suspicion that calls into question customary forms of life. As Habermas puts it: ‘[T]he transition to argumentation has something unnatural about it: it marks a break with the ingenuous straightforwardness with which people have raised the claims to validity on whose intersubjective recognition the communicative practice of everyday life depends. This unnaturalness is like an echo of the developmental catastrophe that historically once devalued the world of traditions and thereby provoked efforts to rebuild it at a higher level’.31 Words like ‘unnatural’ and ‘catastrophe’ attest to the radical change visited on all past claims and traditions by modern rationalization processes. J. M. Bernstein argues that the distrust shown to all conventions established by tradition should cause alarm since it appears to suggest that ‘up to the moment of modernity the forms of recognition that traditional practices permitted were illusory through and through’.32 Such a sweeping skepticism is, however, central to Habermas’s view of rationalization as the progress towards a postconventional modernity: ‘No normative validity claim raised in the life-world is immune to challenge; everything counts as a hypothesis until it has regained its validity through the authority of good reasons’.33 Loss and Compensation If nothing in the life-world is immune to challenge and everything in it counts as a hypothesis, and if the life-world’s background knowledge ‘is submitted to an ongoing test across its entire breadth’,34 then a difficult question arises for Habermas: can the life-world still be an inescapable horizon or context of understanding and the source of cultural knowledge and normative values, if, at the same time, it is constantly challenged or tested across its entire breadth? Even though Habermas might respond that the life-world’s rationalization through moral argumentation (or discourse ethics) can be seen as a correction and transcendence of its conventional limits, doesn’t the unmerciful gaze of rationalization threaten, at least in theory, to dissolve the very ground of the life-world from which the corrective gaze emanates? And wouldn’t such a rational dissolution of ‘normatively ascribed agreement’ for a risk-laden, counter- factual ‘communicatively achieved understanding’ place us ‘within the impossible space of an unlivable scepticism and undischargeable rationalism’?35 In her perceptive study of Habermas’s work, Maeve Cooke worries, for example, that the life-world’s ‘fabric could be worn away through constant critical examination and rejection of its traditions, practices, and fixed patterns of personality development’.36

Embracing the totality of existence releases us from the hold of rationality and action

Bataille 45 (Georges, “On Nietzsche”, pg. xxvi-xxvii)[rkezios]

If I want to realize totality in my consciousness, I have to relate myself to an immense, ludicrous, and painful convulsion of all of humanity. This impulse moves toward all meanings. It's true: sensible action (action proceeding toward some single meaning) goes beyond such incoherence, but that is exactly what gives humanity in my time (as well as in the past) its fragmentary aspect. If for a single moment I forget that meaning. will I see Shakespeare's tragical/ridiculous sum total of eccentricities, his lies, pain, and laughter; the awareness of an immanent totality becomes clear to me-but as laceration. Existence as entirety remains beyond any one meaning-and it is the conscious presence of humanness in the world inasmuch as this is nonmeaning, having nothing to do other than be what it is, no longer able to go beyond itself or give itself some kind of meaning through action. This consciousness of totality relates to two opposed ways of using that expression. Nonmeaning normally is a simple negation and is said of an object to be canceled. An intention that rejects what has no meaning in fact is a rejection of the entirety of being-and it's by reason of this rejection that we're conscious of the totality of being within us. But if I say nonmeaning with the opposite intention, in the sense of nonsense, with the intention of searching for an object free of meaning. I don't deny anything. But I make an affirmation in which all life is clarified in consciousness. Whatever moves toward this consciousness of totality, toward this total friendship of humanness and humanity for itself, is quite correctly held to be lacking a basic seriousness. Following this path I become ridiculous. I acquire the inconsistency of all humans (humanness taken as a whole. and overlooking whatever leads to important changes). I'm not suggesting that I'm accounting for Nietzsche's illness this way (from what we know, it had some somatic basis), though it must be said, all the same, that the main impulse that leads to human entirety is tantamount to madness. I let go of good. I let go of reason (meaning). And under my feet, I open an abyss which my activity and my binding judgments once kept from me. At least the awareness of totality is first of all within me as a despair and a crisis. If I give up the viewpoint of action, my perfect nakedness is revealed to me. I have no recourse in the world there's nothing to help me-and I collapse. No other outcome is possible, except endless incoherence, in which only chance is my guide.

### AT: Perm

**Trying to perm the K only links to the taboo of sacrifice – only through the repulsion of sacrifice, the forced break in taboo, can we ever achieve solvency. The permutation only serves to bring discontinuity back to continuity, thus destroying any chance of alt solvency.**

**Igrek 4** (Apple, Vanderbilt University, “Violence and Heterogeneity: A Response to Habermas’ “Between Eroticism and General Economics: Georges Bataille””)[rkezios]

Discontinuity is Bataille’s term for a self-enclosed, self-protecting individual. It is a vital concept because if there were no discontinuous beings, ardently attached to the perpetuation of their singular existence, neither would there be violence or transgression. In a sense, then, the aﬃrmation of a transgressive erotics, what Bataille also calls a return to continuity, is likewise an aﬃrmation of the discontinuity without which eroticism and communication are unimaginable. To cast some light on these strange remarks it is paramount to ﬁrst explain what is meant here by discontinuity. One way of ascertaining its meaning for Bataille is by looking at the interiority of individual existence, in particular the existence of a being who is aware of that existence objectively. 27 First, it can be said that the creation and conservation of interiority is inseparable from the movement of repulsion that was discussed in the previous section. Taboos are the socializing articulations of passionate loathing which cannot be disjoined from the individual’s attempt to ward oﬀ danger, violence, or anything reminiscent of life out of control. Taboos therefore reinforce a sense of interiority on the part of the subject who removes herself, as best as she can, from the scene of violence. What is meant by this interiority is the subject’s perception that intimate life has been excluded from the movements and operations of a life subordinated to the authority of prohibition. 28 In other words, the discontinuous being who lives in accordance with social regulation as determined by the banishment of violence no longer sees itself as participating in the excess of life destroying itself in dazzling, tumultuous upheavals. Banishment is unevenly realized, and the fact of the matter is that life is never totally forgotten even by those who live according to the strictest rules. The crucial point here, however, is that discontinuity, translated as interiority in the realm of things, takes on the meaning of disguising its innermost truth qua violence. Let’s take a look at how Bataille himself illustrates discontinuity: “Each being is distinct from all others . . . . Between one being and another, there is a gulf, a discontinuity. This gulf exists, for instance, between you, listening to me, and me, speaking to you. We are attempting to communicate, but no communication between us can abolish our fundamental diﬀerence. If you die, it is not my death. You and I are discontinuous beings.” 29 What is the importance of gesturing toward an inﬁnite gulf separating all individual beings? What does this fundamental diﬀerence tell us about selfprotecting, self-interested creatures? It seems to me that the inﬁnite abyss, when taken seriously, reminds us that individuated existence is absolutely incomprehensible, unsynthesizable. I say this because if it weren’t true then the discontinuous being could be subsumed by a system of thought which connected this being, in a manner beﬁtting a logical organization of social reality, to all those other beings ostensibly divided by an inﬁnite gulf But in that case the gulf would be measurable and distinct beings would lose their absolute particularity to a system of thought which beholds in particularity the birth of sameness. Insofar as a particular subject can be assimilated to an all-encompassing logic of reality, it follows that the individual is selfidentical, unchanging, and wholly complete. 30 An unsynthesizable being can therefore be understood as devoted to its ﬁnite, particular ends only on the condition that its self-preservation is seen as a genuine eﬀort. Such an eﬀort assumes that the discontinuous self is vulnerable to all sorts of accidents, diseases, insecurities, predators, injuries, reprisals and the very loss of self which is so urgently defended. If the closure of discontinuity weren’t vulnerable to the dangers of the outside, as well as the inside, no eﬀort would be required to secure its borders.

**The permutation seeks to place the tools of the sacrifice in control of the sovereign – this dooms permutation solvency and only serves to reentrench fascism**

**Goldhammer 5** - Ph.D. in political science from the University of California, Berkeley (Jesse, “The Headless Republic”, pg 168-174)[rkezios]

Bataille’s essay “The Psychological Structure of Fascism” both expands upon and departs from his earlier development of unproductive expenditure. Unproductive expenditure appeals to Bataille because its rupture of exchange – economic, contractual, spiritual, and sacrificial – generates an ontologically fragmenting affectivity. Although it has been conceptualized in different ways, sacrificial affectivity has been the hallmark of the French discourse on sacrificial violence. One of Bataille’s unique contributions to the discourse is to characterize the affective power of sacrifice in ontological as opposed to moral terms. In his essay on fascism, Bataille develops a terminology that explains the ontology of sacrifice as well as its political importance. Like his predecessors, Bataille recognizes that political power is not purely rational construction. This insight informs his desire to elucidate the attraction of fascism by revealing the complexity of the sacred concepts from which fascist power is constructed. Bataille’s analysis of fascism’s sacred power also contributes to his discussion of unproductive expenditure, which itself entails only a narrow view of the role of sacred in political life. Most important, Bataille's fascism essay reveals that his sacrificial view of proletarian revolution is in tension with his critical understanding of fascist power. Seeking to prevent the proletarian revolution from taking a fascist turn, Bataille argues that any attempt to use sacrifice for the sake of political foundation risks fascism, the logical culmination of sacrificial founding violence used to constitute authority. By claiming that unproductive sacrificial loss ruptures political authority, Bataille's discussion of fascism begins his repudiation of the French discourse on sacrificial violence. In his essay on unproductive expenditure, Bataille offers no vocabulary for the internal dynamics of transformative sacrificial processes. How does the unrecoverable sacrifice of a person or thing affect the participants? What role does such sacrifice play in the realm of politics? Seeking to answer these questions in his essay, on fascism, Bataille significantly broadens his analysis of sacrifice from a study of the act itself to an inquiry into the sacred concepts upon which it depends. He introduces the concepts of homogeneity and heterogeneity in order to describe two opposing modes of existence, each of which highlights different roles of the sacred in modern life. Homogeneity, which is similar to the profane, describes societies structured by production, rationality, specialization, organization, conservation, predictability, and preservation. For Bataille, these terms characterize modern Western bourgeois society, which excludes anything that does not conform to its homogeneous structure. "Above all:' writes Michèle Richman, "homogeneity is identified as comtnensurabiity among elements and a consciousness of the process whereby 'human relations can be maintained by a reduction to fixed rules based on the identity of person and well defined situations; in principle, violence is excluded from the course of an existence so defined! '129 The hallmark of the homogeneous society is the contract, which forms the basis of all social bonds because, as jean Michel Heimonet observes, "the contract establishes a general equivalence among men, things, and men and things."" Heterogeneity; which is more closely associated with sacredness, is a bipolar category that encompasses everything that is unproductive, irrational, incommensurable, unstructured, unpredictable, and wasteful.While homogeneity excludes violence, heterogeneity is the chief domain of violence. Bataille offers five descriptions of heterogeneous elements: (i) taboo and mana; (2) everything resulting from unproductive expenditure, including excrement, eroticism, and violence; (3) ambiguous phenomena that are simultaneously attractive and repulsive; (4) excess, delirium, and madness; and () any reality that is affectively forceful or shocking.3t The bipolarity of heterogeneity captures two related but opposing, shifting, and unstable characteristics of sacred things; purity and impurity." Pure sacred and impure sacred, which Bataille labels "right" and "left" respectively, challenge Mauss's and Durkheim's rigid theoretical views on sacred objects, which they consider (negatively) as the source of all prohibitions.33 Mauss and Durkheim qualir the sacred as dangerous and repulsive. In contrast, building upon Maistre's observation that the pure authority of the king requires the impure violence of the executioner, Bataille captures the ambiguity of the sacred by qualifying it as a form of energy that fluctuates between two oppositely charged poles.34 Bataille also counrerintuitively describes both heterogeneous sacred polarities as sovereign in an effort to convey the double significance of the sacred.When qualified with the word "imperative," the term "sovereign" describes sacred things, such as kings, who are noble, pure, elevated, and singular.35 In contrast, Bataille uses words like "base:' "abject:' and "accursed" to characterize subversive sovereignty, sacred power that is ignoble, impure, mired, or chthonian. The executioner, who also participates in the formation of monarchical power (imperative sovereignty), exhibits subversive heterogeneity that is radically impure, and as a result is placed completely outside the social hierarchy defined by the king. Thus, Bataille's theoretical elaboration on Maistre's original distinction reveals that both the king and his executioner are sovereign, but in consequence of opposite sacred qualities and with different ontological effects. Bataille's dualistic concept of heterogeneity serves as the basis for his novel understanding of sovereignty. Because heterogeneity is its primary animating force, sovereignty has two forms, the imperative and the subversive. Imperative sovereignty describes ruling power whose legitimacy is constructed on a hierarchical, elevated, and amplified basis. In his postwar writings on sovereignty, Bataille describes its imperative form as belonging to kings, priests, chieftains, and "all men who possess and have never entirely lost the value that is attributed to gods and 'dignitaries."36 Although imperative sovereignty is the preeminent source of state power and is typically associated with mastery and supremacy, Bataille argues that it,is actually servile because it is useful. In contrast, subversive or revolutionary sovereignty derives its power from the abject and useless. Bataille writes: "Life beyond utility is the domain of sovereign ty:'37 Subversive sovereignty is experienced as unproductive loss and dissolution; instead of authoritatively establishing limits (laws), this revolutionary form of power comesinto being when limits are transgressed. For this reason, sacrifice plays an essential role in the invocation of an impure heterogeneous sovereignty. When useless, sacrifice also gives rise to an acephalic community, which has no trace of, imperative sovereignty and, therefore, no leader or authority. No headless community can form, however, if its members seek to conserve some aspect of the sacrifice. Bataille rejects sovereignty that relies upon purity and hierarchy in order to establish dominion. Bataille uses the concepts of homogeneity and heterogeneity to describe the affective qualities of politicalpower embodied by leaders, institutions, symbols, and the like. All traditional forms of political power combine homogeneous and heterogeneous elements, albeit in different ways. Consider three extremes: liberalism, monarchism, and fascism. The liberal state is the most homogeneous. As Stoeki interprets Bataille's fascism essay, however, homogeneous forces never completely exclude heterogeneous ones, even in liberal states: "The imperative, or sovereign, form of heterogeneity goes to aid the homogeneous forces: it guarantees the stability of a society which can give itself meaning only through the sadistic exclusion of impure heterogeneity."" Stoeki's reading of Bataille suggests a quasi Weberian interpretation of liberal states: parliamentary regimes remain stable thanks to legal rational authority, which they achieve, in part, through the force of the law, namely violence. The homogeneous state maintains, through the army and police, a store of imperative heterogeneity, which guards the boundaries of the state's homogeneous authority through violent exclusion. Monarchies and fascist regimes operate differently. As Stoeki points out, "The king or the fascist leader (as imperative heterogeneity) is in a way excluded from the homogeneous activities of society, but he dominates that society and embodies it."" In the case of the king, the imperative sovereignty of the monarchy, which itself relies on the equally imperative heterogeneity of Christianity, cooperates with and coopts the subversive (impure) heterogeneity of the executioner in order to police the boundaries of the royal body. For the fascist leader, as Bataille's essay reveals, the mixture of homogeneity and heterogeneity becomes increasingly potent and complex. His analysis, which focuses particularly on fascism's appropriation of religion and the military, reveals a fascination with the important role of imperative heterogeneity in the fascist movement. Although Bataille recognizes, even admires, the revolutionary potential of this mixture of pure and impure sacred fascist power, he remains convinced that only communities organized on the basis of subversive heterogeneity can be truly liberating. The fluidity of the categories used by Bataille to describe the psychological structure of fascism demonstrates the importance of the sacrificial mechanism, which inserts an element of agency into what otherwise appears as an unchangeable world of sacred polarities. The crucifixion of Christ clearly demonstrates this mechanism when it transforms the impure, bleeding, and agonized body of Christ into the pure, transcendental figure of the corpus nsysticurn. Bataille, like his predecessors in the discourse, recognizes that sacrificial violence makes things sacred. Unlike them, however, Bataille also realizes the theoretical importance of the capacity of sacrifice to negotiate between different forms of the sacred. For Bataille, the imperative heterogeneity of the army is not the same kind of sacred power as the subversive heterogeneity of the proletariat. Indeed, in his discussion of the army Bataille characterizes it as imperatively heteroge neous: hierarchy and discipline in the service of death. Because the army amalgamates purity and violence, it possesses an ambiguous attractive power, which Bataille describes in the following way: "This process is the intermediary through which disgusting slaughter is radically transformed into its opposite, glory namely, into a pure and intense attraction. "40 Although armies are not engaged in sacrificial acts per .se, the military demonstrates that violence can be transformed into a positive, glorious accessory of political power. Similarly, religion has a dual characterization that contributes to its own form of attraction. Bataille writes: "The supreme being of theologians and philosophers represents the most profound introjection of the structure characteristic of hooaigeueity into heterogeneous existence: in his theological aspect, God preeminently fulfills the sovereign form?'41 Religion is attractive because it elevates the abject through sacrificial symbolism, such as Christ's sacrifice. Religion confers order, status, and purity on death, which is originally and profoundly impure. In describing the affective power of fascism, Bataille focuses on the army and religion because of their long, combined historical complicity in the foundation and exercise of political power. Bataille perceives both institutions as possessing violent and/or sacrificial mechanisms that provide for the purification of impure heterogeneity. In their ability to convert subversive heterogeneity into pure or imperative heterogeneity to transform abject sacred into pure sacredthe army and the church support the augmentation and stabilization of authoritarian political power. Like the French revolutionaries, Maistre, and Sorel, Bataille appreciates that the effectiveness of political power its authority is intimately linked to the afectivity of violence. Bataille's analysis of the emergence of fascism also suggests that he is particularly attuned to the affective impact of fascism's use of both martial and religious violence. "Fascist power;' Bataille writes, "is characterized by a foundation that is both religious and military, in which these two habitually distinct elements cannot be separated."" Bataille discovers that fascism taps into the same sacred well of affectivity as other regimes, but in ways that vastly increase mass enthusiasm. Although Bataille admires fascism's ability to convert impure heterogeneity into a pure sweetener of its authority, he rejects the desirability of a revolution based on imperative heterogeneity. Like other forms of Western politics, fascism is politically unfeasible without imperative heterogeneity, the pure sacred product of armies or churches. Sword and scepter participate in the establishment of authority by conferring legitimacy upon the exercise of power, which is elevated and concentrated in the leader or Führer. With or without these institu-tional props, Western forms of authority, be they traditional, legal rational, or charismatic, rely on the pure sacred qualities of imperative heterogeneity. Furthermore, in the Western political tradition, this uplifting of power to the status of right always occurs at the expense or with the complicity of subversive (impure) heterogeneity What makes fascism unique, according to Bataille, is that it is the most authoritative of all political regimes. Bataille compares the "total power" of the fascist chief with that of a king, who "manifests ... the fundamental tendency and principle of all authority: the reduction to a personal entity, the individualization of power."43 Fascism requires supreme authority, which is concentrated like royal power in its chief. It is this kind of authority that Bataille hopes to destroy by marshaling the impure heterogeneity of unproductive sacrificial violence.

**The alt is mutually exclusive – using the forces of sacrifice to serve the goals of the sovereign only re-entrench fascism**

**Goldhammer 5** - Ph.D. in political science from the University of California, Berkeley (Jesse, “The Headless Republic”, pg 189-191)[rkezios]

It is true that The Accursed Share revisits eroticism and sovereignty, topics that led Bataille away from politics in the 193os. After the war, however, Bataille treated these concepts politically. For instance, in the epilogue of The History of Eroticism, Bataille speculates that human beings will be driven to a "catastrophic war" unless they find outlets, such as eroticism, for their excess energy. Similarly, in "Sovereignty" Bataille argues that "sovereignty is no longer alive except in the perspectives of communism."" In the case of both eroticism and sovereignty Bataille is expressly looking for instances of unproductive expenditure or sacrifice, which may save human beings from their dangerously compulsive, modern need to engage in economic accumulation without loss. 'What sets The Accursed Share apart from Bataille's prewar work is also what implicates Bataille in his own critique of the French discourse on sacrificial violence. Like his predecessors, Bataille ultimately puts sacrifice to work, a theoretically problematic endeavor that finds its strangest outlet in his consideration of the Marshall Plan. At the conclusion of World War II, Bataille was fearful that competition and excessive economic production in the United States and the Soviet Union would precipitate a devastating third world war. This Cold War pessimism was alleviated only by the appearance of the Marshall Plan, which Bataille interpreted as a form of unproductive expenditure. Here he de . scribes the Marshall Plan in terms of the general economy: "Mankind will move peacefully toward a general resolution of its problems only ([this threat causes the U.S. to assign a large share of the excess deliberately and without return to raising the global standard of living, economic activity thus giving the surplus energy produced an outle,t other than war." 94 By associating the Marshall Plan with unproductive expenditure, Bataille falls into the same theoretical trap as Sorel, Maistre, and the French revolutionaries. Bataille's argument for economic sacrifice may be less pernicious than the French revolutionaries' conviction that human sacrifice would help them to found a republic, but they nonetheless share an expectation that sacrifice will produce specific, ideal, and peaceful political outcomes. The belief that sacrifice will generate an ideal politics of any sort directly contradicts Bataille's fascism essay, where he argues that any attempt to use sacrifice for the sake of traditional (elevated) sovereignty risks a violent, authoritarian politics. That essay illustrates, above all, that one cannot use fascist techniques to achieve antifascist ends without complicity in fascism's imperiousness. Similarly, the Marshall Plan may have provided humanity with an outlet for surplus energy, but it also "wasted" wealth productively, served utilitarian minded liberals, and elevated American international interests, none of which was even remotely akin to the apolitical intentional communities originally desired by Bataille. His postwar work notwithstanding, Bataille fundamentally rejects the basic premise of the discourse on sacrificial violence that sacrifice founds new political regimes. By the end of the 1930s, Bataille declares politics an impossible task, rendering irrelevant the issue of foundation. If a wholly unproductive sacrifice were to create anything, it would be metapolitical communities without conventional notions of authority and identity. As Bataille pushes the concept of sacrifice to its limit, shifting its locus from the street to the bedroom and text, he reveals the difficulty experienced by Maistre, Sorel, and the French revolutionaries in assigning a political role to sacrifice. They put sacrificial violence to work in the establishment of politically significant fictions such as citizenship, authority, morality, and representation. In each case, there was an expectation that the sacrificial crime would lay the groundwork for a new era ofjustice. Following the Marquis de Sade, Bataille comes to appreciate the political absurdity of founding sacrifice: "An already old and corrupt nation, courageously shaking off the yoke of its monarchical government in order to adopt a republican one, can only maintain itse4'thongh many crimes, for it is already a crime, and f it wants to move from crime to virtue, in other words from a violent state to a peaceful one, it would fall into an inertia, of which its certain ruin would soon be the result, "95 Sade observes that the regicidal crime, which inaugurated the French Republic as well as the French discourse on sacrificial violence, is a sacrifice destined to repeat itself because it strips away the possibility of distinguishing right from wrong. In other words, violent political foundation undermines its own possibility. Sade's admonishment applies to the Terror, when the French revolutionaries tragically repeated the regicide thousands of times. It anticipates Maistre, who imagines a world in which the unending sacrifice of the innocent redeems the sins of the guilty. It foresees the work of Sorel, whose myth of the general strike depends upon the working class's martyred repetition of Jesus' crucifixion. And, finally, it highlights the absurdity of Bataille's postwar search for unproductive expenditure in quotidian politics. In each of these cases, sacrifice works to produce virtue and redemption. Sade's argument is straightforward: violent sacrifice never founds politics without also giving rise to an endless repetition of the original crime. Bataille ultimately develops this insight into a• notion of violent waste, which he hopes will demolish the modern fictions that leave human beings powerless and servile. Bataille's sacrificial community does not repair, restore, or regenerate. It is incapable of establishing, founding, and inaugurating. It "begins" with the violation of the limits that make politics possible, and, tragically, it must exist in a permanent state of violation.

ALSO

**Perm fails- it’s impossible to combine your action with our representations**

**Stoekl 7** professor of French and comparative literature at Penn State University (Allan, 8 October 2007, “Bataille's Peak : Energy, Religion, and Postsustainability,” ­­­56-58, Ebrary) //KP

Just as there are two energetic sources of economic value, then— muscle power and inanimate fuel power— so too **there are two kinds of expenditure. The stored and available energy derived from fossil or inanimate fuel expenditure, for production or destruction, is different in quality, not merely in quantity, from muscular energy.** The latter is profoundly more and other than the mere “power to do work.” **No intimacy** (in the Bataillean sense) **can be envisaged through the mechanized expenditure of fossil fuels. The very use of fossil and nonorganic fuels**— coal, oil, nuclear— **implies the effort to maximize production through quantification**, the augmentation of the sheer quantity of things. **Raw material becomes,** as Heidegger put it, **a standing reserve, a measurable mass whose sole function is to be processed, used, and ultimately discarded.** 28 **It is useful**, nothing more (or less), at least for the moment **before it is discarded; it is related to the self only as a way of aggrandizing the latter’s stability and position. There is no internal limit**, no angoisse or pain before which we shudder**; we deplete the earth’s energy reserves as blandly and indifferently as the French revolutionaries** (according to Hegel) **chopped off heads**: as if one were cutting off a head of cabbage. “**Good” duality has completely given way to “bad.” As energy sources become more efficiently usable**— oil produces a lot more energy than does coal, in relation to the amount of energy needed to extract it, transport it, and dispose of waste (ash and slag)—**more material can be treated, more people and things produced, handled, and dumped**. Consequently **more food can be produced, more humans will be born to eat it,** and so on (**the carrying capacity of the earth temporarily rises**). And yet, **under this inanimate fuels regime, the very nature of production and above all destruction changes**. Even **when things today are expended, they are wasted under the sign of efficiency, utility. This very abstract quantification is inseparable from the demand of an efficiency that bolsters the position of a closed and demanding subjectivity.** We “need” cars and SUVs, we “need” to use up gas, waste landscapes, forests, and so on: **it is all done in the name of the personal lifestyle we cannot live without**, which is clearly the best ever developed in human history, the one everyone necessarily wants, the one we will fight for and use our products (weapons) to protect. **We no longer destroy objects, render them intimate, in a very personal, confrontational potlatch; we simply leave items out for the trash haulers to pick up or have them hauled to the junkyard. Consumption** (la consommation) **in the era of the standing reserve**, the framework (Ge-Stell), entails, in and through the stockpiling of energy, the stockpiling of the human: **the self itself becomes an element of the standing reserve,** a thing among other things. **There can hardly be any intimacy in the contemporary cycle of production-consumption-destruction, the modern and degraded version of expenditure.** As Bataille put it, concerning intimacy: I**ntimacy is expressed only under one condition by the thing [la chose]: that this thing fundamentally be the opposite of a thing, the opposite of a product, of merchandise: a burn-off** [consumation] **and a sacrifice.** Since intimate feeling is a burn-off, it is burning-off that expresses it, not the thing, which is its negation. (OC, 7: 126; AS 132: italics Bataille’s) War, too, reflects this nonintimacy of the thing: **fossil fuel and nuclearpowered explosives and delivery systems make possible the impersonal destruction of lives in great numbers and at a great distance. Human beings are now simply quantities of material to be processed and destroyed in wars** (whose purpose is to assure the continued availability of fossil fuel resources). Killing in modern warfare is different in kind from that carried out by the Aztecs. All the sacrificial elements, the elements by which the person has been transformed in and through death, have disappeared. Bataille, then, should have distinguished more clearly between intimate and impersonal varieties of useless squandries when it came to his discussion of the Marshall Plan. 29 (In the same way, he should have distinguished between energy that is stockpiled and put to use and energy that is fundamentally “cursed” not only in and through bodily excess but in its ability to do “work.”) 30 **It is not merely a question of our attitude toward expenditure,** our “self-consciousness”: **also fundamental is how it is carried out.** **Waste based on the consumption of fossil or inanimate** (nuclear) **fuels cannot entail intimacy because it is dependent on the thing as thing, it is dependent on the energy reserve, on the stockpiled, planned, and protected self**: “[This is] what we know from the outside, which is given to us as physical reality (at the limit of the commodity, available without reserve). We cannot penetrate the thing and its only meaning is its material qualities, appropriated or not for some use [utilité], understood in the productive sense of the term. (OC, 7: 126; AS, 132; italics Bataille’s) **The origin of this destruction is therefore to be found in the maximizing of the efficiency of production; modern, industrialized waste is fundamentally only the most efficient way to eliminate what has been overproduced.** Hence the Marshall Plan, proposing a gift-giving on a vast, mechanized scale, is different in kind from, say, a Tlingit potlatch ceremony. “Growth” is the ever-increasing rhythm and quantity of the treatment of matter for some unknown and unknowable human purpose and that matter’s subsequent disposal/destruction. **One could never “self-consciously” reconnect with intimacy through the affirmation of some form of industrial production-destruction.** To see consumer culture as in some way the fulfillment of Bataille’s dream of a modern-day potlatch is for this reason a fundamental misreading of The Accursed Share. 31 **Bataille’s critique** is always an ethics; it enta**ils the affirmation of a “general economy” in which the particular claims of the closed subjectivity are left behind. The stockpiled self is countered,** in Bataille, **by the generous and death-bound movement of an Amélie, of a Sadean heroine whose sacrifice puts at risk not only an object, a commodity, but the stability of the “me.” To affirm a consumption that,** in spite of its seeming delirium of waste**, is simply a treatment of matter and wastage of fossil energy in immense quantities, lacking any sense of internal limits** (angoisse), **and always with a particular and efficacious end in view (“growth,” “comfort,” “personal satisfaction,” “consumer freedom”) is to misrepresent the main thrust of Bataille’s work. The point,** after all, **is to enable us to attain a greater “self-consciousness,” based on the ability to choose between modes of expenditure. Which entails the greatest intimacy? Certainly not nuclear devastation** (1949**) or the simple universal depletion of the earth’s resources and the wholesale destruction of ecosystems (today).**

### AT: Perm Sever Reps

This has empiracly failed – when one tries to separate the mathematical and rational nature from infrastructure it only rises in greater force, dulling the subversive nature of the alt

Lahiji 11 – PhD in Architecture theory from University of Pennsylvania (Nadir, “Architecture and Violence”, pg 201-202)[rkezios]

Is the critique of architecture in the philosophy of two influential twentieth-century thinkers, Georges Bataille and Michel Foucault, a critique of' the violence of architecture, whether in its modern origins as prison in a disciplinary society for Foucault, or as "society's authorized superego"for Bataille? Do both critiques merely address the metaphor o farchitecture in the discourse ofphilosophy?7 I-low do we cut through the metaphor of architecture to the political philosophy of violence? If in this philosophy we are, with Bataille, "against architecture," then the question to be asked is this: must architecture be defended? ln the two-page essay "Architecture," originally published in Documents in 1929, Bataille criticized the expansion of architecture and condemned the "hidden architectural skeleton" that he detected in classical painting. In his essay on informe, or formless, he interrogated architecture's function to provide a "formal coat, a mathematical frock coat" to "whatever exists." To say that this mathematical frock coat is omnipresent in whatever exists, is to claim that we are imprisoned in the suffocating grip of an architecture from which we cannot escape. In this view, architecture would be the arche of violence, the ground for all forms of violence. This simply renders architecture indefensible. Bataille argues that it is only in modern painting-namely, Manet's Olympia-that we see the beginning of the dissolution of this architectural skeleton. Despite the rhetoric of the informe in contemporary art, analyzed by Rosalind Krauss and Yve-Alain Bois, no amount of discussion of formlessness in contemporary architecture can do away with the skeleton and its "mathematical frock coat," which saw its "second death" only in modern painting in Manet.1Â° No matter how much the exponents of the discourse of informe hide behind sophisticated philosophies to shore up their theories and prescriptive practices, their so-called "other" geometry, in spite of themselves, is still ruled by a "mathematical frock coat." It is just a different kind of non-Euclidian mathematical "frock coat." Architecture is still the unspoken Commendatore, subtlety expressive of "society's superego." In this respect, the proponents of the discourse of informe not only lack a critical project, but worse, their discourse has blunted the sharp edges of Bataille's radical philosophy."

### AT: Bataille is a Fascist

**Bataille isn’t a fascist.**

**Falasca-Zamponi 06**. (Simonetta Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara. “A Left Sacred or a Sacred Left?, South Central Review.” Accessed:7/19/12. <http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/south_central_review/v023/23.1falasca-zamponi.html>)//CL

**The connection between politics and sacred did not escape** Georges **Bataille. He saw in fascism the fulfillment of the sacred's ability to** [End Page 43] **communify, and founded the Collège de sociologie as the intellectual site for exploring such a "burning" issue. We indeed owe to Bataille a first analysis of fascism,** well ahead of the Collège, that drew from French sociology, German phenomenology and psychoanalysis. In his 1933 essay "The Psychological Structure of Fascism," **Bataille formulated a theory of politics that was based**, Bataille argued, **on actual experiences, and that directly implicated the role of the sacred**. Bataille contended that **Marx had not made clear the impact of the base on the formation of "religious and political society**."13 More fundamentally, Bataille claimed, **the economic base could not explain the origins and development of a social phenomenon such as fascism**. In order **to understand the formation of religious and political societies**, Bataille continued, **it was necessary to lay out a general explanation of the social structure as a whole on the basis of concepts such as homogeneity, heterogeneity, affectivity and, more generally, here mentioned for the first time, a "sacred sociology."**14 **It was in the context of his consideration of social homogeneity and heterogeneity that Bataille situated the sacred. Bataille identified homogeneity with the rule of commensurability, where production and use dominate.** As **for heterogeneity, the non-assimilable, Bataille believed that it largely comprised the sacred world, "and that reactions analogous to those generated by sacred things are provoked by heterogeneous things that are not, strictly speaking, considered to be sacred**."15 Any object that produces affective reaction is heterogeneous, claimed Bataille, whether one deals with attraction or repulsion. **For, heterogeneous reality is not based on objects, but is force or shock and contains a fundamental dualism, such as we find in the sacred strictly speaking: pure and impure, imperative forces** (i.e. the leader) **and the lowest strata of society** (like the Untouchables in India). Following Mauss and Henri Hubert, Durkheim and Robert Hertz, who were themselves inspired by Robertson Smith's thesis on sacrifice, **Bataille built his own theory of the ambiguity of the notion of sacred. He emphasized the sacred's impure side and argued that the "institutional" sacred is not necessarily healthy to society**. As he tackled the realm of the sacred through his interest in the non-assimilable, **Bataille situated fascism within the higher forms of heterogeneity**. **Fascism, Bataille claimed, was fundamentally based on alterity and in many ways appeared to be above any consideration of utility, of usefulness**.16 **Did that make fascism good? Not so fast**, Bataille warned. "**Higher," that is superior, also meant domination and even oppression within Bataille's schema; it was not a positive quality. As an imperative royal form**, that is, **one that** historically **excluded the impoverished "filthy," fascism, according to Bataille, actually contributed** [End Page 44**] to the stabilization of homogeneous society, for the latter needed "free-floating imperative forces" to expel those incompatible elements that it found mostly unacceptable**. **Although, in principle, homogeneous society excluded "any" heterogeneous element, whether filthy or noble, homogeneous society had to resort to the "higher" forms of heterogeneity to thrive. Fascism represented such a case, making of it an accomplice of homogeneous society**.

**They are missing the boat – Bataille uses the structures of fascism to destroy it from within, to turn the tools of fascism upon itself**

**Stoekl 90** - Professor of French and comparative literature at Penn State University (Alan, “Truman's Apotheosis: Bataille, "Planisme," and Headlessness”)[rkezios]

Was Georges Bataille a fascist? This grossly simplistic question, amazingly enough, is still occasionally asked: most recently, one of Bataille's old editors, Boris Souvarine, stated quite baldly, in the introduction to the reedition of the Critique Sociale, that Bataille, in effect, was not only a fascist sympathizer, but a would-be collaborator as well. ' Clearly, in the simplest, biographical sense, it can be stated that Bataille was neither a fascist sympathizer nor a collaborator. Indeed some of his most important early pieces, such as "The Psycho- logical Structure of Fascism" (1933-which Souvarine himself first published) are among the very first writings by anyone to consider, from a neo-Marxist perspective, the impact and effectiveness of the fascist appeal in the light of recent psychological, anthropological, and sociological work (Freud, Durkheim, Mauss)-thereby providing a much richer analysis of fascism than that provided by a Marxist critique alone. The astuteness of such articles, in fact, at the time made them all the more effective as political critiques of fascism. It seems particularly perverse, then, to accuse Bataille of the very thing he was most effectively combating Political questions, however, are never so easily resolved, and quite often a person starts to take on the colors of his enemy in the very act of fighting him. Bataille leaves himself open to the charge of fascism because, to use an old cliche, he wants to "appropriate the weapons of his enemy"; specifically, he argues that much of the strength of the fascists comes from their use of devices that the left cannot afford to ignore-myth, the collective exaltation involved in public ceremonies, and so on. Certainly, in the French context in which Bataille was writing, and after Durkheim's celebration of the "fete," this valorization of public gathering and the emotion that follows from it was nothing new. But it is possible to argue that attempting to put what amounts to irrationalism in the service of a good cause only places one in the camp of his enemies. Certainly Bataille's use of "mythical figures" (such as the "acephale") that work to disrupt the fascist, fully "headed" mythical figures (such as that of the Fiihrer himself) can be seen to lead to an impasse: even though the Bataillean figure might very well be the totem of headlessness, dispersion, and expenditure, it nevertheless still represents those elements through a unitary, coherent image, around which a group, no matter how marginal, can concentrate. While we can see the new sacred figure's "acephality" as liberating, we can just as easily see its inevitable coherence as repressive.

### AT: Metaphors Bad

**We impact turn this – the alternative is key to creativity and reasonless [insert k goo]**

**[Insert author qual goo]**

**Not only are metaphors inevitable, but they are transgressions that only reinforce the alternative**

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I propose three interpretative hypotheses. First, in all metaphor one might consider not only the word alone or the name alone, whose meaning is displaced, but the pair of terms or relationships between which the transposition operates – from genus to species, from species to genus, from species to species, from the second to the fourth term (and vice versa) of a proportional relationship. This has far-reaching impli- cations. As the English-language authors put it, it always takes two ideas to make a metaphor. If metaphor always involves a kind of mistake, if it involves taking one thing for another by a sort of calculated error, then metaphor is essentially a discursive phenomenon. To affect just one word, the metaphor has to disturb a whole network by means of an aberrant attribution. At the same time, the idea of categorial transgres- sion allows us to fill out that of deviation, which seemed to be implied in the transposition process. ‘Deviation’ appeared to belong to a purely lexical order, but now it is linked to a kind of deviance that threatens classification itself. What remains to be puzzled out is the relationship between the two sides of the phenomenon, between logical deviation and the production of meaning that Aristotle calls epiphora. This prob- lem will be solved in a satisfactory manner only when the statement- character of metaphor is fully recognized. The name-related aspects of metaphor can then become fully attached to a discursive structure.31 As we shall see later, Aristotle himself invites us to take this path when, in the Rhetoric, he takes up the obviously discursive metaphor of comparison (eikôn), or simile.¶ A second line of reflection seems to be suggested by the idea of categorical transgression, understood as a deviation in relation to a pre- existing logical order, as a dis-ordering in a scheme of classification. This transgression is interesting only because it creates meaning; as it is put in the Rhetoric, metaphor ‘conveys learning and knowledge through the medium of the genus’ (1410 b 13). What is being suggested, then, is this: should we not say that metaphor destroys an order only to invent a new one; and that the category-mistake is nothing but the complement of a logic of discovery? Max Black’s integration of model and meta- phor,32 in other words of an epistemological concept and a poetic concept, allows us to exploit thoroughly this idea, which is completely opposed to any reduction of metaphor to a mere ‘ornament.’ Pushing this thought to the limit, one must say that metaphor bears information because it ‘redescribes’ reality. Thus, the category-mistake is the de-constructive intermediary phase between description and redescrip- tion. The seventh Study will be devoted to this heuristic function of metaphor. However, this cannot be brought to light without prior recognition not only of the statement-character of metaphor, but also of its place within the orders of discourse and of the work.¶ A third, more venturesome hypothesis arises on the fringe of the second. If metaphor belongs to an heuristic of thought, could we not imagine that the process that disturbs and displaces a certain logical order, a certain conceptual hierarchy, a certain classification scheme, is the same as that from which all classification proceeds? Certainly, the only functioning of language we are aware of operates within an already constituted order; metaphor does not produce a new order except by creating rifts in an old order. Nevertheless, could we not imagine that the order itself is born in the same way that it changes? Is there not, in Gadamer’s terms,33 a ‘metaphoric’ at work at the origin of logical thought, at the root of all classification? This is a more far- reaching hypothesis than the others, which presuppose an already constituted language within which metaphor operates. Not only is the notion of deviation linked to this presupposition, but also the oppos- ition between ‘ordinary’ language and ‘strange’ or ‘rare’ language, which Aristotle himself introduced, as well as, most definitely, the opposition introduced later between ‘proper’ and ‘figurative.’ The idea of an initial metaphorical impulse destroys these oppositions between proper and figurative, ordinary and strange, order and transgression. It suggests the idea that order itself proceeds from the metaphorical con- stitution of semantic fields, which themselves give rise to genus and species.

### AT: Cant Change Anything

**Sacrifice ideologically restructures dominant hierarchies – their attacks on the alternative cannot fathom the true nature of the sacrificial act**

**Goldhammer 5** - Ph.D. in political science from the University of California, Berkeley (Jesse, “The Headless Republic”, pg 179-181)[rkezios]

Because the obelisk is like an authoritative pile driven into a foundational swamp filled with sacrificial blood, it cannot return to the French what they, in a fit of revolutionary fervor, destroyed. In the Place de la Concorde, spatially speaking, an empty notion of authority surrounds a traditionally elevated one. As Denis Holier writes, "Bataille's Place de la Concorde ... is the place where loss is incarnate embodied in a man who identifies himself by his lack. The headless man, Acephalus, rises up where the guillotine let in the freezing gales of empty space."' Holier's observation reveals Bataille's agreement with Maistre: the regicide was a profoundly evil act, which Maistre lamented and Bataille celebrated. Rather than auguring the return of God, as Maistre had hoped, the regicide killed him, leaving in his place an absence so complete that it forbids the accumulation of transcendental power. Negativity or destruction without recompense: such is the fruit of the regicide and the basis for Bataille's concept of sacrificial violence. The regicide does not make way for the obelisk, which represents none other than the next generation's sovereign intentions. Rather, the regicide calls into question any future claim to authority, leaving the Place de la Concorde to represent not a place of peace, but rather one of permanent disorientation and subversion. Somewhere under the obelisk remain the impression of the guillotine and the blood of the king. Informing Bataille's novel interpretation of the regicide, antipathy toward morality, and subversion of power indeed, his attitude toward politics in to lo¬ is a trenchant rejection of idealism. He rejects all traditions of thought that value the ideal or elevated over the material or base. One of his most eloquent critiques of idealism appears in an early essay in which Bataille argues that the big toe is "the most human part of the body." Using the big toe as a metaphor for seductive baseness, Bataille explains that human beings reject aspects of their uniqueness when they celebrate all that is noble and pure in the hope of masking all that is low and impure: Although within the body blood flows in equal quantities from high to low and from low to high, there is a bias in favor of that which elevates itself, and human life is erroneously seen as an elevation Human life entails, in fact, the rage of seeing oneself as a back and forth movement from refuse to the ideal, and from the ideal to refuse a rage that is easily directed against an organ as base as the foot. 'O Bataille uses the image of the big toe to criticize the metaphysics of elevation. Humans err in their belief that humanity is uniquely an ideal achievement. Idealism is reason's attempt to hide the truth about being human from human beings. This error led human beings to demonize the very part of their bodies that Bataille argues is the most human, an exercise in self loathing. Without the "grotesque" big toe, humans could not stand erect, nor could they differentiate themselves from beasts. This observation recalls Maistre's claim that the greatest human achievements are mired in the worst. Bataille's celebration of the big toe is a reminder that what it means to be human is inescapably deformed, dirty, base, immoral, material, and incapable of rational thought. At the same time, however, Bataille does not seek to elevate the big toe to a higher status. Its value consists paradoxically in its abjectness. Like the regicide, the big toe symbolizes a permanent destabilization of the boundaries established by idealistic thought. When the former royal executioner Sanson guillotined the king, neither monarchists nor republicans imagined that the sacrifice would be a permanently destabilizing loss. Both the Roman and Christian sacrificial traditions instructed otherwise. During the Revolution, the examples of Brutus and Jesus illustrated that different forms of sacrificial violence could be used to destroy as well as create authority. In the minds of the revolutionaries, and then later in the writings of Maistre and Sorel, the concept of sacrificial violence became inextricably linked to the formation of both political and spiritual communities bound together by traditionally elevated notions of power. Sacrifice accomplished this remarkable task by skillfully manipulating the sacred categories that structure people's perceptions of authority. Impurity and purity, sin and redemption, moral decadence and regeneration these are the dueling sacred polarities altered by sacrificial bloodshed in the French discourse. Sacrifice negotiates be tween these terms by fostering different forms of exchange. Kill the king, the revolutionaries believed, and the republic would be purified. Embracing a similar logic, Maistre claimed that the Terror would punitively cleanse the French of their secular hubris. More than a hundred years later, Sorel argued that proletarian martyrs would regenerate working class morality saving in the religious sense of the word French society from bourgeois decadence. In all three cases, the sacrificial death of one human being generated new social bonds by neutralizing and reconfiguring the sacred bases of the old ones. Sacrificial loss thus came to be associated with the creation of new morality, new authority, and new political regimes. Sacrificial Innovation in the Work of Bataille Bataille's interpretation of the regicide as a sacrifice that cannot recover what it has lost presents a radical challenge to the Roman and Christian sacrificial traditions as well as to their incorporation into the French discourse on sacrificial violence. Unrecoverable sacrificial loss is a violent operation that only wastes. In producing nothing useful, sacrifice subverts all idealistic distinctions. Stripped of idealism, Brutus' filicide and Jesus' crucifixion can no longer participate in the task of foundation because sacrifice loses its ability to produce popular authority or redemption. In order for authority to be legitimate or for redemption to cleanse bodies or souls, the sacrificial operation must be capable of establishing stable, hierarchical boundaries between sacred polarities. Cathartic, expiatory, and redemptive exchange permits this delimitation to take place because violent loss is balanccd against some kind of psychological, spiritual, or moral gain. However, regicide that does not recover something from the violent destruction of the king that does not make sacred in a particular way is useless. In this way, Bataillian sacrifice permits no establishment, no obelisk, no higher source of power or authority, because it is a total loss without sacred exchange. It has no capacity to establish order, as, for instance, between sacrilegious and divine bloodshed, or between force and violence. It can neither recover, nor make useful, the pure sacred authority of the king. Only if conceived in ideal and compensatory terms can the collective taking of a life delineate between high and low, pure and impure. If the desire to practice the art of politics were compared to the myth of Icarus,a favorite of Bataille's, then sacrifice would correspond to the sun's blinding, wasted energy, which melted Icarus' wings, reminding all human beings of the fragility of their activities and their existence. Bataillian sacrifice challenges human beings to confront and test the limits of their being, without ever allowing for the reestablishment of order. It is a violent and ecstatic state of permanent alternation between purity and impurity With no finality, no conservation, and no reserve, Bataille's concept of sacrifice reflects not just a critique of idealism but also, more specifically, of Hegelian dialectics. Bataille attended A.lexandre Kojève's lectures on Hegel during which Kojéve famously declared history to be over. Bataille's confrontation with Hegelian philosophy left him feeling "suffocated, crushed, shattered, killed ten times over."" If history was over, what was left to do? In a letter to Kojêve, Bataille wondered what it meant to act freely in such a condition: "If action ("doing") is¬as Hegel says negativity, the question arises as to whether the negativity of one who has 'nothing more to do' disappears or remains in a state of 'unemployed negativity' Personally I can only decide in one way, being myself precisely this 'unemployed negativity' (I would not be able to define myself more precisely). ,12

## Shenanigans

### K of Econ Epistemology

**Even if some sciences are correct, economics is not one of them. We must question the epistemology of their economic statements in order to find a solution.**

**Bataille 67** (Georges, historian, librarian and philosopher, The Accursed Share, P. 20, ADP)

This method is legitimate, and science never proceeds differently. However, economic science does not give results of the same order as physics studying, first, a precise phenomenon, then all studiable phenomena as a coordinated whole. Economic phenomena are not easy to isolate, and their general coordination is not easy to establish. So it is possible to raise this question concerning them: Shouldn't productive activity as a whole be considered in terms of the modifications it receives from its surroundings or brings about in its surroundings? In other words, isn't there a need to study the system of human production and consumption within a much larger framework? In the sciences such problems ordinarily have an academic character, but economic activity is so far-reaching that no one will be surprised if a first question is followed by other, less abstract ones: In overall industrial development, are there not social conflicts and planetary wars? In the global activity of men, in short, are there not causes and effects that will appear only provided that *the general data of the* economy are studied? Will we be able to make ourselves the masters of such a dangerous activity (and one that we could not abandon in any case) without having grasped its *general* consequences? Should we not, given the constant development of economic forces, pose the *general* problems that are linked to the movement of energy on the globe? These questions allow one to glimpse both the theoretical meaning and the practical importance of the principles they introduce.

**Their pursuit of infinite fulfillment of the universe allows for their works to end in catastrophe. We must ignore their economic claims to realize our own ends.**

**Bataille 67** (Georges, historian, librarian and philosopher, The Accursed Share, P. 20, ADP)

At first sight, it is easy to recognize in the economy- *in the production and use of wealth* -a particular aspect of terrestrial activityregarded as a cosmic phenomenon. A movement is produced on the surface of the globe that results from the circulation of energy at this point in the universe. The economic activity of men appropriates this movement, making use of the resulting possibilities for certain ends. But this movement has a pattern and laws with which, as a rule, those who use them and depend on them are unacquainted. Thus the question arises: Is the general determination of energy circulating in the biosphere altered by a man’s activity? Or rather, isn't the latter's intention vitiated by a determination of which it is ignorant, which it overlooks and cannot change?Without waiting, I will give an inescapable answer.Man's disregard for the material basis of his life still causes him to err in a serious way. Humanity exploits given material resources, but by restricting them as it does to a resolution of the immediate difficulties it encounters (a resolution which it has hastily had to define as an ideal), it assigns to the forces it employs an end which they cannot have. Beyond our immediate difficulties ends, man’s activity in fact pursues the useless and infinite fulfillment of the universe. 1Of course, the error that results from so complete a disregard does not just concern man's claim to lucidity. It is not easy to realize one's own ends if one must, in trying to do so, carry out a movement that surpasses them. No doubt these ends and this movement may not be entirely irreconcilable; but if these two terms are to be reconciled we must cease to ignore one of them; otherwise, our works quickly turn to catastrophe.I will begin with a basic fact: The living organism, in a situation determined by the play of energy on the surface of the globe,ordinarily receives more energy than is necessary for maintaining life; the excess energy (wealth) can be used for the growth of a system (e.g., an organism); if the system can no longer grow, or if the excess cannot be completely absorbed in its growth, it must necessarily be lost without profit; it must be spent, willingly or not, gloriously or catastrophically.

### Language 1st – needs kickass tag

Language shapes reality – proves alt solvency

Noys 2k – (BSc, MA, DPhil) Reader in English at the University of Chichester (Benjamin, “Georges Bataille: A Critical Introduction”, pg 18-20)[rkezios]

In the Story of the Eye the narrator, a thinly veiled adolescent Bataille, experiences obscene images that flash through his mind and ‘these images were, of course, tied to the contradiction of a prolonged state of exhaustion and an absurd rigidity of my penis’ (SE, 30). All of Bataille’s subversive images share this contradictory structure of exhaustion and sexual excitement (jouissance). They at once exhaust the possible functions of the image and subvert it with a jouissance which touches on death and that the image can only indicate but not represent. He pursued these multiple images across various media, including painting, photography and writing to the point where we can find no clear distinction between the pornographic tableaux described in his novel Story of the Eye (1928) and the photographic images Bataille commented on in the journal Documents (1929–31). I want to trace Bataille’s subversion of the image through his analysis of specific images to his subversion of vision itself. Documents is the beginning because here Bataille not only writes on images but works with images: Documents is a multimedia production. It engages with Bataille’s other works at the time and also with his later works, prefiguring his fractured and condensed writings which work by producing images of thought. It also raises the question, why has Bataille had so little impact as a writer on the image? Perhaps the reason for Bataille’s lack of impact is that his subversion of the image can never be assimilated by a theory of the image. It is this impossibility of a theory of the subversive image that is first sketched out in Documents by Bataille and his companions. At the centre of Documents is a series of entries written for a planned critical dictionary, with Bataille and Michel Leiris writing most of the entries until the magazine ceased to exist in 1931. Although this meant that the critical dictionary remained incomplete, from the beginning it was always intended to be incomplete. The incompletion of the critical dictionary was a critique of the tendency of dictionaries to try to define all the significant words in a language by freezing their irruptive energies into stable meanings. For Bataille ‘A dictionary begins when it no longer gives the meaning of words but their tasks’ (VE, 31). Instead of being organised by meaning the critical dictionary was organised by the tasks of words, trying to release their irruptive energies. This release often involved a play between the critical dictionary entry for a word and its accompanying image. Moreover, the entries were not originally placed alphabetically (although they have been now in EA) but worked together with their accompanying images in a disjunctive, non-hierarchical ‘structure’. The tasks of words would be explored through the selection of words analysed which ranged from the question of materialism (EA, 58) to a discussion of Buster Keaton (EA, 56). Through this selection process links are made between the tasks of words and a strange ‘logic’ emerges where Keaton’s sang-froid could be the basis of a materialism of ‘raw phenomena’. After only the first issue of Documents one of the co-founders wrote to Bataille that ‘The title you have chosen for this journal is hardly justified except in the sense that it gives us “documents” on your state of mind.’1However, the journal is far more than a catalogue of Bataille’s own state of mind and personal obsessions. Through the critical dictionary he intervenes into the founding classifications that define the meaning of our world. The critical dictionary subverts these classifications by shifting from a word’s meaning to its tasks and effects. These effects are also visual, coming through the images that accompany the ‘definitions’ in the critical dictionary. Bataille and his co-writers are pursuing images that overwhelm the viewer. For Bataille the ‘noble parts of a human being (his dignity, the nobility that characterises his face)’ (VE, 78) cannot ‘set up the least barrier against a sudden, bursting eruption …’ (VE, 78). The critical dictionary registered these bursting eruptions as chance instants in which the image would rear its head and shatter the calm world of the dictionary. The destruction of the classifications of the dictionary would then affect the order of language and of the world itself. Far from being documents of Bataille’s state of mind these are documents of sudden bursting eruptions that are impossible to classify. The critical dictionary is an act of ‘sacrificial mutilation’ (VE, 61–72) of the classical dictionary. It is ‘charged with this element of hate and disgust…’ (VE, 71) for the tranquil orderings of a world bound by meaning. In Documents, however, there is an anomalous image which appears to remain within this world of meaning. It is a photograph taken in 1905 of a provincial wedding party lined up in two regimented rows in front of a shop (EA, 99) which accompanies an essay by Bataille called ‘The Human Face’. The image is anomalous to the critical dictionary because it is so utterly conventional; it is an image out of place. Why is it there when for Bataille ‘The mere sight (in photography) of our predecessors in the occupation of this country now produces, for varying reasons, a burst of loud and raucous laughter; that sight, however, is nonetheless hideous’ (EA, 100)? What fascinates Bataille is that this conventional image should provoke this reaction, a reaction which combines contradictory experiences of laughter and fear. These supposedly incompatible effects are brought together in this image and make it unforgettable. Although we may laugh at the wedding party it still haunts us with a fear that remains with us even in our most acute moments of pleasure. Bataille comments that it forces a youth to confront ‘at every unexpected moment of rapture the images of his predecessors looming up in tiresome absurdity’ (EA, 100).

### Violence =/= Impact

Violence is inevitable – ignoring it only leads to violent eruptions of horror, instead we must accept and affirm violence

Noys 2k – (BSc, MA, DPhil) Reader in English at the University of Chichester (Benjamin, “Georges Bataille: A Critical Introduction”, pg 23-24)[rkezios]

With a rapid movement that is dizzying Bataille moves from the image to science and philosophy, and in doing so he suggests the hidden continuity between science, philosophy and society. What they share is a common repression of the violent irruptive forces on which they depend, but which they cannot fully control. In each case violent forces are repressed and controlled by acts that are themselves violent but which dissimulate this violence. It is this that makes them vulnerable, so when a fly lands on a human face which is trying to present itself as serious and knowledgeable it provokes laughter. There is no fly visible in the photograph Bataille discusses but he can see the fly buzzing around by sliding rapidly through the image. In the flight of the fly in and out of the image the highest of human concerns are dragged into the dirt as the fly is attracted by the odour of the rank and vicious. The fly is a provocation to the image because it cannot be found there. It does not settle within the frame of the photograph but flies out of it, buzzes around it and taunts it like the presence of the acute perturbation that disturbs the calm surface of the image. In this sense it has a virtual presence, neither actually appearing in the photograph yet not completely absent from it either. It is the haunting possibility of the subversive image that rests ‘in’ the photograph but only in so far as it is always spilling out of it. As the fly escapes from the image of the wedding party it moves on to more explicit images of eruption. The photographs of slaughterhouses at La Villette in Paris by Eli Lotar break a taboo on presenting violence. Bataille notes that ‘In our time, nevertheless, the slaughterhouse is cursed and quarantined like a plague-ridden ship’ (EA, 73). Eli Lotar has put us back into contact with this work of death through images of animal carcasses, butchers and smears of blood. What these images also reveal is that this violent slaughter, on which many of us non-vegetarians still depend, has become a mechanical and technical activity. In one of the photographs a line of severed animal legs rests against a wall in an ordered arrangement that represses the violence of the slaughter (EA, 74). We are doubly alienated from the slaughterhouse: firstly, we do not wish to see what happens there and secondly, its activities turn death into a productive and neutral event. This limitation of violence is not a sign of the progress of ‘civilisation’. ‘The curse (terrifying only to those who utter it) leads them to vegetate as far as possible from the slaughterhouse, to exile themselves, out of propriety, to a flabby world in which nothing fearful remains and in which, subject to the ineradicable obsession of shame, they are reduced to eating cheese’ (EA, 73). Our exile from the slaughterhouse does not put an end to the violence but transforms it from something sacred to a technical activity from which we can hide ourselves. This transforming of death into a secret, technical operation has been one of the factors at work in the ‘slaughterhouses’ of human beings in the twentieth century. Bataille’s response is to use these images of the slaughterhouse to break the taboo that protects us from an intimate contact with death. By breaking this taboo he challenges the distance which allows us to transform slaughter into a technical activity, and he puts us into contact with a different experience of death.