## links/ specific impacts

### link—airport security

#### The 1AC’s approach to refining airport security marks out a new era in political ontology in which mobile subjects are subjected to the exercise of power, producing an invisible, yet ever-present border of control

Martin, 10 – grad student in political geography at the University of Kentucky (Lauren, “Bombs, bodies, and biopolitics: securitizing the subject at the airport security checkpoint,” Social & Cultural Geography, Vol. 11, No. 1, February 2010)//HK

Introduction: banning the bomb joke The United States Transportation Security Administration (TSA) broadcasts the following warning in airports around the country: ‘Making jokes or statements regarding bombs and/or threats during the screening process may be grounds for both civil and criminal penalties and could cause you to miss your flight’ (US Transportation Security Agency 2006). Despite the warning, British citizen Samantha Marson was arrested in 2004 for quipping, ‘Hey be careful, I have three bombs in here’ as she placed her bag on the scanner belt at the Miami International Airport (British Broadcasting Corporation 2004). Similarly, Maciej Buchwald, a Polish citizen, was detained at the Cleveland Hopkins Social & Cultural Geography, Vol. 11, No. 1, February 2010 ISSN 1464-9365 print/ISSN 1470-1197 online/10/010017-18 q 2010 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/14649360903414585 International Airport in 2007, when TSA staff misinterpreted a joke in broken English about anthrax (Guevara 2007). While their comments were clearly sarcastic—evidenced by their testimonies to the non-literal intention behind their comments and the absence of any weapons in their baggage—others have been detained for more ambiguous statements. In 2005, Hugo Redwood was detained for saying to his partner, ‘I guess we must be terrorist suspects’ during routine screening (Buhl 2005). And in 2008, Rosalind Baez was arrested for making a joke about a threat, but intended her questions about TSA’s baggage policy to be taken seriously (Win 2008). Similar policies are in place outside the USA, and travelers continue to be detained or arrested for similar quips in the Philippines, Australia and elsewhere (e.g., People’s Online Daily 2008). The problematization of the bomb joke reveals not only how problems of difference—and therefore identity—persist in the ‘surveillant assemblages’ of US homeland security, but also how securitized discursive regimes seek to order the relationship between passengers’ bodies, identities, (self-) representations, and threat. In this paper, I analyze the bomb joke to understand how spatial orders are produced in and through the embodied performance of speech, and further, how disciplining speech demonstrates a deeper anxiety about the ‘securitized subject’ in post-9/11 security regimes. The subject of security Long before the attacks of 11 September 2001, the digitalization of identity data, linking of databases, and molecularization of surveillance (such as the collection of iris scans and fingerprints) changed the spatiality of surveillance, and these technologies have become more entrenched in state security practices in recent years (Dillon 2002). For critical security studies scholars, the collection of biometric data, the tracking of transaction data, and newly linked state intelligence and crime databases mark a change in the spatiality of immigration and border enforcement, producing a border that is ‘everywhere and nowhere’ and imbricated with everyday life (Amoore 2006; Amoore and de Goede 2008; Coleman 2007; Martin and Simon 2008). Airports are particularly salient sites in this regard, because they operate both as ports of entry to the USA and as rather mundane workplaces for business travelers and airport employees (Parks 2007). While airports are often represented as abstractions, ‘spaces of flows,’ and ‘non-places’ of global capitalism, airports are places, located in specific cultural and political economies (Adey 2004a, 2004b). In addition to carrying specific historical geographies and cultures of aerospace, airports serve as experimental sites for merging the regulation of mobility, promotion of consumerism, and surveillance (Adey 2006, 2008; Fuller and Harley 2004; Salter 2007). From ticket purchase to air traffic control to the cockpit, the spatial practices of air travel are produced in and through code, so much so that Dodge and Kitchin (2004) argue that airports are ‘code/spaces.’ The airport represents, therefore, a site in which ‘flows’ of information and capital are facilitated against a background of condensed and highly regulated surveillance practices. The airport epitomizes, in short, how the problems of mobility and state power, capital and security, geo-politics and geoeconomics congeal as a problem of security, addressed through combined surveillance and disciplinary practices (see Salter 2008). Beyond the airport, surveillance is increasingly ‘designed in’—and immanent to—the spaces of everyday life, diffusing and thereby 18 Lauren L. Martin re-ordering the disciplinary mechanisms that form docile subjects. Hearkening to Deleuze (1988), Rose (1999) argues that power relations institutionalized in prisons, workhouses, and schools now work as a ‘diagram of power,’ a topological relationship between discursive objects embedded throughout social and state institutions. For example, closed circuit television (CCTV) records movement through public space (Koskela 2000; Fyfe and Banister 1996, 1998) and credit histories track consumption patterns, often without the knowledge of the citizen/consumer (Amoore and de Goede 2008). In this context, the making of political subjects is not what it used to be. Guided by concerns for the life of statistical populations, subject formation operates less through prescription and prohibition and more through an assemblage of techniques that fine-tune subjects for the living of life. In this ‘control society,’ human beings are ‘not subjects with a unique personality that is the expression of some inner fixed quality’ but are ‘plugged into multiple orbits, identified by unique codes, identification numbers, profiles of preferences, security ratings and so forth’ (Rose 1999: 234). The ‘elements, capacities, and potentialities’ that define the subject of control are continually calculated and calibrated through multi-sited digital surveillance techniques, what Haggerty and Ericson call a ‘surveillant assemblage’ (Rose 1999: 234; Haggerty and Ericson 2000). Further, the digitalization of identity and the molecularization of biology have changed what it is to be living, and have therefore decentered language and labor as constitutive of political subjectivity (Braun 2007; Dillon 2008; Rose 2006). In the context of state security regimes, deterritorializing the surveillance of populations marks, as Dillon argues, a deeper shift in the political ontology of state security (Dillon 2002, 2007, 2008; Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2009). Oriented towards the contingent, complex system, state security practices seek to manage non-linear flows, segregating the threatening from the profitable, and are not concerned with the making of proper political or ideological subjects. Rather, it is an abstracted, disaggregated species-being that has become both the potentially threatening subject and the object of intervention for securitized biopolitics (Dillon and Lobo-Guerra 2009; Adey 2009). Thus, the diffusion of surveillance and ballooning purview of security have reconfigured the spatiality of borders, citizenship, and state power, dramatically reconfiguring the project of contemporary politics.

#### The affirmative’s need for security stems from a flawed epistemology that transforms travelers into subhuman data sets in hopes of masking public uncertainty

Martin, 10 – grad student in political geography at the University of Kentucky (Lauren, “Bombs, bodies, and biopolitics: securitizing the subject at the airport security checkpoint,” Social & Cultural Geography, Vol. 11, No. 1, February 2010)//HK

From the perspective of regulating bomb jokes, however, could it be that the persistence of bluntly disciplinary mechanisms reveals a deep ambiguity about the ‘securitized subject,’ precisely because the ‘new’subject of security is contingent, continually changing, and possibly becoming dangerous? Theories of performativity have sought to recast idealized liberal and disciplinary subjects as processes of subjectification, partial, overdetermined, and under continual transformation (e.g., Butler 1990, 1997; Laclau and Mouffe 1985). Understanding security practices in terms of performative subjectification casts a different light on two related conceptualizations of security and risk: (1) security practice as the spatialization of the biopolitics of exception (Amoore 2006, 2009; Amoore and de Goede 2008); and (2) risk as the operative logic of a post-anthropomorphic biopolitics, which renders travelers sub- or non-human through the management of contingency rather than money, labor, or identity (Adey 2009; Dillon 2007, 2008). Both of these conceptualizations extend Foucault’s concepts of biopower and biopolitics to understand how security practices reconfigure relations of power. Focused on the ways in Bombs, bodies, and biopolitics 19 which biopolitical governance has come to focus on risk analysis and preemption, these studies emphasize the importance of circulation, contingency, and connectivity to the power/knowledge assemblages that undergird security. As a consequence, both of these perspectives underestimate the degree to which the formation of subjects remains critical to the performance of security. Instead, as Foucault argues in his lectures on governmentality, government, discipline, and sovereignty are braided together, rather than episodically sequential modalities of power (Foucault 2007). As such, the formation of a subject is the constitutive moment of power—and power the constitutive outside of the subject—not a byproduct of specifically disciplinary orders (Butler 1997). It is true that subjects are no longer produced in the same way, but it is precisely their overdetermination that makes subjects contingent (see Laclau and Mouffe 1985). Is it possible that apparatuses of security have not replaced disciplinary regimes, but have instead incorporated disciplinary apparatuses in response to the deep ambiguity about what an individual may do, when s/he is an identity in flux? If ‘the securitized subject’ is a contingent one, how might efforts to momentarily stabilize the subject be reconfigured and re-embedded at specific sites? And given that the concept of a coherent liberal subject has long been problematized by numerous social theorists, how might we revise our accounts of security from the perspective of theories of contingent and complex subjects? Drawing on Butler’s (1997) theorization of subjectification as a function of power (not confined to liberal governance), I explore airport security from the perspective of subject formation, and consider the governance of contingency as a project still under construction. I focus on the performativity of language to conceptualize where and how embodied utterances becomes sites of repeated intervention. By and large, social and cultural geographers’ approaches to security remain focused on how discursive formations categorize—and thereby order—objects, bodies, and spaces. Language appears primarily as a contingent symbolic system, a medium for the circulation of power. Building on this methodological approach, this paper seeks to understand how Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) attempt to categorize and order the embodied practice of speaking. I ask, what kind of object, material, or evidence does TSA understand the spoken word to be? From what kind of subject do these utterances emerge? What kind of truth claim are they assumed to be making about the risk or safety of the traveler? And on what criteria of judgment do such truth claims rest? In a sense, this paper analyzes TSA’s discourse of discourse. The paper begins by analyzing the concepts through which TSA understands its task. Drawing explicitly on theories of ‘complex adaptive systems’ institutionalized through the ‘revolution in military affairs’ literatures (Dillon 2002), TSA understands ‘transportation networks’ as emergent phenomena, essential to the circulation of goods and people necessary for commerce. I then analyze the spatiotemporal orientations of each surveillance technique, demonstrating how each inspects a different ‘slice’ of passengers’ past and present to ascertain their future intentions. Next, unraveling how the irony of bomb jokes relies upon embodied discourses of gesture, tone, and comportment, I analyze why the bomb joke evokes the same response as an intended threat. In short, I argue that the spatiotemporality of risk analysis, which folds future potentialities onto the present, leaves TSOs with little room to differentiate between 20 Lauren L. Martin what passengers say, what they mean, and their capacity or intention to commit an act of terrorism. Showing that TSOs seek to interpret legible subjects—made legible in and through information-based security regimes—I argue that the regulation of joking enforces, and thereby normalizes, a particular relationship between speaker, sign, and referent. As such, language remains a privileged register through which subjects are interpellated by security regimes. ‘It takes a network to fight a network’: TSA’s layered security Originating from three different US airports, the hi-jackings of 11 September 2001 were not the first airplanes to be commandeered by their passengers, but the event demonstrated two disturbing facts: (1) ordinary civilian passengers can turn planes, trains, and automobiles into weapons, and (2) they can have a disproportionate impact on the routine circulation of goods, people, and services. This ‘expanding point topology,’ in which individuals are able to impact people and places far beyond the ‘normal’ scale of everyday activities, has framed US homeland security strategizing since the attack (Hannah 2006). This problem enunciates the ‘Janus face of netwar:’ new organizations ‘organized into sprawling, loose, “leaderless” networks’ who ‘exploit the infrastructures of information to communicate and plan’ (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001, in US Transportation Security Administration 2008d). While threats or actual attacks may materialize at any time, it is in and through information—especially computerized information and digital telecommunications networks—that attacks will materialize. Terrorists will, therefore, be ‘hiding in the information,’ and it is through the collection and analysis of information that terrorists will be weeded from the normal transactions of everyday life (Amoore and de Goede 2008). As Dillon (2002) argues, information is ‘the prime mover’ in the ontology of netwarfare, the basic material by which societies organize themselves. Understanding both space and human interaction as information coded and analyzed in algorithmic risk analyses has dramatic implications, not only for understanding the interpretive context of bomb jokes, but for the constitution of the ‘secured subject’ as well (Amoore 2009; Dillon 2008; Dodge and Kitchin 2005). The shift to network thinking in military and security institutions has been rehearsed and debated elsewhere (see Dillon 2002; Ek 2000), but here it is critical to note that TSA’s security strategy is based on a series of assumptions about what transportation is (i.e. its ontological status) that come directly from this school of thought. First, transportation is a system of ‘interdependent links and nodes.’ Second, transportation security is ‘interdependent in nature’ because ‘no element is secure if it can be influenced by a weak link’ (Kunreuther and Heal 2003, in US Transportation Security Administration 2008d). Third, as an interdependent system, elements interact and adapt to each other, forming a ‘Complex Adaptive System’ (CAS). Fourth, as a CAS, transportation networks ‘behave non-linearly, so that small perturbations in the system can sometimes lead to large outcomes’ and show ‘emergent properties,’ or ‘seemingly random interactions among all elements of the system’ (US Transportation Security Administration 2008d). Fifth, as a non-linear CAS, transportation is not simply an ocean of chaotic interactions, but a ‘hierarchical structure in which systems of nature . . . and humans, as well as combined man–nature systems and social-ecological systems are interlinked Bombs, bodies, and biopolitics 21 in never-ending adaptive cycles of growth, accumulation, restructuring, and renewal’ (Holling 2001, in US Transportation Security Administration 2008e). Thus, there are discernible patterns of interaction, which can be known and understood, provided these patterns are analyzed at the proper scale. Sixth, terrorists also operate as networks, but do so in order to (1) ‘inflict damage that is out of proportion to their efforts by attacking parts of the system that will lead to non-linear consequences’ and (2) ‘to be more agile and resilient in response to their environments’ (US Transportation Security Administration 2008e). In short, transportation, TSA, and terrorists operate as networks and, in so doing, display the characteristics of CASs. Thus, this theory of CAS drives TSA’s methodology for identifying the nature of the threat, understanding the nature of the target, and the form of counter-terrorist security measures. The CAS has become, in sum, TSA’s ontology, epistemology, and methodology. Working from the premise that ‘it takes a network to fight a network’ (US Transportation Security Administration 2008d), TSA combines ‘layers of security’ to create an apparently unpredictable series of screening, surveillance, and inspection practices (US Transportation Security Administration 2008b). Each of these layers is aimed at a different spatiotemporal slice of the transportation network, only some of which include airline passengers. For example, airport employees are randomly inspected, Visual Intermodal Prevention and Response squads ‘swarm’ train and bus stations, and longdistance truckers have been enrolled as a sort of citizen patrol of the interstate system (US Transportation Security Administration 2007, 2008b). While this paper focuses on those practices aimed at air travelers, Figure 1 shows how TSA positions travelers’ surveillance Figure 1 TSA’s twenty layers of security. Source: US Transportation Security Administration (2008b). 22 Lauren L. Martin in a spectrum of security practices that include its own staff, airport employees, and bus, train, and highway networks. Thus, according to TSA’s approach, the apparent rigidity of the airport security checkpoint is a specific spatial strategy, nested in a flexible, invisible, and therefore unpredictable assemblage of surveillance, detection, and enforcement practices. ‘Layered security’ also operates on the assumption that surveillance techniques fail. This series of technologies neither catches every potential terrorist, nor identifies every person capable of becoming one. There is, therefore, a pervasive ‘unease’ underlying airport security regimes (Bigo 2002). In ‘becoming unpredictable,’ however, TSA seeks to create such doubt about the probable success of an attack that it deters an unidentified terrorist-to-be from following through with her plan: We had a case where somebody had bomb components in a piece of luggage they were going to take on. Now, do I know that they would have found some way to assemble it, or do I know that at some stage of the person’s flight path, it would not have become the bomb? I don’t know that . . . Do I know how many people I’ve deterred? I don’t know that because I don’t know how many people have said, I’m not going to try to do something because I know there’s a high likelihood I’m going to be caught . . . [G]enerally speaking, people, whether they want to smuggle things in or commit crimes or commit acts of terror . . . particularly if you mix it up, if you do random things, if you change things so they’re unpredictable, I think that that actually enhances security. (US Department of Homeland Security 2008) Thus, the success of security is as uncertain as its impending disruption. In this sense, the performance of security is as much a counter-terrorism strategy as the discovery of actually-existing bomb materials: ‘A lot of what is important in security is public confidence, and visible security adds a certain dimension to public confidence which I don’t think you can underestimate’ (US Department of Homeland Security 2008). Security officers maintain security, in part, by fostering the feeling of safety, a mood of confidence in the proper circulation of goods and people (Adey 2008; Dodge and Kitchin 2004; Massumi 2005, 2007). Are we more secure? We do not know. Do we feel more secure? TSA hopes the answer is ‘yes.’

#### The airport is a heterotopic space of confession wherein the authority of the state apparatus negates resistance

**Salter 07** – (Mark, Associate Professor of Political Studies @ University of Ottawa, “Governmentalities of an Airport: Heterotopia and Confession,” International Political Sociology, 2007, Available Online) SIyer

The modern international airport represents and reﬂects the intersecting forces that organize contemporary politics, facilitating transit while simultaneously securitizing identity. I take this site seriously and ask: how is the airport governed? I make use of two neglected notions from Foucault’s considerable body of work: the confessionary complex and the heterotopia. Modern subjects, according to Foucault, are conditioned by a Christian notion of continual, exhaustive confession in the face of state apparatus, securing not only a docile body but also an anxious, self-disclosing citizen. The airport, while emancipatory and open for some, represents a locus of anxiety and interrogation for many others. In his lecture ‘‘Of Other Spaces,’’ Foucault proposes an examination of heterotopias, locations that are ‘‘in relation with all other sites, but in such a way to suspect, neutralize, or invert the set of relations that they happen to designate, mirror, or reﬂect’’ (1986:24). The airport connects the national and the international (also the national to itself), the domestic and the foreign, in a way that problematizes those connections. In particular, I argue that within this multifaceted environment dominated by doctrines of risk management and customer service, the confessionary complex facilitates the self-policing of transiting individuals and that the overlapping and obscured lines of authority subtly restrict the possibilities of resistance.

International political sociology balances theoretical analysis and empirical material, with an overtly political but not prescriptive frame. By focusing on the system of policies, practices, and discourses that govern particular intersections of the local, national, and global, international political sociology explores the intersections of power and authority that shape the governance of these specific institutions. By eschewing a strict linguistic turn, international political sociology examines not simply the language of politics but also a wider notion of discourse including practices, institutions, and authorities. Bigo’s attention to the rise of international risk consultancies and Walters’ examination of the deportation and decitizenship regimes provide new ways of looking at policing and security. International political sociology is well situated to reﬂect critically on the airport, taking as its subject matter not the grand structure of a universal politics, but more modest examinations of specific sites and institutions where politics are enacted, or as Foucault terms it ‘‘humble modalities, minor procedures, as compared with the majestic rituals of sovereignty or the great apparatuses of state’’ (1977:170).

Civil aviation presents an excellent case study in this regard, because power and authority are diffuse in this sector (Poincignon 2004). International standards are set by an international organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization, which operates through consensus of the members but not without the politics of inﬂuence of donor versus receiving countries. Governments and airlines are jointly responsible for different aspects of aviation security, while some countries have tasked dedicated aviation security agencies (like the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority [CATSA] or the Transportation Security Authority, part of the American Department of Homeland Security). Airports themselves have been increasingly privatized in North America and Europe over the past 20 years, suggesting a neoliberal shift in governance. The governing of international movement is grounded in the rights of mobility and the responsibilities of public security, and it is imperative that we measure the cost of security in terms of mobility and privacy.

#### Airport security measures are an extension of neoliberal and sovereign power’s governmentalities

**Salter 07** – (Mark, Associate Professor of Political Studies @ University of Ottawa, “Governmentalities of an Airport: Heterotopia and Confession,” International Political Sociology, 2007, Available Online) SIyer

Although a primary function of the airport is security, the most fundamental policing functions are conducted out of sight. Many of the gates and check-points that structure mobilities in the airport are invisible (Adey 2004a, 2004b). Indeed, given most airports’ detachment from urban space, travelers have already been ‘‘pre-cleared,’’ if only by their ability to arrive at the airport itself. Lloyd argues that the space of the airport has been conﬁgured into a space of consumption so that ‘‘the ﬁgure of global traveler is allied to the global consumer, whereas the national citizen’s ‘‘othered’’ ﬁgures, the homeless person and refugee, are precluded by consumption practices . . . This imagescape of free mobility in the international terminal is markedly different from the backstage containment of national others in identity checks, detention, and deportation that takes place within the very same institution’’ (2003:106). The airport attempts to make all of these incongruous forces appear smooth and systematic, as if all travelers were safe, all planes on time and all policing efﬁcient. Analyzing the airport as a heterotopia leads to three insights: the disaggregation of sovereignty and territory, the importance of confession and surveillance at the airport, and the hidden dynamics of airport security screening.

Governmentalities of the Airport: Public, Private, and In-Between

Since the attacks of September 11 laid bare the deﬁciencies in American civil aviation security, reinforced by the near-successful attack by Richard Reid, the so-called ‘‘shoe bomber,’’ there have been dramatic reorganizations of private and public security authorities and increases in the public scrutiny of airport security. Bush’s seemingly offhand remark in a recent speech on homeland security illustrates both the new measures and persistent criticism of the system: ‘‘. . . security is strong at the airports. I hope they stop taking off the shoes of the elderly. (Laughter.) I must confess, they haven’t taken off my shoes lately at the airport. (Laughter)’’ (2005). These concerns about security take place within a global neo-liberal trend toward the privatization of both the civil aviation sector and much security work (Lippert and O’Connor 2003, Poincignon 2004). As sites of multiple vectors of authority, airports present fascinating illustrations of network power. Foucault intended dual analyses of sovereign and disciplinary power (1980a: 108), of which the airport is an example in both its role as a port of entry and the sovereign power of entry/exit, and also in its role as constituting and disciplining mobile subjects. He deﬁnes governmentality as ‘‘the ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reﬂections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security’’ (1991:102). At the airport, there are a number of public and private authorities that monitor and control the essential element of global transit. Following Bigo’s outline of IPS methodology, this article studies one empirical site to open up a wider discussion of practices and discourses of security. In particular, I will ‘‘analyze through the conﬁgurations or ﬁelds the topology of the nexus of relations of the different agents’’ at the airport, and in particular the ways in which these authorities overlap and obscure networks of power (Bigo no date). I would argue that there are multiple governmentalities at work in the airport, which are mutually constitutive and in tension. Neoliberal governance marked by deregulation and liberalization is both resisted and supported by the movement toward risk management and policing at a distance. Designs for consumer ‘‘dwell time’’ at airport arcades are at odds with the operational imperatives of the diminution of turn-around times for low-budget airlines. I will focus on the security governmentality, the negotiations between the various polices and agencies that aim to provide civil aviation security. This report does not identify a single source of ‘‘real’’ power in the airport, but rather hopes to illuminate the ways in which multiple lines of force are arranged.

#### The contradictions of different governmentalities of an airport renders the securitizing project of the affirmative useless—creates possibilities for resistance

**Salter 07** – (Mark, Associate Professor of Political Studies @ University of Ottawa, “Governmentalities of an Airport: Heterotopia and Confession,” International Political Sociology, 2007, Available Online) SIyer

Heterotopias isolate deviant individuals, or those going through rites of passage, through the arrangement of space, technologies, and authorities. But, here the contradictions of the airport are laid bare. Despite repeated security checks and regulations, **there is no inherent place where identity is checked against the single clearest threat: known criminals or terrorists**. This is separate from the impossibility of the detection of “clean” terrorists or those like Ahmed Ressam who carry authentic documents (which have been issued fraudulently—as opposed to fraudulent documents, which have been stolen) (Salter 2003:35). Canadian government officials are moving forward with a “no-fly” list of “immediate threats to civil aviation” who will be prohibited from boarding, similar to the America system which currently contains over 350,000 entries. However, at the moment, there is no place in the security architecture for any kind of domestic check of identities, either in terms of document authenticity or anti-terrorism policing. This bears repeating: there is no institutionalized interface between mobility and security data at the Canadian airport. A known terrorist or criminal might travel from Halifax to Vancouver without ever necessarily being before an officer with sufficient intelligence data to know to arrest them. If a traveler bothers to interact with a human airline agent, which is optional in the age of e-tickets and self-serve kiosks, that agent will have only the briefest training in the recognition of false documents. Airline agents are not given watch lists. Police are not given passenger information (although they may request specific information about specific flights). PBS, which is performed by private service providers contracted by CATSA, is entirely isolated from any wider dataveillance. Screening is performed for objects and explosives, and further investigation of individuals' identity, behavior, or documentation is prohibited by TC. CCTV surveillance of the areas is entirely for post hoc investigation rather than real-time detection. Airline agents at the gate simply check ID with boarding pass name—inconsistently and with minimal training. The object of screening for CATSA and airport security is a dangerous object, rendering the fact that “terrorists fly all the time” in Canada invisible to the general public.

There are two conflicting pressures at work in the processing of passengers through the airport: flow and detection. Adey (forthcoming b) points out that flow and detection operate quite differently in the general spaces of the airport, where “dwell time” may be sought precisely for economic reasons. However, at the security points, “dwelling” becomes a risk category. Training and public awareness programs at Halifax International Airport, for example the Jetway Operations and iWatch programs, exhort all airport staff to be vigilant of those individuals who seem to be waiting in screening areas. While airports and airlines focus on an economic model of “throughput,” the number of passengers and aircraft per hour, security services focus on “detection.” But these security organizations have a difficult time quantifying or qualifying success in security. Currently, inspectors verify the adherence to the Security Screening Orders, as interpreted by CATSA into their contracts with the screening providers, and through infiltration tests. Results are then communicated indirectly to the private screening providers through CATSA headquarters, unless there is an immediate breech in which case the screener is immediately decertified and removed from the security post. CATSA is currently redrafting its performance measures to monitor screening success more closely—but this presents a fundamental epistemological and methodological problem. How does one research and describe this kind of activity?

There is a dilemma: “error or failure in the commercial air travel system is publicly unacceptable … and high levels of delay in the air travel system are also unacceptable” (Frederickson and LaPorte 2002:34). Faced with internal pressures by subcontractors for profit and external pressures by airlines and airports for consistent and efficient through-put, the demand by government administrators for detection is expressed in terms of “customer service.” While the CATSA Act details the primary responsibility of the Crown Corporation to be “effective and efficient screening of persons who access aircraft or restricted areas through screening points,” this mandate is translated by CATSA in its own mission statement as to “protect the public by securing critical elements of the air transportation system as assigned by the government (and be) responsible for the delivery of consistent, effective and professional services at or above the standards set by” (Canadian Air Transport Security Authority 2004). “Effective and efficient” in the Act becomes “consistent, effective and professional services.” Within the governmentality of the airport within this neoliberal economic and political framework, the bureaucracy with the greatest numeracy or statistical weight wins. The current focus by CATSA on customer service is indicative of this victory of risk management. Throughput is more easily measured than detection—and that is the direction of greatest pressure by all stakeholders.

The second direction of pressure on screening comes from the impossibility of detecting the dangerous traveler. As above, the confessionary complex is a necessary substructure for the border examination or security screening to function. In the account of the interaction of the 9/11 terrorists and American border security, these terrorists had no trouble lying to the authorities (Salter 2004). There is no quantitative measure of “security”—false positives do not indicate the success of detection any more than false negatives do (Frederickson and LaPorte 2002). Further, there is no process of learning within this system insofar as terrorists neither self-declare their beating the detection system nor indicate their subversion of security on customer service surveys (Barnett 2004). Faced with this impossible task, CATSA focuses on the detection of dangerous objects: “CATSA's primary responsibility is to enhance the security of the traveling public by ensuring that threat items are not carried onto an aircraft” (Canadian Air Transport Security Authority 2005:6). The threat items stopped replace the individuals who pass freely. Screeners have no mandate or authority to check for the integrity or authenticity of identity documents or the behavior of the passenger. There is of course the “no joking” rule: “you should never joke or make ‘small talk’ about bombs, firearms or other weapons while going through PBS” (Canadian Air Transport Security Authority 2004). But, the security screeners do not carry the same authority as the police, CBSA, or American officials—there is no correspondent obligation for individuals to tell the truth to screeners, only an obligation not to joke or make small talk. There is a consensus within the profession of aviation security agents that a terrorist attack by a determined, dedicated suicide bomber cannot be prevented or deterred. Faced with the impossibility of perfect, reliable security screening, CATSA focuses on the policing of objects rather than passengers. In their efficient, reliable, and professional policing of these objects, the lack of screening for dangerous travelers themselves is obscured.

Conclusion: IPS

IPS is useful for directing our critical attention to these understudied sites of local, national, and global politics. Airports are spaces of shared authority where sovereign and disciplinary powers are both mediated and disaggregated. Within the specific workings of preclearance and airport security, the airport is neither a smooth transit zone nor simply a gate into the nation, but a complex of private and public agencies wrestling with the impossible task of perfect security and perfect mobility. As Pearman suggests: ‘‘airport capacity is about runways and the ability of terminal buildings to process people and to provide, in retail and entertainment terms, an ‘experience’ ’’ (2004:235). Scholars of the airport or mobility must not be seduced by the romance of translocality without ﬁrst understanding the ways that the ‘‘experience’’ of the airport varies dramatically according to who is traveling, on what documents, in what class, and with what sociocultural political baggage. The celebration of the airport as a supermodern space of ambiguity, resistance, and freedom is overplayed. While the airport may be a ‘‘machine for processing and controlling mobility’’ (Fuller and Harley 2005:43), a ‘‘space of ﬂows’’ (Castells1982), a ‘‘space between spaces’’ (Iyer in Crusher 2006) it has the inverse effect of rendering mobility entirely problematic, shattering notions of sovereign space, and complicating the assumptions of stable identities upon which the nation rests. Neither scholars nor citizens should confuse the freedom of mobility for some with the openness of the institution. The dominance of the risk management paradigm depends on the confessionary complex and the self-sorting of safe and dangerous travelers. The acceptance of self-policing, as part of the risk management strategy, leads individual travelers to accept greater and greater intrusions into their privacy and liberties. Given the propensity we have as confessing subjects, we must be on guard for the expansion of interrogators. The search for dangerous objects obscures the fact that aviation security screening cannot effectively deter or detect dangerous people. Within Foucauldian analyses of total institutions, there is a tendency to assume the smooth functioning of knowledge/power networks in a way that reproduces relations of dominance and obedience with little room for resistance. Critical theorists have also exaggerated the abilities of governmental institutions to mobilize technologies of surveillance and control, especially in response to the war on terror. In the case of airport screening, as Bennett (2005) conﬁrms with respect to passenger name record data, the state has not become big brother it is not all-seeing, all-knowing. Without relinquishing our vigilance to the increased ambit and abilities of state authorities to police mobile populations, at present in Canadian airports, that ability is limited. This analysis of the governmentalities at play in this international airport invites several questions. What are the politics of resistance at the airport, beyond the romanticism of the global nomad or the protest of specific policies? As Haggerty and Ericson aver, it is the particular ethereality of the surveillance assemblage that makes resistance such a challenge: ‘‘In the face of multiple connections across myriad technologies and practices, struggles against particular manifestations of surveillance, as important as they might be, are akin to efforts to keep the ocean’s tide back with a broom a frantic focus on a particular unpalatable technology or practice while the general tide of surveillance washes over us all’’ (2000:609).

#### Airport and Port security measures reify state control and securitization politics

**Pallitto and Heyman 8** – (Robert and Josiah, Professor of Political Science @ Seton Hall University AND Professor of Sociology and Anthropology @ The University of Texas, “Theorizing Cross-Border Mobility: Surveillance, Security and Identity,” Surveillance Studies Network, 2008, http://www.surveillance-and-society.org/articles5(3)/mobility.pdf) SIyer

Before we turn to the core of our argument, however, it is worth summarizing briefly the history of movement control both within and beyond the bounded nation-state. The thrust of our analysis is that the monitoring of movement, including specific techniques of identification, inspection, clearance, and surveillance, are diffusing from existing national borders to a more widely “distributed” network of control points. Mobility control is deployed inside bounded polities, but as Hardt and Negri (2001) show, it also moves through globally networked sovereignty. Thus, it is necessary to look within, at and beyond national borders as we survey the history of movement control. Over the last several hundred years, there has been a close relationship between state imposed and political personhood (drawing on Torpey, 2000; Caplan and Torpey, 2001). Pre-modern polities had fragmented, personalistic identification, such as letters from local notables, in keeping with their geographical organization of innumerable communal locations and fractured boundaries. In this form of distributed control, states had a limited capacity to inspect, record, and track people. Identification and tracking were greatly strengthened by the rise of nation-states as the political figure of the citizen emerged – with their rights and assigned duties within a nation’s bounded territory. Citizenship limited movement to the outside and likewise, at times, the inward movement of outsiders (non-citizens) was restricted. Overall, however, a specific kind of political personhood emerged that entailed rights to move around the national space. The emerging era of distributed intra- and transnational mobility controls that we will describe shortly is built on this foundation. There have been two broad trends. First, there is increased volume and speed of movement in the world system, though transnational movement itself is hardly new. Checkpoints and barriers may continue, but they have to cope with, and in the case of many privileged travelers and commodities facilitate, high-speed global movement. Second, territorialized regulatory frameworks continue to operate. The programs we will discuss often emerge first at and continue to rely heavily on borders for identification, inspection, and tracking. However, the bounded units involved may change (such as the shift in part of Europe from a national system of movement regulation to a multi-country bounded zone, so-called Schengenland), and the systems of transit control are also diffusing to non-border settings (Lahav, 1998). We link these changes to a process of “securitization”: the spreading of national security techniques across a wide variety of issue domains. When policy issues are raised within a securitization context, they immediately appear urgent to the safety and perhaps even the survival of the society. Thus, immigration and drug trafficking call for swift and drastic action when “security” discourse is used: what were, before, issues simply to study and address over time became the very terrain on which struggles for survival must be fought (Wæver, 1995; Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998). And of course, securitization strengthens the central government (Wæver, 1995). The events of 9/11 gave considerable impetus to the “securitization” of mobility by means of distributed borders -- a development that was, however, well underway before 9/11 (on the securitization of the U.S.-Mexico border, emphasizing technological “solutions,” see Ackelson, 2003).

#### Airport security controls people on fundamental levels through biometric surveillance, creating a biopolitical border and reducing them to mere bodies to be managed

**Adey ’07**, - PhD, lecturer in cultural geography and course tutor for the Dual Honours Human Geography programme, (Peter, “Airports, Mobility, and the Calculative Architecture of Affective Control,” 26 October 2007, ScienceDirect)//aberg

Airports are gateways that differentiate. They sort people through the latest surveillance techniques of retina scanning [biometric systems](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339), algorithmic recognition and through passenger profiling software ( [[Curry, 2004]](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib45) and [[Lyon, 2003a]](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib84)). Power is often focused upon these sites as they act as the contact point between people and the state ([van Houtum and van Naerssen, 2002](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib136)). Forcing people through these bottlenecks means that those in the corridors of power may exert influence over those in the corridors of movement. We can take a recent article by political scientist [Lisle (2003)](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib83) to elucidate this further. Lisle explores the complex deployment of airport power through the different imperatives of the airport’s function. She asks, “what is political about the airport” ([Lisle, 2003](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib83), p. 3). Lisle wants to uncover how power is enacted through security and surveillance measures (see for example [[Adey, 2004a]](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib1), [[Adey, 2004b]](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib2), [[Curry, 2004]](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib45), [[Dodge and Kitchin, 2004]](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib55), [[Lyon, 2003a]](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib84) and [[Lyon, 2003b]](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib85)), through techniques of commercial maximisation ([Freathy and O’ Connell, 1998](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib62)), or for operational purposes. However, while Lisle wants to get at these different power plays, she questions the tendency for scholars to focus upon the personal feelings of loss, hope, [anxiety](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339), joy, and others. She writes: “Although we may experience feelings of loss, hope, [anxiety](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339), joy, adventure, homecoming, and fear in airports, we seldom think beyond these personal experiences and ask how contemporary forms of power are being produced and deployed at the airport” (2003, p. 3). While I am very sympathetic to Lisle’s call to explore the mediated way by which power is enacted in airports and other border zones, I think that she misses the way the power relations she labours to uncover are just as evident within the very ‘personal experiences’ she wants to move beyond. Perhaps Lilse’s approach is not surprising given that technological infrastructures can seem fairly remote from felt experiences. Stephen Graham refers to the way transportation infrastructure has often been metaphorically ‘sunk’ by academics, reinforcing infrastructure’s sunk physical reality as it lies beneath pavements, homes and cities ([Graham, 2000](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib68)). Sociologically, airports have similarly been defined as rather blank spaces and devoid of excitement and interest; they are considered abstract, boring, placeless – perhaps non-places ([Augé, 1995](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib22); see also [[Adey, 2006]](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib3), [[Merriman, 2004]](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib101) and [[Rowley and Slack, 1999]](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib113)). In contrast, I argue that the movements, feelings, and emotions found in airports should not be subtracted from the powerful forces that permeate the airport terminal. While [[Augé, 1995]](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib22) and [[Castells, 1996]](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib37) and others discuss the perceptual experiences of airport life, I will argue that these feelings, motions and emotions are predicated by a form of airport control; bodies, both physically and emotionally, are opened up to power ( [[Agamben, 1998]](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib6) and [[Fuller and Harley, 2004]](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib65)). In other words, the paper seeks to examine how the affective expressions of hope, fear, joy, sadness, and many others, as well as the constitutive mundane bodily motions that occupy the airport terminal, may not be as distanced from power and control as we might think. In fact, they are central to their perpetuation as certain triggers – designed-into the terminal space – are intended to excite bodily and emotional dispositions at an unconscious and pre-cognitive register. Thus, the paper uses the recent interest in ‘mobility’ and ‘affect’ to explore how these motions, feelings and emotions, as Lisa Adkins puts it, “have interests and interests that matter” ([Adkins, 2005](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib5), p. 15; see also [[Thrift, 2004a]](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib127) and [[Thrift, 2004b]](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib128)). The paper explores how airport operators are realising that people are not ‘disembodied universal subjects’ ([Imrie, 2000](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib73)) – rational billiard ball-like objects that make logical decisions (an approach not unlike that practised by Geography’s positivist spatial science ( [[Barnes, 2001]](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib23) and [[Sheppard, 2001]](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib119)). Rather, airports are recognising that passengers are embodied, and have important physical and emotional relationships with the airport terminal building.[1](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#fn1) No doubt there is a sense that this realisation could be seen as a continuation of the ‘biopolitical border’ – delivered by biometric technologies which capture bodily information (see [Amoore’s, 2006](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib13) recent article). This is important, for we must also realise that the techniques explored below also embody the calculative and probabilistic virtualities often associated with risk management practices employed at border zones and nodes on the global mobility regime ([Salter, 2007](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib117)). The knowledge of what bodies can do, how they will react to emotional and physical stimuli in an imaginative futurity opens up entirely new ways for manipulation as airport designers and operators attempt to engineer and facilitate affect.

#### Airport security uses risk calculation to create a dichotomy between threats and non-threats, whereby passengers are seen only as information to be analyzed.

**Adey ’07**, - PhD, lecturer in cultural geography and course tutor for the Dual Honours Human Geography programme, (Peter, “Airports, Mobility, and the Calculative Architecture of Affective Control,” 26 October 2007, ScienceDirect)//aberg

Not surprisingly, the imperatives of safety and security pervade the design and running of airports. The implications for airports have been severe with the eruption of international aviation terrorism in the 1970s ( [[Alexander and Sochor, 1990]](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib8), [[Choi, 1994]](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib38) and [[Wilkinson and Jenkins, 1999]](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib139)). We well know the security procedures every passenger must undergo as security pinch points filter unwanted items such as explosives, weapons, drugs and more at the landside--airside boundary, before the ‘sterilised’ passengers may enter the ‘sterile’ zone of the duty-free airside concourse ([Voigt, 1996](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib137)). As many authors have described, these heavily regulated procedures occur to regulate the mobilities of people that pass through the airport ( [[Salter, 2003]](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib114) and [[Salter, 2004]](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib115)). Clearly, airport security has become an iconic example of national and political insecurity since 9/11 ( [[Rhoades, 2003]](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib112), [[Srivastava, 2002]](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib122) and [[Sweet, 2004]](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib125)). Many scholars have tracked the politics of airport security through the web of surveillance technologies and techniques that permeate the airport structure ( [[Lyon, 2003a]](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib84) and [[Lyon, 2003b]](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib85)). Such issues remain at the heart of airport planning and design. Airport security is the most obvious purveyor of ‘risk management’ and calculation. As sites heightened by states of increased risk and insecurity, airports employ various calculative systems that gauge the individual’s potential to be a terrorist threat. Recent scholarship has suggested that such measures share a common background in marketing and consumer targeting techniques. Passenger profiling systems initially known as Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-screening or CAPPS, and its controversial son CAPPS-II (now Secure Flight), along with the much publicised US VISIT program, work along the principles of ‘dataveillance’, whereby airports gather as much information about a passenger in order to make informed judgements and risk measurements about their propensity to become a threat ( [[Bennett, 2006]](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib26) and [[Curry, 2004]](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib45)). However, a second major imperative shapes these practices. One of the most visibly important interests in airport design today is that of airport commercialisation. Commerciality has become one of the most important focuses of an airport given developments in their ownership, the deregulation of air-travel, and the recent growth of low-cost airlines in Europe and the United States ( [[Arai, 1996]](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib20), [[Ashford et al., 1997]](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib21), [[Binney, 1999]](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib27), [[Blankenship, 1974]](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib30), [[Blow, 1996]](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib31), [[De Neufville and Odoni, 2003]](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib48), [[Kazda and Caves, 2000]](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib74) and [[Sulzmaier, 2001]](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib124)). Ironically, the rise of the commercial imperative has brought with it a similar concern for calculation and prediction that continues into the affective field. Such calculative and predictive thinking is employed in the design and creation of the airport’s architectural space. Airports and other borders work to construct and channel the possibilities of the sensations and emotions experienced within these sites. As [Marx (2005, p. 20)](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib88) discusses, “Many forms of surveillance as border crossing tools and border enhancement tools rely on extending or constricting the senses”; borders such as airports try to channel these senses, they “often aim at limiting or strengthening sense data” in order to construct specific feelings and emotions. Similarly, Massumi suggests that this is within the power of all buildings where, “certain tendencial headings, perceptions and cognitions are backgrounded, peripheralized, or blended-out by the synesthetic economy of movement-across that is regulated by the architectural regime” ([Massumi, 2002](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib92), p. 204). As we will see, however, these designs draw upon vast quantities of statistical data and analytical theorems concerning passenger feelings, needs and wants; airports construct simplified and imaginary passengers with particular affective potentialities.

#### Airport security reduces passengers to mere objects to be ordered and manipulated

**Adey ’07**, - PhD, lecturer in cultural geography and course tutor for the Dual Honours Human Geography programme, (Peter, “Airports, Mobility, and the Calculative Architecture of Affective Control,” 26 October 2007, ScienceDirect)//aberg

Consider how the discursive framing of prediction and calculation is embodied within the figuration of the passenger. In the aviation industry the passenger has usually been referred to and understood under the three letters PAX. According to [Cresswell (2006, pp. 238–239)](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib44) the PAX is essentially the ‘transformation of mobile bodies into a legible record’. The PAX is an abstraction a simplification of real passengers, a generalisation of what real passengers look like, think or feel. According to one report, the PAX resembles “a unit regarded as being of a basic standard, usually miniscule in size, somewhat lacking in both intelligence and general ability to find his way about (especially if he is a holiday traveller on a package tour)” ([Donne, 1988](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib57)). Such conceptions of the passenger are, of course, not new. For architectural critic Lionel Brett, the air-travel industry has often regarded the passenger by way of a modernistic rationality. Writing in the early 1960s he argued: “we have too much Science. To us, the passenger is a package on legs – or more accurately a weak swimmer in the strong current of a Circulation Diagram – accepted, inhaled, sucked into a backwater, ejected, swept on” ([Brett, 1962](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib34), p. 6). Brett found the airport a dehumanising experience that acted as a “sedative, bromide”; it was an ‘antidote to feeling’ (1962, p. 6). But the PAX is also an imaginative figure that can be trialled and tested; the PAX is a simulation or an object to be ethologically experimented with. It can be poked, pricked, and pulled physically and psychologically with the hope that their real counterparts will comply in the same way (see [Adey, 2004a](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib1)). Contemporary airport planners and managers utilise the imaginary PAX as a way to predictively deploy their designs, operations and instructions within the terminal ([Graham, 2003](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib69)). Whilst Brett lamented how the human traits of feeling and desire were so lacking in the formulation of the PAX, sedation, desire and feeling are now fundamental variables in the construction of today’s terminals. Some airport retailers have attempted to differentiate their PAX by building profiles. They understand that different kinds of passenger will react differently within different situations. They do this by building up psychological profiles of potential customers. Some analysts describe this as ‘tapping into the mindset’ of the consumer ([Behnke, 2005](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib25)). In order to do this many airports are employing researchers to provide detailed statistical information on airport behaviour patterns, to build consumer profiles on the kinds of people that inhabit airports – to understand the sorts of motivations that encourage people to part with their money. Drawing on psychological theories from consumer research, they attempt to, “tap into the mindsets of travellers to gain the necessary knowledge that can be used to improve footfall, penetration and conversion” ([Behnke, 2005](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib25), p. 16). These imaginary possibilities are mirrored in the construction of passenger profiling narratives which scholars such as [Curry (2004)](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib45) argue rely on the imagination of future stories. This means that when a passenger is “faced with a particular set of circumstances” the system may predict how they “would likely act in a particular way” ([Curry, 2004](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib45)). According to one report, “leisure travellers […] may not be experienced at using the airport and have the added anxiety of travelling with other family members. The business executive is under pressure of time or work, and may be using a particular airport for the first time” ([Bates, 2000](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib24), p. 45). For others, so-called ‘feeling states’, “may well extend to even the most well-travelled of airline passengers – albeit perhaps a disproportionate affective state compared to other less experienced, travellers” ([Newman et al., 1994](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib103), p. 11). Airport magazines and strategy brochures emphasise the possibilities of the airport market that is unique as a selling point, “representing a captive audience of the more affluent sectors of society. Airports would be foolish not to take advantage of this unique situation by not only putting passengers in the right state of mind to shop, but also giving them a reason to shop” ([Bates, 2000](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib24), p. 45). Airports try to construct ‘compulsive consumption zones’ in the terminal space. The idea of this strategy is that “if the correct state of mind is induced in passengers, and all their needs met, then they will spend, spend, spend” (2000, p. 45). Specifically, some academics have been working with airport authorities to help them understand the relationship between affect and buying. Passenger surveys, questionnaires, and interviews give airports statistical identifiers of the “subconscious elements” which, when activated, may “produce a disposition towards impulse purchasing behaviour” ([Crawford and Melewar, 2003](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib42), pp. 86–87). According to a number of studies, each passenger holds certain affective hierarchical needs. If one need can be fulfilled the need moves up to the higher level. For some airports this hierarchy is envisaged as an emotional pyramid of wants ([Bowes, 2002](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib33)). Each stage on the pyramid is associated with a process within the airport processing system and the affective status of the passenger. Retail is considered right at the top of this pyramid. Passengers will not consider consuming until all the affective states and associated processes have been fulfilled. For the airports, “If one of these lower levels functions has not been satisfied, passengers will not be concerned about the provisions made for their higher level needs” ([Bates, 2000](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib24), p. 44). The result is the imagination of a passenger who, just like von Uexküll’s ticks, has a set of ethological possibilities which can be manipulated and shaped by the airport’s atmospheric and spatial environment. Reminiscent of Jon Goss’s analysis of the shopping mall, the passenger, “is characterized as an object to be mechanistically manipulated – to be drawn, pulled, pushed, and led to flow magnets, anchors, generators, and attractions; or as naïve dupe to be deceived, persuaded, induced, tempted, and seduced by ploys, ruses, tricks, strategies, and games of the design” ([Goss, 1993](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib67), p. 30). Let us now look at some of the main ways, although certainly not the only ways, airports practise affect in design. As we will see, they are premised upon a number of different affective understandings and modalities of control deployed with the supposition of indeterminacy, which is dealt with by prediction and probability. Like the processes discussed just now, they are planned-for without knowing what will precisely happen, nor knowing the precise effects of their intervention.

#### The airport is exclusively designed to close off the potential of passengers exercising free will, ensuring their compliance with the process of securitization.

**Adey ’07**, - PhD, lecturer in cultural geography and course tutor for the Dual Honours Human Geography programme, (Peter, “Airports, Mobility, and the Calculative Architecture of Affective Control,” 26 October 2007, ScienceDirect)//aberg

In contrast to the more openended modalities of affect discussed above, security spaces within the airport employ a more closed-wall style of affective constraint. Physically, the passenger is corralled and contained by barriers, solid walls and security guards ([Pascoe, 2001](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib109)). Even the opportunity to move forward and backwards are closed off by the space as ropes, barriers and instructions hold passengers where they are. The material affordances of the space restrict capacities to move, disrupt, and transgress the physical environment and the intentions it embodies. This way of subduing or even anaesthetising behaviour is matched by an equally important modality. Airport environments are designed in such a way that they disturb expressive resonances of both the emotions and mobility of the passenger. In this instance, the airport design embodies an affective understanding of the transition of feelings and emotions to affect the body’s power to act and move. An architect explained how the space was intended to give people the feeling they were being controlled: [I]t is a very utilitarian looking space in there. It’s a low ceiling. It’s controlled. You’re saying to people you’re now in a controlled environment. […]. And people, they’re not chatting away to each other, they feel quite under pressure (Interview, Airport Director of Corporate Relations, 2003). As several writers have put forward, feelings such as relaxation, excitement and joy are bound up in the capacity of bodies to act, thus, Moira Gatens’ discusses how, “joyful affects which may in turn increase the intensive capacity of a body, others are incompatible relations which give rise to sad or debilitating affects which at their worst may entirely destroy a body’s integrity” ([Gatens, 1996](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib66), p. 169). The understood interrelationship between mobility and affect is bound up within the design of the security area. In particular, it is thought that by creating an uninteresting, and quite oppressive security environment, the idea in many airports has been to induce feelings of melancholy and, to an extent pressure. They do this in the hope of limiting what people do in these spaces. Pressures on security staffing levels as well as the amount of passengers they process per hour are considerable, therefore, airports need passengers to be compliant in order to process them as quickly as possible. Thus, the emotional state of the passenger – affected by the airport environment – is meant to literally close-off the passenger’s capacity to disrupt the security processing system through, for example, walking the wrong way, or by telling a joke or misbehaving. Similarly, some techniques of information bombardment and stress are employed as ways to shut-down and ‘reduce cognitive effects’ ensuring further compliance to security or consumption processes ([Crawford and Melewar, 2003](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib42), p. 92). Having said that, philosophies do differ from airport to airport. For instance, [Salter (2003)](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib114) notes that some airports are employing methods to de-stress and relax passengers in order to achieve a similar result. They do this by using particular materials such as wood panelling and stone, which are seen as especially natural. It is hoped that the use of such materials will suppress the erratic and irrational mobilities associated with stressed and panicked passengers. Seoul’s Incheon airport in particular has installed granite surfaces to enclose three sides of the security area while, “Wood panelling and soothing colours, designed to lower stress levels, line the walls” ([Enlow, 2001](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib59)). In contrast, for Paul Andreu, architect of Charles-de Gaulle-Roissy the philosophy is to expose passengers as much to the reality of flight as possible, “…everything had to be truthful; the materials, the colours, the floors. What is more reassuring for someone entering a building than a concrete beam which says I can hold weight, I am here to hold the weight of the building, everything is just fine, just don’t worry” ([Andreu, 1997](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib19), p. 91). Therefore, Andreu’s technique is to expose passengers to the infrastructure of the building. As Koos Bosma writes, “The space surrounding the flowing movement [of the passengers] should radiate not only an atmosphere of comfort and luxury, but also one of reassurance and mild euphoria, against a backdrop of necessarily facilities” ([Bosma, 1996](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib32), p. 61). However, for Edwards, feelings of groundedness are provided by natural materials in a way not to expose but to hide technological truths and infrastructures, “…to touch an oak handrail or to walk on a slate floor” he writes “is to provide comfort for people in an alienating place” ([Edwards, 2005](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib58), p. 152). Such techniques are used for not just security purposes, but for wayfinding and consumption once ‘impulsive trait tendencies’ have been identified. At a particular airport, the materials they used for the flooring are intended to give a sense of grounding to people, helping diffuse the anxiety of flight. The architect stated that they wanted: “Good quality finishes, and natural materials […]. The flooring looks nice, it’s limestone, but it also has that feeling – solid” (Interview, Airport Architect, 2003). Approximately 10,000 limestone tiles were imported from Italy for this purpose. The floor was highly reflective, bouncing the natural light coming in from the glass façade. It was hoped that the feelings such a floor invoked would stimulate movement forward through the terminal. In fact, the airport believed the flooring would create a ‘yellow brick road syndrome’ that would pull the passengers past the retail environment. Strategies such as these attempt to create a ‘powerful’ and “persistent urge to shop for something immediately” ([Omar and Kent, 2001](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib105), p. 235). To follow [Allen’s (2006)](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib11) recent account, we can conclude that these forms of stimulation and restraint might correspond with his notion of ‘ambience’. Allen describes how there is something about the: “character of an urban setting – a particular atmosphere, a specific mood, a certain feeling – that affects how we experience it and which, in turn, seeks to induce certain stances which we might otherwise have chosen not to adopt” ([Allen, 2006](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib11), p. 445). Such a power is both suggestive, invitational, it is not closed but it inhibits choices and potentials. This kind of power is not read or communicated but it is done through experience; in feeling and inhabiting airport spaces we can argue that “possibilities are closed down by degree through their ambient qualities” ([Allen, 2006](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib11), p. 445).

#### Airport processes create stages of emotion that can be manipulated to ensure psychological compliance with the system.

**Adey ’07**, - PhD, lecturer in cultural geography and course tutor for the Dual Honours Human Geography programme, (Peter, “Airports, Mobility, and the Calculative Architecture of Affective Control,” 26 October 2007, ScienceDirect)//aberg

Our final form of airport affect concerns the techniques which relate not to the physical environment of the terminal, but the processing stages and technologies that facilitate passengers’ journeys. These different stages in the airport process are seen as ‘hurdles’ to accomplish before anxious states of emotion can decrease. Once passengers’ feelings of anxiousness, fear, nervousness, stress and pain have reduced to a certain level, it is perceived that they will then be more likely to spend money ([Bowes, 2002](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib33)). It is in this sense that the airport is envisaged as a landscape of differential affect. Many airports take account of what they see as a time–space processing dependence on the distribution of affect throughout the terminal space. Given the relative states of anxiety associated with different spaces within the terminal and different processes, the propensity to spend money is not strewn evenly throughout the airport. Mark Salter describes how the security spaces are usually considered to be the most intense. He writes how the power of the state, “is internalized into an anxiety of the confession. We do not worry “will the state exclude me because it can?” But rather we think: “have I told the whole truth? Is my story believable?” With “Please step over here” we panic. At the utterance of “Welcome” or “Welcome home” we sigh in relief to have passed the sovereign test” ([Salter, 2007](http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016718507001339#bib117), p. 59). One’s mobility through the airport processing systems is a movement through a range of emotions and feelings. Thus, many airports try not to place retail units within the immediate vicinity of security or check-in, so not to suffer the adverse effects of the affectual intensity of these sites. Similar processes and intertwinements between motion and emotion are evident in the signage systems and electronic flight information displays airports posses. Take the signage system. While the instructions signage systems convey are obviously important, signs are designed with affectual intentions that are woven into the structure of their placement and how they are presented. For instance, a respondent mentioned that the signage was used, “primarily to set up the terminal, to deal with a multimillion passenger throughput and making the experience as pleasurable as possible” (Interview, Director of Airport Operations, 2003). The spatial and temporal structuring of the information not only simplifies the instructions the airport gives people, but if the information is successful and passengers follow the system easily, the signage becomes important to the feelings of passengers and the commercial success of the airport. A respondent stated: [I]f you look at what aviation is about these days, with this it’s a massive stress, it’s very very highly stressed. Cos you’re not only trying to find where you’re going, you’ve got security, you’ve got Sept 11th what happened there. So when you get to the airport you’re worrying. It’s where do I park my car, where’s my passport, have I turned the gas off. So the more we can sort of de-stress it by getting people to the right place at the right time, the more they will benefit. And again the more they keep them relaxed, when they get through the process, the more likely they are to spend. The more likely. So it’s all that process. The calming influence (Interview, Director of Airport Operations, 2003). The active agency the Operations Director delegates to the signage system is seen as something intrinsically important to how passengers feel. However, it is not just the signs themselves that are intended to induce pleasure and enjoyment in the passenger, but the movement they afford. One of the major purposes of the signage system was to, therefore, not only direct passengers but to achieve a particular state of mind and emotion given the stressful situation of air-travel. For the interviewee this was achieved by allowing the passenger to feel at ease that they were moving in the right way and, furthermore, that they could find areas of the airport quickly and easily. The ease and simplicity of the signage was therefore important in stimulating relaxation in the passenger – to de-stress the situation. As a respondent stated: “if I can make a sign, make it clear, make the person happy so they clearly know where they are going to, they are going to be far more relaxed and more likely to spend” (Interview, Director of Airport Operations, 2004). Clearly, this is a kind of inducement bundled up with a hidden manipulation. Passengers are rewarded for following the signage directions with a feeling of happiness and relaxation that they have made it to the correct area of the airport. But given the economic and operational aspects of airports, as described earlier, this calming influence is supposed to benefit the airport. For if it works, it allows the airport to achieve their operational through-put and commercial targets. It is in this way, then, that airports can be much more than just a means of getting onto aeroplanes. Rather, they are being gradually constructed so as to require passengers to undergo “clearly defined series of patterns”. Such processes, not only process the passenger in the sense that they are prepared physically and logistically for take-off. The processing systems conversely prepare the passenger in a way that gives them psychological reassurance, in preparation for security compliance and consumer expenditure.

#### Airport security employs repressive biopolitical strategies that diminish value to life

**Adey, 09** – lecturer in cultural geography at Keele University (Peter, “Facing airport security: affect, biopolitics, and the preemptive securitisation of the mobile body,” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 2009, volume 27, pages 274-295, 2/23/2009)//HK

What do the processes of airport security feel like? Rosaldo, in his visceral poem (cited at the beginning of this paper), describes this. How is one quite literally touched by the procedures of airport processing, as Lisa Parks (2007) has recently asked? With a `command', Rosaldo writes, we spread our legs. The bowing down to untie one's shoes, and to remove them, appears, for Rosaldo, to be symbolic of the submission of the body to the procedures and practices of airport control. What humiliating actions must one endure? We need to ask what quality of life issues are at stake here? Do we submit to humiliation, embarrassment, and some pain, to make us supposedly more safe? We know, for instance, that airports are remarkably emotional places of dread, boredom, fear, excitement, sadness, and terror. Airports have atmospheres of tension, a stressed feeling. They resemble the sorts of `jittery spaces' Steven Flusty (2004) refers to. But this image of an excitable body awakened by airport imagery, signs, symbols, and the hustle and bustle may be contrasted with passivity (Bissell, 2007), such as a body, hungered, fatigued, or exhausted from standing in the immigration queue. For many people, airports and air travel constitute some sort of rite of passage, a journey we must endure if we are to get to our destinations. It is easy to argue that these sorts of anxieties, fears, and experiences are being ignored by academics [although for a counter point see Salter (2007a)]. Though it is less the case for airline, airport, and security professionals who have long worked to previsualise and imagine the passenger's needs and wants in order that their behaviour might be predicted and therein anticipated. Such an attention has arisen in part so that the consumerist political economy of the airport terminal can be managed at a profit as passengers' `felt experiences' are made both measurable and quantifiable (Adey, 2008; Lisle, 2003; Salter, 2008). In other new developments, airport security is becoming more and more responsive to how security is experienced. Consider how these concerns are attended to by the TSA. Their spokesperson Kip Hawley explains, ``We recognize that the checkpoint is an interruption in the way of boarding a flight and often can be a source of frustration for travelers. TSA is moving to an approach where we spread out and calm down the security process. This should decrease stress at checkpoints, improve security, and improve the passenger experience.We're working with our airport and airline partners to establish a more calm security environment'' (2007a). 278 P Adey Here, we see an amazing shift in the intended consequences of security in the ``moving toward a calmer, more nimble process'' as Hawley (2007a) describes it. To sum up, examined according to frames of the biopolitical, the regulation of airport mobilities may be characterized as a movement from the `pan-opticon' to the `ban-opticon' in the sense that such controls are not necessarily disciplinary but are addressed through the other pole of Foucault's apparatus. The power based on abandonment refers, in contrast, to a model of disengagement; ``it is a `banopticon' in the sense that it seeks proactive control and risk management rather than normalization'' (Bigo, 2002, page 82; 2006; Muller, 2004). As Louise Amoore puts it, this is ``an extension of biopower such that the body, in effect, becomes the carrier of the border as it is inscribed with multiple encoded boundaries of access'' (2006, pages 347 ^ 348). Both practices of biometrics and profiling employ a schema of technologies and procedures of recognition and calculation in order to deal with an uncertain future (Crampton and Elden, 2006). Both are based upon or have the effect of discriminating one person from the next. As Mick Dillon and Luis Lobo-Guerrero put it, ``The general problematic with which these biopolitical security techniques of population became preoccupied was ... the problem of differentiating good circulation from bad circulation'' (2008, pages 279 ^ 280). But the idea of biometrics and profiling is that they are also preemptive. Profiling enables the prediction of eventualities in order to prevent them, whereby biometrics sort out some identities from others in order to cancel out specific identities likely to present risks and therefore future eventualities. As Amoore writes, ``What Van Munster (2004, page 142) has called a `discourse on eventualities' has allowed the war on terror to be fought preemptively'' (Amoore, 2006, page 340).

#### Airport security systems animalize their subjects, rendering their lives bare

**Adey, 09** – lecturer in cultural geography at Keele University (Peter, “Facing airport security: affect, biopolitics, and the preemptive securitisation of the mobile body,” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 2009, volume 27, pages 274-295, 2/23/2009)//HK

Let us now explore several avenues of discussion that relate to the practices and technologies I have just described. Enrolled into a form of anticipatory governance (Anderson, 2007a; 2007b; forthcoming; see also Lackoff, 2007; Massumi, 2005), according to several logics of preemption, precaution, and preparedness, the body, I suggest is both imagined and rendered simplistic but not necessarily calculable; it is almost animalistic and organic engaged by an even purer form of biopower which depends less and less on individual bodies. If biopolitical control is premised upon the securing of a specific referent object what Foucault (2003) refers to as the generalisation of the human as a species I suggest that such techniques, by attuning themselves to affects, imagine and render a specific kind of body-subject capable of being affected (Dillon, 2007a; 2007b). The airport and the process of air travel have almost always been associated with a regressive dehumanisation, although these have normally been reserved for petty class differences, resentments, and minor discomforts (Sparke, 2006). Such a comparison is perhaps nowhere better made than in the observations made by David Mutimer (2007; see also Feldman, 2007), who explores Syrian-born Canadian citizen Maher Arer's extraordinary rendition from JFK airport in the United States to Syria for detainment and torture `by proxy'. As Mutimer writes, ``It was at this point that his passage through the airport hub departed from the standard through which we all have passed, and in ways that render the dehumanization of that standard passage little more than the mildest affront to our personal dignity Arer was `rendered extraordinarily' '' (2007, page 160). Deprived of his rights for a fair trial and access to legal representation, Arer was quite literally stripped of all of the things that made him human `extraordinarily rendered' as a bare life. I think we can compare Arer's treatment to a process of what Agamben describes as `animalising the human' (cited in Bull, 2007), whereby, as Agamben (1998) quotes from Foucault, ``the animal life of man'' is taken as the subject of action bestialised ``through the most sophisticated political techniques''. To be stripped of all the rights and civilities which made Arer human made his treatment as an animal validated. (8) It is important to note that these procedures, technologies, and practices have not been implemented immediately, although instant judgments are something they attempt to instil within the airport screener. Rather, they are requiring security screeners to be trained so that they might be able to address these expressions as quickly as they happen.Whilst such an aim is fulfilled through automotive forms of surveillance which capture these transitions, it is also being developed through the increasing capacity of an agent to spot them through so-called `thin-slicing' (Gladwell, 2005; see also Budd and Adey, forthcoming). Facing airport security 283 Whilst I make no claims that the sorts of practices discussed should be equally compared to anything like that experienced by Arer, their deployment embodies a similar underpinning logic of preemption, and an imagination of a subject that oscillates between a prehuman animality and back. For as well as producing a dehumanised subject, such practices are premised upon an in-built imagination of a simplistic yet threatening animalised subject. This is a `` `zoopolis' '' of sorts, ``in which `citizens' are reduced to naked bodies'' (Diken and Lausten, 2006, page 450) and stripped back to what may be thought of as an even simpler `biopolitical domain', a space which Thrift once described as the ``blink between action and performance ... pre-set by biological and cultural instincts which bear both extraordinary genealogical freight and '', as I show in particular, ``a potential for potentiality'' (2000, page 39; Tinbergen, 1969).

#### The aff is a gateway to every biopolitical harm—it justifies complete normalization of people and spaces to achieve their own safety

**Adey, 09** – lecturer in cultural geography at Keele University (Peter, “Facing airport security: affect, biopolitics, and the preemptive securitisation of the mobile body,” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 2009, volume 27, pages 274-295, 2/23/2009)//HK

5 Discussion: the biopolitical securitisation of airport security ``It is the edge of the virtual, where it leaks into the actual, that counts.'' Brian Massumi (2002, page 202) This paper has sought to describe and understand an assemblage of technologies, knowledges, and practices which attempt to regulate mobilities across and through borders such as airports. In an extended discussion, the paper now sets out three specific yet related implications before gesturing towards some further research conclusions and directions. Firstly, it may be simply said that specific knowledges and expertise directly from academics like Ekman are becoming used and deployed in methods of surveillance and control, leading to what Agamben (1998, page 122) describes as an `intimate symbiosis' with the `scientist' and the `expert'. The frame of the biopolitical may seem initially distant from such an approach, and particularly from conceptions such as affect. Characterised as a technique to manage and govern the `population', biopolitical security takes as its referent object, as Foucault would have it, the species-being a life to be secured. I have suggested that the ``imperative of sovereign power to make known'' (Dauphinee and Masters, 2007, page xi, emphasis in original) has made known the species-being as a category with facets of ``the mechanics of life'' and other ``biological processes'' (Foucault, 1980b, page 139). Into this referent object `intrudes' not just the biologic-scientific, but neuro-psychological and physiological principles (Agamben, 1998). In their assemblage of psychological and security expertise, the procedures outlined have made apparent traits of compulsion, drives, instincts, and responses known, identifiable, and measurable (Dingfelder, 2004). It is in this sense that such procedures render the passenger-subject as more or less than human. Treated, read, and scrutinised according to basic indicators of fears and passions that agency cannot disguise but only make worse (Tomkins, 1991), the passenger-subject is continuously partitioned into different sorts of life. What Agamben (2004) refers to as a mobile border helps to capture the continual transgression of passenger-subjects moved in and out of boundaries boundaries of the nonhuman, vegetal, or organic, of the animal or inhuman, of inside and outside the flesh, just as the subject crosses the threshold of the airport/border (Feldman, 2007). Secondly, perhaps the capacity for security to address, identify, and capture affects is nothing unique. As suggested, Foucault's (2007) analysis of security asserts that the `felicity' the well-being and happiness of the population is its aim. The techniques examined are a continuation of a touchy-feely form of security concerned with identifying and thereby securing the well-being the feelings of its population. But in the examples discussed it is the feelings of the population that are used as the very means of security. Thus, while life `constantly escapes' (Foucault, 1980b, page 143) techniques of governance and administration, the practices I have described appear to be determined to envelop this register. But let us be clear that behavioural profiling is far from a simple example of biopolitical security, for it, rather, achieves a blurred distinction between simply making known and other disciplinary forms of normalisation, coercion, and incitement. Most recently, Charlotte Epstein makes a similar assertion using biometrics. She writes that ``A biometric system controls the movement of disciplined bodies in and out of a space, to protect both the space and the bodies within it. Hence, while in its design the system evokes both forms of surveillance, it ultimately subsumes the punishing aspect of surveillance under the security objective, all the while relying centrally on the successful operation of discipline'' (2007, page 154). In this way, behavioural profiling actively regulates and disciplines; it abstracts and manages, while it also normalises and incites.

### link—bike lanes

**The slow, healthy bicycle highways are designed to take cyclers off the main roads, in the search for the most efficient regulation, reproducing inequalities between the automobile driver and the cycler**

**Bonham and Cox 10**—Senior Lecturers in Sociology at the University of Chester (Jennifer Bonham and Peter Cox “The disruptive traveller? A Foucauldian analysis of cycleways” June 2010 <http://adelaide.academia.edu/JenniferBonham/Papers/372359/The_Disruptive_Traveller_A_Foucauldian_Analysis_of_Cycleways>, nkj)

Abstract

The relationship between the cyclist and the use of roadways and other spaces allocated for travel has a contested history. Pro-cycling advocates have argued from a number of positions for the rights of cyclists to use road space and changes in the location of responsibility for road safety. This paper examines how the widespread introduction of segregated cycle facilities in recent years, while having undoubted benefits can also be seen to raise significant problems for cycling in the context of broader travel behaviours. Bonham’s (2006) exploration of the manner in which travel systems and patterns act as disciplinary regimes can be extended to further develop an understanding of the impact of segregated cycle facilities. Drawing on the insights of Michel Foucault, we have examined texts on cycleways in the United Kingdom and Australia, historical and contemporary, for the way in which cyclists are constituted and positioned. The findings are complex. Overall, recent texts produced within the health sciences begin to normalise cycling, while those produced within the field of transport position cyclists as disruptive or deviant travellers – albeit in different ways and with different outcomes depending on the broader context. In each case, the cycle way becomes a special space that enables and constrains cycling, while cycle practices are constituted as slow and disorderly, leisurely, often social and always requiring a ‘quiet’ (both in terms of traffic and noise) context. We conclude that the cycleway, by removing cyclists from road space, ultimately operates to maintain rather than challenge existing travel norms. We argue the consequences of this segregation may be profoundly at odds with the potential of cycling as a core component of sustainable mobility.

INTRODUCTION

The relationship between the cyclist and the use of roadways and other spaces allocated for travel has a contested history. Pro-cycling advocates have argued from a number of positions for the rights of cyclists to use road space and for changes in location of responsibility for road safety. This paper examine show the introduction of segregated cycle facilities in recent years, while having undoubted benefits, also raises significant issues for cycling in the context of broader travel behaviours. In particular, we are interested in whether the separation of cyclists from other road users constitutes the cyclist as disruptive or ‘abnormal’, a traveller to be dealt with as a ‘special case.’ Further, we ask if displacing cyclists onto cycleways has the effect of excising them from the day-to-day travel routine and of facilitating ‘normal travellers’ (i.e. motorized transport users) in the unhindered conduct of their journeys. If this is the case, segregation of cyclists may operate, perversely and paradoxically, to maintain rather than to challenge existing travel norms and hierarchies. This paper analyses texts on cycling for the way they place cyclists, especially in urban environments. We work from the position that what is written is not a more or less accurate reflection of reality but actively constitutes (shapes) that reality in ways that leave room for contestation (Larnerand Walters 2004:3). We focus on texts because they are sites in which discourses (bodies of knowledge)emerge and we are interested in the economic, transport and health discourses through which cyclists are constituted and positioned in relation to others. These discourses objectivise bodies in specific ways, establish new categories of being (subjectivities), create new techniques of measurement, produce new norms and relate bodies to each other in different, often competing, ways. In this understanding, cyclists are not self-evident, fixed beings but the unstable outcome of on-going processes of differentiation and contestation over the (mobile) body. We have analysed historical and contemporary texts produced through parliamentary, research, planning and lobbying processes. We have compared texts produced in the United Kingdom and Australia (but especially South Australia) because they are countries with particularly low levels of cycling. We acknowledge that a comparison between these countries and the Netherlands or Denmark would provide rich insights into different ways of thinking about the place of cyclists in urban space; however, such a project is beyond the scope of this paper. We have examined texts for the way in which they ‘locate’ cyclists in urban space and we are particularly concerned with discussions of cycleways – off-road infrastructure designed for bicycle passage forming a separate right of way. This paper is divided into three sections. The first establishes the theoretical underpinnings of our analysis. Our discussion relies on a very different theorisation of the individual, of the subjects (or categorisations) of travel, and of the relationship between power and knowledge than is generally used in the transport literature. And our paper will only make sense if the key features of this theorisation are explained at the outset. The second part of the paper analyses texts produced in the pre-and post-WWII periods as competing discourses that target the cyclist as either a political or an economic subject. The final section examines contemporary texts for the ways in which cycleways are discussed, and the characteristics, qualities and actions attributed to the ‘cyclist’. Of particular interest is the way the cycleway and the cycling body is constituted, and potentially normalised, in discourses on health and whether or not this perspective challenges transport norms. Put simply, we ask the question: do cycleways challenge or reinforce existing travel norms and hierarchies?

BRINGING FOUCAULT INTO TRANSPORT

In contrast to the broader transport literature, we do not theorise the individual as a natural, pre-social being simply choosing one mode of travel over others. Drawing on Michel Foucault, we are interested in the techniques through which people in contemporary societies come to think of themselves as individuals and regulate themselves towards, alter or resist the subjectivities (or subject positions – e.g. as cyclists, pedestrians, motorists) available to them (Foucault 1982). We take the view that the production of knowledge about human beings – which has proliferated since the eighteenth century – and the operation of power which enables that knowledge is central to our capacity to think of ourselves first as individuals (Digeser 1992) and then as particular types of subjects (Foucault 1977,1978). In this sense, those who produce and utilize transport knowledge participate both in shaping how people can think about their journeys and instructuring the field of action of individual travellers. It is impossible to review the key elements of Foucault’s work in this article, instead we offer a brief introduction accompanied by an example of how Foucault’s work can be utilised in transport. Readers unfamiliar with Foucault are directed to McHoul and Grace (1995) for a concise introduction and Bacchi (2009) on applying Foucault to policy analysis. Foucault offers an understanding of power as productive, as producing particular types of being and knowledge (Bacchi 2009:37–8). He identifies different types of power (Hindess 1996:96–136)and, although governmental 1 and bio power are important to transport, our paper focuses on discipline as it foregrounds the role of ‘spatialising’ practices 2 in processes of objectification and subjectification (the formation of subjects).Disciplinary power, fundamental to the self-regulation that characterises modern societies(Foucault 1991:101), has enabled the production of knowledge about the capabilities and capacities of human beings that, in turn, facilitates innovations in the exercise of power (Foucault 1977:224). It is through the operation of power at a micro-scale, the sorting and physical separation of the human mass– constituting difference through the discursive mechanisms (records keeping, data collection)involved in separating, scrutinising and monitoring bodies – that knowledge of singular bodies has been produced (Foucault 1977:191–2).From the moment we are born – separated from our mothers, gendered male or female, weighed, measured, named, allocated the special space of a cot and monitored at regular intervals – we are subjected to and made subjects through myriad practices involving the operation of power and the production of knowledge. The procedures of inscription which bring individuals into effect and objectivise bodies in specific ways – as healthy or ill, learned or illiterate, political or passive, law abiding or deviant, mobile or stationary –simultaneously enable the aggregation of those singular histories into knowledge of populations where norms, the limits to normal, and deviations from the norm are constituted (Foucault 1977, 1982).An important point here is that these are not necessary ways of knowing individuals. Rather, conditions at different moments enable objectification of bodies in new ways. With this knowledge, individuals are worked upon through systems of punishment and reward to regulate themselves according to the norm while those found wanting – disruptive, abnormal– might be removed altogether. Travel is but one domain in which bodies have been objectivised and subjectivised 3 ; separated, scrutinised and worked upon and, in the case of cycleways, removed altogether. Through the late nineteenth but especially the twentieth century it became thinkable, practicable and meaningful to study urban movement. Until recently, the meaning of that movement has been asserted and widely accepted as ‘transport’ – the journey from a to b specifically to accomplish some activity or task at point b (Bonham 2000). Over time, the journey, or trip, has come to appear as ‘self-evident’, as mechanisms for the study of journeys –origin–destination studies, household travel surveys, vehicle counts – excise particular practices from the mass of daily activities and bring them under scrutiny. Objectifying travel as ‘transport’ establishes the journey as a by-product of its endpoints – derived demand – and provides the imperative for trips to be accomplished as quickly, or as economically, as possible

(Bonham and Ferretti1999). ‘Derived demand’ functions as a ‘statement’(Foucault 1976:102–17) within the field of transport, a statement that both disciplines those who would study travel, and discounts, if not excludes, the many other possibilities of our journeys. Drawing on Foucault’s (1980:119) understanding of power as productive, the objectification of travel as transport is productive in that it has enabled the development of a vast body of knowledge and brought new subjects into effect – the pedestrian, cyclist, motorist, passenger. These subjects have been facilitated through the operation of power at amicro-scale involving practices of differentiation and separation of users of public space, identifying those who are stationary and those who move(Bonham 2002; Frello 2008), and subsequently scrutinising, sorting, categorising and disciplining those who move according to the conduct of their journey (Bonham 2006). A number of practices –particular ways of moving, particular types of observations, pauses, conversations – have been separated out, excluded as NOT-transport and marginalised in the space of the street. Other practices – keeping to course, attuning hearing, sight and reflexes to the operation of vehicles – have been worked upon in disciplining the mobile body(Bonham 2006; Paterson 2007).In cities across the world, the contemporary division and regulation of the public space of the street (and road) has been guided by a transport rationalization of urban travel (Bonham 2000). Streets have been divided lengthwise and travellers allocated space according to the speed and order with which they travel (Bonham 2000). The mobile body has been incited to move at speed to ensure the efficient operation of the city. However, in the early twentieth century, widespread concern over motor vehicle-related deaths and injuries underpinned debate over prioritising speed or safety. The debate was resolved (but never quite fixed) in favour of speed, with ‘vulnerable’ road users giving way to the fast(Bonham 2002). The slow and disorderly –pedestrians, horses and carts – were removed to the margins, checked by the fast and orderly, or excluded altogether. Overall efficiency, measured in time, could only be assured if each traveller agreed to be orderly – hence all those road safety techniques and programs that train bodies in ‘correct movement’(Bonham 2006). The public space of the street, often identified in political discourse as a site available to all citizens, effectively becomes an economic space where the subject of transport discourse, conducting the economical journey, gains primacy. Subjugating oneself within the discourse on transport – becoming the efficient or economical traveller, which in the twentieth century has meant taking up the subject position of the motorist – is rewarded with priority in the use of public space. These individual rewards invoke wider social rewards through the increase in the reproduction of capital through the facilitation of movement (Cox2010). Indeed, an entire literature on globalization has employed this metaphor of increased flows in speed, volume and depth to describe globalization of capitalism from the end of the twentieth century (Boran and Cox 2007). Transport discourses are thus woven into discourses on the nature of public good and of socio-economically responsible behaviour, reinforcing the linkage between travel behaviours and ‘responsible citizens’. The knowledge produced about individual travellers is not only enabled by the exercise of power but also facilitates the further exercise of power. Power–knowledge relations operate at a micro-scale subjectivising singular bodies while, at a macro-scale, the subjectivities constituted within different disciplines (e.g. economics, demography)are deployed in the government of populations(Foucault 1981, 1982, 1991). Further, the aggregation of data about singular bodies not only allows the calculation of norms (and deviations from those norms) but in liberal societies, where citizens are constituted as free and incited to exercise freedom of choice (Huxley 2008), this knowledge is central to government as populations are guided rather than directed toward particular ends (Rose 1990;Gordon 1991; Rose and Miller 1992). In terms of transport, knowledge produced about individual travellers and singular journeys is combined into knowledge of urban populations and used to guide the choices of the population toward economical movement and the economical operation of the city. This process values speed and prioritises the reduction of travel time ahead of the impacts on health, environment and social exclusion that accompany increases in speed and travel energy consumption (Lohan and Wickham 1998; Whitelegg1993, 1997).

PLACING CYCLISTS

The division and regulation of street space according to a transport rationalisation of urban mobility has not gone unchallenged, and material outcomes have varied according to conditions in individual cities: the retention of the tramways in Melbourne or the establishment of shared traffic precincts in German cities are cases in point. But bike riders have been a constant provocation within traffic and transport discourses and the related division of urban space. Cyclists remain difficult to locate in terms of propulsion and vehicle design(Cox and Van de Walle 2007), subjectivity and place. Historically, decision makers, lobbyists and bike riders have vacillated between providing for cyclists on-road, removing them to off-road spaces or ignoring them altogether. Evident within these discussions is a tension that persists today between the cyclist as a political subject, a citizen with equal rights to use public space, and the cyclist as an economic subject – either as a producer who participates in the urban economy or as an economical traveller located within a hierarchy of speed and order. Three brief examples must suffice to illustrate the uncertainty over where to locate cyclists and the tensions these discussions reveal. Attempts through the inter-war years to remove cyclists from the road often met with resistance. The first experimental segregated track installed in the UK in 1934 beside the Western Avenue in North London led to active campaigning from the Cyclists’ Touring Club (1935) as they argued cycle tracks were ‘the thin end of a wedge ultimately to drive bicycles off the road’ (Way 1966:165). 4 By contrast, Frank Urry, a member of the UK’s Ministry of Transport Advisory Council in the 1930s, argued the impracticality of removing ever-growing numbers of cyclist-workers from the streets (Transport Advisory Council 1938). In the former case, the cyclist was located within a political discourse of citizenship rights while in the latter case the cyclist was identified as an integral part of the urban economy, thereby shifting attention from political rights to the most economical means of facilitating the worker. Similar discussions took place in South Australia where bike riding was linked to the worker (Honorary Committee 1936;State Traffic Committee 1938) and this particular economic construction seems to be at the heart of cyclists maintaining an on-road presence. In both the UK and South Australia, debates over cycle tracks were abandoned during WWII when austerity measures and the rationing of fuel for civilian motor vehicles meant personal (private) mobility was effectively given over to the bicycle, alongside public transport provision. In contrast to the segregation measures of the pre-WWII period, cycling was largely ignored in post-WWII urban and transport planning. In South Australia, cycling was discounted within (Adelaide City Council 1957:8) or excluded from bureaucratic routines of data collection and reporting (e.g. Highways and Local Government Annual Reports)or studies of urban transport (e.g. Town Planning Committee 1963; De Leuw, Cather and Company1968). Despite the shift of industrial and retail activity to suburban locations and anecdotal evidence that cycling was an on-going part of the journey to industrial workplaces, shops and schools, cyclists were simply ignored in post-war transport planning in Australia and the UK. Notable UK exceptions were the new town projects of Harlow and Stevenage (and subsequently in Milton Keynes),which included extensive cycle-only routes. In general though, engineering plans provided for motor vehicles – moving and parked – but not for cyclists (e.g. De Leuw, Cather and Company 1968).As cyclists were ignored in transport data collection and transport texts, they were also ignored in street space. The aftermath of the 1960s freeway debates saw renewed interest in cycling that invoked a new round of discussions about the appropriate place of cyclists. The Director General of Transport in South Australia argued cyclists were to be encouraged‘…to use low traffic volume residential streets and, where possible, exclusive tracks’ (Department of Transport, South Australia, 1974:1). In the UK, urbanist Jean Perraton (1968:162) argued for the construction of cycleways. On a modern road system the bicycle is an archaic anachronism, delaying and worrying car drivers and endangering its rider … The quality of urban living will be enhanced if [people] also have the opportunity to cycle on paths which are safer, quieter, with cleaner air and closer to grass and trees than urban motor roads. There are a number of important points to be drawn from this text. First, Perraton constructs mobility practices in terms of progress by juxtaposing the ‘modern road system’ and the ‘archaic anachronistic’ bicycle. This evolutionary view of mobility operates to naturalise and depoliticise the reconfiguration of public space Perraton is proposing, one that facilitates motorists and excludes cyclists. Second, Perraton identifies the bicycle rather than the cyclist as ‘out-of-place’, making this vehicle, rather than the motorist or motor vehicle, responsible for endangering the cyclist’s life. Third, Perraton contests the place of bicycling in the transport order, constructing it in terms of lifestyle rather than access. If cyclists have no place in the transport order, they can be readily excluded from the road, a transformation completed in Perraton’s use of the term motor roads. Finally, as the bicycle is characterised as ‘delaying and worrying car drivers’ a hierarchical relation is established between the cyclist’s journey as a problem and the motorists’ journey as the norm. In this instance, segregated cycle facilities – paths or cycleways – become places for the abnormal journey and cyclists are treated as a special case. Segregation of cyclists onto cycleways echoes the exclusion of ‘abnormal’ bodies (e.g. the sick, the mad, the delinquent) discussed in Foucault’s genealogical works (1977). Removing this disruptive traveller facilitates the routine flow of urban life and enables closer scrutiny of the ‘abnormal’ body. However, cycleways were never seriously implemented in the UK or Australia, possibly because on the one hand cycling could be positioned as a mode of transport without a future – the disruptive traveller would eventually disappear –or on the other hand as a lifestyle activity that did not have to be prioritised in terms of urban infrastructure. Comparison with Dutch and Danish texts of this time would provide important insights into different discursive constructions of cycling and the alternative governmental tactics they enable. Over the past two decades, automobile-oriented transport systems have been re-problematised 5 in terms of environmental degradation, urban congestion, resource depletion associated with peak oil, and the health implications of aging populations and sedentary lifestyles (e.g. Freund and Martin1993; Horton, Rosen and Cox 2007; DfT 2008).Environmental concerns gained traction through the 1990s bringing the mobile body under scrutiny, combining the economic subject who makes the journey as quickly as possible with an environmental subject who minimises resource use and waste out of concern for the environment . In addition, from the early 2000s the mobile body and practices of walking and bike riding have been increasingly scrutinized and worked upon within discourses on health. Seizing this moment, organisations and individuals sympathetic to cycling are shifting bike riding from problem to solution, and cycling practices are gradually being inserted into transport policy and planning. Alongside these developments, there are growing demands for closer scrutiny and accounting of cycling, including cost-benefit analyses of infrastructure, on and off-road cycle counts, and evaluations of cycling infrastructure, programs and promotions (e.g. SQWconsulting2008). Through these mechanisms, discourses on cycling and the subjectivity of the cyclist operate as sites to resist marginalisation of bike riding within transport discourse. However, these discourses also subjugate cyclists in new ways, as we proceed to explore in the next section. They are not an escape from the operation of power or power–knowledge relations, but they operate to fill the category of cyclist with new content. It is within this context and through the intersection of discussions on transport, environment and health that the provision of specific infrastructure measures such as cycleways are brought back in as ‘an opportunity to positively encourage cycling’ (Arup and PartnersLtd. 2009:4).

CYCLEWAYS IN TEXTS TODAY

Although bikes still make up a fairly small proportion of traffic (in frequency and space), their growing on-road presence challenges the practices and priority of motor vehicle mobility. Transport professionals, academics and cycle lobbyists in the UK and Australia continue to debate the placing of bike riders in urban space. Australian state transport departments are implementing various mixtures of on- and off- road infrastructure: New South Wales has focused on off-road facilities such as cycleways, Western Australia appears to have a more even mix between on- and off-road paths, South Australia concentrates on on-road infrastructure. The following section examines texts produced on cycling spaces for the ways in which they simultaneously constitute the cyclist, and practices and rationalisations of bike riding. We focus on discussions of cycleways – those routes that provide cyclists with travel possibilities outside the existing road network and highway systems (paths that run along river banks, through parklands and across the countryside) rather than bike lanes marked out on the street. However, these segregated routes –also referred to in some literature (particularly from the US context) as bike trails – are often linked to specific segments of the urban road network so the discussions frequently overlap. In the UK, the primary motive force behind the creation of surfaced and marked cycleways has come from Sustrans. Originally formed as a lobby group in 1977, Sustrans was registered as a charity in 1983 and has continued to work in partnership with local authorities on numerous projects, including the National Cycle Network and a mixture of signed on-road routes and off-road cycleways, frequently utilising disused former railway routes. Sustrans weaves together discourses on transport and health as the stress in all its original descriptions of cycle routes is related to health, safety and congestion: [t]hese routes provide real, practical benefits to local communities countrywide, reducing traffic fumes, easing congestion and providing a pleasant alternative to the stress and danger of motor traffic (Sustrans 1994). Echoing commentators from the 1960s (e.g. Perraton1968), Sustrans consistently emphasises the sharing of off-road routes by all non-motorised users. It foregrounds the health benefits of cycling in its self-presentation and the lobbying process used to establish partnerships with statutory bodies for infrastructure and other projects (Sustrans 2009). Sustrans provides creative, innovative and practical solutions to the transport challenges affecting us all. By working with communities, local authorities and many other organisations, we create change by putting people at the heart of activities, enabling many more people to travel in ways that benefit their health and the environment (Sustrans 2010). Sustrans’ emphasis on health resonates with the emerging health promotion and preventive medicine literature. Over the past decade, the health benefits of cycling and walking have been tested, and supported, through medical studies that relate these modes of travel to mortality and morbidity among given populations (Andersen et al. 2000;Chief Medical Officer 2004; Hamer and Chida 2008).

Further, as norms have been established in relation to the amount of exercise necessary to maintaining a healthy body, practices such as walking and cycling have been included in health surveys to determine the level of physical exercise undertaken by given populations (Kavanagh et al. 2005).The mobile body objectified within the health and medical literature directly challenges the transportrationalisation of mobility and the concept of ‘derived-demand’ (see also Kitamura, Mokhtarian and Laidet 1997). The journey is not simply a by-product of its origin and destination but is itself meaningful – it might be performed in conjunction with an origin and destination (or not) but its meaning exceeds the ‘trip’. This health perspective opens new ways of thinking about mobility and facilitates the production of new norms in relation to urban movement. The procedures inherent in creating health and medical knowledge lend considerable authority to this alternative view of mobility which commands serious attention and governmental action. In Europe, discourses on health have been recognised and encouraged through the creation of the Lifecycle Project (http://www.lifecycle.cc/), while in Australia the Healthy Spaces and Places (http://www.healthyplaces.org.au/site/) initiative links mobility, place and health. The emergent discourse on health and the governmental programs spawned by it have the potential to facilitate a cultural shift in practices of travel as they operate to regularize and normalise cycling (and walking).In this context, the cycleway might become the place for working toward the healthy body as its users are brought under scrutiny for securing health outcomes (Cohen et al. 2008; Merom et al. 2003; Evenson, Herring and Huston 2008) rather than as displaced and disruptive elements of transport. However, to date, as Sustrans, and others, specify the qualities of cycleways they simultaneously link a particular set of practices – slow, quiet, possibly meandering, appreciation of ‘nature’, peaceful, open to interruption and involving others – to the conduct of the healthy journey. 6 Consequently, the cycling body constituted within transport discourse – as slow and disruptive/disorderly – is largely reproduced in these discussions of health. Similarly, a range of practices – fast, direct, practical, continuous and solitary – are silently marked as inappropriate. But bike riders using cycleways –like mobile bodies everywhere – combine a range of practices at different times and under different circumstances. Like health, safety has been a recurring theme in discussions on cycleways and the concept of ‘quietness’ links health and safety through reference to noise, speed and volume of traffic. In promotional materials for the range of cycleways and tourist routes constructed in the UK over the past two decades, many built in conjunction with Sustrans, constant and repeated reference is made to the ‘traffic-free nature’ of the routing. Immediately, the cycle journey is marked as NOT -traffic, and therefore not part of the normalised flows of vehicular movement on the highways. A series of examples illustrate this process whereby ‘traffic-free cycling’ becomes the selling point of such schemes. Sustrans explains the status of ‘The Jubilee River and Slough Linear Park: Traffic-free cycling opportunities between Slough, Maidenhead and Windsor’ (UK) as part of a wider project to promote cycling: [Sustrans] is behind many groundbreaking projects including the National Cycle Network, over twelve thousand miles of traffic-free, quiet lanes and on-road walking and cycling routes around the UK (Sustrans, Slough Borough Council and The Royal Borough of Windsor and Maidenhead 2008). Similar sentiments are expressed in promotional materials and leaflets for cycleways across the UK: ‘The Water of Leith is a peaceful, traffic free route from Leith to Balerno’ (Edinburgh Council nd);‘Ride through the peaceful South Tyne Valley on a traffic-free greenway to the spectacular Lambley Viaduct’ (Hadrian’s Wall Heritage Ltd 2010 Hadrian’s-Wall-Country); and, advertising holiday accommodation: Although many parts of the UK now have too much traffic for safe cycling, there are parts of the country where you can cycle in relative safety. Some railway tracks have been converted into dedicated cycle ways which is probably the ideal way for families with children to take to the road plus there are numerous national cycle routes and way-marked trails (Country Cottages Online2010). These texts are at odds with attempts to promote daily cycling, as they locate bicycling ‘outside of everyday life’ and ‘outside definitions of traffic.’ Arguably, the assemblage of ‘cycling as a holiday or leisure activity – safe cycling – absence of traffic’ casts doubt on everyday utility riding. Further, in constructing bikes as NOT-traffic the needs of cyclists can readily be dismissed in traffic modeling and planning. In Australia, cycle routes often comprise a mixture of off-road facilities (cycleways, veloways and paths) and on-road ‘quiet’ streets. In a caption accompanying a map of the proposed bike network for Sydney, producers of the NSW Action for Bikes strategy stated: The result will be 420 km of major off-road cycleways and 214 km of major links on quiet streets. There will also be sealed road shoulders in semi-rural areas for experienced cyclists (Roads and Traffic Authority 1999:5). An update to that plan explains: The Metro Sydney Bike Network is made up of off-road paths and on-road links using quiet streets, with facilities offering safe and attractive travel for less experienced cyclists (NSW Government 2010:10). Similarly, the Perth Bicycle Network, while including a wide variety of roads, also relies on quiet streets: A local bicycle route adds value to the concept that ‘every street is a bicycle street’ by linking a series of quiet ‘residential’ streets which need little improvement in order to be attractive and safe for cycling, to provide continuity for somewhat longer trips (Bikewest 1995:5). As ‘quiet spaces’ are designated appropriate to cyclists, the cycling body is simultaneously constituted as one that is averse to or which does not function properly in places with noisy, busy, fast-moving traffic. The constant reference to ‘quiet’ places raises suspicions about the bike rider that uses ‘busy’ streets. Further, as ‘residential’ and ‘local’ streets are identified as appropriate sites for cycling, those who ride along shopping and commercial streets can be called into question. The current debates over the place of cyclists echo those of the inter-war period. Much of the discussion focuses on where and how cyclists should ride to ensure their safety, leaving little more than a disgruntled murmur, dismissed as irrational, around changing the conditions that place cyclists at risk. Several additional issues are raised in relation to this problem of safety. First, a question arises about which cycling body is made safe from what. A recent Australian study found that women prefer to cycle on off-road paths or less heavily trafficked roads (Garrard, Rose and Lo 2008). However, the vast feminist literature on women’s use of public space (e.g. Trench OC and Tiesdell 1992; Valentine1992; Wekerle and Whitzman 1995) suggests that quiet streets and cycleways at night, or in especially ‘out-of-the-way’ places, may be equally or more ‘risky’ than riding on a main road. Indeed this is acknowledged in some cycle planning literature and in anecdotal evidence from women cyclists(Arvidson 2008). 7 The cycleway as ‘haven’ resonates with those uncomplicated constructions of the home as ‘escape’ or ‘haven’ and risks fixing gender, in terms of the spaces and practices of cycling, with off-road spaces being feminised and on-road cycling as masculine. A second issue relates to the infantilisation of the bicycle rider, which takes place in two ways. First,the cyclist is constituted as a vulnerable or ‘soft’ road user. They are often characterised as endangering their own lives, taking unacceptable risks or refusing to take responsibility for their safety. Second, off-road facilities are frequently discussed as serving the needs of novices: ‘...attractive off-road facilities are of particular value because they are more likely to attract new cyclists by overcoming concerns about safety’ (SQW consulting 2008:4). This discursive positioning establishes cycle users as dependent and opens the way for those in positions of authority– ‘responsible adults’ or ‘experts’ – to take charge of bicycle journeys, removing cyclists from the road, providing special protections and particular treatments – with all the negative connotations associated with ‘special treatment’ in liberal societies (Bacchi 2004). Cyclists become those who are indulged. The subordinate status of the cyclist as a traveller is reasserted through the very means by which the intention is to promote and boost the image and activity of cycling. As discussion focuses on a narrow framing of ‘cyclist safety’ – in terms of ‘where they are safe’, the view that cyclists ‘delay and worry car drivers’ (Perraton1968:162), thereby disrupting the economic conduct of particular journeys, does not have to be said. To state in bike plans and strategies that cyclists disrupt motorists would be to invite debate about citizenship and rights to public space. In targeting cyclists through a discourse on safety, which, as argued above, is produced through power–knowledge relations, we do not engage with the explicitly political nature of the placing of cyclists in urban space. Further, and following from this, as attention is focused on practices, bodies and places of cycling, conditions on urban roads go unquestioned. They are simply not considered to be a ‘problem’. Priority for fast, heavy, high-volume, polluting traffic continues to be taken for granted as the necessary outcome of contemporary urban life. Further, in designating cycleways as ‘special’ sites for cyclists, while failing to challenge on-road conditions, we arrive at the current situation where cycling on the road is readily and popularly constructed as inappropriate.

CONCLUSION

This paper is underpinned by the view that street space continues to be divided and regulated according to a transport rationalisation of urban travel – a fundamentally economic understanding of movement which makes governing that movement both thinkable and practicable. This rationalization of movement spawns a plethora of programs to work on the mobile body and guide the traveller in the economical conduct of his/her journey. Further, the transport rationalisation of movement prioritises and allocates space according to speed and order so that practices of walking and cycling become difficult to place on the ‘modern street’. Cyclists’ use of road space has been contested for almost a hundred years as responses to cycling have vacillated between removing them onto segregated paths, ignoring them altogether or, more recently, incorporating them into the street. We have been particularly concerned with the effects of removing cyclists onto the segregated path of the cycleway, the rationalisation through which it occurs and the practices that constitute ‘cycling’ as an aberrant activity and the ‘cycling subject’ as a ‘disruptive traveller’. The cycleway has been deployed in both transport and health rationalisations of cycling. Cycleways, as separate spaces, reinforce norms established through transport discourse. Further, health discourses have assisted in reproducing rather than challenging the way the cycling subject has been constituted within transport discourse – as slow, meandering, interrupted, requiring peace and quiet. In this respect, cycling is entrenched as a health rather than transport practice and, coalescing with modernist planning’s spatialisation of activities, the cycleway becomes the appropriate place for cycling. 8 Paradoxically, the attempt to deal within equalities that are inherent in the move to establish cycleways as special, protected-status spaces,results in reinforcing the cyclist and cycling as the ‘problem’ (Bacchi 2009). Focusing attention on the cycleway allows existing road conditions and travel practices to go unquestioned. Priority for fast, heavy, high volume, polluting traffic continues to be taken for granted, stifling debate on changing travel practices and operating against the establishment of new travel norms.

#### Bike lanes ease the psychological danger of biking without changing anything substantively

**Herr, 12** – Masters student in Geography at the University of Kentucky (Samantha, “Biopolitics of Bike-Commuting: Bike Lanes, Safety, and Social Justice, University of Kentucky, 2012, <http://uknowledge.uky.edu/geography_etds/2)//RM>

As explored in the last chapter, what seems to be the greatest physical danger for cyclists on the road is precisely what bike lanes do not protect against. Categorically, bike lanes don’t provide a physical barrier against motor vehicles, unexpected confrontations with pot-holes and other street obstacles, flying objects or derogatory words, or the subjective dimensions that correspond to the likelihood of these events occurring to some bodies more than others. Instead, bike lanes are employed to affect people’s perceptions. Bike lanes are employed to affect people’s perceptions of how safe it is to cycle on city streets. Consider again this quote from a professional Boston bicycle advocate: You here over and over again, 'Man, I'd really like to bike if there were bike lanes. I'd feel way better if there were bike lanes.' And its not like a strip of paint on the ground makes people safer, it's just that they FEEL safer so then they go riding…(interview transcript 6-16-10). The point of intervention for cycling safety is not the actual safety of bodies, but on increasing people’s perceptions of safety in the hopes that this will work back on the actual safety of bodies. In this way, the bikeways strategy for cycling safety concentrates not on what is, but on what could be—the ‘could be’ of bodily harm, and the ‘could be’ of a safer street and city. In other words, the bikeways strategy for cycling safety is not located in the realm of the here and now, but in the realm of potentiality. Here, “potentiality” is a technical term. Brian Massumi understands potentiality as “the tension between materially superposed possibilities and the advent of the new” (2002:134);25 it is the tension that exists between our materialities and our imaginaries, our reality and our ideals, what is and what could be. For example, in the summer of 2010, 1.65 percent of total trips in Boston were made by bike,26 yet The City of Boston would like to reach at least 30 percent (Freedman interview Transcript 6-23-10). The tension between 1.65 and 30 percent can be understood as potential. Thirty percent of total trips in Boston being made by bicycle is a potential reality that is neither predictable nor necessarily probable—as that level of bicycle commuting in the U.S. is virtually unprecedented—but it is hoped for and possible. Proponents of bikeways that see their ideals for a cycling society as actualized in countries such as Germany, Switzerland, and Denmark (as discussed in the last chapter), understand the high rates of cycling in these countries to be due to their developed bikefriendly infrastructure and people-centered design (e.g. Pucher 2001; Pucher and Buehler 2007; Pucher et. al. 2010; Tolley 1997, interview transcripts 7-7-10, 7-30-10). In this way, bike lanes become linchpins in a collective re-imagining of urban street-space that work towards this possibility. It is true that “infrastructural changes do not have direct causal powers and can only enhance safety and enjoyment in a dialogical way in interaction with bikes, bodies, discourses, feelings and emotions” (Cupples and Ridley 2008:259); but what Cupples and Ridley call an “obsession with cycle lanes” by transport cycling advocates is not necessarily “a will to produce a rational spatial order [that] leads to a neglect of affective and embodied dimensions of cycling…” (Cupples and Ridley 2008:259). Rather, my research indicates that bike lanes currently work affectively. In their current state of implementation in Boston, bike lanes are creating feelings of ambivalence. Cyclists aren’t calculating their risk as demonstrated by the vehicular cycling perspective (see chapter one)—but rather, bike lanes affect cyclists’ embodied experiences riding on the road. Cyclists’ experiences of bike lanes generate ambivalent perceptions of safety. Cyclists feel both safer and less safe. Consider again these contradictory sentiments expressed by one cycle commuter over whether or not the bike lane on Commonwealth Ave. makes her feel more safe. She says, “…the bike lane on Comm. Ave. does not feel safe. I don't care how stupid you are. It's not safe. You know it's not safe, especially when you find cars in it…and motor scooters because they're always in the bike lane as if they belong…” (interview transcript 7-2-10). And then later 74 in the interview, this participant says that the bike lane on Commonwealth Ave. does, in fact, make her feel safer. The green stripe through the BU bridge intersection makes her feel that cars know that she is there, and this makes her feel more secure (ibid., see previous chapter for a full quote). This bike-commuter, as most others that I talked with, distinguishes between actual safety and an affective sense of safety. While this participant expresses knowledge of how bike lanes don’t actually provide more physical safety for her body, a greater sense of safety is nonetheless felt during her experience riding in bike lanes on the road. In the last chapter, I used this example to tease out the disjuncture between the visible and the embodied dimensions of current cycling experiences in Boston. I suggested that cyclists’ bike lane ambivalence is created by their experience of increasing visibility, on the one hand, yet continued experience of bodily threats on the other. This tension between the visible and the embodied, this felt ambivalence over bike lanes, is, unlike the gap between 1.65 and 30 percent, an expression of potentiality made experientially manifest.

### link—congestion

#### Their congestion internal link is based on a discursive storyline molded by industrial beneficiaries of the plan

**Peters, 10** – professor of metropolitan studies at the Technical University of Berlin (Dieke, “Cohesion, Polycentricity, Missing Links and Bottlenecks: Conflicting Spatial Storylines for Pan-European Transport Investments,” European Planning Studies, 11:3, 317-339, 7/2/2010, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09654310303638)//HK

4.5 Bottlenecks Unless infrastructure is interconnected and free of bottlenecks, to allow the physical movement of goods and persons, the internal market and the territorial cohesion of the Union will not be fully realized. (CEC, 2001b, p. 50) The bottleneck storyline is not a new one in EU transport policy, but it has recently reappeared with vigour in the Commission’s new White Paper on the Common Transport Policy (CEC, 2001b). In the section on infrastructure policy, the almost exclusive focus on the issue of bottlenecks in this document is stunning. In some ways, it is a variation of the ‘Missing Links’ storyline. And again, the industry is ahead of the Commission in terms of setting the stage for the ensuing rhetoric. In the mid- to late-1990s, the so-called European Centre for Infrastructural Studies (ECIS) in Rotterdam published two major studies on the ‘State of European Infrastructure’ (ECIS, 1996) and on “Bottlenecks in the European Transport Networks” (ECIS, 1999). The Bottlenecks-storyline aims at creating a strong sense of urgency. Its major implication is that there are congested infrastructures that need to be ‘unblocked’. In its most simple form, it is an unqualified cry for infrastructure expansion. The idea is that the free flow of goods, and by extension, the competitiveness of the entire European economy, is hindered by the limited capacity of Europe’s roads, rail lines, waterways and air routes. In complete disregard for the EU’s Sustainable Development Strategy, which was published the same year, the new Transport White Paper is content in simply focusing on curing the symptoms (i.e. bottlenecks) rather than address transport problems from a more comprehensive, growth-managing perspective. It simply states that the “transport boom is outstripping economic growth” and that this is ‘posing a major problem’. The White Paper’s understanding of the environmentally sustainable policy developed at the Gothenburg European Council is also limited: it supposedly only ‘underlined’ the need “to tackle rising levels of congestion and encourage the use of environmentally friendly modes” (p. 50). As for the latter, this appears to be defined as anything apart from highway funding including multimodal projects, high-speed rail, sea terminals and airports. Already the introductory paragraphs of the section, the writers of the White Paper (i.e. DG TREN) entirely abandon even the slightest nod towards state-of-the-art transport policy—which would advise better management rather than building after demand. Downloaded by [University of Michigan] at 13:50 02 July 2012 332 European Briefing The White Paper suggests concentrating a major share of future TEN resources on ‘unblocking the major routes’, i.e. the existing 14 Essen TEN priority projects as well as a select number of new ‘special’ projects. There is simply no more talk of equal distribution of benefits from infrastructures in this paper. The proposed two-stage revision speaks for itself: The first stage in 2001 … should concentrate on eliminating bottlenecks on the routes already identified as priorities for absorbing the traffic flows generated by enlargement, particularly in frontier regions, and improving access to outlying areas. … [For] the second state in 2004 [t]he idea is to concentrate on a primary network made up of the most important infrastructure for international traffic and cohesion on the European continent. In the entire paper, there is no precise definition of what exactly constitutes a ‘bottleneck’. A section entitled ‘foreseeable bottlenecks’, the White Paper includes missing border links, single track rail lines, lack of bridges, and limitations on certain waterways. Other sections speak of urban ring roads. In the end, the clear tenor is to accommodate rather than manage growth. It would be naı¨ve to pretend that bottlenecks can always be addressed though means other than infrastructure expansion. What is problematic however, is that the Commission should be focusing so vicariously on so-called international bottlenecks in relation to the TENs, since the actual projects hiding behind this designation are often the very same large scale industry-lobbied ‘missing links’ that did not get built (yet) during the 1990s. Here, at a recent conference on the release of the White Paper, the Secretary General of the ECMT, Jack Short (2001, p. 2) warned the Commission not to overstate the case for EU mega projects: Since a bottleneck is where there are severe problems it is logical that investment should show high economic rates of return. But it should be understood that bottlenecks in international traffic might sometimes benefit more from particular national investments rather than high profile and very expensive international projects. For roads, it might be a bypass round Budapest for example or a particular seed investment in terminals for combined transport.22 More importantly, Short reminded his Brussels audience that ‘bottlenecks are not all physical’ and that “there is a tendency to overdimension projects once they are on the maps. Motorways or high speed trains are not needed everywhere” (p. 3). This comment is particularly insightful in light of current Pan-European infrastructure plans for the Central European candidate countries, where ambitions for infrastructure expansion are at a particularly drastic mismatch with actual funding and planning capabilities, and indeed, as Short correctly notes, also with actual needs. Finally, the dramatic resurgence of the bottlenecks storyline also points to the persistent interdependence of Pan-European and urban interests with regard to infrastructure expansion. Apart from bottlenecks at natural barriers and national borders, congestion is primarily related to urban densities. This is a circumstance that opens the way for both cooperation and conflict.

### link—cyber networks

#### Total interconnectedness leads to a bionetwork to allow for more effective control over species-life

**Hight and Perry 06** – (Christopher and Chris, Associate Professor of Architecture @ Rice University AND Adjunct Assistant Professor of Architecture @ Pratt Institute, “The Manifold Potential of Bionetworks,” Perspecta, 2006, JSTOR) SIyer

One manifestation of this is the interest in net-worked practices. With the shift from the second Machine Age to the Information Age, the reflexive network has replaced the assembly line as a preeminent model of organization even as media infrastructures have augmented physical transportation at multiple scales stretching from discrete sites of production and consumption, to economic, political, and even social institutions, and beyond to a global frontier. What is at stake in this shift of models? What we call bionetwork practices seek to capitalize on these developments, continuously modulating flows of information as new forms of design life. We call them bionetworks to refer to concepts of biopower and biopolitics but also because these offices are characterized by prodigious co-minglings of people and social material with media and informational material via communications technologies. This is often as true for the objects they design as it is for the design of the practice. Such practices often span continents and employ information technologies of the global economy while reflexively seeking to expand the limits of architecture's sites of operation and its objects of knowledge to meet the challenges and promise of today's deterritorializations and neocolonizations of space and power. By actualizing this potential, one might reconstruct the opportunity of a technological practice while at the same moment recovering the ethical as an engine of design innovation rather than moralistic codes of conduct (as typically misconstrued). Bionetworks are possible only within the social-technical infrastructures of so-called globalization. However, it is important to think of the global not as a fait accompli but as (at least) two distinct and ongoing unfoldings: one that tends towards centralizing and universalizing values of the whole and organic; the other towards reflexive distributions, machinic heterogenesis, hybridity, and ontologies of multiplicity. These two modes are not dichotomously opposed; rather, organic and multitudinous global- ism operates as two different actualizations of current economic, political, and social singularities. Bionetwork architecture engages architecture's technologies of self-production and its relationship to ontological processes that know no distinction between cultural, technological and biological life forms. It is the latter, however, that produces couplings of technologies with practices most relevant for bionetwork architecture. **Open-source and peer-to- peer, communities such as the Gnutella file-sharing network and "smart mobs" of so-called anti-globalization NGOs are all manifestations of this multiplicitous globalism that employ network organizations and are poised upon a shift from disciplinary structures of control to biopolitical power.** Just as open source communities raise issues of "intellectual property' and file sharing challenges business models of the music industry, can one imagine new forms of architectural practice that reorganize the landscape of architectural knowledge and practice from the normative conservations of professional and academic architecture yet are born from the very techniques and technologies that define existing power structures? Thus, we argue the bionetwork is not ultimately simply a business model but an alternative ethics for the architect - not a technology for the architectural self so much as a praxis of the multitude. This text is itself an dialogic example of bionetwork practice, written collaboratively through internet technologies, blogs, wikis, ftp sites, and email, several cities, from multiple institutional and intellectual contexts through distributed forms of production and identity neither local (specific to one author, one locale, one discipline) nor global (a pure unity and universality). That you are reading the expression of this production in a conventional publication is less interesting than the fact that you are probably doing so because of its association with a set of historically authorizing brands. This is not so much a problem as it reveals the need to question the 'practices' of architectural culture education and knowledge as much as any other economic production.

### link—cycling security

#### The goal of cycling safety is produced by technologies of security that aim to manage and control the population via fear

**Herr, 12** – Masters student in Geography at the University of Kentucky (Samantha, “Biopolitics of Bike-Commuting: Bike Lanes, Safety, and Social Justice, University of Kentucky, 2012, <http://uknowledge.uky.edu/geography_etds/2)//RM>

The bikeways strategy for cycling safety is preemptive. Bike lanes are engaged in the present as insurance for the safe circulation and flow of bodies in the future—a future that hopefully looks like a street in Germany, Switzerland, or Denmark. Feelings of safety in the present respond to the perception of future legitimacy, to the very experience of this process in-motion (of becoming legitimate), and to a ‘safety imaginary’ that hinges on the presence of such legitimacy. This perceived legitimacy qua visibility brought by bike lanes (see the last chapter) is itself a product of a technology of security. Bike lanes as mechanisms of this technique of power, help build ‘the public’ (Foucault 2007:75), notions of freedom and livability, and ideals of inclusion and social justice. They do this, not through claiming spaces of representation like Mitchell (2002) would assert—claims which capture and create artificial stasis—but through managing circulation, managing a “multiplicity in movement” (Foucault 2007:125), managing “freedom” (2007:48-49, my emphasis). Within this framework of security, this freedom is not restricted by law and gained through rights claims, but is rather facilitated and produced through the management of freely moving bodies. Bike lanes attempt to be positively productive. They work to facilitate what people want to do and what they will want to do in the future. In this way, bike lanes participate in an apparatus that “think[s] before all else of men’s freedom, of what they want to do, of what they have an interest in doing, and of what they think about doing” (Foucault 2007:49). It is an apparatus that simultaneously creates and responds to ‘the wills of people’ and a notion of ‘public good.’ It is in this way that bike lanes work towards ‘street for all.’ The bottom line for bikeways believers is that bodily safety increases with increases in the population of cyclists on the road. To produce a greater population of cyclists on the road, transport cycling needs to become more inclusive. Inclusivity is a technology of security in that it preemptively works on the population to effect future behavior as an odds game against risk. To become more inclusive, transport cycling needs to be perceived as a viable option for a wider diversity of people in the city. Bike lanes are used to produce a more inviting and accessible atmosphere for a diversity of cyclists with varying skills, abilities, lifestyles, and purposes. In this way, bike lanes work on the population as mechanisms of inclusion. This is a numbers game, but it is also, very importantly, socio-cultural. Inclusivity, as a safety logic, is a point of convergence between the physical and the ideological dimensions of cycling safety—the physical dimension of the body and the ideological dimension of an idea of a ‘safe space.’ It is also a point of convergence between the individual body and the collective body. Between the individual and collective, physical and ideological, is the unknown of interaction. As noted in the last two chapters, this unknown manifests for many potential cyclists as fear. Fear is the experience of, not the here and now, but a perceived possibility of an undesirable future event. Stated more simply, fear is the emotional experience of threat. The point of intervention for the bikeways safety logic, or inclusivity, is the mitigation of this fear.

#### Power relations condition cycling security on fear and risk—strengthening the power relations that create modes of exception

**Herr, 12** – Masters student in Geography at the University of Kentucky (Samantha, “Biopolitics of Bike-Commuting: Bike Lanes, Safety, and Social Justice, University of Kentucky, 2012, <http://uknowledge.uky.edu/geography_etds/2)//RM>

While Pain’s research has to do with fear related to crime violence, the same can be said for fear related to daily travel. Loukaitou-Sideris (2006), for example, finds that ethnic minorities, and in particular the elderly of this group, experience more fear of walking related to threats of traffic collisions. Similarly, bicycle transportation research shows that women cycle less than men, feel less safe riding next to cars than men, and are less likely to bike if there are not specified lanes because of perceptions of risk (Emond 2009; Krizek 2004). Cupples reflects, “It is no sheer coincidence that commuter cyclists are much more likely to be male, and are often people who don’t have immediate responsibility for the social reproduction of the household” after acknowledging her own productive and reproductive responsibilities, and fear of death by cycling (2011:228). Additionally, Horton (2007) discuses how men who do not have fear for themselves about bike commuting, express fear for wives or daughters if they were to do the samething. While there are, no doubt, many reasons for the differing perceptions of risk, sentiments of fear, and rates of cycling for men and women, the examples here illustrate how notions about female bodies impact fear of particular kinds of movement in the city. It also shows how fear and transport choices can be intertwined with seemingly unrelated material realities, such as care-giving, that are also intertwines with subjectivity. Power relations that play into fear play out in material realities, such as the locations of where income or racial minorities live in relation to infrastructurally impoverished streets, access to types of modal methods stratified by gender, class, and other axis of difference, and whose bodies are more likely to suffer injury or death. Along with her findings on fear, for example, Loukaitou-Sideris (2006) also finds that ethnic minorities disproportionately walk as a mode of transport, and are disproportionately represented in pedestrian injury and fatalities statistics. “[R]isks are not the same for all individuals, all ages, or in every condition, place or milieu. There are therefore differential risks that reveal, as it were, zones of higher risk and, on the other hand, zones of lower risk. This means that one can thus identify what is dangerous” (Foucault 2007:63). Fear is conditioned by subjectivity, but so too is risk. Cycling safety is a mashup of subject positionality, perception, probability, potentiality, and embodied reality. The discourse of inclusivity intervenes at this conjunction. Inclusivity discourse, which is a technology of security, renders cycling safety into a problem of fear and risk, and responds to this rendering through attempting to manage potentialities by affecting probabilities. Inclusivity discourse does this through the negotiation of difference and normalcy. The bikeways discourse of inclusivity that advocates for the inclusion of cycling as an option for travel on city streets and for the inclusion of many different kinds of cyclists, is a project of creating a new norm that maintains multiplicity. As Miller, for example, states, “If cycling is to become mainstream, ordinary, ubiquitous, then we have to find ways to include every potential rider… it requires serious (dare I say ‘affirmative’) engagement with the reality and needs of the under-represented populations” ((blogpost 1/25/11). This is a call to recognize and maintain difference. It is not about trying to get everyone to move the same way, but about providing a space in which different people can move differently within a normal range. Consider again this response from a bike commuter in our conversation about her experiences of bike lanes: Visibility [from bike lanes] has made those of us who are not the crazy eighteen to twenty-four-year-old-boy on their fixed bike darting in and out of traffic being stupid, more comfortable and therefore more visible. And that's important because… they're not the kind [of cyclists] who are going to make drivers think cyclists should be here and that's important to me... (interview transcript 7-2-10). Read straightforwardly, this quote is about visibility and legitimacy. Read sideways, however, this quote is about flows of difference. It is important to this research participant for a person who is not a “crazy eighteen-to-twenty-four-year-old-boy” to be able to cycle on the street as well. From this perspective, it is movement that is of primary concern. In considering her movements through the city, this research participant both distinguishes her movements, and needs that impact her movements, as different from that of a “crazy eighteen-to-twenty-four-year-old-boy on their fixed bike,” and yet the same in that she still needs to be able to move through the city by bicycle. “The norm is an interplay of differential normalities” (Foucault 2007:63). Difference is preserved at the same time as it is subsumed. The norm is created through there being differences that interact in the urban milieu. As the cyclist’s quote above indicates, bike lanes help facilitate these interactions. Bike lanes are mechanisms of inclusivity discourse. Inclusivity, as a technology that gathers differences, helps produce the “plotting of the normal” (Foucault 2007:63). Importantly, inclusivity discourse understood in this light is not about counting bodies, what can be seen, what looks normal, or establishing legitimacy. Rather, it is 83 about what can be expected or predicted, the establishment of a ‘normal’ range of experience. In other words, inclusivity in the Foucauldian sense of security is not about the intelligibility of bodies, but about facilitating their flow through the interaction of differences.

### link—economic growth

#### Using transportation policy to create sustainable development subordinates alternative considerations to the prior goal of economic progress—turns the case

**Schwedes, 11** – research assistant at the Technical University of Berlin (Oliver, “The Field of Transport Policy: An Initial Approach,” German Policy Studies, Vol. 7, No. 2, p. 7-41, 2011)//HK

It was shown, that in the policy field of transport a similar shift of power relations took place. In the transport sector the sit-uation with respect to the central idea of an integrated transport policy appears quite similar as Holger Rogall (2003) described it for the central idea of sustainable development. All agencies are basically in favor, but with a more precise view to the particular goals, considerable differences come to light: “In considering the threat of the natural resources, the majority of the actor groups are not willing to draw adequate conclusions. It is obvious that the indirect as well as the direct actors are concentrating more on making a symbol-policy rather than a solving-policy. Partially (e.g. parts of the economy) sustainability is defined thus the quin-tessence of sustainability is turned upside down. Accordingly, the economic development should not be carried out within the con-straints of the environmental realm but rather, the protection of the environment within the economic compatible” (Rogall 2003: 295).

The discrepancy between the convictions and actions with re-spect to the sustainability discourse, as well as to the integrated transport policy, can be explained by the actors‟ understanding of the necessity to cultivate the image by symbol-policy (Cheney et al. 2004). This practice does not even particularly cover the ca-mouflage of real interests. What is interesting in this regard, is that certain agencies like the automotive industry, are convinced that they do not need this kind of symbol-policy with respect to

32 Oliver Schwedes

an integrated transport policy.16 The reason might be that they do not feel under public pressure.17 That again illustrates the societal function of the central idea of an integrated transport policy. Fol-lowing Eblinghaus and Stickler (1996) a formal and a substantial level can be distinguished: On the one hand, in the diffuse formal concept of the central idea, everyone can find themselves again. On the other hand, with regard to contents, the substantial defini-tion of the concept integrated transport policy by the involved actors, imparted considerably with the disposal of societal power resources. Quintessentially, it manifests a struggle for interpreta-tive authority.

In pursuing a strategy of harmony, by negating factual con-flicts of interest and therefore existing unequal power relations, the central idea of an integrated transport policy performs an ideological function. What Hartwig Berger stated about the sus-tainability discourse as such, is particularly true for the integrated transport policy, aiming at a sustainable transport development: “The recent sustainability discourse compared to the former eco-logical movement does not differ in a broader scope, but in post-poning the radical challenges and weakening the strong impulses for structural societal change the ecological movement once brought on the agenda. Not criticism and conflict but consensus and communication are central terms of the sustainability dis-course. The postulation to initiate change by and in consensus with all participants – an axiom of the most Agenda 21 activities – quickly leads to a down play of different allocations of power and social prestige and even more conflicts of interests. There-fore the sustainability discourse is a comfortable impertinence to power elites” (Berger 2003: 19). In other words, the central idea of an integrated transport policy serves as an instrument for the subordination of competing discourses in favor of a neoliberal transport strategy. This is reflected in the central message of the ruling discourse, transport growth drives economic growth.

16 Neither the three questioned automobile companies (VW, BMW, Daimler AG) nor the German Association of the Automotive Industry would or could say something to the central idea.

17 Some observers believe that is changing right now because of the crises in the automotive industry. The author is more skeptical about it.

The Field of Transport Policy: An Initial Approach 33

Apart from the unequal power relations in the field of trans-port policy, the dilemma of sustainable transport development is characteristically considered as a “publicly, indivisible property”, which barely is recognized. Such general interests, concerning everybody, lack the motivation of organization. “That is why in a highly organized society just these unorganizable and conflict resolute interests are hard to politicize” (Vieler 1986: 191). If however one would stick to the idea of an integrated transport policy committed to the public weal of a sustainable transport development, to date underestimated transport policy would have to be enhanced. Transport policy should no longer remain a play-ing field of economic vicissitudes, but be understood as an im-portant dimension of societal policy and therefore get a stronger voice in the political chorus (Schöller 2007).

To achieve this objective, finally, three constitutive steps are proposed.

First, a political-economic foundation of the sustainability theory has to be established. The sustainability discourse, often criticized as being vague, should for the transport sector be speci-fied in the sense of a **coequality of economic, social and ecologic goals**. A prior goal could be to commemorate basic scientific in-sights in the transport sector which have gotten lost in the neoli-beral backlash during the last 20 years. These could include fun-damental comprehensives which would revoke the plausibility of a transport policy, fixed on eliminating congestion and the traffic flow philosophy. Still on the agenda is a politicization of the transport sector, which for decades was ineffectively pursued by the central idea of an integrated transport policy. In fact, such a project is contradictory to the actual main tendency in societal development and particularly in the transport sector, the commo-dification of politics.

Second, after the first step of scientific inventory and self-assurance, a clearly defined transport policy has to be developed. To start with the political-economic illuminated social configura-tions of power in the field of transport policy, the central chal-lenge will be to address and announce the conflicts with a clear strategy of transport policy. Because, if the future task is an un-derstanding of sustainable transport development as “publicly,

34 Oliver Schwedes

indivisible property”, transport policy has to be more negotiated in public than has been the case up to now, in order to achieve a new significance in public opinion.

Third, at that point and against the background of the une-qually distributed resources of power in the transport sector, the question arises, how another discourse shift can be reached in favor of a sustainable transport development. In this regard it should be stressed that at no time should economic power be transferred into political power. Rather, economic power is al-ways more or less breached by politics. It depends on the societal balance of power how far the political influence reaches. Thus, after the scientific self-assurance and development of a consistent transport policy program, one has to think about a strategic al-liance to win hegemony in transport policy. Although the relev-ance of an integrated transport policy for a sustainable transport development can be scientifically justified, the political will is decisive.

### link—energy security

#### The pursuit of energy security fuels imperialist tendencies and escalatory politics.

**Campbell ’05** – Professor of Cultural and Political Geography in the Department of Geography at Durham University in the UK (David, “The Biopolitics of Security: Oil, Empire, and the Sports Utility Vehicle,” American Quarterly 57.3 (2005) 943-972, JSTOR)//aberg

Securing global oil supply has been a tenet of U.S. foreign policy in the post-World War II era. Because the Middle East holds two-thirds of the known reserves of oil, this objective has made the region an unavoidable concern for successive U.S. administrations. As the largest and most economical supplier of Middle East oil, Saudi Arabia has had a central place in this strategic calcu- lation, with the United States agreeing to defend (internally and externally) the Saudi regime in return for privileged access to Saudi oil. Over the years, this arrangement has cost the United States tens of billions of dollars in military assistance.30 This strategy was formalized in the Carter Doctrine of 1980, which, in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, declared that any power that threatened to control the Persian Gulf area would be directly challenging fundamental U.S. national security interests and would be seen as engaged in an assault on the United States. None of this would be required if the United States did not rely on imported oil for its economic well-being. However, in 2002 oil imports fueled 53 percent of domestic consumption, and the U.S. Department of Energy forecasts only increasing dependence. By 2025 oil import dependence is expected to rise to around 70 percent of domestic needs.31 These percentages mean the United States will consume an additional 8.7 million barrels of oil per day by 2025. Given that total petroleum imports in 2002 were 1 1.4 million barrels per day, this is a very substantial increase. In recent years, faced with increased dependence on oil imports, the United States has been seeking to diversify supply, with some paradoxical outcomes. As the country was preparing to go to war with Iraq, the United States was importing half of all Iraqi exports (which satisfied only 8 percent of Americas needs), even though this indirectly funded the regime of Saddam Hussein.32 Some Republicans in Congress used this data to smear then-Democratic Senate leader Tom Daschle as an Iraqi sympathizer, arguing that the Democrat's failure to support drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) as the Bush administration desired forced America into unholy commercial alliances.33 While this argument conveniently overlooked the fact that ANWR s 3 billion barrels of reserves could supply only six months of the United States' total oil needs, it demonstrated how the internalization of a cleavage between business and environmental interests is sustained through an association with external threat.34 The drive for diversification is now a major security objective. In the 2001 review of energy policy chaired by Vice President Dick Cheney, the final chapter of the report focused exclusively on strengthening global alliances with energy producers to achieve that goal.35 However, the geopolitical pursuit of energy security is likely to produce new and intensive forms of insecurity for those in the new resource zones, which are located in some of the most strategically unstable global locations.36 As a result, the United States has been providing increased military support to governments in the Caspian Basin area, Latin America, and sub-Saharan Africa regardless of their ideological complexion or human rights record.37 A geopolitical understanding of these developments is necessary but not sufficient. That is because the geopolitical frame focuses solely on the supply of oil without interrogating the demand for this resource that makes it so valuable. Possession of a material resource is meaningless unless social networks value that resource. As such, an analysis of the demand side, and attention to the politics of consumption as much as the problem of production, is a first step toward understanding the biopolitics of security.

### link—environment

#### It is impossible to predict the results of the aff’s technology—only reconceptualization can allow for effective decision-making

**Schwanen et al., 11** – professor of geography and the environment at Oxford (Tim, “Scientific research about climate change mitigation in transport: A critical review,” Transportation Research Part A 45 993–1006, 2011)//HK

The idea that transport technologies are means towards ends and that their contribution to decarbonisation can be separated from intentions, aspirations and behaviour is problematic. It can be questioned by drawing on Science, Technology, and Society (STS) studies. A key lesson from actor-network theory (ANT) – one of the leading analytical frameworks within STS studies – is that new technologies tend to act as mediators that change practices rather than intermediaries that realise predefined goals (Latour, 2005). Upon interaction with new technologies, people’s behaviours and intentions are often reconfigured and novelty is inserted in existing routines. It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to anticipate which aspects of behaviours and routines will change. Technological innovations come with fundamental uncertainty, which impose real limits on the predictability of outcomes and on modelling approaches. Hence, when considering the potential contribution of technological changes to decarbonisation, researchers should be much more careful in attributing determinate effects to technological interventions and pay more attention to the minutiae of the practices in which technologies become enrolled (see also Section 5). 4.3.2. Pricing and budgeting The emphasis on, and belief in, economic approaches to decarbonisation in transport operating via pricing and budgeting mechanisms is fully compatible with, and linked to, the EM governmentality and neo-liberalism more generally. While transport researchers have long since emphasised the importance of monetary prices to travel decisions, the more general shift towards market-based approaches and the carbon economy have reinvigorated the idea that ‘‘[p]ricing is absolutely critical’’ (Bristow, 2009, p. 28). Interestingly, authors defend downstream carbon trading approaches amongst others by positioning it as a technique of agency and freedom (Dean, 1999): it both enhances and deploys the capacities of individuals (McNamara and Caulfield, 2011), households (Niemeier et al., 2008) or local communities (Salon et al., 2010) to self-govern emissions levels. Actors are evidently imagined as responsible, active and calculating – neo-liberal – subjects who need not be told what to do when carbon markets function properly. However, these strategies assume that individuals, households and communities are endowed with the competence to allocate their monetary/carbon budgets such that their interests are served in the best possible way. They thus assume that travel choices are primarily governed by an economic, utility maximising logic. While this assumption is common in transport studies (see Section 3.2), there is increasing evidence that other, more-than-rational factors, such as symbolism and affects, play an important role in travel practices (Steg, 2005; Anable et al., in press) and are entangled in complex ways with rationality (Randalls, 2011). Further, the above arguments regarding the introduction of novelty in existing routines can be repeated. Randalls (2011) argues that personal carbon trading will mean that people will re-orient their lives, aspirations and livelihoods and use trading schemes in much more differentiated ways than economic theory suggests. Hence, more may change with trading/pricing schemes than the ways in which people allocate carbon/monetary resources given predefined goals, perhaps to such a degree that the outcomes of such schemes become indeterminable. The voluntaristic model of (boundedly) rational, calculating and self-responsible subjects that is characteristic of neo-liberal governmentalities needs 1000 T. Schwanen et al. / Transportation Research Part A 45 (2011) 993–1006 to be broadened. Richer conceptualisations of subjectivity are required if the full range of effects of market-based approaches to climate change mitigation on individuals (municipalities) are to be appreciated (even if this means that scholars’ ability to predict those effects are sacrificed).

#### The affirmative’s attempt to mitigate climate change through transport draws on inaccurate conceptions of human behavior—they generalize public reactions and ignore the role of the subconscious

**Schwanen et al., 11** – professor of geography and the environment at Oxford (Tim, “Scientific research about climate change mitigation in transport: A critical review,” Transportation Research Part A 45 993–1006, 2011)//HK

4.3.3. Changing psyche The growing reliance on notions and modes of reasoning from social/behavioural psychology can, just like the popularity of market-based approaches to climate change mitigation, be linked to neo-liberalist styles of government and subjectification processes. As Rose (1999, p. 231) documents, neo-liberal discourses of the self hold that individuals actively construe their own life and such domains as work, family, leisure or transport as meaningful and satisfactory in and through the choices they (are obliged to) make. A unique lifestyle is the result, which people are expected to be able to justify and make intelligible to others in terms of motives, needs, aspirations, personal values, likings and so on. Influential models from social/ behavioural psychology, such as the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) (Ajzen, 1991) and Norm Activation Model (NAM) (Schwartz, 1977), are compatible with, and even enhance, this form of subjectification. The growing popularity of these models for understanding the ‘softer’ side of climate change mitigation in passenger transport also reflects that, aided by their quantitative character, they are simultaneously individualising and totalising. Not only do they allow the decision-making processes of individuals to be laid out in separate components; by positing an average or representative subject, they also allow generalisations and the identification of regularities in psychological mechanisms at the population level. They are thus in keeping with biopower thinking. The attractiveness of TPB, NAM and related models in the context of transport related climate change mitigation stems at least in part from the possibilities they offer to target such specific factors as the attitudes, perceptions of control and personal or social norms of individuals within larger populations with dedicated policy interventions (e.g. awareness and promotion campaigns). The self-responsible, active subject positions promoted through such social/behavioural psychology models as TPB and NAM are arguably more textured than those in most utilitarian analyses of behaviour. Nonetheless, these models and the transport studies based on them also expel several issues into invisibility. First, because of their totalising ambitions, the degrees of freedom in terms of the number of factors impinging on behavioural intentions and the structure of relations between those factors are limited. There are clear restrictions on the extent to which differences between people and between situations in terms of drivers of intentions can be captured. Second, models such as TPB and NAM are static, as the dynamics over time and feedback processes are generally not considered. Third, those models intellectualise behaviour (Reckwitz, 2002) as they assume that behaviour is first and foremost driven by conscious thought. However, work in sociology, human geography and other fields – known as practice theories (Reckwitz, 2002) and theories of affect (Thrift, 2007; Clough, 2008) – has shown that conscious thought is but one of many factors involved in behaviour; semi-conscious factors, embodied capacities and tacit know-how are often at least as important. The sidelining of all these processes in the transport literature may be one factor explaining value-action gaps, which is another silence in most psychology-informed studies about travel behaviour change. These gaps refer to the difference between stated values and intentions and actual behaviour (Blake, 1999; Shove, 2010), and constitute significant challenges to such models as TPB and NAM. Hence, we believe that research about travel behaviour change should not only draw on social/behavioural psychology but also on alternative conceptualisations from the social sciences.

#### Attempts to mitigate climate change through transportation policy enable the biopolitical management of resources and their users

**Schwanen et al., 11** – professor of geography and the environment at Oxford (Tim, “Scientific research about climate change mitigation in transport: A critical review,” Transportation Research Part A 45 993–1006, 2011)//HK

At the same time, the dominance of such quantitative methods as models for forecasting future emission levels and regression-type analysis undergirded by positivist epistemologies is consistent with the biopower or green governmentality. This is because these methods allow all carbon consumption in transport activities, which are spatially and temporally distributed across a wide geographical area (typically a country) and time-span (e.g. a year), to be condensed into a centralised account located in a single or several desktop computers. They create what Latour (2005) calls oligoptica – specific sites where the spatially and temporally distributed effects of (future) changes in transport technologies, population composition, land use configurations, and so on, can be observed and monitored. These sites make possible and aid the management of the biosphere’s resources. They allow researchers and others to provide answers to questions about how violations of boundaries on the biosphere’s carrying capacity as a consequence of growing carbon consumption can be avoided, and about how (public) resources available for climate change mitigation can be allocated prudently given those boundaries. The deployment and development of such quantitative methods as forecasting models generate other governmental effects as well. First, virtually all forecasting models used in transport research about climate change mitigation enact time as a linear, objective and singular dimension, and changes occurring at t1 are in principle equivalent to those at t2. Although this understanding of time is common in transport studies and the (social) sciences more widely, it implies that CO2 emissions of quantity x saved will have the same effect in, say, 2020 as in 2040. This (intuitively agreeable) approach entails the favouring of what John Urry (2011, p. 21) calls a gradualist understanding of climate change. Climate change is thus regarded as relatively slow and linear rather than as abrupt, involving thresholds and rapid shifts. Catastrophist understandings of climate change, which revolve around non-linearity and on Urry’s reading are supported by numerous and varied events in the early 2000s (e.g., extreme weather, unprecedented melting of Arctic/Antarctic ice), could be accommodated better if forecasting models and related methods drew on complexity theory. Since these are predicated on non-linearity, they make the urgency of taking action now visible more clearly (Collins, 2010). By incorporating more advanced conceptualisations of time in models and scenario approaches, scholars can offer more nuanced insight into the effects of the timing of measures to decarbonise transport. Secondly, forecasting models also help to reproduce the authority of academic transport studies. While specific methods and results may be challenged from within as well as outside the academic community, quantitative models – more so than qualitative methods like in-depth interviews or ethnographies – confer a sense of objectivity on their developers/users and are capable of generating authority and impact outside academia as well as new research money (cf. Latour, 1987). So, the use of, and reliance on, these methods among transport researchers not only reflects path dependencies and status quo bias. We suspect that they are also popular because their specific and unique capacity to conveniently summarise complex tendencies in carbon use within transport systems and populations reconfirms the societal relevance of academic transport research and helps to secure its continued existence.

### link—food scarcity

#### Food management and city spacing are the frameworks for biopolitical control in which the subjugation of populations is done for the falsified ‘good’ of the majority

Nally 11 – Department of Geography at Cambridge University (David, “The Biopolitics of food provisioning”, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers Volume 36, Issue 1, pages 37–53, January 2011, Wiley Online Library, DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-5661.2010.00413.x)//MM

Introduction

In the late 1970s Michel Foucault began exploring the emergence of a new technique of government that established ‘the basic biological features of the human species’ (Foucault 2007, 1) as the primary object of political strategy. In The history of sexuality, Foucault famously outlined the significance of this development:

The old power of death that symbolized sovereign power was now carefully supplanted by the administration of bodies and the calculated management of life. During the classical period, there was a rapid development of various disciplines – universities, secondary schools, barracks, workshops; there was also the emergence, in the field of political practices and economic observation, of the problems of birthrate, longevity, public health, housing, and migration. Hence there was an explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugation of bodies and the control of populations, marking the era of bio-power. (1980, 140, emphasis added)

For Foucault, what distinguishes the early from the late modern period is the fact that sovereign power is defined less as the ‘right to kill’ and more as the ability to seize, manage and exert influence over the living conditions of individual bodies and whole populations. This does not mean that the ‘power of death’ is completely abandoned, but rather that violence must be rationalised by appealing to future improvements: the pauper will be converted into a sturdy labourer; the prisoner will be rehabilitated; savage populations will be civilised; and wastelands will be transformed into productive environments (Darby 1973; Murray Li 2007, 13). Accordingly, the ‘era of bio-power’ heralded a new taxonomy of everyday life: through administrative measures life itself could be subjugated and managed with a view to the betterment and greater security of humankind (Foucault 1980 2008;Legg 2005; Lemke 2001).

This genealogy of biopolitics is now familiar enough and hardly requires further elaboration.1 This paper instead aims to empirically develop Foucault’s conceptual history by exploring the biopolitics of the modern food economy. The focus on food provisioning is deemed appropriate for two reasons. First, the ongoing publication of Foucault’s lectures at the Collège de France, especially his lectures in 1977–1978, entitled Security, territory, and population, show that Foucault placed the history of food provisioning – and especially the problem of food scarcity – at the very centre of his account of biopower. But while the lecture courses have generated considerable debate, the importance of food in these discussions is generally ignored or poorly reviewed.2 Secondly, in considering food provisioning to be a material expression of biopower, Foucault’s work provides a bridge between research emphasising the political economy of agro-food systems (Friedmann and McMichael 1989) and work that studies the political strategies that regulate biological life (Rabinow and Rose 2006). While the former has enhanced our understanding of the socio-economic transformations, the latter properly reminds us that the spatial dynamics of states and capital are also vital processes (Kearns and Reid-Henry 2009) that can encourage, undermine or otherwise attenuate the potential for life to replenish and flourish. The biopolitics of food provisioning is therefore, a lens to think about how the management of food maps onto strategies for managing life, a synergy that becomes more pronounced as agrarian structures are transformed to suit commercial interests rather than human needs.

My argument proceeds in four parts. The first part reviews Foucault’s writing on food provisioning, the problem of security and the problem of scarcity. I relate these reflections to Foucault’s concern with the ‘economic management of society’, particularly the relationship between laissez-faire economics and liberal government. The second part examines the issue of food provisioning in Europe’s colonies where in fact the drive to eliminate non-market access to food was more acute and biopolitical controls were adopted with greater fervour. The final two sections of the paper use the idea of a ‘biopolitics of food provisioning' to examine corporate efforts to gain control over agricultural life and to turn agrarian systems into a vehicle for capital accumulation (Kloppenburg 2004, 8). The process of commodification through biotechnical innovation – what I term accumulation by molecularisation– is profoundly transforming the evolutionary life of animals and plants, and, in some cases, the very existence of the hungry poor who are finding that their access to vital provisions, and indeed their control over the means of production, is being progressively eroded.

Homo æconomicus and the problem of scarcity

The content of the lectures delivered under the title, Security, territory, and population, might surprise some scholars who believe that Foucault’s concern with the politics of truth is developed at the expense of the vital role of political economy. In these lectures Foucault (2007, 2, 11) shows a strong interest in ‘economic transformations’, which he attempts to define in terms of a much broader history of ‘apparatuses (dispositifs) of security’. This new project opens up four overlapping concerns: first what Foucault (2007, 11) outlines as ‘spaces of security’; second, the management of the uncertain or ‘aleatory’; third, new mechanisms of normalisation; and finally, the emergence of the population as a political-economic problem, and later as a problem of ‘conduct’.

To begin, Foucault shows how these ‘apparatuses of security’ are materialised in the changing morphology of cities in the 17th and 18th centuries. Through the construction of the ‘disciplinary town’, hazards like theft and disease could be minimised and positive elements like the circulation of capital could be reinforced and optimised. Gradually, the spatial fabric of the town – the construction of quays, the partitioning of streets and the spacing of workshops – becomes ordered in such as way as to better manage the population in relation to ‘natural’ and ‘artificial’ occurrences. Focusing on town plans and key urban texts, Foucault shows how

the territorial sovereign became an architect of the disciplined space, but also, and almost at the same time, the regulator of the milieu, which involved establishing not so much limits and frontiers, or fixing locations, as, above all and essentially, making possible, guaranteeing, and ensuring circulations. (2007, 29)

This emphasis on the city as a site of circulation, and the sovereign as the ‘regulator of the milieu’, forms the background to Foucault’s longer discussion of scarcity (la disette) and the policing of grain. The supply and provisioning of food, particularly the threat posed by urban food shortages, brings into sharp relief the concerns highlighted by Foucault earlier in the course. On the one hand, there is the priority of upholding the people’s subsistence rights (what peasants viewed as ‘laws of necessity’) in order to prevent future convulsions and civil disorder. Against this is the emergence of commercial pressures to ensure the optimal circulation of capital and goods. The latter is presented first as a case for purging bad conduct (such as eradicating hoarding, regrating and forestalling practices), but is subsequently theorised as a case for promoting the freedom of trade as a public good in itself.

#### Biopolitics allows the government to let outliers of the system die, wherein food scarcity is used as a violent tool to promote sovereign power

Nally 11 – Department of Geography at Cambridge University (David, “The Biopolitics of food provisioning”, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers Volume 36, Issue 1, pages 37–53, January 2011, Wiley Online Library, DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-5661.2010.00413.x)//MM

This emphasis on the city as a site of circulation, and the sovereign as the ‘regulator of the milieu’, forms the background to Foucault’s longer discussion of scarcity (la disette) and the policing of grain. The supply and provisioning of food, particularly the threat posed by urban food shortages, brings into sharp relief the concerns highlighted by Foucault earlier in the course. On the one hand, there is the priority of upholding the people’s subsistence rights (what peasants viewed as ‘laws of necessity’) in order to prevent future convulsions and civil disorder. Against this is the emergence of commercial pressures to ensure the optimal circulation of capital and goods. The latter is presented first as a case for purging bad conduct (such as eradicating hoarding, regrating and forestalling practices), but is subsequently theorised as a case for promoting the freedom of trade as a public good in itself.

This tension between a nation’s subsistence and the ‘economic management of society’ is most evident in the doctrines of the physiocrats in France (and as we shall see in the writings of free market theorists like David Ricardo and Adam Smith in Britain) who sought to replace the paternalist-interventionist state with a liberal state committed to unrestricted trade.3 However, before the dominance of the physiocrats, the French government operated what Foucault describes as an ‘anti-scarcity system’ (2007, 32). Here he is alluding to the customary mechanisms for ensuring that interventions in times of scarcity were considered ‘an inevitable extension of general state functions’ (Devine 2004, 120). The purpose of these ‘moral economies’ (Scott 1976; Thompson 1971; Watts 1984) differed substantially between societies, though more often than not they included a mixture of price controls, curbs on exportation, the operation of public granaries, prohibitions on the use of provisions for the distillation of alcohol, and the duty-free import of victuals.4 Significantly, these practices were considered preventative rather than remedial: they were designed to stop food shortages from occurring in the first place.

With the ascendency of physiocratic doctrines, and within it the development of a new conceptualisation of the economy, this ‘anti-scarcity system’ begins to implode. According to the free-trade theorists, if entrepreneurial spirit and private interest was encouraged, the deadly effects of uncertain events – like droughts, floods and crop blights – would be lessened and protracted scarcity could be avoided. Indeed, not only was freedom of trade a ‘better mechanism of security’ (Foucault 2007, 34) against famine, but the traditional anti-scarcity structures – in existence for centuries – were represented as the real scourge to be addressed.

This transition to a laissez-faire provisioning model enabled an important epistemological shift in the relationship between the population and subsistence. Under the old mercantile order, hunger and scarcity were considered to be a ‘natural’ phenomena, a reflection of ‘bad fortune’ or a divine condemnation of ‘man’s evil nature’ (Vernon 2007, 3). In the writings of the physiocrats, however, the question of subsistence emerges less as a moral/cosmological concern than as a governmental problem. Famines are no longer thought to be an unavoidable catastrophe (a cosmological crisis) and periodic hunger ceases to be considered as a categorical evil (a moral indictment). Under free-trade principles the fecundity of the soil, transportation networks, husbandry practices, and above all, the efficient functioning of the market, gradually displace the ‘obsessive fears’ that dominate the ‘anti-scarcity’ structures of the mercantile period (Foucault 2007, 35–6).

These developments are critical to what Foucault describes as a nascent ‘ideology of freedom’ associated with European liberalism and ‘capitalist forms of the economy’ (2007, 48). The physiocrats’ conceptualisation of market forces is principally an extended critique of customary food entitlements – now considered unnatural, even dangerous– as well as a prescriptive programme for a radically different kind of provisioning economy. For this reason Foucault is keen to point out that laissez-faire economics does not imply that ‘everything is left alone’. The liberalisation of the food system –‘not interfering, allowing freedom of movement, letting things take their course’– only succeeds by reformulating ‘the permitted and the forbidden’ (Foucault 2007, 45–6) to produce a novel social order and a new level of working on reality called ‘the economy’. Furthermore, the imposition of free markets will require the active collusion of state forces: ‘anti-scarcity systems’ will have to be dismantled; legislative assistance will be needed to place grain markets in private hands; the repressive powers of the police may be called upon to quell revolt, and so on. In other words, free markets emerge from the intimate connections forged between the state and capital. The assumption that markets are ‘natural systems’ operating outside of power and politics is itself an invention of the 19th century that **takes for granted** the violent manner **in which the state must eliminate all behaviour that is now deemed aberrant or undesirable.**

The transition to a free-trade economy also does not mean that famines and other catastrophes will in future be prevented. As mentioned above, re-ordering the food system will in some instances require an increase in repressive measures as artisans, small-holders and agricultural labourers are forced to bear the costs of market regulation (Block’s introduction to Polanyi 2001, xxvii). In Foucault’s words,

there will no longer be any scarcity in general, on condition that for a whole series of people, in a whole series of markets, there was some scarcity, some dearness [in price], some difficulty in buying wheat, and consequentially some hunger, and it may well be that some people die of hunger after all … the scarcity that caused the death of individuals not only does not disappear, it must not disappear. (2007, 42, emphasis added)

Put another way, the old problem of ‘hunger amidst scarcity’ will give way to the distinctly modern crisis of ‘hunger amidst abundance’ (Araghi 2000, 155).

Finally, to legitimise this new biopolitics of provision an ideological distinction between ‘peoples’ and ‘populations’ must be introduced. According to Foucault, the population includes those who conform or adapt to the new economic order; they fall in line with market regulation, even promoting it as a means to attain greater security. The people, on the other hand, are those who ‘disrupt the system’ and ‘throw themselves on the supplies’. They reject the new regime of planned scarcity, and therefore ‘do not really belong to the population’ (2007, 44). For Foucault the act of ‘letting die’ is profoundly connected to the classification of undesirables – what Giorgio Agamben (1995) would later term homines sacri– who are now represented as ‘threats, either external or internal, to the population’ (Foucault 2003, 256). In a liberal biopolitical economy, he concludes,

killing or the imperative to kill is acceptable only if it results not in a victory over political adversaries, but in the elimination of the biological threat to and improvement of the species or race. (2003, 256; see also Minca 2006)

Thus in addition to the identification of ‘artificial’ forms of food provisioning and ‘aberrant’ modes of economic management, there appears a regime of human classification that disaggregates populations according to their conduct and perceived threat to the social order (Dean 2002). Under biopolitical conditions, therefore, scarcity and hunger are permissible in so far as their presence provokes a desirable social or economic change (Raulff 2004, 611). To paraphrase David Keen (1994, 77), famines now have functions as well as causes (Nally 2008).

In this unique genealogy of the modern food system, Foucault does not discuss the political situation in Britain. If he had, he would have found a clear analogue to the birth of liberalism and the biopower of the state that he readily detects in the political and economic discourse of 18th century France. In Thoughts and details on scarcity (1800), for instance, Edmund Burke (1729–1797) relates food supply (‘one of the finest problems in legislation’) to the issue of responsible government. For Burke, public provision was both naive and dangerous:

Of all things, an indiscreet tampering with the trade of provisions is the most dangerous, and it is always worst in the time when men are most disposed to it: that is, in the time of scarcity. (nd, 267–8)

According to Adam Smith (1723–1790) restricting by ‘the violence of government’ the freedoms of the market was the most certain method of prolonging famine (Smith 1998, 597). Similarly David Ricardo’s (1772–1823) views on comparative advantage – suggesting that regions and states should specialise in a single niche product to gain a competitive edge – reinforced the case for interdependent global markets, unrestricted private enterprise and food trade liberalisation (Abraham 1991). Referring to the ‘Irish emergency of 1847’, the liberal economist J.S. Mill (1806–1873) also endorsed market mechanisms as the optimal scheme for addressing food scarcity. In his acclaimed Principles of political economy, Mill warned against ‘direct measures at the cost of the state, to procure food’, favouring instead ‘private speculation’ (1871, 549).

The British promoters of free-trade (Griffin 2009) also dispensed theories about the effective regulation of social behaviour. Although Burke attacked government intervention in the provisions trade, he nevertheless felt that principled administrations should ‘guide our judgment’ and ‘regulate our tempers’, particularly in times of scarcity when ‘multitudes’ are thrust upon the government for support (nd, 251). Such sentiments reinforce Foucault’s point that ‘the people’– those aberrant elements that ‘do not really belong to the population’– need moral guidance and reformatory discipline to correct their individual and collective behaviour. In England the preventive measures that formed the bedrock of the ‘anti-scarcity system’ made way for novel remedial practices designed not to mitigate ‘distress’– the conventional euphemism for starvation – but to stigmatise and discipline the poor (Himmelfarb 1985). This concern with social regulation received its clearest expression in the revision of the English Poor Law of 1834 (Dean 1991; Driver 1993). The new laws established for the first time an epistemological separation and legal distinction between poverty and indigence. This distinction between the ‘pauper’ (a social delinquent) and the ‘labouring poor’ (those who struggled to make ends meet) – codified in law and spatialised in the workhouse – correlates precisely with the caesura distinguishing the ‘people’ from the ‘population’. The Poor Law was therefore a techné for separating the ‘normal’ from the ‘pathological’ in such a way as to naturalise the violence of incarceration and correction. Clearly, market regulation would require certain procedures for disciplining bodies, and in some cases, whole populations (Nally forthcoming).

Colonial agribusiness

This was the situation in Europe, but curiously Foucault fails to consider how the biopower of the state and the biopolitics of food provisioning unfolded beyond the metropole, in the colonies, where European states paid remarkable attention to the biological life of their subjects (Legg 2007; Legg 2009, 222; Stoler 1995). What Philip McMichael (2000, 26) defines as ‘imperial agribusiness’– the use of state and institutional mechanisms to control world agriculture and the circulation of goods – was made possible through colonial expansion, and in particular, the use of temperate lands, their natural endowments and their indigenous peoples (as well as European migrant/colonial populations) to power the process of capital accumulation. At the turn of the 17th century, for instance, the English government formed the East India Trading Company, granting it special exemptions and trading monopolies to wrestle control of markets in tea, cotton, silk and opium. In 1602 the Dutch responded by forming the Dutch East India Company (VOC), using trade restrictions and state monopolies to control commodity markets in South Asia (Braudel 1985). In North America, the Hudson Bay Company administered vast territories and monopolised trade in furs and pelts well into the 18th century, while further south a small handful of royally chartered companies controlled the emerging maritime trade between Europe, Africa and the east coast of the United States.

Out of such intimate connections between capital and state-sponsored violence emerged the first experiment in modern industrial agriculture: the plantation economy. In his fascinating account of the coffee plantations in colonial Ceylon, geographer James Duncan (2007, 35) draws on the work of Foucault to suggest that the plantations were ‘laboratories of modern governmentality’. Duncan’s account highlights the exceptional control over labour (the daily disciplining necessary to insert racialised bodies into the process of surplus production), the creation of drastically new ecologies engineered for the purposes of monocultural production (‘cash cropping’), the growth of an ‘international knowledge economy’ (dedicated to the interests of the planting community and coffee industry), and finally, the role of the colonial state in restructuring markets to encourage export-oriented agriculture (2007, 35, 40). Although the exercise of biopower was never absolute – and workers continued to resist by feigning illness, refusing work and pilfering provisions (Duncan 2002) – there is no doubting the novel nature of the plantations as spaces in which the biological, the economic and the political mixed in a murderous form of capital accumulation (Banerjee 2008; Mbembe 2003).

While Duncan is concerned with the 19th century, his Foucauldian reading of colonial agriculture complements Sidney Mintz’s classic study on the transformation of sugar from an expensive and largely unknown commodity to its central place in Western diets. For Mintz (1986, 51) the West Indian islands, home to the early sugar haciendas of the 16th and 17th century, were the sites of a vast European ‘experiment’– the first synergy of field and factory – which he defines as ‘agro-industrial’. Although proletarian labour in Europe was based on a ‘free contract’ between worker and employer, Mintz finds many similarities between the process of ‘primitive accumulation’ (Marx 1954, 667–724) in the colonies and the ‘precocious development’ of capitalism in Europe. Anticipating the work rhythms of industrial manufacturing (Thompson 1967), for example, labour processes on plantations were acutely ‘time conscious’. Docility and optimal productivity were ensured through a host of corporeal strategies, including dietary management, reproductive controls and physical punishments. Mintz also finds it significant that the slave workforce was composed of ‘interchangeable units’ (a labour structure typical of later forms of capitalist production); that the slaves were divorced from the means of production (e.g. land, tools); and that the entire plantation economy depended on a sharp distinction between sites of production and consumption (Mintz 1986, 51–61; see also Drayton 2002).5

Needless to say, the appalling treatment of plantation slaves differs from the treatment of proletarian labour in Europe. Mintz’s point is not that these labour processes are the same, but that they are connected:

Most students of capitalism (though not all) believe that capitalism itself became a governing economic form in the late eighteenth century and not before. But the rise of capitalism involved the destruction of economic systems that preceded it – notably European feudalism – and the creation of a system of world trade. It also involved the creation of colonies, the establishment of experimental economic enterprises in various world areas, and the development of new forms of slave-based production in the new World, using imported slaves – perhaps Europe’s biggest single contribution to its own economic growth. (1986, 55)

In Foucault’s account, the destruction of rural livelihoods is the prelude to, and **necessary condition for, establishing the welfare of the town and the safety of the** (European) **sovereign**. Arguably, though, the economic experiments described by Foucault were already in train in the 17th century through the establishment of colonies (Habib 1995) and the creation of a plantation system dedicated to export production. These extraterritorial laboratories were in fact ‘field-trials’ (Rabinow 1995) for new forms of agricultural production and labour control that proved pivotal not only to the rise of capitalism within Europe, but also to the promotion of world markets and the development of a global provisioning system (McMichael 1997).

### link—highways/ automobiles

#### Highway infrastructure creates a panoptic discipline by which people and states are controlled by their reliance on the governments—creating transportation hegemony

**Phillips, 02** – (Ryan, “The Driving Ideology,” 20 March 2002, <http://bitman.freeshell.org/essays/the.driving.ideology.html)//abergλ>

Society relies heavily upon having an efficient means of transportation available. Students and employees use transportation on a daily basis when commuting. Trade becomes pointless when the cost of moving goods exceeds the value of the items. Developments in transportation have a profound effect on society, making life and [business](http://bitman.freeshell.org/essays/the.driving.ideology.html) function more smoothly. Those who use such developments gain a measure of power by attaining a greater freedom of movement. Whoever dictates what developments occur holds even greater power, for that person or institution then controls the distribution of power. Throughout much of the twentieth century, the automobile has been the dominant means of transportation in the United States. Driving has become both a discipline and an ideology, for most people today have been molded into accepting driving as the ideal form of transportation - not perfect yet, but heading in the right direction. A common view of the future displays "flying cars" as the fate of transportation, where the form of the vehicle has changed while the personal nature of the transportation which defines driving has not. To maintain driving as such a discipline, a model of power is evoked which Michel Foucault calls "panopticism." In his essay, aptly titled "Panopticism," Foucault presents a model where an institution may achieve its goals by employing enforcement, surveillance, and another form of discipline which holds these three things together. Institutions which have an interest in maintaining the discipline of driving - automobile manufacturers, local police departments, and the Transportation Department, among others - each employ the panoptic model to keep this ideology alive.

Driving [offers](http://bitman.freeshell.org/essays/the.driving.ideology.html) greater freedom of movement and more choice in destination than many other means of transportation, such as riding the bus, taking an airline flight, or car-pooling. Driving becomes a means of avoiding the discipline of time: there is no need to consult a schedule or a coworker whenever one must travel. Instead of being subjected to the stark discipline of the clock, the driver falls into a far more subtle discipline. Driving has every appearance of being a complete void of discipline simply because of the vast freedom offered. Yet driving is something which people must be trained in, a mold into which one must fit as a means of functioning in society. If a person cannot drive, either by inexperience or lack of a vehicle, he or she is severely impaired in the ability to work and run life's errands. The requirement to drive is so strong in American society that a driver's license functions as the de facto means of identification, even though not everyone is required to possess one. By molding and shaping people into accepting the idea that driving is necessary to modern survival, driving is established as a discipline, despite the fact that driving offers an escape from other disciplines that are much more obvious. The popularity of driving can then be explained, in part, by the appeal of avoiding discipline.

Automobile manufacturers make use of this appeal by presenting their [vehicles](http://bitman.freeshell.org/essays/the.driving.ideology.html) as symbols of freedom and rugged individualism. Commercials for sport utility vehicles show their automobile as being perfectly capable of handling the toughest mountain passes, as though their owners would actually risk scratching the paint on such an expensive vehicle. Sports cars are often filmed on open country roads far from the obligations of city life. Rarely is a car commercial set within a city. Each of these methods creates an imaginary ideology of the automobile as a means of escaping the humdrum of everyday life. This triggers a panoptic discipline where people are put in the habit of purchasing or leasing the newest vehicles which conform best to the present ideology. Surveillance of purchase patterns is used by marketing departments to test the effectiveness of the presented ideology in maintaining this discipline. Manufacturers do not have the power to force the incessant purchasing of new cars on consumers, yet enforcement is still achieved by incentives from yet another institution: the government. By creating and funding a transportation infrastructure tailored specifically to the automobile, the government makes it very difficult for another mode of transportation to enter the market. This deficiency in the ability of automobile companies to complete the panoptic model within their own means causes a huge dependance on the government to supply the final key.

Government agencies throughout the United States have many reasons for supporting the role of the automobile in modern society. Licensing of both drivers and vehicles creates both a source of revenue an another means of panoptic power. Police provide both surveillance and enforcement of driving laws by patrolling the road system and issuing tickets to offenders of the law. Drivers discipline themselves into following the "rules of the road" for fear of the police car which may be hiding behind a large bush or around the next corner. Foucault says of the creation of the police as an institution:

... the type of power that it exercises, the mechanisms it operates and the element to which it applies them are specific. It is an apparatus that must be coextensive with the entire social body and not only by the extreme limits that it embraces, but by the minuteness of the details it is concerned with. Police power must bear 'over everything'... (323)

Enforcement of driving law becomes an excellent tool for extending such extreme limits to police power. Many criminals accused of crimes unrelated to driving are caught by the police first because of some small driving violation. In the United States, police are denied the level of surveillance described by Foucault - citizens are protected against unreasonable search and seizure. Only after a person has been deemed guilty of a crime, even a minor traffic violation, can a search for contraband or a criminal record check can begin. Such an extension of power gives governments a huge incentive to support the ideology of driving.

The most prominent effort on the part of governments in the United States to support driving has been the construction of the Interstate Highway System. A join venture between the states and the federal government, which each bearing half the cost, the Interstates greatly favor the automobile by making travel by car comparatively easy, especially for long range travel. Even within cities, Interstates prove essential in the daily commute. Benefits to the state include improved commerce and models of power such as those created for the police. For the federal government, the benefit is much more subtle. Aside from the political popularity which stems from endorsing the driving ideology, the federal government benefits by gaining a measure of power over the states. The Constitution of the United States authorizes Congress to regulate commerce "among the several states" (Article I, Section 8), which encompasses the funding of Interstates highways used in commerce. However, to receive that funding, the federal government is able require that each state agree to follow guidelines on certain unrelated matters. For example, this has been especially effective in creating a federal education policy, where the federal government has no stated power to enforce such a policy. Enforcement takes a contractual form instead. Surveillance arises when each state prepares a report of its success in implementing federal policy, and a discipline arises where each state is willing to do anything to prevent the transportation money that it rightfully deserves from being funneled into other states. Foucault sums up this phenomena best:

And, although the universal juridicism of modern society seems to fix limits on the exercise of power, its universally widespread panopticism enables it to operate, on the underside of the law, a machinery that is both immense and minute, which supports, reinforce, multiplies the asymmetry of power and undermines the limits that are traced around the law. (331)

The federal government capitalizes on the power behind the ideology of driving as a means of exercising a power which it does not actually possess.

The role of the contract becomes important here, for a state can only become involved in this model of power by common agreement. Incentives are used to initiate the contract - a state would seem foolish to give up the huge sums of money and power associated with driving. Unfortunately for the state, the federal government plays the dominant role once the contract is signed. There the funding originates and there the attached policy is formed. Foucault explains that this is typical when a panoptic model of power is combined with a contract:

... the way in which it is imposed, the mechanisms it brings into play, the non-reversible subordination of one group of people by another, the 'surplus' power that is always fixed on the same side, the inequality of position of the different 'partners' in relation to the common regulation, all these distinguish the disciplinary link from the contractual link, and make it possible to distort the contractual link systematically from the moment it has as its content a mechanism of discipline. (Foucault 331)

The state is disciplined into accepting transportation contracts without regard to the effects on its sovereignty. The contract is then distorted into something to which the state no longer agrees to for the merits of the contract, but instead because it is what the state has been doing since Interstates were first constructed. The state thus exercises self-discipline.

Countless disciplines have formed around the automobile, not the least of which is driving itself. These disciplines greatly obscure the merits of the automobile as a means of transportation. The success of the automobile in modern society is easy to measure - almost everyone owns a car or truck of some kind. But determining how much success stems from the actual superiority of the automobile over any other mode of transportation becomes very difficult. An ideology of driving has formed not from debate of its merits, but from the disciplines that have strengthened the role of the automobile throughout the twentieth century. Arguments can certainly be made for and against the automobile - alternatives such as public bus systems, monorails, and even the return of trains have been proposed and implemented, but never with as much success as the established driving ideology. Either the arguments in favor of such systems are flawed or somehow their superiority is not realized because of the difficulty in upsetting the current system. Which of these possibilities is true cannot be determined so long as the government persists in dictating transportation policy, for its policy is subverted to models of power which serve a completely independent agenda. Even car manufacturers rely upon the government to provide the infrastructure - the road system - without which their product would be completely useless. The ultimate power over transportation has been usurped by the government, and that power has been abused.

### link—infrastructure generic

#### Infrastructure works as a technology of security on the population to control how people perceive space

**Herr, 12** – Masters student in Geography at the University of Kentucky (Samantha, “Biopolitics of Bike-Commuting: Bike Lanes, Safety, and Social Justice, University of Kentucky, 2012, <http://uknowledge.uky.edu/geography_etds/2)//RM>

Bike lanes, or more broadly road infrastructure, or even the urban physical environment, are remote factors that work in the milieu and on the population. Bike lanes re-purpose street space and instigate conversation and contention around how street space is purposed. Bike lanes are symbols of transport cycling. They are an attempt to preemptively create ‘safe space,’ whether this safety is experienced or not. This sense does not correspond to individual bodies, but to the body of the milieu. It depends on a notion of ‘the population,’ ‘the collective,’ ‘the public.’ Whether it is safety or something else that is actually experienced by cyclists, bike lanes change the shape of the urban environment, and this change reverberates throughout the milieu, creating shifts in how the urban environment is used, viewed, felt, experienced, and imagined. Boston starts to look more like a European cycling utopia. These changing arrangements of elements in the milieu produce sensations, affects. Cyclists’ experiences actually become more ambivalent. In this way, irrespective of the physicality of what they actually (do not) protect against, bike lanes, as physical components of the urban landscape, play on cyclists’ perceptions of risk and fear. They produce sensations about safety, even growing senses of safety, however preemptive, contradictory, or incomplete they might be. Bike lanes provoke sensations of a space between a present reality and a future potential. This potential is a safer street and city. Bike lanes are investments in this potential safety—or what we can call ‘security.’ Security deals neither in legality nor actuality (Simon 2010), but in potentiality. Security is based on managing the space between what is and what could be. It is a particular technique of power that works on managing potential future events (Foucault 2007:20). Foucault calls this the “the problem of… [a]n indefinite series of mobile elements” (2007:20). “[S]ecurity…tries to work within reality, by getting the components of reality to work in relation to each other, thanks to and through a series of analyses and specific arrangements” (2007:47). Apparatuses and technologies of security “open into a future that is not exactly controllable, not precisely measured or measurable” (2007:20), to maximize positive elements, and minimize what is risky (2007:19) for the population (2007:11, 19, 108, 122). In other words, security is a strategy of predicting and responding to what might happen; it is preemptive. And in that it attempts to minimize risk and maximize benefit for the population—to preserve life and curb death27—security can be seen as a preemptive safety. Bike lanes are mechanisms of security in this Foucauldian sense.

#### The drive to protect infrastructure is rooted in the desire to become ever more secure.

**Cavelty and Kristensen 08** (Myriam D, Kristian S., “Securing the Homeland: Critical Infrastructure, Risk, and (in)Security,” <http://ethz.academia.edu/MyriamCavelty/Books/450274/Securing_the_Homeland_Critical_Infrastructure_Risk_and_In_Security)//aberg>λ

This image of homeland security is painted with the help of CIP. What emerges is a speciﬁc kind of materiality, which is both an underlying condition for pro-tection practices, but also reproduced through them. As we have pointed out before, an infrastructure is, in the ﬁrst instance of its etymology, something that exists, and is also fundamentally on the ‘inside’. In other words, we are looking at the practice of protecting physical and inanimate things. Bridges, storage facilities, streets or buildings, for instance, are objects that are easily identiﬁable(within Euclidian space) and that have a value for society that is usually undis- puted. That they should be made safe makes perfect sense to everyone: infra-structure protection is therefore ultimately concerned with protecting property – and it is obviously legitimate for the state to protect its property. We can even take this argument a step further and argue that cyberspace, too, is grounded in physical reality. Quite obviously, there would be no virtual realm without the physical infrastructures that facilitate its existence. As one observer argues, ‘the channelling of information ﬂows ... occurs within the framework of a “real” geography’ (Suteanu 2005: 130) made up of servers, cables, computers, satellites, etc. Philosopher and psychoanalyst Slavoj Zizek even suggests that cyberspace realises the oxymoron of being actually virtual – that these technolo-gies materialise virtuality ( Zizek 1999). The protection of the critical informa-tion infrastructure – like the protection of knowledge – is also concerned with protecting the physical reality of the ‘real geography’ with the help of electro-magnetic-pulse-proof rooms or backup storages in impenetrable mountain reser-voirs, but also with the help of better locks on server rooms. If the (core) rationality of CIP is associated with physical objects that exist in time and space, CIP practices give speciﬁc value to the inside, to things that are tangible. More than a metaphysical or legal expression of something that a state has, or is, CI – and CIP – is a concrete instantiation of these properties. CIP identiﬁes, signiﬁes and makes speciﬁc the sovereign territory of the state, and is thus a way of re-actualising and re-identifying the state. Seen this way, infra-structure emerges as an alternative to the image of Leviathan as postulated by Hobbes: instead of being made up of its citizens, the state may be regarded as consisting of the things inside its territory that make life there ‘good’. Thus, the state consists of assets that are not directly identiﬁed with its citizens. Again, CIP, in the ﬁrst place, sidesteps the traditional set of problems associated with security policy. Most importantly, there are no concerns about freedom/security tradeoffs, and no civil liberty issues are involved, which differentiates CIP from other better-investigated security strategies. CIP thus seems to slip past Foucauldian bio-politics, and past the Homo Sacer of Giorgio Agamben (1999). CIP does not ‘depend upon the invocation of a state of emergency’ (Dillon 2003: 532), but is ‘clean’ and unproblematic. However, this ideal-type and utopian view of things is inevitably problematised, because there is no way of avoiding the intermingling with both ﬂows and processes, with the truly virtual, and also with questions related to human sub- jects and the law. Even if cyberspace is assumed to have a material quality, the objects of protection in CIP include not only static infrastructures, but also various abstract things such as services , (information) ﬂows , the role and func-tion of infrastructures for society, and especially the core values that are deliv-ered by the infrastructures. The physical pathways through which information is transmitted do matter, but ‘the role of the participants in the game, their func-tional attributes, their position in the virtual context’ (Suteanu 2005: 131) matter even more. While technologies may appear to accumulate information objec-tively and apolitically, the way in which that information is encoded, articulated and interpreted is always political. The protection of ‘abstractions’, such as ‘the population’ or ‘knowledge’ in the security domain becomes problematic rather quickly when considering surveillance programmes, the PATRIOT Act etc. The implications of security strategies for liberty, citizenship, and the freedom of human subjects has been thoroughly investigated and criticised else-where. But CIP emerges as an intermediate entity: even in discussions about virtual aspects or ﬂows and processes, there is always a connection to a place, to a space, to a space of protection. This book shows that homeland security and critical infrastructure protection practices are expressions as well as causes of the breakdown of the central political distinctions between inside/outside, public/private, civil/military and normal/exceptional. It shows that the traditional sovereign act of making society secure has moved into the domestic space, changing the practice of security. In other words, security is privatised while the private is securitised. In transcending the distinction between inside and outside and reconﬁguring the conditions for the exercise of sovereign authority, CIP destabilises our relation to space, time and territory. Security is no longer a ‘special’ and extraordinary issue. This discourse is not primarily about threats and battles against an enemy, the focus of Part II of this volume, but is charac-terised almost more by an inward-looking narrative about vulnerability (Bigo2006b: 89). This means that the traditional and normal conditions for day-to-day politics are intermingled with the exceptional dynamics of national security; and new forms of (in)security and protection emerge.

### link—infrastructure resilience/ CI

#### The development of resilient infrastructure is a tactic for liberalism to promote its vision of a correct society by producing knowledge and power—this biopolitical imperative necessitates war

**Lundborg and Williams, 11** Swedish Institute of International Affairs and Warwick University (Tom and Nick, “Resilience, Critical Infrastructure, and Molecular Society: The Excess of ‘Life’ in Biopolitics”, Warwick University, 2011, <http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/people/vaughan-williams/publications/ips_dec_2011.pdf)//RM>

In recent years, a number of authors have worked with and developed Foucault’s insights about how security can be made compatible with circulation in this way (Amoore 2006; Bigo 2007; Kavalski 2009; Salter 2006). As such, it is unnecessary to rehearse these relatively well-known arguments here, except to stress, as Lentzos and Rose do, that what is valued in liberal democratic societies is precisely the ability to keep people, services, and goods constantly on the move. The necessity to maintain these centrifugal forces therefore takes the analysis of security practices beyond simple (disciplinary) notions of prevention, ‘‘big-brother’’ style surveillance, and barricades. Instead, biopolitical apparatuses of security are shown to work with complexity, embrace and identify patterns in flows, and govern through the management of these dynamics. It is within this context that Lentzos and Rose situate what they call a ‘‘logic of resilience,’’ understood as ‘‘a systematic, widespread, organizational, structural and personal strengthening of subjective and material arrangements so as to be better able to anticipate and tolerate disturbances in complex worlds without collapse’’ (Lentzos and Rose 2009:243). On this view, therefore, resilience encompasses technologies of security that recoil from shocks to (and within) the ‘‘system of systems’’ they constitute, in order to ensure a return to ‘‘normal’’ conditions of circulation as quickly as possible. While also working within the Foucauldian-inspired biopolitical paradigm, Dillon and Reid (2009) examine more specifically the role of resilient CIs in securing what they call the ‘‘liberal way of rule.’’ Before exploring their treatment of CIs, it is first necessary to introduce aspects of their broader argument about the relationship between liberalism and war. Dillon and Reid begin their book by characterizing liberalism as a ‘‘systemic regime of... power relations,’’ which, although committed to peace-making, is nevertheless marked by an equal commitment to war, continuous state of emergency, and constant preparedness for conflict (Dillon and Reid 2009:7). From this perspective, war and society are mutually constitutive and the liberal way of rule can be understood as: ‘‘a war-making machine whose continuous processes of war preparation prior to the conduct of any hostilities profoundly, and pervasively, shape the liberal way of life’’ (Dillon and Reid 2009:9). As such, the liberalism–war complex acts as a grid for the production of knowledge, preoccupations, and political subjectivities. Taking their lead from Foucault’s later work, Dillon and Reid argue that the basic referent object of liberal rule is life itself. From this perspective, the liberal way of rule ⁄ war is inherently biopolitical: ‘‘its referent object is biological being and its governmental practices are themselves, in turn, governed by the properties of species existence’’ (Dillon and Reid 2009:20). They stress, however, that the properties of species existence are not givens, but rather subject to changes in power ⁄ knowledge. Over the last 20 years, the Revolution in Military Affairs, accompanied by developments in the life sciences, has changed the way that life is viewed and understood. The move to ‘‘informationalize’’ life has led to the reduction in what it means to be a living being to a code, and as a result: ‘‘the very boundaries which long distinguished living from not living, animate from inanimate and the biological from the non-biological have been newly construed and problematized...’’ (Dillon and Reid 2009:22). The corollary of this account is that the informationalization of life has, in turn, changed the way in which war is waged by liberal rule: The development of the life sciences in general, and of complexity science in particular, comprising new knowledge about the complex emergent adaptive processes and properties of open living systems, has transformed the ways in which liberal regimes have come to understand that very nature of war, and of the relation of war to complex adaptive evolutionary models of rule and order. (Dillon and Reid 2009:111) The military is as interested now... in life-creating and life-adaptive processes as it is in killing, because, like the liberal way of rule and war more generally, it locates the nature of the threat in the very becoming-dangerous of the vital signs of life itself. (Dillon and Reid 2009:125) In other words, development in the life sciences has been embraced by liberal regimes, which, in turn, has affected the way that they view and fight wars. The move in life sciences away from Newtonian physics to complexity has enabled new biopolitical technologies of governance. Complexity science stresses the ‘‘anteriority of radical relationality,’’ the ‘‘dynamic and mobile nature of existence’’ and the ‘‘contingencies of bodies-in-formation’’ (Dillon and Reid 2009:72). Liberal biopolitical rule takes these problematizations of life as a starting point for securing its own existence. Thus, in a development of Foucault’s account of biopolitics as ‘‘making live and letting die,’’ Dillon and Reid argue that liberalism only promotes the kind of life that is productive for its own enterprise in light of new power ⁄ knowledge relations.

A liberal biopolitical problematization of life entails security practices that can ‘‘pre-empt the emergence of life forms in the life process that may prove toxic to life’’ (Dillon and Reid 2009:87). For these reasons, as set out in the lengthy quotation above, the perceived nature of threats has changed along with the emergence of alternative problematizations of life. Threats are no longer viewed as straightforwardly actual, but what Dillon and Reid refer to as ‘‘virtual’’: ‘‘the very continuous and contingent emergency of emergence of life as being-information; becoming-dangerous’’ (Dillon and Reid 2009:44). To put it differently, the threat with which liberal biopolitics is obsessed is the potentiality of some life to become dangerous and therefore detrimental to what living should involve. It is in this context that Dillon and Reid uncover a paradox of liberalism: the fact that according to its own logic it needs to kill in order to make life live. Dillon and Reid deal with both aspects of this biopolitical ⁄ necropolitical logic. Their discussion of the liberal way of war explores the various ways in which killing takes place, the aporia accompanying universal justifications of it, and the lethal criteria by which politics is reduced to mere ‘‘animal husbandry’’ (Dillon and Reid 2009:104). What is more pertinent for our purposes, however, is the equally significant account they offer of attempts by liberal rule to make life live: If the vocation of biopolitics is to make life live, it must pursue that vocation these days by making live life the emergency of its emergence ever more fully and ever more resiliently; detailing, clarifying, amplifying and otherwise drawing out the entailments of the emergency in the effort to make life live it even more animatedly in both virtual and actual terms. (Dillon and Reid 2009:89) It is in this context that we can return more explicitly to the role of resilient CIs because it is precisely these material apparatuses through which liberal rule secures the way of life it needs to reproduce its vision of ‘‘correct living’’ and also, therefore, the authorization of its own authority. Dillon and Reid pick up on Foucault’s inversion of Clausewitz’s famous aphorism—‘‘politics is the extension of war by other means’’—to argue that the liberal peace is extended throughout society via CIs. They claim it is no coincidence that since 9 ⁄ 11 CIs have become reified as referent objects of securitization. Strategically and symbolically, CIs perform vital roles in securing the liberal way of rule and its vision of what ‘‘quality of life’’ must mean: ...the defence of critical infrastructure is not about the mundane protection of human beings from the risk of violent death at the hands of other human beings, but about a more profound defence of the combined physical and technological infrastructures which liberal regimes have come to understand as necessary for their vitality and security in recent years. (Dillon and Reid 2009:130) On this basis, Dillon and Reid extend the biopolitical diagnosis of resilience offered by Lentzos and Rose. Not only is resilience about the design and management of the ‘‘system of systems’’ in such a way as to enable a smooth and expeditious return to ‘‘normal’’ conditions. More importantly, resilient CIs are also necessary for the optimalization of virtual (that is pre-emptive) tactics against the becoming-dangerous of bodies-in-formation: tactics upon which the edifice of liberal rule ultimately rests. Moreover, Dillon and Reid shrewdly observe that the perception of ‘‘terrorist threats’’ in Western societies enables liberal regimes to further develop and entrench CIs, in turn extending and ntensifying biopolitical control over life.

#### The affirmative’s securitization of infrastructure is rooted in the trope of protecting the sovereign from external threats and vulnerabilities—reifies biopolitical governmentality

**Collier and Lakoff, 09** – The New School, New York, UC Sand Diego (Stephen and Andrew, “On Vital Systems Security”, International Affairs Papers, February 2009, <http://www.gpia.info/files/u16/Collier_and_Lakoff_2009-01.pdf)//RM>

We initially sought to understand new security initiatives in terms of these two existing technologies of power. However, for reasons that we will describe, we gradually came to think that they were better understood in relation to a novel form of security – what we call “vital systems security.” Vital systems security is a way of “problematizing” threats to security that can be contrasted to the forms of sovereign state security and population security. Vital systems security takes up events that are uncertain and unpreventable but potentially catastrophic. Its object of protection is the complex of critical systems or networks on which modern economies and polities depend. The normative rationality of vital systems security is oriented to the resilience of these systems, and preparedness for response to events that might disrupt them. Finally, vital systems security deals with the population insofar as it is dependent on these vulnerable, vital systems. Vital systems security is, thus, linked to a process of “reflexive modernization” in Beck’s sense – the idea that the very success of industrial and social modernity in managing risks has in fact generated new risks.

In the 19th century, total war was associated with the advent of national armies and mass conscription. But by the beginning of the 20th century, it referred to a form of warfare that enlisted the full resources of a country – including its productive apparatus – into military effort. This new form of industrialized total war consolidated during World War I, when all the major combatants introduced new forms of economic planning and coordination – particularly of energy, critical materials, and manufacturing – to contribute to the war effort. This development opened a significant new horizon of strategic thinking for military planners. If national populations and domestic economies were key instruments of warfare, then they could also be conceived as strategic targets. In the waning months of World War I, and then with increased intensity during the interwar period, this new understanding of the domestic economy and polity – as a key instrument of war and thus as target of attack – was developed in the theory of strategic bombing. After World War I, there were two distinct schools of strategic bombing. One focused on “terror” bombing that targeted civilians in order to break their will to contribute to the war effort. The other, which explicitly rejected terror bombing, introduced a different rationale for air war: not to attack enemy forces or civilian populations, but to attack the industrial systems, and the transport and energy infrastructures, upon which an enemy’s war effort depended. Theorists of this second approach developed a new understanding of the national economy – as an interlinked network of critical systems that might be disrupted through air attack. One important locus for developing this new understanding was the U.S. Air Corps Tactical School, the most important institution in the development of strategic bombing in the United States.

Let us turn now to a second point of inflection in the genealogy of vital systems security, through which this approach to thinking about the enemy was transposed onto the U.S. as itself a target of strategic bombing. This shift took place after World War II, with the rise of the Cold War and the nuclear era. Two domains of security planning and organization were particularly important in this development. The first, civil defense, was concerned primarily with the protection of civilian populations. The second, defense mobilization, was concerned with assuring that the U.S. economy could sustain the level of industrial production required for the conduct of war, even, potentially, after a nuclear attack. If strategic bombing theorists asked how national economies could be conceived as a target, then civil defense and defense mobilization planners asked how it could be conceived as an object of protection.

Let us turn first to civil defense planning, which, beginning in 1949, was conducted by the U.S. Federal Civil Defense Agency. In civil defense a number of important techniques and organizational forms were developed that were crucial in the evolution of vital systems security. For example, civil defense planners developed techniques of “catastrophe modeling” to understand the effects of nuclear detonations in cities. They began with spatial models of nuclear detonations, which indicated the dispersion of “blast effects,” firestorms, and radiation over a certain geographical locale. On the same map planners placed structures and other features such as roadways or communication systems that would be affected by the event. By combining these two elements – initially through very rudimentary methods employing transparent overlays – civil defense planners could produce a “vulnerability map.” Through such maps apparatuses of population security were problematized in a new way. Water systems, transportation networks, social services and emergency response organizations – all initially created to promote health and welfare, and to deal with regularly occurring social pathologies of disease, crime, and poverty – were understood in terms of their vulnerability to attack, and in terms of their role in post-attack response. Here, again, we have a fundamentally new kind of knowledge about collective life: not a statistical analysis of actual prior events but enacted knowledge about potential future events. Such techniques of enactment have played a central role in the subsequent development of vital systems security, from imaginative scenarios to highly formal catastrophe models.

It is important to note that these models entailed a crucial shift in the object domain of catastrophe modeling and vulnerability mapping. The concern is no longer with the specter of a threatening enemy and a single nuclear detonation. Rather, it is with the intrinsic vulnerabilities of vital systems. Correspondingly, OEP began to focus on the concept of “survivable” systems – or, as they were increasingly called, “survivable networks” – such as oil pipelines and electricity grids. This interest in survivable networks was structurally similar to the concern with mitigating the vulnerabilities of communications systems that led, also during the late 1960s, to the development of the internet by ARPA; more research is needed to understand the links among these developments. The role of operations research and systems analysis in these new system vulnerability models bears note. Much as statistics, on Foucault’s observation, provided a crucial knowledge-form for population security, systems analysis provided key technical instruments that made knowledge about the vulnerability of vital systems possible. As is well known, systems analysis was developed during and after WWII in relationship to military problems, such as building missile guidance systems or planning bombing runs. These were effectively optimization problems, in which the task was to maximize military “outputs”: kill rates or damage ratios, for example. In OEP and other contexts these techniques were redeployed. The scope of these models expanded, from relatively restricted technical problems concerning, for example, a weapons system, to a much broader understanding of the “system” or “network” that included much of the national economy of the United States, or at least important strategic sectors. And techniques of systems analysis – such as linear programming and Monte Carlo simulations – were used not only for optimization problems but in analyses that focused on the disruption of vital systems. Effectively a shift had taken place, from an emphasis on the singularity of a nuclear attack to the inherent vulnerability of the U.S. economy’s vital systems.

Let us begin with a case of the “object” – namely, the vital system itself. Vital systems, as we have seen, are systems that are essential for the continued functioning of modern polities and economies, such as transport and energy networks, financial systems, health systems, and communication systems. Of course these systems are longstanding objects of population security, and were crucial to strategies of economic development and social welfare throughout the 20th century. What is general in such efforts is an emphasis on infrastructure construction, integration, and standardization, and an orientation to norms of reliability, productivity, and welfare. But beginning in the 1960s and 1970s, these systems were constituted as objects of knowledge and intervention in relation to an entirely different set of problems. These problems did not have to do with the absence of infrastructure, its fragmentation, or routine breakdowns – the traditional concerns of population security. Rather, they were linked to the very success of infrastructural modernization: the fact that collective life depended on complex, integrated infrastructural systems that were vulnerable to disruption. To illustrate, let us take the example of energy infrastructures. The vulnerability of infrastructure systems to enemy attack – and in particular energy systems – had long been addressed in the context of civil defense and defense production planning. In the 1960s, OEP was using new tools of systems and network analysis to think about the complex patterns of disruption that a nuclear attack would have on oil and electricity infrastructures. Key figures in OEP clearly saw the organization’s mission as concerned broadly with the vulnerability of these vital systems. Thus, for example, in a 1969 report on “Critical Networks in a Post-Attack Environment,” Robert H. Kupperman, the head of the Systems Evaluation Division of OEP, wrote “During a nuclear attack on the United States, many of the nation's large networks will be damaged. Most important are the transportation, energy distribution and communication systems. Energy distribution facilities include oil and gas pipelines as well as the electric power grid.” He argued that there was a “vital need to determine realistic planning factors concerning the economic impact of damaged networks and the capabilities for restoration,” suggesting that “network analysis provides a new method for both short and long range recovery plans.” But soon these concerns about infrastructure vulnerability were focused by events other than nuclear war: terrorist attacks on the electricity grid, particularly by domestic groups; the oil shocks in the early and late 1970s; major blackouts in the United States; and catastrophic natural disasters such as Hurricane Agnes in 1972. For Kupperman and a group of like-minded national security thinkers, these events indicated that the nation’s dependence on critical systems was a vulnerability that could be exploited by enemies who lacked the military strength to directly challenge the U.S. But the same dependence on vital systems created vulnerabilities to other kinds of threats. Kupperman noted that disruptions such as the 1965 blackout “gave an indication of what would happen to portions of this country in case of a widespread power failure.” Such arguments followed the concern, first developed in strategic bombing theory, with critical nodes of a production system that, if disrupted, could knock out an entire industrial web. There was a crucial difference, however. The threat now came not from an enemy’s military attack, but from non-deterrable threats – terrorism, and “threats without enemies” such as technological failures and natural disasters. In short, preparedness was no longer viewed as an adjunct to superpower confrontation. Rather, it was a security problem in its own right, one that was reflected in a range of discussions through the 1970s. Concern about the infrastructure vulnerability was thus one important context in which vital systems thinking was de-coupled from military problems. These concerns were reflected in a number of government reports throughout the period. For example, in 1977, the Joint Congressional Committee on Defense Production held hearings and published a two-part report on the nation’s “civil preparedness” programs. The report criticized the nation’s emergency management plans, and recommended a broadening of these efforts to include non-nuclear threats. The first volume of the report articulated, in now-familiar terms, two key aspects of the vital systems security framework: the dependence of contemporary society on complex technological systems, and the vulnerability of citizens to multiple types of threat: “An increasingly complex, technology-dependent, industrial economy in the United States,” the report argued, “has made citizens more than ever vulnerable to the effects of disasters and emergencies over which they have little or no control and to which they cannot successfully respond as individuals” . Here the state’s obligation to provide security to its citizens explicitly includes the demand to mitigate vulnerabilities to a wide variety of potential emergencies. In July 1977, soon after the Committee’s Civil Preparedness Review was published, a major blackout occurred in New York City. The blackout, which was accompanied by extensive riots and looting, brought widespread attention to the frailty and vulnerability of the nation’s electrical grid and other critical systems. The Defense Production Committee held hearings shortly after the blackout on the implications of the event for federal emergency preparedness. At these hearings, the Director of the Defense Logistics Agency testified about military efforts to protect key defense industries from attack. He noted that the scope of his agency’s activity was limited to those industries that had a direct impact on defense needs. Considering the widespread impact of the New York City blackout on economic and social life, he suggested the need for a broader program to secure critical facilities. This would begin with a cataloguing effort: “It might be well if there were some sort of national list, if you please, of facilities that would be a key to our economic and societal well-being. Then at least, we would know what they are and whether or not the Federal Government would see fit to involve itself in providing for their security or would provide at least some advice on what these facilities could do for themselves” . What is significant in these recommendations is the proposal that the Federal Government should generalize its efforts to assure critical infrastructure: from a specific emphasis on those systems essential to military production, to a broader concern with the vital systems essential to the economic and social well being of the nation as a whole. Broadly speaking, by the late 1970s the framework of contemporary Critical Infrastructure Protection initiatives had been established. It is visible in many contemporary initiatives, for example, a recent Presidential Report on Critical Infrastructure Protection which led to the “National Strategy for the Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets”. In this strategy, the term “critical infrastructure” refers to technological systems for sustaining social and biological life, often initially developed as part of population security. Among the sectors included in the “National Infrastructure Protection Plan” are: agriculture and food, public health and healthcare, drinking water and waste water treatment, energy, banking and finance, defense industrial base, telecommunications, chemical, transportation systems, and emergency services.

#### The 1ac’s securitization of urban infrastructure strengthens the hand of the sovereign power to kill and promotes endless machinic militarism

**GRAHAM 9** – Professor of Human Geography @ Durham University (Stephen, “'Cities as Battlespace: The New Military Urbanism,” City, December 2009, Taylor and Francis) SIyer

At the root of such imaginations of war and security in the post-cold war world are technophiliac fantasies where the West harnesses its unassailable high-tech power to reinstate its waning influence in a rapidly urbanizing and intensely mobile world. ‘At home and abroad,’ wrote US security theorists Mark Mills and Peter Huber in the right-wing City Journal in 2002, a year after the 9/11 attacks, ‘it will end up as their sons against our silicon. Our silicon will win.’ Mills and Huber (2002) envisage a near future straight out of Minority Report. In their vision, a whole suite of surveillance and tracking systems develop on the back of high-tech systems of consumption, communication and transportation to permeate every aspect of life in Western or US cities. Continually comparing current behaviour with vast databases recording past events and associations, these, the argument goes, will automatically signal when the city’s bodies, spaces and infrastructure systems are about to be turned into terrorist threats against it. Thus, what Mills and Huber call ‘trustworthy’ or ‘cooperative targets’ are continually separated from ‘non-cooperators’ characterized by their efforts to use postal, electricity, Internet, finance, airline and transport systems as means to project resistance and violence. In effect, Mills and Huber’s vision calls for an extension of airport-style security and surveillance systems to encompass entire cities and societies using the high-tech systems of consumption and mobility that are already established in Western cities as a basis. In resistant colonial frontiers, meanwhile, Mills and Huber dream of continuous, automated and robotized counterinsurgency warfare. Using systems similar to those deployed in US cities, but this time delegated with the sovereign power to kill automatically, they imagine that US troops might be removed from the dirty job of fighting and killing on the ground in dense cities. Swarms of tiny, armed drones, equipped with advanced sensors and communicating with each other, will thus be deployed to permanently loiter above streets, deserts and highways. Automatically identifying insurgent behaviour, Mills and Huber dream of a future where such swarms of robotic warriors work to continually ‘project destructive power precisely, judiciously, and from a safe distance—week after week, year after year, for as long as may be necessary’ (2002). Such two-sided dreams of high-tech omnipotence remain much more than sci-fi fantasy, however. As well as constructing the UK’s E-borders programme, for example, Raytheon are also the leading manufacturer of both cruise missiles and the unmanned drones used regularly by the CIA to launch assassination raids—and kill large numbers of innocent bystanders—across the Middle East and Pakistan since 2002. Crucially, Raytheon are also at the heart of a range of very real US military projects designed to use similar kinds of anticipatory targeting software to allow robotic weapons systems to automatically ‘target’ and kill their foes without any human involvement whatsoever Thus, whether they involve automated policing of no fly lists, or the delegation of the sovereign power to kill, software algorithms must now be seen as a broad continuum of linked techniques. These use historic accumulations of data to make judgments about future potentialities as a means of permanently deploying continuous contemporary violence against the everyday sites and circulations of the city (Amoore, 2009). Media theorist Jordan Crandall (1999) has called this the formation of a constellation of what he calls ‘armed vision’. The key question now, he suggests, is ‘how targets are identified and distinguished from nontargets’ within ‘decision making and killing’. Crandall (1999) points out that the widespread integration of computerized tracking with databases of ‘targets’ represents little but of ‘a gradual colonization of the now, a now always slightly ahead of itself’. This shift represents a process of profound militarization because the social identification of people or circulations within civilian law enforcement is complemented or even replaced by the machinic seeing of ‘targets’. ‘While civilian images are embedded in processes of identification based on reflection,’ Crandall writes, ‘militarised perspectives collapse identification processes into “Id-ing”—one-way channel of identification in which a conduit, a database, and a body are aligned and calibrated.

#### Infrastructure and policy debate are co-targets of militarism

**GRAHAM 9** – Professor of Human Geography @ Durham University (Stephen, “'Cities as Battlespace: The New Military Urbanism,” City, December 2009, Taylor and Francis) SIyer

Such crossovers between high-technology for civilian borders, and high-technology for military killing, between the ‘targeting’ of everyday life in Western cities and those caught in the cross-hairs of aggressive colonial and resource wars, are at the heart of a much broader set of trends which I label the new military urbanism (Graham, 2010). Of course the results of the targeting practices in both cases—the hand on the shoulder in the airport queue or the alleged Taliban base left in smouldering ruins—are very different. But, crucially, both represent acts of violence, which rest at either end of a continuum based on the core ideas driving the new military urbanism. These are based on the triumph of highly profitable, militarized solutions, based on technophiliac dreams of high-tech targeting and the linkage of surveillance databases to the automatic identification of future ‘targets’, to address pressing questions of both security and war in rapidly urbanizing, globalized societies. As I have suggested before in my recent papers for City on the deepening connections between militarism and urbanism, the new military urbanism encompasses a complex set of rapidly evolving ideas, doctrines, practices, norms, techniques and popular cultural arenas (Graham, 2005, 2006, 2008). Through these the everyday spaces, sites and infrastructures of cities—along with their civilian populations—are now rendered as the main targets and threats. It is manifest in the widespread metaphorization of war as the perpetual and boundless condition of urban societies— against drugs, against crime, against terror, against insecurity itself. It involves the stealthy militarization of a wide range of policy debates, urban landscapes and circuits of urban infrastructure, as well as realms of popular and urban culture. And it is leading to the creeping and insidious diffusion of militarized debates about ‘security’ into every walk of life. Together, these work to bring essentially military ideas of the prosecution of, and preparation for, warfare into the heart of everyday urban life. The new military urbanism represents an insidious militarization of urban life at a time when our planet is urbanizing faster than ever before. This process gains its power from multiple circuits of militarization and securitization, which are rarely considered together or viewed as a whole. To understand its breadth, as well as its insidious power, it is necessary to look at the new military urbanism’s five constituent pillars in a little more detail. In what follows, I explore each of these in turn.

#### The 1AC relies on identifying a threat without an enemy, facilitating a process of securitization and regulation of life

**Aradau ’10** – Dr, Senior Lecturer in International Relations and member of the Centre for the Study of Political Community, (Claudia, “Security that Matters: Critical Infrastructure and Objects of Protection,” http://oro.open.ac.uk/26408/1/Aradau\_security\_materiality\_SD.pdf)//aberg

The securitization of critical infrastructure is pre-eminently about the protection of objects. Critical infrastructure protection is generally held to have emerged as a security issue in the mid-1990s and the terminology of ‘critical infrastructure’ itself to have been coined by Clinton administration in 1996. Critical infrastructure allegedly signifies a difference from earlier usages of ‘infrastructure’. While infrastructure was part of military strategy to weaken the enemy, its transformation into a matter of national security has been variously located either during the Cold War (Collier and Lakoff 2007) or after 9/11 (Center for History and New Media 2009). If military strategy could also involve the destruction of one’s own infrastructure, **the securitization of critical infrastructure assumes an understanding of infrastructure as foundational. Societies are ‘grounded’ in infrastructure**, their functioning, continuity and survival are made possible by the protection of infrastructure. A 1997 report by the Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection was symbolically entitled ‘Critical Foundations’ (Commission for Critical Infrastructure Protection 1997). Definitions of critical infrastructure list heterogeneous elements, from communications, emergency services, energy, finance, food, government, health, to transport and water sectors (Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) 2009). The general argument about the necessity to protect critical infrastructure is framed along these lines (with little variation from a report to another and from an author to another): Our modern society and day to day activities are dependent on networks of critical infrastructure – both physical networks such as energy and transportation systems and virtual networks such as the Internet. If terrorists attack a piece of critical infrastructure, they will disrupt our standard of living and cause significant physical, psychological, and financial damage to our nation (Bennett 2007: 9). The UK’s Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure defines the effects of any failure in national infrastructure to lead to ‘severe economic damage, grave social disruption, or even large scale loss of life’ (Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) 2009). **Naming infrastructures as critical** for the purposes of protecting them against terrorist attacks **is a securitising move**. Where critical infrastructure experts would look for the adequacy of representation to the reality of objects threatened – by drawing up lists of critical infrastructure as a result of risk assessment scenarios – a performative approach would consider the constitution of reality through the iterative speech acts that securitize infrastructure by naming as ‘critical’ and in need of protection against potential terrorist attacks and/or other hazards. The Centre for the Protection of Critical Infrastructure in the UK encapsulates this double move: The most significant threat facing the UK comes from international terrorism and its stated ambitions to mount ‘high impact’ attacks that combine mass casualties with substantial disruption to key services such as energy, transport and communications. This is a threat that is different in scale and intent to any that the UK has faced before (Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) 2010b). Yet, for the Copenhagen School of security studies for example, objects are also relegated to the status of external conditions of speech acts. Objects that are generally held to be threatening (for example, tanks or polluted waters) play a facilitating role in the process of securitization (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998: 33). Energy blackouts, transport failures and so on could also be read as facilitating conditions of the speech act. In this approach, there is ontological and epistemological ambiguity about the role of objects: as they outside speech acts or the result of speech acts? As the next section will show, this approach cannot account for different materializations of critical infrastructure – the matter of critical infrastructure is not constant and given but varies depending on the agential cuts created. The Foucault-inspired literature on the biopolitics of security and risk has also paid scant attention to the materiality of infrastructures. For Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, for example, biopolitics takes ‘species life as its referent object, and the securing of species life becomes the vocation of a novel and emerging set of discursive formations of power/knowledge’ (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2008: 267). While they show how a dispositif of security is dependent upon the development of life sciences and they locate historical transformations of biopolitics given the changes in scientific knowledge about the nature of living material (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2008: 273), materiality as such is not discussed. The things in the security dispositif are relegated to the margins of analysis. As noted previously, a dispositif is a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of the said as much as the unsaid, ‘things’ are relegated to the margins of analysis and the focus of analysis is shifted upon institutions, economic and social processes, systems of norms, techniques, types of classification, modes of characterization (Foucault 2002: 49). Critical infrastructure protection as a dispositif would similarly bring together a heterogeneous array of discourses about terrorism, natural disasters, protection, risk management, security institutions alongside architecture, design, and construction experts, new regulations and laws, administrative measures, scientific knowledge about materials, and moral propositions about ‘objects of protection’. As a methodological and epistemological tool, the *dispositif* could shed light on how critical infrastructure protection emerges as a heterogeneous construction. At the same, critical infrastructure is, in a sense, subsumed to the logic of circulatory practices. The securitization of critical infrastructure is ultimately deriving from the practices that separate good from bad circulations and the associated forms of life. This it remains unclear how the materiality of infrastructure is both generative and generated in Barad’s terms. Even when focusing on the rationalities and technologies that make-up particular dispositifs of security, materialities of nonhuman objects are not explicitly theorized (e.g. Aradau and van Munster 2007; Huysmans 2006; Lippert and O'Connor 2003). Although the dispositif has material effects of forming risk groups, dividing the population and placing groups ‘at risk’ under surveillance or treatment (Dean 1999; Rose 1999), matter is univocally given. The effects of risk management appear to have little to do with how infrastructure is built, rebuilt, retrofitted, how materials are selected, their fluidity, stability or fixity, their forms of agency and the differential reconfigurations of the world that are created through intra-actions with other material-discursive practices. As Barad reminds us, matter is not univocal. As light can behave as both a wave and a particle depending on the experimental and laboratory set-up, critical infrastructure is materialized in different ways, depending on how rationalities and technologies of risk management intra-act with other social and political practices, discourses, forms of knowledge, and materialities. Moreover, these approaches can also be read to suggest a ‘periodization’ approach to security. Many of the Foucault-inspired analyses of security have argued for a shift from territory to population, from national to human security and from threats to risk. Recently, Stephen Collier and Andrew Lakoff have located another shift in the dispositifs of security: from population to vital systems. Vital systems security is, according to them, a response triggered by extreme emergencies. Although infrastructure had been an element of military strategy from the 19 th and 20 th century on, ‘total war’ and civil defence during the Cold War shifted this understanding towards system-vulnerability. Over the 1960s and 1970s, Collier and Lakoff (2007) argue, techniques for analysing system vulnerability were gradually generalized in the USA. Vital systems became a national security concern in their own right. While the logic was derived from that of strategic bombing, threats are new non-deterrable ones – ‘threats without enemies’ such as technological failures and natural disasters (Collier and Lakoff 2007). Despite the shift that they locate from population to vital systems as referent objects of security, Collier and Lakoff do not consider the role of materiality in constructions of national security. Materiality appears only in a particular periodization of security starting with the Cold War rather than as matter in intra-action. Thus, the heterogeneous ways in which infrastructure (and critical infrastructure) becomes materialized is lost. As the next section will show, a particular materialization of infrastructure emerges in intra-action with material-discursive practices about the ‘foundations’ of society, spread of biothreats, preparedness measures, medical knowledge, design and engineering expertise, police and military expertise as well as nodes, flows, soils, building materials, etc. Yet, this materialization is also a historical process, which intra-acts with other materializations.

#### Critical infrastructure is a form of the commodification of security that aims to define and exclude particular ways we interact in the world

**Aradau ’10** – Dr, Senior Lecturer in International Relations and member of the Centre for the Study of Political Community, (Claudia, “Security that Matters: Critical Infrastructure and Objects of Protection,” http://oro.open.ac.uk/26408/1/Aradau\_security\_materiality\_SD.pdf)//aberg

These brief notes do not simply trace multiple meanings, but are indicative of different materializations of infrastructure: in military practices, development, culture or state modernization. They are indicative of how infrastructure matters within material practices of capitalist expansion and geopolitical division of the world. In this sense, the materialization of (in)security is also the effect of material and ideological practices of neoliberal globalization (Agathangelou, Bassichis, and Spira 2008; Agathangelou and Ling 2004). Critical infrastructure is also generated by the ‘security industry’ as part of a commercial enterprise that produces security as a commodity (Neocleous 2007). Yet, the commodification and fetishization of security and its inclusion in circuits of neoliberal political economy is not independent of the materialization of particular objects. Agency is also not thought in opposition to structures, but as possibilities for changing particular relations, differences and configurations of the world. *The Times* articles, although suggestive of different materializations, have little to do with the ways in which concrete, asphalt, metal, oil, water, carbon and so on are produced, processed and used, and the forms of agency involved. Agency is not only human and institutions, but the agency of grids, nodes, tubes, soil, foundations and construction materials. All these intra-act with forms of knowledge, humans, institutional practices to create particular materializations of ‘(critical) infrastructure’ to be protected. The next section turns to this understanding of securitization as a process of materialization through intra-action between material-discursive practices which enact agential cuts and draw boundaries. This means that the protection of critical infrastructure needs to be understood as a particular materialization which simultaneously is an intraactive reconfiguration of the world. As part of this reconfiguration, some materializations come to matter more than other and particular differences and boundaries are drawn: ‘Material discursive apparatuses offer constraints on what is produced, but they also always produce particular exclusions’ (Barad 2007: 14).

#### The securitization of critical infrastructure negates the everydayness of infrastructure itself—imposing discursive limits on how it comes to be while materialities are relegated by governmentality

**Aradau ’10** – Dr, Senior Lecturer in International Relations and member of the Centre for the Study of Political Community, (Claudia, “Security that Matters: Critical Infrastructure and Objects of Protection,” http://oro.open.ac.uk/26408/1/Aradau\_security\_materiality\_SD.pdf)//aberg

As boundaries are drawn, critical infrastructure is materialized as interconnected: gas flows, energy supplies flow, oil flows, transport flows and so on. Integrated circulatory processes appear indeed to be at the heart of the securitization of critical infrastructure, as many security scholars have noted in the wake of Foucault’s analysis of biopolitics. This materialization of infrastructure as interconnected, circulating, flows that need to move unimpeded but can be stopped by ‘bad circulation’ (for example ‘hostile vehicle’ as in the study from CPNI) obliterates the materialities of production. 5 The materialization of secure perimeter and boundary demarcation excludes materialities of reverse circulation – from inside out – as much as it obscures the materialization of infrastructure as corroding, decaying or in need of repair. Similarly, the materialization of critical infrastructures as interconnected and circulatory effaces the materialities of production. Discussions of electricity in relation to critical infrastructure protection, for example, efface the materialities of energy production, particularly the relation between generation and use (Graham and Thrift 2007). The materialization of energy as simply flow effaces the material connections that exist in the generation of energy, the nodes and lines contained in the grid, their physical properties and connections: Electricity is nonstorable in large amounts, so an instantaneous balance between power production and power consumption plus transmission losses is needed. Various operational limits (voltage modules and angles, line flows, etc.) define the feasible region of a power system and must be enforced. Power flow paths depend on various physical system parameters (resistance, inductance, conductance and capacitance) that impose limits on flow when transferring power to and from different locations (Bompard, Napoli, and Xue 2009: 6). In the debates in the House of Commons, solar energy is proposed as an alternative to traditional sources of energy given the ways solar energy does not create large-scale interdependencies. However, the materialization of solar energy can also suspend questions of generating energy and the materialities of access to energy. National energy grids have been set in place to ensure access to resources across the national territory. The securitization of critical infrastructures implies that some infrastructures become materialized as infrastructures to be protected at the national or European level, while other materialities are relegated outside the purview of government. As Barad noted about the piezoelectric transducer, materialization entails boundary drawing and reconfiguration of the world. The securitization of critical infrastructure excludes other ‘things’ that make up the ‘underbelly’ of industrial and urban nations: accumulated waste, dirty water, or pollution. The identification of critical infrastructure for the purposes of counter-terrorism and ‘all hazards’ protection re-enacts the clean and well managed nation and city. Critical infrastructure protection changes the other ways in which infrastructure has been thought to matter, from issues of privatization to maintenance and from breakdown to conflict over access and distribution. We are far from the modern vision of infrastructure according to which ‘networks and their nodal infrastructures were not just carrying water, electricity etc. into the city, but also embodied the promise and the dream of a good society’ (Kaika and Swyngedouw 2000: 130). By contrast, critical infrastructures are linked with ‘maintaining a defined minimum level of national or international law and order, public safety, economic life, public health, and environmental protection’ (Bennett 2007: 57 emphasis mine). The materialization of emancipation through constructing connectivities and creating access to better living standards is surpassed by materialities of minimum levels. Through securitization, the access to critical infrastructure can be further limited or curtailed (Coward 2009: 412). The securitization of critical infrastructure emphasizes disruption, interruption and failure. The all-hazards approach to critical infrastructure protection is concerned with the unpredictable and unexpected failure rather than the ordinary, everyday failures and disruption. The materialization of critical infrastructure protection downplays the agential character of infrastructure, its ‘becoming’ in relation to other practices. This materialization obscures the matters of everyday disruption, maintenance and repair as well as the becoming of nodes, grids, metal or concrete in entanglements with materialdiscursive practices.

#### Allowing the state to decide what is critical to its existence is a speech act that creates dichotomies between populations, allowing hierarchical exclusion and commodification.

**Aradau ’10** – Dr, Senior Lecturer in International Relations and member of the Centre for the Study of Political Community, (Claudia, “Security that Matters: Critical Infrastructure and Objects of Protection,” http://oro.open.ac.uk/26408/1/Aradau\_security\_materiality\_SD.pdf)//aberg

This article has taken issue with the inattention to the materialization of non-human objects in the production of (in)security. Drawing on Karen Barad’s feminist materialism, it has reintroduced material objects within conceptualizations of security practices and has proposed to redefine securitization as a process of materialization emerging out iterative intra-action with other material-discursive practices. Considering the role of materiality in the production of security phenomena allows us to conceptualize the boundary practices that are created through the naming of infrastructure as ‘critical’ and ‘European’. The securitization of critical infrastructure materializes critical infrastructure in particular ways that exclude other materializations. From this perspective, the role of critical infrastructure protection is not thought through the opposition between population security and vital systems security as Collier and Lakoff have suggested. Infrastructure is not opposed to people, but is materialized in intra-actions between humans and nonhumans, matter and meaning. In this process, the boundaries of what counts as human and non-human, what comes to matter and what not are defined. The securitization of critical infrastructure reconfigures materialities in the world and creates new hierarchies and forms of exclusion. Interconnectivities and interdependencies do not exist independent of particular materialities – the materialdiscursive practices that securitize connectivity and dependency exclude materialities of the production of objects, for example. At the same time, these materializations of objects to be protected also intra-act with materialities of economic and geopolitical structures. While Barad’s conceptualization of matter as materialization offers the possibility of analysing security practices as constituted and constitutive of matter and meaning, subjects and objects, she does not offer an understanding of how differences play out in the very production of security practices. Matters of capital accumulation, neoliberal governance, commodification and labour practices are intra-actively entangled with matters of circulation, flows, nodes, grids and so on. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to explore how such entanglements are not equal and are themselves differentially enacted rather than just producing of difference, it remains a question mark that Barad’s work does not directly address. However, her analysis of matter allows for an understanding of how practices of (in)security come to matter in ways that are simultaneously less contingent and less stable than theories of security have thought them to be.

#### The vulnerability of transportation infrastructure makes it an object of securitizing practices

**Collier and Lakoff ’08** – (Stephen J., The New School, New York, Andrew, University of California, San Diego, “The Vulnerability of Vital Systems: How ‘Critical Infrastructure’ Became a Security Problem,” <http://anthropos-lab.net/wp/publications/2008/01/collier-and-lakoff.pdf)//aberg>

In recent years “critical infrastructure protection” has emerged as an increasingly important framework for understanding and mitigating threats to security. Widespread discussion of critical infrastructure protection in the United States began in 1996, when President Clinton formed a Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection. The Commission’s 1997 report, Critical Foundations, established the central premise of infrastructure protection efforts: that the economic prosperity, military strength, and political vitality of the United States all depend on the continuous functioning of the nation’s critical infrastructures. As the Report stated: “Reliable and secure infrastructures are … the foundation for creating the wealth of our nation and our quality of life as a people.” Moreover, the Report continued, “certain of our infrastructures are so vital that their incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact on our defense and economic security” (United States. President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection 1997: 3). In discussions such as these, we find a distinctive approach to identifying, assessing, and managing security threats. The characteristics of this approach include: (1) a concern with the critical systems upon which modern society, economy, and polity are seen to depend; (2) the identification of the vulnerabilities of these systems and the threats that might exploit these vulnerabilities as matters of national security; and (3) the effort to develop techniques to mitigate system vulnerabilities. In this chapter we ask: Where did this distinctive way of understanding and intervening in security threats come from? How did “critical infrastructure” come to be regarded as a national security problem? We argue that critical infrastructure protection is best understood as one response to a relatively new problematization of security. As Foucault writes, a new problematization occurs when something has “happened to introduce uncertainty, a loss of familiarity; that loss, that uncertainty is the result of difficulties in our previous way of understanding, acting, relating” (Foucault 1994: 598). As we will show, at pivotal moments in the twentieth century, technological and political developments rendered prior security frameworks inadequate, and forced experts to invent new ways of identifying and intervening in security threats. Specifically, what emerged was a way of understanding security threats as problems of system-vulnerability. The task of protecting national security came to include attention to the ongoing functioning of a number of vulnerable systems that were seen as vital to collective life. The paper follows a series of important moments in the twentieth century history of system-vulnerability thinking: the interwar articulation of strategic bombing theory in Europe and the United States, which focused on the “vital targets” of an enemy’s industrial system; the development of defense mobilization and emergency preparedness in the Cold War U.S. as a means to defend the industrial system against a targeted nuclear attack; the emergence of all-hazards planning and “total preparedness” as paradigms for response to disruptions of vital systems; and the widespread diffusion of formal models for assessing the vulnerability of vital systems (see figure 1). The cul//mination of the story takes place in the late 1970s and early 1980s, among a relatively peripheral group of experts who were thinking about new challenges to national security. These experts had turned their attention to emerging threats – such as energy crises, major technological accidents, and terrorist attacks – that did not fit within the strategic framework of the Cold War. These new threats, they theorized, could not be deterred, and their probability could not be calculated. In this context, they began to draw together techniques and organizational forms developed earlier in the century to define a broad approach to mitigating the perceived vulnerabilities of the nation’s critical systems. From their perspective, the ongoing functioning of such systems was a matter of national security. This approach to security problems was identified as central to post-Cold War national security in documents such as Critical Foundations, cited above. In describing the history of how infrastructure became a security problem, our analytic stance is neither “realist” nor “constructivist” – that is, it supposes neither that security threats are self-evident facts in the world nor that they are simply imagined. Rather, in studying problematizations, we are interested in how a given object – in this case, vulnerable, vital systems – becomes a site of expert reflection and practice. As Foucault writes: A problematization does not mean the representation of a pre-existent object nor the creation through discourse of an object that did not exist. It is the ensemble of discursive and non-discursive practices that make something enter into the play of true and false and constitute it as an object of thought (whether in the form of moral reflection, scientific knowledge, political analysis, etc). (Foucault 1994: 670) The central figures in this story are mostly unknown planners and technicians in military and civilian bureaucracies who, over the course of the twentieth century, constituted system-vulnerability as an object of thought. For the most part their work has stayed below the surface of political debates about security. But the basic principles and practices they crafted can now be found in initiatives such as “critical infrastructure protection.” Our goal in tracing this history is to make this increasingly central approach to security problems available for critical scrutiny by analyzing its elements, and pointing to the contingent historical events and processes that shaped its formation.

#### The fear of an attack on critical infrastructure is used to justify militarization of the industry

**Collier and Lakoff ’08** – (Stephen J., The New School, New York, Andrew, University of California, San Diego, “The Vulnerability of Vital Systems: How ‘Critical Infrastructure’ Became a Security Problem,” <http://anthropos-lab.net/wp/publications/2008/01/collier-and-lakoff.pdf)//aberg>

In this section we trace the genealogy of system-vulnerability thinking to the rise of total war and the development strategic bombing theory. The term “total war” refers to a shift in the very constitution of war. In the 19 th and early 20 th centuries, wars among major European powers were no longer conceived or conducted as battles between sovereigns. Rather, wars were fought between entire nations and peoples, bringing military and industrial organization into ever closer contact. As Aron (1954: 88) put it in a classic statement, the rise of total war meant that “The army industrializes itself, industry militarizes itself, the army absorbs the nation; the nation models itself on the army.” In this context, strategists increasingly recognized that military strength depended on the economic and social vitality of the nation, and on the state’s capacity to mobilize and direct that vital strength to strategic ends. The rise of total war meant that the traditional distinction between the military and civilian spheres – at least in wartime – was eroded in a variety of ways. In mobilizing for war, states vastly expanded their interventions in collective life. These interventions included controlling the production and distribution of industrial products critical to the conduct of war, particularly in sectors such as metallurgy and machine building, as well as the construction or regulation of electricity, transportation and communication systems. These industrial mobilization efforts had their conceptual counterpart in a new type of strategic thinking. Military strategists recognized that, just as their own economic facilities were critical to mobilization efforts, the vital nodes of enemy industrial systems could be exploited as vulnerabilities. An attack on these critical nodes could weaken or completely disable the opponent’s war effort. Based on this line of reasoning, air power theorists developed a theory of air war – strategic bombing – in which such nodes were the “vital targets.”

#### Elevating transportation infrastructure to a national security threat is based off of illusory and non-deferrable enemies

**Collier and Lakoff ’08** – (Stephen J., The New School, New York, Andrew, University of California, San Diego, “The Vulnerability of Vital Systems: How ‘Critical Infrastructure’ Became a Security Problem,” <http://anthropos-lab.net/wp/publications/2008/01/collier-and-lakoff.pdf)//aberg>

In the 1970s, a sub-group of security thinkers with ties to civil defense – including Kupperman and his colleagues – became concerned with the rise of threats other than the Soviet Union. Events such as the 1972 Munich terrorist attacks, followed soon after by the Arab-Israeli War and the 1973 oil crisis, indicated to these thinkers that the nation’s dependence on critical systems was a vulnerability that could be exploited by actors who lacked the military strength to directly challenge the U.S. As we have seen, in OEP Kupperman was concerned with anticipating and managing potential future energy crises. After the events of the early 1970s, he linked this concern to the problem of terrorism. He argued that terrorism was emerging as a strategic tool in low intensity conflict – and that terrorists were likely to exploit vulnerabilities in the nation’s critical systems (Kupperman, van Opstal et al. 1982: 463). This emphasis on the conjuncture of terrorism and the vulnerability of energy systems was shared by other civil defense-oriented security thinkers, such as Maynard M. Stephens, the author of the 1970 study on oil refineries cited above. In a 1979 volume on terrorism co-edited by Kupperman, Stephens wrote that “the uninterrupted flow of natural gas is economically essential to the country” (Stephens 1979: 213). For this reason, he argued, “segments of major natural-gas transmission lines should therefore stand out as attractive targets to the saboteur” (Stephens 1979: 213). Such arguments followed the concern, first developed in strategic bombing theory with critical nodes of a production system that, if disrupted, could knock out an entire industrial web. There was a crucial difference, however. The threat now came not from an enemy’s military attack, but from non-deterrable threats – terrorism, and “threats without enemies” such as technological failures and natural disasters. In short, total preparedness was no longer viewed as an adjunct to the problem of confronting the Soviet Union. Rather, it was seen as a national security problem in its own right. This elevation of systems vulnerability to the level of a national security concern had a certain political salience in the period, given the contemporary concern with problems such as energy and terrorism. For example, in 1977, the Joint Congressional ommitteeon Defense Production held hearings and published a two-part report on the nation’s “civil preparedness” programs. The report was highly critical of the condition of the nation’s emergency management plans, and it recommended the centralization of federal preparedness efforts, and a broadening of these efforts to include non-nuclear threats. The first volume of the report articulated, in now-familiar terms, two key aspects of the vital systems security framework: the dependence of contemporary society on complex technological systems, and the vulnerability of citizens to multiple types of threat. “An increasingly complex, technology-dependent, industrial economy in the United States,” the report argued, “has made citizens more than ever vulnerable to the effects of disasters and emergencies over which they have little or no control and to which they cannot successfully respond as individuals” (United States. Joint Committee on Defense Production 1977: 3). Moreover, the Report noted “increasing demands made on government by citizens” for protection against such threats.” 13 In July 1977, soon after the Committee’s Civil Preparedness Review was published, a major blackout occurred in New York City. The blackout, which was accompanied by extensive riots and looting, brought widespread attention to the frailty and vulnerability of the nation’s electrical grid and other critical systems. The Defense Production Committee held hearings shortly after the blackout on the implications of the event for federal emergency preparedness. One conclusion was that these systems were vulnerable to a wide array of threats, ranging from technical accidents, to natural hazards, to terrorist attacks: “Electric utilities therefore present a relatively compact and especially inviting set of targets for a saboteur, a terrorist or an attacker, as well as a lightning bolt” (United States. Joint Committee on Defense Production 1977: 1-2). The problem of system vulnerability was projected on to the enemy’s strategy, in a mirroring process that was similar to early civil defense. At these hearings, the Director of the Defense Logistics Agency testified about military efforts to protect key defense industries from attack. He noted that the scope of his agency’s activity was limited to those industries that had a direct impact on defense needs. Considering the widespread impact of the New York City blackout on economic and social life, he suggested the need for a broader program to secure critical facilities. This would begin with a cataloguing effort: “It might be well if there were some sort of national list, if you please, of facilities that would be a key to our economic and societal well-being. Then at least, we would know what they are and whether or not the Federal Government would see fit to involve itself in providing for their security or would provide at least some advice on what these facilities could do for themselves” (United States. Joint Committee on Defense Production 1977: 117). What is significant in these recommendations is the proposal that the Federal Government should generalize its efforts to assure critical infrastructure: from a specific emphasis on those systems essential to military production, to a broader concern with the vital systems essential to the economic and social well being of the nation as a whole.

#### Critical Infrastructure programs are quintessential to the survival of state control

**Lundborg and Vaughan-Williams 10** – The Swedish Institute of International Affairs AND University of Warwick (Tom and Nick, “There’s More to Life than Biopolitics: Critical Infrastructure, Resilience Planning, and Molecular Security,” September 2010, http://stockholm.sgir.eu/uploads/SGIR\_2010\_Lundborg\_VaughanWilliamsdoc.pdf) SIyer

In recent years, Western governments have invested significantly in the enhancement of critical infrastructures (CIs). One influential definition of CIs is offered by the United States (US) Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as ‘the framework of physical structures and cyber information networks that provides a continual flow of information, goods, and services essential to the defence and economic security of the US’ (DHS, 2004: 1). Similar definitions can be found in the United Kingdom (UK) and European Union (EU) contexts, all of which stress the importance of such networks for the functioning of everyday life and the return to ‘normality’ in the event of natural disasters, accidents, or terrorist attacks. One example of recent activity is the EU Commission’s attempt to develop information technologies. Though invisible, Critical Information Infrastructures (CIIs) are viewed by the Commission as vital to European economy and society. Indeed, according to the World Economic Forum, there is a 10-20% likelihood of a major CII breakdown in the EU within the next 10 years, which could result in financial losses equivalent to US $250 billion. Any form of disruption to and/or destruction of CIIs would therefore have a serious impact across Europe (EU Commission, 2009). Other sectors typically encompassed by CIs include: agriculture and food; water, sewage works and public health; emergency services; energy supply; banking and finance; and transportation systems. As such, CIs are intimately interwoven with the fabric of societies and the stakes of CI planning are high. Of course, the provision and maintenance of adequate CIs is not a ‘new’ phenomenon, nor one confined to the ‘West’. Rather, CIs are associated with the quintessence of statehood both historically and globally – as, for example, reflected in the basis for popular criticism of the government’s failure to prepare for and mitigate against the catastrophic effects of the recent floods in Pakistan. Nevertheless, what is arguably significant about recent efforts to enhance critical infrastructures in the West is both the scale of investment and the extent to which developments in this context have come to permeate and structure economic, social, military, and political sectors. It is no coincidence that such trends have intensified as a result of the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon (2001), and the bombings in Madrid (2003) and London (2005) – attacks that, after all, struck multiple blows at the heart of essential (and highly symbolic) financial and transportation networks vital for the ‘continual flow of information, goods and services’. Furthermore, alongside this investment has emerged the concept of ‘resilience’ around which current security planning, design, policy, and practice increasingly revolves. Here resilient CIs are conventionally understood in terms of systems that demonstrate the ‘ability [...] to withstand and recover from adversity’ (Cabinet Office, 2010: 5). Indeed, so influential has the idea of resiliency become that it has arguably replaced the ‘war on terror’ as the defining motif of contemporary Western security relations – as illustrated by a recent UK Home Office phrase book that called for civil servants to abandon references to the ‘war’ in favour of ‘building resilience against violent extremism and criminal murder’ (quoted in Amoore 2008: 130).

#### Resilient infrastructure is grounded in the biopolitical desire to protect modern liberal life at all costs

**Zebrowski, 09 –** Keele University (Christopher, “Governing the Network Society: A Biopolitical Critique of Resilience”, Keele University, 2009, <http://www.politicalperspectives.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/Vol3-1-2009-4.pdf)//RM>

As a security strategy, resilience differs markedly from prophylactic forms of security primarily concerned with thwarting an attack. Instead, engendering resilience into the social and infrastructural networks that animate species-life directs attention to the performative adaptability of these networks to withstand, re-route and recombine in the wake of a potentially catastrophic event to maintain systemic operability. Here, security does not refer to the absence of danger but rather the ability of a society to quickly and efficiently reorganise to rebound from a potentially catastrophic strike. As the primary threats to modern liberal life increasingly take on the organisational form of the network to operate within (exploiting) and upon (targeting) the complex networks sustaining the life of advanced liberal societies, then biopolitical governance is increasingly directed towards the realisation of a logistical life in these societies based on models of the most resilient of “living networks” (Reid, 2006).2

#### Resilient infrastructure is born of the desire to secure modern society

**Zebrowski, 09 –** Keele University (Christopher, “Governing the Network Society: A Biopolitical Critique of Resilience”, Keele University, 2009, <http://www.politicalperspectives.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/Vol3-1-2009-4.pdf)//RM>

It has been argued that the eradication, or at least management, of doubt is the driving feature of modern reason (Caygill, 1993). Indeed, the desire to render the future fully knowable has offered a fleeting horizon for both the disciplines of Political Science and International Relations whose emphasis on predictive capacity has been perpetually challenged by the force of uncertain global events (cf. Gaddis, 1992: 5-58). Indeed the recent incorporation of complexity models into theories of social (De Landa, 2006; Urry, 2003) and historical processes (De Landa, 1997) pose a considerable challenge to attempts to uncover timeless, universal laws upon which the unfolding of history and politics could be understood and ultimately controlled. Rather these theories stress the contingency and non-linear evolutionary properties of complex systems, such as social systems. This article examines how these understandings are shaping the contemporary security environment. Focusing on the policy of resilience conducted by the United Kingdom’s Civil Contingencies Secretariat, this article will trace the relationship between an emerging ontopolitical conceptualisation of society in terms of a complex adaptive system, and efforts to manage contingency politically. Resilience represents a novel security strategy that recognizes the importance of preparatory measures within a contingent security environment. Resilience, defined as the capacity to bounce-back from external shocks, seeks to secure society from unpredictable systemic shocks by improving the evolutionary capacity, or “fitness,” of the population. Thus far resilience has been primarily directed at the rapid regeneration and repair of critical infrastructures in the wake of a crisis within the UK; however these strategies are increasingly being operationalised in Europe as a result of European Union initiatives to create a common policy on European critical infrastructure protection (Burgess, 2007).

#### Claims of threats to infrastructure are constructed narratives that allow biopolitical regimes to secure their control

**Zebrowski, 09 –** Keele University (Christopher, “Governing the Network Society: A Biopolitical Critique of Resilience”, Keele University, 2009, <http://www.politicalperspectives.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/Vol3-1-2009-4.pdf)//RM>

As the above statement makes clear, the introduction of the security strategy of resilience has less to do with the changing nature of threats in the contemporary security environment, and more to do with the changing organisational structure of life within advanced liberal societies; the need to adjust security technologies to the protection of the modern “network society”. Coinciding with the advances in the quality of life that international telecommunications networks and just-in-time transportation networks have delivered to advanced liberal societies has been the intensification of certain threats suggesting that these complex networks have also made modern life increasingly vulnerable. The same networks relied upon by advanced liberal societies for a high standard of living are being exploited by other networked communities from viruses (both electronic and organic) to international terrorists who threaten to destabilise the contingent amalgamation of networks that contribute to the “quality of life” experienced in advanced liberal societies. The modern “network society”, it is said, is in desperate need of novel solutions, which take into consideration society’s changing form, to protect it from these threats.

#### Resilience seeks to secure in an entirely new way – not by deterring threats, but by absorbing attacks and continuing to function

**Zebrowski, 09 –** Keele University (Christopher, “Governing the Network Society: A Biopolitical Critique of Resilience”, Keele University, 2009, <http://www.politicalperspectives.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/Vol3-1-2009-4.pdf)//RM>

Ironically, the same design elements that contribute to a system’s capacity to maximise circulation, namely its dynamism or complexity, make control of these systems difficult, if not impossible to obtain without detrimentally affecting it. In other words, the conceptualisation of species-life in terms of an open and adaptive system precludes prophylactic security strategies. Indeed the fitness of any system is dependent upon its ability to interact with its environment. Instead these systems are secured through their contingency, by focusing on optimising the systems ability to respond to threats by evolving over or beyond them (Dillon, 2006). Optimising a system’s capacity to evolve over external shocks, thus maximising a system’s fitness, is referred to as engendering resilience (Dillon and Reid, 2001: 43-45).

### link—mass transit

#### Urban transit systems reinforce a stratified system of unequal control over individual mobility, enabling state-led discipline of whole populations

**Richardson and Jensen, 08** –professors of urban theory at Aalborg University in Denmark (Tim and Ole B., “How Mobility Systems Produce Inequality: Making Mobile Subject Types on the Bangkok Sky Train,” Built Environment, Vol. 34, Issue 2, Pages 218-231, May 2008)//HK

Infrastructure, Elite Mobilities and Inequality Manderscheid (2008) argues that ‘the ability to be mobile appears to be a very crucial force of stratiﬁcation’. Building on Urry’s identiﬁcation of the relation between multiple mobilities and social strati cation, she calls for attention to ‘the complex role mobilities play in the re-articulation of unequal life chances’. Unequal mobilities are, then, at least partly a consequence of unequal power relations. Mobility can be seen as a ‘resource to which not everyone has an equal relationship’ (Skeggs, cited in Hannam et al., 2006, p. 3), and the control of mobility therefore becomes an inevitable focus of urban politics. It then becomes important to examine more closely how inequalities of mobility are produced and manifested in the urban realm, by emphasizing ‘the relation between human mobilities and immobilities, and the unequal power relations which unevenly distribute motility, the potential for mobility’ (Hannam et al., 2006). It is also important to see how this politics of mobility, as it produces unequal mobilities, relates to urban spatial politics more generally: Differential mobility, access to space and inequalities in power to inﬂuence others’ use of space reﬂect the interrelationship between social groups in the city … the city is composed of more or less well deﬁ ned social areas each of which is controlled by one or more groups who sustain a moral order there. (Duncan, 2005, p. 165) And as the potential for mobility becomes socially polarized, certain elites ‘enjoy’ privileged degrees of mobility while others remain more or less immobile, or unable to control their own mobility (Bauman, 1998). From this perspective we begin to see social inequality, in relation to mobility, as being directly related to urban politics and power. However, we need to proceed cautiously. The perspectives introduced above tend to create a polarized view of mobility/immobility, which assumes differentiated mobility to be intrinsically bad, and therefore implies, perhaps, that a lack of mobility is something that needs to be rectified: a contemporary urban problem. Thus in mobility terms, social inequality PEOPLE PLUS TECHNOLOGY: NEW APPROACHES TO SUSTAINABLE MOBILITY 220 BUILT ENVIRONMENT VOL 34 NO 2 means a lack of potential for mobility, which in turn can lead to a progressive ‘solution’ of ever increasing personal mobility for all. This reflects a tendency to equate modernity with mobility, and therefore to see a lack of mobility directly as inequality. This is highly problematic when set in the context of urgent agendas to move towards more sustainable forms of urban mobility. We therefore pose the question slightly differently here. Rather than seeing inequality in a particular way, we ask how the state, and other agents of development, seek to produce new potentials for, and practices of, mobility that are linked to new mobile subject types. As development is conceived and takes place, new ideas and spaces are fabricated that change, sometimes dramatically, how the citizen is seen by the state (Scott, 1998). The production of a mobility system, then, creates a ‘laboratory’ (Urry, 2004) that allows examination of how, as new urban interfaces are produced, imagined categories of citizens are mediated, and everyday mobility is practised and experienced in new ways. This corresponds to Cresswell’s (2006) theorization of mobility as brute facts, representation and embodiment. This creates a complex terrain for the remaking of inequality, necessitating the question: what, in fact, does inequality come to mean in these new mobile spaces, both imagined and material? The research site, then, becomes the material infrastructure of the sociotechnical mobility system, which presents an interface between the state and everyday life (Watson, 2005). We focus squarely then on the material spaces of infrastructure as interfaces across which the dimensions of equality and inequality are reconstituted. Therefore it is important to understand how the material interface ‘between’ the state and the citizen is produced.

#### Transit systems are constructed based on flawed conceptions of their passengers—this normalizes travelers and legitimizes governmental planning in our everyday lives

**Richardson and Jensen, 08** –professors of urban theory at Aalborg University in Denmark (Tim and Ole B., “How Mobility Systems Produce Inequality: Making Mobile Subject Types on the Bangkok Sky Train,” Built Environment, Vol. 34, Issue 2, Pages 218-231, May 2008)//HK

The View from the State: Making Mobile Subjects Kesselring (2005, p. 2) asks ‘What are the imageries … that motivate actors to develop a speciﬁc mobility structure’. Earlier research along these lines has examined how infrastructure networks and spatial concepts are reconﬁguring mobility in space (for example, Jensen and Richardson 2004). This takes us towards a focus on how certain ideas of the city, mobility and citizens, and of the relations between them play a part in the making of urban mobilities. Governing mobilities (Jensen and Richardson 2007) entails particular logics, or rationalities, and particular practices that embed certain ideas of the subjects who are to be governed, and may be traced in policy discourse. In exploring our case we therefore question ‘what forms of person, self and identity are presupposed by different practices of government?’ (Dean, 1999). In planning terms, this means that when particular subjects are imagined in particular ways, this will play a more or less visible part in the formation of policies and plans. Articulated in policy discourses, these particular imaginaries articulate who the subjects of the plans are, what they want and how they act, all of which become normalized over time and through practice. Being normalized also means that, for the planners and policymakers, these subjectivities enter the journey from being merely ‘imaginary subjects’ to stand as images of real, living persons to which the plans and policies are directed. From a mobilities perspective, we see plans reflecting ideas about how certain citizens are imagined to dream and manage their future lives. In other words, mobility systems are designed for certain imagined types of citizens, and urban and regional maps are drawn to fit with the planners’ and policymakers’ imaginaries of how these particular types of citizens will want to move in time and space. This means firstly, that in plans, policies and designs there might be several types of mobile subjects present, each with corresponding imagined mobilities. Secondly, it means that the governing technologies and the domains of knowledge embedded in the HOW MOBILITY SYSTEMS PRODUCE INEQUALITY: MAKING MOBILE SUBJECT TYPES ON THE BANGKOK SKY TRAIN BUILT ENVIRONMENT VOL 34 NO 2 221 logic of governing may work strategically to shape these ideas of mobile subject types. Thirdly, it means that in the actual construction of infrastructures and design of urban and regional spaces, these mobile subjects and their anticipated mobilities are present, legitimizing new infrastructure types such as urban transit systems, and setting the conditions of possibility for the everyday lives of citizens. Future mobile subject types are imagined and narrated across the complex intertextual fields that lead to the production of mobility systems. Their imagined mobilities are predicated upon, and are used to make, thinkable and normal, new technologies of mobility. The governance of socio-technical mobility systems involves routine practices of producing visions of future mobility that have implications for the engagement between planning and everyday life in cities. Inspired by Scott (1998), Anderson (1991), Merriman (2007) and Brenner (2004) we are interested in how urban governance ‘sees’ how mobility systems reconfigure the city by imagining future communities that will populate them and move within them.

#### **Public transit systems are the epitome of modern biopolitics—the aff normalizes entire populations**

Uddin, 11 – master’s thesis in political science (Adam Sultan Ali, “Power and Public Transportation: A Political Deconstruction of Urban Mass Transit,” University of Colorado Denver, June 2011, [http://gradworks.umi.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/14/93/1493350.html)//HK](http://gradworks.umi.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/14/93/1493350.html)//HK\)

Passengers on busses (and to a lesser extent commuter trains) have few options for locating their bodies and belongings. The narrow isle allows for little variation in the expected pattern: unidirectional movement from the driver toward the rear. But even as it is a tightly enclosed space , the constant motion thorough the city streets gives transit a fluidity and openness that are at odds whit its structure The routine and monotony of public transit also make it an ideal location to observe how institutional systems are contested on a daily basis. Continuous change and movement through the various neighborhoods of the urban landscape make this seemingly rigid space very dynamic (Fleetwood 2004, 27). Further, and as if out of the Orwell/Foucault Guide to the Future, the covert signs of "Big Brother" are literally everywhere, if you know what to look for: Even though the bus driver may often be the only representative of state authority in this space, power and institutional control are asserted and experienced even without the visible signs of authority. As Foucault asserts, a part of the problem of institutions is "the government of oneself, that ritualization of the problem of personal conduct" (1991:87) (Fleetwood, 2004) Transit riders may not see the visual manifestation of state authority represented by armed and uniformed private security guards patrolling the bus and light rail platforms, but the warning and indications of state control are plastered on billboards, warning stickers, and courtesy sings everywhere. Primarily concerned with regulating personal conduct and human behavior, the rules on public transportation are narrowly focused: no eating, drinking, smoking, cursing, listening to loud music, or talking too loud.17 Other signs are eerily reminiscent of the Stasi of the former German Democratic Republic, encouraging everyone to report "suspicious" behavior to authorities, actions ranging from unattended Information found via primary documents retrieved form RTD. 18 baggage to excessive sweating18, consistently urging riders to be fearful and alert. Writing extensively on the subject of increased citizen surveillance and subjugation; Foucault anticipated many of the features of contemporary society, which we have come to, if not accept, at least recognize as an almost inevitable component of modern life. He pointed to the growth of modern institutions in this postmodern age, and the depersonalizing nature of much of their activities. The latter included, in particular, the focus upon observation of individuals, so that each of us is never certain whether or not we are being watched by the authorities (Oliver, 2010). Taken for granted as a benevolent function of the state, many citizens remain unaware of the striking similarity between the socialization and surveillance of mass transit riders with that of prisoners, exploited workers, school children and the military. The omnipresent socialization/surveillance systems of the public bus have significant similarities to the classic "Panopticon" prison design theories of Jeremy Bentham. Foucault, in Discipline and Punish, "commented upon the work of Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) who, in the late eighteenth century, designed a type of prison that reflected the prevailing ideology of scientific, structured observation" ( Oliver, 2010, 55). Architecturally planned to maximize the efficiency of guards monitoring prisoners, Bentham's perfect prison, known as the Panopticon, "laid down the principle that power should be visible and unverifiable" (Foucault 1975, pg 201). The Panopticon, designed with prisoner 18 http://www.rtd-denver.com/TransitWatch.shtml 19 cells arranged in a circular pattern around a large tower with opaque windows, values ambiguity, as prisoners never know for sure if they are being watched and if so by how many guards, and are always under the constant awe of the ambient power of the tower: Hence the major effects of the Panopticon: to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power. So to arrange things that the surveillance is permanent in its effects, even if it is discontinuous in its action; that the perfection of power should tend to render its actual exercise unnecessary; that is architectural apparatus should be a machine for the creating and sustaining a power relation independent of the person who exercises it; in short, that the inmates should be caught up in a power situation of which they are themselves the bearers (Foucault 1975, pg 201). The experience of being on U.S. public transportation in many ways mirror the "conscious and permanent" surveillance of the Panopticon: riders not only know they are under surveillance, but many times have willingly authorized increases in security and surveillance measures in the name of fighting terrorism.19 Lester Hoel details the overall increase in security on mass transit systems, especially at major stations: Transit security measures for rapid transits systems have been directed primarily at station areas, because these are the locations of highest crime occurrence and greatest passenger vulnerability. The principle objective of station-related security countermeasures is that passengers be visible to transit personnel police and other passengers so that criminal acts are prevented or help is summoned quickly and so that passengers have the 19 Most major urban mass transit systems are under the authority of a democratically elected governing board that brings all major funding decisions before a public vote. After 9/11 and especially after the Madrid train bombings, regional transit authorities have seen increased citizen support for homeland security and emergency preparedness. 20 perception of a safe environment. Accordingly, architectural design of transit stations areas should include consideration of the following features: • Clear lines of sight unobscured by columns and concessions. Ticket collection booth centrally located for greatest visibility. Straight corridors and passageways, with ample width and good lighting • Closed-circuit TV monitors on platform areas and other hidden locations • High levels of illumination • Minimum number of exit and entry points • Locked and supervised toilet facilities The aforementioned security measures, now prolific among transit authorities nationwide, act as a constant reminder of the vigilance of the state, often times implicitly criminalizing the very same people they were meant to protect: The panoptic mechanism arranges spatial unities that make it possible to see constantly and to recognize immediately. In short, it reverses the principle of a dungeon; or rather its three functions - to enclose, to deprive of light and hide - it preserves only the first and eliminates the other two. Full lighting and the eye of a supervisor capture better than darkness, which ultimately protected. Visibility is a trap (Foucault 1975, pg300). These measures are part of an on-going war for public space that responses to the typical desire of deviants20 on and around public transportation to seek out spaces that provide them the most cover from the all-seeing eye in the sky; spaces like bus stop shelters, the notorious back of the bus, or deeply shielded passages in the stair banks of both buses and light rails are perfect. 20 As defined by the mainstream as anyone not adhering to cultural constructed social rules and norms to include but not limited to: Punks, skaters, drug pushers, the political subversive, and the addicted. 21 Felons are one group of citizens that are deemed permanently deviant regardless of future life choices. In my own observations and interviews felons tend to congregate in the back of the bus, enabling a view of everything and everyone, so as to never be caught unaware by a police officer or would be wrongdoer. Perhaps correlated to an intimate knowledge of the harsh side of power and authority, former inmates never forget that "the Panopticon is ultimately based on force. It always has been and always will be" (Jensen, 2004). However, many other citizens whom have not experienced incarceration fail to recognize power in its diffused forms, resulting in tacit compliance in a system of their own oppression. "What one generation perceives as repression, the next accepts as a necessary part of a complex daily life" (Jensen, 2004). Call it "scientific structured observation," as did Jeremy Bentham, or "Big Brother," like Orwell, or HALO (as the Denver police call their dozens of high-tech security cameras now installed all around Denver's 'high activity' downtown transit area), understanding the intersection of power and technology in the state-sanctioned monitoring and socializing of the public is essential to understanding America's security and surveillance obsessed culture, especially on public transit.

#### The Bangkok Sky Train exemplifies the everyday effects of urban transit—stratification, otherization, and forced Westernization infest the local cultural framework

**Richardson and Jensen, 08** –professors of urban theory at Aalborg University in Denmark (Tim and Ole B., “How Mobility Systems Produce Inequality: Making Mobile Subject Types on the Bangkok Sky Train,” Built Environment, Vol. 34, Issue 2, Pages 218-231, May 2008)//HK

The Bangkok Sky Train 1 The ﬁ rst steps towards realizing the Sky Train came in April 1992 when BMA (Bangkok Metropolitan Authority) awarded the BTSC (Bangkok Mass Transit System Public Company Limited) a 30-year concession to build and operate the system, formally known as the ‘BTS Sky Train’. The goal was to create a mass-transit system that was ‘safe, comfortable, fast, convenient, reliable and affordable’ (Hoskins, 2000, p. 47). The Sky Train eventually went into operation on 1 January 2000. Operating on two lines, the Sukhumwit Line (17 km) and the Silom Line (6.5 km), the Sky Train made travel possible at triple the average car speed in the city, by operating at 35 km/h (see ﬁ gure 1). The Sky Train has now been in operation for 8 years and there has been a shift in both the public’s perception of the train and in the number of passengers. According to local analysts the Sky Train is now considered ‘natural’ within the city’s portfolio of mobility modes (Jensen, 2007a, p. 17). This does not mean that the train has become ‘neutral’ but rather that it fits into the city as another layer of the taken for granted yet highly stratified sociality. Local policy analysts conclude that the Sky Train has come closer to the hearts and habits of Bangkok’s middle class (interview with Charas Suwanmala). In so doing, it reproduces three mobile subject types that are characteristic of the Sky Train system, moving through its seamless mobility corridors, and living a new urban life. The mobile shoppers from the Thai middle class and above belong to one group. The fast moving and Western oriented Thai business people constitute another grouping. The mobile subject imagined, facilitated and ultimately constructed by the Sky Train is a PEOPLE PLUS TECHNOLOGY: NEW APPROACHES TO SUSTAINABLE MOBILITY 224 BUILT ENVIRONMENT VOL 34 NO 2 modern (that is Western) oriented business person with a rational approach to city life and economic opportunity. Finally the third group of subjects that are indeed circulated but also created is the foreign (often Western) tourist. The tourist is experiencing Bangkok very differently 12 metres above the city streets, and in the process forms a particular identity, moving within an elevated urban realm of cool spaces, whilst being voyeur of the relatively chaotic ‘other’ realm below. The practical reality of the Sky Train, then, is that it facilitates the mobile practices and identity construction of these three mobile subject types. Each of these mobile subject types is socio-culturally different, but they share the same mobility practices and motility recourses when it comes to the actual and potential usage of the Sky Train. However, the poor and the immigrant workers still cannot afford the ticket price for the Sky Train. We now discuss specific features of the Sky Train that are key to the production of these mobile subject types: iconic branding; vertical layering of mobility space and urban realms; stratification of time value; and the production of a new relationship between mobility and consumption An Icon for Modern-minded Mobile Subjects The Sky Train is often promoted as a symbol of progress, juxtaposed with the bleak image of a car congested city. As such, it might be said to fulﬁ l a larger role as branding object and imaginary icon to politicians, planners and citizens, as it epitomizes the creation of modern (predominantly Westernized) mobile subjects. The Sky Train, then, has become the supreme symbol and icon of Bangkok’s entrance into the realm of super-modern or perhaps post-modern metropolises: Six years on, it has attained a unique status as the icon of contemporary Bangkok. Its overwhelming presence is featured in every conceivable media – new music videos, movies or advertisements. The Sky Train is an indispensable symbol of the new generation. (Ayuthaya, 2005, p. 16) Clearly, the Sky Train is more than a system for shifting people from point A to point B. The fact that an increasing number of ‘modern’ Western inspired music videos with Thai artists choose the Sky Train platforms as their location indicates that this is a space of particularly strong iconic connotations. The Sky Train facilitates the illusion of a first world urban aesthetic bracketed by deliberate Figure 1. The BTS Sky Train. (Photo: Ole B. Jensen) HOW MOBILITY SYSTEMS PRODUCE INEQUALITY: MAKING MOBILE SUBJECT TYPES ON THE BANGKOK SKY TRAIN BUILT ENVIRONMENT VOL 34 NO 2 225 and meticulously selected camera angles. Furthermore, from field observations it is clear that tourists are taking as many pictures of the Sky Train as of the Royal Castle, illustrating the presence of a global mobility icon in Bangkok’s urban landscape. But the Sky Train is more than a media-made icon of modernity, as the ‘ordinary Thai’ seems to understand it as symbolizing Thailand’s transition towards being a global player in the networked world of planetary capitalism: ‘For Thai people the Sky Train is a symbol of progress and modernization’ (interview with Nopanant Tapananont). The dramatic visual impact of the Sky Train on the city was not universally welcomed at first, but seems to have been accepted as part of this transition: ‘In the beginning there was a big debate with the environmentalists… Right now we realize that Bangkok will not be beautiful anyhow’ (interview with Nopanant Tapananont). This criticism that appeared in the beginning of the construction phase is downplayed by the Deputy Governor of Bangkok Metropolitan Authority: ‘Aesthetically there were complaints when it was built, but after it finished there haven’t been complaints’ (interview with Banasopit Mekvichai). It appears that the powerful symbolism of the Sky Train has overcome objections, at least as far as the powerful actors are concerned. The Sky Train can then be understood as an identity requisite for the construction of Bangkok’s ‘modern’ mobile subjects. In the Thai context ‘modern’ means ‘Western’. To move seamlessly above the city on the Sky Train is to behave in a modern, Western, sophisticated and rational way, in relation to a previously predominantly simplified, traditional and dirty practice of everyday mobility in the dangerous, congested and polluted streets below. Differentiating Space: Layered Mobility Spaces and Urban Realms Bangkok’s middle classes are beginning to re-locate everyday activities such as work, shopping and leisure along the Sky Train corridor, which is leading to a breakdown of the historical importance of the close location of home and workplace (interview with Ole Fryd). The new mobile subjects are re-organizing their experiences of the city at a new spatial scale, conﬁ gured by the new opportunities for mobility provided by the Sky Train infrastructure, and thereby Figure 2. Buying a ticket in the world above. (Photo: Ole B. Jensen)PEOPLE PLUS TECHNOLOGY: NEW APPROACHES TO SUSTAINABLE MOBILITY 226 BUILT ENVIRONMENT VOL 34 NO 2 transforming locally based place identities to city-wide (or corridor-deﬁ ned) identities. In spatial terms, the Sky Train produces a layering of mobility space, with the creation of a raised mobility infrastructure, which in turn makes possible an exclusive, elevated urban realm. The practice of being a tourist, for example, transforms with the aid of the Sky Train. In the words of one of the big authorities on contemporary tourism, The Lonely Planet: ‘The most comfortable option for travelling in “new” Bangkok (Silom, Sukhumwit and Siam Square), the Sky Train is an elevated rail network that sails over the city’s notorious traffic jams’ (Cummings et al., 2005, p. 184). The Sky Train provides an almost homely air conditioned haven to many Western tourists, who circulate between 4 star hotels and shopping arcades above the dirty and noisy streetscape. Moving about in Bangkok, congestion and intense crowdedness are not the only things catching the analytical eye. Bangkok is a city of edges and layers in both physical and socio-spatial terms. Some say the Sky Train has introduced a new sense of order in Bangkok, as it is ‘clean, cool and quiet’ (Hoskins, 2000, p. 54) – the modern antithesis to much else of Bangkok’s urban fabric. However, the Sky Train also spreads generic urbanity as it scatters more or less soulless places. Moreover, the vertical separation that is the Sky Train’s most striking feature creates dark shadowed spaces below its structure, where the congestion fumes and the heat become ‘unbearable’ (Beek, 2002, p. 121). So the Sky Train with its material infrastructure above the city streets functions as a site for layering mobile subjectivities as different speeds and different mobility comforts are differentiated by physical separation, with different subjects at ground level and above (see figure 1). The Sky Train has realized a very profound change in mobility patterns and cultures, particularly amongst business-people, middle classes and tourists. So even though senior government officials seem to think of the Sky Train as socially inclusive and open to all classes – ‘Personally I think everyone uses the Sky Train … that is a new perception … This is convenient and you know exactly when you get somewhere’ (Interview with Banasopit Mekvichai) – the train could also be seen as adding another socially stratifying layer to a city already marked by socioeconomic segregation. What is important here is that the primary causal factor in this social stratification is, again, the vertical separation of certain people from others:

#### Transit infrastructure spatially, economically, and socially elevates a mobile elite, transforming residents into calculated, constantly moving consumers

**Richardson and Jensen, 08** –professors of urban theory at Aalborg University in Denmark (Tim and Ole B., “How Mobility Systems Produce Inequality: Making Mobile Subject Types on the Bangkok Sky Train,” Built Environment, Vol. 34, Issue 2, Pages 218-231, May 2008)//HK

The upper middle classes and the rich people transport themselves and live, generally speaking, from 3rd ﬂ oor and up. They work in buildings with air conditioning; they shop in air conditioned shopping malls; go to cinemas and train in cool ﬁ tness centres. They even transport themselves in air conditioned cars on elevated high ways or in sky trains. (Marling, 2005. p. 34) However, it is not only the networked malls and shopping spaces that carry the mark of social segregation. The city enclaves increasingly are marked by such segregated flows: The local everyday life of the city of enclaves is also disintegrating. Mobility in the city region has become a part of everyday life and increasingly more social groups live their everyday life in transit zones and down-strokes in the city. The infrastructure as well as the lifestyle determine how far you travel and where to. (Ibid., p. 44) To facilitate mobile subject types which can benefit from such extreme differences in speed and comfort as enabled by the Sky Train is therefore also to offer the opportunity to live in a different urban realm for those who can afford access to it. Buying a Sky Train ticket – a passport to the world above (see figure 2) – is a practice of separation between mobile and immobile, rich and poor, modern and traditional. In this way, the Sky Train contributes to a segregating effect that not only separates social groups and classes but also reinforces a mutual ignorance of ‘the other’ that in the long term will have implications for the mobile subjectivities constructed within its mobility worlds.HOW MOBILITY SYSTEMS PRODUCE INEQUALITY: MAKING MOBILE SUBJECT TYPES ON THE BANGKOK SKY TRAIN BUILT ENVIRONMENT VOL 34 NO 2 227 This consequence of separated urban realms is reflected in the relation between the segregated mobility system and the property market in the Bangkok city region. One of the leading Bangkok real estate agencies has a clear view of this connection: mass transit and road network projects … will open new corridors for new property development opportunities. Many areas that now have no property development potential will beneﬁ t from their better accessibility. This means developers can develop new projects outside the downtown area and offer them at lower costs thanks to less expensive land prices in those areas. Once those projects are developed, Jones Lang LaSalle expects a growth in real estate, beginning with the residential sector, followed by retail and the ofﬁ ce sector in certain locations. (Jones Lang LaSalle, 2006) This view of a positive relationship between property prices and Sky Train infrastructure is supported by academic research (Wissink et al., 2005, p. 8), suggesting that future investment patterns will find synergies with the extending reach of the elevated mobility system. As Jones Lang LaSalle (2006) argue there is reason for investors to look with great expectation at the new infrastructure link to the shopping centre at Siam Paragon since it is going to be the ‘hottest retail development project planned for completion this year’. Differentiating Time Alongside this spatial layering, the Sky Train has introduced a new rationality of time. In Bangkok, ‘time value’ has emerged as a dominant culturally speciﬁ c norm of mobility that was not present at the beginning of the Sky Train operation, but which has now become a well established calculus of the Bangkok middle class and business people. The practical effect of this transformed understanding of ‘time value’ means that business-people in particular have come to favour the Sky Train due to its precision, predictability and schedules. The Sky Train enables a mobility logic that is much more calculable and predictable than the congested streets below, making it possible both to make an appointment at a speciﬁ c time, and to be able to keep it. This suggests that the rationalities for coping with daily mobility in Bangkok have changed (for some at least). The socio-technical system of the Sky Train thus shapes the time logic underpinning the production and re-production of mobile subject types. As such the Sky Train is fulﬁ lling a policy vision of imaginary mobile subjects circulating in the new ﬂ ow spaces of Bangkok. Consuming Subjects The Sky Train allows a new relation between shoppers and capital, by turning its travellers into mobile consumers. The accessibility made possible by the Sky Train does more than simply improve commuting in a city of extreme congestion and unpredictability. More than this, it facilitates mobile subject types that are consumption oriented – shoppers and tourists. The Sky Train connects the ‘cathedrals of consumption’ (Ritzer, 2005) enjoyed by the new middle classes and upper classes. Sky-bridges, linking Sky Train to certain shopping malls, ‘convert’ the ﬂ ows of passengers into ﬂ ows of power-shoppers. In the early life of the Sky Train these pecuniary tentacles were few and un-noticed, but during the last few years the mushrooming shopping malls increasingly throw anchors at the ﬂ ow system in order to attract the revenue from the spending masses (see ﬁ gure 3): Its new mode of movement, ﬂ oating high above the ground, allows the commercial buildings that exist along its 13-kilometre distance to ‘plug-in’ to their nearest stations, sucking commuters to engage in shopping activities, forming a new type of hypershopping experience – a central shopping district. The Sky Train functions as an organ of capital ﬂ ow. (Ayuthaya, 2005, p. 16). The Sky Train has a particular set of target groups as it connects to shopping malls and the new condominiums. Thus the construction of mobile shoppers and the facilitating efforts towards developers and investment PEOPLE PLUS TECHNOLOGY: NEW APPROACHES TO SUSTAINABLE MOBILITY 228 BUILT ENVIRONMENT VOL 34 NO 2 must be seen as yet another dimension of its contribution to the construction of particular mobile subjectivities.

#### Mass transit infrastructure constructs a hegemonic, normative urban system based on modern elitism

**Richardson and Jensen, 08** –professors of urban theory at Aalborg University in Denmark (Tim and Ole B., “How Mobility Systems Produce Inequality: Making Mobile Subject Types on the Bangkok Sky Train,” Built Environment, Vol. 34, Issue 2, Pages 218-231, May 2008)//HK

Conclusions The Sky Train is a striking example of a modern transit system. It is designed in ways that both connect and fragment the city it passes through. The city space is transformed – the hot, dark spaces beneath the Sky Train structures, in particular, are striking new urban spaces that jar with the cool, smooth spaces above. The aerial world of the Sky Train integrates with its urban fabric in ways which is more or less selective: the tentacles of the Sky train reaching out to, and making possible, a new aerial urban realm. In this case study, we have analysed the Sky Train as a socio-technical infrastructure capable of producing mobile subject types in the interface between hard infrastructures and soft practices of everyday life. The case brings to the fore how these types are actually produced within designed flow spaces: through contact with brute, material reality, through symbolic resonance, and through embodied everyday experience. Thus, returning to Cresswell (2006), we see how the three ways of thinking of mobilities – as brute facts, as discursive representations and as physical embodiment – are helpful in investigating how mobile subject types are formed at the interface between state and individual. As the Sky Train has become ‘accepted’ in the modernist view of Bangkok’s streetscape, a particular mobility system has become almost stealthily hegemonic, Figure 3. The MBK mega mall connected to the BTS Sky Train. (Photo: Ole B. Jensen)HOW MOBILITY SYSTEMS PRODUCE INEQUALITY: MAKING MOBILE SUBJECT TYPES ON THE BANGKOK SKY TRAIN BUILT ENVIRONMENT VOL 34 NO 2 229 becoming the ‘norm’ and increasingly the desired transportation solution of an urban elite that it has partly produced. We have attempted to show how the symbolic, spatial, temporal and economic manifestation of this new socio-technical mobility system changes the conditions for the production of urban mobile subject types. In particular, it produces an elite typology of middle-class power shoppers, tourists and business people, which together form an imaginary generalized mobile urbanite. The practical outcome is a highclass infrastructure that facilitates elite mobilities, and so contributes to the creation of elite subjectivities at the same time as it reinforces layering and segregation. The Sky Train in its own particular way facilitates the construction of mobile subjects that are modern/Westernized in their approach to urban life, and live their life in parallel to the ‘others’ below. In Bangkok, the Sky Train creates a particular problem of ‘double segregation’: in spatial terms as the cleanaired infrastructure overlays the smog-filled streetscape below, and in socio-economic terms as it separates its users along the lines of income, and thus restricts the relative motility of the less well off inhabitants, compared to Bangkok’s middle class, international business elites, and tourists. In sprawling cities with major economic differences between citizens, and in the face of extreme congestion, it is perhaps not surprising to find that new mass transit infrastructures may be designed for an urban elite. In this paper, we have attempted to go further to show how they can also create new conditions for such elite subjectivities to emerge. In this sense mobility systems can exacerbate existing urban inequalities and create new ones. The users of these mobility systems are elite travellers; international business people and tourists, together with urban citizens who can afford to use them. Though some others may find spaces in the margins of the new flow spaces, for example by setting up informal stalls on station platforms, the majority of urban citizens remain outside these domains. In conclusion, we argue that the concept of mobile subject types can provide an original perspective on how the socio-technical nexus is mediated across the interfaces of urban mobility infrastructures. This may assist in showing just how inequalities are produced, in particular mobility systems. If the concept contributes to critical understanding in this way, it may lead to further insights into how mobility systems act as interfaces between state projects, market actors and citizens, and how mobilities and subject identities are produced within them.

### link—privatization

#### The creation of private markets requires violent state action—undesirable populations/ markets are let die to extend the biology of the species

Nally 11 – Department of Geography at Cambridge University (David, “The Biopolitics of food provisioning”, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers Volume 36, Issue 1, pages 37–53, January 2011, Wiley Online Library, DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-5661.2010.00413.x)//MM

These developments are critical to what Foucault describes as a nascent ‘ideology of freedom’ associated with European liberalism and ‘capitalist forms of the economy’ (2007, 48). The physiocrats’ conceptualisation of market forces is principally an extended critique of customary food entitlements – now considered unnatural, even dangerous– as well as a prescriptive programme for a radically different kind of provisioning economy. For this reason Foucault is keen to point out that laissez-faire economics does not imply that ‘everything is left alone’. The liberalisation of the food system –‘not interfering, allowing freedom of movement, letting things take their course’– only succeeds by reformulating ‘the permitted and the forbidden’ (Foucault 2007, 45–6) to produce a novel social order and a new level of working on reality called ‘the economy’. Furthermore, the imposition of free markets will require the active collusion of state forces: ‘anti-scarcity systems’ will have to be dismantled; legislative assistance will be needed to place grain markets in private hands; the repressive powers of the police may be called upon to quell revolt, and so on. In other words, free markets emerge from the intimate connections forged between the state and capital. The assumption that markets are ‘natural systems’ operating outside of power and politics is itself an invention of the 19th century that **takes for granted** the violent manner **in which the state must eliminate all behaviour that is now deemed aberrant or undesirable.**

The transition to a free-trade economy also does not mean that famines and other catastrophes will in future be prevented. As mentioned above, re-ordering the food system will in some instances require an increase in repressive measures as artisans, small-holders and agricultural labourers are forced to bear the costs of market regulation (Block’s introduction to Polanyi 2001, xxvii). In Foucault’s words,

there will no longer be any scarcity in general, on condition that for a whole series of people, in a whole series of markets, there was some scarcity, some dearness [in price], some difficulty in buying wheat, and consequentially some hunger, and it may well be that some people die of hunger after all … the scarcity that caused the death of individuals not only does not disappear, it must not disappear. (2007, 42, emphasis added)

Put another way, the old problem of ‘hunger amidst scarcity’ will give way to the distinctly modern crisis of ‘hunger amidst abundance’ (Araghi 2000, 155).

Finally, to legitimise this new biopolitics of provision an ideological distinction between ‘peoples’ and ‘populations’ must be introduced. According to Foucault, the population includes those who conform or adapt to the new economic order; they fall in line with market regulation, even promoting it as a means to attain greater security. The people, on the other hand, are those who ‘disrupt the system’ and ‘throw themselves on the supplies’. They reject the new regime of planned scarcity, and therefore ‘do not really belong to the population’ (2007, 44). For Foucault the act of ‘letting die’ is profoundly connected to the classification of undesirables – what Giorgio Agamben (1995) would later term homines sacri– who are now represented as ‘threats, either external or internal, to the population’ (Foucault 2003, 256). In a liberal biopolitical economy, he concludes,

killing or the imperative to kill is acceptable only if it results not in a victory over political adversaries, but in the elimination of the biological threat to and improvement of the species or race. (2003, 256; see also Minca 2006)

### link/ at: statistics

#### The aff ignores identities in favor of identification—this dehumanizes travelers

**Adey, 09** – lecturer in cultural geography at Keele University (Peter, “Facing airport security: affect, biopolitics, and the preemptive securitisation of the mobile body,” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 2009, volume 27, pages 274-295, 2/23/2009)//HK

Much of the work in this area has developed as a critique of a developing vogue within airport and wider border security which uses the body, or information about the body, in order to identify one person from the next. The anxiety over who or what may be passing through the nation's borders means that uncertainty a key object of biopolitical governing is addressed by identification and by making known (Daase and Kessler, 2007; Ek, 2006; O'Malley, 2004). The so-called data-double [for a critical examination of this concept see Bennett (2006)] refers to the notion that our physical bodies and personal identities are repeated digitally by a data-double cruising in some sort of mirror world (Pascoe, 2001). Specific data about one's body are being used to distinguish one person from the next by matching up the corporeal body presented at a border checkpoint with the digital data of that body stored on a database or a credit card [for how these data-doubles enable the augmentation of the `real' passenger, see Fuller and Harley (2004)]. Although, to put it more precisely, it is not bodies per se which are being captured, but parts of bodies dividuals according to Deleuze, a body ``partial, fragmented and incomplete'' (Walters, 2006, page 192; see also Introna and Wood, 2005). For many writers, Foucault's (2003; 2007) texts on the biopolitical help us interpret how these sorts of techniques enact a managerial, and not necessarily disciplinary, enrollment of a molar a group of people addressed as a population and made known. Bodies, and knowledge of bodies, are abstracted into data which may be sifted, tabulated, and searched. In these studies, the body functions as one's passport (Van der Ploeg, 1999). The body must then show up, be present, ready, corporeal, to be read as various thresholds are surpassed (Agamben, 1998). From fingerprint and iris recognition technologies to the simple photograph imprinted on one's passport, identities have been proved by presenting a part of one's body at the airport/border (Salter, 2004; Torpey, 2000). The unity of the body is undone by focusing in on pieces of it. These pieces stand for the whole, for the whole of an identity. For instance, pattern recognition filters use finger prints. Palm recognition and now iris recognition technologies are deployed in many instances of facilitating airport priority passengers and frequent flyers who are pre-enrolled. In airports the Privium frequent flyer programme at Schiphol, Netherlands, as well as CANSPASS, and `trusted traveller' are cases in point of the elite use of these systems wherein trusted and frequent flyers have opted in (Adey, 2004; Cresswell, 2006a; Muller, 2007; Salter, 2004).

#### View the aff’s evidence with skepticism—their models are flawed and oversimplified

Mayer, 12 – research associate at the Bonn University Department of Political Science (Maximilian, “Chaotic Climate Change and Security,” International Political Sociology 6, 165–185, 2012)//HK

General circulation models (GCMs), the centerpieces of the IPCC scenarios, have been increasingly questioned. The very reason GCMs became so important in the first place was because they reduced the earth system’s over-complexity, so that research and its implications can be presented unambiguously to policymakers, ultimately framing climate change as a problem of management. As such, climate models and the practice of parameterization they require are typical boundary objects that enable the ordering and circulation of data dots among scientists of various disciplines, politicians, the media, and the public opinion (Kwa 2005; Sundberg 2007). In short, GCMs enable the quantification and preparation of complex issues in simple ‘‘storylines,’’ and thus are of utmost practical importance for international political negotiations. Modeling climate is not merely a way of predicting but, as Edwards (2001:61) puts it, ‘‘world building.’’ In the 1970s, the emergence of GCMs translated the scientific and political understanding of climate (and the environment in general) from a purely local or regional weather pattern into an interconnected global system (Taylor and Buttel 1992; Miller 2004).8 Today, what we naturally imagine and explore as climate change is mainly based on the ‘‘concept of global mean radiative forcing’’ (NRC, 2005:5) as, for instance, the steady rise of the global mean temperature or global average forcing. These are, of course, virtual entities derived from an averaged trend of multiple simulations by different GCMs (Pielke 2008). The same holds true for the 2C limit for global average temperature increase that has been adopted by the European Union and in the Copenhagen Accord. A leading climate researcher explained that the 2C limit was fabricated simply because of a need ‘‘to have clear targets, and a simple number’’ in order to facilitate political decisions (Der Spiegel 2010). What renders GCMs increasingly unreliable, however, is they can neither simulate nonlinear changes and its systemic repercussions nor determine specific thresholds and tipping points.9 Many scientists believe that IPCC models ‘‘omit key amplifying feedbacks in the carbon cycle’’ (Romm 2008) and that the central tendencies typically produced by GCMs ‘‘mask the wide range of policy relevant results’’ (Schneider and Kunz-Duriseti 2002:79). The modeler community widely disagrees about the actual probability of nonlinear events (Arnell, Tompkins, and Adger 2005; Kriegler, Hall, Helda, Dawson, and Schellnhuber 2009). As a consequence of these controversies, the linear storyline has lost its selfevidence. The highly fluctuating data assembled by scientists caused them to perceive the climate quite differently; they questioned the central role of GCMs and pointed instead to the need for reliable methods of risk assessment (Baer and Risbey 2009).

#### Statistical studies are flawed—they generalize environmental effects and ignore psychological ones

**Schwanen et al., 11** – professor of geography and the environment at Oxford (Tim, “Scientific research about climate change mitigation in transport: A critical review,” Transportation Research Part A 45 993–1006, 2011)//HK

4.3.1. Technology The focus on technology for reducing emissions is entirely consistent with the ecological modernisation (EM) governmentality. This is not only because EM is optimistic about technologies’ contribution to climate change mitigation, but also because technology development and diffusion have positive effects for the economy and greater availability of clean transport allows transport to be decarbonised through the (neo-liberal) logic of consumer choice. The emphasis on technology in T. Schwanen et al. / Transportation Research Part A 45 (2011) 993–1006 999 academic research not only reflects equipment-related path dependencies (see above) but also the popularity of technologically oriented interventions in transport among corporate actors (including the automobile industry) and public authorities, for whom technological innovation is a key mechanism through which EM’s marriage of economy and ecology is forged. The transport literature’s engagement with technology is partial. There exist notable differences across studies, which make it difficult to draw general conclusions about how technology diffusion and adoption are addressed. Nonetheless, the literature tends to consider the complexity of the effects of fuel efficiency improvements and alternative fuels only up to a degree (visibilities). For one, differences between households in the uptake of low-carbon transport technologies are often not satisfactorily addressed; too often an average traveller/consumer is assumed. Axsen et al. (2009) and Musti and Kockelman (2011) constitute exceptions in this regard, respectively examining within the context of forecasting future transport-related CO2 emissions the ‘neighbourhood effect’, whereby EVs become more desirable as adoption rates become higher, and variations in vehicle type choice along sociodemographic lines. Not only is much more research along these lines required; that work should also consider dynamics over time in the cultural legitimacy – socially shared perceptions as to whether a technology is desirable and appropriate within a socially constructed set of values, beliefs, norms and understandings (Geels and Verhees, 2011) – of new transport technologies beyond the neighbourhood effect. Technology diffusion is more than a linear process of moving from niche to mass markets in which consumer preferences change. It often entails changes in the cultural meanings of artefacts, which may both facilitate and obstruct the diffusion of new technologies. Additionally, while the rebound effect of extra kilometres driven with improved fuel efficiency is increasingly considered in prospective scenario studies (Bristow, 2009; Kromer et al., 2010; Morrow et al., 2010), the tendency to separate technological change from behavioural change is widespread in the literature. Technology as a ‘hard’ intervention is often compared to, juxtaposed with, and/or combined into policy packages with ‘soft’ measures that seek to bring about behaviour change by reconfiguring travellers’ psyche (Bristow et al., 2008; Kromer et al., 2010; see also Johansson, 2009). From a Foucaultian perspective, the separation of technology and psyche/behaviour is productive in the sense of allowing research to proceed but as a discursive technique it also has unintended consequences. It strips technology-oriented interventions in transport systems from their behavioural entanglements, i.e. the fact that the extent to which technologies reduce GHG emissions depends on how they are actually used to move people or goods. In the discursive framing of technology versus behaviour, transport technologies are not only positioned as means towards given ends (which are part of the behaviour realm); freed from the vagaries of preferences, values and needs, their contribution to transport’s decarbonisation are also made relatively certain and reliable.

#### The architectural approach of the affirmative allows for the inculcation of difference and organizations for efficiency—colonizes resistance

**Hight and Perry 06** – (Christopher and Chris, Associate Professor of Architecture @ Rice University AND Adjunct Assistant Professor of Architecture @ Pratt Institute, “The Manifold Potential of Bionetworks,” Perspecta, 2006, JSTOR) SIyer

Indeed, it was a specific model of organicism isomorphic to mechanism and to 'architecture' as the image of the systematic and hierarchal configuration of parts into a greater whole. It is no wonder this organicism has been naturalized as the dominant form of architectural practice since architecture is itself a model for such organizations and as Foucault forever reminds us, it is architecture that serves as the model for the expression of disciplinary power upon the constituted subject of this incorporated lévitation. This is the sense behind Le Corbusier's often misunderstood machine for living - an apparatus for the incorporation of the individual into a greater organic whole. Le Corbusier's Modular - the most famous (if for Banham mostly implicit) example of the modernist architect's attempt to develop an aesthetic standard to regulate technological processes also followed organic statistical topos. Such organicism also served in the legal formalization of the architect and its technologies of production - schools and other regulatory bodies. The simultaneous rise of institutions of practice and education is a crucial historical a priori for the identity of those who call themselves 'architects' today. Prior to the late 18th century, architecture was a heterogeneous assortment of regionally determined tacit knowledge disseminated through apprenticeship. Beginning in the late 19th century informal parlors for the discussion of architectural issues began to be formalized as institutions of instruction, often only granting degrees as late as the 1930s. Professional regulatory bodies developed at the same time. The formalization of architectural education is a condition of professionalization rather than something opposed to the needs of practice. Moreover, the rise of usually centralized institutions meant that the Mocar knowledge of architecture could be standardized in advance of technology. The standardization of practice according to models concentrated the objects of production and consolidated power into a few centers. Today, recent AIA studies have shown that the minuscule percentage of firms with over fifty employees consume around nine-tenths of the total project billings for all projects. Under global economies, this condition is usually taken to be healthy in a mature to stagnant growth sector. Indeed, because corporate architectural practice embodies such integrated and standardized organicism, it has been the singular success story of architecture in the latter 20th century. Internally the body of the practice is divided into specialized 'organs' for maximum efficiency, requiring the standardization of techniques, knowledge, and products to be exchanged between its members. The firm becomes an internalized world. Secondly, there are the extensive strategies such organizations deploy. Firms like Skidmore, Owings & Merrill gather multiple profit centers under one large legal body, locating each of these organs within distant locales. This allows adaptation to local conditions while replicating the model of the firm, eventually colonizing otherwise diverse milieus and incorporating their economic and social conditions into the corporate body.10 This oligopolistic model of organization brings communication without communicability: information flows unidirectionally, focused on expanding and securing control for centralized and centralizing forces. It does not operate as a mechanism for invention but is geared instead towards rendering more efficient and expansive a singular trajectory of power with two aims: intensely concentrating the forms of communication to a central organizational focus, and expansively proliferating various forms of power and identity. While it may take the form of a vast network of multiple locations and labor pools, these links are controlled from the top down, typically from corporate command centers located in global cities such as Tokyo, New York, and London.11 Even things that appear disruptive of such hierarchies can be reincorporated into vertical organizations and concentrations of power.

### link—suburbs

#### The suburb is a product of a regimented control over the population—creating massive inequality that is rooted in state racism

**Kuswa 02** – Assistant Professor @ CSU (Kevin, “SUBURBIFICATION, SEGREGATION, AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE HIGHWAY MACHINE,” Journal of Law in Society, Winter 2002, Lexis) SIyer

Detailing the suburb as a primary mechanism for the segregation of people, Lewis Mumford targets the metropolis and its co-option by the military and the state. Citing overvalued land, increasing congestion, a lack of space for recreation, a perpetual cycle of growth and decay, and an elitist distribution of social services, Mumford contends: "The metropolitan regime opposes these domestic and civic functions: it subordinates life to organized destruction, and it must therefore **regiment, limit, and constrict every exhibition of real life and culture**." n37 Mumford's articulation of a regimented urban reality was compounded by the massive expansion of road building following World War II and the 1956 solidification of the highway machine. The rise of the suburb-a place partially produced by (and fueling) the highway's ability to connect the pristine periphery to the central business district-temporarily resolved Mumford's concerns of density and congestion, only to displace those problems with more severe environmental and human costs. Regardless of the organization of the suburb, the construction of highways in urban areas was a traumatic and oppressive event for the people uprooted by the highway's swath. The suburb also exacerbated the human displacement wrought by the highway because the resources necessary to soften the blow of urban construction were being consumed by suburban areas. The suburbs were typically beyond the reach of the poorest residents of the city, a barrier to entry that widened the gap between the rich and the poor, particularly when the poor neighborhoods were often the same neighborhoods torn up by the highway. The paradox was that the highways and the vehicles that traversed them were being promoted under the banners of maximum choice, individual access, and personal mobility. n38 These ideals were used to build more highways, increasing the demand for automobiles, and removing choice from the inhabitants of the city. Personal and individual choice could not exist on a large scale when part of the process necessitated a destructive dissection of urban areas. The connections between highways and suburbia are only less plentiful than the connections between suburbia and segregation. This can be diagramed through the highway machine as a mechanism of containment, population accumulation, sprawl, and what Ronald Greene calls "the racing and placing of populations." n39 According to Greene, **a population control apparatus began articulating modes of government** to the problems of large American cities. Certain governing logics began to contain these social crises by enforcing the segregation of people based on class and race. While enforcing this stratification, **these governing logics were simultaneously lodging blame for the inequality firmly on the shoulders of those communities who had been stripped of access and relegated to the decaying inner city**. These moves gestured to a different sense of power than traditionally deployed. Greene sets up this new intersection of bio-power in two places: the emergence of the inner city as a threat to the health of the social body, and the ways a governing apparatus acts to race and place populations. The rise of urban pathologies and the segregation of "unhealthy" groups of people were made easier by the automobile's facilitation of suburban communities commuting to predominantly white- collar jobs. Greene borrows from Mitchell Gordon, a long-time journalist with the Wall Street Journal, to map the emergence of the diseased city. n40 Gordon's work constructs the city as a withering and doomed sign of human destruction, a perspective advocated in the title, Sick Cities. Gordon's immediate concern involves transformations in transportation and automobile expansion, as he explains in his conclusion: "More people in more automobiles, with more time and money to spend keeping them in motion, will speed up the conquest of urban space on earth and, notwithstanding the huge sums that will be poured into new concrete carpeting, compound congestion at critical places."

### link—SUV

#### The SUV is a cultural artifact that gives insight into the socio-cultural forces that pervade the American identity, objectifying the drive to become ever more secure yet free at the same time.

**Campbell ’05** – Professor of Cultural and Political Geography in the Department of Geography at Durham University in the UK (David, “The Biopolitics of Security: Oil, Empire, and the Sports Utility Vehicle,” American Quarterly 57.3 (2005) 943-972, JSTOR)//aberg

The most important SUV was conceived in a time dominated by the paramilitary culture that emerged after, and in response to, Americas defeat in Vietnam. Obvious in the Hollywood movies the Ford designers watched, it was manifested as well in "techno- thriller" novels by the likes of Tom Clancy and the emergence of paintball as a popular national game. In this energetic cultural militarism, which saw the remasculinization of American identity, heroes were those individuals who overcome the bureaucratic constraints of daily life, braved abnormal environments to fight Americas enemies, and often traveled in exotic vehicles.59 Incorporating some of the codes of cultural militarism, the Explorer also embodied elements of the classic rhetoric of American identity, thus demonstrating the way in which vehicles are part of the imaginaries, geographies, and practices of national identity (fig. 2).60 Baby boomers did not want vehicles akin to the old-fashioned station wagons that had dominated the family vehicle market until the 1990s. Instead, they wanted to use their increasing affluence to express a rugged individualism by purchasing vehicles that allowed them to "to feel a bond with the great outdoors and the American frontier."61 Central to this was four-wheel-drive technology. Prospective buyers told consumer researchers they almost never used this capacity but wanted it anyway. The fact that 80 percent of SUV owners live in urban areas and no more than 13 percent of their vehicles have been off road does not diminish this desire (fig. 3).62 The reasoning behind this paradox was that four-wheel drive offered the promise of unfettered freedom to drive anywhere during vacations. These customers might have given up their childhood dreams of becoming firefighters, police officers or superheroes, and had instead become parents with desk jobs and oversized mortgages. But they told Ford researchers that SUVs made them feel like they were still carefree, adventurous spirits who could drop everything and head for the great outdoors at a moment's notice if they really wanted to do so.63 Combined with this fantasy of vehicular freedom, SUV owners manifest a concern with social insecurity. French medical anthropologist turned marketing consultant Claude Rapaille argues that SUVs offer the physical embodiment of Americans' concern with "survival and reproduction." According to Rapaille, the United States is a society riven with the fear of crime and other insecurities (even in the period prior to September 11). The same conditions that have led to the private security guard industry and the growth in gated communities are behind the consumers desire to ensure that the family vehicle offers a high level of personal security. Amidst this neomedievalization of society, as Americans retreat to our fortified enclaves (or capsules) secure against others, SUVs become "armored cars for the battlefield."6 With high front ends, towering driving positions, fenders designed to replicate the haunches of wild animals, and grills intentionally designed to evoke snarling jungle cats, SUVs give their owners an aggressively panoptic disposition to the world.65 With names like Tracker, Equinox, Freestyle, Escape, Defender, Trail Blazer, Navigator, Pathfinder, and Warrior or designations that come from American Indians (Cherokee, Navajo) or places in the American West (Tahoe, Yukon) SUVs populate the crowded urban routes of daily life with representations of the militarized frontier.66 In the words of one marketing consultant, they say to the outside world: "America, we're risk takers; America, we're rugged."67 This comes across in interviews with SUV owners in California who, while acknowledging the problems caused by the motoring choice, explain it in terms of security: "The world is becoming a harder and more violent place to live, so we wrap ourselves with the big vehicles." In the words of another: "It gives you a barrier, makes you feel less threatened" (fig. 4).68 Crucially, both those voices belong to mothers and indicate how SUVs find particular favor among women. Keen on the high riding position for maximum visibility, women also find that the large ground clearance of their four-wheel drive vehicles intersects with their concerns about security. In one study, respondents surprised researchers by telling them this feature meant "it's easier to see if someone is hiding underneath or lurking behind it."69 Together these desires coalesce into a sense of the SUV being an "urban assault vehicle" for the homeland city at war albeit with the expected comforts that also make it a form of "portable civilization" with the driver as a military figure, confronting, but safe from, an insecure world.7

### link—transportation generic

**Transportation is a system of boundaries, where subjects are transported as efficiently as possible from point A to point B—this system of production marginalizes other modes of movement and disciplines subjects into complying with speed and efficiency to ensure orderly motion—turns the case**

**Bonham and Cox 10**—Senior Lecturers in Sociology at the University of Chester (Jennifer Bonham and Peter Cox “The disruptive traveller? A Foucauldian analysis of cycleways” June 2010 <http://adelaide.academia.edu/JenniferBonham/Papers/372359/The_Disruptive_Traveller_A_Foucauldian_Analysis_of_Cycleways>, nkj)

BRINGING FOUCAULT INTO TRANSPORT

In contrast to the broader transport literature, we do not theorise the individual as a natural, pre-social being simply choosing one mode of travel over others. Drawing on Michel Foucault, we are interested in the techniques through which people in contemporary societies come to think of themselves as individuals and regulate themselves towards, alter or resist the subjectivities (or subject positions – e.g. as cyclists, pedestrians, motorists) available to them (Foucault 1982). We take the view that the production of knowledge about human beings – which has proliferated since the eighteenth century – and the operation of power which enables that knowledge is central to our capacity to think of ourselves first as individuals (Digeser 1992) and then as particular types of subjects (Foucault 1977,1978). In this sense, those who produce and utilize transport knowledge participate both in shaping how people can think about their journeys and instructuring the field of action of individual travellers. It is impossible to review the key elements of Foucault’s work in this article, instead we offer a brief introduction accompanied by an example of how Foucault’s work can be utilised in transport. Readers unfamiliar with Foucault are directed to McHoul and Grace (1995) for a concise introduction and Bacchi (2009) on applying Foucault to policy analysis. Foucault offers an understanding of power as productive, as producing particular types of being and knowledge (Bacchi 2009:37–8). He identifies different types of power (Hindess 1996:96–136)and, although governmental 1 and bio power are important to transport, our paper focuses on discipline as it foregrounds the role of ‘spatialising’ practices 2 in processes of objectification and subjectification (the formation of subjects).Disciplinary power, fundamental to the self-regulation that characterises modern societies(Foucault 1991:101), has enabled the production of knowledge about the capabilities and capacities of human beings that, in turn, facilitates innovations in the exercise of power (Foucault 1977:224). It is through the operation of power at a micro-scale, the sorting and physical separation of the human mass– constituting difference through the discursive mechanisms (records keeping, data collection)involved in separating, scrutinising and monitoring bodies – that knowledge of singular bodies has been produced (Foucault 1977:191–2).From the moment we are born – separated from our mothers, gendered male or female, weighed, measured, named, allocated the special space of a cot and monitored at regular intervals – we are subjected to and made subjects through myriad practices involving the operation of power and the production of knowledge. The procedures of inscription which bring individuals into effect and objectivise bodies in specific ways – as healthy or ill, learned or illiterate, political or passive, law abiding or deviant, mobile or stationary –simultaneously enable the aggregation of those singular histories into knowledge of populations where norms, the limits to normal, and deviations from the norm are constituted (Foucault 1977, 1982).An important point here is that these are not necessary ways of knowing individuals. Rather, conditions at different moments enable objectification of bodies in new ways. With this knowledge, individuals are worked upon through systems of punishment and reward to regulate themselves according to the norm while those found wanting – disruptive, abnormal– might be removed altogether. **Travel is but one domain in which bodies have been objectivised and subjectivised** 3 ; **separated, scrutinised and worked upon** and, in the case of cycleways, removed altogether. Through the late nineteenth but especially the twentieth century it became thinkable, practicable and meaningful to study urban movement. Until recently, the meaning of that movement has been asserted and widely accepted as ‘transport’ – the journey from a to b specifically to accomplish some activity or task at point b (Bonham 2000). Over time, the journey, or trip, has come to appear as ‘self-evident’, as mechanisms for the study of journeys –origin–destination studies, household travel surveys, vehicle counts – excise particular practices from the mass of daily activities and bring them under scrutiny. **Objectifying travel as ‘transport’ establishes the journey as a by-product of its endpoints** – derived demand – and provides the imperative for trips to be accomplished as quickly, or as economically, as possible

(Bonham and Ferretti1999). ‘Derived demand’ functions as a ‘statement’(Foucault 1976:102–17) within the field of transport, a statement that both disciplines those who would study travel, and discounts, if not excludes, the many other possibilities of our journeys. Drawing on Foucault’s (1980:119) understanding of power as productive, the objectification of travel as transport is productive in that it has enabled the development of a vast body of knowledge and brought new subjects into effect – the pedestrian, cyclist, motorist, passenger. These **subjects have been facilitated through the operation of power at a micro-scale involving practices of differentiation and separation of users of public space, identifying those who are stationary and those who move**(Bonham 2002; Frello 2008), and subsequently scrutinising, sorting, categorising and disciplining those who move according to the conduct of their journey (Bonham 2006). A number of practices –particular ways of moving, particular types of observations, pauses, conversations – have been separated out, excluded as NOT-transport and marginalised in the space of the street. Other practices – keeping to course, attuning hearing, sight and reflexes to the operation of vehicles – have been worked upon in disciplining the mobile body(Bonham 2006; Paterson 2007).In cities across the world, the contemporary division and regulation of the public space of the street (and road) has been guided by a transport rationalization of urban travel (Bonham 2000). Streets have been divided lengthwise and travellers allocated space according to the speed and order with which they travel (Bonham 2000). The mobile body has been incited to move at speed to ensure the efficient operation of the city. However, in the early twentieth century, widespread concern over motor vehicle-related deaths and injuries underpinned debate over prioritising speed or safety. The debate was resolved (but never quite fixed) in favour of speed, with ‘vulnerable’ road users giving way to the fast(Bonham 2002). The slow and disorderly –**pedestrians, horses and carts – were removed to the margins, checked by the fast and orderly, or excluded altogether**. Overall efficiency, measured in time, could **only be assured if each traveller agreed to be orderly** – hence all those road safety techniques and programs that train bodies in ‘correct movement’(Bonham 2006). The public space of the street, often identified in political discourse as a site available to all citizens, effectively becomes an economic space where the subject of transport discourse, conducting the economical journey, gains primacy. Subjugating oneself within the discourse on transport – becoming the efficient or economical traveller, which in the twentieth century has meant taking up the subject position of the motorist – is rewarded with priority in the use of public space. These individual rewards invoke wider social rewards through the increase in the reproduction of capital through the facilitation of movement (Cox2010). Indeed, an entire literature on globalization has employed this metaphor of increased flows in speed, volume and depth to describe globalization of capitalism from the end of the twentieth century (Boran and Cox 2007). Transport discourses are thus woven into discourses on the nature of public good and of socio-economically responsible behaviour, reinforcing the linkage between travel behaviours and ‘responsible citizens’. **The knowledge produced about individual travellers is not only enabled by the exercise of power but also facilitates the further exercise of power**. Power–knowledge relations operate at a micro-scale subjectivising singular bodies while, at a macro-scale, the subjectivities constituted within different disciplines (e.g. economics, demography)are deployed in the government of populations(Foucault 1981, 1982, 1991). Further, the aggregation of data about singular bodies not only allows the calculation of norms (and deviations from those norms) but in liberal societies, where citizens are constituted as free and incited to exercise freedom of choice (Huxley 2008), this knowledge is central to government as populations are guided rather than directed toward particular ends (Rose 1990;Gordon 1991; Rose and Miller 1992). **In terms of transport, knowledge produced about individual travellers and singular journeys is combined into knowledge of urban populations** **and used to guide the choices of the population toward economical movement and the economical operation of the city. This process values speed and prioritises the reduction of travel time ahead of the impacts on health, environment and social exclusion that accompany increases in speed and travel energy consumption** (Lohan and Wickham 1998; Whitelegg1993, 1997).

**Transportation infrastructure investment allows domination of transport spaces—personal freedom and mobility are lost in the name of creating a more effective mobility**

**Flyvbjerg and Richardson 2**—Aalborg University, Department of Development and Planning AND Department of Town and Regional Planning(Bent Flyvbjerg and Tim Richardson, “Planning and Foucault In Search of the Dark Side of Planning Theory” <http://flyvbjerg.plan.aau.dk/DarkSide2.pdf>, nkj)

4. Empowering space

A discussion of the full potential of Foucauldian analysis in enhancing our understanding of policy making would not be complete without considering the spatiality of Foucault’s work. This dimension has often been overlooked by theorists who have utilised his theories of discourse and power. Yet it is the spatiality of Foucault’s thinking that makes his work particularly relevant to those working in overtly spatial activities such as planning. The importance of Foucault’s attempted ‘spatialisation of reason’ has been discussed elsewhere (e.g. Flynn 1993, Marks 1995, Casey 1996). For the purposes of our argument, it is important to explain here briefly how Foucault links space with the operation of discourses, and hence with power.

Foucault’s critique, in Discipline and Punish, of Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon is perhaps the archetypal example of this linkage (Foucault 1979). Bentham published his plan for the panopticon in 1791. The object was to create a prison arranged in a ‘semi-circular pattern with an inspection lodge at the centre and cells around the perimeter. Prisoners ... in individual cells, were clearly open to the gaze of the guards, but the same was not true of the view the other way. By a carefully contrived system of lighting and the use of wooden blinds, officials would be invisible to the inmates. Control was to be maintained by the constant sense that prisoners were watched by unseen eyes. There was nowhere to hide, to be private. Not knowing whether or not they were watched, but obliged to assume that they were, obedience was the prisoners’ only rational option’ (Lyon 1993, 655-656). Foucault explains the panopticon as a physical space which, through its design, permits physical functions such as surveillance and control of prisoners, and in so doing makes possible the prevailing modern social discourses of punishment, reform, and education (Marks 1995, 75). The panopticon therefore serves as an axiom for contemporary sociopolitical conditions, illustrating how surveillance and control are reproduced in the fine grain of daily life, in cities where ‘factories resemble schools, barracks, hospitals, which all resemble prisons’ (Foucault 1979, 228).

The construction of the panopticon therefore creates a social ‘space-time’: it creates or makes possible a particular set of practices and knowledges that are specific in both space and time. In this way, social norms are embedded in daily life, and the individual is ‘constructed’ to think and act in particular ways. Through this type of analysis, it becomes possible to understand, for example, how different planning policies construct their own ‘space-time’. For example, **discourses of personal freedom and mobility may require transport policies which produce transport spaces which are dominated**, for example, **by high speed private transport, at the expense of other types of movement**. In this way, the late-modern individual is constructed as increasingly mobile, rejecting barriers to freedom of movement. The pattern of daily life adapts to the opportunities of increased mobility, and land use patterns shift to accommodate the new trends. Conversely, discourses of accessibility, which recognise the mobility needs of those who, for example, do not have access to a car, or wish to travel by other modes, may require policies which intervene to restrict the opportunities of movement by private car. Physical spaces may be characterised by pedestrianisation and traffic calming.

However, if spaces may be constructed, in this way, to allow certain forms of control, they may also be reconstructed by others, to serve different functions. Crush has shown, using Foucauldian analysis, how mining compounds in South Africa, which were designed using panoptic principles, were not simply environments for repression and coercion, but that they ‘were also sites for the development and practice of rich oppositional cultures’ (Crush 1994, 320). Spaces, then, may be constructed in different ways by different people, through power struggles and conflicts of interest. This idea that spaces are socially constructed, and that many spaces may co-exist within the same physical space is an important one. It suggests the need to analyse how discourses and strategies of inclusion and exclusion are connected with particular spaces.

Perhaps most importantly in the context of this paper, exploring power - space relations begins to suggest how we can supplement the preoccupation with language and communication, and develop a distinctively spatial planning theory.

#### The 1AC’s extension of the transportation system is not neutral but rather is a product of the state apparatus’s ability to make war—allows the corporate and state body to infiltrate every aspect of social reality

**Kuswa 09** – Assistant Professor @ CSU (Kevin, “A Brief Genealogy of Fordism in Two Parts,” Journal of Law in Society, Feb. 2009, http://puttingthekindebate.com/2012/04/06/transportation-infrastructure/) SIyer

None of the characteristics of the military-industrial complex (MIC) in America can be cleanly separated from the highway machine and its arrival and consolidation, including the “technical surprise” of World War II and the development of deterrence as warfare: the nuclear bomb. The highway machine contributes to the production of an economy that prepares for war even during peace. The line between civilian and military as well as between peace and war evaporates through Fordism and an era of logistics. Combined with Deleuze and Guattari (1987) who position the military machine in opposition to the state apparatus, Virilio explains warfare as an effect of the constitution of the State. From this perspective, warfare designates the territory of the state’s economy–its economy of space, capitalization, and technology. The result is a school of thought that diverges from the urban planning notion that “the origin of the crystallization of the city, of urban sedentariness, is mercantilism” (Virilio, 1997b, p11). Instead, Virilio suggests, the city’s origin is warfare and continues to be so, making commerce a residual effect.

Putting the larger analogy in perspective, then, Fordism finds itself reconstituted as the product or effect of the state’s generation of militaristic territories (warfare). The highway machine’s entrance sparked Fordism (and contains Fordism) as another engine contributing to a “tragic revision of wartime economy” (Virilio, 1997b, p17). When both sides in World War II realized that more resources were necessary to wage war than could be produced during the war itself, their mutual response was to extend war into peace. This became the technical surprise of World War I–the discovery that the economy could not rest or divert its focus from war preparation even during peace. Economic and military deterrence joined hands in an attempt to support technological progress and the dominance of the state system.

They could no longer simply say that on one side there was the arsenal which produced a few shells, and on the other civilian consumption and the budget. No, they noticed that they needed a special economy, a wartime economy. This wartime economy was a formidable discovery, which in reality announced and inaugurated the military-industrial complex….I mean in fact that the situation is no longer very clear between the civil and the military because of the total involvement of the economy in war–already beginning in peacetime. (Virilio, 1997b, p16-7)

Thus, the many problems with Fordism as a trope, particularly when applied to industrialized economies following World War II, prevent a more contoured understanding of the machinic arrangements involving security, warfare, the state, and the highway machine. If anything, Fordism is, or should be, limited to a specific expression of manufacturing and labor prior to World War II. The exact chronology or periodization of Fordism is not as important as the recognition that **the war machine and the state apparatus had already come together as a highway machine** in the United States. The logistics of war planning makes Fordism one effect among many. This inversion goes beyond the argument that the state regulated Fordism as a mode of growth, with road-construction being one example. The inversion also places statist motions of security and warfare prior to a given collection of economic characteristics–warfare constitutes collective bargaining, monopolistic markets, mass standardized production (of consumer durables), and economies of scale. That way, Fordism does not over generalize industrial experiences in Europe, under generalize industrialism in the Pacific Rim, leave its automobile and highway specificity, confuse American contexts with globalization, or obscure the operations of statism and the military machine. As Allen frets about Fordism, he outlines a central weakness in its application to non-U.S. settings and effectivities outside modes of growth. Allen’s worry (1996, p296) “is not so much its inability to adequately convey a pattern of national diversity as its failure to see beyond large-scale mass production.”

3. Warfare: The Peacetime Mandate of the Highway Machine

Some might contend, and they are partially correct, that the initiation of the present-day interstate system was the first moment a coalition of market forces and state interests coalesced in opposition to the railroads. (3) Hill (1997) paints an interesting history, pitting the railroad interests against the newly formed alliance among the oil, trucking, automobile and lodging lobbies. The contest was fairly tight until the federal government stepped in with “national security” reasons to support the interstate over the railroads. Concrete began flowing in earnest after the federal government sold the machine “on the Cold War inspired theory that such a network of roads would facilitate evacuation of the cities in case of a nuclear attack” (Hill, 1997, p12). A similar argument is advanced today by the national government that the highways provide an indispensable means of transit for hazardous materials, including dismantled nuclear weapons (Giglio, 1985). Going back to the highway machine’s infancy, though, it was not solely the development of nuclear weapons that catapulted the highway’s expansion. Transportation, especially via roadways, has been a driving factor in countless conflicts, not the least of which occurred in France in the 1800s:

Logistics occurs at the time of the Napoleonic wars because these wars pulled millions of men onto the roads, and along with them problems of subsistence. But subsistence isn’t everything: logistics is not only food, it’s also munitions and transportation. As Abel Ferry said, ‘The munitions problems runs parallel to the transportation problem.’ The trucks bringing ammunition and the flying shells bringing death are coupled in a system of vectors, of production, transportation, execution. There we have a whole flow chart which is logistics itself.” (Virilio, 1997b, p23).

To detail and diagram the state’s implementation of the highway machine (and vice-versa), the military and its motions of security must be taken into account. A number of perspectives aid this effort: Yount (1960) hones in on the truck industry during times of peace and war, Medaris (1960) targets the mobility needs of advanced missile systems, and Trudeau (1960) outlines the strategic need for a mobile army.

Paul Yount, a freight ways Vice President in the 50s, uses the word cooperation to describe the alliance (co-optation) between private industry and governmental regulation in transportation. For Yount (1960, p43), the transportation revolution of the 20th Century “gives promise of a bright future for our industry, for transportation in general, and for our nation.” Yount’s main object of concern is the truck, and it does not take him long to state: “From the German invasion of Poland to the final shot of the war in the Pacific, trucks played a leading role both of support and of direct action in battle” (Yount, 1960, p43). It was not just the Panzer division’s blitzkrieg, enabled by trucks, that connected the highway machine’s arrival to the military machine, for it was also the assembly lines of ammunition–the railroads, waterways, ships, and planes–that served as “faithful links in our logistical chain reaching to foreign shores” (Yount, 1960, p44).

Yount also documents Virilio’s contention that the two World Wars extended war preparation into peacetime. Yount (1960, p45) posits the consensus: “I think we all agree that we must prepare in peace against the ever-present threat of war.” In particular, Yount connects highway regulation to war preparation when he complains of different taxation schemes and road constraints among the states. Calling for the highway’s entrance, Yount (1960, p45) proclaims: “Overcoming these obstacles (in highway regulation) is a matter of education, constant effort, and patience.” Yount (1960, p46) continues:

Providing for wartime upkeep and replacement of worn-out equipment is a matter for mobilization planning….The demand for transportation, fast and efficient transportation, is growing. And the various forms of the industry are becoming greatly interdependent. This interdependence is resulting in greater cooperation among different modes than ever before. It is resulting in a revolution in transportation.

General Medaris, the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Ordnance Missile Command during the late 1950s, is even more direct than Yount, contending that “the true history of the United States is the history of transportation” and that, “in time of emergency, the vast transportation industry has always met the national defense requirement” (Medaris, 1960, p71). A major variable for defense systems and missile technology is a functioning highway machine. Access to weapons in an efficient manner is as important to their deployment as is the operation of the weapon itself. General Medaris (1960, p74) supports this argument:

Because our present strategy requires the deployment of trained combat forces in any area of trouble in minimum time, it logically follows that we must have the capacity to move the weapons with the troops. Immediate availability may be a matter of national survival. If we cannot accomplish this, we would be limiting troops to the firepower of shoulder weapons. Thus, we would throw away the deterrent factor we associate with our modern weapons systems.

Moreover, because these weapons systems are far more valuable than the specific piece of the highway machine involved, Medaris asserts that an imperative exists to improve our highway infrastructure beyond the levels needed for civilian speed, capacity, and passenger comfort. Any delay in the delivery of weapons, for instance, “has profound effects upon our research and development programs, upon the training of our troops who will operate the weapons systems, and upon the logistical support of operational missile units throughout the world” (Medaris, 1960, p75).

Finally, General Arthur G. Trudeau, the Chief of Research and Development for the Army in 1959, magnifies the links between the state’s preparations for war and the highway machine. Not only does Trudeau (1960, p12) argue that for the Army, “the advent of nuclear weapons requires mobility far greater than any we have known in the past,” he also globalizes the need for security: “We must be able to move our armed forces and those of the free world rapidly to any part of the world in which they may be needed.” Emphasizing the impending arrival of the highway machine, Trudeau (1960, p133), complains that “the speed of movement of the bulk of our ground forces is limited by that of wheels.” By reiterating Virilio’s geography of warfare, Trudeau (1960, p114) helps conclude:

In discussing a more mobile army, it is important to emphasize the importance of transportation facilities available within our own country. A healthy rail system, together with adequate inland waterways, pipelines, airways, and highways, is vital to the Army. Each has its own unique place in our system of transport. Without any one of them the Army could be handicapped in its drive for increased mobility.

#### State control of mobility is a tool to promote power over the body, making state racism and classism inevitable

**Pallitto and Heyman 8** – (Robert and Josiah, Professor of Political Science @ Seton Hall University AND Professor of Sociology and Anthropology @ The University of Texas, “Theorizing Cross-Border Mobility: Surveillance, Security and Identity,” Surveillance Studies Network, 2008, http://www.surveillance-and-society.org/articles5(3)/mobility.pdf) SIyer

Long ago, Karl Marx showed how misguided it is to assume that in modernity, state power is the only source of harm to individuals and groups. In fact, the state often creates spaces in which private power can operate to produce inequality and injustice. With that observation in mind, then, we cannot look exclusively at state-imposed mobility controls in our effort to understand mobility regimes. Private force also affects mobility, and even more important, state force and private force cannot always be separated. Sometimes they interpenetrate to produce cumulative effects, and sometimes they exhibit tension with each other. Amoore (2006) and Sparke (2006) conceptualize this problem as a tension between securitization and neoliberalist globalization, which operate both to enable and to restrict movement. While the nationalistic imperative of border security urges restriction, globalization demands unrestricted movement of economic actors. Nowhere is this more vividly demonstrated than in Sparke’s (2006) observation that the very same jet aircraft used to transport “extraordinary rendition” captives to overseas torture sites was also used for elite business travel. That example shows that the two logics (securitization and globalization) are not always in conflict, but sometimes work to accommodate one another. Together they stratify social relations, producing groupings based on mobility – mobility classes, if you will – whose members are readily identifiable by their movement capability just as Marx’s social groups were defined by their relationship to the production process. In short, then, “sorting” by surveillance, in the sense used by Gandy (1993) and Adey (2004), has the effect of distributing benefits and burdens, opportunities and risks, along discernible lines that both create and reinforce social inequalities. As Salter (2006) and others rightly point out, the political technologies of biometric surveillance cause surveillance to fall more and more on bodies, but that is not the end of the inquiry. Those technologies impact upon subjects unequally, and how well individuals can negotiate the surveillance of their bodies often depends on class status. If they can declare themselves blameless and be acquitted, they may pass, but the ability to do so is often influenced by race and class, as in the case of highway checkpoints discussed above. It may be impossible for some individuals to escape the discretionary processing that occurs at checkpoints, and agents’ perception of race and class becomes an externally imposed limitation on movement -- illegitimate in legal terms, but nonetheless real. Mitchell (2005) argues that U.S. courts have aided this sorting process, facilitating the free movement of economic elites by a certain kind of pro-privacy legal ruling, keeping those who would impede commerce (such as panhandlers) at a distance. The spaces created by these decisions, which Mitchell describes as “buffer zones” and “bubbles,” allow some individuals to move without impediment, as the state will enforce protective boundaries around them. Crucially, there are two types of state actions at work here. States erect public barriers at borders and elsewhere through which people must pass (and be slowed or stopped). But states also clear away private barriers in certain cases, so that movement is even freer than it would have been if the state had not intervened. Moreover, “ordinary” people can police the movement of suspicious “others.” Amoore (2006) notes that hand-held communication devices allow reporting of suspicious persons directly to federal authorities. With this development, border control diffuses through the social field, and restriction of movement occurs at innumerable nodal points at borders and elsewhere. This diffusion and internalization of discipline recalls Foucault’s (1978) depiction of power-knowledge regimes. However, changes wrought by globalization require some rethinking of his work. Fraser (2003) notes that Foucault’s power framework relied on nation-state power practices and regulation of subjects, which Fraser terms the “fordist mode of social regulation” (2003:160). The “denationalization” and “transnationalization” we have seen in the era of “postfordist globalization,” by contrast, calls for a new analysis (2003:165). Networks, for example, are able to combine rule-governed organization with flexibility, open-endedness, decenteredness and spatial dispersion” (2003:169). A more updated analysis of power practices would consider how network configurations regulate behavior, distribute privilege, and shape subjectivity.

#### The aff homogenizes its potential beneficiaries and excludes public participation—this prevents solvency and causes marginalization

**Richardson, 01 –** professor of urban theory at Aalborg University in Denmark (Tim, “The Pendulum Swings Again: In Search of New Transport Rationalities,” The Town Planning Review, Vol. 72, No. 3, pp. 299-319, July 2001, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40112456)//HK

However, the central focus of the new realism on the technical, rather than democratic, reform of transport policy processes fails to address the demand for increased democratisation. The place of the public in the core areas of transport policy work - investment in roads, railways and public transport - remains as the object of transport decisions rather than as a participant in them. Though the guidance for the new appraisal approach identifies a plethora of opportunities for public involvement, it is not easy to see how this can go hand in hand with the emphasis on increasingly technical methods. Talk of 'carrots and sticks', increasingly common in transport policy, seems in a similar way to portray the public as a mass of unthinking subjects who will react in various ways to different transport choices or conditions. Here, the role of the public is more often as the supplicant of information or attitudes: Surveys can supplement observational surveys by providing much more detail on individual travel patterns and by providing information on the characteristics of the travellers, their attitudes towards travel, and their reason for making one kind of trip rather than another. A major transportation study may require information on all the aspects and may use a combination of discussion groups, interviews and questionnaires to obtain it. (O'Flaherty, 1997, 252) The prevailing view here is of an exclusionary technical process, managed by transport professionals. The construction of knowledge is under expert control - transport professionals use their own values and understanding to interpret the statements of others through the framing of problems, lines of inquiry and responses. The public are reduced to a set of individual travellers who may exhibit generic or atypical behavioural characteristics. There seem to be two problems here. First, the public is becoming increasingly aware and politicised on transport issues. As a result, expert policy analysis, carried out in an exclusionary manner, may not secure support for highly controversial policies. At the local policy level, the innovative participatory techniques which are being explored through Local Agenda 21, for example, are fuelling expectations of increased involvement in transport decision making.8 Second, the exclusion of non-experts suggests that the knowledge that is considered important in transport policy making is closely filtered and regulated. However, it seems likely that lay knowledge, which after all may concern how people use transport systems, how they are affected by them and what they think about them, will be increasingly important in understanding the ways in which policies can succeed and fail (perhaps even at the same time). This exclusionary attitude to knowledge may not be the best way to move into the difficult territory of policy 'integration'. 8 See Young (1996) for a discussiono f participatoryp racticesi n Local Agenda2 1, and Booth and Richardson (2001) for a discussion of public involvement in transport policy making. 314 TIM RICHARDSON The relationship between public involvement and analysis in transport policy making requires major rethinking. Transport policy has lagged behind other policy sectors in this respect and the new realism debate has been late in recognising the urgent nature of the problem. The rhetoric of many of the post1998 transport policy documents now ritually identifies this need to reconstruct legitimacy. However, while consultation and involvement are identified as an integral part of the process of preparing the new local transport plans and strategies in line with the wider democratic viewpoint, placing the public within and alongside the new processes and tools is not a straightforward task. An alternative way forward may be to draw from developments within the wider field of public policy evaluation. Here, fourth generation and communicative approaches to evaluation, among others, recognise that planning takes place in a multiple-stakeholder society, and that evaluation is carried out within a political environment (Dabinett and Richardson, 1999; Khakee, 1998). However, the gap between such debates and current developments in transport policy is striking. Creating spaces in policy making for marginal voices to be heard seems likely to remain for the time being an outcome of struggle rather than a prescription. Additionally, the most radical and challenging ideas thrown up by the proponents of the new realism seem likely not to be offered for public approval.

#### Evaluate power relations first—transportation infrastructure’s effects are shaped by the spatial hierarchies it establishes

**Richardson, 01 –** professor of urban theory at Aalborg University in Denmark (Tim, “The Pendulum Swings Again: In Search of New Transport Rationalities,” The Town Planning Review, Vol. 72, No. 3, pp. 299-319, July 2001, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40112456)//HK

The importance of this discussion is next illustrated by examining the power relations which complicate progress on just one of the key new realism policy measures - the reallocation of road space away from the private car towards other modes. Power and roadspace The rationality of transport policy making has important implications for space. As Foucault explained how discourses of control and punishment are expressed in the physical form of prisons, so transport discourse is expressed in the design and form of transport systems - of street patterns and motorway networks, highspeed railway stations, cycle routes and pedestrian areas. Patterns of mobility are affected by the changes and growth of these systems, and neighbourhoods, cities and regions are gradually reshaped, redefining boundaries of opportunity and exclusion. In the UK, transport policy has been busily restructuring space to meet the expectations and needs of a late-modern high-mobility society creating a trunk road system for rapid inter-urban travel and facilitating a longdistance goods distribution network. However, the fragmentary nature of transport policy discourse, discussed above, suggests that the impact of transport and mobility on space is not determined by a coherent ideology. The spatial effects of transport policy are likely, then, to be complex and contested, rather than harmonious and coherent. In the formal processes of transport policy making, space is often reduced to either an engineering problem, to a series of economic indicators, or to models where generic traffic flows between point spaces. What seems clear is that as transport policy changes physical space, and the possibilities for movement THE PENDULUM SWINGS AGAIN 315 within it, it also 'defines, shapes and transforms social relationships and daily practices' (Swyngedouw, 1993, 310). These subtle socio-spatial effects are not generally captured in policy making. However, in losing these effects, what is also lost is the possibility of understanding how 'mobility itself is part and parcel of the process of uneven development and of consolidating asymmetrical power relationships' (Swyngedouw, 1993, 323). In grounding the new realism, it seems necessary to integrate an understanding of these socio-spatial effects. This need to understand socio-spatial effects needs to be placed within the context of the politics of space. Worsening transport conditions and new transport agendas create new spatial tensions and recast old ones. As a result, we should expect to see contests over the local construction of transport 'spaces'. Transport policies in many cases favour particular interests over others - for example motorised vehicles over cyclists or pedestrians, buses over cars, moving traffic over parked vehicles, parked vehicles over public space, freight over private traffic, travellers over non-travellers. Goodwin (1996b) has explained this as a contest for scarce road space. However, it seems likely that the spatial conflicts caused by transport policies extend beyond the physical boundaries of roads, affecting spaces occupied by other modes of infrastructure as well as other land uses causing a range of effects including blight, bisecting communities, channelling new development and creating shadow and corridor effects. For example, engineering improvements to a particular road may improve speeds and safety for cars and commercial traffic, but may at the same time worsen conditions and create new dangers for those who may wish to make slower or shorter journeys on that road or the adjacent pavement. As time is saved for one group of travellers car dependency is increased, making alternatives less attractive and reducing accessibility for those who do not have access to a car. In past practice, the dominance of time over space has been a critical factor in ensuring that rapid mobility has taken precedence over local accessibility. The central importance of time savings in transport methodology continues to skew policy towards decongestion and high-speed travel, creating difficulties for planning and financing spaces which are expressly designed to slow movement, such as pedestrianised and traffic-calmed zones. The new realism potentially shifts the balance of power in the prioritisation of space by bringing a new emphasis on accessibility rather than mobility for its own sake. The grounding of the new realism will be played out in a series of local power struggles over transport space. At the centre of many of these struggles will be the increasing prioritisation that will characterise physical transport spaces; mounting conflicts of interest between users and non-users of transport systems; and the conversion of places into new spaces of mobility or accessibility. There are no technical answers to many of these social and political conflicts and the new appraisal framework does not pretend to offer them. There are basic political judgements to be made and the possibility of consensus seems an unlikely aspiration in many cases. But the discourse of the new realism fails to provide adequate organising principles to resolve these difficult tensions, or to provide analytical tools that are capable of mapping out the different ways that spaces might be constructed to serve different sets of interests. The challenge is to 316 TIM RICHARDSON design policy processes that can make these tensions explicit, and ensure they receive proper attention. This line of reasoning suggests that we need to rethink the treatment of space in transport policy. Here, Foucauldian analysis may be helpful in integrating a clearer understanding of spatiality into policy making. In particular, new insights may be provided into how particular knowledge of mobility and space is utilised in policy processes to serve particular interests while others are marginalised, and the role played by tools of policy analysis in these constructions.

#### Transportation security extends a totalizing power over biological beings, reducing them to mere instruments of calculability

**Bell 05** – Department of Political Science @ York University (Colleen, Biopolitical Strategies of Security: Considerations on Canada’s New National Security Policy, March 2005, Available Online) SIyer

A variety of new and expanded regulatory surveillance mechanisms have been expended on the more traditional “key” areas of transportation, borders, and international security. What is most interesting about these surveillance enhancements is not only an intensified focus on detecting threats through totalizing surveillance mechanisms, but the reliance on monitoring biological substances and biological characteristics of the population, as opposed to ‘political’ issues, to secure the state. For transportation security, airport screening of goods and people, undercover operations, inspections of transportation workers and enhanced detection technologies for land, air and sea are mandated. New investments in trace detection systems, gamma-ray systems, ion mobility spectrometers as well as “permit effective and unobtrusive screening of containers for explosive, chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological devices.” are set out in the policy. Similarly, detection strategies are key to border security enhancement along with and new funds for “LiveScan” digital fingerprinting, an ‘RCMP Real Time Identification project’ that enables the electronic recording of fingerprints for instant verification, and biometrically enabled smart chips that use facial recognition technologies “to interrupt the flow of high-risk travelers” have also been mandated. Ten new countries were added to the list of those with visa requirements and improvements were made to the screening of VISA applicants abroad. The ‘Smart Borders’ strategy with the US “to enhance the security of the flow of goods and people and the transportation system, and to strengthen intelligence and law enforcement co-operation” will continue to be developed. The policy notes that Canada will also work with international partners and other G8 countries to internationalize Smart Borders programs, in addition to the development of the expanded ‘Next Generation Smart Borders Agenda’ to include cyber-security, food safety, public health, marine and transport security.” Passenger screening while people are in the process of booking flight reservations destined for Canada is also under consideration. Finally, International Security measures include the continuation of support for ‘counter-terrorism’ projects and capacity building in ‘failed’ and ‘failing’ states through funds from the International Assistance Envelope, which have tended to focus on health issues that, if excessively neglected, are considered to contribute to international crime. Tellingly, it is noted that the confluence between the security interests and international policy goals of Canada can be seen by how its democratic and pluralist characteristics provide the means through with ‘failed and failing’ states can be assisted “in the struggle against terrorism.” This commitment to international security points to the ways in which poor and less developed countries are positioned as a threat to global security and consequently require monitoring and intervention. It is significant to note the similarity between the detection strategies and mechanisms in both traditional and non-traditional sets of key security arenas, and highlights the extent to which the classificatory power of surveillance is applied at the level of the population. As groups and individuals are constantly “risk profiled” very little is left outside the purview of security. According to Lyon, this can be seen by how the commercial sphere sorts people into consumer categories, and the social dangerousness of people is rated by policing and intelligence systems. Biopolitical strategies of surveillance are not principally oriented to the past (to reform deviance), but to the future as a mechanism of control concerned with producing the conditions through which members of a population are subjected to continual and expansive risk profiling as a strategy to render the population, and consequently the state, safe and healthy. It is this link between biopolitics as a productive method of governing populations through security apparatuses that provides a decisive turn for surveillance to be constituted as a ‘libratory’ mechanism of societies characterized by the prevalence of ‘risk.’ Contemporary biopolitics, in contrast to biopolitics in the first half of the twentieth century, is also instructive in its sensitivity to liberalist conceptions of multiculturalism and notions of citizen responsibility. The notion of society as composed of a single national culture, with a specific national destiny tied to a national territory, argues Rose, has entered a crisis which has seen the pluralizing of ‘culture’ to ‘cultures,’ and ‘community’ to ‘communities.’ Not only is this crisis reflected in Canada’s multicultural policy generally, but it has informed the creation of the Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security to supplement the development of the national security policy. Rose argues that, among other transformations, this crisis has led to a responsiblization of citizens. In the quest for health, citizens are encouraged to become active partners who are accountable “for securing their own well-being.” The enterprises involved in this “will to health” involve wide ranging aspirations for health in which the “conduct of individuals is governed ‘at a distance,’ by shaping the ways in which they understand and enact their own freedom.” The ‘invitation’ for ‘diverse communities’ to participate in Canada’s national security endeavours is such a case in point. Technological innovations in surveillance as seen in the new security policy enable security measures to be cast as a “will to health” as national security does not only involve prohibitive or coercive mechanisms imposed against the will of its targets. Rather, it may also operate as a productive power that produces the wills of individuals, particularly through discourses of rights and responsibilities in a political context that is increasingly characterized by a range of calculated risks. The normalization of elaborate security operations can be seen by how increasingly, notes Rose, “surveillance is ‘designed in’ to the flows of everyday existence.” As Lyon notes, the post September 11 ‘panic regime’ shows that “anxious publics are willing to put up with many more intrusions, interceptions, delays, and questions than was the case before September 11.” The deployment of mechanisms of state intervention to securitize biological, economic and social processes that concern a population, in conjunction with rationalities of responsibilizaton that treat constituents as facilitators of security, posits security as a condition of liberty. This is a process of subjectification, which Michael Dillon defines as, [A]n order of knowledgeable practices, norms of conduct, and elaborate protocols of behavior. Its object is to produce calculable subjects operating in calculable spaces, formidably empowered by their very subscription to, indeed inscription into force by, technologies of calculation. The defining and distinguishing paradox of power/knowledge is therefore that it is that very subjectification to power that is empowering. Consequently, ‘risk’ as a category of existence rationalizes freedom not as constrained by mechanisms of security, but as protected by them. In a society of security, such forms of regularized freedom are normalized into the paradoxical and everyday conditions of freedom and subjection. In short, security tells people how 109 to be good citizens.

#### The 1ac’s pursuit of a “network society” is an extension of a biopolitical desire to promote species-life

**Zebrowski 09** – PhD Student @ Keele University (Christopher, “Governing the Network Society: A Biopolitical Critique of Resilience,” Political Perspectives, 2009, http://www.politicalperspectives.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/Vol3-1-2009-4.pdf) SIyer

As the above statement makes clear, the introduction of the security strategy of resilience has less to do with the changing nature of threats in the contemporary security environment, and more to do with the changing organisational structure of life within advanced liberal societies; the need to adjust security technologies to the protection of the modern “network society”. Coinciding with the advances in the quality of life that international telecommunications networks and just-in-time transportation networks have delivered to advanced liberal societies has been the intensification of certain threats suggesting that these complex networks have also made modern life increasingly vulnerable. The same networks relied upon by advanced liberal societies for a high standard of living are being exploited by other networked communities from viruses (both electronic and organic) to international terrorists who threaten to destabilise the contingent amalgamation of networks that contribute to the “quality of life” experienced in advanced liberal societies. The modern “network society”, it is said, is in desperate need of novel solutions, which take into consideration society’s changing form, to protect it from these threats. Here, the network society refers not only to the proliferation of communications, transportation and infrastructural networks which support modern life in advanced liberal states; it refers to the complex myriad of network structures through which advanced liberal societies are organised, supported and composed. The idea of the network society is related to, but goes beyond, the notion of the information society, which stresses the growing size and importance of information flows to contemporary societies (Webster, 2006), to emphasize the organisational structure of advanced liberal societies in terms of a complex of interlinked and interdependent networks (Berkowitz and Wellman, 1988; Castells, 1996). At a macro-level this refers to the co-evolution of economics, information technology and business practices that have produced the interdependent social and economic networks of globalised capitalism in the twenty-first century. It also refers to the complex network of critical infrastructures that support modern day societies and which are responsible for the “quality of life” experienced in advanced liberal societies (Collier and Lakoff, 2008: 33-35). Finally, but perhaps most importantly, it reflects a profound cognitive shift to network tropes and informatic metaphors in understandings of “life itself”, that are manifest within a vast array of discourses surrounding the “life properties” displayed by complex systems (Galloway and Thacker, 2007; Kay, 2000; Rose, 2007). This new understanding of society poses a number of conceptual, and thus political, problems for the biopolitical security dispositif 1 charged with protecting and promoting species-life (Foucault, 1998: 143). Simply put, security is always directed towards the securing of a referent object (Dillon, 2007: 10-11). Indeed the way in which these objects are problematised through different discourses of danger give rise to different technologies and rationalities involved with their government (Dillon, 2007: 10). The emerging on to political understanding of society contained within the idea of the ‘network society’ would thus be expected to have an effect on the techniques of governance which seek to promote and protect it. To understand the emergence of resilience as a security practice is thus firstly to understand how the ‘network society’ is understood and problematised within the contemporary security climate.

#### Transportation infrastructure and oil are products of the military-industrial complex

**Kuswa 09** – Assistant Professor @ CSU (Kevin, “A Brief Genealogy of Fordism in Two Parts,” Journal of Law in Society, Feb. 2009, http://puttingthekindebate.com/2012/04/20/transportation-infrastructure-continued-fordism-part-ii/) SIyer

An important moment that becomes more pronounced during the events of 1973 involves the transformation from Fordism to globalization. Because Fordism remained an industrial arrangement tied to the automobile as the basis for mass production, it reached an end-point (or transitional moment) as the post World War II military complex and federal control of highway funding combined to capture certain economic and military logics for the state. Certainly a number of components of Fordism infiltrated other industries and managed to find a niche for themselves alongside the apparatus of the state. The corporate quest for growing markets and a new manufacturing structure also intensified as labor and the production process became more integrated. Many contradictory motions pushed corporate entities in diffuse and uncertain directions—a capitalism contingent on political maneuvering, state diplomacy, and a constantly shifting set of market parameters. The Cold War and its ensuing global chess game for influence also fueled the expansion of the state and the reach of government institutions, whether those institutions exerted themselves in the name of democracy or communism.

By 1973, corporations are experiencing distinct transformations: they are breaking away from the state by creating new profit structures and diversifying across borders to take advantage of abundant labor and tax incentives wherever they may be located, and they are incorporating themselves into the state or subordinating their operations to the regulations and policies imposed by the state. Barlett and Steele lay out both of these transformations in succinct fashion. They talk about the expansion of the corporate scope by reducing the United States to one of the objects of the large energy conglomerates: “In this period, the United States became merely another customer of the American multinational oil companies which supply most of the free world’s oil” (Barlett & Steele, 1974, p332). Barlett and Steele (1974, p333) also talk about the state’s use of the energy crisis to further political aims and attach themselves to business lobbies: “The Administration has consistently overdramatized the extent of the shortage and helped create much of the panic seen today at the gas pump.” It was ultimately the war and the oil embargo of 1973 that catapulted both of these capturing motions to the forefront. Once again, the motions of Fordism helped to generate a multi-dimensional effect.

The oil effects of the highway machine were analogous to the duality of the freedom of driving and the immobility (including mortality) of the car crash. The crash on the oil front, however, was global and all-encompassing. With vehicles and their passengers, the repetition and seriality of the car crash are its biggest threat—the inevitability of a certain percentage of accidents occurring on the highway each and every day. With the oil crash, on the other hand, the regularity of price and supply shocks was not as significant as the sudden rupture in October of 1973. As landmines are to an atomic bomb, so is the car crash to the oil crisis. All four are crippling and destructive, but landmines and car accidents are insidious and relentless while atomic bombs and large oil shocks are quick and total. The speed and scope of the energy crisis forced swift responses from the state and corporations. Having captured militarism in the name of nationalism (and atomic weaponry), the state deployed its military to protect its security. Having captured the state in the name of economic growth, corporate interests capitalized on the crisis by dodging taxation schemes and passing on higher prices to addicted consumers.

### link—warming

#### The aff’s apocalyptic climate rhetoric is constructed for national security purposes—it ensures military buildup

Mayer, 12 – research associate at the Bonn University Department of Political Science (Maximilian, “Chaotic Climate Change and Security,” International Political Sociology 6, 165–185, 2012)//HK

Securitizing Climate Change The specter of chaos and an unpredictable climate also began to haunt national security communities, which have been quick to digest the spectacular insights put forward by a small but growing fraction of climatologists. In 2003, the Pentagon commissioned a consultancy study, which artfully employed what the Copenhagen School refers to as the ‘‘rhetoric of survival.’’ Its authors predict the advent of a nuclear war resulting from a fast shutdown of the ocean conveyor belt in the northern Atlantic (Schwartz and Randall 2003). Subsequent populist works such as Lyna’s Six Degrees, Pearce’s The Last Generation, and Lovelock’s Revenge of Gaia produced powerful narratives that embraced a similarly existentialist language. John Houghton, who served for the IPCC as cochairman of the first working group, called climate change ‘‘a weapon of mass destruction’’ in contradiction to the linear orthodoxy to which most of his colleagues and the IPCC reports still adhered. He accused the American and British leaders of neglecting their ‘‘duty above all others, (…) to protect the security of their peoples’’ (Brown 2003). Similarly, the vast majority of think tanks, NGOs, and research institutes portrayed climate change first and foremost as a national security issue.10 Since 2003, Western military and strategic communities have started connecting rapid climate shifts with national strategy and power politics. Their scenarios were based on ‘‘a decidedly post-equilibrium world, buffeted by greater or lesser degrees of turbulence’’ with profound implications for the US grand strategy (Cooper 2010:183).11 For the imminent future of the world, climate change is not just a minor threat. Environmentally induced interstate conflicts or societal breakdown must be expected (CNA, 2007). The German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU, 2008:1) notes that climate change ‘‘will draw ever-deeper lines of division and conflict in international relations, triggering numerous conflicts between and within countries.’’ The latest forecast by the National Intelligence Council (2008) ranks climate change, with reference to its severe results such as water and resource scarcity, next to international terrorism, while the notoriously skeptic Bush Administration acknowledged the ‘‘significant relevance’’ of climate change for national security in the Arctic region. The new NATO strategy, as well as the 2010 US National Security Strategy, mentions climate as a threat almost identical to the German government and European Commission’s emphasis on climate security (Reiber and Zelli 2011). Another example of the connection between climate and national security can be seen in the Arctic. The rise in regional temperature is as much as twice the global average, rendering the very landscape a matter of concern. The sea ice over the North Pole might vanish completely within the next 30 years, shortening the sea-lanes between Europe and Asia by up to 4,000 nautical miles. The ongoing retraction destabilizes the existing sovereignty practices such as borders, navigation, defense, and extractive policies. It forces ‘‘the state system to confront its accepted suppositions about the relationship among land, state, territory, and nation’’ (Gerhardt, Steinberg, Tasch, Fabiano, and Shields 2010:999). In response, the Canadian government is rapidly extending its military presence at the American continent’s northern rim in order to control its exposed territorial demarcations and the Northwest Passage (Byers 2009). On the opposite side of the Arctic, Russia’s government is trying to secure territorial claims and the interests of its national oil companies by re-establishing its strategic ‘‘bear bombers’’ patrol flights and large-scale military drills (Zysk 2010). ‘‘The bear,’’ Russia’s Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has declared, ‘‘is the real master of the Arctic,’’ thus emphasizing both Russia’s ‘‘profound strategic interests’’ in the region, as well as the dire consequences of ice shield reduction and sea ice melting for the animal’s living conditions (Harding 2010). In this strategic rivalry, the point of view of indigenous groups—not to mention of flora and fauna—is marginalized, despite the fact that their livelihood is existentially threatened (Leichenko and O’Brien 2008:91–103; Adger, Barnett, Chapin, and Ellemor 2011:9–13).12 Despite their conflicting strategic interests, the governments of Denmark, Russia, and Canada agreed to solve their territorial disputes within international legal frameworks. By 2013, the UN seabed commission will determine ownership rights. Here, scientific practices once again come into play, since geologists and 10This conclusion is based on a systematic reading of over 30 reports, policy papers, and magazine articles that were published in Australia, Northern America, and Europe. For further discussions, see Maas and Ta¨nzler (2009) and Brzoska (2009). 11The military’s interest in climate dates back to the World War II and even before, while climate science and the US military have a history of being strongly interwoven (Weart 2003). 12Due to its focus on large-scale system components, the research on ‘‘tipping points’’ usually omits a smallscale, human perspective (Liverman 2009). It thus cannot offer sufficient spatial resolution that would allow for meaningful adaptation policies. Maximilian Mayer 173 lawyers map the region’s continental shelves and shall ascertain which nations own exclusive rights to exploit the large gas and oil deposits under International Law (Mayer and Schouten 2011:25). In sum, the rapid ‘‘opening up’’ of the North leads to the evolution of overlapping assemblages, in which the same materials are often enrolled differently, but rapid physical, ecological, and territorial changes are mainly translated into threats to sovereignty and economic interests. The associations that enact state interests are so dominant because they entail multiple practices in a coherent and geographically dispersed way, and easily connect with the existing global assemblages such as transport shipping and fossil resource extraction.

#### **The aff’s assertions of consensus mask growing division within the climate science field—they use a hegemonic discourse of climate security to protect their impacts from suspicion**

Mayer, 12 – research associate at the Bonn University Department of Political Science (Maximilian, “Chaotic Climate Change and Security,” International Political Sociology 6, 165–185, 2012)//HK

Naturalizing Climate Conflicts Another practice that underpins the stability of the assemblage is the manner in which many protagonists deliberately naturalize the nexus between climate and conflict. Policy advocacy groups, for instance, typically rely on deterministic ad-hoc scenarios, as these representative examples illustrate: The rapid melt is also rekindling numerous interstate rivalries and attracting energy-hungry newcomers, such as China, to the region. The Arctic powers are fast approaching diplomatic gridlock (…). (Borgerson 2008:71; italics added by author) Armed conflict between nations over resources, such as the Nile and its tributaries, is likely and nuclear war is possible. The social consequences range from increased religious fervor to outright chaos. (Campbell, Gulledge, McNeill, Podesta, Ogden, Fuerth, James Woolsey, Lennon, Smith, Weitz, and Mix 2007:7; italics added by author) By presenting a linkage as self-contained and objective knowledge which is, according to peer-reviewed social science, possible but unlikely, the underlying knowledge controversy, though rather open-ended, is silenced. In contrast, academic work usually resorts to a conjectural mode, illuminating the huge uncertainties in terms of both theory and empirical evidence Barnett and Adger 2007; Salehyan 2008. Such is precisely the situation in the research field of environment, resources, and conflict upon which virtually all literature on 14This adds to the already remarkably low rates of risk perception toward climate-related impacts in the United States, in comparison, for instance, with risks from terrorism (Sunstein 2007). Maximilian Mayer 175 climate-induced conflict builds. Very little is agreed upon—central ontological, methodological, and theoretical assumptions remain essentially contested15—and meanwhile, knowledge about the possible consequences of abrupt climate change is even less substantial (Hulme 2003). The success of naturalization is not dependent on phrasing only, but also gains from the existing discourses and mind maps. For instance, widely read books such as Lovelock’s Revenge of Gaia or Diamond’s Collapse are essentially repeating the deterministic arguments of the 1990s (McGregor 2004; Judkins, Smith, and Keys 2008). In a similar manner, scholars localize societal breakdown and security threats—which they anticipate will stem from climate change—in the South. These efforts to assemble climate chaos build upon earlier research traditions and historical cartographies of tropical dangers (Bankoff 2002; Dalby 2002; Hulme 2008). The continuing adherence to this perspective is evident from maps showing the convergence of environmental and political ‘‘hotspots’’ almost exclusively in developing countries (Diamond 2004:497; WBGU, 2008:4). To sum up, the practice of naturalization functions as the backbone of securitization because it silences the absence of quantifiable indicators, elaborated computersimulations, and uncontested knowledge. Growing in size The growing size of the association of chaotic climate change is another source of its stabilization. An enormous number of heterogeneous human and nonhuman actors have been assembled. Dozens of practices across different disciplinary and professional contexts comprising divergent understandings of climate dangers, as well as ‘‘grammars’’ akin to both securitization and riskification, have been interlinked (Lorenzoni, Pidgeon, and O’Connor 2005; Corry 2010:15). For instance, climatologists criticize the IPCC’s inability to provide probability assessments of strong positive feedback loops in the climate system. They resort, as economists do, to the precautionary principle because catastrophic events cannot be ruled out. In contrast, strategists, authors, and NGOs deterministically naturalize climate conflicts and predict international crisis by enrolling exactly the same nonlinearities. Because boundary objects are so central to the connection of materials and practices, their proliferation provides a rough indicator of the approximate size of an assemblage. References to ‘‘tipping points’’ and ‘‘thresholds’’ have sharply increased in peer-reviewed articles, general scientific publications, and the public at large between 1990 and 2010 as shown by the logarithmic graph in Figure 2. In conclusion, the association of chaotic climate change has evolved roughly along the path theorized above. Nonlinear climate change became a matter of concern and turned into an objectified reality that led to further controversies among economists, climate modelers, and within the IPCC, whereas the link between climate and national security became almost hegemonic discourse. Taken together, as illustrated in Figure 3, the association of chaotic climate change has grown immensely in size and is partly stabilized.

## impacts

### bare life

#### **The end point of biopolitics is a state in which legal order is indistinguishable from bare life**

Dean, 04 – professor of sociology at the University of Newcastle (Mitchell, “Four Theses on the Powers of Life and Death,” Contretemps 5, December 2004, http://sydney.edu.au/contretemps/5december2004/dean.pdf)//HK

Fourth thesis: Bio-politics captures life stripped naked (or the zoē that was the exception of sovereign power) and makes it a matter of political life (bios). Today, we seek the good life though the extension of the powers over bare life to the point at which they become indistinguishable. In this formulation, the emergence of a government over life in the eighteenth century does mark a rupture in forms of rule, which the search for an ʻoriginary structureʼ of sovereignty cannot capture. For Foucault, the nature of this rupture is the displacement, articulation or re-inscription of sovereignty within a peculiarly modern form of politics, bio-politics. However, this capture of the government of the state by bio-powers is already present in the structure of sovereignty. It would be a mistake, in this sense, to view Agambenʼs quest for the structure of sovereignty, with its multiple thresholds, as ahistorical, that is, as insensitive to temporal thresholds. His thesis offers a kind of history of modernity. Here, the demonic character of modern states lies in the possibility that the thresholds that maintained bare life as a state of exception are breaking down. Zoē is entering into a sphere of indistinction with bios in modern politics. For Agamben the paradigm of modern politics—the new Nomos—is not the liberal governing of freedom, but the concentration camp. The camp is the material form of the stabilization of the state of exception, the excluded inclusion, both inside and outside modern political and legal ordering. Because the camp is established by law as a space of exception, it is subject to no order itself, only direct police command. It is thus a space of ordered disorder in which bare life enters into a zone of indistinction with legal order. While such views may appear to lead to a kind of radical condemnation of many instances of bio-politics, such as the attempt to develop humane processing procedures for asylum seekers, the idea of mapping zones of indistinction would seem to locate arenas of analysis and spheres of contestation rather than a site of dogmatic rejection. We have become used to a style of criticism in which liberal notions of the individual citizen have been revealed to be constituted through a series of exclusions (of women, the disabled, prisoners, the insane, the poor, the indigene, the refugee, etc). Note that Contretemps 5, December 2004 28 bio-power today holds the promise of extraordinary solutions to disability, criminality and insanity. The inclusion of women through their state of exclusion, also, would appear to raise interesting questions concerning sovereign violence given womenʼs historic biological relationship to the reproduction and care of human life. This relationship, itself excepted under the universality of law, is thus produced as bare life; and women are required to take responsibility for sovereign decisions. If we are to take Agamben seriously, this desire for inclusion may have the effect not simply of widening the sphere of the rule of law but also of hastening the point at which the sovereign exception enters into a zone of indistinction with the rule. Our societies would then have become truly demonic, not because of the re-inscription of sovereignty within bio-politics, but because bare life which constituted the sovereign exception begins to enter a zone of indistinction with our moral and political life and with the fundamental presuppositions of political community. In the achievement of inclusion in the name of universal human rights, all human life is stripped naked and becomes sacred. Perhaps in a very real sense we are all homo sacer. Perhaps what we have been in danger of missing is the way in which the sovereign violence that constitutes the exception of bare life—that which can be killed without committing homicide—is today entering into the very core of modern politics, ethics, and systems of justice.

#### The state of exception renders individuals as outside of the apparatus

**Kusina 6** – Professor of Philosophy @ Bowling Green State University (Jeanne, “The Wolf at the Door: Agamben's State of Exception,” Octobers 22 2006, http://iph.fsu.edu/interculture/pdfs/kusina%20lost.pdf) SIyer

In Schmitt’s formulation of the state of exception, the sovereign decisively moderates the temporary suspension of the law only to return it to its normal state of affairs once the emergence has past (SE, 10). It is a process analogous to the werewolf of medieval folklore who, having completed the transformation back into human form, knocks three times upon the door and is once again allowed back into the city (HS 107-8). However, a distinctly different view, emphasized by Agamben and originally presented by Walter Benjamin is his Philosophy is History, rejects the claim that the state of exception is a temporary condition. On Benjamin’s account, once the state of exception is created no movement is made to return it to an allegedly normal order. Having arrived at the position of the homo sacer, the inhabitants of such zones seemingly exist in something of a timeless state of suspended animation. Attention shifts as one crisis is inevitably followed by a new crisis close on its heels. **Gradually, the exception has become the rule**; moreover, Agamben alleges, this is not a situation limited to an unfortunate few but is instead one with the potential to capture any and all within it. Take into consideration the catastrophic situation created by Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Finding itself woefully un-prepared to respond to such a natural disaster, the United States government’s response to the people of New Orleans was to declare a state of emergency and urge evacuation. Most of those with financial means and available transportation did evacuate, while thousands of people with limited resources were unable to leave. Despite being unable to provide adequate food, water, shelter, or medical support to the citizens that remained, the government’s declaration of martial law initially prioritized protecting businesses from looters. As the severity of the situation escalated so did the violence; and, amidst the swelling floodwaters, New Orleans became a lawless zone of exception within which anyone, it seemed, could be killed at any time. Millions of people watched the human drama unfold on television for several long, painful days, utterly dismayed by what appeared to be the government’s total lack of response to the horrific events that were unfolding. Contrary to the myths of sovereign protection that so often motivate an acceptance of biopolitic regulation, Hurricane Katrina exposed the paradigmatic structure of the camp by unmasking the law as being little more than a technicality, a force that is felt only in its withdrawal and, ultimately, its total abandonment. This permits us to once again speculate on the temporal rhetoric of urgency that always seems so insistent on carving out an isolated space of exception. The temporal element that was so fleeting prior to the exception appears to metaphorically change speed again. For it seems as though often, once the state of exception is achieved, the call of future history that was so desperately in need of action seems noticeably less pressing, perhaps even a distant possibility. For example, by having gone through with the invasion of Iraq but in not being able to establish lasting order there, the nation of Iraq came to mark a territory of exception. Curiously, the rhetoric of time employed by the Bush administration also appeared to “slow down” considerably in concurrence with these events. Moving away from continuing to call upon the American people to become the pre-emptive authors of their own history, within the next few years the President would frequently make remarks that expressed longevity, perhaps even complacency, rather than urgency: Imagine a world in which they were able to control governments, a world awash with oil and they would use oil resources to punish industrialized nations… If we allow them to do this, if we retreat from Iraq, if we don't uphold our duty to support those who are desirous to live in liberty, 50 years from now history will look back on our time with unforgiving clarity, and demand to know why we did not act.

### extinction

#### **The aff’s biopolitics make WMD use and genocide inevitable**

Dean, 04 – professor of sociology at the University of Newcastle (Mitchell, “Four Theses on the Powers of Life and Death,” Contretemps 5, December 2004, http://sydney.edu.au/contretemps/5december2004/dean.pdf)//HK

At some distance from these advances in biomedicine and biotechnology are the issues of life and death that are played in various arenas of international politics and human rights. These concern the effects of the break-ups of nation-states from Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union to Indonesia, the subsequent movement, detention, expulsion, processing, and mass death of refugees and illegal immigrants, and the conditions and forms under which military action, ʻpeacekeepingʼ and ʻhumanitarian interventionʼ are acceptable. They concern the international coalition against the polycentric network of terrorism. Detention camps are again becoming a feature of modern liberal-democratic states. On the one hand, the twentieth century gave us a name for the death of a whole people or ʻraceʼ, genocide. On the other, it sought to promote the universal rights of individuals by virtue of their mere existence as human beings. Bio-politics and thanato-politics are played out in war, in torture, and in biological, chemical and atomic weapons of mass destruction as much as in declarations of human rights and United Nationsʼ peacekeeping operations.

#### **Biopolitical domination enables use of even the most benign technology for global slaughter—WWII proves**

Dean, 04 – professor of sociology at the University of Newcastle (Mitchell, “Four Theses on the Powers of Life and Death,” Contretemps 5, December 2004, http://sydney.edu.au/contretemps/5december2004/dean.pdf)//HK

For Foucault, at least in the History of Sexuality and related texts, modern powers are more closely aligned to a bio-politics, a politics of life. This bio-politics emerges in the eighteenth century with the concerns for the health, housing, habitation, welfare and living conditions of the population. Such an observation leads him to place his concerns with health, discipline, the body, and sexuality within a more general horizon. Again the notion of bio-politics is quite complex. The idea of the population as a kind of ʻspecies bodyʼ subject to bio-political knowledge and power operating in concert with the individual body subject to disciplinary powers would appear central.11 No matter how bloody things were under the exercise of sovereign power with its atrocious crimes and retributions, it is only with the advent of this modern form of the politics of life that the same logic and technology applied to the care and development of human life is applied to the destruction of entire populations. The link between social welfare and mass slaughters can at times appear to be a fairly direct one. Of one of its first manifestations in German police science, Foucault argues, “it wields its power over living beings as living beings, and its politics, therefore has to be a bio-politics. Since the population is nothing more than what the state takes care of for its own sake, of course, the state is entitled to slaughter it. So the reverse of bio-politics is thanato-politics.”12 Despite such statements, there is a hesitation, a point of indeterminacy, in this relation between bio-politics and thanato-politics. Foucault seems to identify a puzzle or an aporia of contemporary politics, which he cannot resolve or which may itself be irresolvable. “The coexistence in political structures of large destructive mechanisms and institutions oriented to the care of individual life is something puzzling,” he states.13 But he immediately adds “I donʼt mean that mass slaughters are the effect, the result, the logical consequence of our rationality, nor do I mean that the state has the obligation of taking care of individuals since it has the right to kill millions of people.” After proceeding through this set of inconclusive negatives he avers, as if trying to defer the answer to the questions he poses: “It is this rationality, and the death and life game which takes place in it, that Iʼd like to investigate from a historical point of view.” One aspect of this historical investigation occurred in Foucaultʼs 1976 lectures. These lectures cover such concerns as the seventeenth-century historical-political narrative of the “war of the races,” and the biological and social class re-inscriptions of racial discourse in the nineteenth century.14 He concludes with the development of the biological state racisms and the genocidal politics of the twentieth century, including a radical analysis of the Nazi state and of socialism. From this perspective, there is a certain potentiality within the human sciences which, when alloyed to notions such as race, can help make Contretemps 5, December 2004 20 intelligible the catastrophes of the twentieth century. Such lectures seem to make the totalitarian rule of the twentieth century a capstone on the histories of confinement, internment and punishment that had made up his genealogical work. This thesis is perhaps close to the work of the first generation of the Frankfurt School and a certain reading of Max Weber. Here the one-sided development of rationality and application of reason to ʻmanʼ in the human sciences has the consequence of converting instrumental rationality into forms of domination. Bio-politics in this reading is the application of instrumental rationality to life. The dreadful outcomes of the twentieth century then result from this kind of scientization and technologization of earlier notions of race. There is also a similarity in this reading of Foucault and the work of Zygmunt Bauman.15 The latter presents the Holocaust as something that must be understood as endogenous to Western civilization and its processes of rationalization rather than as an aberrant psychological, social or political pathology.

#### The pursuit of biopolitics creates dichotomies between the “evil” foreign and the “secure” domestic, drawing boundaries that justify killing in the name of saving life. This society of control spreads across the globe as the domestic populous becomes ever more isolated

**Campbell ’05** – Professor of Cultural and Political Geography in the Department of Geography at Durham University in the UK (David, “The Biopolitics of Security: Oil, Empire, and the Sports Utility Vehicle,” American Quarterly 57.3 (2005) 943-972, JSTOR)//aberg

As an imagined community, the state can be seen as the effect of formalized practices and ritualized acts that operate in its name or in the service of its ideals. This understanding, which is enabled by shifting our theoretical commitments from a belief in pregiven subjects to a concern with the problematic of subjectivity, renders foreign policy as a boundary-producing political performance in which the spatial domains of inside/outside, self/other, and domestic/foreign are constituted through the writing of threats as externalized dangers. The narratives of primary and stable identities that continue to govern much of the social sciences obscure such an understanding. In international relations these concepts of identity limit analysis to a concern with the domestic influences on foreign policy; this perspective allows for a consideration of the influence of the internal forces on state identity, but it assumes that the external is a fixed reality that presents itself to the pregiven state and its agents. In contrast, by assuming that the identity of the state is performatively constituted, we can argue that there are no foundations of state identity that exist prior to the problematic of identity/difference that situates the state within the framework of inside/outside and self/other. Identity is constituted in relation to difference, and difference is constituted in relation to identity, which means that the "state," the "international system," and the "dangers" to each are coeval in their construction. Over time, of course, ambiguity is disciplined, contingency is fixed, and dominant meanings are established. In the history of U.S. foreign policy regardless of the radically different contexts in which it has operated the formalized practices and ritualized acts of security discourse have worked to produce a conception of the United States in which freedom, liberty, law, democracy, individualism, faith, order, prosperity, and civilization are claimed to exist because of the constant struggle with and often violent suppression of opponents said to embody tyranny, oppression, anarchy, totalitarianism, collectivism, atheism, and barbarism. This record demonstrates that the boundary-producing political performance of foreign policy does more than inscribe a geopolitical marker on a map. This construction of social space also involves an axiological dimension in which the delineation of an inside from an outside gives rise to a moral hierarchy that renders the domestic superior and the foreign inferior. Foreign policy thus incorporates an ethical power of segregation in its performance of identity/difference. While this produces a geography of "foreign" (even "evil") others in conventional terms, it also requires a disciplining of "domestic" elements on the inside that challenge this state identity. This is achieved through exclusionary practices in which resistant elements to a secure identity on the "inside" are linked through a discourse of "danger" with threats identified and located on the "outside." Though global in scope, these effects are national in their legitimation.12 The ONDCP drugs and terror campaign was an overt example of this sort of exclusionary practice. However, the boundary-producing political performances of foreign policy operate within a global context wherein relations of sovereignty are changing. Although Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri have overplayed the transition from modern sovereignty to imperial sovereignty in Empire, there is little doubt that new relations of power and identity are present. According to Hardt and Negri, in our current condition, Empire establishes no territorial center of power and does not rely on fixed boundaries or barriers. It is a decentered and deterritorializing apparatus of rule that progressively incorporates the entire global realm within its open, expanding frontiers. Empire manages hybrid identities, flexible hierarchies, and plural exchanges through modulating networks of command. The distinct national colors of the imperialist map of the world have merged and blended in the imperial global rainbow.13 As shall be argued here, the sense of fading national colors is being resisted by the reassertion of national identity boundaries through foreign policy's writing of danger in a range of cultural sites. Nonetheless, this takes place within the context of flow, flexibility, and reterritorialization summarized by Hardt and Negri. Moreover, these transformations are part and parcel of change in the relations of production. As Hardt and Negri declare: "In the postmodernization of the global economy, the creation of wealth tends ever more toward what we will call biopolitical production, the production of social life itself, in which the economic, the political, and the cultural increasingly overlap and invest one another."14 While the implied periodization of the term postmodernization renders it problematic, the notion of biopolitics, with its connecting and penetrative networks across and through all domains of life, opens up new possibilities for conceptualizing the complex relationships that embrace oil, security, U.S. policy, and the SUV. In Todd Gitlins words, "the SUV is the place where foreign policy meets the road."15 It is also the place where the road affects foreign policy. Biopolitics is a key concept in understanding how those meetings take place. Michel Foucault argues that biopolitics arrives with the historical transformation in waging war from the defense of the sovereign to securing the existence of a population. In Foucault s argument, this historical shift means that decisions to fight are made in terms of collective survival, and killing is justified by the necessity of preserving life.16 It is this centering of the life of the population rather than the safety of the sovereign or the security of territory that is the hallmark of biopolitical power that distinguishes it from sovereign power. Giorgio Agamben has extended the notion through the concept of the administration of life and argues that the defense of life often takes place in a zone of indistinction between violence and the law such that sovereignty can be violated in the name of life.17 Indeed, the biopolitical privileging of life has provided the rationale for some of the worst cases of mass death, with geno- cide deemed "understandable" as one group s life is violently secured through the demise of another group.18 However, the role of biopolitical power in the administration of life is equally obvious and ubiquitous in domains other than the extreme cases of violence or war. The difference between the sovereign and the biopolitical can be understood in terms of the contrast between Foucault s notion of "disciplinary society" and Gilles Deleuzes conception of "the society of control," a distinction that plays an important role in Hardt and Negri s Empire. According to Hardt and Negri, in the disciplinary society, "social command is constructed through a diffuse network of dispositifi or apparatuses that produce and regulate customs, habits, and productive practices." In the society of control, "mechanisms of command become ever more democratic, ever more immanent to the social field, distributed throughout the brains and bodies of the citizens." This means that the society of control is "characterized by an intensification and generalization of the normalizing apparatuses of disciplinarity that internally animate our common and daily practices, but in contrast to discipline, this control extends well outside the structured sites of social institutions through flexible and fluctuating networks."19 Network is, therefore, the prevailing metaphor for social organization in the era of biopolitical power, and it is a conception that permits us to understand how the effects of our actions, choices, and life are propagated beyond the boundaries of our time-space location.20 It is also a conception that allows us to appreciate how war has come to have a special prominence in producing the political order of liberal societies. Networks, through their extensive connectivity, function in terms of their strategic interactions. This means that "social relations become suffused with considerations of power, calculation, security and threat."21 As a result, "global biopolitics operates as a strategic game in which the principle of war is assimilated into the very weft and warp of the socio-economic and cultural networks of biopolitical relations."22 This theoretical concern with biopolitical relations of power in the context of networked societies is consistent with an analytical shift to the problematic of subjectivity as central to understanding the relationship between foreign policy and identity. That is because both are concerned with "a shift from a preoccupation with physical and isolated entities, whose relations are described largely in terms of interactive exchange, to beings-in-relation, whose structures [are] decisively influenced by patterns of connectivity."23 At the same time, while conceptual approaches are moving away from understandings premised on the existence of physical and isolated entities, the social and political structures that are produced by network patterns of connectivity often appear to be physical and isolated. As Lieven de Cauter argues, we don't live in networks; we live in capsules. Capsules are enclaves and envelopes that function as nodes, hubs, and termini in the various networks and contain a multitude of spaces and scales. These enclaves can include states, gated communities, or vehicles with the latter two manifesting the "SUV model of citizenship" Mitchell has provocatively described.24 Nonetheless, though capsules like these appear physical and isolated, there is "no network without capsules. The more networking, the more capsules. Ergo: the degree of capsularisation is directly proportional to the growth of networks."25 The result is that biopolitical relations of power produce new borderlands that transgress conventional understandings of inside/outside and isolated/ connected. Together these shifts pose a major theoretical challenge to much of the social sciences, which have adhered ontologically to a distinction between the ideal and the material, which privileges economistic renderings of complex social assemblages.26 As we shall see, overcoming this challenge does not mean denying the importance of materialism but, rather, moving beyond a simplistic consideration of objects by reconceptualizing materialism so it is understood as interwoven with cultural, social, and political networks. This means that "paying increased attention to the material actually requires a more expansive engagement with the immaterial."27

### at: liberalism

#### **The aff doesn’t solve—governmental solutions to the problems of biopower necessitate its continual use**

Dean, 04 – professor of sociology at the University of Newcastle (Mitchell, “Four Theses on the Powers of Life and Death,” Contretemps 5, December 2004, http://sydney.edu.au/contretemps/5december2004/dean.pdf)//HK

If…but…perhaps…Foucault has identified a problem and a language to investigate the problem without identifying how and why these elements form the problem. Before moving to a new thesis, let us note that there is one problem with the view that liberalism can act to check totalitarian administration of life. Both of the means by which it hopes to do so refer principally to nothing but simple existence. On the one hand, the economic rationality that provides a limit to government refers before all else to the means of the sustenance of life. On the other, the sovereign individual has rights, especially in the era of international human rights, simply by virtue of merely living itself. “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights” reads the first article of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. If there is optimism in Foucaultʼs approach, it is one that cannot rely on a movement that checks the powers over life. The more liberalism and modern rights movements seek to defend us from the dangers of bio-powers, it would Contretemps 5, December 2004 22 seem, the more they make possible its extension.

### turns case—local knowledge kt macro

#### Localized knowledges are crucial to inform effective national/ macro-level policy—anything else falls into the trap of ideology and fails

**Uitermark, ’05** –( Justus, Amsterdam School of Social Science Research, University of Amsterdam, “The genesis and evolution of urban policy: a confrontation of regulationist and governmentality approaches” http://www.justusuitermark.nl/files/pg2005.pdf)//abergλ

Indeed, despite initial probes in the direction of a more complete understanding of the dynamic of central–local relationships, these authors are quite clear with respect to urban policy and, to a lesser extent, regional policy. For example, MacLeod and Goodwin (1999), after a sophisticated discussion on state restructuring and scale, argue that successive national governments have tried to shape urban governance in London according to their own ideas and interests. And even though they indicate that the central state cannot ‘ﬁx’ local governance, they ﬁrmly situate change at the national level. Rather than seeing the changing forms of urban governance as the result of the interaction between strategies of local and national actors, they give the impression that the central state has, by itself, the power to shape local governance to the extent that it is unnecessary to pay attention to the intentions, ideas, interests and strategies of local actors. Jones’s statement that ‘‘[p]erhaps the last place to start with TECs and local economic governance is at the local level’’ (Jones, 1998, p. 971, original emphasis) is equally typical; in the end, strategies of regional and local actors are understood to distort or complement national strategies but the latter are always imposed from the outside upon the former. Jones’s contribution to this journal oﬀers a welcome addition to this literature in that it clearly articulates the position of the regulation approach vis-a `-vis other strands of literature and in that it is in fact meant for debate. 2 Let me cite at some length from one passage that neatly summarises the position of STRA researchers on urban policy and, in fact, any policy: Under the surface, local governance has a brutal logic. Because institutional change is driven as much by national crisis management practices aimed at achieving local social control, as it is by the needs of the economy – giving rise to a primacy of political factors involved in the architecture of contemporary local governance – there is more to governance than the complexities of interinstitutional and intra-spatial coordination. This is not to deny the role of local geographies of governance within capitalist transformation but to restate the role of the nation state – political geography (with politics) – when analysing local state transformation (Jones, 1998, p. 960, original emphasis). While I agree overall with the argument Jones is making here, I do want to highlight some aspects that are problematic. First, in contradistinction to Foucauldian accounts, Jones has spotted a logic, implying that there is one mechanism that aﬀects all governance arrangements to the extent that they come to share identical characteristics. Moreover, this logic operates under the surface and has its origin in the central state, which leads Jones (and others who adhere to STRA) to redirect attention away from the nitty-gritty that goes on at the local level. It is important to recognise that these two aspects of his account do not necessarily ﬂow from his important argument that the central state performs a pivotal role. The question, however, is what this role consists of and whether or not there might be reasons to (also) make a claim that contrasts with that of Jones’s, i.e. that central state policies follow a speciﬁc logic that is the cumulative result of, or develop in dialectical relation to (rather than determines), local developments. I do not want to discuss the case of the GLC or TECs, with which these authors are of course far more familiar than I am. I do want to make the point that, especially in advanced liberal societies (see below), the strategies of national actors can only have signiﬁcant eﬀects if they productively intersect with strategies of local actors. Thus, whereas MacLeod and Goodwin (1999, p. 508) approvingly quote Harding’s (1997, p. 308) conclusion that ‘‘little can happen sub-nationally without [the nation state’s] cooperation, acquiescence or benign ignorance’’, I think it is important to stress that the reverse is also true: only if central actors strategically act through local strongholds, capitalise on local knowledge and, more generally, build strategies that complement those of (already) powerful local actors, can it hope to do reach its stated goals. In other words, it is more productive to discuss the actions and strategies of local and national actors in a relational manner as co-constitutive of each other. Such a remark is of course easy to make (who would dare to defend an approach that views the local or central level in strict isolation!) but it is more diﬃcult to substantiate it by providing some analytical instruments to actually ﬁll in the gaps. Without attempting to fully solve these problems here, I suggest that viewing the activity of local governance actors not only as an execution of or a resistance to national policies but also as constitutive of such policies may help identify forces of change that have hitherto been neglected. Investigating the microphysics of power at the local level would not merely ﬁll a small gap in empirical research but may also further understanding of the macro-processes that form the core interest of the STRA writings. This task I take on in the third section, where I will emphasise that, somewhat contrary to Jones’s claim, understanding local governance regimes depends on understanding the transfer of powers and knowledge from the national to the local and vice versa. Formulated in a somewhat more polemical fashion my claim is that we indeed should start at the local level but that we simply should not keep stuck there.

#### A bottom up approach solves best – by influencing policy on a local level we can influence the way the state forms policy

**Uitermark, ’05** –( Justus, Amsterdam School of Social Science Research, University of Amsterdam, “The genesis and evolution of urban policy: a confrontation of regulationist and governmentality approaches” http://www.justusuitermark.nl/files/pg2005.pdf)//abergλ

However, I argue that it may be wrong to assume that national (urban) policies determine local outcomes but that it is equally simplistic to assume that they merely ﬂow from local struggles. Instead, I insist, the central state draws from distinctly local processes of knowledge production for the formulation of its policies and it tries to manipulate the outcomes of those struggles through strategic intervention. The question that then arises is: under what circumstances and with what kind of selection mechanisms does it do so? However, neither Foucault nor his followers ever talk about the evolution of state structures. Everything between, on the one hand, material practices and the production of truths and knowledges in local settings and, on the other hand, the apparently free ﬂoating ideas of philosophers or party gurus with respect to the state, escapes the attention of the governmentality literature. It so happens that the STRA never descends to the local settings where power actually makes itself felt and talks about philosophies of the state only as a background to concrete analysis and theorising – so, in fact, this literature chooses a particular meta-theoretical perspective which enables it to cover issues that have been ignored by Foucauldians. Now the question naturally arises whether, and if so how, the insights of the STRA and other political-economic state theorising might be used to glue together the apparently remote terrains of study covered by Foucault and his followers. In response to this question, I want to develop the argument that the state is central to processes of distribution and that the birth of a particular policy initiative can be considered as a moment in a process where discourses are circulated, selected and reshaped. For now I will focus exclusively on those modes of distribution where the central state is strongly involved. A ﬁrst thing to note in this respect is that municipalities (or other administrative units) that fall within the same national jurisdiction share some characteristics that may not be found either alone or in combination in other countries. For example, they share comparable ﬁscal and judicial systems. And some municipalities may experience a similar fate because of nation-wide (but spatially diﬀerentiated) developments, such as immigration trends or industrial restructuring. Of course, this does not mean that cities will converge but it does mean that similar conditions will occur in diﬀerent places, albeit at diﬀerent times. In this case, the central state, as the core of a more encompassing national institutional structure, performs a crucial structurating role. Thus, a third hypothesis holds that the central state facilitates the distribution of discourses between diﬀerent localities because it harmonises (not homogenises) some conditions that aﬀect the emergence of discourses and the transferability of those discourses. Besides its role in shaping local conditions, the state may play a role as a distributor of discourses. Mann (1993, p. 59) importantly argued that Weber was only half right when he said that the power of a central state increases as it gradually penetrates its territories with an increasingly dense institutional infrastructure that makes it possible to implement decisions in remote territories. The reverse, Mann notes, is also true: actors (including those in remote areas) can use institutional infrastructures to manipulate the decisions of the central state. The institutional infrastructure of the state is exactly that: a set of connections that serve to distribute resources amongst places, administrative levels and spatial scales. The discourses on disadvantaged neighbourhoods can be considered as one particular type of resource since they provide actors with useful conceptualisations that can help them perform their tasks. So here we arrive at a fourth hypothesis: discourses on disadvantaged neighbourhoods, like other discourses that are potentially useful for (urban) policy, can be distributed through the institutional infrastructure of the state. Even though he does not explicitly conceptualise the institutional infrastructure of the state as a vehicle for the transportation of diverse resources, Poulantzas (1978, pp. 132–136) indicated that the state serves to connect diﬀerent element of the social totality. Moreover, he also recognised that power relations amongst social forces were shaped by what he termed the institutional materiality of the state (Poulantzas, 1978). Building on these insights, largely via Jessop, Jones (1997) shows how certain strategies and regimes are spatially selective. This account, too, has a strong statecentrism in the sense that Jones zooms in on national policies and not on the social forces that have acted through the state and given rise to those policies. Nevertheless, his concept is extremely useful, especially because it provides a way to understand the asymmetrical institutional interdependencies that underlie interactions between local and national actors (see also De Swaan, 1987).

### turns case—CI

#### Turns the case – critical infrastructure becomes so interdependent that any disturbance can cause collapse.

**Edwards, 03 –** (Paul N., Professor in the [School of Information](http://www.si.umich.edu/) (SI) and the [Dept. of History](http://www.lsa.umich.edu/history/) at the [University of Michigan](http://www.umich.edu) “Infrastructure and Modernity: Force, Time, and Social Organization in the History of Sociotechnical Systems”)//abergλ

I begin by considering scales of force that run from the powers of the human body (at the low end) to the geophysical. For most of human history, transportation and production systems depended primarily on human and animal power. Many modem infrastructures, such as transportation systems and electric power, create what appear on the human scale as amplifications of natural energies, beyond what unaided human beings or animals could achieve. "Modern" societies are practically synonymous with those in which such amplification is generally available. So (some) infrastructures can be characterized as force amplifiers, and the modem condition as a Heideggerian ready-to-handness of these amplifying powers. 'The sense of empowerment we gain from these is great indeed. Many energy-based infrastructures thus occupy a scale of force intermediate between the human body and the geophysical. They create reliable, invisible, socially useful capacities to contain and control energy. Preindustrial infrastructures, of course, often relied directly on hamess~ ing natural forces, such as water and wind, which also occupy this intermediate scale. A less-noticed point is that many modern energy-based infrastructures also rely, at least in part, on natural forces. Hydroelectric dams and air travel's use of the high-altitude jet stream are only two of many possible examples. This much is relatively obvious. However, another, larger scale ot force is usually ignored in discussions of infrastructure. As the Dutch (for example) know only too well, infrastructures function only within a particular range of natural variability; the system of dikes and pumping stations that keeps the ocean from reclaiming much of the Netherlands is occasionally overcome by unusual natural events. Similarly, floodplain residents across the globe regularly see their homes destroyed, only to rebuild them again. Earthquakes, tornadoes, global climate change, and other natural events represent scales of force beyond the range for which most infrastructures are, or even can be, designed. At least in the United States, these events are known as "natural disasters." Among their social effects is to bring infrastructure suddenly and painfully to our awareness. Hurricane Floyd ravaged North Carolina and other East Coast states in September 1999; headlines about its aftermath frequently focused on the hardship, suffering, and even death re~ sulting from the failure of Water and power supplies. Power failures in major U,S. cities during the summer of 1999, when demand for air conditioning soared because of "unusual" heat waves, were blamed for a number of deaths and near-deaths. California telephone books warn residents to stock a week's worth of water, food, and cooking fuel, in case earthquakes take out electric power, water supplies, and/or gas lines. The severe destruction wrought by earthquakes in Turkey and India, in which many thousands perished, brought hand wringing about building codes, an important politico-legal standard for infrastructure. This list could be expanded indefinitely. In the developed world, probably the large majority of "natural disaster"-related injuries and deaths are actually caused not directly by the natural event itself, but indirectly by its effects on infrastructures. For example, damage to roads, bridges, rails, and tunnels leads to automobile and railroad accidents; or municipal water supplies contaminated by flood waters and broken sewer mains cause disease. Flooding can result as much from shattered dams and levees, or silt buildup actually caused by flood-control systems, as from heavy rainfall. Edward Tenner calls these "revenge effects” of technology (Tenner 1996). The effects of such failures can be magnified by interdependencies among infrastructures. For example, natural cataclysms can cripple one infrastructure, such as the emergency services system, by taking out others, such as the telephone system and the roadway network. Indeed, we depend so heavily on these infrastructures that the category of "natural disaster" really refers primarily to this relationship between natural events and infrastructures. Increasingly, modem societies are confronted with the forgotten relationship between built infrastructures and the assumed background of natural forces and structures upon which the former rely. Long considered essentially static, this background is now regarded not only as naturally variable, but also as subject to alteration by human activity. Global climate change, for example, is altering the parameters within which built infrastructures must function, in ways ranging from changing agricultural conditions to an increase in the frequency of severe weather events. Because of its inherently forward-looking, long-term perspective, the insurance industry-a fundamental financial component of virtually all modern infrastructures--has begun to incorporate climate change in its analysis of vulnerabilities to "natural" disaster, espe~ cially in low-lying coastal regions. As a political issue, climate change represents the dawning awareness that geophysical scales of force must be included in any complete analysis of infrastructure. This recognition could be understood as a fundamental, and fundamentally new, feature of infrastructure in modernity.

## alternative

### alternative—critique

#### The alternative is to vote negative in favor of critique before action—we accept power as inevitable and potentially productive but only powerful analysis of domination can challenge current discourses and act as a pre-requisite to action

**Flyvbjerg and Richardson 2**—Aalborg University, Department of Development and Planning AND Department of Town and Regional Planning(Bent Flyvbjerg and Tim Richardson, “Planning and Foucault In Search of the Dark Side of Planning Theory” <http://flyvbjerg.plan.aau.dk/DarkSide2.pdf>, nkj)

3. Towards Foucault

Instead of side-stepping or seeking to remove the traces of power from planning, an alternative approach accepts power as unavoidable, recognising its all pervasive nature, and emphasising its productive as well as destructive potential. Here, theory engages squarely with policy made on a field of power struggles between different interests, where knowledge and truth are contested, and the rationality of planning is exposed as a focus of conflict. This is what Flyvbjerg has called realrationalität, or ‘real-life’ rationality (Flyvbjerg 1996), where the focus shifts from what should be done to what is actually done. This analysis embraces the idea that ‘rationality is penetrated by power’, and the dynamic between the two is critical in understanding what policy is about. It therefore becomes meaningless, or misleading - for politicians, administrators and researchers alike - to operate with a concept of rationality in which power is absent (Flyvbjerg 1998, 164-65).

Both Foucault and Habermas are political thinkers. Habermas’s thinking is well developed as concerns political ideals, but weak in its understanding of actual political processes. Foucault’s thinking, conversely, is weak with reference to generalised ideals--Foucault is a declared opponent of ideals, understood as definitive answers to Kant’s question, ‘What ought I to do?’ or Lenin’s ‘What is to be done?’--but his work reflects a sophisticated understanding of Realpolitik. Both Foucault and Habermas agree that in politics one must ‘side with reason.’ Referring to Habermas and similar thinkers, however, Foucault (1980b) warns that ‘to respect rationalism as an ideal should never constitute a blackmail to prevent the analysis of the rationalities really at work’ (Rajchman 1988, 170).

Habermas’s main complaint about Foucault is what Habermas sees as Foucault’s relativism. Thus Habermas (1987, 276) harshly dismisses Foucault’s genealogical historiographies as ‘relativistic, cryptonormative illusory science’. Such critique for relativism is correct, if by relativistic we mean unfounded in norms that can be rationally and universally grounded. Foucault’s norms are not foundationalist like Habermas’s: they are expressed in a desire to challenge ‘every abuse of power, whoever the author, whoever the victims’ (Miller 1993, 316) and in this way ‘to give new impetus, as far and wide as possible, to the undefined work of freedom’ (Foucault 1984a, 46). Foucault here is the Nietzschean democrat, for whom any form of government - liberal or totalitarian - must be subjected to analysis and critique based on a will not to be dominated, voicing concerns in public and withholding consent about anything that appears to be unacceptable. Such norms cannot be given a universal grounding independent of those people and that context, according to Foucault. Nor would such grounding be desirable, since it would entail an ethical uniformity with the kind of utopian-totalitarian implications that Foucault would warn against in any context, be it that of Marx, Rousseau or Habermas: ‘The search for a form of morality acceptable by everyone in the sense that everyone would have to submit to it, seems catastrophic to me’ (Foucault 1984c, 37 quoted in Dreyfus and Rabinow 1986, 119). In a Foucauldian interpretation, such a morality would endanger freedom, not empower it. Instead, Foucault focuses on the analysis of evils and shows restraint in matters of commitment to ideas and systems of thought about what is good for man, given the historical experience that few things have produced more suffering among humans than strong commitments to implementing utopian visions of the good.

For Foucault the socially and historically conditioned context, and not fictive universals, constitutes the most effective bulwark against relativism and nihilism, and the best basis for action. Our sociality and history, according to Foucault, is the only foundation we have, the only solid ground under our feet. And this socio-historical foundation is fully adequate.

Foucault, perhaps more than any recent philosopher, reminded us of the crucial importance of power in the shaping and control of discourses, the production of knowledge, and the social construction of spaces. His analysis of modern power has often been read by planning theorists as negative institutionalised oppression, expressed most chillingly in his analysis of the disciplinary regime of the prison in Discipline and Punish (Foucault 1979). However, it is Foucault’s explanation of power as productive and local, rather than oppressive and hierarchical, that suggests real opportunities for agency and change (McNay 1994). Whilst Foucault saw discourse as a medium which transmits and produces power, he points out that it is also ‘a hindrance, a stumbling-block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy’. So, at the same time as discourse reinforces power, it also ‘undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it’ (Foucault 1990, 101).

Foucault rarely separated knowledge from power, and the idea of ‘power/knowledge’ was of crucial importance: ‘ we should abandon a whole tradition that allows us to imagine that knowledge can exist only where the power relations are suspended and that knowledge can develop only outside its injunctions, its demands and its interests ... we should abandon the belief that power makes mad and that, by the same token, the renunciation of power is one of the conditions of knowledge. We should admit rather that power produced knowledge .. that power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge ...’ (Foucault 1979, 27). For Foucault, then, rationality was contingent, shaped by power relations, rather than context-free and objective.

According to Foucault, Habermas’s (undated, 8) ‘authorisation of power by law’ is inadequate (emphasis deleted). ‘[The juridical system] is utterly incongruous with the new methods of power,’ says Foucault (1980a, 89), ‘methods that are employed on all levels and in forms that go beyond the state and its apparatus... Our historical gradient carries us further and further away from a reign of law.’ The law, institutions - or policies and plans - provide no guarantee of freedom, equality or democracy. Not even entire institutional systems, according to Foucault, can ensure freedom, even though they are established with that purpose. Nor is freedom likely to be achieved by imposing abstract theoretical systems or ‘correct’ thinking. On the contrary, history has demonstrated--says Foucault--horrifying examples that it is precisely those social systems which have turned freedom into theoretical formulas and treated practice as social engineering, i.e., as an epistemically derived techne, that become most repressive. ‘[People] reproach me for not presenting an overall theory,’ says Foucault (1984b, 375-6), ‘I am attempting, to the contrary apart from any totalisation - which would be at once abstract and limiting - to open up problems that are as concrete and general as possible’.

What Foucault calls his ‘political task’ is ‘to criticise the working of institutions which appear to be both neutral and independent; to criticise them in such a manner that the political violence which has always exercised itself obscurely through them will be unmasked, so that one can fight them’ (Chomsky and Foucault 1974, 171). This is what, in a Foucauldian interpretation, would be seen as an effective approach to institutional change, including change in the institutions of civil society. With direct reference to Habermas, Foucault (1988, 18) adds:

‘The problem is not of trying to dissolve [relations of power] in the utopia of a perfectly transparent communication, but to give...the rules of law, the techniques of management, and also the ethics...which would allow these games of power to be played with a minimum of domination.’

Here Foucault overestimates his differences with Habermas, for Habermas also believes that the ideal speech situation cannot be established as a conventional reality in actual communication. Both thinkers see the regulation of actual relations of dominance as crucial, but whereas Habermas approaches regulation from a universalistic theory of discourse, Foucault seeks out a genealogical understanding of actual power relations in specific contexts. Foucault is thus oriented towards phronesis, whereas Habermas’s orientation is towards episteme. For Foucault praxis and freedom are derived not from universals or theories. Freedom is a practice, and its ideal is not a utopian absence of power. Resistance and struggle, in contrast to consensus, is for Foucault the most solid basis for the practice of freedom.

Whereas Habermas emphasises procedural macro politics, Foucault stresses substantive micro politics, though with the important shared feature that neither Foucault nor Habermas venture to define the actual content of political action. This is defined by the participants. Thus, both Habermas and Foucault are ‘bottom-up’ thinkers as concerns the content of politics, but where Habermas thinks in a ‘top-down’ moralist fashion as regards procedural rationality – having sketched out the procedures to be followed - Foucault is a ‘bottom-up’ thinker as regards both process and content. In this interpretation, Habermas would want to tell individuals and groups how to go about their affairs as regards procedure for discourse. He would not want, however, to say anything about the outcome of this procedure. Foucault would prescribe neither process nor outcome; he would only recommend a focus on conflict and power relations as the most effective point of departure for the fight against domination.

It is because of his double ‘bottom-up’ thinking that Foucault has been described as non-action oriented. Foucault (1981) says about such criticism, in a manner that would be pertinent to those who work in the institutional setting of planning:

It’s true that certain people, such as those who work in the institutional setting of the prison...are not likely to find advice or instructions in my books to tell them ‘what is to be done.’ But my project is precisely to bring it about that they ‘no longer know what to do,’ so that the acts, gestures, discourses that up until then had seemed to go without saying become problematic, difficult, dangerous (Miller 1993, 235).

The depiction of Foucault as non-action oriented is correct to the extent that Foucault hesitates to give directives for action, and he directly distances himself from the kinds of universal ‘What is to be done?’ formulas which characterise procedure in Habermas’s communicative rationality. Foucault believes that ‘solutions’ of this type are themselves part of the problem.

Seeing Foucault as non-action oriented would be misleading, however, insofar as Foucault’s genealogical studies are carried out only in order to show how things can be done differently to ‘separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think’ (Foucault 1984a, 45-7). Thus Foucault was openly pleased when during a revolt in some of the French prisons the prisoners in their cells read his Discipline and Punish. ‘They shouted the text to other prisoners’, Foucault told an interviewer. ‘I know it’s pretentious to say’, Foucault said, ‘but that’s a proof of a truth—a political and actual truth--which started after the book was written’ (Dillon 1980, 5). This is the type of situated action Foucault would endorse, and as a genealogist, Foucault saw himself as highly action oriented, as ‘a dealer in instruments, a recipe maker, an indicator of objectives, a cartographer, a sketcher of plans, a gunsmith’ (Ezine 1985, 14).

The establishment of a concrete genealogy opens possibilities for action by describing the genesis of a given situation and showing that this particular genesis is not connected to absolute historical necessity. Foucault’s genealogical studies of prisons, hospitals and sexuality demonstrate that social practices may always take an alternative form, even where there is no basis for voluntarism or idealism. Combined with Foucault’s focus on domination, it is easy to understand why this insight has been embraced by feminists and minority groups. Elaborating genealogies of, for instance, gender and race leads to an understanding of how relations of domination between women and men, and between different peoples, can be changed (McNay 1992, Bordo and Jaggar 1990, Fraser 1989, Benhabib and Cornell 1987).

The value of Foucault’s approach is his emphasis on the dynamics of power. **Understanding how power works is the first prerequisite for action**, because action is the exercise of power. And such an understanding can best be achieved by focusing on the concrete. Foucault can help us with a materialist understanding of Realpolitik and Realrationalität, and how these might be changed in a specific context. The problem with Foucault is that because understanding and action have their points of departure in the particular and the local, we may come to overlook more generalised conditions concerning, for example, institutions, constitutions and structural issues.

In sum, Foucault and Habermas agree that rationalisation and the misuse of power are among the most important problems of our time. They disagree as to how one can best understand and act in relation to these problems. From the perspective of the history of philosophy and political theory, the difference between Foucault and Habermas lies in the fact that Foucault works within a particularistic and contextualist tradition, with roots in Thucydides via Machiavelli to Nietzsche. Foucault is one of the more important twentieth century exponents of this tradition. Habermas is the most prominent living exponent of a universalistic and theorising tradition derived from Socrates and Plato, proceeding over Kant. In power terms, we are speaking of ‘strategic’ versus ‘constitution’ thinking, about struggle versus control, conflict versus consensus.

#### The alternative is to acknowledge that state domination exists but view it from an external perspective – every single form of resistance ruptures the system – whole-hearted rejection is vital

**Policante 10** – (Amedeo, Doctoral Candidate in Politics @ University of London, “War against Biopower – Timely Reflections on an Historicist Foucault” Theory and Event, 2010, Project Muse) SIyer

Finally, in order to break the binding gaze of biopower, it will be necessary to reinvent new ways of constituting the self, new life practices and new processes of collective individuation. We must move against the hegemonic liberal rhetoric that, in presenting a pacified world of post-political biopolitics, promotes the oblivion of 'war'. The result of this rhetoric, in fact, is to force on our eyes a complete blindness toward the systemic violence that is perpetuated everyday by the 'normal' working of global institutions. We are made into 'fearful subjects': terrorized by outbursts of subjective violence that we can no longer understand, incapable to see the complex interplay of force-relations that operate under the blood stained surface we came to call 'peace'. We are continuously tempted to call up the forces of the state to protect our belongings from the looming terrorist catastrophe, while we no longer see that the fact that "things just go on is the catastrophe"54. Historicism, with its emphasis on the praxis of struggle, brings forward a new radical subject, identified by Foucault in the figure of the barbarian: 'the one who does not obey'—the one who does not obey an historical or dialectical destiny but rather affirms herself in the haphazard character of struggle. The one who does not obey a Truth but rather discovers herself looking through the deceptions of domination and the lies of peace; who strips down the mask of the "fearful savage" and re-emerges from the Leviathan's intestines holding in her gaze the contingent truth of her body signed, bruised, written by power. The one who does not obey the Law, against whose pretence to universality deploys the weapon of her scarred body, the contingency of her truth. And, especially, who does not obey the totalizing power of a biopolitical state obsessed with life, to which she opposes an openness to the radical difference of living and the haphazard contingency of her own death.

It is in this simple act of exposure that the event reveals itself. Every time we reclaim the streets with the scream of our bodies, every time we refuse the pastoral gaze of a CCTV camera and the medical injunction of the state, every time we flee the sanitized walls of the polis to encounter the unsaid in the streets of transgression, every time we compel what has never happened and make appear what is unseen; **every time, these essential acts of recognition, these moments of exceptional crisis, force us to glimpse, amidst the flames, the secret texture of the sovereign's palace, the intensity of the struggle that keeps it erected and that constantly escapes it**. Biopolitics is nothing but the oblivion of war. It must always remove from sight the irreducibility of struggle and negate the systemic violence that sustains its working: the contingent deaths in the bloody battle to erect and maintain contemporary institutions. While violence is projected on the background of an imagined peace, normality is reduced to a harmonic stasis, continuously interrupted by sudden outbursts of inexplicable violence. Seen from the perspective of biopower, those who die in time of peace can only be 'fatalities', victims of a random, unjustifiable, and yet fully natural - in the sense that is not inscribed in any wider political framework - violence. **We must affirm, instead, that domination and resistance exist, always at once, but can only be seen from below: "only the fact of being on one side makes it possible to interpret the truth, to denounce the illusions and errors that are being used to make you believe we are in a world in which order and peace have been restored"55.** It is this Foucault that talks through us, when we read out loud: "The bullet that pierced Alexis' heart was not a random bullet, shot from a mad cop's gun to the body of an indocile kid. It was the usual working of the state, violently imposing submission and order to the multitude of milieus and movements that continue to resist its arrangement"56.

### solvency—planning/ generic

**The alternative is key to proper planning—status quo approaches to planning theory are mired in oppressive modernities**

**Flyvbjerg and Richardson 2**—Aalborg University, Department of Development and Planning AND Department of Town and Regional Planning(Bent Flyvbjerg and Tim Richardson, “Planning and Foucault In Search of the Dark Side of Planning Theory” <http://flyvbjerg.plan.aau.dk/DarkSide2.pdf>, nkj)

7. Conclusions: take a walk on the dark side.

Planning theorists (and other modernist thinkers) have tended to disregard Foucault’s work as being oppressive. His talk of the all-pervasiveness of power has been seen as crushing the life out of any possibility of empowerment, of change, of hope. Yet this analysis seems to be based on a superficial reading of parts of Foucault’s major works, such as Discipline and Punish, rather than an attempt to understand his overall project. Foucault’s theory of power is exactly not about oppressiveness, of accepting the regimes of domination which condition us, it is about using tools of analysis to understand power, its relations with rationality and knowledge, and use the resulting insights precisely to bring about change.

When it comes to portraying planners and planning, the quest of planning theorists could be called the escape from power. But if there is one thing we should have learned today from students of power, it is that there is no escape from it.

We wish to stress that the modern normative attitude - an attitude that has been dominant in planning theory throughout the history of this discipline - does not serve modernity, or planning theory, well. The ideals of modernity, democracy and planning - ideals that typically are worth fighting for - are better served by understanding Realrationalität than normative rationality. Normative rationality may provide an ideal to strive for, but it is a poor guide to the strategies23 and tactics needed for moving toward to the ideal. This, in our analysis, is the quandary of normative idealists, including the majority of planning theorists: they know where they would like to go but not how to get there.

The focus of modernity and of planning theory is on ‘what should be done’. We suggest a reorientation toward ‘what is actually done - towards verita effettuale. In this way we may gain a better grasp - less idealistic, more grounded - of what planning is and what the strategies and tactics that may help change it for the better.

Foucauldian analysis, unlike Habermasian normativism, offers a type of planning theory which is more useful in understanding how planning is actually done, and offers better prospects for those interested in bringing about democratic social change through planning.

Habermas, among others, views conflict in society as dangerous, corrosive and potentially destructive of social order, and therefore in need of being contained and resolved. In a Foucauldian interpretation, conversely, suppressing conflict is suppressing freedom, because the privilege to engage in conflict is part of freedom.

The Foucauldian challenge applies to theory too: perhaps social and political theories that ignore or marginalise conflict are potentially oppressive. And if conflict sustains society, there is good reason to caution against an idealism that ignores conflict and power. In real social and political life self-interest and conflict will not give way to some all-embracing communal ideal like Habermas’s. Indeed, the more democratic a society, the more it allows groups to define their own specific ways of life and legitimates the inevitable conflicts of interest that arise between them. Political consensus can never be brought to bear in a manner that neutralises particular group obligations, commitments and interests. A more differentiated conception of political culture than Habermas’s is needed, one that will be more tolerant of conflict and difference, and more compatible with the pluralisation of interests.24

A strong democracy guarantees the existence of conflict. A strong understanding of democracy, and of the role of planning within it, must therefore be based on thought that places conflict and power at its centre, as Foucault does and Habermas does not. We suggest that an understanding of planning that is practical, committed and ready for conflict provides a superior paradigm to planning theory than an understanding that is discursive, detached and consensus-dependent.

Exploring the dark side of planning theory offers more than a negative, oppressive confirmation of our inability to make a difference. It suggests that we can do planning in a constructive empowering way, but that we cannot do this by avoiding power relations. Planning is inescapably about conflict: exploring conflicts in planning, and learning to work effectively with conflict can be the basis for a strong planning paradigm.

### solvency—infra/ transport security

#### Only the alternative solves—we must question every aspect of transport security

**Adey, 09** – lecturer in cultural geography at Keele University (Peter, “Facing airport security: affect, biopolitics, and the preemptive securitisation of the mobile body,” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 2009, volume 27, pages 274-295, 2/23/2009)//HK

6 Conclusion In this conclusion, I now end with some further possibilities for consideration. Firstly, we must question what these techniques actually imply for privacy and personal freedoms. The sense that behaviour detection enables one to look within has been described as a process of considerable intrusion. Kathryn Hughes, a journalist writing for The Guardian, states that, ``This prospect is so chilling precisely because, in a world where we have all but ceded our bodies to the public domain, our interior lives are the one piece of ourselves over which we retain sovereignty'' (2005). For others, it is not really an issue of looking within uninvited, but almost an issue of being stolen from forced to give away information without consent. As Matsumoto writes, there is no fifth amendment, ``We're talking about feelings we don't want others to know in the first place'' (cited in Frank, 2007). Therefore, we must question, as Bell puts it, how the alignment of security with the life of a population itself has created an, ``arsenal of surveillance strategies'', how the ever-increasing creep of this `life information' can prove markedly ``inconsistent with substantive democratic principles of equality and freedom'' (2006, page 163). Secondly, we might consider how the techniques described begin to alter the acceptance of faces and bodies in public spaces and everyday life. What, for instance, would it mean to be always conscious about how your face is being read, which emotions are let go, how one can try to contain one's feelings? Moreover, this poses a problem of truth, or the ``swindle'' for Emmanuel Le¨vinas (1969, page 202). How can one believe the facial gestures and body languages one sees and interprets, what sort of `vigilant visualities' (Amoore, 2007) are we starting to witness? Finally, and perhaps most importantly, scholarship should go further to examine the other spheres where behaviour detection methods are being placed and, in all these contexts, their intended and unintended consequences for the embodied `quality of life' issues of those they are composed. In some instances, behavioural detection is deployed with capacities for progressively even more potent discrimination. Whilst behaviour detection supposedly overcomes racial profiling, Joseph Pugliese details the discriminatory assumptions evident within the racialised kinesiology that led to the shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes on the London underground. As Pugliese 290 P Adey (2006) describes, de Menezes's `kinetic repertoire' was interpreted according to a `racialised regime of visuality', where: ``his ambulatory movements and his gestures are scripted in terms of the suspicious movements of the figure of the Orientalist terrorist: the kinesiology of breaking into flight in order to catch a train preparing to depart only serves to confirm his latent criminal intentions.'' In this light, how such techniques go wrong, and are misapplied and disabused, should remain a most important consideration. Just because we are told that behavioural detection apparently overcomes racial profiling does not mean that it does. The harassment and threat of arrest to King Downing, the National Coordinator of the American Civil Liberties Union's Campaign Against Racial Profiling, by law enforcement officers at Boston's Logan airport in 2003 after talking on his mobile phone may have resulted from the enaction of Pugilese's `racialised regime'. Questions surrounding whether the methods of the detection of `hostile intent' actually work should also be considered further, a fact admitted by the TSA, who have claimed that behavioural detection has proved particularly useful for discovering passengers wanted with outstanding convictions or warrants for arrest, or carrying drugs, weapons, and other contraband. People who are not actually terrorists have been caught far more frequently. Finally, changes to the futures and `life chances' of those marked as suspicious or potentially dangerous should receive further scrutiny given the steadily increasing bureaucratic and managerial systems that may dog their potential movements witnessed in the experience of earlier passenger profiling and `no-fly' watch lists.

#### The alternative is to interrogate the relevance of critical infrastructure to the State – that’s key to understanding the way transportation shapes politics.

**Cavelty and Kristensen 08** (Myriam D, Kristian S., “Securing the Homeland: Critical Infrastructure, Risk, and (in)Security,” <http://ethz.academia.edu/MyriamCavelty/Books/450274/Securing_the_Homeland_Critical_Infrastructure_Risk_and_In_Security)//aberg>λ

\*CIP = Critical Infrastructure Protection

While tracking the emergence of the CIP apparatus is important for understand-ing the origins and the current shape of the topic, it is also important to see that current fears exist within a far more complex, technologically dominated polity than the one in which the ideas ﬁrst emerged. The complex interdependence of liberal (risk) societies and their growing technological sophistication have transnationalised and technologised the types of security problems that they face. We seem be witnessing scalar changes moving in opposite directions: the power to resist vulnerability moves outwards to international markets and inter-national organisations while the power to cause vulnerability moves inwards ,through classes and groups to the individual. And ﬁnally, the information revolution as a deﬁning moment changed the overall scope, aim and shape of CIP when it led to the displacement of the material, in favour of the virtual, as the object of control. As Myriam Dunn Cavelty shows in Chapter 2, a growing concern within formation security in the 1980s and 1990s found a technical vocabulary, a set of analytical tools and practices of intervention in a longstanding mode of think-ing about infrastructures as a security problem. By analysing how CIP is expressed by US security policy elites in terms of threat frames (interpretive schemes about what counts as threat or risk, how to respond to this threat, and who or what is responsible for it), the chapter shows how the information revolution is responsible for transforming the issue into a topic of high saliency. With the growth and spreading of computer networks into more and more aspects of life, the object of protection changed. Whereas it had previously con-sisted of limited government networks, it now encompassed the whole of society. In this environment, the threat image of the cyber-terrorist emerges as the ultimate catastrophic threat, as Maura Conway shows in Chapter 5. Through the globalised media, a threat image combining fear of technology with fear of terrorism is spread ad absurdum , leading to what Jean Baudrillard has coined ‘hyperreality’: a ‘reality by proxy’ and endless reproductions of fundamentally empty semantic shells and meanings. Fortunately, the exaggerated representa-tion of the catastrophic accident in cyberspace, Conway argues (following François Debrix), means that any real cyber-terrorist attack that might occur is highly unlikely to live up to the simulated scenarios, and will thus not mobilise fear in a substantive way. For Philippe Bonditti (Chapter 6), the reciprocal relationship between information networks and terrorism, which is also seen as networked, has led to a multilevel transformation of the US agencies of surveillance and control. As Bonditti argues, computer systems are becoming the crucial tool through which the state aims to protect territories and populations from networked terrorist cells. For this reason, cyberspace must be protected ﬁrst, which establishes a hierarchical relation between the security of ‘the homeland’ and that of cyber-space, ‘the security of the latter becoming the condition of security of the ﬁrst’. Virtual networks become the ultimate critical infrastructure for securing society. The information revolution as a deﬁning moment is also addressed by James der Derian and Jesse Finkelstein in Chapter 4. As the information infrastructure emerges as an intermediary between physical assets and physical infrastructure, CIP is being viewed less as a problem of protecting physical resources, and is instead becoming an information problem. In other words, CIP is increasingly about producing and protecting knowledge – and the private sector has become crucial in refashioning the conception of CIP. In Der Derian and Finkelstein’s view, the interweaving of the public and private sectors ‘marks the difference between biopower in the post-disciplinary society and biopower in the control society’. Likewise, biopolitics have evolved to the point where it is not the body of the state that needs to be secured, ‘but the conjoined body of public and private sector networks’. In the conclusion, Julian Reid expands this point even further, focusing on ‘the deliberate targeting of the human life that inhabits crit-ical infrastructures with increasingly invasive techniques of governance’ that the provision of such infrastructure protection requires.

### solvency—environment

#### Testing the aff’s biopolitical methodology is a prerequisite to analyzing its effects on the environment

Funke, 11 - Chief, Information Access Branch, Office of Pollution Prevention and Toxics of the EPA (Odelia, “The role of biopolitics in environmental security analysis,” Politics and the Life Sciences, 30(1):71-76, 2011, http://www.bioone.org/doi/full/10.2990/30\_1\_71)//HK

The role of biopolitics in environmental security Biopolitics provides a key perspective for assessing the various aspects of environmental security. Research on policy matters related to the life sciences sheds light on core factors that are often neglected or whose political importance is not fully appreciated, and provides a factual counterweight to politically motivated assertions that may often be based on false assumptions. The question is: can we identify and develop strategies for pursuing more environmentally sustainable relationships among nations and between humans and the natural world? Knowledge and understanding of the life sciences are key to identifying the best ways to assess, and perhaps alter, impacts. We need to pay greater attention to how biology and ecology operate and interact, and how this should inform policy decisions. Rather than the typical economic analysis heavily emphasizing monetized costs and benefits, and focusing on short-term costs over both nonmonetized benefits and long-term benefits, policy analysts should give greater weight to effects on natural systems. Assessments should consider renewable versus nonrenewable resources, system-wide and long-term effects of resource use and resource depletion, particularly nonmonetary impacts, and effects on populations and other nations. Thayer outlines a broad set of contributions for security analysis, based on studies of human behavior, ethnic ties, and biological factors underlying terrorist behavior, to which biopolitics can contribute.5 The importance of biopolitical perspectives is increasing as challenges related to advances in the life sciences expand in number and complexity. Based on a more accurate understanding of our planet’s natural systems, including the role of humans in them, social scientists might do a better job of defining looming challenges facing national and global communities, persuading others of their relative importance and finding workable solutions. Improved policy analysis is a prerequisite to adopting policies that take into account ecosystem impacts, as well as long-term impacts affecting future generations. Sustainability requires policy options that define a feasible range of alternatives given biological and ecological limits, as well as political and cultural realities. Fostering accountability among leaders demands that a broad array of researchers and policy makers understand these complex and intertwined issues.

### at: habermas

#### Habermas’s ethics fail—they ignore how power relations shape social reality

**Flyvbjerg and Richardson 2**—Aalborg University, Department of Development and Planning AND Department of Town and Regional Planning(Bent Flyvbjerg and Tim Richardson, “Planning and Foucault In Search of the Dark Side of Planning Theory” <http://flyvbjerg.plan.aau.dk/DarkSide2.pdf>, nkj)

2. The Habermasian leap of faith - a weak basis for planning theory

We do not seek to summarise Habermas’s work here, or to carry out an exhaustive critique. Instead, we engage with the treatment of power in Habermas’s theories of discourse ethics and communicative rationality, which provide the theoretical cornerstones to the communicative planning movement. Habermas’s utopian world is oriented towards an ideal speech situation where validity claims are based on consensus amongst equal participants, and the negative, distorting effects of power are removed. Friedmann compared this ideal of a ‘perfect polity’ to a graduate university seminar (Friedmann 1987, 267).

Habermas’s definitions of discourse ethics and communicative rationality, and their procedural requirements (Habermas 1979, 1983, 1985, 1990) are based on a procedural as opposed to substantive rationality: ‘Discourse ethics ... establishes a procedure based on presuppositions and designed to guarantee the impartiality of the process of judging’ (Habermas 1990, 122). Habermas is a universalistic, ‘top-down’ moralist as concerns process: the rules for correct process are normatively given in advance, in the form of the requirements for the ideal speech situation. Conversely, as regards content, Habermas is a ‘bottom-up’ situationalist: what is right and true in a given communicative process is determined solely by the participants in that process.

Habermas operates within a perspective of law and sovereignty which contrasts with that of Foucault (1980a, 87-8) who finds this conception of power ‘by no means adequate.’ Foucault (1980a, 82,90) says about his own ‘analytics of power’ that it ‘can be constituted only if it frees itself completely from [this] representation of power that I would term...‘juridico-discursive’...a certain image of power-law, of power-sovereignty.’ It is in this connection that Foucault (1980a, 89) made his famous argument to ‘cut off the head of the king’ in political analysis and replace it by a decentred understanding of power. For Habermas the head of the king is still very much on, in the sense that sovereignty is a prerequisite for the regulation of power by law.

The basic weakness of Habermas’s project is its lack of agreement between ideal and reality, between intentions and their implementation, and is rooted in an insufficient conception of power. Habermas himself observes that discourse cannot by itself insure that the conditions for discourse ethics and democracy are met. But discourse about discourse ethics is all Habermas has to offer. This is the fundamental political dilemma in Habermas’s thinking: he describes to us the utopia of communicative rationality but not how to get there. Habermas (1990, 209) himself mentions lack of ‘crucial institutions,’ lack of ‘crucial socialisation’ and ‘poverty, abuse, and degradation’ as barriers to discursive decision making. But he has little to say about the relations of power that create these barriers and how power may be changed in order to begin the kinds of institutional and educational change, improvements in welfare, and enforcement of basic human rights that could help lower the barriers. In short, Habermas lacks the kind of concrete understanding of relations of power that is needed for political change.

Habermas (1987, 322) tells us he is aware that his theory of communicative action opens him to criticism as an idealist: ‘It is not so simple to counter the suspicion that with the concept of action oriented to validity claims, the idealism of a pure, nonsituated reason slips in again.’ We would argue further that not only is it difficult to counter this suspicion, it is impossible. And this impossibility constitutes a fundamental problem in Habermas’s work.

‘There is a point in every philosophy,’ writes Nietzsche (1966, 15[§8]), ‘when the philosopher’s ‘conviction’ appears on the stage.’ For Habermas that point is the foundation of his ideal speech situation and universal validity claims upon a Kirkegaardian ‘leap of faith.’ Habermas, as mentioned, states that consensus-seeking and freedom from domination are universally inherent as forces in human conversation, and he emphasises these particular aspects. Other important philosophers and social thinkers have tended to emphasise the exact opposite. Machiavelli (1984, 96) states: ‘One can make this generalisation about men: they are ungrateful, fickle, liars, and deceivers.’ Less radically, but still in contrast to Habermas, are statements by Nietzsche, Foucault, Derrida and many others that communication is at all times already penetrated by power: ‘power is always present,’ says Foucault (1988, 11,18). It is therefore meaningless, according to these thinkers, to operate with a concept of communication in which power is absent.

For students of power, communication is more typically characterised by non-rational rhetoric and maintenance of interests than by freedom from domination and consensus-seeking. In rhetoric, ‘validity’ is established via the mode of communication--e.g., eloquence, hidden control, rationalisation, charisma, using dependency relations between participants--rather than through rational arguments concerning the matter at hand. Seen from this perspective Habermas (1987, 297-8) seems overly naive and idealistic when he contrasts ‘successful’ with ‘distorted’ utterance in human conversation, because success in rhetoric is associated precisely with distortion.

#### Habermasian communication fails—incorporating a power-centric planning theory is more effective

**Flyvbjerg and Richardson 2**—Aalborg University, Department of Development and Planning AND Department of Town and Regional Planning(Bent Flyvbjerg and Tim Richardson, “Planning and Foucault In Search of the Dark Side of Planning Theory” <http://flyvbjerg.plan.aau.dk/DarkSide2.pdf>, nkj)

Habermas does not provide a detailed vocabulary of power, or a theory of its workings, which might facilitate the close understanding of how power shapes policy making and implementation, and rationality itself. Healey recognises the risk that the focus on the analysis of communicative acts 'could render the researcher myopic to the power relations among planners, municipal councils and clients' (Healey 1992, 10). She, like others, addresses the problem by emphasising the permeation of power into communication: 'Communicative acts contain assumptions and metaphors, which by conveying meaning, affect what people do. These assumptions and meanings may carry power relationships or structure within them. In turn, the way communicative acts are created and used help sustain or challenge power structures' (1992, 10). This argument seems to acknowledge the importance of an understanding of power, but then turns away from it, towards a preoccupation with the mechanics and dynamics of communication.

This power blindness is keenly recognised by Hillier, who like Healey seeks to resolve matters by combining Foucauldian power awareness with Habermasian communicative rationality (Hillier 1993). Her aim is to create the idealised Habermasian planning arena, where 'rational debate and negotiation are possible between proponents of different truths, tellers of different stories.... The idea is to pre-empt conflict through negotiated agreement rather than entrenching it' (Hillier19 1993, 108) It seems that the point of linking Foucault and Habermas is again to remove the effects of negative power on the planning process. Yet Hillier's aim, like Healey's is the empowerment of disadvantaged interests, which surely requires an acknowledgment of power relations, and the possibility of power being used in a 'positive' way. Ultimately, it is not clear how the 'actualisation of Habermasian communicative action' (Hillier, 1993), which appears to depend on removing power from the gaze of planners and theorists, is to be achieved.

So Habermas neither provides an achievable model for planning, nor does he explain planning as it is actually done, to the exasperation of many practitioners. He therefore fails to provide guidance for those involved in bringing about change - he does not describe a world they inhabit. We see two dilemmas here for the communicative paradigm. Firstly, why ground a planning paradigm in theory which is in turn grounded in an idealism that even Habermas, together with the proponents of his paradigm, accept as unattainable? Power-free critical debate is set up as the essence of what planning ought to be, when no planner has yet had the good fortune to work in such conditions. Nor are they likely to. Secondly, how can this theory help planners understand the full richness of what happens in real life planning, when they are restricted to a vocabulary of communication, which conditions the thoughts of planning analysts?

Nevertheless, the rhetoric of communicative rationality is reproduced in a burgeoning of interest in, variously, communicative, collaborative, consensus-seeking analysis and normative theorising which is beginning to be translated into new models of practice. The outcome of the new consensus-based approaches to planning remains to be seen, particularly when applied to bitterly fought disputes, with which planning is well supplied.

Michel Foucault presents an alternative theoretical approach which deliberately focuses on ‘what is actually done’ and embraces the centrality of power. Additionally, the spatiality of Foucault's work opens up the possibility of developing a planning theory which understands how power and space are closely bound up in planning. The Foucauldian approach problematises existing planning20 tools and processes, suggesting the need for a power-sensitised understanding of the nature of knowledge, rationality, spatiality, and inclusivity in planning theory.

Communicative theory, unsurprisingly, tends to focus on communicative elements of planning. This focus risks overemphasising the importance of key communicative events in planning, such as public meetings, whilst failing to capture the importance of non-communicative processes and actions. Communication is part of politics, but much of politics takes place outside communication. The reorientation from Habermasian towards Foucauldian planning theory - or planning analytics - would involve detailed genealogies of actual planning in different contexts, of the type we have mentioned above, which would allow a re-imagination of planning in the light of conflict. Foucault takes us towards a different kind of empirical work. Many of the methods are familiar to social researchers, but there are important differences in the overall approach: - the researcher is equipped with a language and theoretical analysis of power and its techniques and strategies which guides the researcher through the studies; - research is based on richly contextualised, detailed case studies; - the relations between power and rationality are a central focus; - the focus moves beyond communicative events; - the language is of conflict rather than communication. Planning processes and events are written as the playing out of strategies and conflicts rather than debates or arguments. Lastly, there is no assumption of the key role of the planner as the facilitator of a rational, communicative process. This can be the role of some planners, but others, clearly, choose to work in other ways.

Even in the analysis of communicative events, a language and analytics of power is required, if the non-communicative effects on communication are to be understood.

### at: perm

#### The perm fails—they aff cannot just insert power into their methodology and expect success—pure alt framing is critical

**Flyvbjerg and Richardson 2**—Aalborg University, Department of Development and Planning AND Department of Town and Regional Planning(Bent Flyvbjerg and Tim Richardson, “Planning and Foucault In Search of the Dark Side of Planning Theory” <http://flyvbjerg.plan.aau.dk/DarkSide2.pdf>, nkj)

Abstract

In this paper we argue that the use of the communicative theory of Jürgen Habermas in planning theory is problematic because it hampers an understanding of how power shapes planning. We posit an alternative approach based on the power analytics of Michel Foucault which focuses on ‘what is actually done’, as opposed to Habermas’s focus on ‘what should be done’. We discuss how the Foucauldian stance problematises planning, asking difficult questions about the treatment of legitimacy, rationality, knowledge and spatiality. We conclude that Foucault offers a type of analytic planning theory which offers better prospects than does Habermas for those interested in understanding and bringing about democratic social change through planning

1. Introduction

Power has become an inevitable question for planning theorists. John Friedmann, reflecting on the progress of theory to date, identifies theorists’ ambivalence about power as one of the biggest outstanding problems in theorising planning (Friedmann 1997). He urges theorists to build relations of power into their conceptual frameworks.

But to bring power more closely into planning theory, we need to consider carefully what is meant by ‘power’, a concept which has long been the subject of philosophical discourse. **For power cannot be simply bolted on to existing planning theory**. What lies ahead is what John Friedmann has called ‘the long trek’ of integrating discourses on power with the ‘still sanitised multiple discourses of planning theory’ (Friedmann 1997). We believe that along the way, emerging theoretical work will be subjected to difficult challenges about power. Power may become the acid test of planning theory.

In this paper we take a few short steps of this long trek, and find our progress blocked by an unresolved difficulty with one such emerging body of theory. We encounter an emerging paradigm which asserts a new, Habermasian communicative rationality for planning (e.g. Innes 1995), which is just beginning to be subjected to sustained critique on its treatment of power (e.g. Huxley 1998, Huxley and Yiftachel 1998).

Some planning theorists may feel they have already explored this route, and that the obstacles to a Habermasian paradigm have been removed. We disagree. In this paper, we argue that treatment of power in communicative theory is compromised by the nature of the theory itself.

We suggest that further progress towards the integration of power can benefit from the work of Michel Foucault, an oeuvre which has been cited already by many planning theorists. We will argue that Foucault’s work holds more promise, and is more relevant to planning theory than seems to have been generally recognised.

The paper pursues its arguments by exploring some of the vexed differences between Habermas and Foucault. We attempt to show that Foucauldian theory is not what has been described as a ‘single minded preoccupation with the politics of coercion’ (Friedmann 1997), but a sustained analytics of power and rationality which we can use in productive ways to support the empowerment of civil society. This productive interpretation of Foucault’s work appears to have been missed, or dismissed, which has facilitated the rejection of his theories in relation to planning.

The position we are attempting to establish is that communicative planning theory fails to capture the role of power in planning. As a result, it is a theory which is weak in its capacity to help us understand what happens in the real world; and weak in serving as a basis for effective action and change. Because of these weaknesses, we believe that this approach to theory building is highly problematic for planning.

**Some theorists might contend that ‘using’ Foucault, they have repaired the weaknesses in communicative theory which are exposed by juxtaposition with Foucault’s work**. We believe, however, that **this cannot be done convincingly**. More importantly we are concerned that, in spite of regular reference to Foucault in planning theory literature, there has not so far been a cogent exploration of the full import of his work for planning. In turning to Foucault’s work, we argue that Foucauldian planning theory addresses exactly the weaknesses in the communicative paradigm, and makes effective understanding (verita effettuale, in Machiavelli's words; Wirkliche Historie in Nietzsche's and Foucault's) and effective action possible, something planners and planning theorists have typically said they want. It requires a turn towards the dark side of planning theory - the domain of power - which has been occasionally explored by planning theorists (e.g. Yiftachel 1994, Flyvbjerg 1996, Roweis 1983, Marcuse 1976) but has been avoided by many others who see only oppression and coercion where power operates.

## framework

### technical perspective bad/ epist

#### Infrastructure is not a physical entity but an interpretation of systematic relations—the 1ac’s approach to the technical and economic effects of infrastructure decontextualized knowledge, turning the case and creating spatial hierarchies

**Neluheni, 01** – Professor of Urban Transportation Studies at the University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee (Malindi, “Changing Identities in Transportation: Definition and Measurement of Cultural Exclusion in Innovative Design,” http://www.msas.maliwatch.org/msas2002/pdf/msas\_pp048\_56.pdf)//HK

4.3. Eliminating technological dependency

Certainly neither Engineering as a broader field of study nor Transportation as a subsection of Engineering does address the question of culture and community values on public transportation buildings. Most recent studies on evaluation of infrastructure construction have traditionally been conceptualized within engineering and economic perspectives. These studies bring the debates primarily in a framework of western, market economies and not in relation to the perspective of socio-cultural groups that comprise the user populations. One reason for this has been the lack of techniques by which different socio cultural perspectives are integrated into a coherent framework to explain developing communities’ relationships with infrastructure construction.

Space creating mechanisms are based on human will, which is independent on patterns that spaces offer. Spatial conditions that reinforce social status and hierarchy within traditional communities, but are ignored by practice within the professional engineering appear to find their expression in infrastructure utility, with context and meaning transposed to serve the need of the user at a specific time. Generic processes of spatial configurations and their relations have outlined geometric regularity determining movement patterns of people, Hillier et al (1996), Hillier (2000). Infrastructure is thus, not a definite entity, but an interpretation of a system of relations between objects, resources, movements and effects, that together achieve a strategic derivative conceptualization to allow for the context of its use. Several problems and issues in implementing socio-cultural issues of infrastructure have been discussed. Kent (1984, 1991), Pader (1988, 1993), Rapoport (1993), and other anthropologically focused authors. They provide an understanding of culture through descriptions of activities and the relationship of people to recurrent everyday activities, people to people, and people and activities to physical elements in the environment. They conceptualize physical environments based on what motivates people in the person-environment relationship. Efficiency of design is also concerned with people's emotional responses and feelings of satisfaction or dissatisfaction when using or occupying such facilities. However, evaluation of appropriate design cannot be directly quantified outside of people’s cultural and social connections to their physical environment. This suggests the need to examine connections between space, their associated meaning and value within social context of user groups.

#### Power relations control all of their impact scenarios—only our critical analysis can ensure that its effects are positive

**Richardson, 01 –** professor of urban theory at Aalborg University in Denmark (Tim, “The Pendulum Swings Again: In Search of New Transport Rationalities,” The Town Planning Review, Vol. 72, No. 3, pp. 299-319, July 2001, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40112456)//HK

Foucauldian discourse: interrogating rationality; embracing power and knowledge To review Foucault's work and to discuss its broader relevance to policy studies is beyond the scope of this paper.2 Here I will simply outline how Foucault's critical inquiries into discourse, power, rationality and space provide a potentially powerful conceptual approach to the analysis of transport policy. Traditionally, the theoretical domain of transportation so far as it can be said to exist has been largely dominated by the use of economic, technical and behavioural analysis, with relatively sparse attention to the broader canvas of politics and power relations upon which decisions and policies are made. There have been few attempts, in transport thought, to close the gap between the technocentrism of operational theory and the socio-political realities of everyday life. Yet this tension between the calm spaces of rational, scientific policy making, and the messy, turbulent world of politics and power has pervaded broader debates in public policy. Since Lindblom, in the 1950s, defined political rationality (Lindblom, 1959), theorists have sought alternatively to avoid, mitigate, or accept the problematisation of policy with power. The modernist tendency, seen in the domain of transport, has been to sidestep the problem, maintaining a claim to value-free objectivity, and constantly refining scientific and economic instruments to shape and deliver policy. The neo-liberal assertion of the critical role of market forces in shaping policy (Healey, 1997), and the resurgence of technical and scientific analysis typified by the development of new approaches to environmental planning (Wong, 1998) represent the two prongs of this instrumental rationality. An emerging body of theory which attempts to break free from instrumentalism instead posits policy making as argumentation, and focuses on communicative rationality (Fischer and Forester, 1993; Innes, 1995; Healey, 1997). In the communicative approach knowledge is negotiated in policy making, and ways of thinking, valuing and acting are 'actively constructed by participants' (Healey, 1997, 29). Power is acknowledged, but regarded as a negative, distorting influence whose effects can be removed by constructing an idealised debate, where all participants have equal status, and where it is the rationality of argumentation that prevails.3 Instead of sidestepping or seeking to remove the traces of power from policy making, the Foucauldian approach recognises the all-pervasive nature of power, emphasising its productive as well as destructive potential.4 Here, theory engages squarely with policy constructed in a field of power struggles between different interests, where knowledge and truth are contested, and the rationality of policy making itself is exposed as a focus of conflict. This is what Flyvbjerg has called 'realrationalitat', or 'real-life' rationality (Flyvbjerg, 1996), where the focus shifts from what should be done to what is actually done. This analysis embraces the idea that 'rationality is penetrated by power', and the dynamic between the two is critical in understanding what policy is about. It therefore 'becomes meaningless, or misleading - for politicians, administrators and researchers alike - to operate with a concept of rationality in which power is absent' (Flyvbjerg, 1998, 164-65).

### at: empiricism

#### Their “data” and “empirics” are just another example of current transportation methodologies’ biggest flaws—only rethinking our underlying assumptions can lead to true knowledge

**Richardson, 01 –** professor of urban theory at Aalborg University in Denmark (Tim, “The Pendulum Swings Again: In Search of New Transport Rationalities,” The Town Planning Review, Vol. 72, No. 3, pp. 299-319, July 2001, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40112456)//HK

The Foucauldian perspective suggests that assertions of a common, universally accepted transport policy discourse are likely to mask serious conflicts and inconsistencies which arise partly from the conflicts between these broader discourses. In fact, such assertions may well be tactical ploys to promote particular interests above others. Furthermore, the increasingly fragmented nature of transport policy making means that these competing discourses are being variously advocated, planned for, or resisted, by governmental institutions as well as by fluctuating coalitions of actors from the public, private and voluntary sectors and citizens. New realism, old rationality To develop this argument further, it is helpful to examine the fine grain of policy making where new thinking may (or may not) be translated into new ways of conceptualising and analysing transport problems, and new policy practices may become embedded. Part of this process of institutionalising a new discourse is the construction of a new rationality, grounded in new tools of policy analysis and the critical review of old ones. This process will be shaped as much by 310 TIM RICHARDSON power struggles over the construction of knowledge as by technical innovation or academic logic. It is likely to be shaped by struggles between opposing discourses, incompatible political priorities and competing interests. However, much of the work being done on tools has tended to focus on the refinement of traditional methods to cope with new circumstances, continuing a reliance on quantitative, technical approaches without considering the broader concerns identified above. The trend is towards computerised, data hungry methods, which in many cases are likely to be impractical at the local level because of their expense and technical complexity.7 The function of tools in policy processes is to create the knowledge which informs policy making. Data are obtained in many different ways and are then sifted and processed as raw information is transformed into 'knowledge'. It is appropriate, then, to examine what forms of knowledge are being created in transport policy processes. The use of technical analysis, which characterises much of transport policy, generally produces 'expert knowledge' which needs to be interpreted by professionals if it is to be made accessible to a wider audience. The techniques of cost-benefit analysis and environmental impact assessment are good examples of this. This raises two questions - how are the values and assumptions in expert knowledge recognised and accounted for; and what place is there for other types of knowledge in policy making? Wynne has argued that the public has a right to debate the values and assumptions used in objective methods, and that their 'vernacular' or lay knowledge needs to be listened to (Wynne, 1996, 59). The methods of the new realism, in their continued reliance on instrumental rationality, seem to exclude such lay knowledge systematically and set limits to what may be debated. If analytical tools clearly have a part to play in institutionalising and legitimising transport policy, then we should expect a dramatic policy turn to be accompanied by a rethinking of traditional ways of studying and representing transport conditions and problems. Indeed, Goodwin has argued that achieving the objectives of the new realism relies on correcting some of the mistakes of past practice, which include 'unrealistic policy assumptions, and inappropriate understandings and methods of analysis' (Goodwin, 1996a, 21). Yet Goodwin continues by arguing that the tools have not kept pace with the demands created by new policy objectives:

### discourse first

#### Discourse comes first—its social and cultural aspects shape all interactions with transportation infrastructure

**Vick, 06** – professor of education at James Cook University (Melissa, “Poststructuralist Theory and Methodology: A Complementary Approach to Road Safety Research,” Australasian Road Safety Research, Policing & Education Conference, October 25, 2006, http://eprints.jcu.edu.au/4253/)//HK

The second broad area of research of interest to road safety is what is broadly understood in road safety research as ‘human factors’. In contrast to much of both sociological and psychological research and theory, which takes the individual as the fundamental social category, the focus of investigation and the foundation for explanations of road use phenomena, poststructuralism takes the human subject as secondary, as the outcome rather than the origin or starting point of social processes. Consequently, rather than seeking to understand individual behaviour in terms of internal psychological dynamics, individual differences in a range of traits or cognitive capacities or the factors shaping the ways individuals internally process and respond to information about external conditions, poststructuralism seeks to explore the discourses through which road users formulate their understandings of road use in general and of themselves as road users, an approach that focuses on the ways particular objects and behaviours come to appear desirable, in relation to their own identities, rather than on cognition or rational calculation.

This, too, can be illustrated with two examples. Young male drivers are widely recognized as a key road use problem population. The problem is commonly taken to be a combination of inexperience, and characteristic behaviours, including behaviours associated with specific sets of social contextual factors (e.g., driving with peers, drinking and speeding) and, more recently, with neurological developmental timeframes (Vick, 2003). Traditional approaches characteristically identify the incidence and circumstances of high risk behaviour; insofar as they focus on explanations, they rely on immaturity, peer cultures, such dispositional attributes of adolescence as ‘risk taking’, and neurological underdevelopment. In contrast, poststructuralist analysis identifies the key problem for analysis as the ways young drivers understand themselves and the nature of driving for what it reveals about them. Thus, a small scale poststructuralist study of young undergraduate drivers analysed their interview narratives of long distance driving. They drew on a range of discourses to construct the task of driving itself principally in terms of technical mastery (skill) and cognitive competence (judgement), but with a minor theme of care and consideration. They represented particular drives as essentially about completion of the task and saw other drivers largely as obstacles and threats to themselves. They saw themselves as good drivers, on the basis of their technical mastery of their vehicle and driving skills, even though all provided evidence of dangerous driving, and as capable of feats of endurance in timely completion of long drives, able to overcome their own mental and physical fatigue (Vick, 2005). This contrasted with other young drivers’ tacit constructions of good driving in ‘street car’, ‘muscle car’, ‘hot car’ and ute magazines and websites. Here, desirable driving was explicitly associated with ‘extreme’ (high risk) behaviour (speed, donuts, burnouts, unsecured passengers in the ute tray), with alcohol consumption, and the sexualisation of the vehicle (through both the gendered terminology for describing their vehicles and the soft-porn images and sex-related slogans that decorate them). Desirable driving was essentially recreational, with even ‘functional’ driving often portrayed through highly recreational imagery, and was closely tied to their identities either as rural people, or as members of one of a variety of (‘rev-head’) subcultures (Vick, 2004). These analyses suggest that whatever the psychological factors involved in young people driving dangerously, they are mediated by their own discursive constructions of themselves, their vehicles, and driving. 5Peer Reviewed Paper

A second example can be found in risk among bicycle users (Vick, 2006a, 2006b). A widely engaged debate concerns the effect of helmet legislation. A number of studies have argued that helmet legislation reduces risk of injury by increasing helmet wearing and thus the risk of head injury in the even of a crash. Others contend that increased helmet wearing encourages riders to feel safer, and thus induces or allows them to take greater risks, thus effectively increasing their risk of crashing. Again, the core of this argument concerns inner psychological processes – rational calculations of risk – on the part of individual riders. The assumptions is that if a cyclist considers something to entail only an acceptable risk, s/he will feel justified in taking that risk; if the benefits outweigh likely costs s/he may well feel almost obliged to take that risk. Poststructuralism, instead, looks at the social and cultural factors shaping understandings of both risk, the significance of risk taking, and the practices of riding themselves. Thus, my study of young Indigenous cyclists showed that they only considered issues of risk in relation to quite specific aspects of riding – aspects that involved other road users. Risk rarely entered their decision-making concerning other aspects of riding, and when it did, as it sometimes did in relation to ‘doubling’, it was marginalized by its relative unimportance in relation to culturally defined social obligations to friends and relatives. This analysis also pointed to the fact that riding itself was complexly shaped by a range of cultural values and social conditions, rather than being a simple functional activity.

Underlying poststructuralist analyses of both policy and human factors is a broad analysis of the place of road use in contemporary culture, both in terms of the socially constructed reliance on and privileging of the private motor vehicle as the preferred mode of passenger transport on large parts of the developed world, and the values associated with the motor car. While this is not necessarily directly of interest to road safety practitioners, it is crucial to establishing the contexts within which policy discourse and road user discourses are themselves shaped. Analysis of the privileged place of the private motor vehicle in western society and culture, for instance, informs the privileged place it occupies in many road safety related policies. Analysis of the privileged place of science and of the links between positivism and notions of progress illuminates the preference for psychological over sociological, and statistical of subjective narrative and other forms of textual data in forming the authoritative basis for policy formation. Analysis of constructions of masculine and feminine identities, and their inflections through different subcultures and identities (e.g., rural identities) informs the ways in which the car is taken up not only as a useful piece of machinery but as a highly symbolic object, saturated with values. Analysis of the privileging of values of competition over caring and compassion, of mind over matter, of the superiority of youth over age, of ‘man’ over the environment’, and of technical mastery informs an understanding of how young drivers are enabled to understand themselves and their driving as they do. Broader cultural analyses of youth and gender also help explain young drivers’ resistance to safe driving messages by revealing how youth and the behaviours associated with it are effectively romanticised and idolized, so that attempts to ‘curb’ youthful ‘exuberance’ are seen as negative, dull and oppressive. Moreover, the analyses it leads to, not just of youth and masculinity in general terms, but of different forms they take in difference social contexts points to the complexity of the policy target group ‘young male drivers’ (see Vick, 2003, 2004; Walker, Connell and Butland, 2000).

#### The aff’s claims are not value-neutral—analyzing discourse and spatial power relations is key to understanding the true nature of their impacts

**Richardson, 01 –** professor of urban theory at Aalborg University in Denmark (Tim, “The Pendulum Swings Again: In Search of New Transport Rationalities,” The Town Planning Review, Vol. 72, No. 3, pp. 299-319, July 2001, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40112456)//HK

The work of Michel Foucault provides a rich resource for those exploring this power-aware approach to policy, the full potential of which has yet to be fully explored in its own right as an approach to both understanding and constructing the policy process. His critical view turns attention away from both the preoccupation of instrumental rationality with the search for new objective scientific or economic techniques, and away from normative communicative rationality, achieved through idealised debate and argument. Instead, Foucault suggests that we live in a society of socially constructed rationalities which are shaped by discourses, constituted through power/ knowledge relations, and made visible in local practices. Foucault's work allows a conceptualisation of policy discourse as a complex body of values, thoughts and practices - which includes communicative acts and scientific knowledge alongside unspoken actions, lay knowledge and power relations. Foucault, then, offers the theoretical foundation for a new understanding of rationality, potentially unlocking an understanding of the policy process which may more closely fit the messy world of policy than approaches which try to reduce things to an objective level, or prescribe what we think ought to happen in an ideal world. This approach to transport policy is being explored empirically and theoretically by Flyvbjerg (1998) and Richardson (1996). Foucault called for critical inquiry to expose how rationality makes possible the powerful conditioning effects which shape the values we hold, what we think, and how we act. This was not a purely abstract theoretical exercise. By analysing rationality, he sought, and encouraged others to use his methods (Foucault, 1980, 65), to 'disrupt taken-for-granted knowledge and point to the contingent power relations which create spaces for particular assertions to operate as absolute truths' (Pavlich, 1995).

Crucially, for Foucault, 'a discourse' is not a communicative exchange (the transport debate, say) but a complex entity of contingent thought, strategy and value, given shape by the relations between power and knowledge, and played out in language and practice (Layder, 1994). In this conceptualisation, the continuous power struggles between competing discourses mould the social and physical world, constructing rationalities and shaping individual identities by delimiting and conditioning thoughts and actions (Foucault, 1965; 1973). Foucault's work contains systematic attempts to understand why it was that in spite of the apparently infinite potential for creating and communicating ideas, thoughts and language, there exists a 'relative paucity or rarity of what it is possible to think and say at any one time' (McNay, 1994, 86). But Foucauldian discourse analysis extends its focus beyond the boundaries of communicative acts to study social practices and power acts. Indeed, Foucault did perhaps more than any recent philosopher to remind us of the crucial importance of power in the shaping and control of discourses, and the production of knowledge (Foucault, 1977, 27; 1979; 1990, 101).

So instead of seeking the ultimate truth of statements, Foucault asks how, why, and by whom, 'truth' is attributed to particular arguments and not others. In particular, he analyses what types of thoughts, ideas, knowledges and practices become accepted, marginalised or silenced in given social conditions. This association of values and power in the construction of knowledge can be understood as the rationality of discourse.

A recurrent thread in Foucault's work, often overlooked by theorists who have drawn from Foucault's theories of discourse and power, is his linkage of space with the operation of discourses and hence with power (Flynn, 1993; Marks, 1995; Casey, 1996). This 'spatialisation of reason' seems particularly relevant to understanding the spatial consequences of policy making. Foucault's critique, in Discipline and Punish, of Jeremy Bentham's panopticon being perhaps the archetypal example of this approach (Foucault, 1979; Lyon, 1993, 655-56; Marks, 1995, 75). He argued that a social 'space time' which facilitated the conditioning of individuals through a particular set of practices and knowledge was made possible by the design and operation of the panopticon. This idea suggests the need to analyse how discourses and strategies of inclusion and exclusion, control and resistance are connected with particular spaces (or indeed spatial policies).5

Foucault was very interested in how discourses operated through the power relations embedded in local practices - the 'apparently humble and mundane mechanisms which appear to make it possible to govern' (Miller and Rose, 1993, 83). These local practices, which will be familiar to policy makers, included: techniques of notation, computation and calculation; procedures of examination and assessment; the invention of devices such as surveys and representational forms such as tables . . . the inauguration of professional specialisms and vocabularies. . . (Miller and Rose, 1993, 83) This insight suggests the importance of close attention to the fine grain of the policy process. The focus is turned towards how commonly used techniques of analysis construct particular forms of knowledge, providing legitimacy for particular spatial strategies while marginalising other ways of understanding policy problems. The tools and frameworks of policy making may mask such conflicts, but inevitably they are marked by them.6

How might this approach help us to understand transport policy change? First, the socio-political context of transport policy is provided by a constellation of discourses, some in harmony, some in competition. In 1990s Britain, the main structuring discourses that provide the setting for contemporary transport policy making might be identified as:

• economic globalisation: trends such as the emergence of the single European market, and the development of technologies such as 'just-intime' logistics - have enabled a more footloose approach to economic development, which relies predominantly on the fast, low-cost movement of goods by road;

• personal mobility: the legacy of the Thatcher administration of the 1980s was the idea that Britain is a 'great car economy', where the car was the archetypal symbol of personal freedom;

• environmental sustainability: a resurgence of environmental concern, with the added recognition of the problem of global warming, has placed increasing road transport as the most serious environmental trend in the EU (CEC, 1996).

• the move from state to market ownership and control: trends such as deregulation and privatisation have resulted in a fragmentation of responsibilities and interests in transport policy at all levels.

Each of these discourses is grounded in a particular set of contested values, expressed through its own language and practice. Transport policy processes at all levels are pursued within this field of discoursive conflict, which shapes the relations of power and knowledge, and affects the fine grain of policy making. So, while it might be argued that the concept of the new realism was generated internally by the transport policy community in recognition of transport problems (Goodwin, 1996a), the impact of these broader discourses in establishing the conditions for the debate cannot be ignored. For example, the conflict between the growth in personal mobility and the impact of increasing traffic on the environment has influenced transport policy making in different ways since at least the 1960s (Steering Group, 1963; Liniado, 1996), and is prominent in the UK Government's sustainability strategy (UK Government, 1994), and in the EU's concept of 'sustainable mobility' (CEC, 1992).

Within this environment of discoursive competition, policy processes are constructed where ground rules are set out for the creation of knowledge, by processing certain data using particular methodologies. At this stage, judgements are made about what transport problems exist, and which ones are worthy of attention. The specific ideas, practices and solutions that are possible in policy making at any particular time and place become locally conditioned. This is what we might understand as the construction of rationality of the policy process. This rationality defines the relationship between technical and lay knowledge, politics and communication, which will establish the legitimacy of policy. The policy processes can be understood as the transient and recurring arenas of conflict between these competing discourses. Gradually, transport 'policy discourse' emerges, which is gradually formed and reformed through many successive policy processes, reflecting the values, thoughts, languages and practices of successful discourses, as well as unresolved conflicts. It is in this way that a new policy discourse may become institutionalised - a move beyond rhetoric takes place as new practices are forged and new ideas begin to make a difference in the real world.

#### Analysis of discourse and power relations is a prerequisite to understanding action

**Peters, 10** – professor of metropolitan studies at the Technical University of Berlin (Dieke, “Cohesion, Polycentricity, Missing Links and Bottlenecks: Conflicting Spatial Storylines for Pan-European Transport Investments,” European Planning Studies, 11:3, 317-339, 7/2/2010, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09654310303638)//HK

Hajer (1995, p. 43) warns that “discourse analysis has come to mean many different things in as many different places”. He also correctly asserts that in everyday speech, discourse is often taken to be synonymous with discussion or a mode of talking. Like most social scientists working on related subjects, Hajer begins his discussion of discourse theoretical approaches with Foucault.3 Foucault focused on the way discourses are produced through institutionalized practices. From a social constructivist viewpoint such as Foucault’s, these practices are what mainly influence people’s actions and hence produce political preferences. Foucault’s discourse theoretical approach fundamentally challenges mainstream political theory since traditionally, political scientists do not focus on ‘institutionalized practices’ (or, as Foucault also termed them, ‘disciplines’) but on institutions, individual stakeholders, and expressed stakeholder preferences. In the end, we need both a combination of both, a thorough analysis of stakeholder power-relationships, and of the related discourses employed. Personal agency and deliberate agenda-setting by particular actors tend to disappear from view when structural discourses are over-emphasized.4

The principal conceptual innovation of Hajer’s Politics of Environmental Discourse consists in its focus on what he calls ‘storylines’. Hajer arrives at this emphasis after a critical review of Foucault’s theory of discourse, which he finds wanting in one central aspect: “the role of the discoursing subject remains ambivalent” (p. 51). Well-aware that in the Foucauldian post-positivist worldview, “discourse is not to be seen as a medium through which individuals can manipulate the world”, but that it “is itself part of reality, and constitutes the discoursing subject”, and that consequently, in this framework “interests cannot be taken as given a priori but are constituted through discourse”. Hajer ultimately finds that “there is still a conceptual gap between Foucault’s abstract work and the study of concrete political events”, which to him points to “a need to devise middle range concepts through which [the] interaction between discourses can be related to the role of individual strategic action in a non-reductionist way” (Hajer, 1995, pp. 51–52). His focus on discourse coalitions and storylines brings a certain amount of agency back into the picture. Rules and practices are only imbued with meaning as long as they are exercised by a particular person, and there is always choice involved in picking between different routines and in the precise way in which these are exercised. In other words, rather than simply note the existence of certain linguistic practices or conventions through rhetorical analysis, what should interest us when looking at political and bureaucratic decision-making, is the use, re-use, and transformation of particular images, phrases or storylines, and who benefits from them.

### framing/error replication

#### The aff can’t address fundamental power relations that will make or break their policies—complete transformation of the rationality behind transportation policy is a prerequisite

**Richardson, 01 –** professor of urban theory at Aalborg University in Denmark (Tim, “The Pendulum Swings Again: In Search of New Transport Rationalities,” The Town Planning Review, Vol. 72, No. 3, pp. 299-319, July 2001, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40112456)//HK

Conclusion Transport policy making remains essentially a technically driven process in spite of clear evidence that technical rationality is not the reliable pillar of decision making that it once was. It remains grounded in a rationality of policy making that cannot address the politics and power struggles that shape the experience of most transport professionals, and fails to provide insights into the subtle sociospatial effects and conflicts that are at the heart of the new transport agenda. This is the real challenge for the new realism - to construct a new rationality for transport policy, grounded in explicit recognition of the shared and contested values and discourses that shape policy. Such a rationality would need to incorporate a deeper sensitivity to the nature of knowledge, spatiality and inclusivity. Constructing new techniques and processes to do this job will necessarily expose the policy measures of the new realism to a new level and type of scrutiny. The long process of institutionalising this new discourse has only begun with the challenges to traditional thinking and the new policy agenda of the 1990s. Now the shaping of the techniques, processes and measures that might form a new rationality is being contested through power struggles played out across many different arenas. Policy makers, politicians, academics, consultants, pressure groups and citizens are currently engaged in these struggles over actions, theories, ideas and arguments. If and until the rationality of transport discourse has been recast through these struggles it cannot be successfully claimed that a new discourse (or paradigm) of transport policy has emerged, and its nature cannot be predicted. Rhetoric has yet to make the difficult leaps into new rationality and beyond into new reality. This paper has been based on the premise that the transport policy community is actively involved in discourse construction and institutionalisation. However, doing this effectively means operating with a more critical understanding of the dynamics between discourse, rationality and power rather than seeking to maintain a discipline grounded in technical rationality. This reframing of rationality centres on establishing a new balance between science, argument and power. The ongoing reconstruction of the rationality of transport policy does not appear to be creating new spaces for a widening and 'softening' of the knowledge base and technology of policy making. Nor is it finding new ways of making transparent and inclusionary the unavoidable but difficult THE PENDULUM SWINGS AGAIN 317 political decisions which are the essence of the new realism, such as those relating to the allocation of road space. This paper has hopefully contributed to conceptual understanding during a turbulent period in transport policy. The conclusion must be that if policy makers or other interests wish the discourse of the new realism to become institutionalised in real world events and processes, and to resist the return swing of the pendulum towards one-dimensional policy and relentless road building, they will need to work effectively within an environment of contingent rationalities - rather than assuming that consensus will be the outcome of better technical analysis. They will need to work proactively to extend the boundaries of the 'thinkable' in transport policy and to translate this new thinking into tangibly different actions. It seems unlikely that a new paradigm can be created based on achieving consensus on the 'right' balance between individual mobility and collective responsibility. There are too many incompatible interests at stake for this to be achievable. Instead, the spaces will have to be fought for where difficult policy ideas can be asserted, and the tools that will allow them to be implemented will need to be moulded. The further deployment of methods and perspectives drawn from social theory seems to be integral to this struggle, particularly in understanding the subtle relationships between transport, society and space and integrating them into policy.