#### Social structures of domination have substantial reproductive capacities that can be examined to draw probabilistic conclusions regarding the future—we are falsifiable.

**Duvall and Havercroft 8** (Raymond Duvall, PhD and Master’s from Northwestern in IR, Professor of Critical International Relations at the University of Minnesota, Jonathan Havercroft, PhD from University of Minnesota, Professor in Political Science at the University of Oklahoma, “Taking sovereignty out of this world: space weapons and empire of the future.”, in Review of International Studies, vol 34)

In examining constitutive eﬀects scholars ask how structured social relations, such as systems of signiﬁcation (Foucaultian discourses), and the processes of their (re-)production constitute what a referent object is as a social kind. To engage in constitutive analysis, then, is to investigate the social determination of the ontology of a being or form. 21 Our concern, however, is with not-yet-realised social beings and social forms of the future. How does one analyse the social constitution of that which does not yet exist? The answer, we maintain, lies in examination of the structural logics of social production. Structured social relations entail (often very powerful) reproductive logics, the constitutive implications of which can be discerned even prior to their eﬀectuation. Those constitutive implications are structural potentialities and tendencies – likelihoods – not determinant products, of course. But to the extent that operative reproductive logics of generative structures are strong, future constitutive eﬀects can be identiﬁed with some degree of conﬁdence. This is precisely the character of Marx’s analysis of capital, as well as Wendt’s argument about teleology and the inevitability of a world state and Herz’s argument about the loss of the state’s ‘hard shell’.

#### Instrumental debate alienates citizens from the political sphere ensuring biopolitical control.

Kulynych ’97 [Jessica J. Kulynych, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Winthrop University, Winter 1997, “Performing Politics: Foucault, Habermas, and Postmodern Participation,” Polity, Vol. 30 No. 2, pg 315]

Political scientists have traditionally understood political participation as an activity that assures individual influence over the political system, protection of private interests, system legitimacy, and perhaps even self-development. Habermas and Foucault describe the impact of the conditions of postmodernity on the possibility for efficacious political action in remarkably similar ways. Habermas describes a world where the possibilities for efficacious political action are quite limited. The escalating interdependence of state and economy, the expansive increase in bureaucratization, the increasingly technical nature of political decisionmaking, and the subsequent colonization of a formerly sacred private sphere by a ubiquitous administrative state render traditional modes of political participation unable to provide influence, privacy, legitimacy, and self-development.(3) As the state is forced to take an ever larger role in directing a complex global, capitalist, welfare state economy, the scope of administration inevitably grows. In order to fulfill its function as the manager of the economy, the administrative state must also manage the details of our lives formerly considered private. Yet, as the state's role in our "private" lives continues to grow, the public has become less and less interested in government, focusing instead on personal and social mores, leisure, and consumption. Ironically, we have become less interested in politics at precisely the same moment when our lives are becoming increasingly "politicized" and administered. This siege of private life and the complicity of this ideology of "civil privatism" in the functioning of the modern administrative state makes a mockery of the idea that there exist private interests that can be protected from state intervention.(4) Correlatively, the technical and instrumental rationality of modern policymaking significantly lessens the possibility for public influence on state policy.(5) The difficulty of participation in Habermas's world is exacerbated by the added complexity of a political system structured by hierarchical gender and racial norms. Nancy Fraser uses Habermas's analysis of the contemporary situation to demonstrate how the infusion of these hierarchical gender and racial norms into the functioning of the state and economy ensures that political channels of communication between citizens and the state are unequally structured and therefore cannot function as mechanisms for the equal protection of interests.(6) Accordingly, theorists are much less [not] optimistic about the possibilities for citizens to acquire or develop feelings of autonomy and efficacy from the attempt to communicate[ing] interests to a system that is essentially impervious to citizen interests, eschews discussion of long-term goals, and requires exclusively technical and instrumental debate. Similarly, Foucault's complex genealogical descriptions of disciplinary power networks challenge the traditional assumption that political power is located primarily in the formal apparatus of the state. The traditional understanding of political participation tells us nothing about what types of political action are appropriate in a world where power is typically and predominantly disciplinary, productive, and normalizing. As long as we define the purpose of participation only in terms of influence, privacy, legitimacy, and self-development, we will be unable to see how political action can be effective in the contemporary world.

#### The Aff’s vision of politics as always circulating around only the most obvious sites facilitates the forms of normalization and discipline that undergird biopower

Halperin 97 David Halperin, Professor of English Language and Literature at Michigan, Saint Foucault, 1997, p 16-19

First of all, on Foucault's view, power is not a substance but a relation. Power is therefore not possessed but exercised. That means that power should not be conceptualized as the property of someone who can be identified and confronted, nor should it be thought of (at least in the first instance) as embedded in particular agents or institutions. Power is not a possession of the Monarch or the Father or the State, and people cannot be divided into those who "have" it and those who don't. Instead, power is what characterizes the complex relations among the parts of a particular society--and the interactions among individuals in that society--as relations of ongoing struggle. Power is thus a dynamic situation, whether personal, social, or institutional: it is not a quantum of force but a strategic, unstable relation. Because power, for Foucault, is intrinsically relational in character, specific political struggles are properly described not in terms of power tout court but in terms of "relations of power." 2 Power, then, is not to be understood according to the model of a unidirectional vector from oppressor to oppressed. Rather, it's a fluid, all-encompassing medium, immanent in every sort of social relation--though unevenly concentrated or distributed, to be sure, and often stabilized in its dynamics by the functioning of social institutions. Foucault doesn't deny the reality of domination, in other words; what he denies is that domination is the whole story there is to tell when it comes to power. And Foucault even asserts--famuously--that "power comes from below." 3 Hence, power is not intrinsically, nor is it only, negative: it is not just the power to deny, to suppress, to constrain--the power to say no, you can't. Power is also positive and productive. It produces possibilities of action, of choice--and, ultimately, it produces the conditions for the exercise of freedom (just as freedom constitutes a condition for the exercise of power). Power is therefore not opposed to freedom. And freedom, correspondingly, is not freedom from power--it is not a privileged zone outside power, unconstrained by power--but a potentiality internal to power, even an effect of power. 4 Power, then, is everywhere. Resistance to power takes place from within power; it is part of the total relations of power, "part of the strategic relationship of which power consists." What escapes from relations of power--and something always does escape, according to Foucault--does not escape from the reach of power to a place outside power, but represents the limit of power, its reversal or rebound. 5 The aim of an oppositional politics is therefore not liberation but resistance. 6 ALTHOUGH SOME of Foucault's critics on the Left may simply have misunderstood his claim, "power is everywhere," to imply that contemporary forms of social domination are so total in their operations and so overwhelming in their effects as to leave no possibility for individual or collective resistance, what most of them are likely to have reacted against in his political theorizing is not a totalitarian concept of power that would deny the possibility of resisting domination--a concept of power that, in any case, is quite alien to Foucault's thinking--but something resembling its opposite: namely, Foucault's reversal of the standard liberal critique of totalitarianism. When he says that "power is everywhere," Foucault is not talking about power in the sense of coercive and irresistible force (which in his lexicon goes by the name not of "power" but of "determination"); rather, he is referring to what might be called liberal power-that is, to the kind of power typically at work in the modern liberal state, which takes as its objects "free subjects" and defines itself wholly in relation to them and to their freedom. 7 Modern forms of governmentality actually require citizens to be free, so that citizens can assume from the state the burden of some of its former regulatory functions and impose on themselves--of their own accord--rules of conduct and mechanisms of control. The kind of power Foucault is interested in, then, far from enslaving its objects, constructs them as subjective agents and preserves them in their autonomy, so as to invest them all the more completely. Liberal power does not simply prohibit; it does not directly terrorize. It normalizes, "responsibilizes," and disciplines. The state no longer needs to frighten or coerce its subjects into proper behavior: it can safely leave them to make their own choices in the allegedly sacrosanct private sphere of personal freedom which they now inhabit, because within that sphere they freely and spontaneously police both their own conduct and the conduct of others--and so "earn," by demonstrating a capacity to exercise them, the various rights assigned by the state's civil institutions exclusively to law-abiding citizens possessed of sound minds and bodies.

#### Power and knowledge are co-productive—their attempt to know the world is itself an exercise of control which must be interrogated

Pickett ‘5 [Associate professor of Political Science at Chaldron State College On the Use and Abuse of Foucault For Politics pp. 10-11]

Axel Honneth, among others, points out that Foucault's conception of power is a reworking of Nietzsche's idea of the will to power.6 Power, in this view, is not a fixed property held by one class or group; it is the outcome of conflict between a number of actors. It is not stable; it is continually in flux and any truces must be considered temporary. Power is ubiquitous in the linguistic, bureaucratic, moral, and other structures in which agents act. For instance, although determined by power, the fundamental rules of morality are often seen as natural rather than contingent products of history: "It is true that it is society that defines, in terms of its own interests, what must be regarded as crime: it is not therefore natural. . . . [But] by assuming the form of a natural sequence, punishment does not appear as the arbitrary effect of human power." By revealing the origins and historical shifts of our basic moral and cultural distinctions, it is possible to show that what seems to be natural and self-evident is in fact contingent and arbitrary. What appears as nature is in fact the workings of power. Furthermore, the will to knowledge is the expression of power. There is a battle for truth; knowledge is the spoils of victory.9 Both Nietzsche and Foucault deny that there is a timeless, a historical truth. Instead, truth is a thing of this world, and as such, it is subject to the contingency, error, mendacity, and struggle that characterize this world. Hence, Nietzsche argues that every philosophy is an expression of the will to power of the philosopher who wrote it.10 Foucault argues that the human sciences operate on the basis of hierarchical relations, such as those between doctor and patient, or teacher and student, and that these sciences in turn have effects of power.11 For these reasons, power must not be considered as an essentially negative force, as something which is "poor in resources, sparing of its methods, monotonous . . . incapable of invention, and seemingly doomed always to repeat itself."12 Instead, power is capable of producing knowledge, rules of morality, and the basic distinctions and denotations of a language. For Nietzsche power is creative and concerned with the continual increase in force. For Foucault, modern power is the same: unlike power in the classical age, it is inventive and concerned with the increase in social forces. Nietzsche and Foucault's views of power culminate in the claim that power produces identity. Each agent is the creation and expression of power. Both are anti-naturalists; they deny that there is something "natural" at the bottom of who we are. There is no fixed human nature or subjectivity. Instead, power produces agency: it creates animals capable of, for example, promising and confessing. A central aspect of both philosophers' work is an attack on the philosophy of the subject, that is, on some concept of an ahistorical metaphysical agent that is the "doer" behind our thoughts and deeds. Instead of positing a subject which is the foundation of all knowledge and action, philosophy should undermine its attachment to this "subject without a history."13 We need to see the subject as simply the outcome of the correlation of forces, relations, and practices that constitute him.

#### Ontology focus opens non-present possibilities.

Dillon and Reid 2k, Michael and Julian, “Global Governance, Liberal Peace, and Complex Emergency,” Alternatives: Social Transformation & Humane Governance, Jan-Mar 2000, Vol. 25, Issue 1, Ebsco

As a precursor to global governance, governmentality, according to Foucault's initial account, poses the question of order not in terms of the origin of the law and the location of sovereignty, as do traditional accounts of power, but in terms instead of the management of population. The management of population is further refined in terms of specific problematics to which population management may be reduced. These typically include but are not necessarily exhausted by the following topoi of governmental power: economy, health, welfare, poverty, security, sexuality, demographics, resources, skills, culture, and so on. Now, where there is an operation of power there is knowledge, and where there is knowledge there is an operation of power. Here discursive formations emerge and, as Foucault noted, in every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organised and redistributed by a certain number of procedures whose role is to ward off its powers and dangers, to gain mastery over its chance events, to evade its ponderous, formidable materiality. More specifically, where there is a policy problematic there is expertise, and where there is expertise there, too, a policy problematic will emerge. Such problematics are detailed and elaborated in terms of discrete forms of knowledge as well as interlocking policy domains. Policy domains reify the problematization of life in certain ways by turning these epistemically and politically contestable orderings of life into "problems" that require the continuous attention of policy science and the continuous resolutions of policymakers. Policy "actors" develop and compete on the basis of the expertise that grows up around such problems or clusters of problems and their client populations. Here, too, we may also discover what might be called "epistemic entrepreneurs." Albeit the market for discourse is prescribed and policed in ways that Foucault indicated, bidding to formulate novel problematizations they seek to "sell" these, or otherwise have them officially adopted. In principle, there is no limit to the ways in which the management of population may be problematized. All aspects of human conduct, any encounter with life, is problematizable. Any problematization is capable of becoming a policy problem. Governmentality thereby creates a market for policy, for science and for policy science, in which problematizations go looking for policy sponsors while policy sponsors fiercely compete on behalf of their favored problematizations. Reproblematization of problems is constrained by the institutional and ideological investments surrounding accepted "problems," and by the sheer difficulty of challenging the inescapable ontological and epistemological assumptions that go into their very formation. There is nothing so fiercely contested as an epistemological or ontological assumption. And there is nothing so fiercely ridiculed as the suggestion that the real problem with problematizations exists precisely at the level of such assumptions. Such "paralysis of analysis" is precisely what policymakers seek to avoid since they are compelled constantly to respond to circumstances over which they ordinarily have in fact both more and less control than they proclaim. What they do not have is precisely the control that they want. Yet serial policy failure--the fate and the fuel of all policy--compels them into a continuous search for the new analysis that will extract them from the aporias in which they constantly find themselves enmeshed. Serial policy failure is no simple shortcoming that science and policy--and policy science--will ultimately overcome. Serial policy failure is rooted in the ontological and epistemological assumptions that fashion the ways in which global governance encounters and problematizes life as a process of emergence through fitness landscapes that constantly adaptive and changing ensembles have continuously to negotiate. As a particular kind of intervention into life, global governance promotes the very changes and unintended outcomes that it then serially reproblematizes in terms of policy failure. Thus, global liberal governance is not a linear problem-solving process committed to the resolution of objective policy problems simply by bringing better information and knowledge to bear upon them. A nonlinear economy of power/knowledge, it deliberately installs socially specific and radically inequitable distributions of wealth, opportunity, and mortal danger both locally and globally through the very detailed ways in which life is variously (policy) problematized by it. In consequence, thinking and acting politically is displaced by the institutional and epistemic rivalries that infuse its power/ knowledge networks, and by the local conditions of application that govern the introduction of their policies. These now threaten to exhaust what "politics," locally as well as globally, is about.[36] It is here that the "emergence" characteristic of governance begins to make its appearance. For it is increasingly recognized that there are no definitive policy solutions to objective, neat, discrete policy problems. The "subjects" of policy increasingly also become a matter of definition as well, since the concept population does not have a stable referent either and has itself also evolved in biophilosophical and biomolecular as well as Foucauldian "biopower" ways.

#### Investigating ontological roots and confirming their eternal existence is a prerequisite to revealing truth.

Elden 2 [Stuart Elden, Philosophy Professor, Durham University, “Mapping the Present: Hedegger and the Project of a Spatial History.” 2002, pg. 9]

Husserlian phenomenology was basically ahistorical, 3 perhaps because of Husserl’s background in mathematics and logic. For Heidegger however, as Krell has argued, the history of philosophy was an ‘essential counterweight to phenomenology’: whereas Husserl had once remarked that he had ‘forgotten about history’, Heidegger never did. 4 In Being and Time Heidegger makes some comments indicating the importance of the historical project, though, as shall be seen, his later work suggests that here he did not go far enough. The basic issues at stake can be seen if the distinction Heidegger makes between ontic and ontological knowledge is examined. Ontic knowledge is knowledge pertaining to the distinctive nature of beings as such, it is the knowledge of the sciences, whereas ontological knowledge is the basis on which any such theory (of ontic knowledge) could be constructed, the a priori conditions for the possibility of such sciences. Heidegger’s own exercise of fundamental ontology deals with the conditions of possibility not just of the ontic sciences, but also of the ontologies that precede and found them. This is the question of being (GA2, 11; see GA26, 195– 202). 5 A glimpse of the possibility this insight allows is found in Heidegger’s discussion of Newton: To say that before Newton his laws were neither true nor false, cannot signify that before him there were no such beings as have been uncovered and pointed out by those laws. Through Newton the laws became true; and with them, beings became accessible in themselves to Dasein. Once beings have been uncovered, they show themselves precisely as beings which beforehand already were. Such uncovering is the kind of being which belongs to ‘truth’. That there are ‘eternal truths’ will not be adequately proved until someone has succeeded in demonstrating that Dasein has been and will be for all eternity. As long as such a proof is still outstanding, this principle remains a fanciful contention which does not gain in legitimacy from having philosophers commonly ‘believe’ it. Because the kind of being that is essential to truth is of the character of Dasein, all truth is relative to Dasein’s being (GA2, 227). 6 From this, it is clear that Dasein and truth are fundamentally linked, that truth is context dependent. This does not mean that truth is only what an individual thinks, but that truth only has a context dependent on the existence of Dasein (GA3, 281– 2). Any eternal truths must rest on an eternal immutability to Dasein. It clearly follows from this that if being changes, or is historicized, so too is truth. It has been remarked by some critics that Heidegger does indeed, in Being and Time, suggest such an immutability to Dasein, examining it and its structures as if they were true eternally. Such critics sometimes point to a shift in the later Heidegger towards an understanding of historical nature of being, through a historical sense of Dasein, which would, following the quotation and explication here, lead to a historicizing of truth. 7 The ontic/ontological difference – especially when historicized – is one that Foucault would go on to elaborate and use in the distinction between connaissance and savoir in The Archaeology of Knowledge, where he examined what he called the ‘historical a priori’. 8