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\*\*\*OFFCASE ARGUMENTS\*\*\*

\*\*\*POLTICS LINKS\*\*\*

1NC – McCain I/L

[ ] McCain opposes withdrawal – Resents Obama’s “Political decision”

Youngman, ’10

[Sam Youngman, White House correspondent of The Hill. 2010. “McCain criticizes Afghanistan withdrawal date as 'political decision' by Obama,” The Hill. June 27th 2010, <http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/105749-mccain-blasts-afghanistan-withdrawal-date-as-political-decision>]

Sen. John McCain blasted President Barack Obama's stated goal of beginning troop withdrawal from Afghanistan in July 2011, saying Obama made a "political decision" not based on military strategy. McCain (R-Ariz.), Obama's opponent in the 2008 presidential election, continued to criticize Obama's decision to include a timetable in his Afghanistan strategy, and he criticized military leaders who signed on to Obama's timetable strategy. "It was purely a political decision," McCain said on NBC's "Meet the Press." "Not one based on facts on the ground, not one based on military strategy." McCain, ranking member on the Senate Armed Services Committee, went further, saying that no military advisers proposed to Obama any strategy that included a timetable. But when host David Gregory noted that Obama's military leaders have endorsed the strategy, McCain faulted them for not opposing the commander in chief. "They didn't do it, and they should have because they know better," McCain said. McCain said the president needs "to just come out and say this is conditions-based and conditions-based only." The White House has said repeatedly that July 2011 represents a start date for withdrawal, and that is not a total withdrawal date. But McCain, echoing arguments against a timeline in Iraq, said that when "you tell the enemy you're leaving, they will wait." "I'm against a timetable," McCain said. "In wars you declare when you're leaving after you've succeeded." Still, McCain said Obama made the right decision in ousting Gen. Stanley McChrystal after McChrystal and his aides made inflammatory and insulting comments about administration officials in a Rolling Stone magazine article. "He took the appropriate steps in my view," McCain said. Though McCain said he understood the mentality of aides speaking out of turn while on a night off, he said "there's no excuse for it." McCain joined other Republicans in praising Obama's replacement for McChrystal, Gen. David Petraeus. McCain called Petraeus "one of the greatest, outstanding leaders in American history."

1NC – McCain K2 Agenda

[ ] McCain controls huge clout with moderates on key issues – He will determine Obama’s agenda

**Adams, ’08**

[Rebecca, 11/8/08 (“CQ Weekly Vantage Point: Farewell or a Future? McCain Still Has Role as Bipartisan Dealmaker,” LN)]

A likelier scenario, observers say, is that McCain will revert to his role as a bipartisan broker of compromise — and, depending on Barack Obama ’s enthusiasm for courting the aid of his presidential rival, McCain could serve as a critical liaison to Senate moderates as the new administration works with a Senate majority just shy of the 60-vote, filibuster-resistant supermajority. That role would permit McCain to bolster the bipartisan credentials he so frequently advertised in his campaign and to refine his legacy in case he decides to retire from public life in 2010, when his fourth term ends and he turns 74. “He can only be a leader for the moderates,” says GOP strategist John Feehery, who worked for 18 years on Capitol Hill. “But at the end of the day, moderates will hold all the power.” Obama could have reason to solicit his support on any number of policy fronts, including the economy, national security (where McCain wields considerable clout as the top Republican on the Armed Services Committee) and the curtailment of global warming — all likely high-priority items on the next president’s agenda. And McCain would probably be keen to add to his already extensive resume of bipartisan collaboration on questions such as nominations to the federal bench, immigration and campaign finance. He probably would not be able to bring major factions of the Senate GOP to the bargaining table, but he could broker agreements on some key issues with influential moderates such as Lindsey Graham of South Carolina and Mel Martinez of Florida. A home-state GOP colleague in the House, John Shadegg , notes that McCain is in closer accord with Democrats than fellow Republicans in some instances, including on legislative proposals curbing global warming. “That’s an area in which there is the potential that Sen. McCain could agree with the president-elect, but I don’t know that McCain can bring along the minority,” Shadegg says. “Given the state of the economy, there will be lots of concerns.” Shadegg predicts that McCain will face minimal opposition if he runs for re-election in two years. But several McCain associates think he may be edging toward retirement. In either case, former McCain aides say he does not intend to fade into the senatorial background as Democrat John Kerry of Massachusetts did after losing the presidency in 2004. “It will be very important that someone in a leadership position in the Republican Party send the signal that they are willing to work with President Obama. McCain is the logical choice,” says Mark McKinnon, a former media adviser for President Bush and for McCain through much of the primary season. “I think Sen. McCain’s interest after this election will be not any political ambition but a genuine desire to make his last chapter in Washington all about bipartisan healing.” The former GOP nominee will be focused on “settling differences rather than settling scores,” McKinnon says. Dan Schnur, a spokesman for McCain in the 2000 election and director of the Jesse M. Unruh Institute of Politics at the University of Southern California, says there is no reason why McCain wouldn’t pick up where he left off in the Senate. “He could be a very valuable ally to President Obama in building bipartisan support for at least some of the administration’s priorities, starting with national security and political reform,” Schnur says. “He spent a lot of years building a reputation as someone who works across the party aisle. He has a strong incentive to spend his last years in the Senate reinforcing that image.”

2NC – McCain Extension

[ ] McCain supports presence in Afghanistan

**McCain, ’10**

[Senate, Sen. John McCain in his opening statement at the Services Committee’s hearing on Afghanistan on Tuesday, June 15th 2010, <http://article.nationalreview.com/436428/getting-it-right-in-afghanistan/john-mccain>]

As all of you know, I believe that winning the war in Afghanistan is a vital national-security interest. I have said for years that the best way to achieve success is through a properly resourced counterinsurgency strategy, backed by strong civil-military and U.S.-Afghan partnerships. For this reason, I have supported, and still do support, the president’s decision to increase our commitment in Afghanistan. I will be brief and come right to the point: As I gauge the progress of any war effort, I look at the broader trend lines, and it is for this reason that I’m so concerned about our campaign in Afghanistan. Many of the key trends seem to be heading in a bad direction, perhaps even signaling a mounting crisis

1NC – Gingrich I/L

Gingrich opposes withdrawal – sends a signal of failure U.S. cannot risk

Hirsh, ’10

[Hirsh, Michael, International Affairs reporter at Newsweek, July 18th 2010, “Afghan About-Face: An Emerging GOP Schism,” Newsweek, <http://www.newsweek.com/2010/07/18/afghan-about-face-an-emerging-gop-schism.html>]

Now some leading conservative politicians—especially those thinking about presidential politics—are jumping in to question Obama’s Afghan policy from a very different tack. Among them is Newt Gingrich, who is considering a 2012 run. In a speech he plans for the end of July, the former House speaker will hit the president hard, siding with hawks like Kristol. **Gingrich thinks the** **U.S. can’t afford to fail in Afghanistan, but it certainly will unless Obama’s July 2011 deadline to begin withdrawing troops is dropped. “The morning we collapse in Afghanistan, the energy level of our enemies will quadruple,” Gingrich told NEWSWEEK. “This is not a war of choice.”** The problem, he added, is that “the president’s current strategy is hopeless … If you have a commander in chief that no one believes, and a strategy that can’t succeed, then I think it becomes very difficult to get people to carry water for him.” Obama still has to worry more about keeping the support of his own Democratic base on Afghanistan than the GOP. **Only seven Republican House members voted for a recent bill restricting funding, compared with 93 Democrats**. And while the president has been attacked by Republicans on almost every front—health care, stimulus spending, financial reform—for most of his 18 months in office, **he’s mostly gotten a pass from the GOP on the conduct of America’s two wars**. But Obama’s poll numbers have been plummeting, especially since the controversy in late June over critical comments by then-Afghanistan commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal and his staff, and Republicans doubtless want to capitalize on that. For those on both sides of the emerging GOP divide—the stick-it-out hawks and the shut-it-down skeptics—the only unifying theme seems to be a lack of faith in the president and his ability to explain what success in Afghanistan will look like. Among those who have recently chimed in are Richard Lugar, the former head of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. “Absent a major realignment on the ground, it’s unrealistic to expect that a significant downsizing of U.S. forces could occur” by Obama’s deadline, Lugar said last week. Obama still has the House and Senate leadership from both parties mostly with him. “I don’t think anybody [significant] is ready to jump ship yet,” says Republican consultant Vin Weber. Democrats, moreover, may be able to take advantage of the radically mixed messages from the GOP. But if Steele, in his fumbling way, is a harbinger of things to come, time is beginning to run out for the president. And he needs a great deal more of it if he’s ever to succeed in Afghanistan.

1NC – Obama Credibility I/L

Withdrawal devastates Obama’s credibility – Turning on his initial commitment creates skepticism

Khan, ’10

[Theodore Khan, “The United States, Europe, and the Threat of Radical Islam Different Means of Engagement,” SAIS Review, Volume 30, Number 1, Winter-Spring 2010, pp. 123-125. The Johns Hopkins University Press. ProjectMUSE. [http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sais/summary/v030/30.1.khan.html]

**Afghanistan, Obama assured the American people, was the war of necessity.** The underlying assumption—that war, somewhere, was necessary— remained unspoken. On the campaign trail, this rhetoric served Obama well. **His commitment to the war in Afghanistan helped shore up the support of independents skeptical of the national security bona fides of a Democratic senator with no military background.** Herein lies a fundamental reality of American politics: **Democrats are still perceived as the party of weakness in national security.** This perception, which took hold after the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980, has apparently survived the Bush years and the political upheaval of 2008. **Gallup polls at the end of 2009 asking which party can better protect the country gave Republicans a healthy edge.**4 **The tenacity of this view points to a failure among Democrats to articulate a distinct vision of foreign policy. By default it often seems war is still our answer.**

1NC – Congress I/L

Congress opposes withdrawal – Must secure Afghanistan first

Catherine, ’09

[Bowman, Steve; Dale, Catherine, Specialists in National Security, “War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military, Operations, and Issues for Congress,” December 3rd 2009, Congressional Research Service, <http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40156_20091203.pdf>]

With a deteriorating security situation and no comprehensive political outcome yet in sight, most observers view the war in Afghanistan as open-ended. By early 2009, a growing number of Members of Congress, Administration officials, and outside experts had concluded that the effort—often called “America’s other war”—required greater national attention. For the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), the war is both a struggle for survival and an effort to establish sustainable security and stability. For the United States, the war in Afghanistan concerns the security of Afghanistan and the region, including denying safe haven to terrorists and helping ensure a stable regional security balance. For regional states, including India and Russia as well as Afghanistan’s neighbors Pakistan and Iran, the war may have a powerful impact on the future balance of power and influence in the region. For individual members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the war may be about defeating terrorist networks, ensuring regional stability, proving themselves as contributing NATO members, and/or demonstrating NATO’s relevance in the 21st century.

2NC – Congress I/L

Congress will continue to support and fund Afghan war – withdrawing is too risky

Richter, ’10

[Paul Richter, Columnist @ L.A. Times, “Congress' support wanes for Afghan war strategy,” July 21st 2010, The Philadelphia Inquirer, <http://www.philly.com/inquirer/world_us/20100721_Congress__support_wanes_for_Afghan_war_strategy.html>]

WASHINGTON - With military progress scarce and doubts remaining about the reliability of President Hamid Karzai, confidence in the administration's Afghan strategy is deteriorating on Capitol Hill, including among prominent lawmakers who had been firm backers of the plan. Concerns are rising as lawmakers consider a bill for $37 billion in emergency war funding. While **Congress overall still supports the U.S. mission and is unlikely to cut off funding**, members may seek to attach conditions, such as requiring the administration to outline goals and fixed timetables to reduce the U.S. commitment in Afghanistan. Leaders in both parties have said the lack of specific goals in President Obama's plan makes it impossible to define success. Obama launched a lengthy review after taking office last year. He chose to increase troop strength to about 100,000 and implement a counterinsurgency strategy to try to stem Taliban gains but pledged that U.S. troops would start pulling out next summer. The effort has been beset by disputes with Karzai over election irregularities and systemic corruption, increasing casualties, and halting progress on high-profile military campaigns. The firing this summer of the general in charge of the war effort, Stanley A. McChrystal, highlighted tension between U.S. civilian and military policymakers. Even among Obama loyalists, a lack of confidence is starting to bubble up. A year ago, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, John Kerry (D., Mass.), praised the administration plan as a "comprehensive, considered path forward." Last week he wondered aloud whether it would ever produce results. "Many people are asking whether this is the right strategy," Kerry said at a hearing. "Some suggest it is a lost cause." Sen. Richard G. Lugar of Indi, the top Republican on the Foreign Relations Committee and a respected voice on foreign policy, welcomed Obama's plan in November. But last week, he also complained about a "lack of clarity" and warned that the United States could continue to spend billions in Afghanistan without ensuring a secure, sustainable democracy. "Arguably, we could make progress for decades . . . - on security, on employment, good governance, women's rights, other goals - expending billions of dollars each year without ever reaching a satisfying conclusion," Lugar said. An international conference meeting in Kabul endorsed Karzai's plan Tuesday for Afghan security forces to take over responsibility for safeguarding the country within four years. Conference participants also endorsed plans to channel at least half of the $13 billion in annual international aid through Afghan government channels. Currently, only one-fifth of such assistance is funneled through Afghan ministries. In return, Karzai promised to fight corruption, requiring officials to declare their assets and strengthening a task force meant to crack down on graft. Administration officials acknowledge lawmakers have been raising questions and say the White House shares their concerns. "**We share the same sense of urgency that many members of Congress have about making progress in Afghanistan and Pakistan**," White House spokesman Tommy Vietor said. "There are always going to be challenges in a war, and we face a difficult fight in Afghanistan." **Many in Congress still believe the United States faces a greater risk if it leaves too soon and Afghanistan descends into civil war or again becomes an unchecked operating base for extremists**. Events in Afghanistan on Tuesday brought a troubling reminder of the profound obstacles to turning the Afghan military into a professional, dependable fighting force. An Afghan military trainer at a firing range in northern Afghanistan turned his weapon on two U.S. civilian counterparts, killing them both before being shot to death himself, Western military officials said. A second Afghan soldier was also killed in the exchange of fire and a Western service member wounded, the NATO force said, adding that the incident was under investigation

1NC – House I/L

House rejects any call of US troop withdrawal from Afghan – Recent bill proves

Malone, ’10

[Jim Malone, Malone, March 10th 2010, “House Votes Down Afghan Withdrawal Resolution,” Voice of America News, <http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/asia/House-Votes-Down-Afghan-Withdrawal-Resolution-87284652.html>]

The U.S. House of Representatives on Wednesday overwhelmingly rejected a resolution calling for a quick withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan. The vote was 356 against and 65 in favor of the resolution. Even though the final tally was not close, the debate in the House gave anti-war lawmakers an opportunity to vent their frustrations about the war. The effort to end U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan was led by a familiar anti-war face in Congress, Democrat Dennis Kucinich of Ohio. Kucinich said the U.S. military effort in Afghanistan was approved shortly after the 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States and that it was time for Congress to reconsider America's commitment there. "To reflect on our responsibility for troop casualties that are now reaching 1000, to look at our responsibilities for the cost of the war, which approaches $250 billion, our responsibility for the civilian casualties and the human costs of the war," said Dennis Kucinich. Kucinich is also a longtime opponent of the war in Iraq. He made a name for himself as an anti-war candidate during the 2008 Democratic presidential primaries. Kucinich offered a motion on the House floor that directed the president to remove U.S. troops from Afghanistan within 30 days or by the end of the year, if the 30 day deadline was deemed unsafe. The Ohio representative won the support of only 60 Democrats and five Republicans in the House vote. They are frustrated by the length of the conflict in Afghanistan and they opposed President Barack Obama's decision late last year to send additional troops. The vast majority of Republicans and Democrats opposed the resolution. Florida Representative Ile Ros-Lehtinen, the top Republican on the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, noted the recent success of a U.S.-led offensive in Afghanistan. "Our brave men and women are making steady progress against the deadly foe and are doing so at great risk to their lives," said Ile Ros-Lehtinen. "This offensive is already producing dramatic success, including the capture of senior Taliban leaders, the routing of their forces and the stabilization of key areas. A winning strategy should be supported, not undermined. "Several Democrats joined Republicans in speaking out against the withdrawal resolution, including Representative Howard Berman of California, the Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. "If we withdraw from Afghanistan before the government is capable of providing a basic level of security for its own people, we face the prospect that the Taliban once again will take the reins of power in Kabul and provide a safe haven to al-Qaida," said Howard Berman. "That would be a national security disaster.” Even though the House easily rejected the call to pull out U.S. troops from Afghanistan, there were many complaints about the government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai from members on both side of the issue. New York Democrat Jerrold Nadler supported the withdrawal resolution. "We should not use our troops to prop up a corrupt government," said Jerrold Nadler. "It is simply not justifiable to sacrifice more lives and more money on this war." Supporters of the resolution to force a U.S. withdrawal knew that they did not have the votes to succeed. But they wanted to use the debate to vent their frustrations over the cost of the war and their concerns about America's military strategy in Afghanistan. President Obama says he would like to begin the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan in July of next year. During a trip to Afghanistan on Wednesday, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates said the U.S. troop drawdown could begin sooner than that, based on conditions on the ground.

2NC – House I/L

House recently passed funding for Afghan and rejected any withdrawal attempts

Pergram, ’10

[Chad Pergram, Writer at Fox News. July 1st 2010, “House Passes War Funding Bill, Votes Against Withdrawal from Afghanistan, Striking $$,” Fox News, <http://congress.blogs.foxnews.com/2010/07/01/house-passes-war-funding-bill-votes-against-withdrawal-from-afghanistan-striking/>]

**The House of Representatives okayed a $60 billion bill Thursday to pay for wars in Afghanistan** and Iraq and fund a variety of other programs like education, Pell Grants, natural disaster relief and relief efforts following the earthquake in Haiti. Many Democrats opposed the bill, concerned about the length of the conflict in Afghanistan. And President Obama even threatened to veto the package if House liberals tried to tie his hands with an amendment to withdraw troops from Afghanistan. “If the final bill presented to the president contains provisions that would undermine his ability as commander in chief to conduct military operations in Afghanistan, the president’s senior advisers would recommend a veto,” said a statement issued by the White House Thursday evening. Defense Secretary Robert Gates said Congress needed to pass the bill by July 4. But the entire package isn’t complete. The Senate approved its version of the bill in May. And the House legislation is different. That means the issue must return to the Senate. And the Senate isn’t going to take up the bill any time soon. The Senate is out of session Friday so lawmakers may travel to West Virginia for the funeral of the late-Sen. Robert Byrd,D-W.Va. The Senate next meets July 12. The House voted down a proposal to strike all funding for the war, 376-26**. Twenty-two lawmakers voted "present.” The House also voted against a plan authored by Rep. Barbara Lee, D-Calif., to order a withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. That idea failed 321-100. In addition, the House defeated an amendment to require the president to present a withdrawal strategy to Congress next year**. The tally there was 260 nays to 162. With some unique parliamentary engineering, the bill was split into four separate sections, producing four distinct roll call votes that paid for social programs or attempted to strike all money for the war. Thus, unlike most bills, there was no definitive vote that passed the war measure

1NC – Feinstein I/L

Feinstein in favor of delaying future withdrawal

Zimmerman, ’10

[Eric Zimmerman, Intelligence Committee chairwoman open to delaying Afghan deadline, Writer @ The Hill, June 27th 2010, <http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/105763-intelligence-committee-chairwoman-open-to-delaying-afghan-deadline>]

The chairwoman of the Select Intelligence Committee said she is "absolutely" open to delaying the July 2011 date for a troop withdrawal from Afghanistan. Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) said on Fox News Sunday this morning that if Gen. David Petraeus wants more time in Afghanistan, she'd support him. "I would say give it to him, absolutely," she said. "Now, let's talk about the deadline. This is a transition point toward the beginning of a withdrawal or a draw down, as Petraeus said in his transcript before the armed services." Feinstein suggested that in the course of such a long war, an extra six months--the time period she was asked about--wouldn't be that long. "I think [Petraeus] has flexibility, realistically. Ten years is a long time to fight a war, particularly with what happened before the 10 years," she said. "And so we need to understand that to get the military trained, get the government online, secure and stabilize and, I think, do away with the drugs to a great extent -- because the drugs are now fueling the Taliban." Senate Armed Services chairman Sen. Carl Levin (D-Mich.) said this morning that Petraeus supports the July 2011 date.

1NC – McCain/Lieberman/Graham I/L

McCain, Graham, and Lieberman upset over McChrystal getting fired – Withdrawal would only escalate their anger

Hartenstein, ’10

[Meena Hartenstein, Daily News Staff Writer, June 23rd 2010, “McCain, Lieberman, leading Republicans think McChrystal's comments 'inappropriate', support Petraeus,” NY Daily News., <http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/2010/06/23/2010-06-23_mccain_lieberman_leading_republicans_think_mcchrystals_comments_inappropriate_su.html>]

In the uproar surrounding Gen. Stanley McChrystal's resignation, conservatives are staying pretty quiet. McChrystal, who was widely supported by Republicans in his role as Afghan war commander, stepped down Wednesday after his explosive comments on the administration were published in a Rolling Stone magazine article. While right wing leaders were quick to defend McChrystal's military legacy, they agreed across the board that the interview was a mistake, and were openly deferential to the President as far as what should be done. “We have the highest respect for General McChrystal and honor his brave service and sacrifice to our nation," Sens. John McCain (R-Ariz.), Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), and Joseph Lieberman (I-Conn.) said in a joint statement issued Tuesday. Obama's decision to accept McChrystal's resignation came Wednesday afternoon, but before the announcement, even the most vocal of pundits watched their words. Jim Nicholson, another guest of Hannity's and the former secretary of Veterans Affairs, said of Obama, "He is the boss... What he says goes." "If Stan McChrystal has to go--and he probably does--it will be a sad end to a career of great distinction," wrote conservative pundit William Kristol, editor of the Weekly Standard. "But the good of the mission and the prospects for victory in Afghanistan may well now demand a new commander." A lone voice calling for Obama to keep McChrystal was Fox News Contributor Charles Krauthammer, even though he acknowledged that "If Obama were to fire him, I think he would be standing on good ground." "Nonetheless," Krauthammer told Fox News, "I think it would be a mistake." Most Republican Senators seemed to be trying to stay out of the fray. "My opinion is that this is solely a matter for the commander-in-chief to decide," said Sen. Lamar Alexander (R-Tenn). "The main thing right now is that we not get distracted from the mission at hand, which is to win the war in Afghanistan," said Sen. Thune (R-S.D.), though he did acknowledge the comments were "inappropriate in terms of the chain of command." Even Sen. McCain's daughter Megan, an outspoken GOP supporter, expressed her respect for McChrystal but her disappointment in his words. "What exactly were the general and his team thinking?" she asked in a blog post for the Daily Beast. "Even if everything they said was an expression of their true feelings, they have all broken a cardinal rule by speaking negatively in a public forum. They should have known better." For now, Republicans are saving their energy to wish new Afghan Commander Gen. David Petraeus well. Texas Republican Sen. John Cornyn told the Wall Street Journal, "I am confident Gen. Petraeus will lead our troops to victory against those who seek to turn Afghanistan back into a terrorist breeding ground." And House Minority Leader John Boehner said he respected the President's decision to remove McChrystal and put Petraeus in charge. “Gen. Petraeus has also dedicated his career to this country and he deserves great credit for his leadership in helping to stabilize Iraq and bring it to a critical transition point this summer," Boehner told the Wall Street Journal Wednesday. "I believe he is the right person take over this command."

2NC – McCain/Lieberman/Graham I/L

McCain, Lieberman, and Graham opposes withdrawal – It would only encourage enemy back lash

Cahn, ’10

[Di Cahn, Writer at Stars and Stripes, Former Associated Press reporter, Worked at CNN International, July 5th 2010, “Senators warn against setting Afghanistan withdrawal date,” <http://www.stripes.com/news/middle-east/afghanistan/senators-warn-against-setting-afghanistan-withdrawal-date-1.109974?localLinksEnabled=false>]

KABUL — The number of Americans dying in Afghanistan will increase before victory is at hand, but this nine-year war can be won as long as there is no pre-set date for withdrawal of U.S. forces, three senior U.S. senators said Monday. Wrapping up a two-day visit to Afghanistan, Senators John McCain (R-Arizona), Joe Lieberman (I-Conn.) and Lindsey Graham (R-South Carolina) said they believed that the strategy now under way in Kandahar would successfully turn the tide of the war. But all three warned that any date for withdrawal needed to be based on improving conditions on the ground and that a pre-set deadline would “send an uncertain trumpet that will then encourage our enemies and discourage our friends.” “In warfare if you tell the enemy you are leaving, you are going to lose,” McCain said. “And we need to have a clear signal that the withdrawal in the middle of next year would be based only on conditions that exist at that time. I am confident that we will make progress between now and then but we must not tell the enemy we will begin leaving when we have not finished the job.” The July 2011 deadline was set in December, when President Barack Obama announced he was sending 30,000 additional troops into Afghanistan. He said that he would begin withdrawing those forces at that time if conditions allowed. Obama recently clarified that the withdrawal would be based on conditions, but the senators warned that the date was still sending a confusing message to both Afghan allies and insurgents. Lieberman, who chairs the Senate Homeland Security Committee, said Obama was trying to send a message that U.S. forces would not be in Afghanistan forever. “But of course we are not going to keep our troops here forever,” Lieberman said. “I think the setting of that date was a mistake by the president and we hear it everywhere we go here. People say that they think we are leaving. We are not going to leave until we win.” After visiting Kandahar, the senators said the operation under way in the critical southern province was pivotal in the war and while they believed the strategy was working, corruption posed a formidable obstacle. The Taliban was only half the battle. Building honest government, police that are not corrupt and a working justice system was just as critical and was “going to take some time,” said Graham, a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee and a retired colonel in the U.S. Air Force. “The people in Kandahar that we met said the Taliban are 30 percent of the problem and poor governance is 70 percent of problem,” Graham said. “I just want the American people to understand that it will get worse before it gets better in terms of casualties. But I would not ask the American people and our men and women in uniform to endure further hardships if I didn’t think it was important.” Graham also warned that members of Congress, by trying to cut spending on military contracts in Afghanistan, would hinder the building of Afghan governance. McCain said the House of Representatives did not have the votes needed to block the spending while Lieberman said it was a more of a warning call that better Afghan and American accountability measures were urgently needed. “The money we are talking about is going to help us build good governance,” Graham said. “I understand the frustration about corruption in this country. I understand we’ve been here a long time, we’ve spent a lot of money and most importantly we’ve lost over a thousand people,” he added. “But Congress needs to understand that statements like this at this point in time are ill advised. ... The money behind in question is just as important to war effort in my view as additional troops.”

1NC – McCain/Lieberman I/L

Withdrawal unpopular – won’t leave till we have won

Riechmann, ’10

[Deb. Riechmann, Associated Press Writer, July 6th 2010, “McCain: Kandahar is key to victory in Afghan war,” MSNBC, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/38095919/ns/world_news-south_and_central_asia/>]

KABUL, Afghanistan — The ranking Republican on the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee said NATO and Afghan troops will prevail in the war if they can succeed in securing and bolstering governance in the Taliban stronghold of Kandahar. Sen. John McCain, who visited Afghanistan's largest city in the south on Monday with two other U.S. lawmakers, warned of tough fighting ahead and predicted that casualties would rise in the short-term. "The Taliban know that Kandahar is the key to success or failure," McCain told a news conference at the airport in Kabul. "So what happens in this operation will have a great effect on the outcome of this conflict. But I am convinced we can succeed and will succeed, and Kandahar is obviously the key area. And if succeed there, we will succeed in the rest of this struggle." **McCain, a Republican from Arizona, also reiterated his opposition to President Barack Obama's plan to begin withdrawing troops from Afghanistan beginning in July 2011**. Obama has said that large numbers of troops would not be pulled out if conditions did not allow, but that caveat has often gotten lost in the discussion over the length of U.S. commitment to the war. McCain said he expected progress to be made in Afghanistan between now and July 2011. "But we must not tell the enemy that we will begin leaving when we have not finished the job," he said. During a two-day visit, McCain and Sen. Lindsey Graham, a Republican from South Carolina who is on the Armed Services Committee, and Sen. Joseph Lieberman, an Independent from Connecticut who is chairman of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, met with Gen. David Petraeus, the newly installed NATO commander, Afghan President Hamid Karzai and U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry. **Lieberman said he understood that Obama wanted to use the July 2011 timetable to send the message that the U.S. would not be in Afghanistan forever. Still, he said he thought the president was wrong to set it. "We hear it everywhere we go here. They say they think we're leaving. We're not going to leave until we win."**

1NC – Snowe I/L

Snowe supports Afghan troop surge

Snowe, ’09

[Olympia Snowe, Senator of Maine, April 4th 2009, “A New Path Forward in Afghanistan,” Magic City Morning Star, <http://www.magic-city-news.com/Olympia_Snowe/A_New_Path_Forward_in_Afghanistan11787.shtml>]

On March 27th, the President presented Congress and the American people with an honest assessment of our strategic position in Afghanistan and underscored that America's core mission must be redefined. President Obama also announced that along with the 17,000 additional combat troops authorized in February, he intends to send 4,000 more this fall to serve as trainers and advisers to an Afghan army expected to double in size over the next two years. Saying that this initiative will require significantly higher levels of U.S. funding for both countries, President Obama expects to increase U.S. military spending in Afghanistan by about 60 percent. The U.S. military currently spends about $2 billion a month in Afghanistan alone. Late last year, I traveled to Afghanistan and Pakistan visiting remote outposts directly along the border and met with Prime Minister Gilani of Pakistan and Afghan President Karzai as well as senior and tactical military and intelligence officers and other government officials, including Afghan Defense Minister Rahim Wardak, the Army Chief of Staff, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, the head of the ISI, Pakistan's intelligence service, General Ahmad Shuja Pasha, former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan William B. Wood, the Commander of the International Security Assistance Force, General David D. McKiernan, and the U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, Ambassador Anne W. Patterson. It was clear the United States undoubtedly stood at a crossroads on how to stem the violence in both countries. As military and civilian deaths tolls rise and the flow of militants along the porous border between Pakistan and Afghanistan continues virtually unchecked, it is abundantly clear that we must re-evaluate our strategy â€“ the security situation has deteriorated to a point that decisive action is necessary. First and foremost, **I have witnessed firsthand the unwavering dedication to duty and consummate professionalism of our troops currently in theater and there can be no denying the phenomenal capacity and readiness of our men and women to fulfill their mission and succeed at the highest levels as they employ sterling skill and training**, boundless bravery, and unconquerable mettle against forces that are truly formidable. **I support President Obama's call to increase our footprint in Afghanistan, but it is imperative that any increase in activity is carefully targeted. Moreover, the Karzai government must combat the rampant corruption inhibiting its political and economic progress and the narcotics trade that continues to enable the Taliban and al Qaeda, or every step forward the Afghan government attempts will be hobbled by these corrosive influences.** Pakistan must do more as well. Pakistan has still failed to pledge to formally cut ties between the Pakistani Intelligence Service, the ISI, and Lashkar and other extremist groups. Pakistan must take unambiguous and durable steps to distance itself from these groups. Furthermore, as the President underscored this morning, it is imperative that our NATO partners provide additional forces to train the Afghan National Army and Police as securing the region must be an international objective. Clearly, **we must act swiftly to shift the current course in Afghanistan or risk a major step back in foreign policy. We must** temporarily **increase troop levels in order to put the enemy on the defensive, initiate a full-scale civilian effort, accelerate the expansion of the Afghan National Army, improve the competency and integrity of the Afghan National Police, and most importantly, foster cross-border cooperation between the key governments in the region.**

1NC – Snowe K2 Major Bills

Snowe has huge influence on bills

Lerer, ’09

[Lisa Lerer, Covers lobbying, policy and economic issues for Politic, October 9th 2009, “The magnificent seven: Senate women pave the way,” <http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1009/27980.html>]

**Women now hold some of the most powerful posts in the Senate**. Five of 20 committees — Environment and Public Works, Intelligence, Agriculture, Ethics and Small Business — are headed by women. Washington Democratic Sen. Patty Murray is conference secretary, a leadership position that makes her the fourth-ranking Democrat in the Senate. As two of the chamber’s most moderate Republicans, Maine Sens. **Olympia Snowe and Susan Collins exert a huge amount of influence over every major bill**. And Mikulski is now the 17th-most senior senator, outranking colleagues such as John McCain (R-Ariz.), budget chief Kent Conrad (D-N.D.) and even Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.).

1NC – Republicans I/L

Republicans are unhappy with withdrawal – Calls it unrealistic and harmful

Zee News, ’10

[Zee News, “July 2011 deadline for Afghan troop withdrawal harmful: McCain,” June 29th 2010, <http://www.zeenews.com/news637524.html>]

Washington: The July 2011 deadline for troop withdrawal from Afghanistan is "unrealistic" and "harmful," Republican Senator John McCain said on Tuesday at Gen David Petraeus' confirmation hearing which was marked by bickering over the Afghan war policy. McCain said the people of Afghanistan will be far less willing to support the administration when they know that the forces will withdraw as early as July 11. "What we're trying to do in Afghanistan, as in any counterinsurgency, is to win the loyalty of the population, convince people who may dislike the insurgency, but who may also distrust their government, that they should line up with us against the Taliban and al Qaida," McCain, a ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee said, in his remarks at the confirmation hearing of Gen Petraeus. "We're asking them to take a huge risk, and they will be far less willing to run it if they think we will begin leaving in a year," he said. Obama last December set the deadline for the American troop withdrawal from Afghanistan and administration officials said this was vital to bring out results. But Republicans have not been happy with such a decision. McCain said a US Marine has put the situation in this way: "They (the people) say you'll leave in 2011, and the Taliban will chop their heads off". The same goes for the Afghan government, he argued. "We're told that setting a date to begin withdrawing would be an incentive for the Karzai administration to make better decisions and to make them more quickly. I would argue it's having the opposite effect. It's causing Afghan leaders to hedge their bets on us," he said. The Republican Presidential candidate in the 2008 American election said this was not only making the war harder, but longer. "If the president would say that success in Afghanistan is our only withdrawal plan, whether we reach it before July 2011 or afterwards, he would make the war more winnable and hasten the day when our troops can come home with honour, which is what we all want," he said. He said in addition to being "harmful", the July 2011 withdrawal date increasingly looks "unrealistic". "That date was based on assumptions made back in December about how much progress we could achieve in Afghanistan and how quickly we could achieve it," he said adding that war never works out the way one assumes. McCain said the performance of the Afghan government over the past seven months was not as rapid as was hoped. "None of this is to say that we are failing or that we will fail in Afghanistan. It just means that we need to give our strategy the necessary time to succeed. "We cannot afford to have a stay the course approach to starting our withdrawal in July 2011, when the facts on the ground are suggesting that we need more time," he said. Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl Levin, D-Michigan, meanwhile said the date was importance, as it "imparts a sense of urgency to Afghan leaders" and is an important method of "spurring action." Supporting the deadline, Petraeus, who will replace Gen Stanley McChrystal as US' top commander in Afghanistan said: "I saw (the establishment of the date) most importantly as the message of urgency to accompany the message of enormous (increased US) commitment".

2NC – Republicans I/L

Republican lawmakers are voicing opposition to Afghan withdrawal

Matthew, ’10

[Lee, Matthew, Associated Press Writer, July 4th 2010, “GOP lawmakers wary of Obama's Afghan deadline.,” Yahoo News. [http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20100704/ap\_on\_go\_co/us\_us\_afghanistan]

WASHINGTON – Leading Republican lawmakers and the Afghan ambassador to the United States are voicing opposition to President Barack Obama's plan to begin withdrawing troops from Afghanistan starting next year. Sens. John McCain and Lindsey Graham, appearing on the Sunday talk shows while in the Afghan capital, said Obama's decision to start pulling out in July 2011 is a mistake and will embolden Taliban and al-Qaida extremists. The senators and the Afghan envoy, Said Tayeb Jawad, said withdrawal should be based on a conditions on the ground, not a fixed date. Their comments came as Gen. David Petraeus assumed command of the 130,000-strong international force in Afghanistan. "We are in this to win," he said, at a time of growing casualties and skepticism about the nearly 9-year-old war. Petraeus backs the withdrawal plan but has stressed it will also be based on conditions. McCain, a former Navy pilot and the ranking Republican on Senate Armed Services Committee, called the deadline "indecipherable" and said it "certainly sounds an uncertain trumpet" to both allies and foes. "I know enough about warfare," the Arizona senator said. "I know enough about what strategy and tactics are about. If you tell the enemy that you're leaving on a date certain, unequivocally, then that enemy will wait until you leave." Graham, R-S.C., said a deadline could cripple the war effort by creating "confusion and uncertainty." "In my view, if people think we're going to leave, we have no chance of winning," he said. "It has hurt. It needs to be clarified. This confusion has hurt, hurt our friends, and emboldened our enemies.""Gen. Petraeus needs this monkey off his back," Graham said. Rep. Duncan Hunter, R-Calif., a veteran of three combat tours in Afghanistan and Iraq, said the July 2011 date "is weighing down on every commander's shoulders, from lieutenants to three-star generals." "I think it's going to be tough. I don't think we can do it in a year," he said. Independent Sen. Joe Lieberman of Connecticut said the deadline "sent a message to the Afghans, to the Taliban, to people in the neighborhood we're going to leave regardless." "We've got to win it. And therefore, you don't put that on a time line," he said from Kabul, Afghanistan. Jawad, the Afghan envoy, echoed that sentiment, saying an artificial deadline is "frankly not" a good idea. "If you overemphasize a deadline that is not realistic, you're making the enemy a lot more bold, you're prolonging the war," he said. "That deadline should be realistic, that deadline should be based on the reality on the ground. And we should give a clear message to the enemy, to the terrorists who are threat to everyone, that the United States, NATO and Afghans are there to finish this job." Jawad also denied reports that the Afghan government was not doing enough to fight graft and he rejected charges that Afghan President Hamid Karzai is himself corrupt. Such allegations have triggered deep concern in Washington and raised questions about the amount of aid the U.S. provides to Afghanistan. "There is no evidence whatsoever," he said. "President Karzai is the most hardworking president in Afghanistan. He is the most sincere partner the United States has in Afghanistan and the region." McCain was on ABC's "This Week," Graham spoke on CBS' "Face the Nation," Jawad and Hunter appeared on CNN's "State of the Union," and Lieberman was on "Fox News Sunday."

1NC – Political Capital – Internal Link

Pulling out will devastate Obama’s political will causing a republican backlash and only devastate the Afghani region

Chapman, ’10

[Steve Chapman, Writer for the Chicago Tribune, “Staying Stuck in Afghanistan,” July 11th 2010, <http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-07-11/news/ct-oped-0710-chapman-20100711_1_afghanistan-president-obama-major-withdrawal>]

It's possible that Obama will break that pattern next summer, just as it's possible that Adam Sandler will go for his doctorate. But there is no reason to bet on it. He came into office opposed to the Iraq war, unlike the Afghanistan war — and yet his schedule for withdrawal is no different from what President George W. Bush planned. Why should anyone expect him to show more nerve in Afghanistan? The political incentives are pushing him to go along with extending our presence because no president wants to be blamed for losing a war (see: Iraq, Vietnam). It's politically safer to muddle along hoping for something that can be portrayed as success than to admit failure. To think Obama will take the risk of a major withdrawal as he's running for re-election assumes him to have more backbone on national security matters than he has yet demonstrated. Time after time, forced to choose between sticking to his commitments and appeasing Republicans, he has opted for the latter — keeping Guantmo open, giving up the idea of trying Khalid Sheikh Mohammed in New York City, abandoning his campaign pledge to leave Iraq in 16 months. The only thing that would spur Obama to start a pullout would be major progress in Afghanistan, which is about as likely as a Hard Rock Cafe in Kandahar. June was the most lethal month for U.S. and NATO troops in the entire war, and this may just be the beginning. A U.N. report says the number of roadside bombings by our enemies nearly doubled in the first three months of this year. So did the number of "complex suicide attacks." Meanwhile, our allies are failing us. Corruption has proliferated, and President Hamid Karzai has not captured the hearts of his countrymen since winning a rigged election last year. The Afghan army suffers from ethnic divisions, weak leadership and an epidemic of desertion. The national police are plagued by illiteracy as well as graft. These developments do not spell "victory." Getting out of Afghanistan would be easy for Obama if things were to go well. But to get out when things are going badly would let Republicans blame him and his party ever after for what happens next. Democrats learned that lesson from Vietnam. In the end, Obama is likely to follow a well-known rule of American politics: Fighting a futile war is excusable. Ending one is not.

**1NC – Senate I/L**

Senate in favor of troop surge

Susan, ’10

[Susan Cornwell, Journalist at Reuters, July 22nd 2010, “Senate sends Afghan war funds bill back to House,” Reuters, <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE66M0HO20100723?type=politicsNews&feedType=RSS&feedName=politicsNews&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+Reuters%2FPoliticsNews+(News+%2F+US+%2F+Politics+News>]

WASHINGTON — (Reuters) -- The Senate on Thursday approved funds to pay for President Obama's Afghanistan troop increase, but refused to sign off on billions in extra nonmilitary spending sought by the House of Representatives. The move sent the legislation funding the U.S. troop surge back to an uncertain future in the House, where lawmakers in growing numbers are demanding a clearer exit plan from Afghanistan after nine years of war. The Obama administration in February asked for $33 billion to pay for the 30,000 increase in troops for Afghanistan that the president announced last December. Congress, controlled by Obama's fellow Democrats, delayed voting on the surge funds for months as domestic priorities took precedence and unease about the war grew. The House and Senate eventually passed different versions of the legislation, and are now trying to reconcile them. The Pentagon has warned Congress it may be forced to take extreme measures such as not paying salaries if the troop surge money is not passed before lawmakers begin an August recess. U.S. troops are encountering stiff resistance and mounting casualties from a resurgent Taliban, despite a six-month buildup in U.S. forces. Opinion polls suggest that doubts about the Afghanistan war are deepening among Americans. The House recently voted for the $33 billion for the troop surge after adding funds for domestic programs, including $10 billion for education jobs. And 162 House members demanded a withdrawal timetable from Afghanistan, although that amendment failed. The House version failed 46-51 to clear a procedural hurdle in the Senate on Thursday evening. Then senators, on a voice vote, insisted on the version of the war funding bill they had passed in May, including their own additions for U.S. disaster relief and aid to Haiti. They lobbed it back at the House, which is in session for one more week before the August break. The Senate is expected to stay for two more weeks. The $33 billion is to fund the Afghanistan troop surge but also includes some money for operations in Iraq, where the United States is preparing for a full troop pullout by the end of 2011. The Senate-passed bill includes an additional $4 billion for the State Department to fund the "civilian surge," bringing economic aid to Afghanistan and neighboring Pakistan. The money is in addition to about $130 billion Congress has already approved for Afghanistan and Iraq for this year -- and more than $300 billion since 2001 for the war in Afghanistan.

2AC – Democrats Support

Democrats support pullout of Afghanistan

O'Callaghan, ’10

[John O’Callaghan, Staff Writers for Reuters, “House rejects pullout from Afghanistan,” March 10th 2010, <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6293CF20100311>]

(John, Mar 10 6,) - WASHINGTON | The House of Representatives on Wednesday - Obama to pull U.S. forces from Afghanistan, in an election-year test of his decision to escalate the war. Dozens of Obama's Democrats in the House did support the pullout resolution, indicating division over war policy ahead of November congressional elections in which Republicans are expected to make gains. Sixty-five lawmakers, most of them Democrats, voted for the pullout resolution written by liberal Democratic Representative Dennis Kucinich, while 356 voted against. It was the first challenge by the Democratic majority in Congress to U.S. involvement in the conflict since Obama ordered 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan and an offensive began last month to retake the Taliban stronghold of Marjah in Helmand province. Supporters of the resolution said it was time for U.S. lawmakers to consider if they wanted to continue the nearly nine-year-old war in which about 1,000 U.S. soldiers have been killed and hundreds of billions of dollars have been spent. "Unless this Congress acts to claim its constitutional responsibility, we will stay in Afghanistan for a very, very long time at great cost to our troops and to our national priorities," Kucinich said. Detractors argued the United States could not withdraw from Afghanistan before the government there was able to provide security because the Taliban could then provide safe haven for al Qaeda once again. "I'm keenly aware that even if we remain in Afghanistan -- and here I want to emphasize this -- there's no guarantee that we will prevail in our fight against al Qaeda. But if we don't try, we are guaranteed to fail," said Representative Howard Berman, the Democratic chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Congress passed a resolution authorizing military force in Afghanistan in 2001 after the September 11 attacks by al Qaeda on the United States. But Kucinich said the 2001 vote was not intended to endorse unending war at an ever-rising price. Aware that many liberal Democrats are unhappy about the continuing war, Obama has said the plan is to start pulling U.S. forces from Afghanistan from July 2011.

2AC – Kucinich Supports

Afghan War has crippled issues at home, immediate withdrawal key – Kucinich and Harman prove

Zifcak, ’10

[Nicholas Zifcak, Epoch Times Staff -Mar 11, 2010, “Congress Rejects Early Troop Withdrawal from Afghanistan - Nonbinding resolution opens debate,” <http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/content/view/31208/>]

A resolution to withdraw U.S. Armed Forces in Afghanistan within 30 days failed Wednesday in Congress. Congressman Dennis Kucinich (D-Ohio) sparked a debate on the issue when he introduced the resolution, which was cosponsored by 21 others. The nonbinding resolution failed with 356 voting against and 65 voting for. The debate was an opportunity to explore members’ views on the issue separately from discussion about spending or appropriations legislation. Speaking about the resolution, Kucinich said the executive branch had gone too far and it is time for Congress to “weigh in on the war.” He said it was a constitutional issue because the power to authorize war lies with Congress. "We can't afford this war," said Kucinich in a video statement released on his Web site. He said that with 15 million Americans out of work, 47 million without health insurance, and 10 million who could lose their homes, “you would think it would be time for us to focus on things here at home." "America is ready to meet the challenges of global security," he said, acknowledging the need to protect against terrorism, and also “to start taking care of things at home.” California Congresswoman Jane Harman (D-Calif.) disagreed that immediate troop withdrawal is the answer. She said she too wants the U.S. military out of Afghanistan at the “earliest reasonable date,” but that accelerating Obama’s timetable “could take grievous risks with our national security.” The debate was recorded by cable channel C-Span. Harman commended Kucinich for raising the Afghanistan debate, saying presidential powers had gone too far. She said the authorization Congress gave the president to go to war back in September 2001 has been “overused and abused as the basis for policy.” Ranking Member of the Foreign Affairs Committee Congresswoman Ile Ros-Lehtinen (R-Fla.) disagreed. She said the years of effort by American forces have forced al-Qaeda and Taliban forces into the mountains, forcing them to worry about their own survival, rather than plan attacks against the United States. She said the current strategy to eliminate al-Qaeda in Afghanistan “is already producing dramatic success.” Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Howard Berman (D-Calif.) said it was good to debate the issue, but he could not support withdrawing troops without regard for the consequences. He said Obama has “left no stone unturned” or “issue unvetted” in reviewing Afghanistan strategy and “I do believe this strategy of our president’s deserves support.” In December 2009, President Obama announced the United States would deploy 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan to help build up Afghan security forces and solidify the Afghan government’s rule. According to that plan, troops will begin returning in July 2011. On his March trip to the region Defense Secretary Robert Gates said that troop withdrawal may begin before the scheduled July 2011 date. According to RTTNews, he mentioned the possible change after touring a training center near Kabul; he said withdrawal will be “conditions-based,” and will begin no later than July 2011. Congressman Patrick Kennedy angrily condemned the news media for focusing on Congressman Massa's troubles to the exclusion of substantial issues such as war authorization.

2AC – Public Supports

Withdrawal popular – majority of Americans are discouraged by high casualties

York, ’10

[Bryon York, Chief of Political Correspondent, July 2nd 2010, “How long will the public tolerate Afghan war?” The Washington Examiner, <http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/politics/How-long-will-the-public-tolerate-Afghan-war_-97625329.html>]

It was an extraordinary moment. Americans overwhelmingly supported the invasion of Afghanistan after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. In eight and a half years of war there, 1,190 American service members have died. And after all that sacrifice, the top American commander is measuring the war's progress by school attendance, child immunization and cell-phone use. That sort of nation building, especially in a place as primitive as Afghanistan, has never been popular with American voters. It's especially unpopular when combined with highly restrictive rules of engagement that have tied the hands of the nearly 100,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan, exposing them to danger from an enemy they're not allowed to strike. Petraeus has promised to review those rules in light of evidence they have caused needless American deaths. The latest example came in the Rolling Stone article that led to the firing of Petraeus' predecessor, Gen. Stanley McChrystal. The article told how U.S. commanders wanted to destroy an abandoned house used by the Taliban to launch attacks, but were denied permission. Then, a 23-year-old Army corporal was killed there. "Does that make any f--king sense?" a fellow soldier asked. "You sit and ask yourself: What are we doing here?" In another scene detailed by author Michael Hastings, a soldier confronted McChrystal about the rules. "We aren't putting fear into the Taliban," he told the general. "Winning hearts and minds in (counterinsurgency operations) is a coldblooded thing," McChrystal responded. "The Russians killed 1 million Afghans, and that didn't work." "I'm not saying go out and kill everybody, sir," the soldier responded. "You say we've stopped the momentum of the insurgency. I don't believe that's true in this area. The more we pull back, the more we restrain ourselves, the stronger it's getting." Put aside the fact that American leaders in Afghanistan are unironically using the phrase "hearts and minds" -- the very words used to describe the folly of U.S. policy in the Vietnam era. Does the American public want to continue a war in which Americans die because they're not allowed to fight back when attacked, all for the purpose of increasing school attendance, child immunization and cell-phone use? President Obama's deadline to begin withdrawing U.S. troops in July 2011 was a topic of much discussion at the Petraeus hearing. There's disagreement in the Senate over the timeline, but the public's opinion is clear. A recent Gallup survey found that 58 percent of those questioned support Obama's timetable, versus 38 percent who oppose. Of those opposed, 7 percent say they're against the timetable because withdrawal starts too late. Add them to the 58 percent who support withdrawal as scheduled, and you have 65 percent of Americans who want a withdrawal that begins no later than July of next year. Given the dreary assessments we've heard from Petraeus and McChrystal, it's unlikely any great victories in Afghanistan will change those opinions. This is not a blame-Obama issue. The first seven years of the war were not his doing. But the decision to leave or stay in Afghanistan is his to make. Near the end of the Rolling Stone article, one of McChrystal's top aides, Maj. Gen. Bill Mayville, gave a bleak forecast of the war's end. "It's not going to look like a win, smell like a win or taste like a win," Mayville said. "This is going to end in an argument." If that's the case, why not just get out and start the argument now?

Support for Afghan war has hit a new low

Langer, ’10

Support fo[Gary Langer, Director of Polling @ ABC News, July 16th 2010, “Poll: Approval of Afghan War Slips, But U.S. Uneasy About Taliban Talk, <http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/obama-loses-ground-afghanistan-wars-intensity-mounts/story?id=11170795>]

r the war in Afghanistan has hit a new low and President Obama's approval rating for handling it has declined sharply since spring – results that portend trouble for the administration as the violence there grows. The Senate passes the most sweeping financial reform since the Great Depression. With Obama's surge under way – and casualties rising – the number of Americans who say the war in Afghanistan has been worth fighting has declined from 52 percent in December to 43 percent now. And his approval rating for handling it, 56 percent in April, is down to 45 percent.

\*\*\*TALIBAN QPQ CP\*\*\*

1NC Taliban CP

TEXT: The United States federal government should [insert plan here] if and only if the Taliban will abide by the Afghan constitution, cut all ties to Al Qaeda and renounce Al Qaeda violence.

Observation 1: Competition

1. Resolved – it means the plan would be an unconditional military withdrawal

Random House ‘06

http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/resolve

re·solve to come to a definite or earnest decision about

1. Timeframe – The plan is immediately implemented, and the CP is not. Any permutation makes the plan untopical and severs initial plan advocacy

Department of Developmental and Environmental Services ‘05

“Permit Report Descriptions & Status Definitions”, http://cf.kingcounty.gov/www6/ddes/scripts/perminfo.cfm?rpt=2

RESOLVED Appealed issue has been resolved and processing completed.

Observation 2: Solvency

The Taliban will accept negotiations to recognize the Afghan constitution, cut links to Al Qaeda and renounce Al Qaeda violence

The Taliban will accept negotiations that the insurgents recognizing the Afghanistan constitution, cutting links to Al Qaeda and renouncing violence.

Oakes ‘10

Dan Oakes, Fairfax Defense and Foreign Affairs Correspondent, 7-22-10, “West Braces for a Difficult Conversation……. With the Taliban”, http://www.theage.com.au/opinion/politics/west-braces-for-a-difficult-conversation--with-the-taliban-20100722-10m5t.html?autostart=1

As the NATO-led coalition grasps that it cannot win militarily in Afghanistan, talking with the Taliban is fast gaining favour as a way of bringing the West's involvement in the country to an end. The message out of this week's Kabul conference is that the United States, in particular, is become more receptive to negotiation as a way of extricating itself. However, rather than opening up a path to a quick withdrawal, the realisation that negotiation with the insurgents is essential throws up a whole new set of problems. The US has insisted that negotiations with senior Taliban (under the rubric of "reconciliation") should be conditional on the insurgents recognising the Afghan constitution, cutting links with al-Qaeda and renouncing violence. Influential Afghans pointed out to The Age in Kabul recently that the conditions were a ludicrous attempt to negotiate from a position of weakness, and that talks would never occur unless they were unconditional. "Why would the Taliban agree to meet these conditions when they can simply wait for the Americans to go?" one said. He also predicted that the Taliban would cut al-Qaeda loose voluntarily if the Afghan government (and the US, which still publicly says it will not talk to the Taliban) negotiated in good faith, without conditions. Another other spanner in the works is Afghan President Hamid Karzai, who has made noises in the past about negotiating with the likes of brutal insurgent chiefs Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Siraj Haqqani, but produced little of substance. A delegation from Hekmatyar's Hezb-i-Islami group met Karzai in Kabul in May, but returned empty-handed. Insurgent leaders then shunned a peace jirga called by Karzai last month. Many of the powerful warlords who nominally support Karzai have a long history of warring with the groups broadly defined as "Taliban" and would not favour a truce between the national government and the insurgents. There would also be opposition to any accommodation with the Taliban from ethnic groups who were persecuted when the Taliban was in power. Groups such as the Hazara are petrified of a resurgent Taliban, particularly as areas such as the Hazara stronghold of Bamiyan province are now among the most secure in Afghanistan. Having said that, the governor of Bamiyan, Dr Habiba Sarabi, who as a Hazara and a woman has more to lose than most if the Taliban regain power, told The Age last week that she accepted there was a need to talk to the Taliban in some capacity. The second leg of engagement with the Taliban is the policy of "reintegration", by which the national government hopes to convince rank and file insurgents to lay down their weapons. However, it is unclear what the insurgents, most of whom are Afghan peasants, are supposed to be "reintegrated" into. When The Age asked a senior US official in Afghanistan that question last week, he struggled to answer, eventually admitting they were really asking Taliban fighters to "change sides". Deputy US Ambassador to Afghanistan James Keith said last week that the national government would reach out to insurgents who were fighting because they wanted stability in their villages. But what if the kind of stability they want is that provided by the Taliban? Anecdotal evidence is that more Afghans in provinces with a strong insurgent presence are going to the Taliban for adjudication in civil matters, believing they will receive a fair hearing and will not be hit up for bribes. The perception might be that, in accepting negotiation is necessary, the US and its allies have seen the light at the end of the tunnel. But the insurgents hold the upper hand. Talking will bring a whole new set of challenges.

1NC Pashtun Net Benefit [1/2]

If the Taliban can’t have Afghanistan, they would take over a nuclear armed Pakistan with Al Qaeda at their side – sparks nuclear war between India and Pakistan

Morgan ‘07

Stephen, British Labor Party and Political Psychologist, “Better another Taliban Afghanistan, than a Taliban Nuclear Pakistan, http://www.electricarticles.com/display.aspx?id=639

It took the Soviets 10 years and the loss of 15,000 troops before they admitted they admitted defeat in Afghanistan. For the West, it will not take so long for the slow bleed to becomes a haemorrhage. It will be only a matter of one or two years, at the most before, Afghanistan falls and the country collapses again into fragmentation and internal civil war. It may indeed come sooner. The Soviets were prepared to fight to the death in Afghanistan because they knew the edge of their empire was crumbling and a domino effect on its other republics would follow. The Soviet bureaucracy was fighting for its life. In Cold War terms it would have been the equivalent of the US loosing Mexico to communism. The US and NATO forces don’t have anything like the same motivation, determination and commitment to fight to the end in Afghanistan. The nature of catastrophy and abysmal defeat in Iraq fundamentally undermines the psychological foundations of any successful defence of the Kabul regime. The failure of new “surge” will embolden the Taliban and undermine confidence in the West among the Afghan people and among the warlord Mujahedin, who dominate its government. Collapse in Iraq will intensify the sense of hopelessness and pointlessness among Western forces and hasten demoralization and defeat. They are low on adequate resources and relegated in importance. The former British Commander of NATO forces admitted that last year they came close to losing Kandahar, the second city. It is not ruled out that much of the south and east could fall into Taliban hands this year, paving the way for the fall of Kabul, the year after. The Taliban are ferocious fighters, with a messianic fervour to fight to the death. They bring with them the experience of veterans of the brutal Soviet war and the civil war which followed. Now regrouped, rearmed, their forces are prepared both for unfavourable open combat of almost suicidal proportions. Furthermore they are opportunistically changing tactics, both in order to create maximum urban destabilization and to win local support in the countryside. Boasting of more than 1,000 suicide volunteer bombers, they have also renounced their former policy against heroin cultivation, thus allowing them to win support among the rural population and gain support from local tribes, warlords and criminal gangs, who have been alienated by NATO policies of poppy field destruction. Although disliked and despised in many quarters, the Taliban could not advance without the support or acquiescence of parts of the population, especially in the south. In particular, the Taliban is drawing on backing from the Pashtun tribes from whom they originate. The southern and eastern areas have been totally out of government control since 2001. Moreover, not only have they not benefited at all from the Allied occupation, but it is increasingly clear that with a few small centres of exception, all of the country outside Kabul has seen little improvement in its circumstances. The conditions for unrest are ripe and the Taliban is filling the vacuum. The Break-Up of Afghanistan? However, the Taliban is unlikely to win much support outside of the powerful Pashtun tribes. Although they make up a majority of the nation, they are concentrated in the south and east. Among the other key minorities, such as Tajiks and Uzbeks, who control the north they have no chance of making new inroads. They will fight the Taliban and fight hard, but their loyalty to the NATO and US forces is tenuous to say the least. The Northern Alliance originally liberated Kabul from the Taliban without Allied ground support. The Northern Alliance are fierce fighters, veterans of the war of liberation against the Soviets and the Afghanistan civil war. Mobilized they count for a much stronger adversary than the NATO and US forces. It is possible that, while they won’t fight for the current government or coalition forces, they will certainly resist any new Taliban rule. They may decide to withdraw to their areas in the north and west of the country. This would leave the Allied forces with few social reserves, excepting a frightened and unstable urban population in Kabul, much like what happened to the Soviets. Squeezed by facing fierce fighting in Helmund and other provinces, and, at the same time, harried by a complementary tactic of Al Qaeda-style urban terrorism in Kabul, sooner or later, a “Saigon-style” evacuation of US and Allied forces could be on the cards. The net result could be the break-up and partition of Afghanistan into a northern and western area and a southern and eastern area, which would include the two key cities of Kandahar and, the capital Kabul. The Taliban themselves, however may decide not to take on the Northern Alliance and fighting may concentrate on creating a border between the two areas, about which the two sides may reach an agreement regardless of US and Allied plans or preferences. The Taliban may claim the name Afghanistan or might opt for “Pashtunistan” – a long-standing, though intermittent demand of the Pashtuns, within Afghanistan and especially along the ungovernable border regions inside Pakistan. It could not be ruled out that the Taliban could be aiming to lead a break away of the Pakistani Pashtuns to form a 30 million strong greater Pashtun state, encompassing some 18 million Pakistani Pashtuns and 12 Afghan Pashtuns. Although the Pashtuns are more closely linked to tribal and clan loyalty, there exists a strong latent embryo of a Pashtun national consciousness and the idea of an independent Pashtunistan state has been raised regularly in the past with regard to the disputed territories common to Afghanistan and Pakistan. The area was cut in two by the “Durand Line”, a totally artificial border between created by British Imperialism in the 19th century. It has been a question bedevilling relations between the Afghanistan and Pakistan throughout their history, and with India before Partition. It has been an untreated, festering wound which has lead to sporadic wars and border clashes between the two countries and occasional upsurges in movements for Pashtun independence. In fact, is this what lies behind the current policy of appeasement President Musharraf of Pakistan towards the Pashtun tribes in along the Frontiers and his armistice with North Waziristan last year? Is he attempting to avoid further alienating Pashtun tribes there and head–off a potential separatist movement in Pakistan, which could develop from the Taliban’s offensive across the border in Afghanistan? Trying to subdue the frontier lands has proven costly and unpopular for Musharraf. In effect, he faces exactly the same problems as the US and Allies in Afghanistan or Iraq. Indeed, fighting Pashtun tribes has cost him double the number of troops as the US has lost in Iraq. Evidently, he could not win and has settled instead for an attempted political solution. When he agreed the policy of appeasement and virtual self-rule for North Waziristan last year, President Musharraf stated clearly that he is acting first and foremost to protect the interests of Pakistan. While there was outrageous in Kabul, his deal with the Pashtuns is essentially an effort to firewall his country against civil war and disintegration. In his own words, what he fears most is, the « Talibanistation » of the whole Pashtun people, which he warns could inflame the already fierce fundamentalist and other separatist movement across his entire country. He does not want to open the door for any backdraft from the Afghan war to engulf Pakistan. Musharraf faces the nationalist struggle in Kashmir, an insurgency in Balochistan, unrest in the Sindh, and growing terrorist bombings in the main cities. There is also a large Shiite population and clashes between Sunnis and Shias are regular. Moreover, fundamentalist support in his own Armed Forces and Intelligence Services is extremely strong. So much so that analyst consider it likely that the Army and Secret Service is protecting, not only top Taliban leaders, but Bin Laden and the Al Qaeda central leadership thought to be entrenched in the same Pakistani borderlands. For the same reasons, he has not captured or killed Bin Laden and the Al Qaeda leadership. Returning from the frontier provinces with Bin Laden’s severed head would be a trophy that would cost him his own head in Pakistan. At best he takes the occasional risk of giving a nod and a wink to a US incursion, but even then at the peril of the chagrin of the people and his own military and secret service. The Break-Up of Pakistan? Musharraf probably hopes that by giving de facto autonomy to the Taliban and Pashtun leaders now with a virtual free hand for cross border operations into Afghanistan, he will undercut any future upsurge in support for a break-away independent Pashtunistan state or a “Peoples’ War” of the Pashtun populace as a whole, as he himself described it. However events may prove him sorely wrong. Indeed, his policy could completely backfire upon him. As the war intensifies, he has no guarantees that the current autonomy may yet burgeon into a separatist movement. Appetite comes with eating, as they say. Moreover, should the Taliban fail to re-conquer al of Afghanistan, as looks likely, but captures at least half of the country, then a Taliban Pashtun caliphate could be established which would act as a magnet to separatist Pashtuns in Pakistan.

1NC Pashtun Net Benefit [2/2]

Then, the likely break up of Afghanistan along ethnic lines, could, indeed, lead the way to the break up of Pakistan, as well. Strong centrifugal forces have always bedevilled the stability and unity of Pakistan, and, in the context of the new world situation, the country could be faced with civil wars and popular fundamentalist uprisings, probably including a military-fundamentalist coup d’état. Fundamentalism is deeply rooted in Pakistan society. The fact that in the year following 9/11, the most popular name given to male children born that year was “Osama” (not a Pakistani name) is a small indication of the mood. Given the weakening base of the traditional, secular opposition parties, conditions would be ripe for a coup d’état by the fundamentalist wing of the Army and ISI, leaning on the radicalised masses to take power. Some form of radical, military Islamic regime, where legal powers would shift to Islamic courts and forms of shira law would be likely. Although, even then, this might not take place outside of a protracted crisis of upheaval and civil war conditions, mixing fundamentalist movements with nationalist uprisings and sectarian violence between the Sunni and minority Shia populations. The nightmare that is now Iraq would take on gothic proportions across the continent. The prophesy of an arc of civil war over Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq would spread to south Asia, stretching from Pakistan to Palestine, through Afghanistan into Iraq and up to the Mediterranean coast. Undoubtedly, this would also spill over into India both with regards to the Muslim community and Kashmir. Border clashes, terrorist attacks, sectarian pogroms and insurgency would break out. A new war, and possibly nuclear war, between Pakistan and India could no be ruled out. Atomic Al Qaeda Should Pakistan break down completely, a Taliban-style government with strong Al Qaeda influence is a real possibility. Such deep chaos would, of course, open a “Pandora's box” for the region and the world. With the possibility of unstable clerical and military fundamentalist elements being in control of the Pakistan nuclear arsenal, not only their use against India, but Israel becomes a possibility, as well as the acquisition of nuclear and other deadly weapons secrets by Al Qaeda. Invading Pakistan would not be an option for America. Therefore a nuclear war would now again become a real strategic possibility. This would bring a shift in the tectonic plates of global relations. It could usher in a new Cold War with China and Russia pitted against the US. What is at stake in “the half-forgotten war” in Afghanistan is far greater than that in Iraq. But America’s capacities for controlling the situation are extremely restricted. Might it be, in the end, they are also forced to accept President Musharraf's unspoken slogan of Better another Taliban Afghanistan, than a Taliban NUCLEAR Pakistan!

Extinction

Fai ‘01

Executive Director of the Washington-based Kashmiri American Council (Dr. Ghulam Nabi, “India Pakistan Summit and the Issue of Kashmir,” 7/8, Washington Times

The foreign policy of the United States in South Asia should move from the lackadaisical and distant (with India crowned with a unilateral veto power) to aggressive involvement at the vortex. The most dangerous place on the planet is Kashmir, a disputed territory convulsed and illegally occupied for more than 53 years and sandwiched between nuclear-capable India and Pakistan. It has ignited two wars between the estranged South Asian rivals in 1948 and 1965, and a third could trigger nuclear volleys and a nuclear winter threatening the entire globe. The United States would enjoy no sanctuary. This apocalyptic vision is no idiosyncratic view. The Director of Central Intelligence, the Department of Defense, and world experts generally place Kashmir at the peak of their nuclear worries. Both India and Pakistan are racing like thoroughbreds to bolster their nuclear arsenals and advanced delivery vehicles. Their defense budgets are climbing despite widespread misery amongst their populations. Neither country has initialed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, or indicated an inclination to ratify an impending Fissile Material/Cut-off Convention

1NC Terrorism Net Benefit

Negotiating with the Taliban is only way to solve terrorism

Rubin ‘09

Barnett R. Rubin, PhD Director of Studies and a Senior Fellow at New York University’s Center on International Cooperation and served as an adviser to the Special Representative of the Secretary General at the UN Talks on Afghanistan in Bonn in 2001, ‘Survival: Global Politics and Strategy,’ vol. 51, February–March 2009, pp. 83–96 “The Way Forward in Afghanistan: Three Views,” Section 1: End the War on Terror, <http://www.iiss.org/publications/survival/survival-2009/year-2009-issue-1/the-way-forward-in-afghanistan-three-views/>

The ‘war on terror’, which amalgamated all Islamist groups that used violence into a common threat, strengthened its primary target, al-Qaeda, by creating incentives for local groups treated as ‘terrorists’ to ally themselves with al-Qaeda. All handbooks of war, dating back at least to Sun Tzu, have recommended dividing the enemy. The ‘war on terror’ did the opposite. While counter-terrorism requires military and intelligence tools, only a drastic strategic reorientation can provide those with their required politi- cal complement. In the Afghan context, such a clear, public reorientation of counter-terrorism policies should lead the United States and its partners in Afghanistan to offer political negotiations to any Taliban and other insur- gents who are willing to separate themselves from al-Qaeda. Such a policy has been in effect formally for several years, but related policies on sanc- tions, detention and reintegration have not been restructured to reflect that stance. Political accommodation with groups that accept effective guaran- tees against the creation or protection of terrorist sanctuaries will require reciprocal US guarantees against detention or sanctions for any leader willing to enter into such an agreement. Thus far the United States has no mechanism to assure that such a guarantee is observed by the multitude of agencies involved in the counter-terrorism effort. The same shift in counter-terrorism policy should apply to Pakistan, though it will take a different form. The United States should support efforts by the elected government of Pakistan to separate Pakistani insurgents from al-Qaeda and other foreign fighters, in particular by supporting programmes to reform the status of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas to address the grievances and isolation of the population there. Separating Afghan or Pakistani Islamic insurgents from al-Qaeda would constitute a serious political setback for the latter that would damage its claims to legitimacy and its recruitment capacity in the Islamic world. Much of the diffuse international sympathy for al-Qaeda (now on the decline) derives from resistance to ‘occupations’ of Afghanistan and Iraq. Any political settlement with Afghan insurgents, especially the Taliban leadership, would deprive al-Qaeda of that claim.

Terrorism leads to extinction

Speice ‘06

Speice 06 JD Candidate @ College of William and Mary, Patrick F., Jr., “NEGLIGENCE AND NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION: ELIMINATING THE CURRENT LIABILITY BARRIER TO BILATERAL U.S.-RUSSIAN NONPROLIFERATION ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS,” William & Mary Law Review, February 2006, 47 Wm and Mary L. Rev. 1427

Accordingly, there is a significant and ever-present risk that terrorists could acquire a nuclear device or fissile material from Russia as a result of the confluence of Russian economic decline and the end of stringent Soviet-era nuclear security measures. 39 Terrorist groups could acquire a nuclear weapon by a number of methods, including "steal[ing] one intact from the stockpile of a country possessing such weapons, or ... [being] sold or given one by [\*1438] such a country, or [buying or stealing] one from another subnational group that had obtained it in one of these ways." 40 Equally threatening, however, is the risk that terrorists will steal or purchase fissile material and construct a nuclear device on their own. Very little material is necessary to construct a highly destructive nuclear weapon. 41 Although nuclear devices are extraordinarily complex, the technical barriers to constructing a workable weapon are not significant. 42 Moreover, the sheer number of methods that could be used to deliver a nuclear device into the United States makes it incredibly likely that terrorists could successfully employ a nuclear weapon once it was built. 43 Accordingly, supply-side controls that are aimed at preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear material in the first place are the most effective means of countering the risk of nuclear terrorism. 44 Moreover, the end of the Cold War eliminated the rationale for maintaining a large military-industrial complex in Russia, and the nuclear cities were closed. 45 This resulted in at least 35,000 nuclear scientists becoming unemployed in an economy that was collapsing. 46 Although the economy has stabilized somewhat, there [\*1439] are still at least 20,000 former scientists who are unemployed or underpaid and who are too young to retire, 47 raising the chilling prospect that these scientists will be tempted to sell their nuclear knowledge, or steal nuclear material to sell, to states or terrorist organizations with nuclear ambitions. 48 The potential consequences of the unchecked spread of nuclear knowledge and material to terrorist groups that seek to cause mass destruction in the United States are truly horrifying. A terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon would be devastating in terms of immediate human and economic losses. 49 Moreover, there would be immense political pressure in the United States to discover the perpetrators and retaliate with nuclear weapons, massively increasing the number of casualties and potentially triggering a full-scale nuclear conflict. 50 In addition to the threat posed by terrorists, leakage of nuclear knowledge and material from Russia will reduce the barriers that states with nuclear ambitions face and may trigger widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons. 51 This proliferation will increase the risk of nuclear attacks against the United States [\*1440] or its allies by hostile states, 52 as well as increase the likelihood that regional conflicts will draw in the United States and escalate to the use of nuclear weapons. 53

2NC Turns Case

Quick, unconditioned withdrawal fails – would empower the Taliban and increase threats to international security, turning case

Schröder ‘09

Gerhard, German politician, and was Chancellor of Germany, “The Way Forward in Afghanistan”, February 12, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,607205,00.html

What does this mean, in terms of consequences? It means that we cannot unilaterally withdraw from Afghanistan right away. This would represent an abdication of international responsibility and a turning away from the community of nations. This is because our involvement is subject to the resolutions of the United Nations. More than 50,000 soldiers from 41 countries, including many Muslims, are active in Afghanistan. For this reason, demands for an immediate withdrawal are irresponsible. Such a withdrawal would strengthen the Taliban and, in the worst case, give it control over the entire country. This would be a setback for Afghan society and it would represent a great threat to international security. Moreover, we should not forget the successes of recent years in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Eighty-five percent of the population now has access to health care, 6 million children are back in school and 2 million of them are girls. Roads, wells and sewage canals are being built. The people were able to freely elect their country's leaders. These are successes that serve as a basis for the further development of a free and sovereign Afghanistan. But we also know that development is not possible without peace. Civil development is the Taliban's greatest enemy, which is why it fights such progress. For this reason, military protection of development activities remains indispensible. But when women and men from Germany, working as soldiers, aid workers, police officers or diplomats are risking their lives and, unfortunately, sometimes losing them for the sake of peace and stability in Afghanistan, a critical interim assessment of this involvement, which has existed for more than seven years now, is certainly appropriate. And the question of how much longer this is supposed to last is also appropriate. I believe that the Bundeswehr's mission can be ended within 10 years. The goal of international involvement in Afghanistan is to place responsibility for the country into the hands of Afghans, but also to ensure that the country does not once again become a safe haven and training ground for international terrorism. At this time, these conditions for a withdrawal of international troops from Afghanistan are far from having been fulfilled. The security situation has deteriorated in the last three years. This has also affected the north of the country, where German troops are active. The resurgence of the Taliban is a consequence of the policies of the Bush administration, which seriously neglected developments in Afghanistan. At the 2002 NATO summit in Prague, I already warned that an Iraq campaign would result in the weakening of the international anti-terror coalition and that we would be distracted from the actual conflict with terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The difficult security situation in Afghanistan is a consequence of this mistaken approach. This dilemma is aggravated by the fact that in the regions where the Americans bear the principal responsibility, a disproportionately greater amount of weight is assigned to the military component than to civil reconstruction. In the north, on the other hand, the Bundeswehr is very well regarded by the local population because of its commitment to reconstruction. This is also reflected in a more stable security situation.

Taliban Say Yes

**Taliban Would break ties with Al Qaeda, they perceive it as in their best interest**

Shah ‘10

Jay Shah, Congressman and Researcher in Foreign Affairs, 2-10-10, “The Afghanistan Campaign Part 2: The Taliban Strategy” http://jayshah.net/archives/192

So, in addition to fighting the current military battle, there is a great deal of factional fighting and political maneuvering with other Afghan centers of power. At a bare minimum, the Taliban intend to ensure that they remain the single strongest power in the country, with not only the largest share of the pie in Kabul (the ability to dominate) but also a significant degree of power and autonomy within their core areas in the south and east of the country. But within the movement (which is [a very diffuse and complex set of entities](http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100212_border_playbill_militant_actors_afghanpakistani_frontier)), there is a great deal of debate about what objectives are reasonably achievable. Like the Shia in Iraq, who originally aspired to total dominance in the early days following the fall of the Baathist regime and have since moderated their goals, the Taliban have recognized that some degree of power sharing is necessary. The ultimate objective of the Taliban — resumption of power at the national level — is somewhat dependent on how events play out in the coming years. The objective of attaining the apex of power is not in dispute, but the best avenue — be it reconciliation or fighting it out until the United States begins to draw down — and how exactly that apex might be defined is still being debated. But there is an important caveat to the Taliban’s ambitions. Having held power in Kabul, they are wary of returning there in a way that would ultimately render them an international pariah state, as they were in the 1990s. When the Taliban first came to power, only Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates recognized the regime, and the group’s leadership became intimately familiar with the challenges of attempting to govern a country without wider international recognition. It was under this isolation that the Taliban allied with al Qaeda, which provided them with men, money and equipment. Now it is using al Qaeda again, this time not just as a force multiplier but, even more important, as a potential bargaining chip at the negotiating table. Mullah Omar, the Taliban’s central leader, wants to get off the international terrorist watch list, and there have been signals from various elements of the Taliban that the group is willing to abandon al Qaeda for the right price. This countervailing consideration also contributes to the Taliban’s objective — and particularly the means to achieving that objective — remaining in flux.

Taliban Say Yes

**Afghanistan Taliban would negotiate with the U.S. – 4 reasons**

**Naiman ‘10**

Robert Naiman, Policy Director and Foreign Policy, 6-12-10, “Could a ‘Great Negotiation’ End the War in Afghanistan” <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-naiman/could-a-great-negotiation_b_643147.html>, Accessed July 15, 2010

A commonly proffered argument against negotiations to end the war in Afghanistan has been: "why should the Afghan Taliban negotiate, when they think they are winning?" For many months, this argument was offered by administration officials to explain why they would not yet pursue serious negotiations with senior leaders of the Afghan Taliban. More recently, administration officials are saying that they have moved significantly. Newsweek [reports](http://www.newsweek.com/2010/07/04/the-afghan-endgame.html): “Washington is eager to make [peace negotiations with high-ranking insurgents] happen -- perhaps more eager than most Americans realize."There was a major policy shift that went completely unreported in the last three months," a senior administration official tells Newsweek..."We're going to support Afghan-led reconciliation [with the Taliban]." U.S. officials have quietly dropped the Bush administration's resistance to talks with senior Taliban and are doing whatever they can to help Karzai open talks with the insurgents, although they still say any Taliban willing to negotiate must renounce violence, reject Al Qaeda, and accept the Afghan Constitution. (Some observers predict that those preconditions may eventually be fudged into goals.)” The administration's shift -- if real -- is tremendously good news for ending the war. But even if this accurately reflects the intentions of the administration, the arguments made earlier against serious negotiations are still politically powerful, in part because the administration made them, and will likely be thrown back in the administration's face by some of its Republican critics if efforts at a negotiated settlement begin to bear fruit. Therefore, these arguments still need to be countered, even if the administration is no longer making them. To the claim that the Afghan Taliban has no reason to negotiate because they believe they are winning, there are several straightforward answers: 1) not every negotiation that ends a war follows a military defeat by one side over the other; 2) politicians close to the Afghan Taliban have been saying for months that a political settlement is possible if the U.S. is seriously interested; 3) waiting to open negotiations until some hoped-for military position is achieved is likely to lead nowhere: as one Western diplomat [told](http://www.newsweek.com/2010/07/04/the-afghan-endgame.html) Newsweek, "Waiting for the perfect security situation is like having a baby ... There's never a right time"; and 4) the primary responsibility of Americans, if we want to end the war, is to ensure that our government is doing all it can to bring about a negotiated end to the war, not to handicap the stance towards negotiations of other actors. Regarding the first point -- not every negotiation that ends a war follows a military defeat -- a key obstacle to moving the debate forward in the U.S. is that most Americans don't know much diplomatic history. We learn in school that American and French forces won a decisive military victory over the British at Yorktown in 1781 that essentially ended the war -- but how did it come to be that half of the forces assembled against the British at Yorktown were French? That's part of the diplomatic history that we don't spend much time studying in school. This ignorance makes us vulnerable to facile slogans that assume the all-conquering efficacy of military force and dismiss the possible efficacy of alternatives. For the neocons in both parties, all you need to need to know about the diplomatic history of the world since Adam and Eve were expelled from the Garden is that diplomatic efforts to avert the Second World War failed in Munich in 1938. For the neocons, every argument is a noun, a verb, and Neville Chamberlain.

Taliban Say Yes

Taliban are willing to negotiate

Giustozzi ‘10

Antonio Giustozzi, a research fellow at the Crisis States Research Centre, “Negotiating with the Taliban issues and Prospects,” London School of Economics and author or editor of several articles and papers on Afghanistan, as well as of three books, a century Foundation report, www.tcf.org/publications/internationalaffairs/Giustozzi.pdf

As mentioned already, the recent divergences among Taliban leadership over the pace and substance of possible negotiations with ISAF and Kabul might be at the source of the Taliban internal crisis of February 2010. While it seems obvious that the minority of Afghan Taliban more closely linked to al Qaeda and other international jihadist groups would oppose a political settlement, after the death of Mullah Dadullah in 2007, this component of the movement has been quite marginal inside Afghanistan; the series of defeats and the loss of several of its more prominent leaders have also weakened the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which had in a sense taken the leadership of the radical wing of the Taliban. Although information concerning the attitude of the rest of the Taliban is scant, their positioning during 2009 seemed to indicate at least some interest in negotiations: consultations with elders and mullahs in the refugee camps of Pakistan, attempts to improve the image of the Taliban, particularly in terms of concerns for the plight of civilians caught in the crossfire, and so on. The unofficial Taliban “representatives” in Kabul, formally reconciled with the Kabul government, but believed to remain in con- tact with their old colleagues, claim that the Taliban would negotiate subject to some key conditions being met.24

Current US policy sets the scene for effective negotiations

Barakat and Zyck ‘09

Sultan Barakat and Steven Zyck. Sultan Barakat, Professor of Politics and Director, Post-war Reconstruction & Development Unit, Department of Politics at the University of York, and Steven Zyck, a Research Fellow there. Mar 3, 2010, “Afghanistan’s Insurgency and the Viability of a Political Settlement,” www.uspolicy.be/issues/afghanistan/afghanistan2.asp

Providing such legitimacy remains politically difficult both within an Afghan government that includes many of the Taliban’s former enemies and within a U.S.-led coalition that, until recently, clung to a policy of non-negotiation. Even considering such an option will require, as Neumann suggested in his confidential message of 1971, accepting “nothing as granted, as too holy or sanctified by contemporary or past doctrine to be unchallenged”.46 Yet, the feasibility of pursuing a negotiated political settlement with the Taliban is aided by the basic fact that many of the current American and international priorities will be critical in “softening up the ground” for power-sharing discussions and discouraging the Taliban’s belief, as reflected by Adam Roberts, that “they are in a position of strength.

Taliban Say Yes

The Taliban would accept incorporation into the government

Barakat and Zyck ‘09

Sultan Barakat and Steven Zyck. Sultan Barakat, Professor of Politics and Director, Post-war Reconstruction & Development Unit, Department of Politics at the University of York, and Steven Zyck, a Research Fellow there. Mar 3, 2010, “Afghanistan’s Insurgency and the Viability of a Political Settlement,” www.uspolicy.be/issues/afghanistan/afghanistan2.asp

Finally, and least discussed, many Taliban, including those at the higher echelons, initially viewed a resurgence of violence as a means of gaining admission to the government after the Bonn Agreement had excluded their formal participation. According to former Taliban members, when the government’s or international community’s anticipated ges- tures of goodwill failed to materialize and the insurgency gained momentum, the hopes for a collaborative co-existence subsided.44 The Taliban and its associates started to adopt a secondary strategy to carve out substantial portions of land beyond the control of the government. Despite the success of this approach, with 10 to 30 percent of Afghanistan under the control of insurgent groups and less than a third effectively “held” by the state, Taliban experts maintain that offers of power-sharing remain a high priority for Mullah Omar, Hekmatyar, and others.45 While the insurgency may be capable of re-creating an “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan,” as the country was known by the Taliban, this goal would likely come far into the future and at great cost. In the process, the Taliban and its affiliates would lose substantial numbers of fighters and commanders and once again be- come internationally marginalized; the Taliban’s security would constantly be under threat from the United States (among others), and the insurgents’ presently growing popularity would be squandered through the brutality necessary for pacifying ethnic minorities and its numerous ethnic Pashtun opponents. As a result, the insurgency would prefer only one thing more than contested, partial rule—the legitimacy provided by incorporation into the Afghan state. This factor, more than any other, suggests that a conditions negotiated political settlement is, under the right, possible.

A2: Perm – Generic (Theory)

1. Perm severs
   1. Resolved – it means the aff must unconditionally withdraw troops from Afghanistan – they must be resolved that the plan should be done no matter what - that’s Random House.
   2. Timeframe – Resolved also means the plan must take place immediately. That’s Department of Developmental and Environmental Services. The counterplan waits to withdraw until Afghanistan meets certain requirements. Immediate implementation is best – otherwise, affs can just reclarify that their plan happens after the uniqueness to our disads passes.
   3. Resolutional competition is best – It’s the basis for all our neg research, and even if we lose this they’re still in a double-bind – either they sever “resolved”, or their plan isn’t resolved and they’re not topical, which is an independent voting issue for fairness – they’ve conceded our definitions and standards.
   4. Voter – Severance allows the aff to dodge all our links for disads and counterplans
2. We don’t need to win that they guarantee enforcement for the CP to be competitive – the CP tests the opportunity cost of unconditional Afghanistan withdrawal
3. Functional competition is best –
   1. Forces better policy-making skills – Functional competition forces better policy making because the aff has to be able to explain how policies could actually work together instead of only combining words
   2. More real world – Congressional bills are thousands of pages, so it’s better to debate how functionally competitive the CP is

A2: Perm – Generic

Mutual exclusivity – the plan and CP are incompatible

CNN ‘09

“Lawmakers question 2011 Afghan exit plan”, December 3, http://edition.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/12/02/obama.afghanistan

Announcing a firm date for starting an American withdrawal while also saying such a withdrawal depends on conditions in Afghanistan "are two incompatible statements**,"** said Sen. John McCain of Arizona, the Senate Armed Services Committee's ranking Republican. "You either have a winning strategy ... and then once it's succeeded, then we withdraw or, as the president said, we will have a date [for] beginning withdrawal in July 2011. Which is it? It's got to be one or the other. It's got to be the appropriate conditions, or it's got to be an arbitrary date. You can't have both."

A2: Perm: Condition Other Things – Time is Now

U.S. should leave Afghanistan if Al Qaeda would pledge to the Afghanistan constitution and leave Al Qaeda. The time to do it is now

Rafiq ‘10

Arif Rafiq is president of Vizier Consulting, LLC, which provides strategic guidance on Middle East and South Asian political and security issues, 7-8-10, July 8, 2010, p. Lexis

Nearly six months into the United States surge in Afghanistan and six months prior to the White House's review of the Afghan war strategy, it's clear our mission in Afghanistan is not only failing, but beyond repair.

Only a political solution can bring lasting peace to Afghanistan and extract the US from this messy conflict. And given Washington's bleak military predicament, it must begin to give precedence to a political reconciliation process with the senior Taliban leadership now, rather than next year. The surge's goal is to blunt the Taliban's advance within a year's time and force it to negotiate from a position of weakness. But the Taliban, rather than weakened, is ascendant and will probably remain so. A recent US Defense Department assessment indicates that most of Afghanistan's key 121 districts are neutral or sympathetic toward the Taliban, or even staunchly support it. Meanwhile, the Taliban has stymied efforts to establish the Afghan government's writ in the restive south - the Taliban heartland and the war's center of gravity. The so called government in a box, or quickly-installable local government, has come to the southern provinces of Helmand and Kandahar - but that box is a coffin. The Taliban has assassinated local government officials essential to efforts to win over the locals by improving their quality of life. Insurgents have returned to the town of Marja after the offensive there this spring. And operations in the neighboring Kandahar Province, originally scheduled for this month, have been delayed at least until early autumn, due to the Marja operation's failure. The status quo - a violent, fractured Afghanistan that is occupied by foreign troops and led by a corrupt, incompetent, and legitimacy-lacking government - benefits the Taliban, who as sons of the soil, can remain in a state of war perhaps indefinitely. But the United States cannot afford to sink deeper into the Afghan quicksand. The war in Afghanistan currently costs American taxpayers between $100 million and $200 million annually. A prolonged, ambitious engagement of up to 10 more years - advocated by some conservatives - could cost the US over a trillion dollars. Fortunately, there is a nascent peace process led by the Afghan and Pakistani governments that Washington can capitalize on. Both Afghan President Hamid Karzai and the Pakistani Army are engaged in outreach to the three major Afghan insurgent parties: the Mullah Omar-led Taliban, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-i Islami, and the network of Jalaluddin and Sirajuddin Haqqani. This initiative is Washington's ticket for a safe and honorable exit from Afghanistan. Washington should let Mr. Karzai and the Pakistan Army take the lead in forging a lasting Afghan peace. Indeed, the military-intelligence establishment of Pakistan is the only entity that has the leverage to bring the Taliban to the table. While the extent of the Pakistani military's support for the Taliban is unclear, it has senior Taliban figures in its custody and the Taliban is dependent on Pakistani havens to wage its fight in Afghanistan. As a result, the Pakistani military is equipped with powerful levers to push the Taliban toward talks. Washington can do its part by coaxing non-Pashtuns, who are reluctant to make peace with the Taliban, into the peace process, and ensure that a political settlement to the Afghan war includes all its major power factions. President Obama announced the start date for a US withdrawal, but it was very vague. There is no complete schedule. Peace with the Taliban would probably require a phased departure of Western troops on a fixed timetable that explicitly states the date for a final withdrawal of coalition forces. The vacuum left by departing Western troops could be filled by peacekeepers from nonneighboring Muslim states, such as Jordan and Turkey. In exchange, the Taliban should pledge to abide by an Afghanistan constitution and end all cooperation with Al Qaeda, which is on its last throes in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. The terms of a peace deal can be finalized in a loya jirga, or grand council, consisting of all Afghan ethnic and religious factions. Though a political settlement with the Taliban will undoubtedly require compromise on legal and social matters, these concessions need not set back Afghan women in the long term. While the Taliban might push for an end to coeducation in Afghanistan's south, there is no Islamic basis for them to oppose girls-only schools. Gulf Arab states that have done their fair share to promote radicalism in Afghanistan should recompense by funding primary and secondary girls schools, putting Afghanistan on a path toward universal education. Within a generation's time, the world can witness an Afghanistan fully healed from the 30 years of strife. But healing Afghanistan requires a political, not a military, solution. And Washington's consent to bring about that solution must come now, before it sinks deeper into an unwinnable war.

A2: Perm: Condition Other Things – Time is Now

Now is key – the Taliban are vulnerable

Evan ‘10

Tom Evan, CNN, 2-2-10, “Experts: Time Ripe for Taliban talks,” http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/02/01/afghanistan.taliban/index.html

The Taliban may have reached the peak of their military achievements in the war in Afghanistan, one of the world's top authorities on the Taliban said. And that position of relative strength might make them more amenable to talks, Pakistani journalist and author Ahmed Rashid said in an interview Monday with CNN's Christiane Amanpour. "They can't go much further than where they are now," Rashid said. "They're across the country. They're having shadow governors and shadow government in all the major provinces, but they can't take the cities because of NATO firepower. They can't create a populist movement against the Americans. They tried and failed to do that." "So in a way," Rashid added, "the Taliban are in a very strong position, which actually might make them more amenable for talks right now." His comments came as [Afghan](http://topics.cnn.com/topics/Afghanistan) President [Hamid Karzai](http://topics.cnn.com/topics/Hamid_Karzai) stepped up his efforts to reconcile with [Taliban](http://topics.cnn.com/topics/The_Taliban) fighters and reintegrate them with Afghan society. In Kabul on Sunday, Karzai said, "The Taliban are welcome to return to their own country and work for peace in order for us to be able then to have the U.S. and other forces have the freedom to go back home." Karzai was renewing an appeal he made at the London Conference on Afghanistan last week. At the conference, Afghanistan and world powers agreed to establish a $500 million "pay-for-peace" fund to try to convince rank-and-file Taliban members to give up the fight, even as the U.S. and its allies send more than 30,000 additional troops to the country -- the so-called "surge." Georgetown University's Christine Fair, who has analyzed Taliban suicide attacks in Afghanistan for the U.N., agreed with Rashid's assessment and said now is the time to offer them an opportunity for reconciliation. "The surge is really focusing on controlling major urban populations, so from the point of view of the Taliban this I going to be an ideal time for them to try to reach some deal," she said. "And to be very clear, I support reconciliation. My concern is that the reintegration plan doesn't go far enough." She said that to be successful, reintegration requires more than just financial incentives. "You also need political incentives to bring them into the picture," she added. Alex Thier, director for Afghanistan and Pakistan at the U.S. Institute of Peace, was more cautious about the possibility of convincing the Taliban to strike some kind of deal with the Karzai government. "They are not particularly amenable to compromise. So while I agree that the Taliban in some ways may be reaching the height of their power, I'm not sure that they know that," he said. "They've demonstrated repeatedly that they are willing to press ahead in the face of uncertainty and danger, as they did during the civil war when it was far from clear that they would achieve what they did," he added. "And of course, after September 11, they were in some ways offered to keep Afghanistan if they turned over Bin Laden, and they refused to, and lost it all." There are also concerns among Afghanistan's ethnic minorities about doing any kind of deal with the Taliban, Thier said, adding. "They (ethnic minorities) certainly have the power to end that prospect." Fair emphasized the importance of making the peace effort an Afghan process. "What the United States should actually do is really be thinking about Plan B," she said. "What are our interests in Afghanistan? Should we be looking for ways to protect ourselves against al Qaeda? Should we be looking at the possibility that Pakistan becomes the locus of our security interests?" Fair said that in her opinion, at some point the Taliban will return to Kabul, so it's important for the U.S. to be thinking about its national interest in light of that potential reality.

A2: Ethnic Conflicts

Inter-ethnic cooperation will be key to long-term stability

Rais ‘99

Rasul Bakhsh Rais, “Conflict in Afghanistan: Ethnicity, Religion and Neighbours,” Ethnic Studies Report, Vol. XVII, No. 1, January 1999, Rasul Bakhsh Rais is Director of the Area Study Centre for Africa, North and South America, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan

All those who are involved in negotiating peace among the Afghan factions have realised how difficult it is to achieve it. The situation in Afghanistan is too complex to lead to any simple or easy solution. The large number and diversity of Afghan groups, the interference of regional states, the apathy of the major powers, the resurgence of ethnic and religious forces are just a few elements that make Afghanistan’s civil war one of the most resistant to resolution. During the past ten years, the groups involved in the power struggle in the country have not given up war as an instrument of their policy. This is probably true of all civil wars and Afghanistan cannot be an exception. But the Afghans have yet to count the millions of people who have been killed or died in conditions of civil war, assess the cost of damage to the infrastructure and realise the dangers that starkly stare into their faces. The responsibility to restore peace in the country lies primarily with the Afghan groups. An understanding on broader issues like the structure of the state, distribution of power, and form of government would be central to laying down the foundations of a stable government. It is tragic that all Afghan factions start with the demand for an adequate share of power and leave the central issues out of the debate. Prospects for peace will remain bleak until the Afghan parties in the conflict evolve a common framework for reordering the Afghan polity. Following that, the role of the external powers may weaken and the civil war may consequently lose much of its venom.

Non-Unique – Colonial age borders cause ethnic conflict

Mahmud ‘10

Tayyab Mahmud, Professor of Law and Director, "COLONIAL CARTOGRAPHIES AND POSTCOLONIAL BORDERS: THE UNENDING WAR IN AND AROUND AFGHANISTAN", Center for Global Justice at the University of Seattle, in the Brooklyn Journal of International Law, 2010

Across the global South, colonial demarcations of zones of control and influence left in their wake political units lacking correspondence between their territorial frame and the cohesion of culture and political identity. The colonial demarcations, with little regard for the history, culture, or geography of the region, often split cultural units or placed divergent cultural identities within a common boundary. As a consequence, the crisis of the postcolonial state stems from its artificial boundaries and “the specter of the colonial … [still] haunts the postcolonial nation,” and the “retrospective illusion” of nationalism remains “suspended forever in the space between the ex-colony and not-yet-nation.” Decolonization movements and postcolonial states adopted and retained the construct of a territorially bound “nation-state” even as they attempted to imagine the “nation” at variance from its European iterations. Imprisonment in inherited colonial territorial cartographies, postcolonial formations inverted this grammar to produce state-nations. Building of state-nations procreates the problem of minorities, ethnicities, ethno-nationalism, separatism, and sub-state nationalism. “[T]he nation dreads dissent” and “the nation-state’s limits implicate its geographic peripheries as central to its self-fashioning.” In the process a co-constitutive role of “nation” and ethnicity develops as a “productive and dialectical dyad.” It is by the construction of ethnicity as a “problem” that the “nation” becomes the resolution and the state incarnates itself as the authoritative problem solver. In this way often “the very micropolitics of producing the nation are responsible for its unmaking or unraveling.” Incessant rhetoric of endangerment and discursive production of threats to the nation render “nation-building” a coercive enterprise and facilitate the overdevelopment of the coercive apparatuses of the state. While inherited boundaries represent the postcolonial state-nation’s “geo-body,” cultural and ethnic heterogeneity within induces “geo-piety.” It is no surprise, then, that most postcolonial states have as their raison d’etre the production, maintenance, and reproduction of the discourses and apparatuses of national security.

A2: Women Oppression

The U.S. will make sure peace in Afghanistan won’t come at the peace of Women

AP ‘10

AP, 7-20-10, “Clinton Tells Afghan Women they will not be forgotten amid Peace Efforts” http://www.680news.com/news/world/article/79328--clinton-tells-afghan-women-they-will-not-be-forgotten-amid-peace-efforts

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton on Tuesday assured Afghan women that they will not be forgotten amid fears that peace efforts and a scaled-down foreign troop presence will bring Islamist extremists into the government. Clinton and European Union foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton told Afghan women leaders in Kabul that the West will not allow Afghanistan to return to the days of Taliban rule, when women's rights and issues were severely restricted and ignored. "We understand why you have these concerns," Clinton told a group of about 15 women's rights activists ahead of an international conference on Afghanistan's future, at which Afghan leaders are to outline their plans to reintegrate militants into society. "This is a personal commitment of mine. I don't want anyone to be under any mistaken impression." Peace in Afghanistan "can't come at the cost of women and women's lives," she said. Ashton echoed that sentiment on behalf of the E.U. "We're not going away," she said. "We are going to support you." The prospect of a Taliban role in government has alarmed many Afghan women, especially as President Barack Obama has declared his intention to begin withdrawing U.S. troops from the country next summer amid growing unease in America about the course of the war. Fouzia Kofi, a former Afghan legislator, told Clinton and Ashton she understood it was difficult to convince Westerners of the importance of the issue given deepening fears of a "never-ending war." "They need to realize that peace here with the Taliban and bringing Taliban on board with a compromise of basic human rights and women's rights means taking this country back hundreds of years," Kofi said.

Aff – Taliban Say No

The Taliban won’t negotiate until the troops have already left

International security and Research Center ‘10

TURKEY BAHÇEŞEHİR UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND STRATEGIC RESEARCHES CENTER, “AF PAK: TEST OF THE NEW *PARADIGM,”* APRIL – MAY 2010]

Particularly, after the re-election of Hamid Karzai as President, he used a new rhetoric which invited the Taliban, at nearly all levels, to negotiations. In November 2009, after the announcement of final election results, Karzai has concentrated his efforts and calls to Taliban leadership for reconciliation by addressing the insurgents “Taliban brothers”. It seems that in the new era of Karzai administration, reconciliation and reintegration efforts are going to hold an important part of Kabul’s agenda as well as US–UK led coalition’s efforts. However, the process is fundamentally debatable. 7Maybe the most critical question is whether the Taliban leadership could be persuaded to participate in negotiations, or not. Hamid Karzai has announced many times that he was ready to talk even Mullah Mohammad Omar, the leader of “the core” Taliban. It is clear that re-integration of those “Taliban brothers” would not be welcomed unless they renounce violence and connection with Al Qaeda. Furthermore, the Afghan President also calls the US forces to negotiate with Taliban leadership. The US officials, however, indicate that it is hard to expect Taliban leadership to negotiate under current circumstances. Taliban’s core leadership, Quetta Shura, has answered the government in a negative manner, and clearly rejected the Karzai’s offers to talk. The primary condition in the Taliban core’s rhetoric is the withdrawal of all foreign forces immediately, which is out of option for now. Additionally, the corruption in the current Karzai government is another aspect of the Taliban’s statements. As an attention getting fact, almost all the calls and announcements of Kabul or even rumors about the reconciliation efforts, which indicate that negotiation is possible, were followed by a Taliban attack in high populated areas or the government buildings are targeted. Though it is not clear to whether there is a correlation between the announcements and incidents, even the hypothesis of Taliban’s systematic reprisal seems threatening. Observing by a rhetoric–analyzing approach, it can be seen that announcements which were held by Taliban spokesmen generally include the rejection of current government’s legitimacy by pointing the corruption. Also they have been opposing troop surge, emphasizing that the surge will harden the ambiance for negotiation. High ranking NATO and US officials have been indicating that the Taliban leadership’s reintegration to the system is almost impossible, at least for now, but may be achievable for mid or low-level Taliban fighters, some commanders and tribes. The reintegration approach is mainly targeting the elements which are on Taliban’s side for socio–economic reasons.

Aff – Taliban Say No

Multiple warrants Taliban won’t cooperate

Rubin ‘09

‘Survival: Global Politics and Strategy,’ vol. 51, February–March 2009, pp. 83–96 “The Way Forward in Afghanistan: Three Views,” Section 1: End the War on Terror, by Barnett R. Rubin, PhD Director of Studies and a Senior Fellow at New York University’s Center on International Cooperation and served as an adviser to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General at the UN Talks on Afghanistan in Bonn in 2001., acc. 20//07/10

This is what the US and Afghan governments should mean when they state that negotiating partners must accept the Afghan constitution. This should not mean passage of an ideological test requiring agreement with every article but recognition of the sovereignty of the government established by the constitution. Many issues dealt with (often ambiguously) by the constitution will remain contentious for a long time, and not only to insurgents. Insurgents who lay down arms will have the same rights as other Afghans to disagree with and seek to change the constitution through peaceful means. Such a declaratory policy is already in effect, but no one takes it seriously, since the existing policies on deten- tion and sanctions send the other message. Taliban and al-Qaeda are detained together in Guantanamo and sanctioned together by the UN Security Council. Closing Guantanamo is a first step. Afghan and Pakistani detainees (except for those closely linked to the al-Qaeda leadership, a category which includes no Afghans) should be transferred to national custody or released. The international community will have to fund generous reintegration packages in both countries.

Negotiations with the Taliban fail

Saikal ‘09

‘Survival: Global Politics and Strategy,’ vol. 51, February–March 2009, pp. 83–96 “The Way Forward in Afghanistan: Three Views,” Section 2: “What Future for Afghanistan?,” by Amin Saikal is Professor of Political Science and Director of the Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies at the Australian National University, and author of Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival acc. 20 July 2010

Afghanistan is in the grip of long-term, violent, structural disorder and insecurity. Senior NATO political and military figures have voiced strong scepticism about winning against the Taliban and their supporters, and have intimated that the United States and its allies should focus more on generating the necessary conditions for security than on democracy. Some have supported Afghan President Hamid Karzai in his efforts to negotiate with the Taliban to produce a viable settlement. The Karzai government and its international backers are not as yet in a position to bargain for such a settlement. They must first not only impress upon the Taliban that the insurgency cannot succeed militarily, but also address the political and strategic vacuum their own failures created and the Taliban have exploited.

AFF – Taliban Say No

Taliban won’t negotiate

Bowman and Dale ‘09

“War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Operations, and Issues for Congress,” by Steve Bowman, Specialist in National Security and Catherine Dale, Specialist in International Security December 3, 2009, report for Congress

For its part, the Taliban has reportedly named conditions that must be met before it would agree to enter any direct talks. These include the withdrawal of all international forces from Afghanistan, immunity of Taliban leaders from targeting by the ANSF, and the ability to retain their weapons. According to U.S. senior officials, such demands would contradict GIRoA principles—for example, that all Afghan citizens must renounce violence and accept the Constitution—and U.S. government views.185 One further challenge, according to many practitioners and observers, is that despite suffering some tactical-level set-backs, the Taliban leadership appears to feel confident, free to approach any talks from a position of strength. One senior UK official stressed that if negotiations took place today, the Taliban would make unrealistic demands, and he estimated that we are “many months if not years from the end game.” He added, “there’s no ‘quick fix’ through reconciliation.”186 Some ISAF officials add that Taliban leaders may be under some pressure from al Qaeda not to participate in negotiations.187

Aff – Taliban Say No

Negotiations will fail without first stabilizing Pakistan

Barakat and Zyck ‘09

“Afghanistan’s Insurgency and the Viability of a Political Settlement,” by Sultan Barakat and Steven Zyck. Sultan Barakat, Professor of Politics and Director, Post-war Reconstruction & Development Unit, Department of Politics at the University of York, and Steven Zyck, a Research Fellow there. 6 June 2009.

Finally, regardless of all improvements made within Afghanistan, conditions will not be ripe for the beginnings of a negotiated settlement until the Pakistani sanctuary for insurgents targeting Afghanistan is largely or totally removed from the equation. Political settlements involving Pakistani tribes or armed elements, which have swapped direct political control and military presence in exchange for guarantees not to challenge the Pakistani government, have historically served as pretext for the expansion of Pakistani insurgent activities.62 The collapse, in May 2009, of the Pakistani government’s deal with Taliban elements in the Swat Valley seem likely to have poisoned the hopes for future such deals and President Asif Ali Zardari’s credibility with populations in the border provinces.63 Yet, despite the Pakistani military’s recent efforts, it appears that armed confrontation will be protracted and enhance recruitment efforts among the Pakistani Taliban, Lashkar-e Taiba, and others. While accompanying development financing is intended to counter insurgent recruitment, it seems unlikely that, in Pakistan’s more ideologically oriented and strategic conflict, agricultural assistance will provide symbolism nearly on par with that of large-scale military operations. Equally troubling, the displacement of several hundred thousand people from the border provinces due to ongoing fighting is likely to facilitate the geographical expansion of Islamist activities in the country beyond the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), NWFP, Waziristan, and Baluchistan. Furthermore, the encampment of displaced persons within Pakistan may result in increased radicalization and the creation of economic, psycho- social, and geographical conditions ideal for insurgent recruitment. The primary benefit of the current militarized strategy is the distraction of Pakistani insurgent groups from the conflict in Afghanistan. While too early to tell, one can expect this diversion to prevent the level of violence from reaching a tipping point (if not necessarily recede) in Afghanistan, thus buying greater (although still insufficient) time to implement the aforementioned improvements in governance, police reform, community self-defense, and economic growth. That said, Pakistan must be stabilized—rather than set aflame—in order to ensure lasting security benefits for Afghanistan and the region as a whole. The ISI remains overly and inappropriately involved with the insurgents, and Pakistani generals have reported their troops’ distaste for firing on their own countrymen.64 Greater political autonomy, the predictable outcome of past negotiations, will only enable insurgents and Al Qaeda to expand their presence in the “Pakistani sanctuary.” As a result of the inadequacy of the previously attempted alternatives, the only remaining solution appears to involve a combination of increased governmental and military presence combined with inducements such as highly decentralized governance, allowance for Sharia law, and a deluge of Pakistani government and international development assistance. As in Afghanistan, a targeted focus on former fighters, starting with amnesty for past activities and concluding with extensive in-kind livelihood support, and other populations vulnerable to mobilization or insurgent recruitment, particularly young and unemployed men, will be critical.

Aff – Ethnic/Civil War

Handing over Afghanistan to the Taliban, creates an ethnic and civil war

Chicago Press Release ‘10

Chicago Press Release, 7-19-10, “Taliban Talks: the obstacles to a peace deal in Afghanistan,” <http://chicagopressrelease.com/news/taliban-talks-the-obstacles-to-a-peace-deal-in> afghanistan?utm\_source=feedburner&utm\_medium=feed&utm\_campaign=Feed%3A+windycitynews+(News+%C2%BB+Chicago+Press+Release+Services

Negotiated settlement: No wonder then that most people’s thoughts, including Barack Obama’s administration, are turning to some sort of negotiated settlement with the insurgents. It is now part of the conventional wisdom in Kabul that the west will have to make compromises with insurgents that once would have been unthinkable, including dropping efforts for women to be given a more equal place in Afghan society. Few people put it quite as bluntly as Francesc Vendrell, a retired senior diplomat who served first the UN in Afghanistan before 2001 and then worked as the top representative of the European Union in Kabul. He recently told the Guardian that the current military effort to push the Taliban out of Kandahar and Helmand was particularly foolish because these are precisely the areas that, in his view, will have to be handed over to Taliban control. Such a handover of the south could be achieved, he argued, through constitutional reform that would decentralise power from Kabul. In a trice, the south would be ceded to Taliban control, under the pretence of local democracy. Meanwhile, the north would similarly be handed back to the old warlords, the former strongmen who rose to prominence during the 1980s resistance to the Soviet occupation and its violent aftermath. But deal-making with the insurgents is fraught with danger. Hamid Karzai’s so far fairly limited appeals to the Taliban, not least during his “peace jirga” in June, have lost the Afghan president the support of some of the few political powerbrokers who backed him that are not from the Pashtun ethnic group, from which the Taliban draws most of its support. Haroun Mir, a political analyst and parliamentary candidate with close links to the largely non-Pashtun Northern Alliance that fought against the Taliban, predicted civil war as the ultimate consequence of peace deal with the Taliban. He said: “The moment the south is abandoned to the Taliban, you will see the north rearming. Any change that sees the Taliban entering government and you will create a full ethnic war.” Put most simply, the risk to the Americans is that they may win over the south, but lose the north. And it is not clear how the Americans will talk to the Taliban. European diplomats say that whatever the latest thinking in the White House might be, David Petraeus, the new US commander of Nato forces in Afghanistan seems interested in making the fight against the Taliban last as long as possible. After years of refusing to contemplate even the most secret of discussions with a movement viewed as partly responsible for the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the Americans have precious few ways of reaching out to the other side. A security official who has in the past been involved in efforts to reach out to the Taliban bemoaned the fact that so many years had been wasted, pointing out that in Northern Ireland the British government had contacts “from the beginning”. Instead of a well-organised effort to talk to the Taliban, there is currently an extraordinary free-for-all, with a whole range of people and countries trying to make contacts with the quetta shura, the Taliban’s leadership council. They include Karzai’s elder brother Qayoum, and even Burhanuddin Rabbani, a northern power broker and former president. Countries interested in getting in on the act are the UK, Germany, Turkey and Indonesia. While Saudi Arabia is often cited as potential interlocutor because of that country’s status as the guardian of the Islam’s holiest places, and because of previous involvement in Afghanistan, diplomats say the Saudis are holding back after “getting their fingers burned once before”, according to one diplomat. With everyone keeping their cards close to their chests, it is not clear whether any country or individual has had any success in talking to anyone of consequence. Mark Sedwill, Nato’s ambassador in Kabul, said that Karzai has had little success in forging strong channels of communication. “There are channels of communication with various people, but it is very hard for the Afghans to know how close those people are to the inner circle,” he said. Obama’s announcement that US troops will start withdrawing next July has been ruthlessly exploited by Taliban propagandists to convey the impression they are on the road to victory. This has helped deter them from negotiating a peace deal now, said Michael Semple, a former deputy of the European Union political mission and regional analyst. “The Taliban’s dominant perspective is to ride it out for another year. They think ‘one more push and we’ll get them out’.” Insurgent groups are already positioning themselves for the post-conflict power grab, he said. “Perversely, now that the Americans have signalled they are leaving, there’s an incentive for the Taliban to keep fighting so they can show they were the ones who pushed them out,” he said. The British description of a commitment to leave by 2015 “plays better to the Afghan audience”, he added. “That’s a more Afghan-style timetable.” For Nato to reverse insurgent thinking it needs to “credibly clarify its plans for the period between 2011 and 2015″. For the time being the Taliban are sticking to their negotiating position that talks will not begin until foreign forces leave Afghanistan.

**Aff – Coalition Government Fails**

Taliban would take over the government and undermine democratic system and is the reason we are there in the first place.

Bezhan ‘10

Fred Bezhan, Freelance Writer, 7-23-10, “Reconciliation Plan Unlikely to bring Peace,” p. Lexis

Negotiating with the Taliban won't work THE landmark international conference in Kabul, attended by 40 foreign ministers and international delegates from more than 70 countries, ended on Tuesday with the official endorsement of Afghan [President Hamid Karzai's](http://www.lexisnexis.com:80/us/lnacademic/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T9796466220&returnToId=20_T9796466252&csi=244777&A=0.2729914959835599&sourceCSI=9369&indexTerm=%23PE0009ZSN%23&searchTerm=President%20Hamid%20Karzai's%20&indexType=P) President Hamid Karzai's  -Search using: [http://www.lexisnexis.com:80/us/lnacademic/images/IconInfo.gif](javascript:showInfoWin(9369,'CSI'))[Biographies Plus News](http://www.lexisnexis.com:80/us/lnacademic/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T9796466220&returnToId=20_T9796466252&csi=244777&A=0.2729914959835599&sourceCSI=9369&indexTerm=%23PE0009ZSN%23&searchTerm=President%20Hamid%20Karzai's%20&indexType=P) [http://www.lexisnexis.com:80/us/lnacademic/images/IconInfo.gif](javascript:showInfoWin(162599,'CSI'))News, Most Recent 60 Daysreconciliation program with armed insurgent groups, including the Taliban. Karzai presented the Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program, an ambitious effort that aims to reintegrate up to 36,000 forme Taliban fighters into mainstream Afghan society. In it, low-level Taliban fighters are to be offered jobs, land and protection in a bid to persuade them to change sides. But attempts at reconciliation with the Taliban have so far failed. Karzai's recent peace jirga was boycotted by the Taliban. Instead, the Taliban has escalated attacks against the Afghan National Army and international forces. So far this month, 45 foreign troops have died in Afghanistan. Two weeks ago, Private Nathan Bewes, a member of the Australian First Mentoring Task Force, died in an improvised explosive blast in Oruzgan. The 23-year-old was the sixth Australian soldier to die in Afghanistan in just over a month. Meanwhile, the US, the main foreign player in Afghanistan, is preparing an operation in Kandahar that will be the biggest military offensive of the war to date. The strategy, endorsed by the majority of the international community at the London Conference earlier this year, was driven by two presumptions. The first was that the Taliban is a well-grounded, grassroots, popular insurgency. It assumed the Taliban was ingrained in the social and political fabric of Afghanistan and could not be defeated militarily. The second was that the Taliban could be successfully integrated into mainstream Afghan politics. But a deeper look not only challenges both assumptions but also questions the strategy of negotiating with the Taliban. The idea of many Western policymakers that the Taliban has grassroots support in Afghanistan is driven by the fact that the majority of the Taliban are Afghans, coming predominantly from the Pashtun ethnic group. Moreover, the majority of the Taliban operate and are stationed in the Pashtun-dominated areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan. But, in reality, the Taliban has little support from local Afghans, who see their fundamentalist Islamic beliefs and system of governance as alien and backward. Rather, the Taliban's success and grip on power in the south and east of Afghanistan is due to three other factors. The first is the drug trade in Afghanistan, which the Taliban uses to finance its insurgency. Counter-terrorism officials claim that the group has a taxation system that generates money from the production, processing and transport of opium from Afghanistan. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime says that between 2003 and 2008, the Taliban made an estimated $18 billion from drug production and trafficking. The second factor is Pakistan's intelligence agency, the ISI, which continues to support the Taliban, providing it with arms and safe havens. For Pakistan, the Afghan Taliban continues to be a strategic asset in achieving strategic depth in Afghanistan, as a tool against the regional influence of arch-rivals India, and most importantly to defuse separatist Pashtun nationalism in Pakistan. The third factor is popular anger at corrupt warlords, who continue to rule as governors and key officials outside the capital. Their draconian rule and their inability to provide justice and law and order have created a power vacuum in large parts of Afghanistan, which the Taliban has successfully filled. The Taliban continues to feed off the dissatisfaction caused by the widespread corruption and inefficiency apparent at every level of government in Afghanistan. The second presumption policymakers have made in devising the new Afghan strategy is that the Taliban can be integrated into mainstream Afghan politics. That idea seems unrealistic, since Taliban ideology rejects any modern institution of government. The Taliban regards the Koran as the only source of political advice, rejecting ideas of democracy and fundamental human rights, including women's rights. During its reign, the Taliban did not rule as a modern state apparatus. It did away with all forms of administration, with laws coming not from parliament or any other institution but from fatwas, religious decrees. The second issue is the lack of expertise in the Taliban ranks. Many Taliban leaders have only studied in madrassas, religious Islamic schools, and at best have a primary school education. This is in contrast to government ministers, most of whom have received tertiary education or higher in the West. The question is, owing to its lack of expertise, what kind of power would the Taliban enjoy in a power-sharing deal with the government? Importantly, the Taliban has never made an alliance with another political group since its emergence in 1994. If the Taliban was to become part of the national government, its political survival would be severely restrained by the little public support it enjoys on the fringes of society. People would simply not vote for it. Adding to this is the fact that the Taliban would become the largest and most powerful political party in Afghanistan, albeit being one of the most unpopular. This in itself would undermine Afghanistan's young democratic system and sow the seeds for future conflict. With Western policymakers proposing ideas on when and how to negotiate with the Taliban, the more immediate questions of if and why talks with the Taliban should begin still remain unanswered.

\*\*\*ECONOMY ADVANTAGE COUNTERPLANS\*\*\*

1NC Small Businesses CP

TEXT: The United States Federal Government should reduce the tax burdens and change the complex loan protocols on small businesses in the United States.

Easing the Tax Burdens on Small Businesses Increases Jobs and Helps Economy

Subcommittee on Finance and Tax ‘09

5-7-09, http://www.house.gov/smbiz/PressReleases/2009/pr-5-7-09-small-business-tax-burden.html

WASHINGTON, D.C. — Entrepreneurs testified before Congress today that streamlining the complex tax code could save small businesses billions of dollars, allowing them to expand their enterprises and hire more workers. In a hearing before the House Committee on Small Business’ Subcommittee on Finance and Tax, small business owners said that the increasing complexity of the tax code was hindering small firms that are already struggling with unprecedented economic pressures.“As a small business owner myself, I understand how difficult it can be to start and run your own business,” said Subcommittee Chairman Kurt Schrader (D-OR). “Unlike big companies, small businesses don’t have an army of tax attorneys and accountants to navigate a tax code that has grown so complex that it is a stumbling block for local merchants.” A 2005 study estimated individuals and businesses spent an estimated 6 billion hours and $265 billion dollars complying with their tax obligations, with compliance costs predicted to grow to $482.7 billion by 2015. As more Americans turn to entrepreneurship to start a new career or to boost their incomes, the 3.7 million word tax code is especially daunting for small businesses and home-based enterprises that operate on thin profit margins. “The current home office deduction requirements are so confusing that many home-based entrepreneurs opt not to take advantage of it because they fear being audited if they make a mistake,” Schrader said. “Small business owners need a simple way to take advantage of these incentives that can help start-ups and established businesses alike.” Schrader partnered with Republican Congressman John McHugh (R-NY) to introduce H.R. 1509, the Home Office Deduction Simplification Act, bipartisan legislation offering small business owners the ability to claim a standard deduction for home office expenses instead of utilizing the current, more complex formula. The simple home office deduction would benefit millions of home-based business owners, who are estimated to comprise 53% of all small businesses. “Small businesses make up 98% of the companies in Oregon, just as they do in many communities across the country, and they are critical to our economic recovery,” Schrader said. “By making it a little easier for small business owners to spend more of their time creating jobs, we can help them turn this economy around.” Witnesses told lawmakers that many tax laws are badly out of date. They cited cell phones as a prime example of an indispensable business tool that is still subject to antiquated tax treatment written decades ago when cell phones were a luxury item. Entrepreneurs also noted that the alternative minimum tax (AMT), which now ensnares 75% of all middle class small business owners earning less than $100,000 per year, as another item woefully out of date. They urged Congress to limit the AMT’s reach and simplify the complex capital gains tax process to help small businesses reduce filing errors. “In order to promote enterprise and reward hard work, our tax laws should be simple, straightforward and fair,” Schrader said. “At a time when we need our entrepreneurs’ ingenuity to lift us out of our economic slump, tax policies should help small businesses meet their obligations, not burden them with unnecessary layers of complexity

2NC Small Businesses CP – Solvency

Small Businesses are the backbone of the economy; key to economic growth

Obama ‘10

President Barack Obama, 5-13, Remarks by the President on the Economy, Industrial Support Inc., Buffalo, NY. Transcript of speech, The Office of the Press Secretary) <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-economy>

And we know that government has to play a role in meeting this goal, but we also know that role is limited. Government is not the true engine of job creation and economic growth in this country; businesses are, especially small businesses like this one. So America’s small business owners -- people like Dave Sullivan -- have always been the backbone of America’s economy. These entrepreneurial pioneers, they embody the spirit of possibility -- tireless work ethic; simple hope for something better that lies at the heart of the American ideal. These are the men and women willing to take a chance on their dream. They’ve got good ideas and then they’ve got the drive to follow through. They’ve started mom-and-pop stores and they’ve got garages they open up and they start tinkering and suddenly that leads to some of America’s biggest, most successful businesses. Ordinary Americans with a dream to start their own business, they create most of the jobs that keep our workers employed. In fact, over the past decade and a half, America’s small businesses have created 65 percent of all new jobs in this country. Now, the problem is, is that our small businesses have also been some of the hardest hit by this recession. From the middle of 2007 through the end of 2008, small businesses lost 2.4 million jobs. And because banks shrunk from lending in the midst of the financial crisis, it’s been difficult for entrepreneurs to take out the loans that they need to start a business. And for those who do own a small business, it’s difficult to finance inventories and make payroll, or expand if things are going well. So government can’t create jobs, but it can create the conditions for small businesses to grow and thrive and hire more workers. Government can’t guarantee a company’s success, but it can knock down the barriers that prevent small business owners from getting loans or investing in the future. And that’s exactly what we’ve been doing. When Dave wanted to expand this company last year, he received a loan from the Small Business Administration that was part of the Recovery Act, part of the stimulus. It’s a loan that allowed him to pay the bills and purchase new equipment. Last fall he was even able to increase his workforce. And today, he feels optimistic that he’ll be able to hire more workers in the near future. Bill Puglisi and his brother Rick are also here with us today. Where are Bill and Rick? Where are they? There they are right there. All right. They run -- (applause) -- good to see you guys. They run a small business called Imperial Textile. And thanks to the SBA loan that they received, they didn’t have to lay any workers off last year. In fact, they were able -- they were even able to purchase a new building. Is that right? So today they’re starting to look to hire again. You guys can sit down. (Laughter.) All across America, we’ve taken steps like these to help companies grow and add jobs. Last year we enacted seven tax cuts for America’s small businesses, as well as what we call the Making Work Pay tax credit that goes to the vast majority of small business owners. So, so far, the Recovery Act has supported over 63,000 loans to small businesses -– that’s more than $26 billion in new lending. More than 1,200 banks and credit unions that had stopped issuing SBA loans when the financial crisis hit are lending again today. More than $7.5 billion in federal Recovery Act contracts are now going to small businesses. Right now, a series of additional tax incentives and other steps to promote hiring are going to take effect. Because of a bill that I signed into law a few weeks ago, businesses are now eligible for tax cuts for hiring unemployed workers. Companies are able to write off more of their investments in new equipment. And as part of health care reform, 4 million small businesses recently received a postcard in their mailbox telling them that they could be eligible for a health care tax cut this year. That’s worth maybe tens of thousands of dollars for some companies. And it’s going to provide welcome relief to small business owners, who too often have to choose between health care and hiring. When we stopped over at Duff’s to get our wings, one of the customers there was a woman who was a small business owner. She had a courier service. And I asked her, “What’s the biggest challenge you’ve got?” She said, “Trying to keep up health care for me and my workers.” And she was appreciative that she’s going to get a 35 percent tax break on her health care costs this year. (Applause.) And I told her that -- and over the next several years we’re setting an exchange where she, as a small business owner, is going to be able to buy into a big pool that all these members of Congress are a part of, so with millions of members, that’s going to give her more leverage with the insurance companies; that’s going to drive down her costs. She offered me to have some of her wings as a consequence. (Laughter.) Said I had already put in an order. So all these steps have helped. They’re going to help. But I believe we’ve got to do even more to give our small businesses a boost. And maybe the single most important thing we can do right now is to help ensure that creditworthy small business owners can get the capital that they need. So in my State of the Union address, I called for a $30 billion small business lending fund that would help increase the flow of credit to small companies that were hit hard by the decline in lending that followed the financial crisis. And last week, I sent Congress this legislation, which now includes a new state small business credit initiative -– an initiative that will help expand lending for small businesses and manufacturers at a time when budget shortfalls are leading a lot of states to cut back on vitally important lending programs. And I’ve also asked Congress to work with us to extend and enhance SBA programs that have helped small business owners get loans so they can create more jobs. That's our small business agenda. That’s our jobs agenda -- empowering small businesses so they can hire. I hear a lot of noise from some of our friends out there that say, this is nothing more than “big government.” I want everybody here to understand, I don't -- I personally don't think that giving tax cuts to businesses is big government. I don’t understand how helping businesses get loans so they can grow and hire more workers is big government.

2NC Small Businesses CP – Solvency

Easing Small Businesses’ Burdens Boosts Economy

Malveaux ‘09

Suzanne, 3-16, CNN Politics, Suzanne Malveaux is a White House correspondent for CNN and primary substitute anchor for The Situation Room with Wolf Blitzer. She holds a a bachelor's degree from Harvard University and a master's degree in journalism from Columbia University) http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/03/16/obama.small.business/index.html#cnnSTCText

President Barack Obama vowed Monday to ease the financial plight of the nation's small businesses, promising immediate action to revive frozen credit markets. President Obama on Monday, with Treasury's Timothy Geithner, says small businesses are job generators. The president called small businesses "one of the biggest drivers of employment that we have" and said his administration is "working diligently to increase liquidity throughout the financial system." Obama spoke to reporters after he and Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner met in the White House with representatives of the Small Business Administration. But Obama cautioned that it will be a long-term effort. "Understand, this is still going to be a first step in what is going to be a continuing effort to make sure people get [credit](http://topics.cnn.com/topics/Consumer_Credit_and_Debt) out there," he said. Geithner said the administration is moving "with exceptional speed" on aid to small businesses after more than a year of recession. He vowed the administration will create a "substantial program" to get credit flowing and to ease the nation's housing crisis. Geithner said the package will nearly double, to $250,000, the new capital investment that can be written off and said it will include provisions to reduce and then eliminate capital gains taxes in stock and to make health insurance more affordable. In addition, the Internal Revenue Service announced Monday that small businesses will be able to carry back business losses for five years instead of the current two years "in order to increase your cash flow as we come out of this period and allow you to invest more in your operations." Geithner then directed comments to the banks, urging them "to go the extra mile." Those banks that individually choose to "pull back out of a sense of prudence and caution" result in a collective impact that will weaken the economy, he said. "This dynamic can feed on itself." He noted that many banks got into trouble by taking too much risk, but he said, "The risk now to the economy is that you will take too little risk." Geithner said the nation's top 21 banks receiving assistance will be required to report on a monthly basis how much they are lending to small businesses. Even small businesses with good credit histories have been denied loans in the downturn. This year, at current rates, SBA-guaranteed new loans would not reach $10 billion. In an average year, it guarantees $20 billion in loans. Christina Romer, who heads the Council of Economic Advisers, said Sunday the government would pump "a significant amount" of money into boosting small business lending, but she did not reveal a total figure. "We know that small businesses are the engine of growth in the economy, and we absolutely want to do things to help them," Romer said on NBC's "Meet the Press." Two senior administration officials said the administration's plan deals with two programs handled by the SBA. The first one, the "7(a) program," allows small businesses to get loans of up to $2 million backed by the federal government through the SBA. Currently, the government guarantees up to 85 percent of loans below $150,000, and up to 75 percent of larger loans. Under the administration's plan, the government temporarily will increase the loan guarantee to 90 percent as an incentive to banks to lend. The administration believes this increase will reduce the risk lenders face when they make loans to borrowers who cannot find credit elsewhere and ultimately give the banks more confidence to sell and make more loans, the officials said. The second program, the "504 program," guarantees up to $4 million worth of economic development projects for small businesses. Starting Monday, the administration temporarily will eliminate fees for lenders and borrowers on any new 504 applications. The aim is to reduce the costs to both borrowers and lenders participating in the program, the officials said. The administration also temporarily will eliminate the upfront fees for 7(a) loans that banks charge borrowers. These fees go up to 3.75 percent for larger loans. The administration believes this move will decrease the cost of borrowing for small businesses and make it easier for them to get the credit they need to make new investments, the officials said.

2NC Small Businesses CP – Solvency

Helping Small Businesses is key to US Economic Stability

AP ‘09

5-19, MSNBC news) http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/30831256/

WASHINGTON - President Barack Obama says the nation's small businesses are responsible for half of the nation's private sector jobs and deserve support from Washington. Obama on Tuesday welcomed winners of a Small Business Administration award to the White House's East Room. He said some of the nation's best businesses began as small ventures, such as Google and McDonald's. Such businesses' impact goes beyond the economy, Obama said, adding that small business owners help strengthen local neighborhoods. Given everything a small business does for its community, the government should do its part to help leaders, he said.

Small businesses are key to economic growth

Velazquez ‘02

Nydia, congressional representative, FEDERAL DOCUMENT CLEARING HOUSE CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY, February 13, 2002, p. Lexis (MHBLUE1652)

We are here today to review the Administration's priorities for this nation's most vital economic engine ---- small business. I need not remind anyone that small business is big business in America, accounting for almost half our GDP --- half our jobs --- and 75 percent of all new jobs created. In a faltering economy, small businesses are especially important to communities struggling with low growth and high unemployment. They hauled us out of recession a decade ago and into the strongest peacetime economy on record. They did it before, and they can do it again, with a little help on our part.

1NC Tax Cuts CP

TEXT: The United States Federal Government should authorize widespread tax cuts for all taxpayers in the United States. We’ll clarify.

Tax cuts solve economic problems

Riedl ‘03

Brian Riedl, Fellow @ Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies, 03, “Ten Common Myths about Taxes, Spending, and Budget Deficits”, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2003/06/Ten-Common-Myths-About-Taxes-Spending-and-Budget-Deficits

The right tax cuts help the economy by creating incentives to work, save, and invest. The Government Budget Restraint shows that government spending does not "pump new money into the economy" because government must first tax or borrow that money from the economy. Tax cuts represent the flip side of the previous section's government spending example. Like government spending, the money for tax cuts does not drop out of the sky. It comes from investment (if financed by budget deficits) or government spending (if offset by spending cuts). Every dollar government "puts in consumers' pockets" means one fewer dollar in governments', businesses', and investors' pockets. Keynesians argue that government can increase total spending by transferring money from savers to spenders--an argument that assumes that taxpayers store their savings in their mattresses, thereby removing it from the economy.4 In reality, nearly all Americans either invest their savings (where it finances business investment) or deposit it in banks (which quickly lend it to others to spend). Therefore, the money is spent whether it is initially consumed or saved. Tax cuts do not increase the economy's short-run demand because they must be offset by equal reductions in investment and/or government spending. However, the right tax cuts can add substantially to the economy's long-term supply side. As stated in the previous section, economic growth requires that businesses efficiently produce increasing amounts of goods and services, and that requires consistent business investment and a motivated, productive workforce. Yet high marginal tax rates--defined as the tax on the next dollar earned--serve as a disincentive to engage in those activities. Reducing marginal tax rates on businesses and workers will increase incentives to work, save, and invest. These incentives create more business investment and a more productive workforce, both of which add to the economy's long-term capacity for growth. Because supply-side tax cuts are not designed simply to "put money in people's pockets," their proponents are not overly concerned with whether recipients are rich or poor. The best tax cuts maximize long-run economic growth, which in turn raises incomes across the board. Should a $1 capital gains tax cut, which can induce enough investment and worker productivity to create $10 in new long-term economic growth, be rejected because much of that $1 in lower taxes will go to wealthier individuals? The $10 in new economic growth matters much more than who receives the $1 tax cut. Yet reporters and lawmakers propose demand-side tax cuts to "put money in people's pockets" and "get people to spend money." The 2001 tax rebates serve as an example: Washington borrowed billions from investors and then mailed that money to families in the form of $600 checks. This simple transfer of existing income had a predictable effect: consumer spending increased and investment spending decreased by a corresponding amount. No new wealth was created because the tax rebate was unrelated to productive behavior--no one had to work, save, or invest more in order to receive a rebate. In contrast, marginal tax rates were reduced throughout the 1920s, 1960s, and 1980s. In all three decades, investment increased and economic growth followed: the inflation-adjusted GDP increased by 59 percent from 1921 to 1929, 42 percent from 1961 to 1968, and 34 percent from 1982 to 1989.5 Instead of asking which tax cuts will put money in consumers' pockets, reporters and lawmakers should ask which policies will best encourage the work, savings, and investment needed to expand the economy's long-term capacity for growth.

2NC Tax Cuts CP – Solvency

Tax cuts are necessary to save the US economy

Feldstein ‘10

Martin Feldstein, professor of economics @ Harvard, 5-12-10, professor emeritus @ National Bureau of Economic Research, “Extend the Bush tax cuts—for now”, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704370704575228123196462504.html?KEYWORDS=MARTIN+FELDSTEIN

This is not the time for a tax increase. But unless Congress acts, under current law the existing income tax rates will rise sharply at the beginning of next year. Congress should vote now to extend all of the current tax rates for two years, including the tax rates on dividends, interest and capital gains. Limiting the resulting tax-rate cuts to two years would reduce the projected future fiscal deficits. The sooner Congress acts, the stronger our prospects for continued economic recovery. A tax increase next year could easily derail the current fragile expansion. The economic upturn since last summer has been nurtured by Federal Reserve credit like the mortgage purchase program and by the fiscal incentives such as the tax credits for car buyers and first-time home buyers that are now coming to an end. Eighty percent of the latest quarterly GDP increase consisted of a rise in consumer spending that was the result of an unrepeatable sharp drop in the saving rate. Without that decline in the saving rate, the first-quarter annual GDP growth rate would have been less than 1%. A 2011 tax increase that reduces economic incentives and household spending would raise the risk of a new economic downturn. President Obama proposes to increase tax rates on high-income households while making the existing tax rates permanent for taxpayers below the top tax brackets. While the increase would hit only a relatively small fraction of all households, that group represents a large share of total taxes and of private spending. Raising their tax rates would be a substantial blow to overall spending and therefore to GDP growth. Small business investment and hiring would also be adversely affected because half of all profits, including most of small business income, is taxed at personal rates rather than at the corporate rate. Although it is important to avoid increasing the current tax rates until the recovery is well established, the enormous budget deficits that are now projected for the rest of the decade must not be allowed to persist. While legislation to reduce future government spending or faster-than-expected income growth could shrink the out-year deficits, it would be dangerous to depend on either of them. It would be wrong therefore to commit to the permanent reduction in tax rates for all taxpayers below the top brackets that is called for in the Obama budget. Changing the Obama budget proposal to limit all tax cuts to two years would reduce the total deficits over the next decade by more than $2 trillion. No single policy change could do as much to limit the future deficits and the national debt. Such a limit on the future tax cuts should be combined with policies to slow the growth of spending. According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the president's budget implies that total federal spending, excluding interest on the government debt, will rise to 21.1% of GDP in 2020 from 17.9% in 2007. If Congress cares about future deficits, it will prevent that unprecedented rise in government spending. It will also do more to deal with the spending programs that are hidden in the tax law like the health-insurance subsidy, the child-care credits, and the deductibility of local property taxes. Failure to cut future deficits would mean a weaker recovery and slower long-term growth. The CBO estimates that annual deficits under the Obama budget will average more than 5% of GDP between now and 2020, enough to absorb all of the current saving of households and corporations. If that happens, the U.S. will be forced to depend on a greater inflow of funds from the rest of the world to finance investments in housing and in business structures and equipment. The result is likely to be much higher interest rates, reducing investments and therefore slowing the growth of our standard of living. According to the CBO, the large projected budget deficits imply that the government debt would rise to 90% of GDP by the end of the decade, about twice the debt-to-GDP ratio in 2008. Paying the interest on that government debt in 2020 would require about 40% of all personal income tax revenue. With half of the government debt already held by foreigners and with that share inevitably rising in the years ahead, there might well be a temptation to erode the real value of the debt with higher inflation. The fragility of the economic recovery means that it would be dangerous to allow any taxes to rise in 2011. The inherent uncertainty about the out-year deficits means that it would be unwise to enact tax cuts that stretch beyond the next two years. Congress should move quickly to reassure taxpayers and financial markets that the current tax rates will be preserved for two years but that further tax cuts will depend on the future fiscal outlook.

2NC Tax Cuts CP – Solvency

Tax cuts solve economic problems

Taylor ‘08

John Taylor, professor of Economics @ Stanford, 2008, senior fellow @ Hoover Institute, “Why permanent tax cuts are the best stimulus”, Nov 25, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122757149157954723.html

The incoming Obama administration and congressional Democrats are now considering a second fiscal stimulus package, estimated at more than $500 billion, to follow the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008. As they do, much can be learned by examining the first. The major part of the first stimulus package was the $115 billion, temporary rebate payment program targeted to individuals and families that phased out as incomes rose. Most of the rebate checks were mailed or directly deposited during May, June and July. The argument in favor of these temporary rebate payments was that they would increase consumption, stimulate aggregate demand, and thereby get the economy growing again. What were the results? The chart nearby reveals the answer. The upper line shows disposable personal income through September. Disposable personal income is what households have left after paying taxes and receiving transfers from the government. The big blip is due to the rebate payments in May through July. The lower line shows personal consumption expenditures by households. Observe that consumption shows no noticeable increase at the time of the rebate. Hence, by this simple measure, the rebate did little or nothing to stimulate consumption, overall aggregate demand, or the economy. These results may seem surprising, but they are not. They correspond very closely to what basic economic theory tells us. According to the permanent-income theory of Milton Friedman, or the life-cycle theory of Franco Modigliani, temporary increases in income will not lead to significant increases in consumption. However, if increases are longer-term, as in the case of permanent tax cut, then consumption is increased, and by a significant amount. After years of study and debate, theories based on the permanent-income model led many economists to conclude that discretionary fiscal policy actions, such as temporary rebates, are not a good policy tool. Rather, fiscal policy should focus on the "automatic stabilizers" (the tendency for tax revenues to decline in a recession and transfer payments such as unemployment compensation to increase in a recession), which are built into the tax-and-transfer system, and on more permanent fiscal changes that will positively affect the long-term growth of the economy. Why did that consensus seem to break down during the public debates about the fiscal stimulus early this year? One reason may have been the apparent success of the rebate payments in 2001. However, those rebate payments were the first installment of more permanent, multiyear tax cuts passed that same year. Hence, they were not temporary. What are the implications for a second stimulus early next year? The mantra often heard during debates about the first stimulus was that it should be temporary, targeted and timely. Clearly, that mantra must be replaced. In testimony before the Senate Budget Committee on Nov. 19, I recommended alternative principles: permanent, pervasive and predictable. - Permanent. The most obvious lesson learned from the first stimulus is that temporary is not a principle to follow if you want to get the economy moving again. Rather than one- or two-year packages, we should be looking for permanent fiscal changes that turn the economy around in a lasting way. - Pervasive. One argument in favor of "targeting" the first stimulus package was that, by focusing on people who might consume more, the impact would be larger. But the stimulus was ineffective with such targeting. Moreover, targeting implied that increased tax rates, as currently scheduled, will not be a drag on the economy as long as increased payments to the targeted groups are larger than the higher taxes paid by others. But increasing tax rates on businesses or on investments in the current weak economy would increase unemployment and further weaken the economy. Better to seek an across-the-board approach where both employers and employees benefit. - Predictable. While timeliness is an admirable attribute, it is only one property of good fiscal policy. More important is that policy should be clear and understandable -- that is, predictable -- so that individuals and firms know what to expect. Many complain that government interventions in the current crisis have been too erratic. Economic policy -- from monetary policy to regulatory policy, international policy and fiscal policy -- works best if it is as predictable as possible. Many good fiscal packages are consistent with these principles. But what can Congress and the incoming Obama administration do to give the economy a real boost on Jan. 20? Here are a few fairly bipartisan measures worth considering: First, make a commitment, passed into law, to keep all income-tax rates were they are now, effectively making current tax rates permanent. This would be a significant stimulus to the economy, because tax-rate increases are now expected on a majority of small business income, capital gains income, and dividend income. Second, enact a worker's tax credit equal to 6.2% of wages up to $8,000 as Mr. Obama proposed during the campaign -- but make it permanent rather than a one-time check Third, recognize explicitly that the "automatic stabilizers" are likely to be as large as 2.5% of GDP this fiscal year, that they will help stabilize the economy, and that they should be viewed as part of the overall fiscal package even if they do not require legislation. Fourth, construct a government spending plan that meets long-term objectives, puts the economy on a path to budget balance, and is expedited to the degree possible without causing waste and inefficiency. Some who promoted the first stimulus package have reacted to its failure by saying that we must now switch to large increases in government spending to stimulate demand. But government spending does not address the causes of the weak economy, which has been pulled down by a housing slump, a financial crisis and a bout of high energy prices, and where expectations of future income and employment growth are low. The theory that a short-run government spending stimulus will jump-start the economy is based on old-fashioned, largely static Keynesian theories. These approaches do not adequately account for the complex dynamics of a modern international economy, or for expectations of the future that are now built into decisions in virtually every market.

2NC Tax Cuts CP – Solvency

Tax cuts help the economy

Lanman and Donmoyer ‘10

Scott and Ryan J., economists at Bloomberg, “Bernanke Says Extending Bush Tax Cuts Would Maintain Stimulus to Economy”, 2010, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-23/bernanke-says-extending-bush-tax-cuts-would-maintain-stimulus-to-economy.html>

Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke said extending at least some of the tax cuts set to expire this year would help strengthen a U.S. economy still in need of stimulus and urged offsetting the move with increased revenue or lower spending. “In the short term I would believe that we ought to maintain a reasonable degree of fiscal support, stimulus for the economy,” Bernanke said yesterday under questioning from the House Financial Services Committee’s senior Republican. “There are many ways to do that. This is one way.” While Democrats want to keep the 2001 and 2003 tax reductions passed during former President George W. Bush’s administration for families earning as much as $250,000, Republicans aim to continue the cuts for high-income people as well. Bernanke didn’t endorse either party’s position or recommend a time period for an extension. “In the longer term, I think we need to be taking steps to reassure the American people and the markets that our fiscal situation is going to be well controlled,” Bernanke said under questioning from Representative Spencer Bachus of Alabama, the committee’s senior Republican. “That means that if you extend the tax cuts, you need to find other ways to offset them.” Bernanke aims to bolster the faltering economic recovery while urging lawmakers to reduce federal budget deficits in the medium term, which he defined as the period from 2013 to 2020. His predecessor, Alan Greenspan, last week said lawmakers should allow the tax cuts to expire at the end of 2010, citing a need for the revenue to reduce the budget gap. Monetary Policy Bernanke, in the second day of semiannual congressional testimony on monetary policy, said the central bank will act to spur growth should the economy sputter. A top lieutenant, New York Fed President William Dudley, said yesterday that the “road to recovery is turning out to be a bit bumpy.” The Fed chief reiterated three central bank options for further steps, including giving more information on the Fed’s commitment to low interest rates, reducing the rate paid on banks’ reserves held at the Fed and buying more securities. “There is an implicit message from various Fed speakers that monetary policy is less useful now than most times,” said Tom Gallagher, senior managing director at International Strategy & Investment Group in Washington. “It is a fair inference that Bernanke thinks it would be good to avoid fiscal restraint rather than have more monetary ease if the outlook for 2011 is poor.”

\*\*\*KARZAI CREDIBILITY DA\*\*\*

1NC – Karzai Credibility DA [1/2]

A. Recent international talks have brought more credibility to Karzai’s government

MEMRI, 7-15

[The Middle East Media Research Institute, “Editorials in Afghan Dailies on the Consultative Peace Jirga”, June 15th 2010, <http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/4377.htm#_edn5>]

"Ambassador Usackas noted: 'The three-day event of the National Consultative Peace Jirga has been an important step toward stabilization and peace in Afghanistan. I look forward to working closely with the Afghan people and their government to support a peace process in Afghanistan.' "The Consultative Peace Jirga was aimed at discussing ways to bring peace to the country through negotiations with the Taliban militants. The insurgents so far have not shown any sign of willingness to negotiate with the government, which they call as the Western puppet. Critics, therefore, believe that any peace talks will not be successful unless the government gets to a vantage point. "The Taliban militants have demonstrated strength in challenging the government and international forces even in their most fortified bases such as the Bagram airbase and Kandahar over the last month. Under such circumstances, Taliban will not relinquish the ideology of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan to embrace the Afghan constitution that runs diametrically counter to their concepts of what Afghanistan should look like. "Added to that, while U.S. military action is heating up in the southern Kandahar region, Washington also does not want President Karzai to cede what it sees as unpalatable concessions to Taliban leaders. The U.S. officials want to see the momentum shifted to compel the militants to embrace peace based on the constitution and human rights. Before the peace Jirga, a senior official said that 'The red lines here are very clear,' while reiterating that only those who renounce violence and ties to Al-Qaeda, and who abide by the Afghan constitution – including women's rights – would be acceptable. On the other hand, officials from the Obama administration have said that the process is expected to boost Karzai's credibility as true national leader: "What we hope is that this process will help demonstrate Karzai as a true national leader."

**B. Withdrawal causes Karzai to fall and the Al-Qaeda backed Taliban to take over**

**Katz, ’09**

[Mark N Katz, Professor of government & politics @ George Mason University, “Assessing an Afghanistan Withdrawal” Sept 9, <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detail/?lng=en&id=105801>]

Far more than what it might add to al-Qaida’s capabilities, t**he most important geopolitical impact of a US/NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan would** be the perception of a western (read: American) defeat. Yet even in the worst case - **the Taliban return to power and once again allow carte blanche to al-Qaida - the most negative geopolitical effects are more likely to be felt not by the US and Europe** (which al-Qaida can attack without a base in Afghanistan since it already has bases elsewhere), **but the countries neighboring and near Afghanistan: the Central Asian republics, Russia, China, India - and perhaps even Pakistan and Iran.**

**C. Karzai’s credibility key to reintegrating insurgents and ending terrorism**

**Partlow, 7-23**

[Joshua Partlow, Writer for the Washington Post and former correspondent on the Iraq war, “Minority leaders leaving Karzai's side over leader's overtures to insurgents,” July 23rd 2010, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/22/AR2010072206155.html>]

Karzai spokesman Waheed Omar declined to comment on Saleh's analysis. **Karzai's government has made reconciliation a top priority, and officials say they are proceeding carefully. Karzai has invited Taliban leaders to talk, but he has said insurgents must accept the constitution, renounce violence and sever their links to foreign terrorists before they can rejoin society**.

D. Terrorism causes extinction

Speice, ’06

(Speice, JD Candidate @ College of William and Mary [Patrick F. Speice, Jr., “Negligence And Nuclear Nonproliferation: Eliminating The Current Liability Barrier To Bilateral U.S.-Russian Nonproliferation Assistance Programs,” William & Mary Law Review, February 2006, 47 Wm and Mary L. Rev. 1427])

Accordingly, there is a significant and ever-present risk that terrorists could acquire a nuclear device or fissile material from Russia as a result of the confluence of Russian economic decline and the end of stringent Soviet-era nuclear security measures. 39 Terrorist groups could acquire a nuclear weapon by a number of methods, including "steal[ing] one intact from the stockpile of a country possessing such weapons, or ... [being] sold or given one by [\*1438] such a country, or [buying or stealing] one from another subnational group that had obtained it in one of these ways." 40 Equally threatening, however, is the risk that terrorists will steal or purchase fissile material and construct a

nuclear device on their own. Very little material is necessary to construct a highly destructive nuclear weapon. 41

1NC – Karzai Credibility DA [2/2]

Although nuclear devices are extraordinarily complex, the technical barriers to constructing a workable weapon are not significant. 42 Moreover, the sheer number of methods that could be used to deliver a nuclear device into the United States makes it incredibly likely that terrorists could successfully employ a nuclear weapon once it was built. 43 Accordingly, supply-side controls that are aimed at preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear material in the first place are the most effective means of countering the risk of nuclear terrorism. 44 Moreover, the end of the Cold War eliminated the rationale for maintaining a large military-industrial complex in Russia, and the nuclear cities were closed. 45 This resulted in at least 35,000 nuclear scientists becoming unemployed in an economy that was collapsing. 46 Although the economy has stabilized somewhat, there [\*1439] are still at least 20,000 former scientists who are unemployed or underpaid and who are too young to retire, 47 raising the chilling prospect that these scientists will be tempted to sell their nuclear knowledge, or steal nuclear material to sell, to states or terrorist organizations with nuclear ambitions. 48 The potential consequences of the unchecked spread of nuclear knowledge and material to terrorist groups that seek to cause mass destruction in the United States are truly horrifying. A terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon would be devastating in terms of immediate human and economic losses. 49 Moreover, there would be immense political pressure in the United States to discover the perpetrators and retaliate with nuclear weapons, massively increasing the number of casualties and potentially triggering a full-scale nuclear conflict. 50 In addition to the threat posed by terrorists, leakage of nuclear knowledge and material from Russia will reduce the barriers that states with nuclear ambitions face and may trigger widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons. 51 This proliferation will increase the risk of nuclear attacks against the United States [\*1440] or its allies by hostile states, 52 as well as increase the likelihood that regional conflicts will draw in the United States and escalate to the use of nuclear weapons. 53

2NC – Uniqueness Wall

Karzai’s credibility is up

A. Karzai’s approval rating is up

Calstrom, ’10

[Gregg Carlstrom, Journalist, 1/12/10, “AFGHAN POLL: KARZAI'S POPULARITY SKYROCKETS,” <http://www.themajlis.org/2010/01/12/afghan-poll-karzais-popularity-skyrockets>]

The right/wrong direction trend, and Karzai's job approval, both look like outliers -- but maybe not. **70 percent of Afghans say their country is going in the right direction**, **up** **from 40 percent in 2009**; **72 percent said** Afghan president Hamid **Karzai is doing a** good **or excellent job, up from 52 percent last year**. Those jumps are both suspect. **But they're not unprecedented.** Consider similar polling data in the U.S.: Obama's approval rating has dropped from 68 percent to 48 percent in the last 12 months, and 36 percent say America is on the right track, up from 10 percent before Obama's inauguration.

B. He just enacted governmental reforms

Nissenbaum & Shukoor, 7-21

[Dion Nissenbaum and Hashim Shukoor, Staff Writers for The Sacramento Bee, “Karzai: We'll be ready to begin taking control,” July 21st 2010,” <http://www.sacbee.com/2010/07/21/2903655/karzai-well-be-ready-to-begin.html>]

Amid tight security that shut down much of Kabul, Karzai backed new reforms designed to give his government more credibility and to empower the troubled Afghan security forces to take full control of the country by 2014. While Afghan forces prevented any major attacks on the international conference, insurgents sought to disrupt the event by firing a rocket at Kabul's airport, forcing a plane that was carrying U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to land instead at nearby Bagram Air Base. As the conference wound down, NATO officials also announced that an Afghan army trainer had opened fire at a shooting range in northern Afghanistan, the second attack in a week. Tuesday's shooting in Mazar-e-Sharif killed two American civilians – both thought to be private security contractors training Afghan army recruits – as well as two Afghan soldiers, including the suspected attacker. The killings came a week after a rogue Afghan soldier escaped after killing three British soldiers in southern Afghanistan. America's $27 billion plan to create a reliable Afghan police force and army is considered the linchpin for President Barack Obama's plan to start scaling back U.S. forces in Afghanistan next summer.

C. He’s experienced

The Public Record, 7-22

[Wahid Monowar, Afghanistan's former consul general in Toronto. He currently is Afghanistan's deputy permanent representative to the United Nations in Vienna. “Important Notice, In Afghan Peace”, July 22nd 2010, <http://pubrecord.org/commentary/8056/important-notice-afghan-peace/>]

Second, Afghans must do their part and the United States should search options on how to sustain that. As I have mentioned before, for America, Mr. Karzai’s perplexing behavior poses a crucial challenge that represents a critical impasse for an undeviating peaceful settlement of the conflict. Nine years of Karzai’s on the job training has clarified one notion that Mr. Karzai is management material and therefore, the United States should reach out to experts who specialize in managing individuals such as Karzai, even if the Obama administration has to cross the party line to do that. The opportunity cost of winning the war outweighs its political ramification. Consequently, in American calculus, Mr.Karzai accurately fits the eluding variable of its differential equation.

2NC – Link Wall [1/2]

**Withdrawal – Causes Taliban takeover –**

1. U.S. withdrawal would collapse Karzai government and lead to Taliban takeover

Haass ’10

[Richard N. Haass, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, Director of Policy Planning for the United States Department of State and a close advisor to Secretary of State Colin Powell. The Senate approved Haass as a candidate for the position of ambassador and he has been U.S. Coordinator for the Future of Afghanistan. He succeeded George J. Mitchell as the United States Special Envoy for Northern Ireland to help the peace process in Northern Ireland, for which he received the State Department's Distinguished Service Award, “We’re Not Winning, it’s Not Worth it”, July18th 2010, <http://www.newsweek.com/2010/07/18/we-re-not-winning-it-s-not-worth-it.html>]

At the other end of the policy spectrum would be a decision to walk away from Afghanistan—to complete as quickly as possible **a** full **U.S. military withdrawal**. Doing so **would** almost certainly result in the collapse of the Karzai government and a Taliban takeover of much of the country. Afghanistan could become another Lebanon, where the civil war blends into a regional war involving multiple neighboring states. Such an outcome triggered by U.S. military withdrawal would be seen as a major strategic setback to the United States in its global struggle with terrorists. It would also be a disaster for NATO in what in many ways is its first attempt at being a global security organization.

2. The Taliban are waiting for us to withdraw to spring back

Nayar ’10

[Kuldip Nayar, Syndicated columnist, “US Exit means Taliban Entry”, July 10th 2010, <http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=146088>]

Yet President **Obama's** declaration that the **US forces would begin withdrawing from next summer is tantamount to weakening "the wholehearted fight" against the Taliban. How can one fight without reservation when one declares beforehand one's decision to quit? The last time when America did so it gave birth to the Taliban government**, a flagship of fundamentalism. **This time the scenario could be worse because then the Taliban had not tasted power, which they did after America's withdrawal**. At present, **they are lying low and awaiting the departure of the American forces. The Afghanistan government is not viable. Nor has its military developed enough teeth to thwart the Taliban.** What was needed was not the change in command, but a change in American policy to withdraw its forces. True, Islamabad has been able to keep New Delhi out. The latter has not taken up any new economic project. Pakistan has been able to convince America, which needs Islamabad's support the most, that Pakistan cannot fight with all its troops because it has to keep a large number of them on the border with India.

3. Top officials in the Afghani government agree

AFP, ’09

[AFP, “Taliban takeover if troops leave Afghanistan: Abdullah”, November 16th 2009, <http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jf5dFMrHejXDJJU3OIFyGXRrwgAw>]

BERLIN — The Taliban will overrun Afghanistan if international troops pull out, former Afghan presidential challenger Abdullah Abdullah warned on Monday. In an interview with the Financial Times Deutschland, Abdullah said: "Afghanistan will fall immediately into the hands of the Taliban if international forces withdraw." The prospect of US soldiers leaving the country made him "extremely worried," he continued in comments published in German. Abdullah's comments came a day after US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said that her country was "not interested in staying in Afghanistan" and that America had "no long-term stake there." US President Barack Obama on Friday promised to announce his Afghan strategy review soon as he edges closer to a decision on reinforcing the 68,000 US troops who will be fighting in Afghanistan by the end of the year. There are currently more than 100,000 NATO and US troops based in Afghanistan, including around 4,300 German soldiers fighting in a mission that is deeply unpopular back home. Abdullah also said he supported the call of Afghan war commander General Stanley McChrystal, who wants more than 40,000 extra US troops.

2NC – Link Wall [2/2]

D. Karzai will have to hand over control to the Taliban or risk death

**NRO ’10**

[National Review Online, “Mixed-Signal Surge”, June 14th 2010, <http://article.nationalreview.com/436208/mixed-signal-surge/the-editors>]

That’s when Obama said we’d “begin the transfer of our forces out of Afghanistan.” For Obama, stuffed full of cautionary tales about LBJ and Vietnam, that was a clever way to limit his commitment and to placate his anti-war base. For the region, it was a disastrous signal communicating a lack of resolve and staying power. It gave the Taliban yet more reason to believe that they can outlast us and Karzai more reason to consider his options if we leave precipitously. In that event, he basically has three choices — get killed, flee the country, or reach a desperation-driven deal with the Taliban and the Pakistanis. He’s showing an understandable inclination toward preparing the ground for the last of these.

2NC – Taliban I/L

Karzai key to getting a peace deal with the Taliban

[Nic Robertson, CNN International Correspondent, “[Karzai faces credibility balancing act after peace jirga](http://afghanistan.blogs.cnn.com/2010/06/04/karzai-faces-credibility-balancing-act-after-peace-jirga/),” June 4th 2010, <http://afghanistan.blogs.cnn.com/2010/06/04/karzai-faces-credibility-balancing-act-after-peace-jirga/>]

And that’s everyone’s dilemma, not just Karzai’s; it's the international community’s, too. Without credibility, Karzai can hardly lead a peace initiative, or at the very least expect the Taliban to get real about ending the fight. So without listening to his delegates - and he invited a largely loyal and moderate cross section of the country - he can’t expect to build that credibility. But, if he goes along with hard line requests he’ll struggle for international support. And if he doesn’t go along with those far-reaching requests, he’s unlikely to convince the Taliban that now is the time to make peace. Like it or not, Karzai’s fate is deeply tied to the international communities right now. Many diplomats in this city have had to swallow their misgivings about him and, while privately, they are very guarded in their expectations, at the jirga they are publicly supporting it. Quite simply, it is the best option in play for getting the vast majority of their troops back home and soon.

**Karzai’s government is committed to reconciliation efforts with the Taliban**

**Sify News, 7-23**

[Sify News, Indian Newspaper, “US crackdown on Haqqani network to make Karzai's reconciliation task tougher,” July 23rd 2010, <http://sify.com/news/us-crackdown-on-haqqani-network-to-make-karzai-s-reconciliation-task-tougher-news-international-khxnkhiffji.html>]

**The Haqqani Network is a Taliban-affiliated group of militants that operates out of North Waziristan Agency,** Pakistan and has been spearheading insurgent activity in Afghanistan," The Dawn quoted the statement, as saying. The official notification identified Nasiruddin as "an emissary for the Haqqani Network and brother of Sirajuddin Haqqani who leads the group with his father, Jalaluddin." "Today's designation of three senior leaders and financiers for the Taliban and its affiliated Haqqani Network builds upon Treasury's longstanding efforts to deprive these extremists of the resources they need to execute their violent activities," **Adam Szubin, director of Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control, said. "We will continue to aggressively work to expose and dismantle the financial networks of terrorist groups in support of the President's goal of a stable Afghanistan,**" Szubin added. The Treasury Department's move has made the task of Afghan **President Hamid Karzai** more difficult, as he **is seeking a reconciliation in the country involving all the different Taliban factions, including the Haqqani network, which has close ties with the Al-Qaeda**. The Pakistan government is also said to be involved in forging an agreement between the Haqqani network and the Afghan government.

No chance of solving terrorism without a credible government in place

Financial Times, 6-30

[Financial Times, “Countdown Starts in Afghanistan,” June 30th 2010, <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/41c654c8-847a-11df-9cbb-00144feabdc0.html>]

Unless there is a credible government presence, offering security and visible hope of a better future, this enterprise is doomed. That will be doubly true after the allies – hopefully backed by more Afghan forces than are currently fit for purpose – start to gain ground in the Kandahar campaign. The Taliban and allied insurgents will do everything to break the will of coalition governments and the Afghan people. They know they can outwait Nato, waging a war of attrition against its forces and terror against a wavering populace. That is why, as Gen Petraeus said at his confirmation hearing on Tuesda**y**, they must be “hammered” on the battlefield – a precondition to their entering talks within constitutional boundaries. Almost everybody now knows that such talks must eventually happen. The problem is that President Karzai – to whose whims the current policy is hostage – appears to be more interested in talks aimed at securing his own future rather than that of his country.He has had a series of meetings with Pakistan’s military and spy chiefs and, reportedly, with the al-Qaeda allied Haqqani network they allow

2NC – Afghan Stability I/L

Karzai key to Afghan stability

Jacoby, ’04

[Vice Admiral Lowell Jacoby, U.S. Navy Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Statement For the Record Senate Armed Services Committee, February 26, 2004, <http://russia.shaps.hawaii.edu/security/us/2004/20040309_jacoby.html>]

Afghanistan's new constitution was approved in early January. This paves the way for a presidential election this summer and legislative elections later this year. The show of support among Loya Jirga delegates for President Hamid Karzai bodes well for his political strength and chances in the presidential election. **Karzai's ability to use his growing political strength to encourage compliance with his reform agenda may provide long term stability,** but could result in near term tensions. President Hamid **Karzai remains critical to stability in Afghanistan. As a Pashtun, he remains the only individual capable of maintaining the trust of** Afghanistan's largest ethnic group (**Pashtuns) and support of other ethnic minorities. A Taliban insurgency that continues to target** humanitarian assistance and **reconstruction** efforts **is a serious threat**, potentially **eroding commitments to stability and progress in Afghanistan.**

2NC – Pakistan Stability I/L

Karzai collapse will be disastrous for Pakistan stability

**Khan, ’10**

[Wasif Khan, Staff writer on Foreign Policy for Dawn News, “The Karzai Conundrum”, April 14, 2010, <http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/world/03-the-karzai-conundrum-ss-08>]

Yet, if Karzai’s government were to crumble following a US withdrawal, the consequences for Pakistan could be disastrous. A Taliban resurgence in Kabul would undoubtedly bolster the insurgency in Pakistan, where the military and security forces are already spread thin battling homegrown militants, and the population is reeling from frequent suicide attacks. Like all other stakeholders, for Pakistan, there are no easy solutions in Afghanistan. Perhaps one reason for optimism is that in contrast to the 1980’s, the US has indicated a firm and balanced resolve to support and engage Pakistan in the long run, at least under the Obama administration.

2NC – A2: COIN Link Turn

Even if COIN is failing Karzai will be unable to fill the power vacuum left after withdrawal

Haass, ’10

[Richard N. Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, Director of Policy Planning for the United States Department of State and a close advisor to Secretary of State Colin Powell. The Senate approved Haass as a candidate for the position of ambassador and he has been U.S. Coordinator for the Future of Afghanistan. He succeeded George J. Mitchell as the United States Special Envoy for Northern Ireland to help the peace process in Northern Ireland, for which he received the State Department's Distinguished Service Award, “We’re Not Winning, it’s Not Worth it”, July18,2010, <http://www.newsweek.com/2010/07/18/we-re-not-winning-it-s-not-worth-it.html>]

Today the counterinsurgency strategy that demanded all those troops is clearly not working. The August 2009 election that gave Karzai a second term as president was marred by pervasive fraud and left him with less legitimacy than ever. While the surge of U.S. forces has pushed back the Taliban in certain districts, the Karzai government has been unable to fill the vacuum with effective governance and security forces that could prevent the Taliban’s return. So far the Obama administration is sticking with its strategy; indeed, the president went to great lengths to underscore this when he turned to Petraeus to replace Gen. Stanley McChrystal in Kabul. No course change is likely until at least December, when the president will find himself enmeshed in yet another review of his Afghan policy.

AFF – Credibility Low

Karzai credibility low

[Khaleej Times Online](http://www.khaleejtimes.com/index00.asp), 7-19

[Khaleej Times Online, “UN chief urges Karzai to act on good governance”, July 19th 2010, <http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticle08.asp?xfile=data/international/2010/July/international_July788.xml&section=international>]

In exchange they will press the international community to give them control of 50 percent of all donor funds within two years, according to organizers. But with impoverished Afghanistan saddled with one of the most corrupt governments in the world, questions have been raised about the credibility of Karzai’s development plan. The Afghan leader pledged to crack down on corruption after being re-elected in controversial polls marred by fraud last August. “We have been urging President Karzai to do more on good governance, particularly fighting against corrupt practices in his country and to do more to promote reconciliation,” Ban said. He insisted that the world community has endorsed Karzai’s plan to launch peace talks with Taliban moderates. “But that is not without any conditions,” the UN boss stressed, pointing to Karzai’s demand that militants renounce violence, accept the Afghan constitution and break off ties with Al-Qaeda.

AFF – Link Turns

Turn – Current COIN strategy destroys Karzai’s credibility

Dorronsoro ’10

[Gilles Dorronsoro, Visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Expert on Afghanistan, Turkey, and South Asia; Specializes in the security and political development in Afghanistan, particularly the role of the International Security Assistance Force, the necessary steps for a viable government in Kabul, and the conditions necessary for withdrawal scenario; Former professor of political science at the Sorbonne, Paris and the Institute of Political Studies of Renne; Former scientific coordinator at the French Institute of Anatolian Studies in Istanbul, “Afghanistan: Searching for Political Agreement”, 2010 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/searching_polit_agreement.pdf>]

But **COIN** is only a minor part of the strategy. Coalition strategists think they can quickly weaken the Taliban through the creation of militias, the co-opting of Taliban groups, and targeted assassinations.2 These **policies will not strengthen the Afghan government’s legitimacy or influence; to** Carnegie Endowment for International Peace **the contrary, they will further weaken the central power**. Notwithstanding public statements made last fall, the current strategy is not **and** is **destroy**ing **the Karzai government’s credibility**. The effects of the current strategy are irreversible, and with the acceleration of political fragmentation, **the coalition is faced with the prospect of a collapse of Afghan institutions.**

Turn – Current operations create resentment against the Karzai government – civilian deaths

Swiss Peace, ’07

[Swiss Peace, “Afghanistan: Trends in Conflict and Cooperation”, April to May 2007, <http://www.swisspeace.ch/typo3/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/FAST/Updates/2007/Afgh_Up_4_6_07.pdf>]

**The killings of numerous civilians by international forces**, such as Herat (49 civilians killed on 27 and 29 April; source: UN), Helman, Nangahar, Kandahar and other places having sparked popular protest in several [arts of the country. The high death toll among civilians was also criticized by Karzai, the UN, and even NATO/ISAF when the deaths were caused **by the US led Operation Enduring Freedom**. The civilian deaths not only fuel resentment against international troops but also **further undermine the credibility of the Karzai government. Thousands of civilians have also been displaced due to fighting between Taliban and International/National forces in war-torn areas**. According to associated press counts, 1800 people have been killed in insurgency related violence so far this year, including 135civilians killed each by international forces and the Taliban. According to UN figures, 320-380 civilians have been killed by the Taliban and government/international forces in the first four months of 2007. **Compared to the figures of human rights Watch from last year, these new figures suggest an increase in civilian casualties of around 40%.**

\*\*\*TAPI PIPELINE DA\*\*\*

1NC TAPI Pipeline DA [1/3]

TAPI construction will happen – despite geopolitical and religious tension, there is support and cooperation now

Foster ‘10

John Foster, energy economist with worldwide experience in energy and development. He has held posts with the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, British Petroleum and Petro-Canada, “Afghanistan, Energy Geopolitics and the TAPI Pipeline,” Global Research, March 25, 2010, http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=18329

At the time, the Taliban controlled 90 percent of Afghanistan but not the area held by the Afghan Northern Alliance. Unocal testified to Congress that the pipeline "cannot begin construction until an internationally recognized Afghanistan government is in place. For the project to advance, it must have international financing, government-to-government agreements and government-to-consortium agreements." The Bush Administration urged the Taliban regime to form a government of national unity that would include the northern tribes. Bridas took a different approach—they negotiated separately with different tribes. The president of Bridas spent eight months visiting tribes along the pipeline route and reportedly had secured their cooperation for the venture.

Negotiations with the Taliban broke down in July 2001, just before the attacks of September 11. In October, the US ousted the Taliban, with the assistance of the Northern Alliance. The Pashtun—roughly 40 percent of the population—are a major source of Taliban insurgents, and the pipeline route goes through the Pashtun area in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. There are about 30 million Pashtuns on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border. It’s an artificial border—the so-called Durand Line that was imposed by British India in 1893. It was drawn intentionally to break up the Pashtun tribes. In fact, Pashtuns in Kandahar were independent from Kabul for ages, and, until recently, Pashtuns in Pakistan were relatively independent from Islamabad. After the 2001 invasion, planning of the pipeline continued. Interim President Karzai met with President Musharraf in Islamabad in February 2002, where they announced their agreement to cooperate on the proposed pipeline. In May 2002, the heads of state of Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan agreed to cooperate on the project, and a steering committee of oil and gas ministers was established to oversee project development.

US military presence ensures TAPI construction which is key to offset Iranian resource expansion

Sullivan ‘09

Corwin Sullivan, “America, a Gas Pipeline Called TAPI, and Afghanistan,” August 14, 2009, The Canada’s World Blog, http://canadasworld.wordpress.com/2009/08/14/america-a-gas-pipeline-called-tapi-and-afghanistan/

In the early days of the current conflict in Afghanistan, there was a fair bit of talk around the fringes to the effect that the whole invasion was some sort of play for Central Asia’s oil and gas reserves. I was a graduate student in the Boston area at the time, and I remember reading an analysis in the local “alternative” weekly (available online [here](http://www.bostonphoenix.com/boston/news_features/other_stories/multi-page/documents/02388257.htm)) that persuaded me it was all half-informed conspiracy mongering. So imagine my surprise when I came across [a piece in the Toronto Star](http://www.thestar.com/comment/article/679670) arguing that the planned Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) natural gas pipeline is a major influence on US policy towards Afghanistan. The author was someone called John Foster, and it turns out that John Foster is not some random conspiracy nut hiding out in his grandmother’s basement. Cambridge-educated, former lead economist of Petro-Canada, five decades’ and thirty countries’ worth of experience in energy policy and the oil industry – let’s just say it’s an impressive resume. With that said, his article in the Star didn’t entirely make sense to me on a first reading. Foster certainly posed suitably dramatic questions: With the U.S. surge underway and the British ambassador to Washington predicting a decades-long commitment, it’s reasonable to ask: Why are the U.S. and NATO in Afghanistan? Could the motivation be power, a permanent military bridgehead, access to energy resources? But the TAPI pipeline, as the name implies, is supposed to transport gas originating in Turkmenistan to Afghanistan, Pakistan and India – not to America or any other NATO country. Why should “the U.S. and NATO” be so excited about the project? Although it’s less clear from Foster’s Star article than from a report he wrote for the Canadian Centre for Policy alternatives (PDF [here](http://www.policyalternatives.ca/documents/National_Office_Pubs/2008/A_Pipeline_Through_a_Troubled_Land.pdf)), he clearly believes that the answer relates to a rival planned project called the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) pipeline. (These projects certainly do have imaginative names.) The US has an open interest in economically isolating Iran if possible, and a pipeline transporting Iranian gas to Pakistan and India would compromise that isolation. If the Americans can persuade Pakistan and India to buy their gas from Turkmenistan instead, Iran will be frozen out. Just a routine case, then, of a great power trying to inflict economic damage on an enemy.

1NC TAPI Pipeline DA [2/3]

IPI solidifies Iranian leverage over Central Asia, emboldening Iran to proliferate and crushes Middle East stability

Cohen, Curtis, and Graham ‘08

Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is Senior Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Security in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies; Lisa Curtis is Senior Research Fellow for South Asia in the Asian Studies Center; and Owen Graham is a Research Assistant in the Allison Center at The Heritage Foundation, No. 2139, May 30, 2008, “The Proposed Iran–Pakistan–India Gas Pipeline: An Unacceptable Risk to Regional Security,” Executive Summary Backgrounder – Heritage Foundation, <http://www.gees.org/documentos/Documen-03020.pdf>

Iran’s support of terrorism, hostile policies in the Middle East, pursuit of nuclear weapons, and mismanagement of its economy make it a dangerous and unreliable business partner and call into question its capacity to supply natural gas to Pakistan and India through the IPI. Potential transit problems in Baluchistan also make this project inherently risky. As major energy consumers, the U.S. and India share strategic interests in the Persian Gulf and Central Asia. Building the IPI would be contrary to these interests, would destabilize the Persian Gulf, and would strengthen Russia’s grip over Central Asia, decreasing both regional and global energy security. Accordingly, the U.S. should fully back TAPI to increase India’s and Pakistan’s energy security and reduce Russia’s leverage in Central Asia. India and Pakistan would benefit from an increase in LNG contracts and capacity. This would also strengthen India’s ties to the Middle East. Finally, blocking Iran’s overland export option might also increase Iran’s interest in promoting stability in the Strait of Hormuz. The U.S., India, and Pakistan should expand their energy cooperation to ensure security and economic prosperity in the region. The foreign policies of India and Pakistan are driven increasingly by energy security. To sustain their booming economies and growing populations amid tight oil and gas markets, Indian and Pakistani policymakers are turning to energy deals with unsavory regimes, such as Iran’s. At the same time, energyproducing states including Iran and Russia are attempting to tap new markets, drive up oil prices, and secure their own interests by locking in demand. In 1993, Pakistan and Iran announced a plan to build a gas pipeline, which Iran later proposed extending into India. Dubbed the “peace pipeline,” the Iran–Pakistan–India (IPI) gas pipeline would traverse over 2,775 kilometers (1,724 miles) from Iran’s South Pars gas field in the Persian Gulf through the Pakistani city of Khuzdar, with one branch going on to Karachi and a second branch extending to Multan and then on to India.1 This pipeline would give Iran an economic lifeline and increase its leverage and influence in South Asia. U.S. policymakers argue that allowing the IPI pipeline to proceed would encourage the Iranian regime to defy the will of the international community, develop nuclear weapons, and support terrorism. Furthermore, inadequate investment in Iran’s oil and gas industry and increasing domestic demand could render Iran incapable of supplying natural gas through the IPI.

Iranian proliferation causes Middle East proliferation and war

Nye ‘06

Professor of International Politics at Harvard [Joseph S. Nye, a former Assistant US Secretary of Defense under President Clinton, “Should Iran Be Attacked?,” Monday , 29 May 2006, pg. <http://www.turkishweekly.net/comments.php?id=2105>

<<Would an Iranian bomb really be so bad? Some argue that it could become the basis of stable nuclear deterrence in the region, analogous to the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. But statements by Iranian leaders denying the Holocaust and urging the destruction of Israel have not only cost Iran support in Europe, but are unlikely to make Israel willing to gamble its existence on the prospect of stable deterrence. Nor is it likely that Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and others will sit passively while the Persian Shia gain the bomb. They will likely follow suit, and the more weapons proliferate in the volatile Middle East, the more likely it is that accidents and miscalculations could lead to their use. Moreover, there are genuine fears that rogue elements in a divided Iranian government might leak weapons technology to terrorist groups.>>

1NC TAPI Pipeline DA [3/3]

Middle East war leads to extinction

Steinbach ‘02

John, March 3, Center for research on Globalization, <http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2002/03/00_steinbach_israeli-wmd.htm>

As Israeli society becomes more and more polarized, the influence of the radical right becomes stronger. According to Shahak, "The prospect of Gush Emunim, or some secular right-wing Israeli fanatics, or some some of the delerious Israeli Army generals, seizing control of Israeli nuclear weapons...cannot be precluded. ...while israeli jewish society undergoes a steady polarization, the Israeli security system increasingly relies on the recruitment of cohorts from the ranks of the extreme right."(39) The Arab states, long aware of Israel's nuclear program, bitterly resent its coercive intent, and perceive its existence as the paramount threat to peace in the region, requiring their own weapons of mass destruction. During a future Middle Eastern war (a distinct possibility given the ascension of Ariel Sharon, an unindicted war criminal with a bloody record stretching from the massacre of Palestinian civilians at Quibya in 1953, to the massacre of Palestinian civilians at Sabra and Shatila in 1982 and beyond) the possible Israeli use of nuclear weapons should not be discounted. According to Shahak, "In Israeli terminology, the launching of missiles on to Israeli territory is regarded as 'nonconventional' regardless of whether they are equipped with explosives or poison gas."(40) (Which requires a "nonconventional" response, a perhaps unique exception being the Iraqi SCUD attacks during the Gulf War.) Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is gaining momentum (and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major (if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon - for whatever reason - the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration." (44)

Independently, proliferation causes extinction

Utgoff ‘02

Victor Utgoff, Deputy Director for Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division, Institute for Defense Analysis, Summer 2002 (Survival) p. OUP Journals - http://survival.oupjournals.org

Widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons and that such shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear “six-shooters” on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations**.**

­Uniqueness – Instability Now

TAPI construction coming now – only stability issues are in the way

Yang et. al ‘10

Director of Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, Ph.D. in History From the University of Washington, Editor of Journal of Asian Studies and Peasant Studies (2010, Anand, Task Force “U.S. Next Steps In Afghanistan,” https://dlib.lib.washington.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/1773/15596/TF\_SIS495B\_2010.pdf?sequence=1

Transit revenue from the project is estimated to generate up to US$160 million per year,44 as well as create construction jobs and support funding for further development and infrastructure projects. The Gas Pipeline Framework Agreement was signed by the TAPI nations in April of 2008 and is largely sponsored by the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Construction is due to begin in 2010, with a projected completion date by 2015. However, progress has been hindered due to the war in Afghanistan, especially since part of the pipeline goes through the conflict-ridden southern provinces, including Helmand and Kandahar. As a result, construction costs have doubled.45

US is pushing TAPI now but instability can derail it

Alexeev ‘10

Gheorghe Alexeev, April 1, 2010, “The Trans-Afghanistan Pipeline,” http://gheorghealexeev.wordpress.com/2010/04/01/trans-afghanistan-pipeline/

Since the US-led offensive that ousted the Taliban from power, reported Forbes in 2005, “the project has been revived and drawn strong US support” as it would allow the Central Asian republics to export energy to Western markets “without relying on Russian routes”. Then-US Ambassador to Turkmenistan Ann Jacobsen noted that: “We are seriously looking at the project, and it is quite possible that American companies will join it.” Due to increasing instability, the project has essentially stalled; construction of the Turkmen part was supposed to start in 2006, but the overall feasibility is questionable since the southern part of the Afghan section runs through territory which continues to be under de facto Taliban control.

Uniqueness – US Committed Now

Petraus will use the military to ensure construction of TAPI

LeVine ‘10

[Steve LeVine](http://oilandglory.foreignpolicy.com/blog/92421), June 29, 2010, FOREIGN POLICY, “An Afghan trade route: What could possibly go wrong with that?” http://oilandglory.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/06/29/an\_afghan\_trade\_route\_what\_could\_possibly\_go\_wrong\_with\_that

The U.S. military is studying [a plan](http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/silkroadpapers/1005Afghan.pdf) to solve Afghanistan's problems by turning it into a superhighway of roads, railroads, electricity lines and energy pipelines connected to the entire Eurasian landmass. According to a piece in the National Journal by [Sydney Freedberg](http://burnafterreading.nationaljournal.com/2010/06/afghanistan-backwater-to.php), the proposal has the ear of Gen. David Petraeus, whose [confirmation hearings](http://www.thetakeaway.org/2010/jun/29/general-david-petraeus-faces-senate-confirmation-hearings/) to be the new U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan start today in the Senate Armed Services Committee.

Uniqueness – Member Commitment Now

Cooperation now over TAPI by member countries now

Daily News and Analysis ‘06

CORRESPONDENT DAILY NEWS AND ANALYSIS (DNA) (INDIAN NEWS SERVICE), November 21, 2006, “Boost for TAPI gas pipeline project,” <http://www.dancewithshadows.com/business/tapi-gas-pipeline-project.asp>

Work on the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline is to be accelerated and the dedicated efforts to develop a technically and commercially viable project are currently on. This was agreed upon by the second regional economic cooperation conference on Afghanistan. A New Delhi declaration, which was issued at the end of the two-day conference, said the regional countries would work towards concluding or broadening existing preferential trading agreements, including preferential tariffs for Afghanistan. These nations have also agreed to work towards revising and updating the existing bilateral, trilateral and multilateral trade and transit conventions and agreements, select the most promising inter-regional routes, and prioritise investments. As per the declaration, Afghanistan's development is set to gain in strength in order to remain a central factor in assuring the growth, stability and prosperity of the region. The governments in the region will take practical steps in adopting the necessary policies in this direction. The participant nations also agreed that there would be better information sharing, through prioritisation of issues.

Uniqueness – Pipelines Inevitable

Foreign pipelines are inevitable including ones from Russia, China, and Iran

Foster ‘10

John Foster, energy economist with worldwide experience in energy and development. He has held posts with the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, British Petroleum and Petro-Canada, “Afghanistan, Energy Geopolitics and the TAPI Pipeline,” Global Research, March 25, 2010, http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=18329

Turkmenistan is far from the world’s oceans, so it must rely on pipelines to get its gas to market. Like railway lines in the 19th century, pipeline routes are important because they connect trading partners and influence the regional balance of power. Until recently, Turkmenistan’s gas flowed only north through Russia. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, competing world powers have vied to move the gas in other directions. The rivalry is sometimes called the New Great Game, an update of the 19th century Great Game in Central Asia between the Russian and British Empires. Turkmenistan offers a hub for pipelines to export natural gas in all directions. President Berdimuhamedov is committed to multiple export routes: north to Russia, east to China, south to Pakistan and India via Afghanistan, and possibly west to Europe via the Caspian Sea. Significantly, in April 2008 at the NATO Summit in Bucharest, Romania, he met with President Bush to discuss gas export policy, and with President Karzai to review the TAPI project.  Turkmenistan is concerned about pipeline security. It co-sponsored a Resolution on Reliable Energy Transit (63/210) that was passed by the UN General Assembly on December 19, 2008. The Resolution recognized the need for international cooperation to ensure “the reliable transportation of energy to international markets through pipelines and other transportation systems.”  In April 2009, Turkmenistan convened a high-level conference on the topic, where President Berdimuhamedov re-iterated his position on multiple export routes. Russia remains a key player today. In 2007, it signed an agreement with Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan to build a new gas pipeline that would parallel an older one and add to its pipeline network. Russia is the world’s largest producer of natural gas and is a major supplier of gas to Europe. Currently, Russia is building pipelines (South Stream and North Stream) that would link its network to various points in Europe. From Russia’s viewpoint, they provide diversity, adding to the existing pipeline through Ukraine. In December 2009, China tapped into Turkmenistan’s gas reserves, opening a new pipeline from Turkmenistan that travels 1,833 km through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to reach western China. There it connects with the Chinese line east to Shanghai. Pipelines allow Turkmenistan’s gas to flow all the way to western Europe via Russia and east across China to Shanghai—enormous distances.  The US and European Union support Turkmenistan’s policy of multiple export routes. They promote a pipeline project under the Caspian Sea to bring Turkmen gas west to Azerbaijan, where it would connect with the recently-built South Caucasus pipeline to Turkey. In Turkey, it would link with Nabucco, a planned pipeline to Austria. Russia, a littoral country on the Caspian Sea, objects to construction of the trans-Caspian link. Since Azerbaijan doesn’t have enough gas to fill the Nabucco pipeline, Turkey is exploring alternatives, including gas from Iran. The US objects to supplies from Iran. Iran has its own interest in gas from Turkmenistan. It imports Turkmen gas into northern Iran to supply local markets that are far from its own gas fields. In 2009, a second pipeline was completed to augment existing imports. That raises the question: Could this pipeline be used to route gas from Turkmenistan to Turkey—and on to Europe through the Nabucco line?

Uniqueness – TAPI/IPI Tradeoff Now

India and Pakistan are negotiating an Iranian pipeline now if TAPI falls through

Foster ‘10

John Foster, energy economist with worldwide experience in energy and development. He has held posts with the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, British Petroleum and Petro-Canada, “Afghanistan, Energy Geopolitics and the TAPI Pipeline,” Global Research, March 25, 2010, http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=18329

For several years, India and Pakistan have been negotiating with Iran for another pipeline project to bring Iranian gas to their countries. With an estimated capital cost of $7.5 billion, the pipeline would be similar in cost to the TAPI project. Petroleum ministers of India and Pakistan met in Islamabad in April 2008 (just after the TAPI meeting) to resolve a pricing issue and clear the way for signing agreements; and President Ahmadinejad of Iran visited Islamabad and New Delhi the following week for talks on the pipeline. Since then, India has oscillated on the project and has stayed largely on the sidelines following a period of tense India-Pakistan relations. However, in December 2009, India’s petroleum minister, Murli Deora, said his country was discussing important issues relating to the pipeline with other participating countries. In May 2009, Iran and Pakistan went ahead and signed an initial agreement, without India. Russia’s Gazprom expressed willingness to help build the line, most recently in January 2010. The same month, US Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke met with Pakistan’s petroleum minister Syed Naveed Qamar, and, according to a Pakistani newspaper, he offered incentives to Pakistan to abandon the Iranian project. Subsequently, the petroleum minister told journalists that Pakistan and Iran would sign a technical agreement soon; he had met with the US ambassador and officials of US Overseas Private Investment Corporation who had expressed no objection to the project. In 2008, Iran and Pakistan proposed that China join the project. The foreign minister of China, Yong Jiechi, informed Pakistan’s foreign minister, Shah Mahmood Qureshi, that China was seriously studying this proposal. Iran’s foreign minister, Manouchehr Mottaki, affirmed in February 2010 that China is keen to join the project. The demand for energy imports is strong and the stakes are high. Moves by various countries to gain access or control are closely watched—The Grand Chessboard, as Zbigniew Brzezinski called it.

Uniqueness – TAPI Coming Now

TAPI construction has been accelerated

Alexander ‘06

Alexander Gas and Oil: News Trends in Central Asia, “Work on TAPI gas pipeline to be accelerated,” 26-11-06, <http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/news/ntc65139.htm>

Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, the four partners of a proposed $ 3.3 bn pipeline, have vowed to accelerate work on the four-nation project to bring natural gas from Turkmenistan to India.   
The declaration was adopted in New Delhi at a two-day regional economic cooperation forum on Afghanistan, which was attended by Afghan President Hamid Karzai. The partners of the so-called TAPI pipeline also committed to help Afghanistan become an energy bridge in the region. India's Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee appealed to member countries to resolve all disputes pertaining to the project so work can be complete on time.   
"Work will be accelerated on the TAPI gas pipeline to develop a technically and commercially viable project," said the declaration. The federal Indian Cabinet in its meeting May 19 gave its formal approval for India to join the pipeline though it had not formally been invited to become a part of the US- and Asian Development Bank-backed project. India also suggested that a working group on electricity, trade and energy development for TAPI be formed and the meeting of the group be held regularly so progress on the project can be monitored. The other three members of the project agreed to the suggestion. "The pipeline project has the potential to meet natural gas requirements of the region contributing to stability in the South Asian region," said Jayanto Roychowdhury, a senior energy analyst. India has asked Pakistan for transit facility as a part of the strategy for the development of Afghanistan. Initially, New Delhi expressed concern over the security of the pipeline, as half of it would pass through restive parts of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Following assurances from the member countries and the United States, however, India decided to join the joint venture. "The US has also been pushing for the development of closer ties between Central Asia and South Asia and has supported the TAPI project as opposed to the Iran-Pakistan-India has pipeline," said Rangin Dadfar Sapanta, foreign minister of Afghanistan, who accompanied Karzai to the conference.

Uniqueness – TAPI Coming Npow

Construction of TAPI begins this year – operational within 5 years

Maken ‘08

Aftab Maken, April 25, 2008, The News – International, “TAPI gas pipeline finalized,” http://www.thenews.com.pk/top\_story\_detail.asp?Id=14300

ISLAMABAD: The 10th steering committee of oil ministers from Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India on Thursday agreed to start construction work on the much-delayed TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India) pipeline project in 2010. This was stated at a joint press conference by Minister for Petroleum and Natural Resources Khwaja Muhammad Asif, Turkmen Minister for Oil and Gas Industry Dr Baymurad Hojamuhamedov, Afghan Minister of Mines Mohammad Ibrahim Adel and Indian Minister for Petroleum and Natural Gas Shri Murli Deora here after the conclusion of the steering committee meeting. The second meeting of the technical working group (TWG) of the four countries was also held the same day. The gas pipeline project, to be completed at the cost of $7.6 billion, will start supplying 3.2 billion cubic feet gas per day through 56-inch diameter pipeline. The pipeline will start from Dauletabad field in Turkmenistan to Fazilka at the Pakistan-India border, passing through Herat and Kandahar in Afghanistan and Multan in Pakistan. The project cost estimate was $3.3 billion in 2004, which has now been updated to $7.6 billion. The price increase was due to sharp increase in the price of steel, construction cost and the cost of compressor stations. Key principles for future gas sales and purchase agreement will be agreed bilaterally between the buyer and sellers under the heads of agreement discussions. However, any issue that remains unresolved will be left for GSPA (Gas Sales Purchase Agreement), the The Turkmen side informed the meeting that it would submit before Sept 2008 whereas the gas specification would be supplied within one-month time, says the announcement. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) that is facilitating the talks will take up the issue for a comprehensive review of the feasibility study to move forward to the next phase of inviting investors’ interest in the project, the announcement added. The parties have also agreed to form a consortium of investors to undertake a detailed feasibility study and further action, it said. The project would be completed to achieve first gas flow in 2015.

Uniqueness – Brink – Construction Tenuous Now

LeVine ‘10

[Steve LeVine](http://oilandglory.foreignpolicy.com/blog/92421), June 29, 2010, FOREIGN POLICY, “An Afghan trade route: What could possibly go wrong with that?” http://oilandglory.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/06/29/an\_afghan\_trade\_route\_what\_could\_possibly\_go\_wrong\_with\_that

The plan is heavy on ringing optimism. I have my doubts. They are rooted in the last time this was tried, in the 1990s, when Unocal -- now part of Chevron -- [sought to build](http://www.chevron.com/chevron/pressreleases/article/08131996_unocalgazpromsignmouforturkmenistangaspipeline.news) an $8 billion oil-and-natural gas pipeline network from Turkmenistan to Pakistan via Afghanistan. The plan -- which Unocal saw as so potentially lucrative that it could catapult the company into the big leagues of the industry -- attracted much attention, hoopla and hopes for peace after years of war and chaos in the country. Then it fell apart. There were just a few reasons: 1. The country was at war; 2. The Taliban were not the usual pipeline-negotiating types; 3. The Taliban kept beating Afghan women in the streets, which aggravated American human-rights advocates; 4. Osama bin Laden kept attacking U.S. targets like [embassies](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1998_United_States_embassy_bombings), which aggravated the U.S. military. So in 1998, three years after first launching the venture, [Unocal withdrew](http://www.chevron.com/chevron/pressreleases/article/12101998_unocalstatementonwithdrawalfromtheproposedcentralasiagascentgaspipelineproject.news). Taking stock of the affair a few years later, Unocal executive Marty Miller told me he felt like "a team sent on a suicide mission. If it worked out, we would be heroes. But there was a good chance we would be slaughtered." What he said at his Austin, TX., golf club reminded me of nighttime talks I had back in 1996 in the northern Afghan city of Mazar-i-Sharif with Charlie Santos, the on-the-ground pipeline representative for Unocal's partner in the deal, a Saudi company called Delta. Santos was a bit secretive, but he'd talk to you if you asked, and were patient. Much maligned by his colleagues, Santos saw what they didn't. "There isn't going to be any pipeline deal with the Taliban, no freaking way," Santos would repeat. It wasn't that the pipeline idea wasn't technically great -- it was. What Santos meant was that the tribal reality wouldn't allow for such an infrastructure to be built. There was also the matter of funding sources: They weren't going to pony up billions of dollars for an energy network with a 30-year life if it was built across a war zone. The authors of the new report -- S. Frederick Starr over at Johns Hopkins, and Andrew Kuchins at the Center for Strategic and International Studies -- do not suggest that the problems presented by the Taliban in the 1990s are over. Instead, they argue that those focused on security are using "flawed" analysis. [David Ignatius](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/18/AR2010061803761.html) wrote about it over at The Washington Post.

Link – US Presence

US troops are key to support construction of the TAPI pipeline

Foster and Morton ‘10

John Foster is an energy economist (World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, British Petroleum, Petro-Canada). Millie Morton is a sociologist. Both have extensive experience in international development, “Afghanistan, the Pipeline, and Politics,” PEACE Magazine, April-June, 2010, http://www.peacemagazine.org/archive/v26n2p16.htm

One clue to the Big Picture came in 2006, when donors met in New Delhi for a major conference on Afghanistan. At the end of the conference, donors, including Canada, promised to help Afghanistan become an energy bridge — a transit corridor for a natural gas pipeline originating in Turkmenistan. Turkmenistan, a Central Asian country that borders Afghanistan to the northwest, is rarely in our news. Yet it has the fourth (possibly third) largest natural gas reserves in the world. (Iran is number two; Russia is number one). The planned pipeline is called TAPI, after the initials of the four participating countries — Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. Turkmenistan was part of the Soviet Union until 1991 and became an independent country when the Soviet Union broke up. Since 1991, there has been rivalry among great and regional powers for access to Turkmenistan’s natural gas. It can only get to market through pipelines. The Russians have a pipeline north to connect with a network serving Europe. The Chinese have just completed a pipeline east, to connect with their network and go all the way to Shanghai. The US and European Union have proposed a pipeline west to link up with a network of existing and planned pipelines to Europe (bypassing Russia and Iran). And since the mid-1990s, the US has actively promoted the TAPI pipeline south through Afghanistan to Pakistan and India, and possibly Gwadar, Pakistan’s deep-sea port. Afghanistan’s National Development Strategy (2009-2013) mentions planning for the TAPI pipeline and Afghanistan’s central role as a land bridge connecting energy-rich Central Asia to energy-deficient South Asia. For Afghanistan, the pipeline is significant. It could be the country’s largest development project. Transit revenue could be US$300 million — about one-third of Afghanistan’s current domestic revenue for development. Pipelines are geopolitically important; they connect trading partners and influence the regional balance of power. Moves by various countries to gain access or control of Central Asia’s energy resources are closely watched. The Grand Chessboard is what Zbigniew Brzezinski called it.[1](http://www.peacemagazine.org/archive/v26n2p16.htm#fn18777439734ba56c699a5ec) US Goals. In US strategy, Afghanistan plays a vital role. Although official reasons for being in Afghanistan relate to terrorism, the US has other goals too. It wants to ensure that countries in the region and worldwide have access to Turkmenistan’s natural gas. Richard Boucher, US Assistant Secretary of State, said in 2007: “One of our goals is to stabilize Afghanistan,” and to link South and Central Asia “so that energy can flow to the south.”[2](http://www.peacemagazine.org/archive/v26n2p16.htm#fn3517511524ba56c699b579) In 2009, George Krol, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, told Congress that one US priority in Central Asia is “to increase development and diversification of the region’s energy resources and supply routes.” In addition to its military bases in the Middle East, the US now has numerous bases in Afghanistan. Together they provide the United States with a military bridgehead close to the energy resources of the region. Kazakhstan, in Central Asia, has enormous reserves of oil. Iran, a nation that shares a long border with Afghanistan, has the world’s second largest reserves of both oil and gas. Iran has offered Pakistan and India an alternative to the gas pipeline through Afghanistan. Iran and Pakistan expect to sign an agreement shortly. India’s interest has been on-again off-again, though it has participated in various meetings. The US position is clear. It supports the TAPI pipeline through Afghanistan; it objects to the pipeline from Iran. The United States is highly dependent on oil imports — 60 percent of consumption. This dependence on foreign imports is an undercurrent of US foreign policy. The Middle East, where most of the world’s oil is located, is of predominant concern. The United States has acknowledged its vital interest in Saudi Arabia since the 1940s. It affirms it will use military force to defend its national interests in the Persian Gulf region. That’s the Carter Doctrine of 1980. Now Afghanistan has become a “war of necessity.” The phrases — vital interest, national interest — keep recurring. They are clues to US concern about petroleum.

Link – US Presence

Military presence and pipeline development are linked – US blessings are key, we are the largest investor in TAPI

Foster and Morton ‘10

John Foster is an energy economist (World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, British Petroleum, Petro-Canada). Millie Morton is a sociologist. Both have extensive experience in international development, “Afghanistan, the Pipeline, and Politics,” PEACE Magazine, April-June, 2010, http://www.peacemagazine.org/archive/v26n2p16.htm

One has to listen carefully these days. Lots of public statements are technically accurate but misleading. Take, for example, the assertion that Afghanistan is not about oil. That’s literally true; the pipeline planned through Afghanistan is for natural gas. Both oil and gas are hydrocarbons and the term “oil” is sometimes loosely used to represent both. TAPI is a natural gas pipeline. In 2008, the Afghan Ambassador to Canada insisted that TAPI is a project of the four participating countries and is not within the framework of the Canadian mission to his country. His statement ignores the reality that several countries with troops in Afghanistan — including the United States, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Norway — are also active members of the Asian Development Bank, the sponsor of the TAPI project. Any Bank financing for the project would require the approval of member countries. As well, a project as sensitive as this would require the early blessing of the United States and Japan, the two major shareholders. With such a heavy military presence, US/NATO influence on Kabul is obvious. Thus discussions of NATO support for TAPI pipeline security raise questions about the links between military and development decisions.

US force presence is key to securing the region’s energy resources

Foster ‘10

John Foster, energy economist with worldwide experience in energy and development. He has held posts with the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, British Petroleum and Petro-Canada, “Afghanistan, Energy Geopolitics and the TAPI Pipeline,” Global Research, March 25, 2010, http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=18329

US policy recognizes the importance of Central Asia’s energy resources and the economic possibilities they offer in world markets and in the region itself. Richard Boucher, US Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia, said in 2007: “One of our goals is to stabilize Afghanistan,” and to link South and Central Asia “so that energy can flow to the south.” In December 2009, George Krol, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia, told Congress that one US priority in Central Asia is “to increase development and diversification of the region’s energy resources and supply routes.” He said, “Central Asia plays a vital role in our Afghanistan strategy.”

Link – US Presence

U.S. presence and stability to the region is vital to beginning construction

Shah ‘03

Baber Shah, PhD and Research Fellow at the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, “REVIVAL OF TRANS AFGHANISTAN GAS PIPELINE PROJECT”, Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad

There would hardly be any mega project in the present days, that could compare of having become hostage to the extremely complex geo-political conditions of the states of the region, as is the construction of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (TAP) oil and gas pipeline. Hopes and efforts, to turn the dream of constructing this pipeline into a reality, have been reviving and dying with the changing geo-political affairs of the region, especially the dicey Afghan situation. The viability of the project is linked directly with the restoration of a permanent, peaceful and stable politico-administrative environment in Afghanistan. Following the withdrawal of the US oil company, Unocal, from the Central Asia Gas Pipeline Limited (CentGas, a six-company consortium formed for the construction of the TAP pipeline) in December 1998, it was widely believed that without having a comprehensive peace and legitimate central authority in control in Afghanistan this project would remain non-viable. The project’s feasibility ensured an ongoing interest in its realisation. Of the various proposed pipelines from the newly-independent oil-rich states of Central Asia, the TAP pipeline is considered the most feasible both in terms of cost and revenues. A Vice-President of the Unocal Oil Company told the US House Committee on International Relations in 1998 that the best market for the Caspian oil and gas was in south and Southeast Asia.  From the Pakistani coast, oil and gas could be shipped easily and cheaply to other countries, and investment in the Asian energy markets and industry would thus pay off.1 The US-led coalition’s military campaign in Afghanistan, which started on 7 October 2001, has drastically changed the geo-strategic landscape of the region. Prominent developments include the arrival of the US troops to the region and securing military bases in Afghanistan and Central Asia; the ouster of the hard-line Taliban regime; the installation of a pro-US government in Kabul; the destruction of the al-Qaeda network in the country; and the US military presence ensuring a deep American influence over the Afghan affairs.  Parallel to these developments in Afghanistan, international efforts were also revived for resuming negotiations on the abandoned TAP pipeline project. For example, within days of the start of the US bombing in Afghanistan in October 2001, the US Ambassador to Pakistan, Wendy Chamberlain and Pakistani Federal Minister for Petroleum and Natural Resources held a meeting in Islamabad to discuss the revival of the TAP pipeline and the prospects of the US companies investment in oil and gas sector of Pakistan.2   Many believe that apart from fighting terrorism in the region, the US also wants to access, control and regulate the energy resources of Central Asia and the 9/11 incidents in America provided it with just that opportunity to move towards this goal. The most recent development with regard to the revival of the project was the signing of a Pak-Afghan-Turkmen agreement in the Turkmen Capital Ashkabad on December 27, 2002. This agreement provided the framework and final go-ahead nod from the heads of the governments of the three countries.3 The rapid revival of efforts for the construction of TAP pipeline (after the creation a relatively peaceful environment in Afghanistan), the Asian Development Bank’s (ADB) financing of the feasibility study, the extensive consultations among the three concerned countries, and the interest of some international companies in the project show the readiness to implement the practical work on the project, which could and would begin if the relatively peaceful environment in Afghanistan persists and improves. However, given the prevailing ground realities in Afghanistan in particular, as well as in the region in general, there is a cautious optimism about the future of the project. This study is an attempt to evaluate the TAP pipeline project in the light of the present Afghan affairs, which remain in flux. With an overview of the past efforts for the construction of the pipeline project and with special reference to the role of the Unocal, the study will try to explore whether the US war on terror is also focussed on getting the control of energy resources of Central Asia. If so, what prospects does the new Afghan politico-administrative environment offer in this regard? What are the Afghan irritants and what are the political and economic benefits accruing to the concerned countries and the international oil companies? What are the probable US policies and likely actions in this regard?

Link – US Presence

U.S. military presence enable MNC’s to lay claim to the region’s oil reserves

Smith ’07

David Michael Smith, Professor of Government @ The College of Mainlan, “Professor says America seeks Afghanistan Oil Deal,” 2007, <http://www.agoracosmopolitan.com/home/Frontpage/2007/01/18/01326.html>

After the Taliban regime collapsed, the Bush Administration hand-picked Hamid Karzai to head the new Afghan government and named Zalmay Khalilzad, an Afghan-American, as its new special envoy to the Karzai government. As Richard Neville pointed out in the Australian *Sydney Morning Herald*("Beyond Good and Evil," April 15, 2002), both Karzai and Khalilzad are former consultants to UNOCAL. Eric Margolis has disclosed in the *Toronto Sun*("America's New War: A Progress Report," Dec. 9, 2001) that Karzai is also a former "asset" for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. As Salim Muwakkil wrote in the*Chicago Tribune*("Pipeline Politics Taint U.S. War," March 18, 2002), the "rise to power" of these two former UNOCAL employees will "make things even smoother" for the resumption of the pipeline project in Afghanistan. As Daniel Fisher reported in *Forbes Magazine* (Feb. 4, 2002), "It has been called the pipeline from hell, to hell, through hell" but "now, with the collapse of the Taliban, oil executives are suddenly talking again about building it." To be sure, the giant U.S. energy corporations are unlikely to make major investments in the project until the new Afghan regime proves able to suppress the outbreaks of violence among the various warlords' forces and any military challenge from resurgent Taliban fighters. This is certainly one reason why U.S. and British troops in Afghanistan are struggling to piece together a viable Afghan national army that can defend the new regime. In the meantime, Karzai has already made clear that his government fully intends to work closely with neighboring countries and U.S. oil companies to reap the immense profits from the transport of Caspian Basin oil and natural gas. On Feb. 8, 2002, Karzai visited Pakistan and joined with General Pervez Musharraf in pledging "mutual brotherly relations" and cooperation "in all spheres of activity." As the*Irish Times*reported on Feb. 11, 2002, Karzai announced that he and Musharraf had discussed the proposed Central Asian pipeline project "and agreed that it was in the interest of both countries." The mounting U.S. military presence in Afghanistan and other Central Asian countries may enable Chevron, Exxon-Mobil, UNOCAL, and other giant corporations to lay claim to "the number-one prize in world oil."

Link – US Presence

U.S. presence in Afghanistan is meant to secure the interest of multi-national oil companies

Marshal ’09

Adrew Gavin Marshall, Writer for Global Research, “An Imperial Strategy for a New World Order: The Origins of World War III,” October 16th 2009, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?aid=15686&context=va>

NATO undertook its first ground invasion of any nation in its entire history, with the October 2001 invasion and occupation of Afghanistan. The Afghan war was in fact, planned prior to the events of 9/11, with the breakdown of major pipeline deals between major western oil companies and the Taliban. The war itself was planned over the summer of 2001 with the operational plan to go to war by mid-October.[41]   Afghanistan is extremely significant in geopolitical terms, as, “Transporting all the Caspian basin's fossil fuel through Russia or Azerbaijan would greatly enhance Russia's political and economic control over the central Asian republics, which is precisely what the west has spent 10 years trying to prevent. Piping it through Iran would enrich a regime which the US has been seeking to isolate. Sending it the long way round through China, quite aside from the strategic considerations, would be prohibitively expensive. But pipelines through Afghanistan would allow the US both to pursue its aim of ‘diversifying energy supply’ and to penetrate the world's most lucrative markets.”[42]   As the San Francisco Chronicle pointed out a mere two weeks following the 9/11 attacks, “Beyond American determination to hit back against the perpetrators of the Sept. 11 attacks, beyond the likelihood of longer, drawn-out battles producing more civilian casualties in the months and years ahead, the hidden stakes in the war against terrorism can be summed up in a single word: oil.” Explaining further, “The map of terrorist sanctuaries and targets in the Middle East and Central Asia is also, to an extraordinary degree, a map of the world's principal energy sources in the 21st century. The defense of these energy resources -- rather than a simple confrontation between Islam and the West -- will be the primary flash point of global conflict for decades to come.”   Among the many notable states where there is a crossover between terrorism and oil and gas reserves of vital importance to the United States and the West, are Saudi Arabia, Libya, Bahrain, the Gulf Emirates, Iran, Iraq, Egypt, Sudan and Algeria, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Chechnya, Georgia and eastern Turkey. Importantly, “this region accounts for more than 65 percent of the world's oil and natural gas production.” Further, “It is inevitable that the war against terrorism will be seen by many as a war on behalf of America's Chevron, ExxonMobil and Arco; France's TotalFinaElf; British Petroleum; Royal Dutch Shell and other multinational giants, which have hundreds of billions of dollars of investment in the region.”[43]

Link – US Presence

We keep our military presence in Central Asia to protect pipeline workers

Viviano ’01

Frank Viviano, Named Journalist of the year four times, Nominated for the Pulitzer Prize eight times, Staff Writer for the San Francisco Gate, “Energy future rides on U.S. war / Conflict centered in world's oil patch,” September 26th 2001, <http://articles.sfgate.com/2001-09-26/news/17617336_1_energy-resources-world-energy-world-s-energy-center>

They also are active in areas -- such as Chechnya, Georgia and eastern Turkey -- where major pipelines carry energy resources to markets worldwide. Altogether this region accounts for more than 65 percent of the world's oil and natural gas production, according to the Statistical Review of World Energy. By 2050, it will account for more than 80 percent, according to forecasts. The combined total of proven and estimated reserves in the region stands at more than 800 billion barrels of crude petroleum and its equivalent in natural gas. By contrast, the combined total of oil reserves in the Americas and Europe is less than 160 billion barrels, most of which, energy experts say, will have been exhausted in the next 25 years. It is inevitable that the war against terrorism will be seen by many as a war on behalf of America's Chevron, ExxonMobil and Arco; France's TotalFinaElf; British Petroleum; Royal Dutch Shell and other multinational giants, which have hundreds of billions of dollars of investment in the region. There is no avoiding such a linkage or the rising tide of anger it will produce in developing nations already convinced they are victims of a conspiratorial collaboration between global capital and U.S. military might. Nowhere is that alleged collaboration more reviled than on the Arabian Peninsula, where U.S. armed forces have been present at six military bases since the Gulf War and where more than 30,000 Americans work for multinational oil giants.

Link – US Presence

U.S. presence in Afghanistan is meant to secure the interest of multi-national oil companies

Marshal, ’09

(Adrew Gavin Marshall, Writer for Global Research, “An Imperial Strategy for a New World Order: The Origins of World War III,” October 16th 2009, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?aid=15686&context=va>)

NATO undertook its first ground invasion of any nation in its entire history, with the October 2001 invasion and occupation of Afghanistan. The Afghan war was in fact, planned prior to the events of 9/11, with the breakdown of major pipeline deals between major western oil companies and the Taliban. The war itself was planned over the summer of 2001 with the operational plan to go to war by mid-October.[41]   Afghanistan is extremely significant in geopolitical terms, as, “Transporting all the Caspian basin's fossil fuel through Russia or Azerbaijan would greatly enhance Russia's political and economic control over the central Asian republics, which is precisely what the west has spent 10 years trying to prevent. Piping it through Iran would enrich a regime which the US has been seeking to isolate. Sending it the long way round through China, quite aside from the strategic considerations, would be prohibitively expensive. But pipelines through Afghanistan would allow the US both to pursue its aim of ‘diversifying energy supply’ and to penetrate the world's most lucrative markets.”[42]   As the San Francisco Chronicle pointed out a mere two weeks following the 9/11 attacks, “Beyond American determination to hit back against the perpetrators of the Sept. 11 attacks, beyond the likelihood of longer, drawn-out battles producing more civilian casualties in the months and years ahead, the hidden stakes in the war against terrorism can be summed up in a single word: oil.” Explaining further, “The map of terrorist sanctuaries and targets in the Middle East and Central Asia is also, to an extraordinary degree, a map of the world's principal energy sources in the 21st century. The defense of these energy resources -- rather than a simple confrontation between Islam and the West -- will be the primary flash point of global conflict for decades to come.”   Among the many notable states where there is a crossover between terrorism and oil and gas reserves of vital importance to the United States and the West, are Saudi Arabia, Libya, Bahrain, the Gulf Emirates, Iran, Iraq, Egypt, Sudan and Algeria, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Chechnya, Georgia and eastern Turkey. Importantly, “this region accounts for more than 65 percent of the world's oil and natural gas production.” Further, “It is inevitable that the war against terrorism will be seen by many as a war on behalf of America's Chevron, ExxonMobil and Arco; France's TotalFinaElf; British Petroleum; Royal Dutch Shell and other multinational giants, which have hundreds of billions of dollars of investment in the region.”[43]

Link – US Presence

The key reason for invading Afghanistan is to secure routes for oil pipelines

Devraj, ’01

(Ranjit Devraj, Writer for the Asia Times, “The oil behind Bush and Son’s campaigns,” October 6th 2001, <http://www.atimes.com/global-econ/CJ06Dj01.html>)

Just as the Gulf War in 1991 was all about oil, the new conflict in South and Central Asia is no less about access to the region's abundant petroleum resources, according to Indian analysts.  "US influence and military presence in Afghanistan and the Central Asian states, not unlike that over the oil-rich Gulf states, would be a major strategic gain," said V R Raghavan, a strategic analyst and former general in the Indian army. Raghavan believes that the prospect of a western military presence in a region extending from Turkey to Tajikistan could not have escaped strategists who are now readying a military campaign aimed at changing the political order in Afghanistan, accused by the United States of harboring Osama bin Laden.  Where the "great game" in Afghanistan was once about czars and commissars seeking access to the warm water ports of the Persian Gulf, today it is about laying oil and gas pipelines to the untapped petroleum reserves of Central Asia. According to testimony before the US House of Representatives in March 1999 by the conservative think tank Heritage Foundation, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan together have 15 billion barrels of proven oil reserves. The same countries also have proven gas deposits totaling not less than nine trillion cubic meters. Another study by the Institute for Afghan Studies placed the total worth of oil and gas reserves in the Central Asian republics at around US$3 trillion at last year's prices.  Not only can Afghanistan play a role in hosting pipelines connecting Central Asia to international markets, but the country itself has significant oil and gas deposits. During the Soviets' decade-long occupation of Afghanistan, Moscow estimated Afghanistan's proven and probable natural gas reserves at around five trillion cubic feet and production reached 275 million cubic feet per day in the mid-1970s. But sabotage by anti-Soviet mujahideen (freedom fighters) and by rival groups in the civil war that followed Soviet withdrawal in 1989 virtually closed down gas production and ended deals for the supply of gas to several European countries.  Major Afghan natural gas fields awaiting exploitation include Jorqaduq, Khowaja, Gogerdak, and Yatimtaq, all of which are located within 9 kilometers of the town of Sheberghan in northrern Jowzjan province.  Natural gas production and distribution under Afghanistan's Taliban rulers is the responsibility of the Afghan Gas Enterprise which, in 1999, began repair of a pipeline to Mazar-i-Sharif city. Afghanistan's proven and probable oil and condensate reserves were placed at 95 million barrels by the Soviets. So far, attempts to exploit Afghanistan's petroleum reserves or take advantage of its unique geographical location as a crossroads to markets in Europe and South Asia have been thwarted by the continuing civil strife.  In 1998, the California-based UNOCAL, which held 46.5 percent stakes in Central Asia Gas (CentGas), a consortium that planned an ambitious gas pipeline across Afghanistan, withdrew in frustration after several fruitless years. The pipeline was to stretch 1,271km from Turkmenistan's Dauletabad fields to Multan in Pakistan at an estimated cost of $1.9 billion. An additional $600 million would have brought the pipeline to energy-hungry India.  Energy experts in India, such as R K Pachauri, who heads the Tata Energy Research Institute (TERI), have long been urging the country's planners to ensure access to petroleum products from the Central Asian republics, with which New Delhi has traditionally maintained good relations. Other partners in CentGas included the Saudi Arabian Delta Oil Company, the Government of Turkmenistan, Indonesia Petroleum (INPEX), the Japanese ITOCHU, Korean Hyundai and Pakistan's Crescent Group.

Link – Mission

We’re in Afghanistan to get oil

Barnes ’09

Lee John Barnes, Prominent British National Party Writer, “Afghanistan – A War for Oil and Natural Gas,” August 5th 2009, <http://leejohnbarnes.blogspot.com/2009/08/afghanistan-war-for-gas-and-oil.html>

Since the 2001 invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, the US has a military presence on China's Western frontier, in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The U.S. is intent upon establishing permanent military bases in Afghanistan, which occupies a strategic position bordering on the former Soviet republics, China and Iran.  Moreover, the US and NATO have also established since 1996, military ties with several former Soviet republics under GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldava). In the post 9/11 era, Washington has used the pretext of the "global war against terrorism" to further develop a U.S. military presence in GUUAM countries. Uzbekistan withdrew from GUUAM in 2002.(The organization is now referred to as GUAM).  China has oil interests in Eurasia as well as in sub-Saharan Africa, which encroach upon Anglo-American oil interests.  What is at stake is the geopolitical control over the Eurasian corridor.  In March 1999, the U.S. Congress adopted the Silk Road Strategy Act, which defined America’s broad economic and strategic interests in a region extending from the Eastern Mediterranean to Central Asia. The Silk Road Strategy (SRS) outlines a framework for the development of America’s business empire along an extensive geographical corridor.  The successful implementation of the SRS requires the concurrent "militarization" of the entire Eurasian corridor as a means to securing control over extensive oil and gas reserves, as well as "protecting" pipeline routes and trading corridors. This militarization is largely directed against China, Russia and Iran.  Take a look at the maps above - then note how the army bases are in prime positions to protect the oil and gas pipelines. That is what this 'war' is about. The Afghanistan war is about securing the territory through which the oil and gas pipelines will have to pass through in order to ensure Russia, China and Iran are outmanouvered in the last great wars for the last of the global oil supplies on the planet. Only yesterday the Independent reported that the Peak Oil process is even close than the 'experts' have been so far admitting.

U.S. forces are needed to enforce law around pipelines

Rall, ’02

(Ted Rall, Syndicated columnist, Twice winner of the Robert F. Kennedy Journalism Award and finalist for the Pulitzer Prize, “My Government Went to Afghanistan And All I Got Was This Stupid Pipeline,” <http://citypaper.net/pipeline/>)

Experts say that a trans-Afghan pipeline would be subject to continuous threats of sabotage committed by local warlords in the sectors through which it ran, and immense amounts of ever-increasing protection fees would have to be paid to safeguard the steady flow of fossil fuels. In addition, a large foreign -- read, American -- occupation force would be required for many years to enforce comparative law and order, and it remains to be seen whether the Bush Administration -- much less future American presidents -- will be inclined to devote substantial financial and military resources to the aftermath of our 2001 Afghan adventure. If pragmatism triumphs over ideology, it seems likely that the oil companies involved, reported to be led once again by the California-based Unocal Corporation [(27)](http://citypaper.net/pipeline/footnotes.shtml#21-30), will reconsider their decision to bypass the shorter, cheaper and infinitely more workable Iranian proposal. For the time being, however, the Bush Administration and its puppet regime in Kabul are working furiously to make this highly dubious scheme become reality. And various parties -- Russia, Japan and the Asian Development Bank -- are already committing millions of dollars to the job.

Link – Mission

We’re in Afghanistan to bully the Taliban into handing us control of their oil fields

Godoy ’01

Julio Godoy, Writer for OneWorld.net, Cites Brisard – Former French Secret Service Member and Dasquie an investigative

journalist and publisher of Intelligence Online, “U.S. Policy Towards Taliban Influenced by Oil – Say Authors,” November 15th 2001, <http://makethemaccountable.com/articles/U_S_Policy_Towards_Taliban_Influenced_by_Oil_Say_Authors.htm>

Under the influence of U.S. oil companies, the government of George W. Bush initially blocked U.S. secret service investigations on terrorism, while it bargained with the Taliban the delivery of Osama bin Laden ([news](http://web.archive.org/web/20011116183611/http:/rd.yahoo.com/DailyNews/manual/*http:/search.news.yahoo.com/search/news?p=%22Osama%20bin%20Laden%22&c=&n=20&yn=c&c=news&cs=nw) -[web sites](http://web.archive.org/web/20011116183611/http:/rd.yahoo.com/DailyNews/manual/*http:/search.yahoo.com/bin/search?p=Osama%20bin%20Laden)) in exchange for political recognition and economic aid, two French intelligence analysts claim. In the book ''Bin Laden, la verite interdite'' (''Bin Laden, the forbidden truth''), that appeared in Paris on Wednesday, the authors, Jean-Charles Brisard and Guillaume Dasquie, reveal that the Federal Bureau of Investigation's deputy director John O'Neill resigned in July in protest over the obstruction. Brisard claim O'Neill told them that ''the main obstacles to investigate Islamic terrorism were U.S. oil corporate interests and the role played by Saudi Arabia in it''. The two claim the U.S. government's main objective in Afghanistan ([news](http://web.archive.org/web/20011116183611/http:/rd.yahoo.com/DailyNews/manual/*http:/search.news.yahoo.com/search/news?p=%22Afghanistan%22&c=&n=20&yn=c&c=news&cs=nw) - [web sites](http://web.archive.org/web/20011116183611/http:/rd.yahoo.com/DailyNews/manual/*http:/search.yahoo.com/bin/search?p=Afghanistan)) was to consolidate the position of the Taliban regime to obtain access to the oil and gas reserves in Central Asia. They affirm that until August, the U.S. government saw the Taliban regime ''as a source of stability in Central Asia that would enable the construction of an oil pipeline across Central Asia'', from the rich oilfields in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan, through Afghanistan and Pakistan, to the Indian Ocean. Until now, says the book, ''the oil and gas reserves of Central Asia have been controlled by Russia. The Bush government wanted to change all that''. But, confronted with Taliban's refusal to accept U.S. conditions, ''this rationale of energy security changed into a military one'', the authors claim. ''At one moment during the negotiations, the U.S. representatives told the Taliban, 'either you accept our offer of a carpet of gold, or we bury you under a carpet of bombs','' Brisard said in an interview in Paris. According to the book, the government of Bush began to negotiate with the Taliban immediately after coming into power in February. U.S. and Taliban diplomatic representatives met several times in Washington, Berlin and Islamabad. To polish their image in the United States, the Taliban even employed a U.S. expert on public relations, Laila Helms. The authors claim that Helms is also an expert in the works of U.S. secret services, for her uncle, Richard Helms, is a former director of the Central Intelligence Agency ([news](http://web.archive.org/web/20011116183611/http:/rd.yahoo.com/DailyNews/manual/*http:/search.news.yahoo.com/search/news?p=%22Central%20Intelligence%20Agency%22&c=&n=20&yn=c&c=news&cs=nw) - [web sites](http://web.archive.org/web/20011116183611/http:/rd.yahoo.com/DailyNews/manual/*http:/search.yahoo.com/bin/search?p=Central%20Intelligence%20Agency)) (CIA ([news](http://web.archive.org/web/20011116183611/http:/rd.yahoo.com/DailyNews/manual/*http:/search.news.yahoo.com/search/news?p=%22CIA%22&c=&n=20&yn=c&c=news&cs=nw) - [web sites](http://web.archive.org/web/20011116183611/http:/rd.yahoo.com/DailyNews/manual/*http:/search.yahoo.com/bin/search?p=CIA))). The last meeting between U.S. and Taliban representatives took place in August, five weeks before the attacks on New York and Washington, the analysts maintain. On that occasion, Christina Rocca, in charge of Central Asian affairs for the U.S. government, met the Taliban ambassador to Pakistan in Islamabad. Brisard and Dasquie have long experience in intelligence analysis. Brisard was until the late 1990s director of economic analysis and strategy for Vivendi, a French company. He also worked for French secret services, and wrote for them in 1997 a report on the now famous Al Qaeda network, headed by bin Laden. Dasquie is an investigative journalist and publisher of Intelligence Online, a respected newsletter on diplomacy, economic analysis and strategy, available through the Internet.

Link – Mission

We keep our military presence in Central Asia near pipeline workers

Viviano ’01

Frank Viviano, Named Journalist of the year four times, Nominated for the Pulitzer Prize eight times, Staff Writer for the San Francisco Gate, “Energy future rides on U.S. war / Conflict centered in world's oil patch,” September 26th 2001, <http://articles.sfgate.com/2001-09-26/news/17617336_1_energy-resources-world-energy-world-s-energy-center>

Beyond American determination to hit back against the perpetrators of the Sept. 11 attacks, beyond the likelihood of longer, drawn-out battles producing more civilian casualties in the months and years ahead, the hidden stakes in the war against terrorism can be summed up in a single word: oil. The map of terrorist sanctuaries and targets in the Middle East and Central Asia is also, to an extraordinary degree, a map of the world's principal energy sources in the 21st century. The defense of these energy resources -- rather than a simple confrontation between Islam and the West -- will be the primary flash point of global conflict for decades to come, say observers in the region. "You cannot discuss the violence of this region outside the context of oil, " says Vakhtang Kolbaya, deputy chairman of the parliament in the republic of Georgia. "It's at the heart of the problem." WORLD'S ENERGY CENTER The terrain of the globe's energy future ranges along a swath of mountain and desert with resource-poor Afghanistan and Pakistan at its volatile eastern end. Outside of this core, where suspected terrorist leader Osama bin Laden and many of his supporters are located, terrorist groups are active in Saudi Arabia, Libya, Bahrain, the Gulf Emirates, Iran, Iraq, Egypt, Sudan and Algeria. Their operations also threaten to destabilize regimes in Turkmenistan, Kazakstan and Azerbaijan. They also are active in areas -- such as Chechnya, Georgia and eastern Turkey -- where major pipelines carry energy resources to markets worldwide. Altogether this region accounts for more than 65 percent of the world's oil and natural gas production, according to the Statistical Review of World Energy. By 2050, it will account for more than 80 percent, according to forecasts. The combined total of proven and estimated reserves in the region stands at more than 800 billion barrels of crude petroleum and its equivalent in natural gas. By contrast, the combined total of oil reserves in the Americas and Europe is less than 160 billion barrels, most of which, energy experts say, will have been exhausted in the next 25 years. It is inevitable that the war against terrorism will be seen by many as a war on behalf of America's Chevron, ExxonMobil and Arco; France's TotalFinaElf; British Petroleum; Royal Dutch Shell and other multinational giants, which have hundreds of billions of dollars of investment in the region. There is no avoiding such a linkage or the rising tide of anger it will produce in developing nations already convinced they are victims of a conspiratorial collaboration between global capital and U.S. military might. Nowhere is that alleged collaboration more reviled than on the Arabian Peninsula, where U.S. armed forces have been present at six military bases since the Gulf War and where more than 30,000 Americans work for multinational oil giants.

Link – Mission

Afghanistan is the only route for an effective supply line – Our key motivation for staying in the region is oil

Monbiot ’01

George Monbiot, Syndicated columnist on Foreign Affairs, Weekly columnist for The Guardian, “America’s pipe dream,” October 23rd 2001, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/oct/23/afghanistan.terrorism11>

The invasion of Afghanistan is certainly a campaign against terrorism, but it may also be a late colonial adventure. British ministers have warned MPs that opposing the war is the moral equivalent of appeasing Hitler, but in some respects our moral choices are closer to those of 1956 than those of 1938. Afghanistan is as indispensable to the regional control and transport of oil in central Asia as Egypt was in the Middle East. Afghanistan has some oil and gas of its own, but not enough to qualify as a major strategic concern. Its northern neighbours, by contrast, contain reserves which could be critical to future global supply. In 1998, Dick Cheney, now US vice-president but then chief executive of a major oil services company, remarked: "I cannot think of a time when we have had a region emerge as suddenly to become as strategically significant as the Caspian." But the oil and gas there is worthless until it is moved. The only route which makes both political and economic sense is through Afghanistan. Transporting all the Caspian basin's fossil fuel through Russia or Azerbaijan would greatly enhance Russia's political and economic control over the central Asian republics, which is precisely what the west has spent 10 years trying to prevent. Piping it through Iran would enrich a regime which the US has been seeking to isolate. Sending it the long way round through China, quite aside from the strategic considerations, would be prohibitively expensive. But pipelines through Afghanistan would allow the US both to pursue its aim of "diversifying energy supply" and to penetrate the world's most lucrative markets. Growth in European oil consumption is slow and competition is intense. In south Asia, by contrast, demand is booming and competitors are scarce. Pumping oil south and selling it in Pakistan and India, in other words, is far more profitable than pumping it west and selling it in Europe. As the author Ahmed Rashid has documented, in 1995 the US oil company Unocal started negotiating to build oil and gas pipelines from Turkmenistan, through Afghanistan and into Pakistani ports on the Arabian sea. The company's scheme required a single administration in Afghanistan, which would guarantee safe passage for its goods. Soon after the Taliban took Kabul in September 1996, the Telegraph reported that "oil industry insiders say the dream of securing a pipeline across Afghanistan is the main reason why Pakistan, a close political ally of America's, has been so supportive of the Taliban, and why America has quietly acquiesced in its conquest of Afghanistan". Unocal invited some of the leaders of the Taliban to Houston, where they were royally entertained. The company suggested paying these barbarians 15 cents for every thousand cubic feet of gas it pumped through the land they had conquered. For the first year of Taliban rule, US policy towards the regime appears to have been determined principally by Unocal's interests. In 1997 a US diplomat told Rashid "the Taliban will probably develop like the Saudis did. There will be Aramco [the former US oil consortium in Saudi Arabia] pipelines, an emir, no parliament and lots of Sharia law. We can live with that." US policy began to change only when feminists and greens started campaigning against both Unocal's plans and the government's covert backing for Kabul. Even so, as a transcript of a congress hearing now circulating among war resisters shows, Unocal failed to get the message. In February 1998, John Maresca, its head of international relations, told representatives that the growth in demand for energy in Asia and sanctions against Iran determined that Afghanistan remained "the only other possible route" for Caspian oil. The company, once the Afghan government was recognised by foreign diplomats and banks, still hoped to build a 1,000-mile pipeline, which would carry a million barrels a day. Only in December 1998, four months after the embassy bombings in east Africa, did Unocal drop its plans. But Afghanistan's strategic importance has not changed. In September, a few days before the attack on New York, the US energy information administration reported that "Afghanistan's significance from an energy standpoint stems from its geographical position as a potential transit route for oil and natural gas exports from central Asia to the Arabian sea. This potential includes the possible construction of oil and natural gas export pipelines through Afghanistan". Given that the US government is dominated by former oil industry executives, we would be foolish to suppose that such plans no longer figure in its strategic thinking. As the researcher Keith Fisher has pointed out, the possible economic outcomes of the war in Afghanistan mirror the possible economic outcomes of the war in the Balkans, where the development of "Corridor 8", an economic zone built around a pipeline carrying oil and gas from the Caspian to Europe, is a critical allied concern.

Link – Mission

We’re in Afghanistan to get oil

Barnes ’09

Lee John Barnes, Prominent British National Party Writer,   
“Afghanistan – A War for Oil and Natural Gas,” August 5th 2009, <http://leejohnbarnes.blogspot.com/2009/08/afghanistan-war-for-gas-and-oil.html>

Since the 2001 invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, the US has a military presence on China's Western frontier, in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The U.S. is intent upon establishing permanent military bases in Afghanistan, which occupies a strategic position bordering on the former Soviet republics, China and Iran.  Moreover, the US and NATO have also established since 1996, military ties with several former Soviet republics under GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldava). In the post 9/11 era, Washington has used the pretext of the "global war against terrorism" to further develop a U.S. military presence in GUUAM countries. Uzbekistan withdrew from GUUAM in 2002.(The organization is now referred to as GUAM).  China has oil interests in Eurasia as well as in sub-Saharan Africa, which encroach upon Anglo-American oil interests.  What is at stake is the geopolitical control over the Eurasian corridor.  In March 1999, the U.S. Congress adopted the Silk Road Strategy Act, which defined America’s broad economic and strategic interests in a region extending from the Eastern Mediterranean to Central Asia. The Silk Road Strategy (SRS) outlines a framework for the development of America’s business empire along an extensive geographical corridor.  The successful implementation of the SRS requires the concurrent "militarization" of the entire Eurasian corridor as a means to securing control over extensive oil and gas reserves, as well as "protecting" pipeline routes and trading corridors. This militarization is largely directed against China, Russia and Iran.  Take a look at the maps above - then note how the army bases are in prime positions to protect the oil and gas pipelines. That is what this 'war' is about. The Afghanistan war is about securing the territory through which the oil and gas pipelines will have to pass through in order to ensure Russia, China and Iran are outmanouvered in the last great wars for the last of the global oil supplies on the planet. Only yesterday the Independent reported that the Peak Oil process is even close than the 'experts' have been so far admitting.

Link – Troops

Our Marines in Afghanistan are being deployed to secure pipelines

Salhani ’10

Claude Salhani, Editor of the Middle East Times, “Oil for Blood in Afghanistan,” March 24th 2010, <http://oilprice.com/Geo-Politics/Middle-East/Oil-for-Blood-in-Afghanistan.html>

So when told to deploy in an uninhabited part of Afghanistan to secure a portion of desolate desert terrain for the sake of ensuring that oil pipelines are built and kept safe from rebel hands, the Marines take on the job. The Marines might look at this deployment as just another mission that happens to involve oil. This is not the first time, nor is it likely to be the last time the US military gets in a fight over oil. The reason the United States went to war against Saddam Hussein a first time in 1990-91 was to get him out of Kuwait because Kuwait has oil, and because it placed Iraq far too close to Saudi Arabia. There is no question as to the crucial role oil plays when it comes to the national security of the United States. Oil is vital to keeping our cars running, our airplanes flying, our homes heated and our tanks, ships, helicopters and other military vehicles operating. According to a recent report published in The Washington Post military operations in Delaram, in the southwest of Afghanistan, where some 3,000 Marines are to be deployed is "far from a strategic priority for senior officers at the international military headquarters in Kabul.'' Yet, continues the report, ''the U.S. Marines are deployed and are fighting in that part of the country." The report states that Delaram is a day's drive from the nearest city and refers to it as 'the end of the Earth.' The Marines are trained to fight to hell and back, but shouldn’t the politicians back home think twice before placing the leathernecks in such great numbers in a single area?

Our troops are in Afghanistan to maintain nation building operations to secure TAPI pipeline passage

Gatto, ’10

(Timothy V. Gatto, Former Chairman of the Liberal Party of America, Retired Army Sergeant, “Why Afghanistan?” June 22nd 2010, <http://www.opednews.com/articles/Why-Afghanistan-by-Timothy-V-Gatto-100722-382.html>)

The true nature of our involvement in Afghanistan is something that has yet to be defined. The obvious question is why are we there? What makes this nation (and I use the term loosely), so important that we need 150,000 troops from the U.S. (and almost as many mercenaries), and tens of thousands of troops from NATO as well as Mongolia, South Korea and other non-NATO countries, to perform the task of "nation-building"? Is it because of the TAPI petroleum pipeline that will run from the Caucuses to ports in India, thus bringing oil from the Caucuses without having to go through Russia, and insuring petroleum to Western Europe without the inconvenience of having it controlled by Russia and thus holding Western Europe hostage?

Our troops in Afghanistan are there to protect workers building pipelines

Blum ’09

William Blum, Critic of United States Foreign Policy, “America’s Other Glorious War,” January 7th 2009, <http://www.counterpunch.org/blum01072009.html>

Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, US oil companies have been vying with Russia, Iran and other energy interests for the massive, untapped oil and natural gas reserves in the former Soviet republics of Central Asia. The building and protection of oil and gas pipelines in Afghanistan, to continue farther to Pakistan, India, and elsewhere, has been a key objective of US policy since before the 2001 American invasion and occupation of the country, although the subsequent turmoil there has presented serious obstacles to such plans. A planned Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India pipeline has strong support from Washington because, amongst other reasons, the US is eager to block a competing pipeline that would bring gas to Pakistan and India from Iran. But security for such projects remains daunting, and that's where the US and NATO forces come in to play. In the late 1990s, the American oil company, Unocal, met with Taliban officials in Texas to discuss the pipelines.[6] Zalmay Khalilzad, later chosen to be the US ambassador to Afghanistan, worked for Unocal[7]; Hamid Karzai, later chosen by Washington to be the Afghan president, also reportedly worked for Unocal, although the company denies this. Unocal's talks with the Taliban, conducted with the full knowledge of the Clinton administration, and undeterred by the extreme repression of Taliban society, continued as late as 2000 or 2001.

Link – Troops

U.S. bases are deployed near oil pipelines as “energy protection forces”

Margolis ’08

Eric Margolis, Foreign editor for Sun National Media Canada, “At Last, Some Truth About Iraq and Afghanistan,” <http://www.lewrockwell.com/margolis/margolis114.html>

Meanwhile, according to Pakistani and Indian sources, Afghanistan just signed a major deal to launch a long-planned, 1680 km long pipeline project expected to cost $ 8 billion. If completed, the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India pipeline (TAPI) will export gas and, later, oil from the Caspian Basin to Pakistan’s coast where tankers will transport it to the west. The Caspian Basin located under the Central Asian states of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakkstan, holds an estimated 300 trillion cubic feet of gas and 100–200 billion barrels of oil. Securing the world’s last remaining known energy Eldorado is strategic priority for the western powers. China can only look on with envy. But there are only two practical ways to get gas and oil out of landlocked Central Asia to the sea: through Iran, or through Afghanistan to Pakistan. For Washington, Iran is tabu. That leaves Pakistan, but to get there, the planned pipeline must cross western Afghanistan, including the cities of Herat and Kandahar. In 1998, the Afghan anti-Communist movement Taliban and a western oil consortium led by the US firm UNOCAL signed a major pipeline deal. UNOCAL lavished money and attention on Taliban, flew a senior delegation to Texas, and also hired an minor Afghan official, one Hamid Karzai. Enter Osama bin Laden. He advised the unworldly Taliban leaders to reject the US deal and got them to accept a better offer from an Argentine consortium, Bridas. Washington was furious and, according to some accounts, threatened Taliban with war. In early 2001, six or seven months before 9/11, Washington made the decision to invade Afghanistan, overthrow Taliban, and install a client regime that would build the energy pipelines. But Washington still kept up sending money to Taliban until four months before 9/11 in an effort to keep it "on side" for possible use in a war or strikes against Iran. The 9/11 attacks, about which Taliban knew nothing, supplied the pretext to invade Afghanistan. The initial US operation had the legitimate objective of wiping out Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaida. But after its 300 members fled to Pakistan, the US stayed on, built bases – which just happened to be adjacent to the planned pipeline route – and installed former UNOCAL"consultant" Hamid Karzai as leader. Washington disguised its energy geopolitics by claiming the Afghan occupation was to fight "Islamic terrorism," liberate women, build schools, and promote democracy. Ironically, the Soviets made exactly the same claims when they occupied Afghanistan from 1979-1989. The cover story for Iraq was weapons of mass destruction, Saddam’s supposed links to 9/11, and promoting democracy. Work will begin on the TAPI once Taliban forces are cleared from the pipeline route by US, Canadian and NATO forces. As American analyst Kevin Phillips writes, the US military and its allies have become an "energy protection force." From Washington’s viewpoint, the TAPI deal has the added benefit of scuttling another proposed pipeline project that would have delivered Iranian gas and oil to Pakistan and India. India’s energy needs are expected to triple over the next decade to 8 billion barrels of oil and 80 million cubic meters of gas daily. Delhi, which has its own designs on Afghanistan and has been stirring the pot there, is cock-a-hoop over the new pipeline plan. Russia, by contrast, is grumpy, having hoped to monopolize Central Asian energy exports. Energy is more important than blood in our modern world. The US is a great power with massive energy needs. Domination of oil is a pillar of America’s world power. Afghanistan and Iraq are all about control of oil.

Link – Troops

Our troops are in Afghanistan are there to protect the workers building oil pipelines

Blum ’09

William Blum, Critic of United States Foreign Policy, “America’s Other Glorious War,” January 7th 2009, <http://www.counterpunch.org/blum01072009.html>

Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, US oil companies have been vying with Russia, Iran and other energy interests for the massive, untapped oil and natural gas reserves in the former Soviet republics of Central Asia. The building and protection of oil and gas pipelines in Afghanistan, to continue farther to Pakistan, India, and elsewhere, has been a key objective of US policy since before the 2001 American invasion and occupation of the country, although the subsequent turmoil there has presented serious obstacles to such plans. A planned Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India pipeline has strong support from Washington because, amongst other reasons, the US is eager to block a competing pipeline that would bring gas to Pakistan and India from Iran. But security for such projects remains daunting, and that's where the US and NATO forces come in to play. In the late 1990s, the American oil company, Unocal, met with Taliban officials in Texas to discuss the pipelines.[6] Zalmay Khalilzad, later chosen to be the US ambassador to Afghanistan, worked for Unocal[7]; Hamid Karzai, later chosen by Washington to be the Afghan president, also reportedly worked for Unocal, although the company denies this. Unocal's talks with the Taliban, conducted with the full knowledge of the Clinton administration, and undeterred by the extreme repression of Taliban society, continued as late as 2000 or 2001. As for NATO, it has no reason to be fighting in Afghanistan. Indeed, NATO has no legitimate reason for existence at all. Their biggest fear is that "failure" in Afghanistan would make this thought more present in the world's mind. If NATO hadn’t begun to intervene outside of Europe it would have highlighted its uselessness and lack of mission. “Out of area or out of business” it was said. In June, the Canadian Center for Policy Alternatives published a report saying Taliban and insurgent activity against the US-NATO presence in Kandahar province puts the feasibility of the pipeline project in doubt. The report says southern regions in Afghanistan, including Kandahar, would have to be cleared of insurgent activity and land mines in two years to meet construction and investment schedules. "Nobody is going to start putting pipe in the ground unless they are satisfied that there is some reasonable insurance that the workers for the pipeline are going to be safe," said Howard Brown, the Canadian representative for the Asian Development Bank, the major funding agency for the pipeline.

Link – Stability

Perception of stability is a key prerequisite to TAPI construction in Afghanistan

Daly ‘10

John CK Daly, UPI International Correspondent, “[Afghanistan and Central Asian Oil](http://www.isaintel.com/?p=418),” May 7, 2010, The OSINT Group, http://www.isaintel.com/?p=418

The hopes in turn have revived one of the Western energy community’s most cherished and longstanding projects, the proposed Trans-Afghanistan Pipeline (initially “TAP,” now “TAPI” with the inclusion of Pakistan and India) pipeline to bring Turkmenistan’s gas to the burgeoning southern Asian markets of Pakistan and India. TAPI was under development even before the Taliban captured Kabul, as in 1995 Turkmenistan and Pakistan initialed a memorandum of understanding. TAPI, with a carrying capacity of 33 bcm of Turkmen natural gas a year, was projected to run from Turkmenistan’s Dauletabad gas field across Afghanistan and Pakistan and terminate at the northwestern Indian town of Fazilka. As TAPI would require the assent of the Taliban, in 1997 TAPI’s initiators, the Central Asia Gas Pipeline Ltd. consortium, led by U.S. company Unocal, flew a Taliban delegation to Unocal headquarters in Houston, where the Taliban signed off on the project. It is a minor point of history but a telling one that Afghanistan’s President Hamid Karzai at the time worked for Unocal. But then the Taliban made the fatal mistake of offering sanctuary to Osama bin Laden and two months after 9-11 were driven from power for their misguided hospitality. Despite Karzai’s fervent support for the project, security of TAPI’s route through Afghanistan remains an “impediment” to the project’s realization, though in 2008 the Afghan government made several pledges to relieve those concerns. Given the Bush administration policy, inherited by the Obama regime, of dual containment and isolation of both Russia and Iran, TAPI remains the sole significant undeveloped southern output for Central Asian natural gas and oil. Afghanistan remains one of the world’s poorest and least developed countries, where two-thirds of the population lives on less than $2 a day, producing unrest that the insurgency feeds upon. Nevertheless, in the wake of Karzai’s recent resounding electoral victory TAPI has received a new lease on life as visions of transit fee riches from his former employers becloud Karzai’s eyes, which in turn requires defeat of the Taliban, which in turn requires more troops, according to General Stanley A. McChrystal, current Commander, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Commander, U.S. Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A). The bankruptcy of the Bush administration’s policies in occupying countries to corral their energy resources and pacify transit corridors is now evident. Invading Iraq in 2003 because of the threat of non-existent weapons of mass destruction, administration hawks predicted that rising Iraqi oil output would soon cover the cost of military operations, but six years later Baghdad is struggling to reach pre-war levels of output. In Afghanistan, 2009 is proving to be the deadliest year since Operation Enduring Freedom began in 2001.

Link – Stability

TAPI construction will not happen in an unstable Afghanistan

Shah ‘03

Baber Shah, PhD and Research Fellow at the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, “REVIVAL OF TRANS AFGHANISTAN GAS PIPELINE PROJECT”, Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad

The Question of Peace and Security in Afghanistan  The biggest question is that of a permanent, effective, and countrywide security system in the country. In the absence of a well-trained and well-equipped national army and police, the maintenance of security in the country has become a great challenge for the Karzai administration whose writ, it appears, is confined to the capital, Kabul, which is presently considered as the most secure city in the country, where 4,800 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is responsible for maintaining security. However, the murder of Haji Qadeer, assassination attempts on President Karzai and Defence Minister Fahim, frequent bomb blasts and attacks on the ISAF show how difficult security arrangements are even within the capital. Elsewhere in the country, warlordism holds sway.  The work on the formation of the new national army and police is very slow. The country has got divided into various military zones, with each zone headed and controlled by a regional warlord with the support of his tribe. These warlords have sought legitimacy by accepting the Karzai administration. However, within their respective regions they follow an independent line of action. As matters presently stand, for maintaining security in the respective regions, the central government is relying, and will continue to rely, on these warlord militias, until the new security arrangements have taken shape in the country. Meanwhile, these militias remain engaged in loot and plunder, and frequently clash with each other. Furthermore, ethnic frictions remain high and reportedly prevail in the Karzai cabinet as well. The ongoing US-war against al-Qaeda and the dispersed Taliban cadres in the country is another factor of tension. Small scale search operations and occasional encounters with the Taliban and al-Qaeda remnants occur frequently.  Resistance against the US troops and the Karzai administration seems to be turning into the traditional Afghan guerrilla warfare. Recently news of meetings between Hikmatyar and Mulla Omar have also reported the emergence of a new group calling itself ‘the Secret Army of Muslim Mujahideen’ that has claimed responsibility of fifty raids against the US troops and their allies, including the attacks on the US embassy and the ISAF in Kabul.30 To date, most of the guerrilla activities have been taking place in the southern and southeastern parts of the country, which is considered to be one of the probable routes of the TAP pipeline. At the same time, an anti-US and anti-Kabul radio station has started its broadcasts in the eastern provinces of the country.31 Resentment and anger of the common Afghan towards the loss of civilian lives and property is also increasing. If all of these factors of resistance collectively gain momentum, it might create serious problems for the US troops as well as for the administration in Kabul. The most crucial aspect of the post 9/11 Afghanistan, following the arrival of the US troops and their securing military bases in the country as well as in the neighbouring Central Asian states, are the concerns of the neighbouring and regional countries, regarding the long-term goals of the US in the region, especially the oil and gas-rich and geo-strategically important Central Asian States. If the uncertain state of affairs in Afghanistan continue to prolong and the regional countries find that the US-long-term goals conflict with their own national interests in the region, they might extend covert support to the Afghan resistance elements to frustrate the US plans. A strong military, political and financial infrastructure as the backbone of an effective central authority in Afghanistan would remain a crucial factor. Presently the lack of internal political cohesion, the ongoing US military operations, the unabated resistance activities and the slow pace of the reconstruction process all collectively point towards the highly uncertain prevailing state of affairs in the country. The absence of an environment of security directly impacts on the viability of the TAP pipeline project that involves huge multi-national investments. Will any investor agree to invest in the pipeline project, of which over 830 km will pass through a war-prone Afghan territory? So far, only Japan has expressed its willingness to invest.32  For the TAP pipeline to materialise, the Afghan situation demands an effective international role if the country is to act as a transit for energy supplies to the outside world.

Link – Stability

Stability is the key determinant of TAPI construction

Akbari ‘10

Nazneen Akbari, freelance writer, B.A. in Mass Communication, pursuing M.A. in International Journalism, “The Oil Game in Central Asia and Afghanistan,” Suite101, 2/8/10, http://www.suite101.com/profile.cfm/naz22

Afghanistan occupies a strategic position between the Middle East, Central Asia and the Indian Subcontinent and lies squarely between Turkmenistan and the lucrative, desirable and growing markets of India, China and Japan. According to the Organisation *Project Underground*, Oct 31, 2001 “How Oil Interest Play Out in the U.S. bombing of Afghanistan”, “Afghanistan’s significance from an energy standpoint stems from its geographical location as a potential transit root for oil and natural gas exports from Central Asia to the Arabian sea. This potential includes a multi billion dollar oil and gas export pipelines through Afghanistan” Political Stability for Oil trade in Afghanistan Secondly, to play the game of oil, regional stability is necessary, and for a time the U.S. believed the Taliban could provide just that.

Stability is the number one threat to TAPI construction

Bhutta ‘08

Zafar, 2/6/08, Daily Times: “TAP gas pipeline project talks likely from Feb 23 in Islamabad,” <http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008\02\06\story_6-2-2008_pg5_5>

ISLAMABAD: Ministerial level talks on Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (TAP) gas pipeline project are likely to be held on February 23-24 in Islamabad to make further development on the agreement, sources told Daily Times here on Tuesday. Sources in Petroleum Ministry said that Asian Development Bank (ADB) that is sponsoring the gas pipeline project has called for a ministerial level meeting on the project on February 23-24. Earlier, ADB had called the meeting on November 27-28, 2007 in Islamabad but due to political instability followed by imposition of emergency rule in Pakistan, other partners of the project stayed away to join talks. Official said that during the talks the availability of adequate gas reserves in Turkmenistan, third party certification of reserves, project structure and security and gas pricing would be presented to discuss that still remained unresolved to materialize the project  
Security problem in Afghanistan is a big issue that may hamper the building of gas pipeline and during the talks Afghanistan would be asked to ensure the security to materialize the billion dollars gas pipeline project. Official also noted that the proposed gas project cost has been estimated at $6 to $7 billion and though Asian Development Bank (ADB) is sponsoring the gas project, other investors would also be invited to carryout the gas pipeline project. The investors would also arrange the financing from different international financial institutions. “Oil companies like Shell and many others would also be invited to carry out the project,” the official said adding the tender would be floated to hire investors for carrying out the project. They said the investors that would carry out the project would receive that transport fee. Though India, reportedly under pressure from the US to scrap the Iran gas pipeline project and has stayed away from the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline project talks held about four times in Tehran and Islamabad respectively, is taking interest to participate TAP project,” the official said. India had earlier been formally invited to join the talks as fourth stakeholder of Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan gas pipeline project but it wanted to hold talks on TAP project in politically stabilised environment. Sources said that earlier India had the status of observer and at has been participating the talks between three countries Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan but now the project would become four nations project after the participation of India in the talks.

Link – Stability

Afghan stability key to TAPI

Pant ‘10

Harsh V. Pant, lecturer at King's College London, vsitng fellow at CASI, University of Pennsylvania, June 2010, Contemporary South Asia: “India in Afghanistan: a Test Case for a Rising Power”)

India has used Tajikistan as a base for ferrying humanitarian and reconstruction aid to Afghanistan. India's base in Ayni in Tajikistan represents a major element in India's effort to promote stability in Afghanistan and to enhance New Delhi's ability to contain Islamic terrorism both in South Asia and Central Asia. Afghanistan's leaders have also expressed an interest in acting as a 'land bridge' between India and Central Asia. India's interest in the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India gas pipeline is also predicated upon stability and security in Afghanistan. Moreover, India has to keep an eye on various other states that have started expanding their own influence in and around Afghanistan.

Stability is a pre-requisite for TAPI

Cole, 09

Richard E Mitchell Professor of Middle Eastern and South Asian History at the University of Michigan, (2009, Juan. Political Science Quarterly: “Pakistan and Afghanistan: beyond the Taliban,” Academic Onefile

Although competition for political influence in Afghanistan sets its neighbors and the great powers against one another, one key energy project brings some of these actors together. India and Pakistan are hoping that a stable government in Kabul might give them access to Central Asia's natural gas. In late April 2008, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India signed off on a deal that would involve spending an estimated $8 billion to build the aforementioned TAPI pipeline, with construction slated to begin in 2010. The United States strongly backs the project, which would likely make the rival Iranian pipeline plan a dead letter and would reduce Russia's leverage on the natural gas market. Canadian energy economist John Foster rang the alarm soon after the deal was initialed, warning that the Canadian NATO contingent in the Qandahar region would likely be drawn into defending the pipeline from "massive" terrorist attacks. He said Canadians were being drawn into a "geopolitical game in Central Asia" and were "babes in the wood." (35) Because of continued instability in southern Afghanistan, the prospects for the TAPI pipeline are deeply uncertain, and it seems increasingly likely that Turkmenistan will pipe its gas north to Moscow for sale to Western Europe.

Impact [I/L] – Iran – TAPI/IPI Tradeoff

IPI and TAPI are mutually exclusive – TAPI blocks the IPI

Foster ‘08s

International energy economist and an expert on the world oil scene, 6/19/08, Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives’ Foreign Policy Series: “A Pipeline Through a Troubled Land: Afghanistan, Canada, And The Great Energy Game”

Meanwhile, Iran has separately offered an alternative to the route through Afghanistan – a pipeline to supply Iranian gas to Pakistan and India. The Rival Pipeline: Iran-Pakistan-India Pipeline Iran is negotiating with Pakistan and India for a pipeline (called IPI after the names of the three countries) to supply Iranian gas along a relatively secure route. With an estimated capital cost of $7.5 billion, IPI is similar in cost to the TAPI project, and is seen as a potential rival to TAPI. The IPI pipeline would move Iranian natural gas to neighbouring Pakistan and on to India. The route would avoid strife-torn Afghanistan altogether. The IPI pipeline would be 2,670 kilometres long, with about 1,115 kilometres in Iran, 705 kilometres in Pakistan, and 850 kilometres in India, and would take four years to build. It would be constructed by the three nations separately, rather than by a single, co-operative venture along the lines that the TAPI partners propose.34 The purpose of this separate approach is reportedly to avoid raising the United States’ ire and potential sanctions for co-operating with Iran.35 Russia’s Gazprom has expressed willingness to help build the IPI line.36 Pakistan is considering inviting bids by oil and gas companies to build the section in its territory, and BP has publicly expressed interest.37 In 2007, a senior State Department official, Steven Mann, stated that the United States is unequivocally against the deal. “The U.S. government supports multiple pipelines from the Caspian region but remains absolutely opposed to pipelines involving Iran.” Washington fears the IPI pipeline deal would be a blow to its efforts to isolate Iran. The Bush administration has been trying to pressure both Pakistan and India to back off from the pipeline.38 Map3. The Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) Gas Pipeline This has resulted in the TAPI pipeline being viewed as a U.S.-backed initiative to aid in its isolation of Iran. Local leaders are sensitive to this accusation, given widespread popular aversion to the Bush administration. In response to a reporter’s question this April, Pakistan’s petroleum minister categorically denied that talks on TAPI were held in Islamabad under U.S. pressure to block the Iran-PakistanIndia deal.39

Impact [I/L] – Iran – TAPI/IPI Tradeoff

Failure to construct TAPI means the success of the IPI Iranian pipeline – negotiations now

Cohen, Curtis, and Graham ‘08

Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is Senior Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Security in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies; Lisa Curtis is Senior Research Fellow for South Asia in the Asian Studies Center; and Owen Graham is a Research Assistant in the Allison Center at The Heritage Foundation, No. 2139, May 30, 2008, “The Proposed Iran–Pakistan–India Gas Pipeline: An Unacceptable Risk to Regional Security,” Executive Summary Backgrounder – Heritage Foundation, <http://www.gees.org/documentos/Documen-03020.pdf>

The foreign policies of India and Pakistan are driven increasingly by energy security. To sustain their booming economies and growing populations amid tight oil and gas markets, Indian and Pakistani policymakers are turning to energy deals with unsavory regimes, such as Iran’s. At the same time, energy-producing states including Iran and Russia are attempting to tap new markets, drive up oil prices, and secure their own interests by locking in demand. In 1993, Pakistan and Iran announced a plan to build a gas pipeline, which Iran later proposed extending into India. Dubbed the “peace pipeline,” the Iran–Pakistan–India (IPI) gas pipeline would traverse over 2,775 kilometers (1,724 miles) from Iran’s South Pars gas field in the Persian Gulf through the Pakistani city of Khuzdar, with one branch going on to Karachi and a second branch extending to Multan and then on to India. This pipeline would give Iran an economic lifeline and increase its leverage and influence in South Asia. U.S. policymakers argue that allowing the IPI pipeline to proceed would encourage the Iranian regime to defy the will of the international community, develop nuclear weapons, and support terrorism. Furthermore, inadequate investment in Iran’s oil and gas industry and increasing domestic demand could render Iran incapable of supplying natural gas through the IPI. The Energy Chess Game.Although Iran possesses the second-largest gas reserves in the world, inadequate investment and other deficiencies in its hydrocarbon sector call into question Iran’s ability to supply gas to Pakistan and India through the IPI pipeline. In addition, 475 miles of the IPI pipeline will run through the Pakistani province of Baluchistan. This remote region is home to separatist tribes that employ private militias that fight over territory and resources—conditions that are hardly conducive to secure energy transportation. The Kremlin is also seeking to influence Iran to send its gas east through the IPI instead of west through the proposed Nabucco gas pipeline, which would undermine Russia’s supplier dominance over European gas markets. Russia also hopes that the IPI will undercut plans for the proposed Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India (TAPI) pipeline. Russia is interested in developing the Russia- proposed north–south energy and trade corridor. Both Iran and India have expressed interest in participating in this undertaking, which would connect them to Europe by way of Russia. China views Iran as an important node in its energy security and in its strategy to develop more overland energy transport routes to reduce its dependence on U.S.-dominated sea-lanes.

Impact [I/L] – Iran – TAPI/IPI Tradeoff

U.S. opposition of IPI in favor of TAPI undermines IPI success

Jafri ‘08

Safdar Jafri, 4/29/2008, “Choosing The Future of Gas Pipelines in South Asia: IPI or TAPI,” Global Politician, http://www.globalpolitician.com/24636-south-asia

However, the above two are only the economic considerations connected to this project. There are also political considerations that are equally significant. US is strongly opposed to the IPI project and has instead insisted that both Pakistan and India pursue the TAPI project instead. Indeed, the objective is to isolate Iran and deny it any economic expansion in the region. This is no small consideration for the sort of influence that the US exerts in both Pakistan and India. While it is offering a lucrative civil nuclear deal to India, to Pakistan it continues to offer substantial amount of economic assistance. This brings us to the second project, namely TAPI. TAPI pipeline is planned to start from Daulatabad gasfield in Turkmenistan and end in India via Afghanistan and Pakistan. The project can complete in 2011-12 and will include a 56-inch diameter pipeline with at least 30 billion cubic meters of gas a year. The pipeline will b 2000 kilometers long and will pass through Multan in Pakistan. The project is expected to cost in the region of 6-7 billion dollars and is expected to carry 2 billion cubic feet of gas per day (20 billion cubic meters per year). India alone would be recieving half of the total gas transferred through this proposed pipeline. Although the parties involved, particularly India, did not seem very impressed with the project initially, a number of developments and studies have changed the mindset. These developments and studies indicate that not only TAPI is politically a more viable project, particularly the fact that the US is opposed to IPI and supports TAPI, it is also economically comparable with IPI project. Furthermore, the ADB(Asian Development Bank), which is actively engaged in a number of development programs in both India and Pakistan, has expressed its interest in financing the TAPI project. It has not shown the same interest in the IPI project.

Impact [I/L] – Iran – TAPI Solves

TAPI isolates Iran and independently checks Iran hegemony

Kazakova and Komissin ‘01

Marina Kazakov and Irina Komissina, oth are scientific fellows at the Russian Strategic Research Institute, “Pakistan: Geo-Economic Interests in Central Asia,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, <http://dlib.eastview.com/searchresults/article.jsp?art=13&id=4576897>

Nevertheless, the decision to build this pipeline aroused noticeable anxiety in Moscow, Delhi, Beijing, and Tehran. As the Indian newspaper *Indian Express* wrote, the selected route "entirely meets the U.S.'s political, economic and strategic interests in Central Asia, which is striving to stimulate the export of energy resources by the region's countries, hook up, primarily and most importantly, American business to this process, isolate Iran, and make Pakistan the main transit junction for delivering this raw material to other countries." 14 Director of the Paris National Strategic Research Center Oliver Roy gave a similar assessment of the project, noting that construction of the gas pipeline meets two of America's priorities-to ensure direct transportation of petroleum products from Central Asia and the Caspian Region and intensify Iran's isolation. This is particularly important in light of the fact that Iran has a natural claim to the gas pipeline passing through its territory, since it already has the appropriate infrastructures and is close to the production site. 15

Impact [I/L] – Iran – TAPI > IPI Now

TAPI is beating the rival IPI pipeline now

Pannier ‘09

Bruce Pannier, May 25, 2009, “What Are The Prospects For Iran-Pakistan 'Pipeline Of Peace'?” http://www.rferl.org/content/What\_Are\_The\_Prospects\_For\_IranPakistan\_Pipeline\_Of\_Peace/1739236.html

The signing of a 25-year deal under which Iran aims to export some 150 million cubic meters of gas to Pakistan per day has resurrected a moribund pipeline project known as the "Pipeline of Peace." Not much has been heard about the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) pipeline for some time, but that all changed on the sidelines of a regional summit that brought together Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad and Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari in Tehran on May 24. At a signing ceremony, the two leaders hailed the prospects of a pipeline that would start in the Iranian city of Asalouyeh, travel to Pakistan, and could eventually end in India. But there are some major obstacles to overcome before any Iranian gas actually crosses the border into Pakistan -- and even more before that gas can be routed to India. The first major question is where the money will come from. The first leg of the plan is to build a 2,100-kilometer long pipeline from Iran's South Pars gas field into Pakistan -- at an estimated $7.5 billion. The next step would be to build a 600-kilometer extension that would go on to India. But while a rival gas-pipeline project -- the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) -- is supported by the Asian Development Bank, the IPI does not have any backing from international financial institutions. Furthermore, TAPI is not as vulnerable to the financial or political opposition that IPI could experience due to the involvement of Iran, whose nuclear program has made it a pariah in the international community.  Complicating matters for both projects is that they are to be routed through Baluchistan. Considering that Baluch nationalists have already blown up domestic gas pipelines on the Pakistani side of the border in their fight for greater autonomy from Islamabad, their stance on a new pipeline from Iran (or Afghanistan) could be easily guessed.

Impact – Iran – 2NC Shia Revolution Shell [1/2]

Iranian power forms the basis for a Shia revolution in the Middle East

Leigh and Vukovic ‘10

James and Predrag, Izvorni naučni rad, Professor at the University of Nicosia AND \*\*Research Assistant at the University of Nicosia February 2010, “POTENTIAL IRANIAN HEGEMONY IN OIL PRODUCING ISLAMIC COUNTRIES –IMPLICATIONS FOR OIL GEOPOLITICS,” <http://www.diplomacy.bg.ac.rs/pdf/IP_2010_1_J_Leigh.pdf>

In all of this we could expect to see a greater voice of political Islamism coming from the Shia populations of the Gulf states. When that begins to appear, it may herald a growing and accelerating influence of Iranian Islamism over Shia populations, in the Gulf states, to influence their countries’ foreign oil policy. The following quote from Stratfor highlights the growing concern, in the Gulf nations, about the ascendancy of Iran as a regional power: “Despite recent efforts on the part of the Gulf Cooperation Council member countries to engage Iran in a positive manner, countries like Saudi Arabia and Bahrain remain only too aware of Iran’s increasing ability to inflame internal sectarian tensions in their countries as its influence continues to rise…”23 Iranian Islamism’s influence may also extend to other Islamic Arab states, for example, across North Africa. This potential Iranian international Islamist power bloc, as a bulwark against the West, may greatly influence OPEC oil policy, and steer its decision making, and so exacerbate these oil producers’ relations with the Western Christian world. Oil could become much more expensive for the west and even difficult to obtain, and particularly so if oil scarcity becomes an increasing and reoccurring problem in the looming world. Growing Shia power and influence coincides with the spread of Islamism at all levels of society in many Arab states. Not only in Iran is there a Shia government but as Juan Cole says, “The Shia now also have an Arab champion. This is a new thing. Baghdad has emerged as a centre of Arab Shiite power”.24 David Hirst comments further, “For the first time in centuries, Shias are about to come into their own as the rulers – or at least the politically dominant community – in a key Arab country, Iraq.”25 Jordan’s King Abdulla is anxious about the Iranian peril which is beginning to appear as the leader of Shia in the Gulf and the wider region. King Abdulla has warned that with Iranian success to establish Iraq as an Islamic Shia Republic, Iran will not stop there. He has warned of a Shia “crescent” stretching from Iran into Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.26 It is not an exaggeration to say that several Arab leaders watch with anxiety as they suspect Shia emancipation looms large. Arab regimes with a majority, or at least a significant minority of Shia, could begin to feel the pressure of Political Shia as it aggressively pursues a more dominant role in several nations across the Gulf region: Iran, Bahrain, Yemen and Iraq, with majorities, and in Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, with minorities. Further afield there could also be a swelling of Shia influence with their majority in Azerbaijan, and minorities in Turkey, Pakistan, Syria and Afghanistan. As Bernard Lewis says, “Iranians have plans going far beyond the Gulf and Middle East extending eastward to South and Southeast Asia and westwards into Africa.”27 Further, growing Iranian Shia influence in other nations’ own populations, through inciting revolutionary groups even where the group is Sunni like the Moslem Brotherhood, Hezbollah which is Shia and Hamas, we would add these three areas of Egypt, Lebanon and Palestine into the fold of the Islamist bloc. Already Iran has vassal bases in the Eastern Mediterranean with Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza, and this is bound to be of growing concern to Europe. So in total we could expect to see Shia power appear in an array of nations, to a significant level, of course giving Iran access to much political power, in and across these nations, through their proxies or vassals. The map shows the impressive regional expanse of nations across the Middle East, the Gulf, and well into South Asia, from Turkey to Pakistan, from Azerbaijan to Yemen, where Shia political power is well established, or soon by proxy, could be significant.

Impact – Iran – 2NC Shia Revolution Shell [2/2]

Shia weapons leads to nuclear exchange

Leigh and Vukovic ‘10

James and Predrag, Izvorni naučni rad, Professor at the University of Nicosia AND \*\*Research Assistant at the University of Nicosia February 2010, “POTENTIAL IRANIAN HEGEMONY IN OIL PRODUCING ISLAMIC COUNTRIES –IMPLICATIONS FOR OIL GEOPOLITICS,” <http://www.diplomacy.bg.ac.rs/pdf/IP_2010_1_J_Leigh.pdf>

The potential and looming nuclear proliferation in the Persian Gulf Arab states could play out to eventually increase the hegemony of a potential Iranian league. Amir Tahiri’s chilling assessment of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, in the Middle East and Persian Gulf, is foreboding of the great likelihood of conflict with mass destruction weapons in the near future.43 Tahiri records that Iran has “triggered the nuclear race” and many Arab countries are considering, or actively seeking, to have nuclear weapons. Various agreements and cooperation with France, China, Pakistan, and even the US, could enable several nations to acquire nuclear capability: Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, Iraq and Turkey.44 Also at the regional level, the six nations in the (Persian) Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are working on joint nuclear cooperation for a potentially massive project which could have far reaching possibilities for military development: “The Persian Gulf Cooperation Council has set up a study group to find a fast track to nuclear power. Having spent more than $140 billion on arms purchases in the past decade, the oil-rich Arab monarchies that make up the council – Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Oman – and allies such as Egypt and Jordan would have little difficulty financing a massive nuclear project.”45 The six nations of the GCC, along with Iraq, which is presently suspended, have a total of 50% of world oil reserves, and just under 22 million Shia, making up 32% of these Gulf countries’ total populations. So any nuclear proliferation could eventually be subject to growing Iranian hegemonic influence either through the Shia or sympathetic Sunnis, or a combination of both. This would tremendously empower a bold Iranian league, and so the likelihood of nuclear force in armed conflict, would increase manifold from what it is at the moment.

Impact – Iran – 2NC Sanctions Shell

IPI undermines US economic sanctions on Iran – causes Iranian prolif

Cohen, Curtis, and Graham ‘08

Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is Senior Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Security in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies; Lisa Curtis is Senior Research Fellow for South Asia in the Asian Studies Center; and Owen Graham is a Research Assistant in the Allison Center at The Heritage Foundation, No. 2139, May 30, 2008, “The Proposed Iran–Pakistan–India Gas Pipeline: An Unacceptable Risk to Regional Security,” Executive Summary Backgrounder – Heritage Foundation, <http://www.gees.org/documentos/Documen-03020.pdf>

The United States has been firm in its opposition to the proposed Iran–Pakistan–India pipeline since negotiations started to gain traction in 2005. In 2006, U.S. Ambassador Steven Mann reiterated that “[t]he U.S. government supports multiple pipelines from the Caspian region but remains absolutely opposed to pipelines involving Iran.”29 U.S. officials also continually remind India and Pakistan that U.S. legislation sanctions any company investing more than $20 million annually in Iran’s oil and gas industry. Indian support for the IPI undercuts U.S. efforts to isolate Iran economically by challenging U.S. sanctions against Iran’s oil and gas industry. Over the long term, pursuing the IPI will increase Iranian influence in South Asia, which could contribute to greater instability in the region, especially if Iran develops a nuclear weapons capability and continues to support international terrorism. Iran continues to flout international pressure to cease its uranium-enrichment efforts and discontinue its nuclear program. In March 2008, the U.N. Security Council took notice and passed Resolution 1803, the third round of sanctions on Iran, adding to the sanctions adopted in 2006 and 2007.30

Iranian proliferation sparks a Middle East proliferation cascade that sparks a nuclear war

Allison ‘06

Graham Allison, Harvard Government Professor, 2006, “The Will to Prevent”, Fall, Harvard International Law Review, L/N, Accessed 7/16/10

Meanwhile, Iran is testing the line in the Middle East. On its current trajectory, the Islamic Republic will become a nuclear weapons state before the end of the decade. According to the leadership in Tehran, Iran is exercising its “inalienable right” to build Iranian enrichment plants and make fuel for its peaceful civilian nuclear power generators. These same facilities, however, can continue enriching uranium to 90 percent U-235, which is the ideal core of a nuclear bomb. No one in the international community doubts that Iran’s hidden objective in building enrichment facilities is to build nuclear bombs. If Iran crosses its nuclear finish line, a Middle Eastern cascade of new nuclear weapons states could trigger the first multi-party nuclear arms race, far more volatile than the Cold War competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. Given Egypt’s historic role as the leader of the Arab Middle East, the prospects of it living unarmed alongside a nuclear Persia are very low. The IAEA’s reports of clandestine nuclear experiments hint that Cairo may have considered this possibility. Were Saudi Arabia to buy a dozen nuclear warheads that could be mated to the Chinese medium-range ballistic missiles it purchased secretly in the 1980s, few in the US intelligence community would be surprised. Given Saudi Arabia’s role as the major financier of Pakistan’s clandestine nuclear program in the 1980s, it is not out of the question that Riyadh and Islamabad have made secret arrangements for this contingency. Such a multi-party nuclear arms race in the Middle East would be like playing Russian roulette—dramatically increasing the likelihood of a regional nuclear war. Other nightmare scenarios for the region include an accidental or unauthorized nuclear launch from Iran, theft of nuclear warheads from an unstable regime in Tehran, and possible Israeli preemption against Iran’s nuclear facilities, which Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has implied, threatening, “Under no circumstances, and at no point, can Israel allow anyone with these kinds of malicious designs against us to have control of weapons of destruction that can threaten our existence.”

Impact – Iran – A2: IPI Inevitable [1/2]

Not inevitable – IPI negotiations are based on a tenuous relationship between India and Pakistan and many obstacles still need to be resolved

Jafri ‘08

Safdar Jafri, 4/29/2008, “Choosing The Future of Gas Pipelines in South Asia: IPI or TAPI,” Global Politician, http://www.globalpolitician.com/24636-south-asia

The IPI project was conceptualized in 1989 when both India and Iran enjoyed relatively better terms with a democratic set up in Pakistan. The proposed project involves a gas pipeline from Assalouyeh in southern Iran through Baluchistan and Sindh provinces of Pakistan to India. The deal however received several set backs over wide ranging issues including the gas price and security of the pipeline from Pakistan. India and Pakistan finally agreed in February 2007 to pay Iran $4.93 per million British thermal units ($4.67/GJ) but some details relating to price ajustment remained open to further negotiation. The more than 1700 miles of pipeline would send 3.2 billion cubi feet per day of Iranian gas to Pakistan and 2.1 billion cubic feet per day to India by 2011. The project is presently expected to cost in the region of 7-8 billion dollars. Originally, Pakistan was to get a totla of 2.1 BCFD and India 3.2 BCFD, making a total gas supply of 5.3 BCFD. However, if India pulls out of the deal, then the pipeline's length would come down to 1600 kms and the gas volume to Pakistan would increase to 3.2 BCFD. The pipeline would initially transport 60 million cubi meters per day of gas, which would be equally shared between India and Pakistan. Since mid-2007 however India has been reluctant to participate in the meetings, which critics allege has been primarily due to the US pressure on India for not becoming a part of the deal to punish and isolate Iran over its nuclear enrichment and political hostilities with the US; the US has instead offered India a civil nuclear deal as a compensatory olive branch. Indian officials however argued that the real reason behind their foot dragging has been their concern for security of the pipeline through Pakistan and its restive province of Baluchistan as well as Iran's insistence that a clause for the revision of gas price every three years be incorporated into the agreement, which both India and Pakistan disagreed with.

Impact – Iran – A2: IPI Inevitable [2/2]

Negotiations are happening now but IPI construction is not assured – many obstacles remain

Cutler ‘09

Robert M Cutler, educated at the Massachusetts Institute of [Technology](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/KF26Ak03.html) and the University of Michigan, senior research fellow in the Institute of European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, Carleton University, Canada, “Iran-Pakistan pipeline not a done deal,” Jun 26, 2009, Asia Times – Online, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/KF26Ak03.html>

MONTREAL - Some small fanfare was given to the signature on May 24 between the presidents of Iran and Pakistan of an agreement for the construction of a gas pipeline running from the former's South Pars gas field through the latter's unstable Balochistan province to population centers in the east of the country, notably Lahore. This is the rump result of Iran's inability to come to terms with India for the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) pipeline, as it was originally proposed. The most widely known reason for that failure is Iran's poor negotiating strategy over the pricing scheme (for background, see[Delhi's options beyond Iran](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/HC28Df06.html), Asia Times Online, March 28, 2006 ). However, another contributing reason was the Indian government's concern over the pipeline's security in transiting Balochistan in western Pakistan. There has long been popular discontent there over the central government's failure to take the local population into its confidence in the development process of previous projects, provide significant social or development assistance to them, or even provide them gas resources from the deposits drilled in their territory. Roughly 450 of the Iran-Pakistan pipeline's 1,300 miles would pass through Balochistan. A third reason why the original IPI pipeline project failed was the November 26, 2008, terrorist attack in Mumbai. With reports of the indirect involvement of Pakistan security services personnel, Indian opinion, always hesitant, rapidly shifted against the prospect of a pipeline giving Pakistan the capacity to shut off[India's](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/KF26Ak03.html) energy supplies by turning a tap. In the [Indian](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/KF26Ak03.html) view, nothing would stop the Pakistani government from producing or fabricating an incident in Balochistan where a pipeline attack could diminish or cut off gas to India. China looks forward to replacing India as a third partner to receive gas transiting Pakistan. This could be delivered either as liquefied natural gas (LNG) exported from the Chinese-financed Pakistan port of Gwadar or overland through a pipeline parallel to the Karakoram Highway, also financed by China, which runs through the north of the country into the Xinjiang region in western [China](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/KF26Ak03.html). Russian companies would also like to assist the project's completion, as this would diminish if not eliminate Iranian competition for European markets, the prospect of which is a card that the European Union (EU) has been trying to play against Gazprom. Although gas for the Nabucco pipeline would be slated at least in the first instance to come from Turkmenistan, Iran has never been ruled out and has been in the EU's strategic view for years. However, it is not clear that prospects for the Iran-Pakistan pipeline are much better than those for the IPI, despite its reduced scale and despite the signed [document](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/KF26Ak03.html). When India was in negotiations with Iran over the price of eventual imports, it also had in mind the Turkish experience with Iran. (There is a gas pipeline between the latter two countries that has never really operated at full capacity) In that instance, Iran has unilaterally and repeatedly altered its interpretation of established agreements concerning prices and quantities as well as the quality of the product. This experience and others have created a widespread perception in the industry that the Iranian government regards such signed agreements as starting-points for subsequent negotiations. Moreover, Iran's constitution explicitly forbids its government to recognize international judicial or arbitration mechanisms; as a result, the only recourse is Iran's judicial system (for background, see [Another trans-Caspian pipedream](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/IJ24Ag01.html), Asia Times Online, October 24, 2007). The bilateral Iran-Pakistan project is projected to cost US$7.5 billion, but there is no indication where the funds for this will come from. The Asian Development Bank does not support the project. Also Russia's Gazprom does not have the deep pockets it once might have had. Further, it is not clear that China's banks or its parastatal companies, which still have to pay their own way on a commercial basis, would be interested to sponsor the pipeline financially, in view of the fact that the prospect of China receiving any gas is so distant and contingent. In this respect, the Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan-China gas pipeline is a much better bet (for background, see [Gas pipeline gigantism](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/JG17Ag01.html), Asia Times Online, July 17, 2008).

Impact [I/L] – Afghan Stability

TAPI solves Afghanistan instability

Rakhimov, ’10

(Dr. Mirzokhid Rakhimov, Head of Contemporary history and international relations department of the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences, “Internal and external dynamics of regional cooperation in Central Asia,” May 15th 2010,

<http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B9HC2-5032NPX-2&_user=961290&_coverDate=07/31/2010&_rdoc=1&_fmt=high&_orig=search&_sort=d&_docanchor=&view=c&_acct=C000049422&_version>=

1&\_urlVersion=0&\_userid=961290&md5=17c6ebf636de385ff223968dadd20333)

It is also grooving interest from Central Asia and outside to alternative pipelines. In December 2005 the construction of a 988 km Kazakhstan–China oil pipeline from Atasu in West Kazakhstan to the Chinese bonder town Alashankou was completed and it enable Kazakhstan to export up to 10 million barrel of oil a year. In May 2006, the Indian government also officially approved its participation in the $5 billion US Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India (TAPI) gas pipeline project. In the perspective Central Asian countries could also participate at different international energy projects, including EU’s NABUCCO project and in July 2009 Turkmen President Berdimuhamedov expressed that his country could participate at the NABUCCO projects. Stabilization and positive changes in Afghanistan grant new opportunities for Central Asian cooperation. Improvement of transport connection between Central Asia and Afghanistan would be a significant contribution toward future economic recovery and political stabilization of Afghanistan and also development of transport communications of Central Asia countries with the South and East Asia.

Impact – 2NC Afghan Stability Shell [1/2]

Revenue from the TAPI Pipeline boosts the Afghani economy and cases stability

Foster ‘10

John Foster, energy economist with worldwide experience in energy and development. He has held posts with the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, British Petroleum and Petro-Canada, “Afghanistan, Energy Geopolitics and the TAPI Pipeline,” Global Research, March 25, 2010, http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=18329

Several bilateral meetings took place in 2009. In April, a Pakistani delegation visiting Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, suggested a new TAPI route that would skirt the war-torn area and add a spur to Gwadar, a Pakistani deep-water port. Turkmen officials stated they would offer gas from the Yasrak field, instead of the planned  Dauletabad field, and they provided a reserves certification for Yasrak. In September 2009, the foreign minister of India, S M Krishna, visited President Berdimuhamedov of Turkmenistan for discussions that included terms of the TAPI pipeline project. If the pipeline goes ahead successfully, it could be Afghanistan's largest development project. According to the Ambassador of Afghanistan to Canada, transit revenue could amount to US$300 million per year. That would represent about one-third of the domestic revenue (US$887 million in 2008/09) budgeted for development efforts. Transit fees could help pay for teachers and infrastructure. Even so, Afghanistan's domestic revenue is dwarfed by aid. Foreign donors contribute about 90 percent of total funding for the development budget, and they call the shots.  TAPI is expected to boost the economies of all four countries. In 2008, Pakistan's Prime Minister described the pipeline as a vital project for the development and progress of the region. Further, pipelines are potentially good for peace. As President Berdimuhamedov of Turkmenistan said: “The pipeline between Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India will be a weighty contribution to the positive cooperation on this continent.”

Afghan instability sparks conflict in Central Asia

Lal, ’06

[Rollie, Rand Corporation, "Central Asia and Its Asian Neighbors. Security and Commerce at the Crossroads,"<http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=A450305&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>]

Afghanistan remains critical to the future of Central Asia and its neighbors, as instability in Afghanistan has the potential to destabilize the region (pp. 19–20). A potent combination of drugs, weapons, and militants traverse Afghanistan and cross into Central Asia and beyond. Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan fear that Islamic militants trained in Afghanistan may slip back across their borders (p.20). Iran remains apprehensive that hostile, anti-Shia elements may take control of Afghanistan, putting Iranian security at risk (p. 12). And Pakistan and India both compete to ensure that the Afghan regime in power is friendly to their interests (pp. 26, 29). Although the countries across Asia do not agree on how to secure Afghanistan against threats, unanimous agreement exists on the fact that a stable Afghanistan is critical to their own security interests.

Impact – 2NC Afghan Stability Shell [2/2]

Rapidly escalates to uncontrolled, nuclear conflict

Blank, 2k

(Stephen, June, pg. <http://www.milnet.com/pentagon/Russia-2000-assessment-SSI.pdf>)

In 1993 Moscow even threatened World War III to deter Turkish intervention on behalf of Azerbaijan. Yet the new Russo-Armenian Treaty and Azeri-Turkish treaty suggest that Russia and Turkey could be dragged into a confrontation to rescue their allies from defeat. 72 Thus many of the conditions for conventional war or protracted ethnic conflict in which third parties intervene are present in the Transcaucasus. For example, many Third World conflicts generated by local structural factors have a great potential for unintended escalation. Big powers often feel obliged to rescue their lesser proteges and proxies. One or another big power may fail to grasp the other side’s stakes since interests here are not as clear as in Europe. Hence commitments involving the use of nuclear weapons to prevent a client’s defeat are not as well established or apparent. Clarity about the nature of the threat could prevent the kind of rapid and almost uncontrolled escalation we saw in 1993 when Turkish noises about intervening on behalf of Azerbaijan led Russian leaders to threaten a nuclear war in that case.73 Precisely because Turkey is a NATO ally, Russian nuclear threats could trigger a potential nuclear blow (not a small possibility given the erratic nature of Russia’s declared nuclear strategies). The real threat of a Russian nuclear strike against Turkey to defend Moscow’s interests and forces in the Transcaucasus makes the danger of major war there higher than almost everywhere else. As Richard Betts has observed, The greatest danger lies in areas where (1) the potential for serious instability is high; (2) both superpowers perceive vital interests; (3) neither recognizes that the other’s perceived interest or commitment is as great as its own; (4) both have the capability to inject conventional forces; and, (5) neither has willing proxies capable of settling the situation.74

Impact [I/L] – India-Pakistan – TAPI Solves

TAPI would save the Pakistan economy – and solves India-Pakistan conflict

Shah ‘03

Baber Shah, PhD and Research Fellow at the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, “REVIVAL OF TRANS AFGHANISTAN GAS PIPELINE PROJECT”, Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad

At present, Pakistan is self-sufficient in its gas reserves and caters well to the domestic requirements. The estimated recoverable reserves of natural gas in Pakistan stand at 17.39 billion cubic feet. If further exploration is not done by 2010, a sizeable shortfall is expected of around 7 billion cubic feet, given the increase in the demand for domestic and industrial consumption. Through the TAP project, Pakistan will diversify its own energy supply sources that would help it in the overall strengthening of its energy sector. It would not only help to meet any energy shortfalls in the country but offer attractive pricing both at the domestic and industrial levels as well. Pakistan would also be able to earn huge foreign exchange through export of liquefied gas to international markets.34 Apart from an estimated $700m royalty from the transit facility, Pakistan would also be allowed to purchase $200m worth of gas at a cheaper rate. With the availability of sufficient cheaper gas, Pakistan can convert its industries currently using electricity and furnace oil to natural gas. The availability of more natural gas would also reduce reliance on firewood for domestic use, especially in the far-flung and marginalised areas, that in turn would help stop the rapid deforestation in the country. Similarly, Pakistan spends $3b annually on the import of oil for industrial and transportation purposes. A significant saving could be made in that regard. Overall, on an immediate basis, Pakistan would benefit to the tune of $6bn, which would give a tremendous boost to its economic growth rate.35 The TAP project could also act as a strong non-military confidence building measure between India and Pakistan. According to planners and analysts, India is the potential major market for the Turkmen gas. Analysts are of the view that the future of the project largely depends upon India’s readiness to buy gas through the pipeline.36 Several international think-tanks, including the Washington-based Henry Stimson Centre, in their reports have suggested the viability of the TAP pipeline in the context of the Indian need for gas for its domestic and industrial needs. Technically also, TAP is a most feasible project, as there are no major topographical constraints along the proposed transit route to India and even beyond. However, Indo-Pak tensions, as well as the law and order conditions within Afghanistan cause apprehensions regarding the project’s viability in the face of disruptive elements that could sabotage the pipeline, once it is in place.37

The TAPI pipeline increases Pakistan and India cooperation

Kazakova and Komissin ‘01

Marina Kazakov and Irina Komissina, oth are scientific fellows at the Russian Strategic Research Institute, “Pakistan: Geo-Economic Interests in Central Asia,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, <http://dlib.eastview.com/searchresults/article.jsp?art=13&id=4576897>

The gas pipeline may be extended to Delhi (the length of this section would be 600 km, and the construction cost approximately $600 million), but India has still not made a final decision on this issue. As some Indian politicians and experts believe, the delivery of Turkmenian gas would help to meet the country's energy needs, while participation in the construction would serve a good basis for establishing cooperation with Pakistan. At the same time, fears are expressed in Delhi that in the event of a deterioration in interrelations, Islamabad could close the pipeline. 9 In addition, the possibility is being discussed of extending the gas pipeline to China.

Impact – 2NC India-Pakistan Shell

Pipeline between India and Pakistan encourages more stable relations solves potential conflicts

Cohen, Curtis, and Graham ‘08

Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is Senior Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Security in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies; Lisa Curtis is Senior Research Fellow for South Asia in the Asian Studies Center; and Owen Graham is a Research Assistant in the Allison Center at The Heritage Foundation, No. 2139, May 30, 2008, “The Proposed Iran–Pakistan–India Gas Pipeline: An Unacceptable Risk to Regional Security,” Executive Summary Backgrounder – Heritage Foundation, <http://www.gees.org/documentos/Documen-03020.pdf>

The pipeline has been referred to as the “peace pipeline” because creating economic linkages between India and Pakistan would likely encourage more stable relations between the two historical foes, which have fought three wars since their independence in 1947 and experienced two military crises in the past nine years. In fact, the Clinton Administration was relatively supportive of the pipeline idea in the late 1990s, when the “moderates” were in ascendancy in Teheran, as a way to defuse Indo–Pakistani tensions, but the Bush Administration has backed away from supporting the proposed Iran–Pakistan–India pipeline in recent years because of increased Iranian belligerence on the nuclear issue.

Indo-Pak conflict causes a nuclear winter that threatens the globe

Fai ‘01

Executive Director of the Washington-based Kashmiri American Council (Dr. Ghulam Nabi, “India Pakistan Summit and the Issue of Kashmir,” 7/8, Washington Times

The foreign policy of the United States in South Asia should move from the lackadaisical and distant (with India crowned with a unilateral veto power) to aggressive involvement at the vortex. The most dangerous place on the planet is Kashmir, a disputed territory convulsed and illegally occupied for more than 53 years and sandwiched between nuclear-capable India and Pakistan. It has ignited two wars between the estranged South Asian rivals in 1948 and 1965, and a third could trigger nuclear volleys and a nuclear winter threatening the entire globe. The United States would enjoy no sanctuary. This apocalyptic vision is no idiosyncratic view. The Director of Central Intelligence, the Department of Defense, and world experts generally place Kashmir at the peak of their nuclear worries. Both India and Pakistan are racing like thoroughbreds to bolster their nuclear arsenals and advanced delivery vehicles. Their defense budgets are climbing despite widespread misery amongst their populations. Neither country has initialed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, or indicated an inclination to ratify an impending Fissile Material/Cut-off Convention

Impact [I/L] – China – Will Join IPI [1/2]

Bilateral consensus now – China will join IPI project

Blank ‘10

[Stephen Blank](http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/articles-by-author/?no_cache=1&tx_cablanttnewsstaffrelation_pi1%5Bauthor%5D=125), Research Professor of National Security Affairs, March 5, 2010, China Brief Volume: 10 Issue: 5, “Will China Join the Iran-Pakistan-India Pipeline?” Jamestown Foundation, Ph.D. in History from the University of Chicago, .[http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx\_ttnews[tt\_news]=36122&tx\_ttnews[backPid]=25&cHash=0e88d5e465](http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5btt_news%5d=36122&tx_ttnews%5bbackPid%5d=25&cHash=0e88d5e465)

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of Iran’s most recent announcement is that China has yet to comment publicly on the pipeline except that it is studying the Pakistani proposal. And that was in 2008. Chinese foreign minister, Yang Jiechi said at that time: “We are seriously studying Pakistan’s proposal to participate in the IPI gas pipeline project” (Steelguru.com, May 3, 2008; Asia Times Online, March 6, 2008). Pakistan clearly wants China to join the pipeline for many reasons. Islamabad desperately needs the gas that might not come otherwise if there is no third party to make the deal profitable to Iran. Second, it would gain much revenue from the transit fees for the gas going to China and benefit considerably from the ensuing construction of infrastructure within Pakistan. Third, it would further solidify its “all-weather” relations with China. Those goals have always been part of Pakistan’s foreign policy and explain not only its interest in the original pipeline plan but also its previous invitations to China to join the project. The prospect of an invitation to China was also used in the past to galvanize India’s decision-making process regarding the pipeline (Steelguru.com, May 3, 2008; Asia Times Online, March 6, 2008). Throughout the spring of 2008, former Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf and his government frequently courted Chinese leaders to join the pipeline project, a pitch that Musharraf also tied to an earlier proposal of establishing a corridor linking Pakistan to China through rail, road and fiber optics. At that time, China promised to consider the proposal and then asked for more information, but did nothing else, leaving the issue in abeyance (Indian Express, April 15, 2008; The Indian, June 19, 2008). Subsequently, Pakistani media reports claimed that China was keen on joining the pipeline and would send a delegation to negotiate the deal, but clearly, nothing came of it (The Indian, June 26, 2008). In 2009, Iran’s ambassador to India, Seyid Mehdi Nabizadeh, told Indian journalists that China was interested in the pipeline, but he too refused to confirm if talks with China were taking place (The Indian, September 15, 2009). Based on this precedent, it may be possible that these Pakistani and Iranian gambits were spurious to begin with and its purpose was to pressure India or entice China into joining the pipeline project. There is considerable interest among external observers in the pipeline and from Chinese officials have sporadically expressed an interest in it For example, China’s ambassador to India in 2006, Sun Yuxi, said that China has no objections to the IPI, while India’s minister for State Planning M.V. Rajashekaran, also said that once the pipeline is completed it could be extended to China [1]. Gazprom and the Russian government have long since indicated a desire to participate in sending oil and/or gas to the subcontinent through the IPI (ITAR-TASS, April 17, 2007). Indeed, one Russian official, Gazprom’s man in Tehran, Abubakir Shomuzov, has even advocated extending the IPI pipeline to China to tie Russia, China, India, Pakistan and Iran together in a very big project having major strategic implications as well as a huge number of consumers. Presumably, such statements—if not plans—are intended to mollify Chinese concerns about the possibility of Russian energy being diverted from it to India (The Hindu [Internet Version], May 7, 2007). Nevertheless, if one correlates China’s recent maneuvers in Central Asia concerning pipelines with its deals with Iran, it is clear that China is contemplating a pipeline network running from Iran either through Central Asia, or prospectively through Pakistan and/or India to China (Central Asia Caucasus Analyst, September 19, 2007).

Impact [I/L] – China – Will Join IPI [2/2]

China is looking to become a party in the IPI pipeline now

Najeeb ‘08

Muhammad Najeeb, “China keen on joining Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline project,” Thu Jun 26 2008, Thaiindian News, <http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/business/china-keen-on-joining-iran-pakistan-india-pipeline-project_10064600.html>

Islamabad, June 26 (IANS) China is keen on joining the $7.5 billion Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) gas pipeline project and will send a delegation here for negotiations on the deal, a Pakistan petroleum ministry official said Thursday. “We had sent a formal proposal to China to join the project earlier this month and have received a positive response,” the official told IANS on condition of anonymity. He said a Chinese delegation will soon visit Pakistan for initial talks and may also undertake a trip to Iran. The IPI pipeline is a proposed 2,775-km-long pipeline to deliver natural gas from Iran to Pakistan and India. The official said China has asked for some more information about the project, which Pakistan would be furnishing “very soon”. When asked if Iran was willing to supply gas to China, the official said: “We invited China after seeking Iran’s consent.” The project was mooted in 1990 with expectations that it will benefit both India and Pakistan, who do not have sufficient natural gas to meet their rapidly increasing domestic demand for energy. However, it was delayed due to several reasons, including New Delhi’s security concerns. Pakistan, which is keen on buying gas because of its own diminishing gas reserves, is looking at China to make the project a reality if India decides to pull out. During his last visit to China, President Pervez Musharraf had tried to convince his counterpart Hu Jintao to join the project. The petroleum ministry official said Pakistan had also asked the Chinese government to conduct a detailed feasibility study of the gas pipeline. There has been no progress on the project since a dialogue was held between Pakistan and India in Islamabad in April. “We are very keen to undertake the project with India but we are no more getting any positive signals from Delhi,” said the official.

Impact – China – 2NC Economy Shell [1/2]

Having a pipeline in the region is critical to check the reemergence of China

Monbiot ’01

George Monbiot, Syndicated columnist on Foreign Affairs, Weekly columnist for The Guardian, “America’s pipe dream,” October 23rd 2001, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/oct/23/afghanistan.terrorism11>

American foreign policy is governed by the doctrine of "full-spectrum dominance", which means that the US should control military, economic and political development worldwide. China has responded by seeking to expand its interests in central Asia. The defence white paper Beijing published last year argued that "China's fundamental interests lie in ... the establishment and maintenance of a new regional security order". In June, China and Russia pulled four central Asian republics into a "Shanghai cooperation organisation". Its purpose, according to Jiang Zemin, is to "foster world multi-polarisation", by which he means contesting US full-spectrum dominance. If the US succeeds in overthrowing the Taliban and replacing them with a stable and grateful pro-western government and if the US then binds the economies of central Asia to that of its ally Pakistan, it will have crushed not only terrorism, but also the growing ambitions of both Russia and China. Afghanistan, as ever, is the key to the western domination of Asia.

Securing oil interests cuts off oil to china

Barnes ’09

Lee John Barnes, Prominent British National Party Writer, “Afghanistan – A War for Oil and Natural Gas,” August 5th 2009, <http://leejohnbarnes.blogspot.com/2009/08/afghanistan-war-for-gas-and-oil.html>

The successful implementation of the SRS requires the concurrent "militarization" of the entire Eurasian corridor as a means to securing control over extensive oil and gas reserves, as well as "protecting" pipeline routes and trading corridors. This militarization is largely directed against China, Russia and Iran.  Take a look at the maps above - then note how the army bases are in prime positions to protect the oil and gas pipelines. That is what this 'war' is about. The Afghanistan war is about securing the territory through which the oil and gas pipelines will have to pass through in order to ensure Russia, China and Iran are outmanouvered in the last great wars for the last of the global oil supplies on the planet. Only yesterday the Independent reported that the Peak Oil process is even close than the 'experts' have been so far admitting.

Impact – China – 2NC Economy Shell [2/2]

Oil is key to rapid Chinese economic

States News Service ’09

11/15/09

Another thing is the way we're discussing with the Chinese authorities on the right policy to implement and the view we have on the Chinese economy. I'm very happy to see that maybe as part of a result of this discussion, or almost partly as a result of those discussions, the recent shift from the Chinese authorities from an export-led growth model to a more domestic-consumption-led growth model is exactly what the IMF was arguing for months. So in this respect we're very happy with this new evolution, with this shift in the policy and I think that it will be very useful both for the Chinese economy and for the influence of China in the world economy.

That prevents large-scale U.S.-China war

Mearsheimer ’05

John J. Mearsheimer, political science professor U of Chicago, Jan-Feb 2005, Foreign policy special report: China Rising , “Better to Be Godzilla than Bambi”, [www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=16565](http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=16565)

China cannot rise peacefully, and if it continues its dramatic economic growth over the next few decades, the United States and China are likely to engage in an intense security competition with considerable potential for war. Most of China’s neighbors, including India, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Russia, and Vietnam, will likely join with the United States to contain China’s power.

Extinction

Straits Times 2K

“Regional Fallout: No one gains in war over Taiwan,” Jun 25, LN

THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -- horror of horrors -- raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any USforces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, East Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -- truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option**.** A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilization. There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armageddon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, itcannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else.

Impact [I/L] – China – Expansionism

Chinese inclusion in IPI sparks Chinese geopolitical expansion

Blank ‘10

[Stephen Blank](http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/articles-by-author/?no_cache=1&tx_cablanttnewsstaffrelation_pi1%5Bauthor%5D=125), Research Professor of National Security Affairs, March 5, 2010, China Brief Volume: 10 Issue: 5, “Will China Join the Iran-Pakistan-India Pipeline?” Jamestown Foundation, Ph.D. in History from the University of Chicago, .[http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx\_ttnews[tt\_news]=36122&tx\_ttnews[backPid]=25&cHash=0e88d5e465](http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5btt_news%5d=36122&tx_ttnews%5bbackPid%5d=25&cHash=0e88d5e465)

At the same time, if China did become a full partner in the IPI pipeline that would offer it another opportunity to build on Beijing’s so-called strategy of building what has been called a “string of pearls” across the Indian Ocean. Chinese officials have publicly stated their desire to turn the Chinese-built Pakistani port of Gwadar into an energy hub. China also has substantial interests in overland transport links in Pakistan through the Karakorum Highway and participation in the IP pipeline would extend those interests deeper. Indeed, many observers in New Delhi and Washington view Sino-Pakistani collaborations to build naval facilities and oil refineries at Gwadar as a prelude to the establishment of a Chinese naval base there. Whether this is true or not, if China joins the IPI project, then the odds of China supporting American efforts to isolate Iran would effectively be reduced to zero because it would depend too much on Iranian gas, in addition to its recent oil contracts to antagonize Iran by siding with Washington [4]. While we wait to see how China decides to play this issue, the United States needs to understand that Beijing's decision to join or stand aloof from this pipeline will have major geopolitical repercussions and comparable geo-economic repercussions across Asia, another sign not only of the integration of south and southwest Asia with East Asia, but also of China’s rising importance as the nexus of the Asian continent.

Impact – China – 2NC Expansionism Shell

TAPI and IPI are fighting over Chinese involvement – Chinese partnership in IPI sparks Chinese expansionism into the Middle East

Fillingham ‘09

Zachary Fillingham - Nov 05, 09, Geopolitical Monitor, “India, China & the IPI pipeline,” <http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/india-china-the-ipi-pipeline-1>

The 2,700 kilometer pipeline originally sought to transport natural gas from Iran’s South Pars field through Pakistan and into the thirsty Indian market. At every turn, the [IPI pipeline](http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/iran-and-pakistan-to-sign-peace-pipeline-deal/) has had to compete with the U.S.-championed Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline that has hitherto been thwarted by the resilience of the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. Since the [IPI pipeline](http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/iran-and-pakistan-to-sign-peace-pipeline-deal/)'s inception, the Indian government has had to carefully balance energy considerations with the project’s many potential strategic drawbacks.  In the end, it’s more likely that New Delhi will choose to nurture the nascent [U.S.-Indian strategic engagement](http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/privatized-foreign-policy-the-india-lobby-1/) and pull out of the project. India’s decision will no doubt be made easier by Iran’s hard bargaining on gas prices, [recent energy discoveries within India](http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/bric-countries-energy-security-report-1/), and New Delhi’s reluctance to allow Pakistan any strategic levers in the wake of the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks. In what is becoming a re-occurring theme in the regional competition between these two [BRIC countries](http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/bric-countries-energy-security-report-1/), India’s withdrawal from the project could open a door for China. Politicians in New Delhi will be watching intently to see if Beijing swoops up yet another energy prize, and in doing so deepens the Chinese strategic encirclement of India. The [IPI pipeline](http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/iran-and-pakistan-to-sign-peace-pipeline-deal/) poses several possible risks and rewards for the Chinese government. With India out of play, Iran has less leverage to drive a hard bargain on gas prices, and a new over-land energy link would help further China’s energy diversification strategy. However, the project faces several political and logistical difficulties that could scuttle Chinese participation. The pipeline’s path is set to traverse some very difficult terrain in Pakistan’s Gilgit region, increasing the costs and time required to eventually connect to Xinjiang. Moreover, the massive investment required to link China would be imperiled in the event of an American attack on Iran or mass civil upheaval in Pakistan.  Given the geopolitics and the harsh terrain involved, Beijing might just be feigning interest in the [IPI pipeline](http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/iran-and-pakistan-to-sign-peace-pipeline-deal/) to get a better deal in negotiations with Russia on relatively safer Siberia-China gas pipelines. If China does become a full partner in the [IPI pipeline](http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/iran-and-pakistan-to-sign-peace-pipeline-deal/), however, it will provide another opportunity to build on Beijing’s [string of pearls](http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/china-india-the-new-naval-arms-race-1/).  Chinese officials have made public their desire to turn the Chinese-built Pakistani port of Gwadar into an energy hub. A link to the [IPI pipeline](http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/iran-and-pakistan-to-sign-peace-pipeline-deal/), and over-land transport links in the form of the Karakoram Highway represent substantial Chinese interests in Pakistan. As such, Sino-Pakistani collaborations to build naval facilities and oil refineries at Gwadar are being interpreted by Washington and New Delhi as a prelude to the establishment of a [Chinese naval base](http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/china-india-the-new-naval-arms-race-1/) there. Whether this is true or not, if China joins the IPI project, then the odds of China supporting American efforts to isolate Iran would effectively be reduced to zero.

Chinese expansionism sparks nuclear war

Copley News Service ’05

7/25/05 (“Daily Editorials Bombs and Butter,” lexis nexis

As China gains economic clout, its government's brand of touchy, saber-rattling nationalism becomes more worrisome. That touchiness is rooted in the memory of humiliation inflicted by foreigners, from the Western colonial concessions of the 19th century, and it is rooted in the more recent memory of Japanese atrocities during the World War II occupation. That wounded pride explains the orchestrated national spleen-venting over Japanese textbooks, the 2001 U.S. spy plane collision and the mistaken U.S. bombing of China's embassy during the Kosovo campaign. It has much to do with China's oft-repeated threats to attack Taiwan, which seem extreme to everyone except the Chinese. As China gains power, that nationalism becomes more worrisome. China's authoritarian government lacks the natural restraint of voters or of dissenters free to challenge government assumptions that can lead to war. The Pentagon recently reported that China is rapidly building its military with a goal of extending its influence across Asia. In the future, its leaders "may be tempted to resort to force or coercion more quickly to press diplomatic advantage, advance security interests or resolve disputes," the report concluded. If more muscle combined with nationalist passions tempt Chinese leaders to attack Taiwan, the United States and the world would be faced with a crisis more serious than any since at least the 1962 Cuban missile crisis with the Soviet Union. The United States would feel compelled to come to Taiwan's aid, resulting in a war between heavily armed countries that possess nuclear arsenals.

Impact [I/L] – Russia – Expansionism – Pipeline Key [1/2]

Having a pipeline in the region is critical to check the emergence of Russia and China

Monbiot ’01

George Monbiot, Syndicated columnist on Foreign Affairs, Weekly columnist for The Guardian, “America’s pipe dream,” October 23rd 2001, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/oct/23/afghanistan.terrorism11>

American foreign policy is governed by the doctrine of "full-spectrum dominance", which means that the US should control military, economic and political development worldwide. China has responded by seeking to expand its interests in central Asia. The defence white paper Beijing published last year argued that "China's fundamental interests lie in ... the establishment and maintenance of a new regional security order". In June, China and Russia pulled four central Asian republics into a "Shanghai cooperation organisation". Its purpose, according to Jiang Zemin, is to "foster world multi-polarisation", by which he means contesting US full-spectrum dominance. If the US succeeds in overthrowing the Taliban and replacing them with a stable and grateful pro-western government and if the US then binds the economies of central Asia to that of its ally Pakistan, it will have crushed not only terrorism, but also the growing ambitions of both Russia and China. Afghanistan, as ever, is the key to the western domination of Asia.

Securing oil interests beats back Russia’s interests in the region

Barnes ’09

Lee John Barnes, Prominent British National Party Writer, “Afghanistan – A War for Oil and Natural Gas,” August 5th 2009, <http://leejohnbarnes.blogspot.com/2009/08/afghanistan-war-for-gas-and-oil.html>

The successful implementation of the SRS requires the concurrent "militarization" of the entire Eurasian corridor as a means to securing control over extensive oil and gas reserves, as well as "protecting" pipeline routes and trading corridors. This militarization is largely directed against China, Russia and Iran.  Take a look at the maps above - then note how the army bases are in prime positions to protect the oil and gas pipelines. That is what this 'war' is about. The Afghanistan war is about securing the territory through which the oil and gas pipelines will have to pass through in order to ensure Russia, China and Iran are outmanouvered in the last great wars for the last of the global oil supplies on the planet. Only yesterday the Independent reported that the Peak Oil process is even close than the 'experts' have been so far admitting.

Central Asia key to Russian Influence

Rakhimov, ’10

(Dr. Mirzokhid Rakhimov, Head of Contemporary history and international relations department of the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences, “Internal and external dynamics of regional cooperation in Central Asia,” May 15th 2010,

<http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B9HC2-5032NPX-2&_user=961290&_coverDate=07/31/2010&_rdoc=1&_fmt=high&_orig=search&_sort=d&_docanchor=&view=c&_acct=C000049422&_version>=

1&\_urlVersion=0&\_userid=961290&md5=17c6ebf636de385ff223968dadd20333)

It is well known that Russia, US and China declared their support peace and stability in Central Asia and support regional cooperation and these declaration of course is welcomed in Central Asian countries. But, there are some contradictions between them. Russia traditionally view the Central Asia states as being within its sphere of influence and does not wish to see nether China or US become deeply involved there; China expresses understanding of Russia’s strong role in the region and at the same time like Russian against US strong military presence in the region, because it considers this as endangering the safety of its own north-west region.

Impact [I/L] – Russia – Expansionism – Pipeline Key [2/2]

Other energy pipelines will decimate Russia’s energy superpower

**Wishnick, ’09**

(Elizabeth Wishnick, Research Associate at the Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University, Visiting Professor in the Department of Political Science, New School University, Fulbright Visiting Scholar at Lingnan University, “Russia, China, And the United State In Central Asia: Prospects for Great Power Power Competition And Cooperation In the Shadow of the Georgian Crisis,” February 2009, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA494509&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>)

In Alexei Malashenko’s view, alternative energy pipeline routes are “the Kremlin’s worst nightmare. . . .” because they will reduce Russian leverage over Central Asia as well as making it less likely for Russia to become an energy superpower.100 Indeed, Russia is facing rebellion in two directions and is seeing its monopoly over Central Asian gas exports increasingly challenged. The most heated competition is centered on 33 control over gas exports from Turkmenistan to Europe, which now flows through Russian pipelines. The EU and the United States have been trying to convince Turkmenistan to participate in the trans-Caspian and Nabucco gas pipeline projects which would connect Europe to Caspian resources, bypassing Russia. In response, Gazprom announced in September 2008 that it was prepared to offer Turkmenistan (as well as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan) “European” prices for contracts beginning in 2009, possibly as much as $400/ thousand cubic meters (tcm), and more than double the current rate of $150/tcm.101

Impact – Russia – 2NC Expansionism Shell [1/2]

Russian pipelines would dramatically increase Russia’s geopolitical influence

Monbiot, ’01

(George Monbiot, Syndicated columnist on Foreign Affairs, Weekly columnist for The Guardian, “America’s pipe dream,” October 23rd 2001, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/oct/23/afghanistan.terrorism11>)

The invasion of Afghanistan is certainly a campaign against terrorism, but it may also be a late colonial adventure. British ministers have warned MPs that opposing the war is the moral equivalent of appeasing Hitler, but in some respects our moral choices are closer to those of 1956 than those of 1938. Afghanistan is as indispensable to the regional control and transport of oil in central Asia as Egypt was in the Middle East. Afghanistan has some oil and gas of its own, but not enough to qualify as a major strategic concern. Its northern neighbours, by contrast, contain reserves which could be critical to future global supply. In 1998, Dick Cheney, now US vice-president but then chief executive of a major oil services company, remarked: "I cannot think of a time when we have had a region emerge as suddenly to become as strategically significant as the Caspian." But the oil and gas there is worthless until it is moved. The only route which makes both political and economic sense is through Afghanistan. Transporting all the Caspian basin's fossil fuel through Russia or Azerbaijan would greatly enhance Russia's political and economic control over the central Asian republics, which is precisely what the west has spent 10 years trying to prevent. Piping it through Iran would enrich a regime which the US has been seeking to isolate. Sending it the long way round through China, quite aside from the strategic considerations, would be prohibitively expensive.

Russian expansionism causes nuclear war with the US

Cohen ‘96

Cohen, Research Fellow in the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies at The Heritage Foundation, 1996 [http://www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaandEurasia/BG1065.cfm](http://www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaandEurasia/BG1065.cfm%29)

The main threat to the equitable development of Eurasian oil is the Russian attempt to dominate the region in a de facto alliance with the radical Islamic regime in Tehran.8 Russia benefits from instability in the Caucasus, where wars and conflicts undermine independence and economic development while hindering the export of oil from the region's states. Moscow has gone beyond words to establish its power in the Caucasus. The Russians are setting up military bases in the region in order to gain exclusive control over all future pipelines. Georgia now has four Russian bases and Armenia has three, while Azerbaijan is still holding out under severe pressure from Moscow. In addition, members of the Commonwealth of Independent States are required to police their borders jointly with Russian border guards, and thus are denied effective control over their own territory. Attempts to Reintegrate the South The struggle to reestablish a Russian sphere of influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia started in early 1992. While not a full-scale war, this struggle employs a broad spectrum of military, covert, diplomatic, and economic measures. The southern tier of the former Soviet Union is a zone of feverish Russian activity aimed at tightening Moscow's grip in the aftermath of the Soviet collapse. The entire southern rim of Russia is a turbulent frontier, a highly unstable environment in which metropolitan civilian and military elites, local players, and mid-level officers and bureaucrats drive the process of reintegration.10 With the collapse of the Soviet Union, President Boris Yeltsin called for a re-examination of Russia's borders to the detriment of her neighbors, especially Ukraine and Kazakhstan. For example, upon his return from a state visit to the U.S. in September 1994, Yeltsin reiterated Russia's "right" to conduct "peacemaking" in the "near abroad," to protect Russian speakers and to exercise freedom of action in its sphere of influence.11 These statements were echoed on numerous occasions by former Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and other key policymakers in Moscow. In his September 1995 Decree "On Approval of the Strategic Policy of the Russian Federation Toward CIS Member States,"12 Yeltsin outlined plans to create a CIS military and economic union. Some observers have termed this design an informal empire "on the cheap," a "sustainable empire" which is less centralized than the old Soviet Union.13 The aim of such an arrangement would be to ensure Russia's control of the oil and gas reserves in Eurasia. Competing political interests inside Russia's neighbors often prompt local elites to challenge the faction in power and to seek Moscow's support. For example, Russian oil chieftains in Kazakhstan and military commanders who are still in place in Moldova and Georgia naturally maintain close links with Moscow. Where it lacks troops on the ground, Moscow supports the most pro-Russian faction in the conflict, such as Trans-Dniestrian ethnic Russians in Moldova, the separatist Abkhazs in Georgia, warlords and former communist leaders in Azerbaijan, and pro-communist clans in Tajikistan. This is a classic scenario for imperial expansion. What is common to these conflicts is that without Russian support, the pro-Moscow factions (regardless of their ethnicity) could not have dominated their respective regions, and would be forced to seek negotiated and peaceful solutions. In each case, appeals by the legitimate governments of the Newly Independent States to restore their territorial integrity were ignored by Moscow. Russian political elites have not overcome the imperialist ideology that inspired both pre-1917 and Soviet expansionism. For today's Moscow bureaucrats and generals, as for their predecessors in St. Petersburg prior to 1917, the turbulent southern periphery is a potential source of political fortunes, promotions, and careers. For Russian politicians in search of a grand cause, re-establishing the empire and paying for it with Eurasian oil revenues is a winning proposition, especially in the murky environment in the aftermath of imperial collapse. Key Russian Players in the Great Oil Game The Russian military and security services are by far the most resolute driving force behind the restoration of a Russian-dominated CIS. They are playing a key role in ensuring Moscow's control over the pipeline routes. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Berlin Wall terminated, at least temporarily, confrontation with the West, leaving the Red Army's General Staff, the Russian military intelligence (GRU), and the former KGB desperately seeking new missions. The biggest of these new missions is to establish control over Caucasus and Central Asian oil, establishing a Russian sphere of influence in the process. The Russian army and security services seek to deny foreign companies the right to export oil without their control. Russian military activities over the last four years indicate an attempt to consolidate strategic control of oil sources and export routes in Eurasia.

Impact – Russia – 2NC Expansionism Shell [2/2]

For example, the war in Chechnya blocked an important pipeline from Azerbaijan through Grozny, and the victory of the Abkhaz separatists, supported by the Russian military, further secured the Russian oil terminals in the ports of Novorossiysk and Tuapse. In order to obtain an oil route in the region, Western exporters may be pressured to reach accomodations with the Russian generals. The Russian intelligence services are also involved. The successor to the KGB's First Chief Directorate, now known as the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia (SVRR) and led until January 1996 by KGB general and now Foreign Minister Evgenii Primakov, published an important document in 1994 on Russia's policies in the "near abroad," called "Russia-CIS: Does the Western Position Require Correction?"14 General Primakov's staff argued that any attempt to integrate the CIS states into the global economy without Moscow's cooperation is doomed to fail. Russia already has effectively stopped Kazakhstani and Azerbaijani joint oil exporting ventures in their tracks. The states of the CIS's southern tier were coerced by Russia even before they declared their independence from the USSR. Moscow incited local pro-Russian factions, such as Abkhazians in Georgia, Armenians in Karabakh, and hard-line communist pro-Russian clans in Tajikistan, to challenge the independence and territorial integrity of these nascent states. The Russian military provided advisers, hardware, training, planning, and coordination for the military activities in these areas. As a result, hundreds of thousands have been left dead, wounded, or homeless. In addition, these violent conflicts blocked the transit routes to the West for Caspian and Central Asian oil. The U.S. Role in the Great Game Much is at stake in Eurasia for the U.S. and its allies. Attempts to restore its empire will doom Russia's transition to a democracy and free-market economy. The ongoing war in Chechnya alone has cost Russia $6 billion to date (equal to Russia's IMF and World Bank loans for 1995). Moreover, it has extracted a tremendous price from Russian society. The wars which would be required to restore the Russian empire would prove much more costly not just for Russia and the region, but for peace, world stability, and security. As the former Soviet arsenals are spread throughout the NIS, these conflicts may escalate to include the use of weapons of mass destruction. Scenarios including unauthorized missile launches are especially threatening. Moreover, if successful, a reconstituted Russian empire would become a major destabilizing influence both in Eurasia and throughout the world. It would endanger not only Russia's neighbors, but also the U.S. and its allies in Europe and the Middle East. And, of course, a neo-imperialist Russia could imperil the oil reserves of the Persian Gulf.15 Domination of the Caucasus would bring Russia closer to the Balkans, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Middle East.

Only scenario for extinction

Bostrom ‘02

Nick Bostrum, PhD faculty of philosophy at Oxford, “Existential Risks Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards,” Published in the Journal of Evolution and Technology, Vol. 9, March 2002

The US and Russia still have huge stockpiles of nuclear weapons. But would an all-out nuclear war really exterminate humankind? Note that: (i) For there to be an existential risk it suffices that we can’t be sure that it wouldn’t. (ii) The climatic effects of a large nuclear war are not well known (there is the possibility of a nuclear winter). (iii) Future arms races between other nations cannot be ruled out and these could lead to even greater arsenals than those present at the height of the Cold War. The world’s supply of plutonium has been increasing steadily to about two thousand tons, some ten times as much as remains tied up in warheads ([9], p. 26). (iv) Even if some humans survive the short-term effects of a nuclear war, it could lead to the collapse of civilization. A human race living under stone-age conditions may or may not be more resilient to extinction than other animal species.

Impact – Russia – 2NC Relations Shell

Russian pipelines would dramatically increase Russia’s geopolitical influence

Monbiot, ’01

(George Monbiot, Syndicated columnist on Foreign Affairs, Weekly columnist for The Guardian, “America’s pipe dream,” October 23rd 2001, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/oct/23/afghanistan.terrorism11>)

The invasion of Afghanistan is certainly a campaign against terrorism, but it may also be a late colonial adventure. British ministers have warned MPs that opposing the war is the moral equivalent of appeasing Hitler, but in some respects our moral choices are closer to those of 1956 than those of 1938. Afghanistan is as indispensable to the regional control and transport of oil in central Asia as Egypt was in the Middle East. Afghanistan has some oil and gas of its own, but not enough to qualify as a major strategic concern. Its northern neighbours, by contrast, contain reserves which could be critical to future global supply. In 1998, Dick Cheney, now US vice-president but then chief executive of a major oil services company, remarked: "I cannot think of a time when we have had a region emerge as suddenly to become as strategically significant as the Caspian." But the oil and gas there is worthless until it is moved. The only route which makes both political and economic sense is through Afghanistan. Transporting all the Caspian basin's fossil fuel through Russia or Azerbaijan would greatly enhance Russia's political and economic control over the central Asian republics, which is precisely what the west has spent 10 years trying to prevent. Piping it through Iran would enrich a regime which the US has been seeking to isolate. Sending it the long way round through China, quite aside from the strategic considerations, would be prohibitively expensive.

Russian energy hegemony creates anti-Americanism killing US-Russia relations

Cohen and Ericson ‘09

Ariel, Senior Research Fellow, The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, and Robert, Chair of the Department of Economics at the East Carolina University and former Director of the Harriman Institute at Columbia University (11/7/09, Heritage foundation, “Russia's Economic Crisis and U.S.-Russia Relations: Troubled Times Ahead,” <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/11/Russias-Economic-Crisis-and-US-Russia-Relations-Troubled-Times-Ahead>

An economic model based on natural resources would tend to perpetuate authoritarianism, nationalism, and corruption, and it would require Russia to follow a neo-imperial policy throughout the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to support Russian domination of the pipeline system. In a way, the petrostate model and the associated militarized foreign policy require Russia to label the U.S. as an enemy. A more open and diversified economy would be more compatible with democratization and the rule of law.Russia's falling economic performance has dampened some aspects of the revisionist rhetoric, but has not drastically changed Russia's foreign policy narrative, which remains decidedly anti-status quo and implicitly anti-American. Recent increases in oil prices ensure the continuation of this policy. Even during the current crisis, Russia has continued to voice strong grievances against the West and made revisionist demands to change key international economic and European security institutions for its benefit. Unless the Kremlin significantly reorients its foreign and security policy priorities, the Obama Administration's attempt to "reset" U.S.-Russian relations may fail. Only a coherent policy by the Obama Administration and Congress can force the Russian leadership to realize that they would be better served by cooperating with the U.S. and the West than by subverting it.

Relations key to solve all global problems  
Taylor, ’08

(Jeffrey Taylor, Atlantic correspondent living in Moscow, November 2008, Medvedev Spoils the Party, <http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200811u/medvedev-obama>)

Like it or not, the United States cannot solve crucial global problems without Russian participation. Russia commands the largest landmass on earth; possesses vast reserves of oil, natural gas, and other natural resources; owns huge stockpiles of weapons and plutonium; and still wields a potent brain trust. Given its influence in Iran and North Korea, to say nothing of its potential as a spoiler of international equilibrium elsewhere, Russia is one country with which the United States would do well to reestablish a strong working relationship—a strategic partnership, even—regardless of its feelings about the current Kremlin government. The need to do so trumps expanding NATO or pursuing “full-spectrum dominance.” Once the world financial crisis passes, we will find ourselves returning to worries about resource depletion, environmental degradation, and global warming – the greatest challenges facing humanity. No country can confront these problems alone. For the United States, Russia may just prove the “indispensable nation” with which to face a volatile future arm in arm.

AFF – TAPI Inevitable

TAPI is inevitable, investments now – stability is not an important factor

Daily News and Analysis ‘06

CORRESPONDENT DAILY NEWS AND ANALYSIS (DNA) (INDIAN NEWS SERVICE), November 21, 2006, “Boost for TAPI gas pipeline project,” <http://www.dancewithshadows.com/business/tapi-gas-pipeline-project.asp>

The summit has also agreed that the current conditions in Afghanistan, despite security and other constraints, still represented a good opportunity to improve the welfare of the people. Peace and stability in the region is dependent in large measure on the progress made in stabilising the security situation in southern and eastern Afghanistan, the declaration added. The Asian Development Bank has also agreed to set up soon a Centre for Regional Cooperation in Kabul to pursue specific initiatives for regional development. With regard to Taliban’s threat against India’s participation in the matter, New Delhi has categorically stated that it will not pull out its personnel, engaged in reconstruction work, from Afghanistan.

AFF – Link Turn – Withdraw

Troop withdrawal facilitates TAPI construction

Blum ’09

William Blum, Critic of United States Foreign Policy, “America’s Other Glorious War,” January 7th 2009, <http://www.counterpunch.org/blum01072009.html>

"Stability", it should be noted, is a code word used regularly by the United States since at least the 1950s to mean that the regime in power is willing and able to behave the way Washington would like it to behave. It is remarkable, and scary, to read the US military writing about how it goes around the world bringing "stability" to (often ungrateful) people. This past October the Army published a manual called "Stability Operations". It discusses numerous American interventions all over the world since the 1890s, one example after another of bringing "stability" to benighted peoples. One can picture the young American service members reading it, or having it fed to them in lectures, full of pride to be a member of such an altruistic fighting force. For those members of the US military in Afghanistan the most enlightening lesson they could receive is that their government's plans for that land of sadness have little or nothing to do with the welfare of the Afghan people. In the late 1970s through much of the 1980s, the country had a government that was relatively progressive, with full rights for women; even a Pentagon report of the time testified to the actuality of women's rights in the country. And what happened to that government? The United States was instrumental in overthrowing it. It was replaced by the Taliban. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, US oil companies have been vying with Russia, Iran and other energy interests for the massive, untapped oil and natural gas reserves in the former Soviet republics of Central Asia. The building and protection of oil and gas pipelines in Afghanistan, to continue farther to Pakistan, India, and elsewhere, has been a key objective of US policy since before the 2001 American invasion and occupation of the country, although the subsequent turmoil there has presented serious obstacles to such plans. A planned Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India pipeline has strong support from Washington because, amongst other reasons, the US is eager to block a competing pipeline that would bring gas to Pakistan and India from Iran. But security for such projects remains daunting, and that's where the US and NATO forces come in to play. In the late 1990s, the American oil company, Unocal, met with Taliban officials in Texas to discuss the pipelines.[6] Zalmay Khalilzad, later chosen to be the US ambassador to Afghanistan, worked for Unocal[7]; Hamid Karzai, later chosen by Washington to be the Afghan president, also reportedly worked for Unocal, although the company denies this. Unocal's talks with the Taliban, conducted with the full knowledge of the Clinton administration, and undeterred by the extreme repression of Taliban society, continued as late as 2000 or 2001. As for NATO, it has no reason to be fighting in Afghanistan. Indeed, NATO has no legitimate reason for existence at all. Their biggest fear is that "failure" in Afghanistan would make this thought more present in the world's mind. If NATO hadn’t begun to intervene outside of Europe it would have highlighted its uselessness and lack of mission. “Out of area or out of business” it was said. In June, the Canadian Center for Policy Alternatives published a report saying Taliban and insurgent activity against the US-NATO presence in Kandahar province puts the feasibility of the pipeline project in doubt. The report says southern regions in Afghanistan, including Kandahar, would have to be cleared of insurgent activity and land mines in two years to meet construction and investment schedules. "Nobody is going to start putting pipe in the ground unless they are satisfied that there is some reasonable insurance that the workers for the pipeline are going to be safe," said Howard Brown, the Canadian representative for the Asian Development Bank, the major funding agency for the pipeline. If Americans were asked what they think their country is doing in Afghanistan, their answers would likely be one variation or another of "fighting terrorism", with some kind of connection to 9-11. But what does that mean? Of the tens of thousands of Afghans killed by American/NATO bombs over the course of seven years, how many can it be said had any kind of linkage to any kind of anti-American terrorist act, other than in Afghanistan itself during this period? Not one, as far as we know. The so-called "terrorist training camps" in Afghanistan were set up largely by the Taliban to provide fighters for their civil conflict with the Northern Alliance (minimally less religious fanatics and misogynists than the Taliban, but represented in the present Afghan government). As everyone knows, none of the alleged 9-11 hijackers was an Afghan; 15 of the 19 were from Saudi Arabia; and most of the planning for the attacks appears to have been carried out in Germany and the United States. So, of course, bomb Afghanistan. And keep bombing Afghanistan. And bomb Pakistan. Especially wedding parties (at least six so far).

AFF – Link Turn – Instability

Instability incentivizes TAPI construction – they perceive it as a necessity to solve

Georgian Daily ‘10

Roman Muzalevsky, JUNE 17, 2010, “TAPI and the Prospects of an Indian-Turkmen Strategic Partnership,” http://georgiandaily.com/index.php?option=com\_content&task=view&id=18941&Itemid=132

Difficult security conditions in Afghanistan and unresolved issues between India and Pakistan may serve to encourage the launch of the TAPI rather than cause its failure. Moreover, providing its parties with diversified energy imports, the project would assist with the reconstruction of Afghanistan by providing twelve thousand jobs to the Afghans and $400 million in annual transit fees to the country (www.islamnews.ru, April 3). The planned withdrawal of coalition forces only reinforces this imperative as the operation of the pipeline will ensure a steady stream of financial flows, with local and regional actors gradually developing a lasting stake in the emerging economic links. The TAPI will also contribute to a more competitive economic and political environment in Central Asia, providing Ashgabat with more room to maneuver vis-à-vis Russia, the West, China, India and Iran –the players that either have, or plan, a significant presence in Turkmenistan’s energy sector.

AFF – No TAPI Construction – Taliban

Pipeline won’t be build – the Taliban will sabotage it

Ibrahimi and Nasrat ‘06

Sayed Yaqub Ibrahimi and Amanullah Nasrat are journalists, April 17, 2006ll “Afghanistan's New Pipeline Deal May Be Just Another Pipe Dream,” http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/apr2006/2006-04-17-05.asp

This argument does not sway those observers who maintain that the Taleban and the Baluchistan rebels have no interest in improving the situation - quite the reverse, in fact. “The Taleban are now fighting the Afghan government and the insurgents in Baluchistan are fighting the government of Pakistan. These groups will never allow their enemies to reap the benefits of this project,” said Babak. Given the security situation in the southern Afghan provinces, where government convoys come under almost daily attack, Babak describes the proposed pipeline route as “hilarious.” “Building a valuable pipeline through insecure deserts and regions is impossible and absurd,” said political analyst Mohammad Hassan Wolesmal. “Even if it were built, it would be destroyed immediately.”

AFF – No TAPI Construction – Weather/Building Condition

Pipeline impossible – weather and building conditions

Ibrahimov ‘09

Rovshan Ibrahimov, PhD, Ankara University, Institute of Social Sciences, Department of International Relations, October 31, 2009, “Trans-Afghan Pipeline: Will Ambitions Convert into the Reality,” http://www.energyresearches.org/articles/articles/85-articles/186-trans-afghan-pipeline-will-ambitions-convert-into-the-reality.html

In addition to the problems of political nature, there are a number of technical difficulties. In particular, some 400 km pipeline will be held on mountainous terrain that will complicate construction, and subsequent control over the pipeline, especially in the winter seasons. In addition, in Afghanistan could complicate the transportation of pipes because of the lack of a railway that will also lead to costs of works. Still is question about source of financing for the project. None of the known financial institutions will agree to invest capital in such a costly and risky project. But the greatest problem could be that even after the construction of a pipeline from Turkmenistan could simply not have the necessary amount of natural gas for export in this direction. It is not a secret that virtually the entire export gas, which is about 50 billion cubic meters of gas sold by Russia. Moreover, Russia wants to increase imports from Turkmenistan. In addition, Turkmenistan signed a treaty on its gas deliveries to China and Iran, and also promised to export a certain amount of gas in a westerly direction to the European Union. Turkmenistan currently produces 60 billion cubic meters of gas, and if in the short term fails to drastically increase gas production, it will serve as the main reason that the draft would remain on paper.

AFF – NO TAPI Construction – Security/Diplomacy

TAPI project will fail and IPI construction is inevitable – security and diplomatic factors

UPI Energy ‘09

UPI Energy, June 18, 2009, “Progress on TAPI pipeline in doubt,” nexis

Plans for the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India pipeline to move forward seem unlikely because of security and diplomatic concerns. Officials have raised repeated concerns that the security risks for the $7.8 billion TAPI project along the planned route through Afghanistan are far too high, Pakistan's news service, Online International News Network, reports. Meanwhile, Turkmenistan has failed to come forward with audits of its overall gas reserves while a U.S.-backed civilian nuclear energy program in India puts New Delhi's role in doubt. The 1,044-mile TAPI pipeline is seen as a rival to the long-delayed Iran-Pakistan-India natural gas pipeline from the Iranian South Pars gas field. Security of the TAPI route through Afghanistan is an impediment, though in 2008 the Afghan government made several pledges to relieve those concerns. Asim Hussain, a top energy negotiator from Pakistan, had led a delegation to Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, in April to discuss TAPI. Agreements with Iran were reached earlier in the year onIPI, though reports Wednesday said the partners were at odds over feasibility contracts for the pipeline. Pakistan is struggling to overcome a looming energy crisis with either project, though progress on both TAPI and IPI is slow.

AFF – TAPI Bad – Russian Economy

TAPI destroys Russia’s economy

Torbakov ‘01

Igor Torbakov, freelance journalist who specializes in CIS political affairs, holds an MA in History from Moscow State University and a PhD from the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, was a Regional Exchange Scholar at the Kennan Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 12/21/2001, “TALIBAN DEFEAT REVIVES DEBATE ON TRANS-AFGHAN PIPELINE,” Eurasianet, <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav121201.shtml>

The country most likely to suffer from the possible construction of pipelines in Afghanistan is Russia, currently a leading member of the anti-terrorism coalition, and a long-time sponsor of the Northern Alliance. Moscow has long been wary about the development of new Central Asian oil and gas export routes that do not go through Russian territory. There are some indirect signs that the idea of a trans-Afghan gas project is being revived. The United States and Great Britain have recently lifted economic sanctions against Afghanistan. This move, apprehensively notes Moscow economic publication [Rossiiskaya Biznes-Gazeta](http://www.rg.ru/bussines/), "can be the first harbinger of the US companies' intentions to re-join the trans-Afghan gas consortium." In late October, Turkmenistan's president, Saparmurat Niyazov, sent a letter to the UN leaders advocating construction of a pipeline bringing Turkmen gas to Pakistan's Arabian Sea ports across the Afghan territory. Seeking UN support for the project, Niyazov contended that this pipeline "will help rebuild this country [Afghanistan], normalize peaceful life and work of the Afghan people, and also accelerate socio-economic development of the entire adjacent region." Speaking at the newly refurbished Turkmen embassy in Moscow on November 30, Niyazov elaborated on his intentions. "We could sell to foreign markets about 120 billion cubic meters of gas annually, but we can not do this due to the lack of pipelines," he said. Niyazov went on to take a swipe at Russia: In reciting foreign investment statistics for 2001, the Turkmen strongman noted the lack of Russian investment. "Russia is nowhere to be seen not because they do not want to take part, but because they have problems, they themselves are looking for investments," Niyazov said. If the trans-Afghan gas project is realized, Moscow experts say, the Russian economy will face two unpleasant consequences. Firstly, Russian energy sector will lose Turkmen gas that is now being delivered to Russia and, in the long-term perspective, also Uzbek gas. That could amount to 25 billion cubic meters annually. Secondly, if Central Asian gas exports are directed south, across Afghanistan to the Indian Ocean, Russia will lose transit revenue. Russian experts reluctantly acknowledged the existence of a price incentive for Central Asia states to seek alternates to Russian routes. According to Rossiiskaya Biznes-Gazeta, Russia can pay maximum $38 per thousand cubic meters of Turkmen and Uzbek gas. At the same time, the potential importers of Central Asian gas in South Asia have recently confirmed that their minimal price per thousand cubic meters is up to $60, notes the newspaper. Even the most liberal Russian experts are ambiguous about a trans-Afghan pipeline. It "will surely give a substantial boost to the country's [Afghanistan's] development," concedes Alexei Malashenko, a leading Central Asia analyst. "However, in this case Turkmenbashi will gain too much leverage for control over the situation," adds Malashenko. "No one knows how he [Niyazov] might behave". According to Unocal officials, the company doesn't plan to get involved into Afghanistan again and has shifted its resources to other world regions. However, Moscow is suspicious that Unocal "tries to hide its true intentions," according to an editorial in the Russian daily Izvestia. A number of Russian observers tend to interpret the current US troop deployment and basing agreements with the Central Asian nations within the context of energy geopolitics. "The United States does not conceal the plans to establish its [military] bases in the region to secure the safety of energy transit routes," writes the [Kommersant](http://www.kommersant.ru/) daily. Another detail adds to the Kremlin's worries. Zalmay Khalilzad, an Afghan-American academic, recently was appointed in June as special assistant to President George W. Bush and senior director at the National Security Council for the Persian Gulf and southwest Asia and other issues. According to Philip Smith, director of the Center for Public Policy Analysis, "Zalmay is immensely influential in driving US policy toward Afghanistan." Four years ago, Khalilzad served as a liaison for Unocal in the trans-Afghan pipeline project. Moscow is likely to try to thwart the building of what the international oilmen call the "new Silk Road." There are two ways Russia may do this: by increasing its on-the-ground military presence in Afghanistan, and by wooing Niyazov. Russia seems to be already undertaking steps in both these directions. The Kremlin reportedly is offering Niyazov a 10-year deal covering Russian purchases of Turkmen gas and its export to third countries. Moscow analysts say that Russia may also offer Turkmenistan special quotas for deliveries of natural resources through the Russian transit network. In the military sphere, Defense Ministry officials are expanding Russian military participation in Afghanistan. Sources in Russia's defense ministry argue that there is a danger of "military-political vacuum" in Afghanistan that might "create conditions for the breaking of civil war."

AFF – TAPI Bad – Russian Economy

That leads to global nuclear war

David ‘99

Steven David, Professor of Political Science at The Johns Hopkins University, Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb, 1999

If internal war does strike Russia, economic deterioration will be a prime cause. From 1989 to the present, the GDP has fallen by 50 percent. In a society where, ten years ago, unemployment scarcely existed, it reached 9.5 percent in 1997 with many economists declaring the true figure to be much higher. Twenty-two percent of Russians live below the official poverty line (earning less than $ 70 a month). Modern Russia can neither collect taxes (it gathers only half the revenue it is due) nor significantly cut spending. Reformers tout privatization as the country's cure-all, but in a land without well-defined property rights or contract law and where subsidies remain a way of life, the prospects for transition to an American-style capitalist economy look remote at best. As the massive devaluation of the ruble and the current political crisis show, Russia's condition is even worse than most analysts feared. If conditions get worse, even the stoic Russian people will soon run out of patience. A future conflict would quickly draw in Russia's military. In the Soviet days civilian rule kept the powerful armed forces in check. But with the Communist Party out of office, what little civilian control remains relies on an exceedingly fragile foundation -- personal friendships between government leaders and military commanders. Meanwhile, the morale of Russian soldiers has fallen to a dangerous low. Drastic cuts in spending mean inadequate pay, housing, and medical care. A new emphasis on domestic missions has created an ideological split between the old and new guard in the military leadership, increasing the risk that disgruntled generals may enter the political fray and feeding the resentment of soldiers who dislike being used as a national police force. Newly enhanced ties between military units and local authorities pose another danger. Soldiers grow ever more dependent on local governments for housing, food, and wages. Draftees serve closer to home, and new laws have increased local control over the armed forces. Were a conflict to emerge between a regional power and Moscow, it is not at all clear which side the military would support. Divining the military's allegiance is crucial, however, since the structure of the Russian Federation makes it virtually certain that regional conflicts will continue to erupt. Russia's 89 republics, krais, and oblasts grow ever more independent in a system that does little to keep them together. As the central government finds itself unable to force its will beyond Moscow (if even that far), power devolves to the periphery. With the economy collapsing, republics feel less and less incentive to pay taxes to Moscow when they receive so little in return. Three-quarters of them already have their own constitutions, nearly all of which make some claim to sovereignty. Strong ethnic bonds promoted by shortsighted Soviet policies may motivate non-Russians to secede from the Federation. Chechnya's successful revolt against Russian control inspired similar movements for autonomy and independence throughout the country. If these rebellions spread and Moscow responds with force, civil war is likely. Should Russia succumb to internal war, the consequences for the United States and Europe will be severe. A major power like Russia -- even though in decline -- does not suffer civil war quietly or alone. An embattled Russian Federation might provoke opportunistic attacks from enemies such as China. Massive flows of refugees would pour into central and western Europe. Armed struggles in Russia could easily spill into its neighbors. Damage from the fighting, particularly attacks on nuclear plants, would poison the environment of much of Europe and Asia. Within Russia, the consequences would be even worse. Just as the sheer brutality of the last Russian civil war laid the basis for the privations of Soviet communism, a second civil war might produce another horrific regime. Most alarming is the real possibility that the violent disintegration of Russia could lead to loss of control over its nuclear arsenal. No nuclear state has ever fallen victim to civil war, but even without a clear precedent the grim consequences can be foreseen. Russia retains some 20,000 nuclear weapons and the raw material for tens of thousands more, in scores of sites scattered throughout the country. So far, the government has managed to prevent the loss of any weapons or much material. If war erupts, however, Moscow's already weak grip on nuclear sites will slacken, making weapons and supplies available to a wide range of anti-American groups and states. Such dispersal of nuclear weapons represents the greatest physical threat America now faces. And it is hard to think of anything that would increase this threat more than the chaos that would follow a Russian civil war.

AFF – IPI Good – India-Pakistan

The IPI is crucial to solve Indo-Pak relations through economic dependency

Verma ‘07

Shiv Kumar Verma, Political Geography Division, Center for International Politics in New Delhi, “Energy geopolitics and Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline,” Energy Policy, Volume 35, Issue 6, June 2007

As far as the IPI gas pipeline project is concerned, the Indian government is committed to favor this project in the current situation in the aftermath of the Indo-US nuclear deal and the prevailing nuclear scenario in Iran. The impetus is India's long-term energy demand. The Indo-Iran pipeline project has such broad geopolitical ramifications that it would be prefer or favor this project. 1. It would be a financially viable alternative. 2. India and Pakistan will experience the necessary burden of mutual dependency for the first time in decades. Iran will get to develop a stable and secure export market for its natural gas. 3. The IPI pipeline might become the catalyst for a wider network of pipelines crisscrossing the Asian heartland and connecting areas of supply with areas of demand in a manner unmediated by outside influence. 4. The involvement of Pakistan in this project is not a problem. But an opportunity for India because involving Pakistan in a trilateral or even multilateral energy grid is an excellent way of raising the level of economic interactions between the two neighbors who have traditionally been at loggerheads with each other ([Varadarajan, 2006](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6V2W-4MV71RB-2&_user=99318&_coverDate=06%2F30%2F2007&_rdoc=1&_fmt=high&_orig=search&_sort=d&_docanchor=&view=c&_acct=C000007678&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=99318&md5=4177a1e8c992216a8c9432f8c9765d1a" \l "bib45)).

AFF – A2: IPI – No Tradeoff

TAPI won’t tradeoff with the IPI – demand is high enough for both

Chandra ‘09

Amresh Chandra, Ph.D. from School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, India and Research Investigator-cum- District Coordinator, A.N. Sinha Institute of Social Sciences, June 2009, Journal of Peace Studies: “Geopolitics of Central Asian Resources and Indian Interests,” http://www.icpsnet.org/adm/pdf/1251369051.pdf

Doubts on Iranian route have been relatively lessened in recent months. In his South Asian tour [mainly India and Pakistan] US President George Bush okayed the $7.2 billion project linking Iran, Pakistan and India [IPI].14 But Pakistan’s questionable ability to protect the pipeline, as it passes through sensitive Baluchistan , creates doubts in New Delhi. An alternative is being considered by New Delhi in the shape of the Turkmenistan –Afghanistan-Pakistan[TAP] pipeline project, which already has the backing of Asian Development Bank] (ADB)15 and the US. India has reportedly decided to join the $3.5 billion TAP project for fetching gas from Turkmenistan. This will also help unlock gas from Uzbekistan, Kazakistan and Azerbaijan.16 Further TAP is also key ingredient of Washington’s Afghan rehabilitation plan as it will earn substantial transit fee. The economic benefit alone is expected to ensure the safety of the pipeline.17 During his visit to Afghanistan, August 28, 2005 Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said that both pipeline projects needed to be realized in order for New Delhi to achieve the energy security that it seeks. “It is not a question of preferring one [pipeline] over the other,” Singh said during a joint news conference with Afghan President Hamid Karzai. “We need both pipelines. ... India’s needs for commercial energy are increasing at an explosive rate”, he reiterated, 18

AFF – A2: IPI – IPI Inevitable

IPI construction is inevitable – its three times cheaper than TAPI

UNI ‘08

UNI (United News of India), September 6, 2008, “IRAN OFFERS GAS TO INDIA AT MUCH CHEAPER THAN TURKMENISTAN,” nexis

Dubai, Sep 6 (UNI) Iran has offered gas to India at a one-third price than Turkmenistan's offer. Iran's price of gas via Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) pipeline to India would be at a one-third price than of Turkmenistan offer for the gas to be sold to India via Turkmenistan-Afghanistan- Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline, an Iranian News Agency (IRNA) report said. Turkmenistan reportedly wants to charge 400-450 dollars per thousand cubic meters (12.5 dollars per million British thermal unit, MBTU) for the gas from its Dauletabad fields it wants to sell to India through TAPI pipeline. After adding transportation costs and transit fee payable to Afghanistan and Pakistan, the price of imported gas for India through TAPI will be close to 18 dollars per MBTU compared to 5.56 dollars per MBTU for the gas it can import from the rival IPI pipeline. The Iranian Fars News Agency quoting a former Iranian Deputy Oil Minister Mohammad Hadi Nejad Hossenian said Iran was concerned that the agreed price of exported gas to India might be too low and in case of implementation of IPI project Iran would suffer a heavy loss. Gas producers are increasingly base the gas price to the oil price, arguing cleaner energy source, natural gas, should have 16 per cent higher price than the prevailing oil price. He said the price formula agreed between the two countries is two or three times lower than the current international gas price. Turkmenistan has agreed to sell 50 billion meter gas to Iran and Russia and 40 billion to China.

\*\*\*CASE ARGUMENTS\*\*\*

\*\*\*A2: AFGHAN STABILITY ADVANTAGE\*\*\*

1NC – Afghanistan [1/2]

**1. We’re winning the war now**

**Kagan, ’09**

[Fredrick, R**esident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute** ‘‘A Stable Pakistan Needs a Stable Afghanistan”, Wall Street Journal, **September 5th 2009,** <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204731804574386602057103982.html>]

Trying to win in Afghanistan is not a fool's errand, however**. Where coalition forces have conducted properly resourced counterinsurgency operations in areas such as Khowst, Wardak, Lowgar, Konar and Nangarhar Provinces in the eastern part of the country, they have succeeded despite the legendary xenophobia of the Pashtuns.** Poorly designed operations in Helmand Province have not led to success. Badly under-resourced efforts in other southern and western provinces, most notably Kandahar, have also failed. Can well-designed and properly-resourced operations succeed? There are no guarantees in war, but there is good reason to think they can. Given the importance of this theater to the stability of a critical and restive region, that is reason enough to try.

**2. Surge fights off Taliban and provides development**

**Charney, ’10**

[Craig, Charney Research President, “The Surge is working all signs point America’s way,” 2-26-10, <http://www.newsweek.com/2010/02/25/the-surge-is-working.html>]

Even as the Marines' battle for Marja grabs headlines, it's diverting attention from a bigger story. **Though the Taliban is entrenched in Helmand province, where Marja is situated, its grip is slipping in the rest of Afghanistan as President Barack Obama's 30,000-troop surge unfolds. These developments undercut the common belief that America is doomed to fail in a land of fiercely tribal, pro-Taliban Pashtuns who hate infidel invaders.** In fact, Afghanistan's demography, sociology, military situation, and politics all favor Obama's counterinsurgency strategy. **That's why it's working**. **The strategy, devised by** U.S. and NATO commander **Gen. Stanley McChrystal, aims to win over Afghans by protecting them from the Taliban**, **restraining firepower** to limit civilian casualties, and **speeding up development, along with seizing Taliban sanctuaries like Marja.** It has six things going for it. Most Afghans aren't Pashtuns —and most Pashtuns oppose the **Taliban. Three fifths of Afghans are Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazara, and other ethnicities who suffered under Taliban rule and dread its return**. What's more, while most Taliban fighters are Pashtun, **70 percent of Pashtuns dislike the Taliban**. Only one Pashtun in four favors the insurgents. Most Pashtuns desire closer ties with the West. Why? **Polls say they, like other Afghans, mainly want jobs, electricity, and reconstruction—none of which the Taliban offers.**

1NC – Afghanistan [2/2]

**3. New commitments to Afghanistan will alleviate corruptions and stabilize the country.**

**Rupert & Penny, ’10**

[James and Thomas, Staff Writers, “Karzai says Afghanistan May Need Foreign Troops for the Next 15 Years,” January 28th 2010, <http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-01-28/karzai-says-afghanistan-may-need-foreign-troops-for-15-years.html>]

A $500 million plan to entice Taliban fighters to quit the growing insurgency in Afghanistan will form the centerpiece of a conference in London after President **Hamid Karzai warned that international troops may be needed in his country for as many as 15 years. More than 60 foreign ministers are meeting top Afghan officials to approve a political strategy backing the U.S.-led troop surge. The ministers will show support for** **Afghan President Hamid Karzai and resolve to stabilize his country,** while countering falling public support for the war in Europe and the U.S. by offering a timeline for troops to come home. “This conference marks the beginning of the transition process, agreeing the conditions under which we can begin district by district, province by province, transferring the responsibility for security from international forces to Afghan forces,” U.K. Prime Minister Gordon Brown said in a speech today opening the one-day meeting. **Governments at the conference will pledge about $500 million, German Chancellor Angela Merkel said, to provide jobs, homes and farming help for Taliban fighters who return to civilian life.** Alexander Dobrindt, deputy leader of Merkel’s sister party, the Christian Social Union, dubbed the plan a “Taliban cash-for-clunkers” program. **Conference attendees will also renew pressure on Karzai to reduce official corruption that has weakened his government. Karzai,** in an interview with BBC television, **said he’ll present a “new, invigorated” anti-corruption plan. The blueprint will include more deadlines, laws and regulations than previous plans, he said.**

**4. Obama’s Withdrawal Plans leads to Pashtun and Non-Pashtun split – Turns civil war**

**Rasgotra, ’10**

[Maharajakrishna, Indian Diplomat “Indian commentary says US troop exit from Afghanistan to be "historical blunder,” June 12th 2010, Lexis]

**The United States is in the process of committing a historical blunder with grave consequences** for not only Afghanistan but also the regions surrounding it. President Barack Obama's decision to begin withdrawing US troops from Afghanistan in 2011 is understandable: the long and costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have taxed the patience of the Americans, and the President himself must start planning his campaign for the second term. But it is **the manner of the planned exit and its consequences that cause worry. The strategy devised** at the London Conference in January 2010 on Afghanistan -- "reintegration and reconciliation" **-- is a veiled scheme to hand over Afghanistan, once again, to Pakistan.** President Obama's rhetoric on the "Way Forward in AF-PAK" has the same thrust. **The consequences of this dangerous scheme are not hard to foresee: the return of the brutal Taleban rule in Kabul, the resumption of a civil war which will suck in the neighbouring countries; and spread of terrorism and bloodshed farther afield. The end result** will be a virtual **partition of Afghanistan into Pushtoon and non-Pushtoon countries and** the eventual rise of **a larger, independent Pushtoonistan incorporating Pakistan's own Pushtoon lands.** I would not wish that fate for Afghanistan or Pakistan.

2NC – Winning Now [1/2]

**1. The United States is winning the trust of the Afghan people by providing enough security to exist normally and come together**

**Kitson, ’10**

[Nick Kitson, Lieutenant Colonel, “Afghanistan: A war we’re winning,” June 9th 2010, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/afghanistan-a-war-were-winning-1994934.html>]

Of real significance though, and **a sure sign that we and the Afghan Government we support are having effect, is the in-fighting that has begun to boil over amongst our Taliban adversaries**. It seems that the locals may be getting increasingly fed up with the extremism of the external militants loyal to Quetta and out-of-area power brokers. While we continued to fend off our enemy, often with a fierce fight, and targeted them ruthlessly when the appropriate opportunity arose, one of this Battle Group's principal achievements was to take the heat out of the fight. Our soldiers took considerable extra risk upon themselves to move in these small numbers amongst the people, not to overreact when provoked and do their very best to engage with the locals so as to pass the message of what we stand for, what we are trying to achieve and to ask them what they want from the Government. We were told since before we deployed that our mission was about "winning the argument" and we left a situation where the argument is most definitely being had – and it is a socio-political argument not a fighting argument. The most important thing is that, now Sangin has a credible District Governor committed to his people and a better future, the argument is between the people and the Afghan Government. **Our role was simply to provide enough security for them to exist normally and to bring them together.** **Reducing the levels of fighting on the streets of the centre certainly helped that begin to take place. If war is politics by other means** (as Clausewitz tells us) **then we can tentatively take heart that we are now perhaps beginning to move back towards politics.** The Helmand Provincial Governor, Gulab Mangal, visited again in early April and was visibly impressed by what the new District Governor had achieved in his month in office. **Mangal was able to sit down with genuine, respected local elders and remind them of their responsibilities for uniting the people and the tribes to work together for a better future.** This was a far cry from his previous visit in mid-January, where the previous District Governor had that morning press-ganged a few old tramps from the bazaar to come and pretend to be community elders. **The locals beyond the security footprint that we provide in the town** (the District Centre) **are beginning to see what is on offer by way of development, healthcare, education and assistance with agriculture.** **Our struggle for the hearts and minds of the people, on behalf of the Afghan Government, has forever been hampered by a leaderless population of fence-sitters too battered, intimidated, cynical and jaded to trust anyone. Perhaps now the grass is beginning to look decidedly greener on the Government side.**

**2. We can win in Afghanistan – Afghanistan supports a stable government and likes the U.S.**

**McCain, ’09**

[John McCain, Arizona Senator, “The Situation in Afghanistan” <http://www.aei.org/speech/100046>]

I am confident victory is possible in Afghanistan. I know Americans are weary of war. I’m weary of it. But we must win the war in Afghanistan. The alternative is to risk that country’s return to its previous function as a terrorist sanctuary, from which al Qaeda could train and plan attacks against America. Such an outcome would constitute an historic success for the jihadist movement, severely damage American standing and credibility in a region that already doubts our resolve, and threaten the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. A terrorist sanctuary in Afghanistan would encourage and enable al Qaeda and other terrorist groups to destabilize neighboring countries. Broader insecurity in Afghanistan--with the violence, refugee flows, and lawlessness it would engender--could spill beyond its borders to nuclear armed Pakistan or other states in south and central Asia, with the gravest implications for our national security. Afghans reject the Taliban. Just 4 percent of Afghans wish them to rule the country, and they rate the Taliban as by far the most dangerous threat to their nation. Despite the deteriorating conditions, nearly 70 percent continue to say the U.S. invasion and overthrow of the Taliban were a good thing. What the people in Afghanistan want most is not the exit of foreigners, or of coalition troops, but rather the things that a properly configured and resourced strategy would deliver: security, some degree of development, and basic good governance. The problem in Afghanistan today is not innate xenophobia or hostility to the West. It is our own failed policies that are the problem. We have tried to win this war without enough troops, without sufficient economic aid, without effective coordination, and without a clear strategy. The ruinous consequences should come as no surprise. If we change our policies, the situation on the ground will change, too.

2NC – Winning Now [2/2]

**3. Afghans approve of our presence**

[Arnoldy](http://www.csmonitor.com/About/Contact/Staff-Writers/Ben-Arnoldy), ’10

[Ben, “Afghanistan war worsening but optimism is up, says new poll,” January 12th 2010, <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2010/0112/Afghanistan-war-worsening-but-optimism-is-up-says-new-poll>]

It’s morning in Afghanistan, according to a new nationwide poll of Afghan public opinion. But while even some skeptics agree that Afghans may have a more optimistic view of their country than outsiders suppose, analysts with deep experience there are cautious about the sunny picture emerging from the survey released Monday, saying it runs counter to their sense of the mood and the repercussions of the recent fraud-riddled election. **Seventy percent of Afghans say the country is moving in the right direction, up 30 points from one year ago,** according to the poll from ABC News, the BBC, and ARD German TV. **Conducted last month after President Hamid Karzai’s reelection was confirmed, the survey also found his approval up 19 points on the year, to 71 percent. Matthew Warshaw,** managing director of ACSOR Surveys, the firm in Kabul that conducted the poll, **chalked the optimism up to three things: the peaceful resolution of the election controversy, the US deepening its commitment to the country, and more Afghans seeing development in their local area.“I think there was somewhat of an election honeymoon” in December, says Mr. Warshaw, referring to the bump in optimism that usually follows democratic elections in other parts of the world.**

**4. Local trust**

**A. We’re winning now – building relationships with locals**

**Peter, ’10**

[Tom Peter, Foreign Correspondent, “Afghanistan war: Good counterinsurgency, like good politics, is local,” January 27th 2010, <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2010/0127/Afghanistan-war-Good-counterinsurgency-like-good-politics-is-local>]

While it might not be possible to send every unit back to an area where it has already deployed, Vanda Felbab-Brown, **an expert in Afghanistan and counterinsurgency at the Brookings Institution in Washington, says that the goal is to "build a process that enhances and allows for as much continuity of relationships and knowledge as possible.”** According to Ms. Felbab-**Brown, many soldiers complained that it was difficult to make progress when they had to leave after a year, often just as they were starting to benefit from the relationships they'd built**. **The new policy allows units to keep those connections, but without having to endure longer deployments.** Although Attack Company redeployed to Kunar Province several months before McChrystal took the helm in Afghanistan, **their deployment has accomplished many of the goals sought under the new policy.** Some of the soldiers had worked with their counterparts in the Afghan Army during previous rotations. Sfc. Jose N. Urrutia-Castanon of San Diego, Texas, **says he may not always remember specific Afghan soldiers, but both sides remember particular units, and finding out they fought together in the past provides common ground that he says improves relationships.**"It works to our advantage, and it also works great toward influencing the local population. **They see us working together as one**

B. Local Trust means better intelligence and development

**Peter, ’10**

[Tom Peter, Foreign Correspondent, “Afghanistan war: Good counterinsurgency, like good politics, is local,” January 27th 2010, <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2010/0127/Afghanistan-war-Good-counterinsurgency-like-good-politics-is-local>]

It is hoped that, **by gaining locals' trust, soldiers will also be able to gather better intelligence and more effectively stop the Taliban from infiltrating communities.** Most of the relationship-building happens between American officers, who have interpreters, and their Afghan counterparts, while rank-and-file soldiers pull guard duty outside the meeting. Still, these lower-ranked enlisted soldiers often remember the area where they served, adding to the institutional memory. **Sgt. Harry Griffith** of Pittsburgh says **he doesn't remember any locals but does recall many of the villages and is surprised to see how much they've developed since he left. In several towns, he says, he's noticed new shops and restaurants, and the completion of a US-funded road."It's really cool to see because that's what we're here for [to develop the country], that was a huge motivator to help the people out," he says.**

2NC – Presence K2 Stability [1/2]

**1. New commitments to Afghanistan will alleviate corruptions and stabilize the country**

**Rupert & Penny, ’10**

[James and Thomas, Staff Writers for Business Weeks “Karzai says Afghanistan May Need Foreign Troops for the Next 15 Years,” January 28th 2010, <http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-01-28/karzai-says-afghanistan-may-need-foreign-troops-for-15-years.html>]

A $500 million plan to entice Taliban fighters to quit the growing insurgency in Afghanistan will form the centerpiece of a conference in London after President **Hamid Karzai warned that international troops may be needed in his country for as many as 15 years. More than 60 foreign ministers are meeting top Afghan officials to approve a political strategy backing the U.S.-led troop surge. The ministers will show support for** **Afghan President Hamid Karzai and resolve to stabilize his country,** while countering falling public support for the war in Europe and the U.S. by offering a timeline for troops to come home. “This conference marks the beginning of the transition process, agreeing the conditions under which we can begin district by district, province by province, transferring the responsibility for security from international forces to Afghan forces,” U.K. Prime Minister Gordon Brown said in a speech today opening the one-day meeting. **Governments at the conference will pledge about $500 million, German Chancellor Angela Merkel said, to provide jobs, homes and farming help for Taliban fighters who return to civilian life.** Alexander Dobrindt, deputy leader of Merkel’s sister party, the Christian Social Union, dubbed the plan a “Taliban cash-for-clunkers” program. **Conference attendees will also renew pressure on Karzai to reduce official corruption that has weakened his government. Karzai,** in an interview with BBC television, **said he’ll present a “new, invigorated” anti-corruption plan. The blueprint will include more deadlines, laws and regulations than previous plans, he said.**

**2. U.S. and International presence key to stability**

**Krishna, ’10**

[Somanahalli, Indian Prime Minister for External Affairs, “Longer international presence needed in Afghanistan,” July 22nd 2010, <http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report_longer-international-presence-needed-in-afghanistan-sm-krishna_1413123>]

With the **US having announced that it will begin pulling out its troops from Afghanistan from July 2011, India on Thursday said that "international presence" in the war-torn country was needed for a much longer time.** Just back from Kabul after attending an international conference on Afghanistan, External Affairs Minister S M Krishna said that he shared President Hamid Karzai's enthusiasm for Afghan forces to take over security of the entire country from 2014. "He is very enthusiastic and I am very happy about it. He is also confident that he will be able to raise his own security force," said Krishna, who had discussions with Karzai and US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in the Afghan capital. Asked if India was willing to help in raising the security forces necessary for the task, the minister replied, "Well, if Afghanistan asks India shall help. We have been helping Afghanistan in our own way. It depends on what kind of help they seek and what kind of help we can render." **Responding to a question as to whether the US decision to commence troops pull out in a year was premature, Krishna said, "I feel that international presence is needed in Afghanistan for a much longer time than it has now now been projected. We hope that international presence will act as some kind of insulation to Afghanistan for normalisation."** Asked whether India would like the US to take a fresh look at its decision, the minister said that New Delhi had conveyed its views to the US and to Afghanistan in bilateral meetings. To a question on Pakistan's efforts to play the power broker in Afghanistan, Krishna said that India had emphasised that initiative for future set up in the country had to be "Afghan-led and Afghan-owned". Asked whether there was a shift in India's stand on good Taliban and bad Taliban, he said, "Well, we cannot wish away Taliban. Who are Taliban--they are all citizens of Afghanistan. "There is a realisation among individual members of Taliban that their movement is not not going to be helpful to Afghanistan and that they should reconsider their association with Taliban. Then I think they should go back to the

2NC – Presence K2 Stability [2/2]

**3. We must follow the Iraqi model to leave a stable Afghanistan - rapid withdrawal will only lead to instability**

**Washington Times, ’10**

[Washington Times, “Winning the war in Afghanistan,” <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/jul/19/winning-in-afghanistan-786391921/>]

Afghanistan has 34 provinces comprising 397 districts. Some are very secure, others decidedly not. In that respect, Afghanistan is in a similar situation to Iraq's in 2007. **A province-by-province approach to** [**Afghanistan**](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/afghanistan/) **- starting with the most secure areas and handing off responsibility for the defense of the area to the Afghan government** - **could build the same kind of momentum it did in Iraq. It also could** help **rebuild support with the American public for the war effort similar to the surge in Iraq.** Such a strategy will make progress in the war more comprehensible to the American people and build a more solid political foundation in the country. This is critical because, as in the case of Vietnam, the enemy cannot defeat U.S. forces on the battlefield but may be able to create domestic political conditions that will make it difficult if not impossible to sustain the war effort .**Handing over all the security responsibilities to the Afghan government is a reasonable measure of success in the war, so this approach lays out a road map to victory.** It's important that the United States comes out of its longest war with a check in the win column.

\*\*\*WITHDRAW TIMELINE GOOD\*\*\*

1NC – Withdrawal Timeline Good [1/2]

**1. Turn – Premature withdrawal causes Al-Qaida triggered Indo-Pak nuclear war**

**Landay, ’10**

[Jonathan Landay, National Security and Intelligence Correspondent, McClathy Newspaper, “Britain Warns Against ‘premature’ Afghanistan withdrawal,” 6-30-10, <http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/06/30/96836/britain-warns-against-premature.html>]

In his speech Wednesday, Fox warned that withdrawing international forces "prematurely" would allow al Qaida to return to use Afghanistan as a sanctuary from which to attack, and could lead to new conflict among the country's ethnic groups. The instability could infect neighboring nuclear-armed Pakistan "with potentially unthinkable regional, and possibly nuclear, consequences," Fox continued, referring to the possibility of extremists obtaining a nuclear warhead. With the Taliban-led insurgency expanding and Afghan the war becoming bloodier and increasingly unpopular along their publics, the U.S. and British governments and other nations that are contributing to the U.S.-led military coalition are under growing pressure to pull out of the country. Fox also laid out a long-term strategic goal that seemed to go beyond stated U.S. policy in Afghanistan. The goal, he said, is to reverse "the momentum of the Taliban-led insurgency" and reduce the threat "to a level that allows the Afghan government to manage it themselves." Fox said, however, that the allies also must create "a stable and capable enough system of security and governance so the Afghan government can provide internal security on an enduring basis."

**2. Continued Afghan stability rests on ANSF forces**

**CSIS, ’09**

[Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Afghan National Security Forces: Shaping the Path to Victory,” July 27th 2009, <http://www.afghanconflictmonitor.org/2009/07/the-ansf-is-vital-to-natoisaf-success.html>]

**Military action is only a part of the strategy needed to win in Afghanistan, but no other effort towards victory will matter if the Afghan people cannot be given enough security and stability to allow successful governance, the opportunity for development, and an established civil society and rule of law that meets Afghan needs and expectations.** NATO/ISAF and US **forces cannot win this kind of** military **victory on their own. Their success will be determined in large part by how well and how quickly they build up a much larger and more effective Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) first** to support NATO/ISAF efforts, then take the lead, and eventually replace NATO/ISAF and US forces. **No meaningful form of success can occur without giving the development of ANSF forces a much higher priority.** The US and other NATO/ISAF nations need to act immediately begin to support and resource NTM-A/ CSTC-A plans to accelerate current ANSF force expansion plans.

**3. Training ASNF forces will not happen quickly; we must overcome eight years of critical failure**

**CSIS, ’09**

[Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Afghan National Security Forces: Shaping the Path to Victory,” July 27th 2009, <http://www.afghanconflictmonitor.org/2009/07/the-ansf-is-vital-to-natoisaf-success.html>]

President Obama‘s new strategy for Afghanistan is critically dependent upon the transfer of responsibility for Afghan security to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). His speech announcing this strategy called for the transfer to begin in mid-2011. However, creating the Afghan forces needed to bring security and stability is a far more difficult challenge than many realize, and poses major challenges that will endure long after 2011. A successful effort to create effective Afghan forces, particularly forces that can largely replace the role of US and allied forces, must overcome a legacy of more than eight years of critical failures in both force development and training, and in the broader course of the US effort in Afghanistan. Such an effort must also be shaped as part of an integrated civil-military effort, and not treated simply as an exercise in generating more Afghan military and police forces. Success will be equally dependent on strategic patience. There is a significant probability that the ANSF will not be ready for any significant transfer of responsibility until well after 2011. Trying to expand Afghan forces too quickly, creating forces with inadequate force quality, and decoupling Afghan force development from efforts to deal with the broad weakness in Afghan governance and the Afghan justice system, will lose the war. America‘s politicians, policymakers, and military leaders must accept this reality—and persuade the Afghan government and our allies to act accordingly—or the mission in Afghanistan cannot succeed.

1NC – Withdrawal Timeline Good [2/2]

**4. Obama refuses to deviate from the current withdrawal timeline**

**MacGreal & Boone, ’10**

[Chris MacGreal, Former BBC journalist, Washington Correspondent, Jon Boone, Kabul correspondent, “Barrack Obama rejects calls to drop deadline for Afghanistan troop exit,” June 24th 2010, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jun/24/us-troop-withdrawal-afghanistan-strategy>]

Barack Obama today rejected calls to abandon his Afghan war strategy and either offer an open-ended commitment to US troops fighting there or start withdrawing immediately, after his dismissal of the US and Nato commander in Kabul, General Stanley McChrystal. Leading Republican politicians and the former American secretary of state Henry Kissinger have called on the president to drop a July 2011 deadline to begin withdrawing US troops, saying that it undermines the effort to defeat the Taliban. Voices on the Democratic party's left want withdrawal to begin immediately, saying the war cannot be won. But today, Obama said he intended to stick with the strategy and timetable agreed last year, while indicating that US troops could remain in Afghanistan in significant numbers well after the withdrawal is due to start next summer. "We did not say, starting in July 2011, suddenly there will be no troops from the United States or allied countries in Afghanistan," Obama said at a press conference with the Russian president, Dmitry Medvedev, who sidestepped a question about whether, in light of the Soviet Union's defeat in Afghanistan, a foreign army can expect to win a war in Afghanistan. "We didn't say we'd be switching off the lights and closing the door behind us. We said we'd begin a transition phase that would allow the Afghan government to take more and more responsibility." Obama added that part of the strategy would include a reassessment at the end of this year. "In December of this year, a year after the strategy has been put in place, at a time when the additional troops have been in place and have begun implementing the strategy, then we'll conduct a review and make an assessment. Is the strategy working? Is it working in part? Are there other aspects of it that aren't working?" he said.

2NC – Terrorism Turn

1. Timely U.S. withdrawal promotes peace talks among insurgent groups

Reuters, ’10

[“Afghan rebels say Obama timeline prompts peace offer,” 3/24/2010, <http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/SGE62N0C0.htm>]

One of Afghanistan's main insurgent groups is ready to make peace and act as a "bridge" to the Taliban, if Washington fulfils plans to start pulling out troops next year, a negotiator for the group said on Wednesday. The remarks from a representative of Hezb-i-Islami, were the first time insurgents have suggested they could be satisfied by a timetable unveiled by President Barack Obama in December. Afghan President Hamid Karzai acknowledged this week that he had met a delegation from Hezb-i-Islami, his first direct contact with one of the three main factions fighting against his government and foreign troops. In a wide-ranging interview at a Kabul hotel, Hezb-i-Islami negotiator Mohammad Daoud Abedi told Reuters the decision to present a peace plan was taken as a direct response to a speech by Obama in December, when the U.S. president pledged 30,000 extra troops but announced a mid-2011 target to start a pull-out. "There is a formula: 'no enemy is an enemy forever, no friend is a friend forever,'" Abedi said. "If that's what the international community with the leadership of the United States of America is planning -- to leave -- we better make the situation honourable enough for them to leave with honour." alks between Hezb-i-Islami and Karzai appear to be at a preliminary stage, but the public acknowledgement of the meeting is a major milestone. The group has presented a 15-point plan, including a demand that foreign troops begin withdrawing in July this year and pull-out completely within six months.Abedi stressed that the timetable in the plan was flexible, and indicated the rebels could be satisfied with Obama's target of mid-2011 to start withdrawing -- provided preparations for the pullout began sooner to demonstrate Washington was sincere. "First of all, this is not written in stone and it's not the verse of the Koran, not to be changed. This is a starting point," he said of the group's demand for withdrawal this year. "If we agree on this departure date: OK, the U.S. will leave. Give us a timeframe. They have said 18 months," he said. "So if we come to an agreement, and preparations are actually taking place ... that is considered a positive step. That is considered that the U.S. really means withdrawal. Because right now, there is a problem of trust between both sides."`

2. Current timetable prevents violent extremists from waiting out the clock

Talk Radio News, ’09

[“Defense Secretary Gates Defends Afghanistan Withdrawal Timetable,’ 12/3/2009, <http://www.talkradionews.com/news/2009/12/2/defense-secretary-gates-defends-afghanistan-withdrawal-timet.html>]

Senior Obama administration officials Wednesday defended the recently announced withdrawal timetable for Afghanistan in an appearance before the Senate Armed Services Committee. According to Defense Secretary Robert Gates, the timetable, which aims to begin removing U.S. troops by July of 2011, will not create a situation through which violent extremists can simply wait out the clock. “We certainly would welcome them not being active for the next 18 months,” said Gates. “We are already in a situation in which they are emboldened ... and where they have the momentum right now. It’s not clear to me what more they can do than they can’t do right now.” Gates added that the July date holds additional significance since it will mark two years since 12,000 U.S. troops were sent to Helmand this Summer. While Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Michael Mullen stated that the withdrawal date was carefully considered, he did signal that it is not necessarily written in stone. “By Mid-2011 we will know if we are going to succeed here or not,” said Mullen. “[The president said Withdrawal] would be responsible and it would be based on conditions. All of us can speculate on what those conditions will be, but I think we have to be careful about that.” President Barack Obama announced the withdrawal timetable Tuesday evening coupled with a pledge to send 30,000 more U.S. troops.

2NC – Economy Turn

Timeline ensures the U.S. economy won’t collapse

Schlesinger, ’10

[Steven Schlesinger, Author and Fellow at the Century Foundation, “The Afghan Withdrawal Date is Smart Policy,” 3/13/2010, [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/stephen-schlesinger/the-afghan-withdrawal-dat\_b\_497896.html#](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/stephen-schlesinger/the-afghan-withdrawal-dat_b_497896.html)]

But why should he have set a deadline at all? For the simple reason that, if you don't insist on a deadline, the President of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai, will do little to reform his government, end corruption, and assume defense of his own country. As the current U.S. envoy to Afghanistan, Karl Eikenberry, wrote in a confidential cable to Washington last November, "Karzai continues to shun responsibility for any sovereign burden, whether defense, governance or development. He and much of his circle do not want the US to leave and are only too happy to see us invest further. **They assume we covet their territory for a never-ending 'war on terror' and for military bases to use against surrounding powers.**" Or, as British Afghan expert Rory Stewart, writing in the January 2010 issue of the New York Review of Books, saw it: "**As long as the U.S. asserted that Afghanistan was an existentialist threat**, the front line in the war on terror, and that, therefore, failure was not an option, **the U.S. had no leverage over Karzai." Thus President Obama, to exert pressure on Karzai to end his reliance on America, had to establish a clear finish date by which time Karzai had to take fuller responsibility over his own nation's fate.** Yes, as Obama said, we are still intent on tracking down and defeating al-Qaeda worldwide, but in Afghanistan we can, at best, contain Kabul's greatest peril--the Taliban--and "deny it the ability to overthrow the government." But, Obama was saying, we don't have the resources to do more. **And there is another reason for Obama's decision to set a deadline**--namely **our** dire **economic situation at home**. As Obama explained in his address: "As President, I refuse to set goals that go beyond our responsibility, our means, or our interests. And I must weigh all of the challenges that our nation faces. I don't have the luxury of committing to just one. ... **We've failed to appreciate the connection between our national security and our economy. ... So we can't simply afford to ignore the price of these wars.** ... **That's why our troop commitment in Afghanistan cannot be open-ended**--because the nation that I'm most interested in building is our own." Indeed, by the deadline of July 2011, the U.S. will have lost hundreds more American lives as well as spent billions more U.S. tax dollars in Afghanistan--and that's clearly as much as the American populace, by Obama's judgment, is willing to put up with after ten years. **Obama's decision in setting a completion timeline**, in short, **is the result of a hard-nosed and realistic assessment by an experienced political leader of his own nation's capacity to endure further continuation of wartime obligations.** In short, just as O**bama was being realistic about the need to compel Karzai to take on the governance of his own his country, Obama was also being realistic about the limited willingness of our own citizenry to support the Afghans as opposed to deal with the needs of our country at home.** Obama was acting as the leader of a great nation who must calibrate his country's national interests in a balanced and proportionate way.

2NC – Stability Turn [1/3]

1. The current timeline is good – only way to ensure Afghanistan stability

Farrell, ’10

[John A. Farrell, Staff writer for U.S. News & World Reports, “In Afghanistan, a Troop Withdrawal Deadline Is Good Policy,” June 25th 2010, <http://politics.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/john-farrell/2010/6/25/In-Afghanistan-a-Troop-Withdrawal-Deadline-Is-Good-Policy.html>]

I don't buy it. Take it from a newspaperman. The great thing about deadlines is--they compel action. The future of Iraq, and [Afghanistan](http://politics.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/john-farrell/2010/6/25/In-Afghanistan-a-Troop-Withdrawal-Deadline-Is-Good-Policy.html), lies in a political solution. We can stay forever, and let them kill us, or we can leave, and let them kill each other. But we cannot make rival tribes and sects and gangs stop killing until they decide to do so. What we are really seeking is the best way to improve our leverage. Now put yourself in the sandals of an Iraqi sheik, or an Afghan warlord, or President Hamid Karzai. Under the umbrella of a Western occupation, you can blame all problems on the occupiers, keep your own folks in a frenzy, settle old blood-scores and grudges, and make millions of dollars in corrupt dealings. If the occupiers vow to stay forever, you have no incentive to settle things. War is great business. But what if you know the Western troops are leaving? And that, in not too many months, you'll be staring at the gun barrels of the well-armed troops of your foes. This scenario gives you two immediate needs: to whip your own act into shape, and to make those tough political deals, even with age-old enemies, that will give you a chance to survive. What else does a deadline accomplish? A deadline will likely give the Karzai government more credibility as it seeks to begin serious negotiations with the Taliban, perhaps along the lines of a coalition government a la Nepal, especially if Obama's surge manages to blunt the Taliban offensive and convince the insurgents that their cause is futile. Karzai, indeed, is already making overtures to the Taliban, possibly as a result of the Obama deadline. And, as the Taliban is a local Pashtun group, not a global Islamic extremist movement or al-Qaeda itself, there may be grounds for both parties to work out a deal as Karzai, too, is a fellow Pashtun. The Taliban have insisted all along that they won't start talks with Karzai until the U.S. sets a date for withdrawal. This means that even if Karzai makes no progress with the Taliban, the Obama deadline at least meets the foe's condition and will test the Taliban's readiness to abide by it. And a settlement with the Taliban could well mean the end of al-Qaeda, since many in the Taliban cannot forgive al-Qaeda for its 9/11 attacks on the U.S., which led to the Taliban's defeat in 2001. In any event, most of al-Qaeda's band have already fled to Pakistan or Yemen.

**2. Rapid withdrawal from Afghanistan would be disastrous for Afghan security forces**

**Shulman, ’09**

[Daniel Shulman, News Editor, written for the Boston Globe and the Village Voice, 11/30/2009, “Karzai said what,” <http://motherjones.com/politics/2009/11/karzai-contractor-ban-obama-afghanistan>]

During his recent inaugural address, Afghanistan's embattled president Hamid Karzai dropped a major bombshell. "Within the next two years," he declared, his administration intends to phase out "operations by all private national and international security firms" and transfer their duties to "Afghan security entities." Coming in a speech full of bold promises, from a vow to crack down on the corruption that pervades his government to a five-year time frame for a handover of security to Afghan forces, this news was largely lost in the resulting media coverage. State Department and Pentagon spokesmen contacted by Mother Jones seemed surprised to learn that Karzai had made such an "eyebrow raising" announcement, as one put it. After all, if Karzai follows through on this pledge, it has the potential to undermine the Obama administration's new Afghanistan strategy. On Tuesday evening the president is expected to announce that he's deploying as many as 35,000 additional troops to address Afghanistan's rapidly deteriorating security situation. Though Obama has had tough words for contractors in the past, once declaring that "we cannot win a fight for hearts and minds when we outsource critical missions to unaccountable contractors," any troop influx will likely require an increase in security contractors to guard bases and convoys, among other things. Last February, Defense Secretary Robert Gates described the use of armed contractors as "vital to supporting the forward-operating bases in certain parts of the country." "There's going to have to be an accompanying increase in private security for all the activities of the new soldiers going in," says Jake Sherman, a former United Nations official in Afghanistan who is now the associate director for Peacekeeping and Security Sector Reform at New York University's Center for International Cooperation. "To hear Karzai talk about ramping down and abolishing private security in two years at a time when we're awaiting a decision on the ramping up of international forces seems highly inconsistent." He adds, "It's ludicrous. It's completely implausible."

2NC – Stability Turn [2/3]

3. Obama’s time table good – Promotes stronger effort in the Afghan government and training of Afghan counter-insurgency forces

Whickham, ’10

[John Whickham, Former United States Army Chief of Staff, **7/7**/2010 “Obama’s Timetable for Afghanistan makes Sense, <http://azstarnet.com/news/opinion/article_dc631003-365d-590d-a5ee-c0c9bac5e54a.html>]

President Obama plans to begin withdrawing U.S. combat forces from Afghanistan in the summer of 2011 and to turn over major responsibility for counterinsurgency operations to Afghan forces. Gen. David Petraeus, the newly appointed combat commander, as well as the U.S. defense chain of command, fully supports this plan though virtually all officials note that the timetable is not an exit but rather initiation of process for engaging Afghan forces more extensively in counter insurgency operations. This plan envisages U.S. involvement in assisting Afghanistan for many years, so we would not be abandoning the operation, nor should we do so given the vital importance of assuring that terrorists do not gain another foothold for training potential attackers of the U.S., and to destabilize neighboring Pakistan with its large arsenal of nuclear weapons. In my view this withdrawal timetable is sensible for at least two reasons. • First, the timetable forces the Afghan government to accelerate efforts, which remain woefully lacking, for improving governance, curtailing endemic corruption and fielding Afghan army forces and national police forces. Without a date, less Afghan incentive exists to achieve results. We have experienced this unfortunate reality in Vietnam, in Iraq and during the past 10 years in Afghanistan. Moreover, the Russians discovered this reality too late during their 10-year debacle in Afghanistan. • Second, the timetable forces U.S. military and coalition troops to accelerate Afghan training and counterinsurgency efforts. Again, without a date the mañana tendency will persist to our mutual disadvantage despite ongoing herculean efforts by U.S. as well as coalition forces to recruit and train Afghan army troops and police. Some critics of the timetable argue that it gives comfort to the enemy, who will wait us out and reappear in force after we leave. While some truth exists in this criticism, clearly the U.S. will retain considerable leverage over events in Afghanistan for many years to come. The leverage will exist in the long-term presence of military and civilian advisers, and economic as well as military assistance to the Afghan government and its security forces. A historical example of leverage may be instructive. During the last year of U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, when the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese clearly knew that the U.S. was leaving, negotiations on prisoner release broke down. As senior negotiator in Saigon, I faced Viet Cong and North Vietnamese military negotiators who brusquely refused to agree to terms for release of all prisoners. But fortunately, we still retained some leverage because at the same time we had begun, at North Vietnamese request, the clearance of anti-ship mines in the Haiphong harbor near Hanoi. When the communist negotiators walked out of the meeting, I directed that all mine clearance operations cease. Within hours, the communist negotiators reappeared to tell me that they would agree to all the conditions for total prisoner release if we would resume clearance of the mines. Although the example is not entirely analogous to what might occur in Afghanistan with the U.S. withdrawal timetable, it does illustrate that we can still influence future events in positive ways. In conclusion, the Obama administration's plan to start withdrawal of U.S. combat troops in summer of 2011 and turn over major counterinsurgency operations to Afghan forces makes sense in terms of our own national security interests and for practical and Afghan cultural reasons.

2NC – Stability Turn [3/3]

**4. Withdrawal timeline key to fight corruption in the Afghani government**

King, ’10

[Laura King, GW James Clark Welling Presidential Fellow, Foreign Correspondent in Afghanistan, 7/20/2010, “Western

forces agree on potential withdrawal timeline for Afghanistan,” <http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-0721-afghan-conference-20100721,0,5959046.story>]

"I remain determined that our Afghan national security forces will be responsible for all military and law enforcement operations throughout our country by 2014," Karzai told the delegates, including Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and dozens of foreign ministers and other dignitaries. Conference participants also endorsed plans to channel at least half of the $13 billion in annual international aid through Afghan government channels. Currently, only one-fifth of such assistance is funneled through Afghan ministries. In return, Karzai promised to fight corruption through such means as requiring government officials to declare their assets, and the strengthening of a task force meant to crack down on graft. Events elsewhere in Afghanistan on Tuesday brought a troubling reminder of the profound obstacles to turning the Afghan military into a professional, dependable fighting force. An Afghan military trainer at a firing range in northern Afghanistan turned his weapon on two U.S. civilian counterparts, killing them both before being fatally shot himself, Western military officials said. A second Afghan soldier was also killed in the exchange of fire and a Western service member wounded, the NATO force said, adding that the incident was under investigation. The endorsement of Karzai's security timeline by the Kabul conference was not binding, but it addressed a growing desire on the part of NATO allies to have some kind of pullback plan in place. All the major troop-contributing nations in the Afghan conflict were represented at the meeting. Karzai had put forth the goal of a security handover by 2014 last November, as he was inaugurated for a second presidential term. Since then, though, the sense of urgency surrounding an exit strategy for the West has increased dramatically.

2NC – A2: ASNF Ready

**Training ASNF forces will not happen quickly; We must overcome eight years of critical failure**

**CSIS, ’09**

[Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Afghan National Security Forces: Shaping the Path to Victory,” July 27th 2009, <http://www.afghanconflictmonitor.org/2009/07/the-ansf-is-vital-to-natoisaf-success.html>]

President Obama‘s new strategy for Afghanistan is critically dependent upon the transfer of responsibility for Afghan security to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). His speech announcing this strategy called for the transfer to begin in mid-2011. However, creating the Afghan forces needed to bring security and stability is a far more difficult challenge than many realize, and poses major challenges that will endure long after 2011. A successful effort to create effective Afghan forces, particularly forces that can largely replace the role of US and allied forces, must overcome a legacy of more than eight years of critical failures in both force development and training, and in the broader course of the US effort in Afghanistan. Such an effort must also be shaped as part of an integrated civil-military effort, and not treated simply as an exercise in generating more Afghan military and police forces. Success will be equally dependent on strategic patience. There is a significant probability that the ANSF will not be ready for any significant transfer of responsibility until well after 2011. Trying to expand Afghan forces too quickly, creating forces with inadequate force quality, and decoupling Afghan force development from efforts to deal with the broad weakness in Afghan governance and the Afghan justice system, will lose the war. America‘s politicians, policymakers, and military leaders must accept this reality—and persuade the Afghan government and our allies to act accordingly—or the mission in Afghanistan cannot succeed.

**The ANSF will be ready by the 2014 deadline**

**Nelson, ’10**

[Dean Nelson, Telegraph Media groups South Asian Editor, 7/20/2010, “Can Afghanistan take control by 2014,” http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/7900689/QandA-Can-Afghanistan-take-control-by-2014.html, 7/22/2010]

Why has the Kabul conference been described as 'historic'? It marks a significant moment in the process of 'Afghanisation' and the timeline towards Afghans taking full responsibility for their own security and economic development. The clock is now ticking towards Western withdrawal and an Afghan- led country by 2014. Related Articles Karzai calls for Nato troop withdrawal by 2014 Rogue Afghan soldier shoots dead US trainers Why do we support Afghanisation when Mr Karzai's government has presided over chronic corruption and the theft of billions of pounds in aid? The increase in British and American casualties has increased pressure for a deadline for withdrawal, but we cannot pull out without a strong, credible pro-Western government in Kabul. President Karzai is still seen as the only option, so he will be given aid money directly and support to develop his security forces in the hope he will grow strong enough to negotiate a settlement with the insurgency. How likely is that? Diplomats in Kabul say they have been impressed with the Afghan National Army. It is now playing an equal role with American forces in their operations in Kandahar, but serious doubts remain about the prospects for the Afghan police force which is non-existent in parts of the country. The Karzai regime's poor record of governance is the key reason for popular dissatisfaction, but diplomats say 'there is no Plan B'. They will monitor spending on health and education and make payments conditional upon progress.

2NC – A2: Petraeus Doesn’t Support Deadline

**1. Petraeus supports Afghan withdrawal date**

**CNN Wire Staff, ’10**

[CNN, “Petraeus backs July 2011 Afghan withdrawal date,” 6/24/2010, <http://www.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/06/24/petraeus.afghanistan/index.html>]

Gen. David Petraeus told CNN on Thursday that he supports President Barack Obama's July 2011 deadline to start withdrawing U.S. troops from Afghanistan, a key point of contention between the president and many of his Republican critics in Congress. Petraeus -- tapped to replace Gen. Stanley McChrystal as the U.S. commander in Afghanistan -- expressed his respect and appreciation for McChrystal's work and said the circumstances surrounding the change in command are "sad." Obama relieved McChrystal of his duties Wednesday after the general and his staff were quoted in a Rolling Stone magazine article making comments that appear to mock top administration officials. Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Joint Chiefs Chairman Adm. Mike Mullen endorsed Obama's decision during a Pentagon news conference Thursday. Mullen said he was nearly physically "sick" when he read the Rolling Stone story. The comments in the article constituted an unacceptable challenge to civilian authority, the men said. "We do not have the right, nor should we ever assume the prerogative to cast doubt upon the ability or mock the motives of our civilian leaders, elected or appointed," Mullen said. "We are and must remain a neutral instrument of the state." Petraeus' remarks to CNN's Dana Bash and Ted Barrett were his first public comments since being chosen as the new U.S. military chief for the Afghan conflict. The Senate Armed Services Committee is set to begin his confirmation hearings Tuesday morning. "I support the president's policy, and I will also provide the best professional military advice as we conduct assessments," Petraeus said. The general said it's a privilege to serve. "It's obviously a hugely important mission," he said.

**2. Petraeus supports July 2011 timeline**

**Tiron, ’09**

[Roxana Tiron, The Hill defense and security reporter, was assistant editor for National Defense Magazine, 12/15/2009, “Petraeus supports July 2011 deadline,” <http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/106169-petraeus-supports-2011-troop-withdrawal-urges-congress-to-pass-war-funding>]

Gen. David Petraeus on Tuesday reiterated his support for President Barack Obama’s plan to start withdrawing U.S. troops from Afghanistan in July 2011. The general, the president’s new choice to lead U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, made his remarks during his confirmation hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee. The panel, on a voice vote, agreed to favorably report Petraeus’s nomination to the full Senate. Petraeus is expected to be confirmed by the Senate as early as Wednesday, according to a Senate leadership aide. Petraeus said the pace of the U.S. drawdown and the transition to Afghan responsibility will be based on conditions on the ground. July 2011 will mark the beginning of a process rather than “the date when the U.S. heads for the exits and turns out the lights,” Petraeus assured committee members. He also warned that the United States will need to provide assistance to Afghanistan “for a long time to come,” as it will be several years before the Afghan military and police will be able to secure the country by themselves. Petraeus noted that, by and large, Afghans are good fighters. The general has been consistent in his support for the July 2011 timeline. When testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee two weeks ago, Petraeus faced some intense grilling, particularly regarding the withdrawal date. At the time, Petraeus, who testified as the head of Central Command, emphasized that Obama sought to convey two messages with the July 2011 timeline: one of an “enormous additional commitment” of troops and other resources and one “for urgency.” Petraeus created suspense when he paused for what seemed a fairly long time after panel Chairman Carl Levin (D-Mich.) asked him whether his statement of continued support for the withdrawal date represented his best “personal” and “professional judgment.”

\*\*\*SURGE GOOD\*\*\*

Surge Good – Generic

Turn: Withdraw leads to a resurgent Taliban – spills over to Pakistan and causes governmental collapse, civil war, humanitarian crisis, and refugee exodus

Phillips ‘09

James Phillips, December 2, Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation. <http://www.aolnews.com/nation/article/opinion-obama-risks-failure-in-afghanistan-by-not-sending-more/19262353>

This downsizing of urgently requested troop reinforcements could lead to a dangerous and tragic outcome. If Obama retreats to a "McChrystal Light" option that shortchanges his own hand-picked commander, it will greatly increase the risk of failure, not only in Afghanistan but in the struggle against Islamist radicals in neighboring Pakistan. It could result in a downward spiral of security in Afghanistan: a resurgent Taliban, eventual collapse of the Afghan government, an even bloodier civil war, renewed humanitarian crisis and a refugee exodus. Moreover, the Taliban will bring back not just their ally al-Qaida, but a rogues' gallery of almost every major Islamist insurgent movement in the world today. Resorting to half-measures would be courting disaster. Like it or not, Obama is a wartime president who must make timely decisions on difficult issues, sometimes with no guarantee of success. The United States needs a decisive commander in chief, not a professorial hair-splitter trying to transcend the differences of opinion of his staff. The basic concept of the McChrystal strategy is sound. U.S. troops must increase the focus on protecting Afghan civilians to reduce the space in which the Taliban can operate freely. **A major part of this** effort **must be a "civilian surge" to help build the capacity of the Afghans to govern, fight corruption, restore the rule of law and revitalize the Afghan economy**. **But security must come first**. There must be additional American "boots on the ground" to defend civilians -- and the sooner, the better.

Turn: Without an Afghanistan Surge, security will deteriorate, ending in instability.

Downey et al. ‘08

Lieutenant Colonel Robert A. Downey, Lieutenant Colonel Lee K. Grubbs, Commander Brian J. Malloy and Lieutenant Colonel Craig R. Wonson, Lieutenant Colonel Robert A. Downey, USAF. Lt Col Downey is currently assigned to USTRANSCOM where he serves as the J5/4-SC Branch Chief for Distribution Process Owner Change Management and Joint Logistician Professional Development. He was commissioned through the United States Air Force Academy in 1992, an earned a M.S. in Management from Troy State University in 2000. Lt Col Downey served as the 455 AEW Expeditionary Logistics Readiness Squadron Commanders in 2004 and with CJTF-76 as a Joint Logistician in 2006. Small Wars Journal, November 15

As the situation in Iraq continues to improve and indigenous forces assume greater responsibility for providing security in that country, the U.S. must redirect its attention and resources toward addressing the crisis that continues to build in Afghanistan. The rapidly deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan can be attributed directly to the lack of persistent presence amongst the rural Pashtun population, the failure to prevent Taliban freedom of movement along the border, and the inability to train sufficient numbers of capable ANA and ANP personnel. By surging an additional eight brigades into Afghanistan, however, U.S. and NATO forces can quickly regain the initiative from the Taliban and improve the security situation dramatically. A surge would establish and maintain a continuous presence in areas currently dominated by the Taliban, allow security forces to relentlessly pursue the enemy, and support the training of additional Afghan army and police units to augment, and eventually replace, the surge forces. If the U.S. does not surge these additional forces into Afghanistan, security will continue to deteriorate, the Taliban will assume control over much of the country, political instability will follow, and the U.S. will face strategic failure.

Surge Good – Surge Solves

The Surge worked in Iraq, and will work in Afghanistan

Downey et al. ‘08

Lieutenant Colonel Robert A. Downey, Lieutenant Colonel Lee K. Grubbs, Commander Brian J. Malloy and Lieutenant Colonel Craig R. Wonson, Lieutenant Colonel Robert A. Downey, USAF. Lt Col Downey is currently assigned to USTRANSCOM where he serves as the J5/4-SC Branch Chief for Distribution Process Owner Change Management and Joint Logistician Professional Development. He was commissioned through the United States Air Force Academy in 1992, an earned a M.S. in Management from Troy State University in 2000. Lt Col Downey served as the 455 AEW Expeditionary Logistics Readiness Squadron Commander in 2004 and with CJTF-76 as a Joint Logistician in 2006. Small Wars Journal, November 15

U.S. military commanders concluded that the best way to improve the security situation in Iraq was to adopt a more proactive “clear-hold-build” strategy supported by a significant increase in the number of ground combat units. This increase in forces, often referred to simply as “the surge”, introduced five additional combat brigades into Iraq that provided the means to wrest the initiative from the enemy. It allowed U.S. forces to simultaneously conduct large-scale operations to clear enemy safe havens, train Iraqi security forces, and disrupt insurgent lines of communication without having to leave key urban areas unprotected. In less than a year, the surge helped reduce the number of enemy attacks, increased the support of the Iraqi people, improved the security situation throughout the country, and all but defeated the insurgency. The security situation in Afghanistan has steadily deteriorated since 2006 largely due to the lack of forces required to execute an effective counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy.

The Surge was an undeniable success

USA Today ‘08

USA TODAY, July 24, 2008, <http://www.pointblanknews.com/os1069.html>

But the extra U.S. troops, brilliantly deployed by Gen. David Petraeus, have made a huge difference in calming the chaos. In doing so, it also contributed to the other developments. Why then can't Obama bring himself to acknowledge the surge worked better than he and other skeptics, including this page, thought it would? What does that stubbornness say about the kind of president he'd be? In recent comments, the Democratic presidential candidate has grudgingly conceded that the troops helped lessen the violence, but he has insisted that the surge was a dubious policy because it allowed the situation in Afghanistan to deteriorate and failed to produce political breakthroughs in Iraq. Even knowing the outcome, he told CBS News Tuesday, he still wouldn't have supported the idea. That's hard to fathom. Even if you believe that the invasion of Iraq was a grievous error -- and it was -- the U.S. should still make every effort to leave behind a stable situation. Obama "seems stuck in the first part of that thought process, repeatedly proclaiming that he was right to oppose the war and " AND disparaging worthwhile efforts to fix the mess it created. Hence, his dismissal of the surge as "a tactical victory imposed upon "a huge strategic blunder.""

Surge Good – Prevents Insurgency [1/2]

Afghanistan Surging disrupts insurgent action

Downey et al. ‘08

Lieutenant Colonel Robert A. Downey, Lieutenant Colonel Lee K. Grubbs, Commander Brian J. Malloy and Lieutenant Colonel Craig R. Wonson, Lieutenant Colonel Robert A. Downey, USAF. Lt Col Downey is currently assigned to USTRANSCOM where he serves as the J5/4-SC Branch Chief for Distribution Process Owner Change Management and Joint Logistician Professional Development. He was commissioned through the United States Air Force Academy in 1992, an earned a M.S. in Management from Troy State University in 2000. Lt Col Downey served as the 455 AEW Expeditionary Logistics Readiness Squadron Commander in 2004 and with CJTF-76 as a Joint Logistician in 2006. Small Wars Journal, November 15

The U.S. will not be able to achieve a 20:1,000 security force density ratio for an Afghan population well over 32 million, even with the help of NATO and Afghan National Security Forces. However, a surge could establish at least a 10:1,000 ratio in key parts of the critical Pashtun-dominated south and east regions until more ANA and ANP units could be fielded in sufficient numbers. Surging the equivalent of an additional eight brigades (approximately 25,000-40,000 personnel) over a one-year period would help disrupt insurgent freedom of movement, improve border security, expedite the fielding of indigenous security forces, and restore the confidence of people living in these key areas. The positive effects resulting from the improved security situation in those regions would be felt throughout the country.

Surge prevents Taliban and al Qaeda insurgency

Carroll ‘09

Conn, Assistant Director for The Heritage Foundation's Strategic Communications, September 28, Editor of The Foundry, <http://blog.heritage.org/tag/iraq/>

On March 27th, President Barack Obama followed through on one of his core campaign promises and announced a New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan that included sending an additional 21,000 troops to the region. Speaking from the Eisenhower Executive Office Building, Obama explained: “Multiple intelligence estimates have warned that al Qaeda is actively planning attacks on the United States homeland from its safe haven in Pakistan. And if the Afghan government falls to the Taliban — or allows al Qaeda to go unchallenged — that country will again be a base for terrorists who want to kill as many of our people as they possibly can. …But this is not simply an American problem — far from it. It is, instead, an international security challenge of the highest order. Terrorist attacks in London and Bali were tied to al Qaeda and its allies in Pakistan, as were attacks in North Africa and the Middle East, in Islamabad and in Kabul. If there is a major attack on an Asian, European, or African city, it, too, is likely to have ties to al Qaeda’s leadership in Pakistan. The safety of people around the world is at stake.”

A lack of ground forces gives rise to violent resurgence

Carroll ‘09

Conn, Assistant Director for The Heritage Foundation's Strategic Communications, September 28, Editor of The Foundry, <http://blog.heritage.org/tag/iraq/>

The war in Afghanistan cannot be effectively waged merely with air power, predator drones, and special forces. In the late 1990s, the Clinton Administration hurled cruise missiles at easily replaceable al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan, but this “chuck and duck” strategy failed to blunt the al-Qaeda threat. The Bush Administration’s minimalist approach to Afghanistan in 2001 was a contributing factor that allowed Osama bin Laden to escape from his mountain redoubt at Tora Bora. Afterwards, Washington opted to focus narrowly on counterterrorism goals in Afghanistan–rather than counterinsurgency operations–in order to free up military assets for the war in Iraq. This allowed the Taliban to regroup across the border in Pakistan and make a violent resurgence. The “small footprint” strategy also failed in Iraq, before it was abandoned in favor of General Petraeus’s counterinsurgency strategy, backed by the surge of American troops, in early 2007. Despite this record of failure, some stubbornly continue to support an “offshore” strategy for landlocked Afghanistan today. But half-measures–the hallmark of the “small footprint” strategy–will not work. Precise intelligence is needed to use smart bombs smartly. Yet few Afghans would risk their lives to provide such intelligence unless they are assured of protection against the Taliban’s ruthless retaliation.

Surge Good – Prevents Insurgency [2/2]

We must maintain troops in Afghanistan until the insurgency is defeated; anything short emboldens terrorists

Cole ‘09

Rep. Tom Cole, Oklahoma’s Fourth Congressional District, 2009, became the Representative for Oklahoma's Fourth Congressional District on November 6th, 2002., December 17

By telegraphing our intention to abandon the battlefield based on the calendar rather than the progress of our mission, we simply embolden the terrorists to wait us out. Not only does this put our soldiers at greater risk, it also undermines the long term authority of the legitimate Afghan government. The bottom line is this: the terrorists must be defeated and if that takes longer than 18 months, and I strongly suspect it will, then we have to stay until the job is done. The American public deserves political leadership that is as committed to winning this war as our soldiers are. After committing an additional 30,000 troops, the President has a responsibility to fully embrace his role as the Commander in Chief. This will entail rallying the public to support our troops, and building a genuine bi-partisan coalition in Congress to continue the hard work that lies ahead. There is no doubt that the President has committed our nation more deeply to Afghanistan. It is my belief that we must move forward with determination and a will to win by dismissing arbitrary timelines that undermine the efforts of our forces and our allies. Our soldiers have shown both these qualities on the battlefield and now the President needs to follow their example.

New troops are eroding insurgency in Afghanistan

Lubold ‘10

Gordon Lubold, Reporter for POLITICO, 2010 Christian Science Monitor, “*Afghanistan war: surge on cusp of bringing 'real change'”,* April 28

But the trends will favor the US and NATO in coming months as the number of American troops Mr. Obama ordered to Afghanistan arrive there and more of the population centers can be protected, defense officials say. At the same time, the strength of the Afghan national security forces, including the army and police, will improve over time. Insurgent groups are so decentralized, and command-and-control sometimes so difficult, that they are often less effective than they can be, according to the report. And, few groups are on the same page: “Persistent fissures among insurgent leadership persist at the local levels,” the report says. Pakistani officials have made a series of high-profile, recent arrests of top Taliban and other insurgent leaders in Pakistan. That has triggered “concerned chatter” among intelligence sources about the future of the insurgency. But it has as not yet translated to an insurgency that is significantly degraded, the defense official said.

Troop increase key to Afghanistan stability and training Afghani Scecurity Forces

Outlook Daily ‘09

Outlook Daily, “*Obama to decide surge in Afghanistan”* Daily Outlook Afghanistan, Novemeber 25 2009 <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/LNacademic/>

President Obama is going to announce his much-awaited reviewed Afghan policy next week by December 01, 2009. The top US Commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal Stanley McChrystal had demanded about 44,000 extra troops earlier in August. Contrary to the officials in Pentagon, Obama Administration  was reluctant to troops surge.It took the president too long to decide. The more awaiting, the more his Administration seemed indecisive and dithering on Afghanistan issue. There was a confused situation particularly during the controversial Presidential elections in Afghanistan. President Obama might announce increase of 30,000 to 35,000 troops. The surge lacks the number of troops demanded by Gen. McChrystal. White House expects other NATO nations to contribute the troops' surge. UK might take the lead in doing so. On the other hand, Gen. McChrystal is traveling to Washington to brief Congress about his plans for the increasing troops. Finally, the much carefully-decided troops surge to suppress the sophisticated Taliban insurgency will officially be announced next week. It would set the objectives clear in all minds. The US besides troops surge, should also rapidly increase the number and capacity of Afghan National Security Forces in order to enable them take command of security across the country. Without strong and capable Afghan Forces, the war would never be won in Afghanistan. Other than the military options against Taliban, talks with insurgents should also be given a serious try this time. Several top American officials have been admitting that military option alone would not win the war in Afghanistan. President Karzai has already set negotiation with insurgents as an important agenda of his second term. The international community should keep in mind that an irresponsible withdrawal strategy made in hasty would lead Afghanistan to fall into the hands of extremists that hosted and encouraged Al-Qaeda to destroy world security. The Afghans cannot bear another severe mistake, made by the US after withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. International community needs to stay involved in Afghanistan for long-term objectives of instability in the region. Only surge in troops and negotiations with insurgents would not provide sustainable solution to the conflict in Afghanistan. The international allies should engage regional powers and work out a regional solution for Afghanistan.

Surge Good – Withdrawal Bad

U.S. Should not pull out of Afghanistan until four conditions are met: No corruption, Afghan Security, limited drug trade, and a robust economy

Olson ‘09

Rep. Pete Olson, R-TX, 2009 congressman, December 9th, Heritage, The Foundry, <http://ethiopedia.com/world/80424>

As I see it, there are four key areas that must improve to ensure victory. First, the corruption that is rampant throughout Afghanistan must be stopped. The influence of corrupt officials in the Afghan government is a troubling problem that will have long-term impacts on stability. Secondly, while our troops are doing a remarkable job of training Afghanistan forces, the Afghans are nowhere near ready to take over security yet. This is a concern, which must be addressed before our troops return home. The well-known illicit drug trade is also a core impediment to the U.S. mission in Afghanistan, generating what is estimated to be about $70 million – $100 million per year for the Taliban. Afghanistan is the source for roughly 93% of the world’s opium supply. While steps are being taken to reduce this problem, more must be done. Finally, long-term success is also dependent upon a robust economy in Afghanistan. Afghanistan residents need to know they have a working government and a stable economy so they do not feel compelled to ally with the Taliban for survival. And progress must be made in Pakistan. They must take an aggressive stand against the militants on their side of the border. Testifying before Congress last week, Defense Secretary Robert Gates called the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan the “epicenter of extremist jihadism.” The players in Pakistan must step up and instill a zero tolerance policy on harboring terrorists to maintain control of the region.

Afghanistan timeline gives the perception of withdrawal, weakening U.S. resolve in the region

McNamara and Curtis ‘10

Sally, Lisa, July 16, Sally McNamara is Senior Policy Analyst in European Affairs in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, and Lisa Curtis is Senior Research Fellow for South Asia in the Asian Studies Center, at The Heritage Foundation. <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/07/The-Cameron-Obama-White-House-Meeting>

The circumstances surrounding the recent departure of General McChrystal from command of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan reflect the lack of unity among U.S. civilian and military leaders regarding U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. Obama should discard the artificial deadline for beginning U.S. troop withdrawals, which has contributed to the tensions between U.S. civilian and military leaders by placing commanders under enormous pressure to achieve results in an unrealistic timeframe. The highly accomplished General Petraeus—credited with developing and implementing the counterinsurgency strategy that helped turn the Iraq war around—has repeatedly said that any U.S. troop withdrawals from Afghanistan should be driven by conditions on the ground. The Obama Administration should actively counter the perception that the U.S. is war-weary and ready to strike a grand bargain with the Taliban. Such perceptions weaken the U.S. position in the region and dampen prospects for the overall success of NATO’s new counterinsurgency strategy.

Surge Good – Withdrawal Bad

Obama is sending mixed signals about Afghanistan, which makes the war unwinnable

Elder ‘10

Larry, July 1, “President Obama, Make the Case for Afghanistan -- or Get Out”, July 1, Creators Syndicate Inc. <http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2010/07/01/president_obama_make_the_case_for_afghanistan_--_or_get_out_106158.html>

The "war of necessity" became the schizophrenic war. What happens if we leave before the Afghan government can maintain security? Will it again become a base of operation for al-Qaida and other terrorist groups? Will they step up their efforts in neighboring Pakistan, a country that possesses nuclear bombs? Will a defeat in Afghanistan confirm the enemy's assumption that we cannot and will not make the necessary commitment to defeat them? Obama now seems to speak of Summer 2011 less as a fixed date for withdrawal and more as one based on conditions. But it's hard to say what the President believes. In any event, the mixed signals give comfort to the enemy. Without American public support, the war in Afghanistan cannot be won. Without a commander in chief committed to winning, the war in Afghanistan cannot be won. A commitment requires the President to repeatedly and persuasively explain why we are at war and, if we leave too soon, the consequences to national security. Does Obama believe this war must be fought? Candidate Obama called a nuclear Iran "unacceptable." Yet CIA Director Leon Panetta admits that the recently announced "tough" sanctions will not stop Iran's nuclear program. So the Obama administration accepts the eventuality of a nuclear Iran and has shifted to a policy of management and containment - the opposite of what Obama promised during his campaign for president. If Obama believes Iran can be managed, why would he not accept whatever consequences follow from a complete withdrawal from Afghanistan? Why assume Obama was any more sincere about the "unacceptability" of a nuclear Iran than he was when he called Afghanistan a "war of necessity"?

Surge Good – Wins War [1/2]

The New Troop Surge in Afghanistan makes winning the war on terror possible

Scott ‘10

Scott, Lucas, Journalist for Enduring America, “Afghanistan: A Winnable War? (Kagan & Kagan)”Enduring America, June 29 , 2010, <http://enduringamerica.com/2010/06/29/afghanistan-a-winnable-war-kagan-kagan/>

Success in Afghanistan is possible. The policy that President Obama announced in December and firmly reiterated last week is sound. So is the strategy that General Stanley McChrystal devised last summer and has been implementing this year. There have been setbacks and disappointments during this campaign, and adjustments will likely be necessary. These are inescapable in war. Success is not by any means inevitable. Enemies adapt and spoilers spoil. But both panic and despair are premature. The coalition has made significant military progress against the Taliban, and will make more progress as the last surge forces arrive in August. Although military progress is insufficient by itself to resolve the conflict, it is a vital precondition. As *The New York Times* editors recently noted, “Until the insurgents are genuinely bloodied, they will keep insisting on a full restoration of their repressive power.” General David Petraeus knows how to bloody insurgents—and he also knows how to support and encourage political development and conflict resolution. He takes over the mission with the renewed support of the White House.Neither the recent setbacks nor the manner of McChrystal’s departure should be allowed to obscure the enormous progress he has made in setting conditions for successful campaigns over the next two years. The internal, structural changes he made have revolutionized the ability of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to conduct counterinsurgency operations. He oversaw the establishment of a three-star NATO training command that has accelerated both the expansion and the qualitative improvement of the Afghan National Security Forces in less than a year. He introduced a program of partnering ISAF units and headquarters with Afghan forces that had worked wonders in Iraq—and he improved on it. He oversaw the introduction of a three-star operational headquarters to develop and coordinate countrywide campaign plans. He has managed the massive planning and logistical burden of receiving the influx of surge forces and putting them immediately to use in a country with little infrastructure. While undertaking these enormous tasks of internal reorganization, he has also taken the fight to the enemy. The controversies about his restrictions on the operations of Special Forces and rules of engagement that limit the use of destructive force in inhabited areas have obscured the fact that both Special Forces and conventional forces have been fighting harder than ever before and disrupting and seriously damaging enemy networks and strongholds

New troop surge key to fighting terror – and maintaining security

BBC ‘09

“US Envoy to Afghanistan welcomes fresh deployment of troops” BBC Monitoring South Asia, BBC Worldwide Monitoring, June 10 2009 <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/LNacademic/>

[Presenter] The British ambassador to Afghanistan has said in an exclusive interview that foreign troops surge will help defeat terrorism in this country. The British ambassador welcomes the fresh deployment of American troops to Helmand Province, saying security must improve in Helmand with the foreign troop surge. Pervez Shamal has the report.  [Correspondent] The deployment of extra American troops to Afghanistan is under way, and the British ambassador to Afghanistan is welcoming deployment of extra American forces to Afghanistan, especially in Helmand Province.  [British ambassador in Kabul, Mark Phillip Sedwill, in English superimposed with Dari translation] We very much welcome the deployment of extra American forces to Afghanistan, and we are optimistic about the arrival of more troops in Afghanistan, especially in Helmand Province. The troop surge will help us gain victory over terrorism. The American and British forces will cooperate with the Afghan forces in the war. We should help expand security in Helmand Province, while at the moment, we are unable to improve security in some parts of the province.  [Correspondent] America earlier announced it would send 17,000 extra troops to Afghanistan most of whom would be stationed in the south of the country, especially in Helmand and Farah.  [Sidan Stryker, spokesman for American forces in Afghanistan, in English superimposed with Dari translation] As part of the decision on troop increase, 17,000 new American troops are due to arrive in Afghanistan by the end of this year's summer 7,000 of whom have arrived in Afghanistan so far, bringing the total number of American forces in Afghanistan to 54,000. The total number of American forces will reach to 64,000 by the end of this year's summer.  [Correspondent] The spokesman is saying the new troops will help train Afghan forces, but the Ministry of National Defence is saying foreign troops surge alone is not enough to restore peace in Afghanistan, calling for more support and aid for the Afghan national army.

Surge Good – Wins War [2/2]

Surge Key to quashing the Taliban spilling over into Pakistan

Boot and Kagan ‘09

Boot and Kagan, New York Times, 2009, “How to Surge the Taliban”, March 12, Max Boot is a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. Frederick Kagan is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. Kimberly Kagan is the president of the Institute for the Study of War. <http://www.cfr.org/publication/18762/how_to_surge_the_taliban.html>

There are many who claim that a large-scale commitment isn’t necessary. Some say we have no interest in making Afghanistan a functioning state — all that matters is preventing Al Qaeda from re-establishing safe havens, and we can do that by killing terrorist leaders with precision air strikes or covert raids. The key question for those who advocate pulling back is this: Where will we get the intelligence to direct the raids? If we have few troops on the ground, we will have to rely on intercepted communications. But seven years into the fight, the terrorists have learned a thing or two about keeping their communications secret. The only way to get the intelligence we need is from the residents, and they won’t provide it unless our troops stay in their villages to provide protection from Taliban retribution. This struggle is not just about Afghanistan. It is also about tracking and effecting what is going on in Pakistan’s tribal areas. That is where the global Qaeda leadership is. It is the nexus of terrorist groups including the Lashkar-e-Taiba, which is implicated in the Mumbai, India, attacks last November; the Tehreek Nifaz-e-Shariat Mohammadi, which now has control of the Swat region in Pakistan; and Baitullah Mehsud’s Pakistani Taliban, which are said to have plotted the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, the former Pakistani prime minister. From their positions across the border in Afghanistan, American forces can literally see these areas. They can also gather invaluable intelligence from, and spread our influence to, the tribes that straddle the frontier. But we get that vantage point only as long as we have something to offer the Afghans — security, improved quality of life, hope for a better government. If we abandon them, we will become blind to one of the most dangerous threats to our security, and also hand our most determined enemies an enormous propaganda victory — their biggest since 9/11. Make no mistake: there is hard, costly fighting ahead in Afghanistan. But the fight is worth pursuing, and the odds of success are much better than they were in Iraq when we launched the forlorn hope known as the surge.

\*\*\*A2: PAKISTAN INSTABILITY ADVANTAGE\*\*\*

1NC – Pakistan Stability [1/3]

1. Pakistan-U.S. relations are strong now ­– leads to stability

Right Vision News, ’10

[Right Vision News, “Pak-US partnership will deliver common goals of security: Patterson”, June 29th 2010, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/auth/checkbrowser.do?rand=0.028396264158245366&cookieState=0&ipcounter=1&bhcp=1>, Lexis, Accessed 7/21/10]

US Ambassador in Pakistan Anne W. Patterson on Sunday said that America's offer of a long-term partnership with Pakistan is tangible and "It is our hope that this partnership will deliver our common goals of security and prosperity, in the region and throughout the world."  Pakistanis and Americans are working together to build a better world, "We all aspire to leave as our legacy," she said while addressing the handing over ceremony of latest version of F-16 aircraft to Pakistan Air Force (PAF) at newly upgraded Air Base Shahbaz.  She said that Pakistan and the United States share a deep and broad partnership, which is growing to encompass nearly every element of government-to-government cooperation.  Under the Strategic Dialogue established by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi, she said, the two nations are working together on economic development, trade and energy, health care, education, science and technology and agriculture.  "Our governments share a vision of partnership today which is unprecedented in the history of our bilateral relationship," she said.  It both reflects America's long-term commitment to Pakistan as an important ally and partner and "is a testament to the shared vision of our democratically elected governments," she added.  The US Ambassador said that an important element of Pakistan-US relationship is strong and a growing security partnership, through which the two countries are working to make this region secure, stable and peaceful.  She recalled that four years ago, the United States and the Government of Pakistan had signed a Letter of Agreement for the acquisition of 18 new F-16 aircraft by Pakistan to support this country's counterterrorism efforts.  "I am glad to be here today to witness the induction of the first three of these aircraft into the Pakistan Air Force in an event which begins yet another cycle of fulfillment in America's commitments to Pakistan," the US envoy said.  The induction of these advanced F-16s is a historic milestone for US-Pakistan relations - "both a symbolic and a tangible demonstration of our strong partnership" and the US intent to stand beside Pakistan over the long-term as an important ally and friend, Patterson said.  "Our commitment does not end with the delivery of these aircraft. The United States will continue to support the Pakistan Air Force through training and munitions procurement, and through updates to the 45 F-16s in the Pakistan Air Force's existing fleet," she added.

2. No terminal impact – Pakistan and India are cooperating now.

Wright, ‘10

[Tom Wright, “India, Pakistan Ministers meet in Islamabad”, The Wall Street Journal, June 27, 2010, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703615104575328131506715988.html?mod=googlenews_wsj>, Accessed 7/20/10]

Indian Home Minister P. Chidambaram has met with his Pakistani counterpart, Rehman Malik, in Islamabad in the latest in a series of high-level discussions aimed at lowering the political temperature between the oft-feuding nations.  The two men talked on Friday ahead of a weekend regional meeting of interior ministers from South Asian nations. Their meeting builds on discussions last week between the two countries' foreign secretaries. In July, foreign ministers of India and Pakistan will meet as part of a peace-talk process initiated in February.  The peace process started in 2004 but was put on hold in 2008 after Pakistani-based gunmen attacked Mumbai, India's financial center, killing more than 160 people.  The Associated Press said that at the Saturday regional meeting, Mr. Chidambaram raised the Mumbai attack. "All the masterminds and handlers behind the (attacks) must be brought to justice. We must ensure that terrorists have no free run either in Pakistan or India and both countries must work together," the agency said.  According to the AP, Mr. Malik said his country had received additional information about the attacks from India. "No act of terrorism will be allowed from Pakistan to be replicated like Bombay or anywhere," the AP quoted him as saying. "We have resolved to work together."  India has said it wants Pakistan to make more arrests of Islamist militants linked to the Mumbai killings before it accedes to Pakistan's requests to allow bilateral talks to address other areas, such as cross-border trade and the division of water resources in the disputed Kashmir region.  Although only a start, Friday's talks had been welcomed on both sides of the border. Mail Today, an Indian newspaper, said in an editorial that they "could lead to a "fully-fledged resumption of the Indo-Pak dialogue process."  Mushtaq Gaddhi, a lecturer in social studies at Quaid-e-Azam University in Islamabad, said the talks were a good starting point to help the two nations reduce a deep mistrust. "If there's continuous dialogue this will help in changing perceptions," he said.

1NC – Pakistan Stability [2/3]

3. Pakistan is creating peace and stability now

The International News, ‘10

[The International News, “Qureshi Rubbishes Osama Presence Claim”, July 22, 2010, <http://www.thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=30220>]

Speaking at a joint press conference with Nato Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Qureshi rubbished these allegations as “speculations”, saying Pakistan’s continuing sacrifices against the war on terror should not be doubted. “This is not the first time that this has been said and our position has been consistent. These are speculations,” Qureshi said. It appears that Pakistan makes the obligatory remarks against the US drone attacks to pacify its domestic audience and the US levels allegations against Pakistan to pacify theirs. “Our position is that we are partners and allies (of the US) to achieve the same objective... Our sacrifices are second to none, so Pakistan’s intentions should not be doubted. If there is credible information available, then it should be shared with Pakistan,” he said. Anders Fogh Rasmussen praised Pakistan’s role in promoting peace and security in the region. “We would like to commend the Pakistan military and government for the action in the tribal belt. We commend your transit trade agreement with Afghanistan, which will benefit stability in the region and lead to economic development for mutual benefit of all countries of the region,” he said. The secretary general said Pakistan had made contribution for regional peace and security and thus could play a role in the political settlement of Afghanistan. He said Nato and Pakistan would also strengthen their political relations. “I want to stress that it should be an Afghan-led process but we should give reconciliation a try to bring in people who put down their weapons and abide by the constitution,” he added. Qureshi said Pakistan was ready to play such a role but only if requested by the Afghan government. “Pakistan is not looking for a role but if the government of Afghanistan so desires and wants us to help, we are more than willing. If not then we won’t,” he said.

4. Pakistan is adamant about not withdrawing US troops in Afghanistan.

Daily Times, ’10

[“Haqqani expects US help toward regional stability”. Daily Times, July 13, 2010, <http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010\07\13\story_13-7-2010_pg7_27>]

Asserting that Pakistan would not allow a handful of extremists to impose their agenda on his country, Pakistan's Ambassador to the US Husain Haqqani voiced the hope for continued US engagement towards regional stability.  "We are sure lessons have been learned and there will be no walking away this time," he said in an interview with The Washington Examiner.  To a question if Pakistan was concerned about the possibility of the US and NATO pulling out of Afghanistan, Ambssador Haqqani replied, "We hope that the US and the international community will continue their cooperation to fight terrorism and work together to achieve peace and stability in Afghanistan."  Islamabad, he underlined, remains firm in its resolve to get rid of terrorists.  "Our message to the US is that Pakistan is fully committed to fighting and defeating extremism and terrorists, and the fight against them would continue till their eradication," he said, when questioned about Pakistan's message to new US Commander for Afghanistan General David Petraeus.  "We believe that a handful of militants and extremists would never be allowed to impose their vicious agenda on the people of Pakistan," Ambssador Haqqani said.  Pakistan will continue to work with the US and Afghanistan until the terrorists are defeated, he added.  Haqqani also highlighted the country's anti-terror efforts, saying Pakistani security forces have achieved tremendous successes in its military operations in Swat, Malakand division and in the tribal areas.

1NC – Pakistan Stability [3/3]

5. Turn – Strong ground presence in Afghanistan critical to prevent spillover into Pakistan

Amr, ’10

[Hady, Director of Brookings Doha Center, in a policy discussion with Michael E. Hanlon, Director of Research and Foreign Policy Senior Fellow, “Toughing it Out in Afghanistan”, Brookings Institute, 2010, <http://www.brookings.edu/events/2010/0216_toughing_it_out_doha.aspx>, Accessed 7/22/10]

In responding to a question on why the United States should remain involved in Afghanistan, O’Hanlon mentioned humanitarian interests, which are significant, as well as more critical strategic concerns such as the danger posed by extremist groups in nearby nuclear Pakistan. Furthermore, O’Hanlon highlighted polling data indicating that Afghans are feeling more hopeful because “there’s been enough sense of recommitment from the international community.” He outlined the high stakes of the U.S. mission in Afghanistan and what failure would mean. First, if the Taliban were to regain power, Afghanistan would suffer great humanitarian devastation. Second, since the links between the Taliban and al Qaeda have become more frequent and common, al Qaeda would surely have sanctuary in a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. He highlighted the most significant factor of the case for U.S. forces in Afghanistan: its volatile nuclear neighbor—Pakistan. O’Hanlon stressed that, for the United States, winning this war necessarily entails a strong presence on the ground and having Afghans as primary sources of information.

6. Deterrence checks nuclear escalation

Alagappa, ’08

[Muthiah, Distinguished Senior Fellow at the East-West Center, editor of several volumes on Asian Security, “The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia”, Winner of the 2009 Choice Outstanding Academic Title Award, Published 2008, <http://globalasia.org/pdf/issue9/Muthiah_Alagappa.pdf>]

Although they do not affect the regional distribution of power, nuclear weapons strengthen weaker powers by canceling or mitigating the effects of imbalance in conventional and nuclear weapon capability and thereby reducing their strategic vulnerability. By threatening nuclear retaliation and catastrophic damage in the event of large-scale conventional or nuclear attack, and exploiting the risk of escalation to nuclear war, weaker powers with nuclear weapons constrain the military options of a stronger adversary. This is most evident in the cases of Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel. Pakistan is much weaker than India in several dimensions of national power. It suffered defeats in two of the three conventional wars it fought with India in the prenuclear era, with the 1971 war resulting in humiliating defeat and dismemberment. In the nuclear era, which dates from the late 1980s, Islamabad has been able to deter India from crossing into Pakistan proper and Pakistan-controlled Kashmir even in the context of Pakistani military infiltration into Indian-controlled Kashmir in 1999. India did not follow through with the limited-war option in 2001–02 because of the grave risk it entailed. India was also forced in part by the risk of nuclear war to engage in a comprehensive dialogue to explore settlement of disputes between the two countries, including the Kashmir conflict. Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal has blunted the potency of India’s large conventional military force. Although it has not canceled out all the consequences of the large power differential between the two countries, it has had significant constraining impact on India’s military options and assuaged Pakistan’s concern about the Indian threat.

2NC – Indo-Pak Cooperation High

No terminal impact – Pakistan and India are cooperating now.

Wright, ‘10

[Tom Wright, “India, Pakistan Ministers meet in Islamabad”, The Wall Street Journal, June 27, 2010, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703615104575328131506715988.html?mod=googlenews_wsj>, Accessed 7/20/10]

Indian Home Minister P. Chidambaram has met with his Pakistani counterpart, Rehman Malik, in Islamabad in the latest in a series of high-level discussions aimed at lowering the political temperature between the oft-feuding nations.  The two men talked on Friday ahead of a weekend regional meeting of interior ministers from South Asian nations. Their meeting builds on discussions last week between the two countries' foreign secretaries. In July, foreign ministers of India and Pakistan will meet as part of a peace-talk process initiated in February.  The peace process started in 2004 but was put on hold in 2008 after Pakistani-based gunmen attacked Mumbai, India's financial center, killing more than 160 people.  The Associated Press said that at the Saturday regional meeting, Mr. Chidambaram raised the Mumbai attack. "All the masterminds and handlers behind the (attacks) must be brought to justice. We must ensure that terrorists have no free run either in Pakistan or India and both countries must work together," the agency said.  According to the AP, Mr. Malik said his country had received additional information about the attacks from India. "No act of terrorism will be allowed from Pakistan to be replicated like Bombay or anywhere," the AP quoted him as saying. "We have resolved to work together."  India has said it wants Pakistan to make more arrests of Islamist militants linked to the Mumbai killings before it accedes to Pakistan's requests to allow bilateral talks to address other areas, such as cross-border trade and the division of water resources in the disputed Kashmir region.  Although only a start, Friday's talks had been welcomed on both sides of the border. Mail Today, an Indian newspaper, said in an editorial that they "could lead to a "fully-fledged resumption of the Indo-Pak dialogue process."  Mushtaq Gaddhi, a lecturer in social studies at Quaid-e-Azam University in Islamabad, said the talks were a good starting point to help the two nations reduce a deep mistrust. "If there's continuous dialogue this will help in changing perceptions," he said.  India's Home Ministry said in a statement on Friday that it had decided to release four Pakistani prisoners from jail in the western Indian state of Gujarat as a gesture of goodwill ahead of the talks.  The prisoners will be handed over to Pakistani security forces at the border with India on June 30, the statement said.

2NC – Pakistan Stable [1/2]

1. No impact – Pakistan is stable now, as well as India and Afghanistan

Thai Press Reports, ’10

[“Pakistan Holbrooke Acknowledges Pakistan’s Political Stability; Economic Recovery”, Thai News Service, July 16, 2010, Lexis]

The United States on Wednesday acknowledged the Pakistani democratic leadership's efforts towards fostering national anti-terror resolve, with its special representative for the region Richard Holbrooke also noting political stability and economic recovery in the country following recent constitutional and economic decisions. Appearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Holbrooke also highlighted improvement in US-Pakistan ties and reaffirmed the Obama Administration's commitment to strategic ties with the country, which he said is pivotal to peace and security in the region. Washington, he said, stands for enhancing stability in Pakistan, supporting Pakistan's offensive against extremists who threaten Pakistan and the United States and encouraging a closer relationship between Islamabad and Kabul. The envoy particularly noted a greater degree of political stability in Pakistan as a result of recent constitutional reforms. We have seen a steady improvement in our bilateral relationship, he said of US-Pakistan relations. As members of this committee have recognized, what happens in Pakistan has tremendous implications not only for our goals in Afghanistan, but also for the stability of South-Central Asia and for U.S. national security. Holbrooke paid tribute to Pakistan's sacrifices in the fight against terrorists. We cannot forget that the Pakistani people and armed forces have made huge sacrifices as part of this fight. In the past month alone, scores of innocent Pakistanis have been killed or wounded in suicide attacks. Hundreds of thousands of Pakistanis have also had their lives upended. Holbrooke, who departs for the region Thursday evening and will travel to Kabul, and New Delhi, also cited the upcoming round of US-Pakistan strategic dialogue as signifying close substantive relations between the two countries. In addition to meetings with key leaders on a range of topics, I will join Secretary Clinton when she reconvenes the U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue in Islamabad and leads the U.S. delegation to the Kabul Conference. While the Kabul Conference has attracted more international attention, the Secretary's visit to Islamabad will be equally significant, coming on the heels of 13 successful Strategic Dialogue Working Group meetings in Islamabad over the past two months and the Secretary's highly successful visit to Pakistan in October 2009. The special representative said the US is the biggest assistance provider of Pakistan and sought the American senators' support for the preferential trade initiative of Reconstruction Opportunity Zones. He said the Obama Administration recognizes that Pakistan's and Afghanistan's futures are intertwined and has consulted closely with both governments on its strategy in the region. Through the trilateral process, we have facilitated a significant thaw in relations between Islamabad and Kabul and encouraged progress on regional economic integration. There is not yet strategic symmetry on all topics, but the thawing of differences should create additional opportunities as our regional diplomacy and political strategy develops. Significantly, Pakistan's leaders now publicly acknowledge the cross-border nature of the extremist threat and that Afghan stability is in Pakistana's interest. Meanwhile, we have also welcomed the resumption of more frequent high-level dialogue between New Delhi and Islamabad, which should benefit regional stability. He said the US goal in Afghanistan-Pakistan region is to disrupt and dismantle al-Qaeda and prevent the militant organization's return to both countries.

2. Policies in the region ensure stability

Zakaria, ’10

[Fareed, editor of Newsweek International, columnist for Newsweek and Washington Post, hosts international affairs program, “A Victory for Obama”, March 12, 2010, <http://www.newsweek.com/2010/03/11/a-victory-for-obama.html>]

President Obama gets much credit for changing America's image in the world—he was probably awarded the Nobel Prize for doing so. But if you asked even devoted fans to cite a specific foreign-policy achievement, they would probably hesitate. "It's too soon for that," they would say. But in fact, there is a place where Barack Obama's foreign policy is working, and one that is crucial to U.S. national security—Pakistan.  There has been a spate of good news coming out of that complicated country, which has long promised to take action against Islamic militants but rarely done so. (The reason: Pakistan has used many of these same militants to destabilize its traditional foe, India, and to gain influence in Afghanistan.) Over the past few months, the Pakistani military has engaged in serious and successful operations in the militant havens of Swat, Malakand, South Waziristan, and Bajaur. Some of these areas are badlands where no Pakistani government has been able to establish its writ, so the achievement is all the more important. The Pakistanis have also ramped up their intelligence sharing with the U.S. This latter process led to the arrest a month ago of Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the deputy leader of the Afghan Taliban, among other Taliban figures.  Some caveats: most of the Taliban who have been captured are small fish, and

2NC – Pakistan Stable [2/2]

the Pakistani military has a history of "catching and releasing" terrorists so that they can impress Americans but still maintain their ties with the militants. But there does seem to be a shift in Pakistani behavior. Why it's taken place and how it might continue is a case study in the nature and limits of foreign-policy successes.  First, the Obama administration de-fined the problem correctly. Senior ad-ministration officials stopped referring to America's efforts in Afghanistan and instead spoke constantly of "AfPak," to emphasize the notion that success in Afghanistan depended on actions taken in Pakistan. This dismayed the Pakistanis but they got the message. They were on notice to show they were part of the solution, not the problem.  Second, the administration used both sticks and carrots. For his first state dinner, Obama pointedly invited Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh—clearly not Pakistan's first choice. Obama made clear that America would continue to pursue the special relationship forged with India under the Bush administration, including a far-reaching deal on nuclear cooperation. But at the same time, the White House insisted it wanted a deep, long-term, and positive relationship with Pakistan. Sens. John Kerry and Dick Lugar put together the largest nonmilitary package of U.S. assistance for the country ever. Aid to the Pakistani military is also growing rapidly.  Third, it put in time and effort. The administration has adopted what Central Command's Gen. David Petraeus calls a "whole of government" approach to Pakistan. All elements of U.S. power and diplomacy have been deployed. Pakistan has received more than 25 visits by senior administration officials in the past year, all pushing the Pakistani military to deliver on commitments to fight the militants.  Finally, as always, luck and timing have played a key role. The militants in Pakistan, like those associated with Al Qaeda almost everywhere, went too far, brutally killing civilians, shutting down girls' schools, and creating an atmosphere of medievalism. Pakistan's public, which had tended to downplay the problem of terrorism, now saw it as "Pakistan's war." The Army, reading the street, felt it had to show results.  These results are still tentative. Pakistan's military retains its obsession with India—how else to justify a vast budget in a small, poor nation? It has still not acted seriously against any of the major militant groups active against Afghanistan, India, or the United States. The Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani group, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and many smaller groups all operate with impunity within Pakistan. But the Pakistani military is doing more than it has before, and that counts as success in the world of foreign policy.  Such success will endure only if the Obama administration keeps at it. There are some who believe that Pakistan has changed its basic strategy and now understands that it should cut its ties to these groups altogether. Strangely this naive view is held by the U.S. military, whose top brass have spent so many hours with their counterparts in Islamabad that they've gone native. It's up to Obama and his team to remind the generals that pressing Pakistan is a lot like running on a treadmill. If you stop, you move backward, and, most likely, you fall down.

2NC – Presence Good [1/2]

1. Withdrawal destabilizes Pakistan and causes them to strike deals with jihadist groups – empirically proven

WSJ, ’09

[Wall street Journal, “US credibility and Pakistan”, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704471504574443352072071822.html>, Oct. 1, 2009]

**As for the consequences to Pakistan of an American withdrawal**, the foreign minister noted that "we will be the immediate effectees of your policy." Among the effects he predicts are "**more misery," "more suicide bombings," and a dramatic loss of confidence in the economy, presumably as investors fear that an emboldened Taliban, no longer pressed by coalition forces in Afghanistan, would soon turn its sights again on Islamabad**. Mr. Qureshi's arguments carry all the more weight now that Pakistan's army is waging an often bloody struggle to clear areas previously held by the Taliban and their allies. Pakistan has also furnished much of the crucial intelligence needed to kill top Taliban and al Qaeda leaders in U.S. drone strikes. But that kind of cooperation will be harder to come by **if the U.S withdraws from Afghanistan and Islamabad feels obliged to protect itself in the near term by striking deals with various jihadist groups, as it has in the past.**

2. Turn – Withdrawal from Afghanistan will squander any gains from Pakistan

Curtis, ’10

[Lisa, Senior Research Fellow for South Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation, “Taliban Reconfiliation: Obama Administration Must Be Clear and Firm”, The Heritage Foundation, March 11, 2010, <http://heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/03/Taliban-Reconciliation-Obama-Administration-Must-Be-Clear-and-Firm>]

The Obama Administration has recently begun to challenge the Pakistanis on their lack of consistency in countering terrorism in the region. The Kerry-Lugar bill passed by the Senate last September (the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009) authorizes $7.5 billion in civilian aid to Pakistan over the next five years and conditions military assistance on Pakistani measures to address terrorist threats. U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates hinted that Pakistan could be doing more to fight terrorism when he noted in a recent op-ed in the Pakistani daily The News that seeking to distinguish between different terrorist groups is counterproductive. U.S. Director of National Intelligence Admiral Dennis Blair recently elaborated on this point when he testified before Congress on February 2, 2010, that "Pakistan's conviction that militant groups are strategically useful to counter India are hampering the fight against terrorism and helping al-Qaeda sustain its safe haven." U.S. officials must continue to make such statements and be prepared to follow them up with action in order to demonstrate that Washington's patience with Islamabad is not unlimited. If the U.S. seeks to prevent Afghanistan from turning back into a safe haven for terrorists that want to attack the U.S., it must convince Pakistani officials to crack down on Taliban leaders who find sanctuary in their country. Pakistani public opinion is beginning to turn against the Taliban and al-Qaeda. **If the U.S. tries to find a quick exit from Afghanistan, however, these gains in Pakistan will be squandered and the Taliban's ideology will regain legitimacy throughout the region**. The U.S. should support Afghan reconciliation efforts on the ground in Afghanistan diplomatically and financially, and at the same time militarily squeeze the Taliban leadership based in Pakistan that is still closely linked to al-Qaeda. These actions should occur simultaneously so that the local Taliban fighters view the U.S., NATO, and Afghan authorities as being on the winning side, and simultaneously see a process through which they can switch sides without punishment. But U.S. over-anxiousness to negotiate with the senior Taliban leadership in Pakistan would likely undermine efforts to coax local fighters into the political mainstream, thus jeopardizing General McChrystal's counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan and prolonging instability throughout the region.

2NC – Presence Good [2/2]

3. Downsizing of the troops will lead to failure in Pakistan.

Phillips, ‘09

[James, Senior Research Fellow in Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation, “Obama Risks Failure in Afghanistan By Not Sending More Troops”, December 2, 2009, <http://heritage.org/Research/Commentary/2009/12/Obama-Risks-Failure-in-Afghanistan-By-Not-Sending-More-Troops>]

In late August McChrystal submitted a situation report that concluded that more U.S. troops were required to carry out the strategy. McChrystal reportedly requested about 40,000 more troops. But the White House apparently has gotten cold feet about implementing its own strategy, announced with much fanfare last March, opting for a commitment to provide 30,000 more troops for a period of three years. This **downsizing of** urgently requested **troop** reinforcements could lead to a dangerous and tragic outcome. If Obama retreats to a "McChrystal Light" option that shortchanges his own hand-picked commander, it **will greatly increase the risk of failure**, not only in Afghanistan **but in the struggle against Islamist radicals in neighboring Pakistan**. It could result in a downward spiral of security in Afghanistan: a resurgent Taliban, eventual collapse of the Afghan government, an even bloodier civil war, renewed humanitarian crisis and a refugee exodus. Moreover, the Taliban will bring back not just their ally al-Qaida, but a rogues' gallery of almost every major Islamist insurgent movement in the world today.

4. A retreat would embolden extremists and take away all recent gains in Pakistan.

Curtis and Phillips, ‘09

[Lisa, Senior Research Fellow for South Asia, and James, Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs in Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation, “Shortsighted US Policies on Afghanistan to Bring Long-Term Problems”, October 5, 2009, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/10/shortsighted-us-policies-on-afghanistan-to-bring-long-term-problems>]

There have been several positive developments in Pakistan over the last six months, such as the Pakistan military's thrust into the Swat Valley to evict pro-Taliban elements and significant improvement in U.S.-Pakistani joint operations along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border that led to the elimination of Baitullah Mehsud in August. Moreover, the Pakistani military is reportedly preparing for an offensive in South Waziristan, where al-Qaeda and other extremists have been deeply entrenched for the last few years. But this recent success in Pakistan should not mislead U.S. policymakers into thinking that the U.S. can turn its attention away from Afghanistan. In fact, now is the time to demonstrate military resolve in Afghanistan so that al-Qaeda and its affiliates will be squeezed on both sides of the border. If the U.S. scales back the mission in Afghanistan at a time when the Taliban views itself as winning the war there, it is possible that the recent gains in Pakistan will be squandered. Anti-extremist constituencies in Pakistan that are fighting for their lives and the future of Pakistan are begging the U.S. to "stay the course" in Afghanistan, with full knowledge that a U.S. retreat would embolden extremists region-wide. Washington should listen to these voices.

2NC – Deterrence Prevents Escalation

1. The use of nuclear weapons has allowed a bilateral dialogue to settle dispute

Alagappa, ’08

[Muthiah, Distinguished Senior Fellow at the East-West Center, editor of several volumes on Asian Security, “The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia”, Winner of the 2009 Choice Outstanding Academic Title Award, Published 2008, <http://globalasia.org/pdf/issue9/Muthiah_Alagappa.pdf>], Accessed 7/23/10]

The stabilizing effect of nuclear weapons may be better illustrated in India-Pakistan relations, as the crises between these two countries during the 1999–2002 period are often cited as demonstrating nuclear weapon-induced instability. Rather than simply attribute these crises to the possession of nuclear weapons, a more accurate and useful reading would ground them in Pakistan’s deliberate policy to alter the status quo through military means on the premise that the risk of escalation to nuclear war would deter India from responding with full-scale conventional retaliation; and in India’s response, employing compellence and coercive diplomacy strategies. In other words, particular goals and strategies rather than nuclear weapons per se precipitated the crises. Further, the outcomes of these two crises revealed the limited utility of nuclear weapons in bringing about even a minor change in the territorial status quo and highlighted the grave risks associated with offensive strategies. Recognition of these limits and the grave consequences in part contributed to the two countries’ subsequent efforts to engage in a comprehensive dialogue to settle the many disputes between them. The crises also led to bilateral understandings and measures to avoid unintended hostilities.

2. In the specific context of Asia, nuclear weapons have actually contributed to peace

Alagappa, ‘08

[Muthiah, Distinguished Senior Fellow at the East-West Center, editor of several volumes on Asian Security, “The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia”, Winner of the 2009 Choice Outstanding Academic Title Award, Published 2008, <http://globalasia.org/pdf/issue9/Muthiah_Alagappa.pdf>]

The primary argument of this article is that although there could be destabilizing situations, on net, nuclear weapons have contributed to peace, security, and stability **in Asia**. This argument is supported on the following grounds. First, nuclear weapons have not fundamentally disrupted the regional distribution of power or intensified security dilemmas. In fact by assuaging the security concerns of weak and vulnerable states they promote stability in conflict prone dyads. Second, fear of the devastating consequences of a nuclear exchange prevents the outbreak and escalation of regional hostilities to full-scale war, strengthens the political and military status quo, and impels conflicting parties to freeze the conflict or explore a negotiated settlement. Third, the combination of minimum deterrence strategies and general deterrence postures enhances stability among major powers and avoids strategic arms races like that during the Cold War. Finally, nuclear weapons reinforce the trend in the region to circumscribe and transform the role of force in international politics. The article further argues that the oftenposited destabilizing effects of nuclear weapons (dangers associated with new nuclear-weapon states, domino effect, preventive military action, and early use postures) have not materialized. There are indeed risks associated with nuclear weapons. However, they must be addressed on their own merits and not be advanced as a reason to deny the security relevance of nuclear weapons. The effort of the non-proliferation community to stop the spread of nuclear weapons on the basis of risks associated with nuclear weapons in the hands of “new” states generates an unproductive and futile debate.

Miscellaneous – Afghanistan Troop Presence Good

Withdrawal would have multiple consequences – Pakistani terrorism, destabilization, violent Islamism, and loss of NATO credibility

Fox, ’10

[Liam, MP, Secretary of State for Defense in the United Kingdom, “Afghanistan: Standing Shoulder to Shoulder with the US”, July 7, 2010, The Heritage Foundation, <http://heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/07/Afghanistan-Standing-Shoulder-to-Shoulder-with-the-United-States>]

The Taliban were driven out of power by Afghan and international forces. Al-Qaeda fled to the border areas of Pakistan. Although reduced and under considerable pressure, they are still there and continue to pose a real and significant threat to us. So the first reason we cannot bring our troops home immediately is that their mission is not yet completed. Were we to leave prematurely, without degrading the insurgency and increasing the capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), we would probably see the return of the destructive forces of transnational terrorism. Not only would we risk the return of civil war in Afghanistan creating a security vacuum, but we would also risk the destabilization of Pakistan with potentially unthinkable regional, and possibly nuclear, consequences. The second reason is that it would be a shot in the arm to jihadists everywhere, re-energizing violent radical and extreme Islamism. It would send the signal that we did not have the moral resolve and political fortitude to see through what we ourselves have described as a national security imperative. Premature withdrawal would also damage the credibility of NATO, which has been the cornerstone of the defense of the West for more than half a century. To leave before the job is finished would leave us less safe and less secure. Our resolve would be called into question, our cohesion weakened, and the Alliance undermined. It would be a betrayal of all the sacrifices made by our armed forces in life and limb.

\*\*\*PMC BAD\*\*\*

PMCs Bad F/L [1/3]

1. Private Contractors are ineffective – Law breaking

**Isenberg, ’10**

[David Isenberg, Military Analyst for the Cato Institute**,** "Private Military Contractors as Buzz Lightyear: To Afghanistan and Beyond." The Cato Institute. March 11, 2010. 15 Jul 2010 <http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=11441]

While the role and impact of private military and security contractors in Iraq is hardly a spent issue, increasingly, eyes and attention are turning to Afghanistan. This is hardly surprising. The Obama Administration's surge strategy inevitably means more US and NATO member troops, which, in turn, means more bases needing to be built, more facilities to be managed, and more people to guard them, as well as the convoys that bring in supplies by truck. Remember that the 30,000 extra US troops being deployed to Afghanistan could be accompanied by up to 56,000 additional contractor personnel. These contractors are involved in Base Support, Construction, Translator/Interpreter, Security, Transportation, and Communications Support functions. A January 19 report by the Congressional Research Service states: In Afghanistan, there are currently 52 PSCs licensed to operate in Afghanistan with some 25,000 registered security contractors. PSCs operating in Afghanistan are limited to 500 employees and can only exceed 500 with permission from the Cabinet. Because of the legal restrictions placed on security companies in Afghanistan, a number of PSCs are operating without a license or are exceeding the legal limit, including security contractors working for NATO and the U.S. Government. Many analysts believe that regulations governing PSCs are only enforced in Kabul; outside Kabul there is no government reach at present and local governors, chiefs of police, and politicians run their own illegal PSCs. Estimates of the total number of security contractors in Afghanistan, including those that are not licensed, are as high as 70,000. The majority of these PSCs do not work for the U.S. government. Responding to the concerns over the use of PSCs in Afghanistan, in November 2009, President Karzai stated a goal of closing down all PSCs in two years**.** From the viewpoint of ensuring accountability over contractors this is obviously not the best of all possible worlds. But it may be of some small comfort, at least to Western firms, that local, Afghan owned and operated, private contractors may be the ones most likely to run afoul of the law. Still, some U.S. firms have already created their own controversies. Just last week US Defense Secretary, Robert Gates, said he will review allegations of misconduct in Afghanistan by the firm formerly known as Blackwater. The company is mired in allegations that it has previously misappropriated government weapons and hired people with violent backgrounds. But in the meantime it is still getting contracts. Just yesterday the Pentagon announced that Xe subsidiary Presidential Airways, Inc. was awarded a $39,084,532 task order for rotary wing aircraft, to perform passenger and cargo air transportation services in Afghanistan, to be completed by Nov. 30, 2010. And despite the recent Senate Armed Services Committee hearing into various misdeeds committed by contractors working for Paravant, a Xe Service subsidiary or shell company, depending on how you look at it, that was working for Raytheon Technical Services, Xe may well win later this month a new Pentagon contract that could be worth as much as a billion dollars to train the Afghan police. Although how that could happen given Xe/Blackwater's history remains a mystery. Spencer Ackerman at the *Washington Independent* notes that the military command responsible for training Afghan security forces said that good-government contract rules prevent them from banning Blackwater**.** Specifically, an obscure contracting rule known as Federal Acquisition Regulation 9.406-2 prevents an acquisition official for banning a company from being awarded a contract unless the company has been formally "debarred" from eligibility - something that has never happened in Blackwater's case. However, several criteria for debarment appear to apply to Blackwater, including "commission of fraud," "theft," "falsification or destruction of records, making false statements," "a history of failure to perform, or of unsatisfactory performance of, one or more contracts," and "violations of the Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988."

PMCs Bad F/L [2/3]

2. Abuses done by security contractors escalate anti-American sentiments and prevent the U.S. winning its Hearts and Minds campaign

**Schwartz, ’10**

[Moshe, Specialist in Defense Acquisition, January 19, 10 “The Department of Defense’s Use of Private Security Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background, Analysis, and Options for Congress,” <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA513870>]

According to the Army Field Manual on counterinsurgency, one of the fundamental tenets of counterinsurgency operations—such as those undertaken in Iraq and Afghanistan—is to establish and maintain security while simultaneously winning the hearts and minds of the local population. Abuses by security forces, according to the manual, can be a major escalating factor in insurgencies.39Abuses committed by contractors, including contractors working for other U.S. agencies, can also strengthen anti-American insurgents.40 There have been published reports of local nationals being abused and mistreated by DOD contractors in such incidents as the summary shooting by a private security contractor of an Afghan who was handcuffed,41 the shooting of Iraqi civilians,42 and the abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.43 (It should be noted that there have also been reports of military personnel abusing and otherwise mistreating local nationals, including the abuses that took place at Abu Ghraib prison.44 CRS has not conducted an analysis to determine whether the incidence of abuses is higher among contractors than it is among military personnel.)

3. Private Security companies fund the Taliban and cripple the U.S. Economy

Filkins, ’10

[Foreign Correspondent for the New York Times, June 6, 2010, [Dexter, “Rule of The Gun Convoy Guards in Afghanistan Face an Inquiry”, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/07/world/asia/07convoys.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1>]

Afghanistan — For months, reports have abounded here that the Afghan mercenaries who escort American and other [**NATO**](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/n/north_atlantic_treaty_organization/index.html?inline=nyt-org) convoys through the badlands have been bribing [**Taliban**](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/t/taliban/index.html?inline=nyt-org) insurgents to let them pass. Then came a series of events last month that suggested all-out collusion with the insurgents. After a pair of bloody confrontations with Afghan civilians, two of the biggest private security companies — Watan Risk Management and Compass Security — were banned from escorting NATO convoys on the highway between Kabul and Kandahar. The ban took effect on May 14. At 10:30 a.m. that day, a NATO supply convoy rolling through the area came under attack. An Afghan driver and a soldier were killed, and a truck was overturned and burned. Within two weeks, with more than 1,000 trucks sitting stalled on the highway, the Afghan government granted Watan and Compass permission to resume. Watan’s president, Rashid Popal, strongly denied any suggestion that his men either colluded with insurgents or orchestrated attacks to emphasize the need for their services. Executives with Compass Security did not respond to questions. But the episode, and others like it, has raised the suspicions of investigators here and in Washington, who are trying to track the tens of millions in taxpayer dollars paid to private security companies to move supplies to American and other NATO bases. Although the investigation is not complete, the officials suspect that at least some of these security companies — many of which have ties to top Afghan officials — are using American money to bribe the Taliban. The officials suspect that the security companies may also engage in fake fighting to increase the sense of risk on the roads, and that they may sometimes stage attacks against competitors. The suspicions raise fundamental questions about the conduct of operations here, since the convoys, and the supplies they deliver, are the lifeblood of the war effort. “We’re funding both sides of the war,” a NATO official in Kabul said. The official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because the investigation was incomplete, said he believed millions of dollars were making their way to the Taliban. The investigation is complicated by, among other things, the fact that some of the private security companies are owned by relatives of President [**Hamid Karzai**](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/k/hamid_karzai/index.html?inline=nyt-per) and other senior Afghan officials**.** Mr. Popal, for instance, is a cousin of Mr. Karzai, and Western officials say that Watan Risk Management’s largest shareholder is Mr. Karzai’s brother Qayum. The principal goal of the American-led campaign here is to prepare an Afghan state and army to fightthe Taliban themselves. The possibility of collusion between the Taliban and Afghan officials suggests that, rather than fighting each another, the two Afghan sides may often cooperate under the noses of their wealthy benefactors. “People think the insurgency and the government are separate, and that is just not always the case,” another NATO official in Kabul said. “What we are finding is that they are often bound up together.” The security companies, which appear to operate under little supervision, have sometimes wreaked havoc on Afghan civilians. Some of the private security companies have been known to attack villages on routes where convoys have come under fire, Western officials here say. Records show there are 52 government-registered security companies, with 24,000 gunmen, most of them Afghans. But many, if not most, of the security companies are not registered at all, do not advertise themselves and do not necessarily restrain their gunmen with training or rules of engagement. Some appear to be little more than gangs with guns. In the city of Kandahar alone, at least 23 armed groups — ostensibly

PMCs Bad F/L [3/3]

security companies not registered with the government — are operating under virtually no government control, Western and Afghan officials said. On Kandahar’s chaotic streets, armed men can often be seen roaming about without any uniforms or identification. “There are thousands of people that have been paid by both civilian and military organizations to escort their convoys, and they all pose a problem,” said Hanif Atmar, the Afghan interior minister. (Mr. Atmar resigned under pressure from President Karzai on Sunday.) “The Afghan people are not ready to accept the private companies’ providing public security.”

4. PMC outsourcing put us on the verge of breakdown.

Singer, ’07

[Peter Singer, Senior Fellow and Director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative at the Brookings Institution. **,** September 2007, “Can’t Win With ‘Em, Can’t Go To War Without ‘Em: Private Military Contractors and Counterinsurgency”, <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2007/0927militarycontractors/0927militarycontractors.pdf>]

At the same time, the use of contractors appears to be hampering efforts to actually win the counterinsurgency campaign on multiple levels. Many of those vested in the system, both public and private leaders, will try to convince us to ignore this cycle. They will describe such evident pattern of incidents as “mere anomalies,” portray private firms outside the chain of command as somehow “part of the total force,” or claim that “We have no other choice.” These are the denials of pushers, enablers, and addicts. Our military outsourcing has become an addiction that is quickly spiraling to a breakdown. Only an open and honest intervention, a step back from the precipice of over-outsourcing, can break us out of the vicious cycle into which we have locked our national security. Will our leaders have the will to just say no?

5. Private contractor misconduct fuels instability and undermines the local government

**Schwartz, ’10**

[Moshe, Specialist in Defense Acquisition, January 19, 10 “The Department of Defense’s Use of Private Security Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background, Analysis, and Options for Congress,” <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA513870>]

According to many analysts, these events have in fact undermined the U.S. mission in Iraq and Afghanistan.48 An Iraqi Interior Ministry official, discussing the behavior of private security contractors, said “Iraqis do not know them as Blackwater or other PSCs but only as Americans.”49 One senior military officer reportedly stated that the actions of armed PSCs “can turn an entire district against us.”50 Some analysts also contend that PSCs can be a direct threat to the legitimacy of the local government. These analysts argue that if counterinsurgency operations are a competition for legitimacy but the government is allowing armed contractors to operate in the country without the contractors being held accountable for their actions, then the government itself can be viewed as not legitimate in the eyes of the local population. These analysts point to the recent court decision dismissing the case against former Blackwater employees as a case in point where the legitimacy of the U.S. and local government is being undermined by the actions of PSCs.51 The perception that DOD and other government agencies are deploying PSCs who abuse and mistreat people can fan anti-American sentiment and strengthen insurgents, even when no abuses are taking place. There have been reports of an anti-American campaign in Pakistan, where stories are circulating of U.S. private security contractors running amok and armed Americans harassing and terrifying residents.52 U.S. efforts can also be undermined when DOD has ties with groups that kill civilians or government officials, even if the perpetrators were not working for DOD when the killings took place. In June 2009, the provincial police chief of Kandahar, Afghanistan, was killed by a group that worked as a private security contractor for DOD.53

Terrorism Funding Extension

**The Private Security Companies Have ties to the Taliban**

Filkins, ’10

[Dexter, Foreign Correspondent for the New York Times, “Rule of The Gun Convoy Guards in Afghanistan Face an Inquiry”, June 6th 2010m <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/07/world/asia/07convoys.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1>]

The security companies’ methods are sometimes unorthodox. While at least some of the companies are believed to be bribing Taliban fighters, many have also been known to act with extreme harshness toward villagers or insurgents who have tried to interfere with their convoys. One of the more notorious commanders of a private security outfit is an Afghan named Ruhullah, who, like many Afghans, goes by one name. Mr. Ruhullah controls a company called Commando Security, which escorts convoys between Kandahar and Helmand Province to the west. While he is suspected of striking deals with some Taliban fighters, Mr. Ruhullah is known to have dealt brutally with those — civilians or insurgents — who have impeded the flow of his trucks. “He’s laid waste to entire villages,” said an official at the Interior Ministry who spoke on the condition of anonymity. Many of the private security companies, including the one owned by Mr. Ruhullah, appear to be under the influence of [Ahmed Wali Karzai](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/k/ahmed_wali_karzai/index.html?inline=nyt-per), a brother of President Karzai and the chairman of the Kandahar Provincial Council. Though nominally an American ally, Ahmed Wali Karzai has surfaced in numerous intelligence and law enforcement reports connecting him to Afghanistan’s booming opium trade. He did not respond to questions for this article, but he has denied any involvement in Afghanistan’s narcotics trade. The NATO official, speaking on the condition of anonymity, said the Popals, the nominal owners of Watan Risk Management, cooperate with Ahmed Wali Karzai and Mr. Ruhullah. “They are very, very close,” he said. Mr. Popal, in his interview, said he had no contact with anyone in President Karzai’s immediate family. “This is just politics,” he said of the accusations made against him. American and Afghan officials said that Ahmed Wali Karzai was moving rapidly to bring the 23 unregistered security companies in Kandahar under his own control. With the government’s support, Ahmed Wali Karzai, together with Mr. Ruhullah, plan to form an umbrella company, called the Kandahar Security Force, that will broker business for the various individual companies, a senior NATO official said. “He wants a cut off every contract,” the NATO official in Kabul said. At least two groups of American investigators are focusing on potential bribes to the Taliban: the House national security subcommittee, whose chairman is Representative John F. Tierney, a Democrat from Massachusetts; and another group working for NATO in Kabul. While the practice of buying off the enemy may seem extraordinary, it is neither unusual here nor unprecedented. Many Afghans, even those in the government, have relatives, even brothers and sons, in the Taliban. Western officials believe that Afghan officials have paid bribes to the Taliban before — for instance, so that they will refrain from attacking the transmission towers that make up the country’s cellphone network. Officials familiar with the investigations say that most, if not all, of the security companies actually do fight the Taliban. The evidence, they say, suggests that the Afghan security companies sometimes make deals with insurgents when they feel they have to — that is, where the Taliban are too strong to be defeated. “The rule seems to be, if the attack is small, then crush it,” the Interior Ministry official said. “But if the presence of Taliban is too big to crush, then make a deal.” Mr. Popal, the Watan executive, said that his security teams regularly fought the Taliban, and died doing so. Last year, he said, his company lost 250 men. “We fight the Taliban,” Mr. Popal said. Exact casualty figures are difficult to come by, because statistics are kept only for the Host Nation Trucking contract. American officials in Kabul say 27 security contractors were killed between April 2009 and May 2010, and 38 were wounded. Investigators say they are having a hard time putting a dollar figure on the amount the Taliban may be receiving, in part because the trucking companies are not required to report what they pay for security. Trucking contractors pay security companies, which sometimes award subcontractors to other companies, which sometimes do the same. “I can’t tell you about the sub to the sub to the sub,” the senior NATO official said, speaking on the condition of anonymity. As a result, much about the relationships between the security companies and the Taliban is shrouded in mystery. Afghan and NATO officials say that anecdotal evidence suggests that in order to keep their trucks moving — and to keep up their business — some companies may sometimes pay Taliban fighters not to attack, to sometimes mount attacks on competitors, or, as is suspected in the case in Maidan Shahr, to attack NATO forces. “It would be my expectation that people might create their own demand,” said [Maj. Gen. Nick Carter](http://www.nato.int/isaf/structure/bio/rc_s/carter.html), the commander of NATO forces in southern Afghanistan. “It is essential that these highways move freely without extortion and racketeering.” Officials say that they are not certain what happened last month in Maidan Shahr, but that some of the circumstances surrounding the case points to the possibility of some sort of collusion with insurgents or criminals. Mohammed Halim Fedai, the governor of Wardak Province and the official who pushed for the ban on Watan and Compass, said he was not sure what happened either. But he noted that Watan Risk Management came under attack far less frequently than the other security companies did. “Maybe they are just stronger, so the Taliban are afraid of them,” he said.

PMCs Bad – Hostility Ext

**Increased amounts of Private Military Contractors cause hostility against the United States due to misconduct.**

Jordan, ’09

[Craig S. Jordan, Student at New England School of Law ,35 N.E. J. on Crim. & Civ. Con. “Who Will Guard the Accountability of Private Military Contractors in Areas of Armed Conflict” 309]

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the "War on Terror," have marked a significant departure from the methods adhered to in traditional  [\*310]  U.S. combat operations. **[n7](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1279046205675&returnToKey=20_T9735917073&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.8223.4750947624" \l "n7)** One of the most drastic changes is the use and role of private military contractors (PMCs). [n8](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1279046205675&returnToKey=20_T9735917073&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.8223.4750947624" \l "n8) Currently, there are thousands of **PMCs** operating in Iraq, many of whom are engaged in activities traditionally reserved to the U.S. Armed Forces. [n9](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1279046205675&returnToKey=20_T9735917073&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.8223.4750947624" \l "n9) A gap in the laws of armed conflict has allowed PMCs to operate free from any true measure of criminal liability. [n10](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1279046205675&returnToKey=20_T9735917073&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.8223.4750947624" \l "n10) Recent allegations of criminal misconduct by private military contractors have highlighted this lack of accountability. [n11](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1279046205675&returnToKey=20_T9735917073&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.8223.4750947624" \l "n11) There are three important reasons for the need to address the accountability of **PMCs**. First is the integrity of the U.S. Armed Forces in war zones or contingency operations. **[n12](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1279046205675&returnToKey=20_T9735917073&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.8223.4750947624" \l "n12)** The failure to investigate or prosecute wrongdoings by persons acting on behalf of, or in conjunction with, U.S. military operations can have an adverse effect on U.S. relations with the host country and create a more hostile environment, thus making military campaigns more difficult to sustain. [n13](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1279046205675&returnToKey=20_T9735917073&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.8223.4750947624" \l "n13) Second, though many PMCs have military experience, [n14](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1279046205675&returnToKey=20_T9735917073&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.8223.4750947624" \l "n14) the overall lack of military training and discipline provided by private military contracting companies suggests an increased likelihood of **PMC** misconduct in war or contingency operations. [n15](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1279046205675&returnToKey=20_T9735917073&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.8223.4750947624" \l "n15) The third reason is to ensure that companies involved in combat and contingency operations are complying with appropriate rules of  [\*311]  armed conduct. [n16](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1279046205675&returnToKey=20_T9735917073&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.8223.4750947624" \l "n16) As the use of force is traditionally a state action delegated to formal militaries, the use of private forces to conduct such operations should be subject to a higher level of scrutiny. [n17](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1279046205675&returnToKey=20_T9735917073&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.8223.4750947624" \l "n17) Higher scrutiny is necessary to preserve civil-military relationships, as well as to deter human-rights violations and other crimes that may occur in war zones. [n18](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1279046205675&returnToKey=20_T9735917073&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.8223.4750947624" \l "n18) Abraham Lincoln's law-of-war advisor, Francis Lieber, asserted that strict enforcement of the rules of war is essential to maintain the "discipline and morale of America's Armed Forces and [to] uphold our nation's reputation."

PMCs Growing in Number

The number of Private Military Contractors in Afghanistan is high, and rising.

**Lendman, ’10**

[Stephan, Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization, January 19, 2010, “Outsourcing War: The Rise of Private Military Contractors (PMCs)”, http://www.thepeoplesvoice.org/TPV3/Voices.php/2010/01/19/outsourcing-war-the-rise-of-private-mili,July 16th 2010]

According to a September 21, 2009 Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report, as of June 2009, PMCs in Afghanistan numbered 73,968, and a later year end 2009 US Central Command figure is over 104,000 and rising. The expense is enormous and growing with CRS reporting that supporting each soldier costs $1 million annually, in large part because of rampant waste, fraud and abuse, unmonitored and unchecked. With America heading for 100,000 troops on the ground and more likely coming, $100 billion will be spent annually supporting them, then more billions as new forces arrive, and the Iraq amount is even greater - much, or perhaps most, from supplemental funding for both theaters on top of America's largest ever military budget at a time the country has no enemies except for ones it makes by invading and occupying other countries and waging global proxy wars.

Solvency – Restrictions Key [1/2]

Restrictions key to prevent misconduct and win the hearts and minds of the people.

**Schwartz, ’10**

[Specialist in Defense Acquisition**,** January 19, 2010[Moshe, The Department of Defense’s Use of Private Security Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background, Analysis, and Options for Congress, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA513870>]

**Analysts calling for restrictions on the use of PSCs generally believe that contractors are more likely to commit abuses or other atrocities than military personnel.** Some analysts believe that the culture of the military, which is focused on mission success and not on profit or contractual considerations, makes it less likely that uniformed personnel will behave inappropriately. Some analysts and DOD officials believe that lax contractor oversight has significantly contributed to contractor abuses.56 This sentiment was echoed by then Senator Barack Obama, who stated **“we cannot win a fight for hearts and minds when we outsource critical missions to unaccountable contractors.”**57 **According to these analysts, improved oversight and accountability could mitigate the negative effects that the use of PSCs and other contractors has had on U.S. efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and could potentially bring the standard of behavior of PSCs on par with that of uniformed personnel.**

**Restrict PSCs to static security, with an exception for local nationals.**

**Schwartz, ’10**

[Specialist in Defense Acquisition**,** January 19, 2010[Moshe, The Department of Defense’s Use of Private Security Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background, Analysis, and Options for Congress, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA513870>]

Allowing local national contractors to participate in convoy and personal security would minimize the impact of such a restriction on military forces. Proponents argue that reserving an exception for local nationals gives the military more flexibility in using PSCs without adding significant risk. As discussed above, using local national contractors is an important element in DOD’s counterinsurgency strategy. Local nationals understand the language and are subject to local jurisdiction. Few of the high-profile incidents between PSCs and local citizens involved local national security contractors who were working for the U.S. government. Opponents of this approach will still argue that such a restriction leaves DOD with insufficient forces to accomplish its mission in Iraq and Afghanistan, and that it limits the flexibility that allows DOD to mobilize and demobilize defensive security forces that can be tailored for specific situations in a highly fluid environment. Such a restriction could also hamper DOD in future military operations, particularly in the early days of a conflict when events are particularly fluid and the need to rapidly deploy security personnel could be acute. To address this last issue, Congress could empower a Combatant Commander to waive this restriction in initial phases of an operation, for a period not to exceed one year.

**Regulations are necessary to increase accountability and government oversight.**

**Jones,** ’08

[Oliver Jones, Professor @ University of Oxford, 2008. "IMPLAUSIBLE DENIABILITY: STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ACTS OF PRIVATE MILITARY FIRMS" The Selected Works of Oliver Jones. Available at: http://works.bepress.com/oliver\_jones/2]

The need to PMF regulation, then, is driven by two interconnection concerns:**71** (1) PMFs and their employees do not exist within established legal structures to maintain discipline and respect for human rights (individual accountability); and (2) PMF actions are not subject to public oversight (public accountability). PMFs operate in an environment that is defined by violence. Their very existence relies on conflict. However, while they share the field with military personnel, PMF employees are not subject to the same accountability and discipline mechanisms as their counterparts in the armed forces.72 Military personnel exist within established legal structures, such as the court martial system, and must obey the military code of justice from their State of origin.73 However individual contractors and members of PMFs that have been hired by states are civilians and are therefore not part of this military chain of command.74 Their legal status is murky, discipline is sporadic and accountability is sparse.**75** Government oversight in these circumstances, if present at all, is thin.**76**

Solvency – Restrictions Key [2/2]

Policies must be placed to create legal accountability for PMCs

**Morris, ’09**

[Erika, Professor @ Utah State University, “Private Warfare: History of the Increasing Dependency on Private Military Corporations and Implications”, <http://digitalcommons.usu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1005&context=honors>]

The murkiest of the policy prescriptions, yet one of the primary caveats within the system is creating an atmosphere where legal accountability can be placed upon these corporations and the organizations that hire them. There are many things to consider, but the main issues that need to be solved including restrictions on who can be hired by corporations, what types of organizations and entities that can hire these corporations, and what judicial system will "investigate, prosecute, and punish" any abuses (The Private Military Industry and Iraq 21). It is obvious that international regulation will have to be set in place alongside domestic restrictions. Some of the options that might be implemented include broadening the UN mandate to allow the UN Special Rapporteur ofmercenaries to include PMC's, international measures to provide transparency and sharing of information on PMC's, and mandating necessary safeguards within PMC's to protect against human rights abuses abroad. This could mean allowing PMC's to adopt a voluntary code of conduct or legally defining legitimate and illegitimate activities that PMC's mayor may not engage in. Another level might be to require licensing for those wishing to market services abroad or a blanket registration for all international PMC's (Schreier 116125)

Congressional oversight key to enforcing regulations

**Morris, ’09**

[Erika, Professor @ Utah State University, “Private Warfare: History of the Increasing Dependency on Private Military Corporations and Implications”, <http://digitalcommons.usu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1005&context=honors>]

The other level of regulation is at the national level. These options are far more specific and require rigorous oversight. One of the ways to regulate the industry is by establishing a licensing system where standards are delineated as to contracting and hiring practices that includes what activities are permitted and restricted. Standards may be put in place that requires financial transparency and minimum levels of training and screening for those they hire. The surest way to keep up with the rapidly changing industry is to establish Congressional oversight that can assist in a plethora of issues, including compliance with regulations, establish a system to assess and approve when outsourcing would be appropriate, rather than the use of our private military capabilities (Schreier 134-126).

\*\*\*A2: ECONOMY ADVANTAGE\*\*\*

1NC Economy Frontline [1/4]

1. The US Economy is dependent on the War in Afghanistan

Welsh ‘10

Ian Welsh, 7-3-10, editor, writer, and social media consultant; he was the Managing Editor of FireDogLake and the Agonist, both consistent political blogs reporting specifically on Economics, Foreign Policy, and the Middle East. His work has also appeared at Huffington Post, AlterNet, and Truthout, as well as the now defunct Blogging of the President (BOPNews). “War of Choice.” http://www.ianwelsh.net/actually-afghanistan-is-a-war-of-choice/

Michael Steele’s comments on Afghanistan remind me of my favorite definition of a gaffe: “saying the truth in the worst way possible.” To whit, Steele said that Afghanistan is a war of Obama’s choosing, and that everyone who’s occupied Afghanistan has come to grief over it.  Now one can quibble a bit over the details of who came to grief and who didn’t, but basically he’s right.  Afghanistan went badly for the Russians and the British, most recently.  There’s a reason Afghanistan is called the “graveyard of Empires” and if the US isn’t careful it’ll be the graveyard of the US empire. Likewise, yes, this is a war of choice for Obama.  He could have done his review, said “hey, there are almost no al-Q’aeda fighters in Afghanistan anymore, so we won, let’s go home.”  He could have said “fighting in Afghanistan is seriously destabilizing Pakistan, which is far more important than Afghanistan, so let’s go home.”  He could have said “yes, if we leave, some al-Q’aeda camps might spring up but we can always bomb them and anyway there are plenty of failed states where al-Q’aeda can set up camps and we can’t occupy all of them.” The point is that continuing in Afghanistan was a choice.  Obama could have chosen otherwise.  Not being in Afghanistan will not create an existential threat to the US. So yeah, Steele was right.  Of course, being the RNC chairman, Steele isn’t allowed to say things that make sense and contradict Republican warmongering. Now here’s a truth that Steele didn’t tell.  Obama has to stay in Afghanistan because war spending is one of the only reliable forms of stimulus he has.  The economy is in bad shape, and it needs that stimulus.  Since he can’t get a new large stimulus through Congress that means he MUST keep the Afghan war going if he doesn’t want an economic disaster, which would then lead to an electoral disaster. This is the sad truth of America: the only acceptable form of Keynesian spending is military Keynesianism. Instead of hiring tens of thousands of teachers, building a high speed rail network across the country, refitting every building to be energy efficient and doing a massive solar and wind build-out to reduce dependence on oil, well, the US would rather turn Afghans and Pakistanis into a fine red mist. That fine red mist is what’s keeping the American economy from going under entirely.  And so, even if it’s the wrong thing to do, even if it’s the graveyard of America’s Empire, the war will continue.

1. Military spending key to the reviving US economy

Borch ‘10

UAB Media, 6-17-10, “UAB Study Confirms Military Spending Helps States Survive Poor Economy.” Casey Borch, Ph.D., studies and teaches social psychology and medical and political sociology. He has co-authored studies that have been published in the Journal of Adolescence, Sociological Forum and Public Opinion Journal. He is an assistant professor in the UAB Department of Sociology.) http://main.uab.edu/Sites/MediaRelations/articles/78097/

States in which defense spending is high are better equipped to withstand the effects of an economic downturn than others, according to a new study led by University of Alabama at Birmingham (UAB) Assistant Professor of Sociology Casey Borch, Ph.D. The study, published this week in the June issue of the journal *Social Forces*, confirms that states with high levels of defense spending have lower poverty rates, less income inequality, lower unemployment and higher median family income. It also demonstrates that the U.S. economy is increasingly dependent on military spending. "Politicians always have assumed that military spending helps the economy, but there have been very few studies to prove that it's true. No studies have examined the effects of military spending on as many measures of economic well-being at the state level as our study," said Borch, who teaches in the UAB Department of Sociology and Social Work. For this study, Borch and his team examined data taken from 49 states during the post-Vietnam War era, from 1977 to 2004, to determine the role of military spending in a peacetime economy. The time span coincided with a 30-year decline in and dependence on manufacturing in the United States, Borch said. The researchers reviewed spending on defense contracts and military personnel and compared it to changes in economic indicators over time - poverty and unemployment rates, median family income and income disparities. The researchers also adjusted for variables such as the dominant political party in a state, strength of labor unions, number of Fortune 500 companies, gross state product (GSP) from manufacturing and proportion of military and non-military federal spending. The researchers found, for example, that an increase in a state's dependence on military spending, from 5 to 10 percent of its total GSP, increased employment about 1 percent - despite nationwide declines in manufacturing - and a $14,000 per household increase in median family income. In addition, the Gini Index, a measure of income distribution across a population, fell about 6 percent. Poverty rates fell about 2 percent. Data in the study showed that decreased military spending coincided with times of economic hardship in the states. For example, the 1990s were marked by slowdowns in military spending, and many state economies dependent on military spending suffered higher unemployment, slow economic growth and widening income inequality, Borch said. "For some cities and states, military spending is an incredibly important part of the local economy," said Borch. "For example, in places like Virginia, which has military bases and a shipbuilding center, there is an enormous amount of military spending, and Huntsville, Ala., is the third most dependent metropolitan statistical area in the country. Other states like Montana and Idaho enjoy less. Therefore, you have politicians and community leaders who work to get military spending funneled into their states because it helps the state economy." The United States ranks No. 1 in the world for military spending, said Borch. Russia ranks second, with a military budget about seven times smaller than the United States. "Former U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower warned us against what he called the military industrial complex - the takeover of the economic system by military contractors and the military in general," Borch said. "This study shouldn't be read as advocating for more military spending to ensure economic well-being of individuals. But it points to a stubborn reality of the modern United States - that the economic system that Eisenhower warned us about has become reality, and we have become increasingly dependent on military spending."

1NC Economy Frontline [2/4]

1. Reduction in military spending is bad—it emboldens Iran and kills alliances

Kagan ‘10

Robert Kagan, Senior Associate @ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “No time to cut defense spending”, Feb 3, 2009, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/02/AR2009020202618.html>

Pentagon officials have leaked word that the Office of Management and Budget has ordered a 10 percent cut in defense spending for the coming fiscal year, giving Defense Secretary Robert Gates a substantially smaller budget than he requested. Here are five reasons President Obama should side with Gates over the green-eyeshade boys. It doesn't make fiscal sense to cut the defense budget when everyone is scrambling for measures to stimulate the economy. Already, under the current Pentagon budget, defense contractors will begin shutting down production lines in the next couple of years -- putting people out of work. Rather than cutting, the Obama administration ought to be increasing defense spending. As Harvard economist Martin Feldstein recently noted on this page, defense spending is exactly the kind of expenditure that can have an immediate impact on the economy. A reduction in defense spending this year would unnerve American allies and undercut efforts to gain greater cooperation. There is already a sense around the world, fed by irresponsible pundits here at home, that the United States is in terminal decline. Many fear that the economic crisis will cause the United States to pull back from overseas commitments. The announcement of a defense cutback would be taken by the world as evidence that the American retreat has begun. This would make it harder to press allies to do more. The Obama administration rightly plans to encourage European allies to increase defense capabilities so they can more equitably share the burden of global commitments. This will be a tough sell if the United States is cutting its own defense budget. In Afghanistan, there are already concerns that the United States may be "short of breath." In Pakistan, the military may be tempted to wait out what its members perceive as America's flagging commitment to the region. A reduction in defense funding would feed these perceptions and make it harder for Obama's newly appointed special envoy, Richard Holbrooke, to press for necessary changes in both countries. What worries allies cheers and emboldens potential adversaries. The Obama administration is right to reach out and begin direct talks with leaders in Tehran. But the already-slim chances of success will grow slimmer if Iranian leaders believe that the United States may soon begin pulling back from their part of the world. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's spokesman has already declared that the United States has lost its power -- just because President Obama said he is willing to talk. Imagine how that perception would be reinforced if Obama starts cutting funding for an already inadequately funded force. Similarly, the Obama administration is right to want to begin negotiations with Russia over missile defense and arms control. But it is a poor opening gambit to announce a cut in American defense spending before negotiations even begin. If Russian leaders believe that the United States is looking for a way out of weapons systems -- missile defense in particular -- they will negotiate accordingly. They might ask why they should make a deal at all. Cuts in the defense budget would have consequences in other areas of the budget, most notably foreign aid. Some Republicans have already begun to grumble about foreign aid and development spending. If the Obama administration begins by cutting defense, it will be much harder to persuade Republicans to support foreign aid. Finally, everyone knows the U.S. military is stretched thin. Some may hope that Obama can begin substantially drawing down U.S. force levels in Iraq this year. No doubt he can to some extent. But this is an especially critical year in Iraq. The most recent round of elections is only one of three: District elections are in June and all-important parliamentary elections are in December. The head of U.S. Central Command, Gen. David Petraeus, is unlikely to recommend a steep cut with so much at stake. Moreover, any reduction of U.S. forces in Iraq is going to be matched by an increase of forces in Afghanistan. The strain on U.S. ground forces, even with reductions in Iraq, won't begin to ease until the end of next year. And that assumes that the situation in Iraq stays quiet, that there is progress in Afghanistan, that Pakistan doesn't explode and that no other unforeseen events require American action. At a time when people talk of trillion-dollar stimulus packages, cutting 10 percent from the defense budget is a pittance, especially given the high price we will pay in America's global position. The United States spends about 4 percent of GDP on defense. In 1962, the figure was 9 percent. Some unreconstructed anti-Cold Warriors from the 1980s may see the Obama revolution as a return to the good old days of battling against Ronald Reagan's defense spending. But that's not the way Barack Obama ran for president. He didn't promise defense cuts. On the contrary, he called for additional forces for the Army and Marines. He insisted that the American military needs to remain the strongest and best-equipped in the world. In his inaugural address, President Obama reminded Americans that the nation is still at war. That being so, this is not the time to start weakening the armed forces.

1NC Economy Frontline [3/4]

1. U.S. not key to world economy – prefer our evidence, it’s in the context of recovery.

The Economist ‘09

The Economist, “Decoupling 2.0” May 21, 2009, http://www.economist.com/opinion/displaystory.cfm ?story\_id=13697292

REMEMBER the debate about decoupling? A year ago, many commentators—including this newspaper—argued that emerging economies had become more resilient to an American recession, thanks to their strong domestic markets and prudent macroeconomic policies. Naysayers claimed America’s weakness would fell the emerging world. Over the past six months the global slump seemed to prove the sceptics right. Emerging economies reeled and decoupling was ridiculed. Yet perhaps the idea was dismissed too soon. Even if America’s output remains weak, there are signs that some of the larger emerging economies could see a decent rebound. China is exhibit A of this new decoupling: its economy began to accelerate again in the first four months of this year. Fixed investment is growing at its fastest pace since 2006 and consumption is holding up well. Despite debate over the accuracy of China’s GDP figures (see article), most economists agree that output will grow faster than seemed plausible only a few months ago. Growth this year could be close to 8%. Such optimism has fuelled commodity prices which have, in turn, brightened the outlook for Brazil and other commodity exporters. That said, even the best performing countries will grow more slowly than they did between 2004 and 2007. Nor will the resilience be universal: eastern Europe’s indebted economies will suffer as global banks cut back, and emerging economies intertwined with America, such as Mexico, will continue to be hit hard. So will smaller, more trade-dependent countries. Decoupling 2.0 is a narrower phenomenon, confined to a few of the biggest, and least indebted, emerging economies. It is based on two under-appreciated facts: the biggest emerging economies are less dependent on American spending than commonly believed; and they have proven more able and willing to respond to economic weakness than many feared. Economies such as China or Brazil were walloped late last year not only, or even mainly, because American demand plunged. (Over half of China’s exports go to other emerging economies, and China recently overtook the United States as Brazil’s biggest export market.) They were hit hard by the near-collapse of global credit markets and the dramatic destocking by shell-shocked firms. In addition, many emerging countries had been aggressively tightening monetary policy to fight inflation just before these shocks hit. The result was that domestic demand slumped even as exports fell.

1. **Economy resilient – Obama administration prevents depression**

Jaffe ‘09

Matthew, ABCnews reporter for the Treasury Department and financial issues from Washington, D.C., “Back from the Abyss”: Obama Adviser Touts Economic Rescue”, June 17, <http://blogs.abcnews.com/politicalpunch/2009/07/back-from-the-abyss-obama-adviser-touts-economic-rescue.html>

The nation’s economy has been rescued from the brink of collapse, President Obama’s top economic adviser believes. In excerpts released by the White House, National Economic Council director Larry Summers touts the progress made by the administration in averting a financial meltdown. “We were at the brink of catastrophe at the beginning of the year, but we have walked some substantial distance back from the abyss,” Summers plans to say this morning at the Peterson Institute in Washington. “Substantial progress has been made in rescuing the economy from the risk of economic collapse that looked all too real six months ago.” When the administration entered office back in January, Summers recalls, “the economy was in free-fall at the start of the year with no apparent limit on how much worse things could get…fear was widespread and confidence was scarce.” But thanks to President Obama’s two-tiered approach of addressing the immediate crisis and building for long-term growth, Summers says, “the distance we have traveled these past six months is remarkable.” “First, the most immediate priority was to rescue the economy by restoring confidence and breaking the vicious cycle of economic contraction and financial failure,” outlines Summers. “Second, the recovery from this crisis would be built not on the flimsy foundation of asset bubbles but on the firm foundation of productive investment and long-term growth.” In recent weeks, the administration has sent their sweeping financial regulatory reform proposals down Pennsylvania Avenue to Congress. Going forward, Summers calls for an economy that is more export-oriented and more balanced in terms of income distribution. While acknowledging that the administration’s agenda is “ambitious”, Summers believes it will “lay a foundation for future prosperity and for the confidence on which the current recovery depends.”

1NC Economy Frontline [4/4]

1. Economic decline does not cause violence or war

Miller 2K

Morris, Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, “Poverty as a cause of wars?” Morris Miller is an economist, adjunct professor in the University of Ottawa’s Faculty of Administration, consultant on international development issues, former Executive Director and Senior Economist at the World Bank, attended McGill and Harvard Universities and the London School of Economics, majoring in economic policy. Has taught at McGill University, the University of Maryland, Carleton University and the World Bank's Economic Development Institute. http://www.management.uottawa.ca/miller/poverty.htm

The question may be reformulated. Do wars spring from a popular reaction to a sudden economic crisis that exacerbates poverty and growing disparities in wealth and incomes? Perhaps one could argue, as some scholars do, that it is some dramatic event or sequence of such events leading to the exacerbation of poverty that, in turn, leads to this deplorable denouement. This exogenous factor might act as a catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who would then possibly be tempted to seek a diversion by finding or, if need be, fabricating an enemy and setting in train the process leading to war. According to a study undertaken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. After studying ninety-three episodes of economic crisis in twenty-two countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since the Second World War they concluded that:19 Much of the conventional wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong ... The severity of economic crisis - as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth - bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes ... (or, in democratic states, rarely) to an outbreak of violence ... In the cases of dictatorships and semidemocracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another).

1. Economy high, no depression on the horizon

Waddell ‘10

David, 7-13, “Slow Growth, Not Double Dip, On Horizon,” David Waddell is regularly featured in the Wall Street Journal, USA Today and Forbes, as well as on Fox Business News and CNBC. He is the president and CEO of Memphis-based Waddell & Associates. He holds a BA in Economics from the University of the South and received his MBA degree with a concentration in finance and investments at the F.W. Olin School at Babson College.) http://www.memphisdailynews.com/editorial/Article.aspx?id=51272

Equity markets gathered their composure last week with the S&P 500 advancing over 5 percent. Markets have a habit of siding with the minority, and the statistic I found most reassuring heading into the week was that 24 percent of all retail investors surveyed by the American Association of Individual Investors were bullish. This is understandable as the most recent media brainwashing claims that we will “double dip” back into recession and that a slower economy means weaker market returns. Let’s investigate. There have been two legitimate double dips in the U.S. economy, both of which were government policy induced, occurring in 1937 and 1981. In the early 1980s, while emerging from a recession, Fed Chair Volker increased the Federal interest rate significantly to stifle inflation. While Volker won the inflation battle, he created yet another recession. In the wake of the Great Depression, policy makers also slipped the economy in reverse by prematurely reducing fiscal and monetary stimulus. The economics of the Great Depression were clumsy at best, as many of the theories that help guide monetary policy today hadn’t yet been theorized. Given the cumulative knowledge at the Fed today, it is unlikely monetary conditions will tighten until economic momentum has confirmed escape velocity. Furthermore, the federal government seems all too willing to spend money on the economy’s behalf. U.S. economic policy continues to pursue monetary and fiscal expansion, differing from the policy stances contributing to the last two double dips. Absent policy detractors, a double dip would require premature economic exhaustion.While economic indicators do confirm a slowdown in recent activity, they do not indicate a reversal. Recent releases measuring manufacturing and service activity exhibit slower growth, but growth nonetheless. Employment conditions may be anemic, but they are improving. With the global economy slated to grow 4.5 percent this year and 4.25 percent next year (as forecast by the International Monetary Fund) it would be difficult for the U.S., which represents 20 percent of global economic activity, not to benefit. In fact, the growth expectations for the U.S. have risen for 2010 and 2011 to 3.3 and 2.9 percent, respectively. So while growth may not be robust, and may taper somewhat, we should see 3 percent growth rate for the U.S. and 4 percent plus for the world over the next 18 months. Is this enough to power stock markets? After comparing annual GDP and stock market returns going back to 1930, I found if we concentrate on the “just fine” growth rates between 2 and 4 percent, the average annual market return has been 13.1 percent with only four of the 22 years posting negative returns. With GDP growth all but assured for 2010, it’s 2011 that remains in question. Based on history and the information available today, slow growth appears likely while a double dip appears unlikely. So while a 2-3 percent growth rate may not satisfy economists, it should satisfy investors.

2NC Defense Spending Good EXT

Defense Spending boosts the economy

Korb ‘09

Lawrence J., Laura Conley, Sean Duggan, Matthew Merighi, 2-2-09, “Military Spending can grow the Nation’s Economy.” Lawrence J. Korb is a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress. He is also a senior advisor to the Center for Defense Information and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University. Prior to joining the Center for American Progress he was a senior fellow and director of National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. From July 1998 to October 2002 he was council vice president, director of studies, and holder of the Maurice Greenberg Chair. He received his Ph.D. in political science from the State University of New York at Albany and has held full-time teaching positions at the University of Dayton, the Coast Guard Academy, and the Naval War College.) http://www.americanprogressaction.org/issues/2009/02/military\_spending\_memo.html

Introduction: Nearly 600,000 Americans lost their jobs last January, pushing unemployment to a 16-year high of 7.6 percent. This announcement is the latest indication of the dire state of the U.S. economy. Without a doubt, the nation’s mounting economic crisis will be one of the toughest tests the Obama administration will face in its first term. But times of great economic challenge also present the administration and the country with opportunities to spend on much-needed government projects that will enhance our national interests while stimulating the economy. The Department of Defense is an ideal government agency to play a role in economic recovery for several reasons: The defense budget is massive. The Pentagon accounts for a little more than half of U.S. discretionary spending, and the country spends more on defense than the rest of the world combined. In fiscal year 2009, the regular defense budget totaled $518 billion. When the costs for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are added, the budget rises to about $700 billion. The FY 2010 baseline defense budget is projected to reach about $587 billion. Importantly, every $1 billion spent on defense generates close to 10,000 jobs.1 Only about two-thirds of the defense budget is spent in the years for which it is authorized. Consequently, some spending can be accelerated without adding to the nation’s long-term debt or purchasing items that do not enhance our overall national security. For example, funds authorized for military construction, or MILCON, which includes base facilities and military housing, can be spent over five years. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have worn out equipment much more rapidly than anticipated. When the Pentagon purchases a piece of equipment, be it a truck or tank, it assumes that the equipment will last for a given number of years. However, the harsh environmental conditions in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as combat damage, have destroyed large amounts of equipment much faster than anticipated. This equipment will have to be replaced or repaired, a process the military terms reset. According to Congressman John Murtha (D-PA), Chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, resetting all of the equipment in need could total $100 billion. There is no reason that this reset cannot be done much more rapidly. Because of the demands on our ground forces, the Army and Marine Corps plan to add about 48,000 men and women to the active component between now and 2013. This build-up, like military construction spending, can also be accelerated without increasing the long-term debt that must eventually be accrued to pay for these necessary items. All of these reasons make strong cases for the DOD to aid economic recovery. Therefore, when policymakers consider how to jumpstart the economy, they should focus on the following three areas in the defense budget: Combat rising unemployment by increasing the size of the ground forces to projected levels as quickly as possible Accelerate the spending of funds already authorized for military construction and authorize an additional $25 billion in the FY 2010 budget for construction projects that will be needed in the next five years Accelerate Army and Marine Corps equipment reset These recommendations would cost $106 billion and would create approximately 1 million jobs.2 It is also important to note that while defense spending may not create as many jobs as other forms of government spending, over a quarter of the funds that are required to implement the above recommendations have already been authorized and the remaining funds will eventually be authorized. Increase personnel Several military, economic, and social factors make the current environment an ideal time to recruit ground forces in particular. First, the Army and Marine Corps have already been authorized to increase their ground forces to approximately 550,000 and over 200,000 active duty troops, respectively. Under current plans, the Army will recruit an additional 7,000 soldiers per year above its normal quota and the Marines will recruit 5,000, for a total of 12,000 per year between 2010 and 2013. Given the fact that this plan is already in place, the new administration should attempt to speed up the process. In 2010, the Army and Marines should attempt to add all 48,000 troops to their roles without lowering standards. This will increase military personnel expenditures by an estimated $5 billion in 2010 alone. Second, today’s overall unemployment rate is at a 16-year high. Unemployment is even higher for our nation’s youth, who are the prime recruiting pool for the armed forces. While the national unemployment average is 7.6 percent for adults ages 16 years and older, for young men and women ages 16 to 24 the rate is 17.7 percent, and among men and women ages 20 to 24 it is 12.1 percent.3 With private-sector employment shriveling, military service has become a more attractive option. But while increasing unemployment has created an opening for increasing enrollment, the military must still ensure that its recruits meet high education, aptitude, and moral standards. Recruitment and retention bonuses must also be maintained and in some cases increased. Currently the Army offers $20,000 to $50,000 signing bonuses—on top of education and health benefits—to new recruits depending on their professional skills and service specialty. These bonuses have been critical to attracting talented men and women, and they should be maintained. Moreover, these signing bonuses can have an immediate economic multiplier effect since a large portion is given to service members and their families upon enlistment. Unfortunately, the Army offers significantly lower retention bonuses than other services. According to a 2007 report by the Government Accountability Office, the Navy and Air Force pay about 10 times what the Army pays in retention-related incentives.4 If a Navy lieutenant commander (O-4), the equivalent of an Army major, were commissioned in 1997, he or she could have received $121,000 in retention bonuses during a 12-year career. An Army infantry officer over that same time span would not have received any retention pay.5 It is critical that Army retention bonuses be brought up to par with other services. This will help the Army retain its most talented and experienced commissioned and non-commissioned officers. And as a matter of equality, Army officers have been more stressed than their counterparts in the other services since 9/11, so their pay should reflect this level of commitment. Fully implementing this plan will add about $1 billion to the defense budget. Third, public attitudes toward service in the military have improved over the past year. According to a recent Rasmussen survey, 79 percent of Americans have a favorable opinion of the U.S. military. And according to The Christian Science Monitor, 11 percent of young people ages 16 to 21 say they will “definitely” or “probably” serve in the military within the next two years, which is up from 9 percent one year, which is up from 9 percent one year ago. The reduction in causalities from the Iraq war, the election of Barack Obama—who has pledged to withdraw troops from Iraq—and rising unemployment among today’s youth are key reasons enlistment is becoming more appealing to youth. This increased interest in enlistment means that the military can and should be more selective with recruits and reduce the number of criminal and education waivers to pre-Iraq war levels. Fourth, the military can enlarge its pool of potential recruits by dropping the outdated “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy that prohibits openly gay people from serving in the military, as well as ending the ban on women in combat. Fortunately, the new commander in chief has signaled his intent to repeal “don’t ask, don’t tell,” a move that is now supported by the overwhelming majority of the American people. Fifth, the recently passed 21st-century G.I. Bill will be a boon to military recruitment. The bill, the largest educational benefit for service members and their families since World War II, goes into effect on August 1, 2009. The Army Times notes that, “On average, the combination of payments adds up to more than $85,000 in college benefits over four years. Pentagon officials believe the option of sharing these benefits with family members could be the most significant across-the-board retention bonus ever offered to military members, and could radically transform the career force.”6 The bill not only will help to recruit a large number of talented troops to the force, but it also has the ancillary benefit of investing in the education of our nation’s youth. And finally, the new president has called on Americans to embrace national service, which should increase the number of those young men and women willing to consider volunteering for military service. Accelerate previously authorized funding for military construction and increase future funding in the short term The decision to grow the ground forces will necessitate the construction of additional barracks, headquarters, and other base facilities. Therefore, the Obama administration will face substantial military construction, or MILCON needs in the next four years. Additionally, President Barack Obama and Congress will need to continue to fund the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure process, or BRAC, and this too will require an increase in MILCON spending. In this troubled economy, construction workers have been hit especially hard. The industry lost 101,000 jobs in December 2008 alone, pushing unemployment among construction workers to 15.3 percent.7 Although seasonal fluctuation in this industry should be expected, this year’s numbers represent a significant rise over last December’s industry rate of 9.4 percent unemployment.8 Lawmakers have an opportunity to alleviate some of this burden by aggressively promoting and funding military construction jobs for these civilian workers. These jobs would be comparatively easy to create, as many construction workers can learn skills on the job and may not require specialized education and training.9

2NC Defense Spending Good EXT

Opportunities for investment in military construction Both the BRAC process and efforts to increase the size of the armed forces offer an opportunity to create additional MILCON jobs. For example, as a part of the 2005 BRAC process, Walter Reed Army Medical Facility will be moving from Washington, D.C. to share the current campus of the National Naval Medical Center in Bethesda, Maryland. Construction and renovation for relocating Walter Reed’s staff and operations to Bethesda and one other site in Virginia are estimated to cost $1 billion, and all relocation is scheduled to be complete by mid-September 2011.10 This project and other BRAC initiatives are already planned, so Congress should use this opportunity to fully fund all of these projects in FY 2010. Moreover, the Pentagon should spend the money as quickly as possible. Not only will this have an impact on jobs, but it will allow communities to begin putting the vacant land to productive use much more quickly. Increasing the size of the Army and Marines has created an additional need for increased MILCON spending. The GAO reported in September 2008 that due to efforts to grow the ground forces some bases are currently oversubscribed. These facilities would not be able to support all of the soldiers assigned to them if it were not for current overseas deployments.  The report notes that, “installation management officials are concerned that, in the event of a major reposturing of units out of Iraq and the concomitant return of Army units to their home stations, there will not be enough room to accommodate all of the equipment, unit headquarters staff, and soldiers stationed at an installation.”11 Under the Status of Forces Agreement signed by President George W. Bush and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, all U.S. forces must leave Iraq by the end of 2011, and President Obama has pledged to withdraw all combat units by April 2010. The military should prepare aggressively for this influx of troops by investing in the necessary military construction now. Given the downturn in housing construction, there exists plenty of excess capacity in the housing industry. MILCON funds should also be used to reduce the environmental footprint of military facilities. Not only will this create jobs in an important sector of the economy, it will also yield long-term energy savings. The Pentagon aims to have 25 percent of its electricity provided by renewable energy sources by 2025, yet Defense News reported in January of this year that “no additional money has been allocated for the effort.”12 Additionally, all new Army buildings are required to follow U.S. Green Building Council guidelines.13 Extra MILCON funding could be used to update old facilities as far as is practicably possible to meet these guidelines. Moreover, improved bases, offices, and living quarters will enhance the overall quality of life for our service members and their families. These improvements are a small gesture in light of the sacrifices we have asked of our troops over the past eight years, and they will need to be done eventually. Moreover, new and improved living quarters and other MILCON projects such as schools on bases will be a boon to recruitment and retention. There is no reason not to build them now. Funding sources An analysis of the FY 2009 Green Book, the Department of Defense’s compendium of national defense budget estimates, reveals that funding is already available for many military construction projects. From FY 2006 to FY 2009, the total budget authority for military construction projects, including money for the active services, reserves, and BRAC-mandated construction, outpaced outlays by about $24 billion. Because military construction funding may be spent for up to five years following authorization, unspent money from FY 2005 through the current fiscal year could be funneled to short-term or immediate construction projects as a mechanism to aid in economic recovery. Including the FY 2005 funding, this pot is in excess of $25 billion. In addition, Congress could also increase total MILCON funding by $25 billion over the projected level in FY 2010 as a short-term boost to aid economic recovery and pay for the needed but unfunded military construction projects at bases around the country. The DOD has already been receiving some funding above baseline levels through supplemental appropriations bills. For example, the DOD requested approximately $3.5 billion in MILCON funding in the second FY 2008 supplemental appropriation, and Congress enacted $4.2 billion.15 While an added $25 billion would bring the MILCON budget to $50 billion and would represent a significant increase over the sum of the baseline and supplemental appropriations, the country’s declining economic health and rising construction sector unemployment both suggest this increase is desirable. Accelerate Army and Marine Corps equipment reset Although effective personnel are the foundation of any strong military, proper equipment allows personnel to accomplish their objectives. Prioritizing and accelerating defense spending to reset equipment that has been damaged or destroyed in Iraq and Afghanistan is another opportunity to spur medium- to long-term economic growth. But in order to use reset funding for economic recovery, the Department of Defense and Congress must first work together to determine what kinds of equipment are essential for the military to successfully defeat current and future threats.  The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have depleted the supply of battle-ready, essential equipment. These shortfalls have created ripple effects throughout the military in the form of repair backlogs. Over the course of the last eight years, it has been common practice for deploying units to siphon equipment from non-deployed units—a process known as cross-leveling. In its most extreme from, this process has resulted in combat brigades deploying to war zones without essential equipment or full combat readiness. Congressman Murtha, the Chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, has estimated that resetting all of this equipment will cost about $100 billion. These problems can be partially mitigated by making equipment reset a part of an economic recovery plan. The vehicles most in need of reset are those seeing service in Iraq and Afghanistan. These include M1 Abrams tanks, M113 Armored Personnel Carriers, Stryker combat vehicles, military Humvees, and various support vehicles. These vehicles are largely produced and repaired in the United States in states such as Texas, California, Oregon, Utah, Ohio, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Alabama, where they provide continuous employment for mechanics and machinists. Accelerating reset will provide much needed employment opportunities in the midst of these difficult economic conditions. Spending federal money on equipment reset at this time would have several ancillary benefits. It would buoy our economy with government spending and reverse damages caused by eight years of war. Both of these effects would fundamentally contribute to our nation’s security and prosperity.Conclusion The federal government should not be spending defense dollars for the sole purpose of stimulating the economy. For example, some have argued that the Obama administration should continue purchasing unnecessary F-22 fighters because close to 100,000 potential jobs would be lost from stopping production at 183 fighters—a recommendation of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates.  Instead, the DOD should spend funds that would have to be spent eventually on people, projects, and reset that would enhance our overall security while enabling the economy to recover. While this would mean a temporary increase in the overall defense outlays for FY 2010 and FY 2011, it would also mean that in 2012 and 2013, defense spending on items such as military construction would tail off sharply when the economy should be back to its normal level of activity. According to some economists, increasing military spending by this amount could create an additional 1 million jobs.16 Moreover, accelerating the recruitment effort would provide jobs for 36,000 men and women in the next year, providing employment at a time when it is sorely needed.

2NC Defense Spending Good EXT

Defense Spending stimulates the economy

Feldstein ‘08

Martin, 12-24, “Defense Spending Would Be Great Stimulus.” Mr. Feldstein, chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers under President Reagan, is a professor at Harvard and a member of The Wall Street Journal's board of contributors.) http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123008280526532053.html

The Department of Defense is preparing budget cuts in response to the decline in national income. The DOD budgeteers and their counterparts in the White House Office of Management and Budget apparently reason that a smaller GDP requires belt-tightening by everyone. That logic is exactly backwards. As President-elect Barack Obama and his economic advisers recognize,countering a deep economic recession requires an increase in government spending to offset the sharp decline in consumer outlays and business investment that is now under way. Without that rise in government spending, the economic downturn would be deeper and longer. Although tax cuts for individuals and businesses can help, government spending will have to do the heavy lifting. That's why the Obama team will propose a package of about $300 billion a year in additional federal government outlays and grants to states and local governments. A temporary rise in DOD spending on supplies, equipment and manpower should be a significant part of that increase in overall government outlays. The same applies to the Department of Homeland Security, to the FBI, and to other parts of the national intelligence community. The increase in government spending needs to be a short-term surge with greater outlays in 2009 and 2010 but then tailing off sharply in 2011 when the economy should be almost back to its prerecession level of activity. Buying military supplies and equipment, including a variety of off-the-shelf dual use items, can easily fit this surge pattern. For the military, the increased spending will require an expanded supplemental budget for 2009 and an increased budget for 2010. A 10% increase in defense outlays for procurement and for research would contribute about $20 billion a year to the overall stimulus budget. A 5% rise in spending on operations and maintenance would add an additional $10 billion. That spending could create about 300,000 additional jobs. And raising the military's annual recruitment goal by 15% would provide jobs for an additional 30,000 young men and women in the first year. An important challenge for those who are designing the overall stimulus package is to avoid wasteful spending. One way to achieve that is to do things during the period of the spending surge that must eventually be done anyway. It is better to do them now when there is excess capacity in the economy than to wait and do them later. Replacing the supplies that have been depleted by the military activity in Iraq and Afghanistan is a good example of something that might be postponed but that should instead be done quickly. The same is true for replacing the military equipment that has been subject to excessive wear and tear. More generally, replacement schedules for vehicles and other equipment should be accelerated to do more during the next two years than would otherwise be economically efficient. Industry experts and DOD officials confirm that military suppliers have substantial unused capacity with which to produce additional supplies and equipment. Even those production lines that are currently at full capacity can be greatly expanded by going from a single shift to a two-shift production schedule. With industrial production in the economy as a whole down sharply, there is no shortage of potential employees who can produce supplies and equipment. Military procurement has the further advantage that almost all of the equipment and supplies that the military buys is made in the United States, creating demand and jobs here at home. Increased military spending should involve more than just accelerated replacement schedules. Each of the military services can identify new equipment and additional quantities of existing equipment that can improve our fighting ability in Afghanistan and our ability to protect our military forces while they are in combat. Military planners must also look ahead to the missions that each of the services may be called upon to do in the future. Additional funding would allow the Air Force to increase the production of fighter planes and transport aircraft without any delays. The Army could accelerate its combat modernization program. The Navy could build additional ships to deal with its increased responsibilities in protecting coastal shipping and in countering terrorism. And all three services have significant infrastructure needs. Although some activities like ship building cannot be completed in the two year stimulus period, the major part of the expenditures can be brought forward in time by acquiring components and materials quickly and holding them in inventory until they are needed in the ship building process. Such a departure from just-in-time inventory management would be wasteful under normal conditions, but makes economic sense when there is temporary excess capacity. Now is also a good time for the military to increase recruiting and training. Because of the current very high and rising unemployment rates among young men and women, it would make sense to depart from the military's traditional enlistment rules and bring in recruits for a short, two-year period of training followed by a return to the civilian economy. As a minimum this would provide education in a variety of technical skills -- electronics, equipment maintenance, computer programming, nuclear facility operations, etc. -- that would lead to better civilian careers for this group. It would also provide a larger reserve force that could be called upon if needed by the military in the future. The budgets for homeland security, for intelligence activities, and for the FBI have increased substantially during the past decade. The greater terrorist threat fully justifies these additional funds. The current two-year stimulus period provides an opportunity for additional temporary spending increases with high payoffs. Investments in port security would reduce a major homeland vulnerability. Expanding the government's language training programs for new intelligence community recruits would provide more translators who can monitor the terrorist communications that we are able to intercept. Additional infrastructure for the FBI would remove an important constraint on the number of new FBI agents. The Obama team's goal of sending a stimulus package to Congress before the end of January may not leave enough time to work out the details of expanded military and intelligence budgets. If so, the stimulus plan should ask the Congress to provide a total of at least $30 billion a year of increased outlays in these budget categories. A substantial short-term rise in spending on defense and intelligence would both stimulate our economy and strengthen our nation's security.

2NC Defense Spending Good EXT

Defense spending boosts the American economy—2003 economic rebound proves

Willard ‘03

Anna Willard, reporter @ Reuters, 2003, “Defense spending drives economy”, http://www.axisoflogic.com/artman/publish/article\_1355.shtml, AD: 7-20-10

Soaring defense spending is driving the U.S. economy, but not doing too much for the unemployment picture as Americans still struggled to find jobs and corporations saw their profits fall, government reports on Thursday showed. The Commerce Department said the economy grew at a revised 3.1 percent pace in the second three months of 2003, boosted by defense spending, business investment and consumers. That was faster than the 2.4 percent rate first reported a month ago and boosts hopes momentum will carry into the current quarter. "The numbers are a confirmation of the existing trend or prevailing view that the economy is strengthening, hitting out of the second quarter and into the third," said Nick Bennenbroek, foreign exchange strategist at Brown Brothers Harriman. But in a separate report, the Labor Department said the number of Americans lining up to claim jobless benefits in the Aug. 23 week rose to 394,000 from 391,000 the prior week. Although the number was below 400,000, a level considered a sign of a soft labor market, analysts said the claims numbers were disappointing. In a separate report the Commerce Department also estimated after-tax corporate profits were down by 3.4 percent for the second quarter. The dollar strengthened slightly in reaction to the good growth number, but Treasury bonds also rose because of the rise in jobless claims. Stocks opened higher, encouraged by faster economic growth which fostered hopes for better corporate profits. Within the gross domestic product report, government spending on defense -- much of it to pay for the U.S.-led war in Iraq --soared 45.9 percent, the strongest gain since the third quarter of 1951, during the Korean War. In a sign that long-awaited business confidence is returning, nonresidential spending -- the broadest category of investment -- rose 8.0 percent in the spring quarter after a drop of 4.4 percent in the first quarter. Business investment, touted as a key to economic recovery, has lagged since the 2001 recession. Consumers, whose spending fuels more than two-thirds of national economic activity, were also in a buoyant mood with consumer spending rising 3.8 percent. Businesses cut back on inventories at an annual rate of $20.9 billion in the second quarter after building them up at a $4.8 billion rate in the first quarter of the year. Lean inventories are generally considered a promising sign, since this means companies may have to ramp up production to keep up with demand. This in turn can lead to a pick up in hiring. "The third quarter is stacking up to be a 4 to 6 percent quarter," said Jim Glassman, senior economist at J.P. Morgan in New York. "It's all a demand story and businesses have been surprised by this and will have to build inventories." The GDP (news - web sites) report follows upbeat consumer confidence data for August, and gains in durable goods and home sales in July. But analysts continue to have lingering worries about unemployment. "Most of the data coming in this month have been strong but still no jobs," said William Cheney, chief economist at John Hancock Financial Services. "That's the wildcard for the economic outlook." Analysts and policy makers will be watching the Labor Department's monthly payroll data report, due to be released next Friday, for more details on the jobs market. Wall Street is expecting non-farm payrolls to have added a scant 10,000 jobs in August after shedding 44,000 in July. This would mark the first rise since January.

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Defense Spending saves the economy—jobs, consumer spending, and more money in the economy

Johnson ‘07

Chalmers Johnson, professor emeritus @ UCSD, 2007, “Republic or empire: A national intelligence estimate of the United States”, August, Harpers Magazine, http://harpers.org/archive/2007/01/0081346, AD: 7-21-10

The ongoing U.S. militarization of its foreign affairs has spiked precipitously in recent years, with increasingly expensive commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq. These commitments grew from many specific political factors, including the ideological predilections of the current regime, the growing need for material access to the oil-rich regions of the Middle East, and a long-term bipartisan emphasis on hegemony as a basis for national security. The *domestic* economic basis for these commitments, however, is consistently overlooked. Indeed, America's hegemonic policy is in many ways most accurately understood as the inevitable result of its decades-long policy of military Keynesianism. During the Depression that preceded World War II, the English economist John Maynard Keynes, a liberal capitalist, proposed a form of governance that would mitigate the boom-and-bust cycles inherent in capitalist economies. To prevent the economy from contracting, a development typically accompanied by social unrest, Keynes thought the government should take on debt in order to put people back to work. Some of these deficit-financed government jobs might be socially useful, but Keynes was not averse to creating make-work tasks if necessary. During periods of prosperity, the government would cut spending and rebuild the treasury. Such countercyclical planning was called “pump-priming.” Upon taking office in 1933, U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt, with the assistance of Congress, put several Keynesian measures into effect, including socialized retirement plans, minimum wages for all workers, and government-financed jobs on massive projects, including the Triborough Bridge in New York City, the Grand Coulee Dam in Washington, and the Tennessee Valley Authority, a flood-control and electric-power-generation complex covering seven states. Conservative capitalists feared that this degree of government intervention would delegitimate capitalism—which they understood as an economic system of quasi-natural laws—and shift the balance of power from the capitalist class to the working class and its unions. For these reasons, establishment figures tried to hold back countercyclical spending. The onset of World War II, however, made possible a significantly modified form of state socialism. The exiled Polish economist Michal Kalecki attributed Germany's success in overcoming the global Depression to a phenomenon that has come to be known as “military Keynesianism.” Government spending on arms increased manufacturing and also had a multiplier effect on general consumer spending by raising worker incomes. Both of these points are in accordance with general Keynesian doctrine. In addition, the enlargement of standing armies absorbed many workers, often young males with few skills and less education. The military thus becomes an employer of last resort, like Roosevelt's Civilian Conservation Corps, but on a much larger scale. Rather than make bridges and dams, however, workers would make bullets, tanks, and fighter planes. This made all the difference. Although Adolf Hitler did not undertake rearmament for purely economic reasons, the fact that he advocated governmental support for arms production made him acceptable not only to the German industrialists, who might otherwise have opposed his destabilizing expansionist policies, but also to many around the world who celebrated his achievement of a “German economic miracle.” In the United States, Keynesian policies continued to benefit workers, but, as in Germany, they also increasingly benefited wealthy manufacturers and other capitalists. By the end of the war, the United States had seen a massive shift.

2NC Defense Spending Good EXT

Military spending boosts the economy

Feldstein ‘09

Martin Feldstein, professor of economics @ Harvard, 2009, also professor emeritus @ National Bureau of Economic Research, “An $800 billion mistake”, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/28/AR2009012802938.html, AD: 7-21-10

As a conservative economist, I might be expected to oppose a stimulus plan. In fact, on this page in October, I declared my support for a stimulus. But the fiscal package now before Congress needs to be thoroughly revised. In its current form, it does too little to raise national spending and employment. It would be better for the Senate to delay legislation for a month, or even two, if that's what it takes to produce a much better bill. We cannot afford an $800 billion mistake. Start with the tax side. The plan is to give a tax cut of $500 a year for two years to each employed person. That's not a good way to increase consumer spending. Experience shows that the money from such temporary, lump-sum tax cuts is largely saved or used to pay down debt. Only about 15 percent of last year's tax rebates led to additional spending. The proposed business tax cuts are also likely to do little to increase business investment and employment. The extended loss "carrybacks" are primarily lump-sum payments to selected companies. The bonus depreciation plan would do little to raise capital spending in the current environment of weak demand because the tax benefits in the early years would be recaptured later. Instead, the tax changes should focus on providing incentives to households and businesses to increase current spending. Why not a temporary refundable tax credit to households that purchase cars or other major consumer durables, analogous to the investment tax credit for businesses? Or a temporary tax credit for home improvements? In that way, the same total tax reduction could produce much more spending and employment. Postponing the scheduled increase in the tax on dividends and capital gains would raise share prices, leading to increased consumer spending and, by lowering the cost of capital, more business investment. On the spending side, the stimulus package is full of well-intended items that, unfortunately, are not likely to do much for employment. Computerizing the medical records of every American over the next five years is desirable, but it is not a cost-effective way to create jobs. Has anyone gone through the (long) list of proposed appropriations and asked how many jobs each would create per dollar of increased national debt? The largest proposed outlays amount to just writing unrestricted checks to state governments. Nearly $100 billion would result from increasing the "Medicaid matching rate," a technique for reducing states' Medicaid costs to free up state money for spending on anything governors and state legislators want. An additional $80 billion would be given out for "state fiscal relief." Will these vast sums actually lead to additional spending, or will they merely finance state transfer payments or relieve state governments of the need for temporary tax hikes or bond issues? The plan to finance health insurance premiums for the unemployed would actually increase unemployment by giving employers an incentive to lay off workers rather than pay health premiums during a time of weak demand. And this supposedly two-year program would create a precedent that could be hard to reverse. A large fraction of the stimulus proposal is devoted to infrastructure projects that will spend out very slowly, not with the speed needed to help the economy in 2009 and 2010. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that less than one-fifth of the $50 billion of proposed spending on energy and water would occur by the end of 2010. If rapid spending on things that need to be done is a criterion of choice, the plan should include higher defense outlays, including replacing and repairing supplies and equipment, needed after five years of fighting. The military can increase its level of procurement very rapidly. Yet the proposed spending plan includes less than $5 billion for defense, only about one-half of 1 percent of the total package. Infrastructure spending on domestic military bases can also proceed more rapidly than infrastructure spending in the civilian economy. And military procurement overwhelmingly involves American-made products. Since much of this military spending will have to be done eventually, it makes sense to do it now, when there is substantial excess capacity in the manufacturing sector. In addition, a temporary increase in military recruiting and training would reduce unemployment directly, create a more skilled civilian workforce and expand the military reserves. All new spending and tax changes should have explicit time limits that prevent ever-increasing additions to the national debt. Similarly, spending programs should not create political dynamics that will make them hard to end. The problem with the current stimulus plan is not that it is too big but that it delivers too little extra employment and income for such a large fiscal deficit. It is worth taking the time to get it right.

2NC Defense Spending Good EXT

Military spending boosts economic growth and recovery

Dias ‘10

Ricardo Dias, writer @ American Public University, 5-26-10, “Does military spending help the economy?”, 2010, <http://ricardodiasjourney.blogspot.com/2010/05/does-military-spending-stimulate.html>, AD: 7-22-10

An antiwar poster from the 1960s bore the message "War is good business. Invest your son." War itself poses too many economic and human costs to be good business, but military spending could be a different matter. According to the basic Keynesian model, increases in planned aggregate expenditure resulting from stepped-up government purchases may help bring an economy out of a recession or depression. Does military spending stimulate aggregate demand? During World War II (1941-1945), military spending in U.S. reached nearly 38% of U.S. GDP, as well as the surge during the Korean War (1950-1953). Smaller increases in military spending relative to GDP occurred at the peak of the Vietnam War in 1967-1969, during the Reagan military buildup of the 1980s, and during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The clearest case in the World War II era, during which massive military spending helped the US economy to recover from the Great Depression. The US unemployment rate fell from 17.2% of the workforce in 1939 (when defense spending was less than 2 percent of GDP) to 1.2 percent in 1944 (when defense spending was greater than 37% of GDP). Two brief recessions, in 1945 and 1948-1949, followed the end of the war and the sharp declining in military spending. At the time, though, many people feared that the war's end would bring a resumption of the Great Depression, so the relative mildness of the two postwar recessions was something of a relief. Increases in defense spending during the post-World War II period also were associated with economic expansions. The Korean War of 1950-1953 occurred simultaneously with a strong expansion, during which the unemployment rate dropped from 5.9% in 1949 to 2.9% in 1953. A recession began in 1954, the year after the armistice was signed, though military spending had not yet declined much. Economic expansions also occurred during the Vietnam-era military buildup in the 1960s and the Reagan buildup of the 1980s. Finally, on a smaller scale, increased government spending for homeland security and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq probably contributed to the relative mildness of the US recession in 2001 and the strength of the subsequent recovery. The episodes support the idea that increases in government purchases - in this case, of weapons, other military supplies, and the services of military personnel - can help to stimulate the economy.

2NC Defense Spending Good EXT

Military spending is key to the economy, technology, space, and security

Rights for Prosperity ‘09

Research group, American relations research group, Aug 28, “Military spending: the missing key to future growth”, <http://www.rightsforposterity.com/rights-for-posterity/2009/08/military-spending-the-missing-key-to-future-growth.html>

Right now we are in a recession and people are not expecting much in terms of economic growth this year. But before the recession began, the average growth rate for the past 5 years was only about 3% on average. Can the United States ever experience growth rates of up to 8% a year like China? If it were possible to know how to accomplish such high growth rates, we obviously would not be in a recession right now. But there is one thing the country can do to improve things: Increase spending on defense. Increasing military spending will result in technological development, improved infrastructure and increased employment that will lead to greater economic growth in the future. In the article "Defense Spending Would Be Great Stimulus" from the Wall Street Journal, Mr. Feldstein, chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers under President Reagan, discusses the intricacies of military spending and the economy. The article was written just before Obama took office, and it came as a policy suggestion to the new Congress and new administration. The article illustrates all of the positive effects such spending can have on growing a struggling economy. In another article "Declining Defense" (also from the Wall Street Journal) it becomes apparent that the current administration has utterly ignored the suggestions of Mr. Feldstein. And while Obama ignores Feldstein who is an important voice from the Reagan era, he also claims to be following in the footsteps of Reagan with his economic stimulus and bailout bills. However, it is obvious to many that the President is doing no such thing. Obama’s policies are a display of economic and historical ignorance (or denial) that must be corrected if the country is to recover. Few countries have experienced the economic benefits of military spending like the United States has. Many economists and historians believe that World War II and the military buildup that it required is the reason for the end of the depression and the economic boom that followed. The war resulted in full employment, development of industry, and new technologies. The Cold War produced many developments of its own, including the interstate highway system that was originally conceived for defense purposes, among other improvements in infrastructure. Of course, there is also the military buildup that occurred during the Reagan administration, and the growth experienced during that time. According to the Washington Post article--"Reagan's Defense Buildup Bridged Military Eras," Reagan began a military buildup that increased spending by over 100 billion dollars annually. He spent a great deal of money much like the current administration and he did this during a similar period of economic weakness. Many believe it was a combination of military spending and tax cuts that ended that period of economic hardship. The economic growth from military spending makes sense. Increased production needs create more jobs. And there are so many more benefits of military spending as well. For instance, soldiers learn valuable skills while in the military that are useful in a post-military civilian life, resulting in improved human capital. Also, someone has to build all of those ships, tanks, jets and guns. Also, the need for new technology results in government contracts with private companies like Lockheed Martin, SAIC and many others. Again, this results in more jobs. As an added benefit, the new technologies can often be used for civilian use, later resulting in increased productivity, efficiency and overall quality of life. Among such developments are the computer, replaceable parts, and let us not forget that the military had a lot to do with the development of aircraft over the course of the last century. As an aside, it is also important to note the incredible advances in technology that have come out of NASA and efforts to develop space. The race to the moon did more than simply boost our national ego. The effort produced technology and innovation that is widely used in civilian life today and has improved the economy and the American way of life. Like the military, NASA is now being neglected financially as well. Technology seems to be the key for post-recession economic growth in the United States. Technology improves our economic capacity in several ways. It makes production cheaper, quicker and more efficient. Such technological achievements include the assembly line, the internet, cell phones, and robotics. It is possible to reach a limit as to how much you can educate and train the populace, and develop infrastructure, but there is no foreseeable limit to technological development and innovation. When it seems like the limit on development has been reached, new technology is the answer for continued economic growth. It would be ridiculous to say that without NASA and the military, technological improvement would not occur. But it is safe to say that if the government wants to stimulate the economy, the military and NASA are important tools it should use. Doing so would create jobs and technology and improve the economy as a whole. Much of the spending authorized under the stimulus bill will be on projects that will not benefit most people, or will fail to create the jobs that are needed by our country right now. Finally, the double implications of military spending cannot be denied. We live in a time of increasing international tension. And in a time when we are fighting two wars, combating terrorism and dealing with rogue, possibly nuclear states like Iran and North Korea, Congress and the President are cutting the missile defense programs, canceling advanced weapons development projects, and mothballing modern weapons systems. The current path will cost America more than jobs--it will cost America lives. The difference between Reagan era spending and spending today is what the money is being spent on. The current budget is clearly deficient in military spending. President Obama has supported large amounts of government spending but the numbers show that the military will be taking a cut over the next several years. The stimulus bill contained excessive funds for pork and projects that will add temporary jobs and government jobs, but the private sector job growth is simply not there. Current policy does not make economic sense, nor does it make sense for our national security in a time of war and international insecurity. Military spending is the way to go if America wants to see job creation and economic growth.

2NC Defense Spending Good EXT

Defense spending boosts economic growth through jobs

Sanchez ‘09

Cpl. Matt Sanches – US marine corps and starr writer, “Future weapons development could help stimulate ailing economy”, Feb 18, <http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/02/18/future-weapons-development-help-stimulate-ailing-economy/>

A series of short videos released on YouTube recently showed the U.S. Army's vision of the military to come with infantrymen maneuvering robots, electronics and guided missiles that moved at lightning speed with James Bond coolness. Called the Future Combat System, the short videos show the many moving parts of the modern military using state-of-the-art equipment to fight a common foe. But despite the cheers at the end of each presentation, the FCS program may not have a happy ending. While the stimulus bill President Obama signed into law on Tuesday includes $10 billion to upgrade military barracks, hospitals, clinics and child-care centers, it doesn't add a single dollar for weapons development. And some observers think that's a mistake. A stimulus in defense spending, they say, would be a victory not only for American servicemen and women -- but for the nation's economy, as well. The Lockheed Corporation, linking defense spending to immediate economic stimulus, says 95,000 Americans' jobs across the country depend on the Defense Department buying more of its F-22 Raptors. "This is shovel-ready," said Larry Lawson, executive vice president and general manager of the F/A-22 Raptor program. "Our point is, this preserves jobs, and it is immediate. You don't have to develop anything." But a new administration means new priorities, and the Defense Department is now reviewing future purchases. The F-22 has Mach speed capabilities, but speed comes at a price. Each F-22 costs $350 million -- a sum that could make the fighter jet a target for budget-cutters. "It does not make sense to cut defense procurement and eliminate high-paying, middle-class union jobs, in order to fund other government programs to create jobs. That's just plain stupid," said James Carafano, military affairs expert for the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank. "We really haven't significantly increased the core defense budget," Carafano added. "Most additional money has gone for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a result, the military still has not fully recovered from the 'procurement holiday' of the Clinton years... and we've used up a lot of equipment since then." "The world becomes a more, not a less troubled place, in tough economic times," said Carafano. "It is not a good time to cut the defense budget." But some observers say defense budgets have been fraught with overspending and poor oversight for years. "Last year, [defense contractors] got 127 of the F-22s," said Larry Korbs, a former Navy flight instructor and author of "Building a Military for the 21st Century." He said conservatives and defense contractors are playing politics with the Obama administration. "Under Bush," Korbs said, "defense spending went up 40 percent from 2001 to 2008 in real dollars," he said. "There is no defense spending cut." "The last eight years have been a defense spending Mardi Gras," said Collin Clark, editor of DODD Buzz and the Pentagon for Military.com. "I wouldn't say there was a lot of wasteful spending," he said. "Waste is a loaded term, these are complicated systems. Contractors will just be given a smaller margin of error now."

2NC Defense Spending Good EXT

Deficit spending works—economic recovery proves

This Week ‘09

THIS WEEK, respected publication, Feb 24 2009, “How spending stimulates”, respected political publication, <http://theweek.com/article/index/93614/How_spending_stimulates>

Will the Obama deficit-spending plan work? Will throwing $800 billion—$500 billion in extra government spending, and $300 billion in tax cuts—at the economy produce a world in which production and employment are higher and unemployment lower than would otherwise have been the case? The short answer is yes. The short reason is that spending works—eras in which some group or other gets excited about future prospects and starts madly spending money are eras in which production and employment are high and unemployment is low. And the government, in this respect, is just like any other group of starry-eyed optimists whose eagerness to spend pulls the economy into a high-employment, high-pressure boom. Consider the engines of previous boosts to production and employment. Between 2003 and 2005 the assembled investors of the world discovered the American housing market. Low interest rates produced by the Federal Reserve allowed them to borrow and leverage up cheaply—and the promise of financial engineering that would greatly help them diversify risk made them think investing in new construction and new homeowners’ moves into new construction was a profit opportunity. Spending on home construction rose. And the adult civilian employment to population ratio rose from 62 percent to 63.5 percent while the unemployment rate fell from 6.0 percent to 4.8 percent. Between 1996 and 1998 the assembled investors of America discovered the Internet and spent enormous sums to exploit and expand it. And the adult civilian employment to population ratio rose from 63 percent to nearly 65 percent as the unemployment rate fell 5.6 percent to 4.3 percent. In August, 1982, Paul Volcker’s Federal Reserve released the interest-rate chokehold it had been using to strangle the economy. Lower interest rates induced homebuilders to spend massively, since for the first time in nearly half a decade they could obtain financing for construction. At the same time, the Reagan administration ramped up defense spending for the second cold war, and luxury spending rose as the Reagan tax cuts gave money back to America’s rich. The adult employment-to-population ratio rocketed up from 57.2 percent to 59.9 percent in the short order of two years while the unemployment rate fell from 10.8 percent to 7.3 percent. These are just three examples of a general principle: each major business-cycle expansion we have seen has been driven by a leading wave of spending—by some group that became enthusiastic about their prospects and decided to greatly increase its spending. And that pulled employment and production up. Now we are attempting to do the same thing once again—but this time with the government as the leading spender. Obama’s stimulus spending increases are bigger, as a share of the economy, than Reagan’s defense increases were, while Obama’s tax cuts are smaller. Unlike 1983, when the Fed cut interest rates to help Reagan’s economic recovery, it cannot do so to help Obama. The Fed has done all the cutting it can. Still, a boost to spending by the government should have the same effects as boosts to spending by luxury consumers and the defense department and homebuilders in the early 1980s, by the high-tech sector in the late 1990s, and by homebuilders in the mid-2000s. The government’s money, after all, is as good as anybody else’s. So there is little question about the likely impact of the Obama deficit-spending program: production and employment are going to be higher than they would have been otherwise. As Greg Mankiw, the former chief economic adviser to George W. Bush, said back in 1983: “There is nothing novel about this. It is very conventional short-run stabilization policy: You can find it in all of the leading textbooks.” But there is a relevant question outstanding: Will there be some sort of a hangover after this Obama spending binge—some debt-induced, groggy morning after? And if there is a hangover how bad will it be? For the answer to that, we will have to wait and see.

2NC Defense Cuts Bad EXT

Defense Spending key in times of recession; cuts would crush economy

Lubold ‘09

Gordon Lubold, staff writer Christian Science Monitor, “Defense spending as stimulus?”, Jan 8, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2009/0108/p01s03-usmi.html

The Defense Department has enjoyed a long budgetary heyday, but the golden times may be nearing an end as the Iraq war, which has been eating up $10 billion a month, starts winding down and recession pressures force federal budgeteers to rein in spending. That's the conventional wisdom, at least. But defense spending won't drop anytime soon, experts predict. Even as the nation gasped over a $1.2 trillion federal budget for this fiscal year, estimated Tuesday by the Congressional Budget Office, President-elect Obama this week signaled his resolve to spend the country out of recession. In the short term, that probably means more money for defense. It may be impractical, for several reasons, to cut defense spending for the first year or two of the Obama administration, experts say. One is that a de-escalating war in Iraq won't immediately curtail expenditures needed to keep troops and equipment whole. Defense Secretary Robert Gates, in a New Year's Eve request to Congress, asked for an additional $70 billion to pay for war costs. At the same time, ramped-up military operations in Afghanistan under Mr. Obama will cost the US government more. Perhaps the biggest reason defense spending won't fall anytime soon is that it would be too hard for congressional lawmakers to justify cuts to defense during a recession, and lawmakers will instead seek to retain and renew defense contracts – and keep thousands of people in their jobs. "I would be very doubtful that Congress will cut any major procurement programs, because the Democrats would not want to be accused of putting anyone out of work as they put together an economic stimulus package," says Dov Zakheim, who served as the Pentagon's chief financial officer until 2004. Federal spending on defense could rise as much as 2 percent over the next couple years, says Mr. Zakheim, now a consultant in Washington. Still, Obama made a point Wednesday of saying his administration would dedicate itself to rooting out inefficiencies in government and finding ways to streamline operations. The Pentagon budget, which accounts for almost 47 percent of all federal discretionary spending, would seem to be a prime place to start. This week, the Government Accountability Office reported that every year the military stashes $7.5 billion in unneeded parts in Navy warehouses. The Pentagon's baseline budget for the current fiscal year is $514 billion, but with Secretary Gates's $70 billion request, war funding will top $136 billion in additional defense costs for 2009. Other factors are also at play. To pay for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Pentagon has used a controversial budgetary maneuver called "supplemental funding," in which costs for war operations are counted separately from the normal baseline budget. As equipment such as trucks, planes, and other gear failed, these supplementals have been used to bankroll new weapons systems to replace the dilapidated gear. Supplemental funding has been like candy to a child, and lawmakers and the Pentagon itself would like to see the Pentagon be weaned off it. Senior Pentagon officials say the Defense Department's fiscal year 2010 budget, to be unveiled two weeks after Obama takes office, will reflect an increase of about $57 billion in money that is "migrated" from supplemental funding to the baseline budget – which will represent an annual increase of about 13 percent. Boosting defense spending is the way to go in a recession anyway, argue many economists. The US government under Obama should go on a major spending spree to spur job growth and keep the economy from derailing, says Martin Feldstein, chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers under President Reagan. He argues that Obama should increase the defense budget by 10 percent for procurement and research, a move that could potentially create about 300,000 additional jobs. "A substantial short-term rise in spending on defense and intelligence would both stimulate our economy and strengthen our nation's security," Mr. Feldstein wrote in a recent op-ed in The Wall Street Journal. Senior military officials, including Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, argue for maintaining a "floor" of defense spending commensurate with about 4 percent of US gross domestic product. The US now spends 4.2 percent of GDP on defense – about $700 billion (of which roughly $187 billion is supplemental funding for the two wars). Admiral Mullen and others would like to see defense spending stay at that level for several years. It's a target that seems unlikely to many analysts. "That is a proxy argument," says Robert Work, vice president for strategic studies at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, a think tank here. The Pentagon simply wants to maintain the current level of funding – including war funding – even after the wars wind down. The baseline defense budget will rise somewhat as it absorbs supplemental war costs, he says, but competing interests will force the Pentagon to decrease its overall spending in the longer term.

2NC US Not K2 Global Economy EXT

US not key to global economy

NYT ‘09

New York Times, Some Economies Show Signs of Less Reliance on U.S., June 30, 2009,

<http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/01/business/economy/01decouple.html?ref=business>

HONG KONG — For a while, when the economic crisis was at its worst, it was a dirty word that only the most provocative of analysts dared to use. Now, the D-word — decoupling — is making a comeback, and nowhere more so than in Asia. Put simply, the term refers to the theory that emerging markets — whether China or Chile — will become less dependent the United States as their economies become stronger and more sophisticated. For much of last year, the theory held up. Many emerging economies had steered clear of investments that dragged down banking behemoths in the West, and saw nothing like the turmoil that began to engulf the United States and Europe in 2007. But then, last autumn, when the collapse of Lehman Brothers caused the financial system to convulse and consumer demand to shrivel, emerging economies around the world got caught in the downdraft, and the D-word became mud. Now, the tables are turning, especially in Asia, where many emerging economies are showing signs of a stronger recovery than in the West. And economists here have begun to talk of the decoupling once again. “Decoupling is happening for real,” the chief Asia-Pacific economist at Goldman Sachs in Hong Kong, Michael Buchanan, said in a recent interview. To be sure, the once sizzling pace of Asian economic growth has slowed sharply as exports to and investments from outside the region slumped. Across Asia, millions of people have lost their jobs as business dropped off and companies cut costs and output. Asia is heavily dependent upon selling its products to consumers in the United States and Europe, and many executives still say a strong American economy is a prerequisite for a return to the boom of years past. But for the past couple of months, data have revealed a growing divergence between Western economies and those in much of Asia, notably China and India. The World Bank last week forecast that the economies of the countries that use the euro and the United States would contract 4.5 percent and 3 percent, respectively, this year — compared with 7.2 percent and 5.1 percent growth forecast for China and India. Forecasts from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development that were also published last week backed up this general trend. Major statistics for June, due Wednesday, are expected to show manufacturing activity in China and India are on the mend. By contrast, purchasing managers indexes for Europe and the United States are forecast to be merely less grim than before but still show contractions. Why this diverging picture? The crisis hit Asia much later. While the American economy began languishing in 2007, Asian economies were doing well until the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September. What followed was a rush of stimulus measures — rate cuts and government spending programs. In Asia’s case, these came soon after things soured for the region; in the United States, they came much later. Moreover, developing Asian economies were in pretty good shape when the crisis struck. The last major crisis to hit the region — the financial turmoil of 1997-98 — forced governments in Asia to introduce overhauls that ultimately left them with lower debt levels, more resilient banking and regulatory systems and often large foreign exchange reserves. Another crucial difference is that Asia, unlike the United States and Europe, has not had a banking crisis. Bank profits in Asia have plunged and some have had to raise extra capital but there have been no major collapses and no bailouts. “The single most important thing to have happened in Asia is that there has not been a banking crisis,” said Andrew Freris, a regional strategist at BNP Paribas in Hong Kong. “Asia is coming though this crisis with its banking system intact. Yes, some banks may not be making profits — but it is cyclical and not systemic.” The lack of banking disasters also has meant that, unlike in Europe and the United States, Asian governments have not had to spend cash to clean the balance sheets of faltering banks. Add to that the fact that companies and households in Asia are typically not burdened with the kind of debt that is forcing Americans and Europeans to cut back consumption and investment plans. Asians are generally big savers; those in developing nations have limited health care and pension systems to fall back on. So they put aside cash for retirement, sickness and their children’s education, rather than maxing out multiple credit cards. Paul Schulte of Nomura said this difference was leading to a long-term shift. Western nations and consumers will struggle for years to pay down debt — and in some cases face higher taxes as governments try to rein in their swelling budget deficits. Consumers there, he said, will thus spend less. In developing Asia, by contrast, incomes are expected to rise gradually and savings rates to fall as improving health and welfare systems make the region’s fast-growing population less determined to save. Taken together, Mr. Schulte said, this means Asian consumers, as a whole, will become more important in global terms — another example of how the region will become less dependant on the West. Similarly, companies in developing Asian nations tend to have fewer debts — partly because the region enjoyed several years of strong economic growth. Low corporate and household debts mean governments in the region have had more firepower to pursue aggressive stimulus measures, said Jonathan Garner, head of emerging markets strategy at Morgan Stanley. The Chinese stimulus package of 4 trillion renminbi yuan, or $585 billion, announced last November, has led to a boom in spending and is a major reason why economists are optimistic about China, and about much of the region as a whole. Asia’s generally lower debt levels also mean there has been no credit crunch of the kind that has handicapped companies and consumers elsewhere. “Asia does not have a credit crunch. It has excess liquidity,” Mr. Neumann of HSBC said. “The banking system is stuffed with liquidity.” This is benefiting Asian asset markets — from stocks to property — and is leading to a gradual “financial decoupling” from the United States and Europe, Mr. Neumann said. “For the past two decades, equities markets have been driven by Western risk capital, not Asian investors themselves,” he said. “Now, you’re finding that Asian money is increasingly driving the market.” Analysts at Merrill Lynch agree. In a recent research note they said the Hong Kong stock market, for example, had performed much better than markets in the United States, and property prices in the city have risen, partly because of capital inflows from mainland China. Of course, none of this means Asia has become completely independent from the rest of the world. Asia remains heavily reliant on exports for economic growth. The result, despite increased “decoupling,” is that growth in Asia has slowed down, in some cases sharply. The Indonesian economy, for example, is expected to grow 3.6 percent this year, the Asian Development Bank forecasts. This compares to more than 6 percent in 2008 and 2007. The bank expects the Indian economy to grow to 5 percent this year, and the Chinese economy 7 percent — down from 7.1 percent and 9 percent, respectively, in 2008. Nor has the effect been uniform. Developed Asian economies, like Japan, Singapore and Hong Kong, are much more tightly tied into the world economy and financial system. All three are in recessions. “The United States has deep structural problems that are coming home to roost — Asia hasn’t got those, and that has been very, very important,” says Mr. Garner of Morgan Stanley. “Emerging Asian nations went into recession last,” he says. Increasingly, they are looking like they will also to come out first — and strongest.”

2NC US Not K2 Global Economy EXT

American economic slowdown won’t bring down the rest of the globe

The Economist ‘06

The Economist, 2-4-06, “Testing all engines,” http://cms.cass.cn/show\_News\_e.asp?id=9302

Alongside stronger domestic demand in Europe and Japan, emerging economies are also tipped to remain robust. These economies are popularly perceived as excessively export-dependent, flooding the world with cheap goods, but doing little to boost demand. Yet calculations by Goldman Sachs show that Brazil, Russia, India and China combined have in recent years contributed more to the world’s domestic demand than to its GDP growth. They have chipped in almost as much to global domestic demand as America has.If this picture endures, a moderate slowdown in America need not halt the expansion in the rest of the world. Europe and Japan together account for a bigger slice of global GDP than the United States, so faster growth there will help to keep the global economy flying. A rebalancing of demand away from America to the rest of the world would also help to shrink its huge current-account deficit. This all assumes that America’s economy slows, rather than sinks into recession. The world is undoubtedly better placed to cope with a slowdown in the United States than it was a few years ago. That said, in those same few years America’s imbalances have become larger, with the risk that the eventual correction will be more painful. A deep downturn in America would be felt all around the globe.

US isn’t key to the world economy

Wolf 2K

Marin Wolf, associate editor and chief economics commentator at the Financial Times, 2000, Foreign Policy, “After the Crash,” September-October, http://www.jstor.org/pss/1149711

The notion that the strong U.S. economy “saved” the rest of the world during the global financial turmoil of the late 1990s has become increasingly fashionable. Even U.S. Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers recently referred to the United States as “the main engine of global growth.” However, this proposition is not strictly true. Since the United States accounts for slightly more than a quarter of global economic activity, it certainly exerts a powerful influence. But positive correlations between U.S. business cycles and those of other countries have not, historically, been that high. Among leading industrial countries, only the United Kingdom and Canada have displayed business cycles that move together with those of the United States. Indeed, if the U.S. economy helped prevent a global recession following the financial crises of 1997 and 1998, it was precisely because its business cycle was not closely synchronized with many other economies. Otherwise the United States would have fallen into a recession along with the crisis-ridden regions.

2NC US Not K2 Global Economy EXT

US not key to world economy—equity relocation

Wan ‘10

Hanny Wan, “US will avoid second recession”, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-20/u-s-will-avoid-second-recession-spurring-rally-in-stocks-rcm-asia-says.html

The U.S. economy will avoid its second recession in three years, helping global stock markets recover losses in the second half of 2010, according to RCM Asia Pacific Ltd. Investors will regain an appetite for risk in the third quarter, said Mark Konyn, chief executive officer of RCM Asia Pacific, which oversees more than $12 billion. Institutional funds are building up cash that will be spent on equities, he said. The MSCI World Index has gained 4.7 percent since June 30, rebounding from an 11 percent loss in the first half of the year as European budget deficits and China’s steps to curb asset bubbles threatened to derail the global recovery. Speculation the U.S. economy will contract intensified as reports pointed to a retreat in manufacturing and home sales. “There are challenges along the road, and growth will be subdued,” Konyn told reporters in Hong Kong yesterday. “Corporate earnings growth is buoyant, low interest rates will remain. We are confident that the U.S. can avoid a double dip.” Of the 28 companies in the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index that have reported results from July 12, all but four beat earnings- per-share forecasts, according to Bloomberg data. Growth in U.S. gross domestic product is forecast to average 3 percent through 2012, according to economists surveyed by Bloomberg. “In the second half of the year, we’ll see better performance in the equity market,” Konyn said. “There’s a good chance investors will recover their losses, and end the year in the positive territory.” Konyn’s views echo those of Robert Doll, vice chairman of BlackRock Inc., the world’s largest asset manager, who told Bloomberg Television this week that a recession was unlikely. RCM is “overweight” Hong Kong and Chinese banks because of a lower risk of non-performing loans, according to Konyn, while “underweight” U.S. and European financial shares amid concerns of a stricter regulatory environment. Chinese government measures to curb increases in property prices have raised concerns over the strength of the world’s third-largest economy. Growth slowed to 10.3 percent in the second quarter, from 11.9 percent the previous three months, the country’s statistics bureau reported on July 15. The Shanghai Composite Index has fallen 23 percent this year, following an 80 percent rally in 2009. Hong Kong’s Hang Seng China Enterprises Index has declined 10 percent after gaining 62 percent in 2009. Konyn predicted in January that concerns over banking reforms in the U.S. and China’s tightening measures could lead to a long “correction” in Hong Kong and Chinese equities. Underlying demand has led him to believe that China’s property market will have a “soft landing,” Konyn said. New home sales in Shanghai climbed 33 percent in the week ended July 18 from the previous week, according to figures from Shanghai Uwin Real Estate Information Services Co. “All signs are there and if China’s economy can sustain growth, there’ll be a potential of reallocation into Chinese equities as we move into 2011,” Konyn said.

2NC US Not K2 Global Economy EXT – China

US decline doesn’t affect world economy; China key now

Doshi ‘07

Hiren, 10-24, “China, More than the US is the Driver of the World Economy,” Hiren Doshi has traveled and worked around the globe in his career with Infosys. As an Indian living in China, he is uniquely poised to observe the triumphs and challenges each country faces as it undergoes economic and social change. Sparked by his experience at Infosys, Hiren is particularly interested in examining the role of information technology in catalyzing the development of both countries. Specifically, he aims to analyze the potential for increased sharing of resources and knowledge between India and China--a united front in the journey toward globalization. Hiren received an MBA in finance from the University of Mumbai. His international experience offers keen insight into dilemmas facing India and China today, http://www.financialexpress.com/news/china-morethantheusisthedriverofworldeconomy/231607/0

With a number of economists raising the probability of the US economy sliding into recession next year, the implication on the global economy may range from a fundamental shift in pattern of trade and material flow to a new currency regime where Asian currencies start playing a significant role. Alan Greenspan, last month said the odds of hard landing of the US economy have increased as consumer spending may slow down due to a decline in house prices. Similar assertions have been made by likes of Richard Syron of Freddie Mac to Lawrence Summers of Harvard University. Although, the mood is more of caution rather of panic at this point, the world may just come out unscathed whatever the fate may hold for US economy. After 16 years into the current cycle of US trade deficit, which began in 1991, the trend has reversed marking a fundamental shift. For the past two decades, US mainly bought and borrowed while rest of the world sold and saved. The US has been considered having the safest and most liquid financial market and consequently it has been the recipient of the global excess savings. It may be in the interest of Japan, China, Russia and Europe to maintain surpluses against the US in the long run as they tackle serious demographic changes expected to occur in the next few decades. The US current account deficit that hit an all-time high of 6.8% at the end of 2005 of GDP was down to 5.5% earlier this year. Instead of depending heavily on the US economy as the global growth engine, the world economy could start to become more evenly balanced. No other country seems to have benefited from the seemingly insatiable consumption by the US consumers than China. There is an interesting and ironical connection between US consumers and China. To pay for these imports, the US has to attract $2.1 billion in foreign investment every single day. Since China opened its economy three decades ago, it has been growing at a blistering pace. It has clocked more than 10% average GDP growth rate for the last 30 years, which is higher than what most developed economies witnessed during their growth days. America was one of China’s most important export markets. Exports kept the factories humming and provided employment to thousands of unskilled and semi-skilled migrant rural workers. To maintain the competitive edge in exports, China pegged its currency to the US dollars. To maintain its peg and keep the interest rate low, it started accumulating massive foreign exchange reserves by mopping up foreign currency. This was in turn invested in dollar denominated assets, mainly the US government bonds. While in theory, foreign central banks investing in the US government bonds and thereby funding the budget deficit signifies the strength of the US economy, this has, however, now reached to a stage where more than 40% of national debt is owned by foreigners. The long-term interest rates, which is driven by government-bond pricing is now controlled by foreign central banks, mainly Japan and China and mortgage rates are directly linked to government bond yields and long-term interest rates. Increasing housing prices was one of the important underlying factors in strong consumer spending and resultant above average growth of US economy since the recession of 1991. With the current turmoil in credit market and meltdown in housing prices, the consumer spending is almost certain to slow down. Moreover, the dollar has been hammered in the last 10 months to a new low which may trigger fear of higher interest rates and inflation if the foreign central banks decide not to invest in the US treasury bonds any more. Recent data shows that long-term capital flows measured just $19 billion in July as compared to $91 billion the previous month. Soaring interest rates will increase mortgage rates making borrowing for home more difficult and thereby decreasing the demand for new homes. It is estimated that every 6% drop in dollar value reduces American income by 1% and coupled with reduced consumption this may nudge the US economy into recession. With a mere 50% probability of such an event occurring, one would expect it to send shock waves to markets in China, one of the largest trading partner for US. However the reality is quite different. The Shanghai stock exchange composite index recently crossed 6,000 marking new high with the price-earnings ratio based on historic profits touching almost 50. China, which has traditionally punched below its weight, has now started playing a bigger role in the global economy. At market-exchange prices, this year China will contribute more towards global GDP growth than the US. While the fate of US economy seems downbeat, the fate of the world’s economy may now also hinge on the strength of Chinese economy. The primary threats are formation of asset bubble, surging inflation, slump in exports to the US and over-investment. The share prices have more than quadrupled since 2005. This is, without doubt, a bubble waiting to burst but the implication of the bust may not have significant impact on the economy. The bulk of the shares is still held by the government through state owned enterprises and the remaining value of the tradable shares is only 35% of GDP. This accounts for only 20% of household financial assets that may not adversely influence the consumer spending in the event of the market downturn. A nastier impact of fallout in stock market would be in corporate profitability. According to a study by Morgan Stanley, more than 30% of profits reported by listed companies came from share price gains and other investment income. A stock-market crash would impact the corporate profitability and make borrowing from banks more difficult curtailing future investments. China has gradually shifted its export focus from the US to the European Union (EU). The growth in exports to EU in the last quarter has outstripped growth in exports to US by a factor of three. While export constitutes 40% of China’s GDP, it only contributes to 25% to the growth of GDP. The growth in Chinese economy is increasingly driven by domestic consumption rather than external dependency. The slowdown in the US consumer consumption may shave off half a percent of China’s GDP growth, but not enough to have any material impact on its already high growth rate. Instead it may actually help the Chinese government to cool off the overheating economy. It will help China reduce the burgeoning trade deficit with US, which is often used as a weapon by the US to pressurise China to appreciate its currency faster. The Chinese economy is at a juncture where high savings and investment rates are coupled with soaring asset prices and upward pressure on inflation and currency. It will be interesting to see how China’s economy fares in a rebalancing world economic order.

2NC US Not K2 Global Economy EXT – China

US economy no longer the world’s engine; China proves

Powell ‘09

Bill, 8-10, Time Magazine “Can China Save the World,” **Bill Powell**is a senior writer for TIME in Shanghai. Prior to current his post, he was Chief International correspondent for Fortune based in Beijing and then New York. He also served as Newsweek bureau chief in Moscow, Berlin and Tokyo.) http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1913638-3,00.html

On a steamy saturday afternoon just outside Shanghai, Zhang Yi is in a blessedly cool General Motors showroom, kicking the tires of the company's newer models. He's not there to beat the heat. He drives a small Volkswagen now and wants to upgrade. A middle manager at a state-owned steel company, Zhang has no worries about his job or China's economy. "Things are still pretty good," he says. "I have no problem now affording one of these," nodding toward the array of gleaming new Buicks nearby. There aren't a lot of places in the world these days where consumers speak with that kind of confidence. With the U.S., Japan and all of Europe mired in the worst global recession in 30 years, China has shown a restorative strength that six months ago many doubted it had. A devastating slump in exports crippled growth late last year, but on the back of a $586 billion government stimulus program — about 13% of GDP, spread over two years — China has snapped back. The economy grew 7.9% in the second quarter and will now probably expand 8% or more this year. Evidence of increasing momentum appears almost every day. Factory production has begun to edge up, in part because Chinese consumers continue to spend money at a healthy pace. Auto sales, helped significantly by government subsidies for small-car purchases, hit an all-time record in April and will easily surpass those in the U.S. this year. Overall, retail sales in China this year are up 16% Numbers alone do not capture the sense that the balance of global economic power is shifting eastward. There have been several moments that seemed to crystallize the zeitgeist, none more memorable than U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner's speech in June before the best and the brightest at Peking University, the Harvard of China. Not long ago, students there would have been the most respectful and polite of audiences. Yet when Geithner tried to reassure one questioner that China's investments in U.S. government debt were "very safe," the response was perhaps an indication of the onset of a new economic order: the students laughed. The U.S., the unquestioned leader of the global economy, is now in the midst of a disorienting shift in economic policy, away from the let-it-rip form of capitalism that has guided it for almost 30 years and toward more overt government control and regulation of huge swaths of the economy. No one yet can safely say whether this is wise, but in the U.S. it is certainly the stuff of increasingly fierce debate. No such doubts are evident in China, where the government reacted to the crisis with alacrity and the economy is now responding in kind. That's why, for global companies like General Motors, China is no longer the future. It's the present. Of the world's 10 biggest economies, China's is the only one that is growing, and it could soon surpass Japan's to become the world's second largest. The Shanghai exchange has soared more than 80% this year, by far the best performance among major markets. Nations that depend on producing commodities, such as Australia and Brazil, have benefited immensely over the past six months as demand from China has driven up the price of raw materials. Helped by trade with China, Asia's export-driven economies are sputtering back to life. Overall, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) forecasts that in the three years from 2008 to 2010, China will, astonishingly, account for almost three-quarters of the world's economic growth. Not surprisingly, China has now become the focus of a world that is looking for a way out of the swamp. As Shanghai-based economist Andy Xie puts it, "Everyone wants to know the same thing: Can China save the world?" Trading Places A few years ago, that question — and the notion that China could drive global growth — would have seemed absurd. After all, China's economy was dependent on manufacturing, which was in turn dependent on demand from the U.S., the world's undisputed economic locomotive. But that engine remains sidetracked. The IMF predicts the U.S. economy will contract 2.6% this year. American home prices continue to fall in some cities, while the unemployment rate has soared to 9.5%, the highest since 1983. The U.S.'s much ballyhooed stimulus plan has so far yielded little measurable benefit, save putting some spark back in stock markets. The absence of real signs of recovery has Washington discussing the possibility of yet another round of stimulus spending, despite a ballooning federal budget deficit. The speed and relative success so far of China's stimulus stands in stark contrast with that of the U.S. According to a recent study by the World Bank, Beijing's government spending will generate more than 80% of the country's overall economic growth this year. This is partly because China was already in the midst of a nationwide infrastructure program when the recession hit. Emergency spending measures simply added to existing schemes already under way. In other words, the projects really were shovel-ready, and the money hit the streets quickly — and in large dollops. Outlays on new railway construction, for example, were $41 billion last year. They will be $88 billion this year. Says one senior FORTUNE 500 executive: "In the U.S., NIMBY [not in my backyard] is still the order of the day, whereas in China it's more like IMBY. They build where they want, when they want. And they move fast." China's recovery and growing economic importance have led some to suggest that global institutions such as the Group of Eight — the U.S., the U.K., Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and Russia — are becoming obsolete; that the only dialogue that really matters going forward is the conversation between the "G-2": China and the U.S. On July 27, President Barack Obama appeared to acknowledge this when, addressing participants in high-level talks between the two countries, he said Washington's relationship with Beijing would "shape the 21st century." In recent months, Beijing has started to throw its weight around. China seeks — and will almost certainly soon get — greater voting rights in the IMF. In June, China agreed to buy up to $50 billion in bonds issued by the IMF to boost the fund's capacity to deal with the global financial crisis. Earlier this year, Chinese leaders, worried about the strength of the U.S. dollar and the safety of their own $763.5 billion investment in U.S. Treasury Department debt, called for the creation of an alternative to the greenback as a global reserve currency. More recently, Beijing has signaled an intention to slowly establish its own currency, the renminbi, as a dollar alternative in international trade by providing subsidies for Chinese companies to price their exports in renminbi. One economist, Qu Hongbin of HSBC in Hong Kong, goes so far as to say that 40% to 50% of China's overall trade flows could be settled in renminbi by 2012 (though few other economists believe this will happen anywhere near that fast). This willingness to make its positions known publicly and push other governments to see things China's way "is very different from 10 years ago, when Beijing was much quieter and more low-profile," says Jun Ma, an economist at Deutsche Bank in Hong Kong. Indeed, China is increasingly open about both its ambitions and its concerns over U.S. economic policy, given its position as Washington's largest foreign creditor. Beijing never signed on to what became known in the late 1990s as the Washington Consensus on global economic policy, which called for free trade, privatization, light-touch regulation, prudent fiscal policies and — at least as many interpreted the consensus — free capital flows. The U.S. Treasury, in the wake of the credit meltdown, has put forward a plan to enhance regulation of its own capital markets, but that is unlikely to prevent Beijing from continuing to push for the IMF to take a greater role in policing global markets. At its core, despite embracing many aspects of the market, China runs a top-down, command-and-control economy, and its success so far in skating through the recession relatively cleanly may encourage other developing countries to adopt its brand of capitalism.

2NC US Not K2 Global Economy EXT – China

US isn’t key to world economy—China proves

Lynch ‘10

David J., **reporter @ USA Today**, “China pushes domestic economic growth”, 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/money/world/2010-07-14-China14\_CV\_N.htm

Ma Xiaojing and his girlfriend, Niu Shanni, weren't trying to shake up the global economy. They just wanted to go shopping. But as they strolled through the Viva Beijing mall on a recent workday, the young couple seemed to embody a transformation that many economists say is essential to long-term global stability. With American consumers tapped out in the wake of the financial crisis, China must rebalance its economy to rely more on its own domestic demand rather than exports to the United States. That will raise living standards here and eventually shrink the costly and controversial U.S. trade deficit with China, which hit $22.3 billion in May, up from $17.5 billion in the same month last year. Chinese leaders have publicly endorsed the shift. But while there are signs that Chinese consumers such as Ma, 23, and Niu, 22, are slowly assuming a more prominent role, completing the overall transition will take years. Meanwhile, there's another shift underway that may be less congenial to American interests. Asked about the economy's prospects, Ma replied: "We are not that market-oriented. The market is controlled by the government, so I'm not worried." China ducked the worst of the global downturn thanks to a massive burst of government spending and officials' stubborn rejection of earlier American advice to open its financial system. Thus, Beijing's crisis-fighting experience has sparked another type of rebalancing with leaders, including Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, placing renewed emphasis in their public remarks on the state's role in steering the economy. As the wounded U.S. economy struggles to heal, Chinese officials feel their "big government" response to the crisis has been vindicated and should shape their future course. Barry Naughton, an expert on the Chinese economy at the University of California-San Diego, has labeled the new attitude "probably the most unambiguous movement to re-emphasize centralization and administrative instruments to govern the economy" in almost 20 years.

2NC US Not K2 Global Economy EXT – China

US isn’t dominant economy—China’s energy usage proves

Swartz and Oster ‘10

Spencer and Shai,Reporters Wall Street Journal “China tops US in energy use”, 7-18-2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703720504575376712353150310.html?mod=googlenews\_wsj

China has passed the U.S. to become the world's biggest energy consumer, according to new data from the International Energy Agency, a milestone that reflects both China's decades-long burst of economic growth and its rapidly expanding clout as an industrial giant. China's ascent marks "a new age in the history of energy," IEA chief economist Fatih Birol said in an interview. The country's surging appetite has transformed global energy markets and propped up prices of oil and coal in recent years, and its continued growth stands to have long-term implications for U.S. energy security. The Paris-based IEA, energy adviser to most of the world's biggest economies, said China consumed 2.252 billion tons of oil equivalent last year, about 4% more than the U.S., which burned through 2.170 billion tons of oil equivalent. The oil-equivalent metric represents all forms of energy consumed, including crude oil, nuclear power, coal, natural gas and renewable sources such as hydropower. China, meanwhile, disputed the IEA figures, but didn't offer alternative data, according to Zhou Xian, spokesperson for China's top energy agency. The U.S. had been the globe's biggest overall energy user since the early 1900s, Mr. Birol said China overtook it at breakneck pace. China's total energy consumption was just half that of the U.S. 10 years ago, but in many of the years since, China saw annual double-digit growth rates. It had been expected to pass the U.S. about five years from now, but took the top position earlier because the global recession hit the U.S. more severely, slowing American industrial activity and energy use. China's economic rise has required enormous amounts of energy—especially since much of the past decade's growth was fueled not by consumer demand, as in the U.S., but from energy-intense heavy industry and infrastructure building. China's growing energy demands will present new challenges to U.S. foreign policy, as well as to international efforts to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases linked to climate change. China National Petroleum Co., the country's biggest oil company, is pushing forward with oil and gas projects in Iran, despite U.S. efforts to enforce sanctions against the Tehran government. Beijing has refused to agree to cap its overall growth in its consumption of fossil fuels, or reduce its emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases. That frustrated President Barack Obama's efforts to forge an international climate agreement at a United Nations summit in Copenhagen last December. China instead set a target to reduce emissions intensity—the amount of carbon dioxide emitted per unit of gross domestic product—by 40% to 45% from 2005 levels by 2020. That meant China was agreeing to make its economy more energy efficient—boosting its competitiveness—but not to consume less energy overall. China's growth has transformed global energy markets and sustained higher prices for everything from oil to uranium and other natural resources that the country has been consuming. Once, China was a major exporter of both oil and coal. Its increasing reliance on imports has sustained higher energy prices worldwide and underpinned a natural-resource boom in Africa, the Middle East and Australia. "There is little doubt that China's growing consumption changes what ability we have to control our own destiny within global energy markets," said David Pumphrey, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. "China can now demand a large space inside any energy-policy tent." China's rapidly expanding need for energy promises to have major geopolitical implications as it hunts for ways to satisfy its needs. Already, China's rising imports have changed global geopolitics. Chinese oil and coal companies have been looking overseas in their quest to secure energy supplies, pitching the Chinese flag in places like Sudan, which Western companies had largely abandoned under international pressure. The most ambitious effort to secure overseas energy supplies was the failed 2005 attempt Cnooc Ltd. to take over California-based Unocal in an $18 billion bid, which was trumped by politics and rival Chevron. Despite a short pullback in the aftermath of that failed deal, Chinese companies have expanded overseas, buying assets in Central Asia, Africa, South America, Canada and even small stakes in the Gulf of Mexico. While their overall overseas footprint is still small compared with that of big international oil companies, these companies are expanding with access to cheap credit through China's state-owned banks. Voracious energy demand also helps explain why China—which gets most of its electricity from coal, the most polluting of fossil fuels—passed the U.S. in 2007 as the world's largest emitter of carbon-dioxide emissions and other greenhouse gases. In the past, being the world's biggest consumer of fossil fuels went hand in hand with being its dominant economy.

2NC Economy Resilient EXT

The financial system is resilient – no collapse like the 1930’s possible

Smith ‘95

Roy C. Smith, Professor of Finance and International Business at NYU’s Stern School of Business, 1995, The Washington Quarterly, “Risk and Volatility,” Autumn, Vol. 18, No. 4

Although concerns about a systemic collapse should not be dismissed lightly (regulators appropriately worry about such things all the time), they should be kept in perspective. Indeed, in different ways the world experienced a major systemic shock with the failure of the U.S. savings and loan banks (S&Ls) and some other banks in the 1980s, which required the intervention of the federal deposit insurance institutions to the extent of several hundreds of billions of dollars. Unlike the 1930s, when thousands of banks failed, helping to push the country into the Great Depression, this time no such result occurred. The crisis was confined to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. It had little effect on either the United States or the world economy. Also, about 10 years later, a second potentially systemic crisis occurred when the stock market and real estate bubble enveloping the economy of Japan burst and the government had to face up to the damage. Massive loan losses and bankruptcies were the resuit (estimated in total to exceed $ 500 billion), which significantly dried up the real economy in the aftermath, creating a low-growth economic condition that lasted several years. The crisis, however, did not spread to other countries. The government intervened in many ways to manage the crisis, including slowing down the deregulatory efforts needed to conform to world financial practices, and steps are under way to deal with the bad loans. The financial system in Japan now appears to be recovering, although slowly. The lesson from this, and the U.S. S&L crisis, may be that the global financial system may be tougher than it looks and much less susceptible to self-inflicted damage than generally thought; certainly it is tougher than it was in the 1930s.

2NC Economy Resilient EXT

U.S. Econ resilient – markets are stable

Reuters ‘08

Reuters Mar 16, 2008 “Treasury's Paulson says U.S. economy resilient” http://www.reuters.com/article/businessNews/idUSN1648658420080316

In an interview with "Fox News Sunday" Paulson said U.S. markets were "resilient" and that he felt the $152 billion economic stimulus plan would help lift the economy. Paulson said the Bush administration continued to believe that "long-term economic strength is going to be reflected in the dollar." Paulson also said the Federal Reserve made the right decision on Friday to come to the rescue of Bear Stearns, BSC.N, the fifth largest investment bank. Paulson said it was important to minimize market disruptions and enhance confidence in the U.S. economy. "I've got great confidence in our financial institutions," Paulson said. "Our markets are resilient." He added that he had confidence U.S economy would work it way through the current crises that began with a sharp downturn in the U.S. housing market leading to a full-blown credit crisis. (Reporting by Donna Smith; Editing by Jackie Frank)

US market flexibility makes the economy resilient – per capita income and position in the global economy prove

Info-Prod Research ‘09

Info-Prod Research (Middle East), ProQuest SuperText, “Info-Prod Strategic Business Information”, May 31, Lexis

Even with a significant deterioration in the US government's debt position, its rating has a stable outlook and demonstrates the attributes of a Aaa sovereign, says Moody's Investors Service in its annual report on the United States. These attributes include a diverse and resilient economy, strong government institutions, high per capita income, and a central position in the global economy. "Moody's expects that, because of these factors, US economic strength will emerge after the crisis without major impairment," said Moody's Vice President Steven Hess, author of the report. "The global role of the US currency also contributes to the ability of the economy and government finances to rebound." He said the government balance sheet has been weakened by the combination of efforts to stabilize the financial system, the effects of the sharp economic recession on federal finance, and the $787 billion federal stimulus package passed earlier this year. The result has been much higher debt ratios that may persist for some years to come. While these ratios are deteriorating in the US, they are also doing so in most other advanced economies due to the global recession. Furthermore, the level of debt is less important than the government's balance sheet flexibility, which Moody's believes is still high in the case of the US. Despite a worsening government balance sheet, Moody's cites other factors in support of the Aaa rating. "The current economic downturn has only temporarily altered America's productivity dynamic, and productivity has risen in the recession period, as is typical," said Hess. "US labor market flexibility has been a key factor in this trend." A higher rate of US population growth through 2025 relative to other advanced economies will also contribute to continued economic growth --and government revenues. "While our outlook for the US rating is stable, a reassessment of the long-term growth prospects of the economy and the ability of the government to return to a sustainable debt trajectory could put negative pressure on the rating in the future. How the economy and fiscal policy fare after the recession will be key," said Hess. He added that, over the longer term, contingent liabilities related to Social Security and Medicare programs could also pressure the rating.

2NC Economy Resilient EXT

Even if they win that the global economy will decline, the US is extremely resilient – data shows and predicts continued growth

National Post ‘09

National Post's Financial Post & FP Investing, 2009, Canada, “Alia McMullen, Financial Post; With Files From Bloomberg News”, February 10, Lexis

The Japanese economy is shrinking at an "unimaginable" speed, fiscal stimulus would be "useless" in Italy, and the already painful U. K. recession will likely be even "deeper" than expected. The United States may have kick-started the global recession, but its emergence has uncovered structural deficiencies in a number of developed countries around the globe. The evidence suggests countries such as the United Kingdom, Japan and Italy will suffer a heavier downturn than the United States, in what has become the worst global recession since the Second World War. But as others sink, the U. S. economy has shown some resilient signs. Non-farm business productivity grew 3.2% in the fourth quarter after growth of 1.5% the previous quarter, data from the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics showed on Thursday. Paul Ashworth, an economist at Capital Economics, said the relatively high rate of U. S. productivity in the past 13 years would help output and profit recover. Productivity might also help the U. S. economy outperform those of other developed countries. Even so, the ability of the United States to remain productive gives it an economic advantage over a country such as Italy, where productivity has been in decline since 2001. "Italy is a mess and its decline irreversible, at least within the euro-structure," said Charles Dumas, an economist at London's Lombard Street Research, who said Italy's economy would likely contract 3% to 3.5% this year, an outlook that could even be overly optimistic. Even Giulio Tremonti, Italy's Finance Minister, has appeared to have lost confidence in the economy. "I'm absolutely sure any kind of stimulus is useless in any case," he told the Financial Times last month. Meanwhile, conditions in Japan have begun to deteriorate at an alarming rate. "Japan's recent economic decline is faster than that of the U. S., which has been experiencing the worst financial crisis in a century," Kazuo Momma, head of research and statistics at the Bank of Japan, said in Tokyo yesterday. Economists expect economic growth figures next Monday to reveal Japan's economy contracted at an unprecedented annualized rate of 11.7% in the fourth quarter of 2008. Mr. Momma said the Japanese economy could have shrunk at an "unimaginable" speed in the fourth quarter and would likely contract at a similar pace, or worse, in the first three months of 2009. "Essentially nobody has been able to escape the slowdown that we're seeing," said Mark Chandler, an interest-rate strategist at RBC Capital Markets. "It's certainly the case in the U. K., where conditions are as bad or worse than in the U. S." The International Monetary Fund has forecast a U. K. contraction of 2.8% in 2009.

2NC Economy Resilient EXT

Global economy resilient – stimulus solves decline and the dollar will remain strong

AFP ‘09

Geithner sees US finance system improving, June 15,

[http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5i-2OSW jmh8AEtJteYaMoONqzWkg](http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5i-2OSW%20jmh8AEtJteYaMoONqzWkg)

PARIS — The stricken US financial system is poised for recovery as stimulus measures hit home, US Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner said Thursday, as more upbeat earnings figures emerged from the banking sector. Measures taken to calm the financial crisis would have their main effect in the second half of this year and any thought of new steps was premature, Geithner said in comments published online by French newspaper Les Echos. The existing "stimulus program was designed to make a contribution over a two-year period, and the biggest impact on investment will come in the second half of this year," he said. He also held that the dollar would remain the main international reserve currency, against a background of questions about its supremacy, mainly from China and Russia but also from France. The pre-eminence of the dollar placed special responsibility on the United States in restoring confidence in the financial system and in the reduction of deficits once recovery was under way, he said. In remarks to Bloomberg Television, he said that the US financial system was showing signs of "repair", but also warned against blanket state caps on traders' pay. In a positive sign for the sector, US banking giant JPMorgan Chase beat expectations on Thursday, reporting a quarterly profit of 2.7 billion dollars. Investment giant Goldman Sachs had also posted strong earnings on Tuesday. Geithner met French Prime Minister Francois Fillon, and they stressed the importance of dealing with imbalances in the global economy as it begins the pull-out of the financial crisis, a statement here said. On regulation of derivative markets, Geithner said on the Les Echos site: "Actually, our approaches are very similar. We need a common, global solution to these global markets, not separate regional solutions." Geithner also said in remarks to Bloomberg Television: "What we are generally seeing across the US financial system is welcome signs of stability and repair.**"**  He added: "We are moving very quickly to try to put in place comprehensive reforms of risk-taking in the financial sector to try to make sure we put in place not just strong protection for consumers... but also to make sure that we have a more stable, more resilient financial system less prone to crisis." This would involve restrictions on leverage by means of tightened standards for the capital held by financial companies. Another "comprehensive" reform would affect the way people in financial companies were paid, he said, referring to the controversy about big performance bonuses which are widely held to have encouraged imprudent risk-taking. Financial sector pay packages had to be tightened up, he argued, but he also said: "We don't think it's appropriate for governments anywhere to try to set limits or to provide the details of compensation practices." "We want to make sure that compensation is rewarding good performance, not bad performance and is reinforcing our basic objective to create a more stable system." France has taken a lead in pushing for a firm line in restraining bonuses for those in the financial sector. Fillon assured Geithner that France was determined to balance its public finances, a statement from the prime minister's office said. They are deep in deficit in line with the crisis budgets of many leading economies. France had a "central target" of "an eventual return to balanced public finances," the statement said. The prime minister's office said that the two men had reviewed the international economic situation and notably the scale and effectiveness of plans to boost economies and the need to absorb global imbalances.

2NC Economy Resilient EXT

Economic downturn won’t lead to their impacts—most problems are individual instead of organized

Durodie ‘09

Bill, senior fellow with the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, The Straits Times, “Recession and unrest: Cauldron may not boil over,” 5/28/09, Lexis

Some commentators have suggested the recession may be a good thing. These romanticize a supposed spirit of community they believe will emerge from an enforced curb on consumption. One should be wary of talking up the crisis in this fashion, as the British shadow health secretary has discovered. He was chastised for suggesting the recession would be good for families since it would prevent people from buying cigarettes and alcohol. The masses may not be revolting, but they are not stupid either. They are quite capable of noting that a recession is nothing to celebrate. At the opposite end of the spectrum, some have worried that the crisis will lead to social unrest. These overestimate the inevitability of social instability and underestimate its requisite political drivers. Compared to previous recessions, the worldwide working class has never been so disconnected and disorganised. In the 1960s and 1970s, leaders across the globe faced the twin threats of the organised labour movement within their borders and the alternative of communism without. These elements disintegrated in the 1980s and 1990s, leaving behind an atomised and disillusioned workforce. Of course, atomisation breeds alienation with a concomitant and occasional lashing out against the system. But this is sporadic and exceptional, rather than generic and protracted. The concerns of the elites therefore have more to do with their sense of isolation and insecurity than any conscious or organised threat. Indeed, most world leaders do not even face a serious challenge from within their own ranks, let alone one from outside.The most vocal have been the disgruntled middle classes, and their supporters in the media. Of course, since the French revolution, it has been the historic role of the middle class to co-opt the lower orders in their struggles only to turn against them at the last moment. But the absence of any oppositional ideology today suggests this to be extremely unlikely. Crime, of course, is a separate matter from social unrest. One might expect social hardship to lead to some increase in particular types of criminality. Illegal immigration and insurance scams may also increase, as could covering up errors for fear of losing one's job. But some crimes, such as metal theft in a period of diminishing demand, may decrease. The important thing to note is that these are individual responses rather than organised ones. It is the worrying about, and talking up of, the possibility of crime that may encourage it. Blaming bankers for causing all these problem is also unproductive. This ignores the responsibility of governments in encouraging their activities.

No evidence that the recession will lead to social instability—unpreparedness doesn’t automatically mean crisis

Durodie ‘09

Bill, senior fellow with the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, The Straits Times, “Recession and unrest: Cauldron may not boil over,” 5/28/09, Lexis

NO SOONER had the economic crisis emerged before security agencies began worrying about its implications for social stability. This tells us more about their crisis of confidence than inherent tendencies. The recession will not necessarily lead to social problems. It is striking how swiftly the world moved into recession and how unexpected this was. On June 20, 2007, the then British Chancellor of the Exchequer congratulated the City of London for creating 'an era that history will record as the beginning of a new golden age for the City’. The US sub-prime mortgage crisis emerged a month later. By September, Britain's Northern Rock Bank was seeking support from the Bank of England. But even at that stage, many considered the crisis to be specific rather than systemic. On Aug 13 last year, the Bank of England governor Mervyn King announced: 'The central projection is one of a broadly flat output over the next year.’ Events then accelerated from September last year, with the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. Only one month later, a major British policing agency was asking: 'How will crime against business and industry change in an economic downturn?’ This suggests the discussion on the implications of the recession for social cohesion has been driven more by speculative concerns than evident trends. That is not surprising as the current period is marked more by elite insecurity than inherent social instability.

2NC Economy Resilient EXT

US economy empirically resilient—it won’t crash

Stelzer ‘08

Irwin, writer at the examiner, “Resilient US economy has weathered many storms”, Jan 8, <http://www.examiner.com/a-1144203~Irwin_Stelzer__Resilient_U_S__economy_has_weathered_many_storms.html>

Country singer Kris Kristofferson did not have fallen CEOs and other investment bankers in mind when he sang about the man who “Once ... had a future full of money, love, and dreams, which he spent like they was goin’ out of style,” but it is an apt description of many shell-shocked bankers and investors. They have reason to worry. Oil finally hit $100 per barrel, sending share prices tumbling and gold prices soaring, in anticipation of renewed inflation. Rising food and gasoline prices are reducing consumer discretionary-spending power to a mere shadow of its former self. The unemployment rate last month soared from 4.7 to 5 percent. And the manufacturing sector is slowing. Whether all of this will produce a recession in 2008 remains less than certain. For one thing, the White House might step in with a fiscal stimulus package that includes allowing faster write-offs of business investment or, if Congress will go along, lowering the corporate tax rate. For another, we can’t be certain whether the Federal Reserve, now more worried that the slowdown might morph into a recession, will accelerate the pace of its interest rate cuts. But there are some things we do know. The structure of the financial services industry is changing. Many banks need to rebuild their balance sheets by attracting equity capital, and sovereign wealth funds of oil-producing and other exporting nations need someplace to put their cash to work. The result has already been these funds’ purchase of important positions in Merrill Lynch, Citigroup, UBS and other investment banks. So far, not a peep from the politicians, but that won’t last. We know, too, that as the greenback depreciates in value, foreign central banks are less inclined to keep stores of American presidents in their vaults and more interested in diversifying their currency holdings. The dollar’s share of central banks’ holdings of foreign reserves has fallen to 63.8 from 66.5 percent in the past year. Equally important, oil-producing nations — which until now accepted dollars for crude and pegged their currencies to the dollar — are finding it increasingly difficult to hold to those policies. The dollars they use to pay the large foreign work forces on which their work-shy citizens rely now buy less and less when remitted to the workers’ wives and families. That is causing social discontent of the sort that horrifies the ruling classes in the Arab countries. My guess is they will begin pegging their own currencies to a basket of currencies that includes the dollar, but in which the euro is importantly represented as well. We know two other things. The first is that the U.S. economy will indeed slow, at least in the first half of 2008. The second is that America will elect a new president pledged to retreat from the nation’s historic position in favor of free trade. Doha and other trade deals, if not already dead, will breathe their last and be buried. But these are all small things compared to the really big thing that we also know: The American economy is an amazingly resilient and flexible machine. Remember the dot-com bust, now cited as the model for what we are about to go through? Since that dreary period, the U.S. economy added 8 million jobs. In real, inflation-adjusted terms, the value of the goods and services produced in America is about 15 percent higher than during the dot-com bust. And even after the precipitous drops of recent days, the leading share-price indices are healthily up over dot-com bust levels. If you need any further proof of the ability of the U.S. economy to thrive after taking a blow, consider the speed with which output, employment and every other indicator rose soon after the devastating attack on Sept. 11, 2001. Or after Hurricane Katrina. Or ask yourself whether you can identify the enduring effect of these events during the Clinton years, now remembered as a golden age: The Mexican peso crisis, the Asian financial crisis, and what scholars now call “the crisis of confidence and legitimacy of the international monetary and financial system.” It’s fashionable to call the year just ended a year of two halves: prosperous first half, followed by a subprime-infected second six months. 2008 might just prove to be the reverse: stormy first half, followed by gradual brightening as America’s entrepreneurs find new fields to conquer.

2NC Collapse Doesn’t Cause War EXT

Economic decline does not cause violence or war

Miller 2K

Morris, Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, “Poverty as a cause of wars?” Morris Miller is an economist, adjunct professor in the University of Ottawa’s Faculty of Administration, consultant on international development issues, former Executive Director and Senior Economist at the World Bank, attended McGill and Harvard Universities and the London School of Economics, majoring in economic policy. Has taught at McGill University, the University of Maryland, Carleton University and the World Bank's Economic Development Institute. http://www.management.uottawa.ca/miller/poverty.htm

The question may be reformulated. Do wars spring from a popular reaction to a sudden economic crisis that exacerbates poverty and growing disparities in wealth and incomes? Perhaps one could argue, as some scholars do, that it is some dramatic event or sequence of such events leading to the exacerbation of poverty that, in turn, leads to this deplorable denouement. This exogenous factor might act as a catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who would then possibly be tempted to seek a diversion by finding or, if need be, fabricating an enemy and setting in train the process leading to war. According to a study undertaken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. After studying ninety-three episodes of economic crisis in twenty-two countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since the Second World War they concluded that:19 Much of the conventional wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong ... The severity of economic crisis - as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth - bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes ... (or, in democratic states, rarely) to an outbreak of violence ... In the cases of dictatorships and semidemocracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another).

2NC Collapse Doesn’t Cause War EXT

We control uniqueness—surge was $130 billion and no economic collapse

Cornwell ‘10

Susan Cornwell, reporter @ Reuters, 7-02-10, “US House approves money for surge”, 2010, http://in.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-49827220100702

The US House of Representatives on Thursday approved funds to pay for the Afghan troop surge amid criticism of the unpopular war by both Democrat and Republican lawmakers. The House-approved bill includes nearly $4 billion in economic aid to Afghanistan and Pakistan. The war funds are in addition to the $130 billion Congress has already approved for Afghanistan and Iraq this year. The House’s Democratic leaders, who had procrastinated for weeks over the bill, did not act in time to get the $33 billion to the troops by July 4 as the Pentagon had requested. An amendment demanding an exit timetable from Afghanistan failed, but got 162 votes, the biggest anti-war vote in the House on Afghanistan to date.  All but nine of the supporters were Democrats, and included House Speaker Nancy Pelosi. House leaders added billions of dollars in non-military spending before passing the war funds, so the measure must now return to the Senate, which is not in session again until July 12. Pentagon chief Robert Gates said recently the money for 30,000 additional troops to Afghanistan should be approved by July 4 to avoid the Pentagon having to juggle accounts and possibly lay off civilians while continuing war operations. Still it seemed a wonder the new money for the unpopular war got through the lower house at all, after long arguments among Democratic lawmakers over whether and how to do it. They set up a complicated series of votes in which the non-military spending passed 239-182, while the part containing the war funding passed 215-210. “I do not believe this war is anything but a fool’s errand. If I had my way, I would never bring this to the floor,” said Representative David Obey. “Why are we continuing to send our troops into a Mission Impossible?” asked Dennis Kucinich, a liberal Democrat during the discussion. While, Representative Louise Slaughter complained that the US has already spent too much on the Afghan war — some $345 billion — and needed to pay attention to its own economic problems.

2NC Collapse Doesn’t Cause War EXT

No Impact—Economic Decline does not cause wars

Deudney ‘91

Daniel, Hewlett Fellow in Science, Technology, and Society at the Center for Energy and Environmental Studies, Princeton University, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April 1991

In a second scenario, declining living standards first cause internal turmoil, then war. If groups at all levels of affluence protect their standard of living by pushing deprivation on other groups, class war and revolutionary upheavals could result. Faced with these pressures, liberal democracy and free market systems could increasingly be replaced by authoritarian systems capable of maintaining minimum order. If authoritarian regimes are more war-prone because they lack democratic control, and if revolutionary regimes are war-prone because of their ideological fervor and isolation, then the world is likely to become more violent. The record of previous depressions supports the proposition that widespread economic stagnation and unmet economic expectations contribute to international conflict. Although initially compelling, this scenario has major flaws. One is that it is arguably based on unsound economic theory. Wealth is formed not so much by the availability of cheap natural resources as by capital formation through savings and more efficient production. Many resource-poor countries, like Japan, are very wealthy, while many countries with more extensive resources are poor. Environmental constraints require an end to economic growth based on growing use of raw materials, but not necessarily an end to growth in the production of goods and services. In addition, economic decline does not necessarily produce conflict. How societies respond to economic decline may largely depend upon the rate at which such declines occur. And as people get poorer, they may become less willing to spend scarce resources for military forces. As Bernard Brodie observed about the modern era, “The predisposing factors to military aggression are full bellies, not empty ones.” The experience of economic depressions over the last two centuries may be irrelevant, because such depressions were characterized by under-utilized production capacity and falling resource prices. In the 1930's, increased military spending stimulated economies, but if economic growth is retarded by environmental constraints, military spending will exacerbate the problem.

2NC Collapse Doesn’t Cause War EXT

Economic Collapse doesn’t cause war

Ferguson 06

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Nor can economic crises explain the bloodshed. What may be the most familiar causal chain in modern historiography links the Great Depression to the rise of fascism and the outbreak of World War II. But that simple story leaves too much out. Nazi Germany started the war in Europe only after its economy had recovered. Not all the countries affected by the Great Depression were taken over by fascist regimes, nor did all such regimes start wars of aggression. In fact, no general relationship between economics and conflict is discernible for the century as a whole. Some wars came after periods of growth, others were the causes rather than the consequences of economic catastrophe, and some severe economic crises were not followed by wars.

\*\*\*A2: TERRORISM ADVANTAGE\*\*\*

Terrorism 1NC

1. If the U.S. leaves Afghanistan, terrorism will still be a major threat.  
BBC News 2010

(“Afghan paper fears factional fighting if foreign forces withdraw too soon.” Text of article, “Warning from Senator John McCain, Liam Fox,” by state-owned Afghan newspaper Hewad. July 8, 2010 LEXIS.)

An assessment of the warnings of John McCain, Liam shows that such concerns truly exist. Many political and military experts believe that determining an exact date for the withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan will cause the war to continue. It is also clear that the international forces cannot stay here forever. However, their withdrawal should be conditional. It means that if the situation is satisfactory, Afghan security forces are capable of ensuring security and can foil foreign terrorist threats to the country, there will be no need for the presence of international forces in Afghanistan. Terrorism still poses a serious threat to the security and stability of Afghanistan, the region and the world. The centres where terrorists are recruited, trained, funded and armed are still active outside Afghanistan. Different fighters, including suicide bombers, are trained in these centres and then sent to Afghanistan to attack internal and international forces, government establishments, highways and civilians. The Afghan military forces are not strong enough to ensure countrywide security. The most serious problem is that the system has not yet politically, economically, militarily and socially stood on its own feet. If the international forces leave prematurely, there is a strong possibility that factional fighting will resume over power. A number of powerful people have already issued threats. If the international forces leave prematurely, they will start fighting one another. This will again claim the lives of innocent Afghans. If the international community, in particular America, wants to pave the way for its withdrawal, it must strengthen the system. International forces can confidently leave the country only when Afghanistan has a strong and self-sufficient system that can foil all internal and foreign threats to its security and stability and implement economic programmes for the prosperity and well-being of people.

2. Al Qaeda is now weak because of the war in Afghanistan.

Reid 2009

(Robert H., a veteran foreign correspondent who covers conflicts in the Middle East, “U.S. says al Qaeda now weak in Afghanistan,” October 07, 2009 <http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1A1-D90G6SS00.html>.)

Al Qaeda's role in Afghanistan has faded after eight years of war. Gone is the once-formidable network of camps and safe houses where Osama bin Laden and his mostly Arab operatives trained thousands of young Muslims to wage a global jihad. The group is left with fewer than 100 core fighters, according to the Obama administration, likely operating small-scale bomb-making and tactics classes conducted by trainers who travel to and from Pakistan. Assessing the real strength and threat posed by al Qaeda is at the heart of an evolving policy debate in Washington about whether to escalate the U.S. military presence in this country. The war was launched soon after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks to root out al Qaeda and deny the militant movement a safe haven in a Taliban-ruled Afghanistan.

3.  Terrorist can’t get weapons of mass destruction or nuclear weapons.

Healy 2010

Gene, Examiner Columnist Gene Healy is a vice president at the Cato Institute and the author of "The Cult of the Presidency," The Washington Examiner, April 6, 2010, “Gene Healy: Terrorism isn't an 'existential threat',” <http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/columns/Terrorism-isn_t-an-_existential-threat_-89944242.html>.)

When the enemy's best recent shot involves lighting his pants on fire, we shouldn't torture ourselves with nightmarish visions of weapons of mass destruction. Such weapons are exceedingly hard to come by. As political scientist John Mueller notes in his recent book "Atomic Obsession," "no state has ever given another state -- even a close ally, much less a terrorist group -- a nuclear weapon (or chemical, biological, or radiological one either)." And home-grown WMD tend to be ineffective. The Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo had roughly a billion dollars devoted to developing chemical and biological weapons, the most sophisticated such program in the history of terrorism. But when it released sarin gas on the Tokyo subway in 1995, it only managed to kill 12 people. Building a nuclear weapon is even harder. Any group trying to do so faces "Herculean challenges," according to the Gilmore Commission, the advisory panel President Bush set up to assess terror threats in the wake of 9/11. There has been no known case, Mueller points out, of any appreciable amount of weapons-grade uranium disappearing. None of this should be taken as a counsel of complacency. The low risk of terrorist WMD doesn't make guarding against it a waste of time. It makes sense, for example, to boost funding for international efforts to prevent nuclear smuggling, as the Obama administration has done. But when we overreact, we're doing terrorists' job for them.

Terrorism 1NC

4. Terrorism is not an existential threat.

Mueller & Stewart

John, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, and Mark G., Professor of Civil Engineering and Director of the Centre for Infrastructure Performance and Reliability at the University of Newcastle in Australia, “Hardly Existential: Thinking Rationally About Terrorism,” April 2, 2010, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66186/john-mueller-and-mark-g-stewart/hardly-existential>.)

An impressively large number of politicians, opinion makers, scholars, bureaucrats, and ordinary people hold that terrorism -- and al Qaeda in particular -- poses an existential threat to the United States. This alarming characterization, which was commonly employed by members of the George W. Bush administration, has also been used by some Obama advisers, including the counterterrorism specialist Bruce Riedel. Some officials, such as former U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff, have parsed the concept further, declaring the struggle against terrorism to be a "significant existential" one. Over the last several decades, academics, policymakers, and regulators worldwide have developed risk-assessment techniques to evaluate hazards to human life, such as pesticide use, pollution, and nuclear power plants. In the process, they have reached a substantial consensus about which risks are acceptable and which are unacceptable. When these techniques are applied to terrorism, it becomes clear that terrorism is far from an existential threat. Instead, it presents an acceptable risk, one so low that spending to further reduce its likelihood or consequences is scarcely justified.

5. Fear of terrorism cause human rights violations and too=powerful government.

Campos 2010

(Paul, professor of law at the University of Colorado, “Undressing the Terror Threat,” The Wall Street Journal, JANUARY 9, 2010, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704130904574644651587677752.html>)

No amount of statistical evidence, however, will make any difference to those who give themselves over to almost completely irrational fears. Such people, and there are apparently a lot of them in America right now, are in fact real victims of terrorism. They also make possible the current ascendancy of the politics of cowardice—the cynical exploitation of fear for political gain. Unfortunately, the politics of cowardice can also make it rational to spend otherwise irrational amounts of resources on further minimizing already minimal risks. Given the current climate of fear, any terrorist incident involving Islamic radicals generates huge social costs, so it may make more economic sense, in the short term, to spend X dollars to avoid 10 deaths caused by terrorism than it does to spend X dollars to avoid 1,000 ordinary homicides. Any long-term acceptance of such trade-offs hands terrorists the only real victory they can ever achieve. It's a remarkable fact that a nation founded, fought for, built by, and transformed through the extraordinary courage of figures such as George Washington, Susan B. Anthony and Martin Luther King Jr. now often seems reduced to a pitiful whimpering giant by a handful of mostly incompetent criminals, whose main weapons consist of scary-sounding Web sites and shoe- and underwear-concealed bombs that fail to detonate. Terrorball, in short, is made possible by a loss of the sense that cowardice is among the most disgusting and shameful of vices. I shudder to think what Washington, who as commander in chief of the Continental Army intentionally exposed himself to enemy fire to rally his poorly armed and badly outnumbered troops, would think of the spectacle of millions of Americans not merely tolerating but actually demanding that their government subject them to various indignities, in the false hope that the rituals of what has been called "security theater" will reduce the already infinitesimal risks we face from terrorism. Indeed, if one does not utter the magic word "terrorism," the notion that it is actually in the best interests of the country for the government to do everything possible to keep its citizens safe becomes self-evident nonsense.

6. Pakistan plans on defeating the Taliban.

Haider 2009

(Kamran, writer for Reuters, “Pakistan PM says will defeat Taliban and ensure peace,” May 18, 2009, The Independent, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/pakistan-pm-says-will-defeat-taliban-and-ensure-peace-1687058.html>)

Pakistan's army will finish its offensive against Taliban militants in the Swat valley and ensure peace, Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani said today as he rallied the support of political parties. The offensive, launched this month as international alarm grew over an intensifying insurgency, was making progress and every effort would be made to help the more than 1 million people displaced by the fighting, he said. "The operation against the terrorists is progressing very successfully and those who destroyed the peace of the nation are fleeing in disguise," Gilani said in an opening address to an all-parties conference on the fighting. "Troops will remain in the region until peace is ensured and all the displaced people return home," he said. Militant violence in nuclear-armed Pakistan has surged over the past two years, raising fears for its stability and alarming the United States, which needs Pakistani action to help defeat al Qaeda and bring stability to neighbouring Afghanistan.

Terrorism 1NC

7. The War on Terror has begun to eliminate extremists.

Baker 2008

(Gerard, staff writer for The Sunday Times, “Cheer up. We're winning this War on Terror,” Sunday Times, June 27, 2008, <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/article4221376.ece>)

The third and perhaps most significant advance of all in the War on Terror is the discrediting of the Islamist creed and its appeal. This was first of all evident in Iraq, where the head-hacking frenzy of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and his associates so alienated the majority of Muslims that it gave rise to the so-called Sunni Awakening that enabled the surge to be so effective. But it has spread way beyond Iraq. As Lawrence Wright described in an important piece in The New Yorker last month, there is growing disgust not just among moderate Muslims but even among other jihadists at the extremism of the terrorists. Deeply encouraging has been the widespread revulsion in Muslim communities in Europe - especially in Britain after the 7/7 attacks of three years ago. Some of the biggest intelligence breakthroughs in the past few years have been achieved from former al-Qaeda supporters who have turned against the movement. There ought to be no surprise here. It's only their apologists in the Western media who really failed to see the intrinsic evil of Islamists. Those who have had to live with it have never been in much doubt about what it represents. Ask the people of Iran. Or those who fled the horrors of Afghanistan under the Talebans.

Withdrawal 🡪 More Terrorism Ext

Withdrawal from Afghanistan would lead to a new terrorist threat in Afghanistan.

Daily Mail 2010

(Quotes Anders Fogh Rasmussen, 12th and current Secretary General of NATO, “British forces' withdrawal from Afghanistan could cause surge in Taliban attacks, Nato warns,” July 13, 2010, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1294258/British-forces-withdrawal-Afghanistan-cause-surge-Taliban-attacks-Nato-warns.html>.)

Mr. Rasmussen, the Nato secretary-general, said that while he understood the desire of elected leaders to bring back their forces, the mission had to continue until the Afghans could take responsibility for their own security. 'We can have our hopes, we can have our expectations, but I cannot give any guarantee as far as an exact date or year is concerned,' he told The Daily Telegraph. 'The Taliban follow the political debate in troop-contributing countries closely. 'If they discover that through their attacks, they can weaken the support for our presence in Afghanistan, they will just be encouraged to step up their attacks on foreign troops.' Mr. Rasmussen, a former Danish prime minister, said that withdrawing too soon from Afghanistan would lead to a renewed terrorist threat from Al Qaeda, and would risk destabilizing neighboring Pakistan 'The Taliban would return to Afghanistan and Afghanistan would once again become a safe haven for terrorist groups who would use it as a launch pad for terrorist attacks on North America and Europe,' he said. Following Mr. Rasmussen's meeting with Mr. Cameron, Downing Street said they had agreed on the 'central importance' of the ongoing international mission in Afghanistan 'to the national security of the UK and all Nato allies'.

There will be a new surge of terrorism if the U.S. withdraws from Afghanistan too early.

BBC News 2010

(“USA to brace for new surge of terrorism if withdraws from Afghanistan,“ Text of editorial in Dari headlined "Setting a timetable for withdrawal from Afghanistan will embolden the Taleban and prolong the war" and published by Afghan independent secular daily newspaper Hasht-e Sobh, July 8, 2010, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T9787946933&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T9787946945&cisb=22_T9787946944&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=10962&docNo=6> LEXIS)

The main concern is that setting a deadline will give concessions to the Pakistani military, which supports the Taleban, and it will open the way for its interference in Afghanistan. Taleban and their allies are now stronger than ever and as Taleban spokesman, Zabihollah Mojahed, says, Taleban have the upper hand. Is withdrawing from Afghanistan in this situation not tantamount to abandoning the field for the Taleban? Surprisingly, the decision to withdraw from Afghanistan is announced at a time when General Petraeus is speaking of victory in the nine year war without telling us how we can tell that this war is being won. There is no doubt that the Taleban interpret this decision as their victory and can use it as an effective propaganda tool to recruit more fighters. The Afghan ambassador is right when he says that too much reliance on an unrealistic timetable will only embolden the enemy and prolong the war. Considering the reconciliatory efforts of the government of Afghanistan, it is not clear who the enemy is. Currently, Taleban have the upper hand despite extensive presence of foreign forces and national army and police. What guarantees are there that the country and the people will be better defended in the absence of these forces? Premature withdrawal of American forces can only boost the morale of the opposition front and make the government of Afghanistan vulnerable. Moreover, the question that has to be asked is how is this decision made nine years later? There is no doubt that if the United States of America withdraws from Afghanistan without ensuring durable peace, it will have to strengthen its defences against terrorism on its own borders. One of the consequences of this premature withdrawal will be violation by the government of Afghanistan for its survival of all the values enshrined in the constitution and a hasty reconciliation deal with the opposition.

Withdrawal 🡪 More Terrorism Ext

If international forces leave Afghanistan, the Taliban and Al Qaeda will start fighting again.

BBC News 2008

(“Afghan paper against withdrawal of foreign forces,” Text of report by M. Motahar entitled "Withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan or the rule of terrorists again" published by private Afghan newspaper Arman-e Melli, December 14, 2008, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T9787946933&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T9787946945&cisb=22_T9787946944&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=10962&docNo=15>, LEXIS)

During the mojahedin's rule our country was afflicted by the civil war that was imposed on it. After that, the terrorist Taleban group ruled the country for five years and the Afghan people's cries could be heard from a distance. It was a time when many innocent women and children were killed in harsh ways and at that time foreign countries were the observers of this explicit violation of human rights. Some of these countries, including Britain - that talk about democracy and human rights today - did not apply any serious efforts against the terrorists at that time and they supported the terrorist Taleban and Al-Qa'idah group in some ways. After the 11 September attack, the United States apparently realized that the terrorists stationed in Afghanistan were the very serious danger posed to the international security. As a result, the anti-terrorist coalition forces, with the collaboration of the national forces, dissolved the terrorists' system in Afghanistan. However, after a short time, the terrorists got new blood with the collusion of the spying channels in countries near and far. Today, the terrorists are strongly lining up against the national and international forces and their elimination seems impossible. The withdrawal of the international forces is the slogan of the Taleban and Al-Qa'idah and they give religious and lawful justification to all their murders, even the killing of innocent people. There is no doubt that after the withdrawal of the international forces from Afghanistan, the Taleban would soon start fighting the national forces. Their cruelty, fear, bloodshed and revenge on the people would start and such a thing is not seen by history. It is seen right now that some of the government officials who are eager for power, point to the withdrawal of the foreign forces especially the American soldiers, though they denounce the succession cycle. The leading circles in the Afghan government think that they have lost the foreign support. Thus they want to attract the peoples' support by raising the issue of negotiation with the opposition and the withdrawal of the international forces, through which they would be able to be at the helm for some more years and they are not even concerned if this ship is going to sink.

Withdrawing from Afghanistan would just benefit the terrorists and cause an increase in terrorism.

May 2009

(Clifford D., President of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a policy institute focusing on terrorism created immediately following the 9/11 attacks on the United States, “Eight Years and Counting,” National Review, September 10, 2009, <http://article.nationalreview.com/405851/eight-years-and-counting/clifford-d-may?page=2>)

It is a war over ideas as much as it is a war over land. In fact, as real estate, Afghanistan is of minimal value. But what happens there will help determine how we — and our enemies and the millions of people around the world who have not taken sides — understand what this struggle is about and who is likely to prevail. “It was the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan that laid much of the imaginative groundwork for 9/11,” Wall Street Journal columnist Bret Stephens points out. “If one superpower could be brought down, why not the other?” General McChrystal and his commander, Gen. David A. Petraeus (a brilliant military mind), know what needs to get done to win the Battle of Afghanistan. They ask only that we provide the troops, weapons, and support. Less certain is whether political leaders on either side of the aisle have a coherent strategy to win the broader conflict. I suspect bin Laden was correct when he observed that most people prefer a strong horse to a weak horse. The strategic implication is that America and the few allies that have any fight left in them need to beat al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other militant Islamists like rented mules. It is a fact of life that generals who win victories attract recruits; losing generals end up alone. What’s more, in a war against religious fanatics — the Taliban is not, as NBC’s David Gregory recently said, a “nationalist movement” — no editorial, no speech, no talking point demonstrates the absence of divine endorsement quite so convincingly as defeat on the battlefield. Any time infidels flee, declaring “This is a war that can’t be won!” or even “This is a war that can’t be won militarily!” the jihadis gain. By contrast, any time jihadis flee because they can’t stand up to “the strongest tribe,” they lose more than that engagement and lines on a map. “We pray that Allah will enable us to destroy the White House, New York, and London,” said Baitullah Mehsud, leader of the Pakistani Taliban. His recent death — killed in Pakistan killed by an American drone launched from Afghanistan — suggests his prayer went unanswered. It suggests, also, that his bellicose interpretation of Islam may be a dead end — both figuratively and literally. It was consequential that American forces and our Iraqi allies defeated al-Qaeda in Iraq (and if democracy promotion is not your top priority, don’t fret that the government there is flawed). It will be useful for us to defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan (and don’t expect to leave behind a Costa Rica of the Hindu Kush; just leave behind local forces trained to defend themselves). It is imperative, too, that we exert maximum pressure on the Islamist regime in Tehran that has been waging war against us for 30 years, and is today supporting terrorists from Afghanistan to Iraq to Gaza to Argentina. If this struggle is too much for the present generation, we will deserve what comes in its place. Americans used to say that freedom is not free, that it must be earned by generation after generation. That sounds hokey to 21st-century ears, I know. That doesn’t make it less true.

Withdrawal 🡪 More Terrorism Ext

The U.S. must stay in Afghanistan to fully defeat Al Qaeda and the Taliban.

Curtis & Phillips 2009

(Lisa, the Heritage Foundation’s senior research fellow on South Asia, Lisa Curtis specializes in U.S. policy toward India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal, and James, Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs at the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation, The Heritage Foundation, October 5, 2009, “Shortsighted U.S. Policies on Afghanistan to Bring Long-Term Problems,” <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/10/shortsighted-us-policies-on-afghanistan-to-bring-long-term-problems>)

It is difficult to overstate the importance of the outcome of the current White House debate on Afghanistan to the future of vital U.S. national security interests. Early discussions have been characterized by wishful thinking about the U.S.'s ability to negotiate a political solution in the near term and confusion about the relationship between al-Qaeda and the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. A shortsighted view of the long-entrenched problems in Afghanistan and Pakistan risks plunging the region into deeper instability, thus reversing recent gains against al-Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban.The success of increased drone strikes against al-Qaeda and senior Taliban leaders in Pakistan's tribal border areas over the last year has apparently led some U.S. officials to mistakenly conclude that these types of operations alone can end the threat from al-Qaeda and its extremist allies. Analysis of the Taliban and its evolution over the last 15 years reveals, however, that its ideology, operational capabilities, and close ties with al-Qaeda and other Pakistan-based extremist organizations allows the movement to wield tremendous influence in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Thus the U.S. cannot hope to uproot extremism from the region without denying the Taliban the ability to again consolidate power in Afghanistan… If the Obama Administration chooses to deny its field commander's request for more troops and instead seeks to engage Taliban leaders in negotiations with the vain hope that these militants will break from their al-Qaeda allies, the results would likely be disastrous. Many Afghans that currently support the Kabul government would be tempted to hedge their bets and establish ties with the Taliban, while Afghans sitting on the fence would be much more likely to come down on the Taliban's side. President Obama must take the long view and avoid shortsighted policies that undermine U.S. friends in Afghanistan and Pakistan while encouraging America's enemies.

Al Qaeda Weak Ext

The U.S. has crushed Al Qaeda in Afghanistan.

Gerecht 2002

(Reuel Mark, a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, “Crushing al Qaeda Is Only a Start,” February 1, 2002, <http://www.aei.org/issue/13538>, Accessed 7/23/10.)

**Before the Afghan War, Osama bin Laden constantly underscored American cowardice in battle.** When "one American pilot was dragged in the streets of Mogadishu," he gleefully remarked, "you left the area in disappointment, humiliation, and defeat." The enormous growth of anti-Americanism and the holy-warrior ethic in the Middle East has in great part been fueled by the widespread perception that the United States is, as bin Laden put it, "a paper tiger." Daisy-cutter bombs, B-52s, and American soldiers in Afghanistan have certainly helped change Middle Eastern views. The Bush administration has demonstrated tenacity toward al Qaeda and the Taliban that bin Laden and Mullah Omar probably didn't expect. In the past, bin Laden referred to the futility of confronting America militarily, and thus the need for sustained "clandestine . . . guerrilla operations." The Saudi holy warrior finally provoked that which he'd most feared. And the inevitable repercussions have already started. In Sudan, Yemen, and Lebanon-all possible future targets of America's war against terrorism-official voices now distance themselves from anti-Americanism and militant Islam. Bin Laden has in defeat publicly fallen from grace. Clerical Iran, the progenitor of modern Islamic terrorism, even gives sermons against the Saudi's methods if not his anti-American spirit.

Al Qaeda is becoming smaller in size and less of a threat.

Flaherty 2010

(ANNE, writer for the Associated Press, “CIA chief Panetta: US has driven back al-Qaida,” June 27, 2010, <http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20100627/ap_on_go_ca_st_pe/us_us_afghanistan>)

CIA Director Leon Panetta's assessment comes as President Barack Obama advances a risky new war plan that relies on 98,000 U.S. troops to prop up the Afghan government and prevent al-Qaida from returning. No longer overseeing the commander in chief's mission is Gen. Stanley McChrystal, sacked this past week in a stunning shake-up in U.S. military leadership after his critical comments about the White House. "We're seeing elements of progress, but this is going to be tough," Panetta told ABC's "This Week." He said al-Qaida's evolving attack strategy increasingly relies on operatives without any record of terrorism involvement or those already in the U.S. As for Osama bin Laden, Panetta said it's been years since the U.S. had good intelligence about his whereabouts. Panetta estimated there are fewer than 100 al-Qaida militants operating inside Afghanistan, with the rest hiding along Pakistan's mountainous western border. He said U.S. drone strikes and other spy operations have helped to "take down" half of al-Qaida's senior leaders. "We are engaged in the most aggressive operations in the history of the CIA in that part of the world, and the result is that we are disrupting their leadership," Panetta said.

Al Qaeda is at its weakest point in years.

Flaherty 2010

(ANNE, writer for the Associated Press, “CIA chief says Al-Qaida at weakest point in years,” June 27, 2010, <http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20100627/ap_on_go_ca_st_pe/us_us_afghanistan_7>)

CIA Director Leon Panetta said Sunday that al-Qaida is probably at its weakest since the Sept. 11 attacks because of U.S.-led strikes, with only 50 to 100 militants operating inside Afghanistan and the rest hiding along Pakistan's mountainous western border. Panetta said the U.S. hasn't had good intelligence on Osama bin Laden's whereabouts for years and that the terrorist network is finding smarter ways to try to attack the United States. Of greatest concern, he said, is al-Qaida's reliance on operatives without previous records or those living in the U.S. "We are engaged in the most aggressive operations in the history of the CIA in that part of the world, and the result is that we are disrupting their leadership," Panetta told ABC's "This Week." The rare assessment from the nation's spy chief comes as President Barack Obama builds up U.S. forces in Afghanistan to prop up the government and prevent al-Qaida from returning. About 98,000 U.S. troops will be in Afghanistan by fall. Panetta initially said in the interview that the Taliban leadership was at its weakest point since the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, when it escaped from Afghanistan into Pakistan. He later corrected himself to say he was talking about al-Qaida.

Not Existential Risk Ext

Terrorists don’t have the means or strength to attack from abroad.

Mueller 2006

(John, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, “Is There Still a Terrorist Threat?: The Myth of the Omnipresent Enemy?” <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61911/john-mueller/is-there-still-a-terrorist-threat-the-myth-of-the-omnipresent-en>, September/October 2006)

For the past five years, Americans have been regularly regaled with dire predictions of another major al Qaeda attack in the United States. In 2003, a group of 200 senior government officials and business executives, many of them specialists in security and terrorism, pronounced it likely that a terrorist strike more devastating than 9/11 -- possibly involving weapons of mass destruction -- would occur before the end of 2004. In May 2004, Attorney General John Ashcroft warned that al Qaeda could "hit hard" in the next few months and said that 90 percent of the arrangements for an attack on U.S. soil were complete. That fall, Newsweek reported that it was "practically an article of faith among counterterrorism officials" that al Qaeda would strike in the run-up to the November 2004 election. When that "October surprise" failed to materialize, the focus shifted: a taped encyclical from Osama bin Laden, it was said, demonstrated that he was too weak to attack before the election but was marshalling his resources to do so months after it. On the first page of its founding manifesto, the massively funded Department of Homeland Security intones, "Today's terrorists can strike at any place, at any time, and with virtually any weapon." But if it is so easy to pull off an attack and if terrorists are so demonically competent, why have they not done it? Why have they not been sniping at people in shopping centers, collapsing tunnels, poisoning the food supply, cutting electrical lines, derailing trains, blowing up oil pipelines, causing massive traffic jams, or exploiting the countless other vulnerabilities that, according to security experts, could so easily be exploited? One reasonable explanation is that almost no terrorists exist in the United States and few have the means or the inclination to strike from abroad. But this explanation is rarely offered.

Terrorism not a real threat – Americans overreact

Healy 2010

Gene, Examiner Columnist Gene Healy is a vice president at the Cato Institute and the author of "The Cult of the Presidency," The Washington Examiner, April 6, 2010, “Gene Healy: Terrorism isn't an 'existential threat',” <http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/columns/Terrorism-isn_t-an-_existential-threat_-89944242.html>.)

Well, at the risk of sounding "negative," it's worth remembering that terrorism has always been a weapon of the weak -- and it usually fails. As the analysts at the Human Security Report Project explain, "the overwhelming majority of terrorist campaigns fail to achieve their strategic objectives." And, despite media sensationalism, fatalities from terrorism have actually declined by some 40 percent in recent years. Terrorists bank on overreaction. As Osama bin Laden put it in 2004, "All that we have to do is to send two mujahedeen to the furthest point east to raise a piece of cloth on which is written al Qaeda, in order to make the generals race there to cause America to suffer human, economic, and political losses." Adam Gadahn, the U.S.-born al Qaeda spokesman, recently called for more "lone-wolf" strikes, because "even apparently unsuccessful attacks on Western mass transportation systems can bring major cities to a halt [and] cost the enemy billions."

Not Exitential Threat Ext

The chance of someone dying because of terrorism is practically zero.

Campos 2010

(Paul, professor of law at the University of Colorado, “Undressing the Terror Threat,” The Wall Street Journal, JANUARY 9, 2010, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704130904574644651587677752.html>)

It might be unrealistic to expect the average citizen to have a nuanced grasp of statistically based risk analysis, but there is nothing nuanced about two basic facts: (1) America is a country of 310 million people, in which thousands of horrible things happen every single day; and (2) The chances that one of those horrible things will be that you're subjected to a terrorist attack can, for all practical purposes, be calculated as zero. Consider that on this very day about 6,700 Americans will die. When confronted with this statistic almost everyone reverts to the mindset of the title character's acquaintances in Tolstoy's great novella "The Death of Ivan Ilyich," and indulges in the complacent thought that "it is he who is dead and not I." Consider then that around 1,900 of the Americans who die today will be less than 65, and that indeed about 140 will be children. Approximately 50 Americans will be murdered today, including several women killed by their husbands or boyfriends, and several children who will die from abuse and neglect. Around 85 of us will commit suicide, and another 120 will die in traffic accidents.

The threat of nuclear terrorism is over-exaggerated.

Kitfield 2008

(James, has written on defense, national security and foreign policy issues, three-time winner of the Gerald R. Ford Award for Distinguished Reporting on National Defense, interviewing Brian Michael Jenkins, a longtime terrorism expert with the Rand Corp, “Expert says nuclear terrorism is not a major threat,” National Journal, October 20, 2008, <http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/1008/102008nj1.htm>)

NJ: To what do you attribute that fear? Jenkins: I concluded that there is a difference between nuclear terrorism and nuclear terror. Nuclear terrorism is about the possibility that terrorists will acquire and detonate a nuclear weapon. Nuclear terror, on the other hand, concerns our anticipation of such an attack. It's about our imagination. And while there is no history of nuclear terrorism, there is a rich history of nuclear terror. It's deeply embedded in our popular culture and in policy-making circles. NJ: So the fear of nuclear terrorism is not new? Jenkins: Almost as soon as the people involved in the Manhattan Project tested an actual atomic bomb they started to wonder about the possibility of someone using it for terrorist purposes. In the 1970s, some talented nuclear weapons designers studied the issue of whether someone outside of a government program could possibly design and build a workable nuclear weapon. They concluded it was possible, and then postulated who might do such a thing -- terrorists! So, in a way, the threat preceded any terrorist actually thinking about the issue. To a certain extent, we educated the terrorists on the subject. NJ: Hasn't Al Qaeda, in particular, focused considerable energy on nuclear weapons? Jenkins: Yes, because terror is the use of violence to create an atmosphere of fear that causes people to exaggerate the strength of the terrorists, and they are very good at that. So in Al Qaeda's media jihad there is a recurrent theme of nuclear terrorism. They realize that if they put the words "terrorism" and "nuclear" in proximity to each other it creates added fear. It also excites their constituency, because nothing excites the powerless more than the idea of ultimate power. NJ: Are you saying that Al Qaeda is interested in nuclear weapons only in the abstract, as a propaganda tool? Jenkins: No. Al Qaeda has actual nuclear ambitions, there is no doubt about that. When Osama bin Laden was in Sudan, he tried to acquire some nuclear material. The efforts were mostly amateurish, and Al Qaeda was the victim of some scams. Qaeda [leaders] also had meetings with some Pakistani nuclear scientists while in Afghanistan. So, clearly, they were thinking about nuclear weapons. If bin Laden were able to acquire a nuclear weapon, I also suspect that he would use it. My larger point is that Al Qaeda has already become the world's first nonstate nuclear power without even having nuclear weapons.

Terrorism Decreasing Ext

Terrorism has decreased significantly since the U.S. invaded Afghanistan.

Baker 2008

(Gerard, staff writer for The Sunday Times, “Cheer up. We're winning this War on Terror,” Sunday Times, June 27, 2008, <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/article4221376.ece>)

And yet the evidence is now overwhelming that on all fronts, despite inevitable losses from time to time, it is we who are advancing and the enemy who is in retreat. The current mood on both sides of the Atlantic, in fact, represents a kind of curious inversion of the great French soldier's dictum: “Success against the Taleban. Enemy giving way in Iraq. Al-Qaeda on the run. Situation dire. Let's retreat!” Since it is remarkable how pervasive this pessimism is, it's worth recapping what has been achieved in the past few years. Afghanistan has been a signal success. There has been much focus on the latest counter-offensive by the Taleban in the southeast of the country and it would be churlish to minimise the ferocity with which the terrorists are fighting, but it would be much more foolish to understate the scale of the continuing Nato achievement. Establishing a stable government for the whole nation is painstaking work, years in the making. It might never be completed. But that was not the principal objective of the war there. Until the US-led invasion in 2001, Afghanistan was the cockpit of ascendant Islamist terrorism. Consider the bigger picture. Between 1998 and 2005 there were five big terrorist attacks against Western targets - the bombings of the US embassies in Africa in 1998, the attack on the USS Cole in 2000, 9/11, and the Madrid and London bombings in 2004 and 2005. All owed their success either exclusively or largely to Afghanistan's status as a training and planning base for al-Qaeda. In the past three years there has been no attack on anything like that scale. Al-Qaeda has been driven into a state of permanent flight. Its ability to train jihadists has been severely compromised; its financial networks have been ripped apart. Thousands of its activists and enablers have been killed. It's true that Osama bin Laden's forces have been regrouping in the border areas of Pakistan but their ability to orchestrate mass terrorism there is severely attenuated. And there are encouraging signs that Pakistanis are starting to take to the offensive against them. Next time you hear someone say that the war in Afghanistan is an exercise in futility ask them this: do they seriously think that if the US and its allies had not ousted the Taleban and sustained an offensive against them for six years that there would have been no more terrorist attacks in the West? What characterised Islamist terrorism before the Afghan war was increasing sophistication, boldness and terrifying efficiency. What has characterised the terrorist attacks in the past few years has been their crudeness, insignificance and a faintly comical ineptitude (remember Glasgow airport?)

Pakistan Solves Terrorism Ext

Pakistan is determined to fight and beat the Taliban.

Evans 2010

Tom, CNN Iraq Bureau Chief, “Pakistan determined to fight Taliban, retired general says,” July 23, 2010, <http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/11/24/pakistan.taliban/index.html>)

The Pakistani people now believe the war against the Taliban is their war, whereas in the past they considered it to be the United States' war, a former Pakistani general with close ties to his country's military told CNN's Christiane Amanpour on Tuesday. Retired Lt. Gen. Talat Masood, who also was an official in the Pakistani Ministry of Defense, told Amanpour, "I think the Pakistani army and the people of Pakistan are truly determined to fight this war and win." "Under no circumstances do they think that there is any future for Pakistan unless this succeeds, so they are fighting for their future rather than anything else," he said. Masood spoke to Amanpour as the Pakistani army presses its offensive into the Taliban stronghold of South Waziristan after a series of deadly bomb attacks across the country, and the United States continues its air strikes from unmanned drones on suspected Taliban targets in Pakistan. U.S. President Barack Obama is on the brink of announcing what is expected to be a big increase in the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan.

Pakistan’s fight against the Taliban is paying off.

Dilanian 2010

(Ken, USA Today reporter, “Pakistan steps up anti-Taliban efforts,” USA Today, March 4, 2010, <http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2010-03-04-pressure-pakistan_N.htm>)

U.S. pressure on Pakistan to crack down on Taliban extremists within its borders is paying off, American officials and independent analysts say, paving the way for progress in the war in neighboring Afghanistan. Pakistan's cooperation marks a shift after years of tolerating the presence of homegrown extremists operating openly in the country. The government recently has pressed an offensive in tribal areas home to al-Qaeda, has arrested major Taliban figures and has signed off on airstrikes by pilotless drones that have killed important terrorist suspects. In recent months: - Pakistan on Thursday announced the arrest of the Taliban's former finance minister, days after saying it killed about 75 militants and discovered a network of 156 caves used by the Taliban near the Afghan border. -After downplaying for years the presence of extremist leaders in Pakistani cities, the government last month arrested a number of key Taliban figures, including Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the Afghan Taliban's second in command. -U.S. drone strikes have increased to 53 in Pakistan in 2009 from 36 in 2008 and five in 2007, according to statistics compiled by the Long War Journal website. An August strike killed Baitullah Mehsud, a major Taliban leader. Although Pakistan's government hasn't done everything the [United States](http://content.usatoday.com/topics/topic/Places,+Geography/Countries/United+States) has wanted, these developments are "all having an effect," said Richard Holbrooke, the State Department's special representative for Pakistan and Afghanistan. "I think that in Pakistan and in Afghanistan, but particularly in Pakistan, there's been a movement, a shift in sentiment here."

Pakistan is cracking down on Al Qaeda

Wright & Khan 2010

(Tom and Shahnawaz, Wall Street Journal staff writers, “Pakistan Cracks Down on al Qaeda-Linked Groups,” Wall Street Journal, JULY 13, 2010, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704288204575363303591010986.html>**)**

Pakistan's most populous province began a crackdown Monday on banned Islamist groups linked to al Qaeda, little more than a week after a suicide bomb attack targeting moderate Muslims here killed more than 40 people. The July 1 attack in Lahore caused widespread outrage; moderate Muslim organizations threatened to arm themselves and fight extremist groups unless the government of Punjab province, in eastern Pakistan on the border with India, took action. Police across Punjab detained 178 people in a continuing operation on Monday, largely members of the banned al Qaeda-linked terrorist organization Sipah-e-Sahaba and an associated group, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, senior provincial police officers said. The raids began Sunday night across the province, with a focus on southern areas where militants have found widespread support. Police said they had closed 22 branches of Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat, an Islamist organization that they say has acted as a front for Sipah-e-Sahaba and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi activists since the two groups were banned in 2002…Those links began to fray as Pakistan's military, aided by U.S. drone strikes, began a war almost two years ago aimed at dislodging the Taliban and its allies from the tribal regions in the northwest, where they had set up a parallel government. In retaliation, a nexus of Punjabi militants, al Qaeda and Taliban operatives have unleashed a wave of suicide bombings across Pakistan. The attacks, initially aimed at government, police and army targets, have become more indiscriminate in recent months, hitting markets, schools and the Data Gunj Bakhsh shrine.

\*\*\*A2: RUSSIA ADVANTAGE\*\*\*

INC Russia 1/3

1. U.S.-Russia relations on an upward path—Obama and Medvedev prove

Migranyan, 2010

(Andranik, Director of the Institute for Democracy and Cooperation in New York, He is also a professor at the Institute of International Relations in Moscow, a member of the Public Chamber and former member of the Russian Presidential Council, “Russia Optimistic,” July 15th 2010, <http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=23700>)

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton recently returned from a tour of Eastern European countries and the post-Soviet space where she seemed to be backtracking on promises made during the recent successful Obama-Medvedev summit held in Washington, DC. Yet, notwithstanding some tough talk from Clinton, one might have noticed there was very little reaction from Moscow. And that was because it was pretty clear this time around that the secretary of state was grandstanding for a domestic-political audience. It is a sign that **U.S.-Russia relations are in fact moving in the right direction.** To show just how significant the change is, after the supposedly successful Moscow summit a year ago between Obama and Medvedev, **the U.S. administration sent Vice President Biden to the region with a mission to clarify Washington’s new reset policy**. **He was charged with convincing America’s allies that improving relations with Moscow did not mean handing the region over to Russia on a silver platter,** and that giving up missile-defense plans in the Czech Republic and Poland, and abandoning further expansion of NATO by inviting Ukraine and Georgia into the club, did not mean that the United States would be giving Russia carte blanche. Biden’s visit was somewhat scandalous. Many people, both in Moscow and in Washington, were skeptical about the reset’s prospects. It was yet to be tested by the upcoming elections in Ukraine, the U.S.-sponsored UN Security Council resolution on Iran, U.S.-Russian cooperation on Afghanistan and a number of other challenges on which Moscow’s and Washington’s stances often diverged significantly. It may have been for that specific reason that Vice President Biden was less reserved, less diplomatic, at times tactless and even offensive in his statements with regard to Russia and Russian policy vis-à-vis the post-Soviet space. **This newest summit took place in a completely different environment. The reset had already been tested. The strategic-arms-limitation treaty was signed.** The Ukrainian vote, unlike the previous presidential election, had not aggravated the conflict between Moscow and Washington but, on the contrary, showed the two countries were willing to work together. **Russia supported the Security Council resolution tightening sanctions against Iran. And the parties have displayed their readiness to work in a constructive manner on a wide range of policy issues, taking into account each other’s interests and concerns.**

2. A post-US Middle-East would mean an expansionist Russia—they’ll expand the “sphere of influence”

Weinbaum, 2007

(Dr. Marvin g., scholar-in-residence at the Middle East Institute, “Counterterrorism, Regional Security, and Pakistan’s Afghan Frontier”, 10/10/10, <http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/FC101007/Weinbaum_Testimony101007.pdf>)

Yet serving as patron to Islamist elements has long served the Pakistan military’s strategic purposes. Beginning in the 1980s, successive governments in Pakistan have concluded that supporting Pashtun mujahideen and Taliban Islamists in Afghanistan and their ethnic cousins in Pakistan is pivotal to acquiring strategic depth in the event of an armed conflict with India. That policy also calls for efforts to ensure a friendly regime in Kabul. Even in recent years when Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence would appear to make the concept of strategic depth outmoded, supporting Afghan Pashtuns seems warranted. That conclusion rests on the assumption that **Pakistan may be confronted in the not too distant future with a disintegrating post-American, post-NATO Afghanistan.** In that event, **Russia, through its Central Asian surrogates, and Iran, both with close ties to India, can be expected to carve out their geographic spheres of influence in Afghanistan.** Non- nationalist, Islamist Pashtuns are then seen as serving Pakistan’s interests as a proxy force in helping to create a buffer zone for Pakistan in southern and eastern Afghanistan. Pakistan, however, pays a heavy political and social price in its tribal frontier for adopting a Pashtun reserve strategy.

INC Russia 2/3

3. Turn - US withdrawal from Afghanistan would lead to aggressive Russia-China relations and a Chinese attack.

Editorial Debt, 2009

(“Interests in Afghanistan and Pakistan Set to Collide, With Global Implications”, 12/30/09, <http://oilprice.com/Geo-Politics/Middle-East/Interests-in-Afghanistan-and-Pakistan-Set-to-Collide-With-Global-Implications.html>)

Thus, **the recent US initiatives**, while essentially futile, **have nevertheless increased the fear in Beijing and Islamabad of US conspiracies, as well as engendered their apprehension of a possible US challenge to their long-term vital interests**. **Both Beijing and Islamabad will not take a chance and wait for the US to fail and disengage on its own**. Instead, it is probable that **they will opt for a war-by-proxy; that is, sponsoring a marked escalation of anti-US/NATO insurgency and even cooperation with** foreign neo-*salafite* **jihadists** despite repeated calls by radical Islamist leaders such as Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri for the *jihadists* to take on Islamabad. Even with the forthcoming “surge” in mind, US and NATO forces are woefully insufficient and under-equipped to meet the current level of fighting, let alone the anticipated escalation. The restrictive ROE (rules of engagement) in the name of pro-people COIN further diminish the effectiveness, and undermine the deterrence, of the US/NATO military forces without any tangible contribution to building bridges to the frustrated and increasingly hostile population. But the West cannot just drop everything and walk away from Afghanistan and Pakistan as the Obama White House yearns to do. **The West has vital interests in the energy resources and strategic stability in Central Asia** . Simply put, Europe’s ability to rely on “the Persian Gulf of the 21st Century” — Central Asia — for its long-term secure energy supplies depends on containing the PRC’s strategic ascent and quest for the same energy resources and the southwards transportation routes (there is a limit to the quantities of hydrocarbons which can be piped westwards through Russia). These interests can be secured through the Russian political-security hegemony in Central Asia , which, in turn, is facilitating the Western economic outreach. The European Union-Russian Federation (EU-RF) “Eurasian Home” grand strategy codifies such cooperation. The PRC’s containment can also be achieved in part by ensuring a strategic balance between India and the PRC, a policy supported by Russia . As well, Western interests would be furthered by the stifling of the continued spread of *jihadism*, a key objective of Russia as well. Moscow is most apprehensive about the *jihadist* attrition of socio-political stability in Central and South Asia and the ensuing spread into Russia ’s sizeable Muslim population. **Ultimately, however, there is no substitute for the West’s long-term direct presence and military involvement at the Heart of Asia. A US withdrawal would abandon the Heart of Asia to a Russian-Chinese condominium with the EU** — being dependent on the region’s energy resources — playing a pliant supportive rôle. Apprehensive as it is of China ’s strategic ascent, **Russia does not have the means to singlehandedly block the PRC. To remain in Central Asia, Russia will have to compromise with China against its own better judgment. Russia would rather have the West in the area to jointly contain China. It is therefore crucial for Russia and the West to demonstrate US-led Western commitment through long-term military presence and continued fighting against the primary foes.** Afghanistan and Pakistan are the crux of such presence for they are outside Russia ’s strategic domain in Central Asia, and they constitute both the vital corridor for independent Western access to Central Asia and the primary route of pipelines transporting the region’s hydrocarbons to the West (or China ). **Moreover, Western military presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan would calm down India ’s warranted anxieties of** **strategic encirclement and the imperative of an audacious breakout, thus significantly reducing the threat of Indo-Pakistani crisis and war**. The Obama White House, however, is going to undermine these vital interests of the entire West and abandon everything.

4. Russia opposes an Afghanistan withdrawal—It threatens Russian security

Blank, 2009

(Stephen Blank, a professor of Russian National Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College in Pennsylvania with an M.A. and Ph.D. in Russian History from the University of Chicago, “What does Moscow want in Afghanistan?”, 4/2/09, Volume XIX, Number 1, http://www.bu.edu/phpbin/news-cms/news/?dept=732&id=53003)

Nevertheless**, Russia has several reasons not to want an American defeat in Afghanistan**.  This goes beyond the correct, but trite, observation that **fundamentalist Islam**, if victorious there, **could then ignite a widespread destabilization of Central Asia**.  **A Taliban victory would threaten not just the stability of the despotic regimes of Central Asia,** many of which are in serious trouble now because of the global economic crisis, **it also would pose serious dilemmas to Russian foreign and defense policy**.    First of all, **it would endanger one of the foundations of Russia’s economic and foreign policy,** notably its ability to compel Central Asian energy supplies to flow primarily through Russia and then on to Europe, or simply to Russia itself, so that in effect Central Asia subsidizes

INC Russia 3/3

Russia’s energy consumption.  Second, **a Taliban victory in Central Asia would put the onus of defending the region squarely on Russia’s shoulders, and Moscow cannot bear that burden.**  Although Moscow steadily has built up its military capabilities in Central Asia to create an integrated land, sea, and air force, those forces, by Moscow’s own admission, are not ready for contemporary warfare. Hence the current large-scale efforts at military reform that are running into trouble by virtue of the economic crisis. (5)  While the purpose of these forces and those of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), is to defend Central Asia against foreign military threats, in fact the reality is less than it seems.  The CSTO is just getting started and it is doubtful that its forces could be effective in combating a victorious Taliban and native insurgents.  Although the CSTO claims that its forces will be used only for defense against foreign aggression and terrorism (as opposed to domestic uprisings against local governments) it is hard to see what else it could do, for it is hardly ready to tackle the Taliban. (6)  We should remember that in 1999-2001, when the terrorist threat first materialized, Russia offered many promises but failed to deliver timely and effective material assistance to threatened Central Asian regimes, two of which then opted for US bases after 9/11.  Since Russia has continued to fail to keep its promises of aid to states like Tajikistan and is unlikely to deliver the full aid it has promised to Kyrgyzstan, **Moscow cannot afford to find itself in a situation where it then must deliver or lose positions in Central Asia**.  **For this reason, it clearly prefers to have NATO and the US fighting in Afghanistan** (also because it distracts them from Europe) to prevent a Taliban victory.  **Another**, and increasingly **important Russian concern is the drug war that its politicians say is being waged upon it from Afghanistan**. (7)  President Medvedev has claimed that cooperating to shut down the growing drug trade is the most significant aspect of the conflict in Afghanistan. (8)  Russian and Central Asian governments have been understandably critical of previous US policy regarding the drug trade and the protection of traffickers in the Afghan government, for that trade has wreaked havoc upon their countries.  According to Viktor Ivanov, head of the Federal Narcotics Control Service, the production of opiates in Afghanistan has grown by 44 times since the deployment of US troops there in 2001.  250 youngsters become addicts daily and 30,000 persons a year, or 82 a day, die from Afghan heroin – double the number of losses in the Soviet-Afghan war of 1979-89. (9)

5. No threat of a US-Russia nuclear war

Sokov, 2003

(Nikolai, Senior Research Associate at CNS, “Evolution of Nuclear Strategy in US and Russia and its Implications for Arms Control”)

Both **the United States and Russia deny that they have increased reliance on nuclear weapons in their defense policy**. This is a matter of definition, however. Indeed, compared to the Cold War, when the two countries permanently maintained high level of alert, ever ready to respond to the anticipated first strike of the other side, and when only the prospect of Armageddon prevented them from the actual use of nuclear weapons, **the degree of reliance on nuclear weapons has dramatically declined. Today the threat of nuclear war between the United States and Russia simply does not exist.**

Relations High

US-Russia relations are at a high

China Daily, 2010

(“Obama, Medvedev say 'reset' US-Russia relations”, 6/25/10, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2010-06/25/content\_10016800.htm)

-President Barack Obama declared Thursday that he and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev have "succeeded in resetting" the relationship between the former Cold War adversaries that had dipped to a dangerous low in recent years. Medvedev expressed hope that Moscow and Washington would ratify the new strategic arms reduction treaty in the near future. "I hope it will be done as soon as possible," Medvedev said at a news conference with his US counterpart, Barack Obama. Medvedev and Obama agreed that the ratification processes should be simultaneous. Russia and the United States signed the new treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive weapons in Prague on April 8. The document will replace the START 1 treaty, which expired in December 2009. Obama directly acknowledged differences in some areas, such as Moscow's tensions with neighboring Georgia, but said "we addressed those differences candidly." And he announced that the US and Russia had agreed to expand cooperation on intelligence and the counterterror fight and worked on strengthening economic ties between the nations. Obama gave Russia perhaps the biggest gift it could have wanted from the meetings: an unqualified, hearty plug for Moscow's ascension to the World Trade Organization. Russia has long wanted membership but U.S. support in the past has come with conditions.

US-Russia relations take a new improved phase—reset proves

Collinson, 2010

(Stephen, has covered national elections, joined AFP, campaign trail in his third US president election,

“Obama welcomes Russia's Medvedev”, 6/24/10, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5isCGJlOOW-svMHYs0oHirI4y0nmQ)

President Barack Obama welcomed Russian counterpart Dmitry Medvedev to the White House Thursday, crediting improved US relations with the Kremlin for a series of foreign policy breakthroughs. The two leaders met for Oval Office talks encompassing key diplomatic and security issues and were to hold a joint press conference, before both taking part in a US-Russia business summit in Washington. Medvedev arrived in Washington fresh from a tour of Silicon Valley, which saw him brandish an iPad and courting Internet pioneers in a bid to showcase his effort to launch a technology revolution in Russia. "I think that we believe that this visit takes place at a new phase in US-Russia relations," said Ben Rhodes, director of strategic communications on the National Security Council. "It comes after a period when we've made very substantial progress in resetting the US-Russia relationship and making concrete progress on a number of very important and substantive areas." Obama took office vowing to recalibrate relations with the Kremlin, after a tense period in the latter years in the Bush administration, which included tensions over Russia's war with Georgia. Administration officials say that "reset" -- reciprocated by Medvedev -- has resulted in important progress, for example with a new nuclear arms reduction treaty to replace the START agreement and new UN nuclear sanctions on Iran.

Relations High

Russia is no longer a “flashpoint”—US-Russia ties strengthened despite internal problems

Collinson, 2010

(Stephen, has covered national elections, joined AFP, campaign trail in his third US president election,

“Obama welcomes Russia's Medvedev”, 6/24/10, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5isCGJlOOW-svMHYs0oHirI4y0nmQ)

Russia has also cooperated with Washington on supplying US troops in Afghanistan, and now both sides want to move beyond "flashpoint" issues and seek new areas of cooperation, including in economics. However, some US critics of Obama say he may be relying too much on a personal relationship with Medvedev, and argue that the real power in Russia lies with Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. They also cite what they say is a deteriorating human rights situation in Russia and question whether Moscow is merely cooperating with Washington in the short-term in a bid to enhance its long-term geopolitical interests. Medvedev's three-day **visit** -- the seventh meeting between the two leaders -- **aims to further improve US-Russia ties and strengthen cooperation on economic issues and new technology**. Cooperation increasingly has extended to the thorny area of crafting an international response to Iran's controversial nuclear program.

U.S-Russia relationship on a strong path—external policies won’t undermine it.

reuters, 2010

(“US: spy case won't upset broader U.S.-Russia ties”, 6/29/10, http://www.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-49755220100629)

"**We have made significant progress in the 18 months that we have been pursuing this different relationship with** [**Russia**](http://www.reuters.com/places/russia). We think we have something to show for it," Philip Gordon, assistant secretary of state for European affairs, said. The Justice Department said on Monday it had arrested 10 people for working undercover to gather intelligence for Moscow. Despite angry [Russia](http://www.reuters.com/places/russia)n denunciation of the arrests, Gordon told a news briefing they would not undercut new cooperation on a range of issues including disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and Afghanistan. "**We're moving towards a more trusting relationship. We're beyond the Cold War," Gordon said. "I think our relations absolutely demonstrate** **that**. But as I say, I don't think anyone was hugely shocked to know that some vestiges of old attempts to use intelligence are still there." Gordon said the State Department was in touch with the [Russia](http://www.reuters.com/places/russia)n government both in Washington and in Moscow about the case, but declined to provide further detail. News of the alleged spy ring broke days after President Barack Obama welcomed [Russia](http://www.reuters.com/places/russia)n President Dmitry Medvedev in Washington on visit which ended with a U.S. vow of support for Russia's bid to join the World Trade Organization. Gordon said the Justice Department determined its own timing for the spy ring announcement and this had no connection to the U.S.-[Russia](http://www.reuters.com/places/russia) diplomatic relationship. **"We have from the start focused on the reason for the reset in the relations and the common interest, and I think we will continue to do so,"** Gordon said.

Russian Adventurism Ext

Russia has intentions of expanding its “sphere of influence”

Nemtsova, 2010

(Anna, Writer for NewsWeek, “Russia Invades Afghanistan—Again”, 4/3/10, http://www.newsweek.com/2010/04/02/Russia-invades-afghanistan-again.html)

Still, **Russia's ambitions in Afghanistan go far beyond the drug war**, **and include building a pro-Russian constituency among the country's elite, dominating Afghanistan's multibillion-dollar infrastructure-development industry, and exploiting its underground wealth. "It is not too late. We are determined to activate our business cooperation with Afghanistan. Russia is first of all interested in exploiting Afghan gas and mineral resources,"** says Avetisyan, the Russian ambassador. To access these riches, Russia has been courting Afghan Vice President Karim Khalili—a leader of the country's persecuted Hazara community who Moscow hopes will act as Russia's chief lobbyist in Kabul. At a meeting with Khalili in March, Ivanov offered to aid Japanese efforts to restore the huge Buddha statues destroyed by the Taliban in 1999 in Banyan, Khalili's power base, and to develop tourism there, as well as to reconstruct a power station and a nearby tunnel that links north and south Afghanistan. **Russia also has a huge number of potential allies among Afghanistan's former communists,** many of whom studied and lived in Russia in the 1980s. Some of these approximately 100,000 educated Afghans joined the mujahedin after the fall of Moscow's puppet Mohammad Najibullah in 1992 and are now powerful men in Afghan President Hamid Karzai's administration. Gen. Abdul Rashid Dostum, for example, a onetime officer in Najibullah's military, now rules a personal fiefdom in the north of the country and is an adviser to the chief of staff of the Afghan National Army.

Russia’s expansionist framework to establish a sphere of influence are a top priority

Blank, 2009

(Stephen Blank, a professor of Russian National Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College in Pennsylvania with an M.A. and Ph.D. in Russian History from the University of Chicago, “What does Moscow want in Afghanistan?”, 4/2/09, Volume XIX, Number 1, http://www.bu.edu/phpbin/news-cms/news/?dept=732&id=53003)

While Moscow may still have—or may profess to have—an Afghanistan syndrome and therefore will not send troops to the area, **such ideas as a division of Afghanistan into spheres of responsibility and a new Russian military presence there as a leverage point to insert itself into NATO raise so many objections that they are non-starters for any serious discussion of the matter.** Certainly, this is not an acceptable foundation for cooperation with the US on Afghanistan, as it would provide only a basis for either unending or future conflict. Indeed, Moscow confirms Henry Kissinger’s observation that the past conduct of Afghanistan’s principal neighbors does not augur well for a policy of restraint, opposition to terrorism, and we might add, non-intervention in its politics. (25) But Rogov’s formula, plus Moscow’s decision to send military aid to Afghanistan also suggest Russia’s apprehension that the Taliban might win, thus leaving Russia to confront that movement with no means of dealing with it politically or of insulating Central Asia from it. Indeed, it is clear that **Moscow is making every effort to enmesh the Central Asian regimes even further in various forms of economic, trade, and defense integration that would preclude them from being able to act effectively in defense of their own sovereignty.** Likewise, Moscow’s abortive efforts to obtain approval from the Central Asian governments for its unilateral revisions of Georgia’s borders in August 2008 represent another sign of its basic contempt for their sovereignty, an attitude the Central Asian states seem to recognize. From the beginning of his tenure, **Putin’s first priority, and one that remains Russia’s central foreign policy priority, is to establish an exclusive sphere of influence in the CIS and to revitalize the existing institutions of cooperation, or even create new ones in defense, intelligence sharing, and overall economic policy, including trade and energy.** (26)

Russian Adventurism Ext

Russia would expand its sphere of influence with a withdrawal.

Blank, 2009

(Stephen, a professor of Russian National Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College in Pennsylvania with an M.A. and Ph.D. in Russian History from the University of Chicago, “Afghanistan: Examining the Implications of a Central Asian Supply Line for Afghanistan”, 1/21/09, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav012209g.shtml)

**Keeping Islamic militants in Afghanistan in check is in Moscow's interests**, and there are signs that the Kremlin is willing to assume a role in Afghanistan that goes beyond that of logistical support provider. To help put Moscow in a more cooperative mood, Washington appears to have made a commitment that it will step up anti-narcotics initiatives, aiming to contain the flow of drugs that is moving into Central Asia and Russia. As Secretary of State Hilary Clinton stressed during her recent confirmation hearing, **Afghanistan will be US President Barack Obama's "highest priority,"** and his team is clearly considering a broader, multidimensional effort to reverse the current unfavorable trends for the US and NATO there. **The opening of a Central Asian route is in part connected with American plans** to send 32,000 more troops and more equipment to Afghanistan in 2009. **This virtual doubling of the US military footprint in Afghanistan will entail a** commensurate **increase in food, fuel and construction materials**. **A Central Asian supply network fits in with US policy in numerous ways**. The plan is to buy a considerable amount of supplies locally from Central Asian countries that, as suppliers and transit states, stand to make considerable amounts of money. While other supplies could be airlifted, heavy construction equipment and fuel would be sent by rail to Central Asia and then trucked into Afghanistan. To reassure Central Asian leaders wary of a US attempt to secure new bases in the region, American military planners have assured them, and, presumably, the Kremlin as well, that Washington is not interested in new facilities, and that the United States seeks to use the Central Asian route solely to ship non-lethal supplies. As a severe economic crisis deepens in the region, it is perfectly understandable why Central Asian leaders would welcome a mammoth construction project that will bring large amounts of US dollars into their countries, build valuable infrastructure that would outlast the war, and also create a non-threatening US economic and political presence that they could then use to balance other great powers. Islam Karimov in Uzbekistan, for example, is a past master at playing that game. Likewise, Tajikistan, which is already close to being a failing state, is desperate for foreign assistance and has frequently made that clear publicly. **A** secondary and unarticulated **motive for Washington to open a Central Asian supply route is a desire to prevent Tajikistan's implosion -- a** wholly w**orthwhile aim since the United States cannot afford to allow a Central Asian state to fail.** **Such a development could increase the difficulties of stabilizing Afghanistan and heighten the US-Russian geopolitical rivalry.** In placing a big bet on Central Asia, the United States is assuming that Russia shares a common interest in defeating the Taliban. While this is generally true, the intensity of Moscow's commitment can be questioned. The old thinking -- in which an enemy of my enemy is my friend - still seems to linger among some in the Kremlin. Indeed, Russia's coping strategy seems to diverge markedly from that being pursued by the United States and its NATO allies. In keeping with its traditional policy of communicating with all parties in Afghanistan, Moscow has frequently been reported as acting on its own to establish a lasting and independent position of interest in Afghanistan. Thus, **there are many signs of a renewed Russian desire to create some sort of sphere of influence over at least part of Afghanistan, in order to neutralize what Moscow fears might be a forthcoming Taliban victory**. Russia has never been wiling to contribute its forces to the conflict, perhaps out of concern for memories of the Soviet invasion of 1979, but also because it does not have the capability to do so. Nevertheless, **the Kremlin does exhibit a desire to harvest the fruits of war, if it can do so cheaply.**

Withdrawing from Afghanistan expands Russia’s sphere of influence over the near abroad

Nemtsova, 10

(Anna, Writer for NewsWeek, “Russia Invades Afghanistan—Again”, 4/3/10, http://www.newsweek.com/2010/04/02/Russia-invades-afghanistan-again.html)

So far, such moves seem to elicit more relief than concern in Washington. **The Obama administration has taken a big gamble with its surge,** and everything is being done with an eye to July 2011, when the administration has promised to begin its withdrawal. For that to happen, **Afghanistan's neighbors must shoulder more and more of the burden** of helping fix its drug and infrastructure problems**. If that means Afghanistan moving closer to Russia's orbit, then Washington, at least for now, seems to deem that a price worth paying**. "The United States is not concerned about Russia coming back," says Anthony Cordesman, a respected analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies

Russian Adventurism Ext

Russian expansionism into Afghanistan crushes Afghani stability, ensures extremist takeover, and cracks the Russian economy

Blank, 2009

(Stephen, a professor of Russian National Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College in Pennsylvania with an M.A. and Ph.D. in Russian History from the University of Chicago, “Beyond Manas: Russia’s game in Afghanistan”, 2/11/09, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst

http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5036)

**The implications of this posture are exceptionally negative for both the West and for Central Asia**. First, it shows that contrary to much American commentary (not by the Administration however) **Russia** is not truly interested in cooperation with the U.S. and NATO regarding Afghanistan. It **insists on its unlimited and exclusive hegemony in Central Asia, a task that is beyond its ability to sustain, as the price that must be paid in advance of its cooperation**. But based on its promises to date those promises of cooperation remain just that – promises – which remain unfulfilled. Certainly the Russian army is incapable of fighting victoriously in Afghanistan and maybe in Central Asia even if it is deployed there. Likewise, the financial support promised by Russia comes with strings attached, particularly as regards the sovereignty of Central Asian governments, even if it is ever transmitted to them. Instead, Moscow’s demand for a free hand in Central Asia and the CIS as a whole is ultimately a guarantee that these states will not be able to meet the security demands of the contemporary world either in economics or in defense. **The Central Asian states and Afghanistan will not be able to stand up to the Taliban or to their own domestic rivals if they remain tied to a backward, underdeveloped model of economic policy and in neo-colonial subordination to Russia**. Neither does Russia have the resources to sustain this imperial fiction though it does not seem to understand that yet, in spite of an intensifying economic crisis at home. Ultimately, **the continuing pursuit of empire will place too much of a burden on Russia with unhappily predictable consequences,** as in the past. **The demand for a closed sphere in Central Asia and even in Afghanistan is**, however**, all too consistent with Medvedev and Putin’s policies**. In the past, whenever confronted with the choice between empire and reform or cooperation with the West, **Russia’s rulers have chosen empire**. But this choice cannot save them or their clients in Central Asia. Instead, **it makes the forthcoming crisis in both Russia and Central Asia all the more likely. Moscow’s pursuit of its own security at everyone else’s expense is finally a fool’s mission that will only lead to greater insecurity and more likely tragedy for all concerned.**

Russian expansionism means global insecurity and world chaos.

Cohen, 2006

(Ariel, writer for the Heritage Foundation, Ph.D, “The NEW "GREAT GAME": OIL POLITICS IN THE CAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA”, 1/25/06, http://www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaandEurasia/BG1065.cfm)

**Much is at stake in Eurasia for the U.S. and its allies.** Attempts to restore its empire will doom Russia's transition to a democracy and free-market economy. The ongoing war in Chechnya alone has cost Russia $6 billion to date (equal to Russia's IMF and World Bank loans for 1995). Moreover, it has extracted a tremendous price from Russian society. **The wars which would be required to restore the Russian empire would prove much more costly not just for Russia and the region, but for peace, world stability, and security.** As the former Soviet arsenals are spread throughout the NIS, these conflicts may escalate to include the use of weapons of mass destruction. Scenarios including unauthorized missile launches are especially threatening. Moreover, if successful, **a reconstituted Russian empire would become a major destabilizing influence both in Eurasia and throughout the world. It would endanger not only Russia's neighbors, but also the U.S. and its allies in Europe and the Middle East. And, of course, a neo-imperialist Russia could imperil the oil reserves of the Persian Gulf.1**5 Domination of the Caucasus would bring Russia closer to the Balkans, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Middle East. **Russian imperialists**, such as radical nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky**, have resurrected the old dream of obtaining a warm port on the Indian Ocean.** **If Russia succeeds in establishing its domination in the south, the threat to Ukraine, Turkey, Iran, and Afganistan will increase.** The independence of pro-Western Georgia and Azerbaijan already has been undermined by pressures from the Russian armed forces and covert actions by the intelligence and security services, in addition to which **Russian hegemony would make Western political and economic efforts to stave off Islamic militancy more difficult.**

Russia Hates Withdrawal Ext

Russia supports U.S.-Afghanistan war effort—our evidence subsumes theirs

VOA, 2009

(Voice of America, one of the world's most trusted sources for news and information from the United States and around the world, “Russia Supports US War Effort in Afghanistan”, 7/16/09, http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2009-07-16-voa49-68746282.html)

**Russia has agreed to cooperate with the United States in Afghanistan**.  The agreement gives the United States the right to fly over Russian territory as it transports military equipment and personnel to support American and NATO forces in Afghanistan.  The White House says the accord will permit 4,500 flights per year, saving the U.S. government $133 million annually in fuel, maintenance and other transportation costs. In addition, the Russians have waived any air navigation charges.   During a Moscow news conference on July 6 following talks with Russian President Dmitri Medvedev, U.S. President Barack Obama hailed the agreement.   "**This is a substantial contribution by Russia to our international effort, and it will save the United States time and resources in giving our troops the support they need,"** he said.  Up until now, Russia has allowed only non-military - or what is described as 'non-lethal' - materiel to transit through its airspace on its way to Afghanistan.   Executive Director Daryll Kimball, of the private research firm the Arms Control Association, says the new agreement is a very significant step.  "This is quite a remarkable development if you consider the history of the United States and Russia.  For the United States, this is very important because as we ramp up the military effort in Afghanistan, we need to ship more personnel and supplies and equipment in.  And if anybody looks at the map, Russian airspace makes that a lot easier," said Kimball. "**So I think Russia is signaling that they want to help the United States in that effort in Afghanistan.  They recognize that the Taliban is a threat to both the United States and to Russia**.  **This is a very concrete action on the part of Russia** that I think would not have happened, did not happen, a year ago," he added.  Marshall Goldman of Harvard University also sees Moscow's action as a positive step, but done not without self-interest.  "**It is in their interest to have the Americans commit themselves to Afghanistan, because if the Americans do not do it, sooner or later the bill is going to come up against the Russians - and they will have to deal with it**," he said. "So that the extent that the Russians have said we will let you do this, is not only helpful for us because of the problems of bringing in supplies through Pakistan - but I think it also allows the Russians to say we are helping you and we hope, we wish you success - all the success.  Because I think if push comes to shove, **the Russians would rather have Americans there than the Taliban,"** said Goldman.  The agreement for the use of Russian airspace came shortly after the United States signed a new accord with Kyrgyzstan to lease the Manas airbase located in the northern part of the country.  That air base is critical for the U.S. and NATO war effort in Afghanistan.   Last year, more than 11,000 aircraft were refueled over the skies of Afghanistan by tankers based at Manas.  More than 170,000 soldiers have transited in and out of Afghanistan through the airbase - and more than 5,000 tons of cargo have made their way to that country through Manas.   Last February, the Kyrghiz government decided to evict the Americans who have been leasing Manas since 2001.  Many experts said Russia pressured the Kyrghiz government to force the Americans out.   But last month, Kyrghyzstan reversed that decision after the United States agreed to more than triple the yearly lease - from $17.5-million to $60-million.  Other economic incentives were also added.   Former senior State Department official David Kramer, who is now with the German Marshall Fund in the United States, says the new Manas lease and Russia's decision to allow military overflights are key developments.  "But **it does represent sort of a schizophrenic approach at times that we have seen from Russian officials, where on the one hand they do recognize the interest in stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan - that is important for Russia**," he said.  "But **on the other hand, they also have an interest in driving us out of the region.  And they have to decide which is more important to them -** and at least as of now, **they seem to have come down on the side of working together and stabilizing Afghanistan,**" said Kramer.  Many analysts say **Russia's decision to help the United States in Afghanistan is a sign that President Obama's strategy to "reset" relations between Washington and Moscow is on the right track.**

No US-Russia War

Russia won’t use nuclear weapons to attack

Frost 2005

(Robin, Professor of Political Science, Simon Fraser University, British Columbia, December 2005 “Nuclear Terrorism after 9/11,” Adelphi Papers)

Russian nuclear weapons.Russian nuclear weapons appear to be under the generally good control of élite troops. There is no evidence in open-source material that a single nuclear warhead, from any national arsenal or another source, has ever made its way into the world's illegal arms bazaars, let alone into terrorist hands. No actual or aspiring nuclear-weapon state has ever claimed to have nuclear weapons without also having all of the technical infrastructure necessaryto produce them ab initio, although they could, if the ‘loose nukes’ arguments were sound, easily have bought a few on the black market. Even the extravagant sums sometimes mentioned as the alleged asking price for stolen weapons would be tiny fractions of the amount required to develop an indigenous nuclear-weapon capability**, yet circumstances seem to have compelled states to choose the more expensive course.**

US-Russia relations high enough to prevent a nuclear exchange

Kostreci, 2010

(Keida, staff writer for America.gov, “Opportunities Unfolding in U.S.-Russian Relations”, 4/14/10, http://www.america.gov/st/peacesec-english/2010/April/20100414150444FJreffahcS9.868801e-03.html)

**U.S.-Russian relations are now on a much more solid footing than they were just one year ago,** says William Burns, under secretary of state for political affairs. “Many challenges and difficulties remain, and we have a great deal of work to do together to widen and strengthen the base of cooperation, but **we’ve made a promising start,”** Burns said April 14, a day after the [Nuclear Security Summit](http://www.america.gov/relations/nonproliferation.html) in Washington. [Speaking at the Center for American Progress](http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2010/April/20100414161120eaifas0.9604303.html), a nonpartisan public policy organization, the under secretary said that both President Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton have made relations with Russia a high priority. “Rarely has there been a time when getting relations right between our two countries, and between our two societies, mattered more than it does today,” Burns said. The under secretary said the [new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty](http://www.america.gov/st/nonprolif-english/2010/April/20100408130409esnamfuak0.8880274.html) (**START**) signed by President Obama and President Dmitry Medvedev in Prague on April 8 “enhances American security, **reduces the threat of nuclear war, and sets a powerful example of responsible U.S.-Russian leadership in managing and reducing our remaining nuclear arsenals on the eve of the NPT** [Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty] Review Conference in May.” Missile defense, which has been a source of such suspicion and tension between Russia and the United States, instead can be a transformative opportunity for both countries, he added. “We can explore practical steps toward cooperation on missile defense, consistent with the new phased adaptive approach of the Obama administration,” the under secretary said. Burns talked about the increased cooperation by the two countries to ensure that other countries do not acquire nuclear weapons. **He singled out the bilateral and multilateral efforts to remove the threat of nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula and the new United Nations Security Council sanctions resolution about Iran.** “That level of cooperation was unimaginable in the depths of U.S.-Russian acrimony at the end of 2008; while we will no doubt continue to have our share of tactical differences, we have come a long way in a relatively short time in our efforts together on Iran,” Burns said. He said that the fight against violent extremism is a second area of significantly improved cooperation, stressing that “the attacks on the Moscow Metro two weeks ago are a horrific reminder of what we have both suffered at the hands of terrorists, and of our common stake in defeating them.”

A2 Israeli Strike

Iran sanctions means an Israeli strike won’t happen

Reuters, 2010

(“Biden: Iran sanctions soon, no Israeli strike likely”, 4/22/10, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE63L4HZ20100422)

Biden issued the latest U.S. warning to Iran, which is locked in a standoff with the West over its nuclear program, in an appearance on ABC television's "The View" talk show. "Everyone from the Israeli prime minister straight through to the British prime minister to the president of Russia, everyone agrees the next step we should take is the U.N. sanction route," Biden said. "**I believe you will see a sanction regime coming out by the end of this month**, beginning of next month," he said. Asked whether **Washington was concerned that Israel might attack** its arch-foe Iran without U.S. consultation, Biden said, "**They're not going to do that."** He said Israel had agreed to await the outcome of tightened sanctions against Iran, an effort being led by President Barack Obama. "They've agreed the next step is the step we -- the president of the United States -- have initiated in conjunction with European powers, the NATO powers," he said. **Israel, the only assumed nuclear weapons power in the Middle East, has made clear it is keeping open the military option against Iran even as Washington proceeds on the dual diplomatic and sanctions track.**

2NC Racism Turn

Claiming terrorists could get Russian nuclear weapons relies on Cold War threat construction and racist Russian stereotypes.

Frost ’05, Robin Frost, Professor of Political Science, Simon Fraser University, British Columbia, Dec 2005 (“Nuclear Terrorism after 9/11,” Adelphi Papers)

In general, at least some of the concern about loose Russian weapons may stem from an unconscious but pervasive belief that Russians cannot possibly be as responsible and effective as the Americans, the French, or the British in safeguarding their nuclear arsenal, an attitude reminiscent of the demonising mythology of the Cold War, which simultaneously exaggerated the capabilities of the Soviet military, while denigrating the professionalism and competence of its members. Granted, with the near-collapse of the Russian state there was indeed a severe rise in criminality that did not exclude the armed forces, and which persists to this day. However, it is one thing to acknowledge disorder in a society simultaneously released from decades of authoritarian rule and subjected to the severe stress of economic failure; it is another altogether to allege a general abeyance of morality. Consider this excerpt from a RAND Corporation briefing paper on nuclear terrorism, which discussed the Japanese sect Aum Shinrikyo’s failure to obtain nuclear weapons or technology from Russia: ‘even enterprising Russian officials and scientists may have feared the implications of transferring nuclear technology, knowledge, or material to a religious organization based in a foreign state…Aum’s contacts may have been good, but not good enough to secure the transfer of such sensitive capabilities’ (emphasis added). The default assumptions appear to have been that ‘enterprising Russians’ might normally have been expected to transfer nuclear weapons or technology to an apocalyptic religious cult without considering the consequences (in other words, that they would have lacked ordinary standards of morality and responsibility); that there most likely were people in positions to do so who would indeed have handed nuclear weapons over to a cult, if only its contacts had been good enough; and that evidence to the contrary was worthy of special note, to be expressed in a tone of faint but distinct surprise.

We must reject every instance of racism—it’s the biggest impact

Barndt ’91, educator, trainer and organizer for racial justice, (Joseph, Understanding & Dismantling Racism, p.219-220)

The constraints imposed on people of color by subservience, powerlessness, and poverty are inhuman and unjust; but the effects of uncontrolled power, privilege, and greed that are the marks of ourwhite prison inevitably destroy white people as well. To dismantle racism is to tear down walls. The walls of racism can be dismantled. We are not condemned to an inexorable fate, but are offered the vision and the possibility of freedom. Brick by brick, stone by stone, the prison of individual, institutional, and cultural racism can be destroyed. It is an organizing task that can be accomplished. You and I are urgently called to join the efforts of those who know it is time to tear down, once and for all the walls of racism. The walls of racism must be dismantled. Facing up to these realities offers new possibilities, but refusing to face them threatens yet greater dangers. The results of centuries of national and worldwide colonial conquest and racial domination, of military buildups and violent aggression, of over-consumption and environmental destruction may be reaching a point of no return. The moment of self-destruction seems to be drawing ever more near, nationally and globally. A small and predominantly white minority of the global population derives its power and privilege from the sufferings of the vast majority of peoples of color. For the sake of the world and ourselves, we dare not allow it to continue. Dismantling racism also means building something new it means building an antiracist society.

Russia-NATO DA 1/2

Staying and working in Afghanistan is key to restore NATO-Russia relations.

Wendle, 2009

(John, worked as a freelance photographer and was the TIME Magazine correspondent for Russia based in Moscow, a masters from the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism, “Afghanistan Help Restores NATO-Russia Ties”, 1/27/09, TIME Magazine, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1874320,00.html)

[**Russia**](http://www.time.com/time/topics/russia/0,30939,,00.html) **is signaling a willingness to help the U.S. secure new supply lines for its mission in** [**Afghanistan**](http://www.time.com/time/topics/afghanistan/0,30939,,00.html) **— but only if Washington is willing to accommodate Moscow's concerns on other issues** that have soured their relationship. Last week's swing through central Asia by U.S. Central Command leader General David Petraeus to shore up support for the U.S.'s mission in Afghanistan was followed, within days, by a visit to Tashkent, Uzbekistan, by Russian President Dmitri Medvedev, who met with President Islam Karimov. Although the talks were nominally about oil and gas, Afghanistan featured prominently in comments by both Presidents after the meeting. "Relating to the situation in Afghanistan, and in countries that border Afghanistan, we ... have come to the conclusion that there is no unilateral solution," Medvedev said, adding, "Cooperation with the United States must be equal and full." Strategic cooperation between Russia and NATO broke down last August during the [conflict in Georgia](http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1832294_1832295_1831243,00.html), and both sides have remained chilly over the issues of possible membership in the alliance for Georgia and Ukraine and U.S. plans to station a missile shield in both Poland and the Czech Republic. But both sides are hoping that the arrival of the Obama Administration represents an [opportunity to repair relations](http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1864774,00.html). President Barack Obama and Medvedev spoke on the phone on Monday and agreed to meet in the near future. ([See pictures of Russia's conflict with Georgia.](http://www.time.com/time/photogallery/0,29307,1832554,00.html)) **One of Obama's immediate priorities is to shore up the beleaguered NATO mission in Afghanistan by deploying thousands more troops.** But the turmoil in Pakistan has [imperiled the mission's main supply line](http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1864774,00.html) that runs through the Khyber Pass, which is why the Pentagon has sought additional logistical routes into northern Afghanistan. To that end, **Petraeus said late last week that the** [**U.S. had reached agreements**](http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1872694,00.html) **with several central Asian states and Russia. Moscow is playing along, seeing Washington's need for help in Afghanistan as an opportunity to seek a quid pro quo**. On Monday, Dmitri Rogozin, Russia's NATO envoy, met for two hours behind closed doors with alliance heads in Brussels for the first time in five months. More talks are planned next month between NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and Russia's Deputy Prime Minister, Sergei Ivanov. "The ice is thawing," Rogozin told a Moscow radio station last weekend. "**The ice has been broken because the informal NATO-Russia meeting on Monday marks a resumption of large-scale activity in all our cooperation with the alliance**." For its cooperation, however, **Russia will demand concessions on U.S. missile-defense plans and concerns about NATO "encroachment" along Russia's borders.** "Russia wants to get NATO's agreement that Ukraine and Georgia will not accede to the organization," said Alexander Khramchikhin, a senior researcher at the Institute for Political and Military Analysis in Moscow. "I think that was the main objective, and that that objective will be achieved." "There are signals from Washington for the revision of the terms of the deployment of the U.S. missile-defense system in Europe," Colonel General Leonid Ivashov, president of the Academy of Geopolitical Problems, told a Russian newspaper. "And we can place specific conditions regarding the Caucasus." Rogozin added, "The integration of Ukraine and Georgia into NATO is a red line, and we do not advise anyone to cross it." **Helping NATO succeed in Afghanistan is not simply an opportunity for Russia to press unrelated concerns; it also conforms to Russia's national interest. Rogozin noted that defeat for the U.S. and NATO in Afghanistan could spur instability in central Asia, which Russia calls its "near abroad**." Said Rogozin in the radio interview: "I can responsibly say that in the event of the defeat of NATO in Afghanistan, fundamentalists, inspired by this victory, will begin to look north. First they will hit Tajikistan, then they will try to break into Uzbekistan. If things end up badly, in something like 10 years, our boys will have to fight well-armed and highly organized Islamists somewhere in Kazakhstan ... Therefore, **it is necessary to assist NATO in Afghanistan**."

[insert impact scenario]

Russia-NATO impact : Terror

Russia-NATO relations important for fight against terrorism, spread of WMD and trafficking.

China Daily, 2009

(“Russia, NATO eye cooperation in Afghanistan”, 12/17/09, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2009-12/17/content\_9196384.htm)

Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who had met with Rasmussen earlier in the day, said after the Kremlin talks that the president had instructed the government to study the NATO chief's proposals. Rasmussen later also held talks with Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, who said he hoped for less contradictions between Russia and NATO in the future. "**A unification of Russian and NATO efforts in spheres of common interests may yield good results,"** Putin said. Although Russia and NATO hold different views on various issues, **they continue to cooperate in the combat against terrorism, expansion of weapons of mass destruction, drug trafficking and organized crime,** the premier added. Relations between the military bloc and Moscow have improved recently after being frozen for months. Rasmussen, who has made ties with Moscow a priority since he assumed the post, was reported to be seeking to transport lethal cargoes by railroad across Russia to Afghanistan. **Russia has allowed the transit of non-lethal supplies for NATO and US troops in Afghanistan through its territory** under an April 2008 deal signed in Bucharest. Rasmussen told the Ekho Moskvy radio station late Wednesday that NATO has not asked for Moscow's permission to use its territory for the overland transit of military supplies to Afghanistan. However, he acknowledged that **NATO is interested in expanding cooperation with Russia on Afghanistan,** including the transit of the alliance's cargoes.

Russia-NATO Impacts – Missile Defense

Russia-NATO key to missile defense and fighting terrorism.

Rasmussen, 2009

(NATO Secreary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, ''NATO and Russia: A New Beginning'', 9/18/09, http://www.NATO.int/cps/en/NATOlive/opinions\_57640.htm)

My first proposal concerns the short term. **I would like NATO and Russia to strengthen their practical cooperation in** the many areas where we have a clear common interest. Key among these areas is **the fight against terrorism**. The days when terrorism was a purely local phenomenon have long passed. Terrorism has mutated into a global, trans-border franchise. Terrorists move from theatre to theatre – from Iraq to Afghanistan, from the Middle East to the Caucasus. **And several NATO nations as well as Russia have repeatedly suffered the horrors of terrorist attacks.** Much has already been done in this area. We agreed a Joint Action Plan on Terrorism. **We have been looking at threats posed by Al Qaeda. We have examined the threat to civilian aircraft and to critical infrastructure. We also analysed the terrorist threats to our troops** when we were jointly engaged in bringing stability to the Western Balkans**. But in order for all this work to bring lasting benefits to all our nations, we need to give it another political push**. Let us agree, for example, to update our Joint Action Plan on Terrorism. Another shared interest is preventing the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and their means of delivery. Many international experts believe that we are at a nuclear tipping point. If North Korea stays nuclear, and if Iran becomes nuclear, some of their neighbours might feel compelled to follow their example. Such a multi-nuclear world is not in NATO’s interest – and it’s definitely not in Russia’s interest either. And so I believe we need to take a much more thorough look at the available options: at arms control as well as at non-proliferation efforts, and at means to protect ourselves against Weapons of Mass Destruction. And here as well, we can build on work that we have already initiated in the recent past, such as our joint assessment of proliferation trends, risks and challenges. **This brings me to another area where Russia and NATO can and should work together, which is missile defence.** Yesterday, the US announced its plans with regard to a missile defence which can include and can protect all European allies. These plans will involve an even greater role for NATO with regard to missile defence in Europe – and I welcome that as a positive step. In my view, **the proliferation of ballistic missile technology is of concern not just to NATO nations, but to Russia too**. Our nations, and our forces deployed in theatre, will all become increasingly vulnerable to missile attacks by third parties**. Studying ways to counter this threat is in NATO’s and Russia’s fundamental strategic interest. We should explore the potential for linking the US, NATO and Russia missile defence systems at an appropriate time.** And I believe that the work that we have already done on Theatre Missile Defence under the aegis of the NATO-Russia Council, including joint exercises, clearly demonstrates the potential for cooperation in this area. **Both NATO and Russia have a wealth of experience in missile defence. We should now work to combine this experience to our mutual benefit.**

Russia-NATO Impacts- Missile Defense

Russia-NATO cooperation is on the top agenda—It will yield anti-missile defense to prevent an Iranian nuclear attack.

Kharlamov, 2010

(Ilya, Staff writer for The Voice of Russia, articles on Russia, Kyrgyzstan and NATO relations, “Russia and NATO: ‘sworn’ partners”, 5/20/10, http://english.ruvr.ru/2010/05/20/8175970.html)

As he spoke at an Atlantic Council seminar in Washington, Admiral Stavridis pointed out that some NATO countries view Russia as a potential threat. However, **NATO’s number one member, the United States, is set on cementing partnership with Russia in all areas, including the joint struggle against international terrorism and Afghan drug trafficking.** Naval crews in the Gulf o Aden have demonstrated that Russian-US cooperation can be a success. Even though the Gulf of Aden countries have still to come to agreement on the joint command of this piracy-infested area, cooperation between Russian and NATO naval ships have produced good effect.    As for countries hostile towards Russia in the NATO, these must be the Baltic countries, which are new to NATO and made no secret of their hostility at the last session of the Russia-NATO Council, where they attempted to set restrictions on defense cooperation. Though these countries’ weight in the alliance is negligibly small in view of the potential of their armed forces, they can block important decisions. For this reason, Russia and NATO have to supply them with extra guarantees that Moscow nurtures no evil intentions towards them.    As NATO is busy working out a strategic concept, intensive consultations are underway on all issues of the political agenda. Commenting on that is the head of the European security department at the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences Dmitry Danilov. Relations with Russia are top on the agenda, he says, and were central on the agendas of all NATO meetings of late, including the summits in Strasbourg and Tallinn. NATO countries do differ on relations with Russia. In all likelihood, NATO countries will stick to the policy of maintaining a strong defense, including on their eastern borders, but will keep the so-called pragmatic partnership with Russia in areas of mutual concern.    Russia and NATO may cooperate in building a common European missile defense shield. President Medvedev has signaled Russia’s readiness to set up a continental anti-missile shield but has received no concrete proposals to that effect from NATO yet. That means Moscow will not be invited to join a new European defense system, a decision on which is to be passed by a NATO summit in November. This is the most likely scenario, given the US attempts to deploy its own missile defense system in Eastern Europe under the pretext of a nuclear threat from Iran.

Russia-NATO Impacts – Missle Defense

A strong Russia-NATO relationship is key to a strong missile defense program

Charnysh, 2010

(Volha, has written extensively on issues relating to NATO-Russia relations, missile defense, and nuclear proliferation. She is currently a New Voices Nonproliferation Fellow at the Arms Control Association in Washington, D.C. and will be starting a Ph.D. program in government at Harvard in 2010, “Russia-NATO Missile Defense”, 5/27/10, http://www.e-ir.info/?p=4234)

Floated on both sides of the Atlantic by high officials for at least a decade, the idea of joint Russia-NATO ballistic missile defenses remains controversial and far-fetched. Experts say going beyond a limited exchange of early warning data to genuine cooperation would require resolving numerous military, diplomatic and technical issues and take another decade, during which the NATO-Russian rapport could wither. Just last week, NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said the “daring” proposal to establish a joint NATO-Russia short-range missile defense system would become “mainstream” – when “Russia starts to feel the effects of proliferation.” How big are the obstacles to a genuine Russia-NATO missile defense cooperation and is overcoming them worth the trouble? The most obvious issue with bringing the idea into reality is of technical nature: the incompatibility of NATO and Russian radar and interceptor components complicates intelligence sharing and requires a considerable number of technical adjustments on both sides. However**, the main obstacle to building a joint missile defense shield and**, more broadly, **to moving the NATO-Russia relationship to a new level is their mutual mistrust**.Even when the nuts and bolts of integrating the NATO and Russian systems are resolved, collaboration is impossible while the NATO and Russian lists of threats include each other. Hastings Ismay, the first secretary-general of NATO, famously said, “NATO is created to keep Russia out, Germany down and Americans in.” While the situation has changed considerably with the end of the Cold War, **Russia still feels left out**. Even though it does not aspire to become a member of the alliance — as it did for a brief period under Boris Yeltsin — **Moscow wants NATO to take heed of its interests.** The alliance, on the other hand, is wary of giving Russia a veto over its decisions. Today, the Kremlin obsesses over NATO expansion and US missile defense plans in Europe and, long after the end of the Cold War, holds military exercises simulating an invasion of a NATO member state. In a similar fashion, NATO’s idée fixe is that Moscow longs to restore the lost empire and schemes to sow discord among the allies. Even though they claim that the alliance no longer views Russia as a threat, the experts tasked with drawing recommendations for NATO’s new Strategic Concept said Moscow’s politics toward NATO were unpredictable and there was no guarantee that Russia would be inclined to cooperate with NATO in the near future**. This mistrust is reflected in the views on joint NATO-Russia missile defense: Moscow suspects the idea is a Western ruse to undermine Russia while the alliance worries that sharing critical technology will weaken NATO**. To build trust and make a higher level of cooperation possible, **both sides should increase the transparency of their strategies and doctrines and engage in a more frequent dialogue** openly sharing their concerns with each other. **The ideal forum for addressing  the issues related to creating a joint missile defense system is the NATO-Russia Council.** In fact, it is under the auspices of the NATO-Russia Council that the first steps toward making a joint missile defense system possible were taken.  Tasking the Council with facilitating missile defense collaboration between NATO and Moscow could help it reach its full potential becoming the institution where the individual NATO member states and Russia work as equal partners – what its founding documents envisioned and what it has failed to become so far. **Building trust also requires clarifying the relationship between the future NATO-Russia joint missile defense system and the US missile shield in Europe.** While Russia seems to welcome missile defense cooperation with NATO, it continues to agonize over the US missile defense plans in Europe. Were Washington to unexpectedly start building ICBM interception facilities in Russia’s neighborhood, the Russia-NATO collaboration would be undermined. Of course, joint missile defense with Russia is not an instant solution for NATO’s troubles, but overcoming the above-mentioned obstacles would not only protect from Iranian missiles, but also contribute to redefining NATO-Russian relations, facilitate NATO’s transition into a 21st century alliance, and possibly even help resolve the problem of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. **A joint missile defense system could also be an important step toward the creation of a European security zone**, envisioned by Russia’s draft European Security Treaty. While Russia has a history of security cooperation with European nations, the United States tends to be excluded from the security discussions between Russia and the European Union. **Russia-NATO collaboration on missile defense provides an opportunity to meaningfully engage the United States in the EU-Russia security dialogue. Upgrading the relationship with Russia by cooperating on missile defense would also improve NATO’s readiness to deal with the 21st century challenges**. An attack on its members that Article V of the NATO treaty envisions is unlikely today; the alliance that was created in 1949 and had developed its mission during the Cold War must adapt to the new security environment where threats range from nuclear proliferation to cyber attacks. Finally, **progress on NATO-Russia joint ballistic missile defense system could make the removal of US tactical nuclear weapons from the European territory a less controversial issue.** Replacing the forward-deployed US nuclear weapons with ballistic missile defenses would improve the security of the NATO members that are most threatened by Iranian missiles and are therefore most wary of the weapons’ withdrawal. Given Moscow’s opposition to US missile defense plans, building European missile defense architecture with Russia’s participation seems to be the only viable option today. And while the technical merits of missile defense system are disputable, **the political benefits of collaborating on the issue with Moscow are clear.**

Russia-NATO Impacts – Global

Russia-NATO relations are critical to solving international problems—there’s no alternative

RFERL, 2007

(Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty by country/Russia, “NATO Chief Urges Calm In Russia-NATO Relations”, 6/26/07, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1077345.html)

De Hoop **Scheffer** (left) **and Putin met on the sidelines of the NATO-Russia Council session** (epa) June 26, 2007 (RFE/RL) -- **NATO and Russia don't see eye-to-eye on a lot of issues, but one thing they can agree on is that communication is the key to overcoming their differences**. That was the general message both sides sent during a NATO-Russia Council session in Moscow that also featured talks between the NATO secretary-general and the Russian president Following those talks, NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer called for constraint on issues on which the two sides disagree. "It is advisable to lower the volume a bit of the public comments made by one or the other. Because as it is with your iPod, if you put the volume too high in the long run it will damage your ears," RFE/RL's Russian Service quoted de Hoop Scheffer as saying.     Russia and the alliance disagree on a range of issues, including U.S. plans to place an antimissile defense shield in Poland and the Czech Republic, the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty imposing limits on military deployment, and the future status of Serbia's Kosovo Province.     De Hoop Scheffer said Putin's threats to re-target Russian missiles at sites in Europe if Washington goes ahead with its shield "do not have a place" in diplomatic relations.     **He said there was "no alternative" to sound relations between NATO and Russia.    "I strongly believe that there is no alternative to a good and healthy Russia-NATO relationship because NATO cannot do without its important partner Russia, and I think I can say that Russia cannot do without NATO,"** de Hoop Scheffer said.     The NATO chief also called on Moscow not to abandon its commitment to the CFE treaty in retaliation to the U.S. missile shield, saying this would be "a very negative development."  On Kosovo, de Hoop Scheffer said he called on Putin to swiftly allow a vote on an United Nations Security Council resolution granting Kosovo internationally supervised independence. Russia, which holds a veto in the Council, strongly opposes the proposal.     Putin, for his part, struck a conciliatory tone during his meeting with the NATO secretary-general:     "**We have moved from a period of confrontation to cooperation,"** Putin said. "Naturally, this is big, multifaceted work, and it cannot happen without problems. But we hope that **an ongoing dialogue between Russia and NATO will help resolve all problems in the interest of international security, for the sake of strengthening peace in the whole world."**

Russia-NATO Impacts – Artic Security

And, the NRC is key to prevent Arctic conflicts

RIA Novosti, 2009

(Russian International News Agency, “U.S. analyst says NATO-Russia Council ideal for Arctic talks”, 5/27/09, http://en.rian.ru/world/20090527/155103313.html)

A leading U.S. analyst has **said the NATO-Russia Council is the perfect forum for talks on Arctic security. "There seems to be a growing interest and importance in the Arctic region**. Certainly, Russia has a fundamental interest in the Arctic and its future development in terms of economics and resources, and also maritime trade," Dr. Charles M. Perry, vice president and director of studies at the [Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis](http://www.ifpa.org/home.htm), told RIA Novosti. "There are some contentions about who owns what. **The NATO-Russia forum would be an excellent place to talk about things like Arctic security**. Not necessarily solving it all bilaterally...this concerns everybody in the region and right now we are not talking about it very well," Dr. Perry, who is also vice-president of National Security Planning Associates, said. Arctic territories, seen as the key to huge untapped natural resources, have increasingly been at the center of mounting disputes between the United States, Russia, Canada, Norway, and Denmark in recent years as rising temperatures lead to a reduction in sea ice. President Dmitry Medvedev said in September at a Russian Security Council session that the extent of the Russian continental shelf in the Arctic should be defined as soon as possible. Russia has undertaken two Arctic expeditions - to the Mendeleyev underwater chain in 2005 and to the Lomonosov ridge in the summer of 2007 - to support its territorial claims in the region. Moscow has pledged to submit documentary evidence to the UN on the external boundaries of Russia's territorial shelf by 2010. The Russia-NATO Council meets on Wednesday in Brussels for the second time since the end of last August's war between Russia and Georgia over [Abkhazia](http://en.rian.ru/photolents/20061020/54983580.html). The work of the Council was suspended by the alliance unilaterally in September 2008, Relations had looked to be recovering, but took another hit earlier this month with the expulsion of two Russian NATO diplomats from Brussels. Russia responded by expelling two NATO officials from Moscow and pulling out of a NATO-Russia Council session. "**It is really important to keep some kind of useful form and vehicle, at the very least, for Russia and NATO member states to gather around the same table, lay out their concerns about emerging problems**," Dr. Perry said. **The meeting is expected to focus in particular on security in the Euro-Atlantic region and NATO-Russia relations, as well as see a discussion of Monday's announcement of a nuclear test by** [**North Korea**](http://en.rian.ru/photolents/20070219/60953737.html)**.**

Climate Change Causes Global Wars

Zellen, 2007

(Barry, Security Innovator, “The Polar Show Down: As the Arctic's ice begins to melt, a new race for its undersea resources begins”, 8/23/07, http://securityinnovator.com/index.php?articleID=12387&sectionID=43)

The impacts of global warming and the resulting Arctic thaw will be profound. Michael T. Klare, a professor of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College and defense correspondent for The Nation and, told us that “global warming will affect resource competition and conflict profoundly” in the coming years—and while “global warming’s effects cannot be predicted with certainty, it is likely to produce diminished rainfall in many parts of the world, leading to a rise in desertification in these areas and a decline in their ability to sustain agriculture” which “could force people to fight over remaining sources of water and arable land, or to migrate in large numbers to other areas, where their presence may be resented by the existing inhabitants.”[4] Klare added that “global warming is also expected to produce a significant rise global sea levels, and this will result in the inundation of low-lying coastal areas around the world”—resulting in “the widespread loss of agricultural lands, forcing many millions of people to migrate to higher areas, possible encountering resistance in the process.” Klare cautioned that “because many poor countries will be unable to cope with the catastrophic effects of global warming, state collapse is a likely result along with an accompanying epidemic of warlordism, ethnic violence, and civil disorder.”

Russia-NATO Impacts – Us-Russia Relations

Better Russia-NATO relationship would eliminate Russian concerns towards US

Russett and Stam, 97

(Bruce and Allan, Political Science Department at Yale University, “Russia, NATO, and the Future of U.S.-Chinese Relations”, http://www.fas.org/man/NATO/ceern/NATO-final\_vs.htm)

Such an alliance would look very attractive to two big powers that saw themselves as excluded from a hegemonic western community. **We can be satisfied only with a form of NATO expansion that ties Russia securely to the West.** Any defensive alliance serves two purposes. The first is to prevent an external power from trying to alter the international territorial status quo -- the second is to prevent any of the member states from wishing to do the same. From a cost-benefit perspective, **it is not only about what the Russians might bring to NATO, but what NATO brings to the Russians, and what the Russians then *do not* bring to the Chinese. A future round of NATO expansion that fully incorporated Russia into NATO -- not just in a second class NATO-Russia Joint Council -- would eliminate Russian concern about western encirclement and address the long-term problem of growing Chinese power. It would allow Russia to become a normal democratic state within the EuroAtlantic community.**[**(10)**](http://www.fas.org/man/nato/ceern/nato-final_vs.htm#N_10_) **That would firmly bind Russia's future to Western Europe's and ensure substantial global peace for the next century.**

Afghan K2 Russia-NATO Relations

Staying to win the war in Afghanistan will boost Russia-NATO relations

China Daily, 2009

(“Russia, NATO eye cooperation in Afghanistan”, 12/17/09, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2009-12/17/content\_9196384.htm)

MOSCOW: **NATO** Secretary-general Anders Fogh Rasmussen on Wednesday **asked for greater Russian assistance for the Western military alliance's operations in Afghanistan**, but received no immediate promise of more help from Moscow. Making his first visit to Moscow since taking office in August, Rasmussen met with a series of senior Russian officials in his latest effort to lubricate NATO-Russia ties that were strained in the wake of the Caucasus war last year. At a meeting with Rasmussen, President Dmitry Medvedev said that **Russia's relations with NATO are entering a new stage. "We have many reasons for interaction, many subjects for discussion**," **including** joint **actions to counter terrorism, crime and other common threats,** Medvedev said. He expressed the hope that Rasmussen's visit would help make Russia-NATO ties "stronger and more productive." Rasmussen, in his turn, admitted differences in NATO-Russia relations, but said they should not overshadow common interests in many fields. The Russian president missed no opportunity to urge NATO to mull over Russia's proposal to map out a new European security treaty. Medvedev in late November sent a draft treaty on European security to leaders of others countries and international organizations of the Euro-Atlantic space. But the initiative has so far received a lukewarm response from the West. Speaking to reporters after the Kremlin meeting, Rasmussen said he has presented Russian leaders with a list of "concrete proposals" on rendering NATO more assistance in Afghanistan. "I have invited Russia to step up its terms of cooperation in Afghanistan," the Danish NATO chief said, adding that Russia could contribute by supplying helicopters, spare parts and fuel, and by training pilots. Rasmussen stressed that **Russia's cooperation on NATO's war effort in Afghanistan is beneficial to both sides. "I do believe that it's essential for Russia that we succeed in Afghanistan,"** he said. "If Afghanistan once again becomes a safe haven for terrorists, then **Russia would be among the first victims, as terrorists could easily spread from Afghanistan through Central Asia to Russia,"** Rasmussen said.

Afghan K2 Russia-NATO Relations

Afghanistan is a key point for Russia-NATO relations

rt, 2009

(Russian English news, “Afghanistan is the key to Russia-NATO relations”, 4/29/09, http://rt.com/Politics/2009-04-29/Afghanistan\_is\_the\_key\_to\_Russia-NATO\_relations.html)

**The future of Afghanistan and the whole Central Asian region is on the agenda of Russia-NATO cooperation** because stability in neighbouring Iran and Pakistan is under question.**It would be difficult for NATO to deal with all the obstacles in Asia without Russia**. So **both** **NATO and Russia**, which has its own interests in the region, **are now trying to mend the relations** that suffered after last year’s war in South Ossetia, says political analyst Sergey Utkin from the Institute of World Economy, and the president of the New Eurasia Institute Andrey Kortunov.

Russia-NATO relations revolve around Afghanistan’s fate

Rogozin, 2010

(Dmitry, a Russian politician and diplomat, Russia's ambassador to NATO, “2011 “to be decisive” in Russia-NATO relations –Moscow”, 5/31/10, http://english.ruvr.ru/2010/05/31/8804592.html)

**2011 will be decisive in Russia-NATO relations**, Russia’s permanent representative to the alliance Dmitry Rogozin told a Latvian radio station. According to him, **NATO’s new strategy, which is currently being worked out, has many provisions concerning cooperation with Moscow**.    Rozogin is taking part in a NATO Parliamentary Assembly session in Riga. **28 countries are discussing the situation in Afghanistan,** the Balkans **and Russia-NATO strategic cooperation**.

Russia-NATO Impacts - China Impact

Russia-NATO dialogue would help the West while guarding against external Chinese threats.

Russett and Stam, 97

(Bruce and Allan, Political Science Department at Yale University, “Russia, NATO, and the Future of U.S.-Chinese Relations”, http://www.fas.org/man/NATO/ceern/NATO-final\_vs.htm)

**Integrating Russia into NATO provides time and means to guard against the rising power of China in the short run**. In the longer run, **it creates a mechanism and a model by which China can, over time, become fully integrated into the international system**, allowing the future rising power to be accommodated without cataclysmic conflict. The one factor that most constrains a state's potential power is its population. With but 150 million people, Russia is a fragment of its former self. Even a reconstituted Soviet Union, somehow developing economically to the point at which it might approach parity with the West, could pose no fundamental danger to NATO's roughly 700 million people. **Russia is not today,** nor could it be in the future**, a threat to the demographic and economic preponderance of the West.** China, however, is another matter. An economically growing China, with 1.2 billion citizens, is the only single country that could pose a threat to the future security and prosperity of the NATO countries. Expanding NATO to include the Visegrad countries and Russia would produce a population base of more than 900 million people. More important, the combined wealth and technological superiority of the alliance would significantly postpone the day of reckoning with China's overtaking of the West. China can only achieve geostrategic parity by growing its economy to the point at which its income approaches that of the West, a development that is simply impossible in the near term. Even in the longer future, if the Chinese economy were to grow at 8 percent a year while the expanded NATO's grew at only 2 percent per year, it would take nearly until the year 2030 to reach parity with the West.[(25)](http://www.fas.org/man/nato/ceern/nato-final_vs.htm#N_25_) There is no historical precedent Ð Japan included Ð for a long-sustained growth rate as high as 8 percent.[(26)](http://www.fas.org/man/nato/ceern/nato-final_vs.htm#N_26_) Nor is there much chance that China could maintain that rate with growing environmental problems[(27)](http://www.fas.org/man/nato/ceern/nato-final_vs.htm" \l "N_27_) and, as its technological gap with the West narrowed, with less room for catching up simply by copying western goods and services. **Given an expanded NATO's power preponderance, a growing mercantilist China[(28)](http://www.fas.org/man/nato/ceern/nato-final_vs.htm" \l "N_28_) would find it very hard to develop the military or economic capabilities needed to challenge America and NATO for system leadership**, by force *or* beggar-thy-neighbor policies. **Incorporating Russia into NATO would improve the short-run position of the West**, postponing the time of China's transition to military-economic parity with the West. As for potential Chinese fears, the Chinese have their deterrents against Russian or western aggression. **An invasion and occupation of China's vast territory and population is unimaginable, particularly by a NATO limited to a defense-orientation**. China also possesses the world's third largest nuclear deterrent force. In this scenario, both sides would have ample time to develop a long-term solution to the parity problem, which will require a convergence of both preferences and interests.

A2 Russia Perceives NATO Threat

NATO is not a threat to Russia.

RIA Novosti, 2010

(Russian International News Agency, “NATO not a threat to Russia - Secretary General Rasmussen”, 3/12/10, http://en.rian.ru/world/20100312/158178314.html)

NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh **Rasmussen** **said** on Friday **the West is no threat to Moscow and that** Russia's new military doctrine is off target, the Polish Radio Foreign Service reported. "**NATO is not a threat to Russia. And NATO will never invade Russia. Nor do we consider Russia a threat to NATO,"** Rasmussen told an audience in Warsaw on the 11th anniversary of Poland's admission to the defense alliance. "That is why Russia's new military doctrine does not reflect the real world." **He said he would continue to work for a strong, trustful NATO-Russia relationship.** Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski said **his government supports NATO efforts to improve relations with Russia, but still expects solidarity and security from NATO. "Central Europe wants NATO to develop relations with Russia** as a partner pragmatically and with full respect to the legitimate security concerns of both sides," Sikorski said.

Turns Case

Turns case—Russia-NATO relations are key to U.S.-Russia relations

Kupchan, no date

(Charles, Professor at Georgetown University and Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, “How Enlargement Should Proceed after the First Tranche”)

The question of whether NATO should open its doors to Russia seems to me to be somewhat premature. That question needs to be asked in a way that relates it to the questions that we now face. The best way to phrase it in my mind is that, assuming that there will be three or maybe four new countries admitted sometime before the end of this century, then what? Is this a policy that, as we heard from our representative from the State Department, is really going to move on down or is that just rhetoric to keep Russia happy and to keep the gray zone happy in a situation in which enlargement really is not going to go any further? That question has not been answered. Nobody has really thought about it deeply because we have all been focused on this question of these three. **What is going to happen?** **I think we need to start focusing on that question.** There is a current conventional wisdom that is moving toward either "don't go beyond these three" or, "if you go beyond these three, don't do it for at least five to ten years." There is an influential document that is circulating now -- I think it was Sam Nunn, Bob Blackwell and Arnold Horelick that wrote it -- that says, basically, that we need a real pause. The Russians may well like this because it gives them some breathing space, it does not move NATO any closer. The American administration will probably like it because it will mean that they do not have to go back to the Senate and ask them to ratify four, five, six more Article 5 guarantees to new countries. But I think it is an unacceptable way to proceed for three reasons. First, it is going to leave in no man's land those countries that most need some sort of concrete security structure and reassurance -- Bulgaria, Romania, the Baltics, Ukraine. Yes, they are going to be given Partnership for Peace, plus they are going to be patted on the head, they're going to be told not to get discouraged, but the bottom line is that they are going to be in no man's land. Second point**, one of the main things that I think we should be thinking about here is not just how to keep Russia from going off the deep end, but how to get some influence over Russian behavior --** how it uses its forces, how it goes about peace keeping in the near abroad. And the way to do that is not to hold Russia at arm's length; it is to embrace Russia in as many networks and as many activities as possible. And so I think a 10-year pause sends a message to Russia that you now have 10 years to do more or less what you want do because you are not going to be embraced in this framework. And third -- and this is to repeat something that others have said today -- I think that the view from Russia is already bad, and it is going to get worse. Sitting in Moscow, you look one direction and you see a China with incredible growth rates, a huge population, an Asia-Pacific that is probably more dynamic than any other part of the world. You look on the other side and you see NATO and the European Union coming slowly towards your borders. This is not a very benign geo-political environment. On the contrary, if there is one thing that we know from the 20th Century that we want to avoid, it is a country that is going through the midst of difficult political economic transition that feels encircled. Countries in transition that feel encircled tend to go off the deep end. They tend to go bonkers. We saw Germany do that twice this century. We saw Serbia do it recently. **We do not want to leave a Russia feeling isolated and alone in the heart of Eurasia. And it seems to me that we are heading in that direction if we let in three countries and say it is over**, or maybe it is not over but we are going to wait another decade or two before we do anything else. So that

Turns Case

brings me to the topic that the panel is addressing, and that is: What do we do after this first accession? And **do we talk seriously about Russian membership in NATO? I think that the answer is yes.** I would make three comments on this front. One is that, assuming that this first step forward on the enlargement of NATO goes forward, it is going to be time to start talking about a relationship with Russia that is not put in compensatory terms. Right now we are saying that we need to get Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic in, and then we are throwing some bones to Russia; we are compensating them with a charter, CFE, etc. But the bottom line is that Russia is the Big Kahuna. Russia is the country we most need to worry about. If we have a policy that has focused on matters which then, as an afterthought, make us ask "how are we going to compensate Russia," that says to me something is wrong with our policy. **I would be much more comfortable with a policy that was focused on making sure that Russia gets integrated into the West** and then we say, how do we compensate other countries that will be somewhat uncomfortable with that? That seems to me to keep the big picture in front. So, again, I think we have to stop thinking about compensating Russia and have to focus on concrete, not rhetorical ways of bringing Russia in a real sense into a European security framework. **The second point I would make is I do not think that this should proceed in a sequential West-to-East manner**, because that basically means that Russia, if it gets in at all, gets in at the very end. And if that happens, I think we will end up in a situation where Russia, for one reason or another, does not ultimately want in because it is 30, 40 years down the road. Everyone else to its west is already in. That strikes me as putting Russia in that geo-political isolation that we definitely want to avoid. The final point I would make comes to how I think we should address this issue. We should stop asking who gets in when -- that is what we have been asking for the last four or five years -- and we should start asking, what are they getting into? The reason that I think we have had so much trouble debating this is because we keep focusing on getting countries into a traditional NATO with Article 5 that is a collective defense organization that is going to require us to go to the U.S. Senate to ratify. I do not want the U.S. Senate to debate the future of NATO at this point in time. I think it is going to be bloody. I think it may lead to the worst outcome, which is that we move down this road and the people of Iowa and the people of Wisconsin stand up and say, "What's going on here? Why are we doing this?" That is going to be a bruising debate that we do not want to have, and we do not want to see it happen every time a new country comes in. I think what we really need to do is to say that we need to have a vehicle that ultimately is open to Russia and in which Russia can comfortably join. **That means it has to be something other than the current NATO, something other than a traditional military alliance focused on collective defense, because right now there is not an enemy. Collective defense is the wrong organizing principle**. What I would argue is that, okay, let's get these three in because we are already way down the road. It probably hurts more to say no at this point than to let them in. But then we need to do what **we should** have done to begin with, and that is to get the vessel right, to **create some sort of architecture that keeps NATO's infrastructure, integrated military structure,** intact, **but** also **eases the problem of bringing in other countries into an all-purpose multilateral military framework that is focused** principally **on peacekeeping and collective security and not on an alliance against an enemy that no longer exists.**

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Russia-NATO cooperation would tie Russia closer to the Western community—key to relations

Kortunov, no date

(Dr. Andrei, President, ussian esearch Foundation, “Full ussian Membership as a bond to the West”, http://www.fas.org/man/NATO/ceern/gwu\_c2.htm)

But here, I guess what we should keep in mind, at least from the Russian viewpoint, is that **there is a clear distinction between NATO as a defense alliance and NATO as a body that coordinates foreign policies of developed Western democracies. I**f you take NATO as a defense alliance, its importance will probably go down. NATO will get looser; it will get more ambiguous. And if there is no clear threat looming on the horizon, probably the integrity of the NATO alliance will be questioned. However, as the vehicle to coordinate foreign policies of developed Western democracies**, NATO is still a very important institution**. And I think **for Russia,** at least for liberals in Russia, **it is extremely important to use any opportunity they have to tie Russia closer to the Western community** of nations, to anchor Russia to some institutions that can put some constraints on the Russian behavior if there are changes in the domestic politics in the country. Let me remind you that when there were discussions about Germany entering NATO back in 1955, one of the prime arguments for taking Germany in was the idea that if Germany is not anchored to the Western security system, if Germany is not a member of the club, the odds are that revanchism might get a chance in Germany. And, in a sense, I think it will be also correct to assume that Russia is no different. Indeed, it would be a severe test for Russia to meet all the criteria that the West might have. But why don't you really try to test Russia? Let Russians face this test. If they fail to meet criteria, if they cannot make it, compete, let them be outside of NATO. But if it is something that can mold the behavior of Russian elites in the right direction, I think that these options should not be ignored altogether. Let me give you one example -- the Council of Europe. Of course, it is no NATO; it is a less important institution. And for Russia it was not easy to join the Council of Europe. However, already now we can see that the membership to the Council of Europe does affect the Russian domestic behavior. Right now it would be much more difficult for Russians not to introduce the jury trial, for example, or not to drop the capital punishment, because Russia is constrained by its membership to the Council of Europe. I guess that this might be also true if we are considered for membership to NATO. Of course, **this membership** will not come easy for the West, not only for Russia. It will require certain accommodations on the part of major NATO institutions, but on the other hand, it **might also mean a new beginning for the alliance. And in this case, NATO at some point might really turn into the collective security mechanism in Europe**. It is a long road, it will be a very difficult road, but **why don't we try to make the first step?**