Taliban QPQ CP

[Taliban QPQ CP 1](#_Toc267763168)

[\*\*\*1NC SHELL\*\*\* 2](#_Toc267763169)

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[A2: Perm: Condition Other Things – Time is Now 15](#_Toc267763182)

[A2: Perm: Condition Other Things – Time is Now 16](#_Toc267763183)

[A2: Ethnic Conflicts 17](#_Toc267763184)

[A2: Women Oppression 18](#_Toc267763185)

[\*\*\*AFF ANSWERS\*\*\* 19](#_Toc267763186)

[Aff – Taliban Say No 20](#_Toc267763187)

[Aff – Taliban Say No 1](#_Toc267763188)

[AFF – Taliban Say No 1](#_Toc267763189)

[Aff – Taliban Say No 1](#_Toc267763190)

[Aff – Ethnic/Civil War 2](#_Toc267763191)

[Aff – Coalition Government Fails 3](#_Toc267763192)

\*\*\*1NC SHELL\*\*\*

1NC Taliban CP

TEXT: The United States federal government should [insert plan here] if and only if the Taliban will abide by the Afghan constitution, cut all ties to Al Qaeda and renounce Al Qaeda violence.

Observation 1: Competition

1. Resolved – it means the plan would be an unconditional military withdrawal

Random House ‘06

http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/resolve

re·solve to come to a definite or earnest decision about

1. Timeframe – The plan is immediately implemented, and the CP is not. Any permutation makes the plan untopical and severs initial plan advocacy

Department of Developmental and Environmental Services ‘05

“Permit Report Descriptions & Status Definitions”, http://cf.kingcounty.gov/www6/ddes/scripts/perminfo.cfm?rpt=2

RESOLVED Appealed issue has been resolved and processing completed.

Observation 2: Solvency

The Taliban will accept negotiations to recognize the Afghan constitution, cut links to Al Qaeda and renounce Al Qaeda violence

The Taliban will accept negotiations that the insurgents recognizing the Afghanistan constitution, cutting links to Al Qaeda and renouncing violence.

Oakes ‘10

Dan Oakes, Fairfax Defense and Foreign Affairs Correspondent, 7-22-10, “West Braces for a Difficult Conversation……. With the Taliban”, http://www.theage.com.au/opinion/politics/west-braces-for-a-difficult-conversation--with-the-taliban-20100722-10m5t.html?autostart=1

As the NATO-led coalition grasps that it cannot win militarily in Afghanistan, talking with the Taliban is fast gaining favour as a way of bringing the West's involvement in the country to an end. The message out of this week's Kabul conference is that the United States, in particular, is become more receptive to negotiation as a way of extricating itself. However, rather than opening up a path to a quick withdrawal, the realisation that negotiation with the insurgents is essential throws up a whole new set of problems. The US has insisted that negotiations with senior Taliban (under the rubric of "reconciliation") should be conditional on the insurgents recognising the Afghan constitution, cutting links with al-Qaeda and renouncing violence. Influential Afghans pointed out to The Age in Kabul recently that the conditions were a ludicrous attempt to negotiate from a position of weakness, and that talks would never occur unless they were unconditional. "Why would the Taliban agree to meet these conditions when they can simply wait for the Americans to go?" one said. He also predicted that the Taliban would cut al-Qaeda loose voluntarily if the Afghan government (and the US, which still publicly says it will not talk to the Taliban) negotiated in good faith, without conditions. Another other spanner in the works is Afghan President Hamid Karzai, who has made noises in the past about negotiating with the likes of brutal insurgent chiefs Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Siraj Haqqani, but produced little of substance. A delegation from Hekmatyar's Hezb-i-Islami group met Karzai in Kabul in May, but returned empty-handed. Insurgent leaders then shunned a peace jirga called by Karzai last month. Many of the powerful warlords who nominally support Karzai have a long history of warring with the groups broadly defined as "Taliban" and would not favour a truce between the national government and the insurgents. There would also be opposition to any accommodation with the Taliban from ethnic groups who were persecuted when the Taliban was in power. Groups such as the Hazara are petrified of a resurgent Taliban, particularly as areas such as the Hazara stronghold of Bamiyan province are now among the most secure in Afghanistan. Having said that, the governor of Bamiyan, Dr Habiba Sarabi, who as a Hazara and a woman has more to lose than most if the Taliban regain power, told The Age last week that she accepted there was a need to talk to the Taliban in some capacity. The second leg of engagement with the Taliban is the policy of "reintegration", by which the national government hopes to convince rank and file insurgents to lay down their weapons. However, it is unclear what the insurgents, most of whom are Afghan peasants, are supposed to be "reintegrated" into. When The Age asked a senior US official in Afghanistan that question last week, he struggled to answer, eventually admitting they were really asking Taliban fighters to "change sides". Deputy US Ambassador to Afghanistan James Keith said last week that the national government would reach out to insurgents who were fighting because they wanted stability in their villages. But what if the kind of stability they want is that provided by the Taliban? Anecdotal evidence is that more Afghans in provinces with a strong insurgent presence are going to the Taliban for adjudication in civil matters, believing they will receive a fair hearing and will not be hit up for bribes. The perception might be that, in accepting negotiation is necessary, the US and its allies have seen the light at the end of the tunnel. But the insurgents hold the upper hand. Talking will bring a whole new set of challenges.

1NC Pashtun Net Benefit [1/2]

If the Taliban can’t have Afghanistan, they would take over a nuclear armed Pakistan with Al Qaeda at their side – sparks nuclear war between India and Pakistan

Morgan ‘07

Stephen, British Labor Party and Political Psychologist, “Better another Taliban Afghanistan, than a Taliban Nuclear Pakistan, http://www.electricarticles.com/display.aspx?id=639

It took the Soviets 10 years and the loss of 15,000 troops before they admitted they admitted defeat in Afghanistan. For the West, it will not take so long for the slow bleed to becomes a haemorrhage. It will be only a matter of one or two years, at the most before, Afghanistan falls and the country collapses again into fragmentation and internal civil war. It may indeed come sooner. The Soviets were prepared to fight to the death in Afghanistan because they knew the edge of their empire was crumbling and a domino effect on its other republics would follow. The Soviet bureaucracy was fighting for its life. In Cold War terms it would have been the equivalent of the US loosing Mexico to communism. The US and NATO forces don’t have anything like the same motivation, determination and commitment to fight to the end in Afghanistan. The nature of catastrophy and abysmal defeat in Iraq fundamentally undermines the psychological foundations of any successful defence of the Kabul regime. The failure of new “surge” will embolden the Taliban and undermine confidence in the West among the Afghan people and among the warlord Mujahedin, who dominate its government. Collapse in Iraq will intensify the sense of hopelessness and pointlessness among Western forces and hasten demoralization and defeat. They are low on adequate resources and relegated in importance. The former British Commander of NATO forces admitted that last year they came close to losing Kandahar, the second city. It is not ruled out that much of the south and east could fall into Taliban hands this year, paving the way for the fall of Kabul, the year after. The Taliban are ferocious fighters, with a messianic fervour to fight to the death. They bring with them the experience of veterans of the brutal Soviet war and the civil war which followed. Now regrouped, rearmed, their forces are prepared both for unfavourable open combat of almost suicidal proportions. Furthermore they are opportunistically changing tactics, both in order to create maximum urban destabilization and to win local support in the countryside. Boasting of more than 1,000 suicide volunteer bombers, they have also renounced their former policy against heroin cultivation, thus allowing them to win support among the rural population and gain support from local tribes, warlords and criminal gangs, who have been alienated by NATO policies of poppy field destruction. Although disliked and despised in many quarters, the Taliban could not advance without the support or acquiescence of parts of the population, especially in the south. In particular, the Taliban is drawing on backing from the Pashtun tribes from whom they originate. The southern and eastern areas have been totally out of government control since 2001. Moreover, not only have they not benefited at all from the Allied occupation, but it is increasingly clear that with a few small centres of exception, all of the country outside Kabul has seen little improvement in its circumstances. The conditions for unrest are ripe and the Taliban is filling the vacuum. The Break-Up of Afghanistan? However, the Taliban is unlikely to win much support outside of the powerful Pashtun tribes. Although they make up a majority of the nation, they are concentrated in the south and east. Among the other key minorities, such as Tajiks and Uzbeks, who control the north they have no chance of making new inroads. They will fight the Taliban and fight hard, but their loyalty to the NATO and US forces is tenuous to say the least. The Northern Alliance originally liberated Kabul from the Taliban without Allied ground support. The Northern Alliance are fierce fighters, veterans of the war of liberation against the Soviets and the Afghanistan civil war. Mobilized they count for a much stronger adversary than the NATO and US forces. It is possible that, while they won’t fight for the current government or coalition forces, they will certainly resist any new Taliban rule. They may decide to withdraw to their areas in the north and west of the country. This would leave the Allied forces with few social reserves, excepting a frightened and unstable urban population in Kabul, much like what happened to the Soviets. Squeezed by facing fierce fighting in Helmund and other provinces, and, at the same time, harried by a complementary tactic of Al Qaeda-style urban terrorism in Kabul, sooner or later, a “Saigon-style” evacuation of US and Allied forces could be on the cards. The net result could be the break-up and partition of Afghanistan into a northern and western area and a southern and eastern area, which would include the two key cities of Kandahar and, the capital Kabul. The Taliban themselves, however may decide not to take on the Northern Alliance and fighting may concentrate on creating a border between the two areas, about which the two sides may reach an agreement regardless of US and Allied plans or preferences. The Taliban may claim the name Afghanistan or might opt for “Pashtunistan” – a long-standing, though intermittent demand of the Pashtuns, within Afghanistan and especially along the ungovernable border regions inside Pakistan. It could not be ruled out that the Taliban could be aiming to lead a break away of the Pakistani Pashtuns to form a 30 million strong greater Pashtun state, encompassing some 18 million Pakistani Pashtuns and 12 Afghan Pashtuns. Although the Pashtuns are more closely linked to tribal and clan loyalty, there exists a strong latent embryo of a Pashtun national consciousness and the idea of an independent Pashtunistan state has been raised regularly in the past with regard to the disputed territories common to Afghanistan and Pakistan. The area was cut in two by the “Durand Line”, a totally artificial border between created by British Imperialism in the 19th century. It has been a question bedevilling relations between the Afghanistan and Pakistan throughout their history, and with India before Partition. It has been an untreated, festering wound which has lead to sporadic wars and border clashes between the two countries and occasional upsurges in movements for Pashtun independence. In fact, is this what lies behind the current policy of appeasement President Musharraf of Pakistan towards the Pashtun tribes in along the Frontiers and his armistice with North Waziristan last year? Is he attempting to avoid further alienating Pashtun tribes there and head–off a potential separatist movement in Pakistan, which could develop from the Taliban’s offensive across the border in Afghanistan? Trying to subdue the frontier lands has proven costly and unpopular for Musharraf. In effect, he faces exactly the same problems as the US and Allies in Afghanistan or Iraq. Indeed, fighting Pashtun tribes has cost him double the number of troops as the US has lost in Iraq. Evidently, he could not win and has settled instead for an attempted political solution. When he agreed the policy of appeasement and virtual self-rule for North Waziristan last year, President Musharraf stated clearly that he is acting first and foremost to protect the interests of Pakistan. While there was outrageous in Kabul, his deal with the Pashtuns is essentially an effort to firewall his country against civil war and disintegration. In his own words, what he fears most is, the « Talibanistation » of the whole Pashtun people, which he warns could inflame the already fierce fundamentalist and other separatist movement across his entire country. He does not want to open the door for any backdraft from the Afghan war to engulf Pakistan. Musharraf faces the nationalist struggle in Kashmir, an insurgency in Balochistan, unrest in the Sindh, and growing terrorist bombings in the main cities. There is also a large Shiite population and clashes between Sunnis and Shias are regular. Moreover, fundamentalist support in his own Armed Forces and Intelligence Services is extremely strong. So much so that analyst consider it likely that the Army and Secret Service is protecting, not only top Taliban leaders, but Bin Laden and the Al Qaeda central leadership thought to be entrenched in the same Pakistani borderlands. For the same reasons, he has not captured or killed Bin Laden and the Al Qaeda leadership. Returning from the frontier provinces with Bin Laden’s severed head would be a trophy that would cost him his own head in Pakistan. At best he takes the occasional risk of giving a nod and a wink to a US incursion, but even then at the peril of the chagrin of the people and his own military and secret service. The Break-Up of Pakistan? Musharraf probably hopes that by giving de facto autonomy to the Taliban and Pashtun leaders now with a virtual free hand for cross border operations into Afghanistan, he will undercut any future upsurge in support for a break-away independent Pashtunistan state or a “Peoples’ War” of the Pashtun populace as a whole, as he himself described it. However events may prove him sorely wrong. Indeed, his policy could completely backfire upon him. As the war intensifies, he has no guarantees that the current autonomy may yet burgeon into a separatist movement. Appetite comes with eating, as they say. Moreover, should the Taliban fail to re-conquer al of Afghanistan, as looks likely, but captures at least half of the country, then a Taliban Pashtun caliphate could be established which would act as a magnet to separatist Pashtuns in Pakistan.

1NC Pashtun Net Benefit [2/2]

Then, the likely break up of Afghanistan along ethnic lines, could, indeed, lead the way to the break up of Pakistan, as well. Strong centrifugal forces have always bedevilled the stability and unity of Pakistan, and, in the context of the new world situation, the country could be faced with civil wars and popular fundamentalist uprisings, probably including a military-fundamentalist coup d’état. Fundamentalism is deeply rooted in Pakistan society. The fact that in the year following 9/11, the most popular name given to male children born that year was “Osama” (not a Pakistani name) is a small indication of the mood. Given the weakening base of the traditional, secular opposition parties, conditions would be ripe for a coup d’état by the fundamentalist wing of the Army and ISI, leaning on the radicalised masses to take power. Some form of radical, military Islamic regime, where legal powers would shift to Islamic courts and forms of shira law would be likely. Although, even then, this might not take place outside of a protracted crisis of upheaval and civil war conditions, mixing fundamentalist movements with nationalist uprisings and sectarian violence between the Sunni and minority Shia populations. The nightmare that is now Iraq would take on gothic proportions across the continent. The prophesy of an arc of civil war over Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq would spread to south Asia, stretching from Pakistan to Palestine, through Afghanistan into Iraq and up to the Mediterranean coast. Undoubtedly, this would also spill over into India both with regards to the Muslim community and Kashmir. Border clashes, terrorist attacks, sectarian pogroms and insurgency would break out. A new war, and possibly nuclear war, between Pakistan and India could no be ruled out. Atomic Al Qaeda Should Pakistan break down completely, a Taliban-style government with strong Al Qaeda influence is a real possibility. Such deep chaos would, of course, open a “Pandora's box” for the region and the world. With the possibility of unstable clerical and military fundamentalist elements being in control of the Pakistan nuclear arsenal, not only their use against India, but Israel becomes a possibility, as well as the acquisition of nuclear and other deadly weapons secrets by Al Qaeda. Invading Pakistan would not be an option for America. Therefore a nuclear war would now again become a real strategic possibility. This would bring a shift in the tectonic plates of global relations. It could usher in a new Cold War with China and Russia pitted against the US. What is at stake in “the half-forgotten war” in Afghanistan is far greater than that in Iraq. But America’s capacities for controlling the situation are extremely restricted. Might it be, in the end, they are also forced to accept President Musharraf's unspoken slogan of Better another Taliban Afghanistan, than a Taliban NUCLEAR Pakistan!

Extinction

Fai ‘01

Executive Director of the Washington-based Kashmiri American Council (Dr. Ghulam Nabi, “India Pakistan Summit and the Issue of Kashmir,” 7/8, Washington Times

The foreign policy of the United States in South Asia should move from the lackadaisical and distant (with India crowned with a unilateral veto power) to aggressive involvement at the vortex. The most dangerous place on the planet is Kashmir, a disputed territory convulsed and illegally occupied for more than 53 years and sandwiched between nuclear-capable India and Pakistan. It has ignited two wars between the estranged South Asian rivals in 1948 and 1965, and a third could trigger nuclear volleys and a nuclear winter threatening the entire globe. The United States would enjoy no sanctuary. This apocalyptic vision is no idiosyncratic view. The Director of Central Intelligence, the Department of Defense, and world experts generally place Kashmir at the peak of their nuclear worries. Both India and Pakistan are racing like thoroughbreds to bolster their nuclear arsenals and advanced delivery vehicles. Their defense budgets are climbing despite widespread misery amongst their populations. Neither country has initialed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, or indicated an inclination to ratify an impending Fissile Material/Cut-off Convention

1NC Terrorism Net Benefit

Negotiating with the Taliban is only way to solve terrorism

Rubin ‘09

Barnett R. Rubin, PhD Director of Studies and a Senior Fellow at New York University’s Center on International Cooperation and served as an adviser to the Special Representative of the Secretary General at the UN Talks on Afghanistan in Bonn in 2001, ‘Survival: Global Politics and Strategy,’ vol. 51, February–March 2009, pp. 83–96 “The Way Forward in Afghanistan: Three Views,” Section 1: End the War on Terror, <http://www.iiss.org/publications/survival/survival-2009/year-2009-issue-1/the-way-forward-in-afghanistan-three-views/>

The ‘war on terror’, which amalgamated all Islamist groups that used violence into a common threat, strengthened its primary target, al-Qaeda, by creating incentives for local groups treated as ‘terrorists’ to ally themselves with al-Qaeda. All handbooks of war, dating back at least to Sun Tzu, have recommended dividing the enemy. The ‘war on terror’ did the opposite. While counter-terrorism requires military and intelligence tools, only a drastic strategic reorientation can provide those with their required politi- cal complement. In the Afghan context, such a clear, public reorientation of counter-terrorism policies should lead the United States and its partners in Afghanistan to offer political negotiations to any Taliban and other insur- gents who are willing to separate themselves from al-Qaeda. Such a policy has been in effect formally for several years, but related policies on sanc- tions, detention and reintegration have not been restructured to reflect that stance. Political accommodation with groups that accept effective guaran- tees against the creation or protection of terrorist sanctuaries will require reciprocal US guarantees against detention or sanctions for any leader willing to enter into such an agreement. Thus far the United States has no mechanism to assure that such a guarantee is observed by the multitude of agencies involved in the counter-terrorism effort. The same shift in counter-terrorism policy should apply to Pakistan, though it will take a different form. The United States should support efforts by the elected government of Pakistan to separate Pakistani insurgents from al-Qaeda and other foreign fighters, in particular by supporting programmes to reform the status of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas to address the grievances and isolation of the population there. Separating Afghan or Pakistani Islamic insurgents from al-Qaeda would constitute a serious political setback for the latter that would damage its claims to legitimacy and its recruitment capacity in the Islamic world. Much of the diffuse international sympathy for al-Qaeda (now on the decline) derives from resistance to ‘occupations’ of Afghanistan and Iraq. Any political settlement with Afghan insurgents, especially the Taliban leadership, would deprive al-Qaeda of that claim.

Terrorism leads to extinction

Speice ‘06

Speice 06 JD Candidate @ College of William and Mary, Patrick F., Jr., “NEGLIGENCE AND NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION: ELIMINATING THE CURRENT LIABILITY BARRIER TO BILATERAL U.S.-RUSSIAN NONPROLIFERATION ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS,” William & Mary Law Review, February 2006, 47 Wm and Mary L. Rev. 1427

Accordingly, there is a significant and ever-present risk that terrorists could acquire a nuclear device or fissile material from Russia as a result of the confluence of Russian economic decline and the end of stringent Soviet-era nuclear security measures. 39 Terrorist groups could acquire a nuclear weapon by a number of methods, including "steal[ing] one intact from the stockpile of a country possessing such weapons, or ... [being] sold or given one by [\*1438] such a country, or [buying or stealing] one from another subnational group that had obtained it in one of these ways." 40 Equally threatening, however, is the risk that terrorists will steal or purchase fissile material and construct a nuclear device on their own. Very little material is necessary to construct a highly destructive nuclear weapon. 41 Although nuclear devices are extraordinarily complex, the technical barriers to constructing a workable weapon are not significant. 42 Moreover, the sheer number of methods that could be used to deliver a nuclear device into the United States makes it incredibly likely that terrorists could successfully employ a nuclear weapon once it was built. 43 Accordingly, supply-side controls that are aimed at preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear material in the first place are the most effective means of countering the risk of nuclear terrorism. 44 Moreover, the end of the Cold War eliminated the rationale for maintaining a large military-industrial complex in Russia, and the nuclear cities were closed. 45 This resulted in at least 35,000 nuclear scientists becoming unemployed in an economy that was collapsing. 46 Although the economy has stabilized somewhat, there [\*1439] are still at least 20,000 former scientists who are unemployed or underpaid and who are too young to retire, 47 raising the chilling prospect that these scientists will be tempted to sell their nuclear knowledge, or steal nuclear material to sell, to states or terrorist organizations with nuclear ambitions. 48 The potential consequences of the unchecked spread of nuclear knowledge and material to terrorist groups that seek to cause mass destruction in the United States are truly horrifying. A terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon would be devastating in terms of immediate human and economic losses. 49 Moreover, there would be immense political pressure in the United States to discover the perpetrators and retaliate with nuclear weapons, massively increasing the number of casualties and potentially triggering a full-scale nuclear conflict. 50 In addition to the threat posed by terrorists, leakage of nuclear knowledge and material from Russia will reduce the barriers that states with nuclear ambitions face and may trigger widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons. 51 This proliferation will increase the risk of nuclear attacks against the United States [\*1440] or its allies by hostile states, 52 as well as increase the likelihood that regional conflicts will draw in the United States and escalate to the use of nuclear weapons. 53

\*\*\*2NC STUFF\*\*\*

2NC Turns Case

Quick, unconditioned withdrawal fails – would empower the Taliban and increase threats to international security, turning case

Schröder ‘09

Gerhard, German politician, and was Chancellor of Germany, “The Way Forward in Afghanistan”, February 12, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,607205,00.html

What does this mean, in terms of consequences? It means that we cannot unilaterally withdraw from Afghanistan right away. This would represent an abdication of international responsibility and a turning away from the community of nations. This is because our involvement is subject to the resolutions of the United Nations. More than 50,000 soldiers from 41 countries, including many Muslims, are active in Afghanistan. For this reason, demands for an immediate withdrawal are irresponsible. Such a withdrawal would strengthen the Taliban and, in the worst case, give it control over the entire country. This would be a setback for Afghan society and it would represent a great threat to international security. Moreover, we should not forget the successes of recent years in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Eighty-five percent of the population now has access to health care, 6 million children are back in school and 2 million of them are girls. Roads, wells and sewage canals are being built. The people were able to freely elect their country's leaders. These are successes that serve as a basis for the further development of a free and sovereign Afghanistan. But we also know that development is not possible without peace. Civil development is the Taliban's greatest enemy, which is why it fights such progress. For this reason, military protection of development activities remains indispensible. But when women and men from Germany, working as soldiers, aid workers, police officers or diplomats are risking their lives and, unfortunately, sometimes losing them for the sake of peace and stability in Afghanistan, a critical interim assessment of this involvement, which has existed for more than seven years now, is certainly appropriate. And the question of how much longer this is supposed to last is also appropriate. I believe that the Bundeswehr's mission can be ended within 10 years. The goal of international involvement in Afghanistan is to place responsibility for the country into the hands of Afghans, but also to ensure that the country does not once again become a safe haven and training ground for international terrorism. At this time, these conditions for a withdrawal of international troops from Afghanistan are far from having been fulfilled. The security situation has deteriorated in the last three years. This has also affected the north of the country, where German troops are active. The resurgence of the Taliban is a consequence of the policies of the Bush administration, which seriously neglected developments in Afghanistan. At the 2002 NATO summit in Prague, I already warned that an Iraq campaign would result in the weakening of the international anti-terror coalition and that we would be distracted from the actual conflict with terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The difficult security situation in Afghanistan is a consequence of this mistaken approach. This dilemma is aggravated by the fact that in the regions where the Americans bear the principal responsibility, a disproportionately greater amount of weight is assigned to the military component than to civil reconstruction. In the north, on the other hand, the Bundeswehr is very well regarded by the local population because of its commitment to reconstruction. This is also reflected in a more stable security situation.

Taliban Say Yes

**Taliban Would break ties with Al Qaeda, they perceive it as in their best interest**

Shah ‘10

Jay Shah, Congressman and Researcher in Foreign Affairs, 2-10-10, “The Afghanistan Campaign Part 2: The Taliban Strategy” http://jayshah.net/archives/192

So, in addition to fighting the current military battle, there is a great deal of factional fighting and political maneuvering with other Afghan centers of power. At a bare minimum, the Taliban intend to ensure that they remain the single strongest power in the country, with not only the largest share of the pie in Kabul (the ability to dominate) but also a significant degree of power and autonomy within their core areas in the south and east of the country. But within the movement (which is [a very diffuse and complex set of entities](http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100212_border_playbill_militant_actors_afghanpakistani_frontier)), there is a great deal of debate about what objectives are reasonably achievable. Like the Shia in Iraq, who originally aspired to total dominance in the early days following the fall of the Baathist regime and have since moderated their goals, the Taliban have recognized that some degree of power sharing is necessary. The ultimate objective of the Taliban — resumption of power at the national level — is somewhat dependent on how events play out in the coming years. The objective of attaining the apex of power is not in dispute, but the best avenue — be it reconciliation or fighting it out until the United States begins to draw down — and how exactly that apex might be defined is still being debated. But there is an important caveat to the Taliban’s ambitions. Having held power in Kabul, they are wary of returning there in a way that would ultimately render them an international pariah state, as they were in the 1990s. When the Taliban first came to power, only Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates recognized the regime, and the group’s leadership became intimately familiar with the challenges of attempting to govern a country without wider international recognition. It was under this isolation that the Taliban allied with al Qaeda, which provided them with men, money and equipment. Now it is using al Qaeda again, this time not just as a force multiplier but, even more important, as a potential bargaining chip at the negotiating table. Mullah Omar, the Taliban’s central leader, wants to get off the international terrorist watch list, and there have been signals from various elements of the Taliban that the group is willing to abandon al Qaeda for the right price. This countervailing consideration also contributes to the Taliban’s objective — and particularly the means to achieving that objective — remaining in flux.

Taliban Say Yes

**Afghanistan Taliban would negotiate with the U.S. – 4 reasons**

**Naiman ‘10**

Robert Naiman, Policy Director and Foreign Policy, 6-12-10, “Could a ‘Great Negotiation’ End the War in Afghanistan” <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-naiman/could-a-great-negotiation_b_643147.html>, Accessed July 15, 2010

A commonly proffered argument against negotiations to end the war in Afghanistan has been: "why should the Afghan Taliban negotiate, when they think they are winning?" For many months, this argument was offered by administration officials to explain why they would not yet pursue serious negotiations with senior leaders of the Afghan Taliban. More recently, administration officials are saying that they have moved significantly. Newsweek [reports](http://www.newsweek.com/2010/07/04/the-afghan-endgame.html): “Washington is eager to make [peace negotiations with high-ranking insurgents] happen -- perhaps more eager than most Americans realize."There was a major policy shift that went completely unreported in the last three months," a senior administration official tells Newsweek..."We're going to support Afghan-led reconciliation [with the Taliban]." U.S. officials have quietly dropped the Bush administration's resistance to talks with senior Taliban and are doing whatever they can to help Karzai open talks with the insurgents, although they still say any Taliban willing to negotiate must renounce violence, reject Al Qaeda, and accept the Afghan Constitution. (Some observers predict that those preconditions may eventually be fudged into goals.)” The administration's shift -- if real -- is tremendously good news for ending the war. But even if this accurately reflects the intentions of the administration, the arguments made earlier against serious negotiations are still politically powerful, in part because the administration made them, and will likely be thrown back in the administration's face by some of its Republican critics if efforts at a negotiated settlement begin to bear fruit. Therefore, these arguments still need to be countered, even if the administration is no longer making them. To the claim that the Afghan Taliban has no reason to negotiate because they believe they are winning, there are several straightforward answers: 1) not every negotiation that ends a war follows a military defeat by one side over the other; 2) politicians close to the Afghan Taliban have been saying for months that a political settlement is possible if the U.S. is seriously interested; 3) waiting to open negotiations until some hoped-for military position is achieved is likely to lead nowhere: as one Western diplomat [told](http://www.newsweek.com/2010/07/04/the-afghan-endgame.html) Newsweek, "Waiting for the perfect security situation is like having a baby ... There's never a right time"; and 4) the primary responsibility of Americans, if we want to end the war, is to ensure that our government is doing all it can to bring about a negotiated end to the war, not to handicap the stance towards negotiations of other actors. Regarding the first point -- not every negotiation that ends a war follows a military defeat -- a key obstacle to moving the debate forward in the U.S. is that most Americans don't know much diplomatic history. We learn in school that American and French forces won a decisive military victory over the British at Yorktown in 1781 that essentially ended the war -- but how did it come to be that half of the forces assembled against the British at Yorktown were French? That's part of the diplomatic history that we don't spend much time studying in school. This ignorance makes us vulnerable to facile slogans that assume the all-conquering efficacy of military force and dismiss the possible efficacy of alternatives. For the neocons in both parties, all you need to need to know about the diplomatic history of the world since Adam and Eve were expelled from the Garden is that diplomatic efforts to avert the Second World War failed in Munich in 1938. For the neocons, every argument is a noun, a verb, and Neville Chamberlain.

Taliban Say Yes

Taliban are willing to negotiate

Giustozzi ‘10

Antonio Giustozzi, a research fellow at the Crisis States Research Centre, “Negotiating with the Taliban issues and Prospects,” London School of Economics and author or editor of several articles and papers on Afghanistan, as well as of three books, a century Foundation report, www.tcf.org/publications/internationalaffairs/Giustozzi.pdf

As mentioned already, the recent divergences among Taliban leadership over the pace and substance of possible negotiations with ISAF and Kabul might be at the source of the Taliban internal crisis of February 2010. While it seems obvious that the minority of Afghan Taliban more closely linked to al Qaeda and other international jihadist groups would oppose a political settlement, after the death of Mullah Dadullah in 2007, this component of the movement has been quite marginal inside Afghanistan; the series of defeats and the loss of several of its more prominent leaders have also weakened the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which had in a sense taken the leadership of the radical wing of the Taliban. Although information concerning the attitude of the rest of the Taliban is scant, their positioning during 2009 seemed to indicate at least some interest in negotiations: consultations with elders and mullahs in the refugee camps of Pakistan, attempts to improve the image of the Taliban, particularly in terms of concerns for the plight of civilians caught in the crossfire, and so on. The unofficial Taliban “representatives” in Kabul, formally reconciled with the Kabul government, but believed to remain in con- tact with their old colleagues, claim that the Taliban would negotiate subject to some key conditions being met.24

Current US policy sets the scene for effective negotiations

Barakat and Zyck ‘09

Sultan Barakat and Steven Zyck. Sultan Barakat, Professor of Politics and Director, Post-war Reconstruction & Development Unit, Department of Politics at the University of York, and Steven Zyck, a Research Fellow there. Mar 3, 2010, “Afghanistan’s Insurgency and the Viability of a Political Settlement,” www.uspolicy.be/issues/afghanistan/afghanistan2.asp

Providing such legitimacy remains politically difficult both within an Afghan government that includes many of the Taliban’s former enemies and within a U.S.-led coalition that, until recently, clung to a policy of non-negotiation. Even considering such an option will require, as Neumann suggested in his confidential message of 1971, accepting “nothing as granted, as too holy or sanctified by contemporary or past doctrine to be unchallenged”.46 Yet, the feasibility of pursuing a negotiated political settlement with the Taliban is aided by the basic fact that many of the current American and international priorities will be critical in “softening up the ground” for power-sharing discussions and discouraging the Taliban’s belief, as reflected by Adam Roberts, that “they are in a position of strength.

Taliban Say Yes

The Taliban would accept incorporation into the government

Barakat and Zyck ‘09

Sultan Barakat and Steven Zyck. Sultan Barakat, Professor of Politics and Director, Post-war Reconstruction & Development Unit, Department of Politics at the University of York, and Steven Zyck, a Research Fellow there. Mar 3, 2010, “Afghanistan’s Insurgency and the Viability of a Political Settlement,” www.uspolicy.be/issues/afghanistan/afghanistan2.asp

Finally, and least discussed, many Taliban, including those at the higher echelons, initially viewed a resurgence of violence as a means of gaining admission to the government after the Bonn Agreement had excluded their formal participation. According to former Taliban members, when the government’s or international community’s anticipated ges- tures of goodwill failed to materialize and the insurgency gained momentum, the hopes for a collaborative co-existence subsided.44 The Taliban and its associates started to adopt a secondary strategy to carve out substantial portions of land beyond the control of the government. Despite the success of this approach, with 10 to 30 percent of Afghanistan under the control of insurgent groups and less than a third effectively “held” by the state, Taliban experts maintain that offers of power-sharing remain a high priority for Mullah Omar, Hekmatyar, and others.45 While the insurgency may be capable of re-creating an “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan,” as the country was known by the Taliban, this goal would likely come far into the future and at great cost. In the process, the Taliban and its affiliates would lose substantial numbers of fighters and commanders and once again be- come internationally marginalized; the Taliban’s security would constantly be under threat from the United States (among others), and the insurgents’ presently growing popularity would be squandered through the brutality necessary for pacifying ethnic minorities and its numerous ethnic Pashtun opponents. As a result, the insurgency would prefer only one thing more than contested, partial rule—the legitimacy provided by incorporation into the Afghan state. This factor, more than any other, suggests that a conditions negotiated political settlement is, under the right, possible.

A2: Perm – Generic (Theory)

1. Perm severs
	1. Resolved – it means the aff must unconditionally withdraw troops from Afghanistan – they must be resolved that the plan should be done no matter what - that’s Random House.
	2. Timeframe – Resolved also means the plan must take place immediately. That’s Department of Developmental and Environmental Services. The counterplan waits to withdraw until Afghanistan meets certain requirements. Immediate implementation is best – otherwise, affs can just reclarify that their plan happens after the uniqueness to our disads passes.
	3. Resolutional competition is best – It’s the basis for all our neg research, and even if we lose this they’re still in a double-bind – either they sever “resolved”, or their plan isn’t resolved and they’re not topical, which is an independent voting issue for fairness – they’ve conceded our definitions and standards.
	4. Voter – Severance allows the aff to dodge all our links for disads and counterplans
2. We don’t need to win that they guarantee enforcement for the CP to be competitive – the CP tests the opportunity cost of unconditional Afghanistan withdrawal
3. Functional competition is best –
	1. Forces better policy-making skills – Functional competition forces better policy making because the aff has to be able to explain how policies could actually work together instead of only combining words
	2. More real world – Congressional bills are thousands of pages, so it’s better to debate how functionally competitive the CP is

A2: Perm – Generic

Mutual exclusivity – the plan and CP are incompatible

CNN ‘09

“Lawmakers question 2011 Afghan exit plan”, December 3, http://edition.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/12/02/obama.afghanistan

Announcing a firm date for starting an American withdrawal while also saying such a withdrawal depends on conditions in Afghanistan "are two incompatible statements**,"** said Sen. John McCain of Arizona, the Senate Armed Services Committee's ranking Republican. "You either have a winning strategy ... and then once it's succeeded, then we withdraw or, as the president said, we will have a date [for] beginning withdrawal in July 2011. Which is it? It's got to be one or the other. It's got to be the appropriate conditions, or it's got to be an arbitrary date. You can't have both."

A2: Perm: Condition Other Things – Time is Now

U.S. should leave Afghanistan if Al Qaeda would pledge to the Afghanistan constitution and leave Al Qaeda. The time to do it is now

Rafiq ‘10

Arif Rafiq is president of Vizier Consulting, LLC, which provides strategic guidance on Middle East and South Asian political and security issues, 7-8-10, July 8, 2010, p. Lexis

Nearly six months into the United States surge in Afghanistan and six months prior to the White House's review of the Afghan war strategy, it's clear our mission in Afghanistan is not only failing, but beyond repair.

Only a political solution can bring lasting peace to Afghanistan and extract the US from this messy conflict. And given Washington's bleak military predicament, it must begin to give precedence to a political reconciliation process with the senior Taliban leadership now, rather than next year. The surge's goal is to blunt the Taliban's advance within a year's time and force it to negotiate from a position of weakness. But the Taliban, rather than weakened, is ascendant and will probably remain so. A recent US Defense Department assessment indicates that most of Afghanistan's key 121 districts are neutral or sympathetic toward the Taliban, or even staunchly support it. Meanwhile, the Taliban has stymied efforts to establish the Afghan government's writ in the restive south - the Taliban heartland and the war's center of gravity. The so called government in a box, or quickly-installable local government, has come to the southern provinces of Helmand and Kandahar - but that box is a coffin. The Taliban has assassinated local government officials essential to efforts to win over the locals by improving their quality of life. Insurgents have returned to the town of Marja after the offensive there this spring. And operations in the neighboring Kandahar Province, originally scheduled for this month, have been delayed at least until early autumn, due to the Marja operation's failure. The status quo - a violent, fractured Afghanistan that is occupied by foreign troops and led by a corrupt, incompetent, and legitimacy-lacking government - benefits the Taliban, who as sons of the soil, can remain in a state of war perhaps indefinitely. But the United States cannot afford to sink deeper into the Afghan quicksand. The war in Afghanistan currently costs American taxpayers between $100 million and $200 million annually. A prolonged, ambitious engagement of up to 10 more years - advocated by some conservatives - could cost the US over a trillion dollars. Fortunately, there is a nascent peace process led by the Afghan and Pakistani governments that Washington can capitalize on. Both Afghan President Hamid Karzai and the Pakistani Army are engaged in outreach to the three major Afghan insurgent parties: the Mullah Omar-led Taliban, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-i Islami, and the network of Jalaluddin and Sirajuddin Haqqani. This initiative is Washington's ticket for a safe and honorable exit from Afghanistan. Washington should let Mr. Karzai and the Pakistan Army take the lead in forging a lasting Afghan peace. Indeed, the military-intelligence establishment of Pakistan is the only entity that has the leverage to bring the Taliban to the table. While the extent of the Pakistani military's support for the Taliban is unclear, it has senior Taliban figures in its custody and the Taliban is dependent on Pakistani havens to wage its fight in Afghanistan. As a result, the Pakistani military is equipped with powerful levers to push the Taliban toward talks. Washington can do its part by coaxing non-Pashtuns, who are reluctant to make peace with the Taliban, into the peace process, and ensure that a political settlement to the Afghan war includes all its major power factions. President Obama announced the start date for a US withdrawal, but it was very vague. There is no complete schedule. Peace with the Taliban would probably require a phased departure of Western troops on a fixed timetable that explicitly states the date for a final withdrawal of coalition forces. The vacuum left by departing Western troops could be filled by peacekeepers from nonneighboring Muslim states, such as Jordan and Turkey. In exchange, the Taliban should pledge to abide by an Afghanistan constitution and end all cooperation with Al Qaeda, which is on its last throes in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. The terms of a peace deal can be finalized in a loya jirga, or grand council, consisting of all Afghan ethnic and religious factions. Though a political settlement with the Taliban will undoubtedly require compromise on legal and social matters, these concessions need not set back Afghan women in the long term. While the Taliban might push for an end to coeducation in Afghanistan's south, there is no Islamic basis for them to oppose girls-only schools. Gulf Arab states that have done their fair share to promote radicalism in Afghanistan should recompense by funding primary and secondary girls schools, putting Afghanistan on a path toward universal education. Within a generation's time, the world can witness an Afghanistan fully healed from the 30 years of strife. But healing Afghanistan requires a political, not a military, solution. And Washington's consent to bring about that solution must come now, before it sinks deeper into an unwinnable war.

A2: Perm: Condition Other Things – Time is Now

Now is key – the Taliban are vulnerable

Evan ‘10

Tom Evan, CNN, 2-2-10, “Experts: Time Ripe for Taliban talks,” http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/02/01/afghanistan.taliban/index.html

The Taliban may have reached the peak of their military achievements in the war in Afghanistan, one of the world's top authorities on the Taliban said. And that position of relative strength might make them more amenable to talks, Pakistani journalist and author Ahmed Rashid said in an interview Monday with CNN's Christiane Amanpour. "They can't go much further than where they are now," Rashid said. "They're across the country. They're having shadow governors and shadow government in all the major provinces, but they can't take the cities because of NATO firepower. They can't create a populist movement against the Americans. They tried and failed to do that." "So in a way," Rashid added, "the Taliban are in a very strong position, which actually might make them more amenable for talks right now." His comments came as [Afghan](http://topics.cnn.com/topics/Afghanistan) President [Hamid Karzai](http://topics.cnn.com/topics/Hamid_Karzai) stepped up his efforts to reconcile with [Taliban](http://topics.cnn.com/topics/The_Taliban) fighters and reintegrate them with Afghan society. In Kabul on Sunday, Karzai said, "The Taliban are welcome to return to their own country and work for peace in order for us to be able then to have the U.S. and other forces have the freedom to go back home." Karzai was renewing an appeal he made at the London Conference on Afghanistan last week. At the conference, Afghanistan and world powers agreed to establish a $500 million "pay-for-peace" fund to try to convince rank-and-file Taliban members to give up the fight, even as the U.S. and its allies send more than 30,000 additional troops to the country -- the so-called "surge." Georgetown University's Christine Fair, who has analyzed Taliban suicide attacks in Afghanistan for the U.N., agreed with Rashid's assessment and said now is the time to offer them an opportunity for reconciliation. "The surge is really focusing on controlling major urban populations, so from the point of view of the Taliban this I going to be an ideal time for them to try to reach some deal," she said. "And to be very clear, I support reconciliation. My concern is that the reintegration plan doesn't go far enough." She said that to be successful, reintegration requires more than just financial incentives. "You also need political incentives to bring them into the picture," she added. Alex Thier, director for Afghanistan and Pakistan at the U.S. Institute of Peace, was more cautious about the possibility of convincing the Taliban to strike some kind of deal with the Karzai government. "They are not particularly amenable to compromise. So while I agree that the Taliban in some ways may be reaching the height of their power, I'm not sure that they know that," he said. "They've demonstrated repeatedly that they are willing to press ahead in the face of uncertainty and danger, as they did during the civil war when it was far from clear that they would achieve what they did," he added. "And of course, after September 11, they were in some ways offered to keep Afghanistan if they turned over Bin Laden, and they refused to, and lost it all." There are also concerns among Afghanistan's ethnic minorities about doing any kind of deal with the Taliban, Thier said, adding. "They (ethnic minorities) certainly have the power to end that prospect." Fair emphasized the importance of making the peace effort an Afghan process. "What the United States should actually do is really be thinking about Plan B," she said. "What are our interests in Afghanistan? Should we be looking for ways to protect ourselves against al Qaeda? Should we be looking at the possibility that Pakistan becomes the locus of our security interests?" Fair said that in her opinion, at some point the Taliban will return to Kabul, so it's important for the U.S. to be thinking about its national interest in light of that potential reality.

A2: Ethnic Conflicts

Inter-ethnic cooperation will be key to long-term stability

Rais ‘99

Rasul Bakhsh Rais, “Conflict in Afghanistan: Ethnicity, Religion and Neighbours,” Ethnic Studies Report, Vol. XVII, No. 1, January 1999, Rasul Bakhsh Rais is Director of the Area Study Centre for Africa, North and South America, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan

All those who are involved in negotiating peace among the Afghan factions have realised how difficult it is to achieve it. The situation in Afghanistan is too complex to lead to any simple or easy solution. The large number and diversity of Afghan groups, the interference of regional states, the apathy of the major powers, the resurgence of ethnic and religious forces are just a few elements that make Afghanistan’s civil war one of the most resistant to resolution. During the past ten years, the groups involved in the power struggle in the country have not given up war as an instrument of their policy. This is probably true of all civil wars and Afghanistan cannot be an exception. But the Afghans have yet to count the millions of people who have been killed or died in conditions of civil war, assess the cost of damage to the infrastructure and realise the dangers that starkly stare into their faces. The responsibility to restore peace in the country lies primarily with the Afghan groups. An understanding on broader issues like the structure of the state, distribution of power, and form of government would be central to laying down the foundations of a stable government. It is tragic that all Afghan factions start with the demand for an adequate share of power and leave the central issues out of the debate. Prospects for peace will remain bleak until the Afghan parties in the conflict evolve a common framework for reordering the Afghan polity. Following that, the role of the external powers may weaken and the civil war may consequently lose much of its venom.

Non-Unique – Colonial age borders cause ethnic conflict

Mahmud ‘10

Tayyab Mahmud, Professor of Law and Director, "COLONIAL CARTOGRAPHIES AND POSTCOLONIAL BORDERS: THE UNENDING WAR IN AND AROUND AFGHANISTAN", Center for Global Justice at the University of Seattle, in the Brooklyn Journal of International Law, 2010

Across the global South, colonial demarcations of zones of control and influence left in their wake political units lacking correspondence between their territorial frame and the cohesion of culture and political identity. The colonial demarcations, with little regard for the history, culture, or geography of the region, often split cultural units or placed divergent cultural identities within a common boundary. As a consequence, the crisis of the postcolonial state stems from its artificial boundaries and “the specter of the colonial … [still] haunts the postcolonial nation,” and the “retrospective illusion” of nationalism remains “suspended forever in the space between the ex-colony and not-yet-nation.” Decolonization movements and postcolonial states adopted and retained the construct of a territorially bound “nation-state” even as they attempted to imagine the “nation” at variance from its European iterations. Imprisonment in inherited colonial territorial cartographies, postcolonial formations inverted this grammar to produce state-nations. Building of state-nations procreates the problem of minorities, ethnicities, ethno-nationalism, separatism, and sub-state nationalism. “[T]he nation dreads dissent” and “the nation-state’s limits implicate its geographic peripheries as central to its self-fashioning.” In the process a co-constitutive role of “nation” and ethnicity develops as a “productive and dialectical dyad.” It is by the construction of ethnicity as a “problem” that the “nation” becomes the resolution and the state incarnates itself as the authoritative problem solver. In this way often “the very micropolitics of producing the nation are responsible for its unmaking or unraveling.” Incessant rhetoric of endangerment and discursive production of threats to the nation render “nation-building” a coercive enterprise and facilitate the overdevelopment of the coercive apparatuses of the state. While inherited boundaries represent the postcolonial state-nation’s “geo-body,” cultural and ethnic heterogeneity within induces “geo-piety.” It is no surprise, then, that most postcolonial states have as their raison d’etre the production, maintenance, and reproduction of the discourses and apparatuses of national security.

A2: Women Oppression

The U.S. will make sure peace in Afghanistan won’t come at the peace of Women

AP ‘10

AP, 7-20-10, “Clinton Tells Afghan Women they will not be forgotten amid Peace Efforts” http://www.680news.com/news/world/article/79328--clinton-tells-afghan-women-they-will-not-be-forgotten-amid-peace-efforts

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton on Tuesday assured Afghan women that they will not be forgotten amid fears that peace efforts and a scaled-down foreign troop presence will bring Islamist extremists into the government. Clinton and European Union foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton told Afghan women leaders in Kabul that the West will not allow Afghanistan to return to the days of Taliban rule, when women's rights and issues were severely restricted and ignored. "We understand why you have these concerns," Clinton told a group of about 15 women's rights activists ahead of an international conference on Afghanistan's future, at which Afghan leaders are to outline their plans to reintegrate militants into society. "This is a personal commitment of mine. I don't want anyone to be under any mistaken impression." Peace in Afghanistan "can't come at the cost of women and women's lives," she said. Ashton echoed that sentiment on behalf of the E.U. "We're not going away," she said. "We are going to support you." The prospect of a Taliban role in government has alarmed many Afghan women, especially as President Barack Obama has declared his intention to begin withdrawing U.S. troops from the country next summer amid growing unease in America about the course of the war. Fouzia Kofi, a former Afghan legislator, told Clinton and Ashton she understood it was difficult to convince Westerners of the importance of the issue given deepening fears of a "never-ending war." "They need to realize that peace here with the Taliban and bringing Taliban on board with a compromise of basic human rights and women's rights means taking this country back hundreds of years," Kofi said.

\*\*\*AFF ANSWERS\*\*\*

Aff – Taliban Say No

The Taliban won’t negotiate until the troops have already left

International security and Research Center ‘10

TURKEY BAHÇEŞEHİR UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND STRATEGIC RESEARCHES CENTER, “AF PAK: TEST OF THE NEW *PARADIGM,”* APRIL – MAY 2010]

Particularly, after the re-election of Hamid Karzai as President, he used a new rhetoric which invited the Taliban, at nearly all levels, to negotiations. In November 2009, after the announcement of final election results, Karzai has concentrated his efforts and calls to Taliban leadership for reconciliation by addressing the insurgents “Taliban brothers”. It seems that in the new era of Karzai administration, reconciliation and reintegration efforts are going to hold an important part of Kabul’s agenda as well as US–UK led coalition’s efforts. However, the process is fundamentally debatable. 7Maybe the most critical question is whether the Taliban leadership could be persuaded to participate in negotiations, or not. Hamid Karzai has announced many times that he was ready to talk even Mullah Mohammad Omar, the leader of “the core” Taliban. It is clear that re-integration of those “Taliban brothers” would not be welcomed unless they renounce violence and connection with Al Qaeda. Furthermore, the Afghan President also calls the US forces to negotiate with Taliban leadership. The US officials, however, indicate that it is hard to expect Taliban leadership to negotiate under current circumstances. Taliban’s core leadership, Quetta Shura, has answered the government in a negative manner, and clearly rejected the Karzai’s offers to talk. The primary condition in the Taliban core’s rhetoric is the withdrawal of all foreign forces immediately, which is out of option for now. Additionally, the corruption in the current Karzai government is another aspect of the Taliban’s statements. As an attention getting fact, almost all the calls and announcements of Kabul or even rumors about the reconciliation efforts, which indicate that negotiation is possible, were followed by a Taliban attack in high populated areas or the government buildings are targeted. Though it is not clear to whether there is a correlation between the announcements and incidents, even the hypothesis of Taliban’s systematic reprisal seems threatening. Observing by a rhetoric–analyzing approach, it can be seen that announcements which were held by Taliban spokesmen generally include the rejection of current government’s legitimacy by pointing the corruption. Also they have been opposing troop surge, emphasizing that the surge will harden the ambiance for negotiation. High ranking NATO and US officials have been indicating that the Taliban leadership’s reintegration to the system is almost impossible, at least for now, but may be achievable for mid or low-level Taliban fighters, some commanders and tribes. The reintegration approach is mainly targeting the elements which are on Taliban’s side for socio–economic reasons.

Aff – Taliban Say No

Multiple warrants Taliban won’t cooperate

Rubin ‘09

‘Survival: Global Politics and Strategy,’ vol. 51, February–March 2009, pp. 83–96 “The Way Forward in Afghanistan: Three Views,” Section 1: End the War on Terror, by Barnett R. Rubin, PhD Director of Studies and a Senior Fellow at New York University’s Center on International Cooperation and served as an adviser to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General at the UN Talks on Afghanistan in Bonn in 2001., acc. 20//07/10

This is what the US and Afghan governments should mean when they state that negotiating partners must accept the Afghan constitution. This should not mean passage of an ideological test requiring agreement with every article but recognition of the sovereignty of the government established by the constitution. Many issues dealt with (often ambiguously) by the constitution will remain contentious for a long time, and not only to insurgents. Insurgents who lay down arms will have the same rights as other Afghans to disagree with and seek to change the constitution through peaceful means. Such a declaratory policy is already in effect, but no one takes it seriously, since the existing policies on deten- tion and sanctions send the other message. Taliban and al-Qaeda are detained together in Guantanamo and sanctioned together by the UN Security Council. Closing Guantanamo is a first step. Afghan and Pakistani detainees (except for those closely linked to the al-Qaeda leadership, a category which includes no Afghans) should be transferred to national custody or released. The international community will have to fund generous reintegration packages in both countries.

Negotiations with the Taliban fail

Saikal ‘09

‘Survival: Global Politics and Strategy,’ vol. 51, February–March 2009, pp. 83–96 “The Way Forward in Afghanistan: Three Views,” Section 2: “What Future for Afghanistan?,” by Amin Saikal is Professor of Political Science and Director of the Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies at the Australian National University, and author of Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival acc. 20 July 2010

Afghanistan is in the grip of long-term, violent, structural disorder and insecurity. Senior NATO political and military figures have voiced strong scepticism about winning against the Taliban and their supporters, and have intimated that the United States and its allies should focus more on generating the necessary conditions for security than on democracy. Some have supported Afghan President Hamid Karzai in his efforts to negotiate with the Taliban to produce a viable settlement. The Karzai government and its international backers are not as yet in a position to bargain for such a settlement. They must first not only impress upon the Taliban that the insurgency cannot succeed militarily, but also address the political and strategic vacuum their own failures created and the Taliban have exploited.

AFF – Taliban Say No

Taliban won’t negotiate

Bowman and Dale ‘09

“War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Operations, and Issues for Congress,” by Steve Bowman, Specialist in National Security and Catherine Dale, Specialist in International Security December 3, 2009, report for Congress

For its part, the Taliban has reportedly named conditions that must be met before it would agree to enter any direct talks. These include the withdrawal of all international forces from Afghanistan, immunity of Taliban leaders from targeting by the ANSF, and the ability to retain their weapons. According to U.S. senior officials, such demands would contradict GIRoA principles—for example, that all Afghan citizens must renounce violence and accept the Constitution—and U.S. government views.185 One further challenge, according to many practitioners and observers, is that despite suffering some tactical-level set-backs, the Taliban leadership appears to feel confident, free to approach any talks from a position of strength. One senior UK official stressed that if negotiations took place today, the Taliban would make unrealistic demands, and he estimated that we are “many months if not years from the end game.” He added, “there’s no ‘quick fix’ through reconciliation.”186 Some ISAF officials add that Taliban leaders may be under some pressure from al Qaeda not to participate in negotiations.187

Aff – Taliban Say No

Negotiations will fail without first stabilizing Pakistan

Barakat and Zyck ‘09

“Afghanistan’s Insurgency and the Viability of a Political Settlement,” by Sultan Barakat and Steven Zyck. Sultan Barakat, Professor of Politics and Director, Post-war Reconstruction & Development Unit, Department of Politics at the University of York, and Steven Zyck, a Research Fellow there. 6 June 2009.

Finally, regardless of all improvements made within Afghanistan, conditions will not be ripe for the beginnings of a negotiated settlement until the Pakistani sanctuary for insurgents targeting Afghanistan is largely or totally removed from the equation. Political settlements involving Pakistani tribes or armed elements, which have swapped direct political control and military presence in exchange for guarantees not to challenge the Pakistani government, have historically served as pretext for the expansion of Pakistani insurgent activities.62 The collapse, in May 2009, of the Pakistani government’s deal with Taliban elements in the Swat Valley seem likely to have poisoned the hopes for future such deals and President Asif Ali Zardari’s credibility with populations in the border provinces.63 Yet, despite the Pakistani military’s recent efforts, it appears that armed confrontation will be protracted and enhance recruitment efforts among the Pakistani Taliban, Lashkar-e Taiba, and others. While accompanying development financing is intended to counter insurgent recruitment, it seems unlikely that, in Pakistan’s more ideologically oriented and strategic conflict, agricultural assistance will provide symbolism nearly on par with that of large-scale military operations. Equally troubling, the displacement of several hundred thousand people from the border provinces due to ongoing fighting is likely to facilitate the geographical expansion of Islamist activities in the country beyond the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), NWFP, Waziristan, and Baluchistan. Furthermore, the encampment of displaced persons within Pakistan may result in increased radicalization and the creation of economic, psycho- social, and geographical conditions ideal for insurgent recruitment. The primary benefit of the current militarized strategy is the distraction of Pakistani insurgent groups from the conflict in Afghanistan. While too early to tell, one can expect this diversion to prevent the level of violence from reaching a tipping point (if not necessarily recede) in Afghanistan, thus buying greater (although still insufficient) time to implement the aforementioned improvements in governance, police reform, community self-defense, and economic growth. That said, Pakistan must be stabilized—rather than set aflame—in order to ensure lasting security benefits for Afghanistan and the region as a whole. The ISI remains overly and inappropriately involved with the insurgents, and Pakistani generals have reported their troops’ distaste for firing on their own countrymen.64 Greater political autonomy, the predictable outcome of past negotiations, will only enable insurgents and Al Qaeda to expand their presence in the “Pakistani sanctuary.” As a result of the inadequacy of the previously attempted alternatives, the only remaining solution appears to involve a combination of increased governmental and military presence combined with inducements such as highly decentralized governance, allowance for Sharia law, and a deluge of Pakistani government and international development assistance. As in Afghanistan, a targeted focus on former fighters, starting with amnesty for past activities and concluding with extensive in-kind livelihood support, and other populations vulnerable to mobilization or insurgent recruitment, particularly young and unemployed men, will be critical.

Aff – Ethnic/Civil War

Handing over Afghanistan to the Taliban, creates an ethnic and civil war

Chicago Press Release ‘10

Chicago Press Release, 7-19-10, “Taliban Talks: the obstacles to a peace deal in Afghanistan,” <http://chicagopressrelease.com/news/taliban-talks-the-obstacles-to-a-peace-deal-in> afghanistan?utm\_source=feedburner&utm\_medium=feed&utm\_campaign=Feed%3A+windycitynews+(News+%C2%BB+Chicago+Press+Release+Services

Negotiated settlement: No wonder then that most people’s thoughts, including Barack Obama’s administration, are turning to some sort of negotiated settlement with the insurgents. It is now part of the conventional wisdom in Kabul that the west will have to make compromises with insurgents that once would have been unthinkable, including dropping efforts for women to be given a more equal place in Afghan society. Few people put it quite as bluntly as Francesc Vendrell, a retired senior diplomat who served first the UN in Afghanistan before 2001 and then worked as the top representative of the European Union in Kabul. He recently told the Guardian that the current military effort to push the Taliban out of Kandahar and Helmand was particularly foolish because these are precisely the areas that, in his view, will have to be handed over to Taliban control. Such a handover of the south could be achieved, he argued, through constitutional reform that would decentralise power from Kabul. In a trice, the south would be ceded to Taliban control, under the pretence of local democracy. Meanwhile, the north would similarly be handed back to the old warlords, the former strongmen who rose to prominence during the 1980s resistance to the Soviet occupation and its violent aftermath. But deal-making with the insurgents is fraught with danger. Hamid Karzai’s so far fairly limited appeals to the Taliban, not least during his “peace jirga” in June, have lost the Afghan president the support of some of the few political powerbrokers who backed him that are not from the Pashtun ethnic group, from which the Taliban draws most of its support. Haroun Mir, a political analyst and parliamentary candidate with close links to the largely non-Pashtun Northern Alliance that fought against the Taliban, predicted civil war as the ultimate consequence of peace deal with the Taliban. He said: “The moment the south is abandoned to the Taliban, you will see the north rearming. Any change that sees the Taliban entering government and you will create a full ethnic war.” Put most simply, the risk to the Americans is that they may win over the south, but lose the north. And it is not clear how the Americans will talk to the Taliban. European diplomats say that whatever the latest thinking in the White House might be, David Petraeus, the new US commander of Nato forces in Afghanistan seems interested in making the fight against the Taliban last as long as possible. After years of refusing to contemplate even the most secret of discussions with a movement viewed as partly responsible for the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the Americans have precious few ways of reaching out to the other side. A security official who has in the past been involved in efforts to reach out to the Taliban bemoaned the fact that so many years had been wasted, pointing out that in Northern Ireland the British government had contacts “from the beginning”. Instead of a well-organised effort to talk to the Taliban, there is currently an extraordinary free-for-all, with a whole range of people and countries trying to make contacts with the quetta shura, the Taliban’s leadership council. They include Karzai’s elder brother Qayoum, and even Burhanuddin Rabbani, a northern power broker and former president. Countries interested in getting in on the act are the UK, Germany, Turkey and Indonesia. While Saudi Arabia is often cited as potential interlocutor because of that country’s status as the guardian of the Islam’s holiest places, and because of previous involvement in Afghanistan, diplomats say the Saudis are holding back after “getting their fingers burned once before”, according to one diplomat. With everyone keeping their cards close to their chests, it is not clear whether any country or individual has had any success in talking to anyone of consequence. Mark Sedwill, Nato’s ambassador in Kabul, said that Karzai has had little success in forging strong channels of communication. “There are channels of communication with various people, but it is very hard for the Afghans to know how close those people are to the inner circle,” he said. Obama’s announcement that US troops will start withdrawing next July has been ruthlessly exploited by Taliban propagandists to convey the impression they are on the road to victory. This has helped deter them from negotiating a peace deal now, said Michael Semple, a former deputy of the European Union political mission and regional analyst. “The Taliban’s dominant perspective is to ride it out for another year. They think ‘one more push and we’ll get them out’.” Insurgent groups are already positioning themselves for the post-conflict power grab, he said. “Perversely, now that the Americans have signalled they are leaving, there’s an incentive for the Taliban to keep fighting so they can show they were the ones who pushed them out,” he said. The British description of a commitment to leave by 2015 “plays better to the Afghan audience”, he added. “That’s a more Afghan-style timetable.” For Nato to reverse insurgent thinking it needs to “credibly clarify its plans for the period between 2011 and 2015″. For the time being the Taliban are sticking to their negotiating position that talks will not begin until foreign forces leave Afghanistan.

**Aff – Coalition Government Fails**

Taliban would take over the government and undermine democratic system and is the reason we are there in the first place.

Bezhan ‘10

Fred Bezhan, Freelance Writer, 7-23-10, “Reconciliation Plan Unlikely to bring Peace,” p. Lexis

Negotiating with the Taliban won't work THE landmark international conference in Kabul, attended by 40 foreign ministers and international delegates from more than 70 countries, ended on Tuesday with the official endorsement of Afghan [President Hamid Karzai's](http://www.lexisnexis.com:80/us/lnacademic/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T9796466220&returnToId=20_T9796466252&csi=244777&A=0.2729914959835599&sourceCSI=9369&indexTerm=%23PE0009ZSN%23&searchTerm=President%20Hamid%20Karzai's%20&indexType=P) President Hamid Karzai's  -Search using: [Biographies Plus News](http://www.lexisnexis.com:80/us/lnacademic/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T9796466220&returnToId=20_T9796466252&csi=244777&A=0.2729914959835599&sourceCSI=9369&indexTerm=%23PE0009ZSN%23&searchTerm=President%20Hamid%20Karzai's%20&indexType=P) News, Most Recent 60 Daysreconciliation program with armed insurgent groups, including the Taliban. Karzai presented the Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program, an ambitious effort that aims to reintegrate up to 36,000 forme Taliban fighters into mainstream Afghan society. In it, low-level Taliban fighters are to be offered jobs, land and protection in a bid to persuade them to change sides. But attempts at reconciliation with the Taliban have so far failed. Karzai's recent peace jirga was boycotted by the Taliban. Instead, the Taliban has escalated attacks against the Afghan National Army and international forces. So far this month, 45 foreign troops have died in Afghanistan. Two weeks ago, Private Nathan Bewes, a member of the Australian First Mentoring Task Force, died in an improvised explosive blast in Oruzgan. The 23-year-old was the sixth Australian soldier to die in Afghanistan in just over a month. Meanwhile, the US, the main foreign player in Afghanistan, is preparing an operation in Kandahar that will be the biggest military offensive of the war to date. The strategy, endorsed by the majority of the international community at the London Conference earlier this year, was driven by two presumptions. The first was that the Taliban is a well-grounded, grassroots, popular insurgency. It assumed the Taliban was ingrained in the social and political fabric of Afghanistan and could not be defeated militarily. The second was that the Taliban could be successfully integrated into mainstream Afghan politics. But a deeper look not only challenges both assumptions but also questions the strategy of negotiating with the Taliban. The idea of many Western policymakers that the Taliban has grassroots support in Afghanistan is driven by the fact that the majority of the Taliban are Afghans, coming predominantly from the Pashtun ethnic group. Moreover, the majority of the Taliban operate and are stationed in the Pashtun-dominated areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan. But, in reality, the Taliban has little support from local Afghans, who see their fundamentalist Islamic beliefs and system of governance as alien and backward. Rather, the Taliban's success and grip on power in the south and east of Afghanistan is due to three other factors. The first is the drug trade in Afghanistan, which the Taliban uses to finance its insurgency. Counter-terrorism officials claim that the group has a taxation system that generates money from the production, processing and transport of opium from Afghanistan. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime says that between 2003 and 2008, the Taliban made an estimated $18 billion from drug production and trafficking. The second factor is Pakistan's intelligence agency, the ISI, which continues to support the Taliban, providing it with arms and safe havens. For Pakistan, the Afghan Taliban continues to be a strategic asset in achieving strategic depth in Afghanistan, as a tool against the regional influence of arch-rivals India, and most importantly to defuse separatist Pashtun nationalism in Pakistan. The third factor is popular anger at corrupt warlords, who continue to rule as governors and key officials outside the capital. Their draconian rule and their inability to provide justice and law and order have created a power vacuum in large parts of Afghanistan, which the Taliban has successfully filled. The Taliban continues to feed off the dissatisfaction caused by the widespread corruption and inefficiency apparent at every level of government in Afghanistan. The second presumption policymakers have made in devising the new Afghan strategy is that the Taliban can be integrated into mainstream Afghan politics. That idea seems unrealistic, since Taliban ideology rejects any modern institution of government. The Taliban regards the Koran as the only source of political advice, rejecting ideas of democracy and fundamental human rights, including women's rights. During its reign, the Taliban did not rule as a modern state apparatus. It did away with all forms of administration, with laws coming not from parliament or any other institution but from fatwas, religious decrees. The second issue is the lack of expertise in the Taliban ranks. Many Taliban leaders have only studied in madrassas, religious Islamic schools, and at best have a primary school education. This is in contrast to government ministers, most of whom have received tertiary education or higher in the West. The question is, owing to its lack of expertise, what kind of power would the Taliban enjoy in a power-sharing deal with the government? Importantly, the Taliban has never made an alliance with another political group since its emergence in 1994. If the Taliban was to become part of the national government, its political survival would be severely restrained by the little public support it enjoys on the fringes of society. People would simply not vote for it. Adding to this is the fact that the Taliban would become the largest and most powerful political party in Afghanistan, albeit being one of the most unpopular. This in itself would undermine Afghanistan's young democratic system and sow the seeds for future conflict. With Western policymakers proposing ideas on when and how to negotiate with the Taliban, the more immediate questions of if and why talks with the Taliban should begin still remain unanswered.