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# CMR DA – 1NC

## CMR high now-Obama’s approach is working

**CNAS 2010**

(“Civil-Military Relations in the Obama Era”, 5-17, <http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama/2010/05/civil-military-relations-obama-era.html>, ldg)

This article by Jonathan Alter in Newsweek on how Obama tamed his generals is great and worth reading -- although not necessarily for the reasons the author intended. I'm going to offer up my bottom line conclusion up front and then use the article as a starting point to consider some other issues. BLUF: President Obama has brought civil-military relations back into line in a way that would have made Samuel Huntington proud. There are problems with this, as I will note later on in this post, but overall, this is a really good thing. Alter: Deputy national-security adviser Tom Donilon had commissioned research that backed up an astonishing historical truth: neither the Vietnam War nor the Iraq War featured any key meetings where all the issues and assumptions were discussed by policymakers. In both cases the United States was sucked into war inch by inch. I have spent a little time recently with Paul Pillar, a man whose intellect and record of service I really respect. Paul has made a point similar to Tom Donilon's regarding the Iraq war -- that there never really was a coherent governmental decision-making process. Obama's decision-making process on Afghanistan, by contrast, is to be applauded for the way in which it differed from the "decision-making process" (if you can even call it that) of 2002 and 2003. Why? First, do what Dick Betts does when writing about Huntington's so-called "normal theory" for civil-military relations and draw a big triangle on a sheet of paper. Now draw three horizontal lines on the triangle, dividing it into four levels -- political, strategic, operational and tactical. In the normal model, civilians have responsibility for the top section. They decide the policy aims. Then civilians and the military decide on strategic goals and resources. (Betts adds a fifth layer, actually, for ROE.) The military has responsibility for everything else under Huntington's model. If you look at the decision-making process in 2009 on the war in Afghanistan, things more or less proceeded according to the normal theory. The president commissioned a review of policy and strategic goals in the winter of 2009, which resulted in this white paper. Gen. McChrystal then thought about how to operationalize the president's policy and strategic goals and submitted his own assessment along with a request for more resources. That assessment, combined with a corrupt Afghan presidential election, caused the administration to re-think its assumptions and prompted another strategic review. This was, on balance, a good thing that made me feel good about the president. The president then re-affirmed his policy aims, articulated new strategic goals, and committed more resources to the war in Afghanistan. (I write more about this process here.) The good news in all of this is that whether or not you agree with the decisions made by the president and his team in 2009, the national security decision-making process more or less worked, and the civilians were in charge every step of the way. This is as both Sam Huntington and the U.S. Constitution intended.

# CMR DA – 1NC

## Reducing foreign military presence sparks backlash that undermines CMR

**Kohn, history professor at UNC, 2008**

(Richard, “Coming Soon: A Crisis in Civil-Military Relations,” World Affairs, Winter, <http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2008-Winter/full-civil-military.html>, ldg)

Yet imagine the outcry any one of these proposals would provoke, and the resistance it would generate from the services, agencies, and congressional committees whose ox was being gored. The delegation or defense company about to lose a base or a weapons contract would certainly howl—and mobilize. Organizational change in any bureaucracy provokes enormous and almost always successful resistance. In the Pentagon, the battles have been epic. The world has a say in all this, too. The next administration will take office nearly twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Yet the American military establishment is essentially the same one created in the 1940s and 1950s to deter the Soviet Union. The United States today boasts four independent armed services with the same weapons, upgraded and more capable to be sure, as those known to George Marshall, Dwight Eisenhower, Chester Nimitz, and Curtis LeMay. Not only are the ships, planes, tanks, vehicles, and guns similar, but they are organized similarly, performing virtually the same roles and missions assigned them in the late 1940s. The United States after 1989 did not demobilize. It “downsized.” Successive administrations cut the budget by ten percent and the size of the force by about 25 percent, while the Pentagon substituted regional threats for the Soviet menace in its planning. Even in the midst of a “Global War on Terrorism,” neither the generals nor their bosses in the White House and Congress have been able to rethink the purpose, organization, command and control, or even operation of the armed forces. Two decades is a long time. The decades between 1895 and 1915, 1935 and 1955, and 1975 and 1995 all involved paradigm shifts in America’s role in the world and in its national security requirements. Today’s security situation differs no less radically from the Cold War for which today’s military establishment was devised. Are these the armed forces we really need? Bitter fights over strategy, budgets, weapons, and roles and missions dating back sixty-plus years suggest the question may not be answerable in any practical sense. To understand fully just how difficult it will be to raise fundamental concerns about defense policies, consider the recent confusion over what exactly the role and purpose of the National Guard and reserves ought to be. A week before 9/11, I participated in a roundtable discussion of the subject for the Reserve Forces Policy Board. There was general agreement that reserve forces should concentrate more on homeland defense and less on backstopping active duty forces on the battlefield. Yet the former head of the National Guard Bureau insisted, without evidence and in the face of great skepticism, that the Guard and reserves could do both. The past five years have proved him wrong; reserve forces are underequipped and stretched thinner than the active duty army and Marine Corps. Today, a congressionally chartered commission on the National Guard and reserves still struggles with how to shape and organize the reserves (particularly the National Guard, which reports to each state governor unless summoned for federal service). Admittedly, the National Guard and reserves possess unusual political power and since 1789 have been more resistant to rational military policy than any other part of the national security community. Robert McNamara, who transformed American defense more than any other Pentagon leader, failed utterly to budge the Guard and reserve. None of his successors possessed the nerve even to try. But the problem cannot be avoided. As the commission wrote in bureaucratic understatement, in March 2007, “the current posture and utilization of the National Guard and Reserve as an ‘operational reserve’ is not sustainable over time, and if not corrected with significant changes to law and policy, the reserve component’s ability to serve our nation will diminish.” All the more so because Iraq and Afghanistan compose the first substantial, extended military conflicts the United States has fought with a volunteer force in more than a century. Today’s typical combat tour of fifteen months is the longest since World War II. Expensive procurement programs are underway, but sooner or later they will be robbed to pay for other costs, such as war operations, the expansion of ground forces, or medical and veterans costs. Already, the Project on Defense Alternatives has proposed cutting two Air Force wings, two Navy wings, and two aircraft carriers for a total savings of more than $60 billion over the next five years. Eventually, the bill comes due, either in blood, defeat, or political crisis. As the old Fram oil filter advertisement put it, “Pay me now, or pay me later.”

# CMR DA – 1NC

## Good civil military relations key to check global wars.

**Cohen, professor of strategic studies John Hopkins, 1997**

(Eliot, Civil-military relations - Are U.S. Forces Overstretched?, Orbis, Spring 1997, <http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0365/is_n2_v41/ai_19416332/pg_9/?tag=content;col1>)

Left uncorrected, the trends in American civil-military relations could breed certain pathologies. The most serious possibility is that of a dramatic civil-military split during a crisis involving the use of force. In the recent past, such tensions did not result in open division; for example, Franklin Roosevelt insisted that the United States invade North Africa in 1942, though the chiefs of both the army and the navy vigorously opposed such a course, favoring instead a buildup in England and an invasion of the continent in 1943. Back then it was inconceivable that a senior military officer would leak word of such a split to the media, where it would have reverberated loudly and destructively. To be sure, from time to time individual officers broke the vow of professional silence to protest a course of action, but in these isolated cases the officers paid the accepted price of termination of their careers. In the modern environment, such cases might no longer be isolated. Thus, presidents might try to shape U.S. strategy so that it complies with military opinion, and rarely in the annals of statecraft has military opinion alone been an adequate guide to sound foreign policy choices. Had Lincoln followed the advice of his senior military advisors there is a good chance that the Union would have fallen. Had Roosevelt deferred to General George C. Marshall and Admiral Ernest J. King there might well have been a gory debacle on the shores of France in 1943. Had Harry S Truman heeded the advice of his theater commander in the Far East (and it should be remembered that the Joint Chiefs generally counseled support of the man on the spot) there might have been a third world war. Throughout much of its history, the U.S. military was remarkably politicized by contemporary standards. One commander of the army, Winfield Scott, even ran for president while in uniform, and others (Leonard Wood, for example) have made no secret of their political views and aspirations. But until 1940, and with the exception of periods of outright warfare, the military was a negligible force in American life, and America was not a central force in international politics. That has changed. Despite the near halving of the defense budget from its high in the 1980s, it remains a significant portion of the federal budget, and the military continues to employ millions of Americans. More important, civil-military relations in the United States now no longer affect merely the closet-room politics of Washington, but the relations of countries around the world. American choices about the use of force, the shrewdness of American strategy, the soundness of American tactics, and the will of American leaders have global consequences. What might have been petty squabbles in bygone years are now magnified into quarrels of a far larger scale, and conceivably with far more grievous consequences. To ignore the problem would neglect one of the cardinal purposes of the federal government: "to provide for the common defense" in a world in which security cannot be taken for granted.

# CMR DA – 2NC/1NR Overview

## Good civil-military relations are key to effective management of global hotspots and conflicts, outweighs the case:

## A. Magnitude – Absent civil-military relations the United States can’t terminate and manage conflicts. Future conflicts will inevitably escalate and have global ramifications-that’s Cohen

## B. CMR suppresses the affirmative impacts because the United States can effectively manage and terminate conflicts before they escalate.

## C. Takes out solvency-no enforcement.

**Feaver, political science professor Duke University, 2003**

(Peter, “Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations”, pg 68, ldg)

In practical terms, military shirking in the U.S. context is rarely open in subordination and has never risen to the point of a coup. But shirking is possible even if the military never carries out a coup, and when it happens, shirking by the US military usually takes one of three forms: (1) efforts to determine the outcome of a policy calculus by driving inflated estimates of what a military operation would cost: (2) efforts to determine the outcome of a policy calculus with “end runs,” unauthorized public protest, leaks, or appeals to other political actors; (3) efforts to undermine a policy through bureaucratic foot-dragging and “slow rolling” so that the undesired policy will never be implemented.

# CMR DA – Uniqueness – 2NC/1NR Wall

## Civil Military Relations are good now

**Schake, fellow at the Hoover Institution and holds the Distinguished Chair in International Security Studies at the United States Military Academy, 2009**

(Kate Schake, “So far so good for civil military relations for Obama” 2009, September 4, 2009, <http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/09/04/so_far_so_good_for_civil_military_relations_under_obama>)

Afghanistan was always going to be a central national security issue, because President Obama had campaigned and carried over into governance his argument that it was the "right" war and negligently under-resourced during the Bush administration. Even with domestic anti-war sentiment on the rise and a potential rebellion by Congressional Democrats against funding the Afghan mission, Obama is seemingly trapped into supporting the military commander's troop requests. Hard to imagine the Houdini contortion that lets him sustain his claim that his predecessor neglected the most important war and then refuse troops to a commander who you put into position and who is supported by a well-respected Defense Secretary. Yet the President may -- and perhaps should -- do exactly that, and for reasons that are laudable in our system of civil-military relations. The American way of organizing for warfare has distinct responsibilities for the leading military and civilian participants. To work up the ladder, it's the military commander's job to survey the requirements for success and make recommendations. It's the job of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to evaluate the military judgment of that strategy and resourcing, advising the Secretary and the President on its soundness and other possible courses of military action. It's the Secretary of Defense's job to figure out how to provide those resources from a limited pool of people and equipment, to identify and manage the risk it creates for other operations and objectives (e.g., Iraq, managing China's rise, deterring North Korea, etc). It is the Commander in Chief's job to establish the war's objectives and determine whether they merit the resources it would require to be successful. He may determine the objectives are too costly in themselves, or that achieving them would distract too much effort from other national priorities, or that we do not have the necessary partners in the Karzai government to achieve our objectives. It should go without saying that it is not the National Security Advisor's job to intimidate military commanders into dialing down their requests to politically comfortable levels, although that is what Jim Jones is [**reported**](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/30/AR2009063002811.html) to have done when visiting Afghanistan during the McChrystal review. Such politicization of military advice ought to be especially noxious to someone who'd been both the Commandant of the Marine Corps and a Combatant Commander. When [**the Bob Woodward article**](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/30/AR2009063002811.html) recounting Jones' attempted manipulation as published, Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen commendably defended McChrystal's independence. It is also curious that the one person invisible in this debate, as in the debate about relieving General McKiernan, is the CENTCOM commander, General Petraeus. But beneficially and importantly for our country, policy debates over the war in Afghanistan indicate that the system of civil-military relations is clearly working as designed. We owe much to Gates, Mullen, and McChrystal for shielding the process from politicization and providing military advice the President needs to make decisions only he can make.

## Civil-Military Relations are good-Afghanistan proves.

**Rogin, national security reporter for Federal Computer Week magazine and Japan's leading daily newspaper, the Asahi Shimbun, graduate of the George Washington University, has worked at the House International Relations Committee, the Embassy of Japan, and the Brookings Institution 2010**

(Josh Rogin “Holbrooke: Everybody on the Afghanistan team gets along great” 2010, July 1 2010

<http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/07/01/holbrooke_everybody_on_the_afghanistan_team_gets_along_great?obref=obnetwork>)

Despite what you may have read, the top Afghanistan policymakers in the Obama administration are all working together constructively and are on the same page, according to Special Representative **Richard Holbrooke**. [**In an interview**](http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/asia/jan-june10/holbrooke_06-30.html) Wednesday with *PBS NewsHour*'s **Gwen Ifill**, Holbrooke said he has seen some truly dysfunctional administrations in his storied, multi-decade diplomatic career -- and this administration isn't one of them. "I have worked in every Democratic administration since the Kennedy administration, and I know dysfunctionality when I see it. We have really good civil-military relations in this government," he said. Holbrooke touted his close working relationship with new Afghanistan commander, Gen. **David Petraeus,** and pushed back against Sen. **Lindsey Graham**, R-SC, and others who have pointed to [quotes from officials](http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/06/30/inside_the_biden_petraeus_dinner) and the *Rolling Stone* article that led to the firing of Gen. **Stanley McChrystal** as evidence that U.S. leaders in Washington and Kabul are not on the same page. "This is one [administration] which is absent of any ideological differences, as occurred in the last administration and several I served in. We work closely together," he said. "There are always personal differences and ambitions, but this is just not true. It's not a dysfunctional relationship." Holbrooke, who happened to be in Afghanistan when the *Rolling Stone* story broke, revealed that McChrystal woke him up in the middle of the night to apologize for quotes attributed to the general's aides that called him a "[wounded animal](http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/06/22/is_holbrooke_really_a_wounded_animal)," and an anecdote that portrayed McChrystal as irritated at getting emails from Holbrooke. "I was appalled that they said those things, but I don't take it personally. These things happen," Holbrooke said. So who's to blame for the perception that Obama's Afghanistan team is in disarray, according to Holbrooke? The media. "The press then created a narrative out of an isolated incident," he said, referring to the McChrystal story. "Honestly, it just isn't true." "Well, I have got be honest with you. If there's a misunderstanding, it may be because the issue has not been correctly represented in the media," Holbrooke said. He declined to blame the confusion on leading senators like Graham and **John McCain**, R-AZ, who have repeatedly said they are still confused as to what exactly what will happen next summer. Holbrooke finished off the interview by arguing that the Obama administration's relationship with the Afghan government shouldn't be judged on the ups and downs between the U.S. and Afghan President **Hamid Karzai**. "So, this is a very tough situation in Afghanistan. No one denies that. But the important thing to underscore is that it's not a government of one person," he said.

# CMR DA – Uniqueness – A2: McCrystal

## McChrystal not a threat to civil-miltary relations

**Penza, 10** (Logan Penza, POLITICS WAR, “McChrystal No Threat to American Civil-Military Relations”, http://themoderatevoice.com/77600/mcchrystal-no-threat-to-american-civil-military-relations/, 7/16/10)

**Fallout continues in the wake of mocking comments by U.S. Afghanistan commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal regarding several senior members of the Obama administration. While most public officials have carefully limited their condemnations to leave open the question of whether McChyrstal should be fired, reactions among media and bloggers have often strayed into the hyperbolic. For example, civil-military relations expert Eliot Cohen writes in the Wall Street Journal that McChrystal’s comments represent a threat to the “fundamental imperative of maintaining order and discipline”**, as if ill-advised comments in Rolling Stone will cause officers and enlisted throughout the military to suddenly lose control of themselves and start refusing orders to take the next hill. A deep, calming breath is in order. **From what appears in the Rolling Stone piece** (and since when did Rolling Stone become a serious news outlet worthy of extended top-level access to field commanders in a war zone?), **McChrystal’s behavior and that of his staff comes across as smug and unprofessional, as well as remarkably clueless about the pop-culture reporter in their midst. But their words, while sophomoric, are far short of a MacArthur-type crisis in American civil-military relations.** With the sole possible exception of comments regarding Vice-President Biden (the most significant of which was spoken by an unnamed staffer, not McChrystal), the comments do not appear to fall under the cover of UCMJ Article 88, which bars “contemptuous words” towards the President, Vice-President, Defense Secretary, service secretaries, and, inexplicably, the Secretary of Transportation. Ambassadors and lower-level national security officials who were the primary objects of McChyrstal’s apparent contempt are not covered. **More importantly, the objectionable comments are personal, not about policy. They do not represent any kind of move ala MacArthur to challenge the President’s command authority.** The comments do not wound the institutional fabric of American civil-military relations, they only wound a few egos. Also, his comments do not warrant the hyperbolic interpretation of disdain or contempt for civilian control of the military. **If anything, McChrystal’s quick apology and tail-between-the-legs pilgrimage to the White House tends to reaffirm civilian control dramatically, in marked contrast to MacArthur’s historic refusal to travel any further than Guam to meet Truman.**

## Resignation solved CMR crisis

**Roston, Politics Reporter at The Huffington Post, 2010**

(Michael, “Obama relieves General Stanley McChrystal of his command, David Petraeus to Afghanistan”, 6-23, <http://trueslant.com/level/2010/06/23/report-obama-to-relieve-general-stanley-mcchrystal-of-his-command/>)

President Obama hasn’t yet made his statement, but big read breaking news banner at MSNBC says that General Stanley McChrystal is on his way out as commander of US forces in Afghanistan. AP is confirming it, and word on MSNBC at this hour is that General David Petraeus, former commander of US forces in Iraq, is going to leave his post at US Central Command and shift to Afghanistan to fill McChrystal’s role. Word had it that General McChrystal, who along with his staff made some unsavory remarks about President Obama, Vice President Biden, and other senior officials in the administration in a Rolling Stone profile by Michael Hastings, tendered his resignation last night, although he denied this fact this morning. There are some reasons to expect that it will turn out well. If McChrystal is General Douglas MacArthur, perhaps General Petraeus will be as effective as General Matthew Ridgway, the general who succeeded MacArthur and is generally credited with turning back the Korean War in favor of the anti-Communist side. Moreover, the re-assertion of civilian primacy in our military’s chain of command will only send a good message to the world. Of course, given that Petraeus passed out in a hearing last week, questions will arise about whether he’s healthy enough to manage this task. Additionally, Petraeus is catnip to Obama’s progressive base, who disdain the counterinsurgency tactics that Petraeus executed in Iraq. This will aggravate the MoveOn.org wing of the Democratic Party. Obama should be at the podium soon – more to come. Update: Obama in his remarks at the White House, backed up by a dour looking Vice President Biden, Admiral Mullen and General Petraeus, expressed “considerable regret” at his decision to accept McChrystal’s resignation, but called it “the right thing…for our military and country.” Obama made it clear that he did not differ from McChrystal on policy in Afghanistan, and that he considered the general “one of our nation’s finest soldiers.” However, the priority in removing McChrystal from Afghanistan was the necessity to preserve the American conception of civil-military relations. “Our democracy depends on institutions that are stronger than individuals,” he said. “That’s why as commander-in-chief I believe this decision is necessary to hold ourselves accountable to standards that are at the core of our democracy.”

# CMR DA – Link – Afghanistan – 2NC/1NR Wall

## Petraues doesn’t support immediate Afghanistan withdrawal

**Petraeus Commander of US Forces in Afghanistan 2K10**

(David, ***“***HEARING TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN”***,*** Armed Services Committee Transcripts, Jun 15)

<http://armed-services.senate.gov/Transcripts/2010/06%20June/10-52%20-%206-15-10.pdf>

So I’d rather delay a few months and have a few more Afghan forces in the lead when the security presence is expanded and operations begin more forcefully than to have an ISAF-dominated force attempt to secure Kandahar a few months earlier. Our top priority then must be training, mentoring, and partnering in the field with Afghan troops and placing them in the lead in operations against insurgents, backed by U.S. and coalition support.

## Petraeus is key to CMR-politicians love him.

**Guardiano, contributor to the American spectator, 2010**

(John, “Don’t Hold All Generals to the Petraeus Standard”, 7-2, <http://www.newsrealblog.com/2010/07/02/dont-hold-all-generals-to-the-petraeus-standard/>, ldg)

By a vote of 99-0, the Senate has unanimously confirmed General David Petraeus as the commanding general of American forces in Afghanistan. This is not surprising because the politicians now all love Petraeus, and for two reasons. First, he is a great military leader who won a war (in Iraq) for them — and not just any war, but a war that was once thought to be unwinnable. Second, Petraeus doesn’t embarrass the pols or cause them problems. He is, quite literally, a political general — and I mean that in the best sense of the term. I mean he understands well the contours and fault lines in American politics, and studiously avoids tripping over them.

## Military hates withdrawal-they think the only way out is victory

**Cohen, former Army intelligence officer, 08**

(Raphael, *War Games: Civil-Military Relations, c. 2030*, World Affairs Journal, March/April 2008

<http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2010-MarApr/full-Cohen-MA-2010.html>; Accessed on 7/16/10)

Finally, there likely will be debates regarding an exit strategy. The outcomes of today’s wars will shape this debate. If the lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan are that with enough time, these campaigns are winnable, the military officers may push for a more flexible exit strategy (under the assumption that, once committed, there is no way out, except through victory). On the other hand, our politico, depending on the will of the president, may push for more rigid time limits—to get in and out before the next election cycle. Alternatively, if the lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan are that these campaigns at best amount to muddled stalemates that simply “degrade the force,” the roles may be reversed: the general officers may push for hard timelines, while our politico may want a more flexible policy to allow the United States to claim victory for his administration’s political gains. Our politico, recognizing the United States’ security commitment to South America dating to the Monroe Doctrine, also might argue that a set exit date runs counter to larger American strategic interests. In this case, our civilian-warrior functions as the wild card in the debate, torn between political and military necessity.

## Miltiary opposes withdrawals

**Goodman, Senior Analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency, 2010**

(Melvin, resident Barack Obama inherited a difficult national security situation — wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; an exaggerated and counterproductive war on terror; debilitating deficits and rising debt; an obstructionist Congress; and a corporate media that has abandoned its watchdog ethos. July 8, 2010 <http://www.consortiumnews.com/2010/070810a.html>)

For instance, Official Washington and the corporate media have hailed Obama’s choice of Petraeus to replace General Stanley McChrystal as commander in charge of the Afghan War. Yet, this move also has increased the power of the Pentagon to override any deadline for troop withdrawal from the nation’s longest war.

Neither Petraeus nor his bosses (Gates and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Mike Mullen) have accepted Obama’s notion of a deadline to begin significant withdrawals of U.S. troops next summer. McChrystal’s contemptuous remarks in Rolling Stone exposed an even deeper strain of resistance to the civilian government at the highest levels of the uniformed military.

Instead of the needed firmness, President Obama has contributed to the militarization of overall national security policy by appointing general officers to key positions that should have been in the hands of civilians. These appointments include the national security adviser; the intelligence tsar (first a retired admiral and, more recently, a retired general); ambassadors to such key states as Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia; and a mediator for Sudan

# CMR DA – Link – Afghanistan – 2NC/1NR Wall

**Gates opposes immediate withdrawal**

**Tiron, assistant editor of National Defense, 2009**

(Roxana, “Gates opposes troop withdrawal”, 12-2, <http://thehill.com/contact/about-us/roxana-tiron>)

Defense Secretary Robert Gates said he opposed setting deadlines for U.S. troop withdrawal from Afghanistan as he defended President Barack Obama’s new war strategy. Gates, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Mike Mullen on Wednesday made their first rounds on Capitol Hill to publicly sell Obama’s Afghanistan war plan to conflicted lawmakers still trying to digest the president’s announcement. Obama announced on Tuesday he will send an additional 30,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan, some as early as the next few weeks. The president also announced his goal of beginning a U.S. troop withdrawal by the summer of 2011. Gates said he agrees with the president’s July 2011 timeline but he would not agree with any efforts to set a deadline for complete troop withdrawal. “I have adamantly opposed deadlines. I opposed them in Iraq, and I oppose deadlines in Afghanistan. But what the president has announced is the beginning of a process, not the end of a process. And it is clear that this will be a gradual process and, as he said last night, based on conditions on the ground. So there is no deadline for the withdrawal of American forces in Afghanistan,” Gates told the House Foreign Affairs Committee on Wednesday afternoon. “July 2011 is not a cliff.” Gates’s comments came after lawmakers, particularly Republicans, attacked Obama’s plan to begin thinning out U.S. forces in the South Asian country by July 2011. Earlier in the day, during a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, Obama’s presidential rival, Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), lamented the “arbitrary” deadline, which is not based on conditions on the ground in Afghanistan. Gates, who found himself in front of Congress defending the second surge of his tenure, stressed that the United States will thin its forces in Afghanistan as it turns over more districts and more provinces to Afghans. The transition will first start in “uncontested areas” and will ensure that the Afghans are capable of taking care of their own security. “We are not going to throw these guys in the swimming pool and walk away,” Gates said. Gates told the Senate Armed Services Committee that the administration will thoroughly review the war’s progress in December 2010 and evaluate whether the objective of starting the transfer will be met.

## Gates key to CMR

**Bruno, Aviation Week & Space Technology staff writer, 1-5-2009**

[Michael, "The Pragmatist," Aviation Week & Space Technology, lexis)

Gates was not in government when the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003, nor was he the architect of the Bush administration’s surge strategy, though he became its chief advocate on Capitol Hill. Republican presidential contender Sen. John McCain (Ariz.) closely identified himself with both the strategy and Gates. Some antiwar proponents were skeptical that Gates would implement Obamas vision to reduce forces in Iraq. «That was the only thing I was worried about,» says Rep. Norm Dicks, the Washington state Democrat who describes himself as «more bullish» on getting out of Iraq. «But they must have worked it out or else Gates wouldn’t have accepted and Obama wouldn’t have offered.» Gates has not made whole a stressed and strained military, and there still are many key issues to tackle. But his respect for collaborative decision-making among government institutions could make the case for his singularly outstanding impact on aerospace last year. Gates has focused on the simple idea, albeit a complex task, of getting the job done. This grounded purpose has been long needed in a Washington polariz2ed by political disagreement over the use of military power abroad and the struggle to reinvigorate strained alliances. Gates’s pragmatism is rippling through many facets of U.S. policy and helping to repair damaged relations with Congress, the State Dept. and the global aerospace industry. This is why he is Aviation Week’s Person of the Year for 2008. But it would be a mistake to see Gates only as a mild-mannered consensus-builder. Though one of his goals has been to repair relations between the Pentagon’s civilian leadership and its top military officers, he is not afraid of citing officers accountable for errors. He sacked the Army secretary over scandalous lapses at Walter Reed Army Medical Center, and fired top civilian and military leadership of the Air Force for embarrassing slipups in the transport of nuclear weapons. Gates has also challenged NATO allies to send more manpower, equipment and funding to Afghanistan and asked Congress to increase funding for State Dept. reconstruction and nation-building efforts—even if it meant taking money away from the Pentagon. «Perhaps most important at this time in our history, Bob Gates understands that the secret to successful leadership lies in the willingness to accept counsel and advice from people, both inside and outside of government,» said Sam Nunn in 2006. The influential conservative Georgia Democrat who chaired the Senate Armed Services Committee from 1987-95 and is a respected voice of experience on defense matters, added: «When facts and circumstances change or when mistakes are made, we must have a secretary of Defense who listens, who understands, who corrects errors rapidly and who adapts to reality. I am confident Bob Gates will listen, will understand, will adapt and will make sound recommendations and decisions for our nation’s security.»

# CMR DA – Link – Afghanistan – 2NC/1NR Wall

## Military will only support gradual withdrawal

**Richter, publisher, 2009**

(Paul, Robert Gates says Afghanistan withdrawal will be gradual, Los Angeles Times, 12/7/09, accessed on 7/16/2010, <http://articles.latimes.com/2009/dec/07/world/la-fg-gates-afghanistan7-2009dec07> )

Reporting from Washington — Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates denied Sunday that President Obama had set an "exit strategy" for Afghanistan, and he forecast that only a "handful" of U.S. troops may leave the country in July 2011, when a withdrawal is due to begin. Gates, appearing on television news programs with other senior U.S. officials, said the Obama administration intended to maintain its commitment to Afghanistan while gradually shifting security responsibilities to the country's central government. "This is a transition," Gates said on ABC's "This Week." "We are not talking about an abrupt withdrawal. We are talking about something that will take place over a period of time."Gates, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and national security advisor James L. Jones appeared on the Sunday TV talk shows in a continuing effort to explain a policy that aims to satisfy those who want to end the war swiftly, as well as those who want to stay for as long as it takes for U.S. goals to be met.Obama announced last week that he would soon send 30,000 additional U.S. troops to Afghanistan, bringing the total to nearly 100,000, but that some would start to return home in 18 months.His decision to set July 2011 as the point when U.S. troops will begin to depart has proved the most difficult element to explain to domestic audiences and allied governments. The Afghan, Pakistani and Indian governments are concerned that the war-weary United States might sharply scale back its commitment to the region, as it has in the past.Gates said U.S. troops would first be withdrawn from areas where the Taliban poses less of a threat, mostly in the north. He said U.S. military commanders had reason for optimism that a minimum 18-month troop buildup would work, because they have seen progress in the south where U.S. forces have been added.

## Pentagon hates the plan

**Moran Digital Reporter 2K9**

(Andrew, ***“***HEARING Pentagon opposes timetable to withdraw troops from Afghanistan”***,*** CNN, Sep 27)

<http://www.digitaljournal.com/article/279780>)

On Sunday, the Pentagon exclaimed that they oppose any type of timeline to withdraw United States troops from Afghanistan. As President Barack Obama discusses the possibility of adding more soldiers to the war in Afghanistan, the Pentagon said on Sunday that they disapprove of a timeline that would withdraw US soldiers out of the region, according to China View. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates told [*CNN*](http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2009/09/27/gates-new-troops-to-afghanistan-wouldnt-flow-til-early-2010/)in an interview on Sunday, that making such a timeline would be a “strategic mistake” and one that could possibly embolden the Taliban and other terrorist groups in the Middle East.

## Petraeus’s policy relies on being in Afghanistan for at least a decade

**Dreyfuss Forrner Middle East Intelligence director of the *Executive Intelligence Review* 2K10**

(Robert – “Will Petraeus Thwart Obama's Timetable for Withdrawal from Afghanistan?”, alternet.org Jun 27 http://www.alternet.org/story/147346/will\_petraeus\_thwart\_obama's\_timetable\_for\_withdrawal\_from\_afghanistan/?page=1)

Still, it’s worrying. Petraeus’s COIN policy logically demands a decade-long war, involving labor-intensive (and military-centric) nation-building, waged village by village and valley by valley, at a cost of hundreds of billions of dollars and countless U.S., NATO, and Afghan casualties, including civilians. That idea doesn’t in the least square with the idea that significant numbers of troops will start leaving Afghanistan next summer. Indeed, Bruce Riedel, a former CIA officer with long experience in the Middle East and South Asia, who headed Obama’s first Afghan policy review in February 2009, told me (for an article in Rolling Stonelast month) that it’s not inconceivable the military will ask for even more troops, not agree to fewer, next year.

# CMR DA – Link – Consultation

## OBAMA SHOULD CONSULT MILITARY COMMANDERS TO PRESERVE CMR

**ACKERMAN, SENIOR REPORTER FOR WASHINGTON INDEPENDENT, 08**

Spencer, Productive Obama-military relation possible, Washington Independent, 7/16/10, <http://washingtonindependent.com/18335/productive-obama-military-relationship-possible>

During his July trip to Iraq, Sen. Barack Obama met with a man who represents both an opportunity and an obstacle to his presidency: Army Gen. [David H. Petraeus](http://washingtonindependent.com/1433/king-david). Petraeus, a hero to many Americans for his management of the war in Iraq, argued in a private briefing that military commanders should be given wide latitude in handing the future course of the war — though Obama was running for president on a platform calling for a withdrawal of combat troops in 16 months. The meeting offered a test for a relationship that might help define Obama’s term in office**.** Though he’s talked about governing in a bipartisan fashion, Obama ran for office as a progressive opposed to the Iraq war. The uniformed military, typically wary of liberals in general, is unsure what to think about Obama — and the last Democratic president, Bill Clinton, stumbled early in his relationship with the military. To Peter Feaver, one of the leading scholars of civil-military relations, that comment was auspicious**. “**Obama had it pitch-perfect,” said Feaver, a professor of political science at Duk**e** University and a national-security staffer for both Clinton and George W. Bush. **“**Obama was right to signal to the military, ‘I want your military advice, and I will factor it into my strategic decisions, where military advice is one of my concerns.’”Whether a Commander-in-Chief Obama can continue the tone that Candidate Obama sounded in July remains to be seen. According to interviews with active and retired military officers, Obama and the military can have a productive relationship, provided that Obama operates along some simple principles. Consult, don’t steamroll — and don’t capitulate. Be honest about disagreements, and emphasize areas of agreement. Make Petraeus a partner, not an adversary. The lesson for Obama**,** this official continued,is “not to get rolled or railroaded by the top brass**,** as Clinton and his civilian team were by Colin Powell,” who was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time.“Obama and his team need to be respectful and solicitous of senior military advice, but leave no doubt about who is in charge.”Indeed**,** the differences between Obama and Petraeus or Odierno on Iraq might turn out to be healthy for civilian-military relations. Judging from how the July meeting with Petraeus in Baghdad went, “Obama should be in good shape,” said the Pentagon official. “It will be a refreshing change from recent years, when civilian political leaders have shirked off tough questions about — and responsibility for — their war policies by claiming, in effect, that they’re just taking directions from the commanders on the ground, in effect, hiding behind the skirts of the military.” Like Feaver, the anonymous senior Army officer expected Obama to make Petraeus a partner on Iraq and other issues. “Once President-elect Obama is in office,” the officer said, “he can very easily shift his view based on advice he has received, as well as the situation on the ground at the time, since he has left himself an out or two over time. It would be surprising to see him go completely against Gen. Petraeus, since I would think [Obama] would rather have him in uniform than out — where he would then be free to provide commentary on the decisions that have been made.” **“**The single biggest mistake Obama could make would be to “completely discount the advice of the military senior leadership and those of his combat commanders who have the most experience dealing with the issues,”said the anonymous senior Army officer.“Even if he does not discount it, but is perceived to discount it, the relationship will be largely going back to the Clinton era, and will take years to repair. That’s not something you want to do in a time of war, which most of the nation has forgotten.”

## Obama needs see out the advice of his military leaders to avoid a civil-military relations crisis

**Collins** a retired Army colonel, teaches strategy at the National War College. From 2001 to 2004, he was deputy assistant secretary of defense for stability operations **2K10**

(Joseph, “What civil-military crisis?”*,* Air Force Journal, Feb)

In times such as these, the most important task for the scholar and senior officials is to find ways to keep normal friction from becoming a serious problem or a crisis in civil-military relations. Here are some recommendations: First, presidents should hear real policy options, not just the ready-to-wear policy package decided on (and papered over) by his or her Cabinet officers. The president should hear what the principals think on the options and hear also the unvarnished advice of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the director of National Intelligence. On matters of war and peace, the president should also hear from the service chiefs and combatant commanders directly and, as often as possible, as individuals, not just in the group sessions that take place a few times a year. These tasks all need to be approved by an engaged president and managed by his or her national security adviser.

# CMR DA – Link – Iraq – 2NC/1NR Wall

## Withdrawing from Iraq poisons CMR.

**Downing, author of political and military history books, 08**

(Brian M., *Will it be ‘Obama’s War?*’, The Asia Times online, June 11, 2008

<http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/JF11Ak01.html>, Accessed on 7/16/10)

The US military will also oppose large-scale withdrawal. The generation of officers who learned hard lessons in Vietnam are almost all gone now, leaving successors who are only vaguely wary of foreign quagmires. The torch has been passed to a new generation that believes in one main lesson from Vietnam: future wars must be seen through. The military thinks it has turned a corner in Iraq and that General David Petraeus' troop "surge" is working well. It will ally with like-minded members of the US Congress, conservative media and think-tanks to argue the stay-put message. If a Democratic president were somehow able to overcome opposition to withdrawal, he would bring bitter enmity between the generals and his party, which is already disliked for its lineage to the antiwar movement of the Vietnam years and for trimming defense budgets. Leaving Iraq - cutting and running, as it is often called - would poison civil-military relations as never before in the nation's history.

## Withdrawal from Iraq causes backlash

**Dr. Porter is an investigative historian and journalist on U.S. national security policy 2k9**

(Gareth Ph.D. in Southeast Asian politics from [Cornell University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cornell_University). During the Vietnam War, Gareth Porter served as [Saigon](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saigon) Bureau Chief for [Dispatch News Service International](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dispatch_News_Service) and later co-director of the Indochina Resource Center, an anti-war research and education organization based in [Washington, D.C.](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Washington,_D.C.) Obama not bowing to top brass, yet February 2009. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle\_East/KB04Ak02.html)

WASHINGTON - United States Central Command chief General David Petraeus, supported by Defense Secretary Robert Gates, tried to convince President Barack Obama that he had to back down from his campaign pledge to withdraw all US combat troops from Iraq within 18 months. This was at an Oval Office meeting on January 21. But Obama informed Gates, Petraeus and already begun pressuring Obama to change his withdrawal policy Joint Chiefs chairman Admiral Mike Mullen that he wasn't convinced and that he wanted Gates and the [military](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/KB04Ak02.html) leaders to come back quickly with a detailed 16-month plan, according to two sources who have talked with participants in the meeting. Obama's decision to override Petraeus's recommendation has not ended the conflict between the president and senior military officers over [troop](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/KB04Ak02.html) withdrawal, however. There are indications that Petraeus and his allies in the military and the Pentagon, including General Ray Odierno, now the top commander in Iraq, have. A network of senior military officers is also reportedly preparing to support Petraeus and Odierno by mobilizing [public opinion](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/KB04Ak02.html) against Obama's decision. Petraeus was visibly unhappy when he left the Oval Office, according to one of the sources. A White House staffer present at the meeting was quoted by the source as saying, "Petraeus made the mistake of thinking he was still dealing with George Bush instead of with Barack Obama." Obama decided against making any public reference to his order to the military to draft a detailed 16-month combat troop withdrawal policy, apparently so that he can announce his decision only after consulting with his field commanders and the Pentagon. The assertion that Obama's withdrawal policy threatens the gains allegedly won by the Bush "surge" and Petraeus' strategy in Iraq is apparently the theme of the campaign that military opponents are now planning.

# CMR DA – Link – Iraq – 2NC/1NR Wall

## Iraq withdrawal kills CMR-ignites every conflict.

**Kohn, history professor at UNC, 2008**

(Richard, “Coming Soon: A Crisis in Civil-Military Relations,” World Affairs, Winter, <http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2008-Winter/full-civil-military.html>, ldg)

Four problems, in particular, will intensify the normal friction: the endgame in Iraq, unsustainable military budgets, the mismatch between twenty-first century threats and a Cold War military establishment, and social issues, gays in the military being the most incendiary. As to the first of these, Iraq confounds the brightest and most knowledgeable thinkers in the United States. George W. Bush has made it clear that he will not disengage from Iraq or even substantially diminish the American military presence there until the country can govern, sustain, and defend itself. How to attain or even measure such an accomplishment baffles the administration and war critics alike. That is precisely why a majority of the American people supports withdrawing. It follows that no candidate will be elected without promising some sort of disengagement. An American withdrawal would probably unleash the all-out civil war that our presence has kept to the level of neighborhood cleansing and gangland murder. Sooner or later that violence will burn itself out. But a viable nation-state that resembles democracy as we know it is far off, with the possibility that al-Qaeda will survive in Iraq, requiring American combat forces in some form for years to come. In the civil-military arena, the consequences of even a slowly unraveling debacle in Iraq could be quite ugly. Already, politicians and generals have been pointing fingers at one another; the Democrats and some officers excoriating the administration for incompetence, while the administration and a parade of generals fire back at the press and anti-war Democrats. The truly embittered, like retired Army Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, who commanded in Iraq in 2003­­–04, blame everyone and everything: Bush and his underlings, the civilian bureaucracy, Congress, partisanship, the press, allies, even the American people. Last November, Sanchez went so far as to deliver the Democrats’ weekly radio address—and, with it, more bile and invective. Thomas Ricks, chief military correspondent of the Washington Post, detects a “stab in the back narrative . . . now emerging in the U.S. military in Iraq. . . . [T]he U.S. military did everything it was supposed to do in Iraq, the rest of the U.S. government didn’t show up, the Congress betrayed us, the media undercut us, and the American public lacked the stomach, the nerve, and the will to see it through.” Ricks thinks this “account is wrong in every respect; nonetheless, I am seeing more and more adherents of it in the military.” If the United States withdraws and Iraq comes apart at the seams, many officers and Republicans will insist that the war was winnable, indeed was all but won under General David Petraeus. The new administration will be scorned not only for cowardice and surrender, but for treachery—for rendering meaningless the deaths, maiming, and sacrifice of tens of thousands of Americans in uniform. The betrayed legions will revive all of the Vietnam-era charges, accusing the Democrats of loathing the military and America and of wishing defeat. The resentments will sink deep into the ranks, at least in the army and the Marines, much as the Praetorian myths about Vietnam still hold sway today in the Pentagon. The response—namely, that the war was a strategic miscalculation bungled horribly by the Bush administration—will have no traction. There will only be a fog of anger, bitterness, betrayal, and recrimination.

## TROOPS WANT TO STAY AND FIGHT

**Ackerman**, senior correspondent for the American Prospect and a national security correspondent for the Washington Monthly, **07**

(Spencer, The Bitter End, Washington Monthly, June 2007, <http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2007/0706.ackerman.html#Byline>, Accessed on 7/17/10 Defense Secretary)

On the merits of withdrawal, the Democrats have it right. The politics of it, however, remain complicated. It’s become common among Democrats to argue for withdrawing from Iraq in the name of the troops. In January, for instance, New York Congressman Jerrold Nadler introduced a bill titled the Protect the Troops and Bring Them Home Act. In February, Congresswoman Lynne Woolsey sent a letter to Bush arguing that it was “time to truly support our troops—by bringing them home.” Fifteen members of Congress signed on. Senators, too, have been willing to support this idea. Senator Barbara Mikulski of Maryland said in a February floor speech that “the best way to support our troops serving in Iraq is to say ‘NO’ to the president’s escalation of the war.”Haunted by Vietnam, Democrats are determined to express support for the troops. This is admirable. The truth of the matter, however, is this: many troops in Iraq, perhaps even most of them, want to stay and fight. That doesn’t mean that we should stay in Iraq any longer. It does mean, however, that if Democrats want to bridge the divide between themselves and the military—an effort further complicated by their opposition to the war—they’re going to have to recognize that arguing in the name of the troops isn’t going to work.To speak to the troops fighting in Iraq is to see a particularly stark difference between their mindset and that of most Americans today. I saw this when, a few weeks into the surge, I traveled to Baghdad to see what the change in tactics looked like on the ground. One of the places I visited, on a hot March afternoon, was a much-heralded “neighborhood outpost” in the Hurriyeh Joint Security Station in western Baghdad. Crammed into the basement of the building, which houses a contingent of Iraqi soldiers and policemen, were soldiers from the 1st Battalion of the 325th Infantry Regiment. I was struck by the griminess of the locale. The air was thick with the smell of dried sweat, and all the light came from a few intensely flickering florescent bulbs. Don’t ask about the latrines.

# CMR DA – Link – Japan – 2NC/1NR Wall

## Senior official support military presence in Japan

**Clinton, Gates, Okada, Kitazawa US Japan Security Consultative Committee 2K10**

(Hillary, Robert, Katsuya, Toshimi ***“***Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee***”*** DOD, Mar 28)

<http://www.defense.gov/news/joint_statement_us_japan_security_consultative_committee.pdf>

On May 28, 2010, the members of the United States-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) reconfirmed that, in this 50th anniversary year of the signing of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, the U.S.-Japan Alliance remains indispensable not only to the defense of Japan, but also to the peace, security, and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region. Recent developments in the security environment of Northeast Asia reaffirmed the significance of the Alliance. In this regard, the United States reiterated its unwavering commitment to Japan’s security. Japan reconfirmed its commitment to playing a positive role in contributing to the peace and stability of the region. Furthermore,the SCC members recognized that a robust forward presence of U.S. military forces in Japan, including in Okinawa, provides the deterrence and capabilities necessary for the defense of Japan and for the maintenance of regional stability. The SCC members committed to promote and deepen security cooperation in wide-ranging areas to enable the Alliance to adapt to the evolving challenges of the 21st century.

**The Pentagon wants to keep troops in Japan – view China and North Korea as threats**

**Daily Yomiuri 2010**

("EDITORIAL; Cooperation with U.S. key to Japan's defense", 2-3, lexis)

Amid an increasingly severe security environment, the United States presented its latest defense strategic guidelines, placing emphasis on cooperation with its allies. The U.S. Defense Department on Monday released the Quadrennial Defense Review, the first of its kind under the administration of President Barack Obama. The report listed prevailing in the current wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as the top priority of the United States' defense strategies. The report also pointed out the need for continuous operations to crush Al-Qaida, expressing determination to win the fight against terrorism. The report stressed that the United States will make an all-out military and diplomatic effort to prevent and deter disputes and will make full preparation for any type of contingencies. The latest report was compiled based on the current situation in which the United States faces drastic changes in the security environment due to the rise of China and India, as well as expanding threats of terrorism and nuclear proliferation. The report's emphasis on tackling diversified threats and the importance of close cooperation with its allies and partners reflects its recognition that U.S. military superiority has been eroding. Keeping an eye on China As did the last report, the latest version highlights the Pentagon's vigilance regarding China's military expansion, a process that has lacked transparency. The report says China has been developing and fielding ballistic missiles, new attack submarines, cyber-attack capability, and counter-space systems, pointing out that many doubts remain about their long-term purposes. The report also referred to a fear that nuclear proliferation may proceed at once due to instability or collapse of nuclear powers. This reflects the United States' strong concern about international terrorist organizations, North Korea's nuclear tests and long-range ballistic missiles and Iran's nuclear development. Expansion of various threats may weaken the effectiveness of the forward deployment of U.S. forces and the U.S. nuclear deterrent, something that also would have a serious effect on Japan's security. Thorough coordination between Japan and the United States is necessary. Meanwhile, senior foreign and defense officials from Japan and the United States entered into discussions in Tokyo aimed at deepening the bilateral alliance, as the current bilateral security treaty marked its 50th anniversary this year. Dangers must be considered It is vital that the acknowledgement of the threats posed by China's military expansion and North Korea's nuclear development presented in the report should be reflected in future discussions. In light of the rapid modernization of China's military, it is indispensable to strengthen cooperation between the Self-Defense Forces and the U.S. military and to make an effort to strengthen deterrence. The report hammered out a policy to steadily implement the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan, ensuring the long term presence of the U.S. forces in Japan and the reorganization of U.S. forces in Guam. It is important that Japan and the United States share awareness of the security environment of Asia and the rest of the world, then continue strategic discussions on examining rolesharing and cooperation. At the same time, to enable such discussions, it is indispensable to resolve the relocation issue of the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station in Ginowan, Okinawa Prefecture, by the end of May. Putting off the issue is no longer acceptable.

# CMR DA – Link – South Korea – 2NC/1NR Wall

## US committed to keeping troops in South Korea.

**Kirk, masters in IR from University of Chicago, 2009**

(Donald, “In South Korea, Gates underscores threat from North” Christian Science Monitor, 10-21, <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2009/1021/p06s11-woap.html>, ldg)

Whatever happens, the secretary vowed, the US "is committed to providing extended deterrence using the full range of American military might – from the nuclear umbrella to conventional strike and defense capabilities." And, for the benefit of those who might think the US plans to pull some of its 28,500 troops from South Korea, he promised that the US "will maintain an enduring and capable military presence on the Korean peninsula." As proof of the US commitment, Gates cited "our plans to make three-year accompanied tours," that is, Korean assignments with families accompanying troops at government expense, "the norm for most US troops in Korea" – the same perks provided US troops in Europe

# CMR DA – Link – Turkey – 2NC/1NR Wall

## Military thinks Incirlik is invaluable.

**Petraeus Commander of US Forces in Afghanistan 2K10**

(David, ***“***HEARING TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN”***,*** Armed Services Committee Transcripts, Jun 15)

<http://armed-services.senate.gov/Transcripts/2010/06%20June/10-52%20-%206-15-10.pdf>

Incirlik is an invaluable instrument for the execution of NATO and U.S. policies in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere in the Middle East. It offers a 10,000-foot main runway and a 9,000 foot alternate runway able to service large cargo planes. Some 74% of all air cargo into Iraq transits Incirlik. The U.S. Air Force prizes the efficiency of the use of the base: six C-17 aircraft based at Incirlik move the same amount of cargo that 9 to 10 aircraft used to carry from Rhein-Main Air Base in Germany, saving about $160 million a year. In addition, thousands of U.S. soldiers have rotated out of Iraq via use of Incirlik for transit. KC-135 tankers operating out of Incirlik have delivered more than 35 million gallons of fuel to U.S. fighter and transport aircraft on missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. On more than one occasion, Turkey has authorized the temporary deployment of U.S. Air Force F-16's from Germany to Incirlik for training. In addition, in 2005, Incirlik served as an air-bridge for the Pakistan Earthquake Relief Effort of seven NATO countries and, in 2006, U.S. forces from Incirlik helped with the evacuation of some 1,700 Americans from Lebanon during the Israeli-Hezbollah war.

# CMR DA – Impact – Iraq – 1NC

## Strong civil-military relations key to Iraq.

**Cronin, Director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense**

**University, 2008**

(Patrick, “Irregular Warfare: New Challenges for Civil-Military Relations” Strategic Forum, October 2008, <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Strforum/SF234/SF234.pdf>)

Success in the highly political and ambiguous conflicts likely to dominate the global security environment in the coming decades will require a framework that balances the relationships between civilian and military leaders and makes the most effective use of their different strengths. These challenges are expected to require better integrated, whole-of-government approaches, the cooperation of host governments and allies, and strategic patience. Irregular warfare introduces new complications to what Eliot Cohen has called an “unequal dialogue” between civilian and military leaders in which civilian leaders hold the true power but must modulate their intervention into “military” affairs as a matter of prudence rather than principle. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated that irregular warfare— which is profoundly political, intensely local, and protracted—breaks from the traditional understanding of how military and civilian leaders should contribute to the overall effort. One of the key challenges rising from irregular warfare is how to measure progress. While there is disagreement about the feasibility or utility of developing metrics, the political pressure for marking progress is unrelenting. Most data collection efforts focus on the number of different types of kinetic events, major political milestones such as elections, and resource inputs such as personnel, money, and materiel. None of these data points serves easily in discerning what is most needed—namely, outputs or results. A second major challenge centers on choosing leaders for irregular warfare and stability and reconstruction operations. How to produce civilian leaders capable of asking the right and most difficult questions is not easily addressed. Meanwhile, there has been a general erosion of the traditional Soldier’s Code whereby a military member can express dissent, based on legitimate facts, in private to one’s superiors up to the point that a decision has been made. Many see the need to shore up this longstanding tradition among both the leadership and the ranks. A third significant challenge is how to forge integrated strategies and approaches. Professional relationships, not organizational fixes, are vital to succeeding in irregular war. In this sense, the push for new doctrine for the military and civilian leadership is a step in the right direction to clarifying the conflated lanes of authority.

## Losing in Iraq causes nuclear war.

**Corsi, Ph.D political science Harvard University, 2007**

(Jerome, “War with Iran is imminent”, World Net Daily, January 08, 2007, <http://www.wnd.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=53669>)

If a broader war breaks out in Iraq, Olmert will certainly face pressure to send the Israel military into the Gaza after Hamas and into Lebanon after Hezbollah. If that happens, it will only be a matter of time before Israel and the U.S. have no choice but to invade Syria. The Iraq war could quickly spin into a regional war, with Israel waiting on the sidelines ready to launch an air and missile strike on Iran that could include tactical nuclear weapons. With Russia ready to deliver the $1 billion TOR M-1 surface-to-air missile defense system to Iran, military leaders are unwilling to wait too long to attack Iran. Now that Russia and China have invited Iran to join their Shanghai Cooperation Pact, will Russia and China sit by idly should the U.S. look like we are winning a wider regional war in the Middle East? If we get more deeply involved in Iraq, China may have their moment to go after Taiwan once and for all. A broader regional war could easily lead into a third world war, much as World Wars I and II began.

# CMR DA – Impact – Irregular Warfighting – 1NC

## Irregular warfare hurts civil-military relations. These relations are VITAL to succeeding in wars.

**Cronin, Director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, 08**

(Patrick M., Irregular Warfare: New Challenges for Civil-Military Relations, Small Wars Journal, September 19, 2008,

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/09/irregular-warfare-new-challeng/, Accessed on 7/16/10)

Success in the highly political and ambiguous conflicts likely to dominate the global security environment in the coming decades will require a framework that balances the relationships between civilian and military leaders and makes the most effective use of their different strengths. These challenges are expected to require better integrated, whole-of-government approaches, the cooperation of host governments and allies, and strategic patience. Irregular warfare introduces new complications to what Eliot Cohen has called an “unequal dialogue” between civilian and military leaders in which civilian leaders hold the true power but must modulate their intervention into “military” affairs as a matter of prudence rather than principle. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated that irregular warfare - which is profoundly political, intensely local, and protracted—breaks from the traditional understanding of how military and civilian leaders should contribute to the overall effort. One of the key challenges rising from irregular warfare is how to measure progress. While there is disagreement about the feasibility or utility of developing metrics, the political pressure for marking progress is unrelenting. Most data collection efforts focus on the number of different types of kinetic events, major political milestones such as elections, and resource inputs such as personnel, money, and materiel. None of these data points serves easily in discerning what is most needed - namely, outputs or results. A second major challenge centers on choosing leaders for irregular warfare and stability and reconstruction operations. How to produce civilian leaders capable of asking the right and most difficult questions is not easily addressed. Meanwhile, there has been a general erosion of the traditional Soldier’s Code whereby a military member can express dissent, based on legitimate facts, in private to one’s superiors up to the point that a decision has been made. Many see the need to shore up this longstanding tradition among both the leadership and the ranks. A third significant challenge is how to forge integrated strategies and approaches. Professional relationships, not organizational fixes, are vital to succeeding in irregular war. In this sense, the push for new doctrine for the military and civilian leadership is a step in the right direction to clarifying the conflated lanes of authority.

## Irregular warfighting key to prevent inevitable conflicts from escalating

**Bennett, Defense News, 2008**

(John, “JFCOM Releases Study on Future Threats,”, 12-4, <http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3850158>)

The study predicts future U.S. forces' missions will range "from regular and irregular wars in remote lands, to relief and reconstruction in crisis zones, to sustained engagement in the global commons." Some of these missions will be spawned by "rational political calculation," others by "uncontrolled passion." And future foes will attack U.S. forces in a number of ways. "Our enemy's capabilities will range from explosive vests worn by suicide bombers to long-range precision-guided cyber, space, and missile attacks," the study said. "The threat of mass destruction - from nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons - will likely expand from stable nation-states to less stable states and even non-state networks." The document also echoes Adm. Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other U.S. military leaders who say America is likely in "an era of persistent conflict." During the next 25 years, it says, "There will continue to be those who will hijack and exploit Islam and other beliefs for their own extremist ends. There will continue to be opponents who will try to disrupt the political stability and deny the free access to the global commons that is crucial to the world's economy." The study gives substantial ink to what could happen in places of strategic import to Washington, like Russia, China, Africa, Europe, Asia and the Indian Ocean region. Extremists and Militias But it calls the Middle East and Central Asia "the center of instability" where U.S. troops will be engaged for some time against radical Islamic groups. The study does not rule out a fight against a peer nation's military, but stresses preparation for irregular foes like those that complicated the Iraq war for years. Its release comes three days after Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England signed a new Pentagon directive that elevates irregular warfare to equal footing - for budgeting and planning - as traditional warfare. The directive defines irregular warfare as encompassing counterterrorism operations, guerrilla warfare, foreign internal defense, counterinsurgency and stability operations. Leaders must avoid "the failure to recognize and fully confront the irregular fight that we are in. The requirement to prepare to meet a wide range of threats is going to prove particularly difficult for American forces in the period between now and the 2030s," the study said. "The difficulties involved in training to meet regular and nuclear threats must not push preparations to fight irregular war into the background, as occurred in the decades after the Vietnam War." Irregular wars are likely to be carried out by terrorist groups, "modern-day militias," and other non-state actors, the study said. It noted the 2006 tussle between Israel and Hezbollah, a militia that "combines state-like technological and war-fighting capabilities with a 'sub-state' political and social structure inside the formal state of Lebanon." One retired Army colonel called the study "the latest in a serious of glaring examples of massive overreaction to a truly modest threat" - Islamist terrorism. "It is causing the United States to essentially undermine itself without terrorists or anyone else for that matter having to do much more than exploit the weaknesses in American military power the overreaction creates," said Douglas Macgregor, who writes about Defense Department reform at the Washington-based Center for Defense Information. "Unfortunately, the document echoes the neocons, who insist the United States will face the greatest threats from insurgents and extremist groups operating in weak or failing states in the Middle East and Africa." Macgregor called that "delusional thinking," adding that he hopes "Georgia's quick and decisive defeat at the hands of Russian combat forces earlier this year [is] a very stark reminder why terrorism and fighting a war against it using large numbers of military forces should never have been made an organizing principle of U.S. defense policy." Failing States The study also warns about weak and failing states, including Mexico and Pakistan. "Some forms of collapse in Pakistan would carry with it the likelihood of a sustained violent and bloody civil and sectarian war, an even bigger haven for violent extremists, and the question of what would happen to its nuclear weapons," said the study. "That 'perfect storm' of uncertainty alone might require the engagement of U.S. and coalition forces into a situation of immense complexity and danger with no guarantee they could gain control of the weapons and with the real possibility that a nuclear weapon might be used."

# CMR DA – Impact – Readiness – 1NC

## CMR key to readiness-effects recruitment and morale.

**Hoffman, retired US Marine Corps officer, 2007**

(Frank, “Bridging the civil-military gap,”, December, <http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2007/12/3144666>, ldg)

What Ricks detected has not gone away, and it may have been extended. Several reports suggest the gap between an all-volunteer force and the rest of America is widening. One non-academic assessment detected “a kind of embattled alienation, and perhaps even a creeping sense of superiority” emerging in today’s military. Other reports suggest a growing degree of mistrust, misunderstanding and overt resentment. Additionally, the military’s isolation from its larger civilian component, via its professional educational system and its enclaves around the U.S., has become an issue. Such a cultural divide might weaken the long-term support the military enjoys among the body politic. But it may also negatively affect the ability to recruit and maintain a strong and effective military. An astute but sympathetic Robert Kaplan warns that “a military will not continue to fight and fight well for a society that could be losing faith in itself, even if that society doffs its cap now and again to its warrior class.”

## Readiness is key to prevent war with great power adversaries

**Feldstein, economic professor at Harvard, 2007**

(Martin, "The Underfunded Pentagon," Foreign Affairs, March /April 2007, Volume 86 • Number 2, ebsco)

Deterring other great powers, such as Russia and China, will require Washington to maintain its dominance in conventional warfare and therefore at least to maintain its current level of military spending. But in addition, the United States now faces three new types of threats for which its existing military capacity is either ill suited or insufficient. First, there are relatively small regional powers, such as North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan, that can or will soon be able to strike the United States and its allies with weapons of mass destruction (wmd).Second, there are global nonstate terrorist networks, such as al Qaeda, with visions of re-creating the world order. And third, there are independent terrorists and groups motivated less by a long-term vision of global conquest than by hatred, anti-Americanism, and opposition to their own governments. Each of these threats is exacerbated by the relative ease with which crude wmds can be developed due to the diffusion of modern technology and the potential emergence of a black market in fissile material. Furthermore, there seems to be general agreement that the United States has committed so much of its war-fighting capacity to Iraq and Afghanistan that it could not fight in Iran or North Korea or elsewhere if that were deemed necessary. That limit on capacity encourages U.S. adversaries to behave in ways that are contrary to U.S. interests. Those adversaries would be less likely to do so if Washington had the extra manpower and equipment that were once assumed to be the goal— and perhaps the reality—of the U.S. military structure.

# CMR DA – Impact – Readiness – EXTN

## Politicizing the military destroys readiness

**Morgan, graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and has completed graduate work at Harvard Business School and author of over 30 articles on strategic and organizational issues, 2k1**

(Matthew J., *Army Recruiting and the Civil-Military Gap*, bNet, Summer 2001

<http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBR/is_2_31/ai_76496212/?tag=content;col1>; Accessed on 7/17/10)

This failure to adequately appreciate the requirements of military readiness--which have historically been prioritized by government authorities, as the Supreme Court record shows [1]--is characteristic of a growing trend of disinterest and unawareness among not only cultural and political elites, but also among the public at large. This broadening estrangement between the military and society has sparked interest among scholars. While some have focused on an increasingly hostile and politicized military, others charge that civilian culture is distancing itself from the military through a progressive deterioration of values, and still others emphasize the growing chasm among elite spheres. Although occurrences such as the appointment of General Colin Powell, USA Ret., as Secretary of State would seem to suggest otherwise, the distance between elites in society and the military arguably is growing. [2] However, in a democratic society, trends among elites are inevitably related to developments in the general public. As Senator John McCain, a member of the Armed Services Committee, has pointed out, "Most Americans don't care that much about national security and defense issues anymore," [3] and elected officials obviously take a greater interest in those issues their constituents believe are important. The disconnect between today's armed forces and society may be aptly described as one of apathy rather than hostility. [4] The peacetime military seems to be often viewed as irrelevant to the major issues of popular life. This leads to less attention to military affairs and a reduced familiarity and comfort with the military, which may become a self-perpetuating trend. The significance of these developments to the military and to national security is that the quality of the association between the military and society affects numerous facets of military resourcing. The amount of funding and personnel provided by a democratic nation depends on the perceptions and will of the public. Much of the Army's reaction to the recruiting challenges posed by the strong economy of the 1990s, consequently, was to address extrinsic incentives. In the short term, at least, the Army's effort seems to be working. However, an effective long-term solution to military recruiting difficulties may be possible only if we can resolve the underlying divide in civil-military relations.

## Poor Civil-Military Relations leads to poor strategic performance

**Hoffman** Research Fellow at the Marine Corps Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities **2K8**

(Frank, “Dereliction of Duty Redux?: Post-Iraq American Civil-Military Relations”)

<http://www.examiner.com/x-42296-DC-Political-Buzz-Examiner~y2010m6d24-Obama-makes-correct-call-with-Petraeus-but-cannot-expect-miracles>

The ongoing debate has generated potential solutions. One scholar suggested that we return to the school of separate spheres. The political scientist Michael Desch finds the kind of dialogue and interaction recommended in Supreme Command to be intrusive and bound to exacerbate friction. He contends that Huntington’s separate spheres and grand compact to be ‘‘conducive to good civil-military relations as well as to sound policy decisions.’’47 Relentless questioning of ‘‘military policies’’ by civilians is seen as the problem for effective strategic performance. Instead of probing deeply into the details of proposed military operational plans, Desch contends we should return to Huntington’s deal. This division of labor grants military professionals control over the operational and tactical sphere in return for their subordination and loyalty to policy and strategic decisions made by civilian policy makers. He explicitly places the blame for ‘‘the parlous situation in Iraq today’’ on the ‘‘willful disregard for military advice.’’48

# CMR DA – Impact – Terrorism – 1NC

## CMR is critical to effective war on terror

**Guttieri, Professor Naval Postgraduate School, 2003**

(Karen, “Homeland Security and US Civil-Military Relations”, Strategic Insights, Vol. 2, No. 8, August 2003, Columbia International Affairs Online)

The American strategic policy community—for example, the US Commission on National Security in the 21st Century—was concerned with homeland defense prior to 9/11. After that fateful day, the Bush administration began using a new, more proactive sounding term: homeland security. The Pentagon, however, treated this new term not as a replacement for, but as separate from, homeland defense. A seemingly simple matter of semantics reveals a great deal about US civil-military relations. America's post-9/11 obsession with securing the "homeland" shifted the domestic political landscape, including American civil-military relations. The American model of civil-military relations has been characterized by a contract according to which the military defends the nation's borders while domestic police keep order at home. "On September 11," in the words of DoD Transformation "czar" Arthur K. Cebrowski, "America's contract with the Department of Defense was torn up and a new contract is being written."[1] This Strategic Insight describes some of the forces compelling military changes in the historical context of US civil-military relations. Although the military itself may resist change, institution-building (outside and within that organization) and attitudinal changes in response to massive terrorist attacks at home cannot but alter American civil-military relations. Much of the shift in American politics since 9/11 has to do with the nature and requirements of homeland security: it is both public and private, interagency (involving a number of government elements) and civil-military. Implementing the new national security strategy will require cooperation across sectors of activity and jurisdictions of authority.[2] Government-private sector coordination is vital to critical infrastructure protection. Agency-to-agency coordination is the foundation of any national response to security threats involving multiple levels of government in a nation consisting of more than 87,000 government jurisdictions.[3] Civil-military coordination is indispensable for ensuring adequate military support to civilian agencies responsible for homeland security. The quality of America's civil-military relations will be a factor in the effectiveness of America's "war on terror," while by the same token, the conduct of the war will irrevocably shape those relations. Given the US military's lead in homeland defense, civilian control of the military should be a topic of particular interest to anyone concerned with the function of democracy in wartime.

**Terrorism causes extinction.**

**Alexander, professor terrorism studies, 2003**

(Yonah, “Terrorism myths and realities”, Washington Times, August 28, 2003, lexis, ldg)

Last week's brutal suicide bombings in Baghdad and Jerusalem have once again illustrated dramatically that the international community failed, thus far at least, to understand the magnitude and implications of the terrorist threats to the very survival of civilization itself. Even the United States and Israel have for decades tended to regard terrorism as a mere tactical nuisance or irritant rather than a critical strategic challenge to their national security concerns. It is not surprising, therefore, that on September 11, 2001, Americans were stunned by the unprecedented tragedy of 19 al Qaeda terrorists striking a devastating blow at the center of the nation's commercial and military powers. Likewise, Israel and its citizens, despite the collapse of the Oslo Agreements of 1993 and numerous acts of terrorism triggered by the second intifada that began almost three years ago, are still "shocked" by each suicide attack at a time of intensive diplomatic efforts to revive the moribund peace process through the now revoked cease-fire arrangements [hudna]. Why are the United States and Israel, as well as scores of other countries affected by the universal nightmare of modern terrorism surprised by new terrorist "surprises"? There are many reasons, including misunderstanding of the manifold specific factors that contribute to terrorism's expansion, such as lack of a universal definition of terrorism, the religionization of politics, double standards of morality, weak punishment of terrorists, and the exploitation of the media by terrorist propaganda and psychological warfare. Unlike their historical counterparts, contemporary terrorists have introduced a new scale of violence in terms of conventional and unconventional threats and impact. The internationalization and brutalization of current and future terrorism make it clear we have entered an Age of Super Terrorism [e.g. biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear and cyber] with its serious implications concerning national, regional and global security concerns. Two myths in particular must be debunked immediately if an effective counterterrorism "best practices" strategy can be developed [e.g., strengthening international cooperation]. The first illusion is that terrorism can be greatly reduced, if not eliminated completely, provided the root causes of conflicts - political, social and economic - are addressed. The conventional illusion is that terrorism must be justified by oppressed people seeking to achieve their goals and consequently the argument advanced by "freedom fighters" anywhere, "give me liberty and I will give you death," should be tolerated if not glorified. This traditional rationalization of "sacred" violence often conceals that the real purpose of terrorist groups is to gain political power through the barrel of the gun, in violation of fundamental human rights of the noncombatant segment of societies. For instance, Palestinians religious movements [e.g., Hamas, Islamic Jihad] and secular entities [such as Fatah's Tanzim and Aqsa Martyr Brigades]] wish not only to resolve national grievances [such as Jewish settlements, right of return, Jerusalem] but primarily to destroy the Jewish state. Similarly, Osama bin Laden's international network not only opposes the presence of American military in the Arabian Peninsula and Iraq, but its stated objective is to "unite all Muslims and establish a government that follows the rule of the Caliphs." The second myth is that strong action against terrorist infrastructure [leaders, recruitment, funding, propaganda, training, weapons, operational command and control] will only increase terrorism. The argument here is that law-enforcement efforts and military retaliation inevitably will fuel more brutal acts of violent revenge. Clearly, if this perception continues to prevail, particularly in democratic societies, there is the danger it will paralyze governments and thereby encourage further terrorist attacks. In sum, past experience provides useful lessons for a realistic future strategy. The prudent application of force has been demonstrated to be an effective tool for short- and long-term deterrence of terrorism. For example, Israel's targeted killing of Mohammed Sider, the Hebron commander of the Islamic Jihad, defused a "ticking bomb." The assassination of Ismail Abu Shanab - a top Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip who was directly responsible for several suicide bombings including the latest bus attack in Jerusalem - disrupted potential terrorist operations. Similarly, the U.S. military operation in Iraq eliminated Saddam Hussein's regime as a state sponsor of terror. Thus, it behooves those countries victimized by terrorism to understand a cardinal message communicated by Winston Churchill to the House of Commons on May 13, 1940: "Victory at all costs, victory in spite of terror, victory however long and hard the road may be: For without victory, there is no survival.

# AFF – CMR DA – Uniqueness – CMR Down Now

## Civil Military Realtions are Failing

**Yoo, law professor and author 2k10**

(John is an American [attorney](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lawyer), law professor, and author. As a former official in the [United States Department of Justice](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Department_of_Justice),. June 24 2010 <http://blog.american.com/?p=15927>)

I ran an [op-ed](http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704629804575324610902472990.html) today in the Wall Street Journal on the firing of General McChrystal. Over on the [Ricochet.com](http://www.Ricochet.com) website, I blog about the growing crisis in civil-military relations since the end of the Cold War. Another point to make is that it was almost predictable that there would be such a crisis under President Obama, not because of Obama’s obviously uncomfortable attitude toward national security matters, but because of the serious harm done to civil-military relations by Congress during the last half of the Bush years. Congressional Democrats encouraged and fed upon the resistance by officers and retired generals to Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and the Iraq war. This blurred lines of accountability in civilian control over the milary, and led to greater military independence. The wider the policy differences between the military brass and the president, the more you will see appeals to Congress and efforts to undermine direct presidential control—and this should happen more often under a Democratic president than a Republican, for many reasons. This sort of thing happens all the time with regulatory agencies, which are only too happy to play off the White House against the Congress to create freedom for themselves—but the Constitution, I believe, is meant to prevent this from happening to an institution as dear as the presidency.

## Civil Military Relations down now.

**CNAS 2010**

(“Civil-Military Relations in the Obama Era”, 5-17, <http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama/2010/05/civil-military-relations-obama-era.html>, ldg)

2. **We've still a long way to go before civil-military relations get as healthy as they should be**. On the one hand, the U.S. military and its officer corps is seriously sick in terms of its relations with the elected civilian leadership. I subscribe to many of [Richard Kohn's worries](http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2009-Spring/full-Kohn.html) that the officer corps is overly politicized. My cousin, who serves as an officer in the Marine Corps, just returned from Iraq and reports that officers there regularly make disparaging remarks about the president in front of subordinates. Have any of these guys ever heard of George C. Marshall? (The fact that these soldiers are serving in *Iraq* yet spare the younger President Bush any criticism is kind of hilarious if sad.) On the other hand, it seems clear the Obama Administration thinks "us vs. them" more appropriately describes the administration's relations with the uniformed officer corps than it does the fight against the Taliban. Why, I have to ask myself, have members of this administration -- I'm looking at you, Mr. Vice President -- seemingly gone out of their way to cast the June 2011 decision as a zero-sum game between the civilians in the administration and the uniformed officers in the Department of Defense and at NATO/ISAF? Shouldn't we all be in this thing together and reconvene to assess our strategy as *one team* this winter? I'm encouraged the president apparently likes Stan McChrystal, because honestly, if a Democrat can't get along with Gen. McChrystal, there's not much hope he can get along with *any* U.S. general. But below the president I sense this paranoia in the administration's staff that the military is out to get them. And that's not healthy, because...

## No uniqueness

**Bacevich, professor of history and international relations at Boston University, 2k10**

(ANDREW J. BACEVICH, professor of history and international relations at Boston University, Fire Gen. Stanley McChrystal? Not yet: Obama should wait -- then assess the Afghanistan surge, NY Daily News, 6/7/10 <http://www.nydailynews.com/opinions/2010/06/22/2010-06-22_fire_gen_mcchrystal_not_yet_obama_should_wait_until_december__then_assess_his_co.html#ixzz0tor4jtqX>, 7/16/10)

Although the principle of civilian control, the cornerstone of the American system of civil-military relations, has sustained more than its share of blows in recent years, it remains largely intact. Even if McChrystal's understanding of that principle obviously leaves much to be desired, he and his subordinates pose a negligible threat to the established constitutional order. They simply require additional instruction regarding the chain of command, along with a tutorial in the fundamentals of military professionalism.

# AFF – CMR DA – Link – No Spillover

## Policy disagreements don’t undermine overall CMR and don’t spill over

Hansen, law professor at New England Law School, 2009

(Victor, “SYMPOSIUM: LAW, ETHICS, AND THE WAR ON TERROR: ARTICLE: UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF MILITARY LAWYERS IN THE WAR ON TERROR: A RESPONSE TO THE PERCEIVED CRISIS IN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS,” South Texas Law Review, 50 S. Tex. L. Rev. 617, p. lexis

According to Sulmasy and Yoo, these conflicts between the military and the Bush Administration are the latest examples of a [\*624] crisis in civilian-military relations. n32 The authors suggest the principle of civilian control of the military must be measured and is potentially violated whenever the military is able to impose its preferred policy outcomes against the wishes of the civilian leaders. n33 They further assert that it is the attitude of at least some members of the military that civilian leaders are temporary office holders to be outlasted and outmaneuvered. n34 If the examples cited by the authors do in fact suggest efforts by members of the military to undermine civilian control over the military, then civilian-military relations may have indeed reached a crisis. Before such a conclusion can be reached, however, a more careful analysis is warranted. We cannot accept at face value the authors' broad assertions that any time a member of the military, whether on active duty or retired, disagrees with the views of a civilian member of the Department of Defense or other member of the executive branch, including the President, that such disagreement or difference of opinion equates to either a tension or a crisis in civil-military relations. Sulmasy and Yoo claim there is heightened tension or perhaps even a crisis in civil-military relations, yet they fail to define what is meant by the principle of civilian control over the military. Instead, the authors make general and rather vague statements suggesting any policy disagreements between members of the military and officials in the executive branch must equate to a challenge by the military against civilian control. n35 However, until we have a clear understanding of the principle of civilian control of the military, we cannot accurately determine whether a crisis in civil-military relations exists. It is to this question that we now turn.

# AFF – CMR DA – No Impact

## CMR is empirically resilient

**Hooker, PhD in IR from UVA, 2004**

(Richard, “Soldiers of the State: Reconsidering American Civil-Military Relations,” Parameters, Winter, pg 4-18, ebsco)

The arguments advanced herein attempt to show that the dynamic tension which exists in civil-military relations today, while in many cases sub-optimal and unpleasant, is far from dangerous. Deeply rooted in a uniquely American system of separated powers, regulated by strong traditions of subordination to civilian authority, and enforced by a range of direct and indirect enforcement mechanisms, modern US civil-military relations remain sound, enduring, and stable. The American people need fear no challenge to constitutional norms and institutions from a military which—however aggressive on the battlefield—remains faithful to its oath of service. Not least of the Framer’s achievements is the willing subordination of the soldiers of the state.

## CMR is resilient

**De Luce, writer for Tehran Times, 2009**

(Dan, “Like past presidents, Obama faces tension with his generals,” 10-29 http://www.tehrantimes.com/index\_View.asp?code=205967)

As he contemplates dire warnings from his military commanders on Afghanistan and demands for more troops, Barack Obama might find some comfort in knowing his predecessors had a much tougher time dealing with the top brass. Despite talk of tension between U.S. military and civilian leaders, relations between Obama's White House and senior officers are downright cordial compared to past administrations, historians say. From president Abraham Lincoln's frustration with his cautious commander during the Civil War to John F. Kennedy's skepticism of hawks in the joint chiefs of staff during the Cuban missile crisis, “there's nothing new” in the tense back-and-forth over Afghanistan policy, said Mackubin Owens, a professor of national security at the U.S. Naval War College. During the Korean War, the imperious General Douglas MacArthur defied and disobeyed his commander-in-chief, president Harry Truman, by publicly threatening to attack China just as diplomats were looking to open peace talks. In the end, Truman had to fire the popular general, who came home to a parade and a media frenzy. “That's the classic case of the complete breakdown in civil-military relations,” said James Helis, a retired Army colonel and head of the national security and strategy department at the U.S. Army War College. “And the only possible outcome was the relief of General MacArthur.” No one has compared the top U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, to acting like MacArthur, but he has drawn criticism for expressing his views on strategy in public at a time when the White House is carrying out a sensitive policy discussion in private. At an event in London this month, McChrystal dismissed as “short-sighted” an alternative strategy under discussion that would call for a smaller ground force. A former defense official, who asked not to be named, said the commander appeared to have stumbled due to his relative inexperience in the intense heat of the political arena. His performance is in contrast to the politically savvy General David Petraeus, who persuaded a skeptical Congress in 2007 to give his approach in Iraq time to succeed. Helis said military commanders have to walk a fine line, as they are obliged in a democracy to speak to the media about what is at stake in a war. But if they go too far they run the risk of undermining the chain of command and venturing into partisan politics. “How much do you discuss in public as the public wrestles with these issues, and how much do you hold for your private discussions and conversations with the president?” he said. The debate over the role of the military in Afghan policy has tended to pit liberals -- who say the generals need to keep their opinions private -- against conservatives -- who argue Obama is failing to act decisively on the military's advice. But the roles were reversed just a few years ago over Iraq, when the left accused former president George W. Bush of ignoring the warnings of senior officers. Although analysts worry the all-volunteer military could be steadily drawn into party politics, the climate has improved since the 1800s when generals were knee-deep in partisan vitriol, Owens said. During the Mexican war, president James Polk, a Democrat, was at logger heads with his top two generals, who were from the rival Whig party that had opposed the war. One of the generals, Zachary Taylor, openly questioned Polk's handling of the campaign in a letter published in a newspaper, infuriating the president. The U.S. military has become more professional and less politicized in the years since, but presidents have kept colliding with their commanders, Owens said. The relationship amounts to a “bargain” between the American public, the military and the government, which has to be regularly adjusted and “renegotiated,” he said. The arrangement works best when senior officers offer their unvarnished opinion without currying favor, but then salute when the president makes up his mind, historians said. “You are expected to give your best advice to the civilian policy makers,” Helis said. “But that doesn't mean the civilian policy makers are obligated to follow your advice.” And after the president has made a decision, “then our obligation is to carry that out to the best of our ability.”