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# Japan AFF – Inherency – 1AC

## Troops will stay in Okinawa now

**Japan Today 2010**

(“Kan apologizes for base-hosting burden on Okinawa”, 6-23, <http://www.japantoday.com/category/politics/view/kan-visits-okinawa-amid-criticism-over-us-base-relocation>)

Prime Minister Naoto Kan offered an apology to people in Okinawa Prefecture on Wednesday for forcing them to host a large part of U.S. military bases in Japan, but suggested the bases are indispensable to peace in the Asia-Pacific region. Kan made his first visit to the island prefecture since he took office earlier this month amid strong criticism from locals for an agreement reached between Japan and the United States in May to keep a key U.S. military base in Okinawa. ‘‘I offer an apology as a representative of all Japanese people,’’ Kan said at a ceremony to mark the 65th anniversary of the end of the Battle of Okinawa, which killed over 200,000 soldiers and civilians in the closing days of World War II. The government ‘‘will make a further serious commitment to easing the burden of hosting the bases and removing dangers’’ linked to their existence, Kan said. But he also expressed his ‘‘appreciation,’’ saying that Okinawa accepting the U.S. military presence has helped secure peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Okinawa Gov. Hirokazu Nakaima, who attended the ceremony, said the obligation of hosting the U.S. bases in Japan must be equally shared among Japanese people. ‘‘I would like the burden (on Okinawa) to be visibly reduced,’’ he said.

# Japan AFF – Plan – 1AC

## Thus the plan:

## The United States federal government should withdraw its military presence from bases in Okinawa, Japan.

# Japan AFF – Alliance Advantage – Asia War Module – 1AC

## US East Asian influence is declining-Iraq war and financial crisis

**Beeson, international studies professor University of Birmingham, 2009**

(Mark, “East Asian Regionalism and the End of the Asia-Pacific: After American Hegemony”, 1-12, <http://www.japanfocus.org/-Mark-Beeson/3008>)

The economic crisis that currently grips the world will have many consequences, not least for the US. A decade ago during the East Asian crisis, the US lectured East Asian elites on the shortcomings of ‘crony capitalism’ and close business relationships. Such claims look bizarrely anachronistic as the US government finds itself having to nationalise or bail-out large chunks of the domestic economy brought low by an inadequately regulated, predatory, but politically-influential financial sector. It is not just that the material significance of the US economy will be diminished as a consequence of this crisis, however, so will its ideational influence and authority. The Washington consensus centered on the dismantling of state regulation and the unfettered working of the market, had few admirers in East Asia even before the current crisis; [1] the current turmoil will further diminish its appeal and make alternatives more attractive. This diminution of the US’s overall ideological and economic importance compounded by its failed wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, is likely to undermine its influence in East Asia and its standing as both a regional and a global power. One consequence of this process may be to strengthen the attractiveness of exclusively East Asian regional organisations—especially if China’s economic development continues to cement its place at the centre of an increasingly integrated regional economy. I suggest that the US’s hegemonic influence over East Asia is consequently likely to decline and so is the significance of the ‘Asia-Pacific’ region of which it is notionally a central part. North Korea fired a long-range rocket on April 5. Pyongyang claimed the rocket sent a satellite into orbit, but the U.S. North American Aerospace Defense Command said in a statement: “Stage One of the missile fell into the Sea of Japan and the remaining stages along with the payload itself landed in the Pacific. No object entered orbit and no debris fell on Japan.” Well, that's the reason why the Japanese self-defense forces didn't fire missiles to destroy any debris. But along with the United States, Japan believes North Korea was testing long-range ballistic missile technology that can be used to carry a nuclear warhead far beyond its skies to Alaska. The fear of a nuclear attack from North Korea, coupled with the current economic recession, is more than likely to prompt Japan to re-arm itself. North Korea, rather than Russia or the People's Republic of China, is Japan's only potential enemy. And the country is headed by Kim Jong-Il, the erratic despot son of Kim Il-Song, who launched an invasion to kick off the Korean War in 1950. Pyongyang has gone on the record by saying it has stopped trying to make nuclear bombs, but the Japanese military suspects that they may have been stockpiled. Japan has a mutual defense treaty with the United States. Uncle Sam provides a nuclear defense umbrella for Japan under the treaty signed at the beginning of the Cold War era for protection against attacks from the Soviet Union. Thanks to the mutual defense arrangements, Japan has been able to refrain from rearmament, which is frowned upon by the United States and the People's Republic of China, along with those Asian countries that were invaded or occupied by the Japanese Imperial Army before and during the Second World War. The global financial crisis has changed the situation, however. Japan is one of the countries hardest hit by the silent tsunami, which, if not halted in time, may engulf the world like the Great Depression of the early 1930s. The Wall Street crash of 1929 precipitated a sharp decline in Japan's silk industry first. By 1931, the index of raw silk prices, with those in 1914 at 100, was down to 67, compared with 151 in 1929 and 222 in 1925. Over the same period, the index for rice fell from 257 to 114. A world slump in international trade simultaneously reduced Japan's cotton exports, driving a large proportion of unemployed girl factory workers to seek refuge in their native villages. The result was widespread poverty in rural areas. One solution Japan found to cure its economic woes was to expand military spending. The Kwantung Army created the Mukden Incident on Sept. 18, 1931.

# Japan AFF – Alliance Advantage – Asia War Module – 1AC

## And the Okinawa issue will unravel the Alliance-2 reasons.

**Ogoura, political science professor at Aoyama Gakuin University, 2010**

(Kazuo, “Japan-U.S. relations cry out for new management, dialogue”, 6-13, <http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20100613ko.html>)

Ripples, frictions, uneasiness, concern and even dismay — these are the words by which most of the Japanese mass-media commentaries characterize present Japan-U.S. relations. Behind this phenomenon lies the impact from several issues. The problem of bases in Okinawa, particularly the so-called Futenma air base issue, is one. In this case there are two aspects of friction. The first was the change in the position of a new Japanese government divorced from an "agreement" that had been reached between the former LDP government of Japan and the Bush administration. The second aspect appears to be related to the series of "changes" in the position of the Japanese authorities, which has wavered between consideration for international strategy and and the strong resistance of the people in Okinawa. Somewhat related to the base issue is a question as to how to deal with the mitsuyaku (secret deals or agreements) between Japanese and American authorities over the Okinawa reversion. Though, in substance, the contents of the secret agreement, even if proved to be true, does not directly jeopardize Japan-U.S. strategic relations, the underlying political implication is rather serious. The existence of a secret agreement between the conservative government of Japan and the American administration is regarded by many Japanese as a typical example of insincerity toward and neglect of the people's wishes at the expense of military or strategic dealings between the two governments. In other words, popular support and more transparent decision-making are now required in dealing with politico-military issues between Japan and the U.S. Then comes former Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama's emphasis on the formation of an East Asia Community coupled with the concept of yuai or fraternity. Although neither the idea of an East Asian Community nor yuai should necessarily give rise to concern in the American mind, these concepts have been viewed by some observers on both sides of the Pacific as signs of the new Japanese administration's "inclination" toward less attachment to strategic considerations in international relations. Finally, there is on the side of Japan a vague feeling of being "bullied" by America (such as on the issue of the recall of Toyota cars in the U.S.) or of being increasingly marginalized or neglected in the wake of the rising Chinese power and the increasingly visible U.S.-China strategic partnership.

## Alliance is key to Asian stability.

**Twining, Senior Fellow for Asia at the German Marshall Fund, 2009**

(Daniel, “A crib sheet for President Obama's upcoming Asian summitry”, 11-10-2009, Foreign Policy, http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/11/10/a\_crib\_sheet\_for\_president\_obamas\_upcoming\_asian\_summitry)

"Asians are like spectators in a movie theater. They are all looking at the screen, which is America, rather than at each other." So says one of Japan's smartest strategic thinkers, and he is right. Despite the hype surrounding the rise of China, it is the United States that provides the public goods for order, security, and prosperity in East Asia; China in many respects free-rides on these public goods to sustain its focus on internal development. And it is the quality of relations with the United States that helps determine the nature of Asian states' relations with each other. Imagine, for instance, how different Japan-China relations would be in the absence of the U.S.-Japan alliance; look at how India's relationship with China has changed in the wake of the U.S.-India strategic rapprochement. American friends (and competitors) across the region will be watching President Obama closely for the signals he sends on his forthcoming Asia trip. Most Asian nations prefer American preeminence to the alternatives -- and want to know that President Obama has a strategic vision for sustaining American leadership in a region that craves it. Here is what they will want to see: 1. A continuing commitment to American alliance leadership and forward presence The American alliance system, and the security guarantees and forward deployment of military forces that underpin it, remain an important stabilizing force in a region experiencing the kind of dynamic shifts in relative power that so often lead to arms racing, regional polarization, and conflict. In this context, U.S. leadership provides a stabilizing reassurance to Asian states that might otherwise need to pursue destabilizing "self-help" policies in the face of security dilemmas American security guarantees help mitigate. American alliance commitments to Japan, South Korea, and other nations promote what political scientists call "underbalancing" -- regional states enjoying U.S. protection are able to invest more of their national resources in the pursuits of peace rather than preparations for war, which in turn helps reassure their neighbors. Asians are particularly watching to see how President Obama handles conflict with Japan, Washington's most important regional ally, over troop basing rights and other issues. Many Asian states fear that a Japan unshackled from its close alliance with the U.S. would be a destabilizing force in the region -- which is why so many Asian countries applauded the deft alliance management shown by Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush. The inexperience of the new Japanese government makes this a real challenge for President Obama, who may have to speak past Japan's uncertain leadership and directly to the Japanese public, which overwhelmingly supports a strong U.S. alliance, to rally public support for a stronger and more capable U.S.-Japan security partnership for the 21st century.

# Japan AFF – Alliance Advantage – Asia War Module – 1AC

## And plan allows Japan to have a more independent and assertive foreign policy-key to regional stability.

**Ikenberry, professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton University, 2010**

(John, “A New Japan, a New Asia”, 1-21, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/21256/new_japan_a_new_asia.html>)

As the Obama administration struggles to sort out its Japan policy, it should tilt decidedly toward welcoming rather than rebuffing the fresh approach of the government of Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama. While a cold response to his more assertive foreign policy is predictable--Tokyo since World War II has consistently deferred to its U.S. protector--it is sorely misguided. In questioning the location of the Okinawa bases and seeking a relationship with China not entirely mediated by Washington, the new government is not attempting to demote Japan's alliance with the United States. On the contrary, it is seeking to update the alliance to the new political and strategic environment in the region. Rather than warning Tokyo to return to the fold, Washington should work with the Hatoyama government to forge a healthier and more mature relationship. The election last year of the Democratic Party represents a watershed in Japanese politics, bringing to an end the post-war reign of the Liberal Democratic Party. In breaking the lock that the L.D.P. had on Japanese politics, the D.P.J. has cleared the way for pressures long pent up to rise to the surface. Many voters long for Japan to become a "normal" country - one that assumes more geopolitical responsibility and conducts a foreign policy made in Tokyo, not Washington. Mr. Hatoyama has pledged to address citizens' concerns about the social ills that U.S. bases have brought to their communities. And he has vowed to cut back the power of entrenched bureaucrats, who for decades preserved the status quo on foreign policy. Among older Japanese, for whom the U.S.-Japan alliance enjoyed a sacred status, this status quo was more than acceptable. But younger Japanese have begun to ask tough questions - to which Mr. Hatoyama is seeking answers. Tokyo's search for a more autonomous foreign policy is also a reflection of a changing strategic environment. China's rise is reshaping the region. It has become Japan's largest export market. Beijing has discovered the merits of regional engagement, opening the door to a new level of dialogue with Japan. Meanwhile, North Korea's nuclear program has provided a new urgency to regional dialogue, encouraging Japan to step out from behind the shadow of U.S. power. Japan is in many respects beginning to travel down the road taken by Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall. With the end of the Cold War, the European Union both quickened its pace of regional integration and yearned for more autonomy from Washington. Germany and France even led the charge against the Iraq war in 2003, and the trans-Atlantic alliance emerged the stronger for it. Europe no longer grumbles about the excesses of U.S. power. And the United States enjoys the benefits of a more independent and capable Europe that is shouldering a heavy burden in Afghanistan, leading the effort to curb climate change, and helping to stabilize the global economy. Japan needs to similarly update its alliance with the United States, getting a measure of distance from Washington, but ultimately making the partnership stronger and more mature. Japan has the potential to be a regional leader on peacekeeping, foreign aid and clean energy technology. As Japan deepens its bilateral relationship with China, the two countries may finally have the opportunity to replicate the kind of rapprochement achieved by France and Germany after World War II. In the same way that Europeans built a self-sustaining regional peace, Japan should capitalize on the stability afforded by its alliance with the U.S. to make a push for Sino-Japanese reconciliation and regional integration.

## Key to a stable multipolar peace.

**Sukma, executive director CSIS, 2010**

(Rizal, “East Asian Needs a Strong Japan”, 6-14, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/06/14/east-asia-needs-a-strong-japan.html>)

Despite all the difficulties, we hope Japan would be able to withstand the challenges. As international relations in East Asia enter its most crucial juncture, the role of Japan as a major regional power is very much needed. It is for the first time in Asia’s history that regional politics would be characterized by more than two powerful players. China will undoubtedly soon emerge as the most powerful country, second only to the US. India too will become a power that would shape the future of East Asia. As a result, a new emerging regional order is in the making. Southeast Asian countries, having good relationships with all four major powers, expect that the ongoing power shift in East Asia will continue to be peaceful and to the benefits of all regional nations, small and big. I, for one, believe that some sort of multi-polar structure in East Asia would ensure that the region continues to enjoy the stability it has experienced over the last five decades. In that context, a strong Japan would greatly contribute to the preservation of peace, stability and prosperity in the region. A strong Japan would be beneficial for the fulfillment of the ideal of an East Asian community.

# Japan AFF – Alliance Advantage – Asia War Module – 1AC

## Asian conflict is the most likely scenario for nuclear war and economic collapse- Asia lacks organizations and interdependence that prevent war elsewhere

**Landay**, Knight-Ridder National Security and Intelligence senior correspondent, 3-10-**2000**

[Jonathan, Knight Ridder Washington Bureau, "Top administration officials warn stakes for U.S. are high in Asian conflicts," l/n)

The 3,700-mile arc that begins at the heavily fortified border between North and South Korea and ends on the glacier where Indian and Pakistani troops skirmish almost every day has earned the dubious title of most dangerous part of the world. Few if any experts think China and Taiwan, North Korea and South Korea, or India and Pakistan are spoiling to fight. But **even a minor miscalculation** by any of them could destabilize Asia, jolt the global economy and even **start a nuclear war**. India, Pakistan and China all have nuclear weapons, and North Korea may have a few, too. Asia lacks the kinds of organizations, negotiations and diplomatic relationships that helped keep an uneasy peace for five decades in Cold War Europe. "**Nowhere else on Earth** are the stakes as high and relationships so fragile," said Bates Gill, director of northeast Asian policy studies at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank. "We see the convergence of great power interest overlaid with lingering confrontations with no institutionalized security mechanism in place. There are elements for potential disaster." In an effort to cool the region's tempers, President Clinton, Defense Secretary William S. Cohen and National Security Adviser Samuel R. Berger all will hopscotch Asia's capitals this month. For America, the stakes could hardly be higher. There are 100,000 U.S. troops in Asia committed to defending Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, and the United States would instantly become embroiled if Beijing moved against Taiwan or North Korea attacked South Korea. While Washington has no defense commitments to either India or Pakistan, a conflict between the two could end the global taboo against using nuclear weapons and demolish the already shaky international nonproliferation regime. In addition, globalization has made a stable Asia with its massive markets, cheap labor, exports and resources \_ indispensable to the U.S. economy. Numerous U.S. firms and millions of American jobs depend on trade with Asia that totaled $600 billion last year, according to the Commerce Department.

## Economic crash causes nuclear world war III

**O'Donnell**, 2-26-200**9**

[Sean, Baltimore Republican Examiner writer and Squad Leader in the Marine Corps Reserve, the Baltimore Examiner, "Will this recession lead to World War III?," <http://www.examiner.com/x-3108-Baltimore-Republican-Examiner~y2009m2d26-Will-this-recession-lead-to-World-War-III>]

Could the current economic crisis affecting this country and the world lead to another world war? The answer may be found by looking back in history. One of the causes of World War I was the economic rivalry that existed between the nations of Europe. In the 19th century France and Great Britain became wealthy through colonialism and the control of foreign resources. This forced other up-and-coming nations (such as Germany) to be more competitive in world trade which led to rivalries and ultimately, to war. After the Great Depression ruined the economies of Europe in the 1930s, fascist movements arose to seek economic and social control. From there fanatics like Hitler and Mussolini took over Germany and Italy and led them both into World War II. With most of North America and Western Europe currently experiencing a recession, will competition for resources and economic rivalries with the Middle East, Asia, or South American cause another world war? Add in nuclear weapons and Islamic fundamentalism and things look even worse. Hopefully the economy gets better before it gets worse and the terrifying possibility of World War III is averted. However sometimes history repeats itself.

## Asian conflict would break out quickly and escalate globally

**Emmott**, former editor of The Economist, 6-4-200**8**

[Bill, "Power rises in the east," The Australian, http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,23768795-25132,00.html]

The rise of Asia is not just, or even mainly, going to pit Asia against the West, shifting power from the latter to the former. It is going to pit Asians against Asians. This is the first time in history when there have been three powerful countries in Asia at the same time: China, India and Japan. That might not matter if they liked each other, or were somehow naturally compatible. But they do not, and are not. Far from it, in fact. Asia is becoming an arena of balance-of-power politics, with no clear leader, rather as Europe was during the 19th century. China may emerge as the most powerful of the three, but as with 19th-century Britain it is unlikely to be capable of dominating its continent. A new power game is under way, in which all must seek to be as friendly as possible to all, for fear of the consequences if they are not, but in which the friendship is only skin deep. All are manoeuvring to strengthen their positions and maximise their long-term advantages. The relationship between China, India and Japan is going to become increasingly difficult during the next decade. An array of disputes, historical bitternesses and regional flashpoints surround or weigh down on all three. Conflict is not inevitable but nor is it inconceivable. If it were to occur -- over Taiwan, say, or the Korean Peninsula, or Tibet or Pakistan -- it would not simply be an intra-Asian affair. The outside world inevitably would be drawn in, and especially the US, given its extensive military deployments and alliances in Asia. Such a conflict could break out very suddenly.

# Japan AFF – Alliance Advantage – Asia War Module – 1AC

## Military power and hostility means we outweigh on magnitude

**Hoge,** Foreign Affairs editor, 200**4**

[James, "A Global Power Shift in the Making," July/August, Foreign Affairs, <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20040701facomment83401/james-f-hoge-jr/a-global-power-shift-in-the-making.html>)

This time, the populous states of Asia are the aspirants seeking to play a greater role. Like Japan and Germany back then, these rising powers are nationalistic, seek redress of past grievances, and want to claim their place in the sun. **Asia's growing economic power is translating into greater** political and **military power**, thus **increasing the potential damage of conflicts**. Within the region, the flash points for hostilities -- Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula, and divided Kashmir -- have defied peaceful resolution. Any of them could explode into large-scale warfare that would make the current Middle East confrontations seem like police operations. In short, the stakes in Asia are huge and will challenge the West's adaptability.

## Population centers mean billions die.

**May**, **Stanford** University Freeman Spogli **Institute for International Studies senior fellow**, 19**97**

[Michael, Stanford engineering professor, former co-director of Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation, and director emeritus of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, "The Real Future of Energy in East Asia," The Washington Quarterly, l/n)

The unpalatable facts, to Europeans and North Americans, are that Asia has about half of the world's people, that it is growing faster than other parts of the world, and that, by mid-century, it will probably have more than half the population of the developed world and more than half of its money. Energy consumption, economic influence, and military power will be distributed in proportion. That is the rosy scenario. The dark scenario is that of a war that would, in all likelihood -- because nuclear weapons can be procured and deployed by any of these countries at a fraction of the cost of peaceful development -- leave most of the civilized world devastated.

# Japan AFF – Alliance Advantage – Hegemony Module – 1AC

## The Okinawa issue will unravel the Alliance-2 reasons.

**Ogoura, political science professor at Aoyama Gakuin University, 2010**

(Kazuo, “Japan-U.S. relations cry out for new management, dialogue”, 6-13, <http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20100613ko.html>)

Ripples, frictions, uneasiness, concern and even dismay — these are the words by which most of the Japanese mass-media commentaries characterize present Japan-U.S. relations. Behind this phenomenon lies the impact from several issues. The problem of bases in Okinawa, particularly the so-called Futenma air base issue, is one. In this case there are two aspects of friction. The first was the change in the position of a new Japanese government divorced from an "agreement" that had been reached between the former LDP government of Japan and the Bush administration. The second aspect appears to be related to the series of "changes" in the position of the Japanese authorities, which has wavered between consideration for international strategy and and the strong resistance of the people in Okinawa. Somewhat related to the base issue is a question as to how to deal with the mitsuyaku (secret deals or agreements) between Japanese and American authorities over the Okinawa reversion. Though, in substance, the contents of the secret agreement, even if proved to be true, does not directly jeopardize Japan-U.S. strategic relations, the underlying political implication is rather serious. The existence of a secret agreement between the conservative government of Japan and the American administration is regarded by many Japanese as a typical example of insincerity toward and neglect of the people's wishes at the expense of military or strategic dealings between the two governments. In other words, popular support and more transparent decision-making are now required in dealing with politico-military issues between Japan and the U.S. Then comes former Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama's emphasis on the formation of an East Asia Community coupled with the concept of yuai or fraternity. Although neither the idea of an East Asian Community nor yuai should necessarily give rise to concern in the American mind, these concepts have been viewed by some observers on both sides of the Pacific as signs of the new Japanese administration's "inclination" toward less attachment to strategic considerations in international relations. Finally, there is on the side of Japan a vague feeling of being "bullied" by America (such as on the issue of the recall of Toyota cars in the U.S.) or of being increasingly marginalized or neglected in the wake of the rising Chinese power and the increasingly visible U.S.-China strategic partnership.

## Japan is key to US hegemony-power projection, credibility and political influence.

**Rapp, Brigadier General US army, 2004**

(William, “PATHS DIVERGING? THE NEXT DECADE IN THE U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY ALLIANCE”, January 2004, http://www.scribd.com/doc/1575556/US-Air-Force-rap)

Currently in Northeast Asia there is considerable uncertainty about the future for all countries involved in the region. The nuclear ambitions of an increasingly desperate North Korea have led to serious ruptures in the U.S.-Republic of Korea alliance and greatly enhanced security fears in Japan. The global war on terrorism and widely perceived unilateralism on the part of the United States has, ironically, enhanced the confidence of China to portray itself as a multidimensional leader in Asia. The growing strength of the Kuomintang in Taiwanese politics and its agenda to build a closer relationship or even confederation with mainland China after the presidential elections of March 2004 may upend the security assumptions of the region. Operation IRAQI FREEDOM has reinforced the concepts of transformation and power projection from a more limited number of forward bases advocated so strongly by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, while at the same time highlighting America’s need for allies in the war on terrorism. It is a region awash in uncertainly, but one in which the United States must remain firmly engaged to protect its vital interests. In the breadth of its reach and influence, the United States is often described by others as hegemonic and the world’s sole superpower. This is a very clumsy caricature, however. Colin Powell recently quipped, “We are so multilateral it keeps me up 24 hours a day checking on everybody.” 2 The extent of that reach and the means necessary for achieving American interests around the world depend. greatly on cooperative efforts with other like-minded nations, if only in “coalitions of the willing” built by the United States for ad hoc purposes. In Northeast Asia, the United States has two vital alliances―with Japan and South Korea―already in place. Although the American relationship with the Republic of Korea (ROK) is undeniably critical to security on this strategically important peninsula, the relationship is very narrow in its scope and its future in some doubt. 3 The relationship with Japan, however, offers greater potential to achieve American interests in the long run in Asia, beyond simply the defense of Japan. Being off the shores of mainland Asia and combining the two biggest economies in the world, 4 this alliance offers significant long-term opportunities to more actively promote peace, prosperity, and liberal values in the region. Japan and the United States share many important long-term interests, and the convergence of these interests highlights the continued need for their relationship. Concern about the growth and character of Chinese power, fears about the future of North Korea, prevention of the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), maintenance of secure sea lines of communication, concern about the absence of alternative security institutions in East Asia, and a shared desire for democracy, human rights, and increased trade all strongly reinforce the need for the alliance.

# Japan AFF – Alliance Advantage – Hegemony Module – 1AC

## Maintenance of U.S. global leadership is vital to preventing numerous scenarios for nuclear conflict

Thayer, 06 (Bradley, "In Defense of Primacy," The National Interest, November/December 2006, p. lexis)

Throughout history, peace and stability have been great benefits of an era where there was a dominant power-- Rome, Britain or the United States today. Scholars and statesmen have long recognized the irenic effect of power on the anarchic world of international politics. Everything we think of when we consider the current international order--free trade, a robust monetary regime, increasing respect for human rights, growing democratization--is directly linked to U.S. power. Retrenchment proponents seem to think that the current system can be maintained without the current amount of U.S. power behind it. In that they are dead wrong and need to be reminded of one of history's most significant lessons: Appalling things happen when international orders collapse. The Dark Ages followed Rome's collapse. Hitler succeeded the order established at Versailles. Without U.S. power, the liberal order created by the United States will end just as assuredly. As country and western great Ral Donner sang: "You don't know what you've got (until you lose it)." Consequently, it is important to note what those good things are. In addition to ensuring the security of the United States and its allies, American primacy within the international system causes many positive outcomes for Washington and the world. The first has been a more peaceful world. During the Cold War, U.S. leadership reduced friction among many states that were historical antagonists, most notably France and West Germany. Today, American primacy helps keep a number of complicated relationships aligned--between Greece and Turkey, Israel and Egypt, South Korea and Japan, India and Pakistan, Indonesia and Australia. This is not to say it fulfills Woodrow Wilson's vision of ending all war. Wars still occur where Washington's interests are not seriously threatened, such as in Darfur, but a Pax Americana does reduce war's likelihood, particularly war's worst form: great power wars. Second, American power gives the United States the ability to spread democracy and other elements of its ideology of liberalism. Doing so is a source of much good for the countries concerned as well as the United States because, as John Owen noted on these pages in the Spring 2006 issue, liberal democracies are more likely to align with the United States and be sympathetic to the American worldview.3 So, spreading democracy helps maintain U.S. primacy. In addition, once states are governed democratically, the likelihood of any type of conflict is significantly reduced. This is not because democracies do not have clashing interests. Indeed they do. Rather, it is because they are more open, more transparent and more likely to want to resolve things amicably in concurrence with U.S. leadership. And so, in general, democratic states are good for their citizens as well as for advancing the interests of the United States. Critics have faulted the Bush Administration for attempting to spread democracy in the Middle East, labeling such an effort a modern form of tilting at windmills. It is the obligation of Bush's critics to explain why democracy is good enough for Western states but not for the rest, and, one gathers from the argument, should not even be attempted. Of course, whether democracy in the Middle East will have a peaceful or stabilizing influence on America's interests in the short run is open to question. Perhaps democratic Arab states would be more opposed to Israel, but nonetheless, their people would be better off. The United States has brought democracy to Afghanistan , where 8.5 million Afghans, 40 percent of them women, voted in a critical October 2004 election, even though remnant Taliban forces threatened them. The first free elections were held in Iraq in January 2005. It was the military power of the United States that put Iraq on the path to democracy. Washington fostered democratic governments in Europe, Latin America, Asia and the Caucasus. Now even the Middle East is increasingly democratic. They may not yet look like Western-style democracies, but democratic progress has been made in Algeria, Morocco, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, the Palestinian Authority and Egypt. By all accounts, the march of democracy has been impressive. Third, along with the growth in the number of democratic states around the world has been the growth of the global economy. With its allies, the United States has labored to create an economically liberal worldwide network characterized by free trade and commerce, respect for international property rights, and mobility of capital and labor markets. The economic stability and prosperity that stems from this economic order is a global public good from which all states benefit, particularly the poorest states in the Third World. The United States created this network not out of altruism but for the benefit and the economic well-being of America. This economic order forces American industries to be competitive, maximizes efficiencies and growth, and benefits defense as well because the size of the economy makes the defense burden manageable. Economic spin-offs foster the development of military technology, helping to ensure military prowess. Perhaps the greatest testament to the benefits of the economic network comes from Deepak Lal, a former Indian foreign service diplomat and researcher at the World Bank, who started his career confident in the socialist ideology of post-independence India. Abandoning the positions of his youth, Lal now recognizes that the only way to bring relief to desperately poor countries of the Third World is through the adoption of free market economic policies and globalization, which are facilitated through American primacy.4 As a witness to the failed alternative economic systems, Lal is one of the strongest academic proponents of American primacy due to the economic prosperity it provides. Fourth and finally, the United States, in seeking primacy, has been willing to use its power not only to advance its interests but to promote the welfare of people all over the globe. The United States is the earth's leading source of positive externalities for the world. The U.S. military has participated in over fifty operations since the end of the Cold War--and most of those missions have been humanitarian in nature. Indeed, the U.S. military is the earth's "911 force"--it serves, de facto, as the world's police, the global paramedic and the planet's fire department. Whenever there is a natural disaster, earthquake, flood, drought, volcanic eruption, typhoon or tsunami, the United States assists the countries in need. On the day after Christmas in 2004, a tremendous earthquake and tsunami occurred in the Indian Ocean near Sumatra, killing some 300,000 people. The United States was the first to respond with aid. Washington followed up with a large contribution of aid and deployed the U.S. military to South and Southeast Asia for many months to help with the aftermath of the disaster. About 20,000 U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines responded by providing water, food, medical aid, disease treatment and prevention as well as forensic assistance to help identify the bodies of those killed. Only the U.S. military could have accomplished this Herculean effort. No other force possesses the communications capabilities or global logistical reach of the U.S. military. In fact, UN peacekeeping operations depend on the United States to supply UN forces. American generosity has done more to help the United States fight the War on Terror than almost any other measure. Before the tsunami, 80 percent of Indonesian public opinion was opposed to the United States ; after it, 80 percent had a favorable opinion of America. Two years after the disaster, and in poll after poll, Indonesians still have overwhelmingly positive views of the United States. In October 2005, an enormous earthquake struck Kashmir, killing about 74,000 people and leaving three million homeless. The U.S. military responded immediately, diverting helicopters fighting the War on Terror in nearby Afghanistan to bring relief as soon as possible. To help those in need, the United States also provided financial aid to Pakistan; and, as one might expect from those witnessing the munificence of the United States, it left a lasting impression about America. For the first time since 9/11, polls of Pakistani opinion have found that more people are favorable toward the United States than unfavorable, while support for Al-Qaeda dropped to its lowest level. Whether in Indonesia or Kashmir, the money was well-spent because it helped people in the wake of disasters, but it also had a real impact on the War on Terror. When people in the Muslim world witness the U.S. military conducting a humanitarian mission, there is a clearly positive impact on Muslim opinion of the United States. As the War on Terror is a war of ideas and opinion as much as military action, for the United States humanitarian missions are the equivalent of a blitzkrieg. THERE IS no other state, group of states or international organization that can provide these global benefits. None even comes close. The United Nations cannot because it is riven with conflicts and major cleavages that divide the international body time and again on matters great and trivial. Thus it lacks the ability to speak with one voice on salient issues and to act as a unified force once a decision is reached. The EU has similar problems. Does anyone expect Russia or China to take up these responsibilities? They may have the desire, but they do not have the capabilities. Let's face it: for the time being, American primacy remains humanity's only practical hope of solving the world's ills.

# Japan AFF – Alliance Advantage – Laundry List Module – 1AC

## And the Okinawa issue will unravel the Alliance-2 reasons.

**Ogoura, political science professor at Aoyama Gakuin University, 2010**

(Kazuo, “Japan-U.S. relations cry out for new management, dialogue”, 6-13, <http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20100613ko.html>)

Ripples, frictions, uneasiness, concern and even dismay — these are the words by which most of the Japanese mass-media commentaries characterize present Japan-U.S. relations. Behind this phenomenon lies the impact from several issues. The problem of bases in Okinawa, particularly the so-called Futenma air base issue, is one. In this case there are two aspects of friction. The first was the change in the position of a new Japanese government divorced from an "agreement" that had been reached between the former LDP government of Japan and the Bush administration. The second aspect appears to be related to the series of "changes" in the position of the Japanese authorities, which has wavered between consideration for international strategy and and the strong resistance of the people in Okinawa. Somewhat related to the base issue is a question as to how to deal with the mitsuyaku (secret deals or agreements) between Japanese and American authorities over the Okinawa reversion. Though, in substance, the contents of the secret agreement, even if proved to be true, does not directly jeopardize Japan-U.S. strategic relations, the underlying political implication is rather serious. The existence of a secret agreement between the conservative government of Japan and the American administration is regarded by many Japanese as a typical example of insincerity toward and neglect of the people's wishes at the expense of military or strategic dealings between the two governments. In other words, popular support and more transparent decision-making are now required in dealing with politico-military issues between Japan and the U.S. Then comes former Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama's emphasis on the formation of an East Asia Community coupled with the concept of yuai or fraternity. Although neither the idea of an East Asian Community nor yuai should necessarily give rise to concern in the American mind, these concepts have been viewed by some observers on both sides of the Pacific as signs of the new Japanese administration's "inclination" toward less attachment to strategic considerations in international relations. Finally, there is on the side of Japan a vague feeling of being "bullied" by America (such as on the issue of the recall of Toyota cars in the U.S.) or of being increasingly marginalized or neglected in the wake of the rising Chinese power and the increasingly visible U.S.-China strategic partnership.

## And, the Alliance is key to check terrorism, pandemics and warming.

**Nye, Kennedy school of government at Harvard, 2009**

(Joseph, “Will US-Japan Alliance Survive?”, The Korea Times, 7-14-2009, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2009/07/137\_48423.html)

Third, the U.S.-Japan alliance will have to face a new set of transnational challenges to our vital interests, such as pandemics, terrorism, and human outflows from failed states. Chief among these challenges is the threat posed by global warming, with China having surpassed the U.S. as the leading producer of carbon-dioxide emissions (though not in per capita terms). Fortunately, this is an area that plays to Japan's strengths. Although some Japanese complain about the unequal nature of the alliance's security components, owing to the limits that Japan has accepted on the use of force, in these new areas, Japan is a stronger partner. Japan's overseas development assistance in places ranging from Africa to Afghanistan, its participation in global health projects, its support of the United Nations, its naval participation in anti-piracy operations, and its research and development on energy efficiency place it at the forefront in dealing with the new transnational challenges. Given today's agenda, there is enormous potential for an equal partnership, working with others, in the provision of global public goods that will benefit the U.S., Japan, and the rest of the world. That is why I remain optimistic about the future of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

## Terrorism causes extinction.

Mohamed **Sid-Ahmed**, Al-Ahram Weekly political analyst, ‘**04**

[Al-Ahram Weekly, "Extinction!" 8/26, no. 705, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm]

What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This could lead to a third world war, from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers.

# Japan AFF – Alliance Advantage – Laundry List Module – 1AC

## Disease spread causes extinction.

**Keating, Foreign Policy Web Editor, 2009**

(Joshua, “The End of the World”, 11-13, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/11/13/the\_end\_of\_the\_world?page=full)

How it could happen: Throughout history, plagues have brought civilizations to their knees. The Black Death killed more off more than half of Europe's population in the Middle Ages. In 1918, a flu pandemic killed an estimated 50 million people, nearly 3 percent of the world's population, a far greater impact than the just-concluded World War I. Because of globalization, diseases today spread even faster - witness the rapid worldwide spread of H1N1 currently unfolding. A global outbreak of a disease such as ebola virus -- which has had a 90 percent fatality rate during its flare-ups in rural Africa -- or a mutated drug-resistant form of the flu virus on a global scale could have a devastating, even civilization-ending impact.How likely is it? Treatment of deadly diseases has improved since 1918, but so have the diseases. Modern industrial farming techniques have been blamed for the outbreak of diseases, such as swine flu, and as the world’s population grows and humans move into previously unoccupied areas, the risk of exposure to previously unknown pathogens increases**.** More than 40 new viruses have emerged since the 1970s, including ebola and HIV. Biological weapons experimentation has added a new and just as troubling complication.

## Warming does too

Tickell, Climate researcher 2008

(Oliver, Climate Researcher, The Gaurdian, “On a planet 4C hotter, all we can prepare for is extinction”, 8-11, http://www.guardian.co.uk/ commentisfree/2008/aug/11/ climatechange)

We need to get prepared for four degrees of global warming, Bob Watson told the Guardian last week. At first sight this looks like wise counsel from the climate science adviser to Defra. But the idea that we could adapt to a 4C rise is absurd and dangerous. Global warming on this scale would be a catastrophe that would mean, in the immortal words that Chief Seattle probably never spoke, "the end of living and the beginning of survival" for humankind. Or perhaps the beginning of our extinction. The collapse of the polar ice caps would become inevitable, bringing long-term sea level rises of 70-80 metres. All the world's coastal plains would be lost, complete with ports, cities, transport and industrial infrastructure, and much of the world's most productive farmland. The world's geography would be transformed much as it was at the end of the last ice age, when sea levels rose by about 120 metres to create the Channel, the North Sea and Cardigan Bay out of dry land. Weather would become extreme and unpredictable, with more frequent and severe droughts, floods and hurricanes. The Earth's carrying capacity would be hugely reduced. Billions would undoubtedly die. Watson's call was supported by the government's former chief scientific adviser, Sir David King, who warned that "if we get to a four-degree rise it is quite possible that we would begin to see a runaway increase". This is a remarkable understatement. The climate system is already experiencing significant feedbacks, notably the summer melting of the Arctic sea ice. The more the ice melts, the more sunshine is absorbed by the sea, and the more the Arctic warms. And as the Arctic warms, the release of billions of tonnes of methane – a greenhouse gas 70 times stronger than carbon dioxide over 20 years – captured under melting permafrost is already under way. To see how far this process could go, look 55.5m years to the Palaeocene-Eocene Thermal Maximum, when a global temperature increase of 6C coincided with the release of about 5,000 gigatonnes of carbon into the atmosphere, both as CO2 and as methane from bogs and seabed sediments. Lush subtropical forests grew in polar regions, and sea levels rose to 100m higher than today. It appears that an initial warming pulse triggered other warming processes. Many scientists warn that this historical event may be analogous to the present: the warming caused by human emissions could propel us towards a similar hothouse Earth

# Japan AFF – Alliance Advantage – Proliferation Module – 1AC

Japan isn’t proliferating now, but it’s on the brink. Any stress of the US-Japan alliance will empower Japanese hawks to push for a nuclear arsenal.

Chanlett-Avery, CRS Asian Affairs Specialist, and Nikitin, CSIS Nonproliferation Analyst, 2009

Emma, Congressional Research Service, Analyst in Asian Affairs in the Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade division, Mary, Research Associate for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Japan’s Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and U.S. Interests”, February 19, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34487.pdf, Accessed 7/18/2010

Today, Japanese officials and experts remain remarkably uniform in their consensus that Japan is unlikely to move toward nuclear status in the short-to-medium term. However, as the security environment has shifted significantly, the topic is no longer toxic and has been broached by several leading politicians. North Korea’s test of a nuclear device in 2006 and China’s military modernization have altered the strategic dynamics in the region, and any signs of stress in the U.S.-Japan alliance raises questions among some about the robustness of the U.S. security guarantee. An ascendant hawkish, conservative movement—some of whom openly advocate for Japan to develop an independent nuclear arsenal—has gained more traction in Japanese politics, moving from the margins to a more influential position. In addition, previous security-related taboos have been overcome in the past few years: the dispatch of Japanese military equipment and personnel to Iraq and Afghanistan, the elevation of the Japanese Defense Agency to a fullscale ministry, and Japanese co-development of a missile defense system with the United States. All of these factors together increase the still unlikely possibility that Japan will reconsider its position on nuclear weapons.

## The Okinawa issue will unravel the Alliance-2 reasons.

**Ogoura, political science professor at Aoyama Gakuin University, 2010**

(Kazuo, “Japan-U.S. relations cry out for new management, dialogue”, 6-13, <http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20100613ko.html>)

Ripples, frictions, uneasiness, concern and even dismay — these are the words by which most of the Japanese mass-media commentaries characterize present Japan-U.S. relations. Behind this phenomenon lies the impact from several issues. The problem of bases in Okinawa, particularly the so-called Futenma air base issue, is one. In this case there are two aspects of friction. The first was the change in the position of a new Japanese government divorced from an "agreement" that had been reached between the former LDP government of Japan and the Bush administration. The second aspect appears to be related to the series of "changes" in the position of the Japanese authorities, which has wavered between consideration for international strategy and and the strong resistance of the people in Okinawa. Somewhat related to the base issue is a question as to how to deal with the mitsuyaku (secret deals or agreements) between Japanese and American authorities over the Okinawa reversion. Though, in substance, the contents of the secret agreement, even if proved to be true, does not directly jeopardize Japan-U.S. strategic relations, the underlying political implication is rather serious. The existence of a secret agreement between the conservative government of Japan and the American administration is regarded by many Japanese as a typical example of insincerity toward and neglect of the people's wishes at the expense of military or strategic dealings between the two governments. In other words, popular support and more transparent decision-making are now required in dealing with politico-military issues between Japan and the U.S. Then comes former Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama's emphasis on the formation of an East Asia Community coupled with the concept of yuai or fraternity. Although neither the idea of an East Asian Community nor yuai should necessarily give rise to concern in the American mind, these concepts have been viewed by some observers on both sides of the Pacific as signs of the new Japanese administration's "inclination" toward less attachment to strategic considerations in international relations. Finally, there is on the side of Japan a vague feeling of being "bullied" by America (such as on the issue of the recall of Toyota cars in the U.S.) or of being increasingly marginalized or neglected in the wake of the rising Chinese power and the increasingly visible U.S.-China strategic partnership.

# Japan AFF – Alliance Advantage – Proliferation Module – 1AC

## Japanese confidence in the US-Japan alliance deters its acquisition of a nuclear arsenal. Weakening the alliance strengthens support in Japan for it to acquire nuclear weapons.

Chanlett-Avery, CRS Asian Affairs Specialist, and Nikitin, CSIS Nonproliferation Analyst, 2009

Emma, Congressional Research Service, Analyst in Asian Affairs in the Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade division, Mary, Research Associate for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Japan’s Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and U.S. Interests”, February 19, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34487.pdf, Accessed 7/18/2010

Perhaps the single most important factor to date in dissuading Tokyo from developing a nuclear arsenal is the U.S. guarantee to protect Japan’s security. Since the threat of nuclear attack developed during the Cold War, Japan has been included under the U.S. “nuclear umbrella,” although some ambiguity exists about whether the United States is committed to respond with nuclear weapons in the event of a nuclear attack on Japan.25 U.S. officials have hinted that it would: following North Korea’s 2006 nuclear test, former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, in Tokyo, said, “ ... the United States has the will and the capability to meet the full range, and I underscore full range, of its deterrent and security commitments to Japan.”26 Most policymakers in Japan continue to emphasize that strengthening the alliance as well as shared conventional capabilities is more sound strategy than pursuing an independent nuclear capability.27 During the Cold War, the threat of mutually assured destruction to the United States and the Soviet Union created a sort of perverse stability in international politics; Japan, as the major Pacific front of the U.S. containment strategy, felt confident in U.S. extended deterrence. Although the United States has reiterated its commitment to defend Japan, the strategic stakes have changed, leading some in Japan to question the American pledge. Some in Japan are nervous that if the United States develops a closer relationship with China, the gap between Tokyo’s and Washington’s security perspectives will grow and further weaken the U.S. commitment.28 These critics also point to what they perceive as the soft negotiating position on North Korea’s denuclearization in the Six-Party Talks as further evidence that the United States does not share Japan’s strategic perspective.29 A weakening of the bilateral alliance may strengthen the hand of those that want to explore the possibility of Japan developing its own deterrence.

## Japanese proliferation collapses the NPT, leading to wildfire proliferation.

Chanlett-Avery, CRS Asian Affairs Specialist, and Nikitin, CSIS Nonproliferation Analyst, 2009

Emma, Congressional Research Service, Analyst in Asian Affairs in the Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade division, Mary, Research Associate for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Japan’s Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and U.S. Interests”, February 19, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34487.pdf, Accessed 7/18/2010

Diplomatically, the policy turn-about would have profound implications. Japan has built a reputation as a leader in non-proliferation and as a promoter of nuclear disarmament. It has consistently called for a “safe world free of nuclear weapons on the earliest possible date.” Japan submits a resolution to the General Assembly’s First Committee each year on a nuclear-free world and submits working papers to the NPT review conferences and preparatory committees on disarmament. It has been a vocal advocate for IAEA verification and compliance and was the first to respond with sanctions to nuclear tests in South Asia and North Korea. It has been a constant voice in support of nuclear disarmament in international fora. An about-face on its non-nuclear weapon state status would dramatically change the global view of Japan, or might dramatically change the perception of nuclear weapons possession in the world. This move could have profound implications for nuclear proliferation elsewhere, perhaps leading to additional NPT withdrawals. Acquiring nuclear weapons could also hurt Japan’s long-term goal of permanent membership on the U.N. Security Council.

# Japan AFF – Alliance Advantage – Proliferation Module – 1AC

## Statistical evidence proves that the NPT effectively solves proliferation

Walsh, Harvard University Kennedy School of Government International Security Program Fellow, 2005

Jim, Director of the Managing the Atom Project and Fellow in the International Security Program at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, “Learning from Past Success: The NPT and the Future of Non-proliferation”, The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, October, http://www.wmdcommission.org/files/no41.pdf, Accessed 7/18/2010

There are several types of arguments that support the view that the NPT has been a success. The first type is statistical. Statistical One set of statistics looks at nuclear outcomes in the aggregate. In particular, one can point to a) the declining rate of proliferation over time, b) the small percentage of countries that became nuclear weapons states compared with the number of countries that considered doing so, and c) the declining number of countries interested in acquiring nuclear weapons. Proponents cite this record of restraint and make the additional point that these positive developments follow or coincide with the establishment of the treaty. Consider, for example, the rate of proliferation. Measured as number of new nuclear weapons states per decade, the rate of proliferation peaked in the 1960s and began to decline in the 1970s. Perhaps not coincidentally, the NPT came into force in 1970. Sceptics could rightly point out that the chart does not include North Korea. Moreover, it might be argued that the chart, while dramatic, is an artefact of small numbers. With so few cases, one cannot be especially confident in the conclusions. North Korea is not reflected in the chart, in part, because their nuclear status is unclear. Most analysts believe that, consistent with North Korean claims, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) possesses at least one device. On the other hand, some long-time observers would not be surprised if it turned out that Pyongyang, in fact, had no nuclear weapons. More importantly, the DPRK has repeatedly suggested that it is willing to renounce its arsenal, in which case the corrected chart would nevertheless exhibit a declining rate of proliferation. Indeed, as Matthew Bunn has observed, even if one includes the DPRK as a weapons state, there are the same number of nuclear weapons states today as there were 15 years ago.21 It is certainly true that the chart reflects a small number of cases, but that, of course, is the point. The very fact that there are a small number of cases suggests that the treaty has been successful. Regardless, one has to use the data that is available, and it points to a thirty-year decline in the rate of proliferation. As discussed above, the number of countries that became nuclear weapons states is relatively small, but evidence of nuclear restraint is not only found in this small number of states but in the modest percentage of countries that acquired nuclear weapons. A much larger number of countries considered, inherited, or acquired a nuclear option but maintained or reverted to a nonnuclear status. Indeed, 75% of countries that could have become nuclear weapons states are instead non-nuclear weapons states. A final statistical measure is the number of countries that aspire to become nuclear weapons states. Contemporary analysts focus on North Korea and Iran, but how does that compare with previous decades? There are, in fact, fewer states seeking nuclear weapons today than at any point since WWII. The 1960s had the most nuclear aspirants. Indeed, the number of countries that were interested in acquiring nuclear weapons in the 1950s and 1960s is roughly double the total number of countries seeking nuclear weapons for the subsequent three decades combined. As threatening as it may seem that a DPRK or Iran might seek to be nuclear weapons states, policy makers from decades past found themselves in a far more threatening situation in terms of proliferation.22 Simply put, since the NPT, fewer countries have had nuclear ambitions.

# Japan AFF – Alliance Advantage – Proliferation Module – 1AC

## Proliferation causes nuclear war –it uniquely increases the risk and magnitude of conflicts.

Sokolski, Nonproliferation Policy Education Center Executive Director, 2009

Henry, Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center and serves on the US congressional Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, “Avoiding a nuclear crowd,” Policy Review, June/July

AT A MINIMUM, such developments will be a departure from whatever stability existed during the Cold War. After World War II, there was a clear subordination of nations to one or another of the two superpowers' strong alliance systems — the U.S.-led free world and the Russian-Chinese led Communist Bloc. The net effect was relative peace with only small, nonindustrial wars. This alliance tension and system, however, no longer exist. Instead, we now have one superpower, the United States, that is capable of overthrowing small nations unilaterally with conventional arms alone, associated with a relatively weak alliance system (NATO) that includes two European nuclear powers (France and the UK). NATO is increasingly integrating its nuclear targeting policies. The U.S. also has retained its security allies in Asia (Japan, Australia, and South Korea) but has seen the emergence of an increasing number of nuclear or nuclearweapon- armed or -ready states. So far, the U.S. has tried to cope with independent nuclear powers by making them "strategic partners" (e.g., India and Russia), NATO nuclear allies (France and the UK), "non-NATO allies" (e.g., Israel and Pakistan), and strategic stakeholders (China); or by fudging if a nation actually has attained full nuclear status (e.g., Iran or North Korea, which, we insist, will either not get nuclear weapons or will give them up). In this world, every nuclear power center (our European nuclear NATO allies), the U.S., Russia, China, Israel, India, and Pakistan could have significant diplomatic security relations or ties with one another but none of these ties is viewed by Washington (and, one hopes, by no one else) as being as important as the ties between Washington and each of these nuclear-armed entities (see Figure 3). There are limits, however, to what this approach can accomplish. Such a weak alliance system, with its expanding set of loose affiliations, risks becoming analogous to the international system that failed to contain offensive actions prior to World War I. Unlike 1914, there is no power today that can rival the projection of U.S. conventional forces anywhere on the globe. But in a world with an increasing number of nuclear-armed or nuclear-ready states, this may not matter as much as we think. In such a world, the actions of just one or two states or groups that might threaten to disrupt or overthrow a nuclear weapons state could check U.S. influence or ignite a war Washington could have difficulty containing. No amount of military science or tactics could assure that the U.S. could disarm or neutralize such threatening or unstable nuclear states.^^ Nor could diplomats or our intelligence services be relied upon to keep up to date on what each of these governments would be likely to do in such a crisis (see graphic below): Combine these proliferation trends with the others noted above and one could easily create the perfect nuclear storm: Small differences between nuclear competitors that would put all actors on edge; an overhang of nuclear materials that could be called upon to break out or significantly ramp up existing nuclear deployments; and a variety of potential new nuclear actors developing weapons options in the wings. In such a setting, the military and nuclear rivalries between states could easily be much more intense than before. Certainly each nuclear state's military would place an even higher premium than before on being able to weaponize its military and civilian surpluses quickly, to deploy forces that are survivable, and to have forces that can get to their targets and destroy them with high levels of probability. The advanced military states will also be even more inclined to develop and deploy enhanced air and missile defenses and long-range, precision guidance munitions, and to develop a variety of preventative and preemptive war options. Certainly, in such a world, relations between states could become far less stable. Relatively small developments — e.g., Russian support for sympathetic near-abroad provinces; Pakistani-inspired terrorist strikes in India, such as those experienced recently in Mumbai; new Indian flanking activities in Iran near Pakistan; Chinese weapons developments or moves regarding Taiwan; state-sponsored assassination attempts of key figures in the Middle East or South West Asia, etc. — could easily prompt nuclear weapons deployments with "strategic" consequences (arms races, strategic miscues, and even nuclear war). As Herman Kahn once noted, in such a world "every quarrel or difference of opinion may lead to violence of a kind quite different from what is possible today."^^ In short, we may soon see a future that neither the proponents of nuclear abolition, nor their critics, would ever want.

# Japan AFF – Alliance Advantage – Okinawa Hurts Alliance – EXTN

## Futenma sparks Japanese backlash-undermines the entire alliance

**Kapila, PhD in Strategic Studies Allahabad University, 2010**

(Subhash, “Japan’s Political Instability and Its Strategic Impact”, 6-7, [http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/\papers39\paper3848.html](http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers39%5Cpaper3848.html))

The latest issue in Japan-US Security Relationship to rock Japanese politics and bring down outgoing Prime Minister Hatoyama was the relocation of the US Marine Air Base, Futenma.  It is not the intention to go into the merits or demerits of the Futema issue.  The aim is to focus on the larger issue as to why earlier Prime ministers strongly aligned to US security interests had long and stable tenures and why presently Japanese Prime ministers are increasingly becoming vulnerable to strong Japanese domestic opinion on US-Japan security related issues.  This significant change can be attributed to two strategic factors, both pertaining to the United States.  In the past United States reigned supreme strategically in East Asia.  That strategic strength provided Japan with a sheet anchor for its security.  Today, United States strategic power is on the decline and China is rising strategically strong in East Asia.  Japanese insecurities therefore are raised.  More seriously, Japanese insecurities are magnified further when Japan perceives that United States policy formulations in East Asia exhibit ambiguities about Japan’s strategic sensitivities.  Under the present US Administration, even though the US President and US Secretary of State visited Japan first  in East Asia, but in their pronouncements in Tokyo they seemed to indicate that the United States intends to adopt China as a partner in the security management of East Asia. With such US attitudinal adoptions, it becomes logical for Japanese public to question the very premises of  US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, Japan’s financial underwriting of US forward military presence in Asia and the sizeable US Marines presence on Okinawa Island.

## US-Japan alliance is in crisis, Futenma is the key issue-US compromise is key.

**Vaughan, School of Political Science & International Studies The University of Queensland, 2010**

(Michael, “JAPAN’S QUIET REVOLUTION: THE 2009 ELECTION & ITS AFTERMATH”, 1-8, [http://espace.library.uq.edu.au/eserv/UQ:191742/Japans\_Quiet.pdf](http://espace.library.uq.edu.au/eserv/UQ%3A191742/Japans_Quiet.pdf))

The United States appears increasingly concerned about the new course of Japan’s foreign and security policy. At the centre of a widening gap between the allies is the fate of a 2006 bilateral agreement to reconfigure US forces stationed in Japan, especially the relocation of the US Marine Corps’ Futenma Air Station in Okinawa Prefecture. Differences among Japan’s Cabinet members are compounding the issue. Foreign Minister Okada said he does not “think it’s an option” to move the facility out of Okinawa, while SDP leader and Minister for Consumer Affairs and Falling Birthrate Issues, Mizuho Fukushima, insisted that the base be transferred outside the Prefecture. 13 Tokyo is under strong US pressure to implement a 2006 plan to move Futenma Air Base to a less crowded part of the island of Okinawa as part of an overhaul of the 47,000 strong US force in Japan. Prime Minister Hatoyama is now caught between the hopes of Okinawa residents that were fanned by his Election comments to move the Base off Okinawa and a tough stance by his Coalition partner the SDP on one hand, and an increasingly frustrated Washington on the other. 14 In recent commentary, Carolyn Leddy, a former National Security Council director for counterproliferation strategy, sharply criticized what she described as the Hatoyama government’s “increasing security-policy schizophrenia”, including its pursuit of an East Asian Community that might shut the United States out. “Tokyo’s position threatens to undermine the cornerstone of East Asian security: the US-Japan alliance … The DPJ’s ideas just don’t make sense,” she said. 15 The Futenma Base issue has thus been the cause of severe friction between Japan and the United States. Either one or the other of the parties will have to concede ground or else face a damaging major rift in the long-standing alliance. It remains to be seen whether the Hatoyama government holds its resolve or whether the Obama administration imposes its will upon the angry and disaffected people of Okinawa. As Columnist Roger Cohen has observed, President Obama “has a Japan problem … there are troubles. Reliable Japan is now restive Japan. It’s talking about a more ‘equal partnership’ – read less subservient. Acquiescence has given way to argument.” 16

# Japan AFF – Alliance Advantage – Okinawa Hurts Alliance – EXTN

## Relationship is contentious-Okinawa is the epicenter.

**Cohn, a lecturer at the University of New York in Prague, 2010**

(William, “De-based: US Military Bases Abroad Fall into Disfavor”, New Presence: The Prague Journal of Central European Affairs; Winter, Volume 13, Issue 1, ebsco)

Asia: For the older generation, the popular protests against the US base in Okinawa, Japan is a powerful rebuke of America. Japan has been a solid ally of the US for decades, and Okinawa is a key base of US military operations in the Pacific region. When Obama arrived in Tokyo in November, US relations with Japan were most contentious. The US air base at Okinawa, built on land seized in the closing days of WWII, has taken on added significance as a symbolic and strategic base. Almost 40,000 US military personnel are based in Japan. In September, the Democratic Party of Japan was elected ending 50 years of rule by conservatives. President Hatoyama campaigned on a platform of revisiting Japan’s alliance with the US and within weeks of being elected he announced that Japan would stop refueling warships used for the US campaign in Afghanistan and would revisit a 2006 agreement to relocate a US airfield on Okinawa. Japan’s government has also called for a review of the US-Japan Status of Forces Agreement which protects US troops from Japanese prosecution, something Japanese citizens have been demanding for years (more than 20,000 Okinawans held a protest rally against the base in November. In 1996 there was great public outcry following the rape of a 12-year-old Japanese girl by three American servicemen, and again in 2004 following a fiery marine helicopter crash on the neighboring campus of Okinawa International University). Hatoyama has called for ending Japan’s “overdependence” on the US and reorienting his nation toward a resurgent Asia. Cornell University professor Eswar Prasad says “Japan sees its future more within Asia. They feel that they owe a lot less to the US right now. US economic policy is hurting them in a lot of ways, particularly with the decline of the US dollar versus the yen.”

# Japan AFF – Alliance Advantage – Okinawa Hurts Alliance – EXTN

## Tensions now-2 reasons, plan solves

**Harris. East Asia Forum, 2009**

(Tobias, “US-Japan alliance: Time for the US to accept new realities”, 11-15, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/11/15/us-japan-alliance-time-for-the-us-to-accept-new-realities/)

 The current tension — if tension is the right word for it — is the product of structural change in two areas, neither of which works in favor of the US. First, that the DPJ is in power is alone an indicator of profound changes occurring within Japan. For all the speculation by analysts about whether the public favors this proposal or that proposal in the DPJ’s manifesto and about whether the public actually expects the Hatoyama government to be able to deliver, the DPJ’s victory spelled the end of the old system of government. While the new system is still coalescing, I think it is already safe to say that there will be no going back to the old regime of cozy ties among LDP backbenchers and bureaucrats. The old system meant that the alliance rested in the hands of a small number of LDP alliance managers and MOFA and more recently JDA/MOD officials. As analysts like the Washington Post’s Jim Hoagland, who rushed to the defense of Japan’s bureaucrats after the August election, realized, the US benefited greatly from this system. Alliance cooperation was predictable, even if the US government would have preferred that Japan contribute more. This system, however, made it difficult for the Japanese government to secure the approval of the Japanese people when it came to things like sweeping changes in the configuration of US forces in Japan. Indeed, after the fiasco of the 1960 treaty revision, the Japanese people and their representatives were rarely consulted when it came to alliance cooperation with the US. And the US government had little reason to object to this — indeed, while the Obama administration may have forgotten or may not appreciate the role the US played in propping up the LDP and its 1955 system, the DPJ and the Japanese public has not. The old system was also poorly configured for introducing sweeping changes into the nature of the alliance. The alliance managers on both sides certainly tried after 1996, when they thought they could turn the alliance into a global security partnership without having to consult with the Japanese people about whether they wanted their Self-Defense forces participating in US-led wars far from Japanese shores. When the people were finally consulted, it turns out that they had no interest in the ‘Japan as the Britain of Asia’ model. The public had no interest in a robust military bolstered by bigger defense budgets, or in constitution revision, which some officials on both sides thought would be the inevitable product of greater US-Japan defense cooperation. It turns out that if given a choice between maintaining the constitution and cooperating with the US abroad, the Japanese people would prefer the former. The DPJ’s victory, while not directly a result of foreign policy, was a product of public dissatisfaction of the LDP’s government behind closed doors in which the Japanese people were consulted as an afterthought — including and especially on the alliance. With the option of a more robust global security partnership foreclosed, the discussion is now turning to what the alliance should be instead, a discussion that is long overdue and might have happened sooner if the two governments had been more honest with each other. What Cooper sees as the signs of tension stemming from the DPJ’s coming to power I see as the first stirrings of an honest dialogue between the two governments. Okinawa is just one manifestation of this process. The US was the beneficiary of an arrangement by which the LDP made its life easier politically by foisting the bulk of US forces in Japan to distant Okinawa. It is now paying the price, as the DPJ tries to get the best deal possible for the people of Okinawa. Of course, that the DPJ wants to reconsider the alliance with the US is shaped by another structural change, the transformation of East Asia. To a certain extent the 1996 vision of the alliance was undone precisely because the two governments were unable to decide what role the alliance could and should play in a region in which growing Chinese influence (and interdependence) was an inescapable fact. The answer provided by the Bush administration and the Koizumi and Abe governments was ’shared values’ and cooperation among democracies, an approach that did not survive the Abe government. And values diplomacy notwithstanding, even Abe Shinzo recognized that jabbing the Yasukuni stick in China’s eye was a poor substitute for a China policy. Arguably Japan was already shifting in the direction of an Asia-centered foreign policy after Koizumi, but — with the notable exception of Fukuda Yasuo — its prime ministers were less explicit about the changes underfoot. They dutifully recited the mantras while reorienting Japan away from a security-centered US-Japan alliance. As I’ve argued previously, what’s changed with the Hatoyama government is that it has for the most part discarded with the alliance boilerplate and is actually trying to articulate what Japanese foreign policy should look like in an age characterized by a rising China, a still strong but struggling US, and a region populated with countries facing the same dilemma as Japan. As Hatoyama’s frenetic Asia diplomacy suggests, his government is obsessed with carving out a leadership role for Japan. Devin Stewart is right to suggest that Japan cannot neglect the US dimension of its new realism. But I think Stewart is mistaken when he suggests ‘the path toward a more ‘independent’ foreign policy for Japan is not by weakening its alliance with the world’s strongest military power.’ On the contrary, I think Japan’s credibility as a leader in the region is enhanced to the extent to which the Hatoyama government is able to show that its foreign policy is not dominated by its alliance with the world’s strongest military power. Which is precisely what Fukuda tried to achieve when he stressed that security cooperation would take a back seat — and what some in the US are coming to appreciate. The DPJ still has work to do answering the question of precisely what kind of security relationship it wants with the US, of course, which is why it is good that the Hatoyama government decided not to rush the National Defense Program Guidelines that were originally supposed to be issued in December. Instead the US and Japan will be conducting a bilateral review of the alliance at the same time that the DPJ-led government is conducting an internal review of defense policy going forward. Meanwhile the Japanese people are sensitive to the need for an Asia-centered approach in Japanese foreign policy. The public had little interest in Koizumi’s approach to China. Whatever concerns Japanese citizens have about China, they have little interest in policies in provoking China. Indeed, the remarkable thing is that despite, in Stewart’s words, a ‘bellicose North Korea and an increasingly powerful China,’ the public does not support a dramatic increase in Japan’s military capabilities, an expansion of the roles open to the JSDF, and ever closer defense cooperation with the US. At the same time there is little support for ending the alliance entirely. Both the US and Japan have considerable room for maneuver within these structural constraints. Indeed, the US is by no means powerless in the face of Japan’s push to reorient its foreign policy. For starters, the Obama administration can reverse course on trade policy in Asia, a region which Daniel Drezner contends ‘has simply bypassed Washington.’ Instead of viewing the DPJ’s initiatives in the region as leaving the US behind, the Obama administration should view it as a spur to join the game. Moreover, the Obama administration ought to reconcile itself to the DPJ’s message. Thus far Washington has mishandled the transition to the DPJ, in what arguably counts as an open-source intelligence failure. Washington did not take the DPJ seriously until far too late, and even when analysts in Washington began listening to the DPJ they still thought that the DPJ was bluffing — or was trying to appease its left-wing members and the Social Democrats — when it talked about the alliance and Okinawa. The DPJ means exactly what it says. Of the examples cited by Cooper, all were articulated by the DPJ well before it won the August election, and articulated not because of the DPJ’s left but because there is a broad consensus within the party on the need to reconsider the alliance and recenter Japanese foreign policy on Asia.

# Japan AFF – Solvency – 1AC

## Plan solves-prioritizes the strategic over the tactical relationship.

**Michaeli, Fulbright research fellow in China, 2010**

(Daniel, “Give Up the 2006 Futenma Agreement: There’s More to the U.S.-Japan Alliance”, 5-10, <http://www.asiaruminations.com/2010/05/10/give-up-the-2006-futenma-agreement-theres-more-to-the-u-s-japan-alliance/>)

In negotiations between democracies, the atmosphere and public perceptions of the negotiations can matter even more than their paper outcome. In negotiations with Japan over relocating Futenma, the U.S. Marine Corps air station in the middle of Ginowan City, it’s time for the United States to recognize that. Maintaining an effective relationship with the Japanese public requires a policy change on Futenma relocation. The U.S. bases much percent of its presence in Japan on Okinawa, an island strategically located near the Taiwan Strait. The tactical arguments for why the U.S. marines need to be in Okinawa province are compelling, even if the public relations effort at explaining it has been inept. Marines operate as a combined air-land-sea force and these different elements would have to be brought to bear together, and quickly, in the event of a crisis–such as an attack on Taiwan from the Chinese mainland. The new V-22 Osprey transport aircraft the Marines plan to deploy there can take off and land vertically, but apparently requires a new long runway “just in case” due to reliability issues. But the reason the U.S.-Japan relationship works is, more than anything else, strategic rather than tactical. Japan–and, for that matter, Taiwan (as I noted here)–are able to develop closer ties with mainland China because they understand the United States is committed to ensuring their security. The reason the United States is able to protect its allies and economic interests in the region is because commitments have been made in treaties and are consistently repeated at the highest levels. That is a strategic, not a tactical, matter. Tactical coordination and basing in the region perform two primary tasks, from the American perspective: 1) they help demonstrate how serious the United States is about its commitments; and 2) they prepare U.S. forces to respond in any contingency scenario. But from the perspective of Asia’s strategic elites, the nature of the U.S. presence matters for a different reason, too. Much better than Americans, they recognize that public support for these alliances in both the United States and its Asian allies is necessary for the strategic message of the U.S. presence to be credible in the long run. So here’s where we are now: Some 90,000 Okinawans came out from across the political spectrum last month to protest the 2006 plan–and, in many cases, the U.S. presence on Okinawa altogether. Yukio Hatoyama, elected to Japan’s prime ministership last summer; Susumu Inamine, the new mayor of Nago City, elected this January; and the governor of Okinawa depend on public opinion for their political futures. But as of very recently, the U.S. has simply chanted over and over again that the Futenma relocation agreement, signed in 2006, is a done deal and “it is time to move on.” The agreement would build new runways on reclaimed land in Nago City to enable the Marines to maintain a substantial forward-deployed presence in Okinawa. The 2006 deal was also intended to lighten the load on Okinawa, shifting 8,000 Marines to Guam and closing Futenma, which is in the middle of a busy city. Still, Okinawans aren’t satisfied. When the tactical value of a certain kind of deployment could begin undermining the strategic stability of the alliance, it’s time to scrap the idea and come up with something else. The United States should start coming up with new ideas and stop chanting the old ones.

## Compromise key-hardline stance collapses the alliance

**Glosserman, executive director of the Pacific Forum, 2010**

(Brad, “Japan’s security options limited by economic realities”, 1-25, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/01/25/japans-security-options-limited-by-economic-realities/>)

In short, Japan cannot afford to abandon its alliance with the United States. This does not mean, however, that Washington can adopt an obdurate stance in its talks with Tokyo, for doing so would vitiate the public support that is critical to the bilateral relationship. It would make more sense to accommodate Japan’s reasonable needs while also acknowledging that economic trends imply that Tokyo’s financial contribution to the alliance may well diminish over time. The goodwill engendered by such a moderate negotiating strategy would then reinforce the alliance during the probably difficult transition to Chinese regional dominance. Put simply, the United States should not dwell on the fact that Japan has no alternative to the bilateral partnership but rather seek to enhance the mutual confidence that underlies it.

# Japan AFF – Solvency – EXTN

## The plan solves U.S. and Japan relations— The base has ate away at the foundation of these ties

**Eldridge, associate professor of U.S.-Japan relations at the School of International Public Policy, Osaka University, 2005**

(Robert, “Toward a Viable, Comprehensive, Long-term Approach to the Okinawa Basing Issue and the True Strengthening of the Alliance”, 9-24, http://www2.osipp.osaka-u.ac.jp/~eldridge/)

The main reason I am uncertain of this is that I believe the results will be more like a band aid-like approach than effective surgery in dealing with the cancer that has been eating away at the alliance since the return of Okinawa of 1972. The cancer has weakened the alliance, affected the relationship between the central government and local communities, and impacted America’s image within Japan. Attempts in the past to resolve issues such as land returns, base consolidations, new facility construction, restrictions on training, etc., that have arisen were at best temporary patchwork, treating the symptoms rather than the illness. Even the 1995-1996 Special Action Committee on Okinawa, while important, was not able to fully tackle the issues. Indeed, the centerpiece of the agreement, the return of Futenma, ended up causing the cancer to spread, rather than isolating and reducing it. As a result, the full potential of the alliance is not being realized because policy makers and our respective leaders are more involved in micro-managing the alliance than in developing the alliance to realize our common regional and global objectives to promote peace and prosperity for everyone in the world.

## Closing Futenma is the most obvious solution.

**Feffer, co-director of Foreign Policy in Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies, 2010**

(John, “Okinawa and the new domino effect”, 3-5, <http://inthesenewtimes.com/2010/03/05/okinawa-and-the-new-domino-effect/>)

Under the circumstances, the new government of Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama proposed something modest indeed – putting the US-Japan alliance on, in the phrase of the moment, a “more equal” footing. It inaugurated this new approach in a largely symbolic way by ending Japan’s resupply mission in the Indian Ocean (though Tokyo typically sweetened the pill by offering a five-year package of $5 billion in development assistance to the Afghan government). More substantively, the Yukio Hatoyama government also signaled that it wanted to reduce its base-support payments. Japan’s proposed belt-tightening comes at an inopportune moment for the Obama administration, as it tries to pay for two wars, its “overseas contingency operations”, and a worldwide network of more than 700 military bases. The burdens of US overseas operations are increasing, and fewer countries are proving willing to share the costs. Of dugongs and democracy The immediate source of tension in the US-Japanese relationship has been Tokyo’s desire to renegotiate that 2006 agreement to close Futenma, transfer those 8,000 Marines to Guam, and build a new base in Nago, a less densely populated area of the island. It’s a deal that threatens to make an already strapped government pay big. Back in 2006, Tokyo promised to shell out more than $6 billion just to help relocate the Marines to Guam. The political cost to the new government of going along with the LDP’s folly may be even higher. After all, the DPJ received a healthy chunk of voter support from Okinawans, dissatisfied with the 2006 agreement and eager to see the American occupation of their island end. Over the last several decades, with US bases built cheek-by-jowl in the most heavily populated parts of the island, Okinawans have endured air, water, and noise pollution, accidents like a 2004 US helicopter crash at Okinawa International University, and crimes that range from trivial speeding violations all the way up to the rape of a 12-year-old girl by three Marines in 1995. According to a June 2009 opinion poll, 68% of Okinawans opposed relocating Futenma within the prefecture, while only 18% favored the plan. Meanwhile, the Social Democratic Party, a junior member of the ruling coalition, has threatened to pull out if Hatoyama backs away from his campaign pledge not to build a new base in Okinawa. Then there’s the dugong, a sea mammal similar to the manatee that looks like a cross between a walrus and a dolphin and was the likely inspiration for the mermaid myth. Only 50 specimens of this endangered species are still living in the marine waters threatened by the proposed new base near less populated Nago. In a landmark case, Japanese lawyers and American environmentalists filed suit in US federal court to block the base’s construction and save the dugong. Realistically speaking, even if the Pentagon were willing to appeal the case all the way up to the Supreme Court, lawyers and environmentalists could wrap the US military in so much legal and bureaucratic red tape for so long that the new base might never leave the drawing board. For environmental, political, and economic reasons, ditching the 2006 agreement is a no-brainer for Tokyo. Given Washington’s insistence on retaining a base of little strategic importance, however, the challenge for the DPJ has been to find a site other than Nago. The Japanese government floated the idea of merging the Futenma facility with existing facilities at Kadena, another US base on the island. But that plan – as well as possible relocation to other parts of Japan – has met with stiff local resistance. A proposal to further expand facilities in Guam was nixed by the governor there. The solution to all this is obvious: close down Futenma without opening another base. But so far, the US is refusing to make it easy for the Japanese. In fact, Washington is doing all it can to box the new government in Tokyo into a corner.

# Japan AFF – Solvency – EXTN

## U.S. reduction of US military presence on Okinawa solves Japanese voters popularity and the alliance.

Vaughan 10 (Michael Vaughan, Michael Vaughn, Ph.D. is Assistant Professor in the School of Social Work at Saint Louis University 3-23-2010)

(“Japan’s New Government – Finding or Losing Its Way? http://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:200332)

For its part, the US military has largely treated Okinawa as its own fiefdom since 1945. Some 12,500 Americans died and 37,000 were wounded in the battle for the island. Until it officially reverted to Japan in 1972, the US military ran the place with a free hand, often defying the wishes of both the Japanese Government and the US State Department. In one incident, in 1966, the US military secretly transported nuclear weapons from Okinawa to Honshu, Japan’s main island, in flagrant violation of the 1960 Security Agreement. The US military also resisted Okinawa’s reversion to Japanese rule and it continues to have a proprietary attitude about what takes place there. The US Government should respect Japan’s desire to reduce the US military presence on its sovereign territory, as it has respected the same desire on the part of Germany, South Korea and the Philippines. It should be willing to renegotiate the agreement that governs the presence of US troops in Japan, which to some is redolent of 19th Century assertions of extraterritoriality. It should be aware that, at the end of the day, Japanese voters will determine the course of the alliance.13

# Japan AFF – A2: Hegemony DA

## U.S. troops are not necessary in Okinawa— The Marines would be useless in a major war or conflict

**Bandow, Cato senior fellow, 2010**

(Doug, “Get Out of Japan”, 6-18, <http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=23592>)

The claim is oft-made that the presence of American forces also help promote regional stability beyond Japan. How never seems to be explained. Bruce Klingner of the Heritage Foundation contends: “the Marines on Okinawa are an indispensable and irreplaceable element of any U.S. response to an Asian crisis.” But the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), while packing a potent military punch, actually has little to do. The MEF isn’t necessary to support manpower-rich South Korea, which is capable of deterring a North Korean attack. The Marines wouldn’t be useful in a war against China, unless the Pentagon is planning a surprise landing in Tiananmen Square to seize Mao Zedong’s mausoleum. If conflict breaks out over Taiwan or various contested islands, America would rely on air and naval units. Where real instability might arise on the ground, only a fool would introduce U.S. troops—insurgency in Indonesia, civil strife in the Solomon Islands or Fiji, border skirmishes between Thailand and Burma or Cambodia General Ronald Fogleman, a former Air Force Chief of Staff, argued that the Marines “serve no military function. They don’t need to be in Okinawa to meet any time line in any war plan. I’d bring them back to California. The reason they don’t want to bring them back to California is that everyone would look at them and say, ‘Why do you need these twenty thousand?’”

# Japan AFF – A2: Hurts Alliance

## Withdrawal doesn’t hurt the alliance, makes Japan assert themselves which is net better.

**Bandow, senior fellow at Cato, 2010**

(Dough, “Okinawa and the Problem of Empire,” The Huffington Post, 3-25, <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11617>)

The Japanese government needs to assess future dangers and decide on appropriate responses — without assuming that the U.S. Marines will show up to the rescue. It is Japan's decision, but it should not be based on the presumption of American intervention. Having made its decision, then Tokyo should reconfigure its forces. Fairness suggests a major drawdown from Okinawa irrespective of whose military is protecting Japan. If the U.S. disengaged militarily, these decisions could be made without pressure from Washington. The two countries would still have much to cooperate about, including security. Leaving responsibility for Japan's defense with Tokyo would simply eliminate the unrealistic expectations engendered by the alliance on both sides. The governments could focus on issues of mutual interest, sharing intelligence, preparing emergency base access, and otherwise cooperating to meet international challenges. The best way for Americans to help residents of Okinawa is to press Washington to reshape U.S. foreign policy, making it more appropriate for a republic than a pseudo-empire. With the rise of numerous prosperous allied and friendly states — most notably Japan, but also South Korea, Australia, India, and others — the U.S. should step back, prepared to deal with an aggressive hegemon should one arise but determined to avoid being dragged into routine geopolitical squabbles. Then Tokyo could chart its own destiny, including deciding what forces to raise and where to base them. The Japanese government could no longer use American pressure as an excuse for inaction in Okinawa. Then Okinawans finally might gain justice — after 65 long years.

# Japan AFF – A2: Japan Will Compromise

## Japan in incapable of compromising-3 reasons

**Green, senior adviser and Japan Chair at CSIS, 2010**

(Michael, “Japan’s Confused Revolution”, THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, January, <http://www.twq.com/10january/docs/10jan_Green.pdf>)

There appears to be general confidence in the Obama administration that the DPJ-led coalition will eventually moderate its demands, drop campaign rhetoric which clashes with reality, and seek to demonstrate competent management of the U.S.-Japan alliance. There are several factors, however, that cause senior officials like outgoing Pacific Commander Timothy Keating to confess that they are ‘‘almost certain’’ (emphasis added) and not simply ‘‘certain’’ about this outcome.20 The first is the obvious difficulty that the party leadership has had bridging differences within the DPJ as well as with the Socialists in the coalition over security policy. The second is the DPJ’s obvious reluctance since the election to drop any of its pledges to change the alliance, and its apparent decision to go ahead with specific promises to withdraw its ships from the coalition in the Indian Ocean and to establish a project team to investigate the secret nuclear arrangements from the 1950s and 1960s.21 Third is the sudden removal from decision making of bureaucrats who have managed the alliance in Tokyo for five decades. These senior officials are now uncertain about what Japanese policy will be on Afghanistan or bases and nuclear weapons, and about the continuing influence of outside advisors to the DPJ whose primary competence has been in sloganeering over the past decade rather than national security policymaking.

# Japan AFF – A2: US Will Relocate Base

## No new bases

**Feffer, co-director of Foreign Policy in Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies, 2010**

(John, “Okinawa and the new domino effect”, 3-5, <http://inthesenewtimes.com/2010/03/05/okinawa-and-the-new-domino-effect/>)

Wherever the US military puts down its foot overseas, movements have sprung up to protest the military, social, and environmental consequences of its military bases. This anti-base movement has notched some successes, such as the shut-down of a US navy facility in Vieques, Puerto Rico, in 2003. In the Pacific, too, the movement has made its mark. On the heels of the eruption of Mt Pinatubo, democracy activists in the Philippines successfully closed down the ash-covered Clark Air Force Base and Subic Bay Naval Station in 1991-1992. Later, South Korean activists managed to win closure of the huge Yongsan facility in downtown Seoul. Of course, these were only partial victories. Washington subsequently negotiated a Visiting Forces Agreement with the Philippines, whereby the US military has redeployed troops and equipment to the island, and replaced Korea’s Yongsan base with a new one in nearby Pyeongtaek. But these not-in-my-backyard (NIMBY) victories were significant enough to help edge the Pentagon toward the adoption of a military doctrine that emphasizes mobility over position. The US military now relies on “strategic flexibility” and “rapid response” both to counter unexpected threats and to deal with allied fickleness. The Hatoyama government may indeed learn to say no to Washington over the Okinawa bases. Evidently considering this a likelihood, former deputy secretary of state and former US ambassador to Japan Richard Armitage has said that the United States “had better have a plan B”. But the victory for the anti-base movement will still be only partial. US forces will remain in Japan, and especially Okinawa, and Tokyo will undoubtedly continue to pay for their maintenance. Buoyed by even this partial victory, however, NIMBY movements are likely to grow in Japan and across the region, focusing on other Okinawa bases, bases on the Japanese mainland, and elsewhere in the Pacific, including Guam. Indeed, protests are already building in Guam against the projected expansion of Andersen Air Force Base and Naval Base Guam to accommodate those Marines from Okinawa. And this strikes terror in the hearts of Pentagon planners. In World War II, the United States employed an island-hopping strategy to move ever closer to the Japanese mainland. Okinawa was the last island and last major battle of that campaign, and more people died during the fighting there than in the subsequent atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined: 12,000 US troops, more than 100,000 Japanese soldiers, and perhaps 100,000 Okinawan civilians. This historical experience has stiffened the pacifist resolve of Okinawans. The current battle over Okinawa again pits the United States against Japan, again with the Okinawans as victims. But there is a good chance that the Okinawans, like the Na’vi in that great NIMBY film Avatar, will win this time. A victory in closing Futenma and preventing the construction of a new base might be the first step in a potential reverse island hop. NIMBY movements may someday finally push the US military out of Japan and off Okinawa. It’s not likely to be a smooth process, nor is it likely to happen any time soon. But the kanji (a form of Japanese writing) is on the wall. Even if the Yankees don’t know what the Japanese characters mean, they can at least tell in which direction the exit arrow is pointing.

## AND- Current levels of US presence is unnecessary-military experts concede

**Congressional Research Service 09**

(Konishi, Weston. “The Changing U.S.-Japan Alliance: Implications for U.S. Interests.” Congressional Research Service. 7-23-09. http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA504451)

Some analysts argue that the Cold War formula for the U.S.-Japan alliance is outdated and that the forward presence of 53,000 U.S. troops is an unnecessary burden to the U.S. military. They assert that Japan has the resources to develop into a more autonomous defense force and could cooperate with the U.S. military in areas of mutual concern on a more limited, “normal” country- to-country basis. Further, advocates argue that the eventual withdrawal of U.S. forces from Japanese soil could cement a more durable strategic partnership than the current configuration.31 Opponents of this strategy argue that the large-scale U.S. military presence is necessary in a region with simmering tension and the rise of China, a power that may challenge U.S. hegemony in Asia. Some military experts argue that reducing the number of Marines stationed in Japan, while maintaining air and sea assets, could reduce some of the burden on local communities and still maintain a strong U.S. deterrence in the region