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The Plan

The United States federal government should withdraw its Marine Corps from Japan.

Advantage One: The Alliance

First, relations decline is inevitable – the alliance is coming under fire due to US assertiveness in Okinawa

Associated Press 10

[ “US-Japan security alliance strained by base decision, other pressures on its 50th anniversary” Published June 22, 2010 http://www.foxnews.com/world/2010/06/22/japan-security-alliance-strained-base-decision-pressures-th-anniversary/ Date Accessed: 6/28/10]

But while the alliance is one of the strongest Washington has anywhere in the world, it has come under intense pressure lately over a plan to make sweeping reforms that would pull back roughly 8,600 Marines from Okinawa to the U.S. Pacific territory of Guam.

The move was conceived in response to opposition on Okinawa to the large U.S. military presence there — more than half of the U.S. troops in Japan are on Okinawa, which was one of the bloodiest battlefields of World War II.

Though welcomed by many at first, the relocation plan has led to renewed Okinawan protests over the U.S. insistence it cannot be carried out unless a new base is built on Okinawa to replace one that has been set for closing for more than a decade.

A widening rift between Washington and Tokyo over the future of the Futenma Marine Corps Air Station was a major factor in the resignation of Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama earlier this month. It could well plague Kan as well.

And, mounting anti-american activism will eventually topple the alliance

Doug Bandow 2010, is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and Vice President of Policy for Citizen Outreach, June 18th, 2010 [“Get Out of Japan”, National Interest Online, June 18th, 2010, available online at http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=23592, accessed June 28, 2010]

Moreover, there is talk of activists mounting a campaign of civil disobedience. Public frustration is high: in mid-May, a human chain of 17,000 surrounded Futenma. Local government officials oppose the relocation plan and would hesitate to use force against protestors. Naoto Kan could find himself following his predecessor into retirement if he forcibly intervened. Even a small number of demonstrators would embarrass U.S. and Japanese officials alike.

Moreover, Washington’s high-handedness may eventually convince the Japanese people that their nation must stop being an American protectorate. It may be convenient to be defended by the world’s superpower, but self-respect matters too. Tokyo has essentially given up control over its own territory to satisfy dictates from Washington. That is a high price to pay for U.S. protection. Kenneth B. Pyle, a professor at the University of Washington, writes: “the degree of U.S. domination in the relationship has been so extreme that a recalibration of the alliance was bound to happen, but also because autonomy and self-mastery have always been fundamental goals of modern Japan.”

That destabilization causes nuclear war, destroys the economy

Landay 2000, Jonathan S. Landay, national security and intelligence correspondent, March 10, 2000, Knight Ridder/Tribune News Service, “Top administration officials warn stakes for U.S. are high in Asian conflicts,” p. Lexis

Few if any experts think China and Taiwan, North Korea and South Korea, or India and Pakistan are spoiling to fight. But even a minor miscalculation by any of them could destabilize Asia, jolt the global economy and even start a nuclear war. India, Pakistan and China all have nuclear weapons, and North Korea may have a few, too. Asia lacks the kinds of organizations, negotiations and diplomatic relationships that helped keep an uneasy peace for five decades in Cold War Europe. “Nowhere else on Earth are the stakes as high and relationships so fragile,” said Bates Gill, director of northeast Asian policy studies at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank. “We see the convergence of great power interest overlaid with lingering confrontations with no institutionalized security mechanism in place. There are elements for potential disaster.” In an effort to cool the region’s tempers, President Clinton, Defense Secretary William S. Cohen and National Security Adviser Samuel R. Berger all will hopscotch Asia’s capitals this month. For America, the stakes could hardly be higher. There are 100,000 U.S. troops in Asia committed to defending Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, and the United States would instantly become embroiled if Beijing moved against Taiwan or North Korea attacked South Korea. While Washington has no defense commitments to either India or Pakistan, a conflict between the two could end the global taboo against using nuclear weapons and demolish the already shaky international nonproliferation regime. In addition, globalization has made a stable Asia \_ with its massive markets, cheap labor, exports and resources \_ indispensable to the U.S. economy. Numerous U.S. firms and millions of American jobs depend on trade with Asia that totaled $600 billion last year, according to the Commerce Department.

And, The costs of US bases disproportionately burdens Japan economically

Sakaguchi ‘9, (Daisuke, The Realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan and its Impact on the Interdependent Relationship between Japan and the U.S., in NIDS Security Report #10 (December 2009), http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/kiyo/e2009.html date accessed 6/23/10)

In spite of a situation in which the value of U.S. bases in Japan appears to be declining, the Japanese government is cutting back on another of Japan’s strengths in the form of its contribution to the cost of stationing U.S. troops in Japan. From 1978 Japan has been posting a so-called HNS toward the cost of stationing U.S. troops. Based on the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement and a special agreement (amended every five years from 1987 and scheduled to be extended for two years from 2007), in addition to facilities costs, Japan contributes the salaries and other labor costs of Japanese employees working on U.S. bases, the cost of constructing housing for U.S. forces’ families, water, heating and lighting expenses, the cost of constructing schools and other expenses. The size of the Japanese government’s contribution in 1978 was 6.2 billion yen, but in 1995 this had expanded to 271.4 billion yen. According to statistics for 2004 from the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. spends $60 billion or more a year to keep troops stationed offshore, and of this its allies contribute $8.5 billion. There are 41,626 U.S. military personnel stationed in Japan and the value of support is $4.41134 billion, or $105,976 per head. Meanwhile, in Italy it is $27,923 per head and in South Korea $21,772, clearly less than Japan’s contribution.16 Table 1 shows the situation regarding the sharing of costs in nations in which U.S. troops are stationed.17 Only Japan contributes the entire cost of leasing bases, water, lighting and heating costs, the deployment of facilities and labor costs. In fiscal 2007, 217.3 billion yen was budgeted toward sharing the cost of U.S. forces stationed in Japan, and in fiscal 2008 the unofficial amount was 208.3 billion. With regard to the special agreement from April 2009, it was decided that labor costs and the cost of relocating training would be kept within the framework of the present agreement, while where water, lighting and heating costs are concerned, in fiscal 2008 Japan would contribute fuel and other expenses equivalent to around 25.3 billion yen, the same amount as in the fiscal 2007 budget, and in fiscal 2009 and fiscal 2010 it would contribute fuel and other expenses equivalent to around 24.9 billion yen, a 1.5% reduction from the fiscal 2007 budget amount. In addition, the U.S. and Japanese governments are to conduct comprehensive reviews in order to achieve more efficient and effective sharing of costs for U.S. forces stationed in Japan.18

US presence in Japan has a significant negative impact on the US economy – closing bases would save money and shift jobs back to the US

Meyer ‘9 [Carlton, former Marine Corps officer, G2mil, “Outdated U.S. Military Bases in Japan, 2009, Accessed:6-25-10, http://www.g2mil.com/Japan-bases.htm]The irony is that closing or downsizing some of these bases would save the USA millions of dollars a year and shift thousands of jobs to the U.S. economy. However, many powerful Japanese and American corporations support the status quo from which they profit. They work with American Generals and Admirals to argue that Japan helps defray the cost of U.S. bases in Japan by paying for some utilities and the salaries of some Japanese workers. In reality, Japan never pays one cent to the U.S. military, and most of the claimed contributions are artificial. For example, goods imported for sale at U.S. military stores are not taxed by the Japanese government, so this is counted as a financial contribution. Another major "contribution" is rent paid to Japanese landowners. Cost sharing contributions have been reduced in recent years, and further cuts have been promised to prod the American military to reduce its presence.

Maintaining 50,000 U.S. troops in Japan requires millions of dollars each year to rotate GIs for three-year tours, which includes shipping their children, pets, and household goods. In addition, mainland Japan is an unpopular duty station because of cold weather, high costs, and polite yet unfriendly locals. Since housing costs for military families and American civilian employees are twice that of the USA, the U.S. military also spends millions of dollars for additional housing costs and "locality" pay.

The terminal impact is global nuclear war.

Walter Russell Mead, Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, 2009 (“Only Makes You Stronger,” The New Republic, February 4th, Available Online at http://www.tnr.com/story\_print.html?id=571cbbb9-2887-4d81-8542-92e83915f5f8)

None of which means that we can just sit back and enjoy the recession. History may suggest that financial crises actually help capitalist great powers maintain their leads—but it has other, less reassuring messages as well. If financial crises have been a normal part of life during the 300-year rise of the liberal capitalist system under the Anglophone powers, so has war. The wars of the League of Augsburg and the Spanish Succession; the Seven Years War; the American Revolution; the Napoleonic Wars; the two World Wars; the cold war: The list of wars is almost as long as the list of financial crises. Bad economic times can breed wars. Europe was a pretty peaceful place in 1928, but the Depression poisoned German public opinion and helped bring Adolf Hitler to power. If the current crisis turns into a depression, what rough beasts might start slouching toward Moscow, Karachi, Beijing, or New Delhi to be born? The United States may not, yet, decline, but, if we can't get the world economy back on track, we may still have to fight.

Independently, Japan economic collapse triggers global economic collapse and risks armed conflict throughout Asia

Michael Auslin 2009, is the director of Japan Studies at the American Enterprise Institute and senior research fellow at the MacMillan Center for International and Area Studies at Yale University, 2/17/09

[“Japan’s Downturn is Bad News for the World: The US Can’t Count on Japanese Savers”, Wall Street Journal, February 17th 2009, available online at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123483257056995903.html accessed June 28th, 2010]

If Japan's economy collapses, supply chains across the globe will be affected and numerous economies will face severe disruptions, most notably China's. China is currently Japan's largest import provider, and the Japanese slowdown is creating tremendous pressure on Chinese factories. Just last week, the Chinese government announced that 20 million rural migrants had lost their jobs.

Closer to home, Japan may also start running out of surplus cash, which it has used to purchase U.S. securities for years. For the first time in a generation, Tokyo is running trade deficits -- five months in a row so far.

The political and social fallout from a Japanese depression also would be devastating. In the face of economic instability, other Asian nations may feel forced to turn to more centralized -- even authoritarian -- control to try to limit the damage. Free-trade agreements may be rolled back and political freedom curtailed. Social stability in emerging, middle-class societies will be severely tested, and newly democratized states may find it impossible to maintain power. Progress toward a more open, integrated Asia is at risk, with the potential for increased political tension in the world's most heavily armed region.

Withdrawing ground forces sustains the US/Japan alliance, decreases tensions in East Asia and sets a better regional balancing framework

Carpenter ‘9, (Ted Galen, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb111/index.html, pgs. 567-568, date accessed 6/23/10)

In the past decade, though, attitudes have shifted among the governing elites in both Japan and the United States. It began to dawn on Japanese political and military leaders that America’s interests and policy preferences might not always be the same as Japan’s, and that Tokyo could not always count on Washington to adequately protect Japan’s vital interests. That point was driven home in 1998 when North Korea conducted a missile test that included overflying Japan. U.S. leaders responded with a casualness that bordered on indifference, much to the annoyance and frustration of their Japanese counterparts. Not long after that episode, Japan decided to develop its own system of spy satellites instead of relying on the United States for the necessary data. More generally, sentiment has gradually grown in Japan for a more assertive security policy. American attitudes have also become more favorable to the prospect of a more active role for Japan in the security arena. The report of the so-called Armitage Commission (named after future Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage) in the late 1990s proposed that Japan play a more robust security role, albeit still in a supporting capacity to the United States. Not coincidentally, Washington’s policy regarding the U.S.-Japan alliance during the Bush administration seemed to adhere rather closely to those recommendations, quite possibly reflecting Secretary Armitage’s influence.

Japan is an important security partner of the United States and should play a crucial role in the gradual emergence of a multipolar security environment in East Asia. Tokyo’s position is especially pivotal if the United States does not want to be the only power standing in the way of eventual Chinese hegemony in that region. Despite underinvesting in defense, Japan has developed modern, capable naval and air forces, and it is certainly capable of doing even more. Although Japan is relevant to important American interests in East Asia and beyond, we should not simply let the alliance operate as though it were on autopilot. It is time for a comprehensive review of every aspect of Washington’s security relations with Tokyo.

We should especially move to terminate obsolete portions of that relationship. Most notably, that means withdrawing all U.S. ground forces from Japan. Most of those forces consist of Marine Corps units stationed in Okinawa. U.S. military bases occupy approximately 20 percent of the island’s land mass, including some prime real estate, and the presence has long been a source of extreme irritation to the inhabitants. Keeping the marines there makes sense only if the United States intends to intervene with ground forces in a new Korean war or to wage a land war somewhere else in East Asia. Neither mission makes sense from the standpoint of genuine American interests. Those forces should be withdrawn immediately, and the bases closed.

The future disposition of U.S. air and naval forces is a more complex and difficult decision. Some forces should certainly be withdrawn, and many of them can be relocated to American possessions in the Central Pacific, especially Guam, without having a significant negative effect on U.S. military capabilities in that part of the world. But given the importance of East Asia, both strategically and economically, it is uncertain whether the United States should withdraw all its air and naval forces from Japan. That topic needs to be a crucial aspect of discussions about the future U.S.-Japan security relationship.

Those discussions also need to focus on whether the defense treaty should be retained in its current form. At the very least, Washington should insist that Tokyo now take the lead in addressing the security problems in East Asia instead of expecting the United States to continue its dominant role. It is possible that a more informal and flexible security relationship would serve both countries better than the formal alliance.

Advantage Two: East Asia

First is China

US regional primacy puts sets a crash course with China

Christopher Layne 2007, Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute, 2007 ("The Case Against the American Empire," American Empire: A Debate, Published by Routledge, ISBN 0415952034, p. 73-74)

To be sure, the United States should not ignore the potential strategic ramifications of China’s arrival on the world stage as a great power. After all, the lesson of history is that the emergence of new great powers in the international system leads to conflict, not peace. On this score, the notion—propagated by Beijing—that China’s will be a “peaceful rise” is just as fanciful as claims by American policy-makers that China has no need to build up its military capabilities because it is unthreatened by any other state. Still, this does not mean that the United States and China inevitably are on a collision course that will culminate in the next decade or two in a war. Whether Washington and Beijing actually come to blows, however, depends largely on what strategy the United States chooses to adopt toward China, because the United States has the “last clear chance” to adopt a grand strategy that will serve its interests in balancing Chinese power without running the risk of an armed clash with [end page 73] Beijing. If the United States continues to aim at upholding its current primacy, however, Sino-American conflict is virtually certain.

War over Taiwan draws in everyone, goes nuclear, and destroys civilization

Straits Times (Singapore), 2000 (“Regional Fallout: No one gains in war over Taiwan,” June 25th, Available Online via Lexis-Nexis)

The high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -- horror of horrors -- raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -- truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation. There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else.

Japan can deter Chinese invasion of Taiwan diplomatically and militarily – US involvement waters down their defense

Preble 6 [Christopher, director of foreign policy studies @ Cato institute, Cato institute, “Two Normal Countries: Rethinking the U.S.-Japan Strategic Relationship” April 16 2008, p. http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa566.pdf

Whether this mutual appreciation would translate into a formal Japanese pledge to assist Taiwan in the event of Chinese aggression remains to be seen, but that should ultimately be a decision for the Japanese government, and the Japanese public, consistent with their own security concerns. The presumed wishes or desires of the United States should not be the determining factor. Given Taiwan’s strategic location across crucial Japanese lines of communication, the Japanese would view PRC control over the island as a security threat. Although Japan currently has only a limited capacity for blocking military annexation, a strong statement, building on the February 2005 joint declaration, may help deter Chinese military action against Taiwan. Even a position of deliberate ambiguity, holding out the possibility that Japan might employ military means to repel Chinese aggression, would likely be more credible coming from a regional military power than is the current ambiguous pledge originating with a United States that is struggling to sustain a host of commitments around the globe.

Second is North Korea

US involvement in Japan hinders moves to negotiate with North Korea, guaranteeing instability

Auslin 10 [Michael, resident scholar at AEI, American Enterprise Institute, “The Real Futenma Fallout”, Jun. 16 (http://www.aei.org/outlook/100929) 6.24.10]

Of greater concern for the long-term viability of the alliance is whether Washington and Tokyo continue to share common political and security goals for maintaining East Asian stability and prosperity. As the North Korean nuclear crisis continues to drag on, both sides retain their focus on missile defense, which now has resulted in several successful interception tests by Japanese Maritime SDF destroyers outfitted with Aegis antimissile systems.[8] Yet, with Tokyo beginning to reduce its commitment to future missile-defense systems and with no current political movement on negotiations with North Korea (the six-party talks), it is unclear whether Washington and Tokyo share the same vision for dealing with Pyongyang. Further, Japan's demand that the status of its citizens abducted by North Korea be fully resolved has also caused strains within the alliance, since the Bush administration treated such concerns as secondary to the goal of achieving North Korean denuclearization. Considering the failure so far to end Pyongyang's nuclear programs, U.S. unwillingness to pressure North Korea on the abductees issue has resulted in subdued, yet real, resentment on the part of some Japanese officials. That said, Japanese support for the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative (to stop the export of illicit materials) and United Nations sanctions against North Korea have allowed the allies to work together to control the maritime domain in Northeast Asia.

And, US bases push North Korean missile targeting to Japan

Meyer ‘9 [Carlton, former Marine Corps officer, G2mil, “Outdated U.S. Military Bases in Japan, 2009, Accessed:6-25-10, http://www.g2mil.com/Japan-bases.htm]While Americans worry that North Korea may build a missile that can strike the USA, it has dozens of missiles that can reach Japan. Persistent American saber rattling with North Korea worries the Japanese, especially those living near American military bases that are prime targets should North Korea decide to strike, or ideal retaliatory targets should the USA decide to bomb North Korea. Another source of friction is that Japan has a very low crime rate and the presence of thousands of young American GIs result in numerous robberies, assaults, rapes, and murders of Japanese citizens each year. Finally, Japan is densely populated while American military bases occupy large tracts of land in urban areas that are frequent targets of complaints and lawsuits because of loud aircraft.

The impact is global nuclear war that destroys everything

Peter Hayes 2009, Professor of International Relations at RMIT University (Australia) and Director of the Nautilus Institute in San Francisco, and Michael Hamel-Green, Dean of and Professor in the Faculty of Arts, Education and Human Development at Victoria University (Australia), 2009 (“The Path Not Taken, The Way Still Open: Denuclearizing The Korean Peninsula And Northeast Asia,” The Asia-Pacific Journal, December 14th, Available Online at http://www.japanfocus.org/-Peter-Hayes/3267)

At worst, there is the possibility of nuclear attack1, whether by intention, miscalculation, or merely accident, leading to the resumption of Korean War hostilities. On the Korean Peninsula itself, key population centres are well within short or medium range missiles. The whole of Japan is likely to come within North Korean missile range. Pyongyang has a population of over 2 million, Seoul (close to the North Korean border) 11 million, and Tokyo over 20 million. Even a limited nuclear exchange would result in a holocaust of unprecedented proportions. But the catastrophe within the region would not be the only outcome. New research indicates that even a limited nuclear war in the region would rearrange our global climate far more quickly than global warming. Westberg draws attention to new studies modelling the effects of even a limited nuclear exchange involving approximately 100 Hiroshima-sized 15 kt bombs2 (by comparison it should be noted that the United States currently deploys warheads in the range 100 to 477 kt, that is, individual warheads equivalent in yield to a range of 6 to 32 Hiroshimas).The studies indicate that the soot from the fires produced would lead to a decrease in global temperature by 1.25 degrees Celsius for a period of 6-8 years.3 In Westberg’s view: That is not global winter, but the nuclear darkness will cause a deeper drop in temperature than at any time during the last 1000 years. The temperature over the continents would decrease substantially more than the global average. A decrease in rainfall over the continents would also follow…The period of nuclear darkness will cause much greater decrease in grain production than 5% and it will continue for many years...hundreds of millions of people will die from hunger…To make matters even worse, such amounts of smoke injected into the stratosphere would cause a huge reduction in the Earth’s protective ozone.4 These, of course, are not the only consequences. Reactors might also be targeted, causing further mayhem and downwind radiation effects, superimposed on a smoking, radiating ruin left by nuclear next-use. Millions of refugees would flee the affected regions. The direct impacts, and the follow-on impacts on the global economy via ecological and food insecurity, could make the present global financial crisis pale by comparison. How the great powers, especially the nuclear weapons states respond to such a crisis, and in particular, whether nuclear weapons are used in response to nuclear first-use, could make or break the global non proliferation and disarmament regimes. There could be many unanticipated impacts on regional and global security relationships5, with subsequent nuclear breakout and geopolitical turbulence, including possible loss-of-control over fissile material or warheads in the chaos of nuclear war, and aftermath chain-reaction affects involving other potential proliferant states. The Korean nuclear proliferation issue is not just a regional threat but a global one that warrants priority consideration from the international community.

AND, US presence fractures East Asia along ideological lines, preventing multilateral cooperation and regional integration

Mark Beeson 2009, Professor and Head of the Department of Political Science & International Studies, The University of Birmingham, “East Asian Regionalism and the End of the Asia-Pacific: After American Hegemony” The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 2-2-09, January 10, 2009.

Nevertheless, for most of the post-World War II period, much of East Asia benefited economically from the overarching multilateral, open economic order that emerged under U.S. hegemony. In the strategic sphere, however, the picture has always been more complex and for many less benign, despite the fact that a number of countries in the capitalist camp actually benefited economically from American involvement in the wars in Korea and Vietnam.[18] The most significant consequence of the Cold War period generally, and the U.S.’s strategic orientation to East Asia in particular, was that American policy effectively divided the region along ideological lines and established a ‘hub and spokes’ series of bilateral alliances that made closer ties and cooperation within the region more problematic. [19] In other words, as far as East Asia was concerned, there was an in-built bias toward bilateralism, major constraints on multilateral processes, and formidable potential obstacles to any sort of regional integration. Consequently, America’s strategic engagement with East Asia generally and the continuing importance of its bilateral alliances across the region has led to widespread scepticism about the prospects for greater East Asian security cooperation. And yet the ending of the Cold War has, at the very least, raised important questions about the basic rationale for a continuing major American military presence in the region. Older patterns of intra-regional relations that pre-date American involvement are beginning to reassert themselves in ways that further undermine the idea of a more inclusive Asia-Pacific region.

Absent a regionalism framework, East Asia conflict is the biggest impact- multiple nuclear countries, great power interest, and lack of regional relations and negotiating frameworks

Suto and Tasaki ‘9, (Takaya, director of the Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Hirofumi, senior research fellow at the Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, both at Japan Institute of International Affairs, Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, pgs. 216 [www.carnegieendowment.org/files/abolishing\_nuclear\_weapons\_debate.pdf](http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/abolishing_nuclear_weapons_debate.pdf))

Northeast Asia is one of the most critical regions with regard to nuclear issues. Every state that has direct security stakes in the region has been closely engaged with nuclear weapons. The United States, Russia, and China are all parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), while North Korea possesses nuclear weapons in violation of the NPT. Although neither Japan nor South Korea possesses any nuclear weapons, both are under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. On top of all this, the security environment of this region has remained volatile, even since the end of the Cold War. The possibility of major armed conflicts erupting in the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait has long been worrisome. Additionally, several unsolved territorial disputes exist in Northeast Asia, and the relationships among regional countries are not necessarily amicable. Furthermore, a rising China has continued to modernize its military force, including its nuclear capabilities, while its intentions remain unclear. In the medium to long term, the United States and China may vie for hegemony and influence in the Asia–Pacific region, resulting in confrontation.

\*\*We must transition away from the unequal dependence in the US/Japan security alliance. Drawing down from Okinawa ensures long-term stability in the alliance and a greater, more sustainable role for Japan in East Asia

Preble 6 [Christopher, director of foreign policy studies @ Cato institute, Cato institute, “Two Normal Countries: Rethinking the U.S.-Japan Strategic Relationship” April 16 2008, p. http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa566.pdf

The decades-long U.S.-Japan strategic partnership is changing. Americans are becoming increasingly anxious about the costs and risks of our permanent global military presence and are looking for ways to devolve security responsibilities and reduce our risk exposure. The Japanese, although retaining a strong anti-militarist disposition, are willing to play a more assertive role. The Japanese SDF is already highly capable, and Japanese military capabilities could quickly expand if the security environment grows more threatening.

Americans and Japanese should welcome a transition from a patron-client relationship to one of mutual trust and understanding based on shared interests. The renowned international relations scholar Hans Morgenthau theorized years ago that “alliances are typically of temporary duration” because they rely on a fragile “community of interests.” The “traditionally separate and frequently incompatible interests of the individual nations” tend to erode support for the alliance over time.95 But such arguments do not account for the possibility that states, particularly states that share a commitment to political and economic liberalism, might similarly share a broad conception of common strategic interests.

Today, Japan and the United States certainly do share many common interests, and it is worth pausing briefly to marvel at this remarkable transformation over the past 60 years. President Bush is particularly effusive in his praise of Prime Minister Koizumi. The two men share a genuine friendship, but U.S. and Japanese policymakers should seek to craft a strategic partnership that will endure long after Koizumi and Bush have passed from the scene. Under the current arrangement, the United States pledges to defend Japan in exchange for basing rights. In addition, however, Japan’s security dependence has led the Japanese to defer to the United States on regional security issues. More recently, Japan has sent a token force to a far-off land in order to curry favor with its benevolent patron, but not necessarily out of a sense of shared strategic objectives. This is not a sustainable model over the long term.

Defending Japan with Japanese Forces The Bush administration is contemplating a shift in the U.S. military’s global posture in many other places around the globe, including Europe and South Korea. Those changes are long overdue, and they should be accelerated. The presence of U.S. troops in stable, democratic countries that are capable of playing a larger regional role might inhibit such countries from assuming responsibilities commensurate with their political, military, and economic strength. Although the United States spends far more on its military than any other country in the world, policymakers must still make difficult choices about where U.S. forces should or should not be deployed. But the decision on whether to leave U.S. forces in Japan should be an easy one.

Under the terms of the current security treaty, Japanese forces have primary responsibility for defending Japan. Those forces, although configured for self-defense, also possess the capability to play a wider role in the region, but they have been discouraged from doing so by the presence of U.S. forces in the region, particularly on the island of Okinawa. Accordingly, the Bush administration should clearly outline U.S. plans for shifting security responsibilities to the Japanese, a process that would culminate with the removal of U.S. forces from Japan. The announcement that 8,000 Marines will be moved from Okinawa to Guam by 2012 does not go nearly far enough fast enough96 and implies that U.S. forces will forever remain on Japanese soil in some capacity. Instead of assuming an indefinite troop presence, the final security agreements between the two countries should include provisions for port access for the United States, and the agreements might also include some prepositioning of heavy equipment, in the event that other U.S. facilities in the western Pacific (for example at Guam, Hawaii, and Wake Island) prove inadequate to deal with future security emergencies.97

US Marines in Okinawa are strategically bankrupt – their important functions can be launched from elsewhere and they create no strategic advantage in East Asia

McCormack 10 [Gavan, coordinator of The Asia-Pacific Journal – Japan Focus, and author of many previous texts on Okinawa-related matters. “Ampo’s Troubled 50th: Hatoyama’s Abortive Rebellion, Okinawa’s Mounting Resistance and the US-Japan Relationship” The Asia-Pacific Journal, May 31, 2010. http://japanfocus.org/-Gavan-McCormack/3367 Accessed June 24, 2010]

Many military analysts recognize that the Security Treaty has little to do with the defense of Japan. It is clear that the reason that the Marines in particular are in Japan is that the Government of Japan provides the bases and pays such generous subsidies for them. More important, since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the putative “enemy,” the bases have become oriented to global rather than to Japan or “Far Eastern” considerations as required by the treaty. Since 1990, the Marines have flown from bases in Japan for participation in the Gulf, Afghanistan, and Iraq Wars. They are essentially an expeditionary land combat “attack” force, held in readiness to be launched into enemy territory, or for the defense of US carriers and ships. In contrast to the US navy and air force, they are largely irrelevant to the defense of Okinawa or Japan as stipulated under the Treaty.1 Though the Japanese government referred to an 18,000-strong marine presence in Okinawa, of whom 8,000 were to be transferred to Guam under the 2006 “Roadmap,” leaving a 10,000-strong component to transfer to the Futenma Replacement Facility, in fact there were only 12,400 marines as of September 2008, and perhaps as few as 4,000 to 5,000 (according to Defense Minister Kitazawa) in February 2010, the rest then serving in Afghanistan or Iraq. That meant that both the supposed 8,000 to be transferred to Guam and the 10,000 to move to Henoko were phantom, groundless, figures.2

The notion that a Marine force in Okinawa somehow stays China or North Korea from possible aggression seems especially misconceived. China, if ever it might have been considered a potentially hostile country, is now Japan’s closest trading partner and governments of Japan and China talk about formation of an East Asian Community. As for North Korea, if it constitutes a “threat,” it is the threat of its possible collapse rather than of it launching suicidal attack on its neighbours. As Okinawa International University’s Sato Manabu put it (of the Henoko project), “This is not a replacement of Futenma, whose main function is training. This is a new, different, upgraded facility that U.S. Marines will receive for free and will use as a forward base capable of attacking foreign territories, not just for training.”3 Senior levels of the Japanese defense bureaucracy express a similar view. The 3rd Marine Division is a “force for deployment at any time to particular regions beyond Japan …. By their nature, they are not for the defense of particular regions.”4

Advantage Three: Biodiversity

New base construction would destroy several endangered species of mammals, fish and aquatic plants. These species are vital for the global ecosystem

CBD 9 [Center for Biological Diversity, advocate group for biodiversity, COP10, “Dugongs vs. the Military”, Dec. 3 (http://cop10.org/japanspecific/76-marine/106-henokodugongs) 6.24.10]

The island of Okinawa has been called the “Galápagos of the East” because of the incredible variety of marine and terrestrial life it supports. Unfortunately, a joint military project proposed by the U.S. and Japanese governments threatens to destroy one of the last healthy coral-reef ecosystems in Okinawa, pushing many magnificent species to the brink of extinction. You have the power to protect these unique and priceless creatures.

Under a 2006 bilateral agreement, U.S. and Japanese governments agreed to relocate the contentious U.S. Marine Corps’ Futenma Air Station to Camp Schwab and Henoko Bay. This shortsighted plan does not take into consideration that the relocation will destroy a valued ecosystem, including the nearly 400 types of coral that form Okinawa’s reefs and support more than 1,000 species of fish. It will also hurt imperiled sea turtles and marine mammals.Current plans call for construction of the new military base near Henoko and Oura bays in Okinawa. But the habitat this project would destroy supports numerous endangered species — animals protected by American, Japanese, and international law for their biological and cultural importance. These species include:

Okinawa dugong: The critically endangered and culturally treasured dugong, a manatee-like creature, relies on this habitat for its very survival in Okinawa. Japan’s Mammalogical Society placed the dugong on its “Red List of Mammals,” estimating the population in Okinawa to be critically endangered. The U.S. government’s Marine Mammal Commission and the United Nations Environmental Program fear the project would pose a serious threat to this mammal’s survival. The World Conservation Union’s dugong specialists have expressed similar concerns and have placed the dugong on its Red List of threatened species. The Okinawa dugong is also a federally listed endangered species under the U.S. Endangered Species Act.

The Okinawa dugong has extreme cultural significance to the Okinawan people, and only about 50 dugongs are thought to remain in these waters. The base construction will crush the last remaining critical habitat for the Okinawa dugong, destroying feeding trails and seagrass beds essential for dugong survival.

Sea turtles: Three types of endangered sea turtle — the hawksbill, loggerhead, and green — also depend on this ecosystem. These turtles are listed under the U.S. Endangered Species Act and the global Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species. The turtles use nearby beaches to feed and lay their eggs. The construction and operation of the new base will cause water and air pollution, create artificial light pollution, and increase human activity — all of which are harmful to sea turtle survival.

Many plant and animal species are still being discovered in Henoko Bay. Since the base plan was announced, new types of seagrass — a vital staple food for the dugong — and mollusks have been discovered on the project site. New wonders of nature are found here each year.

The base plan would devastate dugong habitat in Henoko Bay and nearby Oura Bay, and would be extremely harmful to turtles, fish, coral, and other marine life. The recently elected Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama and the Democratic Party of Japan have expressed the desire to renegotiate the 2006 agreement and cancel plans to relocate the base. You have the ability and duty to alter the course of this devastating plan, but time is of the essence. We urge you to direct the U.S. secretaries of defense and state to cancel this project immediately. By canceling the plan to expand an airbase near Henoko and Oura bays, you will protect a globally important ocean ecosystem and some of the best remaining habitat for the Okinawa dugong. IUCN has designated the 2010 Year for Biodiversity as the year of the dugong. Please cancel this destructive project and ensure that the Okinawa dugong has a fighting chance at celebrating its importance in 2010 and years to come.

The best evidence proves that the positive environmental assessments of base relocation in Okinawa are flawed

McCormack 10 [Gavan, coordinator of The Asia-Pacific Journal – Japan Focus, and author of many previous texts on Okinawa-related matters. “Ampo’s Troubled 50th: Hatoyama’s Abortive Rebellion, Okinawa’s Mounting Resistance and the US-Japan Relationship” The Asia-Pacific Journal, May 31, 2010. http://japanfocus.org/-Gavan-McCormack/3367 Accessed June 24, 2010]

Major global media, even in the year of Copenhagen and in the context of an awakening sense of the urgency of protecting species and nature and bringing an ecological conscience to bear on global problems, pays little attention to the environmental aspect of the Henoko project. It is true that an environmental impact study was conducted, as required by Japanese law, but it was conducted by the Okinawa Defense Bureau, not by an independent body, and the ODB seems to have undertaken a perfunctory investigation, avoiding large questions and taking it as given that the national government wanted a positive outcome. It paid no attention to the likely impact of typhoons, because none happened while the survey was in process, and concluded that “dugong are not in the area” since it saw none, though critics protested that the dugong were not to be seen precisely because the disturbances caused by the investigation process had driven them away. The best scientific and legal opinion is that the Henoko Environmental Impact Assessment probably breached Japanese law and almost certainly lacked scientific credibility by international standards.41 Among other deficiencies, an environmental assessment to which no information was available on the kinds or number of aircraft that would be using the facility, or the materials that would be stored or used on it, could scarcely be serious.

The landfill required alone would disrupt the land and sea environment

McCormack 10 [Gavan, coordinator of The Asia-Pacific Journal – Japan Focus, and author of many previous texts on Okinawa-related matters. “Ampo’s Troubled 50th: Hatoyama’s Abortive Rebellion, Okinawa’s Mounting Resistance and the US-Japan Relationship” The Asia-Pacific Journal, May 31, 2010. http://japanfocus.org/-Gavan-McCormack/3367 Accessed June 24, 2010]

The environmental survey also neglected to consider the matter of landfill. According to the January 2008 plan, a total of 21 million cubic metres of landfill would be required, of which initially 17 million would be sea sand. That would mean a staggering 3.4 million dump truck loads of sand, more than 12 times the current volume of sand extracted in a year from throughout Okinawa. How this alone could be done without causing significant impact on Okinawa’s fragile land and sea environment defies the imagination; yet it was not considered at all.44

Setting aside the diplomatic, political, and military considerations, on ecological grounds alone the idea that a huge new military installation should be constructed at Nago is implausible. Yet neither government (and only a tiny sector of national or global media) is willing to face this fact.

The conclusion seems obvious: Futenma should be closed, not replaced. A US military facility that does not meet the standards that would be required of such facilities within the United States surely cannot be justified in the territory of a supposedly friendly “ally.” And since the Pentagon had made clear it would not agree to the construction of any new base without the approval of the host community, the same principle should mean its closure of one that so plainly enjoys no such consent.

Biological diversity of this kind prevents extinction

David N. Diner 1994, Major in the Judge Advocate General's Corps of the United States Army, 1994 (“The Army And The Endangered Species Act: Who's Endangering Whom?,” Military Law Review (143 Mil. L. Rev. 161), Winter, Available Online via Lexis-Nexis)

4. Biological Diversity. – The main premise of species preservation is that diversity is better than simplicity. 77 As the current mass extinction has progressed, the world's biological diversity generally has decreased. This trend occurs within ecosystems by reducing the number of species, and within species by reducing the number of individuals. Both trends carry serious future implications. 78 [\*173] Biologically diverse ecosystems are characterized by a large number of specialist species, filling narrow ecological niches. These ecosystems inherently are more stable than less diverse systems. "The more complex the ecosystem, the more successfully it can resist a stress. . . . [l]ike a net, in which each knot is connected to others by several strands, such a fabric can resist collapse better than a simple, unbranched circle of threads -- which if cut anywhere breaks down as a whole." 79 By causing widespread extinctions, humans have artificially simplified many ecosystems. As biologic simplicity increases, so does the risk of ecosystem failure. The spreading Sahara Desert in Africa, and the dustbowl conditions of the 1930s in the United States are relatively mild examples of what might be expected if this trend continues. Theoretically, each new animal or plant extinction, with all its dimly perceived and intertwined affects, could cause total ecosystem collapse and human extinction. Each new extinction increases the risk of disaster. Like a mechanic removing, one by one, the rivets from an aircraft's wings, 80 mankind may be edging closer to the abyss.

\*\*Case-side Mechanics\*\*

Marines = Lame

US Marines are useless in Japan – they don’t help deterrence and they wouldn’t be used in conflict

Doug Bandow 2010, is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and Vice President of Policy for Citizen Outreach, June 18th, 2010 [“Get Out of Japan”, National Interest Online, June 18th, 2010, available online at http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=23592, accessed June 28, 2010]

The claim is oft-made that the presence of American forces also help promote regional stability beyond Japan. How never seems to be explained. Bruce Klingner of the Heritage Foundation contends: “the Marines on Okinawa are an indispensable and irreplaceable element of any U.S. response to an Asian crisis.” But the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), while packing a potent military punch, actually has little to do.

The MEF isn’t necessary to support manpower-rich South Korea, which is capable of deterring a North Korean attack. The Marines wouldn’t be useful in a war against China, unless the Pentagon is planning a surprise landing in Tiananmen Square to seize Mao Zedong’s mausoleum. If conflict breaks out over Taiwan or various contested islands, America would rely on air and naval units. Where real instability might arise on the ground, only a fool would introduce U.S. troops—insurgency in Indonesia, civil strife in the Solomon Islands or Fiji, border skirmishes between Thailand and Burma or Cambodia.

General Ronald Fogleman, a former Air Force Chief of Staff, argued that the Marines “serve no military function. They don’t need to be in Okinawa to meet any time line in any war plan. I’d bring them back to California. The reason they don’t want to bring them back to California is that everyone would look at them and say, ‘Why do you need these twenty thousand?’”

Marines = Lame

There’s no need for US ground forces in Japan – Japan can secure East Asia by itself

Bandow 10, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, May 12, 2010

(Doug, “Japan can Defend Itself”, http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=11804)

Okinawans are tired of the heavy U.S. military presence. Some 90,000 — nearly 10 percent of the island's population — gathered in protest at the end of April. It is time for Washington to lighten Okinawa's burden.

An independent kingdom swallowed by imperial Japan, Okinawa was the site of a brutal battle as the United States closed in on Japan in early 1945. After Tokyo's surrender, Washington filled the main prefecture island with bases and didn't return it to Japan until 1972. America's military presence has only been modestly reduced since.

The facilities grew out of the mutual defense treaty between America and Japan, by which the former promised to defend the latter, which was disarmed after its defeat. The island provided a convenient home for American units. Most Japanese people also preferred to keep the U.S. military presence on Japan's most distant and poorest province, forcing Okinawans to carry a disproportionate burden of the alliance.

Whatever the jutifications of this arrangement during the Cold War, the necessity of both U.S. ground forces in Japan and the larger mutual defense treaty between the two nations has disappeared. It's time to reconsider both Tokyo's and Washington's regional roles. The United States imposed the so-called "peace constitution" on Japan, Article 9 of which prohibits the use of force and even creation of a military.

However, American officials soon realized that Washington could use military assistance. Today's "Self-Defense Force" is a widely accepted verbal evasion of a clear constitutional provision.

Nevertheless, both domestic pacifism and regional opposition have discouraged reconsideration of Japan's military role. Washington's willingness to continue defending an increasingly wealthy Japan made a rethink unnecessary.

Fears of a more dangerous North Korea and a more assertive People's Republic of China have recently increased support in Japan for a more robust security stance. The threat of piracy has even caused Tokyo to open its first overseas military facility in the African state of Djibouti. Nevertheless, Japan's activities remain minimal compared to its stake in East Asia's stability.

Thus, Tokyo remains heavily dependent on Washington for its security. The then opposition Democratic Party of Japan promised to "do away with the dependent relationship in which Japan ultimately has no alternative but to act in accordance with U.S. wishes." The party later moderated its program, calling for a "close and equal Japan-U.S. alliance."

However, the government promised to reconsider a previous agreement to relocate the Marines Corps Air Station at Futenma elsewhere on Okinawa. The majority of residents want to send the base elsewhere.

The Obama administration responded badly, insisting that Tokyo fulfill its past promises. Only reluctantly did Washington indicate a willingness to consider alternatives — after imposing seemingly impossible conditions.

Still, the primary problem is Japan. So long as Tokyo requests American military protection, it cannot easily reject Washington's request for bases. Thus, Okinawan residents must do more than demand fairness. They must advocate defense independence.

Who should protect Japan? Japan. Tokyo's neighbors remain uneasy in varying degrees about the prospect of a more active Japan, but World War II is over. A revived Japanese empire is about as likely as a revived Mongol empire. Both Japan and India could play a much larger role in preserving regional security.

Many Japanese citizens are equally opposed to a larger Japanese military and more expansive foreign policy. Their feelings are understandable, given the horrors of World War II. However, the most fundamental duty of any national government is defense. If the Japanese people want a minimal (or no) military, that is their right. But they should not expect other nations to fill the defense gap.

Moreover, with an expected $1.6 trillion deficit this year alone, the United States can no longer afford to protect countries which are able to protect themselves. Washington has more than enough on its military plate elsewhere in the world.

Raymond Greene, America's consul general in Okinawa, says: "Asia is going though a period of historic strategic change in the balance of power." True enough, which is why East Asian security and stability require greater national efforts from Japan and its neighbors. Regional defense also warrants improved multilateral cooperation — something which should minimize concerns over an increased Japanese role.

Now Better Than Later

Japan forcing the US out creates a domino effect, abruptly forcing the US out of other areas

Feffer 10, co-director of Foreign Policy in Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies, 3/6/2010

John, “Okinawa and the New Domino Effect”, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/LC06Dh02.html

The current row between Tokyo and Washington is no mere "Pacific squall", as Newsweek dismissively described it. After six decades of saying yes to everything the United States has demanded, Japan finally seems on the verge of saying no to something that matters greatly to Washington, and the relationship that Dwight D Eisenhower once called an "indestructible alliance" is displaying ever more hairline fractures. Worse yet, from the Pentagon's perspective, Japan's resistance might prove infectious - one major reason why the United States is putting its alliance on the line over the closing of a single antiquated military base and the building of another of dubious strategic value.

During the Cold War, the Pentagon worried that countries would fall like dominoes before a relentless communist advance. Today, the Pentagon worries about a different kind of domino effect. In Europe, North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries are refusing to throw their full support behind the US war in Afghanistan. In Africa, no country has stepped forward to host the headquarters of the Pentagon's new Africa Command. In Latin America, little Ecuador has kicked the US out of its air base in Manta.

All of these are undoubtedly symptoms of the decline in respect for American power that the US military is experiencing globally. But the current pushback in Japan is the surest sign yet that the American empire of overseas military bases has reached its high-water mark and will soon recede.

Can’t start drawing down later – China’s rise will force the US to leave on bad terms, locking the US out of economic cooperation

Mark Beeson 2009, Professor and Head of the Department of Political Science & International Studies, The University of Birmingham, “East Asian Regionalism and the End of the Asia-Pacific: After American Hegemony” The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 2-2-09, January 10, 2009.

Such a possibility is still quite unimaginable for many policymakers and commentators around the region. Yet it is becoming increasingly less controversial to suggest that China’s rise will inevitably draw Southeast and Northeast Asia into ‘a single East Asia regional security dynamic’. [61] If the ‘Korean problem’ can be resolved satisfactorily, if the status quo prevails in relation to Taiwan, if Japan and the rest of the region remain comfortable with the inevitability of a more powerful China and do not seek to ‘balance’ its ascendancy in the manner much Western scholarship predicts – all clearly big ‘ifs’ – then it is not obvious what justification or support there would be for continued American troop deployments across the region, or even a security architecture that continues to revolve around Washington rather than Beijing. In such circumstances the Asia-Pacific would become the emptiest of signifiers, and the US would be deprived of a potentially important institutionalised link to the countries of East Asia.

Okinawa Significant

Even if there’s support for some presence in Japan, Okinawa bears the overwhelming burden of US presence

Preble 6 [Christopher, director of foreign policy studies @ Cato institute, Cato institute, “Two Normal Countries: Rethinking the U.S.-Japan Strategic Relationship” April 16 2008, p. http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa566.pdf

An Audit of U.S. and Japanese Forces in East Asia The more than 35,000 U.S. military personnel in Japan are approximately 12 percent of all U.S. military troops stationed abroad. Many Japanese welcome the U.S. troop presence and the security guarantee that goes with it. But anti-American sentiment lingers on the island of Okinawa, which is less than 1 percent of Japan’s territory but hosts over half of all U.S. troops in Japan. U.S. military facilities take up about 20 percent of the land in the Okinawa prefecture.27

Okinawa bears the bulk of US military presence, creating mounting pressure to kick them out

Doug Bandow 10, Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute, former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan and Senior Policy Analyst in the 1980 Reagan for President Campaign, holds a B.A. in Economics from Florida State University and a J.D. from Stanford University, 2010 (“Okinawa and the Problem of Empire,” The Huffington Post, March 25th, Available Online at http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=11617)

Today the prefecture, Japan's smallest with just .6 percent of the country's land area, hosts roughly three-quarters of American military facilities and two-thirds of American military personnel — some 27,000 personnel stationed on 14 major bases — located in Japan. U.S. operations take up about 18 percent of the main island's territory. Although some Okinawans benefit from land rent, construction contracts, and consumer spending, for most residents the inconvenience is monumental, the limits on development costly, and the environmental consequences substantial. No surprise, the vast majority of residents want to reduce or eliminate the American presence.

The rape of a 12-year-old girl by three U.S. personnel in 1995 led to mass protests against both the SOFA (which left the accused in American custody) and the bases. A decade later the U.S. and Japanese governments agreed to move the Marines Corps Air Station at Futenma out of Ginowan to a less heavily populated area on Okinawa, and relocate 8,000 Marines (plus dependents) to Guam. Tokyo pledged to cover about $6 billion of the relocation cost.

Withdrawal Inevitable

US withdrawal inevitable – they’ll be kicked out later

Gerson ‘10 [Joseph, Director of the Peace and Economic Security Program for AFSC, “American Continuities: Obama’s Asian and Nuclear Weapons Policies”, Jun. 20, (http://afsc.org/story/joseph-gersons-main-speech-third-china-us-civil-society-peace-forum-changzhou-china-june-20) 6.24.10]

By forcing Hatoyama to renege on his promises, Secretary Gates and his allies won a pyrrhic victory that will reinforce Okinawan nonviolent resistance. The shame of kowtowing to Washington, Japan’s long-term economic interests, and what historian Paul Kennedy termed the “imperial overstretch” will ultimately conspire to force the U.S. to withdraw its hundreds of military bases and installations from the East Asian periphery.

US must remove some military presence now or Japan will eventually kick the entire military out

Meyer ‘9 [Carlton, former Marine Corps officer, G2mil, “Outdated U.S. Military Bases in Japan, 2009, Accessed:6-25-10, http://www.g2mil.com/Japan-bases.htm]Japan is one of America’s closest allies, yet this relationship is threatened by a refusal to accommodate reasonable demands from the Japanese people to close outdated American military bases. During the Cold War, the USA maintained some 50,000 military personnel in Japan to help defend that nation from the Soviet Union and Communist China. Those threats are mostly gone, while Japan now fields a first-rate military that can defeat any threat. As a result, the Japanese people are less tolerant of the noise and crime produced by large American military bases. President Obama must close some bases before the new Japanese nationalist government demands that all American GIs leave immediately.

A2: “Plan = Slow”

Downsizing in Japan can be quick – Japan would pay and the US could just rotate personnel out -

Meyer ‘9 [Carlton, former Marine Corps officer, G2mil, “Outdated U.S. Military Bases in Japan, 2009, Accessed:6-25-10, http://www.g2mil.com/Japan-bases.htm]If they can stall for a couple of years, President Obama may lose interest, or possibly the 2012 election. If the President persists, the solution they devise will cost billions of dollars and a decade for new construction, environmental studies, and base clean ups. In reality, the U.S. military can implement this plan within two years because excess base capacity already exists. Since personnel are rotated every three years, it costs nothing to divert them elsewhere. The Japanese government would happily pay for any relocation and clean-up costs. Meanwhile, Americans are waiting to see if President Obama will show the courage to eliminate government waste by closing military bases "that have outlived their usefulness."

\*\*Alliance\*\*

Alliance: Unsustainable

US presence creates an unstable reliance on Japan – Japan gives massive support through money and its own military capabilities

Sakaguchi ‘9, (Daisuke, The Realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan and its Impact on the Interdependent Relationship between Japan and the U.S., in NIDS Security Report #10 (December 2009), http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/kiyo/e2009.html date accessed 6/23/10)

3. Changes in the relationship of interdependence between Japan and the U.S. (1) The decline in the U.S.’ dependence on Japan and the decline in Japan’s status to the U.S. What sort of changes will a realignment of U.S. forces in Japan that reduces Japan’s burden bring to the structure of the Japan-U.S. Alliance? The U.S. has found significance in its alliance with Japan as a result of having bases and stationing costs provided by Japan. The value of Japan’s geopolitical position and the bases that are located there is high; Japan assumes a vital role in the U.S.’ Asia strategy. At the same time, Japan receives a nuclear umbrella from the U.S. and is heavily reliant on the U.S. on the security front in terms of deterring and defending against threats. In particular, the reason why this awareness has been instilled in Japanese people is said to lie in the Standard Defense Force Concept that has been adopted as the basis for Japan’s defense policy. Some have observed that while the Standard Defense Force Concept sought to limit defense capability out of domestic considerations – namely, budget and public opinion – it ended up increasing the importance of the Japan-U.S. security relationship and as a result formed an “incentive to become dependent on the U.S.”23 Nevertheless, it can be said that Japan and the U.S. have a mutually dependent relationship in their security structure that is based on their alliance. And as a result, even if Japan came up for criticism from the U.S. regarding how it was contributing to the alliance, as long as the U.S. requires Japan’s bases and its support with stationing costs, labor, technology and so on, the U.S. possesses the weakness of having to depend on Japan and this is conversely Japan’s strength. At the same time, in its alliance relationship with the U.S., Japan has a constant “fear of being swallowed up” as well as a “fear of being discarded,”24 and it cannot be denied that this fear of being discarded that arises from the alliance dilemma has exerted considerable influence on Japan’s buildup of defense capabilities. Following the 1,000 nautical mile sea lane defense promise and the formation of the Japan-U.S. Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement (1983) that exempted the U.S. from the Three Principles of Arms Exports, Japan has taken part in research in the SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative) at the request of the U.S., abolished its one percent of GDP limit on defense spending, and created a medium-term defense buildup plan (1985) that includes the purchase of Aegis-equipped destroyers and 100 P-3C anti-submarine patrol aircraft. In all cases it can be seen that this was made possible against the backdrop of the fear of being discarded.25

The status quo is unsustainable – disagreements permeate all areas of the alliance

Preble 6 [Christopher, director of foreign policy studies @ Cato institute, Cato institute, “Two Normal Countries: Rethinking the U.S.-Japan Strategic Relationship” April 16 2008, p. http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa566.pdf

Addressing Regional Concerns Americans and East Asians alike must overcome their latent fears of Japan, albeit perhaps for different reasons. Americans must appreciate that a commitment to the status quo, which has the effect of inhibiting the emergence of independent Japanese military power, unnecessarily increases America’s own security burdens in the present and well into the future. On a deeper level, however, people in the United States who remain unalterably opposed to a fundamental reorientation of the current U.S.-Japan relationship must understand that reflexive obstructionism could do irreparable harm to the relationship of trust and cooperation so carefully cultivated since the end of World War II. Obstruction implies mistrust, and it is hard to envision how the entire range of U.S.- Japanese relationships, military and diplomatic as well as political and economic, could continue to flourish in such an environment.

Alliance: Unsustainable

The alliance is toast, now – there’s growing tension and the US commitment isn’t credible anyway

Klingner 9 [Bruce, Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation “How to Save the U.S.-Japan Alliance” Heritage Foundation. http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/08/How-to-Save-the-US-Japan-Alliance August 26, 2009. Accessed on June 22, 2010]

Although severing the military partnership is neither likely nor in the interests of either country, growing disenchantment could exacerbate existing tensions and lead to greater fissures in the relationship or a stagnant alliance that is unable to adapt to a rapidly changing Asian security environment.

U.S. policymakers are weary of Tokyo's long-standing complaints of being treated as a junior partner despite Washington's repeated entreaties for Japan to assume a larger security role. For its part, Japanese trust of the U.S. security commitment has eroded as a result of the Bush Administration's premature removal of North Korea from the terrorist list and fears that President Obama will acquiesce to accepting Pyongyang as a nuclear weapons state.

Japan already questions US security commitment

Klingner 9 [Bruce, Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation “How to Save the U.S.-Japan Alliance” Heritage Foundation. http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/08/How-to-Save-the-US-Japan-Alliance August 26, 2009. Accessed on June 22, 2010]

As a result of the Bush Administration's decision to delist North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism, Tokyo now questions U.S. support for Japanese foreign policy priorities. Japan perceives a difference in the U.S. approach to Iran's and North Korea's nuclear programs. Although North Korea already has nuclear weapons, Tokyo perceives the U.S. as not expending the same level of effort toward Pyongyang, causing some Japanese officials to question whether Washington believes that protecting Israel is more important than protecting Japan.

Alliance: Plan Solves It

Reducing US presence in Japan reduces tension, sustaining the alliance long-term

Bandow ‘8 [Doug, FPIF contributor & former Special Assistant to Reagan, Foreign Policy in Focus Institute, "Bring Them Home...from Asia", September 19, 2008 Accessed: 6-25-10, http://www.fpif.org/articles/bring\_them\_homefrom\_asia]Finally, downplaying America's military role would improve overall U.S. relations with other countries. The continuing presence of bases and troops creates endless local grievances. Part of that reflects nationalist frustrations with the foreign control that inevitably accompanies foreign garrisons. There are also the inevitable problems that come from putting a large number of young American males in the middle of a foreign country and culture.

The U.S. government has a particular image problem with young South Koreans, who tend for instance to view America as a greater threat than North Korea. But anger towards Washington extends well beyond universities; the recent protests against U.S. beef imports were directed at far more than the fear of consuming unsafe food. As a result, President George W. Bush received a less-than-friendly reception when he visited in early August. In Japan, the heavy concentration of U.S. bases in Okinawa has spawned strong opposition to America's presence in that province. Without the presence of U.S. military forces, which emphasize Washington's dominance, the bilateral relationships would be closer to ones of equals, with greater emphasis on private economic and cultural ties rather than on government-to-government geopolitical relations.

The same threats do not exist anymore – drawing back US forces is a drastically better balancing strategy that preserves US/Japan relations

Bandow ‘9 [Doug, senior fellow Cato Institute, Huffington Post, “Dealing with the New Japan: Washington Won’t Take ‘ No’ for an Answer”, Sep. 2 (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/doug-bandow/dealing-with-the-new-japa\_b\_275914.html) 6.25.10]

Actually, Americans should be as interested as Japanese in transforming the U.S.-Japan alliance. The current relationship remains trapped in a world that no longer exists. The imperial Japanese navy has been rusting away on the bottom of the Pacific for more than six decades; Douglas MacArthur departed as American regent in Tokyo nearly a half century ago; China buried Maoism with Mao Zedong more than three decades ago; the Cold War ended two decades ago; Japan retains the world's second (or third, based on purchasing power parity) largest economy despite "the lost decade."

Yet Japan remains dependent on America for its security, a minor military player despite having global economic and political interests. There are historic reasons for Tokyo's stunted international role, but it is time for East Asian countries to work together to dispel the remaining ghosts of Japanese imperialism past rather than to expect America to continue acting as the defender of last resort.

Since Japan and Asia have changed, so should America's defense strategy. There should be no more troops based on Japanese soil. No more military units tasked for Japan's defense. No more security guarantee for Japan. The U.S. should adopt a strategy of off-shore balancer, expecting friendly states to defend themselves, while being ready to act if an overwhelming, hegemonic threat eventually arises. China is the most, but still not very, plausible candidate for such a role--and even then not for many years.

Alliance: Plan Solves It

Removal of US Marines is necessary to force Japan to confront regional issues without a US crutch, streamlining US/Japan relations in a positive direction

Doug Bandow 10, Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute, former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan and Senior Policy Analyst in the 1980 Reagan for President Campaign, holds a B.A. in Economics from Florida State University and a J.D. from Stanford University, 2010 (“Okinawa and the Problem of Empire,” The Huffington Post, March 25th, Available Online at http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=11617)

The Japanese government needs to assess future dangers and decide on appropriate responses — without assuming that the U.S. Marines will show up to the rescue. It is Japan's decision, but it should not be based on the presumption of American intervention. Having made its decision, then Tokyo should reconfigure its forces. Fairness suggests a major drawdown from Okinawa irrespective of whose military is protecting Japan. If the U.S. disengaged militarily, these decisions could be made without pressure from Washington.

The two countries would still have much to cooperate about, including security. Leaving responsibility for Japan's defense with Tokyo would simply eliminate the unrealistic expectations engendered by the alliance on both sides. The governments could focus on issues of mutual interest, sharing intelligence, preparing emergency base access, and otherwise cooperating to meet international challenges.

The best way for Americans to help residents of Okinawa is to press Washington to reshape U.S. foreign policy, making it more appropriate for a republic than a pseudo-empire. With the rise of numerous prosperous allied and friendly states — most notably Japan, but also South Korea, Australia, India, and others — the U.S. should step back, prepared to deal with an aggressive hegemon should one arise but determined to avoid being dragged into routine geopolitical squabbles.

Then Tokyo could chart its own destiny, including deciding what forces to raise and where to base them. The Japanese government could no longer use American pressure as an excuse for inaction in Okinawa. Then Okinawans finally might gain justice — after 65 long years.

Base Issues Key

Base issues are overwhelmingly key to the alliance – US insistence in this area blocks Japan’s developing role in the world

Tandon 6/4/10, (Shaun, AFP, Resignation offers U.S. new chance on Japan, http://www.etaiwannews.com/etn/news\_content.php?id=1276597&lang=eng\_news&cate\_img=140.jpg&cate\_rss=news\_Opinion, date accessed 6/23/10)

While Japanese premiers have notoriously short shelf-lives, Hatoyama's fall was all the more dramatic because it was tied to one issue - his promise, then failure, to change a plan on an unpopular U.S. military base on Okinawa island.

"I think this is an opportunity, frankly, on both sides to quietly sit back and evaluate what needs to happen," said Sheila Smith, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Smith said that both Japan and the United States shared some of the blame for the deterioration in relations between the two nations, which forged an alliance after World War II.

But Steven Clemons, director of the American strategy program at the New America Foundation, said that the Obama team had been tone deaf as Japan enters a critical phase of debating its role in the world.

Hatoyama's Democratic Party of Japan took office with a pledge to develop a "more equal" relationship with the United States, while maintaining the alliance.

Clemons said the United States developed an "obsession" with preserving the previous agreement on the Futenma air base rather than seeing the dispute as a symbol of a deeper identity issue for Japan, Clemons said.

"I think there will be some very real ramifications," Clemons said.

"The bottom line underneath all of this is increasing resentment by the average Japanese," he said.

"Even with the North Korea problem, even with the rise of China, they feel that they are being bullied. The U.S. was willing to risk the whole tone of the U.S.-Japan relationship over one base," he said.

Economy: Japan Down

Japan’s economy on the decline – on the brink of being completely passed by China and India

Klinger and Scissors ‘9 [Bruce Klingner and Derek Scissors, Ph.D. Bruce Klingner is Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia, and Derek Scissors, Ph.D., is Research Fellow in Asia Economic Policy, in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation. “Japan's Economic Weakness: A Security Problem for America” Heritage Foundation. May 22, 2009. http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/05/Japans-Economic-Weakness-A-Security-Problem-for-America Date accessed: June 22, 2010]

To reclaim that mantle, Japan needs efficiency-oriented reform that will create domestic sources of growth. Political paralysis has been such, though, that a third decade of effective economic stagnation seems more likely.[6] In that case, China will pass Japan in terms of nominal GDP, and any Japanese claim to being the world's second-largest economy will be lost. Further, India will pass Japan in terms of GDP adjusted for purchasing power. Already in the 30s in world rankings of per capita income, Japan will drop further down the list.[7]

Economy: Okinawa

US military presence crushes Okinawan development

Meyer ‘9 [Carlton, former Marine Corps officer, G2mil, “Outdated U.S. Military Bases in Japan, 2009, Accessed:6-25-10, http://www.g2mil.com/Japan-bases.htm]Over 27,000 U.S. military personnel and their 22,000 family members are stationed on Okinawa. The U.S. Air Force maintains the large Kadena airbase on the island while the Army and Navy maintain several small bases. The Marines have a dozen camps and a small airbase at Futenma where loud helicopters anger nearby residents. (left)

Discontent among the people of Okinawa regarding the foreign military presence has been rising for years. Their chief complaint is that Okinawa hosts over half of U.S. forces in Japan, which hampers economic development. After a series of violent criminal acts by U.S. servicemen, the U.S. military agreed in 1996 to reduce the impact of their presence. A few minor military facilities were consolidated while training and operational procedures were changed to reduce noise. The most significant concession was a promise to close the Marine Corps airbase at Futenma by 2003.

Economy: Plan Solves It

Reducing US presence in Japan is key to ease the US taxpaying burden

Preble 6 [Christopher, director of foreign policy studies @ Cato institute, Cato institute, “Two Normal Countries: Rethinking the U.S.-Japan Strategic Relationship” April 16 2008, p. http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa566.pdf

That would be beneficial to both the United States and Japan. To be sure, an equitable strategic partnership could make things more difficult for U.S. policymakers in certain instances, but that is a chance worth taking in the interest of devolving security responsibilities away from the United States and lowering U.S. risk exposure. Reducing the global U.S. military presence is essential to alleviating the considerable burdens on U.S. taxpayers, who collectively spend more than 10 times as much on defense as do the Japanese. U.S. policy should seek to accelerate Japan’s emergence as a more effective military ally in the region.

Relations: Decline Inevitable

US and Japan disagreements over basing will inevitably tank relations

Auslin 10 [Michael, resident scholar at AEI, American Enterprise Institute, “The Real Futenma Fallout”, Jun. 16 (http://www.aei.org/outlook/100929) 6.24.10]

The Obama administration's moves to cut advanced weapons systems such as the F-22 and to scale back missiledefense plans naturally raise questions about longterm U.S. military capabilities in the Pacific.

The Democratic Party of Japan's (DPJ) rise to power seems to have fundamentally shifted Japan's political landscape. While U.S. administration turnover between the Democratic and Republican parties is common, the accession of an opposition party to power in Japan for the first time in over fifty years has raised questions as to the future of the alliance under DPJ rule. U.S. observers have been watching Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama closely, listening to his statements about basing Japan's foreign policy on the concept of "fraternity,"or yuai, as well as his call for a new East Asian Community centered on the trilateral relationship of Japan, China, and South Korea. The U.S. role in Hatoyama's grand strategy is unknown, although he has repeatedly stated that the relationship with America, in other words the alliance, is the "cornerstone"of Japanese security for the foreseeable future.

As of January 2010, however, the new Japanese and U.S. administrations find themselves in a rare, public dispute over fulfilling the 2006 agreement on realigning U.S. forces in Japan. Of particular controversy is the move of the U.S. Marine Corps Air Station at Futenma, in Okinawa, to a new location on the same island at Camp Schwab. Hatoyama has repeatedly called for a renegotiation of the agreement, which would also affect the timetable for moving eight thousand U.S. Marines from Okinawa to Guam, as well as the consolidation and return of other areas on Okinawa used by U.S. forces to Okinawa's government. Both U.S. and Japanese diplomats have traded sharp words over the fate of the agreement, and a failure to come to an acceptable resolution would certainly cast a pall on U.S.-Japan relations during President Barack Obama's term in office. Already, senior observers on both sides of the Pacific worry that the unresolved disagreement is doing significant damage to long-term political relations. Yet, if the overall goal of the realignment process is to allow U.S. forces to maintain their presence in Northeast Asia while minimizing the burden placed on the Japanese host areas, then the agreement as a whole should be fulfilled as planned.

US/Japan alliance is currently driving a wedge with China – Japan is questioning the credibility of the US commitment anyway

Auslin 10 [Michael, resident scholar at AEI, American Enterprise Institute, “The Real Futenma Fallout”, Jun. 16 (http://www.aei.org/outlook/100929) 6.24.10]

Japan and the United States share the same strategic conundrum regarding China: how can each country maintain and develop economic relations with China while attempting to hedge against its growing military capabilities? The U.S. Navy and the Japanese Maritime SDF are particularly concerned about the power of China's Navy, which now has over sixty submarines and increasing numbers of destroyers, patrol ships, Coast Guard–equivalent vessels, and the like. With China stating that it plans to build several aircraft carriers, alliance military planners are questioning why Beijing is developing power-projection capabilities that could be used to deny access to U.S. naval ships and to control strategic waterways.[9] Similarly, the growth of the Chinese Air Force's fighter squadrons, including advanced 4.5 generation fighter planes, indicates that the United States, along with alliance partners like Japan, may not have air superiority in the case of a conflict with China (such as over the Taiwan Strait) in the future. This, combined with the expansion of China's strategic rocket forces, complicates the alliance's plans for ensuring peace and stability in Northeast Asia. On top of such strategic changes, the Obama administration's decision to halt America's F-22 Raptor fleet at 187 planes and not to allow export variants of the Raptor also leaves Japanese planners uncertain about whether the United States will continue to maintain a credible regional force to protect Japan.

SDF Good: East Asia

The SDF is already one of the most advanced militaries in the world – US downsizing in Japan would create a more stable East Asia while freeing up resources to fight terrorism

Preble 6 [Christopher, director of foreign policy studies @ Cato institute, Cato institute, “Two Normal Countries: Rethinking the U.S.-Japan Strategic Relationship” April 16 2008, p. http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa566.pdf

The Americans and Japanese have cooperated to address East Asian security issues for many years. The United States has retained a formal leadership role in the region through its maintenance of a sizable military garrison on Japanese territory. For their part, Japanese policymakers have grown more confident and assertive. They have increasingly pushed the envelope on the definition of “self-defense,” progressively expanding, in both philosophical and practical terms, the uses of military force that are considered legitimate under Japan’s officially pacifist constitution. The Japanese Self-Defense Force (SDF) today is one of the most capable militaries on the planet, and that will continue to be the case, even if total Japanese defense spending remains relatively modest.

Meanwhile, U.S. military power, still unmatched in absolute terms, is insufficient for maintaining a dominant position in all corners of the globe. If the United States is to focus on a few areas of particular concern related to the global war on terrorism, especially the Middle East, then U.S. policymakers must seek ways to quietly devolve security responsibilities to wealthy, stable, democratic allies in other regions of the world. That reorientation applies to Europe, where long-time NATO allies should be expected to play a much larger role in the defense of a continent that has enjoyed relative peace and security for more than 50 years. U.S. policymakers should apply the same reasoning to East Asia, a region confronting several urgent security challenges.

Japan is more than capable – their “limited” military is a myth. In real terms, Japan spends just as much on its SDF as other countries and is comparatively technologically advanced

Preble 6 [Christopher, director of foreign policy studies @ Cato institute, Cato institute, “Two Normal Countries: Rethinking the U.S.-Japan Strategic Relationship” April 16 2008, p. http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa566.pdf

As the total number of U.S. military personnel in Japan has remained relatively stable since the end of the Cold War, Japan’s defensive capabilities have expanded. Japan is already an active player in East Asia, and it possesses the resources necessary for it to contribute to global security using a wide range of political, economic, and military means. Indeed, Japan’s total economic output ranks second only to that of the United States. Japan has used a small portion of its great economic strength to upgrade its military capabilities, focusing particularly on qualitative improvements, as opposed to the number of troops, ships, or planes.28 So even as Tokyo continued to brandish its pacifist constitutional principles, and while total military spending as a share of GDP has remained at or just below 1 percent, the SDF has become a formidable, technologically advanced, and tactically diverse force whose ground, maritime, and air components boast nearly 240,000 active-duty personnel. The Maritime SDF includes 44 destroyers, 9 frigates, and 16 submarines, and the combined air power of the SDF includes 380 combat-capable aircraft plus other fixed-wing and helicopter assets.29 Japan’s defense expenditures are much smaller than those of the United States but are comparable to those of all other advanced industrial economies in real terms. In the mid- 1980s, Japan had the world’s sixth-largest defense budget behind the Soviet Union, the United States, France, West Germany, and the United Kingdom; by the end of the decade, Japan trailed only the Soviet Union and the United States. Military spending continued to rise throughout the 1990s, and expenditures have remained stable since then. According to official statistics compiled by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Japan’s defense expenditures in 2004 were exceeded only by those of the United States and the United Kingdom. It seems likely, however, that Japan’s defense budget was also less than that of China (Table 1).30 Chinese defense figures are widely disputed, and are likely 40 to 70 percent higher than the Chinese government’s official statistics. Leaving those three countries aside, however, Japan almost certainly spends more than the other two permanent members of the UN Security Council (France and Russia) but also more than Germany and almost three times as much as India, two other countries that aspire to permanent membership on the Security Council.

SDF Good: China

An independent Japan SDF is key to counterbalance a rising China – it’s the best model for regional security

Preble 6 [Christopher, director of foreign policy studies @ Cato institute, Cato institute, “Two Normal Countries: Rethinking the U.S.-Japan Strategic Relationship” April 16 2008, p. http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa566.pdf

Meanwhile, Japan’s neighbors should welcome a potential counterweight to a rising China. Many already do. Attitudes toward Japan vary widely, with Taiwanese, Singapore- ans, Filipinos, and Malays much more favorably disposed than are Koreans. The Chinese are not eager to see the emergence of a strategic competitor in Asia. From the perspective of political and military leaders in Beijing, a “proper” role for the Japanese SDF would have little if any impact on the regional balance of power.

China’s path over the past 30 years has been marked by increased economic liberalization combined with some (albeit halting) political reform. But there is still a long way to go. Common economic interests within Asia may lead to China’s peaceful integration into the region. Or China could turn away from its current course of political and economic liberalization and revert to economic autarchy imposed by military force. It is even possible that China could become a revisionist power, no longer content to accept regional security configurations in their present form. That could occur even if the PRC holds to a course of economic reform. Against those unlikely but dangerous possibilities, East Asian countries might wish to adopt a hedging strategy that would allow for the emergence, in the meantime, of other regional powers capable of balancing against a rising China.

Japan is the one regional power best suited to play this role. Japan is a stable and mature democracy. The pre–World War II era, when an imperial Japan attempted to secure an exclusive economic sphere for itself, is long past. The Japanese people have demonstrated a consistent aversion to the use of force and an equally strong determination to maintain firm civilian control over the nation’s military. It is highly unlikely that a new strategic relationship between the United States and Japan, one that affords Japan a place within the international community consistent with its economic, political, and military strength, would open the door to Japanese militarism that has remained dormant for nearly 60 years.

A2: Japan -> Iraq

Japan would not increase out of area operations like Iraq post the plan

Preble 6 [Christopher, director of foreign policy studies @ Cato institute, Cato institute, “Two Normal Countries: Rethinking the U.S.-Japan Strategic Relationship” April 16 2008, p. http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa566.pdf

Of the three cases discussed above, popular support for an active role by Japanese military forces is weakest with respect to Iraq. Japanese elites place great importance on retaining the favor of their security patron. It is unlikely that there would be Japanese forces operating in Iraq today were it not for U.S. pressure, and the Japanese may be reluctant to become involved in similar military missions in the future. However, lingering anti-militarism within Japan does not proscribe the SDF from serving in the more ambiguous role of security provider in postconflict settings, with or without U.S. encouragement. If the pattern of SDF peacekeeping established in the 1990s were to continue, or even expand, that should not be seen as a manifestation of resurgent Japanese militarism. On the other hand, it seems more likely that, in the absence of U.S. pressure to become more actively involved around the world, a more independent Japan would use its military forces to deal with issues more directly relevant to its own national security.

Japan’s contributions to Iraq are not strategically important

Preble 6 [Christopher, director of foreign policy studies @ Cato institute, Cato institute, “Two Normal Countries: Rethinking the U.S.-Japan Strategic Relationship” April 16 2008, p. http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa566.pdf

Within the context of a more equitable U.S.-Japan alliance, if Japanese forces were deployed to any country far outside the East Asian region, their dispatch would be dependent on Tokyo’s assessment of Japanese security interests and therefore would be far more likely to enjoy the support of the Japanese public. Under the current patron-client relationship, Japanese and American officials alike have bent over backwards to place the small number of SDF troops in a location where they are unlikely to be exposed to harm; by extension, this small number of troops is not measurably contributing to the completion of the mission in Iraq; nor are they substantially reducing the threat to other Coalition forces. In short, their presence is almost entirely symbolic and has little, if any, strategic value.

A2: Futenma Key

Futenma is a worthless base – other capabilities more than make up for it

Feffer 10, co-director of Foreign Policy in Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies, 3/6/2010

John, “Okinawa and the New Domino Effect”, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/LC06Dh02.html

Yet the actual strategic value of Futenma is, at best, questionable. The South Koreans are more than capable of dealing with any contingency on the peninsula. And the United States frankly has plenty of firepower by air (Kadena) and sea (Yokosuka) within hailing distance of China. A couple thousand Marines won't make much of a difference (though the leathernecks strenuously disagree). However, in a political environment in which the Pentagon is finding itself making tough choices between funding counterinsurgency wars and old Cold War weapons systems, the "China threat" lobby doesn't want to give an inch.

A2: Nationalism

Any Japanese nationalism increase post the plan is benign – they just want to protect themselves

Preble 6 [Christopher, director of foreign policy studies @ Cato institute, Cato institute, “Two Normal Countries: Rethinking the U.S.-Japan Strategic Relationship” April 16 2008, p. http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa566.pdf

According to Eugene Matthews, a former senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and now president of the interna- tional educational firm Nintai, Japan’s growing self-reliance is indicative of resurgent nationalism. Matthews urges that U.S. policy be directed at blocking such sentiments, or at least attempting to channel them in a particular direction.3 But it is hardly unreasonable for Japan to seek some measure of independence from the United States.4 A desire that one’s country be capable of defending itself might be a sign of nationalism, but if it is, it is no different from the nationalism expressed by the United Kingdom and dozens of other countries that have maintained a robust defensive capability in spite of security assurances from the United States.

No risk in removing unpopular US presence – Japan is strong enough and renewed aggression is highly unlikely

Bandow ‘8 [Doug, FPIF contributor & former Special Assistant to Reagan, Foreign Policy in Focus Institute, "Bring Them Home...from Asia", September 19, 2008 Accessed: 6-25-10, http://www.fpif.org/articles/bring\_them\_homefrom\_asia]But Japan long ago enjoyed an economic miracle that turned it into the world's second-ranking economic power. Regional suspicions of Japan have not disappeared, but the prospect of renewed Japanese aggression is about as great as the likelihood of an invasion from Mars. North Korean aggressiveness and Chinese nationalism have generated greater popular support in Japan for a more active defense and foreign policy.

Yet nothing's really changed with America's military role. The United States maintains bases and troops in both nations and guarantees the security of both states. American force levels have come down, but American responsibilities remain the same. Increased Japanese and South Korean wealth have led Washington to demand that Tokyo and Seoul do more, but the U.S. government just wants greater assistance to promote its own priorities.

Local opposition has forced some reconsideration of some base facilities. Okinawa remains a sore point between the U.S. and Japanese governments, while the United States and ROK have been negotiating over the South's share of base relocation and garrison support costs. However, the idea that the United States should step back and turn over regional security duties has occurred to almost no one in Washington.

But now is the time for a complete rethink of American security policy, including in East Asia. It doesn't matter whether John McCain or Barack Obama is the victor on November 4: Washington's insistence that its allies remain subordinate belongs in the wastebasket of history.

A2: “Okinawa Not Key”

Okinawa is the fault line – it’s preventing streamlining the alliance and regional balancing

Associated Press 10

[ “US-Japan security alliance strained by base decision, other pressures on its 50th anniversary” Published June 22, 2010 http://www.foxnews.com/world/2010/06/22/japan-security-alliance-strained-base-decision-pressures-th-anniversary/ Date Accessed: 6/28/10]

Still, the Okinawa problem underscores an increasingly skeptical stance among some Japanese leaders toward the role of the security alliance.

Though the pact was strongly supported by the staunchly pro-U.S. conservative party that ruled Japan for most of the past 60 years, the newly empowered Democratic Party of Japan, which swept to office last year, have taken a more nuanced approach, saying that while close security ties with Washington remain crucial Japan needs to improve its relations with its Asian neighbors, particularly China.

A2: “Okinawa Not Key”

Okinawa is the flashpoint – eventual political unrest will tank the alliance. There is no precedent for the amount of pressure being built up in the status quo

McCormack 10 [Gavan, coordinator of The Asia-Pacific Journal – Japan Focus, and author of many previous texts on Okinawa-related matters. “Ampo’s Troubled 50th: Hatoyama’s Abortive Rebellion, Okinawa’s Mounting Resistance and the US-Japan Relationship” The Asia-Pacific Journal, May 31, 2010. http://japanfocus.org/-Gavan-McCormack/3367 Accessed June 24, 2010]

There is no precedent in modern Japanese history for an entire prefecture to unite, as does Okinawa today, in saying “No” to the central state authorities, just as there is no precedent throughout the post-1945 decades for the confrontation that has occurred between the US and Japan in 2009-10. Transcending conventional political divisions, the polls say the Okinawan struggle is now supported by 90 per cent of its people. The Okinawa Times expressed the hope that the 50th anniversary might offer a “chance to reconsider the Japan-US Security treaty that from Okinawa can only be seen as a relationship of dependence.”46 The Ryukyu Shimpo said that it was not just the fate of Henoko that was at issue but the question of whether the Japanese constitution’s guarantees of popular sovereignty, basic human rights, and peace applied to Okinawa.47 Ginowan mayor Iha was in 2010 preparing to launch a suit against the national government for neglect of its duty to protect the constitutional rights of Okinawan citizens to livelihood and safety.48 The breadth and depth of such Okinawan sentiment was hard to detect in mainland discourse.

Okinawan sentiments are especially aroused as the contest over the base issue coincided with revelations of lies and deception practised by LDP governments over the past half-century, and with exposure of the readiness of successive Japanese (LDP) governments to pay almost any price to retain US forces in Okinawa. Disappointment with Hatoyama was so much the greater because the hopes of change raised by the DPJ before it took office had been high, only to be slowly let down since then, till it “seemed to be adopting an even weaker position towards the US than its LDP predecessor.”49 In Hatoyama’s Japan, all parties save the Communist were committed to continuing and “deepening” the Security Treaty, none to fundamentally revising the relationship. In Hatoyama’s Okinawa, all parties and almost all the people were united in demanding that the burden of foreign military presence on the prefecture and its people be lightened. The Okinawa Times noted ominously that if the government tries to impose a new base on Okinawa it would invite “unpredictable” consequences.50

The reason it had taken 13 years to determine the Guam Treaty formula for Futenma replacement had nothing to do with inherent complexity or difficulty of construction and everything to with the fierce, uncompromising, non-violent and popularly-supported resistance to further base construction on Okinawa. The “old regime” (to 2009) contemplated using force, and in 2007 sent the Maritime Self-Defense Force’s frigate, Bungo, to intimidate the sea-floor civic defenders of the sea and its creatures at Henoko, but held back in fear of the political consequences of mass arrests and imposition of martial law. Whether Hatoyama will be able to muster a greater resolve than his LDP predecessors seems doubtful, meaning that the fifteen year struggle to block construction of a new base at Henoko will continue.

In Washington, managers of the alliance could feel satisfied that their uncompromising stance had forced the Prime Minister of Japan to surrender. They could also note with pleasure that Tokyo was increasingly committed to the principle of military facilities being shared between US and Japanese forces. Already, JGSDF (Japan’s “Army”) command has moved to the US Army’s Zama, outside Tokyo (which handles much of US military planing for the Pacific), where it is merged (under the 2006 Agreement) with US Army 1 Corps command.51 Already, the JASDF (Japan’s “Air Force”) command has merged with that of the US 5th Air Force at Yokota. As for the JMSDF (Japan’s “Navy”), it is already a subsidiary and support organization under the Yokosuka home-based US 7th Fleet (with the aircraft carrier George Washington), regularly engaged in joint war games and exercises under US direction). It is far-fetched to suggest that, under such circumstances, Japan retains autonomy of “defense” planning and policy or that its SDF serves exclusively to defend; more likely it is furthering its “Client State” agenda by subordinating its 240,000-strong military to Pentagon direction with the result that the scope of its operations extends throughout the Asia-Pacific and beyond.

So, while the 2009 Hatoyama rhetoric of a close and “equal” relationship had worried Washington, and led to the flood of abuse, intimidation, and derision without parallel in the US relationship with any country, seven months of unremitting pressure wore him down till he and his ministers looked like nothing so much as clones of their LDP predecessors.

The alliance in its first fifty years was characterized by subterfuge and by the persistent abuse of Okinawa. Is it possible that it can now substitute a “mature” alliance relationship with the US for the “Client State” relationship cultivated by the former (George W. Bush) administration and its LDP partners in successive Tokyo governments? If it is to do so, also it will have to face up to the secret diplomacy, lies, deception and manipulation of the last 50 years, and reflect upon, apologize, and offer redress for the wrongs that have for so long been visited upon the people of Okinawa as a result. It is surely time to extend to the Japanese and Okinawan people the constitutional guarantees of pacifism, human rights, and local autonomy guaranteed by its constitution. Instead, at the end of May 2010 and in the teeth of unprecedented American intimidation, Hatoyama vacillated and retreated, and the deeply rooted structures of dependency pushed Japan on the 50th towards a deepening and widening of clientelism and outright clash with Okinawa.

\*\*Biodiversity\*\*

Shifting the bases to Henoko will destroy several critical animal and plant species

McCormack 10 [Gavan, coordinator of The Asia-Pacific Journal – Japan Focus, and author of many previous texts on Okinawa-related matters. “Ampo’s Troubled 50th: Hatoyama’s Abortive Rebellion, Okinawa’s Mounting Resistance and the US-Japan Relationship” The Asia-Pacific Journal, May 31, 2010. http://japanfocus.org/-Gavan-McCormack/3367 Accessed June 24, 2010]

The Henoko site is commonly described as “sparsely populated,” as if that made it an obvious and almost unproblematic choice to replace the overcrowded Futenma. The Pentagon has eyed it as a site for comprehensive militarization since at least 1966.39 However, quite apart from the rights of the people who do undoubtedly live in the area and its vicinity, such discussion passes over the qualities that make this region not just of regional or national, but of global significance: its unique and precious marine and forest environment.

Under the Okinawa Prefectural Government’s Guidelines for Environmental Protection, the coastal areas of Henoko are classified as rank 1, warranting the highest level of protection. In these waters, the internationally protected dugong graze on sea grasses, turtles come to rest and lay their eggs, and multiple rare birds, insects, and animals thrive. A colony of blue coral was discovered only in 2007 (and in 2008 placed on the IUCN’s “Red,” or critically endangered, list, joining the dugong). A 2009 World Wildlife Fund study found an astonishing 36 new species of crabs and shrimps in Oura bay.40

Relocating military basis will destroy the remaining dugong

Feffer 10, co-director of Foreign Policy in Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies, 3/6/2010

John, “Okinawa and the New Domino Effect”, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/LC06Dh02.html

Then there's the dugong, a sea mammal similar to the manatee that looks like a cross between a walrus and a dolphin and was the likely inspiration for the mermaid myth. Only 50 specimens of this endangered species are still living in the marine waters threatened by the proposed new base near less populated Nago. In a landmark case, Japanese lawyers and American environmentalists filed suit in US federal court to block the base's construction and save the dugong.

Realistically speaking, even if the Pentagon were willing to appeal the case all the way up to the Supreme Court, lawyers and environmentalists could wrap the US military in so much legal and bureaucratic red tape for so long that the new base might never leave the drawing board.

\*\*East Asia\*\*

China: Balancing US

Japan is becoming ever closer with China – creating economic leverage against the US

Sakaguchi ‘9, (Daisuke, The Realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan and its Impact on the Interdependent Relationship between Japan and the U.S., in NIDS Security Report #10 (December 2009), http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/kiyo/e2009.html date accessed 6/23/10)

Thirdly, the improvement of the relationship between Japan and China will act as leverage in Japan’s relationship with the U.S. Until now the U.S. has been Japan’s biggest market. An enormous trade deficit with Japan developed in the U.S., but the fact that the U.S. is a massive market for Japan increased Japan’s dependence on the U.S. economically, and this was also a strength for the U.S. Now, however, China has replaced the U.S. as Japan’s largest trading partner. According to provisional statistics of trade on a customs clearance basis for 2007 published by the Ministry of Finance Japan on January 24, 2008, the value of Japan’s trade with China, excluding Hong Kong, was just under 28 trillion yen (total value of exports and imports), and the value of Japan’s trade with the U.S. was some 25 trillion yen, meaning the value Japan’s trade with China exceeded the value of its trade with the U.S. for the first time on a calendar year basis.46 In other words, because Japan has the option of trading not only with the U.S. but with China, its economic dependence on the U.S. has declined. In the Cold War the only option was to side with either the West camp or the East camp, but now, because Japan’s dependence on China, Russia and other nations has deepened and is not limited to the U.S., it has become possible to use this as leverage in diplomacy with the U.S. Naturally, the U.S. also has the same options, and China is a major market for it.

China: Plan Solves It

US Marines are useless against China – a better balancing model would be led by Japan and drawing down from Okinawa is the catalyst

Bandow 10, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, May 12, 2010

(Doug, “Japan can Defend Itself”, http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=11804)

Checking China is next on the potential Okinawa mission list. However, no one expects the United States to launch a ground invasion of the People's Republic of China irrespective of the future course of events. Thus, the MEF wouldn't be very useful in any conflict. In any case, a stronger Japanese military — which already possesses potent capabilities — would be a far better mechanism for encouraging responsible Chinese development.

There's also the kitchen sink argument: the Marines are to maintain regional "stability." Pentagon officials draw expanding circles around Okinawa to illustrate potential areas of operation.

The mind boggles, however. Should U.S. troops be sent to resolve, say, the long-running Burmese guerrilla war in that nation's east, a flare-up of secessionist sentiment in Indonesia, violent opposition to Fiji's military dictator, or border skirmishes between Cambodia and Thailand? It hard to imagine any reason for Washington to jump into any local conflict. America's presumption should be noninvolvement rather than intervention in other nations' wars.

Making fewer promises to intervene would allow the United States to reduce the number of military personnel and overseas bases. A good place to start in cutting international installations would be Okinawa.

America's post-Cold War dominance is coming to an end. Michael Schuman argued in Time: "Anyone who thinks the balance of power in Asia is not changing — and with it, the strength of the U.S., even among its old allies — hasn't been there lately."

Japan Leadership: China Balance

Japanese leadership is necessary to check China’s influence – China will fill in where Japan doesn’t

Klingner 9 [Bruce, Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation “How to Save the U.S.-Japan Alliance” Heritage Foundation. http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/08/How-to-Save-the-US-Japan-Alliance August 26, 2009. Accessed on June 22, 2010]

If Japan is uncertain of its future regional role, China is not. China, like nature, abhors a vacuum. If democratic Tokyo is unwilling to play a leadership role, China's growing economic and military capabilities will increasingly enable it to fill the gap that Japan's declining financial strength and self-imposed security constraints have caused. That could lead nations in Southeast Asia, Africa, and the Middle East to increasingly see China as a more capable and reliable actor than Japan. This is certainly not good for U.S. strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific region.

Japan Leadership: Low Now

Japan’s soft power in the status quo is useless – they can’t have meaningful global influence if it’s not augmented with their own military capability

Klingner 9 [Bruce, Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation “How to Save the U.S.-Japan Alliance” Heritage Foundation. http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/08/How-to-Save-the-US-Japan-Alliance August 26, 2009. Accessed on June 22, 2010]

Japanese economic contributions are impressive. Moreover, they outweigh those of China despite Beijing often receiving far greater media attention. But these are Japanese economic, not security, contributions; the U.S.-Japan alliance is, of course, a security relationship. One cannot substitute non-security accomplishments as compensation for Tokyo's grudging implementation of its military commitments. Tokyo has been unable to translate its economic strength into political and security influence or into an effective leadership role. And its economic power is a slowly melting iceberg.

Some Japanese scholars point to the intangible influence provided by Japan's "soft power," pointing to polls that show the country is well respected throughout Asia. "While Japan's relative economic strength may be on the decline, smart diplomacy and soft power can supplement this loss and make sure that Japan's future remains bright,"[16] believes Hitoshi Tanaka, Japan's former Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Academics on both sides of the Pacific seek to justify Japan's shortcomings by advocating a more comprehensive, "non-traditional" definition of the alliance to include non-security issues. "Non-traditional security" is, in fact, non-security. Redefining non-security issues as "soft" security accepts passivity as a strategy and highlights non-relevant achievements to compensate for security shortcomings. Japanese efforts on global warming, energy issues, or combating pandemics do not contribute to a military alliance. Tokyo cannot substitute initiatives on these issues for fulfilling its security requirements.

Unless soft power is convertible into political influence, it is merely an oxymoron that is used as an excuse for avoiding security responsibilities. Even effective soft power can only augment, not replace, security commitments.

Japanese leadership is waning – without changes in the alliance, they can’t come back

Klingner 9 [Bruce, Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation “How to Save the U.S.-Japan Alliance” Heritage Foundation. http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/08/How-to-Save-the-US-Japan-Alliance August 26, 2009. Accessed on June 22, 2010]

Japan's regional and global influence and relevance are diminishing due to a faltering economy, paralyzed political system, and constrained armed forces. The current trajectory of Japan's future is poor, with little reason for optimism for a change in course. "The danger is that [the bilateral] alliance will, despite its strategic importance, grow ever more irrelevant to the increasingly global realities of world affairs,"[13] warns Kent Calder of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. As a result, the world "has likely seen the high-water mark of Japan's international presence and assertiveness."[14] Japan must realize that the result of indecision, stagnation, and attempting to merely maintain the status quo is devolving it to a second-tier, middle-power nation.

Left unchecked, Tokyo's influence and relevance in Asia will continue to erode. It is not a case of Japan abandoning the race, but simply that its competitors have gotten much better. It is like a ball player who continues to play the same level of game, oblivious to the fact that the other players on both his team and the opponent's are continually improving their capabilities.

Japan Leadership: Plan Key

US Marines are useless, straining alliance commitments and blocking Japan’s regional leadership

Doug Bandow 10, Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute, former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan and Senior Policy Analyst in the 1980 Reagan for President Campaign, holds a B.A. in Economics from Florida State University and a J.D. from Stanford University, 2010 (“Okinawa and the Problem of Empire,” The Huffington Post, March 25th, Available Online at http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=11617)

In fact, there's no reason for the U.S. to do either. Allies are a means to an end; the defense of America, not allies, is America's vital interest. Sometimes protecting other nations is necessary for U.S. security, as during the Cold War. But that world disappeared long ago. Enemy threats are far fewer and allied capabilities are far greater.

True, politicians and analysts alike routinely term America's alliances "cornerstones" and "linchpins" of U.S. security, regional stability, and world peace. In reality, today's alliance are unnecessary at best and dangerous transmission belts of conflict and war at worst.

Consider Japan. President Barack Obama says that "America's commitment to Japan's security is unshakable," but does that mean the U.S. forever must defend that nation? The 1951 military treaty committed Japan to "increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression."

In fact, Tokyo is capable of defending itself. Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada recently expressed doubt that "Japan on its own can face up to such risks" as China, but Tokyo needs a deterrent capability, not superiority. That is well within Japan's means. Certainly the U.S. would be far more secure if its allies and friends created forces to discourage aggression and worked together to encourage regional stability, rather than depended on Washington.

If the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force located on Okinawa is not needed to defend Japan, then what is it for? South Korea vastly outranges the North on virtually every measure of power and can do whatever is necessary to deter North Korean adventurism. There also is much talk, offered unceasingly and uncritically, about maintaining regional stability. But what invasions, border fights, naval clashes, missile threats, and full-scale wars are the Marines preventing?

US Commitments act as a disincentive to Japan’s more active role in East Asia

Preble 6 [Christopher, director of foreign policy studies @ Cato institute, Cato institute, “Two Normal Countries: Rethinking the U.S.-Japan Strategic Relationship” April 16 2008, p. http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa566.pdf

These numbers make clear that Japan already plays an active role in world affairs, in spite of the constitutional restrictions on the use of military force. What Japan has lacked for much of its history since the end of World War II is the incentive and the will to take responsibility for its own security—and for regional security—to a degree commensurate with its economic power and interests. The U.S. security guarantee serves as a disincentive for change, and U.S. policy has therefore impeded the development of Japan’s indigenous military capabilities, capabilities that might prove useful to both countries in the future.

Japan Leadership: Plan Key

Japan’s military is already fully capable of ensuring stability in East Asia – the US just needs to jumpstart the political momentum for Japan to take charge

Preble 6 [Christopher, director of foreign policy studies @ Cato institute, Cato institute, “Two Normal Countries: Rethinking the U.S.-Japan Strategic Relationship” April 16 2008, p. http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa566.pdf

The agreements announced in late October 2005 suggest that the process of strategic devolution may already be taking place. As discussed above, Japanese military forces are already extremely capable of both defending the territory of Japan and confronting would-be regional threats. Japan possesses advanced anti-submarine warfare capabilities, which are particularly important in the East Asian theater, and it also is capable of conducting mine-clearing activities. 56 Those assets are geared primarily to regional contingencies, but the vessels in Japan’s Maritime SDF constitute the second or third most capable fleet in the world. A shift in Japanese defense posture would not necessarily require a substantial expansion of current military spending.57 Given Japan’s tight integration into the global economy, and its continued reliance on raw materials and energy resources from outside the Asia-Pacific region, the Japanese want to be in a position to safeguard the flow of such strategic resources, as well as finished goods, to and from their country, and this might require a new approach to the deployment and disposition of their existing military, especially naval, assets.

Ultimately, however, Washington must prompt such a shift by continuing to stress its new vision for U.S.-Japan strategic cooperation. The Japanese government must decide the size and composition of Japan’s military, consistent with the wishes of the Japanese people. Americans must be willing to allow the Japanese to assert a measure of independence from their former patron; it serves neither U.S. nor Japanese long-term interests to expect Tokyo to merely toe Washington’s line.

Japan Leadership: Regionalism

A more independent Japan is welcomed by democratic countries throughout the Pacific

Doug Bandow 2010, is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and Vice President of Policy for Citizen Outreach, June 18th, 2010 [“Get Out of Japan”, National Interest Online, June 18th, 2010, available online at http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=23592, accessed June 28, 2010]

Anyway, the best way to assuage regional concerns is to construct cooperative agreements and structures between Japan and its neighbors. Democratic countries from South Korea to Australia to India have an interest in working with Tokyo to ensure that the Asia-Pacific remains peaceful and prosperous. Japan has much at stake and could contribute much. Tokyo could still choose to do little. But it shouldn’t expect America to fill any defense gap.

North Korea: Japan Key

Japan taking an active role in the North Korea situation is comparatively better than being hamstrung by the US – Japan could contain North Korea by itself

Preble 6 [Christopher, director of foreign policy studies @ Cato institute, Cato institute, “Two Normal Countries: Rethinking the U.S.-Japan Strategic Relationship” April 16 2008, p. http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa566.pdf

Finally, with respect to the ongoing crisis on the Korean peninsula, the danger of nuclear proliferation in East Asia, combined with continued ill-will engendered by the abductee controversy, suggests that the Japanese would likely be dealing far more harshly with the North Koreans than they are now were it not for the United States. At least one recent poll suggest that the Japanese are less concerned about the threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear weapons than are many Americans,92 but, objectively, Kim Jong-il does pose a more urgent security threat to Japan than he does to the United States.

The North Korean crisis may have provided the catalyst for a fundamental shift in Japanese strategy and policy, but it cannot be viewed in a vacuum. Although the steps thus far taken by Koizumi against North Korea have not satisfied a segment of the Japanese population, many of whom remain more concerned about the emotional abductee issue than about the objective security threat, China’s rise poses a more important challenge to Japan’s security over the medium to long term.93 For now, given the urgency of the North Korean threat to Japan, and befitting Japan’s emergence as a normal power, it would be natural for Japan to take a leading role in attempting to end North Korea’s nuclear program.

As other regional threats become more serious, however, many Japanese may come to resent U.S. policies that appear to impede their reasonable efforts to defend themselves. Continued strong opposition within Japan to the use of the military for offensive ends suggests that unilateral preemptive action by Japan against North Korea is highly unlikely. On the other hand, it is unrealistic to expect that Tokyo would wait for U.S. permission to respond to a direct attack. It is only slightly more plausible that the Japanese would refrain from using force in response to credible evidence of an imminent threat.

Military action against North Korea, even if it were found to be a legitimate exercise of the right of self-defense, would certainly stir regional animosity. That is a reflection of the difficult balancing act that Japan must play vis-à-vis other potential allies in the region, chief among them South Korea. North and South Koreans alike harbor deep resentment toward the Japanese. Koreans were the victims of horrible crimes at the hands of the Japanese, of which the notorious abuses inflicted on Korean “comfort women” were only the most infamous. Although U.S. policymakers should rightly be concerned about regional hostility toward Japan, such concerns are not more worrisome than the crisis in the here and now, when an impoverished and increasingly des- perate North Korea might be tempted to sell nuclear materials to terrorists.

Short of offensive military operations against Pyongyang, Japan has other means for defending itself from North Korean nuclear weapons independent of the United States. Japan has cooperated with the United States in the construction of an anti-ballistic missile system, but the further development and deployment of such a system need not depend on U.S. support. If active countermeasures for dealing with regional security threats were deemed insufficient, the Japanese might even take the fateful step of developing their own nuclear deterrent.94

In short, a Japanese military, operating independent of the United States but still constrained by the pacifist impulses of the Japanese public, could prove a credible deterrent to offensive actions by North Korea against Japan proper and might also succeed in convincing the DPRK to abandon its nuclear ambitions, in contrast to U.S. economic and diplomatic pressure, which has been completely ineffective. Beyond the North Korean crisis, Japanese military power might prove instrumental for dealing with future serious challenges to the regional security order.

Off-Shore Balancing: US Presence Blocks

Scaling back US presence in Japan transitions to more a more efficient off-shore balancing model – military technology can compensate for the need for troops in Japan

Sakaguchi ‘9, (Daisuke, The Realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan and its Impact on the Interdependent Relationship between Japan and the U.S., in NIDS Security Report #10 (December 2009), http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/kiyo/e2009.html date accessed 6/23/10)

Robert L. Rothstein explains that “In an alliance relationship between a large nation and a small nation, from the outset intrinsic imbalances exist in various issues in terms of maintaining and preserving the alliance. While the small nation demands debate as an absolute right, the large nation seeks to decide the degree of debate according to the small nation’s capacity to contribute when it comes to actual problem solving.”32 If the scale of U.S. military bases in Japan contracts and the U.S.’ degree of dependence on Japan decreases, Japan’s ability to negotiate with the U.S. would be expected to decline.

(2) Realigning U.S. forces with the goal of reducing dependence on allied nations Accompanying the end of the Cold War, George F. Kennan argued that the U.S. should reduce its offshore involvement.33 In addition, the U.S.’ traditional offshore balancing – whereby the balance of power within regions is left to the nations making up the region, with the U.S. intervening only when the balance cannot be maintained – also came to be revisited as a grand strategy. This strategy involves boosting nuclear weapons and the power of long-range mobility, and withdrawing U.S. forces from offshore bases, enabling the U.S. to make itself safer while not relinquishing regions of vital importance to large, rival nations.34 Possibly due to the influence of this point of view, the U.S.’ military transformation and the GPR also aim to reduce dependence on allied nations. Following the Transformation Planning Guidance,35 in which the U.S. government ordered each of the armed forces to create a roadmap for reform every year, the U.S. Air Force is exhibiting the concepts of global mobility and global strike. The former means to “launch an operation anywhere in the would in the minimum time” and the latter means to be able to strike “an important target” within a number of hours or a number of minutes, wherever that target may be in the world. As a result of progress with innovative military technologies, demonstrable improvement is occurring in information-gathering capacities, troop mobility and the might and accuracy of fire power. However, the most important point of all is that technological progress such as this will diminish the value of offshore bases and the degree of dependence on them. Among adherents to the revolution in military affairs, many believe that once it is possible to attack potential enemies around the world from the U.S. mainland or ocean, offshore bases will be unnecessary. For example, even if a change in the political climate saw an allied nation suddenly deny the U.S. the use of bases, if it were possible to immediately project military strength from the U.S. mainland to locations in which forward-deployed forces were not present the impact would not be major.36 In fact, at the time of the Iraq War, Turkey denied the U.S. military the use of bases and Austria denied the U.S. military passage through its airspace, and these experiences are a strong motivator for reviewing approaches to offshore bases.37 Regarding the issue of realigning U.S. forces, Richard Hawley, a retired U.S. Air Force general who makes proposals on approaches to the Air Force’s military strength in the Asia- Pacific region, says the reason Guam is an important operation base is that “In the Iraq War [the U.S.] was unable to get permission from Turkey to use bases and this proved a hindrance to constructing an Iraq northern front, but political problems do not arise in the U.S. territory of Guam.”38 Furthermore, the high cost of stationing troops offshore and improving the working conditions of military personnel who have to live away from their families for long periods are issues that the U.S. military needs to resolve quickly. Going forward, progress in military technology is likely to become an alternative means for compensating for the withdrawal of bases. The “sea basing” being pursued by the Navy and Marine Corps is one such example. A sea base involves viewing a ship positioned on the coast like a base on land, with an attempt to utilize it not only for support for ground offensives and troop landings, but also as a supply point and as a place for repairing equipment, massing and training troops, and other uses.39 The advantage of sea bases is that they are safer than land bases and are not restricted by political and diplomatic restraints, thus allowing the U.S. military to function independently. The goal of reducing dependence on forward-deployed bases forms a backdrop to this concept also.40 With modern threats it is not possible to specify beforehand the regions in which conflicts are likely to occur. In order to deal with this situation, the U.S. military prepares for various contingencies and regardless of where in the world a conflict looks set to break out it must be able to deploy military force there rapidly. The goal of the military transformation and the GPR can be perceived as boosting the readiness of military forces to prepare for unforeseen situations. This indicates a fundamental change in forward-deployed bases and troops; their role could be said to be starting to shift and to center on a means of deploying rapidly to areas of conflict, not just on the defense of allied nations and neighboring regions.41 As a result of the abovementioned changes in the military, it is becoming possible to deploy troops rapidly and the need to station large forces offshore in advance – and the dependence on offshore bases – is gradually weakening. Once the concepts of global strike and sea basing become reality the goal of offshore bases for determent and containment will fade and they are likely to become nothing but relay points for projecting military force onto a conflict area smoothly.42

Regionalism: China’s Rise

US troops in Okinawa block China’s peaceful rise, dismantling the foundations for a stable East Asian regionalism

Mark Beeson 2009, Professor and Head of the Department of Political Science & International Studies, The University of Birmingham, “East Asian Regionalism and the End of the Asia-Pacific: After American Hegemony” The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 2-2-09, January 10, 2009.

This prospect is not as unlikely as it once was. Despite some initial misgivings, China has been rapidly incorporated into an array of multilateral institutions at both the regional and global levels, and its political elites do, indeed, appear to be undergoing an extensive socialisation process of precisely the sort many in both Southeast Asia and the U.S. desired. [50] Yet despite – perhaps, because of – the increasing sophistication of Chinese foreign policy, this is likely to consolidate an East Asian, rather than an Asia-Pacific identity. China’s assiduous wooing of its ASEAN neighbours, combined with its growing strategic and economic importance in East Asia, are giving China a centrality in regional affairs that may ultimately restore an order that prevailed for hundreds if not thousands of years. As David Kang has persuasively argued, ‘When China has been strong and stable, order has been preserved. East Asian regional relations have historically been hierarchic, more peaceful, and more stable than those in the West’. [51] It is highly significant that, as David Shambaugh points out, ‘most nations in the region now see China as a good neighbour, a constructive partner, a careful listener, and a non-threatening regional power’; consequently, ‘the structure of power and the nature of the regional system are being fundamentally altered’.[52] In other words, not only is there no inevitability about the form that international relations may take in East Asia, contrary to what much realist scholarship might have us believe, but it is entirely possible a different, regional order centred on Chinese rather than American power may re-emerge. This is especially the case as China’s growing economic importance to the region, and its own increasing interdependence with and reliance on the rest of the region, makes it potentially a centre of regional stability and growth, rather than destabilising insecurity. [53]

The key regional obstacle to China assuming this role is Japan. Japan’s own regional leadership ambitions, combined with an increasingly close security relationship with the US under the Koizumi government, [54] seem to preclude regional cooperation. Indeed, when combined with Koizumi’s apparent indifference to regional sensitivities about Japan’s war-time record, the prospects for greater East Asian cohesion and autonomy look rather dim. However, there are long-term underlying national and regional dynamics that may undermine the US’s position and force an accommodation with China. On the one hand, it is clear that there is significant popular concern in Japan itself about America’s role – something highlighted by continuing tensions over the troop deployments in Okinawa, deep divisions over US pressures to deploy SDF in the Middle East war zone, and the popularity of nationalist political figures. On the other, the sheer magnitude of the economic links and the expanding personal interactions they necessitate between China and Japan may be compelling a rapprochement between two powers that simply cannot live without each other [55] – despite the nationalistic bluster on both sides. In this context it is significant that bilateral relations have improved significantly since Koizumi’s departure from office, with China and Japan agreeing in principle to jointly develop disputed potential oil and gas deposits in the East China Sea. [56]

Elsewhere in the region American policy generally and the ‘war on terror’ in particular have eroded popular support for the U.S. even more dramatically.[57] That enthusiasm for the U.S. in Islamic Indonesia might plummet as a consequence of the U.S.’s increasingly unilateral, for-us-or-against-us policy stance in the ‘war on terror’ is perhaps predictable enough. What is more surprising is that the U.S.’s frequently heavy-handed, uncompromising approach, when combined with a frequently unsophisticated understanding of, or apparent disregard for, Southeast Asia’s particular difficulties, may actually have encouraged further opposition to its policies. Moreover, there is a good deal of scepticism about American policy in the region, even amongst supporters of the war on terror, as US policy appears to be equally preoccupied with countering Chinese influence in Southeast Asia – a concern that is not widely shared in the region.[58]

Regionalism: East Asian Stability

US troop deployments block regional resolutions in North Korea, Taiwan and China.

Mark Beeson 2009, Professor and Head of the Department of Political Science & International Studies, The University of Birmingham, “East Asian Regionalism and the End of the Asia-Pacific: After American Hegemony” The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 2-2-09, January 10, 2009.

The other issue that may be effectively creating a divide, or at least a growing sense of difference, between the East Asian and North America sides of the Asia-Pacific is the growing realisation that, while the hub and spokes architecture that the U.S. continues to dominate may further American grand strategy, it is not necessarily helpful in resolving specific East Asian problems or promoting greater regional cooperation. As Muthiah Alagappa points out, it is striking that ‘the development of international society has made the greatest progress in a subregion - Southeast Asia - after American disengagement and has made much less progress in a subregion - Northeast Asia – where the United States has continued to be engaged most heavily’.[59] Not only has Southeast Asia been able to foster a sense of regional identity in the absence of direct American engagement - with no obvious loss of security or stability - but American policy has made little progress in resolving the East Asian region’s most intractable and dangerous confrontation on the Korean peninsula. Indeed, Alagappa argues that American troop deployments across Northeast Asia may actually be making the resolution of stand-offs in North Korea, and between Taiwan and China, more difficult to resolve. Like Kang, Alagappa concludes that ‘the consequences of American disengagement- may not be as disastrous as posited’. [60]

Regionalism: US Blocks It

Traditional US hard power is undermining East Asian regionalism and US soft power

Mark Beeson 2009, Professor and Head of the Department of Political Science & International Studies, The University of Birmingham, “East Asian Regionalism and the End of the Asia-Pacific: After American Hegemony” The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 2-2-09, January 10, 2009.

There are a number of different ways of conceptualising hegemony. While all agree hegemony is about dominance in the international system, there are very different views about what this means and how it is achieved.[3] For realists, hegemony is about material resources, principally military. In the endless quest for power that realists believe characterises the international system, hegemonic competition is cyclical and inevitable, as rising powers supplant enfeebled ones in a Darwinian struggle for survival. [4] If this was all there was to hegemony, the US ought to be in an unassailable position for the foreseeable future given its military and technological superiority. And yet, not only can the US not impose its will in Iraq and Afghanistan, but there is plainly more to contemporary dominance than sheer brute force. This is an especially important consideration given the bloody recent history of the East Asian region and the US’s direct military involvement in it: if any region ought to be acutely attuned to a predominantly strategic calculus it is East Asia. While much of East Asia does remain preoccupied with ‘traditional’ notions of security, even here America’s strategic presence is, as we shall see, no longer as decisive as it once was.

Hegemony has an important ideational or ideological component that is realised discursively, and which can be a crucial determinant of a hegemony’s power to achieve its goals peacefully.[5] Despite their very different views about the impact of hegemony, there is a surprising amount of agreement between liberal theorists and those ‘neo-Gramscians’ who draw their inspiration from a radical, Marxist tradition about the importance of ideas and institutions in entrenching hegemonic rule. Both stress the normative and ideational component of hegemonic rule, although they differ markedly on it overall impact. For liberals like John Ikenberry, American dominance has been effective and – until recently, at least – largely unchallenged, because it offered real advantages to subordinate powers which benefited from key collective goods like a relatively stable, liberal economic system and access to lucrative US markets.[6] Critical scholars like Robert Cox, have also emphasised the importance of pay-offs for subordinates, although these have been largely confined to members of the local ruling classes, rather than nations as a whole.[7]

Both the liberal and critical perspectives highlight the potential strengths and weaknesses of American power: the establishment of the Bretton Woods institutions under US auspices in the aftermath of World War II plainly did entrench American power and offer potential advantages to allies as Ikenberry suggests. However, it is precisely this aspect of American power that is being undermined by its recent shift to more unilateral and/or bilateral policies, and encouraging a greater interest in regional mechanisms and strategies that could exclude the US as a consequence. This leads to an important insight developed by critical theorists: the operation and impact of hegemony is something that transcends national boundaries, and is not solely a consequence of state behaviour. Although nation-states generally and the US in particular remain the most important actors in the international system, particular sets of ideas, practices and power relations have taken on a distinctly trans-national form.[8]

This is where East Asia’s nascent pursuit of regional cooperation that excludes the US becomes especially significant and interesting: while critical theorists are right to stress the importance of trans-national forces and the declining significance of strictly national political and economic structures, they have generally neglected the potential importance of regional strategies for maintaining different, non-hegemonic approaches to questions of political, economic and even strategic management and cooperation. Paradoxically, the attempted application of the most traditional forms of American military power in the ‘war on terror’, or through direct bilateral leverage in the economic sphere, is actually undermining its more institutionally embedded, normatively based authority and influence, and encouraging the development of alternative, regionally-based modes of organisation. [9] Before considering how such impulses have been realised in East Asia, it is worth briefly spelling out the regional dynamics have been understood, and why an East Asian, rather than an Asia-Pacific from of regionalism is emerging.

Regionalism: US Blocks It

US involvement and push for a range of bilateral ties hinders East Asian multilateral regionalism, driving wedges between Japan, China and Russia.

Mark Beeson 2009, Professor and Head of the Department of Political Science & International Studies, The University of Birmingham, “East Asian Regionalism and the End of the Asia-Pacific: After American Hegemony” The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 2-2-09, January 10, 2009.

No region was more affected by the Cold War than East Asia. True, Europe may have been the epicentre of the super-power stand-off for much of the Cold War period, but this did not erupt into major conflict as it did in Asia. Like Europe, though, the super-power rivalry in East Asia created ideological divisions that effectively split the region into pro-and anti-American camps. This potential for intra-regional cleavage was reinforced by American strategic policy. The ‘hub and spoke’ security architecture that the U.S. constructed in much of East Asia was predicated on a series of bilateral relationships that made the establishment of intra-regional relations within East Asia inherently problematic. Indeed, it is important to recognise that the U.S.’s preference for bilateral security relations was not simply a functional consequence of the divided and unstable nature of the East Asian region, as some have argued, [41] but a key element of its overall grand strategy. In other words, as Michael Mastanduno points out,

since the United States does not want to encourage a balancing coalition against its dominant position, it is not clear that it has a strategic interest in the full resolution of differences between, say, Japan and China or Russia and China. Some level of tension among these states reinforces their individual need for a special relationship with the United States. [42]

Against an established backdrop of American strategic involvement in the region that is expressly designed to keep East Asia divided and its security orientation firmly oriented toward Washington, the prospects for a more exclusive, East Asian mechanism with which to manage regional security concerns might seem bleak. And yet an examination of the historical record and the impact of the U.S. ‘war on terror’ suggests that the prospects for a more exclusive regional order are not as remote or unprecedented as some observers believe. Even in Northeast Asia, which has the most entrenched divisions and historical animosities, the increasing interest in and push toward regional cooperation is in the view of one seasoned observer, ‘a realistic response to the rise of US unipolarity’.[43]

And yet, the conventional wisdom has it that a region that contains two great powers like China and Japan which are competing for regional leadership, which have fought a major war in living memory, and which have enduring misgivings about each other as a consequence, is hardly a recipe for regional cooperation and harmony. When combined with a modest record of achievement in, and capacity for, managing regional security issues independently of extra-regional powers, East Asia, it is suggested, looks ‘ripe for rivalry’. [44] However, an increasing number of observers are questioning whether Asia’s future will inevitably replicate nineteenth century Europe’s past, and whether the region is necessarily as unstable and prone to conflict as such realist analyses imply. [45]

Taiwan: Japan Key

Japan can deter Chinese invasion of Taiwan by itself

Preble 6 [Christopher, director of foreign policy studies @ Cato institute, Cato institute, “Two Normal Countries: Rethinking the U.S.-Japan Strategic Relationship” April 16 2008, p. http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa566.pdf

That does not mean that Tokyo wishes to antagonize Beijing. The Japanese clearly are concerned about recent Chinese pressure on Taiwan, but they have stopped short of pledging to come to Taiwan’s aid in the event of a conflict. Continued free and unfettered passage through the sea-lanes that surround the island is vital to Japanese interests; it is therefore implausible to assume that the Japanese would inevitably accede to PRC aggression against Taiwan. Taiwanese president Chen Shui-bian misconstrued Japanese pledges to Taiwan when he told the Washington Post’s Anthony Faiola that “Japan has a requirement and an obligation to come to the defense of Taiwan.”91 Nonetheless, even the mere possibility that China could face a retaliatory response from either or both of two powerful states, one of which is located only a few hundred miles off the coast of China, might serve as a more credible deterrent than that which is posed today solely by the United States, with Japan serving in a supporting role.

US Diplomacy/Soft Power

Realignment is key to lessen US dependence on Japan, boosting US diplomatic and economic leverage

Sakaguchi ‘9, (Daisuke, The Realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan and its Impact on the Interdependent Relationship between Japan and the U.S., in NIDS Security Report #10 (December 2009), http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/kiyo/e2009.html date accessed 6/23/10)

That is to say, because both Japan and the U.S. have strengths and weaknesses the equilibrium of their alliance has been preserved. However, the U.S.’ military transformation and realignment of its forces in Japan will probably bring changes of some sort to this relation of interdependence. As previously stated, Japan has provided bases and contributed to stationing costs, and this has been Japan’s strength in the Japan-U.S. relationship. However, the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan will weaken this strength of Japan’s and create a concern that the balanced structure may be disrupted. This is because whatever the strategic backdrop may be, while a reduction in the U.S. military bases means a reduction in Okinawa’s burden, this will result in a weakening of the U.S.’ degree of dependence on Japan. U.S. military bases in Japan perform a hub role and it is possible to interpret this as meaning Japan’s importance has been emphasized as a result, but the withdrawal of U.S. military bases and troops will reduce Japan’s burden and lead to a weakening in the U.S.’ dependence on Japan. Generally, a lesser degree of dependence would be a source of power to the dependent nation. This is because between two mutually dependent parties, if one party’s degree of dependence is less than that of the other party, as far as both parties consider the relationship of interdependence to be important, the source of power will lie with the party with the lower degree of dependence.26 This sort of interdependent relationship, as previously described in Figures 1 to 3, behaves the same way as market principles. As Adam Smith pointed out in The Wealth of Nations, division of labor is a fundamental principle that enhances wealth, and the human nature of trading a certain item for another item and exchanging it, in other words the “propensity to exchange,” encourages the division of labor.27 Like the market, the Japan-U.S. Alliance arises out of the mutual exchange of desired items. Accordingly, the weakening in dependence toward Japan will be advantageous to the U.S. position in Japan-U.S. relations outside of security, such as diplomatic negotiations and economic negotiations, and the breadth of its concessions in negotiations can be expected to contract. As has been noted, “The consequences of the transformation conversely lie more in the sphere of diplomacy and politics than they do in the sphere of military affairs,”28 indicating that the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan is also likely to have an impact on the diplomatic and economic sectors.

\*\*Japan Politics\*\*

Links

Kan will face extreme pressure on US bases – Not acting strong pits everyone in Japan against him…

Shuster 6/21/10, (Mike, NPR, Japan's PM Faces Test Over U.S. Base On Okinawa, http://www.scpr.org/news/2010/06/21/japans-pm-faces-test-over-us-base-on-okinawa/, date accessed 6/23/10)

The U.S. says it will transfer 8,000 Marines to Guam and move a portion of the base to another part of Okinawa.

Kan, the new prime minister, has pledged to seek a solution that is in line with this offer, but he still faces overwhelming opposition on Okinawa, Honda says.

"So far mayors, governors and local politicians in Okinawa, everybody [is] against the proposal of the new government. So he will be completely blocked by this," he says.

Kan needs to look strong in the face of US presence to gain credibility

Shuster 6/21/10, (Mike, NPR, Japan's PM Faces Test Over U.S. Base On Okinawa, http://www.scpr.org/news/2010/06/21/japans-pm-faces-test-over-us-base-on-okinawa/, date accessed 6/23/10)

In order to handle the matter successfully, Kan, the new prime minister, will have to explain that need better to the Japanese people, say some analysts.

Narushige Michishita, a specialist in strategic and defense studies at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, says Kan needs to address the issue of defending Japan. Michishita is sympathetic to the U.S. position, but he believes it will be difficult for Kan to convince the Japanese, especially the people of Okinawa, of the dangers Japan may face that require a large U.S. military presence.

"In a way he has been a little bit exaggerating the need for U.S. troops in Okinawa for the defense of Japan at the current moment," Michishita says.

More in Japan oppose US presence than support it

Preble 6 [Christopher, director of foreign policy studies @ Cato institute, Cato institute, “Two Normal Countries: Rethinking the U.S.-Japan Strategic Relationship” April 16 2008, p. http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa566.pdf

At the same time, a series of urgent security challenges has prompted a reassessment throughout Japanese society of the utility of military power. While it is conceivable that a few Japanese might wish to remain dependent on America for their security, either out of a desire to avoid paying more for defense or for fear of the risks associated with a change from the status quo, many more are now willing to embrace a new strategic relationship with the United States in which the Japanese take full responsibility for their own security and also accept additional responsibilities in East Asia and the western Pacific.

Links

US security issues are a vital internal link to Japan’s government credibility – US troop presence is a key area

Kapila 10, graduate of the Royal British Army Staff College, with a Masters in Defence Science (Madras University) and a PhD in Strategic Studies (Allahabad University), 6/7/10 Subhash, “Japan’s Political Instability and Its Strategic Impact”, http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/\papers39\paper3848.html)In the last few years, two striking Japan-US Security Relationship issues can be cited as having becoming emotive political issues resulting in changes of Prime Ministers. The first such issue pertained to extending the parliamentary mandate for Japanese Navy missions in the Indian Ocean to support US war effort in Afghanistan. This basically involved Japanese Navy providing logistics and refuelling to US and allied Navy ships deployed to cover military operations in Afghanistan. This facility was extended to Pakistan Navy ships also.

The latest issue in Japan-US Security Relationship to rock Japanese politics and bring down outgoing Prime Minister Hatoyama was the relocation of the US Marine Air Base, Futema. It is not the intention to go into the merits or demerits of the Futema issue. The aim is to focus on the larger issue as to why earlier Prime ministers strongly aligned to US security interests had long and stable tenures and why presently Japanese Prime ministers are increasingly becoming vulnerable to strong Japanese domestic opinion on US-Japan security related issues.

This significant change can be attributed to two strategic factors, both pertaining to the United States. In the past United States reigned supreme strategically in East Asia. That strategic strength provided Japan with a sheet anchor for its security. Today, United States strategic power is on the decline and China is rising strategically strong in East Asia. Japanese insecurities therefore are raised.

More seriously, Japanese insecurities are magnified further when Japan perceives that United States policy formulations in East Asia exhibit ambiguities about Japan’s strategic sensitivities. Under the present US Administration, even though the US President and US Secretary of State visited Japan first in East Asia, but in their pronouncements in Tokyo they seemed to indicate that the United States intends to adopt China as a partner in the security management of East Asia. With such US attitudinal adoptions, it becomes logical for Japanese public to question the very premises of US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, Japan’s financial underwriting of US forward military presence in Asia and the sizeable US Marines presence on Okinawa Island.

One gets a feeling from media features in Japanese press that strong resentment is surfacing in Japan on these issues. More importantly the arrogance of US officials in dealings with Japan’s security matters is being resented.

No wonder outgoing Japanese PM Hatoyama made pointed public references during President Obama’s visit to Tokyo that United States needs to manage relations with Japan on a more "equitable basis". He was airing widespread Japanese sentiments on the issue.

Kan’s position on base relocation, despite some statements, remains unclear

Shuster 6/21/10, (Mike, NPR, Japan's PM Faces Test Over U.S. Base On Okinawa, http://www.scpr.org/news/2010/06/21/japans-pm-faces-test-over-us-base-on-okinawa/, date accessed 6/23/10)

His successor, Naoto Kan, took office earlier this month. It is not clear how he will deal with the problem of Okinawa, says political analyst Masatoshi Honda of the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies.

"He hasn't made any clear statement about Futenma before and even right now. He just said he will follow the decision of the previous prime minister. So we cannot see what he really wants to do on this issue," Honda says.

Consumption Tax Good

Increasing the consumption tax is critical to improve welfare programs that give people the security to spend more which is key to growth in Japan

The Asahi Shimbun 10, June 29, [“Kan’s dilemma: Is Japan Ready to pay?”, published in the Asahi Shimbun Globe, June 29, 2010, available http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201006280353.html]

Prime Minister Naoto Kan's proposals on tax reform didn't come out of thin air.

He got advice from an economics professor who champions the Swedish example of a very high tax burden in exchange for social security benefits that allow retirees to live comfortably.

Sweden's consumption tax rate is 25 percent overall. A 12-percent tax is levied on foodstuffs.

Kan, who at the time was deputy prime minister with the Finance Ministry portfolio, convened a meeting May 17 with Naohiko Jinno, a professor emeritus of economics at the University of Tokyo.

Also present were Yoshito Sengoku, then state minister in charge of national policy and now chief Cabinet secretary, and Kazuhiro Haraguchi, minister of internal affairs and communications.

The meeting was held in Tokyo's administrative heartland of Kasumigasaki. As the key member of the government's Tax Commission, Jinno explained the direction he thought Japan should take to address its fiscal woes and create a solid social security net.

"Here's why I think we need to impose a heavier tax burden," Jinno said. "It would create a solid welfare system and a strong economy. Those two points will ensure that domestic consumption remains strong as people will be able to spend."

His proposal reflected the experience of the Swedish model coupled with his own ideas.

Kan, Sengoku and Hara-guchi listened intently as Jinno outlined a radical restructuring of Japan's tax system. "It's a good idea," Sengoku said. Kan bowed his head in assent.

Two weeks later, Yukio Hatoyama abruptly resigned as prime minister. Kan immediately threw his hat into the ring for the election for a new president of the ruling Democratic Party of Japan.

In a news conference held to express his candidacy, Kan said, "I plan to achieve a strong economy, strong public finances and a strong social security system all acting in tandem."

Kan clearly borrowed part of Jinno's explanation to make this public pledge.

Economic theory, according to Kan, centers on the following: Japan has no time to waste in implementing fiscal reconstruction. To do that, tax increases are indispensable. But simply raising taxes will cool the economy. If the government uses the additional tax revenue to fund improved social security programs, gloom about the future will evaporate, and, as a result, people will start spending again. Based on this idea, if the government pumps money into medical services and nursing care, areas where demand is expected to grow sharply due to the aging population, economic growth will follow.

As a first step, Kan is leaning toward raising the consumption tax rate, now at 5 percent.

\*\*Answers To\*\*

Regulations Counterplans

Tougher restrictions on Marines don’t solve – eventually pressure will mount to kick them out

Maddox 10 [Bronwen, staffwriter New York Times, The Sunday Times, “65 years after the war, Japan needs convincing of the need for US bases”, March 11, 2010, Accessed: 6-25-10, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article7057378.ece]

The US has slapped tough rules on the 22,000 Marines and 24,000 other personnel on its vast bases on Okinawa, the southernmost island of Japan, after the rape of a 12-year-old girl by three servicemen in 1995 brought tens of thousands of people on to the streets in protest.

Two other alleged rapes in 2008, a rash of robberies and assaults and cases of drink-driving and trespassing brought an apology from Condoleezza Rice, then Secretary of State.

US forces “still have the mentality of conquerors”, said Kuniko Tanioka, a government expert on Okinawa and member of the lower house of parliament. “They train when they like, never mind the rules, so that, for some people, the morning alarm call is the sound of a helicopter.”

Yoshiyuki Uehara, the director of the governor’s secretariat in the Okinawa administration, called it a “vast presence — too many, too much”.

On Monday senior government officials convened to try to find a new site for Futenma, the most controversial airbase, which lies in the centre of Ginowan, one of Okinawa’s busiest cities. In 2004 a helicopter crashed in the grounds of the university; two years later Japan and the US struck a deal to shift the base to Henoko, a tiny fishing village on the pristine east coast.

After the election last August, in which the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) overturned decades of one-party rule, Yukio Hatoyama, the new Prime Minister, scrapped parts of the 2006 pact on the status of US forces, acknowledging local passions and hinting that Futenma could be moved off Okinawa altogether.

Ichiro Ozawa, the DPJ’s secretary-general and the power behind the Hatoyama throne, said this week that the party could lose crucial elections in July if it tried forcibly to rebuild the base anywhere else on the island.

“Even if the Government in Tokyo now decides to relocate the base within Okinawa, people will stop it physically, with boats, with protests,” said Hiromori Maedomari, an editorial writer at Okinawa’s Ryukyu Shimpo newspaper.