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\_\_\_\*\*CMR DA – 1NC

CMR DA – 1NC

Civil-military relations are on the brink post-McChrystal but the institutional fabric of CMR are still in place

Penza 6/23 (Logan, The Moderate Voice, http://themoderatevoice.com/77600/mcchrystal-no-threat-to-american-civil-military-relations/?utm\_source=feedburner&utm\_medium=feed&utm\_campaign=Feed%3A+themoderatevoice+%28The+Moderate+Voice%29)JFS

Fallout continues in the wake of mocking comments by U.S. Afghanistan commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal regarding several senior members of the Obama administration.  While most public officials have carefully limited their condemnations to leave open the question of whether McChyrstal should be fired, reactions among media and bloggers have often strayed into the hyperbolic.  For example, civil-military relations expert Eliot Cohen writes in the *Wall Street Journal* that McChrystal’s comments represent a threat to the “fundamental imperative of maintaining order and discipline”, as if ill-advised comments in *Rolling Stone* will cause officers and enlisted throughout the military to suddenly lose control of themselves and start refusing orders to take the next hill.  A deep, calming breath is in order. From what appears in the *Rolling Stone* piece (and since when did *Rolling Stone* become a serious news outlet worthy of extended top-level access to field commanders in a war zone?), McChrystal’s behavior and that of his staff comes across as smug and unprofessional, as well as remarkably clueless about the pop-culture reporter in their midst.  But their words, while sophomoric, are far short of a MacArthur-type crisis in American civil-military relations.  With the sole possible exception of comments regarding Vice-President Biden (the most significant of which was spoken by an unnamed staffer, not McChrystal), the comments do not appear to fall under the cover of UCMJ Article 88, which bars “contemptuous words” towards the President, Vice-President, Defense Secretary, service secretaries, and, inexplicably, the Secretary of Transportation.  Ambassadors and lower-level national security officials who were the primary objects of McChyrstal’s apparent contempt are not covered. More importantly, the objectionable comments are personal, not about policy.  They do not represent any kind of move ala MacArthur to challenge the President’s command authority.  The comments do not wound the institutional fabric of American civil-military relations, they only wound a few egos.  Also, his comments do not warrant the hyperbolic interpretation of disdain or contempt for civilian control of the military.  If anything, McChrystal’s quick apology and tail-between-the-legs pilgrimage to the White House tends to reaffirm civilian control dramatically, in marked contrast to MacArthur’s historic refusal to travel any further than Guam to meet Truman.

CMR DA – 1NC

Withdrawal without consultation sparks a civil-military crisis – the military is on heightened alert for how Obama treats Petraeus

Ackerman, ‘8. Spencer, “Military experts to Obama: Don’t get rolled by top brass,” Colorado Independent, 11-14, <http://coloradoindependent.com/15149/military-experts-to-obama-dont-get-rolled-by-top-brass>.

During his July trip to Iraq, Sen. Barack Obama met with a man who represents both an opportunity and an obstacle to his presidency: Army Gen. David H. Petraeus. Petraeus, a hero to many Americans for his management of the war in Iraq, argued in a private briefing that military commanders should be given wide latitude in handing the future course of the war — though Obama was running for president on a platform calling for a withdrawal of combat troops in 16 months. The meeting offered a test for a relationship that might help define Obama’s term in office. Though he’s talked about governing in a bipartisan fashion, Obama ran for office as a progressive opposed to the Iraq war. The uniformed military, typically wary of liberals in general, is unsure what to think about Obama — and the last Democratic president, Bill Clinton, stumbled early in his relationship with the military. Yet Obama struck a balance in the Petraeus meeting. “If I were in his shoes, I’d probably feel the same way” about preserving flexibility for military operations, Obama said of Petraeus after the meeting ended. “But my job as a candidate for president and a potential commander in chief extends beyond Iraq.” To Peter Feaver, one of the leading scholars of civil-military relations, that comment was auspicious. “Obama had it pitch-perfect,” said Feaver, a professor of political science at Duke University and a national-security staffer for both Clinton and President George W. Bush. “Obama was right to signal to the military, ‘I want your military advice, and I will factor it into my strategic decisions, where military advice is one of my concerns.’” Whether a Commander-in-Chief Obama can continue the tone that Candidate Obama sounded in July remains to be seen. According to interviews with active and retired military officers, Obama and the military can have a productive relationship, provided that Obama operates along some simple principles. Consult, don’t steamroll — and don’t capitulate. Be honest about disagreements, and emphasize areas of agreement. Make Petraeus a partner, not an adversary. Similarly, the uniformed military will have to keep certain principles in mind as well. There’s only one commander in chief, and you’re not him. Don’t substitute military judgment for strategic judgment. Obama enters office without some of the impediments to healthy civil-military relations that hindered Clinton. Clinton, a baby boomer, had to deal with the legacy of not serving in Vietnam, while Obama, born in 1961, doesn’t have the baggage of the Vietnam era weighing him down. “He didn’t serve, but he didn’t serve with distinction,” said Feaver, laughing. Similarly damaging to Clinton was his early misstep with gays in the military. During Clinton’s transition from candidate to president, he seemed to suggest lifting the ban on gays serving openly, an implication seized on by conservatives and met with furor from the armed services. His response was to back down — which set a tone to the military that an uncertain Clinton could be rolled. Defense Department officials today still believe Clinton’s early capitulation set a troublesome precedent. “If Clinton had simply ordered the military to lift the ban on gays in the military — as Truman did with racial integration against near universal opposition,” said one Pentagon official who requested anonymity, “he would have been much better off in dealing with the military for the rest of his administration. There would have been a big fuss, but they would have respected him more.” The lesson for Obama, this official continued, is “not to get rolled or railroaded by the top brass, as Clinton and his civilian team were by Colin Powell,” who was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time. “Obama and his team need to be respectful and solicitous of senior military advice, but leave no doubt about who is in charge.” Yet Obama doesn’t wish merely not to be railroaded. Much as with the Petraeus meeting in July, Obama’s team has signaled an openness to the military since coming to Washington. One of Obama’s first foreign-policy aides in the Senate, Mark Lippert, deployed to Iraq in 2007 as a Naval reservist. Several of his principal advisers today command widespread Pentagon respect. Former Sen. Sam Nunn, who served as a longtime chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and is now an influential military reformer, is advising Obama’s Pentagon transition. Michele Flournoy, a former deputy assistant secretary of defense in the second Clinton term and prominent authority on counterinsurgency, is helping run Obama’s Pentagon headhunting process. Most important, Obama’s aides have flirted in the past week with asking Bob Gates, the current defense secretary, to stay on for an extra year. In addition to benefiting from succeeding a widely-disliked defense secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, Gates’ brief tenure at Defense has earned plaudits from around the military, especially as he worked closely with Petraeus in implementing the troop surge in Iraq last year. “Keeping Gates is a huge gesture to the military,” said Ian Moss, a Marine corporal who recently left active duty. “Simply put, from my conversations with military personnel, there is much respect for Gates. By retaining Gates, Obama instantly communicates to military personnel that he values their assessment of Gates.” Feaver said the Gates trial balloon indicated that Obama doesn’t intend to govern in an “Anything But Bush” manner — rigidly rejecting every aspect of the Bush legacy as a matter of principle. “The very fact that they want to send that signal is a positive from the point of view of civil-military relations,” he said. “If it’s not a trial balloon, and they actually do it, it would further cement an emerging view of Obama as a pragmatist.” One early decision that many in the military likely look to is whether Obama holds to his position on withdrawing from Iraq according to a fixed timetable. As with the country as a whole, there is no unanimity of opinion on Iraq within the military. But at the very least, the war is more personal to the military than it is to the civilian population. Many view this withdrawal with anxiety. Feaver said it would be useful for Obama to blur the difference between his withdrawal proposals and Petraeus’ plan to shift the U.S. footprint to “strategic overwatch” functions, like training Iraqi troops — though Petraeus’ plan has no timetable associated with it. “If what he’s describing is a target, a goal that’s desirable, that he’ll shoot for, and work to make conditions on the ground consistent with … then that’s not really much of a problem,” Feaver said. But if, on the other hand, Obama really does intend to withdraw two combat brigades every month — as he indicated during the Democratic presidential primaries, “then that would spark a civil-military — I won’t say crisis, but a challenge to manage,” Feaver pointed out. Some members of the military community are more sanguine. Several say that if they disagree with the decision, they respect Obama’s authority to make it. “In the end, we are not self-employed. And after the military leadership provides its best military advice, it is up to the policy-makers to make the decision and for the military to execute those decisions,” said a senior Army officer recently back from Iraq, who requested anonymity because he is still on active duty. “Now, if those in the military do not like the decision, they have two choices. One, salute smartly and execute the missions given them to the best of their ability. Or, the other, leave the military if they do not feel they can faithfully execute their missions. That is one way the military does get to vote in an all-volunteer force.” Moss agreed. “The military will just follow the order,” he said. “The great majority of Americans want U.S. forces out of Iraq. This is part of the reason Obama was sent to the White House.” Much as with Obama’s pick for secretary of defense, many in the military will watch how Obama and Petraeus interact as a barometer for civil-military harmony. To some degree, there could be an invisibility to the relationship — as the senior Army officer said, “most will not know about or see” what the president says to his Central Command chief — but it could still be closely scrutinized.

CMR DA – 1NC

**CMR is critical to fight irregular warfare**

Cronin 08 [Patrick, Director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, Strategic Forum, October, 2008, <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Strforum/SF234/SF234.pdf>]JFS

Success in the highly political and ambiguous conflicts likely to dominate the global security environment in the coming decades will require a framework that balances the relationships between civilian and military leaders and makes the most effective use of their different strengths. These challenges are expected to require better integrated, whole-of-government approaches, the cooperation of host governments and allies, and strategic patience.

Irregular warfare introduces new complications to what Eliot Cohen has called an “unequal dialogue” between civilian and military leaders in which civilian leaders hold the true power but must modulate their intervention into “military” affairs as a matter of prudence rather than principle. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated that irregular warfare - which is profoundly political, intensely local, and protracted—breaks from the traditional understanding of how military and civilian leaders should contribute to the overall effort.

One of the key challenges rising from irregular warfare is how to measure progress. While there is disagreement about the feasibility or utility of developing metrics, the political pressure for marking progress is unrelenting. Most data collection efforts focus on the number of different types of kinetic events, major political milestones such as elections, and resource inputs such as personnel, money, and materiel. None of these data points serves easily in discerning what is most needed - namely, outputs or results.

A second major challenge centers on choosing leaders for irregular warfare and stability and reconstruction operations. How to produce civilian leaders capable of asking the right and most difficult questions is not easily addressed. Meanwhile, there has been a general erosion of the traditional Soldier’s Code whereby a military member can express dissent, based on legitimate facts, in private to one’s superiors up to the point that a decision has been made. Many see the need to shore up this longstanding tradition among both the leadership and the ranks.

A third significant challenge is how to forge integrated strategies and approaches. Professional relationships, not organizational fixes, are vital to succeeding in irregular war. In this sense, the push for new doctrine for the military and civilian leadership is a step in the right direction to clarifying the conflated lanes of authority.

**Irregular warfare causes nuclear and chemical annihilation**

Bennett 8 (John, December 4th, DefenseNews, http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3850158)JFS

The study predicts future U.S. forces' missions will range "from regular and irregular wars in remote lands, to relief and reconstruction in crisis zones, to sustained engagement in the global commons."

Some of these missions will be spawned by "rational political calculation," others by "uncontrolled passion."

And future foes will attack U.S. forces in a number of ways.

"Our enemy's capabilities will range from explosive vests worn by suicide bombers to long-range precision-guided cyber, space, and missile attacks," the study said. "The threat of mass destruction - from nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons - will likely expand from stable nation-states to less stable states and even non-state networks."

The document also echoes Adm. Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other U.S. military leaders who say America is likely in "an era of persistent conflict."

During the next 25 years, it says, "There will continue to be those who will hijack and exploit Islam and other beliefs for their own extremist ends. There will continue to be opponents who will try to disrupt the political stability and deny the free access to the global commons that is crucial to the world's economy."

The study gives substantial ink to what could happen in places of strategic import to Washington, like Russia, China, Africa, Europe, Asia and the Indian Ocean region.

But it calls the Middle East and Central Asia "the center of instability" where U.S. troops will be engaged for some time against radical Islamic groups.

The study does not rule out a fight against a peer nation's military, but stresses preparation for irregular foes like those that complicated the Iraq war for years.

Its release comes three days after Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England signed a new Pentagon directive that elevates irregular warfare to equal footing - for budgeting and planning - as traditional warfare. The directive defines irregular warfare as encompassing counterterrorism operations, guerrilla warfare, foreign internal defense, counterinsurgency and stability operations.

Leaders must avoid "the failure to recognize and fully confront the irregular fight that we are in. The requirement to prepare to meet a wide range of threats is going to prove particularly difficult for American forces in the period between now and the 2030s," the study said.

\_\_\_\*\*UQ

Uniqueness Wall – 2NC

**Civil military relations are high**

**Los Angeles Times 7/1** (http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jul/01/opinion/la-oew-0701-archer-20100701)

**A June** 23 **op-ed** by Bruce Ackerman that **portrayed civil-military relations against the backdrop of the Gen. McChrystal affair is wildly off the mark**. Dr. Ackerman's commentary presumes a rapid politicization of the U.S. military and a foreboding future of a biased officer corps involved in political partisanship. **To the contrary, the vast majority of military officers are well disciplined in the principle of civilian control of the military**. Modern military officers are purposefully educated on its tenets and governed by strict codes of conduct. Gen. McChrystal's regrettable actions are in no way symptomatic of a politicized officer corps. **Civilian control of the military is a concept that is widely understood, shared among service members, and taught to each new generation of officers**. From the very moment of their induction, military officers assume subordination to civilian control through an oath of allegiance. This oath directs that officers "support and defend" the Constitution**. From that, the concept of civil control of the military is inherent in the very foundation of each officer's authority** and his *raison d'être*. Officers know this concept, understand it, and are legally compelled to support it through service regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Conduct. When an officer fails to adhere to the standards set forth in these regulations, he or she is immediately disciplined. Adhering to civilian control of the military, however, doesn't inhibit an officer from holding opinions or engaging in discourse on political or current events. Officers have always carried a sense of public duty and, as such, have opinions and positions that may be critical of governmental policies or changing social behaviors. The myth of an early 20th century officer corps without political affiliation and faithfully abdicating the right to vote was perpetuated by Gen. George Marshall during and after World War II. The fact that many early 20th century officers had no party affiliation simply reflects the larger rural society that was decidedly more independent and less affiliated with structured national political parties. Certainly it's ludicrous to believe that early 20th century officers held no political opinion or refused to exercise their right to vote.

**CMR high now**

**Rogan 7/1** (Josh, writer for Foreign Policy, http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/07/01/holbrooke\_everybody\_on\_the\_afghanistan\_team\_gets\_along\_great)

Despite what you may have read, the **top** Afghanistan **policymakers in the Obama administration are all working together** constructively **and are on the same page**, according to Special Representative Richard Holbrooke. In an interview Wednesday with *PBS NewsHour*'s Gwen Ifill, **Holbrooke said he has seen some truly dysfunctional administrations in his** storied, **multi-decade** diplomatic **career -- and this administration isn't one of them.** "I have worked in every Democratic administration since the Kennedy administration, and I know dysfunctionality when I see it. We **have really good civil-military relations in this government," he said**. Holbrooke touted his close working relationship with new Afghanistan commander, Gen. David Petraeus, and pushed back against Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-SC, and others who have pointed to quotes from officials and the *Rolling Stone* article that led to the firing of Gen. Stanley McChrystal as evidence that U.S. leaders in Washington and Kabul are not on the same page.

**CMR high now – McChrystal got off easy**

**Daileda 6/23** (Colin, writer for CBS News, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544\_162-20008657-503544.html)

"**You can be court-martialed for making certain comments or statements against the president, the vice president,"** Fontaine said. **"There is a difference between the kinds of remarks that commissioned officers**, General McChrystal and his aides, **make and civilians who work for the government or frat boys or anyone else because of the civil military relations in this country where the military is subordinate to the civilian command."** McChrystal's departure puts a spotlight on a war in Afghanistan that is already under some scrutiny. "This is sort of another indication to people, probably in the region, but also here at home that are increasingly getting the feeling the war's not going particularly well," Fontaine said. "It's going to take time. There is a deadline a year out from now but with the larger campaign not looking tremendously successful...I think this probably just increases the doubts people have about the long-term viability of the strategy there." General David Petraeus, McChrystal's replacement, and will have a lot on his plate from the get-go.

Uniqueness Wall – 2NC

**CMR high now – Obama reestablishes**

**Korski 6/24** (Daniel, contributor to The Spectator, http://www.spectator.co.uk/coffeehouse/6100798/hail-to-the-chief.thtml)

How wrong I was. President **Obama,** lambasted by his critics for being ponderous, **has acted with lightening speed**: less than 24 hours after *that* Rolling Stone article, General Stanley **McChrystal was forced out of his job in place of** the only person that could pick up where he left off, namely General David **Petraeus**. In acting swiftly, **the US president has moved to restore the authority and respect his position as Commander-in-Chief deserves; and he has begun to re-establish the kind of civil-military relations that need to exist in militarily-capable liberal democracies** like the United States.

McChrystal is actually a victory for CMR – it shows how generals are able to enter into the civilian world rather than a rupture between the two

Reveron 6/23 (Derek, writer for globalsecurity.org, http://sitrep.globalsecurity.org/articles/100623622-triumph-for-civil-military-rel.htm) GAT

Relieving General Stanley McChrystal could not have been an easy decision for President Obama. In this speech, he emphasized McChrystal's patriotism and accomplishments and thanked him for decades of service to the United States. However, he was relieved for poor judgment and not competence. This particular episode of civil-military relations also serves as a reminder to all officers that they do more than fight wars. Admirals and Generals are also policy actors. But filling a policy role is not without some peril to the military; civilian control is the law. When military leaders do get out of step with the administration or show disrespect, they are let go. Admiral Fallon was relieved in spring 2008 because of perceived differences with President Bush on Iran. General David McKiernan was replaced to bring fresh ideas to Afghanistan in 2009. And now McKiernan's successor, General Stanley McChrystal, was relieved. Up to this point, McChrystal precariously navigated the civil-military divide during key policy debates, but ultimately undermined his own position. The Rolling Stone profile was certainly outrageous and damaging, but President Obama appointed General McChrystal last year to bring fresh ideas to supporting Afghanistan claim its sovereignty. To date, efforts have been slow, but McChrystal, who is an accomplished soldier and leader, has refocused the United States on Afghanistan. But McChrystal forgot himself and lost the confidence of the president guaranteeing his departure. Given the size and scope of the U.S. military, President Obama recognized that no single person is responsible for success in Afghanistan. Fortunately, he had choices, which is a good sign of how healthy the U.S. military officer corps is. By going with General David Petraeus, however, the President is emphasizing continuity with the current policy and the ongoing counterinsurgency campaign. Petraeus was not only the architect of United States counterinsurgency doctrine and implemented the strategy in Iraq, but also served as one of General McChrystal's bosses (the other is NATO commander Admiral Jim Stavridis). As General David Petraeus takes the reins in Kabul, we are reminded that military leaders like him are viewed as capable of "getting the job done." General Petraeus certainly knows counterinsurgency, is adept in the political-military circles he must travel, and understands the importance of coalition operations.

UQ: A2 McChrystal

Problems with McChrystal will not affect Civil Military Relations

Penza 6/23 (Logan, writer for The Moderate Voice, http://themoderatevoice.com/77600/mcchrystal-no-threat-to-american-civil-military-relations/) PJ

Fallout continues in the wake of mocking comments by U.S. Afghanistan commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal regarding several senior members of the Obama administration.  While most public officials have carefully limited their condemnations to leave open the question of whether McChyrstal should be fired, reactions among media and bloggers have often strayed into the hyperbolic.  For example, civil-military relations expert Eliot Cohen writes in the [*Wall Street Journal* that McChrystal’s comments represent a threat](http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704853404575322800914018876.html) to the “fundamental imperative of maintaining order and discipline”, as if ill-advised comments in *Rolling Stone* will cause officers and enlisted throughout the military to suddenly lose control of themselves and start refusing orders to take the next hill.  A deep, calming breath is in order. From what appears in the *Rolling Stone* piece (and since when did *Rolling Stone* become a serious news outlet worthy of extended top-level access to field commanders in a war zone?), McChrystal’s behavior and that of his staff comes across as smug and unprofessional, as well as remarkably clueless about the pop-culture reporter in their midst.  But their words, while sophomoric, are far short of a MacArthur-type crisis in American civil-military relations.  With the sole possible exception of comments regarding Vice-President Biden (the most significant of which was spoken by an unnamed staffer, not McChrystal), the comments do not appear to fall under the cover of UCMJ Article 88, which bars “contemptuous words” towards the President, Vice-President, Defense Secretary, service secretaries, and, inexplicably, the Secretary of Transportation.  Ambassadors and lower-level national security officials who were the primary objects of McChyrstal’s apparent contempt are not covered. More importantly, the objectionable comments are personal, not about policy.  They do not represent any kind of move ala MacArthur to challenge the President’s command authority.  The comments do not wound the institutional fabric of American civil-military relations, they only wound a few egos.  Also, his comments do not warrant the hyperbolic interpretation of disdain or contempt for civilian control of the military.  If anything, McChrystal’s quick apology and tail-between-the-legs pilgrimage to the White House tends to reaffirm civilian control dramatically, in marked contrast to MacArthur’s historic refusal to travel any further than Guam to meet Truman. President Obama would be ill-served to let wounded egos force the replacement of a battlefield commander in the midst of extended operations.  Also, McChrystal is the only American official with a viable working relationship with the Karzai government in Afghanistan.  Replacing him out of pique would be strategically foolish. Of course, if President Obama determines that the apparent loss of judgment inherent in McChrystal’s remarks indicate a deeper and broader lack of judgment that could impact McChyrstal’s effectiveness as a theater commander, replacement would be justified.  But the President would need to make that particular justification, as differentiated from the personal one, crystal-clear (no pun intended).

**UQ Turn – McChrystal was sacked in order to save CMRs**

Ampikaipan 6/29 (Umapagan, reporter for newstraitstimes.com, <http://www.nst.com.my/nst/articles/Inrealpolitics_expectno__8216_WestWing__8217_moments/Article/>) GAT

Despite Gen Stanley McChrystal’s insulting and insubordinate statements to the press, how would it look if the president sacked his man in Afghanistan for what was, essentially, name-calling? Surely the fictional President Bartlett had it right, that the commander-in-chief had to rise above and beyond such pettiness; that there was an elegance in taking the high road.Alas, there is no high road in politics. Such notions are merely the product of unrealistically optimistic and overly sentimental fictions. There is only action and consequence. And to ignore either would be a grave mistake.Because there is no such thing as the “right to speak” when it comes to the military. There is no such thing as healthy dissent. Dissent is insubordination. Dissent is treason. And so the general needed to be sacked. Not because “of any sense of personal insult” towards the president. Not even because of the need for the “team to unite in pressing the war effort”.The general needed to be sacked because naiveté is not an excuse. The general needed to be sacked because he strayed from the military code of conduct. He needed to be sacked for the sake of civil-military relations. To make the all-important point that the military remains subservient to the civilian.

UQ: A2 McChrystal

McChrystal’s removal has slowed the erosion of CMR

Heuvel 6/24 (Vanden, writer for Washington Post, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/postpartisan/2010/06/after\_mcchrystal\_time\_to\_chang.html) GAT

Gen. Stanley McChrystal has submitted his resignation. Or he's been fired. In any case, it was time for him to go. His departure will help slow the increasing erosion in civil-military relations -- aided by both political parties over the last 20 years -- which has threatened civilian control of the military. It also means we can now turn to a more fundamental exit debate: How do we change course and craft a responsible strategy to end the war in Afghanistan? It is critical we have this debate. Here's one good reason: McChrystal's top aide believes this war is unwinnable. In the most important quote in Rolling Stones' fascinating article, Maj. Gen. Bill Mayville argues that the only way we win in Afghanistan is to redefine failure as victory: "It's not going to look like a win, smell like a win or taste like a win. This is going to end in an argument."

**CMR high now – McChrystal firing proves**

**Haddick 6/22** (Robert, writer for Small Wars Journal, http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/06/mcchrystal-will-get-a-red-card/)

It is hard to believe that President Obamaand his staff will be able to continue to work with McChrystal after the revelation of the *Rolling Stone* affair. President **Obama will have to** defend his commander-in-chief powers under Article II of the Constitution and that will almost certainly **require McChrystal’s swift retirement. To allow McChrystal to apologize and stay on would set a bad precedent, send the wrong signal regarding civil-military relations to the rest of the military**, and would cause great uproar among Obama’s civilian staff.

**CMR high now – respect for McChrystal proves**

**Feaver 6/24** (Peter, writer for Foreign Policy, http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/06/24/the\_petraeus\_move\_was\_a\_good\_step\_but\_whats\_the\_game\_plan)

It also reaffirmed **some essential democratic principles: civilian supremacy, military respect for higher authority, and the awkward truth that no one is indispensable**. In delivering the blow, President **Obama offered some gracious words of praise for McChrystal's heroic record of service, and some very well-crafted remarks about the nature of healthy civil-military relations**. It was, in short, a high-water mark for Obama as commander in chief.

\_\_\_\*\*Links

Link – Unilateral Civilian Action

Unilateral civilian control hurts civil-military relations

Kabalan 9 (Marwan Al, writer for Gulf News, 12/20, http://gulfnews.com/opinions/columnists/us-civil-military-relations-are-strained-1.529859) PJ

This formula provides that military leaders should be given wide latitude in the technical and operational realms of war in return for their complete subordination to civilian control of politics and grand strategy. This approach could have worked fairly well under different circumstances. But with a president that many in the US still think should not be in the White House, civil-military tension is likely to increase rather than decrease.

Link – Withdrawal

Withdrawing forces signals a liberal civilian mentality that contradicts the military’s conservative perspective hurting effectiveness

Nielsen 5 (Suzanne C, assistant professor in the Social Sciences Department at the. U.S. Military Academy, http://www.spaef.com/file.php?id=178) PJ

In *The Soldier and the State*, one of Huntington’s basic methodological assumptions is that it is possible to define an equilibrium called ‘‘objective civilian control’’ that ensures civilian control and maximizes security at the same time. (Huntington, 1957: p. viii) He argues that ‘‘In practice, officership is strongest and most effective when it most closely approaches the professional ideal; it is weakest and most defective when it falls short of that ideal’’ (Huntington, 1957: p. 11). An officer corps is professional to the extent it exhibits the qualities of expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. In addition to enhancing effectiveness, these traits also enhance civilian control because a professional military seeks to distance itself from politics (Huntington, 1957: p. 84).(1) In the American context, however, military professionalism is difficult to maintain because liberalism is inherently hostile to the military function and military institutions. The classic liberal approaches to military affairs are extirpation (reduce the military to the lowest possible level) or transmutation (to civilianize it) (Huntington, 1957: p. 155). Huntington later lists a third option: ‘‘The prevailing societal values can shift away from traditional liberalism in the direction of conservatism, society thereby adopting a policy of *toleration* with respect to the military’’ (Huntington, 1977: p. 7). This seems to be the option Huntington advocates in *The Soldier and the* *State*. If obtaining a shift in the values of an entire society is not possible, the only way to maintain military professionalism in a liberal context is to ensure that the military has minimal political power. Therefore, Huntington argues that the achievement of objective civilian control in the United States requires allowing military professionals autonomy within their own realm, while ‘‘rendering them politically sterile and neutral’’ (Huntington, 1957: p. 84). Firm civilian control and military security are complementary and mutually supporting goals. As mentioned above, though civilian control is a central concern, Huntington also sought a pattern of civil-military relations that would promote military professionalism and hence military effectiveness. As he later acknowledged, he was concerned at the time of the book’s writing that the United States, given its liberal ideology, would be disadvantaged in a prolonged competition with the Soviet Union in the Cold War (Powell, et. al., 1994: p. 29). However, ‘‘professionalism’’ as Huntington defines it is problematic as an adequate indicator of effectiveness. This comes through clearly in Huntington’s interpretation of military theorist Carl von Clausewitz. Huntington argues that ‘‘The fact that war has its own grammar requires that the military professionals be permitted to develop their expertise at this grammar without extraneous influence . . . The inherent quality of a military body can only be evaluated in terms of independent military standards’’ (Huntington, 1957: p. 57). This extension of Clausewitz’s thought is problematic because it implies that there exists a set of ‘‘independent military standards’’ that is valid across time and place. This is unlikely, since the characteristics of effective armed forces will vary with factors such as the resources they have, the missions they must accomplish, and other aspects of their environments. In addition, reliance on ‘‘independent military standards’’ is also problematic given that the effectiveness of military means can only be evaluated in relation to the political ends that these means are to serve.

Removal of troops make civil-military relations tense by reducing confidence in Obama

WorldNetDaily 9 (1/3, http://www.wnd.com/?pageId=85121) PJ

A recent Military Times survey of active-duty service members found 6 of 10 U.S. soldiers polled said they were "pessimistic" or "uncertain" about Barack Obama serving as commander in chief of America's armed forces. In follow-up interviews reported by the Army Times newspaper, respondents cited Obama's inexperience in leading soldiers, his plans for accelerated removal of troops from Iraq and his pledge to overturn the military's "don't ask, don't tell" policy regarding homosexual service members as reasons for their cautious outlook. "Being that the Marine Corps can be sent anywhere in the world with the snap of his fingers," said one lance corporal who asked not to be identified, "nobody has confidence in this guy as commander in chief."

Link – Withdrawal

Withdrawing troops re-entrenches the dysfunctional civil-military relations

Sterner 6/25 (Eric, writer for World Politics Review, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/5893/obama-and-mcchrystal-the-generals-need-a-lincoln) PJ

First, the president himself announced plans to begin withdrawing forces from Afghanistan in July 2011, sending the signal to a range of factions in Afghanistan and Pakistan that they should begin maneuvering for position after the U.S. withdrawal. After all, why sign on for the American governance project if your local warlords will still be there in two years, but the Americans will not? While the president hedged his comments, numerous administration officials have in recent weeks firmly reiterated it, reinforcing the deadline in the hearts and minds of the very people America needs to commit to its agenda. Second, the U.S. civil-military team in Afghanistan is clearly dysfunctional. Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, an accomplished former general who commanded in Afghanistan, notoriously sent two cables to Washington second-guessing McChrystal's operational plans and trashing Afghan President Hamid Karzai as an unreliable partner. In the former, he overstepped his bounds. In the latter, he raised a moot issue. The United States does not get to choose foreign heads of state any more than it gets to choose its enemies. The memo's leak appears to have been calculated to undermine McChrystal's July 2009 strategy review and troop request in Washington. Since then, the embassy has reportedly resisted the military's near-term reconstruction efforts, preferring long-term projects that will not demonstrate results in a militarily useful timeframe, even as the administration provides fewer reconstruction resources than the ambassador's team believes necessary.

Link – Afghanistan Withdrawal

Rapid withdrawal from Afghanistan widens the civil-military gap and is detrimental to Afghanistan success

Carlstrom 6/23 (Gregg, writer for the American Chronicle, http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/yb/146543277) PJ

Civil-military relations Obama may also calculate that he needs to assert himself in order to preserve his July 2011 deadline for beginning to withdraw US troops. The White House insisted last week that the deadline is "firm", but military officers have begun to hint at a delay. An unnamed officer quoted by Rolling Stone said commanders might even ask for an escalation, rather than a drawdown. Obama's administration has long been plagued by divisions over Afghan strategy [AFP] "There's a possibility we could ask for another surge of US forces next summer if we see success here," a senior military official in Kabul tells me. McChrystal has been rebuked before for undermining the White House on policy. In an October speech at London's Institute for Strategic Studies, he said Biden's proposed counterterrorism strategy would turn Afghanistan into "Chaosistan" and ultimately result in failure. That rebuke, coupled with the summertime leak of McChrystal's strategic review, helped to build the case for a counterinsurgency strategy. Critics at the time argued that the military had pushed Obama into a corner -- so Obama might decide to cashier McChrystal because he feels he is once again being manipulated. The legal argument for sacking McChrystal is thin. So Obama will ultimately have to weigh the merits reaffirming civilian control over the military against the potential impact on the war in Afghanistan.

Rapid withdrawal from Afghanistan is detrimental to civil-military relations

Raja 10 (Asif Haroon, writer for the Asian Tribune, http://www.asiantribune.com/news/2010/06/28/nothing-going-right-usa-final-phase-afghanistan) PJ

Repeated deployments, health and traumatic stress disorder problems have driven much of increase in soldiers listed as non-deployable. Sarah Lazre says that US Army is overstretched and exhausted. Many from within ranks are openly declaring that they have had enough, allying with anti-war veterans and activists calling for an end to US led wars, with some active duty soldiers publicly refusing to deploy. While grappling with mounting problems in Afghanistan and trying to lessen Washington-Kabul strains, US leadership was faced with yet another challenge of civil-military relations within USA. Gen Stanley McChrystal whom Obama had chosen for Afghanistan ruffled the feathers of Obama and other high officials in his administration as a consequence to his scathing interview he gave to a magazine. He and his aides didn’t mince their words in censuring Obama and top US officials. Some among Obama’s administration as well as US Ambassador in Kabul Eikenberry differed with McChrystal’s policies in Afghanistan. Disagreements surfaced after McChrystal asked for additional troops in September 2009 to recapture southern and eastern Afghanistan. His opponents who were not in favor of troop surge and risky stretching out strategy became more vocal once McChrystal failed to show results. Other grouses against him were his inability to rein in Karzai who of late had become belligerent, and to train Afghan National Army (ANA) to takeover security duties from coalition troops. Most weaknesses pointed out are command failures, but these could have been over looked and he retained despite his diatribe had he been a winning General.

Link – Afghanistan Withdrawal

Relations between Petraeus and Washington are great now – but he opposes arbitrary withdrawal from Afghanistan

Norington 7/1 (Brad, Washington correspondent for The Australian, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/general-david-petraeus-signals-changes-in-afghanistan-strategy/story-e6frg6so-1225886391310) GAT

GENERAL David Petraeus wants to keep civilian casualties to an "absolute minimum" in Afghanistan but has indicated he may approve more airstrikes. Yesterday, appearing before the US Senate Armed Services Committee for a confirmation hearing after the sacking of General Stanley McChrystal, the new top commander of allied forces in Afghanistan said he would review the rules of engagement. With troops complaining that combat restrictions have prolonged battles and cost more lives, the general signalled an early policy difference with his predecessor. Just hours after his appearance, two service personnel were wounded in an attack on one of the biggest NATO bases in Afghanistan. In a brazen daylight attack claimed by the Taliban, gunmen set off a car bomb and fired rocket-propelled grenades at the Jalalabad air base. Several of the assailants were killed. General Petraeus had a dream run as committee senators from opposing parties gushed about his qualifications and voted to confirm him a few hours after the hearing ended. The full Senate is expected to follow suit. Former Republican presidential candidate John McCain attempted at one point to test General Petraeus on the proposed timing of July next year to start withdrawing troops. With General Petraeus known to oppose any arbitrary withdrawal date, Senator McCain asked whether he or anyone in the military had recommended a date. General Petraeus said no such recommendation had been made - effectively confirming it came from the White House. General Petraeus means to argue against a significant troop withdrawal next year unless conditions permit. The general, credited with having turned the Iraq war around with a military surge in 2007, is expected to continue the "counterinsurgency" strategy. Combining military goals with attempts to win the support of local people, this has strived to minimise civilian deaths. General Petraeus yesterday played down reported differences between the military and Vice-President Joe Biden, exposed in the Rolling Stone interview that got General McChrystal sacked. General Petraeus is so popular that there is speculation he could be well placed for a run at the presidency in the mould of Dwight Eisenhower. Mr Obama yesterday allowed General McChrystal to retire as a four-star general, with a $US149,700 ($175,000) pension, despite his not having held the rank for four years.

Petraeus wants civil-military relations to remain high to battle the Afghan insurgency but he’ll still oppose any immediate withdrawal

Fisher 6/29 (Matthew, writer for CanWest News, [http://www.nationalpost.com/news/world/Petraeus+warns+huge+insurgency+ahead+withdrawl/3216722/story.html](http://www.nationalpost.com/news/world/Petraeus%2Bwarns%2Bhuge%2Binsurgency%2Bahead%2Bwithdrawl/3216722/story.html)) GAT

In Washington on Tuesday, Gen. David Petraeus cautioned Americans to prepare for several more years of war in Afghanistan and cast the Obama administration’s July 2011 timeline to begin withdrawing troops as a highly flexible deadline. Appearing before the U.S. Senate’s armed services committee, Gen. Petraeus told lawmakers the pace of the American troop drawdown would “be determined by conditions” on the ground in Afghanistan — which he bluntly said would get worse before they get better. “July 2011 will mark the beginning of a process, not the date when the U.S. heads for the exits and turns out the lights,” said Gen. Petraeus, who has been tapped by President Barack Obama to take command of U.S. and allied forces in Afghanistan after General Stanley McChrystal was fired from his post for the controversial comments he made to Rolling Stone magazine. “It is going to be a number of years before Afghan forces can truly handle the security tasks in Afghanistan on their own.” Combat “may get more intense in the next few months” as U.S. forces intensify their campaign against the Taliban in Kandahar province, Gen. Petraeus said. At his Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, Gen. Petraeus promised greater civilian-military unity of effort to counter what he called an “industrial strength insurgency.” He said he would reassess controversial rules of engagement that limit the use of force by U.S. troops and aircraft in an attempt to protect civilians. Critics say the rules put U.S. units at unnecessary risk. Petraeus told the committee that broader changes are possible depending on a White House review of war strategy in December.

**Link – Japan**

Gates hates withdrawal from japan -

Green 9 (Michael, October 23rd, http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/10/23/tokyo\_smackdown)JFS

Hatoyama came into office a month ago vowing to pull Japanese ships out of the coalition effort in Afghanistan; to oppose the U.S.-Japan agreement realigning U.S. bases on the island of Okinawa; to investigate U.S.-Japan secret agreements on nuclear weapons dating back to the 1950s and 60s; and to increase Japanese independence by establishing a new "East Asia Community" that would exclude the United States. Gates' message in Japan this week was no-nonsense: The Obama administration is not interested in renegotiating previous base agreements and needs the new Japanese government to get behind the alliance. Hatoyama's response was defiant: He would not rush to decisions just to accommodate Obama's visit to Japan on Nov. 11.  But Gates' tough stance sent shudders through Hatoyama's Democratic Party of Japan.

The military’s united in support for presence in Japan

McCormack 9 (Gavan McCormack, emeritus professor at Australian National University, coordinator of The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, http://www.japanfocus.org/-Gavan-McCormack/3250)jfs

As the year wore on and as the new agenda in Tokyo became apparent before and after the August election, the confrontation deepened. Warnings became more forceful. Kurt Campbell told the Asahi there could be no change in the Futenma replacement agreement. Michael Green, formerly George W. Bush’s top adviser on East Asia, though moved under Obama to the private sector at the Centre for International and Strategic Studies, warned that “it would indeed provoke a crisis with the US” if the Democratic Party were to push ahead to try to re-negotiate the military agreements around the Okinawa issue.” Gregson, for the Pentagon, added that the US had “no plans to revise the existing agreements. Ian Kelly, for the State Department, stated that there was no intention on its part to allow revision. Kevin Maher (also at State) added a day later that there could be no reopening of negotiations on something already agreed between states. A “senior Department of Defense spokesperson” in Washington said it would be a “blow to trust” between the two countries if existing plans could not be implemented. Summing up the rising irritation in Washington, an unnamed State Department official commented that “The hardest thing right now is not China. It’s Japan.”

Link – Iraq Brink

It’s the brink for CMR – withdrawing from Iraq makes interagency conflict inevitable

Feaver 9 (Peter, Oct 21, Foreign Policy, http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/10/21/obamas\_military\_problem\_is\_getting\_worse)JFS

Post reporters Alec MacGillis and Ann Scott Tyson cited 'defence experts' as predicting a 'smooth and productive' relationship between Obama and these military leaders 'if Obama takes the pragmatic approach that his advisers are indicating, allowing each side to adjust at the margins.' But if Obama 'presses for the withdrawal of two brigades per month,' the same analysts predicted, 'conflict is inevitable.'

President Obama is presiding over a slow-motion civil-military crash occasioned by his meandering Afghanistan strategy review. The crash has not yet happened and is avoidable, but it also foreseeable. Of concern, the latest reports out of the White House suggest that Obama's team is not yet fully aware of the dangers. If it happens, it will be a problem entirely of Obama's own making and it could have a lasting impact on the way his administration unfolds.

Link – Iraq COIN

Resolving Iraq is key to CMR – that’s key to effective counterinsurgency

Dobbins 6/24 (James, director of International Security and Defense Policy Center at the Rand Corporation, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/24/the\_afghanistan\_clock?page=full)JFS

The strategy that McChrystal designed for Afghanistan is based on best practices in dealing with insurgencies over the past half-decade and in particular on Petraeus's own successful application of those principles in Iraq in 2007. In naming Petraeus to succeed McChrystal, Obama is effectively recommitting himself to such a COIN strategy, at least for another year. But successful counterinsurgency requires the intense integration of civil and military services, U.S. and allied troops, Afghan and international efforts. That is very hard to do, particularly with the sort of synchronicity that the president's timetable demands. Uncertainty about the president's longer-term intentions only increases this difficulty. If everyone thinks the United States is heading for the exits next year, why should they pay large costs and take large risks now?

Back in 2007 in Iraq, under even more difficult local circumstances and with even less domestic support for their efforts, Petraeus and the U.S. ambassador to Iraq, Ryan Crocker, set a model for civil-military collaboration: They never let daylight show between their positions -- not to outsiders, not to official Washington, not even to their own staffs. Petraeus certainly understands the importance of such unconditional collaboration in getting NATO allies and Afghan President Hamid Karzai on the same page -- and moving at the same pace. But achieving that unity of action within the U.S. team, particularly given the uncertainty surrounding Obama's intentions for 2011, will require the U.S. president to take a more hands-on approach to managing the war in Afghanistan than he has adopted to date.

Link – Iraq Withdrawal

Rapid withdrawal would result in a civil-military crisis because Obama isn’t being flexible with military officials

Porter 8 (Gareth, writer for North America Inter Press Service, http://ipsnorthamerica.net/news.php?idnews=1836) PJ

Despite subtle and unsubtle pressures to compromise on his withdrawal plan, however, Obama is likely to pass over Gates and stand firm on his campaign pledge on military withdrawal from Iraq, according to a well-informed source close to the Obama camp. Within 24 hours of Obama's election, the idea of Gates staying on as defence secretary in an Obama administration was floated in the New York Times, which reported that 'a case is being made publicly by columnists and commentators, and quietly by leading Congressional voices of Mr. Obama's own party -- that Mr. Gates should be asked to remain as defence secretary, at least for an interim period in the opening months of the new presidency.' The Wall Street Journal reported Tuesday that two unnamed Obama advisers had said Obama was 'leaning toward' asking Gates stay on, although the report added that other candidates were also in the running. The Journal said Gates was strongly opposed to any timetable for withdrawal from Iraq, and it speculated that a Gates appointment 'could mean that Mr. Obama was effectively shelving his campaign promise to remove most troops from Iraq by mid-2010.' Some Obama advisers have been manoeuvering for a Gates nomination for months. Former Navy Secretary Richard Danzig publicly raised the idea of a Gates reprise in June and again in early October. Danzig told reporters Oct. 1, however, that he had not discussed the possibility with Obama. Obama advisers who support his Iraq withdrawal plan, however, have opposed a Gates appointment. Having a defence secretary who is not fully supportive of the 16-month timetable would make it very difficult, if not impossible for Obama to enforce it on the military. A source close to the Obama transition team told IPS Tuesday that the chances that Gates would be nominated by Obama 'are now about 10 percent'. The source said that Obama is going to stick with his 16-month withdrawal timeline, despite the pressures now being brought to bear on him. 'There is no doubt about it,' said the source, who refused to elaborate because of the sensitivity of the matter. Opposition to Obama's pledge to withdraw combat troops from Iraq on a 16-month timetable is wide and deep in the U.S. national security establishment and its political allies. U.S. military leaders have been unequivocal in rejecting any such rapid withdrawal from Iraq, and news media coverage of the issue has been based on the premise that Obama will have to modify his plan to make it acceptable to the military. The Washington Post published a story Monday saying that Adm. Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, opposes Obama's timeline for withdrawal as 'dangerous', insisting that 'reductions must depend on conditions on the ground'. Along with Gen. David H. Petraeus, now the head of CENTCOM and responsible for the entire Middle East, and Gen. Ray Odierno, the new commander in Iraq, Mullen was portrayed as part of a phalanx of determined military opposition to Obama's timeline. Post reporters Alec MacGillis and Ann Scott Tyson cited 'defence experts' as predicting a 'smooth and productive' relationship between Obama and these military leaders 'if Obama takes the pragmatic approach that his advisers are indicating, allowing each side to adjust at the margins.' But if Obama 'presses for the withdrawal of two brigades per month,' the same analysts predicted, 'conflict is inevitable.' The story quoted a former Bush administration National Security Council official, Peter D. Feaver, who was a strategic planner on the administration's Iraq 'surge' policy, as warning that Obama's timetable would precipitate 'a civil-military crisis' if Obama does not agree to the demands of Mullen, Petraeus and Odierno for greater flexibility. Underlying the campaign of pressure is the assumption that Obama's 16-month timetable is mainly posturing for political purposes during the primary campaign, and that Obama is not necessarily committed to the withdrawal plan.

Rapid withdrawal from Iraq kills civil-military relations

Bhadrakumar 8 (M K, 12/15, writer for the Asian Times, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South\_Asia/JK15Df02.html) PJ

The Washington Post newspaper reported that a "smooth and productive" equation between the military brass and the incoming president will be possible only "if Obama takes the pragmatic approach that his advisers are indicating, allowing each side to adjust at the margins". The newspaper quotes Peter D Feaver, a former National Security Council official in the Bush administration who was a strategic planner on the administration’s Iraq "surge" policy, to the effect that if Obama presses ahead with his 16-month withdrawal plan, "a civil-military crisis" might arise in Washington. According to Porter, Obama had a battle of wits with Petraeus when they met in Baghdad in July and the general argued for a "conditions-based" withdrawal rather than the presidential candidate’s 16-month deadline. Porter says Obama refused to back down and told Petraeus, "Your job is to succeed in Iraq on as favorable terms as we can get. But my job as a potential commander-in-chief is to view your counsel and interests through the prism of our overall national security."

Link – Iraq Withdrawal

Rapid withdrawal widens civil-military divide

O’Hanlon 5 (Micheal, Senior Fellow at Brookings, 11/28, http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2005/1128iraq\_ohanlon.aspx) PJ

In recent months a civil-military divide has emerged in the United States over the war in Iraq. Unlike much of the Iraq debate between Democrats and Republicans, it is over the present and the future rather than the past. Increasingly, civilians worry that the war is being lost, or at least not won. But the military appears as confident as ever of ultimate victory. This difference of opinion does not amount to a crisis in national resolve, and it will not radically affect our Iraq policy in the short term. But it is insidious and dangerous nonetheless. To the extent possible, the gap should be closed. In fact, objective realities in Iraq suggest that the military is too optimistic—but also that the public and the strategic community are becoming too fatalistic. Neither of these outlooks should be left unchecked. To the extent that military planners see Iraq through a rosy prism, they may not favor making policy changes when they should. And if we somehow lose in Iraq, the military may collectively blame the national media and the American body politic for a defeat that occurred on the streets of Iraq. On the other hand, if the public becomes too negative about the war, calls for a premature departure could grow louder and louder—and have a real policy effect, if not through George Bush directly then through Congress. The military's enthusiasm about the course of the war may be natural among those four-star officers in leadership positions, for it has largely become their war. Their careers have become so intertwined with the campaign in Iraq that truly independent analysis may be difficult. But it is striking that most lower-ranking officers seem to share the irrepressible optimism of their superiors. In talking with at least 50 officers this year, I have met no more than a handful expressing any real doubt about the basic course of the war. Contrast that with the rest of the country. The polls are clear; the American public is deeply worried and increasingly pessimistic. The numbers are not (yet) abysmal; 30 to 40 percent still seem bullish on trends in Iraq. But even among those who strongly support the Bush administration, doubts are emerging. Among defense and Middle East analysts, my own informal survey suggests at least as negative an overall outlook, with decidedly more pessimism than optimism. Even among centrists who supported the war or saw the case for it, optimism is now hard to find. Many expect things to get worse, even much worse, in the coming months and years. Members of both camps have plenty of evidence to support their view. But the risk is that each group is starting to selectively ignore information that does not fit with its increasingly firm conceptions about how things are going. For example, military leaders (and many Bush administration officials) point to some good news on the economic front: growing gross domestic product, bustle on the streets, creation of small businesses, adequate availability of most household fuels, gradually improving national infrastructure for water and sewage, more children in school, more Internet usage, and lots more telephone service. They also note the gradual improvement in Iraqi security forces, with 30,000 or more now capable of largely independent operations. And they rightly observe the remarkable progress made in drafting the Iraqi constitution. A can-do military officer aware of such information, and also tactically succeeding day in and day out in finding and killing insurgents, is likely to see a trajectory toward victory. But is that really what is happening? Growing GDP is good for those with access to the twin golden rivers flowing through Iraq—not the Tigris and Euphrates, but oil revenue and foreign aid. The rest of the economy is, on the whole, weak. Unemployment remains in the 30 to 40 percent range, and the psychologically most critical type of infrastructure—electricity—has barely improved since Saddam Hussein fell. Iraqi security forces are getting better, but they are also losing more than 200 men a month to the insurgency. Civilian casualties in Iraq from the war are as high as ever; combine that with the region's highest crime rates, and Iraq has clearly become a much more violent society since Hussein fell. Tactically, the resistance appears to be outmaneuvering the best military in the world in its use of improvised explosive devices. And politically, every move forward toward greater Sunni Arab participation in the political process seems to be accompanied by at least one step back. In the short term, of course, this civil-military divide matters only so much. The Bush administration has great political leeway in how it prosecutes the Iraq war. Officers in the field are not so stubborn as to resist smart changes in policy when the need becomes obvious. And on the other side of things, even those members of Congress and the public who think we are stuck in stalemate generally oppose radical alternatives to present policy. But the dangers of a growing divide are real. In a year we will have a new Congress, and if the public has become fatalistic about Iraq by then, Congress may assert itself in demanding rapid moves toward complete withdrawal—be they prudent or not. By contrast, if military officers see the good news more than the bad, they may feel increasingly cut off from the rest of the country. They may fail to understand why their recruiting efforts are not always appreciated by parents. They may be too reluctant to change tactics away from overly muscular combat operations that have accorded insufficient emphasis to protecting the Iraqi population. They may not feel enough urgency about advocating changes in policy that are needed there—like much better protection for Iraqi security forces, which remain badly under-armored, and a jobs program to directly target the high unemployment rate. Penetrating and respectful civil-military debates are difficult to conduct, especially in a time of war. But we need one now.

Link – Iraq Withdrawal

Rapid withdrawal results in civil war between civil and military factions

Kohn 8 (Richard H, writer for World Affairs, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2008-Winter/full-civil-military.html) PJ

It follows that no candidate will be elected without promising some sort of disengagement. An American withdrawal would probably unleash the all-out civil war that our presence has kept to the level of neighborhood cleansing and gangland murder. Sooner or later that violence will burn itself out. But a viable nation-state that resembles democracy as we know it is far off, with the possibility that al-Qaeda will survive in Iraq, requiring American combat forces in some form for years to come. In the civil-military arena, the consequences of even a slowly unraveling debacle in Iraq could be quite ugly. Already, politicians and generals have been pointing fingers at one another; the Democrats and some officers excoriating the administration for incompetence, while the administration and a parade of generals fire back at the press and anti-war Democrats. The truly embittered, like retired Army Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, who commanded in Iraq in 2003­­–04, blame everyone and everything: Bush and his underlings, the civilian bureaucracy, Congress, partisanship, the press, allies, even the American people. Last November, Sanchez went so far as to deliver the Democrats’ weekly radio address—and, with it, more bile and invective. Thomas Ricks, chief military correspondent of the Washington Post, detects a “stab in the back narrative . . . now emerging in the U.S. military in Iraq. . . . [T]he U.S. military did everything it was supposed to do in Iraq, the rest of the U.S. government didn’t show up, the Congress betrayed us, the media undercut us, and the American public lacked the stomach, the nerve, and the will to see it through.”  Ricks thinks this “account is wrong in every respect; nonetheless, I am seeing more and more adherents of it in the military.”

Link – Kuwait Withdrawal

The military wants pro-military plans in regards to Kuwait – plan deepens the civil-military rift

Myers et al 7 (Richard B, Richard H Cohen, Mackubin Thomas Owens, Lawrence J Korb, Michael C Desch, writers for Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/62843/richard-b-myers-and-richard-h-kohn-mackubin-thomas-owens-lawrenc/salute-and-disobey?page=3) PJ

Desch is correct to observe that there is a troubling rift between the uniformed U.S. military and civilian leaders (although it is not as great as he suggests). But Desch errs when he blames most of the current problems on the Bush administration in general and on former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in particular. In fact, the uniformed military deserves a significant share of the blame as well. Desch charges the administration with willfully ignoring military advice, initiating the Iraq war with too small a force, ignoring the need for preparations for postconflict stabilization, failing to foresee the insurgency, and not adapting once things started to go wrong. This criticism is predicated on two questionable assumptions. The first is that soldiers deserve to have a voice in making policy regarding the use of the military -- indeed, that they have the right to insist that their views be adopted. The second is that the judgment of soldiers is inherently superior to that of civilians when it comes to military affairs -- and that in times of war, accordingly, civilians should defer to military expertise. Both of these assumptions are questionable at best. They are also at odds with the principles and practice of U.S. civil-military relations, which subordinate the uniformed military to civilian authority even in what might seem to be the purely military realm. As Eliot Cohen demonstrates in Supreme Command, a book that Desch cites disapprovingly, successful wartime presidents, such as Abraham Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt, "interfered" extensively and frequently with military operations. Desch's first assumption rests on a misreading of McMaster's Dereliction of Duty. Many serving officers believe that Dereliction of Duty concludes that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should have more openly voiced their opposition to the Johnson administration's strategy of gradualism in Vietnam and then resigned rather than carry out the policy. But in fact, this is a serious misinterpretation that has reinforced the increasingly widespread belief that officers should be advocates of particular policies rather than simply serving in their traditional advisory roles. Desch's second assumption -- that soldiers have better judgment than civilian policymakers on military affairs -- is called into question by a review of the historical record. Lincoln constantly prodded George McClellan to take the offensive in Virginia in 1862, while McClellan constantly whined about insufficient forces. During World War II, there were many differences between Roosevelt and his military advisers. General George Marshall, the greatest soldier-statesman since George Washington, opposed arms shipments to the United Kingdom in 1940 and argued for a cross-channel invasion before the United States was ready. History has vindicated Lincoln and Roosevelt. Many in the military blame the U.S. defeat in Vietnam on civilians. But in fact, the operational approach in Vietnam was forged by the uniformed military. General William Westmoreland adopted the counterproductive strategy of emphasizing attrition of Peoples' Army of Vietnam forces in a "war of the big battalions" -- sweeps through remote jungle areas in an effort to destroy the enemy with superior firepower. By the time his successor could adopt a more fruitful approach, it was too late. During the planning for Operation Desert Storm in 1990-91, General Norman Schwarzkopf, then the head of U.S. Central Command, called for a frontal assault against Iraqi positions in southern Kuwait followed by a drive toward Kuwait City. That plan would probably not have achieved the foremost military objective of the ground war: the destruction of the three divisions of Saddam Hussein's Republican Guard. Accordingly, the civilian leadership rejected it and ordered Schwarzkopf to return to the drawing board. The revised plan was far more imaginative and effective.

Link – South Korea Withdrawal

Gates supports being tough on North Korea

Bumiller 9 (Elisabeth, writer for the New York Times, 5/30, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/31/world/asia/31gates.html?\_r=1) PJ

SINGAPORE — Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates raised the idea of a tougher approach toward North Korea’s recent nuclear test in meetings here with Asian allies on Saturday, including the prospect of building up United States military forces in the region should six-nation diplomatic talks with North Korea fail, American defense officials said. Mr. Gates raised “the notion that we should think about this as we are pursuing the six-party talks,” said a senior defense official who asked for anonymity because he was not authorized to speak publicly on the issue. “We ought to think about what more we need to do should they not prove successful.” But another defense official cautioned that talk of any military buildup was premature and that it was merely a “prudent option” in terms of “what should we be thinking about in the event that we need to start enhancing our posture, our defenses?” On Friday Mr. Gates said that the United States had no plans to reinforce some 28,000 American troops based in South Korea. Mr. Gates, who warned North Korea in a speech here early Saturday that the United States would not tolerate it becoming a nuclear-armed nation, met throughout the day at the conference, called the Shangri-La Dialogue, with defense officials from China, South Korea, Japan and other Asian nations to begin pulling together a consensus on how to proceed. James B. Steinberg, the deputy secretary of State, attended a number of meetings, as did Dennis C. Blair, the director of national intelligence.

Military wants to stay in South Korea to deter North Korea

Reuters 8 (6/3, http://in.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-33875320080603?pageNumber=2&virtualBrandChannel=0) PJ

(Reuters) - North Korea presents a serious security threat and U.S. forces in South Korea are ready to respond quickly and decisively to counter any attack, the U.S. defence secretary and military leaders said on Tuesday. The United States has been trying to convince impoverished North Korea to abide by an international disarmament deal and scrap its nuclear arms programme in exchange for aid and better global standing. "We face a serious adversary across the DMZ (Demilitarised Zone) in the North. That is why we have this alliance," Defense Secretary Robert Gates told reporters at a ceremony to mark a change of command for U.S. military forces in South Korea. The United States has about 28,000 troops in the country to support the South's 670,000-strong military. North Korea stations most of its 1.2-million-troop army near the DMZ buffer that has divided the peninsula since the end of the 1950-53 Korean War. Gates and South Korean Defence Minister Lee Sang-hee met ahead of the ceremony and agreed to keep U.S. troop numbers at their current levels, the ministry said in a statement. General Walter L. Sharp, who took over as commander of U.S. Forces Korea, said the allies were ready to deter North Korean aggression with "immediate and overwhelming firepower". "We are ready to respond quickly and decisively against any attempts to threaten the security of the Republic of Korea (South Korea)," Sharp said

Link – Nuclear Arms Reduction

Reduction of nuclear weapons results in a wider gap between civil and military relations

Megorden 2k (Cadet Kima, USAFA, http://isme.tamu.edu/JSCOPE01/Megorden01.html) PJ

In the new and rapidly evolving post-Cold War geopolitical reality, the role of United States military members has become less and less clear.  In large part due to these uncertainties the relationship between the military and the civilian apparatus of the government has also become less clear.  A now commonly accepted and worrisome notion is that of an existing and widening gap between the U.S. military and civilian society.  This civil-military gap is seen in the nuclear debate.  Most of those who propose more drastic cuts in the nuclear arsenal, dealerting, and even elimination of the nuclear arsenal are mostly members of the civilian sector.  Those who view nuclear weapons as absolutely necessary to deterrence strategy, and wish to keep the nuclear weapons as the basis of National Security are members of the military sector.  This gap is seen in the public sector, in the press, and in debate over nuclear strategy. The existence of a gap between the military and society in general in the United States cannot be contested.  The primary concerns of citizens and scholars revolve not around whether or not there is a gap, but among other things, on nature and extent of the gap, and the difference, if any, between common perception and reality.  A 1999 project commissioned and completed by the Triangle Institute for Security Studies in North Carolina investigated the extent and implications of a civilian-military gap, and is one of the more prominent recent academic works on the subject.  Both the Triangle Institute study and a twenty-year study analyzed by Ole Holsti indicate that the gap between the military and civilian society manifests itself, for the most part, in partisan political leanings.  Studies show “strong support for the proposition that: 1) members of the military have become increasingly partisan, 2) they are significantly more Republican and conservative than civilians holding comparable leadership positions” This apparent trend away from political neutrality on the part of the nation’s professional military officers is disconcerting to some.  However, the Triangle Institute is quick to note that “the partisan ideological differences do not necessarily spill over into the full range of domestic and foreign policy issues, and the gap appears to be wider in the realm of ideas and values than on more specific policy issues.” More polling established that, generally, military members are pessimistic about the moral health of the society that they serve, and worry over the perceived degradation of morality and values in American society.  This can be explained by the fact that the military has a distinct role and mission, which requires it to embrace values, which run contrary to those, cherished by late 20th century and 21st century American liberal democracy.

Link – TNWs

TNWs keep the military and political scenes united

Polser 4 (Brian, Major USAF, “Theater Nuclear Weapons in Europe: The Contemporary Debate”) PJ

U.S. policymakers support the TNW policy for traditional reasons as well as emerging roles. The fall of the Soviet Union by no means assured that Europe was safe from aggression in the early post-Cold War years. U.S. theater nuclear weapons in Europe, although reduced in quantity by the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs), retained their historical political and military utility. In the twenty-first century strategic environment, U.S. officials see continued political and military utility in TNWs. The new U.S. defense policy goals-assure, dissuade, deter and defeat-outlined in the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review, combined with the Bush administration's doctrine of preemption and focus on counterproliferation laid out in the National Security Strategy and National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, highlight security concerns that make administration officials reluctant to give up options.[1]

A2: Normal Means Solves Link

Obama’s relationship with the military stands on a brink – this is a crucial time for CMR

Feaver 6/22 (Peter, writer for Foreign Policy, http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/06/22/obama\_and\_his\_generals) GAT

If Obama takes that course, he should also tongue-lash the other participants in this feud, namely his closest circle of White House advisors and his country team in Kabul. The Americans seem to be preoccupied with Washington enemies when they should be directing their fire at the real enemy -- the one that is firing bullets, not insults, at them.  Indeed, the dissension and back-biting that has characterized the Obama administration is precisely the sort of divide-and-conquer confusion we are trying to foster among the Taliban and Al Qaeda foes we are confronting in the AfPak theater. It is a tragic irony that we have proven more capable of sowing it among our own ranks than among the ranks of the enemy. Good civil-military relations and the unity of command and effort they engender may not be sufficient to win. But in a war this complex, they may be a necessary condition for success. President Obama has not yet achieved good civil-military relations in the conduct of his wars and he does not have much time to get it right.  Let us hope that he finally heeds the wake-up call, however discordant and unfortunate it is.

A2: Troops Shifted, Not Cut

Putting military forces in disaster relief positions kills CMR

**Owens 5** (Mackubin T, Professor of Strategy and Force Planning at the Naval War College in Newport, http://www.ashbrook.org/publicat/oped/owens/05/katrina.html)

**The magnitude of the Katrina disaster and the subsequent failure of local, state, and federal agencies to react in a timely manner have led some to call for an expansion of the military’s role in domestic affairs**, including law enforcement. "The question raised by the Katrina fiasco," writes Daniel Henninger of the *Wall Street Journal*, "is whether the threat from madmen and nature is now sufficiently huge in its potential horror and unacceptable loss that we should modify existing jurisdictional authority to give the Pentagon functional first-responder status." The call for expanding the military’s domestic role did not begin with Katrina. Arguing that "the rising tide of drugs being smuggled into the United States… present[ed] a grave threat to all Americans" and that civilian law enforcement was not effectively dealing with this threat, Congress passed the Military Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies Act of 1981." In 1986, existing law was changed in order to permit the military more leeway in fighting the drug war. In 2002, Air Force General Ralph Eberhart, the first head of Northern Command, the unified command created in the wake of 9/11 and given responsibility for defending the United States, expressed support for changes in existing law that would expand the military’s domestic powers in the war against terrorism. At about the same time, Senator Joe Biden, a member of the Judiciary Committee, endorsed the idea of granting soldiers the power to arrest American civilians. Meanwhile during his first term, President Bush directed the Departments of Justice and Defense to review the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) of 1878, the law that limits the use of the military in domestic law enforcement. **This trend toward increased involvement of the US military in domestic affairs is at odds with healthy civil-military relations**. In addition, **officers** traditionally **have expressed the fear that involving the military in domestic tasks will undermine the war fighting capabilities of their units and cause their "fighting spirit" to decline**.

**\_\_\_\_\*\*Internals**

**Plan** 🡪 **Spillover**

**Spillover – small threats to CMR expand throughout the military**

Arthur 96 (Stanley, retired Admiral of the US Navy, Civil Military Relations and the Not-Quite Wars of the Present and Future, 10(30), p. 16-17)JFS

As we shrink the size of the armed forces while maintaining the high quality of our forces, and at the same time encourage them to turn inwards, how can we ensure that they will not see themselves as superior to the American people that they serve? We need to think hard about this because the more those in the ranks think of themselves as elite, the less likely they are to be concerned with attitudes, needs, and demands of the nation. There is a real problem when the armed forces do not respect the values of the society at large. The recent troubles with hate groups and skinheads could be, in part, attributable to this dynamic. Superficial remedies, like banning Nazi flags or watching for certain kinds of tattoos, address symptoms rather than causes.

This problem occurs more at the lower level of the service hierarchy than with the leadership. But if allowed to develop, it will inevitably migrate upwards. People are aware of the culture of promotions and education in the military and what will and will not be tolerated. If these attitudes develop among the privates and lieutenants, they will inevitably develop among sergeants and majors, and then among sergeant majors and colonels. When they reach the flag officer levels, there is potentially a threat to civilian control.

One slip-up in CMR can destroy it all

Ackerman, 08 (Spencer, The Washington Independent, 11/13, “Productive Obama-Military Relationship Possible,”

<http://washingtonindependent.com/18335/productive-obama-military-relationship-possible>)JFS

Another challenge for Obama, beyond Petraeus and Iraq, would be senior officers’ desire “to get back to preparing –and procuring — for the big, conventional Russia-China scenario the U.S. military institutionally prefers,” the anonymous Pentagon official said. But the current financial crisis and massive budget deficits create their own pressures on defense spending.

All interviewed said there were no shortage of potential pitfalls in the new Obama-military relationship. Two wars, a persistent threat from Al Qaeda, an overstretched ground force and a likely Pentagon budget crunch guarantee difficult decisions in the next four years.

“The single biggest mistake Obama could make would be to “completely discount the advice of the military senior leadership and those of his combat commanders who have the most experience dealing with the issues,” said the anonymous senior Army officer. “Even if he does not discount it, but is perceived to discount it, the relationship will be largely going back to the Clinton era, and will take years to repair. That’s not something you want to do in a time of war, which most of the nation has forgotten.”

CMR 🡪 Global Modeling

The U.S. is the global model for civil-military balance

Cronin 8 (Patrick M. Cronin, Director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, September 2008, online: http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/iwcivmilrelations.pdf)JFS

In the search for the right balance between military and civilian contributions— between command and leadership— in an irregular war, much has been learned in Iraq and Afghanistan. Secretary Gates acknowledges that “the lines separating war, peace, diplomacy, and development have become more blurred, and no longer fit the neat organizational charts of the 20th century,” but that all the various elements and stakeholders working in the international arena—military and civilian, government and private—have learned to stretch outside their comfort zone to work together and achieve results.”31

Although there has been undeniable progress in rebalancing the capability portfolios of each of the players, all the problems have yet to be resolved. What is clear is that the world will continue to look to the United States for leadership. How to best bring together America’s civilian and military assets to protect our national interests and support our alliances and local partners is an essential conversation that should be continued.

CMR Key to Effectiveness

Bad civil-military relations kill effectiveness

Talmadge 9 (Caitlin, Ph.D. candidate, Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, http://web.mit.edu/polisci/research/gradresearch/TalmadgeAPSAWeb.pdf) PJ

It seems safe to say that “bad” civil-military relations should somehow negatively influence battlefield performance, and that a state with such relations that had very high military effectiveness would constitute a puzzling anomaly for a civil-military explanation. But what actually distinguishes “good” civil-military practices from bad ones, and the effects of such practices on the aspects of tactical and operational performance listed above, is not obvious from the existing literature.54 This is partly because the existing literature focuses heavily on whether civilian involvement in military affairs should be high or low, rather than on the content of that involvement, and partly because many of the studies of the tactical- and operational-level effects of civilmilitary relations examine cases where the battlefield performance in question was heavily over-determined. For example, most of the case studies that demonstrate the negative effects of “coup-proofing” fail to control for at least one obvious confounding variable from those listed above, and there is an especially pronounced tendency to examine instances of poor Arab autocracies fighting economically advanced non-Arab democracies.55 Unfortunately, such tests cannot pin down the independent impact of civil-military relations as separate from Arab culture, autocracy, and wealth, because all of these independent variables make the same prediction about the value of the dependent variable in those circumstances. As a result, it is still difficult to define, much less isolate and measure, the independent effect of “civil-military dysfunction,” even if everyone can agree that such “dysfunction,” whatever it is, would be bad for military performance, while some other pattern of civil-military relations would presumably be beneficial on the battlefield.

CMR key to military effectiveness

Bruneau and Krasner 9 (Thomas C, Professor of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, and Stephen D, Professor of International Relations, http://iis-db.stanford.edu/evnts/5541/Bruneau\_final\_file.pdf)

Although it may seem counter-intuitive, increased democratic control can improve effectiveness in military, intelligence, and police forces. Based on historical research, Deborah Avant concludes, ‘Having more civilians control the army made it easier, not harder, for the army to maintain its focus.’56 While too much direction and oversight obviously can hamper security services’ capabilities or reveal sources and methods in intelligence, implementing ‘good’ control, i.e., instituting control and oversight in a way that provides top-level direction and general oversight guidance, as opposed to malfeasance or cronyism, leads to improved effectiveness. For example, one of the few acknowledged successes in US civil military relations, the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, both reinforced democratic civilian control and mandated ‘jointness’ for the military services in the United States. Although some interoperability issues certainly remain, US forces have been more effective at fulfilling their various roles and missions since this level of democratic control was enacted. Operation Desert Storm, operations in the former Yugoslavia and Afghanistan, and the initial combat success in Iraq bear witness to these improvements.

Too much civilian control leads to military ineffectiveness

Bruneau and Krasner 9 (Thomas C, Professor of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, and Stephen D, Professor of International Relations, http://iis-db.stanford.edu/evnts/5541/Bruneau\_final\_file.pdf)

While we believe that improved democratic control generally improves effectiveness, efficiency is not always a by-product of increased democratic control. In most countries, there are several different branches of the military, along with various intelligence organizations. This diversity fosters improved democratic control in that no single security apparatus monopolizes all government knowledge or power; yet it often leads to duplication of effort and bureaucratic competition among various entities vying for government resources. The reality is that direction and oversight are costly. If security services never had to testify before legislative committees, provide data to oversight organizations, reform their institutions when problems are uncovered, undergo time-consuming audits, or improve professional standards, then all resources might be used to obtain the best military equipment, provide the most intelligence product or increase the number of police on the streets.

**CMR** Key to Readiness

A stable CMR is key to military readiness

Foster 97 (Gregory D, Brookings, http://www.brookings.edu/articles/1997/fall\_defense\_foster.aspx) PJ

Civilian Leaders and the Military What are these expectations? To the practiced observer, they are obvious. For their part, civilian officials, presidents in particular, expect two things above all else from the military. The first is operational competence—the ability to accomplish assigned missions, whatever they may be. The second is sound advice. Of course, there are no clearly objective bases for determining what constitutes either. Both are inherently subjective and depend ultimately on the powers of discernment possessed by those who make such judgments. An uninformed observer—whether political appointee or average citizen—devoid of military understanding, especially of the strategic ramifications of military affairs, is fundamentally ill-equipped to distinguish a military that is doing well what it should be doing from one that is doing either the right thing badly or the wrong thing satisfactorily. We see and hear much of this today from those in authority who, wishing to establish their bona fides, incessantly mouth the platitudes of militarese—"readiness," "op tempo," "warfighting"—without having the first demonstrable clue as to what militaries actually do or ought to do, much less how.

\_\_\_\*\*Democracy Scenario

CMR Key to Democracy – 1NC Internal\*\*

Civil-military relations are modeled globally pave the way for democracy

Diamond and Plattner 96 (Larry Jay, sociologist, Marc F, editor, “Civil-military relations and democracy” p. xii) PJ

Huntington attributes this relative success in reforming civil-military relations to three factors. First, the norms of military professionalism and civilian control are increasingly being accepted around the world—owing, at least in part, to training provided by the United States. Second, political and military elites have come to recognize that the institutionalization of what Huntington calls "objective civilian control" serves the interests of both. Military officials, having learned through their experience in power that many economic, social, and political problems have no easy solution, understand that the demands of political involvement have undermined the military's own coherence, efficiency, and discipline. Politicians, for their part, have seen the high price to be paid for bringing the military into partisan political battles. Finally, civil-military reform has yielded widespread benefits—including reductions in military budgets and manpower requirements, the curtailment of human rights abuses, and the transfer of military-run enterprises into civilian hands—that are popular with society as a whole. Nonetheless, a number of challenges remain: reducing the likelihood of military coups, curtailing the residual political influence of strong militaries that have withdrawn from direct rule, forging new roles and missions for the armed forces, and reducing the military's isolation from society at large. According to Huntington, economic development, which created the conditions for democratization, also reduces the likelihood of future military coups. He observes that, during the third wave of democratization, coup attempts against new democracies, with a few notable exceptions (Nigeria, Haiti, and Sudan), have generally failed. In fact, the data indicate that there exist coup-attempt and coup-success "ceilings" that can be defined in terms of per-capita GNP. Countries with per-capita GNPs above $1,000 do not experience successful coups, and no country with a per-capita GNP above $3,000 has witnessed even an unsuccessful coup attempt. Successful coups have occurred only in those countries with per-capita GNPs under $1,000. Militaries still wield considerable influence behind the scenes in those countries where they yielded power more or less voluntarily, as occurred in Brazil, Chile, Nicaragua, Turkey, and South Korea. Civilian govern­ments have nonetheless made considerable progress in asserting their control over military budgets, personnel, and force structures and in curtailing many of the military's long-held privileges. The main sticking point remains the handling of past human rights abuses by the armed forces, as governments are under considerable popular pressure to rewrite the amnesty agreements that served as the foundation for the military's withdrawal from politics.

CMR Key to Democracy

Civil military relations key to democracy

Forman and Welch 98 (Johanna Mendelson and Claude, writers for Center for Democracy and Governance Bureau for Global Programs, Field Support, and Research U.S. Agency for International Development, http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/200/200sbf.pdf) PJ

Civil-military relations focus on the relative distribution of power between the government and the armed forces of a country. Countries with recent histories of authoritarian rule face particularly onerous challenges in making their military establishments politically neutral and subject to the types of control necessary for meaningful democracy. Countries emerging from civil wars also pose a particular problem to the wider discussion of civil-military relations. Balancing internal security needs for reconstruction with appropriate civil-military relations creates a tension in governance that makes difficult a national dialogue on the roles and missions of the armed forces.

**Good CMR key to democracy**

**Mares 98** (David R, author, Civil-Military Relations: Building Democracy and Regional Security in Latin America, Southern Asia, and Central Europe, p. 25, Questia)

Conceptualizing the range of **civil-military relationships constitutes a fundamental step in evaluating** their impact on **the consolidation of democracy**. The introduction presented a theoretical argument that the range is broad and the links between a civil-military relationship and democracy varied. Part One of this volume examines the empirical experience of four of the most intriguing cases in this volume: India, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Venezuela. Rebecca Schiff begins this section by investigating the Indian and Pakistani cases. She organizes her analysis around the concept of a concordance between civilians and the military as an alternative to civilian control of the military. **This form of pacted relationship has been successful in guaranteeing democratic politics even as the Indian polity increasingly strains against the centrifugal forces of caste and ethnicity.** In contrast, the Pakistani civil-military relationship produced military rule in the face of domestic civil strife. J. Soedjati Djiwandono's analysis of Indonesia explores the possibilities of creating a democratic polity in which the military has a legitimate role as partner. Although critical of the way in which the current civil-military relationship constitutes a barrier to democratization, Djiwandono believes that the cultural and historical characteristics of Indonesia require the military's participation in politics. Hence his analysis focuses on the conditions under which *Dwifungsi* (the military's dual function) can support democratic consolidation. **Venezuela is one of Latin America's longest-standing democracies.** Gisela Gómez Sucre and María Dolores Cornett demonstrate that **the country has a civilian-dominant civil-military relationship.** Nevertheless, in 1992 there were two major coup attempts. The chapter thus investigates how such military insubordination could occur under civilian dominance. In many ways, the Venezuela case compels us to recognize that democrats should be ever vigilant in defending democracy, in both civil society and the military.

CMR Key to Democracy

**CMR key to democracy – India proves**

**Ahmed 9** (Firdaus, writer for the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, http://ipcs.org/article/pakistan/an-issue-in-civil-military-relations-3000.html)

Recently, the Army Chief is reported to have said that the "US has not allowed a second 9/11 to happen. Indonesia has not allowed a second Bali bombing to happen. India has allowed people to get away after the Parliament attack, the Delhi blasts and finally 26/11. It's time for all of us to say no more." In the light of weightier civil-military issues however, both analogies are inappropriate and not worth pondering. But it might be useful to consider if this is indeed a defining juncture in India’s civil-military relations. The context is the forthcoming anniversary of 26/11, which India would hope will pass without incident. The urgency owes to the worsening situation in Pakistan. It is possible that the government is mounting pressure on Pakistan to rein in the jihadis to the extent it can. This explains the Home Minister’s earlier warning that “If Pakistan attempts to send terrorists into India again, India will not only foil those attempts but also give them a crushing response.” This ‘good cop-bad cop’ routine has helped balance out the Prime Minister’s offer of friendship to Pakistan on his trip to the Valley late last month**. The Army Chief made his statement in the presence of the Minister of State for Defence**, the provocation for which seems to have been the news that the latest terror plan, a plot busted by the FBI in the US, was to target India’s prestigious National Defence College. **The statement made by the present Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee is in keeping with the precedent set by the previous COSC Chairman**, Admiral Sureesh Mehta, of making policy-influencing pronouncements such as his recent address at a National Maritime Foundation lecture regarding India’s China policy. But is India capable of such finesse in signalling? **Answering this question in the ‘affirmative’ would mean treating the Chief’s statement as a departure in civil-military norms as an attempt to generate conflict where there is none.** Whether there is a plan behind the government’s moves cannot be known with any certainty, and therefore, giving the benefit of doubt is warranted. The government is using the Chief’s broad shoulders to unmistakably convey to Pakistan that India is poised precariously on its proverbial ‘tolerance threshold’. Nevertheless, even as an academic exercise, it is worth probing what the juncture implies. **Keeping civil-military relations under periodic scrutiny, helps keep militarization in check and democracy in good health.**

**CMR key to democracy**

**The Daily Star 9** (12/17, http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=114410)

**Military and non-military institutions should work in an integrated and harmonised manner to strengthen democracy,** HT Imam, an adviser to the prime minister, said at a workshop in the city yesterday. Mutual **understanding and confidence in the civil-military relations are vital, because destabilised civil-military relations affects democracy and the national interests**, he said. Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (BEI) and Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS) jointly organised the four-day Workshop on 'National security and civil-military relations in Bangladesh' in collaboration with Asia-Pacific Centre for Security Studies (APCSS) based in Honolulu, Hawaii.

**CMR key to democracy**

**Bruneau 4** (Thomas C, Distinguished Professor of National Security Affairs in the Naval Postgraduate School's Department of National Security, “Teaching Civil-Military Relations”)

**The** study and teaching of **civil-military relations is extremely important because unless civilians know how to establish and manage these key institutions, real democratic civil-military relations cannot be achieved**. Absent effective institutional controls, a country is simply not a democracy. **Democracy is a value by itself, derivative of the benefits of liberty and freedom, and it is widely known that democracies create better conditions than other political systems for human progress and the minimization of conflict and war**. By employing a "lessons-learned and bestpractices approach," civilians can learn how to control the military, and officers can come to understand that, in the long run, such control benefits them and their nation.

CMR Key to Modeling/Internal – Democracy/Human Rights

**US CMR is modeled globally**

**Kohn 97** (Dick, professor of history and chairman of the Curriculum in Peace, War, and Defense at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/AD\_Issues/amdipl\_3/kohn.html)

At one time or another in the 20th century alone, **civilian control of the military has been a concern of democracies like the United States** and France, of communist tyrannies such as the Soviet Union and China, of fascist dictatorships in Germany and Italy, and since 1945, of many smaller states in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. As recently as ten years ago, military regimes ruled at least seventy of the world's countries. **Civilian control has special significance today more than ever. Throughout the formerly communist world, societies are struggling to build the institutions for democratic governance**. NATO has made civilian control a prerequisite for joining the Alliance. **In encouraging democratization, the United States and other western powers use civilian control of the military as one measure of progress toward democratic process.** Control by civilians presents two challenges today: For mature democracies, where civilian control has been strong and military establishments have focused on external defense, the test is whether civilians can exercise supremacy in military policy and decision-making. When the military enjoys great prestige, possesses advanced bureaucratic skills, believes that its ability to fulfill its mission may be at risk, or comes to doubt the civilian leadership, civilians can face great obstacles in exercising their authority. For the new or newly-emerging democracies without much experience in combining popular government and civilian control, the challenge is more difficult: to assure that the military will not attempt a *coup*, or defy civilian authority. In many former autocracies, the military has concentrated on internal order, or been deeply involved in political life, sometimes preying on the society rather than protecting it. Then the chief requirement is to establish a tradition of civilian control, to develop an ironclad system of political neutrality within the military establishment, and to prevent or forestall on a permanent basis any possibility of a *coup* or military intervention in political life. The task will still remain to establish civilian control over national security policy and decision-making. But in the new democracies the challenge is more formidable, for in attempting to gain supremacy over military affairs, civilians risk provoking the defiance of the military, and without sufficient public support, perhaps even military intervention. The purpose of what follows is to describe briefly certain of the common characteristics or experiences that have, historically, fostered civilian control in democracy. While based mostly on western, and particularly Anglo-American experience, the analysis applies to any society that practices democratic government, or is making the transition to government based upon the sovereignty and will of the people. Why Civilian Control Matters FO R    D E M O C R A C Y,  civilian control -- that is, control of the military by civilian officials elected by the people -- is fundamental. **Civilian control allows a nation to base its values and purposes, its institutions and practices, on the popular will rather than on the choices of military leaders, whose outlook by definition focuses on the need for internal order and external security.**

Democracy Impacts – Violence

**Democracy is key to prevent mass murder end all forms of violence**

**Rummel 1** (RJ, professor of Political Science at the University of Hawaii, http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/WF.CHAP8.HTM)

This is still more to say about freedom's value. While we now know that the world's ruling thugs generally kill several times more of their subjects than do wars, it is war on which moralists and pacifists generally focus their hatred, and their resources to end or moderate it. This singular concentration is understandable given the horror and human costs, and vital political significance of war. Yet, **it should be clear by now that war is a symptom of freedom's denial; and that freedom is the cure**. Three points bear repeating from Chapter 7. First, *democratically free people do not make war on each other*. This is so important that some scientists have made this historical fact the subject of whole books, such as Bruce Russett's *Grasping The Democratic Peace*, James Lee Ray's *Democracy and International Conflict*, and Spencer R. Weart's *Never At War*. **There is a very good explanation for why democracies do not make war on each other, and it is the same as that for why there is by far the least internal violence and democide within democracies**. **The diverse groups, cross-national bonds, social links, and shared values of democratic peoples sew them together; and shared liberal values dispose them toward peaceful negotiation and compromise with each other.** It is as though the people of democratic nations were one society. *The truth about democracies not making war on each other gives us a way of eliminating war from the world: globalize democratic freedom*. This solution is far in the future, however. It may only kick in when most nations are democratized. Therefore the second point: *the less free the people within any two nations, the bloodier and more destructive the wars between them; the greater their freedom, the less such wars*. And third, as seen in Table 8.1: *the more freedom the people of a nation have, the less bloody and destructive their wars*. What this means is that we do not have to wait for all, or almost all, nations to become liberal democracies to reduce the severity of war. **As we promote freedom, as the people of more and more nations gain greater human rights and political liberties, as those people without any freedom become partly free, we will decrease the bloodiness of the world's wars.** In short, *increasing freedom in the world decreases the death toll of its wars. Surely, whatever reduces, and then finally ends, the scourge of war from our history, without causing a greater evil, must be a moral good. And this is freedom*. The implications of this for foreign policy and international activism are profound. Since peace, national security, and national welfare are the paramount concerns of a democratic nation's foreign policy, clearly the overriding goal should be to peacefully promote human rights and democratic freedom. This should be the bottom line of international negotiations, treaties, foreign aid, and military action (if necessary for defense or humanitarian reasons, as in Kosovo or Bosnia). As to defense policy, military planning is based on assessments of intentions and capability. What is clear is that the less the people of a nation are free, the more we should beware of the intentions of their rulers. In other words, it is not the democracies of the world that we need to defend against. Moreover, think about what the peace-creating power of freedom means for nuclear weapons. Many people are justly worried about the ultimate danger to humanity--nuclear war. They protest and demonstrate against nuclear weapons. Some cross the line into illegal activities, such as destroying military property, and risk prison to draw public attention to the danger of such weapons. Were these dedicated people to spend even half this effort on promoting freedom and human rights for the people of the most powerful dictatorships that have or may soon have such weapons--for instance, China, North Korea, Iraq, and Iran--they would be striking at the *root cause* for the risk of nuclear attack. **The power of freedom to end war, minimize violence within nations, and eradicate genocide and mass murder, almost seems magical**. It is as though we have a single-drug cure for cancer. Had I not actually done much of the research myself over more than forty years, of which the most recent is shown on this web site, I would have doubted all this. Yet, my work and that of other social scientists and scholars have proven it true. Our knowledge of the peace-creating and peace-making effects of freedom now gives us a nonviolent way to promote a nonviolent world. As should now be clear, *democratic freedom is a method of nonviolence*. Enhancing, spreading, and promoting human rights and democracy are the way to enhance, spread, and promote nonviolence. Proponents of nonviolence have worked out many peaceful tactics for opposing dictators, such as sit-down strikes, general strikes, mass demonstrations, refusal to pay taxes, underground newspapers, sabotage by excessive obedience to the rules, and the like. Much thought has gone into how a people can nonviolently promote human rights. Overall, however, nonviolence works best among a free people, and *freedom itself promotes a nonviolent solution to social problems and conflicts*. In conclusion, then, we have then a wondrous human freedom as a moral force for the good. *It produces social justice, creates wealth and prosperity, minimizes violence, saves human lives, and is a solution to war*. In two words, it creates *human security*. Moreover, and most important, *you should not only be free because of how good it is for you. You should be free because it is your right as a human being* In opposition to freedom is power, its antonym. While freedom is a right, the power to govern is a privilege granted by a people to those they elect, and can hold responsible for its use. Too often, however, thugs seize control of a people with their guns and use them to make their power total and absolute. **Where freedom produces wealth and prosperity, such absolute power causes impoverishment and famine. Where freedom minimizes internal violence, eliminates genocide and mass murder, and solves the problem of war, such absolute power unleashes internal violence, murders millions, and produces the bloodiest wars. In short, power kills, absolute power kills absolutely**.

Democracy Impacts – Freedom

**Democracy key to freedom, economic prosperity and preventing violence**

**McFaul 5** (Michael, writer for the Washington Quarterly, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/washington\_quarterly/v028/28.1mcfaul.html)

In *On Democracy*, Robert Dahl succinctly summarizes the advantages of democracy as a system of government.[3](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/washington_quarterly/v028/28.1mcfaul.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT3) According to Dahl, **democracy helps prevent rule by cruel and vicious autocrats, guarantees citizens a set of fundamental rights, ensures a broader range of personal freedoms, helps people protect their own fundamental interests, provides the maximum opportunity for self-determination**—the freedom to live under laws of one's own choosing— [End Page 148] **provides the maximum opportunity for the exercise of moral responsibility, encourages human development, fosters a relatively high degree of political equality, promotes peace—as modern representative democracies do not fight one another—and generates prosperity.** Throughout most of modern history, Dahl's claims would have invoked heated debate. For millennia, monarchs, emperors, mullahs, and kings ruled and based their legitimacy on the claim of authority from God. In pockets of the world, these kinds of autocrats still remain, but divine right alone is no longer a sufficient justification for their power. These rulers must now also present other cultural or developmental arguments to explain why implementing democracy would be inappropriate or premature.

Democracy Impacts – Terrorism

**Democracy key to prevent terrorism**

**Diamond 2** (Larry, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, http://www.stanford.edu/~ldiamond/papers/coldWarOnTerrorism.pdf)

**If we are serious about getting at the roots of international terrorism**, and of the spreading international sympathy it enjoys, **we must get serious about fostering development that gives people hope and dignity and improves the quality of their lives.** In real terms, levels of U.S. development assistance have fallen dramatically since the 1970s and especially since the end of the last Cold War. As Jeffrey Sachs recently observed, “the United States now spends only 0.1 percent of GNP in foreign assistance, and only 0.02 percent of GHP in assistance for the poorest countries.” This is by far the weakest effort of any of the wealthy democracies. It will not work to just throw money at the problem in some new “Marshall Plan.” No infusion of economic resources, no matter how massive and sustained, will in itself generate development, because the problem (unlike in Europe after World War II) is not simply a lack of resources or functioning infrastructure**. The problem is a** more **fundamental shortage**: **of** the institutions of **democracy** and good governance. **Unless we help to develop states** that collect taxes, limit corruption, control crime, enforce laws, secure property rights, provide education, attract investment, and answer to their own people, countries will not develop and the violent rage against the West will not subside. **Neither will we stem the proliferating threats of state collapse, international crime, drug trafficking, environmental disaster, and infectious disease, all of which breed in the swamps of economic failure and rotten governance**. This is why we must not only substantially increase our foreign assistance budget but also devote a much larger portion of that budget to democracy and governance programs, while deploying more aid workers with training in political development. We can win the immediate war against the Taliban. We can and must help the people of Afghanistan to free themselves from this Medieval tyranny. But that victory will only provide us a narrow window of opportunity to begin gaining ground in a far more difficult and elusive struggle. We must help societies to build the political institutions that foster human progress**. Only then can we achieve a lasting victory in the war on terrorism.**

**Terrorism leads to extinction**

**Pacotti 3** (Sheldon, writer for Salon, http://www.salon.com/technology/feature/2003/03/31/knowledge/index.html)

A similar trend has appeared in proposed solutions to high-tech terrorist threats. Advances in biotech, chemistry, and other fields are expanding the power of individuals to cause harm, and this has many people worried. Glenn E. Schweitzer and Carole C. Dorsch, writing for The Futurist, gave this warning in 1999: **"Technological advances threaten to outdo anything terrorists have done before; superterrorism has the potential to eradicate civilization as we know it."** Schweitzer and Dorsch are so alarmed that they go on to say, "Civil liberties are important for a democratic society; the time has arrived, however, to reconfigure some aspects of democracy, given the violence that is on the doorstep." The Sept. 11 attacks have obviously added credence to their opinions. In 1999, they recommended an expanded role for the CIA, "greater government intervention" in Americans' lives, and the "honorable deed" of "whistle-blowing" -- proposals that went from fringe ideas to policy options and talk-show banter in less than a year. Taken together, their proposals aim to gather information from companies and individuals and feed that information into government agencies. A network of cameras positioned on street corners would nicely complement their vision of America during the 21st century. If after Sept. 11 and the anthrax scare these still sound like wacky Orwellian ideas to you, imagine how they will sound the day a terrorist opens a jar of Ebola-AIDS spores on Capitol Hill. As Sun Microsystems' chief scientist, Bill Joy, warned: "We have yet to come to terms with the fact that the most compelling 21st-century technologies -- robotics, genetic engineering, and nanotechnology -- pose a different threat than the technologies that have come before. Specifically, robots, engineered organisms, and nanobots share a dangerous amplifying factor: They can self-replicate. A bomb is blown up only once -- but one bot can become many, and quickly get out of control." Joy calls the new threats "knowledge-enabled mass destruction." **To cause great harm to millions of people, an extreme person will need only dangerous knowledge**, which itself will move through the biosphere, encoded as matter, and flit from place to place as easily as dangerous ideas now travel between our minds. In the information age, **dangerous knowledge can be copied and disseminated at light speed, and it threatens everyone**. Therefore, Joy's perfectly reasonable conclusion is that we should relinquish "certain kinds of knowledge." He says that it is time to reconsider the open, unrestrained pursuit of knowledge that has been the foundation of science for 300 years. "[D]espite the strong historical precedents, if open access to and unlimited development of knowledge **henceforth puts us all in clear danger of extinction**, then common sense demands that we reexamine even these basic, long-held beliefs."

Democracy Impacts – Proliferation

**Democracy key to check back proliferation of dangerous weapons**

**Diamond 95** (Larry, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/1.htm)

This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. **Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate**. The very source of life on Earth, **the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness.**

Democracy Impacts – Proliferation

**Proliferation leads to nuclear terrorism and extinction**

**Taylor 2** (Stuart, writer for the National Journal, http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0902/091702db.htm)

The truth is, no matter what we do about Iraq, **if we don't stop proliferation, another five or 10 potentially unstable nations may go nuclear before long,** making it ever more likely that one or more bombs will be set off anonymously on our soil by terrorists or a terrorist government. **Even an airtight missile defense would be useless against a nuke hidden in a truck, a shipping container or a boat**. As to Iraq, unless we can get U.N. Security Council support for whatever we decide to do (on which, more below), either a go-it-alone U.S.-British invasion or a Bush backdown from the beating of war drums would carry incalculable risks. An invasion would, of course, end Saddam's quest for nuclear weapons and probably Saddam himself. So far, so good. But some hawks greatly underestimate the costs and risks, claiming that an easy victory in Iraq will lead to a flowering of democracy that will inspire the rest of the Arab world to follow suit, destroy the appeal of militant Islam, pave the way for Israeli-Palestinian peace and make us all safer. This is a fantasy. Unless Saddam is overthrown from within, we would have to take Baghdad in house-to-house fighting, with many thousands of casualties. The task of pacifying and democratizing a nation that has never known freedom and hates our ally Israel would be at least as difficult as bringing peace and democracy to Afghanistan. And the administration has not made a very credible beginning there. The effects of a unilateral invasion on our national security would extend far beyond Iraq. Viewed optimistically, it might also—if accompanied by a credible threat to launch a succession of pre-emptive wars—convince Iran, Libya, North Korea, and other potential threats that we would do the same to them if they persist in developing nuclear weapons. But then again, rogue nations might react by hiding, rather than ending, their bomb-building programs. And as the cost of a policy of pre-emptive wars without end becomes apparent, American voters might balk. A U.S.-British invasion would also divert resources from the war against al Qaeda, especially in Afghanistan, where al Qaeda is already regrouping. It would alienate Russia and others whose cooperation we need in the vital project of securing fissile materials. It would thereby increase the danger of a nuclear attack by al Qaeda or others. By enraging hundreds of millions of Muslims worldwide, it would swell the ranks of terrorist groups—perhaps making it easier for them to recruit nuclear engineers as well as suicide bombers—and risk a militant Islamist takeover of nuclear-armed Pakistan. Years or even decades of sometimes-bloody occupation could keep the hate-America pot boiling. With Kurds in the north and Shiites in the south demanding independence, we would have to choose between crushing those movements and alienating Turkey, a vital ally with a region of restive Kurds bordering Iraq. Many in Europe and elsewhere would see the Bush administration as less interested in democratizing Iraq than in controlling the region's oil and in achieving world domination. All of this international ill will could doom any hope for support in fighting nuclear proliferation. Does all of this mean that a unilateral invasion should be ruled out as complete folly? Not necessarily. The dangers of backing down are also grave. It is foolish for doves to scoff at the risk that a nuclear-armed Saddam could or would launch what they say would be a "suicidal" attack on the United States. He seems entirely capable of smuggling a bomb into one of our cities, perhaps in league with al Qaeda, and setting it off anonymously in the hope of escaping retaliation. If we stand aside while Saddam builds or buys nuclear weapons, and if at some point thereafter a bomb takes out Washington or New York, how could we be sure that Saddam was involved? The culprits might be terrorists connected, not to Iraq, but perhaps to Pakistan, North Korea, Iran, or Libya. Against whom would we retaliate? Doves also seem disingenuous in ruling out an invasion unless and until we can produce irrefutable evidence that Saddam presents an imminent nuclear threat. Most would be no less dovish after seeing such proof than they are now. After all, once Iraq has nuclear arms, an invasion would be far more perilous. So a decision not to invade now is a decision not to invade ever—not, at least, until Saddam has actually used nuclear or biological weapons or repeated his use of chemical weapons. And a Bush backdown now would surely embolden other rogue states to accelerate their nuclear programs. In short, the future will be extremely dangerous no matter what we do about Iraq. The best way out would be to use the threat of a unilateral invasion to push the U.N. Security Council to demand that Iraq submit to unconditional, unrestricted arms inspections, as proposed by President Chirac of France, followed by military action if Saddam balks or cheats or it becomes clear that inspections cannot be effective. France and Russia might go along, suggests a former Clinton administration official, if that were the only way to get a piece of the post-invasion protectorate over the world's second-largest oil supply. We should not become so fixated on Iraq that we ignore the greater dangers: al Qaeda, loose nuclear materials in Russia and elsewhere, and nuclear proliferation. House Republicans have idiotically refused to provide adequate funding to secure nuclear stockpiles abroad. They and the Bush administration have greatly damaged the effectiveness of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty by spurning the closely related Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, without which more and more nations will be tempted to seek nuclear weapons.  **Unless we get serious about stopping proliferation, we are headed for "a world filled with nuclear-weapons states, where every crisis threatens to go nuclear," where "the survival of civilization** truly is in question from day to day," and where "it **would be impossible** to keep these weapons out of the hands of terrorists, religious cults, and criminal organizations." So writes Ambassador Thomas Graham Jr., a moderate Republican who served as a career arms-controller under six presidents and led the successful Clinton administration effort to extend the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

Democracy Impacts – Poverty

**Democracy key to solve poverty**

**Machipisa 2** (Lewis, writer for the BBC, http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/27a/088.html)

**Though poverty also exists in developed democratic** **countries**, Save-Soderbergh says ahead of the conference, **'democratic values and institutions such as civil liberties and press freedom increase accountability and reduce corruption, and help draw public attention to pressing needs thus increasing the potential for meeting the needs of the poor'**.

**Poverty outweighs global nuclear war**

**Spina 2k** (Stephanie Urso, Ph.D. candidate in social/personality psychology at University of New York, “Smoke and Mirrors: The Hidden Context of Violence in Schools and Society”, p. 201)

8. This sad fact is not limited to the United States. **Globally, 18 million deaths a year are caused by structural violence, compared with about 100,000 deaths per year from armed conflict**. That is, **approximately every fifteen years, as many peo­ple die because of relative poverty as would be killed in a nuclear war that caused 232 million deaths, and every single year, two to three times as many people die from poverty throughout the world as were killed by the Nazi genocide of the Jews over a six-year period**. **This is**, in effect, the equivalent of **an ongoing**, un­ending, in fad accelerating, **thermonuclear war or genocide, perpetrated on the weak and poor every year of every decade, throughout the world**. (See James Gilligan, Violence: Reflections on a National Epidemic, New York: Vintage Books, 1997, 196.)

Democracy Impacts – Environment

**Democracy solves their environmental impacts**

**Matthews and Mock 3** (Emily and Gregory, writers for Earth Trends, http://earthtrends.wri.org/features/view\_feature.php?fid=45&theme=10)

The assertion that greater **democratic rights can**, in the right circumstances, **result in better environmental policy and performance has been given powerful support in the aftermath of the terrible environmental abuses** revealed in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union after the fall of Communist regimes in 1989–1990. Environment was a rallying cry of reform movements in the region, and stricter environmental legislation has been rapidly enacted under new democratic governments. **The link between citizen rights and improving environmental trends has much to do with the power that democracies give to citizens to affect decision-making processes and hold government officials, corporate authorities, and other individuals accountable. Democratic freedoms encourage access to information—such as planning documents, budgets, reports on local environmental conditions, or pollution records—that can help citizens protect their environmental interests** (Petkova and Veit 2000:3–5).

\_\_\_\*\*Pakistan Scenario

Pakistan – 1NC

US CMR is key to preventing Pakistani collapse

Frederick **Barton and** Noam **Unger, ‘9**. Barton is Codirector, Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project and Senior Adviser, International Security Program at the CSIS. Unger is fellow and policy director of the Foreign Assistance Reform project at Brookings. “civil-military relations, fostering development, and expanding civilian capacity ,” <http://csis.org/publication/civil-military-relations-fostering-development-and-expanding-civilian-capacity>.

The security rationale for stability and development in poor and fragile states is based on the understanding that strengthening the economy of states and ensuring social equity are in the short and long term interests of the United States. **Stable states pose the United States with far fewer security challenges than their weak and fragile counterparts**. Indeed, stable states with healthy economies offer the United States opportunities for trade and represent potential partners in the fields of security and development. In contrast, weak and failing states pose serious challenges to the security of United States, including terrorism, drug production, money laundering and people smuggling. In addition, state weakness has frequently proven to have the propensity to spread to neighboring states, which in time can destabilize entire regions. While the group acknowledged that the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan are particular in scope and complexity (and may not be repeated in the near future by the U.S.), **participants broadly concurred that** the lessons of these challenges are that **the United States must improve and expand its stabilization** and development **capabilities. In particular, cases such as Pakistan** and Nigeria, **huge countries with strategic importance, make clear that a military response to many internal conflicts will be severely limited. As such,** increased emphasis on civilian capacity within the U.S. government and civil-military relations in general, will greatly improve the United States’ ability to respond to such crises in the future.

Pakistan – 1NC

**Pakistan collapse causes nuclear volleys at Kashmir – its as large a threat as Great Power Wars**

**Kagan and O’Hanlon, ‘7**. Frederick W. Kagan is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. Michael O’Hanlon is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. “Pakistan’s Collapse, Our Problem,” NYT 11-18, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/18/opinion/18kagan.html>.

**AS** the government of **Pakistan totters, we must face a fact: the United States simply could not stand by as a nuclear-armed Pakistan descended into the abyss**. Nor would it be strategically prudent to withdraw our forces from an improving situation in Iraq to cope with a deteriorating one in Pakistan. We need to think — now — about our feasible military options in Pakistan, should it really come to that. We do not intend to be fear mongers. Pakistan’s officer corps and ruling elites remain largely moderate and more interested in building a strong, modern state than in exporting terrorism or nuclear weapons to the highest bidder. But then again, Americans felt similarly about the shah’s regime in Iran until it was too late. Moreover, **Pakistan’s intelligence services contain enough** sympathizers and supporters of the Afghan Taliban**, and enough** nationalists bent on seizing the disputed province of Kashmir from India, **that there are** grounds for real worries**. The most likely possible dangers are** these: a **complete collapse of Pakistani government rule that allows an extreme Islamist movement to fill the vacuum**; a total loss of federal control over outlying provinces, which splinter along ethnic and tribal lines; **or a struggle within the Pakistani military in which** the minority sympathetic to **the Taliban and Al Qaeda try to establish Pakistan as a state sponsor of terrorism**. All possible military initiatives to avoid those possibilities are daunting. With 160 million people, Pakistan is more than five times the size of Iraq. It would take a long time to move large numbers of American forces halfway across the world. And **unless we had precise information about the location of all of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and materials, we could not rely on bombing or using Special Forces to destroy them. The task of stabilizing a collapsed Pakistan is beyond the means of the United States** and its allies. Rule-of-thumb estimates suggest that a force of more than a million troops would be required for a country of this size. Thus, if we have any hope of success, we would have to act before a complete government collapse, and we would need the cooperation of moderate Pakistani forces. One possible plan would be a Special Forces operation with the limited goal of preventing Pakistan’s nuclear materials and warheads from getting into the wrong hands. Given the degree to which Pakistani nationalists cherish these assets, it is unlikely the United States would get permission to destroy them. Somehow, American forces would have to team with Pakistanis to secure critical sites and possibly to move the material to a safer place. For the United States, the safest bet would be shipping the material to someplace like New Mexico; but even pro-American Pakistanis would be unlikely to cooperate. More likely, we would have to settle for establishing a remote redoubt within Pakistan, with the nuclear technology guarded by elite Pakistani forces backed up (and watched over) by crack international troops. It is realistic to think that such a mission might be undertaken within days of a decision to act. The price for rapid action and secrecy, however, would probably be a very small international coalition. A second, broader option would involve supporting the core of the Pakistani armed forces as they sought to hold the country together in the face of an ineffective government, seceding border regions and Al Qaeda and Taliban assassination attempts against the leadership. This would require a sizable combat force — not only from the United States, but ideally also other Western powers and moderate Muslim nations. Even if we were not so committed in Iraq and Afghanistan, Western powers would need months to get the troops there. Fortunately, given the longstanding effectiveness of Pakistan’s security forces, any process of state decline probably would be gradual, giving us the time to act. So, if we got a large number of troops into the country, what would they do? The most likely directive would be to help Pakistan’s military and security forces hold the country’s center — primarily the region around the capital, Islamabad, and the populous areas like Punjab Province to its south. We would also have to be wary of internecine warfare within the Pakistani security forces. Pro-American moderates could well win a fight against extremist sympathizers on their own. But they might need help if splinter forces or radical Islamists took control of parts of the country containing crucial nuclear materials. The task of retaking any such regions and reclaiming custody of any nuclear weapons would be a priority for our troops. If a holding operation in the nation’s center was successful, we would probably then seek to establish order in the parts of Pakistan where extremists operate. Beyond propping up the state, this would benefit American efforts in Afghanistan by depriving terrorists of the sanctuaries they have long enjoyed in Pakistan’s tribal and frontier regions. The great paradox of the post-cold war world is that we are both safer, day to day, and in greater peril than before. **There was a time when volatility in places like Pakistan was mostly a humanitarian worry;** today it is as much a threat to our basic security as Soviet tanks once were. **We must be militarily and diplomatically prepared to keep ourselves safe in such a world.** Pakistan may be the next big test.

Pakistan – 2NC ! Calc

**( \_\_ ) Complete human extinction**

**Chomsky, ‘9**. Noam, “Crisis and Hope: Theirs and Ours,” http://www.thefallingrain.com/Crisis%20and%20Hope%20-%20Noam%20Chomsky.pdf

It’s also not too encouraging that **Pakistan and India are now rapidly expanding their nuclear arsenals**. Pakistan’s nuclear arsenals were developed with Reagan’s crucial aid. And India’s nuclear weapons program got a major shot in the arm with the recent US-India nuclear agreement. It’s also a sharp blow to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. **Two countries have twice come close to nuclear war over Kashmir, and they’re** also engaged in a kind of a proxy war in Afghanistan. These developments pose a very serious threat to world peace, even to human survival. Well, a lot to say about this crisis, but no time here.

**( \_\_ ) It’s an expert-consensus top-3 potential cause of nuclear war**

**Moran, ‘9**. Michael, “Beyond "Af-Pak",” Global Post, 3-4, <http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/worldview/090304/beyond-af-pak?page=0,0>.

In the world viewed through America's lens, "Af-Pak," the catch-phrase of the moment in Washington foreign policy circles, makes a good deal of sense. With 17,000 more American troops en route to Afghanistan, and **with the Taliban operating largely beyond their reach in the Pakistani tribal lands, the need to deal with both problems in tandem has become conventional wisdom**. Yet focusing solely on what goes in Afghanistan and the largely ungoverned lands south of its border misses a larger, even more difficult reality. After seven years of virtual stalemate in Afghanistan, and with Pakistan looking shaky at best, other, larger powers in the region are placing their bets — and not necessarily on America and its NATO allies. Russia, Iran, China, and India all have vital interests at stake, and all have moved in different ways to hedge their bets. Nowhere is this more true than in the long-running territorial dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. According to new revelations from Steve Coll, an American journalist and author, **concerns about the direction of the India-Pakistan nuclear rivalry over Kashmir so unnerved both sides that these sworn enemies launched a secret peace process** that very nearly took the issue off the table in 2007. Coll, president of the New America Foundation, revealed in the New Yorker magazine last week that the two sides came so close to agreement that, in the words of one senior Indian official involved, "we'd come to semicolons." Without American mediation — indeed, one former American official told me the U.S. was aware of, but not involved in, the negotiations — these sworn enemies very nearly solved on the the world’s major conflicts. The effect such a peace would have on the region would be profound. Pakistan's unwillingness to accept India's hold on a large part of that northern region led successive governments to use Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency to train Islamic militants to infiltrate the Indian-rule portion of Kashmir. The ISI already had ties with the Afghan Taliban and other groups there dating to the anti-Soviet resistance. Tolerance of terrorism — as an end to a means winning back Kashmir and maintaining influence in Afghanistan — has poisoned the ISI's reputation and nearly led to war with India in the Kargil region in 1999. On most expert lists of top 5 potential causes of nuclear war, Kashmir is 1, 2, or 3.

**( \_\_ ) Global effects**

**Fai, ‘1** (Executive Director of the Kashmiri American Council, 7/8, The Washington Times, lexis)

The most dangerous place on the planet **is Kashmir,** a disputed territory convulsed and illegally occupied for more than 53 years and sandwiched between nuclear-capable India and Pakistan. **It has ignited two wars** between the estranged South Asian rivals in 1948 and 1965, **and a third could trigger** nuclear volleys **and a** nuclear winter threatening the entire globe. The United States would enjoy no sanctuary.

**( \_\_ ) Continental spread**

**Stratfor, 8-27**-09. “Iran: Unrest In Afghanistan Could Spread To Other Regions – FM,” http://www.stratfor.com/memberships/144696/sitrep/20090827\_iran\_unrest\_afghanistan\_could\_spread\_region\_fm

Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki said **the insurgency in Afghanistan could spread throughout the Middle East and Central Asia unless it is “completely eradicated**,” Press TV reported Aug. 27. Mottaki said **the insurgency in Pakistan** originated in Afghanistan **and likewise could “spread not only to the Arab countries in the Persian Gulf region but also to India and Central Asia.”** Also, foreign powers, specifically in Europe, are deliberately creating insecurity in the region, said Mottaki.

Pakistan – 2NC ! Calc

**Pakistani-India war causes extinction – ozone depletion, famine, disease outbreaks, food riots, escalatory war, and global cooling**

**Loretz 8** (John, Program Director of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, May 16, http://www.ippnw.org/ ResourceLibrary/ NPTPrepCom2008.pdf)JFS

**The studies looked at the consequences of a possible regional nuclear war in South Asia, using** numbers of weapons currently estimated to exist in the combined arsenals of **India and Pakistan.** This scenario is only examplary. In addition to the nine countries that already possess nuclear weapons, 32 own sufficient fissionable nuclear materials to construct them, **placing several other regions of the world at risk of nuclear war** on the scale described here should the non-proliferation regime unravel.Population and economic activity in **India and Pakistan are congregated in megacities, which** probably **would be targeted in a nuclear conflict.** An examination of **the** likely **outcome of** a **nuclear exchange** in South Asia **involving** the100 15-kt weaponsavailable inthe combined **Indian and Pakistani arsenals** shows that such an exchange **could have devastating immediate effects, killing 20 million people**, a number equal to half of all those killed worldwide during the six years of World War II. In addition, **there would be tremendous economic consequences with** the **megacities** exposed to atmospheric fallout likely **abandoned indefinitely**. As horrible as **these regional effects would** be, however, they might well **be dwarfed by** the **global climate consequences** of this conflict. **Smoke** and soot **from** urban firestorms caused bythe **multiple nuclear explosions** — 1-5 million metric tons — **would rise into the** upper troposphere and, due to atmospheric heating, would subsequently be boosted deep into the **stratosphere**. **The resulting** soot **cloud would block the sun** leading to significant cooling and reductions in precipitation lasting **for over a decade.** Within 10 days following the explosions, there would be a drop in average surface temperature of 1.25° C. Over the following year, a 10% decline in average global rainfall and a large reduction in the Asian summer monsoon is predicted. Even 10 years out, there would be a persistent 0.5° C average surface cooling. **In a matter of days, temperatures around the Earth would become colder** **than** those experienced during **the** pre-industrial Little **Ice Age** (which occurred from approximately 1400 to 1850). To make matters even worse, such amounts of **smoke** injected **in**to **the stratosphere would cause a huge reduction in the** Earth’s protective **ozone**. **A study** published in April by the National Academy of Sciences, using a similar nuclear war scenario involving 100 Hiroshima-size bombs, **shows ozone losses in excess of 20%** **globally**, 25–45% at mid latitudes, and 50–70% at northern high latitudes **persisting for five years**, with substantial losses continuing for five additional years. The resulting increases in **UV radiation would have serious consequences for human health.** The sudden **climate changes** predicted by these studies **would** have a significant **impact** on **agricultural production**. **The growing season would be shortened** by 10 to 20 days in many of the most important grain producing areas in the world **which might completely eliminate crops** that have insufficient time to reach maturity. **Large quantities of food might** also **need to be destroyed** and significant areas of crop land might need to be taken out of production **because of radioactive contamination**. **There are currently** more than **800 million people** in the world **who are** chronically **malnourished** and several hundred million more live in countries which are dependent on imported grain. **Even a** **modest**, sudden **decline in agricultural production could trigger** significant **increases in the prices for** basic **foods** and hoarding on a global scale, both of **which would make food inaccessible to poor people** in much of the world. While it is not possible to estimate the precise extent of the global famine that would follow a regional nuclear war, **it seems reasonable to fear** **a** total **global death toll** in the range **of one billion from starvation alone**. **Famine** on this scale **would** also **lead to major epidemics** of infectious diseases, **and** would **create** immense **potential for war** and civil conflict. ... In the event of a regional nuclear war, the grain exporting states would be faced with major crop losses and the prospect of bad harvests for the next several years. It is probable that they would refuse to export whatever grain surplus they might have, retaining it instead as a domestic reserve. It is, of course, impossible to estimate with accuracy the full extent of the global famine that would follow a regional nuclear war. But it seems reasonable to conclude that **few of the 800 million people who are already malnourished would survive** if their already substandard intake decreased by even 10% for a whole year. **If the crop failures** and resulting food shortages **persisted** for several years **their fate would be sealed.** Two other issues need to be considered as well. First, **the vast megacities of the developing world,** crowded, and often **lacking** adequate **sanitation** in the best of times, **would** almost **certainly see major outbreaks of** infectious **diseases**; and illnesses such as plague, which have not been prevalent in recent years, might again become major health threats**.** Second, **an immense potential for war** and civil conflict **would be created by famine** on this scale. Within nations where famine is widespread **there** **would** almost certainly **be food riots, and competition for** limited food **resources** might well exacerbateethnic and regional animosities. Among nations, armed conflict seems highly likely as states dependent on imports adopt whatever means are at their disposal in an attempt to maintain access to food supplies.

UQ/Brink – Pakistan Could Collapse

**It’s the brink for Pakistani collapse – if it happens, Al Qaeda gets nukes**

**Ansari 9** (Khalid, Sydney Mid-day Newpaper, 4/14, http://www.mid-day.com/opinion/2009/apr/140409-khalidoscope-Pakistan-Afganistan-Taliban-terrorist.htm)JFS

An influential consultant to the US administ- ration has warned **Pakistan could collapse within months.** The prediction from Dr David Kilcullen, a former Australian Army officer and specialist adviser to the Bush administration, said yesterday, "We have to face the fact that **if Pakistan collapses it will dwarf anything we have seen so far in** whatever we are calling **the war on terror** now. "**You just can't** say you're **not** going to **worry about al-Qaeda taking control of Pakistan and its nukes.**" He warned, "**The safety of** people around **the world is at stake".** Kilcullen said **time was running out** for international efforts **to pull** both **Pakistan** and Afghanistan "**back from the brink"."Pakistan has** 173 million people and **100 nuclear weapons**, an army, which is bigger than the American army, **and the headquarters of al-Qaeda sitting in two-thirds of the country, which the government does not control,**" the counter-insurgency expert told a Sydney newspaper yesterday.

**Pakistan’s on the brink of collapse – impact is the global economy**

**Nathani 6/26** (Vijay, political analyst, http://vijay-nathani.blogspot.com/2010/06/war.html)JFS

**Pakistan is on the brink of collapse.** It survives on the grants given to it by USA. USA has brought about this destruction in Pakistan with its policies. **It is possible that some group will retaliate against USA. If there is another terrorist strike** in USA, **then the** USA **government** **will try to use it to its economic advantage. Blaming the terrorists, USA will devalue the dollar and impose** financial restrictions / **taxes** on its people. **This will cause a collapse of stock** prices **all over the world.** So **stocks have become risky**. Same for mutual funds. Same for any instrument that locks your money for long term e.g. PPF, government bonds, LIC investments, etc.

UQ/Brink – Pakistan Could Collapse

**Pakistan is about to collapse – debt, bankruptcy, war on terror, suicide bombers, oil prices, no peace deal with India, border disputes, expensive social programs**

**The Coming Depression 5/3** (a news source about the stability of the international economy, http://www.thecomingdepression.net/countries/eurasia/pakistan-on-verge-of-bankruptcy/)JFS

“The ratings agency Standard and Poor’s has given Pakistan’s sovereign debt a grade of CCC +, which stands only a few notches above the default level. The agency gave warning that **Pakistan may be unable to cover** about **$3 billion in** upcoming **debt payments**.”

**This is not the first time**, and indeed probably not the last, that **Pakistan has**/will face **financial troubles and potential bankruptcy.** In the fall of 2008, Pakistan sought help from the International Monetary Fund to avoid defaulting on billions of dollars in debt. In a statement, the IMF said **Pakistan had requested help “to meet** the balance of **payments** difficulties the country is experiencing.”

**One of the major reasons for Pakistan’s problems is the ‘war on terror’ which caused a significant outflow of capital and investment (due to political instability).** The country was starting to improve economically before this. Indeed, **you don’t mobilize 160,000 troops to border regions, have suicide bombers attack your infrastructure, and not think it would have an effect on your economy. The bulk of Pakistan’s economic imbalance** (aside from corrupt leaders) **came because oil** essentially **spiked** from $40 to $100 plus per barrel. **The country is an oil importer** and was subsidizing oil and food to prevent people from getting impacted. It couldn’t sustain this.

**Pakistan is** mostly **in this mess because of** the following: 1.) **an inability to sign a** comprehensive **peace deal with India, 2.) an inability to agree with the US** and its allies **on** dealing with **its northern border, 3.) subsidizing fuel earlier this year,** and **4.) engaging is many social programs it could not afford** to begin with. The first two lead to enormous military costs. The third was to make the government popular by keeping fuel costs down. The fourth was to look good and help people. Yet if you cannot afford them then the answer is don’t do them.

Collapse coming now – economy and AfPak war

**Symonds 5/12**(Peter, World Socialist Web Site, International Committee of the Fourth International http://www.wsws.org/articles/2010/may2010/pers-m12.shtml)JFS

According to the Washington Post, those Obama officials that oppose a more aggressive military policy insist that **the Pakistan government has no option but to do Washington’s bidding**. “**Pakistan’s economy is on the verge of collapse, with g**ross **d**omestic **p**roduct **falling** from more than 8 percent growth in 2005 **to under 3 percent** last year. More than $3.5 billion in US economic and military assistance is in the pipeline, and a nearly $8 billion International Monetary Fund agreement and a $3.5 billion World Bank financing package are pending.” Whether directly through an increased US military presence or indirectly by compelling the Pakistani military to go on the offensive in North Waziristan and other areas, **the Obama administration is drawing Pakistan into** the broader American **quagmire** in the region. It is no accident that increased pressure on Islamabad comes as the US military is preparing to launch a major offensive to stamp its control over the southeastern Afghan city of Kandahar. The Times Square incident is simply a convenient pretext to demand parallel action on the Pakistani side of the border. **Under the banner of the “war on terrorism,” President Obama has escalated his** so-called **AfPak war**, **which**, along with the occupation of Iraq, **is aimed at securing American** economic and strategic **dominance in** the key energy-rich regions of **Central Asia and the Middle East.** In pursuing these reckless and predatory wars over the past eight years, **the US has steadily undermined the economic and political stability of Pakistan and encroached on its national sovereignty, and exacerbated wider regional tensions, particularly with India.**

UQ/Brink – Pakistan Could Collapse

**Pakistani collapse coming now – overpopulation, Taliban, corruption, debt, Iran, India, Kashmir, terrorism**

**Willis 10** (Ian, writing on predicting problems in the world, http://www.hitler2012.com/two-important-predictions-for-2010/)JFS

**The** second **major threat to** relative **world stability is** considerably **more terrifying.  Pakistan has been teetering on the verge of collapse.  Pakistan has a massive population**, around 170million, most of whom are muslim.  **The Taliban is sweeping the countryside** and the government has repeatedly proved ineffectual at stopping them.  Political **corruption and social upheaval is epidemic** **and the government has** serious **debt** problems.  As if this weren’t bad enough, **Pakistan is a confirmed nuclear power**.  **They border Iran, have been in a 60 year cold war with India**, sometimes all out hot war **and there are a dozen other things that can go very**, very **wrong here**.  Somehow it just hasn’t made it to the presses.  I don’t understand why they haven’t reported these developments in the proper light, but 2010 is probably the year Pakistan descends into massive chaos.  This, more than anything else, I believe is the reason for Obama’s Afghanistan Surge.  It is a prepositioning of troops to deal with the fall-out.  Any number of things could happen here.  **India could make their move against** heavily disputed **Kashmir**, hell even China might do this given our government’s present willingness to give the Chinese whatever the hell they want.  Or **the situation could foster** an Islamic Extremist **Terrorism** / Freedom Fighter movement **that threatens key pipelines.** **These guys could even get their hands on the nukes.** If that were to happen, or if America was forced by this destablization to move more troops in at great cost of dollars and lives we’re likely to see a massive anti-islamic sentiment forming at least in America, and in the event of a nuclear detonation, worldwide.  **It’s a scary scenario** no matter how you guess it might play out.  The first world countries don’t have the financial resources any more to keep a country this large and this unstable from collapse.  **We’re going to have to brace ourselves for this in 2010**.  If anything significant at all happens allong these lines, the 2011-2012 financial collapse will be decidedly severe and the social implications of a worldwide financial collapse being exacerbated by Islamic extremism will breed a very dangerous breed of religious racism.

CMR = K2 Pakistan

CMR is key to terror fight in Pakistan – the risk is quickly escalating

**Tellis, ‘9**  (a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. From 2001 to 2003 he served as Senior Adviser at the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi, Foreign Affairs, 3-31, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/discussions/roundtables/whats-the-problem-with-pakistan.>)JFS

As far as **the West** is concerned, its **principal objective is** simply **getting the Pakistanis to** make good on their commitment to **confront terrorism** comprehensively. **It is easy to understand why Pakistan won't.** It is harder to understand why Pakistan, even now, cannot appreciate the risks to itself in its chosen course. **Three problems account for this** in my opinion: **first, simple inertia** (what has been done for fifty years becomes the default course of action); **second, a tendency to maximize short-term gains at the expense of long-term interests; and third, the vexed civil-military relationship in Islamabad. Unfortunately for Pakistan, the West is losing patience with its shortcomings** -- and while Pakistan may be slowly changing, **the threats emerging from that country** toward the rest of the world **are increasing fast**.

**It’s the brink for Pakistani CMR – that’s key to stability and conflict resolution**

**Rizvi 98** (Hasan Askari, *Survival* 40(2), Southern Asian Institute, School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University)JFS

**Governance in Pakistan is a delicate balancing act between the military** chiefs **and the** elected **civilian government. It is a power-sharing arrangement** **whereby** **the military** has important influence over foreign, security and key domestic issues, and **mediates confrontations** among feuding political leaders, parties or state institutions- **if** such **confrontations are deemed threatening to political order** **and stability.** **Although the civilian government enjoys** **considerable** **autonomy** for political and economic management and exercise of state authority, **it is expected** always **to consider the military's sensibilities.** **The military has** repeatedly **demonstrated** **that** **it** **can** and will **influence** the nature and direction of **political** **change** **without** necessarily **assuming** **power**.

Collapse 🡪 Nuclear War

**Pakistan collapse causes escalating global meltdown and Indo-Pak nuclear war**

Center for a New American Security **(CNAS), ‘9**. “Tell Me Why We’re There? Enduring Interests in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” January, [http://se1.isn.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/95723/ipublicationdocument\_singledocument/F18F1F7C-9FFF-4172-B229-3C4C761C45A6/en/2009-01\_Enduring+Interests+in+Afghanistan+and+Pakistan.pdf](http://se1.isn.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/95723/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/F18F1F7C-9FFF-4172-B229-3C4C761C45A6/en/2009-01_Enduring%2BInterests%2Bin%2BAfghanistan%2Band%2BPakistan.pdf).

Squeezed by American military operations, many in this shadowy alliance have shifted to Pakistan’s cities and frontier areas, beyond easy reach of the coalition. American efforts now focus on Pakistan as a launching pad for militants fighting in Afghanistan. But the problem runs both ways: **A failed Afghanistan would become a base from which Taliban and Al Qaeda militants could work to further destabilize Pakistan, and the ultimate prize in that contest would be not another ridge or valley, but** Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. This scenario could spark a cascading regional meltdown, even spiraling into a nuclear confrontation between Pakistan and India. Because the threats of terrorist sanctuary and regional instability emanate from territory shared by Pakistan and Afghanistan, Pakistan must also be helped to accomplish the two no’s within its own borders. The two countries are inextricably linked, and America’s safety depends on their future.

Impact Module – Sunni-Shia

**Afghanistan collapses causes Sunni-Shia war**

**Guardian, ‘7**. “Failure in Afghanistan risks rise in terror, say generals,” July 15, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2007/jul/15/world.afghanistan

'The situation in Afghanistan is much worse than many people recognise,' Inge told peers. 'We need to face up to that issue, the consequence of strategic failure in Afghanistan and what that would mean for Nato... We need to recognise that the situation - in my view, and I have recently been in Afghanistan - is much, much more serious than people want to recognise.' Inge's remarks reflect the fears of serving generals that the government is so overwhelmed by Iraq that it is in danger of losing sight of the threat of failure in Afghanistan. One source, who is familiar with the fears of the senior officers, told The Observer: 'If you talk privately to the generals they are very very worried. You heard it in Inge's speech. Inge said we are failing and remember Inge speaks for the generals.' Inge made a point in the Lords of endorsing a speech by Lord **Ashdown, the former Liberal Democrat leader**, who **painted a bleak picture** during the debate. Ashdown told The Observer that Afghanistan presented a graver threat than Iraq. **'The consequences of failure in Afghanistan are far greater than in Iraq**,' he said. **'If we fail in Afghanistan** then Pakistan goes down. The security problems for Britain would be massively multiplied. I think **you could not then stop a widening regional war that would start off in warlordism but it would become essentially a war in the end between Sunni and Shia right across the Middle East.'**

**Sunni-Shia war escalates to doomsday proportions**

**CNN, ‘7**. January 24, 2007 - 14:01 ET ("Opposing the 'Surge'; Energy Challenge; Second Air Strike Against Suspected al Qaeda Targets in Somalia")

RAMAN: **For years**, Sunnis, given their reach, have dominated Middle Eastern affairs. **Shia, based mainly in Iran, claimed little clout. But when Saddam Hussein's regime fell** amid the instability that followed, **an opportunity emerged** for Iran to change the landscape. And that it did, **ramping up influence in Baghdad through Shia militias**, in Lebanon through **Shia Hezbollah, and in the Palestinian areas through Hamas**. All while pursuing a nuclear program in open defiance of the world. It's a strategy that, in short, has worked. In the course of a year, **Iran has become the dominant player** in the Middle East, **forcing Sunni states**, especially U.S. allies like Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, **to confront a whole new level of regional uncertainty,** one that could drag them all into the fight. KASSEM: **It could end up as like the big confrontation, the big Sunni- Shia confrontation**. RAMAN: **The signs are there.** One example, responding to Iran's several Sunni states are now planning nuclear programs of their own. (on camera): It is a dauntsing question. What comes next for the Middle East? On the Arab street there are as many opinions as there are people willing to voice them. (voice over): For decades, those that sat here witnessed change of all kinds. But those that sit today seem more concerned than ever before. "I am afraid," says Mohammed, "**the fight between Shia and Sunnis in Iraq will spread**, perhaps to Lebanon and Syria. And it could then have a bad effect on all Arab countries." UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Iran, in case of having (INAUDIBLE) will try to take control. RAMAN: It is a doomsday scenario, a centuries-old Shia-Sunni divide spreading to all Arab streets. But unthinkable as it may seem, people here are bracing for anything.

\_\_\_\*\*CMR Impacts

**Impact Magnifier**

**Unbalanced CMR threatens national survival – first question in determining instability**

**Owens 10** (Mackubin T, Professor of Strategy and Force Planning at the Naval War College in Newport, 6/13, http://www.eurasiareview.com/201006133105/civil-military-relations-and-the-us-strategy-deficit.html)

**The primary focus of** those who have examined **civil-military relations** since the 1990s **has been on the issue of civilian control of the military.** Of course, civilian control is important, especially in the case of a liberal society such as the United States. But **civilian control is only one part of the civil-military equation. The effectiveness of the military is equally important because failure on the battlefield threatens the very existence of the polity the military is sworn to defend. The issue of civilian control means very little if the military instrument is unable to ensure the survival of the state**.

**Iraq Module**

**A. CMR is critical to bring stability in Iraq**

Cronin 08 [Patrick, Director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, Strategic Forum, October, 2008, <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Strforum/SF234/SF234.pdf>]JFS

Success in the highly political and ambiguous conflicts likely to dominate the global security environment in the coming decades will require a framework that balances the relationships between civilian and military leaders and makes the most effective use of their different strengths. These challenges are expected to require better integrated, whole-of-government approaches, the cooperation of host governments and allies, and strategic patience.

Irregular warfare introduces new complications to what Eliot Cohen has called an “unequal dialogue” between civilian and military leaders in which civilian leaders hold the true power but must modulate their intervention into “military” affairs as a matter of prudence rather than principle. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated that irregular warfare - which is profoundly political, intensely local, and protracted—breaks from the traditional understanding of how military and civilian leaders should contribute to the overall effort.

One of the key challenges rising from irregular warfare is how to measure progress. While there is disagreement about the feasibility or utility of developing metrics, the political pressure for marking progress is unrelenting. Most data collection efforts focus on the number of different types of kinetic events, major political milestones such as elections, and resource inputs such as personnel, money, and materiel. None of these data points serves easily in discerning what is most needed - namely, outputs or results.

A second major challenge centers on choosing leaders for irregular warfare and stability and reconstruction operations. How to produce civilian leaders capable of asking the right and most difficult questions is not easily addressed. Meanwhile, there has been a general erosion of the traditional Soldier’s Code whereby a military member can express dissent, based on legitimate facts, in private to one’s superiors up to the point that a decision has been made. Many see the need to shore up this longstanding tradition among both the leadership and the ranks.

A third significant challenge is how to forge integrated strategies and approaches. Professional relationships, not organizational fixes, are vital to succeeding in irregular war. In this sense, the push for new doctrine for the military and civilian leadership is a step in the right direction to clarifying the conflated lanes of authority.

B. <Iraqi Stability Impact>

Disaster Relief Module

**CMR key to natural disaster responses**

**Marret and Brimmer 8** (Jean-Luc and Esther, writers for the Global Public Policy Institute, http://www.disastergovernance.net/fileadmin/gppi/JLM\_Esther\_Brimmer\_RTB\_Concept\_Paper\_draft\_JeanLuc\_web.pdf)

Increasingly, **military**, humanitarian **and** other **civilian actors** **find themselves working together to respond to disasters** and complex emergencies. **These situations pose challenges** for all parties concerned. Traditional humanitarian actors are asked to work in physically challenging environments or areas plagued by violence. In these settings, the humanitarian relief workers may need the assistance of military actors for transportation or security. Yet for over a century**, humanitarian actors have guarded their neutrality strongly eschewing government and military contacts that might infringe upon their special status**. For example, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement proclaim its principles of “humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity, and universality.”1 Often local people accept humanitarian agencies because they are seen as providing impartial help to afflicted civilians. Yet, **many humanitarians work to relieve suffering amid complex emergencies and unconventional crises in which they need support from the military to do their job**. At what point in the spectrum of support does assistance become interference? Is transport into mountainous terrain acceptable? What about providing armed guards (“Armed humanitarianism”)? On that point, though there are limited examples of humanitarian actors using armed guards or private security companies for armed protection, Iraq has become a watershed moment for the humanitarian community.2 Does having military security undermine the humanitarian mission? This problem may produce ambiguities. The UN Civil-military Coordination Officer Field Handbook prescribes, as general rule, that humanitarian convoys will not use armed or military escorts. But exceptions to the general rule can be considered, “as a last resort”, and only when requirements of sovereignty, need, safety and sustainability have been met.3 **Disaster relief also poses challenges for militaries. For some military leaders providing relief is a distraction from their primary mission to defend their country.** For other military leaders providing humanitarian support is an appropriate duty that advances overall policy goals. **Increasingly many military personnel understand that they will be deployed in complex crises**, in **which** minimizing humanitarian casualties is **politically important**.

**Natural disasters threaten human extinction faster than any war sceanrio**

**Sid-Ahmed 5** (Mohamed. “The post-earthquake world.” Al-Ahram Weekly Online. Jan 6-12, 2005. http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2005/724/op3.htm)

The human species has never been exposed to a natural upheaval of this magnitude within living memory. What happened in South Asia is the ecological equivalent of 9/11. Ecological problems like global warming and **climatic** **disturbances in general threaten to make our natural habitat unfit for human life**. The **extinction** of the species **has become a very real possibility**, whether by our own hand or **as a result of natural disasters** of a much greater magnitude than the Indian Ocean earthquake and the killer waves it spawned. Human civilisation has developed in the hope that Man will be able to reach welfare and prosperity on earth for everybody. But now things seem to be moving in the opposite direction, exposing planet Earth to the end of its role as a nurturing place for human life. Today, **human conflicts** have become less of a threat than the confrontation between Man and Nature. At least they **are less likely to bring about the end of the human species**. The reactions of Nature as a result of its exposure to the onslaughts of human societies have become more important in determining the fate of the human species than any harm it can inflict on itself. Until recently, the threat Nature represented was perceived as likely to arise only in the long run, related for instance to how global warming would affect life on our planet. Such a threat could take decades, even centuries, to reach a critical level. This perception has changed following the devastating earthquake and tsunamis that hit the coastal regions of South Asia and, less violently, of East Africa, on 26 December. This cataclysmic event has underscored the vulnerability of our world before the wrath of Nature and shaken the sanguine belief that the end of the world is a long way away. **Gone are the days when we could comfort ourselves with the notion that the extinction of the human race will not occur before a long-term future** that will only materialise after millions of years and not affect us directly in any way. **We are now forced to live with the possibility of an imminent demise of humankind.**

**Disaster Relief – XT**

**Good CMR key to disaster preparedness and response**

**Stavridis 9** (James, US-Adriatic Charter (A5) Chief of Defense Conference, 9/25, http://www.eucom.mil/english/news/speeches.asp)

**Because responders need to react with speed and agility—discovery learning is poor practice in emergency responses**. **It is simply too late to establish critical linkages and begin planning after the disaster strikes.** Great ideas birthed too late are of little value. Therefore, we need to seize the great ideas of today, expand linkages, do the weighty thinking, plan, and exercise together today, so we can better work together for tomorrow. Just last week, we concluded a multi-national communications exercise, Combined Endeavor, and a multi-national medical exercise. MEDCEUR. I was encouraged to see all Adriatic Charter nations actively involved in planning and executing these exercises. It is also noteworthy that Combined Endeavor was the first ever major exercise led by a Partnership for Peace nation--and the newest member of this Charter--Bosnia and Herzegovina. MEDCEUR focused on increasing host-nation civilian and military engagement and capacity, or what I like to call "International Military and Interagency Partnering." Exercise participants, including members from the local Red Cross, Civil Protection agencies, municipalities and development organizations, provided medical and emergency training as well as interoperability testing. Much like this conference**, the exercises improved interaction between military, civil, international and local agencies…all of whom have a role in disaster preparedness and response.**

Nigeria Modeling Scenario (1/2)

**A. United States CMR is modeled by Nigeria**

Africa News 2 (3/27, Available on Lexis)JFS

United States Ambassador to Nigeria, Mr. Howard Jeter, yesterday in Abuja called on the defence establishment in the country to commence dialogue on the building of a healthy civil-military relationship.

Speaking in Abuja at the on-going seminar on the "Role of the military in a democracy", Jeter said that the United States had found it extremely useful to have civilians work for the military services.

He pointed out that in the effort to build a strong and healthy civil-military realtionship, "we have serving military officers working in various capacities in civil institutions like the legislature and the executive". According to him such interface of civil-military relationship enables the system to benefit from the expertise and operational understanding of both sides in policy formulation.

"Through these exchanges, the civilian agencies are better informed, the military and the department of defence are better informed and decision making is easier," he said.

B. That’s key to Nigerian democracy

BBC 2 (British Broadcasting Corporation, 8/5, Lexis)JFS

"It must be borne in mind that the Western Regional election violence (Operation wetie) of 1965-66, played a key role in the military coup of January 1999," he noted.

He said that the rule of law must be strictly adhered to, while the electorate on their part, must tolerate the political, ethnic, and religion differences of others, since democracy legitimizes diversity and protects and promotes alternative options, especially the views of the minority. While advising that the fundamental human rights of citizens should be respected, Ogomudia said that the interest of the military in the area of welfare, training, procurement and maintenance of equipment, release and payment of salaries, and provision of barracks accommodation, amongst other things, should be taken care of.

There is also the need for the holding and organization of regular dialogue between the political class and military leaders in order to promote transparency and ensure mutual confidence, he stressed.

Ogomudia said: "It is in the interest of the nation, for the growth and consolidation of democratic culture and ethos that civil-military relations should be developed in all fronts and ensured to be cordial at all times.

C. Nigerian democracy prevents African wars

BBC 2k, (25 May, 2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/763818.stm)JFS

While still celebrating the new freedoms associated with the restoration of democracy, Nigerians have been forced to think long and hard about the country's future. In most parts of the country there is a now a clamour for a greater devolution of power to the regions, and to the many ethnic groups which were carelessly thrown together by the British colonialists to form modern-day Nigeria.

Since May 1999, several ethnic and pressure groups have emerged or gained prominence in Nigeria. They include Odua Peoples Congress (fighting for the south-western Oduduwa States), Arewa Peoples Congress (protecting the interest of ethnic northern Nigeria) and Middle Belt Forum (canvasing for their geographical identity which is distinct from northern Nigeria).

Among others are Egbesu Boys and Ijaw Youth Council (seeking increased share in Nigeria's wealth for the impoverished oil-rich Niger Delta region), Movement for the Actualisation of Sovereign States of Biafra (fighting for the separatist eastern Biafra State which had resulted in the 1967-70 Nigerian civil war) and Bakassi Boys (fighting against social ills in Nigeria).

"It's as if there is no cartilage between the bones; for as long as we are thrown together in this way the painful friction is bound to continue" argues Ayo Obe, a leading Lagos human rights activist.

Nigeria Modeling Scenario (2/2)

D. Large-scale African conflict will draw in outside powers and escalate to nuclear war

Deutsch 02 (Founder of Rabid Tiger Project, Political Risk Consulting and Research Firm focusing on Russia and Eastern Europe, Jeffrey, *Rabid Tiger Newsletter*, Nov 18, http://www.rabidtigers.com/rtn/newsletterv2n9.html)JFS

The Rabid Tiger Project believes that a nuclear war is most likely to start in Africa. Civil wars in the Congo (the country formerly known as Zaire), Rwanda, Somalia and Sierra Leone, and domestic instability in Zimbabwe, Sudan and other countries, as well as occasional brushfire and other wars (thanks in part to "national" borders that cut across tribal ones) turn into a really nasty stew. We've got all too many rabid tigers and potential rabid tigers, who are willing to push the button rather than risk

being seen as wishy-washy in the face of a mortal threat and overthrown. Geopolitically speaking, Africa is open range. Very few countries in Africa are beholden to any particular power. South Africa is a major exception in this respect - not to mention in that she also probably already has the Bomb. Thus, outside powers can more easily find client states there than, say, in Europe where the political lines have long since been drawn, or Asia where many of the countries (China, India, Japan) are powers unto themselves and don't need any "help,"

thank you. Thus, an African war can attract outside involvement very quickly. Of course, a proxy war alone may not induce the Great Powers to fight each other. But an African nuclear strike can ignite a much broader conflagration, if the other powers are interested in a fight. Certainly, such a strike would in the first place have been facilitated by outside help - financial, scientific, engineering, etc. Africa is an ocean of troubled waters, and some people love to go fishing.

Gates Military Transformation Scenario (1/2)

A. CMR is critical for Gates to push his agenda, specifically his military transformation plan

Desch 7 (Michael, May 29, Foreign Affairs, holds the Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security Decision-Making at Texas A&M's George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/05/bush\_and\_the\_generals.html)JFS

The new secretary of defense therefore has a lot on his plate. In the short term, Gates must play out the endgame of a war in Iraq that he admits the United States is "not winning" but that he and the president do not want to "lose" either. He must continue the efforts to transform the U.S. military while repairing a ground force that has been nearly "broken" by almost four years of continuous combat in Afghanistan and Iraq. But Gates can hope to succeed at those tasks only if he manages to rebuild a cooperative relationship between civilian leaders and the U.S. military. He must both rethink how civilian officials oversee the military and clarify the boundaries of legitimate military dissent from civilian authority.

The key is that Gates needs to recognize that Rumsfeld's meddling approach contributed in significant measure to the problems in Iraq and elsewhere. The best solution is to return to an old division of labor: civilians give due deference to military professional advice in the tactical and operational realms in return for complete military subordination in the grand strategic and political realms. The success of Gates' tenure in the Pentagon will hinge on his reestablishing that proper civil-military balance.

**B. Gates’ military transformation plan is key to fighting irregular warfare**

Klare 9 (Michael, The Nation, http://www.thenation.com/article/gates-revolution)JFS

The preliminary Defense Department budget announced by Defense Secretary Robert Gates on April 6 represents the most dramatic shift in US military thinking since the end of the Vietnam War. Gates merely hinted at the magnitude of the proposed changes, claiming only that he seeks to "rebalance" the department's priorities between conventional and irregular warfare. But the message is clear: from now on, counterinsurgency and low-intensity conflict will be the military's principal combat missions, while other tasks, such as preparing for an all-out war with a well-equipped adversary, will take a decidedly secondary role.

…

These programs are far less costly than the super-sophisticated weapons Gates seeks to eliminate but far more useful, he argues, in the irregular, small-scale operations that US troops are conducting in Iraq and Afghanistan and are likely to encounter in future conflicts. "We must rebalance this department's programs in order to institutionalize and enhance our capabilities to fight the wars we are in today and the scenarios we are most likely to face in the years ahead," he declared.

…

After the tragedy of Vietnam, officers purged military thinking of its counterinsurgency leanings and refocused on conventional war strategy--a posture seen most conspicuously in the 1991 Gulf War and in the 2003 invasion of Iraq. More recently, under the prodding of Gen. David Petraeus, counterinsurgency has made a comeback. Gates aims to institutionalize that shift and make it, once again, the centerpiece of US strategy. "I want to get that capability"--to fight irregular conflicts--"into the base budgets so that it will continue and we don't forget, as we did after Vietnam, how to do what we're doing right now so successfully in both Iraq and Afghanistan," he said.

Gates Military Transformation Scenario (2/2)

C. Irregular warfare causes nuclear and chemical annihilation

Bennett 8 (John, December 4th, DefenseNews, http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3850158)JFS

The study predicts future U.S. forces' missions will range "from regular and irregular wars in remote lands, to relief and reconstruction in crisis zones, to sustained engagement in the global commons."

Some of these missions will be spawned by "rational political calculation," others by "uncontrolled passion."

And future foes will attack U.S. forces in a number of ways.

"Our enemy's capabilities will range from explosive vests worn by suicide bombers to long-range precision-guided cyber, space, and missile attacks," the study said. "The threat of mass destruction - from nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons - will likely expand from stable nation-states to less stable states and even non-state networks."

The document also echoes Adm. Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other U.S. military leaders who say America is likely in "an era of persistent conflict."

During the next 25 years, it says, "There will continue to be those who will hijack and exploit Islam and other beliefs for their own extremist ends. There will continue to be opponents who will try to disrupt the political stability and deny the free access to the global commons that is crucial to the world's economy."

The study gives substantial ink to what could happen in places of strategic import to Washington, like Russia, China, Africa, Europe, Asia and the Indian Ocean region.

But it calls the Middle East and Central Asia "the center of instability" where U.S. troops will be engaged for some time against radical Islamic groups.

The study does not rule out a fight against a peer nation's military, but stresses preparation for irregular foes like those that complicated the Iraq war for years.

Its release comes three days after Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England signed a new Pentagon directive that elevates irregular warfare to equal footing - for budgeting and planning - as traditional warfare. The directive defines irregular warfare as encompassing counterterrorism operations, guerrilla warfare, foreign internal defense, counterinsurgency and stability operations.

Leaders must avoid "the failure to recognize and fully confront the irregular fight that we are in. The requirement to prepare to meet a wide range of threats is going to prove particularly difficult for American forces in the period between now and the 2030s," the study said.

Iran Strikes Scenario (1/2)

A. Collapse of CMR means neocons will pressure obama to strike iran

Dreyfuss 8 (Robert, Contributing editor at the Nation magazine <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bob-dreyfuss/still-preparing-to-attack_b_147876.html>)JFS

A familiar coalition of hawks, hardliners, and neoconservatives expects Barack Obama's proposed talks with Iran to fail -- and they're already proposing an escalating set of measures instead. Some are meant to occur alongside any future talks. These include steps to enhance coordination with Israel, tougher sanctions against Iran, and a region-wide military buildup of U.S. strike forces, including the prepositioning of military supplies within striking distance of that country.   Once the future negotiations break down, as they are convinced will happen, they propose that Washington quickly escalate to war-like measures, including a U.S. Navy-enforced embargo on Iranian fuel imports and a blockade of that country's oil exports. Finally, of course, comes the strategic military attack against the Islamic Republic of Iran that so many of them have wanted for so long. It’s tempting to dismiss the hawks now as twice-removed from power: first, figures like John Bolton, Paul Wolfowitz, and Douglas Feith were purged from top posts in the Bush administration after 2004; then the election of Barack Obama and the announcement Monday of his centrist, realist-minded team of establishment foreign policy gurus seemed to nail the doors to power shut for the neocons, who have bitterly criticized the president-elect's plans to talk with Iran, withdraw U.S. forces from Iraq, and abandon the reckless Global War on Terrorism rhetoric of the Bush era. When it comes to Iran, however, it's far too early to dismiss the hawks. To be sure, they are now plying their trade from outside the corridors of power, but they have more friends inside the Obama camp than most people realize. Several top advisers to Obama -- including Tony Lake, UN Ambassador-designate Susan Rice, Tom Daschle, and Dennis Ross, along with leading Democratic hawks like Richard Holbrooke, close to Vice-President-elect Joe Biden or Secretary of State-designate Hillary Clinton -- have made common cause with war-minded think-tank hawks at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), and other hardline institutes.

The [report](http://www.bipartisanpolicy.org/ht/a/GetDocumentAction/i/8448) of the Coats-Robb task force -- "Meeting the Challenge: U.S. Policy Toward Iranian Nuclear Development" -- went far beyond the WINEP task force report that Lake and Rice signed off on. It concluded that any negotiations with Iran were unlikely to succeed and should, in any case, be short-lived. As the report put the matter, "It must be clear that any U.S.-Iranian talks will not be open-ended, but will be limited to a pre-determined time period so that Tehran does not try to 'run out the clock.'

Anticipating the failure of the talks, the task force (including Ross) urged "prepositioning military assets," coupled with a "show of force" in the region. This would be followed almost immediately by a blockade of Iranian gasoline imports and oil exports, meant to paralyze Iran's economy, followed by what they call, vaguely, "kinetic action."

That "kinetic action" -- a U.S. assault on Iran -- should, in fact, be massive, suggested the Coats-Robb report. Besides hitting dozens of sites alleged to be part of Iran's nuclear research program, the attacks would target Iranian air defense and missile sites, communications systems, Revolutionary Guard facilities, key parts of Iran's military-industrial complex, munitions storage facilities, airfields, aircraft facilities, and all of Iran's naval facilities. Eventually, they say, the United States would also have to attack Iran's ground forces, electric power plants and electrical grids, bridges, and "manufacturing plants, including steel, autos, buses, etc."

This is, of course, a hair-raising scenario. Such an attack on a country that had committed no act of war against the United States or any of its allies would cause countless casualties, virtually destroy Iran's economy and infrastructure, and wreak havoc throughout the region. That such a high-level group of luminaries should even propose steps like these -- and mean it -- can only be described as lunacy. That an important adviser to President-elect Obama would sign on to such a report should be shocking, though it has received next to no attention.

Iran Strikes Scenario (2/2)

B. It escalates to full-scale nuclear war

Hirsch 6 (Professor of physics at the University of California San Diego Jorge, “America and Iran: At the Brink of the Abyss,” <http://www.antiwar.com/orig/hirsch.php?articleid=8577>)JFS

The U.S. has just declared that it will defend Israel militarily against Iran if needed. Presumably this includes a scenario where Israel would initiate hostilities by unprovoked bombing of Iranian facilities, as it did with Iraq's Osirak, and Iran would respond with missiles targeting Israel. The U.S. intervention is likely to be further bombing of Iran's facilities, including underground installations that can only be destroyed with low-yield nuclear bunker-busters. Such nuclear weapons may cause low casualties, perhaps only in the hundreds, but the nuclear threshold will have been crossed.

Iran's reaction to a U.S. attack with nuclear weapons, no matter how small, cannot be predicted with certainty. U.S. planners may hope that it will deter Iran from responding, thus saving lives. However, just as the U.S. forces in Iraq were not greeted with flowers, it is likely that such an attack would provoke a violent reaction from Iran and lead to the severe escalation of hostilities, which in turn would lead to the use of larger nuclear weapons by the U.S. and potential casualties in the hundreds of thousands. Witness the current uproar over cartoons and try to imagine the resulting upheaval in the Muslim world after the U.S. nukes Iran.

Terrorism Module

A. CMR is key to stop terrorism – inter-agency cooperation

Guttieri 2003 (Karen, Strategic Insights, 2(8), Homeland Security and US Civil-Military Relations.http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2003/aug03/homeland.html)JFS

The American strategic policy community—for example, the US Commission on National Security in the 21st Century—was concerned with homeland *defense* prior to 9/11. After that fateful day, the Bush administration began using a new, more proactive sounding term: homeland *security*. The Pentagon, however, treated this new term not as a replacement for, but as separate from, homeland defense. A seemingly simple matter of semantics reveals a great deal about US civil-military relations.

America's post-9/11 obsession with securing the "homeland" shifted the domestic political landscape, including American civil-military relations. The American model of civil-military relations has been characterized by a contract according to which the military defends the nation's borders while domestic police keep order at home. "On September 11," in the words of DoD Transformation "czar" Arthur K. Cebrowski, "America's contract with the Department of Defense was torn up and a new contract is being written."[1] This Strategic Insight describes some of the forces compelling military changes in the historical context of US civil-military relations. Although the military itself may resist change, institution-building (outside and within that organization) and attitudinal changes in response to massive terrorist attacks at home cannot but alter American civil-military relations.

Much of the shift in American politics since 9/11 has to do with the nature and requirements of homeland security: it is both public and private, interagency (involving a number of government elements) and *civil-military*. Implementing the new national security strategy will require cooperation across sectors of activity and jurisdictions of authority.[2] Government-private sector coordination is vital to critical infrastructure protection. Agency-to-agency coordination is the foundation of any national response to security threats involving multiple levels of government in a nation consisting of more than 87,000 government jurisdictions.[3] Civil-military coordination is indispensable for ensuring adequate military support to civilian agencies responsible for homeland security. The quality of America's civil-military relations will be a factor in the effectiveness of America's "war on terror," while by the same token, the conduct of the war will irrevocably shape those relations. Given the US military's lead in homeland defense, civilian control of the military should be a topic of particular interest to anyone concerned with the function of democracy in wartime.

B. Extinction – world war three, arms race, ethnic conflict, and human rights

Sid-Ahmed 04 [Mohamed, Managing Editor for Al-Ahali, Extinction! <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm>]JFS

What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilizations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive.

But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This could lead to a third world war, from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers.

Nuclear War

Low CMR causes the military to engage in wars without the consent of civilian leaders – nuclear war

Feaver, 96 (Peter D. Feaver, Assistant professor of political science at Duke University, ARMED FORCES AND SOCIETY, Winter 1996, p. proquest) JFS

A direct seizure of political power by the military is the traditional worry of civil-military relations theory. Less obvious, but just as sinister, is the ability of the military to destroy society by draining it of resources in a quest for ever greater strength as a hedge against the enemies of the state. Yet another concern is that a rogue military could involve the society in wars and conflicts contrary to society's interests, either directly as in the hypothetical precipitation of a nuclear war or indirectly as in the World War I case of rigid mobilization schedules that came to dictate state policy in the final days of the crisis. And, finally, there is a concern over the simple matter of obedience: even if the military does not destroy society, will it obey its civilian masters or will it use its considerable coercive power to resist civilian direction and pursue its own interests?

Wars

Good civil-Military relations determine efficiency and help win wars

Feaver 6/22 (Peter, writer for Foreign Policy, http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/06/22/obama\_and\_his\_generals) PJ

McChrystal has already apologized and his apology seems sincere. But it may not be enough to save his head from this famously thin-skinned White House. The last time a senior military commander spoke this unwisely to a reporter, he quickly resigned, and rightly so because his bad behavior thoroughly squandered whatever confidence his chain of command had in him by that point. McChrystal has a stronger battlefield record and so may have started with a bit more confidence to squander.  Moreover, President Obama may not want the painful confirmation hearings for McChrystal's successor that a hasty departure would generate. And the McChrystal interview accurately notes that other members of the Obama AfPak team are already on beltway insiders' short-lists to leave, opening up the possibility of widespread chaos at the top during the most critical year of the war so far. Obama might be wiser to bring McChrystal in for a tongue lashing and send him back into the fight as quickly as possible. If Obama takes that course, he should also tongue-lash the other participants in this feud, namely his closest circle of White House advisors and his country team in Kabul. The Americans seem to be preoccupied with Washington enemies when they should be directing their fire at the real enemy -- the one that is firing bullets, not insults, at them.  Indeed, the dissension and back-biting that has characterized the Obama administration is precisely the sort of divide-and-conquer confusion we are trying to foster among the Taliban and Al Qaeda foes we are confronting in the AfPak theater. It is a tragic irony that we have proven more capable of sowing it among our own ranks than among the ranks of the enemy. Good civil-military relations and the unity of command and effort they engender may not be sufficient to win. But in a war this complex, they may be a necessary condition for success. President Obama has not yet achieved good civil-military relations in the conduct of his wars and he does not have much time to get it right.  Let us hope that he finally heeds the wake-up call, however discordant and unfortunate it is.

Failed States Scenario

A. CMR is key to prevent failed states

Barton and Unger 9 (Frederick and Noam, Brookings Center for Strategic and International Studies)JFS

The security rationale for stability and development in poor and fragile states is based on the understanding that strengthening the economy of states and ensuring social equity are in the short and long term interests of the United States. Stable states pose the United States with far fewer security challenges than their weak and fragile counterparts. Indeed, stable states with healthy economies offer the United States opportunities for trade and represent potential partners in the fields of security and development. In contrast, weak and failing states pose serious challenges to the security of United States, including terrorism, drug production, money laundering and people smuggling. In addition, state weakness has frequently proven to have the propensity to spread to neighboring states, which in time can destabilize entire regions. While the group acknowledged that the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan are particular in scope and complexity (and may not be repeated in the near future by the U.S.), participants broadly concurred that the lessons of these challenges are that the United States must improve and expand its stabilization and development capabilities. In particular, cases such as Pakistan and Nigeria, huge countries with strategic importance, make clear that a military response to many internal conflicts will be severely limited. As such, increased emphasis on civilian capacity within the U.S. government and civil-military relations in general, will greatly improve the United States’ ability to respond to such crises in the future.

B. Failed states cause every impact

African Studies Centre ‘3 (The Transnational Institute, The Center of Social Studies, Coimbra University, and The Peace Research Center – CIP-FUHEM, <http://www.globalpolicy.org/nations/sovereign/failed/2003/12failedcollapsedstates.pdf>)JFS

In the malign scenario of global developments the number of collapsed states would grow significantly. This would mean that several more countries in the world could not be held to account for respecting international agreements in various fields, be it commercial transactions, debt repayment, the possession and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the use of the national territory for criminal or terrorist activities. The increase in failed states would immediately lead to an increase in international migration, which could have a knock-on effect, first in neighbouring countries which, having similar politico-economic structures, could suffer increased destabilization and collapse as well. Developments in West Africa during the last decade may serve as an example. Increased international migration would, secondly, have serious implications for the Western world. In Europe it would put social relations between the population and immigrant communities under further pressure, polarizing politics. An increase in collapsed states would also endanger the security of Western states and societies. Health conditions could deteriorate as contagious diseases like Ebola or Sars would spread because of a lack of measures taken in collapsed areas. Weapons of mass destruction could come into the hands of various sorts of political entities, be they terrorist groups, political factions in control of part of a collapsed state or an aggressive political elite still in control of a national territory and intent on expansion. Not only North Korea springs to mind; one could very well imagine such states in (North) Africa. Since the multilateral system of control of such weapons would have ended in part because of the decision of the United States to try and check their spread through unilateral action - a system that would inherently be more unstable than a multilateral, negotiated regime - one could be faced with an arms race that would sooner or later result in the actual use of these weapons. In the malign scenario, relations between the US and Europe would also further deteriorate, in questions of a military nature as well as trade relations, thus undercutting any possible consensus on stemming the growth of collapsed states and the introduction of stable multilateral regimes towards matters like terrorism, nuclear weapons and international migration. Disagreement is already rife on a host of issues in these fields. At worst, even the Western members of the Westphalian system - especially those bordering on countries in the former Third World, i.e. the European states - could be faced with direct attacks on their national security.

Regional Security

**Civil military relations are key to prevent regional conflicts and promote security**

**Mares 98** (David R, author, Civil-Military Relations: Building Democracy and Regional Security in Latin America, Southern Asia, and Central Europe, p. 1-2, Questia)

The authors of this volume contend that the **dynamics of the domestic civilmilitary relationship determine the likelihood of conflict or cooperation at the regional level.** In that arena, international and domestic challenges and opportunities shape a state's foreign policy preferences. **The economic and military interests of civilians and the military are key to determining the degree to which regional relations will be conflictive or cooperative.** This chapter proposes a framework that postulates which civilian and military interests are most important in determining policy preferences. It demonstrates how these interests produce variation in the pattern of domestic **civil-military relations**, and it suggests hypotheses relating patterns of civil-military relations to the consolidation of democracy 1 and to cooperation in regional relations. 2 The framework **uses insights** from the study of grand strategy, historical sociology, interest group politics, **and** organizational theory. The grand-strategy perspective 3 **suggests the** importance of **distinguishing among** (1) **identification of threats** (economic, political, and military at both domestic and international levels); (2) elaboration of strategies to counter the identified threats; **and** (3) **implementation of** doctrines for each **strategy.** Historical sociology focuses our attention on the domestic social and economic bases of government, 4 whereas interest-group politics disaggregates these bases into more specific political actors. 5 Organizational theory examines how the military's degree of professionalism, need for autonomy and resources, as well as desire for growth, affect the perception of threat and the options for response. 6 An important assumption made here is that overt military challenges to fundamental national security assets are unlikely to dominate regional relations. Authors in the realist school contend that territorial and resource disputes will continue into the future, but the authors in this volume maintain that those conflicts will play a secondary role to disputes related to the domestic political and organizational interests of civilian politicians and military officers. We have also accepted the premise that the civil-military relationship and its potential implications for domestic and regional relations is best studied by undertaking theoretically informed, structured, and focused comparisons within and across regions. To accomplish this, we examine southern Asia ( Thailand, Indonesia, India, and Pakistan) and Latin America ( Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Venezuela, and Guatemala). These cases offer a range of potential causal variables identified in the social-science literature, such as region, type of government, military power, and culture. The addition of three Central European cases ( Poland and the Czech and Slovak Republics) helps us evaluate whether unique regional factors are important determinants of behavior. Countries selected also have varied experiences with democratic institutions. India and Venezuela are long-standing democracies; Thailand, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile have recently redemocratized; and Indonesia and Guatemala are suffering a problematic transition toward democracy. The confluence of the end of the Cold War, global economic restructuring, and worldwide political liberalization has affected each country differently. This introduction begins by developing a typology of civil-military relations and examining the determinants of where a relationship falls in the typology, using as variables political culture and constitutive rules of political interaction. Next I analyze the dynamics of **the civil-military relationship** by focusing on civilian and military interests as they **relate to the potential sources of threat and possible policy responses**. The chapter concludes with hypotheses on **how civil-military relations influence the consolidation of democracy and produce cooperative or competitive regional relations**.

**Regional Security**

**Good CMR key to regional stability and security**

**Mares 98** (David R, author, Civil-Military Relations: Building Democracy and Regional Security in Latin America, Southern Asia, and Central Europe, Questia)

From the analysis in this introduction, we can hypothesize that **the key to** cooperative **regional security relations is to keep the professional military from having a major role in the identification of threat**, the selection of appropriate responses, or even in the elaboration of military doctrines (specifically what weapons to buy and whether they will defend by attacking the enemy or waiting for him to invade). The organizational tendency of professional militaries is to prepare to defend the nation against neighbors. Preparation means focusing on the local balance of power and thus regional cooperation will be hindered by competitive arms buildups. In addition, because professional militaries prefer offensive strategies, 54 confidence-building measures will be difficult to implement. But civilian domination per se is not a guarantee of cooperative regional relations. Exclusionary civilian governments, even of a liberal stripe, will tend to look to international factors to explain why a domestic opposition mobilizes among the excluded. If regional states vary in whom they include in the legitimate political process, civilian regimes of exclusionary states will have an opportunity to engage in diversionary tactics as they seek to retain exclusionary politics. We can thus hypothesize that **the civil-military relationships most conducive to regional cooperation will be those in which either inclusionary civilians dominate or in which the pacted or parallel relationships force a nonprofessional military to look inward** (see Table 1.5 ). Although military-dominated polities may rarely fight external wars, 55 their militarized foreign policies will tend to create tense regional relations and thus hinder cooperation. **The civil-military relationship most dangerous for regional relations is likely to be a parallel relationship in which the professional military is given carte blanche on security matters.**

CMR Key to Hegemony

Poor civil military relations kill military effectiveness

**Kohn and Feaver 1** (Richard H. Kohn and Peter D. Feaver, Richard is a Professor of History and Chair of the Curriculum in Peace, War, and Defense at the University of North Carolina, Peter is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Duke University and Director of the Triangle Institute for Security Studies, “Civilians and Soldiers”)

**The general consensus on how capable the US. military is at doing what civilian society asks of it could also mask disagreements about what sorts of problems could erode that effectiveness. The culture gap thesis sug­gests that one way a civil-military gulf might threaten national security would be if the military and civilians hold sharply divergent opinions on what hurts military effectiveness and** therefor, by implication**, endorse** sharply different **policies for preserving the combat effectiveness of the armed forces**. Indeed, Johnnen has argued that "If (the military) goes too far In pleasing the social mores of contemporary society, it may lose the culture needed for success in war" (Hilien 1998a). The MS survey asked respondents to indicate whether they believed civil-military alienation would erode military effectiveness and then whether they believed certain conditions, such as "Americans' lack of trust in the uniformed leaders" or "a ban on language and behavior that encourage camaraderie among soldiers? were in fact occurring and if so, whether they would hurt military effectiveness. If there is a civil-military consensus on these issues, military effectiveness might still be a matter for concern, but any problems would not be exacerbated by a civil-military culture gap. Dissensus, however, would be evidence that a gulf between civilians and the military threatened core values that at least some influential groups believe to be essential to the military's ability to be effective in combat. As Figure 3.7 shows, elite military officers and elite civilians, particu­larly elite civilians with no military experience, gave differing responses to the statement, "Even if civilian society did not always appreciate the essential military values of commitment and unselfishness, our armed forces could still maintain required traditional standards" (Question 33h)-Somewhat contrary to conventional wisdom, it is the elite military that has the more optimistic view, and it is the elite non•veteran civilians who express the greatest level of concern about the gap—even though it is their attitudes that comprise the largest gap with the military. By contrast, **a clear consensus emerges when we look at a series of re­sponses concerning potential threats to military effectiveness**, Elite civil­ians and the elite military officers generally agree on whether a particular problem is happening in the military today. What differences of opinion do appear are subtle and marginal, far more so than one would expect given the ambiguity inherent in the topic: even experts have trouble agreeing on what is necessary for military effectiveness. After a first cut, this uncertainty does not appear in the 1155 survey. We cannot say con­clusively what this means, but it does suggest the optimistic finding that **military effectiveness may be an issue on which there is a healthy civil-military consensus.**

**Military effectiveness key to hegemony**

**Herald Tribune 8** (5/1, http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/05/01/news/30oxan.php)

Wellsprings of power**. US hegemonic power is exercised** globally **through** several key institutions and mechanisms:· Economic power. Following the Second World War, US economic dominance was so great that it was able to help reconstruct post-war Western Europe via the Marshall Plan. Although its relative advantage has since declined, Washington continues to play a key role in global economic affairs; its intervention helped halt the spiralling depreciation of the Mexican peso in 1994. The dollar also remains the world's dominant reserve, or 'numeraire', currency.· **Military might**. US defence spending continues massively to overshadow the military outlays of other societies. Substantial elements of the US armed forces are still permanently based in many areas abroad. While this overseas basing is, in part, a residue of the old Cold War security apparatus, **many areas of the world welcome these troops as the guarantors of stability and the regional balance of power**.· Post-1945 legacy. The United States had a major role in structuring post-1945 political and social systems. For example, both the German Basic Law of 1949 and Japan's 1947 constitution reflected significant US input. Both **countries were subject to US influence directly through occupation forces, but also intellectually and culturally as their new governments operated under US-influenced constitutional systems.** While such influence is today much diminished, it has not entirely vanished.· International organisations. Washington dominates key international organisations, notably NATO and the UN. NATO, which once had a limited collective security role centred around defending Western Europe from a Soviet attack, is slowly moving towards an expanded 'out of area' mission under US prodding. Despite President George Bush's occasionally confrontational stance towards the UN, the United States remains highly influential there due to the size of its financial contribution and Security Council veto.· Aligning allies. The United States works assiduously to promote its interests by influencing how other states align or realign. For example, it has promoted Turkey's candidacy for EU membership, as a means of promoting political and economic reform.· Ideas and culture. US ideas and popular culture, from jazz to art and cinema, have infectiously spread -- rendering 'Americanisation' among the most significant and disputed phenomena of the contemporary era. Americanisation has its antinomy, 'anti-Americanism', and this cleavage operates globally. 'Globalisation' both overlaps with, and is distinct from, Americanisation, but the two phenomena are often conjoined in political analysis and popular discourse.

\_\_\_\*\*AFF Ans

NU – Gates

Gates is mad now – mcchrystal

CNN 6/24 (http://news.blogs.cnn.com/2010/06/24/pentagon-official-gates-wanted-to-keep-mcchrystal/)JFS

Defense Secretary Robert Gates backed keeping Gen. Stanley McChrystal on the job because he was vital to the war effort in Afghanistan, but he was overruled, a senior Pentagon official told CNN's Barbara Starr.

The official has direct knowledge of the events but declined to be identified because of the internal administration discussions.

President Barack Obama relieved McChrystal of command of the Afghan war on Wednesday, a day after Rolling Stone published critical comments about top White House officials by members of McChrystal's staff.

Gates was initially furious about the article, but said McChrystal had to stay in command because the war is at such a critical point, a second source - who also asked not to be named on internal administration discussions - told CNN.

NU – McChrystal

The McChrystal incident proves that a lapse of civil-military relations has no impact

Feaver 10 (Peter, writer for Foreign Policy, 6/30, http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/06/30/tom\_ricks\_gets\_the\_mcchrystal\_affair\_mostly\_rightbut\_not\_entirely) PJ

Now I supported McChrystal resigning -- calling it "clearly a firing offense" -- and I wholeheartedly agree that the disrespectful command climate that the *Rolling Stone* interview revealed was corrosive of healthy civil-military relations. But it was meaningfully *less* corrosive than the MacArthur incident on several dimensions and it is both unfair and unwise to equate the two. MacArthur vigorously opposed Truman's Korea policies of restraint, sought to lift them, and was colluding with friendly reporters and political allies back in Washington to thwart them. And he made no bones about this disagreement, as his post-firing Congressional lobbying makes clear.  McChrystal and President Obama both claimed that there was no policy dispute at issue, neither in the *Rolling Stone* interview nor in the larger civil-military dustup. McChrystal's disrespectful comments were directed at members of Obama's team who, in McChrystal's views, were not doing enough to implement Obama's policies. This is a distinction that may not matter in terms of McChrystal keeping his job, but should influence what we learn from the incident (and may justify giving McChrystal a dispensation to retire at 4-star pay.

McChrystal breached civil-military relations norms

Cohen 10 (Eliot A, writer for the Wall Street Journal, 6/23, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704853404575322800914018876.html) PJ

President Obama should, nonetheless, fire him. Gen. McChrystal's just-published interview in Rolling Stone magazine is an appalling violation of norms of civilian-military relations. To read it is to wince, repeatedly—at the mockery of the vice president and the president's special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan, at the sniping directed toward the U.S. ambassador, at a member of his staff who, when asked whom the general was having dinner with in Paris said, "Some French minister. It's so [expletive deleted] gay." The quotes from Gen. McChrystal's underlings bespeak a staff so clueless, swaggering and out of control that a wholesale purge looks to be indicated. The larger predicament here is not the general's fault. The Obama administration has made three large errors in the running of the Afghan war.

NU – Obama

Obama is being tougher on the military

Alter 10 (Jonathan, writer for Newsweek, 5/15, http://www.newsweek.com/2010/05/15/secrets-from-inside-the-obama-war-room.html) PJ

The first of 10 “AFPAK” meetings came on Sept. 13, when the president gathered 16 advisers in the Situation Room in the basement of the White House. This was to be the most methodical national-security decision in a generation. Deputy national-security adviser Tom Donilon had commissioned research that backed up an astonishing historical truth: neither the Vietnam War nor the Iraq War featured any key meetings where all the issues and assumptions were discussed by policymakers. In both cases the United States was sucked into war inch by inch. The Obama administration was determined to change that. “For the past eight years, whatever the military asked for, they got,” Obama explained later. “My job was to slow things down.” The president had something precious in modern crisis management: time. “I had to put up with the ‘dithering’ arguments from Dick Cheney or others,” Obama said. “But as long as I wasn’t shaken by the political chatter, I had the time to work through all these issues and ask a bunch of tough questions and force people to sharpen their pencils until we arrived at the best possible solution.”

Obama’s policies are causing a rift in civil-military relations, but they’re safe for now

Ellis 6/23 (Aaron, writer for Thinking Strategically, http://thinkstrat.wordpress.com/2010/06/23/%E2%80%98quick-and-dirty%E2%80%99-obama-mcchrystal-and-petraeus/) PJ

At *Permissible Arms*, Karaka describes President Obama’s press conference today dismissing McChrystal as ‘quick and dirty’. It’s a phrase that can be used to describe the whole episode, like a fight which everyone involved feels embarrassed about afterwards. A good commander has been dismissed because of poor judgement; an administration has been humiliated by some apt ridicule; it’s been taken up by some on both the Left and the Right to advance agendas, and used as a proxy war between COINistas and those pushing for withdrawal/drawdown. The only person to come out of it all well and arguably more powerful is General Petraeus, who steps down as head of CENTCOM to replace McChrystal. Bernard Finel has fortunately kept his head in assessing the appointment, but there are some points that I think are important. To me and many outside the United States, this isn’t a great crisis in civil-military relations; one could say because it’s not our military, but I’d guess many Americans think the same too. It has exposed a rift between the administration and some military personnel, but I’d argue that responsibility for the rift lies ultimately with President Obama. He himself has created weaknesses in his own policy on Afghanistan, either matching goals with inadequate resources or by tolerating divisions within his team. That has formed the environment in which a breakdown in civil-military relations often occurs, with weak policy and indecisive leadership creating a vacuum that politically-savvy generals fill while maintaining the fiction of civilian control. As I said yesterday, this happened in Britain and France during the First World War and has happened to some extent over Afghanistan with the Obama administration. McChrystal’s behaviour is the symptom of a breakdown in civil-military relations, therefore; not its cause – the fault is with the president.

NU – Relations Low

Relations low now – withdrawal timeline proves

Feaver 10 (Peter, writer for Foreign Policy, 6/30, http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/06/30/tom\_ricks\_gets\_the\_mcchrystal\_affair\_mostly\_rightbut\_not\_entirely) PJ

Establishing the provenance of the timeline is useful not merely for the historical record but also as an antidote to a potentially dangerous gambit that some of Obama's political advisors may have been attempting. According to Jonathan Alter's account of the Fall 2009 Afghan Strategy Review, the White House sought to pin the military down on the timeline so as to give the White House political cover to abandon the Afghanistan surge; they wanted to be able to pin the blame for any failure on the military and the timeline played a key role to this end.  This kind of gamesmanship is bad strategy and makes for bad civil-military relations. Identifying who proposed what and why is helpful.

Relations low now – they’ve been eroding for years

The Washington Post 6/23 (http://voices.washingtonpost.com/postpartisan/2010/06/after\_mcchrystal\_time\_to\_chang.html) PJ

Gen. Stanley McChrystal has submitted his resignation. Or he's been fired. In any case, it was time for him to go. His departure will help slow the increasing erosion in civil-military relations -- aided by both political parties over the last 20 years -- which has threatened civilian control of the military. It also means we can now turn to a more fundamental exit debate: How do we change course and craft a responsible strategy to end the war in Afghanistan? It is critical we have this debate. Here's one good reason: McChrystal's top aide believes this war is unwinnable. In the most important quote in Rolling Stones' fascinating article, Maj. Gen. Bill Mayville argues that the only way we win in Afghanistan is to redefine failure as victory: "It's not going to look like a win, smell like a win or taste like a win. This is going to end in an argument."

Relations low now – McChrystal proves

Kabalan 9 (Marwan Al, writer for Gulf News, 12/20, http://gulfnews.com/opinions/columnists/us-civil-military-relations-are-strained-1.529859) PJ

Civil-military relations in the US have always been a matter of hot debate. Outside the US, however, the topic has rarely been discussed. The widely held belief that in democracies the military salute and obey has made it almost impossible for foreign observers to see how complicated the relationship between elected officials and army officers is. Tension in civil-military relations is perceived, hence, as a peculiar characteristic of non-democratic countries. A closer look at the issue shows a different picture, however. Earlier this month, analysts throughout the region were surprised by the souring relationship between the Obama administration and the military establishment. It all started when General Stanley McChrystal, commander of the US forces in Afghanistan, in an address in London described as "short-sighted" Vice President Joseph Biden's preferred strategy of using Predator and cruise-missile strikes to cut US losses in Afghanistan. Furthermore, McChrystal leaked his assessment of the situation there to the press. He advised that the US should shift its strategy to population security and dedicate up to 40,000 additional troops to the war. Days later, he revealed that he had spoken to US President Barack Obama only once since his appointment as commander of US troops in Afghanistan. Unsurprisingly, McChrystal's public statements offended the Obama administration, drawing bitter criticisms from senior officials. National security adviser General James Jones told CNN that it is "better for military advice to come up the chain of command". Secretary of Defence Robert Gates reinforced this message when he said, "It is imperative that all of us taking part in these deliberations — civilians and military alike — provide our best advice to the president candidly but privately". This was not, however, the first time that tension has risen between civilian and military officials in the US. In 2003, former Army chief of staff Eric Shinseki criticised in public the Bush administration's proposed force levels for the invasion of Iraq, describing them as too low. There are many other occasions in which relations between generals and civilians in the US government turned sour, especially in times of war.

NU – Relations Low

Relations low now and leading to disaster

Leon 6/27 (Michael, writer for Veterans Today, http://www.veteranstoday.com/2010/06/27/nothing-is-going-right-for-usa-in-final-phase-in-afghanistan/)

Although Gen McChrystal has been sacked and replaced with Gen David Petraeus but not without creating tension in civil-military relations. In case the situation in Afghanistan spins out of control and coalition forces are forced to hurriedly exit in disgrace, or fatalities mount up, it is bound to further aggravate civil-military relations in USA. However, prompt action by Obama has dispelled the lingering impression that Pentagon has become more powerful than White House. He has reasserted his authority by this act and demonstrated that he is in full command.  Replacement of military commanders is not the solution to the problem particularly when Petraeus and McChrystal were on one frequency. At no stage there was any difference of opinion between the two. Petraeus task will be more arduous since he will have to hop between his two offices of CENTCOM and US-NATO Command HQ in Kabul . Unless the US leadership undertakes some revolutionary and well meaning steps to get rid of weak areas, the US will not be able to overcome its host of problems and final phase will end up in complete disaster.

Alt Causes

**Alt Cause for CMR –**

**A. Afghanistan, budget, DADT, RMA**

**King, 2009** (Will, Fort Weathenworth Lampoon, Army News, “Panel discusses civil-military relations at Fort Leavenworth, March)JFS

**"The president has arranged it so that he is free to ignore** the advice of **his** uniformed **chiefs** **and** field **commanders** because he will have cover of General Jones by his side, and other senior military in his administration," Kohn said, "**and at the same time demonstrates that he has been reaching out to the military** and wants to have military judgment." **The four areas** **where Kohn sees** potential **civil-military problems** in the future **are** in **Afghanistan**, the **budget**, **gays in the military** **and the restructuring of military forces** away from Cold War structure. He said budgetary issues would create the most problems of those four areas.

**B. Obama is too slow**

**Feaver 9**  (Alexander F. Hehmeyer Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at Duke University, Director of the Triangle Institute for Security Studies (TISS), and former special advisor on the National Security Council Staff – ‘Foreign Policy: Woodward discloses troops needed” <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=113022583>)

Here is the crucial bit: "... But **Obama's deliberative pace** — he has held only one meeting of his top national security advisers to discuss McChrystal's report so far — **is a source of growing consternation within the military. 'Either accept the assessment or correct it, or let's have a discussion,' one Pentagon official said.** 'Will you read it and tell us what you think?' **Within the military**, this official said, **'There is** a frustration. A **significant frustration**. A serious frustration.' "**The civil-military dimensions of the challenge confronting** President **Obama could hardly be more clearly spelled out.** This is significant and serious.

**C. NMD**

**Smith 9-21** (Jeffrey, Staff Writer – Washington Post, “Missile Defense's Shelving Reflected Military's Concerns”, Washington Post, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/20/AR2009092002532.html>)JFS

**Call it another revolt of the generals.** More than 13 years ago, the nation's **military leaders told civilian** defense **officials** **they wanted to limit** spending on **missile defenses** **and** to **emphasize** the protection of **forces** deployed **overseas** over defense of the American homeland against a long-range missile threat. **Last week**, after a lengthy internal Pentagon review and against the backdrop of new limits on overall military spending, **the generals** again **threw their weight behind a** relative **contraction** **of the** **effort to defend against** long-range **missile attacks**. They cited needed budgetary savings and more immediate threats in demanding faster work to protect overseas forces and bases against shorter-range attack. The latest shift shelved a plan to deploy in Europe an advanced radar and interceptors of long-range missiles by 2017. And **it adds impetus to the Pentagon's request** earlier this year **for** **a cut of** about **15 percent in** overall **missile defense spending**, a scaling back of the deployment of long-range missile interceptors in Alaska and California, and the cancellation of three costly Reagan-era missile defense programs that officials say had threatened to balloon out of budgetary control.

**D. Tensions inevitable – Iraq, budgets, Cold War, social issues**

**Kohn 8** (Richard, World Affairs Journal, Prof of History @ U of North Carolina, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2008-Winter/full-civil-military.html)JFS

**While civil-military relations at the beginning of the Republic involved** real **fears of a coup**, for the last two centuries **the concern has revolved around** relative **influence: can** the **politicians** (often divided among themselves) **really “control” the military?** **Can** the **generals** and admirals **secure the necessary resources and autonomy to accomplish** the government’s **purposes** with minimal loss of blood and treasure? Until World War II, **the influence of the regular military** even in its own world **was limited.** **After the war, the integration** **of** foreign and **military policies,** the creation of the intelligence community, new weapons systems, **and other** elements of the **Cold War national security establishment** decidedly **enhanced the military’s say in policy deliberations.** **The end of the Cold War** and an operational tour de force in the first Persian Gulf War **cemented the military’s position as the public’s most trusted** and esteemed **institution**. During the Clinton administration, **the military leadership had a virtual veto over military policy,** particularly the terms and conditions of interventions overseas. The power of the military has waxed and waned since the 1940s, but not a single secretary of defense has entered office trusting the armed forces to comply faithfully with his priorities rather than their own. **Four problems**, in particular, **will intensify** the **normal friction**: the endgame in **Iraq,** unsustainable military **budgets, the mismatch between twenty-first century threats and a Cold War military establishment, and social issues, gays in the military being the most incendiary.**

Alt Causes

**E. Tensions are inevitable**

**Sewall and White 09**(Sarah and John, The boston globe, 1-29, The civil military challenge, lexis)JFS

One finding is that senior **civilian and military leaders** often **lack a common understanding of** roles and reciprocal **responsibilities within the partnership.** The traditional shorthand that "civilians make policy and the military executes" is overly simplistic, masking the intricate mutual dependence of the parties. For example, **civilians may not see their policymaking role as accompanied by a responsibility to** ensure that **military concerns** about policy implementation have been fully addressed. **Military leaders may define their** substantive **advising role narrowly and perform it only in response to civilian inquiry. These misunderstandings have proven costly in national security decision-making.** In addition, the parties largely fail to harness the inherent frictions in the relationship. **The roles of** various **civil and military actors** abut and **overlap** in practice, particularly when multiple civilian authorities (including members of Congress) are engaged. **Managing** the inevitable **tensions without** rancor or **overreaction is** a **key** responsibility of the civilian leadership. **Transparent and consistent decision-making processes would** also **help** clarify roles and **build trust in civil-military relations,** particularly in terms of reinforcing the importance and scope of military advice. When that process is inclusive, it is viewed by military actors as more satisfactory - even if the outcomes are not preferred by military actors. Still, **there are no good options for military leaders who disagree with civilian decisions.** Expressing professional views to civilians is part of the military's responsibility. But once decisions have been made, continued expressions of disagreement undercut civilian authority. At the same time, **civilian leaders must** publicly assume **accountability for their** policy **decisions**. **Hiding behind military advice** undermines the military's professional independence and **is an abdication of civilian responsibility.** Our research highlighted both the importance and fragility of the military's apolitical and nonpartisan status. **Civilians should refrain from viewing military officers as "part of"** or "loyal to" **the administration** during which they were appointed. The military participants found their most difficult challenge to be fulfilling their constitutional responsibilities to serve both the administration and the Congress objectively and professionally. We found that **partisan political activities of** retired **senior officers fueled civilian distrust of** currently serving **military officers**. **Retaining trust that the** uniform **military serve in an apolitical capacity is vital for a healthy civil-military dynamic.** The retired community should carefully consider its public involvement in partisan activity.

Turn – Civilians Good

Civilians must make strategic decisions that must be enforced

**Owens 10** (Mackubin T, Professor of Strategy and Force Planning at the Naval War College in Newport, 6/13, http://www.eurasiareview.com/201006133105/civil-military-relations-and-the-us-strategy-deficit.html)

Unfortunately, **the failure of the current civil-military framework to provide strategic guidance for integrating the operational level of war and national policy** is obscured by the myopic focus of students of civil-military relations on the issue of civilian control. Rectifying this situation requires that both parties to the civil-military bargain adjust the way they do business. On the one hand, the military must recover its voice in strategy-making while realizing that politics permeates the conduct of war and that civilians have a say, not only concerning the goals of the war but also how it is conducted. On the other, **civilians must understand that to implement effective policy and strategy requires the proper military instrument. They must also insist that soldiers present their views frankly and forcefully throughout the strategy-making process**.

**The impact to CMR decline will take decades to occur, and turn - solutions will be opposed by the military**

**Cohen 97** (Eliot Professor of Strategic Studies at Johns Hopkins, “Civil-military relations – Are US Forces Overstretched?” ORBIS)JFS

**The ills besetting civil-military relations in the U**nited **S**tates **are the deeply rooted product of historical developments dating back several decades or longer. Remedies will take time to have an effect.** More important, **they will require tough and imaginative civilian leadership,** because **they will be opposed by important** (though by no means all) **segments of military opinion and will be relatively unattractive politically.** The military opinion will be bolstered by civilian allies, including military retirees (who can speak far more freely than those in uniform) and that large group of civilians who occasionally confuse unthinking support of military traditions and practice with patriotic support for the armed forces.

Turn – Conflict Good

**Tensions good – military will respect the president, that’s overall better for cmr
Ackerman 8** [Spencer, “Productive Obama-Military Relationship Possible” Washington Independent, <http://washingtonindependent.com/18335/productive-obama-military-relationship-possible>]JFS

During **Clinton’s** transition from candidate to president, he seemed to suggest **lifting the ban on gays serving openly,** an implication seized on by conservatives and **met with furor from the armed services. His response was to back down** **— which set a tone to the military that** an uncertain **Clinton could be rolled.** Defense Dept. officials today still believe Clinton’s early capitulation set a troublesome precedent. “**If Clinton has simply ordered the military to lift the ban** on gays in the military — as Truman did with racial integration against near universal opposition,” said one Pentagon official who requested anonymity, “**he would have been much better off in dealing with the military for the rest of his administration.** There would have been a big fuss, but they would have respected him more.” **The lesson for Obama**, this official continued, **is “not to get rolled** or railroaded **by the top brass,** as Clinton and his civilian team were by Colin Powell,” who was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time.

**Plan is a win – unilateral withdrawal boosts CMR**

**Ackerman 8** (Spencer, writer for The Washington Independent, http://washingtonindependent.com/18335/productive-obama-military-relationship-possible) GAT

Robert Mackey, a retired Army officer, said that both Petraeus and the new Iraq commander, Gen. Ray Odierno, can work with Obama despite disagreements on Iraq. “I think that **both are pretty good thinkers**, **more than able to understand that change is going to occur and that their job is to complete whatever mission [Obama] orders them to do,**” Mackey said. “**They don’t have to be Obama’s buddies to do the job.** In fact, **that would most likely reflect poorly on the administration within the military.”** Indeed, **the differences between Obama and Petraeus or Odierno on Iraq might turn out to be healthy for civilian-military relations**. Judging from how the July meeting with Petraeus in Baghdad went, “Obama should be in good shape,” said the Pentagon official. “It will be a refreshing change from recent years, when civilian political leaders have shirked off tough questions about — and responsibility for — their war policies by claiming, in effect, that they’re just taking directions from the commanders on the ground, in effect, hiding behind the skirts of the military.” Moss agreed. **Institutional pushback is “not a bad thing” necessarily**, he said. “If anything, **the major lesson from the past decade should be that the solutions to the challenges we face must be approached from multiple angles, and that is what Obama has signaled as his intention.”** Like Feaver, the anonymous senior Army officer expected Obama to make Petraeus a partner on Iraq and other issues. “Once President-elect Obama is in office,” the officer said, “he can very easily shift his view based on advice he has received, as well as the situation on the ground at the time, since he has left himself an out or two over time. It would be surprising to see him go completely against Gen. Petraeus, since I would think [Obama] would rather have him in uniform than out — where he would then be free to provide commentary on the decisions that have been made.”

No Impact – CMR = Resilient

**CMR is resilient – SOP checks collapse.**

**Hooker 3**(Richard National War College Army Staff, Winter, “Soldiers of the State,” Parameters,

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_m0IBR/is\_4\_33/ai\_111852934/print)

In American academe today the dominant view of civil-military relations is sternly critical of the military, asserting that civilian control of the military is dangerously eroded. (1) Though **tension clearly exists in the relationship, the current critique is largely inaccurate and badly overwrought.** Far from overstepping its bounds**, America's military operates comfortably within constitutional notions of separated powers, participating appropriately in defense and national security policymaking with due deference to the principle of civilian control.** Indeed, **an active and vigorous role by the military in the policy process is and always has been essential to the common defense.**

**CMR resilient – inherent patriotism and support for the troops**

**Carafano 8** (James Jay, senior research fellow for national security at The Heritage Foundation, “Soldiers, Civilians, and ‘The Great War’” accessed 7-22, http://www.heritage.org/press/commentary/ed050808b.cfm)JFS

Civil-military relations are back in the news. There could not be a better time for fresh views on this vital subject. Nancy Gentile Ford's The Great War and America: Civil-Military Relations During World War I is a welcome contribution. Ford, a professor of history at Bloomsburg University of Pennsylvania, provides a broad historical survey of the critical issues that confronted the United States leading up to, during and after World War I. In The Great War and America, Ford argues that this period of American history is worthy of particular attention—and she is absolutely right. The dawn of the 20th century was a turning point for how America's military and American society are interwoven. **Many of the fundamental military institutions that we rely on today, from recruiting military officers from civilian universities to relying on the National Guard, emanate from this era. The United States has traditionally enjoyed a remarkably resilient and healthy civil society. When civil society is strong, relations between soldiers and the state tend to remain pretty stable. The Great War and America supports this thesis. America's sudden entry into World War I and the rush of transforming a constabulary force scattered throughout the United States into a mass citizen army to fight on the world's first "high-tech" battlefield raised innumerable concerns and challenges. America survived them all—and helped win the war.**

**CMR resilient – military leaders willing to cooperate**

**Schake 09** (Kori, “So far so good for civil-military relationg under Obama”, online)

It should go without saying that **it is not the** National Security **Advisor's job to intimidate military commanders into dialing down their requests to politically comfortable levels**, although that is what Jim Jones is [reported](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/30/AR2009063002811.html) to have done when visiting Afghanistan during the McChrystal review. **Such politicization of military advice ought to be especially noxious** to someone who'd been both the Commandant of the Marine Corps and a Combatant Commander. When [the Bob Woodward article](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/30/AR2009063002811.html) recounting Jones' attempted manipulation as published, Secretary **Gates** **and** Admiral **Mullen** commendably **defended McChrystal's independence.** **It** **is** also **curious that the one person invisible in this debate,** as in the debate about relieving General McKiernan, **is** the CENTCOM commander, General **Petraeus**. But beneficially and importantly for our country, policy **debates over the war** in Afghanistan **indicate** **that** the system of **civil-military relations is clearly working as designed.** **We owe much to Gates, Mullen, and McChrystal for shielding the process** **from politicization and providing military advice the President needs to make decisions only he can make.**

No Impact – CMR = Managed

**No negative impact to tensions – they’re managed and key to national security**

**Biddle 9** (Stephen, Senior Fellow for Defense Policy, Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/publication/20283/us\_policy\_toward\_afghanistan.html)JFS

**As far as** the **civil-military relations** aspects of this **go, we have civilian control of the military**.  The military does not make U.S. national strategy.  **The military does not** even **make** theater **strategy**.  **The civilians are** constitutionally **in charge** of this. Now, what we would like is I think what Eliot Cohen has termed "an unequal dialogue," in which both sides are respectful of the other and interacting with the other in dialogue, but that **dialogue is unequal because**, at the end of the day, **the civilians** are the ones who **have** the legal **responsibility** -- not just the right, but the responsibility **to make the decisions,** and to be held accountable for the results as a result. In that setting, it seems to me the appropriate role for a theater commander -- and remember that General McChrystal is commander of forces in Afghanistan.  We are engaged in conflict in multiple theaters around the world, so this is just one of them.  **The responsibility of the** theater **commander** **is to produce an** objective, clear-eyed, sort of, rigorous **analysis of the situation,** the way forward, **the prognosis**, and the required costs of pursing the best strategy for his theater. **That** then **goes up the chain**, **and superiors, both military and civilian** above him in the chain of command, **have** just as much of a **responsibility** as he does **to** rigorously critique and **evaluate what he said** -- in light not just of checking for the internal validity of what the theater commander has said about his theater, but especially in terms of considerations that are broader than the theater commander's writ. **One of the obvious ones,** in this instance, **is Iraq**.  We have ongoing, serious military operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan.  I'm on record as having said in the past that I think U.S. interests engaged in Iraq are very important and require a continued presence, at least as far as the Iraqis will permit. That is not General McChrystal's job to worry about.  It's not General Odierno's job to worry about.  **It's** General **Petraeus's**, Admiral **Mullen's**, the secretary of Defense, **and the president's job to worry about the relationship between theaters** in an environment where the same forces are in demand by more than one theater and in which the prospects in any theater would be improved by getting somebody else's forces to come and help out.  (Chuckles.) So **I** **see** a degree of **inherent tension, not just between civilian and military,** given the difference of backgrounds and purview and responsibilities, **but between different theater commanders** at the theater level within the military chain of command. **And that tension is healthy and appropriate, as long as it's adjudicated properly by the people above them** in the food chain -- **both the military people** above them in the food chain, Petraeus and Mullen, **and by the civilians.** Now, if this produces, kind of, endless analysis without decision, it would satisfy academics like me who love that sort of thing.  But **it** obviously **wouldn't serve the national interest.  We** will eventually **need a decision**. I would personally prefer that these analyses be aggressively challenged, critiqued and assessed, and that the administration take the time it thinks it needs to do that. I think in terms of the consequences of getting the strategy wrong, which are enormous, the consequences of taking another couple of weeks to avoid that are minor -- are modest.

No Impact – CMR = Insolvable

**You can’t solve CMR**

**Hsai 9** (Tim, Today’s Alternative News, http://www.todaysalternativenews.com/index.php?event=link,150&values[0]=&values[1]=6296)JFS

**Did the end of the draft**, and the beginning of an all volunteer force **dissolve society’s relationship with the military? What is the status of c**ivil-**m**ilitary **r**elations **today?** Is watching the movie the Hurt Locker, a recent movie about Army explosive ordnance soldiers, as close as Americans can get to feeling like a nation at war. At West Point one of the most spirited debates I witnessed as a cadet revolved around a discussion concerning civil-military relations. The class was divided into three camps, **one group** which **argued** that **the military was a microcosm of American society, a small circle within a larger circle.** **Another group claimed that the military shared some beliefs with society**, but also had values which were incompatible, and hence the relationship was better represented by two circles which overlapped in some areas. **A third group** of cadets disputed both groups, and **contended that the American military and society were** really **two distinct circles** sharing only one point in common, a commitment to the Constitution. **The discussion** and questions **raised** in that class **have increasing relevance as the** duration of the **wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have lasted longer than the combined time** which the United States was engaged **in** fighting during **W**orld **W**ar **I**, **W**orld **W**ar **II**, **and the Korean War.** The questions raised should not be confused with shouldering burdens, as **the recession’s impact has been felt** far and widespread **amongst many Americans** who are struggling to put food on the table and find jobs. Moreover, **the new G.I. Bill**, the first lady’s outspoken commitment to military families, **and the** overall **support by Americans for the troops has been incredible**. **But can Americans** honestly **say this country is at war, when less than one percent of the country wages war?** Perhaps **the** blanket **support for troops is merely a coping mechanism** for Americans in order to wash away any psychological discomfort for not feeling more involved in the nation’s supposed wars. If this is the case, then **the country could be entering an era of persistent conflict,** not because of the threats the U.S. faces, but rather because society has become inoculated to the concept of the ever-present war. Are Americans less averse to war as long as it means not me or my family? But Americans cannot feel guilty for not feeling at war when the nation has not even officially declared war. Or perhaps **this undeclared state of war is just an extension of society’s general disconnect with the military**, or awkwardness with being at war but not feeling at war? Worse yet, do we not declare war so we can conveniently support wars we are winning, while also allowing us the flexibility to move out of conflicts which are difficult and necessary but do not receive favorable press? Since leaving that class that day, my classmates and I have debated these questions in our heads for years. **There seems to be no clear-cut answer,** and sometimes the answers seem too hard to confront. But from the class, I now realize why the instructor always stressed that it was important to leave the ego in the hallways. Because **presuming one had the answers and not listening to others, was a clear sign of** moral and intellectual **laziness**.

**\_\_\_\_\*\*Consult the JCS CP**

Solvency - Afghanistan

**Obama’s desire for Afghanistan withdrawal can gain a consensus---but the military wants a say in the matter**

**Chandrasekaran and DeYoung 9** (Rajiv and Karen, writers for Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/20/AR2009092002878\_pf.html) GAT

**Obama insisted** in interviews aired Sunday **that he will not be rushed into making a decision. "We're not going to** put the cart before the horse and j**ust think that by sending more troops, we're automatically going to make Americans safe**," he said. The president, one adviser said, is "taking a very deliberate, rational approach, starting at the top" of what he called a "logic chain" that begins with setting objectives, followed by determining a methodology to achieve them. Only when the first two steps are completed, he said, can the third step -- a determination of resources -- be taken. "Who's to say we need more troops?" this official said. "McChrystal is not responsible for assessing how we're doing against al-Qaeda." **The administration's template for error is the Bush administration's policy in Iraq**. Initially, a small group of White House and Pentagon officials set the policy without regard for dissenting views; in later years, President George W. Bush said he was following advice from military commanders. "**We have seen what happens when an administration makes decisions by momentum and doesn't** challenge underlying assumptions and . . . **ensure that everybody with an equity in the matter is heard**," another official said. Among the key players shaping Obama's thinking on Afghanistan is **Gates**. The defense secretary **has repeatedly expressed concern about the size of the military's footprint in Afghanistan** even as he has acknowledged that McChrystal's plans have eased that anxiety. Some officials charge that the military has been trying to push Obama into a corner with public statements such as those by Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that the situation in Afghanistan is "serious and deteriorating" and "probably needs more forces." One official questioned whether McChrystal had already gone beyond his writ with public statements describing the protection of the Afghan population as more important than killing Taliban fighters. When Obama announced his strategy in March, there were few specifics fleshing out his broad goals, and the military was left to interpret how to implement them. As they struggle over how to adjust to changing reality on the ground, some in the administration have begun to fault McChrystal for taking the policy beyond where Obama intended, with no easy exit. But **Obama's deliberative pace** -- he has held only one meeting of his top national security advisers to discuss McChrystal's report so far -- **is a source of growing consternation within the military. "Either accept the assessment or correct it, or let's have a discussion**," one Pentagon official said. "Will you read it and tell us what you think?" Within the military, this official said, "there is a frustration. A significant frustration. A serious frustration."

Solvency - Afghanistan

**Gates and Petraeus are both opposed to rushing out of Afghanistan – they want to have a say in evaluating the conditions**

**Raw 6/20** (Raw Story, 6/20/10, http://rawstory.com/rs/2010/0620/officials-july-2011-afghan-withdrawal-deadline/) GAT

US Defense Secretary Robert **Gates rejected suggestions** Sunday **that US forces will move out of Afghanistan in large numbers** in July of next year **under a deadline set by** President Barack **Obama**. "That absolutely has not been decided," Gates said in an interview with Fox News Sunday. His comment was the latest indication that the magnitude of the drawdown, if not the deadline itself, is the subject of an intensifying internal debate at a time when a NATO-led campaign against the Taliban is going slower than expected. Vice President Joe Biden, an early skeptic of the US military buildup in Afghanistan, was quoted as telling author Jonathan Alter recently: "In July of 2011, you're going to see a whole lot of people moving out. Bet on it." White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel did not deny the Biden quote when asked about it, but, like Gates, said that the size of the drawdown would depend on conditions on the ground. "Everybody knows there's a firm date. And that firm date is a date (that) deals with the troops that are part of the surge, the additional 30,000," he said in an interview with ABC "This Week." "What will be determined at that date or going into that date will be the scale and scope of that reduction," he said. General David Petraeus, the commander of US forces in the Middle East, said last week that in setting the deadline for the surge last year, Obama's message was "one of urgency -- not that July 2011 is when we race for the exits, reach for the light switch and flip it off." **Petraeus told lawmakers he would** be duty-bound to **recommend delaying the redeployment of forces if he thought it necessary**. In the same hearing, the Pentagon's policy chief, Michelle Flournoy, said a responsible, conditions-based drawdown would depend on there being provinces ready to be transferred to Afghan control, and that there be Afghan combat forces capable of taking the lead. Officials have said that training of Afghan security forces has gone slower than expected, in part because there are not enough trainers. **Gates said** he had not personally heard Biden's comments so would not take them at face value. "**The pace... with which we draw down and how many we draw down is going to be conditions-based**," he said. He said there was "general agreement" that those conditions would be determined by the US commander, General Stanley McChrystal, the senior NATO representative in Kabul and the Afghan government. McChrystal has said that even though a key campaign in Kandahar was taking longer than expected, it will be clear by December whether the surge and his counter-insurgency strategy were working**. Gates complained that "there's a rush** to judgment, frankly**, that loses sight of the fact we are still in the middle of getting all of the right components into place and giving us a little time to have this work**." But lawmakers from both parties have voiced increasing concern about the situation in Afghanistan. Diane Feinstein, chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee, said Sunday that 40 percent of the country is controlled or contested by the Taliban, and the conflict is "metastasizing" with insurgent groups joining forces and sharing money. "There is one, I think, irreversible truth: The Taliban is on a march," she said. "If you lose Afghanistan, Pakistan is the next step. And so what that bodes is nothing but ill because Pakistan is a nuclear (state)." Senator Richard Lugar, an influential Republican, said saying "goodbye" to Afghanistan was not the solution. "I think the president is going to have to redefine the plan, and when the proper time comes for that, he will have to make a decision," he said.

Solvency - Iraq

**Gates will be willing to cooperate over Iraq withdrawal as long as genuine consultation is involved**

**Gray 8** (Andrew, writer for Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN02288401) GAT

U.S. Defense Secretary Robert **Gates**, who will stay on under Barack Obama, **said** on Tuesday **he supported the president-elect's Iraq policy** but declined to back his proposed timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. forces. Gates, who had previously insisted he wanted to bow out at the end of the Bush administration, also vowed he would not be a "caretaker" under Obama and said no time limit had been put on how long he would continue to serve. "The president-elect and I agreed that this would be open-ended," said Gates, introduced on Monday as Obama's pick for the Pentagon in a national security team that also includes Sen. Hillary Clinton as his choice for secretary of state. The decision by the Democratic president-elect to retain Gates, a Republican, was historic. Gates said it was the first time a new U.S. president had chosen to retain the secretary of defense from a previous administration. Gates, a former CIA director, was hired by President George W. Bush in late 2006 primarily to help turn around a deeply unpopular Iraq war that was almost out of control. He oversaw a surge of 30,000 extra U.S. troops that helped produce a dramatic decline in violence and he has been widely praised for repairing relations with the military, Congress and the media that frayed under his predecessor Donald Rumsfeld. But Obama and the Bush administration had clashed over withdrawals from Iraq, where the United States still has 146,000 troops, more than five years after the 2003 invasion. Obama and other Democrats have demanded a pullout timetable while the Bush administration insisted any troop cuts should be based on commanders' assessments of the security situation. Obama restated on Monday that be believed U.S. combat troops could be withdrawn in 16 months. **Gates** declined to say whether he backed the 16-month goal but **indicated he was comfortable with Obama's position because the president**-elect **had pledged to** act responsibly and **listen to U.S. commanders**. "I would subscribe to what the president-elect said yesterday in Chicago," he said. "**He repeated his desire to try and get our combat forces out within 16 months. But he also said** that he wanted to have a responsible drawdown. And he also said **that he was prepared to listen to his commanders**," Gates said. "So **I think that that's exactly the position the president-elect should be in**." Both Obama and Gates are committed to sending more troops to Afghanistan, where insurgent violence has risen sharply. Gates pledged to give personal attention to a wide range of issues, from the needs of wounded troops to modernizing weapons systems. "We need to take a very hard look at the way we go about acquisition and procurement," he said. But Gates declined to comment on specific weapons programs or his position on the purchase of additional top-of-the-line F-22 fighter jets, made by Lockheed Martin Corp (LMT.N). Gates said he expected Obama's transition team to suggest nominees for almost all the political posts at the Pentagon. He would interview nominees and make recommendations but the final decision would be Obama's. Gates' deputy Gordon England, who took the post under Rumsfeld, announced on Tuesday he would not stay on.

Solvency - Iraq

**Gates has said that is willing to work with Obama’s open-minded approach to Iraq as long as consultation is involved**

**Barnes 8** (Julian E., writer for the LA Times, http://articles.latimes.com/2008/dec/03/nation/na-gates3/2) GAT

Defense Secretary Robert M. **Gates said he accepted** President-elect Barack **Obama's approach to** scheduled **troop reductions in Iraq**, arguing Tuesday that the hotly debated subject of timelines for withdrawal largely had been settled by a new U.S.-Iraq security agreement. "That bridge has been crossed," Gates said a day after he formally agreed to remain as Obama's Defense secretary. "And so the question is: How do we do this in a responsible way?" The security agreement, approved last week by Iraqi officials, requires U.S. combat troops to leave Iraqi cities and towns by June 30 and to withdraw completely by the end of 2011. Obama wants combat troops out within 16 months, but has indicated he would take security considerations and advice from commanders into account. By staying, Gates becomes the first U.S. Pentagon chief to be carried over from one administration to the next. In a Gallup poll released Tuesday, 80% of Americans surveyed supported Obama's decision to keep Gates. But Gates will have to manage a sharp change in policy, shifting from working for a president who has supported a high number of troops in Iraq to one who has repeatedly said he intends to quickly withdraw combat troops. Saying that his tenure would be "open-ended," Gates promised during a Pentagon news conference that he would not be merely a caretaker as secretary. He hinted that he planned to put some muscle behind his rhetorical critique of Pentagon spending priorities and to overhaul the way the military buys weapons. He also said that closing the U.S. military prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, would be a high priority, but could require new legislation, such as a measure preventing former detainees from seeking asylum in the United States. And Gates said that the next request for emergency war funding, an estimated $83 billion, would be delivered to Congress in a matter of weeks. If approved, it would bring the cost of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to about $947 billion. Obama assembled an experienced team of strong-willed national security experts, and Gates said that he expected there would be differences of opinion. But he emphasized that Obama would make the big strategic decisions. "The president-elect has made it pretty clear that he wanted a team of people around him who would tell him what they thought and give him their best advice," Gates said. "There will no doubt be differences among the team, and it will be up to the president to make the decisions." Although he is remaining in his job, Gates has told other political appointees that they should expect to be replaced as the Obama transition team moves to install its own team in the Pentagon. "The truth of the matter is, when I came here two years ago every single position was filled by somebody who had been appointed by somebody else," Gates said. "And I think it's worked out OK." After the news conference, Gordon R. England, the deputy Defense secretary, announced that he would leave his post. Transition team members have said that Richard Danzig, a close Obama advisor, is the leading candidate to replace England. In Washington, there had been debate over whether Gates, who was not registered in a political party, would fulfill Obama's promise of placing a Republican in his Cabinet. Gates, who worked at the CIA from 1966 to 1993, said he had not registered as a member of a political party because he believed that politics should not color the job of an intelligence analyst. But he added that before now, his senior appointments in government had been under Republican administrations, and that he considered himself a Republican. Gates first spoke with Obama about remaining on the job at a secret meeting inside the firehouse at Reagan National Airport, shortly after the president-elect met with President Bush last month at the White House. Aides to Obama never revealed that the airport meeting involved Gates. "They pulled the trucks out so that our cars could go in," Gates said. For months, advisors to Obama, including Danzig, had raised the possibility of keeping Gates on. Publicly, Gates had said that remaining in his post was "inconceivable," and he repeatedly referred to a clock he kept to count down the days to the end of the Bush administration. On Tuesday, Gates said he had "thrown away the clock." **The question of troop withdrawal** timetables **has been deeply divisive**. Many Republicans and military officers have bitterly opposed Obama's stance. Now, however, **with the U.S.-Iraq agreement in place, Gates said he could subscribe to Obama's view. He noted that the president**-elect **had indicated a willingness to be flexible**. "He did talk about the 16 months in terms of combat forces," Gates said. "But **he** also **talked about a responsible drawdown and that he was willing to listen to the commanders**." Gates also faces internal battles over Pentagon spending. He has long criticized the Pentagon, saying it favors complex and costly cutting-edge weapons at the expense of cheaper systems that could be produced quickly and sent to the field. With the Bush administration's time in office limited, Gates has deferred a string of important decisions dealing with the future of the Air Force's F-22 fighter jets and refueling tankers. He reiterated his support for building up American "soft power" by investing more in the State Department. Gates said that the new administration would need to discuss how to improve those capabilities, how to work with Congress to find more funding, and where that money should come from. "That's all still out in front of us," Gates said.

Solvency - Japan

**Gates is open to new approaches to military presence in Japan …**

**Japan Update 6/18** (online: <http://www.japanupdate.com/?id=10416>) GAT

 Prime Minister Naoto Kan has publicly announced he’ll honor the May agreement signed by his predecessor that keeps the base in Okinawa. Kan is also promising to work hard to reduce the burdens carried by the people of Okinawa. He’s reassured U.S. President Barack Obama that the bilateral agreement will move forward as planned. U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert **Gates**, speaking in London, signaled **a softening of the American position.** “I think **we have an obligation to work with our Japanese partners to see how we can together mitigate the impact in Okinawa of our military presence**,” Gate said, “**whether it’s having more training outside of Okinawa, or whether it’s noise-abatement procedures**. Gates added that “**there are some things we need to look at in terms of how we can be helpfu**l.” Japanese Defense Minister says the relocation must go forward, but says it will be difficult to gain consent from Okinawa before the end of August, as had been hoped. Toshimi Kitazawa says he doesn’t think the Kan administration can win the local consent needed to advance to the next phase. As the Cabinet moves toward the project, Kitazawa promised to provide as much transparency as possible on the issue.

**But he doesn’t want to rush or complicate any sort of troop withdrawal or movement in Japan – consultation is key**

**Pomfret and Harden 9** (John and Blaine, writers for the Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/21/AR2009102100746.html) GAT

**Worried about a new direction in Japan's foreign policy, the Obama administration warned** the **Tokyo** government Wednesday **of** serious consequences **if it reneges on a military realignment plan** formulated to deal with a rising China. The comments from Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates underscored increasing concern among U.S. officials as Japan moves to redefine its alliance with the United States and its place in Asia. In August, the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) won an overwhelming victory in elections, ending more than 50 years of one-party rule. For a U.S. administration burdened with challenges in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, North Korea and China, troubles with its closest ally in Asia constitute a new complication. **A** senior **State Department official said the U**nited **S**tates **had "grown comfortable" thinking about Japan as a constant in U.S. relations** in Asia. **It no longer is**, he said, adding that "the hardest thing right now is not China, it's Japan." The official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issue, said the new ruling party lacks experience in government and came to power wanting politicians to be in charge, not the bureaucrats who traditionally ran the country from behind the scenes. Added to that is a deep malaise in a society that has been politically and economically adrift for two decades. In the past week, officials from the DPJ have announced that Japan would withdraw from an eight-year-old mission in the Indian Ocean to refuel warships supporting U.S.-led coalition forces in Afghanistan. They have also pledged to reopen negotiations over a $26 billion military package that involves relocating a U.S. Marine Corps helicopter base in Japan and moving 8,000 U.S. Marines from Japan to Guam. After more than a decade of talks, the United States and Japan agreed on the deal in 2006. The atmospherics of the relationship have also morphed, with Japanese politicians now publicly contradicting U.S. officials. U.S. discomfort was on display Wednesday in Tokyo as **Gates pressured the government**, after meetings with Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, **to keep its commitment to the military agreement. "It is time to move on," Gates said, warning that if Japan pulls apart the troop "realignment road map," it would be "immensely complicated and counterproductive**." In a relationship in which protocol can be imbued with significance, Gates let his schedule do the talking, declining invitations to dine with Defense Ministry officials and to attend a welcome ceremony at the ministry. Hatoyama said Gates's presence in Japan "doesn't mean we have to decide everything." For decades, the alliance with the United States was a cornerstone of Japanese policy, but it was also a crutch. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) outsourced many foreign policy decisions to Washington. The base realignment plan, for example, was worked out as a way to confront China's expanding military by building up Guam as a counterweight to Beijing's growing navy and by improving missile defense capabilities to offset China and North Korea's increasingly

Solvency – Asian Theater (1/2)

**Gates is determined to maintain stability in Asia, but he’s willing to approach that goal from different ways now**

**Gates 6/5** (Robert, US Secretary of Defense, http://www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2010/plenary-session-speeches/first-plenary-session/robert-gates/) GAT

Thank you, John, for that kind introduction and, of course, as always, my thanks to everyone with the International Institute for Strategic Studies for making this conference possible. Your hard work makes a valuable contribution to the international dialogue and facilitates understanding among the countries represented here. I would also be remiss if I did not extend my gratitude to our Singaporean hosts and, of course, the Shangri-La Hotel for preparing for this event. As you mentioned, John, this is the fourth consecutive year that I have had the opportunity to address this forum as the United States Secretary of Defense. Each time I have spoken here, I have emphasised that **the US** is a Pacific nation and is, and **will remain, a power in the Pacific**. I do so for a reason: with sovereign territory and longstanding economic and cultural ties to this region, America’s security interests and economic well-being are integrally tied to Asia’s. As President Obama has noted, Asia and the US are not separated by the Pacific Ocean – we are bound by it. When I last stood before you, I did so only a few months after a new administration had taken office. President Obama’s policies toward this region were still evolving, but I noted that he had a very personal connection to this part of the world, and that, regardless of new initiatives or different areas of emphasis under his administration, the underlying themes of continuity and engagement in Asia would hold true. **The US has responsibilities to friends and allies, and will not waver in its longstanding commitments here**. Indeed, we will continue to deepen and expand our alliances and partnerships. In the next few minutes, I would like to provide an overview of how the US sees its responsibilities in the Asia-Pacific region within the context of broader US defence priorities and events over the past year. As a starting point, it is important to remember that the success this region has enjoyed over the past several decades – its unprecedented economic growth and political development – was not a foregone conclusion. Rather, it was enabled by clear choices about the enduring principles that we all believe are essential to peace, prosperity, and stability. These include our commitment to free and open commerce, a just international order that emphasises rights and responsibilities of nations and fidelity to the rule of law, open access by all to the global commons of sea, air, space, and now, cyberspace, and the principle of resolving conflict without the use of force. Simply put, pursuing our common interests has increased our common security. **Today, the Asia-Pacific region is contending with new and evolving challenges**, from rising powers and failing states, to the proliferation of nuclear and ballistic missiles, extremist violence, and new technologies that have the ability to disrupt the foundations of trade and commerce on which Asia’s economic stability depends. **Confronting these threats is not the task of any one nation acting alone**. Rather, our collective response will test our commitment to the principles I just mentioned – principles that are key to the region’s continued prosperity. In this, all of us have responsibilities we must fulfill, since all will bear the costs of instability as well as the rewards of international cooperation. **My government’s overriding obligation to allies, partners, and the region is to reaffirm America’s security commitments in this region. Over the past year,** the **Obama** administration **has begun to lay out the architecture of America’s future defence posture** through a series of strategy reviews. These reviews were shaped by a bracing dose of realism, and in a very sober and clear-eyed way assessed risks, set priorities, made tradeoffs, and identified requirements based on plausible, real-world threats, scenarios, and potential adversaries. **It has become clear to us that an effective**, affordable, **and sustainable US defence posture requires a broad portfolio of military capabilities with maximum versatility across the widest possible spectrum of conflict**. Fielding these capabilities, and demonstrating the resolve to use them if necessary, assures friends and potential adversaries alike of the credibility of US security commitments through our ability to defend against the full range of potential threats. With regard to Asia, the US is increasing its deterrent capabilities in a number of ways. Firstly, we are taking serious steps to enhance our missile defences with the intent to develop capabilities in Asia that are flexible and deployable, tailored to the unique needs of our allies and partners and able to counter the clear and growing ballistic missile threats in the region. Secondly, we are renewing our commitment to a strong and effective extended deterrence that guarantees the safety of the American people and the defence of our allies and partners. As President Obama has stated, this administration is committed to reducing the role of nuclear weapons as we work toward a world without such weapons but, as long as these weapons exist, we will maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal. Finally, as has been the case for six decades, the strength of US commitment and deterrent power will be expressed through the continued forward presence of substantial US forces in the region. While this is the subject of a Global Posture Review scheduled to be completed toward the end of the year, one general trend should be clear: **the US defence posture in Asia is shifting to one that is more geographically distributed**, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable. The build-up on Guam is part of this shift, as well as the agreement reached on basing with Japan, an agreement that fittingly comes during the 50th anniversary of our mutual security alliance and transcends any individual policymaker. Broadly speaking, it is important to note that **we should not measure US presence**, and the associated impact and influence, **solely in terms of conventional military bases**. Rather, we must think more about US presence in the broader sense of what we achieve in the region – the connections made, the results accomplished – and this includes everything from medical teams, to civil engineering personnel, to partner militaries that are more professional and capable of contributing to international efforts to deal with the most vexing security challenges we face. These kinds of activities reflect a priority of the overall US security strategy: to prevent and deter conflict by better deploying and integrating all the elements of our national power and international cooperation. As we have learned, **military capabilities are critically important but, by themselves, do not deter conflict**; sustained diplomatic, economic, and cultural ties also play vital roles in maintaining stability and improving relationships. The history of the past 60 years in this part of the world has proven that historic tensions can be overcome, that instability can be avoided, and that strategic rivalries are not inevitable. As has been the case

throughout the years, the responsibility to prevent and deter conflict must be shared by everyone in the region. Last fall, President

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Solvency – Asian Theater (2/2)

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Obama and President Hu made a commitment to advance sustained and reliable military-to-military relations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. The key words here are ‘sustained’ and ‘reliable’ – not a relationship repeatedly interrupted by and subject to the vagaries of political weather. Regrettably, we have not been able to make progress on this relationship in recent months. Chinese officials have broken off interactions between our militaries, citing US arms sales to Taiwan as the rationale. For a variety of reasons, this makes little sense: Firstly, US arms sales to Taiwan are nothing new. They have been a reality for decades and spanned multiple American administrations. Secondly, the United States has for years demonstrated in a very public way that we do not support independence for Taiwan. Nothing – I repeat, nothing – has changed in that stance. Finally, because China’s accelerating military build-up is largely focused on Taiwan, US arms sales are an important component of maintaining peace and stability in cross-strait relations and throughout the region. Considering all this, President Obama’s decision in January to sell select defensive weapons to Taiwan should come as no surprise. It was based on well-established precedent and the longstanding belief of the US government that a peaceful and non-coerced resolution to the Taiwan issue is an abiding national interest and vital for the overall security of Asia. The US and China clearly disagree on this matter. Yet Taiwan arms sales over the decades – in fact, since normalisation – have not impeded closer political and economic ties, nor closer ties in other security arenas of mutual interest, which I know all too well. Only in the military-to-military arena has progress on critical mutual security issues been held hostage over something that is, quite frankly, old news. It has been clear to everyone during the more than 30 years since normalisation that interruptions in our military relationship with China will not change US policy toward Taiwan. That said, I can tell you all that the US Department of Defense wants what both Presidents Obama and Hu want: sustained and reliable military-to-military contacts at all levels that reduce miscommunication, misunderstanding, and miscalculation. There is a real cost to the absence of military-to-military relations. I believe they are essential to regional security and essential to developing a broad, resilient US-China relationship that is positive in tone, cooperative in nature, and comprehensive in scope. The US, for its part, is ready to work toward these goals. Of course, building greater trust and enhancing transparency is a common interest of all the countries represented here. On this note, I welcome the increase in recent years of multilateral forums in which Asian countries can discuss security issues and share information. Though progress has been made, I believe more can be done. **We can only deal with the complex threats of the twenty-first century through an increased commitment to results-oriented multilateral cooperation**. I should mention here that yesterday I was pleased to accept Minister Thanh’s invitation to participate in the expanded ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting in Hanoi this October. One of the most important areas where these forums can play a role is in promoting open, transparent, and equal access to the global commons. Whether the issue is cyberspace, maritime security, or freedom of navigation, **it is clear that increased multilateral dialogue is necessary to avoid unnecessary tensions, miscalculations, and, in a worst-case scenario, open conflict**. It is the longstanding policy of the US to defend these principles and we will continue to do so in the future. In Asia, we have placed a particular importance on the maritime commons for many years – for security, for trade and commerce, and free passage. We must strive together for outcomes and solutions that are not zero-sum – pitting one nation’s interests against another’s. In this respect, the South China Sea is an area of growing concern. This sea is not only vital to those directly bordering it, but to all nations with economic and security interests in Asia. Our policy is clear: it is essential that stability, freedom of navigation, and free and unhindered economic development be maintained. We do not take sides on any competing sovereignty claims, but we do oppose the use of force and actions that hinder freedom of navigation. We object to any effort to intimidate US corporations or those of any nation engaged in legitimate economic activity. All parties must work together to resolve differences through peaceful, multilateral efforts consistent with customary international law. The 2002 Declaration of Conduct was an important step in this direction and we hope that concrete implementation of this agreement will continue. Another aspect of maritime security – and the overall US defence strategy in this region – is building partner capacity. After all, shared responsibilities for security in Asia require, as a starting point, that individual nations have the ability to contribute in the first place – that they possess the means not only to secure their own territories, but also to export security abroad. **As our partners develop new capabilities, they have a responsibility to take a greater role in providing for regional and global security**. Whether in the Gulf of Aden, or in Iraq, or in Afghanistan, the nations of Asia are making vital contributions to international operations. They are demonstrating real responsibility on the global stage. On the other hand, **we all face the reality of North Korea, which continues to undermine the peace and stability of Asia**. As you know, on March 26th, North Korea, in an unprovoked attack, sank the Cheonan, a South Korean ship patrolling South Korean territorial waters, and in so doing killed 46 South Korean sailors. This sinking is far more than a single, isolated incident with tragic results for the sailors and their families. It is, rather, part of a larger pattern of provocative and reckless behaviour. As I pointed out last year at this forum, North Korea has for some time faced the choice of continuing as a destitute, international pariah or charting a new path. Since then, the North Korean regime has only further isolated itself from the international community. Since the sinking of the Cheonan, the US, the Republic of Korea, and others have been in close consultations. My government has offered full support of our ally in this difficult hour. We will conduct combined military exercises with South Korea and support action in the United Nations Security Council. At the same time, we are assessing additional options to hold North Korea accountable. The **nations of this region share the task of addressing these dangerous provocations**. Inaction would amount to an abdication of our collective responsibility to protect the peace and reinforce stability in Asia. North Korea must cease its belligerent behaviour and demonstrate clearly and decisively that it wants to pursue a different path. Overall, everything I have discussed today is emblematic of a renewed and deepening commitment to this region and the partnerships we have worked hard to cultivate over the decades. **We are, and will remain, a Pacific power**. There is no question that, in the future, even more than in the past, the safety, security, and economic well-being of the US will be increasingly linked to Asia. **The US defence strategy in this region reflects continuing recognition of both old and new challenges to peace** and security, from North Korea to extremist terrorism, **while acknowledging the many changes that have taken place in recent years**, especially the rise of Asia and its place in the global order. All of this calls on us to step forward and counter new threats and harness new opportunities. The US is prepared to do just that, and we ask that all the nations represented here join us, as together we work to forge a peaceful and prosperous future. Thank you.

Solvency - Contractors

**The military is becoming increasingly anti-contractor – they’d say yes**

**Isenberg 10** (David, writer for the Huffington post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-isenberg/military-ethics-and-priva\_b\_466291.html) GAT

But aside from arguments over cost-effectiveness other **military professionals have criticized reliance on private contractors** for what they see as a deleterious impact on both civil-military relations and military professionalism itself. The latest example of this is a monograph published earlier this month by the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute. The monograph, written by Colonel Matthew Moten, deputy head of the Department of History at West Point, says this with respect to contractors: Since the post-Cold War drawdown, the Armed Forces have chosen to rely more and more heavily on commercial contractors. In many cases, this reliance has been unavoidable and indeed liberating, such as in the manufacture of complex weapons systems. Properly overseen, this military-industrial partnership can be a boon tonational security**. In many** other **cases**, however, **contractors have assumed responsibilities that heretofore were considered inherently military**, such as logistical support, protecting installations and high-ranking officials, and developing professional doctrine. An army that depends on commercial enterprise to deliver its food and fuel is subcontracting its sustenance--an army travels on its stomach. An army that relies on contractors for its doctrine is farming out its thinking--an army fights with its brain as much as its arms. And an army that permits civilians to employ armed force on the battlefield tolerates mercenaries, the antithesis of professionals. **Today, the Army is "selling" large tracts of its** professional **jurisdiction**. Moreover, as the Army contracts for these core functions, **it not only cedes professional jurisdiction to private enterprise, it****loses some of its ability to sustain and renew its expertise**, to develop the next generation of professional officers, **and to nurture the ability to think creatively about new problems--**each of which is intrinsic to a healthy profession. **An army that chooses short-term expediency over long-term professional****health also chooses slow professional death. (**pp. 16-17)

Solvency – Non-Combat Missions

**Civilian command of non-combat missions can cause CMR to break down – the military would say yes**

**Yoo 9** (John, prof. of Law at Berkeley Univ, Duke Law Journal, June 2009) GAT

This appears to explain developments in civil-military relations since the end of the Cold War. It does not appear that civilian monitoring or sanctions have fallen; in fact, they may well have risen. The **tension in civilian-military relations** nevertheless **has sharpened because the difference between civilian and military policy preferences has grown** at an even faster rate. This should come as no surprise. The disappearance of the Soviet threat, which had been the overwhelming focus of American military planning for a half-century, left both sets of leaders searching for a redefinition of national security means and ends. **Increasing reliance on the military for operations that do not involve combat**, such as drug interdiction, nation building, and disaster relief, **may draw the military more deeply into civilian debates, increase the scope for disagreements over the role of the military, and place strains on the military’s resources and warfighting abilities**. An all-volunteer force may have exacerbated tensions as the military becomes more separate and distinct from civilian society.

Solvency – Troop Withdrawal

**Consulting the military is key to successful troop withdrawal**

**Cook & Ulrich 6** (Martin L., U.S. Air Force Academy; Marybeth P., Department of National Security and Strategy at U.S. Army War College, November 2006, Journal of Military Ethics, Vol. 5, No. 3, p. 161-182) GAT

 **The Bush administration has maintained** throughout the conflict th**at the president defers to the commanders** on the ground **on the issue of troop levels**. Paul Bremer, the President’s representative on the ground in the first year of the occupation, reportedly clashed with the military on this issue. In October of 2004, he remarked to the media that he had wanted more troops on the ground in Iraq as phase IV operations began. Scott McClellan, White House Press Secretary, stated in response to Bremer’s comments, ‘The lessons from the past, including Vietnam, are that we shouldn’t try to micromanage military decisions from Washington’. President Bush used almost the same words himself in an interview in the heat of the 2004 presidential campaign: The thing about the Vietnam War that troubles me as I look back was it was a political war. We had politicians making military decisions, and it is [sic] lessons that any president must learn, and that is to the set the goal and the objective and allow the military to come up with the plans to achieve that objective. And those are essential lessons to be learned from the Vietnam War (Meet the Press 7 February 2004) In the final presidential debate, the presidential candidates clashed over the issue: President Bush: I remember sitting in the White House, looking at those generals, saying, do you have what you need in this war? Do you have what it takes? I remember going down in the basement of the White House the day we committed our troops\*as last resort\*looking at Tommy Franks and the generals on the ground, asking them, do we have the right plan with the right troop level? And they looked me in the eye and said, yes, sir, Mr. President. Of course, I listened to our generals. That’s what a President does. A President sets the strategy and relies upon good military people to execute that strategy. Moderator : Senator. Senator Kerry: You rely on good military people to execute the military component of the strategy, but winning the peace is larger than just the military component. General Shinseki had the wisdom to say you’re going to need several hundred thousand troops to win the peace. The military’s job is to win the war. The President’s job is to win the peace. **The civilmilitary relations question** to consider **is: ‘What is the proper balance between relying on military advice while also maintaining responsibility for the policy?**’ President **Bush’s** understanding of **civilmilitary relations** in wartime does **not allow for the process of collaborative civilmilitary strategic reassessment** to occur in that ‘achieving the objective’ is left to the military. **This has been particularly true in the question of troop levels** where President Bush has repeatedly declared that he defers to his commanders in this area. He reaffirmed this belief in his December 18, 2005, address to the nation, ‘I will make decisions on troop levels based on the progress we see on the ground and the advice of our military leaders\*not based on artificial timetables set by politicians in Washington’. Political leaders must be careful not to shift the burden of initiating strategic adjustment to the military. **Modifying troop levels is an action of strategic adjustment requiring both the input of military experts and political judgment. Political leaders who delegate strategy adjustment to their military commanders run the risk of undermining their own authority** and responsibility over strategic policy if such action elevates military advice to the final authority on policy. **The civilmilitary norm in this area should reflect** two fundamental principles. The first of these is **an understanding** that the military sphere **of** competence is limited vis-a`-vis the president’s and Congress’ political sphere. Both sides should also take into the account **the requirement in democratic states for the civilian policymaker to be the accountable authority** in the decision-making process. The residual climate that prevails in the post- Shinseki era is likely constraining the uniformed military from speaking out.

Solvency – Troop Withdrawal

**Genuine consultation key to successful troop withdrawal – internal opposition created by unilateral decisions**

**Porter 9** (Gareth, reporter for IPS, http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=45640) GAT

CENTCOM commander Gen. David **Petraeus, supported by** Defence Secretary Robert **Gates, tried to convince** President Barack **Obama that he had to back down from his** campaign **pledge to withdraw** all U.S. combat **troops from Iraq** within 16 months at an Oval Office meeting Jan. 21. But Obama informed Gates, Petraeus and Joint Chiefs Chairman Adm. Mike Mullen that he wasn't convinced and that he wanted Gates and the military leaders to come back quickly with a detailed 16-month plan, according to two sources who have talked with participants in the meeting. **Obama's decision to override Petraeus's recommendation has not ended the conflict between the president and** senior military **officers over** troop **withdrawa**l, however. There are indications that Petraeus and his allies in the military and the Pentagon, including Gen. Ray Odierno, now the top commander in Iraq, have already begun to try to pressure Obama to change his withdrawal policy. Gareth Porter talks to Real News about his investigative piece for IPS. A network of senior military officers is also reported to be preparing to support Petraeus and Odierno by mobilising public opinion against Obama's decision. Petraeus was visibly unhappy when he left the Oval Office, according to one of the sources. A White House staffer present at the meeting was quoted by the source as saying, "Petraeus made the mistake of thinking he was still dealing with George Bush instead of with Barack Obama." Petraeus, Gates and Odierno had hoped to sell Obama on a plan that they formulated in the final months of the Bush administration that aimed at getting around a key provision of the U.S.-Iraqi withdrawal agreement signed envisioned re-categorising large numbers of combat troops as support troops. That subterfuge was by the United States last November while ostensibly allowing Obama to deliver on his campaign promise. Gates and Mullen had discussed the relabeling scheme with Obama as part of the Petraeus-Odierno plan for withdrawal they had presented to him in mid-December, according to a Dec. 18 New York Times story. Obama decided against making any public reference to his order to the military to draft a detailed 16-month combat troop withdrawal policy, apparently so that he can announce his decision only after consulting with his field commanders and the Pentagon. The first clear indication of the intention of Petraeus, Odierno and their allies to try to get Obama to amend his decision came on Jan. 29 when the New York Times published an interview with Odierno, ostensibly based on the premise that Obama had indicated that he was "open to alternatives". The Times reported that Odierno had "developed a plan that would move slower than Mr. Obama's campaign timetable" and had suggested in an interview "it might take the rest of the year to determine exactly when United States forces could be drawn down significantly". The opening argument by the Petraeus-Odierno faction against Obama's withdrawal policy was revealed the evening of the Jan. 21 meeting when retired Army Gen. Jack Keane, one of the authors of the Bush troop surge policy and a close political ally and mentor of Gen. Petraeus, appeared on the Lehrer News Hour to comment on Obama's pledge on Iraq combat troop withdrawal. Keane, who had certainly been briefed by Petraeus on the outcome of the Oval Office meeting, argued that implementing such a withdrawal of combat troops would "increase the risk rather dramatically over the 16 months". He asserted that it would jeopardise the "stable political situation in Iraq" and called that risk "not acceptable". **The assertion that Obama's withdrawal policy threatens the gains allegedly won by** the Bush surge a**nd Petraeus's strategy in Iraq will apparently be the theme of the campaign** that military opponents are now planning. Keane, the Army Vice-Chief of Staff from 1999 to 2003, has ties to a network of active and retired four-star Army generals, and since Obama's Jan. 21 order on the 16-month withdrawal plan, some of the retired four-star generals in that network have begun discussing a campaign to blame Obama's troop withdrawal from Iraq for the ultimate collapse of the political "stability" that they expect to follow U.S. withdrawal, according to a military source familiar with the network's plans. The source says the network, which includes senior active duty officers in the Pentagon, will begin making the argument to journalists covering the Pentagon that **Obama's withdrawal policy risks an eventual collapse in Iraq**. That would raise the political cost to Obama of sticking to his withdrawal policy. I**f Obama does not change the policy**, according to the source, **they hope to have planted the seeds of a future political narrative blaming his withdrawal policy for the "collapse" they expect in** an **Iraq** without U.S. troops. That line seems likely to appeal to reporters covering the Iraq troop withdrawal issue. Ever since Obama's inauguration, media coverage of the issue has treated Obama' s 16-month withdrawal proposal as a concession to anti-war sentiment which will have to be adjusted to the "realities" as defined by the advice to Obama from Gates, Petreaus and Odierno\

Solvency – Consultation Key to Success

**Real consultation with the military is needed to create effective policies involving the military**

**Cook & Ulrich 6** (Martin L., U.S. Air Force Academy; Marybeth P., Department of National Security and Strategy at U.S. Army War College, November 2006, Journal of Military Ethics, Vol. 5, No. 3, p. 161-182) GAT

The aftermath of the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks illustrated the difficulties inherent in applying the civilmilitary conventional wisdom as a recipe for strategic success. Yet **in the current strategic environment basic principles underlying the collaboration of civilian and military actors go unarticulated**. Who is responsible for initiating the process of strategic adaptation\*commanders on the ground or civilian policymakers? How should military professionals balance the requirement to remain subordinate to civilian politicians while also executing their professional responsibility to ensure that the strategy benefits from the unique strategic insights and professional expertise the military can provide? As of this writing, in March 2006, with over 2568 US military personnel dead in both Iraqi and Afghan operations and more than 17,000 wounded, achievement of the operations’ objectives is eluding the Bush Administration. Casualty rates in Iraq throughout 2005 and into 2006 parallel the highest levels of the war. Cindy Sheehan, the gold-star mother (i.e., a mother whose son was killed in wartime) who set up camp in the summer of 2005 in Crawford, Texas outside the vacationing President Bush’s ranch, became a media phenomenon in the summer. Public opinion polls now indicate a majority of Americans disapprove of President Bush’s handling of the War in Iraq (Forsythe 2005).3 Conflicting reports have been issued from the Pentagon, the White House, and commanders in the field regarding important aspects of adapting strategy such as timetables, troop levels, and whether or not Iraq is on the brink of civil war (Hendren 2006). The war’s cost mounts as double-digit billion dollar supplemental appropriations have become routine in Congress and total costs now surpass $248 billion.4 What had been a slumbering, compliant Congress passed anti-torture legislation against the Administration’s wishes, is discussing a requirement for regular reports on secret detentions, and rejected the Administration’s request for the full renewal of the USA Patriot Act. Long-time conservative Democrat and defense proponent, Congressman John Murtha of Pennsylvania, spoke out against the war in mid-November 2005. The respected, decorated Vietnam veteran and 16-term congressman declared that the War in Iraq could not be won militarily and that US forces should be gradually withdrawn (Murtha 2005). Only in late 2005 did the administration begin to change its tune from ‘stay the course’ to admission of some mistakes and miscalculations. It began to talk about significant troop withdrawals from Iraq as a possibility in the not-too-distant future. Defining policy success may be an elusive aim, but at a minimum **a policy is successful when its desired outcomes are achieved at an acceptable cost**. This definition focuses on the importance of reaching a consensus on reasonable desired outcomes at the outset. Furthermore, **unless the articulated desired outcomes are accompanied by realistic cost estimates, policymakers run the risk that political support** for the policy **will erode when actual costs far outstrip the estimates. If one applies this concept** of policy success **to the** case of the **war in Iraq, it is clear that the current state of affairs does not appear to be achieving the desired outcomes** and the initial cost estimates were utterly unrealistic. Much of the US debate is currently focused on recommendations for salvaging policies that have not played out according to plan. But in addition, **attention must** also be **paid to the flawed national security processes that resulted in the current state of affairs.** We argue that **the nature of these civil military interactions is a critical variable in determining whether or not policies are successful. Success is more likely when the civilian and military actors fully collaborate in ways that draw on the distinct competencies and responsibilities that each brings to the policy**. This article goes beyond recent calls by both authors to ensure that the principles of democratic civilian control are attained (Ulrich 2005: 655682; Cook 20022003: 2133). Civilmilitary relations since 911 suggest that these normative principles must be extended to include the assumption of responsibility by the military for the overall success of a strategy. Assuming responsibility for strategy success means that the military and other national security professionals5 with a role in the development and execution of the policy take all steps to ensure that their expertise is considered when the policy is vetted. When a policy begins to show signs of strategic failure, national security professionals should attempt to adapt the strategy.

Solvency – Consultation Key to Success

**Successful military policies rely on consultation of military actors**

**Cook & Ulrich 6** (Martin L., U.S. Air Force Academy; Marybeth P., Department of National Security and Strategy at U.S. Army War College, November 2006, Journal of Military Ethics, Vol. 5, No. 3, p. 161-182) GAT

**The** strategic **complexities of** waging and winning **the War on Terror require a new** fundamental **understanding of** democratic **civil-military relations**. Not US ‘crossing the line’ remains a professional obligation. However, **the current** strategic **environment demands a complementary requirement to ‘approach the line’ to ensure full** strategic **engagement of** all relevant **national security actors**. Strategic success depends on more than keeping the competing forces of liberty and security in balance. Indeed, focusing on this balance alone could result in strategic failure. In addition, **national security professionals must be able to** take comprehensive stock of all elements of the strategy and **offer their unique expertise** to note omissions and correct mistakes. In short, **strategic success is dependent on military and civilian professionals**, alike, actively asserting their strategic expertise to influence strategic deliberations. Such actions, along with concrete efforts to encourage strategy adaptation, constitute assuming responsibility for the overall success of the policy.

Net Ben – Politics Shield

**Failure to enter into consultation creates political backlash**

**Hooker 4** (Richard D., member of the Council on Foreign Relations, Winter 2004, Parameters, p. 4-18) GAT

To be sure, **the military as an institution enjoys** some **advantages**. Large and well-trained staffs, extended tenure, bureaucratic expertise, cross-cutting relationships with industry, **overt and covert relationships with congressional supporters**, and stability during lengthy transitions between administrations **give it a strong voice**. But on the big issues of budget and force structure, social policy, and war and peace, the influence of senior military elites—absent powerful congressional and media support—is more limited than is often recognized. If this thesis is correct, the instrumentalities and the efficacy of civilian control are not really at issue. As I have suggested, political freedom of action is the nub of the problem. Hampered by constitutionally separated powers which put the military in both the executive and legislative spheres, **civilian elites** face a dilemma. They **can force the military to do their bidding, but they cannot** always **do so without paying a political price. Because society values the importance of independent, nonpoliticized military counsel, a civilian who publicly discounts that advice in an area presumed to require military expertise runs significant political risks. The opposition party will surely exploit any daylight between civilian and military leaders, particularly in wartime**—hence the discernible trend in the modern era away from the Curtis LeMays and Arleigh Burkes of yesteryear who brought powerful heroic personas and public reputations into the civil-military relationship.

Net Ben – Solves CMR

**Obama needs to consult the military before any serious policy implementations to maintain CMR**

**Kohn 8** (Richard H., Professor of the Hist. of Peace, War, and Defense at Univ. of North. Carolina, <http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2008-Winter/full-civil-military.html>) GAT

Last of all, **the** new **president ought to reach out to the armed forces** in their own communities: visiting bases, praising the military with genuine sincerity, addressing veteran’s care, making certain that as troops are withdrawn from Iraq, no blame falls unfairly on them for what follows. **The political leadership will have to consult widely about changes, cuts, consolidations, and other modifications** to the defense establishment. **The next administration will need to establish a precedent for** strict **civilian control from the outset**, all the while spending political capital on national defense and boosting the morale of what will likely be an anxious force. Consistent and vocal praise for military (and public) service would go a long way—easy for a Republican who abandons the demonization of government, difficult for a Democrat accustomed to ignoring or criticizing the military. Soldiers and civilians alike will have momentous decisions to make. **Politicians will have to choose whether** to lead or to hide, whether in **the name of maintaining or establishing their bona fides as “supporters of the military” they will put off decisions that upend the current and unsustainable order of things. Military leaders face their most important choice** in more than half a century: **whether to cooperate and assist in this effort, or to resist past the point of advice and discussion**, to the detriment of their service, national defense, and indeed their professional souls.

**Consulting, not steamrolling, is key to maintaining CMR**

**Ackerman 8** (Spencer, writer for the Washington Independent, http://washingtonindependent.com/18335/productive-obama-military-relationship-possible) GAT

Whether a Commander-in-Chief Obama can continue the tone that Candidate Obama sounded in July remains to be seen. According to interviews with active and retired military officers, O**bama and the military can have a productive relationship, provided that Obama operates along** some simple principles. **Consult, don’t steamroll** — and don’t capitulate. **Be honest about disagreements, and emphasize areas of agreement. Make Petraeus a partner, not an adversary**. Similarly, the uniformed military will have to keep certain principles in mind as well. There’s only one commander in chief, and you’re not him. **Don’t substitute military judgment for strategic judgment**. Obama enters office without some of the impediments to healthy civil-military relations that hindered Clinton. Clinton, a baby boomer, had to deal with the legacy of not serving in Vietnam, while Obama, born in 1961, doesn’t have the baggage of the Vietnam era weighing him down. “He didn’t serve, but he didn’t serve with distinction,” said Feaver, laughing.

**Binding consultation is necessary for Obama to maintain CMR**

**Ackerman 8** (Spencer, writer for the Washington Independent, http://washingtonindependent.com/18335/productive-obama-military-relationship-possible) GAT

**A**nother **challenge for Obama**, beyond Petraeus and Iraq, **would be senior officers’ desire “to get back to preparing –and procuring — for the big, conventional Russia-China scenario** the U.S. military institutionally prefers,” the anonymous Pentagon official said. **But the current financial crisis and massive budget deficits create their own pressures on defense spending. All interviewed said there were no shortage of potential pitfalls** in the new Obama-military relationship. **Two wars, a persistent threat from Al Qaeda, an overstretched ground force and a likely Pentagon budget crunch guarantee difficult decisions in the next four years.** **“The single biggest mistake Obama could make would be to “completely discount the advice of the military senior leadership** and those of his combat commanders who have the most experience dealing with the issues,” said the anonymous senior Army officer. “**Even if he does not discount it, but is perceived to discount it, the relationship will be largely going back to the Clinton era, and will take years to repair. That’s not something you want to do in a time of war, which most of the nation has forgotten.”**

Net Ben – Solves CMR

**Consultation solves CMR problems through media – this is crucial in the modern age**

**Sarkesian 98** (Sam C., professor of Political Science, http://www.fpri.org/americavulnerable/07.USMilitaryMustFindItsVoice.Sarkesian.pdf) GAT

**Constructive political engagement offers a means by which** the realities of **military life and** the essence of military **culture can be presented to the public** and elected officials **as well as to the mass media. This is particularly important in the information age with the expansive information technology capabilities available to the general public** as well as to the military.

**Consultation is good – it saves the military from constant fear and eases CMR**

**Sarkesian 98** (Sam C., professor of Political Science, http://www.fpri.org/americavulnerable/07.USMilitaryMustFindItsVoice.Sarkesian.pdf) GAT

Most important, **the military** brass **should** **feel no hesitancy about providing the commander in chief with its specific** and clear **opinion on issues** such as Bosnia. **Disagreements that arise among the military, the president, and members of Congress should not be stifled**, as was the case during the Vietnam War, **but should be aired** honestly and **without prejudice to the military’s obedience to**, and implementation of, **civilian directives. Nor should the armed forces wait until a debate occurs before presenting its perspective** and objections to a given policy line. Military professionals ought to be as free to make known their technical judgments as engineers, scientists, or doctors without conjuring fears that they are trying to escape civilian control. **The alternative**, after all, **is to perpetuate the timidity, extreme defensiveness, and fear of criticism from the public and Congress that seems to pervade the military today.**

**Consultation Solves CMR**

Sans consultation of the JCS, Obama will have a CMR crisis

Porter 6/30 (Gareth, North American Inter Press Service, http://ipsnorthamerica.net/news.php?idnews=1836)JFS

The story quoted a former Bush administration National Security Council official, Peter D. Feaver, who was a strategic planner on the administration's Iraq 'surge' policy, as warning that Obama's timetable would precipitate 'a civil-military crisis' if Obama does not agree to the demands of Mullen, Petraeus and Odierno for greater flexibility.

Net Ben – Boosts Effectiveness

**Consultation is the only way to correct skewed views of military culture – this solves effectiveness**

**Sarkesian 98** (Sam C., professor of Political Science, http://www.fpri.org/americavulnerable/07.USMilitaryMustFindItsVoice.Sarkesian.pdf) GAT

The wide range of civil-military contacts adumbrated above would seem a basis for challenging the notion of a widening gap between the military and society in the United States. But **to the extent the military and society do exist in two worlds, such a “gap” would only** seem to **underscore the need for a more politically streetwise military**, one attuned to certain values and institutions. Indeed, **to ensure that the needed equilibrium between the military and society is not thrown out of balance, military professionals must engage the political process.** Such **engagement would lead to a clearer civilian understanding of military culture and help to correct the distorted views** and unrealistic images **that currently threaten the effectiveness of the military**. For the real danger today is not military dominance of civil government, but rather a civilian policy elite dominating a military of which it has only the most superficial understanding, and thus imposing on the military frivolous “reforms” and imprudent overseas commitments without regard to long-term consequences.

**Consultation is key to the nurturing of the military culture – this is key to troop effectiveness**

**Sarkesian 98** (Sam C., professor of Political Science, http://www.fpri.org/americavulnerable/07.USMilitaryMustFindItsVoice.Sarkesian.pdf) GAT

To adjust to today’s uncertain domestic and strategic landscapes, **the U.S. officer corps must transcend its purely military notion of professionalism and practice constructive political engagement based on the recognition that the issues it faces have undeniable political dimensions**. To be sure, **there are limits to constructive political engagement** as defined by the military professional ethos and the American democratic system. However**, these limits do not proscribe military professionals’** airing and **articulating their views when policy and strategy** (or lack thereof) **pose significant dangers to the U.S. military’s** raison d’être and **quality of life**. The inescapable fact is that an effective military system must be authoritarian and driven by the need for combat cohesion, unit effectiveness, discipline under a chain of command, subordination of individual rights to the group, and unity of effort. Not least, **this unique military culture must be nurtured within the American democratic system**. At the same time, within these parameters, individual dignity must be maintained.53 This was never an easy proposition and it appears even more difficult today, at a time when the reigning ethos of the civilian culture appears increasingly hostile to the professional military ethos, places social agendas above military preparedness on its list of priorities, and embraces the notion that a technological “revolution in military affairs” (push-button warfare) makes possible “clean” wars and a kinder, gentler battlefield. **But it has yet to be demonstrated that the information age and smart weapons have eliminated the need for soldiers “on the ground”** or will allow killing to be done humanely and nicely.

**Consultation is key to military effectiveness**

**Sarkesian 98** (Sam C., professor of Political Science, http://www.fpri.org/americavulnerable/07.USMilitaryMustFindItsVoice.Sarkesian.pdf) GAT

**The task before us** should be obvious. It **is to reinforce**, not undermine, **the military culture**—a culture that remains rooted in the psychological and physical notions of killing the enemy— while maintaining its loyalty to the principles of democracy and civilian supremacy. At the present time, t**hat task is not advanced by silence**. On the contrary, the **voice of the military profession must be heard if the military is to serve the nation effectivel**y. **It is particularly important for the military profession to respond to those who** dogmatically and **erroneously associate the U.S. armed forces with a particular political preference**, bureaucratic interest **group**, **or** subversive **conspiracy**.

Lack of Consultation Turns Case

**Consultation is necessary for effective military policy – leaning too far towards military autonomy or civilian domination will result in failure**

**Cook & Ulrich 6** (Martin L., U.S. Air Force Academy; Marybeth P., Department of National Security and Strategy at U.S. Army War College, November 2006, Journal of Military Ethics, Vol. 5, No. 3, p. 161-182) GAT

**The elusiveness of policy success** in Vietnam and today **in Iraq suggests that merely limiting civilian leadership’s capacity to conduct policy and strengthening the military’s role is inadequate**. Conversely, **overemphasis on limiting the military’s input in the policymaking process** in the name of subordination **may also contribute to policy failure**. This paper will argue for **a new approach to** democratic **civil\_military relations that respects constitutional restraints** and power, **while leveraging the contributions of all** empowered **national security actors to promote strategic success**. This approach **calls for** a reformulation of the professional ethical guidelines that presently inform civil\_military relations. These revised guidelines highlight the need for **policy collaboration among national security actors, while reinforcing traditional notions of military restraint and nonpartisanship** in policymaking. **The guidelines challenge military actors to engage actively** in strategy deliberations **and for civilian actors to foster conditions that facilitate such engagement so that strategy adjustment critical to policy success is more likely**. Deficiencies of the Status Quo Approach H. R. McMaster’s Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam had an enormous impact on the thinking of the officer corps. It states what is commonly believed to be a ‘lesson learned’ about the obligation of military professionals to ‘call them as they see them’. Another ‘lesson learned’ was a preference for a more clear division of labor between those issuing political guidance and military leaders charged with carrying it out. Yet focusing on these narrow lessons may not necessarily improve the likelihood of policy success. **Strategic complexity requires collaboration across the spheres of political and military expertise to ensure that the strategy is continuously and appropriately adapted over time.**

AT: Perm 1/2

**First, doesn’t solve the NB – the perm amounts to little more than informing and not consultation which is resented by the military. EVEN IF – Obama ignores the advice of the JCS the prior consultation is essential to avoiding major pitfalls in CMR that spillover to Iraq.**

**CMR key to Iraq success**

**Cronin 8** (Patrick, Director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Strforum/SF234/SF234.pdf>) GAT

**Success in the highly political and ambiguous conflicts** likely to dominate the global security environment **in the coming decades will require a framework that balances the relationships between civilian and military leaders** and makes the most effective use of their different strengths. These challenges are expected to require better integrated, whole-of-government approaches, the cooperation of host governments and allies, and strategic patience. **Irregular warfare introduces new complications to** what Eliot Cohen has called **an “unequal dialogue” between civilian and military leaders** in which civilian leaders hold the true power but must modulate their intervention into “military” affairs as a matter of prudence rather than principle. The **wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated that irregular warfare**— which is profoundly political, intensely local, and protracted—**breaks from the traditional understanding of how military and civilian leaders should contribute to the overall effort**.**One of the key challenges rising from irregular warfare is how to measure progress**. While there is disagreement about the feasibility or utility of developing metrics, the political pressure for marking progress is unrelenting. Most data collection efforts focus on the number of different types of kinetic events, major political milestones such as elections, and resource inputs such as personnel, money, and materiel. None of these data points serves easily in discerning what is most needed—namely, outputs or results. **A second major challenge centers on choosing leaders for irregular warfar**e and stability and reconstruction operations. **How to produce civilian leaders capable of asking the right and most difficult questions is not easily addressed**. Meanwhile, there has been a general erosion of the traditional Soldier’s Code whereby a military member can express dissent, based on legitimate facts, in private to one’s superiors up to the point that a decision has been made. Many see the need to shore up this longstanding tradition among both the leadership and the ranks. A third significant challenge is how to forge integrated strategies and approaches. **Professional relationships**, not organizational fixes, **are vital to succeeding in irregular war**. In this sense, the push for new doctrine for the military and civilian leadership is a step in the right direction to clarifying the conflated lanes of authority.

**Iraq escalation starts**

**Corsi 7** (Jerome, a staff reporter for WND, <http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=53669>) GAT

 Truthfully, we are already at war with Iran. My concern stems from the realization that the internal politics in Iran may be such that Ahmadinejad cannot allow a massive U.S. military build-up in the region without making some kind of a response. With Iraq's borders as open as is our southern border with Mexico, Iran has now sent into Iraq a sufficient number of terrorists and arms to create a real civil war. Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi militia, which featured so prominent in the Shi'ite rejoicing that reduced Saddam's hanging to a partisan event, is an Iran-funded creation. Ahmadinejad cannot afford to see a strengthened U.S. military destroy Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi army.  **If a broader war breaks out in Iraq, Olmert will certainly face pressure to send the Israel military into the Gaza after Hamas and into Lebanon after Hezbollah.** If that happens, **it will only be a matter of time before Israel and the U.S. have no choice but to invade Syria. The Iraq war could quickly spin into a regional war**, **with Israel waiting on the sidelines ready to launch an air and missile strike on Iran that could include tactical nuclear weapons.**  With Russia ready to deliver the $1 billion TOR M-1 surface-to-air missile defense system to Iran, military leaders are unwilling to wait too long to attack Iran. **Now that Russia and China have invited Iran to join their Shanghai Cooperation Pact, will Russia and China sit by idly should the U.S. look like we are winning a wider regional war in the Middle East? If we get more deeply involved in Iraq, China may have their moment to go after Taiwan once and for all.** **A broader regional war could easily lead into a third world war,** much as World Wars I and II began.

AT: Perm 2/2

**JCS will ONLY say yes in the world of the CP – consultation smoothes out relations.**

**Non-compliance – resolving tensions is key.**

**Sulmasy & Yoo 7**

(Glen & John, Associate Professor of Law, U.S. Coast Guard Academy & Professor of Law, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California, Berkeley; Visiting Scholar, American Enterprise Institute. UCLA Law Review, August, 2007) GAT

**Military resistance to civilian policies with which military leaders disagree could take several forms short of an outright refusal to obey orders. Military officers can leak information to derail civilian initiatives. They could "slow roll"** civilian orders **by delaying implementation. They could inflate the estimates of the resources needed, or** the possible **casualties and time needed** to achieve a military objective. **And** perhaps **a relatively unnoticed but effective measure is to divide the principal - if the number of institutions forming the principal increases, it will be more difficult to monitor the performance of the agent and to hold it accountable.** [\*1829] Deborah **Avant argues,** for example, that civilians exercise greater control of the military in Great Britain than in the United States, because the parliamentary system merges the executive and legislative branches of the government. 61 **Greater agency slack may result** from information asymmetries that may favor the military**, such as information and expertise about warfare, adverse selection that may cause the promotion of officers resentful of civilian meddling, and moral hazard in which the inability of civilians to directly observe the performance of the military may allow the military to pursue its own preferences.**

**Perception of clear decisions before the consultation undermines CMR – supercharges the link because the perm is still unilateral**

**Cook & Ulrich 6** (Martin L., U.S. Air Force Academy; Marybeth P., Department of National Security and Strategy, November 2006, Journal of Military Ethics, Vol. 5, No. 3, p. 161-182) GAT

A key question is this: did marginalized military advice and flawed collaborative civil military relations lead to a flawed strategy at the onset of the war? Was there a breakdown in the policymaking process in which the military offers its best advice and policymakers at least respectfully consider these inputs before making the final decision? **Policymaking environments in which military participants** come to **believe that civilian policymakers already have clear preferences regardless of military expertise may result in a pattern of military acquiescence. In such an environment, the military ceases to function truly professionally**, and becomes merely an obedient bureaucracy. **Such environments** may **threaten the success of strategy if it proceeds without the benefit of the expert knowledge and insight from the military sphere which may be especially essential to correcting struggling strategies midstream.**

**Political engagement builds military political savvy that’s key to CMR.**

**Sarkesian 98** (Sam C., professor of Political Science, http://www.fpri.org/americavulnerable/07.USMilitaryMustFindItsVoice.Sarkesian.pdf) GAT

The American military faced similar dilemmas after the Civil War and World War I, for a brief time after World War II, and following the Vietnam War.’ At least one lesson clearly emerged from those experiences: **the military profession dare not withdraw into an ethical cocoon and take on a defensive posture**. Instead, **it must make a prudent and positive response to the travails imposed on it** and not shrink from articulating its views in the public square. In short, **senior military officers must reshape the very notion of military professionalism by** candidly admitting the impact of politics on the military’s ability to do its job and **daring to practice constructive political engagement.** This would appear to violate the sacred code of silence by which the U.S. military is strictly apolitical, offers technical advice only, and goes out of its way to honor the principle of civilian control. But **only through constructive political engagement can military professionals legitimate their role in policy debates,** provide a dear boundary between defense policy and merely partisan politics, **and provide the American public with a clearer understanding of military life and culture.** Nor are constructive political engagement and loyalty to the country, civilian leadership, and the Constitution in any way incongruous. Indeed, such **constructive political engagement**, far from threatening to make the military an independent actor, **presupposes that the military is dependent upon a variety of political actors and the public at large. It is because the U.S. military is under such tight civilian control that it needs to make its voice heard in civilian councils.**

\_\_\_\*\*Consult the JCS – AFF

Say No

**The military would say no – their goals are incompatible with pulling out**

**QDR 2010** (Quadrennial Defense Review, <http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf>) GAT

**The mission of the** **D**epartment **o**f **D**efense **is to protect the American people** and advance our nation’s interests. In executing these responsibilities, **we must recognize that** first and foremost, **the United States is a nation at war**. In Afghanistan, our forces fight alongside allies and partners in renewed efforts to deny Al Qaeda safe haven, reverse the Taliban's momentum, and strengthen the capacity of Afghanistan's security forces. In Iraq, U.S. military personnel advise, train, and support Iraqi forces as part of a responsible transition and drawdown. Above all, the United States and its allies and partners remain engaged in a broader war—a multifaceted political, military and moral struggle—against Al Qaeda and its allies around the world. Furthermore, as a global power, **the strength and influence of the United States are deeply intertwined with the fate of the broader international system**—a system of alliances, partnerships, and multinational institutions that our country has helped build and sustain for more than sixty years. **The U.S. military must therefore be prepared to support broad national goals of promoting stability in key regions**, providing assistance to nations in need, and promoting the common good. With these realities in mind, the **2010 Quadrennial Defense Review advances two** clear **objectives**. First, **to** further **rebalance the capabilities of America’s Armed Forces to prevail in today’s wars**, while building the capabilities needed to deal with future threats. Second, **to** further reform **the Department’s institutions and processes to better support the urgent needs of the warfighter**; buy weapons that are usable, affordable, and truly needed; and ensure that taxpayer dollars are spent wisely and responsibly. The strategy and initiatives described in the QDR will continue to evolve in response to the security environment. Using the QDR as its foundation, the Department will continually examine its approach—from objectives to capabilities and activities to resources—to ensure its best alignment for the nation, its allies and partners, and our men and women in uniform.

Say No

**The JCS would say no to withdrawal of troops stationed for non-combat presence in every topic region**

**Schwalbe 5** (Stephen R., Director of the Air War College’s Regional Studies Program, prof. of Global Security at Air War College, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/schwalbe2.html) GAT

Congress legislated a defense review every four years, called **the Quadrennial Defense Review** (QDR), which **includes an assessment of the US overseas military posture**. Shortly after President George W. Bush took office, another QDR was required (the final report was due to Congress by September 2001). Dr. Michele **Flourney was tasked by the** Chairman of the **Joint Chiefs of Staff to organize** a small working group at the National Defense University (NDU) to provide the intellectual underpinnings of **the 2001 QDR.** Flourney’s subsequent book, QDR 2001: Strategy-Driven Choices for America’s Security, covered the military posture in chapter five (cowritten with Col Sam Tangredi), “Defense Strategy alternatives: Choosing Where to Place Emphasis and Where to Accept Risk.”9 Professor Flourney broke the book up into sections covering the three major regions of the world: Europe, Middle East, and Asia-Pacific. **In Europe, the NDU working group determined that Russia was still a potential threat to the security of the U.S**., even though it had a democratically-elected president and was aligned with the West. **As such, they recommended no major force changes in Europe** in order to maintain peace and stability (more of the Cold War mantra: keep America in, Germany down, and Russia out). **This included keeping the combat-heavy forces in place**. They admitted their recommendation left the Cold War force posture pretty much intact, meaning it was positioned to fight in place; not to be deployed outside the region. To counter such criticisms, they recommended DOD develop new weapon systems that were more easily deployable**. In the Middle East, the NDU working group recommended an increase in naval presence**, primarily because the Arab governments of these countries wanted the American security, but being sensitive to their Islamic citizens, wanted to keep US forces out of sight. As such, the US presence in the Middle East remained small, but supported by a significant amount of pre-positioned weapon systems and supplies (enough to field 11 Army brigades). **In the Asia-Pacific region, the group considered China to be the next peer competitor to America. So**, once again, **no change in the US military posture in this region was recommended**. In fact, they recommended that the facilities in Guam and Diego Garcia be upgraded just in case. (Note: of all the recommendations the NDU working group proposed, this may have been the only one actually implemented.)

Say No 🡪 Link to Politics

**If the military says no in a binding consultation, there will be huge political backlash**

**Feaver et al 5** (Peter, professor of Poli. Sci., Asian Perspective, Vol. 29, No. 1, pp. 233-271) GAT

**The** post-cold war **election of** President Bill **Clinton**, however, markedly **shifted** the values of **the factors that determined civil-military relations**. At least along some crucial dimensions, **the civil-military gap widened** with a liberal-leaning Democratic president facing a conservative-leaning, Republican-oriented military. Of even greater consequence, Clinton [brought to the office unique civil-military baggage; he famously avoided any kind of military service during the Vietnam War, dissembled about those efforts in the campaign, and then was obliged to confront an extremely popular military leader, General Colin Powell, whom many considered to be a likely future electoral rival. **When Clinton challenged the military** on lifting the ban on gays serving openly in the ranks, he **was met with vigorous objections; he backed down, paid an enormous political cost for doing so**, and subsequently signaled repeatedly that he was reluctant ever to challenge the military again. Observers warned of a "crisis" in American civil-military relations.4

Costs capital

Feaver 9 (Peter, Oct 21, Foreign Policy, http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/10/21/obamas\_military\_problem\_is\_getting\_worse)JFS

If Obama regains a deft touch, the crash can be averted. To avert it he needs to do more than simply endorse the McChrystal request, though that would surely help. He needs to show that he respects the civil-military process, and he needs to rein in his advisors who have been stumbling about. If he is going to over-rule McChrystal, which is his right as a Commander-in-Chief, he will have a much steeper climb out of his civil-military hole. At a minimum, he will need to forthrightly take ownership of the war and all of its consequences and spend the political capital he has hitherto avoided spending on national security issues to explain his decision to the American people and the American military.

Perm Solvency

**The best form of CMR involves non-binding consultation**

**Feaver 9** (Peter, prof. of Poli. Sci. at Duke Univ., http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/05/15/is\_obama\_really\_getting\_rolled\_by\_the\_us\_military) GAT

It is not shirking, however, when the military is given an opportunity to present its case to the president, and the president changes his mind. **Healthy civil-military relations involve civilians** giving the military an opportunity to provide candid advice -- check that, **requiring the military to provide candid advice -- and** then civilians making a decision. Sometimes that decision is different from what the civilians would have made in the absence of that advice. But **that is not necessarily "getting rolled." It could just be "getting informed."**

**Consultation is fine, but only when it’s the civilians who ultimately make the decision**

**Noonan 8** (Michael P., managing director of the Program on National Security at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, http://www.fpri.org/enotes/200801.noonan.mindthegap.html) GAT

Lt. Col. Frank G. Hoffman, USMCR (ret.), a non-resident senior fellow of the FPRI and a research fellow at the Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities (CETO) in Quantico, Virginia, stated that the protracted war in Iraq “has uncovered profound cracks in some of the dysfunctional elements that are inherent to American civil-military relations.” The precarious nature of the nation’s civil-military relations contributed to poor policymaking and ineffective execution. **Civilian control of the military is firmly grounded constitutionally, structurally, and historically, but civil-military relations**—the interface between policy leaders and military officers—**are more complex and less structured**. “Ultimately, **it’s about the interchange of viewpoints, and the production of effective strategies** and decisions about the use of the military instrument.” **A narrow focus on control leads to overlooking the overall purpose of the use of force and can denigrate the quality of the decision-making process**, the outputs of which are what are really at issue. **During recent conflicts** the climate and context of the civil-military relationship has not been open to rigorous discourse. **Needed inputs for military officers** and others were **“either ignored, muzzled, intimidated, or cut out of the process.”** Hoffman noted that problems in civil-military relations are embedded in several myths. One myth is that there has been a clear, inherent division of labor between the military and civilians since Vietnam: civilians set political objectives and then get out of the way. This overlooks what Eliot Cohen has called the “unequal dialogue,” where civilian leaders probe the military and the military asks the same about the ends and means of policy.[4] “Separating policy from strategy and operations is simply an extremely poor alternative to the intense and admittedly uncomfortable interaction of policy desires and military realities that needs to occur inside the White House and inside the Pentagon.”

**Non-binding consultation is key to civilian authority – this is a net benefit to the perm**

**Cook & Ulrich 6** (Martin L., U.S. Air Force Academy; Marybeth P., Department of National Security and Strategy at U.S. Army War College, November 2006, Journal of Military Ethics, Vol. 5, No. 3, p. 161-182) GAT

Professional guidelines for military professionals include the limits of dissent, restraint from leveraging bureaucratic advantage to achieve institutional self-interest, and the acceptance of the principle of non-partisanship. It is essential to the professional development of military officers that they learn to recognize when the bounds of the limits of dissent are breached. **Policy advocacy has its place in a collaborative policymaking process, but actions resulting in outcomes counter to the civilian leadership’s policies subvert civilian authority.** The military leadership should apply its expertise without ‘shirking’.7 Officers should represent their profession and offer their best military advice. Their core responsibility is to execute policy, avoiding excessive advocacy and insistence of their views. **Healthy civilmilitary relationships engender a climate of collaboration within which civilian and military expertise can come together** to craft national security policy. **The civilian** political **leadership sets political objectives that the military supports through** continued **interaction with the political leadership**.

Binding Consultation 🡪 Less Effective

**Ceding power to the military leads doesn’t lead to an effective policy – nothing changes**

**Partridge 5/24** (Teddy, reporter for the Seminal, http://seminal.firedoglake.com/diary/50577) GAT

**The Lieberman** sham **compromise on** **D**on’t **A**sk **D**on’t **T**ell **cedes control of the military from the law-making** and law-executing **branches of government to the U**nited **S**tates **military**. In effect, this law says open service is legal, but only when the military pleases. Joe Lieberman, Monday’s progressive hero, has not introduced a repeal of Don’t-Ask-Don’t-Tell. The legislative language in the much-heralded compromise leaves everything up to our formerly civilian-controlled military and formerly subordinate-to-the-President Secretary of Defense. Sure, **there’s a structure for repeal, but there are lots of hoops the military can elect to jump through**. Or not. **This isn’t repeal. This is repeal with a trigger. And the trigger is in the hand of** the President, along with his **Secretary of Defense and the** Chairman of the **Joint Chiefs of Staff**. Who do you think holds the whip hand on military matters there? **Everything remains exactly the same:** Section 654 of title 10, United States Code, shall remain in effect until such time that all of the requirements and certifications required by subsection (b) are met. If these requirements and certifications are not met, section 654 of title 10, United States Code, shall remain in effect. In fact, that clause is entitled "No Immediate Effect on Current Policy." Until the President, the Secretary, and the Chairman complete, certify and accept the idea that the time for open service has arrived. All of these must occur before the policy will change: (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by subsection (f) shall take effect only on the date on which the last of the following occurs: ARM10802 S.L.C. (1) The Secretary of Defense has received the report required by the memorandum of the Secretary referred to in subsection (a). (2) The President transmits to the congressional defense committees a written certification, signed by the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stating each of the following: (A) That the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the recommendations contained in the report and the report’s proposed plan of action. (B) That the Department of Defense has prepared the necessary policies and regulations to exercise the discretion provided by the amendments made by subsection (f). (C) That the implementation of necessary policies and regulations pursuant to the discretion provided by the amendments made by sub-section (f) is consistent with the standards of military readiness, military effectiveness, unit cohesion, and recruiting and retention of the Armed Forces. Note that all the excuses-language previously justifying this homophobic policy are included in the final paragraph: military readiness, military effectiveness, unit cohesion, and recruiting and retention. Not one of which has been a problem for any of our many allies that have implemented open service. In other words, the legislative branch has ceded its law-making power to the formerly subordinate-to-the-Executive military. Until the military is ready to implement open service, it won’t happen. (And just in case you weren’t completely satisfied with your purchase, there’s a bonus section to ensure that no benefits are provided to anyone possibly affected by any eventual DADT repeal in violation of the Defense of Marriage Act.) **This is a sham — a sop to the Democrats’ left-of-the-left**, as you might expect from anything organized by Joe Lieberman.

Binding Consultation 🡪 Less Effective

Deferring all military decisions to binding consultation with the military is simply not realistic – it is inevitable that the civilian sphere must make some military decisions

Cook & Ulrich 6 (Martin L., U.S. Air Force Academy; Marybeth P., Department of National Security and Strategy at U.S. Army War College, November 2006, Journal of Military Ethics, Vol. 5, No. 3, p. 161-182) GAT

This analysis points to a more subtle and nuanced characterization of the ideal civil military relationship than is typical in civil military relations literature. There the tendency is to take for granted the professional expertise of the military and frame the question solely in terms of the degree to which that advice is or is not heeded by civilian leaders. Indeed, the imagined ideal tends toward a pole which suggests that civilian leaders make the core determination that the political ends being sought warrant use of military force for their achievement (and, in consultation with the highest levels of military leadership, that those goals are indeed achievable by military means). But after that determination is in place, military officers (and at times political leaders, such as Bush’s deferment to his commanders on troop levels) often imagine the ideal case to be one in which civilians defer all subsequent operational decisions to military expertise. One unfortunate consequence of that way of looking at things is that it views every intervention of civilian leadership into operational decisions as an inappropriate encroachment of civilians into the sphere of proper military expertise. But since all uses of military force are inevitably ‘politics by other means’, civilian leaders will necessarily be monitoring closely the political consequences of the details of the conduct of military operations. Eliot Cohen’s outstanding set of case studies chosen for Supreme Command illustrates multiple instances of near-certain defeat of national interests had not civilian leaders remained engaged in the process of strategy adaptation and oversight of military operations in wartime (Cohen 2002).