# K Updates

# Security K

## 1NC Security

**Their apocalyptic rhetoric is a product of insecurity - the framing of existential risks enables perpetual apocalypses to maintain "order" and "control"**

**Coviello 2k** - Peter, Associate Professor English @ Bowdoin, "Apocalpyse from Now On," Queer frontiers, by J. Boone, Women's Studies @ USC

Perhaps. But to claim that American culture is at present decisively postnuclear is not to say that the world we inhabit is in any way post-apocalyptic. Apocalypse, as I began by saying, changed – it did not go away. And here I want to hazard my second assertion: if, in the nuclear age of yesteryear, apocalypse signified an event threatening everyone and everything with (in Jacques Derrida’s suitably menacing phrase) “remainderless and a-symbolic destruction,” then in the postnuclear world apocalypse is an affair whose parameters are definitively local. In shape and in substance, apocalypse is defined now by the affliction it brings somewhere else, always to an “other” people whose very presence might then be written as a kind of dangerous contagion, threatening the safety and prosperity of a cherished “general population.” This fact seems to me to stand behind Susan Sontag’s incisive observation, from 1989, that, “Apocalypse is now a long running serial: not ‘Apocalypse Now’ but ‘Apocalypse from Now On.’” The decisive point here in the perpetuation of the threat of apocalypse (the point Sontag goes on, at length, to miss) is that the apocalypse is ever present because, as an element in a vast economy of power, it is ever useful. That is, though the perpetual threat of destruction – through the constant reproduction of the figure of the apocalypse – the agencies of power ensure their authority to act on and through the bodies of a particular population. No one turns this point more persuasively than Michel Foucault, who in the final chapter of his first volume of The History of Sexuality addressess himself to the problem of a power that is less repressive than productive, less life-threatening than, in his words, “life-administering.” Power, he contends, “exerts a positive influence on life … [and] endeavors to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations.” In his brief comments on what he calls “the atomic situation,” however, Foucault insists as well that the productiveness of modern power must not be mistaken for a uniform repudiation of violent or even lethal means. For as “managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race,” agencies of modern power presume to act “on the behalf of the existence of everyone.” Whatsoever might be construed as a threat to life and survival in this way serves to authorize any expression of force, no matter how invasive, or, indeed, potentially annihilating. “If genocide is indeed the dream of modern power,” Foucault writes, “this is not because of a recent return to the ancient right to kill’ it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population.” For a state that would arm itself not with the power to kill its population, but with a more comprehensive power over the patters and functioning of its collective life, the threat of an apocalyptic demise, nuclear or otherwise, seems a civic initiative that can scarcely be done without.

**Specifically, this view of infrastructure authorizes violent disciplinary control which secures infrastructure from itself. This logic creates "logistical life," which renders individuals subject to destruction to preserve existence itself. Reject their securitized framing of critical infrastructure to reconceptualize our relationship with power**

Reid 8 (Julian, International Relations @ King's College, Visiting Professor of International Relations @ University of Lapland, "Conclusion: The Biopolitics of Critical Infrastructure Protection," Securing 'the Homeland:' Critical Infrastructure, Risk, and (In)Security, ed. Cavelty and Kristensen, pg. 179-182)

In order to afford their own protection, liberal regimes have learned histori ¶ cally to govern human life via its reduction to what I have called 'logistical¶ life'. This term is apt because the techniques and practices of social control through which regimes of the eighteenth century learned to govern were drawn directly from the domains of war, military strategy, tactics and organisation (Reid 2006: 17-39). Logistical life is a life lived under the duress of the command to be efficient, to communicate one's purposes transparently in rela¬tion to others, to be positioned where one is required, to use time economically, to be able to move when and where one is told to, and crucially, to be able to extol these capacities as the values for which one will agree to kill and die for (Reid 2006: 13). In the eighteenth century, the deployment of techniques with which to increase the logistical efficiencies of societies was legitimised by regimes through the claim that it was necessary for the exceptional defence of the civil domain of society from its external enemies. Increased military effi¬ciency and discipline was said to be necessary and beneficial to forms of civil life, the 'quality' of which was defined by their distinction from the warlike conditions that were said to prevail beyond the boundaries of the state. It is in critique of this type of legitimisation that Foucault's analysis, in its demonstra¬tion of the ways in which techniques for the increase of the logistical efficiency of armed forces impacted directly upon the everyday order of life within the civil domain of society, is so powerful. He exposes how the methods with which liberal regimes historically prepared for war with external enemies pro¬vided model templates with which to subject the life of their civilian popula¬tions to new insidious forms of control and manipulation, and how, in turn, liberal regimes have sought to legitimise their wars in the name of the defence and development of the very forms of logistical ways of living they were busy inculcating within and among their subjects.¶ Now, in the twenty-first century and in the context of the war on terror, we are witnessing precisely the same methods of legitimisation being employed by liberal regimes, but with a radical twist. Today, the argument being deployed is not, as it was in the eighteenth century, that the increase of the logistical effi¬ciency of societies is a necessary sacrifice in the interest of defending an other¬wise distinctly civilian population. Today, it is deemed necessary to defend the logistical life of society from enemies that are deemed dangerous precisely because they target life in its logistical dimensions. Amid the global campaign against terrorism, the capacities of societies to practice a logistical way of life¶ ¶ 180 J. Reid¶ have become indistinguishable from conceptions of the 'quality of life' for human beings. Throughout, for example, the seminal US National Plan for Research and Development in Support of Critical Infrastructure Protection, one finds the quality of human life construed in terms of its logistical capacities. The docility and plasticity of human bodies, the manipulability of human disposi¬tions, and the many ways in which human behaviour can be subjected to tech¬niques of control, are conceptualised not just as a means for the protection of liberal societies, but as qualities that distinguish the uniqueness of the human species. As the Plan for Research and Development states:¶ Part of the challenge of infrastructure protection is how to take full advant¬age of human capabilities. The Social, Behavioral and Economic (SBE) Working Group in the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) is focused on scientific research in the areas of sensory, motor, cognitive and adaptive capability of the human. Currently, the brain is unmatched by any technological system. The human brain is a semi-quantitative supercom¬puter that is programmable and reprogrammable by explicit training, previ¬ous experience, and on-going observations on a real-time, virtually instantaneous basis.¶ (Department of Homeland Security 2004: 63)¶ The quality of human life, we are told in forthright terms, is reducible to its superior amenability to logistical transformation. Its greater capacity for adapta¬tion and transformation is what distinguishes it from other life forms. Contemporary accounts of this form of human superiority, understood in terms of humans' amenability to logistical techniques of transformation, recall in their depth and specificity the expressions of wonderment at life's malleability to be found in military texts of the eighteenth century that Foucault's original explo¬ration of the disciplinary and biopolitical underpinnings of liberal modernity first exposed (1991: 135-69).¶ Human eyes are capable of high-resolution, stereo-optical vision with immense range, and, integrated with a highly plastic brain, make humans uniquely capable of discovery, integration, and complex pattern recognition. Human hands constitute a dexterous, sensitive biomechanical system that, integrated with the brains and eyes, are unmatched by current and near future robotic technologies. Humans operate in groups synergistically and dynamically, adjusting perceptions, relationships and connections as needed on a real-time and virtually instantaneous basis. Human language cap¬abilities exist and operate within a dimensional space that is far more complex and fluid than any known artificial architectures.¶ (Department of Homeland Security 2004: 63)¶ ¶ As Foucault's original analysis of the development of liberal regimes of power revealed, the emergence of military sciences in the eighteenth century was allied to as well as constitutive of the broader development of the life sciences. Developments in modern military science have consistently fed off and con¬tributed to changes in the life sciences more generally. Now, in the twenty-first century, we can see this alliance being cemented in the development of new methods for the defence of liberal regimes in what is known as 'human factors engineering', or HF/E. HF/E is, as the National Plan describes, 'both a science of human performance and an engineering discipline, concerned with the design of systems for both efficiency and safety' (Department of Homeland Security 2004: 64). Developed since before the Second World War, its aim is to harness the 'cognitive, emotional and social capabilities of the human' in order to design more secure systems for the defence of critical infrastructures and to invest in such human capabilities with a view to creating systems of infrastructure that are resilient to 'deceptive behaviors', 'rogue activities', and to 'insider threats' said to endanger critical infrastructures (Department of Homeland Security 2004:¶ 42). ¶ But in engineering, the means with which to secure infrastructures against the 'deceptions', 'rogues' and 'insider threats' aimed at it, human life today faces increasingly intense threats to its integrity. The radical indeterminacy of the human, its capacity for error, its creative capacities for thought and expression, are directly endangered by the increasingly insidious forms of control being wielded and asserted in strategies for the securing of critical infrastructures against terrorism. As the Plan informs its readership, 'Anyone can be presumed to be a candidate for insider threat' (Department of Homeland Security 2004:¶ 43). Indeed, everyone is suspect of constituting this form of threat. Research and development in response to the fear of insider threats is aimed at the creation of what is called a 'National Common Operating Picture for Critical Infrastructure' (COP) not simply in order to 'sense rogue behavior' in pre-identified sources of threats to life, but in order to be able to 'sense rogue behaviour in a trusted resource or anticipate that they may be a candidate threat' (Department of Homeland Security 2004: 41). It is therefore deemed necessary 'that we presume any insider could conduct unauthorised or rogue activities' (Department of Homeland Security 2004: 42). Consequently, the movement of human life, each and every possible human disposition and expression, is becoming the target of strategies construed paradoxically for the defence of human well-being. In this context, any action or thought that borders on abnormality is to be targeted as a potential source of threat. As the Plan states, 'the same anticipation of overt damaging action by a purposeful threat can be used to anticipate an unfortunate excursion in thought or action by a well-meaning actor' (Department of Home¬land Security 2004: 44).¶ The development of technologies and techniques for the analysis of 'what people do' and their 'deceptive behaviours' runs the risk not simply of outlaw¬ing fundamental conditions for quality of human life. It creates and indeed instantiates the risk of the violent destruction of forms of life, of human popula-tions and individuals, who through no fault of their own are deemed to exhibit signs of anomalous and threatening behaviour. The deliberate murder of Jean¶ ¶ 182 J. Reid¶ Charles de Menezes, killed with five gunshots to the head fired at point-blank range by British police on 22 July 2005, is a case in point. This human being, described as an 'unidentified male' with 'dark hair beard/stubble', was targeted on account of the fact that his 'description and demeanour' matched the identity of a bomber suspect'. The simple fact of his leaving an apartment block thought to have been used by terrorist suspects, the simple fact that on his subsequent journey, he exited and re-entered the bus on which he travelled, and in spite of the fact that he walked and did not run, showed no sign of possessing weapons of destruction, and gave no signal of intent of any sort, was nevertheless deemed to represent a divergence from a normal pattern of behaviour so serious that he was targeted and killed with the most deliberate violence. In spite of the scale and intensity with which the aim of a complete mapping of human dispositions and behaviours has been pursued, and in spite of the urgency with which today it is being implemented, the most banal and everyday expressions of life continue to fall, tragically, outside its grasp.¶ As it was in the eighteenth century that the fantasy of a society which func¬tions as a type of socio-military machine, and 'that would cover the whole terri¬tory of the nation and in which each individual would be occupied without interruption but in a different way according to the evolutive segment, the genetic sequence in which he finds himself' (Foucault 1991: 165) emerged, so at the beginning of the twenty-first century, we can see that fantasy being given new forms in the shape of critical infrastructure protection. Making sense of what is at stake in this phenomenon requires a complete reversal of the terms in which its utility is currently being articulated by liberal regimes of power. Rather than conceptualise this present struggle in terms of a war on terror in the defence of a common humanity against an enemy that is inimical to life, we can better conceptualise it as a conflict over the political constitution of life itself. When the methods with which regimes are seeking to secure the life of their societies demand an incremental targeting of life, to the point where the most ordinary expressions of life are rendered objects of strategic intervention, it is necessary to question the ways of valorising life that create such paradoxical conditions. This volume, in my reading, creates important openings for the further exploration of such a line of questioning.

## AT: Booth

Their call for reasonable, secure living is turned by the state into antiseptic terror fighting - invasive forms of biopolitics create paradoxical security dilemmas where anyone is everything is a threat

Reid 8 (Julian, International Relations @ King's College, Visiting Professor of International Relations @ University of Lapland, "Conclusion: The Biopolitics of Critical Infrastructure Protection," Securing 'the Homeland:' Critical Infrastructure, Risk, and (In)Security, ed. Cavelty and Kristensen, pg. 179-182)

In concluding this volume, then, I would like to extend and draw out what I read as being its most valuable contribution to our knowledge of this lugubrious phenomenon. If we believe our governments and most of the academic literature on the subject, both the security and quality of life is inextricably dependent on the protection of the critical infrastructures through which liberal regimes are organised. But the provision of such infrastructure protection requires the delib¬erate targeting of the human life that inhabits critical infrastructures with increasingly invasive techniques of governance. As a consequence of the decla-ration of the war on terror, and more especially as a result of the ways in which the threat of terrorism is being interpreted and understood by its proponents, the investment of regimes in the development of new techniques and technologies for the control of human life is increasing rapidly. Strategies for critical infra¬structure protection are affording significant advances in the development of scientific knowledge and technological control of the evolutionary capacities and adaptive capabilities of the human. Amid the creation of plans for the provi¬sion of critical infrastructure protection, and in the establishment of new govern¬mental agencies for the execution of those plans, the biological sciences in¶ ¶ Conclusion 179¶ particular are undergoing a major renaissance (Cooper 2006). The implications of these new forms of knowledge and security technologies for the quality of human life are profoundly paradoxical. Human beings themselves do, of course, rely significantly on the operability and maintenance of infrastructures them¬selves. But it is a fact that human beings within critical infrastructures are also regarded as posing the greatest danger to them (Dunn 2005). In this context, the human can be seen to have become both the rogue element against which liberal regimes are today seeking to secure themselves, as well as the central resource on which they are attempting to draw in pursuit of their security.

## Alternative Cards

## Threats Manufactured

**Distrust their evidence - their authors have political motives to fearmonger**

**Zenko & Cohen 12** (Micah Zenko, fellow at the Center for Preventative Action at the Council on Foreign Relations AND Michael Cohen, Fellow at the Century Foundation, March/April 2012, "Clear and Present Safety: The United States Is More Secure Than Washington Thinks," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91(2))

The disparity between foreign threats and domestic threatmongering results from a confluence of factors. The most obvious and important is electoral politics. Hyping dangers serves the interests of both political parties. For Republicans, who have long benefited from attacking Democrats for their alleged weakness in the face of foreign threats, there is little incentive to tone down the rhetoric; the notion of a dangerous world plays to perhaps their greatest political advantage. For Democrats, who are fearful of being cast as feckless, acting and sounding tough is a shield against gop attacks and an insurance policy in case a challenge to the United States materializes into a genuine threat. Warnings about a dangerous world also benefit powerful bureaucratic interests. The specter of looming dangers sustains and justifies the massive budgets of the military and the intelligence agencies, along with the national security infrastructure that exists outside government-defense contractors, lobbying groups, think tanks, and academic departments.

## AT: Policy Paralysis

**Policy paralysis is good - policy focus leads to myopic, oversimplified solutions which result in policy failure**

**Miller 12** — distinguished scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, US Advisory Council of Israel Policy (Aaron David, "The Dumb Idea Hall of Fame," *Foreign Policy*, May 2nd)

\*\*\*we do not endorse ableist rhetoric

Dumb Idea No. 5: A bad idea is better than no idea Dumb ideas come along for many reasons. Sometimes they result from bad analysis, imperfect policy options, or desperation. They can also arise from wishful thinking or from an obsession with fixing things. It's a variation of that last notion that represents the dumbest idea of all: that action -- any action, no matter how harebrained and ill-advised -- is better than no action. This idea is quintessentially American and results from the unique blend of idealism and pragmatism that cuts to the core of who Americans are as a people and how they see the world. The fact is, Americans can't help themselves. America isn't a potted plant. Americans believe they can always make a bad situation better. This fix-it mentality is in our DNA. If it's harnessed and rigorously controlled, the United States can actually accomplish some things, particularly if it actually thinks through a strategy. But if not, it leads to what my friend Gamal Helal, an Arabic-language interpreter and confidant of presidents and secretaries of state, calls the United States' rush toward disaster. America is headed that way on Syria, I'm afraid.

## Econ Link

**Their obsession with the flow of goods grounds biopolitical logic - the management of capital and circulation of goods enables management of life**

**Dillon 9** (Michael Dillon, Politics at Lancaster Univ., Luis Lobo-Guerrero, IR at Keele Univ., January 2009, "The Biopolitical Imaginary of the Species-Being," Theory, Culture, Society, Vol. 26(1))

The purpose of biopower is fundamentally, therefore, the facilitation and optimization of ‘circulation’ (Foucault, 2007: lecture 1). Circulation is understood in the widest sense of the term. It begins, of course, with the commerce of economic exchange, whence Foucault derived his initial analysis, but it is clearly also extendable to the most general intercourse between living things as well as between living things and other things, specifically, for example, in the form of information. This preoccupation with circulation also poses the problematic of how to maximize good and limit bad circulation. That in turn is closely related to the problem of governing too little and governing too much (Dean, 1999; Rose, 1999: 70). These are two of the core aporias of biopolitical regulation and governance. Irresolvable difficulties, they do not result in stasis. Quite the contrary. Aporias, like power, are productive. They are dynamically lived out through the changing figures of political speech and epistemic discourses that comprise the political rationalities and governmental technologies of governance (Dillon, 2008a). It follows that the problematic of circulation includes diverse modes of circulation and not just things in circulation (Lobo-Guerrero, 2008). One singularly important contemporary example of the way in which a mode of circulation radically impacts on things that circulate is provided by the liquefaction of ‘information’. A complex of conceptual as well as scientific and technological processes has been involved in the liquefaction of information. A prerequisite was the reduction of language to communication and the differential operation of the ‘sign’.10 Communication had then to be reduced cybernetically to information and systems of information exchange, processes critically related also to the molecularization of life (Fox Keller, 2000; Kay, 1989, 1993, 2000a, 2000b). Thereafter information was reduced to digital bites electronically, and molecular code biologically. In the process of that complex process, other processes – from economy to military strategic organization – have also been utterly transformed (Dillon, 2004; Dillon and Reid, 2001). Liquefaction of information served the commodification of language. Liquefaction and commodification via information also serves to intensify the liquefaction and commodification of life understood informationally. Circulating bodies these days simply are bodies-in- formation.11 One of the staple fields of positivity and empiricity for biopolitics is therefore that of circulation: every aspect of how species-being circulates and every circulation that affects the welfare of species-being, including every conceivable transaction and exchange by means of which it is capable of being related to every other form of matter both actual and virtual (Foucault, 2007: Lecture 1). This development both reflects and further ramifies the relation between the actual and the virtual, thereby also foregrounding the virtual over the actual.12 Freedom becomes the freedom simply to be in circulation; freedom reduced to the transactions which constitute circulation virtually as well as actually. Connectivity Remarkably, considering that he was writing in the 1970s rather than the 1990s, Foucault also posed this as a problem of the connectivity and operation of networks (réseaux), and of how the balance of good and bad circulation within them is to be optimized; recognizing that, given the very ways in which networks operate, it is not possible completely to eliminate bad or unwanted circulation (2007, Lecture 2). Here, then, while economic circulation and exchange, together with commodification, is obviously fundamental, Foucault locates economic circulation within a much broader account of circulation, such that the economy relies upon other circulatory factors and considerations. It is clear from Foucault’s accounts in those lectures, and in the allied series The Birth of Biopolitics (Foucault, 2008) as well, that while addressing circulation in the widest possible way Foucault is also addressing the complex of relationality established by processes of circulation. Circulation is also a function of connectivity, a matter in effect of ‘propinquity’. Circulation helps engender new forms of nearness, proximity and association different from those of cultural specificity or territorial contiguity. Global producers and consumers are, for example, caught in a web of co-relation, implication and obligation that transcends the traditional markers of territoriality, language and culture. Virtual space similarly constitutes an entirely different space of propinquity. One may feel closer to one’s Internet lover than one’s terrestrial partner. Consider also, in this respect, Paul Rabinow’s reflections on biosociality (1999).Today, however, biopolitical rule through freedom responsibilizes through the orchestration of the radical relationality of the circulation of species-being as emergent life, globally as well as locally. Well-regulated liberty is increasingly understood to be dependent on the ‘resilience’ that such life and its complex national and international infrastructures may display.13 The moral economy of prudence associated with insurance also, for example, comes under pressure from these and allied developments in which freedom is urged to embrace risk if it is to remain resilient.14 The more things circulate the more they become associated. The more they become associated the more they become connected. In the process, the more connectivity can be understood and organized in novel ways. From this has emerged the very science of networks, a form of new physics devoted to the epistemic characteristics of different forms of association, such as those of power networks and scale-free networks (Barabassi, 2002). ComplexityThe more things circulate and are connected, however, the more complex they also become. The difference between complicated and complex is by now well established and needs little rehearsal. Complicated refers to closed systems of many elements. Complex refers to dynamic open systems whose operations engender more than the sum of their parts. Open systems, it is said, are characterized by emergent properties, phase changes and nonlinear transformation and change. They are said to display these characteristics, in part, because their initial conditions cannot be fully known, and in part because they are said to operate through informational transactions on the basis of which they complexly adapt in novel and innovative ways. While the vocabulary of connectivity and complexity is not Foucault’s, we nonetheless think it consistent with the operational dynamics and generative principles of formation that characterize the biopolitical imaginary of species-being that takes ‘life’ as its referent ontological and epistemic object of being. The vocabulary of circulation, connectivity and complexity is certainly the vocabulary of the new global economy and of the emergent bioeconomy in particular – especially in the concerns expressed, for example, with innovation cycles, convergences and linkages, rapid and discontinuous change, and identifying bottle necks to the emergence of a new bioeconomy (e.g OECD, 2006). Complexity, like circulation and connectivity with which it is intimately allied, thus also comes to constitute a quasi-transcendental for the biopolitical imaginary of species-being. …Continued… In sum: the more things relate, the more they circulate; the more they relate and circulate, the more interconnected they become; the more things circulate and become interconnected, the more complexity they are also said to display. Finally, the more they interconnect, circulate and complexly adapt, the more aleatory they become. Here what Marx called the ‘perpetuum mobile of circulation’ (1976: 226), which defines capitalism, is embedded by Foucault within a wider perpetuum mobile of biopolitical circulation and radically contingent, emergent, reproduction whose criterion of success is variously said to be fitness or resilience.

## Remote Sensing Links

**The affirmative's approach to monitoring and tracking enables biopolitical control - this enables the militarization of everyday life**

Kaplan 6 (Caren Kaplan, Women's Studies @ UC Davis, "Precision Targets: GPS and the Militarization of US Consumer Identity," American Quarterly, 58(3))

And, of course,it is only more integrated into the warfare in Afghanistan and Iraq as another round of "democratization" is pursued by means of war in the Middle East and South Asia. 62 If contemporary subjects of technoscience and its military-industrial-media-entertainment networks are constituted as targets, it is imperative that we understand this as a form of mobilization.Peter Miller and Nikolas Rose have argued that the subject of consumption is "mobilized" through the links between "human passions, hopes, and anxieties" and the "specific features of goods." 63 I have tried to show how "precision" has entered the emotional [End Page 707] field of subjectivity as the military-industrial complex has grown to encompass more fully the culture industries of media and entertainment. Thinking of consumer subjects as "mobilized" helps us in two regards. First, it allows us to move beyond the model of consumers as feminized, passive targets of unscrupulous advertisers in order to see the ways in which people participate in their construction by "volunteering," if you will, to engage in the products generated by technoscience. Secondly, it allows us to understand how citizens and consumers come together as militarized subjects through target marketing that seeks to identify their tastes, desires, and interests.The ambiguity of subject formation generates the complexities of political and cultural life in an affluent nation. Regardless of whether or not we serve in the military or have the means to afford the latest electronics, residents of the United States are mobilized into militarized ways of being.The aftermath of the first Persian Gulf war, then, has witnessed not only another war in the same region but also a proliferation of GPS-enhanced consumer goods and civilian applications of the technology. This period has also seen a veritable explosion of data-mining and marketing based on geodemographics. 64Most recently, the method of identifying consumers by zip code has been challenged by more multileveled cross-referencing. For example, the "old" ACORN Market Segmentation System divided the country into more than 250,000 blocks of neighborhoods. Each block was analyzed and sorted by some forty-nine characteristics, including household income, occupation, age, education, age of the housing stock, and other characteristics of neighborhood purchasing power. Blocks were then recombined under forty-four market segments including, for example, "trendsetting, suburban neighborhoods," "older, depressed rural towns," and "Hispanic and multi-racial neighborhoods." 65 Throughout the 1990s there was mounting evidence of the growing importance of targeting consumers on the basis of "demography and habits rather than on the basis of geographical proximity"; as the maxim from 1980s advertising giant Saatchi & Saatchi had it, there are greater differences between midtown Manhattan and the Bronx than between midtown Manhattan and the seventh arrondissement in Paris. 66 At the turn of the century, then, it is possible to propose that the citizen/consumer subject in the United States is not so much identifiable in relation to intrinsic territories but mobilized as clusters of identities in and through consumption in the context of militarization.67 Militarization in the expanded sense in which I have been using it in this essay can be seen as a set of practices at work in sites of war, as well as those of consuming, schooling, worship, and homemaking. Yet, the deterritorializing tendencies of contemporary[End Page 708] geodemographics are tempered by the will to locate that subjects of consumption generate and require for identification**.** GIS- and GPS-linked technologies offer to tell citizen/consumers their precise location, positioning them geographically for any number of reasons. This recourse to terra firma can be seen as a recuperation of geography in the face of digitalized dispersal, but it can also be seen as an articulation of the world that GIS has wrought. The deep meaning of database culture in the age of the Internet is that the less we appear to need geographical information, the more it becomes clear how anchored contemporary power is to geography. That is, the anxiety over security, the call to militarize the borders of the nation, to further police the ports, to conduct satellite surveillance on individuals in their homes and places of work, shows us that the military-industrial-media-entertainment network reworks what geography means in terms of the nation-state under the sign of globalization and in the service of mobilization.

**This approach is coopted into the military industrial complex - it gives militarism a hold over daily life, providing the impetus for global wars**

Kaplan 6 (Caren Kaplan, Women's Studies @ UC Davis, "Precision Targets: GPS and the Militarization of US Consumer Identity," American Quarterly, 58(3))

GPS exemplifies the belief in precision as a required element in armaments, especially in bombardment, and the militarization of space. According to military historians, the entire rationale for GPS development was linked to the demands of precision in missile guidance. Standard histories point to the checkered experience of aerial bombing raids during the world wars and after to demonstrate the importance of accurate targeting, especially for bombardments at night or in poor weather conditions. However, Donald MacKenzie argues that the desire for bombing precision is neither natural nor inevitable but the product of "a complex process of conflict and collaboration between a range of social actors including ambitious, energetic technologists, laboratories and corporations, and political and military leaders and the organizations they head." 25 MacKenzie's research demonstrates that a technologically determinist discourse of accuracy or precision marks the attitudes of both the political Right and Left in debates about military technologies during the period between the two world wars. How precision came to dominate discourses of military strategy in the period before World War II through the Vietnam War and beyond to the first Persian Gulf war is a complicated tale of the competing claims on resources between the branches of the U.S. armed forces as well as the growing power of what should really be termed the governmental-military-industrial complex. 26 Above all, the mystique of precision became the underlying rationale for the founding of an air force separate from the navy (which had its own flight craft and pilots) and for the organizing of U.S. national defense and offensive warfare on the principles of airpower. The rise of airpower as a military strategy is linked to the belief, passionately argued in the aftermath of WWI's previously unimaginable number of civilian as well as military casualties, that precision bombing would be a more humane practice than previous strategies of ground wars. Intrinsic to the argument for aerial bombardment are the key European Enlightenment precepts of distance, precision, and the truth-value of sight. Each of these concepts itself requires an underlying belief in the mastery of technology and the superiority of information systems that privilege vision. Nothing brought these disparate discourses and ideologies together more effectively than the development of enhanced bombsights in WWII. The ability to target selected sites on the ground from a machine traveling at rapid speeds through uncertain weather at heights great enough to remain safe from enemy detection and attack was not easy to achieve. The U.S. military itself was divided on the subject of airpower and the necessity of a separate air force branch. 27 Moreover, given the technological constraints, it was not clear that the moral high ground that precision bombing seemed to offer was achievable. Navigational and computational errors, inaccurate intelligence, [End Page 699] weather interference, and human and technological failures often sent bombs awry, killing innocent civilians while destroying nonmilitary sites and structures. Nevertheless, the impression prevailed that U.S. precision bombing was far superior to its obverse strategy: tactical or saturation bombing, a technique that focused on destroying the morale of the civilian population in enemy territory through wide-scale devastation and terror. 28 Aerial bombardment during WWI had consisted of dropping armaments by hand with "no bombing sights, no aiming points, and no true bombs." 29 As the world geared up for the next war, entire industries were pressed into the quest for high-tech solutions to the perceived need for precision—both to better the record of aerial bombardment and to protect the lives of the airmen. With the new bombsights developed for WWII, popular belief held that a bombardier's precision was increased such that he could "drop a bomb into a pickle barrel." 30 While this claim to precision was often contradicted by evidence, the bombardier became a heroic, even iconic, figure in popular perception. 31 As Conrad Crane argues, accurate daylight bombing, with its precision mystique, called upon "traditional," favored American characteristics such as marksmanship, fair play, and other "frontier" stereotypes, adding to its strategic appeal to planners and the public alike. 32The precise aim of the bombardier (in truth, more the result of skilled mathematical calculation and new technologies than the classic "line of sight" attributed to great marksmen) became legendary. The development of the Norden and Sperry bombsights, along with the engineering of the B-17 long-range airplane (known as the "Flying Fortress"), brought daylight precision bombing into the policy and strategy of modern warfare as an integral component of airpower.

## Security cards more

**Cavelty 8** (Myriam Dunn Cavelty, Lecturer and head of New Risks research at Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich, coordinator of the Crisis and Risk Network, "Like a phoenix from the ashes: the reinvention of critical infrastructure protection as distributed security," Securing 'the Homeland:' Critical Infrastructure, Risk, and (In)Security, ed. Cavelty and Kristensen, pg. 40-63)

On the referent object side, it was established that 'the nation is so dependent on our infrastructures that we must view them through a national security lens' (PCCIP 1997: vii). Furthermore, critical infrastructures are 'the foundations of our prosperity, enablers of our defense, and the vanguard of our future. They empower every element of our society. There is no more urgent priority than assuring the security, continuity, and availability of our critical infrastructures (PCCIP 1997: vii). The dependence of society on the information and communi¬cation infrastructure on the one hand, and ever-more complex interdependencies between infrastructures on the other, were established as creating a new dimen¬sion of vulnerability, 'which, when combined with an emerging constellation of threats, poses unprecedented national risk' (PCCIP 1997: ix).¶ Again and again, the PCCIP stresses the evaporation of boundaries and the high degree of interdependency between single infrastructure elements, which creates overwhelming complexity, conveying a sense of powerlessness vis-a-vis technology. This powerlessness seems exacerbated by several business trends within the infrastructures: extensive use of information automation; deregulation and restructuring; physical consolidation; globalisation; and adoption of a just¬in-time' operational tempo (PCCIP 1997: Appendix A). Technological develop¬ment is depicted as a force out of control, and the combination of technology and complexity conveys a sense of unmanageability. An overall pessimistic perspective concerning accidents and the limited possibilities of preventing them and coping with them resonates in much of the cyber-threats debate (Perrow 1984). Furthermore, the dynamic interaction of complex systems ins believed to overtax the human ability to evaluate the problem. This discourse is built on a general distrust towards computer technology, which feeds on the fear of the unknown. Technology, including information technology, is feared because it is seen as a complex, abstract, and arcane in its impact on individuals. Because computers do things that used to be done by humans, there is a notion of technology being out of control that is even strengthened by the increase in connectivity that the information revolution brings (see Conway, Chapter 5, this volume; Pollitt 1997).

**Kristensen 8** (Kristian Soby Kristensen, PhD candidate with the Research Unit on Defense and Security at the Danish Institute for International Studies, Political Science @ University of Copenhagen, "'The absolute protection of our citizens': critical infrastructure protection and the practice of security," Securing 'the Homeland:' Critical Infrastructure, Risk, and (In)Security, ed. Cavelty and Kristensen, pg. 63-84)

Borders, security and sovereignty¶ The border is the ultimate place of sovereign control demarcating inside from outside. It has a central symbolic function as the external face of the state. It is¶ supposed to be impregnable and controlled by the state. 'Citizen' and non- citizen', 'illegal' and 'legal' entry, 'legitimate trade' and 'smuggling' — all these labels are used to characterize the subjects crossing the border into the territorial space of the state. Borders play an essential function in the production of state sovereignty, security and territorial integrity. The border is the symbolic begin- ning and end, as well as the primary point of control and surveillance of the state (Bigo 2001: 101). Inside, the social contract applies; outside, there are no such guarantees. This concept of borders and sovereignty has, of course, always been an idealized theoretical description — no such thing as a secure border has ever existed. However, the ideal is an exact description of a pure form, and this pure form of border and security is the conceptual ideal on which the modern nation state is founded (e.g. Hertz 1957; Hinsley 1967; Morgenthau 1948;¶ Kratochw¶ 1.986): This ideal has lived side by side with a sedimented practice that has stabi- lized inconsistencies between practice and theory, and has reproduced the sym- bolic value of borders in delimiting sovereign space as well as their practical¶ d 0¶ function as points of control and passage into the inside (Lap i Borders create places where sovereign power is legitimated — they jesta2b011s1h: 8¶ th)e. spatial beginning of the Hobbesian contract.¶ ¶ The absolute protection of our citizens' 65¶ This practice of state sovereignty at the territorial border has, however, for some time been challenged. Global flows of trade, investment, migration and commerce, it is argued, put the sovereign state under functional pressure. This pressure changes the character and function of borders as barriers to movement, and as points of sovereign control. Globalization favours freedom and the cre¬ation of a 'space of flows' decoupled from territorial constraints (Castells 2000; Anderson et al. 2002; Sassen 1996). The functions of borders are in the process of changing from 'being boundaries that are heavily protected and militarized to [being] more porous, permitting cross border social and economic integration' (Hertzog 1996: 84). Thus, the state and the 'world of states' (Blatter 2001: 175) are changing as a consequence of changed border practices. The effects of glob¬alization also manifest themselves in relation to security. Society, it is argued, is threatened by these new trans-border flows. For the Western societies, the threat from this new condition of porous borders has been politically conceptualized as being closely entwined with immigration (e.g. Bigo 2000; Wxver et al. 1993), as well as terror and organized crime (Andreas 2003; Guild 2003). The state is caught in a dilemma; on the one hand, it has to allow the economically essential flows of globalization. On the other hand, flows of people and things cannot be controlled as in the Westphalian ideal, leaving both state and society vulnerable (Biersteker 2003: 157-61; Rudolph 2005). This leads to new border policies blurring the distinction between inside and outside (Walker 1993; Beck 2003), thus also blurring the distinction between external and internal security (Bigo 2000; Lutterbeck 2005). The border is deterritorialized or debordered (Andreas 2003: 98; Blatter 2001: 176f.). These developments move the sovereign task of Providing security away from the border and change its character.¶ Much of the literature that is based on this assumption of a blurring of the distinction between inside and outside focuses on how internal security dynam¬ics are pushed outwards (Bigo 2000: 171ff.). This is especially true for the way in which the state manages the outsider (asylum seekers, immigrants etc.) and how this subject, in state practices, is associated with terror (Bigo 2000: 174; Bonditti, Chapter 6, this volume; Huysmans 2004). A number of studies have empirically investigated this debordering of the border both in Europe and in America. For instance, developments in Europe displace border controls from the territory of individual states to the EU's external borders as well as to the territory of third countries (Boswell 2003; Huysrnans 2000). Similarly, US Policy towards Mexico has consisted of pushing its anti-immigration efforts as \yell as counter-terrorism policies into Mexican territory, while still strengthen¬ing controls at the border (Andreas 2003; Serrano 2003). Similarly, the US war On drugs' can be seen as an outward displacement of practices traditionally carried out at the border (Andreas 2000). Thus, a widespread and well investi- gated (and criticized) change in border policies is taking place. States are extending their border policies from the state boundary in order to secure their own societies. However, this change is not a solitary trend occurring in isolation. It coincides with a reverse movement; at the same time, various forms of secur- ity Policy are moving inside, into the territory of the state.

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In short, physically securing the citizen body and the territorial homeland of the US is the core task of the government. This line of argumentation again invokes the out¬of-the-ordinary dynamics of security policy. When the security of every citizen is at play in conjunction with what is in fact the survival of the constitutionally legitimate government, the goal of securing both obviously takes precedence, and protective measures naturally spread to include more and more issues and sectors of society. This all-inclusive strategy runs through much of CIP dis¬course, and the expansion of the concept in particular can be understood as a consequence of this discursive function. When the security of the nation and every citizen as well as the legitimacy of the government are defined as being at stake, then everything that could possibly have an effect immediately becomes critical, and thus a potential object for securitization. The strategies in the CIP discourse relate directly to potentiality and securitization, as they attempt to answer questions concerning the potential impacts of certain developments. The emphasis on networks, interdependency and interconnectedness in the conceptu¬alization of CIP has to be seen from this perspective. Even a discrete event of little apparent significance could entail largely unpredictable cascading effects throughout a large number of sectors. These factors, combined with the high stakes involved, give rise to a natural impulse to protect everything. Further¬more, the expansion of the concept to include both a psychological perspective and public trust in government is also an illustration of the above dynamic of eliciting possible outcomes. For example, a terror attack on a local school (Bush 2002: 42) does not in itself threaten the continued functioning of US society. However, the psychological effect of such an attack on the public might verY well have 'cascading' consequences for both the continued functioning of society and indeed for public trust in government. The concept of criticality, and accordingly what is to be secured, is thus expanded from interconnected phys¬ical networks to include everything with an emotional attachment ranging from schools to national monuments. In the words of President Bush: 'every terrorist attack has a potential national impact' (Bush 2003a: ix). In principle, everything has to be protected. But this follows not from an assessment of the particular threat, but from an a priori definition of terrorist attacks as constituting critical threats. From the argument that any terrorist attack is a potential threat to the nation, it automatically follows that everything that can be targeted is a critical infrastructure. Therefore, everything has to be secured; the constitutional legiti- macy of government depends upon it. This is in line with the traditional concep¬tion of security inside the sovereign space. Every citizen everywhere inside sovereign space should be able to demand absolute protection. The universal character of the discourse leads to policies based on worst-case scenarios. But protecting everything is impossible. It is not in the power of the sovereign to absolutely secure the homeland, because 'we must accept some level of terrorist risk as a persistent condition of our daily life' (Bush 2003a: 12). The threat is already inside: '[T]errorism is insidious. Terrorists seek to infiltrate ¶ our society, scope out targets and wage war in our streets and cities.¶ The consequences for the provision of security are considerable. As we have seen, inside sovereign space, sovereign power is paradoxically limited, and the almost natural tendency of the state to protect everything is equally and necessarily limited. Inside society, the state faces other political imperatives than that of security. Absolute protection can only be achieved by imposing severe restrictions on activities inside society; by going against the economic preroga¬tive of private actors. As stated by Secretary Chertoff: 'I can guarantee you perfect security at a port, for example, if I shut the port down' (Chertoff 2005c: 8). Instead, to avoid these consequences, the aim is 'to create a security environ¬ment that works with the grain of commerce' (Chertoff 2005a). Consequently, how does the state secure the homeland and carry out its constitutional obliga¬tions, while still bearing in mind that absolute protection is impossible because on the inside state action is limited. That is the project of the DHS — to create a security environment that on the one hand protects society, but on the other hand 'works with the grain' of society. Again, the issue is how to balance the differ¬ences between security and the market, and between state and society. This is to be achieved through the concept of risk.

**Their risk doctrine is incoherent**

**Kristensen 8** (Kristian Soby Kristensen, PhD candidate with the Research Unit on Defense and Security at the Danish Institute for International Studies, Political Science @ University of Copenhagen, "'The absolute protection of our citizens': critical infrastructure protection and the practice of security," Securing 'the Homeland:' Critical Infrastructure, Risk, and (In)Security, ed. Cavelty and Kristensen, pg. 63-84)

This view is diametrically opposed to the conception outlined earlier. If, as¶ stated by President Bush, every terrorist attack has a national impact (Bush¶ 2003a: ix), then every terrorist attack is important. This effectively annuls the discriminating function of risk. There are two simultaneous CIP rationalities at work in government strategies, with two opposing goals. On the one hand, the goal of absolute protection inevitably expands the meaning of critical infrastruc¬ture protection, and security concerns cover more and more parts of society and thus necessarily integrate an increasing number of private actors. On the other hand, the concept of risk makes anti-terror strategies relative, dependent on other goals besides absolute protection. There is a fundamental conceptual insta¬bility in the discourse on how to protect critical infrastructure and secure society. Risk introduces probability as the basis for action, which makes sense from the economic-risk perspective of business. Taking action based on calcu¬lated risk is a normal and legitimate business practice. However, that is not the way things usually work when national security is at stake. In the national secur¬ity context, action is usually justified by the precautionary principle of 'better safe than sorry' (on the precautionary principle as security strategy, see Ras¬mussen 2006: 123-9; Aradau and van Munster 2007). Risk analysis depends on how important the object of analysis is deemed to be, and on how the con¬sequences of putting it at risk are assessed; ultimately, it depends on a cost—benefit analysis. Furthermore, when protection from terror has already been defined as the most important activity of the state, the costs of a terrorist attack are always already analysed as being too high; the risk of incurring such an attack would always be catastrophic. Applying a risk perspective will not fundamentally change this, and thus the goal of securing the homeland is still conceived as consisting of 'absolute protection'. The two opposing conceptual¬izations, which are not easily made compatible, both live on in the discourse.

# Environment K

## Prolif Impact

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It will affect the living conditions of many people. In many cases the change in living conditions will be for the worse. This may, in turn, lead to violent conflict. The deterioration of the human environment and the resulting violent conflict may induce large numbers of people to migrate, thus also creating conflicts in areas less negatively affected by climate change. Beyond local and regional effects, climate change increases the global risk of violent conflict by adding another element of contention to the competition among major powers. These dangers associated with climate change are by now quite well rehearsed. But how high is the probability that they will occur? How likely is it that climate change will lead to more interstate wars, intrastate wars or terrorism? How much do we know about the links between climate change and violence? Are these dangers ‘real’ in the sense of having a high likelihood of occurring or are they largely fictitious, edge-of-range possibilities that are used to draw attention to climate change, a level of attention that would not be attainable by stressing the more likely, but less spectacular economic and social consequences of the problem? The latter would be understandable but potentially counterproductive. In the literature on securitization it is implied that when a problem is securitized it is difficult to limit this to an increase in attention and resources devoted to mitigating the problem (Brock 1997, Waever 1995). Securitization regularly leads to all-round ‘exceptionalism’ in dealing with the issue as well as to a shift in institutional localization towards ‘security experts’ (Bigot 2006), such as the military and police. Methods and instruments associated with these security organizations – such as more use of arms, force and violence – will gain in importance in the discourse on ‘what to do’. A good example of securitization was the period leading to the Cold War (Guzzini 2004 ). Originally a political conflict over the organization of societies, in the late 1940s, the East-West confrontation **became an existential conflict that was overwhelmingly addressed with military means, including the potential annihilation of humankind**. Efforts to alleviate the political conflict were, throughout most of the Cold War, secondary to improving military capabilities. **Climate change could meet a similar fate**. An essentially political problem concerning the distribution of the costs of prevention and adaptation and the losses and gains in income arising from change in the human environment might be perceived as intractable, thus necessitating the build-up of military and police forces to prevent it from becoming a major security problem. The portrayal of climate change as a security problem could, in particular, cause the richer countries in the global North, which are less affected by it, to strengthen measures aimed at protecting them from the spillover of violent conflict from the poorer countries in the global South that will be most affected by climate change. It could also be used by major powers as a justification for improving their military preparedness against the other major powers, thus leading to arms races.

## Discourse First

**Discourse comes first in the context of climate change - their so-called "truth claims" are politically constructed - our interpretation shapes the reality of our response**

**Backstrand & Lovbrand 6** (Karin Backstrand, Wallenberg Research fellow PoliSci @ Lund Univ. AND Eva Lovabrand, Prof Environmental Science @ Kalmar Univ., "Planting Trees to Mitigate Climate Change: Contested Discourses of Ecological Modernization, Green Governmentality and Civic Environmentalism," Global Environmental Politics, 6 (1) pg 50-75, Discourses of Environmental Governance)

Discourse analysis has gained ground and proliferated in the analysis of global environmental change in sociology, political ecology and policy studies.[2](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/global_environmental_politics/v006/6.1backstrand.html#FOOT2) A central insight of this disparate work is to identify power relationships associated with dominant narratives surrounding "environment" and "sustainable development." Four dimensions of discourse analysis that are prominent in the literature and relevant for our study are highlighted. First, discourses are conceived of as a shared meaning of phenomena. Global environmental change in general and the role of terrestrial carbon sinks in particular are permeated by a struggle over meaning and symbolic representation. In line with Hajer we understand discourses as "specific ensembles of ideas, concepts and categorization that are produced, reproduced and transformed in a particular set of practices."[3](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/global_environmental_politics/v006/6.1backstrand.html#FOOT3) Secondly, the exercise of power is closely tied to the production of knowledge, [End Page 51] which in turn can sustain a discourse. Hence, discourses are embedded in power relations, "as historically variable ways of specifying knowledge and truth--what is possible to speak at a given moment."[4](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/global_environmental_politics/v006/6.1backstrand.html#FOOT4) Discourses as "knowledge regimes" bring us squarely to the role of science. In expert-driven global environmental change research especially, modern scientific knowledge, techniques, practices and institutions enable the production and maintenance of discourses. Thirdly, in line with argumentative discourse analysis, we subscribe to a conception of discourse that bridges the gap between the linguistic aspects and institutional dimensions of policy-making. In this vein discourse analysis can be brought to the forefront of the analysis of power and policy. Policies are not neutral tools but rather a product of discursive struggles. Accordingly, policy discourses favor certain descriptions of reality, empower certain actors while marginalizing others. The concept of discourse institutionalization is useful as it refers to the transformation of discourse into institutional phenomena.[5](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/global_environmental_politics/v006/6.1backstrand.html#FOOT5) Fourthly, we align ourselves with a discourse analysis that includes a notion of agency. Recent studies have advanced concepts such as "discourse coalition" and "knowledge broker" to highlight how agents are embedded in discourses.[6](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/global_environmental_politics/v006/6.1backstrand.html#FOOT6) In this perspective, discourses are inconceivable without discoursing subjects or agents that interpret, articulate and reproduce storylines congruent with certain discourses. We use the concept of discursive agent and argue that political power stems from the ability to articulate and set the term for the discourse. To conclude, we employ a discourse-analytic framework that sheds light on how discourses are deeply embedded in scientific practices and techniques, institutionalized in global policy arenas and articulated by agents spanning the public-private and local-global divide. In the sections below we present each of the three discourses that arguably underpin policy practice and academic debates of environmental governance. They provide rough maps for understanding the discursive framing of contemporary global environmental politics. However, as will be demonstrated, each discourse is heterogeneous and thus in a constant change and redefinition. Consequently, there are overlaps and conflicts between the discourses when making sense of environmental governance.

**Reject appeals to science - it's not objective - the alternative is key to reconfigure the role of sciecne**

**Wæver 11** (Ole Wæver, Centre for Advanced Security Theory, Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, "Politics, Security, Theory," Security Dialogue, 42(4-5) 465–480)

Also science might reconfigure securitization. Trine Villumsen Berling (this issue) rightly points ¶ to the neglected issue of how scientific arguments and ‘facts’ are at play in securitization. Change in ¶ the nature and place of science in society (Gibbons et al., 1994; Weingart, 2001) could spell systematic changes in securitization. Previously, basic science was produced in discipline-divided academic ¶ sanctuaries, while only applied science was getting its hands dirty. Increasingly, the most influential ¶ research is developed in the ‘context of application’ – that is, basic science is organized by specific ¶ tasks. Science has become too important to be left to scientists, and it is negotiated all the way from ¶ priorities to usage by economic, societal, media and political actors. Security expertise of the political ¶ science kind was always thus embedded, but securitization often relies not only on security expertise ¶ as such, but on more natural science-like technical expertise, typically in relation to specific threats. ¶ Such knowledge becomes increasingly entwined with extra-academic processes, yet science usually ¶ retains its particular aura, and political discussions of scientific advice are dichotomized, treating ¶ science as either pure or tainted. Rarely can public debate simultaneously take into account how science is socially shaped and acknowledge that it provides a particular form of knowledge (Jasanoff, ¶ 2005). As Berling points out, science often depoliticizes, and our ironic future seems to be one where ¶ science is increasingly politicized yet simultaneously able to depoliticize. This constitutes one more ¶ reason to pay increasing attention in the future to the interface of science and securitization.