# \*\*\*VIRILIO\*\*\*

## LINKS

#### The plan is preoccupied with logistics, signals the accident

Bratton ’06

(Benjamin Bratton, Introduction to Speed and Politics by Paul Virillio, pg. 7-8)

PAUL VIRILIO'S MODERNITY is logistical. It doesn't directly deal with war, but with everything that makes it possible. Logistics is the preparation for war through the transfer of the nation's potential to its armed forces in time of peace as in times of war.1 Modernity is a world in motion, expressed in translations of strategic space into logistical time, and back again. It is a history of cities, partitions, trading circuits, satellites, and software; of a political landscape governed by competing technologies of surveillance, mobilization, fortification and their interdependent administrations. It begins as an archaelogy of naval routes, strategic techniques and urban distributions, and becomes an integrated world of events reduced to shapes and symbols, viewed and manipulated instantaneously on screens. In Virilio's narrative, 7 architectural regimes become computational, and vice versa. Both are logistical media for mobilization and its administration, technologies that consolidate territory into logistical fields and enable a Modern governance based on the abstracted calculation over omnidirectional spaces and surfaces, from open oceans to shared spreadsheets. This comprehensive technologization of the globe signals for Virilio both integration and disintegration, both control and accident. And it is finally through the accident, the realization of the imminent, irreducible risk that logistics hopes to contain, and not through control, that the strongest bonds of the polis are formed. For Virilio, they are an exceptional condition already contained within, and rigorously predicated by the invention that made them possible.

#### City planning perpetuates the idea of speed found in pure war

Bratton ‘06

(Benjamin Bratton, Introduction to Speed and Politics by Paul Virillio, pg 19-21)

Virilio's history—and our present moment—is a profile of violence, of both binding and fissure. While Virilio begins with the literal, primordial bunker, he extends the economy of attrition to characterize Modernity itself. The bunker and its double, the camp, are the elemental spaces of this. The bunker is a concrete prophylactic, the camp is incarcerating. Both are hygienic, defensive. One is an architectural membrane against a hostile world, and one is an expulsion-by-enclosure of the Other from the normal performance of law. In their extreme forms, both spaces, even as they are often architecturally identical, are in their way zones of pure logistics. They are sites where the only compulsion is the execution of governance on a raw mass, mobilizing it, diagramming it. They are only ideal types, and the real world is full of spaces (factories, airports, warehouses, laboratories, jails, shipping ports, etc.) that are complex combinations of the bunker and the camp, switching from one the other, inverting exteriorization and interiorization moment by moment. For Virilio, the accumulation of capital is a means to ensure security, not the inverse. He writes: "Bourgeois power is military even more than economic, but it relates most directly to the occult permanence of the state of siege, to the appearance of fortified towns, those 'great immobile machines' made in different ways" (36). The competitive and complicit energies of the masses are understood as possessing a permanent poliorcetic historical mission (conducting or resisting sieges), and their movements are governed by the immobile surfaces of city, resolved in a suspended state of soft siege. This slow, permanent war is itself a technology of glacial attrition and shared deterrence. The city is in essence a bunker, characterized by Virilio as a deliberate "reduction of power in favor of a better trajectory, life traded for survival" (85). The "front" of this "pure war" is everywhere and everything, both inside and outside of the "closed world" of the "society of control." The comprehensive enclosure of earthly territory under dromocratic supervision totalizes this soft siege as a condition of global social space. Today's "security environment" (a preferred catch-phrase of Rumsfeld's) is populated by a Poliorcetics Lite, in which the defense of common civilian passage from potential acts of violence is folded into design criteria for the dissuasion of both petty and grand crime.7

#### The logistics of images and information perpetuate war and speed

Virilio 2K

(Paul Virilio, Paul Virilio in Conversation with John Armitage, The Kosovo War Took Place In Orbital Space, published in 2000, Paul Virilio is a renowned urbanist, political theorist and critic of the art of technology)

For me, Sun Tzu's statement that military force is based upon deception is an extraordinary statement. But let us start with the title of War and Cinema. The important part of the title is not War and Cinema. It is the subtitle, The Logistics of Perception. As I said back in 1984, the idea of logistics is not only about oil, about ammunitions and supplies but also about images. Troops must be fed with ammunition and so on but also with information, with images, with visual intelligence. Without these elements troops cannot perform their duties properly. This is what is meant by the logistics of perception. Now, if we consider my latest book, Strategie de la deception, what we need to focus on are the other aspects of the same phenomenon. For the strategies of deception are concerned with deceiving an opponent through the logistics of perception. But these strategies are not merely aimed at the Serbs or the Iraqis but also at all those who might support Milosevic or Saddam Hussein. Moreover, such strategies are also aimed at deceiving the general public through radio, television and so on. In this way, it seems to me that, since 1984, my book on the logistics of perception has been proved totally correct. For instance, almost every conflict since then has involved the logistics of perception, including the war in Lebanon, where Israel made use of cheap drones in order to track Yasser Arafat with the aim of killing him. If we look at the Gulf War, the same is also true. Indeed, my work on the logistics of perception and the Gulf War was so accurate that I was even asked to discuss it with high-ranking French military officers. They asked me: 'how is it that you wrote that book in 1984 and now it's happening for real?' My answer was: 'the problem is not mine but yours: you have not been doing your job properly!' But let us link all this to something that is not discussed very often. I am referring here to the impact of the launch of the television news service CNN in 1984 or thereabouts. However, what I want to draw your attention to is CNN's so-called 'Newshounds'. Newshounds are people with mini-video cameras, people who are continually taking pictures in the street and sending the tapes in to CNN. These Newshounds are a sort of pack of wolves, continually looking for quarry, but quarry in the form of images. For example, it was this pack of wolves that sparked off the Rodney King affair a few years ago in Los Angeles. Let us consider the situation: a person videos Rodney King being beaten up by the cops. That person then sends in the footage to the TV station. Within hours riots flare up in the city! There is, then, a link between the logistics of perception, the wars in Lebanon and the Gulf as well as with CNN and the Pentagon. But what interests me here is that what starts out as a story of a black man being beaten up in the street, a story that, unfortunately, happens all the time, everywhere, escalates into something that is little short of a war in Los Angeles!

#### The use of GPS promotes localization and territorial control

Virilio 2K

(Paul Virilio, Paul Virilio in Conversation with John Armitage, The Kosovo War Took Place In Orbital Space, published in 2000, Paul Virilio is a renowned urbanist, political theorist and critic of the art of technology)

GPS not only played a large and delocalizing role in the war in Kosovo but is increasingly playing a role in social life. For instance, it was the GPS that directed the planes, the missiles and the bombs to localised targets in Kosovo. But may I remind you that the bombs that were dropped by the B-2 plane on the Chinese embassy — or at least that is what we were told — were GPS bombs. And the B-2 flew in from the US. However, GPS are everywhere. They are in cars. They were even in the half-tracks that, initially at least, were going to make the ground invasion in Kosovo possible. Yet, for all the sophistication of GPS, there still remain numerous problems with their use. The most obvious problem in this context is the problem of landmines. For example, when the French troops went into Kosovo they were told that they were going to enter in half-tracks, over the open fields. But their leaders had forgotten about the landmines. And this was a major problem because, these days, landmines are no longer localised. They are launched via tubes and distributed haphazardly over the territory. As a result, one cannot remove them after the war because one cannot find them! And yet the ability to detect such landmines, especially in a global war of movement, is absolutely crucial. Thus, for the US, GPS are a form of sovereignty! It is hardly surprising, then, that the EU has proposed its own GPS in order to be able to localise and to compete with the American GPS. As I have said before, sovereignty no longer resides in the territory itself, but in the control of the territory. And localisation is an inherent part of that territorial control. As I pointed out in The Art of the Motor and elsewhere, from now on we need two watches: a wristwatch to tell us what time it is and a GPS watch to tell us what space it is!

#### The internet contributes to virtualization

Virilio 2K

(Paul Virilio, The Information Bomb, culture theorist and urbanist 1998 p.14)

This is an active (wave) optics, replacing in a thorough- going way the passive (geometric) optics of the era of Galileo’s spy-glass. And doing so as though the loss of the horizon-line of geographical perspective imperatively necessitated the establishment of a substitute horizon: the ‘artificial horizon’ of a screen or a monitor, capable of permanently displaying the new preponderance of the media perspective over the immediate perspective of space. Widi the relief of the ‘tele-present’ event then taking precedence over the three dimensions of the volume of objects or places here present . . . This helps us better to understand the sudden multiplication of those ‘great lights’2 that are meteorological or military observation satellites. The repeated sending into orbit of communications satellites, the spread of metropolitan video-surveillance or, alternatively the recent development of live-cams on the Internet. All this contributing, as we have seen, to the inversion of the usual conceptions of inside and outside. Finally this generalized visualization is the defining aspect of what is generally known today as virtualization. The much—vaunted ‘virtual reality’ is not so much a navigation through the cyberspace of the networks. It is, first and foremost, the amplification of the optical density of the appearances of the real world. An amplification which attempts to compensate for the contraction of distances on the Earth, a contraction brought about by the temporal compression of instantaneous telecommunications. In a world in which obligatory telepresence is submerging the immediate presence of individuals (in work, trade, etc.), television can no longer be what it has been for half a century: a place of entertainment or of the promotion of culture; it must, first and foremost, give birth to the world time of exchanges, to this virtual vision which is supplanting the vision of the real world around us. Grand-Scale Transhorizon Optics is, therefore, the site of all (strategic, economic, political . . .) virtualization. Without it, the development of globalitarianism, which is preparing to revive the totalitarianisms of the past, would be ineffective. To provide the coming globalization with relief] with optical density it is necessary not merely to connect up to the cybernetic networks, but, most important, to split the reality of the world in two. As with sterevoscopy and sterenphvny, which distinguish left from the right, bass from treble, to make it easier to perceive audiovisual relief, it is essential today to effect a split in primary reality by developing a stereo-reality, made up on the one hand of the actual reality of immediate appearances and, on the other, of the virtual reality of media transappearances. Not until this new `reality effect’ becomes generally accepted as commonplace will it be possible really to speak of globalization. To manage at last to ‘bring to light’ an overexposed world, a world without dead angles, without ‘areas of shadow' (like the micro video which replaces both car reversing lights and rear-view mirrors) — this is the objective of the technologies of synthetic vision. Since a picture is worth a thousand words, the aim of multi- media is to tum our old television into a kind of domestic telescope for seeing, for foreseeing (in a manner not unlike present weather forecasting) the world that lies just around the corner. The aim is to make the computer screen the ultimate window, but a window which would not so much allow you to receive data as to view the horizon of globalization, the space of its accelerated virtualization . . . Let us now take an example whose significance is widely misrecognized; that of ‘live—cams’, those video imaging devices which have been set up all over the place and which are only accessible through the Internet. Though apparently aimless and insignificant, the phenomenon is nonetheless spreading to all parts of an increasing number of countries: from San Francisco Bay to Jerusalem’s Wailing Wall, by way of the offices and apartments of a few exhibitionists, the camera enables you to discover in real time what is going on at the other end of the planet at that very moment. Here the computer is no longer simply a device for consulting information sources, but an automatic vision machine, operating within the space of an entirely virtualized geographical reality. Some Internet enthusiasts are even happy to live their lives 'on screen'. Interned in the closed circuits of the Web, they offer up their private lives for everyone to watch. The collectivist introspection of these people, who exemplify a universal voyeurism, is set to expand at the speed of the single world advertising market, which is not far of now Advertising, which in the nineteenth century was simply the publicizing of a product, before becoming in the twentieth an industry for stimulating desire, is set in the twenty-first century to become pure communication. To this end it will require the unnirling of an advertising space which stretches to the horizon of visibility of the planet. Global advertising, far from being satisfied with the classic poster or with breaks between TV or radio programmes, now requires the imposition of its ‘environment’ on a mass of TV viewers who have in the interim become tele-actors and teleconsumers. To come back again to the Internet, a number of towns forgotten by tourists vaunt the merits of their regions there. Alpine hotels show of their fine vistas on the screen, while proponents of land art are preparing to equip their works with multiple Web cameras. You can also travel vicariously: you can tour America, visit Hong Kong, and even view an Antarctic station in its polar darkness . . . In spite of its poor optical quality ‘live transmission’ has become a promotional tool directing anyone and every- one’s gaze to some privileged vantage points.

#### Attitude towards high-speed causes congestion, life is connected to clock-time, plan affects later generations

Adam, Harris, and Lewis ’04

(Barbara, Peter, Jamie, Social Sciences at Cardiff University, Time, Sustainable Transport and the Politics of Speed World Transport Policy & Practice, Volume 10, Number 2, published 2004)

This attitude towards high-speed, we want to suggest, has developed on the basis of the dominant position that clock-time has taken within Western industrialised societies and the values that this subsequently informs and underpins. Historically, the organisation of social life to the time of the clock has spread with industrialisation. Thus, for example, the development of railways was dependent on its reliable metre as it needed an invariable and precise time-form for their timetables (Le Goff, 1980; Adam, 2004). The clock is different both from natural temporal rhythms and indigenous social time structures in that it is abstract, decontextualised and therefore universally applicable. The global spread of clock-time was accompanied by a new economic attitude, pertinently described by Benjamin Franklin as ‘time = money,’ an attitude that has become deeply embedded within contemporary Western culture. Within this relationship time becomes a quantity that is inextricably tied to economic exchange. Thus, to maximise profit it is economically advantageous to complete activities in the least possible amount of time. It is this attitude that leads to the prioritisation of speed within transport as the ‘time = money’ rationale has meant that high-speed becomes imperative. Faster is seen to be better, as it achieves more in a given time frame. High-speed is viewed as less time consuming and therefore less costly and thus more efficient and profit creating or enhancing. It is within this context that the temporal connection between high-speed temporality and transport is observed. However, the question of what temporal effects this coupling of time with money and speed with profit has on society in general and on the development of sustainable transport in particular is rarely addressed. As has been previously mentioned, speeds of travel are increasing within all modes of transport. For example, the average power of motorcars in production throughout the EU today has consistently increased since 1990 (ACEA), and similar statistics apply to most modes of travel, both sustainable and non-sustainable. Yet the implications of moving fast are significant. Within this paper we are focusing on these implications with regard to four central concerns associated with mobility and transport policy. These are congestion and sustainability, equity, and safety. Congestion and Sustainability The attitudes to time and high-speed outlined above are deeply embedded yet continually present in transport users’ decision making. By bringing them to the surface, or explicating them, we can establish some of their largely neglected implications. Three of these can serve as examples to illustrate the link between speed valorisation, sustainable development and congestion. First of all, high-speed travel does not always establish substantial time-savings for individual transport users. If we focus first of all on cars, we find that increases in speed have occurred simultaneously with increases in car ownership. Ever growing numbers of cars try to get to their destination by the fastest possible means with the result being an increased potential for congestion. This relationship between increased speed, congestion and the potential for standstill has been formulated by Paul Virilio as the ‘Law of Dromology,’: ‘increases in speed are coupled with increases in gridlock’ (Virilio, 1991, 65). Research has shown that when journey times are reduced through increased speed the time saved is rarely used for other meaningful activities. Instead it tends to be ploughed back into transport, that is, it is used to travel further distances (Brög, 1996; Whitelegg, 1997). Similarly, within rail transport the ability to travel at high speed is being undermined by low levels of synchronisation, which in turn leads to an inefficient rail network and causes difficulties in developing successful inter-modality. This means that the potential time-savings of increased speed are not utilised by transport users in the form of reduced journey times but for increasing the distances to be travelled. Increasing speed in transport also has negative consequences for the environment. All modes of transport that use non-renewable forms of energy require higher levels of energy consumption for higher speeds. Consequently, travelling at increased speeds also produces higher-levels of pollution. Moreover, the congestion that accompanies higher speeds increases the weight of traffic on the roads that must raise the levels of damage being caused to transport infrastructure. Not only does this raise the financial cost of transport, it also increases the amount of raw materials that have to be extracted and used on roads, railways and airport runways. Whilst some of the above effects, such as smog and infrastructural damage, are being felt by today’s generation, many of the other environmental consequences may not be experienced for some years and their full effects felt only by subsequent generations. This creates a democratic deficit, where future generations are subject to risks, hazards and problems not of their own making and over which they have no control.

## ALT/ALT SOLVENCY

#### The alt is to resist speed in every instance,

Virilio 2K

(Paul Virilio, Paul Virilio in Conversation with John Armitage, The Kosovo War Took Place In Orbital Space, published in 2000, Paul Virilio is a renowned urbanist, political theorist and critic of the art of technology)

Resistance is always possible! But we must engage in resistance first of all by developing the idea of a technological culture. However, at the present time, this idea is grossly underdeveloped. For example, we have developed an artistic and a literary culture. Nevertheless, the ideals of technological culture remain underdeveloped and therefore outside of popular culture and the practical ideals of democracy. This is also why society as a whole has no control over technological developments. And this is one of the gravest threats to democracy in the near future. It is, then, imperative to develop a democratic technological culture. Even among the elite, in government circles, technological culture is somewhat deficient. I could give examples of cabinet ministers, including defence ministers, who have no technological culture at all. In other words, what I am suggesting is that the hype generated by the publicity around the Internet and so on is not counter balanced by a political intelligence that is based on a technological culture. For instance, in 1999, Bill Gates not only published a new book on work at the speed of thought but also detailed how Microsoft's 'Falconview' software would enable the destruction of bridges in Kosovo. Thus it is no longer a Caesar or a Napoleon who decides on the fate of any particular war but a piece of software! In short, the political intelligence of war and the political intelligence of society no longer penetrate the technoscientific world. Or, let us put it this way, technoscientific intelligence is presently insufficiently spread among society at large to enable us to *interpret* the sorts of technoscientific advances that are taking shape today.

#### The Alt is to slow down, and speed cedes the political

Glezos ‘09

(Simon Glezos, Ph.D. in political theory and international relations from Johns Hopkins University, now works in the department of political science at University of Regina, “ The politics of speed: Capitalism, the state and war in an accelerating world” [dissertation] pg. 93-94)

The goal then is thus to politicize the military, to politicize war, to challenge the military from a political standpoint, and return it to civilian control. However, there is an obstacle to this endeavour, since, as we've learned, there is a fundamental disjunct between politics and dromocratic war. This is because politics is rooted in what Virilio term "the last commodity: duration. Democracy, consultation, the basis of politics, requires time. Duration is the proper of man; he is inscribed within it"189 Dromocratic war instead employs what Virilio terms "Trans-politics" which "marks the end of a concept of politics based on dialogue, dialectic, time, reflection."190 The problem then, is one of pace. Having taken advantage, or rather being the result, of the technological acceleration of the dromocratic revolution, the globalitarian state moves too fast to be challenged by traditional politics ("There will be no time"). Popular political resistance then must take aim at the dromocratic revolution; at the technological acceleration which provides the foundation of the globalitarian state. Virilio says in multiple instances that this shouldn't be confused with a simple luddsism, an attempt to do away with technology tout cours. "I'm not saying that we should revert to ancient democracy, stop the clock and all that."191 Rather what he advocates is that "We must politicize speed."192 And though he states that he does not want a regressive rejection of technology, to politicize technology and speed is, for Virilio, to slow it down, to make it subject to debate, discussion and deliberation. Thus, he goes on to say. ...that there's work to be done, the epistemo-technical work we were talking about before, in order to re-establish politics, at a time when technology no longer portions out matter and geographical space as was the case in ancient democratic society but when technology portions out time - and I would say: the depletion of time193 Virilio thus says that we must invert the material hierarchy that we find ourselves in; that we must develop an environment where technology is subject to the mandates of politics, not politics subject to the mandates of technology.194 In short, Virilio argues that we must deploy slowness against speed. Popular resistance must (mimicking the old forms of war that have now been abandoned) form a brake on technology. This must happen theoretically and culturally, partly through philosophical work such as Virilio, and more through the valorization of older forms of organization which were based on principles of slowness and territoriality (the family195, the nation state196). However, it must also happen materially, through political practice. When Virilio speaks of concrete political forms of resistance that could be put in to practice, they invariably take the form of a brake. The strike, the barricade, popular defense; political resistance, says Virilio, decelerates society.197 An appeal to slowness is the only defense against historical necessity of the vicious cycle of reinforcement between speed, war and the (Globalitarian) state.

#### Increased speed lowers accessibility, systematic policy failures

Adam, Harris, and Lewis ’04

(Barbara, Peter, Jamie, Social Sciences at Cardiff University, Time, Sustainable Transport and the Politics of Speed World Transport Policy & Practice, Volume 10, Number 2, published 2004 pg. 7-8)

With advancing age tends to come reduced physical mobility and therefore an increased reliance on both public and private transport for short distance journeys. However, the current transport system is underpinned by high-speed principles, and is therefore biased to best serve those who require high-speed transport over longer distances. Timetables and schedules that enforce this pace are predominantly geared towards the temporal needs of the middle-aged (i.e. 18–65 age group) who largely work the five-day week. This pace can alienate those who, for whatever reason, live and operate at a slower pace, be it as a result of lifestyle, age, illness or immobility. Thus, those on the margins of these groups, such as the elderly, sick or disabled, who live at a different pace from those who work in gainful employment tend to be poorly served by current transport policy. This temporal inequity within transport has yet to be fully acknowledged in policy. While these societal groups are not completely isolated or marginalised by our transport network, it is their specific temporal needs, implicit in their way of life, which, if considered, might provide a more equitable service. There are other inequities that can be seen as a direct result of the valorisation of high-speed. Increased velocity in transport requires more time to build up and longer to slow down. Thus, for example, for high-speed rail, stopping and starting becomes inefficient, meaning that high-speed rail routes have fewer stops than services operating at a slower pace. Likewise, motorways have fewer junctions than the smaller roads that carry the slower local traffic. To further maximise time-savings, high-speed infrastructure is tied to the shortest and most direct/straight path between two points. This means communities who are distant from high-speed corridors as well as those who are not close to stopping points along these corridors are at a disadvantage when using public services for both long and short journeys. People who do not want to embrace high-speed transport, such as those car-users who do not want to drive on motorways, are also disadvantaged by this system that prioritises high speed. Again this is another way in which the valorisation of high speed has caused a temporal blind spot in current mainstream transport policy, where users who do not fit into the standardised temporal regime are being disadvantaged.

#### **Speed causes conflict of pace, shift away from speed opens up the space**

Adam, Harris, and Lewis ’04

(Barbara, Peter, Jamie, Social Sciences at Cardiff University, Time, Sustainable Transport and the Politics of Speed World Transport Policy & Practice, Volume 10, Number 2, published 2004 pg. 8)

The valorisation and priority given to speed within transport also has a fundamental impact with regard to safety. Any increase in speed, particularly in residential and urban areas will increase the number of serious and fatal accidents as a result of the collision of out-of-sync speeds of different mobility groups within a selected environment. Regardless of the technology, increases in speed require increases in distances to slow down and stop. This general principle applies to bikes, cars, trains and all other modes of transport. Thus it is not just speed per se but the discrepancy of speeds between modes of mobility that poses a problem. When placed in the same environment the higher speeds of cars can create a ‘conflict of pace’ with the slower tempo of children, other pedestrians and cyclists. Hillman (1993, 9) discovered that four times as many children were driven to school in 1990 as compared to 1971, which he linked with the increase of a perceived danger of walking or cycling in areas with a high level of fast moving traffic. This change in children’s mobility patterns, he argued, has both a negative impact on child health levels and develops a positive attitude of car-culture amongst the very young – the next generation of transport users.

## IMPACTS

#### The need for speed self-perpetuates with vehicles, inevitably isolating the human and creating a new machine of war, absolutely linked to surveillance

Virilio ’98

(Paul Virilio, renowned urbanist, political theorist and critic of the art of technology, Dromoscopy, or the Ecstasy of Enormities, published in 1998 pg. 2)

In fact, the dromoscopic simulation hides the violent compression of driving. Its dissimulation assures and reassures the driver in his drive. If in its aero-dynamism **the vehicle** of the trip **is** only the embryo of a constantly deferred **becoming,** by improvements decreasing wind resistance the vehicle is also the figure of a generalized desertion, **a larva of speed the development** of which one will not perceive except in the emergence of a better shape **permitting still greater speed.** It is the same with the dromoscopic play provided by the staging of the motor. Each dashboard is nothing but a moment in the mise-en-scene of the windscreen. 2 The rushes of landscape are nothing but a cinematic hallucination which is the opposite of stroboscopy. In dromoscopy the fixity of the presence of objects ceases, seducing the voyeur-voyager. In the rapidity of this displacement, the voyeur-voyager finds himself in a situation which is the opposite of that of the habitué of darkened cinemas: it's the traveler who is projected. Both actor and spectator in the drama of projection, in the moment of flight the traveler plays the role of his own destination. **The** art of the **dashboard appears** therefore both **as a substitute for hunting** with its scenery and also as a substitute for dueling with its feints. **The accelerator pedal and the steering wheel function** respectively **like sword and shield**: the accelerator pedal projects the assaulting vehicle which pierces through the theatrical sets of the traversed land, while the movements of the steering wheel dodge the rays projected from the enemy horizon. In the mirror of the windshield, the windshield wipers maintain the play of transparency, that transparency just as necessary to the dromoscopic play of images as the escape in depth of the highway is to that of the automobile. Despite its pane, the opening of the cockpit is not a simple window: it's a stage where signs of the places traversed animate themselves in a play of scenery changes composed of speed changes. Restricting the visual field of the passengers, the frame [End Page 13] of the dashboard expands the acceleration of that unfurling which confirms the vehicle's speed. The dromoscopic simulation results from that double reduction: of the distance-time of the trip, and of the narrowness of the dashboard's frame. In reality**, the car driver's seat is nothing but a landscape simulator:** elsewhere, on certain supersonic flights, the direct view from the aircraft of the landings is often abandoned in favor of the electric images of **a "flight simulator**." Even if in flying school the flight simulator gives the pilot the illusion of flying, in driving school one uses a cinematographic projection to watch the sequences of the driving film unroll. The driver imagines the arrangement of dashboard meters of his future voyages. In the travel scenes of the windshield the world becomes a video game, a game of transparency and of "trans-peirce-n-cy" which drives the stage director of the mise-en-route. 3 **The ability to control blurs into the permission to move--that is to say, the license to drive.** The mastery of the dromoscopic projection assures the security of the trip--in other words, the traveler's comfort depends upon being immobile while moving. On the pain of death, the brutal truth of their status will never be revealed to the passenger. **Those who travel violently must remain "silent as a painting,"** immobilized by the straps which recall those of childhood. They can only impotently watch the exhibition of tableaux of swirling colors which rapidly succeed each other before their eyes. So long as the dromoscopic simulation continues, the comfort of the passengers is assured. However, if this stops abruptly in a crash, the voyeurs-voyagers would be immediately projected like Alice through the looking glass of the dashboard, thrown from death but above all thrown from the truth of their trajectory when the swerving of the show ceases. The spectators will become actors. It's this sudden uprising which the safety belt attempts to subdue. With the DROMOSCOPE, it's required under the gravest penalties to go through each gear. The opposite of CINEMASCOPE, the gear shifts necessitate that the agent-driver make each sequence replace one another on the screen of the windshield: from the acceleration, deceleration, until the still shot of the stop, by way of the reverse dolly shot of parallel parking. [End Page 14] This backwards motion of images in the progressive arrest of the projection is similar to that of the transmission gears. The unfolding in stages is an obligation of speed. One never jumps over the order of gears--first, second, third, fourth. The agent-driver maintains the "dromocratic" order of the dictatorship of movement. In this race-pursuit, the countryside is never exactly traversed but rather perforated, brought to light. The driver is only the verifier of this perforation where the real, it seems, folds back on itself like a glove. Going as well as coming back, the trajectory is only a tunnel where the meaning of distance's expansion reverses itself. With the scenery changes of the gear shifts, the informational content of places evolves, each state of movement of the car's engine corresponding to a state of the signification of the milieus driven through. By the dromoscopic figuration each gear appears a bit like a bureau of Time, of the trip's duration. The opening of the windshield is therefore not a window but a kind of glass door through which the passengers pass non-stop, a glass door by which the voyeurs-voyagers engulf themselves in the attraction of arrival. [End Page 15] Comparable to the vertical turnstile of a revolving door, the screen of the windshield functions a little like flaps at a tunnel's mouth, of which the horizontal axis would be the vehicle, the flaps the landscapes which successively pass by the car's exterior. In this obscene overturning, the country exposes its underside, and in turning over its landscapes, the territorial body excites the master of place to the violence of speed by inciting him to a rape of distance. But the transparent screen is also a sort of dial, a gauge which shows in its dromoscopic simulation the violence of the trip. There, where the viewers and the other dashboard indicators make known the state of the motor, the glass of the windshield indicates the status of the journey. The dromoscopic vision gives in plain language a double transparence, of the window and of the road, the evolution of the physical world and the simulated deformations of the visual field traversed. These are the precious indications of the state of places. With daily mobility's gallery of dashboards, the cultural revolution of transportation exposes itself publicly. In the screen of the car trip, the speeding-up of images is equivalent to an apparent seismic movement of which the epicenter would place itself at the blindspot of arrival. The vector of transportation is therefore nothing but an implosion, and the users of this ambulatory catastrophe are less the privileged contemplators of the route [End Page 16] and more a thwarted landing party. With the speed of pursuit, it's the objective of the trip which destroys the path. **It's the target of the projecting projectile (the automobile) which seems to provoke the ruin of distance. It's the passenger's desire to go to the end of the line as fast as possible which produces in the drawing-on of the voyage the brutal drawing and quartering of the landscape.** The irresistible attraction of the route dissolves with the fixity of objects, the time of travel, the distance-time. The cognitive distance of space certainly subsists somewhere, but it tends to become a memory, the commemoration of ancient paths of faintly recalled journeys. The other end of the countryside is closer and closer but the consistency of places has disappeared in the aesthetic of rapidity, an optical phenomena. The goal of the voyage acts like a hardener. The instrument controls permit one to seize on the vivid--the suddenness of the tree, the instantaneity of houses, the hills which successively explode the route. The excessive attraction of the arrival changes the view of the passenger like the shutter of a camera--an instantaneous luminosity. The acceleration of the camera of dromographic shooting corresponds to the progressive closing of the windshield, the will to rejoin as fast as possible the goal of the voyage restraining the field of vision of the voyeurs-voyagers, their depth of field. Today, the means of communication not only produces as yesterday the transfer from one point to another (no matter what the bridge), the means of rapid transportation also produces a fleeting figuration of flight. In simulating the transitoriness of immobile things, the means of communication shows the unbelievable reality of an end to space. The dromoscopic simulation makes believable the counter-truth of the world's contraction. The animation of dashboards deceives the voyagers with the cataclysmic movement of the end, the arrival of the end. Like a magic mirror, the windshield permits the future to be seen. In fact, the DROMOVISION (automobile media) simulated transitoriness well before the TELEVISION (audiovisual media) simulated proximity... all the way until the not-at-all-unimagineable moment when the instantaneity of omnipresence will abolish the distance of space, in the same blow making the dromovisual apparatus the perfect equivalent of the audivisual apparatus! [End Page 17] The departure of the automobile should, however, be the occasion to examine the prospects of projection. Somewhat as one enters the laboratory, we should climb on board in order to decipher an enigma, that of the incoherence of the motorized wandering, trying to guess the logic of that desertion which impels travel. If in the history of architecture the window initially appeared in places of worship before proliferating in its usual habitat, this is because the window's opening permitted one to contemplate the sky without touching it: the environs of a temple. Yet more slowly, in pictorial history this time, the frame of easel painting permitted a renewal of this critical distance which geometric perspective confirmed scientifically. Today, it seems very much that the screen of the dashboard repeats this false proximity: with its rear-view mirror, its windowed doors, its frontal windshield, the automobile forms a quadriptych where the travel lover is the target of a permanent assault which renews the perspective of painting. The illusion is the same, but henceforth it extends itself at the surface of the world and no longer only on the surface of the canvas. The drive replaces the painting's varnish: the painter (driver) brings along behind him the viewer (passenger) in the transparent wake of his driving. If yesterday [End Page 18] painting attracted the gaze of art lovers in the painted work's illusion of depth, currently the dromoscopic work attracts at the same time the driver and his passenger in the "work" of an entire country. Projected towards the light of the arrival, they occupy together the soul of a sort of translucent pit where the countrysides compose the measure of the journey. From the driver's seat, immediate proximity means little. All that counts is what holds itself at a distance. In the pursuit of the voyage the vantage controls the advance. The speed of propulsion produces its own horizon: the bigger this is, the farther the horizon. The philosophy of the windshield necessitates foresight in addition to plain sight, because the latter is tricked by advancing. It's the future which decides the present of the route. In the accelerated wandering the past is overtaken. The landmarks are essentially those of the future. The dromovisual apparatus functions therefore above all like a means of exhumation. As a means of communication it only communicates that which is to come. In the unidirectionality of the trip, that which stands still has long since disappeared in the archeology of the departure. [End Page 19] For the forward-looking driver of the trip, the driver's seat is a seat of foresight, a control tower of the future of the trajectory. On the contrary, that of the airport is for the air traffic controller the driver's seat of the airlines. Whatever be the apparent movement of the countryside in the screen of the windshield or the real movement of airplanes in the radar screen, that which counts for the controller of the trip is the anticipation, the advance knowledge. The technique of vectors henceforth replacing the tactics of bodies, this vision of a world lost as soon as it's perceived identifies itself well enough with a conqueror's vision, to the point that the control of the dashboard could appear a bit like a misunderstood form of war game. Let's remember: in the dialectic of war, that which unveils itself undoes itself; the visible is lost because it escapes the prescience which is the rule of the game of strategy. Likewise in the automobile's path the foresight of the movement of the adversary horizon is for the driver the twin of that movement of the adversary for the army commander. A sophisticated form of kriegspiel, the dromoscopy would be in some form a video game of speed, a blitzkriegspeil in which the military staff's exercises would ceaselessly perfect themselves, each rapid vehicle would be in sum a vector of command, a "command car." It is, moreover, instructive to consider the historical [End Page 20] evolution of diverse "cockpits": if yesterday one still drove in the open air, in contact with the atmosphere while hearing the noise of the motor and the wind, feeling the machine vibrate, one can notice that **the excess of speed has contributed to progressively enclosing the driver**, first behind the screen of goggles, then behind the windshield, and finally in the interior driver's seat. **The driving "by instinct" of the pioneers has given way to the "driving by instruments," then to the "auto-pilot,"** while **awaiting the likely integral automation of automobility....** In fact**, the driver's seat of machines offers a political image of the future. The instrument panel exposes** to he who wants to observe it **the foreseeable evolution of power**. A veritable crystal ball, these screens and dials illuminate by their dim glow forthcoming political paths. The new **"machine of war" brings with it the** last **"machine of surveillance." The two together become one**. There is no more, as in the past, **a dichotomy between the function of the weapon and that of the eye. The assault vehicle carries a scope machine, and the destruction of the looking illustrates that of living**. Unfortunately, the dromoscopic accidents are less spectacular, it appears, in their immediate consequences than the telescopic accidents, not one wreck subsists and "visibly" nothing concerns itself with the security of looking. Nonetheless, in confronting this vertigo which attacks the passenger when he plunges in the depth of the countryside, we should question ourselves. This ecstasy of enormities which follows such vertigo and overtakes certain abatements of acceleration is formidable. The size of the world, its extension, is suddenly penetrated by the will to power of the driver: it's the assault which brings to light the regions of the journey. The territory no longer exists but by the violence of the advance. It's the advance which in the end provokes the dawning of places. The voyeur-voyager no longer has need like his sedentary brother to hold himself behind the keyhole of a center of panoptic convergence. His course is no more than a long look where the site and the sight etymologically intermix.

#### **Speed merges life, science and war, causing consequences like Hiroshima**

Virilio ’98

(Paul Virilio, The Information Bomb, 1998, cultural theorist and urbanist pg.28-31)

After Dolly, the predestined sheep, will there soon be human clones? And why not, indeed, since it will be possible before the end of the twentieth century to produce them? Even now, hundreds of men and women are requesting exact copies of themselves or duplicates of one of their dear departed from the famous Dr Wilinut. We might say that, for a section of today’s public, human cloning is becoming as simple an operation as having one’s portrait taken by a photographer in the nineteenth century. Or, since 1895, buying a ticket to see the Lumiere brothers’ baby guzzling its food up on a screen} As the century of unbounded curiosity; covetous looking and the de—regulation of the gaze, the twentieth has not been the century of the ‘image’, as is often claimed, but of optics — and, in particular, of the optical illusion. Since pre-1914 days, the imperatives of propaganda (of advertising) and, subsequently during the long period of Cold War and nuclear deterrence, security and intelligence needs have gradually drawn us into an intolerable situation in which industrial optics have run wildly out of control. This has produced the new opto-electronic arsenal, which ranges from remote medical detection devices, probing our ‘hearts and loins’ in real time, to global remote surveillance (from the street-corner camera to the whole panoply of orbital satellites), with the promised emergence of the cyber—circus still to come. ‘The cinema involves putting the eye into uniform,’ claimed Kafka} What are we to say then, of this dictatorship exerted for more than half a century by optical hardware which has become omniscient and omnipresent and which, like any totalitarian regime, encourages us to forget we are individuated beings? lf, in terms of current laws, which are supposed to protect individual liberties, we are in fact the owners of our bodies — and also if the images of those bodies - our prolific audiovisual environment has long since induced us to cease having any concern for those multiple appearances of our- selves which unknown general staffs — of the military and the police, but also the medical, financial, political, industrial and advertising establishments — steal, misappropriate, explore and manipulate without our knowing it, engaged as they are in secretly fighting over our optical clones, our modern mortal remains; to turn them, in the short term, into unconscious actors in their virtual worlds, their nomadic games. Science-fiction, socio—fiction, political fiction . . . role- playing games, parallel strategies, the divergent and scattered elements of a future cyberspace in which, naturally ‘there is no need to move about in a body like the one you possess in physical reality . . . Your conditioned notion of a unique and immutable body will give way to a far more liberated notion of "body" us something quite disposable .... ’ After the disclosure in March 1996 of the ‘mad cow’ affair, followed closely by transgenic foodstuffs and animal cloning, the huge marketing operation launched by the ‘food power’ multinationals is likely then, to find an audience which, if not informed, is already half-converted. The public will be ready finally to accept that, in the years of global crisis which apparently lie before us, and in a physical world entirely doomed to a joyful Lust um Untergang, the evolution of the human species may depend more and more blindly on the expeditious procedures of animal experimentation. This had long seemed to be presaged in the practice of vivisection, the dissection of living creatures, or rather, as Antonin Artaud put it, creatures condemned to die alive. An old Japanese friend recently confided to me: ‘l can’t forgive the Americans for the fact that Hiroshima wasn’t an act of war, but an experiment.' The fear today must be that, after the end of East—West nuclear deterrence and the resounding failure of the social experimentation of the early part of the twentieth century the global economic warfare which has descended on our planet may in turn become experimental and, most significantly bio-experimental. Dolly is not, then, an innovation, or even an event. She is a clone in the full sense of the term, a slip or cutting (klon) in the strict sense. Before having a fixture, she has, as the saying goes, ‘a past’. It is this which should worry us, this fraught past of our not so much industrial as military-industrial society; in which scientific futurology and crime - all crime - have been closely associated and have progressed together, carrying each other for- ward. "There are perhaps just wars, but there are no innocent armies’, or so the saying goes. From now on, it is the same with science as it is with war: there is no longer any really innocent science. If we have long claimed that there existed somewhere a `tribunal of history’, it was doubtless because our history was rather disreputable. We are currently creating a kind of experimental judicial system on an international scale which has been given the task of reassuring us, by managing, alter a fashion, in public relations terms the ravages and excesses of an experimental science which has itself fallen into rather ill repute, and of restoring a semblance of conscience to an applied science which has begun to carry on like an economic ‘bad boy’ . . .

#### The annihilation of territory by technologies of speed is totalitarian

Luke and O’Tuathail, ’98

(Timothy Luke, Political Science@ Virginia Polytechnic Institute, Gearoid O’Tuthail, Geograpy @ State University; Thinking Geopolitical Space: The Spatiality of War, Speed and Vision in the work of Paulo Virilio)

Politics is less in physical space than in the time systems administered by various technologies, from telecommunications to airplanes, passing by the TGV, etc. There is a movement from geo- to chrono-politics: the distribution of territory becomes the distribution of time. The distribution of territory is outmoded, minimal (1983, 115). At other points, he reads this tendency as the discrediting of "geopolitical extensivity in favor of a transpolitical intensivity of exchange and communication" which has declinist implications for states as territorial entities (1991, 92, emphasis his). The "war of real time has clearly supplanted the war in real space of geographical territories that long ago conditioned the history of nations and peoples" (1994, 206). "Territory has lost its significance in favor of the projectile. In fact, the strategic value of the non-place of speed has definitely supplanted that of place, and the question of possession of Time has revived that of territorial appropriation" (1986, 133, emphasis his). Places disappear in a world delimited by the "vehicular extermination" of the global nuclear war qua deterrence machines (1986, 134). These polemical claims by Virilio are certainly overstated, but they should not be underestimated. Virilio's opposition of geopolitics to chronopolitics is a crude and misleading one inasmuch as questions of technology, transportation and speed have always been central to geopolitical theorizing. The pivot in Halford Mackinder's famous 1904 "geographical pivot of history" paper is the relationship between physical geography and transportation technology or what he called "mobilities of power" (Mackinder, 1904). The dominant mobility of power of Mackinder's pre-Columbian epoch was the horse and camel, the dominant drama the horseback Asiatic invasions of Europe and the ascendant region the landpower of the Asian steppes. In the Columbian epoch, the dominant mobilities of power lay with the most advanced seapower states who were able to construct vast overseas empires for themselves. In the post-Columbian epoch Mackinder envisioned beginning with the disappearance of the last open spaces for colonial conquest, land-based mobilities of power, particularly railways, would supposedly be dominant. Mackinder's schema was, of course, crude, sketchy and seriously flawed but it does illustrate how technologies of movement and speed have always been important in geopolitical theorizing. Virilio's equally sweeping speculations take Mackinder's mode of reasoning a step further when he questions the displacement of place by twentieth century logistics: What seems central to me is the question of place. In some way, place is challenged. Ancient societies were built by distributing territory. Whether on a family scale, the group scale, the tribal scale or the national scale, memory was the earth; inheritance was the earth. The foundation of politics was the inscription of laws, not only on tables, but in the formation of a region, nation, or city. And I believe this is what is now challenged, contradicted by technology...Now, technology -- Gilles Deleuze said it -- is de-territorialization...Deterritorialization is the question for the end of this century (1983, 142) Just as total war inspired militarist dreams of a perfect arrangement of territory and partly though unevenly realized these dreams in its fortress and bunker landscapes, so also has pure war incited visions of new strategic order and landscapes appropriate to it. The space-time of pure war is a strategic order where "the violence of speed has become both the location and the law, the world's destiny and its destination" (1986, 151). As the name for terracentric orders of strategic knowledge, geopolitics has not disappeared but it is no longer at the heart of the war machine. As the name for the space-time problematic of war more generally, geopolitics is becoming intensively dromological. In the era of pure war, geopolitical space begins to warp under the gun of speed for we inhabit accelerating times and spaces. "We no longer populate stationariness; we populate the time spent changing place" (1983, 60). Yet, territory remains a unit of power's measure as weapons and ideologies mark their ranges in terms of distances travelled in time (1983, 116). So, we still have not yet reached his state of chrono-political nirvana, because there is still functional space somewhere, and this space still imposes a few constraints (1983, 166). The speed-body of dromological societies reconstitutes the time/space of society's enstructuration and acculturation around the conditions of permanent mobilization. Their imbrication with living beings running at metabolic speed forces humans to accept automated perception, robotic reasoning, networked community, and computerized communication as part and parcel of any effective collaboration with other and non-living beings running at technological speeds (Castells, 1996). This techno-logistical supra-nationalism is totalitarian, and essentially irresistible. To be borne by these techno-logistics, all are reborn continuously and painfully with each new generation of techno-logistical complex which now hosts almost all human life. Inhabiting chronopolitical acceleration rather than geopolitical space is not a liberation of movement but a tyranny of speed: The blindness of the speed of means of communicating destruction is not a liberation from geopolitical servitude, but the extermination of space as the field of political freedom...the more speed increases, the faster freedom decreases (1986, 142).

#### Speed destroys democratic process, nuclear war and uncontrollable weapons become inevitable

Kellner ‘08 (George F. Kellner, Professor Philosophy of Education Chair, Social Sciences and Comparative Education, UCLA 2008, Douglas, “Virilio, War, and Technology: Some Critical Reflections”)

In addition, for Virilio, the acceleration of events, technological development, and speed in the current era designates “a double movement of implosion and explosion,” so that “the new war machine combines a double disappearance: the disappearance of matter in nuclear disintegration and the disappearance of places in vehicular extermination“ (Virilio 1986: 134). The increased speed of destruction in military technology is moving toward the speed of light with laser weapons and computer-controlled weapons systems constituting a novelty in warfare in which there are no longer geo-strategic strongpoints since from any given spot we can now reach any other, producing what Virilio calls “a strategy of Brownian movement through geostrategic homogenization of the globe” (Virilio 1986: 135). Thus, “strategic spatial miniaturization is now the order of the day,” with microtechnologies transforming production and communication, shrinking the planet, and preparing the way for what Virilio calls “pure war,” a situation in which military technologies and an accompanying technocratic system come to control every aspect of life. In Virilio’s view, the war machine is the demiurge of technological development and an ultimate threat to humanity, producing “a state of emergency” in which nuclear holocaust threatens the very survival of the human species. This involves a shift from a “geo-politics” to a “chrono-politics,” from a politics of space to a politics of time, in which whoever controls the means of instant information, communication, and destruction is a dominant socio-political force. For Virilio, every technological system contains its specific for of accident and a nuclear accident would, of course, be catastrophic. Hence, in the contemporary nuclear era, in which weapons of mass destruction could create an instant world holocaust, we are thrust into a permanent state of emergency that enables the nuclear state to impose its imperatives on ever more domains of political and social life. Politics too succumbs to the logic of speed and potential holocaust as increased speed in military violence, instantaneous information and communication, and the flow of events diminishes the time and space of deliberation, discussion, and the building of consensus that is the work of politics. Speed and war thus undermine politics, with technology replacing democratic participation and the complexity and rapidity of historical events rendering human understanding and control ever more problematical. Ubiquitous and instantaneous media communication in turn makes spin-control and media manipulation difficult, but essential, to political governance. Moreover, the need for fast spin control and effective media politics further diminishes the space and role of democratic political participation and interaction.

#### With all technology there is a built in accident, only question is how big

Virillio ’07

(Paul Virilio, urbanist and renowned philosopher “The original accident,” trans. by Julie Rose, 2007)

'There is no science of the accident,' Aristotle cautioned a long time ago. Despite the existence of risk studies which assess risks, there is no accidentology, but only a process of fortuitous discovery, archaeotechnological invention. To invent the sailing ship or steamer is to invent the shipwreck. To invent the train is to invent the mil accident of derailment. To invent the farnily automobile is to produce the pile-up on the highway. To get what is heavier than air to take off in the form of an aeroplane or dirigible is to invent the crash, the air disaster. As for the space shuttle, Challenger, its blowing up in flight in the same year that the tragedy of Chernobyl occurred is the original accident of a new motor, the equivalent of the first shipwreck of the very first ship. An indirect invention of the breakdown of computer (or other) systems, look at the econornic upheaval in the financial markets when suddenly, with the stockmarket crash, the hidden face of the econornic sciences and technologies of d b automate dealing in values rears up, like the iceberg before the Titanic, only on Wall Street, in Tokyo and in Lon:ion And so, if, for Aristotle some little time ago and for us today, the accident reveals the substance, this is in fact because WHAT CROPS UP (accidens) is a sort of analysis, a technoanalysis of WHAT IS BENEATH (substare) any knowledge. It follows that fighting against the darnage done by Progress above all rneans uncovering the hidden truth of our successes in this accidental revelation - in no way apocalyptic - of the incriminated substances. Whence the urgent need, at the threshold of the third millennium, for public recognition of this type of innovation that comes and feeds off every technology, as the twentieth centurv never ceased stunningly demonstrating. On this score, too, political ecology cannot long go on sweeping under the carpet the eschatological dimension of the cal annties caused by the positivist ideology of Progress. So the dromologue, or, if you like, the analyst ot the phenomena of acceleration, is consistent in thinking that if speed is responsible for the exponential development of the artificial accidents of the twentieth century, it is also every bit as responsible for the increased impact of ecological accidents (the sundry instances of pollution of the environment) as, let's say, the eschatological calmnities that are loorning with the very recent discoveries of crenomics and biotechnologies. 1 Once upon a time the local accident was still precisely situatedas in the North Atlantic tor the Titanic. But the global accident no longer is and its fallout now extends to whole continents, anticipating the integral accident that is in danger of becorning, tomorrow or the day after, our sole habitat, the havoc wreaked by Progress then extending not only to the whole of geophysical space, but especially to. timespans of several centuries, to say nothing of the dimensions of a 'cellular Hiroshima'. Actually if the substance is absolute and essential (to science) and if the, accident is relative and contingent, we can now identify the 'substance' at the beginning of specific fields of knowledge and the 'accident' at the end of the philosophical intuition that Aristotle and a few others pioneered . Far from urging some 'millenarian catastrophism', there is no question here of making a tragedy out of an accident with the aim of scaring the hordes as the mass media so often do but only of finally taking accidents seriously.

## PERM/AFF INDICTS

**Perm Do the [plan] and slow down**

#### Virilio advocates senseless technophobia, doesn’t take into account how tech affects the world, critique fails on its own

**Kellner ‘99** (Ph.D., Philosophy, Columbia University, Illuminations, 1999, “Virilio, War, and Technology: Some Critical Reflections”)

Virilio misses a key component of the drama of technology in the present age and that is the titanic struggle between national and international governments and corporations to control the structure, flows, and content of the new technologies in contrast to the struggle of individuals and social groups to use the new technologies for their own purposes and projects. This optic posits technology as a contested terrain, as a field of struggle between competing social groups and individuals trying to use the new technologies for their own projects. Despite his humanism, there is little agency or politics in Virilio's conceptual universe and he does not delineate the struggles between various social groups for the control of the new technologies and the new politics that they will produce. Simply by damning, demonizing and condemning new technologies, Virilio substitutes moralistic critique for social analysis and political action, reducing his analysis to a lament and jeremiad rather than an ethical and political critique Œ la Ellul and his tradition of Catholic critique of contemporary civilization, or critical social theory. Virilio has no theory of justice, no politics to counter, reconstruct, reappropriate, or transform technology, no counterforces that can oppose technology. Thus, the increasing shrillness of his lament, the rising hysteria, and sense of futile impotence. While Virilio's take on technology is excessively negative and technophobic, his work is still of importance in understanding the great transformation currently underway. Clearly, speed and the instantaneity and simultaneity of information are more important to the new economy and military than ever before, so Virilio's reflections on speed, technology, politics, and culture are extremely relevant. Yet he seems so far to have inadequately conceptualized the enormous changes wrought by an infotainment society and the advent of a new kind of multimedia information-entertainment technology. If my hunch is correct, his view of technology and speed is integrally structured by his intense focus on war and the military, while his entire mode of thought is a form of military-technological determinism which forces him not only to overlook the important role of capital, but also the complex ambiguities, the mixture of positive and negative features, of the new technologies now proliferating and changing every aspect of society and culture in the present era. Virilio thus emerges as a highly useful theorist of the post-World War Two and Cold War era of the military with the domination of military technology and military capitalism, but he never analyses the complicity of capitalism and those economic forces that deploy technology for power and profit, instead putting all blame for contemporary problems on technology and its deployment by the military and perhaps the state. But against Virilio, it should be recognized that new technologies are part of the capitalist project, that capital recognizes, along with Marx, that surplus value is gained by productive deployment of new technologies, and that technology provides powerful weapons of profit and social control. By eschewing critical social theory, Virilio does not have the resources to theorize the complex relations between capital, technology, the state, and military in the present age, substituting a highly elusive and evocative method for systematic theoretical analysis and critique. Virilio himself acknowledges his elusive and suggestive approach to writing, noting: "I don't believe in explanations. I believe in suggestions, in the obvious quality of the implicit. Being an urbanist and architect, I am too used to constructing clear systems, machines that work well. I don't believe it's writing's job to do the same thing. I don't like two-and-two-is-four-type writing. That's why, finally, I respect Foucault more than I like him" (Virilio and Lotringer 1983: 38-39). Indeed, Virilio's style is extremely telescopic, leaping from topic to topic with alacrity, juxtaposing defuse elements and themes, proliferating images, quotes, and ideas which rapidly follow each other, often overwhelming the reader and making it difficult to grasp the thrust of Virilio's argument.

#### Virilio is crazy, uses sexist language to talk about development of war machine

Wilbur ‘98

(Shawn Wilbur, Professor at Vancouver Island University, “Dromologies: Paul Virilio: Speed, Cinema, and the End of the Political State,” http://records.viu.ca/~soules/media301/dromologies.htm)

Virilio explains portions of his dromological narrative in terms of the development of "vehicles," although he uses this term in rather novel ways. At various times, Virilio speculates on the "first vehicle," which he most often identifies with "woman." Both in sexual intercourse, when "mounted" by man, or in the relation of support characteristic, he believes, of the human heterosexual couple, the woman in some sense "carries" the man. The couple constitues the simplest "war machine." Of course, since every mode of carriage brings along its own accident, we should note here then "little death" of orgasm as the fatal accident of this particular vehicular relationship. Beyond this are more conventional forms of vehicles, beginning with the riding animal and beast of burden and extending through various wheeled, tracked and winged forms, then becoming strange again as various telecommunications forms begin to "carry" us afar in a variety of ways. That many of these earlier forms of communication techniques were in fact vehicular technologies only becomes more obvious in an era where we take certain forms of tele-presence for granted. The obvious differences in these modes of transportation point to essential changes in the world, as it is organized by vectors of time-space-speed. We can fairly easily trace the "conquest of space" that involves an acceleration form the nearly static travelling of sexual intercourse to the escape velocity of spacecraft. It is harder to comprehend the subsequent "conquest of time" which telepresence, "live" satellite braodcast, and other "technologies of ubiquity" have nearly accomplished. When the time of transportation or transmission is relative, depending not on distance but on where you want to go, distant points become both nearer and sooner than those closer in strictly spatial terms. Virilio argues that what we are left with is finally only speed, the ability to manipulate the space-time matrix. This certainly seems to be the case in the virtual spaces of the internet, where speed of transmission--and the consequent ability to process greater "bandwidth"--has become the guiding criteria for nearly all hardware and software development decisions.

#### Turn: Superstition and mindless magic supplant science when anti-tech mumbo jumbo is brought in

Raman 09

(Varadaraja Raman, Bachelor's and Master's degrees in Physics and Mathematics from the University of Calcutta before doing his doctoral work on the foundations of quantum mechanics at the University of Paris Global Spiral, Jan 23, 2009)

Next there are philosophical reasons for the anti-science movements, formulated by thinkers who bring their full logical prowess to show that a framework based on logic alone is untenable. They explore the flaws in the foundations of scientific thinking, and question science's claim to hold monopoly for a correct interpretation of the natural world. These are interesting perspectives in the academic arena, but when they spill over to the general public and uproot the public's respect for science, they can cause serious damage to the framework of reason and rationality in which science operates in its interpretation of the world. When reason and rationality are devalued or are equated with unreason in our pursuit to explain the world, superstition and mindless magic can take over with serious adverse impacts on society. Societies which are persuaded that rationality can be dispensed with can do immense harm to their peoples. In this sense philosophical anti-science is perhaps the most dangerous of all.