NATO CP – Aff Answers

[NATO CP – Aff Answers 1](#_Toc266998758)

[2AC – Permutations 2](#_Toc266998759)

[Consult CP’s Bad 3](#_Toc266998760)

[Pic’s Bad 4](#_Toc266998761)

[No Solvency – Generic 1/3 5](#_Toc266998762)

[No Solvency – Generic 2/3 6](#_Toc266998763)

[No Solvency – Generic 3/3 7](#_Toc266998764)

[No Solvency – NATO Says No 8](#_Toc266998765)

[No Impact – Alliance Resilient 1/2 9](#_Toc266998766)

[No Impact – Alliance Resilient 2/2 10](#_Toc266998767)

[Consultation Hurts US Leadership 11](#_Toc266998768)

[Consultation = Normal Means 1/2 12](#_Toc266998769)

[Consultation = Normal Means 2/2 13](#_Toc266998770)

[NATO Saps US Troops 14](#_Toc266998771)

[EU Solves Security Risks 15](#_Toc266998772)

[NATO Can’t Solve Terrorism 16](#_Toc266998773)

2AC – Permutations

**Good for a few reasons-**

1. **Key to test competition- no other way for the affirmative to test the links.**
2. **No ground loss- they should be prepared to answer a perm.**
3. **Key to education- forces the negative to answer multiple worlds increases critical thinking.**

Perm do the cp and do plan anyway

Acknowledging NATO’s opinion while pursuing some policies without compromise can still facilitate an effective alliance

Moravcsik, 3 (Andrew, Harvard Government Professor, “Striking a New Transatlantic Bargain,” Foreign Affairs, July/August, http://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/bargain.pdf)

<The pessimists are right to note that the Iraq crisis highlighted the need for a new set of arrangements, structures that can deal with global issues but are appropriate to a world in which the United States and Europe possess different means, perceive different threats, and prefer different procedures. For their part, however, the optimists are right to argue that such crises are still manageable and that Western governments have a strong incentive to manage them. Wiser leadership on both sides, backed by solid institutional cooperation, could have avoided the transatlantic breakdown in the first place. To prevent future ruptures, both sides must recognize that they benefit from the active participation of the other in most ventures. Only a frank recognition of complementary national interests and mutual dependence will elicit moderation, self-restraint, and a durable willingness to compromise. To this end, the allies could follow one of three paths. They can simply agree to disagree about certain issues, cordoning off areas of dispute from areas of consensus; they can begin to part ways militarily, with Europe developing its own, more autonomous force projection capabilities; or they can negotiate a new bargain, in which American military power and European civilian power are deployed together at targets of mutual concern. The first option is the simplest and least costly solution, but the last promises the greatest returns. decent diplomacy The easiest way to overcome the recent troubles would be for the United States and Europe to manage controversial high-stakes issues delicately while continuing to work together on other subjects that matter to both sides. This is how the Western alliance has functioned for most of its history—protecting core cooperation in European and nonmilitary matters, while disagreeing about “out of area” intervention and, sometimes, nuclear strategy. Today this lowest-common-denominator policy should still unite nearly all Western leaders.>

Consult CP’s Bad

Bad for a few reasons-

1. Plan plus- Steals literally the entirety of the affirmative plan- forces us to debate against ourselves.
2. Topic education- forces generic debates about NATO trades off with in depth topic specific education.
3. No offense- we can only impact turn- not sufficient 2ac ground.

Pic’s Bad

1. Counterinterp: All PICs must have solvency advocates and be

nontopical  
a. Key to Fairness:  
Eliminate 9 minutes of aff offense against the squo--entire 1AC  
should be a reason to vote aff  
AND  
Drive affs to defend minute changes, shifting debates from the  
lit, gutting topic specific education and neg strat options  
AND  
Create incentive to find most minute exclusion and net benefit  
AND  
Lack advocates, guts aff ability to generate specific offense  
AND  
Can run net benefits as disads, checking their offense  
AND  
b. Key to Education  
shift debates from rich, topic-centered lit to narrow, contrived  
net benefit literature  
AND  
don’t reflect the real world because the PIC would be a friendly  
amendment

No Solvency – Generic 1/3

**No solvency, NATO can only engage in non-binding consultations**

David Yost, Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, NATO’s evolving purposes and the next strategic concept, 2010, http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/123318689/PDFSTART,%206/29/10?CRETRY=1&SRETRY=0

**Since the end of the Cold War the allies have given NATO three additional functions: opposing the proliferation of WMD; supporting EU-led crisis management operations; and serving as a general ‘toolbox’ for ad hoc security operations**.The North Atlantic Council first referred to WMD proliferation as one of the ‘new security risks and challenges of a global nature’ facing the alliance in 1990.The Allies referred to WMD proliferation as a risk for ‘Alliance security interests’in the 1991 Strategic Concept, and pointed out in the 1999 Strategic Concept that it ‘can pose a direct military threat to the Allies’ populations, territory, and forces’. In the same document the Allies stated that ‘**The Alliance will enhance its political efforts to reduce dangers arising from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.’** The Allies added that, ‘By deterring the use of NBC [nuclear, biological and chemical] weapons’, **NATO’s forces ‘contribute to Alliance efforts aimed at preventing the proliferation of these weapons and their delivery means’**. The main institutional consequences have been the alliance’s WMD Centre and the committees at NATO Headquarters that deal with WMD proliferation. Despite the political and strategic importance that the allies accord to addressing WMD proliferation, they have not attempted to coordinate their positions on nuclear non-proliferation matters either in the UN or in the review conferences of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). As Roberto Zadra, the deputy head of NATO’s WMD Centre, wrote in 2007: **The Allies have agreed to limit themselves to the monitoring of developments, to informal information exchanges, and to non-binding consultations** … NATO’s role in terms of non-proliferation efforts, i.e. political and diplomatic efforts, remains relatively small. Declarations from NATO Summits and Communiqués from Foreign and Defense Ministers’ meetings usually emphasize the Alliance’s support for the NPT and its goals, but there is little measurable follow-up in terms of concrete action. These Communiqués are nonetheless important as they demonstrate the Alliance’s overall commitment to the principles and objectives of the NPT.

NATO fails – no replacement for Dutch and Canadian troops ensures failure

Maclean, 2007, Paul Wells, Canadian Journalist, B.A. Political Science at University of Western Ontario, “NATO is getting jittery,” Nexis

Like Canada's own Armed Forces, the Dutch have discovered in the sands of Afghanistan a measure of the warlike spirit they thought they had left behind. Or at least, their soldiers have. It's not at all clear that the populations of Canada or the Netherlands share that taste for the nastier elements of the soldier's work. Which leads us to the other topic of preoccupation among NATO planners: that the two most plucky middle powers in ISAF, the International Security Assistance Force, are preparing to rotate out of their posts in the south of Afghanistan. And that no other country will be willing or able to take our soldiers' place. The United States and Great Britain have substantially larger troop deployments in Afghanistan, but their commitment to the mission seems unlikely to flag any time soon. Of the 41,000 ISAF troops throughout Afghanistan, about 14,750 are American, 6,500 British, 2,500 Canadian and 1,300 Dutch. Only Germany, Italy, Poland and Turkey have also fielded national contingents of more than 1,000 soldiers. All of which puts on Canada and the Netherlands a particularly heavy burden. Persuading the two countries to stay in the south of Afghanistan--or finding replacements in the event either country decides to scale back its commitment--"will be the big issue for 2008, absolutely," a senior NATO official told Maclean's. A diplomat from a smaller NATO member nation went further. "I frankly fear a negative domino effect. I fear the Dutch will want to leave. And then the Canadians will follow. And after that? We don't have a debate in my country yet, 'Why Afghanistan?', but who knows? This has become a test of cohesion."

No Solvency – Generic 2/3

NATO irrelevant—alliances solve.

Menon, Professor of International Relations at Lehigh University and a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations,2003

Rajan, The End of Alliances, WORLD POLICY JOURNAL, SUMMER

The current European members of NATO will form alliances (bilateral and multilateral) or tacit alignments to protect themselves, and the Atlantic alliance could form the basis for a purely European defense community.**Europe unquestionably has the economic wherewithal to safeguard its security; what it lacks is the will. NATO’s creeping irrelevance may actually supply this vital ingredient, stimulate European solutions, and end the strategic infantilization created by a half-century of dependence on the U**nited **S**tates. There is, of course, no reason why the United States could not—through diplomacy as well as economic assistance, arms sales, and military training—bolster the ability of Europe’s weakest states to defend themselves and to participate as effective members in Europe’s security arrangements. **The enlargement of the** **E**uropean **U**nion **and the consolidation of democracy in the EU’s current and prospective members** from East-Central Europe, the Baltic states, and the Balkans **should**, in any event, **create a setting in which war and insecurity recede so that the United States needs no longer be the sine qua non for peace in Europe**.

Competing interests and threat construction among members weakens NATO.

Richard Rupp, Department of History and Political Science

Purdue University Calumet, NATO after 9/11: An Alliance in Decline, March 2006,

http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p\_mla\_apa\_research\_citation/0/9/9/2/4/p99241\_index.html

Despite these accomplishments, NATO is proving to be of increasingly

limited value to its members and has adopted structural changes that will

exacerbate the organization’s ability to function effectively in the future. This

conclusion is based upon analysis of three primary factors: first, the competing

national interests, identities, and threat perceptions among NATO members;

second, the competing alliance structures that have evolved within NATO; and

finally, the military capabilities gap (MCG).

The coalition of the willing structure of NATO undermines effectiveness.

Richard Rupp, Department of History and Political Science

Purdue University Calumet, NATO after 9/11: An Alliance in Decline, March 2006,

http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p\_mla\_apa\_research\_citation/0/9/9/2/4/p99241\_index.html

One of the principle factors undermining NATO in 2006 is the presence of

competing perspectives among member-states, officials in Brussels, and NATO

supporters, as to the fundamental nature and purpose of the Alliance. NATO was

established in 1949 as a military alliance based on the tenets of collective defense.

For the next forty years, NATO’s security guarantee and identity remained unchanged and resolute. In the 1990s, NATO governments gradually altered the organization’s structure and mission, shifting the Alliance’s moorings toward collective security as NATO enlarged its membership. Sparked, in part, by the 1999campaign in Kosovo, which some observers labeled “war by committee,” NATO’s transformation continued into a third phase, commonly known or derided as the “coalition-of-the-willing.” Each alliance structure—collective defense, collective

security, and collations-of-the-willing—has strengths and weaknesses; however, the

thinking behind each is unique, and though not mutually exclusive, efforts to unite

the three into one coherent and effective alliance are not likely to succeed.

No Solvency – Generic 3/3

NATO is politically and strategically useless and will soon be replaced

Jonathan Strong, editor of the Family Security Foundation Inc., 7-30-2007, EXCLUSIVE: BEYOND NATO: A NEW ALLIANCE FOR A NEW THREAT

A new alliance may not need a formal command structure, but it would not hurt to have one to proclaim a body of collective defense for freedom and democracy to the world. It would also put other “fair weather” allies, who are less than cooperative, on notice that their voice will not be heard, or can at least be ignored, if obstruction is chosen over cooperation. Think Germany and France at the moment. Beyond this, Europe seems to be dying demographically and culturally as Islamic immigration and falling birth rates continue to change the face of Europe. The time to act is now. It is always better to act sooner than later in the face of terrorism because of its invisible nature, which does not heed national boundaries, treaties, or conventions. A new threat has resulted in the need for a new security structure. The threat of terrorists with WMDs forces us to ignore fair-weather friends and allies of convenience. We require allies who are willing to act preemptively and swiftly to confront this threat. While NATO had its place in the past and can continue to be a useful structure in Europe, it is not an adequate organization for dealing with the threat of terrorism and the states that sponsor it.

NATO is ineffective in conflict resolution and rebuilding

Simon Serfaty Senior Professor of US Foreign Policy, Old Dominion University ACT-ODU Symposium 2007 “The Euro-Atlantic Partnership at 60 NATO, the United States and the European Union In a World Restored” April 19, 2007

Prior NATO interventions suggest that Afghanistan is not an aberration: Bosnia remains far from an effectively functioning state, East Timor faces significant difficulties, Haiti remains a murk, Somalia is worse; and Kosovo is yet to be resolved. In each of these areas, NATO interventions were cause for some achievements, not the least being a halt to the killing, and there is no doubt, as shown in Darfur, that non-intervention would have had catastrophic consequences, but no intervention has succeeded to an extent comparable to earlier postwar conditions in Europe, with regard to Germany, and Asia, with regard to Japan. The point is that the need for postwar stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) inherent in dealing with failing states requires more than the military approach that NATO can provide, but also more than the civilian power that the EU can mobilize. Each involves tasks that are on a par with the other.

NATO is an irrelevant bureaucracy whose time has passed

[By Robert A. Levine](http://www.iht.com/cgi-bin/search.cgi?query=By%20Robert%20A.%20Levine&sort=swishrank) former official in the U.S. executive and legislative branches, and an economist and defense analyst, “NATO is irrelevant : A bureaucracy whose time has passed”, Saturday, May 24, 2003, International Herald Tribune,

To the evanescent need for American commitment to European security has more recently been added the U.S. need for cooperation against terrorism. But that is a common goal of NATO members, to which the organization itself contributes little. France and Germany cooperate not because of the alliance, but because they too fear and have experienced terrorism. NATO has become irrelevant, both to the Bush administration, which wants support, and to those Americans who fear unbridled U.S. strength and would like to see real power in opposition to the administration. Bureaucracies are difficult to kill and NATO is unlikely to die soon. That is just as well: Abolishing it would cause real traumas and tremors, and the organization does provide useful if minor functions in military planning and training, as well as a forum.

No Solvency – NATO Says No

**NATO won’t solve challenges it faces---won’t say yes**

Daniel Hamilton, Professor and Director of the Center for Transatlantic Relations

at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University, wanted: a new balance for NATO, 2009, http://transatlantic.sais-jhu.edu/transatlantic-topics/Articles/nato/5.6.09NATO\_SFRC\_testimony\_DH.pdf

Taken together, these reforms promise to reinforce each element of NATO’s enduring purpose,

while repositioning the Alliance within a broader, reinvigorated Atlantic partnership that is more

capable of responding to the opportunities and challenges of the new world rising. To succeed in this new world, Europeans and Americans must define their partnership in terms of common security rather than just common defense, at home and away. This will require the Alliance to stretch. Depending on the contingency at hand, NATO may be called to play the leading role, be a supporting actor, or simply join a broader ensemble. Even so, NATO alone -- no matter how resilient -- simply cannot stretch far enough to tackle the full range of challenges facing the Euro-Atlantic community. It must also be able to connect and work better with others, whether they are nations or international governmental or non-governmental organizations. And if NATO is to both stretch and connect, it will need to generate better expeditionary capabilities and change the way it does business.

**No solvency- no consensus within NATO on priorities means they will say no**

Atlantic Council, NATO’s new strategic concept must make alliance relevant, 2.24.2010, http://www.acus.org/new\_atlanticist/natos-new-strategic-concept-must-make-alliance-relevant

The easier political course is to assume the former. Unfortunately, merely assuming that the alliance is as or even more relevant to the future needs of its members will not sit well with a public that is skeptical and even cynical about the need for NATO in the light of [Afghanistan](http://www.upi.com/topic/War_in%3Cafghanistan/) and so-called out-of-area [operations](http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Analysis/2010/02/24/Outside-View-NATOs-future-backbone-is-needed/UPI-60831267016940/) against enemies that possess no armies, navies or air forces. The decision by the Netherlands to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan this summer underscores these reservations. Whether relic or relevant very much depends on whether NATO can continue as a military alliance conceived to counter a military threat that no longer exists or whether it will expand further to conform with security threats and dangers that exceed these traditional military boundaries. Given the current economic crisis that now must deal with possible financial insolvency in Greece, Spain, Portugal and perhaps Italy, defense is not the first priority of NATO's members. And, as some members fear Russia above all, NATO must reconcile often powerfully conflicting and opposite perceptions of threat that make gaining consensus very difficult. Hence, the absence of an agreed-upon threat such as the old Soviet Union greatly confounds and impedes winning consensus among each member state required for approval by the alliance as a whole.

The Alliance will say no to the US

Gabriel Kolko, is the leading historian of modern warfare, the age of unilateral war: Iraq, the united states and the end of the European coalition, 2003, http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:egp\_UK-TyTwJ:www.counterpunch.org/kolko04302003.html+%22The+furious+American+response+to+Germany,+France,+and+Belgium%E2%80%99s+refusal%22&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&client=firefox-a

The furious American response to Germany, France, and Belgium's refusal, under article 4 of the NATO treaty, to protect Turkey from an Iraqi counterattack because that would prejudge the Security Council's decision on war and peace was only a contrived reason for confronting fundamental issues that have simmered for years. The dispute was far more about symbolism than substance, and the point was made: some NATO members refused to allow the organization to serve as a rubber stamp for American policy, whatever it may be.

No Impact – Alliance Resilient 1/2

Conflicts within NATO won’t kill the alliance

Atlantic Council, nato a permanent alliance: outlook for the future, 6.16.2010, http://www.acus.org/new\_atlanticist/nato-permanent-alliance-outlook-future

Will the NATO members continue to find NATO cooperation to their advantage, even with a difficult experience in Afghanistan? Only time will tell. However, history suggests that, in spite of their differences, the United States and Europe will try to keep their act together. And today, NATO remains an important part of the script for that routine**. Dealing with the threats posed by terrorism and managing most other aspects of transatlantic relations demand more effective transatlantic cooperation in political, economic, financial, and social as well as military aspects of the relationship.** While NATO, the European allies and the European Union can all be faulted for either ineffective or insufficient contributions to the effort in Afghanistan, the United States carries part of the blame for not making Afghanistan a higher priority. There is plenty of blame to go around, and the "failures" in this effort may unite the allies as much as dividing them. For its part, **the United States does not want the Afghan problem to be "Americanized," and the formal involvement of NATO and NATO allies in helping shape an acceptable outcome helps ensure that the conflict remains internationalized. NATO's involvement, even as flawed as it may be, provides a critical link to international legitimacy for US policy objectives**. That link runs through NATO directly to the United Nations, hopefully (from the US point of view) ensuring that the broader international community will share responsibility for ensuring that Afghanistan does not return to a failed state that offers a welcoming habitat for future terrorist operations. **As far as the European allies are concerned, most if not all governments appear to recognize that the future of Afghanistan does hold the key to the level of threat likely to be posed by international terrorism in the coming years. They also recognize that bailing out of responsibility for the outcome in Afghanistan would call into question the vitality of the security links among them and to the United States. They too want the broader international community to remain committed to a positive outcome in Afghanistan, and the NATO role provides and important link to international legitimacy and assistance for the European allies as well**. The bottom line, therefore, is that **the transatlantic bargain will survive Afghanistan. The alliance has already shown its resilience during the early 21st century when decisions by the Bush administration put alliance cooperation under severe pressure.**

**NATO has always recovered from near crisis times**

James Sperling, professor of political science at the university of Akron, and Mark Webber, professor of international politics at Loughborough University, NATO: from Kosovo to Kabul, 2009, http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/122368466/PDFSTART?CRETRY=1&SRETRY=0

This **view of a NATO apparently perched permanently at the edge of collapse is problematic on at least three counts. First, the narrative of crisis is clouded by imprecision—at what point a crisis becomes terminal and precisely what NATO’s dissolution would look like are rarely, if ever, specified. Second, it falls foul of what might be termed the ‘Peter cried “Wolf!”’ syndrome. NATO has faced imminent collapse so often that it is difficult to take seriously the latest judgement that its days are numbered.** Third, and as the list above suggests, **NATO seems to possess an inexhaustible capacity for recovery, a characteristic NATO pessimists largely ignore. Of course, mere survival is not enough; what matters equally is how far and how well survival reflects a more thoroughgoing adaptation to new circumstances. NATO’s efforts to do just that, however imperfect or ill-judged, is the real story of the last two decades**.

No Impact – Alliance Resilient 2/2

NATO is resilient

Kwok, 5 (James, staff writer at the Harvard International Review, “Mending NATO: Sustaining the Transatlantic Relationship,” [Defining Power](http://hir.harvard.edu/symposia/65/), Vol. 27 (2) – Summer, http://hir.harvard.edu/articles/1344/)

<The greatest misperception of the transatlantic relationship is that the United States is incapable of seeing eye-to-eye on any issue with Europe. The eminent political scientist Robert Kagan has pointed out that the prevailing attitude toward the transatlantic relationship is usually described as that between “cowboys” and stiff Eurocrats. That the two peoples are diametrically opposed is completely false. Both sides of the Atlantic have the same fundamental beliefs in free markets, liberal government, and democracy. This dedication to liberalism and open societies was not only evident in the joint NATO peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia and Croatia, but also most recently in Ukraine. Then-Secretary of State Colin Powell worked closely with his opposite numbers in Brussels—NATO’s headquarters—to ensure that the elections occurring in 2004 went smoothly and according to plan. NATO, while playing no military role in the Iraq War, recently has spearheaded the Training Implementation Mission in Iraq, which seeks to create a self-sufficient Iraqi army. If argument has made the relationship tenuous, it certainly has not paralyzed NATO.>

NATO will not collapse because of inertia

Tertrais, 4 (Bruno, senior research fellow at the Foundation for Strategic Research and associate researcher the Center for International Studies and Research in France, Washington Quarterly, Spring)

Overall, there are therefore good reasons to believe that the Atlantic Alliance will survive despite internal strains. NATO still serves important functions for its members.n18 It has proven successful at adapting and undertaking new missions of peace support. Threats to Europe have not disappeared, and although a resurgent Russian threat does not appear all that credible at the moment, the alliance still serves an important function by reassuring new members. NATO also remains a vehicle of U.S. influence on the European continent, particularly on the eastern part today. There is also inertia.n19 Contrary to other multilateral alliances of the Cold War, NATO created a large civilian and military bureaucracy, and history teaches us that large institutions do not die easily. One overall explanation for this resilience is simply the fact that, despite disagreements and misunderstandings, Americans and Europeans have much more in common from a political, economic, and cultural point of view than, say, the United States and its Asian allies. Such is the reason why NATO now is and will probably remain the only U.S.-led multilateral alliance standing.

The U.S. will maintain beneficial relations with key allies even if NATO collapses

Gallagher, 3 (Michael, Assistant Secretary of Commerce, Houston Journal of International Law, Winter)

NATO’s supporters argue that ending NATO will destabilize Europe. Ending NATO, they claim, will destroy the transatlantic link between the United States and Europe, and isolate the United States from Europe. The ties of history, however, prevent this outcome. The United States has long enjoyed a “special relationship” with the United Kingdom. The United States also has strong relations with such nations as Italy, Turkey, Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway. Some claim that NATO is the foremost expression of U.S. commitment to Europe. The United States, however, aided Europe in two world wars, and stood firmly by Europe’s side during the Cold War – this commitment surpasses diplomatic formalities. The United States will not isolate itself from Europe merely because NATO disbands. Additionally, European nations do not need a formal security link to the United States. Even with NATO gone, “there is still plenty of life in, and need for, [the United States-Europe security] partnership.”

Consultation Hurts US Leadership

Consultation ties the US down – NATO hurts US flexibility essential to global stability

Cordesman 05 (Anthony, Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, NATO Review, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue1/english/main\_pr.html)

A NATO in which Europe focuses on Europe, and the United States focuses on the rest of the world with contingency-driven support from individual European states may in fact be the only way in which the West can act in most out-of-area contingencies. NATO does not create common interests and perceptions. In many cases, Alliance-wide consensus is a recipe for paralysis, and Alliance-wide force transformation of any kind will never happen at more than token levels because many – if not most – European states have no clear motive to become involved and pay the cost.   The fact that NATO is most useful as a common security forum that ensures suitable dialogue and cooperation where cooperation is seen as both necessary and affordable is still success by any rational standard. The “specialisation” of Europe and the United States also reflects the reality that two of the most important security priorities for the United States are outside of Europe: the security of Korea and stability in the Taiwan Straits. Both are military arenas where Europe can at most play a token role. Even in the Gulf and Central Asia, the United Kingdom is now the only European power with any real-world prospect of deploying and sustaining serious out-of-area deployments.>

Giving NATO a veto will undermine U.S. leadership

Kolko, 3 (Gabriel, research professor emeritus at York University in Toronto, CounterPunch, "A Geopolitical Earthquake?" [www.counterpunch.org/kolko02182003.html](http://www.counterpunch.org/kolko02182003.html), Downloaded on 2-15-2005)

NATO provided a peacekeeping force in Bosnia to enforce the agreement that ended the internecine civil war in that part of Yugoslavia, but in 1999 it ceased being a purely defensive alliance and entered the war against the Serbs on behalf of the Albanians in Kosovo. The U. S. employed about half the aircraft it assigns for a full regional war but found the entire experience very frustrating. Targets had to be approved by all 19 members, any one of which could veto American proposals. The Pentagon's after-action report of October 1999 conceded that America needed the cooperation of NATO countries, but "gaining consensus among 19 democratic nations is not easy and can only be achieved through discussion and compromise." But Wesley Clark, the American who was NATO's supreme commander, regarded the whole experience as a nightmare--both in his relations with the Pentagon and NATO's members. "[W]orking within the NATO alliance," American generals complained, "unduly constrained U.S. military forces from getting the job done quickly and effectively." A war expected to last a few days instead took 78-days. The Yugoslav war taught the Americans a grave lesson.

Consultation = Normal Means 1/2

No competition-Normal means is to consult NATO whenever a member country’s security is affected

State department, 2003, “[NATO Defense Planning Committee on Measures to Protect Turkey; Statement on agreement reached February 16](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T9649860811&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=26&resultsUrlKey=29_T9649860816&cisb=22_T9649860815&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=247474&docNo=31)”, lexis

At the Prague Summit, the NATO Allies committed themselves to take effective action to assist and support the efforts of the United Nations to ensure full and immediate compliance by Iraq, without conditions or restrictions, with UN Security Council Resolution 1441. This remains our policy. Following **Turkey's request for consultations within the framework of Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty**, as expressed in its letter of 10 February 2003, and pursuant to Article 4 of the Treaty **which states that "the Parties will consult whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened", Allies have begun consultations.** As part of these consultations, the Chairman of the Military Committee briefed the North Atlantic Council on 10 February 2003, assessing the potential threat against Turkey and informing about planning requirements for the reinforcement of Turkey's defence, including relevant timelines.

No Competition- Biden will continue consulting NATO over Afghanistan

Department of Defense, March 10 2009, “Biden Consults NATO Allies on Afghanistan”, Lexis

After nearly eight years of war, the people of Europe and the United States are tired, and many question the need to have forces fighting in Afghanistan, Biden said. "But we know that it was from the space that joins Afghanistan and Pakistan that the attacks of 9/11 occurred," he said. "We know that it was from the very same area that extremists planned virtually every major terrorist attack on Europe since 9/11, and the attack on Mumbai [India]. **We know that it was from this same area that al-Qaida and its extremist allies are regenerating and conceiving new atrocities to visit upon us."** **The alliance must stand together in the face of the threat**, which is at the heart of the strategic review that President Barack Obama has ordered. The review will be released before the NATO Summit in early April. **Biden and others are consulting with NATO and non-NATO allies on the strategy.** "I heard from our allies," the vice president said. "I heard the concerns, and they listed their priorities. And I pledged to them, as I pledge to all Europeans now, that we will build their ideas into our review." Biden pointed out the factors that are shaping strategic thinking, including setting clear and achievable goals, looking at Afghanistan and Pakistan together, and melding the military, diplomatic and economic effort in the region. "Our goal is not to stay in Afghanistan; it's to be able to leave and to leave behind Afghan forces that can provide for the security and safety of the people of Afghanistan, and the need to ensure the security and legitimacy in this year's presidential elections," he said**. Biden said there was an "incredible amount of consensus" at the council meeting. The United States will continue to** **consult with interested parties as the process continues.**

Consultation = Normal Means 2/2

No competition- binding consultation is the policy of the Obama administration

David Mckeeby, staff writer, State department publications “NATO Allies Share Vital Interest in Stabilizing Afghanistan; Tran-Atlantic advice essential to shaping new South Asia strategy”, No Date, Lexis

Biden's visit to **NATO** headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, is the latest step in the[**Obama administration**](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T9649860811&returnToId=20_T9650391389&csi=247474&A=0.9251609165073339&sourceCSI=9369&indexTerm=%23PE000A0BO%23&searchTerm=Obama%20administration&indexType=P) **'s effort to consult closely with allies and partners worldwide as the White House formulates a strategy to help Afghans take back their country from extremists, eliminate terrorist safe havens, and emerge from decades of war and poverty.**"We're here to **consult**. We're here to listen. We're here to come up with a joint strategy," Biden said. "Once that is arrived at, we, the **United States**, expect everyone to keep whatever commitments were made in arriving at that joint strategy.

No competition- Gates says consultation is normal means when dealing with Afghanistan

Baltic News Service, May 8 2010 “Gates says US could take over southern Afghanistan mission”

US Defense [**Secretary Robert Gates**](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T9650461182&returnToId=20_T9650675709&csi=172030&A=0.34959304326470275&sourceCSI=9369&indexTerm=%23PE0009XOK%23&searchTerm=Secretary%20Robert%20Gates%20&indexType=P)  **said on Friday the** **United States could consider taking over NATO's command in southern Afghanistan,** where some NATO allies have been reluctant to provide combat forces, Reuters reported. But Gates said the Pentagon would **consult** closely with **NATO** allies, particularly those countries with combat forces in the southern region, before making any decision to alter its **military** role in the country.

NATO Saps US Troops

NATO does nothing but bog down valuable US troops for useless missions.

Rajan Menon, Professor of International Relations at Lehigh University. 2007. *The End of Alliances*. Pg. 97-98

What does NATO do for American security now that the cold war is over? The question does not have a clear answer any longer. Despite the demise of the Soviet Union, the alliance still ties down tens of thousands of American troops even though the major threats now confronting the United States lie beyond Europe. Yet missions outside the Continent will occupy most of America’s attention and power in the twenty-first cen­tury and will turn on sea power, long-range aircraft, and light forces— precisely the capabilities NATO lacks. These limitations were revealed not just in the Balkans, but also after 9/11. While America’s NATO allies invoked Article V of the alliance’s charter—and for the first time—in a display of solidarity, the reality was that this amounted to symbolism. NATO had little to offer by way of firepower in support of the American war against the Taliban regime.74 As a leading authority on Europe notes, what occurred was a “snubbing of his NATO allies’ offer to help” by President Bush, who politely told them that their services were not required.75 They did assist in less critical ways, for example, by conduct­ing naval surveillance in the Mediterranean to foil terrorist attacks on ships and ports; but even that task involved only a handful of NATO navies, given the pallid capabilities of the others.

NATO saps vital US troops.

Rajan Menon, Professor of International Relations at Lehigh University. 2007. *The End of Alliances*. Pg. 98.

The conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq have put extreme pressure on regular American forces and necessitated an increased reliance on re­serve and National Guard units, which soon accounted for one-third of the deployment in Iraq. What sense does it make to maintain large, long-term deployments of armored units in Europe, when there is no identifiable threat there and when European NATO is more than capa­ble of dealing with any threat that could arise?76 Persisting with the pre­vious (cold war) pattern merely perpetuates Europe’s strategic infan­tiization and misallocates U.S. resources. So long as American power can be relied on to defend them, Europeans will have no reason to de­velop the forces, to engage in the strategic thinking, or to devote the funds necessary for their own defense, particularly now that Europe has become a community of peace and that war within it is virtually unimaginable, as is war against it. In NATO’s early years, American leaders assured the public that the stationing of American troops in Europe was a temporary measure that was necessary because Europe’s means were so meager and the Soviet threat so massive. Over time, they said, Europe should and would de­velop its own military might so as to reduce its dependence on the United States.77 That time has long since arrived.

EU Solves Security Risks

The European Union will fill in to provide security

Tertrais, 4 (Bruno, senior research fellow at the Foundation for Strategic Research and associate researcher the Center for International Studies and Research in France, Washington Quarterly, Spring)

A Europe-wide security guarantee already exists. In 1947, France and the United Kingdom allied themselves against the possible resurgence of German nationalism in the Pact of Dunkirk. The following year, this arrangement was enlarged to include three other European nations (Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) and became the Brussels Treaty, which includes a commitment to use military force if one of the treaty's parties is attacked. The Brussels Treaty was modified in 1954 to include Germany and Italy and remains in force today. Article 5 of the Brussels Treaty provided the basis for the Washington Treaty's own Article 5, which is less demanding because it does not automatically commit NATO members to military assistance. Emboldened by their common perception of the Iraq war and the evolution of U.S. policy, several countries in the EU, including France and Germany, are tempted to deepen their defense cooperation independently of the United States and NATO. Although the degree to which the EU's defense policy should be independent from NATO and the United States is still a point of contention among Europeans and a touchy subject in transatlantic circles, consensus holds that, in the case of a regional crisis, the EU should not be impotent if Washington chose not to intervene. More recently, the EU made the historical decision to include a security clause in its draft constitution that amounts to a mutual security guarantee with the possibility of military assistance. The formulation agreed on by EU governments in December 2003 states: If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States. Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under NATO, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence.n20 The EU thus increasingly appears to be a real security alliance, and it may in fact be among the most solid ones imaginable, given its roots in strong economic, legal, and political integration. Thus, in the midst of the decline of other Western, permanent multinational alliances, the EU's emerging common defense policy appears one of the most original and interesting developments in the long history of military alliances. If NATO were to decline further in importance for Europeans, the continent would not be left without a security guarantee. In fact, in spite of the wishes of all alliance members, the existence of such an EU security clause could even be a logical consistency contributing toward NATO's decreased importance in the future.

NATO Can’t Solve Terrorism

NATO is a poor mechanism for dealing with terrorism—unilateral approach solves best

Asmus, 2 (Ronald, senior fellow for European studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, NATO Review, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2002/issue1/english/debate.html#top)

<Finally, you want the Alliance to focus on the new security threats, like terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Of course NATO should do what it can against such threats, but how well suited is it to play a leading role? The fight against terrorism surely requires the sharing of intelligence and speedy decision-taking. A large multinational bureaucracy with — soon, perhaps — 25 members may not be well suited to such a struggle. The same argument applies to WMD. Is not NATO too leaky and slow-moving to manage an offensive operation that would, for example, destroy biological weapons factories? I suspect that the Pentagon would rather fight terrorism and WMD on its own, or with a small group of allies that can be trusted to keep a secret, provide skilled forces and accept US command. >